IMAGES OF RESOLVE: MOTIVATED SCHEMATA AND THE (IN)CREDIBILITY
OF DOMESTIC DISSENT IN COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

DISSERTATION

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Abstract

What is the effect of domestic dissent on the credibility of deterrent and compellent threats in coercive diplomacy? Like many questions in international relations, the field is divided about what the impact of incoming information should be during foreign policy crises. I test three sets of hypotheses—two rationalist and one psychological—using a multimethod approach. The conventional wisdom regarding domestic dissent—that it has a handicapping ability on a statesman’s ability to credibly make threats in extended immediate deterrent and compellent situations—is generally borne out in tests that employed experimental manipulations embedded within opinion surveys on a sample of undergraduates. But another idea—that the impact of incoming information is mitigated by the presence in the minds of observing national decision-makers of stereotypical clusters of beliefs called schemata—also receives some support in these experiments as well as from a case study analysis of German perceptions of French extended deterrent threats during the Czechoslovakia crisis in 1938. The findings highlight the promise of multimethod research in International Relations, and illustrate the promise of experimental research for answering “small-n” questions in security studies.
Dedication

To my family, friends, and teachers, but most of all, to my wife, Robin Goldstein
Acknowledgments

It is common that dissertation writers acknowledge those who have helped them along their way towards completion. In that respect, this section will be no different from similar sections found in innumerable other dissertations. It will vary, however, in the amount of specificity and the earnestness with which it expresses gratitude to those individuals. I remain disheartened to this day that people are far too reticent to directly thank others for their contributions to their lives; and that people who are not intimates are far too uncomfortable telling others they have made an impact in their life. I have indeed stood on the shoulders of some unbelievable people who have helped me along my way, and I am not shy or ashamed to admit it. As such, I will acknowledge all those who have contributed to both my personal and professional journey up to this point, because this work is theirs as much as it is mine.

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1. INTRODUCTION: THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC DISSENT ON COERCIVE CREDIBILITY

Domestic dissent is almost universally understood by foreign policy decision-makers and political officials as sending unambiguously harmful signals about the credibility of foreign policy threats to international observers. Henry Kissinger, for instance, speculated in his memoirs that “observing the divided American public opinion on the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese knew all too well that “America was negotiating not with its adversary but with itself” (Kissinger 1979: 303). In 2001, then-attorney general John Ashcroft opined that those who opposed the Bush administration’s counter-terrorism policies “give ammunition to America’s enemies and pause to its allies.”¹ Similarly, when commenting on the loss of Connecticut senator Joe Lieberman in the 2006 senatorial primary, Vice President Dick Cheney suggested that the loss of a pro-Iraq war senator sent the message to “al-Qaeda types…that they can break the will of the American people…,”² and thus had a pernicious effect on the ability of the American government to demonstrate resolve to credibly commit to continue the war in Iraq. Were

these politicians correct in their appraisal of dissent’s effects on the credibility of foreign policy threats? The answer is somewhat unsatisfying: it depends.

On what does it depend? It is something of a truism to say that you can’t break what is already broken, and you cannot break what is too strong to break. Quite often in the world of international politics, the perceptual prisms through which decision-makers understand other states in the international system are crystallized well in advance of a coercive diplomatic crisis. More concretely, dissent is unlikely to negatively affect credibility when decision-makers already hold entrenched perceptions that a state lacks credibility or resolve well before dissent becomes visible in a given crisis; in such cases, domestic dissent might simply tell an international observer what they already know. Similarly, in the same way that one unfavorable action does not shake a family member’s love for a child, or why stockholders may not run for cover when Apple has a substandard financial quarter, domestic dissent may be unlikely to have a negative effect on credibility when a decision-maker sees another state according to certain pre-defined stereotypes that mitigate the impact of incoming information. In summary, ingrained perceptions of other states—relatively common in the international system—can create non-falsifiable belief systems which make the updating of beliefs about the internal strength of an adversary unlikely to change.

Second, there is a simple logical reason that dissent may not have the canonical effect across all observing decision-makers: although most decision-makers and scholars see dissent as detracting from international perceptions of a state’s resolve, not all have believed that dissent reveals information only (or even primarily) about a state weak in
resolve. Richard Nixon, for instance, suggested that a decision-maker who laughed off dissent that emerged during a compellent campaign created perceptions abroad of a ruthless, determined leader, who may indeed enjoy leverage from the strategic reference to his domestic weakness. The “madman theory” of coercion suggested just that. According to Nixon aide HR Haldeman, the madman theory sought to signal to adversaries a president’s willingness to pursue a policy that was costly by virtue of extant constraints (Kimball 1998: 76-86). In the madman theory, threats in the face of constraint were thought by Nixon to signal his personal resolve to Hanoi. The message was that “[Nixon] possessed the will and ability to disregard domestic and international constraints in order to deliver even more devastating destruction in the future…” (Kimball 2003: 18). Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Thomas Moorer subsequently summed up Nixon’s understanding of the “madman” mentality: “[Nixon] did not care if the whole world thought he was crazy in resuming the bombing [of North Vietnam]…if it did, so much the better” (Kimball 1998: 77). In other words, coercive threats made in the face of dissent signaled the resolve of the leader of a state.

The basic argument I make is simple: the incidence of either one of these interpretations can be assessed empirically without careful study of the ways in which decision-makers perceive other states in the international system. Dissent’s impacts, whether on the resolve of a state or a leader, or on the credibility of a coercive threat that a state may make, are contingent on the extent to which decision-makers hold

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3 Both the etiology and etymology of the strategy of madness are hotly debated among both historians and strategists. On these matters see Kimball (2005).
stereotypical perceptions of other states that bias their interpretation and treatment of incoming information.

Surprisingly enough, however, direct and systematic tests of the effects of domestic dissent have been incredibly scarce. It is towards this goal that this dissertation earnestly proceeds. Though Edward R Murrow once pled with Americans “not to confuse dissent with disloyalty” for reasons of civility,4 Murrow said nothing about the measurable effect that domestic dissent might have on the credibility of a state in a foreign policy crisis. And while most reasonable observers can agree that reasonable disagreement and lively debate are markers of healthy democracy, we cannot simply assume a priori that the unforgiving structural environment of the anarchic international system (and the foreign policy interests of the states within that system) align with the discursive needs of democratic citizens. Empirical inquiry is needed to determine whether the long held conventional wisdom is correct, or whether that wisdom is instead in need of revision. It is with this implication firmly in mind that this dissertation proceeds.

But before we can discuss an alternative theory for the structure of these empirical tests in a bit more detail, more background and clarification is needed. Broadly speaking, this chapter provides that background, setting the stage for the explication of an alternative theory of dissent’s effects. The remainder of this introductory chapter will proceed as follows: after Section 1.2 details the way in which key concepts will be understood in this dissertation while specifying the scope conditions of its claims.

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Section 1.3 will conclude with a few brief words about the theory I offer in chapter 2 to explain the effects of domestic dissent, and will detail the remaining chapters by providing a summary of the methodologies used to test the opposing theories of dissent’s effects.

1.1 Concepts and Definitions

The preoccupation of political leaders with the way in which other decision-makers perceive them goes back a long way, and is on its face well-justified. After all, if the stakes of the international game are war and peace, and successful prevention of violence is based on another’s accurate appraisal of one’s capabilities and intentions, decision-makers are right to be cautious. The consequences of misperception can be dire: either one state overestimates the strength and commitment of another, leading to a suboptimal slice of the goods at stake; or worse yet, if a state underestimates the strength or ferocity of another, it may be taken by surprise when a surprise attack occurs.\(^5\) The anarchic international system leaves decision-makers uncertain over the intentions of other states, and it may be prudent to prepare for the worst.\(^6\) So the concern over the messages abroad that may be sent by a fragmented domestic political picture seems a priori reasonable.

But the empirical puzzle above referenced the effect of dissent during coercive diplomacy, vaguely defined—Former VP Cheney’s statement was made during a time at which the United States was at war, employing violence strategically; but also during a

\(^5\) Jervis (1976) remains the canonical work on the causes and effects of misperception.

\(^6\) The most pertinent theorization of the uncertainty created by anarchy and the worst-case dynamics it engenders remains Waltz (1979).
time at which the United States was seeking to discourage the rise of Great Power
challengers to its hegemony. What do we mean by coercive diplomacy? The term here
is used to represent a broad class of phenomena that collectively span each of two general
types of coercive diplomacy—that is deterrence, and compellence. Both deterrent and
compellent situations are circumstances where credibility is paramount (Schelling 1960:
5-6), because they both involve the strategic application of threats of violence—or the
power to hurt (Schelling 1966: 31-32); this power to hurt, especially in the nuclear era, is
“most effective when held in reserve” (Schelling 1966: 3). Deterrence, based as it is on
the use of a threat to discourage another (usually with the threat of military force) from
some not already-begun undesirable behavior, and compellence, involving the application
of violence (and the threat of possibly more to come) to discourage further violations of
cherished values, form the conceptual core of this dissertation, used to answer an
empirical question about the effect that domestic dissent has on the credibility of a state
in a diplomatic crisis. But the inferential challenges that plague those who seek to study
these phenomena—those that are characterized by difficult to observe non-events⁷ (in the
case of deterrence), and possible war that follows failures of deterrence (in the case of
compellence)—are vast. The risk of over-generalizing from biased samples of these
relatively rare and unique events is extreme.⁸

Somewhat in reaction to the epistemological and inferential difficulties associated
with studying general deterrence, scholars began to seek more structured universes of

⁷ See Lebow & Stein (1989) for an excellent review of the practical and epistemological challenges related
to the study of deterrence.

⁸ See Gartzke (1999) for an excellent case that most studies of violence in the international arena may be
theoretically badly afield.
cases on which to understand the dynamics of deterrence. This dissertation relies on one of these to test its theoretical claims—that of the extended immediate deterrent crisis. Driven by concerns over the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella during the Cold War, scholars developed conceptual frameworks for analysis that would permit valid conclusions to be drawn from their study by defining in a precise manner the circumstances under which a theory ought to hold. The extended immediate deterrent crisis has two general components—extension and immediacy. By extension of deterrent threat, we mean that deterrence is a policy undertaken by one state (the defender) to protect another state rather than itself (an ally or “protégé”). By immediacy of deterrent threat, we mean that some third party (an “attacker”) is actively considering attacking the protégé. The Defender is aware of this threat, and either via explicit verbal statement or via the mobilization of military forces, threatens the would-be attacker with military force in the event that they follow through on their contemplated attack (Huth 1988: 15-16).

The experiments that form the empirical core of the dissertation, the results of which are presented in Chapter 3, are based around stylized attempts at extended immediate deterrence, and the stipulated subsequent failure of those deterrent threats, that then lead to attempted compellence against the state previously labeled as the “attacker.” In compellence, vice deterrence, punishment (in this case coercive violence) is “administered until the other acts, rather than if he acts” (Schelling 1966: 70). After the failure of deterrence in the extended immediate context, this involves the state that was

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10 See Morgan (1977) for the first usage of the term.
the defender attacking the state that was the “attacker” in an attempt to convince him to abandon course. While extended immediate deterrent crises and their aftermath hardly constitute the totality of coercive diplomatic interactions, they constitute a constructive palette on which to investigate the effects of domestic dissent that is at once empirically significant, and policy relevant.

What do we mean by domestic dissent? The hypothetical incidence and form of disagreement within a given domestic polity is obviously tied to the institutional structure of that polity. Hypothetically, cries from the Gulag (Solzhenitsyn 1973), back-channel overtures to the press (Suskind 2004), or overt demonstration against national foreign policy, as experienced in the United States during the Vietnam War (Kissinger 1979), might all prove damaging to the credibility of a deterrent or compellent threat if perceived by another state in the international system. But it is certainly the case that these forms of dissent are more likely to be tolerated in democratic rather than non-democratic states. In this study, we employ a slight modification of the definition that Kenneth Schultz employed in his (2001) book. This dissertation sees dissent as either one or both of either legislative opposition to the possibility of a use of force (similar to Schultz), but also broadens the definition to include any organized civil/public opposition to a deterrent threat or an active military campaign. The experiments that form the empirical core of this dissertation, detailed in chapter 3, employ a definition that employs both of these empirical markers of the concept of dissent. The illustrative case study that forms the front end of the concluding chapter, chapter 4, uses Schultz’s definition for case selection.
1.2 The argument and a Means for Testing it

The argument I make is simple at its core: Deterrent crises do not occur in a perceptual vacuum. More specifically, decisions to challenge the status quo, escalate, or resist are not made purely according to a simple cost-benefit calculus devoid of emotion or cognitive ambiguity. They also are not necessarily made without regard to the previous history between a pair of states or a pair of decision-makers. Instead, the perceptual baggage that decision-makers bring into a crisis looms large. The concept of imagery, which will be further developed in chapter 2, has been defined by Robert Jervis in a way that serves the purposes of the introduction, but will be elaborated upon later in the course of building an alternative framework for understanding dissent’s effects. An Image can be loosely understood as “…those of his beliefs about the other that affect his predictions of how the other will behave under various circumstances” (Jervis 1970: 5).

Essentially, the argument I make is that the effect of dissent on credibility and its correlates is contingent upon the variety and strength of imagery active in the mind of a decision-maker interpreting it. When images take on rather predictable, stereotypical forms that contain powerful pre-existing beliefs about the resolve of a state and its leader, dissent’s impact on onlooking decision-maker perceptions about state resolve, leader resolve, and credibility, should be minimal.

This argument is first tested formally with an extensive battery of experimental manipulations embedded within opinion surveys. The experimental method, which tests this study’s hypotheses in detail in Chapter 3, allows tight and direct control over the concepts of interest (in this case dissent, credibility, and resolve), and the survey platform allows for detailed quantitative measurement of the effects of those manipulations on the
beliefs of those exposed to the experiments. Chapter 4 employs an illustrative case study of the perceptions of the German High command during the Czechoslovakia crisis immediately prior to World War II; this case vividly demonstrates the power of stereotypical images in filtering dissent’s impacts on perceptions of credibility and resolve. Chapter 5 concludes the document with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the work, its limitations, and an agenda for further research on the effects of domestic dissent.

While experimental tests offer a way to examine claims pertaining to rare constellations of empirical conditions, they are not a panacea. Furthermore, given the rather restrictive definition of crisis used in these empirical tests, the results may not be as broad in applicability as they might otherwise be. And while the success of my theory in explaining the effects of dissent is far from overwhelming, the results still have bearing for both future research on coercive bargaining and the policy community.
2. THEORIES OF DOMESTIC DISSENT’S EFFECTS

This chapter will be primarily concerned with deriving the theories of domestic dissent’s effects that will be tested in chapter 3. While empirical work on the effects of domestic dissent on coercive credibility has been limited, there is no shortage of theoretical work from the broader literature on coercive bargaining that suggests how domestic dissent might work to influence coercive threats. Despite the popularity of the conventional wisdom about the effects of domestic dissent, it has rarely been subjected to direct empirical test. When it has been tested, its implications have not been universally corroborated. Although a great deal of attention has been paid in the security studies literature to situations where the presence of domestic dissent (usually operationalized as a lack of executive decision-maker popularity) may a dissent-ridden lead to voluntarily pursue military adventures abroad, there exists a paucity of literature examining the effects that domestic dissent has on bargaining processes like deterrence and compellence. What little work exists is purely in the behavioral

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11 The notion that the presence of either domestic squabbling over internal matters or an unpopular chief executive may lead to military interventionism abroad is known as the diversionary theory of war. So goes the theory, in the presence of internal dissension, a leader can take his nation to war in order to create positive nationalistic feelings in a citizenry (i.e. the rally-around the flag effect) that will displace domestic problems. For a good review of literature concerning the diversionary theory of war, see Levy (1989); on the “rally” effect, see Mueller (1973) or Baum (2002).
realm—it examines correlates of deterrence success, but does not examine the way in which dissent affects the perceptions of onlooking actors.\textsuperscript{12}

At this point we need only offer a high-level summary of the conceptual apparatus needed to examine the arguments about how and why domestic dissent affects coercive credibility. Coercive threats are perceived as credible, (Mercer 1996: 15), based on whether an actor has the “interests, capability, and resolve” to enforce it. This cocktail of factors is not new, nor is Mercer’s (1996) distillation novel. Theorists have long postulated that some combination of a state’s interests (George 1974; Snyder and Diesing 1978; Snyder 1997), capabilities (Schelling 1966; Snyder and Diesing 1978), and resolve (Schelling 1966; Fearon 1997) determine the credibility of a coercive threat.\textsuperscript{13}

The remainder of my review of the literature in this chapter proceeds as follows: In section 2.1, I discuss the level-of-analysis problem in international relations as it pertains to understanding effects of domestic dissent in coercive bargaining. From this discussion, section 2.2 derives the relevance of the concepts of state and leader resolve to bargaining outcomes from the rationalist literatures on coercive diplomacy and signaling, and then deduces hypotheses about dissent’s effects from these literatures, noting the seeming puzzle that exists between dissent’s possible effects on state and leader resolve. Section 2.3 builds a case for a perceptual theory of dissent’s effects from

\textsuperscript{12}To be fair, this is not problematic in itself. But behaviorally-based research on deterrence can often obscure significant theoretical problems at the process (or perception) level. On these matters, see Lebow and Stein (1989), or George and Smoke (1974).

\textsuperscript{13}It should be noted that a theory of credibility in coercive diplomacy is far too ambitious a task for this dissertation. While the results presented herein may help subsequent scholars push in that direction, that is a task for an army bigger than one.
phenomenological work on coercive diplomacy, and section 2.4 extracts hypotheses for the effects of dissent through the explication of schema theory. Following this extraction, we can proceed with empirical tests of how and why domestic dissent affects coercive credibility; an experimental test in chapter three and a case study in chapter four.

2.1 From Black Boxes to Domestic-International Linkages

Kenneth Waltz’s (1959) work on the causes of war was seminal for a variety of reasons. Most pertinent to our present discussion of the effects of domestic dissent in coercive diplomacy is the taxonomy he proposed for classifying families of theories in international relations. Dividing families of theory by their causal origin, Waltz suggested that causes of war could fall into either the first (individual), second (domestic), or third (international systemic) level of analysis. While this is not the only effort to conceptually divide the IR universe, it is the most prominent, and it serves the purposes of this thesis because it provides a handy taxonomy for discussing the history of bargaining theory.

The publication of Waltz’s (1979) seminal work, and the coincident rise of neorealism as IR’s preferred theoretical apparatus, was emblematic of a class of theory that anthropomorphized the state, turning each sovereign in the international system into billiard balls of different sizes corresponding to their structural position within the balance of power. But states in Waltz’s model had “behavior” and “motivation”; human

14 Waltz calls these levels of analysis “images.” But given the subsequent reliance of my alternative theory of dissent’s effects on the concept of imagery in the psychological sense, I refer to Waltz’s “images” as “levels of analysis” in text in order to prevent reader confusion.

15 See for instance, Jervis (1976) or Singer (1961).
qualities attributed to inhuman entities. Models such as Waltz’s posited that attempts to peer inside of the “black box” were reductionistic, or logically incapable of generating general IR theory. But Waltz’s work was not the beginning nor the end of theories that treated the nation-state as the primary relevant unit of analysis within the international system. Morgenthau’s (1959) classical realism posited the primacy of the structural level analysis in determining international outcomes, and even Wendt’s (1999) canon of constructivism posited the primacy of the state in “making” the “unregulated” condition (cf. Mueller 2004) of anarchy what it is.\textsuperscript{16} Subsequent studies of the informational benefit of institutions in mitigating the consequences of anarchy (Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984) similarly posited the state as a unitary actor.

But although these works are not primarily or explicitly focused upon the bargaining metaphor, the state-centric focus of grand theories of IR mirrors the early configuration of the bargaining literature, and it is this literature that is most relevant to our analysis of deterrence and compellence. Daniel Ellsburg’s (1961) analysis of a US-Soviet “game” of strategy and Herman Kahn’s (1960) analyses of potential superpower nuclear exchanges brought Von Neumann and Morganstern’s (1944) more abstract methodology of the deduction of rational choices in games via objective cost-benefit calculus into the military realm. Kahn, in particular, attempted elaborate systems models of entire nuclear crises, from provocation to annihilation—from attempted deterrence to failed (but irradiated) compellence. These methods were further advanced into the

\textsuperscript{16} John Mueller sensibly contends that “anarchy” sounds far more menacing than “unregulated”; even if the two share similar meanings in the context of the international system, they have strikingly different implications.
mainstream of strategic thought by Thomas Schelling (1960, 1966), and laid a common conceptual framework for future bargaining theorists. Indeed, it was now possible to represent entire sequences of international interactions mathematically; this common framework shaped the future course of subsequent scholarly inquiries into coercive bargaining. In so doing, these unified models of rational behavior that focused on international interaction shaped the current conventional wisdom about the effects of domestic dissent. Through their reification of the state as a unitary actor, and their use of expected utility theory\(^\text{17}\) as a means of venturing predictions about international behavior, they gave rise to the commonly held idea that domestic dissent should reduce the credibility of a state’s threats.

More background is needed to substantiate this rather bold (and somewhat complex) claim. The conventional wisdom about dissent comes in part from objectivist models of signaling, where the perception of signals of credibility and resolve was assumed to be smooth and non-problematic. Indeed, the early formal models of perhaps inherently incredible uses of force\(^\text{18}\) detailed above laid the conceptual groundwork for the subsequent study of “signaling” through their reification of state-level credibility and resolve as correlates of successful bargaining.\(^\text{19}\) A generation after the publication of Schelling’s most influential book, international relations theorists began modeled international interactions as “two-level games”—that is, games where the chief executive

\(^{17}\) For the first such formulation, see von Neumann and Morganstern (1944).

\(^{18}\) On the possibly inherent incredibility of American extended deterrent nuclear threats, for instance, see Jervis (1984).

\(^{19}\) Indeed, much of Schelling’s (1966) work reads like a how-to on bargaining and the skillful employment of signals.
played two games at once; one between his state and another state, but also between himself and his domestic political audience (Putnam 1988). Correspondingly, opposing states considered signals from two relevant audiences: their crisis counterpart’s state-level military gestures and its domestic polity. James Fearon (1994) subsequently expanded upon this idea, modeling escalation in crises as a competition between two state*polities, and suggesting that the more constrained state should emerge from the confrontation victorious. Borrowing Schelling’s metaphor, Fearon was suggesting, in essence, that “…in bargaining, weakness is often strength,” whereas “freedom may be freedom to capitulate” (Schelling 1960:22). Democratically constrained leaders, in other words, were able to more credibly commit to a course of action by virtue of their constraint. After all, to make an empty threat in the face of expected domestic backlash for tarnishing the national honor would be politically suicidal. Other scholars picked up on this idea, suggesting that the ability to transparently generate “audience costs” by taking a public foreign policy stand in front of a politically engaged domestic audience should provide bargaining leverage, and thus, favorable bargaining outcomes (Martin 1994; Schultz 1998; Finel and Lord 1999; Tomz 2007). \(^{21}\) Large-N empirical studies of patterns of dispute initiation studies confirmed the viability of this intuition (Partell 1997; Partell and Palmer 1999; Eyerman and Hart 1996; Gelpi and Grieco 2001). \(^{22}\)

\(^{20}\) Though this is certainly not the first instance of domestic politics being seen as relevant to deterrence outcomes and processes, it is probably the first mathematical model that did so. For one early such instance, see Lebow (1981).

\(^{21}\) Though for an argument that transparency is overrated in its ability to help leaders gain bargaining leverage via audience costs, see Weeks (2008).

\(^{22}\) Though for evidence suggesting audience costs have little salutary effect on credibility are , see Mears 2009.
The logic of audience costs was taken one step further by Kenneth Schultz. If democratic states were able to more clearly send signals of resolve than non-democratic states via their superior transparency, and states with open polities are more easily able to generate credibility via audience costs, then a coercive threat made in the shadow of support from political opposition parties should make the generation of audience costs even easier. According to this logic, the more a coercive threat is supported by domestic political audiences, the higher the audience costs should be from a leader who reneges from such a threat. Consequently, leaders with opposition parties who are supportive of coercive threats should find their threats perceived internationally as more credible. The corollary to this idea, of course, is that democratic leaders whose political opposition publicly opposes their coercive threat should find coercive diplomacy more difficult. That is, domestic dissent should harm credibility. But neither Schultz’s empirical test of this idea, nor the tests of others wholly bear out this expectation. Schultz (2001a: 161-230) test did not find that dissent was exceptionally harmful to credibility in extended immediate deterrent crises. Rather, dissent was at worst a probabilistic gambit. In cases of extended immediate deterrence, Schultz (2001a) found that democratic “defender” states in which dissent was present deterred immediate challenges only marginally less successfully than states in which no dissent was present, indicating that credible commitments probably remain possible in the face of domestic dissent. Of the 31 cases

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23 Schultz’s informational theory of democracy suggests that by virtue of possible electoral competition, the correlates of credibility within democratic states are more visible to international observers.

24 Again, Schultz operationalizes dissent using the general political sentiment of an opposition political party. Domestic dissent is said to exist when an opposition party publicly disagrees with the foreign policy of the political party in power.
of extended immediate deterrence in democratic systems, polities in which dissent was present deterred adversaries with a 60% success rate (3 of 5 cases), whereas polities in which dissent was absent deterred with a 73% success rate (19 of 26 cases) (Schultz 2001: 169). Importantly, this is the only existing test of the effects of domestic dissent in EID crises.

The remainder of the empirical studies presented in this section deal with the effects of dissent on other types/phases of crisis, but they are pertinent because they deal with domestic dissent’s effects in a theoretical way. Dennis Foster’s (2008) study deals with another behavioral indicator of credibility (the lack of initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes from other states), and the relative sparseness of other empirical tests of the effects of dissent makes this work applicable here. Foster quantitatively examines the correlates of militarized interstate dispute initiation to see whether signals of domestic discord make militarized challenges from abroad more likely; if dissent attracts military challenges, we may be able to make inferences about the credibility of threats made in the face of dissent. Foster concludes that legislative opposition to American presidential foreign policy initiatives reduces the credibility of foreign policy threats and may give “comfort to our adversaries by undermining perceptions of American [state] resolve” abroad (Foster 2008: 419).

Similar, Kris Ramsay’s model of the signals sent by domestic opposition party leaders during crises, suggests that “[a] message sent by the opposition in the signaling phase” “is received [as sent] by the

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25 Or, in the case of a lack of credibility, the presence of MID initiation.

Instead, the study argues by implication that congressional acts of foreign policy opposition and an elevated misery index\(^{26}\) are a reasonable proxy for the amount of resolve that opposing decision-makers actually perceive. Though this may be the case, we cannot accept such a conclusion a priori because Foster does not make a serious effort to provide micro-level evidence that opposing decision-makers compute resolve in this way. Though there is a certain extent to which such a criticism could be made of any quantitative work because correlation is never equivalent to causation,\(^{27}\) we still must have adequate linkage of theory to evidence in order to accept the reasonability of a theoretical argument (cf. Herrmann 2003). Though Foster clearly has evidence concerning the correlation of dissent on dispute initiation (and thus perhaps credibility), because he does not more exhaustively theorize the sources of resolve, his conclusion regarding dissent’s effects on perceptions of resolve almost certainly overreaches. But that contention is an empirical matter: his theory offers clear expectations. Foster’s (2006) study also examines MID initiation likelihood, this time against the United States. Taking the outcome of congressional votes and agential acts of vocal opposition of presidential foreign policy choices as an independent variable, he finds significant correlation between these signals and the likelihood of MID initiation. In short, opposed

\(^{26}\)The misery index is a quantitative measure that attempts to capture in an index the economic discontent within a nation. It is constructed by combining inflation and unemployment numbers into a numerical index. Original credit for its conception goes to Lyndon Johnson economic advisor Arthur Okun,

\(^{27}\)See Layne (1994) for one notable example of such a criticism of a correlational empirical study (Russett 1993) in the security studies literature.
American presidents are more likely to find themselves the victims of foreign policy challenges.

These theoretical and empirical studies—spanning extended immediate deterrent crises (Schultz), general deterrence of militarized challenges (Foster), and escalation of militarized disputes (Fearon) collectively imply the following hypotheses about domestic dissent:

H1: The emergence of domestic dissent should significantly and negatively affect an attacker’s subsequent perception of a defender state’s resolve in extended immediate deterrence.

H2: The emergence of domestic dissent should significantly and negatively affect the attacker’s subsequent perception of credibility of a defender’s threat in extended immediate deterrence.

In the event that deterrence fails, and the previously labeled defender state has to resort to attempted compellence to prevent an imminent attack, rationalist signaling theory expects a similar pattern of effects.

H3: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, an attacker’s subsequent perception of a (previously labeled) defender state’s compellent resolve

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28 As Schelling (1966: 69-70) points out, compellence is the active application of violence, with further violence contingent upon cessation of undesired action by a component. By a state’s compellent resolve, here we mean the resolve attributed to a state.
should be significantly and negatively affected by the emergence/existence of domestic dissent.

H4: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, an attacker’s subsequent perception of the credibility of a (previously labeled) defender state’s compellent threat should be significantly and negatively affected by the emergence/existence of domestic dissent.

