Race and International Politics:
How Racial Prejudice Can Shape Discord and Cooperation among Great Powers

DISSERTATION

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Abstract

This dissertation is motivated by the fact that race is understudied in the discipline, despite its historical importance in international politics, its ubiquity in adjacent disciplines, and its importance in the “real” world. It attempts to mitigate this problem by extending the study of race to the hard case of great power politics. The dissertation provides a two-step racial theory of international politics according to which racial prejudices embedded in racial identity can shape patterns of discord and cooperation. In the first step, racial prejudices embedded in different racial identities inflate threat perceptions, while prejudices embedded in shared racial identities deflate them. In the second step, racially shaped threat perceptions generate behavioral dispositions. Inflated threat perceptions predispose racially different agents towards discord, while deflated threat perceptions predispose racially similar agents towards cooperation. The theory works best when states have dominant racial groups, they hold activated threat-relevant racial prejudices, and when threats are ambiguous.

Three empirical chapters assess the theory’s strengths and probe its limits. The first shows how racial prejudices regarding fundamental difference and aggressive intentions inflated American threat perceptions of Japan and, with British cooperation, led to the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923). The second traces how
racial prejudices regarding aggressive intentions and irrationality inflated American threat perceptions of Chinese nuclear proliferation and, with Soviet cooperation, resulted in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The last one illustrates how racial prejudices of immorality and aggressive intentions inflated American threat perceptions of Japanese foreign direct investment in the 1980s and led to the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of race and the legitimacy of the liberal international system in the context of rise of the developing world.
Acknowledgments

I wrote the dissertation during what is now called “The Great Recession,” when much of the world struggled with debt. In a way, it is a child of its time. In the course of writing it I accumulated so much intellectual and emotional debt that without regular “bailouts” from generous friends and teachers I would not have been able to finish it. The generous grant awarded by the Mershon Center for International Security Studies allowed me to do archival research without accumulating financial debt. In classes offered by Richard Herrmann, Jennifer Mitzen, and Daniel Verdier I learned even more than I realized at the time. Fellow graduate students did much to make my graduate school experience more productive and more fun. At the “Wendt workshop” they provided useful feedback on various draft chapters. On the fun side, I particularly enjoyed Thursday night soccer. For all this and more, I thank Bentley Allan, Austin Carson, Aldous Cheung, Kevin Duska, Jason Keiber, Josh Kertzer, Tim Luecke, Eleonora Mattiacci, Fernando Nunez Mietz, John Oates, Xiaoyu Pu, and Clement Wyplosz.

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Chapter One: Introduction

One of the earliest and most influential textbooks in International Relations (IR), written in 1925, opened with an invitation to imagine how “the Man in the Moon” would see the “Human World”. One of the first things he would notice, readers were told, is that the globe is inhabited by people of “different hues”. In Europe and America he would find the white man, in Asia the yellow and the brown man, and in Africa he would find the black man. If “the Man in the Moon” looked carefully enough, he would find that people differed not only in terms of physical characteristics, but also in terms of “material and mental accomplishments”. In Europe and North America he could see “sky-scraper cities, steaming ships, roaring railways, blasting furnaces, soaring airplanes, honking automobiles, and greasy gas-stations.” Asia and Africa were home to “the more leisurely life of the shepherd, the farmer, the huntsman and the nomad,” but also to “sleeping sickness, pugnacious neighbors, beasts of the jungle, the terrors of nature…and the grasping exactions of the white man.”

If the “Man in the Moon” took a closer look, he would notice that troubled relations among races were at the heart of international politics. As the rise of the non-white world challenged “white supremacy,” the author worried about “the conflict of color”. In the Middle Ages wars were religious, in the nineteenth century they were
national, but in the twentieth century they threatened to be racial. What made interracial relations particularly explosive was the deep-seated nature of racial prejudices. The textbook then went on to discuss various other topics in international relations, many of which were connected to race and racism.

This IR textbook serves as a reminder that race is one of the most powerful ideas that shaped modern international politics and its study. The views of the author, Harvard’s Raymond L. Buell, were representative of the discipline at the time. The importance given to race reflects the recognition that to a significant extent international relations were interracial relations. For centuries, race contributed to the hierarchical structure of the international system. The degree to which political units were sovereign, were protected by international law, and had privileged access to material resources depended partly on their position in this racial hierarchy. Because at the discipline’s birth racial ideas were remarkably influential, IR was profoundly shaped by race, as Buell’s *International Relations* illustrates. That *Foreign Affairs* grew out of *The Journal of Race Development* suggests that thinking about international politics was intertwined with race. As one scholar put it fourteen years after Buell,

“For the last century there has been growing in the popular mind the belief that race is a hidden and all-powerful force essential and decisive for the human animal in his evolutionary process. It is held to embrace an extraordinary range, being responsible for cultural clashes between nations, for economic rivalries, for the

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1 Buell 1925, 3-5, 57.
2 That Buell and his position on race was representative of the discipline is supported by several indicators: 1) his IR textbook was positively received in the discipline, was widely used at the college level, and went through multiple editions (Saunders 1926; Garner 1930; Vitalis 2000, 353, fn 89); 2) he also published widely in the mainstream political science journals of the time (including Political Science Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, and APSR) and occupied positions of influence in the profession.
3 Lauren 1996, 10, 47.
4 Vitalis 2010, 929.
necessary enslavement of inferior races, for revolts against authority, for migration and wars.”

Since Buell wrote his IR textbook, much progress has been made on the problem of racism. Before things got better, they first got worse, however. Although Buell’s concerns about racial conflict did not materialize in a global race war, they were partially fulfilled by the Holocaust and the merciless killing during World War II. Following WWII, decolonization and civil rights movements gradually dismantled (at least formally) the racial hierarchic system. The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and various other legal instruments prohibited racial discrimination. In addition, progress has been made on material inequality and racial prejudice. Global wealth inequality is decreasing as the developing world is catching up with the developed world. Public opinion surveys consistently find that explicit racism is declining. These legal-institutional, material, and social-cognitive changes amount to a shift from a racial hierarchic international system to one based on racial equality.

Although the importance of this systemic change cannot be understated, it should not be equated with a change from a racial to a post-racial system. A large body of interdisciplinary work on race has made a convincing case for the continuing, albeit changing, relevance of race. Even in the US, where Barack Obama’s election as President signaled a change in racial attitudes, and where racial categories are changing in interesting ways, post-racialism is not in sight. Race remains one of the central

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7 Bobo and Dawson 2009; Hochschild, Weaver, and Burch 2012.
categories through which we think, talk, and act. Once thought to be “the phlogiston of our time,” race continues to subtly influence international politics.

Several examples suggest the continuing influence of race and racism. Brazil’s former president, Lula da Silva, in 2009 blamed the financial crisis on “the irrational behavior of white people with blue eyes.” Far from being an idiosyncratic statement, the statement reflects Brazil’s color-conscious approach to international politics. Few know that one initial impetus of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests was the Nanjing anti-African movement, sparked by Chinese opposition to contact between African male students and Chinese women. The secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity called the racial incidents “appalling,” while African students, haunted by Chinese cries of “Black devils, go home!,” talked of “apartheid in disguise.” Some argue that American opposition to Japanese whaling is partly motivated by racism. While Norway harvests annually 700 minke whales in the North Atlantic Ocean (0.5 percent of the total population), and Japan harvests 400 minke whales in the Antarctic Ocean (0.05 percent of the total population), it is Japanese whaling that elicits stronger opposition. Some studies found that racism is partly to blame. South Africa’s apartheid system survived until 1994 and some of its effects persist. The UN’s Durban Conferences on race and racism still elicit passionate debates. Issues related to immigration, global inequality, and indigenous rights typically also contain a racial aspect. European far right parties flirt

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8 Montagu 1962, xii.
10 Spektor 2010, 3.
with racism on a regular basis. Despite considerable progress made against racism, the 10
to 12 million Roma citizens of the European Union are still subject to systematic racial
discrimination.\textsuperscript{14} France’s 2010 deportation of Roma immigrants was only one
manifestation of Western European intolerance towards this stateless, darker-skinned
minority. But racial discrimination against the Roma is much worse in Eastern and
Central Europe. Corneliu Vadim Tudor, a Romanian Member of the European
Parliament, who received more than a quarter of the votes in the 2000 Romanian
presidential election, reportedly stated that “We are not interested in what Gypsies want.
All [Gypsies] should be put in jail. There is no other solution.”\textsuperscript{15}

The continuing relevance of race is also manifest in international efforts to
counter racism. For example, some argue that human rights emerged in response to racial
discrimination. This is how one scholar summarizes the importance of race in this regard:

“The first global attempt to speak for equality focused upon race. The first human
rights provisions in the United Nations Charter were placed there because of race.
The first international challenge to a country’s claim of domestic jurisdiction and
exclusive treatment of its own citizens centered upon race. The first binding treaty
of human rights concentrated upon race. The international convention with the
greatest number of signatories is that on race. Within the United Nations, more
resolutions deal with race than with any other subject.”\textsuperscript{16}

Buell may be impressed with the progress made on international and domestic
racism. But given that he considered racism as one of the most difficult issues in
international politics, he may be skeptical that it was entirely abolished. Despite
considerable economic growth in the developing world, wealth inequality still correlates

\textsuperscript{14} Goldston 2002.
\textsuperscript{15} Cited in Goldston 2002, 155.
\textsuperscript{16} Lauren 1996, 4.
with race both within and between states. Despite the dismantling of the legal-institutional aspect of the racial hierarchic system, there are still institutional structures which favor some racial groups over others.\textsuperscript{17} Buell may be particularly skeptical that what he saw as “deep-seated racial prejudices” disappeared. He may suspect, as some studies have shown, that legal prohibition and normative delegitimation made racial prejudices more subtle and complex, rather than eliminating them altogether.\textsuperscript{18}

This dissertation argues that the continuing relevance of race and racism in international politics is to an important extent based on the social-cognitive microstructures represented by racial prejudices. It focuses on racial prejudices embedded in racial identities to show that race shapes patterns of discord and cooperation among great powers. Under particular conditions racial prejudices “color” the threat perceptions of agents, predisposing them to discord or cooperation. Agents with shared racial identity will perceive each other as less threatening and will tend to cooperate. Agents with different racial identities will perceive each other as more threatening and will be predisposed towards discord.

The dissertation is motivated by dissatisfaction with the gap between the past and present importance of race in the “real world” and its relative neglect in mainstream IR. My survey of leading IR journals from their establishment to January 2012 found only five articles on the subject.\textsuperscript{19} This neglect is even more puzzling when we consider that

\textsuperscript{17} For general discussion of structural racism see Bonilla-Silva 1997; Wight 2003.
\textsuperscript{18} On implicit racial prejudices see Phelps and Thomas 2003; Quillian 2008. For a critique see Tetlock and Arkes 2004. On the complexity and subtlety of racial prejudices see Fiske et al. 2009.
\textsuperscript{19} I searched for “race” or “racial” in the titles, keywords and abstracts of article in the following journals: \textit{International Organization}, \textit{International Security}, \textit{International Studies Quarterly}, \textit{World Politics}. 
race receives substantial attention in other disciplines, and even in other subfields of political science, such as American politics. If race is still important in America and IR is still primarily an “American social science,” then IR pays surprisingly little attention to race.

Two developments make it particularly timely to think about race and international politics. First, one of the most important changes occurring in the international system is “the rise of the Rest.” As the balance of power shifts to the developing world, it is a good time to think about what the racial implications for international politics might be. As we move from a unicolor to a multicolor world, the governing institutions of the international system will have to change accordingly if they are to be legitimate. There will be more pressure for greater representation of currently underrepresented non-whites in leading international organization. The European presidency of the International Monetary Fund and the American presidency of the World Bank are already under challenge. The rise of China may also result in a hegemonic competition with the US which could be exacerbated by racial prejudices. In this context, a deeper understanding of “politics among races” would be helpful. Second, advances in genomics may raise questions about current understandings of race; genetics may even reshape existing social identities, giving rise to new “biosocial groups.” Although it is

European Journal of International Relations, and Review of International Studies. The five articles are the following: Cotton 2009; Klotz 1995; Malik 2000; Marx 1996; Shilliam 2006.
20 Nonetheless, in political science in general race receives less attention than it deserves (Smith 2004). Race also receives considerable attention in American history (Krenn 1999).
21 Hoffmann 1977, 59.
22 Zakaria 2009.
23 Hacking 2006. On genomics and race also see Hochschild, Weaver, and Burch, chapter 4.
too early to know what the specific international implications of these two developments will be, they are likely to bring race into public attention.

The remainder of the Introduction provides more examples of the importance of race in modern international politics. Next, it surveys the small, but growing literature on race and IR. The third section briefly summarizes the argument of the dissertation and its contributions. The chapter concludes with the road map of the dissertation.

**Race and Modern International Politics**

To convince the reader that the neglect of race by mainstream IR is an important omission, this section provides a brief historical overview of race in modern international politics. It shows how race shaped the international system, the state, and interactions among states. In addition, the section points out how race sheds new light on our understanding of central concepts and empirical phenomena of the discipline.

**Race and the International System: Racial Hierarchy**

Race served as an organizing principle for the international system for centuries. Despite widespread acceptance of the anarchic nature of the international system, IR scholars have recognized the existence of "hierarchy under anarchy." However, few recognized the role of race in this regard. Race structured the system hierarchically, with states occupying the rank corresponding to the position of their dominant racial

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24 Anarchy here, as in much of the discipline, refers to the absence of world government, not chaos.  
group in the racial hierarchy. In what we could call the racial culture of hierarchy, the
white race was at the top, followed by the yellow and the brown races, and the black race
at the bottom. The lower a political entity ranked in this hierarchy, the more likely it was
that it would be denied sovereignty and it would be colonized.

Along with other cultural and material factors, this racial hierarchy was mirrored
by various international arrangements. One example is provided by the hierarchic
nineteenth century British treaty system against slave trade.27 British treaties with
“civilized” European and American states emphasized the sovereign equality of the
parties and stipulated shared enforcement, while British treaties with less “civilized”
African and Arab rulers carefully avoided references to equality and excluded the latter
from enforcement. The League of Nations Mandate System is another example of such a
hierarchic arrangement. To integrate former German and Ottoman colonies into the
international system as sovereign states, the Mandate System established a three-tiered
system of administration. Former colonies in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific
were classified as A, B, or C tier mandates, partly based on their perceived degree of
development. The final classification closely paralleled racial hierarchy.28

The racial hierarchic system was first challenged by Japan at the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference. Japanese delegates pushed hard for the inclusion of a racial equality clause
in the League of Nations Covenant. They insisted that they wanted only the general
recognition of the principle of racial equality, leaving its application up to individual

27 Keene 2007. Although the study explains this hierarchy based on the distinction between “civilized
nations” and “barbarous people,” the centrality of race in this distinction cannot be ignored.
states. Anglo-Saxon states were the main opponents of the proposal, apparently because they were concerned that it would undermine their exclusionary immigration policies.

During the April 11, 1919 session of the League of Nations Commission, eleven out of seventeen delegates voted in favor of the Japanese proposal. President Woodrow Wilson, who served as the chair, ruled that in contrast with previous proposals the racial equality clause required a unanimous vote rather than simple majority, and the proposal was defeated.\footnote{While all other delegates voted for the Japanese proposal, the US (2), British (2), Portuguese (1), and Romanian (1) delegates did not register their votes. They effectively vetoed the racial equality clause without voting against it and thus mitigating the opprobrium of the world public opinion. For a detailed account of Japan’s search for racial equality at the Paris Conference see Shimazu 1998; Lauren 1996, ch. 3.}

After WWII racial equality was formally recognized, but some of the material and ideational legacies of racial hierarchy are remarkably persistent.\footnote{Gaertner and Dovidio 1977; Jones 2008.}

\textit{Race and the State: The Racial State}

Race not only structured the international system, but also shaped the nature of its main unit, the state.\footnote{On how the state shaped race see Goldberg 2002 and Nobles 2000.} For good reasons, the discipline focuses mainly on the role of nationalism in shaping states. Nonetheless, bringing race in would provide a more accurate picture of the forces that shaped the make-up of states. Goldberg summarized the importance of race for the complexion of the state in the following way:

\begin{quote}
“It [race] has established who can be imported and who exported, who are immigrants and who are indigenous, who may be property and who citizens; and among the latter who get to vote and who do not, who are protected by the law and who are its objects, who are employable and who are not, who have access and privilege and who are (to be) marginalized.”\footnote{Goldberg 1993, 87.}
\end{quote}
In Nazi Germany the Aryan body-politic was ‘purified’ from the Semitic element through mass extermination. Eugenics was employed in much of Europe to ‘improve’ the racial stock of the citizenry. In Switzerland the practice of sterilization and castration of “lesser races” and other undesirables lasted until 1973. White settler states such as South Africa, Australia, or the United States were built on “white nationalism” at the expense of other racial groups. In Latin America, most notably Argentina, the Creole elite perceived itself as essentially white and employed eugenics and immigration legislation to ‘whiten’ the state at the expense of blacks, indigenous Indians, mestizo, and other ‘nonwhite’ racial groups. In Asia, modern China was conceived of as the home of the Han race-nation (minzu), while Japan’s identity was dominated by the pure Yamato race. A recent provocative book makes the case that North Korea is built more on racial than communist ideology. In light of these examples, the argument that the state is best conceived of as being based on a racial, rather than a social contract makes sense.

*Race and Interaction among States: Politics among Races*

By shaping both the international system and its units, race also has implications for the nature and intensity of unit interactions. Sometimes international cooperation occurred along the “color line”. During World War II the Anglo-Saxon “allies of a kind”

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38 Myers 2010.
were united against Japan. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill told the Cabinet that “We could never stand by and see a British Dominion overwhelmed by a yellow race,” while US Admiral Ernest King advocated the protection of Australia and New Zealand from Japan because they were “white men’s countries.” Racial cooperation was sometimes formalized, as the example of the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) illustrates. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles labeled it “an elite Anglo-Saxon club,” and a secret British Embassy memorandum saw it as a “white man’s pact,” guarding its members not only from ideological, but also from racial threats. Of course, it would be inaccurate to reduce ANZUS to a racial alliance, but to overlook its racial aspect would be equally flawed. Race could also shape the form of international cooperation. Peter Katzenstein and Christopher Hemmer convincingly argue that variation in racial identity helps explain why transatlantic security cooperation took on a multilateral form (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), while the transpacific one took on a bilateral “hub-and-spoke” form. Although much of this variation can be explained by various economic and strategic factors, the role of shared racial identity should not be disregarded. A considerable segment of the Atlantic elite, which dominated US policymaking, was of European ancestry and identified with Europe culturally and racially. Racial identification made transatlantic cooperation seem natural, while it made transpacific cooperation appear less so. US policymakers perceived their European allies as “relatively equal members of a shared community,” but they saw their Asian allies as

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41 Koshiro 1999, 42, 45.
“part of an alien and, in important ways, inferior community.” Consequently, transatlantic relations were managed multilaterally, while transpacific relations were managed bilaterally. Some, like former US Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton even saw NATO as a step towards an Atlantic Federal Union. As he put it in a Senate testimony, “my idea would be that in the beginning the union would be composed of all countries that have our ideas and ideals of freedom and that are composed of the white race.”

There are also good reasons to believe that security community and democratic peace have racial aspects. Shared racial identity can facilitate the development of deep trust and the norm of peaceful conflict resolution, which are central to security communities. It is not an accident that Karl Deutsch’s pioneering work on security communities focused on the North Atlantic. As discussed in more detail below, Deutsch also explored how race could serve as a signaling device, which allowed quick and reliable identification of racial groups. Such identification could facilitate the development of security communities and make them appear natural. Race also shaped the origins of the democratic peace. The mutual perception of states as true democracies, which lies at the heart of democratic peace, can be facilitated by shared racial identity. Moreover, one of the most important cases employed to illustrate the emergence of democratic peace shows evidence that peace broke out to a large extent for racial reasons.

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43 Cited in ibid., 593.
44 On security communities see Adler and Barnett 1998.
45 Deutsch 1957.
46 Deutsch 1970, 123.
47 Owen 1994.
In the 1895 Venezuela crisis the US and Britain backed down from the brink of war, after the initial escalation of tensions and a war scare. The public and the leaders justified the decision to keep the peace at least as much based on shared Anglo-Saxon racial identity as based on shared democratic regime type.⁴⁸ As one study put it, “…what caused peace over Venezuela was Anglo-Saxon democracy, not Anglo-Saxon democracy.”⁴⁹ War among Anglo-Saxon democracies was made unthinkable to a large extent because of the aversion to killing racial kin. It is also worth noting that in the political thinking of the time, regime type was to race what in vulgar Marxism the ideational “superstructure” is to the material “base”. Many believed that only superior races, especially the Anglo-Saxons, were capable of democracy, the highest form of regime type.⁵⁰

Race shaped not only peace and cooperation, but the likelihood and intensity of war as well. World War I illustrates how race can influence the likelihood of war. As pan-nationalist movements appropriated racial ideas of Social Darwinism, they saw international politics as a natural struggle. The idea of a racial war between the Germans and the Slavs became widely held by the public and by leaders including the Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, former German Chief of Staff Alfred von Schlieffen, and German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg.⁵¹ Kaiser Wilhelm II himself was convinced that international conferences could not solve the tensions between Slavs and Germans because “it is not a question of high politics, but one of

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⁴⁸ Kupchan 2010, ch. 3.
⁴⁹ Vucetic 2011, 11.
⁵⁰ Thompson 1978, 41.
race…for what is at issue is whether the Germanic race is to be or not to be in Europe."^{52}

Not surprisingly, a commonly held “unspoken assumption” on the eve of WWI was the belief in the inevitability and even necessity of war.\(^{53}\) What Stephen Van Evera calls “the cult of offensive” was underpinned by racial ideas.\(^{54}\)

Race also influenced the intensity of violence in war, as the bloody fighting of WWII illustrates. Undoubtedly other factors contributed to the fierceness of the conflict, but it is difficult to deny the importance of race. Instructions given to German soldiers on the Eastern front made clear that the rules of war did not apply. This was to be a racial war in which the goal was to exterminate the inferior Slav race mixed with Jewish and Asian elements, creating *Lebensraum* (living space) for the superior and pure Aryans.\(^{55}\)

Similarly, race intensified conflict in the Pacific, causing unimaginable atrocities on both the American and the Japanese side. Allied forces came to believe that “the only good Jap is a dead Jap.”\(^{56}\) To be sure, Dresden’s firebombing in WWII was as savage as any, but this was the exception, not the rule in American-German encounters. If 57.8 percent of Russian POWs taken by Germans died in captivity, only 4 percent of Anglo-American POWs taken by Germans died in captivity. 42 percent of American soldiers said they felt “all the more like killing” Japanese soldiers after having seen them, while only 18 percent felt this way about Germans.\(^{57}\) Race does not account for all this variation, but it certainly does for part of it.

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\(^{52}\) Cited in Fischer 1967, 33.
\(^{53}\) Joll 1968.
\(^{54}\) Van Evera 1984, 62.
\(^{55}\) Connelly 1999; Weingartner 1996.
\(^{56}\) Dower 1986, 78-79.
\(^{57}\) Bartov 2001 [1985], 153, 155.
In sum, race shaped the international system, the state, and various interactions among states. In conjunction with the more recent examples mentioned earlier, I hope these examples made a convincing case for the relevance of race in IR. To be sure, race does not always matter, and even when it does, it typically interacts with a host of other factors to shape specific outcomes. Nonetheless, race is important enough to deserve more attention in the discipline.

**Race in International Relations Theory**

Race is underappreciated in mainstream IR theory. Realist approaches pay attention to ethnicity and nationalism, but not to race and racism. Stephen Van Evera provides a systematic discussion of nationalism and war, while Barry Posen deploys the security dilemma to explain ethnic conflict. Even John Mearsheimer makes a quick reference to “hypernationalism” as a factor which may shape patterns of conflict. Democratic peace theory largely neglects race. According to liberalism race should not matter, but there are reasons to think that it does. A look at the list of imperialist conflicts and covert operations performed by white liberal democracies against non-white non-democracies leaves one wondering whether race is indeed epiphenomenal. While dyadic versions of democratic peace emphasize that democracies are peaceful only when dealing with other democracies, according to monadic versions liberal democracies

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59 Mearsheimer 1990. It is worth noting that Mearsheimer sees hypernationalism as the result of intense European security competition and so not independent of structural forces.
60 One study identifies thirty-three imperial wars involving white liberal democracies against non-white political entities between 1838 and 1920, and eight American covert operations in non-white countries during the Cold War. For further details see Rosato 2003, 589-590.
should be peaceful regardless of the regime type of their counterparts. Yet Dan Reiter and Allan Stam note that “What makes imperial wars especially disturbing to the liberal conscience is that they demonstrate also that it is easier to generate public consent if the target is racially or ethnically different from the attacker.”61 English School approaches incorporate nationalism as a fundamental institution of international society but reserve a less central role for race, despite its attention to the “standard of ‘civilization’” in international politics.62 Race has always lurked in the background of international society, but only more recently started to receive some attention.63 Constructivist approaches provide exciting accounts of how gender, religion, culture, or national identity matters in international politics.64 Yet race regrettably receives less attention. A recent series of edited volumes on civilization in world politics constitutes an important exception.65

Although race is understudied in mainstream IR theory, a small but growing body of literature exists on the margins of the discipline. There are two main waves of race literature in IR. The first wave emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.66 The initial impetus for it was a practical concern. Decolonization and civil rights movements sparked racial tensions and many worried about a global race war: “Already the most destructive war in the history of mankind has been fought in the name of racial supremacy. Another one

61 Reiter and Stam 2002, 152.
63 Keal 2003; Keene 2002; Callahan 2004.
65 Katzenstein 2009, Katzenstein 2012a and Katzenstein 2012b. Sadly, although the last two are particularly relevant to race, they were published too late for me to engage with them more seriously.
66 Here I omit earlier work on race as my focus is on the post-World War II period. For a good review of how race was intertwined with the early years of the discipline see Vitalis 2010.
could be fought eventually in the name of racial equality."

Some, like Harold Isaacs and Robert Gardiner struggled with these problems in a historically informed fashion. But theoretical tools to understand race in international politics were largely absent. The most important pioneering effort to provide a theoretical framework for thinking about race in IR was the edited volume Race among Nations: A Conceptual Approach. Two contributions in particular are representative of the first wave. First, James Rosenau developed a racial theory of international politics with racial identity as the independent variable. Next, he identified intervening variables at different levels of analysis and formulated a number of hypotheses connecting racial identity to conflict (the dependent variable) through these intervening variables. Second, Karl Deutsch offered a theory of race as a signaling device and discussed prominent economic and cultural implications. The theory was based on a conception of race as “a built-in, rapid, inexpensive, and reliable signaling device” which allowed “the identification of a group of persons on the basis of some physical characteristic, very quickly, very cheaply, very reliably, and without elaborate procedures for verification.”

The theories of Rosenau and Deutsch illustrate the main features of the first wave: the use of race as a cause and the definition of race based on physical difference.

The second wave of race literature in IR emerged at the end of the Cold War and has continued since then. This wave went beyond the first in two main respects. First, it shifted the emphasis from race as a cause to race as an effect. Unsatisfied with the largely

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67 Le Melle 1970, xv; see also Browne 1961; Segal 1966.
69 Shepherd and Le Melle 1970.
70 Rosenau 1970.
71 Deutsch 1970, 123.
taken for granted approach to race of the first wave, it highlights the socio-politically constructed nature of race.\textsuperscript{72} One group of scholars is critical of teaching and research in IR for making race and racism invisible, and proposes ways in which these can be systematically included in the discipline.\textsuperscript{73} Another group discusses how race shapes and is shaped by international politics in a wide range of issues areas, including nuclear proliferation, global wealth inequality, US sanctions against apartheid South Africa, and global labor recruitment and supply.\textsuperscript{74} Second, this wave moves from a definition of race based on physical difference to a broader one based on naturalization. What is distinctive about race in this view is not phenotype, but the fact that it fixes identity boundaries between various groups, which may or may not be phenotypically different. This broader approach also led scholars to think harder and more systematically about how race interacts with nation, class, and gender to shape international politics.\textsuperscript{75}

Although they differ regarding the definition and use of race, the two waves share a substantive focus on race relations of domination. Race relations of domination involve actors with vastly asymmetrical capabilities and different racial identities. Examples include anti-Semitism and colonialism. This focus is justified given that the worst human suffering was confined to race relations of domination, but it is also based on two problematic assumptions. The first assumption is that race and racism imply hierarchy. Although there is much evidence in support of this assumption, scholars have shown that hierarchy is not a necessary element of race and racism. Fundamental

\textsuperscript{72} Doty 1993.
\textsuperscript{73} Callahan 2004; Chin 2009; Chowdhry and Rai 2009; Grovogui 2001; Hobson 2007; Krishna 2001; Mittelman, 2009; Vitalis 2000.
\textsuperscript{74} Biswas 2001; Jones 2008; Klotz 1995; Persaud 2001.
\textsuperscript{75} Chowdhry and Nair 2002; Short and Kambouri 2010.
difference is sufficient. Admittedly, hierarchy and fundamental difference are difficult to disentangle empirically and the latter may just be the former in disguise. Nonetheless, in principle hierarchy is not a necessary element of race and racism. The second assumption is that racism implies only negative prejudices. However, to every negative racial prejudice towards one racial group there is typically a corresponding positive racial prejudice towards another racial group, usually one’s own. In addition, recent studies show that prejudices in general and racial prejudices in particular can take a positive, benevolent form.

If hierarchy and negative prejudice do not capture all types of race and racism, then race relations of domination, important as they may be, are not the only ones worthy of study. We can map race relations along two dimensions which are at the heart of racism: power and difference. According to the race dimension actors can have shared or different racial identities. According to the power dimension actors can be relatively equal in terms of material capabilities (symmetrical power relations) or they can be relatively unequal (asymmetrical power relations). Symmetrical power relations never imply complete equality, but they are sufficiently different from vastly asymmetrical power relations to warrant a separate category. Japan may not have been as powerful as some Western states, but it was powerful enough to resist colonization. This made Japanese-Western relations qualitatively different from Western colonial relations with Africa. Based on these two dimensions we can formulate a typology of race relations,

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76 Goldberg 1993, 94.
77 Glick and Fiske 2012; Ikuenobe 2011.
which includes not only race relations of domination, but also race relations of protection, of discord, and of cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACIAL IDENTITY</th>
<th>POWER RELATIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Different</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DISCORD</td>
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<td>Shared</td>
<td>COOPERATION</td>
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Table 1.1: A Typology of Race Relations

Race relations of protection are characterized by actors with shared racial identities and asymmetrical distribution of capabilities. An example is the relationship between Britain and its white Dominions during the first half of the twentieth century.

Race relations of cooperation are characterized by actors with shared racial identity and relatively symmetrical distribution of capabilities. British-American relations during the interwar period fall in this category. Another example is the racial solidarity of former African colonies, which cooperated under the banner of Pan-Africanism in their struggle for self-determination. Finally, race relations of discord are characterized by actors with
different racial identities and relatively symmetrical distribution of capabilities. The relationship between the US and Japan during WWII is one example.

This dissertation attempts to contribute to the race literature in IR by building on the strengths of the extant literature and extending its substantive focus. I use race primarily as an independent variable or cause as the first wave does, but I embrace a constructivist understanding of race as the second wave does. Substantively, much of the discipline focuses on race relations of domination. In addition, there is an interdisciplinary body of literature on race relations of cooperation and protection, which explores how racial ideas of Anglo-Saxonism shaped interactions in the Anglosphere.79 I extend the study of race to race relations of discord and cooperation.

There are at least two concerns pertaining to race as a cause and to focusing on racial discord. First, by showing that race is not a natural but a social kind, social constructivism aims at emancipation from racial iniquities. One may worry that employing racial identity as a cause undermines this normative effort because it “permits biology/genetics to re-enter through the back door.”80 In light of the past complicity of the social and natural sciences in legitimizing racist ideas, these concerns are well founded. However, because today the social constructivist position on race is dominant in the social sciences, revisiting the explanatory efforts of the first wave of racial theorizing, equipped with the advances made by the second wave is less dangerous. Nevertheless, to prevent it from turning into “tacit ontology,”81 we should keep in mind that I bracket the

80 Doty 1993, 450.
81 Wendt 1999, 115.
social construction of racial identities for reasons of tractability rather than ontology. Perhaps one can think of this bracketing as a version of “strategic essentialism,” where racial difference is strategically essentialized to make it more vulnerable to criticism and to fight racial oppression. Second, one may worry that focusing on race relations of discord lends further support to “clash of civilizations” types of arguments. For this reason, it is important to emphasize that there is no inherent cause of discord among racial groups. Rather, this discord is driven by racial prejudices. By identifying these racial prejudices and their pernicious international effects, I hope that the dissertation will have a self-falsifying, rather than a self-fulfilling effect. The normative rationale is to challenge, not legitimize racism.

The Argument and Its Contributions

The dissertation argues that race matters in great power politics. More specifically, it shows that racial identity can shape patterns of discord and cooperation among Asian and Western great powers. The logic of the argument is fleshed out in a two-step racial theory of international politics. In the first step, racial identity influences threat perceptions. Agents’ racial identities and prejudices are activated by specific international events. As a consequence, agents perceive others through a racial lens. There are four kinds of threat-relevant racial prejudices which “color” perceptions of others: pertaining to intentions, morality, the body, and reason. Agents with different

82 Spivak 1987, 205; Du Bois position in favor of “conservation of race” can also be interpreted in this way; see Du Bois 2009.
83 Huntington 1996.
races are perceived as 1) having aggressive intentions; 2) immoral or devious; 3) fundamentally different; 4) and irrational. Meanwhile, agents with shared racial identity are perceived as defensive, moral, fundamentally similar, and rational. Various combinations of these racial prejudices embedded in different racial identities inflate threat perceptions, while shared racial identities deflate threat perceptions. Typically all four categories can be identified in any given empirical case, but one or two tend to be dominant.

In the second step, racially shaped threat perceptions generate behavioral dispositions. Inflated threat perceptions predispose racially different agents towards discord, while deflated threat perceptions predispose racially similar agents towards cooperation. Although racial identities predispose actors towards certain behaviors through the logic of habit, they do not determine policy options and outcomes. To explain specific outcomes, racially shaped threat perceptions interact with strategic calculations, political ideologies, and domestic politics. This eclectic second step provides an opportunity to show how the racial theory developed in the next chapter complements other IR theories to shed new light on international phenomena. The theory works best when states have dominant racial groups, their racial identities and prejudices are activated, they hold threat-relevant racial prejudices, and when threats are ambiguous.

The dissertation makes four main contributions. First, it contributes to the race literature by showing that the explanatory power of race is not confined to asymmetrical power relations, but extends to the more symmetrical power relations of great power

84 Hopf 2011.
politics. Also, much of the race literature focuses on the US and a limited number of African, European, and Latin American states. The dissertation extends this empirical focus to Japan and China, which are often neglected. Furthermore, it addresses the concerns of those who worry that race theories based on prejudice are necessarily individualistic and miss the larger, structural aspects of race and racism. Since racial prejudices are as social as they are cognitive, they cannot be confined to individual subjectivity. They function as micro-structures which uphold legal-institutional and material macro-structures of racism, and should be taken seriously.

Second, the dissertation adds a “color of threat” theory to the literature on threat and threat perception. Sophisticated realist theories such as the “balance of threat” and the “balance of interest” recognize that threat perception is not simply a function of material capabilities.\(^85\) Cognitive and social psychological approaches offer useful theories of how various psychological biases shape threat perception.\(^86\) Liberals and constructivists showed that shared regime type and collective identity impact threat perception.\(^87\) Drawing on these theoretical insights, I formulate a racial theory of threat perception. As discussed in Chapter 6, this “color of threat” theory both corrects and complements instrumental theories of threat inflation.

Third, the dissertation contributes to constructivist IR theories by showing that constructivism can offer good theories of continuity. The literature tends to provide theories of ideational change, typically based on cases where “bad” norms are replaced

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\(^{85}\) Schweller 2006; Walt 1987.  
\(^{87}\) Haas 2005; Owen 2005; Rousseau 2006.
by “good” ones. Excellent studies show how territorial conquest, landmines, slave trade, nuclear and chemical weapons and many other bad things have been delegitimized and legally prohibited.\textsuperscript{88} This body of literature identifies and explores important progressive shifts in the international system. However, by focusing on benign change, it also tends to pay less attention to much malign continuity. By exploring how race has shaped discord and cooperation among great powers before, during, and after decolonization, this dissertation contributes a case of malign continuity to this literature. It shows that constructivism can provide not only good theories of ideational change, but also good theories of ideational continuity. Kenneth Waltz argued that continuity in the international system is best explained by structural approaches. Despite the diversity of units, structural constraints limit the diversity of outcomes.\textsuperscript{89} I agree with Waltz, but I would broaden his argument to include not only material, but also ideational structures. As Ted Hopf observed, social constructivism in other disciplines “has been concerned with explaining why more change has not occurred than one might feasibly expect given the brute material world and stark inequalities.”\textsuperscript{90} As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, the microstructures constituted by racial prejudices embedded in racial identities explain in part why more change has not occurred regarding racism.

Finally, this study has policy implications as well. Given the rise of the developing world, many of the most important bilateral relations in the future will span across racial identities. Policymakers should be particularly alert to the ways in which

\textsuperscript{89} Waltz 1979. 
\textsuperscript{90} Hopf 2009, 282.
racial prejudices might influence their perceptions and behavior. Similarly, in the context of the “war on terror,” both the elites and the public needs to be aware of the threat inflationary effects of race to avoid costly overreactions to Arab terrorism. Finally, given the power of prejudice over perception and action, the dissertation favors making domestic and international institutions more racially inclusive. This could undermine the pernicious effect of racial prejudice and could ensure impartiality based on a “balance of prejudices”.

Outline of the Dissertation

Next, Chapter 2 provides a social-cognitive racial theory of international politics. The theory challenges the colorblind nature of much IR theorizing by suggesting that patterns of international discord and cooperation sometimes follow the color line. Its two step theory argues that states with shared racial identities under certain conditions cooperate against states with different racial identities. The chapter embraces a racial constructivist conception of race, derives hypotheses from the theory, and formulates a research design to evaluate them against alternative explanations. The three empirical chapters test the theory across time and issue areas to assess its strengths and limitations.

Chapter 3 focuses on the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923). It asks why the U.S. misperceived the alliance as threatening and contributed to its demise. The chapter shows that difference in racial identity between the U.S. and Japan inflated American threat perceptions. First, Japanese immigration activated American racial identities and prejudices. Next, based on their racial prejudices Americans imputed
aggressive intentions to Japan and consequently believed that a Japanese-American war was inevitable. As racial prejudices inflated threat perceptions, Americans came to misperceive Japan as a “Yellow Peril”\(^1\) and pushed for the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Britain cooperated with the US in allowing the alliance to expire, partly due to shared racial identity and partly due to strategic reasons. The alliance became the victim of the “Yellow Peril” at the 1921 Washington Conference. Its termination opened the way for Anglo-Saxon—Japanese alienation and German-Japanese rapprochement, arguably making World War II possible.

Chapter 4 discusses why under President John F. Kennedy the US pursued a nuclear test ban more vigorously than ever before, despite many years of unproductive negotiations. It shows that American efforts to achieve a test ban were motivated not so much by general fears of nuclear proliferation, but by more specific fears of Chinese nuclear proliferation. First, the Korean War activated American racial identity and prejudices. Then, because of difference in racial identity, the US perceived Communist China not only as a ‘Red Peril’, but also as a ‘Yellow Peril.’ Therefore, China was perceived as more threatening than the USSR, which was seen only as a ‘Red Peril’.

Based on racial prejudices underlying the ‘Yellow Peril’, the US imputed aggressive intentions and occasionally irrationality to China. That an aggressive and even irrational China would go nuclear appeared particularly alarming. The Soviets shared these fears, partly for racial reasons, partly due to the Sino-Soviet split and fears of a German bomb.

\(^{1}\) ‘Yellow Peril’ refers to a racial image based on racial prejudices. According to this image Asia (usually represented by China or Japan) poses an existential threat to the West (usually represented by the US) through war, economic competition, or immigration (Thompson 1978).
The superpowers saw a test ban as a strategy against the Chinese nuclear program and signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. The treaty ultimately failed to inhibit Chinese nuclear proliferation, but it did represent an important step towards subsequent arms control measures and Soviet-American détente.

Chapter 5 asks why US Congress pushed for restrictions on foreign direct investment in the US (FDIUS), eventually achieving the passage of the Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Act. It argues that Congress weakened America’s open investment policy through Exon-Florio in response to the public’s racially inflated threat perceptions of Japanese FDIUS. Japan’s impressive economic growth and its trade surplus with the US led to trade frictions, which activated the American perception of Japan as a ‘Yellow Peril’. Based on racial prejudices underpinning this lens of perception, the American public imputed aggressive and devious intentions to the Japanese. Americans then perceived the smaller FDIUS from Japan, a non-white democratic ally, as more threatening than the larger FDIUS from Britain, a white democratic ally. By the late 1980s the ‘Yellow Peril’ trumped even the ‘Red Peril’ as Americans perceived Japan, their non-white democratic ally, as more threatening than the USSR, their white communist enemy. Congress acted on these racially inflated fears to restrict American investment policy. The President’s support for open investment and subsequent selective application of Exon-Florio mitigated the extent to which US open investment policy was undermined.

The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the dissertation and evaluates the strengths and limitations of the theory. Next, it turns to future avenues of
research that extend the theory to new issue areas or correct some of the limitations of the
dissertation. Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion of race, legitimacy, and the
future of the liberal international system in the context of the rise of the developing
world.
Chapter 2: A Racial Theory of International Politics

Much of the study of international politics is animated by efforts to identify and explain patterns of international discord and cooperation. A central question pertaining to this problem is whether there are recurring patterns of cooperation among like units and patterns of discord among unlike units. Do birds of a feather flock together? Do birds of different feathers fly apart? Do like units cooperate against unlike units?

The conventional wisdom, most eloquently articulated by realism, is that patterns of discord and cooperation are primarily a function of interests, rather than unit similarity. In this view there is no close connection between unit similar and shared interests. This idea is at the heart of Balance of Power, raison d’état, and Realpolitik. As British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston put it in 1848, “We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and these interests it is our duty to follow.” 92 Hans Morgenthau’s second principle of realism stipulates that “The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.” 93 Any birds can flock together as long as they have shared interests, but as soon as these shared interests vanish, they will fly apart.

92 Cited in Heath 1969, 39.
93 Morgenthau 1985, 5.
Neorealist theories further weakened the idea that unit similarity matters for discord and cooperation. Kenneth Waltz’s assumption that all units are alike in that they are functionally undifferentiated was meant to divert the discipline’s interest from unit properties. The only unit property that mattered for explaining international outcomes was capability, because the distribution of capabilities was a structural variable which explained the recurring balance of power. All other factors were relegated to the unit level and the theories that focused on them were ostracized as “reductionist.” Because structure intervened between actions and outcomes, one could not explain outcomes based on unit properties. Even if some decision makers wished to cooperate with like units against unlike units, the imperatives of the balance of power forced them to make decisions based on calculations of power. Birds of a feather often had to join the weaker side regardless of unit similarity to balance against the stronger side and ensure their survival. Units that did not abide by this imperative would be selected out.

Although national interests and the distribution of capabilities undoubtedly shape international discord and cooperation, they do not render unit similarity irrelevant. Henry Kissinger was correct that if ideological similarity “determined foreign policy, Hitler and Stalin would never have joined hands any more than Richelieu and the Sultan of Turkey would have three centuries earlier.” States sometimes do ally with ideological adversaries to restrain these adversaries or to counter more immediate threats from third parties. Yet just because ideological similarity does not determine foreign policy, it

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95 Ibid., 60-61.
96 Kissinger 1994, 332.
does not mean that it is irrelevant. It may still matter in more subtle ways. Mark Haas found that ideological similarity plays an important role in great power politics by deflating threat perceptions among ideological similar states.\(^{98}\) Moreover, even if ideological similarity did not matter at all, one could not conclude that unit similarity is inconsequential since ideological similarity is only one of the numerous respects in which units can be similar. Which of the multiple identities shapes foreign policy depends on which identity is salient in any given situation.

We have good reasons to think that sometimes like units cooperate with each other and engage in conflict against unlike units. Systemic constraints derived from the distribution of capabilities are often indeterminate, allowing considerable unit agency. Neoclassical realism points out that how systemic constraints are translated into behavior depends on the character of the units.\(^{99}\) Similarly, as Alexander Wendt showed, how the distribution of capabilities shapes states’ calculations depends on the distribution of identities.\(^{100}\) Shared identities are not unit-level properties, but structural, hence they can shape international outcomes.

Democratic peace theory found evidence of peace and cooperation among democracies and of conflict among democracies and non-democracies.\(^{101}\) Shared democratic regime type facilitates peace and cooperation among democracies for normative, institutional, and economic reasons.\(^{102}\) Democratic alliances and zones of peace such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union

\(^{98}\) Haas 2005.
\(^{100}\) Wendt 1992, 397.
\(^{101}\) Doyle 1983a; Doyle 1983b; Doyle 1986; for criticism see Layne 1994; Oren 1995; Spiro 1994.
\(^{102}\) Mousseau 2003; Owen 1994; Russett 1993; Schultz 1998;
(EU) may have been conceived in response to Soviet power or threat, but the fact that the members of these organizations are democracies is not a coincidence. Their shared threat perception of the USSR was to a large extent a function of their shared regime type. The flipside of peace and cooperation among democracies is discord among democracies and non-democracies: “The very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and non-liberal societies.”

Democracies are not the only birds that sometimes flock together. For example, Randall Schweller showed that revisionist states tend to ally against status quo states due to shared interests, regardless of the balance of power: “Satisfied powers will join the status-quo coalition, even when it is the stronger side; dissatisfied powers, motivated by profit more than security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state.” John Owen’s study of alliances in the sixteenth century Holy Roman Empire found that Protestant estates allied with each other against Catholic estates. This religious alignment was particularly strong when estates believed that the opposing side intended to roll back their religion. Charles Kupchan showed that, independent of regime type, stable peace was more likely to flourish among culturally similar states. Shared interests and threat perceptions were also at the heart of other non-democratic alliances including the League of Three Emperors, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the Holy Alliance.

103 Mearsheimer 1995; Rosato 2011.  
104 Doyle 1983b, 324-325.  
106 Owen 2005.  
107 Kupchan 2010.
Similar patterns of conflict and cooperation are observable in the case of non-state entities as well. Social identity theory provides robust micro-foundations for cooperation within groups, which under certain circumstances may also spill over into conflict between groups. Universal cognitive limitations and motivations of self-esteem give rise to categorization and the association of positive features with in-groups and negative ones with out-groups. There is substantial empirical evidence which shows that shared identity facilitates cooperation within ethnic groups and facilitates conflict across them. For example, in weak states ethnic groups confront an anarchic environment and the security dilemma kicks in. Chauvinist elites can then easily mobilize ethnic myths and symbols that justify interethnic hostility and amplify fears of group extinction, which trigger ethnic conflict. Others show how shared ethnic identities can facilitate economic transactions as they increase trust and decrease uncertainty. These racial dynamics are applicable to state behavior as well.

This chapter provides a racial theory of discord and cooperation. According to Niall Ferguson, race, along with ethnicity, was one of the main causes of conflict in the Age of Hatred of the twentieth century. In spite of this, the influence of race on international discord remains underexplored. As a study put it more than forty years ago, “Race hatred has already taken its place among the very real sources of human discord…It remains, however, to be shown to what extent the race issue contributes to tension and conflict at the international, in the sense of inter-State, level, as a separate and

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110 Tai Landa 1995.
111 Ferguson 2006.
clearly identifiable factor.”\textsuperscript{112} International racial cooperation remains similarly understudied. Apart from the difficulty of isolating the causal effect of race, this relative neglect is due to the conventional wisdom that race matters little in the international realm. Arnold Wolfers opined that “some Americans may feel enmity for the colored races, but this does not prevent ‘cordial’ or ‘friendly’ diplomatic relations between the United States and many African and Asian nations.”\textsuperscript{113} Wolfers’ point is well taken insofar as domestic sentiments do not determine international politics. But neither are they inconsequential. I argue that when threats are uncertain, states have dominant racial groups, and these groups hold salient threat-relevant prejudices, states with shared racial identities are likely to cooperate against states with different racial identities.

The chapter is organized as follow. The first section locates the dissertation in the broader race literature and conceptualizes the “independent variable” of the theory, racial identity. The second section explains how racial identity shapes threat perceptions. Racial identity functions as a lens of perception, where perception of other groups is “colored” by racial prejudices. Shared racial identity deflates threat perceptions, while difference in racial identity inflates threat perceptions. The third section discusses how threat perception predisposes states towards discord or cooperation. Inflated threat perceptions facilitate discord, while deflated threat perceptions facilitate cooperation. The theory does not imply that cooperation across racial groups or conflict within them does not occur. Nonetheless, racial difference makes discord easier and cooperation harder. The chapter

\textsuperscript{112} Preiswerk 1970, 55.
\textsuperscript{113} Wolfers 1962, 25.
closes with a discussion of research design including case selection, methods, and the operationalization of inflated threat perception.

WHAT RACE IS: DEFINING RACIAL IDENTITY

There is perhaps no other concept associated with so much controversy and human suffering as race. The Holocaust, colonialism, apartheid, slavery, Jim Crow and eugenics are only a few examples where oppression, exclusion, and even extermination occurred in the name of race. It is not surprising then that the concept is surrounded by deep ontological and normative disagreements. This section starts with a brief overview of the broader race debate and locates the dissertation in it. Then it defines racial identity as a collective identity based on beliefs of common origins and shared physical traits, and distinguishes it from other forms of identity.

Embracing Racial Constructivism

For centuries, the conventional wisdom about race was based on racial essentialism. According to this approach, 1) humankind can be divided into discrete biological races, 2) with distinct and stable physical markers, 3) which stand for inherited and essential social, cultural, and moral traits, 4) based on which races can be ranked hierarchically. Although traces of racial essentialism can still be found in the ordinary use of race, respectable natural and social scientific approaches have abandoned it.

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The main disagreements in the current race debate are ontological and normative. Disagreements along the ontological axis focus on what race is made of and whether it is real. Disagreements along the normative axis are about whether we should continue to use race or whether we should drop it in an effort to combat racism. The two axes are not independent, insofar as one’s ontological position tends to shape one’s normative position. Those who think that race is real tend to favor its continued use, whereas those who think that race is not real tend to advocate its abandonment. Based on the two axes we can identify three main positions in the race debate: racial naturalism, racial skepticism, and racial constructivism.115 These positions overlap in interesting ways.

Racial naturalists and racial constructivists agree that race is real, but disagree about what it is made of. Racial skeptics and racial constructivists agree that race is a social kind, but disagree whether race is real.

Racial naturalists, mostly students of genetics, evolutionary biology, and philosophy of biology, argue that race is a natural kind and favor its continued use. In this view, race refers to subspecies of *Homo sapiens* whose members share some combination of common ancestry, genotype, and phenotype.116 A recent strand, cladism, defines races as “ancestor-descendant sequences of breeding populations, or groups of such sequences, that share a common origin.”117 Cladists measure genetic distance between breeding populations based on difference in gene frequencies, to identify races. This new strand of racial naturalism distances itself from racial essentialism. Although it argues that race is

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115 Mallon 2006.
biological, it conceives of race as dynamic rather than stable, avoids extending its implications to social and moral traits, and denies racial hierarchy.

This new strand of racial naturalism is less vulnerable than racial essentialism to many of the criticisms made against the biological ontology of race:\textsuperscript{118} that phenotypic variation is continuous and phenotypic traits vary independently, precluding discrete categorization; that genetically pure racial groups have never existed; that most genetic variation occurs within racial groups; and that variation in phenotype does not correlate well with variation in genotype.\textsuperscript{119} The more difficult questions are whether we should call the breeding populations of racial naturalism “races,” since they do not map well onto, and even cross-classify, folk racial categories;\textsuperscript{120} and whether what these breeding populations are sufficiently isolated reproductively today to warrant the continued use of the term.\textsuperscript{121} Racial naturalists recognize that races were the product of interaction between different environmental conditions and relative reproductive isolation. As reproductive isolation decreases, races are disappearing. Moreover, given the harm that nineteenth century race science caused by legitimating racism, it may be prudent not to call breeding populations “races”. Indeed, some racial naturalists are reluctant to use “race” in their research.\textsuperscript{122}

Racial skeptics and racial constructivists argue that race is a social kind. This ontological position emerged as a critique to racial essentialism, which provided scientific legitimacy to oppressive racial categories. By showing that race is not a

\textsuperscript{118} Sesardic 2010.
\textsuperscript{120} Glasgow 2003.
\textsuperscript{121} Appiah 1994, 100.
\textsuperscript{122} Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza 1994.
biological, but a social kind, it opened the possibility of changing or even abolishing race altogether. This position does not deny the existence of physical difference, but argues that there is nothing objectively racial about it. Races are socially constructed through the imposition of a set of racial ideas to particular human groups.

While racial skeptics and racial constructivists agree on the social ontology of race, they disagree whether this implies that race is real or not. This disagreement leads to divergent normative positions. Racial skeptics believe that because the concept of race refers primarily to a biological kind, showing that race is social implies that race is not real.\textsuperscript{123} For this reason their normative position favors the elimination of the concept of race. They worry that its connection to racial essentialism is too intimate and it facilitates racism. Racial constructivists believe that it is a mistake to eliminate race and champion its conservation as long as racism exists. Although they agree with skeptics that biological races do not exist, they believe that race can be social \textit{and} real.\textsuperscript{124} Since race has always had both biological and social aspects, race can be real as a social kind. They worry that eliminating race would make racism less visible and would leave its victims without a valuable resource of resistance. While skeptics see race as facilitating racism, constructivists tend to see it as facilitating anti-racism.

\begin{itemize}
\item[123] Appiah 1994; Montagu 1945; Zack 2002.
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### Table 2.1: Mapping the Race Debate

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<th>Approach</th>
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The racial theory presented in this chapter embraces the social ontology and normative conservationism of racial constructivism. Ontologically, racial constructivism occupies the middle ground between racial naturalism and racial skepticism, which allows it to strike a balance between reifying race\(^{125}\) and treating it as an illusion.\(^{126}\) On the one hand, racial naturalism’s conception of race risks reifying race and perhaps legitimizing racism. The advantages of biological ontology may outweigh disadvantages in forensic anthropology, genomics, and biomedicine, but even there it has drawbacks.\(^{127}\) In my view in international politics the disadvantages of a biological ontology would outweigh its advantages. What is most interesting about race in this realm are its social meanings and political implications. Because racial naturalism operates with a deflationary conception of race, limiting it to biology, it cannot capture these. On the other hand, racial skepticism risks treating race as an illusion, because it denies its reality.

