PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

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2012

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses the question of progress in international politics. International relations scholarship has been relatively silent on the issue since World War II and conventional wisdom in both academia and the broader population tends to be fairly pessimistic. However, an analysis of the norms, behaviors, and institutions of international politics actually demonstrates a tremendous amount of what most would consider progress over the last two centuries. An incremental evolution of the international system has taken place, evolving from 18th century practices in which territorial expansion, slavery, and colonization were both legitimate and commonplace to a 21st century international community defined by interstate equality, deliberative conflict resolution, and international law that limits the unilateral use of power. Intuitively these appear to be very positive developments for international politics, but they deserve more rigorous treatment to identify how exactly international politics have changed, and why this should be deemed progressive.

Building on Eliot Sober’s definition of “Progress = Directional Change + Values,” I adopt a three-pronged approach that (1) proposes a normative definition of international political progress (i.e. values), (2) empirically demonstrates its
accomplishment over the last two centuries (i.e. directional change), and (3) offers an explanatory theory for how progressive change can be advanced in the future.

I present global collective identity as a normative benchmark for political progress. By looking beyond substantive outcomes to the ways in which patterns of political interaction have changed – shifts in identifications, norms, and rules in the international system – we can begin to gauge the significance and durability of international political change. Specifically, as networks of identification become more inclusive, first at the interstate level and eventually at the global level, the most basic but seemingly interminable problems of international cooperation are ameliorated. Progress, then, can be measured by the salience of international (and eventually global) collective identifications in the system.

The empirical chapters present a historical narrative demonstrating greater international collective identifications over time and the budding potential for global identifications in the future. Starting from the French Revolution, I elucidate the evolution and growing salience of identifications through the Concert of Europe Era (1815-1878), League of Nations Era (1880s-1939), and United Nations Era (1945-Present). Additionally, these chapters reveal a strong correlation between collective identifications and the gradual emergence of procedurally liberal international institutions over the same periods, drawing initial inferences of a mutually reinforcing relationship that are useful in accounting for collective identity formation over time.

Finally, I present an inductively generated theory to explain, in part, how progress has been achieved in the past and how its progression can be continued.
Specifically, I propose a procedurally liberal institutional theory of collective identity formation, elucidating how procedural liberalism’s principles of equality and universality operate to promote collective identifications among institutional participants while simultaneously introducing pressures to expand participation. In sum, I offer an institutional alternative to violent conflict as a catalyst of collective identity formation, thus providing an opportunity for progress to develop more consensually, deliberatively, and peacefully than in prior eras.
For Sara
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The professional and personal support I have received during my graduate experience has been overwhelming, and I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to far more people than I can mention here. The following people have been particularly influential in shaping this document, though all its theoretical, empirical, and typographical shortcomings are, of course, my own.

The intellectual contribution and mentorship of my committee cannot be overstated. As my advisor, Alex Wendt undertook the difficult task of focusing and structuring the wide range of research ideas I introduced in my many dissertation proposals. His comments and criticisms grounded my thoughts and brought much needed clarity and rigor to the project while simultaneously encouraging my intellectual freedom. Alex introduced me to a wide variety of influential literatures I might not have discovered otherwise, and he fostered the courage necessary to tackle a ‘big’ idea that I will continue grappling with well into the future. Ted Hopf’s sobering criticisms coupled with strong doses of encouragement struck a masterful balance for the fragile psyche of a graduate student. He consistently kept me intellectually off balance, often poking where I thought my arguments were strongest and praising where I thought they might be wanting. The committee member who most recently defended her own dissertation, Jennifer Mitzen kept my attention trained on the task at hand and offered a pragmatic foil
to my often nebulous thoughts and ideas. Her questions and comments persistently forced me to crystallize my thought process and more thoroughly explicate my arguments.

I am also indebted to my graduate student colleagues for their support over the years. The conversations around the office and over dinner, drinks, and poker nights with Seth Goldstein, Michael Reese, Autumn Lockwood-Payton, Michael Cohen, Richard Arnold, Byungwon Woo, TongFi Kim, Srdjan Vucetic, Lorenzo Zambernardi, Burcu Bayram, John Oates, Tim Luecke, and many others sharpened my own research ideas and kept me abreast of other research areas in our field. Just as importantly, their commiseration and camaraderie were critical for my own sanity. Additionally, I should thank my literary ‘companions.’ As scholars we stand on the shoulders of giants, and without the intellectual contributions of Norbert Elias, Paul Schroeder, and many, many other tremendous thinkers, my thoughts and intuitions would be poverty-stricken and without foundations.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their steadfast support and encouragement. Aside from my brother’s good-natured teasing about my academic ‘hobby,’ they have all expressed nothing but confidence and pride in my academic pursuits. As an academic himself, my father-in-law has spent countless hours over coffee discussing my research ideas, patiently listening to the typical intellectual and professional angst of a graduate student, and offering sage advice at all the right times. Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Sara. She is my best friend and my rock, whatever may come, and without her none of this would have been possible.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“In the preceding centuries, in which actual progress was already very palpable yet still slow and relatively limited, the idea of further, future progress had the character of an ideal toward which its adherents were striving and which possessed high value precisely as an ideal. In the twentieth century, when actual progress in science, technology, health, the standard of living, and not least in the reduction of inequality between people exceeds by far, in the older industrial nations, the progress in all previous centuries, progress has ceased for many people to be an ideal. The voices of those who doubt all this actual progress are growing more numerous.”

A few years ago I was called up for jury duty. In answer to jury selection questioning I mentioned that I was a graduate student in international relations. This piqued the judge’s interest, and he asked what my dissertation was about. I told him I was writing on progress in international politics. He dryly replied, “That will be a very short book.” Though I simply smiled and waited for the next question, I continued to think about the judge’s remark – not because of what he had said precisely, but rather how his comment merely echoed a sentiment I hear so often from individuals both inside and outside of academia. Most people would agree that the last two hundred years have brought an unprecedented amount of progress in science, technology, economic

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production, and, not least, the fields of health and medicine. Yet there remains deep skepticism about the possibility of political progress, especially at the international level. Conventional wisdom seems to hold that progress in international politics is nonexistent, or even impossible. After all, the 20th century gave us two world wars, unprecedented ethnic genocide, nuclear weapons, and rising global inequality. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and Russia’s 2008 incursion into Georgia only seem to further advance the notion that international politics is still the same old game stacked in favor of the strong, in which world leaders perpetually engage in adaptive dishonesty in their competition for power. The realist research program in international relations (IR) theory expresses this general pessimism more formally. Since, according to the basic tenets of realism, significant change in international politics is either illusory or cyclical and temporary, real progress is impossible. Whether history is an interminable balance of power between adversaries or a succession of hegemonies, the logic of anarchy is self perpetuating and unchanging, and talk of progress belongs to the bygone era of interwar Idealism. Given the horrific turmoil of the 20th century, Gertrude Himmelfarb laments that “this may seem to be the worst of all times to propose this idea [of progress].”

Yet all is not doom and gloom, and we should not let these readily visible, sometimes extremely visceral, events of the 20th century obscure the profoundly positive undercurrents of change in international politics that have been at work for nearly 200 years. Slavery, colonization, and a host of other now-abhorrent customs that were once

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2 See, for example, Almond, Chodorow, and Pearce, eds (1982) and Kagan (2008).
3 Waltz (1979), Mearsheimer (2003)
4 Gilpin (1981)
5 2004:196; Michael Ruse claims that “[the idea of] progress is in eclipse” (1996:36).
considered standard practice in past eras are now proscribed by a robust legal framework that increasingly governs state practices and behaviors. Cooperation and conflict resolution are increasingly mediated multilaterally and transparently, rather than through secret pacts and open war. Despite localized deviations, global life expectancies and educational levels are higher and poverty levels lower than ever before, in no small part due to the diffusion of science and technology, innovation, and trade through the liberalization of international trade and finance. And it appears that growing levels of international cooperation and the recognition of sovereign equality among states has given rise to an emergent sense of international community, or collective identity.\(^6\)

While the international lacks the traditional stability, order, and intense collective identity of the domestic, and international conflict is far from becoming an artifact of the past, international politics do seem to be overcoming the problems of anarchy in important ways.

In this dissertation I directly challenge the skeptical conventional wisdom by proposing that history actually exhibits a tremendous amount of progress in international politics over the last two centuries. Consider the differences between today’s international system and late 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century Europe. The American Heritage Dictionary defines autism as, “A pervasive developmental disorder characterized by severe deficits in social interaction and communication, by an extremely limited range of activities and interests, and often by the presence of repetitive, stereotyped behaviors,” providing a scarily accurate – and only partially tongue-in-cheek – analogy to late 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century

\(^6\) See Ellis (2009) on the term ‘international community’ – a speech act that evokes a common international identity.
international politics. The period was characterized by a handful of immensely powerful individuals repeatedly engaging in war with one another, partitioning weaker European states, and colonially subjugating non-European populations in pursuit of (often short term) self-aggrandizement. Talk was cheap, the primary language of diplomacy was the blunt instrument of war, and the great power monarchs were inwardly fixated on narrowly defined self-interests. Multilateral diplomacy was reserved for dividing the spoils of war, and there was little binding the people of Europe (much less the world) with common purposes or interests. Now contrast this with today’s international order, in which nearly two hundred states continually collaborate through myriad multilateral institutions addressing a wide range of issues of international concern, constructing an international community that operates, however imperfectly, on the ideal of sovereign equality. Talk has important implications for the legitimacy of opinions and of those states that voice them, deliberation and negotiation are important languages of diplomacy, war is the exception rather than the rule, and state interests are increasingly defined within the context of international law and community. While great powers still sometimes opt to pursue their interests unilaterally and their responsiveness to weaker powers’ wishes often falls short of the ideal of sovereign equality, the differences between the eras are truly astounding.

Importantly, I wish to set aside the generally agreed upon progressive developments in science and technology, health, education, and economic production in order to draw attention to developments in the processes of international politics that, I argue, are progressive in themselves. Specifically, this dissertation focuses on two
sustained trends that have profoundly altered the social and institutional fabric of international politics over the last two centuries.

The first has been a social transformation characterized by the emerging sense of international community – or international collective identity – that has increasingly affected the way in which states see themselves in relation to others and how they define their interests. This trend can be briefly illustrated by touching on four successive eras spanning more than two hundred years. During the 18th century, European great power monarchs generally viewed the world as their oyster, often taking an adversarial approach to other great powers and seeing them as obstacles to be overcome in accumulating greater power and security. The cooperation and intermarriage that took place between monarchies were primarily strategic, and though they shared basic social identities as great powers and Europeans, there was little shared sense of community among them. The self-regulating logic of balance of power and dynastic legitimacy that characterized the 18th century international order did nothing to encourage identification, and, indeed, actually rewarded egoistic social roles by casting international politics as a zero-sum game.\(^7\) The revolutions of the late 18th century and the Napoleonic Wars not only changed beliefs about the principles of balance of power – from understanding it as a self-regulating system to one that required management – but also shifted the way in which European states viewed one another. Whereas before there was a clearer delineation between Self and Other that rested on territorial boundaries, the recognition that each state’s fate was bound to the stability of Europe began to blur the line between

\(^7\) Schroeder (1994:3-52)
Self and Other, and in this second era great powers began to adopt social roles that aimed
to achieve the stability and interests of a collective Europe. While differences certainly
remained between European great powers, and between great powers and weaker states
in Europe, the salience of a European collective identity took institutional form in the
Concert of Europe. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 provide initial
evidence of a third era, in which the (still emergent) identity of Europe began to blur to
include other ‘civilized’ states as states increasingly adopted social roles promoting
international law and society. Though it ultimately failed to prevent WWII, the Covenant
of the League of Nations illustrated the growing salience of an international collective
identity among ‘civilized’ states, which helped forge the Allied resistance and presaged
the post-WWII international order. Finally, in the modern era we see states adopting
social roles that would have been inconceivable in past centuries. Following
decolonization, the international system became truly international for the first time, and
in no time in history have states exhibited such a firm commitment to the maintenance
and stability of what has become ubiquitously termed the international community. From
(1) self-aggrandizing European monarchs of the 18th century that put their faith in a self-
regulating interpretation of the balance of power, to (2) 19th century monarchs who
adopted collective social roles for the preservation and maintenance of European order, to
(3) the expansion of the idea of international community to include ‘civilized’ countries
in the early 20th century, to (4) the modern era’s thick international laws, principles, and
norms that continue to promote the adoption of internationally-focused social roles –
there has been a clear shift toward a salient international collective identity over the past two centuries.

The second trend has been an institutional transformation characterized by the incremental construction and proliferation of procedurally liberal international institutions premised on principles of equality and universality. The procedurally liberal character of the post-World War II international order is obvious in the rules and practices of the many international organizations we are all familiar with today (UN, WTO, etc.), but its pedigree in international politics dates back nearly two centuries. Largely restricted to political theory discourses and limited domestic practices in the 18th century, the seeds of procedural liberalism in international practices were first sown in the international congresses collectively known as the Concert of Europe, and have been growing – albeit in fits and starts – ever since. In the successive two centuries, procedurally liberal practices and institutions have proliferated to include a vast array of important security, economic, and social international institutions. Moreover, the proliferation of procedural liberalism has not just been quantitative, but also qualitative. As procedurally liberal international institutions have become more common, they have also become more procedurally liberal in terms of universality and equality. Earlier institutions strictly confined to Europe and only loosely adopting principles of equality (e.g. the Concert of Europe) gave way to institutions with codified rules of equality that welcomed the participation of ‘civilized’ non-European nations (e.g. the League of Nations), which in turn gave way to institutions that, after decolonization, are truly

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8 Defined in greater detail below, procedural liberalism is a minimalistic, or ‘thin’, interpretation of liberalism that is confined to the processes – or procedures – of decision making.
international and vest even greater power in egalitarian decision-making bodies (e.g. the United Nations).

It is from these empirical trends that I develop a theory of progress in international politics. Starting from Eliot Sober’s algorithmic definition, “Progress = Directional Change + Values,” the study of progress must address both normative and empirical issues, and it becomes much more interesting and useful if an explanatory component is included as well. This requires a three-pronged approach, which I accomplish by employing the empirical trends above to bridge a normative assessment of political change and an explanatory theory for continued progress.

This begins with establishing a normative benchmark for progress. What constitutes progress in international politics, and how can it be defined in a way that distinguishes it from the substantive progress we have witnessed in health, technology, material production, etc.? In short, I propose a procedural definition of progress rooted in global collective identity (GCI) formation, in a political sense. This places normative emphasis on social and institutional developments that encourage shifts in political identity toward the construction of global political community. Not only does this ideal possess the intuitive appeal of global community and justice that forms the foundation of cosmopolitanism in IR theory; from a pragmatic standpoint, it also holds the potential to ameliorate some of the longstanding barriers to international cooperation that are continually debated in mainstream IR theory, including collective action problems, distributional conflict, and political instability – especially in times of rapid political
change. While there are tradeoffs that must be taken into account when proposing a significant alteration in political identities, I aim to provide a procedural, rather than substantive, benchmark by which we can normatively assess political change over time.

My normative argument leads directly to an assessment of the empirical record in international politics over the last two centuries, asking: has progress occurred? The empirical component of my project seeks to accomplish two goals: 1) demonstrate the incremental emergence of international collective identity since the French Revolution as well as more recent developments in GCI formation, and 2) illuminate the procedurally liberal institutional pathway these developments have followed. Toward these ends I present three historical case studies of successive eras that seek to capture and make sense of both the social and institutional trends outlined above. Historical treatments of what I term the Concert Era (1815-1878), the League Era (1880s-1939), and the United Nations Era (1945-Present) provide a detailed analysis of changing political identities at the international level and institutional developments in international security regimes, from which I draw inferences about the relationship between collective identity formation and the expansion of procedural liberalism in international institutions. Ultimately, I illustrate how the last two centuries exhibit significant steps toward GCI, primarily through the development of international collective identifications in the 19th and 20th centuries and an emergent sense of global identity – evidenced in the importance of human rights and security and greater attention to global governance structures – in the 21st. Additionally, my analysis provides preliminary evidence of their mutually

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9 It is, after all, the potential to actually achieve normative goals that distinguishes social scientific normative theory from utopian musings (Prozorov 2009:243).
reinforcing relationship, by which changing political identities create space for the development of procedurally liberal international institutions, which in turn appear to reinforce and expand the scope and domain of collective identifications.

Placing my normative contention in historical context – and hopefully showing that progress, as I define it, has been palpable over the last two centuries – immediately begs the question: how are these empirical trends causally related? The final prong of my argument, then, entails developing an explanatory theory of collective identity formation. For this I take an institutional approach, proposing that procedurally liberal institutions act as socializing arenas that are particularly adept at encouraging broad participation and producing collective identifications among participants. Building on Jeffrey Checkel’s work on institutions as sites of socialization and Alistair Johnston’s institutional socialization framework, I hypothesize that the institutional rules and practices of procedurally liberal institutions are particularly well-suited to promote collective identifications through both persuasion and more pragmatic mechanisms of social influence. The causal component of my theory is necessarily circumscribed – it is particularly useful for recent historical periods when international institutions more faithfully evince procedurally liberal principles (universality and equality), and brackets the causal pathways by which collective identities promote institutionalization – but it draws out testable hypotheses for institutional effects on political identity. It is here that policy implications of institutional participation, and the promotion of procedurally

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liberal institutional rules and practices, can be considered in light of the normative component of my argument.

Ultimately, by linking the normative and explanatory aspects of progress by way of the empirical, I take a holistic approach to the question of progress – what is it, has it occurred, and how can it be achieved/continued? But before defining my terms and laying out my argument and the dissertation chapters in more detail, we should first explore the idea of progress and its place in IR theory.

