“Y’ALL DONE UP AND DONE IT”: THE SEMANTICS OF PERFECT CONSTRUCTION IN A SOUTH CAROLINA DIALECT

THESIS

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This thesis provides an analysis of the done construction of Spartanburg, South Carolina. I argue that utterances such as I done ate describe an eating event that is perceived by the speaker as being connected to the reference time. If the eventuality under the scope of done is a state, then done allows for a continuative reading, in which the eventuality is still on-going at the reference time. Roseanne done lived in Columbus for three years, which describes a living-in-Columbus-state, can be uttered in a situation in which Roseanne lives in Columbus at the reference time. On the other hand, I done ate, which describes an eating event, may only be used to describe an event that has culminated by the reference time.

An adaptation of Dowty’s (1979) Extended Now analysis of the Standard English perfect best accounts for the properties of done. I conclude that done is a marker of perfect aspect, but unlike the Standard have perfect, it is an untensed construction. I assume that tense restricts the reference time of an utterance, and that tense is optional with the done construction. In order to model the restriction of reference time without tense markers, I adopt proposals by Lee & Tonhauser (2010) for untensed constructions in Korean and Japanese. The crucial property that Korean, Japanese, and Spartanburg English share is that they are languages that have tense as a grammatical category, but they also have constructions in which tense is prohibited or optional.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This thesis proposes a formal analysis of the verbal marker *done* as it is used by speakers of Spartanburg, South Carolina. This construction is attested in many non-standard American English dialects, though so far there have been few formal semantic analyses of *done*. Since most formal semantic work on English is based on a standard variety, formal analyses of non-standard constructions are lacking. The benefit of such analyses is that they provide a much more complete picture of semantic and syntactic variation within English.

Most of the past studies of *done* in non-standard varieties have been conducted from a sociolinguistic perspective, with a focus on social distribution and social meaning of linguistic forms. Formal analyses complement these works with a fuller picture of the range of semantic and syntactic variation attested for a given construction. Past studies on the *done* construction span from attestations in New York City to Detroit to New Orleans, but none have specifically addressed the dialect of Spartanburg or the surrounding region. The intent of this study is not to provide a unified analysis of *done* across these dialects but to define the Spartanburg *done* in a formal semantics as well as to describe the ways in which Spartanburg *done* differs from attestations in other dialects.

The city of Spartanburg is in the Upstate region of South Carolina, the northwestern portion of the state. In Figure 1.1, Spartanburg is indicated by the mark labeled ‘A’, and Upstate region is outlined in red. The population of the city of Spartanburg is estimated at 37,013 residents, with approximately 45.6% of those being Caucasian, and 49.3% African American (U.S. Census Bureau). This is interesting to note because most past studies of *done* have focused on African American speakers solely (Green, 1993; Terry, 2004; Edwards, 2001) or white speakers solely (Wolfram & Christian, 1976; Feagin, 1979), often noting the differences in African American and white speakers’ usages of *done*. However, with such a balanced distribution in the racial make-up of Spartanburg, it is unclear to what extent, if at all, the white and African American speakers differ with respect to *done* within the city. My data from Spartanburg comprise 79 naturally-occurring tokens of *done*, which were recorded in writing from anonymous, overheard conversations. Unfortunately, only two of
the tokens were uttered by African Americans, so no clear conclusions can be made in regards
to variation within the community itself.

The construction in question is comprised of a subject and an unstressed done followed
by some type of verb with past verbal morphology 1. An example is provided in (1). The
construction consists of, minimally, a subject, done, and the past verb form.

1 As I will elaborate later, this form is often ambiguous between a past participle and a simple past tense,
and often the same speaker varies between both (irregular) forms, as both a past participle and a past
tense, e.g.: I seen/saw, he come/came.
Louise is showing her mother her new cellphone and how to check the balance of minutes that her own cell phone account has left. When the mother sees her balance, she marks that a new cycle must have started because she has more minutes than she did originally.²

They’ve done put more minutes on mine ’cause I didn’t have that many.

‘[The phone company] has put more minutes on [my phone]...’

The utterance in (1) describes an event of putting more minutes on the speaker’s phone. The event occurred during some time period that is perceived as being connected in some way to the reference time, which in the case of (1) is roughly equivalent to the time of utterance. The time of an eventuality described by an utterance containing done is in the “Extended Now” of the reference time. I argue that done is what introduces the Extended Now, which is a connection between the event described and the reference time. Specifically, I show that done is a marker of perfect aspect, and an adaption of Dowty’s Extended Now analysis of the Standard English perfect provides the best account of the properties of done. As an aspectual marker, done does not restrict the temporal reference of the utterance—which is the function of tense, adverbials, and context—and is compatible with different types of temporal reference.

In the following chapter, I define in more detail the concepts of temporal reference, aspect, and Aktionsart as they apply to my analysis. Chapter 3 provides details of the Spartanburg done construction and the crucial properties that the analysis must account for; Chapter 4 summarizes past analyses of done in other dialects in order to provide a picture of variation within the construction itself, as well as to describe the inadequacies of these approaches in accounting for Spartanburg done. Chapter 5 lays out the formal interval semantics that I propose for Spartanburg done, followed by a conclusion in Chapter 6.

²All examples are presented with a context in italics, the utterance itself beneath, and a paraphrase in Standard English. I omit paraphrases of phrases that have the same meaning in Standard American English. # preceding an example indicates that the utterance is infelicitous, and ? indicates questionable acceptability.
CHAPTER 2
TEMPORAL & ASPECTUAL REFERENCE AND AKTIONSART

In order to describe *done* as an aspectual marker, some framework for temporal and aspectual reference is needed. I adopt a framework that defines temporal and aspectual reference in terms of three parameters. I outline this framework in §2.1 and §2.2. In §2.3, I show that the inherent lexical properties of an utterance, called Aktionsart, also play a major role in the interpretation *done*.

2.1 Temporal Reference

I assume that temporal and aspectual reference are properties of utterances, and they are defined in terms of three parameters: reference time, situation time, and utterance time. Informally, reference time (RT) is the time that an utterance is “about”. Utterance time (UT) is the time at which an utterance is made, and situation time (ST) is the actual running-time of an eventuality.\(^1\)

Temporal reference is a relation between RT and UT. Past temporal reference denotes the relation that RT precedes UT; intuitively, this means that the time for which the assertion is made is some time interval prior to the time of utterance. Similarly, present temporal reference denotes that RT includes UT, and future reference denotes that UT precedes RT.

- Present reference: \(UT \subseteq RT\)
- Past reference: \(RT < UT\)
- Future reference: \(UT < RT\)

The concept of reference time (sometimes referred to as “topic time”) has been discussed in depth in the literature. Here I adopt Klein’s (1994) model for RT, UT, and ST. The

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\(^1\)I used the term “eventuality” as a cover term for events and states, following Bach (1986).
definition that he proposes is that RT, which he refers to as “topic time”, is the time for which a claim is made. He contrasts this with “time of situation”, or situation time (ST), which is the time at which an eventuality actually takes place, or its running time. Example (2) illustrates.

(2) A judge is interrogating a witness in the courtroom. She asks what the witness noticed when he looked into the room.
   a. The light was on.
   b. There was a book. It was in Russian.

(from Klein, 1994, pp. 2-4, ex. 1-3)

RT is set by the context of the judge’s question; the judge is asking about the time when the witness looked into the room. The witness’s responses make claims about that specific RT when he looked into the room. The amount of time the light was actually on, the ST of (2a), may or may not actually be a larger interval than the RT; it may have been on only during the time that the witness looked into the room, or it may have been on for hours before and after. However in the case of (2b), it is almost certain that the ST of \textit{the book was in Russian} is longer than the RT. Books do not normally change their language, so the ST of \textit{it was in Russian} is as long as the book is in existence. The RT set by the judge’s question is why the sentences have past tense verbs corresponding to the past temporal reference, even though the book, if it still exists, is still in Russian.

Utterance time seems to be the most straightforward of the three temporal parameters, but as Klein notes, it is not exactly straightforward on how narrowly UT is defined. Is it the time of the entire witness’s testimony, or does it change from statement to statement? (Klein, 1994, p. 38). However, these questions are not immediately relevant for this analysis. It will suffice to assume that UT is the relatively short interval of time during which an individual utterance is made. It is for this reason that present temporal reference is defined as the relation $UT \subseteq RT$. This assumes that any RT will be at least as large an interval as UT, and often larger.

I assume that temporal reference is a property of utterances and that tense is a grammatical category that restricts the relation between UT and RT. A simple past tense form -ed in Standard American English (hereafter, SAE), restricts the utterance’s assertion to some time before the time of utterance. In other words, a simple past form is only felicitous in utterances with past temporal reference. (3) can only be used to make an assertion about an RT that is some past time.

(3) John and Mary are talking about their morning that day.
   John: What did you have for breakfast?
Mary: I had some grits and eggs.

John asks Mary about a restricted interval of time, which is that morning. Mary’s response asserts that during that past interval, she ate eggs and grits. The simple past verb had conforms to this restriction on RT. If Mary were to say what she will have for breakfast tomorrow, she could not use a past tense as in (4a), but instead must use some form that is compatible with future time reference, such as the will construction in (4b).

(4) John asks Mary what she will eat for breakfast tomorrow morning.
   a. #I had eggs and grits.
   b. I will have eggs and grits.

The context of John’s question in (3) ensures that Mary’s answer makes an assertion not about any past time, but about that morning specifically when she had breakfast, assuming that Mary is a cooperative speaker. Similarly, John’s question and the context in (4) ensure that Mary’s response will be an assertion that is relative to tomorrow morning. Tense markers must agree with the contextually given RT, which is why the example in (4a) is unacceptable: the RT, provided by John’s question, is tomorrow morning, and the sentence has past tense morphology on had, so there is a disagreement between the contextually-supplied RT and the restriction on RT imposed by the past tense. (4b) includes will, which is used to describe future eventualities; will does not clash with RT, so it is felicitous in this context.

In addition to tense and discourse context, temporal adverbials, such as yesterday and this morning, play a role in restricting the RT of an utterance. Tense restricts RT in a relatively broad way, for instance, by requiring that RT precede UT. Adverbials, on the other hand, may restrict RT to a more limited interval. The adverbial yesterday in (5a) describes Jackie’s car-buying event is made for the time denoted by yesterday. Similarly in (5b), the assertion that Annie’s husband will go to the store is made for the time denoted by tomorrow.

(5) a. Bobbie sees that Jackie has bought a new car and asks him when he bought it. Jackie replies:
   I bought it yesterday.

   b. Annie tells her husband that they are almost out of milk and eggs.
   I’ll go to the store tomorrow.

Reference time is the central notion in defining temporal reference. RT may be restricted by three parameters: tense, temporal adverbials, and context. However, in the case of
Spartanburg done, the only parameter that is always present is the context; tense and adverbials are optional and are in fact, frequently absent. These properties are discussed further in Chapter 3.

2.2 Aspectual Reference

Aspectual reference and aspect are the analogs of temporal reference and tense: tense denotes a certain relationship between RT and UT (temporal reference), and aspect denotes a certain relationship between RT and ST (aspectual reference). I assume that aspect is a grammatical category, and aspectual reference refers to a relation between RT and ST.

There are several ways in which RT and ST can be related, but I only focus on the three primary types of aspectual reference described by Klein (1994): the perfective, imperfective, and perfect aspects. Ultimately I argue that done is a marker of perfect aspectual reference, so the perfective and imperfective are only briefly addressed. Many different analyses of the perfective and imperfective have been proposed (cf. Comrie, 1976, Smith 1997), but I summarize Klein’s analysis for these two types of aspectual reference for expository purposes. The relations that Klein proses for these types aspectual reference are below, to be discussed in turn (Klein, 1994, pp. 99-100).

- Perfective: ST ⊆ RT
- Imperfective: RT ⊂ ST
- Perfect: ST < RT

The ST of an eventuality is time during which the eventuality takes place. If the ST of an eventuality is a subinterval of the RT, the utterance has perfective aspectual reference. The hypothetical example in (6) is an instance of perfective aspectual reference.

(6) Mary knows that John’s doctor told him to jog for an hour each day. She calls him and asks when he jogged yesterday. He replies:

Yesterday, I jogged from three to four.

The utterance to describe a jogging event that took place during the hour from three to four o’clock yesterday, which is its ST. The RT of such an utterance would be interpreted

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2 "Aspect" is sometimes used as a cover term for both form and relationship (cf. Comrie (1976); Klein (1994)). Following Bohnemeyer & Swift (2004) & Lee & Tonhauser (2010), I distinguish between (grammatical) aspect and the semantic relation of aspectual reference; the distinction also makes consistent the parallel between tense/temporal reference and aspect/aspectual reference.
as *yesterday* or *from three to four yesterday*. $ST \subseteq RT$, because the hour described is a subinterval of the time denoted by *yesterday/from three to four yesterday*. Intuitively, an utterance with perfective aspectual reference describes an eventuality as a complete unit, without reference to a specific portion of the eventuality. The relation that $ST$ is a subinterval of $RT$ captures this notion.

Imperfective aspectual reference, on the other hand, may be used to describe on-going eventualities, in which $RT \subset ST$, such as in (7).

(7) *Mary’s friend asks her whether she did any spring cleaning over the weekend, and she replies:*

I didn’t have to. When I got home from work, John was cleaning the house.

The RT of the utterance in (7) is the contextually-determined time at which Mary got home. The utterance describes a dish-washing event that was on-going at RT. The ST of the event began prior to RT, includes RT, and may continue after RT.\(^3\)

Lastly, Klein defines perfect aspectual reference as the relation $ST < RT$, illustrated in (8).

(8) *John woke up for work and thought he was going to be late because he had forgotten to wash his uniform. He tells his co-worker that luckily his friend washed it for him. Thankfully, when I woke up, Juanita had washed my uniform.*

The RT of the utterance in (8) is the contextually-determined time at which the speaker woke up. The utterance describes a washing event that precedes this RT; the event was over by the time of RT, so it has perfect aspectual reference. Klein’s definition of perfect aspectual reference has problems accounting for sentences with statives, such as the state of living in Columbus, described by the utterance in (9).

(9) *Mary starts a conversation with a new co-worker. The co-workers asks her how long she has lived in Columbus.*

I have lived in Columbus since 2010.