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\(^{125}\) Reification means the treatment of social facts in a taken for granted manner, as if they were natural facts.

\(^{126}\) Goldberg 1993, 69; Omi and Winant 1986, 3, 69.

\(^{127}\) Fujimura, Duster, and Rajagopalan 2008; Whitmarsh and Jones 2010.
I am persuaded that race is as real as any other social kind. The etymology of race suggests that race has as much cultural as biological content.\textsuperscript{128}

Normatively, I am unconvinced that race should be eliminated. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage this aspect of the race debate more seriously since “Resolving this disagreement requires a complex assessment of many factors, including, the epistemic value of ‘race’ talk in various domains, the benefits and costs of racial identification, the value of racialized identities and communities fostered by ‘race’ talk, the role of ‘race’ talk in promoting or undermining racism, the benefits or costs of ‘race’ talk in a process of rectification for past injustice, the cognitive or aesthetic value of ‘race’ talk, and the degree of entrenchment of ‘race’ talk in everyday discourse.”\textsuperscript{129}

I favor conservationism based on my reading of the extant literature, most of which argues that its benefits outweigh the costs.\textsuperscript{130} The quasi-consensus seems to be that talking and thinking about race does more to combat than to facilitate racism. Although the invention of race made racism possible, its elimination would not make racism impossible. It would, however, make its detection and mitigation more difficult. Yet because we should be sensitive to the concerns of racial skeptics, I focus below on racial identity rather than race. Even prominent racial skeptics like Anthony Appiah grant reality to racial identity and find its use less objectionable than that of race.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{129} Mallon 2006, 550.
\textsuperscript{130} Glasgow 2006, 172-176.
\textsuperscript{131} Appiah 1994.
Defining Racial Identity

The analytical focus on racial identity is popular in the race literature. Already scholars of the first wave of the race literature in IR, like James Rosenau, argued for this approach.\(^{132}\) It allows us to address the real effects of race and provides victims of racism with a valuable resource. At the same time, it mitigates worries of racial eliminativists, because the reality of racial identity does not presuppose the biological reality of race. Like other “imagined communities,”\(^{133}\) the identity derived from group membership can be real even if the group rests on imagined foundations. As Paul Gilroy argued, “‘Race’ must be retained as an analytical category not because it corresponds to any biological or epistemological absolutes, but because it refers investigation to the power that collective identities acquire by means of their roots in tradition.”\(^{134}\) Needless to say, despite its advantages, race as collective identity cannot exhaustively capture the various ways in which race matters. It is one, albeit central, aspect of larger racial orders.\(^{135}\) According to Howard Winant, “Race must be grasped as a fundamental condition of individual and collective identity, a permanent, although tremendously flexible, dimension of the modern global social structure.”\(^{136}\)

Defining racial identity and differentiating it from other collective identities is challenging. Much of the political power of race is due to its connotative poverty and denotative ambiguity, which explains its extraordinary ability to define very different

\(^{132}\) Rosenau 1970.
\(^{133}\) Anderson 1993 [1983].
\(^{134}\) Gilroy 1987, 247.
\(^{135}\) King and Smith 2005; Omi and Winant 1986.
\(^{136}\) Winant 2002, 3.
populations across time and space. Yet its historical use, scholarly definitions, and the ordinary concept of race suggest that racial identity is not entirely devoid of defining elements. Beliefs of common descent and shared physical markers are at the heart of racial identity.

During its long and controversial history, the meaning of race revolved around common descent. The Oxford English Dictionary defines race as “A group of people, animals, or plants connected by common descent or origin.” The ancients already had an awareness of phenotypic differences. But racial categories and identities emerged in response to European voyages of discovery which brought whites in contact with non-whites. Thus, the markers of common origin tended to be visible, phenotypic traits. In his popular Systema Naturae (1735) the Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus formulated one of the earliest racial classifications, identifying the following races: Homo americanus, Homo europaeus, Homo asiaticus, and Homo afer. During the nineteenth century when racial theories acquired unprecedented influence, racial identity was broadly applied to various pan-ethnic groups (Germans), classes (blue-blooded aristocracy), and religious groups (Jews). This broad usage loosened but did not sever the link between racial identity on the one hand, and common origins and phenotypic markers on the other. Blue eyes and blond hair were invented as the phenotypic markers of the German Aryan race. Phrenology and craniology “discovered” systematic differences in the skulls of the

137 Goldberg 1993, 80.
139 Lauren 1996, 6; Rattansi 2007, 13-14.
140 Rattansi 2007, 25.
various European nations and categorized them into different racial groups.\textsuperscript{142} When non-phenotypic groups were racialized, phenotype did not disappear as a marker of racial identity. Rather, it emerged in the form of negative physical stereotypes such as the Irish simian appearance and ‘Africanoid skull’, or the Jewish hooked nose.\textsuperscript{143} Higher classes were attributed whiter skin than lower classes. In a biography of George Lord Curzon, Harold Nicolson relates this story. During World War I Curzon saw private soldiers bathe after returning from the trenches. “Dear me!” he said, ‘I had no conception that the lower classes had such white skins’.\textsuperscript{144} Whether the story is real or not, it suggests an attempt to link racialized class to phenotype.

Reference to common origins and phenotype is also common in social scientific definitions of race and folk theories of race. In the introduction of a recent \textit{International Studies Perspective} symposium on race, Tilden LeMelle defines race as “a group of people who are socially defined on the basis of phenotypically similar (and dissimilar) characteristics.”\textsuperscript{145} In a survey of the race literature, Matthew Desmond and Mustafa Emirbayer define race as a “symbolic category, based on phenotype or ancestry and constructed according to specific social and historical contexts, that is misrecognized as a natural category.”\textsuperscript{146} The emphasis on common descent and phenotype is also at the heart of the ordinary concept of race. Phenotype in particular is central to the folk use of race:

\textsuperscript{142} Jahoda 2009.
\textsuperscript{143} McCarthy 2009, 8; Rattansi 2007, 39, fn 13.
\textsuperscript{144} Cited in King 1981, 118.
\textsuperscript{145} Le Melle 2009, 77.
\textsuperscript{146} Desmond and Emirbayer 2009, 336.
“The very notion of a visually indistinguishable racial group runs counter to the idea of race.”

In light of the historical use of race, social scientific definitions, and the ordinary concept of race, I define racial identity as a collective identity based on beliefs of common descent the markers of which are phenotypic (visible physical traits). I emphasize beliefs because common descent and phenotype do not objectively delimit racial groups. If they did, passing (being perceived as a member of one racial group is perceived as a member of another racial group) would be impossible. There is more variation within racial groups than across them, and racial categories vary across space and time. While in North America racial categories have tended to be dichotomous (one was black or white), in Latin America they have been closer to a continuum. The relative importance of phenotype and descent in defining race also varies across time and space. While in North America descent is more important than phenotype in defining blackness, in Latin America phenotype is more important than descent. Nonetheless, beliefs of common descent and shared phenotype tend to uphold a real and visible racial identity. Visible markers of racial identity include the color of skin and eyes, the texture of hair, the shape of nose, characteristics of the skull and so on. But what is really important about racial identity is not physical markers, but the meanings associated with them, the shared experiences and the social heritage they imply. Phenotype serves only as a marker of racial identity, or, as W.E.B. Du Bois put it, a “badge” of race. It does not stand for

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147 Hardimon 2003, 442.
149 Alcoff 2006.
150 Du Bois 1940.
deeper, socially relevant essential features shared by the members of a racial group. As
gender cannot be reduced to biology, racial identity cannot be either. This, however, does
not mean that racial identity is an illusion. It is socially constructed but real, just as
money is.

Racial identities are constructed through a combination of three practices: 1) racial labeling or ascription of racial identity to a group; 2) institutionalization and
enforcement of specific roles, norms, and expectations attached to racial identity; and 3) acceptance of the racial identity ascribed to them by members of the group.151 As a result, “racialized” groups acquire a new status as a race. To paraphrase John Searle, “Human
groups X count as race in context Z.”152 Races are primarily social groups rather than
biological ones. All social facts are ultimately based on some brute matter,153 and in the
case of race this tends to be phenotype. “The choice of natural kind as the criterion of
group construction and difference is inevitably a social one.”154 Since the construction of
race on phenotype is a social choice, race can be built on various real or imagined
biological traits. The physical markers of race can vary across time and place, just as the
boundaries and content of racial identities do.

A broader, alternative approach identifies naturalization as the defining feature of
race, rather than beliefs in common descent and phenotype. Superficial biological
elements are important for race construction only because of the ideological role they
play: naturalization. Anything that can perform this function can replace biology in the

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151 Sundstrom 2002, 95-104; for a similar approach see Appiah 1994, 110.
154 Goldberg 1993, 75.
construction of racial identity. For instance, “…culture can be reified and essentialized to the point where it becomes the functional equivalent of race.”\textsuperscript{155} This naturalization-based definition is embraced by supporters of the “new racism” and “racism problematic” paradigms in the race literature.\textsuperscript{156} One may worry that by using a narrower definition of racial identity, I truncate the import of race and racism in international politics.

Although sympathetic to this approach, for purposes of this dissertation I prefer the narrower definition of racial identity for two reasons. First, the dissertation tries to bring together two areas of study which are typically kept apart: great power politics and race. To convince skeptics that race matters in this area, it makes sense to opt for this more conventional and more demanding definition of racial identity. This narrower definition may capture only a fraction of what race and racism do, but it also constitutes a harder case for showing that race matters in great power politics. If the plausibility of the relevance of racial identity is established, then one can broaden the definition of race to pursue other promising research avenues.\textsuperscript{157} Second, naturalization is a necessary element of race, but I am not convinced that it is sufficient. One way to think about this is to conceive of racialization as a continuum. Although groups can be naturalized without reference to phenotype, they remain incompletely racialized. Complete racialization in my view requires reference to phenotype. This is partly why the “new racism” paradigm considers discrimination against partially racialized groups “racism without races.”\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{155} Fredrickson 2002, 7.
\textsuperscript{156} Balibar 1991; Miles and Brown 2003.
\textsuperscript{157} For a similar argument see Katzenstein 1996, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{158} Balibar 1991.
The study of incompletely racialized groups is as important as that of the completely racialized ones. For purposes of this study, however, I am interested in the latter.

*Distinguishing Racial Identity from Adjacent Identities*

Racial identity significantly overlaps with gender, class, national, and ethnic identities. Historically whites often saw non-white races as feminine. In the wake of World War II the “geisha” image of Japan became pervasive in the US, which facilitated Japan’s occupation by a masculine America.\(^{159}\) There has also been a significant correlation between racial hierarchy and class. In nineteenth century Europe aristocracy was seen as a superior race, while the “laboring class” was considered an inferior and even dangerous race.\(^{160}\) Moreover, the rise of capitalism and the exploitation of African slave labor were inextricably intertwined.\(^{161}\) Much interesting work examines the interactions among these different identities.\(^{162}\) But there is also value in trying to isolate and assess their independent effect, difficult though this may be.

Although racism and sexism often appear together, gender and racial identities are different. Gender may be based on physical markers, but it does not imply beliefs in common descent. Despite the close historical link between race and class, they can be distinguished. At least in its more recent use, class is more closely linked to factors of production than to common descent and its phenotypic markers. Race cuts across class,

\(^{159}\) Shibusawa 2006.

\(^{160}\) Chevalier 1973; Pick 1989.

\(^{161}\) McIntyre 2011.

\(^{162}\) Chowdhry and Nair 2002; Short and Kambouri 2010.
which is why Marxists worry that race masks class inequality, weakens class consciousness, and sustains exploitative capitalism.\textsuperscript{163}

Race is more difficult to distinguish from nation and ethnicity. Nation-builders frequently imagined the body politic in terms of race and excluded racial others from full membership in the state.\textsuperscript{164} Race and ethnicity are even more entangled. After World War II many advocated the replacement of race with ethnicity, further blurring the distinction between the two. Not surprisingly, some scholars prefer concepts such as “ethno-race,” “racial ethnicity,” or “ethnic races.”\textsuperscript{165} Yet race cannot be reduced to nation and ethnicity. One way in which these identities differ is that although they all share beliefs in common descent, national and ethnic identities emphasize its cultural markers (language, dress, and customs), while racial identity emphasizes its physical markers (phenotype). As Paul Taylor put it, “…‘race’ points to the body, while ‘ethnicity’ points to culture.”\textsuperscript{166} This is partly why the ascriptive element is stronger in racial than in national and ethnic identities. Historically external imposition played a larger role in the case of racial identity than in that of national and ethnic identities.\textsuperscript{167} Even today, one has more choice whether to identify with an ethnic identity than whether to embrace a racial identity. While most Irish Americans have a choice over whether to identify with this ethnic group, most African Americans do not have a choice over whether to identify with this racial group.\textsuperscript{168} Other differences are that national identity is tied closer to citizenship and

\textsuperscript{163} Callinicos 1993.
\textsuperscript{164} Marx 1998.
\textsuperscript{165} Gracia 2007.
\textsuperscript{166} Taylor 2004, 54.
\textsuperscript{167} Doty 1993, 452.
\textsuperscript{168} Appiah 1990.
the state than racial identity is (at least formally). Racial identity is also a more
encompassing category than ethnic identity. While different ethnic groups can be of the
same race, different races are typically not of the same ethnicity.

In conclusion, I define racial identity as a form of collective identity based on
beliefs of common descent the markers of which are phenotypic. This definition is
admittedly narrow and the distinction between racial identity and adjacent identities is
imperfect. My hope is that it nonetheless can serve as a working definition to establish
the relevance of race in great power politics. Following an initial review of the threat
literature in IR, the next section provides a two-step racial theory of discord and
cooperation.

WHAT RACE DOES: RACIAL IDENTITY, THREAT PERCEPTION, AND
BEHAVIOR

Threat Perception in International Relations

In his “balance of threat” theory Stephen Walt made a cogent case that balancing
does not occur simply in response to power. Drawing on empirical evidence of Middle
Eastern diplomacy between 1955 and 1979, he found that states ally not against the
strongest, but the most threatening unit. According to Walt, threat is a function of four
factors: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived
intentions.”169 While the first three have long been part of the realist toolbox, the last has
not. Walt’s innovative theoretical move was based on the conviction that “Perceptions of

169 Walt 1985, 9; Walt 1987, 5.
intent are likely to play an especially crucial role in alliance choices." The more aggressive the perceived intentions of a state, the more likely it is that others would form a balancing coalition against it. Because power can be used either to hurt or help, perceptions of intentions shape balancing. Others subsequently showed that not only perceptions of intent, but also perceptions of power matter for balancing.

While Walt argued that threats were the primary drivers of alliances, he also found evidence that shared ideology mattered for alliance formation when the ideology was unifying rather than divisive, when threats were moderate, and when weak states wanted to enhance their legitimacy. Like classical realism, Walt did not exclude the possibility that like units may cooperate against unlike units. But while classical realism emphasized that national interests trumped unit similarity, for Walt threats trumped unit similarity.

Walt recognized that threats could not be treated as objective and that theorizing threats required theorizing perceptions. But he ultimately shied away from providing a theory of threat perception. He limited his efforts in this regard to the stipulation that “statesmen often seek shortcuts to identify friends and foes.” Walt’s “balance of threat” theory raises at least three questions: What kind of shortcuts do statesmen use when perceiving threats? What is the precise relation between threat perception and unit similarity? Can unit similarity serve as a shortcut through which threat is perceived? Below I address these questions through a brief literature review of threat perception.

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170 Walt 1987, 25.
171 Wohlforth 1993.
172 Walt 1987, 38.
173 Ibid., 180.
Regarding the first question, psychological approaches and social identity theory explore the nature of shortcuts which shape decision makers’ threat perception. Among others, they discuss how social-cognitive biases can amplify the competitive consequences of anarchy. Psychological approaches show that when actors face new problems, the stakes are high, and structural factors are indeterminate, cognitive biases can intensify the security dilemma, escalating arms races and pushing states towards conflict. Social identity theory posits a universal need for positive self-esteem to explain ethnocentrism. The desire to maximize self-esteem drives categorization of individuals into different groups as well as comparisons which favor one’s in-group over others. The upshot is a predisposition toward competition and conflict. Drawing in part on these insights, neoclassical realists have recognized that misperceptions shape how structural constraints are translated into behavior. Randall Schweller showed that the reason the USSR bandwagoned rather than balanced against Germany on the eve of WWII was because Stalin misperceived Europe as tripolar, when in fact it was bipolar. Elsewhere Schweller provides a discussion of misperception, concluding that it can be a function of motivated biases, wishful thinking, and various predispositions including “emotional factors rooted in psychopathologies of hatred, guilt, or ethnic, religious, and ideological hostilities.”

Regarding the second question, constructivism did much to specify the relationship between threat perceptions and unit similarity. Although unit similarity does

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174 Jervis 1976, 68; Stein 2002.
175 Mercer 1995.
177 Schweller 2006, 43.
not always imply shared threat perception, the threat perceptions of similar units often converge for at least three interrelated reasons. First, shared identity implies some degree of mutual identification and solidarity. The trust and cooperation that results facilitate the rise of “cooperative security systems” or “security communities,” while their absence may give rise to “competitive security systems” or “insecurity communities.”178 For example, David Rousseau provided evidence that shared identity decreases threat perception and increases chances of cooperation.179 Second, decision makers tend to infer defensive intentions from similar identities and offensive intentions from different identities. At the basis of this inference is the tendency to assume that a “good” state like one’s own is less likely to engage in aggression. For instance, in his study of the transatlantic democratic community Thomas Risse-Kappen showed that decision makers infer defensive intentions from the democratic regime type of their counterparts, and externalize their domestic norms of peaceful conflict resolution to their inter-democratic interactions.180 Third, threat perception can also be linked to shared identity through norms and rules. Based on the logic of appropriateness, states with shared identity are expected to follow the same norms.181 If a state violates a fundamental norm and flouts the logic of appropriateness, others may interpret this as evidence that the state is “bad” and threatening. South Africa’s apartheid system violated the global norm of racial equality and the international community reacted by ostracizing and sanctioning the

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179 Rousseau 2006.
Rule violation may also threaten others because it challenges a fundamental value they hold or is seen as proof that the rule violator is revisionist. Barbara Farnham showed that Roosevelt perceived Hitler’s Germany as a threat to American security not because Germany was non-democratic, but because Hitler violated norms of political accommodation at Munich, suggesting that he was an unlimited revisionist.

To be sure, the logic of identity depends not only on the boundaries of collective identities, but also their content. Shared identity alone does not guarantee cooperation among similar units. Shared identity as criminals, for example, may increase rather than decrease threat perceptions and may inhibit cooperation. As Walt noted, shared ideology may result in a clash of interests if the ideology is divisive. The Sino-Soviet competition for ideological leadership during the Cold War, which led to the Sino-Soviet rift, illustrates this phenomenon. Michael Barnett’s study on the Middle East shows that shared pan-Arabic identity led to discord due to disagreements over what constitutes appropriate behavior for members of the group. Nonetheless, even in these divisive relations there was arguably as much cooperation as discord. After all, there was substantial cooperation within the Communist bloc during the Cold War and there is some cooperation among Arab states against Israel. When the content of shared identities is unifying, rather than divisive, shared identities are more conducive to cooperation than to discord.

184 Farnham 2003.
185 Walt 1985, 33.
Building on the insights of the threat perception literature discussed above, I propose a racial theory of threat perception which addresses the third question raised in connection to Walt: Can unit similarity serve as a shortcut through which threat is perceived? I argue that unit similarity (shared identity) can serve as a shortcut or a lens of perception through which threat is perceived. Despite his recognition that threat perception lies at the heart of patterns of conflict and cooperation, Walt stopped short of providing a theory of threat perception.\textsuperscript{187} Ted Hopf argued that “What is missing here is a theory of threat perception, and this is precisely what a constructivist account of identity offers.”\textsuperscript{188} While constructivists have explored the impact of various shared identities on threat perception, they have largely neglected racial identities. In the next section I argue that sometimes states perceive threats based on racial prejudices embedded in their racial identity. In such cases we can talk about the color of threat.

**The Color of Threat: Racial Identity Shapes Threat Perception**

I build on Ted Hopf’s social cognitive conception of identity where identities function as lenses of perception.\textsuperscript{189} Identities are social, because they are the result of interactions with the social environment. At the most general level, identity refers to actors’ self-understanding acquired through social interactions. Identities are also cognitive heuristics which allow us, cognitive misers, to cope with the complexity of the world. They function as lenses of perception, or what Hopf calls “axis of interpretation”

\textsuperscript{187} Gause III 2003, 273.  
\textsuperscript{188} Hopf 1998, 187.  
\textsuperscript{189} Hopf 2002.
and Linda Alcoff calls “interpretive horizons.” They make “threats and opportunities, enemies and allies, intelligible, thinkable, and possible.” Identities as lenses of perception do more than just tell us who we are. They also tell us who others are. Identities are “mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other.”

The insight that identities function as lenses of perception has provided a fruitful starting point for several different theories. John Owen built his explanation of democratic peace on the assumption that “people perceive their material environment through ‘lenses’, formed by the ideas they hold, that give that environment meaning.” Richard Herrmann and Michael Fischerkeller provided an image theory of foreign policy where behavior is largely a function of actors’ strategic images of others. Based on judgments about relative power, culture, and threat or opportunity, the authors identify multiple images and strategic behaviors associated with them. Although Herrmann and Fischerkeller briefly touch on race, they limit its relevance primarily to the asymmetrical power relations of the “colony” image. They assume that race is irrelevant in more symmetrical power relations such as that of the “enemy” image. As discussed in Chapter 1, the dissertation extends the relevance of race to the symmetrical relations of great power politics, including the “enemy” image.

My contribution lies in applying the insight that identities function as lenses of threat perception to racial identities. Racial identities, like any identity, vary along two

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194 Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995.
main dimensions: content and contestation.\textsuperscript{195} Since, as explained in the introductory chapter, I use race as a cause rather than as an effect, I bracket contestation and focus on content. Racial identity shapes threat perception through the prejudices it contains. The visibility of racial identity facilitates the development of prejudices. Based on our limited experiences we form categories of others, attach various attributes to them, and then over-generalize these attributes to all members of the category.\textsuperscript{196} Prejudices are primarily the consequence of our being cognitive misers, but they may also be reinforced by other needs and interests. They may satisfy humans’ need for positive self-esteem and may contribute in subtle but powerful ways to the maintenance of existing power relations.\textsuperscript{197} Although their strength varies across levels of education, geographic location, age, gender, or level of income, prejudices are surprisingly widespread and resilient.

One concern in the race literature regarding racial theorizing that relies on prejudices is that it reduces racism to individual idiosyncrasy and misses its broader structural aspects.\textsuperscript{198} Indeed, a significant portion of the prejudice literature tends to embrace methodological and ontological individualism. Theodor Adorno’s classic study located prejudice in the “authoritarian personality,” and more recent cognitive-behavioral approaches locate it in the individual mind.\textsuperscript{199} Nonetheless, there is no good reason to assume that prejudices are necessarily individual, rather than structural. The assumption

\textsuperscript{195} Abdelal et al. 2009.
\textsuperscript{196} Allport 1958 [1954].147.
\textsuperscript{197} Maykovich 1971, 448; Mercer 1995.
\textsuperscript{198} Bourne 2001; Silliman 2003; Wight 2003.
\textsuperscript{199} Adorno 1950; Corlett 2003; Levine and Pataki 2004.
that prejudices are individualist has recently come under attack in social psychology. As mentioned earlier, social identity theory revealed the social origins of prejudices. In the same vein, I conceive of prejudices embedded in racial identities as the micro-structures which help uphold larger material, institutional and legal macro-structures. They are embedded in the larger social structure, are relational, and are transmitted socially, which makes them as social as they are cognitive. By embedding them in racial identities, I hope to avoid the reductionist trap associated with theories of racial prejudices.

Prejudices help racial identity shape threat perception in two ways. First, racial prejudices facilitate the activation of racial identities by providing the cognitive associations on which activation depends. Because agents have multiple identities, the activation of racial identities is necessary in order to perceive others through a racial lens. Activation is a cognitive process which can occur automatically, but can also be facilitated by a wide range of cues provided by the media and politicians. It depends on the prior existence of conscious or unconscious cognitive associations between racial others and particular characteristics, events, or policies. Such close associations usually take the form of prejudices. The literature on racial cues and on playing the “race card” provides strong evidence in this regard. For example, the close connection in the American mind between crime and African Americans can activate racial perception if one is exposed to images or statements about crime, even if no direct reference to race is

200 Dixon and Levine 2012, 6-10.
This implicit activation is the more powerful because it can circumvent norms prohibiting racism by avoiding explicit reference to race. Similar activation of racial identities as a lens of perception can occur towards racial groups inhabiting other states if one is exposed to images or statements which focus on characteristics closely associated with that racial group. Although much of this literature in American politics emphasizes the instrumental role of manipulative elites and the media in activating racial prejudices, there is nothing in the logic of activation that requires instrumentalism. In practice it is often the manipulative elite and the media that provide racial cues, but sometimes they provide racial cues automatically, without being motivated by some self-interest.

Second, racial prejudices provide the specific content of racial identities, decisively influencing the impact of racial identities on threat perception. Racial prejudices relevant to threat perception can be grouped into four categories: related to the body, related to reason, related to intentions, and related to morality. These four aspects have been central to the modern conception of self and other. In addition to fundamental biological difference, the racial self is imputed rationality, defensive intentions, and morality; while racial others are imputed fundamental biological similarity, irrationality, offensive intentions, and immorality. Similar prejudices have also been applied to gender, class, ethnic, and religious identities, but I am interested in how these prejudices link racial identity to threat perception.

Threat perception is the intervening variable between racial identity and behavior. I define threat perception broadly, as the anticipated outcome of A’s (intended future)
activities as perceived by B through its racial lens of perception, which would result in B’s loss of something valuable.\textsuperscript{204} Threats are intersubjective, which makes them dependent on collective perceptions and intentions, rather than on material capabilities alone.\textsuperscript{205} As opposed to “Rubicon theories,” where prejudices influence international politics after decisions are made and agents switch from a deliberative to an implemental mind-set,\textsuperscript{206} I show that racial prejudices can have an impact before decisions are made as well, constraining not only action but also deliberation. Below I discuss how each of the four categories of racial prejudices can shape threat perception.

The first category of racial prejudices is related, but not reducible to, the body. At the heart of this prejudice is the belief that racial others are fundamentally different biologically. This contributes to naturalizing racial identities and fixing racial boundaries. Phenotypic markers create the illusion that racial identity is natural (biological) and fixed, rather than social and changeable: “race gives to social relations the veneer of fixedness, of long duration, and invokes, even silently, the tendency to characterize assent relations in the language of descent.”\textsuperscript{207} Individuals are believed to enter their racial group through birth and exit it through death. Those who share the agent’s racial identity are seen as biologically fundamentally similar. At the same time, other racial groups are perceived as fundamentally different, even inferior, and are perceived as threatening to one’s ‘natural’ racial identity. The proximity of racial difference is perceived as threatening because it heralds transgression of fixed racial boundaries with allegedly disastrous consequences.

\textsuperscript{204} Baldwin 1971, 72; Knorr 1976, 78.
\textsuperscript{205} Owen 1997, 18.
\textsuperscript{206} Johnson and Tierney 2011.
\textsuperscript{207} Goldberg 1999, 374.
The assimilation of racial others is seen as either impossible because the difference is too great or undesirable because it threatens the superiority, purity and the cohesion of one’s own racial group. Thus, even in the absence of offensive intentions and capabilities, racial others can pose a threat. Although the degree to which this hypothesis inflates threat perception may depend on the social distance between the racial groups involved, it holds as a general rule of thumb. Bodily prejudices are upheld by what Gordon Allport in Chapter 8 of his classic study on prejudice called “sensory aversion.” He observed that often people express distaste for others by referring to bodily characteristics.

Racial prejudices related to the body inflated threat perceptions of racially different groups and justified anti-miscegenation norms, segregation measures, and eugenic policies far into the twentieth century. Extreme domestic examples include South Africa’s apartheid system (1948-1994), Nazi Germany’s anti-Semitic legislation in the 1930s, America’s Jim Crow laws, and European interwar sterilization laws. For instance, the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor prohibited sexual relations between Jews and ‘Aryans,’ while the Law for the Protection of the Hereditary Health of the German People excluded “alien races” from the national community. In the US interracial marriages were prohibited until 1967. International racial others are typically kept out through restrictive immigration legislation. Latin American countries like Brazil introduced immigration restrictions to exclude Jews and Japanese, who were

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208 Bogardus 1925; Karakayali 2009.
209 Allport 1958 [1954].
211 Burleigh and Wippermann 1991, 45, 49.
considered non-assimilable.\textsuperscript{212} The pervasive belief was that “The yellow and white races are immiscible as oil and water.”\textsuperscript{213} British Dominions restricted Oriental immigration through “education tests” (Australia) or diplomatic agreements with Japan (Canada).\textsuperscript{214} In the US the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act were partly the result of racial fears based on prejudice related to the body. Racial fears of fundamental biological difference underpinned the emergence of demographic studies on differential fertility during the early twentieth century. Interwar contributions in the \textit{American Journal of Sociology} conceived of demographic issues as a dimension of “interracial struggle”. The relative decline of whites versus non-whites (especially Asians) was seen as “race suicide” and justified immigration control.\textsuperscript{215}

In the past the threat posed by racially different groups was seen as primarily biological, but over time it became cultural. According to past versions races had biological inherited essences, which determined the nature of their institutions, laws, and civilizations. Joseph De Gobineau argued that the decay of civilizations was due to the pollution of the racial essence of superior races by inferior races.\textsuperscript{216} Over time, the biological foundation of this threat perception receded in the background and the emphasis shifted to culture. Yet racial prejudices often still lurk beneath the surface. An April 18, 2000 article in \textit{Nezavisimaya Gazeta} reported that “The yellow-faced billion assimilate villages [in the Russian Far East] which are close to the Chinese border

\textsuperscript{212} Stepan 1991.
\textsuperscript{213} McLaughlin cited in Steiner 1917, 97
\textsuperscript{214} Doc 218 [F 1144/223/23], 11841/52, Colonial Office, Memorandum respecting Australian and Canadian Legislation restricting the Immigration of Japanese (rec’d March 31)
\textsuperscript{215} Furedi 1998, 69-71, 73, 76, 78.
\textsuperscript{216} De Gobineau 1915 [1853-5].
excessively quickly.” At a conference the same year, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned: “I do not want to dramatize the situation, but if we do not make every effort, even the indigenous Russian population will soon speak mostly Japanese, Chinese and Korean.” Based on the discussion above, we can identify the first hypothesis through which racial prejudices shape threat perception:

**Hypothesis 1: The proximity of agents with different racial identities is perceived as threatening because they are considered fundamentally different and non-assimilable. The proximity of agents with shared racial identity is perceived as non-threatening, because they are considered fundamentally similar and assimilable without major difficulties.**

The second category of racial prejudices refers to intentions. Racial others may be perceived as threatening not because of their proximity, but because of prejudices about their intentions. Agents habitually impute aggressive intentions to racial others and they impute peaceful ones to those with similar racial identities. An example of a prejudice related to offensive intentions is that African Americans (especially men) are violent and crime-prone. John Dollard’s fascinating ethnographic study drew attention to the tendency of whites to impute aggressive intentions to African Americans, which then inflated whites’ threat perception. According to Dollard, “It is astonishing, when any little incident occurs, how unerringly aggressive intent on the part of the negro is assumed.” An oft-cited experiment found that whites interpreted the same ambiguous

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218 Brewer 1999, 438.
219 Dollard 1957 [1949], 288.
shove as violent when performed by blacks and friendly when performed by whites.\textsuperscript{220} Under conditions of uncertainty about threats prejudices pertaining to offensive intentions can strongly color threat perceptions. Although one may think these prejudices belong to the past, that is sadly not the case. The 1992 American National Election Studies (ANES) found that 50.5 percent of respondents thought that blacks were violent.\textsuperscript{221} A 1998 study estimated that from a third to half of whites view blacks as “lazy” and “violent,” and the actual numbers were probably higher given that the norm against racism inhibits the explicit expression of such beliefs.\textsuperscript{222}

To inflate threat perceptions, prejudices related to aggressive intentions interact in interesting ways with material capabilities. Due to the aggressive intentions imputed to racial others even their harmless or defensive capabilities may be misperceived as threatening. Studies in experimental psychology marshal robust evidence that racial prejudice leads to misperceptions of others’ capabilities. For instance, white subjects are more likely to misperceive harmless objects as weapons when they are held by African Americans than when they are held by whites.\textsuperscript{223} At the same time, imputed aggressive intentions will inflate threat perceptions the most when racial others have enough material capability to pose a credible threat.

Hypothesis 2: Difference in racial identity inflates threat perceptions, because agents impute aggressive intentions to racial others. Imputed aggressive intentions inflate threat perceptions most when racial others are strong enough to pose a credible threat. Shared racial identities deflate threat perception because

\textsuperscript{220} Duncan 1976.
\textsuperscript{221} Peffley and Hurwitz 1998, 62.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{223} Correll et al., 2007; Greenwald, Oakes, and Hoffman 2003.
agents impute benign intentions to those with similar identities, and perceive their material capabilities as non-threatening.

The third category of racial prejudices which shapes threat perceptions pertains to racial prejudices related to rationality. Reason has been at the center of the modern self’s identity. Liberalism’s universal principles and its ideal of progress presuppose a human nature based on rationality. Liberals unsurprisingly based their exclusion and oppression of racial others on imputed irrationality. Much of the literature discusses how Westerners habitually imputed irrationality to “uncivilized” racial others, making them less than fully human. This justified Western imperialism, exclusion, and oppression.224

But there is another aspect of imputed irrationality which is more relevant to threat perception. This implies fanaticism and disregard for human life. Racial others are seen as ruled by emotion rather than reason, which predisposes them towards irrational action and fanaticism. This strand of the prejudice was supported by two sets of claims. On the one hand, it was argued that non-white societies placed the community above the individual. In practice this meant that individual lives were devalued for the sake of the community’s well-being.225 On the other hand, the devaluation of human life was linked to the relatively large number of individuals which made up non-white groups. In the “human sea” of non-white populations individual human life was so abundant that it was worth little. This latter argument was typically made with the Chinese in mind.

Several examples illustrate prejudices regarding the lack of reason. Sidney L. Gulick, a Japanophile American missionary, who argued that racial differences are social

225 Gulick 1903, 258.
rather than biological, could nonetheless write: “The strength of the emotional element tends to make the Japanese extremists.” Although he cautioned that this tendency should not be exaggerated, he went on to discuss how emotions determined the mental activities of the Japanese and gave examples of “waves of feeling” sweeping across Japan. Gustav Le Bon’s classic study of mass psychology emphasized the importance of inherited racial features. He argued that while all masses tended to be driven by emotion, rather than reason, masses comprised of inferior races were more emotional than those of superior races. Edward Said noted that irrationality is a fundamental element of “Orientalism” that has contributed to the image of the bloodthirsty Arab and shaped Western perceptions and actions towards the Middle East in general.

In the absence of imputed aggressive intentions such irrationality would not necessarily be threatening, but in its presence it is frightening. Because other racial groups are understood to value their own life less, these racial groups cannot be deterred from carrying out aggressive intentions. Furthermore, because they value others’ lives less too, they are likely to pose a threat to others’ survival.

Hypothesis 3: Agents with different racial identities are perceived as threatening because of imputed irrationality. This irrationality, along with aggressive intentions, produces an image of fanatic racial others, which are impossible to deter. In contrast, agents with shared racial identity are rational and can be deterred even when they are hostile.

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226 Ibid., 83.
227 Le Bon 2002 [1895], 13.
The fourth category of racial prejudices pertains to morality. The prejudice that racial others are immoral and devious is facilitated by differences in religious and moral traditions. Judging based on one’s own moral code, racial others more often than not appear immoral. This tendency in the West was amplified by the long history in Christianity of associating dark skin with evil. This prejudice of immorality underlies the image of black sexual immorality and pathological sexuality, which scientific racism explained with reference to black men’s large penis and black women’s protruding buttocks. The racial prejudice of immorality also supported the image of the ‘scheming Jew’, who murdered Christ, engaged in avaricious money-lending, and was disloyal to the European nation-state.-Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda resonated so much with the masses because it appealed to these prejudices. The 1894 conviction in France of the Jewish army officer Alfred Dreyfus on false charges of espionage was an expression of this prejudice. Imputed immorality is conducive to distrust and inflated fears, as racial others are perceived as devious and disloyal. In addition, a strong emotional component, a dislike of racial others makes conflict easy and cooperation difficult.

Prejudices of the “heathen” Chinese, based on selective evidence regarding opium-smoking, gambling, lawlessness, and prostitution were widespread in the West. As a consequence, Chinatown came to be seen as the symbol of immorality, a den of vice and sin. Another example illustrating the prejudice that racial others are more devious and therefore more dangerous is related to the WWII internment of Japanese Americans.

229 Bastide 1967.
231 Ibid., 5, 36, 57-8.

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While all ‘Japs’ were enemies, only the ‘Nazis’ (rather than all Germans) were perceived to be enemies. The assumption was that Japanese Americans would be disloyal to the US due to their stable racial traits. In his report on the internment of Japanese Americans, General J. L. Dewitt made the point that “Racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized,’ the racial strains are undiluted.” In 1942, based on President Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, the United States interned about 120,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans into ‘War Relocation Camps’. Canada also interned about 22,000 Japanese and Japanese-Canadians. No similar measures were taken against Germans and German-Americans. Although racial prejudice alone cannot account for this outcome, it was a contributing cause.

Hypothesis 4: Due to imputed immorality, agents with racially different identities are perceived as devious and thus threatening. Agents with shared racial identity are seen as moral and less threatening.

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234 Robinson 2009.
235 The larger number of German-Americans compared to Japanese-Americans, their earlier immigration to the US, and their membership in the American ruling elite were some other reasons for their differential treatment. Although German-Americans were subject to disparaging epithets (“heinies,” “Huns,” “Jerry’s,” or “Krauts”), these were milder and more sparingly used than those applied to Japanese-Americans (Dower 1986, 81-82).
Hypothesis 1: Racial prejudices related to the body make agents with different racial identities appear threatening, because they are perceived as fundamentally different and non-assimilable. In contrast, agents with shared identities are perceived as fundamentally similar and assimilable.

Hypothesis 2: Racial prejudices related to intentions make agents with different racial identities appear threatening, because they are perceived as having offensive intentions. In contrast, agents with shared identities are perceived as having benign intentions.

Hypothesis 3: Racial prejudices related to rationality make agents with different racial identities appear threatening, because they are perceived as irrational. In contrast, agents with shared identities are perceived as rational.

Hypothesis 4: Racial prejudices related to morality make agents with different racial identities appear threatening, because they are perceived as immoral. In contrast, agents with shared identities are perceived as moral.

Table 2.2 Hypotheses linking Racial Identity to Threat Perception

The relationship between the four hypotheses varies across cases. They may work together in sequential or simultaneous fashion, but they may also work independently. None of the hypotheses is necessary to shape threat perception, but they are all independently or jointly sufficient. They might appear in combinations which can amplify their effect on threat perception. For example, as mentioned above, the prejudices of aggressive intentions and irrationality can together inflate threat perceptions by creating an image of a fanatic, undeterrable racial other. Prejudices pertaining to morality and fundamental biological difference can also jointly inflate threat perceptions. The French decision to occupy the Rhineland after WWI partly with black troops from African colonies caused outrage in Germany and parts of Europe. The response was a campaign against the “black horror on the Rhine.” The inflated threat perception behind
the campaign was related to fears of sexually immoral and biologically different African soldiers raping German women and ‘polluting’ the German race. Adolf Hitler alluded to fears of biological difference and deviousness, but he blamed, as usual, Jewish “deceitfulness”: “the main artery of the German people flows through the playground of black African hordes…It was and is the Jew who brings the Negro to the Rhine, always with the same concealed thought and the clear goal of destroying by the bastardization which would necessarily set in, the white race they hate.”

The four hypotheses might also work at cross-purposes in some cases. Prejudices regarding biological difference may mitigate fears of aggressive intentions when biological prejudices point to inferiority. The British Naval Attaché in Tokyo informed the Admiralty in 1935 that the Japanese ‘have peculiarly slow brains’ and the Commander in Chief in China dismissed Chinese and Japanese in 1937 as ‘inferior yellow races’. ‘Scientific’ theories suggested that the bone structure of Japanese inner ear made them unfit for flying airplanes. As a result some British policymakers underestimated the Japanese threat and were underprepared for Japanese aerial attack.

While the argument above focuses on how identities influence threat perception, threat perception also influences identity. Group position theory provides useful insights into how racial identities and prejudices are influenced by perceived threats to the position of dominant racial groups by subordinate ones. Similarly, group threat theory analyzes how (perceived or real) threats by subordinate groups to dominant

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238 Dower 1986, 102.
239 Campbell 1998.
240 Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999.
groups’ material resources (realistic threat) or values (symbolic threat) cause racial prejudices.\(^{241}\) In a powerful criticism to democratic peace, Ido Oren showed that collective identity boundaries may be redrawn in response to threats.\(^{242}\) His point is valid regarding racial identities as well. When Germany threatened England and the US on the eve of WWI, the latter countries moved from a Teutonic racial identity they shared with Germany to an Anglo-Saxon racial identity that excluded Germany.

The causal arrow between identity and threat perception runs both ways, but my contribution lies in the less studied aspect of this relationship: the impact of racial identities on threat perception. Biased threat perceptions can have numerous pernicious effects. They can distort national priorities, lead to the misallocation of scarce resources, and produce an incoherent and “episodic” foreign policy which stumbles from one crisis into another.\(^{243}\) The next section discusses how racially shaped threat perceptions generate behavioral dispositions towards discord and cooperation.

Racial Threat Perceptions Shape Discord and Cooperation

Identity influences foreign policy behavior in several ways. It may serve as an ideological device to justify self-interested policies, it may influence the cost of policy options, it may restrict the menu of possible foreign policies, or it may provide foreign

\(^{241}\) Realistic threat is based on Realistic Group Conflict Theory, where out-group prejudices are the effect of inter-group competition for scarce resources. Symbolic threat theories treat prejudices as effects of conflicting values and beliefs. Corenblum and Stephan 2001; Quillian 1995; Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006; Stephan and Stephan 1996.

\(^{242}\) Oren 1995.

\(^{243}\) Johnson 1985-86, 68.
policy preferences.\textsuperscript{244} My approach is closest to the latter two. Identities influence action by narrowing the menu of foreign policy options and by giving actors “primary reasons for action” or providing them with “motivational and behavioral dispositions.”\textsuperscript{245}

I link racial identities to behavior through a relaxed version of the “logic of habit.”\textsuperscript{246} Once activated, racial prejudices embedded in racial identities shape threat perceptions and create behavioral dispositions habitually and relatively automatically. All else equal, racial identity shapes patterns of discord and cooperation as follows. Through the lens of their racial identity agents perceive racial others as more threatening, which facilitates discord and impedes cooperation. In turn, agents perceive those with shared racial identity as less threatening, which facilitates cooperation and impedes discord. In this view, “structures of identity that yield systematically biased perceptions” sustain enduring patterns of conflict and cooperation.\textsuperscript{247} The endurance of these behavioral patterns is supported by the self-fulfilling nature of prejudices. The perceiver acts unconsciously on prejudices, which elicits prejudice-consistent behavior from target agents, validating prejudices and reinforcing their impact on the behavior of the prejudiced agent.\textsuperscript{248}

Although a relaxed logic of habit does not obviate the role of agency, rationality, and uncertainty, it reduces their significance. Agents may refuse to act on a particular prejudice if they recognize it as such, but since most of the time prejudices work unconsciously or are not recognized as prejudices, agents tend to act on them. States may

\textsuperscript{244} Barnett 1999; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Telhami and Barnett 2002, 7.
\textsuperscript{245} Reus-Smit 1999, 29; Wendt 1999, 224.
\textsuperscript{246} Hopf 2011.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., 549.
still rationally calculate what their best options are. However, their agency will be
constrained and rationality “bounded” as states will consider and act on a menu of foreign
policy options limited by racial prejudices. This relaxed logic of habit does not exclude
the logic of consequences where actors are driven by cost-benefit calculations, but it sets
the parameters within which this latter can operate. Uncertainty plays a role in initial
stages of threat assessment, but once racial prejudices are activated, they dissipate
uncertainty by imposing a false certainty on threats. The process through which
difference in racial identity predisposes agents towards discord is similar to that through
which “misplaced certainty” facilitates conflict.249 In the absence of significant threats
decision makers may nonetheless be certain that they perceive threats. This can give rise
to a series of escalatory actions and reactions which can facilitate conflict.

I define discord and cooperation as follows. Discord characterizes relations
between two actors if A pursues policies which B perceives as threatening to something
its values. The policies of A may undermine the security, the well being, or some
symbolic value of B, and A does little to change course. I adopt Robert Keohane’s
conventional definition of cooperation: “Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy
coordination.”250 In general, such cooperation requires negotiation and bargaining.
Although for Keohane cooperation and discord are sequential because cooperation is a
reaction to discord, this need not be the case. I use discord and cooperation not
sequentially, but simultaneously. Cooperation may be the result of shared threat

249 Mitzen and Schweller 2011.
250 Keohane 1984, 51.
perceptions, as much of the alliance literature argues.\textsuperscript{251} When the relationships between A on the one hand and B and C on the other are characterized by discord, B and C may engage in cooperation against the perceived threat posed by A. Of course, B and C may also cooperate with A to mitigate discord. I am however, most interested in discord and cooperation caused by threat perception. Discord and cooperation are not mutually exhaustive and most bilateral relations most of the time are characterized by a mix of the two. However, one tends to dominate specific issue areas at specific times.

Racial identities influence foreign policy through the state. I adopt a widely used conception of the state where the state represents and acts on the preferences of dominant domestic groups.\textsuperscript{252} I assume that states will act on the racial identities and prejudices of their dominant racial groups. Of course, in practice this assumption is not always valid. Sometimes racial minorities may be able to shape a state’s foreign policy in accordance with their racial identities and prejudices. If decision makers of minority racial groups are in power, they may act in conformity with their racial prejudices. If majority racial group have no strong and well defined preferences, racial minorities can shape state action, provided that their preferences are strong and well defined enough to overcome collective action problems. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, here I assume that the racial identity of states is that of their dominant racial group. All else equal, dominant racial groups are likely to have more impact on a state’s policies than racial minorities. Minorities sometimes also share the prejudices of racial majorities against a third racial

\textsuperscript{251} Walt 1987. For definitions of competition and cooperation in the security realm see Glaser 2010, 51. \textsuperscript{252} Gilpin 1981, 19; Moravcsik 1997, 518.
group inhabiting another state, hence this assumption should not be particularly problematic.

Racial identities can influence international patterns of discord and cooperation by shaping decision makers’ threat perceptions and/or that of the public. Although theories of international politics often assume that decision makers are exempt from the prejudices of the larger public, this is not necessarily the case. They are often as socialized into racial prejudices embedded in racial identities as the general public is. By coloring the perceptions of decision makers, racial identities can exert a direct influence on international politics. Sometimes, however, decision makers are less subject to prejudices for a host of reasons. Prejudices may be less pervasive in their immediate social environment and their higher level of education may help them shed some prejudices. Even when they are as much subject to racial prejudices as the general public, they may be less willing to act on them for strategic reasons. In these cases racial identity can shape patterns of international discord and cooperation indirectly, by shaping the threat perceptions of domestic racial groups. Such domestic racial groups then pressure decision makers to act in conformity with their fears. Domestic institutions undoubtedly influence which groups are represented how much in foreign policy. However, my focus is not on how the threat perceptions of various racial groups are selected and aggregated up to the state level by these institutions, but on how they shape foreign policy after selection and aggregation are complete.

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253 Hopf 2002.
Race does not always shape international discord and cooperation. The argument I propose is not deterministic, but probabilistic. Identifying the scope conditions of the theory is crucial. Many of these are commonsensical, but stating them explicitly may nonetheless be useful. First, prejudices embedded in racial identities shape discord and cooperation if they are activated. Activation is an important antecedent condition for the theory to have explanatory power. If racial identities are not activated, other identities will serve as lenses of perception and will provide states with a different set of actions. Second, racial identities are most likely to shape discord and cooperation through threat perception if agents hold racial prejudices which associate racial others with danger and are not strongly contradicted by other prejudices. Individuals may hold incoherent and even contradictory prejudices, which may mitigate the extent to which any one prejudice can shape threat perceptions. Negative prejudices of the irrational “Oriental” may be mitigated by positive prejudices regarding highly intelligent Asians. Negative prejudices of violent African Americans may be counterbalanced by positive prejudices regarding their gregarious and friendly nature. If actors do not hold threat-relevant prejudices or they hold other prejudices which trump those associated with danger, racial difference may not inflate threat perception. Third, racial prejudices will shape threat perceptions when there is uncertainty about threats, when it is not certain that others will carry out a potential threat. Although prejudices are quite resistant to falsifying evidence, ultimately they may be overcome by such evidence. If agents with shared racial identities pose unambiguous threats, then racial identity can do little to deflate threat perceptions. If

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254 Haas 2005, 29.
a racially different actor poses no threat because it does not have sufficient capabilities, the ability of racial prejudices to inflate threats will be limited. Racial prejudices can shape threat perceptions most when there is some uncertainty about threats, in which case they can impose false certainty on these threats. Finally, if the state does not have a dominant racial group, the theory’s utility may be limited. Racial identities and prejudices may still influence the state’s foreign policies, but a more nuanced racial theory is necessary to account for such dynamics, which can specify which racial group’s identities will drive the state’s behavior under what conditions.

Figure 2.1: The Causal Chain

In sum, the chapter provided a racial theory of discord and cooperation. The figure above summarizes the causal chain of the theory. In the first step, racial identities are activated and serve as lenses of perception through which agents perceive threats. Racial prejudices pertaining to the body, to offensive intentions, to irrationality, and immorality “color” threat perceptions. As a result, agents perceive those with shared
racial identity as less threatening, while they perceive agents with different racial identities as more threatening. In the second step, inflated threat perceptions predispose agents towards discord, while deflated threat perceptions predispose them towards cooperation. Racial identities generate behavioral dispositions through the logic of habit.

Finally, while the logic of habit takes us from racial identity to behavior, it does not determine outcomes. As with most theories of international politics, this racial theory remains indeterminate regarding specific policy choices and outcomes. Getting from more general behavioral dispositions to specific outcomes requires the incorporation of additional factors, such as strategic calculations, political ideologies, and domestic politics. Because the specific combination of racial fears and these additional factors is historically contingent, theorizing it a priori is not possible. Since the interaction between race and other factors provides a good opportunity to show how race can complement established explanatory factors to explain international outcomes, inspired by Yuen Khong, in each empirical chapter I discuss how specific international outcomes result through interactions between race and additional factors.255

**Research Design**

The next three empirical chapters assess the causal chain of the racial theory derived from our earlier discussion. Before I turn to them, however, I discuss indicators of inflated threat perception, methodological issues pertaining to case selection, and alternative explanations.

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Indicators of Inflated Threat Perception

Above I discussed in detail the cause or “independent variable” of the dissertation, racial identity. I also defined the “dependent variables,” discord and cooperation. Here I briefly operationalize the “intervening variable,” threat perception. Assessing whether threat perception is racially inflated is challenging. There is no objective baseline or clear measurement we can use to establish whether threat perception is inflated or not. I employ four indicators to operationalize inflated threat perception. Although separately they may not be sufficient to indicate racially inflated threat perception, together they are.

First, I look at the relationship between levels of threat perception of decision makers and the public on the one hand, and facts on the other. By looking at the archives and various secondary sources I try to reconstruct the level of threat perception of decision makers. I look at public opinion data to assess public threat perceptions. If threat perception is inflated, the gap between the level of threat perceptions and the facts should be large. For example, if I find that the American public and decision makers are extremely worried about Japanese foreign direct investment even though this constitutes a very small proportion of the American economy, it is reasonable to suggest that threat perceptions are inflated. Second, I compare levels of threat perception in similar cases involving different racial identities. Suppose that states A and B are similar except for their racial identity, and state C shares racial identity with A but not with B. If C perceives B as more threatening than it perceives A, we have reasons to suspect that racial identity shapes C’s threat perceptions. Third, I look at whether informed observers
at the time or in retrospect saw threat perception as inflated. If there is agreement across observers of various political persuasions that threat perceptions of a state were inflated, we have good reasons to believe them. Finally, since race is not the only cause of inflated threat perception, we need to make sure that threat perception is inflated due to racial difference, not some alternative factor. If race played a role in inflating threat perceptions, I expect to see evidence of this in the form of racial rhetoric. This racial rhetoric may become more subtle over time as the normative prohibition against racism strengthens, but it should nonetheless be observable. Together these indicators should provide a satisfactory indicator that threat perception was racially inflated.

**Case Studies and Case Selection**

The dissertation relies on three diachronic or “across time” case studies to evaluate the racial theory of this chapter. Such case studies are appropriate for evaluating the relevance of race in international politics. The detailed study of a small number of cases allows a high degree of conceptual validity and a close look at hypothesized causal hypotheses. Yet there are also costs involved. In particular, one may worry about biased case selection and omitted variables. The advantages of case studies can be maximized and their disadvantages minimized through case and method selections. I tried to do so by selecting cases which offer significant within-case and cross-case variation on all the variables. In addition, the use of controlled comparisons and process tracing can increase the accuracy of the findings. It is also important that the cases satisfy the scope conditions

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256 For advantages and disadvantages of case studies see Bennett 2004, 19, 22, 34. On selections problems see Geddes 1990; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 129.
regarding activation, threat-relevant prejudices, uncertainty, and the existence of dominant racial groups within states. Below I briefly discuss my rationale for case and method selection.