**Progress in Political Thought**

Though it has all but disappeared from contemporary international relations discourses, the idea of progress has played an integral role in the development of the social sciences over the last several centuries and remains an important – if now primarily implicit – consideration for IR theorists and policy makers alike. Dating back at least to the Enlightenment period of early modern Europe, ideas of social and political progress were intimately related to the ascendance of humanism and scientific rationality that characterized the era, providing the initial motivation for and ultimate objective of systematic studies of social phenomena. As social inquiry became secularized and causal effects were attributed to both agents and institutional structures, the possibility of social and moral improvement became increasingly apparent and important. The accumulation of knowledge offered its own rewards, but the promise of progress provided a purpose for constructing a scientific framework for understanding individual motivations and social structures. This normative motivation took many forms – developing more efficient
social institutions, constructing more just political orders, and even attempts to perfect human nature – but for all of them the idea of progress served as a humanistic motivation and objective that could be pursued through the scientific study of social and political interactions.\textsuperscript{11}

In the centuries following the Enlightenment scholarly work on international politics often combined explanatory treatments of political phenomena with explicitly normative objectives, coupling an account of existing political orders with ideological and/or policy-relevant prescriptions. This vision of the social sciences’ place in politics and society extended well into the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and, indeed, reached a fever pitch in the aftermath of World War I. Rather than demoralizing political thinkers and policy makers, the devastation of WWI motivated many (primarily Western European) international scholars and political elites to ‘double down’ on an idealist notion of progress. It was believed that the proper configuration of international laws and institutions could alter the behavior of political actors and achieve desirable outcomes (i.e. avoid devastating conflicts in the future). The League of Nations, Permanent Court of International Justice, Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the many other international laws and institutions constructed during the 1920s – as well as the establishment of IR as a discipline at Aberystwyth in 1918 – were manifestations of this ideal championed by international scholars and lawyers and political elites.

\textsuperscript{11} See Bury (1920), Pollard (1968), and Nisbet (1980) on the importance of ‘progress’ in the development of the social sciences during and following the Enlightenment. See Ross (1991) on the role of progressive thought in American social sciences prior to World War I.
Of course the outcome of these endeavors is well known; what some might term idealist overreach aided the rise of the Third Reich and contributed to the onset of World War II. Of particular interest here, however, are the lessons drawn from the most devastating conflict in history. The political elites of the victors continued to press ahead, albeit more cautiously, with normatively-motivated visions of social improvement, or political progress. The post-WWII order that emerged bore a striking resemblance to that of the interwar period, though with a more pragmatic assessment of power distributions and the enforceability of international law. In contrast, the lessons taken from the political upheaval of the 1930s and WWII profoundly altered the field of international relations. Still a young field attempting to credibly establish itself as a social science, IR underwent a transformation that brought about the segregation of normative and explanatory analyses in the study of international politics and all but banished the notion of progress from academic discourses, particularly in the American academy. Two significant shifts in IR, one theoretical and one methodological, highlight the general hostility that emerged toward the study of progress.

The ascendance of Realism in IR scholarship in the late 1930s and following WWII directly challenged the possibility of progress in international politics from a theoretical perspective. E.H. Carr’s seminal work offered a damning critique of Idealism as a naïve and dangerous attempt at social engineering. While directed specifically at the liberal internationalist tenor of international politics at the time, it more generally criticized normative aims in the study of politics and the belief that the processes of

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12 1939
international politics could be molded by international law and institutions. More formally developed by Hans Morgenthau and a host of more contemporary scholars,\(^{13}\) Realism dominated IR during the Cold War and continues to hold a prominent position in IR theory today. Whether ascribed to human nature or the structure of international politics, Realism’s ‘logic of anarchy’ suggests an interminable struggle for power among nations that essentially denies the possibility of significant change (a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for progress) in the international system. And while other research programs have forged ahead with theories of change in international politics, especially in the last two decades, specifically addressing the idea of progress apparently remains taboo.\(^{14}\)

The behavioral revolution and the concomitant ‘scientization’ of IR methodologically segregated explanatory and normative theory, further squeezing the idea of progress from IR discourses. As a consequence, a division of labor between IR theory and political theory emerged, particularly in the American academy.\(^{15}\) With an eye to understanding change and continuity in international politics, IR theory primarily concerns itself with the ‘realities,’ or explanatory aspect, of politics, while political theory is usually associated with the normative issues of morality and ethics.\(^{16}\) In other words, the discipline has partitioned the study of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ often neglecting

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\(^{13}\) For example, Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981), Mearsheimer (2001), among many others.

\(^{14}\) See Adler and Crawford (eds, 1991) and Haas (1997) for notable exceptions.


\(^{16}\) Walker (1993), Frost (1996), and Cochran (2000) offer persuasive arguments for taking normative theory seriously in IR. I do not address this important debate here, except to point out that this division of labor presents an obstacle to merging normative and explanatory arguments.
the usefulness of ‘praxeological’ analyses that explore the relationship between empirical realities and moral possibilities.\textsuperscript{17} The result of this division of labor has been a dearth of literature on progress that encompasses both its explanatory and normative aspects in the realm of international politics.\textsuperscript{18} As it straddles the normative-explanatory divide, it is easy to see how the study of progress has fallen through the cracks.

\textit{Why Progress?}

While these shifts in IR since WWII certainly go a long way toward explaining the dearth of literature on progress in international politics, they in no way diminish the \textit{importance} of its study in IR theory. Ironically, the purging of progressive discourses from IR theory largely stemmed from a conflict premised on dueling conceptions of progress – that between liberal internationalists and German and Japanese nationalists. Assuming progress to be impossible in international politics is as great a fallacy as the overly optimistic ambitions of interwar Idealists, and to neglect the question altogether – even in the name of science and objectivity – may be worse than both. Normative considerations are an inherent part of policy making as well as political theorizing; to neglect them in order to remain ‘realistic’ or ‘scientific’ is to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

This drives directly to the basic purpose of social scientific research and should call into question the stark separation between normative and explanatory theorizing in

\textsuperscript{17} Linklater (1998:5)  
\textsuperscript{18} This is not to say that IR theory completely neglects the normative or political theory cannot have empirical grounding, but rather one side is usually asserted by assumption in order to focus attention on the other. See Price (2008:192-3) for more on this point.
IR. As an academic enterprise, social scientific research is charged with not only uncovering how the world works, but also with exploring the possibilities for change and potential for improvement. And though they are often cloaked in objective language, social scientific research agendas are pregnant with normative values. As Robert Cox has famously noted, “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose,” or as he put it in a more recent title, “The Point Is not Just to Explain the World but to Change It.” Of course these words should always be read with a healthy dose of pragmatism – causally focused research has contributed immensely to our understanding of how the world works, and scholarship that expresses explicit normative goals should be held to the same rigorous standards as explanatory scholarship, and maybe more so when they advocate radical change. However, social scientific research – IR included – is inherently explanatory and normative. The segregation of explanatory and normative theory is an artificial one. While it has been in many ways a useful division of labor, it cannot (or should not) be reified in a way that discourages or discounts scholarly attempts to bridge the two and construct theories that more fully capture the essential purposes of scientific inquiry. IR theory is a living, breathing, reflexive enterprise; to discount its reflexivity is to drain it of its vitality and utility.

Yet, for all the potential offered by a normative/explanatory synthesis, resistances to the literatures’ reincorporation have evolved over time, presenting problems for an integrative approach to international political progress. In IR theory, justifications used to reject normative theorizing have been improperly applied to the subject matter of

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19 1981:128 (emphasis in the original); 2008:84.
(primarily American) IR theory, leading many scholars to erroneously ignore the importance of normatively driven international political practices in their theoretical models.\textsuperscript{20} Most notably manifest in neorealism and neoliberalism, rationalist research programs discounting social aspects of international politics dominated IR through the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, and continue to be the predominant foundation for empirical IR theory in this one. Political theory, on the other hand, has come to suffer from what Richard Price terms “an undue divorce of ethics from power,” leading to two extremes in normative theory – the liberal, Habermasian pole, and the critical, Foucauldian pole.\textsuperscript{21}

The liberal pole of political theory, Price argues, is utopian in that it tends to disregard, or bracket, issues of power and lacks practical mechanisms by which the international is transformed from ‘is’ to ‘ought.’ Without a roadmap from point A to point B that is sensitive to international power dynamics, agreeing upon the proper course of incremental political changes toward the liberal end goal becomes all but impossible.

Conversely, the critical pole tends to suffer from policy paralysis due to its ability to identify forms of domination and control in virtually any political configuration, meaning that even critical theory-induced change will lead to new configurations that inevitably have their own insidious power arrangements. This raises uncomfortable and fiercely contested issues over which forms of domination and control are ‘better’ than others, and for whom; and which political changes will incrementally lead to progress, versus those that represent regress or generate structural resistances to future change. However, the

\textsuperscript{20} See Ashley (1984), Walker (1993), and Ruggie (1998) on this point. There are, of course, notable exceptions, including the ‘proto-constructivisms’ of Deutsch (1954), Haas (1964), and Keohane and Nye (1977/89).

\textsuperscript{21} Price (2008:211); These poles represent the extremes, whereas there are, again, exceptions, including Wheeler (2000) and Tan (2004).
many roadblocks erected in IR and political theory against a normative/explanatory synthesis appear to be a result of the evolution of the fields and ongoing paradigm wars rather than an intellectually grounded refutation of the inherent connection between the empirical and normative worlds and the reflexivity of the social sciences.

For those less inclined to philosophy of science arguments, this has real world implications for the policy field as well. Ironically, policymakers appear more acutely aware of the limitations imposed by this normative/explanatory division of labor than IR theorists. In constructing policy, they must reconcile the realities of international politics with the normative motivations of the nation on a daily basis. This in part explains the similarities between the post-WWI international order and that which followed WWII; political elites recognized the weaknesses of the League but remained committed to its underlying principles. Policy making is indeterminate without normative motivations, and by neglecting them in their research IR scholars necessarily limit their own usefulness. E.H. Carr saw this as a clear limitation of his own formulation of Realism:

“Consistent realism excludes four things which appear to be essential ingredients of all effective political thinking: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment and a ground for action.”

And continues with:

“Every realist, whatever his professions, is ultimately compelled to believe not only that there is something which man ought to think and do, but that there is something which he can think and do, and that his thought and action are neither mechanical nor meaningless.”

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22 1939:89
23 Ibid:93
These limitations can be applied to explanatory theory more generally, in that it only offers insight into one half of the political decision making equation. This ultimately leaves it to policymakers to mesh sometimes-incongruent normative and explanatory frameworks in forming policy, which can lead to sub-optimal results.\textsuperscript{24} While not feasible in all cases, when causal arguments can be complimented with normative ones, IR scholars provide more holistic, coherent, and possibly more useful frameworks for policy making. Metaphorically speaking, in eschewing explicitly normative arguments mainstream IR enters the political fray with one arm tied behind its back.

More specifically to the issue of progress, this points to the importance of progressive discourses in political decision-making and underscores the value of producing intellectually rigorous theories that bridge the normative/explanatory divide. State elites, like all individuals, are guided by conceptions of progress – what they imagine to be desirable outcomes in political interaction shape their strategic behavior toward these results. History is defined by the evolving contestation of differing interpretations of progress, which served as underlying motivations for Napoleon Bonaparte, Klemens Wenzel (Prince von Metternich), Woodrow Wilson, Adolph Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and all other elites alike. Some interpretations are deemed more desirable and others more despicable, but any normative assessment of them itself flows from a particular idea of progress. By constructing theories of progress that provide both normative ideals and explanatory theories for how they are achieved, IR

\textsuperscript{24} See, for example, Goldsmith (2008) on the misapplication of democratic peace theory in recent U.S. attempts to promote democracy through the use of force.
scholars can offer (what we hope to be) more intellectually rigorous formulations of the 'ought,' and explicitly show how we might get from 'here' to ‘there’ in a way that is both practical and desirable. Conversely, when international politics is theorized in amoral terms or when the possibility of progress is denied due to the self-help nature of international politics, it can very well contribute to amoral policy-making and the maintenance of the international political status quo – unwittingly perpetuating a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Moreover, the current state of international politics only serves to emphasize the point. After twenty years of unipolarity the United States remains the most dominant state in international politics and possesses somewhat unique advantages in preserving it in the near term. While the predictions for a relatively swift return to multipolarity have not been borne out, shifts in geopolitical and economic power have raised questions about its sustainability in the future. If these shifts continue, what will the future of international politics look like? One potential outcome might be that emerging powers such as China, Russia, and others will choose to work within the framework of the existing liberal international order to pursue their interests. Another might be a return to multipolarity and great power conflict, or an international system remade in the image of a new hegemon. Regardless, how international politics take shape in the coming decades will be a result of the strategic behaviors adopted by the U.S. and rising

26 Mearsheimer (1990), Layne (1993)
27 See, for example, Pape (2005) and Zakaria (2008).
29 Mearsheimer (2001), Wohlforth (2009)
powers, which in themselves are motivated by normative beliefs of state elites. At root, conceptions of progress held by the U.S. and rising powers will determine whether the U.S. will aggressively confront rising powers unilaterally or focus attention on strengthening the rules and norms of the existing international order, and whether rising powers will work within the existing structure or seek to overthrow it. These conceptions of progress are not arbitrarily constructed, but rather reflect the accumulated knowledge and belief systems of state elites. It is here that work on the idea of progress in IR becomes useful in contributing to the state of knowledge in our field and more fully developing understandings of international politics that combine the normative and explanatory, helping elites both frame their interests and determine their strategies.

What the above discussion suggests is that the idea of progress, as a research field, offers a bridge between normative and explanatory theorizing that reconnects IR theory to its original purpose. It is not an attempt to trivialize the differences between normative and explanatory theory, or to argue for the superiority of normative theory or the ‘descentization’ of IR theory, or even an attempt to merge the two. Rather, the study of progress represents a focal point around which the realities of contemporary international politics can be fused with the moral possibilities available in a given time and place to lend our research greater traction in understanding current trends and effecting political change. It is this line of research that motivates the theory of progress presented here, which can be understood as one cut into conceptualizing progress, identifying it in international history, and understanding its development.
Beyond the Cosmopolitan/Communitarian Debate

One of the most common questions about my project, and one that deserves attention before moving forward, is whether it is cosmopolitan or communitarian in nature. To this I reply ‘both.’ I advocate international community building through the development of international norms and institutions that provide agents with mutually recognized networks of knowledge and practice that provide a common (political) culture for social interaction. In this sense, my argument is communitarian. At the same time, my commitment to a procedurally liberal approach to international collective identity formation identifies the individual as the subject of progress. In this sense, my argument is cosmopolitan. However, I suggest that the mutual constitution of agency and structure requires moving beyond a singular focus on the individual or community in normative theory. To clarify what I mean by this, I briefly lay out the major positions of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, while remaining cognizant of the fact that each encompasses a variety of authors and perspectives. I then demonstrate how a social ontology of mutual constitution provides formal justification for the increasingly pragmatic turn in the literature, suggesting that a full account of social processes requires borrowing from both ends of the spectrum.

The cosmopolitan/communitarian debate is driven by differing beliefs about the proper subject of justice, with the former privileging the individual and the latter the community. Chris Brown characterizes cosmopolitanism as “the refusal to regard

existing political structures as the source of ultimate value.”

Starting from an individualist ontology, the cosmopolitan agenda seeks to dismantle what it deems to be artificially constructed exclusionary identity boundaries in order to realize universal principles of justice. Positing individuals as prior to society, cosmopolitans attempt to identify and emphasize those pre-social aspects of agents that form the locus of universal morality and community. While his political vision of republican peace among sovereign states stops short of the more common aim of tiered sovereignty with an explicit international component, Kant’s commitments to individual rationality, cosmopolitan law, and a universal morality represent the core ideals of cosmopolitanism.

Conversely, communitarianism asserts that “value stems from the community, that the individual finds meaning in life by virtue of his or her membership of a political community.” Originally constructed as a critique of Rawlsian liberalism, communitarianism implies a structural ontology with its focus on the role that shared practices and traditions of community play in the construction of individual moral and political beliefs. By positing that individuals are social products, communitarianism rejects cosmopolitanism’s pre-social, ‘unencumbered subject,’ cautioning that the deconstruction of social norms and institutions that reinforce differences among groups endangers the very concept of self by exposing individuals to the “hell of an infinite

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31 (1992:24); also see Linklater (1998).
32 Rawls (1971), Beitz (1979)
33 See, for example, Pogge (1992).
34 Brown (1992:55)
35 See, for example, Sandel (1982), Walzer (1990, 1994b), Jordaan (2006)
openness.” The communitarian emphasis on the role of community as the source of moral and political beliefs also rejects the universalistic project of cosmopolitanism. If social meaning and values flow from the social practices and traditions of community, they are by definition particularistic, and thus there is no Archimedean Point from which to objectively arbitrate between the moral superiority of one community over another.

Aware of the ontological assumptions involved, the literature has taken a decidedly pragmatic turn that threatens to collapse the debate in on itself, and, moreover, a social ontology of mutual constitution provides a formal justification for such a synthesis. Cosmopolitanism has shifted away from Kant’s universalism and Rawls’ Archimedean Point by recognizing the role community plays in constructing and maintaining moral and political frameworks. This is evident in the rising concern for pluralism in cosmopolitan literatures. Communitarianism, on the other hand, has always displayed an implicit pragmatism in its recognition of the imperfect nature of existing social structures. By proposing normative arguments for altering the way in which communities address difference, communitarianism expresses a cosmopolitan concern for basic individual rights that belies its particularism while simultaneously illustrating the ability of individuals to critically reflect on the social structures around them. For example, while William Connolly’s anti-cosmopolitan concept of agonism calls for respecting pluralistic difference rather than constructing assimilative moral frameworks, he nevertheless presents agonistic respect as a normatively valued code of

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38 See Cochran (2000) for a cosmopolitan/communitarian synthesis based on Dewey’s pragmatism.
conduct with seemingly universal applicability.\textsuperscript{40} Simply put, an individualist ontology alone cannot sustain cosmopolitanism’s vision of international community and a structural ontology alone cannot sustain communitarianism’s concern for safeguarding pluralistic rights, leading the debate into a pragmatic gray area that is more about matters of degree than of kind. Importantly, constructivism reveals this pragmatism to be less about a compromise away from diametrically opposed poles than a budding realization that the poles are subsumed by their mutual constitution. Moderating cosmopolitanism, this suggests that morality and ethics are not universal, though they may be universalizable. Moderating communitarianism, this suggests that community may be a primary source of morality and ethics, but that the development of existing communities required the destruction or incorporation of prior ones in the same way that new forms of community will challenge existing ones, and that such a process is often driven by the critical reflection of individuals that initiate social change. Normatively, this translates into a need for a synthesis that appreciates the role both individuals and communities, or agents and structures, play in constructing, reproducing, and changing moral and political frameworks.

Michael Walzer writes “we can never be communitarians or liberals simply, but now one, now the other as the balance requires.”\textsuperscript{41} While the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate provides a helpful heuristic device with which to understand the agential and structural foundations of our normative concepts of justice

\textsuperscript{40} Connelly (1991/2002)
\textsuperscript{41} (1994b:191)
and progress, I find it more useful to move beyond the labels of the debate in order to take a more holistic approach to progress that synthesizes the two.

**Defining and Measuring Collective Identity and Procedural Liberalism**

Before detailing the layout of the argument, it is necessary to provide definitions for the dissertation’s key concepts.