The RT in (9) is the time of utterance. The utterances describes a state whose ST does not precede RT, but overlaps with it. If the RT is approximately *now*, the ST of the state is a period from 2010 until now. As I will show in Chapter 3, *done* may be used in an utterance to describe an eventuality whose ST precedes RT, but it may be used to describe one whose ST overlaps with RT.

\(^3\)This is a very simplistic view of the imperfective, but it suffices for the purposes here. Many recognize the need to include an element of modality in the English Progressive (cf. Dowty (1979), Landman (1992), Portner (1998)).
Dowty (1979) formalizes a different analysis of the English perfect. In Dowty’s analysis, perfect aspectual reference describes an “Extended Now” interval, which contains RT as a final subinterval, and the ST of an eventuality is also a subinterval of the extended-now interval. This analysis allows for the continuative interpretation illustrated in (9) because it does not require that $ST < RT$. Since I conclude that done is a marker of perfect aspect, a fuller discussion of various analyses of the perfect is provided in Chapter 5.

2.3 Aktionsart

Temporal reference is defined in terms of RT and UT, both of which rely heavily on the context of utterance. Aktionsart (also referred to as “lexical aspect” or “situation aspect”), in contrast, refers to the inherent temporal properties of an utterance’s lexical content. Following Klein, I use the term ‘lexical content’ to denote the “individual items and the compositional rules” of an utterance (1994, p. 12). Basically, the lexical content is the text of an utterance with all tense and aspect information removed. For instance, the lexical content of the light is shining is $<$the light shine$>$, with the present tense and progressive -ing morphology removed. The lexical content of I am reading the whole Harry Potter series is $<$I read the whole Harry Potter series$>$. I use the convention of placing the lexical content of an utterance between the symbols $<$.$>

I adopt Smith’s (1997) taxonomy of Aktionsart. She provides three properties that distinguish the different Aktionsarten: telicity, stativity, and durativity. Each of the properties has two possible values. I elaborate on these three properties in turn. An utterance can be either telic or atelic. Telic lexical contents have a natural endpoint or goal. For example, the lexical content $<$I read the whole Harry Potter series$>$ has a natural end, which occurs once I finish the seventh and final installment in the Harry Potter series. As a consequence, if a telic is indicated as currently in progress, one cannot say that the event has happened. This is only possible once end of the event has been reached. “I am reading the Harry Potter series”—which means that the content of $<$I read the whole Harry Potter series$>$ is in progress—does not entail that I have read the series because the progressive denotes that the endpoint has not been reached.

In contrast to telics, atelics do not have a natural endpoint encoded in their lexical content. For example, the atelic lexical content of $<$the light shine$>$ does not encode any specific endpoint or duration of the light’s shining. If one says that “the light is shining”, the lexical content of the utterance is in progress, but since there is no natural endpoint encoded in this progress, one can say that a light-shining event has taken place (Klein, 1994). Dowty (1987) refers to this as the ‘subinterval property’. A one-hour light-shining event entails
a thirty-minute light-shining event, which entails a one-minute light-shining event. Atelics have the subinterval property (at least down to a certain interval), but telics do not.

The second property proposed by Smith (1997) is stativity/dynamism, which is used to distinguish states from events. States ‘consist of a single, undifferentiated period’ (p. 19). The verb live typically belongs to a stative lexical content. For example, the lexical content <I live in Columbus> does not comprise distinct periods which define my living in Columbus. As Smith notes, states ‘hold’, and events ‘take place’, a linguistic manifestation of the different nature of states and events. The contrast with events helps clarify this property. Events are comprised of different phases or periods, so they are dynamic. The lexical content <John walk> or <Sheila climb to the top of the mountain> consists of series of processes or phases which take place at different moments in time. John’s walking consists of subsequent stepping actions. Sheila’s climbing to the top of the mountain consists phases of Sheila climbing or walking or hiking, with a final reaching of the summit (Smith, 1997, p. 19). In contrast, my living in Columbus, a state, does not have phases or distinct periods in the same sense.

Smith’s third characteristic of Aktionsarten is durativity. Durativity splits the telics into two sub-classes, achievements and accomplishments. For example, the content <Ashley win the race> is an instantaneous lexical content. Though of course winning a race involves the milliseconds it takes for Ashley to be the first past the finish line, it is conceived of as instantaneous. Accomplishments are durative telics. <I read the whole Harry Potter series> is an accomplishment; in contrast to winning a race, reading the seven books of the Harry Potter series is conceived of as taking some length of time to culminate.

In the course of my analysis of Spartanburg done, it became clear that this last property is not relevant to describing the semantics of done. I include it here in the interest of completion. Stativity, however, does have a major impact on the interpretation of an utterance containing done. For example, utterances with stative lexical content combined with done may be interpreted as holding at the time of utterance. I refer to this as the continuative reading. The SAE have perfect also has this property, as the examples in (10) and (11) illustrate. In (10), the lexical content of both sentences is <I live in Cowpens>, which is stative. Both

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4 Since I am a native of Spartanburg, the felicity judgments for these two hypothetical examples are my own.

5 Although there is much debate in the literature on the semantics of the English progressive, in the case of done, an embedded progressive has the same effect on interpretation as a lexical stative (such as I believe/love/think). For this reason, I treat embedded progressives as derived statives.
sentences are felicitous in a context where the speaker still lives in Cowpens. The stative content of the utterance is what allows this continuative reading.

(10) Statives
   a. I’ve lived in Cowpens for ten years (and I still do).
   b. I done lived in Cowpens for ten years (and I still do).

Lexical contents that are eventive cannot have the continuative reading. In (11), the lexical content \textit{<I see that movie>} cannot combine with either the \textit{done} or the \textit{have} perfect to denote a situation in which I am currently watching the movie. My movie-watching event must be over by the time of utterance.

(11) Events
   a. I’ve seen that movie (#and I’m still watching it).
   b. I done seen that movie (#and I’m still watching it).

In addition to the information on Aktionsart gleaned from the 79 naturally-occurring tokens of \textit{done}, four elicitation sessions with Spartanburg residents provided further clues to the interaction of Aktionsart with the interpretation of \textit{done}. These four consultants are all long-time friends and acquaintances of mine. Two of them (a woman and a man) are over 50 years old, and the other two (also a woman and a man) are in their twenties. All four are white speakers, and all but one are natives of Spartanburg. The other speaker has lived in Spartanburg for seven years, and is originally from Macon, Georgia.

I constructed contexts in order to elicit lexical contents of all the types of Aktionsart described by Smith (1997). The consultants were then asked for the appropriateness of different verb forms in the contexts, including the \textit{done} construction, the simple past form, and the SAE perfect. The elicitations also sought the difference, if any, of the \textit{done} construction when there is a tense marker present. A sample elicitation is presented in (12). The targeted lexical content is the stative \textit{<she want one for months now>}. 

(12) \textit{Imagine that you and a coworker are discussing what you are going to get your daughter for her birthday. You say that you are going to buy her a new bike. Your coworkers asks you how long your daughter has wanted one. How do you answer?}  
   Can you say, “She done wanted one for months now”? \hspace{.25in} \textit{(done without tense)}  
   And, “She’s done wanted one for months now”? \hspace{.25in} \textit{(done with tense)}  
   How about, “She’s wanted one for months now”? \hspace{.25in} \textit{(SAE perfect)}  
   Could you say, “She wanted one for months now”? \hspace{.25in} \textit{(simple past tense)}
Aktionsart plays the same role with respect to the SAE perfect and the done construction; stative lexical content allows the ST to extend up to RT (which in the case of present reference, includes UT), but eventive lexical contents prohibit this continuative reading. The shared property is one piece of evidence that done, like the SAE have construction, is a perfect. The specific properties of the Spartanburg done construction are presented in detail in Chapter 3.

2.4 Summary

Three time intervals serve as key parameters in interpreting the temporal reference and aspect of an utterance: reference time (RT), situation time (ST), and utterance time (UT). RT is the time for which an assertion is made; it is the time that an utterance is “about”. ST is the running time of an eventuality, and UT is the time at which an utterance is made. Temporal reference is a relation between RT and UT. Past temporal reference, for example, is the relation \( RT < UT \); the time that an utterance with past temporal reference is “about” precedes UT. Present reference is the relation \( UT \subseteq RT \).

Aspectual reference is a relation between ST and RT. Perfective aspectual reference, for example, is the relation \( ST \subseteq RT \), which means that the entire running time of an eventuality is contained within the RT of the utterance, so that the eventuality is described as a unit, without reference to any part of the eventuality. Perfect aspectual reference is less easily defined. While Klein argues that perfect aspectual reference is the relation \( ST < RT \), this does not account for instances in which ST overlaps with RT, which might be the case in an utterance containing the sentence I have lived in Columbus since 2010. A full discussion of different analyses of the perfect, as well as my analysis of Spartanburg done as a perfect, are provided in Chapter 5.

Three parameters—tense, temporal adverbials, and context—affect the temporal reference of an utterance. Tense is a grammatical category that restricts temporal reference. Past tense, for example, restricts the RT of the utterance to some time in the past (i.e., prior to UT). Temporal adverbials such as this month also restrict RT to a certain time interval. Finally, context plays a significant role in defining RT. Tense only restricts RT to a very broad time, and frequently temporal adverbials are absent. This leaves context to “fill in the blanks”, so to speak, in determining the RT. Utterances are always embedded in some type of conversational context and topic, so that the RT of the utterance will often be evident from the context.

Aktionsart refers to the inherent temporal properties in an utterance’s lexical content, which is basically the sentence with all tense and aspect information removed. The classes
of Aktionsart that are relevant here are states (including progressives) and events. Events have different phases or stages. For example, the lexical content <John walk> inherently encodes phases of John’s walking, such as taking one step after another. States, on the other hand, do not have such phases. <I live in Cowpens>, a stative lexical content, consists of an undifferentiated period referring to my living in Cowpens; it does not have stages such as a walking event or building event would.

Aktionsart has an impact on the interpretation of done and the SAE perfect. Stative lexical content allows for a continuative reading, meaning that the ST of the state extends up to RT. In the case of utterances with present reference means that it holds at UT as well (since $UT \subseteq RT$). For example, one can say I done lived in Cowpens for 3 years to denote a state of living in Cowpens which is still true at UT. Events do not receive this continuative reading. This generalization is also true of the SAE perfect.
CHAPTER 3
THE SPARTANBURG DONE CONSTRUCTION

The previous chapter was devoted to introducing the basic framework which I assume for describing temporal and aspectual reference and Aktionsart. In this chapter, I describe the semantic generalizations related to the Spartanburg done construction for which my analysis must provide an account. §3.1 describes the properties of the done construction relating to temporal reference. In §3.2, I show the influence of Aktionsart on the interpretation of utterances containing done.

3.1 Temporal Reference and Done

Three factors provide evidence for the temporal reference of an utterance: tense, temporal adverbials, and context. In this section, I describe how each of these contributes to the generalization that the Spartanburg done construction is compatible with present temporal reference and past temporal reference. None of the 79 naturally-occurring tokens from Spartanburg speakers are in utterances with future temporal reference, and I did not investigate future temporal reference in the elicitation sessions with the four consultants. Therefore, it is unclear whether done is compatible with future temporal reference, and this question is left for future research. Tense markers and temporal adverbials are optional, so that often the only information on the temporal reference of an utterance containing the done construction is the discourse context. For this reason, I include the contextual background all examples of naturally-occurring tokens.

3.1.1 Tense

An utterance with present temporal reference has a RT that includes the UT. As stated in Chapter 2, I assume that tense is a grammatical category that restricts the temporal reference of an utterance. Present tense restricts an utterance to present temporal reference, and past tense restricts an utterance to past temporal reference. In utterances containing the done construction, when tense is present, it is expressed by an inflected form of have.
The example in (13) illustrates the occurrence of done with present tense, denoted by the contracted form ’ve.

(13) *Louise is showing her mother her new cellphone and how to check the balance of minutes that her own cell phone account has left. When the mother sees her balance, she remarks that a new cycle must have started because she has more minutes than she did originally.*

They’ve done put more minutes on mine ’cause I didn’t have that many.

‘[The phone company] has put more minutes on [my phone]...’

Intuitively, time that the speaker is talking about is “now”. The phone company put more minutes on her phone since the last time she learned her balance; the present tense, which denotes present temporal reference, is consistent with the RT provided by the context. The ST of the event precedes RT in this case; the event of putting more minutes on her phone must be over in order for her to be able to utter (13). (14) is another example of done with a present tense form, expressed by the contraction ’s.

(14) *John and his dad go to visit John’s grandmother. When they arrive, the grandmother asks John if he is hungry, but John’s dad replies:*

He’s done et.¹

‘He has already eaten’.

Similar to (13), the speaker in (14) makes an assertion using the present tense ’s, which limits the reference of the utterance to the present. The utterance describes an eating event, which is meant to imply that John is not hungry as an answer to the grandmother’s question.

Just as with present temporal reference, the done construction does not require tense in utterances with past temporal reference. When past tense is marked, it is expressed by a past tense form of have, as in example (15).

(15) *The speaker is telling a story about a time when her boyfriend tried to convince her that the hamburger meat in the refrigerator was still fine to eat, but she refused.*

It had done turned brown-looking!

‘It had turned brown!’

The speaker in (15) is telling a story about a past incident when her boyfriend tried to convince her that some hamburger meat was fine to eat. Therefore, the utterance has past temporal reference, and the past tense marker had conforms to the past reference of the utterance.

¹ *Et* is a past tense form of *eat*. Although *et* is not anomalous in this region, in my experience, *ate* is far more common as a past form among Spartanburg speakers.
3.1.2 Temporal adverbials

While tense restricts the temporal reference of an utterance in a broad way, temporal adverbials can restrict the RT of an utterance to a more specific interval. Adverbials such as *now*, *this week*, *for a while* can be used to denote a time interval that includes the time of utterance; therefore, the presence of such adverbials indicates that the utterance has present temporal reference. The example in (16) illustrates the co-occurrence of *done* with the adverbial *now*.

(16) The speaker is talking to her friend about old remedies and folk medicine that people used to believe in. She remarks that that type of thing is fading away because those older people have mostly ‘gone’ (a euphemism).
I guess all them old people’s done gone now.
‘I guess all those old people have died now.’

The general topic of the conversation in (16) is the knowledge of old remedies that were commonly shared among the older generations, but that nowadays, fewer people know about and believe in these things.\(^2\) In the context of (16), the speaker is making an assertion about “now”, which is the RT of the utterance; though it is hard to precisely define the length of “now” in a given context, it can at least be said to include the moment of utterance, which is the definition of present reference.