Since the dissertation’s aim is to extend the relevance of race to great power politics, and the only non-white great powers in the international system have been Asian, it was necessary to select cases involving Asian great powers. I focus on Japan and China because they are the two Asian powers whose relations with the West oscillated widely over time between amity and enmity. They were also able to better resist Western imperialism than most and remained formally sovereign, although they did have to accept unequal treaties. I did not select India because the second scope condition is largely missing insofar as Western prejudices regarding danger were rarely held in connection to Indians. The case of India is interesting and it should be explored in future work as it may reveal some limits of this racial theory. The fact that India was part of the British Empire may have made it into an honorary ‘white’ state, whose actions were less likely to be perceived as threatening by Western states than those of Japan or China. Of the ‘white’ powers, I focus primarily on the United States. The reason is not that the US is more racist than any other state, but because of its intrinsic importance as the leading great power of the twentieth century. I also focus on Britain and the Soviet Union, which provides useful variation in regime type. If racial cooperation occurs not only between the US and the UK, but also between the US and the USSR, then the predictions of this racial theory can be distinguished from liberal theories of international politics.
To assess the different predictions of the racial theory and conventional wisdom, I needed to select cases from the period before, during, and after decolonization. While I expect that race would matter in all three cases, albeit in increasingly subtle ways, the post-racial conventional wisdom would expect that after decolonization race did not matter. To evaluate whether the relevance of race in great power politics is limited to certain issue areas, I also wanted to select three different substantive issue areas for the three cases. In addition, I tried to select cases which were intrinsically important, had some current relevance, and offered divergent predictions for at least some competing theories.\(^{257}\)

Based on these criteria, I selected the following three cases: the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1922), the negotiation and signing of Limited Test Ban Treaty (1961-1963), and Japanese foreign direct investment in the United States (1980-1990). In all these cases, the theory’s scope conditions were satisfied: US racial identities and prejudices were activated; there was uncertainty about threats; Americans held threat-relevant prejudices of “Orientals;” and dominant racial groups existed in the states involved. Because of language constraints, the dissertation explores how difference in racial identity shaped the threat perception of Western states and influenced their behavior. Hence, all three empirical cases have at their center the “Yellow Peril,” the racially inflated threat perception of Western great powers.

The first case evaluates the first two hypotheses. It shows that racial prejudices about the body and aggressive intentions inflated US threat perceptions of Japan and

\(^{257}\) Van Evera 1997, 77.
resulted in Japanese-American discord. The UK cooperated with the US to end its alliance with Japan. The second case evaluates the second and third hypotheses. It shows that racial prejudices about aggressive intentions and irrationality inflated US threat perceptions of Chinese nuclear proliferation and amplified Sino-American discord. The USSR cooperated with the US in an attempt to inhibit the Chinese bomb through the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The third case tests the second and the fourth hypotheses. Racial prejudices about aggressive intentions and deviousness inflated US threat perceptions of Japanese foreign investment, caused Japanese-American discord, and resulted in restrictive American legislation regarding foreign investment. This last chapter probes the limits of the theory. Although the European Union shared American inflated threat perceptions of Japanese foreign investment, transatlantic cooperation against Japanese remained minimal. The chapter discusses why the theory’s expectations were partially unfulfilled.

In terms of methods, I used a loose version of controlled comparisons and process tracing. For controlled comparisons I rely on John Stuart Mill’s methods of agreement and difference. According to the method of agreement, selected cases should be similar in all respects, except the value on the independent variable. If the cases also show variation on the dependent variable, there may be a causal relation. For example, if states A and B were similar in all respects but had different racial identities, yet state C perceived A more threatening than B, we can suspect that C’s threat perceptions are shaped by racial identity. According to the method of difference, selected cases should be

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258 For a good discussion see George and Bennett 2004, 81-82, 153-160.
different in all respects, except the value on the independent variable. If the cases had the same value on the dependent variable, there are reasons to suspect that there may be a causal relation. If states A and B differed in all respects but shared racial identities, yet state C perceived A and B as posing similar levels of threat, we can suspect that racial identity shapes and threat perception. To ensure that the relationship discovered is not spurious or limited to correlation, I employ process tracing (see more on this below).

Controlled comparisons are particularly useful for the purposes of this study for at least two reasons. First, as discussed earlier, assessing threat perceptions is challenging. Controlled comparisons can provide a useful, if partial, baseline since in similar cases we expect similar levels of threat perceptions and in different cases we expect different levels of threat perceptions. Deviations from this baseline may indicate inflated or deflated threat perceptions. Second, because of normative prohibitions against racism, sometimes explicit or direct evidence that racial difference shaped threat perceptions is scarce. In such cases it is useful to rely on controlled comparisons. If the main difference between A and B is racial identity, and C perceives one of them as more threatening, it is plausible that C is not colorblind and race shapes its threat perception.

Despite their advantages, controlled comparisons alone are of limited utility. Mill’s requirements are too demanding to be satisfied in international politics. Two cases are never similar or different in all respects but one. Even if they were, we could not be sure that the relationship between independent and dependent variables amounted to causation, rather than correlation. Moreover, Mill’s methods work best when applied to deterministic causal relations, where the independent variable is either necessary or
sufficient. Many if not most causes in international politics do not fall in this category. Race is neither necessary nor sufficient cause of international discord and cooperation in general, even if it is necessary or sufficient in specific cases of discord and cooperation. Racial identity perhaps is best conceived of as “contributing” or “permissive” cause, which facilitates certain outcomes but does not determine them.\(^{259}\) For all these reasons, I combine controlled comparisons with process tracing to make a better case for race.

Process tracing allows us to shed light on the specific nature of the causal mechanism. By employing it we can be more certain that racial identity is not spurious and that the empirical phenomena we try to explain follow the causal pathway elaborated by the theory. There are three main stages of process tracing in each empirical chapter. First, I trace when and how racial identities and prejudices are activated. Second, I look at how racial identities and prejudices inflate threat perceptions of racially different actors, but not of racially similar actors. Third, I explore how inflated threat perceptions lead to discord among racially different actors and to cooperation among racially similar actors. Good process tracing depends on good sources. The next section discusses the types of sources I used and then addresses alternative explanations.

Sources and Alternative Explanations

The dissertation relies on a wide variety of primary and secondary sources. The primary documents include official speeches, congressional debates, telegrams, and various declassified documents. I conducted archival research at the Kennedy Library in

\(^{259}\) George and Bennett, 2004, 27.
Boston and the National Archives in Washington, DC. I consulted numerous primary
documents held at The Ohio State University and Princeton University, as well as various
on-line archives (including the British National Archives) and databases. I supplemented
primary sources with a wide variety of secondary ones. I looked at the most relevant
scholarly books and journals, and I read widely newspaper and magazine accounts
relevant for all three cases. In order to get a good sense of public threat perceptions I also
went beyond conventional scholarly sources and read fiction bestsellers and watched
popular movies. One potential limitation is that I relied less on systematic text selection
than one might like. Instead, I tried to read as much as I possibly could from as many
relevant sources as possible. For methodological guidance I relied on Marc
Trachtenberg’s advice on historical research for international relations. I hope that by
reading widely and broadly, I compensated for the lack of systematic text selection and
avoided significant biases that might have resulted from it. I also tried to mitigate this
shortcoming by performing classical content analysis on more systematically sampled
texts in Chapters 3 and 4.

Focusing on alternative explanations helps sharpen one’s own explanation and
identify its value added. I tried to select cases where competing theories offered different
predictions. While realism expects discord and cooperation to be primarily a function of
power, and liberalism expects it to be a function of regime type, this racial theory expects
it to be a function of racial identities and prejudices. If this theory is right, we should see
recurring patterns of discord and cooperation along the color line, despite changes in

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260 Trachtenberg 2006.
polarity and regime type. However, in some cases I found that there were other explanations which made similar predictions. When the causal chain is largely consistent with multiple explanations it is particularly important to explicitly discuss alternative explanations. This may mitigate the confirmation bias, the tendency of scholars to emphasize evidence that supports their own explanations.

For example, an instrumental model of threat inflation could be largely consistent with the causal chain of this racial theory. According to this model threat inflation is a result of elite efforts to facilitate foreign interventions, maximize parochial interests through expansion, act free of legal constraints, or to mobilize the public against threats to national security. Although different in many respects, these approaches assume that elite threat perception is relatively unproblematic, and conceive of threat inflation as an instrument employed by elites under conditions of anarchy and information asymmetry. For example, certain US industries may be threatened by Japanese foreign direct investment and they may manipulate the public and lobby Congress to restrict Japanese investment. One should note that this explanation is not necessarily devoid of racial prejudice. The public may be manipulable in the first place because it harbors racial prejudices. The main difference between this model and my racial theory is that elite perceptions are assumed to be free of racial prejudices and elites are assumed to act on the logic of consequences, rather than that of habit. At the end of each chapter I will evaluate my racial theory against this and other alternative explanations.

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Conclusions

While realist and liberal theories expect states to be colorblind, I argue that these expectations are not always valid. Under certain conditions patterns of discord and cooperation follow the color line. To return to the introductory metaphor, birds of a feather may flock together against birds of different feathers. The two-step racial theory developed in this chapter suggests that difference in racial identity inflates threat perceptions and facilitates discord, while shared racial identity deflates threat perceptions and facilitates cooperation. When threats are uncertain, states have dominant racial groups, which hold salient threat-relevant prejudices, racially similar states will cooperate against racially different states.

The next three empirical chapters assess the theory’s strength and probe its limits. Chapter 3 shows how racial prejudices regarding fundamental difference and aggressive intentions inflate American threat perceptions of Japan and, with British cooperation, lead to the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923). Chapter 4 traces how racial prejudices regarding aggressive intentions and irrationality inflated American threat perceptions of Chinese nuclear proliferation and, with Soviet cooperation, resulted in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Chapter 5 illustrates how racial prejudices of immorality and aggressive intentions inflated American threat perceptions of Japanese foreign direct investment in the 1980s and led to the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment. The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the dissertation, identifies its contributions and limitations, and highlights future avenues of research. The dissertation ends with thoughts on race, legitimacy, and the future of the liberal international system.
in the context of the shift from a “unicolor” to a “multicolor” system, brought about by the rise of the developing world.
Chapter Three: Race and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1923

For two decades the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923) was a crucial aspect of Far Eastern international politics. Its termination opened the way for Anglo-Saxon—Japanese alienation and German-Japanese rapprochement, arguably making World War II possible. In Winston Churchill’s words, “The annulment caused a profound impression in Japan, and was viewed as the spurning of an Asiatic power by the Western world...Thus, both in Europe and in Asia, conditions were swiftly created by the victorious Allies which, in the name of peace, cleared the way for the renewal of war.”

There is widespread agreement that a necessary cause for terminating the alliance was American opposition to it. Ian Nish, the most prominent historian of the alliance, speaks for most scholars when he argues that Britain and Japan would have renewed the allies in the absence of US opposition to it. Scholars and policy makers alike concur that it was due to American fears of the alliance that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated at the Washington Conference in 1921.

While there is agreement that American opposition was necessary for the demise of the alliance, there is considerable disagreement about the causes of this opposition.

262 Churchill 1948, 13.
263 Nish 1972, 395; see also Buckley 1970, 185.
264 Kennedy 1969, 52; Sir Robert Vansittart, the British Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the 1930s, that Britain terminated the alliance “to please America” (Louis 1971, 2-3); see also O’Brien 2004, 268; Turner 1971, 61-62.
Indeed, a closer look reveals its puzzling nature. The alliance treaty included Article IV, which in effect stipulated that Britain would not assist Japan in the event of a Japanese-American war. The parties repeatedly reassured the US that the alliance was not aimed at her. As British Foreign Secretary Lord George Curzon of Keddleston told American Ambassador George Brinton McClellan Harvey, “at no stage had it ever been contemplated by us, even as a remote possibility, that the agreement could be used against America, or that we should find ourselves committed to an attitude that was even indirectly inconsistent with a fundamental principle of British policy, namely, a good understanding and the closest co-operation with the United States in re-establishing the peace of the world.”

Similarly, the Japanese Ambassador in America, Baron Kijūrō Shidehara, noted that “By no stretch of the imagination can it be honestly stated that the alliance was ever designed or remotely intended as an instrument of hostility or even of defence against the United States.”

Why did the U.S. contribute decisively to the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, even though it represented no significant danger to her? Current explanations are insightful, but incomplete. A realist explanation is that American fears of and opposition to the alliance were the result of leaders’ worst-case assumptions. For states seeking survival under anarchy and uncertainty it is more prudent to be prepared for imagined threats than to be surprised by real ones. However, this explanation has difficulties explaining variation in threat inflation as both anarchy and uncertainty are

265 Doc. 17 [F 2461/63/23] 12008/15, Curzon to Geddes, Foreign Office, July 5, 1921
266 As opposed to the standard Japanese usage, for simplicity’s sake I use Japanese family names last.
Why did leaders make worst-case assumptions about Japan but not about many other potential threats? An instrumentalist explanation could be that threat inflation was the function of manipulative elites maximizing interests under conditions of information asymmetry. Undoubtedly, some newspapers eager to increase their subscription rates, politicians looking for more votes, and labor unions concerned about competition by Japanese immigrants inflated the Japan threat instrumentally for self-interested reasons. Although very powerful, this explanation underestimates the elite’s vulnerability to misperception and is insufficient to explain why threat inflationary arguments based on race resonated so well with the larger public. Given that the US government did more to deflate than to inflate the threat, concerned about a premature conflict with Japan, it is unclear why threat inflationary arguments trumped threat deflationary arguments. A liberal explanation might explain the demise of the alliance based on the incompatibility between the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the League of Nations Covenant. However, both Britain and Japan considered that the incompatibility could be remedied by modifying the alliance.

This chapter provides evidence that racial prejudices embedded in American racial identity inflated US threat perceptions of Japanese immigrants and Japan, transforming the latter into a “Yellow Peril”. Racially inflated threat perceptions eventually led to the American misperception of the alliance as highly threatening. In the first step, Japanese immigration and Japanese victory in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War activated American racial prejudices regarding Japanese biological difference and...

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268 Some realists allow such variation by incorporating costly signaling, information about type, and offense-defense variables (Glaser 2010).
aggressive intentions. Through the lens of these prejudices Japanese immigration was perceived as an existential threat to the white race, and the resulting frictions with an allegedly aggressive Japan was thought to inevitably lead to a Japanese-American war. In conformity with Hypotheses 1 and 2, racial prejudices pertaining to the body and intentions inflated American threat perceptions of Japanese immigration and Japan, and eventually the US came to misperceive the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a potentially dangerous instrument at Japan’s disposal. In the words of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, “the Anglo-Japanese alliance was the most dangerous element in our relationship with the Far East and with the Pacific.” In turn, through the lens of its racial identity Americans perceived the stronger Britain as a non-threatening racial kin, which was fundamentally similar and had benign intentions. In the second step, racially inflated American threat perceptions of Japan motivated US opposition to the alliance. Partly due to Anglo-Saxon racial solidarity and partly due to strategic calculations, Britain cooperated with the US to bring about the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the 1922 Washington Conference. Japan had no choice but to accept the end of the alliance. The absence of the alliance made Anglo-Saxon—Japanese alienation and German-Japanese rapprochement easier, preparing the way for WWII. The “Yellow Peril” became self-fulfilling prophecy.

It is important to make clear what the chapter does not argue. The argument does not imply that race is the only or even the most important explanation for the demise of the alliance. It only argues that it was a necessary cause, without which explanations of the demise of the alliance remain incomplete. The argument does not imply that Japan

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269 Lodge at Congressional Record 62 Cong. Rec. (1922), Congressional Record-Senate, Wednesday, March 8, 1922 (Legislative day of Tuesday, March 7, 1922), p. 3552.
harbored no racial prejudices. Nor does the chapter argue that Japanese behavior gave no reasons whatsoever for American concerns. The point is that racial difference inflated threat perceptions beyond what the evidence can reasonably support. Race did not create the Japan threat, but it significantly inflated it.

The chapter consists of three main sections. The first section discusses how racial difference inflated American threat perceptions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The second section traces how, motivated by racially inflated perceptions of threat, the US contributed to the demise of the alliance. The chapter closes with a test of the theory based on classical content analysis and a discussion of alternative explanations.

RACE INFLATES US THREAT PERCEPTIONS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

The Activation of Racial Prejudices

Japanese immigration and the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War activated American racial prejudices regarding Japanese biological difference and aggressive intentions. Initially anti-Asian racial prejudices in the US developed in response to Chinese immigration, which started with the 1849 California gold rush. The emergence of anti-Chinese racial prejudices was facilitated by, but was not reducible to, the anti-Chinese rhetoric of labor unions, the media, and politicians. Labor unions felt threatened by cheap Chinese labor, especially after the depression of the 1870s.
Newspapers like the *San Francisco Chronicle* hoped to increase their subscription rates by engaging in anti-Chinese tirades. Politicians catered to anti-Chinese prejudices to maximize their share of votes.\textsuperscript{270} Anti-Orientalism became a national issue when the evenly matched Democrats and Republicans appealed to racial prejudices to gain control of the crucial swing state of California, which was vital for winning national elections.\textsuperscript{271} Although instrumental threat inflation played an important role in activating racial prejudices, once activated, their threat inflationary impact went beyond instrumentalism.

When the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, made permanent in 1902, slowed Chinese immigration, these prejudices were transferred to the Japanese. Japanese immigration was increasing rapidly, albeit from a low base, in response to labor shortages in California, the 1885 Japanese legalization of emigration, and the promise of higher wages (see Table 3.1).\textsuperscript{272} Of the various anti-Japanese racial prejudices, here I am interested in those pertaining to the body (Hypothesis 1) and intentions (Hypothesis 2).

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{270} Thompson 1978, 10-12.
\item\textsuperscript{271} Thompson 1978, 12.
\item\textsuperscript{272} Buell 1922.
\end{enumerate}
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<td>2,039</td>
<td>1,891</td>
<td>1,277%</td>
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<td>24,326</td>
<td>22,287</td>
<td>1,093%</td>
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<td>72,157</td>
<td>47,831</td>
<td>196.6%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>119,207</td>
<td>47,050</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
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Table 3.1: Japanese in the United States, 1880-1920\(^{273}\)

Prejudices pertaining to the body were activated primarily by rising Japanese immigration. Its core component was the conviction that the yellow race was biologically different from the white race and it was impossible to assimilate. Racial traits were fixed and could not be altered by the American social, political, and geographic environment. In this view, “the Oriental always remained an Oriental”\(^{274}\) because “You cannot make bad stock into good by changing its meridian, any more than you can turn a cart-horse into a hunter by putting it into a fine stable, or make a mongrel into a fine dog by teaching it tricks.”\(^{275}\)

The immigration of biologically different Japanese was perceived as an existential threat to the white race. As the “teeming millions of Orient” immigrated to the West, their “rising tide of color” would “drown” the white race.\(^{276}\) Immigration restriction was allegedly necessary for racial self-preservation, and its absence meant racial suicide.

\(^{273}\) Iyenaga and Sato 1921, 94.
\(^{274}\) Thompson 1978, 224.
\(^{275}\) Pearson 1894; Stoddard 1920, 258.
\(^{276}\) Stoddard 1920.
While immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe was resented for the social and political problems it caused, it did not lead to the high levels of threat perception caused by Japanese immigration, because it was not seen as an existential threat. In the words of a contemporary, “White immigrants created social and political problems, but the Oriental created a biological problem.”277 “The menace of an Asiatic influx is 100 times greater than the menace of the black race, and God knows that is bad enough,” stated C.O. Young, special representative of American Federation of Labor.278 His concerns about Japanese immigration probably went beyond race, but contributed to the activation of anti-Japanese prejudices all the same.

While Japanese immigration activated prejudices related to the body, Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 activated prejudices related to aggressive intentions. If before the war American perceptions of Japan were generally positive, after the war they gradually became negative.279 Initially the US was more concerned about the Russian dominance of Manchuria. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War some Americans even argued that modernizing Japan better represented Western civilization than despotic Russia. Theodore Roosevelt himself on July 26, 1904 wrote to Secretary of State John Milton Hay that “The Japs have played our game because they have played the game of civilized mankind…”280 But the “yellowing” of Russia and the “whitening” of Japan ultimately remained unsuccessful.281 Some of Roosevelt’s early letters already

277 Stoddard 1920, 79.
278 Daniels 1977, 16.
280 Esthus 1966, 43.
show signs of racial concerns about Japan’s rising power. Hay reports that Roosevelt was worried about “Japanese hostility to the white race in general and especially to Americans,” widely reported on by newspapers and military attachés. Three days later, in a letter to his friend, British diplomat Cecil Spring Rice, Roosevelt wrote:

“The Japanese, as a government, treated us well and what they contended for was what all civilized powers in the East were contending. But I wish I were certain that the Japanese down at bottom did not lump Russians, English, Americans, Germans, all of us, simply as white devils inferior to themselves not only in what they regard as the essentials of civilization, but in courage and forethought, and to be treated politely only so long as would enable the Japanese to take advantage of our various national jealousies, and beat us in turn.”

Roosevelt secretly hoped that Japan and Russia would exhaust each other in the war, so that “peace will come on terms which will not mean the creation of either a yellow peril or a Slav peril.” When the “Yellow Peril” trumped the “Slav peril,” Americans started to worry about potentially aggressive Japanese intentions. Memories of late nineteenth century Japanese-American frictions over the annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines resurfaced. Japan’s performance at the Portsmouth Peace Conference contributed to these concerns. The American public assumed that Japan was fighting a defensive war. Japan’s desire to strengthen its control over Southern Manchuria and Korea raised worries of a “Japanese peril.” Anti-American riots in Tokyo caused by Japanese dissatisfaction with the peace treaty further facilitated the activation of American prejudices regarding Japanese aggressive intentions.

282 Hay diary, December 24, 1904, Hay papers.
284 Cited in Esthus 1966, 37.
After the war prejudices regarding Japanese aggressiveness became widely activated. Already before the war ended John A. Hull, chairman of the House Committee of Military Affairs, warned that if Japan won the war with Russia, she would fight a “bloody war with the United States over the Philippines.” Others saw Japanese atrocities committed during the capture of Port Arthur as evidence for Japanese aggressiveness. Roosevelt himself believed that Japan was “a power jealous, sensitive and warlike…There can be none more dangerous in all the world.” Richmond P. Hobson, American hero in the Spanish-American War, drew attention to Japan’s innate “war habit.”

Prejudices related to Japanese fundamental difference and aggressiveness were intertwined, just as the immigration and security threats rooted in them were. Many saw Japanese immigration as one facet of Japan’s aggressive foreign policy. Japanese immigrants also activated prejudices of aggressiveness. At least some Americans saw them as brutal, lacking humanity, and possessing a fanatical hatred for foreigners. The prejudice that the Japanese were impossible to assimilate amplified security concerns, because of worries that unassimilated Japanese would side with Japan in a Japanese-American war.

Interestingly, while most white Americans’ perception of Japan worsened, those of African Americans went in the opposite direction, shifting from negative to positive. Although before the war African Americans saw the Japanese largely as a threat in the

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286 Buell 1922, 614-5.
287 Iriye, 1972, 111.
288 Thompson 1978, 54.
289 Thompson 1978, 81.
290 Thompson 1978, 212-14.
labor market, after the war they saw them mainly as welcome challengers of “white supremacy.” The fact that African Americans perceived the Japanese as less threatening after the war can be interpreted as partially supporting the argument that fears of Japan were based on racial prejudices. Although more research is needed to establish this fact, it is reasonable to suggest that American racial minorities perceived Japan as less threatening because they did not share the racial prejudices which were inflating the threat perceptions of white Americans.

In sum, Japanese immigration and the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War activated American racial prejudices regarding Japanese fundamental difference and aggressive intentions. Before the war racial prejudices towards Japan were mainly paternalist, but after the war they became antagonistic. As one prominent Japan scholar put it, “The charmingly quaint and admirably quick Japanese had suddenly become for us the sinister Yellow Peril.”

Racial Prejudices Inflate Threat Perceptions: Japan as a “Yellow Peril”

While the section above showed how racial prejudices pertaining to Japanese fundamental difference and aggressive intentions were activated, this section traces how they inflated American threat perceptions of Japan, transforming it into a “Yellow Peril”. The mechanisms linking racial prejudices embedded in racial identities to threat

291 Shankman 1977.
292 Kowne 2000, 130.
293 Reischauer 1951, 20.
perception are those of hypotheses 1 and 2. According to hypothesis 1, the proximity of agents with different racial identities is perceived as threatening because they are considered fundamentally different and non-assimilable. The proximity of agents with shared racial identity is perceived as non-threatening, because they are considered fundamentally similar and assimilable without major difficulties. According to hypothesis 2, difference in racial identity inflates threat perception because agents impute aggressive intentions to racial others. Imputed aggressive intentions inflate threat perceptions most when racial others are strong enough to pose a credible threat. Shared racial identities deflate threat perceptions because agents impute benign intentions to those with similar racial identities and perceive their material capabilities as non-threatening.

Establishing the inflated nature of threat perceptions is challenging as no objective baseline exists. Throughout the chapter I provide four indicators that American threat perceptions were inflated. First, I compare levels of threat perception in similar cases involving different racial identities. For example, I show that Americans welcome British immigration but perceive the much smaller Japanese immigration as threatening. Second, I look at the gap between levels of threat perception and facts. It shows that even states with negligible Japanese population worried about Japanese immigration. Third, I discuss the sheer magnitude of perceived threats, which culminated in war scares. Finally, I show that numerous observers at the time saw American threat perception as inflated.

The remainder of this section shows how racial prejudices sequentially inflated threat perceptions of Japanese and Japan. In 1906, 1913, and 1920 racial prejudices
related to biological difference resulted in waves of fear of Japanese immigration, leading to Japanese-American discord. Then, racial prejudices related to aggressive Japanese intentions led to inflated fears of Japanese-American war. The upshot was the perception of Japan as a “Yellow Peril”.

The 1906 San Francisco School Segregation Crisis

On October 11, 1906 the San Francisco Board of Education made the decision to segregate all Japanese children to separate Oriental Public Schools. The board claimed the segregation was justified “not only for the purpose of relieving the congestion at present prevailing in our schools, but also for the higher end that our children should not be placed in any position where their youthful impressions may be affected by associations with pupils of the Mongolian [Asian] race.” 294 The school segregation decision was followed by a series of anti-Japanese riots and discriminatory measures against Japanese businesses that lasted through the summer of 1907.

Japan protested the school segregation measure. The Japan Weekly Mail characterized Japanese reaction as one of “profound sorrow and disappointment,” while the American Ambassador in Japan Luke Wright reported “marked feeling of irritation” toward the US. 295 President Theodore Roosevelt grew concerned about the international repercussions of the school segregation case. He could not hide his irritation with California and told his cabinet that the state “was too small to become a nation, and too

294 Cited in Buell 1922, 623.
large to put into a lunatic asylum.”  

Despite his opposition to California’s actions, Roosevelt himself shared the widespread racial prejudice that the Japanese were biologically fundamentally different and impossible to assimilate. Secretary of State Elihu Root warned that “This silent invasion by foreign people is as effective as that of the Huns and Goths in the days of the Roman Empire.”

To mitigate tensions with Japan, Roosevelt acted promptly and on October 31, 1906 dispatched Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor Victor H. Metcalf to investigate the situation. According to Metcalf’s report, out of 25,000 school children in San Francisco only 93 were Japanese and they were distributed among 23 schools. That 0.37 percent of the pupils or an average of four students per school would significantly contribute to crowded schools defies credibility and suggests the racial and inflated nature of American threat perception. Roosevelt came to a similar conclusion. In a letter to George Kennan he wrote that the issue was not really about schools, but it was “partly labor, and partly a deep-rooted racial antipathy, the extent of which fairly astounds me.”

Roosevelt promised to reduce Japanese immigration and the Board of Education ended school segregation on March 13, 1907. To address the deeper problem of Japanese immigration, of which the school segregation was only a symptom, the two governments

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296 Esthus 1966, 293.
297 Neu 1967, 185-86.
298 Tupper and McReynolds 1937, 27; Buell 1922, 625.
299 Roosevelt to Kennan, February 9, 1907, Kennan Papers, cited in Esthus 1966, 166.; See also Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, February 4, 1907: “…I have to face facts, and one is that, save as between gentlemen of the two nationalities, there is a strong and bitter antipathy to the Japanese on the Pacific slope—the antipathy having been primarily due to labor competition, but complicated by genuine race feeling.” (Roosevelt Papers, cited in Esthus 1966, 149.)
concluded the Gentlemen’s Agreement. In return for American withdrawal of the school segregation decision, Japan agreed to limit Japanese emigration to the US. The agreement seemed to work. The number of Japanese immigrants between 1907 and 1910 declined from 9,948 to 1,552 and when Roosevelt left office in March 1909 more Japanese departed than entered the country.\textsuperscript{300}

While racial prejudice regarding Japanese biological difference inflated American threat perceptions of Japanese immigration, racial prejudice regarding Japanese aggressive intentions inflated threat perceptions of war with Japan. The inflated threat perception of the 1906 crisis culminated in a war scare. American citizens saw ubiquitous signs of a looming Japanese invasion. Ordinary Japanese from El Paso, Texas to Lamar, Colorado were thought to be undercover soldiers or spies. The public had become extremely preoccupied with a Japanese-American war: “From California to Delaware, from Ohio to New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Americans suggested how best to prepare for and win the expected war.”\textsuperscript{301} Some even worried about an anti-white alliance of Japan and African-Americans.

The press inflated and reflected fears of a ‘Yellow Peril’. The \textit{Coast Seaman’s Journal}, the San Francisco \textit{Chronicle} and \textit{Examiner} were filled with “yellow perilist” stories. The \textit{Santa Clara Journal}, the \textit{Hanford Sentinel, San Francisco Argonaut, Sacramento Union, Seattle Daily Times} and others regularly ran headlines such as “The Japanese Invasion, the Problem of the Hour.”\textsuperscript{302} A certain genre of Yellow Peril war

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{300} Esthus 1966, 228; Iyenaga and Sato 1921, 217.
\textsuperscript{301} Iriye 1994, 159.
\textsuperscript{302} Daniels 1977, 25; Tupper and McReynolds 1937.
\end{footnotesize}
literature became popular. Books like Homer Lea’s *Valor of Ignorance* (1907), H.G. Wells’ *War in the Air* (1907), Marsden Manson’s *The Yellow Peril in Action* (1907) stressed the inevitability of a racial war and depicted it in vivid terms.

The American elite were less alarmed, but they were nonetheless worried. To reassure Americans, Secretary of State Root released an official statement that the San Francisco school crisis would not cause war, but this only further inflated perceptions of threat.\(^{303}\) In reality, Root himself was concerned. As he stated on October 27, 1906 he believed that the Japanese were particularly sensitive about issues of racial equality and “one-tenth of the insults which have been visited upon Chinese by the people of the United States would lead to immediate war.”\(^{304}\) Roosevelt’s British friend and future Ambassador to the US, Cecil Spring Rice, estimated that a great racial conflict in the Pacific was imminent.\(^{305}\)

The Cabinet met on the issue on June 7, 1907. Secretary of Interior James R. Garfield came away with the conclusion that “the general feeling is that war with Japan is inevitable before the Panama Canal is finished—not immediately for the Japanese are not ready.”\(^{306}\) The financial crisis which brought down the Saionji cabinet in 1908 supported this assessment. Roosevelt took the crisis seriously, but maintained his composure. In a July 16 letter he voiced his concerns about Japan’s military power and intentions.\(^{307}\) On July 26 he wrote to Root that he did not think Japan would attack, but “there is enough

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\(^{303}\) Tupper and McReynolds 1937, 33-4.
\(^{305}\) Neu 1967, 181.
\(^{306}\) Ibid., 103.
\(^{307}\) Roosevelt to Baron Hermann Speck von Sternberg, Germany’s Charge d’Affaires; cited in Esthus, 191.
uncertainty to make it evident that we should be very much on our guard and should be ready for anything that comes.”

To be “on guard,” in the aftermath of the crisis Roosevelt became a staunch advocate of naval building. He also decided to dispatch the Great White Fleet to the Pacific at the end of the year. The official justification was that the American Navy needed training. But in a 1916 letter to a friend, psychology professor Hugo Münsterberg, Roosevelt wrote that the trip of the battle fleet was meant to curb Japan’s belligerence. The fleet was well received in Japan and by the time it left Japan’s shores on October 25, 1908 the war scare was over.

Although both governments handled the crisis well, American-Japanese relations were not left unscarred. The crisis represented a first step towards American perceptions of Japan as the “Yellow Peril”. The armed forces started preparing military strategy against Japan under the 1907 Orange War Plan. While the Japanese army still regarded Russia as its main enemy, the navy’s prime “enemy contemplated” became the US. Carl J. Arnell, the Consul General in Mukden, Manchuria wrote: “They [the Japanese] appreciate that the maintenance of this friendship is beset with racial and political obstacles, and many of them sorrowfully apprehend that this friendship will some day [sic] be broken off by inevitable causes.”

308 ibid., 192.  
309 Roosevelt to Münsterberg, February 8, 1916, Morrison, Roosevelt letters, VIII, 1018; in ibid., 184.  
310 Morton 1959.  
311 Nish 1972, 87.  
The 1913 Alien Land Law Crisis

While in 1906 inflated threat perceptions of Japanese immigration led to school segregation, in 1913 they led to anti-Japanese land legislation. The reprieve brought by the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement was short-lived. Although the overall number of Japanese immigrants remained low, there had been a slight increase since 1910. The main complaints against the Gentlemen’s Agreement were that it was easily sidestepped by Japanese “picture brides,” it allowed too many exceptions, did nothing about illegal Japanese immigration through Canada and Mexico, and gave the US no control over Japanese immigration.

Despite their low numbers and their modest land control, Japanese immigrants were increasingly seen as a threat to the white labor force, especially in agriculture. In 1913 of the 2,500,000 population of California 50,000 were Japanese. Of California’s 27,931,444 acres of farmland they operated less than 200,000 acres. This means that 2 percent of California’s population operated less than 1 percent of its farmland, which hardly seems threatening.

Nonetheless, politicians catered to anti-Japanese fears and prejudices in an attempt to gain votes. Democrats and Republicans alike wanted to take credit for anti-Japanese legislation. The 1912 presidential campaign was saturated with anti-Japanese

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313 In 1913 1,124 (6,771 admitted and 5647 departed) more Japanese entered the US than departed Iyenaga and Sato 1921, 217. According to more liberal estimates 2,390 more Japanese entered California than left in 1913 (Stephens Report).
314 This refers to the practice of bringing into the US Japanese women who were married to Japanese men working in the US through a wedding where the latter were represented at their own wedding in Japan by their picture. The practice seemed objectionable to Americans, but entirely acceptable to Japanese.
315 For instance, relatives of Japanese immigrants were allowed to enter the US.
legislation promises. In May 1912 Woodrow Wilson telegraphed James D. Phelan, a Senator from California, to reassure him that

“In the matter of Chinese and Japanese coolie immigration, I stand for the national policy of exclusion. The whole question is one of assimilation of diverse races. We cannot make a homogenous population of a people who do not blend with the Caucasian race. Their lower standard of living as laborers will crowd out the white agriculturalist and is, in other fields, a most serious industrial menace…Oriental coolieism will give us another race problem to solve and surely we have had our lesson.”

Numerous anti-Japanese bills were introduced in the legislatures of California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Montana and Nebraska. In the California legislature anti-Japanese discriminatory bills were introduced during every session between 1906 and 1913. In 1913 alone forty anti-Japanese bills were proposed, including prohibition of Japanese land ownership, residential and school segregation, imposition of special fees on Japanese businesses, and prohibition of Japanese employing white women. Although these bills were defeated by a combination of federal pressure and state legislature strategies, it was only a matter of time before one would be passed into law.

The Webb-Heney Alien Land Act Bill, known as the 1913 Alien Land Law, was that bill. It limited the right of “aliens ineligible for citizenship” to own agricultural land, allowing only leaseholds of three years. Although the bill did not explicitly mention Japanese, voter pamphlets explained that the rationale of the bill was to deprive Japanese immigrants of farmland. Since the Japanese were by far the largest group of “aliens ineligible for citizenship,” it was not difficult to see that they were the target of the bill.

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316 Stoddard 1920, 286-7. Although Wilson lost California to the Progressives, he did so only by 174 votes out of 700,000, which was the best performance of Democrats since 1882.
317 Bailey 1932, 36.
318 McClain 1994, 10.
The Japanese Ambassador in the United States, Sutemi Chinda, filed official protests against the bill on numerous occasions and warned Washington that its adoption would have a negative impact on Japanese-American relations.\textsuperscript{319}

Prompted by these protests and belligerent mass demonstrations in Tokyo, President Woodrow Wilson decided to intervene, but could not kill the bill.\textsuperscript{320} Because the federal authority for effective intervention did not exist, informal measures were necessary. Wilson sent Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to persuade Californians to stop the bill. But this time federal pressure did not work, perhaps because the Democratic President had less leverage over California’s Progressive Governor, Hiram Johnson, than Roosevelt had. The anti-Japanese public sentiment in California was based on strong racial prejudices. This was captured in a letter written by William Kent, a member of Congress from California, to Bryan: “We merely recognize with frankness what they [the Japanese] must recognize, although they do not wish to let the fact be known, that there are such things as racial lines that cannot be crossed except with peril and irritation. The Negro problem under which this country labors is a sufficient proof of this fact.’”\textsuperscript{321}

The bill passed in the California legislature by 72 to 3 and Governor Johnson signed it into law in May 1913. In the telegram exchange that followed, Japan claimed that the Alien Land Law not only violated the 1911 Japanese-American Treaty of

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{319} Curry 1957, 43.
\textsuperscript{320} Bailey 1932, 40.
\textsuperscript{321} William Kent to Bryan, April 7, 1913, Wilson Papers, II, 39; cited in Curry 1957, 49; my emphasis.
\end{footnotes}
Commerce and Navigation, but it also amounted to racial discrimination. In Chinda’s words, because the Japanese were ineligible to US citizenship, “they are the principal sufferers from that enactment, and that the avowed purpose of the law was to deprive my countrymen of the right to acquire and to possess landed property in California, the Imperial Government are unable to escape the conclusion that the measure is unfair and intentionally racially discriminatory…” What Japan objected to was not discrimination per se, but the singling out of the Japanese based on race. Japan also discriminated against foreigners, but she did so indiscriminately, regardless of their race and nationality.

Once again, inflated threats of Japanese immigrants led to inflated threats of war with Japan. The intensity of the war scare was captured by the Los Angeles Examiner’s April 23, 1913 issue, which stated that “Not since the guns of Fort Sumter boomed out over Charleston Harbor in 1861 has the nation fronted so serious a threat as it does today.” The inflated threat perception was fanned by anti-Japanese propaganda such as Shadows of the West, a movie which depicted Japanese controlling American agriculture, spying, abducting white girls, and even fighting a race war against America. An APSR article published in 1914 shows that international relations scholars were also subject to

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322 Japan argued that the law violated Article 1 of the treaty: “The subjects or citizens of each of the high contracting parties shall have liberty to enter, travel, and reside in the territories of the other, to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses, and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade, upon the same terms as native citizens” Iyenaga and Sato 1921, 201-2. The US argued that the article should be interpreted more narrowly, and since it does not explicitly mention farmland, it is not in contradiction with the 1913 Alien Land Law.

323 FRUS 1913, 633.

324 Doc 24, 12008/225(i), inclosure in Doc 23, memo, H.G.Parlett, “Memorandum respecting Discriminatory Disabilities to which Foreigners are Subjected in Japan,” n.d

325 Buell, 1923, 64-65

326 ibid., 71.
racially inflated threat perception: “A nation of materialists, fired with ambition and military ardor, are going just as far in their aggressiveness as sheer force will carry them. That is why Japan with her present ambitions is so generally regarded as a menace to the peace of the world.”

Books like Sax Rohmer’s popular novels contributed to threat inflation. Rohmer’s well-known character, Dr. Fu Manchu, was the embodiment of ‘Yellow Peril’:

> “Imagine a person, tall, lean and feline, high shouldered, with a brow like Shakespeare and a face like Satan, a close-shaven skull, and long, magnetic eyes of true cat-green. Invest him with all the cruel cunning of an entire Eastern race, accumulated in one giant intellect, with all the resources, if you will, of a wealthy government which, however, already has denied all knowledge of his existence. Imagine that awful being, and you have a mental picture of Dr. Fu Manchu, the yellow peril incarnate in one man.”

The American military in the Philippines worried about a Japanese invasion and kept in “constant readiness of action.” In mid-May 1913, Admiral Bradley A. Fiske told Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels that “war is not only possible but even probable.” If in 1907 War Plan Orange was quite rudimentary, in 1913 it was sophisticated enough to guide American operations in a war with Japan. But when the Cabinet discussed the possibility of Japanese-American war, it again concluded that Japan was financially unprepared for war.

The war scare gradually disappeared, but the crisis represented another step towards Japanese-American discord and the consolidation of the racially inflated “Yellow Peril” perception of Japan. It did not help that the Japanese were also subject to racially

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327 Latane, 1914:583.
328 Rohmer 1961 [1913], 17 my emphasis.
330 LaFeber 1997, 105-06.
inflated threat perceptions. Field Marshal Prince Aritomo Yamagata, the main *genrō* (personal adviser to the Emperor), grew concerned about a coming racial conflict. He thought that after WWI “the rivalry between the white and colored peoples will intensify; and perhaps it will be a time when the white races will all unite to oppose the colored peoples.”\(^{331}\)

*The 1920 Alien Land Law Crisis*

By 1920 dissatisfaction with the Gentlemen’s Agreement reached new heights and the 1913 Alien Land Law was seen as inadequate. Critics claimed that the Japanese sidestepped the law in various ways, including owning land in the name of their US-born children and leasing land through corporations with a majority of American stockholders. As support for a stricter alien land law was mounting, the Governor of California, William D. Stephens, expressed his hope that Japan would “understand our attitude and recognize that it is prompted solely by that inherent desire of every race and type of people to preserve itself.”\(^{332}\) The American Ambassador in Japan, Roland S. Morris, warned US Secretary of State Robert Lansing on November 19, 1919 that further discrimination against the Japanese in California “would lead to an extremely serious crisis.”\(^{333}\)

Congressional immigration hearings were organized in California in 1920. The main objection to Japanese immigration, repeated in hearing after hearing, was based not

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\(^{331}\) Cited in ibid., 102.  
\(^{332}\) Stephens report sent to Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, June 19, 1920; FRUS 1920, 9.  
\(^{333}\) FRUS 1919, 417.
on economic competition, important as that was, but on the racial prejudice of Japanese non-assimilability due to fundamental racial differences. Senator James D. Phelan (D-California) claimed that Japanese assimilation was biologically impossible and would lead to “mongrelization and degeneracy.”

Valentine S. McClatchy, a prominent member of the Japanese Exclusionist League of California, argued that “it would be a national suicide to encourage or permit the Japanese to secure a foothold here.”

Governor Stephens repeated arguments against racial mixing. California was closest to “that great ocean the teeming millions of the Orient…But that our white race will readily intermix with the yellow strains of Asia, and that out of this inter-relationship shall be born a new composite human being is manifestly impossible…history does not show any material fusion of either blood or idea between these peoples.”

The hearing of Chris R. Jones, president of the real estate board in Sacramento, by Representative King Swope from Kentucky, member of the congressional hearings committee, captures the racial aspect of fears of Japanese immigrants:

Mr. Swope: “Assuming other people of the same habits came in there, but were not Japs, what would the answer be?
Mr. Jones: If they were assimilable white people, I mean people who would assimilate, why, I can see no objection.
Mr. Swope: In other words, if the race feature were eliminated, you would have no objection to the Japanese?
Mr. Jones: I would not have any objection to the Japanese if the Japanese could assimilate with our population.”

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334 Congressional Hearings on Japanese Immigration 1921, 25.
335 Congressional Hearings on Japanese Immigration 1921, 342.
336 FRUS 1920, 6.
337 Congressional Hearings 1921, 314.
Jones’ position was not different from that of the American political elite. President Warren G. Harding in a speech at Birmingham, Alabama on October 26, 1920 stated that while “the negro was entitled to full economic and political rights as an American citizen,” racial amalgamation “could never come in America”. These racial prejudices were reflected in governmental studies such as the *Nonassimilability of Japanese in Hawaii and the United States* (Washington 1922), by the House of Representatives’ Committee of Territories.

Books and newspapers amplified and reflected these racial fears and prejudices. The most popular topics were Japanese breaking laws, spying, and invading US states including Texas, Florida, Colorado and others. Fears of Japan and the Japanese were reflected in books such as Sidney Osborne’s *The New Japanese Peril* (1921) and Lothrop Stoddard’s *The Rising Tide of Color* (1920). In addition to prejudices regarding Japanese aggressiveness, social Darwinist ideas about the inevitability of racial war inflated fears of Japanese-American conflict. Walter Pitkin’s popular *Must We Fight Japan?* (1921) suggested that a war between the US and Japan was inevitable. Institutional or legal solutions would be futile; this was a natural struggle for survival. A conflict with Japan was only a matter of time.

Inflated perceptions of threat resulted in a new piece of anti-Japanese legislation. The 1920 Alien Land Law was adopted in California with 668,483 votes in favor and 222,086 against on November 2, and became effective on December 10, 1920. It was

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338 BDFA- Doc. 34 [A 3344/3344/45], Annual Report on the United States for the Year ending 1921 (Geddes to Curzon)
339 Among such vehicles of threat inflation were the *Sacramento Bee*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Albuquerque Morning Journal* and many others.
essentially a stricter version of the 1913 Alien Land Law, prohibiting Japanese ownership and leasing of land for agricultural purposes through their American born children and through American companies. California, Arizona, Washington and Oregon also imposed anti-Japanese measures. In a memo sent to Ambassador Morris on June 16, John Van A. MacMurray, the Department of State’s Chief of Division for Far Eastern Affairs admitted that although the measures are framed so as not to mention the Japanese explicitly and not make it look like they constitute racial discrimination, they “are known to be directed against the Japanese.”

In addition to the treatment of Japanese immigrants, international events also reflected inflated American perceptions of a Japanese threat. Japan became the America’s “Yellow Peril”. For example, the Japanese presence in Siberia, following a joint intervention with the US after WWI, was also perceived as threatening. Secretary of State Lansing, recognizing the inflated nature of this threat perception, complained in a 1919 memo:

“Japanese designs as to Siberia are worrying a lot of Americans, who see in everything that the Japanese Government does some hidden motive, some insidious purpose…The Japanese are not fools. They know that a white race would never submit to the domination of a yellow race. To take the sovereignty or economic control of Eastern Siberia would mean endless trouble for Japan, as the Siberians would never rest until they had driven the Japanese out of their country. I have little patience with these people who are forever on the verge of hysterics about the deep and wicked schemes of Japan. They imagine some of the most preposterous things and report them as facts. I would think that some of these enemies of Japan were mentally unbalanced but for their sanity on all other subjects.”

340 FRUS 1920, 2.
Just like in 1906 and 1913, inflated perceptions of threat culminated in war scare. Secretary of War John W. Weeks made speeches emphasizing the imminence of war with Japan. During Senate debate regarding Shantung the fear of war was palpable. William C. Greene claimed that during his six years in Tokyo as British Ambassador racial discrimination in California was the main source of irritation for Japan and that the problem was worse than ever in 1920.

Japanese newspapers argued that anti-Japanese inflated perceptions of threat and discriminatory measures were rooted in “racial prejudice which is latent in the breast of the white race, and the fears aroused by the yellow peril agitations.” Former Japanese Premier Marquis Shigenobu Okuma in an article published in *Taikwan* (Great Outlook), explained Japanese-American discord with references to “racial prejudice and to the fear of a yellow peril.”

Although not everyone was equally anti-Japanese in the US, racial prejudice was sufficiently influential to facilitate Japanese-American discord and transform Japan into a “Yellow Peril.” Some churches, prominent academics, and business groups opposed anti-Japanese measures, but the majority of Californians supported them. Moreover, the importance of California in national elections made it difficult for national political leaders to ignore the issue. Anti-Japanese measures were also supported by southerners sharing racial fears. The *Charleston News and Courier*, the *Louisville Courier-Journal*,

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342 Tupper and McReynolds 1937, 154.
343 In BDFA: Doc 90 [F 2116], 11691/60, Notes by Sir C. Greene on Japan’s Foreign Policy, bearing on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and Comments on Mr. Wellesley’s Minute, Sept 11, 1920, p. 113.
344 Doc 230, 12008/191(i), inclosure in Doc 229, Extract from the ‘Japan Chronicle’ of September 2, 1921
345 Doc 229 [F 3763/2905/23], 12008/191, Eliot to Curzon, Tokyo, Sept 9, 1921 (rec’ed Oct 13)
346 As discussed in Chapter 6, more research is needed to account for variation in racial prejudice across regions and even individuals.
and the New Orleans Times-Democrat showed sympathy for California’s racial riots. Southern politicians supported California in what they saw as a race struggle. Congressman John L. Burnett of Alabama asked: “We have suffered enough already for one race question and now will we fly to a conflict with another?”347 The Midwest was divided, while the East opposed California’s actions. Opposition to California’s anti-Japanese actions does not necessarily reflect lower racial prejudice, but concerns that the nation would be dragged by California into a premature conflict with Japan. This is precisely the reason why Roosevelt opposed California’s action. Arthur Lee of Fareham, the British First Lord of Admiralty reminisced that “The late President Roosevelt told me, on more than one occasion, that nothing caused him more constant anxiety during his Administration than the capacity (and sometimes the apparent readiness) of California to involve the United States in a war with Japan without the Federal Government having any say in the matter.”348

Inflated Threat Perceptions: The Gap between Threat Perception and Facts

In closing this section, it may be helpful to show that American threat perceptions of the Japanese and Japan were inflated, by briefly drawing attention to the gap between the high levels of threat perceptions discussed above and the facts. During the period under study, the number of Japanese in the US peaked in 1920 at 119,207 at a time when total US population according to the Census was 106,021,537. Hence, the Japanese

348 CAB 24/123 Memorandum 65/0065 on the AJ Alliance; former reference: CP 2957; Title: Anglo-Japanese alliance Author: Lee of Fareham (the First Lord of the Admiralty)
represented only 0.11 percent of the US population, which can hardly justify cries of
Yellow Peril. Perhaps what was threatening was the high concentration of the Japanese in
California. In 1920 58.8 percent of all Japanese in the US were located in this one state.
However, the number of Japanese at its highest in 1919 was only 78,279 or 2.04 percent
of the total population of California.\(^{349}\) Admittedly, these statistics do not include illegal
Japanese immigrants and unregistered Japanese births. But even if there were twice as
many Japanese as the official statistics indicate, the gap between the actual numbers and
the level of American threat perception remains wide: the ‘Yellow Peril’ had little
objective basis.

To put the numbers of Japanese immigrants in perspective, it may be helpful to
contrast them with British ones. Between 1815 and 1940 approximately 28 million
individuals left Great Britain, of which 58 percent or (16,240,000) settled in the US.
Between 1881 and 1890 the number of British immigrants to the US was 2,546,018
compared to 2,270 Japanese. Between 1901 and 1910 British immigrants to the US
numbered 2,714,188 compared to 54,838 Japanese.\(^{350}\) Since much higher British
immigration was not perceived as threatening, it is not unreasonable to suspect that it was
racial difference that made Japanese immigration appear so threatening.

Although one may want to argue that Japanese immigrants constituted an
economic challenge to Americans in ways that British immigrants did not, the numbers
suggest that this challenge was not even significant in California. The state’s total land

\(^{349}\) For useful statistics on Japanese immigration and birthrates see the Stephens report (anti-Japanese) in
Congressional Hearings on Japanese Immigration and Naturalization 1921 and Iyenaga and Sato 1921 (pro-
Japanese).

\(^{350}\) Turner 1971, 16.; Iyenaga and Sato 1921, 218.

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area was 99,617,280 acres, of which 27,931,444 acres were farmland. Japanese control of farmland reached its peak in 1920, when they owned 74,769 acres and leased another 383,287, representing 0.27% and 1.37% of the total farmlands, respectively.\textsuperscript{351} In other words, 2.04% of the total population of California cultivated 1.57% of the state’s farmlands. If we take into account that 16,000,000 acres of agricultural land was left uncultivated, the case for threat inflation regarding Japanese control of farmland is robust.\textsuperscript{352} Admittedly, fears of Japanese immigrants were not imaginary. Some Japanese did work for lower wages, dominated parts of the intensive agriculture,\textsuperscript{353} and their land holdings grew fast, albeit from a very low base.\textsuperscript{354} Nevertheless, racial prejudices inflated threat perceptions of Japanese immigrants far beyond what the facts could support.

Concerns about Japan were similarly inflated as power indicators show (see Table 3.2). The US scored higher than Japan on all these indicators and many others. Moreover, although Japan’s power was rising, Britain was still much more powerful. If threat perception were only a matter of power, the US should have perceived Britain as more threatening than Japan. Of course, threat perception is not reducible to material capabilities. Perceptions of aggressive intentions are particularly important, and American racial prejudices pertaining to intentions inflated the Japan threat. To be sure, this is not to say that Japan gave no reason for concerns. Japanese imperialism in

\textsuperscript{351} Iyenaga and Sato, 136. Congressional hearing, Stephens report, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{352} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{353} Japanese dominated the production of celery, berries, asparagus, Cantaloupes, onions, and tomatoes. However, they did not produce any of the grain and hay, and little of nuts (4%), corn and rice (10%) and potatoes (20%). See the report of the Japanese Agricultural Association of California, Congressional hearings 105, 216.
\textsuperscript{354} The State Board found that by 1919, the Japanese held 427,029 acres, an increase of 412.9% in the previous ten years. During the same period the increase in the value of Japanese-grown products was 876.8% Tupper and McReynolds 1937, 173. If in 1909 market value of their crops was $6,235,856 there was a tenfold increase to 1919 to $67,145,730 Iyenaga and Sato 1921, 122-23.
Manchuria and Korea was far from reassuring. However, in embracing imperialism Japan was no substantially different than the other great powers. Race did not create the Japan threat out of thin air, but it did inflate it.