**Collective Identity**

Collective identity, like all forms of identity, cannot be directly observed but only inferred from the behaviors and declarations of actors. This can lead to differences in precise definitions, but the basic premises are often similar. Identities are simply those biological and social traits that make us who we are, or the collection of personal and behavioral characteristics that establish our understanding of ourselves and make us recognizable to others. Apart from the physical separation of our biological entities, it is the unique collection of identity traits that defines our individuality.

This establishes a sense of the personal Self while simultaneously positioning actors within larger social groupings and the corresponding social roles actors adopt or are assigned within them. As Jacques Hymans points out in his summary of social identity theory (SIT):

> …a person has not just one, “personal” self, but rather several selves that correspond to ever-widening circles of group membership. Different social contexts may trigger an individual to think, feel and act on the basis of (for example) his personal, family, regional, occupational, partisan, or national “level of self.”

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42 2002:4; also see Brown (2000).
Furthermore, our identities are socially constructed and malleable. Though they only exist to the extent to which they are ‘carried around in our heads’ as subjectively held beliefs about who we and others are, how we interpret our own identities and those of others is strongly influenced by the social context within which we find ourselves. In other words, identities are intersubjectively ‘taught’ through socialization and contested in everyday discourses, which encourages symmetry between the way in which we identify ourselves (and others) and how others identify us (and themselves).  

Additionally, identities are variable in that they are “always in process, always contested, always an accomplishment of practice.” Some social identities are thin and transient while others endure, but they are all continually reproduced and/or changed through social interaction, and their salience varies according to social context. The point is that they are variables rather than constants, and that they are strongly influenced by the social fabric in which they are embedded.

Collective identity refers to those ‘levels of self’ beyond the personal that are cognitively recognized and salient to the individual. More specifically, it is a particular cognitive process by which pre-existing distinctions between Self and Other become blurred, expanding the domain of Self to include prior Others and reconfiguring interests according to these new collective identifications. In SIT this process is more familiarly known as group identification, by which actors’ subjective association with an ‘in-group’ leads them to adopt the interests of the group and behave in a manner that promotes

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43 See, for example, Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Searle (1995).
44 Wendt (1999:340)
45 See Legro (2009) on identity plasticity in international politics.
46 Wendt (1999:229)
them. Collective identifications are an integral part of our daily lives, and their indispensability is obvious in the large inventory of collective identifications each one of us holds. Our interests are routinely informed by our attachments to family, friends, sports teams, social clubs, political parties, nations, and a plethora of other groups that we deem important.

This also underscores the fact that there is not just a single collective identity but rather multiple identities ‘competing’ for salience in the minds of actors. For a given issue and social context numerous ‘levels of self’ come into play, and an actor’s interests and behaviors are a function of relative identity salience – or the hierarchy of identities that defines the actor. In this dissertation I am specifically interested in political identities that hold salience for international politics, and I focus particularly on national, international, and global identifications. While the concept of national identity is well-known and its basic meaning probably evident, the distinction between international and global identity for this project is less so. Here I refer to international identity as collective identifications forged among states. This focuses on the state-as-actor and entails identifications between political elites or nations. Global collective identity (GCI), on the other hand, focuses on individuals as the basic unit of concern and implies a deeper shift in the constellation of political identities in international politics. Whereas international identities can be constructed among states and remain relatively distinct from (largely domestic) national identifications – though salience contestation certainly takes place between the two – GCI directly challenges both in important ways. At the

47 See McDermott (2009) for a recent review and application of Social Identity Theory.
domestic level, it encourages denationalization by reorienting individual’s political identities and interests toward a more inclusive, global political community. At the international level, GCI challenges the state’s privileged position in international politics by encouraging transnational (or ‘trans-state’) identifications, which problematizes the state-centricity of global politics. So while international identity implies a higher ‘level of self’ and creates a hierarchical, dichotomous competition for salience with national identity between the domestic and international levels, GCI deemphasizes the inside-outside divide between the national and international. Ultimately, I will argue that it offers a ‘third way’ for international politics under which the state’s ontological status as principal actor is deconstructed, giving way to institutions of global governance in which the state plays an increasingly intermediary role between the individual and global politics. But for now these distinctions between national, international, and global identity should suffice to move forward.

To ascertain collective identifications I use Alexander Wendt’s four master variables presented in *Social Theory of International Politics*: interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint. Wendt presents these as causal variables of collective identification. He contends that the objective conditions of interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity serve as efficient causes of collective identity by creating an environment that encourages actors to recognize their positional similarities and come to see themselves as being a part of a larger in-group. The fourth variable, self-restraint, is a behavioral decision that checks actors’ pursuit of those self interests that may appear

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48 See Zurn and Walter (eds, 2005) on processes of denationalization in response to globalization.
49 1999:343-66
to run counter to the interests of the group, which can serve as a trust-building mechanism that signals commitment to the collective and encourages others to follow suit. Wendt also points out that these variables, when measured differently, are themselves constitutive of collective identity. The *subjective* recognition among actors of interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity establishes the cognitive bases of group identification, while the practice of self-restraint (and, even more so, behaviors that actively promote collective interests) evinces the salience of collective identification by demonstrating its relative primacy within an actor’s hierarchy of identities.

In order to demonstrate collective identity formation in my empirical chapters I employ these four variables in both their causal and constitutive variations, though the sheer number of actors involved necessitates relying more on the former than the latter. In each era under study, I note the objective conditions under which states find themselves in terms of interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity as a measure of structural conditions that can promote collective identifications. Additionally, I provide a sampling of evidence for states’ subjective awareness of these conditions, usually with a focus on ‘major players’ and those actors that appear resistant to identifications or revisionist toward the contemporary international order. This provides rough boundary conditions for the potential salience of collective identifications and their dispersal among relevant actors. Finally, I draw attention to important instances of self restraint, or behaviors that demonstrate actors foregoing actions that would appear to be in their self-interest in order to further collective aims. Often this will include additional evidence of actors going beyond self restraint (or non-action) to actively behaving in ways that
contribute to collective interests. The first three variables represent necessary background conditions for robust identifications while the fourth allows us to more concretely infer intentions and identities through the actions (or inactions) of actors.

Admittedly, this is a relatively thin and indirect gauge of collective identification, but it is one that appears to best fit the purpose and scope of this study. Recent scholarship on social identities has resulted in more robust formulations for measuring collective identifications. For example, one innovative approach defines and measures collective identifications in terms of their content and contestation, which encompass an identity’s meaning, constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models. This approach certainly provides scholars with a nuanced understanding of a particular identity and places them in an excellent position to predict the changing contours of the identity over time. Ideally, I could conduct a thick identity recovery for each actor in the analysis: probing domestic discourses, foreign policy papers, and government policies to establish identity benchmarks for each era and process tracing changes in policies and behaviors that may indicate interest and identity change. However, while such a rigorous approach to identity measurement and recovery would certainly prove more robust, the number of actors and extended time period covered by this study render such it impractical. Alternatively, I could conduct such an identity recovery for a small selection of actors, but this would blind us to the broader shifts in identifications that I propose are taking place, missing the forest for the trees.

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50 Abdelal et al (2009)
Attempting to chart general patterns in political identifications between the national and international over two centuries of international politics, the specific contours and content of international collective identifications are less important (and less practical) than the relative salience of and more general shifts in identifications among a large number of actors over an extended period of time.

Additionally, I should point out that my empirical analysis conspicuously lacks the focus on discourse that is traditionally associated with identity studies. Instead, I train attention on actors’ actions and behaviors and what they reveal about their interests and identities. While I include a number of important statements and telling quotes, talk is often cheap in international politics and actions are often better indicators of intensions and beliefs. Indeed, a relatively ‘silent’ approach to identity recovery may prove more convincing by examining whether actors actually ‘walk the walk’.

_Procedural Liberalism_

Procedural liberalism can be defined and measured more precisely than collective identity, though caution must be taken to avoid its conflation with the broader liberal research agenda in political theory. Procedural liberalism is a processual approach to deliberation that promotes _equality_ among participants and _universality_ in representation. It is an ideal type for governance that, borrowing from Ernst Haas, “employs decision-making procedures that provide for the representation of all major social and economic interests and ideologies and allow almost unrestricted discussion” with “voting procedures that prevent the tyranny of majorities and minorities,” and is premised on the
idea that “[t]he evolution of contested values into shared values cannot begin with the unilateral assertion of the superiority of a single one.”\textsuperscript{51} It is also akin to John Ruggie’s qualitative definition of multilateralism, which entails coordination among states “on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct – that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.”\textsuperscript{52} In other words, procedural liberalism is a processual institutional framework for making decisions, establishing norms, and implementing laws among actors (usually states in this analysis) – always with a focus on its dual core principles of equality and universality.

To measure equality I seek to identify the formal relative status of participants in the institution. There are many ways in which this can be measured, including voting rules, agenda setting powers, and enforcement duties. For this analysis I focus on the first. While many factors go into determining the equality of participants, voting rules are a core indicator of equality in that they are a direct determinant of institutional outcomes and, as other institutional conditions can be augmented through procedural votes, other factors of institutional status are in many ways dependent upon them. In order to measure universality I train attention on the requirements for participation to gauge institutional inclusiveness. In other words, given an institution’s policy scope (e.g. local, national, regional, global), to what extent are all relevant actors represented in the decision-making process? This becomes a fairly straightforward task of inferring the domain of relevant actors from the purposes and goals provided in an institution’s

\textsuperscript{51} 1997a:20
\textsuperscript{52} 1992:571
founding treaty or charter and comparing this with the (sub)set of actors invited to participate.

Neither of these variables is dichotomous. Equality can vary from one actor having unilateral decision-making powers (classical empire), to weighted voting that favors more powerful actors (the UNSC), to voting equality among collective actors (the UNGA), to voting equality among relevant individuals (imperfectly captured by democracy at the domestic level; a global congress at the international?). The level of universality can equally vary from the inclusion of only a small subset of relevant actors in decision-making processes (the Concert of Europe), to a broad but nonetheless exclusive club of decision-makers (the League of Nations), to the inclusion of all relevant actors (the UN). Importantly, as my analysis is an attempt to capture institutional trends over time, it is not the absolute value these variables take so much as the level of equality and universality institutions adopt relative to those that proceed and succeed them that is of primary interest. Procedural liberalism represents an institutional ideal type that has never been achieved at the international level, and still only imperfectly in democratic regimes at the domestic level. However, there are numerous shades of gray between procedural liberalism and its opposite (unilateralism, empire?) that can be captured with these measures.

Procedural liberalism should not be conflated with the broader concept of liberalism in political theory. Though as an ideal of governance it shares liberalism’s commitment to equality in and access to decision making processes, procedural liberalism takes a ‘thin,’ analytical approach to liberalism that is largely devoid of its
traditional normative and substantive implications. My usage of procedural liberalism is
descriptive and instrumental. It defines a particular framework for decision-making that,
I argue, is generative of political collective identifications. While I briefly explore its
normative desirability at the end of Chapter 2, this rests on the instrumental utility of
procedural liberalism in achieving GCI in a relatively peaceful manner. The inherent
desirability of procedural liberalism is something I may appreciate, but for my immediate
purposes it is something that remains outside the parameters of my broader normative
argument for GCI. Additionally, procedural liberalism addresses processes of
deliberation rather than substantive beliefs and outcomes. It is not necessary that
participants in procedurally liberal institutions hold liberal values or intentions. Nor is it
required that institutional outcomes should be liberal in nature. The scope of procedural
liberalism is trained exclusively on the positional structure of deliberative processes, and
therefore quite distinct from many of the broader implications of liberalism.

Dissertation Argument and Layout

This dissertation provides a systematic, three-pronged approach to developing a
theory of progress in international politics. Three questions are posed: how should we
define progress, is progress thus defined evident in international history, and how can
further progress be accomplished moving forward? I address these in order. The first
prong of my argument proposes global collective identity (GCI) as a normative
benchmark and argues that movement toward this ideal constitutes progress in
international politics. The second prong empirically investigates the last two centuries of
international history to reveal shifts in political identity toward the international and, in recent decades, the global. It also draws attention to the concurrent development of procedurally liberal international security regimes and draws preliminary inferences concerning the relationship between collective identity formation and procedural liberalism. The third prong presents an explanatory theory premised on the inferences drawn in the empirical chapters. Bracketing the effects of collective identity on institutional formation, I focus attention on the ability of procedurally liberal institutions, as socializing arenas, to redefine political identities toward more inclusive conceptualizations of political community. Taken together, they provide the normative, empirical, and explanatory bases for a theory of progress in international politics.

Chapter 2 addresses the normative component of progress. I begin by taking stock of the (few) contemporary works on progress in international politics and calling into question the viability of substantive definitions of progress that have been adopted in the literature. Instead, I adopt a procedural approach to progress that focuses on the ‘deeper,’ more enduring undercurrents of change in political identifications, proposing GCI formation as a benchmark for progress. While arguments for GCI, or global community, are not new to the literature (e.g. cosmopolitanism), I elucidate a justificatory framework more familiar to mainstream IR theory by directly addressing the benefits of collective identity in ameliorating longstanding barriers to cooperation in international politics, namely its positive effects on collective action problems, distributional conflicts, and issues of political instability. Conversely, I also address some of the concerns held about global community and the specter of assimilation that often frames them, with
particular attention paid to how depoliticizing cultural difference can allow for GCI formation within a world of cultural pluralism. Finally, I foreshadow the empirical chapters by discussing the multiple realizability of GCI and highlighting the apparently incremental, procedurally liberal character of collective identity formation over the last two centuries. There are many pathways to achieving GCI, though I briefly flesh out how some might be more viable and desirable than others. In sum, I intend to show that, while GCI is not a panacea for all the world’s ills, it does offer an attractive alternative to the current nationalistic international order.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are historical case studies providing an empirical assessment of collective identity formation over the last two centuries. They proceed with two goals in mind: 1) to capture significant shifts in political collective identifications between and within eras and 2) explore the relationship between collective identity formation and the international security regimes that loosely define the eras. Together they illustrate the incremental development of collective political identifications beyond the state toward GCI and suggest the importance of successively more procedurally liberal international security regimes in solidifying and deepening them.

Chapter 3 analyzes what I term the Concert of Europe Era (1815-1878), focusing on the collective identifications forged and the security regime constructed among the Great Powers of Europe (Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia) following the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. During this period the Great Powers exercised unprecedented self-restraint in subordinating immediate national interests to the collective interests established among them at the Congress of Vienna in order to
maintain general peace on the continent. Additionally, for the first time in European history the Concert introduced a (relatively thin) procedurally liberal approach to conflict resolution by establishing forums in which the Great Powers deliberated as formal equals and according to unanimous consent. Though the many revolutions within smaller states in Europe, asymmetric domestic political reforms among the Great Powers, and the Eastern Question ultimately led to the unraveling of the Concert, the era established important precedents for collective identifications beyond the state and for procedural liberalism in constructing international security regimes.

Chapter 4 assesses what can be termed the League of Nations Era (1880s-1939). The era’s roots lay in the nationalistic turn in European politics in the latter 19th century, which contributed to the deconstruction of collective identifications among Europe’s Great Power monarchs while simultaneously opening discursive space for new constellations of political identifications. Even as it destabilized the Great Power-centric congress system, nationalism provided the smaller states of Europe and some non-European states a basis from which to demand recognition as legitimate players in international politics. However, it was only after the devastation and emasculation of World War I that most states appreciated their position within an interdependent community of nations bound in many ways by a common fate, which emphasized the need for concerted and collective action. This budding international collective identity among many of the world’s ‘civilized’ nations institutionally resulted in the League of Nations, whose procedurally liberal framework encouraged most member states to subordinate national interests to the collective maintenance of international peace and
stability. Though the League was unable to forestall the revisionist intentions of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, the political community it represented defined the battle lines of World War II and significantly shaped the post-WWII international order.

Chapter 5 captures significant advances in international collective identity and procedural liberalism following WWII and touches on preliminary signs of an emerging GCI following the Cold War. Illustrating how the political identifications forged in the interwar period contributed to the relatively quick development of the United Nations system, I highlight its role in catalyzing decolonization and expanding the notion of international community to include all self-governing nations – the point at which international politics truly became international, three centuries after the Peace of Westphalia. It is in this era that institutions appear to exert their influence most powerfully, helping to define the boundaries of ‘international community’ and socializing states to view national interests within the context of collective ones. This is no more so than in the post-Cold War period, in which the UN has been instrumental in attempts to recast international politics as global politics. Toward the end of the chapter I address reform proposals that seek to incrementally expand the UN’s purview from state rights and international security to include human rights and security issues, and efforts to bring non-state actors (e.g. NGOs and/or population-based, rather than state-based, legislative assemblies) into the decision making arena. Though still very young in their development, these proposals hint at an institutionally-driven attempt to engineer global, in addition to international, perceptions of political collective identity.
While the empirical chapters demonstrate progress in collective identity formation at the international – and recently global – level, which has institutionally manifest itself in the emergence of procedurally liberal security regimes, the role of conflict in catalyzing identifications has been both decisive and normatively problematic. Moreover, the diminishing opportunities to revise the international system through open warfare – particularly with the advent of nuclear weapons – have made it empirically problematic as well. Thus, Chapter 6 proposes an institutional theory that elucidates how specifically procedurally liberal institutions can structure and channel socialization in ways that strengthen and expand notions of political collective identity. Specifying the causal effects of procedural liberalism’s dual principles of institutional equality and universality, I call attention to the two-step process they introduce: institutional equality spurring collective identity formation among institutional participants and universality empowering discourses that seek to broaden the inclusiveness of institutional forums. Taken together the theory suggests that, once empowered, procedurally liberal institutions can potentially encourage collective identity formation among participants while simultaneously widening notions of participation from the current state-centric international order toward a population-centric global order. Indeed, Chapter 5 provides preliminary evidence that such a process may already be taking place.

Finally, in Chapter 7 I reflect on the implications my theory of progress – both normative and explanatory – holds for the field of IR and for international politics. This, I hope, will underscore how the study of progress should not be thought of as a free floating research program hovering in the void between traditional IR and political
theory, but rather one that can be integrated into current research in IR and political
theory and provide a potential bridge between the two for future praxeological research.
Additionally, I propose future lines of research on the idea of progress more generally
and explore potential ways in which to specifically test my causal theory.
Chapter 2: The Progressiveness of Global Collective Identity

This chapter is concerned with establishing a definition of progress in international politics. In many ways progress is the basis of all politics; it represents the broader normative goals that constitute interests and provide a foundation and entry point into the strategic logic of political interaction. Conceptions of political progress are readily apparent at the national level in that they provide an ideal point, the ‘national interest,’ from which foreign policies are crafted and implemented. From this perspective international politics can be framed as a complex network of interactions between competing notions of progress that lead to cooperation, negotiation, and/or conflict among states, spurring learning processes that affect strategic choices as well as states’ underlying identities and interests.\textsuperscript{53} While national conceptions of progress traditionally form the baseline for studying international politics, progress can alternatively be assessed in a more holistic manner by establishing a measure that can be applied to the global system as a whole.