Similarly in (17), the adverbial *for a while* specifies an interval that extends from (and includes) the UT and encompasses a contextually-determined interval that qualifies as a *while*. This is the time for which the speaker makes her assertion, the RT of the utterance, and so the utterance has present temporal reference.

(17) Floyd arrives at the hospital to visit a family member. He sees another relative in the waiting room and asks how long she has been there.
I done BEEN\(^3\) here. We done been here for a while.
‘I’ve BEEN here. We’ve been here for a while.’

Unlike examples (13) - (16), the utterance in (17) has no tense marker. The temporal reference is indicated solely by the adverbial *for a while* and the context of the utterance.

\(^2\)One such remedy for removing a wart is that the afflicted person should face a pecan tree and rub the wart with his thumb while uttering the proper saying.

\(^3\)Capital letters to indicate an audible stress.
It must be noted that temporal adverbials may modify the RT of an utterance, but they may also modify the ST of the eventuality described in the utterance. Consider the example (18), which is based on SAE.

(18)  *I am discussing a party I attended last night. I had intended to meet Mary there, but she left before I arrived.*

I arrived at the party at ten o’clock, but Mary had left at nine.

The RT of the utterance in (18) is ten o’clock; this is the time for which the speaker makes his assertion. In the first sentence, *I arrived at the party at ten o’clock*, both the ST and the RT the interval denoted by *at ten o’clock*. The RT of the second sentence is also *at ten o’clock*, but the ST of the utterance *Mary had left at nine* is nine o’clock: this is the time at which Mary’s leaving event took place. In this case, ST is specified by an adverbial in one utterance, and RT in another. In the case of *Mary had left at nine*, the ST precedes RT.

Similarly, the RT of the utterance and the ST of an eventuality described by a *done* construction do not always coincide. (16) is an example of this: the RT is *now*, but the ST, which is the time of the old people’s dying, is some past time. However, the *done* construction is usually incompatible with adverbials that modify the ST of the eventuality in utterances with present temporal reference. The SAE present perfect also displays this behavior, and it is discussed extensively in the literature. I expand on this in Chapter 5; I note this here because the analysis must account for why an adverbial can modify the RT of a *done* utterance with present temporal reference, but it cannot modify a past ST of the eventuality described. I will draw on theories for the SAE present perfect that attempt to account for this property.

I elicited information on this apparent restriction on adverbials in utterances with present temporal reference with the four Spartanburg consultants. I presented them with contexts in which the ST of the target utterances was a past time, and the reference depended on the tense of the various elicited utterances. One of these contexts is presented in (19) along with the elicited utterances. The targeted lexical content is <*he die a long time ago*>. The adverbial *a long time ago* denotes an interval that clearly does not include UT, so that it cannot restrict the reference time in an utterance with present temporal reference. In the case of *done*, however, the RT and the ST do not always coincide, so that in principle, it could be used to denote the ST of the lexical content, the time of the uncle’s dying event. (19) shows that this is not readily accepted.

(19)  *Someone you haven’t seen in a very long time comes to visit you. He asks how your uncle is, but he does not know that your uncle died many years ago.*

  a. ?He done died a long time ago.  

  done with a past adverbial
b. He’s done died a long time ago.  
   done with tense & past adverbial

   c. He died a long time ago.  
      simple past with past adverbial

Two of the four informants rejected (19a). The past adverbial *a long time ago* makes the sentence questionably acceptable at best. The judgments were even more clear for (19b), which has the added present tense marker; all of the informants rejected this response. The present tense marker ‘s restricts the utterance’s RT to the present (so that UT is included in RT), but this clashes with the adverbial *a long time ago*, which does not include UT. The generalization is that in utterances with *done* that have present reference, adverbials cannot modify the past ST of the eventuality. Temporal adverbials must denote intervals that include the interval UT in utterances with present reference.

In contrast is (19c), which contains the simple past tense form *died* and the adverbial *a long time ago*. All of the informants readily accepted this sentence in the presented context. The past tense, which restricts RT to a past time, indicates that the utterance has past reference, so there is no clash with the past adverbial *a long time ago* and the temporal reference of the utterance.

Lastly, none of the 79 naturally-occurring tokens of *done* with present reference includes adverbials whose denoted intervals do not include UT. In fact, the only adverbials attested are *now*, *by now*, *for a while*, and *this morning*. *Now* is found in four tokens, *this morning* is attested twice, and *by now* and *for a while* are only attested once each. An analysis of Spartanburg *done* must account for the fact that the co-occurrence of past time adverbials with *done* in utterances with present reference are not felicitous, or at least questionably so.

### 3.1.3 Context

The previous two sections have shown how tense markers and temporal adverbials serve to restrict the reference time of an utterance. However, utterances containing *done* frequently display no tense marker or temporal adverbials. Of the 79 naturally-occurring tokens, 48 have neither a tense marker nor an adverbial which restricts the RT of the utterance. The sole source of the reference time of the utterance is the discourse context.

The example in (20) has past reference, but contains no tense or adverbials. In the context of the conversation, the speaker is telling his friends about the lunch that she had earlier that day.

(20) Fred was in the hospital for a few days about a year ago. He is recounting his experience, describing how bored he was. He asked the staff if he could get up and walk around a bit, but they did not let him.

I was laying down there and she done put all those monitors all over me.
‘I was lying there and [the nurse] had put monitors all over me.’

The RT of the utterance is provided by the context of the utterance: it is the time when Fred asked to walk around. The sentence she done put those monitors all over me contains no tense or adverbials which specify the RT. The done, I argue, specifies a certain relationship between this contextually-provided RT and the ST, which is the time at which the nurse put the monitors on Fred. In this case, ST precedes RT because the nurse put the monitors on Fred some time before he asked to take a walk. However, it is not the case that done always denotes that ST precedes RT, as is shown in the following section.

Similar to example (20), the RT of the utterance in (21) is entirely contextually-supplied, since the utterance itself contains no tense or adverbials which would overtly restrict RT.

(21) The speaker is telling her friend how well her prematurely born granddaughter is progressing. She started taking a pacifier just earlier that week, which indicates that she is now growing normally.
They done give her a passy.
‘[The hospital staff] have given her a pacifier.’

In the context of (20), the baby was born premature and is in the hospital, but she is progressing normally. The speaker is filling in her friend on the present condition of her granddaughter, so the RT is the present. Her utterance asserts that the ST of the event of the hospital staff giving her granddaughter a pacifier preceded RT; it is also implies that the baby is growing normally now because previously, she was too small to take a pacifier.

(22) provides a final example of an utterance containing done with no tense or adverbials.

(22) Tom and Jerry are watching a talk show, and Jerry makes a remark about the host.
He look\(^4\) like he never ages. Probably done had that skin pulled back.
‘He looks like he never ages. [He] has probably had a face-lift.’

In this context, as Tom and Jerry watch the show, Jerry makes an assertion about the host’s appearance. The sentence probably done had that skin pulled back has an RT that is contextually-supplied as the present moment, but the ST of the denoted event—of his probable undergoing of a face-lift—is some past time.

Tense markers and temporal adverbials restrict the RT of an utterance containing done, but they are often absent from naturally-occurring utterances. When tense and adverbials are not present, the temporal reference of the utterance is solely determined by context.

\(^4\)The third person singular present form of verbs in the Spartanburg dialect do not require -s. Speakers alternate between the two forms: he look/looks, she think/thinks.
The importance of this generalization is that the done construction is optionally tensed; it is frequently used in utterances (both present and past temporal reference) with no tense markers at all, but done does not prevent the possibility of overt tense marking. This generalization requires an account that allows for an untensed sentence as well as a tensed one to denote truth values. In the next section, I discuss how the inherent lexical properties of a sentence influence the interpretation of an utterance containing done.

### 3.2 The Influence of Aktionsart

I show in this section that stative lexical contents allow for a continuative interpretation in the appropriate context. I use the term ‘continuative’ to refer to readings of done utterances in which the ST of the denoted eventuality extends up to the RT of the utterance. In other words, a continuative reading indicates the eventuality is still going on at the RT. In utterances with present temporal reference, where UT ⊆ RT, this also indicates that the ST holds at UT. Of the 79 tokens of done from Spartanburg data, only three receive a continuative interpretation.

Example (23) is an example of a continuative reading. It has the stative lexical content <Jonesville and Union be getting it>, a derived stative. The clerk at a gas station and a customer are chatting about a wave of crime that is afflicting two nearby towns.

(23) A customer is chatting with the clerk at a gas station. They are discussing recent crime sprees in nearby towns. The clerk says:

Jonesville and Union done been getting it. There’s a lot of crazy stuff going on down there.

‘Jonesville and Union have been having a lot of trouble. There are a lot of crazy things happening down there.’

The crime spree that is rocking Jonesville and Union is still going on, as the speaker says: ‘[T]here’s a lot of crazy stuff going on down there’; the present tense of his utterance, marked by contraction ’s, indicates that the ‘crazy stuff’ is still going on. Therefore, it is not correct to say that Jonesville and Union done been getting it entails Jonesville and Union are no longer getting it (‘Jonesville and Union are no longer having a lot of problems’). The semantics of done must allow for the possibility that the ST of the lexical content overlaps with RT, as is the case in (23).

The other two instances of continuative done from the Spartanburg data, in (24), are uttered right in sequence by the same speaker.
Floyd arrives at the hospital to visit a family member. He sees another relative in the waiting room and asks how long she has been there.

I done BEEN here. We done been here for a while.

‘I’ve BEEN here. We’ve been here for a while’.

The speaker tells Floyd that she has been at the hospital for a while. The utterance has present temporal reference in this context. The sentence I done BEEN here includes the lexical content <I be here>. It is clear that, in this context, the ST of this lexical content includes the RT (and UT): the speaker is still there as she makes the statement. In the second sentence, the adverbial for a while indicates that the ST of the eventuality denoted extends from UT back for some, unspecified time.

What these three tokens have in common is that they all stative lexical content. The utterance in (23) has a progressive embedded under done: <Jonesville and Union be getting it>. The lexical content of the sentences in (24) are stative; <I be here> and <we be here for a while> denote sets of eventualities that do not have distinct phases as an event, such as <I eat dinner>, would have.

The other naturally-occurring tokens from the Spartanburg data have a non-continuative interpretation. The ST of the denoted events does not overlap with the RT of the utterances. Their lexical contents are eventive, not stative. For example, the sentence in (25) contains the lexical content <it get hard as a brick>.

The speaker is cleaning out her refrigerator, and finds some old banana bread. She remarks to her son that it is no longer good.

I don’t want this banana bread. It’s done got hard as a brick.

‘... It has become hard as a brick.’

The event in question is the banana bread’s getting stale. The ST of this eventuality is some time in the past when the bread got stale. The RT, which is present, is restricted by the present tense marker ’s. Therefore, the ST of the eventuality precedes the RT of the utterance.

Whether or not a done utterance can receive a continuative reading depends on the lexical content under the scope of done. If the lexical content is stative, then the ST could be interpreted to extend to RT, and so the state is interpreted as on-going at RT. However, when the lexical content is eventive (excluding progressives, which I assume are derived statives), the only available interpretation is one in which ST precedes RT.

In the case of the 79 naturally-occurring tokens, the three tokens with stative lexical content all have a continuative interpretation in their respective contexts. However, the elicitation was not designed with this issue in mind, so that it is not clear whether statives
require a continuative reading, or they simply allow one. Future work is needed to address this question.

I have shown that *done* does not restrict the temporal reference of an utterance, and it can be used in utterances with present or past temporal reference. Since *done* does not affect the temporal reference of the utterance, it is compatible with forms that overtly restrict temporal reference, such as tense markers and temporal adverbials, but these items are not required with the *done* construction, and they are frequently absent.

*Done* restricts the possible adverbials that are acceptable; when *done* is used in utterances with present temporal reference, only adverbials that denote intervals that include UT are felicitous. This means that past time adverbials such as *yesterday*, which might denote the past ST of the event, are incompatible with the *done* construction in utterances with present reference. On the other hand, adverbials such as *now* and *for a while* are perfectly acceptable since they denote intervals that can include UT in a given context.

Lastly, the lexical content under the scope of *done* has an effect on the interpretation of the utterance. Stative lexical contents, such as <*we be here for a while*>, allow a *done* utterance to receive a continuative reading. In the appropriate context, *we done been here for a while* can be interpreted so that the ST of the state of our being here is still true at RT/UT. Eventive lexical contents do not allow such a reading. For instance, <*the banana bread get hard as a brick*> describes a set of events of banana bread getting stale. Under the scope of *done*, such an event cannot be interpreted as being in progress at RT/UT. *The banana bread’s done got hard as a brick* can only be used to denote that the time of the bread’s-getting-stale event preceded RT. The analysis of Spartanburg *done* must account for these facts. The next chapter summarizes the properties and analyses of *done* in other dialects.
CHAPTER 4
DONE IN OTHER DIALECTS

In the previous chapter, I described the temporal and aspectual properties of the Spartanburg done construction that the analysis must account for. In this chapter, I describe the properties and analyses of done in other American dialects and compare them to the properties of Spartanburg done. I also show that the previous analyses of done in other dialects cannot capture all of the properties of Spartanburg done.

In order to avoid muddying the picture of the variation exhibited by the done across dialects, the previous studies on the done construction are presented in the framework of the temporal structure and Aktionsart that I detailed in Chapter 2. In doing so, I avoid the multitude of terms that have been adopted by various authors to describe done. Some of the labels ascribed to done are: “perfective” (Wolfram & Christian, 1976), “perfect” (Feagin, 1979; Terry, 2004), “intensive” (Labov et al., 1968), and “completive” (Green, 1993). Different authors use the terms in different ways, and some use the terms “perfect” and “perfective” interchangeably. More confusing still, they frequently do not provide a formal or detailed definition of the terms. Describing these previous studies in terms of a common framework allows for a more direct comparison between the meaning of done in previously described dialects and the Spartanburg dialect.

4.1 NYC (Labov et al. 1968)

Labov et al. (1968) is a wide-spanning sociolinguistic study of African American and Puerto Rican English speakers in New York City; several tokens of done from African American speakers are attested. Labov et al. ascribe to done a meaning similar to that of the SAE have perfect because this form is frequently used to paraphrase done, as the speaker in (26) does.