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Table 3.2 Power Indicators: US, Britain, and Japan

In sum, this section showed that inflated threat perceptions inflated by racial prejudices resulted in Japanese-American discord and turned Japan into America’s “Yellow Peril”. During the crises of 1906, 1913, and 1920 the mechanisms contained by Hypotheses 1 and 2 worked both directly through decision makers’ threat perception and indirectly through the American public’s threat perception. They also worked in a sequential fashion to inflate American threat perceptions. Prejudices about Japanese biological difference first inflated threat perceptions of Japanese immigration. Then, prejudices about Japan’s aggressive intentions inflated threat perceptions of a Japanese-American war. These perils of immigration and war constituted the “Yellow Peril” due to

Kennedy 1989, chs 5-6; CR 16 May 1921, p. 1742.
which Americans perceived Japan as threatening. The next section shows that the US also misperceived the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a potentially threatening instrument at Japan’s disposal.

**Inflated Threat Perceptions of Japan Lead to Misperception of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as Threatening**

*The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923)*

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded by Britain and Japan on January 30, 1902 and it was in force until August 1923, when it was abolished by the Four-Power Treaty of the 1921 Washington Conference. The alliance was renewed in 1905 and 1911. The 1902 alliance, concluded for 5 years, had two main provisions. First, the signatories promised to stay neutral if the other party was at war with one opponent, and to provide assistance if the other party was at war with more than one opponent. Second, Britain claimed special interests in China, while Japan claimed special interests in China and Korea. The alliance was renewed in 1905 for 10 years with two main modifications: mutual assistance was now required even if the other party was at war with a single opponent; Britain also brought India under the security umbrella of the alliance and in turn recognized more extensive Japanese influence in Korea. The alliance was renewed for the last time in 1911 for 10 years. Again, there were two main changes: a) the inclusion of Article IV, which exempted Britain of the obligation to assist Japan in the
case of a Japanese-American war; and b) the removal of Korea from the alliance as she was already colonized by Japan.\textsuperscript{356}

That Britain allied with Japan may seem problematic for the larger argument of the dissertation that racial difference leads to discord. But Britain had no choice as she needed an alliance and could not find an adequate “white” ally. As Britain’s relative power declined while her interests remained global, the grand strategy of “splendid isolation” became more isolating than splendid. Because the U.S. was not interested in “entangling alliances,” Britain approached Germany and Russia.\textsuperscript{357} Only when these attempts failed did she, as \textit{The Economist} put it at the time, “quit decidedly… that unwritten alliance of all White Powers against all coloured races and through which alone the supremacy of Europe over Asia and Africa can finally be established.”\textsuperscript{358} Japan, isolated “in a world which was afflicted by suspicions based on fear of the Yellow Peril,” embraced the alliance.\textsuperscript{359} To avoid wider domestic opposition to this interracial alliance, Britain and Japan made it into a “secretariat alliance,” negotiated in secret and reinforced by court diplomacy.\textsuperscript{360}

Throughout its lifetime, the alliance served both parties well, providing several benefits beyond its immediate raison d’être of countering a potential Russian threat. For Japan it was the first alliance with a European power, which lent her great power status

\textsuperscript{356} Chang 1931; Davis, 2008/09; Dennis 1934. 
\textsuperscript{357} Steiner, 1959. 
\textsuperscript{358} Cited in Daniels, 2003. 
\textsuperscript{359} Nish, 1966:377. 
\textsuperscript{360} Best, 2006; Nish, 1966:366.
and helped her avoid another Triple Intervention\textsuperscript{361} during the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. Britain got a loyal ally against Russia and Germany, and achieved “security with economy,” keeping only a squadron of five cruisers in the Far East to protect her immense imperial possessions.

The US supported the alliance in 1902 and 1905. However, as American racial prejudices were activated and they inflated threat perceptions of Japan, she gradually came to oppose the alliance. The next section argues that America’s perception of Japan as the “Yellow Peril” led to the misperception of the alliance as threatening, even though the alliance was not threatening to the US.

*A Non-Threatening Alliance*

The alliance was not threatening to the US for at least two reasons. First, for Britain Anglo-American war was unthinkable, to a considerable extent due to shared Anglo-Saxon racial identity. Just as difference in racial identity facilitated American-Japanese discord, shared racial identity facilitated Anglo-American rapprochement and cooperation.\textsuperscript{362} In a speech on May 13, 1898 in Birmingham, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain stated: “Our first duty is to draw all parts of the empire into close unity, and our next to maintain the bonds of permanent unity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic.”\textsuperscript{363} James Bryce, British Ambassador in the US between 1906 and 1913, reaffirmed that “The sympathy of race does not often affect the relations of states, but

\textsuperscript{361} In 1895 Germany, France and Russia forced Japan to forego the territorial gains she made as a result of her victory in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war. In 1904-05 Britain held the ring during the Russo-Japanese war.


\textsuperscript{363} Kramer 2002, 1334.
when it does it is a force of tremendous potency; for it affects not so much governments
as the people themselves, who, both in America and in England, are the ultimate
repositories of power, the ultimate controllers of policy.”364 Gradually, following the
1895 Venezuela dispute over colonial boundaries, the idea of race patriotism took sway,
leading to increased Anglo-American cooperation.365 Britain supported the US in the
American—Spanish-Cuban war, while the US supported Britain in the Boer War. In 1905
the incoming liberal Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman reiterated that “with
the United States we are bound by the closest ties of race, tradition and fellowship.”366
H.G. Wells put it vividly: “But to the common British, fighting Americans would have
much the same relation to fighting other peoples that cannibalism would have to eating
meat.”367 The First Lord of Admiralty, Lee of Fareham, wrote in February 1905 that
Anglo-American war would be “the supreme limit of human folly” and it was
unthinkable for British decision makers.368 British Dominions concurred. In the words of
Australia’s Premier William Hughes “War with America is unthinkable.”369

Second, the alliance was not threatening to the US also because of Article IV
through which Britain made sure that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would not force her
into an Anglo-American conflict. As early as 1905 Foreign Secretary Lord of Lansdowne
Henry Petty Fitzmaurice wrote to British Ambassador to Japan Claude Maxwell

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364 Anderson, 28.; Carnegie went as far as to say that racial feelings are “the strongest sentiment in man”
and “the real motive which at the crisis determines his action in international affairs” ibid., 52.
365 Clark 1957, 100. For an argument that Anglo-American rapprochement occurred by the middle of
the 19th century see Fanis 2011.
366 Gelber 1938, 253.; See also Rosebery: “But whether you call it British or Anglo-Saxon, or whatever you
call it, the fact is that the race is there and the sympathy of the race is there” Allen 1959, 96.
367 Wells 1922, 83.
368 Turner 1971, 57.
369 Cited in Keith 1976, 49.
MacDonald that “All we desire is that we should not be compelled to go to war with the US in the event of a violation of established Treaty rights by Japan.”\textsuperscript{370} Similarly, the British Ambassador to America, Sir Mortimer Durand, explained to President Roosevelt on 3 August, 1905, that Britain would not go to war with the US.\textsuperscript{371} As Japanese-American relations worsened, Britain wanted to make this very clear. When Japan proposed the renewal of the alliance in 1911, Britain asked for the explicit exclusion of the US as a target of the alliance. Japanese statesmen knew that with or without such an amendment Britain would never go to war with the US and conceded on this point.\textsuperscript{372} However, Japan was concerned that mentioning the US explicitly would expose the government to fierce attacks from domestic opponents for concluding a one-sided alliance, where Japan had to guard India, but Britain had no obligation to help against the US.\textsuperscript{373} Because in 1911 Britain and the US were close to concluding a general arbitration treaty, Japan agreed to the inclusion of Article IV in the renewed treaty with the following wording: “Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.”\textsuperscript{374}

\textsuperscript{370} Lansdowne to MacDonald, July 26, 1905; cited in Gooch and Temperley, eds., \textit{British Documents}, vol. VIII, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{371} Nish 1966, 329.
\textsuperscript{373} Indeed, the \textit{Hochi Shim bun} lamented after the modified renewal of the alliance that Japan was now “America’s slave and India’s policeman” Dennis, 37.
\textsuperscript{374} Nish 1972.
Although the arbitration treaty was signed in August 1911, it was not ratified by Congress due to Taft’s weak position at home and some disagreements over Senate powers.\textsuperscript{375} When the Anglo-American Peace Commission Treaty was signed three years later, Britain communicated to Japan that she regarded it as equivalent to an arbitration treaty. Japan accepted the equivalence claim which exempted Britain from assisting Japan in the event of a Japanese-American war.\textsuperscript{376} Britain did not \textit{officially} communicate the equivalence to the US “as there is no reason to believe that the responsible authorities are in any doubt as to the true position.”\textsuperscript{377} Americans were apprised about it through informal channels. As one American Congressman put it during the 1922 Senate debates on the ratification of the Four-Power Treaty, “For years past we have been assured by all the responsible statesmen of England and Japan that their alliance was not directed at us and never could be.”\textsuperscript{378} Similarly, Senator Joseph Taylor Robinson (D-Arkansas) stated that the purpose beyond Article IV “was to exempt the United States from the effect of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Everybody understood that. It was a matter of common information.”\textsuperscript{379} Alarmed by the anti-alliance press reports in the US, the Japanese Ambassador Baron Shidehara also evoked Article IV to mitigate fears of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He stated that “it was already well understood at time of negotiating

\textsuperscript{375} Ibid., 78.
\textsuperscript{377} Doc 191 [F 788/63/23] 11841/31, Question asked in the House of Commons, March 1, 1921 by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir F. Hall from Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mr. Kellaway.
\textsuperscript{378} Mr. Johnson cited in Congressional Record (CR) 62, Senate, March 13, 1922.
\textsuperscript{379} CR 18 March 1922, p. 4069.
existing agreement that the alliance should in no case be directed against the United States.\footnote{Doc 15 [F 2445/63/23], 12008/13, Geddes to Curzon, Washington, undated 1921 (rec’d July5); a similar position was taken by Count Uchida on February 4\textsuperscript{th} in the Japanese Diet.} The alliance was not aimed at the United States.

\textit{Inflated American Threat Perceptions of a Non-Threatening Alliance}

Although the alliance was not aimed at her, the US misperceived the alliance as threatening. Historians talk about the “neurosis towards the Anglo-Japanese alliance” developed by the American public.\footnote{Ibid., 281.} Part of the political elite was similarly concerned. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, Senator James A. Reed (D-Missouri) claimed that the alliance contained a secret clause against the US.\footnote{The Times, Jan 4, 1921, p. 10; cited in Spinks 1937, 326.} In January 1918 British Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour decried the “profoundly gloomy” and even “excessive” suspicions of Japanese policy in the State Department.\footnote{Balfour to Milner 19 January 1918; cited in ibid., 224.} To be sure, not everyone perceived the alliance as threatening. For instance, at least one Congressman believed that “…the Anglo-Japanese alliance, judged by its words, judged by its text, judged by the solemn protestations of the parties to it, is no danger whatsoever to this country…”\footnote{Johnson, CR 62, 3783.} Yet many other Americans did perceive the alliance as threatening.

The British Ambassador in America, Auckland Geddes, reported that average American’s perception of Japan was characterized by inflated threat perception, which
was also shared by the armed forces.\textsuperscript{385} Similarly, the American Ambassador to Britain John W. Davis wrote to Lee of Fareham that

“There is more feeling on the subject of the Japanese treaty than I had imagined, and a very general misunderstanding as to its present scope and bearing. I was surprised the other day to find one of the most intelligent men of my acquaintance wholly ignorant of the fact that it contained any clause which would eliminate a quarrel between Japan and America from its provisions.”\textsuperscript{386}

Although ignorance probably contributed to threat misperception, it is not sufficient to explain exaggerated fears of the alliance. That much of this inflated fear was not due to simple ignorance is suggested by the fact that it proved impermeable to much contrary evidence and that the better informed American political elite was also subject to it. Racial prejudice inflated threat perception automatically, limiting rational deliberation, and made inflated threat perceptions impermeable to disproving facts. American Admiral William Sims warned that “there was no use in telling an American in the Middle West that Article IV of the Alliance provided for Great Britain being under no obligation to go to war in support of Japan against America.”\textsuperscript{387} Geddes noted that “\textit{No amount of assurance} that this treaty is so drafted as not to involve any aggressive action by Great Britain upon America appears to be able to remove the conviction in the public mind that Great Britain is associated in a war-like alliance with America’s greatest potential enemy.”\textsuperscript{388} Similarly, Viscount Bryce, following a trip to the US, wrote that

\textit{“It has been pointed out over and over again that there is nothing in that treaty [Anglo-Japanese] to affect the United States. Nevertheless, nine men out of

\textsuperscript{386} Davis to Lee of Fareham, 6 July 1921; cited in Nish 1972, 281-2. fn 14
\textsuperscript{387} Cabinet Minutes 43(21), Secret, 30 May 1921, CAB 23/25. CAB/23/25 1921.
\textsuperscript{388} BDFA Doc. 24, [A 7058/7058/45], Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (rec’d Sept 27), Washington, September 15, 1921, emphasis added.
ten in the United States continue to repeat that England is the ally—the exclusive ally—of Japan, and that the effect of the treaty has been and is to make Japan think she has a comparatively free hand and may adopt policies of aggression on which she would otherwise fear to embark.\textsuperscript{389}

Some recognized that racial prejudice contributed much to the ignorance underlying the ‘Yellow Peril’ and tailored their policy recommendations accordingly. For instance, Lee of Fareham suggested that Britain should “realise, and give full weight to, not merely the views but the prejudices of the American people and Government with regard to this question.”\textsuperscript{390} The next section shows that this is exactly what Britain did by giving in to American pressure to end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

RACIALLY INFLATED THREAT PERCEPTIONS LEAD TO THE END OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

The American Contribution to the Demise of the Alliance

Due to inflated perceptions of threat, the American public and the political elite strongly favored the demise of the alliance.\textsuperscript{391} This section traces the American contribution to the demise of the alliance. It first shows that in the absence of American opposition, the allies would have renewed the alliance. Next, it discusses how the American opposition to the alliance pushed British preferences away from renewal and closer to the accepting its termination. Finally, it reveals how US direct and indirect

\textsuperscript{389} The \textit{Times}, Oct 18, 1921; cited in Tate and Foy 1959, 549, my emphasis.
\textsuperscript{390} My emphasis, CAB 24/123 Memorandum 65/0065 on the AJ Alliance; former reference: CP 2957; Title: Anglo-Japanese alliance Author: Lee of Fareham (the First Lord of the Admiralty)
\textsuperscript{391} Nish 1972, 281; Vinson 1953, 40.
pressure in 1921 at the Imperial Conference and the Washington Conference contributed to ending the alliance.

**Britain and Japan Would Have Renewed the Alliance**

The three main options Japan and Britain had regarding the alliance were 1) termination, 2) renewal in a modified form, and 3) replacement with a trilateral agreement including the US. Due to the absence of a shared threat and frictions over commercial interests in China between Britain and Japan, the alliance had been in decline since 1911. But the allies still deemed it useful enough to renew it in 1921, when the alliance was due to expire.392

Japan preferred the second option, renewal in a modified form. From her perspective the alliance was still valuable insofar as it helped her avoid isolation and provided her with great power status. She recognized the necessity of amending the alliance to bring it into agreement with the League of Nations, but thought that it was doable and desirable. Viscount Takaaki Katō, former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to Britain, considered the demise of the alliance “extremely undesirable”. Prime Minister Takashi Hara argued that “even if the establishment of a League of Nations has the effect of undermining the functions of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, there is no question about the need for its continuation.”393 Former Premier Marquis Okuma distrusted the League and saw no reason for the termination of the alliance.394 Baron Eiichi Shibusawa, the

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392 Buckley 1970, 185.
393 Hosoya 1982, 7.
394 No. 598, Mr. Alston to Earl Curzon (Rec’d Jan 1, 1920), No. 497, Tokyo, November 25, 1919
Japanese J.P. Morgan, supported renewal in the name of Japanese business interest. Although there was some opposition to renewal in the armed forces, the official position as expressed by the Minister of War Giichi Tanaka was support for renewal.\(^{395}\) In May 1920 Foreign Minister Kōsai Uchida informed the British Ambassador in Japan, Charles Eliot, that the Japanese Government is officially in favor of renewal.\(^{396}\) Japan was so eager to start negotiations that Uchida inquired about the existence of a British draft which could be consulted by the Japanese Foreign Office.\(^{397}\)

Initially Britain also appeared to favor the second option, renewal in modified form. British debates regarding the alliance were dominated by arguments in favor of renewal. The main British reasons for renewal were the following: Japan had been a useful ally against Russia and Germany; the alliance provided cheap security for Britain’s Far Eastern imperial possessions, making Japan their watchdog and easing pressures of naval building on the strained British treasury;\(^{398}\) the alliance was instrumental in providing Britain with some control over a potentially dangerous ally and in “keeping the Japs a little in hand.”\(^{399}\) Britain and her Dominions were not exempt from the Yellow Peril.\(^{400}\) But while the US saw the alliance as amplifying this threat, Britain thought the

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\(^{395}\) Enclosure in No. 528, Brigadier-General Woodruff to Mr. Alston, Tokyo October 5, 1919
\(^{396}\) Doc 66 [F 1446/199/23], 11691/43 Sir C. Eliot to Earl Curzon, Tokyo June 7, 1920
\(^{397}\) Doc 150 [F 2330/2330/23], 11718, Japan: Annual Report, 1920; Sir C. Eliot to Earl Curzon, Tokyo, May 24 1921 (rec’d June 27)
\(^{398}\) Memo on “The Naval Situation in the Far East,” 31 Oct 1919, CP 54, Lloyd George Papers F/143); Doc 7 [178570], 11691/5, letter, O. Murray (Admiralty), 12 Feb 1920; Doc 2 [1666706], 11691/3, letter, Hubert Montgomery (FO), 21 Jan 1920, Foreign Office to Colonial Office
\(^{399}\) FO 371/3816 [1779312], minute by J.A.C. Tilley, 21 February 1920
\(^{400}\) Victor Wellesley, the assistant secretary in the Foreign Office superintending the Far Eastern Department, wrote: “the militarisation of China under Japanese leadership may not only lead to the ejection of the British from Asia and Australia, but ultimately to the destruction of Europe by Asiatic invasion. It is important, therefore, that we should take a longer view than the immediate needs of the political situation, and consider the whole problem of the Far East as one affecting the future of civilization…Therein lies the
alliance would mitigate it. Finally, because the unity of the multiracial British Empire depended on the absence of open racial conflict, the alliance was valuable in bridging the gap between the white and yellow races.401

Although there were also powerful arguments against renewal, they seemed to be weaker than those in favor of renewal. The main reasons against renewal were the following: the Russian and German threats were gone; Japan violated the principle of open door in the Far East, encroaching upon British commercial interests,402 and there were concerns that British Dominions would oppose the alliance given their exclusionary anti-Japanese immigration laws. In response to these arguments Charles Eliot claimed that although at the moment Russia and Germany were not threatening, the alliance deterred the reemergence of a hostile Russo-German coalition and precluded Japan’s joining of it. Next, he made the case that in the absence of the alliance, Japan would be even more dangerous for both the security and economic interests of Britain. Finally, as long as the issues of immigration and the alliance were kept separate, the Dominions did not have to worry about Japan. During WWI for instance, Japan provided invaluable danger, for she could and would implant her own aggressive policy on those millions, with the result that one-half of the world would be placed in racial antagonism against the other.” No 97, Memorandum by Mr. Wellesley respecting the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, FO, Sept 1, 1920 [in BDFA it has no F 2200/199/23; conf print and piece no. 11691/58]; “Every Japanese is born and bred with ideas of aggressive patriotism, of his superiority to foreigners, of his national call to head a revival of the neighboring brown and yellow races”, has become the Prussia of the Far East—“fanatically patriotic, nationally aggressive, individually truculent, fundamentally deceitful” (226) in Doc 242, 10845, Memorandum by Foreign Office, March 1917, prepared for the Imperial Conference, March 1917; title is Memorandum on Anglo-Japanese Relations.

401 Eliot to Curzon, Tokyo, Dec 12, 1920 ([F 3205/199/23], 11691/87); HANSARD 1803-2005 British Parliamentary Debates on AJ Alliance, HC Deb 17 June 1921 vol. 143, 788; Secretary of State for India (Montagu)- “From the point of view of India, the Alliance constituted a wedge in the policy of ‘Asia for the Asiatics’” Cabinet Minutes 43(21), Secret, 30 May 1921, CAB 23/25.

402 No 97, Memorandum by Mr. Wellesley respecting the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, FO, Sept 1, 1920 [in BDFA it has no F 2200/199/23; conf print and piece no. 11691/58]
assistance to British dominions in the Pacific, despite their exclusion of Japanese immigrants. At a subsequent Cabinet meeting Foreign Secretary Lord George Curzon of Kedleston, made a very similar case in favor of renewal. Prime Minister Lloyd George found the arguments for renewal “irresistible,” while A.J. Balfour, now Lord President of the Council, considered them “very convincing”.

However, when American preferences for terminating the alliance are factored into the British position, we see a shift away from renewal towards a trilateral agreement. Eliot might have brushed aside most arguments against renewal, but he could not ignore the most serious one, “that it might be displeasing to the United States and injuriously affect our relations with them.” The War Office and the Foreign Office both stressed that the dominant consideration for renewal is not antagonizing the US or “embarrassing in the smallest degree our relations with that country, whose friendship is of prime importance for us both from the point of view of material interests and racial affinity.”

British eagerness to please Americans was based on racial and strategic reasons. Just as conflict with the US was unthinkable, cooperation was seen as natural. Strategic reasons included the desire for a naval arms limitation and hopes for a forgiveness of British war

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403 No 52: [in BDFA number F 1559/199/23; confidential print and piece number 11691/45]Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (Rec’d July 23), Tokyo, June 17, 1920
404 Cabinet Minutes 43(21), Secret, 30 May 1921, CAB 23/25.
405 No 52: [in BDFA is F 1559/199/23]; confidential print and piece number 11691/45]Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (Rec’d July 23), Tokyo, June 17, 1920; Memorandum by Sir B. Alston respecting suggestions for an Anglo-Saxon Policy for the Far East, FO, August 1, 1920, rec’d August 70 [in BDFA is F 1742/199/23; conf print no. 11691/50]; See also HANSARD 1803-2005 British Parliamentary Debates on AJ Alliance, HC Deb 17 June 1921 vol. 143.
debt held by America. British Parliamentary debates on the alliance show the extent of American influence on Britain’s position on the alliance.

At the heart of the British decision about the alliance was what may be called the ally-friend dilemma: how to keep close a potentially dangerous ally (Japan) without alienating a potentially unreliable friend (the US)? As a Foreign Office memorandum put it,

“Our future course lies between our ally with whom our interests conflict, and our friend who is united to us by race, tradition, community of interests and ideals. It will be difficult for us to steer a straight course; both parties will no doubt reproach us, as they have done in the past, for not giving them more whole-hearted support against the other, but this course must be steered—our interests demand it.”

The optimal solution to “steering a straight course” between ally and friend, as the British Cabinet saw it, was a trilateral agreement including both Japan and the US. Similarly, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Committee, established under the aegis of the Foreign Office to study the problem of renewal, in its January 1921 report called for replacing the alliance with a tripartite agreement.

There were two problems with this solution, however, which made many British reluctant to embrace trilateral agreement (the third option). The first problem was that the

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407 In preparation for the Imperial Conference, First Admiral Lee of Fareham argued that the main driving force behind the American desire of naval armament is the fear of Japan and the alliance. Giving up the alliance for a tripartite agreement would mitigate American fears and would be conducive to an advantageous disarmament agreement with the US. CAB 24/123 Memorandum 65/0065 on the AJ Alliance; former reference: CP 2957; Title: Anglo-Japanese alliance Author: Lee of Fareham (the First Lord of the Admiralty), May 21, 1921. Lee of Fareham May 21, 1921. on war debt see Dayer 1976.

408 Hansard, HC Deb 17 June vol 130 cc1491-602; and HC Deb 17 June 1921 vol 143 cc 783-860.


ratification of a trilateral agreement by the US Congress was doubtful. The second problem was that even if Congress would ratify a trilateral agreement, it would be so watered down as to be a poor replacement for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For these reasons, some still thought that renewal in a form satisfactory to the US was desirable.

When taking into account American preferences, the British shifted her position into the grey area between renewal and trilateral agreement. They hoped that the two options can be reconciled to keep both the US and Japan happy. However, during the summer and autumn of 1921 Britain’s position underwent an important transformation as the result of American pressure exerted during the 1921 Imperial Conference. When the US made clear that renewal in any form would be opposed by her and that she was open to a trilateral agreement, Britain embraced the trilateral agreement.

*Britain Embraces the Trilateral Agreement: The Imperial Conference of 1921*

American direct and indirect pressure at the 1921 Imperial Conference made the trilateral agreement Britain’s first choice. American pressure was exercised directly through Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes’ conversations with British Ambassador to the US Auckland Geddes. Indirectly, the American preference for termination was represented energetically by Canadian Prime Minister Arthur Meighen. Although the US was not present at the conference, through these direct and indirect channels she attained an impressive degree of influence. As one historian put it, “From the opening speech of British Prime Minister Lloyd George until the end of the Conference, it was apparent that

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411 Tate and Foy 1959, 547.
no decision could be reached as to the policy of the Empire without reference to the reaction of the United States government."\textsuperscript{412}

The Imperial Conference opened in London on June 20, 1921. The fate of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the most important topic discussed. The opening session stressed the importance of Anglo-American friendship. Lloyd George stated that Anglo-American cooperation was a “cardinal principle” for Britain, “dictated by instinct quite as much as by reason and common sense.”\textsuperscript{413} Yet this did not imply that all participants were ready to give up the alliance.

The main voice in favor of renewal was that of Australian Prime Minister William Hughes. Although Hughes would have preferred an alliance with the US, he was skeptical that the US would enter such an alliance. In the context of falling commodity prices, post-WWI exhaustion, British naval weakness in the Far East, and US isolationism, he felt that Australia had no choice but to support renewal. Australia could not afford to face a hostile Japan that non-renewal may create.\textsuperscript{414} Before his departure to the Imperial Conference, William Hughes set out Australia’s position in a Parliament speech in April 1921:

“We say to America: here we are, a young democracy with 13,000 miles of coast line within three weeks of a thousand million Asiatics. Will you come to our assistance if we call? America gives no answer. If Australia were asked which she would prefer as an ally, America or Japan, she would say ‘America,’ but that choice is not given to her. Australia will vote against renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty: \textit{Provided} that America gives us assurance of safety.”\textsuperscript{415}

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\textsuperscript{412} Galbraith 1948, 145
\textsuperscript{413} Keith 1976, 44.
\textsuperscript{414} Spinks 1937, 329; Keith 1976, 48.
\textsuperscript{415} Galbraith 1948, 147.
\end{flushleft}
New Zealand’s Prime Minister William Massey agreed with Hughes. In a *Times* interview of May 25, 1921 he noted that as long as the alliance did not interfere with New Zealand’s ability to exclude Asian immigration, New Zealand favored renewal.  

The main opponent of renewal was Canada. As early as February 15, 1921 Canadian Premier Meighen telegraphed Lloyd George that “every possible effort should be made to find some alternative policy to that of renewal” and stressed “the importance of promoting good relations with the United States.” He continued the crusade against the alliance at the Imperial Conference. On June 29 Meighen argued eloquently against renewal and in favor of a tripartite agreement. One by one he attacked the British arguments for renewal: The German and Russian threats were gone and their future possibility was too remote to justify renewal. Because she violated fundamental principles of the alliance, Japan was not a loyal ally. The alliance was incompatible with the principles of the League of Nations and it legitimized Japanese imperialism. Most importantly, renewal would hurt Anglo-American relations and could even provoke a naval arms race. Meighen was convinced that the US was open to closer Anglo-Saxon cooperation. His recommendation was to terminate the alliance and instead conclude a “multilateral Pacific agreements to be arrived at in international conference.” At the July 1st session Meighen restated Canada’s opposition to renewal and the desirability of replacing the alliance at a Pacific Conference.

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416 Tate and Foy 1959, 537.
417 No 261, Memorandum by Mr. Lampson on correspondence with the Canadian Government relating to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, FO, April 8, 1921
418 Brebner 1966 [1945], 290.
419 ICM 12th meeting, 1 July 1921 CAB 32/2); Louis, 76.
In addition to the indirect opposition to renewal exercised through Canada, the US also pressured Britain to terminate the alliance through more direct diplomatic channels. Geddes apprised Curzon on June 24th that the Imperial Conference triggered considerable American opposition to renewal, fanned by an anti-alliance media campaign. Similar media campaigns were initiated in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Victor Wellesley, the assistant secretary in the Foreign Office superintending the Far Eastern Department, argued that British action on the alliance “should depend to a large extent on the result of our conversation with the United States Government…” Geddes, the British Ambassador in the US, pursued these conversations, which revealed the extent of US opposition to renewal and her openness to a trilateral agreement. On June 23 Secretary of State Hughes told Geddes that both the American public and the government opposed the alliance. American opposition was so determined that even if the US was explicitly excluded as a target of the alliance, renewal would be still seen as “little less than unfortunate” and would have “very serious effects on American opinion.” Hughes believed that the alliance made Japan more aggressive and increased chances of Japanese-American war.

Secretary of State Charles Hughes was strongly opposed to renewal in any form. On June 29, the same day that Meighen made the case against renewal, Curzon informed Geddes that everyone at the conference took into account American preferences.

Curzon wanted to know whether the alliance could be renewed in a form acceptable to

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420 Sir A. Geddes (Washington) to Earl Curzon, Washington, June 24, 1921 (rec’d June 25)
421 Spinks 1937, 327.
422 No 97, Memorandum by Mr. Wellesley respecting the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, FO, Sept 1, 1920 [in BDFA it has no F 2200/199/23; conf print and piece no. 11691/58]
423 Curzon to Geddes, FO, June 29, 1921 (in BDFA is [F 2367/63/23; 11841/177])
the US. The American Ambassador to Britain, George Harvey, reassured Curzon that the US was open to renewal, but this turned out to be false. Geddes informed Curzon on July 2 that according to Secretary of State Hughes “the mere fact of renewal, in whatever form, would create a very unfavourable impression on the present administration.”\(^{424}\) Four days later he telegraphed Curzon again: “Mr. Hughes again told me quite plainly that renewal of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, or establishment of any special relations between British and Japanese, would create unfavourable impression, not only in mind of American people, but in that of United States Government.”\(^{425}\) And again, on July 7 Geddes told Curzon that Harvey was given instructions to inform Britain that the US would oppose renewal or any exclusive special relations between Britain and Japan.\(^{426}\) At the same time Secretary of State Hughes signaled that the US would be interested in some kind of tripartite agreement.

In the face of firm American opposition to renewal and interest in trilateral agreement, Britain gave up renewal and embraced the trilateral agreement. The change in Britain’s position is epitomized by Geddes’ case. Initially a champion of renewal, he had become an advocate of the trilateral agreement. At the end of 1920 he still recommended renewal in a modified form.\(^{427}\) Yet strong American opposition to the alliance and US interest in a trilateral agreement gradually changed Geddes’ position. Two weeks before the Imperial Conference he telegraphed Curzon about “increasing popular American

\(^{424}\) In BDFA it is Doc 5 [F 2426/63/23], 12008/4) Geddes to Curzon, July 2, 1921
\(^{425}\) Doc 19 [F 2467/63/23] 12008/17, Geddes to Curzon, Washington, July 6, 1921;
\(^{426}\) No 326: Geddes to Curzon, July 7, 1921 (in BDFA it is [F 2485/63/23], 12008/28)
\(^{427}\) No 162, Sir A. Geddes (Washington) to Earl Curzon, Washington, Nov 15, 1920 (in BDFA it is [F 2338/199/23], 11691/73); No. 175, Geddes (Washington) to Curzon, Washington, December 3, 1920 (in BDFA it is [F 3202/199/23], 11691/86)

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Hughes warned Geddes that renewal would be “disastrous” and hinted at American openness to a trilateral agreement. The degree of American opposition to the alliance, along with Geddes’ earlier belief that “there is now for the first time since 1776 some chance of arriving at a working agreement with this country [US] which it will observe and honour,” changed his position. By the summer of 1921 Geddes shifted from supporting renewal to advocating a trilateral agreement. The British political elite gradually underwent a similar transformation.

Due to direct and indirect American pressure, participants at the Imperial Conference did not renew the alliance, became interested in a trilateral agreement, and decided to participate in a Pacific Conference. Some still hoped to retain the alliance, but their numbers were dwindling. Reiterating the advantages of the alliance, Curzon remarked that “I regard the loss of these advantages with no small apprehension and am not at all sure that they will be compensated for by a temporary conquest of the beaux yeux of America.” But the trilateral agreement became Britain’s first choice, and the alliance would be retained only if it could be reconciled with a trilateral agreement or participants would fail to conclude such an agreement at the Pacific Conference. The Japanese Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were still “extremely anxious” to retain the alliance with minor modifications.

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429 BDFA [A 7615/7615/45] Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon, No. 1260; Washington, Oct 18, 1920:
430 CAB/23/26; former reference: Cabinet 56(21); Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, 30th June, 1921CAB/23/26 30 June, 1921
431 Curzon to Geddes , July 9 it may be Doc 17 [F 2461/63/23] 12008/15, Curzon to Geddes, Foreign Office, July 5, 1921 (check)
432 Buckley 1970: 129.
The alliance became the casualty of American inflated threat perception at the 1921 Washington Conference. As Congressman John R. Tyson put it on the first day, the US made clear to Britain that “The price of American friendship is the abrogation of that alliance.”\textsuperscript{434} British statesmen were perceptive to American preferences and the alliance was brought to an end. The three main ingredients of the demise were British desire to cooperate with the US, America’s insistence on only one Pacific Conference, and American preference for a Four-Power Treaty that ended the alliance.

First, in Britain the dominant theme was the desire to cooperate with the US for racial and strategic reasons. The strategic reasons were that WWI depleted British finances, Britain accumulated a large foreign debt (much of it held by the US), and she could not afford a naval arms race.\textsuperscript{435} The main racial reason was shared Anglo-Saxon racial identity with the US, which predisposed Britain to cooperation with the US. In the words of Lloyd George in the House of Commons: “I do not know of any country in the world with whom it is more important that we should act in concert than with the United States of America. So much so that it is very difficult to get an Englishman to regard an American as a foreigner. There is a different feeling; there is a sense of fraternity.”\textsuperscript{436}

\textsuperscript{434} Congressional Record 61 Cong. Rec. (1921), Appendix to the Congressional Record, “Extension of Remarks of Hon. Percy E. Quin, of Mississippi, in the House of Representatives, Wednesday, November 23, 1921, p. 8951; Winston Churchill reiterated the same point later, and stated that “Accordingly this alliance was brought to an end Turner 1971, 62.

\textsuperscript{435} Doc 216 [F 3012/2905/23] , 12008/178, Memorandum respecting British Neutrality in the events of a Japanese-American War, by Ashton-Gwatkin,10 Oct 1921

\textsuperscript{436} Doc 132 [F 3162/63/23]12008/114, Extract from Statement by Prime Minister in the House of Commons, August 18, 1921
Atlanticists imagined a post-World War I international system based on close Anglo-American cooperation. At least some British diplomats saw international politics in the Pacific in racial terms, arguing that it took precedence over political and economic problems. Under these conditions, cooperating with the US was desirable because it would buttress a white supremacy challenged by Japan’s victory over Russia in 1904-05 and Europe’s decline after WWI. Britain was concerned that challenges to white supremacy would also challenge the British Empire. Although she would have preferred to keep the Anglo-Japanese Alliance alive, she deemed cooperation with America and a disarmament agreement more important. If the alliance was the price for this, Britain was willing to make the transaction.

Second, “a series of very regrettable misunderstandings” in July and August of 1921 ensured that the fate of the alliance would have to be discussed by the parties in a hostile environment in Washington. Both Britain and the US supported the Pacific Conference idea, but they disagreed about what it entailed. Britain preferred to have a preliminary Pacific Conference in London first with Japan, and then a separate disarmament conference in Washington, arguing that before any negotiations on disarmament were possible, Pacific issues had to be settled. The US preferred one conference in Washington which covered both issues, arguing that they were inseparable.

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437 Roberts 1997.
438 No 404, General Survey of Political Situation in Pacific and Far East with reference to the forthcoming Washington Conference, FO, October 20, 1921 (prepared by Victor Wellesley) (in BDFA it is doc 239, [F 3823/2635/10])
439 No 404, General Survey of Political Situation in Pacific and Far East with reference to the forthcoming Washington Conference, FO, October 20, 1921 (prepared by Victor Wellesley) (in BDFA it is doc 239, [F 3823/2635/10])
440 Curzon to Eliot, FO, August 15, 1921
Hughes made clear that the American government was “unalterably opposed” to a preliminary conference\textsuperscript{441} and after a long exchange of telegrams,\textsuperscript{442} Britain reluctantly gave in. From the empirical record it is not clear whether the misunderstanding was a brilliant American diplomatic trick to ensure that no separate Anglo-Japanese understanding on the alliance occurred at a preliminary conference, or it was due simply to miscommunication, Harvey’s incompetence, or American ambition to claim sole credit for the conference.\textsuperscript{443} Whatever the true cause, the allies had to discuss the fate of the alliance on American terms in an environment hostile to renewal.

The Conference started on November 11, 1921. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was not on the official agenda, but was discussed at informal meetings. The Japanese delegation, aware of the intensity of the anti-Japanese sentiment in the US, decided to land in Seattle instead of California to avoid complications. Negotiations were conducted in “a climate of intense national and racial emotions.”\textsuperscript{444} The American public followed closely the fate of the alliance and would have interpreted renewal as an “unfriendly act”.\textsuperscript{445} Senator William Borah (D-Idaho) declared that if the alliance were renewed, it would be hard not to conclude that it was aimed against America.\textsuperscript{446} In addition to providing a hostile environment for renewal, organizing only one Pacific Conference in Washington allowed the US to link closely the fate of the alliance and a disarmament

\textsuperscript{441} Geddes to Curzon, July 29 (in BDFA is doc 99 [A 5549/18/45]):
\textsuperscript{442} No 335, Curzon to Geddes, FO, July 14, 1921; Geddes to Curzon July 30; For a good summary see No 337, Memorandum by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston on the situation re proposed Conference at Washington, FO July 24, 1921
\textsuperscript{443} Geddes to Curzon, July 31 (in BDFA doc 107, [A 5552/18/45]
\textsuperscript{444} Buckley 1970, 75.
\textsuperscript{445} BDFA-Doc. 34 [A 3344/3344/45], Annual Report on the United States for 1921 (Geddes to Curzon)
\textsuperscript{446} William E. Borah papers, Library of Congress, Washington, Box 630 [2]).
agreement. Essentially she made the demise of the alliance conditional on the successful conclusion of a disarmament treaty. Since Britain valued such an agreement more than the alliance, this drastically decreased chances of renewal. Under these conditions, it is hard not to agree with Eliot who regretfully stated that the alliance “was really dead before its termination.” The allies were reconciled to the demise of the alliance, and instead of discussing how to renew it, they focused on the optimal way to terminate it.

Balfour, as the leader of the British delegation, formulated a tripartite agreement that would facilitate a disarmament conference by ending the alliance, without hurting the feelings of Japan. His draft left open the possibility of resurrecting the alliance if Britain was threatened by Germany or Russia. On November 10, Balfour consulted Secretary of State Hughes on the alliance and handed him the draft. A few days later he discussed his draft with the Japanese delegation. Japan would have preferred renewal, but she recognized that “circumstances were not favorable” and some alternative had to be considered.

When the Japanese realized that Britain was ready to sacrifice the alliance for a disarmament treaty and cordial Anglo-American relations, they decided to contribute to the demise of the alliance, hoping that this would facilitate an American-Japanese rapprochement. On November 25 the Japanese delegation gave the British their draft of a tripartite agreement, prepared by Shidehara. The draft built on Balfour’s, but introduced several changes. Most importantly, it excluded the possibility of the future

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447 No. 548, Letter from Eliot to Curzon, Jan 13, 1922
448 Nish 1972, 368;
449 Doc 69 (inclosure in Doc 68 [F 4563/2905/23]), 12008/247(i): Balfour to Lloyd George, Washington Nov 24, 1921; Doc 70 (inclosure in doc. 68) 12008/247(i), Sir M. Hankey to Mr. Balfour, 18 Nov 1921
450 Nish 1972, 381.
revival of the alliance and stipulated that the trilateral agreement would replace the alliance. Not surprisingly, Hughes liked Shidehara’s draft better than that of Balfour.\textsuperscript{451} To water down the agreement even more, Hughes insisted on the inclusion of France in the trilateral agreement, transforming it into a quadruple or four-power one. Balfour consulted Root and Lodge about the Japanese draft, and found that they liked it.\textsuperscript{452} On the afternoon of November 28, Balfour also had a long conversation with Hughes in which they both accepted the Japanese draft with some changes. Shidehara’s draft represented the basis of the remainder of negotiations for the Four-Power Treaty.

The Four-Power Treaty was signed at the State Department at 11:00 AM on December 13, 1921 by the US, Britain, Japan and France. Article IV stipulated that “This treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the high contracting parties, and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded in London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate.”\textsuperscript{453} The treaty was ratified in August 1923 when it replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

As expected, American satisfaction was great. Already during the negotiations the American public opinion showed excitement.\textsuperscript{454} The \textit{Literary Digest} polled 803 newspapers, and it found that 723 were for ratification, while only 66 opposed it.\textsuperscript{455} The

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{451} Doc 60 [F 4413/2905/23] Balfour to Curzon, Nov 29, 1921
\textsuperscript{452} Doc 108 [F 4683/2905/23] 12008/274, Balfour to Lloyd George, Washington Nov 29, 1921 (rec’d Dec 14); Doc 49 [F 4372/2905/23] Balfour to Curzon, Nov 28
\textsuperscript{453} Nish 1972, 377.
\textsuperscript{454} Doc. 29 [A 9255/18/45], conf print and piece no. 11942/278 Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Keddleston, Nov 30, 1921
\textsuperscript{455} Buckley 1970, 173.
\end{flushleft}
treaty was ratified in the Senate 67 to 27, with 2 abstentions.\textsuperscript{456} In the wake of the Four-Power Treaty Geddes reported: “…the sentiment is so much more favourable, the atmosphere is so much more genial that it is difficult to realise that this is the same country as that to which I came almost two years ago. Given wise and patient handling of our policy, I see no reason to doubt that we are at the beginning of a new and better epoch in Anglo-American relations.”\textsuperscript{457}

In hindsight, historians and policymakers alike agree that terminating the alliance was the result of American pressure and that it was a mistake. Ten years after the Washington Conference when frictions over Ireland, naval rivalry, and war debt reappeared, many in Britain decried the demise of the alliance, including the British Treasury’s permanent secretary Sir Warren Fisher and Neville Chamberlain.\textsuperscript{458} Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the 1930s, blamed “American fear of the ‘Yellow Peril’ for terminating the Alliance.”\textsuperscript{459} The main historian of the alliance, Ian Nish concluded that “Under the pretext of safeguarding her security in the Pacific area, she [the US] presented the alliance which could in fact hurt her very little as one which challenged her existence and transformed it.”\textsuperscript{460}

With the demise of the alliance an important international moderating factor disappeared and frictions resulted in alienation. The 1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act prohibited Japanese immigration to the United States. Emperor Hirohito referred to it as one of the original causes of the Pacific War and Kikuichi Fujita, commander of the

\textsuperscript{457} Geddes to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1922, cited in Fry 1972, 188.
\textsuperscript{458} O’Brien 2004, 267.
\textsuperscript{459} Louis 1971, 3.
\textsuperscript{460} Nish 1972, 396.
Eighth Squadron at Pearl Harbor, saw it as a cause for revenge. After the demise of the alliance Japan and the Anglo-Saxon states gradually drifted apart, and Japan started its preparation for total war. The militarization of Japan cannot be blamed on Anglo-Saxon anti-Japanese policies, but they did contribute to an atmosphere where Japanese ultra-nationalists flourished and eventually attempted to replace a Pax Anglo-Americana with a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The “Yellow Peril” became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Classical Content Analysis

In the case study above I proceeded like an attorney, trying to make the best possible case for race. Here I wish to act more like an impartial arbiter. For this purpose I employ classical content analysis on a wide range of systematically selected texts to evaluate whether race was important in inflating the Japan threat and whether it fares worse or better than alternative explanations. By providing word frequencies and concordances (the immediate textual context of relevant words), classical content analysis can give us an idea of the relative importance of different factors. How often is “threat” mentioned in American texts on Japan? Is “threat” associated more often with racial terms or economic terms? If we find that racial words are more frequently mentioned in connection with Japan and threat, there are reasons to suspect that race is a stronger explanation of the Japanese threat than economic factors. Of course, word

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461 Hirobe 2001, 1.
464 On content analysis see Krippendorff 2004; Neuendorf 2002.
frequencies are imperfect proxies for explanatory factors, but together with concordances they may nonetheless be useful. The large-N, primarily quantitative nature of classical content analysis complements the narrower, qualitative case study of this chapter well.

I selected 150 texts, including a broad range of newspaper articles, governmental documents, and journal articles for the period between January 1, 1905 and December 30, 1922 (see Appendix A). To select newspaper articles, I searched in the Proquest Historical Newspapers database using three search words: “Japan,” “threat,” and “Anglo-Japanese Alliance.” Of the 59 search results I selected the first 50 articles. The articles come from four historical newspapers: The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and Chicago Daily Tribune. To select journal articles, I searched the JSTOR database using “Japan” (title) and “threat” (full text). I had to omit the third search term (“Anglo-Japanese Alliance”) because there were no search results if I included it. Because I initially found only 8 hits, I supplemented this search with “Japan” (title) and “danger” (full text). This second search resulted in 69 hits, of which I selected the first 42 to reach the limit of 50 journal articles. The selected texts come from a wide variety disciplines. In addition to political science and international politics, they include law, folklore, health policy, and geography. Finally, to select governmental documents I searched the Proquest Congressional database with “Japan” (all fields except full text) and “threat” (all fields including full text). I found 167 hits in the Congressional Record category and I selected every fifth text to obtain 33 Congressional documents. For the remaining 17 documents I selected the section on Japan of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) document series for the period between 1906 and 1922. While the
newspaper articles were the most narrowly searched, the journal articles and governmental documents were the most broadly selected (I could not use the “Anglo-Japanese Alliance” search term because I found no hits if I included it). Consequently, the newspaper articles turned out to be most relevant for the topic of this study, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, while several of the other texts were not very relevant. Nonetheless, I included all 150 texts in the content analysis to mitigate concerns of selection bias.

I analyzed these 150 texts using classical content analysis. To produce word frequencies and concordances, one needs to operationalize the relevant terms by building “content dictionaries,” a set of words which capture the relevant terms. I was interested in the word frequencies of threat (the “dependent variable” for purposes of this analysis), race and economy (the “independent variables” of this analysis). I also wanted to look at the concordances of “threat” to verify whether “race” or “economy” is mentioned most often in the immediate neighborhood of “threat,” to ensure that I did not omit some important alternative explanation, and to eliminate from the frequency count cases where the text actually refers to the lack of threat (such as “no threat”). Relying on the Thesaurus and my prior knowledge about the discourse of this historical period, I constructed the following content dictionaries. To capture the frequency of “threat” I looked at how often threat, peril, danger, and menace are mentioned. For the concordance test I looked at the 5 words on the left and 5 on the right of “threat” and its synonyms.

In addition to the frequency and concordance tests on threat, I also performed frequency tests for “race” and “economy”. To capture the frequency of race, I constructed
a content dictionary comprised of the following words and their variations: race, Anglo-Saxon, Asiatic, Oriental, assimilation, civilization, color, descent, white, and yellow. A powerful alternative explanation for inflated threat perceptions of Japan was economic. According to the domestic strand of the economic explanation, Japanese immigrants were perceived as threatening because they represented a fierce competition to the white worker (especially in agriculture). According to the international strand of the economic explanation, Japan was perceived as threatening by the US because it undermined the open door and American commerce in China. To capture these two economic explanations, I created the following economic content dictionary: agriculture, industry, employment, labor, land, and wage (all domestic); commerce, trade, and open door (all international).

The crucial assumption behind classical content analysis is that the more important an explanation is, the higher the frequency count of its terms would be. This may be somewhat problematic for race, but in the early twentieth century normative prohibition against racism was not strong enough to substantially distort results. If the racial theory was stronger in explaining American inflated threat perceptions, I would expect to find “race” more often mentioned than “economy” in connection to threat.

There is no objective rule to construct content dictionaries and others may have done it differently. In hindsight, I found that the importance of race was slightly undercounted by not including in the search racial or racially charged terms such as Caucasian, blood, and ancestry. In particular, I found that leaving out “immigration” and “aggressiveness,” which are at the heart of Hypotheses 1 and 2, understates the
importance of race. However, I wanted the racial theory to undergo a hard test and did not want to risk artificially inflating the importance of race. Although intertwined with race, immigration was not always seen as racial. Similarly, the taken-for-grantedness of Japanese aggressiveness was striking, but it would have been hard to establish to what extent it was seen as innate and thus racial. At the same time, by leaving out terms such as “market,” the economic explanation was also slightly undercounted. Overall, I consider that these content dictionaries did not favor one explanation over another and did justice to them.

To perform the analysis I employed Yoshikoder, a content analysis software. When the texts were not convertible to a format accessible to the software, I did the analysis manually. This gave me a good sense of the nature of texts, mitigating disadvantages that come from the thinness of quantitative textual analysis. For example, I was able to minimize the counting of words when they did not capture what I intended to capture (think of the non-racial meaning of “race” as in arms race, or the not strictly economic use of “industry”). For all documents, except the Congressional Records, I did the content analysis by reading the entire text. Several of the Congressional debates were longer and less relevant to the analysis than I would have liked. For instance, the Congressional Record of 28 June 1906 mentions Japan a few times and then only related to tobacco duties. Counting all the relevant words in the document would have severely distorted the findings. Therefore, I analyzed Congressional Records as follows. I looked for “Japan” within each document. I counted the relevant words only for the pages where the discussion was related to Japan. If Japan was not mentioned for more than one page
and the discussion had nothing to do with Japan or a related topic (the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Four Power Treaty, naval building, or disarmament), I skipped to the next place in the document where Japan was mentioned.

The results of the classical content analysis are mixed. While economy outperforms race in the frequency tests, race outperforms economy in the concordance test. The aggregate frequency tests suggest that although the racial explanation of inflated threat perception is solid, economic explanations are much stronger (see Table 3.3). Race did respectably, being mentioned 847 times in the 150 documents, but economy far outperformed it by being mentioned 1972 times. But the aggregate results are somewhat misleading, because the large difference is due to the fact that a few outlier texts between 1910 and 1912 inflate the “economy” word count by 739. In particular, two articles on village government in Japan, one published in 1910 and the other in 1911, distort the findings. Without these outliers, economy still outperforms race in the aggregate, but the numbers would be much closer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Threat Frequency</th>
<th>Race frequency</th>
<th>Economy frequency (International+ Domestic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Newspapers</strong></td>
<td>91</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47 (35 + 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Journal Articles</strong></td>
<td>137</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>994 (356 + 638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Documents</strong></td>
<td>171</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>931 (381 + 550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>399</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>1972 (772 + 1200)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.3: Content Analysis Frequency Test**
Disaggregated frequency test results show that racial explanations are stronger than economic ones when looking at texts more relevant to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For reasons explained above, for newspaper articles I used a third search term (in addition to “Japan” and “threat”), “Anglo-Japanese Alliance”. I could not do the same for journal articles and governmental documents, because the search results were then too few. It is interesting that in the newspaper article category race outperforms economy, albeit narrowly. In the other two categories of journal articles and governmental documents economy does much better. If we separated the economic factors, the racial theory would outperform the international strand of the economic theory, but it would still be outperformed by the domestic economic theory. Admittedly, race does better than the international strand partly because the latter’s content dictionary is based on only three search words compared to race’s ten. The domestic strand’s dominance in part is due to the frequent mention of “land” and “labor”. Of course, as I try to show in the rest of the chapter, fears that the small number of Japanese immigrants threatened American labor and land ownership is not independent of race.
If we disaggregate the results by year, it is clear that race and economy are closer in terms of explanatory power than the aggregate numbers indicate, except for the outlier period between 1910 and 1912. In 1905 and 1920 race even outperforms economy (see Figure 3.1). The patterns of race frequency loosely follow the waves of war scares discussed in the chapter (1906-7, 1912-3, and 1920). In addition, there is a spike in 1916, a war scare not mentioned in the case study. The pattern of economy frequency also largely follows this pattern, although interestingly it drops in 1907, and in 1913 is much below the 1911 peak. “Threat” peaks in 1907, 1912, 1915-16, and then increases after WWI. It is interesting that while all frequencies increase after WWI, “economy” decreases significantly from 1921 to 1922. The low frequency of “threat” compared with “race” and “economy” is not indicative of its relative importance, but it is a function of
the lower number of words in its content dictionary (4 compared to 10 for race and economy). In hindsight, it was a good idea to keep “threat” narrow, not to overinflate the numbers. However, one aspect that the count missed was the talk of an “aggressive” Japan. The concordance test can compensate for this shortcoming.

While economy does better than race in the frequency test, race does better than economy in the concordance test. The concordance test of “threat” gives us a good sense of what terms were associated with threat and its synonyms most often. As mentioned earlier, I did the concordance test by selecting the 5 words on the left and 5 words on the right of “threat”. Then, I excluded cases which referred to the lack of threat. I excluded prepositions, pronouns, definite and indefinite articles; I kept only verbs, nouns, and adjectives. The five most frequently mentioned words adjacent to threat and its synonyms were Japan (30), Anglo-Japanese Alliance (17), war (17), Yellow Peril (14), and Germany (10). The presence of Germany may come as a surprise, but it can be explained by American fears of Germany during WWI. Race is well represented in the concordance test by Yellow Peril (14), civilization (5), Oriental (2), and unassimilable (1). Economy, in contrast, was surprisingly absent. To provide a visual representation of the results, I created a word cloud with the most frequently mentioned terms. The more often a term was mentioned in the 150 texts, the larger its size in the word cloud:

465 Danger (68), dangers (3), dangerous (4), threat (65), threatening (5), threatened (9), threatens (4), menace (44), peace (7), peril (20), Yellow Peril (14), Anglo-Japanese Alliance (17), Japan (30), war (17), civilization (5), Germany (10), Russia (8), Britain (4), race (3), power (6), Four-Power Treaty (3), foreign (8), China (7), national (3), aggression (3), imminent (4), Far East (3), military (4), real (2), serious (2), immigration (2), Oriental (2), and fear (2).
In conclusion, while economy does better than race in the frequency test, race does better than economic explanations in the concordance test. Race may not be the most important explanation of inflated American threat perceptions of Japan, but it is certainly important enough to deserve attention. As the frequency test indicates, especially regarding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, race is closely associated with American threat perceptions.