This, in my opinion, is the appropriate scope for defining and assessing political progress. As humans we all share in a common life experience. Our life arcs, from birth to death, are guided by physical and social environments that define and pattern our development through processes of socialization that are strikingly similar. We all make

\textsuperscript{53} See, for example, Finnemore (1996).
sense of the world through cognitive and affective interaction with those around us. We all find ourselves embedded in social structures defined by particular rules and norms, languages, and cultural histories. We all must confront the competing demands that come with the many identities and social roles we adopt, or have foisted upon us. While socialization processes certainly differ between societies – so much so that they can even alter how individuals cognitively process information\textsuperscript{54} – the accumulated knowledge in a variety research fields such as physiology, sociology, and psychology appears to confirm that the ‘likeness’ between human beings outpaces the cultural differences that have sedimented over time. As a species our DNA make-ups are virtually identical, our purportedly diverse modes of social organization are constructed on similar basic principles of social interaction, and as individuals we share in many of the same essential biological and social needs.

Therefore, in the arguments that follow, I measure political progress within the context of the global population by recognizing the essential characteristics that define the human race as a single whole, or a single community. Importantly, this should not be construed as papering over the cultural diversity that has always and continues to differentiate populations. Though these differences are socially and historically contingent, they have very real consequences for the individual and collective interests and beliefs that constitute political interaction in its current, principally nationalistic form; and contingence often means very little to an individual within society, for whom many aspects of the social world appear inelastic or even static. To ignore them would

\textsuperscript{54} Fiske et al (1998)
be overly idealistic as well as poor social science. Rather my initial purpose is to simply justify a global perspective as a starting point for defining and assessing political progress.

Specifically, I propose global collective identity (GCI) as a benchmark for progress in world politics. GCI implies a political community fully inclusive of the global population that entails a shared interest in and commitment to the rules and norms of governance. Whereas national identity defines and underpins modes of governance that are deemed more or less legitimate at the domestic level, GCI implies collectively held beliefs about proper governance at the global level. This, I argue, is progressive insofar as it constitutes a global political community that can significantly ameliorate some of the most basic dilemmas in international politics. When interests are perceived within the context of a global community – and political interaction is defined by collectively held rules and norms – the likelihood of normatively desirable, or just, political outcomes increases. In other words, GCI reduces the salience of priorly constructed barriers to identification and cooperation at the global level (e.g. nationalism) and establishes a foundation of collective interest and trust among actors, providing opportunities to avoid conflict and achieve the benefits that result from cooperation.

This is a provocative thesis, immediately raising concerns about GCI’s desirability and the cultural homogenization it suggests as well as its feasibility given the current international order. Therefore, this chapter proceeds systematically in four sections, cautiously and incrementally constructing an argument for the progressiveness and realizability of GCI. I begin by reviewing previous analyses of political progress.
with the purpose of distinguishing between existing definitions of progress rooted in substantive outcomes and my own, procedural, approach to progress. Next, I take a step back from GCI (global collective identity) in order to assess collective identities more generically, elucidating their benefits for in-group members as well as the significant problems, or ‘negative externalities’, they produce. I then return focus to GCI. While section two implies the benefits and desirability of GCI once achieved, section three directly addresses concerns about cultural assimilation and how GCI formation can be reconciled with the current pluralism in international politics. Finally, the fourth section addresses the feasibility of GCI. Foreshadowing the empirical chapters with a cursory analysis of international history, this section suggests that GCI is not only feasible but that movement toward its realization may already be underway.

It is essential to note that this chapter is not intended to provide an objectively ‘correct’ normative theory of progress and social order that will end all further discussions of progress. Rather, I am attempting to make a case for the desirability of GCI over other constellations of political communities and interactions. A global political order will have its warts like any other, and I highlight some of them below. I would suggest that the appropriate means of assessing my argument follows from a relative comparison of political orders and communities. Specifically, how does the normative desirability of a global order defined by a salient political GCI stack up against the current international order, prior political orders in history, and other potential configurations of political identification short of GCI?
Defining Progress in International Politics

Attempting to define international political progress appears, at least initially, akin to asking to be poked in the eye with a sharp stick. If politics is principally about contestation, how can I pretend to offer a definitive definition from which to work? The answer is simple: I can’t. Runners can measure progress in minutes and seconds, pitchers by improvements in their ERA or other statistics, and basketball teams by trends in wins and losses and point differentials. These are all sports analogies, and they seem to hint at a lesser known reason for sports’ popularity. In sports the rules are clear and the objectives unambiguous. Their attraction lies in their simplicity and straightforwardness, which allows us to immerse ourselves in the simple excitement of competition without the nagging doubts or moral complexities that often follow us in our daily lives. Real life is not so clear cut. For example, how should a small business owner define and measure progress for herself? A larger bottom line, the amount of time she is able to spend with family, her workers’ safety and morale, the environmental impact her business has on local waterways? Or how should schools define and measure educational progress? Enhancing information retention, honing critical thinking skills, encouraging independent thought? Or how should countries define and measure economic progress? In terms of total GDP growth, income equality, charitable donations? Everywhere we look our understandings of progress are contested not only in how we seek to measure it, but in how we conceptualize and define it in the first place.

So while an ‘objective’ definition of political progress may be unattainable, not all definitions are created equal. Some definitions are probably deemed more broadly
desirable and more feasible than others. Advocating greater living space for the German people has been tried before with devastating consequences and would likely meet with even greater resistance were it tried again, while a beauty queen’s call for world peace draws as many sniggers as it does applause. The trick is to offer a definition that can potentially achieve broad consensus as to its desirability as well as its feasibility. As J.B. Bury wrote in his masterful work on the subject, “The idea of human Progress then is a theory which involves a synthesis of the past,” which defines what is possible, “and a prophecy of the future,” which defines a desirable destination.55

As a constitutive element of political discourse the idea of progress has been around as long as civilization itself, but only since the Enlightenment has it become an explicit engine of socioeconomic and political thought. Bury’s survey of the subject demonstrates how the idea of progress has dominated philosophical and scientific inquiry since the 16th century as scholars have attempted to define societal goals and/or develop mechanisms for their achievement. Critical of the cyclical pattern of social development adopted by the Ancients as well as the principle of divine will that informed philosophical debates during the Middle Ages, Enlightenment thinkers often viewed social change through the lens of humanistic progress, which varied greatly between Fontenelle’s idea of progress through the steady accumulation of knowledge, Condorcet’s notion of individual equality among all peoples, and Votaire’s incremental approach to progress – in many ways foreshadowing the Hegelian dialectic – as successive clashes

55 (1920:5)
and changes of opinion that would steadily eliminate the prejudices of man.\textsuperscript{56} Through a prism of contemporary thought and morality some seem more pernicious and others more just or enlightened, but nevertheless political thought has become increasingly concerned with the idea of perfecting society through social engineering. Maybe better than anyone else, Michel Foucault exemplifies how the idea of progress has come to insinuate itself into the everyday facets of modern governance through his lectures on governmentality. Simply put, governmentality captures the steady rationalization of politics that has transformed governance by (1) utilizing available knowledge power to (2) construct apparatuses of security designed to (3) shape and achieve the wants and desires of the population.\textsuperscript{57} In other words, the function and legitimacy of the modern administrative state rests on its ability to efficiently produce the desired outcomes of the population – or its ability to achieve particular definitions of societal progress.

Yet, for the many ways the idea of progress has influenced how we perceive, think about, and inject ourselves into the social world, we are still left with a collection of unsatisfying definitions of political progress. Ideas on perfecting human nature would seem a little too unworkable. Fontenelle’s focus on knowledge accumulation appears too circumscribed. Hegel’s concept of the historical dialectic is instructive, but he seems to have thought that it had come to its conclusion in the Prussian state (something few would agree with today), while the specificity of Karl Marx’s vision of progress – exclusively focused as it was/is on class identity – has left many skeptics in the wake of 20\textsuperscript{th} century communist experiments. Kant, like Hegel and Marx, has suffered criticism

\textsuperscript{56} ibid, 108-113 212-5, and 148-53, respectively.
\textsuperscript{57} Foucault (1991:101-4)
for his teleological view of progress, and his ‘end point’ of republican peace appears incomplete in light of modern international politics. The list of political philosophers could go on and on, but I think my point – that the idea of progress has been instrumental in shaping political thought for centuries past even as a single definition has yet to ‘rise to the top’ – need not be further belabored.

Now, bringing the idea of progress into clearer focus for and grounding it in current mainstream IR theory, it is useful to consider contemporary attempts to define progress. The idea has received scant attention in IR since WWII, largely due to the retreat from Idealism and the push to ‘scientize’ the study of politics discussed in the introduction. However, two works on international political progress emerged in the 1990s that reflected the cautious optimism in IR following the Cold War, both of which help frame the definition I put forth here. These were Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford’s edited volume, *Progress in Postwar International Relations*, and Ernst Haas’s two volume work, *Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress*. Both works advance similar, substantive definitions of progress. The first defines progress as “changes in the pursuit of states’ national interests in ways that further human interests…. defined here as security, welfare, and human rights for individuals,” while Haas defines it similarly as “directional change for the better” and, more specifically, “healthy, wealthy, and relatively peaceful life.” Both works also advance similar arguments for the process by which progress is achieved, namely through a process of cognitive evolution that is

58 Wendt 2003
59 1991, and 1997 and 2000, respectively. The edited volume is actually dedicated to Ernst Haas.
60 Adler, et al (1991:2) and Haas (1997:9, 10, emphasis in the original), respectively.
driven by elites’ disappointment in outcomes and reinforced by interdependence. For Adler, actually borrowing from Haas’s earlier works, cognitive evolution is a neofunctionalist learning process by which actors accept a “collective descriptive and normative set of understandings of what it takes to advance the nation’s power, influence, and wealth,” and it is “progressive when an awareness of interdependence engenders a further awareness of limits and obligations.” Similarly, while he does not explicitly use the term cognitive evolution, Haas also employs a neofunctionalist learning process by which actors, in the face of rising complexity, develop bases of consensual knowledge that allow for mutual interest formation and cooperation.

While the works differ in their empirical focus, they both view progress as an emergent process, the causal forces of which emanate from the changing beliefs and interests of domestic elites as they construct consensual knowledge. Haas addresses the fluidity of nationalism and specifically liberal nationalism, emphasizing the role of scientific knowledge and Western rationality in creating a common framework for producing shared meanings, which lay the foundations for constructing collective interests. Adler and Crawford’s edited volume constructs a less historically focused and culturally contingent narrative, with the authors assessing progress in various contemporary issues, including international conflict and trade, nuclear proliferation, human rights, and environmental protection. Nonetheless, they both share a common causal framework for progress: in an international environment characterized by increasing complexity and interdependence on issues of security, trade, and human rights,

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62 (1997:5-9)
states (or, more specifically, domestic elites) realize disappointment in the conflicts and sub-optimal outcomes resulting from their pursuit of national interests in traditional ways, which catalyzes a learning process that encourages elites to reshape national interests in ways that conform to collective ones. This learning process, in turn, leads to instrumental progress in the construction of international regimes and institutions that formalize interdependences, encourage cooperation and deliberative conflict resolution, and, ultimately, contribute to the substantive well-being of the world’s population. While this greatly simplifies each work’s argument and cannot convey the pragmatism with which they address contemporary problems of international conflict and cooperation, it does faithfully capture the causal frameworks they present.

Taken together, these works brought progress back onto the IR radar and made important contributions to our understanding of the concept. At the same time, they shed light on hitherto unexplored aspects of progress that I take up in this study. We can distill the following from these works in order to draw contrasts with my conceptualization of progress. First, both define progress in substantive terms. Second, both focus on cognitive evolution as the process by which progress is achieved. Third, both theorize the effect changes in elite beliefs have on international cooperation and, in particular, international institutions. The theory I propose here, in contrast, defines progress as procedural change, frames the process of progress in more specific terms of collective identity formation, and (as will be laid out in Chapter 6) reverses the causal arrow, focusing on the causal effects international institutions exert on collective identification. Let me take each difference in turn.
My definition of progress is procedural, focusing on significant changes in the social configuration of international interaction over time rather than changes in substantive outcomes. While substantive goals such as health, wealth, and peace, or security, welfare, and human rights are probably ones that most would intuitively agree with, their achievement does not necessitate an underlying shift in international interaction. For example, Haas’s definition could conceivably be accomplished through imperialism, under which subjects’ material requirements are met at the price of political rights; and Adler et al’s definition could conceivably be accomplished under traditional hegemony, which might provide the substantive requirements of progress but is, ultimately, only a temporary period of order in a cyclical pattern of conflict and peace.

While both appear to imply deeper shifts in the social configuration of international politics through cognitive evolution that preclude the progressiveness of imperialism or traditional hegemony, such shifts are not formally introduced with the substantive benchmarks for progress from which they begin. Circumscribing their definitions of progress to relatively easily measured outcomes may very well be a reflection of the division of labor between normative and explanatory theory that has characterized mainstream IR theory since WWII. I would venture to guess that Haas and Adler et al’s substantive focus is, in part, an attempt to quickly establish consensus on a normative benchmark in order to focus the bulk of their attention on the explanatory aspects of their theories, which is their primary concern.

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63 Haas (1997a:10)
64 Adler et al (1991:2)
Regardless, the cosmopolitan view of progress that I adopt – shifts in collective identifications toward a global political community – reflects changes in the social relationship between actors. This approach underscores the significance of structural changes in international politics that, while in many ways implying the substantive goals presented in these other works, instead focuses on a process-oriented framework for durable change for the better. Improvements in substantive outcomes might be progressive, but they could very well be the product of technological or economic progress rather than anything political. After all, better health, wealth, and security might come during times of politics as usual, or even at the cost of political freedoms. By zeroing in on the underlying shifts in political interactions and processes, we can isolate political progress from other forms of progress. Politics is a procedural beast, concerned as it is with the ongoing interaction between actors, so a definition for political progress should be procedural as well.

As just mentioned, however, Haas and Adler et al. go beyond their formal definitions of progress to suggest that a particular process, namely cognitive evolution, holds the key to achieving substantive progress. In this light my focus on collective identity formation is not so much a departure from these works as it is a further specification of the process itself. Collective identity formation, as defined in the introduction, is a particular cognitive process by which pre-existing distinctions between Self and Other become blurred, expanding the domain of Self to include prior Others and reconfiguring interests according to these new collective identifications.65 Interests come

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65 Wendt (1999:229)
to reflect the well being of the group, resulting in the adoption of group categorizations and social roles that seek to advance the collective interest. Defined in this way, collective identity formation represents a *particular direction* in cognitive evolution, which does not formally imply specific directionality or desirability on its own. Cognitive evolution involves learning, but what is learned is left wide open – it is a generic process for change. One might imagine this could cover all matter of sins, but I do not think this is what the authors had in mind. While both Haas and Adler et al draw on cognitive evolution as a generic catalyst for changing beliefs and interests, more specifically it appears to be processes of collective identification that catalyze their notions of *progressive* change.

Up to this point I have made a case for a procedural approach to defining political progress. But why should we care about the process of collective identity formation and, more specifically, GCI? And why should we think of it as progressive?

**Collective Identity in Political Interaction**

In order to recognize the unique nature and desirability of a salient *global* collective identity it is useful to first take a step back and consider collective identifications more generically. Where are they located in society and politics? How do they affect political interaction? And are they, in and of themselves, desirable aspects of political life?

To speak of collective identifications is not to engage in idealistic musings about how, against the competition for power that defines the realist paradigm, we can
reconfigure political interaction in order to rise above politics and all just get along. Collective identifications are actually all around us, embedded as a social element of political interaction from the very local, to the national, international, and sometimes even the global. There is not just one political collective identity but many. They oftentimes overlap and their relative salience varies across time and space. As Alexander Wendt points out, “[i]dentification is usually issue-specific and rarely total,” varying in intensity and according to particular socio-historical contexts.66

Their effects on political interactions and outcomes are deep and complex. They constitute political communities by structuring interaction and behavior both within and between communities, and an analysis of the constellation of identifications defining a particular set of interactions can help predict outcomes. The importance of collective identifications in understanding political interaction has long been established, and contemporary research continues to confirm it. Nearly two hundred years ago Alexis de Tocqueville famously noted the importance of strong civic bonds within local communities for the success of democracy in the just-established United States; Robert Putnam’s seminal works on civic associations in modern Italy and the United States have confirmed and elucidated the role of local civic engagement in constructing and sustaining political community.67 Since its emergence in the late 18th century revolutions in the United States and France, nationalism’s preeminent role in shaping domestic and international politics has been so well catalogued that exemplars are hardly necessary. At the regional (international) level, Kant’s work on republican governance in constituting

66 (1999:229)
67 de Tocqueville (1835/2003); Putnam (1993, 2000)
political communities between states has endured in more recent scholarship on security communities, the democratic peace, and international collective identity. And recent patterns of globalization have motivated a growing body of work on global community, both at the institutional level of global governance structures as well as grassroots movements in transnational civic community.

What we can draw from this is fairly clear – that the importance of collective identifications in shaping political interaction as well as our understandings of politics more generally is not so much in question as their ability to achieve normatively desirable political outcomes, particularly from a global perspective. From one point of view collective identifications can appear to be what most of us would consider desirable. By introducing collective interests and establishing trust relationships between individuals, populations sharing in collective identifications can cooperate more easily to overcome material hardships and social discord. Their salience can facilitate the construction of markets, which can help populations aggregate knowledge and resources to feed, shelter, and supply themselves against the vagaries of nature; they can help establish social tranquility and protection from external aggression; and they can smooth the process of constructing legitimate laws and norms that form the backbone of political stability.