State and Leader Resolve as Distinct Concepts in Understanding Credibility

But this is not the only hypothesis that can be extracted from the signaling literature about the effects of dissent because state resolve is not the only resolve relevant to credibility. As models of domestic-international linkages increase in complexity, artificial bracketing of the individual leader from explicit inclusion in the study of bargaining outcomes or credibility seems less and less tenable. After all, if it is plausible that different types of states vary in their bargaining leverage, is it not possible that different leaders do as well? Indeed, Fearon’s explicit suggestion that “leaders” “suffer audience costs” (Fearon 1994: 577) from empty threats, which then benefit their states in militarized disputes, brings the leader as a unit of analysis squarely into the bargaining metaphor. Examining the bargaining literature for hypotheses about the effects of domestic dissent on perceptions of a leader’s resolve, we uncover a theoretical puzzle that this dissertation’s empirical framework seems ideally suited to answer. That is, the possibility of dissent causing changes in perceptions of both state and leader resolve, but sending directionally opposite signals thereupon.
State and Leader Resolve in Tying Hands and Sunk-Cost Signaling

Returning to Nixon’s “madman theory,” teased in the introduction, the idea that leader resolve could supplement state resolve in the determination of credibility has found support in recent scholarly work as well. Indeed, an emerging research community that has begun to study the effect of leaders on international relations more broadly (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Goemans 2000). More recently, scholars have begun to consider the idea that individual leaders may vary in their resolve (or their perceived resolve), and hence be disproportionately likely to attract interstate challenges. Wolford (2007) suggests that there exists a “turnover trap,” wherein soon-to-depart leaders not constrained by the shadow of upcoming elections may be less able to credibly deter challenges from abroad. Chiozza and Choi (2001) provide empirical support for this, among other ideas that stress the uniqueness and variability of individual leaders’ resolve. Horowitz et al. (2005), for instance, suggest that leaders of more senior age may be more likely to end up in violent international interactions, while Enterline and Williams (2010) and Bak and Palmer (2010) suggest that youthful, inexperienced leaders may fall victim to the “Biden prophecy,” wherein green leaders may be targeted by aggressive, opportunistic states early in their tenure of leadership. But these are merely

29 The first hint of this idea in the literature is likely Schelling (1966: 40-42), even if much of the work assumes away leader-specific factors away by focusing on the state as the unitary actor. A more explicit suggestion to this effect can be found in Paul Huth’s review of the deterrence literature; see Huth (1997: 78-80).

30 The “Biden prophecy” refers to then-Vice Presidential candidate Joe Biden’s 2008 gaffe of assuring a debate audience that a would-be president as inexperienced as Barack Obama would be targeted by opposing states with militarized challenges should he become president.
suggestions that the construct of leader resolve is worth studying—no one has yet directly examined the way in which domestic dissent affects perceptions of leader resolve.

But the possibility that domestic dissent may help a leader reveal information about his personal resolve\(^{31}\) warrants further explanation. Indeed, Fearon’s (1997) study reveals two possible signaling mechanisms: tying hands and sinking costs. In essence, tying hands signaling suggests that threats are most credible when the statesman who is constrained (ex-ante, but especially ex-post) from making them. Thus, a credible leader is one who has paid costs in initially taking them or will pay costs in reneging upon them. As cited above, the possibility of ex-post constraint formed the basis for Fearon’s (1994) work on the “audience costs” generated by leaders who make public threats to engaged domestic audiences. This mechanism was dubbed “tying hands,” because “an action is taken that increases the costs of backing down if the would-be challenger actually challenges” the threat “but otherwise entails no costs if no challenge materializes” (Fearon 1997: 70). According to this “tying hands” logic, when a chief executive makes a public statement of intention, it serves to tie his hands in the eyes of the perceiving (target) state because of the perception created that he would pay domestic political costs if he were to renege on such a public commitment. The tied hands of the chief executive, then, ought to hypothetically create perceptions of high state resolve. In this logic, the more the mass public initially approves of a threat, the more state resolve should be interpreted to exist. The idea being that the more the public approves of a threat initially, the greater their rebuke in the event that the threat proves to be hollow.

\(^{31}\) Or “leader resolve,” as I will label it.
The sinking costs logic, on the other hand, suggests a threat can be credible even when the executive is constrained not from reneging upon it, but from making it in the first place. This logic then implies that domestic dissent can reveal leader resolve because ex-ante constraint can create bargaining credibility through the ability of a chief executive to “sink costs”\textsuperscript{32}, to metaphorically burn money and thereby “signal [to international observers] [his] political resolve regarding the issue at stake” (Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001: 636, fn7)\textsuperscript{33} by threatening (or doing) that which is currently costly (whether strategically or politically). Such was the intuition behind Nixon’s so-called “madman theory” of diplomacy, which attempted to utilize domestic discord and/or the manifest costly nature of escalatory coercion to the president’s advantage by portraying it as a signal of his resolve. Recall that the madman theory was based on the idea that that “[Nixon] possessed the will and ability to disregard domestic and international constraints in order to deliver even more devastating destruction in the future…” (Kimball 2003:18). Though Fearon’s conclusion that “leaders do better on average by tying hands [than sinking costs] may be unfounded,”\textsuperscript{34} Fearon provides a formal

\textsuperscript{32} Though classical economists would argue, correctly, that modifying one’s behavior in an attempt to “recover” sunk costs is substantively irrational because sunk costs are objectively unrecoverable, the tendency of humans to do so themselves or to believe that others will or should is procedurally or boundedly rational (i.e. goal seeking rather than utility maximizing). This behavior is well documented by psychologists and behavioral economists; On sunk costs, see Arkes and Blumer 1985; On substantive vs. procedural rationality, see Simon 1985. Arkes and Blumer’s research would suggest that although sunk costs should not (in a normative sense) serve as signals to observers because people shouldn’t make decisions attempting to recover sunk (irrecoverable) costs, they frequently do in spite of expected utility theory’s predictions.

\textsuperscript{33}Emphasis mine: Gelpi and Griesdorf’s characterization of this as a signal is true to Jervis’s (1989 [1970]) distinction between signals and indices.

\textsuperscript{34} This seems a stretch of inference absent empirical testing, which Fearon does not undertake.
theoretical basis for Nixon’s idea that it is in theory possible for domestic dissent to help enhance the credibility of threats by increasing adversary perceptions of leader resolve.  

Fearon’s work may object to the characterization of either tying-hands or sunk-cost signaling as pertaining to the concept of resolve. Depending on the way that one interprets Fearon’s (1997) model and the theory behind it, domestic dissent can be interpreted as sending harmful signals about the foreign policy interests or resolve of a state; or the interests or resolve of the leader of that state. Though the title of Fearon’s piece (Fearon 1997: 68) would indicate that he discusses how states can best communicate their foreign policy interests, his argument is not explained in a way that is true to the title; in fact it seems much more reasonable to conclude that his paper is about signals of resolve. Even as Fearon suggests that he is writing about the way that domestic politics communicate information about foreign policy interests, his explication is much more nearly concerns the communication of resolve. The ostensible suggestion that dissent signals a lack of foreign policy interests posits that dissent communicates information about the political incentives of forces who have institutionalized incentives to dissent when it is good politics to do so (an opposition political party, for instance). Thus, by observing dissent within a given polity, a foreign observer can get a read on that

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35 Fearon’s original conception of actions that sunk costs more closely envisioned manifest actions that constituted “costly signals” rather than “cheap talk,” such as the mobilization of military troops. For the original explication of this distinction, see Austen-Smith and Banks 2002. Jervis (1989 [1970]: xvi; Jervis 2002: 301-303), casts doubt on the tenability of the Austen-Smith and Banks distinction, arguing that what is costly and what is not, of course, is in the eye of the beholder. According to Jervis, distinguishing between words and deeds (as do Austen-Smith and Banks 2002) yields little insight into the processing of signaling because “words are not always cheap…If they were, statesmen would pay no attention to them.” Although this dissertation shares Jervis’s view in the case of state resolve, the case it makes about dissent’s effects on perceptions of leader resolve dovetails with Austen-Smith and Banks’s distinction.

36 That is, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs.”
state’s probable foreign policy interests. In this understanding, dissent signals a lack of interests of a state because an opposition political party would be unlikely to dissent against a conflict that they felt to be in their state’s interests; after all, politicians rarely find it to be in their domestic political interests to speak out or vote against foreign policy threats that they consider to be in their states’ interests.

But interests and resolve are conflated in his piece because the bulk of the discussion examines how “a threat may be rendered credible” by the use of “costly signaling,” which reveals a state’s level of commitment to a given policy. Threats are credible when “the act of sending [them] incurs or creates some cost that the sender would be disinclined to incur or create if he or she were in fact not willing to carry out the threat” (Fearon 1997: 69). This description revolves around the perception of a state’s willingness to risk war to achieve its objectives or intentions, which has been argued by Mercer (1996: 15) and other deterrence scholars as constituting the concept of resolve. Indeed, defining resolve as Webster’s dictionary does—as “fixity of purpose”—it seems reasonable to argue that the political positions of opposition political forces or the domestic public send information about the likely future behavior of the government, and “future behavior” would seem germane to “fixity of purpose.” The conflation seems logical when we consider the possibility that states tend to be highly resolved to fight when it is in their interests to do so—that is, resolve follows from the presence of foreign policy interests. While the conflation is forgivable, we treat the political positions of opposition parties and the mass public as conceptually germane to resolve.
What hypotheses can we deduce about the way in which domestic dissent affects perceptions of leader resolve during crises? Based on this idea of ex-ante constraint, domestic dissent should enhance perceptions of leader resolve when a leader has escalated a crisis following the exhibition of dissent. In essence, the madman theory implies that the exhibition of dissent should make a compellent threat more credible, but not necessarily affect the credibility attached to a deterrent threat. In essence, for dissent to enhance perceptions of leader resolve or credibility, dissent must have existed prior to at least one escalation of the crisis. The perception of increased resolve and credibility is derived from a leader’s throwing caution to the wind, and threatening or escalating a crisis when the dissent of a polity has already been revealed. In the stylized depiction of an EID crisis that is employed in the experimental framework in Chapter 3, this means that this idea only has implications for the compellent phase of a crisis, but not the deterrent phase.

Domestic dissent should significantly and positively affect the attacker’s perception of credibility of a defender’s threat in the event that extended immediate deterrence has failed.

H5: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the emergence/existence of domestic dissent should significantly and positively affect the (previously labeled) attacker’s subsequent perception of a leader’s compellent resolve.\(^{37}\)

\(^{37}\) I realize, of course, that this is not the only rationalist hypothesis that may be deduced in this situation. A failure of leader resolve to increase may also simply mean that because leaders are nested within states, perceptions of state resolve may “leech off” into perceptions of leader resolve; in essence, that the perception of a leader’s resolve will be epiphenomenal from a state’s resolve.
H6: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the emergence/existence of domestic dissent should significantly and positively affect the (previously labeled) attacker’s subsequent perception of the credibility of a state’s compellent threat.

The reader will note that H6 makes an opposite prediction from H4. In essence, the tying hands and sinking costs implications for dissent’s effects only vary once a crisis has escalated to compellence. While readers may only recognize H1 through H4 as summarizing the conventional wisdom about the harm that dissent causes in coercive diplomacy to perceptions of state resolve and credibility, expanding the unit of analysis to leaders embedded within states may alter the tenor of the conventional wisdom while still preserving the rationalist idea that interstate communication occurs with little interference from existing beliefs.

All of the hypotheses put forth thus far have been drawn from the rationalist signaling literature. Each hypothesis has assumed that information passes from its source to its perceiver in a fairly universal way; and that the existing mental model of the perceiver is irrelevant in assessing the effects that domestic dissent has on credibility and its correlates. Indeed, communication in the signaling models discussed above remains conceptualized as a restrictive version of what communications theorists call the “encoding-decoding paradigm,” which envisions the process of drawing inferences about signals as a simple enterprise in which a signal is interpreted exactly as sent, much as clicks over a telegraph are decoded in the Morse system. In this understanding of
communication, a given pattern of clicks always represents one and only one corresponding letter to the decoding party.\textsuperscript{38}

If there are factors that prevent from information from being read as nonproblematically as morse code can be interpreted, we are in need of a theory of what causes those distortions in communication. Whether the psychological model has a meaningful contribution to make to the understanding of the effects of dissent is an empirical question that this dissertation seeks to answer.

### 2.2 Laying Out An Alternative Theory: Stereotypical Images and the Appraisal of Domestic Dissent

This section lays out a psychological theory of the effects that domestic dissent has on credibility and its correlates that makes different predictions than the rationalist models outlined above. The core of my argument is that when foreign policy decision-makers have active in working memory stereotypical beliefs about a crisis opponent, they will be resistant to the impact of any new information that challenges any of those well-entrenched beliefs. I employ schema theory from the psychological literature along with Herrmann’s (1997) image theory to make this argument. The upshot of this theory is that certain perceptual patterns, that some scholars have called images, when active in their stereotypical forms, moderate the effect of domestic dissent on changes in beliefs about state resolve, leader resolve, and credibility. More specifically, acting in the same way social stereotypes do, rational learning is impeded by schemata; in the context of

\textsuperscript{38} On the encoding-decoding paradigm, see Krauss and Morsella (2000): 133.
international signaling, this means that signals are not incorporated into current beliefs. Given the link between state and leader resolve and credibility established in the previous section, I will argue that when cognitive schemata about other states are active, decision-makers will rely on these stereotypes, rather than signals about dissent, to make judgments about credibility and resolve.

It has been nearly 60 years since Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (2002:58-59) admonished scholars of foreign policy to study the “decisionmaker in the decision-making setting.” Since that time, as rational models of coercive diplomacy have gained in popularity, there has not been a sustained effort to test the psychological scope conditions for the validity of those signaling models. The alternative theory outlined in this section is step in that direction in the context of one particular stimulus—that is, domestic dissent.

If we accept the simple psychological truism that more than one inference can be drawn from a given stimulus, we are naturally drawn to presume that the size of that inference will be heavily colored by the extent to which an observer has a strong cognitive or emotional prior about the subject of that communication. In essence, this means that domestic dissent can be understood only in the context of the strength of perceiving (target) decision-maker’s beliefs at the time they “observe” domestic dissent. As such, an alternative theory of dissent’s effects should ideally seek to apply what we know about the way in which novel information is assimilated into existing sets of beliefs because, in Robert Jervis’s words, different perceivers “infer differently” (Jervis 2002: 297-298) based on their models of people and situations. This study thus takes a step
towards Jervis’s (2002) desire to join the study of signaling and perception. The justification for such a mandate is simple and intuitive: when individuals are confronted with new but ambiguous information about other people in our daily lives, this information is often judged, not simply on its own merit, but against an existing mental model that is held about that person. One useful way to conceive of that mental model in the world of international politics is the concept of an image. Although we will operationally define the concept in greater detail below, an image is generally defined as “beliefs about [an] other that affect [one’s] predictions of how the other will behave [in the future] under various circumstances (Jervis 1970:5). Although conceptual foci and exact operational details have varied, many scholars have diversely employed the concept of imagery to study perception.39

The general argument that I develop here is that perceptions of state resolve and leader resolve contained within images prior to the exhibition of domestic dissent have great impact on the effect that dissent has on subsequent perceptions of state and leader resolve and foreign policy credibility. Pertaining to the effects of dissent more specifically, when existing beliefs are sufficiently strong, dissent should have little measurable effect on perceptions of state or leader resolve or coercive credibility. The reasons for this general hypothesis are many, and span both the cognitive and motivational traditions in psychological theory. In opposition to the above section on rational communication, the theory of images as cognitive schemata that I advance below suggests that the ability of domestic dissent to affect decisionmaker calculations is only

39 See Herrmann (2003) for a full accounting of the different ways in which IR scholars have employed the concept of imagery. It is by no means the only way perception has been studied in international politics: see Sylvan and Thorson (1992) on problem representations or Axelrod (1977) on cognitive maps.
possible when stereotypical forms of international imagery—that I conceptually define as stereotypical schemata—are not activated.

The central hypothesis of the alternative theory of dissent’s effects outlined herein is that the negative effect of domestic dissent has been vastly oversold in the existing literature. Indeed, we see something of a puzzle between the bulk of the signaling literature and the literature on perceptions. Indeed, signals are not always perceived as the signaler (or the theorist) may expect. This is quite simply because existing beliefs condition both the perception and interpreting of incoming information. When decision-maker perceptions of another state fit neatly into stereotypical archetypes (schemata), we have great reason to doubt the extent to which incoming information is even considered by observers. But what are the origins of these schemata? How do they form and what activates them? Reviews of the cognitive-motivational debate and schema activation literatures guide our answers to these questions. But it is first necessary to situate our conception of stereotypical images as schemata within the psychological literature on mental models and belief change. I suggest that stereotypical images function as Koopman, Jervis, and Snyder (1990) suggest—as essentially forms of theory-driven reasoning. The stronger ones prior beliefs, the less should be the impact of incoming information. This implies that the closer ones imagery veers to a stereotypical schema, the lesser the impact of incoming data about domestic politics on perceptions of resolve and credibility.

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40 For a good discussion of this debate, see Tetlock and Levi 1982.

41 Jervis (1976) uses the terms “theories” and “images” interchangeably to refer to the set of beliefs a decision-maker holds that guide their interpretation of incoming information.
The Cognitive Revolution and the Role of Affect in Stereotype Activation

Newly conscious from the scientific black hole of Freudianism (cf. Popper 1963) and psychobiography (cf. Laswell 1930), in the early days of the cognitive revolution, many psychologists suggested that thoughts were largely a response to situational stimuli and that belief systems were most obviously limited by the human mind’s limited capacity for effective and complete information processing. Early scholars of cognitive psychology suggested that the human mind was simply incapable of making logically sound judgments about the prospective probability of unfolding events. More specifically, experimental participants were prone to overusing readily available information when making decisions, neglecting base rates when making probabilistic judgments, becoming excessively tethered to recently encountered information, and inconsistently valuing gains vs. losses when making decisions under conditions of risk.

Initial observations of these so-called heuristics treated portrayed decision-makers as victims of cognitive limitations or the circumstances of their decision-making environment, in which time is scarce and the volume of information is overwhelming (cf. Jervis 1976). The “nature” or “cause” of the observed biases (or deviations from statistical rationality) in reasoning was assumed to be the result of the experimental circumstances created by the authors rather than any source of motivated cognition in decision-makers.

42 For a seminal work here, see Kahneman and Tversky (1972).

43 On the overweighting of available information (the availability heuristic), base rate neglect (the representativeness heuristic), and see Tversky and Kahneman (1974).

44 On the difference in valuation attached to gains vs. losses, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
By not formally controlling for the potentially confounding cause of emotion, these works assumed by omission that passion, ideology, and desire were irrelevant in the stability of beliefs across time. In this understanding of reasoning, decision-makers are portrayed as actors who are generally honest brokers who simply want to “get [decisions] right” rather than hot-headed politicians who want make decisions based on ideologies and already-preferred policies. In seeking honest, logical accuracy, cognitive accounts of decision-making argue that policymakers are driven by “accuracy goals” rather than “directional goals.”

But another branch of psychological thought sees humans not as victims responding to the informational environments they confront in the foreign policy decisional circumstance, but instead as emotional beings with needs that drive thoughts—in the words of Ned Lebow, in this understanding, rather than seeing what they expect to see, policymakers “see what [they] want to see” (Lebow 1981:111). Theories that stressed human desires and the ability of the human mind to mangle facts to fit unconscious emotional needs formalized many of the ideas first suggested by Freud’s work of the early 19th century. Some motivational psychologists see decision-makers as driven by an unconscious need to avoid disharmonious thoughts. Balance theory suggests that people unconsciously seek a harmonious balance between thought and feeling, and that thoughts will change to match feelings under select conditions.

45 Kunda (1990): 480-481. See also Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987) on the distinction between these two different goals.

46 Heider’s (1958) is the seminal work here. For a more contemporary adaptation of a similar idea in a decision-making context, see for instance, Janis and Mann (1979). Herrmann (1988: 184), quoting Abelson
The theory I put forth suggests that dissent’s effects on decision-maker beliefs can be mitigated through the prism of stereotypical patterns of perceptions that may come about as a consequence of cognitive or motivated biases. In this understanding, a cognitive picture of another state is activated which balances with pre-existing feelings about what policies are appropriate to pursue towards that state given the affect generated by another state’s interests as posing a threat, possibility for mutual gain, or an opportunity for exploitation. This idea is not new. Contemporary students of this school see images forming as a response to sentiment that a decision-maker has towards another state.\(^{47}\) When behavioral inclinations are aggressive and threatening, a picture of an adversary is created to remove moral inhibition for aggressive action to remove the source of a threat (Herrmann et al. 1997: 412). When decision-makers see an opportunity for mutual gain, the balanced mental picture of another actor must be one that morally permits cooperation with that state. The feeling of opportunity for mutual gain drives the cognitive picture of another state. In this way, affect (feeling) drives cognition (thought), making desired actions seem more palatable by creating an image that makes a preferred policy maximally appropriate. Balanced images allow for policymakers to make decisions with a minimum of perceived trade-offs, making certain policy options more palatable while taking others off the table. But more importantly, stereotypical images, understood as schemata, are relatively immune from incoming information, because thought is driven by existing affect rather than incoming information.

\(^{47}\) See for instance, Herrmann (1985) or Cottam (1977).
This process of motivated reasoning offers one possible starting point for our empirical expectations regarding the movement of decision-maker beliefs about resolve and credibility prior to the exhibition of dissent. These existing beliefs about a state’s resolve will then structure our expectations of for the effects of domestic dissent. But these images are not unique in their implication that existing beliefs will structure the interpretation of incoming information.

Along similar lines, Festinger’s (1956) idea of cognitive dissonance would suggest that interpreting dissent contrary to existing beliefs is unlikely because of the basic human desire to maintain an organized, consonant, and consistent picture of other actors. In the logic of cognitive dissonance theory, an extant belief of a state high in resolve would then make dissonant an interpretation of domestic dissent as indicative of a weakly resolved state. According to this idea, “people screen out information that is inconsistent with their initial beliefs and attitudes” (Kelman and Fisher 2003: 327-328). In the event that they cannot or do not screen out information that conflicts with their initial beliefs, that information is usually explained away by altering it or framing it in such a way that does not require revision of the initial belief. By this logic, it might become unlikely that dissent, in the event it is perceived by an observer who perceives the state in question as possessing high resolve to begin with, will be interpreted as an indication of a state lacking resolve, which is a plausible interpretation that does not challenge the initial judgment of a highly resolved state.

The possibility of dissent having little negative effect on perceptions of state or leader resolve might also be explained with reference to confirmation bias, a cognitive
account of information processing suggesting decision-makers are driven only by “accuracy goals.” Confirmation bias is defined as “unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence.” More specifically applicable to the present analysis may be a special case of confirmation bias: “my-side bias” (Nickerson 1998: 178).\(^{48}\) My-side bias results in the preferential treatment of evidence that is perceived to bolster an already personally-favored belief. The tendency towards using one’s existing beliefs to interpret incoming information also resonates with what many have called theory-driven reasoning (Koopman et al 1991).\(^{49}\) Those who engage in theory-driven reasoning are essentially preconception driven-ideologues; data-driven reasoning, on the other hand, would reflect a more fact-based empiricism.\(^{50}\)

**Substantively Defining Images: Interests, Power, and Culture**

In order to properly theorize the effects that dissent has on perceptions of state resolve, the following approach to understanding dissent will assume that images in the foreign policy setting are defined by three specific elements very familiar to international relations theorists (Herrmann 1988; Cottam 1977). The compatibility of the target state’s interests with one’s own (whether that state is seen/felt to pose a threat, an opportunity for mutual gain, or an opportunity for exploitation), the relative military capability of a state, and the relative cultural status of that state constitute this tri-partite understanding of imagery. These three factors assumed to constitute images are not chosen at random,

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\(^{48}\) On my-side bias more specifically, see Perkins et al. (1983) or Baron (1995).


\(^{50}\) This distinction is similar to Tetlock’s (2005) usage of Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between foxes (data-driven) vs. hedgehogs.
as the theoretical pedigree behind each of them is well-established and extensive. As schemata, these three categories form the mental scaffolding through which foreign policy decision-makers filter incoming information.

The importance of another state’s interests has been discussed by classical realists and newer realist scholarship alike. Neoclassical realists have suggested that the “balance of interests” is a key element of the international system that constrains state action. Other scholars have discussed the perception of incompatible state interests more directly. Stephen Walt (1988), for instance, argues that states decide whether to balance or bandwagon based on the extent to which some other state threatens their interests. Classical realists (Carr 1939) realized the centrality of states’ foreign policy interests to a state’s own foreign policy choices. More contemporary game theoretic models of international interaction use the similarity of dyadic interests as one component of the way in which decision-makers are posited to make foreign policy decisions. Similarly, critics of rational deterrence theory have concluded that states should not fight to protect their reputations for resolve in peripheral regions of the globe because observing decision-makers are not swayed in their calculations of a state’s resolve or credibility by anything other than the presence of obvious and intrinsic foreign policy interests. The collective wisdom of international relations theory thus strongly suggests

51 For classical realists, see Morgenthau (1956); for a more contemporary adaptation of the concept of interests, see Schweller (1998).
52 Carr 1939.
54 Hopf (1994) comes to this conclusion by implication.
that perceptions of another state’s foreign policy interests constitute a central consideration to decision-makers glancing out at the world around them.

Even if there is widespread disagreement over how to define or operationally measure the concept, there is similar agreement regarding the centrality of relative power to decision-maker perceptions of other states. Theorists going back to Machiavelli and Thucydides, along with more contemporary students of (neo)realism and strategic choice have emphasized the importance of military capabilities or national power to both outcomes of crises and impressions of other states. Though neorealism is neither a theory of credibility nor of foreign policy choice (Waltz 1979:121-122), it is reasonable to assume a micro-level implication regarding the importance of military capabilities to credibility from Waltz’s systemic theory. If the distribution of military capabilities affects international political outcomes by “selecting out” of the international system those states that do not yield to structural imperatives, it is reasonable to posit that military capabilities should also be extremely critical to perceptions of the foreign policy actions taken by states.

Decision-makers can also bring strong beliefs about another state’s cultural status to the table. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, argued that decision-maker beliefs about their own state’s cultural and moral superiority have driven imperialistic expansion in the

55 See Baldwin 2002 for an instructive review of these debates.

56 Contemporary neoclassical realists emphasizing the importance of military capabilities to foreign policy calculations include Schweller (1998); one seminal work in the strategic choice literature arguing similarly is Bueno de Mesquita (1981).
modern state system. 57 Jack Snyder (1991) made similar claims about perceived “myths” regarding the profit of empire, arguing that imperial expansion occurs in part due to perceptions of the cultural backwardness of other (conquered) states. Michael Fischerkeller (1997) argued that cultural judgments effectively could “discount” a state’s formidable military capability in foreign policy judgments by creating perceptions of incompetence. Similarly, others argue that perceptions of national culture play an important role in conditioning expectations about norm dynamics in foreign policy interactions. 58 Most famously, Samuel Huntington (1993) argued that perceptions of cultural or “civilizational” similarity have served (and will continue to in the 21st century) as a gatekeeper for positive economic and foreign relations among nations. Other scholars argued that perceptions of moralistic or cultural backwardness act to generally encourage self-righteous and violent behavior at sub-state levels of analyses (intergroup or interpersonal) by dehumanizing others. Dehumanization removes human characteristics—for instance, caring, cognition, empathy, agency—from perceptions in favor of robotic or barbaric characteristics. 59 Furthermore, scholars who have associated regime type with bargaining credibility have implicitly argued that some measure of culture is relevant to crisis bargaining decisions. Although description of regime type in cultural terms is rare, there is some theoretical precedent for doing so. 60 There is also an

57 Morgenthau (1973:110) calls this tendency “nationalistic universalism.”

58 For such an argument, see Rob Jackson (1993) in eds. Goldstein and Keohane.

59 For a recent review of theoretical and empirical work on dehumanization, see Haslam 2006. For a laboratory demonstration of dehumanization in action, see Zimbardo (2008). At the interpersonal level, see Horowitz (1985).

60 See Palmer (1997) or Schultz (2001a) are examples where regime type is described in purely institutional, rather than cultural, terms. For descriptions of regime type as a cultural dimension, see Russett’s (1993) “cultural/normative” explanation for the absence of war between democracies or Oren’s
empirical basis for this conceptual categorization: the nation-building thrust of American foreign policy during George W Bush’s presidency was based strongly on moralistic judgments made by key decision-makers about the cultural status of nondemocracies.\(^6\)

Image theory posits that these three factors—perceptions of threat or opportunity (of another’s foreign policy interests), relative cultural status, and relative military capability constitute images in a combinatorial fashion. This is treated not as a theory, but as a premise. The relative judgment about each of these three constructs—that is, whether each is perceived as constituting a threat, opportunity for mutual gain, or opportunity for exploitation, and then relatively lesser, equal, or greater in the latter two attributes than one’s own state. If each of three constructs can take on one of three perceptual levels, this nets 3\(\times\)3\(\times\)3 (27) possible permutations of the three factors. In accordance with prior theory, this project proposes that six of these 27 components are common enough to decision-maker perceptions of states around the world and provide an empirically useful template for the understanding of foreign policy decision-making. These six combinations, it then stands to reason, can be used to understand the effects of domestic dissent. The integrated pictures formed by internalized beliefs of these six types of relationships run the gamut from asymmetric perceptions of menacingly powerful others, to weak states ripe for exploitation, to peaceful, modern republics who may make for good allies.