Alternative Explanations

A liberal explanation of the demise of the alliance could emphasize the incompatibility between the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the League of Nations
Covenant, rather than racially inflated threat perceptions. Indeed, one of Meighen’s arguments against renewal, as discussed above, was precisely this incompatibility. Part of the media subscribed to the position that “military pacts had no place in an international order now defined by the League of Nations…” Decision makers argued that although the preamble of the alliance may be in agreement with the Covenant, some of its operative provisions were not. Most importantly, the requirement of the alliance to assist the other party in war may conflict with the collective security clause of the Covenant that all members must go to war against an aggressor.

Although the liberal explanation correctly identifies the tension between the League and the Anglo-Japanese alliance, a closer look reveals that this tension was not significant enough to preclude the renewal of the alliance. Both Britain and Japan believed that the inconsistence between the alliance and the Covenant were only at the level of the letter of the alliance and could be remedied relatively easily. Their joint communication to the League on July 8, 1920 reflects this:

“The Governments of Japan and Great Britain have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of July 13, 1911 now existing between their two countries though in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nation is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant which both Governments earnestly desire to respect. They accordingly have the honor to jointly inform the League that they recognize the principle that if the said agreement be continued after July 1921 it must be in a form not inconsistent with that Covenant.”

466 Best 2006, 818.
467 Doc 322, 11580/26i, Memorandum by Mr. C. Wingfield; see also No. 522: Letter from Mr. Alston (Tokyo) to Sir J. Tilley (Received Nov 11), sent on Oct 7, 1919;
468 No. 744: Memorandum by Mr. Malkin on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as affected by the Covenant of the League of Nations, Foreign Office, Feb 18, 1920;
469 FRUS 1920, 686; see also No 41: Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo), FO June 3, 1920; No. 45: Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (rec’d June 10), Tokyo, June 8, 1920;
The communication left the issue of renewal open, implying that if the parties
opted for it, renewal would not be precluded by the inconsistence with the Covenant. This
explanation then cannot account for the demise of the alliance. Interestingly enough, the
joint note did almost cause the end of the alliance, but for entirely different reasons.
Some in Britain interpreted the joint note narrowly as a notification to terminate the
alliance. Only after an intense exchange of telegrams between May and July 1921, did
the allies convene that the joint communication did not represent such a notification.

A neorealist explanation could be that threat inflation was not the result of
misperception rooted in racial difference, but it was a rational strategy for states seeking
survival under anarchy and uncertainty. Decision makers inflate threats through worst-
case assumptions because it is more prudent to be prepared for imagined threats than to
be surprised by real ones. This is why “we find that decision-makers, and especially
military leaders, worry about the most implausible threats.” Leaving aside that worst-
case assumptions can become self-fulfilling prophecies, the problem with this
explanation is that because both anarchy and uncertainty are constant, it has difficulties
explaining variation in threat inflation. Why do decision makers inflate some potential
threats but not others? Neorealism suggests that because intentions are unknowable and
changeable, decision makers must infer threats from capabilities. Hence, they would

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470 According to article 6 of the 1911 alliance, which was concluded for 10 years, could be terminated if the
parties notified each other 12 months in advance. Milkin, the legal adviser to the FO argued that the joint
note amounted to such a notification to terminate the alliance Nish 1972, 303.
471 Curzon to Eliot FO, May 11, 1921; Eliot to Curzon, Tokyo May 20, 1921; Eliot to Curzon Tokyo May
31, 1921; Curzon to Eliot, June 7, 1921; Curzon to Japanese Ambassador, FO, July 2, 1921
472 Mearsheimer 2001, 43.
inflate potential threats posed by stronger opponents. Indeed, the reason why a century ago the U.S. perceived Japan rather than China as threatening was partly because Japan’s superior (and rising) power. But capabilities constitute only a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for perceived threat. Whether a state is threatening is not only a function of material capabilities but of aggressive intentions as well.\(^{474}\) Due to their shared racial identity, Britain and the U.S. did not perceive British power as threatening.\(^{475}\) The lack of mutual threat perception is the more remarkable given that British power was superior to that of Japan and American power was growing faster than that of Japan. As showed in Table 3.2, during this period Japan remained far below Britain and the U.S. according to most power indicators.\(^{476}\) Without racial difference Japanese power remains indeterminate. The U.S. perceived Japan as threatening to an important extent because of the racially inflated threat perception, the “Yellow Peril”.

Instrumental models of threat inflation would explain American inflated threat perceptions not as a result of racial difference, but as the function of manipulative elites maximizing interests under conditions of information asymmetry.\(^{477}\) The media inflated threats to sell newspapers, politicians inflated threats to gain votes, and labor unions inflated threats to gain protection from Japanese labor competition. This explanation is very powerful and explains much of inflated American threat perceptions towards Japan. Nonetheless, American inflated threat perceptions cannot be reduced to instrumentalism.

\(^{474}\) Walt 1987.
\(^{475}\) Kramer 2002; Fry 1972, 7.
\(^{476}\) 388/BDF/II/E/2; 213/BDF/II/E/4; U.S. Congress, 1920); see also Table 3.2 of this chapter.
\(^{477}\) Christensen 1996; Kaufmann 2004; Snyder 1991.
Instrumental threat inflation played an important role in activating racial prejudices, but once activated, the racially inflated threat of Japan took on a life of its own.

The instrumental model is incomplete in at least two respects. First, it overestimates the accuracy of elite threat perception and elite ability to manipulate information. Part of the elite was subject to the “Yellow Peril,” genuinely perceived Japan and the alliance as threatening, and “was content to be carried forward by the popular mood.”\footnote{Nish 1972, 281.} Even those not subject to inflated threat perceptions were constrained by the “Yellow Peril” rhetoric. Second, even assuming that elites used the “Yellow Peril” purely instrumentally, it is not clear why it resonated so well with the public. This is particularly puzzling given that a considerable part of the elite was engaged in threat deflation, concerned about a premature conflict with Japan. Why were threat inflationary arguments more persuasive than threat deflationary ones? Although one may want to point to Japanese labor competition, it is hard to explain why Louisiana with 13 Japanese residents of a population of 2,363,880 or Kansas with 10 Japanese residents of a population of 1,801,028 were alarmed by the Yellow Peril and later introduced anti-Japanese measures.\footnote{McGovney 1947, 18} Bringing racial prejudice in makes this puzzle easier to solve.

Using the terminology of Lieutenant-Colonel F.S.G. Piggott, British Military Attaché to Japan, it was the “latent anti-Japanese” of the majority that made the success of the small minority of “professional anti-Japanese” possible.\footnote{Doc. 210, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Vol. II, Series E, 5 (210/BDFA/II/E/5).} The U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Roland S. Morris, told Japanese Ambassador Shidehara that the 1920 Alien Land Law

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\footnote{Nish 1972, 281.}
\footnote{McGovney 1947, 18}
\footnote{Doc. 210, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Vol. II, Series E, 5 (210/BDFA/II/E/5).}
“was not primarily economic but that it arose from the fear of the people of California that the presence of a large body of unassimilable people would threaten them with a serious and persistent race problem.” 481 According to the Foreign Office, “The question can be regarded from an economic or from a political point of view, but in its essence it is a racial one.” 482 I would not want to posit the primacy of race, but it is reasonable to suggest that it was nonetheless important.

Finally, one may argue that the U.S. opposed the alliance not because she saw it as threatening her security, but because she believed that under its cover Japan violated the “open door” principle according to which all powers were supposed to have equal commercial opportunities in the Far East. The U.S. understood that Britain would not side with Japan in a Japanese-American war, but she believed that the alliance allowed Japan to claim zones of special interests in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, hurting American commercial interests. 483 As Congressman John R. Tyson put it, the alliance “enables Japan to threaten the doctrine of the open door and the principle of the integrity of China…The domination and control desired by Japan of the Far East is the real yellow peril.” 484

As the classical content analysis above showed, this explanation is weaker than the racial one, but it is still important. Nonetheless, it has a few shortcomings. Although the alliance may have made Britain more accepting of Japanese economic expansion in the Far East, it also allowed Britain to moderate Japanese economic demands. It is

481 FRUS 1920, 12.
482 Memorandum respecting Racial discrimination and immigration, FO (F. Ashton-Gwatkin), 10 October 1921; see also 12/B DFA/II/E/5; 211/B DFA/II/E/5.
483 Buckley 1970, 118; Tate and Foy 1959, 544.
484 Congressional Record, 61:8951.
difficult to say whether in its absence Japan would have been more imperialistic in China. This explanation also omits that a crucial reason why Japan wanted zones of special interest in the Far East was that Britain and the U.S. excluded her from the rest of the world for economic and racial reasons.\footnote{Kennedy 1969, 38; Louis 1971, 2.} Economic fears of Japanese expansion in China were inextricably intertwined with racial ones in one additional way. In the minds of many Americans (and Westerners) the “Yellow Peril” was embodied not by an isolated Japan, but one that assumed the leadership of the Chinese masses. The concern was that this “Oriental” alliance would lead to the exclusion of whites from Asia, and, according to the most alarmist scenario, ultimately destroy Western civilization.\footnote{Memorandum by Mr. Wellesley respecting the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, FO, September 1, 1920}

**Conclusions**

This chapter argued that race is necessary to understand the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Racial prejudices embedded in different racial identities inflated American threat perceptions of Japan, facilitated Japanese-American discord, and resulted in the misperception of the alliance as dangerous. In contrast, shared Anglo-Saxon racial identity deflated threat perceptions and facilitated Anglo-American cooperation. At the 1922 Washington Conference Britain, partly for racial reasons, agreed to the demise of the alliance to satisfy American preferences. Japan accepted the fait accompli. The absence of the alliance made Anglo-Saxon—Japanese alienation and
German-Japanese rapprochement possible, culminating in WWII. American fears of the
“Yellow Peril” became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
For nearly twenty years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki decision makers tried to impose political controls on nuclear weapons. Although some arms control negotiations aimed at scoring propaganda points before the international public, many genuinely aimed at achieving agreement. Yet, despite countless proposals and long negotiations in various institutional environments, little was achieved. Test ban talks in particular appeared “an exercise in exasperating futility” or “a soufflé that never rose”. Nonetheless, under President John F. Kennedy the US pursued a test ban more vigorously than ever before. These efforts paid off in 1963 when the US, the USSR, and the UK signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). Although it fell short of a comprehensive test ban by allowing underground testing, the LTBT represented a significant agreement. Kennedy considered it his “proudest achievement.” Chief British negotiator Lord Hailsham (Quintin Hogg) called it “the biggest step forward in international relations since the beginning of the Cold War.” The LTBT prepared the way for subsequent arms control agreements and Soviet-American détente.

487 Mastny 2008, 5; Mandelbaum 1979, 27.
488 Rusk 1990, 259; Seaborg 282; Sorensen 2009 [1965], 26.
489 Cited in Mastny 2008, 3.
Why did the US push so hard for a test ban despite many years of unproductive negotiations? Extant explanations emphasize the American public’s concerns of radioactive fallout, the traumatic experience of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and general fears of nuclear proliferation. As discussed in more detail later, these explanations are insightful, but provide incomplete explanations for the LTBT. Public fears of radioactive fallout peaked in 1959 and decreased afterwards. Although they have facilitated the initiation of test ban talks, they mattered less in later stages. Moreover, approval rates show that the American public followed, rather than pushed Kennedy towards the LTBT. The Cuban Missile Crisis created a “window of opportunity” for a test ban by driving home the importance of nuclear cooperation between the superpowers. However, Kennedy’s rejection of Khrushchev’s test ban proposal in late 1962 and Soviet diplomats’ obstructionism in early 1963 effectively closed this window. Without other reasons for a test ban it is unlikely that it would have been achieved. Fears of nuclear proliferation provide the strongest explanation and can account for much of the US push for a test ban. But with respect to the timing of the LTBT they are indeterminate. If the US was concerned about nuclear proliferation in general, it is unclear why it did not work harder for the LTBT earlier, before France obtained nuclear capability.

This chapter argues that while American efforts to achieve a test ban were motivated primarily by general fears of nuclear proliferation, more specific racial fears of Chinese nuclear proliferation also facilitated these efforts. Difference in racial identity contributed to American perceptions of Communist China as not only a “Red Peril,” but
also as a “Yellow Peril.” Thus, China was perceived as more threatening than the white USSR, which was seen only as a “Red Peril.” American threat perceptions of China were inflated by racial prejudices pertaining to aggressive intentions and, to a lesser extent, irrationality. That an aggressive and even irrational China would go nuclear appeared particularly alarming. Driven by this inflated threat perception, the Kennedy administration pursued nuclear cooperation with the Soviets to inhibit the Chinese bomb. Mainly for strategic reasons and to a lesser extent for racial reasons, the Soviets responded favorably. The superpowers decided to use the LTBT against the Chinese nuclear program, because it nicely fit with the broader “containment with isolation” China policy of the US and was palatable to the Soviets who were reluctant to engage in harsher measures against their ally. Ultimately the LTBT failed to inhibit Chinese nuclear proliferation, but it did represent an important step towards arms control and détente. An interesting aspect of the argument is that a malign cause (racism) had a benign effect (the LTBT).

This chapter supports Hypotheses 2 and 3 of the racial theory presented in Chapter 2. In the first step, racial prejudices are activated and then these inflate threat perceptions. The Korean War activated American racial prejudices pertaining to aggressive intentions and irrationality, which then served as lenses of perception through which subsequent Chinese behavior was perceived. They inflated American threat perceptions of a nuclear China, which was seen as a “Yellow Peril.” In the second step, racially inflated threat perceptions interacted with other domestic (the China lobby’s
preference for harsher measures) and international factors (the Soviet preference for less aggressive measures), to contribute to the achievement of the LTBT.

The LTBT case is puzzling for some strands of dominant international relations theories. Balance of power approaches would have predicted Sino-American cooperation against the USSR, rather than Soviet-American cooperation against China. Allying with a stronger state against a weaker one deviates from balance of power logic.\textsuperscript{490} Soviet-American nuclear cooperation also runs counter to the expectations of liberal theories, which predict interstate cooperation along ideological lines rather than across them.\textsuperscript{491} As discussed in Chapter 2, however, the argument is consistent with balance of threat theory.\textsuperscript{492} By shifting the focus from material capabilities and ideology to race, we are better equipped to explain why the US perceived a nuclear China as so threatening and pushed for the LTBT to inhibit the Chinese bomb.

Two caveats. First, the chapter does not argue that there was no reason to be worried about a nuclear China, but that American threat perceptions were inflated beyond what the evidence at the time and in hindsight supported. Race \textit{inflated}, not created, US threat perceptions. Although this is hard to quantify, I would argue that while Chapter 3 focused on a case where race inflated a low threat, this chapter focuses on a case where race inflated a medium threat. Second, since after WWII racism was increasingly delegitimized, the chapter relies on subtler evidence than Chapter 3, which focused on the 1902-1922 period.

\textsuperscript{490} Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001.
\textsuperscript{491} Doyle 1986; Owen 1994; Russett 1993.
\textsuperscript{492} Walt 1987.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first part shows how race inflated US threat perceptions of a nuclear China. The second part traces how this racially inflated threat perception led to the LTBT. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the arguments based on classical content analysis and a discussion of alternative explanations.

RACE INFLATES US THREAT PERCEPTIONS OF A NUCLEAR CHINA

As discussed in Chapter 2, establishing that threat perception is inflated is difficult in the absence of an objective baseline. In this chapter I argue that American threat perceptions of China were inflated by showing that it became more threatening than the Soviet Union; that scholarly consensus points in this direction; and that fears of a nuclear China follow the logic of “domino theory,” whose threat inflationary nature is widely accepted. Throughout the chapter I also provide evidence of racial rhetoric to argue that the China threat was racially inflated.

This part starts with a brief discussion of the international and domestic racial context after WWII and places the argument in the race literature. Next, it turns to China and traces how the Korean War activated the racial prejudices pertaining to aggressiveness and irrationality. The third section argues that through the lens of these racial prejudices the US perceived Chinese nuclear efforts as a “Yellow Peril.” The last section shows that US perceptions of a nuclear China were inflated to the point where China was perceived as more threatening than the USSR.
Race after World War II

If WWI was “the graveyard of empires,” WWII was the graveyard of imperialism. It universalized the principle of self-determination by delegitimizing the racial ideologies underpinning formal colonial empires. The prohibition of racial discrimination was enshrined in the United Nations Charter. During the first two decades of the Cold War, newly decolonized states and civil rights movements challenged racism at the international and the domestic levels. Race became an important aspect of Cold War international politics. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it, “Race relations within the United States during the sixties had a profound impact on the world’s view of the United States and, therefore, on our foreign relations.”

US policymakers quickly realized that domestic racial discrimination against African Americans hindered US foreign relations with decolonized African states and hurt the US in the competition with the USSR for Third World allies. For this reason, the State Department supported formal racial equality and the recruitment of African American diplomats. If initially uninterested in the civil rights agenda, Kennedy later embraced it and took important steps against racial discrimination regarding voting rights, housing, employment and education. Lyndon B. Johnson’s voting record on civil rights may have been “conventionally southern” until 1957, but as President he took unprecedented measures to extend full citizenship to African Americans.

494 Rusk 1990, 586.
495 Borstelmann 2001; Dudziak 2011 [2000].
496 Dudziak 2011 [2000], ch. 5.
497 Rostow 1972, 52, 337.
The importance of black-white race relations and their impact on US foreign policy should not be underestimated, but the influence of race on international politics cannot be reduced to them. Black-white relations and the progress made towards addressing racial discrimination against African Americans are widely discussed in the literature. Yet racial discrimination was endemic not only towards Africans and African-Americans, but also towards Asians and Asian-Americans. Race influenced US foreign policy not only, as Rusk put it, by shaping the world’s view of the US, but also by shaping the US’s view of the world. This is the focus of the rest of the chapter.

The Korean War Activates Racial Prejudices of Aggressiveness and Irrationality

Sino-American relations during the Cold War are typically understood in ideological terms, rather than in racial ones. After Mao Zedong defeated Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War, China became an ideological threat to the US. But this widely acknowledged ideological threat was paralleled by an often neglected racial threat. To many, Communist China’s “Chineseness” loomed larger than its Communism.

In sharp contrast with Japanese-American relations, early Sino-American relations are remembered for their benign, if paternalistic, nature. It is often forgotten that before Japan’s rise at the end of the 19th century, it was China that represented the “Yellow Peril.” As Japan suffered a dramatic defeat in WWII and became America’s Cold War ally, it temporarily ceased to be perceived as threatening. It was time for the

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499 Daniels 1988; Takaki 1989; Wu 2002.
500 Thomson 1972, 221; Rusk 1990, 288. The US was not the only country that perceived China as a Yellow Peril in the 1950s and early 1960s. For similar developments in Australia see Strachan 1996.
pendulum to swing back to China. The Chinese Civil War turned China into a “Red Peril,” but the Korean War turned it into the new “Yellow Peril” by activating racial prejudices of aggressive intentions and irrationality (in the sense of fanaticism or indifference towards death).

On 25 June 1950 North Korean forces invaded South Korea with the blessing of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Joint UN-US troops intervened and pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel toward the Yalu River. China feared that if the US defeated North Korea, it would attack China.\textsuperscript{502} It warned the US not to cross the 38th parallel, but these warnings were ignored.\textsuperscript{503} In what it saw as self-defense, China joined North Korea and pushed the UN-US troops back across the 38th parallel.\textsuperscript{504} In the fight that followed the US lost 14,000 soldiers and suffered the longest retreat in American military history.\textsuperscript{505}

The determined fighting of the large Chinese army in the Korean War helped activate American prejudices of “Oriental” aggressiveness and irrationality, which underpinned the “Yellow Peril.” General Douglas MacArthur concluded that “Orientals” have a different attitude toward death: “We hate to die; only face danger out of a sense of duty and through moral issues; whereas with Orientals, life begins with death. They die quietly, ‘folding their arms as a dove, folding his wings, relaxing, and dying’.”\textsuperscript{506} Colonel Robert B. Rigg’s report \textit{Red China’s Fighting Hordes} talked of “a sadism and brutality

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Christensen 1996, 158.
\item Whiting 2001, 106.
\item Gaddis 2005, 107.
\item Goh 2005, 23, fn 21.
\item Harriman, Memorandum of a Conversation with General MacArthur, June 8, 1951; cited in Peck 2006, 110.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
inherent in many Asiatics.” Colonel Samuel Marshall described how American soldiers were “swamped by a yellow tide which moved upon it from all sides…it was like dealing with mass lunacy.” General Mark Clark characterized the Chinese army’s tactic in terms of a “human sea,” where “the enemy hurled overwhelming numbers of men at us, apparently heedless of how many he lost.”

*507* A *Life* magazine headline of 20 November 1950 warned that *Aggressive China Becomes a Menace.* *508* A year later a *Foreign Affairs* article warned that if China modernized with Soviet assistance, it could become a “Yellow Peril.”

Before the Korean War the Truman administration and the American public perceived China as weak and representing a threat only as a Soviet puppet. After the war they perceived China as aggressive, insensitive to human losses, and dangerous in its own right. George F. Kennan’s early warnings that the Soviets would find it impossible to control the ‘inscrutable Orientals’ gained credibility: “The men in Kremlin would suddenly discover that this fluid and subtle oriental movement which they thought they held in the palm of their hand had quietly oozed away between their fingers and that there was nothing left there but a ceremonious Chinese bow and a polite and inscrutable Chinese giggle.” *510* America’s benign paternalism toward China gave way to a relationship based on fear. The “Yellow Peril” image of China remained influential in

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507 Rigg, Marshall, and Clark are cited in Scott 2007, 29.
508 Cited in Scott 2007, 27.
509 Baldwin 1951.
510 Naval College War lecture, October 11, 1948, Kennan Papers, Box 17; cited in Gaddis 2005, 42.
American political culture during the 1950s and 1960s supported by and facilitating regular Sino-American crises.

Although public rhetoric shifted towards racial equality, racist statements implying the presence of racial prejudices were not absent. In his inaugural address of January 20, 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower took a strong stance in support of racial equality. Later, reflecting on the 1954-55 Taiwan Straits Crisis, he stated that “the Red Chinese appear to be completely reckless, arrogant, possibly overconfident, and completely indifferent to human losses.” In contrast, the Russians “were human beings, and they wanted to remain alive.” British Prime Minister Winston Churchill thought that the China threat was inflated just like the “Yellow Peril” of his youth was, but Eisenhower disagreed.

Similarly, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles thought the Russians were “calculating,” while the Chinese were characterized by “aggressive fanaticism.” The Soviets shared to some extent the view that China was inherently aggressive. When US Under-Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith complained to the Soviet Minister of

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511 Ryan 1989, 186.
514 Cited in Chang 1990, 170.
515 Cited in Jones 2010, 233; Churchill to Eisenhower, 7 December 1954, PREM 11/898, The National Archives; Eisenhower to Churchill, 15 Dec 1954, PREM 11/898, The National Archives. Churchill himself harbored racial prejudices towards the Chinese, but these associated China with inherent weakness and inferiority, which is why he did not see China as a threat.
Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. Molotov about China’s recklessness, the latter retorted that “China is always going to be China, she is never going to be European.”\textsuperscript{517}

Fears of China were amplified on the eve of the 1955 Bandung Conference. Many in the US were concerned, without much justification as it turned out, that this first big conference of African and Asian states would result in pan-Asianism under Communist Chinese leadership. Memories of Japanese efforts during WWII championing “Asia for the Asians” against white imperialism were fresh.\textsuperscript{518} The China threat was also reinforced by China’s attack against India in 1962. India’s provocations were downplayed and the restrained nature of the Chinese offensive was explained in situational rather than dispositional terms.\textsuperscript{519}

The racial prejudices at the heart of American threat perceptions were not simply the effect of Sino-American ideological differences and geopolitical tensions. Americans applied them to Chinese Nationalists as well, although this tendency was moderated by shared interests, alliance ties, and the ROC’s relative weakness. During the 1955 Straits Crisis Eisenhower warned the National Security Council regarding Chiang Kai-shek that “We are always wrong when we believe that Orientals think logically as we do.”\textsuperscript{520} He also compared Chiang to a “mule who walked into the brick wall” to emphasize his

\textsuperscript{517} Cited in Foot 1995, 123; Dulles-Herter files, box 2, 23 May 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL)
\textsuperscript{518} Jones 2010, 4, 128.
\textsuperscript{519} Kochavi 2002, 121; Schaller 2002, 155. One reason was that liberals, who were usually more skeptical of the ‘Yellow Peril’ sympathized with India due to its democratic regime. However, it is also the case that racial prejudices related to danger are much less often applied to India. This variation constitutes an interesting phenomenon. Perhaps due to its membership in the British Commonwealth and its democratic political system, India was perceived as an “honorary white” country. The long tradition of nonviolence embraced by India also made it harder to perceive it as dangerous. As discussed in Chapter 2, India’s “exceptionalism” is a topic worthy of further study.
\textsuperscript{520} Cited in Peck 2006, 5-6; Memorandum of Discussion of the 237\textsuperscript{th} Meeting of the National Security Council, February 17, 1955 FRUS, China, 1955-57, 2:285.

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intransigence and Oriental irrationality. Secretary of State Dean Rusk believed that Chiang was prone to “wholly irrational” thinking. Dulles told Wellington Koo, the Republic of China’s (ROC) Ambassador to the US, that the ‘Oriental’ mind “was always more devious” than the Occidental.

In sum, the Korean War activated prejudices of Chinese aggressiveness and irrationality which underpinned the inflated threat perception of China as a “Yellow Peril”. But American perceptions of China cannot be reduced to this image. In addition to the “Yellow Peril,” other images of China in the US were “Red Menace,” “Revolutionary Rival,” “Troubled Modernizer,” and “Resurgent Power.” At the domestic level people imputed to Chinese Americans not only negative traits underpinning the “Yellow Peril,” but also positive traits underpinning the “Model Minority” image. For instance, Rusk perceived the Chinese not only as expansionist and hostile, but also as resilient and hard working. A study based on 181 interviews with the American elite found that the Chinese were perceived not only as shrewd, opportunistic, inscrutable, cruel, devious, or dishonest; but also as intelligent, industrious, and stoic. But during military competitions, economic crises, or other alarming events, positive traits tend to give way to negative ones, some of which are racial. While other images may be useful in explaining other aspects of Sino-American relations, the “Yellow Peril” image based on racial prejudices of aggressiveness and, to a lesser extent irrationality, is useful in

524 Goh 2005.
526 Isaacs 1958, 63, 73.
explaining inflated US fears of a nuclear China. The next section traces how racial
prejudices inflated American perceptions of a Chinese bomb.

**Racial Prejudices Inflate Fears of a Nuclear China: The Nuclear “Yellow Peril”**

*US Fears of a Nuclear China*

China’s nuclear program was extremely alarming to the US as it was perceived
through the ‘Yellow Peril’. The danger of a nuclear holocaust already loomed large in
American imagination, as shown by the popularity of fiction bestsellers and movies such
as *On the Beach* (1959), *Cat’s Cradle* (1963), *Fail-Safe* (1964) and *Dr. Strangelove*
(1964).\(^{527}\) Civil defense initiatives became daily ingredients of Americans’ lives.\(^{528}\) The
threat of a nuclear China rapidly overshadowed more established nuclear fears.

Mao decided to acquire nuclear weapons in the wake of the 1954-55 Taiwan
Straits crisis.\(^{529}\) During the 1950s, the US threatened the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) repeatedly with nuclear attack.\(^{530}\) Despite his “paper tiger” rhetoric regarding
nuclear weapons, Mao recognized their power. As he put it, “If we are not to be bullied in
the present-day world, we cannot do without the [atomic] bomb.”\(^{531}\) The 1958 Taiwan
Straits crisis reinforced the Chinese determination to get the bomb. In the same year
China established the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute, the Tongxian

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\(^{527}\) For a good overview see Weart 1988.

\(^{528}\) Boyer 1984, 822.

\(^{529}\) Lewis and Xue 1988, 35.

\(^{530}\) Foot 1995, 167; for US atomic diplomacy towards China see also Foot 1988-89 and Dingman 1988-89.

\(^{531}\) Cited in Kochavi 2002, 214.
Uranium Mining and Hydrometallurgy Institute, and started the construction of the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant and the Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Plant.532

Inflated US threat perceptions of Chinese nuclear proliferation were part of a larger fear of non-white nuclear proliferation. At the time the atomic bomb was still the “white man’s weapon.”533 The US, the USSR, the UK and France were sober and responsible nuclear powers. They were white, rational, and valued human life, all of which increased the reliability of nuclear deterrence. Although there is an established tradition of representing Russia as semi-Oriental, I found that at least in the early 1960s the image of a rational and calculated Russia was dominant.534 The racially inflated fear at the time was that the reliability of nuclear deterrence would be undermined if a non-white state acquired the bomb, because such a state would be aggressive and perhaps irrational.535 This is why, as nuclear strategist Herman Kahn put it, Washington’s main concern was that “a Hottentot” would get the bomb.536 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) mentioned this concern several times.537

532 Burr and Richelson 2000, 58.
533 Jones 2010, 288.
534 The official documents cited in this chapter provide ample evidence of this. I also skimmed important secondary works such as Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1969), Maxwell Taylor’s Swords and Plowshares (1990), and Herman Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War (1978), but I found no strong evidence to the contrary. This, however, does not mean that Russia’s racialization was inexisten. It occasionally resurfaced, and some would argue that Richard Pipes’ work in the 1970s and 1980s racializes Russia and Russians.
536 Maddock 2010, 7.
As China made progress towards the bomb, this broad racial fear became specific. Various documents, such as a 1962 State Department memorandum, made it clear that Washington’s main proliferation fears focused on China.\textsuperscript{538} While nuclear weapons undermined Western conceptions of war and inhibited the use of force, they allegedly supported the “Oriental” conception of war and encouraged the use of force. In the Western conception of war dominated by Clausewitz’s logic, military force is employed in pursuit of political goals, where the enemy is compelled to do one’s will.\textsuperscript{539} In contrast, “Asiatic hordes” employed war not to shape the enemy’s behavior, but to destroy the enemy.\textsuperscript{540} Since nuclear weapons are better at fate-control (the ability to determine what happens to others) than behavior-control (the ability to control the behavior of others),\textsuperscript{541} ‘Orientals’ would be more likely to initiate nuclear war. China scholar Robert S. Elegant gave voice to this concern when he warned of “Chinese incineration of a good part of the world.”\textsuperscript{542} Even if China was not irrational, its “arrogant self-confidence, revolutionary fervor, and distorted view of the world” made it likely that it would miscalculate.\textsuperscript{543}

Fears of a nuclear China were significant in the Kennedy administration. The President frequently expressed concern of a nuclear holocaust brought about “for irrational reasons by a fanatic or a demagogue.”\textsuperscript{544} He repeatedly explained that he was

\textsuperscript{539} Clausewitz 1968.
\textsuperscript{542} Jervis 1989, 3.
\textsuperscript{543} Elegant 1964.
\textsuperscript{544} Cited in Maddock 2010:145. Kennedy also expressed his concerns of an irresponsible nuclear power in a 26 July 1963 address, see in \textsuperscript{544} Public Papers of the President of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 604.
most concerned about a nuclear China. According to Deputy National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow, Kennedy believed that a Chinese nuclear detonation would be “the most significant and worst event of the 1960s.” Although Kennedy also opposed the earlier French nuclear program, except a few outlandish suggestions for more “vigorous measures against French testing,” the official US policy was that of minimal assistance and “dragging of feet,” rather than the fierce opposition we see in the China case. The US did not fear the French bomb per se, but was concerned that this would unleash nuclear proliferation.

Various US agencies’ threat perception of China was inflated, but more nuanced than is sometimes recognized in the literature. Official documents reveal three main aspects of a nuclear China threat: psychological, political, and military. While some believed that these threats were complementary, others saw them as contradictory. While some saw them as synchronic, most believed they were diachronic.

In Phase I, representing the short term (approximately 1962-1965), China’s rudimentary nuclear arsenal and delivery system would pose a psychological threat with

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545 Cited in Nash 1999, 135.
547 “‘Dragging Feet’ on French Request for Nuclear Aid,” Memorandum of Conversation, 23 March 1957, in NSA The Nuclear Vault: Key Documents on Nuclear Policy issues. While under Kennedy and Johnson US nuclear assistance to France was limited, under Nixon it was considerable (Ullman 1989).
548 Since France was an ally, a democracy, and a white state, we cannot know how much shared racial identity mattered as opposed to other factors. But the fact that, as discussed below, the immense Soviet nuclear arsenal was less threatening than the Chinese bomb implies the racially inflated nature of the nuclear China threat.
549 The Kennedy administration tried to prevent European proliferation through Multilateral Force (MLF). The idea was to create a nuclear-armed NATO fleet under US control, which would reassure Europeans of the US nuclear umbrella, mitigating their desire for an independent nuclear capability.
political implications. Relying on logic similar to domino theory, it was estimated that nuclear weapons would increase China’s prestige in Asia. Its Asian neighbors would see China as too powerful to resist, would bandwagon with it, which would lead to the spread of Chinese influence in the region at the expense of the US. Communist China would attain great power status and would be recognized as “the sole voice of China in world affairs,” marginalizing the ROC.

In Phase II, representing the medium term (1965-1970), China would pose a political threat with military implications. It would have an established nuclear arsenal and delivery capability, possibly including medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). China could attack Asian states and US bases in the region, but not the US itself. Early National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) predicted that although nuclear weapons may make China more intransigent, American nuclear superiority would deter China from initiating a nuclear war and from behaving recklessly. However, China was expected to

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553 Document 5, NIE 100-4-60, “Likelihood and Consequences of the Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Additional Countries,” 9 September 1960; NSA NIEs of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem 1957-67 collection.
become politically more aggressive, betting that the US would be more reluctant to intervene. NIEs in 1963 and later highlighted the military dangers of Chinese political aggressiveness. China was perceived as inherently more risk-prone than the Soviets regarding the promotion of “wars of national liberation.” This would result in more aggressive foreign policy, which would increase chances of miscalculation and escalation, eventually leading to military conflict. Conventional military conflict with China was most likely over the Offshore Islands, North Vietnam, North Korea and Laos. Although China may be rational enough to be deterred from fighting a nuclear war, US officials were less confident that it was rational enough to be deterred from fighting conventional wars. The main concern was that China would subvert non-Communist Asian governments and would obtain regional hegemony at the expense of the US.

Finally, during Phase III, representing the long term (1970-1980), Chinese nuclear weapons would pose a military threat and may also change the balance of power.\textsuperscript{559} China would obtain intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and could initiate a nuclear attack against the US.\textsuperscript{560} By 1975 Chinese ICBMs would be able to destroy San Francisco, Chicago, New York, and Washington. In another five years China would develop the capability to “destroy much of the United States” and kill 100 million Americans.\textsuperscript{561} In contrast with the Soviets who were perceived as “particularly conscious of the hazards of nuclear war,”\textsuperscript{562} China was seen as less aware of the dangers of a nuclear war and more risk-prone regarding a general war,\textsuperscript{563} which made nuclear deterrence unreliable. This is partly why, although the US would have second-strike capability against the Soviets and first strike capability against the Chinese, many Americans saw Chinese nuclear weapons as the more threatening. Not even overwhelming US nuclear superiority could deter China. Policymakers believed that if the Cuban Missile Crisis involved China rather than the USSR, the outcome would have been tragic.

While the psychological and political China threats implied Chinese aggressiveness, but not necessarily irrationality, the military China threat implied both. Hence, it is easier to see that the Phase III military threat perception was inflated as it

\textsuperscript{559} Outline for Secretary’s Briefing Book, Memo for the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, October 27, 1964 (DDRS).
\textsuperscript{560} “Communist China: intelligence handbook,” Office of Central Intelligence, CIA, OCINo. 0942/66, Jan 1, 1966 (DDRS).
\textsuperscript{561} Document 00020, 1964/10/07, “China as a Nuclear Power (Some Thoughts Prior to the Chinese Test),” DNSA, China and the US collection.
\textsuperscript{562} NIE 11-4-60, 1 December 1960, FRUS 1961-3, Vol. V, Soviet Union, p. 2.
portrayed the Chinese as aggressive and irrational, willing to engage in a suicidal nuclear attack on the US. The inflated nature of the Phase I psychological threat and the Phase II political threat is more subtle.

One way to support the argument that the psychological and political threats were also inflated is through what I call the “nuclear domino theory.” At the heart of domino theory was the fear that unless the US intervened, Southeast Asian states would fall like dominoes in the face of an aggressive and expansionist Communist China. There is widespread consensus today that the domino theory was based on inflated threat perceptions of China.\(^{564}\) Chinese subversion in Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, and even in Indonesia remained modest and the dominoes did not fall even after US withdrawal from Vietnam.

The “nuclear domino theory” follows the logic of domino theory, but the exaggerated fears at its core are further inflated by China’s nuclear capability. In the face of an aggressive and expansionist nuclear China, the fall of the dominoes would be faster, wider, and more certain.\(^{565}\) The US could not stop a nuclear China from taking over Asia, except if it inhibited Chinese efforts to get the bomb. This view was expressed by Kennedy in an October 1961 interview with Arthur Krock of the New York Times.\(^{566}\)

Like domino theory, “nuclear domino theory” was based on inflated psychological and political-military threats. In the end, China went nuclear, but the dominoes did not fall. In


\(^{565}\) Although here I focus on the racially inflated threat perception of China behind domino theory, it is interesting to note that these fears were also amplified by racial prejudices emphasizing the racial inferiority of Southeast Asians. For example, the racial prejudices towards Vietnamese as ‘primitive,’ ‘lazy,’ ‘cowardly,’ ‘vain,’ ‘dishonest,’ ‘unclean,’ and ‘somnolent’, reinforced the fact that it could not withstand Chinese military or political pressures (Bradley 2000).

fact, nuclear weapons made Chinese behavior not more, but less aggressive. While they were nuanced, the fears of these US agencies were nonetheless exaggerated. Admittedly, this is easier to discern in hindsight, but it supports our theoretical expectations no less.

**Soviet Fears of a Nuclear China**

The Soviets shared American concerns of a nuclear China, albeit for somewhat different reasons and to a lesser extent. Initially the USSR provided China with nuclear assistance, probably to increase its influence over its ally. Between 1955 and 1958 the two states signed six agreements on nuclear cooperation. The 1957 Sino-Soviet New Defense Technical Accord, for instance, stipulated that the USSR would provide wide ranging nuclear assistance to China, including a prototype atomic bomb.\(^{567}\) The Soviet desire to maintain control over the eventual Chinese bomb\(^{568}\) and the deepening Sino-Soviet split led to the collapse of nuclear cooperation. Although the USSR did supply China with a research reactor, cyclotron, technical assistance and training, it withheld about 40 percent of the promised assistance and the prototype atomic bomb.\(^{569}\) By August 1960 the Soviets withdrew their nuclear advisers and equipment, and justified their action based on the Geneva test ban talks.\(^{570}\)

Soviet fears of a nuclear China were primarily strategic, related to the Sino-Soviet spit, but racial difference also played a role, albeit a smaller one. The split was caused

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\(^{567}\) Foot 1995, 118-9; Bundy 1988, 527.


\(^{570}\) Foot 1995, 128; Lewis and Xue 1988,64-5.
primarily by ideological disputes and competition for Communist leadership, but it also
had a racial aspect.\footnote{For an explanation of the split as a function of ideological dispute see Lüthi 2008; for the racial aspect see Radchenko 2009 and Parente 1974; for the identity aspect see Hopf 2009.} US Ambassador Marshall Green drew attention to the “Russian fear of ‘the yellow peril’”.\footnote{Cited in Scott 2007.} In his memoirs Khrushchev wrote that Mao “has played politics with Asiatic cunning, following his own rules of cajolery, treachery, savage vengeance, and deceit.”\footnote{Khrushchev 1970, 461-2.} Despite shared ideology, in a way China posed a bigger threat to the USSR than the US did. If the US won the Cold War, Russia would only have to change its political color, but if China won a Sino-Soviet war, Russia itself would disappear, ‘swamped’ by a sea of Chinese.\footnote{Radchenko 2009, 197; A poll of Radio Free Europe of 4000 subjects in Poland, Hungary and Romania between June 1963 and August 1964 found that they shared these fears and supported the Soviets because “they are Europeans, Chinese hate Russians and all whites: Chinese are a danger to the white race” (Parente 1974:5).}

The Soviets, like the Americans, also perceived China as aggressive and disregarding human life, which amplified their fears of a nuclear China.\footnote{Document 00031, 1966/04/22, CIA Intelligence Handbook, “The Deterioration of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1956-1966,” DNSA, China and the US collection; Chang 1990, 259.} As Khrushchev explained in an address to socialist leaders, unlike the Soviets, the Chinese did not understand that the socialist revolution could not be pursued through violence as it may result in a nuclear war that would “set humanity back by centuries.”\footnote{Cited in Foot 1995, 179; Ann Whitman File, NSC series, 464th meeting of the NSC, Box 13, 20 October 1960, DDEL.} There is no doubt that the Soviets had an interest in portraying the Chinese as aggressive and irrational since they were engaged in a competition with them for international

Communist leadership. Nonetheless, US diplomat and Soviet expert Charles E. Bohlen’s
conviction that the Soviets were genuinely more concerned about the Chinese bomb than about the immense American nuclear stockpile is plausible.  

The “Yellow Peril” Trumps the “Red Peril”: China as the Greatest Threat to the US

One indicator that American threat perceptions of a nuclear China were inflated is that both the public and decision makers perceived China as the greatest threat to the US. While in March 1961 almost half of the American public saw the USSR as the greatest threat and a third perceived China as the greatest threat, two years later the situation was completely reversed (see Figure 4.1 below). After China went nuclear in October 1964 almost 60% of Americans perceived China as the most threatening, compared with 20% of those who saw the USSR as the most threatening. This inflated threat perception was not simply a function of domestic political ideology as it did not follow party lines. It also cannot be explained by the fear of nuclear weapons alone as there was no similar reaction to the French bomb in 1960.

580 Kochavi 2002, 43.
Not all of those who saw China as the greatest threat did so for racial reasons and not all of those who did would say so publicly, but some did. A Samuel Lubell poll found that in 1961 5 percent of the public interpreted the Chinese threat in racial terms publicly, but by 1963 the number quadrupled to about 20 percent. While China was seen as controlled by “irrational, Oriental” leaders, Russia was perceived as embodying the values of Western civilization. Perhaps not surprisingly, the poll showed close correlation in the South between attitudes towards China and attitudes towards civil rights. The poll

**Figure 4.1: Rising ‘Yellow Peril’ and Falling ‘Red Peril’**

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581 Source: Kusnitz 1984, 112, Opinion Index, No. 76, October 1971, Gallup polls, various years.
concluded that deep in the public mind is “the dread that Red China is moving inexorably towards a nuclear, racial war…”\textsuperscript{582}

That no more than a quarter of the electorate publicly interpreted the China threat in racial terms may seem low, but given the delegitimization of racism, it is considerable. Moreover, the actual numbers were probably higher. One indirect way of getting to covert racial prejudices is to look at what percentage of Americans attributed positive traits to the Chinese. Not attributing positive characteristics to racial others makes one less vulnerable to the charge of racism than attributing negative characteristics to them. For instance, a 1966 Gallup poll found that 20\% of Americans saw the Chinese as “sly” and 19\% saw them as “treacherous”. One would then expect that even if not the rest of 80\%, but at least some of the respondents would see the Chinese as “honest”. In fact, 0\% did,\textsuperscript{583} which suggests that the percentage of Americans who saw the Chinese as “sly” or “treacherous” was in reality higher. Racial prejudice was underreported, as it is today.\textsuperscript{584}

Prominent members of the Kennedy administration shared the public’s perception that China was more threatening than the USSR. According to Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy held this view “perhaps to excess.”\textsuperscript{585} Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told Congress in 1964 that although the Soviets possessed the superior military capability, China was “the more reckless and

\textsuperscript{583} Cited in Scott 2007, 54-5.
\textsuperscript{584} Quillian 2006, 303.
\textsuperscript{585} Seaborg 1981, 217; Tucker 1990-92, 83.
belligerent of the two.”

Secretary of State Dean Rusk thought that, as opposed to the Soviets, the Chinese would push for a socialist revolution even with the risk of a nuclear war. Although Deputy National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow and Under-Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman held more nuanced views of the China threat, they tended to concur. Even Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman, who supported less hostile China policies, warned that Communist China disregarded human life and may engage in reckless actions.

US Ambassador to India and Under-Secretary of State Chester B. Bowles, and US Ambassador to the UN Adlai E. Stevenson initially were less alarmed by the threat of a nuclear China, but later they grew more concerned. Bowles came to think that China wanted a *Lebensraum* in Southeast Asia, while Stevenson saw China as pushing harder than the Soviets for the “triumph of their fanatical dream.”

Others such as George F. Kennan, Charles E. Bohlen, Paul H. Nitze, or Llewellyn Thompson also agreed that China was more threatening and favored cooperation with the Soviets against it.

Interestingly, in a 1963 *New York Times* article the famous British historian Arnold J. Toynbee discussed the chances of a “race war” being initiated by China, and argued that unless the Soviets and the Americans figured out a way to cooperate, China may come to dominate the world.

Part of the inflated US threat perceptions may be explained by the China lobby’s efforts to manipulate the China threat, but the China threat cannot be reduced to their

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586 Cited in Peck 2006, 211.
590 Toynbee 1963.
actions. Under-Secretary of State Bowles warned that China was “far more dangerous, in many ways, than even the [pro-Nationalist Chinese] Committee of One Million would have us think.” The China lobby’s threat inflationary success depended primarily on American anti-Communism. The fact that more than 28 percent of the American public did not know that mainland China was ruled by a Communist government suggests that Communist ideology contributed to the China threat less than what is often believed. Inflated threat perceptions of China went far beyond the China lobby’s efforts. Moreover, as mentioned below, these high levels of threat perception existed despite the US government’s efforts to deflate the China threat, concerned that China would derive some prestige from it.

The China Threat Was Plausible, but Exaggerated

Although there were reasons to be more concerned about China than the Soviet Union, the differences tend to be exaggerated. The image of the Chinese as the “bad” Communists and that of the Soviets as the “good” Communists masked similarities in their behavior and facilitated the exaggeration of Chinese aggressiveness. The potential threat posed by China justified medium rather than high levels of threat perceptions.

Chinese rhetoric and behavior were more threatening than those of the Soviet Union. While both China and the USSR embraced Communism, China embraced a more militant strand of the ideology. After the twentieth congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev

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591 Chang 1988, 1288.
talked about de-Stalinization at home, peaceful transition to socialism abroad, and peaceful coexistence with the West. In turn, Mao remained faithful to Stalinism, emphasized the importance of armed struggle to promote socialism abroad, and attacked peaceful coexistence as an impediment to national liberation movements.\textsuperscript{593} China was indeed more supportive of revolutionary wars in Laos and South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{594} After 1964 the Soviets matched their support, to a large extent because they did not want to be outdone by the Chinese. At home, based on his more militant ideological strand, in 1958 Mao launched a disastrous domestic socioeconomic developmental project, the Great Leap Forward, which constituted an aggression against Chinese citizens. According to conservative estimates, it caused 18.5 to 20 million famine deaths between 1959 and 1961.\textsuperscript{595} Chinese rhetoric was more aggressive than Soviet rhetoric as well. Kennedy complained to Khrushchev that Chinese verbal attacks were “going on like a drumbeat.”\textsuperscript{596} Perhaps most alarming was that Mao called the atomic bomb a “paper tiger” and reportedly told Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that “even if one half of the world’s population were destroyed, there would still be the other half left. The imperialists would be wiped out and the whole world would become Socialist. After so many years, there will again be a world population of 2 billion, 700 million, and certainly

\textsuperscript{593} See the Chinese Communists’ 1964 June 14 letter to the Soviets, cited in has Document 00457, 1965/01/00 Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1966-70 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, DNSA US Nuclear History Collection, p. 11; For Sino-Soviet difference in rhetoric also see Rusk, 1990:289.
\textsuperscript{594} Christensen 2011, ch. 5.
\textsuperscript{595} Luthi 2008, 158.
more.” This statement suggested that due to China’s large population and insensitivity to human losses, Mao was not afraid of nuclear war. The American media accordingly depicted Mao as a psychotic calling for “worldwide racial war.”

Based on China’s more militant ideology, disastrous domestic policies, and aggressive rhetoric, it is easy to exaggerate Sino-Soviet differences regarding threat. In this oversimplified view, the Soviets preferred the peaceful promotion of socialism, were very concerned about a nuclear war, and opposed national liberation struggles out of fear that they might escalate into nuclear war between the superpowers. In contrast, the Chinese were portrayed as thinking that war with the “imperialists” was inevitable, being less concerned about a nuclear war, and being more supportive of national liberation struggles. While the Soviets thought that nuclear wars ended the era where war could be an instrument deployed in pursuit of political goals, the Chinese thought that past era.

Undoubtedly, there was some truth to this view, but the extent to which the Chinese were more threatening than the Soviets was overstated.

The empirical record indicates that there were important parallels and similarities between Chinese and Soviet rhetoric and behavior. Soviet rhetoric was not exclusively peaceful. Khrushchev in his January 6, 1961 speech also promised support to national liberation struggles, and his ultimatums over Berlin were far from reassuring. At the same

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time, Chinese aggressive rhetoric, especially regarding nuclear weapons, signaled not Chinese aggressiveness and disregard for the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, but constituted an instance of the “rationality of the irrational.” Given the precedent of multiple US nuclear threats and that China did not have nuclear weapons, cultivating an image of indifference to nuclear war was a strategy to deter US nuclear threats and keep Chinese domestic morale intact. A few analysts, like George C. Denney, Jr. of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), recognized this, but most did not. On a few occasions the Chinese even made clear that they were aware of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and while they would defend against a nuclear attack, they would never initiate one.

Similarly, Sino-Soviet behavioral differences were smaller than many think. While China invaded Tibet, the USSR invaded Hungary. While China provoked multiple crises over Taiwan, the USSR provoked multiple crises over Berlin. While China waged war against India, the USSR provoked the Cuban Missile Crisis. Admittedly, Khrushchev’s backing down during the Cuban missile crisis and fierce Chinese criticisms of this “capitulationism” correctly strengthened the view that China was more aggressive than the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is often omitted that the Chinese leadership

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601 Schelling 1960.
criticized not only the Soviet “capitulationism,” but also Soviet “adventurism,” the Soviet attempt to smuggle nuclear missiles into Cuba as well.\footnote{Luthi 2008, 227.}

In sum, the degree to which China was more threatening than the Soviet Union should be acknowledged, but not overstated. Their behavior was more similar than many think, and Soviet overwhelming material capability was at least as threatening as aggressive Chinese rhetoric. American China specialists later came to the consensus that the China of the 1950s and 1960s was not aggressive and expansionist, but cautious and defensive.\footnote{Schaller 2002, 159; Barnett 1970, 437-438; See also Alice Langley Hsieh and A. Doak Barnett at the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, 91st Congress, second session, 1970.} The large gap between the Soviet threat and the China threat in the American mind overstated the extent to which the threat posed by these Communist giants differed.

RACIALLY INFLATED THREAT PERCEPTIONS LEAD TO THE LTBT

The first part of the chapter showed how race inflated US threat perceptions of a nuclear China. This second part traces how racially inflated threat perceptions resulted in the LTBT. The first section discusses the various options the US considered against the nuclear China threat and then argues that domestic and international constraints made the LTBT the instrument of choice. The second and third sections trace the negotiations leading up to and the signing of the LTBT. The last section briefly discusses two significant issues after the LTBT was signed: the possibility of preventive strikes against China and the Sino-American rapprochement.
Choosing the LTBT to Inhibit the Chinese Bomb

*Actions Considered against the ‘Nuclear Yellow Peril’*

Recall that US threat perceptions of a nuclear China included psychological, political, and military threats. The actions considered in response by US policy makers paralleled these threats.  

The psychological threat could be countered using threat deflating propaganda. Although such propaganda was meant for both domestic and international consumption, here I focus more on the latter. The Kennedy administration was very concerned about a nuclear China, but it realized that expressing these fears publicly would only make things worse. As a set of guidelines for public statements on China put it later, it was not in US interest to make the Chinese “seem ten feet tall.”

While Asian countries were concerned about the Chinese bomb, US decision makers overestimated the extent of these concerns and decided to engage in threat deflation to lower them. In October 1961 the Policy Planning Council suggested a covert propaganda campaign in Asia to mitigate the anticipated psychological impact of a

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Chinese detonation.\textsuperscript{611} An overt propaganda campaign by the State Department was initiated to emphasize the superiority of US (nuclear) power, while the CIA was to engage in covert media propaganda against the impending Chinese nuclear bomb.\textsuperscript{612}

The political threat could be addressed using political means such as a test ban. That a test ban could inhibit nuclear proliferation was recognized early. According to an Office of Intelligence Research paper, “…it appears that cessation of tests under a system of inspection and control offers a contribution towards an increase in the US security position, primarily because of the hesitancy of potential fourth countries to develop weapons programs clandestinely.”\textsuperscript{613} While developing nuclear weapons without testing was possible, it was more difficult, and the reliability of one’s arsenal would be uncertain. The US anticipated that the USSR would welcome such a test ban because it was relatively cheap and helped the Soviets to justify the discontinuance of their nuclear assistance to China.\textsuperscript{614} Few believed that a test ban was sufficient to stop proliferation, but most saw it as necessary. Official estimates in 1962 and 1963 anticipated that without a test ban, between 8 and 16 countries could acquire nuclear weapons in a decade, while with a test ban (especially a comprehensive one) this number could be kept substantially

\textsuperscript{612} Jones 2010, 409-10.
lower.\textsuperscript{615} In addition, the US could use some “carrots” to cajole China into joining a test ban agreement. Positive incentives mentioned included the removal of nuclear weapons from the Far East, the removal of travel restrictions, the alleviation of Chinese food shortages, the creation of an international airline, increased Japanese trade with China, assistance to establish diplomatic relations between China and other states, and even the possibility of Chinese UN membership.

