Economics of Emergencies: North Carolina, Civil Defense, and the Cold War, 1940 – 1963

DISSERTATION

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Abstract

Civil defense in the early Cold War years resulted from a perceived security threat to the American homeland. But whereas Americans remained skeptical of the ability to defend against nuclear attack, the assignment of disaster relief responsibility to civil defense provided a new avenue along which federal “defense” funds would flow. North Carolina’s civil defense history broadly mirrors the changes and evolution in the federal program but differs noticeably in how civil defense was implemented in communities more concerned with natural disasters than nuclear attack. State civil defense efforts served not just as a tool to secure federal money for infrastructure improvement, but also as a way to make North Carolina a safer place for business investment. By orienting the state’s civil defense program and policies toward planning for and responding to natural disasters, state leaders sought to minimize the damage such disasters could have on efforts to promote economic development. Federal civil defense funds essentially helped North Carolina develop an emergency management and response apparatus that reassured businessmen wanting to invest in new ventures that the state could effectively protect such investments.

Under the administration of Governor Luther H. Hodges, North Carolina embarked on a program of disaster relief which in time placed the state at the forefront of emergency preparedness. From 1953 and 1955, two severe droughts and four successive hurricanes imperiled the state’s agricultural, textile, and coastal tourism industries, inflicting well over $300 million in total damages. These disasters instigated a noticeable shift toward the use of civil defense resources to alleviate the effects of natural disasters in the state and mitigate
economic losses for current and future industry. Hodges employed civil defense resources to guide the rebuilding and future economic development of the state’s coastal areas and mitigate against future hurricane hazards. This state effort secured millions in federal disaster relief and civil defense funds to protect both economic development and coastal tourism in the eastern counties.

North Carolina’s civil defense legacy from the Cold War is best described as a catalyst. Civil defense almost never served as the outright reagent for economic or policy development in the state. Rather, civil defense resources permitted Hodges and succeeding governors to secure the funding or political support necessary to protect existing and promote future economic development in the state. The refutation of nuclear civil defense did not coincide with a rejection of emergency preparedness. Work in response to natural disasters put federal investment in equipment and training for nuclear war into peacetime use and provided federal officials with a means to promote the necessity of civil defense. With natural disaster response as a responsibility of the state civil defense agency, government at all levels mined the modern security state for federal largesse to fund the creation of a capable emergency response apparatus exemplified in today’s professional emergency management agencies.
Dedication

To the forgotten few who served North Carolina in the name of civil defense.
Acknowledgments

The roots of this dissertation reach back to 1996, when Hurricane Fran’s eye passed over my parent’s home. On the evening of 5 September, I slept blissfully through the night, unaware of the tempest outside my bedroom window. The next two weeks witnessed a massive cleanup and new experience as a disaster victim. Years later I returned to disasters as an area of research which culminates, at least for now, in this dissertation.

A document of this length is neither researched nor written without the assistance of many professionals, friends, and family. Thanks are extended to the staff of the North Carolina Archives, Outer Banks History Center, and Old State Records Center, notably Kim Anderson, David Chiswell, Dennis Daniels, Sarah Downing, Anne Miller, Larry Odzak, and Kenny Simpson. The archivists at the Southern Historical Collection and North Carolina Collection at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library at Duke University provided timely, friendly, and helpful service to which I am forever grateful. Likewise, the archivists and staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library promptly answered any research inquiry and directed me to additional sources which proved valuable. Finally, thanks are extended to the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for financial grants that enabled the completion of this dissertation and repeated archival research trips.
Several professors are owed a debt of thanks for answering research questions, editing and reviewing innumerable drafts, and bucking up my spirits with a friendly lunch or conversation over coffee. Professors Joseph Caddell, James Crisp, Craig Friend, Joseph Hobbs, Nancy Mitchell, and Carolyn Pumphrey of North Carolina State University I extend a hearty thanks. At The Ohio State University, Professors Paula Baker, James Bartholomew, Kevin Boyle, Philip Brown, John Guilmartin, Peter Mansoor, and David Stebenne have all guided and taught me through four years of doctoral work. Special thanks are given to Professors Mitchell and Stebenne, who both extended to me the opportunity to pursue this research and help bring this story to the light of day. Thank you for believing in me and taking a chance on my prospects for success.

Without friends or family, I might have just as well have pursued other ventures in life. To Mom, Dad, Joan, and Brian, thank you all for seeing me through with this research over the years . . . and your patience in listening to me drone on about civil defense, disasters, and North Carolina history. My graduate school colleagues in North Carolina and Ohio have given me tremendous input over the past few years on countless writing drafts, suggested new ideas or areas of inquiry, and shared numerous hours of conversation about my research. Thank you all and do not forget to “duck and cover” when disaster threatens!
Vita

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Introduction: Reinterpreting Civil Defense in the Cold War

The first fact that everybody needs to remember is that Civil Defense becomes operational only at [the] local level. . . .

As you know, Civil Defense is a two-fold organization – designed for national emergencies and natural disasters. Even a simple, voluntary Civil Defense organization can be invaluable in time of emergency.
– Governor Luther H. Hodges, 22 January 1955

In September 1933, a strong hurricane struck the North Carolina coast. From the afternoon of the fifteenth through the morning hours of the sixteenth, the Outer Banks Hurricane tore through the Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds with winds in excess of 92 mph. The winds pushed back the waters of the Bogue and Core Sounds and blew the waters into the Pamlico and Neuse Rivers, flooding the low-lying mainland from eight to ten feet deep at points. The salty, brackish water inundated not-yet-harvested fields of corn, cotton, and sweet potatoes and ruined countless tons of tobacco stored and drying in barns. Fishing communities built along the shorelines were smashed or washed away, leaving many people with little more than the soggy clothes on their backs. Manteo’s oldest residents rated the

1 “Defense Exhibit: North Carolina is Helpless; Civil Defense train to show what atomic warfare is like,” The State, 26 January 1952, 11.
hurricane the most severe storm to strike the area since August 1899. The 1933 storm cut an inlet 150 feet wide and seven feet deep across the causeway leading to the eastern end of the Roanoke Sound bridge to Whalebone Junction, leaving the bridge isolated from the highway and Roanoke Island cut off for the first time since 1926. A second inlet, this time a half-mile across, opened up between Currituck and the Virginia state line, while down in New Bern the flooding was the most extensive ever recorded. The storm smashed the Neuse River bridge between New Bern and Bridgeton, and damaged both the Norfolk and Southern railroad trestle and Trent River bridge.

Residents up and down the coast suffered terribly. In addition to the crop losses, the storm destroyed 1,166 buildings and damaged another 7,244. Twenty-one residents died, and a further 54 suffered injuries with estimated total financial losses ranging from $2 – 3 million. Officials from the North Carolina Board of Health reached the coast on the morning of the sixteenth and commenced work trying to ward off a potential disease epidemic. Together, the United States Coast Guard and American Red Cross (ARC) ferried provisions of food, clothing, and blankets to the isolated villages along the Outer Banks. Governor John

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4 “Storm is Rated by Manteo’s Oldest Inhabitants as the Most Severe Since August, 1899,” *Daily Advance* (Elizabeth City, N.C.), 18 September 1933, 2.
8 American Red Cross, *Hurricane Disasters of August and September, 1933*, 38.
9 Barnes, *Hurricane History*, 73; American Red Cross, *Hurricane Disasters of August and September, 1933*, 33. Barnes listed $3 million dollars, while the Red Cross figure is $2 million, hence the compromise.
C.B. Ehringhaus designated the ARC as the official relief agency for the crisis and urged citizens to contribute what they could for storm relief.\(^{11}\)

Federal funds under the Federal Emergency Relief Administration could not be used, unfortunately, for disaster relief. Only months prior, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal economic programs had begun to address an even greater economic disaster.

Ehringhaus, however, received word that the state of Florida had requested $1 million for storm damage relief in conjunction with August 1933 storms that hit that state; on 20 September 1933 he suggested to several of his department heads that “our State agencies might very well take advantage of the opportunity and see what can be done for our State.”\(^{12}\)

The following day the Public Works Administration revealed plans for a $2 million development and restoration plan to rehabilitate the Outer Banks. The plans would reforest the islands, rebuild sand dunes, construct a highway, and develop a recreational center.

Although the proposal for the federal plan predated the hurricane by months, word of impending federal spending came along with the ARC’s expenditure of $44,160 for hurricane relief.\(^{13}\) By January 1941, the federal government had invested $1.7 million on the Outer Banks, constructing 115 miles of dunes in the process.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{11}\) “Urgent Appeal for Funds is Made by Red Cross to Help the Storm Sufferers,” *Daily Advance*, 20 September 1933, 1.


Twenty years later, disaster relief would be organized by the state and local authorities under the jurisdiction of civil defense, and once again hurricanes would bring federal dollars to North Carolina. Under the guise of preparing the American people to survive a nuclear war, civil defense emerged as an important function of government during the Cold War. In the end it had more impact in the mitigation of natural disasters, but the architects of civil defense could not foresee its future when they created the organizations to implement it in the 1950s.

*   *   *

Civil defense in the early Cold War years resulted from a perceived security threat to the American homeland. The detonation of an atomic device by the Soviet Union in August 1949, the victory of the communist forces in China in October, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 provided the impetus to create a national civil defense program in the United States. Broadly defined, civil defense included all activities and measures designed and undertaken to protect the civilian population in wartime due to enemy attack, and respond to peacetime disasters, both nature-induced and man-made, to prevent and mitigate the effects on the population. By September 1950, Congressman Carl T. Durham of Chapel Hill, North Carolina introduced legislation to establish the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, the same month that President Harry S. Truman signed National

16 This definition is a creation by the author to represent civil defense through its policy evolution. For a listing of definitions of civil defense, see B. Wayne Blanchard, “Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders and Legislation: A Tutorial on Emergency Management, Broadly Defined, Past and Present” (Emmitsburg, M.D.: Emergency Management Institute, 22 October 2008), 113-17.
Security Council report NSC 68, which recommended development of civil defense as part of a comprehensive program to defeat Soviet designs. Truman signed Public Law 920, creating the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) into law on 12 January 1951. The law was meant to “provide a plan of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack,” and stated that the responsibility for civil defense “shall be vested primarily in the several states and their political subdivisions.” The federal government would “provide the necessary organization and guidance,” but each state was responsible for establishing and operating its own civil defense agency.17 Also in September 1950, Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act, Public Law 875, “to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance . . . to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major disasters.” This legislation would serve as the model for all succeeding federal disaster laws.18

Throughout the 1950s, ways and means of achieving federal civil defense were unclear. Officials vacillated between an emphasis on sheltering or evacuating the American people in the event of a nuclear attack. Civil defense funding during the Eisenhower years remained small and planning ineffective, shifting from sheltering in place (“duck and cover”) to evacuating the cities (“run like hell”).19 Due to the increased risks of fallout from thermonuclear weapons and the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile, civil defense efforts at the end of the decade centered on constructing fallout shelters, but the federal government left the funding and onus for building shelters to the individual citizens

and state governments. Via executive order in January 1953, Truman conferred upon the FCDA responsibility for providing assistance to stricken communities in the event of major disasters caused by nature or man. Civil defense therefore found itself with “peacetime” functions for disaster relief along with the more prominent work of preparing the nation for enemy attack.

With the election of President John F. Kennedy in November 1960, the federal civil defense effort changed dramatically. From 1961 to 1963, Americans witnessed one of the hottest periods of the Cold War. Kennedy spoke to the American people about the need for a greater civil defense program, urging them to build fallout shelters. Congress appropriated in August 1961 approximately $208 million, just to implement the National Fallout Shelter Survey (NFSS). This program to survey, mark, and stock public fallout shelter spaces began in late 1961 and continued well into the Nixon administration, eventually identifying shelter space for approximately 222 million people by 1973. With the Senate’s ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in September 1963, public anxiety over nuclear warfare and emphasis on and funding for civil defense decreased noticeably throughout the remainder of the decade. The Kennedy-created Office of Civil Defense was replaced by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) in 1972, which promulgated the dual capability and

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utility of preparedness for nuclear war and natural disaster planning. President Jimmy Carter transformed the DCPA into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979 and tasked it to “prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.” Thus, the evolution of civil defense to emergency management was complete.

In North Carolina, the Cold War civil defense effort paralleled the federal effort. Governor William Kerr Scott, under the authority of the World War II-era North Carolina Emergency War Powers Act, created and appropriated emergency funding to establish the North Carolina Council of Civilian Defense on 20 July 1950. The General Assembly in April 1951 passed the North Carolina Civil Defense Act, formally establishing the State Council of Civil Defense, later renamed the North Carolina Civil Defense Agency (NCCD). In accordance with the federal merger of civil defense and disaster relief in 1953, the General Assembly that same year amended the state civil defense act to include responsibility for natural disasters. In 1972, the state government reorganized the NCCD in a shuffle of state agencies and in 1975 was renamed it the North Carolina Division of Civil Preparedness (NCCP). From the onset of the NCCD’s creation, there was the awareness that civil defense would only be as effective statewide as it was at the local level (via county and municipal government).

North Carolina stood at the forefront of emergency preparedness. Natural disasters, ranging from droughts and ice storms to hurricanes and nor’easters, hammered the state from...
1950 to 1963. A series of four hurricanes struck the coast within eleven months between 1954 and 1955, instigating a noticeable shift toward the use of civil defense resources to alleviate the effects of natural disasters in the state.²⁷ North Carolina civil defense operations were held in high regard nationally and internationally. In 1952, NCCD director E.Z. Jones reported that the FCDA ranked North Carolina among the top six civil defense operations in the country.²⁸ William S. Lonnie, director of the Civil Defense and Emergency Service for Western Australia, visited the NCCD headquarters in December 1962. Lonnie reported that the agency’s organization was “most impressive,” and the state of readiness for the NCCD was “colloquially expressed as ‘bang on.’ In more conservative terms the organization is geared to a very high state of preparedness.”²⁹ From a scant four paid employees in 1951 with little more than memorandums and pamphlets, the NCCD by the end of the 1960s had grown into a robust agency of almost fifty employees with operations in all 100 counties preparing for and responding to emergencies great and small.³⁰

The greatest growth in civil defense within North Carolina came under the administration of Governor Luther H. Hodges. Elected as lieutenant governor in 1952, Hodges became an “accidental governor” after the death of Governor William B. Umstead on 7 November 1954. A retired textile executive, Hodges served out the remainder of Umstead’s term and won election as governor for the remainder of the decade in 1956. Using a

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²⁷ The four hurricanes were Hazel, Connie, Diane, and Ione. Hurricane Hazel stuck the coast on 15 October 1954. The 1955 hurricane season was one of the most extreme in North Carolina history. In a span of six weeks, three hurricanes made landfall on the coast: Connie, 12 August; Diane, 17 August; and Ione, 19 September.
²⁸ “Defense Exhibit: North Carolina is Helpless; Civil Defense train to show what atomic warfare is like,” The State, 26 January 1952, 11.
conservative-leaning pro-business strategy. Hodges worked tirelessly to improve the standard of living in the state, ranked forty-fourth in the nation in per capita income in 1953.\textsuperscript{31} His business progressivism today is best exemplified by the creation of the Research Triangle Park, but less well-known is his firm advocacy for civil defense. Entering office only weeks after Hurricane Hazel smashed the state’s coast and the Piedmont region, Hodges dealt with subsequent hurricanes in 1955 that exacerbated the damages caused by Hazel. In October 1955, the governor tasked the NCCD to undertake a Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project to guide the rebuilding and future development of the state’s coastal counties in relation to the area’s resources and hurricane hazards.\textsuperscript{32} This project funneled approximately $6.2 million federal civil defense dollars into North Carolina, principally along the coast to rebuild sand dunes, fill inlets, stabilize beaches, and restore the tourist industry. Additional federal funds for civil defense training, planning, equipment, and other elements of preparedness and disaster relief flowed into the state under Hodges’s tenure and continued into that of Governor Terry Sanford and the fallout shelter era of Kennedy.\textsuperscript{33}

In the 1950s, civil defense stood at the crossroads of intersecting interests, promoting postwar economic development and strengthening the national security state. States created civil defense programs out of public and federal requests for safeguards against nuclear war, but found themselves confronting technological, financial, and policy difficulties that


\textsuperscript{33} NCCD, “Summary of Federal Aid in Funds and Property which has come to North Carolina through its Council of Civil Defense covering the period 1 January 1955 to 1 January 1959,” 25 February 1959, folder #471, Guion Griffis Johnson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina, Box 48.
severely inhibited their operations. North Carolina’s civil defense history broadly mirrors the changes and evolution in the federal defense program. The state’s effort differs noticeably, however, in how civil defense was implemented in communities more concerned with the threat of natural disasters in the form of hurricanes than manmade ones in the form of hydrogen bombs. Tar Heel state civil defense efforts served not just as a tool to secure federal money for infrastructure improvement, but also as a way to make North Carolina a safer place for business investment. By orienting the state’s civil defense organization and policy toward planning for and responding to natural disasters, state leaders sought to minimize the damage such disasters could have on efforts to promote economic development. Thus, federal civil defense funds helped North Carolina develop an emergency management and response apparatus that reassured businessmen wanting to invest in new ventures there that the state could effectively protect such investments.

This is more than the story of just one state’s creative use of federal civil defense funds. The North Carolina approach attracted national attention and led to outside scrutiny by other state and international programs. In all, North Carolina’s postwar civil defense model is a reminder that what on the surface seemed to be mostly about national defense had at least as much to do with promoting other worthwhile social objectives. This story also helps broaden the existing narrative about how federal defense dollars aided southern economic development by adding civil defense to the more familiar tale focusing on the construction of military installations.

* * *

Scholarship on the intellectual and methodological development of federal civil defense in the early Cold War is both impressive and extensive. Civil defense policy histories
tend to focus on the shifting policies from the administrations of Truman through those of President Ronald Reagan, emphasizing the reasons why civil defense never grew to its envisioned potential. Reasons for the failure of civil defense center on the lack of leadership, funding, technological deficiencies, and communication issues with civil-military relations, state-federal relations, and secrecy over fallout and nuclear weapons. Another body of scholarship has investigated civil defense with a cynical eye, deeming the entire program in the early Cold War as little more than a system of propaganda designed to engender Americans’ support for the policy of deterrence and the strategy of containment. When a crisis requiring civil defense emerged, the dearth of preparations bred distrust and cynicism among the American people. Civil defense and its role in society broadly encompass a third corpus of writing. Although authors reach different conclusions about the efficacy of civil defense planning and policies, the literature is evenly balanced, devoid of generalizations and harsh denunciations of federal policy.

Amidst these three schools of scholarship, four contested issues emerge for discussion: public apathy toward civil defense, federal – state relations concerning civil defense, civil defense as a part of the modern security-promoting welfare state, and the

34 Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S.; Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield; Blanchard, American Civil Defense 1945-1984; and Winkler, “A 40-year History of Civil Defense.”
impact of civil defense on the state. Public apathy toward civil defense policies and plans remained a constant drag on state and federal efforts throughout the Cold War. In the three cycles of intense public discourse about civil defense (1945–50, 1954–63, and 1981–85), policymakers and citizens debated the aspects of nuclear defense, particularly shelter and evacuation programs.\(^{37}\) When citizens shunned shelters or responded unenthusiastically to nuclear defense drills, these reactions were interpreted as reflecting broad public apathy toward civil defense. B. Wayne Blanchard offers the explanation that civil defense’s failure stems from a lack of leadership, notably at the presidential and congressional levels, to support civil defense policies and programs with funding and active federal involvement.\(^{38}\) Harry Yoshpe contends that public apathy stemmed from confusion about what civil defense really meant, and placed the onus for that confusion on the program’s leaders.\(^{39}\) Thomas Kerr contextualizes the apathy issue by noting how the debate “has often been about nuclear war rather than civil defense per se.”\(^{40}\) Kerr’s delineation of the debate illuminates another issue, which is what aspects of civil defense, if any, did citizens approve of? Following Truman’s executive order transferring disaster relief responsibility to the FCDA, civil defense officials began handling non-nuclear aspects of domestic security. While nuclear disaster thankfully did not befall the United States, weather phenomena certainly did, as well as daily disasters ranging from car accidents to house fires to industrial mishaps. Arguably, victims of non-nuclear disasters would not demonstrate apathy to or displeasure with civil defense

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\(^{40}\) Kerr, *Civil Defense in the U.S.*, 170.
authorities if aided by them in some fashion. Civil defense therefore could mean different things to different people, be they state and local officials or members of the general public.

Differing perceptions of civil defense calls into focus the issue of scholarly cynicism about the purposes behind that program. The reestablishment of civil defense in 1950 in response to the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union naturally involved senior policymakers conceptualizing the desired protection afforded by civil defense with respect to the American people. Guy Oakes and Andrew Grossman perceived civil defense in the early years of the Truman administration as a participatory form of propaganda, a “system of emotional management” or “social control,” respectively, intended to convince the American people that they could survive nuclear war. In this regard, Truman used civil defense as a means to shore up the nation’s strategy of nuclear deterrence. Part of this effort involved the use of government secrecy about nuclear weapons and their challenges to create the illusion of manageable survival. An issue here, however, is the emphasis on the decision making and conceptualization of civil defense at the upper echelons of leadership. Did the state and local civil defense organizations have any concept of civil defense as little more than a distraction, or did they honestly believe in the program and attempt to implement it to combat a variety of man-made and nature-induced threats? Only a careful study of state and local civil defense operations can provide an answer to this question.

The postwar period when civil defense re-emerged coincided with a larger ideological conflict between the new national security state and a fear of the old “garrison state.” Michael Hogan in his book Cross of Iron does not discuss civil defense directly, yet he details how the feared “garrison state” did not come to pass. Rather, a new national security

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41 Oakes, Imaginary War, 8; Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red, 128.
state emerged, one characterized by stronger relationships between the Department of
Defense and state governments. Civil defense therefore can be seen as a national system for
communicating directly with the American people, and as a connection between state and
federal officials in regard to policies and programs for defense purposes. State civil defense
offices administered federal programs which admonished the public to build shelters,
stockpile food, and learn to manage emotions. These efforts, as Laura McEnaney argues,
became a type of “self-help defense” to avoid military overreach, but still militarize the
homestead in the event of enemy attack. These efforts almost entirely centered on nuclear
defense and spawned an array of cultural responses. Efforts to persuade Americans to build
fallout shelters, as detailed by Kenneth Rose, are a prime example of a program that failed to
produce any appreciable success. Civil defense programs intended to shelter the American
people during a nuclear attack were unquestionably unsuccessful. Other aspects of civil
defense efforts had more merit. Local governments quickly learned the advantages of using
the program’s auxiliary aspects, including warning systems, emergency communication
networks, and rescue squads to respond to natural and localized disasters.

Studying civil defense programs and policies through the relationship between federal
and state officials provides room for a new historiographic perspective. The national security
state also coincided with the ideas and actions of the New Deal-era welfare state and its

42 Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-
43 Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 5. A similar presentation of civil defense is presented
by Elaine Tyler May in her book *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York:
44 Rose, *One Nation Underground*, 204.
leitmotif of promoting security. During World War II, the Office of Civilian Defense established a Citizens Service Corps which promoted non-protective activities serving citizens’ home front needs, such as child daycare services, youth fitness activities, and nutrition programs. This venture was inspired by Eleanor Roosevelt in a spirit of New Deal liberal reform. The New Deal left an indelible mark on American governance and society with its massive influx of federal spending on the welfare state and investment of federal funds in state social and economic growth. During the war, the federal government and New Deal liberalism exploded in scale, scope, and federal influence into a “warfare state,” far surpassing in size the Roosevelt New Deal programs enacted between 1933 and 1938. And while the Great Depression and the war both ended, lasting legacies remained.

In the postwar era, Southern states eagerly sought out industry and economic development, with state and local governments in turn internally reorganizing to attract business. Bruce Schulman makes the argument that federal New Deal spending post-1938 shifted to the South, specifically investment through the national defense establishment. Although social welfare programs appeared to wane, defense-related programs “forged a new sort of southern political economy,” permitting the South “to pursue development through federal investments as southern New Dealers had envisioned.” Civil defense dollars represented yet another form of federal defense largesse. But with the federal government

promoting a civil defense program of self-help and discouraging the construction of public shelters, state officials needed to find another means to obtain civil defense dollars.\textsuperscript{50}

Disaster relief provided the vehicle for government officials to obtain substantial funding from civil defense. During World War II, state and government officials witnessed civilian defense personnel – trained and equipped at federal expense – assisting with disaster relief, be it an act of man or nature. While Americans remained skeptical of the ability to defend against attack, the inclusion of disaster relief with civil defense in 1953 provided a new avenue along which federal “defense” funds would flow. Furthermore, as Michelle Landis aptly describes, “disaster relief became the template for the welfare state because people, engaged in practical politics and legal work, settled upon it as the most promising avenue for securing funding for relief of economic distress.”\textsuperscript{51} Expanded since the creation of the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, disaster relief grew dramatically in the mid-1960s and today continues to grow in scope and cost.\textsuperscript{52} States, ironically, needed a disaster to serve as a focusing event to direct officials either to reexamine or modify existing policies, or draft new ones. Disaster relief served as the vehicle to unlock vast amounts of civil defense dollars

\textsuperscript{50} McEnaney, \textit{Civil Defense Begins at Home}, 45. The issues stemmed principally about whether federal shelter construction constituted a type of New Deal-style public works program, and this interpretation of shelters dates to the early 1950s. Later attempts at a national shelter program in the 1950s, as notably recommended by the Gaither Committee in 1957, failed to gain traction due to the immense costs, among other reasons. See David L. Snead, \textit{The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War} (Columbus, O.H.: Ohio State University Press, 1999), 151-54.


for internal relief and potential redevelopment. In North Carolina, the hurricanes from 1954 to 1955 exposed the public and state officials to the vast potential of disaster relief.

Business interests in states affected by hurricanes, tornadoes, or earthquakes recognized well before the advent of civil defense the need to divorce the disaster from the potential economic prosperity in a given locality. The concept of “natural” disaster subsequently developed, writes Ted Steinberg, “when those in power in disaster-stricken cities sought to normalize calamity in their quest to restore order . . . to restore property values and the economy to their upward trajectory.” When governors requested the president to declare their states disaster areas, nature became the enemy and served “as a proxy for blamelessness,” thereby avoiding the sticky issues of questioning economic development policies in risk-prone areas, justifying federal funding under the guise of civil defense and disaster relief, and acting as a form of economic welfare in the spirit of New Deal liberalism.

How one views the legacy and “value” of civil defense in the early Cold War period depends ultimately on whether disaster relief is included as part of “civil defense.” Almost no history ever mentions, much less discusses, the natural disaster responsibilities of the federal and state civil defense organizations in the Cold War. Whereas the general public rejected nuclear defense programs, state civil defense programs provided leverage to release federal defense dollars to states as a form of social welfare, albeit in the form of disaster relief. In the South, these funds facilitated economic development by mitigating the effects of disasters.

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54 Platt, *Disasters and Democracy*, 12.
improved the economic potential of areas affected by disasters, and demonstrated civil defense’s worth as a component of government. The true efficacy of civil defense cannot be ascertained solely by a study of the nuclear defense programs, or from an examination at the senior policymaker level. Rather, by merging existing civil defense history within a broader understanding of postwar southern economic development, disaster relief, and the national security state, civil defense can be properly studied not as a misguided offspring of the Cold War but as an evolutionary part of contemporary state building in a federal system.

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This dissertation is organized in chronological fashion to best demonstrate the evolution of state civil defense policies and ideas about their application. Chapter one provides background on the origins of civil defense nationally and in the state, from the Council of Defense in World War I to the State Office of Civilian Defense in World War II. The ideas and use of civilian defense for localized emergencies and the availability of federal funds for this work which first emerged in the 1940s, became central to civil defense thereafter. Chapter two covers the period from 1945 to 1952. Although North Carolina disbanded its civilian defense program in 1945, the federal government continued intermittently to plan for a future national civil defense program. When developments in the Cold War provided the impetus for reestablishing civil defense, North Carolina followed suit with its own civil defense council. Small and ineffective, the initial state civil defense organization remained an inconsequential state agency until 1953, when a series of bad droughts brought the state civil defense positive attention as a source of relief beyond preparedness for war.
The four hurricanes and droughts of 1953 through 1955 anchor the story of chapter three. The year 1954 was a turning point for North Carolina civil defense. The threat of nuclear fallout, the naming of a new state civil defense director, Edward F. Griffin, arrival of Hurricane Hazel, and the ascendancy of Hodges to the governor’s office expanded the importance and scope of civil defense efforts in the state. Following the hurricanes of 1955, Hodges began to use civil defense as a means of leveraging federal dollars for the rehabilitation of eastern North Carolina’s economy and infrastructure in conjunction with his wider effort to improve the state’s overall economic health. Chapter four continues this story from 1956 to 1960, detailing the changes in federal civil defense policy, creation of a state operational survival plan, passage of Congressional legislation to increase the size of the state civil defense agency, and exploring the state’s effort in promoting fallout shelters. The shelter program under Kennedy from 1961 to October 1962 is discussed in chapter five. North Carolina became the site of several federal shelter studies but remained largely unprepared for the risks of fallout. Chapter six explores how the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 exposed the sheer folly of the state fallout shelter effort. Surprisingly, state residents did not condemn civil defense, but rather lauded the non-nuclear aspects of the program. The chapter further details the end of Kennedy’s fallout shelter effort and provides an epilogue to the state and national civil defense efforts for the remainder of the decade into the 1970s. A final conclusion reevaluates the North Carolina civil defense effort from 1940 to the present, critiquing the evolution of civil defense in perspective with the state’s economic development and federal civil defense policy.

A focused, in-depth study of a state civil defense agency will provide valuable information on past policies and action influential and explanatory for present and future
emergency management policies. Coupled with the economic developments in the postwar South, this dissertation will explore civil defense from a completely new angle, reevaluating how civil defense impacted people and policymakers at the state and local level. The state provides an excellent case study to examine government disaster policy outside of the often-studied and much maligned nuclear history to examine the “other” work of civil defense. In the wake of increasingly costly natural disasters, a historical study of the economic impact of civil defense and the policies of state agency can provide necessary guidance and suggestions for the improvement or development of emergency management policies in the future.
Figure 1. Scene of destruction from 1933 Outer Banks Hurricane in Nags Head, N.C. Source: Brant Wise Family Collection, Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, N.C.
Figure 2. Debris along Nags Head from the 1933 Outer Banks Hurricane. Source: Brant Wise Family Collection, Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, N.C.
Chapter 1: Civilian Defense for the Nation, Emergency Preparedness for the State

The North Carolina Office of Civilian Defense has been of inestimable value during these trying war-time years. It has mobilized a home army of over 250,000 volunteer workers ready and able to meet any emergency, war-caused or otherwise, and in many instances they have proved their worth to their community, State and nation. The very fact that they have been and are standing by to assist in any emergency has been and is of immeasurable value during the crisis through which we are passing.

– Governor R. Gregg Cherry, 13 June 1945

In a meeting of North Carolina Office of Civilian Defense (NCCD) coordinators on 9 March 1944, John B. Martin, acting director of the U.S. Office of Civilian Defense (OCD), declared that North Carolina’s civilian defense program was one “which we in Washington like to point to as a model for other states to follow.” At the same conference, Colonel William S. Pritchard, military commander for the Internal Security District Number 2 (North Carolina), further remarked that “the first responsibility for defense rests upon the individual citizen.” By 1944, citizens in North Carolina could take pride in Martin’s views and comprehend Colonel Pritchard’s succinct assessment of domestic wartime security. These remarks raise two prominent questions, however: what made North Carolina a model civilian defense organization, and what exactly did civilian defense mean to Tar Heel residents?

Like so many other aspects of World War II, precedents set during the previous world war influenced civilian defense. In both wars, civilian defense in North Carolina relied upon mobilizing the state’s residents and coordinating the efforts of thousands of unpaid volunteers.

of both sexes and all races. What hampered and helped shape the state’s civilian defense effort in both world wars is its relative poverty and economic composition. This composition of North Carolina changed dramatically from 1900 to 1940 in areas of education, industrialization, and urbanization. These changes bore influence on how state civilian defense policies evolved comparably to other states, oriented to provide solutions compensatory for deficiencies or differences specific for the state.

Statistically, the differences between the states of 1900 and 1950 demonstrate slow, methodical development. At the turn of the twentieth century, North Carolina spent $4.56 per child annually on education in comparison with the national average of $21.14. As a consequence, 19.5 percent of white state residents ten years and older were illiterate. In 1900, the National Industrial Conference Board ranked North Carolina last nationally in education, and by 1910 the state improved one place, with an illiteracy rate of 18.5 percent for white state residents ten years and older. Throughout the coming decades the state invested and passed considerable legislation to improve education, but trended with the South overall as the most illiterate region of the nation.

Agriculture held fast as the state’s economic foundation throughout the first half of the twentieth century. From 1910 to 1940, approximately three quarters of the state’s


population lived in rural areas. In 1925, the state ranked second in the nation for its number of individual farms, which, on average represented the smallest individual farms in the nation. Despite all the farms, only one-fourth of the state’s lands by 1925 were under cultivation. The state ranked seventh nationally in 1927 in value of crops (not including livestock), and led the nation in production of tobacco, peanuts, and soybeans. Tobacco was king, representing almost a third of all crop values. By 1928, the state grew more tobacco than any other state (one-third of all tobacco in the nation), and manufactured 61 percent of all cigarettes in the nation; by 1950, the state manufactured 52.2 percent of all tobacco products nationwide. By 1950, the state continued to increase the number of farms, albeit with a decrease in rural population. Agriculture and rural life represented bulwarks of North Carolina for the first half of the century.

Despite agriculture’s grip, industrialization took hold in North Carolina in the early twentieth century. Unsurprisingly, the processing of agricultural products served as the three main industries: tobacco, textiles, and furniture production. Prior to World War I, North Carolina’s industrial output ranked in the middle of the nation, but spurred on by wartime necessity, the state’s textile and tobacco industries grew tremendously. Prior to the stock market crash of 1929, North Carolina was the South’s leading industrial state. Textiles led the triad of industrial strength, with the state home to the world’s largest towel and hosiery mills, and the nation’s largest denim, damask, and underwear mills. From 1899 to 1952, the

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63 Hobbs, Economic and Social, 89-98.
64 Hobbs, Economic and Social Profile, 79, 111-12. Notable to mention that this tobacco manufacturing centered in only four cities: Durham, Greensboro, Reidsville, and Winston-Salem.
state’s proportion of knit-goods production rose from 1.8 percent to 40 percent of the nation’s total production.66 The state’s third major industry, furniture manufacturing, grew from 44 factories in 1899 to over 300 by 1955. At the outset of World War II, the state ranked first in the nation in production of wood household furniture, bedroom, and dining-room furniture, and overall ranked as the South’s leading furniture manufacturer.67

The situation for North Carolina in the first half of the twentieth century looked ideal. A closer examination, however, reveals broader problems. In 1912, the state ranked forty-seventh in per capita income and by 1925 rose to the rank of forty-first nationally.68 In 1929, the per capita income dropped to forty-fourth in the nation, at $334 and sank even lower to $187 in 1931, 42.8 percent of the national average. This rose to 55 percent in 1940, and 65.8 percent of the national average by 1950. Despite a percentage increase in total state income of 413 percent from 1929 to 1955, the state per capita income still ranked forty-fourth in the nation in 1955.69 In the 1938 National Emergency Council’s Report on the Economic Conditions of the South, it acknowledged the South’s average per capita income as half that of the nation’s average, that overall industrial wages ranked lowest in the nation, and how much of the region’s industrial profit left the South in the form of dividends and interest to outside financiers.70

North Carolina seemingly lacked the financial resources to address civilian defense and emergency preparedness on a durable basis until the late 1940s. In comparison to the more urban and industrialized Northeast and Midwest, North Carolina was poor, heavily

66 Hobbs, Economic and Social Profile, 104.
67 Hobbs, Economic and Social, 141-43; Hobbs, Economic and Social Profile, 120.
68 Hobbs, Economic and Social, 183-84.
69 Hobbs, Economic and Social Profile, 159, 323.
rural, and agrarian. Therefore, the World War I and II experiences set important precedents as
the state followed federal guidelines in both conflicts and adapted and organized as forced by
limited resources or as warranted to serve state needs and desires. This chapter predominately
provides background information on the World War I-era Council of National Defense and
the North Carolina Council of Defense; and the Second World War counterparts, the North
Carolina Council of National Defense and Office of Civilian Defense. Charting the ebb and
flow of the NCCD in particular from June 1941 until June 1945 will reveal how that federal
wartime program evolved into the roots of North Carolina’s more permanent civil defense
and emergency preparedness apparatus, which appeared in the early years of the Cold War.

*World War I – Progressive Volunteerism and Mobilization*

All twentieth century civil defense activity in the United States originated during
World War I. With the outbreak of mass, modern warfare in Europe in August 1914, the
American political, military, and business communities found themselves ill-prepared for a
coordinated wartime mobilization of the nation’s industrial and economic sectors should the
nation be drawn into the conflict. For North Carolinians, after the assassination of Austro-
Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in “a place not even the schoolteachers had ever heard
of or could pronounce,” the war seemed a distant afterthought in the midst of progressive
movements to reform child labor laws, legislate women’s suffrage, and improve the
educational system.71 America’s movement for wartime preparedness began in 1915, when
Secretary of the Navy (and North Carolina native) Josephus Daniels established the Naval
Consulting Board. A subcommittee on industrial preparedness, chaired by automobile
executive Howard E. Coffin, inventoried American industrial and natural resources, and in

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due course developed a plan to create state committees of industrial preparedness. This plan
would involve the mobilization of state residents serving voluntarily to organize the war
effort.  

Coffin’s work for the Naval Consulting Board fully matured in 1916 with
establishment of the Council of National Defense. Created by Congress on 29 August 1916 in
the Army Appropriations Act, the council became “the first formal body” within the federal
government charged with preparing the nation for war. Consisting of the Secretaries of War,
Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, the act charged the council with
coordinating American industries and resources for national security and welfare. The act
authorized the founding of an advisory commission of seven persons, with “special
knowledge of some industry, public utility, or the development of some natural resource, or
be otherwise specially qualified . . . for the performance of the duties hereinafter provided.”
The advisory commission became the driving force behind the nation’s domestic
mobilization effort once the United States entered World War I, but by design the council
served only as an investigating and advisory body. Therefore, any direct action desired by the
council to mobilize the nation for war would take place within a federal system of the then 48
states, and rely heavily on unpaid citizen volunteers.

The same day the United States declared war against Germany (6 April 1917), the
Council of National Defense established a State Councils Section. It acted as a liaison
between councils at the state and federal levels. Its first directive asked each of the nation’s

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governors to develop a State Council of Defense that would organize and direct the human and materiel resources of his state. On 21 April, the National Council appointed a Woman’s Committee to bring women into closer communication with their local, state, and federal governments, and increase the efficiency of women in defense work. Nationally, state councils varied in power, composition, activities, and efficiency. Nevertheless, the councils’ strength derived from their ability to “reach deeply into the population and to involve large numbers of peoples,” writes historian William J. Breen.75

In North Carolina, Governor Thomas Walter Bickett appointed a State Council of Defense on 27 May 1917. At the initial meeting on 31 May, the State Council decided that the county would serve as the basic unit of organization, with county chairmen appointed by the Council’s executive committee. In conformity with the requests of the National Council, the State Council’s principal goal was to mobilize and coordinate the state’s resources for war: “to secure mass action on a national scale by democratic means . . . and [to] unite the people of the state into a union that would cooperate in every way with each other to further the interest of this country into the war and take care of those affected by the war.”76 Locally, the state arranged for the creation of County Councils of Defense for all of its 100 counties, emphasizing the establishment of county committees of health and sanitation, farming, food, home-saving, and families of soldiers, among other matters.77

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The North Carolina State Council, along with the other state councils across the country, grew rapidly as countless civilians answered the patriotic call to serve their country. The State Council’s initial aim in 1917 “was to mould public thought and sentiment; and to get into the minds of the people the truth” that sacrifices and volunteerism would be required to secure victory.\(^{78}\) As an advisory body without any power or authority to enforce its requests, the State Council found itself hamstrung by the terms of its establishment, which prevented acquisition of any legal authority. Therefore, the State Council was obliged to achieve its goals through persuasion, rather than coercion.

Throughout its existence, the State Council operated with an extremely small budget. In keeping with that reality, the executive committee members all held other state offices, thereby making council salary costs negligible. Bickett solicited 100 prominent North Carolinians to contribute $100 apiece for support of the State Council’s activities, resulting in the collection of $6,500.\(^{79}\) From May 1917 to May 1918, the State Council spent a grand total of $3,591. This rose to $5,420 for the entire organization’s history, a tiny sum compared to more affluent states; Michigan, for example, appropriated $5 million to fund its council’s activities.\(^{80}\) This disparity reflected less of the state’s willingness to support the council, but rather the poverty of North Carolina at that time. Despite such paltry expenditures, in August 1917 a representative from the National Council ranked North Carolina “with Tennessee and

Louisiana as among the three most progressive states” in the South, thanks to strong support from volunteers.81

The United States entered World War I during a period of considerable domestic divisiveness. In the previous two decades, efforts to reform society had highlighted existing social tensions between whites and blacks, native-born and immigrants, the rural and urban populations, easterners and westerners, business and labor, and men and women. President Woodrow Wilson needed to unite the nation behind the war effort and the defense councils provided a means to accomplish that objective. The wartime mobilization gave progressives and their supporters the chance to spread reform through the increased reach of government.

In North Carolina, 99 counties established Councils of Defense to mobilize volunteers for the war effort, all composed primarily of local doctors, lawyers, and businessmen, representative of the “new middle class” of professionals attuned to administration and management.82 For a predominantly rural state, county councils provided a conduit for the federal government’s war effort to reach the individual citizen; furthermore, remarks historian William J. Breen, “The county councils gradually became agents of social reform within the state.”83

North Carolina’s women and African Americans participated in the state’s mobilization effort through their own organizations. Although the African American

population in North Carolina and the South represented a considerable human resource for the war effort, the possible political organization of blacks presented a potential threat to prevailing white supremacy doctrines and the political balance. North Carolina chose at first to ignore the issue of African American involvement. In November 1917, however, the State Council discussed the need to establish some connection with the African American community. The State Council agreed to a plan whereby one or two prominent African Americans in each county would be selected to act as communication channels, but not as formal county council members. Federal pressure in February 1918 to organize separate, county-level African American defense councils received the support of State Council chairman Dr. Daniel Harvey Hill, Jr. Nevertheless, the State Council resisted any change to their system of token representation until 12 October 1918, when Hill appointed an advisory committee of six prominent African Americans known as the State Central Committee. The war ended, however, before this committee could meet and begin its operations.  

In response to a call from the national Woman’s Committee, prominent North Carolina women established a Woman’s Committee of the State Council of Defense on 8 June 1917. Led by Laura Holmes Reilly of Charlotte, the committee organized subcommittees for every county. From its inception, the State Woman’s Committee lacked a definition for its role in the mobilization effort, and operated without financial support. A notable problem of duplication of efforts with the (all-male) State Council persisted until the two organizations amalgamated beginning in October 1918. Nationally, the Woman’s Committee and the Council of Defense recognized by summer 1918 that duplication issues at

the state and local levels warranted merging, and in October 1918 the State Councils Section and Woman’s Committee combined to form the Field Division. The war would end before the Field Division could begin national operations, and the efficacy of combining male and female efforts would not be realized until the next world war.\textsuperscript{85}

The State Council of Defense did not respond to any natural disasters. The organization and vast network of county councils, however, proved invaluable in responding to the influenza pandemic in the fall of 1918. The State Council of Defense’s Committee on Health and Sanitation cooperated with the State Board of Health to mobilize county councils, commissioners, nurses, and health professionals to staunch the spread of the disease, which killed 13,644 in the state.\textsuperscript{86}

By November 1918, approximately 182,000 county councils dotted the nation. These councils and the volunteers at the federal, state, and local levels addressed mobilization issues and progressive-inspired reform activities for the war effort and the betterment of the public good. The armistice on the eleventh brought a swift dissolution to these councils. In North Carolina, the Woman’s Committee officially disbanded on 15 February 1919, while the State Council of Defense continued functioning until 1921, and officially remained in existence, albeit without meeting or conducting operations, until 1927.\textsuperscript{87} The experience of


the defense councils in World War I, argues Nehemiah Jordan, left three legacies that would influence civil defense planning in World War II. First, Americans would understand civil defense as a three tiered system: federal – state – local. Second, civil defense would include “patriotism, morale-building, and other social activities.” Third, relying on large numbers of volunteers would become standard practice in future civil defense planning, as civil defense came to be understood as an almost entirely volunteer organization or “effort.”

The Rise of Civilian Defense

From 1919 to 1939, the need for domestic mobilization and participation in the nation’s defense appeared to vanish. When World War II broke out, however, civil defense planning swiftly returned. As with other key components of the nation’s security apparatus, the fall of France served as a catalyst for restarting domestic mobilization. On 25 May 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) within the Executive Office of the President. Tasked with coordinating the nation’s defense program, OEM served as “the incubator for many defense and war organizations.” On 29 May, the president reestablished the Council of National Defense utilizing the 1916 legal framework. He appointed a National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) to advise and coordinate the nation’s industrial infrastructure for defense production. As NDAC became inundated with problems and inquiries from state governments, it established the Division of State and Local Cooperation (DSLC) on 31 July. Directed by Frank Bane, executive director of the Council of State Governments, the division served “as the channel of communications

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between the Council of National Defense and Advisory Commission and the State
Councils.”

In August, NDAC sent all state governors guidance on “State and Local Cooperation
in National Defense.” The commission suggested to the governors that if desirable, “a state
council of defense be created, and that such councils in turn, guide and assist in the formation
of councils of defense in the local subdivisions of the State whenever the need becomes
apparent.” Suggested functions for the state councils of defense involved advising the
governor on integrating federal defense programs with state government and coordinating
state and private agency operations with the national defense effort. Local councils of defense
were to be organized along similar lines.

North Carolina’s Department of Conservation and Development served as the state’s
vehicle for creating a new state defense council. The department’s Division of Commerce
and Industry believed they would be an integral component of a state defense program in
mid-1940, but oddly did not consider an effort to attract war industries to the state as a

91 Jordan, *U.S. Civil Defense*, 34-38; Robert E. Miller, “The War that Never Came: Civilian Defense,
adds that the Division would serve as the “organizational nucleus for what was to become the Office of
Civilian Defense during World War II.” In October 1939, the War Plans Division, a department within the
General Staff of the U.S. Army, proposed the establishment of a Civilian Defense Bureau within the War
Department, an organization that paralleled Roosevelt’s executive order of September 1939 creating OEM.
In March 1940, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall approved this plan, which assumed that in
the event of war, the War Department would direct the nation’s civil defense preparations through the
Provost Marshal General’s office. See B. Franklin Cooling, “U.S. Army Support of Civil Defense: The

92 NDAC letter and memorandum, “State and Local Cooperation in National Defense” reproduced in
chapter titled “State and Local Cooperation in the National Defense Program” in The Council of State
1941), 33-42. In section 4, “Powers and Duties” the state council shall have the power and duty to
supervise and report to the Governor in matters related to defense. Included among categories of
transportation facilities, welfare, and finance, was “civil defense, including police mobilization,
coordination for fire protection, and disaster relief.”
worthwhile objective, due to the transitory nature of war contracts. But as the year passed and North Carolina officials observed other state’s profiting off the defense contracts, the department decided to change its actions. On 23 October, Governor Clyde R. Hoey announced arrangements by the Division of Commerce and Industry to open a branch office in Washington, D.C. to procure war contracts and industries for the state. The office would represent “an effort to acquaint those in charge of war industries and activities of the resources and possibilities of North Carolina” and therefore obtain a slice of the defense build-up. Under the stewardship of James T. Anderson, industrial engineer for the Department of Conservation and Development, the office operated in the Mayflower Hotel in Washington at the start of November. On 14 November, Blake R. Van Leer, the Dean of the School of Engineering at North Carolina State College, spoke with Bane, who recommended to Van Leer that North Carolina organize a state defense council.

Events now accelerated. Two days after speaking with Bane, Van Leer wrote to Hoey and outlined the need for a defense council. The state’s decision to not pursue defense contracts earlier in 1940 and open an office in November evidently represented too little, too late. The lack of organization on the state home front hampered the Washington office’s work, primarily because the state needed a defense council to determine policies regarding

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94 Press release from governor’s office, 23 October 1940, folder labeled “Correspondence, etc. Gov. Clyde Hoey 1940,” Department of Conservation and Development, Administrative Records and Correspondence, NCA, Box 6.
defense contracts, industries, and housing for workers.\textsuperscript{97} Less than a week later, on 22 November, Hoey appointed the North Carolina State Council of National Defense. To chair the council, the governor tapped Colonel John William Harrelson, a World War I veteran and Dean of Administration at North Carolina State College, and appointed Anderson as executive secretary.\textsuperscript{98} The State Council consisted of 50 members, all state leaders from industry, agriculture, academia, politics, civic organizations, banking, women’s organizations, and the black community.\textsuperscript{99} Even with the council, however, Harrelson and Hoey did not exactly know what to do with it, and the governor asked Bane for suggestions for using the new organization as part of the national effort.\textsuperscript{100}

Continuing into 1941, the defense council remained a paper organization. In mid-January 1941, newly elected Governor Joseph Melville Broughton authorized the continuation of the Washington office.\textsuperscript{101} As to the activities of the office and the council at this time, a state civilian defense report from December 1942 explained that

\begin{quote}
The purpose of the council was to ease the transition from peace to war production then taking place to meet lend-lease demands, by procuring new industries for the state and obtaining war contracts for already established plants facing suspension through restriction of manufacture of civilian goods. An office was opened in Washington and maintained by funds from the Governor’s contingency fund and from the appropriation for State Advertising.\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{97} Blake R. Van Leer to Clyde R. Hoey, 16 November 1940, folder labeled “Hoey, Clyde R. 1940 – 41,” Department of Conservation and Development, Division of Commerce and Industry, NCA, Box 21.
\textsuperscript{98} Press release from the Governor’s Office, 22 November 1940, folder labeled “MC 1.9.9 Council of Defense 1940,” John William Harrelson Papers (JWHP), Military Records, North Carolina State University Libraries (NCSU), Special Collections Research Center, Raleigh, North Carolina, Box 9.
By February, the council still had not met even once.\textsuperscript{103} The Washington office continued to try to secure defense contracts for the state’s industries and manufacturers, before finally closing in September.\textsuperscript{104} In contrast with the federal desire to prepare the state’s population for war, the State Council focused its energies on securing federal largesse, reinterpreting the intent of the council to function as a form of economic preparedness.

Broughton’s administration took office amidst national changes to the mobilization and preparedness effort. At the end of January, New York City Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, executive director of the United States Conference of Mayors, sent a report to Roosevelt critical of the activities of the DSLC, requesting greater federal involvement to help states and communities prepare for possible enemy air or naval attack.\textsuperscript{105} On 20 May 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8757, replacing the DSLC with the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) within the Office of Emergency Management. Roosevelt tapped LaGuardia to serve as the first director on a voluntary basis. The president tasked the OCD to coordinate federal civilian defense activities with the state and local governments, and assist these governments in the establishment of state and local defense councils to coordinate civilian defense activities. Furthermore, Roosevelt tasked the infant OCD Board for Civilian Protection and the Volunteer Participation Committee to study and prepare plans to protect “life and property in the event of emergency,” and “promote activities designed to sustain the national morale and to provide opportunities for constructive civilian participation in the


\textsuperscript{105} Yoshpe, \textit{Our Missing Shield}, 61-65.
defense program,” respectively.106 Within OCD, the basic organization of civilian defense consisted of two operating branches: a Civilian Protection Branch for protective missions and a Civilian War Services Branch for non-protective missions. In July, OCD established regional offices as advisory and information organizations in nine geographical areas coinciding with those of the U.S. Army’s corps areas. These nine OCD regional offices worked to coordinate OCD and War Department activities with the state and local defense councils, tailoring national plans to regional needs and capabilities.107

Roosevelt’s creation of the OCD produced immediate and notable changes in North Carolina’s Council of National Defense. Three days after the establishment of the new federal office, Harrelson wrote to Broughton. Mentioning the plans of OCD, Harrelson recommended to the governor that he create a state civilian defense office in Raleigh with a full-time salaried director as the “demands for action on the part of North Carolina are coming fast and I think it is necessary to give immediate attention to the problem of civilian defense.”108 On 2 June, Theodore S. Johnson, a professor of civil engineering at North Carolina State College and chief engineer of the Department of Conservation and Development, became the full-time executive director of the State Council. On 12 June, Broughton revised an expanded State Council under the DSLC guidelines from August 1940.

The expanded council first met on 18 June and formally established the North Carolina Office of Civilian Defense (NCCD), naming Johnson as director.\textsuperscript{109} With its headquarters in Raleigh, Johnson and the State Council worked in the summer months of 1941 to establish local defense councils in all 100 counties and select cities. Broughton directly appointed the county council chairmen; by 18 July, 90 counties possessed chairmen, who in turn began forming their county councils and appointing members.\textsuperscript{110} By the end of August, all but two counties had chairmen, and they were lumped together under a council in an adjacent county.\textsuperscript{111}

Initial work for the revamped NCCD involved creation of the Aircraft Warning Service. In July, the Third Air Force requested that the state organize this service to take part in training maneuvers to be held in the Carolinas during October and November 1941. Johnson tapped William F. Nufer of Goldsboro to be the NCCD assistant director in charge of organizing this service.\textsuperscript{112} The warning service essentially was a signal and communication system for detecting enemy aircraft, warning civilians, and directing American aircraft to


\textsuperscript{111} The regional council was established on account of the U.S. Marine Corps base, Camp Lejeune, near Jacksonville, and the North Carolina Shipbuilding Company yards in Wilmington. Separate City Councils of National Defense took hold in High Point and Rocky Mount, and a Regional Council was organized for the New Bern – Jacksonville – Wilmington area. Prior to the reorganization, five local councils were organized in Craven, Cumberland, Mecklenburg, New Hanover, and Onslow counties. Several cities also had defense councils prior to the creation of the NCCD, notably Charlotte, Durham, Greensboro, High Point, and Wilmington.

intercept enemy forces. The military asked Nufer to recruit more than 13,000 volunteers to staff 834 observation posts in 63 counties.\textsuperscript{113} Organized into the Ground Observer Corps, from one to two hundred male volunteers would staff the observation posts scattered around the coast and three hundred miles inland twenty-four hours a day. Further volunteers (frequently women) would work in filter centers, receiving observer reports, “filtering” out the erroneous messages, and then relaying the accurate reports to military officials at an information center, where Army personnel would then vector interception aircraft, alert anti-aircraft defense batteries, or order blackouts. The War Department ensured that the Aircraft Warning Service received first priority from the OCD for civilian defense volunteers during the war. Nationally and in North Carolina, the American Legion registered all available veterans for civilian defense work and pledged full cooperation in organizing the observation posts around the state. Statewide, the Army established an information center in Wilmington, and filter centers in Raleigh, Charlotte, and Wilmington – all staffed with female volunteers.\textsuperscript{114}

To improve the State Council’s advisory function, in mid-July Johnson suggested to Broughton that he appoint an Executive Committee of the State Council.\textsuperscript{115} Membership in the Executive Committee mirrored the State Council. The twenty members represented the

\textsuperscript{113} Walter H. Frank to John W. Harrelson, 27 May 1941; Harold B. Hinton to John W. Harrelson, 27 June 1941, folder labeled “MC 1.9.10 Council of Defense 1941,” JWHP, NCSU, Box 9.
overall State Council, but with only three women and one African American in the organization.\textsuperscript{116} By the end of August, the proposed Executive Committee was established, congruent with the recommendations and requests from the new OCD Fourth Regional Office that North Carolina begin to organize an auxiliary fire fighting service, air raid warden service, supplementary police services, emergency medical services, aircraft warning service, and public education services “to promote the National War Effort.”\textsuperscript{117}

The Executive Committee first met on 10 September. During this meeting, the group began to establish what would later be termed the Citizens Defense Corps, appointing exploratory committees in the areas of emergency medical care, fire mobilization, police mobilization, a civil air reserve, and educational services. The group also authorized an expansion of the State Defense Council to include representatives from railway and bus transportation, nurses association, the American Red Cross, and the American Legion.\textsuperscript{118} In a marked departure from the practice of the First World War State Council for Defense, the Executive Committee decided not to organize a separate woman’s division.\textsuperscript{119}

Throughout the fall of 1941, the state civilian defense program continued to expand and increase in scale and scope. As the Army maneuvers unfolded in October and November, on 25 October, the State Council passed a resolution authorizing the organization of a Civil Air Defense Service.\textsuperscript{120} The air service would organize the state’s private pilots into a

\textsuperscript{118} Theodore S. Johnson to J. Melville Broughton, 9 October 1941, folder labeled “Governor – Broughton,” WWII, NCA, Box 191.
\textsuperscript{120} Telegram from Thomas A. Banks to L.S. McGinnis, 25 October 1941, folder labeled “Civilian Defense File 5,” GJMB, NCA, Box 28.
volunteer air force to patrol the coastline, act as observers, or assist in other emergency or wartime functions as required. Placed under the control of the national OCD headquarters, civilian defense officials defined CAP as “an organization of the civilian aviation resources of the nation for national defense service.” The State Council swiftly adopted the CAP program building off the air defense service planning, and on 9 December the North Carolina Wing of the Civil Air Patrol appointed its first commander. In addition, the State Council had also approved a statement of policy with the Red Cross clarifying functions of civilian defense and the Red Cross under normal and emergency conditions. By the end of 1941, every county in North Carolina possessed a Defense Council, and half of the local councils were completely staffed, with the remainder scheduled to be fully assembled by 1 January 1942.

**Pearl Harbor to May 1942 – Building the NCCD Organization**

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 found North Carolina civilian defenses only partially organized but capable of rapid expansion. Initially the NCCD

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121 James L. Hamilton to J. Melville Broughton, 27 March 1942; J. D. Winstead to J. Melville Broughton, 21 May 1941; Aero Club [J.L. Hamilton] to J. Melville Broughton, 2 June 1941; J. Melville Broughton to James L. Hamilton, 5 June 1941, folder labeled “Civil Air Patrol,” WWII, NCA, Box 192.
122 Fiorello H. LaGuardia to J. Melville Broughton, 28 November 1941; Administrative Order No. 9, Fiorello H. LaGuardia, 8 December 1941, folder labeled “Civil Air Patrol,” WWII, NCA, Box 192.
called on every community in the state with a population greater than 2,500 to establish protective organizations (auxiliary police, fire fighters, air raid wardens) in their local defense councils. The Army reactivated the Aircraft Warning Service and sent out requests for women to serve as volunteers at the filter centers. On 11 December, the U.S. Army Fourth Corps Area assigned Major Dewey Herrin, a reserve officer from Winston-Salem, to serve as the liaison officer between the Corps headquarters and the State Council to assist in coordination of civilian defense between military and civilian authorities. George W. Jeffrey, hired in October to assist the state’s lone regional defense council, expanded his duties to assist all local councils for the eastern half of the state, while Charlotte Mayor Ben E. Douglas joined the NCCD on 13 December as an assistant state director to aid in coordination of activities for local councils in the western half. At the recommendation of state women’s organizations, the State Council added “leaders in women’s activities . . . and the policy of not having a separate women’s division was approved.” By the close of 1941, the civilian defense offices in counties statewide began volunteer recruiting campaigns by word of mouth, print media, and radio advertisements, informing residents that “civilian

defense will be a deciding factor in winning the war,” and “every patriotic citizen must carry his share in the defense program.”

In the opening months of 1942, state civilian defense officials focused their efforts on the organization of the Citizens Defense Corps. Fears of enemy air raids became the early nucleus of the NCCD effort and catalyst for development of protective services. Formally established by the federal OCD on 30 April 1942, the United States Citizens Defense Corps imposed no restrictions on membership based on race, color, sex, or religion and it represented a blend of all volunteer services engaged in minimizing the effects of enemy attack. Coupled with the Aircraft Warning Service, civilian defense personnel hurried to train air raid wardens, organize auxiliary police and firefighters, and commence blackout drills. Concurrently, the NCCD undertook the establishment of a rationing system in the state to conserve essential war materials. By 5 January 1942, the NCCD organized 140 rationing

131 Mauck, “Civilian Defense in the United States,” Chapter 6, 1-2. As defined in the NCCD publication Guide to Victory, “The Citizens Defense Corps is recommended by [the national] OCD on the theory that American cities, towns and counties may be bombed in hostile air attacks; that in these hostile air attacks fires may be started, buildings demolished, water mains broken, power, transportation and communication systems disrupted, people injured, panic aroused; that air raid wardens might be needed to take air raid precautions; that firemen might need the assistance of auxiliary firemen; police, the assistance of auxiliary helpers; public works and utilities, the assistance of auxiliary workers; and that local governmental agencies should be buttressed and strengthened by auxiliaries trained to function in emergencies.” See Coates, Guide to Victory, 34-35. Local defense councils recommended that the Defense Corps include the following categories of personnel: Air raid wardens, auxiliary firemen, emergency medical, auxiliary policemen, nurse’s aids, war gas protection, fire watchers, demolition, messengers, drivers, utilities repair, emergency food and housing, bomb reconnaissance, plant protection, road repair, and facilities security. See North Carolina Council for National Defense, “Coordinating War Services for Unconditional Victory,” 10 February 1943, folder labeled “Lists,” WWII, NCA, Box 210. The United States Citizens Service Corps, Civil Air Patrol, and Civilian Defense Auxiliary group were also established concurrently with the Citizens Defense Corps by OCD Administrative Order No. 23. See Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review (February 1944),” no folder, WWII, NCA, Box 165.
boards across the state, leading the South in completion of a rationing program. The State Council made oversight of this rationing program its primary function and NCCD director Johnson served as state rationing administrator.

The first substantial reorganization of the NCCD occurred in the first quarter of 1942 in response to growing civilian defense requirements. North Carolina civilian defense work at this point subdivided into four categories: local council assistance, the rationing program, development of the Citizens Defense Corps, and general coordination of state agencies and organizations. A salvage program also worked closely with civilian defense at this point in time. With a small staff, a state civilian defense director wearing two hats, and only two field representatives, the NCCD desperately needed immediate reinforcements. In a letter to Broughton dated 14 February, Ben Douglas noted how “I have been Assistant Director for the western half of North Carolina since December 13, and I haven’t the slightest knowledge what the east is doing or what I should do to coordinate my work with that of the other portions of the state.” The changes necessary for improved coordination that began early in 1942 would not be in place until May.

Working with the War Department and national OCD to build the state’s Citizens Defense Corps, the NCCD envisioned a program of centralized planning and decentralized execution. This began with the hiring of additional assistant civilian defense directors. A total of four regional directors could more effectively oversee the development of civilian defense

work in the local defense councils.\textsuperscript{137} To manage the burgeoning NCCD administrative apparatus, R. Walker Martin joined in February as assistant state director for office administration, along with Guy Rawls as assistant state rationing administrator. To clarify the relationship of civilian defense with the American Red Cross in the area of first-aid training and civilian protection and preparedness, the NCCD reached an updated understanding on 25 February. The understanding stated that civilian defense would have primary responsibilities in the event of disaster caused by war, while “the sole responsibility for disaster operations caused by peacetime hazards, i.e. floods, fires, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc., rests upon the American Red Cross.”\textsuperscript{138} The NCCD, the American Red Cross, and the State Welfare Commission signed a formal agreement on 9 September 1942 which maintained that understanding concerning disaster relief and civilian war aid. The NCCD remained in charge of response for war-caused emergencies, the Red Cross for natural disasters, and the Welfare Commission using federal funds was tasked to manage mass feeding and housing after an emergency situation stabilized.\textsuperscript{139}

Despite the proposed and actual changes, civilian defense operations in North Carolina remained incomplete. By early March 1942, the cities of Durham, Raleigh, Rocky Mount, and Wilson all had severe deficiencies in civilian defense volunteer enrollment.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{137} Theodore S. Johnson to J. Melville Broughton, 6 February 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense File #3,” GJMB, NCA, Box 28; J. Melville Broughton to Patrick Healy, Jr., 5 February 1942 and 10 February 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense State Office – Reports and General Correspondence,” GJMB, NCA, Box 27.

\textsuperscript{138} Theodore S. Johnson to County Chairman of Civilian Defense, 25 February 1942, folder labeled “State Office OCD, 1942-1944,” WWII, NCA, Box 3.


\textsuperscript{140} J. Melville Broughton to Theodore S. Johnson, 2 March 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense State Office – Reports and General Correspondence,” GJMB, NCA, Box 27.
the wake of this discouraging development, Broughton called for the first full meeting of the State Council of National Defense on 17 March. Among the several issues addressed, two were prominent: a lack of instructional material, and a role for the membership of the State Council.\footnote{Kenneth C. Royall to J. Melville Broughton, 23 March 1942, folder labeled “State Council for National Defense,” GJMB, NCA, Box 58; Ben E. Douglas, “Civilian Defense in North Carolina, 31 December 1942,” folder labeled “MC 1.9.11 Council of Defense 1942-1943,” JWHP, NCSU, Box 9.} In his report to the Council at the meeting, Johnson concluded that the lack of training and instructional material from the national OCD “represents the largest single obstacle to rapid progress in organization for civilian defense.”\footnote{Theodore S. Johnson, “Report of Director of Civilian Defense,” 17 March 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense File #2,” GJMB, NCA, Box 27.} To address the training problem, the NCCD named Albert Coates, founder and director of the Institute of Government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, as state director of training. The first NCCD “Civilian Defense School” at the Institute of Government took place from 24 to 27 March, designed for local defense councils’ coordinator/director, local director of training, and chief air raid warden. As Johnson noted, “it is the hope that these instructors will in turn organize classes and conduct training in their local communities.”\footnote{Ben E. Douglas to J. Melville Broughton, 20 March 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense State Office – Reports and General Correspondence,” GJMB, NCA, Box 27.}

In spite of training difficulties, the growth of local civilian defense organizations continued at a steady pace. In the western half of North Carolina by late March, approximately 80,000 residents volunteered for civilian defense work. Throughout the month, the NCCD began hiring the personnel for the envisioned regional director program.\footnote{Ben E. Douglas, “Civilian Defense in North Carolina, 31 December 1942,” folder labeled “MC 1.9.11 Council of Defense 1942-1943,” JWHP, NCSU, Box 9.} On 29 April, Norman Y. Chambliss of Rocky Mount and George K. Snow of Mount Airy, joined the NCCD as assistant directors. Also in late April, the need to separate civilian
defense from the state-wide rationing program became apparent. In the first week of May, the Office of Price Administration (OPA) established an office in Raleigh. Johnson stepped down as NCCD director to become state OPA director. Jeffrey resigned and became rent administrator for the OPA in Wilmington. Broughton then promoted Douglas to become the state’s second civilian defense director, and the governor appointed Junius H. Rose of Greenville to become assistant director to replace Douglas.\textsuperscript{145} As state director, Douglas subdivided the state’s 100 counties into four civilian defense regions (Chambliss – Northeast; Rose – Southeast; Martin – Piedmont; Snow – West).\textsuperscript{146} With the framework of the NCCD finalized, state efforts focused on the completion of the Citizens Defense Corps and the protection of the North Carolina coast from German U-boats.

\textit{Tackling the U-Boat Threat – Blackouts and the Civil Air Patrol}

World War II’s bloodshed washed ashore along North Carolina’s coast in January 1942. On 16 January, the German submarine \textit{U-66} arrived in the waters off Cape Hatteras. On the night of the eighteenth, the U-boat’s commander, \textit{Korvettenkapitän} Richard Zapp, spotted the Standard Oil of New Jersey-owned tanker \textit{Allan Jackson} and sank her with two torpedoes, killing 22 out of the crew of 35. By the end of January, an additional eight vessels went down off the North Carolina coast, including the British tanker \textit{Empire Gem}, with a loss of 49 crewmembers. In February, U-boats sank eight more ships along the state’s coast; 22 vessels sank beneath the waves in March, and 23 more in April. Lights from vehicles,

\textsuperscript{145} Broughton appointed Douglas as new NCCD director on 9 May 1942, effective on 12 May 1942. See “Governor Names Douglas State Director of OCD,” \textit{News and Observer} (Raleigh, N.C.), 10 May 1942, 7. Junius H. Rose High School in Greenville is named in honor of Rose, once superintendent of the Greenville City Schools. He retained this position as he volunteered his services as assistant director of civilian defense for North Carolina.

residences, and businesses along the Outer Banks aided the German submarines by silhouetting merchant vessels against the glowing shore. Once detected, an unescorted merchant vessel became easy prey for enemy submariners. At the war’s end, U-boats sank 78 vessels off the North Carolina coast. Military officials in the early months of 1942 tried to calm public fears, but confronted a shocking lack of preparedness to combat the submarines.147

The waters off North Carolina, particularly Cape Hatteras, became a prime hunting area for U-boats. A natural choke point, merchant traffic heading north and south would swing out from the cape to avoid the treacherous Diamond Shoals, placing them on the very edge of the continental shelf. Here the warm waters of the Gulf Stream smashed into cooler Arctic waters, creating turbulent winds and waves. Frying Pan Shoals, off Cape Fear, and Lookout Shoals, off Cape Lookout, also became graveyards for numerous U-boat victims. Long before submarine warfare commenced off Cape Hatteras, the North Carolina coast acquired the moniker “Graveyard of the Atlantic” for the sheer volume of vessels wrecked by the sands and surf. U-boats could spend the day submerged in the deeper waters on the narrow edge of the continental shelf, then surface under cover of darkness and patrol, spotting the profiles of ships from their running lights or silhouetted by glow along the shore. For these reasons, German Admiral Karl Doenitz later remarked, “the area of Cape Hatteras

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proved particularly fruitful.”

U-boats sank merchant vessels off Hatteras and the North Carolina coast with startling regularity, earning the area a new title: “Torpedo Junction.”

At first to combat the U-boats and threat of air attack, the NCCD began small practice blackout and dim-out drills in communities across the state. On 8 March, Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, Commander, Eastern Defense Command, wrote Broughton of the imperative necessity to “blackout or eliminate shore illumination which serves to silhouette passing vessels to enemy observation,” and requested that regional civilian defense directors work to eliminate illuminated signs and business lights along waterfronts of coastal communities.

In response to the governor’s inquiry, state director Johnson reported that the regional office had not sent any guidance about elimination of lighting, and that the NCCD required permission from military officials to even hold practice drills. Broughton, without authority to order a coastal blackout, requested residents to dim their lights shining out over the Atlantic to not silhouette passing ships. Despite this request, the coast remained illuminated.

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150 Hugh A. Drum to J. Melville Broughton, 8 March 1942, folder labeled “Governor – Broughton,” WWII, NCA, Box 191.

151 Dim-out refers to where an automobile’s headlights would have the head and taillights modified to restrict the amount of visible light.


152 Telegram from J. Melville Broughton to Frank Knox, 26 March 1942, folder labeled “Press Releases, Proclamations, Speeches, January – May 1942,” GJMB, NCA, Box 90.
As ship losses continued unabated, Broughton decided to take action. He wrote to Roosevelt, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and Drum on 26 March, stating “I am definitely of the opinion that the defenses against submarine depredations certainly in the North Carolina coastal area are wholly inadequate and frequently inept and that there is a shocking lack of coordination between army, navy, coast guard and air forces.”

In April, under pressure from multiple sources, including the British government, the navy finally transmitted information on blackout procedures for North Carolina coastal areas. In mid-May, Drum issued Proclamation No. 1, formally establishing the Eastern Military Area of the Atlantic Seaboard States, vesting in it the responsibility for enforcing wartime restrictions. Both civilian defense personnel and local authorities would henceforth cooperate with the military both to implement and to maintain the new lighting restrictions. Further military proclamations in September 1942 and January 1943 limited coastal access, moved the blackout and dim-out restrictions to an area 25 miles inland, and strengthened the military’s control of the state’s coastal defenses. The blackout and dim-out restrictions remained in place until cancelled on 11 May 1945. The navy achieved their first U-boat kill in early April and belatedly introduced a convoy system in mid-May 1942. These measures had an immediate impact. In July, German submarines sank only three ships off the entire East Coast. On 19 July 1942, Doenitz withdrew his last two submarines off Cape Hatteras and the U-boat focus returned to operations in the North Atlantic.

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153 Telegram from J. Melville Broughton to Frank Knox, 26 March 1942, folder labeled “Press Releases, Proclamations, Speeches, January – May 1942,” GJMB, NCA, Box 90.
154 Hugh A. Drum to J. Melville Broughton, 11 April 1942; Frank Knox to J. Melville Broughton, 11 April 1942; telegram from H. B. White to J. Melville Broughton, 27 March 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense Activities – Air Patrol; Fire School; Warning Posts; etc.,” GJMB, NCA, Box 29; W. J. Jones to J. Melville Broughton, 10 April 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense Activities – Air Patrol; Fire School; Warning Posts; etc.,” GJMB, NCA, Box 29; Tollin L. Tilton to J. Melville Broughton, 21 April 1942; J. Melville Broughton to William F. Nufer, 24 April 1942; telegram from Hugh A. Drum to J. Melville
In addition to blackouts and dim-outs, the North Carolina Wing of the Civil Air Patrol became operational and began coastal patrol operations from the late summer of 1942 until August 1943. In organizing the nation’s civilian aviation resources, the CAP became a highly flexible tool for civilian defense authorities, whether scouting aloft for sources of scrap metal, performing courier duty by shuttling messages and personnel, or spotting and observing forest fires.\textsuperscript{155} As of April 1942, the North Carolina Wing operated without any funding whatsoever from either the federal or state government. Pilots flew or loaned their personal aircraft, purchased uniforms and other supplies out of their own pockets, and served their state and nation out of their sense of patriotic duty. If the NCCD could envision a task where aerial resources would be of assistance, the North Carolina Wing reported for duty.\textsuperscript{156}

The submarine attacks off the East Coast gave the Civil Air Patrol a mission of unprecedented civilian involvement in the war effort: anti-submarine patrols. Beginning in late February and early March 1942, experimental coastal patrol bases at Atlantic City, New Jersey, Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, and West Palm Beach, Florida tested out the concept of the CAP pilots flying anti-submarine patrols for a 90-day period. Pilots on patrol received a per diem of $8.00 and free fuel in return for plenty of risk. These early efforts entailed

\textsuperscript{155} The purposes of CAP as envisioned by national officials centered on stimulating interest in aviation (particularly among youth), providing preliminary training and experience to potential enlistees for the armed services, and performing other services essential to the nation’s war effort.

spotting submarines and forcing them to dive and evade attack, locating shipwrecked sailors, marking wreckage or mines, and escorting merchant vessels. Spurred on by the success of these efforts, other states began to set up CAP coastal bases, which eventually numbered 21 in total from the coast of Maine to the Gulf of Mexico.

North Carolina established two CAP coastal patrol bases in the late summer of 1942. The first base, Coastal Patrol Base No. 16, began operations at Skyco Field near Manteo, with the first coastal patrols commencing on 10 August, patrolling the entire Outer Banks from dawn to dusk. A total of 80 Tar Heel aviators and other personnel operated from the primitive grass strip at Skyco until moving to the newly constructed Naval Auxiliary Air Station Manteo in late November 1942. On 2 September 1942, national CAP headquarters authorized the establishment of Coastal Patrol Base No. 21 at Beaufort. North Carolina CAP Wing commander Major Frank E. Dawson of Charlotte took command of the base and the first patrols began on 30 September. To assist CAP operations in the state, the General Assembly voted to appropriate funds for the wing. In January 1943, Representative Roy Rowe (D–Burgaw), a CAP member himself, introduced legislation to appropriate $30,000 for

156 This would be the last coastal patrol base established by the Civil Air Patrol in World War II. 
160 Frank E. Dawson to J. Melville Broughton, 5 August 1942, folder labeled “Civil Air Patrol,” WWII, NCA, Box 192; Melvin J. Warner and George W. Grove, *CAP Coastal Patrol Base Twenty-One* (u.k., 1944), 17-19.
the North Carolina Wing’s coastal patrol bases and other state operations, approved by the General Assembly on 11 February.162

Nationally, the civilian defense “air force” proved its worth. While the American military establishment initially remained skeptical about the creation of the Civil Air Patrol, doubting whether civilian aviators could contribute effectively to the nation’s defense, by the summer of 1943 both the army and navy recognized the value of the CAP, due largely to the success of the coastal patrolling operations. On 29 April 1943, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9339, transferring the Civil Air Patrol from the Office of Civilian Defense to the Department of War, and CAP became the auxiliary of the Army Air Forces. In mid-July 1943, Dawson received word from the national CAP headquarters that all coastal patrol bases were to be closed on 31 August. The Manteo and Beaufort bases were also to be consolidated and moved intact elsewhere in the country. This consolidation was due to the radically decreased U-boat threat along the Eastern seaboard and the immense expansion of military forces, negating the need for civilian coastal patrols.163

162 J. Melville Broughton to Robert L. McMillan, 2 January 1943; Frank E. Dawson to Robert L. McMillan, 11 January 1943; document titled “Application to the North Carolina State Legislature for Funds to be Used in Construction and Maintenance of the North Carolina Wing of Civil Air Patrol,” authored by Frank E. Dawson, folder labeled “1943 Civil Air Patrol,” WWII, NCA, Box 153; State of North Carolina, Journal of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina, Session 1943 (Raleigh, N.C.: Edwards & Broughton Company, 1943), 66, 138, 154, 190; North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1943, H.B. 103, Chapter 63. In a letter to the General Assembly regarding the CAP appropriation, Dawson noted that New York and New Jersey each donated $150,000 for each state’s base; Florida donated $100,000 for one base; Georgia $75,000 for one base; Tennessee $50,000 for one base; and Virginia donated ten aircraft valued at $6,000 apiece for their lone base.

163 Neprud, Flying Minute Men, 77; Warner and Grove, Base Twenty-One, 92-94; J. D. Winstead to J. Melville Broughton, 31 July 1943; Frank E. Dawson to J. Melville Broughton, 17 August 1943; J. Melville Broughton to Frank E. Dawson, 20 August 1943, folder labeled “Civilian Defense Activities – Air Patrol; Fire School; Warning Posts, etc.,” GJMB, NCA, Box 29. The personnel from Coastal Patrol Base No. 21, together with several from Coastal Patrol Base No. 16, transferred to Monogram Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Driver, V.A. and became CAP Tow Target Unit No. 21. The pilots towed large canvas target sleeves behind their aircraft to train naval aviators in aerial gunnery procedures and target tracking until 15 April 1944.
North Carolina’s bases left an impressive record of achievement. The Manteo and Beaufort bases patrolled for approximately 1,000 hours from December 1942 to February 1943; pilots from each base flew more than one million miles of patrols during their existence and only two merchant vessels were lost to enemy action in the patrol area from August 1942 until August 1943. The Beaufort aviators spotted six submarines during their existence, rescued 45 shipwreck survivors and aided 11 vessels in distress. With these numbers came the unfortunate deaths of two aircrew from Manteo and four personnel from Beaufort. During the existence of the bases, U-boats sank only two vessels, both night attacks when aircraft were not flying. Compared to the 74 vessels sunk and 16 damaged off the coast before the CAP bases operated, this record establishes the legacy of lives saved and cargos safely delivered to fight and win the war. Through the CAP, North Carolina utilized existing aviation resources in the state with a minimum of investment, which released military personnel for combat service overseas.

From Defense Corps to Service Corps

Throughout the summer of 1942, the NCCD expanded the Citizens Defense Corps. The establishment of an Emergency Medical Service (EMS) division in July added another facet to the state’s civilian defenses. The federal OCD organized the medical service to “provide instruction in the medical aspects of civilian protection against war gas, demolition bombs, and fire, to establish units for care and treatment of causalities, and to prepare in case

164 Frank E. Dawson to J. Melville Broughton, 1 February 1944; Frank E. Dawson to J. Melville Broughton, 3 July 1943; Frank E. Dawson to J. Melville Broughton, 4 December 1943, folder labeled “Civilian Defense Activities – Air Patrol; Fire School; Warning Posts, etc.,” GJMB, NCA, Box 29; Neprud, Flying Minute Men, 120; Keefer, Maine to Mexico, 373-401, 499-523.

165 Warner and Grove, Base Twenty-One, 105-06.

166 The men killed were as follows: Manteo – CAP 1st Lieutenant Frank M. Cook (Concord, N.C.) and 1st Lieutenant Julian L. Cooper (Nashville, N.C.), 21 December 1942; Beaufort – 2nd Lieutenant Guy T. Cherry (Kinston, N.C.), 16 November 1942, Captain H. Leonard Lundquist (Gastonia, N.C.) and Sergeant David S. Williams (Wallace, N.C.), 27 June 1943, and 1st Lieutenant Alfred C. Kendrick (Gastonia, N.C.)
of need [of] an emergency mortuary service.”167 In May, Dr. S.D. Craig of Winston-Salem, president of the State Board of Health, became the EMS chief for the NCCD.168 Craig began surveying North Carolina’s hospitals and blood bank facilities in August and decided to bring in a nurse deputy for the state EMS. In October, Maude T. Brown of Hillsborough became state nurse deputy and commenced surveying all nurses in the state available for work with emergency services or the Red Cross. From the fall of 1942 and into 1943, Craig and Brown organized nine affiliated hospital units ready to assist in local emergencies or care of military wounded, filled blood plasma banks across the state, distributed medical supplies on loan from the federal OCD, trained nurses’ aides for civilian defense work, and promoted Red Cross Nursing Courses.169

To manage the growth of civilian defense more effectively, the state took steps to regulate the deluge of information raining down upon the citizenry. On 1 August, Charles Parker, the former city editor for the Raleigh News and Observer, became the NCCD director of information, handling requests for information and preparing newspaper and magazine articles publicizing the NCCD’s work. Preceding Parker, the state office began a weekly fifteen minute radio program, “North Carolina in Civilian Defense,” which aired on WPTF radio in Raleigh beginning on 7 January to keep citizens informed about civilian defense activities.170 In July, the state office began publication of the War Bulletin, a self-described

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169 S. D. Craig to B. A. Dyar, 9 September 1942, folder labeled “Medical, Craig, S.D. Dr.,” WWII, NCA, Box 193; NCCD, War Bulletin, 12 October 1942, 3; Maude Turner Brown to B.A. Dyar, 13 November 1942, folder labeled “Medical, Craig, S.D. Dr.,” WWII, NCA, Box 193; S. D. Craig, to Robert L. McMillan, 17 January 1944; Maude T. Brown to Robert L. McMillan, 7 January 1943, folder labeled “Coordinators’ Report,” WWII, NCA, Box 159.
“Readers Digest’ of Civilian Defense in North Carolina,” issued every few weeks to provide brief updates on activities both at the state office and local council level.\footnote{171}{NCCD, \textit{War Bulletin}, 20 July 1942, 2. In August 1943, the more elaborate \textit{Home Front} replaced the \textit{War Bulletin}, issued monthly by the NCCD until June 1945. See “Debut of Your Newspaper,” NCCD, \textit{Home Front}, August 1943.} Also that month, the NCCD established a Speakers Bureau under the direction of North Carolina American Legion commander Robert L. McMillan to locate and educate qualified public speakers on an array of defense subjects to boost morale and build support for civilian defense.\footnote{172}{Ben E. Douglas, “Civilian Defense in North Carolina, 31 December 1942,” folder labeled “MC 1.9.11 Council of Defense 1942-1943,” JWHP, NCSU, Box 9.}

The information effort aided the completion of the Citizens Defense Corps and a shift in focus to the development of the Citizens Service Corps. From the beginning of Executive Order 8757, civilian defense at the national level was designed as a two-prong effort between protective services (Citizens Defense Corps) and war services (Citizen Service Corps). LaGuardia – in statements and actions – directed all OCD activity toward protective services, and judged the volunteer and morale-building activities of the service corps as “sissy stuff.” LaGuardia ignored war services until pressure from the Bureau of Budget, the White House, and the general public coerced him into appointing Eleanor Roosevelt as assistant director in charge of volunteer participation on 22 September 1941.