\(^{1998}\) work that suggests that perceptions of regime type and foreign policy follow from normative judgments.

The so-called “enemy” image is deduced from a perceptual pattern common to adversarial relationships where power discrepancies do not exist, for instance the dyadic perceptions of each of the superpowers during the Cold War, wherein intense feelings of threat combine with judgments of comparable relative capability and culture. The so-called “ally” image is a schema commonly observed within the friendly relations of an alliance, when feelings of an opportunity for mutual gain combines with perceptions of equal relative power and culture. The “degenerate” pattern is one that results from the combination of feelings of an opportunity for exploitation, along with perceptions of relatively comparable power and inferior cultural status; the degenerate stereotype is common when a state appears to another to be fading from superpower status—for instance, as will be explored in chapter 4, the German perception of the French leading up to World War II.

The “colony” image is characterized by feelings of an opportunity for exploitation along with perceptions of relatively inferior military capability and cultural status, and is commonly captured by the notion of the so-called “white man’s burden,” wherein developed nations might feel some sort of opportunity to exploit (often veiled in helping terms that stress development of modernity rather than extraction of natural resources) states perceived to be relatively weak and culturally backward. Perceptions of this variety were descriptions that American foreign policy decision-makers may have seen in North Vietnam in the late 1960s. The “imperialist” image captures a set of perceptions that result from a feeling of threat from a culturally similar but relatively more powerful other; this stereotype is evoked when there is a perception that another actor has colonial interests in some other state and is able to manipulate a third-party client state by virtue
of its power—Lebanon’s current perception of the United States comes to mind here.\(^{62}\) Many Palestinians may see the current Israeli state as a “barbarian”—as a vastly more powerful but culturally inferior state that engenders intense feelings of threat, and enjoys violence for its own sake while being totally unreceptive to any attempt at conflict resolution.

The other point that needs to be made is that these integrated combinations of beliefs about interests, capability, and culture conjure powerful (and perhaps emotion laden) ideas about the credibility and resolve of other states. Although the expectations themselves are not directionally important to hypothesizing the effects of domestic dissent, the key take-away is that the expectations are powerful; or in any event, are most powerful when these images are evoked in their stereotypical form.

Although these six image types cover a good deal of the perceptual terrain common in the international arena, they do not cover it all. Furthermore, because these image types are in fact stereotypes that are assumed to result from a combination of three strategic judgments, we do not expect that we will observe one of these stereotypical perceptions across all cases or in all situations. The overarching expectation of this study, however, is steeled by numerous observations of these stereotypes in the speech acts of decision-makers. As such, we expect that beliefs related to the credibility of a threat or its correlates—a state’s and a leader’s resolve—should move less in response to dissent in the presence of any stereotypical imagery than they should when such imagery

\(^{62}\) On this suggestion, see Bilali (2010). In the context of the Lebanon-US example, Iraq might be perceived as an American client state.
is not activated. In other words, we expect that stereotypical images function as schemata.

**Stereotypical Images as Schemata**

A schema, in the words of one influential theorist, enables the brain to “summarize that which is common to a large number of things or situations” (Andreson et al. 1978: 434). More precisely, schemata have been defined as “cognitive structure[s] that represent[t] knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus” (Fiske and Taylor 1984: 140). In the present context of international images, as schemata, these three strategic judgments of interests, capability, and culture are clusters of knowledge that serve as the starting “mental models” for decision-makers to interpret incoming information about states in the international system. Schemata, once “activated by the occurrence of a relevant event or circumstance…function[n] as a scaffold for the orderly encoding of incoming information (Hastie 1986: 22).” In the present context, the relevant event that might activate a schema is an extended immediate deterrence crisis.

There are many types of social schemata, but research has centered around three types: person schemata, role schemata, and event schemata. Person schemas deal with people of a certain type or characteristic—for instance “loner” or “social butterfly”; they can also be specific to individuals—for instance “Barack Obama”; they might also concern an individual’s perception of themselves (i.e. a “self-schema”). Each of these schemata, when activated, enables a set of expectations for a social situation to fill in any informational gaps in an observer’s perception of another person and condition the

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63 As opposed to self-schemata.
impact of incoming information. Role schemas can refer to familial, social, professional, or group roles, for instance, “brother,” “friend,” “lawyer,” or “Muslim.” Finally, event schemas refer to templates for social situations: for instance, “dinner” or “college lecture.” The variants of international images describe herein fit most closely into the category of role schemata.

As a sort of blueprint for further analysis of some event or entity (in the present case, that entity is a state in the international system), the parts of the scaffold act as “slots” into which information can be fit; if information is not available, a schema induces an individual to place a “default” (or expected) value into the empty informational slot. In the present context, specific combinations of the 3*3*3 interests*power*culture apparatus are assumed to constitute these slots—and their filling in certain ways may activate a stereotypical schema from memory. The activation of a stereotypical would provide a decision-maker with a starting belief about the credibility, state resolve, leader resolve of a state, that might then follow a would-be decision-maker into the beginning of a crisis. Herrmann et al. (1997) found that even when two of the components of this scaffold were presented, experimental subjects had a propensity to correctly fill in the remaining third at a rate significantly greater than chance.

Ultimately, we cannot be sure about the mechanisms at work when a schema is activated from memory. But this is not a crippling problem for this dissertation’s goals; as we are interested in the consequences of schema activation, rather than the process.

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64 See Taylor and Crocker (1981) for this tripartite typology.
itself. Moreover, the cognitive-motivational debate ended in a draw decades ago;\textsuperscript{65} and it is not clear what process—whether “hot” motivation or “cold” cognition is at the bottom of the schema-activating process. Evidence can be marshaled to support both perspectives: people are at once cognitive misers, relying on theory-driven reasoning to economize mental effort, or seeking emotional release, Heiderian balance, self-justification, or some other cognitive pleasure principle.\textsuperscript{66} Furthermore, it is not epistemologically possible to objectively know or identify anyone’s thoughts, in the same way it is impossible to objectively know a state’s power. We may have objective and reliable measurements of power (see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), but drawing the line from measurement to inference is complicated (Herrmann 2003). But in order to be a useful explanatory device, a cognitive theory need not read minds, it need only correctly predict the empirical consequences of patterns of thought (Herrmann et al 1997: 410). Indeed, teasing apart “hot” and “cold” cognitive forces is difficult even in highly controlled laboratory experiments.

Understanding when schemata are likely to be activated is considerably easier. Fiske and Taylor (1984) suggest that there are several factors that affect schema activation. Firstly, schemata that have been recently activated or “primed” are more likely to be employed again.\textsuperscript{67} In one study of “person” schemata, experimental participants that were primed with a positively connoted trait (adventurous) saw an adrenaline-seeking individual more positively than those primed with a negatively

\textsuperscript{65} On the inconclusiveness of the cognitive-motivational debate, see Tetlock and Levi 1982.

\textsuperscript{66} On the former, see Jervis (1986: 329); on the latter, see Lane (1986: 308).

\textsuperscript{67} On the recency effect, see Fiske and Taylor 1984, and Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977),
connoted trait (reckless). In essence, the recent trait schema priming affected subsequent appraisals of an individual’s character simply by virtue of its recent use. In this way, schemata are recalled according to a process very near the availability heuristic.68

In addition to recency of use, schemata are also more likely to be employed when they are used with great frequency than those that are not. Higgins and King (1981) found that schemata that are used with great regularity are more accessible and thus more used. In a sense, continued schema use begets further schema activation. Finally, schemata that are laden with affect are more commonly evoked than those with less affective charge behind them. In the words of Fiske and Taylor, “unmet needs can prime one’s interpretation of ambiguous stimuli” (Fiske and Taylor 1984: 176). Erdelyi (1974) and Klinger, Barta, and Maxeiner (1980) each produce findings that suggest that schemata stored with great emotion are more easily recalled, and more haphazardly applied to novel situations than are schemata stored without comparable levels of affect. These findings suggest that if in fact international images are stored with great affective charge, they are more likely to function as schemata, and to be deployed when stimulated.

**Schemata, Belief Stability, and the “Perseverance Effect”**

In accordance with the most recent empirical investigations into the effects of images, this dissertation assumes that these six specific combinations of the three above factors are common enough to sometimes, but not always, function as cognitive schemata (Herrmann et al. 1997). When images do function as stereotypical schemata, we expect

68 On the availability heuristic, see Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
that beliefs about state and leader resolve are less likely to change in response to incoming information like domestic dissent. As we detail below, by providing a cognitive structure for the interpretation of information, schemata inhibit the change of schema-relevant beliefs during a crisis. And if this is the case, we should expect that when schema are active, the observation of domestic dissent in another state should have a minimal effect on a decision-maker’s perception of that counterpart state’s resolve, leader resolve, and credibility.

Once activated, schemata often tend to persevere even when evidence is encountered that might seem disconfirm them. Fiske and Taylor (1984) call this general class of phenomena—related to the stability of schematic beliefs “the perseverance effect.” The most powerful demonstrations of irrational persistence of schema-based beliefs come from the realm of self-schemata; Herrmann (1988: 183) has suggested that positive self-schemas are part of schemas of the other, which makes them theoretically relevant for understanding the effect of international images on cognition.

On prominent study asked experimental participants to take an apparently new personality test, and then revealed to some participants that the “test” revealed them to score high in social sensitivity and personal empathy (Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard 1975). Even after participants were informed that this “test” was fictional, the majority continued to believe in the conclusion falsely given to them—that they were indeed more socially sensitive than average. This study is especially important because it provides a very difficult test for schema theory, because the initially primed belief is subsequently revealed to be based on completely fictitious evidence. This sort of absolute empirical
disconfirmation is rare in the real world. Although we might be regularly confronted with evidence that our beliefs may be inaccurate, it is rare to see bulletproof logical and empirical disconfirmation of a belief. Even when our expectations are not confirmed, it is rare for us to perceive them as such; instead, the nonfalsifiability of beliefs often allow people to construct stories (e.g. close-call counterfactuals) about the “near accuracy” of their previous or current judgments.

These rationalizations enable overconfidence and inhibit belief change by giving an individual less impetus to revise actually erroneous (but seemingly correct) beliefs. Furthermore, once a schema is planted, provided it is reasonable, the mind begins to formulate other evidence to support the schema. In the case of social sensitivity, once an individual received fictitious test-results, individuals conjured past instances that could be interpreted as evidence of their social sensitivity, which aided in making the primed schema even tougher to disconfirm. Even upon being presented with bulletproof evidence that their belief in their elevated social sensitivity was fabricated and thus unwarranted, the evidence participants conjured in the interim period between the initial priming and apparent disconfirmation resulted in the illogical and unwarranted perseverance of the schema. Once participants were informed of something, they began recalling other past instances of their apparent social sensitivity; the discredited information was thus only part of the available empirical picture, and consequently the belief in elevated sensitivity remained even after it was logically debunked.

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69 See Tetlock (2005) for detailed explications of close-call counterfactuals and of other impediments to rational learning.

70 On this study specifically, see Anderson, Lepper, and Ross 1980, example cited in Fiske and Taylor (1984: 171).
To summarize, schemata are used to fill in gaps in a fragmentary informational picture (Minsky 1975). When confronted with cues that conjure such schemata, the schemata will activate to fill in the missing details. Once stimuli activate schemata, the schemata act to constrain belief change, especially when the attitude conjured by the schema has emotional/affective resonance.

Hence we expect that cases in which stereotypical schemata are activated should be cases in which dissent has a relatively minor effect on whether a state is perceived as resolute or credible. If stereotypical images do act as schemata, the effect that dissent has on the resolve and credibility perceived to be behind a state’s foreign policy threats is more a function of the circumstances that activate various schemata than it is about the innate effect of dissent itself.

Assessing Schema Activation and Deriving Hypotheses of Its Effects

Functioning like genetic predispositions in the “diathesis-stress” model of mental illness, wherein an existing genetic predisposition is activated by experiences or events, schemata, although initially learned, operate in a similar way—lying in the subconscious as dormant scaffolds until specific sets of stimuli activate them. We assess the activation of stereotypical schemata experimentally in chapter 3 by providing very specific and detailed cues on two of the three dimensions of relevance—specifically on a state’s interests and capabilities, and minor cues on culture, in an attempt to get a decision-maker to fill in the holes in the schemata with information about the decision-making process of the target state (the observable indicator of a subject’s perception of another’s

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71 For the original use of this term, see Zubin (1977).
cultural status); this will be presented in more detail in Chapter 3. For now it is sufficient to say that we will use the correspondence of an individual’s perception of a target decision-making process to the ideal-typical form as a proxy for whether a stereotypical schema is indeed active.

The overarching hypothesis of schema theory in this context is that the effect of incoming information about state resolve, leader resolve, and credibility, will be determined by the correspondence of decision-maker perceptions of target states to ideal typical (stereotypical) forms of international imagery. Consequently, we expect that dissent will be most likely to have a negative effect on the credibility of a coercive threat in the absence of activated stereotypical schemata because stereotypical schemata inhibit the recognition or assimilation of signals into already strong belief systems that resemble stereotypes in their tendency towards non-falsifiability (Cottam 1986; Stuart and Starr 1986; Holsti 1970).

The general logic can be spelled out as follows: stereotypical schemata activate powerful expectations for state and leader resolve. State and leader resolve influence perceptions of credibility. Because stereotypical schemata set up beliefs about resolve that are difficult to disconfirm, the impact of incoming information is mitigated in their presence. For example, in the presence of an active schema, if one believes a state’s resolve is high before the introduction of dissent, they are likely to ignore or discount information that challenges that perception and resolve should remain high. If resolve is low before the introduction of dissent, dissent won’t carry any new information (i.e. it
will be non-diagnostic).\textsuperscript{72} This is what a casual observer might label “heads I win, tails you lose”—nonfalsifiable thinking.\textsuperscript{73} Essentially, the argument is that the activation of stereotypical schemata moderate the effect that domestic dissent has on perceptions of state resolve, leader resolve, and credibility. The argument is not that dissent will have no effect on these perceptions, but rather that the activation of stereotypical schemata will moderate the negative effects that dissent is hypothesized to have by the rationalist signaling models described in Section 2.2. That is, over time in a crisis, schema theory implies that schemata should lessen the extent of dissent’s negative effects on credibility and resolve.

This summary in mind, we can deduce the following general hypotheses from schema theory that we expect to hold in all previously discussed image cases (enemy, ally, colony, degenerate, barbarian, imperialist).

H7: The activation of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on the attacker’s perception of a state’s resolve in extended immediate deterrence.

H8: The activation of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on the attacker’s perception of the credibility of a threat in extended immediate deterrence.

\textsuperscript{72} On diagnosticity, see Jervis (1970).

\textsuperscript{73} Also on the relative immunity of images in dyadically conflictual relationships, see Hopf (1994).
In the event that deterrence fails, and the previously labeled defender state has to resort to attempted compellence to prevent an imminent attack, schema theory expects a similar pattern of effects.

H9: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the presence of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on a (previously labeled) attacker’s perception of a defender state’s compellent resolve.

H10: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the presence of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on a (previously labeled) attacker’s perception of a defender state’s compellent credibility.

H11: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the presence of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on a (previously labeled) attacker’s perception of a defender’s compellent leader resolve.

**Limitations of the Tested Hypotheses**

The hypotheses are not designed to make point predictions about state and leader resolve or credibility. For instance, the fact that in the enemy stereotype, a state may be perceived to be a paper tiger (resolute in deterrence but irresolute in compellence) is not relevant to our understanding of the effect of schemata. In a sense, the goals of this study are more modest. If we can provide evidence that stereotypical forms of imagery make the rationalist signaling model less likely to operate, we have made a significant contribution to our understanding of credibility.
Furthermore, the experimental framework we employ in chapter 3 is capable of testing additional hypotheses, but they are out of scope for this dissertation. For instance, the extent to which escalation of an EID threat to compellence is an issue with ample coverage in the literature (Huth and Russett 1984), but is beyond the bounds of our interest.\footnote{The results of escalation are however, included in tables of our data analytic results: they are labeled as the effects of “time” in our analyses in chapter 3.}

These caveats in mind, we can now turn our attention to the testing of the hypotheses laid out in this chapter.
3 AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC DISSENT

This chapter will feature empirical tests of the two theories detailed in Chapter 2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will present the results of a comprehensive experimental test of the effects of domestic dissent and cognitive schemata after the experimental design and data analytic methodology are presented in sections 3.1 and Section 3.2. Sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively, discuss and interpret the results. This chapter will set up the plausibility probe case study in Chapter 4.

3.1 Experimental Recruitment and Survey Design

185 undergraduates completed a paper-and-pencil survey during 45 minute windows in a classroom in the Department of Political Science at the Ohio State University during November or December in 2009 or May or June 2010. The survey presented each participant with vignettes and survey experiment questionnaires about four different imaginary countries after a quick demographic survey. Each of the 4 was engineered to correspond to the compatibility of relative interests, relative culture and relative power of ally, colony, and degenerate, imperialist, and barbarian states. The

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75 This research was conducted with the approval of The Ohio State University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), under protocols 2009B0175 and 2010B0098.

76 See Appendix A for the demographic survey.

77 Each participant completed 4 of the 6 image panels. Please see Appendix B for the complete country vignettes.
countries were named in an affectively sterile fashion to minimize the possibility that participant appraisals were driven by pre-existing bias to the names. Following each vignette, an imaginary extended immediate deterrent crisis was described. Subject perceptions of state and leader resolve and credibility were measured at 5 different points throughout each hypothetical coercive crisis. Following the completion of four image vignettes, subjects completed an individual differences battery to measure their attitudes towards citizen dissenters, how they might deal with dissent if they disagreed with government policy during a crisis, as well as some homemade measures on trust in government, and some of Holsti’s (1984) items on foreign policy belief systems like internationalism vs. isolationism.

After reading each initial country vignette, participants were presented with a prompt. In this prompt, a crisis involving an oil-rich neighbor of a (target) country is on the verge of civil war. American intervention to diffuse the crisis is said to be possible, and the given state makes an extended deterrent threat to attack the participant’s home country’s troops if they are sent to protect the resource-rich third party. The scenario was designed to give students the opportunity to assess the credibility of that target state’s threats to intervene. Questions as to the credibility of threat, resolve of state, and resolve of leader, were asked as repeated measures (pre-test/post-test control group design) before crisis onset (Time T1), then after the deterrent threat was made (Time T2).

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78 There is no perfect way to accomplish this mitigation. In order to simply name countries by letter (i.e. A, B, C, D, etc.), countries were named after buildings on the Ohio State University campus that began with each letter. Notwithstanding the possibility that students may associate campus buildings with previously enjoyed (or loathed) academic experiences, this seemed a reasonable mitigation strategy.

79 The risk of using the same scenario four times within-subjects is fatigue. This risk we felt worthwhile in order to hold constant the interests of the dispute, thereby ruling it out as a determinant of credibility from image to image.
Subjects, depending on their assignment, were either told of domestic political dissent (or support) within the described country, then asked again of the credibility of the threat (Time T3), and the resolve of the state and leader in question. It was then posited that deterrence fails, and the US deployed troops to protect the civil-war-torn state, which results in bombing raids on US troop positions.\(^{80}\) At this point (Time T4), subjects were again asked about the credibility and resolve of the relevant state. After another paragraph reinforcing the present domestic dissent (or support), participants were asked a final time about their perceptions of the attacking state’s credibility, and the resolve of the state and its leader (Time T5).

The US being explicitly mentioned was geared to the expected largely US-citizen participant population because stereotypical schemata are easier to prime when one can identify the self (i.e. the nation-state in the world of foreign policy) to generate higher felt sentiment.\(^{81,82}\) While a concerted effort was made to recruit non-US citizen population with citizenship in countries where one could expect imperialist and barbarian schemata to be familiar, that effort failed. A recruitment campaign was launched with the help of the OSU Office of International Affairs (the survey instrument was a linguistically-home-country-agnostic,\(^{83}\) but in spite of substantial financial remuneration to participants and

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\(^{80}\) The repeated use of the same scenario was a way of bracketing the issue of stake, or the level of interests engaged in a crisis. The goal in portraying the defender state as an oil rich state was designed to give Americans the perception of a crisis in a region that Americans might care about.

\(^{81}\) 183 of the 185 participants whose data is analyzed here were in fact US citizens.

\(^{82}\) This OIA-assisted attempted recruitment campaign was a satisficing solution itself. The original plan was to travel to Ramallah to collect data with the help of the head of the Palestinian Center for Survey Research; and a Mershon Center grant was obtained to support the travel. Safety concerns connected with political conditions in Ramallah made this trip impossible.

\(^{83}\) Instead of describing one of the countries in the scenarios as “the US,” “your home country” was used.
multiple attempts at recruitment, only about a dozen were able to be recruited. Given the abject failure of this recruiting strategy and the possibility of significant heterogeneity in the overall datapool if combined with the American sample, these observations were dropped from the analysis. Everyone included in the present analysis in this chapter was recruited through the OSU Political Science Department’s Human Subjects Pool, which offers extra credit to undergraduate students willing to participate in experimental research.

The December recruitment round gave subjects vignettes corresponding to enemy, ally, colony, and degenerate states, while the May and June subjects got for enemy, ally, imperialist, and barbarian states. Consequently, the quantity of participants exposed to each image type is not constant—far more subjects got the enemy and ally manipulations than got the colony, degenerate, imperialist, and barbarian conditions. This was by design—the ally and enemy manipulations are the most relevant to conventional IR theory. In a perfect world, we could have exposed all participants to all six image conditions. But such a strategy would not have been feasible due to the likelihood of participant fatigue—as given, the survey took an average of about 35 minutes to complete, already a significant time imposition on undergraduate subjects as it was. Adding 50% more time to the study would likely have further diluted the overall quality of the data by increasing attrition and decreasing the attention paid by subjects.
Figure 3.1 Experimental Procedure

The risk of potential order effects was neutralized by altering the order in which the four image types were presented to subjects—in accordance with a modified 4*4 latin square.84 We allowed the order of image panel presentations to vary according to a latin square, but constrained that each subject would see two image panels presented with dissent and 2 without dissent, and that no participant could see two dissent or two no dissent panels in a row. These decisions, while they cause deviation from an exhaustive/completely randomized latin square, were made in order to minimize the possibility of learning effects and fatigue. The idea being that if fatigue set in during the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th image panel, the fatigue would be randomly distributed across image types. While we do not anticipate fatigue as a major concern, the effects of fatigue, if anything, would bias the experimental setup against the researcher. If one concedes that fatigue would be likely to mitigate the differences between responses in various experimental conditions, this research design becomes an even “tougher” one for the researcher. In

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84 On latin square designs in general, see Field and Hole (2003: 84-86).
essence, by leveling the differences that might be observed between conditions, fatigue is far more likely to increase the probability of a Type II error than a type I error—the logic being that a tired participant is more likely to miss subtle cues about the level of dissent within a hypothetical state’s domestic polity, or to fail to distinguish an enemy state from an ally state.

While it would have been ideal to use a “purer” or “completely randomized” latin square strategy that would have allowed the form for each image panel (4 images*2 types of dissent condition*4 places in the order of 4 images), the logistics of managing so many forms for a paper and pencil survey that was conducted under the cloud of uncertain subject enrollment numbers made this impractical.

Each subject saw the same foreign policy scenario described 4 times, but the “defender” states involved in the scenario varied in how their interests related to those of the US and the degree of their relative power and cultural status versus the US. In short, the basic image of the state in question was varied in the vignettes that preceded the foreign policy crisis scenario. The technique used can be described as priming, wherein participants are given prompts about scenarios and asked to retain that information so that they can answer questions on its basis. This technique has a long pedigree in political psychology (cf. Iyengar and Kinder 1987) and has been successfully applied to studies on the ways in which the mass public thinks about foreign policy (Herrrmann et al. 1997).

The theory being tested here posits that priming serves to activate clusters of knowledge (schemata) that serve as mental models for the interpretation of foreign policy information.
The operationalization of the key theoretical concept, schema, was accomplished employing a measure of the extent to which subjects answered a series of follow-up questions about the decision-making process, style, and leadership characteristics of the “defender” country in a way that accorded with the stereotypical image form. Four specific questions were used for this task; a subject was considered to have a stereotypical schema activated if he/she answered at least three of the four questions in schema-consistent fashion. The four questions employed pertained to the unity of the decision-making process in a target state, the effectiveness of policy implementation, the personal qualities of the leaders, and the relative cultural sophistication of the state.

While the following questions each appear to present 6 options (A through F) for each manipulation check question, this is done to condense questions that spanned two different rounds of data collection into digestible form. Each participant had four of these choices for each of their four image conditions--in the November/December collection, a correct response was gauged by whether a participant chose the schema-consistent response from among the four enemy, ally, colony, and degenerate-consistent responses. In the May/June round, a correct response was gauged by whether a participant chose the schema-consistent response from among the 4 enemy, ally, imperialist and barbarian responses.\(^85\)

\(^85\) We do of course realize that the “luck” schema activation rate—or the base rate with which we would expect to see a schema-consistent response for each item with random responses from a dart-throwing chimp is .25. More broadly, the probability of a dart-throwing chimp getting at least 3 of the four responses correct (and appear to have an active schema, even when they do not) does not exceed \( .25^3 = .016 \). On dart-throwing chimps, see Tetlock (2005).
For decisional unity, participants were asked “In your opinion, which of the following is most likely to describe the unity of the top decision-makers within Canfield?” (the schema-consistent answer is in parentheses). In the case of the enemy stereotype, the top decision-makers are often seen simply as united; in the imperialist stereotype, the perception of unification is similar, but it extends to client governmental officials and lower level bureaucrats as well. In the colony stereotype, little unity is perceived, with decisional power split between radical and moderate governmental elites. In the degenerate stereotype, a lack of unity is perceived by virtue of the hedonistic nature of many of the decision-making elite. The unity of an “ally” state is seen as situationally specific and responsive. Finally, unity in the “barbarian” state is seen as difficult by virtue of the clan-like structure of the government. The possible responses for the item on perceived decisional unity were:

A. Top governmental officials are united behind the leader of Dulles’s policies. (Enemy)

B. Top governmental officials disagree with the leader of Dulles when it is prudent to do so, and work out conflicts through compromise and careful deliberation. (Ally)

C. Top governmental officials unified behind the leader of Dulles, unification compels compliance from lower-level bureaucrats and foreign governmental officials. (Imperialist)

D. Top governmental officials of Dulles find unification difficult because of the clan-like structure of various groups of governmental elites and the inability of the top decision-maker to rein in these groups. (Barbarian)

E. Top governmental officials badly divided between moderate forces who try to loyally serve the president and radical forces that resist the president at every turn. (Colony)

F. Top governmental officials divided; some are responsibly motivated by the national interest, others are corrupt and seek only personal material enrichment. (Degenerate)
For the item in the schema scale on personal leadership qualities, participants were asked, “In your opinion, which of the following most likely describes the personal qualities of the leadership of Dulles?” In the case of the ally image, leaders are seen to be capable and qualified; in the degenerate image, the signature feature is the lack of national purpose; in the enemy image, the ruthlessness, efficiency and coordination are defining features. The imperialist image is characterized by a perception of leadership wherein decision-makers are perceived as crafty and cunning; in the case of the barbarian stereotype, leaders are seen as coarse and sadistic. Finally, in the case of the colony stereotype, the defining feature is good intentions but a lack of willpower. The possible responses for the item on the personal qualities of decision-makers were thus as follows:

A. Leaders are of high character and qualification. (Ally)
B. Leaders lack a defining sense of national purpose and so are easily led adrift. (Degenerate)
C. Leaders are ruthless, efficient, and out able to carry out complex conspiracies. (Enemy)
D. Leaders are generally well-intentioned, but need to be tutored and prodded to make good decisions. (Colony)
E. Leaders are crafty and cunning, encourage subversion of overseas governments to advance their state’s interests. (imperialist)
F. Leaders are aggressive, coarse and take pleasure in causing others physical pain. (barbarian)

For the item in the schema scale on ease and effectiveness of policy implementation, participants were asked, “In your opinion, which of the following most likely describes the effectiveness and ease with which the government of Dulles implements its chosen policies?” For this item, the stereotypical ally response portrays an efficient, effective bureaucracy, whereas the stereotypical enemy response portrays a universality and hierarchy that compels swift and rigid implementation. Again, the degenerate stereotype portrays inefficiency and incompetence, whereas the colony
stereotype portrays internal dissension, wherein high-level decision-makers cannot compel the compliance of less powerful officials. The barbarian-consistent response again plays on the stereotype of a clan-like governmental structure, wherein governmental policy is implemented unevenly and inefficiently. The imperialist-consistent response suggests a reliable but slow policy implementation policy due to a perceived massively influential and wide-ranging government bureaucracy. The possible responses for the item on the perceived effectiveness and ease of policy implementation within a target state was thus as follows (schema-consistent responses in parentheses):

A. Policies are implemented more efficiently and effectively than quickly; more complex policies take more time to implement than simple ones. (ally)
B. Policies are implemented in a universal, hierarchical way; the pressure exerted by the leadership on lower level officials compels their swift and certain implementation. (enemy)
C. Policies are slowly and inefficiently implemented because of the lack of support that the lower levels of the government show for the top-level officials. (colony)
D. The implementation of policy is badly inefficient because of the government’s inability to manage the foreign policy decision-making process. (degenerate)
E. Policies are implemented unevenly and unpredictably, because high-level elites cannot control the desires of lower-level officials, and lower level officials disobey instructions when they feel like it. (Barbarian)
F. The implementation of policy is efficient because of the pressures of loyalty but slow because of the size and scope of the state’s overseas bureaucracy (Imperialist)

For the fourth item—the item on cultural sophistication—the question was: “In your opinion, on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being of much less sophisticated culture than the US, 5 being comparable culture to the US, and 10 being of much more sophisticated culture than the US, what do you imagine is the caliber of general culture of the leaders and people of Dulles, when compared to those of the United States?” (Enemy, Ally consistent answers if 4, 5, or 6; Colony, Degenerate, Barbarian-consistent answers if 1, 2, or 3; Imperialist-consistent answer if >6)
In a technical sense, the schema-activation aspect of the experimental design was quasi-experimental because we do not assume that all participants were driven by the experimental manipulations to see the states described in the survey in stereotypical ways. Instead, their “assignment” into schema and non-schema conditions was based on their responses (getting at least 3 of 4 in image-consistent terms) to the previously introduced four item scale. Quasi-experiments, as we recall, “make use of a pre-existing difference between the participants, and use [the difference] as a basis for putting them in the different conditions of [the] study.” In this case, the “pre-existing difference” can be understood as the propensity for stereotypical schemata to activate and influence the interpretation of incoming information. By measuring the correspondence of participant perceptions of state decision-making processes to those contained within the aforementioned stereotypical schemata, we are able to get some sense of how well our manipulations have induced motivated biases. As discussed in the above section, we restrict our analysis to those whose perceptions of target state decision-making indicates that a motivated bias has in fact taken root. But such a strategy does not solve the overriding structural weakness of experiments for evoking motivated biases. Indeed, it is exceedingly difficult to “motivate” or “arouse” experimental volunteers in a way that engages their core emotions while remaining true to ethical obligations. If ethics were of no consequence, inducing a volunteer participant to feel scared, nervous, happy, etc would be a relatively simple matter. Consequentially, we must be aware of the fact that we may fail to properly arouse experimental participants. Comparatively speaking, real-world foreign policy decision-makers (that we observe in chapter four) are easy marks for

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the observation of motivated bias. Politicians overridingly become involved in politics because they care—at least in some way—about political decisions. When people care about anything, by definition their passions are engaged and they have strong motivations in one way or another.