The military threat posed by a nuclear China could be addressed by military action against Chinese nuclear facilities. Small scale conventional air attacks or tactical nuclear attacks on selected targets were considered, but were deemed politically too costly. Political costs could be mitigated if such actions were taken in response to Chinese aggression, were covert, or were performed by Chinese Nationalists. But even then, the problem of feasibility remained. Despite aerial reconnaissance flights there was no guarantee that all Chinese facilities were identified. Moreover, preventive strikes would only delay a Chinese bomb by a few years.

\textit{Domestic and International Constraints Push towards the LTBT}

The LTBT became the instrument of choice against the Chinese bomb largely because it fit domestic and international constraints. The international constraint was represented by Soviet preference for less aggressive measures. Soviet cooperation was desirable because each of the three measures discussed above was seen as more effective if implemented jointly. Since precluding Chinese nuclear proliferation was the most immediate shared interest of the superpowers, hopes of Soviet-American cooperation were realistic. The Soviets were also concerned about a West German bomb, which provided additional incentives to cooperate with the US to inhibit nuclear proliferation. The US initiated Soviet-American cooperation with a series of unilateral gestures, which were then reciprocated by the Soviets, led to a reduction of tensions, and facilitated cooperation. But despite their concerns of a nuclear China, the Soviets wanted to maintain a public stance of reconciliation as they hoped that the Sino-Soviet split could be healed. Harsher Soviet measures against China would have also been condemned by others in the “Socialist camp.” Hence, the USSR was more receptive towards less aggressive actions (psychological and political measures) and less receptive towards more aggressive actions (military measures).

The domestic constraint was represented by the China lobby in the US, which preferred more aggressive measures. Although weakening, it still constituted a force to reckon with. Moreover, Senator Joseph McCarthy’s (R-Wisconsin) purges left few of

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618 Etzioni 1967.
619 Outline for Secretary’s Briefing Book, Memo for the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Oct 27, 1964 (DDRS).
those favoring a softer China policy in positions of power. Even if Kennedy wanted to pursue a more flexible China policy, his small electoral margin would have made him reluctant to engage in such a political battle.

And the Democrats were particularly vulnerable to charges of not being tough enough on Communism after allegedly “losing China”.

The upshot was hawkish China policy. Psychological measures were deemed useful, but insufficient. They focused on mitigating fears of Chinese nuclear weapons, rather than actually doing something to stop Chinese nuclear proliferation. Moreover, if deflating the China threat was too successful, it would make it more difficult to justify harsher US actions against the Chinese bomb later. Though military action may have been preferable, the Soviets would not have cooperated. Political measures were the harshest form of action that could be undertaken jointly with the Soviets. The test ban was favored because it fit nicely with the broader and hawkish “containment with isolation” China policy. It tried to contain the Chinese bomb and if China did not join the test ban, such an agreement would further isolate China and would facilitate harsher

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621 Hilsman 1967, 297; Thomson 1972, 222.
622 Kennedy 1957.
measures against it. In contrast, the “carrots” aspect of the political action did not fit the hawkish China policy and consequently was dropped.

The test ban represented a middle ground between these international and domestic constraints. It was harsher than psychological measures (which were also employed), but soft enough that it could be implemented jointly with the Soviets. Test ban talks also had the advantage that they were already under way. The next two sections trace how the LTBT was negotiated and signed.

**The Road to the LTBT**

*Test Ban Talks*

The idea of a test ban originated with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and was introduced into American politics by Democratic presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson during the 1956 campaign. When Stevenson lost the election, the re-elected Eisenhower picked up the idea. Nonetheless, defense and deterrence remained more important in his national security policy than arms control. Moreover, many in his administration, like Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss, opposed a test ban because they saw testing as necessary for maintaining US nuclear superiority over the USSR. Eisenhower’s consensus-seeking leadership and deep suspicion of the USSR provided additional impediments to the achievement of a test ban.

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625 Kochavi 2002, 216.
626 Bundy 1988, 329.
627 Maddock 2010, 82.
628 Greene 2007.
Although in 1960 the superpowers came close to an agreement, when an American U-2 spy plane was shot down in Soviet airspace in May, test ban talks collapsed. The 1958 Soviet-American moratorium on testing remained the greatest arms control accomplishment of his administration. Eisenhower later acknowledged that the inability to achieve a test ban was “his greatest regret about his presidency.”629 But his efforts were not entirely in vain. In addition to the moratorium, Kennedy inherited a legacy of separation of test ban talks from the more elusive problem of general disarmament; a commitment to a test ban by a Republican war hero; and a well established diplomatic process to pursue it.630

Arms control is rarely a primary goal of a President, but for Kennedy this was the case. He was the driving force behind the US pursuit and eventual achievement of the LTBT.631 At the time of Kennedy’s inauguration test ban negotiations were deadlocked. He appointed Arthur Dean as the head of the US delegation at the Geneva test ban talks and made John McCloy his Special Adviser on Disarmament. Both were centrist Republicans, who enjoyed bipartisan respect. Kennedy also asked for the postponement of the Geneva talks from February 7 to March 21 1961 and charged McCloy with a detailed review of US arms control policy.632

By the time the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests resumed in March, Kennedy did his homework. While Eisenhower tabled no full draft treaty in Geneva, Kennedy did so less than three months after taking office. The US

629 Seaborg 1981, 10.
proposal in April contained several new elements, including increased duration for a moratorium on underground testing below the 4.75 seismic magnitude from two to three years; acceptance of a total test ban in space; reduction of control posts in the USSR from twenty-one to nineteen; and acceptance of the Soviet request for equal annual quota of twenty inspections for each original party to the treaty. In the meantime, McCloy carried on bilateral talks until September with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin. Kennedy also met with Khrushchev at the Vienna summit of June 3-4, 1961 where he personally raised the test ban issue and the China threat.

But these initial efforts were no more fruitful than those under Eisenhower. In Vienna, Khrushchev remained unresponsive to Kennedy’s concerns that China military development would upset the balance of power. Moreover, he suggested that test ban talks be merged again with the elusive disarmament talks, which would have made it harder to reach a test ban agreement. Kennedy concluded that, probably due to Chinese pressure, the Soviets lost interest in a test ban. The Soviets also rejected the April US proposal and held on to their position of an underground testing moratorium of 4-5 years, 15 control posts, and 3 annual on-site inspections. While the US and the UK saw international inspection and verification as crucial for a test ban, the Soviets considered them “legalized espionage” and opposed them. Bilateral talks between McCloy and Zorin did not bring much progress either.

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634 They also wanted control commissions to be supervised by a troika which gave equal say and veto power to Western, Communist, and neutral interests. Firestone 1999, 71,77; Kaysen 1999, 101.
In spite of this rocky start, Kennedy made clear that he was motivated to pursue these “perhaps uselessly prolonged efforts by the intense desire to do everything possible to assure that Communist China won’t have a bomb.” But his resolve was to be severely tested. On September 1 the Soviets decided to resume atmospheric testing. Not only that progress was not made, but even the moratorium inherited from Eisenhower came to an end. Kennedy was angry with the Soviets. Nonetheless, on September 3 he jointly submitted an atmospheric test ban proposal to Khrushchev with British Premier Harold Macmillan. The Soviets rejected it on September 9 and the US resumed underground testing six days later.

Test ban negotiations reconvened in Geneva on November 28, 1961 with a Soviet proposal that insisted on provisions that the Soviets knew the West found unacceptable. The Soviets were interested in scoring propaganda points and improving their image after the resumption of tests. Next spring Kennedy was pressured into atmospheric testing by the Pentagon and nuclear weapons laboratories, concerned that the US would fall behind in the nuclear race. Talks in the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests collapsed.

Test ban talks continued in March 1962 in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) under UN auspices. At the August 27 session the US and the UK jointly tabled two test ban treaty drafts, one comprehensive and one limited. Although they proposed a lower inspection quota than before (8-10), the Soviets rejected both

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637 Seaborg 1981, 168.
proposals. However, Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov proposed a moratorium on testing from January 1, 1963 and Kennedy supported it. Rusk saw this as a sign that Soviet positions on China were shifting and that Moscow may be more open to a test ban despite fierce criticisms from Beijing.\textsuperscript{638}

In October the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the superpowers to the nuclear brink. The peaceful resolution of the crisis and Chinese criticism of Khrushchev’s backing down, which they called a ‘Soviet Munich,’ reinforced Kennedy’s belief that China was more threatening:

“We would be far worse off—the world would be—if the Chinese dominated the Communist movement, because they believe in war as the means of bringing about the Communist world. Mr. Khrushchev’s means are destruction, but he believes that peaceful coexistence and support of these wars of liberation…will bring about our defeat. The Chinese Communists believe that by constantly hitting, and if war comes, a nuclear third world war, they can survive it anyway with 750 million people. So we are better off with the Khrushchev view than we are with the Chinese Communist view, quite obviously.”\textsuperscript{639}

National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy confided to John McCone, the head of the CIA, that Kennedy saw a nuclear China as the biggest problem facing the world which “would so upset the world political scene it would be intolerable to the United States and the West…”\textsuperscript{640} Bundy shared Kennedy’s fears of a nuclear China.\textsuperscript{641}

\textsuperscript{638} Burr and Richelson 2000, 68.
\textsuperscript{639} Kochavi 2002, 202; \textit{Public Papers of President Kennedy}, 17 December 1962, p. 900.
\textsuperscript{640} Memorandum for the record by McCon, 11 January 1963; see editorial note, \textit{FRUS, 1961-1963}, XXII, p. 339.
Meanwhile, intelligence reports estimated that the first Chinese nuclear detonation would occur sometime in the next two years. Together with the traumatic experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis, this gave the threat of a nuclear China unprecedented urgency. That time was running out became frequent in Kennedy’s speeches and played an important role in his determined quest for a test ban. Hoping to convince France to join a test ban, in January 1963 Kennedy told Andre Malraux, the French Minister of Culture, that a nuclear China would be a “great menace in the future to humanity, the free world, and freedom on earth,” because “the Chinese would be perfectly prepared to sacrifice hundreds of millions of their own lives if it were necessary in order to carry out their aggressive and militant policies.”

There is no doubt that the main motivation behind pursuing a test ban was the hope that it would inhibit Chinese nuclear efforts. Both Bundy and Rusk saw the test ban as important to counter this threat. At a January 22, 1963 National Security Council meeting Kennedy reiterated that the main purpose of a test ban from the American perspective was to stop or at least delay the Chinese bomb. The next day Harriman wrote a letter to Kennedy agreeing with his position. He also suggested that Moscow shared Kennedy’s perspective on the test ban and that Washington and Moscow “could compel China to stop nuclear development, threatening to take out the facilities if

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643 Seaborg 1981, 171.
necessary.” Kennedy was open to using military measures if the test ban failed to work.

A few days later Rusk on Meet the Press confirmed that a nuclear China “is one of the reasons why we are very much interested in such a thing as a nuclear test ban…” At a February 8, 1963 White House meeting, Kennedy reiterated that the test ban was important for its effect on nonproliferation, particularly that of China and “If it weren’t for this possible gain, it wouldn’t be worth the internal disruption, fighting with Congress, and so forth.” He was even willing to risk some Soviet cheating for the test ban. The Chinese had no doubt that the test ban was directed against their nuclear efforts and bitterly criticized it.

Yet in early 1963 a test ban still seemed remote. Khrushchev was bitter about a previous event. On December 19, 1962 he proposed a test ban to Kennedy, which allowed for an annual quota of 2-3 onsite inspections, a move that Khrushchev saw as a Soviet compromise. Kennedy knew that a proposal based on so few inspections would be rejected by Congress and on December 28 rejected the offer. Khrushchev was angry because he apparently thought that his offer was based on Arthur Dean’s and Science Advisor Jerome Wiesner’s hints in conversations with the Soviets earlier that year. It appears that, whether intentionally or not, the Soviets misinterpreted these

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648 Cited in Jones 2010, 418.
651 Lewis and Xue 1988, 193.
conversations. Additional impediments to a test ban were created by Soviet diplomats. On January 21 Semyon Tsarapkin told Dean that the Soviets insisted on nationally operated control posts, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated publicly that a test ban was impossible without the adherence of France. March 1963 brought another deadlock at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference.

At this point Kennedy became pessimistic regarding the chances of a test ban. But due to the urgency of stopping the Chinese bomb, he tried again. In April he used Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins’ visit to the Kremlin to explain to Khrushchev their previous misunderstanding. On April 15, Kennedy also sent Khrushchev a joint letter with Macmillan, proposing to move forward with test ban talks at a high level tripartite conference in Moscow. Khrushchev reluctantly agreed to Kennedy’s proposal on May 8. July 15, 1963 was agreed on as the starting date for the Moscow talks. On June 6 Beijing warned Moscow “against any agreement with the United States that would amount to depriving China of the right to equip itself with nuclear weapons.” The Soviets did not retract their conference invitation, but arranged for parallel Sino-Soviet talks.

To prepare the American public, on June 10 Kennedy gave an important speech at American University. Enmity does not last forever, he said, and no government was as

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654 Wenger and Gerber 1999, 472.
655 Mandelbaum 1979, 174.
evil to lack all virtue. The US fought no wars against the USSR and they even fought together during WWII. They shared interests, especially regarding arms control, where a fresh start was badly needed. Hence, the US would participate in test ban talks in Moscow. The speech increased public support for a test ban and was well received in the Kremlin. On July 2 Khrushchev signaled a new flexibility in the Soviet position. In an East Berlin speech he stated that the USSR preferred a comprehensive test ban treaty, but because the West would not agree to one without inspections, he was also open to a limited test ban treaty.

**Signing the LTBT**

Under-Secretary of State Averell W. Harriman and British Minister of Science Lord Hailsham (Quintin Hogg) started test ban negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on July 15. Khrushchev participated as well. The parties stated that they would have preferred a comprehensive test ban, but due to irreconcilable differences over inspection, they settled for the LTBT. The US was aware that this would have a weaker effect on Chinese proliferation, but it was better than no agreement. At the first meeting, Khrushchev tabled a limited test ban treaty draft and a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Harriman tabled the limited test ban treaty draft that the US and the UK proposed in Geneva in August 1962. The next ten days of negotiations hammered out the LTBT, which was very similar to the Western draft.

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658 Dean 1966, 98.
Khrushchev showed considerable flexibility by agreeing not to make the non-aggression pact and France’s adherence to the treaty conditions for the signing of the LTBT. But when Harriman brought up the issue of China, Khrushchev, in line with the established Soviet position,659 did not voice much concern.660 In response, Kennedy continued to express concern and sent a telegram to Harriman to explore other, possibly more aggressive actions against China, in case these become necessary:

“I remain convinced that Chinese problem is more serious than Khrushchev comments in first meeting suggest, and believe you should press question in private meeting with him. I agree that large stockpiles are characteristic of US and USSR only, but consider that relatively small forces in hands of people like ChiComs could be very dangerous to us all. Further believe even limited test ban can and should be means to limit diffusion. You should try to elicit Khrushchev’s view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness either to take Soviet action or to accept US action aimed in this direction.”661

Harriman was convinced that Khrushchev, like Kennedy, was interested in a test ban because of China. Since the Soviets were not able to make the Chinese join a test ban, they wanted to isolate them through such an agreement.662 During a reception at the Polish Embassy Gromyko’s wife told US Ambassador to the USSR Foy D. Kohler: “You tell Mr. Harriman that he has to do everything that is necessary to get this (test ban) treaty. We have to have this so that when those Chinese have their first nuclear explosion,

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we will have a basis on which to call them to account.”

Given that Soviet spouses did not play an important role in Soviet policy, the significance of this event should not be exaggerated. Indeed, Gromyko and Khrushchev were unwilling to discuss the issue, so Harriman could not pursue the possibility of harsher measures with them. Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin argued that the Soviets regarded the split as the result of Mao’s megalomania, and hoped that once he was out of the way Sino-Soviet relations would improve.

The main provision of the treaty, Article I, stated that each of the signatories “undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosions, or any other nuclear explosions, at any places under its jurisdiction or control” in the atmosphere, under water and outer space. It allowed underground testing provided it did not result in radioactive debris beyond the border of the testing state.

If preventing Chinese proliferation was the main reason for the test ban, then Chinese nuclear explosion would obviate such a ban. Thus, the US insisted on the inclusion of a withdrawal clause that allowed the US to leave the agreement if China went nuclear. This would also help the ratification of the treaty by Congress. To make the withdrawal clause more palatable to the Soviets, the US agreed to extend the treaty to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as well. There was some haggling over the wording of the withdrawal article, because the Soviets wanted to avoid explicit reference

665 Document 54, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 25, 1964, 1-3:30 p.m., Vol. XXX, China.
to a Chinese nuclear detonation. They preferred to put pressure on China indirectly, through the Afro-Asian bloc whose leadership China craved. In the end the agreed-on withdrawal clause (Article IV) stipulated that withdrawal was justified if a signatory “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”

In parallel with the test ban talks Sino-Soviet talks were held in Moscow between July 5 and 20. As these talks failed to improve relations between the two communist giants and collapsed on July 20, they cleared the way for a test ban treaty. Test ban negotiations ended on July 25. The test ban that seemed so elusive for so many years was achieved in ten days. The LTBT was initialed on July 25 and formally signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963 by Rusk, Gromyko, and British Foreign Minister Lord Home.

Kennedy felt very strongly about the LTBT and he did all he could to ensure its ratification by Congress. Reportedly he said that he “would gladly forfeit his re-election, if necessary, for the sake of the Test Ban Treaty.” He carefully selected influential Senators for the bipartisan delegation to the Moscow signing ceremony. He also reassured the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the LTBT would not hurt national security and their interests. He consented to a vigorous program of underground testing, improvement of US technical

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666 Seaborg 1981, 247; Dean 1966, 100. When China did finally detonate its first nuclear device more than a year later, none of the parties took advantage of the withdrawal clause.
668 Jacobsen and Stein 1966, 463.
equipment to monitor observance of the treaty, and readiness to resume atmospheric testing if the Soviets violated the LTBT.\textsuperscript{669}

Kennedy’s efforts were fruitful. On September 24 the US Senate ratified the treaty by 80 votes to 19. Kennedy signed the LTBT on October 7, which then entered into force on October 10. World opinion greeted the LTBT enthusiastically and the \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists} pushed back the Doomsday Clock from eight to twelve minutes to midnight.\textsuperscript{670}

\textbf{After the LTBT}

\textit{Considering Preventive Strikes}\textsuperscript{671}

By the end of the year more than a hundred states signed or acceded to the LTBT, except France, China and a few regimes friendly to China.\textsuperscript{672} Kennedy was angry with France and thundered that “Charles de Gaulle will be remembered for one thing only—his refusal to take that treaty.”\textsuperscript{673} Since China did not join the LTBT, the US remained concerned about a nuclear China. On 1 August Kennedy stated that with “700 million people, a Stalinist internal regime,…nuclear powers, and a government determined on

\textsuperscript{669} Kaysen 1999, 111.
\textsuperscript{670} Maddock 2010, 218.
\textsuperscript{671} Although decision makers conducted the discussion in terms of “preemption,” arguably “prevention” is the more appropriate term. Preemptive strikes refer to targeting an enemy which represents an imminent threat, while preventive strikes refer to targeting an enemy before it becomes an imminent threat. The US would strike against China before it could pose an imminent nuclear threat to the US.
\textsuperscript{672} Jacobson and Stein 1966, 464.
\textsuperscript{673} Kochavi 2002, 223.
war as a means of bringing about its ultimate success,” a nuclear China would result in an extremely dangerous situation.674

In addition to US prejudices which imputed aggressive intentions and occasionally irrationality to China, race amplified fears of a nuclear China in another way. If China broke the white nuclear monopoly, other non-white countries would also want the bomb. As a State Department memo put it: “The phenomenon of nuclear spread may come to have a racial aspect, with a widespread feeling that nuclear weapons, now in the hands of yellow men, can be in the hands of brown and black men.”675 Moreover, there was a sense that decolonization was increasing non-white influence in international politics at the expense of white powers. In this context, in the words of a briefing prepared for McNamara, “The Chinese test will represent probably the last opportunity for the Western world to determine the patterns for the evolution of world politics” (underlined in original).676

The Kennedy administration suspected that the LTBT may not be sufficient to stop Chinese proliferation,677 but hoped that it would facilitate the Soviet policy of non-assistance towards the Chinese nuclear program and would isolate China internationally.678 The latter expectation was only partially met. Afro-Asian countries

675 “Effects of the Chinese Bomb on Nuclear Spread,” November 2, 1964, Dept of State memo, DDRS.
676 Outline for Secretary’s Briefing Book, Memo for the Secretary of Defense, October 27, 1964, DDRS.
opposed proliferation, but they were also proud of China for breaking the white nuclear monopoly, which substantially decreased the isolating effect of the treaty.679

Since China was unwilling to join the LTBT, it was time to consider harsher measures.680 Both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations considered preventive strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities.681 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster recalled that Kennedy told the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Nogueira, that “the day [was] fast approaching [when] the West [would] have to decide whether to use the atomic bomb on China so as to prevent the Chinese from making atomic weapons.”682

The main preventive military actions considered were (1) overt action without specific justification; (2) covert action without specific justification; (3) overt action justified as response to Chinese aggression; and (4) overt action justified based on non-proliferation.683 Robert Johnson of the Policy Planning Council represented the moderate position in the debate about prevention. He advised against the first option because he considered that such an unprovoked military action would entail high political costs and

679 Outline for Secretary’s Briefing Book, Memo for the Secretary of Defense, October 27, 1964, DDRS.
680 For a good discussion see Burr and Richelson 2000.
682 Cited in Kochavi 2002, 220.

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military risks. Interestingly, he argued that any unprovoked prevention would be vulnerable to the charge of racism. 684

Covert action (option 2) would decrease political costs, but would only briefly delay a Chinese bomb and its feasibility was uncertain. The last option was more preferable because it would lower the political costs of prevention by further isolating Chinese nuclear efforts through arms control agreements. The problem was that non-proliferation agreements would take longer to achieve and in the meantime China may go nuclear. Robert Johnson argued that the third option, action taken in response to Chinese aggression, was the most preferable, because it would be politically the least costly.

While Robert Johnson represented the dovish camp, Henry S. Rowen of the International Security Affairs Office in the Department of Defense represented the hawkish camp. 685 The doves, he argued, underestimated the long-term implications of a nuclear China. Even in the short run nuclear weapons would make China more dangerous in Asia. But in the long run China would develop ICBMs and the US would become vulnerable to a Chinese nuclear attack. Robert Johnson’s moderate position missed the fact that even a small Chinese arsenal could be very destructive and threatening. In what harkened back to the idea of a China insensitive to human losses, the hawks argued that the US was far more vulnerable than China, because “we are likely to be more concerned about, say, the loss of our two or three largest cities than would be China with respect to

her’s.” The doves also overestimated the feasibility problems of military prevention, and underestimated the importance of delaying the Chinese bomb. Moreover, forceful action against China would also discourage nuclear proliferation by other states.

Although Bundy and others found Rowen’s argument powerful, eventually the moderate position won the day and no military action was taken. Rusk, McNamara and Bundy at a State Department lunch and then at a meeting with President Kennedy, decided that the US should not launch an unprovoked unilateral military action against China’s nuclear facilities. But they were favorable to prevention in response to Chinese aggression or if the US became engaged in military conflict with China. They were also open to joint action with the Soviets. The Soviets remained uninterested in harsher measures until the 1969 clashes with China and by then the US lost interest.

China detonated its first nuclear device on October 16, 1964. The PRC’s official statement called the LTBT “a big fraud,” reiterated the “paper tiger” view of the bomb, and declared a policy of non-first use. China restated its interest in the elimination of nuclear weapons, but until that was possible, Chinese nuclear capability was necessary in the struggle against imperialism. In a television interview Kennedy labeled the Chinese bomb an offense against humanity, which violated world consensus for the test ban.

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686 Analysis of Robert Johnson’s paper of 14 April 1964, ACDA memo, December 14, 1964, DDRS.
But much of the American official reaction, especially under President Johnson, took a moderate tone similar to earlier threat deflation propaganda.  

Between October 1964 and March 1972 the PRC conducted 14 nuclear weapons tests. As opposed to the Americans and the Soviets, the Chinese chose to keep their nuclear arsenal surprisingly small. Nuclear weapons not only did not make China more aggressive, but actually made it less aggressive and more cautious. The figure below shows that similar to most other states, but in contrast with the Soviet Union, China became significantly more peaceful after it acquired nuclear weapons.

Figure 4.2: China More Peaceful After Going Nuclear

690 Foot 1995, 183-4; NSF Country file, Box 22, C050-2, 16 Oct, 1964, LBJL.
693 Jones 2010, 449; Gavin 2009-10, 16.
694 Fearon January 29, 2012. A similar graph also shows that China not only was involved in fewer military disputes, but also initiated fewer disputes after going nuclear.
The 1972 Sino-American Rapprochement

A major event in the aftermath of the LTBT was the Sino-American rapprochement almost a decade later. One may wonder how, if US threat perceptions of China were inflated, was this improvement of relations possible. I contend that inflated threat perceptions do not necessarily imply conflict. They create certain dispositions but are not entirely determinate as to the particular behavior and need to rely on other factors to become determinate. To explain the broader US China policy we need to bring in domestic politics. The US continued to perceive China as threatening, just as it did earlier. But if inflated threat perceptions were channeled towards “containment with isolation” in the early 1960s, they were channeled towards “containment without isolation” a decade later. The main reasons were the bankruptcy of the “containment with isolation” policy and the weakening of the China lobby that championed it. The tide turned in favor of China policy revisionists.695

“Containment without isolation” gradually became the dominant revisionist China policy. In its 1965 report to the President, the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation argued that a nuclear China was the biggest problem facing non-proliferation efforts “because of their size, intransigence and isolation.”696 The proposed policy was to end the isolation of China by adopting “a ‘join first’ instead of ‘behave first’ position”. If the US was committed to nonproliferation, a major reconsideration of China policy was necessary.697

695 For the three main revisionist schools see Kochavi 2002, 248-9.
697 Goh 2005, 70.
Perhaps China could be told that joining the LTBT was a first step in its path towards responsible membership in the international community.\textsuperscript{698}

Amidst the shift towards more cooperative China policies the China threat remained strong. McNamara and later President Nixon justified the deployment of light Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems based primarily on the nuclear China threat.\textsuperscript{699}

Given overwhelming US nuclear superiority, such a position suggested underlying concerns of Chinese irrationality,\textsuperscript{700} which made deterrence unreliable. Indeed, McNamara argued that the ABM system would be useful “to limit damage to our Nation in the event of our offensive force failed to deter an ‘irrational’ aggressor”. That he had China in mind was implied as he added that the ABM system “could hold US fatalities below 1 million in face of primitive Chinese attack.”\textsuperscript{701} Similarly, President Johnson justified the build-up of troops in Vietnam based on the China threat,\textsuperscript{702} while in October 1967 Rusk infamously invoked the threat of a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{703}

\textsuperscript{698} Doc. 63, “Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” October 28, 1964, FRUS 64-8, XXX, China.
\textsuperscript{700} Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, 91\textsuperscript{st} Congress, second session, 1970, p. 172.
\textsuperscript{702} Peck 2006, 226.
\textsuperscript{703} Rusk 1990, 290.
Even if the China threat was employed purely instrumentally in some or all of these cases, it nonetheless shows that threat perceptions remained high. But in the absence of a strong China lobby these fears were channeled towards “containment without isolation.” In a 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article Richard Nixon argued that in the long run isolating China was not a viable solution because there was not enough room on the planet for a billion Chinese living in “angry isolation.” He dismissed the idea that the US should form an anti-Chinese alliance with the Europeans and the Soviets, as this would be seen as racist. Instead, he believed it was best “to pull China back in to the family of nations”. 704 A Lou Harris poll of June 1966 found that 57 percent of the public supported the recognition of China, while 43 percent opposed it. China was still perceived as aggressive, but the public concluded, perhaps due to China’s nuclear detonation, that it was here to stay and the threat it posed should be addressed by engaging, rather than isolating it. 705 More China-friendly policies also seemed attractive because they promised to help settle the Vietnam War. 706 Consequently, President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger orchestrated the Sino-American rapprochement.

**Classical Content Analysis**

This section employs classical content analysis to assess the extent to which the arguments made in this chapter are supported by evidence drawn from a more systematic sampling of texts. More specifically, it looks at three questions: 1) Is there evidence that

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706 Doc. 00307, 1974/08/14, People’s Republic of China, DNSA China and the US.
perceptions of the China threat were greater than those of the Soviet threat? 2) How does race hold up in comparison with alternative explanations? 3) Is there systematic evidence that the China threat was racial? As discussed in Chapter 3, classical content analysis can be helpful in answering such questions by providing word frequencies and concordances (the immediate textual context of relevant words). For example, if we find that “threat” is more frequently associated with China than with the Soviet Union, there are reasons to think that China was perceived as more threatening. While frequency tests can help us indirectly assess degrees threat perception, concordance tests can help us assess the nature of these perceived threats. Word frequencies and concordances can also give us an idea regarding the relative importance of alternative explanations.

Of course, classical content analysis has significant limitations. Concordances might not capture relative explanatory power, since correlation is not causation. Word frequencies can miss the importance of taboo topics, such as race. We must keep these limitations in mind as we evaluate the results below. Nonetheless, the large-N quantitative evidence analyzed by classical content analysis can still usefully complement the in-depth case study of this chapter.

In order to perform content analysis, I operationalized the relevant terms by building “content dictionaries”. Content dictionaries are a group of words, usually synonyms of the term we are interested in analyzing. In constructing content dictionaries I relied on my knowledge of the subject and the Thesaurus to put together a list of words that in my view could best capture the relevant terms. I built a content dictionary for race consisting of yellow, white, race, color, civilized, fanatic, irrational, Asiatic, and Oriental.
To minimize chances of overcounting race, I performed concordance tests and excluded non-racial occurrences (such as arms race) from the frequency test. The content dictionary of threat consists of threat, peril, danger, menace, aggression, conflict, fear, tension, violence, and war. To capture the threat perception of China and the Soviet Union, I performed a concordance test of “threat” and selected those instances where “threat” was associated with China or the Soviet Union. The frequencies and concordances together provide a useful depiction of American threat perceptions of China and the Soviet Union.

I also looked at word frequencies for the “Cuban missile crisis,” “proliferation,” and “fallout,” key words of alternative explanations for the LTBT. As discussed in the next section, these alternative explanations argue that the LTBT was not so much the result of racially inflated threat perceptions as of fears of nuclear proliferation more generally, fears of radioactive fallout due to atmospheric testing, and fears of a nuclear war amplified by the Cuban missile crisis. I coded most texts manually, except the journal articles, where I used the Yoshikoder software, as I did in Chapter 3. This gave me the chance to include in the frequency count most variants and synonyms of the key terms of alternative explanations, even though I did not construct separate content dictionaries for them.

I performed the content analysis on 150 systematically selected texts, including a broad range of newspaper articles, governmental documents, and journal articles for the period between January 1, 1961 and December 30, 1964 (see Appendix B). To select newspaper articles, I searched the Proquest Historical Newspapers database using four
search words: “threat,” “test ban,” “Communist China,” and “Soviet Union”. Of the 343 search results I selected the first 50, ordered by relevance. The articles come from four historical newspapers: The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, and the Chicago Tribune. To select journal articles, I searched the JSTOR database using the same four search words. Of the 122 search results, I selected the first 50, ordered by relevance. The selected articles come primarily from political science, international relations, and international law. Finally, to select governmental documents I searched the Proquest Congressional database with the same search words. I found only 2 congressional documents. I selected the rest of 48 governmental documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Since I was interested in American threat perceptions of both China and the US, I selected the following FRUS volumes between 1961 and 1963 (FRUS for the Kennedy years): Volume V The Soviet Union; Volume VII Arms Control and Disarmament; Volume VIII National Security Policy; and Volume XXII Northeast Asia (section on China). I searched for “threat” in each of these volumes and selected the first ten documents from Vols. V, VIII, and XXII. Because it is the most relevant for the subject matter of the chapter, I selected the first 18 documents from Volume VII to reach the limit of 50 governmental documents.

The results pertaining to the first question suggest that perceptions of China were greater than those of the Soviet Union. Although the frequency of the Soviet threat, especially in governmental documents, suggests that the Soviet Union was seen as a threat (not surprisingly for the Cold War), overall threat was more often associated with China (83) than with the Soviet Union (61) (see Table 4.1). Concordance tests suggest
that not only were threat perceptions of China higher than those of the Soviet Union, but their nature was also different. While both communist giants were seen as enemies of the “Free World,” Khrushchev was perceived as brutal but calculating, while Mao was perceived as a “madmen”. The intensity of the adjectives associated with the China threat (“vicious,” “aggressive,” and “fanatic,”) suggests that, with a few exceptions, it was seen as more dangerous than the one posed by the Soviets. The Chinese were perceived as convinced of the inevitability of (nuclear) war with the “imperialist West”. In contrast, the Soviets were perceived as an enemy which embraced “peaceful coexistence”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>China threat</th>
<th>Soviet threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal Articles</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Documents</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Content Analysis Threat Frequencies

Second, in the frequency test Race does respectably in absolute terms, but it is outperformed by two of three alternative explanations (see Table 4.2). In the aggregate, the Cuban missile crisis was the most frequently mentioned (114), closely followed by Proliferation (104). Race was third (84), just ahead of Fallout (74). Cuban missile crisis

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707 Some criticized explicitly the widespread view that the Chinese were the “bad” Communists, irrational and fanatic, while the Soviets were the “good” Communists (see Ford 1964; US, China, Russia: A Strange Triangle, Washington Post, October 18, 1964.)
performed best in all categories except governmental documents, where Proliferation was most frequently mentioned (64). Race performed worst in governmental documents (5), and best in journal articles (63). The respectable performance of Race suggests that while it may not be the primary explanatory factor of the LTBT, it played a sufficiently important role to be worth taking seriously. Admittedly, the results may have been influenced by the fact that in the absence of a content dictionary Yoshikoder undercounted the alternatives in the Journal articles. However, I suspect that the emerging taboo nature of race talk at the time contributed at least as much to the undercounting of race in these documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Proliferation</th>
<th>Fallout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Alternative Explanation Keyword Frequencies

Third, although the causal link between race and the China threat cannot be unequivocally established, there are some reasons to suspect its existence. Explicit rhetoric linking race to China threat is absent, not surprisingly, given emerging normative prohibition against racism. Although China was seen as vicious, aggressive, and fanatic, based on this sample of texts it is difficult to show that these features were seen as racial.
For example, President Johnson voiced concerns of a nuclear China, arguing that the four (white) nuclear powers (the US, the USSR, Britain, and France) were all “sober and serious states, with long experience as major powers in the modern world. Communist China has no such experience.” Whether China’s lack of sobriety and seriousness implied by this statement is inherent to the Chinese character, and hence racial, is impossible to tell. Yet the loose correlation between Race and the China threat frequencies suggests that a causal connection is plausible, even if explicit rhetoric does not connect the two (see Figure 4.3). Race and the China threat fall and rise together between 1961 and 1963. The dip from 1961 to 1962 is surprising. The shift away from race and the China threat to the Soviet threat may be due to Cuba. After 1963 somewhat surprisingly the China threat decreases slightly, while race continues to rise. Perhaps cooperation with the Soviets and the conclusion of the LTBT mitigated the China threat.

Figure 4.3: Correlation between Race and the China Threat

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In sum, classical content analysis provides evidence which suggests that 1) American threat perceptions of China were higher than those of the Soviet Union; 2) that race is an explanatory factor worth taking seriously, but it may not be the strongest explanation for the China threat and the LTBT; and 3) the link between race and the China threat cannot be unambiguously established, but is plausible. I hope that with the evidence provided by the case study above, and the discussion showing the lacunae of alternative explanations, the reader is persuaded that race played a role in inflating threat perceptions and facilitating the LTBT.

**Alternative Explanations**

One alternative explanation to the racial one provided in this chapter is that public fears of radioactive fallout led to the LTBT. The 1954 BRAVO test series of US hydrogen bombs, which contaminated the Japanese fishermen aboard the Lucky Dragon, mobilized international public opinion against atmospheric testing. The 1955 radioactive rain in Chicago did the same domestically. Furthermore, new research suggested that strontium-90 was found in milk due to testing, and this caused various diseases including leukemia, bone cancer, and genetic defects. In response, a grassroots anti-testing movement emerged, which included famous scientists like Linus Pauling and influential organizations like the Nuclear Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE). Kennedy himself referred to the danger of fallout when asking the Senate to ratify the LTBT.

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Fears of radioactive fallout were important in initiating test ban talks and the 1958 moratorium on testing.\textsuperscript{711} But there is little evidence that they played an important role in the achievement of the LTBT. The American public’s concerns over fallout actually decreased over time as information about it increased. If in 1958 less than a third of the public dismissed the danger of radioactive fallout, by 1961 two thirds did.\textsuperscript{712} Wide swings in public support for test cessation also suggest that the public could not have pressured the US government towards the LTBT. A majority of Americans approved of test cessation in November 1959 (77\%), disapproved between June 1961 (53\%) and March 1962 (67\%), and approved again in August 1963 (61\%).\textsuperscript{713} That support for test cessation was highest in 1959 and then increased again after the LTBT was signed suggests that the public followed, not pushed, Kennedy to the LTBT. After Kennedy’s American University speech in June 1963 unqualified public support for a test ban increased to 52 percent, and after the treaty was signed it increased to 81 percent.\textsuperscript{714} The media followed a similar trajectory, opposing a test ban in the late 1950s and supporting it after its signing.\textsuperscript{715} The high public support elicited by Kennedy’s efforts may have facilitated the ratification of the treaty by Congress. AEC Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg argues that congressional mail showed that fear of fallout was the primary factor in public support for the LTBT.\textsuperscript{716} Nonetheless, the empirical record shows little evidence that public concern of fallout was a prominent reason for Kennedy’s pursuit of a test ban.

\textsuperscript{711} Wittner 1997, 181-82, 414, chapter 18.
\textsuperscript{712} Boyer 1984, 823; Rosi 1965, 287.
\textsuperscript{713} Rosi 1965, 283.
\textsuperscript{715} Lepper 1971, 53; Terchek 1970, 70.
\textsuperscript{716} Seaborg 1981, 268-9.
Another explanation emphasizes the role of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The crisis, this explanation goes, created a political context favorable to test ban negotiations, by driving home the importance of nuclear cooperation between the superpowers to avoid nuclear holocaust. In a letter to Khrushchev Kennedy expressed his hopes that stepping back from the nuclear brink would facilitate progress on the test ban. Khrushchev responded two days later by suggesting that “we have now conditions ripe for finalizing the agreement on signing a treaty on cessation of tests of thermonuclear weapons.”

There is no doubt that the crisis created a “window of opportunity” for the test ban. The crisis probably contributed to Khrushchev’s December 19 proposal. But Kennedy’s rejection of this proposal and the obstructionist attitude adopted by Soviet diplomats in early 1963 effectively closed this window of opportunity. Without Kennedy’s growing concerns of Chinese nuclear detonation it is unlikely that he would have nonetheless persisted in his test ban efforts.

General fears of nuclear proliferation provide the strongest alternative explanation. It can account for much of the US persistence in pursuing a test ban. Kennedy repeatedly expressed his concerns regarding the danger of nuclear proliferation. His statement during the news conference of March 21 1963 is representative: “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the president of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons. I regard that as

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717 Wenger and Gerber 1999, 469.
720 Firestone 1999, 74; Bechhoefer 1972, 130.
the greatest possible danger…’”721 This fear was echoed by others in the administration. Harriman told Khrushchev in Moscow that “If no agreement is reached, then in a few years there might be ten or fifteen nuclear powers.”722 Kennedy’s instructions to Harriman before leaving for Moscow stated that a test ban was in US national interest in part because it was an “indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons.”723 Although members of the Kennedy administration did not think a test ban would stop nuclear proliferation, they hoped that it would slow it down.

Concerns of nuclear proliferation were certainly important drivers behind test ban efforts. But with respect to the timing of the LTBT, they are indeterminate. If the US was so concerned about nuclear proliferation, it is unclear why it did not push harder for the LTBT earlier, before France obtained the bomb in 1960. During the early years of the nuclear age the US was less concerned about nuclear proliferation.724 The empirical record shows that what made the issue a top national security priority was the fear of a nuclear China. It was not simply the threat of proliferation that led to the LTBT, important as that was, but the threat of Chinese proliferation. Without the racially inflated threat perceptions of the Kennedy administration explanations of the LTBT remain severely truncated. This chapter contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the LTBT and explores one way in which race matters in international politics.

723 He also mentioned that it was a first step towards stopping the arms race. Draft Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman), July 5, 1963, FRUS 1961-3, Vol. VII:769.
724 Mandelbaum 1979, 161.
Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter argued that racial prejudices inflated American threat perceptions and facilitated the achievement of the LTBT. In conformity with Hypotheses 2 and 3, racial prejudices pertaining to aggressive intentions and irrationality inflated American threat perceptions of a nuclear China. These racially inflated fears facilitated American efforts to work towards the LTBT, despite years of unproductive arms control negotiations. The Soviets, largely for strategic reasons, but to a lesser extent also because they shared racial fears of a nuclear China, cooperated with the US to bring about the LTBT. Although the LTBT ultimately did not inhibit the Chinese bomb, it facilitated détente and subsequent arms control agreements.
Open investment is the twin of free trade in American economic policy. After World War II the US had maintained one of the most open investment policies in the world, keeping restrictions at a minimum. During the second half of the 1980s this open investment policy was challenged by a flurry of Congressional bills proposing stricter regulations of foreign direct investment in the United States (FDIUS). These Congressional efforts led to the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment, which expanded federal authority to regulate foreign direct investment. For the first time in history, the President had discretionary power to screen and even block FDIUS on national security grounds broadly construed.

Why did Congress push for Exon-Florio, weakening America’s open investment policy? There is much agreement that Congressional action was driven by fears of Japanese FDIUS, but there is little agreement over the sources of this fear. Given that Japanese FDIUS was much smaller than European FDIUS in general and British FDIUS in particular, this fear is puzzling. Why did Americans perceive Japanese direct investment as more threatening than British direct investment, which was double the size? As discussed in more detail later, alternative explanations focusing on Pearl Harbor,

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725 A prior, smaller challenge to open investment occurred in the 1970s in response to Arab investment.
threat inflation by US industries, and the fast growth of Japanese investment are insightful, but incomplete, leaving room for a racial explanation.

This chapter argues that Congress weakened the open investment policy through Exon-Florio in response to the American public’s racially inflated threat perceptions of Japanese FDIUS. Japan’s impressive economic growth and its trade surplus with the US led to trade frictions. In the American mind these frictions activated the perception of Japan as a ‘Yellow Peril’. Based on racial prejudices underpinning this lens of perception, the American public imputed aggressive intentions and deviousness (Hypotheses 2 and 4) to the Japanese. Americans then perceived the smaller FDIUS from Japan, a non-white democratic ally, as more threatening than the larger FDIUS from Britain, a white democratic ally. By the late 1980s the ‘Yellow Peril’ trumped even the ‘Red Peril’ as Americans perceived Japan, their non-white democratic ally, as more threatening than the USSR, their white communist enemy. Due to differences in electoral incentives and institutional roles, Congress was more eager to act on these popular fears than the Executive. Although it could not be insensitive to public and Congressional pressure, the Executive used liberal free market rhetoric to justify its support for open investment. It successfully opposed the most restrictive Congressional bills, but eventually had to acquiesce to a watered-down Exon-Florio. The President’s support for open investment and subsequent selective application of Exon-Florio mitigated the extent to which the America’s open investment policy was undermined.

The argument does not imply that all those concerned about Japanese foreign investment did so because of racial prejudices. Unfortunately, a limitation of the analysis

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is that it cannot tell us precisely how important race is relative to alternative factors. The argument is only that race was an important contributor to the passage of Exon-Florio, not that it was more important than other factors. The argument also does not imply that race is necessary for inflated fears of foreign investment generally. These fears can have various other causes, such as nationalism or a history of conflict between host and source countries. 726

Although this case is consistent with the theoretical expectation that race inflates threat perceptions, it only partially meets another theoretical expectation: that of cooperation along the color line. Europeans’ threat perception of Japanese investment was also racially inflated, but transatlantic cooperation against Japan was modest, largely limited to policy coordination. More extensive cooperation was obstructed by a host of factors including heightened concerns of being perceived as racist, US liberalization efforts at the Uruguay Round negotiations of GATT, the liberal economic ideas prevalent in the Reagan Administration, and coordination problems among European states.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first part shows how race inflated US threat perceptions of Japanese FDIUS. It starts with a brief discussion of the “economic Yellow Peril”. The chapter continues by tracing how Japanese-American trade frictions activated prejudices of the ‘Yellow Peril’, rendering Japanese investment more threatening than European investment. US threat perceptions were inflated to such an extent that Japan came to be seen as more threatening than the USSR. The second part traces how this

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726 European concerns of American FDI in the 1960s and American concerns of European FDIUS in the late 19th century provide examples of how nationalism can inflate such threats (Wilkins 1989, 573-84; Reich 1989). Asian concerns of their markets being flooded by Japanese products in the 1970s were also inflated by World War II memories of Japanese atrocities.
racially inflated threat perception led to the Exon-Florio Amendment. The chapter concludes with a discussion of alternative explanations and the limitations of the argument.

RACE INFLATES US THREAT PERCEPTIONS OF JAPANESE FDIUS

The “Economic Yellow Peril”

Western concerns about the ‘economic Yellow Peril’ can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{727} This perceived peril came in two versions. The first, touched upon in Chapter 3, was the economic peril of ‘Oriental’ immigration.\textsuperscript{728} Allegedly due to racial characteristics, inferior non-whites were better adapted to inferior living conditions and mechanized production. ‘Oriental’ laborers could work more for less, posing a severe challenge to the welfare and even the survival of white laborers. Once they monopolized a sector of the economy, their racial solidarity facilitated collusion to raise wages. The competition was unfair and whites had to be protected. The “silent invasion” of ‘Oriental’ laborers could be stopped only by prohibiting Oriental immigration to the US altogether. With the 1924 immigration law excluding ‘Oriental’ immigrants from the US, this version of the ‘Yellow Peril’ receded.

This chapter focuses on the second version of the ‘economic Yellow Peril’, economic competition from the Orient.\textsuperscript{729} The dominant fear was not of ‘Oriental’ immigrants, but of inexpensive ‘Oriental’ products. ‘Oriental’ industrialization, in conjunction with cheap and abundant labor, would flood Western markets with goods at

\textsuperscript{727} Pearson 1893, 100-101; 133-41; Wilkinson 1991, 126-7.  
\textsuperscript{728} Thompson 1978, chapter 4.  
\textsuperscript{729} Thompson 1978, chapter 5.
the expense of white producers. In the case of Japan this perceived peril was amplified by the racial prejudices of devious and aggressive Japanese (businessman), traits which made Japanese economic competition especially formidable. By 1893-1894 the US Congress considered the protection of the American silk and camphor industries from Japanese competition.\textsuperscript{730} Following Japan’s victory over Russia in the 1904-5 war, Roosevelt warned that soon the West “would dread the economic power of Japan more than that of any current industrial rival.”\textsuperscript{731}

Although in the US prejudices of Japanese aggressiveness and deviousness were reinforced by Pearl Harbor, in the West more generally they preceded this historical event by centuries. As early as 1580 the Italian Jesuit Alessandro Valignano noted that the Japanese “are the most false and treacherous people of any known in the world.”\textsuperscript{732} More than three centuries later, these prejudices were alive and well. In 1902 one British observer explained the Western prejudice of Japanese deviousness as an overgeneralization from the realm of business. Because being a merchant in Japan was “formally the lowest of the respectable callings” it was hard to find “a very high standard of business morality.” English and American businessmen only interacted with these supposedly immoral Japanese businessmen, hence they thought of all Japanese as “dishonest, tricky and altogether unreliable…”\textsuperscript{733}

Western prejudices of Japanese aggressiveness can be traced back to perceptions of the Japanese “warrior trader” and “soldier-bureaucrat.” This prejudice was reinforced

\textsuperscript{730} Thompson 1978, 145,158.
\textsuperscript{731} Cited in Thompson 1978, 170.
\textsuperscript{732} Cited in Littlewood 1996, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{733} A.M. Bacon, \textit{Japanese Girls and Women}, Boston, 1902, p. 262; cited in Wilkinson 1991, 120; interestingly, Bacon did not extend this characterization to the Chinese.
when Japan aggressively pushed into Western markets in the 1930s. During the Great Depression of 1929-32, in contrast with other industrialized nations, Japan registered an increase in exports and foreign market share. Western businessmen reacted vehemently, denouncing Japanese exports as a “swelling tide of yellow trade,” “unfair competition,” “new yellow peril” and the “menace of a sharp inrush of Japanese goods”. A similar minor wave of “economic Yellow Peril” occurred in Europe in the 1950s, but it failed to take off because Japan was a Western ally and China represented the real “Yellow Peril”. It was not until the 1970s, after the Sino-American rapprochement, that American perceptions of the Japanese “Yellow Peril” were activated by trade frictions. The next section discusses how this happened.

**US-Japanese Trade Frictions Activate Prejudices Underlying the Japanese ‘Yellow Peril’**

After Japan’s defeat in the “war without mercy,” the racial fears and hatreds of World War II faded into the background. Japan became America’s Cold War ally against the Soviet Union. Although race continued to mediate Japanese-American relations, the ‘Yellow Peril’ temporarily gave way to racial paternalism, with Japan in the role of a “good pupil” to be guided to democratic and capitalist maturity. During the same period, as discussed in Chapter 4, China was perceived as the nuclear “Yellow Peril”. But

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735 Dower 1986.
736 US Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., *Hearings to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in that Area*, 1951, pt. 1:312-13, cited in Dower 1986, 303. This racial paternalism overlapped with the gendered image of Japan as a subservient geisha, further mitigating American racial fear of and hostility towards Japan (Shibusawa 2006).
the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement and China’s responsible behavior as a nuclear power discredited these racially inflated threat perceptions. Meanwhile, the Japanese economy’s meteoric rise and ballooning trade surplus with the US caused trade frictions. These re-activated American racial fears of Japan and transposed the ‘Yellow Peril’ from China to Japan. This time around, however, Japan was an “economic Yellow Peril,” rather than the “immigration Yellow Peril” of the early twentieth century or the “military Yellow Peril” of World War II.

After World War II the Japanese economy lay in shambles. For resource-poor Japan the best solution for economic recovery was export-led growth. Stimulated by the industrial policy of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and access to the American market, from 1949 to 1973 Japanese exports grew by 14.7 percent and real GNP by 9.5 percent per year.\textsuperscript{737} Japan’s GNP surpassed Britain’s in 1967, France’s in 1968, and West Germany’s in 1969. In 1970 Japan became the world’s third largest economy with $200 billion, after America’s $932 billion and the USSR’s $600 billion.\textsuperscript{738} “If the present Japanese expansion of production continues,” Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige warned, “it will be, in 20 years, a greater industrial power than the United States.”\textsuperscript{739}

After 1965 Japan’s chronic trade deficit with the US was replaced by a chronic trade surplus. A frustrated Nixon referred to Japanese diplomats as “little Sony salesman” and threatened to apply import tariffs under the Trading with the Enemy Act “only for

\textsuperscript{737} Watts et al 1979, 7.
\textsuperscript{738} Japan was only 19\textsuperscript{th} measured by GNP per capita. See “Toward the Japanese Century,” Time, March 2, 1970.
\textsuperscript{739} Cited in White 1985.
textiles—i.e., Japs,” sparing the Europeans.\footnote{Cited in Schaller 1997, 212, 235; Haldeman notes, Aug. 14, 1971, WHSF, Nixon Project. In 1971, upset that the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported bad economic news, Nixon instructed his aide Frederick Malek to purge the ‘Jewish cabal’ there (Schaller 1997:234). Although the dissertation focuses on Asian racial Others, there is an interesting study to be written on Israel as the racial Other.} Kissinger was recorded telling the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Japanese are “mean and treacherous”.\footnote{Cited in LaFeber 1997, xxi.} This trade surplus increased substantially under President Ronald Reagan, whose fiscal expansion and monetary contraction raised the value of the dollar, making US exports less competitive. American cumulative foreign trade deficit during the 1980s totaled $1 trillion, about half of it with Japan. High interest rates attracted Japanese capital, which in effect financed America’s deficit spending. By 1986 Japan replaced the US as the world’s biggest creditor, while the US became the world’s biggest debtor. To decrease the growing trade deficit and protect threatened industries, the US pressured Japan into a series of ‘voluntary’ export restraints (VERs) first in textiles, then in steel, televisions, automobiles, and many others. Despite these agreements, Japanese-American trade frictions proliferated.

Frequent and persistent trade frictions activated the racial prejudices underpinning the ‘Yellow Peril’. Americans imputed aggressive and devious intentions to Japanese in general and Japanese businessmen in particular. Imputed deviousness was visible in extreme versions of ‘Japan, Inc’. This pejorative label was coined in the 1960s in the business press to refer to collusion among private and public actors in Japan to promote exports and protect domestic markets from foreign competition. Extreme versions of Japan, Inc. explained Japanese economic success as a function of “scheming, conniving, treacherous or playing by immoral rules in the frantic equation of economic competition
with war.” In this view, the liberal economic system built on openness and fair competition was taken advantage of by a closed and unfair trader, Japan. Some even argued that Japanese culture was incompatible with the liberal economic order, thus Japan could not partake in it without losing what made it “genuinely Japanese.”

Prejudices of Japanese aggressiveness were also widespread. A 1970 *Time* article explained that the Japanese businessman was the descendant of the “warrior-trader, who began plundering Asia as early as the 14th century,” and the “soldier-bureaucrat who went to war a generation ago to develop a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’.” A 1971 *Time* story transposed to Japanese businessmen elements of the ‘Yellow Peril’ applied to Chinese soldiers during the Korean War. It was now Japanese businessmen who constituted “the human sea” and employed “human-sea tactics” as they ‘flooded’ foreign markets and ‘drowned’ foreign businessmen. It further explained that, because Japan “has been shaped by Oriental history and psychology,” it engaged in “inscrutable economics.” The article cited a member of the Nixon Cabinet, most likely Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans: “The Japanese are still fighting the war, only now instead of a shooting war it is an economic war. Their immediate intention is to try to dominate the Pacific and then perhaps the world.”