Her five month tenure “proved turbulent,” thanks in part to the appearance of frivolous expenditures at a time of frugality during a national emergency. Congressional debates lambasted “recreational dances” organized by Mrs. Roosevelt at OCD headquarters. The greatest scorn targeted her appointments of actor Melvyn Douglas and her personal friend Mayris Chaney, a professional dancer. Allegedly, each received large salaries, and
Congressmen accused Douglas of communist tendencies and labeled Chaney as a “fan dancer.” These attacks by Congressional critics and the press caused the prestige of the OCD to plummet. Mrs. Roosevelt resigned on 20 February 1942, after completing organization of the Division of Civilian Participation. The fallout from the Congressional outrage over the Chaney-Douglas appointments, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the necessity for a full-time OCD director, and LaGuardia’s multiple leadership positions all bore down on the president to make a change. On 12 January 1942, Roosevelt appointed James M. Landis, Dean of the Harvard Law School, as special assistant to the president for OCD and Landis immediately devoted all his energies to executive OCD duties. LaGuardia subsequently resigned on 10 February 1942 and Landis took over his duties until formally appointed as OCD director on 15 April.¹⁷³

The scope and scale of World War II dwarfed America’s participation in the previous global conflagration. To mobilize the nation’s resources, rationing and price controls stripped store shelves of little more than the necessities of life; bond sales and labor shortages further drained the financial resources and idle time of every American citizen for the war effort. Civilian defense found itself sensitive to the shortages of resources, and thus the criticism Congress leveled against Mrs. Roosevelt’s capricious use of resources was not unfounded. Extensive use of unpaid volunteers allowed the manpower requirements of civilian defense work to be met, but equipping them was another matter. Nationally, few communities possessed the firefighting equipment or other tools for responding to war emergencies. OCD acquisition of equipment for distribution to the states, furthermore, remained contingent on

¹⁷³ Mauck, “Civilian Defense in the United States,” Chapter 4, 5, 11-14; Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense, 46-49; Miller, “The War that Never Came,” 93-162; Lingeman, Don’t You Know There’s a War On?, 36-38. In addition to directing the OCD, LaGuardia remained mayor of New York City and Chairman of the Canadian-American Defense Board.
the armed forces having priority for raw materials. Prior to his replacement, LaGuardia requested funding for OCD equipment, and on 27 January 1942 Roosevelt approved a Congressional appropriation of $100 million dollars to provide “facilities, supplies, and services . . . for the adequate protection of persons and property. . . .” Deficiencies in materials, improvements in the military situation (thus eliminating the need for protective equipment), and problems with distribution contributed to the expenditure of only half of these funds.

Landis took the helm of the OCD at its lowest point in reputation and organizational morale. He emphasized developing the organization, rebuilding the reputation of the agency, and mobilizing volunteer support for OCD and the war. To address the issue of mobilization, Jonathan Daniels, Raleigh-native and editor of the News and Observer, replaced Mrs. Roosevelt. With Daniels working to rebuild the OCD’s reputation and mobilize volunteers, Landis, like LaGuardia, placed initial focus on the protective services due to the military situation, yet pledged to develop the war services as well. Landis’s formal appointment came with a new executive order to streamline the agency and improve inter-agency cooperation. Executive Order 9134, issued 15 April 1942, amended and superseded Executive Order 8757 in its entirety. This order created a Civilian Defense Board (merging the civilian protection and war services under one roof), and omitted the responsibility for sustaining national

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174 For example, the War Production Board refused the release of copper and rubber to manufacture fire hoses and couplings. Substitutes of malleable iron replaced bronze fittings, but required factories to retool for production. See John M. Blum, V Was For Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 226-27; Lingeman, Don’t You Know There’s a War On?, 234-70.


morale. However, by the late summer of 1942, with the threat of enemy air attack diminished and millions of volunteers available, Landis turned OCD attention to the long-neglected war services mission.\(^{178}\)

By the end of September, the North Carolina Citizens Defense Corps achieved complete operational readiness. A state-wide blackout at the end of the month provided the corps with a graduation exercise. The NCCD saw the blackout as “the final test of coordination of air raid warning systems and of the efficiency of Citizens Defense Corps organizations before the Army begins calling for practice blackouts without notice.”\(^{179}\) The test, the first state-wide blackout in the South, occurred on the evening of 29 September.\(^{180}\) More than 100,000 members of the North Carolina Citizens Defense Corps participated, with Civil Air Patrol pilots monitoring from the skies. In 14 of the state’s 17 districts the blackout was universally effective, with the problems in the other three resulting from use of a new alert signal.\(^{181}\) Enforcement of the blackout overall went smoothly state-wide. In Asheville, the blackout assisted law enforcement in an unusual circumstance. A bootlegger apparently “forgot a light in his basement, [and] was found out when police entered his unoccupied home to extinguish the light and discovered four cases of illegal whiskey.”\(^{182}\) Following corrections to the alert system, on 12 November North Carolina became the first state in the


\(^{179}\) NCCD, \textit{War Bulletin}, 8 September 1942, 1.


Fourth Civilian Defense Region to be certified for surprise blackouts.\textsuperscript{183} By the end of September 1942, the NCCD numbered approximately 120,000 civilian defense volunteers.\textsuperscript{184}

Weeks before the blackout, the NCCD began work on the state Citizens Service Corps. Shelved until the completion of the Defense Corps, civilian defense officials in Raleigh acted swiftly to mobilize the state’s citizenry. On 17 September, the State Council held the largest meeting in its existence to formally inaugurate the North Carolina Citizens Service Corps.\textsuperscript{185} As described in an announcement at the meeting, the Citizens Service Corps would be “an army of unpaid civilian workers, mobilized to do the many civilian war jobs that must be done to fortify the Home Front.”\textsuperscript{186} Just as with the defense corps, any citizen, irrespective of race, color, sex, or religion was eligible to join, handling problems resulting from the war’s disruption of daily life.\textsuperscript{187} In North Carolina, potential volunteers had

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} Document titled “Civilian Defense in North Carolina,” 17 September 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense Reports,” WWII, NCA, Box 221; A survey of the state civil defense councils in August 1942 resulted in reports from 92 county councils and three city councils (out of 103 councils statewide) totaling 117,624 volunteers engaged in some sort of civilian defense work. The statement “approximately 120,000” is an educated estimate as to the number by the end of September 1942.
\item \textsuperscript{185} NCCD, \textit{War Bulletin}, 8 September 1942, 1; NCCD, \textit{War Bulletin}, September 14, 1942, 1; NCCD, \textit{War Bulletin}, 21 September 1942, 1. As defined in the NCCD publication \textit{Guide to Victory}: “The Citizens Service Corps is recommended by OCD to handle problems of civilian defense involving the dislocations and disruptions – in homes, businesses and communities – growing out of the transition from the usual business of peace to the unusual business of war; problems growing out of military mobilization – the disruption of family and business ties, the resettlement of families shifted from camp sites, hospitality to soldiers coming to the camps; problems growing out of industrial mobilization – the conversion of industry to war production, the slowdown and shutdown of industries unable to convert, and the quick and sudden concentrations of men and women in areas where industry converts to war production; problems growing out of shortages of metals, food, rubber, gasoline, transportation, manpower; problems growing out of more to spend with less to buy, financing of total war, and the maintenance of essential public services.” See Coates, \textit{Guide to Victory}, 36.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Document titled “North Carolina Office of Civilian Defense Citizens Service Corps,” 17 September 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense Reports,” WWII, NCA, Box 221.
\end{itemize}
to complete a training course that focused on community war service. The state’s paramount goal was “welding the many home war services into unified action.”

To organize the Citizens Service Corps rapidly, the NCCD decentralized the process at a district level. Civilian defense officials divided the state into 20 districts and began meetings at that level after mid-October. As outlined in the NCCD plan of organization, “A major purpose of the Citizens Service Corps is to coordinate war efforts rather than to create new agencies,” to eschew duplication of effort and overlap in missions. An array of organizations, ranging from federal, to civic, to prominent local businesses, were suggested as examples from which to recruit members for the county committees. To assist with the needed volunteers, the state encouraged the committees to coordinate with their local Citizens Volunteer Office, a place where men and women could go to register their services for civilian defense work and be placed in appropriate unpaid jobs. Working with the Service Corps committees at the local level, the Volunteer Office contributed mightily to the growth of the NCCD. By November 1942, North Carolina ranked first in the Fourth Region OCD with 125,100 active civilian defense volunteers (86,630 in the Defense Corps, 34,230 in

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189 NCCD, War Bulletin, 12 October 1942, 1; NCCD, War Bulletin, 27 October 1942, 1; Memorandum from Ben E. Douglas to All Local Councils about “Citizens Service Corps,” 29 September 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense File #2,” GJMB, NCA, Box 27.
190 Ben E. Douglas to all local councils, 29 September 1942, folder labeled “Civilian Defense File #2,” GJMB, NCA, Box 27.
191 As defined in the NCCD publication Guide to Victory: “The Citizens Volunteer Office is recommended by OCD on the theory that there should be some center to which all the citizens of a community might go to volunteer their services, register their names, list their skills, find out the things that need to be done and how they may help to do them. It should be a place where all the human resources of the community may be cataloged, classified and mobilized for use in the protective services of the Citizens Defense Corps and in the multiplying war services of the Citizens Service Corps – a sort of local War Manpower Commission to call for and direct volunteers in meeting the needs and repairing the breaks created by the inroads of war on community life.” See Coates, Guide to Victory, 36-37.
the Service Corps) and an additional 66,386 registered but unassigned volunteers. The NCCD estimated total volunteer involvement at more than 200,000 people.\(^{192}\)

From the fall of 1942 through the end of 1943, the Citizens Service Corps took precedence over the Citizens Defense Corps. Independently, the NCCD named E.D. Johnson as War Records Coordinator at the start of November and began the process of establishing local council war records collectors to preserve the county and community records of civilian defense and home front activities.\(^{193}\) On 15 December 1942, Ben Douglas resigned as NCCD director, and the following day Broughton appointed Robert L. McMillan, head of the Speakers Bureau, to be the third (and final) director of the state civilian defense office. In his resignation letter to the governor, Douglas wrote that “It is my firm belief that you will find that the Citizens Service Corps will answer many perplexing questions of Government.”\(^{194}\)

As Service Corps programs began to multiply, the risk of duplication and waste raised concerns. To maintain a degree of control, the State Defense Council held a meeting on 10 February 1943 with the purpose of coordinating all state, federal, and private organizations involved with service work to “provide the foundation for an over-all plan eliminating overlapping and duplication of effort inevitable in un-coordinated war service.”\(^{195}\) Flexibility mattered tremendously, as the NCCD did not expect every local

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\(^{195}\) North Carolina Council for National Defense, “Coordinating War Services for Unconditional Victory,” 10 February 1943, folder labeled “Lists,” WWII, NCA, Box 210. This meeting was the last where Harrelson oversaw as chairman of the North Carolina Council of National Defense, having resigned on 27 February 1943 after being ordered to active duty in the U.S. Army. Broughton appointed William B. Umstead of Durham on 27 May 1943 to replace Harrelson. Umstead himself resigned on 13 March 1944 due to his work as campaign manager for R. Gregg Cherry’s campaign for governor. Broughton
council to have identical programs. The Fourth Regional Office of the OCD praised the state
civilian defense efforts, believing this course of planning satisfactory not only for the state
but for the entire civilian defense region. In March, the NCCD created the position of
special assistant to the director for the Citizens Service Corps and appointed Jennie Craven to
act as a field representative for local councils and to further regulate the expansion of the
Service Corps. A final culminating aspect of the Service Corps took place in June with the
creation of the North Carolina Recreation Committee to coordinate recreational programs
state-wide. Under the direction of Russell M. Grumman (director) and Dr. Harold D. Meyer
(coordinator and executive secretary), the Recreation Committee blossomed from summer
1943 until the end of the war. OCD director Landis thought Meyer’s organization of the
recreation committee so well thought out that he recommended it to other state defense
councils.

1943 – The Transitional Year

The year 1943 featured the apex of the Citizens Service Corps, but would conclude
with the eventual draw down of both state and national civilian defense efforts. From 1943 to
the end of the war, the Service Corps work superseded the Defense Corps in priority of
manpower and activities in North Carolina. Local communities bore the small costs of this

subsequently appointed Judge Henry L. Stevens of Warsaw as State Council chairman on 15 March 1944
“for the duration of the war.” See John W. Harrelson to J. Melville Broughton, 27 February 1943, folder
labeled “MC 1.9.11 Council of Defense 1942-1943,” JWHP, NCSU, Box 9; William B. Umstead to J.
Melville Broughton, 31 May 1943; J. Melville Broughton to William B. Umstead, 28 May 1943; William
B. Umstead to J. Melville Broughton, 13 March 1944; J. Melville Broughton to William B. Umstead, 14
March 1944; press release from Governor’s Office, 15 March 1944, folder labeled “N.C. Council for
National Defense – 1941-45,” GJMB, NCA, Box 35.  
196 Charles H. Murchison to Charles Parker, 26 February 1943, folder labeled “Regional Office,” WWII,
NCA, Box 163.  
198 Report titled “Recreation on the March: Organization Meeting of the North Carolina Recreation
Committee, State Office of Civilian Defense, Raleigh, June 11, 1943,” folder labeled “Recreation,” WWII,
NCA, Box 156; James M. Landis to Harold D. Meyer, 7 July 1943, folder labeled “Civilian Defense File
#3,” GJMB, NCA, Box 28.
work relying on increasing numbers of unpaid volunteers. This service work mirrored in many respects the activities of the defense council work in World War I, mobilizing large numbers of men and women to sustain the home front against the strains of war time necessities.

Of future importance, on 9 March the General Assembly passed the North Carolina Emergency War Powers Act. The bill authorized the governor, with the approval of the Council of State, to prepare North Carolina for, and mobilize the resources of the state, for any emergency caused by enemy attack, natural disaster, or manmade accident. Through the legislation, the governor received authority for the “organization and coordination of civilian defense in the State in reasonable conformity with the program of civilian defense as promulgated from time to time by the Office of Civilian Defense of the federal government,” to order and execute blackouts, radio silences, evacuations, and other precautionary measures for air raids or other enemy actions. The Emergency War Powers Act permitted the NCCD and state law enforcement to charge any violators of civilian defense or military orders, rules, and regulations with misdemeanors, notably in regard to blackouts. Granted, law enforcement arrested and fined blackout violators in 1942, but apparently these matters were handled on a county-by-county basis, without a uniform policy prior to the Emergency War Powers Act.

Despite the countless volunteer opportunities in the Citizens Service Corps, the improving war news in 1943 caused interest in civilian defense to wane. Nationally, the number of civilian defense volunteers began to decline in the summer of 1943 with the

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reduced threat of air attack, therefore warranting a reduction in Defense Corps personnel. In February, Chambliss noted that the problem in some counties stemmed from the local council leadership: “where we have active Chairmen, with a volunteer office, we get results, otherwise we don’t.” In May and June, Chambliss recommended that the state hold blackout tests to stimulate civilian defense volunteers for eastern counties. Other state regional directors – George K. Snow and R. W. Martin – by late summer reported “no let-up of interest” in the western half of the state and declared that civilian defense “is moving along.” Chambliss likewise acknowledged that although a lull in civilian defense activities existed, he reaffirmed that “I think our people are standing by and will be willing at all times to respond to any definite program.” As of June 1943, the NCCD had approximately 205,000 volunteers enrolled in civilian defense a slight increase from December.

The national decline in civilian defense volunteerism produced a deleterious effect on the Office of Civilian Defense. While Roosevelt supported the continuation of civilian defense as a means to engage the public in the war effort, privately Landis lost faith in the national program. A Bureau of Budget report in May 1943 noted that problems from the fall of 1942 remained with the OCD. In August 1943, Landis resigned as OCD director to accept a diplomatic mission in Cairo. In his resignation letter, Landis recommended to Roosevelt

204 Norman Y. Chambliss to Robert L. McMillan, 26 May 1943; Norman Y. Chambliss to C.G. Yates, 10 June 1943, folder labeled “1943 Norman Chambliss,” WWII, NCA, Box 153.
206 Norman Y. Chambliss to Robert L. McMillan, 4 September 1943, folder labeled “Coordinators’ Reports,” WWII, NCA, Box 153.
207 Charles Parker to Ralph T. Bradbeer, Jr., 28 June 1943, folder labeled “Copies from Charlie Parker’s Office,” WWII, NCA, Box 153.
that the OCD be abolished and the Defense and Service Corps programs be transferred to the War Department and Office of Community War Services of the Federal Security Agency. Landis felt that this action could be undertaken because the state and local councils nationwide were “capable of discharging [their] responsibilities. . . .” Despite Landis’s high opinion of the state and local defense councils, Roosevelt did not abolish the OCD and John B. Martin, Landis’s deputy, took over as acting director, who in turn “produced no significant changes in OCD’s organization or programs.”

The deactivation of the Aircraft Warning Service followed Landis’s departure from the OCD. Beginning on 4 October 1943, the War Department curtailed the activities of all ground observers, plotters, tellers, and filterers for all the information and filter centers on the eastern seaboard. The War Department acknowledged the change thanks in part to “a mechanical device [radar] which is very accurate and can detect all aircraft headed towards our shores,” negating the need for observers and filters nation-wide. This action released approximately 600,000 civilian defense volunteers for civilian defense work in other areas, notably the Service Corps. In North Carolina, the October orders inactivated the Raleigh and Charlotte Filter Centers, and the Wilmington Information Center. Weeks later, the Fourth Region civilian defense directors and the army agreed to discontinue surprise blackout drills, due in part to “the Allied military successes, as well as a thorough appreciation of the

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212 Frank W. Blauvelt to Civilian Defense Air Raid Warning District Personnel, 6 October 1943, folder labeled “1943 Aircraft Warning Service,” WWII, NCA, Box 153.
tendency on the part of the public to consider practice drills and blackouts as wasted time and effort. . . “214 The army publicly stated that semi-surprise drills would continue on a periodic basis to maintain the readiness of protective service personnel.215

In October, the NCCD issued new statements of policy for the use of local civilian defense councils. At a conference for the Fourth Region directors in October 1943, North Carolina joined with other states in calling for the discontinuation of surprise blackout drills.216 The state civilian defense directors, however, desired a continuation of the Defense Corps’s personnel and capabilities. In a policy statement, the directors declared:

The protective forces of Civilian Defense should and must be kept intact for the protection of our communities in the event of widespread sabotage, fires, or other community catastrophes during the war. This is true irrespective of whether we ever have enemy air raids. If none of these ever occur, Civilian Defense will have been necessary and worthwhile as insurance against them.217

In the wake of the deactivation of the Aircraft Warning Service, Broughton asked McMillan whether the War Department’s actions would justify a reduction in employed civilian defense personnel and the future of civilian defense.218 On 10 November, six representatives from the Fourth Regional OCD headquarters visited Raleigh and together with several of the NCCD personnel responded to three questions from McMillan, should civilian defense be continued and if so for how long and with what changes or adjustments. The respondents all agreed that

215 “Army Says Air Raid Drills Must be Conducted Regularly,” Home Front, NCCD, December 1943, 1, 4.
217 “Statement of Policy of State Directors in Region Four in Conference with Fourth Regional Officials of Civilian Defense,” undated but listed as not to be released before 20 October 1943, folder labeled “East Coast Conference,” WWII, NCA, Box 154.
218 J. Melville Broughton to Robert L. McMillan, 4 October 1943, folder labeled “1943 Governor Broughton,” WWII, NCA, Box 153.
certain aspects of civilian defense should continue for the duration of the war (notably auxiliary police and fire programs) – and the majority believed that both Defense Corps and Service Corps ought to be maintained for the duration.\(^{219}\)

Evidently, the idea that civilian defense personnel could be utilized for non-military functions engrained itself in the minds of state and regional civilian defense officials in 1943. The 1942 agreement with the Red Cross, however, had tasked natural disaster response to their organization, not the NCCD. This shift in civilian defense usage can partially be explained in the drawdown of OCD nationally, with government officials pursuing alternative roles for civilian defense either out of altruistic reasons or for the self-serving motive of job security. Whatever the true reasons, the idea of using civilian defense for non-military emergencies became entrenched due to practical experience with natural and man-made disasters.

A shift to combating local emergencies and natural disasters proved poignant for North Carolina civilian defense volunteers in 1943. On 19 April, a tornado almost completely destroyed the tiny town of Roxobel, killing seven, injuring 15, and destroying or damaging every building in the community. Civilian defense personnel throughout Bertie County converged on the scene and Defense Corps members assisted the survivors until the Red Cross arrived to assume responsibility for the disaster scene.\(^{220}\) NCCD volunteers responded to an even worse disaster on 16 December, when a northbound Atlantic Coast Line train struck the derailed cars of a southbound train in Rennert. Seventy-two people, mostly servicemen, died, and an additional 187 passengers suffered injuries in the deadliest train

wreck in North Carolina history. Civilian defense emergency medical services personnel from Lumberton and Red Springs raced to the scene to assist military personnel from Fort Bragg and Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base in treating the injured. Civilian defense volunteers worked with acetylene torches to cut through the wreckage to remove dead and injured, while other volunteers fed the rescue workers, comforted the survivors, and aided the staff at the two Lumberton hospitals in treating the injured.\footnote{221}

At the OCD, however, the War Department’s actions in October forced a reevaluation and curtailment of civilian defense operations. In December, after having been informed by the War Department of the minimal risk of enemy air raids and need for greater volunteerism in Service Corps work, the OCD completed plans to reduce office staff and protection services nationwide.\footnote{222} Acting director Martin wrote to Broughton on 23 December and informed him of reductions at the OCD office, but reassured the governor that “This action on our part is not a demobilization of Civilian Defense at the National level, but a readjustment to meet the changing picture.”\footnote{223} Martin acknowledged that the states should continue to maintain civilian defense protective and war service programs for the duration of the war. Broughton in his reply affirmed that “we shall undoubtedly continue the operation of

\footnote{221}{ Interstate Commerce Commission, \textit{Investigation No. 2751: The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company Report in Re. Accident Near Rennert, N.C., on December 16, 1943} (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 18 January 1944); S. D. Craig to J. Melville Broughton, 29 December 1943, folder labeled “Civilian Defense File 5,” GJMB, NCA, Box 28; “CD Gives Aid Quickly at Train Wreck,” \textit{Home Front}, NCCD, January 1944, 1, 3. The cause was determined to be a “failure to provide adequate protection for derailed cars which fouled adjacent main track.” A rail fractured on the one set of tracks, cause three cars to derail onto the adjacent tracks. Despite warnings of the fouled tracks and application of the emergency brake, the oncoming train could not avoid a collision.}

\footnote{222}{ Mauck, “Civilian Defense in the United States,” Chapter 5, 11-14.}

\footnote{223}{ John B. Martin to J. Melville Broughton, 23 December 1943, folder labeled “1943 Governor Broughton,” WWII, NCA, Box 153.}
our Civilian Defense work in North Carolina,” but added “with such adjustments as may be needed from time to time in the light of changed circumstances.”  

1944 to VE Day – Shutting down the NCCD

In January 1944, Broughton and McMillan reevaluated the state civilian defense office in the wake of the OCD’s curtailment of its activities. Part of the federal funding for the Defense Corps in the state consisted of loans of federal property, notably medical and firefighting equipment, which as of January 1944 totaled between $400,000 and $500,000. McMillan and state property officer R.W. Martin informed Broughton of the strong possibility that this equipment should be left in the state, and to “move in the direction necessary to promote this probability.” An additional financial factor, NCCD personnel costs, entered into the equation for Broughton. From 1942 to 1945, the NCCD budgets averaged $65,000, mostly for salaries and travel expenses. Considering the decline in federal civilian defense funding for equipment and personnel for protective operations, Broughton appears to have decided by the end of January that the NCCD would also draw down and not project its programs into the post-war era. In a letter to Martin, Broughton wrote, “It is my view that civilian defense is essentially an emergency and temporary organization . . . it is not our intention to project its activities beyond the war emergency.”

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224 J. Melville Broughton to John B. Martin, 27 December 1943, folder labeled “1943 Governor Broughton,” WWII, NCA, Box 153.
Internally, Broughton informed McMillan of this opinion, and asked him to give “immediate consideration . . . to the reduction, if not entire elimination, of expense” to civilian defense beyond what was absolutely necessary. McMillan agreed with Broughton on both points. Across the state, cities and counties began to dismantle Defense Corps programs and civilian defense personnel either left the program or joined the Service Corps.

The dismantling of civilian defense in North Carolina paralleled the federal OCD’s drawdown in 1944. In February, Martin resigned as OCD director, succeeded by retired Lt. General William N. Haskell. Historian Elwyn Mauck observes that Haskell presided over “the gradual curtailment of OCD’s activities pointing toward the early termination of the agency,” continuing the shift in emphasis from protection to war services and a reduction in the federal staff. Locally, enthusiasm for Service Corps work remained high as the NCCD arranged to hold area conferences at the end of March. The Fourth Regional Office field representative Harold O. Rogers acknowledged how the conference would “to determine the attitude of the communities in the state toward Civilian Defense in all of its phases . . . to clear up misunderstandings, to evaluate accomplishments, and to formulate a state policy for the future.”

A series of area civilian defense conferences in March 1944 began the drawdown of the NCCD civilian defense program. Following the conferences, McMillan reached the

233 Harold O. Rogers to W. S. Frost, 3 April 1944, folder labeled “March 1, 1944 – April 30, 1944,” WWII, NCA, Box 167.
conclusion that “it is apparent that our local Councils are prepared to mobilize Defense Corps Units on reasonable notice to deal with whatever emergency may arise, whether from enemy action or other cause.”

State and military officials recommended that the local councils reduce their expenses, and the state office informed local councils that they were free to decide whether or not Defense Corps units could perform Service Corps work. The state effectively yielded directorship of civilian defense activities to the prerogative of counties and communities. Satisfied with the quality of the local council leadership and the improved war situation, McMillan informed Broughton that “we do not need as extensive personnel with the State office as we needed formerly.”

From April to July, Craven, Snow, Brown, Martin and Chambliss resigned. By the start of July, the state NCCD paid staff consisted of McMillan, public information officer C. A. Upchurch, two clerks and two stenographers. Assistant director Junius H. Rose served on a temporary basis for the remainder of the summer.

Nationally, Haskell ordered the abolishment of the regional OCD offices on 7 June (effective 1 July), and by September the federal OCD staff numbered less than 100.

The March 1944 conferences also reinforced the idea of transforming civilian defense into a form of emergency preparedness service. In a report to the OCD Fourth Regional Office, Rogers noted how among the county representatives “Major interest centered around

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234 Robert L. McMillan to all local civilian defense councils, April 1944, folder labeled “Conferences – General File,” WWII, NCA, Box 162.
235 Robert L. McMillan to J. Melville Broughton, 4 April 1944, folder labeled “Conferences – General File,” WWII, NCA, Box 162.
236 Mrs. Walter G. Craven to Robert L. McMillan, 6 April 1944, folder labeled “Mrs. Walter Craven,” WWII, NCA, Box 160; “Mrs. Craven, Snow Leaves OCD Posts for New Positions,” Home Front, NCCD, April 1944, 1, 4; Robert L. McMillan to J. Melville Broughton, 4 April 1944; Robert L. McMillan to J. Melville Broughton, 22 June 1944; press release from Governor’s Office, 26 June 1944, folder labeled “Governor Broughton,” WWII, NCA, Box 167; William N. Haskell, Administrative Order No. 38, “Abolition of Civilian Defense Regional Offices, 7 June 1944, no folder, WWII, NCA, Box 166.
the use of the defense corps units in natural disasters, tornado, fire train wrecks, flood, etc.”

Rogers continued:

I would like to offer the opinion, by way of suggestion, and it is no new idea, that a most interesting and valuable training program could be developed by the region, naturally in consultation with the state directors. The American Red Cross disaster chairman has no ready made organization and must develop one at the time of disaster. OCD does have the organization personnel.238

At Roxobel and Rennert, the Red Cross’s lack of immediate response ability highlighted the utility and availability of the civilian defense volunteers for emergency relief work. In those disasters, civilian defense personnel arrived immediately on the scene, administered first aid, and commenced search and rescue missions until the Red Cross arrived. Undoubtedly, the training and organizational effectiveness of local civil defense personnel saved lives in Rennert.

Before the NCCD completely faded away, Mother Nature gave civilian defense one last emergency to confront. On 14 September, the “Great Atlantic Hurricane of 1944” passed just east of Cape Hatteras before proceeding north and slamming into Long Island the following day. In North Carolina, the storm killed one person ashore and sank the U.S. Coast Guard Cutters *Jackson* and *Bedloe* off Oregon Inlet with the loss of 47 men. Serious flooding devastated the Outer Banks town of Avon, where 96 out of 115 homes suffered damage or were washed off their foundations.239 McMillan and Rose placed the NCCD on alert, mobilized Defense Corps volunteers along the coast, evacuated residents from Carolina and Wrightsville beaches, and coordinated with the State Highway Patrol and Army officials for

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238 Harold O. Rogers to W. S. Frost, 3 April 1944, folder labeled “March 1, 1944 – April 30, 1944,” WWII, NCA, Box 167.
communication and emergency transportation capabilities. OCD Director Haskell praised the work of the state’s civilian defense volunteers for their rapid response.

The response to the hurricane represented the last major action by the NCCD. Prior to the hurricane, Broughton and McMillan discussed the closing of the NCCD state office at the end of 1944. For 1945, the proposed NCCD office would exist on “inactive” status with a volunteer director, a lone secretary or stenographer, and a tiny budget. Should conditions change, the office would be reactivated, but civilian defense work for 1945 would be “primarily the work of local Civilian Defense Councils.” The governor agreed with McMillan’s recommendation to deactivate the NCCD. In October, the governor accepted his resignation. However, the failure of Operation Market Garden and the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) in the fall of 1944 shifted estimates about the conclusion of the war in Europe, and altered the psychological situation on the home front. Broughton therefore asked McMillan to rescind his resignation and continue operation of the NCCD, albeit in more of a ceremonial capacity.

On 30 June 1945, the end of the fiscal year, both the NCCD and OCD ended their operations. President Harry S. Truman ordered the OCD abolished, despite Haskell’s request

240 Press release from Governor’s Office, 19 September 1944, folder labeled “Governor Broughton,” WWII, NCA, Box 167.
241 William N. Haskell to J. Melville Broughton, 3 October 1944, folder labeled “Governor Broughton,” WWII, NCA, Box 167.
that the agency continue due to its value in maintaining civilian morale. Truman announced his decision on 2 May and urged that state and local councils continue their civilian defense volunteer activities. On 2 June, Truman issued Executive Order 9562, terminating the Office of Civilian Defense effective 30 June. Of critical importance to North Carolina and other states, the order declared that all OCD property would be transferred to the Department of Commerce, and the Secretary of Commerce assumed responsibility for the storage, care, transportation, inspection, and disposition of civilian defense property in accordance with the Surplus Property Act of 1944. The local communities and counties would therefore be able to purchase protective equipment at a discounted value. 

Newly-elected Governor Robert Gregg Cherry officially notified McMillan on 13 June that the NCCD would be terminated as a full-time state agency at the end of the month. Cherry asked McMillan to remain in a volunteer capacity as state civilian defense director, and wrote to county council chairmen asking them to serve until the defeat of Japan. Local councils and communities across the state continued civilian defense functions in varying degrees into the fall of 1945. Nevertheless, on 1 July 1945, another chapter concluded in the civilian defense history of North Carolina.

Conclusion

North Carolina’s mobilization efforts in World War I and World War II are notably similar. The two state defense councils, accompanied with the Office of Civilian Defense in the latter conflict, comprised a cross section of predominantly professional white, middle and

upper-class citizens, drawn from the ranks of state government, business, and education. These councils remained small in number and operated with extremely modest budgets. Often the staff members worked for the council while on loan from other state agencies. Acting in accordance with suggested federal guidelines of organization and program activities, these state councils recruited and mobilized large numbers of North Carolinians to volunteer their time, without pay, for protective and service activities during wartime. Appointed chairmen of local councils – typically community leaders – remained in state practice for both wars. Rarely did the state councils act independently of federal actions or policies. Much like their federal counterparts, North Carolina viewed their state mobilization/civilian defense efforts as temporary measures in response to the national war emergency.

Returning to the opening questions of why North Carolina served as a model state civilian defense effort in World War II, and what civilian defense meant for state citizens, a few conclusions emerge. Unlike World War I, North Carolina in World War II mobilized all residents, including women and African Americans, with the establishment of the State Council of National Defense in November 1940. This development increased the reach of civilian defense programs into both the urban and dispersed rural communities. Partly as a result, North Carolina’s model of civilian defense met all of the tasks presented to it by the federal government. North Carolina led the Fourth Region of OCD in civilian defense volunteer enrollment. State officials organized local councils, recruited and trained civilian defense volunteers, and executed federal policy and programs in complete cooperation with the United States military establishment. All of this was achieved by a relatively poor state with a minimum of funds, a small state office staff, and limited federal persuasion.
Civilian defense for North Carolinians initially became associated with protective measures, but later fostered the idea of using the organization for emergency preparedness and response. Unlike World War I, where mobilization and service work represented the sum of volunteer possibilities, the World War II effort required citizens to prepare the homeland for enemy attack. Although civilian defense remained a temporary organization, local counties and communities recognized the value of auxiliary police, firefighters, emergency medical services, and air raid wardens in combating local emergencies and natural disasters. This idea of taking a temporary wartime organization and employing it for non-military, state-centric purposes gained traction throughout the war. The idea of civilian defense-as-peace time emergency services, together with actual examples of this capability in responding to a tornado, train wreck, and hurricane, gave thoughtful local and state officials the opportunity to see the value of maintaining civil defense capabilities in the postwar period. Although Service Corps activities remained the thrust of civilian defense efforts from 1943 to 1945, the utility and purpose of civilian defense, in the eyes of local and state government, remained fixed upon the Defense Corps and protective operations. The ideas, training, and memories of the Citizens Defense Corps from World War II, therefore, would play an important role in postwar civilian defense and emergency preparedness planning.

The state policy of emphasizing county-level organization proved itself effective for the function of civilian defense in both conflicts. With executive appointments of county chairmen, the State Council ensured the loyalty of these individuals to the state government. Failure to perform the requested programs of the state office resulted in reports from state assistant directors to the executive officials in Raleigh, wherein the governor or the Executive Committee could request action or outright replacement. State civilian defense officials
recognized that counties and community volunteers won or lost the battle of home front preparedness, and likewise accomplished the directives of the federal government. The establishment and operation of county councils would remain the foundation of North Carolina’s civil defense program in the 1950s.

Thoughts of employing civilian defense organization for peacetime emergencies and the emphasis on county-level organization did not disappear in peacetime. In the wartime milieu, state and local officials and residents recognized the merits of a temporary, federal program and the potential to adapt civilian defense to the rural, economically underdeveloped North Carolina. While Broughton and Cherry chose to terminate the NCCD, the practitioners of civilian defense would reemerge five years later with their wartime ideas and experiences to guide the organization’s rebirth, and establish emergency preparedness as a permanent function of state and local government.
Figure 3. North Carolina Office of Civilian Defense area organization, 1942 – 1944. Source: Created from information obtained in North Carolina Archives, Raleigh, N.C.

Area 1 - Norman Y. Chambliss (Red)  
Area 2 - Junius H. Rose (Green)  
Area 3 - R.W. Martin (White)  
Area 4 - George K. Snow (Yellow)
Figure 4. North Carolina Office of Civilian Defense organizational chart, May 1942 – April 1944. Solid lines indicate direction; dashed lines coordination. Source: Created from information obtained in North Carolina Archives, Raleigh, N.C.
Figure 5. Organizational chart for county and local defense councils, as suggested by the North Carolina Office of Civilian Defense, 1943. Source: Created from information obtained in North Carolina Archives, Raleigh, N.C.
Figure 6. Theodore S. Johnson (seated) and Ben E. Douglas (standing) discuss the transition of the state directorship of the NCCD, May 1942. Source: North Carolina Archives, Raleigh, N.C.
Figure 7. The new NCCD staff meets in Raleigh, May 1942. From left to right, Norman Y. Chambliss, George K. Snow, Junius H. Rose, Ben E. Douglas, Major D. A. Herrin, R. Walker Martin, and William F. Nufer. Source: North Carolina Archives, Raleigh, N.C.
Figure 10. Scene of the destruction from the December 1943 Atlantic Coast Line disaster at Rennert, N.C. Responding to the disaster, the NCCD demonstrated capabilities beyond home front defense. Source: “CD Gives Aid Quickly at Train Wreck,” *Home Front, NCCD*, January 1944, 2.
Chapter 2: Compromised Planning and the Atomic Threat

Because of developments in this air-atomic age, the United States can no longer be free from the danger of a sudden devastating attack against the homeland. . . Since there can be no absolute military defense, an effective civil defense is vital to the future security of the United States because it might provide the means whereby this country, if suddenly attacked heavily and without warning, could get up off the floor to fight back.
– United States Civil Defense, September 1950

On 21 January 1952, the North Carolina Council of Civil Defense (NCCD) announced the only visit of the “Alert America” convoy in the state. The massive civil defense display could be seen at the U.S. Army Armory in Winston-Salem, from February 1st through the 4th. An audio-visual extravaganza consisting of ten semi-trucks and trailers, the joint undertaking between the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) and the Valley Forge Foundation sought to “demonstrate the hazards of modern warfare and the whole story of Civil Defense as preparation of the homefront against it,” touted the North Carolina press release. Nationally, the FCDA planned the “Alert America” convoy to traverse the United States, presenting civil defense as a military necessity and civic duty to galvanize the general public to volunteer for civil defense work and support local, state, and

249 NCCD press release, “Announcement of Only North Carolina Showing of Alert America, Winston Salem – February 1-2-3-4,” 21 January 1952, folder labeled “Freedoms Foundation,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 10. There are two versions of this press release, both titled and dated the same, but the wording is different. This quote originates from what appears to be the earlier draft.
federal efforts to prepare the nation for the possibility of enemy attack. For the NCCD, the state headquarters hoped to use the Winston-Salem show to “create much public interest in Civil Defense and the need for it, as well as the service it renders,” adding, “If used correctly the exhibit can be used to sign up all of the needed volunteers” for the state civil defense effort.

NCCD director Elbert Zed “E.Z.” Jones, in an article for The State magazine on 26 January, emphasized the importance of the “Alert America” convoy to the state’s citizens. He acknowledged that the NCCD ranked among the top six of the nation, but noted that “Civil Defense has progressed in each municipality in direct ratio to the degree of interest and support demonstrated by local civil authorities.” While some counties and communities possessed viable, capable civil defense organizations, other parts of the state seemed oblivious to the threat of nuclear attack. Jones continued: “Frankly, neither North Carolina nor the nation is in any position to withstand even a slight attack upon our citizens. That condition will not be improved until local authorities take stock of themselves, check their communities’ needs and discharge the responsibility vested in them when they were elected.”

Jones’ message possibly fell on deaf ears. A reported 9,466 visitors attended the state “Alert America” exhibition, less than a quarter of a percent of the state’s population, but

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Grossman acknowledges that as part of the national civil defense public relations campaign, “Alert America” focused on ingratiating three messages in the public: Cold War patriotism, national responsibility for civil defense, and conveying these messages of the manageability of nuclear weapons.


252 “Defense Exhibit: North Carolina is helpless; Civil Defense train to show what atomic warfare is like,” The State, 26 January 1952, 11, 32.
the 5,500 visitors in the first two days represented the largest turnout per capita in any city visited by the convoy to date.  

Months later, on 22 April, Jones served as North Carolina’s sole representative at the Nevada Proving Grounds to witness Shot Charlie of Operation Tumbler. Shot Charlie consisted of a 31-kiloton atomic bomb dropped from a B-50 bomber and detonated 3,400 feet above the ground. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for the first time permitted, even encouraged members of Congress, civil defense officials, and the press to witness an atomic test at its secret continental test site. Jones reported before the blast, “I feel confident that if every North Carolinian could be an eye-witness to such an event that our major Civil Defense problem – that of apathetic public officials would be solved.” As he and other officials observed the flash of the detonation followed by a tremendous roar and shockwave, a monstrous mushroom cloud of boiling colors, smoke, and radioactive fission products rose to 35,000 feet in altitude. Days later, aircraft detected some of these fission products over Wilmington, Jacksonville, New Bern, and Elizabeth City. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in September 1952, Jones reported that “the state is not ready, by any possible stretch of


imagination, to withstand the impact, either psychological or physical, of even an ordinary bomb. An atomic attack would be disastrous.”

From 1945 to 1952, North Carolina and the nation reestablished civil defense organizations to prepare the American people for the new threat of enemy attack with nuclear weapons. From 1945 to 1950, several planning efforts by the United States military and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) attempted to distill the lessons from the defunct Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) with the goal of creating a new national civil defense effort to provide every American a means of survival. These efforts, while substantial, produced a less than ideal piece of national legislation in the fall of 1950. The FCDA represented a compromise on civil defense. Developments in the Cold War abroad, government reorganization, and political differences in Washington between Congress and the White House all inhibited the renewal of American civil defense.

How and why civil defense returned in its 1950 form and function is the main theme of this chapter. For North Carolina, civil defense vanished from government and public interest after World War II. In late 1949, the state began to reinvestigate the need for a new council of civil defense, riding the national wave of public advocacy for the government to protect citizens from enemy attack. The ensuing rebirth of the NCCD in July 1950 and the accompanying legislation passed in April 1951 broadly mirrored suggested legislation provided by the federal government. With limited personnel and funding, the new NCCD distributed tons of publications, assisted with community drills, and made marked headway with scant resources. Apathy towards and disinterest in civil defense by public officials,

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together with limited resources relegated the state and local civil defense efforts to only minimal preparations against potential enemy attack.

* A New Sun and the Ominous Threat to America

On the morning of 6 August 1945, 26-year old Major Thomas W. Ferebee, from Mocksville, N.C. adjusted his M-9B Norden bombsight in the nose of the B-29 Superfortress *Enola Gay*. At 8:14AM, 31,000 feet over Hiroshima, Japan, Ferebee peered though his bombsight as the planned aiming point, the T-shaped Aioi Bridge, came into view. At precisely 8:15:17AM, he released the 9,700 pound “Little Boy” atomic bomb containing 140 pounds of enriched uranium U-235. At 8:16AM, the bomb detonated at 1,900 feet over the courtyard of the Shima Hospital, releasing the equivalent of 16,000 tons of TNT. The bomb destroyed an estimated 4.7 square miles of the city, initially killing approximately 80,000 inhabitants, while the combination of the blast and subsequent conflagration destroyed 69 percent of the city’s buildings. Over 90 percent of the city’s medical personnel died or suffered injuries in the bombing, and only three out of 48 hospitals remained usable. The death toll from radiation, blast, and heat-inflicted injuries raised the death toll to more than 140,000 people. The bomb vaporized those closest to the epicenter, leaving only shadowy outlines of people and objects against the few surfaces able to withstand the weapon’s force. On 9 August, a second B-29 carrying the “Fat Man” atomic bomb containing 14 pounds of plutonium Pu-239 detonated at 11:02AM over Nagasaki. A more efficient design, the bomb exploded with a yield of 22 kilotons, killing approximately 35,000 to 70,000 inhabitants and destroying 1.8 square miles of the city. As a result of the atomic blasts and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, on 14 August the Imperial Japanese government agreed to
surrender to the Allied forces. The formal surrender ceremony took place on 2 September on the deck of the battleship USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay. World War II was over.²⁵⁷

Prior to a North Carolinian releasing the first nuclear weapon in combat, the world entered the atomic age on 16 July 1945. Exactly at 5:29:45AM in the Jornada del Muerto valley near Alamogordo, New Mexico, a plutonium implosion device (essentially the Fat Man bomb design) detonated with a yield of 20 kilotons. The blast, code named Trinity, vaporized the 100-foot steel tower holding the weapon aloft and was felt and seen by outsiders as far as 150 miles distant. The explosion concluded the work of the Manhattan Project, begun in 1939 under utmost secrecy. Costing an estimated $1.9 billion, the project produced the most powerful weapon known in history, and presented military officials with a quantum leap in offensive firepower along with an absolute nightmare of preparedness and protection issues.²⁵⁸

Americans greeted news of the atomic bombs and the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender with both jubilation and apprehension. Historian Paul Boyer points out that “the United States at the moment of victory perceived itself naked and vulnerable. Sole possessors and users of a devastating new instrument of mass destruction, Americans envisioned themselves not as a potential threat to other peoples, but as potential victims.” The


bomb represented a tool for victory, but also injected deep-seated fear into a nation traditionally protected by the broad expanses of two oceans. To military professionals and civilian strategists, the new atomic weapons represented more than just a mere piece of weaponry; the bomb posed the potential for swift, sudden, and decisive blows against an adversary. Whereas the firebombing of Tokyo on the evening of 9 – 10 March 1945 required 279 aircraft and 1,665 tons of bombs to kill 5,300 people per square mile, a single plane with a single bomb killed three to four times that number per square mile in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Almost naturally, writes nuclear strategist Lawrence Freedman, policymakers recognized “the logic of retaliation as the best deterrent to aggression.”

Even before the surrender of either the Japanese or Germans, the military began a study of the effectiveness of aerial bombardment. On the directive of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson established the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) on 3 November 1944. The survey studied the aerial attacks on Germany to establish a foundation for analysis of air power’s strategic uses and planning for future development of the American military forces and national economic policies. In the wake of the Japanese surrender, Truman authorized the survey to study the effects of air attacks on Japan as well. When the survey released its report on the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in June 1946, it acknowledged how the investigators kept asking, “What if the
target for the bomb had been an American City." Discussing such matters as building materials, population densities, and the comparison of American cities to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the sobering reality became apparent:

Scattered through those findings . . . are the clues to the measures that can be taken to cut down potential losses of lives and property. But if a policy is laid down, well in advance of any crisis, it will enable timely decentralization of industrial and medical facilities, construction or blueprinting of shelters, and preparation for life-saving evacuation programs. . . . If we recognize in advance the possible danger and act to forestall it, we shall at worst suffer minimum casualties and disruption.264

While the feasibility and practicality of dispersion can be debated, the other proposals of the survey certainly could be met by government planners.

The USSBS report further detailed the aspects of shelters, decentralization, and civilian defense. At Nagasaki, several hundred inhabitants survived the blast close to ground zero in tunnel shelters. “Carefully built shelters, though unoccupied, stood up well in both cities,” concluded the report.265 In a final recommendation for civilian defense, the report reiterated the need for immediate planning and recommended advanced planning for evacuation and sheltering of urban residents.266

Domestically, another civilian defense-directed study gathered data in the summer of 1945. On 16 July 1945, hours after the Trinity device ushered in the atomic age, General Thomas T. Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, approved a recommendation for the War Department to commence postwar civilian defense planning. On 4 August, the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces sent a memorandum to the Provost Marshal General (PMG) to study plans and problems for postwar civilian defense against enemy action.

263 USSBS, Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 36.
265 USSBS, Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 38.
266 USSBS, Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 41-43.
directed at civilians. This study would also identify the agency responsible for planning postwar civilian defense and for implementing these plans. The PMG tabbed Lt. Colonel Barnet W. Beers, an experienced army officer familiar with civilian defense matters, to oversee the production of the study. Throughout the 1945 – 1950 period of postwar planning, Beers remained a constant adviser for government officials.

With a mere handful of people, Beers and his team worked several months to produce Study 3B-1, *Defense Against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians*. Classified and released on 30 April 1946, the study group analyzed the British, German, and Japanese efforts, and expressed admiration for the advanced planning and meticulous implementation of the British program. Perhaps, as historian Lyon G. Tyler acknowledges, this admiration influenced the decision to reject the term “civilian defense” and substitute “civil defense” to describe the postwar American effort. Civil encompassed defense of the people, economy,

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269 *Study 3B-1*, 60-68. The Jordan study has a valuable primer about the British civil defense effort in the interwar period. See Jordan, *U.S. Civil Defense*, 11-30.
and government of a nation, not merely the citizenry. Among the conclusions in Study 3B-I, Tyler summarizes the most important lessons learned from the World War II experiences as:

1. Civil defense must be planned in advance.
2. Civil defense must be recognized as important and essential.
3. The federal government must be able to command the civil defense organization.
4. The federal government must provide trained, mobile forces for assistance to stricken areas.
5. The public must not be involved until plans are laid and there is something for each person to do.

To ensure policymakers took these lessons to heart, Study 3B-I stressed the roles and responsibilities all citizens needed to observe.

For the individual man, woman, or child on the street, Beers and his group offered the concept of “self-help.” “Self-help by the individual is keynote,” stated the study, wherein individuals bore responsibility to protect their person, property, and engage in other civil defense functions, such as learning first aid techniques, fire fighting, or finding shelter. Self-help henceforth became the cardinal principle of all civil defense, the fulcrum for any successful national program. To sustain the vitality of self-help, Study 3B-I assigned responsibility to the federal government to establish and maintain a strong central command and control, initiate a national shelter program, stockpile supplies, establish an effective attack warning system, plan for dispersal of industry and evacuation of populations, and provide training. Study 3B-I recommended creation of a permanent civil defense agency.

\[\text{Study 3B-I defined civil defense as “mobilization of the entire population for the preservation of civilian life and property from enemy attack and the rapid restoration of normal conditions in any area which has been attacked.” See Study 3B-I, 2-3.}\]

\[\text{Tyler, “Civil Defense,” 31-38, 342; Study 3B-I, 7-11, 282-89.}\]

\[\text{Study 3B-I, 7.}\]


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within the military establishment and the immediate formation of an interim agency within the War Department.  

Between the USSBS and Study 3B-1, the message is clear. For civil defense to be effective, the government should immediately initiate civil defense planning to address the issues of organization and delineation of responsibilities at inter- and intra-governmental levels. Individual citizens required knowledge and training to survive nuclear attack through use of shelters or evacuation. Unsurprisingly, fear manifested itself among the minds of the general public about the potential for atomic attack after August 1945. But this fear did not prevent Americans in the summer of 1946 from following the planning and preparations for the first postwar nuclear tests.

In June and July 1946, Operation Crossroads opened at Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific before an international audience. A joint task force set sail for the remote atoll with a mission “to determine the effects of the atomic bomb upon Naval vessels in order to gain information of value to the national defense.” Under controlled conditions with members of Congress, the national and international press, and foreign nations watching, the true capacity of the atomic bomb would be demonstrated to the world.

Crossroads consisted of two atomic tests. A B-29 dropped the first bomb, Test Able, with a yield of 23 kilotons, over an anchored armada of 95 target vessels on the morning of 1 July. The weapon produced a massive mushroom cloud, but when the smoke cleared the

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274 Study 3B-1, 11-14.
275 Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light, 3-81, 319-20.
results were not impressive. The bomb missed its intended aiming point by hundreds of yards and sank a mere five ships. The throng of observers expressed disbelief at the lack of destruction, deeming Able a “dud.” For all the talk of nuclear weapons, the fear now seemed irrational, although the Able test filled almost a quarter of all newspaper headlines nationwide. On 25 July, the second bomb, Test Baker, detonated while suspended from a barge 90 feet underwater. Baker left all observers in absolute terrified awe. The 23-kiloton blast lifted a two million ton column of water 300 feet thick over a mile skyward, enveloping the target fleet in a dome of radioactive steam. As the column suddenly fell downward, it created a new phenomenon, a base surge of powerful waves of highly radioactive water and air which drenched the entire target fleet and a neighboring island with fission products, irradiated water, and pulverized sand and coral. The blast sank ten ships and heavily contaminated all but nine ships of the remaining target fleet. Test planners did not envision a nuclear disaster of this magnitude, although the danger would not grab the public’s attention for some time.278

With Crossroads in the limelight, the recommendations of Study 3B-1 languished in obscurity. The army’s delay in immediately commencing civil defense planning centered on the conclusion that the War Department bore responsibility for civil defense. The Army Plans and Operations Division, cognizant of possible budget cuts and desiring to maintain focus on war fighting, proposed creation of a new study into the matter of civil defense’s position in the federal government to be undertaken by the Bureau of the Budget. Secretary of War Robert A. Patterson in August 1946 contacted the Director of the Bureau of the Budget,

278 Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 116-28, 182-226; Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, 104-07, 145-56; Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light, 83-84. The base surge from Test Baker created the greatest waves in recorded human history, with photographic evidence indicating a height of 94 feet at the edge of the water column. The radioactive dangers of nuclear weapons will be covered more fully in Chapter 3.
Granville County, N.C. native James E. Webb, and stated that “the War Department considered civil defense to be of equal and direct interest to civilian and military agencies.” Webb replied that “we should move promptly to fix primary responsibility in an appropriate agency,” but believed the proposed National Security Resources Board (NSRB) might be a suitable future home for civil defense. Nevertheless, the Bureau considered the War Department the only present government agency capable of studying the civil defense issue until the formal establishment of the NSRB.

On 25 November 1946, General Dwight D. Eisenhower established the War Department Civil Defense Board. He charged the board with formulating War Department views and policies on allocation of civil defense responsibilities, structural organization and required authority, and what civil defense matters the War Department should currently undertake pending future action. Major General Harold R. Bull would lead the board of senior officers, with the study thereafter known as the “Bull Board.” In accordance with the memorandum, the board convened on 2 December and completed its hearings on 28 February 1947. During the period of hearings, 59 witnesses testified, including wartime Office of Civilian Defense directors Fiorello LaGuardia and James M. Landis, and many other state and national civil defense directors and experts. Testifying witnesses reached agreement on the points that civil defense at heart was a community function requiring outside help, and it should be completely civilian controlled at the state and local level, with responsibility vested within the military establishment. Some critics raised questions as to the viability of a

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281 Bull Board, 1; War Department Memorandum Establishing the War Department Civil Defense Board (Known as the Bull Board), WD Memo 400-5-5, 25 November 1946, in Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), *Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack: Preliminary Data*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 49-50.
peacetime civil defense program when no disasters existed. As a system dependent on
volunteers, could civilians in sufficient number maintain interest during extended periods of
peace?\textsuperscript{282}

After the conclusion of the hearings in February 1947, the Board sent its confidential
report to Eisenhower. The report listed several basic concepts of civil defense, including self-
help, deemed “the fundamental principle of civil defense.”\textsuperscript{283} The government responsibilities
at each echelon for civil defense entailed the organization, training, and equipping of
personnel. States needed to provide capability to quickly support counties and communities,
to direct mutual aid, and to request federal assistance when required. The board tasked the
federal government with providing “guidance and coordination in planning, organizing, and
training for civil defense. It should direct only as necessary to insure uniform plans and
actions . . . and, when required, assume control.”\textsuperscript{284} Contrasting \textit{Study 3B-1}, the Bull Board
stated that the armed forces’ primary focus rested on offensive and defense measures, only
turning to civil defense matters in extreme circumstances.\textsuperscript{285}

Local communities would bear the burden of civil defense, specifically local
governments. Since the responsibility for local civil defense fell on the shoulders of local
governments, this necessitated local civil defense councils and civil defense directors. At the
state level, a civil defense council and state director, emulating the local organization, were
required to assist local communities and assist their efforts. Addressing the matter of civil
defense work in peacetime, the report observed that using state and local civil defense

\textsuperscript{283} Bull Board, 12.
\textsuperscript{284} Bull Board, 13.
\textsuperscript{285} Bull Board, 14.
organizations “for . . . emergency work in peacetime there can be maintained economically as an operating organization capable of rapid conversion to civil defense in the event of a war emergency.” The board remarked that civil defense efforts in some states would provide valuable help in connection with natural disasters.286 At the federal level, the board suggested the proposed National Security Resources Board formulate overall national civil defense policy. A new civil defense agency, the board concluded, “should be established as a separate civilian agency, within the Department of the Armed Forces, with a Director reporting directly to the Secretary of the Armed Forces.”287 The secretary (later to be known as the Secretary of Defense) would “be responsible for over-all coordination of civil defense.”288

Some federal officials thought that assigning civil defense to the Pentagon only allowed the military to grab more of the federal budget. But there were reasonable arguments to be made for military jurisdiction. These included close contact and coordination between two components of the nation’s defense, broadly understood. The board report also urged that planning for civil defense be initiated immediately, but with plans to be kept private until finalized for public involvement.289 With clear organizational responsibilities and state and local civil defense agencies aligned with the federal program, the board sought to avoid the haphazard creation of the Office of Civilian Defense and state civil defense councils that occurred in World War II. Finally, the Bull Board recommended that the Secretary of War ask the president to decide whether or when to establish the civil defense agency and at presidential directive, if the War Department should be charged with developing plans.290

286 Bull Board, 17-19.
287 Bull Board, 30.
288 Bull Board, 32.
289 Bull Board, 31.
National Security and the Hopley Report

Even before the ink dried on the instrument of surrender in Tokyo Bay, fissures emerged in the alliance between the United States and Soviet Union. By March 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared that an “iron curtain” divided Eastern and Western Europe.291 A month prior, the American chargé d’affaires in Moscow, George Kennan, in his “long telegram” to Washington, judged the Soviets “a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with us there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary . . . if Soviet power is to be secure.”292 Kennan would later publish a revised version of his views from the telegram in July 1947 in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym “X,” further articulating the policy of containment focused on restricting and confining Soviet influence and expansion.293 On 12 March 1947, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and recommended approval of a massive package of aid to the Greek and Turkish governments battling communist insurgencies, enunciating what became known as the Truman Doctrine, emblematic of the bipolar world of liberal democracy versus communist totalitarianism.294 Committed to collective security

294 The Truman Doctrine, as addressed to Congress: “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” See U.S. Congress, House, Address of The President of the United States, Recommendation for
agreements with the United Nations Charter and an ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States committed itself to maintaining a peacetime military that in the aftermath of World War II was seemingly both unwieldy and costly.\textsuperscript{295}

Truman, still committed to a domestic expansion of the New Deal, had to find a way to streamline and reorganize the nation’s military forces to meet the new Cold War challenges. The Bull Board’s recommendation for immediate civil defense planning coincided with the battle in Washington to craft a new national military establishment. In December 1945, Truman urged Congress to investigate unifying the army and navy under one military establishment, in the process eliminating wasteful spending, ensuring security, and safeguarding civilian control of the military.\textsuperscript{296} Atomic weapons, observe military historians Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, “sharpened interservice competition,” as every service sought a nuclear warfare capability, all the while necessitating greater military spending.\textsuperscript{297}

Throughout 1946 into 1947, civilian and uniformed leaders of the army and navy battled in public and private over the shape of the reorganized American military. In the first half of 1947 an agreement took shape and on 26 July Truman signed the National Security Act of that year into law. “It [the act] laid the institutional foundations of the national security state,” concludes historian Michael Hogan.\textsuperscript{298} The act created the National Military Establishment (NME), directed by a Secretary of Defense, composed of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The act also established the National Security Council.


\textsuperscript{295} Hogan, \textit{Cross of Iron}, 43-44.
\textsuperscript{296} Hogan, \textit{Cross of Iron}, 38.
\textsuperscript{298} Hogan, \textit{Cross of Iron}, 66.
(NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Munitions Board, War Council, Research and Development Board, and the NSRB.\textsuperscript{299} The act listed the NSRB’s functions as advising the President “concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization,” including “policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation’s manpower in the event of war. . . .”\textsuperscript{300} On 18 September, the Senate confirmed James V. Forrestal, former Secretary of the Navy, as the first Secretary of Defense, and the provisions of the act took effect.

With the creation of the National Military Establishment, the matter of civil defense returned to the agenda. The Bull Board recommended, by presidential direction, that the War Department (now Department of the Army) be tasked with civil defense planning and that the Secretary of War (now Army) recommend establishment of a civil defense agency. Truman, preoccupied with creation of the NME, chose not to act. Beers, the army’s civil defense expert, spoke in the early fall with Secretary of the Army (and Goldsboro, N.C. native) Kenneth C. Royall to meet with Forrestal and urge establishment of a civil defense planning body in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Forrestal approved Royall’s recommendations on civil defense and in November at a meeting of the War Council, all three services agreed that civil defense planning at the present time should be placed in the OSD. Truman agreed to this arrangement.\textsuperscript{301} On 18 January 1948, Forrestal ordered the Bull Board report declassified and released it to the general public on 14 February. When Forrestal released the Bull Board report, he announced the development of a new national


\textsuperscript{301} Tyler, “Civil Defense,” 79-82.
civil defense organization for the atomic age, beginning with his founding of a “top-level planning agency” to draft a national program.302

Shortly after the initial announcement, Forrestal searched for a director of his civil defense planning body. His search led him to Russell J. Hopley, president of the Northwestern Bell Telephone Company in Omaha, Nebraska. Hopley, with 33 years of experience in telephone communications, previously chaired Omaha’s city planning committee with great acclaim. On 5 March, Forrestal announced Hopley’s appointment, commencing on 22 March, with Beers as his assistant.303

On 27 March, Forrestal issued a long memorandum creating the Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP) in the OSD. The memorandum tasked Hopley and the OCDP to “prepare, and to submit to the Secretary of Defense, a program of civil defense for the United States, including a plan for a permanent federal civil defense agency which, in conjunction with the several States and their subdivisions, can undertake those peacetime preparations which are necessary to assure an adequate civil defense system in the event of a war.”304 Forrestal expected the OCDP to initiate interim measures and provide the NME, federal, state and local governments with information and guidance about civil defense. The memorandum also called on the OCDP to “draft any legislation required to implement the civil defense program” they planned and proposed.305

305 JCAE, Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack: Preliminary Data, 51.
For the next six months, a team of forty-nine experts researched, analyzed, and drafted a voluminous report to guide America’s initial civil defense effort in the Cold War. The approach to success, in Hopley’s view, was three-fold: produce a plan for civil defense, draft measures to put the plan into effect, and establish a permanent peacetime civil defense program “which will constitute the skeleton on which a wartime force could be quickly constructed.” Once again, the principle of self-help served as the foundation for civil defense. As historian Lyon G. Tyler records, the largest question before the OCDP “concerned who should run civil defense – the federal agency or the states and cities?” Ultimately, the report declared that “Basic operational responsibility [should] be placed in States and communities. . . .” Emphasis on the state and local level would be strongly reflected in the final report.

On 1 October, Hopley submitted to Forrestal the 301-page report, Civil Defense for National Security. The report proposed: establishment of a national Office of Civil Defense; placing basic operational responsibility in states and local communities; a maximum use of volunteers and existing organizations; planning, equipping, and training units nationally to prepare for enemy attack; and a peacetime organization for use in natural disasters. To accompany these broad proposals, the report included legislative requirements to implement

306 While several civil defense-related histories discuss the development of the Hopley Report, the doctoral dissertation of Lyon Gardiner Tyler, Jr. is unquestionably the authoritative source, incorporating interviews with Colonel Beers and other members of the OCDP. The discussion of the drafting of the Hopley Report is fully covered in Tyler, “Civil Defense,” 77-116.
310 Hopley Report, 2.
civil defense for the federal, state, and local levels, together with a detailed model state civil
defense act.

The basic principles of civil defense in the Hopley Report conform to the lessons
gleaned from the Bull Board and Study 3B-1. Initial civil defense action involved the
individual (self-help), assisted by a civil defense effort with responsibility shared between the
federal government, the state, and communities. Peacetime uses are emphasized, and states
and local communities “should not fail to take . . . into account” that civil defense can be
used to save lives and reduce damage in response to accidents or extreme weather.311

Once more a civil defense report attempted to address the difficult question of where
to place civil defense within the federal government. The Hopley Report proposed that the
Office of Civil Defense be established within the executive branch, with a civilian director
reporting either directly to the President or the Secretary of Defense. The report preferred
placement under the Secretary of Defense due to the need for constant coordination with the
National Military Establishment. For state and local governments, the system thus
promulgated in the Hopley Report effectively borrowed the design of the World War II OCD,
a program the Bull Board considered “inadequate for the future.”312

Of great importance, as will be seen later, is the report’s chapter concerning civil
defense legislation. A model civil defense act had dual purposes, providing “for the necessary
organizations to deal with potential enemy-caused disasters as well as natural disasters, such
as floods, fires, explosions and the like.”313 This inclusion of non-war related disaster

312 Bull Board, 30. At the state level, control of civil defense organization and activities, and responsibility
for civil defense operations rested with the governor. In political subdivisions, this responsibility rested
with the mayor. Civil defense directors and advisory councils would direct operations on the day-to-day
basis and advise the governor and mayors, as required. See Hopley Report, 25-33.
313 Hopley Report, 280.
assistance affirmed the views expressed in the Bull Board about peacetime uses of civil defense. In the model state civil defense act, the natural disaster/peacetime aspect was directly included in the legislative definition of civil defense: “preparation for and the carrying out of all emergency functions, other than the functions for which military forces are primarily responsible, to minimize and repair injury and damage resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack, sabotage or other hostile action, or by fire, flood, earthquake, or other natural causes [events].”  

Overall, in examining the report, the document seems a compromise between the proposed and the practical. The Hopley Report jettisoned the guidance of Study 3B-1 for a tight centralized command and control apparatus. Entrenchment of civil defense responsibility with the states and local levels certainly afforded the federal government less cost and investment, but it also built the entire national civil defense program on shifting sands. Self-help by individuals and families would be in vain if the community or state lacked the resources or initiative to provide greater levels of support to mitigate disasters. For states that disbanded civilian defense offices at the conclusion of the war, the Hopley Report provided a blueprint to reestablish these offices in at least a more efficient, coherent fashion. With almost complete emphasis on organizational detail and responsibility vested in states and communities, early Cold War civil defense would hopefully be palatable to the nation’s governors and serve as a useful guidebook in a pinch.

With his report in Forrestal’s hands, Hopley had accomplished the basic objectives of his directives. In a desire to return to his company, Hopley rushed the report’s production and failed to fully involve the Bureau of the Budget and other elements of the executive branch in

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314 Hopley Report, 280.
the review and evaluation of the overall report. “Little attention has been paid to the thinking
of other governmental agencies or to securing their support,” concludes Tyler, and “neither
the government nor the public had been prepared for the release of the report.”316 On 12
November 1948, the OCDP distributed hundreds of copies of the report to state and local
governments, as well as to other public groups interested in civil defense. Forrestal sent
copies to the members of the NSRB and other elements of the NME requesting commentary
on the report but he released it to the public a mere four days later on 13 November. The rush
of events caught members of the government completely off guard. At 301 pages, the Hopley
Report could not be properly digested, reviewed, and critiqued in a few days before the court
of public opinion passed judgment.317

Government officials expressed less than favorable appraisals of the report. Common
complaints included the limited time to review the plans and too heavy a reliance on the
World War II OCD effort, considered obsolete in the atomic era. The navy considered the
NSRB the more suitable location for the civil defense agency; the air force and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff favored the proposed Office of Civil Defense reporting directly to the
President. Collectively, the NME advocated further study of civil defense, this time by the
NSRB.318 A possible source of contention, argues policy analyst Nehemiah Jordan, was that
“the Hopley report seemed to recommend a detailed organization plan to be implemented
immediately; it was interpreted as a call for immediate action.”319

Truman and senior military officials saw neither an immediate threat nor the need to
rush through a plan without strong support. On 3 March 1949, Truman requested Forrestal’s

318 Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield, 99-100; Tyler, “Civil Defense,” 154-55.
analysis of the *Hopley Report* and proposals for future actions on the matter. Concurrently, Truman sent a memorandum to Dr. John R. Steelman,\(^{320}\) acting chairman of the NSRB, explaining how

> Under present conditions the essential need of the Federal Government in the area of civil defense is peacetime planning and preparation for civil defense in the event of war, rather than operation of a full-scale civil defense program. Therefore, I see no need to establish at this time a permanent organization, such as a proposed Office of Civil Defense. Rather, I see a definite necessity to continue planning for civil defense and an immediate need to fix in a responsible agency definite leadership for such planning.\(^{321}\)

Truman thereby rejected the *Hopley Report*, and went on to anoint the NSRB with responsibility for civil defense planning.\(^{322}\) The same day, Truman announced Forrestal’s resignation as Secretary of Defense, replaced by Louis A. Johnson. Johnson abolished the OCDP on 1 August 1949, but kept Beers on as his Assistant for Civil Defense Liaison.\(^{323}\)

*Perspective, NSRB, and the Soviet Bomb*

The emergence and rejection of the *Hopley Report* is best understood in the context of its birth and development within Washington. The reorganization in Washington that brought about the NME and the NSRB coincided with a presidential determination to expand the New Deal welfare state, control a massive military establishment, and uphold the new obligations of international peace, security, and leadership thrust upon the United States at the conclusion of World War II. The elements of domestic and foreign policy became entwined with the ideology of national security. Historian Michael Hogan defines the new,

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\(^{320}\) Steelman earned a doctorate in economics and sociology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1928.


\(^{322}\) Ibid.

postwar national security ideology as including “the conviction that national security . . . required some elaboration of the state’s authority to organize civilian and military resources behind a permanent program of peacetime military preparedness.” 

This new vision contrasted with the older ideology of antistatism and antimilitarism, and the birth of the National Security Act of 1947 reflected many of the political battles to balance American tradition with the exigencies of possible atomic war. 

For Truman, the national security state clashed with his desire to restrain defense spending. The president hoped to shrink the federal budget overall and he believed the defense portion should not exceed one quarter to one third of the national budget. As it stood, this restraint brought all three military branches into conflict for limited funds in the 1945–1950 period. New weapon systems, training, research and development, and planning for the three services meant fierce battles to court the favor of the public and politicians for the lion’s share of the budget. To the military services, civil defense could therefore be looked upon not just as a diversion of needed personnel from active offensive and defensive matters, but as a potential fiscal drain from the defense budget. Nevertheless, foreign

324 Hogan, Cross of Iron, 23.
325 Hogan’s book, Cross of Iron, articulates the two competing ideological threads as the more recent liberal reforms, advocating economic efficiency with centralized direction and expert leadership (harkening back to Progressive thought at the turn of the twentieth century) with the ideology of liberal-republicanism, with power divided and controlled through institutional checks and balances. “The national security discourse amounted in part to a dialogue between these different visions of the American state,” concludes Hogan. See Hogan, Cross of Iron, 23-24, 43-54.
326 Hamby, Man of the People, 398.
328 Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense, 83.
policy demands and increasing Cold War tensions necessitated a balance between the warfare and the welfare state.\footnote{329}

Budgetary concerns also aligned in the postwar period with a concern over civilian control of the military, spawning fear of a “garrison state.”\footnote{330} The challenge for Truman and his advisers, therefore, was ensuring that this postwar fear of militarism would not come to pass.\footnote{331} The fear of the garrison state subverting the budget, contends Hogan, “influenced Truman’s decision to demobilize the armed forces far more rapidly than most of his national security managers thought desirable.”\footnote{332} Creation of the NME, moreover, could reinforce the tenet of civilian control of the military and allay garrison state fears via a civilian defense secretary answering directly to the president. Ironically, the National Security Act of 1947 left the Secretary of Defense with an insufficient powers and staff, and therefore weak and ineffective.\footnote{333}

Civil defense found itself trapped within these bureaucratic battles. The placement of civil defense under the NSRB and the rejection of the \textit{Hopley Report} were prudent decisions


\footnote{332} Hogan, \textit{Cross of Iron}, 72.

\footnote{333} Hogan, \textit{Cross of Iron}, 38, 67-68. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 vastly strengthened the powers of the Secretary of Defense over the renamed Department of Defense (DoD), and in so doing strengthened civilian control of the nation’s military. See Hogan, \textit{Cross of Iron}, 200-08; Millett and Maslowski, \textit{For the Common Defense}, 504-05; Weigley, \textit{American Way of War}, 376-77.}
by Truman. A push for additional planning under a civilian agency kept a potential political bombshell from exploding among a fearful public, alleviated budget worries for the military services, and conserved resources for Truman’s peacetime domestic agenda. Without the urgency to establish a national program, and given the perspective of domestic and foreign policy battles, planning kept the embers of civil defense smoldering, requiring only a handful of caretakers to tend the fire.  

Civil defense planning began initially as an inauspicious NSRB effort. In the wake of Truman’s letter of 3 March, Steelman surveyed the personnel of the NSRB and found a dearth of civil defense expertise. He assigned to William A. Gill, director of the mobilization, procedures, and organization section, the task of planning and managing the organization of civil defense. Gill, a management analyst, knew nothing about civil defense but recognized the administration’s desire to mothball and not scrap civil defense efforts. Steelman asked Gill to report on the present status of civil defense based on the OCDP work, and propose the steps necessary to fulfill the conditions of Truman’s memorandum. Gill broke civil defense into five problem areas of planning: civilian participation in active (military) defense; wartime disaster relief; peacetime disaster relief; internal security; and volunteer war activities. He advocated initial priority be placed on the first two categories: civilian participation in active defense and wartime disaster relief. To plan the former, Gill recommended delegating planning responsibility to the DoD; for the latter, encompassing those aspects most aligned with civil defense, Gill recommended the Federal Works Agency (FWA). On 3 June 1949, Steelman designated Gill the coordinator of civil defense planning.

335 Interestingly, Gill included volunteer war activities, constituting victory gardens, scrap and bond drives, activities the Bull Board and *Hopley Report* both rejected as outside civil defense’s jurisdiction.

While the NSRB appeared to fulfill the wishes of Truman, the results bore rotten fruit. Less than a month after being effectively delegated responsibility for civil defense planning, the FWA was reorganized as the General Services Administration (GSA) as part of Truman’s massive government reorganization effort in Washington. Unfortunately, the GSA’s new responsibilities shared nothing in common with civil defense matters. Given the confusion and time required to adjust for a new organization, civil defense became low priority. Nevertheless, on 23 August the GSA submitted to Steelman a prospectus of the agency’s plans to collaborate with other government agencies on “Planning for Wartime Civil Disaster Relief.” While the prospectus detailed many areas of planning, mirroring the detailed sections in the \textit{Hopley Report}, at the time only three people at the GSA worked on civil defense matters.\footnote{Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense, 91-92; Tyler, “Civil Defense,” 185-93; Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Public Law 81-152, U.S. Statutes at Large 63 (1949): 377-40; Kerr, Civil Defense in U.S., 25; JCAE, Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack: Preliminary Data, 15-17; Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield, 111-13.}

But as the American civil defense effort languished in the bureaucratic doldrums, the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon on 29 August. Amidst great secrecy, in the barren steppe of northeast Kazakhstan, 50 miles northwest of the town of Semipalatinsk at 2:00AM local time the RDS-1, a near copy of the Fat Man bomb was assembled and raised by a freight elevator on a tower to a height of 104 feet.\footnote{What the Soviet code name RDS-1 stood for it not entirely known, aside from the “1” designating this as the first design. The original report designated the devise as \textit{Reaktivnyi Dvigatei S} (“Rocket Engine S”). See Michael D. Gordin, \textit{Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly} (New}
time, the first Soviet atomic bomb, code named First Lighting, detonated with a yield of 22 kilotons. The Soviet Union had broken the American atomic monopoly. Without any additional weapons for use, Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin decided to keep the achievement a secret.\textsuperscript{339}

On 3 September, a WB-29 weather reconnaissance aircraft, flying between Japan and Alaska east of the Kamchatka Peninsula, detected radioactivity 300 percent higher than established alert rates. An expert committee of the AEC drew on additional tests and data to conclude that the Soviets had successfully detonated an atomic bomb. On 23 September, White House Press Secretary Charles G. Ross handed out an official statement from the president to members of the press. The brief release observed that “we have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R. Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always been taken into account by us.”\textsuperscript{340} Public reaction to the announcement of the Soviet bomb was muted. Both historians Paul Boyer and Michael Gordin noted that a majority of Americans took the news in stride. The military and Truman administration henceforth transitioned from atomic monopoly to nuclear superiority, moving to expand the nation’s stockpile of nuclear weapons and begin development of the hydrogen bomb.\textsuperscript{341}

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But Truman failed to fully appreciate the status of the nation’s civil defense program. The NSRB and the GSA had nothing to provide to the Truman administration, much less to the states and local governments. Even before Truman’s announcement of the Soviet bomb, the NSRB drafted a policy statement outlining relationships with state and local governments in civil defense planning. Federal officials admitted that the government was not prepared at the moment to furnish timely civil defense information. The NSRB suggested the *Hopley Report* as “a useful guide” for planning civil defense at all levels of government. Released to the nation’s governors on 5 October 1949, the NSRB statement came four days after Mao Zedong proclaimed victory by the Chinese Communists in Beijing and established the People’s Republic of China. Communist aggression appeared to be waxing.

Events now accelerated for the NSRB. Congressman John F. Kennedy (D–MA) wrote to Truman on 8 October, asking why the GSA had only one person working on wartime disaster relief, and warning that the nation risked “an atomic Pearl Harbor” through apathetic indifference to civil defense planning. Bernard M. Baruch called for the immediate enactment of a “stand-by mobilization plan, including civilian defense,” and on 10 October Senator Brien McMahon (D–CT), chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) announced plans for public hearings on civil defense, to be held in 1950.

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Return of North Carolina Civil Defense

From the summer of 1945 to the end of the decade, North Carolina occupied itself with a return to peace and economic growth. The disbandment of the NCCD by Governor Robert Gregg Cherry in June 1945 brought civil defense to an end in North Carolina for the time being. Cherry, a conservative Democrat, took office while the state’s resources supported the war effort, leaving little with which to expand state government or provide new facilities or resources for state services. Disbanding the NCCD in 1945 was a prudent decision by Cherry, as the services of civilian defense, a wartime agency, were seemingly no longer needed. 346

During the war, North Carolina’s effort to attract defense industries fell flat. The state suffered the fourth lowest ratio of war facilities to prewar manufacturing in the entire nation. Historian Bruce Schulman writes that during the war “North Carolina’s leaders made only lackluster efforts” to attract defense dollars. 347 Nevertheless, the postwar period from 1945 to 1947 witnessed a massive expansion of industry in the state, a rate of industrialization, as reported by the state Department of Conservation and Development, “probably greater than for any similar period in the history of the State. This development was particularly noticeable in view of the fact that North Carolina had relatively little in the way of new war industries.” 348 Political scientist V.O. Key, Jr. observed in 1949 that the prevailing mood in

North Carolina during the administration of Cherry was “energetic and ambitious,” with a progressive outlook in industrial development, education, and race relations.\textsuperscript{349}

Cherry’s administration placed added emphasis on a program of rural industrialization. In the aftermath of World War II, studies revealed that 95 percent of all North Carolina industry could be found west of Raleigh. Eastern North Carolina remained almost entirely agrarian; out of the state’s 100 counties, a mere ten possessed half of all the state’s industry. In November 1945, the governor appointed a general committee on rural industries to facilitate the establishment of small manufacturing operations in rural areas.\textsuperscript{350}

Overall, the industrial effort from 1945 to 1947 under Cherry brought in a total investment of more than $238 million.\textsuperscript{351}

Tourism represented another North Carolina economic engine that gained a full head of steam in the immediate postwar period. The state maintained a division of advertising throughout the war that readily transitioned to the postwar peace. In 1946, the Department of Conservation and Development estimated the value of the state travel industry at $175 million. In 1947, travelers in North Carolina brought in $192 million in revenue. In a letter to an advertising executive in April 1947, Cherry touted the benefits of the state advertising division for attracting industrial investment and tourist dollars. “North Carolina does not look upon advertising as an expense, but as a program that creates more wealth, more jobs, more income, and produces revenue,” boasted the governor.\textsuperscript{352}

\textsuperscript{351} Department of Conservation and Development, \textit{Twelfth Biennial Report}, 42.
Carolina moved past the war and into an era of new prosperity under Cherry. Civil defense and atomic attack did not factor into the state’s future development, at least for the moment.

In 1949, newly elected Governor William Kerr Scott entered office as a populist determined to further bring the state into the modern era. Having won the 1948 election outside of machine politics, Scott possessed a clean slate with which to implement his “Go-Forward Program.” Scott proposed to utilize the state’s large revenue surplus to pave countless miles of secondary roads, construct new schools, improve the ports at Wilmington and Morehead City, increase electricity and telephone service to rural corners of the state, and expand public health programs. A $200 million bond issue for road paving and another $50 million in bonds for school construction aided his vision. The Go-Forward Program would pave more roads during Scott’s tenure than all previous administrations combined. Electricity and telephone service to rural North Carolina, together with road access, greatly benefited industrialization efforts. Spending revenue also brought forth new sources of income, notably in tourism. During the 1948 – 1950 biennium, tourism and travel in North Carolina reached a value of $250 million dollars and generated $12 million in tax revenue, ranking it as the third most valuable resource in the state, behind the nationally leading fields of textiles and tobacco.353

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Scott’s expansion of state government coincided with the creation of the North Carolina Council of Civil Defense in June 1950. The first steps for a new state civil defense effort began in November 1949. In mid-November, the army contacted Scott about providing assistance in preparing a North Carolina civil defense plan. The governor’s office directed the requests to Adjutant General John Van Bokkelen Metts, who acknowledged that he had been discussing the issue of planning civil defense in the state with the army, but provided no further details. In December, Metts met with Scott about appointing a state civil defense director, so “that the organization for such activities may be started.” At the end of 1949, Metts reported to Joint Committee of Atomic Energy chairman McMahon that North Carolina had no civil defense effort underway, but “anticipated . . . that when our next General Assembly convenes in January 1951, that a bill will be presented looking to legislation providing a Civil Defense Law.”