Hitler, specifically discussed in chapter four, is the quintessential example of the hot-headed politician, and his impromptu extended rants and fiery temper are the stuff of legend. But it is rare to get someone with political motivations and beliefs as extreme as Hitler in the experimental laboratory of a university; a lunatic though he was, he’d be an easy mark in which to observe stereotypical schemata. This issue is one aspect of what psychologists have called “the college sophomore problem,” the term used to described the inferential issues associated with the use of student samples in psychological research. Can we validly infer anything about real world decision-makers with strong propensities for motivated biases based on the motivated biases we can induce in the laboratory? Some academics have attempted to induce the emotions that lead to strong motivated biases in artificial ways in the laboratory. One recent study used exercise to activate the physiological consequences of stress and anxiety, as researchers believe that physical stress can activate the “fight or flight” emotions that lead to impassioned—but not necessarily clear-headed—decision-making. But the success of this technique was limited, and a compelling argument can be made that the

87 On Hitler’s reputation for hot-headedness, see Bullock (1962: 372–410); Rauschning (1940)
88 For one cogent description of this problem, see Sears (1986).
89 See Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann (1999) for an attempt to do so through the use of physical exertion.
variety of arousal employed is not at all comparable to the “fire” or emotion that political decision-makers routinely exhibit.

Indeed, much available evidence suggests that a sample of undergraduates is far less likely to have the motivation necessary to activate motivated biases in the laboratory. The reasons are manifold. As discussed above, the students in this study were offered either extra credit in a political science class or a small monetary remuneration. In the world of motivations, when judged against passionately ideological politicians motivated by the consequences of electoral failure, the wrath of an angry mob, or strong personal involvement in their own political agendas—the strength of emotions elicited by this study’s compensation is likely to be miniscule in comparison. But this is not the only reason to suspect that our experimental design may not provide incentive strong enough to elicit the motivated bias outlined in Chapter 2. Ideology is another source of motivated bias, and much public opinion research has doubted whether a somewhat unsophisticated mass public—of which undergraduates are a part—can be expected to have strong, or even coherent ideologies.  

So if we cannot reliably induce (and therefore cannot validly assess) motivated bias in the laboratory, is there anything pragmatic we can do to enhance the validity of our conclusions? Though few practical measures can mitigate this problem because academic researchers are for better or worse dependent on student samples because of

90See for instance Converse (1964)
their availability and low cost,\(^{91}\) there are ways in which we can calibrate our conclusions to appropriately address this problem. The most obvious solution—and the one this study employs—is based on the logic of case selection.\(^ {92}\) In Harry Eckstein’s language, if we are far less likely to observe in undergraduates the motivated biases that we readily find in the world of elite political decision-makers, then the experimental test presented in this chapter is a “hard” test of the psychological theory of dissent appraisal outlined in chapter 2. Thus, if we can induce motivated biases in this “hard” circumstance and the effects of dissent are as we expect even in spite of the difficulty of this setup, then we can be fairly confident that an empirical test that examined decision-makers directly would yield results at least as supportive of our theory as the ones we generate here. If, on the other hand, we find that dissent has effects more consistent with the extant conventional wisdom, it is not necessarily evidence that our theory is wrong per se. Rather, it may instead be an indication that the test we set up is simply too difficult to observe the posited effects.

The other rejoinder to this challenge is that despite being perhaps short on external validity, experiments are long on internal validity. And while we may suspect that students are tougher marks in which to activate motivate biases, we don’t have great a priori reason to believe that the effects of the biases, if evoked, will be any different than they would be in elite decision-makers. These caveats in mind, we move forward with the analysis of our experimental data.

\(^{91}\) This remains a problem, but the advent of platforms like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, which now allows researchers to recruit large numbers of non-college students, that has become popular in the time since data was collected for this dissertation, may make this issue a thing of the past for future researchers.

\(^{92}\) On case selection, see Eckstein (1975).
Measurement

Participants rated credibility, leader and state resolve on scales of 1 (extremely low) to 10 (extremely high). While in hindsight the researcher may have chosen to use 0-100 thermometer scaling or a 1 to 9 scaling with a labeled midpoint, the decision was not an unreasonable choice in foresight given the expected sophistication of the participants. Credibility was queried by asking participants their subjective perceptions of: at time T1, the general credibility they expectedly ascribed to future foreign threats made by a country, and at times T2-T5, the likelihood that the leader of a country will do as he threatened. At T2 and T3, this was nominally expressed in terms of a deterrent threat (e.g. the likelihood the target country would attack the US), and at Times T4-T5, this was nominally queried as the likelihood that his country would continue the attempted compellent action of bombing US troops until they were withdrawn from the ally of the target country. Resolve was queried in the same way from T1 through T5—by asking “how resolute is [in the case of leader resolve, ‘The President of’] Archer likely to be in pursuit of [its own/country name’s] foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute).”

3.2 Method of Experimental Data Analysis

Sections 3.4 through 3.10 present the results of Three-way Mixed ANOVA, which examines the effects of dissent and schemata at the image level, Three-way Mixed ANOVA (TWMA) is appropriate for experimental designs in which one type of repeated 93 Each of these alternative scaling procedures has potential drawbacks as well; in the case of thermometer ratings, with a large number, it is far too easy for participants to assign numbers close to 50 for each. With a 1 to 9 scale, you lose intuitive plausibility for unsophisticated participants.
measurements occur within one participant;\textsuperscript{94} it is also flexible enough to include between-subjects manipulations. However, it cannot accommodate the more complicated (nested) superstructure of the experiment at large. This is to say that each of the Three-way Mixed ANOVAs treats only one of an experimental participant’s four image trials.

Although the manipulation of image was manipulated within subjects (i.e. each participant was exposed to four different image panels successively), this manipulation is treated as exogenous to each quantitative model for the purposes of the experimental design because the effects of imagery broadly construed\textsuperscript{95} are already well understood. In essence, it is far from controversial that the resolve assigned to a state by a decision-maker (or in the case of a laboratory experiment, an amateur decision-maker) would be greatly affected by descriptions of a state’s motivation, capability, and culture. Indeed, the hypotheses laid out in chapter two analyze the effect of stereotypical instantiations of imagery, not that of the imagery itself. In testing the effects of dissent and schemata, we will examine the changes in subjective ratings of the resolve of hypothetical countries in terms of both their state and leader, along with the credibility of the threats they make. Although this dissertation does attempt to separate these measurements conceptually, it is worth noting that state and leader resolve are highly correlated (Cronbach’s $\alpha=.92$).\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{94} Some texts will simply refer to all variants of ANOVA with repeated measures as repeated measures ANOVA; as does this study, others will specify the precise nature of the design in the labeling of its methodology—“Three Way Mixed ANOVA.”

\textsuperscript{95} That is, images in their non-stereotypical (schema) form.

\textsuperscript{96} We will model a factor-analyzed composite of the three as a robustness check in a subsequent section of this chapter.
The three measured dependent variables—state resolve, leader resolve, and credibility are highly correlated as well (Cronbach’s α=.89).\textsuperscript{97}

Recall our hypotheses from cognitive schema theory and the rationalist literatures. These literatures make different hypotheses regarding the movement of state resolve and credibility throughout the entire experiment. But recall that rationalist bargaining theory does not have a prediction about leader resolve in the deterrence phase of the experimental crisis, only during the compellence phase.\textsuperscript{98} Consequently, we present 18 TWM ANOVAs (TWMAs) pertaining to compellence (6 Images*SR/LR/CR) and 12 pertaining to deterrence (6 Images*SR) for a total of 30 TWM ANOVAs.\textsuperscript{99} Within each image type, time (time T2-T3 for deterrence, and time T4-T5 for compellence) as described above is considered the within-subjects factor; the presence or absence of dissent is manipulated between subjects, and the presence of schema is also considered to vary between subjects. In strictly technical terms, schema presence was manipulated quasi-experimentally, because although the purpose of the above-described vignettes was to activate stereotypical schemata, we could not simply assume that this occurred in all cases. Instead, as indicated above in section 3.1, it was measured; the concept was operationalized by the number of subsequent questions about a country’s decision-making process that a subject answered in schema-consistent terms. For the purposes of

\textsuperscript{97} It is this high degree of correlation and the consequent multicollinearity between dependent variables that makes this inappropriate for MANOVA, an extension of ANOVA geared toward multield dependent variable problems. On this recommendation, see Tabachnick and Fiddell (2007).

\textsuperscript{98} This is a consequence of the fact that leader resolve has not been exceptionally covered terrain; the hypotheses about the rationalist alternative are drawn out by implication rather than explicit theoretical basis.

\textsuperscript{99} Repeated measures ANOVA was run in SPSS version 19.
this analysis, a schema was considered activated if a participant answered at least three out of four questions in accordance with a given class of stereotypical imagery. So, in terms of design, each TWMA is a 2*2 unbalanced factorial repeated measures design with 1 within subjects factor; that dissent and schema activation are manipulated between subjects makes the design properly labeled factorial; but the quasi-experimental manipulation of schema activation means that the “cells” in this 2*2 design are of differing (or unbalanced) quantities.

Addressing the appropriateness of Three-way Mixed ANOVA for this design, there are several factors to consider. We must first consider the quasi-experimental manipulation of schema activation. Is it appropriate to employ this type of ANOVA for a quasi-experimental manipulation? We address this based on the consequences. The primary risk of quasi-experimental manipulation is lack of control, in the sense that the concentration of participants in each between-subjects cell of the experimental design is no longer randomly assigned, and therefore cannot be exactly engineered. Because of this loss of control, we cannot be a prior certain that each cell within the design will contain an equal number of participants. This has two consequences, each of which are relatively manageable (and more importantly, visible). First, the unbalanced data structure between experimental cells may reduce statistical degrees of freedom available for between subjects F-tests. Second, the unbalanced data structure within a hybrid between-within design can complicate selection of the appropriate method for calculating model sum of squared errors. Within the GLM framework (of which ANOVA is part), Type III sum of squared errors are reasonably robust to unbalanced data; this makes them
the appropriate choice in our TWMA analyses below.\textsuperscript{100} So even this though the quasi-experimental manipulation may affect the internal validity of our results, the gain is one of external validity. Importantly, our awareness of the nature of our manipulation enables us to select appropriate model specifications and enables proper calibration of the inferences that will come out of said analysis.

Generally speaking, there are two types of effects one can check in Three-way Mixed ANOVA: within-subjects effects and between-subjects effects. In a design with a temporal element, between-subjects effects measure the difference between the (2*2) 4 groups of subjects (dissent/not*schema/not), ignoring the temporal element of the design. Essentially, examination of between-subjects effects enables us to answer the question: irrespective of time, are there across-group differences in the dependent variable? Between-subjects tests pool the T2 and T3 responses into one basket, and compute differences in means responses across the four groups of experimental participants. Because we have no hypotheses about mean scores at T1 and T2 however, the between subjects effects are, in a sense, too (broad) by a half, because they do not explicitly compare the differences between pre-manipulation and post-manipulation scores across experimental groups.

Contrarily, within subjects tests explicitly test the effect of time (i.e. as the case may be in this experiment, a proxy for conflictual intensity and the addition of information about domestic dissent/support) on its own, as well as when interacted with the between subjects manipulations of the aforementioned factors. The main within-

\textsuperscript{100} On the robustness of Type III sum of squared errors, see SPSS 19 Advanced Statistics Manual, Chapter 2, pp. 7-8.
subjects effect of time reflects an examination of the differences in means between all responses at the T2 time point and the T3 time point. Interacting this temporal effect with the group-wise factors yields the hypotheses that no difference in means exists between T2 and T3, even when we consider the effects of the between subjects manipulations. While the between subjects main effect of schema is one we take note of for its general support of the hypotheses that schemata serve as reliable indicators of stereotypical mental models, it is these interactive (within subjects) tests that serve as the primary tests of the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2. Examination of interactive within subjects effects allow us to determine whether the presence of a stereotypical schema causes a mitigation of domestic dissent’s effects and mediates the reduction in state/leader resolve. Given the present experimental design, which involves identical treatment of experimental subjects through time T2, we are primarily interested in the difference attributable to the presence/absence of domestic dissent and stereotypical schemata across the pre to post test window. We will report results for within subjects effects, and interactions between the between and within factors. We will report F test results, along with p-values, as well as the effect size statistic $\eta_p^2$—that is, partial Eta squared. Although the original architect disavows any attempt to conversationally/nonnumerically convey the practical size of these effects, one fairly conventional scheme for interpreting $\eta_p^2$ suggests that $0.01 \leq \eta_p^2 \leq 0.06$ is a small effect, $0.06 \leq \eta_p^2 \leq 0.14$ is a

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101 That is to say, for example, in the case of our dissent manipulation from T2 to T3, $T2^{*}\text{dissent}=T2^{*}\text{no dissent}=T3^{*}\text{dissent}=T3^{*}\text{no dissent}$.

102 The summary tables include all tests from each mixed ANOVA.
medium/moderate effect, and $\eta_p^2 \geq .14$ is a large effect;\(^{103}\) we will adhere to this system when interpreting significant effect sizes that come out of our Three-way Mixed ANOVA analyses.

It is also necessary at this point to clarify the statistical standards employed below. Generally speaking, given the rather exploratory nature of this research, a liberal cutoff for statistical significance ($p=.1$) is employed, but each summary table employs a key that quantifies the durability of the significance at various statistical thresholds, in recognition that different scholars adhere to different epistemological standards in the world of frequentist statistics.$^{104}$

We also present results from two-sample mean comparison tests (t-tests) at the timepoints of theoretical interest in order to identify the directionality of effects in a way that ANOVA cannot.$^{105}$ The decision to employ the two-sample assumption in our mean comparison tests was based on observation of moderate divergences in variances over time and across factorial conditions within our experiment. We employ the Satterthwaite calculation for degrees of freedom to take account of this.$^{106}$ Given that this dissertation is concerned with the effects of domestic dissent on decision-maker perceptions, we

\[^{103}\text{Kinnear and Gray (2008: 2); Ferguson (2009).}\]

\[^{104}\text{Cowles and Davis 1982, “On the Origins of the .05 Level of Statistical Significance.”}\]

\[^{105}\text{The F-test, for instance, is concerned with variance and error across factors, and does not identify the directionality of an effect.}\]

\[^{106}\text{That calculation is as follows: } \frac{n}{\frac{n_1^2}{\chi^2_{n1} (\chi^2_{n1} - 1)} + \frac{n_1^2}{\chi^2_{n1} (\chi^2_{n1} - 1)}}. \text{ See } \text{http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/prc/section3/prc31.htm.}\]
analyze mean response levels at Times T3 and T5 for deterrence and compellence, respectively, in order to speak to our hypotheses about the effect of schemata on state and leader resolve. We also analyze the changes in means from Times T2 to T3 for deterrence and from Times T4 to T5 for compellence via two-sample mean comparison tests to expound upon the results presented by our TWMAs.\textsuperscript{107}

The decision to run separate models for deterrence and compellence also was not arbitrary. One might argue that because the data were all part of the same experiment, one model ought to be used for hypothesis tests. We opt for the smaller ANOVAs for the sake of simplicity of interpretation. It also allows us to avoid the problem of violations of the sphericity assumption\textsuperscript{108} that comes into play when data from more than 2 time points is analyzed within the same ANOVA.

Also germane to three-way mixed ANOVA is the homogeneity of variances across the within subjects repeated measure. In order to satisfy this assumption, our data must pass Levene’s test at \( \alpha = .1 \). The topline correction for this problem, if the “null hypothesis” is rejected at the .1 level, is caution in interpreting null hypotheses significance tests. While transforming the dependent variables (e.g. logarithmically) is

\textsuperscript{107} While some argue that temporal comparisons within ANOVA should be made with dependent samples t-tests, we have good empirical reason to employ the downwardly adjusted degrees of freedom that are employed in the two-sample independent t-test. With the fewer degrees of freedom provided by the more conservative Satterthwaite approach, our type I error rate should be reduced, and the t-test results are more cautious and conservative.

\textsuperscript{108} Sphericity refers to the assumption that the differences in the variances across each time point in the analysis are equal; see Field and Hole 2003, pp 183-184.
oftentimes an effective solution, it is not in this case.\textsuperscript{109,110} Beyond that, non-parametric statistics (e.g. Wilcoxon signed rank order tests)\textsuperscript{111} can be effective at mitigating the problem, but the data and detail loss can be severe. We opt for the let-the-reader-decide solution, and report F-test statistics as we find them, but advise the reader to take these results with something of a grain of salt.\textsuperscript{112}

3.3. The Effects of Dissent and Schema Activation on Perceptions of Deterrent State Resolve and Credibility

As discussed in Section 3.2, Three Way Mixed ANOVA (TWMA) was employed to assess the effects of dissent and schemata on state and leader resolve. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present the results of these analyses in the cases of the “Deterrence” and “Compellence” stages of our experimentally-manufactured crisis scenario. The TWMAs presented in 3.3 assume that the relevant repeated measurement (state or leader resolve) was repeated only at times T2 and T3 for the purposes of crafting a set of results that can speak to our hypotheses about the effects of schemata and dissent in the deterrent context. In each case, we will present a simple graphical picture of the movement of perceptions in each image*case during the indicated temporal window as a means of conveying descriptive statistics that are then expounded upon with a description of the general

\textsuperscript{109} It is also the case that transformed dependent variables significantly complicate analysis and interpretation of effects.

\textsuperscript{110} While many researchers include Box’s test of homogeneity of covariances (i.e. heteroskedasticity), the test is highly prone to misleading results when quantities of observations within each factorial cell are unbalanced and sample sizes are small.

\textsuperscript{111} On solutions to violations of Levene’s test, see Field and Hole (2003: 176); on Wilcoxon and other non-parametric tests, see (Ibid: 234-257).

\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, as the reader will see in the tables of TWMA results, this violation only occurred in a few cases; to make a move to non-parametrics based on only a few such violations seems a bit like trying to kill an ant with plastic explosive.
results from each TWMA. To make it easier for the reader to follow along and to enable cross-image comparison, the results of all six TWMAs for the deterrent case are presented on a single table. A summary of our hypotheses is presented in Table 3.2. The results of the Three-way Mixed ANOVAs for testing our hypotheses about dissent and cognitive schemata in the deterrent context are presented in Table 3.1.

Top level analysis of schema activation suggests that 404/740 (54.9%) participant*images exhibited evidence of active schemata: 100/185 in the enemy case, 115/185 in the ally case, 45/100 in the colony case, 57/100 in the degenerate case, 46/85 in the barbarian case, and 51/85 in the imperialist case.
### Table 3.1 Results of TWMAs by Image and Correlates of Deterrent State Resolve and Credibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Enemy (df=1, 181)</th>
<th>Ally (df=1, 181)</th>
<th>Colony (df=1, 96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SR</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>SR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between Subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissent</td>
<td>1.217 (.007)</td>
<td>4.218** (.023)</td>
<td>3.338* (.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schema</td>
<td>6.993*** (.037)</td>
<td>2.938* (.016)</td>
<td>4.486** (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissent*Schema</td>
<td>.181 (.001)</td>
<td>.776 (.004)</td>
<td>.776 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within Subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>.078 (.78)</td>
<td>2.229 (.012)</td>
<td>.343 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time*Dissent</td>
<td>13.02*** (.067)</td>
<td>37.314*** (.156)</td>
<td>36.319*** (.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time*Schema</td>
<td>2.25 (.012)</td>
<td>.169 (.001)</td>
<td>.037 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time<em>Schema</em>Dissent</td>
<td>3.53* (.016)</td>
<td>3.383* (.016)</td>
<td>.058 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levene’s Test (Times T2 and T3)</td>
<td>2.4*, .84</td>
<td>803, 2.866**</td>
<td>.556, 2.076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Degenerate (df=1, 96)</th>
<th>Barbarian (df=1, 81)</th>
<th>Imperialist (df=1, 81)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SR</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>SR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between Subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissent</td>
<td>1.807 (.018)</td>
<td>3.844* (.038)</td>
<td>.034 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schema</td>
<td>7.441*** (.072)</td>
<td>6.583** (.064)</td>
<td>.131 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissent*Schema</td>
<td>.021 (.000)</td>
<td>.217 (.002)</td>
<td>1.934 (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within Subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>9.92*** (.094)</td>
<td>15.999*** (.143)</td>
<td>13.213*** (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time*Dissent</td>
<td>4.382** (.044)</td>
<td>7.482*** (.072)</td>
<td>.516 (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time*Schema</td>
<td>2.147 (.146)</td>
<td>.351 (.004)</td>
<td>.096 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time<em>Schema</em>Dissent</td>
<td>2.765* (.028)</td>
<td>1.451 (.015)</td>
<td>.046 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levene’s Test (Times T2 and T3)</td>
<td>1.689, 2.622*</td>
<td>2.451*, .386</td>
<td>1.25, .97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F test statistics reported first; Partial eta-squared (Effect sizes) are in parentheses. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01,
Summarizing these hypotheses (presented in Table 3.2) in the context of what effects to examine within our TWMA analyses, we will use the table of results to first flag significant F-tests, which we will then examine for directional accuracy in section 3.3’s sub-sections.\(^{114}\) In the deterrent context, we will scan our results for significant time*dissent F-test results for both credibility and state resolve, because they indicate the possibility that our directional hypotheses are correct; cases where the null hypothesis is rejected will flag the items for further tests of our hypotheses. This chapter’s presentation of TWMA results will proceed in two parts; first with checks of our deterrence hypotheses, then with checks of our compellence hypotheses. With the assessment of each subhypothesis (i.e. H1 in the enemy image, etc), the reader is reminded that each subhypothesis is tested in a structure of models as described above; that is, each image*situation*correlate\(^{115}\) got its own TWMA.

| \textbf{H1:} The emergence of domestic dissent should significantly and negatively affect an attacker’s subsequent perception of a defender state’s resolve in extended immediate deterrence. |
| \textbf{H2:} The emergence of domestic dissent should significantly and negatively affect the attacker’s subsequent perception of credibility of a defender’s threat in extended immediate deterrence. |
| \textbf{H7:} The activation of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on the attacker’s perception of a state’s resolve in extended immediate deterrence. |
| \textbf{H8:} The activation of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on the attacker’s perception of the credibility of a threat in extended immediate deterrence. |

\(^{114}\) And, in the case of our compellence analyses, Section 3.4 subsections.

\(^{115}\) For example, enemy image responses in the deterrence context for state resolve.
Table 3.2 Summary of Deterrence Hypotheses

If the rationalist hypotheses about dissent in the deterrent context are correct, we should see significant F-test scores on the time*dissent variable; such a result would tell us that dissent had a time-contingent effect. This is the correct effect to examine here because as we recall, participants were not exposed to the dissent manipulation in an image panel until after time T2; so if dissent effects credibility or its correlates, we should observe the rejection of the null hypothesis of no significant time–contingent difference in factorial group means.

Scanning Table 3.1, we find significant within-subjects variation across the dissent*no dissent groups (i.e. the time*dissent F-tests) for the time*dissent interaction term for deterrence credibility in each image case except the barbarian case. We also see a significant effect of the time*dissent interaction on state resolve in every case except the imperialist and barbarian. A priori, this is excellent evidence in support of H1 and H2. On the other hand, we do see some possible a priori evidence that schema activation may moderate the effects of dissent. In the case of enemy image state resolve and credibility, and in the case of colony and degenerate image state resolve, we see some a priori evidence that schema theory’s expectations in an extended immediate deterrence crisis—H7 and H8—may be supported. These a priori intuitions will be investigated further in the subsequent sections.

3.3.1 Enemy Image Deterrence

Enemy Image Deterrent State Resolve
A few high-level descriptive statistics are germane. 185 participants completed the enemy image panel, which measured perceptions of state and leader resolve at 5 time points throughout a hypothetical foreign policy crisis (see section 3.1). Of these 185, 100 exhibited evidence that the stereotypical enemy schema was activated, while 85 did not. 91 were exposed to the “no dissent”/control condition, while 94 were exposed to the “dissent”/treatment condition. Because state and leader resolve are each measured within subjects, these descriptive statistics are constant across both of the enemy image ANOVAs. Within the no dissent condition, 44 of 91 subjects exhibited active enemy schemata; within the dissent condition, 56 of 94 did so.

Time*dissent was significant with a moderate effect size on F(1, 181)=13.02, p<.000, η²=.067. Conventionally significant results also presented for the three way interaction of time*schema*dissent, F(1, 181)= 3.53, p<.09, η²=.016. This suggests that schema activation may have moderated dissent’s negative effect in the case of state resolve in the Enemy image, one of the main hypotheses of this study.  But recall that a statistically significant F test suggests only that the differences in the factorial means are large enough to not be written off as occurring by chance, and says nothing about the directionality of the factorial effects.

116 On moderation vs. mediation, see Baron and Kenny (1986).

117 It should be noted that effect size statistics are not derived for each individual t-test results due to the possibility of confusion and redundancy with effect size statistics presented in the repeated measures ANOVA framework. But if the reader is so inclined, Pearson’s r, one common measure of effect size can be easily calculated using only the results of a t-test, the relevant degrees of freedom, and the back of an envelope. Pearson’s r (eff)=√((t²)/((t²)+df)). See Field and Hole 2003, p. 166.

118 That is, a significant F test for an interaction term does not by itself indicate whether a variable mitigates or aggravates another directional effect. Examination of factorial means is required to make such a claim.
Indeed upon examination of the factorial group means across times T2 and T3, this is not what we observe. Instead, we observe that when dissent is present, from Time T2 to T3, the mean state resolve falls from 7.69 to 6.87 (t (109.56)= 2.15, p=.03) in the schema activated condition, while mean state resolve falls from 6.68 to 6.61 in the schema inactive condition (t (73.44)=.15, p=.88)). So although state resolve is higher in the schema active*dissent condition, it falls by a significantly greater distance to get there than it does in the schema inactive* dissent condition. The activation of schema drives up state resolve at T2 only to allow it to fall by T3, but to a level significantly higher than that of the no schema condition. Furthermore, the presence of a schema does not mitigate belief change over time, it increases the magnitude of belief change; dissent is more diagnostic in the schema case than in the non-schema case.

On the other hand, in the absence of dissent, in the no dissent*no schema condition, the mean state resolve rises, in a not-statistically-significant fashion, from 6.66 to 7.02 from time T2 to T3, yielding t(91.74)=-.768, for a p of .444. Similarly, the no dissent* schema condition generates a non-significant rise in state resolve from T2 to T3, from 7.52 to 7.93, yielding t (84.17)= -1.06 for a p of .293. So while state resolve is higher in the schema condition, the rise over time is comparable in the schema and non-schema condition in the absence of dissent.