1The examples cited are not present with any content. As I showed in Chapter 3, context is immensely important in the interpretation utterances, especially with respect the temporal reference and whether or not it receives a continuative reading. I discuss the examples with this caveat in mind.
(26) But you done tol’ em, you don’t realize, you d—you have told ’em that.

(Labov et al., 1968, p. 265, ex. 260)

The speaker’s first sentence contains the *done* construction (*But you done tol’ em*), and his second sentence contains the *have* perfect (*you have told ’em that*); the fact the the SAE perfect is used to paraphrase *done* leads the authors to conclude that they have a similar meaning. They argue that *done* relates a past eventuality to the present moment. In the case of (26), the past event of the addressee’s telling them is marked as somehow bearing on the present.

In addition to the perfect meaning just described, Labov et al. assert that *done* has an “intensive” meaning, though “intensive” is given no technical definition. They argue that *done* in (27) only has an intensive meaning and that a perfect meaning is difficult to extract.

(27) a. I done about forgot mosta those things.

(Labov et al., 1968, p. 266, ex. 266)

b. I forgot my hat! I done forgot my hat! I done forgot it!

(Labov et al., 1968, p. 266, ex. 267)

Whether or not one accepts the evidence for the intensive meaning of NYC *done* presented by Labov et al., the tokens of Spartanburg *done* display several instances of *done* that do not appear in contexts without any intensive emotion. It is not necessary to postulate that intensity of emotion is in any way attached to the meaning of *done* itself. In fact, many utterances of *done* are not “intensive” in any sense of the word. (14), repeated below as (28), illustrates.

(28) *John and his dad go to visit John’s grandmother. When they arrive, the grandmother asks John if he is hungry, but John’s dad replies:*

He’s done et.

‘He has already eaten’.

The discourse context of (28) is not emotionally-laden. It simply describes an eating event.

Labov et al. (1968) argue that their speakers in NYC use *done* as a perfect and as an intensive marker, but that these meanings are separate and unrelated. This leads them to the conclusion that *done* has a meaning that is inherently “disjunctive” because of these different meanings.

I do not posit an “intensive” meaning for Spartanburg *done*; I considers aspects such as the emotional intensity of an utterance to be a function of the context. It may very well be that speakers prefer *done* over the SAE perfect when they are speaking in an emotional state, but I do not propose this to be a part of the semantics of *done*.
Lastly, none of the examples in Labov et al. (1968) have tense markers, but from the information that can be surmised without a surrounding context, all of their examples have present reference. None of the examples, however, seem to have a continuative interpretation. This contrasts with Spartanburg done, since, as noted in the Chapter 3, Spartanburg done may be used in utterances with past or present temporal reference, and may in turn co-occur with inflected tense markers that agree with the temporal reference of the utterance. Furthermore, the Spartanburg done allows for a continuative reading, in which the eventuality under the scope of done holds at RT.

4.2 The Appalachians (Wolfram & Christian, 1976)

Wolfram & Christian (1976) is a survey of a white Appalachian speakers. Just like the Spartanburg done construction, their attested tokens of done precede a verb form that either has simple past tense morphology or past participle morphology, without any obvious difference in meaning. Consider (29): done precedes the past participle form of take in (29a), the past tense form in (29b).

(29)  a. ... and then she done taken two courses again.
    b. ... he done took the baby from her.

(Wolfram & Christian, 1976, p. 93, ex. 25 a&b)

Wolfram & Christian state that done marks the past completion of some eventuality prior to RT (1976, p. 93). They also note that done is compatible with past and present tense forms of have, which in turn indicates that it is compatible with past and present reference. Furthermore, as with the Spartanburg construction, tense is optional in utterances with both past and present reference.

An example of an utterance with present reference is given in (30); present tense is marked by the contracted form 's.

(30) The speaker is discussing what happens to certain kinds of women.²
    ... and then the next thing you know, she’s done throwed herself plumb to the dogs.
    ‘...and then the next thing you know, she has thrown herself straight to the dogs.’

(Wolfram & Christian, 1976, p. 95, ex. 38, my paraphrase)

In this instance, the present tense is what indicates that the utterance has present reference. It indicates the continuing relevance of a past event (though apparently hypothetical in this

²This is the context that Wolfram & Christian (1976) provide. Most of their examples, however, have provide no discourse context. They include no paraphrases into SAE.
context), the woman throwing herself to the dogs. There are also instances of utterances with no tense markers, such as example (31).

(31) And they done bought their home up there so they can’t, you know, just up and leave it.
‘And they’ve bought their home up there so that can’t just leave it now.’
(Wolfram & Christian, 1976, p. 96, ex. 39b, my paraphrase)

The utterance in (31), just as in (30), denotes a past home-buying event, which bears on the present because the home owners would have a difficult time just moving now that they have bought the home.

The examples in (32) display utterances with past temporal reference. (32a) has the past tense marker had, but the example in (32b) has no tense marker.

(32) a. When I was a boy, if you seen a woman’s knee, you had done seen something.
‘When I was a boy, if you saw a woman’s knee, you had really seen something.’
(Wolfram & Christian, 1976, p. 96, ex. 39a, my paraphrase)

b. The speaker is telling a story about when a cat was accidentally baked. She opened the oven door to put her bread in to bake it and there set the cat. Hide done busted off his skull and fell down and his meat just come off’n his bones.
‘... [The cat’s] hide had come off his skull and fallen down, and his meat had come off his bones.’
(Wolfram & Christian, 1976, p. 95, ex. 37, my paraphrase)

The RT for the utterance in (32b) is the past time when the woman opened the oven door to put her bread in the oven. She finds the macabre scence inside; the sentence [the cat’s] hide done busted off his skull denotes that ST of the lexical content, the time at which the poor cat’s hide burst off, was prior to this past RT.

The Appalachian done construction described by Wolfram & Christian indicates the connection of a past eventuality to the RT of the utterance, and it is compatible with both present and past temporal reference, but tense markers are optional in either case. However, the major difference is the continuative reading. Wolfram & Christian (1976) conclude that done requires that ST precede RT, which does not allow for continuative readings, in which ST overlaps with the RT. In Chapter 3, I showed that Spartanburg done does not have this requirement. Wolfram & Christian (1976) do not consider the role of Aktionsart, so it is no certain whether Appalachian done differs from Spartanburg done with respect to the possibility of a continuative interpretation.

26
4.3 Anniston, Alabama (Feagin, 1979)

Feagin (1979) is a study of the non-standard, White vernacular spoken in Anniston, Alabama. Her data attest numerous examples of *done*. Feagin argues that Anniston *done* denotes the current relevance of a past event. In terms of the framework presented here, this means that the ST of an utterance containing *done* precedes RT. The data are compatible with both present and past temporal reference, and as is the case with Spartanburg *done*, tense is optional.

The examples in (33a) have present reference, from what can be gathered from the examples where no context is presented. A present tense marker is present in (33a), but not in (33b). Both of these utterances convey that a past event has some type of connection to the present moment.

(33) a. He’s done got a hole walled out in the carpet in there where he watches TV.
   ‘He has made an indentation in the carpet . . .’
   (Feagin, 1979, p. 128, ex. 95, my paraphrase)

b. The buses done quit runnin’.
   ‘The buses have quit running.’
   (Feagin, 1979, p. 128, ex. 108, my paraphrase)

The examples in (34) have past reference. The utterance in (34a) has the past tense marker *had*; the past temporal reference in (34b) is indicated from the context. The RT in (34b) is the time interval denoted by *when she come out*, and the sentence *I done gone to sleep* indicates that the ST of her sleeping event precedes RT.

(34) a. Well, he had done retired then. He useta work at Monsanto.
   ‘Well, he had retired then. He used to work at Monsanto.’
   (Feagin 1979, p. 127, ex. 92, my paraphrase)

b. I heard her when she went in there, but I think I done gone to sleep when she come out.
   ‘. . . but I think had gone to sleep when she came out’.
   (Feagin 1979, p. 140, ex. 141, my paraphrase)

Finally, Feagin’s data attest usages of *done* that are quite unlike those found in other studies. The examples in (35) show *done* preceding forms that are not past tense/participle forms. *Done* precedes an adjective (*dead*) in (35a), a present participle (*lightnin’*) in (35b), and an infinitival form (*be*) in (35c).
(35) a. ... That's where she died ... I run and told Mama ... And they come out there and pick’ Will up and carried her to the house. Well, she ’uz done dead. ‘...Well, she was already dead’.
(Feagin, 1979, p. 140, ex. 145)

b. By the time he got up there, it was done jus’ lightnin’ and rainin’!
‘...it was already lightning and raining quite a lot’.
(Feagin, 1979, p. 139, ex. 139)

c. It should done be up.
(Feagin, 1979, p. 141, ex. 114)

These examples are different from instances of *done* that are the mostly widely attested. To my knowledge, Feagin’s is the only study that mentions instances of *done* like these, in which *done* does not precede a past verb form.

### 4.4 Lake Arthur, Louisiana (Green, 1993)

Green (1993) analyzes the verbal system of African American English (AAE), including a syntactic analysis of the *done* construction. Some of the data are from introspection, others were produced by speakers in Lake Arthur, Louisiana, where the author grew up (pp. 5-6). Since Green (1993) provides a formal analysis for *done*, I discuss the semantic generalizations for the *done* construction described in §4.4.1 and her formal analysis §4.4.2.

#### 4.4.1 Semantic Generalizations

The Lake Arthur *done* construction is found to be an aspectual marker whose function is to denote that the ST of the eventuality under its scope precedes RT. For example, in (36), the time event of telling him about the pipes is taken to precede RT, which is the present.

(36) We done told him bout these pipes already.
‘We have told him about these pipes already’.
(Green, 1993, p. 142, ex. 1a)

Green finds that *done* is only compatible with utterances with present temporal reference, taking the evidence from the co-occurrence restrictions of *done* with temporal adverbials; it is found that *done* is only compatible with adverbials that refer to a period of time which includes the present, such as *today* and *this year*, illustrated in (37).

(37) I done saw him today / this month / this year / ??recently.
(Green, 1993, p. 148, ex. 10)
In contrast, *done* is not compatible with adverbials that denote intervals that exclude UT, such as *yesterday* and *last weekend*, illustrated in (38).

(38) #I done went back to visit two months ago / last weekend / yesterday.

(Green, 1993, p. 150, ex. 14 a,b,&c)

This same restriction applies to the Spartanburg *done* construction when it is used in utterances with present temporal reference. Adverbials that denote intervals that do not include UT are not allowed. Furthermore, *done* does not appear with (overt) tense marking, though in Green’s analysis, utterances receive a default, covert present tense value. In contrast, the Spartanburg *done* allows for optional tense marking, and it is compatible with past temporal reference. Furthermore, the *done* construction presented by Green does not allow for a continuative interpretation since ST must precede RT, while Spartanburg *done* does allow this interpretation when the lexical content is stative.

### 4.4.2 Formal Analysis

Since the *done* described by Green requires that eventuality under its scope be over by the time of utterance, Green’s analysis makes use of the notion of resultant state, which is defined as “‘for every e that culminates, there is a corresponding state that holds forever after’” (Green, 1993, p. 107, citing Parsons, p. 234). The resultant state of the eventuality holds from some past time, which is after the event is no longer on-going, up to UT and thereafter as well.

In a Parsons-style semantics, utterances describe eventualities. The semantic representation for (39a) is given in (39b).

(39) a. The police done took the victim.
   
   b. (Ee) [taking(e) & Agent(e, the police) & Theme(e, the victim) & Hold(e’s R-state, Now)]

(Green, 1993, p. 146)

(39b) means that ‘there is some taking event and the police is the agent and the victim is the theme, and the event’s resultant state holds now’ (Green, 1993, p. 147). The role of *done* is to denote that the eventuality’s resultant state holds “now”; that the event has culminated follows from the definition of resultant state that Green adopts.

This analysis cannot be extended to the Spartanburg *done* construction for several reasons. The first is that the definition provided requires that whatever is under the scope of *done* no longer hold at RT. As shown in Chapter 3, Spartanburg *done* utterances with stative lexical content allow for the possibility that the state still holds at RT. This would bring up
the question of what the resultant state of an on-going state exactly is. Terry (2004) tries to reconcile the continuative reading of the done construction in his study while keeping the resultant state in his semantics of done; however, this over-complicates that picture in many ways, which I will discuss in my description of Terry’s analysis in §4.6.

The second reason that Green’s analysis of the done construction cannot apply to the Spartanburg construction is the requirement that done utterances have present temporal reference, since the resultant state must hold “now”. This could be fixed by changing the requirement that the resultant state hold now to the requirement that the resultant state hold at RT; this could allow a representation of the utterances with past temporal reference. However, the definition of resultant state is a state that holds forever after an event culminates, so that even if the resultant state does hold in the past, it would hold at UT as well, by definition.

My analysis of the Spartanburg done does not make use of the notion of resultant state, which is the notion of a state that holds forever after an event culminates. Furthermore, my analysis of Spartanburg done does not require the use of covert tense operators, but rather allows for tense to be optionally marked.

4.5 Detroit (Edwards, 2001)

Edwards (2001) is a study of done among Detroit African American English (AAE) speakers. As is the case with done in most of the dialects discussed, the AAE Detroit speakers use done before a past verb form. None of the examples in Edwards (2001) have tense markers, but based on the contextual information provided, they all have present temporal reference.

For example, the interviewer’s question in (40) sets the RT of the conversation; the interviewer is asking what the mayor should do to improve the city from now onward. The interviewee responds that the mayor has actually done a lot for senior citizens in the city (though he does not quite give the mayor all the credit). The denoted event is the mayor’s doing a lot for senior citizens, whose ST precedes RT.

(40) Interviewer: What other things should the mayor do to improve the city?
    Well, he done did a lot for senior citizens, houses, churches, homes, hospitals. But, you know, it ain’t all up to him: it’s the people telling him what to do.
    ‘Well, he’s done a lot for senior citizens, houses, churches, homes, hospitals. . . ’
    (Edwards, 2001, p. 415, ex. 3, my paraphrase)

The Edwards’ data from Detroit also displays one instance of done in an utterance with a continuative interpretation. The lexical content <he be in there long>, describes a state that is still true at UT: Coleman Young is the mayor of Detroit at UT.
The speaker is talking about the current mayor of Detroit, Coleman Young.
The people saying now what kind of leader he is. He done been in there long, about twenty something years, and he’s getting really senile.
‘The people are saying now what kind of leader he is. He has been in office a long time...’
(Edwards, 2001, p. 418, ex. 9, my paraphrase)

Edwards’ generalization is that done is used by Detroit AAE speakers in utterances with present reference, though tense is not marked by an inflected form of have. Done relates some past event to the present, or it relates some state that began in the past (but is not necessarily over) to RT. The same is true of Spartanburg done, except that Spartanburg done may be used in utterances with past temporal reference, and that tense is optional. They relate the lexical content to the present in some way.