In the beginning of 1950, Scott and Metts quietly pushed forward initial planning for the state civil defense effort. In January, the NSRB began distributing civil defense planning bulletins to state governors to both encourage, structure, and possibly slow and delay state and local civil defense planning until the federal effort became fully operational. Steelman wrote to Scott and requested that North Carolina begin organizing a state civil defense

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354 The Council met in June 1950, but operations did not commence until July, when the governor appointed a director and the Council of State appropriated funds for the state civil defense office.
program. Scott thereafter charged Metts with gathering and studying available civil defense information about what steps North Carolina needed to take next.\textsuperscript{358}

On 17 March, the JCAE opened hearings on the topic of civil defense. Two months earlier Steelman announced that Paul J. Larsen, former director of Sandia Special Weapons Base Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico would replace Gill as director of the NSRB’s Civilian Mobilization Office.\textsuperscript{359} Larsen took office on 1 March and commenced a study of all current NSRB planning.\textsuperscript{360} The JCAE hearings, chaired by McMahon, would pit the federal government’s civil defense perspective against that of the general public. Congressman Carl Thomas Durham (D–NC) a pharmacist from Chapel Hill, presided as JCAE vice chairman during the hearings. Larsen testified on 23 March about the NSRB’s planning. Admitting that absolute security is not possible, “unless we are willing to become a garrison state,” Larsen confirmed that the nation was not ready should bombs fall tomorrow, “not as ready as we will be a year from now, but more nearly ready than a year ago.”\textsuperscript{361} Planning for peacetime disasters Larsen deemed an important step for achieving “adequate civil defense,” but since civil defense must be based on self-help, local and state civil defense planning had to be conducted by the people on the ground and not necessarily by the federal government.\textsuperscript{362} Civil defense remained a responsibility of civilians, not the nation’s military, Larsen concluded.

Gill also testified about NSRB planning results and the status of the state civil defense activity. Roughly 44 states either had an active civil defense director or adjutant

\textsuperscript{359} Gill remained as Larson’s deputy.
\textsuperscript{360} Tyler, “Civil Defense,” 216-20.
general overseeing civil defense or some form of civil defense legislation on the books. North Carolina in the report appears to be the only state in the former Confederacy with nothing regarding civil defense, although this is not entirely accurate. The War Powers Act of 1943 remained active policy for North Carolina in 1950. Apparently Metts, when reporting to McMahon on the state’s civil defense preparations and status, did not recognize or recall this legislation.

As the hearings in Washington continued, North Carolina at last began to act. At a meeting of the Council of State in Scott’s office on 31 March, Metts presented a proposal for a state civil defense plan at the request of the NSRB. The proposal would create a position for a state civil defense director to coordinate all state, county, and municipal agencies in the event of emergency. Metts requested $15,000 from the state’s Contingency and Emergency Fund to begin the program. The director, together with an assistant and office staff, would draft the state plans. Some council members questioned the need for a civil defense program; and in response, Scott created a Committee on Civil Defense, consisting of state Attorney General Harry McMullan, Secretary of the State Thad A. Eure, Commissioner of Labor Forest H. Shuford, and State Auditor Henry L. Bridges to “visit Washington and discuss this matter with the Federal authorities.”

For the position of director, Metts suggested Elbert Zed “E.Z.” Jones of Burlington, N.C. The choice of Jones originated prior to the meeting of the Council of State in March. Discussing the matter with Scott, Metts and the governor agreed that Brigadier General James W. Jenkins, a National Guard commander and head of the North Carolina State Guard

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during World War II, would be a good first choice. When Jenkins declined the position on account of his age and various other reasons, he suggested Jones as state director. A native of Lakeland, Florida, Jones visited North Carolina in 1930 and liked the state and its people so much that he opted to move there. During World War I, he enlisted in the army at the age of 15 and almost made it overseas as an ambulance driver before being tossed out when his true age was discovered. Building his career in radio, Jones managed the WBBB radio station in Burlington and became active in broadcasting and professional radio circles in the state.

When World War II broke out, he enlisted in the Civil Air Patrol, rising to the rank of major and acting as the state wing’s communications and radio relations officer. Around 1943, Jenkins needed a communications officer on his staff and Jones became a major in the North Carolina National Guard. Metts and Jones agreed to meet in Raleigh to discuss the civil defense directorship. Together, the men worked out estimates as to the operating costs for the state agency and met with Scott about the position. 365

Scott’s civil defense committee traveled to Washington on 5 April to meet with officials of the NSRB, including Gill and Larsen. Asked about the meeting, McMullan professed, “I don’t want to alarm people, but our state can start a civilian defense program against atomic bombs right now if we want to. I have advised Gov. Kerr Scott and the Council of State that the war powers act is still in effect in North Carolina – under which they can set up civilian defense.” 366 In the meantime, Jones wrote to Scott on 7 April and gave the governor his frank appraisal on various matters. “You, as a private citizen, know that at no


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time during the last war did any voluntary program prove a success,” remarked Jones. “If these same people who suggest such a thing will investigate the ridicule and criticism such a voluntary organization received during the last war they would not even dare to suggest such a program.” Continuing to explain his views on civil defense, Jones declared

Anyone who has made a study of the International situation knows that it is time to wake the people up that a war may be around the corner and that they should be taught to take care of themselves in case they are victims of an attack. We already know that they will not do this voluntarily. Such protection must be organized and prosecuted with an office of authority and with the time and material to devote full time to its prosecution and success.

I am not interested in whether you appoint me or someone else, but I do hope that you will carry out your original idea on this subject. That is, organize a N.C. Civil Defense Bureau on a full time basis.

John Marshall, Scott’s private secretary, replied to Jones’ letter, writing that “you are so right; and I think this thing should be pursued further.”

At the end of April, the Council of State met to share their report on the Washington trip. After hearing the committee’s report for a state civil defense organization, the Council voted on the twenty-seventh to request a draft of “a program of planning and coordination in line with Federal requirements and to present it at the next meeting.” In particular, the civil defense committee recommended that the state establish a program of state officials acting as planners and coordinators, similar to that of Indiana, as recommended by Gill during the conference in Washington. After the meeting, McMullan contacted Gill requesting a copy

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367 E.Z. Jones to W. Kerr Scott, 7 April 1950, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWKS, NCA, Box 52. Emphasis in original.
368 E.Z. Jones to W. Kerr Scott, 7 April 1950, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWKS, NCA, Box 52.
370 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of State, 27 April 1950, folder labeled “Council of State Minutes – 1950,” GWKS, NCA, Box 204.
371 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of State, 27 April 1950, folder labeled “Council of State Minutes – 1950,” GWKS, NCA, Box 204.
of the Indiana civil defense act and information for a “proper setup in this State.” Larsen replied to McMullan on 3 May, including a copy of the Indiana Civil Defense Act and an outline for organizing a state civil defense program.

Larsen’s outline, “Suggestions for a State Organization for Civil Defense,” is concise, general, and mundane. It recommended that a State Council of Defense be established with the governor as chairman. This council should include members from public safety (police or fire), health, welfare, education, public utilities, and public works and highways. States should appoint a civil defense director, encourage formation of local defense councils in the largest cities, modeled on the state agency, and provide adequate funding. The State Council of Defense would prepare “a comprehensive plan and program for civil defense . . . to be integrated into and coordinated with the civil defense plans of the Federal Government and of other states.” Larsen encouraged the council to institute training and public information programs, and “take all other preparatory steps including the partial or full mobilization of civil defense organizations in advance of actual disaster.” Lastly, the council needed to survey the state’s industries, resources, and facilities and arrange mutual aid compacts with other states and municipalities.

Using Larsen’s suggestions as a guide, Scott’s civil defense committee presented its recommendations at the Council of State meeting on 16 May. The committee recommended Scott set-up a temporary effort pending legislation by the General Assembly in 1951. No funds should be expended and only current state officials should be used, with the exception

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372 Harry McMullan to William A. Gill, 28 April, 1950, folder labeled “Council of State Minutes – 1950,” GWKS, NCA, Box 204.
373 Paul J. Larsen to Harry McMullan, 3 May 1950, folder labeled “Council of State Minutes – 1950,” GWKS, NCA, Box 204.
of hiring a civil defense director “unless and until some real and imminent emergency should arise.” The proposed group would be called the “North Carolina Council of Civil Defense,” composed of the governor as chairman, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles as executive vice chairman; the Executive Secretary of the State Board of Health; Chancellor of North Carolina State College; the Director of the State Bureau of Investigation; and the General Counsel for the North Carolina League of Municipalities.\footnote{Group Will Plan for Civilian Defense,” News and Observer, 17 May 1950, 24.} For the matter of legislation, the committee recommended “careful consideration of the Indiana law. . . .”\footnote{Report to Governor and Council of State by Committee on Civil Defense, 15 May 1950, folder labeled “Council of State Minutes – 1950,” GWKS, NCA, Box 204.} The Council approved the committee’s suggestions.\footnote{Minutes of the meeting of the Council of State, 16 May 1950, folder labeled “Council of State Minutes – 1950,” GWKS, NCA, Box 204.} The first meeting for the North Carolina Council of Civil Defense took place on 6 June 1950 in Scott’s office.\footnote{John Marshall to J.W.R. Norton, 26 May 1950, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWKS, NCA, Box 52.} The first meeting for the North Carolina Council of Civil Defense took place on 6 June 1950 in Scott’s office.\footnote{Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield, 119.}

With the state council in essence created, the civil defense scene seemingly quieted down. In April, former Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington assumed the chairmanship of the NSRB.\footnote{Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield, 119.} Just weeks prior on 7 April, Truman received National Security Council report 68 (NSC 68). Truman had requested the drafting of NSC 68 to reexamine the nation’s peace and wartime national security objectives. State Department policy planner Paul H. Nitze drafted the document with the carefully crafted argument that the nation faced a Soviet Union driven by a fanatical faith in communism and possessing military strength that threatened America’s national security and strategic objectives. Only a robust, dominant American military could thwart Soviet objectives. While advocating development of thermonuclear weapons and the stockpiling of nuclear warheads, the report conceded that combating the Soviet nuclear capability “will require . . . implementation of a
civilian defense program which has been thoroughly integrated with the military defense systems.”\footnote{380} After reviewing NSC 68, Truman ordered it classified “Top Secret” and chose to set the report aside while appointing a study committee to prepare cost estimates on the report’s recommendations.\footnote{381}

Everything for Truman and civil defense changed on 25 June when North Korean military forces invaded South Korea. The military forces of the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of Korea, catching the South Korean military completely off guard. Within a week the southern capital of Seoul fell to the communist forces. Truman quickly decided to intervene and commit American forces to the defense of South Korea. In the initial battles, American and South Korean forces, outgunned and outmanned, slowly retreated before the North Korean assaults. Together with the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb and the fall of China to the communists, the Korean War provided the overwhelming impetus to increase funding for national defense and to reestablish a civil defense program in North Carolina and the nation.\footnote{382}

On 20 July, the Council of State approved employment of a full-time paid director of civil defense for North Carolina. Under the authority of the Emergency War Powers Act of 1943, Colonel L. C. Rosser, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and vice chairman of the State

\footnote{380} “A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC 68),” 14 April 1950, 37, folder labeled “NSC 68 (1),” White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-61, Disaster File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEL), Box 7.
\footnote{381} Hamby, Man of the People, 527-29; Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 355-60; Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1993), 8-14.
Civil Defense Council, presented a resolution to hire a civil defense director and support staff. Speaking before the council, Rosser faced the reality that the conflict in Korea “has gotten to the point where we need a full-time director,” echoing comments from an editorial in the *Greensboro Daily News* that criticized the state’s lag in establishing a civil defense program. Rosser’s resolution, hereafter known as North Carolina Emergency War Powers Proclamation Number XVII, codified the creation of the State Council of Civil Defense. The Council of State unanimously adopted the resolution and on 24 July, Scott appointed Jones as state director of civil defense. The following day, Jones took the oath of office and commenced work immediately.

Foremost for Jones and the NCCD was a public information campaign to “sell” civil defense to the public and municipal officials. Jones felt the best approach would be through public appearances rather than impersonal mass mailings. Beginning on 14 August, Jones commenced a massive speaking tour, traversing every corner of the state speaking almost nightly to civil and volunteer groups. Jones urged people to educate themselves on the

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threats facing the nation and the need for civil defense, promulgating the message that the possibility of enemy attack against North Carolina did exist. 387

The sale of civil defense in North Carolina progressed methodically. In August, Jones issued his first information bulletin about the “local civil defense format.” Jones urged mayors to appoint a director of civil defense to begin the process of building the local organization. Tentative state plans further acknowledged that “Most of the protective aspects of Civil Defense should be handled by the usual departments of our local governments.” He recommended local civil defense programs educate “the public with respect to the necessity for a civilian defense program. Use your radio stations, newspapers, civic clubs, etc.” 388

Without funds and inadequate federal civil defense information, these early local efforts ebbed and flowed with the volunteer efforts and dedication of local governments. In Salisbury, civil defense director S.C. MacIntyre, Jr. expressed frustration with the planning effort, writing,

My experience is that the entire program will be seriously handicapped for the lack of adequate local funds and the normal lethargy. I believe the biggest job lies with the Public Information Bureau on a national, state, and local level to keep the public constantly conscious of the seriousness of the situation and that it will be necessary for the individual citizens to be indoctrinated that their actions will become automatic and that they will subconsciously react properly in an emergency wherever they happen to be. 389

To help the cities promote the necessity for civil defense, the NCCD hired Russell C. Nicholson on 1 December to act as the assistant director in charge of training. Nicholson, a Murfreesboro, N.C. native, served as a lieutenant commander in the navy during the war and as a welfare and recreational officer during Operation Crossroads, making him the state’s first civil defense official with eyewitness experience of a nuclear blast.

Blue Book, Korea, and Public Law 920

The same day that Scott appointed Jones as NCCD director, the governor received information that the NSRB’s comprehensive civil defense plan would be ready in September. The Korean War had taken civil defense planners completely by surprise. During the March hearings, Larsen informed the committees that the NSRB plans would be tentatively prepared by the beginning of September. To help out Larsen, Symington brought his brother-in-law, James J. Wadsworth, on board to accelerate the planning process. Larsen, in the newly named Civil Defense Office, asked Wadsworth to bring in the GSA staff to finish up their reports for the overall plan, but the GSA could not meet their deadlines. Symington then requested for Beers and his DoD staff to join the NSRB planning effort. Under Beers, the NSRB plan essentially became an updated version of the Hopley

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391 Biographical sketch for Russell C. Nicholson, undated, folder labeled “Public Information Program – Reference Data,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 8; handwritten biographical sketch for Russell C. Nicholson, folder labeled “Miscellaneous (Griffin),” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 7.
392 Frank Bane to all governors, 24 July 1950, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWKS, NCA, Box 52.
Report, with a new, streamlined text and improved clarity, but little else. Symington submitted the report, United States Civil Defense, to Truman on 8 September.\(^{395}\)

The NSRB plan, dubbed the Blue Book for its cover, represented a compromise for the nation’s civil defense. Half the size of the Hopley Report, the Blue Book defined civil defense as “the protection of the home front by civilians acting under civilian authority to minimize causalities and war damage and preserve maximum civilian support for the war effort.”\(^{396}\) The emphasis of civil defense again rested upon self-help with responsibility vested in state and local governments.\(^ {397}\) For the federal government, the Blue Book called for legislation to create a Federal Civil Defense Administration with an independent administrator and deputy answering to the president. The report included model federal legislation “to authorize a Federal Civil Defense program and for other purposes,” and a model state civil defense act, an almost word-for-word copy of the same legislation found in the Hopley Report.\(^ {398}\)

While not original, the Blue Book offered advantages over the Hopley Report. The federal civil defense effort would report to the president as opposed to the defense secretary. The clarity and concise nature of the report made it readily digestible to all Americans, unlike the dense, repetitive Hopley text. The Blue Book lacked specifics, but maintained the civil defense fundamentals familiar to anyone who had followed civil defense planning over the previous years.\(^ {399}\) The proposed organization, however, bore much similarity with the OCD. Former Office of Civilian Defense director Landis criticized the Blue Book as “more like a

\(^{396}\) Blue Book, 3.
\(^{397}\) Blue Book, 4-6.
\(^{398}\) Blue Book, 27, 126-149.
\(^{399}\) Namely self-help, entrenching responsibility at the local and state governments, clear delineation of the local-state-federal levels of civil defense, and a strict focus on matters for preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation of enemy attack (but undertaking no morale activities).
plan for World War II than for World War III, a plan for TNT bombs rather than for A-bombs,” and called for a more centralized, powerful federal civil defense effort.\textsuperscript{400} All the same, the \textit{Blue Book} fulfilled Larsen’s promise to the American people, and on the day Symington submitted the report to Truman, Larsen resigned from the Civil Defense Office, with Wadsworth promoted to acting director.\textsuperscript{401}

Truman transmitted the \textit{Blue Book} to Congress on 18 September. In his message to Congress, Truman proclaimed:

\begin{quote}
I believe this report presents a sound and workable outline of the civil defense problems we face. . . . I urge the members of the Congress to consider this report carefully over the next few weeks as a basis for the enactment of legislation in the near future. . . . In the meantime, I intend to establish a temporary Civil Defense Administration, which will carry forward the civil defense work until permanent legislation is enacted by the Congress. . . .
\end{quote}

That afternoon, vice JCAE chairman Durham introduced H.R. 9689 to authorize a federal civil defense program. In the other chamber the following day, McMahon, JCAE chairman, introduced the Senate version of the same bill, S. 4162. Both bills copied the model federal legislation in the \textit{Blue Book}.\textsuperscript{403} In a radio address on the evening of the eighteenth, Durham explained his views on the \textit{Blue Book} and the legislation he introduced, deeming the matter as “a new departure in American affairs. It is not pleasant to contemplate the necessity of preparing ourselves against the danger of atomic attack. . . . The facts are simple. Russia

\begin{flushright}\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{401} Tyler, “Civil Defense,” 276.  \\
\textsuperscript{403} \textit{Cong. Rec.}, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 96, pt. 11: 14993, 15075-76.  \\
\end{flushright}
possesses the atomic bomb. From this simple truth flows the necessity for a Federal Civil Defense Agency.\textsuperscript{404}

The federal civil defense program served as a third action within as many weeks for Truman’s confrontation with the Soviets. On 15 September, American and South Korean forces stormed ashore at the South Korean coastal city of Inchon, just to the west of Seoul. In less than two weeks, they liberated the capital and cut the North Korean supply lines. United Nations (UN) forces broke out of the Pusan Perimeter in the south and began a massive counterattack, inflicting devastating losses on the communist forces. By early October, UN troops began moving across the 38th parallel into North Korea.\textsuperscript{405} Truman signed off on NSC 68 on 30 September and ordered it put into immediate effect. The approval of NSC 68 immediately tripled the defense budget, making resources available for a variety of programs, among them civil defense.\textsuperscript{406} With civil defense part of the NSC 68 recommendations, and the legislation in the works for a federal program, the civil defense planning of the previous five years finally appeared poised for success.

Fears of the bomb and communist victory seemed to lessen in October. UN forces moved with limited opposition into North Korea, capturing the communist capital of Pyongyang on the twentieth. Unbeknownst to the overall UN commander General Douglas MacArthur, 200,000 Chinese troops were massing along the Yalu River and began engaging South Korean and American units on the twenty-sixth. MacArthur and his staff ignored the signs of pending catastrophe. On 24 November, almost 400,000 Chinese troops smashed into


\textsuperscript{405} Millett, \textit{They Came from the North}, 250-80.

the UN forces, inflicting massive losses and pushing them back to the 38th parallel by Christmas Eve. During his morning news conference on 30 November, Truman commented that the nation would use “every weapon that we have” in fighting the communist forces in Korea, but that he did not want to use the atomic bomb if avoidable.

A sense of extreme urgency engulfed civil defense. As Truman spoke about possible nuclear bombings, over on Capitol Hill, Durham introduced a revised version of his civil defense bill, now named H.R. 9798, while in the Senate on 1 December, Senators Estes Kefauver (D–TN) and Harry P. Cain (R–WA) introduced S. 4219 to parallel Durham’s bill. That morning, Truman sent a message to Congress, requesting an additional DoD appropriation of $16.8 billion to rapidly build up the armed forces. Finally, in the afternoon of 1 December, the president issued Executive Order 10186, establishing the Federal Civil Defense Administration in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President. The order spelled out the basics of the legislation in Congress and transferred the NSRB’s civil defense resources and personnel over to the new administration. Truman tabbed Millard F. Caldwell, the former governor of Florida, as the first FCDA director. Wadsworth stayed on as Caldwell’s deputy.

407 Millett, They Came from the North, 285, 291-357.
409 A bill to authorize a Federal civil defense program, and for other purposes, H.R. 9798, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 30 November 1950, folder labeled “Congressional (House),” GWKS, NCA, Box 53; Cong. Rec., 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 96, pt. 12: 16007, 16009. McMahon’s earlier bill, S. 4217, was also still active and hearings were held discussing both bills in December 1950, resulting in a merged Senate civil defense bill. 410 Special Message to the Congress Requesting Additional Appropriations for Defense, 1 December 1950, in Public Papers of the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1945 – 1953 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966), 6:296.
Days later, on 4 December, hearings began on the civil defense legislation in Congress. Chairing a special subcommittee on civil defense of the House Committee on Armed Services, Durham proceeded to meticulously examine H.R. 9789’s language and provisions over the next two weeks. During his testimony, Wadsworth reported that state civil defense directors and most governors supported the new legislation under consideration and Beers, speaking for the DoD, affirmed that the defense establishment approved of the legislation in general.\footnote{House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on H.R. 9798, to Authorize a Federal Civil Defense Program, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, H. Rep. 224, 7708-12.} The American Municipal Association expressed a desire for civil defense to exist under the Secretary of Defense. Mayors of major cities across the country feared that weak or ineffective state civil defense officials would fail to direct federal resources to critical target cities.\footnote{House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on H.R. 9798, 7817-24.}

Despite the concern, Congress pushed the legislation forward with notable expediency. On 16 December, Truman declared a national emergency in wake of the Korean War’s downturn and called for the accelerated strengthening of the military and civil defense.\footnote{Proclamation 2914: Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency, 16 December 1950, in Public Papers of the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1945 – 1953 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966), 6:304.} On 20 December, the House approved Durham’s bill by a vote of 247 – 1; the Senate approved its civil defense bill with a voice vote two days later.\footnote{Cong. Rec., 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 96, pt. 12: 16847-48, 16979-80. In the House, 181 representatives did not vote; Congressman Clare E. Hoffman (R–MI) cast the lone dissenting vote.} The Senate and House ironed out minor differences between the two bills, reached agreement on the

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legislation on 2 January 1951, and sent the finished bill to the Oval Office. Truman signed Public Law 920, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, into law on 12 January 1951.416

Public Law 920 and the North Carolina Civil Defense Act of 1951

Public Law 920 represented the culmination of over five years of civil defense planning. In the declaration of policy, the bill affirmed that the:

. . . responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions. The Federal Government shall provide necessary coordination and guidance; shall be responsible for the operations of the Federal Civil Defense Administration as set forth in this Act; and shall provide necessary assistance as hereinafter authorized.417

Congress tasked the FCDA with several functions. These included preparing plans and programs; delegating and coordinating civil defense responsibilities within the federal government; providing for communications and dissemination of attack warnings; researching and developing measures to protect life and property; conducting training programs; assisting and encouraging states to enter into interstate civil defense compacts; providing financial grants on a matching basis to states; and coordinating, assisting, and guiding the state and local civil defense efforts.418

The bill’s compromises did not raise too many eyebrows. Civil defense became ensconced in the realm of civilians and not the military. The administrator’s powers in an emergency allowed him to draw on all federal agencies for personnel, materials, facilities, and other resources as needed to assist the states and mitigate and aid in recovery of attack. Provisions in the act gave the administrator permission to make financial contributions to the states and share organizational equipment costs, but explicitly stated that “no contributions

shall be made for State or local personnel and administrative expenses. . .” 419 The greatest point of all, the vesting of civil defense responsibility in the states, suffered the most with the lack of funds for personnel. Yes, civil defense with civilian oversight would not affect the defense budget, conveniently avoiding the fears of the garrison state, but this came at a cost for state governments. For those states without the financial resources or potential target areas, the means to justify a high civil defense budget would have to come from either the state officials deciding to act, or citizens clamoring for greater civil defense measures. 420

Problems aside, the year 1951 had ushered in a federal civil defense program, and now North Carolina followed suit by passing the legislation for their state effort. Before Truman signed the Federal Civil Defense Act into law, Scott delivered his biennial address to the General Assembly on 4 January 1951. Recognizing that the legislative body met under the shadow of a period of national emergency, Scott proclaimed that “All the plans we make here must be subject to revision as we fit ourselves into the national defense program.” 421 Accordingly, the governor reminded the legislators that “To continue our present program and achieve effective civil defense will require legislation.” Adding that the state civil defense council had legislation already drafted, Scott appealed to the General Assembly to “give it immediate consideration.” 422

The legislation for the state civil defense act did not sit high on the priority list of the General Assembly. On 6 March, over two months after Scott called for the legislation, Senator J. Hampton Price (D–Leaksville), chairman of the finance committee, introduced

421 Scott, Public Addresses, 33.
422 Scott, Public Addresses, 39.
S.B. 306. The legislation presented to the General Assembly is a variant on the model state civil defense act in the *Blue Book*, essentially the model act in the *Hopley Report*. Another influence in the bill came from suggested legislation offered by the Council of State Governments, which drafted the suggested legislation in both the *Blue Book* and *Hopley Report*. The bill featured two changes specific to North Carolina, mainly to incorporate Scott’s Council of Civil Defense organization and tax provisions to conform to existing North Carolina law. Price probably did not consult the Indiana Civil Defense Act of 1949, which the NSRB the previous year had recommended as the model for North Carolina. After discussion, the state Senate sent the bill to the House and on 14 April the bill passed into law.

The North Carolina Civil Defense Act of 1951 is a parochial document in many respects. Civil defense is defined specifically for enemy attack, “the preparation for and the carrying out of all emergency functions, other than functions for which military forces are primarily responsible, to prevent, minimize and repair injury and damage resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack, sabotage, or other hostile action.” Disasters outside of warfare were thus technically beyond the jurisdiction of civil defense authorities. Section three covered the state civil defense council and included the provisions of the July 1950

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425 The Indiana act is modeled directly off the *Hopley Report*’s suggested model state civil defense act. See Indiana Civil Defense Act of 1949, folder labeled “Council of State Minutes – 1950,” GWKS, NCA, Box 204.
proclamation for the salary and responsibilities of the director. Responsibilities of the governor mirrored with minor edits the text of the suggested legislation in the *Blue Book*.

In all cases, the edits involved narrowing civil defense to address only matters of enemy attack. The North Carolina act differs from the suggested federal legislation by authorizing the governor in event of declared war or imminent danger of enemy attack to secure compliance with civil defense orders and regulations, and to enter into reciprocal aid agreements or compacts with other states and the federal government.428 Since Congress did not declare war, the Korean conflict did not qualify under this wording, leaving North Carolina able to accept, but not initiate, reciprocal aid agreements. This action, through amendments offered by Senator James H. Pou Bailey (D–Raleigh) was not a flaw but an intentional action to limit the governor’s power. Jones later lamented “that political personalities were stronger than political good judgment.”429 Local civil defense directors, however, could enter into mutual aid agreements with neighboring communities and counties and, with the approval of the governor, enter into mutual aid arrangements with other state civil defense agencies.430

Budgetary issues were another contentious focus of discussion, particularly in regards to suggested federal figures. Back on 22 December 1950, Caldwell contacted Scott and included a memorandum with guidance for North Carolina to use in drafting a budget. For smaller states, “with few critical target areas,” the FCDA guidance suggested costs as low as $30,000 annually; for North Carolina, with a population in 1950 of 4,060,000, the suggested

428 Ibid.
budget provided by the FCDA totaled $2,060,000.\textsuperscript{431} Weeks after the release of the *Blue Book*, the NSRB sent out guidance on all the critical target areas in the nation. This information delineated three types of critical target areas, organized according to population and/or the number of industrial workers concentrated in metropolitan areas; all critical target areas contained features essential to the nation’s defense effort. North Carolina possessed seven critical targets areas, based on their populations, but the state government and NCCD did not consider these cities to be in imminent danger.\textsuperscript{432} In February 1951, Caldwell sent a revised memorandum with updated suggested biennial civil defense budgets, including estimated financial figures “not yet . . . approved by the President and the Congress.” The FCDA recommended North Carolina budget $2,318,400 for civil defense between 1951 to 1953, with no funds allocated for shelters, reaffirming the lack of critical target areas.\textsuperscript{433}

Caldwell and the FCDA intended shelters to be a centerpiece for the nation’s civil defense effort.\textsuperscript{434} When the new federal agency presented its first budget request of $403 million before the House Appropriations Committee in March 1951, it requested $250

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\textsuperscript{431} Millard Caldwell to W. Kerr Scott, 22 December 1950; memorandum No. 7 from Millard Caldwell to State Civil Defense Directors, “Proposals Under Consideration by States for Civil Defense Budgets as of December 1950,” 21 December 1950, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWKS, NCA, Box 52.

\textsuperscript{432} The three types of critical target areas were Type I – Industrial Metropolitan (One or more industrial counties with at least 40,000 industrial workers); Type II – Industrial (County or groups of contiguous countries of 20,000 or more industrial workers, but smaller in population density than an industrial-metropolitan area); and Type III – Metropolitan (Central city or cities having populations of 50,000 or more). By default, all standard metropolitan areas (at least one city of 50,000 population or more) were designated target areas for civil defense purposes, but those metropolitan areas with populations of 40,000 or more manufacturing employees the FCDA designated “critical target areas.” North Carolina’s initial target areas, by default standard metropolitan areas, were Asheville, Charlotte, Durham, Greensboro, Raleigh, Wilmington, and Winston-Salem. Later, the FCDA dropped Wilmington from the list of target areas. North Carolina had no “critical target areas” during the FCDA era (1951 – 1958). See NSRB Document 128/1, *Critical Target Areas in Civil Defense* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1950), 2-3; FCDA, *Target Areas for Civil Defense Purposes: Their Population, Principal Cities, Counties* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1953), foreword, 8; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1952), 32, 51.


\textsuperscript{434} The type of shelters Caldwell envisioned intended to mitigate against the effects of blast and heat, but not specifically radioactive fallout.
million for shelters. The agency intended this initial $250 million to be part of a three year, $1.25 billion effort to identify and modify existing structures as shelters in critical target cities. The FCDA based the need for shelters on the assumption that the Soviet Union possessed sufficient Tupolev Tu-4 bombers to deliver a substantial nuclear strike on the continental United States. Caldwell during his testimony before the Appropriations Committee failed to impress the members with the imperative need for shelters and the agency received only approximately $31.8 million for this purpose – eight percent of the requested $403 million.435

For the 1952 fiscal year, Caldwell again tried to request funds for shelters. Truman recommended an FCDA budget of $535 million, $250 million for shelters (termed protective facilities). Again, both the Senate and House balked at Caldwell’s vision and defense of shelters, appropriating $75 million, a reduction of 85 percent from the budget request. This pattern continued for FY 1953, with $43 million appropriated from a request of $600 million. The elephant in the room, for the FCDA, was the stabilization of the Korean War by the spring of 1951. Even with the arms build-up approved via NSC 68, shelters seemed a frivolous expense compared to offensive weaponry.436 With the complete removal of shelter funding from the FCDA budget, however, North Carolina did not lose out on the possibility of matching funds. Instead, the limited nature of the state’s civil defense legislation, restricting operations only to the event of hostile action, constrained the NCCD to three principal expenditures: personnel salaries, administrative costs, and training funds. Additional funds, as needed, could be procured in the event of attack, but in the meantime

Jones and his small staff operated with a skeletal budget to prepare the state for the worst and convince local communities to invest in their own protection.

*The NCCD under E.Z. Jones, 1951 – 1952*

Nonetheless, throughout 1951 and 1952 the NCCD took form. A lack of federal guidance and information forced Jones to improvise. He crafted the early state civil defense program by drawing on available expertise from state and military officials. With the release of the *Blue Book*, Jones could proudly report that “it was found that the plans, as created . . . were so near in keeping with those outlined by the Federal Government, that few, if any, changes were found to be necessary.”

In these initial years the NCCD effort focused on public information and education; organizing and directing local efforts; and training to ensure long-term preparedness. These efforts differed little from either the World War II effort or the chronic need to cope with minimum funds or information. To combat these deficiencies, the NCCD organized existing state agencies and public organizations by assigning specific civil defense responsibilities tailored to the organizations’ existing purposes. During an emergency, then, the NCCD could have a ready reserve to draw upon while maximizing its limited budget.

Training and public information campaigns arguably posed the greatest challenge to the NCCD. To convince people to heed the messages of civil defense, Jones faced the “greatest selling job of all time.” Initial issues arose about building civil defense in smaller, rural communities, far removed from the metropolitan areas with manufacturing infrastructure. In March 1951, Jones reminded people of the basic truth, mainly “Who in this


nation can say what the enemy’s plan of operation will be? Too much emphasis is put on the
A-bomb without considering . . . the many other types or methods the enemy uses. . . . This
can and may happen to your community.”

Civil defense units tended to be organized in the larger communities and not the
counties, leaving isolated farms and hamlets uninvolved. As late as 1948, North Carolina
claimed 302,000 individual farms, thanks to New Deal price and production-control
programs that permitted small tobacco farmers to maintain their economic independence. This
anomaly exacerbated the challenges associated with the NCCD’s rural organization
effort. The main problem was finding directors willing to undertake the difficult task of
organizing civil defense in all communities and outlying areas, a tremendous job with little to
no salary. By June 1951, a mere 20 of the state’s 100 counties possessed a county-wide civil
defense program; but at the end of 1952, civil defense directors held posts in 75 counties and
275 cities and towns state-wide.

To tackle the matter of improving public information, the NCCD expanded. On 1
August 1951, the NCCD hired Sarah Boyd Weaver as deputy director in charge of women’s
affairs and public information. A Mooresville, N.C. native and journalism school graduate
from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Weaver had worked for several years
with newspapers and advertising in Durham, Salisbury, and Forest City. Just before joining
the NCCD, she worked several months in the Florida civil defense office and acquainted

“Civil Defense F – K,” GWKS, NCA, Box 87.
440 Christensen, Paradox of Tar Heel Politics, 114.
441 Jackson T. Ramsaur to E.Z. Jones, 25 May 1951; E.Z. Jones to Jackson T. Ramsaur, 1 June 1951, folder
labeled “Civil Defense L – Z,” GWKS, NCA, Box 87; NCCD, Summary of Operations, July 1950 –
September 1952, 3.
herself well with civil defense matters.\textsuperscript{442} Weaver wasted little time accelerating the distribution of press releases and information from the FCDA and NCCD, drafting speeches for Jones, and working with various state publications to publish articles about the need for civil defense. In Weaver’s opinion, the FCDA itself was at fault for the lack of civil defense awareness because of poor distribution of printed materials, badly written manuals, and too much red tape. In a note to Jones, she remarked how “Civil Defense is really simple, but it has been couched in such terms that it is completely confusing to the ordinary person who needs it.” She urged Jones to let the FCDA know that “the example for dead serious, effective Civil Defense has got to be set by them. . . .”\textsuperscript{443}

For Weaver, the NCCD needed to balance the message between scaring people into immediate action and building steady, consistent appeals to patriotic duty. The elephantine problem for civil defense and DoD planners, nonetheless, remained the atomic bomb. In order for the civilian population to buy into civil defense, people needed to accept that individuals and society could survive the bomb. The Truman administration’s concern, notes historian Andrew Grossman, was that “nuclear terror could subvert the strategy of nuclear diplomacy and deterrence by producing an apathetic American public. . . .”\textsuperscript{444} Between 1951 and 1952, the DoD, NSRB, and FCDA commissioned the think tank Associated Universities, Inc. to “evaluate and recommend the optimum combination of non-military measures” for the

\textsuperscript{443} Sarah Boyd Weaver to E.Z. Jones, April 1952, folder labeled “Office Reports,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 11.
\textsuperscript{444} Andrew Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red: Civilian Defense as an American Political Development During the Early Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2001), 44.
three organizations to best prepare the nation for possible nuclear war.\footnote{Associated Universities, Inc., General Report: Part I Report of the Project East River (New York: Associated Universities, Inc., October 1952), i. In 1951, psychologist Irving L. Janis’s study on bombing and civilian defense concluded that civil defense officials could develop emotional control in the population through preparatory education about the bomb and ultimately create an environment of positive attitudes for civil defense to train people to react to attack in a calm, controlled, almost ritualistic manner. See Irving L. Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress: Psychological Studies of Bombing and Civilian Defense (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), 185, 242-48.} The ensuing ten-part report, \textit{Project East River}, concluded that civil defense must be a permanent partner in national defense and leaders must convince the American people that civil defense could increase a person’s chances for survival and minimize the destruction of his or her property.\footnote{Project East River, Part I, 9-11.} Federal officials thereafter concentrated their efforts on an information campaign designed to impose a form of emotional control, balancing the need for preparedness between impulses of fear and panic, all the while shaping the perceptions and reactions of the public to the atomic bomb. Hopefully citizens would gravitate to civil defense and support the administration’s massive build up of nuclear weapons advocated in NSC 68.\footnote{There are numerous works that discuss the wider FCDA information/propaganda effort to convince, cajole, and manipulate the American people into supporting civil defense and a Cold War between nuclear nations. See Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red, 45-58; Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 46-56; Dee Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 48-51; McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, 28-39; and Allan Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 109-116.}

The FCDA informational battle touched North Carolina much as it did the rest of the nation. The Alert America convoy which stopped in Winston-Salem brought in numbers of visitors comparable with attendance in other cities across the nation, all experiencing “the show that may save your life.”\footnote{FCDA, Annual Report for 1952 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953), 47-49.} An editorial in the \textit{Chapel Hill Weekly} urged support for the town civil defense effort, explaining how “It is no evidence of panicky fear, it is only commonsense, to take the precautions. . . .”\footnote{Editorial, “Civil Defense,” \textit{Chapel Hill Weekly}, 21 March 1952.} Likewise, the editors of the \textit{Rocky Mount}
*Sunday Telegram* called civil defense “one answer to the new warfare, and its success is in the hands of the civilians. . . . Let’s inform ourselves of the facts, so the effort will not be lost.”

Asking merchants whether “his employees and customers [will] rush into the street to possible injury or death, or will they proceed in orderly manner to a designated shelter area under [the] calm guidance of . . . trained . . . personnel?” Jones urged businesses in the state to embrace civil defense.

For those readers desiring specific details, the NCCD blanketed the state with paper. From July 1950 to September 1952, the NCCD mailed 2.5 million pieces of information to local civil defense directors for distribution in the counties and communities. This included the NSRB information booklet, *Survival Under Atomic Attack*. Readers learned that yes, “You Can SURVIVE” by merely getting low or falling flat, seeking shelter and covering exposed areas of the body. In December 1951, the FCDA and NCCD introduced school children across North Carolina to Bert the Turtle, who taught children to “duck and cover” under their wooden desks, or behind a wall or in a ditch when they saw the flash of an atomic bomb. Tens of thousands of children received Bert’s comic book or watched his cartoon film in elementary schools. A NCCD film library with 65 FCDA movies supplemented the paper publications. Audiences could watch the film, *Survival Under Atomic Attack*, narrated by the calm, authoritative voice of Guilford County, N.C. native Edward R. Murrow and

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witness just how they could survive. Over 115,000 Tar Heels sat through at least one civil
defense training film during the first years of the NCCD.455

But it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the NCCD informational and training
campaign with actual disasters. The city of Statesville provides one example of North
Carolina’s civil defense training effort.456 Statesville conducted four full-scale tests of a
simulated atomic attack on their civil defense program from 1951 to 1952. Their most
publicized test took place on 23 October 1951 when an enemy aircraft dropped a simulated
atomic bomb over the city. As Jones and 75 civil defense directors from across the state
looked on, civil defense volunteers manned a communications center while doctors and
nurses established mobile emergency hospitals to treat victims with a variety of simulated
injuries. Wardens blocked off areas of the city to permit auxiliary fire trucks and ambulances
to move into the area to assist rescue squads freeing trapped victims and turning them over to
the medical personnel. All the while, other volunteers set up an emergency field kitchen to
begin mass feeding operations. Jones deemed the exercise “magnificent” and a year later in
an unannounced alert on 15 October 1952, the city civil defense program responded to a
simulated disaster of 21 fires in a mere 35 minutes.457

The Statesville civil defense test appeared to indicate a high state of preparedness in
North Carolina, but Jones and the NCCD refuted this perception. By the end of August 1952,

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455 NCCD Information Bulletin No. 31, 19 February 1951, folder labeled “Civil Defense, General, A-E,”
GWKS, NCA, Box 87; NCCD, Summary of Operations, July 1950 – September 1952, 13; NCCD,
456 Tracy C. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, N.C.: Duke
457 “Simulated Atomic Bomb Attack is Staged Here,” Statesville Record and Landmark, 24 October 1951, 1;
Roy Thompson, “‘Enemy Plans’ Drop A-Bomb at Statesville: Civil Defense Corps Stages Dress
Exercise, City of Statesville,” 10 September 1951, folder labeled “Civil Defense A – E General,” GWKS,
NCA, Box 87; NCCD, Summary of Operations, July 1950 – September 1952, 12; NCCD, Supplement to
the state civil defense program numbered a mere 24,260 enrolled volunteers, a little over half a percent of the state’s population.458 Jones admitted the state was not ready for any attack, conventional or nuclear, and he blamed the problems on inadequate funding and “apparent disinterest on the part of public officials at every level.” Jones affirmed that “the progress of Civil Defense in any community or political sub-division is in direct ratio to the interest and support demonstrated by local civil authorities.” The matter of public apathy among the state and local leadership he divided into the five factors of disbelief, escapism, suspicion, fatalism, and refusal, specifically “to accept the possibility of attack upon the American mainland, and . . . to believe that this state would be a target.” To neutralize these apathy-inducing factors, Jones advocated greater publicity on the part of media and public officials, whom he also blamed for the inadequacy of the state’s civil defense funds.459

But responsibility for correcting the problems Jones articulated would fall to another state civil defense director. On 31 December 1952, he submitted his resignation letter to the governor. Jones accepted the directorship under the condition that he would serve as long as an emergency existed. By late 1952, he believed circumstances still remained difficult, but needed to return to his family and business. Furthermore, the directors of the Alamance Broadcasting Company, Inc. in Burlington, N.C. had called for Jones to resign and return to managing radio station WBBB in July. Scott, leery of the international situation, requested Jones stay on for the remainder of his term.460 In his resignation letter, Jones thanked the governor for the opportunity to serve the state, but did not mince words in his frank appraisal of the present and future civil defense needs for the state:

460 W. Kerr Scott to Ralph Scott, 18 July 1952; V. Wilton Lane to W. Kerr Scott, 22 July 1952, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWKS, NCA, Box 113.
With all that has been, and is being done, the people of North Carolina . . . are far from ready for any size attack. I feel that North Carolina is as ready as most States.

I cannot leave this office without warning you and Mr. Umstead, as the next Governor, that the Civil Defense Act, as it now stands, is far from adequate or desirable and many changes should be made by a new law, if Civil Defense is to survive and be successful in North Carolina.\textsuperscript{461}

The changes Jones alluded to would come to pass in the General Assembly in the next three years, fortuitously so in the face of impending destruction in eastern North Carolina by the combined forces of wind and rain.

\textit{Conclusion}

The reemergence of civil defense in 1950 provided North Carolina and the nation with proposals only slightly better than those from the World War II Office of Civilian Defense. Despite the advent of the atomic bomb, years of planning and study, and peacetime opportunities to act, the United States failed to implement a Cold War civil defense program until international events forced the hand of policy makers. While not every state in the nation chose to wait for federal action before establishing a civil defense program, North Carolina declined to act until requested by federal authorities. The deficiencies of the State Council of Civil Defense from 1950 to 1952 mirror those of the federal program.

Civil defense planning in the aftermath of World War II held great potential for preparing America for all disasters. The initial work of the USSBS, \textit{Study 3B-I}, and the Bull Board all embodied the fundamental tenets of civil defense planning, training, and preparations later advocated in the \textit{Hopley Report} and \textit{Blue Book}. Cities and citizens could be protected through self-help, urban planning, advanced warning systems, training programs, and shelters. These fundamentals, however, depended on thorough planning and the

\textsuperscript{461} E.Z. Jones to W. Kerr Scott, 31 December 1952, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWKS, NCA, Box 113.
establishment of a national civil defense program. The stumbling block of where to vest responsibility for civil defense within the federal government brought the postwar effort to a temporary standstill.

The confluence of government reorganization, budgetary priorities, and discarding of tradition tossed civil defense around in choppy waters. Specifically, the question of whether to place civil defense within the reorganized military establishment or assign it to a strictly civilian federal agency delayed serious action for years. Truman’s budgetary desire to elevate the welfare state over the warfare state pressured the military services to avoid the acquisition of civil defense as a role or mission since it came with no funding. Domestically, fears of a “garrison state,” fostered in part by the end of the traditional small peacetime military and limited international involvement, made any move to ensconce civil defense within the military politically destabilizing. Forrestal’s decision to launch the OCDP and draft the \textit{Hopley Report} in some respects can be viewed as the best compromise possible; at least it offered a blueprint for civil defense should it be needed. The report’s recommendations of placing responsibility for civil defense on states and political subdivisions while vesting the federal effort in the executive branch was as much a political decision as a practical one for the NME and the budget. Truman’s rejection of the report cost him nothing in March 1949 so long as the international situation remained stable.

For a state like North Carolina, the compromised federal planning left a mixed legacy. The state’s economy began to expand and flourish after the war, particularly in the areas of industry and tourism. Under Scott, the budgetary surplus accumulated during World War II funded a belated road construction program as well as rural electrification and telephone line installation. Scott’s administration did not view enemy attack or emergency
preparedness as causes for concern. The quixotic journey of civil defense through various federal planning periods seemed irrelevant until the NSRB requested the state to take action. The governor and the Council of State, when requested, moved promptly, albeit methodically, to reinstitute a civil defense program. Unquestionably, the shock of the Korean War took both state and federal civil defense planners by surprise. North Carolina shook off the effects of this international event with fewer repercussions than did the federal government thanks to lower expectations. Whether because they thought communism did not pose a threat to the state, or because the DoD possessed the means to defend the homeland, or because just having a civil defense office provided the desired sedative, North Carolinians did not attack the Scott administration for being ill-prepared.

Jones and his tiny NCCD office faced daunting challenges. The NSRB’s deficiencies forced North Carolina to resort to planning based on older information and expertise. This resulted in a serendipitous alignment with the plans in Blue Book; but in both cases the plans represented a refined, antiquated variant of the much-maligned OCD. Nevertheless, Jones pressed ahead with overcoming the obstacles of apathetic public officials, limited federal information, and meager funding. Regarding the latter, neither state nor federal legislators accepted the gospel of civil defense, nor did the stalemated combat situation in Korea by the summer and fall of 1951 provide a return of 1950s specter of military disaster for expediting massive budget requests. Subsequently, the NCCD could do little more than promulgate, cajole, lambaste, and advocate action on the part of individuals to educate themselves about civil defense. Some counties and municipalities appointed civil defense directors and began establishing local programs, and a few citizens partook of literature or training films. The
numbers of participants, unfortunately for Jones and the NCCD, did not even approach half those of the state’s World War II civilian defense efforts.

Causes for the lack of public involvement are numerous, but the lack of urgency to do more is the most likely culprit. With laws and definitions of civil defense centered on enemy attack, all any citizen of North Carolina (or for that matter the nation) needed to ask was where and when the attack would come. Neither the government nor general public by 1950 questioned the existence of a Soviet atomic bomb or its means of deliverance. But without a tangible incident, a Pearl Harbor or German U-boats marauding along the East Coast, the threat and the specter of communist external aggression seemed nebulous and civil defense frivolous compared to the need for paved roads, electricity, and telephones to a rural North Carolina farmer. Confined to just responding to enemy attack, the North Carolina civil defense effort by 1952 was little more than an anemic program of state government longing for a mission and opportunity to justify its existence.
Figure 11. T.L. Transou and his son Tommy ring the bell to alert America of their volunteering for civil defense after touring the Winston-Salem showing of the FCDA’s “Alert America” convoy. Source: Majorie Hunter, “Thousands See State Premier of ‘Alert America’ Exhibition,” *Winston-Salem Journal*, 3 February 1952, 1.
Figure 12. Elbert Zed “E.Z.” Jones. the state’s first Cold War-era civil defense director from July 1950 until December 1952. Source: “Defense Exhibit: North Carolina is helpless; Civil Defense train to show what atomic warfare is like,” The State, 26 January 1952, 11.
Figure 13. For the first information bulletin, the NCCD distributed this organizational chart for counties and municipalities to use in expediting the staffing of their civil defense programs. Source: North Carolina Council of Civil Defense, Informational Bulletin No. 1, "Local Civil Defense Format," August 1950, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWKS, NCA, Box 52.
Figure 14. At both the state and federal level, funds for civil defense failed to match requested budget appropriations throughout the 1950 – 1952 period. Source: NCCD scrapbooks, OSRC-NCA.
Figure 15. Police Chief Frank Hartness and other civil defense volunteers man the communications center during a mock atomic test in Statesville, N.C., 23 October 1951. Source: NCCD scrapbooks, OSRC-NCA.
Figure 16. E.Z. Jones and other civil defense officials discuss the Statesville civil defense exercise, 23 October 1951. Source: NCCD scrapbooks, OSRC-NCA.
Chapter 3: Fire and Rain, Wind and Storm

I can not agree with you that it is not in the best interest of our country to carry on the hydrogen bomb tests. . . . The primary purpose for testing these weapons is not for the potential destructive power to civilians, but it is to learn many things that could not otherwise be known about the effects of the weapons.  
– Congressman Carl T. Durham, 25 March 1955

At the moment, Hurricane Hazel is approaching our coast; and we do hope that it may bring some rain to North Carolina.  
– Edward L. Rankin, Jr., 14 October 1954

Throughout September and October 1952, a team of military personnel, civilian scientists, and engineers of Joint Task Force 132 toiled beneath the tropical sun on the tiny island of Elugelab in Enewetok Atoll in the South Pacific. On Elugelab, the men constructed a six-story building over the white sands to house the seminal component of Operation Ivy. Inside the “shot cab,” engineers carefully assembled the code-named Mike device, an 82-ton, six foot-eight inch tall bomb intended to test the ideas of physicists Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam for creating a thermonuclear explosion. The scheduled detonation of Mike would take place in the morning of 1 November. Aboard the task force command ship USS Estes, western film actor Reed Hadley narrated background information about the purposes of the task force and the Mike device to cameras recording the events of the day. Coolly smoking a pipe, Hadley informed his audience that the crew on the Estes

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464 Enewetok Atoll is officially part of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.
would detonate Mike remotely at a distance of 30 miles from ground zero.\(^\text{465}\) A few minutes before detonation, Hadley proudly declared to the viewing audience that

> You have a grandstand seat here to one of the most momentous events in the history of science. In less than a minute, you will see the most powerful explosion ever witnessed by human eyes. The flash will come out of the horizon just about there, and this is the significance of the moment: This is the first full-scale test of a hydrogen device. If the reaction goes, we’re in the thermonuclear era. For the sake of all of us, and for the sake of our country, I know that you join me in wishing this expedition well.\(^\text{466}\)

At exactly 7:15AM, the Mike device detonated.\(^\text{467}\)

Hadley and the thousands of observers could not have imagined what ensued. Within seconds of detonation, the Mike explosion’s fireball expanded to over three miles in diameter, generating temperatures hotter than the core of the sun. Intense heat blanketed the crew of the *Estes* and heated the wings of orbiting bombers 15 miles and 40,000 feet altitude distant from the fireball to 93 degrees Fahrenheit almost instantly. After five minutes, the mushroom cloud of the bomb rose to a height of 27 miles, eventually stabilizing to a maximum size of a 30 mile stem and a cap cloud over 100 miles wide. The 10.4 megaton blast completely vaporized the island of Elugelab, turning 80 million tons of sand, rock, and coral into radioactive fallout that rained down upon adjacent islands and eventually spread across the globe. The resulting crater measured 6,420 feet across and 164 feet deep. Mike obliterated all plant and animal life within three miles of ground zero. Birds in flight simply disappeared into dust or died instantly from the heat and blast waves, dropping in smoldering


News of the test and Mike’s power remained a secret to the American people, at least officially. President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower learned of Mike and the thermonuclear age just before Thanksgiving and he quickly decided to keep news of Mike secret.\footnote{Priscilla J. McMillan, \textit{The Ruin of J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Birth of the Modern Arms Race} (New York: Viking, 2005), 159.} On 16 November, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) quietly reported that weapon development tests took place at Eniwetok Atoll, and “the test program included experiments contributing to thermonuclear weapons research,” but the government did not formally reveal possession of the hydrogen bomb.\footnote{U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Periodical Digest for Administrative File, no. 29, 28 November 1952; Carl T. Durham to E.Z. Jones, 8 December 1952; E.Z. Jones to Carl T. Durham, 21 November 1952, folder labeled “#1224, 18 Oct – 29 Dec (& N.D.) 1952,” CTDP, SHC, Box 66.} Nevertheless, word about Mike leaked out in the American press from letters home by sailors detailing the blast.\footnote{U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Periodical Digest for Administrative File, no. 29, 28 November 1952; Carl T. Durham to E.Z. Jones, 8 December 1952; E.Z. Jones to Carl T. Durham, 21 November 1952, folder labeled “#1224, 18 Oct – 29 Dec (& N.D.) 1952,” CTDP, SHC, Box 66.} In March 1953, new Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) administrator Frederick Valdemar (Val) Peterson saw film footage of Mike, a classified production aptly titled \textit{Operation Ivy}. The images of devastation helped Peterson conclude that the only way to survive thermonuclear weapons was to not to be there.\footnote{Thomas J. Kerr, \textit{Civil Defense in the U.S.: Bandaid for a Holocaust?} (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1983), 63; Senate Committee on Armed Services, \textit{Hearings, Civil Defense Program}, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, 67.} The secrecy about Mike became somewhat mute, however,
with the AEC announcement on 20 August that the Soviet Union detonated a fusion bomb a week previously on the twelfth. While not a true thermonuclear weapon like the Teller-Ulam design, the Soviets once again possessed nuclear parity.\(^{473}\)

In September, acting FCDA administrator, Katherine Graham Howard, contacted the White House about the possibility of declassifying the film *Operation Ivy* for civil defense purposes. The reasoning, as Graham explained, would be to educate the public about thermonuclear weapons in a “calm, unemotional and authoritative exposition of the essential facts about thermonuclear weapons, their probable effects, and civil defense measures to minimize these effects upon life, property and national morale,” aligning with the recommendations of *Project East River* to emphasize survival and control panic.\(^{474}\) In February 1954, the AEC released *Operation Ivy* for viewing only by members of Congress.\(^{475}\) The National Security Council (NSC) discussed releasing the film during the same period, and Peterson argued for release on the grounds that “he had to have something which would help to scare the American people out of their indifference to the requirements of adequate civilian defense.”\(^{476}\) In March, the NSC recommended release of the film.\(^{477}\) The AEC and

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\(^{473}\) Rhodes, *Dark Sun*, 523-25; *FRUS, 1952 – 1954, National Security Affairs*, vol. II, part 2, 1185-88. The Soviet bomb design was a boosted fission weapon with a single stage compressing thermonuclear fuel to create fission. This original design was not a true hydrogen weapon, like the Teller-Ulam design, but to the Soviets, the successful test on 12 August 1953 deprived Americans of a thermonuclear monopoly. See David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939 – 1956* (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1994), 303-09.


\(^{475}\) Sterling Cole and Bourke B. Hickenlooper to all members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, 28 January 1954, folder labeled “#1318, 26 Jan – 16 June 1954,” CTDP, SHC, Box 72.


\(^{477}\) Discussion at the 188th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 11 March 1954, folder labeled “188th Meetings of NSC March 11, 1954,” DDEP-AWF, NSC Series, DDEL, Box 5.
Eisenhower administration announced the public debut of the film on 1 April, approximately 15 months after Mike’s detonation. Finally the American people and civil defense officials could come face to face with the greatest weapon in the history of mankind.478

The advent of the thermonuclear age posed incredible new challenges to an already feeble civil defense effort. Secrecy about thermonuclear weapons did nothing to alleviate the apprehension of civil defense officials. With Congress slashing funding for a nation-wide shelter network, nothing could repel firepower of such magnitude, and officials found themselves trapped without funds or effective plans. The enormous blast posed less of a challenge or threat than fallout, an insidious byproduct of the super bomb capable of blanketing areas thousands of miles away from ground zero with dangerous radioactive dust and particulate matter. In the first years of the Eisenhower administration, federal and state civil defense efforts attempted to either reorganize plans for thermonuclear attack or reemphasize the need for greater protective measures. For the most part, this work appeared fruitless and occasionally ludicrous.

In North Carolina, the thermonuclear era began amidst an onslaught of extreme weather phenomena. Between 1954 and 1955, four deadly hurricanes struck the state, each storm releasing heat energy equivalent to a Mike device exploding constantly every 20 minutes.479 The four storms, Hurricanes Hazel, Connie, Diane, and Ione, collectively and cumulatively devastated the eastern coastal counties of the state.

478 Sterling Cole to Carl T. Durham, 30 March 1954; Sterling Cole to members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1 April 1954, folder labeled “#1318, 26 Jan – 16 June 1954,” CTDP, SHC, Box 72. Cole originally slated release of the film on 7 April 1954, but apparently due to premature release, he moved the date to 1 April.

Council of Civil Defense (NCCD), Hurricane Hazel in October 1954 exposed the existing state effort as woefully ineffective and incapable of mitigating and responding to even a natural disaster. In 1955, Hurricanes Connie, Diane, and Ione all struck within a five week period from August to September, exacerbating Hazel’s damages. Preceding the hurricanes, two droughts in 1953 and 1954 managed to desiccate farms throughout parts of North Carolina and the nation. The economic impact of these natural disasters made the risk of thermonuclear war appear distant and irrelevant to those North Carolinians without power, water, shelter, or an economic future.

But the residents of North Carolina and the NCCD found comfort and defense in changing policies and leaders. Amendments to state and federal law gave civil defense responsibility for preparing for and responding to natural disasters. These changes equipped apathetic citizens or demoralized volunteers with a new purpose and importance for civil defense and federal disaster relief funds to mitigate and rebuild from Mother Nature’s wrath. Civil defense may not have funds to build shelters to protect against nuclear weapons, but leaders could bring in federal monies to rebuild areas destroyed by hurricanes. In North Carolina, a new governor and NCCD director brought public officials into office committed to building up the civil defense program and improving the state’s economy. When hurricanes destroyed coastal communities, the state used the NCCD’s resources to rehabilitate and strengthen the physical communities and economic viability of eastern North Carolina. In a period of uncertainty about the federal civil defense effort to defend against enemy attack, the NCCD began to build itself around a foundation of natural disaster response and rehabilitation.
New Leadership and Natural Disasters

Adding natural disasters to the FCDA’s responsibilities potentially challenged public indifference. In his final week in office, Truman issued Executive Order 10427, transferring responsibility for disaster relief to the FCDA. From the nation’s origins well into the twentieth century, federal relief for disaster victims had proceeded haphazardly. The first federal appropriations for individual relief began in 1790, and between 1803 and 1947 Congress passed 128 acts offering some form of disaster relief. Congress, however, did not view responsibility for disaster relief as primarily a federal matter, but rather one of states, localities, and private relief organizations. In 1905, Congress re-chartered the American Red Cross and designated the organization as the official federal agent for disaster relief.

For the first half of the century, responsibility for disaster relief rested in the hands of the Red Cross, private charities, churches, communities and citizens. This arrangement slipped as the scale and scope of disasters increased. The advent of massive floods along the Mississippi in 1927, the Great Depression, and other natural disasters (notably the Dust Bowl) in the early 1930s all exceeded the capabilities and resources of the Red Cross. As lawyer and sociologist Michelle Landis Dauber writes, federal disaster relief became a means for advocates of the welfare state to “show how the New Deal was consistent with this

482 Moss, “Courting Disaster?”, 313-15.
precedent for federal assistance. . .”483 Disasters, however, over time became considered “acts of God,” removing any moral and ethical responsibility from the individual.484 This moral abdication, coupled with the growth of the welfare state in the 1930s and government intervention in economic affairs, as geographer Rutherford Platt notes, forged a “new social compact” where the government would assume a larger share of disaster losses.485

The Disaster Relief Act of 1950 established the permanence of federal relief for natural disasters. As the first continual general disaster act, the legislation moved responsibility for disaster aid from the Congress to the White House and committed the federal government to provide specified assistance before and after disasters.486 Introduced in the House by Congressman Harold Hagen (R–MN) and signed into law on 30 September 1950 as Public Law 875, the act initially remained obscure. The original intent of Hagan’s bill was to assist in rebuilding areas in Minnesota and North Dakota devastated by floods. The Senate accepted the House bill without amendment and it passed easily with bipartisan support.487

Compared to the Federal Civil Defense Act, the Disaster Relief Act is short and concise. The legislation’s purpose states that

it is the intent of Congress to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to States and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major disasters, to repair essential public facilities in major disasters, and to foster the development of

485 Platt, Disasters and Democracy, 11.
such State and local organizations and plans to cope with major disasters as may be necessary.\footnote{488 \textit{Disaster Relief Act of 1950}, Public Law 81-875, \textit{U.S. Statutes at Large} 64 (1950): 1109.}

“Major disasters” by definition included any flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, storm, or other catastrophe anywhere in the nation which the president determined warranted federal assistance to supplement the efforts of states and local governments, who in turn “shall give assurance of expenditure of a reasonable amount of funds.” A major disaster declaration request would be authorized if it met these criteria and when “the governor of any State . . . in which such catastrophe may occur or threaten certifies the need for disaster assistance. . . .” In a declared major disaster, federal agencies received authorization to provide assistance to states and local governments through the loaning of resources and “performing . . . protective and other work essential for the preservation of life and property, clearing debris and wreckage, making emergency repairs to and temporary replacements of public facilities of local governments damaged or destroyed in such major disaster, and making contributions to States and local governments” for said purposes.\footnote{489 \textit{Disaster Relief Act of 1950}, 1110.} Congress assigned the decision for providing financial assistance to the president, and notably did not clarify what exactly “assurance of a \textit{reasonable amount of funds}” entailed.\footnote{490 Emphasis added.} This matter would be clarified in years to come.

chose the HHFA, according to political scientist Peter J. May, “because the resident engineering expertise necessary for guiding facility repair already existed with the agency’s administration of grants for local housing programs.” By shifting responsibility for disaster relief to the FCDA, Truman increased the authority vested in the civil defense agency and exposure of the disaster relief program. The executive order emphasized federal disaster relief as “supplementary to relief afforded by State, local, or private agencies and not in substitution therefore,” with federal funding conditional on initial state and local expenditures. Responsibility for control of the disaster relief funds of the Executive Office of the President also shifted to the FCDA, and the first civil defense allocations for relief occurred in May 1953 in response to a spate of tornadoes.

Shifting disaster responsibility to civil defense collided with the incoming administration of Eisenhower. Even before taking the oath of office, Eisenhower saw

August 2012). The Housing and Home Finance Agency did not formalize any procedures for determining aid but left the matter in the hands of the field engineers to administer the law. See Bourgin, A Legislative History of Federal Disaster Relief, Chapter 1, n26, 28.

May, Recovering from Catastrophes, 51.

As originally developed, a major disaster declaration originated when a governor after consulting with the state civil defense director and officials applied to the president for a major disaster declaration. The president would then request a formal recommendation from the FCDA director. If the director, after consultation with state and regional civil defense officials, recommended a declaration, the president would then issue a major disaster declaration and provide a set amount of funding and federal resources to alleviate suffering. The FCDA director would prepare the rules and regulations for the president to declare disasters and assist federal agencies and state and local organizations to draft suitable plans and preparations in the event of major disasters. Truman also tasked the FCDA director to act as the federal coordinator for declared major disasters. Truman shifted disaster responsibility to the FCDA “because of anticipated increased efficiency in the Civil Defense program and the disaster program which should result from active use of Federal, State and local civil defense organizations in disasters.” See Val Peterson, “Coordinating and Extending Federal Assistance,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 309 (January 1957): 55-58; James J. Wadsworth to William B. Umstead, 24 January 1953, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWBU, NCA, Box 3.


economic strength as equally vital to national security as preponderant military power, and he resolved to rein in the massive military spending of Truman.\textsuperscript{496} By fall 1953, the administration crafted a new national security policy, dubbed the “New Look,” codified in National Security Council report NSC 162/2. Eisenhower’s planners rejected the Truman administration’s massive expansion of conventional and military forces in anticipation of potential full-scale war with China and the Soviet Union. The New Look would counter communist aggression in the world with political, economic, informational, and covert measures as required. Militarily, the New Look would contain and deter Soviet aggression by building massive nuclear capability and strengthening military cooperation with America’s allies. The nation would “consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions,”\textsuperscript{497} trading an expensive, large standing military for relatively cheaper nuclear firepower.\textsuperscript{498}

Civil defense and its costs factored into Eisenhower’s New Look. Congress gave the president fiscal precedent, having slashed requests for shelter funding and leaving the FCDA with a fraction of its requested budget. In keeping with his stated objective to balance the budget by reducing military outlays, Eisenhower needed a program capable of protecting the American people at minimal cost. He singled out civil defense as a component of the nation’s defenses in his first state of the union address, but stressed that “Civil defense responsibilities

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\textsuperscript{497} “A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2),” 30 October 1953, 22, folder labeled “NSC 162/2 (2),” White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948 – 61, Disaster File, DDEL, Box 11. \\
\end{flushleft}
primarily belong to the State and local governments. . . .” While a reiteration of Public Law 920, the reemphasis on state and local funding left expensive programs, like blast shelters, in the theoretical reach of only the wealthiest states.

Eisenhower’s new FCDA administrator, Val Peterson, began the task of reorienting the FCDA away from the Truman administration’s sheltering program. Evacuation planning seemed easier and cheaper from a federal perspective. In a prepared statement to a meeting of the National Security Council in March 1953, Peterson affirmed that “If early warning is given [to] the country, there may be no need for an expensive shelter program.” Peterson would later acknowledge that “the alternatives are to dig, die, or get out; and certainly we don’t want to die.” As succinctly summarized by historian Allan M. Winkler, the Eisenhower administration’s civil defense effort broadly went from “duck and cover” to “run like hell.” The existence of thermonuclear weapons, however, challenged evacuation’s feasibility. To be effective, people required sufficient warning time to move out of potential target areas. In turn, this necessitated a system of sirens, early warning radar, and air defenses capable of granting at least an hour of time to evacuate or find shelter. Presented with the Eisenhower administration’s FY 1954 budget of $125 million and after hearing

Peterson’s criticisms against shelters and the deterrent need for civil defense, Congress appropriated only $46.5 million.\textsuperscript{504}

Disaster relief gave civil defense leaders the opportunity to save face. The shift of disaster relief to the jurisdiction of civil defense included management of the Disaster Relief Fund. Congress voted appropriations for the fund in the budget of the Executive Office of the President, but the FCDA controlled the money.\textsuperscript{505} The maligned FCDA now served as the middleman for states and localities. Those states with legislation authorizing the use of civil defense in natural disasters, or with functioning civil defense programs, stood to benefit from this federal largesse. Furthermore, natural disaster relief work provided opportunities for the practical application of training for wartime conditions in peacetime, and the utilization of civil defense volunteers in disaster relief provided the added boost of morale and importance to the community.\textsuperscript{506}

This new responsibility also gave civil defense positive visibility and opportunities to act. In 1953, the FCDA recognized how disasters “became the proving grounds for civil defense preparedness.”\textsuperscript{507} Furthermore, the FCDA accented how “catastrophes . . . clearly showed that the same men and women who are organized, equipped, and trained to counteract an atomic blast can be effective on the homefront . . .”\textsuperscript{508} Eisenhower also distinguished how disaster relief operations provided training for state and local civil defense programs. They made civil defense “a recognized community service, thereby creating a new


\textsuperscript{507} FCDA, \textit{Annual Report for 1953}, 15.

\textsuperscript{508} FCDA, \textit{Annual Report for 1953}, 17.
dimension of peacetime citizenship,” with participation in disaster relief increasing the operational ability of civil defense organizations in the event of an enemy attack. While the burden rested on state and local governments, a potential financial benefit existed. A small investment in civil defense by a state could translate into massive federal aid. With the nebulous legislative definitions for “major disaster” and “reasonable amount,” civil defense authorizations gave federal and state government officials an innocuous social welfare safety net clothed in the image of national security.

North Carolina Civil Defense in 1953

In Raleigh on the cold, grey morning of 8 January, William B. Umstead took the oath of office as North Carolina’s sixty-third governor. His inaugural address expressed a vision of “a better tomorrow” for North Carolina. Umstead sought further investment in education, roads, and agricultural research and development. In industrialization he turned for salvation, proclaiming how “We should encourage . . . the expansion of industries which we now have. Large segments of industry are now moving south, and North Carolina should make every possible effort to get its share.” He recognized tourism as another source of revenue for the state, and called on communities and residents to cooperate in attracting visitors and their dollars to come to North Carolina, supporting an industry valued at $350 million in 1952.

Listeners greeted Umstead’s address with resounding applause, but the delivery left the governor weakened. After a long afternoon of inaugural activities, Umstead retired in exhaustion but spent the next day in his new office preparing for the legislative session. That

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evening he suffered a debilitating heart attack. He would not return to the governor’s office until 21 May, and thereafter remained in poor health.\textsuperscript{512}

Even before taking office, Umstead needed a new civil defense director. Three days prior to his inauguration, he received the resignation of E.Z. Jones as NCCD director.\textsuperscript{513} The bedridden Umstead announced his selection of William Flemming Bailey of High Point. Bailey, a friend of Jones, had an impressive background. An acting regional director of the Office of Price Stabilization in 1953, Bailey earned degrees from Duke University and Guilford College, with graduate work at Harvard and UNC-Chapel Hill. Prior to World War II, he served as the mayor of High Point and went on to establish and direct the city’s civilian defense office until being called into military service. Rising to the rank of colonel, he served in Europe with distinction. Bailey also sat on the U.S. Olympic Games Teams Committee from 1936 to 1952 and as the vice president for the United States Amateur Athletic Union in 1948.\textsuperscript{514} With his military background, familiarity with civil defense, and leadership experience, Bailey represented an excellent choice. His task was anything but easy, “largely because of the . . . public’s attitude of relative indifference about civil defense,” as the \textit{Greensboro Record} observed.\textsuperscript{515}

For 1953, Bailey and the North Carolina Council of Civil Defense primarily continued the planning work begun by Jones while incorporating the new responsibility for

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{512}{Umstead, \textit{Public Addresses}, vii-xii.}
\footnotetext{513}{Jones explained his departure for business and personnel reasons, with no political implications, and promised to help out Umstead and his replacement up to 31 January. See E.Z. Jones to William B. Umstead, 5 January 1953, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWBU, NCA, Box 3.}
\footnotetext{515}{“In Dependable Hands,” \textit{Greensboro Record}, 29 January 1953, A-10.}
\end{footnotes}
natural disasters. In the wake of Executive Order 10427, the state General Assembly took to amending state law. North Carolina’s civil defense effort previously demonstrated disaster response utility in World War II, but yet the state civil defense act provided no provisions for natural disaster responsibility in 1951. The new NCCD director spent March and April interacting with various legislators, “endeavoring to get additional funds and a better Civil Defense Bill.” As Bailey lobbied for civil defense legislation in Raleigh, he argued for increased statewide preparations, openly recognizing how “Some communities are well organized,” but “many, far too many others are lagging.”

The FCDA provided Bailey support in his effort with the highly-publicized Operation Doorstep. The operation, a joint Atomic Energy Commission, Department of Defense, and FCDA effort, intended to show the American people the effect of an atomic burst over average American homes. While Bailey choose to skip attending the test on 17 March at the AEC’s Nevada Proving Grounds, over 600 people witnessed the detonation of shot Annie, a 16.4 kiloton atomic bomb placed atop a 300-foot steel tower. For the test, the FCDA and AEC constructed a pair of two-story typical American homes with basement fallout shelters, and several outdoor home-type shelters at distances of 3,500 and 7,500 feet from ground zero. Various automobiles placed nearby provided civil defense officials a means to test the protective capabilities of the structures and vehicles, but only for blast. The

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517 William F. Bailey to Carl T. Durham, 4 March 1953, folder labeled “#1315, 5 Jan – 16 April 1953,” CTDP, SHC, Box 71.
519 Doorstep fell under the overall series of nuclear tests codenamed Operation Upshot-Knothole.
520 North Carolina’s only observer for shot Annie was William Woestendiek, assistant city editor for the Winston-Salem Journal. See “Officers Given Blast Account,” News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 23 April 1953.
FCDA furnished the homes with furniture, household goods, and mannequins modeling the finest in J.C. Penney clothing. 521

With cameras rolling, Annie did not disappoint. The blast obliterated the model home at 3,500 feet and tossed the vehicles and mannequins around like toys. In North Carolina, citizens watched footage of the blast on the television or saw photographs in newspapers of the destruction. For federal engineers, the tests proved that the mannequins in the shelters survived undamaged and showed no signs of thermal damage. 522 Historian Laura McEnaney, writing about Doorstep, deems the tests “as much public relations morality plays about the dangers of family apathy as they were scientific experiments.” 523 This certainly holds true for North Carolina. The Raleigh Times reported that “Civil defense authorities could not have prepared any better advertisement for the urgency of their program than the newspapers and television pictures of the atomic explosion at Yucca Flat.” 524 The Raleigh paper later asked city residents what they would do if the capital were subject to an atomic attack. Those interviewed “indicated how distressingly ill informed all . . . are on the matter of civil defense.” 525

Bailey had his opportunity in the coming months to increase the civil defense program. On the matter of amending the state law to extend responsibility for natural disasters to civil defense organizations, Senator James H. Pou Bailey (D–Raleigh) who

522 FCDA, Operation Upshot-Knothole, 10–13. Gamma radiation effects could not be studied on account of high levels of residual radiation at the test site.
524 “New Dread of War is Following Public Understanding of A-Bomb,” Raleigh Times, 23 March 1953, 4.
previously limited the state’s civil defense legislation in 1951, introduced new legislation on 26 February.\textsuperscript{526} The bill expanded the 1951 definition of civil defense to include “fire, flood, earthquake, or windstorm when so requested by the governing body of any county, city or town in the State.” It further defined all emergency functions to include “fire fighting services, police services, medical and health services, rescue, engineering, air raid warning services, communications, radiological, chemical and other special weapons of defense, evacuation of persons from stricken areas,” among other aspects. After being sent to the House for approval at the beginning of March, the General Assembly ratified the bill on 29 April.\textsuperscript{527}

The NCCD now focused efforts on increasing local participation and breaking the grip of apathy. Bailey approached preparedness in the state concurrently from the bottom-up and top-down angles. The top-down approach had already yielded success with the amended state civil defense legislation. Bailey approached the bottom-up, “grass roots” approach by drafting plans for local authorities to organize civil defense programs, for teaching civil defense in the public schools, and for North Carolina families to learn and prepare for emergencies. He wanted to hire a communications officer for the NCCD staff and establish a state civil defense control center outside of Raleigh for use in emergencies.\textsuperscript{528} In June, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction published the information booklet \textit{The Schools and Civil Defense} “as an aid to the schools in meeting needs contemplated as possibilities during

\textsuperscript{528} William F. Bailey to William B. Umstead, 31 August 1953, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWBU, NCA, Box 3.
an emergency resulting from enemy attack, sabotage, or from natural causes.” Bailey’s *Plan for Civil Defense* became available to city and county civil defense directors in July. Intended as a blueprint to help local civil defense efforts prepare responses to military or natural disasters, the plan can safely be compared as North Carolina’s *Blue Book*.530

Despite these publications, the status of civil defense in North Carolina lagged severely. In one of several prepared statements to television and radio stations in May, Bailey described attitudes towards civil defense in the state “as anything but alarming. In spite of all that has been said, in spite of the vivid portrayal . . . of a test bomb at Yucca Flat and its resulting destruction . . . the vast majority of our citizens remain apathetic and smug in the opinion that it in no way can affect them.” Disturbingly, Bailey admitted “about six cities and only three or four counties” even met the minimal requirements for civil defense. To correct these deficiencies, he advocated “COMMON SENSE . . . especially on the part of county and city officials.”531 Privately, the state director saw promise with the inclusion of natural disaster responsibilities to his civil defense organization, expressing hope that the change in state and federal law “will be an incentive to speed . . . volunteer registration and training

529 North Carolina Superintendent of Public Instruction, *The Schools and Civil Defense* (Raleigh, N.C.: Superintendent of Public Instruction, June 1953), 3. The booklet outlined and delineated civil defense responsibilities at the state, community, and school level. Information for principals and educators included such topics as student mental health, recommending activities “aiding children to develop self-reliance,” first aid, fire fighting, and even civil defense in physical education. It further recommended activities that, considering Jim Crow legislation in the 1950s South, were progressive before the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* Supreme Court ruling. These included classroom activities “with understanding others – including other races, nationalities, religions . . . prejudice, rumors, and other types of emotional thinking.” See *Schools and Civil Defense*, 11-12.
Nevertheless, civil defense interest did not increase in the state. In an op-ed in the Raleigh *News and Observer*, Nell Battle Lewis lamented the nature of the NCCD, of “the appalling feebleness of civil defense in North Carolina” with a system of volunteers and a state office possessing no enforceable power and little money to operate.\(^{533}\)

During August, North Carolina’s first request for a major disaster declaration brought civil defense a much needed boost in positive press. Throughout the year, a severe drought ravaged the western United States, inflicting great losses on cattlemen and farmers alike. In late June and early July 1953, the House Committee on Agriculture held hearings on the drought situation in the southwest, chaired by Congressman Clifford R. Hope (R–KS). On 28 May, Hope introduced H.R. 6054 to provide additional emergency assistance to farmers and stockmen.\(^{534}\) Congress approved Hope’s bill, Public Law 115, on 14 July, vesting the Secretary of Agriculture with authority to provide emergency assistance in areas declared major disasters under Public Law 875. This agricultural assistance could take the form of financial loans, feed for livestock, or seed for planting.\(^{535}\) On 27 August, the State Agricultural Mobilization Committee informed Umstead about drought disaster conditions in fifteen North Carolina counties. The report considered the damage “serious enough to warrant inclusion of such counties in a drought disaster area under Public Law 115,” with the

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\(^{532}\) William F. Bailey to county and city directors, May 1953, folder labeled “Office Reports,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 11.


existence of an urgent need for livestock feed in the affected counties. The governor promptly wired Eisenhower requesting an immediate disaster declaration.

The drought did not just affect North Carolina agriculture but the state’s communities. Across the Piedmont region, reservoirs and rivers shrank under the blazing sun and the growing demands of communities, agriculture, and industry. As the cities of Raleigh and Burlington both began experiencing water shortages, the governor’s office turned to the regional FCDA office for help. At a meeting of the Raleigh City Council on 3 September, FCDA Region III engineer Earl E. Mader offered the city at no charge the use of eight-inch water pipe and pumps sufficient to provide an additional two million gallons of water per day. The council unanimously accepted the offer. The Burlington City Council also passed a resolution to use 25,000 feet of eight-inch steel pipe along with five 1,500 gallon capacity pumps from federal civil defense stockpiles. The following day, the governor’s office arranged with Colonel Harry E. Brown, FCDA Region III administrator, to accept responsibility for transportation, use, and return of the pipe, fittings, and pumps for the two cities to combat the “threatened disaster.” The town of Sanford two weeks later also


537 Telegram from William B. Umstead to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 31 August 1953; telegram from Bernard M. Shanley to William B. Umstead, 31 August 1953, folder labeled “Argic – Disaster Area (Drought) (1953), GWBU, NCA, Box 33.

required a pump and pipe to alleviate its water shortage which the FCDA promptly addressed.539

This use of civil defense resources for natural disaster response represents a watershed in the development of civil defense in the state. On 11 September, Umstead wrote to Peterson, thanking the FCDA and Brown for their immediate response to help Raleigh and Burlington. The governor expressed how the assistance “means good will and understanding for the Federal Civil Defense Administration among the municipal officials across North Carolina.”540 Acting administrator Katherine G. Howard replied, “We [at the FCDA] feel that the efforts of Civil Defense organizations at all levels in connection with the many natural disasters in recent months have been effective in promoting an awareness on the part of the general public that Civil Defense operations can be utilized in peacetime disasters as well as those caused by enemy warfare.”541 For city officials, the inclusion of natural disaster responsibility in the guise of civil defense provided a valuable new insurance policy for overwhelming natural crises.

For North Carolina’s farmers and ranchers, relief could not come soon enough. Personnel shortages afflicted the NCCD in the late summer of 1953, when Bailey resigned as director on 31 August to become Director of Prisons for North Carolina.542 Assistant director

539 Edward L. Rankin to E.W. Fields, 24 September 1953; E.W. Fields to William B. Umstead, 19 September 1953; Resolution by Board of Aldermen of the City of Sanford, 19 September 1953, folder labeled “Civil Defense Water Shortage 1953,” GWBU, NCA, Box 36.
Russell C. Nicholson took over as acting civil defense director with Sarah Boyd Weaver as his deputy. Shorthanded, Nicholson and Weaver bore the coordinating responsibility for the state’s 4.5 million residents. Umstead again wired the president on 8 September, this time adding nine counties to his previous list. A week later the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) certified that North Carolina’s counties required federal assistance and the FCDA recommended to the president the following day to issue a declaration of major disaster. Eisenhower declared the aforementioned areas as a major disaster area, with assistance being made available by the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with Public Law 115 the next day.