So in essence, further examination of the significant time*schema*dissent interaction reveals that our expectation of moderation of dissent’s negative effects in H7 is not supported.
Turning to H1, examining the time*dissent within subjects means, we find that in the no dissent condition, state resolve rises from 7.08 to 7.46, \( t(179.91) = -1.23, p = .22 \); in the dissent condition, dissent falls from 7.29 to 6.77, \( t(185.82) = 1.67, p = .097 \). This provides confirmatory hypothesis of H1 in the Enemy case.

**Enemy Image Deterrent Credibility**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the enemy image in deterrent crises, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the effects of our experiment on perceptions of credibility. Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, \( F(3, 181) = .803, p = .494 \), whereas at Time T3, \( F(3, 181) = 2.866, p = .038 \); these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives at time T2 but not at T3.

We see a significant and large time contingent effect for dissent, as \( F(1, 181) = 37.314, p = .000, \eta^2_p = .156 \). We do see a small but significant effect for the three way interaction of \( F(1, 181) = 3.383, p = .084, \eta^2_p = .016 \).

The change from T2 to T3 in mean credibility scores is significantly different in the dissent and non-dissent conditions. In the dissent condition, mean credibility goes from 6.58 to 6.06, for \( t(185.56) = 1.43, p = .16 \); in the non-dissent condition, mean credibility goes from 6.54 to 7.34, for \( t(177.36) = -2.31, p = .02 \). This result is supportive of H2.

The three-way interactive effect suggests that the means at Time T2 and T3 vary across the 2*2 factorial conditions of dissent and schema. In the dissent*no schema
condition, mean credibility goes from 5.95 to 5.71, with t(73.9)=.4, p=.69; in the
dissent*schema condition, mean credibility moves from 7.02 to 6.3, with t(109.13)=1.57,
p=.12; in the no dissent*no schema condition, mean credibility goes from 6.45 to 7.1
from T2 to T3, with t(90.41)=-1.27, p=.21; in the no dissent*schema condition, mean
credibility goes from 6.64 to 7.59, with t(84.78)=-2.08, p=.04. This result suggests that
although the time*dissent*schema effect exists, the shift from T2 to T3 is greater in the
schema condition, even if the T3 point mean is higher than it is in the no schema
condition. This suggests no support for H8, as schema presence aggravates, rather than
moderates dissent’s negative effect over time.

3.3.2 Ally Image Deterrence

Turning to descriptive statistics of the success of quasi-random assignment and a
check of our schema manipulation in the ally condition, 185 participants completed the
ally image panel. Of these 185, 115 exhibited evidence that the stereotypical ally schema
was activated, while 70 did not. 92 were exposed to the “no dissent”/ control condition,
while 93 were exposed to the “dissent”/treatment condition. Because state and leader
resolve are each measured within subjects, these descriptive statistics are constant across
both of the ally image ANOVAs. Within the no dissent condition, 58 out of 92 subjects
exhibited active ally schemata; within the dissent condition, 57 of 93 did so.

Ally Image Deterrence State resolve

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of state resolve in
the ally image in deterrent crises, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the
effects of our experiment on perceptions of state resolve. But first once again, we
examine whether and to what extent the assumptions of Three-way Mixed ANOVA are violated. Box’s Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, F(3, 180)=.556, p=.645, whereas at Time T3, F(3, 180)=2.076, p=.145; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives intact.

Within subjects, we see a significant and large time contingent effect for dissent, as F(1, 180)=.36.319, p=.000, η^2=.167. More specifically, the change in mean state resolve from Time T2 to T3 was significantly different in the presence or absence of dissent. In the dissent condition, there was a significant drop in state resolve from 6.82 to 6.17, yielding t(179.491)= -2.141, p=.034. In the nondissent condition, there was a significant increase in state resolve, from 6.57 to 7.34, yielding t (179.41)= -2.71, p=.007. Substantively, this means that schema did not significantly moderate the negative effect that dissent had on perceptions of deterrent resolve in the ally image condition. This result indicates that in the case of deterrent state resolve under the ally image, the rationalist conventional wisdom holds; that is, the results support H1, but do not support schema theory’s H7.

**Ally Image Deterrence Credibility**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the ally image in deterrent crises, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the effects of our experiment on perceptions of credibility. We see a significant and large time contingent effect for dissent, as F(1, 181)=31.711, p=.000, η^2=.149.

More specifically, in the no dissent condition, mean credibility in the ally image goes from 5.14 to 6.22 from time T2 to T3, with t(181.98)= -2.98, p=.003; in the dissent
condition, mean credibility decreases from 5.81 to 5.26, with $t(183.42)=1.49$, p=.14. The results offer mild support for H2, but no support for H8.

3. 3.3 Colony Image Deterrence

Turning to descriptive statistics of the success of quasi-random assignment and a check of our schema manipulation in the colony condition, 100 participants completed the colony image panel. Of these 100, 45 exhibited evidence that the stereotypical colony schema was activated, while 55 did not. 50 were exposed to the “no dissent”/ control condition, while 50 were exposed to the “dissent”/treatment condition. Because state and leader resolve are each measured within subjects, these descriptive statistics are constant across both of the colony image ANOVAs. Within the no dissent condition, 23 of 50 subjects exhibited active colony schemata; within the dissent condition, 22 of 50 did so.

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of state resolve in the colony image in deterrent crises, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the effects of our experiment on perceptions of state resolve. Within subjects, We see a significant and moderately sized time contingent effect for dissent, as $F(1, 96)=9.93$, p=.002, $\eta_p^2=.094$. Specifically, there is a statistically insignificant drop in the dissent condition over time from 4.92 to 4.68, yielding $t(97.43)=5.26$, p=.60, with a statistically insignificant rise in the non-dissent condition from 4.44 to 5.06, yielding $t(97.797)=-1.298$, for a p of .197. We also observe a small but significant effect for the three way interaction of $F(1, 96)=5.061$, p=.027, $\eta_p^2=.05$. We observe statistically insignificant increases in state resolve across the no dissent conditions, with the no schema*no dissent interaction yielding $t(51.25)=-.72$, p=.475 for an increase from 4.33 to 4.81 and the schema* no dissent interaction yielding $t(43.93)=-1.13$, p=.263 for an increase in state
resolve from 4.57 to 5.35 across times T2 to T3. We observe a statistically insignificant drop in the schema*dissent condition from 4.91 to 4.09, yielding $t(41.79)=1.25, p=.22$; while in the no schema*dissent condition we observe a statistically insignificant increase from 4.93 to 5.14, yielding $t(53.07)=-.341, p=.735$. So schema activation does not exhibit a moderating effect on dissent’s negative effect on state resolve; if anything it enhances the rate of downward change over time. The results in aggregate offer mild support of H1, and do not support H7 in the case of colony image deterrent state resolve.

**Colony Image Deterrence Credibility**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the colony image in deterrent crises, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the effects of our experiment on perceptions of credibility. Once again, we examine whether and to what extent the assumptions of Three-way Mixed ANOVA are violated. Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, $F(3, 96)=2.547, p=.06$, whereas at Time T3, $F(3, 96)=.985, p=.403$; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups does not survive at time T2 but does at T3.

Within subjects, we see a significant and large time contingent effect for dissent, as $F(1, 96)=13.696, p=.000$, $\eta^2_p=.125$. In the non-dissent condition, mean credibility jumps from 3.66 at T2 to 5.06 at T3, with $t(97.99)=-2.89, p=.001$; in the dissent condition, mean credibility goes from 4.06 to 4.26, with $t(96.98)=-.41, p=.68$. Substantively, the T2 to T3 increase in mean credibility is significantly blunted by the presence of domestic dissent.
While we are unsure of the cause of this increase, it may be evidence of regression toward the mean. Although the mean state resolve does rise in the dissent condition, it does so to a far lower extent; and the credibility at T3 in the dissent condition (4.26) is (almost) statistically significantly lower than the non-dissent mean (5.06), with \( t(97.74)=1.62, \ p=.109 \). These results thus offer mild support for H2, but no support for H8.

3.3.4 **Degenerate Image Deterrence**

Turning to descriptive statistics of the success of quasi-random assignment and a check of our schema manipulation in the degenerate condition, 100 participants completed the degenerate image panel. Of these 100, 57 exhibited evidence that the stereotypical degenerate schema was activated, while 43 did not. 51 were exposed to the “no dissent”/control condition, while 49 were exposed to the “dissent”/treatment condition. Because state and leader resolve are each measured within subjects, these descriptive statistics are constant across both of the degenerate image ANOVAs. Within the no dissent condition, 31 of 51 subjects exhibited active degenerate schemata; within the dissent condition, 26 of 49 did so.

**Degenerate Image Deterrent State Resolve**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of state resolve in the degenerate image in deterrent crises, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, \( F(3, 96)=1.689, \ p=.175 \), whereas at Time T3, \( F(3, 96)=2.622, \ p=.055 \); indicating that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental does not survive at time T3.
Within subjects we see a small but significant time contingent effect for dissent, as $F(1, 96) = 4.382, p = .039, \eta^2 = .044$. The increase in mean from Time T2 to T3 in the dissent condition from 3.51 to 3.69 is not statistically significant, yielding $t(95.998) = -44, p = .66$. The increase from T2 to T3 of 3.67 to 4.43 in the non-dissent condition, however, is statistically significant, yielding $t(98.95) = -1.7, p = .09$. Collectively, these increases are statistically different from each other, as indicated by the F-test. Although the mean state resolve does rise in the dissent condition, it does so to a far lower extent than it does in the non-dissent condition. Furthermore, the T3 dissent mean (3.69) is significantly lower than that of the non-dissent mean (4.43), $t(96.75) = 1.66, p = .0996$. These results thus offer mild support for H1.

We also see a small but significant time*schema*dissent interaction, suggesting that schema activation may moderate dissent’s negative effect, with $F(1, 96) = 2.765, p = .10, \eta^2 = .028$. Closer inspections of the time*dissent*schema means indicate that while schema activation does moderate the fall in state resolve, the level to which it rises is still lesser than the state resolve in the non-dissent condition.

In the no-dissent*no schema condition, mean state resolve increases in a statistically insignificant way from T2 (4.35) to T3 (5.15), with $t(37.35) = -1.21, p = .24$; in the no dissent*schema condition, mean state resolve increases from T2 (3.23) to T3 (3.97), with $t(59.48) = -1.27, p = .21$. In the dissent*no schema condition, mean state resolve decreases from T2 (4.30) to T3 (4.0), with $t(43.79) = .4114, p = .68$. In the dissent*schema condition, mean state resolve rises from T2 (2.81) to T3 (3.42), with $t(49.97) = -1.61, p = .11$. So although, given membership in the dissent condition, state
resolve rises in the presence of schema from T2 to T3, and falls in absence of a schema, each of these changes over time is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the result of the rise (i.e. comparing the dissent*schema and dissent*no schema T3 means) in the dissent*schema condition still yields a T3 mean (3.42) substantively less than that in the dissent*no schema condition (4.0), even if the difference between those two T3 means is not statistically significant, with t(32.75)=.95, p=.35. So we do not find evidence of support for H7.

Furthermore, the unanticipated and theoretically unexplained rise in state resolve in the degenerate schema*dissent condition may be evidence of regression to the mean, which is 3.83 pooled across all factorial conditions in degenerate T2 and T3, and is 4.07 at degenerate T3.

**Degenerate Image Deterrence Credibility**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the degenerate image in deterrent crises, we first examine whether and to what extent the assumptions of Three-way Mixed ANOVA are violated. Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, F(3, 96)=2.451, p=.068, whereas at Time T3, F(3, 96)=.386, p=.763; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups does not survive at time T2 but does at T3.

We see a significant and large time contingent effect for dissent, as F(1, 96)=7.482, p=.007, ηp²=.072. Dissent’s time-contingent within subjects effect manifests as a significant increase in credibility from T2 (3.35) to T3 (4.43) in the non-dissent condition, with t(97.7)=-2.4, p=.02; in the dissent condition, mean credibility still
increases from T2 (3.08) to T3 (3.31), with t(94.93) = -.51, although not nearly at the same slope, and to a much lower level at T3 than in the non-dissent condition. Although the mean credibility does rise in the dissent condition, it does so to a far lower extent than it does in the non-dissent condition. These results offer mild support for H2, but none for H8.

3.3.5 Barbarian Image Deterrence

Turning to descriptive statistics of the success of quasi-random assignment and a check of our schema manipulation in the barbarian condition, 85 participants completed the barbarian image panel. Of these 85, 46 exhibited evidence that the stereotypical barbarian schema was activated, while 39 did not. 43 were exposed to the “no dissent”/control condition, while 42 were exposed to the “dissent”/treatment condition. Because state and leader resolve are each measured within subjects, these descriptive statistics are constant across both of the barbarian image ANOVAs. Within the no dissent condition, 23 of 43 subjects exhibited active barbarian schemata; within the dissent condition, 23 of 42 did so.

Barbarian Image Deterrent State Resolve

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of state resolve in the barbarian image in deterrent crises, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the effects of our experiment on perceptions of state resolve. But first once again, we examine whether and to what extent the assumptions of Three-way Mixed ANOVA are violated. This ANOVA survives Levene’s test at T2 and T3 at the .1 level.

Within subjects, no effects of theoretical interest yield significant correlations.
Barbarian Image Deterrence Credibility

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the barbarian image in deterrent crises, we first examine whether and to what extent the assumptions of Three-way Mixed ANOVA are violated. Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, $F(3, 81)=3.163$, $p=.029$, whereas at Time T3, $F(3, 81)=2.468$, $p=.068$; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups does not survive at time T2 nor at T3.

Within subjects, we see a significant and moderate time contingent effect for dissent, as $F(1, 81)=6.185$, $p=.015$, $\eta^2_p=.071$. Interpreting the time*dissent effect on credibility, in the no-dissent condition, the mean credibility rises from T2 (7.51) to T3 (8.12), with $t(77.0)=-1.46$, $p=.15$; in the dissent condition, mean credibility falls from T2 (7.83) to T3 (7.5), with $t(80.99)=.68$, $p=.51$. These results offer mild support for rationalist hypothesis H2, but none for H8.

3.3.6 Imperialist Image Deterrence

Turning to descriptive statistics of the success of quasi-random assignment and a check of our schema manipulation in the imperialist condition, 85 participants completed the imperialist image panel. Of these 85, 51 exhibited evidence that the stereotypical imperialist schema was activated, while 34 did not. 43 were exposed to the “no dissent”/control condition, while 42 were exposed to the “dissent”/treatment condition. Because state and leader resolve are each measured within subjects, these descriptive statistics are constant across both of the imperialist image ANOVAs. Within the no dissent condition,
26 of 43 subjects exhibited active imperialist schemata; within the dissent condition, 25 of 42 did so.

**Imperialist Image Deterrent State Resolve**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of state resolve in the imperialist image in deterrent crises, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the effects of our experiment on perceptions of state resolve. But first once again, we examine whether and to what extent the assumptions of Three-way Mixed ANOVA are violated. Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, F(3, 81)=1.356, p=.232, whereas at Time T3, F(3, 81)=.255, p=.857; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives intact.

None of our hypotheses regarding dissent’s effects on deterrent state resolve in the imperialist image—H1 or H7—are supported.

**Imperialist Image Deterrence Credibility**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the imperialist image in deterrent crises, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the effects of our experiment on perceptions of credibility. Once again, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, F(3, 80)=3.209, p=.027, whereas at Time T3, F(3, 81)=.255, p=.857; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups does not survive at time T2 but does at T3.
None of our hypotheses regarding dissent’s effects on deterrent credibility—either H2 or H8—are supported in the imperialist image.

3.3.7 Summarizing the Deterrence Results
Looking across image type, the most striking factor is the relative consistency with which the rationalist conventional wisdom about dissent is supported. Domestic dissent negatively affects perceptions of state resolve and credibility (H1 and H2 respectively) across the enemy, ally, colony, and degenerate image types, regardless of schema activation for both state resolve and credibility. The conventional wisdom is also supported in the case of credibility (H2) in the barbarian image.

Also, we find no support for schema theory’s perseverance effect in the cases of state resolve or credibility (H7 and H8). In fact, the results may most offer hints of an opposite state of affairs. When the time*dissent*schema interaction returns significant F-test results within an ANOVA, the groupwise mean comparison tests do not provide support for schema theory’s idea that the negative effects of dissent should be moderated in the stereotypical schema conditions. In the cases of the enemy and ally images, while the effects of schema are moderated in a statistical sense, they are not “moderated” in a substantive or conversational sense. Rather, they are aggravated, or increased. That is, when the stereotypical schemata are active, beliefs change more, not less, than they do in the non-schema case.¹¹⁹ In essence, schema activation promotes, rather than retards, the diagnosticity of domestic dissent in an extended immediate deterrent crisis. These results

¹¹⁹ Statistical moderation occurs when any relationship between X and Y is affected by the presence or absence of Z. Substantive or “colloquial” moderation would occur when an effect is made less by the presence of some factor. In this colloquial regard, schema activation, aggravates (rather than moderates) the effects of dissent in the cases of the enemy and ally image.
are summarized in Table 3.3, which summarizes the results of the statistical analyses in the cases of H1, H2, H7, and H8. Again, “support” for a hypothesis is triggered by both a significant F-test result from a Three-Way mixed ANOVA, and a directionally correct forecast of the mean between the factorial conditions across time from T2 to T3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th>Ally</th>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Degenerate</th>
<th>Imperialist</th>
<th>Barbarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1 (Rationalist State Resolve)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2 (Rationalist Credibility)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H7 (Schema State Resolve)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H8 (Schema Credibility)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 Summary of Deterrence Hypothesis Test Results

3.4 The Effects of Dissent and Schema Activation on Perceptions of Compellent State Resolve, Leader Resolve, and Credibility

The TWMAs presented in section 3.4 assume that the relevant repeated measurement (state or leader resolve) was repeated only at times T4 and T5 for the purposes of crafting a set of results that can speak to our hypotheses about the effects of schemata and dissent in the compellent context. In each image/case, we will present a simple graphical picture of the movement of perceptions in each image/case during the indicated temporal window as a means of conveying descriptive statistics that are then expounded upon with a description of the general results from each TWMA. To make it easier for the reader to follow along and to enable cross-image comparison, the results of all 18 TWMAs for the compellent case are presented on a single table. The results of the

\[120 S=\text{results supported indicated hypothesis; NS=results did not support indicated hypothesis}\]
repeated measures ANOVAs for testing our hypotheses about dissent and cognitive
schemata in the compellent context for credibility, state resolve, and leader resolve are
presented in Table 3.4. The primary difference between our hypotheses about deterrence
and compellence is due to the structure of the stylized crisis that was used in our
experimental framework.

Schema activation was measured at the start of each image battery\textsuperscript{121}; but
dissent’s presence/absence was essentially manipulated twice: between times T2 and T3
(after a deterrent threat was made), and between times T4 and T5. But our hypotheses
about dissent have two opportunities to be tested in the compellence escalation scenario.
We might expect time contingent (within-subjects effects) of schemata and dissent; but
we also might expect simple between-subjects effects, because we could see dissent’s
first emergence between T2 and T3 carrying over to our observations of credibility and
resolve at T4 and T5. In this sense, the pooled T4 and T5 means of those in the dissent
condition may differ from those in the non-dissent condition, even if the change from T4
to T5 doesn’t vary across conditions within subjects. The hypotheses that we test, then,
are of course, reflective of this quirk of the experimental design. The compellence
hypotheses we test are summarized in Table 3.5.

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\textsuperscript{121} Also worth noting that because schema activation was reported in the section where deterrence results are presented, we do not reiterate the statistics in the forthcoming section on compellence.
### Table 3.4 Results of TWMAs by Image and Correlates of Compellent Resolve and Credibility

| Key: F test statistics in cell; Partial eta-squared (Effect sizes) are in parentheses. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01, |  |
|---|---|---|
| Enemy (df=1, 181) | Ally (df=1, 181) | Colony (df=1, 96) |
| Between Subjects | | |
| Dissent | 6.76*** (.036) | .746 (.004) | 7.018** (.081) | 8.0*** (.043) | 2.365 (.013) | 2.626*.014 | 2.429 (0.025) | .192 (.002) | 3.847*.039 |
| Schema | 10.14*** (.053) | 9.04*** (.048) | .09 (.001) | 5.75** (.031) | 8.003*** (.042) | 2.846*.015 | .074 (0.001) | .193 (.002) | .002 (.000) |
| Dissent*Schema | .015 (.000) | .006 (.000) | 1.86 (.023) | .52 (.003) | .627 (.003) | .001 (.000) | .313 (.003) | .207 (.002) | .119 (.001) |
| Within Subjects | | | |
| Time | 14.35*** (.073) | .562 (.003) | .899 (.005) | .014 (.000) | 4.909** (.026) | .032 (.000) | .073 (.001) | .219 (.002) | 2.153 (.022) |
| Time*Dissent | 6.82*** (.036) | .027 (.000) | .003 (.000) | .251 (.001) | .515 (.003) | .357 (.002) | .027 (.000) | .049 (.001) | .882 (.009) |
| Time*Schema | 1.6 (.009) | 1.21 (.007) | .347 (.561) | .226 (.001) | .329 (.002) | 2.305 (.013) | 2.491 (.026) | 2.642 (.027) | 1.423 (.015) |
| Time*Schema*Dissent | .008 (.000) | .074 (.000) | 2.522 (.014) | 1.203 (.007) | 2.203 (.012) | .169 (.001) | 1.884 (.002) | 2.724 (.028) | .167 (.002) |
| Levene’s Test (Times T4 and T5) | 2.15*, 3.18** | 2.71**, 2.61* | 9.935***, 6.912*** | .948, 1.37 | 2.649**, 1.468 | .572, .277 | 2.2*, 2.543* | 1.369, .462 | .364, 1.323 |
| Degenerate (df=1, 96) | Barbaren (df=1, 81) | Imperialist (df=1, 81) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Between Subjects | | | |
| Dissent | 5.081** (.05) | 3.034*.031 | 1.004 (.01) | .486 (.006) | .437 (.005) | 1.097 (.014) | .675 (.008) | .000 (.000) | 7.062*** (.08) |
| Schema | 7.694*** (.074) | 7.078*** (.069) | 5.625** (.055) | .899 (.011) | .458 (.006) | .601 (.007) | 1.785 (.022) | 3.746* (.044) | .001 (.000) |
| Dissent*Schema | .000 (.000) | .647 (.007) | .544 (.006) | .685 (.008) | .406 (.005) | 3.817** (.046) | .124 (.002) | .374 (.005) | 5.139** (.06) |
| Within Subjects | | | |
| Time | 1.648 (.017) | 12.1*** (.103) | 3.574** (.036) | 2.296 (.028) | 5.282** (.061) | 2.32 (.028) | 4.305** (.051) | 1.14 (.001) | .99 (.012) |
| Time*Dissent | .001 (.000) | 3.037*.031 | 1.577 (.106) | .109 (.001) | .29 (.004) | .062 (.001) | .864 (.011) | .174 (.002) | 2.033 (.024) |
| Time*Schema | .335 (.003) | 3.51* (.036) | 1.788 (.018) | .082 (.001) | .772 (.009) | 1.426 (.018) | .124 (.002) | 2.997*.036 | .366 (.004) |
| Time*Schema*Dissent | .009 (.000) | 1.999 (.021) | 2.352 (.024) | 1.405 (.017) | .048 (.001) | .057 (.011) | 1.382 (.017) | 1.287 (.016) | .129 (.002) |
| Levene’s Test (Times T4 and T5) | 3.35, 603 | 1.099, 506 | 1.496, 412 | .626, 454 | 1.002, 1.371 | 4.25**, 5.628* | 1.187, .34 | 1.73, 2.853** | 2.068, 2.836** |
3.4 The Effects of Dissent and Schema Activation on Perceptions of Compellent Credibility, State Resolve, and Leader Resolve

Compellence Hypotheses

H3: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, an attacker’s subsequent perception of a (previously labeled) defender state’s compellent resolve should be significantly and negatively affected by the emergence/existence of domestic dissent.

H4: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, an attacker’s subsequent perception of the credibility of a (previously labeled) defender state’s compellent threat should be significantly and negatively affected by the emergence/existence of domestic dissent.

H5: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the emergence/existence of domestic dissent should significantly and positively affect the (previously labeled) attacker’s subsequent perception of a leader’s compellent resolve.[1]

H6: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the emergence/existence of domestic dissent should significantly and positively affect the (previously labeled) attacker’s subsequent perception of the credibility of a state’s compellent threat.

H9: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the presence of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on a (previously labeled) attacker’s perception of a defender state’s compellent resolve.

H10: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the presence of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on a (previously labeled) attacker’s perception of a defender state’s compellent credibility.

H11: In the event that extended immediate deterrence fails, the presence of a stereotypical schema should moderate domestic dissent’s negative effect on a (previously labeled) attacker’s perception of a defender’s compellent leader resolve.

Table 3.5 Summary of Compellence Hypotheses
3.4.1 Enemy Image Compellence

**Enemy Image Compellent State Resolve**

Turning now to the experimental differences during times T4 and T5 in our experiment, substantively speaking we are examining the effects of dissent on perceptions of compellent resolve. Examining the results of the repeated measures ANOVA of compellent state resolve, we turn first to an examination of the assumptions. Examining Levene’s test of equality of error variance, state resolve at time T4 reveals $F(3, 181)=2.15$, $p<.096$; state resolve at time T5 reveals $F(3, 181)=3.18$, $p<.025$. So while the test fails the assumption of equality of variance at the $\alpha=.05$ level, it is not a grievous failure.

Turning now to the between subjects effects, dissent’s main effect is significant but small, $F(1, 181)=6.76$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2_p=.036$; as is schema’s $F(1, 181)=10.14$, $p<.002$, $\eta^2_p=.053$. Pooled across times T4 and T5, the mean state resolve in the dissent condition is significantly lower (7.26) than in the non-dissent condition (7.94), yielding $t(366.843)=3.043$, $p=.003$.

Within subjects, time*Dissent is also significant at $F(1, 181)=6.82$, $\eta^2_p=.036$, $p=.01$, with the effect size statistic indicating a small but notable difference between the dissent and non-dissent groups from T4 to T5. Concretely, contrasts reveal that the difference between state resolve in the dissent condition from T4 (7.51) to T5 (7.01) on $t(184.04)=.154$, $p=.13$ is not significant, nor is the difference in the non-dissent condition from T4 (7.99) to T5 (7.89) statistically significant, yielding $t(179.79)=.3247$, $p=.75$. But the expectations of H3 are directionally correct.
Collectively, schema theory’s idea that the negative effect of dissent should be moderated is not supported, and the rationalist conventional wisdom’s contention that dissent should have a negative effect on state resolve within subjects is supported. Consequently, we can say that we find support for H3 but not for H9.

**Enemy Image Compellent Leader Resolve**

Turning now to the analysis of leader resolve in compellence, we begin with a check of the assumptions Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, \( F(3, 181)=2.71, p=.046 \), whereas at Time T5, \( F(3, 181)=2.61, p=.053 \). Again, the violations are mild, but the T4 hypothesis of equal variances across the experimental groups is technically rejected. No between subjects effects of theoretical interest significantly affect leader resolve, and hence do not warrant post-hoc examination. None of our theoretical expectations are tabbed by the within subjects component of the model either. We find no support for H5, nor for H11.

**Enemy Image Compellence Credibility**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the enemy image in the compellence phase of a crisis, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the effects of our experiment on perceptions of credibility. Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, \( F(3, 180)=9.935, p=.000 \), and at Time T3, \( F(3, 180)=6.912, p=.00 \); these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups does not survive at either time T2 or at T3.
Turning next to the between subjects effects, dissent exhibits a significant and moderate main effect, $F(1, 80)=7.018$, $p=.01$, $\eta_p^2=.081$. Substantively, closer examination of the between-subjects main effect of dissent reveals that the pooled T4-T5 mean credibility scores are significantly greater in the no-dissent condition (8.06) than they are in the dissent condition (7.13), with $t(358.95)=3.82$, $p=.00$. Within subjects, we find no results of theoretical interest, and dissent does not have a time-contingent within subjects effect on leader resolve. In the absence of a significant F-test for the time*dissent*schema interaction term, we find no evidence for schema theory’s H10. But we find evidence for H4 (and obviously then, not for H6)\footnote{Again, to recap, H6 and H4 are directionally opposite predictions about credibility; H4 suggests dissent negatively affects credibility, whereas H6 suggests the effect will be positive.}—that is, credibility is decreased, not increased, in the presence of domestic dissent.

### 3.4.2 Ally Image Compellence

#### Ally State Resolve Compellence

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of leader resolve in the ally image in compellent crises, we first discuss the ANOVA results that examine the effects of our experiment on perceptions of state resolve. Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, $F(3, 180)=.948$, $p=.419$, whereas at Time T5, $F(3, 180)=1.37$, $p=.254$; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives intact.

Turning next to the between subjects effects, dissent does exhibit a small but significant main effect, $F(1, 180)=8.0$, $p=.005$, $\eta_p^2=.043$. Pooled across T4 and T5, the
mean for those observations in the dissent condition is significantly lower (7.16) than that in the non-dissent condition (7.94), yielding t(361.75) = 3.59, p = .0004. Within subjects, no effects are significant. Although the expectations of schema theory (H9) are not supported in the case of ally state resolve, the rationalist conventional wisdom—H3—is supported.