The racial prejudices underpinning the perception of Japan as an “economic Yellow Peril” were reinforced by newspapers and books. A systematic survey of the *New York Times* between 1975 and 1995 reveals that trade frictions were regularly described

743 Prestowitz 1988, 313.
in terms of “trade war,” “crossed swords,” “bloody battle,” “weapons,” and “retaliation.”746 Scholars concurred that the Japanese were “targeting one American industry after another for destruction” in what was “an effort to continue fighting World War II through economic aggression.”747 Bestsellers such as Herman Kahn’s 1971 The Emerging Japanese Superstate and Ezra F. Vogel’s 1979 Japan as Number One: Lessons for America depicted a powerful Japan which could threaten American primacy. Book titles such as Japan: The Planned Aggression, The Japanese Threat, The Japanese Industrial Challenge, Japan: Monster or Model, and Stop the Japanese Now captured the rising alarm that Japan engendered.748 While American bestsellers about Japan in the 1950s and 1960s focused on geishas and cherry blossoms, those in the 1970s and 1980s switched to shoguns and ninjas.749 Michael Crichton’s 1992 bestselling docu-novel, Rising Sun, explained Japanese economic success based on “a new kind of trade—adversarial trade, trade like war, trade intended to wipe out the competition—which America has failed to understand for several decades.”750

Consistent with these fears, American public opinion was increasingly leery of Japan. A Louis Harris survey in 1971 found that 25 percent of Americans agreed with the statement that “Orientals, including the Japanese, are sly and devious—we should never trust them or rely on them as allies” and 50 percent agreed that “the Japanese economic advance is so great it now poses a serious economic threat to Western countries,

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746 Luther 2001, 144.
750 Crichton 1992, 347.
including the US.”\textsuperscript{751} Although Americans considered Japan to be more reliable than other Asian states, 54 percent still thought the Japanese were sly, 35 percent that they were treacherous, and 37 percent that they were deceitful.\textsuperscript{752} Trade frictions activated and further amplified these negative attitudes.\textsuperscript{753}

Politicians came to see trade frictions as a trade war against a devious and aggressive Japan, and made increasingly violent statements in response. In 1982 the Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill, asserted that if he were President he would “fix the Japanese like they’ve never been fixed before”. Secretary of Commerce William Verity referred to “the Japs” in a speech before departing to Tokyo for his first round of 1987 trade negotiations.\textsuperscript{754} California Senator Peter Wilson argued that the US was “at war with Japan”.\textsuperscript{755} Another Senator called the Japanese decision to increase automobile exports to the US “an economic Pearl Harbor”; a White House staff member stated that “The next time B-52s fly over Tokyo, we better make sure they carry bombs.”\textsuperscript{756}

If Japan’s economic success was perceived as an external threat to the US, the economic success of Japanese Americans was perceived as an internal threat to white Americans. A 1971 \textit{Newsweek} article made the point that Japanese Americans “not only have outshone their minority groups but…have ‘outwhited’ the whites.”\textsuperscript{757} Coupled with

\textsuperscript{751} Cited in Glazer 1975, 142-143.
\textsuperscript{752} Watts et al 1979,41-47.
\textsuperscript{753} Kunkel 2003, 341.
\textsuperscript{754} \textit{Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly},’ October 26, 1987.
\textsuperscript{755} Burstein 1988, 86.
\textsuperscript{756} Dower 1986, 314.
Japanese-American trade frictions, this resulted in a wave of hate crimes against Asian Americans.\textsuperscript{758}

Although the racial prejudices underlying the “economic Yellow Peril” were based on a kernel of truth, they distorted perceptions, leaving many with a reality selected for them by their stereotypes.\textsuperscript{759} Revisionists and proponents of the developmental state identified unfair and aggressive Japanese economic practices.\textsuperscript{760} Nonetheless, explaining Japan’s economic success based on such unfair and aggressive practices is exaggerated. The bilateral trade imbalance was caused by macroeconomic factors facilitated by “Reaganomics”. Japanese aggressive targeting of foreign markets and ‘devious’ informal trade barriers such as product standards, collusive business practices, and government procurement practices did exist, but accounted for a relatively small portion of the trade deficit.\textsuperscript{761} It is instructive that many of the “unfair” and “aggressive” economic practices used to explain Japan’s economic success in the 1980s were later employed to explain Japanese economic failure.

Economics Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson saw racism underneath the trade friction and stated that “Ugly racism has to be fought, in the economic as well as political and social spheres.”\textsuperscript{762} Nonetheless, many found it convenient to believe that the trade deficit was rooted in ‘Oriental’ deviousness and aggressiveness.\textsuperscript{763} As late as 1985

\textsuperscript{758} Worsnop and Leepson, 1991.
\textsuperscript{759} Littlewood 1996, xiii.
\textsuperscript{762} Samuelson 1971.
\textsuperscript{763} Howe 1988; Johnson 1975, 97.
Theodore White warned in an influential *New York Times* piece entitled “The Danger from Japan” that “the Japanese are on the move again in one of history’s most brilliant commercial offensives” to conquer world markets. Their weapons were aggressive targeting of American industries, devious trading practices, supported by the “gift of genetics”—outstanding intelligence. Some, like U. Alexis Johnson, a former US ambassador to Japan, criticized the conception of international trade as “a form of warfare,” as well as blaming only Japan for the bilateral trade deficit. But such arguments did little to allay public alarmism about Japan.

Consistent with the main argument of this section that trade frictions activated the ‘Yellow Peril,’ Californian Congressman Robert Matsui noted: “There is latent anti-Asian sentiment in this country. The trade imbalance is merely the trigger.” Japan, which was not exempt from racism either, lamented that “Caucasians are prejudiced against Orientals…virulent racism underlies trade friction with the United States.” In contrast, America’s second largest trade deficit was with Canada, but this did not cause much alarm.

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766 Wong 1986.
767 In 1982 a Japanese official explained that “the Japanese are a people that can manufacture a product of uniformity and superior quality because the Japanese are a race of completely pure blood, not a mongrelized race as in the United States.” (cited in Dower 1986, 315). Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone told LDP members in 1986 that US intellectual level was inferior to that of Japan because American society had many blacks, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans (cited in Burstein 1988, 73).
769 McCulloch 1988, 311.
Japanese FDIUS as ‘Economic Yellow Peril’

This section shows that threat perceptions of Japanese FDIUS were racially inflated. First, it demonstrates that there was a large gap between the high levels of threat perception and low levels of (Japanese) investment. Second, Japanese FDIUS was perceived as more threatening than European FDIUS, even though it was smaller. Third, it shows that Japanese FDIUS was not substantially different from European or Canadian FDIUS and did not pose a serious threat to American welfare and sovereignty. Fourth, it shows that security threats of Japanese FDIUS were inflated to the degree that the US perceived Japan as more threatening than the USSR. Finally, it provides evidence of racial rhetoric surrounding Japanese investment.

Inflated Threat Perceptions: High Threat Perception, Low (Japanese) Investment

Before delving into a discussion of inflated threat perception of FDI, it may be helpful to briefly define FDI. Foreign investment can be direct or indirect (also called portfolio). Foreign direct investment is “the ownership of assets in one country by residents of another for purposes of controlling the use of those assets,” while indirect or portfolio investment is “the establishment of a claim on an asset for the purpose of realizing some return.”770 Foreign direct investment tends to take the form of ownership of factories, warehouses, real estate, and assembly plants, while foreign indirect investment tends to take the form of stocks, bonds and Treasury securities. What ultimately distinguishes direct from indirect investment is control. In practice it may be

difficult to assess whether foreign investors have actual control over assets. I use the conventional definition of the Department of Commerce, according to which foreign investment qualifies as direct if a foreign investor (including an associated group) owns at least 10 percent of the investment.\textsuperscript{771} From the perspective of the US, foreign direct investment can be US direct investment abroad (USDIA) or foreign direct investment in the United States (FDIUS). This chapter focuses primarily on the latter.

Beginning in the late 1970s foreign investment in the US underwent a surge as a consequence of high interest rates, US tax reform, the threat of protectionism, and the increased competitiveness of foreign companies. Total foreign investment in 1989 was $2 trillion, of which only $400 billion was direct investment.\textsuperscript{772} Although not trivial, FDIUS accounted for a relatively small share of the US economy. In 1988 total FDIUS amounted to 4.1 percent of total US employment and 4.1 percent of the GDP. Foreigners owned between 4 and 5 percent of total assets in the US, while the Japanese owned less than 1 percent. Although FDIUS grew faster than USDIA, it remained smaller than USDIA until 1989 in book value and after that in market value.\textsuperscript{773} Because the share of FDIUS in the economy remained among the lowest of industrial countries, Commerce Under-Secretary

\textsuperscript{771} Jackson CRS report, 1991, 1. Although one may question the extent to which a 10 percent ownership of an asset provides control, most foreign investors in the US own 80\% of their assets, so this should not be a major problem with the definition (Froot 1991, 6).


\textsuperscript{773} Book value refers to the original cost of the asset, while market value refers to the current price at which investors would trade the asset. Because USDIA was older than FDIUS, it was undervalued in terms of book value. At the end of 1989, the book value of FDIUS was $390.1 billion, while that of USDIA was $359.2 billion. Conservative estimates of the Federal Reserve assigned a market value to USDIA of $750 billion, while valuing FDIUS at $450 billion (Whalen 1990, 70-2; see also Statement of Elliot L. Richardson, US Congress, June 13-July 31 1990, p. 140).
for Economic Affairs Robert Ortner considered complaints about foreign investment “exaggerated, to some degree misplaced, perhaps even chauvinistic.”

Despite relatively low levels of foreign investment, public opinion polls showed high levels of threat perception. As early as 1981, 47 percent of the public was “extremely concerned” about total foreign investment. Roper Organization polls found that, even when told that American economic prosperity depended on continuing investment, the majority of respondents throughout the 1980s opposed raising foreign capital for investment. The public was especially worried about FDIUS, despite its accounting for only 17 percent of total foreign investment. In a 1988 poll taken for The International Economy, 74 percent of respondents believed that FDIUS threatened US economic independence, 78 percent supported legislation to curtail foreign ownership of businesses and real estate, and 89 percent wanted foreign investors to register with the government.

Inflated threat perceptions were facilitated by imagined uncertainty regarding data on foreign investment. “No one knows how much foreign investment there is in the United States,” critics of (Japanese) FDIUS worried. Detailed studies show that much of this uncertainty, especially those based on fears of underreporting, was exaggerated. For example, studies of FDIUS in real estate estimated that the value of unreported real estate does not exceed 2 percent of the total value of reported foreign real estate holdings.

775 See public surveys discussed in DeSouza 1994, 79.
776 Cited in DeSouza 1994, 81.
777 Some critics also worried about Japanese portfolio investment (Frantz and Collins 1989:9, 20). For the inflated nature of this threat see Jackson’s February 15 1990, CRS report.
779 Frantz and Collins 1989, 7; see also Tolchin and Tolchin 1988, 6.
There was also plenty of data on FDIUS, with a GAO report in 1989 identifying 15 agencies which collected such data.\footnote{Graham and Krugman 1995, 30; US Congress, October 17, 1990, p. 8. Much BEA data was somewhat inaccurate in that it assigned all of the investment of a firm to the main industry of the firm, even if that firm invested in several different industries. This resulted in inaccuracies at lower levels of aggregation, but showed accurately the overall level of FDIUS.}

*Lower Japanese FDIUS Was Perceived as More Threatening than Higher European FDIUS*

Although FDI is often perceived as highly threatening because it is visible and “constitutes a foreign-controlled economic presence within a sovereign state,”\footnote{Kudrle and Bobrow 1982, 353.} a closer look reveals that the American public was not equally concerned about all FDIUS. Instead, Americans worried primarily about Japanese investment. For example, a 1988 Roper Organization poll found that while a majority of Americans were comfortable with Canadian and European investment, only a minority was comfortable with Asian investment. Since non-Japanese Asian investment was minuscule at the time, we can safely infer that concerns regarding Asian FDIUS referred to Japan. This was neither an isolated incident, nor a fleeting phenomenon. A similar CBS News/NYT/TBS survey two years later found that while a majority of respondents worried that Japanese foreign investment posed a threat to American economic independence, only a minority held such worries about the much larger European investment (see Table 5.1).
### Table 5.1: Japanese FDI Perceived as More Threatening than European and Canadian FDI\(^{782}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polls</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>March 31, 1988</strong> Roper Organization</td>
<td>73% of Americans were comfortable with Canadian investment and 54% were comfortable with European investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 5-8, 1990 CBS News/New York Times/Tokyo Broadcasting System</strong></td>
<td>37% of Americans perceive European investment as a threat to American economic independence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numerous surveys found additional evidence of inflated fears of Japanese investment. A 1987 survey revealed that 53 percent of respondents would oppose the Japanese acquisition of one of the ten largest American manufacturing plants, and 65 percent would oppose the Japanese acquisition of one of the ten largest American banks.\(^{783}\) A 1988 CBS News/Tokyo Broadcasting System poll found that 64 percent of Americans believed that Japanese investment in real estate and farms posed a threat to American economic independence.\(^{784}\) In addition, 72 percent of Americans said that Japanese investment in American real estate and land “bothered” them, while 73 percent agreed with the statement that “If the US government doesn’t do something soon, the Japanese will end up owning most of this country.”\(^{785}\)

Japan’s higher (typically informal) barriers to foreign investment may have contributed to the American public’s concerns about Japanese FDIUS, assuming that the public was aware of it. If Japanese FDIUS was high, this would have been a legitimate

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\(^{784}\) CBS News/Tokyo Broadcasting System Poll, May 14-17, 1988, Japan and the US, question 30.

\(^{785}\) CBS News/NYT/Tokyo BS poll, June 5-8 1990, questions 20-23, 47, 48, and 50.
cause for concern. However, it is not entirely clear why Japanese barriers to foreign investment would make it more threatening than European investment, given that Japanese FDIUS was modest.

In contrast with high threat perceptions, Japanese direct investment was low. Japanese FDIUS amounted to no more than 1 percent of total US assets at the time. Initially public threat perceptions were narrowly focused on Japanese investment, but by the late 1980s and early 1990s they cast a shadow over American views of Japanese-American relations in general.786 “The most extraordinary thing about Japanese investment in the United States during the 1980s,” wrote one scholar, “is the amount of attention it has attracted relative to the actual level of holdings of US assets by Japanese investors.”787 Striking a similar tone, former Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson lamented that “Japan is popularly vilified as the chief foreign ‘invader’ even though its direct investments in the US amount to half the British total and about the same as the Dutch.”788 One state official involved in a controversy over Japanese ownership of American farmland noted that when Europeans were buying it was never an issue.789

What explains this variation in American public threat perception of FDIUS? Why was Japanese FDIUS perceived as more threatening than the larger European FDIUS? For example, of the $329 billion of total foreign investment in 1988, $216.4 billion came from Europe ($102 billion from Britain), while only $53.4 billion originated

788 Felsenthal 1990, 358.
789 Tolchin and Tolchin 1988, 43.
in Japan. Although the gap narrowed over time, in 1988 at $95.7 billion British FDIUS was twice as large as the $51.1 billion Japanese FDIUS (see Table 5.2). European FDIUS was also older and was undervalued in terms of book value. When adjusted for inflation and market value appreciation, not only British, but also Dutch FDIUS surpassed Japanese FDIUS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Holland</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>14.0 (16.6)</td>
<td>19.1 (25.0)</td>
<td>12.2 (14.4)</td>
<td>4.7 (6.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>18.6 (17.2)</td>
<td>26.8 (24.9)</td>
<td>12.1 (11.0)</td>
<td>7.7 (7.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>28.4 (23.0)</td>
<td>26.2 (21.0)</td>
<td>11.7 (9.3)</td>
<td>9.7 (7.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>32.2 (24)</td>
<td>29.2 (21.3)</td>
<td>11.4 (8.2)</td>
<td>11.3 (8.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>38.4 (23.3)</td>
<td>33.7 (20.5)</td>
<td>15.3 (9.3)</td>
<td>16.0 (9.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>43.6 (23.9)</td>
<td>37.1 (19.7)</td>
<td>17.1 (9.1)</td>
<td>19.3 (10.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>55.9 (25.4)</td>
<td>40.7 (18.5)</td>
<td>20.3 (9.2)</td>
<td>26.8 (12.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>75.5 (28.7)</td>
<td>46.6 (17.7)</td>
<td>24.7 (10.1)</td>
<td>34.4 (13.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>95.7 (30.4)</td>
<td>48.1 (15.3)</td>
<td>26.6 (8.4)</td>
<td>51.1 (16.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>105.5 (28.2)</td>
<td>56.3 (15.1)</td>
<td>28.7 (7.7)</td>
<td>67.3 (18.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>108.1 (26.8)</td>
<td>64.3 (15.9)</td>
<td>27.7 (6.9)</td>
<td>83.5 (20.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: Direct Investment Position in the United States by Country of Ultimate Beneficial Owner, 1980-90 (in billions of US dollars) and percentage of total stock in parentheses.

Much of the explanation for variation in American threat perception can be explained by particular features of Japanese FDIUS. As Table 5.2 shows, Japanese FDIUS grew faster than FDIUS coming from other states. In 1980 Japan was the sixth

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largest investor in the US, but by 1989 it ranked second after Britain. Undoubtedly, this explains an important part of inflated American threat perceptions.

Although this explanation is very powerful, as discussed later in the chapter, it does not capture the whole story. The next three sections provide evidence that threat perceptions of Japanese investment were racially inflated. I first show that Japanese investment was similar to European and Canadian investment and did not pose a serious threat to American welfare and sovereignty. Next, I show that Americans perceived Japan as more threatening than the USSR, its Cold War archenemy. The last section discusses evidence of racial rhetoric surrounding Japanese FDIUS. I hope that together these sections make a convincing case for race.

*Japanese FDIUS: Neither Fundamentally Different nor Threatening*

If Japanese investment was fundamentally different and harmful to the US, then even low levels of it would have justified high threat perceptions. Indeed, at the heart of inflated threat perceptions of Japanese FDIUS was the perception that Japanese investment was fundamentally different than European and Canadian investment. While US affiliates of British, Dutch, and Canadian firms were expected to behave like American firms, those of Japanese firms were perceived as aggressive and devious and were expected to behave in different and harmful ways. Indicative of this sentiment, Richard Lamm, the Democratic governor of Colorado, considered Japanese investments “Faustian bargains,” while the late CIA director William Casey believed they served as a
“Trojan horse”.\textsuperscript{791} This section shows that Japanese FDIUS was neither substantially different from European and Canadian investment nor threatening to American economic welfare and political sovereignty.

**Perceived Economic Threats: Becoming Japan’s Colony**

The three main perceived economic threats were that Japanese investment would provide lower quality jobs, it would increase the trade deficit, and it would result in the Japanese buying up the country. The first two perceived threats centered on the concern that Japanese FDIUS was fundamentally different from European and Canadian FDIUS. Unlike these, which substituted for exports to the US, Japanese FDIUS would facilitate such exports.\textsuperscript{792} Japanese FDIUS would consist of “screwdriver operations,” which would function as trading branches, assembling products from components made in Japan and then selling them on the American market.

The first concern about such “screwdriver operations” was that Japanese FDIUS would provide low skill and wage jobs to Americans, while keeping the good manufacturing jobs at home. Over time, the US would be “de-industrialized” and would become Japan’s economic colony.\textsuperscript{793} In fact, the empirical record shows that, due to their concentration in high-wage industries and the acquisition of large US companies which paid higher than average wages, US affiliates of foreign-owned companies tended to

\textsuperscript{791} Felsenthal 1990, 356.
\textsuperscript{792} In Japanese economist Koyoshi Kojima’s terminology, Japanese FDI was trade-creating, whereas American FDI was trade-destroying (Reich 1996, 41).
\textsuperscript{793} Glickman and Woodward 1989, 121; Frantz and Collins 1989, 169; Tolchin and Tolchin 1988, 28.
provide better jobs than their domestic counterparts.\footnote{Jackson 1991 CRS report: 22-3; Doms and Jensen 1998, 50.} Japanese FDIUS was no different. In 1990 compensation per worker for Japanese-owned US affiliates was $39,130. This was higher than the $35,760 for British-owned ones, but similar to the European-owned affiliate average of $39,680.\footnote{Graham and Krugman 1995, 78.}

It appears that inflated fears of low-wage Japanese jobs were the result of an overgeneralization from a few Japanese carmakers. Some Japanese plants indeed provided lower wages than domestic-owned firms in the automotive industry, because their employees in these new plants were younger, the plants were concentrated in low-wage areas, and because US wages were higher than the average manufacturing wage. But this did not even apply to all US affiliates of Japanese companies in the automotive industry, let alone to all Japanese direct investment. The wages and benefits of most US affiliates of Japanese firms were similar to US-owned firms.\footnote{Glickman and Woodward 1989, 138.} Brookings Institution economist Robert Lawrence concluded: “Fears of deindustrialization were overblown.”\footnote{Frankenberger 1991, 140.}

The second concern about Japanese FDIUS was that it would worsen the bilateral trade imbalance. If Japanese direct investment was only a trading branch for Japanese parent companies, it would increase imports from Japan. This fear was supported by studies showing that Japanese investors had a higher tendency to rely on imported components than other foreign investors.\footnote{Encarnation 1992, 129; Reich, 1996, 46.} The trade deficit caused by US affiliates of foreign companies, particularly that by Japanese-owned US affiliates, also amounted to a considerable share of the total US trade deficit. In 1988 the US trade deficit was $127
billion, of which $89.9 billion was affiliate trade deficit. Of the $89.9 billion affiliate trade deficit $51 billion (57 percent) was Japanese-owned affiliate deficit.799

This concern was more serious than that of low quality jobs, but was nonetheless inflated. Although the US trade deficit was growing constantly, the share caused by US affiliates varied substantially. The affiliate deficit was 93 percent of US trade deficit in 1980, 38 percent in 1984, and 70 percent in 1988. This suggests that although the affiliate deficit contributed to the US total trade deficit, the latter was not primarily a function of the former. Turning to Japanese FDIUS, the baseline for assessing its impact on trade balance is the counterfactual case of its absence, not whether it contributed to trade deficit. If in the absence of Japanese FDIUS the US would have imported even more from Japan and would have exported even less to Japan, then Japanese FDIUS actually had a favorable impact on the bilateral trade balance. Studies suggested that even the higher import propensity of Japanese-owned automotive plants would reduce imports from Japan by displacing imports of finished cars.800

Economists who are skeptical that direct investment can have a significant impact on the trade balance provide another reason why worries about the trade imbalance were inflated. They argue that although microeconomic factors such as higher import propensity have little effect on the trade balance itself801 they do create a need for a weaker dollar in order to offset the trade imbalance. This weaker dollar represents a cost to the US economy. However, estimates indicate that this cost is relatively small.

800 Graham and Krugman 1995, 64-5; see also Orr 1991.
According to a worst-case calculation, in 1990 the higher import propensity of all foreign-owned US affiliates increased US imports by about $20 billion, which forced a 4 percent depreciation of the dollar.\textsuperscript{802} Japanese-owned US subsidiaries’ higher import propensity accounts for at most 2.5 percent of this depreciation, which could have hardly caused any significant economic harm.

This higher import propensity, the one clear difference between Japanese and European FDIUS, is characteristic to all new FDIUS, as product-cycle theory explains.\textsuperscript{803} In the early phases European FDIUS also had a high import propensity. As Japanese FDIUS matured, its practices converged with other FDIUS, decreasing its import propensity and increasing local content.\textsuperscript{804} Consequently, the small cost Japanese FDIUS posed to the US economy by creating incentives to depreciate the dollar was further reduced.

The third perceived economic threat posed by Japanese FDIUS applied to real estate. As the US depreciated the dollar to stimulate exports and correct the trade deficit, the Japanese got bargain prices on US real estate. The perceived threat was that the Japanese were buying up the country, using the pile of dollars earned from their trade surplus with the US. A Time magazine cover read “The Selling of America: Foreign Investors Buy, Buy, Buy”.\textsuperscript{805} Japanese investment in real estate was concentrated in Hawaii and California, amounting to about $7 billion in each. But the Japanese also bought prime real estate property in the major cities: Prudential Plaza and Xerox Center

\textsuperscript{802} Graham and Krugman 1995, 70.
\textsuperscript{803} Vernon 1966.
\textsuperscript{804} Froot 1991, 6; Yoon 1990.
\textsuperscript{805} Time, 14 September 1987, pp. 52-62.
in Chicago; 666 Fifth Avenue, Tiffany, and Exxon in New York; the US News & World Report Building in Washington; one-third of Los Angeles downtown office buildings.\textsuperscript{806} Alarmed by this phenomenon, 53 percent of the American public favored restrictions and 14 percent favored total prohibition on investment in real estate.\textsuperscript{807} Representative Helen Bentley worried that “The United States is rapidly becoming a colony of Japan.”\textsuperscript{808}

Indeed, Japanese investment in real estate registered extraordinary growth and in 1988 it was slightly larger than that of Britain. But total FDIUS in real estate remained much below other sectors of the economy, amounting to about 1 percent of all US real estate and 0.7 percent of all US land.\textsuperscript{809} The Japanese owned about 0.5 percent of US real estate.\textsuperscript{810} Although a few acquisitions were highly visible, the Japanese on average invested in lower value property than the British.

Nonetheless, some worried that Japanese FDIUS in real estate represented an economic threat in a different way. As the Japanese bought undervalued US assets the US would suffer losses on its overseas investment. Yet even on the most pessimistic assumptions, 1989 estimates place US losses of such a “fire sale” to Japanese investors at about $4.2 billion, or less than 0.1 percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{811} While the amount is not trivial, it does not justify the alarm surrounding the issue. The Japanese paid “top dollar” for US real estate and actually lost money when prices later collapsed.

\textsuperscript{806} Burstein 1988, 39; Frantz and Collins 1989, 23-4.
\textsuperscript{807} CBS News/Tokyo Broadcasting System Poll, May 14-17, 1988, Japan and the US, questions 29, 30, and 35.
\textsuperscript{808} Cited in Smith 1990; Prestowitz 1988, 308.
\textsuperscript{809} Froot 1991, 14; Glickman and Woodward 1989, 8.
\textsuperscript{810} Farrell 2000, 179.
\textsuperscript{811} Graham and Krugman 1995, 82.
To summarize, there is little evidence that Japanese FDIUS represented a threat to American welfare. As one economist put it, concerns that “foreign interests are buying out America, lock, stock, and barrel, simply are not supported by the facts.”

Paul Samuelson believed that Japanese investment was “a non-issue” because “foreign investment—including Japanese investment—doesn’t hurt the US economy.”

Perceived Political Threats: Losing Sovereignty

In addition to posing a threat to America’s welfare, many worried that Japanese FDIUS would threaten US political sovereignty. One critic drew attention to the fact that the Japanese annually spent about $300 million to shape public opinion and another $100 million on various “agents of influence” to shape American politics. Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records and Columbia Pictures would also allow the Japanese to shape American public opinion. There was widespread fear that lavish Japanese spending on lobbying bought undue influence and even veto power over US legislation.

The disproportionate political influence of corporations is admittedly a challenge for American democracy. Yet it is unclear why the political influence of foreign corporations would be more pernicious than that of domestic corporations, and it is even less clear why the influence of Japanese corporations would be more pernicious than that of other foreign corporations. Presumably, the reason was that Japan and Japanese firms invested more in lobbying.

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814 Choate 1990.
815 Prestowitz 1988, 310; Frantz and Collins 1989, 12.
Lobbying expenditure data from 1988 to 1991 does not support the concern that Japan bought disproportionate political influence in America. As usual, Israel spent most on political lobbying, while Japanese and British spending was similar, ranking fourteenth and seventeenth, respectively (Canada was fourth). Measured by the amount of PAC contributions, charitable contributions, and Washington lobby contributions, none of the top ten most politically active corporations were Japanese (though some were British). Foreign-owned companies’ PAC contributions amounted to about 5 percent of total corporate PAC contributions in the 1985-6 and the 1987-8 election cycles. In the 1987-88 election cycle foreign-owned companies contributed $2.8 million, of which Japan’s at $403,048 was similar to Canada’s $384,577 (British contributions at $729,187 were the largest by far). Japanese-owned US affiliates contributed 14.3 percent of the $2.8 million total foreign-owned PAC contributions and 0.75 percent of the total $53.6 million corporate PAC contributions, hardly a threat to sovereignty.

It appears that inflated threat perceptions of undue Japanese political influence were based on unwarranted extrapolations from Japanese trade lobbying. Japan ranked first in expenditure on trade lobbying, while Canada ranked third and Britain fourth. But there is little evidence that Japan succeeded in shaping US trade policy. The record of bilateral trade negotiations in this period reveals a series of unfavorable agreements.

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818 Walke and Huckabee 1989.
imposed on Japan by the US to decrease America’s bilateral trade deficit.\textsuperscript{820} Japanese trade lobbying either succeeded only in averting even more unfavorable trade agreements or failed miserably. Nor is there much evidence that Japanese firms swayed American public opinion. As discussed earlier, the majority American public was hostile to Japanese FDIUS. The Japanese spent more on lobbying to counter this hostile climate, rather than to gain disproportionate political control. In this light worries about Japanese lobbying curtailing American political autonomy seem overblown.

This section showed that Japanese FDIUS was not fundamentally different from European and Canadian FDIUS, and it did not pose significant economic or political threats. The next section shows that Japan and Japanese investment did not pose a significant security threat either.

*Perceived Security Threats: The ‘Yellow Peril’ Trumps the ‘Red Peril’*

American threat perceptions were inflated to the extent that Americans perceived Japan as more threatening than the USSR. Japan came to be seen as the next hegemonic challenger and Japanese investment was seen as both a syndrome and an instrument of this challenge. Given that Japan was America’s democratic ally, while the USSR was America’s communist enemy, this was puzzling. The overwhelming Soviet military superiority amplified this puzzle.

\textsuperscript{820} The main bilateral agreements include various Market-Oriented Sector-Selective (MOSS) agreements (1984-85), the Semiconductor Trade Agreement (1986), various voluntary export restrictions, and the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) (1990).
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the public and even some experts thought that the ‘Yellow Peril’ trumped the ‘Red Peril’. A 1989 poll found that 68 percent of the respondents perceived Japan as the greatest threat to the US compared to only 22 percent of those who perceived the USSR as the greatest threat.\textsuperscript{821} A year earlier 59 percent of Americans named Japan as the “strongest economic power in the world today,” when in fact the American economy was twice as large as Japan’s.\textsuperscript{822} A former counselor of the Commerce Secretary, Clyde Prestowitz, warned that “Today the real challenge to American power is not the sinister one from the Eastern bloc, but the friendly one from the East.”\textsuperscript{823} During the early 1990s Samuel Huntington still argued that the Japanese threat to American primacy was equivalent to that of the earlier Soviet threat.\textsuperscript{824} Since academic bestsellers throughout the 1980s emphasized the economic basis of hegemony, this fear was not entirely unreasonable, but it was nonetheless exaggerated.\textsuperscript{825}

Undoubtedly, the ‘Yellow Peril’ trumped the ‘Red Peril’ not only because the former was increasing, but also because the latter was decreasing. Gorbachev’s improved relations with the West, the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, and the winding down of the Cold War in general did much to decrease the Soviet threat. Nonetheless, that American threat perceptions of Japan exceeded that of the USSR is still remarkable, because public threat perceptions of the USSR remained considerable as fears held for half a century died slow. For example, a 1989 poll found that about half of the American

\textsuperscript{821} Friedman and Lebard 1991, 7; see Business Week/Harris Poll, in Business Week, August 7, 1989, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{822} Americans Talk Security, no. 4, April 1988, p. 84, in Thomas 1989, 170.
\textsuperscript{823} Prestowitz 1988, 22.
\textsuperscript{824} Huntington 1991, 8; See also Huntington 1993; Olsen 1992, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{825} Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1989 [1987].
public thought the USSR was aggressive and was trying to dominate the world. It is surprising that threat perceptions of Japan, an ally, could reach levels that exceeded the Soviet threat, even if the latter was not America’s archenemy anymore.

Japanese FDIUS played an important role in these inflated threat perceptions of Japan. On the one hand, Japanese investment was seen as a highly visible syndrome of Japan’s economic might, amplifying threat perceptions. On the other hand, it was seen as an instrument or weapon in this hegemonic challenge as well. Insofar as a hegemonic war was unlikely, the Japanese-American hegemonic competition would take the form of “mercantile realism”. Japanese FDIUS would be Japan’s potent weapon in this competition. In particular, Japanese investors would bankrupt the American semiconductor industry through predatory practices and hollowing out of high technology firms. Furthermore, many worried that, as Senator Daniel P. Moynihan put it, Japanese foreign investment was “a new form of industrial espionage.”

The fear was that Japanese direct investment would lead to the erosion of US defense industrial base and the Pentagon’s dependence on Japanese suppliers. As the electronic content of advanced weapons systems increased, high technology became critical for national security, and foreign dependence raised serious concerns. Foreign dependence put at risk the Department of Defense’s ability to respond to threats, because

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826 May 9-11, 1989 The New Face of Communism, CBS News/NYT poll
829 Hollowing-out referred to investment into US high tech firms only to transfer their technology back to Japan, leaving behind only the hollowed-out shell of the acquired firm (Tolchin and Tolchin 1988, 9, 15). For concerns about Japanese influence in the semiconductor industry see Warhofsacute;ky 1989; Prestowitz 1988, 28; Tyson 1992, 43.
830 Turner 1989, 12; Glickman and Woodward 1989, 110.
831 Moran 1990.
foreign firms may be less sensitive to American defense needs, more amenable to
influence by foreign governments, and harder to monitor. Fears of foreign dependence
were further amplified by concerns of Japanese technology “leakages” to the Soviets and some assertive Japanese statements. Some advocated “containing Japan” in what was in effect an economic cold war, while others even predicted a hot war.

In hindsight, fears of Japan as a hegemonic challenger were overblown. Rather than having to face Japan in a hegemonic competition, the US has enjoyed a rather long “unipolar moment.” Japanese investment did not challenge US hegemony, but actually supported it. Without Japanese capital inflows the US may have been forced to reduce its global commitments. Political scientists like Joseph Nye and Robert Jervis, who at the time unsuccessfully tried to allay fears of an “economic cold war,” were ultimately vindicated.

More specific fears of Japanese investment undermining US security through predatory practices, industrial espionage, and hollowing-out were similarly inflated. If Japanese FDIUS was indeed “aggressive,” one would expect that Japanese FDIUS loomed large in that most aggressive realm of hostile takeovers. In fact, British and Canadian investors were the most active in hostile takeovers, eclipsing Japan, which preferred “greenfield investment” for most of the 1980s and when it did engage in

832 The oft-cited case here is Toshiba’s selling of sophisticated technology, with the Norwegian firm, Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik, to the Soviets, who used it to design more silent submarine propellers, making their detection by the US navy more difficult. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, argued that the Soviets had quiet propellers three years before this technology ‘leakage’ and the US already planned R&D to deal with this challenge (Frantz and Collins 1989, 14).
833 See for instance the bestseller of a former transport minister, Ishihara 1991.
834 Fallows 1989; Friedman and Lebard 1991.
835 Krauthammer 1990/91.
takeovers, it was a “white knight”. A glance at royalties and license fees, which are proxies for technology transfers, shows that the Japanese have not systematically used direct investment to steal US technology. In fact, more technology was shipped to US affiliates of Japanese firms than they shipped abroad. The fact that some interpreted this data as an elaborate Japanese tax evasion scheme further illustrates the distorting effect of racial prejudices. Apart from one case where Hitachi stole industrial secrets from IBM in 1985, there is little evidence of industrial espionage. The erosion of the defense industrial base was due to decreasing competitiveness of US-owned firms, not to Japanese predatory practices and industrial espionage.

The kernel of truth of concerns about the erosion of the US defense industrial base was the growing Japanese influence in semiconductors. By 1986 Japanese production of semiconductors and integrated circuits surpassed that of the US, and it became a major supplier of the latest generation of random access memories (RAMs). Moreover, in semiconductor acquisitions from October 1988 to April 1992 Japanese investors accounted for 51 (85 percent) of 60 foreign acquisitions and 30 (77 percent) of 39 foreign

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838 A “white knight” is a third party which agrees to acquire a company which is a target of hostile takeover, at more favorable terms. Jackson 1990, Japanese Acquisition report: 9; Jackson, April 1991 report:15-6; Froot 1991, 11.
842 Glickman and Woodward 1989, 110.
acquisitions, respectively. Perceived security threats appear to be the result of overgeneralization from this sector.

Nonetheless, if the erosion of the defense industrial base in semiconductors was due to the decreasing competitiveness of US firms, and Japanese FDIUS actually brought more technology to the US than it took, then Japanese FDIUS improved US access to cutting edge technology. In its absence the Pentagon would have had to obtain this technology from overseas, rather than from Japanese-owned plants located in the US. Japanese FDIUS may have increased the Pentagon’s foreign dependence, but there is little evidence in hindsight that national security was hurt by it.

In conclusion, fears of Japan as the next hegemonic challenger were inflated. Moreover, Japanese FDIUS did not pose a serious security threat to the US. Above I showed that the American public misperceived the FDIUS of their non-white and democratic Japanese ally as more threatening than the FDIUS of their white and democratic European (British) allies. Furthermore, the public perceived their non-white democratic Japanese ally as more threatening than their white and communist Soviet enemy. Combined with evidence of racial rhetoric discussed in the next section, this suggests that fears of Japanese investment were racially inflated.

Evidence of Racial Rhetoric Surrounding Japanese Investment

During the 1980s anti-Japanese racial rhetoric of varying subtlety proliferated in America. Economists both critical and supportive of foreign investment agreed that “much of the furor over Japanese FDI in the United States now seems exaggerated,” and even “quite xenophobic at times, sometimes racist…”\textsuperscript{846} Some of this rhetoric was quite subtle and difficult to identify, but there were also numerous instances of more explicit racism.

Politicians and businessmen occasionally made public racist remarks. The head of a congressional delegation to Japan in 1983 made reference to “the little yellow men, you know, Honda”.\textsuperscript{847} In January of 1985 the Deputy US Trade Representative referred to the Japanese as ‘Nippers’ in a discussion with reporters, while in August General Motors chairman Roger B. Smith told \textit{Fortune} magazine that he wanted to “beat the hell out of the Japs” in the auto industry.\textsuperscript{848} The same year Senator John Danforth of Missouri denigrated the Japanese as “leeches”.\textsuperscript{849} Representative Jack Brooks of Texas said in 1987: “God Bless Harry Truman. He dropped two of them, He should have dropped four.”\textsuperscript{850}

Although much of the media opposed anti-Japanese racism, there was evidence of racism there as well. Andy Rooney of CBS’s \textit{60 Minutes}, after joking about Japan

\textsuperscript{847} Cited in Dower 1986, 313.
\textsuperscript{848} Wong 1986.
\textsuperscript{849} Heale 2009, 27, 29.
\textsuperscript{850} Luther 2001,144.
following up the purchase of the ‘Lockefeller Center’ by buying ‘the Gland Canyon and Mount Lushmore’, confessed that “I’m vaguely anti-Japanese. Don’t ask me why. Just prejudice, I guess.” In anti-Japanese advertisements Samurai warriors, exaggerated accents, and ridiculing of the Japanese physique were popular themes. A Bell Lab newspaper ad which depicted a Samurai ready to attack, read: “First it was consumer electronics. Then it was the automobile industry. Is our telecommunications industry next?” A Pontiac dealer in the New York area ran a commercial which invited viewers to imagine their bleak future if they continued to buy Japanese cars: “It’s December, and the whole family’s going to see the big Christmas tree at Hirohito Center”. An Oldsmobile commercial for the same area made reference to the shorter average height of the Japanese: “That’s why our car is built for our size families, not theirs”.

A systematic analysis of American images of Japan in the *New York Times* between 1975 and 1995 found that Japan’s economic success was depicted in terms of ‘unfair’ competition, ‘price rigging’ and ‘duplicity’. The Japanese were characterized as “untrustworthy,” “corporate gangsters,” and even “Asian devils,” using “treacherous economic karate.” In addition, the study found strong correlation between culture and conflict: 66.9 percent of articles which mentioned Japanese cultural characteristics also mentioned conflict, while 92.9 percent of articles that did not mention Japanese cultural characteristics did not mention conflict either.

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852 Rothenberg 1990.
853 Luther 2001, 143-44, 197.
stands in for race are correct, this finding is suggestive.\textsuperscript{854} One can infer that a racially different Japan was perceived as more conflict-prone and hence more threatening.

Anti-Japanese racism was directed primarily against the Japanese, but it also spilled over to affect Asian Americans in general. It resulted in an increase of racist rhetoric and hate crimes, unequaled since World War II. In Los Angeles, for example, there were graffiti reading “Nips Go Home”.\textsuperscript{855} Of the many hate crimes, the most publicized one was that of the Chinese American Vincent Chin, killed by two unemployed Detroit autoworkers. Prior to beating him to death, they used racial slurs, apparently believing that Chin was Japanese.\textsuperscript{856}

Evidence of racial rhetoric strengthens the case that race contributed to inflated American threat perceptions of Japanese investment. This section argued that we have good reasons to think that difference in racial identity helps explain why American perceived Japanese investment as more threatening than similar European investment, and perceived Japan as more threatening than the USSR. American threat perceptions of Japan, scholars concluded, follow patterns which tend to be racial.\textsuperscript{857} As Harvard East Asian expert Peter Stanley put it,

“In moments of international stress, the imagery of Japan almost invariably turns toward conspiracy, insidiousness, deceit, fanaticism, regimentation, and a kind of discipline and loyalty that is somehow less than fully human. This tendency in the imagery reminds us that we are dealing here with something very unusual, a big power relationship that is also an interracial relationship where distrust and caricature come easily.”\textsuperscript{858}

\textsuperscript{854} Balibar 1991.  
\textsuperscript{855} Abramowitz 1992.  
\textsuperscript{856} Worsnop and Leepson 1991.  
\textsuperscript{857} Dower 2001, 302  
\textsuperscript{858} Cited in Moeller 1996, 30.
The first part of the chapter argued that American threat perceptions of FDIUS were racially inflated. The second part traces how inflated threat perceptions led to the Exon-Florio Amendment, which weakened American open investment policy. It starts with a brief discussion of the traditional American open investment policy. Next, it traces how Exon-Florio was passed into law as part of the 1988 Trade Act. Finally, it addresses the subtle but important ways in which Exon-Florio weakened American open investment policy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of alternative explanations and limitations of the argument.

American Investment Policy before the Exon-Florio Amendment

Historically the United States maintained one of the most open investment policies in the world. Favorable attitudes towards foreign investment were deeply rooted in liberal capitalist ideology and America’s positive early experience with FDIUS, which provided much needed capital for the country’s development. US investment policy was guided by Alexander Hamilton’s words:

“It is not impossible that there may be persons disposed to look with a jealous eye on the introduction of foreign capital, as if it were an instrument to deprive our own citizens of the profits of our own industry; but, perhaps, there never could be a more unreasonable jealousy. Instead of being viewed as a rival, it ought to be considered as a most valuable auxiliary, conducing to put in motion a greater quantity of productive labor, and a greater portion of useful enterprise, than could exist without it.”859

To guard against “unreasonably jealousy” against foreign investment, prior to Exon-Florio regulations were kept minimal. There were three categories of regulations. 860 First, sector-specific restrictions limited FDIUS in areas deemed critical to national security, such as broadcasting, telecommunications, shipping, or energy. 861 Although they were permanent, they were applicable only to a narrow and well-defined segment of the economy. Second, emergency restrictions such as the Trading with the Enemy Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act gave the President the authority to seize or restrict FDIUS in times of national emergency, especially war. They were broadly applicable, but were rarely utilized. The third and most recent category included minimal data collecting regulations adopted in response to an increase in Arab investment in the 1970s. 862 In 1975 President Gerald Ford created the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to monitor foreign investment and bring problematic transactions to the attention of relevant agencies.

Overall, US investment policy remained open, with foreign investors being treated by the law as domestic investors were (the principle of national treatment). American open investment policy was enshrined in various international agreements, including fifty treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, twelve Bilateral

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860 For an overview of FDIUS regulations see Seitzinger 1989. An additional body of laws not specific to foreign investment existed that could be applied to block foreign investment. For example, the Department of Defense could use the Defense Industrial Security Program, the Justice Department could rely on antitrust reviews, and the Department of Commerce on export control laws to change or even block transactions.

861 Wilkins 1989, 573-584.

Investment Treaties, and various OECD and GATT multilateral instruments. The Reagan Administration embraced this open investment policy. Reagan’s September 9, 1983 statement illustrated this position: “A world with strong foreign investment flows is the opposite of a zero-sum game. We believe there are only winners, no losers, and all participants gain from it.” But as the public grew increasingly alarmed about Japanese foreign investment, this open investment policy was to be challenged by Congress.

The Road to Exon-Florio: ‘Yellow Peril’ Politics

While the Reagan administration embraced an open investment policy, Congress gradually moved away from it. The main reason for this shift was public pressure. As discussed earlier, a majority of Americans perceived Japanese FDIUS as threatening and favored its restriction. Concerns about FDI reached new heights in 1987-88. A March 1988 Roper Organization survey showed that the vast majority of the American public favored restrictions on FDIUS in companies making products related to national security (82%), real estate (78%), manufacturing (72%), and high technology (72%).

High threat perceptions of Japanese FDIUS held across age, gender, and party affiliation, but were weaker among the American elite. A 1987 survey of CEOs found that only 15.4 percent wanted Congress to limit foreign investment in American companies. A January 1988 Smick Medley poll showed that while 74 percent of the

864 Cited in DeSouza1994, 110.
865 Thomas 1989, 193.
866 This is an interesting variation, a blind spot in my theory, which does not address variation across individuals. One explanation is the higher educational levels of the elite. Studies found that education and racism are inversely correlated. See Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007.
American public felt that foreign investment threatened Americans’ control over the US economy, only 39 percent of the elite felt this way. A similar survey revealed that this difference held at the level of individual industries as well.\textsuperscript{867} That fears of Japanese FDIUS were less intense at the elite level helps explain why the Executive was less worried about Japanese FDIUS and Congress needed external impetus to act.

While the Executive wanted to maintain an open investment policy, Congress, spurred on by public fears and some industry protectionism, pushed for restrictions. This variation is rooted in different institutional roles and electoral incentives.\textsuperscript{868} Because much of the Executive is not elected, it is more insulated from public opinion than Congress. While the President is elected, he has a broader mandate which makes him accountable for the overall economic state of the country. This provided incentives for the President to take into account the overall economic effects of restricting foreign investment at a time when the American economy badly needed it. In contrast, Congressmen have a narrower mandate and are not responsible for America’s overall economic situation.\textsuperscript{869} This makes Congressmen more likely to respond to public opinion to court voters’ favor even when this may have unwelcome economic consequences at the national level. Although the Executive could not be entirely insensitive to public and Congressional pressure, its use of liberal free market rhetoric in defense of open investment provided it with some room of maneuver.

\textsuperscript{867} Thomas 1989, 187, 193.
\textsuperscript{868} Part of this variation may also be explained by party membership.
\textsuperscript{869} Erikson 1990.
Congressional efforts to regulate FDIUS were galvanized when in October 1986 Fujitsu, responding to Fairchild Semiconductor’s invitation to bid, offered to acquire 80 percent of Fairchild’s shares.\(^{870}\) A wave of alarm regarding the potential Japanese acquisition swept through America, even though Fairchild was already owned by the French company Schlumberger Ltd. Defense officials argued that the acquisition threatened national security because Fairchild was an important microchip supplier for the Pentagon. Representatives of the American semiconductor industry worried about Japanese competition. A *New York Times* article, echoing stereotypes of Japanese deviousness, reminded readers that “Japanese businessmen were accused of stealing secrets from IBM and are suspected of technology diversions through Hong Kong.”\(^{871}\) Senator James S. Exon (D-NE) urged the President to investigate the transaction. In response to political pressure the *Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States* (CFIUS) initiated an investigation, its first that year. The Department of Justice also started an antitrust examination. On March 11, 1987 Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige spoke out against the deal. Faced with this vocal opposition, Fujitsu withdrew its bid. Interestingly, while the French ownership of Fairchild was not perceived as a threat, its Japanese ownership was.

The Fujitsu-Fairchild case represented a turning point in Congressional attitudes regarding foreign investment. Some worried that the president could not have blocked the acquisition unless it declared national emergency under the *International Emergency...*

\(^{870}\) Some also mention Sir James Goldsmith’s attempt to take over Goodyear Tire and Rubber as such a galvanizing event; see Graham and Marchick 2006, 29.

Economic Powers Act. This required designating the acquisitions an “extraordinary threat,” which may have caused a diplomatic crisis with Japan.

As public concerns of Japanese FDIUS increased, so did the number of proposed bills to regulate (Japanese) FDIUS. If Japanese FDIUS was fundamentally different and threatening, then the open investment policy which worked with European and Canadian partners was inadequate. Rather, a more restrictive system was necessary, just like in trade, where the US already pressured Japan into various “voluntary” export restriction agreements. Although none of these measures singled out Japan specifically, FDIUS “clearly was a code term for Japanese investment in particular.” As Senator Rockefeller put it later during a congressional hearing: “And the code word, somehow, when we talk about this whole problem [of FDIUS and national security], we are talking about the Japanese. Others are obviously involved, but to the American mind it means the Japanese.” One analyst lamented the popularity of “Japan-bashing” in Congress which exhibited “an undercurrent of racism,” while another worried that this “Yellow Peril Politics” would even retake the White House in 1988. But if the anti-Japanese sentiment was strong enough to push Congress against Japan on investment and trade, it could not win the White House as Representative Richard Gephardt’s (D-Missouri) failed presidential bid illustrated. Nonetheless, in Congress the atmosphere was so anti-Japanese

These include the 1987 Breaux Amendment to regulate foreign financial intermediaries, the Murkowski Amendment to gather more data on foreign capital, the 1988 Schumer Amendment, and the Financial Reports Act. (DeSouza 1994: 15); HR 2514 (Coble et al) Hostile Foreign Takeover Moratorium Act; HR 2695 (Panetta) Amends the Food Security Act of 1985; HR 3246 (Smith) Amends the Clayton Act to improve notification requirements applicable to foreigners who acquire voting securities; S. 1264 (Sanford et al)-Hostile Foreign Takeover Moratorium Act; S. 1697 (Harkin and Levin)-Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1987.


Trezise 1989/90, 3; Brody 1987.
that one anonymous staff aide, with some exaggeration, concluded that in Congress
“everyone hates the Japanese.”

The two bills that attracted the most attention in the wake of the Fujitsu-Fairchild
case were the Bryant and the Exon-Florio Amendments. Representative John Bryant (D-
Texas) was unsatisfied with the data collected and made public on foreign investment. In
his view, “America has been selling off the family jewels to pay for a night on the town,
and all too often, we don’t even know who is buying.” In response, he introduced a
series of bills even before the Fujitsu-Fairchild case. A May 8, 1986 hearing in the House
of Representatives discussed two of his bills: The Foreign Investment Disclosure and
Reciprocity Act (HR 2582) and The Foreign Disclosure Act (HR 4242). HR 2582
required foreign investors to register their investments, provide an exacting amount of
data, and for the home country to provide reciprocity in investment opportunities for US
investors abroad. HR 4242 dropped the reciprocity aspect and specified demanding
reporting requirements.

The Administration fiercely opposed Bryant’s bills. Joseph Grundfest,
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Robert Ortner,
Chief Economist at the Department of Commerce, argued that the government already
collected adequate data on foreign investment. Bryant’s bills would unnecessarily burden
all foreign investors with demanding reporting requirements. Stephen J. Canner, Director
of the Office of International Investment at the Department of Treasury, concurred that

876 Cited in Uriu 2009, 53.
Bryant’s bills would subject foreign investment “to an extraordinarily burdensome, costly and impractical registration system.” Canner also agreed with Ortner that HR 2582 violated America’s open investment policies (and international obligations). Moreover, Bryant’s bills threatened the confidentiality of foreign investment, deterring FDIUS and hurting the economy.

The second bill that attracted considerable attention was Senator Exon’s Amendment. In his opening statement during the June 10th hearings he recalled that the Fujitsu-Fairchild case was one of the main motivating factors behind the bill. Since there was disagreement at that time whether the federal authority to block the acquisition existed, Exon’s bill proposed to explicitly give the Secretary of Commerce and the President the authority to review and possibly block foreign takeovers, mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and licensing agreements which would threaten the national security or essential commerce of the United States. The initial proposal stated that the President and the Secretary

“shall take into consideration the impact of foreign control on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries, and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting from the control of such industries by foreign citizens shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether such weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security and essential commerce.”

The Administration opposed the bill on the grounds that it would have a “chilling effect” on foreign investment, it would lead to retaliation against US investment abroad,

it was unnecessary as existing laws provided adequate safeguards to potential threats by foreign investment, and it would undermine America’s international obligations and efforts to liberalize the international economy at the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Most importantly, the bill was so broad that it seriously threatened US open investment policy. References to “economic welfare of individual industries” and “essential commerce” allowed a very broad application of the bill, where all foreign investment could be screened and possibly blocked. There were too many actors which could initiate an investigation under the bill. Furthermore, the bill applied not only to hostile takeovers, but also friendly mergers, joint ventures, and even licensing agreements. Many worried that this would create an atmosphere of uncertainty for potential foreign investors and would be abused by those seeking protection from foreign competition.\(^882\) In addition, the administration argued that FDIUS posed a negligible threat to national security and existing laws could handle them. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige thought the Exon Amendment was “an example of vast overkill” and was like “trying to kill a gnat with a blunderbuss.”\(^883\)

For all these reasons, the Exon proposal undermined the administration’s “open investment policy”. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul A. Volcker, believed it was “contrary to our long-standing national policy of maintaining an open economic and financial market …” US Trade Representative (USTR) Clayton Yeutter argued that it “runs directly contrary to our belief that investment flows which respond to market forces produce the best and most efficient mechanism to promote economic growth here and

abroad”. Former Deputy Secretary of Treasury, acting Secretary of State John C. Danforth, and Baldrige all concurred. Secretary of the Treasury James Baker threatened a presidential veto, writing that “If this provision is in the final bill, I would find it particularly difficult to recommend that the President sign the bill.”