Unfortunately, the drought situation in North Carolina and the nation did not abate. Umstead requested even more assistance from Eisenhower on the 21st. Of concern to the governor was how the president only declared 16 counties out of a requested 24 disaster areas. Much like a drought itself, Umstead could do little but look to providence, and he even issued a proclamation for “a day of prayer for rain.” Rain did not fall, but federal money finally began to flow. On 3 November, the state signed a cooperative agreement with Secretary of Agriculture Erza Taft Benson, allocating $69,000 (later increased to $80,000) for use by the state with an advance of $40,000 to make hay available to eligible farmers in

544 Umstead, Public Addresses, 262. The new counties were Chatham, Halifax, Hoke, Iredell, Lee, Mecklenburg, Moore, Randolph, and Surry.
545 Val Peterson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 September 1953, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (1),” White House Central Files, Official File, 1953 – 61 (WHCF-OF), DDEL, Box 446.
546 Telegram from Dwight D. Eisenhower to William B. Umstead, 16 September 1953, folder labeled “Argic-Disaster Area (Drought) (1953),” GWBU, NCA, Box 33.
547 Telegram from William B. Umstead to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 21 September 1953, folder labeled “Argic-Disaster Area (Drought) (1953),” GWBU, NCA, Box 33.
548 Telegram from William B. Umstead to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 23 September 1953, folder labeled “Argic-Disaster Area (Drought) (1953),” GWBU, NCA, Box 33. The counties not declared disaster areas were Chatham, Davie, Harnett, Hoke, Iredell, Mecklenburg, Moore, and Randolph.
549 Proclamation by the Governor – A Day of Prayer for Rain, 1 November 1953, folder labeled “Argic-Disaster Area (Drought) (1953),” GWBU, NCA, Box 33.

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the disaster affected counties; at the termination of the program on 15 April 1954, North Carolina had received 15,000 tons of emergency hay.\textsuperscript{550}

The impact of the drought and the civil defense connection on the thinking of public officials is hard to ascertain. With only two officials managing the NCCD, any attempts to implement Bailey’s program were put on hold. Fortunately, civil defense’s rapid response to the water emergencies gave public officials a reason to reexamine their own civil defense programs, with natural disaster work exhibiting a clear value, unlike potential enemy attack. For those counties that did not receive designation as major disaster areas, state officials recognized that a mere request for aid would not always yield results. Umstead’s failure to appoint a new state civil defense director, perhaps due to his poor health or unfamiliarity with Public Laws 115 and 875, cost the farmers of North Carolina in several counties financial assistance.

Agriculture – principally tobacco – remained the state’s economic foundation. An abundant harvest, unfortunately, did not lift the state out of relative poverty. In 1952, North Carolina ranked eighth among eleven southeastern states in per capita income.\textsuperscript{551} As of 1953, the state ranked forty-seventh nationally for the average weekly earnings of workers in


manufacturing industries. Further diversifying the state’s economy with a healthy dose of tourism and industry would improve these statistics. A sound civil defense program able to bring in federal aid in the event of natural disasters would provide a valuable incentive for businesses and tourists to relocate to the Tar Heel state.

Edward Foster Griffin and Castle Bravo – Civil Defense Resurgent

Technological advancements and a new NCCD director brought major changes to civil defense operations in North Carolina and the nation in early 1954. At the end of January, the NCCD had lacked a director for a period of five months. On 23 February, the State Council of Civil Defense, with the consent of the still enfeebled governor, announced the appointment of Brigadier General Edward Foster Griffin of Louisburg as the third director of civil defense for North Carolina.

Griffin, like Bailey, had a distinguished career prior to heading the NCCD. He attended the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill before transferring to Wake Forest College, where he earned a law license in August 1923. Appointed Franklin County prosecuting attorney in 1927, Griffin served as a senator in the General Assembly in 1933 and 1935. A few months after earning his law license, he joined the 113th Field Artillery Regiment of the North Carolina National Guard in October 1923. Griffin rose through the ranks and served with the 30th Division in World War II and achieved further success postwar. On the morning of 1 March 1954, he succeeded Bailey, taking the oath of office

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555 Rising first to the rank of lieutenant in January 1924, by 1939 Griffin assumed command of the 113th. From 1940 to 1947 Griffin served on active duty with the 30th Division, commanding the 113th Field Artillery throughout the entire war, participating in five major campaigns and receiving promotion to
as NCCD director. Umstead, after handing Griffin his commission, remarked that “this position of director of civil defense could become overnight the most important post in North Carolina.” His words could not have been more prophetic.

Far off in the South Pacific at Bikini Atoll, the United States detonated a new, aircraft deliverable version of a thermonuclear device. Code named Shot Bravo as part of Operation Castle, the “shrimp” device used lithium-deuteride fuel and was aircraft-deliverable. With a planned yield of around five megatons, Bravo was smaller than Mike and represented the first real test of the Teller-Ulam design. Shot Bravo detonated on 1 March. The largest explosive device ever tested by the United States, Bravo, with a yield of fifteen megatons, produced a force two and a half times its expected size. It instantly vaporized the artificial island built on the reef near Nam Island, blasting a crater 6,510 feet in diameter and 250 feet deep. The enormous fireball could be seen in Hawaii, almost 1,000 miles away; the mushroom cloud rose to a height of 130,000 feet after six minutes and grew to 62 miles in diameter. After the blast, a warm “snow” began to fall out from the sky, composed of irradiated pulverized rock and coral. The massive amount of fallout, a byproduct of the

558 Unfortunately, physicists at Los Alamos miscalculated in regards to the composition of the lithium used in the bomb, specifically a composition of 40 percent lithium6 and 60 percent lithium7. The problem concerned the fact that during the fission reaction, the extra neutron in lithium7 knocked out of the nucleus during the detonation exponentially increased the yield of the weapon by producing tritium during decay, increasing the fissioning of uranium in the secondary stage of the device, thus increasing the weapon’s yield dramatically. See Rhodes, Dark Sun, 541.
larger-than-anticipated dirty fusion reaction, combined with miscalculated wind shifts to produce the worst radiological disaster in American history.559

Fallout from Bravo completely contaminated Bikini Atoll and several neighboring islands, affecting American military personnel and innocent bystanders caught in the path of the tropical snow. Fallout enveloped an area of 7,000 square miles, extending over 280 miles downwind of ground zero, with the radioactivity dangerous to nearly all unprotected persons 140 miles away.560 This atomic snow fell on 28 Americans and 236 Marshall Islanders, in addition to the 23 man crew of the Japanese fishing vessel Daigo Fukuryū Maru (Lucky Dragon Number Five) that had been tuna fishing 100 miles east of Bikini. Between two and three hours after the explosion, white, sandy flakes with the appearance of salt began to fall on the ship and its crew as they hauled in their long lines and weighed anchor. Symptoms of radiation poisoning quickly manifested themselves among the exposed crew members during the two-week voyage home.561 The crew returned to Japan on 14 March suffering from radiation poisoning, and news of their exposure broke internationally shortly thereafter.562 On 31 March, Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, released a statement about Bravo, understating the dangers of fallout and claiming the radiation burns

562 The crew eventually recovered from their exposure but radioman Aikichi Kuboyama later died on 23 September 1954 from complications of hepatitis, caused by blood transfusions used in his treatment of his radiation sickness. See Hacker, Elements of Controversy, 157-58.
on the Japanese fishermen originated from chemical activity in the pulverized coral rather than radioactivity. More ominously, Strauss admitted thermonuclear weapons could “be made to be as large as you wish . . . large enough to take out a city.” Strauss’s evasive and dismissive responses did little to lessen the public apprehension.

Fallout presented a new challenge for shelter builders and civil defense officials. It consists of particulate matter produced or thrown up from the ground in a nuclear explosion and vaporized in the fireball of the blast, together with fusion and/or fission products from the bomb. Within the boiling fireball the material from the ground mixes with the radioactive products, and as the material cools it forms liquid droplets that solidify into glass-like particles which fall back down to Earth with an appearance of snow or grit. Around fifty-seven grams of fission material are produced for every kiloton of fission energy yielded. While alpha and beta radiation can be stopped by a thin sheet of aluminum, gamma radiation requires substantial shielding, with the best protection afforded by massive, deep underground stone, masonry structures, or several inches of lead. Since fallout could blanket areas thousands of miles from the detonation point, anywhere on the planet could be affected.

Since the beginning of the postwar civil defense effort, experts had dismissed the dangers of radiation or fallout. In the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Major General Leslie R. Groves downplayed the horrors of radiation poisoning, testifying before the Senate how “[A]s I understand if from the doctors it is a very pleasant way to die.”

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565 Sean L. Malloy, “‘A Very Pleasant Way to Die’: Radiation Effects and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb against Japan” *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 3 (June 2012): 518.
1948, David Bradley, a physician monitoring radiation levels during Operation Crossroads, published *No Place to Hide*, an edited journal of his experiences with the atomic tests. Bradley casually described the after effects of Shot Baker, which doused the target fleet with radioactive water and contaminated the lagoon, plant, and animal life of Bikini Atoll. “Radiation is spooky business,” commented Bradley, explaining how fish in the lagoon could be used to make radio-autographs when placed on photographic film. After consuming highly radioactive algae and coral, the fish when sectioned essentially X-ray themselves.566 Historian Paul Boyer writes that Bradley’s book caused consternation at the Pentagon, and sold well with the American public.567 Still, the federal government officially remained silent about the dangers of atomic testing.

Bradley represented a lone voice in a crowd. Physicist Ralph E. Lapp in his 1949 book, *Must We Hide?* (a veiled response to Bradley’s book) discussed fallout in Japan and from the Trinity test. In the latter, Lapp conceded that cattle fifty miles from ground zero suffered damage to their coats, but assured readers that “Prompt bathing will remove most radioactive materials.”568 The following year, the National Security Resources Board booklet *Survival Under Atomic Attack* casually remarked that in case of fallout, “a person could escape contamination by simply taking refuge inside a house or even by getting inside a car and rolling up the windows.”569 As for the fallout itself, the booklet noted that “while the lingering radioactivity . . . may be dangerous, still it is no more to be feared than typhoid

fever or other diseases that sometimes follow major disasters.”

In *How to Survive an Atomic Bomb*, author Richard Gerstell recommended men and women wear wide-brimmed hats to provide protection from face burns, and reassured his readers that not one person at Hiroshima or Nagasaki was killed or injured by fallout. American authorities recognized fallout as a potential hazard, but repeatedly downplayed the risk as something that could be brushed off or hosed down.

The hydrogen bomb and its fallout changed the protection equation. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey report on the results of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan deemed blast and heat effects as the primary killers but emphasized shelters as part of their civil defense recommendations. Millard Caldwell’s attempts to press Congress for a program to create public bomb shelters failed to win support. Under Eisenhower, Peterson turned to an emphasis on evacuation for cost reasons. An evacuation policy for civil defense coincided with the fiscal constraints of the New Look policy. Unfortunately for the FCDA, it also began concurrently with the development of thermonuclear weapons and the announcement of the policy of “massive retaliation.” Announced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on 12 January 1954 before the Council on Foreign Relations, Dulles called for local defense reinforced “by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.”

This emphasis on nuclear weapons and the incredible firepower of thermonuclear weapons made shelters seem like hopelessly expensive boondoggles. Civil defense officials, including Peterson, were not privy to the Atomic Energy Commission’s data about the true extent of the fallout threat from Bravo, but they knew that the blast radius of the weapons

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dwarfed that of more primitive fission weapons. Evacuation remained the focus of Peterson and civil defense planners in Eisenhower’s civil defense budget for FY 1955, but even with a more conservative budget request of $85,750,000 with nothing for shelters, Congress approved only $48,025,000.

News of Shot Bravo found Griffin inheriting a state civil defense program laughably unprepared even to contemplate an atomic, much less a thermonuclear weapon. A look at the largest city in North Carolina, Charlotte, and the state capital of Raleigh exposes the lack of civil defense measures in early 1954. In the Charlotte News, writer Harry Shuford noted Strauss’s public statement about Bravo and asked his readers to contemplate if a hydrogen bomb struck the city. Said Shuford, “Charlottteans would be sitting ducks. The fact is, Civil Defense here barely exists.” Discussing how civil defense officials changed their thinking from shelters to evacuation, he questioned how 134,041 residents could just flee the city, for despite all the plans for evacuation the city and Mecklenburg County still had “no active Civil Defense program.”

On 15 February 1954, Colonel David L. Hardee took the oath as the Raleigh – Wake County civil defense director. A highly-decorated combat veteran of both world wars, survivor of the Bataan Death March and three years of captivity in the Philippines, Hardee once again faced an almost impossible task: preparing one of the state’s six target areas for nuclear attack. In early April, Nell Battle Lewis, a reporter for the News and Observer,

573 Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 60-65; Blanchard, “Evolution of Programs and Policies,” 125. What civil defense officials specifically did not know was that the fallout patterns were not perfect circles, but tend to be elongated, depending on winds, humidity, the size of the cloud, and other variables.
interviewed Hardee at his desk squirreled away in the basement of the Wake County Court House. When asked about evacuating the city, Hardee professed that only part of the residents could make it out in time. “We have to combat two kinds of apathy,” explained Hardee, “One is that of the people who think ‘it can’t happen here.’ The other is that of those who feel that, even if it should happen here, it would be so awful that there’s no use trying to do anything for defense against it.” Lewis defended Hardee as a man facing an impossible situation, but the reporter summed up the civil defense situation in Raleigh and Wake County as “pitiful. Or, maybe there is another, too: dumb.” If North Carolina’s major cities were representative of the other state’s urban areas, civil defense remained superficial at best and hopeless at worst.

A combat veteran and senior military officer himself, Griffin read the newspapers and decided as the state’s civil defense leader to inform the people of the bitter reality of nuclear war. On the evening of 14 April, he gave a statewide radio and television address on the state of civil defense in North Carolina. Griffin announced that the state is “woefully unprepared for any kind of attack. Hence, we are vulnerable to a critical extent.” He explained that the hydrogen bomb’s development did not affect civil defense planning in North Carolina, aside from accelerating it. He recognized that the state lacked critical target areas, and that use of such weapons in North Carolina was highly unlikely. “In North Carolina, at present, we are not planning for evacuation of our target cities. . . . Our only concern with evacuation at this time is long range planning, for use when our warning net is complete and to plan how to take care of the thousands of people who will come or be brought across our borders. We will

577 Nell Battle Lewis, “Incidentally: ‘Shelters Obsolete: ‘Clear City!’” News and Observer, 11 April 1954. The initial Raleigh plans included retrieving the sirens the city disposed of at the end of World War II as part of the modern evacuation plan, as mentioned in Chapter 1.
stay put and ‘duck and cover.’” Responding to matters of apathy, Griffin grimly concluded that “The choice is self-discipline today – or hardship tomorrow. It is as simple as that. And that is our only choice.”

Nevertheless, the state’s unpreparedness appeared almost criminal as a majority of counties and communities lacked civil defense programs three years into the state effort. Succinct and direct, the NCCD effort under Griffin began another push for defensive preparations.

Initial response to the address was generally favorable. Editorials in newspapers across the state supported the general’s message. “Perhaps Gen. Griffin can supply the spark which has been needed for so long to create interest in Civil Defense,” remarked the *Wilmington Star-News*. The *State Port Pilot* in Southport called Griffin’s message “a shocking surprise” but agreed that the county’s residents needed to wake up and help civil defense officials.

In contrast, the *Fayetteville Observer* accepted Griffin’s report as “no surprise” but supported the view that “what we need is less conversation and more perspiration.”

Talk next turned to action. Griffin requested a meeting of municipal officials in Raleigh to share his plans for an improved state civil defense effort. Held on 10 June, approximately three hundred participants heard from federal and state officials about civil defense’s relation with national defense, its legal status, and the state’s current and future plans. Griffin revealed the new state plans to mobilize the entire Highway Commission and other state agencies in the event of enemy attack or natural disaster and to bring together

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580 “We’ve Got to Wake Up,” *State Port Pilot* (Southport, N.C.), 21 April 1954.
582 Edward L. Rankin to Luther H. Hodges, 28 May 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWBU, NCA, Box 36.
existing state resources under civil defense organization and training. In an editorial in the *News and Observer* days later, the newspaper deemed Griffin’s plan as “feasible,” and “If affected, it would accomplish a great deal with a minimum of effort or inconvenience on the part of the public.” Supporting his plan, in March Griffin hired Collin McKinne, an engineering graduate of North Carolina State College, as the NCCD communications officer to develop the state’s warning system and to coordinate a backup radio network among the state’s amateur radio operators. A state civil defense newsletter began in June 1954 to highlight the work of civil defense statewide.

On the heels of the conference, the state took part in the first nationwide civil defense exercise, Operation Alert. Peterson proposed Operation Alert 1954 (OPAL 54) in January as a test exercise involving a hypothetical attack on 42 critical target cities. The grand purpose behind OPAL 54 was “to test the operational and communication capabilities of civil defense organizations at all levels,” test readiness of federal agencies tasked with civil defense responsibilities, and build up national participation in civil defense. Scheduled for 14 – 15 June, North Carolina participated merely in a support role, assigned the task of sending aid to those areas “attacked” in the test, offering only what aid they had to provide, thereby


permitting an inventory of the state’s resources.\textsuperscript{588} The state’s communications program, thirty CONELRAD radio stations, and Ground Observer Corps filter centers at Charlotte and Durham all participated actively.\textsuperscript{589} Although understaffed, the NCCD “learned much of the technique and procedure required for a good communications system,” although a sneak strafing attack on Raleigh inflicted 400 casualties, enemy planes bombed Greensboro causing 175 casualties, and an enemy submarine landed 3 saboteurs on the coast.\textsuperscript{590} The FCDA, however, deemed the editorial reaction in the state as “more unfavorable than favorable.”\textsuperscript{591} Clearly, work remained to be done.

The emergence of a dedicated, active state civil defense leader amidst an atmosphere of increased interest revitalized the NCCD. OPAL 54, the June conference, and Griffin’s public address collectively awoke a state ambivalent or apathetic to preparedness. Griffin’s work with other state agencies to create an affordable response apparatus utilizing existing state resources produced agreements and plans. While positive for public relations, these


\textsuperscript{589} “State’s Civil Defense Preparedness to be Tested in ‘Operation Alert,’” Rocky Mount Telegram, 30 May 1954; CONELRAD, or “Plan for the CONtrol of ELectromagnetic RADiation” was the first nationwide emergency radio system, transmitting on 640 and 1240 kilocycles on the AM frequency, proposed in 1951 and began operating in March 1953. The program was replaced by the Emergency Broadcast System in 1963. See FCDA, CONELRAD, In Case of Attack! Tune your AM Radio Dial for Official Information (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953); NCCD memorandum from Edward F. Griffin to Local Directors about proposed cancellation of CONELRAD, 3 July 1963, folder labeled “Griffin – Directives and Speeches,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 6. The Ground Observers Corps, a quasi-auxiliary of the United States Air Force working in conjunction with state civil defense programs, existed from 1950 to 1959, as a ground tracking supplement to the nation’s early warning radar network. North Carolina’s civil defense effort participated in this program during the 1950s, but it is outside the scope of this dissertation. See Kenton Clymer, “U.S. Homeland Defense in the 1950s: The Origins of the Ground Observer Corps,” The Journal of Military History 75, no. 3 (July 2011): 835-59.


plans remained untested drafts. Nevertheless, hiring a communications director, distributing a newsletter, and actively engaging public officials all helped crack the wall of apathy between government officials and the general public. Although OPAL 54 did not test the NCCD to any great extent, the exercise revealed a state with some optimism and momentum for civil defense development and expansion. Throughout the remaining summer of 1954, Griffin’s efforts would result in increased local civil defense programs statewide. Even so, the ferocity of upcoming natural disasters would bring a harsh reality to the state’s doorstep.

*Drought and Hurricane Hazel*

Griffin’s push to improve civil defense and break the grip of apathy coincided with the first real test of his new program. As with 1953, droughts again wracked the state in the late summer of 1954. On 25 August and 2 September, Umstead wrote the White House and requested a major disaster declaration for thirteen counties in western North Carolina. Unfortunately a disaster declaration was not forthcoming. Following Umstead’s request, the USDA sent a representative to some – but not all – affected counties on a hurried, one-day survey. This representative recommended a denial of the governor’s request for aid. Peterson also recommended that the president not declare a disaster, as conditions in the affected counties were not “sufficiently acute” to warrant aid.

The denial of aid began to produce political hay for North Carolina Democrats. In a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D–NC) commented about how ten of the counties, contiguous and bordering the South Carolina borders, baked under

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593 Val Peterson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 16 September 1954, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (1),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446.
the Southern sun while Eisenhower declared all of South Carolina a drought disaster area. On 21 September, Ervin and Congressman Woodrow W. Jones (D–NC) wired the president and soundly criticized the USDA for its absurd survey, arbitrary delineation of drought between states, and for the federal response to “hope” for rainfall in North Carolina. Both state leaders appealed directly to Eisenhower for action. Congressman Charles Raper Jonas (R–NC) informed the White House of rumors in the state about the denial of aid. Jonas suggested that Umstead’s letter be answered, mentioning that Democratic-sponsored public meetings indicated “that every effort is being made by the Democratic Party to regain this state.” Subsequently, Peterson reversed his position and recommended parts of North Carolina be declared a major disaster area to release aid under Public Law 115. On 23 September, Eisenhower declared these areas affected by drought as a “major disaster.” By mid-October, thirty counties in the state qualified for drought assistance and the emergency hay program in the state received a USDA allocation of $500,000 to defray shipping charges on emergency deliveries to the state.

Just as in 1953, North Carolina communities found their faucets running dry. The city of Gastonia on 11 September contacted Umstead’s office and requested assistance for their

594 Sam J. Ervin, Jr. to Ezra Taft Benson, 16 September 1954, folder labeled “OF 113-I Drought Disaster, 1954 (3),” WHCF-OH, DDEL, Box 475.
595 Telegram from Sam J. Ervin, Jr. and Woodrow W. Jones to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 21 September 1954, folder labeled “OF 113-I Drought Disaster, 1954 (3),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 475.
596 Memorandum for the Record from Earle D. Chesney, 21 September 1954, folder labeled “OF 113-I Drought Disaster, 1954 (3),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 475.
597 Val Peterson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 22 September 1954; Sherman Adams to William B. Umstead, 22 September 1954, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (1),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446.
critical water shortage. By the thirteenth, FCDA regional administrator Brown made available loans of six pumps and ten miles of steel pipe to supply the community and avert a possible economic crisis by allowing the city’s industrial plants to continue operating.  

The swift civil defense response to Gastonia’s request opened a figurative floodgate of aid requests. From September through October 1954, the cities of Graham, Greensboro, Reidsville, Roxboro, Thomasville, and Wilson all requested and promptly received FCDA loans of pumps and pipe to alleviate water shortages. An editorial in the Wilmington Star-News acknowledged that “Tar Heels are discovering that it’s nice to have an organized Civil Defense program to meet various types of emergencies short of an enemy attack.” Speaking of the aid to Gastonia and Greensboro, the editors wrote how after the emergency subsided that the public “will show their appreciation [of civil defense] by supporting the expansion of the state’s CD program so that it will be effective in providing relief and assistance in any type of public emergency.” The NCCD later reported that the FCDA loans of pipe and pumps saved the communities in need “in excess of a half million dollars in rental cost alone,” and prevented the idling of large segments of Piedmont industry, preventing

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“economic chaos in those cities and towns due to an interruption in industrial pay rolls, huge unemployment compensation payments by our state, and large tax losses to the state. . . .”603

Perhaps for these demonstrations of the value of civil defense, more and more counties and communities appointed civil defense directors, with 71 counties and 173 cities reporting a civil defense director by the end of 1954.604

For parts of North Carolina the rains finally fell in October, albeit as one of the greatest hurricanes to strike the state in the twentieth century. Created from a tropical wave on 5 October, the storm quickly developed near Grenada into a hurricane named Hazel. With winds raging at up to 125 mph by 8 October, Hazel crossed Haiti on the 12th, devastating and destroying large swaths of the countryside and killing an estimated 1,000 residents. Passing the Bahamas, Hazel rapidly rebuilt itself and the National Weather Bureau issued storm warnings along the Carolina coasts at 11:00AM on the 14th.605 In Raleigh, the NCCD contacted the state Highway Patrol and the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) to activate their radio networks. All civil defense directors along the coast received alert messages at 1:00AM on 15 October, followed by similar messages broadcast through the Highway Patrol radio network.606 Between 9:30 – 10:00AM on 15 October 1954, Hazel’s eye made landfall along Holden Beach, close to the North Carolina – South Carolina border. Slamming into North Carolina as a Category 4 hurricane, with estimated wind gusts between

130 – 150 mph and a central pressure slightly below 28 inches of mercury, the storm began its terrible work.607

Hazel’s power and freakish nature remain legendary in North Carolina. An 18-foot storm swept across the southern beaches, aided in part by the highest lunar tide of the year. At NCCD headquarters in Raleigh, civil defense officials lost all telephone service with Wilmington by 11:30 AM and Umstead had to transmit his orders to the National Guard for troops to deploy in the city via amateur HAM radio. Hazel swiftly moved inland, maintaining intense wind speeds and large rainfall amounts. Fayetteville recorded gusts of 110 mph and the Raleigh airport gusts of 90 mph. Burlington, High Point, and Lexington recorded 24-hour rainfall amounts of 6.5 inches and the town of Carthage measured 9.72 inches of rain in 24 hours; nearby Robbins recorded 11.12 inches. When the storm struck Raleigh the city lost all power, silencing all three of the city’s radio stations for four to five hours, along with the state Highway Patrol and the NCCD radio networks. Both agencies relied on only spotty amateur radio coverage until a restoration of power in the evening. For several hours after Hazel’s landfall, the NCCD lost all contact with eastern North Carolina. Hazel, moving at speeds upwards of 60 mph, passed into Virginia and Washington, D.C. with recorded gusts of 98 mph before reaching Buffalo, N.Y. and Toronto, Canada by midnight. In Toronto, Hazel induced severe flooding combined with wind gusts up to 110 mph that killed 81 people. By 18 October, the storm finally fell apart over the Arctic Circle.608

Once Hazel passed out of the state, the scale of destruction along the coasts almost defied description. In the words of the official report of the Raleigh office of the Weather Bureau:

Wind-driven tides devastated the immediate ocean front from the South Carolina line to Cape Lookout. All traces of civilization on that portion of the immediate waterfront between the state line and Cape Fear were practically annihilated. Grass-covered dunes some 10-20 feet high along and behind which beach homes had been built in a continuous line five miles long simply disappeared, dunes, houses and all. The paved roadway along which the houses were built was partially washed away, partially buried beneath several feet of sand. . . . In most cases it is impossible to tell where the buildings stood. Where grassy dunes stood, there is now only flat, white sandy beach.  

At Wrightsville Beach, Hazel destroyed 89 beach cottages, and damaged 530 others, inflicting $692,500 in estimated damages to public utilities or property. Carolina Beach lost 475 houses, with over 1,000 suffering damage with losses to public property and utilities totaling $717,000. Hazel completely destroyed the town of Kure Beach, causing $138,000 in estimated damages to public property. Atlantic Beach sustained $170,000 in estimated damages to public property and utilities, with all private business on the waterfront completely demolished.

Brunswick County, where Hazel made landfall, suffered the greatest amount of damage. The community of Long Beach on Oak Island consisted of 357 buildings before Hazel. Only five remained on their foundations by 16 October and the hurricane cut an inlet through the community. Hazel lowered the elevation of dune strands on the island from five to six feet. The Caswell Beach community lost half of its 22 houses; Ocean Isle lost all of its buildings, with only two remaining on the beach, washed off their foundations. At Holden

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Beach, of the 150 buildings before Hazel, 12 remained on their foundations, with the dune strand lowered four to five feet in elevation. The Robinson Beach community lost all 72 buildings to Hazel, and Colonial Beach all 24 buildings, with four to five feet of dune elevation lost to Hazel in both areas. All told, the county suffered an estimated $6.5 million dollars in public and private damage.610

For North Carolina, Hazel’s collective damages dwarfed every other natural disaster since the start of the century. Nineteen persons died in the storm and an estimated 200 sustained injuries. Hazel’s overall property damages totaled approximately $125 million dollars.611 The fishing industry lost $1.5 million; timber industry $3 million; and losses to farm buildings totaled $50 million. Hazel completely obliterated an estimated 4,000 private homes and wrought $10 million in damages to public highways and utilities. Nationally, Hazel killed a total of 95 Americans and caused an estimated $281 million in damages.612

Once the rain stopped and skies cleared over North Carolina, state officials began to act. The first request for aid to the governor’s office came from Kure Beach on the morning

610 NCCD, “Synopsis of Activities of State Civil Defense Office with Respect to ‘Hurricane Hazel’ which Passed through our State on 15 October 1954,” folder labeled “Requests for Fund Allocations – Hazel,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5; Memorandum of Chairman of Hurricane Disaster Relief Committee, 23 October 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82.

611 There is some difference in the costs of Hazel in North Carolina. According to the North Carolina Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project report of December 1955, the state suffered approximately $125,309,000 in damages. Albert V. Hardy and Charles B. Carney, of the Weather Bureau office in Raleigh, cite an Associated Press survey listing $36 million in damage to the beaches, and $100 million in total inland crop and property damage to the state. This total of $136 million is reported by Jay Barnes in his book, North Carolina’s Hurricane History. See NCCD, Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project (Raleigh, N.C.: North Carolina Council of Civil Defense, December 1955), 21; Barnes, Hurricane History, 107; Hardy and Carney, North Carolina Hurricanes, 22.

of 15 October just as Hazel moved past the community.613 By Saturday, 16 October, Brown from FCDA Region III arrived in Raleigh and informed Edward L. Rankin, Umstead’s chief of staff, that if the governor wanted to request federal assistance he would concur under his authority. The governor’s office arranged for Brown to fly immediately to Washington and report on the situation in North Carolina personally to Peterson.614 From his bed in Watts Hospital in Durham, Umstead wired Eisenhower declaring that “Damage, hardship and suffering [are] so severe that federal assistance is required,” reporting “Local and state civil defense organizations [are] producing maximum efforts.”615 As Umstead’s telegram reached the White House, Brown met with Peterson and Rankin spoke with Peterson via telephone shortly thereafter relaying additional damage reports to the FCDA administrator. Later that Saturday afternoon, Peterson recommended to the president that he declare a major disaster in the areas affected by Hazel, as “Federal assistance . . . is necessary.”616 On 17 October, Eisenhower declared those areas of North Carolina damaged by Hazel as major disaster areas.617

The surveying and formal request for funding developed over the following days. On the eighteenth, Griffin, Brown, and various other federal and state officials assembled in the

613 Telegram from G. Taft Russ to William B. Umstead, 15 October 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82.
614 Memorandum to the Governor from Edward L. Rankin, 29 October 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82.
616 Val Peterson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 16 October 1954, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (2),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446.
617 Telegram from Dwight D. Eisenhower to William B. Umstead, 17 October 1954, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (2),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446. Oddly enough, on the seventeenth Griffin and the state Adjutant General, Major General John Hall Manning, were on their way to Miami, Florida to attend a National Guard meeting. At Umstead’s request, both men made it back to Raleigh by the evening. See Memorandum to the Governor from Edward L. Rankin, 29 October 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82.
governor’s office to determine how to best coordinate the disaster relief. At the suggestion of Brown, the state created a Hurricane Disaster Relief Committee chaired by Griffin to coordinate all efforts between state and federal officials.\textsuperscript{618} Afterwards, the men flew to Wilmington to conduct aerial surveys of the damage and meet with other local officials to formulate plans for immediate action. On the twentieth, Griffin outlined a total request for $655,000 in funds to only repair water and sewer damages in several coastal communities.\textsuperscript{619} The Council of State agreed to allocate $100,000 from the Contingency and Emergency Fund to help coastal municipalities, dispersed at the discretion of the governor.\textsuperscript{620} Concluding this action, Umstead wired Eisenhower of the state actions and requested $555,000 for “the temporary restoration of basic public services including . . . water, sewage, and other essential utilities.”\textsuperscript{621} Eisenhower authorized the requested allocation in full, plus administrative expenses.\textsuperscript{622}

Hazel exposed several glaring deficiencies in the state civil defense agency’s operations and capabilities. A few weeks after the hurricane made landfall, the NCCD monthly newsletter admitted:

\textsuperscript{618} The Hurricane Disaster Relief Committee consisted of Brig. General Edward F. Griffin, NCCD director, chairman; William H. Rogers, Chief Highway Engineer, State Highway Department; Colonel R.L. Hill, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Wilmington, N.C.; Honorable E.L. White, Mayor of Wilmington; Maurice Jarrett of the State Board of Health; Honorable George Dill, Mayor of Morehead City; Honorable S. Bunn Frink of Southport; D.N. Lucas, Mayor of Surf City.
\textsuperscript{619} The funding request breaks down as follows: Wrightsville Beach, $200,000; Carolina Beach, $200,000; Kure Beach, $20,000; Atlantic Beach, $100,000; Beaufort, $75,000; Morehead City, $60,000.
\textsuperscript{620} Meeting minutes of Council of State, 18 October 1954, folder labeled “Council of State Meeting, October 18, 1954,” GWBU, NCA, Box 38.1.
\textsuperscript{622} Telegram from Dwight D. Eisenhower to William B. Umstead, 22 October 1954, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (2),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446; Memorandum to the Governor from Edward L. Rankin, 29 October 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82; NCCD, “Synopsis of Activities of State Civil Defense Office with Respect to ‘Hurricane Hazel’ which Passed through our State on 15 October 1954,” folder labeled “Requests for Fund Allocations – Hazel,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5; Memorandum of Chairman of Hurricane Disaster Relief Committee, 23 October 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82.
That halo of immunity some of us kept polished is long gone and hard to find! We
know it can happen here because it DID HAPPEN HERE. Nobody liked it. Nobody
wants a repeat performance. Least of all, Civil Defense workers who found
themselves facing a crucial test – and so handicapped by lack of facilities that they
were practically immobilized. That is a statement of fact – not apology.623

Griffin argued that Hazel “may be a blessing in disguise” by exposing the flaws in the
system. He listed three essentials for civil defense previously submitted to the state Advisory
Budget Committee back in September. These included funds for a communications or control
center, auxiliary power units, and organization of all the amateur radio operators into an
organized, centralized state-sponsored radio network to complement the regular
communications service. Hazel left the entire state’s response apparatus in the dark for hours.
The amateur HAM radio operators thankfully operated to a degree and did provide some of
the only information from the coast.624 Civil defense in North Carolina still lacked a
legislative foundation for entering into mutual aid agreements with neighboring states to
supplement existing resources. North Carolina was the only state in the nation with this
deficiency. South Carolina also sustained damages from Hazel, but at least it could seek aid
from neighboring states.625

The relationship between Griffin and the regional civil defense office proved
invaluable. The involvement of FCDA Region III administrator Brown with the droughts and
then with Hazel accelerated the speed at which communities received aid from civil defense.
In turn, the relationship increased both the positive public awareness of civil defense and
local officials’ knowledge of what options civil defense could provide in an emergency.

623 NCCD Newsletter, November 1954. Emphasis in original.
“Hurricane Hazel Press Releases,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 6; Letter to the editor, L. Marion Shirley, Jr.,
“‘HAMS’ Did a Good Job,” Raleigh Times, 28 October 1954; “Civil Defense and Hurricane Hazel,” Daily
Courier (Forest City, N.C.), 18 October 1954.
While the communications network failed during the storm, the coordination between federal and state civil defense officials quickly facilitated a major disaster declaration.

An interesting example of the working relationship between the NCCD and the FCDA is the interpretation of Public Law 875 for unincorporated communities. At a meeting of officials in Wilmington on 22 October, Griffin and other government officials explained how incorporated towns could apply for federal aid. Former state senator Samuel Bunn Frink pleaded for the restoration of the unincorporated beaches, mostly in Brunswick County, arguing that since the dunes and beaches belonged to the public between the high water line and the private property lines on the ocean front, they warranted aid to be rebuilt. The state highway at Long Beach received aid to be repaired, but not the unincorporated beaches and dune strand. This left the public highway unprotected and vulnerable to continued beach erosion and flooding. In economic terms, one coastal resident warned, “If these beaches there in Brunswick County are not restored so that those who own lots there can rebuild and the resulting tax values be again placed upon the tax books as a source of revenue to the county, the county will become virtually bankrupt, for a large portion of the county’s revenue comes from this source. . . .” Another resident declared that “when you add to the loss the income from the tourist trade, you can easily see why not only the government of Brunswick County will suffer, but the permanent residents who depend upon the tourist trade for their livelihood will be without any sort of income whatsoever.”

626 Memorandum of Chairman of Hurricane Disaster Relief Committee, 23 October 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82.
627 Frank M. Armstrong to Frank Ertel Carlyle, 26 October 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82.
628 R.A. Hedrick to Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 27 October 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82. It should be noted that Hedrick acknowledged being a friend of Armstrong in his letter and conversing about the effects of Hazel.
Fortunately, a compromise was possible. On 27 October, FCDA Region III engineer Mader came to Raleigh and met personally with Umstead, Griffin, and members of the Council of State to finalize the federal-state disaster agreement. After listening to the issue of unincorporated communities receiving federal assistance, Mader commented that under certain circumstances federal aid could be given to the unincorporated areas as the possibility existed for federal money to be used to restore sewage facilities or building sand dunes to protect life and property in unincorporated areas. For the remainder of the year Griffin made personal visits to the affected coastal areas assisting with applications for federal aid and explaining the procedures to officials. While no means a perfect solution, the endeavor by the state to obtain “a more liberal construction” of the language of Public Law 875 provided the NCCD at least a chance to disperse aid to all in need.

The Accidental Governor: Luther Hartwell Hodges

Hazel’s destruction preceded the passing of Umstead. In poor health since the start of his administration, Umstead’s condition deteriorated in the fall of 1954, and on 4 November he returned to Watts Hospital in Durham for treatment where doctors diagnosed him with pneumonia. On the morning of 7 November, Umstead died of congestive heart failure at the age of fifty-nine. At home in Leaksville, Lieutenant Governor Luther H. Hodges sat reading the Sunday paper before church when the telephone rang. Rankin then informed Hodges of the governor’s passing, much to Hodges’s disbelief. On the afternoon of 9 November,

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Hodges took the oath of office to finish out Umstead’s term as the sixty-fourth governor of 
North Carolina. 631

Hodges, an “accidental governor,” came into office with a pedigree for success. Born 
near the village of Cascade, Virginia in 1898, his family moved to Leaksville in 1901. In 
between grade and high school, Hodges worked at the Marshall Field and Company’s 
Fieldcrest Mills in town among other jobs. Working his way through the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, Hodges served in New York and Illinois as a second lieutenant in 
1918 and graduated from Chapel Hill in 1919, having been elected president of his senior 
class. He returned to Leaksville, serving as the secretary to the general manager of the 
Marshall Field mills. By 1938, he rose to the position of general manager in charge of sales 
and production for all twenty-nine Marshall Field mills in the United States and abroad. 
Promoted to vice president in 1943, Hodges served with the company until retirement in 
1950. Active in Rotary International, he served as the organization’s consultant and observer 
at the United Nations (UN) Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in 
1945 and before the UN Security Council. After retiring from Marshall Field, Hodges went to 
Europe in 1950 and worked as chief of the Industry Division of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration in West Germany, and in 1951 as a State Department consultant on the 
International Management Conference. 632

In 1952, Hodges threw his hat into the political arena and decided to run for 
lieutenant governor. Prominent business people in the state, including Wachovia bank

631 Umstead, Public Addresses, xxi-xxiii; Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse, 1-3. Leaksville merged 
with the nearby towns of Spray and Draper in 1967 to become the city of Eden.  
632 Luther H. Hodges, Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers of Luther Hartwell Hodges, Governor of 
Carolina, 1960), xxi-xxv.
director Robert Hanes, recruited the political novice and saw Hodges as insurance in case Umstead died. Political journalist Rob Christensen writes that perhaps for this reason, “Umstead froze his lieutenant governor out of any decisions or discussions, treating him as a virtual nonperson.”633 Announcing his candidacy in February 1952, Hodges ran for public office with the theory, as he wrote a decade later, “that the sound principles of good business could and should apply to government.”634 Inheriting the governor’s office, Hodges possessed two key advantages: no political favors to fill or political machines to serve, and a brusque, no-nonsense business approach to government emphasizing maximum efficiency and output.

The rebuilding from Hurricane Hazel provided Hodges with an opportunity to impose his vision on state government. An avid outdoorsman who enjoyed hunting and fishing, Hodges took great personal joy in North Carolina’s natural wonders, particularly the Outer Banks.635 In August 1954, the South Eastern North Carolina Beach Association invited Hodges to be the guest speaker.636 The association’s executive manager, John Farrell, provided Hodges with the reasoning behind the speaker request. Wrote Farrell:

Confidentially speaking, rumors are all over the Eastern Seaboard of North Carolina that you will be a candidate for Governor in 1956. We hope these rumors will become a reality. . . . I am in constant touch with commercial and sports fishermen, hundreds of tourist trade operators and many others who are interested in the further development of our natural coastal resources which have been sadly neglected. All we ask is our fair share of financial assistance and moral backing by the State of

633 Christensen, Paradox of Tar Heel Politics, 158. Elected with Umstead in November, Hodges spent 1953 and 1954 learning the ropes of state politics, noting later “I was never taken into the confidence of Governor Umstead” and the governor, despite illness, never consulted Hodges on any legislative matters while in office. See Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse, 5.
634 Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse, 5.
635 Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse, 290. Hodges in his autobiography writes “As long as I live, I will never lose my interest in the Outer Banks and what nature has done to them mainly because of mistakes made by human beings.”
636 Glenn M. Tucker to Luther H. Hodges, 20 August 1954, folder labeled “#73, Correspondence August 1954,” Luther H. Hodges Papers, #3698 (LHHP), SHC, Box 8.
North Carolina. We are confident that under your leadership we shall receive our fair share.\textsuperscript{637} Hodges, unable to make the requested presentation, replied to Farrell that he was “very sympathetic” to the association’s aims and plans.\textsuperscript{638} Then Hazel struck the coast. Hodges accompanied civil defense officials and witnessed the scale and scope of destruction first hand. The storm was personal for Hodges, and he described the damage as “a sickening and saddening experience,” particularly since the “hussy Hazel” destroyed his former vacation house on Crescent Beach.\textsuperscript{639}

In the fall of 1954, North Carolina and Hodges faced a financial predicament even greater than Hazel. After entering the governor’s office, Hodges learned from the federal Department of Commerce that North Carolina ranked forty-fourth in the nation in per capita income. Despite leading the South in industrialization, the state’s factory workers earned the lowest wages of any state in 1954, approximately forty percent less than the national average. The causes for this disparity included low-skill jobs in the main industries of textiles, tobacco, and furniture, coupled with small plants and an utter lack of unionization. Agriculture sapped much of the state’s labor and land, employing one-third of residents in a state with more farms than any other aside from Texas. These farms, among the smallest in the nation, resulted in per capita incomes in rural areas half that of other states. Per capita income from manufacturing, ranking fifteenth in the nation, remained the state’s sole bright spot. Here too, however, the situation was somewhat discouraging. A mere ten of the state’s

\textsuperscript{637} John Farrell to Luther H. Hodges, 20 August 1954, folder labeled “#73, Correspondence August 1954,” LHHP, SHC, Box 8.
\textsuperscript{638} Luther H. Hodges to John Farrell, 26 August 1954, folder labeled “#73, Correspondence August 1954,” LHHP, SHC, Box 8.
\textsuperscript{639} Luther H. Hodges to E.R. Johnson, 26 October 1954; Luther H. Hodges to Ted B. Hayward, 26 October 1954, folder labeled “#77, Correspondence October 20 – 31, 1954,” LHHP, SHC, Box 8. Hodges sold the beach house in October 1953.
counties represented half of the total employment and payroll for the entire state, with eight of these located in the Piedmont region.\textsuperscript{640} In Hodges own words, “It was easy to reach the conclusion that what was badly needed in North Carolina was more industry in the other ninety counties, and particularly those counties east of Raleigh.”\textsuperscript{641} Attracting new industry could diversify the economy in agricultural and resource-rich eastern North Carolina, raising incomes by reducing the number of farms and farmers and raising per capita incomes across the board.

Every day the coastal resorts remained closed, the state’s economy lost revenue. The Department of Conservation and Development in October learned that the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization had declared all of North Carolina a non-target area. This declaration contributed to an existing advertising effort with the presumption that this non-target status would attract “plants engaged in the production of defense materials” to relocate to the state.\textsuperscript{642} Furthermore, the non-target status created an impression of the state as a safe, relatively risk-free place for business operations. Months prior in July, the state began placing advertisements in print media pitching North Carolina as a state with ideal plant dispersal opportunities, “a welcome distance from areas vulnerable to enemy attack. . . .”\textsuperscript{643} Considering how in 1953 textiles represented 42.7 percent of all manufactured goods, and tobacco 25.3 percent, Hodges saw industrial diversification as a priority matter.\textsuperscript{644}


\textsuperscript{641} Hodges, \textit{Businessman in the Statehouse}, 32.

\textsuperscript{642} Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Conservation and Development, the Terrace Room, the Hotel Barringer, Charlotte, North Carolina, 25 – 27 October 1954, folder labeled “C&D General,” GLHH, NCA, Box 7.

\textsuperscript{643} Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Conservation and Development, 19 – 21 July 1954, Conference Room, Administration Building, Morehead City Section Base, Morehead City, North Carolina,” folder labeled “Conservation and Development General,” GWBU, NCA, Box 37; Ben E. Douglas to William B.
As governor, Hodges learned the utility of civil defense in disaster and economics. The relationship forged between the NCCD and the FCDA through the work of Brown gave Hodges a great asset. Rankin, in a letter to Peterson after the governor’s death wrote that “The experience which our State, counties and municipalities have had with the Federal Civil Defense Program as a result of the drought and hurricane experiences, stands out as an exceptional example of Federal-State teamwork of the highest order.”

This teamwork held particular new importance following the Department of Conservation and Development’s meeting in October. Amidst reports of Hazel’s damages to state parks, forests, and fisheries, department heads learned that the state advertising effort set records in its scale and scope in the third quarter of 1954 and that inquiries about tourism and industry were up.

Civil defense provided Hodges with a potential economic resource. The governor, cognizant of the potential of the coastal areas to bring in tourist dollars, saw in the federal and state effort to rebuild the beaches and communities a means to uplift the economic prospects of eastern North Carolina. The strong working relationship between the NCCD and FCDA cut through potential red tape to bring in federal aid to alleviate disaster conditions. Furthermore, the state civil defense effort could be reoriented to focus more on natural disaster rather than enemy attack, to those real threats detrimental to industry and economic health. The perception and presence of a strong civil defense program affirmed a state commitment to safeguard its people, resources, and potential industries and employees. This


645 Edward L. Rankin to Val Peterson, 24 November 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Hazel,” GWBU, NCA, Box 82.

recognition gained added traction from the government’s declaration that the state was not a target area. This shift, combined with limited union influence and plenty of available land in the eastern part of the state, provided Hodges and state officials with strong selling points to entice industries to relocate to North Carolina. Using civil defense as a component of economic well-being, rather than as a poor cousin of the national Cold War defense effort, served to jumpstart Hodge’s plan to increase prosperity in North Carolina.

Griffin traveled to affected communities throughout November and December as the number of applications for disaster aid skyrocketed. These totaled over one million dollars by mid-November. 647 On the twenty-second, Hodges convened a conference in Raleigh attended by state, local, and federal officials to chart a course of action for rebuilding from Hazel’s damages. Hodges affirmed the need to rebuild the state’s damaged dunes and coastlines, which he saw as among “our State’s most valuable natural attractions.” 648 Colonel R. L. Hill of the Army Corps of Engineers made a strong presentation to participants for a long-range project to develop new beaches and restore and protect existing ones. 649 As it stood, the state lacked surveys of beach erosion from 1941 to 1954, and the completion of surveys begun in 1954 revealed that “the net general effect has been a retreat of the barrier [islands] as a whole.” These surveys recommended that “every effort should be made to preserve” the island’s sand dunes. The dune strands, serving as “protection to property and as a supply of

new beach material,” were vital to the ecological health of the state. Hazel, assisted by man, had devastated the southern coast’s dune strands.650

Days later, the work of rebuilding the beaches began in earnest. On 24 November, the state opened a disaster relief office in Wilmington to furnish advice and technical assistance for local governments regarding beach restoration applications under Public Law 875. By the first week of December, the FCDA approved the first applications for aid, totaling $603,633, including funds to rebuild sand dunes and beaches in Brunswick, New Hanover, and Onslow counties.651 At meetings held in Wilmington in December by Ben Douglas, director of the Department of Conservation and Development, officials learned what federal aid could be expected and heard impassioned talks by Douglas about “the value of our beaches to the economy of the state.” Suggestions also emerged about passing laws to protect the dunes.652 By 15 December, the state had work crews clearing debris and repairing damaged structures. The first FDCA payments totaling over $387,000 arrived before the New Year and communities received funds within two weeks.653

In mid-January 1955, Griffin and the NCCD gave Hodges a series of recommendations for civil defense based on the Hazel experience. At the local levels, Griffin reiterated a need for community civil defense organizations, specifically auxiliary police and

emergency welfare groups to fill the roles asked of the National Guard. The general asked for civil defense directors and local law enforcement to have full authority to force evacuation when “danger from natural or civil disaster is imminent.” At the state level, he called for every state employee to take an active part in civil defense and reiterated a call for communications expenditures.

Hazel’s destruction of coastal areas necessitated new legislation to mitigate future destruction. Griffin requested new laws making it illegal to alter sand dunes in any way or divest them of vegetation and cover. The state building code laws needed to be amended to regulate and zone all future beach building and construction, including distances from the high-water mark. The NCCD director recommended coastal buildings be constructed on foundations of pilings instead of directly on the sand. Funds needed to be appropriated for continuous study of beach erosion and measures taken to stabilize and control sand dunes along the state’s coastline. To rehabilitate the state’s dunes, Griffin closed by recognizing how they could be constructed and stabilized with brush, debris, or sand fences, all “at a cost well within the amount which has been approved by the Federal Civil Defense Administration for each lineal foot thereof.”

A week after receiving Griffin’s recommendations, Hodges spoke about Hazel in Wilmington. On the morning of 22 January, the governor toured Long Beach and inspected the dune rebuilding effort there. He touted the work of state agencies to alleviate the hurricane’s damages and highlighted the connection between civil defense and business. Civil defense, he said, “is a two-fold organization – designed for national emergencies and

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natural disasters. Even a simple voluntary Civil Defense organization can be invaluable in time of emergency.” Hodges observed the growth of business in the southeast, and urged everyone to work together “to increase the per capita income of this area, strengthen your tremendous tourist industry, encourage the settlement of new industry, and promote the development and expansion of more home industry.” To provide even further aid to the coastal resort communities rebuilding their beaches, the state Division of Advertising emphasized a promotion of salt water sport fishing to bring tourist dollars back. Linking civil defense with business was new in North Carolina. This speech, the first by a postwar North Carolina governor about civil defense, became but one of several by Hodges discussing the role of civil defense in the state’s affairs. More than a mere federal requirement, civil defense under Hodges served as another tool to build the state’s economic prospects and security.

NCCD in 1955 and the Fallout Threat

For the first half of 1955, civil defense at the state and federal levels began to alter plans to respond to nuclear fallout. A threat figuratively and literally brushed aside by the AEC in 1954, public awareness of the dangers posed by fallout grew in late 1954. That November, physicist Ralph E. Lapp published an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists revealing that fallout could extend hundreds or thousands of miles away from ground zero. This fallout threat eviscerated the logic behind the policy of evacuation advocated by Peterson. Lapp postulated how fallout from thermonuclear detonations could

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cover the entire northeastern United States. Fallout shelters would be needed if people could not get out of the way. Additionally, fallout presented civil defense “with potentially greater perils than those of heat and blast” due to the senseless nature of radioactivity and difficulty of radiation detection. It would be disastrous to abandon evacuation policies, concluded Lapp, but fallout could no longer be ignored by civil defense planners.657 On 8 November, the FCDA issued an advisory bulletin on radioactive fallout recommending the use of meteorological data in predicting where fallout might occur.658 Despite this knowledge, Griffin in December urged the target cities of Asheville, Charlotte, Durham, Greensboro, Raleigh, and Winston-Salem with the addition of High Point and Wilmington to develop evacuation plans. The NCCD, according to Griffin, did not consider it necessary for other areas to plan for evacuation, but did not oppose any community that wanted to do so.659

With the threat now apparent, the AEC finally provided official statements on fallout from the Castle Bravo test a year prior. On 15 February 1955, the commission issued a report on the effects of thermonuclear weapon explosions, and admitted that “The area of hazard from radioactive fall-out from a surface explosion of a thermonuclear weapon is much larger than the areas seriously affected by heat and blast,” and that no single pattern applies to predicting fallout dispersal.660 A statement from AEC chairman Strauss revealed the extent of

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658 FCDA advisory bulletin to state and local civil defense directors on “Radioactive Fall-Out from Nuclear Explosions,” 8 November 1954, folder labeled “Civil Defense,” GWBU, NCA, Box 36.
659 NCCD memorandum to all city and county civil defense directors, 2 December 1954, folder labeled “Griffin – Directives and Speeches,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 6. High Point was added because of its proximity to Greensboro, and Wilmington, because “though not as populous [it] is a lucrative target.” The reason other communities were told not to prepare for evacuation stems from three reasons: areas not considered atomic targets; principal role of state communities was for evacuee reception and care, furnishing aid to neighboring communities; and “if everyone evacuates, where will they go? How can everyone remain evacuated in event of a sustained alert? Simple logic proves such a course impractical.”
Castle Bravo’s fallout contamination, sharing the conclusion that “the fallout from large nuclear bombs exploded on or near the surface of the earth would create serious hazard to civilian populations in large areas outside the target zones.”

At a press conference, Peterson defended the policy of evacuation used in conjunction with the provision of adequate shelters but reiterated that the best protection from thermonuclear weapons was simply “don’t be there.” He further admitted that while the FCDA received information on fallout from the thermonuclear tests, due to classification and secrecy reasons this could not be passed to civil defense officials or the public at large.

The problem of fallout for national and state planners varied. At the federal level, as historian Thomas Kerr observes, officials “now faced . . . the unhappy prospect of evacuating people out of prime target areas only to have them perish by radiation exposure.” AEC secrecy over atomic testing, perhaps best exemplified by the mendacious Strauss, hampered efforts of FCDA and state civil defense planners who were forced to work with inadequate or obsolete weapons data. The general public rode the seesaw of plans, from the World War II warden system and protection from conventional bombs, to blast shelters and “duck and cover,” to evacuation, and now back to shelters and evacuation. North Carolina faced an interesting situation. Even though the state was a non-target area, Griffin and the NCCD assessed that the state possessed eight cities that needed to prepare themselves for possible enemy attack. Yes, fallout could affect North Carolina, but without any official target areas this new threat initially did not stir much state action.

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661 Strauss, High-Yield Nuclear Explosions, 7.
663 Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 71.
Nationally the impact on federal civil defense officials and lack of planning for nuclear fallout became painfully apparent after the AEC announcement. Beginning on 22 February, a Senate Armed Services subcommittee chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver (D–TN) opened hearings about the national civil defense program. The fallout issue came into play on the first day of hearings, although the testimony did provide more information than the previous AEC statements. When Kefauver asked AEC commissioner Dr. Willard Libby why the commission kept the fallout threat hidden for so long, Libby plead ignorance and reported that a reason for the delay “is that we wanted to be correct, we wanted to be right, and we think the statement we have released last Tuesday [15 February] is right.” Strauss’s penchant for secrecy provides a more plausible explanation.

Days later, Peterson’s testimony left the senators flabbergasted. He reiterated support for the evacuation program. When asked about protecting evacuees, Peterson stated that:

it would be my plan to employ trenching machines and go along the public highways and dig miles of trenches 2 feet wide and 3 feet deep which can be dug at a cost of about 25 cents a running foot, and place people in those shelters . . . over the top of these trenches. . . . I would suggest using boards and cover the boards with a foot or more of dirt and the people could get into those shelters. It has also been suggested that tar paper could be used, and that a person standing in one of those trenches could flap that thing every 20 or 30 minutes and shake that stuff [fallout] on the ground, and that would offer a considerable amount of protection.

When Kefauver pointed out that Peterson should by then have some definite plans, Peterson replied “This is a definite plan.” To make Peterson’s plan even more miserable, the FCDA administrator admitted people would have to stay in the trenches for days, without provision

666 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Civil Defense Program, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, 47. In this instance, the reiteration of how 2-3 feet of earth provided excellent shielding from fallout.
667 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Civil Defense, 1955, 49.
668 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Civil Defense, 1955, 117-18.
for food, water, or sanitation, and with just three feet of space per person. Although the FCDA never formally proposed the plans Peterson detailed, the committee members understandably did not form a positive impression of civil defense. In their interim report, the committee concluded the national civil defense effort “is presently unprepared to deal with a disaster resulting from a thermonuclear attack on this country.” The committee recommended evacuation, albeit with the federal assumption of financial responsibility for perfecting plans for the critical target areas, including fallout patterns in the process.

The Kefauver hearings exhibited gaping deficiencies in the nation’s civil defense program, but brought about some positive results. Initially the FY 1956 FCDA budget request totaled only $59.3 million. During the hearings, however, Eisenhower requested an additional $12 million for developing evacuation, shelter, and operational plans for critical target cities and research into fallout problems. By summer, the approved FCDA budget totaled $68.6 million, the largest civil defense appropriation in four years. The supplemental appropriation included $8.3 million for survival plan studies, either for individual cities or entire states. The survival plan program would develop plans for “evacuation, shelter, welfare and operational plans for the protection and survival of people in target and reception areas,” utilizing state personnel and resources. Together with the matching funds program, the FCDA at least provided the states with funding to prepare themselves with something presumably more effective than ditches and tar paper.

669 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Civil Defense, 1955, 119-122.
670 Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 78.
672 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Interim Report on Civil Defense, 6-8.
673 Blanchard, “Evolution of Programs and Policies,” 139.
For the NCCD in the spring and summer of 1955, changing the state civil defense program to incorporate the lessons of Hurricane Hazel took priority over fallout issues. In February and March, the General Assembly amended the Civil Defense Act of 1951. The new amended act finally gave the governor the authority to enter into mutual aid agreements with other states and the federal government. The amended act also authorized the governor “to make such studies and surveys of the industries, resources and facilities” of the state for civil defense emergency planning. It further empowered the governor to take the necessary actions to ensure civil defense compliance within all other areas of state government and required all state personnel and government agencies to extend services and facilities to civil defense organizations upon request. These changes cut through red tape dating back to the act’s creation in 1951 and fully authorized civil defense to make use of all state resources in the event of disaster, be it war, natural, or accidental.676

Other prominent post-Hazel changes included managing federal funds, building state civil defense capability, and informing the public. By mid-March, Griffin reported federal approval of 22 Hazel rebuilding projects totaling $1.15 million dollars.677 In April, Eisenhower allocated an additional $945,000 in federal funds under Public Law 875 to cover the costs.678 In July, the NCCD published a state Natural Disaster Relief Plan intended to educate, prepare, and coordinate relief activities before disaster struck. Modeled after the Florida disaster relief plan, the NCCD version delineated responsibilities from the individual up to the federal government to respond to disasters. Operational procedures for government

678 Val Peterson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 April 1955; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Val Peterson, 21 April 1955; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 21 April 1955, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (2),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446.
officials before, during, and after disasters outlined steps to request aid and what forms it could take.\textsuperscript{679}

In the field of emergency communications the NCCD made tremendous headway. By the start of June 1955, the General Assembly appropriated funds for establishment of an emergency communications and control center. The state Highway Patrol used federal matching funds to purchase auxiliary power generators for its communications network. To cap these accomplishments, the NCCD received approval from the Federal Communications Commission and the FCDA for the state RACES plan. An NCCD communications guide and RACES supplement published that summer provided clear guidelines for all state civil defense communications networked among amateur enthusiasts, existing state agencies, the Civil Air Patrol, army and navy reserve units, commercial telephone and telegraph companies, teletypewriter services, and the National Guard.\textsuperscript{680} By July all the state’s target cities – Asheville aside – either installed or secured warning siren networks to alert citizens of attack or adverse weather.\textsuperscript{681} Should any more hurricanes strike the state, the NCCD and state government would presumably not lose the connection with coastal areas and could alert citizens quickly and efficiently to any potential or actual threat.

\textsuperscript{679} NCCD, \textit{State of North Carolina Natural Disaster Relief Plan} (Raleigh, N.C.: North Carolina Council of Civil Defense, July 1955). It should be noted that the plan’s cover lists the publication date of July 1955, but a letter of introduction by Hodges is dated 15 October 1955. Hodges references Hurricane Hazel in his letter, but not the hurricanes of August and September 1955, leading to the belief that the printed edition of this plan used in this dissertation was published in October – November 1955, but with no changes included from the July 1955 draft.


\textsuperscript{681} NCCD Newsletter, July 1955.

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After the Kefauver hearings and Hazel cleanup, the NCCD responded to inquiries about fallout. Initially, Griffin responded to JCAE hearings on the health, safety problems, and weather effects of atomic explosions in a memorandum that said little at all about fallout itself. Instead, Griffin used the awareness of fallout’s threat to proclaim: “IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DEVELOPED A CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION – DO SO AT ONCE.” This memorandum did not alleviate concerns but raised them. Across the state requests for information about fallout shelters came to the NCCD office in Raleigh, but the only available information about shelters consisted of a 1953 FCDA technical manual focused on blast more than fallout. The NCCD, however, publicly chose to downplay fallout as nothing new, commenting “Civil Defense has always advocated shelters . . . instead of being out-moded [by fallout] . . . the shelter program is now a universal necessity. No family can afford to neglect to prepare one.”

Fallout did not alter the course of NCCD activities in the first half of 1955. Reacting to Hazel, the state agency centered activities on correcting the deficiencies revealed by the tempest. They made considerable headway with communications networks and educating officials. The rebuilding from Hazel proceeded along the southern coasts and the Department of Conservation and Development lauded the sport fishing and tourism vital to the region’s economic prosperity. Despite the call for legislation to protect the state’s dunes and coastal resources, the General Assembly did not debate or pass any legislation on the matter. While


the “new” threat of fallout to federal civil defense planning added a wrinkle to the state civil defense program, it did not in any way alter the state effort. Aside from distributing and directing public inquiries to FCDA publications about fallout, Griffin and the NCCD used the threat more as a promotional tool for civil defense than a call for new planning. For the remainder of 1955, the NCCD presumably could focus on building and assisting local civil defense agencies.

Five Weeks of Hell: Connie, Diane, and Ione

Hurricane Hazel lasted a day, but from August to September 1955 three hurricanes struck the state’s southern coasts. Hurricanes Connie, Diane, and Ione individually lacked Hazel’s strength, but collectively they exacerbated that storm’s damages and destroyed the rebuilt coastal areas. The revised civil defense efforts in the state markedly improved communication and coordination between local, state, and federal officials. In the wake of the three storms Hodges chose to implement a Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project, an intensive study and coordinated legislative and policy effort to minimize future hurricane damages and protect the economic resources of eastern North Carolina. Throughout the fall, the NCCD and FCDA found themselves working closely with Hodges’s vision for North Carolina, putting the state at the forefront of natural disaster operational readiness.

Hurricane Connie landed the first blow on 12 August. Originating around the third, Connie grew rapidly into a dangerous category four hurricane days later before weakening as it neared the coast on 11 August. That afternoon, Hodges and Griffin left the national Governors’ Conference in Illinois and headed to Wilmington where FCDA Region III administrator Thomas H. Goodman joined him and other state and local officials. The NCCD and Weather Bureau issued hurricane warnings, activated the RACES network, and Hodges
placed members of the National Guard, Civil Air Patrol, Highway Patrol, and civil defense on standby. Evacuations of coastal areas commenced on the tenth, with emergency shelters for evacuees readied along the coasts.\textsuperscript{684} On the morning of the twelfth, Connie moved ashore over Cape Lookout as barely a category one hurricane with sustained 75 mph winds and gusts of 100 mph. The hurricane moved slowly northward, passing to the east of the communities of Oriental, Belhaven, Plymouth and Elizabeth City, before crossing over into Virginia around midnight on the twelfth. Connie’s power came more from water than wind. Morehead City reported almost twelve inches of rainfall from Connie, and the storm’s slow, erratic movement pushed a wall of water all along the coast. Connie flooded thousands of acres of farmland in the eastern coastal counties with tides seven feet above normal. The wave action and high water pounded the beaches, inflicting beach erosion deemed worse than Hazel. Unlike Hazel, Connie caused no fatalities in North Carolina.\textsuperscript{685}

North Carolina responded quickly after Connie. As the hurricane passed out of the state with the estimated power equal to “a few thousand hydrogen bombs,” Hodges wired Eisenhower on the thirteenth requesting a major disaster declaration and $1.5 million in funds to assist with the cleanup. Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower declared those areas affected by Connie a major disaster and allocated one million dollars in funds to the FCDA to alleviate


hardship and suffering. The Council of State in turn approved an allotment to the NCCD of $100,000 from the Contingency and Emergency Appropriation fund to complement the federal funds. Initial damage estimates, predominantly crop losses, exceeded $3.5 million. Hodges’ presence in Wilmington and his personal inspection of the damages received praise from coastal Carolina. The governor, mindful of business, discredited exaggerated reports of damages that could hinder the tourist trade by using his office and first-hand reports to let the world know that coastal businesses remained viable.

As Connie churned northward, Hurricane Diane moved towards the North Carolina coast. In the early morning hours of 17 August, Diane crossed into North Carolina over Carolina Beach, scene of immense devastation less than a year prior. As with Connie, the Weather Bureau ordered hurricane warnings posted and the state evacuated coastal residents as marines from Camp Lejeune hastily erected dunes in areas damaged by Connie. Diane’s highest winds clocked 74 mph in Wilmington and like Connie it brought severe flooding and erosion to the coastline. Diane’s tides were slightly higher than Connie’s, ranging from five

689 Bruce B. Cameron to Luther H. Hodges, 16 August 1955, folder labeled “#98, Correspondence 20 – 31 August 1955,” Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers (LHHP), #3698, SHC, Box 10; John Farrell to Luther H. Hodges, 16 August 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5. Business leaders in San Francisco following the 1906 earthquake actively obfuscated, mislead, or lied about the earthquake’s damages to both protect future business and investment prospects, and ensure insurance claims would be covered. Similar misleading of natural disasters and disaster risk occurred in Florida regarding hurricanes. See Ted Steinberg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 25-68, 79-96.
690 “Diane’s Gales Hit Carolina’s Coast,” NYT, 17 August 1955, 1; Luther H. Hodges to Edward F. Griffin, 16 August 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Ione, Connie, and Diane,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
to nine feet above mean low water along the state’s beaches and communities. Diane’s floods inundated the already waterlogged low-lying farmlands with salt water and continued to destroy crops and fields already hammered by Connie. Tracking between Fayetteville and Raleigh, Diane weakened rapidly and passed into Virginia early on the eighteenth. North Carolina experienced no deaths or injuries due to Diane, but torrential rains and floods in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and parts of New England killed almost 200 residents and made the storm the nation’s first “billion dollar hurricane.”

Arriving so closely on the heels of Connie, Diane made it impossible to conduct individual storm damage assessments. On 18 August, the same day Hodges signed a Federal-State Disaster Agreement for Connie, the governor wired Eisenhower and asked the president to amend his major disaster declaration to include Diane, a request granted the following day. In all, both hurricanes inflicted extensive damage to crops in 22 coastal counties totaling $28.3 million dollars, predominantly from salt and fresh water flooding. The costs of removing sand and debris, road and bridge repair totaled $405,000.

The flood waters brought with them extensive beach erosion and plagues of mosquitoes. On Topsail Island, Connie and Diane washed away all the temporary dunes erected after Hazel, and the erosion along the beach ranged from 25 to 58 feet of lost

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Clogged or damaged drainage systems, some in a state of disrepair since Hazel, exacerbated the flooding of Connie and Diane and provided countless nurseries for mosquitoes. To combat this disease vector, the FCDA sent engineers and health services officials along with tons of insecticides to clear and open drainage ditches and canals in early September. While the Red Cross could provide aid to the farmers for human comfort, they could not help them cope with the massive financial losses, which threatened their ability to continue farming into 1956. Additional losses included commercial fishermen unable to harvest a catch, but more so the entire tourist industry of the coast, from hotel owners to restaurants to gas stations serving visitors from across the country. These losses could not benefit from FCDA monies administered under Public Law 875. Something more needed to be done.

A day before Diane struck the coast, Hodges received a letter on 16 August that would change the course of hurricane response in North Carolina. Greensboro resident Frank Skrivanek wrote Hodges lamenting the “futile ant-like activities of our people in repairing the damage after each hurricane.” He suggested a permanent solution to decrease hurricane damage and referenced the Rhode Island State Planning Board’s actions following Hazel. If a state planning board, contended Skrivanek, “can solve our coastal storm damage problem, its

695 Press release from Governor’s Office, 2 September 1955, folder labeled “Hurricane Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5; Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, undated note believed to date to August 1955, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Counties Damages 1955,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
696 Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 15 September 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
small expense can save our citizens many millions of dollars in storm losses.” Hodges liked the idea, replying how he thoroughly agreed with the suggestion, and the governor immediately set to work turning the idea into reality. Certainly the need existed to take a proactive approach in regards to hurricanes lest they affect the governor’s economic program. Changing the message and image of the state’s coast was paramount in this regard. Griffin concurred with Hodges that “we must do all in our power to dispel the idea that our beaches have been destroyed and are not in position to take care of our tourist trade.”

Following Diane, Charles Parker, the state advertising director, immediately surveyed the coast. He found that Dare County, “although it was the least damaged physically,” suffered massive economic losses because of the downturn in tourist activity. Even before Connie struck, the State Advertising Division planned a response. After both hurricanes, the division sent out reports on the conditions of the state beaches to publications nationwide, emphasizing the “fine autumn fishing” and “business as usual” at resorts up and down the coast. In October, National Geographic featured a richly illustrated article about vacationing on the Outer Banks and the coast’s romanticism. But the islands themselves provided value beyond tourism and fishing which advertising could not support. The barrier islands protected farmlands from salt water intrusion. In a speech on 2 September, Hodges

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698 Frank Skrivanek to Luther H. Hodges, 16 August 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
699 Luther H. Hodges to Frank Skrivanek, 19 August 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
emphasized the sheer economic strength of agriculture to the state, but also its vulnerability to nature, all too recently demonstrated.703

Before Hodges could move on a proactive program for the coast, a third hurricane struck. Hurricane Ione came ashore near Salter Path in the morning of 19 September. The fourth hurricane within eleven months, Ione’s winds clocked in at a sustained 75 mph with gusts up to 107 mph. As with Connie and Diane, the state evacuated the coastal areas in Ione’s path and civil defense officials stood by to respond to any emergency aid requests.704 Around midnight as the hurricane closed in, Hodges and his aides rode a Highway Commission road grader several miles out to the shore at Atlantic Beach to witness Ione’s fury firsthand.705 Already small when it came ashore, Ione continued weakening and staggered northward along the coast before heading northeast back out to sea near the Virginia border. Ione, as with Connie and Diane, brought more rain to North Carolina, shattering records in the process. The weather substation at Hofmann Forest, near Maysville, in a forty-one day period from 11 August through 20 September recorded a staggering 48.9 inches of rainfall. Ione’s winds pushed yet more tide water inland, at three to ten feet above normal. Ione’s flooding was the greatest inundation of eastern North Carolina in recorded history at that time. The hurricane’s waters flooded forty city blocks of New Bern, thousands of acres of farmland, and caused the deaths of seven people, five from drowning and two from automobile accidents. In a testament to the NCCD’s work, the Weather Bureau wrote that “The lack of any deaths from Connie and Diane in North Carolina and only 7 in Ione and

703 Remarks by Governor Luther H. Hodges at Eighth Annual Benefit Supper of Battleboro Volunteer Fire Department, 2 September 1955, folder labeled “#2059, Speeches, 2 Sept – 31 Dec 1955,” LHHP, SHC, Box 173.
704 “Hurricane Winds Buffeting Coast; City Put on Alert,” NYT, 19 September 1955, 1.
705 Karl Bishopric to Luther H. Hodges, 21 September 1955, folder labeled “#100, Correspondence 21 – 25 September 1955,” LHHP, SHC, Box 11; Hodges, Addresses and Papers, 366.
the comparatively small property damage, excluding crop damage . . . is a tribute to the effectiveness of the warnings and precautionary measures taken by governmental and private agencies. . . .”

Once again the NCCD and Hodges responded to a hurricane with the necessary measures, but the collective damage required greater federal aid. Ione’s damages totaled $88 million, $46 million in agricultural losses alone. Between Connie, Diane, and Ione, early estimates of the total losses ranged from $169 million to $194 million dollars. Hodges requested Ione be included with the major disaster declaration from Connie and Diane, and the following day on 20 September Eisenhower amended his disaster declaration. The governor returned to the coast and conducted an aerial survey of damages accompanied by Griffin and other federal officials, and then met with public officials about applying for funds from Public Law 875. Peterson arrived days later to personally survey the coastal damage. U.S. Under Secretary of Agriculture True D. Morse also came to Raleigh to meet with Hodges about farm damages. During his meeting with Hodges, Morse made $300,000

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707 Hardy and Carney, North Carolina Hurricanes, 24.
710 Telegram from Luther H. Hodges to various officials, 20 September 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Ione, Connie, and Diane,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
available for donation of chemicals to neutralize soil contaminated by salt water flooding. Hodges signed a new Federal-State Disaster Agreement to include Ione on 26 September.\footnote{Val Peterson to Bryce Harlow, 27 September 1955, attached to report titled “Federal Agency Disaster Relief Activity in North Carolina Since January 1, 1955 to Date,” folder labeled “OF 113-F Hurricanes, Tornadoes, Windstorms, Typhoons, Cyclones, 1955,” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 474; Edward L. Rankin to True D. Morse, 29 September 1955; Federal-State Disaster Agreement, Amendment Number 1, between the United States of America and the State of North Carolina, 26 September 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.}

Ione provided the final impetus for Hodges to embark on a proactive long-range planning effort to combat hurricanes. Economic reasons underlined Hodges’s thinking, specifically eastern North Carolina’s heavy dependence on agriculture, its vulnerability to severe weather, and the fragile condition of the state’s barrier islands. From 28 – 29 September, Hodges, Griffin, and other state officials presented testimony before a House subcommittee on Government Operations.\footnote{The purpose of the hearings was to gather insight into the second Hoover Commission recommendations about water resources, and how these recommendations would impact North Carolina.} Hodges used the hearings as a public channel to inform the federal government of the state’s extreme hurricane losses.\footnote{Statement by Governor Luther H. Hodges before Special Sub-Committee on Water Resources and Power of the House Government Operations Committee, 28 September 1955, 10:00AM, folder labeled “#2059, Speeches 2 Sept. – 31 Dec. 1955,” LHHP, SHC, Box 173.} Griffin presented details of Hazel’s damages to drainage systems which the 1955 hurricanes exacerbated. Twelve counties, comprising 45,328 acres of cropland, suffered salt water flooding, and in 31 counties fresh water flooded 86,590 farm acres. All four hurricanes together cost North Carolina $292.6 million in damages, but Griffin added that the more than 100 miles of constructed sand barriers and dunes – using Public Law 875 funds – prevented further untold damages. “We certainly hope we will be able to put in some kind of system in eastern North Carolina along our beaches that would protect a vital part of the economy of this State,”
concluded Griffin. Additional state officials testified about the economic damages from the hurricanes and the need for long-range planning by state and federal governments. Whatever actions the Congress decided, the Raleigh hearings made it clear that water problems required federal and state cooperation that were flexible and non-partisan.

On 1 October 1955, North Carolina commenced work on a long-range hurricane rehabilitation study. At Hodges’ suggestion, perhaps recalling the letter of Skrivanek, Professors John A. Parker and F. Stuart Chapin, Jr., City and Regional Planning, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, prepared a prospectus for long-range hurricane protection to help the residents of eastern North Carolina mitigate future storm damage. The study would focus on 22 counties in the eastern part of the state most vulnerable to hurricane damage, with emphasis placed on surveying crop damage, beach erosion, and destruction to cities and towns. Other rehabilitation programs implemented in Connecticut, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island would provide examples for use in North Carolina. The prospectus recommended hiring a staff but also appointing a Citizens’ Committee on Hurricane Rehabilitation and an advisory panel, the former of residents from the eastern counties, the latter of state officials.

716 House Committee on Government Relations, Hearings, 1955, 313-472.
717 Press release from Governor’s Office, 13 October 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Damages,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5; prospectus for a Hurricane Rehabilitation Study, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1 October 1955, folder labeled “1955 – Hurricanes Connie, Diane, Ione,” State Highway Commission, Engineering Division papers, NCA, Box 3. There is another document that is extremely similar to the prospectus, titled “Outline for The Documentation of Losses Sustained by Hurricanes Hazel, Connie, Diane, Ione, North Carolina, October 1954 to September 1955 and Some Suggestions for Long-Range Needs,” dated 1 October 1955 with the location of Raleigh listed. This version is found in folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation, F – L,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
718 Prospectus for a Hurricane Rehabilitation Study, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1 October 1955, folder labeled “1955 – Hurricanes Connie, Diane, Ione,” State Highway Commission, Engineering Division papers, NCA, Box 3; Outline for The Documentation of Losses Sustained by Hurricanes Hazel,
Hodges wasted no time in developing the prospectus’ recommendations. On 13 October, he publicly announced creation of the North Carolina Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project. As a state civil defense project, the study staff would work under NCCD direction and included the two recommended committees from the prospectus. Peterson and the FCDA approved the North Carolina initiative and the Council of State allocated the NCCD $27,000 to fund the study.\textsuperscript{719} As project director, Parker secured the services of Pearson H. Stewart, who left his present position as director of planning for Warwick, Rhode Island to head to Raleigh.\textsuperscript{720} Hodges wrote to the mayor of Warwick on 14 October and formally requested “loaning” Stewart for the North Carolina project, a request that ruffled a few feathers in a community recovering from Hurricane Carol.\textsuperscript{721} Fortunately, Stewart came to North Carolina without incident and Hodges announced his appointments for the Committee on Hurricane Rehabilitation and the Citizens Advisory Panel on 27 October,

\textsuperscript{719} Press release from Governor’s Office, 13 October 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Damages,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5. This money came out of the $100,000 appropriate by the Council of State for Hurricane Connie back on 16 August 1955.

\textsuperscript{720} Previously, Stewart worked as a visiting associate professor in the Department of City and Regional Planning in Chapel Hill. After his work on hurricane rehabilitation, Stewart joined the staff of the Research Triangle effort where he was responsible for designing the physical form and character of the Research Triangle Park. See “Obituary: Pearson H. Stewart,” Carrboro Citizen, 18 March 2010. Work commenced on the rehabilitation project on 17 October. See John A. Parker to Paul Johnston, 13 October 1955, marked “urgent,” folder labeled “Hurricanes Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5. The working staff, with Stewart as director, consisted of John R. Hampton (Media, P.A.), George Beaton (Portsmouth, V.A.), James Pickford (Frankfort, K.Y.), consultant Aelred J. Gray (Knoxville, T.N.), and Frank Skrivanek (Greensboro, N.C.). See Statement by Governor Luther H. Hodges at the Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project Meeting, Raleigh, N.C., 1 November 1955, 4:00PM, folder labeled “#2059, speeches, 2 Sept. – 31 Dec. 1955,” LHHP, SHC, Box 173.

\textsuperscript{721} Luther H. Hodges to Joseph Mills, 14 October 1955; telegram from Edward F. Phillips to Luther H. Hodges, 14 October 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
with Colonel Beverly Snow from the Department of Conservation and Development, and Farrell as chairmen of the respective bodies.  

Hodges met with the new committees on 1 November. The governor explained the project’s purpose to minimize future hurricane damages and introduced the project staff and their attachment to the NCCD. Hodges tasked the Committee on Hurricane Rehabilitation to ensure coordination between state and federal agencies, and the Citizens Advisory Panel to review the plans of the staff and provide suggestions on improving and implementing the plans. Most of all, Hodges listed what items he wanted from the assembled personnel: documented evidence of all losses and specific recommendations for immediate and long-term action. The latter included building standards and recommended future legislation, including ideas about possible federal disaster insurance. Griffin next addressed the assembled citizens and officials and offered ten recommendations to consider in their work. These included construction of groins, jetties, sand dunes, continuous study of beach erosion, enactment of laws making it illegal to alter dunes, and stricter coastal building codes.

The meeting brought a strong positive response for Hodges. The North Carolina Association of Insurance Agents commended the governor for his vision, and the Washington, N.C. Daily News lauded Hodges’ call for disaster insurance and his focus on

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722 Press release from Governor’s Office, 27 October 1955, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation Committee,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
723 Statement by Governor Luther H. Hodges at the Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project Meeting, Raleigh, N.C., 1 November 1955, 4:00 PM, folder labeled “#2059, speeches, 2 Sept. – 31 Dec. 1955,” LHHP, SHC, Box 173; Memorandum from Edward F. Griffin to Committee on Hurricane Rehabilitation and Citizens’ Advisory Panel about Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project, 1 November 1955, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation Committee,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
724 B.C. Snow to Members of the Committee on Hurricane Rehabilitation, 4 November 1955, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
protecting the barrier islands. An urgency to protect the state’s coasts grew in importance as federal aid appeared inadequate or impossible to obtain for some of the islands. Long Beach still struggled with the inlet Hazel left behind which continued to expand, eroding away taxable property lots. The sheer magnitude of the task required more than the FCDA allocation of $36,000, but by November 1955 the state remained stymied in securing additional funds. After lone, state surveys found new inlets at several points along Currituck Banks, and Carteret County faced the problem of convincing the FCDA to fund dune stabilization for a 15 mile stretch of uninhabited beach from Portsmouth to Drum Inlet.