**Ally Leader Resolve Compellence**

Turning to analyze leader resolve in the ally image in compellent crises, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, F(3, 181) = 2.649, p = .05, whereas at Time T5, F(3, 181) = 1.468, p = .225; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives intact at time T5 though it does not at Time T4.

But no between subjects effects or within subjects effects of theoretical interest are found to significantly correlate with leader resolve. This means that we find no support for hypotheses H5 or H11 in the case of the ally image.

**Ally Image Compellence Credibility**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the ally image in the compellence phase of a crisis, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, F(3, 181) = .572, p = .634, and at Time T3, F(3, 181) = .277, p = .842; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives at both times T2 or at T3. Turning next to the between subjects effects, dissent nearly exhibits a very small main effect, F(1, 181) = 2.626, p = .107, $\eta_p^2 = .014$. Specifically, dissent’s significant between-subjects main effect on
credibility in the ally image condition is illustrated via two-sample t-test. When the T4 and T5 data are pooled, we observe that those datum from the dissent condition have a significantly lower mean credibility (6.69) than those in the non-dissent (7.28) condition, with \( t(366.98) = 2.28, p = .02 \). No within-subjects effects are significantly correlated with ally compellent credibility. These results support H4, the rationalist conventional wisdom about dissent, and dissent’s negative effect on credibility means that H6 is not supported. Furthermore, the absence of a significant dissent*schema or time*dissent*schema interaction effect in the ANOVA results means that H10 is not supported.

3.4.3 Colony Image Compellence

Colony State Resolve Compellence

Turning now to compellence, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, \( F(3, 96) = 2.2, p = .093 \), whereas at Time T5, \( F(3, 96) = 2.543, p = .061 \); these results indicate that the null hypothesis of equal variances across the experimental groups does not survive at T4 or T5. None of our theoretical concepts are found to be significant predictors of state resolve. This means we do not find any support for H3 or H9.

Colony Image Compellent Leader Resolve

Turning now to compellence, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, \( F(3, 95) = 1.369, p = .257 \), whereas at Time T5, \( F(3, 95) = .462, p = .71 \); these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives intact. None of our theoretical concepts are found to be significant predictors of leader resolve. Although schema theory’s predictions are not borne out, neither are the
hypotheses of the conventional wisdom about the negative effects of dissent on leader resolve—that is, we find no support for either H5 or H11.

**Colony Image Compellence Credibility**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the colony image in the compellence phase of a crisis, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, \( F(3, 96) = .364, p = .779 \), and at Time T3, \( F(3, 96) = 1.323, p = .272 \); these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives at both times T2 or at T3.

Turning next to the between subjects effects, dissent exhibits a significant but small main effect, \( F(1, 96) = 3.847, p = .053, \eta^2_p = .039 \). Substantively, we see that dissent’s between subjects main effect on compellent credibility in the colony image is manifested in a two-sample t-test result, with those in the dissent condition assigning a substantially lower credibility (5.22) than those in the no-dissent condition (6.33), with \( t(195.85) = 2.75, p = .01 \). No within subject effects are significant. This result constitutes evidence for H4 and against H6. The absence of a significant schema*dissent or time*dissent*schema interaction means that we find no evidence to support H10.

**3.4.4 Degenerate Image Compellence**

**Degenerate State Resolve Compellence**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of state resolve in the degenerate image in compellent crises, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, \( F(3, 96) = .335, p = .8 \), whereas at Time T5, \( F(3, 96) = .603, p = .5 \).
p=.615; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survive intact.

Turning next to the between subjects effects, dissent exhibits a small but significant main effect on state resolve, $F(1, 96)=5.081$, $p=.026$, $\eta^2_p=.05$. Pooled across T4 and T5, mean state resolve in the dissent observations is significantly lower (4.51) than in the non-dissent observations (5.49), yielding $t(197.78)=2.8, p=.006$. Schema presence has a moderate and significant main effect; $F(1, 96)=7.694$, $p=.007$, $\eta^2_p=.074$. Pooled across T4 and T5, schema state resolve (4.47) is significantly lower than non-schema state resolve (5.72), yielding $t(182.49)=3.56, p=.0005$. Within subjects, none of our concepts of interest serve as significant predictors of state resolve. These results are supportive of H3, but the absence of a significant dissent*schema or time*dissent*schema interaction means we find no evidence in support of H9.

**Degenerate Image Compellent Leader Resolve**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of leader resolve in the degenerate image, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, $F(3, 96)=1.099$, $p=.353$, whereas at Time T5, $F(3, 96)=.506$, $p=.679$; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survive intact. Turning next to the between subjects effects, dissent does exhibit a small but significant main effect on leader resolve, $F(1, 96)=3.034$, $p=.085$, $\eta^2_p=.031$. Substantively, pooled across T4 and T5, subjects in the dissent condition had a mean leader resolve assigned to be 4.51, and 5.49 in the no-dissent condition. This is a
significant effect on leader resolve, but is in the opposite direction of H5. So we find no evidence in support of H5.

Within subjects, we also see a small but significant time contingent effect for dissent, as $F(1, 96)=3.037$, $p=.085$, $\eta^2_p=.031$. In the dissent condition, the change across time is non-significant, returning T4 mean of 3.63 and a T5 mean of 3.94, yielding $t(95.9)=-.71$, $p=.48$; in the no-dissent condition, the T4 mean of 3.62 and a T5 mean of 4.41, $t(97.61)=-1.73$, $p=.09$, statistically significant. In other words, while those in both conditions may have, on average, had leader resolve increase from T4 to T5, it was by a smaller amount in the dissent condition than it was for those in the non-dissent condition. We thus find no evidence in support of H5. But the absence of a significant dissent*schema or time*dissent*schema interaction means we find no evidence in favor of H11 either.

**Degenerate Image Compellence Credibility**

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the degenerate image in the compellence phase of a crisis, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, $F(3, 96)=1.496$, $p=.221$, and at Time T3, $F(3, 96)=.412$, $p=.745$; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives at both times T2 or at T3. But the absence of significant F-test results mean that none of the hypotheses laid out in chapter 2 pertaining to credibility—that is, neither H4, H6, nor H10—is supported in the analysis of degenerate image credibility.
3.4.5 Barbarian Image Compellence

Barbarian State Resolve Compellence

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of state resolve in the barbarian image in compellent crises, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, F(3, 81)=.626, p=.6, whereas at Time T5, F(3, 81)=.454, p=.715; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives intact. But the absence of significant F-tests mean that none of the hypotheses laid out in chapter 2—H3 or H9— are supported in the case of barbarian image compellent state resolve.

Barbarian Image Compellent Leader Resolve

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of leader resolve in the barbarian image in compellent crises, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, F(3, 81)=1.002, p=.396, whereas at Time T5, F(3, 81)=1.371, p=.258; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives intact. But the absence of significant F-tests mean that none of the hypotheses laid out in chapter 2—H5 or H11— are supported in the case of barbarian image compellent leader resolve.

Barbarian Image Compellence Credibility

Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the barbarian image in the compellence phase of a crisis, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, F(3, 80)=4.25, p=.008, and at Time T3, F(3,
80)=5.628, p=.001; these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives at either times T2 or at T3.

Turning next to the between subjects effects, dissent does not yield a significant main effect, F(1, 80)=1.097, p=.298, \( \eta^2_p = .014 \). Neither does schema presence; with F(1, 80)=.601, p=.44, \( \eta^2_p = .007 \). The interactive effect of the two (dissent*schema), however, does significantly affect credibility in compellent situations on a small effect size, with F(1, 80)=3.817, p=.054, \( \eta^2_p = .046 \).

Substantively, we interpret the significant dissent*schema interactive effect on barbarian credibility with a family of two-sample t-tests that assess differences in mean scores pooled across T4 and T5. In the non-schema observations, the non-schema*non-dissent mean is 9.17 while non-schema*dissent mean is 8.02, t(55.8)=3.08, p=.003; in the schema observations, schema*non-dissent mean is 8.13 while schema*dissent mean is 8.49, t(81.97)=.83, p=.41. So schema activation did moderate dissent’s effect (although not to a statistically significant degree), and in fact resulted in a directional change, although not to a statistically significant degree. This is mild evidence in favor of H10.

No significant within subject effects mean that we find no support for any of our other hypotheses regarding dissent’s effects on credibility—either H4 or H6—in the case of credibility in the barbarian image.

3.4.6 Imperialist Image Compellence
Imperialist Compellence State Resolve
Moving now to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of state resolve in the imperialist image in compellent crises, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, \( F(3, 81)=1.187, p=.32 \), whereas at Time T5, \( F(3, 81)=.34, p=.796 \); these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives intact. But none of the hypotheses laid out in chapter 2—neither H3 or H9—are supported in the case of the imperialist image.

**Imperialist Image Compellence Leader Resolve**

For leader resolve Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T4, \( F(3, 81)=1.73, p=.167 \), whereas at Time T5, \( F(3, 81)=2.853 p=.042 \); these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives intact. But none of the hypotheses laid out in chapter 2—H5 or H11—are supported in the case of the imperialist image.

**Imperialist Image Compellence Credibility**

Moving finally to the effects of dissent and schemata in the case of credibility in the imperialist image in the compellence phase of a crisis, Levene’s test of equality of variances indicates that at Time T2, \( F(3, 81)=2.068, p=.111 \), and at Time T3, \( F(3, 81)=2.836, p=.043 \); these results indicate that the null hypotheses of equal variances across the experimental groups survives at neither times T2 nor at T3.

Turning next to the between subjects effects, dissent yields a significant and moderate main effect on credibility, \( F(1, 81)=7.062, p=.009, \eta^2=.08 \). The interactive effect of the two (dissent*schema), does also affect credibility in compellent situations on
a moderate effect size, with $F(1, 81)=5.139$, $p=.026$, $\eta_p^2=.06$. Substantively, we offer an interpretation of dissent’s main effect on imperialist image credibility with a two-sample t-test that analyzes the differences dissent-wise on the pooled means from T4 and T5. The mean credibility scores for those in the dissent condition were significantly lower (8.04) than those in the non-dissent condition (8.83), with $t(157.8)=3.0$, $p=.003$. This constitutes support for H4. Obviously then, we do not see any evidence for the directionally opposite H6.

But the significant dissent*schema F-test result may indicate significant schema moderation of dissent’s effect in the pooled T4 and T5 credibility scores. In the non-schema condition, no schema*no dissent mean credibility is 9.32 but 7.55 in the no schema*dissent condition, $t(46.55)=4.93$, $p=.00$. In the schema condition, schema*no dissent mean is 8.5 but 8.36 in the schema*dissent condition, $t(98.79)=.39$, $p=.695$. In other words, dissent’s effect is statistically moderated via the significant F-test result, and examination of the factorial means indicates that schema activation significantly inhibited change in beliefs about credibility when pooled across T4 and T5. This is evidence in support of H10.

3.4.7 Summary of Compellence Results

Examining the compellence results, we see a story emerge that is similar to the one we observed in the deterrence analyses, with dissent negatively affecting perceptions of credibility and state resolve in the enemy and ally image conditions, confirming the rationalist conventional wisdom in those cases. The rationalist conventional wisdom about dissent’s negative effect credibility is also confirmed in the cases of the colony and imperialist images as well; the conventional wisdom is also confirmed in the case of state
resolve in the degenerate image. We see that schema activation has a moderating impact on dissent’s negative effect on credibility in the barbarian and imperialist image conditions. In terms of leader resolve, we see the least promising results—with none of our “madman” hypotheses being confirmed. The complete results of the hypotheses tested in Section 3.4 are summarized in Table 3.6.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th>Ally</th>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Degenerate</th>
<th>Imperialist</th>
<th>Barbarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H3 (Rationalist State Resolve)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4 (Rationalist Credibility -)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5 (Rationalist Leader Resolve)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6 (Rationalist Credibility +)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H9 (Schema State Resolve)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H10 (Schema Credibility)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H11 (Schema Leader resolve)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6 Summary of Compellence Hypothesis Test Results

3.5 Discussion of Experimental Results

The most striking result from this chapter is the almost complete absence of support for schema theory. The only instances when we find support for the hypothesis that the activation of stereotypical schemata moderates dissent’s negative effect on either credibility or state resolve is in the case of compellent credibility in the imperialist and barbarian stereotypes, a constellation of findings for which theoretical explanation is not readily obvious. Indeed, it may be equally puzzling that the incidence of stereotypical schemata in enemy image deterrence aggravates, rather than mitigates dissent’s negative effects on state resolve and credibility. Similarly striking is the high degree of

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124 S=results supported indicated hypothesis; NS=results did not support indicated hypothesis
corroboration of the conventional wisdom regarding dissent’s negative effects. Finally, we find no support for the “madman” proposition that the incidence of domestic dissent should enhance subsequent perceptions of leader resolve or coercive credibility. Rather, the relative presence of consistency in beliefs about leader resolve across factorial conditions of the experiment suggests that the “madman” logic (where perceptions of leader resolve increase) is likely only as plausible as the “leeching off” hypothesis. The “leeching off” hypothesis suggests that perceptions of leader resolve can never be totally divorced from perceptions of state resolve, and in fact, perceptions of leaders are epiphenomenal to perceptions of states. The logic here being that because leaders are by nature embedded in states, and the predominant effect of dissent is to enhance beliefs of state weakness, these perceptions of state weakness bleed into and overwhelm positive “madman” perceptions of leader resolve during compellence situations. Given that we see almost no statistically significant F-tests for leader resolve, it seems plausible that there exist variation in the ways in which beliefs about leader resolve change over the course of a compellence situation—perhaps both the “madman” and “leeching” logics are equally plausible and equally empirically incident.125

Checking Random Assignment with Individual Differences

Before we automatically accept the veracity of these findings, however, further consideration is necessary. It seems prudent to consider the success of (quasi)126 random assignment before we accept what we have observed whole-heartedly. Analysis of the

125 Indeed, this seems a promising avenue for further research.

126 Quasi-random assignment was employed by virtue of employing the individual differences in stereotypical schema activation as the fulcrum for analysis of the effects of stereotypical schemata.
propensity for schema activation as a function of individual differences does not yield much further insight into the reasons for the failure of schema theory. The most plausible hypothesis is that an individual’s political knowledge or sophistication influenced an individual’s likelihood to adopt a stereotypical schema. We constructed a scale of political sophistication/knowledge using items 30, 31, and 32 in the individual differences survey administered to experimental participants, presented in Appendix C. This three item-scale checked of a participant’s correct knowledge of the US Secretary of State (Hillary Clinton), one of the US Senators from Ohio (George Voinovich at the time of survey administration), and reading/watching/listening to at least 30 minutes per day of political news, with a “correct” score on each item constituting 1 equal point in the scale. Analyzing the data, 79 of 183 participants were of the highest sophistication (a score of 3 on the scale). Examining the correlation of this sophistication scale with the propensity to adopt stereotypical schemata in general, which was defined by the number of schemata were activated in the four image panels a subject completed, we see almost no correlation: political sophistication and schema activation were correlated -.008. Breaking it down more specifically, enemy schema activation was correlated -.02 with sophistication; ally schema activation was correlated .05, colony schema activation was correlated -.07 with sophistication, degenerate schema activation was correlated -.08, imperialist schema activation was correlated -.04 with sophistication, and barbarian schema activation was correlated .08. None of these correlations were statistically significant—indicating that the political sophistication of those in the schema and non-schema active conditions were not substantially different from each other. This makes us confident that the effects of stereotypical schemata, detailed in previous sections, were
well tested with the quasi-experimental design, and that the findings should be fairly robust to replication.

While schema activation was manipulated quasi-experimentally, we can also check the success of random assignment of the dissent condition in terms of political sophistication. Sophistication was correlated .01 with dissent assignment in the enemy image panels, -.001 with dissent assignment in the ally image, -.17 with dissent assignment in the colony image, .03 with dissent assignment in the degenerate image, -.05 with dissent assignment in the imperialist image panels, and .15 with dissent assignment in the barbarian image panels. Only the correlation between sophistication and dissent exposure in the colony image was statistically significant at the p<.1 level. This is somewhat concerning for the robustness of our findings, because it seems the case that those in the colony image dissent condition were of substantially lesser political sophistication than those in the domestic support condition. To the extent that one expects that political sophistication may affect an individual’s propensity to use a stereotypical image as a mental model, this is one case in which random assignment failed.

Also possibly relevant to our appraisal of the success of random assignment to the dissent or non-dissent conditions within each image panel is whether the pre-existing attitudes of subjects towards dissenters were randomly distributed across the experimental conditions. In other words, if participants with very negative views towards those who speak out against a government during a crisis were disproportionately assigned to the dissent condition, the results may appear more sanguine regarding
dissent’s effects than they might otherwise. Item 46 in the individual differences post-test (see appendix C) enables us to check the distribution of attitudes towards dissenters across experimental conditions. It reads: “On a scale of 1-10, (1 being very unfavorably, 10 being very favorably), how favorably do you view fellow citizens who speak out against government policy immediately prior to or during a war?”

Checking the pairwise correlations with assignment to the dissent/non-dissent conditions within each image panel, we see a good deal of variety in the strength and directionality with which attitudes about dissent correlated with the assignment to dissent/non-dissent conditions. Dissent favorability correlated .02 with dissent assignment in the enemy image panels, .04 with dissent assignment in the ally image panels, -.03 with dissent assignment in the colony image panels, -.06 with dissent assignment in the degenerate image panels, .03 with dissent assignment in the imperialist image panels, and -.01 in the barbarian image panels. None of these correlations approached the .1 level of statistical significance.

This fact indicates that random assignment succeeded fairly well in equally distributing dissent attitudes across the dissent/non-dissent factorial groups. To the extent that the favorability with which one views dissenters is tied to the ways in which dissent affects perceptions of credibility and resolve, we should feel confident that those attitudes did not affect the scores of individuals in the dissent conditions any more (or any differently) than they did individuals in the non-dissent conditions. The success of random assignment bodes well more generally for the internal validity of the study, and
obviates concerns that the modeling approach (TWM ANOVA) may have omitted important individual-level correlates in analyzing the effects of dissent.

**Sample Demographics and External Validity**

We first assess external validity by comparing the individuals in our sample as a whole to foreign policy decision-makers. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, our sample consisted of 185 undergraduates. As far as party affiliation, we see that 92/185, or about 50% self-identified as democrats, but only 58/185, or about 31% self-identified as republicans. This suggests that our undergraduate sample was substantially more democratic than the US population at large. Ideologically, 68/185 participants, or about 37% identified as somewhat or very conservative, while 79/185 or about 43% identified as somewhat or very liberal. This roughly even ideological split seems to suggest that our sample matches the likely demographics of US decision-makers fairly reasonably. The broader external validity objections, pertaining to the likely difference between the undergraduate sample of convenience and the inferential target of foreign policy decision-maker, will be addressed in the conclusions section of this chapter (3.6) immediately below.

**3.6 The Experimental Conclusions and Internal and External Validity**

As discussed earlier in the chapter, this experimental setup was a tough test for schema theory’s belief perseverance proposition. The toughness of this test has relevance for our appraisal of the external and internal validity of our inferences. The theory of motivated bias outlined in chapter 2 suggests that decision-makers, when encountering
feelings of threat or opportunity, may form cognitive pictures of others that balance with their emotions. While we attempted, within the limits of ethical research practice, to arouse emotion in our experimental participants, it is not at all clear that we succeeded.

If we were to assume that our operationalization of stereotypical schemata were reasonable, and that participants did indeed adopt schemata, our results would appear to indicate that schema do not moderate the generally negative effects of domestic dissent during escalating extended immediate deterrent crises. In a sense, if we assume internal validity, external validity becomes less problematic. But such an assumption may not be warranted. Indeed, the internal validity of the operationalization seems problematic in hindsight. While additional items in an already long survey instrument would have been risky, we wonder whether emotional priming checks (e.g. asking participants to self-report how angry, for instance, each country vignette made them) would have been useful in helping us better gauge the success of our attempts to induce stereotypical schemata.

Given the temporal component of our experimental design, we also may have observed some evidence of regression to the mean in the examination of our results. When we see contra-theoretical results as we did in our analysis of Degenerate image deterrent state resolve, we have reason to suspect this statistical artifact. While we did not attempt to estimate or correct for the magnitude of this effect given the already very-complicated nature of our experimental design, the possibility that extreme responses at T2 (or T4) attenuated responses at T3 (or T5) should give us a modicum of skepticism regarding our ability to precisely quantify the effects of dissent.
Similarly, we also have internal validity concerns based on the structure of our statistical models. The strategy of employing large numbers of Three-Way mixed ANOVA was chosen with all deliberate consideration. We had three highly correlated dependent variables (Credibility, State Resolve, and Leader Resolve), which ruled out a technique like Multiple ANOVA (MANOVA). Furthermore, the differences that one can observe in the factorial condition means at T2 is indicative that we may have been measuring existing differences in individual attitudes as much as we were measuring the effects of our experimental manipulations. In essence, we see heterogeneity that is uncontrolled in our statistical approach. One solution to this heterogeneity as well as the possibility of order and fatigue effects would have been to employ hierarchical/mixed linear models.

Such a structure would have enabled each dependent variable (credibility, state resolve, and leader resolve) to be assessed across all images and all times within a single statistical model. Instead of grouping a datasheet in rows by participant and looking merely for the differences in means across the factorial cells of an experiment, mixed multilevel (aka hierarchical) models attempt to model a specific response \( Y = X_{ijk} + \epsilon_{ijk} \) where i, j, and k represent the hierarchy of the cross-sectional time-series data. Factors corresponding to experimental conditions are then added to the model to account for between subjects factors (“fixed effects”), and covariates or nuisance effects can be
modeled as “random effects,” which specify the individual participant and image panel variation in responses.\textsuperscript{127}

Mixed models are those that include both fixed effects and random effects components. In the case of the present analysis, given the continuous nature of the 1-10 scaled dependent variables stipulate that the mixed models employed should be of a linear nature. Because of the hybrid nature of the experimental design, wherein each participant completed a series of image panels wherein dissent and schema activation were manipulated factorially/quasi-experimentally and measurements were taken 5 times within each image panel, the linear mixed model must assume a hierarchically nested form. Returning to the original functional form, in the present analysis, the model can be seen as predicting the i’th measurement (i.e. at Times T1-T5 as previously described; corresponding to coercive crisis phase) observation within the j’th image type (i.e. enemy, ally, colony, degenerate, barbarian, imperialist; where each participant completed four image types) within the k’th participant (of the 185 who completed the survey).

Such an approach would have allowed for participant level differences in effects to be estimated. But the increase in neutralization of possible confounds is paid for in difficulty of interpretation—especially in a situation where the existing experimental design is very complicated. This complexity makes the interpretation of three-way interaction terms, for instance (especially when time is one of these three), extremely

\textsuperscript{127} Random effects that merely attempt to identify the nesting structure of the non-fixed effects variation are referred to as random intercept models, whereas random slope models attempt to specify the sources of
difficult. Furthermore, by attempting to predict each response rather than estimate the differences in experimental/factorial means, one gets into the territory of garbage can models—where exhaustive numbers of individual level covariates must be specified—fairly quickly. Nonetheless, this modeling technique is one that may be fruitfully employed in further analysis of this experimental data.

We now turn to external validity concerns. As discussed in chapter 2, the predictions cognitive and motivated factors can inhibit belief change in the presence of stereotypical schemata. But given the relative failure of schemata to mitigate dissent’s negative effects, we are left with two choices—either conclude that we did not actually observe stereotypical schemata in action in our experiment, or conclude that we did, and schemata do not behave as we expected they did.

Upon reflection, we may not wish to toss the schema theory baby out with the convenience sample bathwater. If our experimental participants did not have as well-developed belief systems about other states as do elite foreign policy decision-makers, the conclusions about schema theory stemming from this experiment may not extend to elites. Indeed, politicians are generally a passionate and knowledgeable bunch—and these passions and knowledge would make it likely that the effects of stereotypical schemata would be greater in real world crises than they were in our experiments.

Furthermore, this experiment employed imaginary states, not real-world states, in its experimental manipulation. The affective charge and emotional arousal that the image

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128 I am grateful to Bear Braumoeller for pointing out the complexity of interpretation for three-way interaction effects in mixed (regression) models vice the (relatively) simple matter of interpreting them in ANOVA.
manipulations could induce was necessarily limited. Thing cognitively, by not anchoring the image descriptions to actual states (for instance, perhaps China for the Enemy image), we reduced the likelihood that participants would have strong initial beliefs about the credibility and resolve of the states described in the experiment. This design feature sacrificed external validity for the promise of internal validity. While it was a reasonable trade to make in foresight, it does limit the external validity of our conclusions nonetheless.

So while we did not observe the moderation of dissent’s negative effects here that schema theory’s perseverance proposition should produce, we should not necessarily conclude that the same results would have obtained if our research participants were, for instance, members of the National Security Council. If anything, given the “tough” nature of our experimental test of schema theory, we might expect significantly greater mitigation of dissent’s negative effects had we had NSC members in our experimental sample. While the results are disappointing for schema theory, they should be interpreted in light of the probable differences between our convenience sample and our inferential target (real world decision-makers).
This chapter probes the plausibility of schema theory in mitigating the effect of dissent in the context of German perceptions of France during the Czechoslovakia crisis in 1938. We find rudimentary evidence for the support of schema theory. While the evidence is far from overwhelming that a stereotypical degenerate schema prevented Hitler’s perception of French resolve and credibility from falling in the face of dissent, the idea that motivated biases can evoke stereotypes that mitigate the impact of incoming information is supported by the historical record. But even in the absence of demonstration that the schemata did the explanatory work, the propositions of schema theory are supported to a far greater extent than are the propositions of the rationalist conventional wisdom.

We will not examine the movement of perceptions once deterrence failed and compellence began because of the confounding factor of the beginning of World War II, and the fact that France’s military machine was embedded within the Allies.
4.1 Case Selection and Operationalization of Concepts

Given that the experimental framework was designed around the idea of Extended Immediate Deterrence Crisis, Huth’s (1988) and Schultz’s (2001) volume are where we find a list of cases that are possibly relevant to the Experimental framework in chapter 3 and the theories laid out in chapter 2. Unfortunately, of more than 58 cases of EID, only 5 (including the one under current analysis) had any coded instances of domestic dissent (Schultz 2001: 167); of those four remaining cases, secondary source material (let alone primary source material) was almost nonexistent. While this study would have liked to examine all of these cases in the context of testing our theories about dissent, information constraints meant that this was not practical.

Given that Hitler has been widely studied from a Psychological perspective, and is an easy mark for the observation of motivated bias, this serves as an “easy test” or plausibility probe for schema theory in the context of deterrence, this seems justified by the strength of the test in chapter 3. While the results of Chapter 3 provided little evidence for the idea that the presence of a stereotypical schema mitigated the effects of domestic dissent, we do uncover some evidence in support of schema theory here.

In this chapter, we will thus employ the general methodology laid out by prior foreign policy scholars who are guided by the general methodology of studying “the

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129 The other four cases of EID in which dissent was present were the 1886 British attempt to deter Greece from attacking Turkey; the Panama Canal crisis, in which the US attempted to deter Colombia from attacking Panama; the 1922 British attempt to deter Turkey from attacking Greece, and the 1961-62 attempt by the Netherlands to deter the Indonesians from attacking West Irian (the western half of the island of New Guinea, which was a dutch colony until the early 1960s).

130 On “easy” vs. “hard” cases, see Eckstein (1975).
decision-maker in the decision-making setting.” In the present context, that means we must get as close as possible to the records that foreign policy decision-makers leave behind. In this chapter, the goal is to reconstruct decision-makers’ perceptions of this credibility and its causes prior to and during a crisis. How do we find traces of these perceptions? Firstly, we systematically examine the speech acts—both public and private—that decision-making elites leave behind. We also must make good use of archival materials from inside government decision-making bodies to the extent that they are available. But the majority of the criticism of content analytic schemes revolves around two points. Many scholars have criticized content analyses on grounds that we cannot take what politicians say as indications of what they really think. Though one cannot reasonably quibble with the accuracy of this claim—after all, few take what politicians say at face value— it ceases to be a valid criticism of the methodology proposed within because it applies to nearly every concept in social science with equal accuracy. Perceptions are no more real or empirically observable than power, perhaps the seminal concept in international relations. 

As such, the challenges in operationalizing perceptions are no greater than they are for non-psychological studies of international relations. Consequently, the solution is similar: existing theory must guide our operationalization. By theorizing verbal imagery as a psychological balancing mechanism and using that verbal imagery as evidence of the activation of stereotypical schemata, we assume that decision-maker beliefs will

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132 For a good review of the challenges of operationalizing the concept of power, see Baldwin (2002).
unconsciously seep into their spoken and written descriptions of other states.
Nonetheless, we still must make adjustments to correct for the tendency of politicians to tailor their public speech acts for the consumption of the masses. As such, this will make an active attempt to consider the context in which speeches are given; private speech acts will be weighted as more diagnostic than public ones. Especially in cases where we now know that foreign policymakers actively attempted to deceive their counterparts, this seems a prudent adjustment. As we will detail below, in the case of the crisis over Czechoslovakia, there was enormous spread between Hitler’s public and private perceptions of France. In public, he desired nothing but peace and honest friendship with Germany’s longtime enemy. In private, and in his writings, Hitler saw France as a racially inferior thorn in the Aryan race’s side.