From another perspective, however, collective identifications introduce what can

69 See, for example, McQuillan (ed, 2008) and Florini (ed, 2000) respectively.
70 See, for example, North (1990). While Douglas North’s primary focus is trained on economic and political institutions that sustain the market, they are themselves made possible by shared interests, norms, and beliefs.
71 See Axelrod (1984) on how altruistic behavior can be evolutionarily advantageous by increasing the survivability of the group.
72 For example, Hurd (1999).
euphemistically be termed negative externalities. Strong group identifications can create in-group biases and an insular community that results in harming the status and interests of non-members. This might include economic cartelization, social othering or ostracization, ethnocentrism or political discrimination/disenfranchisement, or jingoism and physical/military belligerence against outsiders.73

In other words, collective identity can be thought of as a double-edged sword in that it often results in an inside/outside divide.74 As probably the most salient political identity over the last two centuries, nationalism offers perhaps the best example of this. The ability of national identity to bridge differences and sustain a stable socio-economic and political order among a relatively large population simultaneously underscores differences between national populations that can lead to disagreement and discord – domestically and internationally. In IR great emphasis has been placed on the ‘problem’ of nationalism as a barrier to international cooperation and peace.75 Indeed, we need look no further than the fascist movements of interwar Europe to recognize this. Yet Ernst Haas and others have pushed back on this to some extent, pointing out the virtues of nationalism in stabilizing domestic society and ordering international politics.76 Particularly in IR – where our focus is on the international – the negative externalities of nationalism are more readily apparent than its potential virtues. While Haas’ efforts to bridge national interests with international ones – through liberal nationalism – tacitly

73 See Henri Tajfel’s edited volume (2010) for an updated overview of the intergroup relations literature in social psychology. Walker (1993) points out how the inside/outside divide between the domestic and international has become reified in political theory, leading to theories in IR that are largely devoid of the moral and ethical considerations often found in domestic political theory.
74 Walker 1993
75 Mercer (1996) provides a forceful example.
76 Haas (1997)
acknowledge the inside/outside tensions national collective identity tends to create, his defense of nationalism reminds us of the dual nature of not just nationalism, but virtually all collective identifications.

In order to probe the normative desirability of collective identity more rigorously, I find it useful to frame its desirable aspects in terms more familiar to mainstream IR. Specifically, collective identity can be viewed as offering a credible, if only partial, resolution to three enduring dilemmas in contemporary IR theory – collective action problems, distributional conflicts, and political instability. Collective identifications fundamentally alter the traditional logic of self-interest and strategic behavior that underpin these dilemmas, thereby ameliorating their intensity to the extent to which collective identifications are salient for a given population. Let us examine each of the three dilemmas in turn.

Collective action is thought to be severely limited in international politics due to the pernicious incentives such endeavors create for participants. As Mancur Olson famously points out, collective action is not only impeded by divergent interests but also by incentives to ‘free ride’ even when interests coincide. Even when participants share the same goals, self-interested actors will always try to have their cake and eat it too by avoiding its obligations and letting others carry their burden, which will inevitably lead to the unraveling of collective efforts. Two rejoinders to Olson’s collective action problem have come from hegemonic stability theory and neoliberal institutionalism. The first theorizes that a hegemon can overcome the problem by either taking upon itself the costs

\footnote{Olson (1965)}
of providing public goods or coercing others to fulfill their obligations in their provision. Conversely, Robert Keohane and others argue that institutions can readily take the place of the hegemon, creating an organizational framework that clearly delineates goals and obligations, provides information sharing and transparency as disincentives to free riding, and codifies methods of enforcement to punish transgressors. Importantly, both take as given the egoistic nature of interests, modifying instead the incentives to free ride or defect through power differentials or the norms and rules of governing institutions. In other words, both treat the symptoms rather than the problem. But how would the incentive structure change if the interests of participants were variable or, more specifically, if interests were collective rather than just coinciding?

From this perspective, collective identity can ameliorate collective action problems by bringing actors’ interests into alignment, reducing the incentives to free ride, and minimizing the fear that others will defect. This is accomplished by reconfiguring actors’ interests away from the traditional, egoistic Self and toward the collective. As collective identifications gain salience, actors adopt social roles that seek to accomplish collectively defined interests of the group. It is no longer the case that their self-interests merely coincide and thus provide an opportunity for cooperation, but that their self-interests actually become synonymous with the interests and well being of the collective. Under these circumstances, the traditional incentives to free ride or take advantage of

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78 See, for example, Kindleberger (1973) and Gilpin (1981).
79 See, for example, Keohane (1984) and Oye (1985). Ikenberry (2001) attempts to bridge the two.
80 See Wendt (1994) for a more detailed analysis of collective identity’s effect on collective action problems.
other actors within the cooperative framework are reduced to the degree to which the collective identity holds salience. This goes beyond the conventional notion of altruism, in which an individual sacrifices her own interests for those of the group. Within the context of a highly salient collective identity altruism itself is nonsensical since there is no apparent sacrifice being made – the self-interests of the individual are the interests of the group. The presence of collective identity and its degree of salience for a particular situation is, ultimately, an empirical matter. However, what is important from a normative standpoint is that collective identity offers a durable response to the collective action problem, which undoubtedly represents a desirable outcome for those who constitute the collective. Indeed, when we consider the disparity between the immense amount of collective action at the domestic level and the meager level of cooperation at the international level, the tremendous opportunity costs due to a lack of cooperation in international politics are readily apparent.

Distributional conflict represents a second, and related, dilemma in international politics. Whereas collective action can suffer from free riding and defection when undertaken for the provision of public goods, when undertaken for the provision of private goods distributional concerns add an additional impediment to successful cooperation. Even when actors’ interests coincide and issues of free riding and defection can be resolved, realists contend that concerns over the relative distribution of gains will

81 Experimental research in social psychology (e.g., Brewer and Kramer 1986; Kramer et al 1993; De Cremer and van Vugt 1998; Fiske et al 1998; Simpson 2006) and behavioral economics (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 2005; Charness et al 2007) has overwhelmingly confirmed the positive effect of ingroup identity on collective action.
continue to inhibit collective action. While institutionalists have worked to qualify and minimize the importance of relative gains – pointing out that it can vary according to group size and issue area, among many other conditionals – the basic issue remains an enduring dilemma when self-interest is taken as a given. But, again, what if the nature of participants’ interests were variable?

Collective identity can ameliorate distributional conflict in much the same way as basic collective action problems – reorienting actors’ interests toward the collective so as to diminish the intensity of distributional concerns. As with collective action, the extent to which distributional conflicts are reduced by the effects of collective identity is a matter of the identity’s relative salience. While collective identity is rarely totalizing and thus distributional conflict will rarely be eliminated, collectively shared interests may present checks on the extent to which actors will press their claims. This may mean that, excepting the most extreme circumstances, the disputing actors may be governed by shared norms of nonviolent conflict resolution, and possibly follow a pre-defined course of negotiation or arbitration to resolve distributional concerns. When actors share a perception of common fate and interests, they are much less likely to engage in the destructive behavior that has made distributional conflict a primary catalyst of war in international politics, and more likely to resolve the distributional concerns that can hinder collective action.

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83 Snidal (1991) and Rousseau (2002), respectively.
84 See Baldwin, ed (1993) for a thorough treatment of the distributional challenges to cooperation.
While we can easily imagine the benefits of reducing the more direct form of distributional conflict – those over existing social and material goods – collective identity can have similarly pacifying effects on disputes over the allocation of potential costs and benefits of collective action. Existing distributional conflicts are certainly very apparent and can be overtly destructive, especially when they concern indivisible goods, but the costs of distributional conflicts that render attempts at collective action stillborn are possibly more significant even as they are less visible. James Fearon points out that, perversely, achieving collective action becomes more difficult as the potential benefits from cooperation increase due to distributional concerns. This implies that the progressiveness of collective identity with respect to distributional conflict goes deeper than merely pre-existing conflicts.

In some ways subsuming the prior two dilemmas, political instability represents somewhat of an overarching meta-problem for the field of political science that is particularly challenging for IR. Whether we are discussing international instability between states or the sharp rise in domestic instability (i.e. civil war) since the end of the Cold War, political instability varies across time and space but its presence in some form is constant. Politics is essentially defined by contestation over material and social power – who has it, who should have it, how should it be employed, etc. To imagine a world without this contestation is almost unthinkable and doing so conjures images of famous dystopic novels from the 20th century. I am not suggesting that collective identity can somehow rid the world of political instability and contestation. However, I am

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85 See, for example, Vasquez (1993), Fearon (1995), and Gilady and Russett (2002).
86 (1998)
suggesting that it can ameliorate some of the devastating consequences of such instability by encouraging actors to engage in diffuse reciprocity and practice self-restraint when attempting to alter or revise the existing political order.

Within the social boundaries of a shared identity, uncertainty about the intentions of others is reduced, diminishing the trust concerns that are traditionally thought to limit the opportunity for cooperation and circumscribe successful cooperative agreements to ones of specific reciprocity. Those who identify with a highly salient collective are more likely to practice diffuse reciprocity when interacting with other in-group members, which is to say they are more likely to share a “widespread sense of obligation” that leads them to be behave “in the interests of continuing satisfactory overall results for the group of which one is a part, as a whole.”87 This obligation to ensure the well being of the collective through consensual means extends to how actors approach political change as well. The social and material circumstances of any population change over time, exerting pressure on the existing political order. It makes sense that social orders whose actors share a strong collective identity, however, are more likely to experience change in a stable, consensual manner than social orders that lack social solidarity. Given the incentives to engage in diffuse reciprocity and practice self-restraint in pursuing political change, the probability and intensity of political instability should be reduced to the extent to which the relevant population shares a sense of collective identity.

While certainly not exhaustive, these three examples illustrate how collective identifications can help overcome some of the basic problems in contemporary

87 Keohane (1986:20)
international politics. Importantly, identifications are not dichotomous. It is not simply a matter of whether or not actors perceive themselves to be an active member of the collective, but rather a matter of identity salience. Self, for both individuals and collective actors (i.e. states), is constituted by a multiplicity of identifications that often compete for salience in determining interests and behaviors, with the ‘hierarchy of identifications’ shifting according to social context. Individual interests in the traditional rational sense stand at times in contradiction with the interests of individuals’ professional, national, or religious groups. States are similarly a composite of domestically driven national interests and their social roles as allies, participants in security regimes, recognized members of the broader international community, etc. So when we speak of national, international, or even global collective identity, a black and white approach to determining interests and behaviors is inappropriate. Rather, as identity salience shifts over time we should usually see gradational changes in the way states perceive their interests and choose to behave in international politics, though sometimes more swift and punctuated during tumultuous periods in history.

It is equally important to note the negative externalities that can result from collective identifications. In-groups often imply out-groups that may suffer negative consequences due to the collective identifications binding the in-group together. This is most obvious in cases where the in-group is, at least in part, constituted by hostility toward a concrete out-group (i.e. the Ku Klux Klan or Nazi Party).\textsuperscript{88} However, negative externalities are also present in more ‘benign’ forms of collective identification that

\textsuperscript{88} Ethnocentrism (Hewstone and Cairns 2001:320)
merely promote preference bias for in-group members.\footnote{Social Identity Theory (Hewstone and Cairns 2001:321-5)} For instance, religious communities may funnel charitable contributions to fellow believers to the detriment of non-believers in need, “Buy American” campaigns might harm foreign competitors, and EU economic policies may adversely affect the economies of neighboring countries. Examples from the historical periods analyzed in the following chapters are also plentiful. The Concert of Europe evinced a collective interest in maintaining monarchical legitimacy and European stability among the great powers of Europe at the expense of weaker states and republican movements across Europe; the League of Nations bound many of the world’s ‘civilized’ states together in collective security arrangements while simultaneously legitimizing the continued subordination of colonized peoples; and even the current international community is state-centric, in many ways resisting the inclusion of non-state actors in global governance. As the noted social psychologist, Marilynn Brewer, stated in a speech to the American Psychological Association:

“[the lack of out-group hatred] doesn't mean in-group bias is benign. In-group bias is the basis for discrimination, the favoring of people in your group over those in another. You don't have to hate people from other groups in order to disadvantage them and to deny them the opportunities you have in your group. That's a real downside to in-group bias.”\footnote{Brewer (2007). Also see Brewer (1999).}

Thus, the primary thrust of this section comes into clear focus. For in-groups, the social cohesion of collective identification can promote many of those things we find to be normatively desirable or progressive – cooperation, stability, and social tranquility. However, the vast majority of collective identifications today and in the past implicitly or explicitly constructs concrete human out-groups, creating an inside/outside divide that

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89 Social Identity Theory (Hewstone and Cairns 2001:321-5)
clouds the normative waters. What if, instead, there could be a political identity constructed at the global level, fully inclusive of the world’s population?

**Global Collective Identity (GCI)**

GCI, in its political sense, broadly entails collective agreement on the legitimate form and contours of governance for global politics. If realized, it would constitute a political community fully inclusive of the global population, forming an in-group devoid of a concrete human out-group. Currently it represents a potentiality rather than a reality. While GCI may already be present in international politics in a very weak, nebulous form – evidenced, for example, in a slowly emerging international consensus on issues of human rights and security – it obviously remains subordinate to competing political identities, particularly nationalism. For GCI to fundamentally alter political interaction and achieve the benefits of collective identification discussed above, a transformation in current political identifications and practices must take place. In other words, GCI must eventually attain preeminent salience in terms of political identity among state elites and broader populations alike. This does not suggest that all other political identities must be annihilated; nationalism currently maintains preeminence in the large majority of societies, even as local, international, and global political identities insert themselves into calculations of interests and behavior on a regular basis. It does suggest, however, that global interests must usually take precedence over local, national,

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91 What Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) term the Common Ingroup Model. What constitutes the out-group, and whether one is even necessary to sustain in-group identifications (Abizadeh 2005), is discussed in the next section.
and regional ones when they are in conflict, just as national interests usually trump others in both domestic and international politics today. So what would such a world look like?

This cannot be answered definitively due to the multiple realizability of GCI, in that it is defined by the intersubjective commitment to generically collective governance rather than a particular manifestation of governance, but it is nevertheless useful to explore potential manifestations. One possibility would be the complete centralization of governance in a world state with power centralized in the hands of a single leader or group of leaders (i.e. monarchy or dictatorship). Nearly complete decentralization, with states retaining autonomy while pursuing collective interests through a loose framework of international institutions, might be another. Or maybe the centralization of power in a democratically structured world government directly elected by and directly exercising control over all political matters? Still another possibility would be a global federation, in which states maintained elements of autonomy within their territory but operated under a ‘federal’ world government that regulated the use of force and defined the terms of interaction between states.

These four represent just a fraction of the possible outcomes, but their variance highlights how the current political order may influence the probability of outcomes as GCI attains salience. The first hardly seems plausible given the current configuration of international politics, while the second may be too similar to what we have today. Political power and the location of important governance structures tend to correlate with the salience of political identity, so if the relative salience of GCI were to increase we should see a shift away from current international practices and toward greater power in
international and/or global governance structures, even as the current status quo might temper attempts at radical transformation. While these musings are conjectural, I would venture to guess that the third and fourth offer more realistic possibilities. State sovereignty is already under siege by the rapid expansion of international institutions and laws in contemporary politics,\footnote{See, for example, Finnemore (1996), Krasner (1999), and Bartelson (2006).} so I think it would be reasonable to expect sovereignty to transfer to the international/global if GCI was to gain relative salience over national identifications. At the same time, the socio-historical and institutional power sedimented in the state and its machinery over the last centuries would likely offer resistance to such a transfer, making an incremental, evolutionary shift – probably through a federal model – most probable. In any case, the bogeyman of a world state, as a centralized authority or a looser federal framework of sovereign international institutions, would invariably result from the development of a unified political GCI.

Musings about a political order constituted by a salient GCI immediately raises two questions: is it desirable, and is it possible? In this section I take up the first question of desirability, reserving the possibility of GCI for the next section. The question of desirability itself can take two forms: the desirability of the processes to achieve it – which I also reserve for the next section – and the desirability of its accomplishment more generally. The prior section’s discussion demonstrated the normative desirability of GCI once achieved, but can the shifts in political identity necessary for GCI be justified in and of themselves? Again, this is separate from the question concerning processes for engineering GCI. Obviously some approaches to GCI clearly transgress ethical
boundaries, and the extermination of the Other or forced assimilation through coercion are methods that, while appallingly common throughout history, couldn’t be further from what this project is suggesting. Rather, here I would like to broach the question more theoretically, setting aside precise processes for achieving GCI in order to address the broader normative question of identity change, and political homogenization in particular.

Homogeneity, to some degree, is a necessary component of collective identification. In order for identifications to take hold and adhere over time, there must be some basis of commonality – or social glue – that constitutes and reproduces perceptions of ‘we-ness’ among group members. And it is on this point that critics of GCI as a progressive development tend to focus.93 Thinking about homogenization often evokes dystopian exemplars from history and literature – the Nazi Youth marching in lockstep or the garish prols of George Orwell’s 1984. Homogenization can certainly manifest itself in Aldous Huxley’s nightmarish destruction of culture, loss of individuality, and automaton-like submission to authority. In this narrative, the bogeyman of the world state is merely the front man for an even more pernicious social process of assimilation and isomorphism that is particularly frightening to individualistic sensibilities, seemingly leading us further and further astray in our search for progress.

The most straightforward response to criticisms of the homogenization required by GCI is to point out its gradational nature. A political GCI resulting in shared beliefs about global governance and the necessary global institutions to sustain them may very well lead to a reconfiguration of political culture that transfers the locus of sovereignty

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93 The ‘communitarian’ rejoinders to cosmopolitanism are particularly skeptical of the culturally destructive effects of global political community (Walzer 1983, 1994; Taylor 1989; Sandel 1998).
from the local or national to the global. It may further lead to global political interests informing political decision-making at all levels of governance. However, though GCI can conceivably take many forms, it need not eliminate pluralism. Political identity is inextricably bound to culture, and some degree of homogeneity in political identity is necessary for GCI, but the political is only one aspect of society and culture. The degree to which a nationalistic political culture penetrates and homogenizes populations varies greatly across states, but in very few does it appear to dominate all aspects of daily life and culture. Certainly an expansive definition of the political could subsume many other elements of culture such as economy, religion or spirituality, leisure activities, and the arts. On the other hand, GCI could just as readily be constructed by de-politicizing difference rather than forcing homogenization. It is here that homogeneity remains distinct from assimilation, or coerced conformity, and one might argue that contemporary cosmopolitanism provides a useful example. It suggests that homogenization can be achieved short of assimilation by removing many aspects of daily life and culture from political purview. This distills a minimalistic framework for identification that bridges existing, largely national, political communities in order to foster global attachments – devoid of the specter of hegemonic assimilation. Cosmopolitanism does require the adoption of an individualistic perspective on social life that may challenge many aspects of culture around the globe, but it is far from the dystopic connotations of assimilation. Here, though, we are straying towards a particular process of GCI formation, and in any

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94 For example, Held et al (1999), Held (2003), and Appiah (2006). These, and other cosmopolitan works, have clearly indicated that global community is amenable to various forms of pluralism, so I will not recapitulate the arguments here.
case pointing out the gradational nature of homogenization does not strike at the heart of the issue.