Hodges kept faith that the long-range project could provide the means to combat future disasters, but for the moment the state did not have the funds to repair the existing damages. In a letter to Congressman Herbert C. Bonner (D–NC), the governor asked “if the Congressional Delegation could possibly get together before you go back to Washington . . . and decide on a program of what we are going to do in the way of getting federal legislation and federal funds. We are going to need millions of dollars to do the job in Eastern North Carolina, and I am very anxious to see it done.” After Thanksgiving, Hodges requested and received an additional $1.5 million in disaster funds. At this point, coastal applications under

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727 Davis C. Herring to Edward L. Rankin, 24 October 1955; Edward L. Rankin to Davis C. Herring, 1 November 1955, folder labeled “Hurricane Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
728 Clyde P. Patton to Luther H. Hodges, 21 October 1955; Luther H. Hodges to Moses Howard, 9 November 1955; Edward L. Rankin to Luther H. Hodges, 9 November 1955, folder labeled “Hurricane Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
729 Luther H. Hodges to Herbert C. Bonner, 30 November 1955, folder labeled “#810, 28 – 30 November 1955,” Herbert C. Bonner Papers, #3710, SHC, Box 16.
Public Law 875 totaled over $7.5 million dollars, though the FCDA only approved projects totaling $823,773.\textsuperscript{730} To the state’s annoyance, the FDCA on 7 December rejected Carteret County’s request for funds to rebuild dunes and sand fences between Portsmouth and Drum Inlet. While cognizant of how the islands “constitute the first line of defense for the protection of occupied areas on the mainland against storms,” the Region III headquarters informed Griffin that since the affected areas were sparsely populated without public roadways, no funds under Public Law 875 could be expended. Hodges ordered Griffin to push the request to the national FCDA headquarters, and Region III agreed to Hodges’s request.\textsuperscript{731}

A week before Christmas, Hodges, Griffin, and other state officials testified in Raleigh before a Senate Committee on Banking and Currency about the subject of federal disaster insurance. Hodges touted that “North Carolina is not sitting back and waiting for someone from outside to do for us.” He explained the long-range rehabilitation project funded at state expense and gave assurances “that this is one State that will assume its full share of responsibility” in responding to disasters.\textsuperscript{732} Various state witnesses all agreed that the federal government needed to assume a larger financial responsibility. Griffin explained that the storms eroded 15 to 60 feet of coastline and inflicted $300 million in damages. Insurance, however, covered less than ten percent of the state’s property losses. Stewart conceded the damage in the state “resulted partially from inadequate measures taken to

\textsuperscript{730} Telegram from Luther H. Hodges to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 29 November 1955, folder labeled “1954 – Requests for Federal Assistance – Hurricanes,” GLHH, NCA, Box 177; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Val Peterson, 2 December 1955, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief-North Carolina (3),” WHCF-OF, Box 446.

\textsuperscript{731} Dial F. Sweeny to Edward F. Griffin, 7 December 1955; Luther H. Hodges to Thomas Goodman, 9 December 1955; Thomas Goodman to Luther H. Hodges, 13 December 1955; Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 20 December 1955, folder labeled “Civil Defense A – Z,” GLHH, NCA, Box 68.

\textsuperscript{732} Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings, Federal Disaster Insurance, Part I, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1956, 819-20.
prevent or minimize hurricane damage and partly from the inability of whatever protective measures might have been taken to provide complete safety from hurricanes.”

Optimistically, he felt that proactive measures could make an area safer from hurricane hazards and lower disaster insurance risks. All the state’s witnesses supported a federal disaster insurance program, but as Hodges undoubtedly recognized, the state could ill-afford to wait for federal relief.

Less than two weeks later, Pearson and the rehabilitation project released their recommendations to the governor. The North Carolina Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project report provided Hodges with his requested information. Thorough and comprehensive, the report gave North Carolina a blueprint to limit future damage. Stewart cautioned Hodges that parts of the program required federal assistance. Active support of the state’s congressional delegation in this matter remained essential to acquire all available federal disaster relief.

The report itself distilled the thinking and discussion of possible solutions to hurricane damage floated among state officials since 1954. Among the many findings, the report declared that “hurricane protection and economic developments are one and the same problem,” and caused both immediate and long-term damage to natural resources. Agriculture, foundation of eastern North Carolina’s economy, retained a positive outlook in the report, but the authors emphasized that “Unless farming in the coastal areas is protected

733 Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings, 1956, 851.
734 Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings, 1956, 817-903.
735 Press release from Governor’s Office, 31 December 1955, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation Committee,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96; Distribution list for Hurricane Project, 29 December 1955, folder labeled “Hurricane Project Report,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
736 NCCD, Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project, 25.
against hurricanes, economic progress will be greatly retarded if not entirely stopped.”737

Man bore responsibility for much of the destruction along the coasts, but the storms “by no means destroyed North Carolina’s beach resorts.” The main culprit to damage resulted from destruction of sand dunes by developers. As the beaches and resort areas represented important economic assets to the state, the report urged the protection of the land itself.738

The authors’ advocated for local organizations to carry out preventative measures of dune reconstruction, zoning, dike and drainage canal construction. State and federal support would be required, including establishment of a state planning assistance program and the state would have to assume a financial and leadership burden for this work. Optimistically, the report closed by noting that “a sturdy economy can absorb heavy hurricane losses with no more than a temporary set-back to expansion.”739 Richly illustrated and carefully organized, the report trumpeted a call for action.

In a private letter to Hodges accompanying the report, Stewart provided further recommendations to unlock the project’s full potential. Stewart accentuated the need for strong leadership to continually encourage, persuade, bribe, or force local units to do their appropriate share of work. He advocated the appointment of a person and staff working under Hodges to implement the report’s recommendations.740 Stewart’s support of these actions coincided with another report Hodges received in late December from the state Division of Commerce and Industry concerning the economic effect of the hurricanes. In the words of chief development engineer A.H. Grant,

737 NCCD, Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project, 28. Emphasis in original.
738 NCCD, Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project, 36-37.
739 NCCD, Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project, 59. Emphasis in original.
The hurricanes of 1954 and 1955 and the attending publicity have been bad for Eastern North Carolina from an industrial development standpoint. Our men visiting firms in the North, Midwest and New England have been told definitely by some industrialists that they would not consider Eastern North Carolina because of the danger of hurricanes. This feeling will of course diminish with the passage of time, and our efforts to dispel these ideas.\(^\text{741}\)

Hodges’s economic development program for North Carolina suffered heavily in 1955 from hurricanes, but at least he had the plan and advice to reverse the declines and make the state a beacon of stability and preparedness for investment. All he now needed was a man to oversee his hurricane rehabilitation program.

*Conclusion*

North Carolina’s civil defense effort by December 1955 bore the indelible marks of eleven months of natural disasters. The four hurricanes alone cost the state over $318 million dollars in lost property, business, and natural resources, an amount greater than the total state tax levy for 1953 to 1954.\(^\text{742}\) Again, the NCCD paralleled federal changes in civil defense policy and legislation. Arguably the imperative for civil defense grew exponentially with the testing and detonation of thermonuclear weapons and the attendant byproduct of radioactive fallout. Unfortunately, neither the nation nor state possessed viable plans, funds, or organizations in place to protect Americans in the event of an enemy nuclear attack. What North Carolina instead had to contend with were repeated droughts and hurricanes which necessitated changes and adjustments in the state civil defense program. A number of these changes were created internally, but others stemmed primarily from the state’s energetic businessman in the statehouse, Governor Luther H. Hodges.

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\(^{742}\) NCCD, *Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project*, 21. As more accurate damage figures came into Raleigh, the overall losses rose from early sub-$300 million estimates to a total of $318 by late 1955.
Apathy toward civil defense in North Carolina did not necessarily abate or dissipate from 1953 to 1955. Thermonuclear weapons and the dangers of fallout garnered attention at points in the news cycle in the spring and summer of 1954 and 1955. Evacuation, a strategy advocated by the FCDA as much from practicality as budgetary constraints, became North Carolina’s default policy. With no shelter system in place and no critical target areas, evacuation made slightly more sense than sitting and waiting for thermonuclear bombs to rain down. The NCCD helped target cities acquire warning systems, urged evacuation planning, and distributed federal information on fallout. With a handful of staffers, the onus for action rested with community and county civil defense directors. But as discussions of Charlotte and Raleigh revealed, citizens knew little about civil defense and the cities remained woefully unprepared. Apathy remained, at least in regards to enemy attack.

In any case, natural disaster response gave the NCCD new focus. Although Griffin began his work entirely focused on preparing for enemy attack, Hurricane Hazel made a mockery of the plans and efforts developed under his predecessors. From the complete loss of communications to initial confusion about Public Law 875, state and local civil defense officials could not perform their duties as required. The saviors of the state came in the form of FCDA Region III administrator Colonel Harry E. Brown and Hodges. Brown’s close work with the state responding to droughts and Hazel quickly cut through bureaucratic red tape, built amicable relations between state and federal officials, and minimized suffering. After the 1955 storms, Hodges’ oversight of coastal rebuilding arguably limited coastal destruction and loss of life. The governor’s vision and awareness of the coast’s value to the state’s economy culminated in the Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project.
The four hurricanes changed attitudes about civil defense’s potential, at least among public officials. Droughts and hurricanes had affected almost every county in some form or another by the mid-1950s. Thermonuclear attack and fallout may have seemed beyond the realm of possibility in most communities, but not natural disasters. Appointing a civil defense director and training people familiar with the policies and procedures for requesting disaster relief seemed a worthwhile action to any mayor or board of county commissioners. The number of communities and counties with civil defense offices and directors increased under Griffin and the NCCD, as natural disaster response provided a strong justification for growth. With a governor actively encouraging industrialization and business activity in North Carolina, civil defense represented another insurance policy against disaster and disorder.

A legacy for the NCCD of the four hurricanes of 1954 and 1955 is one of rebirth and redemption. From a program created by federal fiat and public pressure, hurricanes tested and trained state employees and volunteers to exercise their responsibilities for life and property to the utmost. The storms demonstrated a value and need for civil defense previously disregarded as non-essential or irrelevant. For Hodges, civil defense proved essential to ensuring the economic development of the state. The FCDA perhaps best summed up the effects of the 1955 hurricanes and the status of the NCCD at the end of 1955. In their annual report, the FCDA wrote:

The disasters focused attention on the peacetime role of civil defense, and have resulted in greatly advanced operation readiness in all elements of civil defense in North Carolina. Evacuation and rescue tasks were carried out in almost routine manner; emergency communications were fully tested inasmuch as landline communications had failed. . . . This experience also afforded the opportunity to train State personnel in the proper processing of project applications, and has had important educational value with respect to Congressional intent under Public Law 875 for State and local governments.743

Many of these skills and experiences could transfer over to enemy attack, but from 1955 onwards natural disaster remained the primary field of battle for civil defense in North Carolina.
Figure 18. Governor Luther H. Hodges. Source: North Carolina Archives, Raleigh, N.C.
Figure 19. Edward F. Griffin, the third director of the North Carolina Council of Civil Defense. Source: North Carolina Archives, Raleigh, N.C.
Figure 24. In 1955, the NCCD oversaw the Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project to rebuild and protect the state's barrier islands. Publicly, this initiative received support from the state's coastal communities, who lobbied for action with advertisements such as this one from November. Source: Joseph A. DuBois to Luther H. Hodges, 18 November 1955, folder labeled “Hurricanes Damage,” GLHH, NCA, Box 5.
Chapter 4: Strategic Change, Operational Continuity

In some period beyond the foreseeable future, diplomacy and statesmanship may remove all threat of all-out war, but they cannot negotiate any treaty with Nature. Past experience is sufficient to warrant all possible speed in bringing our State and all its citizens to the point where disaster, no matter what its source, may be successfully withstood.  

My personal interest in the damage caused by hurricanes helped to create an interest on the part of civil defense and other people in Washington – including Republicans. They found out what was going on, and North Carolina was able to get federal money for rehabilitation that we might not otherwise have received had we not given personal attention to hurricane damage.  
– Governor Luther H. Hodges, *Businessman in the Statehouse* \(^{745}\)

From 24 June to 17 July 1959, Governor Luther H. Hodges toured the Soviet Union with a contingent of eight other governors from across the United States. During the three week journey, Hodges visited five republics, met with a large number of Soviet citizens and officials, and even spent several hours with First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita S. Khrushchev. \(^{746}\) For Hodges, the visit was highly informative, particularly concerning the industrial and educational systems in the Soviet Union. The rigorous nature of study and earnest seriousness of the Soviet students to prepare for careers in industry or government made a marked impression on the governor. He left with the conviction “that the Soviet people are just as sincere in their desire for peace as are the


people of our country.” The threat to world peace, observed Hodges, lay with Soviet leaders, “who are extremely clever, ambitious, diplomatically arrogant, and frighteningly confident of their ability eventually to dominate world affairs.”

This disparity between the people and their leaders carried the greatest danger in the thermonuclear age. In the late afternoon of 21 September, Hodges spoke at the Washington Duke Hotel in Durham at the first annual meeting of the North Carolina Civil Defense Association. He chose to speak about survival, lamenting that “Too many of our citizens, I am afraid, fail to associate Civil Defense with survival, when actually they can be one and the same.” Addressing the role of the county and local directors, Hodges recognized the public apathy to civil defense, but despite indifference he believed that “North Carolina is making progress toward recognizing Civil Defense for what it is.” Continued the governor, “I believe that we are beginning to face up to the problem and I feel that state and local governmental units deserve considerable credit for this development. Civil Defense is not a thing apart. It cannot be separated from government because it is government.” Praising the new state survival plans and the growth of local civil defense and emergency services, the governor reminded the audience that greater problems remained.

Returning to apathy, Hodges discussed his trip to the Soviet Union. “There can be no doubt . . . that one of the greatest dangers we must guard against is complacency . . . the conviction that we have done all that we can or that Civil Defense simply will not work in this age of hydrogen bombs and ballistic missiles,” commented the governor. While Hodges

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748 The North Carolina Civil Defense Association began in June-July 1959 with Durham Civil Defense Director Benny E. Daniels as the first director. The organization still exists today, as the North Carolina Emergency Managers Association.
found the Soviets “friendly, hard-working people who fear the prospect of war easily as much as we do,” he reiterated his earlier statement that the Soviet leadership remained extremely confident of its ability to eventually dominate world affairs. Civil defense efforts could not relax and a new emphasis on family fallout shelters did not supplant evacuation plans for target areas. “No one can predict that any area, any section of our State or any State, will never have to use those shelters,” said the governor, “But if they are needed at all, they will be needed badly.” With intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) reducing warning times to mere minutes, the evacuation-to-shelter transition without public funding presented the state’s civil defense officials with an almost impossible task.749

Hodges’s speech before the state’s civil defense directors struck a positive chord in summarizing the national situation. The federal Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) requested the text of the address and on 15 October reproduced and distributed 12,000 copies nationwide.750 Walter P. Halstead, president of the United States Civil Defense Council, wrote to Hodges after receiving a copy of his address. Halstead mused, that “If every Governor of every State would accept their responsibilities in Civil Defense as you obviously are doing, many of our problems and criticisms against Civil Defense would be eliminated.”751

751 Walter P. Halstead to Luther H. Hodges, 23 October 1959, folder labeled “Luther H. Hodges,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 9.
The governor might have been surprised at the distribution of his speech, but his unwavering support made him one of the foremost advocates of civil defense in the nation. Perhaps most surprising to the governor’s audience, the speech did not include any discussion of natural disaster or hurricane rehabilitation. By 1959, Hodges’ views on civil defense and the threats facing North Carolina had shifted with the federal government’s evolving civil defense effort.

Congressional hearings on civil defense three years earlier instigated significant changes to the organization of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) and Public Law 81-920. By 1957, Val Peterson resigned as the nation’s civil defense administrator, and in 1958 the reorganized OCDM came into existence under the leadership of Leo A. Hoegh. Under Hoegh, the OCDM crafted and promulgated a new national plan for civil defense, developed a national shelter policy, and urged the creation of continuity of government programs. Passage of Public Law 85-606 in August 1958 amended the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 to vest responsibility for civil defense jointly between the federal and state governments and authorize financial contributions to state and local civil defense programs for personnel and administrative expenses.

The shift from evacuation to shelters at the federal level did not dramatically affect North Carolina’s civil defense operations. Passage of Public Laws 84-655 and 85-606 gave the North Carolina Council of Civil Defense (NCCD) considerable resources to purchase equipment and increase the professional manpower of the civil defense effort as the state Hurricane Rehabilitation Program worked to repair the storm damages. By the end of the decade, the program broke completely from civil defense, but its actions and plans reduced coastal vulnerability to hurricanes. Development of operational survival plans for the state
and counties provided a major push for the NCCD. The plans enabled the state to develop
emergency services to respond to daily emergencies, nuclear attack, or natural disasters with
rapid and orderly responses. By 1960, the NCCD could look back at a decade with the
competency and ability to respond to the crises affecting the state with marked growth and
progress.

*The Hurricane Rehabilitation Program and Fight for Federal Dollars*

The start of 1956 coincided with the establishment of the North Carolina Hurricane
Rehabilitation Program and the fortuitous hiring of Colonel Harry E. Brown, aided
inadvertently by the FCDA itself. Part of *Project East River's* recommendations encouraged
the dispersal of industry and federal offices outside of the Washington, D.C. area to reduce
the vulnerability of the government to nuclear attack. The FCDA, with the support of
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, relocated its headquarters from Washington to Battle
Creek, Michigan in mid-1954. FCDA administrator Peterson, along with the deputy
administrator and various key staff, remained in Washington; but the bulk of personnel either
went to Michigan or left the FCDA. The move, while exhibiting leadership for the dispersal
policy, hampered the FCDA and cost it qualified personnel unable or unwilling to relocate.752

One of the dissatisfied employees was Brown.

Brown moved with the FCDA to Battle Creek in the summer of 1954. Brown served
in the army from before World War I to the battlefields of Europe on the staff of General
Omar Bradley in the second global conflagration. He retired after the war and worked for the

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752 David F. Krugler, *This is Only a Test: How Washington D.C. Prepared for Nuclear War* (New York:
Yoshpe, the move cost the FCDA a number of personnel with high security clearances and resulted in
considerable commuting.
Veterans Administration before joining the FCDA. Formerly the Region III administrator who assisted North Carolina with the droughts of 1953 and 1954 and Hurricane Hazel, Brown earned promotion to assistant administrator for operations control services in May 1955 working directly under Peterson. After leaving Region III, Brown kept in touch with Hodge’s private secretary, Edward L. Rankin. During one conversation, Brown expressed his displeasure with the cold weather in Michigan and his new FCDA position. Rankin recommended he send his federal employment history to Raleigh, and Brown reported his willingness to work for the state, being best qualified for “hospital administration or industrial development.” Rankin recommended Brown initially to the Department of Conservation and Development, but someone in state government, perhaps Hodges, envisioned him in a different role.

The damages inflicted by the four hurricanes continued to fester in January and February 1956. Resort areas and the tourism industry along the coast remained hampered by negative perceptions. The state advertising committee heard calls in January for increased newspaper advertising to inform tourists that the state’s beaches remained open for business. That same month, Hodges read of the massive federal aid package received by the northeastern states affected by Hurricane Diane, in stark contrast with the relatively paltry amount allocated to North Carolina. The northeastern states received over $31 million in

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757 Luther H. Hodges to Edward F. Griffin, 5 January 1956; untitled, undated document about federal assistance to New England States damaged by floods in fall 1955; Pearson H. Stewart to Edward F. Griffin, 257
work by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to repair and rebuild flood damage under Operation Noah.  

As it stood, funds available under Public Law 875 assisted coastal communities in temporary restoration of essential facilities, notably for pushing up new sand dunes. But continued issues with erosion warranted something of permanence in the form of seawalls, concrete sand bags, or jetties.  

As the Long-Range Hurricane Rehabilitation Project report started to roll off the presses, Hodges spoke of the need for more permanent stabilization methods, but also new regulations governing beach construction.  

In a speech before the Southeastern North Carolina Beach Association on 28 January, the governor reiterated the need for new regulations governing construction and to protect existing dune structures to avoid the need for coastal rebuilding.  

While the hurricane rehabilitation report gave recommendations for what North Carolina could do, the need for concrete action remained. On 23 February, the Department of Conservation and Development sent Hodges a plan to reduce hurricane damage along the coast with three components: groin construction, drainage of agricultural lands and stream clearance, and construction of a breakwater. The total cost of all three components amounted to $30 million.  

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to over $11 million. That same day, Rankin telephoned and spoke with Brown about the
directorship of the North Carolina Hurricane Rehabilitation Program, which Brown accepted
during the conversation. He began work on 2 April. With both engineering experience and
rich understanding of civil defense and disaster policy legislation, Brown represented the
ideal choice to attempt to implement the recommendations of the Long-Range Hurricane
Rehabilitation Project report. But in the month before Brown reported for duty, Hodges and
the state’s congressional delegation initiated other measures to attract additional disaster
relief.

In March 1956, Hodges went on the offensive to bring federal disaster relief
assistance to the state. Back in October 1955, Beaufort County inquired about use of FCDA
funds to clear clogged streams and alleviate flooding. FCDA Region III engineer Earl Mader
suggested the state inform other counties about submitting stream clearance projects for
review. No criteria for eligibility of projects were established by the FCDA at the time. By
late January, however, Mader reported to Griffin that the national headquarters refused to
approve stream clearance projects as eligible under Public Law 875. On 2 February,
Hodges wrote to Thomas H. Goodman, Region III administrator, requesting advancement of
$1.2 million to cover remaining costs of approved disaster relief projects resulting from the

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762 William P. Saunders to Luther H. Hodges, 23 February 1956; E.C. Snow to William P. Saunders, 23
February 1956; document titled “Plan for Work to Reduce Damages to North Carolina Areas Expected to
be Caused by Future Hurricanes and to Relieve Damages Caused by Four Hurricanes Which Occurred
During the Period from October 1954 to September 1954,” folder labeled “Conservation and Development –
General,” GLHH, NCA, Box 69.
763 Luther H. Hodges to Harry E. Brown, 24 February 1956; Harry E. Brown to Luther H. Hodges, 1 March
1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation General,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
764 Edward F. Griffin, “History of Stream Clearance and Drainage Projects,” to Luther H. Hodges, 30
January 1957, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Stream Clearance and Drainage,” Governor Terry Sanford
Papers (GTSP), NCA, Box 28.
1955 hurricanes. Goodman forwarded the letter to the national headquarters, but the funds did not appear.\textsuperscript{765}

With Brown’s services assured and possessing a proposed $11 million plan, the governor went to Washington and met with the members of the North Carolina delegation about the need for additional emergency federal funds.\textsuperscript{766} Representative Charles Raper Jonas (R–NC) wrote to Bryce N. Harlow, Eisenhower’s administrative assistant that “Feeling seems to be developing in the State, certainly in official circles, that our situation in Eastern North Carolina has not received the attention it deserves,” and he asked Harlow for a review of the situation.\textsuperscript{767} Hodges and the state congressional delegation met with Peterson in his Washington office on 5 March. The group expressed displeasure with the FCDA and asked if the federal government under Public Law 875 could do any additional work for the state. Peterson agreed to cooperate with Hodges and establish a joint board of investigation to reexamine rejected project applications and resurvey the affected areas to see if any qualified for additional disaster relief funds.\textsuperscript{768} The following day in the House, Congressman Herbert C. Bonner (D–NC) offered an amendment to the 1957 Independent Offices Appropriation Bill adding $5,386,030 to the president’s disaster relief fund. Bonner, through his proposed appropriation, would earmark the request to create a precedent for Peterson to act “a little

\textsuperscript{765} Luther H. Hodges to Thomas H. Goodman, 2 February 1956; Thomas H. Goodman to Luther H. Hodges, 9 February 1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation, F – L,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.

\textsuperscript{766} Edward L. Rankin to Jack Farrell, 5 March 1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation, F – L,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96; Sam J. Ervin, Jr. to Edward L. Rankin, 5 March 1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation General,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.


\textsuperscript{768} Val Peterson to W. Kerr Scott, 6 December 1956; Bryce N. Harlow to Charles R. Jonas, 12 March 1956, folder labeled “OF 113-F, Hurricanes, Tornadoes, Windstorms, Typhoons, Cyclones, 156,” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 474; telegram from Luther H. Hodges to Herbert C. Bonner, 6 March 1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation, A – E,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
more liberal” in the handling of disaster relief funds under Public Law 875. 769 As his main
goal, Bonner used the amendment as a statement of record that the House intended the money
to be spent in North Carolina. 770 Attention now turned to Brown and the Hurricane
Rehabilitation Program.

At the end of March, the state program began operations in earnest. Hodges asked
Griffin to take a trip to New England to study the northeastern hurricane rehabilitation work
first-hand and document it for North Carolina’s planning. 771 Ten days after taking office,
Brown completed a study of the state hurricane project, with the opening observation that

A study of the “North Carolina Hurricane Project” report clearly indicates that
hurricane protection and economic development are one and the same problem. The
economic progress of the entire state and particularly of the Coastal and Coastal Plain
areas will be seriously affected unless a comprehensive plan to rehabilitate the
damaged areas and to minimize future hurricane damage is developed. 772

He recognized the need for federal assistance and agreed that “The Outer Banks cannot
provide complete protection to the mainland but must be rehabilitated and preserved for the
excellent protection they do give and for the development of the tourist industry.” 773 Brown
agreed with the recommendations in the report and urged their prompt implementation. He
proposed to organize development districts for the coastal counties, encouraging local

769 Cong. Rec., 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956, 102, pt. 3: 4084-87. The figure that Bonner uses stems from the
report Hodges gave to members of the North Carolina Congressional Delegation on 28 February. It
represents the cost to drain agricultural lands by excavation in and clearing of fallen trees and debris from
streams in the area. See “Presentation to the Projects Committee, National Rivers and Harbors Congress, on
10 May 1956, by the North Carolina Delegation to the 43rd Annual Convention,” folder labeled “1956:
Hurricane Relief,” CRJP, SHC, Box 1.
770 Carl T. Durham to Luther H. Hodges, 8 March 1956; telegram from Luther H. Hodges to Herbert C.
Bonner, 7 March 1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation, A – E,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96; Luther H.
Hodges to Edward F. Griffin, 8 March 1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation, F – L,” GLHH,
NCA, Box 96.
771 Luther H. Hodges to Edward F. Griffin, 8 March 1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation, F – L,”
GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
772 Harry E. Brown, “Staff Study – North Carolina Hurricane Project,” 12 April 1956, folder labeled
“Hurricane Rehabilitation Committee,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
773 Ibid.
governments to enact building codes and zoning ordinances for coastal construction and control of beach erosion. Additional plan provisions intended to improve flood control and drainage, minimize salt water infiltration, conduct research into beach preservation methods, and stabilize inlets. The estimated cost for everything totaled $25 million.\footnote{Ibid.; Harry E. Brown to Luther H. Hodges, 17 April 1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation Committee,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96. The specific projects Brown listed came with an estimated price tag of $23.1 million.}

Mother Nature did not provide North Carolina any additional favors. On 11 April, a nor’easter struck the counties of Currituck, Dare, and Hyde, inflicting severe damage to dunes, highways, and public utilities. Shoreline cottages, homes, and businesses fell before the pounding surf and at Nags Head the storm eroded away 75 feet of beach.\footnote{NCCD, \textit{Progress Report, 1957 – 1959}, 20; David Stick, “Dare County Storm Rehabilitation Committee, 1956 – 1957,” 3, Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, N.C.; Russell C. Nicholson to Luther H. Hodges, 12 April 1956, folder labeled “Civil Defense Bulletins General,” GLHH, NCA, Box 68.} As recounted by Outer Banks historian David Stick, some property owners asked for a disaster declaration, but “Other people, dependent on tourism for their livelihood, were afraid a disaster designation would scare tourists away.”\footnote{Stick, “Dare County Storm Rehabilitation,” 3.} The Nags Head Chamber of Commerce called a public meeting and organized a disaster committee. Surveying the damages from the four hurricanes and the nor’easter, the committee recognized coastal erosion as the most severe of damages. The risk of another storm brought an appeal for Hodges to request a disaster declaration.\footnote{Ibid., 3-6.} The governor wired Eisenhower for said declaration and the president issued one on 24 April 1956, later allotting $200,000 in disaster funds for the three counties.\footnote{Telegram from Luther H. Hodges to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 20 April 1956; Val Peterson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 23 April 1956; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 24 April 1956; Val Peterson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 12 May 1956; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 14 May 1956, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (2),” WHCF-OF, 1953 – 1961, DDEL, Box 446.}
Griffin, back from New England, shared his survey findings with the governor. The director professed that previously furnished information about the northeastern rehabilitation work was both “very misleading and does not give the true picture.” After a thorough inspection of the rehabilitation work, Griffin concluded that stream clearance work “was essential in the New England area but I am just as convinced that our storm area is entitled to the same treatment.”

Brown agreed with the findings and explained that several projects deemed ineligible by FCDA Region III in North Carolina were eligible for federal funds under a new, “more liberal interpretation of . . . Public Law 875.”

Armed with this information, Hodges testified in Washington on 24 April during Senate hearings on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1957. In discussion about the Bonner amendment to authorize $5.3 million for disaster relief, the governor provided statistics of damages caused by the hurricanes and the devastation to the streams and drainage networks in eastern North Carolina. Hodges detailed the troubling statistic that insurance companies only paid $5.75 million in claims from the 1955 hurricanes for a state net loss of $185 million.

Peterson testified after Hodges about the FCDA’s annual appropriation and specifically addressed the North Carolina situation. He decided not to discuss the matter in length before the Senate committee, but cited the state hurricane rehabilitation study’s comment that “The problem of drainage was further complicated by the clogging of many channels and streams. Even before the hurricanes some streams had been choked by fallen

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trees or by silt from improperly managed fields.” Although professing sympathy and deeming the situation a “complex problem,” Peterson told the subcommittee chairman, Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D–WA),

that this is a somewhat questionable precedent, when a State comes on the floor of the Congress and seeks to have earmarked for it an appropriation for a specific amount of money to relieve a disaster when it is done on the basis of a scrutiny of the situation and a reliable determination of the damages and the definite activity that is proper on the part of the Federal agency charged with the responsibility of making a determination of the action that is proper within the terms of the law.

Despite Peterson’s views, the Senate appropriations committee recommended an addition of $6 million for disaster relief, with the caveat that the funding “not to exceed $6,000,000 shall be expended in any one State.” In the conference debate the caveat was removed and the Bonner amendment passed into law.

North Carolina would not receive all the funding from the Bonner amendment. The bureaucratic fight to bring every penny of disaster relief into North Carolina persisted for a full year after the hurricanes struck. Following his testimony, Hodges requested and received an additional $600,000 for disaster relief under the 1955 declaration. Following up on his promise to reconsider North Carolina project applications, in early May 1956, Peterson asked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to convene a special board of investigation to examine outstanding project applications and determine if any further work could be carried out under

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786 Telegram from Luther H. Hodges to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 26 April 1956; Val Peterson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 27 April 1956; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 30 April 1956; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Val Peterson, 30 April 1956, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (3),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446.
Public Law 875. The reviewed project applications originated from 26 counties and three towns, totaling approximately $10 million.

As the Corps’ work began, North Carolina faced the problem of a potential disease outbreak. In May, Hodges wrote Peterson about increases in mosquito-borne equine encephalomyelitis in the fall of 1955 which killed at least 500 horses and mules. A survey of coastal mosquito problems in North Carolina from 28 May to 1 June 1956 at the request of the State Board of Health reported that the April 1956 nor’easter compounded damage from 1955 hurricanes. The report’s authors concluded that the new flooding created “a very explosive situation where any unfavorable sequence of weather conditions could very rapidly produce large infestations of mosquitoes,” necessitating drainage projects. Hodges subsequently requested $100,000 for mosquito control under Public Law 875, approved on 20 June. By September, North Carolina needed an additional $25,000 to complete the extermination job, approved in November.

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792 Luther H. Hodges to Thomas H. Goodman, 19 September 1956; teletype from Val Peterson to Luther H. Hodges, 6 November 1956; Edward F. Griffin to Thomas H. Goodman, 6 December 1956; Thomas H. Goodman to Luther H. Hodges, 4 December 1956, folder labeled “Hurricanes – Federal Projects – Mosquitoes – Long Beach Projects,” GLHH, NCA, Box 177.
Peterson’s special board of investigation at last met at the end of May. They discussed the differences between the Carolinas and New England, and reached agreement on eligibility criteria for relief aid. Damage surveyors had to contend with the simple truth that many of the North Carolina waterways suffered from silting and poor maintenance prior to the hurricanes and that this exacerbated flooding conditions. By the end of June, the special board recommended $1,606,864 be provided under Public Law 875 directly to the Corps of Engineers for drainage projects. Eisenhower authorized the funds and informed Hodges in August.

State officials did not radiate graciousness at the news. Griffin and the NCCD did not learn about the criteria used by the special board until 4 September. Project applications which totaled approximately $10 million received only a fraction of the requested federal funding. A suggested press release for the governor quoted Hodges as saying how “the criteria under which the [special] board operated is not responsive to the wishes of the Congress as evidenced by the approval of a $6,000,000 supplemental appropriation. . . .” In Brown’s private opinion,

. . . the Corps [of Engineers] now realizes the directive issued by FCDA is too restrictive and that a review of the applications under a broader directive would result in additional applications being approved. It is disturbing that the Governor has not been officially advised by the FCDA of the results of the investigation.

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793 Minutes of Meeting of Special Board of Investigation on Federal Disaster Assistance in Carolinas, 28 – 29 May 1956, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (3),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446.
794 Special Board of Investigation, “Report of Special Board of Investigation for Federal Disaster Assistance in the Carolinas,” 28 June 1956, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (3),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446.
795 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Val Peterson, 17 August 1956; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 17 August 1956, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (3),” WHCF-OF, Box 446.
Brown recommended Hodges issue the suggested press release but defer further action pending the desires of the Congressional delegates and local reaction. Doubting that an appeal by Hodges to Peterson would be productive, Brown suggested the state congressional delegation appoint a committee to meet with Peterson to reexamine the situation. For the citizens of eastern North Carolina, the bureaucratic marathon dragged on interminably.

The FCDA again agreed to reconsider disaster relief options for North Carolina. Perhaps to assuage a possible torrent of criticism, FCDA Region III informed Griffin on 28 September that applicants could resubmit project applications for stream clearance, more than a year after Hurricane Ione roared ashore. This time, the applications required extra information and justifications to warrant approval. Despite this apparent generosity, farmers in eastern North Carolina charged civil defense and Corps officials with “deliberately stalling” on applications to avoid spending money on disaster relief. Brown concurred that “this entire matter has been badly handled” and “that the so-called investigation made by the original Board was not in accordance with the provisions of Public Law 875 or with the intent of the Congress. . . . The blame for the delay in processing applications rests squarely with the Federal Civil Defense Administration.” Hodges echoed this sentiment to Peterson, writing how he was “perturbed and disappointed that actual work of stream clearance has

been delayed so long and further, that your office did not, months ago, advise us that specific information would be required before project applications could be processed.\textsuperscript{803}

Peterson attempted damage control with North Carolina’s political leaders. Writing to Senator W. Kerr Scott (D–NC) about the handling of disaster relief funds, Peterson contended that he instructed the board “and my own people to be just as lenient as they could in their interpretation . . . of Public Law 875.” Apparently, the main problem centered on applications for “problems of long-standing and continuing nature” as opposed to disaster-induced problems.\textsuperscript{804} Internally, Region III administrator Goodman explained to Peterson that “the paramount reason for any delay in processing the North Carolina drainage applications is either the failure of the responsible authorities of that state to adequately and promptly disseminate the essential criteria” for the applications, or the failure of the applicants themselves.\textsuperscript{805}

Political philosophies factor into this matter. Throughout his tenure in the Eisenhower administration, Peterson remained a staunch disciple of the president’s fiscal values with a firm commitment to administer Public Law 875 to the letter of the law. Peterson never cared for committing civil defense resources for natural disaster operations, considering funds diverted for disasters negatively affecting investment in defenses against enemy attack.\textsuperscript{806} For Hodges and other state officials, the fulfillment of federal responsibility and assistance overrode all other concerns. It can be said that North Carolina’s farmers found themselves

\textsuperscript{803} Luther H. Hodges to Val Peterson, 26 November 1956, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Stream Clearance and Drainage,” GTSP, NCA, Box 28.
\textsuperscript{804} Val Peterson to W. Kerr Scott, 6 December 1956, folder labeled “OF 113-F, Hurricanes, Tornadoes, Windstorms, Typhoons, Cyclones, 1956,” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 474.
\textsuperscript{805} Thomas H. Goodman to Val Peterson, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Stream Clearance and Drainage,” GTSP, NCA, Box 28.
caught between strict federal policy and poverty conditions that inhibited proper maintenance of the state’s waterways in the first place.

Hodges remained undeterred. Thanking Goodman for the initial allocation of $1.6 million, he next requested an additional $1 million for stream clearance. In January 1957, the FCDA’s special board reconvened to reexamine project applications. By June, the Corps commenced work on clearing streams for the approved projects, and to survey streams from the previously rejected applications. By February 1958, the Corps had surveyed over 2,000 miles of streams, and Brown received confidential information that “it appears the expenditure of $3,998,660 for the clearance of streams . . . is justified [by the Corps].” On 2 May, Eisenhower allocated an additional $750,000 for stream clearance work, to accompany approximately $560,000 in remaining funds. In April 1959, the Corps completed all stream clearance work with Hodges’ persistence for aid eventually totaling $2,346,138.

No one project, however, could compete with North Carolina’s fight to close Long Beach Inlet. The inlet left behind by Hurricane Hazel occupied the former location of 30 houses, 1,000 feet of paved highway, and transformed $250,000 in taxable property into open

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water.\textsuperscript{813} Perhaps not as clear to the FCDA is what Southport attorney Ray Walton knew when he wrote to Hodges about how the inlet “is a matter that affects the economy of our State and is of utmost importance to Southeastern North Carolina since the tourist business and summer homes are by far our greatest industry.”\textsuperscript{814} These affected property owners approached Hodges in February 1955 about the matter. By May 1956, the FCDA allocated approximately $100,000 to close the inlet, but none of the NCCD-solicited contractors met with federal approval.\textsuperscript{815} Brown initiated conversations with the Corps to have them perform the work which met with FCDA approval and Hodges subsequently contacted Goodman and endorsed this idea of using the Corps under FCDA authority.\textsuperscript{816} Throughout July, the state and FCDA arranged plans to work through the requirements of Public Law 875, whereby the state would agree that the inlet area would serve as a base for a new public highway to benefit all state residents, affirming that federal disaster relief be used for public and not private, relief.\textsuperscript{817}

By September 1956, efforts to remove the inlet had stalled. Finally, the FCDA in October assigned the Corps to the task and provided the needed funds. North Carolina agreed

\textsuperscript{813} Program for “Ribbon Tying” ceremony for closure of Long Beach Inlet, 6 March 1958, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Long Beach Inlet,” GLHH, NCA, Box 261.

\textsuperscript{814} Ray H. Walton to Luther H. Hodges, 20 September 1957, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Long Beach Inlet,” GLHH, NCA, Box 261.


\textsuperscript{816} Harry E. Brown to Edward L. Rankin, 11 December 1957, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Long Beach Inlet,” GLHH, NCA, Box 261; Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 8 March 1957, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Stream Clearance and Drainage,” GTSP, NCA, Box 28.

\textsuperscript{817} Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 2 July 1956, folder labeled “Hurricanes – Federal Projects – Highway Projects,” GLHH, NCA, Box 177.
to refund $62,500 allocated previously. The Corps commenced new surveys of the inlet in March 1957 to determine the cost of closure. After the Corps finished its study of the inlet, the FCDA in September 1957 informed Hodges that the project would cost $165,000, and it could only contribute $100,000 for this work. Hodges offered a state supplement of $14,000, the difference between temporary and permanent closure. It remains unknown why the FCDA balked at the cost, considering the previous agreement for the state to construct a public roadway and return previous FCDA funds to reunite the island. Much like the pattern of action with stream clearance, the FCDA delayed seemingly without explanation, but Hodges steadfastly refused to abandon the matter.

When the wheels of bureaucracy at last turned enough, North Carolina finally reunited Long Beach. On 9 December 1957, the FCDA reported all administrative details on the inlet closure under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers. The district engineer for the Corps in Wilmington received formal authority to proceed on 3 January 1958 and in a press release, Hodges acknowledged how “The opening of this inlet was a tremendous blow to Brunswick County and Southeast North Carolina. It has meant a tremendous loss in revenue to the county and to individual property owners in this beach community.” News of the agreement brought thanks to Hodges, Griffin, Brown, and other officials for their

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820 Ibid.
823 Press release from Governor’s Office, 3 January 1958; Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 3 January 1958, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Long Beach Inlet,” GLHH, NCA, Box 261.
“untiring and persistence efforts” in closing the inlet, ultimately returning “several hundred thousand dollars in tax valuations” to the county.824

In the clear, cold air of 27 January 1958, the Corps of Engineers dredge Henry Bacon moved into the inlet. The vessel began placing dredging pipeline to move 500,000 cubic yards of material necessary to fill the 1,000 to 1,300-foot wide breach.825 By 13 February, the Henry Bacon completed the major dredging work and at the end of the month Long Beach Inlet was no more. The dedication ceremony on 6 March 1958 came almost two and a half years after Hazel made landfall. A “ribbon tying” ceremony climaxed the event.826 Hodges, speaking before gathered onlookers, proclaimed the closure “a good example of what determined teamwork between all levels of government can accomplish,” adding that the experiences with hurricane rehabilitation would benefit civil defense in North Carolina.827

No state official really anticipated the bureaucratic fight over disaster relief. Undeterred, Hodges, Griffin, and Brown persevered in the effort to bring as much federal disaster relief money to North Carolina as they could. The Hurricane Rehabilitation Program proved a shrewd action by Hodges, attracting Brown and his rich knowledge of civil defense and federal disaster policy into state government. His efforts went far to restore tourism and

827 Remarks by Governor Luther H. Hodges at Ribbon-Tying Ceremonies Marking Final Closure of Long Beach Inlet, Long Beach, N.C., 6 March 1956, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Long Beach Inlet,” GLHH, NCA, Box 261.
tax dollars for eastern North Carolina and stream clearance work removed a disease threat and restored water resources vital to the region’s agrarian economic engine.

Federal disaster relief did not compensate for more than $300 million in damages, but even the small amounts of aid nonetheless benefitted North Carolina. From September 1954 to April 1958, Eisenhower authorized major disaster funds totaling $7,256,864. For Hurricane Hazel, the NCCD paid out $1,290,938 in project costs. A total of $2,611,911 was allocated to pay for damages from the 1955 hurricanes. North Carolina paid out a further $143,426 for the April 1956 nor’easter. Closing Long Beach Inlet cost the federal government approximately $175,000. North Carolina eventually received $2,346,138 in federal funds for stream clearance work. Factoring in Long Beach Inlet, Hodges, Brown, and the NCCD brought $6,567,414 in federal disaster relief dollars to North Carolina, 90 percent of the total appropriated funds for the state. To put this in perspective, only the state

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828 The breakdown is $1.5 million for Hurricane Hazel, $3.2 million for the 1955 hurricanes, $200,000 for the 1956 nor’easter, then $2,356,864 for stream clearance. Funds for closing Long Beach Inlet are not included, as the money in essence transferred from the FCDA to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the authorization came internally, not directly from the president.
830 Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 4 March 1958, folder labeled “Project Applications for Connie, Diane and Ione,” GLHH, NCA, Box 261.
831 Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 26 August 1957, folder labeled “11 April 1956 Storms in Currituck, Dare and Hyde Counties,” GLHH, NCA, Box 261.
832 This figure did not include the funds for Long Beach Inlet, as the work was negotiated and handled by the FCDA with the Corps of Engineers. The money the state received then for closing Long Beach Inlet can be considered federal work on behalf of the state to the amount of approximately $175,000.
833 As for 20 February 1958, the FCDA paid out $1,048,000 from the original $1,606,684 with the resubmitted and approved projects remaining totaling $1,298,075. FCDA administrator Leo A. Hoegh requested an additional $750,000, approved by Eisenhower on 29 April 1958. In 1959, the NCCD reported the cost of the stream clearance project payout as “approximately $2 million.” See Leo A. Hoegh to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 20 February 1958; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Leo A. Hoegh, 29 April 1958, folder labeled “OF 107 C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (3),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446; NCCD, “Summary of Federal Aid in Funds and Property which has come to North Carolina through its Council of Civil Defense covering the period 1 January 1955 to 1 January 1959,” 25 February 1959, folder labeled “Natural Disasters,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 8.
of California received more during the same time period.\textsuperscript{834} Recognizing the vast differences between states in terms of population and economy, the impact of the funds in North Carolina far surpassed those in the Golden State.

\textit{North Carolina Civil Defense – Natural Disasters or Nuclear War?}

Responding to the numerous natural disasters that struck North Carolina in the mid-1950s gave the NCCD and local civil defense agencies immense competency and skill in natural disaster response. Preparations for potential enemy attack, however, received less attention. In December 1955, Congressman Chet Holifield (D–CA), chairman of a military operations subcommittee in the House of Representatives, asked Hodges for his views about the present national civil defense effort. Specifically, Holifield sought the governor’s opinions on civil defense’s biggest problems and the best ways to overcome them.\textsuperscript{835} Rankin passed Holifield’s inquiry to Griffin, requesting a statement for Hodges’ consideration, adding “I think that the Governor would want to stress particularly the natural disaster aspects of Civil Defense.”\textsuperscript{836}

Griffin provided a concise, albeit pointed response to the governor. He included a caveat that “. . . few of my suggestions may appear radical, [and] I sincerely feel that some drastic changes in Civil Defense law and policy must be made” to prepare the population to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[835] Chet Holifield to Luther H. Hodges, 7 December 1955, folder labeled “Civil Defense A – Z,” GLHH, NCA, Box 68.
\item[836] Edward L. Rankin to Chet Holifield, 20 December 1955, with note to Edward F. Griffin at bottom, folder labeled “Civil Defense A – Z,” GLHH, NCA, Box 68.
\end{footnotes}
survive major disaster. “There is a grave danger,” began Griffin, “already apparent – that over-emphasis on the necessity to prepare for natural disaster is causing considerable disregard for the basic reason of . . . Civil Defense, or the possibility of enemy attack.”

To strengthen civil defense in the country, in wake of the nation’s “precarious position in world affairs,” Griffin offered five suggestions to the governor for the national effort, noting that all would impact the state to some degree.

He warned that “Until there is more realistic facing of facts, more consistent support, more clearly defined lines of responsibility and adequate financing at federal level, it appears unlikely that the several states and their respective subdivisions will assume the realistic approach which will eradicate public apathy.”

Hodges underlined the sentence on Griffin’s cover letter, “I hope you do not find this statement too radical and ‘wild-eyed’” and penciled in the margin, “I do!”

When Holifield’s subcommittee published various responses from state and municipal authorities about civil defense, North Carolina’s response was not included.

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838 The five items were: 1) That the federal government place Civil Defense under the Department of Defense, equal in importance with the Army, Navy and Air Force. There should be a Secretary of Civil Defense. 2) Federal funds should be appropriated that would enable Civil Defense to conduct a thorough program in all its phases. 3) Legislation should be enacted to provide personnel, trained by and responsible to the federal government, to be used by Civil Defense at all levels. 4) From the highest echelons of authority should come emphasis on the potential danger of radioactive fall-out. 5) Plans should be in the making to assist rural communities with the burden of caring for refugees or evacuees.


The disagreement between the men did not become a focus of public discussion. Hodges ran for election as governor in 1956 and handily defeated his Republican opponent, carrying all 100 counties and approximately 67 percent of the popular vote, the widest margin of victory since 1928. Hodges could have replaced Griffin, but despite their differing views he reappointed the general as NCCD director in August 1959, personally thanking him “for the outstanding service you have rendered our State in this position, and my confidence in your continued good service.”

The differences were a matter of basic philosophy and current utility. Hodges in May 1956 spoke of civil defense as two-fold, “a dual responsibility – Survival Planning and Planning for Natural Disaster . . . two voluntary programs which are vital to our national and state welfare.” Civil defense served both matters, albeit with Hodges’s present emphasis on natural disaster response. Natural disasters clearly fell under the purview of the NCCD, but Griffin remained steadfast in the primacy of protection from enemy attack. If anything, the hiring of Brown gave Griffin’s work a boost, for Hodges on 24 May informed all state organizations that Brown and the Hurricane Rehabilitation Program would be responsible for coordination of all natural disaster functions within state government and liaison with the

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843 Luther H. Hodges to Edward F. Griffin, 7 August 1959, folder labeled “Civil Defense Director,” Governor’s Papers, William B. Umstead and Luther H. Hodges, Appointments 1953 – 1960, NCA, Box 13. A month later Hodges pinned on Griffin’s second star as commander of the 30th Infantry Division of the National Guard, and the major general continued to serve at the pleasure of the governor for the remainder of his term. See Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 11 August 1959, folder labeled “Civil Defense Director,” Governor’s Papers, William B. Umstead and Luther H. Hodges, Appointments 1953 – 1960, NCA, Box 13; press release from Governor’s Office, 10 September 1959, folder labeled “Civil Defense – General, A – Z,” GLHH, NCA, Box 361.
necessary federal authorities.\textsuperscript{845} Griffin thereafter could turn his attention to planning for the unthinkable, while Brown focused his efforts on mitigation of coastal damages associated with massive weather phenomena.

Brown pursued this mitigation work by stressing public information and commencing repairs to the dune lines. He desired permanent legislation, but since the General Assembly would not meet again until 1957, he could ill-afford to wait.\textsuperscript{846} In the summer of 1956, Brown and the state secured $110,000 for rehabilitation work in the Cape Hatteras National Seashore to erect sand fencing to rehabilitate and stabilize existing dunes to eliminate a gap in coastal defenses.\textsuperscript{847} Active local rehabilitation committees encouraged property owners to be proactive against erosion. Joseph A. DuBois, a member of the Morehead City Chamber of Commerce, emphasized to property owners that “you are probably losing priceless acres” and called for further erosion control. Unfortunately by October, DuBois wrote that 82 miles of undeveloped coastline still remained storm damaged and worthless.\textsuperscript{848} Despite DuBois’ pessimism, Brown could report some progress in hurricane rehabilitation by the fall of 1956,
contingent on maintaining and increasing public interest and participation. Approving legislation to protect coastal areas would presumably affect and secure the necessary public participation.

All the legislation developed by the Hurricane Rehabilitation Program swiftly passed into law in 1957. Drafted largely in the fall of 1956, Brown’s legislative proposals consisted of four bills for immediate and long-range work to prevent coastal erosion, rehabilitate damaged shorelines, and minimize future hurricane damage. In a report on the legislative program to Hodges’ administrative assistant, Paul A. Johnston, Brown reiterated the broad approach to his proposals: “The Outer Banks cannot provide complete protection to the mainland but must be rehabilitated and preserved for the excellent protection they do give and for the development of the tourist industry.” His proposed pieces of legislation included a bill to prevent damage or destruction to sand dunes; another to prohibit stock and cattle from running at large along the Outer Banks; legislation to authorize creation within the Department of Conservation and Development a division of community planning; and an act to amend the state’s urban redevelopment law to take advantage of federal funding programs. All passed into law by the end of June. The latter bills shifted Brown’s work

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850 Brown encountered difficulty in early 1956 obtaining someone to help draft the proposed legislation, but completed the task in December 1956. See Harry E. Brown to Luther H. Hodges, 14 September 1956; Harry E. Brown to Edward L. Rankin, 10 October 1956, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation General,” GLHH, NCA, Box 96.
852 In May 1935, the North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation ordering the removal of all free-range livestock on the Outer Banks in Dare County by 1 February 1937 to protect and allow the native and transplanted vegetation to grow unmolested along the dunes and sandy areas to prevent and minimize erosion. See North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1935, H.B. 979, Chapter 263.
853 Annex B, “A Bill to be Entitled An Act to Prevent Damage or Destruction to Sand Dunes Along the Outer Banks of North Carolina” and Annex C, “A Bill to be Entitled An Act to Prohibit Stock and Cattle

The legislation provided solutions to some, but not all, of the economic issues exposed by the hurricanes. In late May, Dare County’s Hurricane Rehabilitation Committee held public hearings advocating erosion controls, while exposing the economic impact of major storms on the travel industry and tourism. In the county’s report the estimated intangible losses to business from the 1955 storms totaled approximately $831,000.\footnote{Dare County Storm Rehabilitation Committee, “The Need for Hurricane Protection for the Outer Banks of North Carolina, for The Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, in Public Hearing, 28 May 1957, at Manteo, N.C.,” section IV, “Effect of the 1955 Hurricanes on the Travel Industry in the Dare Beaches Area,” Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, N.C. (OBHC). The calculated figure is attributed to the loss in rental fees for beach cottages, hotel and motel rooms, restaurants, gas stations, and fishing piers, among others, who because tourists evacuated or chose not to visit on the threat of hurricanes, lost anticipated revenue.} Notably absent from the legislation Brown proposed were any bills to mitigate such losses. Nor did the General Assembly enact any legislation to assist local governments to take protective storm measures, although Griffin noted such a program “would not be economically or financially feasible at this time.”\footnote{Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 16 May 1957, folder labeled “Hurricane Rehabilitation – Legislative Proposals to be Presented to 1957 General Assembly,” GLHH, NCA, Box 206.}

Even with the passage of legislation, eastern North Carolinians did not necessarily take action. In an article in the \textit{Carteret County News-Times} on 28 October 1958, DuBois praised Hodges’ Hurricane Rehabilitation Program and how coastal residents appreciated the
governor’s interest in coastal development. Hodges responded to DuBois’ optimistic praise in a somewhat critical tone, asking how “there ought to be nothing less than a popular uprising by the tens of thousands of people along the coast . . . to save the situation down there. For decades people around you have allowed the whole coast to be denuded with cattle and horses ruining the whole country-side and now I honestly think we are in desperate terror.”

Hodges’ frustration over eastern North Carolina’s limited pursuit of economic development to save the entirety of the coast received notice. Cattle and livestock, to Hodges’ chagrin, continued to graze on the southern Outer Banks munching the vegetation vital to hold the shifting sands in place. In March 1959, he learned that Carteret County had not yet removed livestock from the Core and Shackleford Banks and the removal did not even finish until the fall of 1960. In another editorial in the Carteret County News-Times from January

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858 Luther H. Hodges to Joseph A. DuBois, 4 November 1959, folder labeled “Civil Defense Beach Erosion,” GTSP, NCA, Box 28.
859 D. G. Bell to Luther H. Hodges, 24 March 1959; Bob Simpson to Luther H. Hodges, 5 February 1960; Thomas W. Morse to Robert E. Giles, 26 February 1960; Thomas W. Morse to Robert E. Giles, 28 April 1960; Thomas W. Morse to Robert E. Giles, 27 July 1960; Thomas W. Morse to Hugh Salter, 28 November 1960; Thomas W. Morse to Robert E. Giles, 28 November 1960; Luther H. Hodges to John P. McIsaac, Jr., 28 September 1959; John T. McIsaac, Jr. to Luther H. Hodges, 24 September 1959, folder labeled “Water Resources: General Assembly Outer Banks Legislation,” GTSP, NCA, Box 120. In a personal letter to Hodges, McIsaac wrote about how grasses and vegetation was sprouting and flourishing along the Core Banks near Cape Lookout, something never witnessed before on account of the cattle grazing on the grasses. Hodges sent copies of McIsaac’s letter to several editors of coastal newspapers to publish articles about the benefit of the legislation to the preservation of the beaches. See Harry E. Brown to Luther H. Hodges, 29 September 1959; Luther H. Hodges to Editor, Daily Advance, 30 September 1959; Luther H. Hodges to Victor Meekins, 30 September 1959, folder labeled “Water Resources: General Assembly Outer Banks Legislation,” GTSP, NCA, Box 120. The General Assembly passed H.B. 674 in June 1959, specifically to provide for the removal of the remaining cattle, sheep, goats, and swine on the coastal areas of Carteret County. See North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1959, H.B. 674, Chapter 782. The North Carolina Supreme Court later declared this legislation unconstitutional in Chadwick v. Salter, 254 N.C. 389 (12 April 1961). See Harry E. Brown to Joel Fleishman, 5 March 1962, folder labeled “Water – A – C,” GTSP, NCA, Box 234.
1960, the editors linked Hodges’ criticism of the cattle to the industrial development of the coastal area:

Add to the fact that the erosion of Core Banks, helped by animals’ eating the vegetation, may cause the flooding of eastern Carolina and you can see that cattle on the outer banks have a great deal to do with industry! Nobody wants to be flooded out – especially businesses and plants that represent a large investment. . . . The tourist industry is our biggest industry – and the industry with the biggest potential. . . . Our best bet lies, at the moment, in aggressive tourist promotion.\textsuperscript{860}

The intangible losses from the hurricanes the state could not replace, nor could federal aid programs assist with all economic issues in eastern North Carolina. Hodges’ emphasis on removing livestock from the Outer Banks provides but one important example of how legislation to safeguard eastern North Carolina’s economy was only as effective as its enforcement. For eastern North Carolina’s coastal economy to reach its full potential, residents had to take charge of their own destiny.

\textit{Survival Plans, Matching Funds, and Surplus Property}

Brown’s handling of natural disaster issues enabled Griffin to oversee development of the North Carolina Operational Survival Plan. In July 1955, Congress approved funds for the FCDA to work with states and selected critical target areas to develop operational plans for survival in the event of nuclear attack.\textsuperscript{861} Upon completion, the plans would use state resources for either evacuation, shelter, reception and care of survivors, or a combination thereof to protect populations and minimize damage from enemy attack.\textsuperscript{862} The NCCD began negotiations with the FCDA for the North Carolina Survival Plan Project in May 1956 and

\textsuperscript{860} “We Heard You, Governor,” \textit{Carteret County News-Times}, 29 January 1960.
\textsuperscript{862} Yoshpe, \textit{Our Missing Shield}, 202-03.
signed an agreement for the survival plan project at the end of the month. The project would be co-directed by professors John A. Parker and James A. Webb from City and Regional Planning at the UNC-Chapel Hill. The men and their assistants were to study the state’s long coastline, military bases, population concentration, industrial development, and agricultural capacity. The project directed specific attention to Asheville, Charlotte, Durham, Fayetteville, Greensboro, High Point, Raleigh, Wilmington, Winston-Salem, and the Camp Lejeune – Cherry Point areas. Griffin supervised the project, begun on 1 June with $22,700 in federal funds. In late September, the NCCD published the Phase I project report.

The Phase I report established the framework for creation of the physical plans. Looking at North Carolina’s location in the national context, the report considered the state more as a likely reception area for refugees and evacuees than a prime area for attack. Possible areas of attention included Burlington, Fayetteville, and Wilmington, “because of their importance as centers of population or manufacturing, and/or because of their proximity

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863 Luther H. Hodges to Val Peterson, 24 May 1956, folder labeled “Hurricanes – Federal Projects – Highway Projects,” GLHH, NCA, Box 177. The FCDA formally approved the North Carolina Survival Plan Project contract on 4 June 1956. The state was the fourth in FCDA Region III to commence this work. See FCDA, Annual Report for 1956, 27.
866 NCCD, Phase One Report: North Carolina Survival Plan Project (Raleigh, N.C.: North Carolina Council of Civil Defense, September 1956); Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 26 October 1956, folder labeled “Civil Defense Bulletins General,” GLHH, NCA, Box 68. Following the FCDA program, the NCCD survival plan project unfolded in four phases: 1) Statement of the problem inventorying of data and civil defense planning, and development of the program and budget for phase two; 2) Part I is a temporary plan based on phase one, with Part II involving detailed surveys and gathering of more data to elaborate and improve the Part I plan; 3) Development of the detailed operational survival plans; and 4) Testing of the survival plans to ensure their workability. See NCCD, Phase One Report: North Carolina Survival Plan Project (Raleigh, N.C.: North Carolina Council of Defense, September 1956), ii-iii.
867 NCCD, Phase One Report, iv-viii.
to strategic or military installations. These areas received the bulk of attention by planners, with the remaining counties primarily considered as reception areas. Of these potential target areas, the study team learned that the largest cities planned only in terms of evacuation, others as reception areas, with Fayetteville considered both reception and evacuation. Disconcertingly, the study team discovered that 68 of the counties had “done little or no research or planning for civil defense purposes, and many have not appointed civil defense directors,” while all the target cities lacked shelters. Armed with this information, the Phase I team designed the interim operational survival plan with three principal components: a movement plan, structures (shelters) utilization plan, and a mass care plan.

Throughout 1957, the North Carolina Operational Survival Plan came into existence. At the State Capital in Raleigh on 9 December, FCDA and NCCD officials presented the preliminary plan to the North Carolina congressional delegation and other top state officials in government and civil defense. State senator Wilbur M. Jolly (D–Louisburg) explained that since the state lacked shelters, “our plans had to utilize distance. The plan was to

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868 NCCD, *Phase One Report*, vii. The Phase I team added these areas to the target list developed by the FCDA, who in 1956 designated the state’s first critical target area as the Greensboro–High Point area. The Phase I planners used the information in the 1953 FCDA publication *Target Areas for Civil Defense Purposes*, that listed Asheville, Charlotte, Durham, Greensboro, Raleigh, and Winston-Salem as the state’s six target areas. The FCDA reclassification of the Greensboro–High Point area as a critical target was for having met the criteria of “standard metropolitan areas having 40,000 or more industrial employees as reported in at least three consecutive issues of the ‘Bi-Monthly Summary of Labor Market Developments in Major Areas’ published by the Department of Labor.” See FCDA, *Annual Report for 1956*, 12; FCDA, *Target Areas for Civil Defense Purposes: Their Population, Principal Cities, Counties* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953), 8.


870 NCCD, *Phase One Report*, 50. The information on the individual counties (or lack thereof) is contained in Appendix A of the *Phase One Report*. In regards to fallout shelters, the survey team discovered that only Burlington, with designated shelter areas in the Western Electric and Burlington Mills plants, had any shelters. See NCCD, North Carolina Survival Plan Project, “Phase I Report: Appendix “A” – Detailed Account of Information Available for Civil Defense Survival Planning Purposes,” 3-39.

871 Press release from Governor’s Office, 4 December 1957, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Civil Defense Meeting, 9 December 1957,” GLHH, NCA, Box 176.
evacuate our densely populated areas to safer, more distant locales. . . .”

Contrasted with Griffin’s call in 1954 for Tar Heels to stay put and “duck and cover,” an evacuation plan aligned with current FCDA guidance. Jolly emphasized planners’ incorporation of a strong command and control apparatus for the NCCD headquarters to orchestrate civil defense evacuations and response during attack. This included the creation of six geographical civil defense areas in the state, each consisting of two to three state highway divisions. The areas would each have a director to coordinate civil defense activities in the counties and communities to ensure conformity with overall state plans.

Broadly speaking, this setup paralleled the NCCD’s organization put in place in 1942. As with World War II, by default the plans called for an expansion in the size of the NCCD, pending additional funds.

By 1958, the project staff completed drafting the state plan. Writing of the finalized version continued into spring until publication of the state plan and seven target county plans on 1 May. At the State Capital on 26 June, Hodges accepted the Operational Survival Plan from the NCCD on behalf of North Carolina. The governor proclaimed that the FCDA Region III considered the plans “the most complete, most practical and operational to be

873 Ibid. The use of highway divisions incorporated the existing organization of the State Highway Commission and Highway Patrol and the resources already established in the counties.
prepared by any state in the Region." After acceptance, the final phase of the survival plan project commenced with the review and adaptation of all county operational survival plans and reception care plans which concluded on 30 June 1959. All told, the project cost the federal government $244,586.

Henceforth, the North Carolina Operational Survival Plan served as the foundational blueprint for all civil defense operations. The state plan’s mission is: “To prepare for and carry out all emergency functions, other than functions for which military forces are primarily responsible, to sustain life, prevent, minimize, and repair injury and damage to lives and property in North Carolina resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack, sabotage or other hostile action, or from natural disaster.” Certain North Carolina state agencies received emergency services assignments. For example, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles assigned responsibility for the attack warning service, while the Director of Highways was tasked as the chief civil defense official for rescue services. Annexes spelled out the tasks, responsibilities, and lists of resources available for each of the emergency services. The six proposed civil defense areas came into existence to coordinate and supervise all local civil defense activities.

The summer of 1956 apparently coincided with a NCCD reemphasis on planning for nuclear attack. In July, the NCCD released a new Guide to Local Civil Defense with step-by-

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880 NCCD, North Carolina Operational Survival Plan, 3-25.
step instructions to create local civil defense organizations, with clear emphasis on the threat of nuclear war, despite a cover letter by Hodges recognizing the dual threats of enemy attack or natural disaster.\(^{881}\) At 1,140 pages in length with 27 annexes, the comprehensive state plan primarily addresses nuclear preparedness. The Operational Survival Plan, aside from the opening mission statement, does not discuss natural disasters thereafter. Development of these new civil defense plans and the assignment of natural disaster coordination to Brown collectively attempted to reorient the NCCD back to its original purposes – to protect people from enemy attack. Natural disaster responsibility, however, remained a civil defense function, even if Griffin desired otherwise.

A financial shortfall hampered the new civil defense plan upon birth. Without funding to hire directors, the civil defense areas created by the plan could not and would not become operational. The NCCD had no choice but to continue to coordinate all county and community civil defense efforts. Reception counties did not share the same burden of responsibility of the target counties, and the impetus for civil defense work for reception areas remained limited. Natural disasters certainly motivated some counties to create civil defense offices, especially to acquire federal disaster relief. Nevertheless, the planning process revealed a scarcity of county and community civil defense planning. An Operational Survival Plan and smaller county plans gave policymakers throughout the state functional, practical blueprints to build civil defense offices, but the final investment rested with local leadership.

Fortunately for the NCCD, the FCDA provided several funding options to expand the state civil defense effort. Public Law 920 authorized the administrator of the FCDA to make financial contributions to state civil defense offices on a matching funds basis, dollar for dollar. These funds could be used for emergency supplies and equipment, but not for personnel or administrative costs.\(^\text{882}\) Initially (1952 to 1955), the NCCD did not benefit from the federal aid, nor did it spend much on civil defense in general. Under E.Z. Jones, William Bailey, and then Griffin, North Carolina spent $0.048 per capita, ranking forty-fourth nationally.\(^\text{883}\) Of this money, three quarters went into communications and warning systems.\(^\text{884}\) The FCDA, from 1 January 1955 to 1 January 1959, allocated North Carolina a total of $1.2 million dollars in matching funds, with an equal amount spent by county and community civil defense programs.\(^\text{885}\) This stood as a marked increase from the $834 the state received in matching funds just for communications during FY 1954 – 1955.\(^\text{886}\) By 1960, the state spent $0.22 per capita, bringing North Carolina to just over half the national average.\(^\text{887}\)

Hurricanes provided incentives to draw on these funds. Communication and warning systems did not differentiate between nuclear war or natural disasters. An investment in one

\(^{885}\) NCCD, “Summary of Federal Aid in Funds and Property which has come to North Carolina through its Council of Civil Defense covering the period 1 January 1955 to 1 January 1959,” 25 February 1959, folder labeled “Natural Disasters,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 8.
\(^{886}\) Document titled “The State Council of Civil Defense,” folder labeled “Civil Defense Bulletins General,” GLHH, NCA, Box 68. It should be noted the FCDA’s annual reports provide financial figures that do not align with the NCCD figures. For FY 1952 to 1959, the OCDM lists North Carolina being obligated $1.3 million in federal funds. Information to explain the disparity between the NCCD figures and the FCDA/OCDM figures has not been located. See OCDM, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1959 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1960), 50.

The federal surplus property program in 1956 provided the state with a second financial source. Previously, the NCCD reached a memorandum of understanding with the General Services Administration on 7 December 1955 to make federal surplus property available to hurricane victims, but only in this special circumstance.\footnote{891}{Edward F. Griffin to Thomas H. Goodman, 6 February 1956, folder labeled “Civil Defense A – Z,” GLHH, NCA, Box 68.} In July 1956, Congress passed an amendment to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, Public Law 84-655, authorizing the disposal of surplus federal property for civil defense purposes.\footnote{892}{\textit{Surplus Property Disposal Amendment of 1956}, Public Law 84-655, \textit{U.S. Statutes at Large} 70 (1956): 493-95.} Once a state agency, county or community civil defense office filed the necessary paperwork, a practical Sears and Roebuck-type catalog of federal property could be purchased at a fraction of the original price to outfit rescue squads, auxiliary police or fire

Both the financial programs and survival plans fueled a gradual state civil defense expansion. By March 1957, Griffin could report on 30 organized active rescue squads in the state, equipped through the matching funds and surplus property programs; by January 1959, this number increased to 53.\footnote{Edward F. Griffin to Johnny Nichols, 20 March 1957, folder labeled “Civil Defense – A – Z,” GLHH, NCA, Box 176; NCCD, \textit{Progress Report, 1957 – 1959}, 16.} Growth in communications capabilities in the state is even more impressive. From 1957 to 1960, the RACES network grew from 51 counties to 67, more than double the national average.\footnote{NCCD, \textit{Progress Report, 1957 – 1959}, 13; NCCD, \textit{Progress Report, 1959 – 1961}, 11-12.} The State Highway Department used matching funds to construct a massive radio network with base stations in all highway divisions and districts with transmission towers and emergency generators at all stations. Five hundred mobile units tied into the network, which served as the backbone of the NCCD’s emergency radio network.\footnote{NCCD press release, “Civil Defense Funds Approved for Highway Commission Radio System,” 19 September 1958, folder labeled “Press Releases – 1958,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 9; NCCD, \textit{Progress Report, 1959 – 1961}, 12.} Adding to siren networks in the seven target cities, 12 other cities installed siren networks through the surplus property program. Federal matching funds enabled the NCCD to install emergency power plants in every hospital in the state sanatorium system and
emergency generator systems in hospitals in Cabarrus, Catawba, Guilford, Mecklenburg, Moore, New Hanover, Person, Randolph, Rockingham, Surry, and Wake counties. An example of just how the infusion of federal funding and civil defense training came into play occurred in western North Carolina in March 1960. Beginning in February, bitter cold temperatures and almost continuous snow blanketed the western counties. From February to March, Asheville recorded 37.4 inches of snow; Banner Elk 74.5 inches, and Charlotte received 22.6 inches. The mountain community of Boone received an incredible 83 inches of snow during this period. While young children enjoyed time off from school, residents in Alleghany, Ashe, Surry, Watauga, and Wilkes counties increasingly found themselves trapped in their homes. Food, fuel, and daily necessities ran dangerously low, but the NCCD came to the rescue. On 9 March, RACES and Civil Air Patrol radio operators began round-the-clock operations to coordinate relief. The American Red Cross, NCCD, National Guard, and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division all integrated into the state civil defense plans to plow through snow or airdrop deliveries of food, coal, and fuel oil to isolated homes and farms. Forsyth County sent rescue squads to deliver aid, civil defense medical teams treated health emergencies, and numerous civil defense personnel from across the state joined together to manage the emergency. Although the state and Red Cross bore the bulk of the financial burdens, the storm did not claim a single life.

From 1956 to 1960, state civil defense expanded in personnel and programs. Federal financial opportunities helped, since to qualify for the funding opportunities, a county or community had to appoint a civil defense director and have a functioning civil defense office. As the financial figures increased, so did the number of civil defense offices in the state. Including the development of county survival plans, the number of counties with civil defense directors climbed from 63 in 1956 to 99 by January 1961, with 266 directors in communities across the state. Half the state’s counties published operational survival plans. The NCCD headquarters by June 1960 totaled 14 employees, six full-time; state-wide, 20,071 state and local officials either worked full-time or had an active civil defense assignment. All told, civil defense in North Carolina accounted for over $10 million in federal funds used to rebuild from natural disasters to plan for nuclear attack. It is doubtful that civil defense’s reach would have grown so much from 1955 to 1960 had the federal funding not materialized.

Holifield Hearings and the Return of Shelters

For the first half of 1956, Congress conducted the most comprehensive study of civil defense ever recorded which lead to considerable changes in policy for the remainder of the decade. Holifield presided over these hearings with a critical eye directed at Peterson and the administration’s handling of civil defense. The fallout danger exposed by the Bravo test had


planted the seeds of Holifield’s initial interest. In June 1955, he soundly criticized Eisenhower for having “woefully failed the American people” with civil defense. Holifield thereafter proposed new legislation calling for greater federal responsibility and financial burden for civil defense.\textsuperscript{905} The House Committee on Government Operations ordered a subcommittee chaired by Holifield to hold hearings on proposed legislation, and for the remainder of 1955 the subcommittee staff investigated civil defense nationwide.\textsuperscript{906}

The hearings encompassed the whole of America’s Cold War civil defense effort. Holifield’s subcommittee weighed Peterson’s evacuation policy against a system of protective shelters. Opening the hearings on 31 January, Holifield expressed the conviction of the subcommittee members that “effective civil-defense measures can be taken if the need for them is sufficiently understood by the public, if . . . financially supported by the Congress and . . . courageously administered by the Executive.”\textsuperscript{907} He listed public apathy, congressional indifference, and bureaucratic inertia as the three great obstacles to civil defense success.\textsuperscript{908} Over the next four months the subcommittee searched for answers to overcome these obstacles. Two hundred eleven witnesses testified in eight cities compiling 3,145 pages of testimony, from an extensive study of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 to the latest developments in nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{909}

\textsuperscript{906} Blanchard, “Evolution of Programs and Policies,” 147.
\textsuperscript{908} Ibid., 1-2.
Holifield pressed Peterson during his testimony about the FCDA’s evacuation policy. In his April testimony, Peterson reiterated points made in the Kefauver hearings. He admitted that civil defense remained inadequate, but chose to emphasize the FCDA’s accomplishments and optimistically see a “glass half full.”\textsuperscript{910} Holifield, however, wanted to learn more about what actions Peterson and the FCDA took in regards to shelters and survival studies, suggesting that more studies were merely a “further delay” with respect to a shelter program.\textsuperscript{911} Peterson argued that any effective strategy would “depend upon a balanced application of evacuation and shelter. Space and shielding are our only weapons in civil defense.”\textsuperscript{912} Although all present agreed on the matter, Holifield and the subcommittee considered Peterson’s approach askew. Holifield even asked Peterson if his balance in percentages was “95 percent evacuation and 5 percent shelter?”\textsuperscript{913} Without any effort on behalf of shelters, the promulgation and development of evacuation plans left citizens to flee into open areas with no protection from fallout or care and reception facilities.\textsuperscript{914} Peterson’s testimony did little to allay the concerns of Holifield and seemed to further expose the dangerous lack of viable FCDA planning for nuclear war.

In the summary report for the hearings, the nation’s civil defense program received failing grades. Addressing the issues of cost, the report highlighted the paltry appropriations for civil defense, but admitted “In view of the disparate and diffused civil defense planning activities sponsored by FCDA, there is reason to believe that some of the meager funds

\textsuperscript{911} Ibid., 1168.  
\textsuperscript{912} Ibid., 1185.  
\textsuperscript{913} Ibid., 1345.  
\textsuperscript{914} Ibid., 1340-41.
available are being wasted.”\textsuperscript{915} The subcommittee eviscerated Peterson’s advocacy of evacuation, concluding that in the thermonuclear era it becomes “readily apparent how weak and ineffective, and indeed dangerously shortsighted, is the FCDA’s reliance on evacuation as a technique for minimizing casualties in the event of nuclear attack.”\textsuperscript{916} As for the survival plan project, one witness deemed the national project a “boondoggle” and the subcommittee concluded that development of said plans before a decision on a national shelter program “is dangerous and doomed to failure.”\textsuperscript{917} In short, local evacuation plans and backyard fallout shelters represented “an inexpensive budgetary substitute for an effective civil defense.”\textsuperscript{918}

The report recommended a redrafting of federal civil defense legislation vesting basic responsibility with the federal government while creating a permanent Department of Civil Defense between a merger of the FCDA and the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM).\textsuperscript{919}

This new cabinet-level department could then formulate a master plan for civil defense with an integral, federally-funded national shelter network to protect against blast, heat, and radiation. State and local civil defense organizations should receive equipment, supplies, and

\textsuperscript{916} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{917} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{918} Ibid., 2.
funds for administration, training, and stockpiles of civil defense supplies from the
Department of Civil Defense.920

Holifield and the subcommittee’s findings brought changes to FCDA policy. When
Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, ODM director, met with Eisenhower in March, they agreed on the
president’s suggestion to study the possibility of making civil defense a cabinet position “in
order to create more public interest in these activities.”921 In June, the National Security
Council (NSC) issued NSC 5606, a report on continental defense which called for a costly
shelter program. The FCDA, however, lacked the plans and funds for such an undertaking.922
A month later, Eisenhower wrote to Peterson with his thoughts on civil defense.
Acknowledging rapid advances in nuclear weapons and missile technology, the president
concluded that “our whole civil defense effort needs both strengthening and modernizing.”
He asked Peterson to participate in cabinet meetings, and requested “realistic
recommendations” for relocation, evacuation, sheltering, and revised civil defense
legislation.923

At the end of summer, Peterson presented the president and NSC with a shelter
program. As reported in the new NSC 5609, FCDA planning regarding shelters through FY
1959 anticipated a five-year program with full federal financing of shelter construction for
continuity of government programs, schools and hospitals, and financing of 90 percent of

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920 House Committee on Government Operations, Civil Defense for National Survival, 84th Cong., 2d sess.,
921 Memorandum of conference with the President, 30 March 1956, folder labeled “Mar ’56 Goodpaster,”
Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, 1953 – 61 (Ann Whitman File) (DDEP-AWF), DDE Diary
Series, DDEL, Box 13.
922 Krugler, This is Only a Test, 136; discussion at the 288th Meeting of the National Security Council,
Thursday, 15 June 1956, folder labeled “288th Meetings of NSC June 15, 1954,” DDEP-AWF, NSC Series,
DDEL, Box 7.
923 White House press release of letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Val Peterson, 17 July 1956, folder
labeled “Cabinet Meeting of 9 January 1957 (1),” DDEP-AWF, Cabinet Series, DDEL, Box 8.

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costs for mass public shelters. Industrial shelters would be funded with a 50-50 matching funds effort to “provide shelter for the greatest possible number of people threatened by blast and fallout.” NSC 5609 noted that “it appears improbable that an adequate level of evacuation capability on the part of the Nation’s population centers will be achieved over the next three years.” The report further warned that “the people may falsely interpret the launching of a comprehensive shelter program as meaning that the Federal Government has abandoned the evacuation concept.” It expected that public acceptance “can be achieved for the necessity of evacuation, in proper balance with a shelter program.”

The cost of the FCDA shelter program for 85 – 100 million people totaled $13 billion over FY 1957 to FY 1958. After Peterson’s presentation of the program, Eisenhower thought it easy to spend copious sums on shelters, but professed that he considered the problem of civil defense and the limits of nuclear war as “virtually unsolvable.”

Despite the president’s pessimism, Peterson pressed ahead with the shelter program proposal. Eisenhower won reelection in November and Holifield, although indicating a desire to reintroduce civil defense legislation, chose to withhold any bills during the lame-duck session. On 21 December, Peterson submitted a new FCDA legislative program to the administration. A national shelter program was the main initiative, designed to protect 50 million Americans from blast and fallout at a cost of $32.4 billion, with $28.6 billion directly

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925 NSC 5609, 14a.
926 NSC 5609, 15.
927 Discussion at the 293rd and 294th Meetings of the National Security Council, Thursday, 16 August, and Friday 17 August 1956, folder labeled “293rd and 294th Meetings of NSC August 16 & 17, 1956,” DDEP-AWF, NSC Series, DDEL, Box 8.
928 Dyke, Mr. Atomic Energy, 193.
billed to the federal government. Peterson himself emphasized “that the evacuation concept is not being abandoned,” but “in [the] FCDA’s judgment the primary civilian defense of the population against nuclear attack was to be found in a greatly enlarged shelter program.”

Other aspects of the legislative program included increased federal support and financial assistance for state and local civil defense programs, and making civil defense the joint responsibility of the federal and state governments. Eisenhower, occupied with his reelection, the Hungarian Revolution, and the Suez Crisis in the fall of 1956, did not directly respond to Peterson’s proposal. Rather, on 9 January 1957, the cabinet approved Peterson’s recommendations for the FCDA. The fate of the proposed shelter program remained to be determined.

Entering 1957, Holifield at last attempted to pass legislation to change the direction of the nation’s civil defense effort. At the commencement of the 85th Congress, he introduced H.R. 2125 to create a Department of Civil Defense and implement the subcommittee recommendations. The bill included cabinet level status for civil defense, vesting responsibility primarily with the federal government, increased funding for the states and subdivisions, and a national civil defense plan with a shelter network. Hearings for Holifield’s bill began in February and the provision for a national shelter program attracted considerable attention. Testimony from the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory calculated the cost of shelters of varying degrees of protection for the entire population at

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930 Discussion at the 306th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 20 December 1956, folder labeled “306th Meetings of NSC December 20, 1956,” DDEP-AWF, NSC Series, DDEL, Box 8.
931 Ibid.
$15.6 to $16 billion, with fully equipped shelters for all Americans totaling $20 billion.\textsuperscript{934}

Despite building considerable public support for the legislation, the White House, represented by the Bureau of the Budget, opposed the bill and the shelter proposal.\textsuperscript{935} With lukewarm support from the Department of Defense and competing legislation from the White House, Holifield’s bill never reached the floor for a vote.\textsuperscript{936}

Holifield’s hearings on civil defense and criticism of the FCDA contributed to the end of the Peterson era. For the FY 1958 appropriations hearings, the FCDA requested $130 million. During FY 1957, the FCDA had received $93.5 million, the highest total under the Eisenhower administration, and Peterson optimistically expected a continuation of the upward trend.\textsuperscript{937} From the start of the hearings on the FCDA budget request, the House appropriations committee slashed the $130 million to $39.3 million, noting the policy differences of Holifield’s shelter approach versus Peterson’s evacuation planning. Even Holifield supported the House cuts, and the Senate agreed to an FCDA budget for FY 1958 of $39.3 million, the smallest federal appropriation for civil defense yet.\textsuperscript{938} In a report on civil defense legislation, a House Military Operations subcommittee concluded that “the FCDA budget appropriated for fiscal year 1958 represents a vote of no confidence in the program of the FCDA.”\textsuperscript{939} Peterson, having lost Congressional support, submitted his letter of resignation to Eisenhower on 31 May 1957, who accepted it two weeks later before naming

\textsuperscript{934} Ibid., 30-40. \\
\textsuperscript{936} Blanchard, “Evolution of Programs and Policies,” 198-99. \\
\textsuperscript{937} Blanchard, “Evolution of Programs and Policies,” 165. \\
Peterson as his ambassador to Denmark.\textsuperscript{940} Former Iowa Governor Leo A. Hoegh replaced him as FCDA administrator on 19 July.\textsuperscript{941}

\textit{The Gaither Report, Fallout Shelters, and Reorganization}

Hoegh became the third governor to administer the FCDA. A former attorney general and infantry officer in World War II, Hoegh first met the president in November 1944 when he briefed then-General Eisenhower on his division’s upcoming combat operation.\textsuperscript{942} Hoegh, recently defeated in his reelection bid for governor, opted to take the administrator’s position seemingly for financial reasons. Eisenhower let Hoegh know that active defense, together with civil defense, provided the military deterrence needed for the nation, and gave him a seat in cabinet and National Security Council meetings.\textsuperscript{943} Replacing Peterson in the summer of 1957, Hoegh entered civil defense with several unfinished matters to attend to, among them deciding on a national shelter program, reorganizing the federal civil defense effort, and amending Public Law 920.