4.6 Wise, North Carolina (Terry, 2004)

Terry’s data on African American English (AAE) done come from African American speakers in Wise, North Carolina. In addition to the work done by Lisa Green, Terry’s is one of the few analyses of done that provide a formal semantics. I discuss the semantic properties of the done construction described by Terry in §4.6.1 and describe his analysis in §4.6.2.

4.6.1 Semantic Generalizations

The basis of Terry’s analysis of done is that the Wise, NC dialect has two perfects: the -ed perfect and the done perfect. The -ed form is syntactically ambiguous. A sentence such as John ate the rutabagas can represent a Standard English present perfect ‘John has eaten the rutabagas’ or the simple past ‘John ate the rutabagas’. The evidence for this comes from the different auxiliaries that combine with the -ed form, depending on whether it is a present perfect or a simple past tense, illustrated in (42).

(42) a. You heard Mary sing, didn’t you?  
    ‘You heard Mary sing, didn’t you?’
    (past tense)
b. You heard Mary sing, ain’t you?  
    ‘You have heard Mary sing, haven’t you?’  
    (Terry, 2004, p. 64, ex. 75)

The simple past form in (42a) requires the auxiliary did, represented in its negative form in the tag question didn’t; the same is true for SAE. The present perfect form in (42b) requires the auxiliary have, whose negative form is ain’t.
The -ed perfect denotes the relevance of a past eventuality to the present moment (the RT). The difference between the -ed perfect and the done perfect is that the latter allows for continuative readings, in which the ST does not necessarily precede the RT, and may overlap it. The -ed perfect, in contrast, may only be used for eventualities that are no longer on-going at RT. The -ed morpheme is central to Terry’s formal analysis of the done construction.

Turning to the Wise, NC done construction, Terry finds that it may appear in utterances with present temporal reference. However, the construction in Terry’s study never appears with present tense markers, as in example (43).

(43) I done lost my job.
    ‘I have just lost my job.’
    ‘I have lost my job already.’
    ‘I have lost my job before.’
    (Terry, 2004, p. 45, ex. 49)

In this example, the job-losing event is meant to precede RT, which also includes UT. Terry’s done construction also allows for a continuative reading, in which ST extends up to RT, when the lexical content is stative, as in example (44). This utterance is acceptable in a context where Mary lives in Oxford at UT.

(44) Mary done lived in Oxford for three years.
    ‘Mary has lived in Oxford for three years.’
    (Terry, 2004, p. 54, ex. 56a)

Furthermore, as is the case with the Spartanburg construction, the Wise done construction, when used in utterances with present temporal reference, is restricted from co-occurring with certain past-time denoting adverbials, which denote intervals that do not include UT.

(45) *John done went to town yesterday/last week/a year ago.
    (Terry, 2004, p. 47, ex. 50a)

The done construction described by Terry is acceptable in utterances with past temporal references; unlike the Spartanburg construction, however, this done requires an overt past tense marker. The intended past reference reading in (46a) is unacceptable since it has no past tense marker; the presence of the past tense marker with done in (46b), however, results in an acceptable utterance.

(46) a. *John done ate the steak.  
    (Terry, 2004, p. 93, figure 7)
b. John’d done baked a cake.

‘John had baked a cake.’

(Terry, 2004, p. 93, ex. 84)

To summarize, the Wise, NC *done* construction is very similar to the Spartanburg construction. It may be used in utterances with present and past temporal reference, it allows for a continuative reading, and it is restricted from co-occurring with past-time denoting adverbials in utterances with present reference. The differences are that the Wise, NC construction never has (overt) tense in utterances with present temporal reference and requires tense in utterances with past reference. Tense is always optional in the Spartanburg construction.

4.6.2 Formal Analysis

Terry’s framework is a type-theoretic semantics with four basic types: intervals of time (i), truth values (t), eventualities (e), and worlds (w). Time (T) is represented as a set of moments on an infinite and continuous time-line. A moment is a singleton set and is conceptualized as a point on the time-line T. Moments are partially ordered by the relation ≤, which denotes temporal precedence. Intervals are defined such that for any two moments \( t_1, t_3 \) in interval \( I \), if \( t_1 \leq t_3 \), and \( t_1 \leq t_2 \leq t_3 \), then \( t_2 \in I \). This condition insures that intervals are continuous segments on the timeline T. \( I \) is a subinterval of \( I' \) (\( I \subseteq I' \)) if and only if every moment in \( I \) is also in \( I' \) (Terry 2004: 83-84).

Terry describes the temporal structure of an utterance in terms of the three parameters: time of utterance, (UT), reference time (which he calls “topic time”), and situation time (ST). RT and UT are, for all intents and purposes, the same as they are defined in my framework in Chapter 2. ST is given a definition different from how it is used by Klein (1994) and myself. In Terry’s framework, ST is the smallest time interval at which an eventuality holds. For telics, which have a natural endpoint, ST is the same as the running time of the event; the content *John ate the rutabagas* can only be true once all the rutabagas are eaten, so that ST is the whole time John was eating the rutabagas until all the rutabagas were gone (Terry, 2004, p. 131). For atelic events, such as the one in the sentence *John ate rutabagas*, ST is the smallest-time interval that could characterize a John-eating-rutabagas event. States, in contrast, are true at all moments of an interval, so their ST is a moment.

As described in the previous section, the Wise, NC dialect has two perfects: *-ed* and *done*. Terry defines perfect aspect as the relation \( ST < RT \), which is denoted by the *-ed* suffix. At a first glance, this definition rules out continuative readings, which is desirable since the *-ed* perfect excludes the possibility of a continuative reading. Furthermore, the *-ed*
verb form is ambiguous; it can be a present perfect or a simple past. The proposed syntax for the simple past is given in Figure 4.1 (Terry, 2004, p. 139, Figure 14), for the -ed present perfect in 4.2 (Terry, 2004, p. 137, Figure 13).

Figure 4.1: Terry’s Syntax of -ed Simple Past

\[
\begin{align*}
S & \quad \exists, \text{TP} \\
& \quad -ed \quad \text{VP} \\
& \quad \text{John ate the rutabaga}
\end{align*}
\]

As Figure 4.1 shows, when -ed is a past tense marker, it is head of the TP (Tense Phrase) node. The past tense sentence John ate the rutabaga is the result of applying the -ed morpheme directly to the lexical content of the utterance, which occupies the VP (Verb Phrase) node.

When -ed is a present perfect, it occupies the head of the AspP (Aspect Phrase) node (rather than the TP node, as with the past tense), and TP is occupied by a phonologically null present tense operator. In Figure 4.2, the present perfect sentence John ate the rutabaga is the result of applying the -ed operator to the lexical content of the utterance, to which the present tense (PRES) applies.
Although Terry concludes that -ed serves as a past tense morpheme in some cases, and a present perfect in others, he provides a single semantics for the form. The placement of -ed within the syntactic structure is what determines whether it denotes past temporal reference or perfect aspect. In both cases, it denotes precedence: the relation $RT < UT$ in the case of the past tense, and the relation $ST < RT$ in the case of perfect aspect. The proposed semantics is given in (47).

\[
-ed \rightarrow \lambda Q_<(e(i(w,t oraz)))\lambda e_0, \lambda t''_0, \lambda w_0[Q(e)(t')(w) \land t' < t'']
\]

(Terry, 2004, p. 135, ex. 111)

This definition is a function that takes as its arguments a lexical content ($Q$), an eventuality ($e$), a time interval ($t''$), and a world ($w$). Put simply, it states that the interval predicated of $Q$, $t'$, precedes the input time, $t''$. This input time will either be UT or RT, depending on the position of -ed within the syntax.

In the case of the present perfect -ed, the time interval $t'$ is assumed to be the ST of the eventuality. The operator -ed is applied to the lexical content, and the null present tense PRES applies to the result of this first function application. PRES supplies an RT, resulting in the desired perfect aspect relation $ST < RT$. For the simple past tense, Terry assumes that the argument of the VP ($t'$ in the definition above) is RT, not ST as it is for the present perfect. The top-level assertion operator supplies speech time, to denote that $RT < UT$, the past temporal reference relation. A weakness in this definition that in one case $t'$ denotes
Terry’s concept of ST, and in the other it denotes RT, but it is not made clear how the difference is derived.

The *done* construction also includes this *-ed* morphology. Since the *done* described by Terry allows for the continuative reading, but the *-ed* perfect does not, Terry defines *done* so that it applies to the AspP (headed by *-ed*) in a way that allows the continuative reading, but does not require it. The syntactic structure for a *done* sentence is illustrated in Figure 4.3. In order to account for this difference between the *-ed* perfect and *done*, Terry argues that *done* introduces a resultant state, whereas the *-ed* perfect simply denotes that $ST < RT$.

![Figure 4.3: Terry's Present Perfect done](image)

The semantics for *done* is given in (48). *Done* takes as its argument predicate $Q$, which is the result of applying *-ed* to the lexical content. $Q(e)(t')(w')$ states that an event took place before time $t'$ in $w'$ if and only if a state holds at $t'$ in $w'$. This state is the resultant state of the event, and the biconditional ensures that it only holds once an event is complete (and conversely, that an event is only complete once the resultant state holds).

$$[\text{done}] = \lambda Q_{e,(i(w,t))} \lambda s_c \lambda t'' \lambda w_w \forall t'_w \forall t'_v \exists e_v [[Q(e)(t')(w') \leftrightarrow hold(s)(t')(w')] \& hold(s)(t'')(w)]$$

(Terry, 2004, p. 191, ex. 165)
Hold(s)(t′′)(w) allows for the resultant state to hold at utterance time, when under the scope of present tense, or prior, under the scope of past tense.

Taking the example of the sentence in Figure 4.3, Terry’s translation for *John done ate the rutabagas* is given in (49).

\begin{equation}
\exists s \forall w' \forall t' \exists e [[\text{eat}(j)(r)(e)(t)(w') \& t < t'] \leftrightarrow \text{hold}(s)(t')(w') \& \text{hold}(s)(t''(w^0) \& t'' \subseteq t^0) \]
\end{equation}

(Terry, 2004, p. 192, Figure 16)

The sentence denotes the existence of a state that holds at UT, which is the resultant state. In order to obtain the continuative reading with a stative lexical content, Terry argues that the resultant state of an on-going state is identical to the state itself.

My analysis of Spartanburg *done* does not make use of operators that are translations of null morphemes in the natural language, such as Terry’s PRES morpheme. Furthermore, I avoid the concept of resultant state, which is simply a state that begins once an event culminates or at the onset of any state. This concept also does not provide a satisfactory account for the co-occurrence restrictions of *done* with past-time adverbials in utterances with present reference.
CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF SPARTANBURG DONE

As shown in Chapter 3, the Spartanburg done construction relates situation time (running time), or ST, of an eventuality to the RT of the utterance. I show that Spartanburg done denotes perfect aspectual reference and borrow from analyses of the SAE perfect to account for the data. Done is often paraphrased into SAE as a have perfect, and it shares several properties with this construction, enumerated below.

1. Eventive lexical contents are interpreted as having an ST that precedes RT (and thus ST precedes UT, in utterances with present reference).

2. Stative lexical contents allow for a continuative reading, in which the ST overlaps with RT, meaning that the state still holds at RT.

3. Temporal adverbials denoting past-time intervals are not acceptable with either construction in utterances with present temporal reference.

I explore the major previous types of analyses of the SAE have perfect and conclude that done is a perfect as well, though it display some differences from the SAE perfect. I explore types of analyses that have been proposed for the SAE have perfect in §5.1; I conclude that the Extended Now Theory is best suited to be adapted to an analysis of Spartanburg done. In §5.2, I provide a formal semantics for done.

5.1 Theories of the SAE Perfect

The following discussion of theories of the SAE have present perfect draws heavily from Portner’s (2003) taxonomy of analyses of the perfect. He identifies three major types of analyses of the SAE perfect: Indefinite Past, Result State, and Extended Now, to be summarized in turn.
5.1.1 Indefinite Past

Indefinite Past (ID) models of the SAE present perfect posit that the construction, quite simply, denotes an eventuality that occurred prior to UT. In other words, the ST of the eventuality precedes RT/UT, ‘but without pointing to any particular occasion or subpart of the past’, thus the name ‘indefinite’ past (McCoard, 1978, p. 76). Analyses of the SAE perfect contrast the ‘indefinite’ past (the perfect) with the ‘definite’ past (the simple past tense).

The ID analysis accounts for utterances with eventive lexical content, such the example in (50), which has the eventive content \(<Mary visit London>\).

(50) Mary has visited London.

The SAE perfect, under this analysis, simply denotes that the ST of Mary’s visiting London event precedes UT, which is the intended interpretation.

The fact that SAE utterances with a present perfect and a stative lexical content allow for a continuative reading (in which ST overlaps with RT) immediately presents a problem to this analysis. Consider the utterance in (51).

(51) Mary has lived in London since 1966.  

(Portner, 2003, p. 467, ex. 21)

The example in (51) has the stative content \(<Mary live in London since 1966>\). It can be truthfully uttered in a context where Mary lives in London at UT, so that the ST of Mary’s-living-in-London-since-1966 state overlaps with the UT. This presents a problem with the ID analysis that predicts that \(ST < UT\) for SAE present perfects.

Done, like the SAE perfect, allows for a continuative interpretation in the appropriate context when the utterance has a stative lexical content. Therefore, an ID analysis encounters the same problem in accounting for done as it does for the SAE perfect. As it stands, the ID analysis does not accurately describe the SAE perfect or the done construction, but some authors have tried to reconcile the continuative reading the with the basic meaning posited by an ID analysis, that \(ST < RT/UT\).

Klein (1994) attempts to rescue the analysis by appealing to scope relations. He argues that the continuative reading of the SAE present perfect is only available when the sentence contains a temporal adverbial, and that the continuative reading results from the perfect having scope over the temporal adverbial, such as for five years. In (52), the SAE present perfect has scope over \(<Mary live in London for five years>\), which includes the adverbial. As a result, the sentence is only true once Mary is in her sixth year of living in London. That is, the state of Mary’s living in London holds at RT/UT, but the state of Mary’s living in London for five years precedes RT/UT.
Mary has lived in London for five years.