More importantly, fears of GCI as an assimilative destroyer of identity and culture, though justified in some respects, tend to suffer from a status quo bias. Realizing political identity at a global level clearly requires de-emphasizing or deconstructing current political identities in order to subsume them under a reconstituted global political community, threatening traditional political culture and modes of governance in the process. But this is true of all socializing processes. Homogenization is a fundamental building block of all civilization that establishes shared interests and beliefs in the rules and norms that order and stabilize societies, and even the current ‘status quo’ of contemporary societies cultures is not static but rather a rough equilibrium point that is neither inherent nor everlasting. Major shifts in cultural attitudes and collective identifications are more readily visible than their stable preservation, but the social processes reproducing and sustaining the stability of contemporary cultures are no less active. Identity and culture are “ongoing accomplishments of practice”\(^{95}\) that require continual maintenance and reproduction, regardless of the amount of ‘change’ we observe over time. Furthermore, contemporary identities and cultures have histories that were probably at one time or another in a similar position GCI finds itself today. Think, for example, ideas of nationalism in 17\(^{th}\) century France. Nationalism had profound effects on culture and identity, rendering the cultural legitimacy of raison d’etat and

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\(^{95}\) Wendt (1999:313)
dynastic legitimacy and problematizing individuals’ localized political attachments.\textsuperscript{96}

Remembering the histories of contemporary identities and cultures – and the often homogenizing effects they had on prior identities and cultures – can help us avoid the essentialistic assumptions that sustain arguments for the cultural status quo in the world today.

This raises two questions. First, can we normatively defend subjecting individual and collective actors to socialization processes of identity change, and second, are the current political collectives we observe today more desirable than a global one?

Setting aside the issue of particular methods of socialization, some of which are surely more agreeable than others, I would think the answer to the first is a resounding ‘yes.’ Indeed, socialization processes are a necessary condition for civilization. Society, culture, and identity are all products of social interactions that foster intersubjective beliefs, rules, and norms, which in turn constitute social collectives, define cultural boundaries, and give meaning to identities.\textsuperscript{97} From birth we are thrust into a world of interaction and socialization that we have little control over, which is followed for many by highly structured, homogenizing educational experiences;\textsuperscript{98} the predominating cultural, economic, and political conditions of our societies continue to shape us throughout adulthood;\textsuperscript{99} and government and society encourage assimilation and conformity through various methods of reward and punishment designed to maintain

\textsuperscript{96} Hall (1999)
\textsuperscript{97} Searle (1995)
\textsuperscript{98} Berger and Luckmann (1966:129-47)
\textsuperscript{99} Weber (1905/1958); DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
acceptable boundaries of social belief and behavior.\textsuperscript{100} We, as individuals, are in many ways products of our social environment. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and others have rightfully challenged the ethical basis of contemporary methods of cross cultural socialization,\textsuperscript{101} but socialization remains a fundamental, and indispensable, aspect of social life. To deny the normative desirability of socialization and identity change would be to deny the desirability of knowledge, learning, and civilization itself. Therefore, the issue is a matter not of total homogenization or none at all, but rather homogenization at what level of community.

This restates the second, and more difficult, question. Progress is a relative concept, so it is not simply a matter of normatively evaluating the homogenizing effects of GCI formation in isolation, but rather comparing it with alternatives – particularly the current constellation of political identities we see today. So, assuming all else equal, which level of political community is ‘better’ – the current nation-centric configuration of identities in contemporary international politics or a global political community? We do not have a basis upon which to state an answer that is objectively true or definitive, but the discussion of collective identity in the prior section strongly points to the global. On one hand, nationalism certainly has much to recommend itself. A strong national identity provides a foundation upon which a large population of otherwise complete strangers can agree upon and abide by a common set of rules, norms, and institutions of governance that promote cooperation, the aggregation of power and economies of scale in production, and a sense of ontological security and belonging within a broader community. On the

\textsuperscript{100} Foucault (1979)
other hand, however, nationalism creates a clear demarcation between Us and Them, or those who possess the characteristics, interests, and beliefs of the group and those who do not. This does not necessarily entail belligerence between groups or enemy imaging, but it usually does entail in-group biases and a measure of social distance between groups that can inhibit two nations from establishing relationships of trust and cooperation that can be found within each nation. The difference between Self and Other is taught at an early age, ingrained through formal education (especially history and civics) and traditional symbols and practices (flags, anthems, national holidays), and reified by the different legal rights accorded to native citizens as opposed to foreigners/aliens. While it might serve to strengthen in-group identity, this process of Otherizing sustains an inside/outside divide that can be and has been used to justify taking an unrestrained, amoral approach to thinking and acting in international politics (i.e. toward the Other).

A global political community constituted by a politically salient GCI would not be a panacea for the world’s ills, but I think the discussion to this point underscores its relative desirability over the present international order. Some measure of violent conflict would persist in all likelihood. Just as the variable salience of national identity has led to numerous examples of civil war, I would expect that GCI’s salience would also vary and suffer from instability and resistance in various regions. However, conflict would be domesticated (or ‘civil-ized’), the use of force in resolving claims would be accountable to the global community, and conflict resolution would likely proceed more often according to collectively legitimated rules and norms rather than armed coercion.

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102 Brewer (1999), Hewstone and Cairns (2001)
103 Walker (1993)
Though fears of an unaccountable world state shrouded in mystery have gained currency in science fiction literatures, such an outcome is anything but certain and there is little reason to believe it would be any more likely than the threat of despotism at the national level today.

Political GCI would also entail a certain level of socialization to its constitutive collective interests and norms, but this is only different from past and contemporary political identities by its scale, or level of community. Though homogenizing pressures would vary wildly depending on the particular interests and norms constituting the collective (just as it does today at the national level), contemporary international and political discourses suggest that any future global community could provide ample room for contestation, pluralism, and dissent. In any case, as discussed above there is nothing inherently wrong with processes of homogenization, so the possibility of undesirable outcomes appear no greater than at the national level today.

In sum, it would appear that the inherent dangers or drawbacks of GCI or global community are the same as those that are equally shared by other forms of political community (e.g. nationalism). However, GCI represents a level of political community that applies the benefits of collective identification to the global level while avoiding the ‘negative externalities’ produced by sub-global collectives.

Yet this leaves many questions unanswered. Is GCI possible? What would the content of GCI, or the particular interests and norms shared by the global population, look like? Are there desirable pathways to GCI, or must it rest on the ends justifying the means? What we established thus far, then, is the progressive potential of GCI, but it
remains an empty vessel. The prior section elucidated the generic normative benefits of collective identifications while highlighting the drawbacks of sub-global collectives. Building on the initial promise of GCI, this section has addressed fundamental concerns about assimilation and GCI. Together these two sections fleshed out a benchmark, or ideal, for political community and, all else equal, I believe it has successfully made the case for the desirability of GCI over other constellations of political communities and interaction. Therefore, it is now time to consider the pragmatic issues of accomplishing GCI or, in other words, filling the empty vessel.

**Filling the Vessel: Procedural Liberalism in Modern International Politics**

The future potential for a salient political GCI raises both empirical and normative questions. Empirically, is political community at the global level even feasible? This in itself begs multiple questions. Can a political in-group cohere in the absence of a concrete out-group? Is it possible to overcome the salience of current political identities (e.g. nationalism) in order to realize GCI? On the normative side, whether or not GCI – once accomplished – is normatively desirable is a separate question from the desirability of the process by which it is achieved. The assimilative influences of GCI formation cannot be entirely neutral from a political or cultural standpoint, therefore any path forward will inevitably preference aspects of particular political cultures over others. Here – where the normative rubber meets the empirical road – the normative terrain becomes exceedingly difficult to navigate. The desirability of the ideal immediately becomes circumscribed by the realities with which we have to work. In other words,
going from ‘here’ (national political identity and international politics) to ‘there’ (global identity and governance) requires a pragmatic assessment of normative tradeoffs that can become uncomfortable very quickly. Given the current configuration of power and identity in international politics, many theoretical ideals will probably not be feasible, so we must temper our expectations and ask whether any of the possibilities for GCI formation are normatively acceptable.

The primary purpose of this section, then, is to assess the feasibility of political GCI, particularly in light of current configurations of power and identity in international politics. Only secondarily do I analyze the normative desirability of various pathways to GCI. The core of this dissertation’s normative argument revolves around the desirability of GCI as a benchmark for progress in international politics. To further take on a thorough normative defense of a particular process for its achievement would introduce complications and digressions that draw attention away from my core argument. Nevertheless, I would be equally remiss in completely ignoring these issues, so below I sketch the normative contours of potential processes for GCI formation – pointing to their relative strengths and weaknesses and revealing my own preference for one over the others, but drawing no definitive conclusions.

Feasible?

An analysis of feasibility begins with a basic question about in-group/out-group dynamics in identity formation: Can political GCI be achieved and sustained in the absence of a concrete human Other? Identities are relational and it is commonly assumed
that collective representations of Self require an Other to both define the contours of what constitutes Self (as opposed to Other) as well as give meaning to Self through Other’s recognition of it. At first glance, this represents a particularly damning critique of my argument since how can we have a Self that is fully inclusive of the global population without a corresponding out-group to define and recognize it?

Realizing political GCI, however, does not necessitate a totalizing Self bereft of an Other. Hegel’s struggle for recognition, Carl Schmitt’s conception of nationalism and sovereignty, and Charles Taylor’s notions of communitarian particularism (to provide just a few examples) make clear that Self requires an Other, but – as Arash Abizadeh so compellingly points out – by no means does this necessitate an Other constituted by a concrete human out-group. Abizadeh illustrates how the ‘ideologies’ of sovereignty and nationalism have conditioned scholars to view political identities dialogically with an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside,’ circumscribing how we think of identity formation and reproduction. Rather, he successively argues that “difference can exist within the putative inside,” that difference “can refer to nonhumans, it can refer to characteristics rather than individuals, and it need not refer to actually existing things at all,” and that “cosmopolitan solidarity or identity does not require an actually existing external other in contrast to which it must constitute itself.” The Other, then, can be conceptualized as a(n) historical Other, counterfactual Other, or particular characteristics and

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105 Hegel (1977), Schmitt (1932/2006), and Taylor (1994), respectively.
106 Abizadeh (2005); also see Hopf (2002).
107 ibid, 57-8.
behaviors against which Self is constructed. It is not necessary at this point to define a specific Other, but rather just to highlight how global community can cohere in the absence of a concrete human Other.

The question of feasibility encounters a second test when we consider the inertia of existing political identities, particularly nationalism. Modern states, in many ways the institutional manifestation of national political identifications, are in the business of reproducing national loyalties that reify difference in international politics. Public education introduces civic attachments and obligations, national symbols (flags, anthems, holidays) reinforce national pride, and militaries at once protect the territorial integrity of the state, advance national interests abroad, and produce patriotic spirit at home. In other words, the modern state represents a “‘local’ attractor” for political identity and institutionalization that may resist new forms of identification, or new focal points for political identity and concomitant institutions.

The inertia of the political identity ‘status quo’ represents a serious challenge to GCI formation, but by no means a decisive one. Given the fluid nature of political identity, as well as the largely unforeseen emergence of nationalism itself in the late 18th century, modern political identities may strongly affect probabilities, but not possibilities. Moreover, there are at least three reasons why GCI may be more probable than conventionally thought. First, nationalism is a relatively new ‘equilibrium’ between political identities and institutions. Though its emergence was gradual and uneven, most

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109 E.g. Daniel Deudney (2007) on the threat of a politically divided, nuclear armed world incentivizing stronger political identifications at the international or global level.

110 Wendt (2003:502)
scholars date nationalism’s genesis as a significant identity in determining political outcomes to the late 18th century\textsuperscript{111} – fairly recently in political history. Additionally, nationalism is not as hegemonic as it is often given credit for. The nation-state remains an ideal-type rather than a reality. While national identities may be well established in many (primarily Western) developed countries that more or less conform to the basic premises of the nation-state, nationalism is significantly contested by competing political identities and interests in many parts of the world today.\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, even as nationalism has yet to take root in some parts of the world, the proliferation of supranational and international institutions – particularly since the end of the Cold War – has increasingly challenged traditional notions of nationally-bounded political community. Whether this shift is merely a function of economic globalization or a reflection of identity change among political elites is less important at the moment than the fact that it appears to be widening the discursive space for new modes of political community and global governance to take hold. In sum, the force of nationalism in contemporary international politics may remain strong, but the potential for GCI formation and movement toward a single global political community certainly exists – and may be growing ever stronger.

If this is the case, what are the potential pathways for achieving GCI, and are some more feasible than others? Here we encounter (at a minimum) four conditions that significantly influence the feasibility of potential pathways to political GCI. The first two

\textsuperscript{111} For example, Anderson (1983).
\textsuperscript{112} For example, see Jackson (1990) on the weakness of nationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa and Choueiri (2000) on the incongruity (and tension) between Arab nationalism and territorial states.
result from the fractured nature of international politics today, manifest in the state-centrism of global politics and the salience of nationalism in global affairs. The final two speak more generally to the ‘artificial’ nature of collective identities, which require continual reproduction and are prone to solidifying into in-/out-group distinctions that can become resistant to change. None of them is insurmountable; otherwise the political evolution that has resulted in the current international state system could never have taken place. But by highlighting particular challenges to global collective identity formation, they do suggest important realities that such a process must take into account.

First, states must be active participants in laying the foundations for global collective identity. No other class of political actor possesses the power and influence of the state, whose primacy literally defines the international state system. Research on epistemic communities, advocacy networks, transnational civil society, and other non-state actors has clearly shown the ability of non-state actors to effect change in international politics, but only in so far as they are able to influence states’ beliefs and interests. Exercising monopolistic control over governance structures and the use of force, only states (and, more specifically, their elites) possess the power to substantively transform international politics to reflect changes in political identification.

Second, nationalistic sentiments must be either transformed into global sentiment or weakened relative to global sentiment. While both political identities can (and do) exist simultaneously, meaningful change toward global community requires a significant shift in their relative salience from the particular to the universal. This might mean

113 For examples of each, see International Organization’s special issue on epistemic communities (1992, 46:1), Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Price (2003), and Florini, ed (2000) and Price (2003), respectively.
expanding current notions of (civic or liberal) national identifications toward a global domain\hspace{1em}\textsuperscript{114} or actively undermining more ‘primordial,’ ethnocentric national identifications that cannot be cognitively widened. In either case, loosening the grip of traditional, nationally defined political identities is a necessary step in realizing global collective identity.

Third, constructing global collective identity must overcome a more general impediment to collective identity that I term the ‘default to individualism.’ Collective identities are accomplishments of practice that must be constructed and actively reproduced in order to remain salient. Though socialization processes can be extremely powerful and robust in shaping actors’ interests, identities, and even their psychological development,\hspace{1em}\textsuperscript{115} certain biological realities exist that challenge the importance of collective identification and make their consistent reproduction necessary. The closed nature of our biological feedback loops continually reproduce basic incentives toward individuation that exert downward pressure on the domain of identification. For example, while I may empathize with your hunger pangs, I can only biologically feel the contractions of my own stomach, and while we may be able to communicate our thoughts and feelings quite effectively through language, our mental consciousnesses remain distinct. There are plenty of examples of individuals sacrificing their lives for others, as well as less spectacular but more common actions taken for the benefit of the group, but these collective identifications are products of socially constructed incentives that must

\textsuperscript{114} See Haas (1997a) for how this takes places. Also, the second volume of his study (1997b:1-45) provides an excellent typology of nationalism.

\textsuperscript{115} Fiske, et al (1998)
be reproduced through social interaction, as opposed to our more ‘native’ biological incentives for individual survival. This ‘default to individualism’ presents a recurring obstacle to constructing and maintaining collective identifications, especially in terms of global identification, in which the level of abstraction from the individual is greatest. Further, it suggests that the success of such a process will partially depend on its ability to account for, harness, and respect these individuating pressures.

Fourth, successful identity change requires confronting the ‘stickiness’ of prior in-group affiliations. When actors are engaged in negotiating an overarching normative framework for collective action, each one tends to perceive her existing normative principles as superior to others’ alternatives.\footnote{Hewstone and Cairns (2001); see Mercer (1995) on how in-group biases help reproduce the logic of anarchy that underpins neorealism.} This presents a major hurdle to achieving consensus on political norms and values, and suggests why the coerciveness of hegemony has traditionally been thought necessary to achieve collective action and political integration.\footnote{Olson (1965), Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1981)} While general to all forms of identity change, this obstacle specifically relates back to the issue of nationalism in modern international relations. In order for a process of global collective identity formation to be successful, then, it must provide incentives for actors to bridge the gap between nations by explicating an institutional framework for arbitration between various norms and values that is perceived as beneficial, legitimate, and enforceable.

How, then, do these conditions affect the feasibility of various approaches to GCI formation? The discussion above indicates the multiple realizability of GCI as a generic
framework for social interaction within a political context, so a full accounting of potential pathways would be neither possible nor useful. However, I think it can be useful to employ a basic taxonomy sorted according to two variables – the relative salience of GCI and the degree of institutionalization through which GCI is achieved – that can give us a rough indication of feasibility in light of the above limiting conditions. The first variable represents the expected strength of political identification at the global level vis-à-vis current national identifications. The second variable captures the ‘thickness’ of institutional structures through which GCI is achieved and maintained. The importance of institutionalization cannot be understated, as it is a common theme through all four conditions above. States are so important to political identity reproduction and change in large part due to the institutional machinery that defines them, and political identities – particularly those that extend beyond face-to-face interaction – require institutionalized mechanisms of socialization to be sustained.

Taken together, the two variables sort pathways toward GCI by both the institutional process they adopt for its achievement and the resulting strength of GCI they expect/prescribe. This yields a simple two-by-two table on which we can chart potential pathways in order to analyze their feasibility. Since we cannot entertain all possibilities here, Table 1 offers a concrete example(s) for each combination with which to work.
Table 2.1: Feasible Pathways to GCI?

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<td>Communism</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>Status Quo/ Int’l State System</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Assimilative Imperialism Procedural Liberalism</td>
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Box I represents pathways advocating only a weak sense of GCI maintained through a loose institutional framework, for which agonism provides a representative example. As a political theory, agonism is constructed on the basis of irreducible difference between individuals and groups that places conflict at the center of political life. Rather than attempting to engineer consensus, the political arena should be geared toward accentuating difference (agonistic pluralism) and encouraging conflict while bounding the forms it takes to deliberative rather than violent means.  