Where will we find these speech acts? In a perfect world there would be a comprehensive database to provide large amounts of verbal imagery that would allow constant measurement across cases, no such database exists. Thus, we will do the best we can with the available materials. Many of those materials are found in anthologies of the speeches of political materials, some are found in primary source documentary records, and many will be gleaned from secondary historical sources.

Though the theories outlined in chapter two gives us expectations for the inferences that should be drawn about domestic dissent, we must make those predictions less structured in order to observe their consequences in the real world of historical cases. Though we can deduce hypotheses from schema theory, they are more easily applied to extended immediate deterrent crises in the laboratory setting. In the real world, because
we cannot as easily track the content of beliefs across time given the inconsistency of available documentary sources at any given moment in time, we must take a blunter approach to measurement of our key concepts. Hence, within these cases, when we look for perceptions of credibility, or resolve, we will not be able to observe incredibly fine-grained variation, because we will be limited by the way in which decision-makers contemporaneously track these concepts in real-world situations. Decision-makers rarely give concrete estimates of probabilities or express the confidence in their beliefs in any reliable way.\textsuperscript{133}

Additionally, decision-makers will rarely extemporaneously express which of our concepts they are discussing. Cabinet-level discussions about another state’s resolve, for instance, are rarely labeled as such by the persons speaking at the time. Hence, we must read the historical record closely in order to find our concepts of interest. Although a quantitative measurement guide would have been ideal, the following guide to measurement of this study’s key concepts was built inductively. Discussions about will, stomach, internal strength/weakness, fortitude, character, etc. can all be seen as being linked to the concept of state resolve, which also loads onto the concept of culture.\textsuperscript{134} Discussions regarding power and culture are a bit easier to spot. Power is typically discussed in terms of strength and is rarely discussed by top level decision-makers in specific, operational terms—rather, they tend to speak in generalities. Because of the

\textsuperscript{133} In a perfect world, a sufficient dataset would exist to track these beliefs quantitatively—see for instance Hopf (1994).

\textsuperscript{134} Though because here we are looking only at a deterrent crisis, and our leader resolve hypotheses only apply once deterrence has failed, we do not examine movement in the perception of leader resolve in this case study.
early 20\textsuperscript{th} century emphasis that political elites attached to race, discussions about culture, especially in such noncontemporary cases, are also fairly easy to detect. Discussions about the national character, the strength of a country’s “racial stock,” the sophistication of its people, and their awareness of mass politics can all be examined in order to infer a given decision-maker’s perception of another state’s culture. So too can we tie to culture deliberations regarding the decision-making processes and regime types of other states.

It is also important to recognize that the quantity of evidence upon which we can rely to draw conclusions is limited by the way in which decision-makers discuss their own beliefs in public and private. Though in a perfect world we would be able to study credibility at a distance by inferring meaning to their beliefs, we are at the mercy of the empirical traces of beliefs that decision-makers leave behind. Practicality, in other words, dictates not only that we must study verbal imagery, but also that we must rely on decision-maker descriptions of situations and characteristics in order to measure the key concepts in this study.

Recall from Chapter 2 that international images are premised as defined by decision-maker beliefs about relative goal interdependence (i.e. posing a threat or an opportunity), relative power, and relative cultural status. When those beliefs are extreme and intensely felt, and fall into certain patterns of the 3*3*3 matrix of relative interests, capability, and culture, stereotypical schemata are considered to be activated. Also, in accordance with chapter 2, as a measure of beliefs about cultural status, we will look for evidence as to whether German beliefs about the French decision-making process look similar to the stereotypical views aligned with each type of imagery. So this chapter will
proceed with three general empirical tasks: identifying the general image type, determining the correspondence of the beliefs to the stereotypical (schema) form of the image, and looking at the impact of domestic dissent (once it emerged) on perceptions of credibility and resolve.

Continuing to employ the Extended Immediate Deterrence crisis as the unit of analysis, changes in Nazi perceptions of French credibility and resolve will be analyzed before Munich and after Munich but before the failure of the French deterrent threat—which is when the most visible dissent in the French polity broke out (see below).

4.2 Setting the Historical Stage for the Sudeten Crisis, Hitler’s Initial Perceptions of Opportunity in Czechoslovakia

Following its humiliating defeat in World War I, Adolf Hitler rose to power from the ashes of a shattered German state. The Treaty of Versailles was conceived of to end World War I and take steps to neutralize future German aggression (Taylor 1983). But not long into his appointment as Germany’s chancellor in 1933 and subsequent monopolization of political power, in steps to acquire *lebensraum* for the German people, Hitler began a campaign to free Germany from the treaty’s shackles by re-militarizing the Rhineland adjacent to northeast France in 1936, directly contrary to the treaty’s provisions (Taylor 1983: 97-101). Consolidating his control at home and abroad, Hitler subsequently provoked a crisis that led to the German occupation and annexation of Austria by March 1938 as an attempt to unite all peoples of Germanic ancestry in Europe under a single government (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997: 591-592). The Munich

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135 The nomenclature from Huth’s EID framework is again worth applying in this case. Germany is the attacker, France is the defender, and Czechoslovakia is the protégé.
agreement in September 1938 paved the way for German occupation of the Sudetenland, and the eventual failure of the French and British deterrent threat to retaliate against Germany in the event of German invasion of Czechoslovakia, which occurred on 16 March 1939.

It is with the pursuit of territory firmly in mind that the historical context of the Czechoslovakian crisis must be understood. As Hitler described in his speeches of September 12, 1938 and March 7, 1936, the Nazis viewed Czechoslovakia as a bastard child—a state “founded…by forcing other nationalities into a structure” that was the product of the 1919 Versailles treaty (Hitler 1973: 505-506). The provisions of Versailles were “injuries” that “the German people cannot forever stand…should not bear…and will not bear…” (Hitler 1973: 370). Of concern to Hitler was the 3.5 million ethnic Germans who has been separated from the German state by virtue of Germany’s defeat in World War I and the consequent dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian state. In the new Czechoslovakian state, in Hitler’s view, this 25% minority of the Czechoslovakian state was oppressed because of the tyranny of the Czech majority, which left these ethnic Germans disproportionately vulnerable to the political and economic consequences of the Great Depression. Though the ethnic Germans of which Hitler spoke were spread all over the new Czechoslovak state, the lion’s share of them lived in the Sudeten political division, adjacent to the southeast German border.

Though Hitler certainly wished to annex the Sudeten regions of Czechoslovakia, he foremost wished that his desire to do so would activate Czech alliances that would give him an excuse to use the German *wehrmacht* for a broader invasion of
Czechoslovakia that would result in the maximal territorial gain for the German state (Bloch 1992: 176-177). But the spirit of alliance and cooperation that followed World War I meant that Hitler could not be sure of such a quick conquest if he attacked Czechoslovakia. The relevant alliance that would in theory govern the European response to a Nazi attack on Czechoslovakia was the Locarno treaty. Although France agreed to act on Czechoslovakia’s behalf in the event it was attacked by Germany, because Britain was a party to the broader agreement at Locarno which served as a nonaggression pact among the European Great Powers, British responsibility in the event of German aggression was less clear. Were they obligated to assist France in its defense of Czechoslovakia the event of a German attack, or were they bound to not assist in resisting until they could ascertain the “aggressor’s” nationality? In essence, did the Locarno treaties render Britain practically unable to fight Germany under the nonaggression provisions (Taylor 1983: 48-56)?

For his part, Hitler was unsure of the answer to this question, remaining convinced well into late 1937 that at least British retaliation for Nazi seizure for Czechoslovakia could be safely written off as a realistic possibility though at that time he was less convinced of French inaction (GFM DII 1949: 32-34). But by the time the crisis flared in mid-1938, he was convinced that the French lacked the capability or resolve to respond. As a consequence, this unique opportunity to add territory to the German state needed to “be seized” (May 2000: 70). These quotes do two things:

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136 Given the cumbersome nature of the parenthetical format here, the reader is advised that DFGP stands for Documents on German Foreign Policy, the canonical translated archive of the Hitler era. D II is the volume and series number within the collection.
provide us with evidence that the credibility of any French deterrent threat to protect 
Czechoslovakia was likely perceived as low within Hitler’s government prior to the 
exhibition of domestic dissent in France, and contribute to the background for our section 
on the perception of French interests.

4.3 The French Deterrent Threat and Dissent in the French Polity

In accordance with Huth’s (1988) definition of extended-immediate deterrent 
situations, we treat the formal beginning of this crisis as occurring when explicit threats 
of force were made to the state contemplating aggression. In this case, that means that 
the crisis begun when France and made explicit deterrent threats to Germany on behalf of 
Czechoslovakia. France, according to Paul Huth, made this threat explicit during an 
April 4, 1938 meeting between meetings between its foreign minister, Joseph Paul 
Boncour, and the German ambassador to France, Johannes Welczeck (Huth 1988: 117). 
According to Welczeck, the French position was that it had “given a solemn promise to 
the Prague government” that “in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, France 
would come to [Czechoslovakia’s] help with all the forces at her disposal (DGFP\(^{137}\) DII: 
214).” Given that the transcript of this conversation was sent to the German Foreign 
Ministry by Welczeck, we can be fairly certain that high level German diplomats, up to 
and including Foreign minister Ribbentrop himself, were apprised of the French threat. 
We should note at this point, however, that the French threat applied only to a German 
“attack,” and thus we cannot regard this threat as a deterrence failure until Hitler’s 
invasion of the non-Sudeten regions of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 as a response to 
the Slovakian declaration of independence which alienated what was left of the Czech

\(^{137}\) DGFP=Documents on German Foreign Policy.
state (Taylor 1983: 201-203). Thus, we are interested in the inferences that German decision-makers were drawing about the French throughout the course of this crisis.

To assess the effect that domestic dissent had on deterrent credibility, we also must determine when dissent to the extant threat emerged within France. As a parliamentary democracy and multiparty system, cabinets formed when several of the many political parties mustered the parliamentary power to form a government. The coalitions in power during the timeframe under discussion were each dominated by left wing political ideologies. The prime ministry was held by members of the so-called “popular front” which was constituted by communists and socialists until April 1938, when Edouard Daladier took over—and though he had been a part of the aforementioned coalition, his 1938 government retained much of the left-wing character of the popular front thereafter. Given Hitler’s outspoken views about the tyranny of socialism (discussed below), we should not be surprised to learn that the French left-wing was more radically militaristic than the right-wing when it came to Hitler’s government. The “Resigned Nationalist” party was most opposed to any French military involvement from the beginning of the crisis, publicly advocating “peace-at-any-price” during the September crises (Micaud 1972: 162-163). The Munich agreement was approved by the French parliament 535 to 75 (Ibid: 176), which constitutes dissent against French Foreign Minister Bocour’s deterrent threat.

The dissent that existed only worsened in the aftermath of the Munich settlement, with the government’s foreign policy of appeasement being upheld, but by a chamber

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vote of a narrow margin—just 323-261 (Micaud 1972: 190). This vote would indicate that Boncour’s April extended deterrent threat—which technically had not been activated because Germany had not “attacked” Czechoslovakia—enjoyed political support of approximately 45%. This analysis will use Munich as the pivot point for comparative analysis, given that that was when French dissent pertaining to Deterrent strategy was the most divided.

4.4 German Imagery of France prior to the Munich Agreement

To test the hypotheses implied in Chapter 3, the first task we ideally would undertake is to determine the prevailing imagery of France in the speech acts of German foreign policy elites at the moment the French made their extended deterrent commitment to Czechoslovakia in order to determine the extent to which a stereotypical schema was activated.

Though written material is somewhat sparse given the closed nature of the Nazi cabinet (and Hitler’s noted penchant to speak, rather than write) this section will do the best possible job within the constraints of available material in attempting to reconstruct German beliefs concerning western interests, capability, and culture, focusing first on German perceptions of France. Given the prevailing structure of the German foreign policy decision-making process, the two elites whose views will be sampled predominantly will be Hitler, and his foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. The

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139 This claim is dependent on the assumption that those who objected to the left-wing government’s foreign policy decisions at Munich would have supported a more assertive use of French military power. The reader should also note that this level of dissent is roughly in line with the “60% opposition” threshold used as the operationalization of dissent in the experimental batteries in Chapter 3.
main satisficing measure taken to gather data is that the perceptions of interests, culture, power, and resolve are taken over a longer time horizon than would be ideal.

If we uncover evidence that a stereotypical schema was active, we can expect that domestic dissent’s negative effect on German perceptions of state resolve and credibility should be moderated. If, on the other hand, we uncover evidence that a stereotypical schema was not active, we should expect the prediction of the rationalist conventional wisdom to hold true.

**German Perceptions of French Interests**

Hitler’s verbal imagery of French interests were marked by contradictions (Leitz 2004: 33-35). Though Hitler maintained in public that he saw German and French interests as aligned rather than opposed—a Franco-German *rapprochement*—in private, he was considerably less conciliatory. Hitler’s perceptions of French interests fluctuated, from extremely threatening to German intrinsic interests in 1925 to posing an opportunity for German exploitation shortly before the onset of the Sudeten crisis in 1938.

In 1925, Hitler viewed French interests in fairly black-and-white terms that left no doubt that France was seen as perhaps the greatest enemy of the German state. “The inexorable mortal enemy of the German people is and remains France,” irrespective of “what governments …will rule in France.” Further, he viewed French interests as posing an inimical and existential threat to the German state, claiming not only that France was implacably against Germany “as a world power,” but was opposed to “the existence of the German fatherland” more broadly. As a result of French desire of “possession of the Rhine frontier” granted it under the treaty of Versailles, German interests were
inextricably opposed to French interests—Germany was indeed fighting for “the daily bread of [its] children” (Hitler 1971: 619-620). As recently as 1928, during the dictation of his second book, Hitler suggested that “whatever European [alliance] combinations may appear in the future, France will always cooperate with the anti-German ones,” and that “in every conflict Germany will become entangled—regardless of the reasons and regardless of the causes—France will always be our enemy.” The reasons for Hitler’s perception were that “the central idea of French foreign policy [was] still the conquering of the Rhine border” and “the tearing up of Germany into individual states…[was] viewed as the best defense of [that] border. In spite of France’s insistence that their objective was to serve the interests of international peace, in Hitler’s eyes, this development indicated that “French continental political objectives [were] a question of life and death for Germany” (Hitler 2003: 140-141).

But as recently as 1936, Hitler gave public assurances that did not view German and French interests as inextricably opposed. Hitler on March 7, 1936, in public lamented what he considered to be misperceptions on both sides of German-French relations in the first half of the decade, suggesting that Germany’s re-armament and return to great power status had “caused nothing painful to the French people” (Hitler 1941: 370). Hitler, in his words, tried “to construct a bridge of understanding to the French people.” Germany, though it “once faced [France] as [an] embittered opponent[t], wanted to create a climate in which the two nations “respect[ed] each other today as brave combatants in a past great struggle” who should “meet again as bearers and conservators of the great general human treasure of culture.” He wished to “call off the purposeless century-long quarrel” and “substitute it for a higher recognition of common
sense”. In short, he wished to create a relationship of “mutual respect for each other and of [sic] European cooperation,” insisting that the German people would experience no joy if the French were to be “visited by misfortune (Ibid 371-372).” But behind closed doors, Hitler was far less conciliatory, referring to France as a “hate-inspired antagonist” during a meeting with the German High Command (Hitler 1990: 966). More proximately to the Sudeten crisis, it is difficult to reconstruct Hitler’s perception of the threat posed by French interests from public speeches as he gave no foreign policy speeches between April 9 and September 6, 1938.

**German Perceptions of French Culture**

Hitler’s perceptions of France are predominantly marked by his consistent denigration of democracy. Democracies were “outworn”—denigrated in Hitler’s mind because democracies allow the free exercise of all religions, and hence democratic states tended to also be states in which Hitler saw the runaway influence of Jewish culture as dragging down other, more superior races (Rauschning 1940: 107). In his September 14, 1936 speech at the Reichstag, Hitler suggested that democracy’s individual liberties were merely a conduit for the advance of Jewish (and then Marxist) interests. In 1936, he suggested that “democracy is the canal through which Bolshevism lets its poisons flow…” (Hitler 1941: 405). This was not an isolated occurrence borne of the tensions of repeated interaction with democratic states since his assumption of the presidency. On the contrary, Hitler’s anti-democratic beliefs went back to his earliest writing in Mein

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140 It should be noted that although the authenticity of Rauschning’s work is in question, per Rauschning’s Wikipedia page, it is generally regarded as a good guide to how Hitler thought (written by someone who knew him) even if the interviews upon which it is based never took place.
Kampf. At that time, he called Western democracy that which “provides this world plague [Marxism] with the culture in which its germs can spread” (Hitler 1971: 78). In addition to this affectively charged frequent invocation of disease and infection to refer to France’s national character, the historical record also shows dehumanization of the French. While almost two decades prior to the Czechoslovakia crisis, Hitler summed up his perception of what he saw as French cultural inferiority in late 1921: “Africa [had] its monkeys, Europe its French” (Hitler 1941: 143).

More proximate to the outbreak of the Sudeten crisis, Hitler’s perception of French culture remained driven by his perception that democracy was inferior in cultural status to what he believed to be the rising tide of Germany’s fascist revolution. In 1934, he believed France to be “humdrum and circumspect,” best described as “a nation of dried-up clerks.” The French (democratic) system of governance was “outworn,” and their ideas about world politics were “totally obsolete.” Fascism, in Hitler’s eyes, gave him moral superiority (as well as diplomatic advantage) over “Bourgeois democrats” by giving him freedom from “pedantic and sentimental inhibitions,” which he regarded as “moral fancies for old women” (Rauschning 1940: 277-278). By 1934, Hitler believed that French culture was ripe for conquest by the Superior German bloodline because “the era of democracy…[was] inexorably finished” (Hitler 1941:105). This latter quotation is suggestive that Hitler viewed France as posing an opportunity for exploitation.

**German Perceptions of French Military Capability**

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141 For a good introduction to dehumanization, see Haslam (2006).
For all of his noted psychopathology, Hitler’s early perceptions of the European balance of power were more or less firmly anchored in reality. Hitler properly appraised the decimated state of Germany’s relative military capability as a result of the Treaty of Versailles in his days as a political prisoner and in his early days as Chancellor, seeing French capabilities as far superior to those of Germany, believing that French military superiority was so great as to constitute an existential threat to the German state. In 1928, Hitler spoke of France’s propensity to exploit “German weakness” that could lead to “damage on [Germany] and disunite [the German people]” that might eventually result in “complete [German] disintegration” (Weinberg 2003:144). One can infer that this should map onto a relatively equal perception of military capability.

But as time went on and Hitler gained power, he succumbed to the temptations posed by his own theories of racial ideology. In this regard, the often formidable material capabilities of potential adversaries were discounted in favor of assessing national power by means of race. Though after the fact, Hitler described his own views on the relative unimportance of material military capability in August 1939, asserting that “it is not machines that fight each other, but men.” Germany “[had] the better men as regards quality” because “spiritual factors” were more decisive in predicting battlefield success than material (Hitler 1990: 1668). According to Hitler, France “was not so strong as it had been in 1914,” and in actuality was “manifestly weaker.” (May 2000: 69). His conceptions of Germany’s relative military capability were considered dangerous by members of his cabinet.

142 On Hitler’s psychopathology, see for instance Langer (1972).

143 For this assertion see Press (2004: 152-153), and Weinberg (1994: 5).
Chief of the German General Staff Beck warned Hitler stridently about what he saw as the limitations of German armaments and the likelihood that France would defeat Germany should they counterattack in light of the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. Beck, prior to his resignation in August 1938, dispatched a number of memos that were striking in the extent to which they departed from Hitler’s thinking, and though these assessments were spoken after the French deterrent threat was issued, the military documents upon which Beck’s statements are based date back several months, making them reasonable fodder for the assessment of German perceptions of French capability. Quite simply, Beck’s ideas departed so much from Hitler’s because he based his thinking on much more prudent assumptions—some have even called his beliefs about French power “worst case” assumptions. Beck, for instance, on May 5, 1938 volunteered that the French army “is and remains intact and [was] at the moment the best in Europe.” As such, his May 5 memo concluded that Germany had “neither the economic nor military base to fight a major war, much less a world war with any prospect of success” (Murray 1984: 174-175; May 2000: 68). Responding directly to Hitler’s own statements, Beck contended that it “was not accurate to judge Germany [at the time] as stronger than in 1914.” For this reason, Germany, even in the event of Italian assistance, “[was] not in a position militarily to match England or France” (May 2000: 71).

To the extent that Hitler made any calculation about German capability, his thinking appears to have counted on the so-called “Siegfried line” or “Westwall” to deter French response to German seizure of Czechoslovakia, or in the event that it did not, this fortification would discount allied military power by rendering France unable to project their power across the European continent (Robertson 1985: 208-209). Ultimately,
however, Hitler was able to perceptually write off British and French material capability by discounting their power with a belief that they were internally weak states; that is, that these democracies lacked resolve at the state level. It is to the appraisal of Hitler’s pre-crisis preconception of French resolve to which we now turn.

**German perceptions of French State Resolve and Credibility**

As hinted above, Hitler discounted the credibility of the threats made by France and England to aid Czechoslovakia if Hitler made good on his May 1938 promise to “smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future” (Hitler 1990b: 1114). In a cabinet meeting on November 5, 1937, Hitler stated that the “internal political difficulties” of the French parliamentary system made effective conduct of foreign policy impossible for the French. Because of their democratic nature, the pacifistic public would be dead-set against any military intervention that might ensnare France in a protracted military campaign. And even though France had a formal alliance that would require them to assist Czechoslovakia, the internal dissent over an aggressive stand on the Sudeten question would also make it difficult for France to convince Britain to assist in the efforts to repel a German invasion. Because of this internal weakness within France, Hitler was of the mind that “France…had already tacitly written off the Czechs” and thus would not make good on their deterrent threats (Ibid: 968-969). Hitler believed that the internal politics within France would make it likely that either “internal strife within France [would] develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the French army” or that France would be “so [politically] embroiled by a war with another state that she could not proceed against Germany” in the event of their invasion of Czechoslovakia (Ibid: 969).
Beck’s memo of May 5 disagreed with Hitler’s perception. Though he conceded that the French people may not have the stomach for capricious military campaigns, he sought to caution Hitler that “in the case of a real threat or what is perceived by the people to be foreign-policy [sic] pressure, the French nation comes together as one” (May 2000: 68).

In spite of the bureaucratic disagreement, no high commanders in the German military had the courage (excepting Beck) to forcefully confront Hitler’s perceptions of French resolve. Indeed, by the end of this crisis, Beck would resign in protest, though if he had not, Hitler would have fired him in order to appoint someone without contrarian or cautious foreign policy views (Ibid: 72-78). As such, the facts make it quite clear that Hitler did not think highly of French resolve prior to the initiation of the Sudeten crisis. Hitler recalled retrospectively in the aftermath of Munich that he did not believe that England or France would go to war (Murray 1984: 267). These factors combined with this discounting of the instruments of French power causes us to label the credibility assigned to the French deterrent threat prior to Munich quite low.

**Labeling the German Image of France**

So how should we sum up the imagery emergent in Hitler’s references to the French? Which, if any of the images did Hitler’s verbal imagery most resemble? Other scholars have suggested that German imagery most nearly resembled the degenerate stereotype, and that certainly seems a reasonable suggestion (Herrmann et al. 1997: 410). Culturally, Hitler did indeed view the French as inferior. French foreign policy interests, while somewhat threatening, were also seen as leading to an opportunity for German
exploitation, especially when it came to Czechoslovakia. Hitler’s perceptions of what he saw as the inferior French military capability, meanwhile, were aberrant when compared to those of most of his military staff (see above), but were stoked by sycophantic ideologues like foreign minister von Ribbentrop (Andrews 1951: 137-138).

If we were to attempt to gauge the resemblance of the German perception of France to our four-pronged experimental operationalization of the stereotypical degenerate image (personal qualities of national leaders, policy implementation effectiveness, unity of top-level decision-making, relative national culture) we would likely come to the conclusion that Hitler’s perception met the criteria. Indeed, as the preceding case study indicates, Hitler likely saw the French leadership as lacking national purpose and as being easily led adrift by political winds. Hitler probably believed that the French political/military was badly incompetent at implementing foreign policy, and he certainly doubted the unity of top-level decision-makers (though he did not believe that this lack of unity existed because some French officials were motivated by a desire for personal material enrichment). And finally, he certainly saw the French as culturally inferior to Germans.

But although the degenerate stereotype is nearest to Hitler’s verbal imagery, the fit is not quite perfect. As seen above, there is not perfect verbal evidence indicating the feeling of need to seize opportunity. Additionally, in the stereotypical degenerate image, military capability of a target state is seen as roughly equal (but fading). This is not precisely the case here, though one could reasonably argue that Hitler’s beliefs were that French capability was somewhere between parity and inferiority. But it is difficult to
separate Hitler’s musings on French capability from his musings on French culture. The terribly inferior culture Hitler saw in the French bears strong resemblance to the decay seen in stereotypical “degenerate” states. Additionally, the speech acts of Hitler, and the intensity of emotion for which he is noted should give us confidence that our expectation should be that the degenerate schema was active in shaping Hitler’s processing of incoming information. We should thus expect that dissent that emerged during the crisis should not affect Hitler’s beliefs in French State resolve or credibility. That is to say, because a belief in a lack of French resolve was likely consistent with the schema unconsciously at work for Hitler, it is unlikely that his perception of French resolve would have been any higher had dissent not been omnipresent in the French polity leading up to the failure of the French deterrent threat.

4.5 Conclusions: German Perceptions of France After Munich and the Emergence of Dissent

Rationalist signaling theory suggests that the emergence of domestic dissent during the French parliamentary vote on the Munich agreement should have subsequently diminished Hitler’s perceptions of French state resolve and credibility. Schema theory suggests otherwise; essentially arguing that an indicator of weak state resolve like dissent should be undiagnostic in a case where a stereotypical schema suggesting weakness is active. What do we find?

While speech data from inside the Nazi cabinet becomes less available in the time after Munich (likely in preparation for War), there is fairly wide agreement among scholars that Hitler had decided to “annex the remaining Czech territory at the first opportunity” (Weinberg 1980: 467). In making his decision, he was “confident that no
one would interfere” (Weinberg 2005: 841). Indeed, within about three weeks of Munich, “Hitler ordered Keitel to begin preparation of deployment orders for seizing the rest of Czechoslovakia (Murray 1984: 266). The German ambassador in France reported back to the Foreign Ministry on November 30, 1938 that a “reorientation [of] French foreign policy [was] now in progress in the direction of turning away from Central and Eastern Europe” (DGFP D4: 467).

While it does not seem as though the German view of French credibility diminishes in the time after the emergence of domestic dissent; neither does it seem to increase. Although the data is sparse in the time period after Munich, the relative stability about beliefs of French state resolve and credibility seems to support the contention of schema theory. Indeed, rather than dissent providing novel information, it seems to be “baked in” to the metaphorical pie of German perceptions about the credibility of the French deterrent threat.

There exists one additional possibility worth examining. Given Hitler’s almost caricature-like depiction of France prior to Munich, if one were to quantitatively label his perceptions of French credibility and state resolve on a scale of 1-100, one might assign some number in the low single digits. If this was in fact the case, it seems possible that Hitler’s perceptions of French credibility and state resolve may have increased, rather than decreased during the crisis. In essence, this would be a non-statistical occurrence of a phenomenon tantamount to regression to the mean. If Hitler’s beliefs were extreme at some point in time prior to the exhibition of dissent, those beliefs may have been more likely to moderate over time. But given that we can get only so
temporally close to German beliefs at the time of the “actual” occurrence of dissent, this is a possibility we cannot evaluate empirically in the confines of this case.

4.6 Limitations of The Case Study Analysis

Firstly, one might argue that the extended immediate deterrence framework is strained because we cannot find direct evidence that the French Foreign minister’s threat was relayed to Hitler, the top foreign policy decision-maker in Germany. While we can consider it probable that if it reached Ribbentrop, it likely reached Hitler, we aren’t entirely convinced. While the threat was made explicitly, and thus meets Huth’s (1988) definition for inclusion in the EID dataset, the circumstances of the threat described above are not ones that commonly come to mind when one thinks about the forms an “explicit threat” might take.

Second, one will notice that we by necessity are measuring perceptions of credibility generally with reference to the correlates of credibility. Until after Munich, when the specter of German action for the remainder of Czechoslovakia loomed, few were commenting the credibility of the French threat and spoke more about French resolve in general terms. While in the context of an experiment like the one presented in Chapter 3, we can simply ask someone how credible a deterrent threat is, when using historical sources, we don’t get to choose what decision-makers discussed during a given crisis. So our data on German perceptions is necessarily provided at an irregular refresh rate, and we are left to use only our conceptual definitions and their deduced meaning to guide our information search. Furthermore, given the high correlation between credibility and resolve (Cronbach’s alpha .81) in our experiment, it may be a bridge too
far to expect to be able to conceptually differentiate between state resolve and credibility within the confines of a historical case.