(Portner, 2003, p. 467, ex. 20)

However, Portner (2003) points out that Klein’s solution of placing the adverbial under the scope of the perfect does not work for the adverbial *since*, as seen in example (51). If perfect has scope over the adverbial, and the perfect requires that ST precede RT, then the state of Mary’s living in London since 1966 is no longer true at RT/UT. However, this is not the case because this sentence may be uttered in a context where Mary lives in London at UT, and as long as she lives in London and moved there in 1966, it is true to say that Mary has lived in London since 1966.

Another issue with the Indefinite Past theory is the problematic notion of what counts as an “indefinite” in terms of temporal reference and adverbials. McCoard argues that sentences like *he has left yesterday* are ungrammatical because of the “definite” adverbial *yesterday* (1978, p. 75). However, as Portner (2003) notes, it is unclear why *yesterday* should could as a “definite” time-span adverbial, but that *within the last hour* is indefinite in a sentence such as (53), as it must be if it is compatible with SAE present perfect under this account.

(53) John has arrived within the last hour.

(Portner, 2003, p. 469)

If it definiteness is a property of the adverb *yesterday*, then it makes sense that it is incompatible with the ‘indefinite past’. However, if *yesterday* is definite, then one would expect that similar adverbials would also be definite. *Today*, for example, would seem, intuitively at least, to be as definite as *yesterday*. However, as McCoard shows, *today* is perfectly acceptable with the SAE present perfect. For example, *Richard has left today, and Mary has left today too* are both judged to be grammatical (1978, pp. 81-83). If the Indefinite Past theory is correct, then *today* must be an indefinite adverbial. The problem is that indefinite and definite adverbials are often nebulous concepts that are not clearly defined, and as Portner notes, definiteness does not seem to have a role in the SAE perfect (2003, p. 469).

The restrictions on adverbials with the *done* construction need not be explained in terms of definiteness, but in terms of temporal reference. Adverbials such as *yesterday / a long time ago* are unacceptable with *done* in utterances with present temporal references because they denote intervals that do not include RT/UT. This is also true for the SAE present perfect, which is one reason that Dowty (1979) chose to adopt the Extended Now theory in his semantics for the the SAE present perfect.
5.1.2 Result State

Result state theories propose that the SAE present perfect denotes that the result state (R-state) or an eventuality holds at UT. The R-state is the state that results from an eventuality once it culminates (in the case of events), or once it begins to hold (in the case of states). Terry’s analysis of AAE done is a result state analysis, which he adapts from result state analyses of the SAE perfect. Citing Parsons (1990), he notes that a sentence such as the one in (54a) has the Parsons-style event-structure semantics in (54b).

(54) a. The police have taken the victim.

b. \( \exists e \) [Taking(e) & Agent(e, the police) & Theme(e, the victim) & Hold(e’s R-state, Now)]

(Terry, 2004, p. 186, ex. 159)

The definition states that the result state R-state of an event holds at UT. In the case of (54), the R-state of the police-taking-the-victim event holds at UT. In the case of an eventive lexical content, such as "the police take the victim" in (54), the R-state can only hold once the event has culminated. The police can only be in the state of having taken the victim once the whole event of the police taking the victim is over.

The R-state of statives, in contrast, begins to hold as soon as the state itself holds, as Terry (2004) notes (p. 189). Example (52) is an example. The lexical content, "Mary live in London since 1966", is stative. Once the state of Mary’s living in London holds, it is also true that she has lived in London. Therefore, the R-state holds once the state itself holds. The two states are identical until the original state ends. The R-state continues forever: once Mary has lived in London, she is always in the state of having lived in London, whether or not the state of her living in London is still true or not.

Portner notes several problems with a result state analysis. One is that the precise result state that arises in an utterance with a perfect is very much contextually-driven; any past eventuality can have a result state that holds at the present (2003, p. 471). If the perfect simply denotes a some result state of a past eventuality holds, it is hardly distinguishable from an indefinite past. For instance, one might say, “The bell has rung” to indicate to a student that she is late for class, with a result state you are tardy. In another context, the same sentence might have the result state the funeral service is now underway. The ill-defined notion and context-dependent notion of result state is clearly problematic to represent precisely.

Furthermore, result state models have problems distinguishing continuative and non-continuative readings of the perfect. If an eventuality can only have a result state if the eventuality is over (i.e., ST does not include UT), then continuative readings are impossible.
However, if a model allows for an eventuality to still hold and also have a result state, then there is no reason why there should be no attestation of non-stative events that are still on-going at UT in the perfect, but this is not the case (Portner, 2003, p. 473). Both for SAE perfect and done perfect, only statives are attested with the continuative reading. Terry (2004) attempts to get around this by stating that the result states of events only hold once the event culminates, but the result state of on-going states are identical to the on-going states. However, once the states no longer hold, then the result state is distinct from the original state.

Lastly, the R-state does not explain why the SAE present perfect is incompatible with past-time denoting adverbials, such as yesterday. Since an R-state semantics makes reference to both an R-state and a past eventuality, one would expect an adverbial to be able to modify either. However, in the case of utterances with present reference, the SAE perfect (and done) are only compatible with adverbials that denote intervals that include UT.

The ID and R-state analyses are undesirable as starting points for the semantics of done for the reasons listed above. Clearly, done is some type of perfect, due to the temporal and aspectual properties that it shares with the SAE perfect: both allow for a continuative reading in utterances with a stative lexical content; eventive lexical contents are only possible when, in a given context, the event culminates prior to RT; furthermore, both done and the SAE perfect are incompatible with past-time denoting adverbials, such as yesterday, in utterances with present temporal reference. In the next section, I describe how these properties can be captured by Dowty’s formal analysis of the SAE perfect in terms of the Extended Now theory.

5.1.3 Dowty’s Extended Now

The Extended Now theory characterizes the SAE present perfect in terms of an interval that includes UT and extends back some period of time that is perceived as part of an “extended now”, as connected to the present in some way. The eventuality under the scope of the perfect takes place within this extended now interval. This contrasts with the simple past tense, which characterizes an event as preceding UT, and is separated from UT by an intervening interval. According to Dowty, the extended now interval in this account must also include UT in utterances with present temporal reference, which is why the SAE present perfect is only compatible with adverbials that include UT, such as today, this week. The simple past is used with adverbials that do not include UT, such as yesterday, last year (Dowty, 1979, pp. 341-342). The notion of R-state is not included in the semantics of the perfect under this analysis, and this analysis provides a truth-conditional difference between the simple past tense and the present perfect.
Before turning to Dowty’s formal analysis, I briefly outline his framework for the interval semantics which is based on Bennett & Partee (1972). Dowty employs a type-theoretic language with lambda abstraction with four basic types for variables: $w$ (for worlds), $e$ (for individuals), $i$ (for time intervals), and $t$ (for truth values). His definitions are summarized in (55) (from Dowty, 1979, pp. 139-140). I adopt these definitions related to intervals in my analysis of done as well.

(55) Dowty’s Interval Semantics

a. **Time**: Let $T$ be the set of real numbers, representing the set of moments in time. A moment in time is represented as a singleton set containing one element from the set $T$.

b. **Order on moments**: $\leq$ is the relation that orders the moments in $T$. Intuitively, for any moments $t, t' \in T$, $t \leq t'$ iff $t$ is earlier than or at the same time (i.e., identical to) moment $t'$.

c. **Intervals**: $I$ is an interval iff it is some proper subinterval of $T$ ($I \subset T$) and for all moments $t_1, t_2, t_3$, if $t_1, t_3 \in I$, and $t_1 \leq t_2 \leq t_3$, then $t_2 \in I$. In other words, an interval is defined as a subset of $T$ such that for any two moments $t_1, t_3$ of $I$, if there is another moment $t_2$ that precedes one and follows another element in $I$ in the linear ordering of $T$, then that moment $t_2$ is also in $I$. This ensures that intervals are continuous parts of the timeline $T$, so that an interval cannot be defined as a time that includes all moments from 5 - 6PM, and from 7-8PM without also including all moments from 6-7PM.

d. **Subintervals**: $\subseteq$ denotes the subinterval relation, and $\subset$ the proper subinterval relation. If $I, J$ are intervals, $I \subseteq J$ iff all moments in $I$ are also in $J$. $I \subset J$ iff all moments in $I$ are also in $J$, and there is at least one moment that is a member of $J$ but not $I$ (so that $J$ is a larger interval than $I$).

e. **Order on intervals**: $<$ is an order on subintervals of $T$. For any intervals $I$ and $J$, $I < J$ iff $\forall t \in I, \forall v \in J, t < v$. This requires that some interval $I$ precedes another interval $J$ if and only if all moments of $I$ precede all moments of $J$.

f. **Initial and Final Subintervals**: $I$ is an initial subinterval of $J$ iff $I \subseteq J$ and there is no $t \in (J - I)$ for which there is $t' \in I$ such that $t \leq t'$. $I$ is a final subinterval of $J$ iff $I \subseteq J$ and there is no $t \in I$ for which there is a $t' \in (J - I)$ such that $t \leq t'$.

Although Dowty focuses on the SAE present perfect, he argues that his analysis can account for the SAE past perfect as well because he assumes that the perfect is under the scope of tense. In the case of the SAE present perfect, the perfect is under the scope of a
present tense operator; for past perfects, the perfect is under the scope of the past tense operator, and the extended-now interval extends back from a time interval introduced by past tense or an adverbial (Dowty, 1979, p. 345). His definitions for the past and present tense operators are given in (56).

\[(56)\]

a. \(\text{PRES}(t)\) is true at \(\langle w, i \rangle\) iff \(t = i\) 
(Dowty, 1979, p. 324)

b. \(\text{PAST}(t)\) is true at \(\langle w, i \rangle\) iff there exists an interval \(i'\) such that (the time denoted by) \(t < i' < i\). 
(Dowty, 1979, p. 342, ex. 20)

The \(\text{PRES}\) (present) operator in (56a) states that an interval \(t\) is a present interval at a time \(i\) (i.e., the UT) if and only if the intervals are the same \((t = i)\). The past operator in (56b) states that a time \(t\) is past if and only if it is separated from the time of evaluation \(i\) by some time interval \(i'\). This captures the notion that the past describes a time that is not connected to the present in a larger interval, whereas, as will be defined below, the extended-now interval includes UT, in the case of a present perfect.

The perfect is defined formally as an Extended Now interval—hereafter, \(\text{XN}\)—a predicate of times. The definition is given in (57).

\[(57)\]

\(\text{XN}(t)\) is true at \(\langle w, i \rangle\) iff \(i\) is a final subinterval of the interval denoted by \(t\).
(Dowty, 1979, p. 342, ex. 212)

(57) states that an interval \(t\) is an extended-now\(^1\) interval at world \(w\) and time \(i\) iff \(i\) is a final subinterval of \(t\). Depending on whether the sentence has present or past tense, the input time interval is either UT or the interval supplied by past tense, respectively.

Lastly, it is necessary to have an operator that states that some proposition is true at some time interval. For this, Dowty defines the operator \(\text{AT}\) as in (58).

\[(58)\]

\(\text{AT}(t, \phi)\) is true at any time \(t'\) iff \(\phi\) is true at the time denoted by \(t\) in world \(w\)
(Dowty, 1979, p. 324)

Since Dowty does not include the concept of reference time in his analysis, it is not clear what exactly characterizes a time interval at which a proposition is true. Within the temporal framework proposed here, this might be the ST of the eventuality or the RT of the utterance. Because of the uncertainty in how to fit this predicate into my own framework, I do not include the \(\text{AT}\) predicate in my analysis of Spartanburg done.

\(^1\)I use \(\text{XN}\) to describe the predicate described in (57), and ‘extended-now’ to describe the interval that is defined by \(\text{XN}\).
These definitions can now be incorporated into the formal definition of the SAE perfect.

(59)  a. \( \text{PERF}^2(\alpha) = \text{have}(\alpha') \), where \( \alpha \) is an intransitive verb phrase (IV), and \( \alpha' \) is the result of replacing the first verb in \( \alpha \) by its past participle form.

b. \( \lambda x \exists t_1[XN(t_1) \land \exists t_2[t_2 \subseteq t_1 \land AT(t_2, a'(x))]] \)

(Dowty, 1979, p. 342)

(59a) states that the operator PERF takes an intransitive verb phrase and returns an intransitive verb phrase. In Dowty’s presentation of Montague semantics, this is a syntactic rule, to be contrasted with the translation in (59b), which is what is input to be interpreted in the semantics. \( \text{PERF}(\alpha) \) is equivalent to \( \text{have}(\alpha') \), where \( \alpha' \) is the same as \( \alpha \) except that the first verb in \( \alpha \) is replaced by past participle form. Thus, in Dowty’s analysis, the past participle morphology does not contribute to the meaning of the perfect. Instead, it is the result of a translation rule for the PERF operator. In other words, the perfect selects for the past participle.

(59b) is the translation of the PERF operator, which is function from individuals to truth values. Dowty assumes that the perfect operates on an intransitive verb phrase, which translates to a function from individuals to truth values. Once an individual is supplied, the perfect denotes the existence of an extended-now interval \( t_1 \), and there is some subinterval \( t_2 \) of the extended-now at which a proposition is true. In other words, the ST of the eventuality is a subset of the extended-now. This definition does not require that ST be a proper subinterval, which allows for the possibility that the ST is equal to the extended-now, which would be the case for a continuative interpretation. For example, \textit{John has slept for an hour now}, which has a stative lexical content, would allow for both the continuative and non-continuative interpretations. The translation that Dowty provides for this sentence is given in (60).

(60) \[
\left[ \text{PRES}(\text{now}') \land AT(\text{now}', \exists t_1[XN(t_1) \land \exists t_2[t_2 \subseteq t_1 \land \text{an-hour}'(t_2) \land \forall t_3[t_3 \subseteq t_2 \rightarrow AT(t_3, \text{sleep}'(j))]]]) \right]
\]

(Dowty, 1979, p. 343, ex. 23')

This translation says that the interval denoted by \( \text{now}' \) is a present time interval, and that at this interval, there exists an extended-now interval \( t_1 \). \( t_2 \) is an hour-long interval that is a subinterval of the extended-now, and John sleeps at all subintervals of \( t_2 \). While John sleeps through an entire hour-long interval, this hour-long interval is a subset of the extended-now. \( t_2 \) could be a proper subinterval, in which case it is smaller than the extended-now.