Shelters topped Hoegh’s agenda. Peterson’s request for $32 billion led to discussion and analysis with the National Security Council in the winter of 1957. By March, the NSC’s planning board released NSC 5709, a study of the FCDA’s proposed eight-year shelter project to protect the entire population from fallout and blast effects. After examining the available data, the board admitted being “unable at this time to make a recommendation which would enable the Council and the President to act upon any shelter proposal on the

\textsuperscript{942} The Reminiscences of Leo Arthur Hoegh, 11 October 1967, 2-3, Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection, Eisenhower Administration Program, DDEL.
\textsuperscript{943} Leo Arthur Hoegh, interview by Thomas Soapes, tape recording, 19 March 1976, DDEL, 21-23.
Issues troubling the board included the balance of active and passive defense measures, the protective potential of a shelter program, civilian casualties, long-term fallout effects, economic impacts of the shelter program, and the support of the American people. The board recommended additional study of various questions by multiple committees.

At the 318th meeting of the NSC on 4 April, the council discussed NSC 5709. During the talks, ODM director Gordon Gray commented that the shelter program represented part of the nation’s overall non-military defense and he advocated a “forthright policy with respect to shelter” since the present policy wavered between shelter and evacuation. Gray agreed to the recommendation in NSC 5709 for the ODM’s Science Advisory Committee to study the shelter issue. Regarding shelter costs, Peterson had strongly supported dual-use shelters, serving as underground parking garages until needed. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles preferred taking the money for shelters and adding it to the Defense Department’s budget with a focus on active deterrence. Eisenhower professed support for Dulles’s view, but he considered shelters a serious matter and agreed that the studies recommended in NSC 5709 “should be undertaken as a matter of urgency.” Of the four studies to be undertaken, historian David L. Snead notes the report of the Science Advisory Committee of the ODM

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945 NSC 5709, 2-5.


947 Discussion at the 318th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 4 April 1957, folder labeled “318th Meetings of NSC April 4, 1957,” DDEP-AWF, NSC Series, DDEL, Box 8.
“proved the most important,” incorporating the findings of the other three studies into its conclusions.\textsuperscript{948}

In what became known as the Gaither Committee, from May to November 1957 the Science Advisory Committee studied active and passive defense measures. Eisenhower tapped H. Rowan Gaither, Jr. to chair a newly created Security Resources Panel. Gaither, chairman of the RAND Corporation’s board of trustees and president of the Ford Foundation, guided the study until stepping down for health reasons in September.\textsuperscript{949} Four subcommittees scrutinized active defense, passive defense, economic costs and the Soviet economic threat, qualitative assistance and evaluation of active and passive defenses. The passive defense subcommittee studied fallout shelter feasibility.\textsuperscript{950} Subcommittee members examined eight different shelter programs, ranging in cost from $5.1 billion to $70 billion, either as fallout shelters or as a combination of blast and fallout shelters to reduce casualties.\textsuperscript{951} Paul Nitze, author of NSC 68, together with Colonel George Lincoln wrote the final committee report presented to Eisenhower and the NSC on 7 November.\textsuperscript{952}

The report, \textit{Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age}, painted an ominous picture of the Soviet threat. In the event of a nuclear attack, the committee concluded that the nation’s active and passive defense programs, both present and planned, would not give adequate assurance of protection to the civilian population.\textsuperscript{953} In the area of military force,
the report advocated reducing the vulnerability of Strategic Air Command bomber and
missile bases, accelerated development and introduction of intermediate range and
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and improved ability for American forces to wage limited
warfare operations, all at an estimated cost of $19 billion. To reduce the vulnerability of
the civilian population, the committee recommended a nationwide fallout shelter program as
“the only feasible protection for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the
hazards of radiation.” Fallout shelters provided the best and most economical means of civil
defense. The committee calculated the fallout shelter program as costing around $25
billion to save potentially 50 million American lives in the event of nuclear war. In
summarizing the advocacy of shelters, the committee said:

> Of itself, a shelter program would, in the Panel’s opinion, forcibly augment our
deterrent power in two ways: first, by discouraging the enemy from attempting an
attack on what might otherwise seem to him a temptingly unprepared target; second
by re-inforcing his belief in our readiness to use, if necessary, our strategic retaliatory
power.

> Further, a shelter program might symbolize to the nation the urgency of the threat,
and would demonstrate to the world our appraisal of the situation and our willingness
to cope with it in strength. It would symbolize our will to survive, and our
understanding of our responsibilities in a nuclear age.

Accompanying the shelter program, the report urged reevaluation of the organizational
structure of the FCDA, ODM, Department of Defense, and state and local governments for

1976, the report was declassified and published. See also U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Defense
Production, Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (The “Gaither Report” of 1957), 94th Cong., 2d
sess., 1976.

954 Deterrence and Survival, 6-7, 11.
955 Deterrence and Survival, 8.
956 Deterrence and Survival, 20.
957 Deterrence and Survival, 22. Emphasis in original.
civil defense. The entire program of active and passive defense enhancement would cost $4.8 to $11.9 billion annually for the next five years.

Weeks prior to the delivery of the Gaither report to Eisenhower, the Soviet Union raised the stakes in the Cold War. On 21 August, a Soviet R-7 missile was successfully launched from Baikonur, Kazakhstan and reached its target area in Kamchatka at the edge of the Pacific Ocean. Although the dummy warhead broke up on reentry, the Soviets could claim the first successful launch of an ICBM. American officials greeted the Soviet announcement of its successful test on 26 August with bated skepticism, but neither panic nor disbelief. Throughout September, Eisenhower found himself embroiled in the civil rights movement, culminating in the integration crisis at Little Rock Central High School. After ordering elements of the 101st Airborne Division to protect African-American students and addressing the nation, the crisis began to subside. But on the heels of Little Rock, the Soviets upped the ante on 4 October by launching the first artificial earth satellite, the 184-pound Prostreishy Sputnik (“simple satellite”). Little more than an orbiting radio transmitter, the highly-polished aluminum orb sent out a steady stream of beeps as it orbited the earth.

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958 Deterrence and Survival, 10.
959 Deterrence and Survival, 12.
962 Newton, Eisenhower, 247-53.
every 96 minutes. But while the White House treated the news of Sputnik casually and without concern, the media and general public expressed distress tinged with fear.

In terms of the military and civil defense importance of Sputnik, its impact far outweighed the object. Hodges in his remarks at the survival plan briefing in December summed Sputnik up perfectly: “The satellite itself is relatively unimportant; but the instrument, the device used to launch the satellite, proves conclusively that the Soviet Union has the means to produce the intercontinental ballistic missile.” With the ICBM as reality, warning times for enemy attack plummeted from hours to mere minutes. Even before America could launch its own satellite, the Soviet Union placed a second satellite, Sputnik 2, into orbit on 3 November. With a mass of 1,118 pounds and carrying the first live animal in space, a female mutt named Laika, the rocket that carried the satellite into orbit could just have easily carried a nuclear warhead. The same day Eisenhower received the Gaither report, he gave a televised address from the Oval Office to assuage fears of the success of Sputnik and elaborate on the steps he would take to strengthen the nation’s missile development. The potential national fallout program came into focus amidst this ominous and uncertain environment.

Despite public fear of Soviet technological superiority, of a “missile gap” or American impotence, Eisenhower carefully deliberated both the impact of Sputnik and the Gaither report. As for the matter of shelters, old opinions died hard. During the presentation of the report on 7 November, Eisenhower worried about the reaction of America building a shelter network while her allies could not. Secretary of State Dulles responded that with an American fallout shelter network “we could surely write off all of our European Allies.”

Privately, in a conversation with Dulles in December, the president expressed his opposition to spending billions of dollars on shelters.

On 16 January 1958, Hoegh presented the FCDA position as being in concurrence with the recommendations on the shelter program. He emphatically argued that fallout shelters would add to the nation’s deterrent capability. The shelters, Hoegh explained, might save 50 million people with the benefits of strengthened morale and increased confidence in national leadership. The ODM also gave general agreement to the FCDA’s position, but director Gray personally refrained from recommending the program pending additional information. After much discussion, Gray recommended “adoption of the concept of shelter,” but not immediate investment in a national shelter program. Except for Hoegh and the FCDA, none of the other NSC members supported a national fallout shelter program (much less any shelter program). After a lengthy and intense discussion, the NSC rejected the Gaither report’s shelter recommendations. The council did agree on modifying existing civil defense policy to incorporate the concept of fallout shelters and created an interdepartmental

968 Discussion at the 343rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 7 November 1957, folder labeled “343rd Meetings of NSC November 7, 1957,” DDEP-AWF, NSC Series, DDEL, Box 9.
committee for additional study into shelters, public information, and other passive defense methods.\textsuperscript{970} In the end, Eisenhower deemed the report “useful” overall, and he would implement aspects of all of the recommendations in the report, sans the shelter program.\textsuperscript{971}

In March, interdepartmental committee members finished their report and the NSC debated fallout shelters again. This report, NSC 5807, “Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter,” recommended funding for research and development of shelter designs to include field testing with nuclear weapons, construction of various prototype shelters, surveys and pilot studies of existing or potential shelter, a public information campaign, and shelter construction in federal and military buildings. These measures “could provide the Federal leadership an example necessary to stimulate State and local governments and the private economy to take necessary shelter measures.”\textsuperscript{972} The cost of these recommendations totaled $448.9 million from FY 1959 to FY 1961.\textsuperscript{973}

In the 360th meeting of the NSC on 27 March 1958, Hoegh briefed the council on NSC 5807. Reaction to the new report was more favorable than the Gaither report. Eisenhower raised a point about the cost of citizens building fallout shelters, and the public’s reaction if only the rich could afford them. While in favor of private shelters, Eisenhower confessed being “baffled by the problem of working out a scheme that offered hope of real success.” The NSC decided to support the provision of research and development, a limited program of prototype shelter construction, shelter surveys, public education, and a study into

\textsuperscript{970} Discussion at the 351st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 16 January 1958, folder labeled “351st Meetings of NSC January 16, 1958,” DDEP-AWF, NSC Series, DDEL, Box 9; Snead, \textit{Gaither Committee}, 152-53.


\textsuperscript{972} “Measures to Carry out the Concept of Shelter (NSC 5807),” 14 March 1958, 12, folder labeled “Mobilization (12),” White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948 – 61, Disaster File, DDEL, Box 36.

\textsuperscript{973} NSC 5807, 11.
promoting shelter construction without extensive federal financial aid, all totaling $29 million.\textsuperscript{974} Although Eisenhower and the NSC excoriated a national fallout shelter program, at least a subdued variant of it won administration approval.

Since Peterson’s grand shelter proposal in December 1956, three civil defense actions had gestated in the nation’s capital. These were a national shelter program, a legislative effort to amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, and a reorganization of the federal civil defense program. From April to October 1958, Eisenhower, Hoegh, and Congress delivered on all three areas. Following the decision in March, Hoegh and the FCDA edited and molded the NSC decision into what became known as the National Shelter Policy. On 30 April, Holifield convened hearings on technical data on nuclear tests of shelter designs in late 1957. Hoegh testified before the Holifield subcommittee on 7 May and revealed the new National Shelter Policy approved by Eisenhower. Five parts comprised the new national policy:

1. Expansion of public information and education programs to acquaint citizens with the threat of fallout and protection against it.
2. Initiation of a survey of existing structures on a sampling basis to gather data on their capabilities for protection against fallout.
3. Accelerated research into incorporating shelters most economically and effectively into new and existing buildings, including homes and private and governmental buildings.
4. Construction of a limited number of prototype shelters in underground parking garages, subways, schools, homes, and other buildings for testing and demonstration and “practical peacetime uses.”
5. Incorporation of fallout shelters in new Federal buildings as an example to state and local governments to follow.

Hoegh concluded the plan by stating “There will be no massive federally financed shelter construction program.”\textsuperscript{975} He and the administration believed this policy would stimulate the

\textsuperscript{974} Discussion at the 360th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 27 March 1958, folder labeled “360th Meetings of NSC March 27, 1958,” DDEP-AWF, NSC Series, DDEL, Box 10; “Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter (NSC 5807/1),” 2 April 1958, folder labeled “Mobilization (13),” White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948 – 61, Disaster File, DDEL, Box 36. During the NSC meeting of 27 March 1958, Eisenhower first received word of Nikita Khrushchev’s selection as the next Soviet premier.
spirit of self-help among governments and individual Americans to build fallout shelters. Holifield bitterly responded after Hoegh’s testimony that “You are not going to get a shelter program for the people in this way by advising them to build their own shelters. . . . It has got to be done not only with Federal leadership and guidance, but with Federal funding. . . .” Despite Holifield’s rancor, the fallout shelter policy held for the remainder of Eisenhower’s presidency.

Eisenhower and Hoegh next moved to reorganize the FCDA and ODM under one roof. On 24 April, Eisenhower transmitted to Congress his Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 that transferred to the president the functions of the FCDA and ODM and consolidated them into a new Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization within the Executive Office of the President. The last element of the plan transferred the membership of the ODM director on the NSC to the director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. The 1956 Holifield hearings previously exposed some of the redundancy in ODM and FCDA operations and Eisenhower’s plan built off this information. The new organization would direct and coordinate civil defense and defense mobilization activities for the federal government.

Both the Senate and House convened committees to analyze Eisenhower’s plan, scheduled to take effect on 1 July unless either legislative body rejected it by a majority vote.

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976 Ibid., 396-97.
977 Ibid., 403.
Reorganization Plan No. 1 neither created new civil defense functions nor increased federal responsibility for the same. In testimony before the 1958 Holifield subcommittee hearings, Hoegh and Gray explained the problems of coordination and conflicting responsibilities and together urged adoption of the plan. Despite reservations by Holifield and his subcommittee, the House recommended approval. In the Senate, Charles E. Potter (R–MI) filed a resolution for disapproval on 25 April. Senate subcommittee hearings commenced on 9 June with Hoegh and Gray reiterating their House testimony. A Senate Committee on Government Operations executive session on 17 June disapproved of Potters’ resolution and approved the plan, with “the hope this will raise the civil defense program to the stature in Government it deserves.” With both chambers in agreement, Reorganization Plan No. 1 took effect on 1 July. Concurrently, Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10773, delegating to the director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization all functions transferred to the president under the Reorganization Plan. Hoegh received nomination and approval to be the director of the new office. On 26 August, Public Law 85-763 changed the office’s name to the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM).

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The effort to amend the federal civil defense legislation commenced in February 1957. As the Holifield hearings discussed H.R. 2125, on 8 February the FCDA transmitted its own proposed amendments in contrast to Holifield’s bill to amend the 1950 Federal Civil Defense Act. Ten days later, Congressman Carl T. Durham (D–NC), chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, introduced this legislation in two bills, H.R. 4910 and H.R. 4911. Bill 4910 would dramatically expand federal civil defense activities and jointly vested responsibility for civil defense with the states and federal government. The remainder of the proposed legislative amendments included increases in federal assistance to state and local civil defense programs for civil defense personnel and administrative expenses. This legislation intended to modify the matching funds program and enable states and local communities to build the communication and command and control centers necessary to operate in event of attack. Proposed bill 4911 amended legislation to authorize greater appropriations to defray the expenses of students attending federal civil defense training schools. After holding hearings on the two bills in March and April, Durham and his House subcommittee agreed to consolidate and amend the legislation into a new bill, H.R. 7576.

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H.R. 7576 would become the basis for Public Law 85-606. As reported by Durham, the bill would amend Public Law 81-920 “to permit . . . the development of greater civil-defense operational capability at State and local levels without resorting to extensive federalization of the civil–defense activity.” 991 The revised, consolidated bill came with an estimated cost of $18.9 million with the potential for increased civil defense capability at the state and local levels. 992 During a full hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, congressmen spoke well of the FCDA’s response to natural disasters and supported the bill for increasing state capabilities. 993 With changes to retain the existing 50-50 basis for matching funds, the committee approved H.R. 7576 with a unanimous vote and the full House passed the bill on 15 July 1957. 994

The Senate Committee on Armed Services held hearings on 10 July 1958 to consider the House bill. During the public hearings, the committee questioned Hoegh about federal contributions for personnel and administrative costs, but overall supported the bill’s language. 995 During the executive session hearings, committee members scrutinized the federal contributions for personnel and administrative costs and almost eliminated them. The ensuing discussion referenced the immense destruction World War II bombing inflicted on the cities of Bremen and Hamburg and the nagging need to do something at the federal level

992 Ibid., 2638.

Unfortunately, while Public Law 85-606 dovetailed perfectly with the OCDM program and plans, the legislation took effect without any Congressional appropriation.\footnote{Leo A. Hoegh to Luther H. Hodges, 8 December 1958, folder labeled “Civil Defense – General, A – Z,” GLHH, NCA, Box 361.} In March 1959, the OCDM appropriation request for FY 1960 totaled approximately $75 million, including $32 million for the provisions in Public Law 85-606. An intense budgetary debate ensued between the House and Senate over the appropriation. For FY 1960, the OCDM received only $44.2 million from Congress, with basically all of the Public Law 85-
606 appropriation excised, much to the disgust of numerous senators, Eisenhower, and civil defense personnel nationwide. Hoegh and the OCDM did not give up their fight for funding and their FY 1961 budget request for $76.4 million included $12 million for the personnel and administration costs. Again, the House removed this funding while the Senate recommended its inclusion. The Senate Committee on Appropriations echoed Eisenhower’s words during the FY 1960 fight, about how funding for personnel and administration “is the heart of the civil defense organization and will materially increase the effectiveness of the entire program.” After a conference compromise, the final FY 1961 OCDM budget included $6 million to implement Public Law 85-606, with the money first made available on 1 January 1961. The NCCD received $113,000 from this appropriation and intended to use the funds to expand the state headquarters and finally staff the new area offices.

All the reorganization actions initiated under Peterson and completed under Hoegh were intended to strengthen the civil defense effort nationwide. When examined through the lens of politics, however, the changes did not prompt substantial improvements. The National Shelter Policy promulgated by Hoegh and the White House amounted to nothing more than a pilot program that could little mitigate the effects of an actual enemy attack. Perhaps most fitting in this regard is Hoegh’s National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization.

1002 Senate Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1961, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, S. Rep. 1611, 2; Cong. Rec., 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, 109, pt. 13: 17237. Eisenhower, in his letter to the President of the Senate dated 25 August 1959, urged the appropriation of $12 million to match funds for personnel and administrative costs. The funds, in Eisenhower’s words, “are required to strengthen civil defense at the State and local levels, the very heart of civil defense, and to give tangible evidence of Federal leadership in encouraging State and local governments to prepare the defense for the people. These funds will implement Public Law 85-606.”
Completed in the spring of 1958 and released to the public in October, the plan established nonmilitary courses of action and defined the roles of government and citizens in deterring aggression to survive, recover, and win a nuclear war. Hoegh and the OCDM considered the plan, together with its 41 annexes, their foremost accomplishment for FY 1959. But with the excision of funds for shelter research or Public Law 85-606, the national plan at best represented a vision, and at worst dry reading material for disheartened civil defense volunteers.

The blame for plans without funding cannot be laid solely on the steps of Congress. Eisenhower’s overarching concern focused on defending the nation while maintaining a balanced budget. His “New Look” policy relying on nuclear weapons for massive retaliation intended to restrain defense costs and avoid an unbalanced budget with defense overriding domestic economic and social development. A massive federal civil defense program and an expensive shelter program did not conform to the New Look. Such an investment threatened to undermine the nation’s nuclear deterrent, unnecessarily inflate government spending, and increase tensions with America’s allies. New plans and making civil defense a “joint” responsibility between states and the federal government were attempts to counter domestic critics of Eisenhower’s civil defense program. The president therefore

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chose to maintain a federal civil defense program long on symbolism and short on protection in the event of nuclear attack.

For North Carolina and other states, the federal civil defense changes and limited funding left officials in limbo. State and county survival plans were all designed around the creation and staffing of area civil defense offices. Funding for these positions required federal funds authorized under Public Law 85-606. But without this Congressional appropriation, the NCCD could neither fully implement its new plans, nor expand its operations to assist the new county and local civil defense offices. Despite awareness of the threat posed by fallout, the state could only urge the construction of fallout shelters and distribute federal publications on home shelters. From 1956 to 1958 the federal civil defense effort reorganized and reoriented itself, but still remained unable to address the problems it faced during the first half of the decade. A lack of funding and executive support, argue historians Harry B. Yoshpe and B. Wayne Blanchard, remained two of the primary reasons for this continuous discrepancy. 

Public Law 85-606 became the lone bright spot. Once funded, the law would greatly augment the state’s disaster capabilities.

**NCCD Reactions to Federal Civil Defense Changes**

For the remainder of the decade, the NCCD did not experience major changes like the national civil defense program. Rather, the state civil defense effort implemented some federal initiatives while delaying others. As noted earlier, the NCCD continued a slow growth in civil defense size, operational capability, and disaster response. Federal funding initiatives benefitted the NCCD but warranted new legislation to take full advantage of Public Law 85-606. Furthermore, the matter of government operation in emergencies

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remained unresolved as hurricanes continued to adversely impact the state. Federal changes to civil defense improved the NCCD’s natural disaster response, but also altered the procedures for requesting federal disaster relief.

State officials responded to the national civil defense changes by amending or drafting new legislation. The General Assembly amended the 1951 North Carolina Civil Defense Act, eliminating the rarely assembled State Council of Civil Defense and replacing it with a Civil Defense Advisory Council composed of the chiefs of emergency services listed in the state Operational Survival Plan. The bill also changed the name from State Council of Civil Defense to the North Carolina Civil Defense Agency. Next, the assembly amended the state general statutes to permit all state civil defense offices to participate in the merit system council to qualify for federal funds under Public Law 85-606. The bill would provide a powerful financial incentive for counties and cities to hire full-time civil defense employees and move from a volunteer to a more professional effort.

Three additional bills addressed the function of state government in the aftermath of nuclear attack. Continuity of government is defined as the specific program(s) designed to assure the preservation and effective operation of government in the event of attack or disaster. Focus on post-attack government operation originated with the beginning of the

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1011 North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1959, S.B. 88, Chapter 337.
Cold War civil defense effort, but Peterson and the FCDA did not initiate emphasis on continuity of government legislation until 1956.\textsuperscript{1014} Griffin drafted basic plans for North Carolina’s government continuity in October 1957, just after Sputnik’s launch, but the plans remained only guidance for state and local governments.\textsuperscript{1015} By April 1959, the state assembly passed three bills to codify an act to provide for continuity of local government in emergencies and to authorize the appointment by the governor of acting officers to fill vacancies (in the context of emergency).\textsuperscript{1016} The Emergency Interim Local Government Succession Act passed in April ensured continuity of local government by allowing for succession of appointed officials, and it authorized enactment of resolutions and ordinances relating thereto.\textsuperscript{1017} All the legislation aligned the NCCD with either the new survival plans or federal civil defense initiatives. One large issue remained – the matter of hurricane rehabilitation and natural disaster relief.

Wind and water continued to be the NCCD’s two biggest adversaries in the final years of the decade. In early February 1957, areas just west of Asheville suffered flooding, remnants of severe rains that had inundated parts of Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Thankfully, the flooding did not inflict any major damages in western North Carolina. The Red Cross administered aid to the affected families and Griffin recommended against


\textsuperscript{1015} Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 11 October 1957; open letter from Edward F. Griffin, 10 October 1957; NCCD, “Planning for Continuity of Government in Emergency (Basic Outline),” October 1957; Leo A. Hoegh to Luther H. Hodges, 2 October 1957; Luther H. Hodges to Leo A. Hoegh, 14 October 1957; Edward F. Griffin to Edward L. Rankin, 15 October 1957, folder labeled “Civil Defense – General,” GLHH, NCA, Box 176.

\textsuperscript{1016} North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1959, H.B. 24, Chapter 285; S.B. 38, Chapter 349.

\textsuperscript{1017} North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1959, H.B. 396, Chapter 314.
issuance of an emergency proclamation or request for federal assistance.\textsuperscript{1018} Minor flooding also confronted the town of Princeville in May 1958, with the Red Cross and state National Guard evacuating and sheltering dislocated residents. As with Asheville, the NCCD surveyed the situation but found matters under control.\textsuperscript{1019} A far greater scene of destruction unfolded in eastern North Carolina when a series of tornadoes struck Cumberland, Dublin, Robeson, Sampson, and Scotland counties on the evening of 8 April 1957. The twisters inflicted an estimated $2.5 million in damages, destroyed 63 homes, 129 farm buildings, and killed four while injuring over 100 residents. Despite the doubts of Brown, Hodges requested a major disaster declaration but the FCDA recommended against such action. Instead, the Red Cross coordinated with the NCCD to provide disaster relief, and spent $107,300 to assist the storm victims.\textsuperscript{1020}

This was the first rejection of a North Carolina request for a major disaster declaration, but it illuminated Eisenhower’s shifting opinion on the responsibility for natural dangers.

\textsuperscript{1018} Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 4 February 1957; Luther H. Hodges to Edward F. Griffin, 6 February 1957; Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 8 February 1957, folder labeled “Civil Defense – A – Z,” GLHH, NCA, Box 176. Areas of Kentucky and West Virginia were declared major disasters on 31 January 1957 under Public Law 875. See House of Representatives, Report of Activity Under Authority of Public Law 875, Eighty-First Congress, As Amended, 24 April 1958, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, H. Doc. 376, 4.


\textsuperscript{1020} Press release from Governor’s Office, 11 April 1957; Harry E. Brown to Edward L. Rankin, 10 April 1957; K.C. Lattimer to Luther H. Hodges, 17 June 1957; telegram from Luther H. Hodges to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 12 April 1957; telegram from Sherman Adams to Luther H. Hodges, 16 April 1957, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Tornado, April 1957,” GLHH, NCA, Box 261.
disaster costs. Back in 1953, Public Law 83-109 established a Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, tasked to study and investigate all activities where federal financial aid is extended to state and local government, including natural disaster relief. A commission report in June 1955 addressed the nebulous issue of funding by recommending a requirement for states to spend or obligate an amount equal to one-fiftieth of one percent of the three year average of its total income payments before receiving federal aid. Eisenhower did not act on this suggested proposal. But in March 1957, the president addressed Congress about drought in the Great Plains and Southwest, and explained how the events led him to conclude that the administration of emergency disaster programs should be kept at the local level. Eisenhower emphasized that state and local governments assume a greater burden for alleviating hardship, and only ask for federal assistance on a supplementary level. In June 1957, he addressed the annual National Governors’ Conference and spoke of federal – state relations, his opposition to an expanding federal government, belief in states’ rights, and the need for a decentralization of authority. The president called for a Joint Federal-State Action Committee to evaluate and recommend courses of action for states to assume the financial burden for functions of the federal

government, including disaster relief.\textsuperscript{1024} The governors agreed to this proposal and began work in August.\textsuperscript{1025}

In October, the joint committee submitted to the president a draft proposal for natural disaster relief.\textsuperscript{1026} This proposal contended that states should expend certain minimum sums of their own money for the removal of health and safety hazards and emergency repair and replacement of essential public facilities before requesting funds from the federal government. Emphasis rested on federal aid as supplementary to state and local funds, and the proposal held that federal financial assistance only be provided for disasters “which cause unusually heavy damage and costs.”\textsuperscript{1027} The joint committee recommended continuing the procedures of Public Law 875, but extending no federal financial aid until states expended suggested minimum funds. The committee then called on the president to put such a schedule of state-local expenditures into effect. They advocated that state governments designate their state civil defense agency as the responsible party for disaster relief functions and establish disaster emergency or contingency funds.

On 29 October 1957, Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10737, incorporating the committee’s recommendations. The order amended Public Law 875, most notably by

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\textsuperscript{1026} The Joint Federal-State Action Committee had three overarching responsibilities. These included 1) To designate functions which the States are ready and willing to assume and finance that are now performed or financed wholly or in part by the Federal Government; 2) To recommend the Federal and State revenue adjustments required to enable the States to assume such functions; and 3) To identify functions and responsibilities likely to require State or Federal attention in the future and to recommend that level of State effort, or Federal effort, or both, that will be needed to assure effective action. See House of Representatives, Report of Activity Under Authority of Public Law 875, Eighty-First Congress, as Amended, 24 April 1958, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, H. Doc. 376, 2.

requiring governors, when requesting federal assistance, to certify “expenditure of a reasonable amount of the funds” from the state and local governments. In April 1958, Eisenhower’s report of FCDA activity under Public Law 875 provided the schedule of minimum state and local financial obligations which would go into effect at the beginning of FY 1960. In September, the joint committee reviewed the funding options of all the states, and reported favorably on North Carolina’s contingency and emergency fund in the sum of $1.75 million for the 1957 – 1959 biennium. When OCDM director Hoegh issued the annual schedule of minimum state and local expenditures effective 1 July, North Carolina found itself in the $1.5 million bracket. Hoegh advised all states that “in unusual circumstances, or in disasters in which exceptional destruction and/or suffering and hardship have occurred, [the federal government] may waive in whole or in part” the requirement to certify state expenditures and obligations.

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1028 Executive Order no.10737, “Further Providing for the Administration of Disaster Relief,” 29 October 1957, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief Authorizations and Allocations (5),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 443. Governors were required to submit the following: 1) An estimate of the severity and extent of damage resulting from the disaster and the total funds, personnel, equipment, and material or other resources required to alleviate such damage; 2) A statement of action taken or recommended to be taken by the State legislature or local legislative and governing authorities with regard to the disaster; 3) An estimate of State and local funds, personnel, equipment and material or other resources, available and to be made available, to alleviate such damage; and 4) A statement of the extent and nature of Federal assistance needed, including an estimate of the minimum Federal funds, personnel, equipment, material or other resources needed to alleviate the damage.


Executive Order 10737 had an insignificant impact on the state in the wake of Hurricanes Helene and Donna. The 1958 hurricane season witnessed Hurricane Helene close in on the North Carolina coast by 27 September, only to veer out to sea, parallel with the coastline. The western edge of Helene’s eye came within approximately 10 miles of Cape Fear, bringing high winds, tides, and intense rainfall.\textsuperscript{1033} Reported Francis W. Reichelderfer, Chief of the Weather Bureau, Helene “was more severe in the intensity of winds than was Hurricane Hazel in 1954.”\textsuperscript{1034} These high winds caused considerable dune erosion and damage at Southport and Long Beach; 75 percent of the sand fences on Hatteras and Ocracoke were destroyed and some beaches remained scoured of all dunes.\textsuperscript{1035}

In a nod to the experiences of 1954 and 1955, the state government swiftly climbed the bureaucratic steps to receive federal disaster relief. Hodges issued a state of emergency declaration and wired Eisenhower on 29 September requesting a major disaster declaration, assuring the president that “all available resources of the state and local governments will be committed” to alleviate disaster conditions.\textsuperscript{1036} If spending state money, Hodges intended to “recover” every federal cent he could. He issued a memorandum to the heads of all state departments, agencies, and institutions requesting complete records of all storm damages and

\textsuperscript{1034} F. W. Reichelderfer to Luther H. Hodges, 29 September 1958, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Helene,” GTSP, NCA, Box 29.
expenditures through use of personnel, materials, and equipment over and above normal operations resulting from Helene. OCDM Region III’s preliminary damage estimates totaled over $4.5 million and Hoegh recommended a major disaster declaration, authorized by the president on 1 October. As with previous storms, the NCCD commenced a detailed survey of damages and estimated Helene’s affects at approximately $20 million and requested a minimum allocation of $1 million. From 19 – 21 October, a nor’easter struck the Outer Banks, with tides four feet above normal and winds 25 – 55 mph in intensity. Already hit hard by Helene, the nor’easter destroyed sections of the state highway and caused $1.6 million in damages. Eisenhower amended the Helene disaster declaration and allotted $750,000 on 7 November. Additional surveys resulted in further allocation of $200,000 in February 1959. From this $950,000, the NCCD distributed $845,588 in the coastal rebuilding efforts.

1037 Luther H. Hodges to heads of state departments, agencies and institutions, 29 September 1958, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Helene,” GTSP, NCA, Box 29.
1038 Telegram from Thomas H. Goodman to Leo Hoegh, 29 September 1958; Leo A. Hoegh to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1 October 1958; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 1 October 1958, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (4),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446.
1039 Telegram from Luther H. Hodges to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 17 October 1958, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (4),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446. On 2 October 1958, Hodges’ office issued a press release listing preliminary damages at $11 million total. This did not include an estimated $100,000 in erosion damages to the beaches of the Cape Hatteras National Seashore. See press release from Governor’s Office, 2 October 1958, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Helene,” GTSP, NCA, Box 29.
1042 Telegram from Luther H. Hodges to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 27 October 1958; telegram from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 7 November 1958, folder labeled “Civil Defense, Nor’easter Storm, 20 – 21 October 1958,” GTSP, NCA, Box 28; Leo A. Hoegh to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 6 November 1958; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 7 November 1958, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (4),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446. This allocation included an amendment of Eisenhower’s major disaster declaration of 1 October to include damages caused by a Nor’easter from 19 – 22 October 1958.
1043 Leo A. Hoegh to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 25 February 1959; Leo A. Hoegh to Andrew Goodpaster, 25 February 1959; Luther H. Hodges to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 28 February 1959; Dwight D. Eisenhower to
A second storm, Hurricane Donna struck the state on 11 – 12 September 1960. Donna hit the Florida Keys on 9 September, then turned north and passed over the Florida peninsula the next day. The hurricane, although weaker, crossed Topsail Island on the evening of 11 September and passed through the sounds before exiting over Virginia Beach back into the Atlantic. Beach erosion, downed trees, smashed roads and houses made a mess of the coast, killing eight and injuring over 100. Hodges proclaimed a state of emergency and requested a disaster declaration, swiftly issued by the president. Damage estimates for Donna totaled approximately $28.8 million with over $2.5 million in public damages. With state and local expenditures totaling in excess of $2.2 million, Hodges thereby requested a minimum of $1 million in federal disaster relief, authorized in turn by Eisenhower on 14 October. In one of his last days in office, Hodges wrote Eisenhower again on 27 December, reporting that damages exceeded initial estimates necessitating $300,000 more. Eisenhower authorized the allocation shortly thereafter. The NCCD eventually spent $1,209,420 of these federal funds.

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1045 Proclamation by the Governor, 14 September 1960; press release from Governor’s Office, 15 September 1960; telegram from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 17 September 1960, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Hurricane Donna,” GTSP, Box 29; Leo A. Hoegh to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 16 September 1960, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (4),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446. 
1046 Telegram from Luther H. Hodges to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 29 September 1960; Leo A. Hoegh to Andrew Goodpaster, 7 October 1960; Leo A. Hoegh to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 7 October 1960; Dwight E. Eisenhower to Luther H. Hodges, 14 October 1960, folder labeled “OF 107-C Disaster Relief – North Carolina (4),” WHCF-OF, DDEL, Box 446. 
For North Carolina, the main difference from the period of federal disaster relief before and after Executive Order 10737 appears to have been slightly more efficient use of federal funds. For Helene and Donna, the state expended 91 percent of the allocated federal funds, compared to 90 percent for the major disaster declarations of 1954 through 1958. The difference is negligible. The increased efficiency perhaps can be attributed to greater awareness of federal disaster relief policies and procedures to increases in county and community civil defense offices. Perhaps the experience of the stream clearance fight in 1956 – 1957 made officials more diligent with requesting funds and screening project applications. Whatever the case, the executive order did not inhibit North Carolina from receiving aid or promptly putting the money to use.

Indirectly, Hurricane Helene’s damages to the coast released more funding from the state to mitigate future losses. With the opening of the 1959 General Assembly, the governor’s budget message included a call to authorize a project to stabilize the Outer Banks. As Hodges explained to the legislators, “if these protective outer banks are destroyed, our sounds are going to become part of the ocean and extensive coastal lands are going to be ruined with flooding salt water and wave damage.” The governor asked for $600,000 for surveys and purchases of land to make it public and thus eligible for federal assistance.1050 The area to be purchased encompassed 22,823 acres from Ocracoke Island to Cape Lookout. As stated by Brown before the General Assembly, “it will be less expensive to rehabilitate and stabilize the Outer Banks area from Ocracoke Inlet to Cape Lookout than to provide

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protective works for the opposite shore of the mainland.” Since the inland area was becoming more urbanized, Brown recognized that it would “never reach its potential industrial capability under the constant threat of hurricane damage unless protective measures to lessen the danger are adopted.”

The governor received the full $600,000.

The General Assembly implemented another Brown recommendation in the 1959 session to create an independent agency to expand the state’s water resources. Initially in 1958, Hodges and Brown viewed such an agency as an aid to merely develop the state’s waterways, but this vision expanded into creating one agency to handle all water-related issues.

Hodges called for creation of a Department of Water Resources in 1959 to develop and ensure adequate water supplies for agricultural and industrial purposes and the well-being of the state’s growing communities. The proposed department would merge the duties and responsibilities of the Department of Conservation and Development’s Division of Water Resources, Inlets, and Coastal Waterways, the Division of Mineral Resources, the Division of Water Pollution Control of the State Board of Health, and the State Board of Water Resources.

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1051 Statement of Harry E. Brown, Director, Hurricane Rehabilitation Program, Relative to the Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Stabilization of the Outer Banks Area Extending from Ocracoke Inlet to Cape Lookout, 23 February 1959, folder labeled “Congressional – Water Legislation,” GLHH, NCA, Box 363.
Water Commissioners.\textsuperscript{1055} The General Assembly passed the legislation and further tasked the department with formulating and developing a program of dune rebuilding, hurricane protection, and shore-erosion prevention.\textsuperscript{1056} This meant the absorption of the Hurricane Rehabilitation Program. The legislation created a Board of Water Resources; and at their first meeting on 28 August 1959, the members selected Brown as director.\textsuperscript{1057} Brown held this post and rolled the Hurricane Rehabilitation Program work into the department until his retirement from state government in December 1963.\textsuperscript{1058}

North Carolina’s legislative responses kept the NCCD contemporary with federal civil defense initiatives. Hurricanes Helene and Donna tested the resources of the NCCD headquarters, and provided ample evidence of the necessity to rehabilitate the state’s fragile coasts and strengthen the natural protection for eastern North Carolina’s economic areas. Creating the Department of Water Resources completed the separation of hurricane rehabilitation from the state civil defense effort. This freed state civil defense resources for responding to other contingencies, notably enemy attack. For this possibility, the state aligned civil defense to take advantage of federal funding under Public Law 85-606. The continuity of government legislation provided for local government contingency plans, but remained notably absent for the state government. This omission stemmed from constitutional limitations, and the state constitution itself needed to be amended to permit the

\textsuperscript{1055} Luther H. Hodges, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Wilkes Chamber of Commerce, 1 February 1960, in Hodges, \textit{Messages, Addresses}, vol. 3, 339.
\textsuperscript{1056} \textit{North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions}, 1959, S.B. 33, Chapter 779.
\textsuperscript{1057} Hodges, \textit{Messages, Addresses}, vol. 3, 339; Organizational Meeting of the Board of Water Resources, Raleigh, N.C., 28 August 1959, folder labeled “Water Resources, Department of,” GLHH, NCA, Box 427.
seat of government to relocate elsewhere, should Raleigh be attacked. The 1959 General Assembly passed the legislative matter on to its successor.\textsuperscript{1059}

\textit{Conclusion}

Between 1956 and 1960, the NCCD increased in size and scale through the financial changes of the federal civil defense program. Transitioning from the Federal Civil Defense Administration to the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization provided these financial resources. This in turn enabled civil defense in North Carolina to transform plans into functional capabilities. State government accordingly amended or passed new legislation to conform to federal civil defense plans and qualify for the various programs. Unfortunately, the federal plans did not always coincide with funding, as the Congressional denial of appropriations under Public Law 85-606 demonstrated. Although this temporarily placed elements of the state’s Operational Survival Plan on hold, creation of the plan nevertheless proved beneficial. The necessity for local civil defense programs to adhere to the plan and organize to acquire federal relief aid forced counties and communities to expand their civil defense efforts. Even with an expanded civil defense program and a state director oriented towards responding to potential enemy attack, North Carolina’s civil defense program maintained an operational readiness due primarily to natural disasters. This reality and the NCCD’s performance in natural disaster response equipped policymakers with clear justification to support civil defense efforts.

\textsuperscript{1059} NCCD, \textit{Progress Report, 1959 – 1961}, 28. The issue of constitutional limitations stems from the fact that in North Carolina the Office of the Governor has the authority to appoint other officers and officials, but in the event of multiple vacancies (governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, for instance) there would be no one to convene the state Senate to elect its president to administer the government. Regarding the seat of government, the constitution needed to alter the language to read that the permanent seat of government rested in Raleigh, thus enabling the General Assembly to relocate the government on a temporary basis.
Although increasingly tangential to the NCCD, the Hurricane Rehabilitation Program proved a boon for civil defense. The program dovetailed with Hodges’s economic vision for the state through its legislative actions and efforts to save the state’s coastlines. As a state initiative, the program acquired a highly competent and capable official in Colonel Harry E. Brown. His background in civil defense and public policy served the state well in its relations with federal officials and agencies. The legislation initiated by the program served to protect and preserve the state’s coastline and water resources, always with the economic health of North Carolina in the foreground. For the NCCD, the frequency of hurricanes impacting the state necessitated a mitigation and recovery effort. Brown not only freed the NCCD from the responsibility of addressing increasing levels of economic and physical storm damage, but saved the state incalculable costs in jobs, business, and negative publicity. For policymakers, Brown’s work contributed to the arduous, but successful effort to bring every possible federal disaster relief dollar to North Carolina, whether building dunes, clearing streams, or closing Long Beach Inlet. From 1954 to 1960, North Carolina spent approximately $8.3 million in federal disaster relief dollars for the eastern part of the state, an investment as much for the future as it was for the present.

The matter of change for the federal civil defense effort also bears the hallmarks of economic policy. Whereas Hodges wanted to increase investment potential and increase per capita income, the Eisenhower administration sought to prudently balance national security with a strong economy. Civil defense found itself in a budgetary minefield. Although the president was cognizant of the costs and difficulty of homeland defense, financially-speaking his support remained minimal. A firm believer in civil defense, Congressman Chet Holifield inadvertently abetted Eisenhower’s position for a limited federal civil defense program. His
subcommittee hearings in 1956 put Peterson and the FCDA on a course towards a massive – and exorbitantly expensive – fallout shelter program. The Gaither report seconded the proposed shelter program, leaving the NSC and Eisenhower to reject the whole matter. The resulting creation of the National Shelter Policy and reorganization of civil defense to create the OCDM did little to safeguard the American people from either fallout or a massive nuclear attack.

Positive changes for civil defense emerged nonetheless. Despite the appropriation battles in Congress, Public Law 85-606 carried tremendous potential for the NCCD to staff newly created area offices. Through decentralized command and control, the NCCD could ensure a more uniform development and execution of plans statewide. As seen in the NCCD’s work in World War II, area civil defense directors provided a valuable outreach ability not only to plant the seeds of success but to reap a harvest of civil defense volunteers and emergency capabilities. To assist the county and community civil defense programs, Public Law 84-655 enabled the purchase of surplus federal property. Warning and communication systems, rescue squads, and staffed auxiliary firemen all contributed to nuclear preparedness and proved useful in the event of localized emergencies (automobile accidents, house fires, medical emergencies) or natural disasters. For local officials faced with addressing multiple problems with a limited budget, civil defense actually provided quite a lot of bang for the buck.

Civil defense assisted policymakers with the future of natural disasters. Although a bane to the state’s coastal residents and economy, the hurricanes spurred Hodges proactively to address the matter with the Hurricane Rehabilitation Program. Under Brown’s guidance and work with state and federal policies and bureaucracies, the disasters exposed a pressing
need to better develop the state’s water resources. The hurricane rehabilitation work, begun under the NCCD, culminated in the creation of the Department of Water Resources. This new department intended over the coming years to solve problems for all North Carolinians, whether directly caused by nature or not. Droughts and hurricanes exposed how industrial demand, burgeoning cities, and coastal tourism remained vulnerable to the forces of nature. Bureaucratic battles for federal disaster aid inevitably drove Brown, Griffin, and Hodges to find a proactive solution to avoid the necessity of having to fight so hard for federal aid after disaster struck. Looking back at the immense physical and economic damages from 1954 and 1955, the establishment of the new department at the end of the decade to develop state water resources and mitigate disaster was a considerable mark of progress.

The NCCD lagged behind in protection from fallout or lingering radiation. The next chapter will show that while state civil defense officials advocated fallout shelter construction in its various publications and public addresses by officials, funds to build them failed to emerge. Hodges, however, himself became an advocate for the subterranean wombs, safe from marauding gamma rays and ionized dust particles. Years of extreme weather had shaped the state civil defense agency to respond to natural disasters, resulting in the loss of priority for development of nuclear preparedness. This situation would soon change as the early 1960s arrived with plenty of Cold War tension to firmly embed the fallout shelter in North Carolina and the nation’s basements.
Figure 25. Long Beach Inlet, January 1958. Torn open by Hurricane Hazel in October 1954, the inlet would not be closed until March 1958. Source: Folder labeled “Long Beach Inlet – 1958,” Department of Water Resources, Office of Director, Hurricane Rehabilitation Progress Records, NCA, Box 3.
Figure 26. Long Beach Inlet, before and after dredging operations. Source: Dedication program for closing of Long Beach Inlet, 6 March 1958, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Long Beach Inlet,” GLHH, NCA, Box 261.
Figure 27. The North Carolina Operational Survival Plan organized the state into six civil defense areas to decentralize command and control for the state’s civil defense plans. Unfortunately, the lack of an appropriation for Public Law 85-606 to pay for the area directors delayed activation of the offices until 1961. Source: Map based off information in NCCD, *North Carolina Operational Survival Plan* (Raleigh, N.C.: NCCD, 1 May 1958), 7.
Figure 28. In the event of nuclear attack or a major disaster, the Operational Survival Plan organized the NCCD headquarters by incorporating existing agencies into the state emergency services. Source: NCCD, *North Carolina Operational Survival Plan* (Raleigh, N.C.: NCCD, 1 May 1958), 9.
Figure 29. Hurricane Helene’s 106 mph winds blew enough sand to completely scour the paint off the north side of this trash can at Cape Hatteras. Source: Robert F. Gibbs to Luther H. Hodges, 20 October 1958, folder labeled “Civil Defense, Nor’easter Storm, 20 – 21 October 1958,” GTSP, NCA, Box 28.
Figure 30. Hurricane Helene and the nor’easter of 19 – 21 October 1958 destroyed dune restoration work along the Outer Banks. In these before and after photos from the Cape Hatteras National Seashore, the sand fences erected to trap sand to build up dunes fared badly against storm surge. Source: Edward Nash to Robert F. Gibbs, 12 November 1958, folder labeled Civil Defense, Nor’easter Storm, 20 – 21 October 1958,” GTSP, NCA, Box 28.
Figure 31. The Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) proved invaluable for North Carolina in natural disasters. Source: NCCD scrapbooks, OSRC-NCA.
Figure 32. Use of the federal matching funds and surplus property programs allowed the counties and community civil defense offices establish rescue squads, which provided lifesaving service in ordinary and extraordinary times. Source: NCCD scrapbooks, OSRC-NCA.
Chapter 5: Advocating Fallout Shelter, Mitigating Mother Nature

We must realize that we are not playing games. Our enemies are real – their weapons are real – and the possibility of a very real war is not as remote as many would like to think. It could happen today – or tomorrow – or never. We must not gamble on the future – as long as the threat exists that does exist – of conflict between countries too terrifying to contemplate.
– Governor Terry Sanford, 28 April 1961

The key element in our new program is the fallout shelter. We expect community shelters to protect a large part of the population, but we recognize that many families, because of their location or individual preferences, will choose family fallout shelters. The Federal Government will join with states and communities, in a variety of ways, to help create fallout shelters.
– Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatrick, 14 December 1961

In early 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower needed to fill three upcoming vacancies on the National Civil Defense Advisory Council. Established as part of Public Law 81-920, the council advised the national civil defense administrator “on general or basic policy matters” pertaining to civil defense. In February, Meade Alcorn, chairman of the Republican National Committee, gave a list of three Democrats to Sherman Adams, Eisenhower’s chief of staff, which included Luther H. Hodges. Federal Civil Defense Administrator (FCDA) Leo A. Hoegh recommended Hodges’ appointment to succeed former Texas governor Allan Shivers for three years on the council. Hodges, having met the

1061 NCCD Newsletter, January 1962.
security and political clearances, indicated a willingness to serve. Edward F. Griffin, North Carolina Council of Civil Defense (NCCD) director, wrote the governor that “with your wide experience and good judgment, your membership would add greatly to the stature of the Council and I sincerely hope that you will accept the appointment. I also feel that with you as a member of the Council, it will greatly bolster our State Civil Defense interest and program.” Hodges agreed to join the council and Eisenhower approved his appointment on 31 March for a three-year term.

Griffin’s opinion on Hodges’ involvement proved accurate. The governor soon found himself privy to drafts of Hoegh’s new National Civil Defense Plan, non-military defense legislative proposals, and the National Shelter Policy. Hodges passed the drafts on to Griffin for his review and opinions, giving the NCCD an inside track on future national civil defense developments. The NCCD did not, necessarily, act independently or expeditiously with this insider information.

After Hoegh began promulgating fallout shelters, the NCCD responded almost immediately. Information about fallout shelters swiftly became available through the state

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1066 Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 26 March 1958, folder labeled “Federal Civil Defense Administration Advisory Council,” Governor Luther H. Hodges papers (GLHH), North Carolina Archives, Raleigh, North Carolina (NCA), Box 476. In 1959, the North Carolina General Assembly changed the name to “North Carolina Civil Defense Agency.” Henceforth use of the NCCD represents this latter name.
and local civil defense offices. Griffin spoke strongly for shelters in every North Carolina home, warning that “far more people could die from fallout radiation, persons so far away from the bomb burst that they might not realized it had occurred, unless . . . every individual citizen . . . [is] responsible for his own home shelter.” The NCCD reported a high demand for shelter information in the initial months of 1959, a trend that continued into the summer.

Through the fall of 1959, Hodges took the lead in promoting fallout shelters for both North Carolina and the nation. Initially, Hoegh informed the governor in September of Congressional appropriations to construct prototype fallout shelters nationwide and asked for locations in North Carolina. Griffin suggested the governor’s mansion as a possible site. Hodges inquired into its cost, and learned that a mansion shelter would cost only a fraction of the OCDM prototypes. Just the day before his inquiry, the National Civil Defense Advisory Council adopted a resolution recommending every citizen build a fallout shelter.

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1071 Leo A. Hoegh to Luther H. Hodges, 11 September 1959, folder labeled “FCDA – Shelter,” GLHH, NCA, Box 476.
1072 Edward F. Griffin to Luther H. Hodges, 16 September 1959; Luther H. Hodges to Leo A. Hoegh, 21 September 1959, folder labeled “FCDA – Shelter,” GLHH, NCA, Box 476. Hodges ultimately requested four prototype shelters, one for each of the largest cities to reach the widest possible audience.
1073 Note to Luther H. Hodges from unknown, 24 September 1959, folder labeled “FCDA – Shelter,” GLHH, NCA, Box 476. Griffin reported the prototypes cost $975.00.
1074 Press release from OCDM with attachments, 23 September 1959, folder labeled “FCDA – Shelter,” GLHH, NCA, Box 476.
Hodges chose to lead by example and adhere to the resolution. In early October 1959, construction began on a six-person concrete block basement fallout shelter in a corner of the mansion basement using exact OCDM plans. Carpenters and bricklayers completed their work by 19 October. Hodges’ shelter officially opened for tours and inspections on 22 October. Built for $282.25 and stocked with $101.98 in supplies to last two weeks, the governor’s shelter demonstrated to residents that family protection could be affordably obtained. North Carolina thus became first state in the nation to build a fallout shelter for its governor.

Griffin and Hodges both addressed an assembled crowd of newsmen at the shelter’s dedication on 22 October. Griffin noted how the shelter “is a thing our people have got to start thinking about and building,” adding “if we have trouble in North Carolina, we think it will be from fallout.” In his statement, Hodges proclaimed how fallout shelters could save most people “far from a likely target and in our rural areas” and that the inexpensive basement shelter “can serve a dual purpose such as protection from hurricanes, tornadoes and

1077 Press release from Governor’s Office, 22 October 1959, folder labeled “FCDA – Shelter,” GLHH, NCA, Box 476; Edward F. Griffin to all local directors and state civil defense chiefs of service, 23 October 1959; itemized cost sheet on basement fallout shelter and survival items; itemized cost sheet, folder labeled “Hodges – Shelter Mansion,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 11.
1078 Sarah Boyd Weaver to Edward F. Griffin, undated, folder labeled “Hodges – Shelter Mansion,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 11. The letter discusses a request from the Office of Civilian and Defense Mobilization for information about the shelter, noting “…this is the first – Maine has done something, but not a complete job and not in order as the N.C. one is.”

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other severe storms.” Hodges’ shelter made national news in an OCDM information bulletin, and inquires about it came from as far away as Ontario, Canada.

Fallout shelters surpassed natural disasters as the primary focus of NCCD efforts in the early 1960s. Throughout the administration of President John F. Kennedy, the national shelter program proposed under Eisenhower’s administration became reality. A revitalized and reorganized national civil defense program commenced work on a nation-wide effort to facilitate the establishment of public and private fallout shelters. For North Carolina, promotion of fallout shelters commenced under Hodges, but became the main NCCD effort during the administration of his successor, Governor Terry Sanford.

Sanford benefitted tremendously from Hodges’ civil defense program. In 1961, federal civil defense engineers surveyed thousands of public and private buildings to establish public fallout shelters for as many residents as possible. Appropriations for implementing Public Law 85-606 allowed the NCCD to fully staff the area offices created in the state Operational Survival Plan with full-time civil defense professionals. The lack of natural disasters permitted nuclear preparedness to dominate civil defense headlines, but the majority of citizens opted not to build shelters. Although fallout issues stood in the limelight in the first years of the 1960s, emergency preparedness remained the foundation of local state civil defense operations, as nor’easters in 1962 reminded officials of how natural disasters continued to factor into state and county civil defense plans.

1080 Statement by Governor Luther H. Hodges at Opening and Dedication of Home-Type Fallout Shelter at the Governor’s Mansion, 12 Noon, 22 October 1959, folder labeled “Hodges – Shelter Mansion,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 11.
Nationally, Hoegh’s shelter program failed to produce results. In late March 1960, Congressman Chet Holifield (D–CA) chaired another subcommittee hearing on civil defense. He remained unwavering in his opinion that the nation remained ill-prepared for nuclear war and oriented the hearings to review the status of shelter construction, planning for post-attack recovery operations and civil defense implications of missile base location and “hardening” programs. The subcommittee sent out questionnaires to all fifty states and select cities inquiring about the status of fallout shelters. The returned data confirmed Holifield’s opinion “that very little has been accomplished.” Of the 35 states and 66 cities reporting, the subcommittee learned of the existence of 1,565 home fallout shelters, 14 buildings modified to provide fallout protection, and nine underground state and local civil defense control centers. Holifield lamented that “those who examine the material will find, I believe, that civil defense throughout the country as a whole is in a deplorable state . . . [and] the national shelter policy has been a failure.” For North Carolina, Griffin reported on 7 March that 25 home fallout shelters existed in the state, and two public buildings had shelters. Colonel David L. Hardee, director of the Raleigh-Wake County Civil Defense Agency, reported no shelters in the capital.

1083 Ibid., 2.
1084 Ibid., 2-3.
1085 Ibid., 3-4.
1087 House Committee on Government Operations, Civil Defense Hearings, Appendix I – Subcommittee Questionnaire and Replies, 1960, 317-18. The number of shelters in North Carolina by January 1961 will never be known with any precision. The biennial NCCD progress report for 1959 – 1961 stated proudly that “the State Agency has distributed more than 100,000 booklets containing instructions on shelter construction. There are now more than 1,000 shelters built and equipped in the state. Many others are under construction.” Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization funds were also allocated to construct larger
In the final weeks of the Eisenhower administration, the National Security Council (NSC) reevaluated the nation’s shelter policy. In December 1960, the OCDM submitted a memorandum to the NSC about passive defense measures with particular regard to fallout shelters. The OCDM recommended a national five-year goal of securing fallout shelter for the entire population at an estimated cost of $10 to 15 billion in private investment and $4.5 billion in federal appropriations and tax credits. The memorandum advocated that “highest priority [be] placed on more direct involvement of the President himself” in promoting fallout shelters and molding public attitudes. On 6 January 1961, the NSC published the top secret report NSC 6104, “Measures to Provide Shelter from Radioactive Fallout,” to supersede NSC 5807/2. At its 474th meeting, the council members remained divided about a shelter program, specifically about the program costs. Eisenhower concluded the discussion by urging the presentation of issue of fallout shelters to Congress. Two days before Kennedy took the oath of office as president, the council published the revised NSC 6104/2. This statement on policy advocated increasing emphasis of fallout shelters due

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community shelters for fifty people in Greensboro and Wilmington. Furthermore, the author conducted an off-the-record interview in 2008 with a Raleigh resident who had a fallout shelter constructed in their basement in 1955. The author visited the shelter and it is today used as a bathroom. Judging by the timidity of the shelter owner to talk on the record about the shelter, the likelihood of private fallout shelters existing to any degree in Raleigh at the time of this subcommittee hearing is strong; the number of such shelters presumably was small. See NCCD, *Progress Report, 1 January 1959 – 1 January 1961* (Raleigh, N.C.: North Carolina Civil Defense Agency, 1961), 9; *NCCD Newsletter, July and August 1960*. See Chapter 4 for information about NSC 5807.

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1089 Ibid., 12.

1090 “Measures to Provide Shelter from Radioactive Fallout (NSC 6104),” 6 January 1961, folder labeled “Mobilization (20),” White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948 – 61, Disaster File, DDEL, Box 37. See Chapter 4 for information about NSC 5807.

to doubts over development of an adequate missile defense system.\textsuperscript{1092} To accomplish the objective of fallout shelter for the nation’s population within five years, the report called for active presidential leadership, increased scientific research, sample surveys and pilot studies, public education, and incorporation of shelters in military and civilian federal buildings.\textsuperscript{1093} The estimated cost of the entire five-year program the report calculated at $347.7 million, with $252 million subject to Congressional approval.\textsuperscript{1094}

In the first quarter of 1961, Kennedy initiated a reexamination of the nation’s civil defense program. NSC 6104/2 factored greatly in the events of the coming months. Replacing Hoegh as head of the OCDM, Kennedy tapped New Orleans attorney Frank B. Ellis, manager of his campaign in Louisiana. Kennedy tasked Ellis to work with David E. Bell, director of the Bureau of the Budget, to conduct a thorough study of the nation’s non-military defense and mobilization programs.\textsuperscript{1095} Ellis’ study painted a depressing picture. Assuming a surprise attack by the Soviet Union, the U.S. stood to lose 100 million dead from nuclear attack, 50 million by fallout alone and, wrote Ellis, “It is apparent that we could lose a nuclear war.”\textsuperscript{1096} He considered the nation’s civil defense and defense mobilization “completely inadequate.”\textsuperscript{1097}

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\textsuperscript{1092} “Measures to Provide Shelter from Radioactive Fallout (NSC 6104/2),” 18 January 1961, 1, folder labeled “Mobilization (20),” White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948 – 61, Disaster File, DDEL, Box 37.
\textsuperscript{1093} NSC 6104/2, 2-5.
\textsuperscript{1094} NSC 6104/2, 7.
\textsuperscript{1097} Ibid., 31.
To improve the OCDM, Ellis provided several suggestions. He described a program to survey, mark, and stock shelters in existing buildings, modify other buildings to incorporate shelters, and a public education program. The federal government could support this effort through surplus property and increased funding; Ellis remarked that Public Law 85-606 “has done more to inspire and encourage state and local governments than any previous federal action. It is expected to vitalize civil defense.” He urged presidential involvement in the area of public information, stating that “a more judicious message is needed to erase public apathy and gain public support.” In a follow-up letter to Kennedy, Ellis hoped to avert calls for more study of civil defense, proclaiming “BELIEVE ME, SIR, NON-MILITARY DEFENSE HAS BEEN STUDIED TO DEATH AND ALMOST REORGANIZED TO DEATH.” The OCDM director asked that the office not be scrapped or rebuilt, but rather improve existing plans to “take advantage of the millions of dollars that have been expended in its [federal] establishment.”

Kennedy shrewdly queried additional staff for opinions about civil defense. After issuing his February report, Ellis worked feverishly to promote his program and requested a tripling of the proposed OCMD budget on threat of his resignation. He even planned a trip to the Vatican to meet with the Pope to curry favor for placing shelters in church basements,

1098 Ibid., 75-76.
1099 Ibid., 113.
1100 Ibid., 122. Ellis listed three principles that the president must put over his message: 1) Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization are vital to National Defense; without them, deterrence is endangered; 2) Survival of the immediate effects of the attack is possible under a sensible civil defense program; the program is technically and financially feasible; 3) A fruitful and productive life is possible in the years after the war; emphasize that the better the civil defense measures taken, the quicker we can return to our high standard of living.
1101 Frank B. Ellis to John F. Kennedy, 20 March 1961, item number PD00639, Presidential Directives Collection, DNSA. Emphasis in original.
1102 Ibid.
much to the president’s chagrin.\textsuperscript{1104} Embarrassed and bothered by this stunt, Kennedy asked for another study on the feasibility of fallout shelters and civil defense.\textsuperscript{1105} A May 1961 report from White House aides Marc Raskin and Carl Kaysen bluntly stated that the federal government should “either stop wasting money on civil defense or take it seriously and turn it over to the Department of Defense (DoD).” Support for this action came from the DoD itself, in particular Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who believed shelters would complement active defense systems and add to the country’s military deterrence.\textsuperscript{1106}

On 25 May in a message to a joint session of Congress, Kennedy outlined his civil defense plans for the nation. He opened his address by stating that “One major element of the national security program which this nation has never squarely faced up to is civil defense. This problem arises not from present trends but from past inaction.”\textsuperscript{1107} Mentioning his administration’s study of the problems, the president explained how civil defense is an insurance that cannot be ignored. He contended that once people accepted this argument,

\ldots there is no point in delaying the initiation of a nationwide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures. Such a program would protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the event of large-scale nuclear attack.\textsuperscript{1108}

To implement the shelter program, Kennedy assigned responsibility for the program to McNamara. The OCDM would be “reconstituted as a small staff agency,” renamed the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) to assist the president in coordination of emergency planning and mobilization. Lastly, Kennedy announced his plan to ask Congress for a “much

\textsuperscript{1106} Sorensen, \textit{Kennedy}, 613-14.
\textsuperscript{1108} Ibid.
strengthened Federal-State civil defense program,” to provide funds for his proposed fallout shelter effort. The appropriation for civil defense, Kennedy noted, would “be more than triple the pending budget requests; and they will increase sharply in subsequent years.”

Throughout June into July, the particulars of Kennedy’s civil defense reorganization began to materialize. The new OEP would assist the president with his responsibilities for non-military defense, and notably coordinate natural disaster declarations and the federal response. Ellis proposed the Secretary of Defense receive responsibility for development and execution of a fallout shelter program and the operational aspects of civil defense. The consulting firm McKinsey and Company also suggested the transfer of responsibilities for nonmilitary defense to the Department of Defense. To handle this arrangement, the firm’s report recommended assigning civil defense to either an assistant to the defense secretary or an assistant secretary to “avoid letting this activity [civil defense] ‘get lost’ within the Department [of Defense].”

Kennedy’s reorganization gave civil defense serious bureaucratic throw-weight. The president incorporated ideas from the Ellis memorandum and the McKinsey and Company report in Executive Order 10952 issued on 20 July 1962. The executive order delegated to the Secretary of Defense responsibilities for the development and execution of a fallout shelter program, warning and communication networks, emergency assistance to state and local governments, and protection of emergency operational capability for state and local governments.

1111 Ibid., 508-18.
1112 Ibid., 516.
government agencies. McNamara issued a statement explaining that civil defense under the DoD would remain under civilian control and all its projects would be directed “toward obtaining maximum protection for lowest possible cost.” A White House press release affirmed that Ellis would continue in his responsibilities for planning continuity of state and local governments and the natural disaster relief program. On 27 September 1962, Kennedy issued Executive Order 11051 which formally transferred responsibility for coordinating all federal disaster relief activities to the director of the Office of Emergency Planning.

Amidst the reorganization of civil defense, relations between the United States and Soviet Union worsened considerably. In April, the CIA-orchestrated invasion of Cuba intended to overthrow dictator Fidel Castro failed miserably at the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy accepted responsibility for the failed invasion, but relations between the new president and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev began to freeze. Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin’s flight into outer space only days before the invasion added weight to the perception of


Kennedy and the Americans as weak. When the two world leaders met from 3 – 4 June 1961 in Vienna, Austria to discuss various issues between nations, the discussions rattled the president. Briefed by various officials that Khrushchev would try to unsettle the president, Kennedy indeed found himself and the United States berated by the Soviet leader.

Discussion about the fate of a divided Berlin and Germany on 4 June raised ominous tones for the coming months. A belligerent Khrushchev had previously called for a German peace treaty in 1958 to permanently legitimize the division of the country. By 1961, however, a rearmed West Germany served as a keystone for NATO forces in Europe, and an enraged Khrushchev told Kennedy this threatened war. Unless the president agreed to an agreement for a German peace treaty, Khrushchev was prepared to act unilaterally. Kennedy countered that the U.S. would not abandon its commitments to Western Europe. Leaving West Berlin meant leaving Western Europe, retorted Kennedy, and he urged Khrushchev not to upset the balance of power. With both men at loggerheads, Khrushchev informed Kennedy a peace treaty would be signed in six months. Khrushchev acknowledged he wanted peace, but warned “if you want war, that is your problem,” to which Kennedy replied “it is you, and not I, who wants to force a change.” With the Soviet leader adamant about signing a treaty in

1117 Sorensen, Kennedy, 524-26; Jamie Doran and Piers Bizony, Starman: The Truth Behind the Legend of Yuri Gagarin (New York: Walker and Co., 2011), 141-145. Kennedy’s shelter announcement in May included his famous pronouncement of committing the nation to landing a man on the moon before the end of the decade; notes historian Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy “was being drawn into competition with Moscow rather than cooperation.” See House of Representatives, Urgent National Needs, 1961, 11; Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 54.
December, Kennedy solemnly remarked “it will be a cold winter,” and potentially a nuclear one.\footnote{Schlesinger, \textit{A Thousand Days}, 374. There is some debate about whether Kennedy, in response to Khrushchev’s affirmation of signing a treaty in December, retorted “Then there will be war, Mr. Chairman” before “It will be a cold winter.” This apparently was not uttered. See W. R. Smyser, \textit{Kennedy and the Berlin Wall: “A Hell of a Lot Better than a War”} (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Pub. Inc., 2009), 71, 261.}

The tension of the summit helped revitalize the national civil defense effort. Five days after the transfer of civil defense to the Department of Defense, Kennedy addressed the nation about the Berlin Crisis. In his remarks, he again mentioned civil defense, but now spoke of it with a far greater sense of urgency. Referencing the reorganization under Executive Order 10952, Kennedy explained his plan:

Tomorrow, I am requesting of the Congress new funds for the following immediate objectives: to identify and mark space in existing structures – public and private – that could be used for fall-out shelters in case of attack; to stock those shelters with food, water, first-aid kits and other minimum essentials for survival . . . and to take other measures that will be effective at an early date to save millions of lives if needed. . . . In the coming months, I hope to let every citizen know what steps he can take without delay to protect his family in case of attack. I know that you will want to do no less.\footnote{Senate, \textit{The Berlin Crisis – A Report Delivered by the President of the United States to the American People, on Tuesday, July 25, 1961}, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, S. Doc. 40, 4.}

Unlike his predecessor, America’s new president appeared committed to a solid national civil defense program with ample funding and strong nuclear preparedness capability.\footnote{Ibid., 5.}

McNamara immediately swung into action. On 31 July, he issued a memorandum for the interim organization of the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) within the Department of Defense. A month later, the Defense Department formally established the OCD under an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense, tasking the assistant secretary to “utilize to the maximum extent the existing facilities of the Department of Defense in lieu of duplicating
such facilities within his office.”

Initial work for the OCD centered on creating a national fallout shelter network. McNamara presented Kennedy’s budget request to Congress: $207.6 million that included $169.3 million to locate, mark, and stock shelters in existing buildings to provide fallout protection for the maximum number of citizens in the shortest possible time and lowest cost. By December 1962, an estimated 50 million shelter spaces would be identified and stocked at a cost of $58.8 million. The $58.8 million, however, would only stock 30 million spaces, with the funding for the remainder of 20 million spaces to be requested later. The surveying would be contracted through the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks at a cost of $93 million.

Unlike previous civil defense budget requests, the supplemental shelter funding appeal sailed through Congress in a scant nine days, with only three senators opposing the bill. On 17 August he signed the budget bill into law. From 1950 to 1960, the federal civil defense programs had been allocated a total of $532 million. In just over two weeks’ time, Kennedy secured civil defense funding that amounted to a third of its previous ten-year budget total. With funding and a reorganized federal civil defense effort, the state civil defense agencies stood poised to receive the tools needed to build up nuclear preparedness.

To direct the new Office of Civil Defense, Kennedy turned to a relative outsider. Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric tapped Washington attorney and personal

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friend Steuart L. Pittman.¹¹²⁷ The president announced Pittman’s appointment on 30 August 1961, and he received Senate confirmation on 15 September.¹¹²⁸ A decorated Marine Corps veteran from the Pacific theater of World War II, Pittman earned praise after his appointment as “bright and able,” calm and collected.¹¹²⁹ As a skilled attorney, Pittman’s analytical and debating skills would prove an asset in Congressional battles in the coming years. For the rest of the Kennedy administration, Pittman would serve as the federal promoter, defender, and resolute leader of civil defense and the fallout shelter movement.

New Governor, Area Networks, and Shelters

Federal changes coincided to a degree with changes in North Carolina and the state civil defense agency. Luther H. Hodges left the governor’s mansion for the first time since 1954 and a new governor, Terry Sanford, took the oath as North Carolina’s chief executive. Thanks to Public Law 85-606 the area offices became operational. Continuing the momentum of promoting fallout shelters begun under Hodges, Sanford and the NCCD made use of the new federal shelter program to facilitate state efforts. In particular, Operation Alert (OPAL) 1961 provided Sanford and the state civil defense agency opportunity to promote shelters in a theatrical way.

If Kennedy offered his vision of a “new frontier,” Sanford announced his as a “new day.” While Hodges focused on economic development, Sanford entered office pledged to making education top priority. A native of Laurinburg, he grew up with a strong progressive education and philosophy. A special agent for the FBI when World War II began, he enlisted

in the army and became a paratrooper, fighting across Europe with the 517th Parachute Regimental Combat Team. Postwar, Sanford entered law and politics, winning the Democratic nomination without Hodge’s endorsement. While continuing Hodges’ emphasis on recruiting industry to North Carolina, Sanford focused on creating the state community college system. The state’s economy boomed. Deemed the “Dixie Dynamo” in 1962 by *National Geographic*, at the end of Sanford’s term as governor in 1965 businesses had invested over $1.2 billion in North Carolina, creating 120,489 new jobs. The U.S. Department of Labor reported that during Sanford’s governorship, North Carolina led the nation in the rate of increase of nonfarm jobs.\(^{1130}\)

North Carolina civil defense grew along with Sanford’s economy. Funding appropriated by the 85th Congress enabled the NCCD to finally staff and activate the six civil defense areas created in the state Operational Survival Plan. David W. Spivey in Washington, N.C. directed Area A, encompassing the Outer Banks and the majority of the coastal counties. Spivey had only recently retired from the army as a lieutenant colonel with combat experience in the European theater of World War II and the Korean War when Griffin wrote him. The NCCD director asked Spivey in November 1960 to come to Raleigh, and in December the agency hired Spivey as an area director. He then went to the Office of Civil

and Defense Mobilization Staff College in Battle Creek to train for his position in January 1961. Returning in February, Griffin told him to “go out and set up an office in your area.” Griffin’s operating instructions to Spivey largely consisted of “don’t let any of those [county] commissioners or anybody get mad at us and come calling to me.”

In 2008, Spivey recalled the ad hoc establishment of the area offices. It is reasonable to presume that the other area directors experienced similar challenges. He remembered the simple and direct instructions he received from the state agency about establishing his office:

General Griffin told me “tell old Blunt, Register of Deeds there [in Washington, N.C.], you see him and tell him to get you an office,” and so I saw him and he got me an office, upstairs over Dick’s Pool Room in an old building right downtown. And he talked to the city, and they agreed to provide their electricity for free, so I went in without charging anything, which lasted a year or so. I’d never been to Washington as a matter of fact until I came down a week or so ahead of this with Wallace H. Dawson [logistics officer for the NCCD].

He and I came down and we rode around the area for a couple of days and that’s when I decided on Washington. The next thing and problem of course was to learn the area itself. I spent a lot of time driving; there was a record supposedly of civil defense directors. Well, it wasn’t worth a great deal. These people existed, but I’m sure one or two of them probably didn’t even know their name was on the list. I of course started with what I had, and trying to get familiar with the area and trying to know the people. I made a special effort of meeting with all the county commissioners, getting to know them and them to know me, and so on.

Throughout the first months of 1961, area offices also opened in Wilson (B), Lumberton (C), Statesville (E), and Asheville (F). Although designed for six directors, federal matching-
funds only provided for five area directors. Russell C. Nicholson, NCCD intelligence officer, ran Area D out of the NCCD headquarters in Raleigh.  

The area offices brought state and federal support more directly to the public. Before the area directors, the NCCD in Raleigh could only cajole and mail handbills, but now the area directors could directly sell civil defense on a daily basis to the people. The area directors met monthly, if not weekly with county commissioners, mayors, and other community officials to provide direct assistance and guidance on civil defense matters. These meetings built contacts and relationships with policymakers, better coordinating civil defense in accordance with state plans, but also for the local communities as its respective needs and threats warranted. Nuclear preparedness often failed to garner support, whereas emergency preparedness for daily emergencies or natural disasters won many converts.

While the NCCD expanded statewide operations, the annual public federal civil defense exercise provided opportunity to promote fallout shelters. Operation Alert 1961 took place 26 – 30 April. OPAL61, as with previous annual tests, intended to test civil defense plans at the federal, state, and local levels, identify weaknesses and provide experience for civil defense volunteers and professionals. “Each Operation Alert was designed as a play, in the sense of both an exercise and a drama. The drama was framed as a grand national epic,” observes sociologist Guy Oakes. For planners, realism was a critical component of the exercise. North Carolina civil defense exercise planners adhered to the federal civil defense

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1134 Ibid.; David W. Spivey, interview by author, Washington, N.C., 18 April 2008. The five area directors were: Area A, David W. Spivey; Area B, Wesley L. Ives; Area C, Victor W. Harris; Area E, Herman J. Sisk; Area F, Archie B. Noell.
defense instructions, but tapped into the drama of OPAL61 by promoting fallout shelters with a public relations gimmick.\footnote{Tracy C. Davis, professor of performing arts emphasizes that this kind of achieved resemblance “functioned like [an] anchor[s] to legitimate ‘real world’ applicability; [it] translated the simulated experience to a possible future emergency.” See Tracy C. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007), 72.}

The NCCD and Sanford’s office decided to make the mansion shelter a focal point for the exercise. At the start of April, the agency issued an announcement for “some lucky North Carolina married couple [to be] selected to live in the Governor’s Mansion as guests of the Governor.”\footnote{Application for OPAL61 Shelter Stay, undated, folder labeled “Civil Defense Bulletins,” GTSP, NCA, Box 27. This document was stapled to an untitled press release dated 3 April 1961, although the text is different.} The event intended “to give Tar Heels a look into problems of survival in the event of nuclear attack” and the NCCD pitched it as a “honeymoon” for a young couple.\footnote{“Charlotte Couple Chosen For Fallout Shelter Test,” News and Observer, 22 April 1961, sec. 1, 18; “In Mansion Shelter – Honeymoon Deal Offered,” News and Observer, 5 April 1961, sec. 1, 5.} The chosen couple would enter on 25 April at noon and exit on the morning of the twenty-eighth, the day of OPAL when citizens would be asked to stay inside and take cover for fifteen minutes. After being interviewed about their experience, the lucky couple would occupy the governor’s suite in the Sir Walter Hotel in Raleigh for Friday night and Saturday morning. While in the shelter the couple would send out press statements about their shelter experience to the state news media.\footnote{Ted Davis to Hargrove Bowles, 10 March 1961, folder labeled “Emergency Information Service – Test Exercise Participation 1961,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 10.}

Twenty couples applied for a chance to have an atomic honeymoon.\footnote{NCCD Newsletter, May 1961.} Thomas and Barbara McAden of Charlotte were chosen. Thomas worked as an interviewer for the Employment Security Commission in Charlotte while Barbara was the home furnishings editor for the Charlotte Observer. Her newspaper background probably had been the reason...
for the couple’s selection. In her application, Barbara noted how she had “written stories on civil defense and wondered about the human translation of defense plans,” and how “we would . . . face the experience in a way typical of the majority of Tar Heels. We have never ‘roughed it’ or camped out. We’re used to comfort and shelter living would be strange to us as to most couples.” This proved accurate.

The shelter they would occupy unquestionably lacked comfort. Occupants had only candles and lanterns for light, while a battery-powered radio served as the only communication. Since the shelter used a chemical toilet, the civil defense officials informed the couple that they “may slip upstairs . . . and use the more elaborate facilities in the mansion.” Both Thomas and Barbara wrote of their first impressions, and Barbara thereafter wrote the remainder of the reports. Thomas commented on the tight squeeze in the shelter and its Spartan conditions: “Never again will I take electricity for granted after being in darkness in a fall-out shelter.” He lamented having “no newspaper. The comic strip ‘Peanuts’ could help anyone’s morale and I can’t help wondering what Linus and Snoopy are doing.” This sacrifice aside, he concluded “despite inconveniences, shelter living is more comfortable than I had imagined.”

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1143 Pronounced “Mc ADD-en.” Thomas died of a heart illness in 1963. Barbara earned a BA from Winthrop College and a Masters in Journalism from Columbia University, left the Charlotte Observer after Thomas’s death and served as executive women’s editor for The State, South Carolina's largest newspaper, and the Columbia Record, both in Columbia, S.C. She retired from the Virginian-Pilot where she worked as the editor of the newspaper's special sections. She died of cancer 9 October 2002 in Virginia Beach.


1144 Telegram from Barbara Brawley McAden to Graham Jones, folder labeled “Civil Defense, L – P,” GTSP, NCA, Box 27. Presumably carbon monoxide issues were addressed through a ventilation system.


Barbara offered a more optimistic appraisal. The couple brought books, magazines, a typewriter, and warm clothes with them and the small confines of the shelter made for a stuffy atmosphere. She further detailed the shelter’s amenities, including to their “pleasant surprise, a small carpet on the concrete floor.” Barbara drove home the point that “We’re not here as a stunt. We’re serious about the test . . . Newspaper headlines and broadcasts of world news are staggering reminders that preparedness against radioactive fall-out is no joke. We’re convinced that this may be essential for our, and your, survival.”

Additional press releases detailed the cooking and eating arrangements of shelter life. Barbara announced that tepid soft drinks and canned foods were not too bad. “Although our sense of humor sparks the austerity of our quarters, we don’t consider this test a joke.”

The supply of Sterno for cooking, cleaning, and other uses became a problem as the supply rapidly depleted together with the supply of water in the shelter. The final portion of the shelter report adopted a more serious tone. Barbara wrote:

We suggest stocking a shelter with games, cards and only a Bible instead of additional reading matter. The light from candles and the battery lantern, even when combined, is inadequate for reading the small print on books and magazines.

We have remained busy by writing two stories a day about our shelter life. We suggest that other shelter dwellers keep a diary, write short stories, work crossword puzzles or use any type of mental activity that will absorb attention and make time elapse quickly. Otherwise, each moment of isolation might seem an hour.

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1149 “Report from the Fall-Out Shelter by Barbara B. McAden,” 26 April 1961, “Emergency Information Service – Test Exercise Participation 1961,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 10. Evening Report. Note, although this document has the same title and date as the previous one cited, this is a different press release and, based on the information in it, was written in the evening whereas the other was written earlier. I conclude this from the opening sentence: “We are dining by candlelight under the Governor’s Mansion.” To clarify, this report is referred to as “Evening Report,” the former as “Morning Report.”
This passage highlighted the tedium of shelter confinement, and Barbara alluded to what many Americans hoped, mainly that the “simulated war conditions will never be more than that – simulated.”