While these factors do cause us to treat the results outlined herein with a healthy dose of caution, this case study is only meant to serve as a plausibility probe of the power of schema theory for explaining dissent’s lack of effect on deterrent credibility.
5: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

This dissertation has sought to serve as the first direct and systematic tests of the perceptual corollaries of domestic dissent. It is my belief that it has succeeded in this task, but more work remains to be done. While I set out to de-bunk the conventional wisdom about the negative effects of domestic dissent, the support we received for the alternate theory I test meets with only limited approval. But sometimes progress in research comes incrementally; and we must always judge the success of a research effort not by its substantive findings, but by the reasonableness of the hypotheses tested at its outset. Although my results largely confirm the conventional wisdom about domestic dissent, the knowledge we have acquired along the way is still of value to scholars and decision-makers. The remainder of the chapter will briefly summarize the conclusions of the previous chapters in section 5.1, remark on the limitations of this study in 5.2, suggest intriguing avenues for further research in section 5.3, and briefly remark on the relevance of the results to policymakers in section 5.4.

5.1 Conclusions

The most striking finding from the experimental data is the regularity with which the conventional wisdom about dissent’s negative effect is robust across image
manipulations. Being as they are reflective upon the perceived relative interests, power, and culture a decision-maker holds of her counterpart, they constitute a fairly robust test of domestic dissent in a variety of perceptual circumstances.

Generally speaking, in our experimental results, we find the rationalist conventional wisdom about domestic dissent’s negative effect supported far more than we find support for our theory of the moderation that schemata provide in the interpretation of signals. Rather than being prisoners of their preconceptions (Tetlock 1999) in assessing the likely attributes of opposing states, the decision-makers in our convenience sample engaged in data-driven reasoning (cf. Koopman, Jervis, and Snyder) far more than theories of image-driven processing (cf. Jervis 1976; Herrmann 1985) might suggest. While we did not test the rate of belief change against a Bayesian ideal, it seems plausible that had we tried, we might have observed rates that approached it. The possibility that an undergraduate sample (theoretical *tabula-rasas*, in a manner of speaking)\(^{144}\) that do not possess active and persistent mental models of states in the international system might be more rational belief updaters is a possibility raised by Tetlock (2005) in his discussion of rational learning.

Our case study does give us some pause in completely siding with the rationalist model, suggesting that domestic dissent is not condemned to negatively affect the perceived credibility of threats or perceptions of state/leader resolve. Instead, the case

\(^{144}\) What I mean here is of course the possibility that in comparison to elite decision-makers with well developed ideologies and belief systems about states in the international system, the average undergraduate, given her likely paucity of mental models of other states, should be more capable of belief change. It seems logical, then, that the employment of a convenience sample, was in fact a very “tough” test for the effects of stereotypical international images.
study of German beliefs in the Czechoslovakia crisis shows that Hitler was cut off from incoming information, operating as nearly a perceptual island. We find no evidence in the documentary record that the “dissent” that Schultz coded was even noticed by any high-level German decision-maker. These findings square with other case study analyses that have suggested that foreign policy decision-maker beliefs about resolve are more or less immobile, and that the interpretation of signals often bears no resemblance to the way in which the theorist sees them. Hopf’s (1994) study of Soviet inferences from American retreats during the Cold War, Mercer’s (1996) study of reputation formation, and a host of other studies all make similar suggestions—arguing that beliefs about resolve are not updated in a smooth or efficient way.

Additionally, although the rationalist conventional wisdom regarding the negative effect of state resolve and credibility is supported in a wide variety of the experimental circumstances explored in Chapter three, the so called “madman theory” of coercion is not. Being as it was—spawned in the mind of Richard Nixon—it may not seem surprising that this idea is not supported by evidence. While it certainly seems intuitively plausible, and Nixon certainly found it persuasive, that does not make it valid in describing the movement of foreign perceptions about credibility and resolve. The results of this study seem to support the idea that Nixon’s musings to Haldeman on the madman theory were driven by fantasy more than reality.

Taken as a whole, some might see the experimental results in this dissertation as validating the free use of theories or models that assume rational communication and smooth updating of beliefs about the credibility and resolve of effectively unitary states.
This would be a mistake. Given the results of the case study analysis are generally countervailing to those of the experiments, caution is well-advised until the experimental results can be replicated. Furthermore, efforts to more precisely empirically measure and theoretically unpack the concept of leader resolve can broaden future studies of coercive diplomacy. As discussed in chapter two, a research community is already emerging that is undertaking this very task (cf. Wolford 2007; Pak and Palmer 2010).

5.2 Limitations of the Research

As discussed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, the primary limitations of any empirical study based around laboratory experiments will always be external validity based. What, some might ask, is the relevance of the experimental responses of OSU undergraduates to theories about signaling among Foreign Policy decisionmakers? The answer of course, is that although they represent a far more sophisticated and engaged universe of individuals, they are still human, and therefore psychologically relevant.

As we discussed in Chapter 3, internal validity of the experimental results can be challenged as well--we set up a very difficult case for the observation of stereotypical imagery. OSU undergrads cannot be expected to have the emotional engagement in matters of foreign policy to necessarily be fair targets in which to observe the strong motivated biases that will substantially inhibit communication. Even theories of cognitive dissonance reduction or confirmation bias generally require well-developed hypotheses—or mental models—in order to produce expectations of slow belief change. Undergraduates, in hindsight, seem less likely to have mental models of other states that are requisitely well-developed. To the extent that any of schema theory’s hypotheses are
supported by the experimental data, the difficulty of the setup for schema theory should not be overlooked.

I remain firmly convinced that given its rarity, more extensive experimental testing would be a good thing for the study of this phenomenon. Firstly, most of the statistical tests we performed in chapter 3 could be argued to be underpowered. Replication on a larger sample size is needed to check the generalizability of our results. Furthermore, our dissent manipulation was extremely weak, and the validity with which we tapped into whether stereotypical schemata were activated was perhaps too tenuous in hindsight. If emotional arousal is the best way to elicit motivated bias, future researchers will have to think carefully about how to do this within the confines of the laboratory. Finally, one would like to see these results replicated on experimental subjects who more closely resemble the inferential target of elite decision-makers. While this is obviously a tough assignment for financial and practical reasons, any increase in the sophistication of the experimental pool would result in more externally valid inferences being drawn from that study than can be drawn from this one.

Additionally, further case study analyses of dissent’s effects may prove fruitful, because of what Schultz calls the “restraining effect” and the “confirmatory effect,” the political incentives of leaders may artificially constrain history’s universe of cases. In a sense, because of the pervasiveness of the conventional wisdom about dissent, leaders may not choose to resist threats when they anticipate a lack of support from either their legislature or their domestic public. In essence, “state leaders have incentives to confound our inferences.” This is the case because “to the extent that leaders value
holding office, they are unlikely to make choices that lead to outcomes with high domestic political costs. (Schultz 2001b: 33) This means that when we observe leaders who disregard their own political welfare, we’d prefer if they and their leaders should be randomly resolute. Essentially, when we observe real world cases (not laboratory experiments) in which the leader makes a deterrent threat or escalates a crisis, we should expect that they should possess an unusually large amount of resolve.

The leaders in the real world cases that have been selected by specific domestic and international circumstances; the very fact that a leader has strategically chosen to make a deterrent threat or escalate a crisis means that we should expect those same leaders to be exceptionally resolute. That is, domestic dissent has a self-confirming effect; if real-world leaders think that a threat made in the face of dissent cannot be credible, then the universe of cases is artificially smaller than if leaders had no inkling that this may be the case. This problem could be mitigated somewhat by studying the validity of the theoretical framework herein on other universes of crisis diplomacy cases. Given the problematic availability or archival data for the other four EID cases discussed in chapter four, the ICB dataset (cf. Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997) seems one promising avenue for this expansion.

Another solution to the problem of a small universe of cases is to take further efforts to simulate the data that the universe has left out by virtue of the common political leader’s perception of her domestic incentive structure.145 While simulations will never be empirical in the same way that case studies are, they can still add to our understanding

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145 Schultz (2001b) has done this in the context of audience costs.
of the difficult-to-study phenomenon of domestic dissent by illuminating the range of empirical possibilities that follows from tenable assumptions.

5.3 Policy Implications

The policy implications of the study are ones that I do not want to write, but am compelled by scientific integrity to do so. With some exceptions, we have determined that dissent may generally be harmful to perceptions of state resolve and credibility in coercive diplomacy. Returning to one of the empirical puzzles raised at the outset of this study, while Edward R Murrow was indeed correct that dissent against one's government while at war is not tantamount to disloyalty, it certainly seems to harm the ability of a hypothetical state to credibly threaten in deterrence and compellence crises. Of course, we'd like to see replication of this finding in a wider battery of case studies before we cast a definitive pall over democratic theory's mandates of responsible and informed citizenry. But policy-makers should be sensitive to the fact that if they threaten foreign countries with unpopular deterrent or compellent policies, their countries may pay a price in blood and treasure if opposing decision-makers behave in the ways suggested by my experimental results. But even if leaders heed this advice and are more careful about the threats they do and do not make, that may be a good thing in itself. While our case study analysis did provide some rudimentary support for the idea that because communication in emotion-laden international relationships moderates foreign governments' receipt of signals of domestic dissent, we want to be cautious in our interpretation of this finding.

This study serves as the beginning of this conversation; not its end. Domestic dissent has been empirically neglected for far too long given the importance of public sphere disagreement to the functioning of healthy democracies. Further inquiries into
this phenomenon have the potential to produce more confident and extensive policy guidance.
Appendix A--Demographics

PLEASE MARK YOUR ANSWER RESPONSES ON THE PROVIDED ANSWER SHEET

For this section, on the answer sheet, write the appropriate answer/letter that best describes you or your beliefs.

1. Of what country are you a citizen of?
   A. United States
   B. Canada
   C. Other (please list):

2. What is your age:
   A. 18
   B. 19
   C. 20
   D. 21
   E. 22
   F. Other (please list):

3. We hear a lot of talk these days about political ideology. On the whole, where on this scale would you describe your own political views?
   A. Very liberal
   B. Somewhat liberal
   C. Moderate
D. Somewhat conservative
E. Very conservative
F. Don’t know/refuse to answer

4. What US political party do you most identify with?
   A. Democratic
   B. Republican
   C. Libertarian
   D. Green
   E. Other
   F. Don’t know/refuse to answer

5. For whom did you vote in the 2004 US presidential election?
   A. John Kerry
   B. George Bush
   C. Other
   D. Didn’t vote
   E. Don’t know/refuse to answer

6. For whom did you vote in the 2008 US presidential election?
   A. John McCain
   B. Barack Obama
   C. Other
   D. Didn’t vote
   E. Don’t know/refuse to answer
Appendix B--Experimental Stem

Read the following prompt carefully and answer the questions that follow the prompt below by marking your response on your answer sheet.

(Ally) Imagine that a country called [Archer/Baker/Canfield/Dulles] exists. Dulles is a moderately powerful country that shares most of the same security interests as the United States. Dulles is a close economic partner of the US, with many American corporations doing business within Dulles and many Dulles’s corporations setting up shop in American cities. Generally speaking, Dulles has a thriving economy and its wealth enables it to have a competent military which has an able air force and a formidable navy, along with a small nuclear weapons arsenal. The inclination of the military is generally defensive, and Dulles tends to avoid the use of its military unless it is acting in self-defense. However, the leaders of Dulles are generally good guardians of the physical security of their citizens, and are willing and able to deploy the military if necessary. Seeing its leaders as good guardians of its interests, the public in general supports its military because it sees a robust national defense force as contributing to Dulles’s strong reputation in the international community. Both Americans and residents of Dulles see each other as reliable partners pursuing mutually beneficial economic and security arrangements. Dulles has supported the United States on critical issues such as prevention of international terrorism and managing the spread of nuclear weapons.

(Enemy) Imagine that a country called Archer has been feuding with the United States off and on for years. Archer is a powerful country, with a large population, a reasonably strong economy, and a formidable military capability that is similar in strength to that of the United States. Archer is also a geographically large country, and as such its economic growth is driven by the fruits of its large geographic size. Archer possesses substantial reserves of oil, coal, and natural gas, and has numerous domestic corporations that profit from the sale of these resources in the global marketplace. Archer is also motivated by a desire to promote what its leaders see as the glory of the ingenuity of Archer’s citizens. Archer has a strong military force, with a large standing army, a formidable navy and air force, and a large stockpile of nuclear weapons. Archer is militarily aggressive but it acts as a bully--Archer is willing to pick on weaker states, but tends to shrink from a challenge from a comparably powerful state. Archer also has different ideas about the way the world should be run and what the pressing challenges are in the world today. Archer has opposed US efforts to manage the spread of nuclear weapons and has fought US efforts to prevent genocide in Africa. The leaders of Archer aggressively believe in the superiority of their own country, but their sense of patriotism is not as enthusiastically shared by members of the general public.

(Imperialist) Country Baker is a powerful country on the rise. Baker is a country more powerful than the US, owing to its larger population and the high standard of living the population enjoys.
US Officials fear that if the US ever found itself at war with Baker, the US would be unlikely to prevail. Baker shares few common interests with the US because it seeks at every chance to take advantage of increasingly scarce natural resources in the US and elsewhere around the world. Baker sees itself as a very powerful nation on the global scene, and conceives of its interests very broadly. They do this with an enormously powerful military with millions of soldiers with a formidable airforce and nuclear weapons. Their decision-makers also seek to expand their country’s influence where possible by co-opting governmental elites in other countries with the promise of material enrichment for anyone who aids Baker’s cause. Many countries have tried to resist Baker’s influence in the past but not many have been successful.

(Barbarian) Country Canfield is a powerful, aggressive country. Canfield has the world’s most fearsome military despite lagging behind in the production of technologically advanced equipment. Its soldiers are difficult control because of a lack of discipline in the military ranks. Its soldiers frequently rape women of other countries and steal and loot when on overseas operations. The top military leadership has little interest in controlling this behavior and ignores these problems. Its military, though it has nuclear weapons, is feared mostly because its prior behavior indicates it has little regard for human life or dignity and enjoys violence for its own sake. Canfield’s government conceives of its interests in a peculiar way, believing that being feared is the path towards being respected. Its government has little respect for human rights, and its military seems constantly bloodthirsty, and prefers war to negotiation. Canfield is perceived as a menace worldwide, and government officials within the US fear that the expansion of its influence could have severe and negative consequences for the US. Canfield’s citizens are seen as lacking sophistication, working tedious industrial jobs, and having little desire for education. The country’s citizens have little interest in the arts and sciences.

(Colony) Imagine that a country called Baker is a small, poor country situated in a geographic area rich in natural resources such as gold, oil, and coal. The economy of Baker itself however is rather weak, with farming and agriculture being the predominant industries. Despite its natural resource endowments, there are no companies that are capable of extracting the resources for the benefit of society and the economy has no ability to produce hi-tech items. Through its unique geographic position, Baker controls the ports surrounding an important trade route that 40% of the world cargo ships pass through on a daily basis. In this way, the United States has an interest in the stability of the government of Baker and the entities that do business in and around Baker’s region. The country possesses some modern military technology, but the government is unable to maintain discipline and loyalty within the military because of domestic unrest. As such, the government’s ability to use its military power to repel external threats is in question because the military forces are focused on maintaining peace and order within Baker’s domestic society. The leaders of Baker are generally well-intentioned and seek noble goals, but are hampered in their efforts to accomplish these goals by radical members within the political elite. The citizens of Baker are generally uneducated, and the literacy rate among Baker’s citizens barely reaches 60%. This lack of literacy is a reflection of antiquated educational institutions.

(Degenerate) Imagine that a country called Canfield exists. Canfield has a viable economy in which there exist some thriving industries but other troubled ones. Canfield’s chief economic industries are the production of clothing (textiles) and heavy industrial equipment like tractors and construction cranes, but many of the jobs in these industries have left as the economy has stumbled on hard times and foreign corporations, who own most of the factories, have disappeared. The tough economic times that Canfield has experienced has also translated into difficulties for its military as well. Its economic wealth was in previous times translated into an effective military capability, with a small but efficient army and a small air force. But recently
the political leadership of the country has allowed the military capacity to lapse, and observers doubt Canfield’s leader’s ability to coordinate its military forces. Furthermore, they doubt that Canfield’s government would order the use of the military, even in the case of self-defense. The leadership of Canfield then can be characterized as cowardly and lacking a strong sense of national pride. Though the leaders have in the past looked out for the well-being of their citizens, the brunt of the consequences of the deteriorating economy is being absorbed by the mass public, because Canfield’s national leaders have become primarily driven by a taste for luxury items such as fine wines, caviar, and private jets. The hedonistic lifestyle of the leadership has come at the expense of more broadly based economic growth.

There is no right or wrong answer to any of the following questions; they are all a matter of opinion. What we are looking for are your first reactions to the scenarios you read, so please mark your first instinct as your response choice.

7. Based on what you have read to this point about Dulles, how resolute is Dulles likely to be in pursuit of its own foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?

8. Based on what you have read to this point about Dulles, how resolute is the president of Dulles likely to be in future pursuit of Dulles’s foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?

9. Based on what you have read to this point about Dulles, how credible do you expect that the threats that the government of Dulles will be in the future on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely incredible, 10=extremely credible)?

10. In your opinion, which of the following is most likely to describe the unity of the top decision-makers within Dulles?

   A. Top governmental officials are united behind the leader of Dulles’s policies. (Enemy)

   B. Top governmental officials disagree with the leader of Dulles when it is prudent to do so, and work out conflicts through compromise and careful deliberation. (Ally)

   C. Top governmental officials unified behind the leader of Dulles, unification compels compliance from lower-level bureaucrats and foreign governmental officials. (Imperialist)

   D. Top governmental officials of Dulles find unification difficult because of the clan-like structure of various groups of governmental elites and the inability of the top decision-maker to rein in these groups. (Barbarian)

   E. Top governmental officials badly divided between moderate forces who try to loyally serve the president and radical forces that resist the president at every turn. (Colony)
F. Top governmental officials divided; some are responsibly motivated by the national interest, others are corrupt and seek only personal material enrichment. (Degenerate)

11. In your opinion, which of the following most likely describes the effectiveness and ease with which the government of Dulles implements its chosen policies?

A. Policies are implemented more efficiently and effectively than quickly; more complex policies take more time to implement than simple ones. (ally)
B. Policies are implemented in a universal, hierarchical way; the pressure exerted by the leadership on lower level officials compels their swift and certain implementation. (enemy)
C. Policies are slowly and inefficiently implemented because of the lack of support that the lower levels of the government show for the top-level officials. (colony)
D. The implementation of policy is badly inefficient because of the government’s inability to manage the foreign policy decision-making process. (degenerate)
E. Policies are implemented unevenly and unpredictably, because high-level elites cannot control the desires of lower-level officials, and lower level officials disobey instructions when they feel like it. (Barbarian)
F. The implementation of policy is efficient because of the pressures of loyalty but slow because of the size and scope of the state’s overseas bureaucracy (Imperialist)

12. In your opinion, which of the following most likely describes the personal qualities of the leadership of Dulles.

A. Leaders are of high character and qualification. (Ally)
B. Leaders lack a defining sense of national purpose and so are easily led adrift. (Degenerate)
C. Leaders are ruthless, efficient, and out able to carry out complex conspiracies. (Enemy)
D. Leaders are generally well-intentioned, but need to be tutored and prodded to make good decisions. (Colony)
E. Leaders are crafty and cunning, encourage subversion of overseas governments to advance their state’s interests. (imperialist)
F. Leaders are aggressive, coarse and take pleasure in causing others physical pain. (barbarian)

13. In your opinion, on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being of much less sophisticated culture than the US, 5 being comparable culture to the US, and 10 being of much more sophisticated culture than the US, what do you imagine is the caliber of general culture of the leaders and people of Dulles, when compared to those of the United States?

14. What is the probable system of government of Dulles?

A. Democratic (regular elections, diffusion of power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches; similar to the United States)
B. Oligarchy; power is vested primarily in the hands of economic elites who represent profit-seeking big business interests.

C. Oligarchy; power concentrated at the top levels, the state is run by small clans of impulsive and militaristic elites.

D. Autocratic/Totalitarian (no elections, power completely concentrated at the executive level)

15. More precisely, on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 representing the most autocratic, totalitarian dictatorship imaginable, and 10 representing the most democratic system imaginable, what score, in your opinion, most accurately describes the governmental system of Dulles?

Assume that your beliefs about Dulles accurately describe Dulles and use your beliefs to answer questions in subsequent sections. Please do not go back and change your answers in the above section based on what you read in following sections.
Deterrence scenario:

Suppose that Dulles’s geographic neighbor and longtime ally, Mershon, is on the verge of civil war. The US is concerned about letting the situation deteriorate because Mershon possesses nearly half of the world’s proven oil reserves and the US fears that any change of government will make such resources inaccessible for a substantial period of time. Dulles fears American influence in its region because it wants its corporations to have the best possible chance to develop those oil resources themselves, without having to compete with the US. The US is contemplating the deployment of military forces to ensure that Mershon and its oil reserves will be accessible to American companies. Yesterday, however, the president of Dulles, gave a televised speech telling the American president that it will “bear any burden to defend the natural resources of Mershon,” and will bomb US troops if the American president sends troops to Mershon.

16. How likely, on a scale of 1-10 (1= very unlikely, 10= absolute certainty), is the government of Dulles to follow through on its threat to attack US troops in order to protect Mershon?

17. Based on what you have read to this point about Dulles, how resolute is Dulles likely to be in pursuit of its own foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?

18. How resolute is the president of Dulles in his pursuit of Dulles’s foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?
[Dissent]*Suppose now that the majority of the members of the opposition political party within Dulles have spoken out against the president of Dulles to various media outlets, criticizing the president’s threat to bomb the troops that the US might send to protect Mershon. Suppose also that in a recent poll, 60% of Dulles’s citizens opposed the threat made by the president of Dulles. The president of Dulles is aware of the disagreement of his fellow citizens, but remains set on his present course.

[Support]* *Suppose now that an opposition political party within Baker had the opportunity to publically condemn the president of Dulles’s threat, but chose not to. Suppose also that in a recent poll, 60% of Dulles’s citizens supported the threat made by the president of Dulles.

19. How likely, on a scale of 1-10 (1= very unlikely, 10= absolute certainty), is the government of Dulles to follow through on its threat to attack US troops in order to protect Mershon?

20. Based on what you have read to this point about Dulles, how resolute is Dulles likely to be in pursuit of its own foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?

21. How resolute is the president of Dulles in his pursuit of Dulles’s foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?
Failed Deterrence/ Compellence scenario: Suppose now that the threat of the president of Dulles proved ineffective in convincing the US president not to send troops to Mershon and American troops are now stationed on the border between Dulles and Mershon. Dulles has begun bombing US troop positions, and the president of Dulles has said that the bombings will continue until the US withdraws its military forces.

22. How likely, on a scale of 1-10 (1= very unlikely, 10= absolute certainty), is the government of Dulles to continue bombing US troops until they are withdrawn?

23. Based on what you have read to this point about Dulles, how resolute is Dulles likely to be in pursuit of its own foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?

24. How resolute is the president of Dulles in his pursuit of Dulles’s foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?
**This intervention has only served to increase the dissent coming from the opposition party and the domestic public within Dulles. Numerous government officials and citizens are speaking out on television programs against the bombing raids on a regular basis. The president of Dulles is well aware of this disagreement, but has indicated that his orders to attack US troops will stand.

Support This bombing has not had much discernable impact on the voices heard from the opposition party and the domestic public within Baker. Again, given the opportunity to speak out against the leader of their country, they declined to do so.

25. How likely, on a scale of 1-10 (1= very unlikely, 10= absolute certainty), is the government of Dulles to continue bombing US troops until they are withdrawn?

26. Based on what you have read to this point about Dulles, how resolute is Dulles likely to be in pursuit of its own foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?

27. How resolute is the president of Dulles in his pursuit of Dulles’s foreign policy interests on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= extremely irresolute, 10=extremely resolute)?

28. Based on what you have read to this point about Dulles, how important, on a scale of 1-10, do you think success in this crisis is to Dulles’s national interests (1=completely unimportant, 10=of absolutely critical importance)?

29. Based on what you have read to this point about Dulles, how militarily powerful do you think Dulles is on a scale of 1-10 (1=possessing no military power at all, 10=possessing unlimited military power)?

YOU ARE NOW FINISHED ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT DULLES. PLEASE MOVE ON TO THE NEXT SCENARIO. ONCE YOU HAVE STARTED A NEW SECTION, DO NOT GO BACK TO WORK ON A PREVIOUS SECTION.
Appendix C—Individual differences (post test after 4 image panels taken)

For this section, on the answer sheet, write the appropriate answer/letter that best describes you or your beliefs.

30. Who is currently the secretary of state of the United States?
   A. Joe Biden
   B. Hillary Clinton
   C. Condoleezza Rice
   D. Madline Albright
   E. Leon Panetta

31. Who is currently a United States senator for the state of Ohio?
   A. Michael Coleman
   B. Barack Obama
   C. George Voinovich
   D. John Glenn
   E. Ted Strickland

32. How much time per day do you spend reading, listening to, or watching news coverage of the political world?
   A. None
   B. A few minutes
   C. A half hour
   D. An hour
   E. More than an hour
33. Do you think that people in government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?
   A. Waste a lot
   B. Waste some
   C. Waste little—most is used correctly
   D. Don’t know

34. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
   A. Run by big interests
   B. Influenced by big interests, but also looking out for the benefit of the people
   C. An equal mix of both
   D. Mostly looking out for the benefit of the people
   E. Entirely concerned with the benefit of the people
   F. Don’t know

35. Here are two widespread, but contradictory statements relating to the role of government in society, which one do you agree most with?
   A. The government should be mainly responsible for the success and well being of its people
   B. People should look out for themselves and achieve success and well being through their own hard work

36. How much do you agree with the following statement: Most people who don’t get ahead shouldn’t blame the system, they have only themselves to blame.
   A. Very strongly
   B. Mostly
   C. Somewhat
   D. Not very much
   E. Not at all
   F. Not Sure/Refuse to answer

37. How much do you agree with the following statement: If people work hard they almost always get what they want.
   A. Very strongly
   B. Mostly
   C. Somewhat
   D. Not very much
   E. Not at all
   F. Not Sure/refuse to answer

38. How much do you agree with the following statement: Any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding
   A. Very strongly
   B. Mostly
   C. Somewhat
39. How much do you agree with the following statement: People are responsible for the choices they make, if they agree to something, they should be willing to accept the consequences, even if they did imagine them as possible when they made their choice.
   A. Very strongly
   B. Mostly
   C. Somewhat
   D. Not very much
   E. Not at all
   F. Not sure/refuse to answer

40. How much do you agree with the following statement: “US Government intervention is usually an effective means of promoting the economic well-being of Americans.”
   A. Strongly agree
   B. Mostly agree
   C. Somewhat agree
   D. Not very much
   E. Not at all
   F. Not sure/refuse to answer

41. How much do you agree with the following statement?: “Presently, there are too many federal intrusions into the private social lives of Americans.”
   A. Strongly agree
   B. Mostly agree
   C. Somewhat agree
   D. Not very much
   E. Not at all
   F. Not sure/refuse to answer

42. How much do you agree with the following statement?: “The United States should take an active role in world affairs.”
   A. Strongly agree
43. How much do you agree with the following statement?: “The United States should generally stay out of world affairs.”
   A. Strongly agree
   B. Mostly agree
   C. Somewhat agree
   D. Not very much
   E. Not at all
   F. Not sure/refuse to answer

44. How much do you agree with the following statement?: The military is usually the best means with which the US can resolve disputes with other countries.
   A. Strongly agree
   B. Mostly agree
   C. Somewhat agree
   D. Not very much
   E. Not at all
   F. Not sure/refuse to answer

45. If you disagree with the foreign policies of the United States government, are you most likely to:
   A. Say nothing publicly and keep your thoughts to yourself
   B. Discuss your feelings of disagreement with friends and family
   C. Publicly air your opinions through marching, protesting, or demonstrating against the government

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46. On a scale of 1-10, (1 being very unfavorably, 10 being very favorably), how favorably do you view fellow citizens who speak out against government policy immediately prior to or during a war?

_How important, on a scale of 1-10 (1 being very unimportant, 10 being very important), do you believe each of the following issues is to national security of the United States? If you have no opinion, don’t know, or refuse to answer, please write NA._

47. Protecting the US homeland from terrorist attacks
48. Securing the US/Mexican border from the flow of illegal drug traffic
49. Stopping the genocide ongoing in Darfur/Sudan
50. Preventing the kidnapping of American tourists in Mexico
51. Securing Iraq from insurgent and/or Iranian forces
52. Brokering an Israeli/Palestinian peace agreement
53. Securing stockpiles of the material required to make nuclear weapons
54. Preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon
55. Improving the image of the United States in foreign countries
56. Preventing China from emerging as a peer competitor of the United States
57. Protecting the security of oil supplies in the middle east
58. Spreading American systems of capitalism and democracy around the world
59. Preventing international pirates from targeting American cargo boats, as well as those of American allies
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