\(^2\)Dowty calls this operator “\( F_{41} \)”. I choose to call it \( \text{PERF} \) for transparency.
and receives a non-continuative interpretation. In case $t_2$ is equivalent to the extended-now interval, the utterance receives an extended-now interpretation. Put simply, the continuative interpretation requires that John’s state of sleep began an hour ago and continues to the present. In this case, $ST = extended$-now. The non-continuative interpretation, on the other hand, requires that $ST$ is a proper subset of extended-now. As Dowty notes, the non-continuative interpretation could be used in the context of a sleep experiment in which, at UT, John is awake but has slept for an hour as an earlier part of the experiment, and that now he is ready to undergo further testing, so that the ST is a smaller interval than the extended-now (1979, p. 343).

Dowty notes that his semantics for the perfect do not account exactly for why an utterance would receive a continuative or a non-continuative reading. He states that ‘[p]erhaps then it is only a result of conversational principles’ that an utterance would be interpreted as continuative or not. The simple past John lived in Boston for 4 years is available to make an unambiguous assertion that John’s state of living in Boston for four years entirely preceded UT.

To summarize, Dowty’s XN analysis of the SAE perfect captures the intuitive notion that this form connects an eventuality that began in the past to the present moment, or, for the past perfect, connects an eventuality that began prior to some past input time to the input time. The key formal components of the XN analysis of the SAE perfect are enumerated in (61) below.

(61) **Summary of the features of the SAE perfect and Dowty’s XN account of them**

a. The perfect relates the ST of an eventuality to the input interval. Under the scope of the present tense, the input interval is UT, and under the scope of past tense, the input interval is a past time interval.

b. The perfect is incompatible with past-time denoting adverbials when under the scope of present tense. Dowty’s definition of the present perfect extended-now is that it is an interval that includes UT, so that adverbials that denote intervals that do not include UT result in a clash between the adverbial and the extended-now interval.

c. Perfect allows for a continuative interpretation, meaning that the ST of the eventuality holds at the input interval. The definition of the perfect requires that the eventuality take place during a subinterval of the extended-now. In the case of the continuative readings, this subinterval is equal to the extended-now interval. For non-continuative readings, the ST is a proper subinterval of
the extended-now interval, and so it is possible to get an interpretation that 
\( ST < UT \).

5.2 \textit{Done} as an XN Perfect

Having laid out Dowty’s analysis of the SAE perfect, I describe how the \textit{done} construction is different from the SAE perfect. Intuitively, the \textit{done} construction describes a connection between the ST of an eventuality and the RT of the utterance. Dowty’s analysis does not employ the concept of RT, but it is a necessary concept to account for the optional marking of tense. The properties of Spartanburg \textit{done} are summarized below in (62).

(62) \textbf{Summary of the properties of the Spartanburg \textit{done} construction}

\begin{enumerate}[a.]
  \item The \textit{done} construction is compatible with both present and past temporal reference. Tense markers may co-occur with \textit{done}, but they are not obligatory.
  \item In utterances with present temporal reference, \textit{done} is incompatible with adverbials that do not include UT.
  \item Utterances with \textit{done} can receive a continuative interpretation, meaning that the ST of the eventuality holds at RT. In the case of utterances with present reference, by the transitive property, this also means that the eventuality holds at UT. Only utterances with stative lexical content allow for a continuative interpretation; eventive lexical contents force a non-continuative interpretation.
\end{enumerate}

So, while \textit{done} shares many properties with the SAE present perfect, Dowty’s XN analysis cannot account entirely for the \textit{done} construction. Some modifications are necessary in order to account for the main difference, i.e., which types of temporal reference the constructions are compatible with. Dowty’s analysis requires tense marking for Standard American English, whereas tense is not obligatory with the Spartanburg \textit{done} construction.

My analysis of the Spartanburg \textit{done} construction is presented in terms of a type-theoretic lambda language. There are four types: \( \epsilon \) (for individuals), \( \iota \) (time intervals), \( \omega \) (for worlds)\(^3\), and \( \tau \) (for truth values). I also adopt Dowty’s framework and definitions for intervals, which was summarized in the previous section. Although this framework does not include a basic type for eventualities, the analysis I present here is not incompatible with an event-based semantics that includes intervals of time as well. The primary reason that I do not to

\(^3\)I include worlds here for the sake of completion. However, worlds are, for the most part, omitted in my analysis for the sake of clarity. Since I do not address the interplay of \textit{done} with modal operators, such as \textit{should}, I assume that any world argument for the utterances here would be the actual world.
include events in the semantics of done here is so that the analysis presented will be more directly comparable to the XN analysis of the SAE perfect offered by Dowty. In doing so, the differences (and similarities) between the two constructions are more evident.

Spartanburg done is not required to appear with tense marking in a given utterance. In Dowty’s analysis, the XN predicate is defined in relation to a world of evaluation (the actual world) and a time interval of evaluation; and interval \( t \) is an extended-now interval if and only if the time of evaluation is a final subinterval for \( t \). However, this requires that the time of evaluation be different for the present and past perfects. For the present perfect, the time of evaluation is presumably \( UT \). The time of evaluation for past perfects must be another past time in order for the semantics to accurately capture the differences in temporal reference. I propose that the time (and world) of evaluation of the XN predicate does not change: it is the actual world and the time of utterance.\(^4\) I modify the XN predicate take two arguments, in contrast to Dowty’s XN predicate in (57). The first argument is the interval that represents the extended-now interval. The second argument is the RT, which serves as the final subinterval of the extended-now. The new definition for the XN predicate, which is of type \( \langle t \langle \iota, \tau \rangle \rangle \), that I propose is given in (63).

\[
(63) \quad XN(t, t') \text{ is true at at } \langle w, i \rangle \text{ iff } t' \text{ is a final subinterval of } t.
\]

The definition in (63) states that an interval \( t \) is an extended-now interval, given the world and time of evaluation, which I assume are the actual world and the time of utterance, if and only if another interval \( t' \) is a final subinterval of \( t \). The RT of the utterance will serve as \( t' \), making RT the final subinterval of the extended-now. Thus, in utterances with present reference, \( UT \subseteq RT \), by definition of present reference, and \( RT \subseteq extended - now \), by the definition of the XN predicate, and so by transitivity, \( UT \subseteq extended - now \). For utterances with past temporal reference, \( RT < UT \), and RT is a final subinterval of the extended-now. Since, by definition of the final subinterval subinterval, there can be no moment in RT that is past the last moment in extended-now, then \( extended - now < UT \). Thus, the modification still achieves the desired effects without changing the world/time of evaluation pair.

The next modification of Dowty’s XN analysis deals with the concept of reference time. Throughout this thesis, I have discussed the importance of reference time to temporal interpretation as well as outlined the ways in which RT can be restricted tense, adverbials, and the discourse context. I have shown that often, the RT of an utterance containing done is defined solely by the discourse context, without any tense or adverbials within the sentence to further restrict the temporal reference. Furthermore, even in the absence of tense and

\(^4\)Contexts such as those of direct quotation would change the world/time of evaluation, but I leave this aside in this thesis.
adverbials, the *done* construction is realized in utterances with past or present temporal reference. The semantics of *done* should reflect the importance of RT as well as the fact that tense is optional; it should also provide a way to fully compose a grammatical sentence (of type τ), whether or not tense is present.

I adopt key ideas from Lee & Tonhauser (2010) in their analysis of tenseless clauses in Japanese and Korean. They argue that, although both languages have grammatical tense markers, in non-final conjuncts of a compound sentence, tense is not required (and in the case of Japanese, tense is prohibited). Instead of positing covert tense operators, the authors derive the RT of these tenseless non-final conjuncts by including the influence of Aktionsart and discourse context into their account. In the tenseless sentences, RT is modeled as a free variable in the translation. This requires a way a clause with a bound time interval, representing RT, into a statement that has a truth value.

In her analysis of Paraguayan Guaraní, Tonhauser (2011), which she argues is a tenseless language, provides a way to translate a clause into an object of type τ (a truth value). For example, Guaraní predicates such as *a-jahu* ‘I bathe’ do not restrict the temporal reference of an utterance, and are compatible with present, past, or future temporal reference, with certain restrictions. In order to account for the different possible temporal reference relations, Tonhauser proposes a rule that translates a predicate with lambda-abstracted time intervals (representing RT and ST) to a surface form which denotes a truth value. The ST (denoted by the variable t) is existentially bound, but the RT is left as a free variable, represented in (64b) as $t_{rt}$.

\[(64)\quad a. \quad a-jahu \Rightarrow \lambda w \lambda t' \lambda t [AT(t', \text{bathe}(sp, w, t))]\]

b. **Matrix Clause Rule:**

The final translation of a matrix clause translated as $\phi$ of type $\langle \omega, \langle \iota, \langle \iota, \tau \rangle \rangle \rangle$ is $\exists t (\phi(w_0, t_{rt}, t))$ of type $\tau$.

(from Tonhauser, 2011, p. 288, ex. 49, 50)

This representation of RT as an unbound variable provides a way to represent RT in the semantics while also incorporating the context-sensitive nature of RT. Furthermore, it allows a truly tenseless representation of a sentence that has no tense markers; on the other hand, it leaves open the possibility of combining with tense—as both Korean and Japanese, as well as Spartanburg English have tense markers. As Lee & Tonhauser note, the possibility that both tenseless and tensed clauses can result in a sentence that has a truth value lies in the assumption that both are of type $\langle \iota, t \rangle$; their definition of the AT predicate, which relates the RT of an utterance to the ST of the eventuality, predicate takes these clauses of type $\langle \iota, \tau \rangle$ as an argument to produce a result of type $\tau$ (p. 326).
I assume that the extended-now interval (to be defined below), binds the ST of the eventuality, so the type of a *done* clause will be \( \langle \iota, \tau \rangle \), with the RT as the bound time interval. Tonhauser’s Matrix Clause Rule for Paraguayan Guaraní binds both RT and ST, and so translates a clause of type \( \langle \omega, \langle \iota, \langle \iota, \tau \rangle \rangle \rangle \) into one of type \( \tau \). Therefore, I modify her Matrix Clause Rule to translate a clause of type \( \langle \iota, \tau \rangle \) into one of type \( \tau \), defined in (65).

(65) **Done Clause Rule:**

The final translation of a *done* clause translated as \( \phi \) of type \( \langle \iota, \tau \rangle \) is \( \phi(t_{\text{rt}}) \).

The rule in (65) translates the derived clause into a statement with a truth value.

As a last note before turning to the formal definition of *done*, I assume that the lexical content of an utterance is of type \( \langle i, t \rangle \), following Dowty (1979). I do not decompose the composition of lexical content beyond this level here. A full analysis of the compositional components of the lexical content of an utterance is beyond the scope of this study. I use the variables \( t, t', t'' \ldots \) and \( i, i', i'' \ldots \) to represent intervals of time.

Having defined my assumptions and modifications from Dowty’s XN analysis, I provide the translation of Spartanburg *done* in (66).

(66) \( \text{done} \implies \lambda Q_{\langle \iota, \tau \rangle} \lambda i \exists t[XN(t, i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land Q(t')]] \)

As shown in (66), *done* translates into an expression of type \( \langle \langle \langle \iota, \tau \rangle, \iota \rangle, \tau \rangle \). It denotes the existence of an extended-now interval \( t \), whose final subinterval is the input time variable \( i \), which represents RT in a given context. It also denotes that the interval \( t' \), which denotes the ST of the eventuality (it is an argument of a lexical content), is a subinterval of the extended-now interval \( t \). Since ST can be any subinterval of the extended-now, this allows for either a continuative or a non-continuative reading, which is desired. For reasons already discussed, the extended-now interval is based on the RT of the utterance rather than a shifting time of evaluation.

The composition of the translation of *done* with a lexical content produces an output of type \( \langle \iota, \tau \rangle \). The translation is composed into a statement of type \( \tau \) by the rule given in (65). I assume, following Lee & Tonhauser (2010), that ‘the variable assignment function keeps track of the reference time [the unbound variable] as the interpretation of the discourse proceeds’ (p. 324).

To illustrate a derivation, consider (67).

(67) *Several family members are sitting in the living room entertaining a toddler. Her grandfather is feeding her some cookies, and the mom walks in from the kitchen. She remarks that the baby is eating too many cookies.*
She done eat\(^5\) half that jug.

‘She’s eaten half that jug [of cookies].’

This utterance has no tense or temporal adverbials, and so it is the simplest to derive.

The lexical content of this utterance is \(<\text{she eat half that jug}>\). I translate this content as \(\lambda t \text{ she-eat-half-jug}'(t)\).\(^6\) \textit{Done} takes this content as its argument to produce an clause of type \(\langle i, \tau \rangle\). I assume two rules for composition: forward function application (FA) and backward function application. The FA rule combines with an expression translated as \(\alpha\) with an expression to its right, translated as \(\beta\), to provide an output with the translation \(\alpha(\beta)\). BA is the same as the FA rule, except that the argument \(\beta\) of the functor \(\alpha\) occurs to the left of \(\alpha\), rather than to the right as in FA.

In (68), I give a derivation of this utterance in (67). The derivations only contain the in the the type-theoretic logic language defined above. Steps in the derivations involving \(\beta\)-reduction are omitted for space.

(68) \textbf{Derivation of she done eat half that jug}

\[
\frac{\lambda Q(i, \tau) \lambda i \exists t[XN(t, i) \wedge \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \wedge Q(t')]] \quad \lambda t' \text{ she-eat-half-jug}'(t')}{\lambda i \exists t[XN(t, i) \wedge \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \wedge \text{she-eat-half-jug}'(t')]]} \quad \text{FA}
\]

The result of this derivation is of type \(\langle i, t \rangle\), and its final translation, by the \textit{Done} Clause Rule, is given in (69).

(69) \(\exists t[XN(t, t_{rt}) \wedge \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \wedge \text{she-eat-half-jug}'(t')]]\)

(67) states that there is an extended-now interval \(t\) whose final subinterval is the contextually-provided reference time. The ST \(t'\) of an eating event is a subinterval of the extended-now interval \(t\). This translation requires that an eating event took place at some subinterval of the extended-now interval. Since \(<\text{she eat half that jug}>\) is an eventive lexical content, I assume, following Dowty (1979), that pragmatic factors require that the ST of the eventuality described precedes the RT, so that the event cannot be interpreted to be on-going at the RT. In the context of (67), the variable assignment function would assign the unbound variable \(t_{rt}\) to an interval corresponding roughly to “now”, since the speaker is speaking about the current situation.