Criticizing both the rational and consensual basis of liberal and cosmopolitan theory as well as their communitarian rejoinders, agonists emphasize the irrationality of politics and the benefits of placing points of disagreement at the center of political debate. Though well-intentioned, attempts at rational consensus are more likely to lead to political non-participation, elite manipulation, or violent manifestations of underlying conflicts than true agreement due to the constitutively conflictual nature of politics. Emphasizing

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118 Connelly 1991
119 Mouffe 1993; 2005: Chap 2
contestation and difference in political deliberations can, counterintuitively, draw strength and support away from violent methods for resolving inter-group antagonisms.

Given these foundational principles, as well as the domestic focus of most agonist scholars, it may appear odd to present agonism as a potential pathway to political GCI. Implicit in the theory, however, is a mutual recognition of both difference and the right to difference. This shifts the frame of Self from opposition or destruction of the Other to engagement of the Other, or in terms of identification, subsumes the Other into a single, though deeply pluralistic, Self. So when we discuss agonistic pluralism at the global level, difference may be driving principle behind political interaction, but this interaction is premised on a foundation of GCI, however thin.

While agonism reminds us of important aspects of politics, including the role of contestation in political interaction, it remains undertheorized as a workable model of governance. Further, there are serious doubts as to its feasibility as a stable international order. On one hand, it is difficult to imagine institutionalizing agonistic pluralism in a way that allows for the free expression of and contestation between individual and group preferences without privileging particular socio-historical modes of governance that, in turn, privilege particular socio-historical groups. On the other hand, how can agonistic respect – recognizing the rights and privileges of other groups and thus limiting contestation to deliberative processes – be sustained without institutional mechanisms to maintain it? In this respect agonism contains strong elements of critical theory – rightly

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120 Wendt 2003; Connelly 2005
121 Connelly himself remains somewhat skeptical of agonistic pluralism’s realization in international politics even as he lays out a normative argument in favor of it (2005:??).
pointing out the flaws of a consensus-based model of governance but lacking a framework for agonistic pluralism as a workable alternative. ¹²²

Pathways populating Box II suffer from a similar weakness. These pathways are revolutionary in their approach, offering an organic, informal, or spontaneous realization of a salient GCI without the need for a thick institutional framework to construct and sustain it. Communism offers an illustrative example in that it (in its simplest form) calls for a global socio-political order established on the recognition and mobilization of collective identity forged along class lines. It may differ from other pathways in this box by the belief that a potentially powerful, cohesive identity already latently exists in the form of class consciousness, but they all hold in common a lack of institutional frameworks that can reproduce and reinforce the salience of GCI while simultaneously challenging and replacing those institutions that underpin existing political identities.

One can surmise that this is at least in part why the communist revolutions in Russia and China were quickly co-opted by state elites in pursuit of traditionally nationalistic interests. ¹²³ Without addressing the stickiness of prior social identities and the default to individualism that results in the absence of institutions that reinforce identity salience, revolutionary approaches to global collective identity are unable to credibly challenge the

¹²² Mouffe (2005) and Connelly (2005) offer loose principles on which such a system would could be constructed, but are much less clear on the system’s institutional manifestation.

¹²³ Benedict Anderson notes the stickiness of nationalism in these two cases, stating that, in studying socialist revolutions, we should “not be much surprised if revolutionary leaderships, consciously or unconsciously, come to play lord of the manor” (1983/2006:160, emphasis in the original).
strength and durability of the state-centrism and nationalism of modern international politics.  

What we can glean from discussing these first two boxes is that the probability of attaining GCI without a relatively thick institutional framework sustaining collective identifications is quite low. Collective identifications require reproduction, and at larger levels of abstraction they require formal institutionalization to provide socialization. Religious groups maintain churches and institutional hierarchies, professions have associations that maintain particular ethics and bylaws of group membership, and nations are often reproduced through the machinery of the state.  

This suggests that a formal institutional framework is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for sustaining political identifications beyond the local community and is of particular importance at the global level.

For Box III, feasibility is not in doubt since it more or less represents the status quo in international politics. While – as illustrated by my third empirical chapter – the current international order is not bereft of political GCI, the system remains nationally focused in terms of political identification and institutionally state-centric. GCI salience is fairly weak and, though the proliferation and thickening of international institutions has brought a measure of deliberation and consensus-based decision making, traditional

\[124\text{ Annihilation of the Other might also fall in this category as well, and the liquidation of North American natives in the 17-19th centuries provides a partially ‘successful’ example of this. However, the conditions in which this was carried out – vast asymmetries in military capabilities coupled with an utter void of shared meanings and mutual recognition that followed from a ‘first encounter’ (Todorov 1996) – do not appear possible today, at least not on a global level.}\

\[125\text{ See, for example, Barnett (1995) on the influence of the state in the evolution of Arab nationalism since World War II, and Barnett (1993) on the destabilizing effects of overlapping international institutions in the Arab world.}\

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patterns of power politics and unilateral decision making still maintain significant currency in determining political outcomes.

While the feasibility of the status quo is not in doubt, an argument can be made that its sustainability is. Even as political, economic, and social forces in 18th and 19th century Europe resulted in nationalism and the international state system displacing the dynastic system that came before it, current pressures appear to be increasingly challenging the significance of state boundaries, the domestic/international dichotomy they create, and the national affinities upon which they are legitimated (and which they, in many ways, reinforce). Economic interdependence in a globalizing marketplace impinges on the state’s sovereign control over trade policy, immigration, and welfare policies while incentivizing greater coordination and cooperation through international and transnational institution-building.126 Advances in military capabilities, the growing destructiveness of modern military hardware, the prevalence of humanitarian intervention, and non-state threats to the international order encourage security policy coordination, command structure integration, and greater international cooperation in threat management and conflict resolution. Furthermore, international law has codified a significant contradiction by enshrining the sovereign equality of states alongside a commitment to protecting human rights,127 which is becoming increasingly apparent in the post-Cold War era of humanitarian aid and intervention and rising concerns for human security issues – pointing to the growing emphasis on human rights over state

126 See, for example, Russett and Oneal (2001)
127 United Nations Charter (Preamble and Chapter 1)
These pressures do not necessarily suggest that movement toward political GCI is the only possible way forward, but they do illustrate the growing institutionalization of international and global governance, and may lend credence to the potential for and likelihood of political community taking shape at the global level.

Moving to Box IV, we find those pathways that couple strong GCI salience with a thick institutional framework to help construct and sustain it. If we had taken the time to create a comprehensive list of alternative pathways to GCI, it is easy to imagine that this is where most of them would reside. Thick institutional frameworks can take a number of forms, just as the content of strong collective identifications can vary considerably. One credible option would be an assimilative form of imperialism. The forced imposition of socializing regimes of governance by a powerful political community on the Other(s) in order to reproduce metropole identifications in the periphery (to use neo-Marxist terms) is not uncommon in history, especially at levels of political community below the global (e.g. colonialism). This necessitates considerable power asymmetries as well as a lack of mobilization and resistance capabilities on the part of the imposed and/or ‘third party’ actors to the imperial effort. While such conditions might exist sometime in the future for renewed imperial ambitions, the probability of imposing international or global institutions by force appear low.

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129 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are notable contemporary exceptions. On one hand, they are certainly examples of imposing institutions and elements of political culture by force. On the other hand, the high costs (in both blood and treasure) and many failures of these protracted conflicts against an essentially failed state (Afghanistan) and one considerably weakened from a lost war and more than a decade of international sanctions (Iraq) underscore the improbability of doing the same across the globe.
A second alternative, and the institutional focal point of this dissertation, is a procedurally liberal approach to institution-building that can foster collective identifications at the international and global levels. This pathway adopts a consensus-based approach to international and global governance by applying procedurally liberal principles to institution-building – namely, universal participation and formal equality among participants. As opposed to revolutionary or imperial methods of achieving political GCI, procedural liberalism provides a voluntary and incremental process for constructing institutions of governance and encouraging identifications. Further, it relies on the mutual reinforcement of collective identifications and institutionalization.

Participation in procedurally liberal institutions implies the acceptance of particular rules and norms of behavior and the recognition of other participants’ (at least formal) equality in conducting business – in other words, at least a thin form of collective identification that encourages restraint in interactions. Conversely, a procedurally liberal institutional framework, due in large part to the way in which its principles define interaction, introduces socializing pressures that encourage deeper identifications among participants – such as issue-linking, logrolling, social influence, and social persuasion.\(^\text{130}\)

The incremental nature of procedural liberalism, as well as the proliferation of international institutions and the growing interest in cosmopolitan global governance over the last few decades, speaks in favor of its feasibility. By minimizing coercion in determining participation and inequality among participants, procedurally liberal

\(^{130}\) See, for example, Jesse and Williams (2005: Chapters 1 and 5) on the role of institutional equality in encouraging transnational identifications and the pooling of sovereignty in Europe, and Pouliot (2011) on the value of multilateralism as an end in itself. See Chapter 6 for a full examination of the mechanisms by which procedurally liberal institutions foster collective identity formation among participants and encourage ever-widening domains of participation.
institutions provide a relatively consensual or ‘safe’ forum for negotiation and socialization that can encourage participation. However, this can also introduce a motivation problem. Mobilizing actors to engage in greater institutionalization must overcome the inertia of the status quo. In this sense, institutionalization is a reactive, rather than proactive, approach to deepening global governance and constructing political GCI. As the empirical chapters will highlight, the impetus for further institutionalization has often followed widespread emasculation resulting from devastating conflicts (with the notable exception of the end of the Cold War, which may provide a model for overcoming inertial resistance to further progress). So procedural liberalism’s feasibility will depend either on the recurrence of conflict – a very real but suboptimal option – or the active mobilization of actors to engage in further institutionalization that emphasizes the undesirable alternative (recurring conflict) or the benefits of thicker institutions and stronger identifications.

Desirable?

Even as questions remain about the feasibility of various pathways to political GCI, the above has underscored the importance of institutionalization in promoting and sustaining collective identifications. Determining their desirability, however, rests on even softer ground. On what basis can we normatively promote particular processes over others? Nothing objective, and probably nothing that would achieve overwhelming consensus among scholars or policy-makers. However, we can sketch some normative contours of the various approaches, and I think consensuality is as good as any other
indicator, and certainly better than most, to cut into the issue. By consensuality I mean the degree to which actors have a free and equal voice in determining the direction of the process, as well as the degree to which outcomes are generally accepted by participants. Really, a consensus-based approach has dominated the normative political theory literature, underpinning a variety of overlapping fields of study such as international democratization, republicanism, and cosmopolitanism. Further, as I will argue in a moment, communitarianism and agonism – though they are rarely associated with a consensus-based model of global community – can also be viewed as consensus-based in the political processes they advocate. Table 2 provides a simple taxonomy similar to Table 1, but substituting consensuality for institutionalization.

Table 2.2: Desirable Pathways to GCI?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCI Salience</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>I Status Quo/Int’l State System</td>
<td>II Communism Assimilative Imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensuality</td>
<td>III Agonism</td>
<td>IV Procedural Liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Box I we find the current status quo of the international state system. As I will illustrate in my empirical chapters, there has been movement – especially over the last few decades – toward a more salient GCI and greater consensuality in international
governance, but the formal principles of the state system continue to persist. Governance remains primarily international rather than global, and national identification remains the principle political identity in international affairs. States operate in an environment of proliferating and thickening institutional structures, but they maintain formal and informal independence in foreign policy decision-making and have yielded little sovereignty to international institutions. So while consensus is sought on a variety of economic and security-related issues, when consensus cannot be reached many states – particularly powerful states – opt to pursue their interests unilaterally. While the institutional structures and body of international law we currently have may be more desirable – from a consensus perspective – than what has come before it, the unilateral and sometimes arbitrary use of force, unaccountable to the international community, continues to produce suboptimal outcomes in terms of consensus-based desirability. Further, the weak nature of GCI diminishes the progressive impact of collective identifications discussed above.

Imperial or revolutionary approaches, in Box II, reject a consensus-based method of collective identity formation altogether. In the Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital, Karl Marx justifies communism’s revolutionary approach with an ahistorically-grounded, structural separation of economic classes that precludes a consensual resolution of class conflict. Assimilative imperialism finds normative justification for an ethno- or culturally-centric perspective in scholarly works that underscore the brutality of human nature and the instinctive will to power (a la Carl Schmitt and Friedrich Nietzsche).\[131\]

\[131\] Though see Abizadeh (2005) on the ontological fallacies of Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction.
According to both political theories, consensus-based politics is merely a mask worn by powerful actors in an attempt to more easily legitimize a political system that advances their own interests. So while it aims to achieve the benefits of political GCI, it promotes a violent or coercive method for its achievement.

This leaves us with the consensus-based approaches. I categorize agonism, representing Box III, as advocating weak GCI through a strongly consensual process. This might appear odd, given its grounding in inescapable difference and the normative importance it places on conflict in political interaction. Agonism certainly rejects the possibility of achieving consensus on political issues. However, implicit in its notion of agonistic respect is a belief that the processes by which political conflict is managed can be constructed on a consensual basis. It requires consensus on limiting the forms political conflict take to those short of violent conflict. Though agonism suffers from a lack of institutionalization (or consensus about what form political institutions should take), from a desirability perspective it conforms to a consensus-based approach in its eschewal of violence in resolving difference. Yet, like Box I, the logical conclusion of agonism reproduces particularistic political identities that deny the social, economic, and political benefits of GCI.

Procedural liberalism and other consensus-based approaches to a strong political GCI inhabit Box IV. Theoretically, they promise the benefits of a strongly salient GCI achieved through consensus among actors. Possibly the most attractive characteristic of procedural liberalism is its focus on process. Beyond the ideals of universality and equality in participation, it remains silent on the content and substance of consensually
agreed upon rules and norms of governance – to be determined through deliberation and negotiation within the institutional structures. Further, and discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, procedural liberalism offers a voluntary and incremental path to greater institutionalization that can encourage the development of identifications that cross over traditional national boundaries.

While this is the pathway endorsed in this dissertation, serious issues about its desirability remain. The sinister motivations attributed to politics by consensus by those approaches in Box II are not easily dismissed. The overwhelming support for consensus-based approaches in much of the political theory literature may be a reflection of the already procedurally liberalizing international community – the rationalizing of politics, the congealing of global political community, and the progressive development of global politics. Or it may be a consequence of the hegemonic position of Western culture, in which mostly Western scholars are a legitimating mouthpiece for a procedurally liberal system that subordinates non-Western culture and peoples in pursuit of its own interests. J. Marshall Beier might see this approach as a product of a Western ‘hegemonologue’ that asserts a culturally Western-centric ontology of political life as universal truth, silencing alternative dissenting ontologies and non-Western peoples. Yet, when juxtaposed with the alternatives of maintaining the status quo or advocating revolutionary change in one form or another, a consensus-based approach to political change remains a powerful discourse, providing a basis for its normative acceptability, if not desirability.

This is a debate that will not be resolved here. Having explicited the desirability of global collective identity and analyzed the feasibility of various processes for achieving it earlier in the chapter, this section has been intended to briefly sketch the normative contours of differing approaches. It is also in some ways an attempt at ‘full disclosure’ of normative priors in justifying the normative acceptability, or even desirability, of consensus-based approaches to identity formation and, particularly, procedural liberalism. This does not suggest that violent methods of political change are never desirable, nor that identity formation through means other than perfect consensuality is unacceptable. Rather, it has been a brief exercise in determining whether or not procedural liberalism passes the ‘smell test’ of normative acceptability as a method for achieving political GCI, and thus not falling back on a purely ‘ends justifying the means’ logic.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has elucidated the normative component of a theory of political progress grounded in an ideal of global collective identity formation. Collective identifications underpin the very notions of society and civilization. By encouraging individuals to define their interests in collective rather than egoistic terms, they legitimate the rules and norms of social interaction that maintain relatively stable and peaceful societies, allow for the aggregation of resources that strengthen the community, and sustain the routines and security of everyday life. In terms more familiar to IR theory, they ameliorate collective action problems, distributional conflicts, and social instability
among group members, offering an alternative to the realist assumptions of uncertainty, egoistic self-interest, and naked power in determining outcomes. Constructing political community at the global level, GCI represents a desirable alternative to inter-group conflict in an amoral international political environment.

As a benchmark and end goal of political progress, GCI says little about its own accomplishment. Thus, the second half of the chapter considered the feasibility and, secondarily, the desirability of various pathways to achieving GCI. Given the pluralism of contemporary international politics, the inertia of a nationalist and state-centric system, and the fragile nature of collective identifications that require routine and systematic reproduction, I highlight the benefits of those pathways that provide strong institutional frameworks (feasibility) and consensus-based approaches (desirability) to GCI formation. The roundabout manner in which I drew attention to procedural liberalism was deliberately done in order to underscore the fact that procedural liberalism is not the only feasible or desirable method for achieving GCI, but that it may be one of the more probable and acceptable.

In the following chapters, however, I focus solely on political GCI and procedural liberalism as a process for its accomplishment. The next three chapters present chronologically-ordered case studies designed to tease out the relationship between collective identity formation and the proliferation of procedurally liberal international institutions. Using descriptive inference, I explore the mutually reinforcing relationship between the two through three eras of identity formation and institution building over the course of two centuries – inter-state collective identity among Europe’s great powers and
the Concert of Europe, international collective identity among ‘civilized’ states and the League of Nations, and a fully international collective identity and the United Nations with particular attention paid to aspects of international society and global governance since the end of the Cold War. They highlight the role of conflict in collective identity formation, but also provide evidence for the incremental development and maintenance of identifications through procedurally liberal institutional structures.
Chapter 3: The Concert Era

In the preceding chapter I identify global collective identity (GCI) as a benchmark for progress and contend that movement toward this ideal may be accomplished through the procedural liberalization of international politics. Here I couple this normative claim with the empirical trends touched on in the introduction. In the next three chapters I conduct a historical analysis of three successive eras of international history over the last two centuries labeled according to the security regimes that roughly defined them – the Concert Era from 1815-1878, the League Era whose beginnings can be traced to the Berlin Conference (1884-5) and Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and ended with the outbreak of World War II, and the current United Nations Era established in 1945. I adopt a descriptive inferential method to: 1) explore the incremental development of collective identity among states over the last two centuries; 2) illustrate the successive procedural liberalization of the international security regimes found in each era; 3) demonstrate their correlation and draw causal inferences about their relationship; while 4) considering alternative explanations for these historical developments in each era. My primary goal is to present historical evidence for these dual trends – to simply show that a clear pattern of collective identity formation is taking place and that international security regimes have been procedurally liberalizing over time. My secondary goal is to map the
causal contours that emerge from these patterns in history, which inform the causal theory laid out in Chapter 6.