Barbara and Thomas McAden lived a unique experience for a few nights under the governor’s mansion. The event made front page news in Charlotte and Raleigh and garnered press coverage across the state, but Raleigh’s News and Observer relegated the story to the last page of the news section, titled “Couple Didn’t Follow All Rules.” The paper noted how the McAdens did not use the chemical toilet in the shelter but rather the servants’ bathroom in the mansion basement. The NCCD Newsletter clarified misconceptions about the McAden’s stay as reported in the media. Notably, although the shelter had electricity, the McAden’s chose to use candles and Sterno. The couple also chose to stay in the shelter, although the state agency explained that “occupants can go outside a fallout shelter for short intervals.” They recommended an increase in the water, food, and canned fuel supplies.

While a creative promotion for fallout shelters, the story of the McAden’s experience faded away after April. The McAdens’s stay in the governor’s shelter remains a significant fallout shelter anecdote, but North Carolina did not experience an upswing in shelter construction in the first half of 1961. Their dispatches exposed the shortcomings of a shelter designed for six: limited resources, tight confines, monotony, and primitive living.

Throughout the first half of 1961, all buildings in Raleigh were targeted in a survey as potential fallout shelter locations. The survey, funded by the OCDM, began on 15

December 1960 and focused on the public and private buildings of the capital city.\textsuperscript{1156} The federal government provided $22,400 for the work to “determine the amount of protection from radioactive fallout they [buildings] would afford in event of nuclear attack.” The survey intended to establish “a guide for other cities and towns of the State to use in evaluating their existing protection.”\textsuperscript{1157} Surveyors inventoried all non-federal buildings within the limits of the city and compiled a list of all existing and potential fallout shelters from January to June.\textsuperscript{1158} Civil defense officials released the results to select officials in October for “reference purposes,” but not to the general public.\textsuperscript{1159} With Raleigh’s daytime population at 115,512 citizens (with a nighttime population of 111,483), the survey provided a somewhat optimistic assessment. Before improvements, the total number of shelter spaces for citizens that would offer from fair to excellent protection against heavy fallout numbered 25,985, which would increase to 144,728 spaces if the existing structures were improved as shelters.\textsuperscript{1160} Initial data indicated Raleigh potentially possessed space for all of its citizens to be protected from fallout.

Average citizens, however, still appeared to lack information on what exactly to do regarding shelters. A flood of letters, telephone calls, and inquiries poured into the NCCD headquarters and the governor’s office in the days after Kennedy’s address on the Berlin Crisis. Griffin reported that the situation in Berlin filled the NCCD headquarters with shelter

\textsuperscript{1157}NCCD, Progress Report, 1 January 1959 – 1 January 1961, 9.
\textsuperscript{1160}OCDM, Report on Fallout Shelter Survey, Raleigh, viii-ix. Figures are taken from a map in the back of the report.
inquiries, adding “I’ve never seen anything like it.” County commissioners, however, repeatedly informed Spivey that they had no money for fallout shelters. “We got our funding [for emergency preparedness] because of shelters,” remembered Spivey, but nuclear defense remained irrelevant in the poorer rural counties. Sanford, unlike his predecessor, remained undereducated about civil defense particulars, and presumably this included disaster relief and its utility to the state. All of Sanford’s initial civil defense exposure contains the hallmarks of a dilettante inclined to defer to Griffin and the NCCD. Fallout protection henceforth became the face of the state civil defense effort, but not necessarily representative of its capabilities.

Practical Civil Defense Planning: The Dare County Experience

Spivey and the other area directors after almost a year of working with local governments found the shelter effort a dead end. Once a month, the directors would meet in Raleigh and talk off the record about problems in the various areas. At one of these meetings, Spivey recalled that the men agreed to “worry about something that can do some good in these emergencies, and that was building up emergency capabilities and communications.” Asked to elaborate on this discussion, Spivey continued:

What we were really saying was “what can we do to make an impact? We can sell emergency preparedness by selling stuff that is going to help, like better medical, better fire, better police and communications.” And I said, “This is the way we can do the most for civil defense by having someone that is capable at coping with things when they happen.” Some capability is worth a hell of a lot more than a few fallout shelters, and this was our consensus that if we want to be effective and do some good this is what we had to do.

1163 William D. Morrison to Terry Sanford, 11 July 1961, folder labeled “Civil Defense – B,” GTSP, NCA, Box 27.
1164 Ibid.
Griffin apparently did not know of this plan by the area directors, but other members of the state agency were informed of this decision to make fallout shelters secondary in importance to other emergency preparedness actions.\footnote{1165}

Another member of the NCCD staff sharing this viewpoint was Clifton E. Blalock. He joined the state agency in September 1959 as the assistant warning and communications officer.\footnote{1166} Born in Winston-Salem and raised in Durham, Blalock served in the Army Signal Corps through World War II, in Europe and the Pacific. Griffin approached Blalock, then the North Carolina National Guard 30th Division signal officer, for the position with the NCCD. At his home in Durham, Blalock corroborated the area directors’ agreement. He emphatically explained what Griffin failed to grasp, mainly that:

> nuclear defense was way in the background, so far as the local people were concerned. They were more concerned about hurricanes and forest fires . . . and if they found out that they could get some help in those areas then they were more receptive of this then they were for fallout shelters. There was no way in hell the area director could go sell a nuclear program to a bunch of local county commissioners. So they had to use what they could to develop the [civil defense] program.

Griffin, never an advocate of using civil defense resources for emergency preparedness work, failed to grasp what the NCCD staff recognized from its interactions with public officials.\footnote{1167}

One of the lagging state problems concerned creation of county and city operational survival plans. Area directors still had to urge and assist counties with development of these plans. By August 1961, forty-five counties still lacked them.\footnote{1168} These county plans would generally follow the outline of the state plan oriented towards nuclear preparedness. For the

\footnote{1165} Clifton E. Blalock, interview by author, Durham, N.C., 31 July 2008. Blalock corroborated Spivey’s account of the gentleman’s agreement to reduce shelter efforts in favor of emergency preparedness. Both men, when asked if the state director was told of this answered no and explained that Griffin was more of a political figurehead for the agency then an integral component of the state’s planning and development. Griffin may have been told, but if so there have not been any documents or sources indicating this.
\footnote{1166} 
\footnote{1167} NCCD Newsletter, September 1959.
\footnote{1168} Ibid.
\footnote{1168} NCCD Newsletter, August 1961.
coast, however, hurricanes and nor'easters posed annual threats, unlike the uncertain threat of fallout. In 1960, David Stick of Kitty Hawk became Chairman of the Dare County of Board of Commissioners. He recalled how civil defense officials then mandated “every county to prepare a defense plan, and especially to go out in my backyard and build a shelter since the Commies would hit here before they ever got to Raleigh. I felt this was the most asinine thing I ever heard.” Rather than pursue plans to ward against fallout, Stick secured permission to use the same survival plan outline, but with an orientation for hurricane response.¹¹⁶⁹

In July 1961, Dare County Civil Defense director and Sheriff Frank M. Cahoon called a meeting of the county Civil Defense Hurricane Committee to draft the new plan.¹¹⁷⁰ Stick wrote the Dare County Hurricane Preparedness Plan as a brief, three-page document to eliminate “confusing and overlapping advisories . . . and to vest in . . . the Dare County Director of Civil Defense – full and sole authority to issue advisories and warnings.”¹¹⁷¹ With the capability to be adapted for other types of emergencies, the plan met with approval by the NCCD. Stick explained that this plan became “the first hurricane preparedness plan in North Carolina.”¹¹⁷² As fate would have it, Hurricane Esther, the fifth hurricane of the 1961 Atlantic hurricane season passed within 150 miles of the Outer Banks on 18 – 20 September and provided an immediate test of the plan.¹¹⁷³

¹¹⁶⁹ David Stick, interview by author, Kitty Hawk, N.C., 11 June 2008.
¹¹⁷⁰ David Stick to Julian Oneto, 11 July 1961, folder labeled “11 – Civil Defense 1960s,” Town of Nags Head, Outer Banks History Center (OBHC), Manteo, North Carolina, Box 2.
¹¹⁷¹ David Stick to Lawrence L. Swain, 22 August 1961 with attached Preliminary Draft of the Dare County Hurricane Preparedness Plan, folder labeled “20 – Civil Defense Program,” Lawrence Swain Papers, OBHC, Box 2.
¹¹⁷² David Stick, interview by author, Kitty Hawk, N.C., 11 June 2008.
The best laid plans of mice and Stick went awry. Local officials used the plan to shelter residents and then attempt to evacuate tourists from Hatteras Island when things fell apart. Stick remembered the confusion clearly:

I was heading to Manteo down the beach and I turned on the radio and there was a news report. All ferries across Oregon Inlet had been pulled out and sent over to Manns Harbor. The second report was that the governor, Terry Sanford, had ordered everyone on Hatteras Island to evacuate. I worried more about that than anything that had ever happened in my experiences with hurricanes. I could see all of these tourists parked in their cars on the exposed beach, lined up for a mile on exposed beach south of Oregon Inlet when the hurricane hit. Fortunately it missed us, but it was frightening. Somehow or another they didn’t get the word in Raleigh that we had a plan, and their plan called for exactly the opposite. It was too late to evacuate, and it was the season of the year when there weren’t that many tourists on Hatteras Island.1174

Fortunately, Esther passed by the Outer Banks without inflicting any injury or loss of life but the lack of coordination between the local and state civil defense officials about emergency planning illustrated that issues far deeper than shelters required attention.

Problems with communications did not affect Dare County alone. Spivey observed that when he began as Area A director, over half of the twenty-two counties, Dare included, lacked radio communications of any kind. Notwithstanding the substantial investment in communications in the late 1950s, holes in radio networks remained. For example, Hyde County used a single, four-party telephone line for all of its emergency, police, and fire department communications. Few professional fire departments existed in parts of eastern and western North Carolina, and those that did “generally consisted of an old tanker pumper with a handful of people.”1175 The state civil defense agency recognized the significance of

1174 David Stick, interview by author, Kitty Hawk, N.C., 11 June 2008; “Dare’s CD Storm Plan Disrupted,” News and Observer, 21 September 1961. Stick did not indicate in his interview that he was discussing Hurricane Esther. The newspaper article matched his description almost exactly, and as such corroborated his account of events.
these problems before Esther closed in, and that “survival will . . . depend upon sound establishment of . . . the emergency services. . . .” Perhaps as a nod to the work of Spivey and the area directors, the NCCD Newsletter reported the agency was “pushing further development of Emergency Services just as fast as the changeover at [the] federal level permits, which will benefit local level services to some extent.”

Development of such services remained fundamental to civil defense operations, with a greater practicality than shelters. Stick’s experience showed him that communication foul-ups during a small storm threatened the safety of coastal residents and that even tailor-made plans could be nullified in an instant. Area civil defense directors statewide had decided to promote emergency preparedness, communications, and improvements in fire and police departments rather than sell an expensive, inflexible emergency item like shelters. North Carolinians on the whole viewed fallout shelters as unimportant, panic-inducing, and expensive follies. Repeated natural disasters provided ample evidence that only those civil defense resources addressing these types of threats stood a chance of support from officials and taxpayers. A significant difference in the early 1960s was that the increasing danger of possible nuclear attack moved fallout shelters to the top of the state and federal agenda. As the rhetoric and actions of the Soviet Union increased in belligerency and Kennedy called for massive civil defense increases, the public could not help but at least consider shelters. Many debated the merits of shelters and learned about them, but few citizens started digging.

_North Carolina, the Nation, and Fallout Shelters: 1961 – Summer 1962_

Fallout shelters served to protect occupants only from fallout and this protection came at considerable cost, a hefty investment for something of questionable necessity.

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1176 NCCD Newsletter, September 1961.
Unfortunately for the majority of homeowners, in early August Griffin announced that the “cost of fallout shelter construction cannot be deducted from either North Carolina Income Tax or Ad Valorem Tax.”¹¹⁷⁷ Considering that the median family income in 1961 was only $5,315, any way to defray shelter costs became a crucial determinant to most citizens’ decision to build one.¹¹⁷⁸ Although the executive mansion shelter cost less than $300, the mansion’s basement already provided a degree of protection, thereby reducing the overall investment. The McAden’s description certainly did not paint an appealing picture of the austere living in a cramped space.

Modern postwar suburbs did not prove advantageous for shelter construction. The little boxes of ticky-tacky were often single-story homes built quickly on flat, inexpensive land. This removed the need for basements and allowed the construction of homes in record time.¹¹⁷⁹ For homeowners without basements or citizens who rented or lived in apartments, shelter construction costs were considerably greater, or the shelters impossible to establish. From 20 July to 20 August 1961, Griffin reported construction of approximately 5,000 private shelters in the state at an increasing pace.¹¹⁸⁰ How many North Carolinians lived in homes with basements is not known, but the majority of homes in the state lacked them, leaving their owners at a distinct economic disadvantage when pursuing the construction of a shelter.

Community shelters offered an alternative for fallout protection. In Washington, N.C., residents joined together to build shelters for neighborhood blocks. In October, Spivey inspected five community shelters he helped establish in the town. Locals constructed one shelter completely underground with room for ninety; another was built half underground, mounded over with earth for fifty residents. Two other shelters had room for twenty and twenty-five people respectively, and the final above ground shelter with double walls had space for a hundred. This community shelter work gained national attention when Pittman recognized the effort in Congressional testimony in February 1962. The success in Washington, N.C. begs the question of whether or not citizens would support or even construct such shelters had Spivey not been manning the Area A office. Optimistically his presence and work convinced locals of the value of shelters. Pessimistically, one can ask why other communities in his area did not do the same.

Institutional fallout shelters provided another viable option to fill gaps in the system. Duke Hospital and University in Durham, Western High School in Elon, Kirkman Parks School in High Point, and the Onslow County Public Library in Jacksonville were selected for a pilot design study by the Office of Civil Defense for community fallout shelters. Duke University itself developed a plan to provide shelter space for the entire campus community of 25,000 individuals. After organizing a Fallout Preparedness Committee in July 1961, a year later the committee reported locating space for 50,000 people, double the size of the university community. The Gothic, masonry campus buildings provided ideal

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1184 NCCD Newsletter, June 1962.
fallout shelter space with excellent shielding from radiation. Duke and Durham County’s work proved the pinnacle of community shelter planning in North Carolina, but they were anomalies. If private shelter would not suffice, Kennedy’s Office of Civil Defense readied its main effort: mass, public fallout shelters.

On the heels of another round of Holifield civil defense hearings and budgetary discussions, the Berlin Crisis evolved again. In the darkness of the first minutes of 13 August, the East German police without warning began to erect barbed wire into what would become a permanent wall around West Berlin. Within days, bricks and mortar replaced the wire. The Berlin Wall caught Kennedy and Western Europe completely by surprise. Rather than express panic, Kennedy saw the wall as lessening tension rather than increasing it, telling his assistant Kenneth O’Donnell that “a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.” The president, holding firm on defense, urged McNamara to push ahead with the national civil defense program. To supplement, and, more accurately, compensate for the lack of home fallout shelters, the federal government implemented a National Fallout Shelter Survey (NFSS).

Weeks after construction of Die Mauer, civil defense officials commenced work on the NFSS in North Carolina. The NCCD released an appeal for architects and engineers to apply for training in fallout shelter analysis and surveying in October. A total of 33

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1186 Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin War, 106. Historian Frederick Taylor observes that none of the three major western powers – U.S, Britain, and France – “were decisively opposed to the division of Berlin. On the contrary, we now have considerable evidence that, since they could not reunify Germany in a way they could tolerate, the West’s leaders went along with the construction of the Wall. It was unpleasant and cruel, but it removed a continuing, serious danger to stability in Europe.” See Frederick Taylor, The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961 – 1989 (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), xxi.
1187 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 72-77.
volunteers received formal training to conduct an entire state survey scheduled to begin in December. Working in teams of two, the architects and engineers would conduct an initial survey on buildings that appeared to provide a protection factor of twenty and accommodate fifty people (at ten square feet per person). The shelters required a protection factor (PF) of one hundred or greater and capacity for fifty or more persons. Each person would be provided with ten square feet of space with ventilation, or five hundred cubic feet without ventilation, and one cubic foot of storage space for food, water, and supplies.

The Defense Department shelter survey would be implemented in two distinct phases. Unlike the earlier Raleigh survey by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization which took several months for one city, this new survey would be “completed as soon as practicable” for the entire nation, and the DoD utilized the Bureau of the Census computers to rapidly process the survey data. Phase I for the survey had four objectives: surveyors would calculate the local population and inventory potential public fallout shelters; collect shielding data for computer analysis of PF ratings; produce data printouts for PF and shelter

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1188 NCCD press release, “Architect and Engineer Applicants Sought for Fallout Shelter Analysis Training Course,” 10 October 1961, folder labeled “Press Releases – 1961 – 62,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 11. In December 1961, Griffin sent out a memorandum to all civil defense directors in North Carolina. He asked the directors to help the architect-engineer teams obtain the permission of property owners for building inspections. The memorandum included an attached “fill-in-the-blank” press release so the local press could spread the word about the program. Ten days later, the state agency released the names of the firms selected to conduct the survey, with the state divided up into nine districts, each with its own assigned architectural-engineering firm to begin the surveying at the start of 1962. See NCCD press release, “Firms Selected to Conduct NC Fallout Shelter Survey,” 29 December 1961, folder labeled “Press Releases – 1961 – 62,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 11.

1189 Fallout protection factors (PF) are defined as the ratio of gamma radiation exposure at a standard unprotected location to exposure at a protected location. The standard unprotected location would be a point three feet above a smooth plane uniformly covered in fallout. People in a shelter with a PF of 100 would receive less than one percent the radiation of an unprotected person. The higher the PF for a shelter, the safer the shelter would be for the occupants. See John Dowling and Evans M. Harrell, eds., *Civil Defense: A Choice of Disasters* (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1987), 69-72.


capacity for each structure; and secure shelter license or privilege agreements from building owners. For Phase II, surveyors would enter the structures and reexamine the shelter space recorded, marking shelters that provided PF 100 or greater; determine the feasibility and preliminary cost estimates for improving designated shelter areas; and survey selected special facilities, such as mines, caves, tunnels, and subways.\footnote{1192} Upon completion of both phases, the marked shelters would be stocked with supplies to provide each shelter occupant ten thousand calories of food and three and a half gallons of water for two weeks. Medical supplies, radiation measurement instruments, sanitation facilities, and engineering tools would complement the sustenance supplies provided by the federal government.\footnote{1193}

In January 1962 the fallout shelter survey began making its initial forays into North Carolina. On 17 January, Griffin announced that Raleigh had been selected as one of only fourteen cities in the continental United States to be part of a pilot test for the national shelter survey. Known as Operation Shelter One, the project aimed at marking and stocking shelters in buildings offering protection for fifty or more citizens.\footnote{1194} As explained by McNamara, the pilot project’s purpose was to “learn . . . what we need to know about the unpredictable practical problems in the operations” planned in the national survey to avoid obstacles in the full-scale survey. The test run would also help determine “how to divide responsibility between the Federal Government and State and local governments.”\footnote{1195} Operation Shelter One made Raleigh the first city in the state with marked and stocked public fallout shelters, and unquestionably the city with the most shelter spaces in the state. The operation resulted

\footnote{1192} Hearings, Civil Defense – 1962, Part II, 583.
\footnote{1193} Ibid., 591. For specifics on the supplies, see ibid., 602-11.
\footnote{1195} House Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense – 1962, 13.
nationwide in 141 buildings marked and stocked for 92,793 persons. In Raleigh, surveyors located 12 “state operated buildings,” all subsequently licensed, marked and stocked with space for 4,952 persons.

Kennedy had promised in his 25 July speech to provide information to the American people about fallout and shelters. Initially, he had envisioned a shelter instruction booklet sent to every home in America; but by September 1961, cracks began to appear in this vision. Initial drafts of the booklet raised considerable controversy among the president’s top advisors, scientists, and technicians. The initial draft, written by a *Time-Life* team, “contained terrorizing pictures, fatuous assurances, useless instructions, and an expectation of nuclear war,” recalled Kennedy speechwriter and historian Theodore C. Sorensen. Economist John Kenneth Galbraith reviewed a draft of the booklet and told Kennedy, “The present pamphlet is a design for saving Republicans and sacrificing Democrats,” adding “I am not at all attracted by a pamphlet which seeks to save the better elements of the population, but in the main writes off those who voted for you.”

In a meeting at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts on 24 November, Kennedy and his advisers reevaluated the booklet and the shape of the national civil defense program for the

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coming year. As the talks unfolded, Pittman recalled an emphasis on “the necessity for the governors to agree to take responsibility for informing the public and giving direction.” He noted how “the prospect of implementing a major civil defense program was clearly unappetizing to the President and his senior advisers.” Kennedy agreed that if McNamara felt the civil defense shelter program feasible, he could proceed with it. The president opted for a follow-through on his May speech by requesting $700 million in the coming year predominately to provide financial incentives for community shelters in schools, hospitals, and public institutions, henceforth making such shelters the emphasis for Kennedy’s civil defense effort. After debate, the officials agreed to edit the booklet from one hundred pages down to twenty-four, prefaced by a letter from McNamara instead of Kennedy. Following Hyannis Port, Kennedy’s public support for civil defense and shelters would be filtered through Pittman and McNamara. Although Kennedy initially began taking a greater leadership role with civil defense, after a few months the costs in political and defense resources became impractical and unpalatable to the young president.

In December, the Department of Defense published the promised civil defense booklet titled *Fallout Protection: What to Know and Do About Nuclear Attack*. Originally planned at a printing of 60 million copies, in the aftermath of Hyannis Port this shrank to 25 million, sent in bulk to U.S. post offices and local civil defense offices for public

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1201 For an excellent discussion and summary of the Hyannis Port civil defense talks, see Blanchard, “Evolution of Programs and Policies,” 308-10.  
consumption. Federal civil defense officials for Region III instructed the state civil
defense offices not to display the booklet in post office lobbies, or advertise it. Instead, any
person who requested the booklet from a Postmaster would receive one.

Distribution of *Fallout Protection* in North Carolina commenced in January 1962 and
revealed a major downturn in public interest. The *Raleigh Times* wrote of a “rather frosty
reception” for the booklets, with only 700 out of 6,250 copies being distributed in the first
weeks of January. Charlotte obtained 24,000 copies for city-wide distribution, but by 14
February residents only requested 6,000 copies. Greensboro civil defense officials, despite
Region III’s request, heavily advertized the booklet on radio and television, with 125 public
service announcements aired offering to mail copies to viewers. A mere 798 residents out of
a viewing area of over 120,000 responded, which did not inspire hope in future private
shelter construction. To “build” off of *Fallout Protection*, the OCD in February released
another booklet, *Family Shelter Designs*, containing blueprints for eight different types of
fallout shelters. These designs, ranging in price from $75 to $650, provided families and
communities options, but the OCD only printed a scant five million copies.

The dearth of public enthusiasm for either publication was attributed by some DoD
investigators to a general lack of interest in shelters. In Washington, D.C., the local chapter of
the Federation of American Scientists declared that the booklet “gives a false hope of

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1206 “U.S. Modifies Plan on Shelter Data,” *NYT*, 1 January 1962, 7; “Shelter Book Mailed,” *NYT*, 3 January
1962, 31.
1207 *NCCD Newsletter*, January 1962.
1210 *NCCD Newsletter*, June 1962.
protection from nuclear attack,” among other criticisms. Michigan State University, working under a Defense Department contract, closely studied public reaction to the booklet. The investigators looked at eight cities, including Chapel Hill, N.C. The investigation revealed that only 1.4 percent of respondents built a shelter, and 52 percent neither had plans for nor thought about doing so. The lead investigator concluded that perhaps 13 percent of the nation’s urban population even noticed the booklet, and less than seven percent read it. If Kennedy originally envisioned informing the masses to spur them to act and build shelters, then clearly the effort failed miserably. Construction of the Berlin Wall diminished the threat of war and debates over who would survive and what the post-attack world would be like.

Another major component of the explanation for the flop of Fallout Protection can be found in the energetic public debates about shelters after Kennedy’s public statements. The moral dilemma for shelter owners surged to the forefront of the shelter debate in August 1961 when Time published an article titled “Gun Thy Neighbor.” The article gave examples in which people were prepared to use deadly force to defend their shelters with statements on shelter ethics from Christian church leaders, both for and against the use of force to protect

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themselves before their neighbors.\textsuperscript{1217} North Carolina native Reverend Billy Graham publicly denounced “gun thy neighbor,” declaring “I couldn’t take a shotgun and sit in front of my shelter and shoot other people, nor could I see them dying outside. I feel I should be out with them.”\textsuperscript{1218}

Media attention about civil defense stimulated discussion over the morality of shelters. Kennedy’s July address to the nation garnered notable media attention on the topic of civil defense. \textit{Life} and \textit{Time} magazine articles about civil defense in September and October 1961 generated questions about the practicality and overly optimistic outlook for shelter survival.\textsuperscript{1219} On television, an episode of \textit{The Twilight Zone}, titled “The Shelter,” encapsulated some of the public debate of the period.\textsuperscript{1220} First aired on 29 September, the episode revolved around what would happen if only one fallout shelter existed in the neighborhood, but possessed room for only a few occupants.\textsuperscript{1221} After increasing disagreement and desperation overcome the panicking resident, they agree to break into the shelter and the once peaceful neighbors come close to destroying themselves.\textsuperscript{1222}

The episode posed the moral dilemma of what a shelter owner should do about unprotected neighbors in a nuclear attack. Raleigh resident Ted Stevenson recalled the morality issues in the experiences of a neighbor who had built a fallout shelter for his family. In a discussion at the local Baptist church, “the neighbors wanted to know if an attack was

\textsuperscript{1218} “Fallout Shelters are Scorned by Graham,” \textit{Asheville News}, 12 March 1962.
\textsuperscript{1220} Rod Serling, writer and creator of the program, had been taking bids for a shelter in his own home, but abandoned the idea when informed if the shelter failed he lacked recourse. This incident helped inspire the script of the episode. See Joel Engel, \textit{Rod Serling: The Dreams and Nightmares of Life in the Twilight Zone} (New York: Contemporary Books, 1989), 223.
\textsuperscript{1221} Rose, \textit{One Nation Underground}, 110-111; Garrison, \textit{Bracing for Armageddon}, 118.
imminent; could they come in to the shelter?” The shelter owners stated that the shelter had room for only the family and that once he locked the door, it would not be opened again. This caused a falling out among neighbors, noted Stevenson, musing that “people thought it was silly to have a shelter.”  

William F. Abee of Belmont referenced “The Shelter” in a letter to Sanford. Abee, himself the owner of a shelter thirty-five feet below ground, ominously wrote that in an attack

You will see how quickly I am swamped with those people that thought that they didn’t need a shelter. It will be like it was in Twilight Zone last night. . . . That can happen to us that have these shelters and that is one reason I am asking you now if you don’t believe there should be some sort of pressure put on the people if they don’t willingly build . . . shelters so that rush on us that have [shelters] won’t happen as bad as it can now.  

Abee’s shelter advocacy by invoking the threat of panic caught Griffin’s attention, and he forwarded the letter to Sanford’s legal assistant, Joel L. Fleishman. In Griffin’s opinion, “a statement dealing with the critical times and urging all citizens to prepare for a civil emergency by Governor Sanford would be most appropriate and helpful in our efforts to arouse the people as to their responsibility for survival.” The governor issued no such statement, but he did send a letter to mayors state-wide urging counties to update and strengthen, or commence development of survival plans, “so that your constituents may have an equal chance of survival with citizens of other communities who have such plans.”

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1224 William F. Abee to Terry Sanford, 29 September 1961, folder labeled “Civil Defense Bulletins,” GTSP, NCA, Box 27.
1225 Edward F. Griffin to Joel L. Fleishman, 9 October 1961, folder labeled “Civil Defense Bulletins,” GTSP, NCA, Box 27.
1226 Open letter from Terry Sanford, 3 November 1961, folder labeled “Civil Defense Bulletins,” GTSP, NCA, Box 27; Terry Sanford to Julian Oneto, 3 November 1961, folder labeled “11 – Civil Defense, 1960s,” Town of Nags Head, OBHC, Box 2. This is the same letter as the unaddressed version in Governor
As the debates about shelters occurred, confusion reigned about what exactly Americans needed to do to survive nuclear attack. The *Leaksville News* declared:

Almost everyone today is an amateur physicist and we all seem to know about fallout. True, we can build a fallout shelter. Tomorrow it may be obsolete and without a clearcut policy we, the citizens, are having to be our own Civilian Defense experts who will make our own errors and either sink or swim in proportion as we can recover from our errors and the results they produce. Who will foot the fallout shelter bill? Will the fallout shelter be obsolete as quickly as was the theory of evacuation?1227

Federal, state, and local civil defense units educated North Carolinians about fallout and shelters for years, but apparently they failed to clearly articulate the matter to the public. Kennedy, caught off guard by the backlash over civil defense, distanced himself from the debates, promised to support McNamara and Pittman, but otherwise left state civil defense agencies to shoulder the burden of educating and selling civil defense to the public.

Complicating this work was public division over the merits of shelters. In Burlington, Elmer Workman told Senator Benjamin Everett Jordan (D–NC) that he “would like to go on record as being opposed to spending Federal money in any way shape or form on Fallout Shelters.”1228 R. S. Nooe wrote both state senators, adamant in his belief that “people cannot live together in public fallout shelters. Neither can they live together in private fallout shelters. These things are of no practical value, and the protection that you get in your own

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house or in your own apartment building is as good protection as you would get in a public fallout shelter.”

Publicly, Griffin and Sanford used their positions to sustain a positive opinion of shelters. In March 1962, the NCCD declared that “until somebody offers a sound alternative to the precautionary measures now advocated by our government, the shelter system will continue to move forward.” Griffin reported to the county and city directors that “the home fallout shelter should not be sidetracked in favor of public shelters. It is the basic component of the shelter system.” To further defuse anti-shelter rhetoric, the state agency armed the local civil defense directors with a “questions and answers” handout to clarify misconceptions or doubts about the survey.

Initial NFSS results did not provide encouraging hope for mass fallout protection. In May 1962, surveyors completed Phase I of the national survey. In North Carolina, surveyors examined a total of 2,842 buildings, deeming 2,141 acceptable, with 457 licensed for use as public fallout shelters. Of the accepted buildings, 800 provided PF 100 or greater, totaling a potential 292,300 shelter spaces. The 1960 census measured North Carolina’s population as 4,556,155 persons, 1,802,000 categorized as urban and 2,754,000 as rural. Ergo, a total of 6.4 percent of the state population could be sheltered in areas with a

1230 NCCD Newsletter, March 1962.
1232 NCCD Newsletter, May 1962.
A number of counties surveyed had no suitable shelter spaces. In a notice to local civil defense directors, the NCCD optimistically looked at the low numbers and concluded that “in any case, the citizens of the county should have the facts – about what is or is not available, what can be made available and what is proposed for their best security.” Rural North Carolina stood apart as the greatest obstacle to civil defense planners. Without the sturdy, masonry buildings of urban areas, rural residents had to either turn to community or construct private shelters for fallout protection.

The information campaign failed as fallout shelters remained a confusing and unsettling topic for discussion. Despite the assurances of state and federal officials, the distributed information and national debates did little to help assuage fears or concerns about the practicality, cost, or feasibility. Unsurprisingly, the same public concerns affected Kennedy and his closest advisers questioning the messages of the national shelter program. With presidential enthusiasm for civil defense ebbing, by the end of 1961 fallout shelters remained a civil defense priority, but with this effort directed to community and state action, accompanied by federal financial assistance. The community shelter program, rather than private shelters, preoccupied civil defense officials and moderately tempered the public debate. Fallout Protection’s lukewarm reception indicated this shift in opinion. Questions and uncertainty about shelters remained in the early months of 1962. Early NFSS returns indicated a majority of state residents needed private shelters. Kennedy’s grand civil defense program appeared to be another federal folly.

1235 OCD, Annual Statistical Report, Fiscal Year 1962, 8.
1236 NCCD Newsletter, June 1962. Emphasis in original.
1237 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 97; Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 124; Sorensen, Kennedy, 616-17. Pittman wrote that “By the time the [civil defense shelter] program was announced in January, 1962, schizophrenia at a high level in the Administration had not only become a fact but had registered with the Washington press corps and congressional leaders.” See Wigner, Who Speaks for Civil Defense, 55.
Beginning in January 1962, the president further retreated from open promotion of shelters. He asked Americans to “concentrate on keeping enemy bombers and missiles away from our shores and less on keeping neighbors away from our shelters.” Historians Elizabeth and Jay Mechling observe that “by the spring of 1962, Americans were over their brief panic and the issue of fallout shelters again became moot.” Kennedy’s retreat and the apparent resolution of the Berlin Crisis contributed to over six hundred home fallout shelter firms failing nationwide. The intense public discussions on fallout shelters in the fall of 1961 convinced many Americans that there would never be enough fallout shelters and that they were probably ineffective anyway.

Local civil defense directors also questioned the accuracy of the national shelter survey after the Phase I data indicated almost no potential shelter space in rural North Carolina. In July, Griffin affirmed how “it becomes increasingly apparent that suitable shelters identified by the survey . . . are located largely in population centers. . . .” He reminded the directors that the national program was meant to last five years. In the meantime, “since none of us may reasonably predict if, or when we may be subjected to nuclear attack . . . we must continue to advocate maximum construction of family and community shelters. . . . For the foreseeable future the family shelter may be the only practical means” to protect rural citizens. Considering the lack of targets in the rural portions of the state, the cost of shelter construction, a sense of isolation, and lack of public buildings, it is not surprising that few rural residents built shelters.

1238 Hine, Populuxe, 138.
1241 NCCD Newsletter, July 1963.
A possible solution existed in the federal Shelter Incentive Program (SIP). As agreed upon in November 1961, the president intended this program as the keystone for his five-year shelter effort. The incentive program, as explained by McNamara to a House Military Operations subcommittee in February 1962, would cost $460 million.\textsuperscript{1242} The federal government would partially fund the construction of public fallout shelters in health, educational, and welfare institutions; the FY 1963 appropriation could create community shelter space for twenty million people. The SIP would provide $25 with the states funding the additional $15 to reach the estimated $40 cost to build one, ten-square foot shelter space per person.\textsuperscript{1243} The shelters would have PF 100 protection, space for at least fifty persons, and be immediately available for public use in an emergency.\textsuperscript{1244} Both the SIP and NFSS, if fully-funded and supported, promised creation or establishment of 233 million shelter spaces by FY 1967 at a total federal cost of $3.5 billion dollars.\textsuperscript{1245}

Congress, unmoved, dismembered the program. A House appropriations subcommittee chaired by Congressman Albert Thomas (D–TX) – a long-time civil defense foe – eliminated the entire $460 million incentive program request in June 1962. Pittman’s testimony did not change Thomas’s negative opinions on civil defense. Thomas also took the unusual step of inviting non-government witnesses to testify in opposition to civil defense, many of whom informed the subcommittee that civil defense was an expensive failure and

\textsuperscript{1242} The state civil defense agencies were informed of the Shelter Incentive Program before the Subcommittee hearings. See Office of Civil Defense Region III to all civil defense directors on Federal Incentives Program for Provision of Fallout Shelters, 1 February 1962, attached to \textit{NCCD Newsletter}, February 1962.


\textsuperscript{1244} Ibid., 156.

\textsuperscript{1245} Ibid., 29-31.
would provoke a war. Kennedy, after months of silence, spoke for civil defense on 5 July 1962, stating “I have talked to the responsible officials involved . . . I hope we will secure the money we requested [for the SIP].” The president’s words did not affect Congress and the House Appropriations Committee excised the incentive program from the OCD budget request, voting to approve a federal civil defense budget of $75 million for FY 1963. The committee requested “more study and research” before approving of the incentive program. Following Senate hearings in August and compromises with the House, the final Office of Civil Defense budget for FY 1963 contained $36 million to continue the NFSS, but the SIP was effectively dead for the time being.

Griffin and the NCCD did find some public success with continuity of government legislation. In 1959, for constitutional reasons the NCCD failed to establish continuity of government procedures for mass appointments. In April 1961, Griffin addressed a joint meeting of the General Assembly House and Senate Committees on Constitutional Amendments on the need for changes to Article XIV, Section 6 of the state constitution to make the permanent seat of state government be Raleigh, thereby allowing the state government to evacuate the city and continue operating in event of an emergency at a

The General Assembly passed two bills in May, one to amend the state constitution to ensure continuity of government and another to submit the amendments to the public for vote in the general election of 1962. The state civil defense agency initiated a publicity campaign to educate the public, blanketing radio and television stations with informational announcements about the amendment, warning that continuity of government is essential in the nuclear age, for “unless Civil Government survives, there will be chaos.” Griffin’s work, unlike the fallout shelter effort, yielded results on 6 November when voters approved the amendment.

Shelter survey work continued in the summer of 1962. Analysis of the returned data undermines the results. Between 30 June and 15 September, the surveys identified 1,534 more buildings in North Carolina that offered at least fair protection from heavy fallout. These potential shelters had a capacity for 348,645. Unfortunately, only 998 shelter licenses had been processed state-wide. Shelters with PF 100 or greater numbered a scant 368. From these licensed PF 100 or greater shelters, the survey had provided public shelter space for 2.8 percent of the state’s residents. Although licensed to become fallout shelters, the necessary marking signs and supplies would not begin to be installed until early October.

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1252 The bills in question concern Chapters 466 and 992 for the 1961 Session of the North Carolina General Assembly. See North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1961, S.B. 154, Chapter 466; S.B. 458, Chapter 992.
1255 NCCD, Progress Report, 1961 – 1963, 22. The exact number of spaces in licensed shelters was 125,957.
Barely eight percent of the state’s resident population had adequate fallout shelter space available, the vast majority of it unprepared for use.\footnote{OCD, \textit{Annual Statistical Report, Fiscal Year 1962}, 3-7. The N.C. residential population as of 30 June 1962 was 4,556,155. The percentage of shelter spaces was calculated by using the figures from the NCCD, \textit{Progress Report, 1961 – 1963}, which listed 348,645 spaces providing protection factors greater than 100. The state report did list 1,303,332 spaces with protection factors from twenty to ninety-nine, but since one hundred was the standard to provide fair protection in heavy fallout, this data was not used for calculation purposes. The OCD did lower the acceptable protection factor for fallout shelters to forty during the Cuban Missile Crisis as a means to boost the number of spaces available, but for purposes here it is not included.} By October 1962, thanks to Operation Shelter One, Raleigh seems to have been the only city in the state with stocked shelters, and this was enough for only four percent of the city occupants.

The North Carolina civil defense effort found itself in an odd position. Citizens supported preparedness in government continuity should a national emergency envelop the state, and looked favorably to natural disaster preparedness. In the area of nuclear preparedness against fallout, citizens did not enthusiastically grab shovels and commence digging. All the evidence pointed to a reliance on government, be it local, state, or federal to address emergencies and provide and fund nuclear preparedness measures. Once the Berlin Crisis faded from memory and the flames of public debate on shelters flickered out, private fallout shelters lost importance and value. The National Fallout Shelter Survey did not locate a significant number of shelters for even a quarter of state residents. Rural residents lacked shelters in any calculable number, but the threat of attack to counties more prone to extreme weather than nuclear attack consigned shelters to the category of frivolous expenses. As fate would have it, another coastal disaster served to divert attention to addressing coastal erosion once again.

\textit{The Ash Wednesday Storm and Sanford}

In the early morning hours of 7 March 1962, an unusual extra-tropical cyclone, a rare winter nor’easter, blasted the eastern coast of the United States. Striking without warning...
from the North Carolina coast to Cape Cod, the “coincidence of high storm surges and waves in conjunction with high astronomical tides” created a perfect storm. The storm caused damage estimated at greater than $200 million and destroyed approximately 1,800 buildings along the east coast. Christened the “Ash Wednesday Storm” for its arrival on the first day of Lent, the nor’easter devastated Currituck, Dare, and Hyde counties. Stick, chairman of the Dare County Board of Commissioners and NCCD Area A director Spivey found themselves in leadership roles in the disaster. Civil defense officials still experienced communications problems, but Sanford’s reaction to the coastal erosion problems demonstrated a continuity of action through governorships in regard to natural disasters.

As the storm churned up the surf on 7 March, Stick at first did not recognize its power. Leaving his home on Colington Island before noon with his three sons, Stick headed to Kitty Hawk School in his Jeep station wagon and chose to see what conditions were like by the water. In Kill Devil Hills, near the Avalon Beach bypass, his vehicle drowned out. “The stupidest thing I ever did,” he remembered. “The water came up in the car and we watched a cottage over by the ocean disintegrate and then the various parts came by us on both sides, though fortunately none hit us.” After a fearful hour, a friend pulled Stick’s vehicle to safety. With his sons safely away, Stick headed to the school, the pre-designated disaster control center, and “from then on I didn’t leave that school for about two or three days,” he recalled.

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1257 When the sun, moon, and earth are aligned, this can produce a Spring Tide, the highest tide possible.
1259 Stick, *Ash Wednesday Storm*, 64.
1260 David Stick, interview by author, Kitty Hawk, N.C., 11 June 2008.
1261 Ibid.
Back on the mainland, Spivey received word about the storm via HAM radio. The call came from an operator in Manteo early in the morning and was sent to another HAM in Raleigh, who then relayed the message to Spivey about how badly conditions were deteriorating. “I threw a couple things in the car and took off, and I managed to get down there,” recollected Spivey. He met with Dare County Sheriff and Civil Defense director Frank M. Cahoon and “the big problem was that the Sheriff didn’t know, and I didn’t know, and nobody knew what had happened on the Banks, because there was no communication. We didn’t know if Ocracoke was still there or not.”

Spivey notified the NCCD in Raleigh of the situation along the Outer Banks, and the state civil defense headquarters contacted Sanford’s office. Ninety miles southeast of Cape Hatteras, near Ocracoke, the 501-foot Liberian tanker Gem broke in half that evening, killing one aboard. Hatteras Village at this point became an island, as the storm tore a 200-foot-wide, 50-foot deep inlet between Avon and Buxton. With roads impassible, Spivey called for reinforcements.

Using the HAM operators, Spivey sent a message to Congressman Herbert C. Bonner (D–NC) requesting three helicopters from Cherry Point Marine Air Station to fly to Manteo. Stick, along with Cahoon and county commissioner Lawrence Swain later requested an additional three helicopters to be sent to Kitty Hawk. Arriving on the morning of 8 March, Spivey and Cahoon “ran the area to find out whether Ocracoke was still

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1265 David W. Spivey, interview by author, Washington, N.C., 18 April 2008; Stick, Ash Wednesday Storm, 95. The inlet was three miles north of Buxton, but grew to six hundred feet wide and twelve feet deep after several months. See “Park Service Asks Increase in Funds for Hatteras Dunes,” Virginian-Pilot, 6 April 1962.
1266 Ibid.
1267 Stick, Ash Wednesday Storm, 92.
there and who was what and where. It was the first time that we really knew how bad it had been torn up,” said the area director. Stick added that “the bypass [US-158] was washed out at Nags Head.” Residents flew in the helicopters along the banks to assist the crews in scouting for marooned motorists and other survivors. Spivey got word to the Highway Patrol to send patrolmen to the coast and the North Carolina National Guard arrived with a contingent of eighty-five guardsmen to set up check points, assist with rescue efforts, and maintain law and order.

With the situation beginning to stabilize, the extent of damages warranted federal assistance. By 10 March, Stick and the Dare County Board of Commissioners held an emergency session and passed a resolution requesting that Sanford declare the county a disaster area. Sanford issued a proclamation on Thursday declaring a state of emergency in Currituck, Dare, and Hyde counties and he conferred with Office of Emergency Planning Area III director Thomas H. Goodman, Griffin, and several other officials to access the situation along the coast. Goodman and R.B. Van Dame, natural disaster director for OEP, praised the emergency program put into action by the NCCD and Dare County as the “best coordinated disaster program” they had yet seen. Initial damage estimates tentatively totaled $10 million to private property, with $1.5 to $2 million in public losses. Following the

1271 David Stick to Terry Sanford, 10 March 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Storm – March 7,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141.
1273 Press release from the Governor’s Office, 12 March 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense, A – Z,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141.
meeting, Sanford wired Kennedy requesting a major disaster declaration for the three counties, issued on 16 March.1274

Damage surveys revealed the nor’easter’s fury. The Army Corps of Engineers deemed the storm “most unusual in behavior and most devastating to the beaches, dunes and barrier islands. This storm combined with spring tides probably destroyed more beach and dune than any other previous storm.”1275 The nor’easter damaged a total of 1,282 buildings in the communities of Southern Shores, Kill Devil Hills, Kitty Hawk, and Nags Head.1276 Along the Cape Hatteras National Seashore, the storm destroyed an estimated 75 percent of the dunes on Bodie and Hatteras Islands and left the newly created Buxton Inlet.1277 Sanford informed Kennedy on 26 March that state damage surveys estimated losses to private property in excess of $10 million, and public property damages estimated at $4.5 million. The governor requested a total of $650,000 in federal disaster relief, which Kennedy authorized days later.1278

Repairs commenced throughout the summer of 1962 to once again repair coastal erosion. The OEP allocated $7,000 per mile to push up the fore dunes and fill in the

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1276 “Damages Assessed in Dare,” Virginian-Pilot, 22 March 1962.
1277 “Park Service Asks Increase in Funds for Hatteras Dunes,” Virginian-Pilot, 6 April 1962, 31. For more information about the erosion battles along the Cape Hatteras National Seashore, see Cameron Binkley, The Creation and Establishment of Cape Hatteras National Seashore: The Great Depression Through Mission 66 (Manteo, N.C.: Cape Hatteras National Seashore, National Park Service, 2008), 166-79.
1278 Terry Sanford to John F. Kennedy, 26 March 1962, Folder – Civil Defense – Storm – March 7, GTSP, NCA, Box 141; telegram from John F. Kennedy to Terry Sanford, 30 March 1962, Folder – Civil Defense – Storm – March 7, GTSP, NCA, Box 141.
numerous breaks in the dune line along the banks. As it stood, the damages required Sanford to request more federal aid, and in August Kennedy authorized an additional $100,000 in disaster relief. Griffin inspected the dune rebuilding in Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia and reported in October that North Carolina’s protective dune work “is as good as or better than the work accomplished by the Corps of Engineers in those other states.” Sanford himself felt “that no state has gotten any better emergency dune barrier from the Office of Emergency Planning than . . . North Carolina.” Compared to the rebuilding from the 1954 – 1955 hurricanes, the federal-state disaster relations now showed a marked improvement in cooperation.

Unlike the ordeal with Long Beach Inlet, closing Buxton Inlet proceeded with relative ease. On 30 March, the OEP requested the Corps of Engineers to survey and effect closure of the inlet. Following bidding and some legal delays, the Corps moved a dredge into position in early November 1962 and began to pump fill material into the inlet until another nor’easter forced it to suspend operations. This second nor’easter, from 25 November to 3 December, exacerbated the March damages considerably. Rebuilt dunes washed away, sand covered the highway, additional cottages succumbed to the stormy seas, and the inlet

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1279 J. L. Murphy to Terry Sanford, 2 July 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – I – Z,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141.
1280 J. L. Murphy to Terry Sanford, 11 August 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – I – Z,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141; House of Representatives, Relating to the Administration of the Federal Disaster Act by the President, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, H. Doc. 111, 3. The exact correspondence requesting the additional funding has not been located. The federal report listing the funds authorized under Public Law 875 list a North Carolina total of $750,000. The cited letter mentions reading about Sanford obtaining the additional $100,000.
1281 Terry Sanford to J.L. Murphy, 10 October 1963, folder labeled “Civil Defense – I – Z,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141.
grew dramatically in size.\textsuperscript{1283} Damages from this second nor’easter totaled $255,539, far too little to request a major disaster declaration.\textsuperscript{1284} The inlet, however, expanded from 760 feet to 1,590 feet in width, encompassing an area of 7,289 square feet.\textsuperscript{1285} Due to this expansion, Sanford asked Kennedy for an additional $500,000.\textsuperscript{1286} The OEP acknowledged to Sanford that they directed the Corps of Engineers to fill the inlet and would “handle the financial arrangements” for the matter.\textsuperscript{1287}

With clear weather again, dredging proceeded quickly. Work recommenced on pumping fill material on 27 December 1962 and a second dredge moved in to assist. On 20 February 1963, the inlet closed after receiving 1,130,050 cubic yards of fill material.\textsuperscript{1288} The entire operation, including use of a second dredge, overruns and complications from the second nor’easter cost $640,710.\textsuperscript{1289} Sanford contacted Goodman at OEP Region III on 3 May requesting $475,000 to pay the Corps of Engineers for the work and the president authorized the amount in full twenty days later.\textsuperscript{1290} Not including the funds to close the inlet, the Office of Emergency Planning approved $519,599 for rebuilding projects and the NCCD

\textsuperscript{1283} David T. Lambert to Terry Sanford, 27 November 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – I – Z,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141; Edward F. Griffin to Terry Sanford, 3 December 1962 with attachment; Edward F. Griffin to Terry Sanford, 10 December 1962, with attachment, folder labeled “Civil Defense – D – H,” GTSP, NCA, Box 140.
\textsuperscript{1284} Edward F. Griffin to Terry Sanford, 6 December 1962, with attachments, folder labeled “Civil Defense – D – H,” GTSP, NCA, Box 140.
\textsuperscript{1285} Corps of Engineers, \textit{Operation Five-High}, Appendix 6-19, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{1286} Telegram from Terry Sanford to John F. Kennedy thru Thomas H. Goodman, 12 December 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – I – Z,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141.
\textsuperscript{1287} Edward A. McDermott to Terry Sanford, 20 December 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – I – Z,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141.
\textsuperscript{1288} The Corps continued to pump sand into the breach until 28 March to further stabilize the affected area.
\textsuperscript{1289} Corps of Engineers, \textit{Operation Five-High}, Appendix 6-19, 1-5.
\textsuperscript{1290} Telegram from Terry Sanford to Thomas H. Goodman, 3 May 1963; telegram from John F. Kennedy to Terry Sanford, 23 May 1963, folder labeled “Civil Defense A – Z,” GTSP, NCA, Box 264.
dispersed $475,923.03 of these federal monies. Unlike the bureaucratic battle with the Federal Civil Defense Administration over Long Beach Inlet, the OEP moved swiftly. Long Beach Inlet had existed for approximately 28 months, whereas the much larger Buxton Inlet lasted a barely a year. If not for a second nor’easter, the inlet might well been closed in December 1962.

The nor’easters convinced Sanford, much as hurricanes did for Hodges, that something greater needed to be done to save the barrier islands. In late May 1962, the governor wrote to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D–NC) acknowledging how “It has become increasingly apparent that the problem of coastal protection has moved beyond the confines of local interest and developed into a matter of concern for the State and National governments as well.” By June, Harry E. Brown, director of the Department of Water Resources, reported that the state had purchased 70 percent of the land encompassing Portsmouth Island, the Core Banks, and part of Shackleford Banks using funds appropriated under Hodges. Influenced by the Ash Wednesday Storm, Sanford met with Interior Secretary Steward L. Udall in July and after talks the two men agreed to expand the Cape Hatteras National Seashore southward to include the islands purchased by the state and all of

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1292 Terry Sanford to Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 31 May 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – Storm – March 7,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141.
Shackleford Banks. Using federal funds, the National Park Service (NPS) would then develop the islands for recreation, stabilize the dunes and preserve the natural splendor of the coastal areas.

To nurture this vision, Sanford issued an executive order in August establishing the North Carolina Outer Banks Seashore Park Commission. The governor tasked the commission with examining the area from “Shackleford Banks to the Virginia state line” to plan and assist in the preservation of the shore line and for development of the Outer Banks to advance tourism, business, and industry. In a press release about the commission, Sanford explained that the commission can help save the Outer Banks, and “in so doing, North Carolina could create the most beautiful beach area in America. This, in turn, would provide a tremendous lift to the economy of the entire coast of our State.” In a statement before the commission, Griffin affirmed that “the very economy of Eastern North Carolina depends greatly upon the preservation of the Outer Banks. . . . The economy of the whole area is almost entirely dependent upon tourism, and of course, the economy of this vast area greatly affects the economy of the State as a whole.” The 1963 General Assembly established a statutory North Carolina Seashore Commission and appropriated $1,560,000 for constructing sand dunes, grass research and planting along the coast, and purchase of land as

1294 Congress established the Cape Hatteras National Seashore on 11 August 1937, but it was formally dedicated on 24 April 1958. See Binkley, Cape Hatteras National Seashore, 181-85.
right-of-way for future dunes. One million dollars, principally for dune and erosion work, fell under the jurisdiction of Brown and the Department of Water Resources.\textsuperscript{1299}

In its final days, the Outer Banks Seashore Park Commission provided Sanford recommendations for the future of the state’s coast. In a resolution, the commission stated that since a

National Seashore Recreation Area would be the most economically feasible method of protecting and preserving these Outer Banks, [it] respectfully requests and urges the Governor and Council of State to take such steps as necessary to make State-owned property on these Banks available to the National Park Service for inclusion in Cape Lookout National Seashore.\textsuperscript{1300}

The commission concurred with the NPS idea to create a new park designated as the Cape Lookout National Seashore. This proposal met with approval from the residents of Carteret County. Deeding the state-owned coastal areas to the NPS for inclusion in the National Seashore would save the state millions in erosion control measures and safeguard countless millions of dollars more in economic potential on the mainland.\textsuperscript{1301} In January 1965, North Carolina’s senators introduced legislation to create the new national seashore and on 10 March 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Public Law 89-366 into law, establishing the Cape Lookout National Seashore.\textsuperscript{1302}


The establishment of the Cape Lookout National Seashore culminated the work of the North Carolina chief executives and the NCCD dating back to the mid-1950s. By transferring land to the federal government, which in turn assumed responsibility for addressing coastal erosion, North Carolina ensured the preservation of several vulnerable barrier islands and shed the long-term costs for its coastal rehabilitation. With the banks under the stewardship of the National Park Service, tourists and outdoorsmen could enjoy the natural beauty of the coast while Carteret County’s sounds and coastal farmlands remained safe from the fury of the Atlantic Ocean. Through the scourge of hurricanes and nor’easters, North Carolina had utilized civil defense resources and federal dollars to repair and affect rehabilitation to save several low-lying sand bars. In turn, the state saved a promising tourism industry and secured economic possibilities for generations to come.

**Conclusion**

For North Carolina, the Kennedy administration’s promotion of fallout shelters and nuclear preparedness coincided with the expansion of the state civil defense agency. An increase in professional civil defense personnel, working closely with county and community civil defense offices, enabled improvements in plans for emergency operations. For state government, success could be measured in amending the state constitution in case of nuclear war and making a concerted effort to promote fallout shelters. Nationally and in North Carolina, citizens did not exhibit enthusiasm for or constructed shelters.

This lack of enthusiasm for and availability of shelters did not leave civil defense without recourse or opportunity. Blalock, who traversed the state working on communications, commented that local reaction to civil defense “varied from ‘very worthy’ to ‘we don’t want any part of you,’” particularly in the rural communities where they lived a
simple life and didn’t see a need for a lot of this [emergency preparedness].” Response to and recovery from natural disasters elevated the profile of the NCCD in the public mind. “We had disasters before, but we didn’t have the media and the people weren’t informed and thus didn’t know about it. The media helped emergency preparedness,” emphasized Blalock. Media coverage of storms helped state civil defense officials to sell local governments on the need for emergency preparedness, “because,” as Blalock said, “most of the time the people that initiated the [emergency] program in most cases were a whole lot better informed then the average citizen who really didn’t give a rat’s ass one way or another.”

Fallout continued to be an invisible and alien threat to North Carolinians. Hurricanes or nor’easters, unfortunately, remained unwelcomed annual visitors to the coast.

Sanford, new to the intricacies of civil defense, responded to matters much in the same manner as his predecessor. He shared a desire and vision to save the state’s barrier islands and thanks to the work of Hodges and Brown, used the aftermath of the Ash Wednesday Storm to move dramatically for the long-term protection of the fragile lands. Culminating in the creation of the Cape Lookout National Seashore in 1966, the governor ensured the state would receive the economic benefit from the islands while shifting the long-term costs for maintenance to the federal government. While the costs of this cannot be calculated, suffice it to say that the amount of federal investment in the national seashore surpassed the funds expended for all the state’s declared major disasters from 1954 to 1962.

After the dust cleared, fallout shelters contributed very little to North Carolina. Financially, the National Fallout Shelter Survey and Operation Shelter One expended a small amount of federal money in the state. Both efforts located shelters where none were

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considered to exist previously and at least provided state officials with a better assessment of the enormity of the task at hand. Yet while Griffin continuously advocated shelters, emergency preparedness became the focus of the NCCD area directors and local civil defense agencies. No amount of information campaigns or promotions could move the public from their apathetic position on fallout shelters. Without federal funding, the fallout shelter effort remained at best an academic exercise. The shelter survey reemphasized that rural portions of North Carolina lacked any real protection. People respond to immediate crises, not before, and the investment in morality and dollars made shelters and thorough preparedness for a potential Armageddon seem illogical. This pattern of behavior in the face of impending hurricanes or recent financial troubles does not differ from emergency responses by Americans today. Civil defense agencies in this regard conform to the pattern of fire departments or any other specialized government service. Unless these agencies are called to provide their services, they tend remain unnoticed.

Nonetheless, the state civil defense agency seemingly remained committed to preparing the state for enemy attack. In mid-September 1962, they reported that “the consistent support and encouragement given to the Agency by our State Government has resulted in a program recognized as outstanding among all the states of the nation.”\textsuperscript{1304} The state’s civil defense leaders also highlighted how its work brought federal funds totaling twenty times the cost of the NCCD to the state’s taxpayers.\textsuperscript{1305} Throughout the first week of October, the state agency ran television announcements to promote the new public fallout shelters being marked under the NFSS, although few Tar Heels paid this much notice. Within

\textsuperscript{1304} North Carolina Civil Defense Agency Accomplishments, 15 September 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – General II,” GTSP, NCA, Box 140.
\textsuperscript{1305} Facts about North Carolina Civil Defense Agency, 15 September 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – General II,” GTSP, NCA, Box 140.
two weeks, the state’s civil defense program found itself preparing the state for possible thermonuclear war, putting its value and proclamation as one of the nation’s best civil defense programs to the test.
Figure 33. Governor Luther H. Hodges and his wife Martha inspect the supplies in the governor's mansion fallout shelter in October 1959. Source: NCCD scrapbooks, OSRC-NCA.
Figure 34. Governor Terry Sanford briefing officials during Operation Alert 1961. Source: NCCD scrapbooks, OSRC-NCA.
Figure 35. The morality of fallout shelters and the potential mass movement of urban residents to rural areas became a public discussion topic in the fall of 1961. Source: Shelby Daily News, 14 November 1961.
**Probable Acute Effects of Gamma Radiation on Humans.**

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<td>Few Survivors</td>
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*The long-range effects such as shortened life spans, decreased resistance to diseases, etc., are not considered here.*

Figure 37. The National Fallout Shelter Survey begun under President John F. Kennedy and the Office of Civil Defense in the fall of 1961 surveyed, marked, and stocked public fallout shelter spaces in public buildings nationwide. Today, the only remnants of this massive undertaking are faded yellow and black signs on buildings, such as this one on the North Carolina Archives in Raleigh. Source: Author’s personal photograph, 2007.
Figure 38. The Ash Wednesday Storm, 7 March 1962, flooded large portions of the Outer Banks, opened a huge inlet north of Buxton, and eventually contributed to creation of the Cape Lookout National Seashore. This photograph, of flooding in Southern Shore, N.C. is of a beach cottage that the author’s family rented for almost twenty years. The wood paneling inside still bears a watermark from the nor'easter. Source: Ash Wednesday Storm Photos, Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, N.C.
Chapter 6: Exit Armageddon, Enter Emergency Preparedness

Our people are asking, “Why should I spend money on a shelter when the Federal Government is not doing anything about it?”
– C.M. Hooper, Winston-Salem, 20 December 19631306

“Civil defense operations” occur when a local government responds to any massive emergency – a tornado, flood, or other natural disaster; a major fire, explosion, or industrial accident; a civil disorder or disturbance; or a nuclear accident.
– Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, July 19721307

In the fall of 1961, some North Carolina residents did in fact heed federal advice and build fallout shelters. In Yanceyville, dentist Dr. Ludolphus G. Page constructed what he deemed an “underground house.” Dr. Page, described by his children as a curious and inventive country genius, conceived the idea of his shelter during the Great Depression. “He thought the most efficient place to build a house was underground,” said his son, retired dentist Dr. Graham A. Page.1308 Page reasoned that an underground house could use natural properties to cool and heat the rooms.1309 The Great Depression curtailed his original plans, but the national shelter debate in the fall of 1961, the younger Dr. Page recalled, “just gave him the incentive to do something he thought about all along.” Designed in the form of a

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1308 Graham L. Page, Susan Page Percy, and Pamela W. Page, interviews by author and visit to site, Yanceyville, N.C., 7 August 2008. The interviews were conducted together as a group. The speakers are identified, but the interview is cited as one.
giant “X” and built at a cost between $2,500 and $3,500, Dr. Page’s shelter certainly turned heads in awe or disbelief.\textsuperscript{1310}

The actual construction techniques are still quite innovative. Using a ditching machine, Dr. Page excavated the walls to a depth of nine feet and poured concrete in to form walls one-foot wide, nine-feet tall, and roughly ten-feet long.\textsuperscript{1311} Each room featured an arched roof, coming to a point in the center of the lobby where occupants could look through an installed periscope to survey the area outside the shelter, built immediately adjacent to U.S. highway Route 158. For the roof, Dr. Page mounded a small amount of dirt over each room, covering it with plastic, and then poured concrete over steel rebar to form an eighteen-inch thick concrete arch, later covered with around three feet of earth. Once the concrete cured after a few days, a backhoe tunneled out each room. The dentist and his assistants installed plumbing before pouring a concrete slab floor and he finished the entire structure by wiring it with electrical fixtures, heat and air conditioning. From start to finish, construction took two weeks.\textsuperscript{1312} The shelter featured a combination electric kitchen/dining room, a full-sized bedroom, children’s bedroom with two sets of bunk beds, a bathroom with hot and cold running water and shower, and a spacious lobby equipped with a television, couches, and lounge chairs.\textsuperscript{1313}

The Page family used the underground house in 1962 for a variety of purposes other than fallout protection. Dr. Page frequently cooked in the shelter kitchen and held all sorts of

\textsuperscript{1310} Graham L. Page, Susan Page Percy, and Pamela W. Page, interviews by author and visit to site, Yanceyville, N.C., 7 August 2008.
\textsuperscript{1311} The “X” shape thus looked like the logo of the Red Cross. The exact length of the walls is not exactly known. The main lobby is ten feet wide and twenty-six feet long according to an original brochure the author was given by Susan Page Percy from 1963. The total length of the walls is mentioned in The State magazine article cited previously as 150 feet total.
\textsuperscript{1313} Brochure, “For Rent: Page’s Underground Motor Apartment, Yanceyville, N.C.,” [1963], original given to author by Susan Page Percy.
gatherings in it. His daughter, Susan Page Percy, remembered having “all sorts of high school friends for parties in it. I was quite popular because my Dad had the fallout shelter. It was sort of adjunct to our house, and if we had extra people it was a place for them to stay.”

In August 1963, Dr. Page began renting out his unique and elaborate fallout shelter as an “underground motor apartment.” The hotel idea came about as “sort of a hobby for him, like a bed and breakfast,” noted Susan, and in August the North Carolina Civil Defense Agency (NCCD) recognized Dr. Page’s creation, writing how “Until such time as it is needed by his family, Dr. Page has arranged for it to serve as a motel since there are no public accommodations anywhere nearby.”

Most Americans, unlike Dr. Page, chose to pass on building a shelter. Promoted by the state and federal civil defense programs since 1958, shelters had failed to materialize in significant numbers by the fall of 1962. To correct failures of the previous federal shelter policy, President John F. Kennedy and the Department of Defense commenced a National Fallout Shelter Survey (NFSS) in the fall of 1961 to provide public protection. This survey intended to survey, mark, and stock public fallout shelters in buildings nationwide for fifty million people by December 1962. By October, however, survey returns indicated North Carolina possessed licensed public fallout shelter spaces for only 2.8 percent of the state’s resident population, and determined adequate space available for an additional 4.9 percent of the state’s residents. Raleigh was the only city in the state with a sizeable number of stocked shelters, but enough for only four percent of residents.

1314 Graham L. Page, Susan Page Percy, and Pamela W. Page, interviews by author and visit to site, Yanceyville, N.C., 7 August 2008.
Interest in fallout shelters suddenly skyrocketed on 22 October, when Kennedy announced the presence of nuclear missile sites in Cuba. In North Carolina, state civil defense personnel worked during and after the crisis to maintain order and locate additional shelters. What did not occur in the state or elsewhere in the nation after the crisis was an increase in shelter construction. For various reasons, many Americans decided not to partake in civil defense. By mid-November, the public’s interest in shelters had returned to pre-crisis levels. But Tar Heels were not indifferent to the crisis; the evidence suggests that the performance of the NCCD assured them that their state and local civil defense agencies had a realistic, efficient, and effective program in place to respond to emergency situations. This success – rather than failure – negated the need to build shelters.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, the high-water mark of the Cold War, did not prove North Carolina’s civil defense efforts inadequate. Instead, the crisis validated the state civil defense program oriented towards emergency preparedness for natural disasters and localized emergencies. At no other point in the existence of the NCCD did nuclear war seem more imminent and yet the state remained woefully unequipped in nuclear preparedness. The need to improve the state’s ability to survive fallout, “the weakest point of our plans for civil defense,” according to Governor Terry Sanford, dominated the actions and discussions of the state civil defense officials from October to December 1962. Nonetheless, the public did

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*protection factor of one hundred or greater, but not licensed or marked for use as shelters. The N.C. resident population as of 30 June 1962 was 4,556,155. The percentage of shelter spaces was calculated by using the figures from the NCCD, *Progress Report, 1961–1963*. The report listed 348,645 spaces providing protection factors greater than one hundred as of 15 September 1962. The state report also listed 1,303,332 spaces with protection factors from twenty to ninety-nine, but since one hundred was the standard prior to the missile crisis to provide fair protection in heavy fallout, this data was not used for calculation purposes.*


1318 Report to the People by Governor Terry Sanford Over Statewide Television and Radio Network, Raleigh, N.C., 31 October 1962, folder labeled “Governor – Proclamation Statements,” State Civil Defense
not level criticism against the state civil defense effort but praised it for aspects of emergency preparedness. This public response represented a subtle but important confirmation of civil defense’s role in the state as emergency responders, not mere town criers shouting “nuclear war is nigh.”

Experiences from the crisis revealed cracks in the national effort and the changing perception of “civil defense.” In 1963, when complete results for the NFSS became available for North Carolina, civil defense officials recognized the vastness of the disparity between urban and rural shelter space. The Shelter Incentive Program, envisioned by Kennedy to fund construction of new public shelter spaces, would be poised for success before dying in a Senate committee. As the shelter program passed from the federal agenda following the death of Kennedy, civil defense continued to evolve over the remainder of the decade into a program attuned to emergency preparedness. North Carolina, already years ahead of this change thanks to numerous natural disasters, continued to build emergency preparedness in the relatively quiet years from 1964 to 1970. In 1972, President Richard M. Nixon established the civil defense policy of “dual-use” wherein resources would be used for both nuclear preparedness and natural disasters, a policy the NCCD first began to promulgate almost a decade prior.

_Missiles of October, Shelters of November_

October 1962 began quietly for civil defense and then turned chaotic. On 16 October, the CIA alerted Kennedy to the presence of medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launch sites in Cuba. Photographs taken by U-2 reconnaissance aircraft on 14 October revealed three
launch sites with at least fourteen missile trailers for SS-3 and SS-4 MRBMs. The missiles, with a range of 1,100 miles and armed with nuclear warheads, could destroy Washington, D.C. within thirty minutes of launch.\footnote{Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., \textit{The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis} (Cambridge, M.A.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 47-49. The SS-4 Sandal had an estimated maximum range by U.S. intelligence of 1,020 statute miles, but in reality was 1,300 statute miles. See Norman Polmar and John D. Gresham, \textit{DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War during the Cuban Missile Crisis} (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), xxiii.} A reexamination of the 14 October photographs also revealed the early construction of Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) launch sites southwest of Havana. Built for SS-5 missiles, each capable of carrying a five-megaton nuclear warhead 2,200 miles, these IRBM sites gave the Soviets and Cubans the ability to attack anywhere in the contiguous United States except the extreme Pacific Northwest.\footnote{May and Zelikow, \textit{The Kennedy Tapes}, 122-26. US intelligence estimates were also incorrect for the SS-5 Skean, which had an actual range of 2,800 statute miles. See Polmar and Gresham, \textit{DEFCON-2}, xxiii.}

Kennedy assembled a talented group of advisers, known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm, to assist him in determining a U.S. response. In its early discussions, the committee seriously considered launching a military strike to destroy the missile sites.\footnote{May and Zelikow, \textit{The Kennedy Tapes}, 97.} On 19 October, speaking to his gathered advisors, Kennedy noted the United States could attack the missile sites directly but conceded that “there’s bound to be a reprisal from the Soviet Union, there always is – they’re just going in and taking Berlin by force. Which leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons – which is a hell of an alternative.”\footnote{Ibid., 176.}

On the afternoon of 22 October, the CIA informed the president that a total of four MRBM sites in Cuba containing sixteen launchers were now fully operational, and two additional MRBM sites with eight more launchers would be operational by 25 and 29 October. The three IRBM sites with twelve launch pads were estimated to be operational by
December. At 7:00PM, Kennedy addressed the nation, acknowledging the presence of Soviet missile installations in Cuba. Most frightening of all, the president stated that “it shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” The threat of Armageddon had never been higher in the Cold War.

North Carolinians, united in support of Kennedy’s stand on Cuba, responded swiftly. An editorial in the Raleigh News and Observer praised Kennedy’s “forthright courage in facing an ominous threat to America,” and acknowledged, “Khrushchev must know, as everyone must know, that in today’s war there would be even for the victor only ashes in the mouth.” Following the editorial, an article in the newspaper ominously noted, “the state civil defense has 4,942 trial spaces for people in the Raleigh area in case of an atomic attack but they still have not been able to work out the problem of getting water.” The article concluded that “civil defense is expecting interest in private bomb shelters to rise since the recent Cuban crisis.”

Civil defense agencies across the state braced for increased public interest after Kennedy’s address. In an internal memorandum on 24 October, Sanford prepared all state government department and agency directors to be activated on his order. The Interim Emergency Control Center for the state would be located in the basement of the newly

1323 Ibid., 248.
1324 White House press release, “Radio and Television Address of the President to the Nation from the White House,” 22 October 1962, item number CC00847, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, Digital National Security Archive online (DNSA).
constructed State Legislature building “in the event of radiation danger.”1327 The NCCD headquarters received several calls specifically about fallout shelters on the twenty-third, but the office acknowledged that no specific action or change in operations would follow Kennedy’s television address.1328 They reassured concerned citizens everything was “going along as normal” and recommended visiting any U.S. post office or local civil defense office where civil defense publications were available.1329

In Greensboro the city-county civil defense office received “a couple of hundred” telephone calls on 23 October. J.M. McGough, Greensboro-Guilford County civil defense director, told people to visit his office rather than try to digest a forty-page pamphlet over the telephone.1330 The civil defense offices of Bladen, Columbus, New Hanover, Onslow, Pender, and Sampson counties also found themselves struggling to provide information to worried citizens. The lack of shelters concerned these coastal civil defense officials, who possessed only 118 shelters in the region. Although New Hanover County had 101 shelters, only 68 percent of these were marked, and none was stocked. Sampson County had four public shelters capable of housing 1,300 (to protect a population of 60,000). In Bladen County, civil defense and city officials informed the press that “plans are underway to provide public trench shelters, the only public protection available.”1331

Across the state, some Tar Heel nerves frayed at the all-too-real possibility of nuclear destruction raining down without warning. In Raleigh, police blamed a jittery public for an unusual jump in traffic accidents, and in Cary, a small fire brought the sounds of an air raid

1327 Terry Sanford to all Department and Agency Heads, having emergency assignments under the North Carolina Operational Survival Plan, 24 October 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – General II,” Governor Terry Sanford Papers (GTSP), NCA, Box 140.
signal rather than the fire signal.\textsuperscript{1332} In Gastonia, civil defense director Ronald Heafner, after a day of answering frantic phone calls, stated in frustration, “We seem to go from complete apathy to complete panic. If we could just educate the people always to be aware of the danger of an attack, and to avoid panic when there is a possibility of immediate danger, we would have accomplished a great deal.”\textsuperscript{1333} A power failure in Greensboro affected fifty families on the morning of 24 October, and “many wondered if the war had come to their neighborhood.” A blown fuse turned out to be the culprit.\textsuperscript{1334} On 31 October, the Raleigh Fire Department planned “Home Fire Drill Day” and intended to sound all civil defense sirens in Raleigh, Cary, and Garner to give the alert signal for three minutes in the evening. Fortunately, someone, “due to the tense situation prevalent for the past several days,” convinced the fire department not to sound the sirens.\textsuperscript{1335} Greensboro avoided this situation by deciding to activate the sirens only in a real emergency.\textsuperscript{1336}

These tensions, perhaps amusing in hindsight, reflected the lack of nuclear preparations throughout the state. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense Steuart L. Pittman briefed President Kennedy on national civil defense readiness on the evening of 23 October. A total of 92 million Americans and 58 cities with populations greater than 100,000 were within range of the SS-4 missiles. Pittman recommended lowering the protection factors for shelter survey buildings from protection factor PF 100 to PF 40 to create more shelter spaces nationwide. The shelter survey would be accelerated in marking and stocking existing PF 100 structures for public use. Ominously, in response to a question from Kennedy about

\textsuperscript{1332} “Lighter Side in Crisis is Seen by Area Behavior,” Raleigh Times, 26 October 1962.
\textsuperscript{1333} “CD Office is Flooded With Calls,” Charlotte Observer, 25 October 1962.
\textsuperscript{1335} “Fire Drill Day Set Wednesday; Siren Tests Set,” Raleigh Times, 29 October 1962; “Sirens Silent Here Tomorrow,” Raleigh Times, 30 October 1962.
protection against radiation, Pittman stated, “if there will be fallout, the only protection that exists today is in the cities, and there’s little to no protection in the rural areas.” The president asked about evacuating cities in the Southeast, but Pittman opposed this action out of the fear of inducing panic. Throughout the crisis, Kennedy ordered civil defense officials to not place state or local civil defense programs on alert.

Although not operating under emergency conditions, the NCCD independently accelerated activity on the national shelter survey. In response to Sanford’s internal memorandum for the Emergency Control Center, the state civil defense agency reported that it was “accelerating surveys of state buildings to relocate government departments in protected locations.” Sanford met in the morning of the twenty-fifth with Griffin and again in the afternoon, this time with the five area directors present to review civil defense planning across the state. David W. Spivey, Area A director, recalled that the purpose of the meeting was more about Sanford wanting to know what capabilities the state had and where. Spivey noted “we all agreed that it was up to us to try to fan out and talk to the local governments and say ‘let’s be calm, check your emergency capabilities, your police, etcetera and make sure everybody’s about as ready to cope with whatever might come along as you

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1337 May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 338-339. The 22 October 1962 meeting between Pittman, ExComm, and Kennedy was the only meeting discussing civil defense during the missile crisis. While the actual tapes of Pittman’s discussion are undecipherable, Pittman later wrote that Kennedy raised the issue about to do regarding Miami and “other coastal cities near Cuba if the United States attacked and [Fidel] Castro replied with a few conventional weapons in sneak attacks possible capable of relatively minor damage to nearby Florida population centers.” See Eugene P. Wigner, ed., *Who Speaks for Civil Defense?* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968), 69.


1339 George, *Awaiting Armageddon*, 43.


can, and that’s about all we can really do.”¹³⁴² For the next few days, Spivey burned up the roads in Area A, meeting with county commissioners in person or via telephone up to 11:00PM nightly.¹³⁴³

The meeting included “a reevaluation of our plans,” explained Griffin. He told reporters that Sanford and the NCCD made no special plans for enlarging or altering the state program for preparedness in the event of attack.¹³⁴⁴ A follow-up message to Office of Civil Defense (OCD) Region III on 26 October was formal and nondescript, until the end: “North Carolina director briefing governor daily. Contacts maintained with all area and local CD offices. State Emergency Operation Center staff vacancies filled. State director reports overwhelming floods of calls and demands for CD publications in all cities.”¹³⁴⁵ Sanford knew what the state had available, according to Spivey. “I believe he realized in his subsequent times with me that perhaps we, the area directors, probably knew more governing bodies and more people who were the ones who were going to cope with this thing, then anybody else we had,” remembered Spivey. The overall objective of the meetings, in his opinion was “that we [area directors] were the ones to go out and do our best to calm the populace, say ‘look we are going to do the best we can, we are keeping at it, the Governor is calling the National Guard out to whatever extent might be necessary. Everybody has got to be prepared to work on their own and expect to be mostly on their own.”¹³⁴⁶

The information released by the state civil defense agency and governor to the news media presented an appearance of calm, professional, orderly action ensuring the citizens that

¹³⁴⁴ “Sanford Sees CD Leaders; Gets Wire From JFK,” News and Observer, 26 October 1962.
¹³⁴⁵ Teletype message from Office of Civil Defense Region III to all state civil defense directors Region III, 26 October 1962, folder labeled “OCD-DoD Cuban Crisis,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 6.
all was well. Lacking from these releases during the crisis is any information about fallout shelters. On 25 October, an editorial in the *Wilmington Star-News* appropriately titled “Some Goals for Civil Defense,” declared that “Civil Defense build up in Wilmington and surrounding areas will have to be stepped up, and continued at an accelerated pace, if it is to come anywhere near being adequate to meet any emergency.” The editorial commented how:

> It does no good at this time to criticize or complain about conditions within the CD, whether they are too far behind or whatever the argument. The point is now to work toward the goal of adequate preparation, and that should be what all communities should be striving for even in the face of possible emergencies.\(^{1347}\)

Despite previous shortcomings, county and city civil defense sprang into action and began marking and stocking fallout shelters with a degree of urgency not seen since in the summer of 1961.

A general, surprising calm existed during the crisis. In Charlotte, city telephone directories listed six companies in the fallout shelter business (three of whom had gone out of business by the time of the crisis), and none of the remaining three reported a shelter sale by four days after Kennedy’s announcement.\(^ {1348}\) Raleigh supermarkets reported normal sales and no signs of people stockpiling food for shelters.\(^ {1349}\) Gaston County, with 232 potential fallout shelters (but none marked or supplied), asked residents to not panic, for no one else in the country had received supplies either. Eventually, seventy-six shelters would be stocked to protect 42,943 residents, or 38 percent of the county population.\(^ {1350}\) Furthermore, residents would have twenty to thirty minutes to find shelter and civil defense director Ronald Heafner doubted that Gaston County would be attacked. “A house will protect you as well as anything

\(^{1348}\) “ Fallout Shelter Work Isn’t Picking up Much,” *Charlotte Observer*, 26 October 1962.
\(^{1349}\) “Cuban Crisis Not Causing Grocery Stockpiling Here,” *News and Observer*, 26 October 1962.
\(^{1350}\) Gaston County’s population was 125,000 in the 1960 U.S. Census.
from radiation,” he acknowledged, adding “and if your house is destroyed, nothing can save
you.”

The missile crisis climaxed on Saturday, 27 October. That morning over Cuba, a
Soviet-supplied SA-2 surface-to-air missile shot down a U.S. Air Force U-2 spy plane over
Cuba, killing the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson. Upon hearing the news, Kennedy asked
“Well now, this is much of an escalation by them, isn’t it?” McNamara responded by noting
how “I think we can defer an air attack on Cuba until Wednesday [31 October] or Thursday.

That same day, the federal accelerated fallout shelter program began. Against the
backdrop of Anderson’s death, Pittman spoke to the Committee on Civil Defense and Post
Attack Recovery of the National Governors’ Conference at the Pentagon.

Pittman proposed to the governors a new, accelerated version of the shelter survey.
The national civil defense effort would “move the program as far as existing resources will
permit in a three months’ period.” Addressing the governors, he optimistically reported that
“We are in much better shape than we were a year ago. This sharpened public interest in
Civil Defense gives us new opportunities to move ahead on the program decided upon last
year [shelter survey].” Approximately 46 million shelter spaces would be stocked
nationwide by April 1963, affirmed the nation’s top civil defense official. Disconcertingly,
Pittman listed the nation’s total number of marked and stocked public shelters as only

1351 “Gaston Civil Defense Plans Will Be Made Known Today,” Charlotte Observer, 26 October 1962;
Live or Not,” Charlotte Observer, 26 October 1962.
1352 Polmar and Gresham, DEFCON-2, 149-150.
1353 May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, 571.
1354 Rose, One Nation Underground, 197.
Steuart L. Pittman, Assistant Secretary of Defense to the Committee on Civil Defense and Post Attack
Recovery of the National Governors’ Conference, October 27, 1962, folder labeled “OCD-DoD Cuban
Crisis,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 6.
170,000. To raise this figure, the OCD decided to lower the standards of shielding from radiation from PF 100 to 40, doubling the number of potential surveyed shelter spaces.\textsuperscript{1356}

Overall, Pittman’s accelerated program consisted of six parts: shelter marking, shelter stocking, promoting rural shelters, training, providing matching funds and surplus property for states, and allocating stand-by military reservists for civil defense service. The OCD would provide supplies only to PF 100 shelters (the previously surveyed 46 million spaces), and un-stocked shelters would depend on the occupants bringing their own supplies. Lowering the protection factor of potential shelters from one hundred to forty would accommodate 110 to 120 million Americans nationwide.\textsuperscript{1357}

Back in the White House, Kennedy and ExComm reached a proposal for a peaceful end to the crisis. The president wrote to Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev on 27 October, pledging to end the quarantine and not invade Cuba if the Soviets in turn removed the missiles from the island.\textsuperscript{1358} On the morning of the twenty-eight, Radio Moscow announced a message from Khrushchev, proclaiming that “the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you

\textsuperscript{1356} Teletype message from Office of Civil Defense Region III to NCCD, 30 October 1962, folder labeled “OCD-DoD Cuban Crisis,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 6. Lowered protection factors would provide shelter spaces for more people, but would expose people to great risk. A PF 40 shelter was the minimum desirable protection for the United States as a whole. A common frame house provided only between PF 1.5 to PF 3 protection, and a common basement from PF 10 to PF 20. According to the calculations of physicist James W. Ring, a one megaton ground burst, with a constant 15 mph wind would yield a “450 rem dose contour in an oblong pattern 256 km long and about 64 km wide at 96 km downwind. This 450 rem dose is taken to be a lethal dose in 50% of the cases.” A massive nuclear attack on the United States covering all major cities would produce enough fallout for accumulated radiation doses of over 10,000 rems for two weeks. In a PF 40 shelter, occupants would be exposed to 250 rems and suffer from radiation sickness. See John Dowling and Evans M. Harrell, eds., \textit{Civil Defense: A Choice of Disasters} (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1986), 72-80. A rem, short of Roentgen equivalent man/mammal, is a measurement of radiation dose received. The average U.S. citizen receives a dose of 0.2 rem annually. See ibid., xvii.