Business representatives, as articulated by Robert L. McNeill, opposed the bill for reasons similar to those of the Administration. Some industry representatives, like Joseph L. Parkinson, Chairman of Micron Technology, supported the Exon proposal. For them it was a welcome defense against what they saw the aggressive and unfair Japanese competition.

The Exon bill was subsequently revised to alleviate the Administration’s concerns. Revisions narrowed the bill from “essential commerce” to “essential commerce which affects national security.” The revised bill also specified that the President or the Secretary of Commerce had discretionary power over whether to take action, and reduced the number of actors able to initiate investigation. It dropped joint ventures and licensing agreements, covering only mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. On June 19 the Senate Commerce Committee unanimously adopted this revised version and reported it out as part of the Technology Competitiveness Act of 1987.

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884 US Congress, June 10, 1987, pp. 12, 47, 69, 70, and 76.
885 US Congress, June 10, 1987, p. 68. Darman, a long time colleague of Baker, at Danforth’s request made clear to the Committee that this was a veto threat: “That is the kind of language you use when you know you want to recommend veto, but you do not have the authority to say that the administration will stand behind the veto” (p. 57).
886 McNeill was the Executive Vice Chairman of the Emergency Committee for American Trade. He represented the Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT), whose views were shared by a large number of businesses. See US Congress, June 10, 1987, 51-52.
On October 20, 1987 the House version of Exon’s bill was introduced by Representative James Florio (D-NJ). Like Exon, Florio was influenced by the Fujitsu-Fairchild case in proposing the bill. Florio’s bill was broader than Exon’s. The Administration opposed it on the same grounds. The next day, October 21, hearings continued in a different subcommittee. Perhaps the most important development was that business representatives hinted at their openness to a trade-off: they would support the Exon-Florio Amendment if Congress dropped the Bryant Amendment. Business representative McNeill suggested that if narrowed to national security, the Exon-Florio Amendment “might be somewhat acceptable to us,” while the Bryant bill was a “killer amendment.”

The Administration threatened to veto the entire Trade Act if it included the Bryant Amendment. Reagan would have preferred to exclude both the Exon-Florio and the Bryant Amendments, but he could not be entirely insensitive to public and Congressional pressures. Moreover, the Executive already used up much of its firepower to ensure that the flurry of Congressional bills on foreign investment were shot down. Given these circumstances, a deal to accept a watered down Exon-Florio in exchange for dropping the Bryant bill was an acceptable compromise. Exon-Florio was also appealing for the President because it provided him with discretionary powers. This not only meant that it favored the Executive over Congress in their perennial power struggle, but it also allowed Reagan to apply the Amendment selectively, mitigating the extent to which the

bill weakened America’s open investment policy. In contrast, the Bryant Amendment was applicable to all foreign investment where foreigners owned more than a 5 percent share.

In the face of the Administration’s vigorous resistance Bryant’s bills had little chance to succeed. But the Fairchild-Fujitsu case reenergized Bryant and his supporters. Bryant dropped the more demanding HR 2582 and resubmitted HR 4242 in January 1987. Despite the Executive’s opposition, the Bryant Amendment passed in the House. It even found a Senate sponsor in Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), but under Presidential veto threat eventually failed to pass in the Senate.

To facilitate its acceptance by Reagan the House-Senate Conference Committee further revised the Exon-Florio Amendment. The final reconciled bill conferred discretionary powers on the President alone, dropping the Secretary of Commerce. It drafted the proposal as an amendment to the Defense Production Act and further narrowed the bill’s focus to national security, eliminating the phrase “essential commerce which affects national security”. The bill required the existence of “credible evidence” of threats to national security and the inapplicability of other laws before an investigation could be started.

Despite this narrowing, the bill remained broad enough to satisfy its Congressional supporters and threaten open investment policy. It left “national security” undefined and the Conference Report specified that the phrase should be interpreted “broadly and without limitation to particular industries” and without implying “any

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894 Alvarez 1989, 74.
limitation on the term ‘national defense’ as used elsewhere in the Defense Production Act.” The standard for “credible evidence” remained low and the President was encouraged to consider broad economic factors when exercising his discretionary power.

The revisions made the bill more palatable to Reagan. Although he first vetoed the Trade Act for other reasons, following another round of revisions, he signed it into law on August 23, 1988 along with the Exon-Florio Amendment. Because of what he saw as a large number of provisions aimed at Japan, the Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry, Hajime Tamura complained that the Trade Act was motivated by “anti-Japanese feeling and racial discrimination.” Some in the US also worried that Exon-Florio “may exacerbate racial animosities” because its legislative history suggested an obsession with Japanese takeovers, but no concern about the more numerous British or Canadian ones.

While this chapter argues that racial prejudices inflated threat perceptions and contributed to the passage of Exon-Florio, I do not mean to imply that all those who voted for the bill were motivated primarily by racism. Many of those who voted for Exon-Florio, also voted in 1988 for legislation which apologized on the nation’s behalf for the internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans during World War II and set

897 These factors included: “a) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements; b) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements; and c) the control of domestic industries and commercial activities by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national security.” See US Congress, April 19, 1988, pp. 36-7.
900 Alvarez 1989, 158.
aside $1.25 billion in reparations for the 60,000 surviving internees. Among the bill’s main supporters were Congressmen Norman Y. Mineta and Robert T. Matsui, both California Democrats who were interned as children with their families.\textsuperscript{901}

One may argue that those Congressmen who had a strong record on civil rights voted for Exon-Florio primarily for pro-union reasons, rather than racial prejudices. Indeed, there is prima facie evidence for this. In 1988 House members voted in agreement on key labor issues with preferences of the umbrella interest group of organized labor, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 68 percent of the time, while Senators voted so 62 percent of the time.\textsuperscript{902}

Relying on a voting record data set I constructed I also found evidence of correlation between votes and interest group ratings. The data set contains the votes of all senators and representatives on the 1988 Trade Act, of which Exon-Florio was part when it passed. Unfortunately I was unable to locate the voting records on Exon-Florio, so in addition to the Trade Act, I also included the votes on a 1988 version of Bryant’s bill, The Foreign Ownership Disclosure Act (HR 5410). To see how well voting records correlated with labor’s preferences, I included in the data set ratings by AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education (COPE) and ratings by the liberal interest group Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). The Trade Act and the Bryant bill are imperfect proxies. Relying on them is likely to overstate the correlation between Congressional voting and labor preferences compared to Exon-Florio, whose security focus made it more palatable to Republicans with no pro-union leanings. Nonetheless,

\textsuperscript{901} Worsnop and Leepson 1991.  
\textsuperscript{902} CQ Almanac 1989, B53-54.
they can still give us an idea of the correlation between Congressional voting and labor preferences.

I found high correlations between higher interest group ratings and voting in favor of these bills. The correlation between COPE ratings and the votes on the 1988 Trade Act is 0.77, while that between COPE and the Bryant bill votes is 0.744. The correlation between ADA ratings and the Trade Act is 0.66, while that between ADA ratings and the Bryant bill is 0.70. Finally, the correlation between votes on the Trade Act and those on the Bryant bill is 0.70. These results suggest that correlation between COPE and ADA ratings on the one hand, and voting on Exon-Florio on the other, were also substantially correlated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Yeas</th>
<th>Nays</th>
<th>COPE ratings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>302 (97%)</td>
<td>9 (3%)</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>60 (27%)</td>
<td>164 (73%)</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: The 1988 Trade Act Votes and COPE Ratings

Figure 5.1: Voting on the 1988 Trade Act
Despite this correlation, there are three main reasons why I think that support for Exon-Florio was not reducible to pro-union sentiments. First, the AFL-CIO and ADA ratings of the bill’s initiator, Senator James Exon were among the lowest among Northern Democrats. In 1988 he scored 50 percent on ADA’s ratings and 71 percent on AFL-CIO’s COPE ratings, both among the lowest among Northern Democrats in the Senate.\textsuperscript{903} To put these numbers in perspective, the average ADA ratings of Democrats in 1988 was 75 percent and their average COPE rating was 90 percent. One may argue that Exon’s ratings are still considerable, so we cannot rule out that the bill was motivated by pro-union feelings. But a second factor suggests that pro-labor sentiments may not have played much role in passing Exon-Florio. There is little evidence of labor lobbying activity regarding the bill. Neither AFL-CIO nor ADA identified Exon-Florio as a key issue that they supported. The one aspect of the 1988 Trade Bill where labor took a strong position in the Senate was related to the requirement of advance notice to workers of plant closing and large layoffs. In the House AFL-CIO supported a bill requiring foreigners with controlling interest in US business or real estate to report additional information, but it did not take a position on Exon-Florio. Further, my reading of primary and secondary sources found that labor did little to support the bill. A “veteran industry lobbyist” who participated in congressional hearings on FDI captures this passivity: “[Union] guys were nowhere to be seen”.\textsuperscript{904} Third, one may argue that labor was so influential that it did not need to lobby Democrats to ensure voting in agreement with its

\textsuperscript{903} CQ Almanac 1989, B56-57.  
\textsuperscript{904} Kang 1997, 322-23.
preferences, but the problem is that labor did not have a clear preference on Exon-Florio. Although labor tended to be protectionist on trade, it was split on foreign investment. On the one hand it was concerned that union jobs would be replaced with nonunion jobs, but on the other it also recognized that foreign investment created important employment, often in “sunset” industries. FDI had a mixed effect on workers’ welfare, which obstructed taking a clear position on it.\textsuperscript{905} Instead of opposing foreign investment, labor unions such as the United Automobile Workers (UAW) tended to limit their position to pushing for higher local content in manufacturing.\textsuperscript{906} Based on these three arguments, it is reasonable to conclude that pro-labor sentiments did not obviate the role of race regarding the passage of Exon-Florio.

**FDIUS Policy after Exon-Florio**

The Executive limited the extent to which Exon-Florio undermined open investment policy, but it could not entirely preclude its effects. Through Executive Order 12661 the President designated the *Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States* (CFIUS) to review foreign investments, determine when more detailed investigation should be undertaken, and to carry out such investigations. The Amendment transformed CFIUS from a monitoring to an enforcement agency and substantially increased federal powers to shape and even block foreign investment.\textsuperscript{907} CFIUS was chaired by the Department of Treasury, which was sensitive to America’s need for foreign capital and

\textsuperscript{905} Glickman and Woodward 1989, 188-222.  
\textsuperscript{906} Goodman, Spar, and Yoffie 1996, 581.  
\textsuperscript{907} Kang 1997, 326.
committed to maintaining an open investment policy. Although the Treasury does not dictate CFIUS decisions, its chairmanship does predispose CFIUS to a very selective application of Exon-Florio, against the intentions of Congress. Between 1988 and the summer of 1992 CFIUS investigated only 14 of the 700 cases of which it was notified, and the President exercised his power of divestiture in only one case.\(^\text{908}\) Nonetheless, such screening mechanisms do not have to prohibit many transactions to have a significant impact.

CFIUS shapes FDIUS under Exon-Florio in at least three ways. First, it discourages certain investments from even being attempted.\(^\text{909}\) Second, it functions as a “trip-wire mechanism” which provides Congress an “entry point” to exert political pressure to block certain transactions or to further regulate and restrict foreign investment.\(^\text{910}\) The vulnerability of this entry point to Congressional pressure was illustrated by subsequent efforts to further restrict FDIUS.\(^\text{911}\) Third, Exon-Florio gives CFIUS the power to shape transactions through lengthy consultation with foreign investors. As one scholar notes, the most important effect of CFIUS may be “jawboning foreign investors either to accept conditions on some kinds of investment or to withdraw their bids, while not officially blocking them.”\(^\text{912}\)

Worries about Japanese FDIUS died hard in the aftermath of Exon-Florio. Stephen Cooney, Director of the National Association of Manufacturers, noted during a

\(^{908}\) Tyson 1992, 147.  
^{910}\) Kang 1997, 328.  
^{911}\) US Congress, March-April, 1992; US Congress, June-July 1990; other bills regarding FDIUS included S. 856 (Murkowski), HR 4520 (Sharp), and HR 4608 (Lent).  
^{912}\) Kang 1997, 304.
1991 Congressional hearing that “with one exception this morning, every negative comment made on foreign investment related to Japan.”  

A 1992 Financial Times criticized the Rostenkowski-Gradison bill at the time as “just one more instance of the national paranoia about Japan.” Japanese FDIUS grew to overtake Britain’s for a few months in 1992, before plummeting. Inflated threat perceptions of Japan died only after Japan’s bubble economy burst and entered the ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s.

**Alternative Explanations**

Alternative explanations are insightful but incomplete, leaving room for a racial one. To begin with, one may argue that the reason why Americans perceived Japanese FDIUS more threatening than European FDIUS was World War II. More specifically, the American public imputed devious and aggressive intentions to the Japanese not because of racial prejudice, but because of Pearl Harbor. This is why many Americans talked about Japanese FDIUS as an ‘economic Pearl Harbor,’ while Nixon talked of an economic threat “far more serious than the challenge that we confronted even in the dark days of Pearl Harbor.” Although the US also fought Germany in World War II, Germany did not cause of Pearl Harbor.

Pearl Harbor undoubtedly reinforced racial prejudices and strengthened the image of the Japanese “Yellow Peril”. World War II more generally helps to explain the war rhetoric around Japanese-American trade frictions. But there are at least three good

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reasons why this explanation is incomplete without race. First, as discussed earlier, the racial prejudices underpinning the Japanese “economic Yellow Peril” preceded Pearl Harbor. Second, they were also shared by the Europeans who did not experience this historical event. Third, although the older generation of Americans feels more intensely about Pearl Harbor, younger generations do not. A series of public opinion surveys between 1985 and 1995 found that only a minority of Americans held attacking Pearl Harbor against Japan. Since the vast majority of Americans feared Japanese FDIUS and favored legal restrictions against it, Pearl Harbor alone is an incomplete explanation.  

Again others may argue that the American public perceived Japanese FDIUS as threatening and Congress passed Exon-Florio because industries looking for protection from Japanese competition inflated the Japan threat. As early as 1971 Elly R. Carraway, Jr., president of the textile manufacturer Burlington Industries, told a Senate subcommittee that the United States was on the ‘brink of defeat’ in a trade war.”  

Chrysler’s chief executive, Lee Iacocca, wrote in his bestselling autobiography of a major trade war with Japan.  

Representatives of the semiconductor industry clearly saw the Exon proposal as a welcome protection against Japanese competition. More sophisticated versions of this explanation also tell us why Japanese, but not European FDIUS was threatening to certain industries. Given economies of scale and steep learning curves, access to foreign markets and control of home markets was crucial in some industries. Since Japan was less open to USDIA than Europe, this would give Japanese

916 CBS/NYT and TBS surveys in Ladd and Bowman 1996, 22.
917 Schaller 1997, 232.
918 Iacocca 1984, 315.
competitors an unfair advantage. For this reason, even some internationally oriented industries, like semiconductors, supported FDIUS restrictions.920

This strategic explanation of threat inflation is insightful. Perhaps it can also account for some of the broad content of Exon-Florio, initial versions of which even referred to the “economic welfare of individual industries”. However, this explanation has at least two shortcomings. First, domestic industry representatives were divided over FDIUS restrictions as they had contradictory economic interests. They wanted protection from foreign competition, but they also wanted to avoid retaliation against their investments abroad. While the semiconductor industry was more protectionist than one would have expected from an internationally oriented industry, even their demands were “ambivalent and contradictory,” as were those of the auto and machine tool industries.921 It is unclear that industries favoring FDIUS restrictions wielded more political power than those opposing such restrictions, especially since protectionist industries were opposed by corporate business interest, and received only lukewarm support by the generally passive labor interests. Second, and closely connected, if protectionists enjoyed no evident power advantage, this account has difficulties explaining why threat inflationary arguments of supporters of FDIUS restrictions resonated more with the public and Congress than threat deflationary arguments of opponents of restrictions. The extent to which racial rhetoric and advertisements by protectionist industries succeeded in inflating threats strategically cannot be explained without reference to widespread anti-Japanese racial prejudices.

920 Milner and Yoffie 1989.
921 Crystal 1998, 528.
Finally, perhaps the most powerful explanation would emphasize that Japanese FDIUS was perceived as more threatening because it grew faster than European FDIUS.\textsuperscript{922} Indeed, Japanese FDIUS increased at an average annual rate of 32.5 percent from 1980 to 1985, and 28.4 percent from 1985 to 1989.\textsuperscript{923} This fast growth can account for much of the high American threat perception of Japanese foreign investment. However, there are good reasons to suspect that it does not capture the whole story and that a racial explanation can usefully complement it to provide a more comprehensive explanation. First, since it was growing from a much smaller base than European FDIUS, Japanese FDIUS should not necessarily have been more alarming.\textsuperscript{924} All FDIUS was growing fast and it is unclear why Americans did not perceive the much larger and fast growing British FDIUS more threatening, even if it was not growing as fast as Japanese investment. Second, levels of threat perception are somewhat at odds with Japanese FDIUS growth rates. Public threat perceptions were lowest when Japanese FDIUS was growing the fastest (1980-85) and they were the highest when Japanese FDIUS was actually growing the slowest or was even stagnating (the early 1990s).\textsuperscript{925} Third, a racial explanation at the very least can complement this and other alternative explanations by explaining the subtle racial language surrounding inflated fears of Japanese FDIUS.

\textsuperscript{923} US Congress, OIT 1993, 82.
\textsuperscript{924} Julius 1991, 9.
\textsuperscript{925} One may want to object to this point by arguing that it is not reasonable to expect the public to be so fine-tuned to levels of Japanese investment growth. This objection is well taken. At the same time, it is arguable whether large fluctuations in Japanese investment growth over more than a decade require an unreasonably fine tuned public.
Conclusions

By bringing in race, this chapter contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of why and how inflated threat perceptions of Japanese FDI in the US led to Exon-Florio and weakened American open investment policy. First, trade frictions activated racial prejudices of Japanese deviousness and aggressiveness, which resulted in American perceptions of Japan as a ‘Yellow Peril’. Second, Americans perceived Japanese investment as more threatening than the larger European investment and they perceived Japan as more threatening than the USSR. Third, racially inflated threat perceptions facilitated the passage of the Exon-Florio Amendment, weakening American open investment policy, albeit to a limited extent.

The finding that racial difference inflated American threat perceptions is consistent with the expectations of the racial theory of Chapter 2, but the Exon-Florio case only partially met the second theoretical expectation, that of cooperation along the color line. Although European fears of Japanese FDI paralleled those of Americans, transatlantic cooperation was modest compared to that found by previous empirical chapters. Europeans perceived Japanese investment as a “Yellow Peril,” as Americans did. In 1967, a few years before Nixon’s similar remarks, French President Charles de Gaulle mocked Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Satō as a “merchant of transistors”. An infamous 1979 European Community memorandum leaked to the press referred to the Japanese as “workaholics living in what Westerners would regard as little more than

926 LaFeber 1997, 327.
rabbit hutches.”927 Racial stereotypes of Japanese aggressiveness and deviousness were not far below the surface. The chief editor of Le Monde believed for Japan economic competition was war by another means.928 In 1991 French Prime Minister Edith Cresson echoed the public sentiment that Japan was bent on cheating its way to world domination: “Japan is an adversary that doesn’t play by the rules and has an absolute desire to conquer the world.”929

However, European-American cooperation against Japan remained limited.930 The worries of C. Fred Bergsten, a former Treasury Assistant Secretary for International Affairs under Carter, about racist transatlantic collusion against Japan remained largely unfulfilled.931 Instead of formal cooperation transatlantic cooperation, what we find is policy coordination. The pattern that emerged was European imitation of American economic policies, where most Japanese-American economic agreements were followed by a request from the Economic Community for a similar agreement with Japan.932

The lack of formal transatlantic cooperation against Japan was due to at least four factors. First, there was more concern than in the past about avoiding the appearance of racist collusion against an Asian state.933 Second, powerful ideas of laissez faire capitalism limited the appeal to US decision-makers of coordinated intervention against Japanese foreign investment. Third, the US assumed leadership on economic liberalization at the ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which impeded

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930 Tyson 1992, 7; Mastanduno 1991, 103.
931 Bergsten 1982, 1059.
933 Nanto 1986, 34.
cooperation with Europe to restrict Japanese foreign investment. Fourth, European states disagreed over how much restriction against Japanese investment was necessary.

Looking at the future, it will be interesting to see whether Chinese (and Arab) investment will bring about inflated threat perceptions and more restrictive investment policy. More recently the proposed takeover of Unocal by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and that of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company by Dubai Ports World led to some alarm. Over twenty bills were introduced in Congress to restrict foreign investment and amend Exon-Florio.\textsuperscript{934} Since Chinese foreign direct investment is currently small, China’s impending liberalization of capital flows will inevitably result in a significant increase of Chinese foreign direct investment. Reactions in the West will provide another test for the racial theory of threat perception provided by this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{934} Graham and Marchick 2006, 2, 31.
Chapter Six: Conclusion

When in 2010 the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum released recordings of conversations captured by President Richard M. Nixon’s secret taping system in the White House, race was at the center of attention. The recordings of discussions between Nixon and his top advisers contained disparaging remarks about racial minorities. In a conversation on February 13, 1973 Charles Colson, a senior adviser, confessed to Nixon that he always had “a little prejudice”. Nixon replied that he was not prejudiced, “I’ve just recognized that, you know, all people have certain traits.” He then went on to discuss the traits that different ethnic and racial groups supposedly have.\textsuperscript{935}

Much has changed since the 1970s in American and international race relations. There is an African American President in the Oval Office. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is commemorated by the King National Memorial on the National Mall in Washington, DC. Interracial marriages are increasing, racial segregation is decreasing, and (at least explicit) racial prejudices are declining. At the same time, like Nixon almost forty years ago, too many still think that they are not prejudiced, but only recognize that “all people have certain traits”. The occasional racist comments of celebrities and the frequent racial slurs of sports fans remind us that racial prejudices are still a force to be reckoned with.

Recently in the first decision under North Carolina’s Racial Justice Act a judge concluded that racial prejudice led to a death sentence 18 years ago and changed the sentence to life in prison without parole. The shooting of unarmed young black males in America frequently leads to heated debates about racial prejudice.

While racial prejudice is taken increasingly seriously at the domestic level, it is relatively neglected at the international level. The conventional wisdom in international politics seems to be that decision makers’ racial prejudices do not bias their foreign policy decisions. After all, despite his anti-Semitic remarks, Nixon provided Israel with vital support during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Admittedly, racial prejudice does not always translate into foreign policy, but when it does, colorblind IR theories are inadequate. This dissertation presented a racial theory of international politics and supported it with three empirical cases. It showed that racial prejudices embedded in racial identities can facilitate cooperation among states with shared racial identity and can facilitate discord among states with different racial identities. Anarchy may provide strong incentives to base discord and cooperation on balance of power calculations, but it does not render race internationally irrelevant.

The concluding chapter is organized as follows. The first two sections discuss the main findings and contributions of the dissertation. The next two sections identify limitations and future research avenues. Having read the dissertation, one may wonder whether racial prejudice and discrimination are inevitable. The fifth section addresses this.

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question and argues that they are not. The chapter closes with thoughts on race, legitimacy and the future of the liberal international system.

Summary of Findings

This dissertation provided a two-step racial theory of discord and cooperation. In the first step, threat-relevant racial prejudices regarding the body, intentions, rationality, and morality are activated and shape threat perceptions. Agents perceive those with shared racial identity as less threatening, because through the lens of racial prejudices they appear rational, moral, fundamentally similar, and as having good intentions. Agents perceive those with different racial identities as more threatening, because through the lens of racial prejudices they appear irrational, devious, fundamentally different, and as having bad intentions. In the second step, racially shaped threat perceptions generate behavioral dispositions. Inflated threat perceptions facilitate discord and inhibit cooperation among agents with different racial identities. Deflated threat perceptions facilitate cooperation and inhibit discord among agents with shared racial identities. The upshot is that agents with shared racial identity can cooperate against agents with different racial identities. Birds of a feather sometimes flock together against birds of different feathers. When states have dominant racial groups that hold threat-relevant racial prejudices, when these prejudices are activated, and when threats are ambiguous, this racial theory will be helpful in explaining patterns of discord and cooperation.
Three empirical chapters tested the four hypotheses derived from this racial theory (for a summary see Table 6.1 below). Chapter 3 explained how race led to the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923). In the first step, the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War and Japanese immigration to the US activated racial prejudices regarding the body and intentions. Many Americans perceived the Japanese as fundamentally different and non-assimilable not only culturally, but also biologically. Moreover, they perceived Japan as having aggressive intentions. Due to racial prejudices related to fundamental difference and aggressive intentions, the US came to see Japan as a Yellow Peril and to consider the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a potential threat. In the second step, driven by this racially inflated threat perception, the US pushed for the demise of the alliance. Great Britain, partly for racial and partly for strategic reasons, conformed to American preferences and facilitated the end of the alliance at the 1922 Washington Conference. The demise of the alliance opened the way for Anglo-Saxon—Japanese alienation and German-Japanese rapprochement, which made WWII possible.

Chapter 4 traced how the emergence of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was shaped by race. In the first step, the Korean War activated American racial prejudices regarding “Oriental” aggressive intentions and irrationality. Through this racial lens Communist China was perceived not only as a Red Peril, but also as a “Yellow Peril”. This inflated US threat perception of Chinese efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. In the second step, the US pushed for cooperation with the USSR to inhibit Chinese nuclear proliferation. Partly for racial reasons, the Soviets cooperated with the US to
create the LTBT. Although the LTBT did not preclude the Chinese bomb, it did open the way for détente and subsequent arms control agreements.

Chapter 5 showed that the Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Act was influenced by race. In the first step, Japanese-American trade frictions activated American racial prejudices pertaining to intentions and morality. In light of these prejudices, Americans perceived the Japanese as aggressive and devious, and Japan appeared to them as an “economic Yellow Peril”. In the second step, prodded by pressure from the American public, Congress moved to restrict Japanese foreign direct investment in the United States. The Executive successfully opposed most Congressional bills, but eventually had to agree to a watered down version of the Exon-Florio bill. The Executive’s strong belief in liberal ideas regarding investment and its selective application of the bill explains why the bill has not undermined US open investment policy to a more significant extent.
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<td><strong>Threat Perception:</strong> Racial prejudices related to the body and intentions inflate threat perceptions among agents with different racial identities and deflate threat perceptions among agents with shared racial identities (<em>hypotheses 1 and 2</em>).&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Behavior:</strong> These racially shaped threat perceptions generate cooperation among agents with shared racial identity against agents with different racial identity.</td>
<td><strong>Threat Perception:</strong> US, but much less British, threat perceptions of Japan were racially inflated. The US and British threat perceptions of each other were racially deflated.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Behavior:</strong> The US and Britain cooperated against Japan to end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 4</strong>&lt;br&gt;Race and Arms Control: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)</td>
<td><strong>Threat Perception:</strong> Racial prejudices related to intentions and rationality inflate threat perceptions among agents with different racial identities and deflate threat perceptions among agents with shared racial identities (<em>hypotheses 2 and 3</em>).&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Behavior:</strong> These racially shaped threat perceptions generate cooperation among agents with shared racial identity against agents with different racial identity.</td>
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<td><strong>Chapter 5</strong>&lt;br&gt;Race and FDI: Japanese FDI in the US</td>
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<td><strong>Threat Perception:</strong> US and European threat perceptions of Japan were racially inflated. US and European threat perceptions of each other were racially deflated.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Behavior:</strong> The US passed the Exon-Florio Amendment to restrict Japanese FDIUS. Transatlantic cooperation against Japan remained modest.</td>
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**Table 6.1: Summary of Findings**
Contributions

The main contribution of the dissertation is to show that race matters in great power politics. Patterns of discord and cooperation can be shaped by race, rather than only material power or regime type. Instead of balancing with weaker states against stronger states, as balance of power theory would expect, great powers chose to cooperate with racially similar states against racially different states, even when the racially similar states were stronger than the racially different ones. Chapter 3 shows that instead of balancing with the weaker Japan against the stronger Britain, the US chose to cooperate with the latter against the former. While shared Anglo-Saxon racial identity deflated American fears of Britain, the different racial identity of Japan inflated American threat perceptions. Chapter 4 shows that instead of balancing with the weaker China against the stronger USSR, the US cooperated with the Soviets against the Chinese.

Patterns of discord and cooperation can also follow the “color line” rather than regime type. In Chapter 4 the Communist USSR cooperated with the liberal democratic US against the fellow Communist China, albeit only partly for racial reasons. Chapter 5 showed that shared regime type did little to alleviate American fears of Japanese foreign direct investment and to inhibit Japanese-American economic discord. The demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the emergence of the LTBT, and the passage of the Exon-Florio Amendment are puzzling when looked at from the angle of balance of power theory or democratic peace theory. The dissertation sheds light on these puzzles through a racial theory of international politics.
The racial theory presented in Chapter 2 not only challenges, but also works together with extant theories to provide more comprehensive explanations of international politics. However, similar to most IR theories, it predicts general patterns of behavior and remains indeterminate regarding specific outcomes. To account for specific outcomes that result from racial patterns of discord and cooperation, each chapter traces how race interacts with other factors such as domestic politics, political ideology, or strategic calculations. Chapter 3 shows how British strategic calculations interacted with Anglo-Saxon racial solidarity to facilitate British cooperation with the US to bring about the demise of the alliance. Chapter 4 traces how American domestic politics and Soviet strategic calculations interacted with American and Soviet racially inflated threat perceptions of a nuclear China to bring about the LTBT. Chapter 5 explains how the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment passed due to interactions between racially inflated threat perceptions, domestic politics, and liberal political ideology. Each of the empirical cases illustrates how race can interact with other factors to provide better explanations of specific outcomes.

In addition to the contributions discussed in Chapter 1, the dissertation makes two specific contributions. One theoretical contribution is to enrich the literature on threat inflation with a “color of threat” theory. This “color of threat” theory of threat perception can both contradict and complement instrumental theories of threat inflation. Instrumental theories assume that elite threat perceptions are relatively accurate and explain threat inflation as the result of elites manipulating the masses to maximize
various interests under conditions of anarchy and uncertainty. The dissertation contradicts theories of threat inflation by showing that elites do not always inflate public threat perceptions instrumentally. Rather than trying to maximize interests, elites may often inflate public threat perceptions through alarmist statements because they genuinely believe that existential threats are on the horizon. Their threat perceptions can be distorted by racial prejudice. The “color of threat” theory also complements instrumental theories of threat inflation. When elite threat perceptions are accurate and they try to inflate public threat perceptions for instrumental reasons, this racial theory helps explain why some threat inflationary arguments may be more persuasive to the public than others, and why threat inflationary arguments may be more persuasive than threat deflationary arguments. Arguments aimed at inflating threats may trump those aimed at deflating threats when the potential threat is posed by racially different agents, because they resonate with the racial prejudices of the public. Similarly, arguments aimed to inflate threats which fit with racial prejudices may inflate public threat perceptions better than threat inflationary arguments that have no racial implications.

Closely connected to the theoretical contributions, the dissertation has two policy implications. First, understanding the threat inflationary logic of racial difference can undermine the ability of race to inflate threats and facilitate costly overreactions. This contribution is particularly timely given fears of Muslim terrorism and the rise of China. Of course, worries about both are justified, but hysteria is not. Regarding fears of

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terrorism, several scholars make cogent arguments that they are “overblown.” In the West, Muslim terrorists are perceived as not only having a different religion, but also having a different racial identity. Perhaps this helps explain why threat inflationary arguments regarding Iraqi WMDs or Muslim terrorism could be so persuasive. Regarding the rise of China, much of the debate so far has been conducted in moderate terms. Yet some, like Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, arguably are subject to inflated threat perception when they predict a “coming conflict” between the US and China. As China increases its military spending and expands its economic clout there is a danger that alarmist arguments will become more influential. China’s human rights violations, the undervaluation of the yuan, tensions with Taiwan or neighbors in the South China Sea could all be used to bolster threat inflationary arguments. If arguments of China as a “Yellow Peril” hijacked the rise of China debate and influenced decision making, the consequences could be disastrous. Awareness of the threat inflationary dynamics of racial prejudices should undercut exaggerated fears of Muslim terrorism, and should make decision makers and the public on both sides more cautious to ensure the peacefulness of Sino-American relations.

The second policy implication pertains to what I call the “balance of prejudices”. Much of social psychology and constructivism recommend diminishing the pernicious influence of racial prejudices through increased interracial interaction or by redrawing identity boundaries to include racial others. In addition to undermining racial prejudices

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938 Brooks 2011; Mueller 2006.
939 For good summaries of these debates see Christensen 2006; Friedberg 2005. For arguments that China is a status quo power see Johnston 2003; Ross 1997.
940 Bernstein and Munro 1997.
by revealing the logic of their pernicious impact, this dissertation suggests a complementary way to mitigate the systematic bias of racial prejudices on policy making. Assuming that different racial groups hold different racial prejudices, increasing the racial diversity in decision making bodies could result in a “balance of prejudices.”

This could mitigate systematic racial biases of decisions and actions and could make them more fair or impartial. Having more Muslim Americans and Chinese Americans in positions of power may mitigate the threat inflationary impact of racial prejudices on US decision making regarding Muslim terrorism and the rise of China. This solution, however, has limits and could also cause new problems. The prospect of Gary Locke, a Chinese American, becoming the US ambassador to China was largely welcomed in China, but not by everyone. Chinese officials offered a warm welcome and the state-run *Global Times* cited a specialist who opined that Locke would better understand “the Chinese way of dealing with issues.” But some ordinary Chinese saw him as a ‘traitor’ and criticized him for not speaking Mandarin Chinese. Assuming that racial identities correlate with racial prejudices may also be problematic. For instance, racial groups can internalize prejudices others hold of them. Nonetheless, the advantages of racially diverse decision making bodies may still outweigh the costs.

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941 Because “balance of prejudices” carries the danger of essentializing race and racial prejudices, I wish to emphasize that this is far from my normative purposes.

942 Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2011.
Limitations

The dissertation also has several limitations, three of which I mention here. I address others in the Future Research section below. The first category of limitations is the imperfect alignment between the theory and the empirical findings. Although most of my theoretical expectations were fulfilled, there are two that were only partially fulfilled. In Chapter 5 both the American and European threat perceptions of Japanese FDIUS were racially inflated and this produced discord between them and Japan. However, contrary to the theory’s expectations, transatlantic cooperation against Japan remained modest. More extensive cooperation to restrict Japanese FDI was obstructed by a host of factors, including heightened concerns of being perceived as racist, US liberalization efforts at the Uruguay Round of GATT, liberal economic ideas prevalent in the Reagan Administration, and European coordination problems. Another case where at least at first glance theoretical expectations were only partly fulfilled comes from Chapter 3. British cooperation with the US to end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was partly racial. However, while British threat perception towards the US was racially deflated, that towards Japan was not substantially racially inflated. In this Britain differed not only from the US, but also from British Dominions such as Australia and New Zealand, all of which held racially inflated threat perceptions of Japan. In fact, this finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1 which stresses that racial prejudices related to the body shape threat perceptions conditional on the proximity of racial others. The more remote Britain did not experience the wave of Japanese immigration that the other Anglo-Saxon states did and British racial prejudices were not activated, or at least not to the same extent as
elsewhere. The race literature provides substantial evidence that higher concentration of racial minorities is correlated with more hostile racial attitudes by racial majorities. Nonetheless, one empirical puzzle remains in Chapter 3. It is unclear why US threat perception towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was more racially inflated by Japanese-American racial difference than it was deflated by Anglo-American racial similarity. Why did the US perceive the alliance as threatening knowing that its racial kin was part of the alliance? More research is needed to establish why and when racially inflated threat perceptions trump racially deflated threat perceptions.

Another shortcoming is normative-political. Because of the methodological choice made for the sake of tractability, this study ignores the fluidity of racial identities, as well as difference within racial groups and similarities across them. Therefore, one may worry that the argument homogenizes agents with shared racial identities and is prone to a binary “us versus them” thinking which might legitimate the “clash of civilizations.” Because nothing is farther from my intentions, I wish to emphasize that the normative purpose of the dissertation is to be self-falsifying rather than self-fulfilling. There is nothing inherent in racial identities that would cause discord across racial identities. By showing how racial prejudices embedded in racial identities bias threat perceptions and behavior, I aim to undermine their influence on international politics.

A final limitation or perhaps future challenge to the argument comes from recent developments regarding race in the US (and perhaps elsewhere). Some race scholars

943 Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Evans 1985; Quillian 1995; Taylor 1998. The relationship between majority racial attitudes and racial minority concentration is not fixed, however, but can vary across racial groups and can be moderated by interracial contact (Rudolph and Popp 2010). For limitations of the racial threat hypothesis see Voss 1996.

944 Huntington 1996.
herald a new American racial order brought about by immigration, multiracialism, genomics, and cohort change.945 Although they think the US will not become colorblind, they contend that “social relations are arguably becoming less color-constrained.”946 This potential change is in an incipient phase and the authors are careful to identify blockages that might stifle it. But if the American racial order changes, it will have important implications for my argument. If no racial group will be dominant or a non-white racial group will be dominant in the US, then American patterns of racial discord and cooperation will be very different. An increasing number of young Americans embrace multiple racial identities.947 If they also harbor less prejudice, the explanatory power of this racial theory will be weakened. This would be a welcome development as it would probably imply a better racial future. One concern, however, is that racial categories and prejudices will simply change rather than disappear. Prejudices against multiracial individuals already raise concerns.948 Only time will tell whether the American racial order will change and what the implications will be. My intuition is that at the very least the influence of racial prejudices embedded in racial identities will become much more complex and nuanced.

**Future Research**

There are at least four research avenues that future work could address. First, I am planning to extend the theory to cases where shared racial identity facilitated the

945 Hochschild, Weaver, and Burch 2012.
946 Ibid., 131.
948 Hochschild, Weaver, and Burch 2012, 65.
underestimation of significant threats and caused underbalancing. Much of the dissertation focused on how difference in racial identity facilitated the overestimation of modest threats and in some cases caused overreactions or overbalancing, neglecting underbalancing. One possible direction is to assess whether shared racial identities can provide an alternative explanation for “unanswered threats.” Randall Schweller explains such unanswered threats based on the degree of elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and regime vulnerability. But it may be no accident that his empirical cases involve states with similar racial identities. It may be fruitful to work through these cases to assess shared racial identity could help explain some of them.

Second, future work should look more closely at the relationship between emotion and cognition to expand this racial theory of international politics. Although the dissertation emphasizes the social cognitive dimension of threat perception and resulting patterns of discord and cooperation, the affective dimension probably plays an important role as well. The emerging literature on emotions in IR suggests that emotions can heavily influence perceptions and actions. One particularly promising direction would be to explore how trust can shape racial patterns of discord and cooperation. According to Jonathan Mercer, “Cognition and emotion meet in trust…” Trust facilitates cooperation, which then can feed back into trust, creating a virtuous circle. In Chapter 3 I looked at how shared Anglo-Saxon identity deflated threat perceptions between the US and Britain and facilitated cooperation. However, trust based on shared racial identity

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949 Schweller 2006.
950 Crawford 2000.
951 Mercer 2010, 6.
was important too. I expect that in many other empirical cases racial trust facilitates cooperation among agents with shared racial identity and racial distrust inhibits cooperation among agents with different racial identities. A number of studies found that trust travels better within racial groups than across them. Shared racial identity seems particularly relevant in facilitating a general trusting disposition. If such generalized trust facilitates the emergence of diffuse reciprocity underlying qualitative multilateralism, then race may have interesting implications for deep international cooperation.

Third, future research should examine how Asian states perceived potential threats posed by Western states. Because of language constraints the dissertation looked only at how Western states (and the USSR) perceived potential threats posed by Asian states. If the theory is right that difference in racial identity inflates threat perceptions, we should find that Japan and China saw Britain, the US, and the USSR as a “White Peril”. Indeed, I found several British documents which report that while the West saw Japan’s rise as a “Yellow Peril,” Japan saw Western economic domination and Anglo-Saxon solidarity as a “White Peril.” Other scholars have also reported similar findings. More research would likely unearth more recent evidence of the “White Peril”. Showing how Asian threat perceptions and behavior were also shaped by race

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952 Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Delhey and Newton 2005.
953 Rathbun 2012.
954 This expectation depends on the assumption that the social cognitive processes on which the theory is based are universal. For an argument that East Asians and Westerners rely on different systems of thought and perception see Nisbett 2003.
955 Koshiro 1999, 2; Document 210, entitled “Notes by Mr. Hobart Hampden on the Memorandum by the Secretary in the Political Department, India Office, on Japanese Policy in its bearings on India,” in British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part II, Series E, Vol. 2, p. 171; Document 522, Letter from Mr. Alston (Tokyo) to Sir J. Tilley (Rec’d Nov 11), sent on October 7, 1919, in Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, Vol. VI, p. 763.
956 Duus 1971.
would serve as a reminder that although the superiority of Western material power made white racism more consequential, the West does not have monopoly over racism. Sadly, other racial groups are subjects to it as well. Japanese exclusionary immigration laws, Arab enslavement of Africans, post-Mao Chinese discrimination against blacks, interwar anti-Semitism in Brazil, or the Creole elite’s oppression of Indians in the Andes are only a few examples of non-white racism.\textsuperscript{957}

Finally, the argument could be strengthened by diversifying the types of cases and methods employed. Although the cases show some limits of the racial theory, they are all essentially positive cases, confirming the bulk of my theoretical expectations. The dissertation contains no negative cases, that is, cases where race did not shape patterns of discord and cooperation. I am planning to add a chapter which includes one or more negative cases. This would allow me to better identify the scope conditions of the theory and to mitigate concerns about selection bias. Furthermore, the case for race could be bolstered by adding large N statistical and/or experimental evidence to the dissertation.

\textbf{Are Racial Prejudice and Discrimination Inevitable?}

Having read the dissertation, the reader might wonder whether racial prejudice and racial discrimination are inevitable. The question is particularly important given the nature of my racial theory and recent developments in the interdisciplinary race literature. The theory is structural, where decision makers’ agency is constrained by racial prejudices and their individuality matters little. New research in evolutionary psychology,
anthropology, and philosophy argues that racial categories are not simply socially constructed. Rather, they are the byproducts of innate cognitive properties which emerged during the evolution of the human species to solve particular problems. In addition, the implicit racism literature revealed evidence of increasingly subtle racial prejudices in experimental settings. Based on these two bodies of literature it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that racial prejudice and discrimination are inevitable. I think this is not warranted.

Whether racial categories are based on innate cognitive tendencies and whether we all hold subtle racial prejudices are controversial and difficult questions. A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter, but there are good reasons to think that racial prejudices and discrimination are not inevitable. Although human agency is constrained, it is not irrelevant. Even if we grant that racial categorization has an evolutionary aspect (and this still needs to be conclusively shown), the variation of racial categories across time and space suggests that, at most, innate cognitive tendencies provide boundary conditions for the construction of racial categories, but do not determine the content of racial categories, the particular prejudices associated with racial groups, and the behavioral impact of such prejudices. The main point of the evolutionary approach is not that racism is inevitable, but only that racial categorization is. Yet other scholars claim that prejudice is an inevitable consequence of categorization and

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958 Gil-White 2001; Hirschfeld 1996; Machery and Faucher 2005; Mallon 2010. This literature is unclear about what these problems were.
suggest that “people will be prejudiced so long as they continue to think.” I would argue the opposite: people will be prejudiced so long as they continue not to think. The more they think, the less prejudices will shape their perceptions and behavior.

Experimental evidence suggests that while racial prejudice and discrimination are widespread, they are not inevitable. The literature on cognitive neuroscience and social psychology typically distinguishes between automatic and controlled components of cognitive processing. The automatic component contains racial prejudices, while the controlled component contains more reflective elements such as anti-racist personal beliefs. These studies show that the controlled component of the brain can inhibit the activation of the automatic component (racial prejudices) or at least it can mitigate its impact on behavior. If individuals with anti-racist personal beliefs repeatedly reject their automatically activated racial prejudices, over time the cognitive link between the racial category and prejudices is weakened. The upshot is that their racial prejudices will not necessarily be automatically activated, because they will become less accessible. Even when it is difficult to avoid the activation of subtle racial prejudices, these do not inevitably translate into racial discrimination. Individuals with anti-racist personal beliefs can refuse to act on their prejudices, even when these do get automatically activated.

In sum, although subtle racial prejudice and discrimination are hard to avoid, they are not inevitable. The more aware of their existence we are, the less they will shape our

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961 Billig 1985, 81.
964 Lepore and Brown 1997. Weakened prejudices may nonetheless persist with more reflective personal beliefs, resulting in “dual attitudes” (Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler 2000).
perceptions and actions. This argument points to another potential future research avenue. The dissertation currently neglects variation in racial prejudices across states, groups, and individuals. Incorporating variation in racial prejudices would make for more fine-grained theories, which could provide more nuanced racial analyses of international politics.

**Race, Legitimacy, and the Future of the Liberal International System**

Let us return briefly to the opening image of the dissertation. If the “Man in the Moon” of Raymond Buell’s IR textbook peered down on the world today, he would notice substantial changes. He would still find that the globe is inhabited by people of “different hues.” However, the “Man in the Moon” would be surprised how much the modernization gap between the West and the emerging world shrank. In 1925 he saw “sky-scraper cities, steaming ships, roaring railways, blasting furnaces, soaring airplanes, honking automobiles, and greasy gas-stations” in the West, and “the more leisurely life of the shepherd, the farmer, the huntsman and the nomad” elsewhere. The modernization gap between Western and non-Western states is closing fast and from the Moon it would be increasingly difficult to notice much difference.

From a racial point of view, the current systemic change is not only one from a unipolar to a multipolar system, but also one from a “unicolor” to a “multicolor” system. The power transition from the West to the Rest is one of the biggest changes in modern history.\(^{965}\) Those who define the system in terms of the distribution of power, typically

\(^{965}\) If one takes a longer term view, it is only a return to the pre-modern normality of Asian dominance.
conceive of this change as a shift from American to Chinese hegemony (hegemonic stability theorists), or from unipolarity to multipolarity (balance of power theorists). Yet as discussed in Chapter 1, race has also been an important organizing principle of the international system. The system is defined not only by the distribution of power, but also by what I call the “distribution of color”. Just as dominant domestic racial groups determine the racial identity of the state, dominant international racial groups determine the nature of the system. For much of modern history the international system was dominated by the white West. The current liberal international system originated in the West and integrated the rest of the world on unequal terms. After decolonization the system shifted (at least formally) from racial hierarchy to racial equality. Former colonies joined the international community as (semi-) sovereign states and gained significant influence in international politics. Nonetheless, in terms of the “distribution of color,” the international system remained unicolor in important respects. The West continued to dominate the governing institutions of the system and, with the exception of China, all great powers remained white. This is changing.

How will the shifts in the distribution of power and the distribution of color influence the liberal international system? Buell’s main concern in 1925 was the outbreak of a devastating global racial war. If he was writing today, his main concern probably would be the future of the liberal international system. Indeed, this is the question on the mind of many IR theorists. Is the liberal international system so profoundly Western that it will not survive the relative decline of the West? Or is it, despite its Western origins, a system which is universal and will accommodate the rise of the Rest?
Pessimists think that the liberal system is inextricably intertwined with the West. It was not only born in the West, but it reflects unique Western values and serves primarily Western interests. As Charles Kupchan put it, “The international order that has been in place since the early nineteenth century has been not just of the West but also for the West.”\textsuperscript{966} Just as the expansion of the system depended on Western power, its survival does too. These pessimistic arguments are undergirded by the logic of hegemonic stability theory, where the distribution of power moves in lockstep with the nature of the system’s governing institutions.\textsuperscript{967} Pessimists agree that the decline of Western power will bring about the end of the liberal order, but disagree about what follows. Some expect that Chinese hegemony will replace American hegemony and the racial hierarchic order will change accordingly to reflect Chinese beliefs in the superiority of the Han race.\textsuperscript{968} Others think that because non-Western powers agree only that they do not want Western hegemony, but they do not have an agreed-upon alternative vision of world order, the “next world will be no one’s world.”\textsuperscript{969} Instead of supporting the Western liberal system, they will replace it with a multipolar, fragmented order, which will reflect their anti-colonial heritage.

Optimists believe that pessimists commit a genetic fallacy, where the origin of things is taken to determine their nature. Although the liberal system was born in the West and served Western interests, its current version is not simply a Western order. The expansion and survival of the liberal system are not dependent on Western power alone,

\textsuperscript{966} Kupchan 2012, 72.  
\textsuperscript{967} Gilpin 1981.  
\textsuperscript{968} Jacques 2009.  
\textsuperscript{969} Kupchan 2012, 183.
but also on the universal appeal of its values. This is why optimists like John Ikenberry contend that the liberal system will not be the victim of hegemonic transition. As opposed to other hegemonic systems, the current system is less hierarchical, more open, more institutionalized, and shares its benefits more broadly. For these reasons, it is a system that is “easy to join and hard to overturn.”\(^970\) Brazil, India and other emerging states prefer it to available alternatives. The liberal order is undergoing only a crisis of authority, a struggle over the allocation of privileges and responsibilities within it, not a crisis of its fundamental principles.

Both camps have important things to say, but the middle ground is the most convincing to me. Liberalism has been both complicit in racial oppression and provided instruments of resistance. Pessimists are correct insofar as historically the liberal international system was structured hierarchically by race, privileging the white West. Sovereignty, rights, privileges, and obligations have been circumscribed by race. Charles Mills argued that “we live in a world which has been foundationally shaped for the past five hundred years by the realities of European domination and the gradual consolidation of global white supremacy.”\(^971\) At the same time, optimists are right that it would be an oversimplification to reduce the current liberal system to its Western aspects. Liberalism has always had an anti-racist and anti-imperialist aspect, and provided a valuable resource against oppression.\(^972\) Since decolonization the emerging world has benefited handsomely from the liberal system and gained increasing influence in it. Nevertheless,
more needs to be done if the current system is to become genuinely universal. Many of
the main institutions of global governance are still led or dominated by the West. Not
surprisingly, some provocatively label the system “global apartheid.” According to
Matias Spektor, Brazil believes that “race is a major criteria for deciding who sits and
who decides at the big tables…It is no wonder that Brazilian diplomats in the UN should
refer to the US and Europe (but also allies like Mexico and South Korea) as ‘the whites’.
Much of the drive behind Brazil’s embrace of the BRIC country meetings, the IBSA
summits, and indeed the G20 is to push for global order that looks more like a United
Colors of Benetton ad.” I suspect that other emerging states hold similar views. This
may come as a surprise to many Westerners who, as beneficiaries rather than victims of
the racial hierarchic system, can afford to be less color-conscious.

A multicolor system requires multicolor global governance. As power shifts from
the West to the Rest, the disequilibrium between the distribution of power in the system
and the distribution of color in the governing institutions of the system will grow. As
power shifts to the non-White world, the dominance of a white minority in the global
governing institutions will become increasingly untenable. To ensure the legitimacy of
the system, racial diversity in these institutions must be increased to bring them into line
with the underlying distribution of color. The liberal international system is flexible
enough to accommodate the rise of non-Western states. It showed remarkable flexibility

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973 Richmond 1994.
974 Spektor 2010, 3.
as it was expanded from its European origins to become the first truly global system.\textsuperscript{975} But unless it becomes more racially inclusive, it is not likely to survive.

The historical support for racial inclusiveness comes from the period between 1830 and 1940. Pan-Islamic and pan-Asian visions of world order emerged during the late nineteenth century as a reaction to the West’s turning away from the universal values of Enlightenment and inclusiveness to embrace a more exclusive racial hierarchic vision.\textsuperscript{976} Between 1830 and 1880 non-Western elites in the Ottoman Empire and Japan embraced the humanist liberal values of the West and based their domestic reformist movements on these. However, the Western imperial turn during the late nineteenth century undermined the legitimacy of Western hegemony and prodded non-Western elites to develop alternative visions of world order. Making the liberal international order more racially inclusive might have prevented the challenges posed by the pan-Asian and the pan-Islamic alternatives.

Racial inclusiveness can increase the legitimacy of governing global institutions in at least three ways. First, legitimacy could be increased through descriptive representation. If those who governed the globe were more representative of the racial composition of the world the legitimacy of global governance would be more likely. Research on domestic political representation of racial minorities found that descriptive representation is an important source of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{977} Second, racial inclusiveness could increase legitimacy by leading to better outcomes. Under particular circumstances, racial

\textsuperscript{975} Reus-Smit 2011.  
\textsuperscript{976} Aydin 2007.  
\textsuperscript{977} Phillips 1995; Whitby 1998; Williams 1998.
diversity can increase the quality of deliberation and can improve problem solving, while avoiding the traps of groupthink. Third, racial diversity may increase the legitimacy of governing global institutions by improving their fairness or impartiality. The dissertation shows how racial prejudices embedded in racial identities can bias threat perceptions and ensuing patterns of discord and cooperation. Dominance of global governance by any one racial group increases the likelihood of systemic racial bias in perceptions and actions. Racial diversity could undermine such systemic biases and could provide more impartiality through a “balance of prejudices.”

To be sure, more racial inclusiveness would not be without drawbacks. Descriptive representation may come at the expense of substantial representation, since the shared racial identity between representatives and the represented does not guarantee that the representative would represent one’s interests better than a racially different representative. Racial inclusiveness at least in some cases would increase the number of decision makers in global institutions, potentially rendering decision making less effective. However, given a history of global racial oppression and the shift of power away from the West, bearing many of these costs would be justified to increase the legitimacy of the global institutions of the liberal system.

To ensure that the transition from the unicolor to the multicolor system will be relatively smooth, the West needs to be proactive in making global institutions more racially inclusive. There are some signs that Western grand strategy is on the right track. In 2009 the West initiated the replacement of the Western-dominated G8 with the more

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inclusive G20 as the main forum for global economic coordination. In 2010 the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund agreed to increase votes allocated to developing nations. But other efforts, such as the reform of the UN Security Council, have remained elusive. If the West makes the necessary adjustments, there is a good chance that an open, rule-based, and multilateral liberal international system will accommodate the rise of the Rest. In the ideal case scenario, a re-negotiated liberal order between the West and the Rest would preclude a fragmented “no one’s world” and would lead instead to an inclusive “everyone’s world.”

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Appendix A: List of Texts Used in Chapter Three Content Analysis Formatting

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