\(^5\)In the Spartanburg dialect, \textit{eat} is frequently used as a past form. It is common to hear “You eat yet?” to mean ‘Have you eaten yet?’ or ‘Did you eat yet?’

\(^6\)The main point is not to analyze the specific composition of the lexical content, but to represent the assumption that it is of type \(\langle i, t \rangle\).
An example with past reference and no tense markers would be derived in the same way as in (68). For example, the speaker in (70) is talking about her lunch earlier that day, and so the utterance has past reference. *Done* does not appear with past tense, but it still denotes an extended-now that extends back from RT, which is introduced by the discourse context.

(70) *Crystal is telling about her lunch earlier that day. She had gone to a Japanese restaurant with a friend. They ordered sushi.*

I was gon take a picture a picture of them, but Anna done put some on her plate.

‘I was going to take a picture of [the sushi rolls], but Anna had already put some on her plate.’

I now turn to an example that has present tense. I assume that a present tense form of *have* denotes present tense\(^7\), which I represent as PRES, and its translation is given is in (71). The variable *now* is interpreted as the time of utterance.

(71) \[
\text{PRES} \Rightarrow \lambda Q_{\langle i,t \rangle} \lambda i [Q(i) \land \text{now} \subseteq i]
\]

The core of the definition of PRES is that UT, represented by *now*, is a subinterval of the input time interval \(i\), which will be provided as the RT. \(\text{now} \subseteq i\) (\(\text{UT} \subseteq \text{RT}\)) is the definition of present temporal reference. This present tense operator takes a *done* clause as its argument to produce a predicate of times, which, like untensed *done* clauses, is of type \(\langle t, \tau \rangle\). The bound time interval will be translated into a free variable, representing RT, by the *Done* Clause Rule.

The utterance in (72) contains both the *done* construction and the present tense. Its derivation in (73) illustrates the interaction of *done* with the present tense operator. In (73), the translation of *done* first applies to the translation of the lexical content; the present tense then applies to the result of this first step to produce a statement of type \(\langle t, \tau \rangle\).

(72) *John and his dad go to visit John’s grandmother. When they arrive, the grandmother asks John if he’s hungry, but his dad replies that John has eaten already.*

He’s done et.

‘He already ate.’

(73) **Composition of *done* clause with present tense**

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda Q_{\langle i,t \rangle} \lambda i [Q(i) \land \text{now} \subseteq i] & \quad \frac{\lambda Q_{\langle i,t \rangle} \lambda i [XN(t,i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land Q(t')]]}{\lambda i \exists[XN(t,i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \text{john-eat}'(t')]]} \quad FA \\
\lambda i \exists[XN(t,i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \text{john-eat}'(t')]] & \quad \frac{\lambda i \exists[XN(t,i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \text{john-eat}'(t') \land \text{now} \subseteq i]]}{\lambda i \exists[XN(t,i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \text{john-eat}'(t') \land \text{now} \subseteq i]]} \quad \text{FA}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^7\)Although *have* may be used as a main verb, I assume that in the case of *done*, its sole role is to mark tense.
The final translation of (73) is given in (74).

\[(74) \, \exists t [XN(t, t_{rt}) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \text{john-eat}'(t')] \land \text{now} \subseteq t_{rt}] \]

This translation in (74) is true if and only if there is an extended-now interval \(t\) that extends whose final subinterval is the RT \(t_{rt}\). At some subinterval \(t'\) of the extended-now, there was an eating event, and the utterance has present temporal reference, denoted by \(\text{now} \subseteq t_{rt}\). The Done Clause Rule applies to an untensed \textit{done} construction, as in (69) or to a tensed one, as in (74). RT is modeled in both cases as a final variable in the final form, but in the case of a tensed clause, the RT is restricted to a time that includes the UT.

Past tense is defined so that the RT is restricted to a time interval that precedes UT. I assume that \textit{have} in its past form is a past tense marker, and I represent this as \textit{PAST}. The translation for \textit{PAST} is provided in (75). This translation restricts the bound variable \(i\), which will be the RT, to a time prior to UT.

\[(75) \, \text{PAST} = \lambda i \lambda Q \langle i, \tau \rangle [Q(i) \land i < \text{now}] \]

Example (76) has a past tense marker. It combines with \textit{done} in a straightforward way to denote an extended-now that extends back from the contextually-define RT, which is restricted to the past. The composition of the \textit{done} clause with past tense is given in (77). The translation of the lexical content is \(\lambda t' \, \text{meat-turn-brown}'(t')\). As with (73), the translation of \textit{done} first combines with the lexical content. The result of this composition in turn combines with past tense.

\[(76) \, \text{The speaker is telling a story about a time when her boyfriend tried to convince her that some hamburger meat in the refrigerator was still fine to eat, but she refused. It had done turned brown-looking! It had turned brown!} \]

\[(77) \, \text{Composition of \textit{done} clause with past tense} \]

\[
\frac{\lambda i \lambda Q \langle i, \tau \rangle [Q(i) \land i < \text{now}]}{\lambda i \lambda Q \langle i, \tau \rangle [Q(i) \land \exists i \exists t [XN(t, i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land Q(t')]] \land i < \text{now}]} \quad \lambda t' \, \text{meat-turn-brown}'(t')}
\]

\[
\frac{\lambda i \lambda Q \langle i, \tau \rangle [Q(i) \land \exists i \exists t [XN(t, i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \text{meat-turn-brown}'(t')]]]}{\lambda i \lambda Q \langle i, \tau \rangle [Q(i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \text{meat-turn-brown}'(t')]] \land i < \text{now}]} \quad \text{FA} \quad \text{FA} \]

The finaly translation of (77) is given in (78).

\[(78) \, \exists t [XN(t, t_{rt}) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \text{meat-turn-brown}'(t')]] \land t_{rt} < \text{now} \]

(78) states that there is an extended-now interval \(t\) whose final subinterval is a contextually provided reference time \(t_{rt}\). The interval \(t'\) is a subinterval of the extended-now \(t\), and a
meat-turning-brown event took place during the time interval denoted by \( t' \). Lastly, the reference time \( t_{rt} \) precedes the utterance time \( \text{now} \). This translation captures the generalization \( \text{done} \) describes an eventuality whose ST is related to the RT by the extended-now interval, since both of them are subintervals of the extended-now. A stative lexical content would allow for the ST of the eventuality described to overlap with the RT, which yields a continuative reading, but an eventive lexical content requires that the ST of the event precede the RT. Since the ST of an eventuality is defined to be some subinterval of the extended-now, my definition of \( \text{done} \) allows for both continuative and non-continuative readings, though the translation itself does not determine whether which interpretation will be available. It is the Aktionsart of the lexical content that determines the availability of a continuative interpretation.

Now that the basic derivation of a \( \text{done} \) construction is with or without tense is established, analysis must also account for the possibility of different temporal adverbials. For instance, the \( \text{done} \) perfect is also compatible with \textit{for}-phrases, such as \textit{for five years/two hours}. I assume that temporal adverbials are of type \( \langle \langle i, t \rangle, \langle i, t \rangle \rangle \). For example, the translation for \textit{now} is given in (79). It states that the UT \( \text{now} \) is a subinterval of the another interval \( i \) (which will be supplied by the RT). This analysis of \textit{now} simply requires that the UT be a subinterval of some other interval, which will be the RT. It will depend on the speaker and the context how large such an interval may be. A detailed argument on the translation of \textit{now} is beyond the purpose here, but the translation in (79) suffices for the purposes of illustrating the composition of \( \text{done}. \)

\[
\text{(79) } \text{now} \rightarrow \lambda Q_{\langle i, rt \rangle} \lambda i [Q(i) \land \text{now} \subseteq i]
\]

The adverbial \textit{now} modifies the RT in (80), and the composition with the \( \text{done} \) clause is given in (81).

\[
\text{(80) } \text{The speaker’s dog does not like when her cat gets on the couch to be petted. When he gets on the couch, the dog does not see him at first. When the dog sees the cat on the couch, she comes to chase him away. She was expecting this, and remarks:}\ 
\text{She done seen him now.}\ 
\text{‘She has seen him now.’}
\]

---

\(^{8}\)I follow the convention of representing UT as the designated variable \textit{now} in the translations here; it is not to be confused with the natural language adverbial \textit{now}.

\(^{9}\)This analysis of \textit{now} does not capture sentences such as \textit{John paid all his bills. Now he was broke}, in which \textit{now} refers to a time other than the UT. Kamp (1971) provides a fuller discussion of the semantics of \textit{now}.
Composition of *done* clause with adverbial

\[
\lambda Q(\iota, \tau) \lambda i [Q(i) \land \text{now} \subseteq i] \quad \frac{\lambda Q(\iota, \tau) \lambda i \exists t[XN(t, i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land Q(t')]]}{\lambda t' \mathsf{she-see-him}'(t')} \quad \mathsf{FA}
\]

\[
\lambda i \exists t[XN(t, i) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \mathsf{she-see-him}'(t)]] \quad \mathsf{FA}
\]

The final translation of the *she done seen him now* is given in (82).

\[
\exists t[XN(t, \text{now}) \land \exists t'[t' \subseteq t \land \mathsf{she-see-him}'(t)]] \land \text{now} \subseteq [i]
\]

The translation in (82) is true if and only if the extended-now interval \(t\), whose final subinterval is the RT \(t_{rt}\), and the UT \(\text{now}\) is a subinterval of the RT. The ST of the seeing event is also a subinterval of the extended-now interval. As in the other examples, the translations of *done* and the lexical content first compose to produce a statement of type \(\langle \iota, \tau \rangle\). The translation of adverbial \(\text{now}\) then applies to this, and the result is of type \(\langle \iota, \tau \rangle\). The Done Clause Rule then applies to produce a translation of type \(\tau\).

This analysis of the Spartanburg *done* construction allows for optional tense marking without the use of covert tense operators. The RT is representation as an unbound variable, which may be restricted by tense and temporal adverbials. The variable assignment function keeps track of the unbound RT variables and assigns it to an appropriate time interval, depending on the discourse context. This solution borrows from Lee & Tonhauser’s solution to a similar phenomenon in Japanese and Korean. When tense is marked, the tense operator scopes over the *done* clause and restricts RT. The ability of both tenseless and tensed clauses to denote truth values, given a UT, stems from the fact that they are both of type \(\langle \iota, \tau \rangle\). A rule then applies to these statements of type \(\langle \iota, \tau \rangle\) to translate them into a statement of type \(\tau\).

Lastly, the semantics of *done* do not technically restrict the ST of an eventive lexical content from having a continuative interpretation. It only requires that the ST is some subinterval of extended-now, possibly the entire extended-now. I attribute the ability of states to receive a continuative interpretation under the scope of *done* to the inherent properties of states and events. States occur the moment the state begins. As soon as I begin to live in Columbus (a state), then it is true that I have lived in Columbus. On the other hand, the events involve culmination, so that an event only occurs once the culmination is reached. When I begin to make dinner (an event), it is not true that I have made dinner. This explains why one can say *I done lived here all my life*, in a situation where I still live here, because even though the state holds now, one can truthfully say that an entire living state exists within the extended-now (and will keep on going). On the other hand, one can only truthfully utter the sentence *he done moved to a new house* once a moving event has culminated. Therefore, the ability of stative, but not eventive, lexical contents with *done*...
utterances to have a continuative reading follows not from the semantics of *done* itself but from the properties of the lexical content.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

I have argued that the done construction of Spartanburg, South Carolina is a marker of perfect aspect. I adapted the version of the Extended Now analysis, proposed in Dowty (1979) for the Standard American English perfect, to account for the different properties of done. This thesis has shown that done introduces a time interval, the extended-now, which is defined such that its final subinterval is the reference time. A done clause describes an event that took place during some subinterval of the extended-now. Stative lexical contents allow for a continuative reading, in which the time of the state overlaps with the reference time; eventive lexical contents require that the time of the event precede the reference time. I attribute this difference to the inherent properties of states and events.

Done is compatible with utterances that have either present or past temporal reference, so that the extended-now interval will depend on the reference time of the utterance. I represented the reference time as an unbound variable in the translation of done clauses, adapting proposals by Lee & Tonhauser (2010) and Tonhauser (2011). Since done does not require the presence of tense, the reference time is set by the discourse context and the variable assignment function. When tense is marked, it serves to restrict the reference time to either a past or present interval, depending on whether it is past or present tense, respectively. The ability of both a tensed done clause and an untensed one to be translated into a truth value relies on the assumption that both types of clauses are predicates of times. A translation rule then allows these to be translated into a statement with a truth value. The optionality of tense with the done construction is a major deviation from the SAE perfect, which requires tense.

It is interesting to note that Spartanburg speakers have in their repertoire two ways to mark the perfect: the SAE have perfect and the non-standard done perfect, both of which are widely used by Spartanburg speakers. I argue that both perfects are of the Extended Now type. More work must be done to examine whether there is a clear difference in distribution between the two forms. One hypothesis is that the done perfect more strongly implies recency of the event, as one consultant said that she would prefer done in some scenarios if the event happened recently, and she preferred the SAE perfect if it was not recent. She did note that
it was not incorrect to say *done* if the event was not recent, however. Another hypothesis is that tensed auxiliaries in the dialect are often not required in places where they would show up in their SAE counterparts. A perfect with a deleted *have* auxiliary is practically indistinguishable, in the surface form, from a simple past tense. It could be that *done* serves as an unambiguous perfect form. These hypotheses provide one area of exploration in the future on how exactly *done* and the *have* perfect are different semantically and pragmatically. Importantly, not only do they have (slightly) different semantics, but their social meaning is different. One is the Standard form, and the other is non-Standard, and sometimes considered by the speakers themselves to be “bad speech”.

The Spartanburg *done* construction is notable because it is a untensed construction. Tense is not required for a *done* clause to be interpreted, which is a trait not commonly attested in varieties of North American English. Rather than posit covert tense operators, my definition allows the contextually-dependent nature of the reference time to determine where the extended-now denoted by *done* is situated. The reference is represented in the semantics as a free variable whose interpretation depends on the discourse context. Nonetheless, the Spartanburg dialect is not a tenseless language, and speakers may choose to overtly mark tense with the *done* construction, in which case the reference time is restricted by this tense marker. This raises the question of how common untensed expressions are in languages that have tense.