\textsuperscript{1357} NCCD reprint of teletype message from Office of Civil Defense Region III to NCCD, 30 October 1962, folder labeled “OCD-DoD Cuban Crisis,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 6.

\textsuperscript{1358} May and Zelikow, \textit{The Kennedy Tapes}, 603-4.
describe as 'offensive' and their crating and return to the Soviet Union.”

The Soviets and Americans managed to dodge Armageddon, and in the views of diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis, the crisis “persuaded everyone who was involved in it . . . that the weapons each side had developed during the Cold War posed a greater threat to both sides than the United States and the Soviet Union did to one another.”

The conclusion of the missile crisis brought awareness to state officials of their nuclear preparedness shortcomings. In Raleigh, Griffin greeted the news with relief, but touted that North Carolina was as “well prepared as any state in the nation,” while admitting that the state’s largest problem remained “the apathy of our people” toward shelters. Ironically, he did not have a fallout shelter himself at home in Louisburg, but expected “to have one very shortly.” Sanford thanked the state civil defense personnel for their work but noted “only one weakness in our plans gave us concern . . . the ability of the average citizen to protect himself and his family.” Griffin and Hugh Cannon, director of the state Department of Administration, met with Pittman on 30 October and received a briefing on the six areas of focus for the accelerated program for the ensuing three months. Pittman instructed the men to “emphasize in all discussions ‘that the only connection between the Cuban situation and this three month undertaking is that the public has been reminded of the

1361 “Civil Defense Chief Keeps Vivid Reminder,” Greensboro Daily News, 28 October 1962. Griffin eventually built a rather complex fallout shelter in the backyard of his home in Louisburg, which still stands to this day.
1362 Statement by Governor Terry Sanford, 29 October 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – General I,” GTSP, NCA, Box 140.
dangers of our times and a new receptivity to civil defense has been created which makes possible civil defense activities which are long overdue.”

Sanford addressed North Carolinians on the thirty-first, urging preparedness while alleviating tensions. “If our civil defense is good enough to save the lives of most of you, then the chances of any enemy attack are reduced,” the governor stated in his opening remarks. He assured citizens that “there has been and will be no reason for panic and no need for hysteria in North Carolina. We are prepared, and we are strong, and we know what to do.” He discussed fallout protection in detail as the weakest aspect of the state civil defense effort. Sanford informed those citizens who could not afford a fallout shelter that “two feet of solid concrete or three feet of earth will give you almost absolute protection. Your imagination, a shovel, some boards or logs, can give you some pretty good protection, without spending any money. We called them foxholes in World War II.”

Listeners shared differing reactions to Sanford’s speech. Bob McNeill of West Jefferson wrote the governor to “heartily commend you on the straightforward way you presented it.” In contrast, Allan P. Sindler, a professor in the political science department at Duke University in Durham, felt that “the only thing that can be said in defense of the misleading impression it deliberately created and the inadequacy of what passes for your policy on the matter is that North Carolina doubtless is no more unprepared to react to nuclear war than most other states.” Sindler attributed public apathy for civil defense and
nuclear preparedness to leadership, urging Sanford to “encourage, goad, persuade, prod, and move people and communities into doing what you know should be done to develop adequate radiation protection.” Historian Laura McEnaney in turn argues that the federal government’s failure to provide shelters and a strong civil defense program resulted in the privatization of the home front. The financial burden fell on the citizen rather than the state, minimizing the leadership required of government. Sindler asked Sanford to lead, but not necessarily to pay for nuclear protection. Without a wider public outcry against civil defense or for increased nuclear preparedness measures, the governor’s public address probably constituted the least he could – or would – say on the matter. The burden for shelters and civil defense would remain firmly ensconced in the hands of the public.

November commenced a flurry of shelter activity statewide. Local civil defense authorities used existing survey data to mark shelters and small black and yellow signs proclaiming “Fallout Shelter” began appearing in urban areas. Fayetteville marked and designated the Cumberland County courthouse as a fallout shelter, the county’s first, with space for 1,052 people. Additional shelters had shelter signs affixed to them in Greensboro beginning on the sixth and continuing throughout the week. In Gaston County, Heafner announced that marking of shelters in the county would begin on the nineteenth for 76 shelters, potentially sheltering 42,943 residents. Wilmington debated

1366 Allan P. Sindler to Terry Sanford, 1 November 1962, folder labeled “Civil Defense – I – Z,” GTSP, NCA, Box 141.
turning the USS *North Carolina*, a floating museum, into a shelter for over 1,300.\textsuperscript{1371} Raleigh’s newly-licensed shelters received signs beginning on the nineteenth, and marking of shelters for 56,913 more people continued well into December.\textsuperscript{1372} The headquarters of the *Charlotte Observer* became the first building in Charlotte with a marked shelter on 27 November, one of an eventual 158 public shelters.\textsuperscript{1373}

By December, this shelter activity substantially decreased in North Carolina. In a message to state civil defense personnel, Griffin expressed his pride in how the NCCD stood up throughout the missile crisis. He warned them not to rest on their laurels, writing that:

> As the atmosphere relaxes we must work with renewed incentive to strengthen our organizations, coordinate our emergency services, train more people and do everything possible to find space that can be used for shelter from radiation. Because this crisis has helped to remove the apathy that has plagued Civil Defense, there will be less excuse next time for shortcomings. Governing officials and citizens alike are more aware of the necessity to take the precautions we advocate and are looking to us for leadership in which they can have confidence. When another crisis comes, we must have more – much more – to work with for the protection of each community and its citizens.\textsuperscript{1374}

His comments prove accurate in assessing the aftermath of the crisis. Griffin’s recognition of the need to strengthen emergency services is notable, as is his failure to explicitly mention shelters. Nationally, historian Kenneth Rose concludes that after the crisis “what did not follow . . . was renewed public enthusiasm for fallout shelters.”\textsuperscript{1375}

> It was for these emergency services that North Carolina received its praise, not nuclear preparedness. On 12 December, Sanford and Griffin hosted William S. Lonnie,

\textsuperscript{1373} “Observer Building is Fallout Shelter,” *Charlotte Observer*, 28 November 1962.
\textsuperscript{1374} *NCCD Newsletter*, December 1962.
director of the Civil Defense and Emergency Service for Western Australia. North Carolina
joined California, Georgia, Maryland, and New Jersey as state-level civil defense
organizations studied by Lonnie. His tour of the NCCD joined with his other visits to several
Western European countries. Sanford and Griffin later gave Lonnie a tour of the
governor’s mansion fallout shelter, allowing him a chance to observe work on the shelter’s
expansion. Afterwards, Lonnie visited the state agency headquarters in Raleigh and received
a briefing by Griffin and other officials on state civil defense organization and operations.

Lonnie wrote highly of the state agency following his travels. The state of readiness
for the NCCD he acknowledged “colloquially expressed as ‘bang on.’ In more conservative
terms the organization is geared to a very high state of preparedness.” The Australian civil
defense director noted that the NCCD bore responsibility for natural disasters and he
recognized the agency’s work in the declared major disasters from 1955 to 1962. The
organization of the NCCD Lonnie deemed “most impressive,” and he wrote that
“communications appeared to cover all possible contingencies with suitable alternatives in
the event of partial loss or destruction.”

After the crisis, newspapers in North Carolina also paid attention to civil defense and
wrote of local level support for emergency preparedness. The Raleigh Times described in
glowing terms the twelve-hour rescue training program in Johnston County’s Civil Defense

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1376 Lonnie undertook a similar civil defense study trip from May to August 1968. During this trip, he
studied civil defense activities and organizations in the U.S., India, Israel, Italy, The Netherlands, West
Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, and Malaysia. In his 1968 report, Lonnie included an appendix with
the United States portion of his 1963 report. This material is used to detail his visit to the NCCD in
(Perth, Western Australia: Alex B. Davies, Government Printer, 1968), 3.
Agency, 11 December 1962, folder labeled “Griffin – Directives and Speeches,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box
6; “Civil Defense to be Studied by Australian,” News and Observer, 9 December 1962; “Aussie CD
Agency. Members of the Wendell Rescue Squad also received coverage in the *Raleigh Times*, with an explanation of the role of the squad and its support from local businesses. New Hanover County’s Rescue Squad received a large billing in Wilmington, recognizing the squad’s contributions and local support for civil defense. In late December, both the Cleveland County – Shelby and Gaston County civil defense programs were showered with praise in the *Charlotte Observer*. Cleveland County–Shelby Civil Defense director Don Shields noted “we’ve had tremendous support from both the commissioners and councilmen and from industry here” for the acquisition of a $100,000 civil defense control center. In Gaston County, Heafner shared similar sentiments, stating that “everyone – especially industry – had gotten behind us since the Cuban crisis,” and he announced that 2,000 Gaston County residents would take a medical self-help course in January 1963.

Recognition of civil defense rescue squads is particularly interesting. These rescue squads are the precursors of the modern emergency response teams. Civil defense tasked the squads in North Carolina to “locate, remove or release persons trapped under debris, in damaged structures or vehicles, administer immediate first aid sufficient to sustain life, and assist in arranging for evacuation of persons [who] required further aid.” Donations from the volunteer members and local businesses supported the squads, with equipment and training provided by the local civil defense office secured through federal matching funds.

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Rescue squads provided valuable public services for civil defense, and unlike fallout shelters, communities could invest in a squad to benefit everyone. By December 1962, 150 rescue squads were reported statewide.\textsuperscript{1386} They served the citizens of North Carolina in normal times, and became an element of civil defense during emergencies. Either responding to a natural disaster or an automobile accident, rescue squads provided communities with a flexible and valuable tool. As with fire and police departments, few communities today are without a rescue squad or emergency medical services.

Wherein prudence appeared to warrant disdain or displeasure with the utter lack of fallout protection, the positive press for civil defense is telling of a shift in public perception. Following the missile crisis, North Carolinians were not displeased with the performance of the state and local civil defense agencies. Officials had recognized long periods of apathy towards fallout shelters, but not praise for emergency services and the non-nuclear aspects of civil defense. This may well be indicative of public respect for emergency services beneficial to local communities. The emergency readiness of the state program received international adulation with disaster response, notably natural disasters. After years of hurricanes, the NCCD developed into an organization geared for state, and not national threats. The missile crisis merely revealed that shelters were but one facet of the overall state program.

\textit{A New Year – Shelter Survey Results and Shortcomings}

The NCCD began 1963 tested by the missile crisis. “Every Civil Defense Director learned during that Crisis – if he didn’t know before – that when danger threatens, citizens want – even demand – protection,” declared Griffin in January.\textsuperscript{1387} The state civil defense director, in stating the obvious, failed to acknowledge that shelter demand returned to pre-

\textsuperscript{1387} NCCD \textit{Newsletter}, January 1963.
crisis levels after October. With the New Year came word from federal civil defense officials that surveyors had completed all field work for Phase II of the National Fallout Shelter Survey.\textsuperscript{1388}

In February, the OCD released the complete data for North Carolina. With improvements in ventilation, public shelter spaces providing PF 40 or greater could protect all the citizens of Asheville, Charlotte, Durham, and Raleigh. Ninety-seven percent of Winston-Salem residents could be sheltered, but only a scant 23 percent of Fayetteville residents. While impressive for the state’s largest cities, the survey returns proved disconcerting for the rural areas. Out of the state’s 100 counties, the survey found no shelter spaces whatsoever in 21, and 90 had shelter space for less than 25 percent of their residents. Only three counties, Cabarrus, Durham, and Polk, had space for more than 75 percent of residents. North Carolina’s 1960 census records calculated the population at 4,556,115 residents, 1,802,000 categorized as urban and 2,754,000 as rural.\textsuperscript{1389} Not including private fallout shelters, the survey found potential space for 28 percent of North Carolinians. Only 49

\textsuperscript{1388} Nationwide, the survey was 90.5 percent complete, and in early returns for North Carolina the survey found 503,345 shelter spaces in buildings with a protection factor (PF) of one hundred or greater. Factoring in improvements in ventilation and shielding, a total of 858,055 spaces would exist. The cost to improve the other approximately 355,000 spaces would be $2,601,270, or roughly fifty-seven cents per North Carolinian. See Steuart L. Pittman to Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 2 January 1963, folder labeled “General 1963, Defense Department, Civil Defense,” Sam J. Ervin Papers #3847 (SJEP), Southern Historical Collection (SHC), Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, Box 77. The letter from Pittman includes a computer printout dated 15 December 1962 where the figures cited come from.

percent of these spaces were found outside of the state’s six largest cities.\textsuperscript{1390} An estimated 10,000 private fallout shelters provided spaces for an additional 75,000 citizens.\textsuperscript{1391}

Sanford spoke to the General Assembly about civil defense for the first time in February, stressing nuclear preparedness. Fallout shelters, not emergency services, were the centerpiece of his remarks. After briefly listing what civil defense activities had taken place in the state, he concluded that “nobody knows whether all of these defense measures will ever have to be used, but as long as there is any possibility that they will be required . . . the effort . . . is fully justified.”\textsuperscript{1392} Following the address, every legislator received a copy of the NCCD’s biennial report for the previous two years, advocating the immediate need for tax concessions for owners of standard home fallout shelters or standard neighborhood shelters.\textsuperscript{1393}

More attractive to legislators was a listing of federal money secured by the NCCD over the past two years. Approximately $1.7 million in surplus federal property acquired through Public Law 84-655 equipped civil defense offices at a minor investment of only $77,925. Under Public Law 85-606, 44 participating state and local civil defense agencies received $530,894 in funds for personnel and administrative operations. The federal matching funds program, administered under Public Law 81-920, contributed a total of $323,143 in federal monies to counties and towns, with $259,898, eighty percent, spent on communications equipment. Civil defense subdivisions spent an additional eleven percent of

\textsuperscript{1390} National Fallout Shelter Survey Statistics, 15 February 1963, folder labeled “Letters to Legislation, June 8, 1959,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 6; Steuart L. Pittman to Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 20 February 1963, folder labeled “General 1963, Defense Department, Civil Defense,” SJEP, SHC, Box 77. Both documents include identical figures.
\textsuperscript{1391} Press release from the Governor’s Office, 19 February 1963, folder labeled “Civil Defense General,” GTSP, NCA, Box 264.
\textsuperscript{1392} \textit{NCCD Newsletter}, March 1963.
funds on warning equipment. Curious in the wake of Sanford’s comments, the report noted a mere 0.3 percent investment in radiological detection instruments, emergency operating centers, or radiological monitoring stations. Emergency preparedness expenditures, rather than nuclear defense measures, represented 92 percent of these federal funds.1394

To provide some financial relief for shelter construction, the General Assembly introduced legislation to provide tax incentives for family fallout shelters. In March, state senators introduced an ad valorem tax bill for family fallout shelters.1395 The act would subject shelters built to the criteria of the Office of Civil Defense to taxation “only to the extent that the appraised value of such shelter . . . exceeds two thousand dollars.”1396 But to the chagrin of Griffin, the bill did not enjoy a smooth passage through the General Assembly. In the House, the Committee on Finances developed strong opposition to the bill on the grounds that it would deprive “counties and towns of local tax.”1397 Griffin appealed to local civil defense directors to write to their legislative representatives to support the bill and in a separate fact paper, the NCCD detailed the potential nuclear targets in the state. It stressed the urgency of remedying the fact that “many of our counties have no public shelter potential whatsoever,” and warned how without any tax incentive, “this costly shelter program will eventually fall on State and local Governments.”1398 In June the committee changed its

1396 North Carolina General Assembly, “A Bill to be Entitled an Act to Classify Individual Family Fallout Shelters for Purpose of Ad Valorem Taxation,” 1963 Session, folder labeled “Letters to Legislation, June 8, 1959,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 6. An identical bill was introduced on the same day in the North Carolina House by Representatives.
position and by month’s end the bill became law, taking effect 1 January 1964.\textsuperscript{1399} This is the first – and only – shelter legislation passed by the General Assembly and one cannot wonder what tax revenue communities lost as a result.

\emph{The Shelter Incentive Program}

The increase, albeit limited, for shelters in the wake of the missile crisis breathed some life into moribund Shelter Incentive Program (SIP). Pittman outlined the program before a House Subcommittee on Government Operations on 19 February 1962. The program would supplement the shelter survey by providing financial assistance to nonprofit institutions engaged in health, education, and welfare activities. He testified “that the combination of a significant amount of shelter space brought into operation under the survey, together with the stimulation of well-located community shelters in schools, hospitals, and similar institutions around the country, would . . . lay a base for coherent planning and development of integrated civil defense systems in communities throughout the United States.”\textsuperscript{1400} Pittman requested an appropriation of $460 million dollars for FY 1963 to construct new shelter spaces to protect 20 million citizens.\textsuperscript{1401} With the cost to provide fallout shelter for a single person at $40, the federal government would provide up to 62.5 percent of the cost for fallout shelter construction.\textsuperscript{1402} OCD officials estimated the program could provide 100 million shelter spaces for $2.25 billion over five years.\textsuperscript{1403} By 1967, the Office of

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\item[1401] Ibid., 10; Thomas J. Kerr, \emph{Civil Defense in the U.S.: Bandaid for a Holocaust?} (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1983), 126.
\item[1402] House Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense – 1962, 35. As designed, the federal government would provide a maximum of $25 per person sheltered, with ten square feet of shelter space per person at a rate of $2.50 per square foot for any of the institutions that built fallout shelters. The shelters would have to have a protection factor of 100 or greater and a capacity for 50 or more persons.
\item[1403] Ibid., 30.
\end{footnotes}
Civil Defense planned 233 million shelter spaces at a total cost of $2.53 billion dollars, enough for the entire population.\footnote{Kerr, \textit{Civil Defense in the U.S.}, 127. The 233,500,000 spaces break down as follows: 70 million from the NFSS, 3.5 million from shelters in federal buildings, 100 million from the SIP, and 60 million from private shelters.}

While impressive and carefully designed, Congress chose to pass on the SIP. In March 1962, Congressman Albert Thomas (D–TX) convened subcommittee hearings for the House Appropriations Committee to consider the OCD budget. Thomas asked Pittman if the shelter program had been authorized by Congress, to which Pittman admitted that it had not. Thomas’s subcommittee thereafter approved a $75 million budget for the most basic of OCD functions, completely removing funds for the SIP. The Senate Appropriations Committee saw civil defense in a different light and allocated the federal office $185 million, with $93.8 million for continued shelter survey work, research and development, and a program to construct shelters in federal buildings. After conference, Congress eventually approved an OCD budget of $113 million dollars. An additional $15 million supplement raised the FY 1963 budget to $128 million, albeit without the SIP.\footnote{Kerr, \textit{Civil Defense in the U.S.}, 128-29; Dee Garrison, \textit{Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 125-26; Boyce Wayne Blanchard, “American Civil Defense 1945 – 1975: The Evolution of Programs and Policies” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1980), 320-23.}

Aside from the completion of the national survey, the future of fallout shelters looked bleak. While private citizens could still build shelters, the completion of the survey ended federal fallout protection efforts. The accelerated action program only intended to finish the NFSS at breakneck speed, nothing more. Although the American people had been bombarded with information about fallout shelters by early 1963, a public opinion survey at the time
concluded most people “had invested little in the issue” and were “waiting for the
government (especially for the federal government) to equip them with places of refuge.”\textsuperscript{1406}

After the missile crisis, Kennedy and Pittman returned to the SIP. At the end of January 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told the House Armed Services Committee that the Department of Defense had concluded that “fallout shelters for the population are absolutely essential to enable us to face the consequences of a nuclear war which might be forced upon us.” He recommended approval of $175 million for the SIP, the “logical next step following on the stocking of the surveyed shelter space. . . .” The program would run for only a year to provide enough experience “to make longer term assessments of local response to Federal assistance in financing shelter.”\textsuperscript{1407} On 7 February, Congressman Felix Edward Hébert (D–LA) proposed bill a bill to “provide for shelter in Federal structures, to authorize payment toward the construction or modification or approved public shelter space, and for other purposes,” with a similar bill introduced in the Senate\textsuperscript{1408}

For rural areas in North Carolina, the incentive program provided a solution where the survey had uncovered a problem. Griffin urged civil defense directors to write to the state’s Congressional delegation to support Kennedy’s shelter program.\textsuperscript{1409} He explained in a letter to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D–NC) that “the best defense of human life against ballistic missile attack is an adequate Civil Defense program with sufficient fallout shelters.” The $175 million earmarked for the incentive program was essential for providing shelter


\textsuperscript{1409} NCCD Newsletter, April 1963.
space in the rural portions of the state, and Griffin advised the senator to consider how “our over-all program must make some provision for our rural citizens.”  

Ervin never voted on the incentive program, but he was skeptical of fallout shelters. In a private letter to then-WRAL-TV 5 vice president Jesse Helms, Ervin wrote how “All I have read and heard has failed to convince me that there is anything of a practical nature in the proposal that the American people build fallout shelters. . . . I think that any claim that we can survive through the agency of fallout shelters is a snare and a delusion.” Helms completely concurred with Ervin’s assessment. North Carolina’s other Senator, Benjamin Everett Jordan (D–NC), appeared more favorable to shelters and in “developing a realistic civil defense program,” and he remained certain that federal financial assistance was the key to success.

In May, the House Armed Services subcommittee held hearings on the civil defense and the SIP bills. The hearings lasted over six weeks, featured testimony from over 108 witnesses, and evolved into one of the most thorough examinations of civil defense ever undertaken by a committee of Congress. Presided over by Hébert, the subcommittee convened on 28 May and the chair assured all those present in the committee room that the

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hearing “will be held in an atmosphere of complete objectivity” with the Office of Civil Defense provided ample time to present its program and answer any questions.\footnote{House Committee on Armed Services, \textit{Hearings, Civil Defense – Fallout Shelter Program}, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, 3027.}

The hearings began with an exposé of substantial objections, problems, and questions about civil defense and shelters.\footnote{Ibid., 3048.} Pittman then testified and skillfully refuted several persistent criticisms to shelters.\footnote{Ibid., 3055-56.} The nation’s civil defense director asserted that the shelter program was neither provocative to the Soviet Union, nor expensive as the civil defense budget constituted a miniscule 0.6 percent of the total DoD budget.\footnote{Ibid., 3060.} He asked the committee members whether it was better “to face a crisis with a well-conceived plan to contain the psychological and physical damage of a nuclear crisis or a nuclear attack, or whether to look the other way until the last possible moment.”\footnote{Ibid., 3161.}

As the hearings progressed in Washington, opposition to the civil defense program began to erode among the Congressmen. A gradual shift developed among the members as the objective, calm, and factually-supported testimony of Pittman and the Office of Civil Defense drowned out the monotonous testimony of shelter critics. Of the 108 witnesses testifying, the majority spoke in favor of a national shelter program, including Dr. William G. Anlyan, chairman of the Duke University Fallout Preparedness Committee. The doctor detailed the university’s shelter program and preparedness plan for fallout or “in the event of natural disasters, such as tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and so forth.” Recalling the events of October 1962, Anlyan mentioned how critics of the university committee “called us in panic
and chastised us for not being better prepared” during the crisis. Furthermore, although the university possessed space for approximately 48,000 residents of Durham, a lack of funds from the Durham civil defense authorities prevented use of the space for fallout protection. By 10 July, the subcommittee swung their support in favor of civil defense. As the final witness for the hearings, Pittman asked the subcommittee to recommend amending the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 to include natural disaster activities to further increase state and local civil defense by removing legal restrictions limiting federal aid to “civil defense operations concerned with wartime emergencies only.” Commenting on how state and local civil defense organizations played increasingly vital roles in natural disaster work, Pittman said “this has not only paid off in the relief of suffering and saving of lives, but has strengthened Civil Defense organization and capacity to perform in a wartime emergency.” He added his opinion that “a closer association of operations to meet both wartime and natural disasters will improve public understanding and public support of civil defense.”

Success seemed at hand. On 12 July, Hébert’s subcommittee unanimously agreed to report favorably on the fallout shelter program, specifically the concept of fallout shelters. The subcommittee decided that the incentive program remained too broad in scope and legislative authority and they subsequently reconvened to draft a new bill. After revisions, on

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1421 Ibid., 4103.
13 August the subcommittee voted nine-to-two in approval of the new bill. The legislation bore little resemblance to the original bill. Hébert explained to the press that “about the only thing that remains is the central theme or idea of a Fallout Shelter Program.” The SIP endured, funded for the sum of $175 million for one year.

Hébert further refined the shelter legislation in late August. Replacing the subcommittee-approved bill, the refined legislation, H.R. 8200, added two new sections to the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, section 206 on the incorporation of public shelters in “all structures existing or to be constructed in the future and owned or occupied by any department or agency of the United States,” and section 207. The latter outlined shelter financing for the SIP and reiterated that the funding, “authorized to be appropriated in fiscal year 1964 [would] not to exceed $175,000,000 to carry out the purpose of this section.”

The full House Armed Services Committee debated the bill and, with committee chairman Carl Vinson’s (D–GA) support, H.R. 8200 passed overwhelmingly.

Back in Raleigh, OCD Region III informed the state agency of the Accelerated Action program progress. Since 1 July, the program had stocked 224,458 shelter spaces at an average rate of 68,000 spaces a month. For 1963, the Office of Civil Defense allocated North Carolina supplies for 566,000 shelter spaces. Furthermore, the OCD declared Durham the leading NFSS city in the nation, with shelter space stocked and ready for 53 percent of the city’s population. By comparison, Washington, D.C. had stocked shelter spaces for only 24.5

1426 NCCD Newsletter – Special Issue, 21 August 1963.  
1430 Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Region III Newsletter, August 1963, 1, no. 7.  
437
percent of residents. In August, the Southern Furniture Exposition building in High Point
agreed to be used as a fallout shelter to protect up to 25,000 residents, and in Wilmington the
museum battleship USS North Carolina received supplies for 2,143 residents. Ashe County
also completed its operational survival plan, making it the 91 county in the state prepared for
disaster.  

While debates in Washington unfolded, far off in Moscow, Soviets and American
negotiators reached an accord for a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Previous attempts at
weapon inspection programs under Eisenhower and Kennedy to mitigate the escalating
nuclear arms race failed to win Soviet approval. After the scare of the missile crisis, both
Kennedy and Khrushchev found common ground to attempt to meet the goals of reducing or
eliminating fallout from testing, slowing the arms race and preventing nuclear proliferation,
particularly in regards to China. After clearing the air of suspicion and distrust between
nations, beginning on 15 July 1963 representatives from the United States, United Kingdom,
and Soviet Union met in Moscow and negotiated a treaty signed on 5 August. Sent to the
Senate for ratification, after three weeks of debate the statesmen overwhelming ratified the
agreement on 24 September and it took effect on 10 October.  

In summation, the treaty banned the testing of nuclear weapons or devices in the atmosphere, underwater, in outer
space, or “any other environment if the explosion would cause radioactive debris to be

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1431 NCCD Newsletter, September 1963. In Durham, 60,000 spaces had been stocked; 35,000 spaces were
located at Duke University, 8,500 at the American Tobacco Company, 9,000 at the Liggett and Myers
Tobacco Company, and the remaining 9,500 dispersed among other business and institutions. See Address
Delivered to the North Carolina Civil Defense Association Annual Conference, R.W. Grabarek, City of

1432 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88th
Holt and Co., 2012), 126-30; Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam
present outside the borders of the state conducting the explosion.” 1433 The significance of this statement, writes historian Allan M. Winkler, is that the treaty “had the effect of quieting public concern, particularly now that fallout would no longer sprinkle the globe.” 1434 For a public apprehensive and agitated about fallout and nuclear weapons, the treaty provided a case of what was “out of sight was out of mind,” explains historian and physicist Spencer R. Weart. 1435

As the Senate debated the test ban treaty, members of the House weighed the Shelter Incentive Program. The moment of truth for H.R. 8200 came on the floor of the House of Representatives on 17 September. Hébert acknowledged in the debate that he shared a negative opinion of civil defense with Vinson before the subcommittee hearings, and “we felt we would be polite about this and have a hearing and let everybody have their say. Then we would bury the bill.” 1436 Explaining the bill’s value, he argued that “While this program would save lives in the largest cities, the greatest benefit would be in the small cities and towns.” Furthermore, Hébert observed how “out of each defense dollar today we spend not more than one-tenth of one cent on civil defense.” 1437 Hébert’s advocacy lifted a wave of support behind the legislation. An amendment was also added to the bill allowing shelter

1437 Ibid., 17247.
equipment and supplies to be available for use in natural disasters.\footnote{1438} With the majority in approval, the amended H.R. 8200 passed a voice vote.\footnote{1439}

\textit{The Swift End – Death by Appropriations Committee}

Although the House passed H.R. 8200, the bill still had to receive approval from the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee before even reaching the full Senate for a vote. The House committee postponed hearings for the Office of Civil Defense budget barring the subcommittee hearings on civil defense. An Independent Offices Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee first met on 11 September, shortly before the house vote on H.R. 8200.\footnote{1440} On 7 October, the committee agreed to eliminate the $175 million for the incentive program and an additional $15.6 million for establishing fallout shelters in federal buildings, approving a total OCD budget of only $87.8 million. Committee chairman Thomas spoke for the panel: “this program has been authorized since 1950. We haven’t changed our minds. We’re not building any fallout shelters, period.”\footnote{1441} After months of hard work to sell the SIP to Congress, in one day the appropriations committee undermined everything and placed the incentive program’s fate in the hands of the Senate.


\footnotetext{1438}{“Fallout Shelter Plan Approved by House,” \textit{NYT}, 18 September 1963, 1.}
\footnotetext{1440}{Blanchard, “Evolution of Programs and Policies,” 338.}
Senate Armed Services Committee, appointed a special subcommittee to consider H.R. 8200, chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA). The Senate Appropriations Committee gave the full Senate their conclusions on 13 November. The recommendations included restoration of $46.8 million for the NFSS stocking phase, but no funds for the SIP. The Senate accepted the report of the Appropriations Committee and the bills went to conference. The House agreed to restore funding for the shelter survey, marking, and stocking for Phase II. The incentive program, however, was not restored. Even if H.R. 8200 gained Senate approval, the incentive program would not be funded unless the OCD could convince the Senate to restore the funds.

The light for the incentive program soon flickered out. In Dallas, Texas on 22 November, an assassin’s bullets struck down Kennedy during a campaign stop. In a statement, Griffin expressed the state agency’s feelings:

For all Americans, recovery from shock generated by the irresponsible assassination of our brilliant young President seems slow in coming. For those of us in Civil Defense it may take a longer time to regain enthusiasm for “business as usual.” From the very start of his administration, President Kennedy’s concern for realistic protection of citizens in case of thermonuclear attack was well known. His forthright support and efforts to establish a practical program afforded inspiration and much-needed encouragement to veteran Civil Defense workers throughout the nation. To all of us, the sense of loss occasioned by his death is deep and personal.

From his earliest days in Congress, Kennedy supported civil defense efforts. With his passing, fallout shelter efforts fell before Congress, never to return.

Jackson’s committee commenced their hearings in December. In his testimony, Pittman cited endorsements for H.R. 8200 from all fifty governors, the AFL-CIO, the

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1444 NCCD Newsletter, December 1963.
National Academy of Sciences, the Reserve Officers Association, and numerous other veterans and civic associations. He recommended that the Senate “come to a firm decision this year on the future direction of the Civil Defense Program.” General Earle G. Wheeler, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who unanimously endorsed the bill, cited “recent studies of the vulnerability of the population demonstrate that a Civil Defense Program oriented on fallout protection can reduce the number of fatalities resulting from nuclear attack by tens of millions. . . .” Jackson, who referred to the bill as “controversial legislation,” remained unconvinced.1445

President Lyndon B. Johnson’s support was crucial to the continuation of H.R. 8200. As hearings for the Jackson subcommittee finished in the first week of March 1964, the chairman indicated that the subcommittee would defer action unless Johnson and his administration indicated they wanted the SIP.1446 Pittman asked McNamara to send a short memorandum to Johnson urging him to sign a note to pass on to Jackson. For several days Pittman heard nothing. At the crucial meeting with Jackson and his subcommittee, the senators allotted Pittman 15 minutes to report on the president’s position, but Pittman’s calls to the White House indicated McNamara had doubts about his message to Johnson about the SIP. Pittman never received an answer and the senate subcommittee therefore lacked any presidential position.1447 Shortly thereafter, the subcommittee voted four to one to defer action on the bill for an indefinite period.1448 Jackson released a statement explaining the subcommittee’s action on 4 March:

1445 NCCD Newsletter, December 1963.
1446 Blanchard, American Civil Defense 1945-1984, 12.
This decision was based on several factors not necessarily related to the substance of the bill. Principally among them is the fact that ballistic missile defense and the shelter program have been closely related and it is believed that a decision as to both should be similarly related. Likewise, all programs involving the expenditure of Federal funds must be closely reviewed in the light of the current program of economy.\textsuperscript{1449}

The fallout shelter – anti-ballistic missile connection was a complete ruse in view of McNamara’s previous statements and actions, but the damage had been done and H.R. 8200 was dead.\textsuperscript{1450}

Exactly what transpired to kill the Shelter Incentive Program remains uncertain to this day. In an executive session hearing on the bill on 2 March 1964, Senator Stephen M. Young (D–OH) considered the bill “not compatible with President Johnson’s frugality program” and felt the civil rights debate trumped the timeliness of civil defense.\textsuperscript{1451} Pittman testified, countering the senator’s opinions on Soviet nuclear attack. The national civil defense director viewed the proposed program “as completing something. We think of it as avoiding the waste of the investment that has already been made.”\textsuperscript{1452} To Pittman, a shelter-based civil defense program “is a better return on the dollar . . . in terms of lives saved in a nuclear attack than any opportunity to improve the strategic weapons systems, offensive and defensive in the judgment of the people who are managing these programs.”\textsuperscript{1453}

Two issues emerge: Johnson’s legislative agenda (civil rights) and the antiballistic missile (ABM) system. In 1968, Pittman contended that the bill failed because the Jackson committee “decided that it should wait until the Defense Department made up its mind about

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1449} Pittman wrote the statement for Jackson to mitigate the lack of presidential support on OCD morale. See Blanchard, “Evolution of Programs and Policies,” 369.


\textsuperscript{1451} Senate, Committee on Armed Services, \textit{Hearings, H.R. 8200 Civil Defense Fallout Shelter Legislation, Executive Session}, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, 3.

\textsuperscript{1452} Ibid., 8-9.

\textsuperscript{1453} Ibid., 20.
\end{footnotesize}
anti-ballistic missiles,” and that Johnson and the Bureau of the Budget made implicit assumptions in Congressional presentations “that civil defense was up to Congress [to decide to fund].” During Department of Defense appropriation hearings in February 1963, McNamara spoke of the ABM system and argued that:

the effectiveness of an active ballistic missile defense system in saving lives depends in large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defense system. Indeed, in the absence of adequate fallout shelters, an active defense might not significantly increase the proportion of the population surviving an all-out nuclear attack. For this reason, the very austere civil defense program recommended by the President . . . should be given priority over any major additions to the active defenses.

In 1968, with the ABM issue still under consideration, McNamara wrote “While we have substantially improved our technology in the field, it is important to understand that none of the systems at the present or foreseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States.” Ergo, fallout would still represent a very real threat, warranting shelters to safeguard American lives. In Pittman’s opinion, McNamara never believed in a nationwide fallout shelter system, only the basics of the national shelter survey, and that the defense secretary committed himself to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction rather than the ABM.

1457 Harry B. Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield: The U.S. Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1981), 375. Explaining his view on mutual deterrence, McNamara, in reference to a discussion about countering a Soviet ABM system, wrote: “There is no point whatever in our responding by going to a massive ABM deployment to protect our population when such a system would be ineffective against a sophisticated Soviet offense. Instead, realism dictates that we then must further expand our sophisticated offensive forces and thus preserve our overwhelming assured-destruction capability. The intractable fact is that both the Soviets and we would be forced to continue on a foolish and unproductive course. In the end it would provide neither the Soviets nor us with any greater relative nuclear capability. The time has come for us both to realize that and to act reasonably. It is clearly in our mutual interest to do so.” See McNamara, Essence of Security, 66.
Johnson’s focus in early 1964 on domestic issues coincides with a domestic shift on nuclear fears. It warrants reiteration that Pittman attempted to obtain Johnson’s view on H.R. 8200 by going through McNamara, and hence the president’s specific views remain obscure. What is known with certainty is that the new president fervently believed in expansive liberal domestic policies committed to social welfare programs and he benefited from a national mood eager for strong presidential leadership. In the area of nuclear fear, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty effectively swept aside public noise over the arms race. Historian Paul Boyer observes that after September 1963, test ban and nuclear disarmament organizations “either collapsed or vanished from public view,” and historian Allan Winkler credits the treat as having “effectively neutralized proponents of protection and left civil defense [as] a casualty of the arms-control process.” Although the dangers and threats of nuclear holocaust remained, the silence about the threat represented “a stagnation of military, political, and moral thought without modern precedent,” concludes physicist and historian Spencer Weart. Without a public clamoring for information on shelters, and with a relative détente between the major nuclear players, Johnson possessed ample reason to let civil defense’s shelter program die off while he focused on a domestic agenda.

By March 1964, politics and shifting priorities snuffed out the Office of Civil Defense’s grand shelter plans as quickly as they caught fire. With the death of Kennedy and the end of H.R. 8200, fallout shelters fell out of favor. At the end of the month, Pittman submitted his resignation to McNamara days before the final decision by the Jackson

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subcommittee and returned to his law practice at the end of the month.\textsuperscript{1461} On 31 March, McNamara reassigned Pittman’s Office of Civil Defense to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. William P. Durkee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense, replaced Pittman as the nation’s civil defense head.\textsuperscript{1462} The National Fallout Shelter Survey continued with skeletal funding and by the end of FY 1964 it had located space for approximately 121.4 million citizens in 143,000 facilities. Officials licensed, marked, and stocked over 45,000 of these facilities to shelter almost 24 million citizens.\textsuperscript{1463} By 1969, the OCD reported a nationwide survey of 195,751 facilities with space for approximately 188.2 million citizens.\textsuperscript{1464}

\textit{The Eight-year Transition to Dual Preparedness}

In North Carolina, throughout the remainder of the decade fallout shelters and nuclear protection gradually lost emphasis as the basis for state civil defense operations. Shelters served as the essential component of the state’s nuclear preparedness effort, but repeated natural and manmade disasters continued to grab press headlines and the attention of local governments. Nationally, Johnson found himself increasingly occupied with the war in Vietnam. Civil defense funding decreased annually as an almost endless array of major disasters impacted the nation. Federal legislation evolved as a result of these disasters which

\textsuperscript{1461} Jack Raymond, “U.S. Civil-Defense Director Resigns,” \textit{NYT}, 9 March 1964, 12. Pittman resigned not out of anger about the failure of the SIP, but rather that he originally accepted the OCD directorship on the understanding he could return to his law practice after two years. On account of the pending shelter bill, Pittman stayed on for an additional six months. See \textit{Cong. Rec.}, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, 110, pt. 5: 6406.
necessitated relief beyond the authority of Public Law 81-875. As earthquakes and hurricanes devastated communities and federal civil defense funding plummeted, Nixon ordered studies into the nation’s civil defense and disaster relief efforts. The results of these studies culminated in the establishment of the policy of “dual-use” for civil defense, preparing and responding equally to natural disasters or nuclear war.

Shelter survey work remained a state civil defense project after the death of the Shelter Incentive Program. For the remainder of the decade the state agency continued to locate, license, mark, and stock public shelters. In September and December 1965, the Office of Civil Defense presented the town of Davidson and both the city and county of Durham with the OCD Distinguished Service Award for licensing, marking, and stocking shelter for the entire population of their respective communities.\textsuperscript{1465} Griffin’s shelter survey effort reported by June 1967 that in 2,496 facilities the state located 1,696,480 spaces. Of these, the state licensed space for 1,260,944, with stocked supplies for 812,082.\textsuperscript{1466} Three years later, the number of spaces more than doubled to approximately 3.5 million.\textsuperscript{1467} Although still insufficient for the state’s population, the shelter survey at least provided a degree of nuclear preparedness lacking a decade earlier.

On the other hand, natural disaster planning and response grew tremendously for the NCCD from 1964 onward. That summer, the agency newsletter for the first time recommended, rather fortuitously, that every local director review preparations for the possibility of natural disasters, specifically hurricanes.\textsuperscript{1468} From August to October, the

\textsuperscript{1466} NCCD Newsletter, June 1967.
\textsuperscript{1468} NCCD Newsletter, July and August 1964.
remnants of three hurricanes – Cleo, Dora, and Hilda – crossed into the state, spawning multiple tornadoes and inflicting heavy flooding in over 40 counties. The extensive flooding tested many local civil defense agencies with an actual disaster for the first time, and the press responded favorably to the emergency services and response. Sanford requested a major disaster declaration and Johnson issued one on 14 October, later authorizing $320,000 in federal relief.

With shelters no longer a prominent federal priority, the hurricanes of 1964 reinforced North Carolina contingency planning for all hazards. The state concept that “civil defense planning must be contingency planning” acquired added reinforcement on 17 March 1965, when a tornado killed two people and inflicted $2 million in damages in Beaufort, Craven, Duplin, Jones, and Pamlico counties. The following summer, Lt. Governor Robert W. Scott articulated where North Carolina’s emergency managers found themselves in the post-shelter civil defense effort:

While protection from the effects of nuclear attack is the primary object of civil defense, the role of coordinating relief and recovery forces to combat the effects of a natural disaster are much more readily understood and appreciated by the general public. We have had our share of natural disasters and our people know the need for a central coordinating agency. They have seen civil defense forces at work in

1470 NCCD Newsletter, November 1964.
1472 NCCD, Progress Report, 1965 – 1967, 4; NCCD Newsletter, April and May 1965; Daniel Killian Moore, Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers of Daniel Killian Moore, ed. Memory F. Mitchell (Raleigh, N.C.: State Department of Archives and History, Council of State, 1971), 591. Governor Moore issued a proclamation of a state of emergency and declared the counties major disaster area, but the damages did not qualify for federal assistance.
hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, threatened explosions, etc. and know what can be done with even partly trained disaster crews. \footnote{Address by Lieutenant Governor Robert W. Scott to North Carolina Civil Defense Association, Goldsboro, 13 June 1966, attached to \textit{NCCD Newsletter}, July 1966.}

Scott’s message may have been just as relevant in 1956, but its expression gave formal recognition of the public perception of civil defense in North Carolina and undoubtedly throughout the nation. For as many citizens thought of “duck and cover” and fallout shelters, countless others could picture the red, blue, and white “CD” logo on the uniforms and vehicles of their disaster response workers.

Changes in the planning and perception of civil defense joined with a change in state leadership. Governor Dan K. Moore replaced Sanford in January 1965, entering office with the conviction that “North Carolina stands . . . on the threshold of greatness, looking to an era of unprecedented prosperity and growth.”\footnote{Moore, \textit{Messages, Addresses}, 7.} Moore stressed a vision of “total development,” using all aspects of government to maximize its resources for the betterment of state and local governments. A former member of the Board of Water Resources, Moore presided over the creation of the Cape Lookout National Seashore and a massive expansion of the state parks system. Economically, he requested and received funds to construct over 10,000 miles of new roads and highways, and his industrial development program brought in more than $2 billion in investment, more successful than Hodges or Sanford.\footnote{Moore, \textit{Messages, Addresses}, xxv-xxxiv.} During Moore’s tenure, the NCCD finally acquired a true Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in 1967, constructed underneath the new State Administration Building and adjacent to the State Legislative Building. As a nerve center for coordinating all state emergencies and disaster control
operations, the new NCCD headquarters provided complete fallout protection for all staffers and a valuable tool for efficient management of any future disaster or crisis.1476

State civil defense leadership changed as well. On 30 June 1967, Griffin retired after serving as the agency’s director since 1 March 1954.1477 From an original staff of four paid employees, the NCCD had grown to 45 members and 230 county and community civil defense directors. The state Operational Survival Plan together with 97 county plans guided responses to any type of emergency or disaster.1478 Six civil defense areas with paid directors oversaw the development of the county and community civil defense offices.1479 Interim director Russell C. Nicholson no sooner took over the top slot when the Burke County Rescue Squad responded to the state’s worst aviation disaster on 19 July when Piedmont Airlines Flight 22 collided with a light aircraft over Hendersonville, killing all 82 passengers and aircrew.1480 On 1 September, William M. Hodges became the new NCCD director. A retired Air Force major and former civil defense director of Beaufort and Pamlico counties,

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1477 Press release from the Governor’s Office, 19 May 1967, folder labeled “Governor Dan K. Moore,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 9.

1478 NCCD Newsletter, June 1967.

1479 The NCCD finally staffed the Area D office on 1 May 1966 when Colonel Charles W. Porter established his office in Asheboro. See NCCD Newsletter, May 1966.


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he previously worked for Moore on studies of the emergency management of state resources in the event of a national or natural disaster.\(^{1481}\)

Hodges’ tenure as NCCD director coincided with varying emergencies. An ice storm from 10 – 13 January 1968 caused damages estimated at greater than $17 million and resulted in a major disaster declaration for 21 counties and the appropriation of $400,000 in federal funds on 10 February.\(^{1482}\) In April, the NCCD coordinated all state activity in the EOC as law enforcement and the National Guard responded to several days of rioting and civil unrest after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Civil defense communications and coordination of state resources proved invaluable and not a single life was lost.\(^{1483}\) In late September and early October, another period of prolonged drought required civil defense to procure $1 million in pipe and pumps to provide water for seven cities and towns.\(^{1484}\)

These emergencies contributed to an increased shift from nuclear to generalized emergency preparedness in North Carolina. In July, Moore issued a State Disaster Operations Plan specifically crafted to “cope with the ever increasing possibility of peacetime disasters,”

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\(^{1481}\) Press release from Governor’s Office, 29 August 1967, folder labeled “Press Releases,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 8; \textit{NCCD Newsletter}, September 1967.
\(^{1483}\) \textit{NCCD Newsletter}, April 1968; Statement by Governor Dan K. Moore, 10 April 1968, folder labeled “Governor Dan K. Moore,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 9.
and pledged his adoption of the document as the official disaster plan for the state.\textsuperscript{1485}

Addressing the annual meeting of the U.S. Civil Defense Council that month, the governor spoke of the increasing frequency of emergencies necessitating civil defense. He referenced how over nearly two decades, civil defense “has moved from the world of possibility – the threat of nuclear attack – into the world of probability where disaster in some fashion can be expected.” Speaking directly of North Carolina’s efforts, Moore’s approach to civil defense conformed to his political philosophy for the state, developing plans to “assure full and prompt utilization of all resources in the event of any type of disaster, be it nuclear attack or an automobile accident.”\textsuperscript{1486} By January 1969, the NCCD reported civil defense directors in all 100 counties, and complete revisions of all state civil defense plans and statements of understandings to conform to this policy shift.\textsuperscript{1487}

Moore’s civil defense policy continued into the administration of Governor Robert W. Scott.\textsuperscript{1488} Scott picked up from his predecessors, embarking on a massive road building campaign, large investments in public education, and economic development with industries investing $2.3 billion and 91,000 new jobs in the state during his administration.\textsuperscript{1489} On 17 July 1969, Scott appointed long-time NCCD employee James W. Denning as the fifth director of the state civil defense agency. Denning joined the agency in August 1955 and over

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[1485]{Dan K. Moore to heads of all state departments, offices, commissions, boards, and agencies, executive heads of county and city government, directors of civil defense, and citizens of the state of North Carolina, 1 July 1968; NCCD press release, “Governor Moore Approves State Disaster Plan; Distribution in Progress,” 19 July 1968, folder labeled “Governor Dan K. Moore,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 9.}
\footnotetext[1486]{Remarks by Governor Dan Moore at U.S. Civil Defense Council – Annual Conference, Asheville, 8 July 1968 (delivered by Charles Dunn), folder labeled “Governor Dan K. Moore,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 9.}
\footnotetext[1488]{Scott was the son of Governor William Kerr Scott, who established the State Council of Civil Defense in July 1950.}
\end{footnotes}
his tenure worked extensively in operations and communications, predominately about
natural disasters or localized emergencies.\textsuperscript{1490} Under Denning, the NCCD placed high priority
on rewriting the state Operational Survival Plans to cover any potential emergency and
assisting counties with the same rewrites.\textsuperscript{1491} Hurricanes, understandably, garnered special
attention and in May 1970 the NCCD initiated an “all-out effort” to educate citizens on
hurricane safety. The agency issued its first hurricane tracking charts and began a tradition
that remains today to inform the public at the start of every hurricane season on how to
prepare themselves for possible storms.\textsuperscript{1492}

Nationally, nuclear civil defense gradually gave way to increased emphasis on
emergency preparedness. After 1963, federal civil defense budgets shrank as the shelter
program dissipated in priority. From FY 1962 to 1969, the congressional appropriation
decreased from a high of $207.6 million to $61 million. Civil defense officials explored other
options to increase shelter space, but by 1969 the OCD reported backlogs in surveys of new
buildings, marking and stocking existing shelters, and research into nuclear protection.\textsuperscript{1493}

With doubts about the viability of shelters, the Vietnam War, Great Society program, a
Congressional mood of economy, and potential public backlash to civil defense and nuclear

\textsuperscript{1490} NCCD press release, 18 July 1969, folder labeled “Press Releases,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 8;
\textit{NCCD Newsletter}, July 1969. Prior to joining the NCCD, Denning served in the 101st Airborne Division
during World War II, jumping into Normandy prior to D-Day and in Holland as part of Operation Market
Garden. Oddly, only a week prior to Denning’s appointment, the first NCCD director, E.Z. Jones, died after
a lengthy illness. Denning himself would die after a lengthy illness on 29 July 1972. See \textit{NCCD Newsletter},
July-August 1972.

\textsuperscript{1491} NCCD, \textit{Progress Report, 1 January 1969 – 1 January 1971} (Raleigh, N.C.: North Carolina Civil

\textsuperscript{1492} NCCD press release, “State CD Chief Pushes State-Wide Distribution of Hurricane Information,” 1
June 1970, folder labeled “Press Releases,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 8; NCCD hurricane tracking chart,
May 1970 , folder labeled “Hurricane,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 8; \textit{NCCD Newsletter}, October 1969,

\textsuperscript{1493} Kerr, \textit{Civil Defense in the U.S.}, 142-45.
deterrence, Johnson and McNamara “withheld the support that was essential if civil defense were to progress,” concludes analyst B. Wayne Blanchard.\(^{1494}\)

Expensive natural disasters in the mid-1960s stressed the confines of Public Law 81-875. On 27 March 1964, a magnitude 9.2 earthquake in Alaska devastated the city of Anchorage and left the entire state’s economy in disarray. The severity of damages overwhelmed Public Law 81-875’s provisions and forced the Congress to appropriate $23.5 million to rebuild and replace lost tax revenue.\(^{1495}\) The following year, Hurricane Betsy struck Florida and New Orleans in September, causing over $1.4 billion in damage.\(^{1496}\) Congress again passed a specific disaster relief bill to provide longer-term assistance, appropriating $70 million in aid.\(^{1497}\) To extend the provisions from these two acts for the entire nation, Congress enacted the Disaster Relief Act of 1966 to amend Public Law 81-875. For the first time, federal disaster relief provided assistance to individual victims. The bill authorized federal loans at reduced Treasury rates of interest, funding to repair damages to higher education facilities and public facilities under construction, and rural communities and unincorporated towns became eligible for relief.\(^{1498}\) In an apparent acknowledgment of the

\(^{1494}\) Blanchard, American Civil Defense 1945 – 1984, 15.

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growing work of disaster relief, in 1968 Congress renamed the Office of Emergency Planning as the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). Commencing in 1969 under Nixon, the nation’s civil defense and disaster relief programs experienced major revisions and realignment. In May, the president directed George A. Lincoln, director of the OEP, to lead an ad hoc group of the National Security Council (NSC) to study the nation’s civil defense program, specifically the shelter program as outlined in National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 57. He further tasked Lincoln to study the relationship between disaster assistance and civil defense activities pertaining to state and local governments. Lastly, Nixon directed Lincoln to increase emphasis on plans, procedures, and preparedness activities of civil defense applicable to peacetime emergencies.

Over on Capitol Hill, the Congress drafted a new comprehensive disaster relief act. The bill included provisions to designate a federal coordinating officer during a major disaster, increased federal agency cooperation in rendering disaster assistance, and provided funding assistance for states and localities to remove debris from private property when in the public interest. The legislation increased aid to victims, including unemployment assistance and food and housing allowances. Just prior to the bill’s completion in August, Hurricane Camille made landfall in Mississippi as a category five hurricane, devastating the Gulf Coast and inducing deadly flash floods in Appalachia. A month later, Congress passed Public Law

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In the wake of Camille and Public Law 91-76, Nixon outlined to Congress his proposals for permanent disaster relief legislation. In his message of 22 April 1970, the president called on the Congress to craft new disaster relief legislation to streamline the cumbersome and convoluted bureaucracy in the interest of greater effectiveness and efficiency. His proposals included federal assistance to states for disaster prevention and damage reduction, improvements in federal–state cooperation, and greater individual victim assistance. After discussions between the White House and Congress, Nixon signed the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 on 31 December as Public Law 91-606. The act repealed the bulk of Public Laws 81-875, 89-769, and 91-79. This new omnibus disaster relief act represented a blend of old and new, maintaining most of the provisions of the 1969 act with a strengthened commitment to provide relief assistance to individual victims, local and state governments. Public Law 91-606 also authorized the director of the OEP to conduct a study to determine what additional plans, procedures, and facilities were necessary to provide effective action to prevent or minimize loss from natural disasters.

Concurrently, Nixon’s study groups on the federal civil defense program began to return their findings. On 6 February 1970, Office of Civil Defense director John E. Davis announced a new OCD policy that made the costs for natural disaster emergencies eligible

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1502 House of Representatives, Message from the President Relative to Disaster Assistance, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, H. Doc. 91-323, 2-6.
for federal assistance for personnel and administrative costs, de facto recognition of the relationship between civil defense planning and natural disaster operations. With a budget limiting further shelter work, Davis and the OCD throughout 1970 increased emphasis on the dual-use of civil defense for preparedness and response to natural disasters and localized emergencies. An OCD study of public attitudes admitted at the start of the decade that “an all hazards preparedness effort is likely to enjoy more public support than the sum total of several independent efforts,” and refuted discussions that this compromised the national fallout shelter capability. Since the goals of civil defense continued to be increasing the numbers of survivors of attack and maximizing recovery from attack, the all hazard approach merely nuanced the national effort. The OCD study spoke of the virtues of an all hazards approach to planning, but warned that it “should enhance nuclear disaster planning, not displace it.”

With the shift in OCD to emphasizing dual-use, local emergency preparedness for natural disasters and local emergencies surpassed national nuclear preparedness. Another federal report issued in July, a comprehensive study of the Department of Defense’s organization and management, explored the division of civil defense responsibility between the OEP and DoD. The study recommended that if delegated civil defense responsibilities

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1504 NCCD Newsletter, January – February 1970.
1507 OCD, Civil Defense and the Public, 40.
remained in the Defense Department that the OCD should be established as an independent agency reporting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a line and not a staff activity.\textsuperscript{1509}

In January 1972, Lincoln presented Congress with his interagency study of the relationship between civil defense and federal disaster assistance. His report, \textit{Disaster Preparedness}, as authorized by Public Law 91-606, served as a blueprint for further development of disaster preparedness in the country. This included assigning the OCD in February responsibility for fostering local government plans and organizations for major disaster responses and providing the same with advice and guidance to meet the effects of major disasters.\textsuperscript{1510} Based on the DoD report and Lincoln’s study, the OEP and OCD reached an agreement whereby the federal civil defense program would undertake efforts to increase emergency preparedness for state and local civil defense efforts for major disasters.\textsuperscript{1511} On 5 May, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird abolished the Office of Civil Defense and created the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA).\textsuperscript{1512}

The DCPA brought civil defense back to the level of the Secretary of Defense and reoriented the national program to emphasize protection from nuclear weapons and natural disasters.\textsuperscript{1513} Laird explained that the new agency would stress the dual capability and utility of civil defense preparedness and natural disaster preparedness at local government level. In carrying out this task, we will provide preparedness assistance across the entire disaster spectrum, tying in closely the many

\textsuperscript{1511} DCPA, \textit{Annual Report FY1972}, 42-43.
\textsuperscript{1512} DCPA, \textit{Annual Report FY1972}, 44.
\textsuperscript{1513} DCPA, \textit{Annual Report FY1972}, 1-2.
similarities of nuclear attack and natural disaster preparedness planning, a concept long recognized and accepted by State and local government authorities.\textsuperscript{1514}

In August, after Nixon reviewed NSSM 57, he decided that the federal government “shall maintain the current overall level of effort in its civil defense activities,” and with “increased emphasis on dual-use plans, procedures and preparedness within the limitations of existing authority. . . .”\textsuperscript{1515}

Although not entirely dead, the era of a nuclear-oriented civil defense was over. Nixon, in an effort to streamline the executive branch, dismantled the OEP in June 1973, transferring responsibilities for disaster preparedness and relief to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).\textsuperscript{1516} In 1975, the administration of President Gerald Ford redirected the DCPA priority to nuclear preparedness, reversing the dual-use policy to loud cries of protest from the states. Reacting to the threat of the DCPA leaving emergency preparedness while the states ignored nuclear preparedness, Congress amended the Civil Defense Act of 1950 in July 1976 with Public Law 94-361. This legislation modified the 1950 bill to permit states and their political subdivisions to use the civil defense organizational structure and federal funds for “disasters other than disasters caused by enemy attack.”\textsuperscript{1517} Dual-use was thus codified into federal law. The splitting of disaster responsibilities between HUD, the DCPA, and other federal agencies together with a policy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1514} House Committee on Appropriations, \textit{Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973}, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, 200.
\item \textsuperscript{1515} National Security Decision Memorandum 184, 14 August 1972, item number PD01275, Presidential Directives Collection, DNSA.
\end{itemize}
shift back to nuclear preparedness caused numerous headaches and confusion at all levels of government. Demand steadily increased for President Jimmy Carter to establish a new, centralized federal program to prepare for and respond to enemy attack, natural and manmade disasters.\textsuperscript{1518} In June 1978, Carter submitted Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 to create the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to centralize disaster and emergency-related responsibilities with continued stress on dual-use of civil defense.\textsuperscript{1519} Carter’s plan became effective in September 1978 and final activation of FEMA took place in March and July 1979 through Executive Orders 12127 and 12148.\textsuperscript{1520}

North Carolina, a long time unofficial practitioner of dual-use civil defense, reorganized itself in the 1970s to better align with federal and state changes. As part of an effort by Scott to reorganize state government, the formerly independent NCCD in 1971 became a division of the newly established State Department of Military and Veterans’ Affairs, and two years later became known as the Division of Civil Preparedness.\textsuperscript{1521} The 1975 General Assembly amended Chapter 166 of the General Statutes renaming the state agency as the North Carolina Civil Preparedness Agency (NCCP). Additional amendments emphasized that the agency’s work would involve “prevention of, preparation for, response

\textsuperscript{1518} May, Recovering from Catastrophes, 52-55; Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield, 433-76; Rubin, Emergency Management, 102-03.
\textsuperscript{1519} House of Representatives, Message from the President Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, H. Doc. 95-356, 1-6.
to and recovery from natural or man-made disasters, riots, or hostile military or paramilitary action." Beginning in 1977, the NCCP became a division of the new state Department of Crime Control and Public Safety before being renamed once again in 1979 as the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management, aligning with the establishment of FEMA.\textsuperscript{1523}

\textit{Conclusion}

Fallout shelters swept into the public sphere during the Kennedy administration and vanished almost as quickly. The Cuban Missile Crisis and its aftermath in the fall of 1962 elevated the work of the North Carolina Civil Defense Agency and the National Fallout Shelter Survey. As the world sweated out a week where nuclear holocaust loomed large, the personnel of the NCCD checked on preparations and reassured the public that shelters and civil defense offered salvation. One of the most striking aspects of the missile crisis in North Carolina is that it appeared to generate so little panic, despite the fact that the state was so ill-prepared to cope with it. After all, less than 8 percent of the state’s citizens had shelter space available. The extraordinary calm could be attributed to apathy. It also could have reflected the fact that North Carolinians had been informed about shelters, assessed the risk, and rejected the cost and bother of building them. Across the state, this calm represented confidence in the state civil defense agency, or at least an acknowledgement that civil defense personnel were capable of managing the situation.

The lack of shelters in North Carolina at the outbreak of the crisis is not necessarily attributable to apathy. Residents contemplated or discussed shelters from 1961 to October 1962 and made their peace with the state’s civil defense program. That the majority of

\textsuperscript{1522} North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1975, S.B. 864, Chapter 734.
\textsuperscript{1523} North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1977, H.B. 119, Chapter 70; North Carolina Session Laws and Resolutions, 1979, H.B. 1744, Chapter 1310.
citizens did not build private shelters, and did not criticize civil defense for failing to provide sufficient public shelters may indicate their faith in the system. Citizens did not focus on the lack of fallout shelters. Instead, they appeared to accept that North Carolina’s civil defense strength was in its ability to maintain communication and centralized oversight of the local civil defense offices. Citizens seem to have valued the fact that the state could react to the crisis in an efficient and collected, orderly fashion, far more than they bemoaned the dearth of shelters. Confident that the state was in control of the situation, Tar Heels supported civil defense. The missile crisis validated the work of the NCCD in the fallout shelter era.

Throughout 1963, the fallout shelter program consumed the work of the state civil defense agency. Experiences from two weeks in October 1962 remained with civil defense officials well into 1963. Sanford, Griffin, and local civil defense directors repeatedly brought up the missile crisis in appeals for support. The countless letters and press statements advocating shelters proved for naught as Johnson and McNamara chose to not accept the Shelter Incentive Program following the death of Kennedy. The incentive program stood as a vital component of North Carolina’s shelter strategy. Private fallout shelter construction never rose above statistically insignificant levels, and the survey produced only small isolated pockets of licensed, marked, and stocked public shelters. Outside of the largest urban areas in the state, the vast majority of counties had little protection from fallout. The death of the SIP relegated the NCCD to continue the national shelter survey work, albeit at a slower pace. In its last biennial report, the NCCD reported locating 2,242,148 fallout shelter spaces with PF 40 or greater as of 31 December 1970. Of these spaces, 1,480,725 were marked statewide and 1,280,704 spaces stocked with supplies. Eighteen counties across the state had located
enough shelter spaces for every resident.\textsuperscript{1524} After ten years of work, the state possessed stocked public shelters for only a quarter of the population.\textsuperscript{1525}

The decline of the shelter program did not adversely impact a growing state commitment to emergency preparedness. After the missile crisis, civil defense received praise at home and abroad for its emergency operations and rescue squads. The decline of the federal shelter effort did not end state efforts to promote shelters throughout the 1960s, but this effort increasingly became secondary to emergency preparedness efforts to meet all contingencies. From 1964 into the early 1970s, the NCCD increased public information efforts about hurricane and tornado season and responded to an increasing array of natural disasters and localized emergencies. Natural disasters, the bane of the state in the 1950s, thankfully did not affect North Carolina with such severity in the 1960s, but the experiences proved beneficial to create local civil defense offices, with their development and professional training funded by federal programs. By 1970, all counties featured civil defense directors and officials rewrote all civil defense emergency plans for state and programs to address natural disasters and localized emergencies, hurricanes to civil disorder. When the federal government finally issued new policies in the early 1970s for the dual-use of civil defense resources for nuclear and emergency preparedness, the state of North Carolina found itself with years of experience in this area.

Figure 39. Images of Dr. Page’s fallout shelter / underground motor hotel. Probably the most distinct fallout shelter in North Carolina, it is also one of the few private shelters built in the state during the fallout shelter push under the Kennedy administration. Source: Brochure titled “For Rent: Page’s Underground Motor Apartment, Yanceyville, N.C.,” original given to author by Susan Page Percy.
Figure 40. After the Berlin Crisis, interest in civil defense waned in North Carolina as it did nationwide. The Cuban Missile Crisis spurred citizens and the NCCD to accelerate work on the National Fallout Shelter Survey. Source: Editorial cartoon from the *Charlotte Observer*, 25 October 1962.
Figure 41. By 1970, the NCCD and the National Fallout Shelter Survey managed to locate shelter space for almost half of all state residents, with marked and stocked space for a quarter of all residents. The effort remained inadequate in the event of nuclear attack. Within a few years, emergency preparedness made fallout shelters largely irrelevant. Source: NCCD, Progress Report, 1 January 1969 – 1 January 1971 (Raleigh, N.C.: North Carolina Civil Defense Agency, 1971), attachment 2.
Figure 42. William M. Hodges followed Edward F. Griffin as the fourth NCCD director. Although only director for less than two years, he presided over the agency's policy shift from nuclear to more generalized emergency preparedness. Source: folder labeled “Hodges, 1 Sept. 1967 – 15 July 1967,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 9.
Figure 43. James W. Denning, the fifth director of the NCCD. An agency veteran from the fall of 1955, Denning oversaw a rewrite of state operational survival plans and promoted hurricane and tornado awareness across the state. Source: NCCD scrapbooks, OSRC-NCA.
Figure 44. A marker of changing civil defense policies and priorities, in May 1970 the NCCD issued its first hurricane tracking chart and began an annual hurricane season awareness effort. Such programs persist to this day. Source: folder labeled “Hurricane,” NCCD, OSRC-NCA, Box 8.
Conclusion: A Catalyst for Development

In this State we learned much from a series of destructive natural disasters. While the public memory is short, many responsible government leaders took heed of the experience.

– Edward F. Griffin, North Carolina Civil Defense Agency Director, June 1967

Few states traveled the economic distance that North Carolina did during the twentieth century. North Carolina was among the poorest states in the country in 1900. It led the nation in illiteracy. It was populated mainly by poor farmers . . . . By the end of the twentieth century, North Carolina looked like the rest of America.

– Rob Christensen, *The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics*

North Carolina enjoyed decades of relative tranquility from natural disasters from the early 1960s until the early 1990s. After a series of near misses, two hurricanes struck the state in 1996: Bertha and Fran. Fran’s fury set a modern benchmark for destruction. Twenty-four people died in North Carolina and the combination of wind and rain tore apart coastal areas, downed forests of trees, and destroyed homes from the Atlantic Ocean to the Virginia state line. The storm’s damages exceeded $5.2 billion dollars, making it the state’s most expensive disaster ever. Governor Jim Hunt declared a state of emergency for all 100 counties; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recognized claims for 58 of these and allocated almost $850 million in federal disaster relief. More hurricanes followed. Bonnie passed through the state in August 1998 and Dennis in late August – early September 1999.

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though the damage they inflicted paled in comparison with that of Fran. Then Hurricane Floyd struck eastern North Carolina ten days later.

A precursor to the flooding and evacuations of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Floyd’s floodwaters affected the state like no storm before or since. FEMA declared 66 counties major disaster areas. Floyd killed 52 people in North Carolina alone, flooded more than 63,000 homes and destroyed 7,300 of these outright. The town of Princeville was completely underwater for almost two weeks. The combination of Dennis’ rains and Floyd’s massive size culminated in a 500-year flood. Wilmington reported over 15 inches of rainfall in a twenty-four hour period. The Neuse, Tar, and Northeast Cape Fear Rivers each established all-time flood records. Floodwaters washed out bridges and highways throughout eastern North Carolina and thousands of citizens huddled on rooftops as helicopters and boats from every possible source rescued the victims over the course of several days. Tens of thousands of fowl and hogs drowned and numerous hog-waste lagoons and sewage treatment plants flooded, with floodwaters further mixed with the oil, gasoline, industrial and chemical spills from submerged automobiles and manufacturing plants.

Financially, Floyd’s destruction to eastern North Carolina surpassed that of Fran. Total damages ranged from $5.5 to $6 billion. Congress rejected Hunt’s request for $5.3 billion in disaster relief and approved only $2.2 billion. The state itself appropriated $836 million for environmental clean-up, housing, aid to farmers and small businesses, public health, and public schools and local government. Floyd displaced a quarter of a million persons and inflicted from $800 million to a billion in agricultural losses alone.1529 The economic devastation of Floyd occurred as the eastern counties suffered job losses from a

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disappearing manufacturing sector, falling crop prices, a tobacco buyout, and a shrinking tax base. In the words of Floyd chroniclers Richard Moore and Jay Barnes, “the disaster took the most from those who had the least.” The work of rebuilding eastern North Carolina and reviving its economy continues to this day.

*     *     *

North Carolina took advantage of federal relief monies in the 1930s much as its leaders would for natural disaster relief and civil defense in the 1950s and 1990s. Economically, the New Deal “rescued the state from economic collapse,” in the words of historian Anthony J. Badger, but it left the “basic economic, social, and political structure of the state largely untouched.” The state’s traditionalistic political culture accepted the positive effect of government in the community, but maintained a conservative role, acting only when pressed by outside forces. For North Carolina, natural disasters in the mid-1950s necessitated policy changes to mitigate the economic devastation and to reacquire command and control amidst chaos. Civil defense, a byproduct of the postwar national security state emerged as a suitable candidate on which to place the burden for crafting and implementing the changes requested by state and federal officials.

Civil defense as an institution and concept evolved throughout the early Cold War period, especially among state officials. For federal planners, the definition and meaning evolved from protection of the homeland from aerial bombardment to nuclear attack and ensuring the functions of government in emergencies. But for state and local government,

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civil defense came to be associated with other kinds of emergencies.\textsuperscript{1533} In fact, one leading disaster studies authority, Enrico L. Quarantelli, noted that in the 20th century emphasis on attack protection at the national level led to greater stress on natural disaster preparation and response at the state and local level.\textsuperscript{1534} North Carolina’s experience with civil defense illustrates this interpretation.

President Harry S. Truman’s transfer of disaster relief responsibility to the Federal Civil Defense Administration in January 1953 would in time prove fortunate for state leaders. In both world wars, civilian defense work in responding to peacetime disasters caught the attention of some policymakers, but not enough to jettison the perception of it as a temporary, wartime organization charged with responding to enemy attack. Shifting responsibility for natural disasters to civil defense breathed new life into an organization that failed to win public enthusiasm in the early 1950s. As a “peacetime” responsibility, federal civil defense leadership considered disaster relief work as an opportunity for positive public relations, even though preparing the country against enemy attack remained its ostensible purpose.

Postwar developments within North Carolina, however, eventually redefined civil defense as a tool to assist with economic growth. World War II did not greatly affect the state’s economy. But rather, a fairly methodical pattern of growth did ensue from initiatives taken by several governors between 1945 and 1973. Governor R. Gregg Cherry and his successors built roads, wired rural counties for telephone service, and promoted industrial development and tourism in North Carolina. Truman’s transfer of disaster relief to civil defense


defense presented state leaders, in the event of a declared major disaster, the opportunity to request federal aid from the president, bypassing Congress. Although not a New Deal social welfare program, disaster relief could soothe the economic agony of storm damage, if civil defense officials provided the oversight of expenditures and losses. Subsequently, state officials could henceforth ill-afford to neglect civil defense programs that could facilitate the release of federal funds, or fail to answer constituents clamoring for relief in any form or amount, a notable example being the fight for stream clearance funds from 1956 to 1959.

A devastating run of hurricanes in the mid-1950s coincided with the tenure of Governor Luther H. Hodges and his economic vision for the state. These hurricanes imposed tremendous costs but also presented opportunities. Hodges’ state development policies to promote industrialization in the state and develop the tourist benefits of the coast could ill-afford a definition of North Carolina as “hurricane alley.” For a state mired in poverty and nationally ranked forty-fourth in per capita income, destructive disasters in the agrarian east affected not only local residents, but threatened to derail state industrialization and investment efforts. Hodges leaned heavily on civil defense to help him secure federal funds to rebuild parts of the east and change both realities in and perceptions of the state. Where appropriate or viable, the North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation to secure federal funding or support federal initiatives.

North Carolina’s policymakers made the most of federal relief for disasters or civil defense. In both instances, the focusing event of hurricanes together with disaster relief provided the state incentive to invest small amounts of taxpayer dollars in erosion control or land acquisition to either mitigate future storm effects or shift the long-term costs to Washington, D.C. Hodges’ Hurricane Rehabilitation Program secured federal civil defense
funds not only to clear streams and rivers for navigation and agricultural development but to stabilize the state’s barrier islands. This work, in turn, sought to protect both economic development and coastal tourism in the eastern counties. When erosion efforts warranted land acquisition, North Carolina managed to work with the Department of the Interior to shift responsibility for the land to the federal government. Cape Lookout National Seashore may not attract many tourists, but the costs to maintain the barrier islands shielding Carteret County’s agricultural areas from the Atlantic Ocean are today a federal and not a state budgetary item.

By securing financial aid to alleviate suffering and economic devastation, Hodges and his successor, Terry Sanford, found civil defense an indispensable asset. Work in response to natural disasters put federal investment in equipment and training for nuclear war into peacetime use and provided federal officials with a means to promote the necessity of civil defense. But more importantly, the NCCD assisted in the economic development of eastern North Carolina. A state effort of response to natural disasters and a commitment to prepare for nuclear attack were born out of political expediency. Civil defense reports and reactions to emergencies facilitated major disaster declarations to open the taps to federal relief aid. Proactive efforts from Hodges using civil defense and the Hurricane Rehabilitation Program to stabilize and rebuild parts of eastern North Carolina sent the message to businesses at home and abroad that the state remained a safe, reliable area for investment or expansion.

Hodges primed the pump for North Carolina’s economic expansion and Sanford reaped the benefits. As a “Dixie Dynamo” in the early 1960s, North Carolina and the Sunbelt reaped a rich harvest of federal investment and industrialization in the ensuing decades. After the Ash Wednesday Storm of 1962, major storms spared the state. By the early 1990s, North
Carolina could boast increased urbanization with larger metropolitan areas, fast-paced growth, and economic parity with the national mainstream. Did civil defense produce this? Certainly not alone, as emphasis must be placed on the policies of Hodges and Sanford, but their use of civil defense’s peacetime disaster responsibilities and resources contributed notably to future success in the critical period of postwar economic development in the 1950s and 1960s.

After civil defense became responsible for natural disaster relief, the nuclear preparedness angle narrowed as disaster readiness and response grew in magnitude. Local governments found utility in the more generalized emergency preparedness than building shelters or preparing for radioactive fallout. Without enemy attack, the nation lost interest in civil defense, and action devolved into apathy. North Carolina witnessed this in World War II and in the early years of the 1950s. Natural disasters proved real, tangible threats necessitating action. Scenes and descriptions of the damages and suffering motivated policymakers to expand civil defense efforts in the state and natural disasters gave civil defense a function and a purpose to policymakers and citizens alike. Scenes of destruction reenacted almost annually in the 1950s entrenched the necessity for civil defense’s peacetime functions firmly in the minds of those living in the affected counties. Bolstering public support for emergency management, these disasters worked to the benefit of North Carolina civil defense, and, in the long run, the state as a whole.

Civil defense oriented exclusively to enemy nuclear attack did not prove a successful endeavor in North Carolina. The re-establishment of civil defense in 1950 contributed little to

win over civilian support in reimagining the maligned World War II civil defense program and placing the onus for preparedness directly into the hands of the public under the guise of “self help.” Routinely the director of the NCCD wrote privately or proclaimed publicly that apathy dogged the work of expanding civil defense into counties and communities. Intra-federal secrecy about nuclear weapon effects and radioactive fallout throughout the 1950s hurt civil defense efforts and forced repeated readjustments to the guidance and planning that Washington, D.C. provided to the states and the general public. Congressional and presidential disapproval of proposed civil defense shelter and evacuation programs resulted in slashed budgets and ambivalent national leadership. The national program failed.1536

As for the state civil defense program, nuclear preparedness failed to grab public attention until the administration of President John F. Kennedy. From 1961 to 1963, national discussion of fallout shelters, together with the tension of the Cuban Missile Crisis brought renewed public attention to the matter of nuclear preparedness. A National Fallout Shelter Survey and potential Shelter Incentive Program enervated state civil defense director Edward F. Griffin’s efforts to secure legislation for continuity of government planning and tax incentives for fallout shelters. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the assassination of Kennedy in 1963 swiftly changed the dynamic of political support for nuclear preparedness, and both events attenuated nuclear civil defense efforts at the state level. Griffin and the NCCD continued to survey shelter locations and urge action; but with the federal shift away

from fallout shelters, state policymakers and their political base returned to emergency preparedness and disaster response work as the main utility of civil defense.

The refutation of nuclear civil defense did not coincide with a rejection of emergency preparedness. Hurricanes Hazel, Connie, Diane, and Ione from 1954 to 1955 collectively acted as focusing events for civil defense in North Carolina to emerge as a valuable Cold War asset. With natural disaster response as a responsibility of the state civil defense agency, government at all levels mined the modern security state for federal largesse to fund creation of operational survival plans, establish massive electronic communication networks from Murphy to Manteo, and equip civil defense personnel to respond to a variety of emergencies. As opposed to the large number of volunteers in both world wars, by the 1960s the state and its political subdivisions featured a small contingent of trained, full-time paid professionals adept at navigating the federal bureaucracy to improve the emergency preparations in their respective areas of responsibility.

Circumstances aided public support for emergency over nuclear preparedness. Hurricane Hazel exposed problems with emergency communications in 1954, and the Ash Wednesday Storm of 1962 underscored this deficiency. Other hurricanes in 1955 and localized disasters in the remainder of the decade tested the utility of operational survival plans for evacuating from hurricanes or coordinating medical assistance or financial relief aid. The Cuban Missile Crisis validated improvements in command and control, communications, and local emergency assistance as the threat of actual nuclear attack did not faze the state’s leadership or public sentiment.

North Carolina’s civil defense legacy from the Cold War is best described as a catalyst. Civil defense almost never served as the reagent for economic development or
policy development in the state. Rather, civil defense resources permitted Hodges and Sanford to secure the funding or political support necessary to protect existing and promote future economic development in North Carolina. Arguably, the greatest legacy of the Cold War-era North Carolina Civil Defense Agency was the creation of the Cape Lookout National Seashore, albeit indirectly, and the hurricane rehabilitation work provided to those areas of the coast affected by hurricanes or nor’easters. A vibrant tourist industry and massive influx of construction and development of coastal communities contributes an impressive share to the state’s coffers today, with visitors spending $18 billion in the state in 2011, producing $1.5 billion in tax revenue.¹⁵³⁷ By the early 1980s, four of the state’s five counties with the greatest population growth rates were coastal counties: Brunswick, Carteret, Currituck, and Dare.¹⁵³⁸ The state’s beaches continue to attract tourists from across the globe and in the words of geologist Orrin Pilkey, “are in remarkably good shape in spite of the development pressure on the coast.”¹⁵³⁹ Had Hodges not used the NCCD to bring relief aid to the coast to address storm damage would the beaches remain? This argument is one of catalytic effect (and geological debate), but the attention and action to do something to alleviate suffering had a positive effect on future economic development.

The evolution of the state civil defense effort into the modern-day emergency management division was also a significant development. True, the abandoned, moldering ruins of fallout shelters and faded black and yellow signs are the most visible remnants of the Cold War nuclear civil defense effort. Looking past shelters, from 1950 to 1963 the state civil

¹⁵³⁹ Ibid., 11.
defense effort gradually and methodically expanded across the state from urban to rural areas. The state and political subdivisions operated with emergency plans that continued to evolve to respond to natural disasters rather than nuclear attack. NCCD communications officer Clifton E. Blalock commented that eastern and western North Carolinians, “particularly in the rural communities, lived a simple life and didn’t see a need for a lot of this [civil defense]. They didn’t know what civil defense was all about and they didn’t need it.” Hurricane Hazel, however “was the first . . . major disaster that brought recognition in to the agency for what they did at that time,” he recalled. Thereafter the state’s political subdivisions became increasingly receptive to civil defense resources for localized emergencies and natural disasters.\textsuperscript{1540} Although the federal shift to the dual-use of civil defense for disasters and nuclear preparedness did not commence officially until 1972, North Carolina’s redefinition had begun about 15 years earlier.

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Success does not negate the need for vigilance. The hurricanes of the 1990s exposed long ignored problems of continuous growth. Overdevelopment along rivers and in flood plains in the eastern counties placed communities in the path of storm waters. Along the coast, the decades-long lull between major coastal storms provided a boon for construction. Beach houses and businesses proliferated in rapidly and property values soared. Natural processes of coastal erosion, largely unknown or misunderstood when the Hurricane Rehabilitation Project operated, remain a contentious issue to property owners wanting to

\textsuperscript{1540} Clifton E. Blalock, interview by author, Durham, N.C., 31 July 2008.
save their investment. Thankfully, the state Coastal Area Management Act of 1974 has served to control coastal development to save the state’s beaches.\textsuperscript{1541} As greater investment and development persists in vulnerable areas, however, policymakers in Raleigh must not ignore the risks for increasingly expensive and catastrophic disasters. Will future governors turn to emergency management much as their predecessors turned to the North Carolina Civil Defense Agency to bring relief and recovery in a previous era? The impressive gains made by the state over the course of the twentieth century can just as easily be destroyed in the twenty-first. North Carolina will continue to have a relationship with extreme weather, but wise policymakers will utilize emergency management’s resources to mitigate loss and help shape a positive future for the Old North State. A few million dollars in annual prevention can easily save billions in damages, or assist in the investment and creation of billions in business.

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