This chapter addresses the Concert Era as the first step in this broader historical process. In lieu of a sterile history of the era that can be found elsewhere, I provide a reading of the era through the lenses of identity and institutions in order to probe the plausibility of my empirical claims. My historical narrative begins with the devastation and emasculation experienced during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and follows its consequences through the Congress of Vienna, the Concert of Europe, and the Concert’s eventual unraveling – highlighting apparent shifts in identifications and important institutional aspects of the Concert. I then assess alternative explanations for the patterns of cooperation, identifications, and institution-building that took place during the era. In particular, I draw attention to the mutually reinforcing relationship between collective identities and procedurally liberal institutions. I hope to show over the next three chapters that their relationship differs across the three eras under study. During the Concert Era it appears that new collective identifications among the great power monarchs served as a condition of possibility for the procedurally ‘proto-liberal’ congress system early in the era and, in turn, the congress system became instrumental in establishing precedents that arrested institutional backsliding as identifications weakened toward the end of the era. Put another way, collective identifications paved the way for the congress system, which then ‘locked in’ norms of diplomacy and institutional cooperation that continued through the turbulence of the late 19th century and aided in the
construction of new international identifications, and greater procedural liberalism, among nations during the League Era.

**The Concert Era, 1815-1878**

The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars sounded the death knell of the 18th century international order, though it refused to go quietly. Diplomatic efforts to solidify a collective response to French revolution and expansion were attempted as early as 1791-2, but the great powers of Europe stubbornly clung to norms and practices that had preserved the basic continental order for several decades and through several wars – a culture premised on pursuing immediate economic, military, and territorial interests that encouraged mutual mistrust and only direct forms of reciprocity among a small but intricate network of dynastic monarchs. The ensuing squabbles between the great powers allowed France to dominate its neighbors and make a run for empire on the continent. It took over a decade of war before the need for collective action solidified in the minds of the great powers, and nearly another decade before such an alliance was successfully constructed. By this time millions of soldiers and civilians were dead, domestic unrest was growing, and the great powers could no longer ignore the fact that the self-regulating balance of power system of the 18th century had failed. With the Treaty of Toplitz in 1813, collective action on the battlefield was finally secured and Napoleon’s army was rolled back. Significant in its own right as the decisive turn in the wars, the treaty also established a precedent for concerted action whose effects carried beyond the peace of
1815 and contributed to the mutual recognition of interdependence and collective identification that sustained among the great power sovereigns for decades after.

It was upon this basis – a significant transformation in the social configuration of European politics – that the Concert of Europe was founded. The congress system established in 1815 was unprecedented in two ways. First, it marked the first successful attempt to hold regular peacetime conferences among the great powers of Europe designed to collectively negotiate settlements for the stability of the continent before widespread hostilities commenced. Second, it introduced (if only among great powers) the norm of sovereign equality to international deliberations and settlement decisions. In other words, for all its warts it was the first multilateral international security regime to endure beyond immediate postwar settlements in modern European history. Additionally, as nationalist movements across the continent began to alter states’ domestic political cultures and challenge the salience of international collective identifications, it appears the Concert was instrumental in preserving the norms and practices of multilateral cooperation, establishing codified precedents that would serve as a blueprint for international diplomacy in following eras.

Presage to Concert: The 18th Century International Order Unravels

The revolutionary events of 1789 in France were met with vocal criticism from the continental powers and, to a lesser extent, Britain, but they were not perceived as an

133 This norm had been nascent in the 18th century as well, but only with the Concert was it institutionalized in the form of peacetime congresses and conferences.
immediate danger in light of other events taking place at the time. At war with both the Ottoman Empire and Sweden, Russia was busy pursuing territorial gains against the Ottomans and exerting its will over Poland. If anything, the revolution eliminated Russian concerns that France might come to the Ottoman Empire’s aid and promised to distract Austrian and Prussian attention away from its designs in Eastern Europe. While the British, like the Russians, had no interest in seeing the revolution spread or the French monarchy permanently expelled, they too capitalized on France’s sudden weakness. As France turned its attention inward, Britain gained the upper hand against Spain in their dispute over the Nootka Sound and, no longer fearing French intervention in the Low Countries, was freed to further leverage its influence over the Austrian Netherlands in an (unsuccessful) attempt to isolate Russia by prying apart the Austro-Russian alliance.

Prussia and Austria were more immediately threatened by the revolution due to the possibility of spreading revolution in the German states and Low Countries, but they had more pressing concerns to the East that were only exacerbated by mutual distrust of one another. Fearing the Austro-Russian alliance against the Ottomans, Prussia initiated a series of diplomatic efforts to woo Austria away from Russia while also strengthening Prussian influence in Poland and its economic centers in the north. It played both sides of the Belgian issue – publicly supporting Austrian rule while secretly encouraging revolt – in order to signal its desire for an Austro-Prussian alliance to contain Russia while simultaneously weakening Austria’s territorial claims. Austria, meanwhile, was in an

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134 Sorel 1971:513-9; Black 1990:142-8
135 Schroeder 1994:61-83
even more precarious position as it attempted to maintain its status as a great power in the heart of Europe. Fighting an increasingly costly war against the Ottomans, Austria was faced with a choice between maintaining an alliance with Russia, in which case it would shoulder the brunt of future conflicts with Prussia, or abandoning the alliance for one with Prussia and Britain, which would further endanger its Eastern front and require depending on a traditional rival and a distant naval power for support. In an effort to couple his Russian alliance with a Prussian one, Austria’s Leopold II urged united action against France to roll back the revolution, but he died in March 1792 and, in any case, the other great powers had little interest in concerted action.\(^\text{137}\) Unfortunately for Austria, it never had to make a decision between alliance partners; in April of 1792 the new French Republic declared war on Austria, commencing what would become more than twenty years of nearly uninterrupted conflict between the great powers of Europe.

During this period, different configurations of European powers formed no fewer than four coalitions against France, the first three of which ended in failure. The First Coalition (1793-7) was formed after an initial Austro-Prussian alliance broke down over squabbles concerning territorial gains in both France and Poland, which gave the French army the advantage it needed to expand into the Low Countries. However, the coalition fared little better than the Austro-Prussian alliance – Russia sat out entirely, choosing instead to finish absorbing what was left of Poland at the time, and the alliance partners’ differing war aims resulted in indecisive strategies and disunity on the battlefield. The Second Coalition (1798-1802) suffered a similar fate. Prussia had no

\(^{137}\) Albrecht-Carrie 1968:25; Schroeder 1994:89-91, 109-10
appetite for another major campaign; Russia exited in 1799 over disputes with both Austria and Britain; Austria was forced into a separate peace with France in 1801; and Britain could not and would not stand alone against Napoleon. The realization that France was more than just a resurgent great power pursuing its rightful place in the balance of power – rather, that Napoleon was bent on establishing a continental empire – began to crystallize with the defeat of the Second Coalition, yet the Third Coalition (1803-6) was able to overcome neither the tit-for-tat squabbles over military contributions and territorial spoils nor the deep-seated distrust that characterized 18th century international politics.\textsuperscript{138} Once again Prussia did not participate in the coalition, and the growing animosity between Russia and Britain led to Russia’s defection from the coalition in favor of an alliance with France in 1807.

A common thread running through the first three coalition failures can be found in the culture of 18th century international politics. Premised on the principles of dynastic rule and a self-regulating balance of power,\textsuperscript{139} the 18th century international order created an incentive structure that rewarded those who pursued narrowly defined self-interests through whatever means possible and taught “that territorial expansion was essential and that war was the best means of achieving it. To be predator or prey: that was the choice.”\textsuperscript{140} Based on their myriad successes and failures over the course of a century, the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[138] Paul Schroeder concludes that, following the 1802 settlement at Amiens, “Bonaparte’s ambition would cause the next war, and several more after it. The sway of balance-of-power politics would cause the failures of peace,” (1994:230).
\item[139] Or a balance of power guided by what Jennifer Mitzen terms “an ‘invisible hand’ of international politics” (dissertation, 2001:175).
\item[140] Blanning 1986:37
\end{footnotes}
sovereigns of Europe had little incentive to work outside these well-established norms of diplomacy and territorial conquest.

In other words, it was not the breakdown of the balance of power system but rather the system’s unbridled success that destabilized Europe at the turn of the century. As Paul Schroeder writes when discussing the failure of the 1792 Austro-Prussian alliance, “All this leaves no doubt that greed, bad faith, and folly reigned among the allies; but it is worth remarking that this was systemic, not individual or accidental, greed, bad faith, and folly.”¹⁴¹ What occurred, then, with the Fourth Coalition (1812-15) was not merely a tactical or strategic adjustment to roll back Napoleon’s bid for empire – it was a comprehensive social transformation in European diplomacy in which sovereigns came to recognize, after twenty years of brutal conflict, a need for concerted action that required self-restraint and an enduring commitment to the collective interests of a stable Europe.

Cooperation in the Postwar Aftermath: The Bond among Sovereigns

Possibly more important than the material losses of blood and treasure, each of the great powers emerged from the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars profoundly emasculated. Following decisive defeats at Ulm and Austerlitz in late 1805, Vienna fell to Napoleon’s army and Austria was left powerless to French demands. The resulting Treaty of Pressburg stripped Austria of important territories in (what is now) Italy and Germany, allowed the French to station soldiers in Austrian territory, exacted

¹⁴¹ Schroeder 1994:109-10 (emphasis in the original)
crippling reparations, and forced Francis II to abdicate his title of Holy Roman Emperor. Prussia was equally prostrated by French power. Coerced into a series of treaties from 1805-6 that steadily transformed Prussia from a neutral power into a junior alliance partner with France and soundly defeated at the Battle of Jena-Auerstädt when Prussia finally chose to stand and fight against French antagonism, Berlin was occupied in October of 1806 and, with the Treaties of Tilsit in 1807, the French imposed a settlement similar to that with Austria.\textsuperscript{142}

The emasculation of Russia and Britain did not include complete submission, but each suffered similar humiliations relative to their status as the flanking powers of Europe. Moscow was occupied in 1812 and, though the campaign ultimately broke Napoleon’s Grand Army and failed to force Russia into an alliance akin to those imposed on Austria and Prussia, the French invasion decimated the Russian military and made it abundantly clear that Tsar Alexander I could neither play the old game of shifting alliances nor stand alone. Britain, on the other hand, was never invaded and its emasculation cannot be traced to a singular event. Rather, it was only slowly revealed through Britain’s inability to manipulate the continental powers or unify them in collective resistance against France. How much of this was a consequence of differing interests (Britain concerned with expanding its overseas holdings, securing sea lanes, and keeping the Low Countries out of French hands; the other powers concerned with territorial gains on the continent and containing France), of Britain’s relatively small land army, or of simple suspicion of Britain’s intentions is up for debate, but, regardless, from

\footnote{ibid:284, 301-10}
1792-1812 Britain’s impotence was repeatedly demonstrated in its failed attempts to organize Austria and Prussia against France and secure a lasting alliance with Russia. French emasculation, of course, came at the hands of the united sovereigns at the Battles of Leipzig in 1813 and Waterloo in 1815.

As Ernst Haas has convincingly argued, disappointment – especially on the magnitude suffered by the great powers – can trigger a collective learning process that goes beyond finding new strategies for achieving old interests to reinterpreting interests in the context of the collective in order to avoid further disappointment in the future.¹⁴³ This appears to be precisely what occurred in the postwar aftermath as the victorious powers met to negotiate a final settlement and construct a new order in Europe. The shared disappointments of two decades of war led the great powers to recognize that: (1) they were bound by a common fate and shared a collective interest in maintaining the stability of Europe, fearful that a future conflict on the continent could inevitably engulf all of Europe; (2) they were linked through a tight web of interdependence in that the stability of Europe would require the concerted action of all the major players; and (3) they were similar in two significant respects – as great powers and as monarchs in Europe (homogeneity) – that legitimated their mutual recognition as formal equals.¹⁴⁴ The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were not solely responsible for bringing about this transformation. The evolution of 18th century diplomacy had already established some of its social precursors in the development of diplomatic immunity,

¹⁴³ 1997:5; also see Jervis (1985:60) and Ikenberry (2001).
¹⁴⁴ I borrow the variables from Wendt (1999:343-57), though notice that here they are used to point out collectively held perceptions that constitute collective identifications rather than objective conditions that promote it.
multilateral conferences to address postwar settlements, and a nascent recognition of sovereign equality among the great powers; and diplomacy – which Henry Kissinger defines as “the art of restraining the exercise of power” – had already laid deep roots in European politics. However, the wars were crucial in catalyzing a learning process that strengthened the bonds among sovereigns and encourage the practice of self-restraint, transforming the culture of European politics from a self-regulating balance of power premised on dynastic rights and succession to one of great power management premised on a treaty system in which sovereigns assumed the responsibility for upholding the collective interests and stability of Europe. As Paul Schroeder concludes about this period:

This sense of inherent limits, acceptance of mutual rules and restraints, common responsibility to certain standards of conduct, and loyalty to something beyond the aims of one’s own state distinguished early nineteenth-century politics from what had preceded and would follow it. It made a different international politics, a different system, and a more stable, peaceful era possible.

This is not to say that disagreement, distrust, and competition were not rampant among the great powers during this era. Alexander preferred a European system of spheres of influence, Metternich a system of monarchal legitimacy upheld through domestic intervention when necessary, and Castlereagh a system of domestic non-intervention excepting cases that threatened continental stability. Austria was deeply

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145 Mitzen 2001:168-78 (dissertation)
146 Kissinger 1964:2
147 Schroeder 1994, esp. pp. 578-9. This draws attention to the structural component of identity discussed in the last chapter that emphasizes the role of collective identity not as a dyadic relationship that fosters ‘friendship’ between those who share in it, but rather a commitment to the rights, obligations, and interests collectively held by the group. Andreas Osiander termed this commitment to collective action for European stability ‘system-consciousness’ (1994:186).
148 1994:802
suspicious of Prussian designs in the German states; both distrusted Russia’s overtures of cooperation (which were formalized in the Holy Alliance) even as it expanded its territorial claims in Poland and elsewhere; Britain feared entangling itself too deeply in continental affairs; and all (except France of course) were wary of France. Moreover, competition for territory and influence over the smaller states of Europe was fierce, with the settlements of Poland and Saxony threatening to drag the great powers back into war. Even so, the early Concert Era distinguishes itself from the prior international order in that, at competitive junctures that would once have resulted in the pursuit of unilateral policies and possibly war, the sovereigns of Europe exercised restraint in upholding the norms and principles of the Congress of Vienna. In other words, the extensive competition and distrust witnessed in the new era was more akin to aggressive gamesmanship that nevertheless conformed to the broad contours of international agreements than the belligerence and brinkmanship that had embroiled Europe in over a dozen wars over the last century.

Additionally, it appears the bonds that formed during this era were circumscribed in three important ways. First, they constituted budding changes that, while ushering in significant changes to diplomacy and the structure of European politics, were far from comprehensive. The great powers still had clearly defined individual interests and enmities with particular others, all had territorial designs on the continent or abroad, and old rivalries were played out on a regular basis – though now tempered by an overarching framework of collective interests and concerted action in the maintenance of European stability. Second, these bonds were forged among the great powers – Austria, France,
Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Though Spain, Sweden, and Portugal were party to the coalition defeating Napoleon and held consultative rights at the Congress of Vienna, the collective interests and stability of Europe were defined by the shared interests and concerns of the five. In fact, the smaller states of Europe – the Italian and German states, Low Countries, Balkans, and elsewhere – were essentially placed on the continental cutting board to be divvied up and dealt with in a manner that smoothed cooperation between the great powers.

Third, the emergent collective identifications pertained only to the great power sovereigns and their governments. Whereas great power status demonstrated the exclusiveness of collective identifications at the international level, this third qualification demonstrates its exclusiveness in the domestic sphere. The identifications that emerged from the Napoleonic Wars were forged among monarchs and established on their shared status and interests as monarchs, and says nothing to the political identities of the populations they ruled – for whom there is little evidence pointing to a broader European identification at this time. This third qualification gains utmost importance in the nationalist turn that was born out of the French Revolution and came to threaten European stability by mid-century. But this is getting ahead of ourselves, for we need to first take a closer look at the congress system that institutionally defined the Concert of Europe and set the stage for what would come in the latter half of the century.

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149 It is during this era that the phrase ‘great powers’ came into regular use, signifying the five powers as well as their shared responsibility to manage Europe. Richard Elrod quotes Castlereagh as saying in 1818, “the Great Powers feel that they have not only a common interest, but a common duty to attend to” (1976:164).

150 Schroeder 1986:17-25
Institutionalizing Collective Action: The Congress System

Some 200 states and principalities of Europe met at the Congress of Vienna (1814-5) to craft a postwar settlement and complete the work begun with the Treaty of Paris (1813). The unprecedented scale and festive atmosphere of the congress, however, was misleading; the full congress was never convened and very little attention was paid to the smaller powers in attendance. The importance of Vienna is found in the very significant, and very serious, negotiations that took place between the Quadruple Alliance members (Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia) and France, with Spain, Sweden, and Portugal granted consultative rights but little decision-making power. Beyond settling the immediate financial and territorial demands of the victors, the negotiations established a congress system we now term the Concert of Europe – an international security regime by which the great powers agreed to meet regularly to collectively deliberate upon and manage the security and stability of Europe. Though the dates ascribed to the Concert vary from 1815 to 1822, 1848, and even 1914, here I identify an endpoint of 1878. While the hope for annual meetings ended after 1822 and rising nationalist sentiment had drained much of the Concert’s claim to legitimacy by 1848, it continued to function as an institutional form through the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Conversely, after 1878 major international conferences were no longer the exclusive domain of the great powers and were often attended by a dozen or more states (e.g. the

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151 Prior to the congress Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia had signed a secret article granting them sole discretion over territorial settlements – essentially disenfranchising the rest of the congress without their knowledge (Peterson 1945:533).
152 Peterson 1945; Osiander 1994:168
153 France was only informally included until the Quintuple Alliance was established at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 (Peterson 1945, Kissinger 1956).
154 See Kissinger 1964, Schroeder 1994, and Albrecht-Carrie 1968, respectively.
Berlin Conference of 1884-5 and the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907). But between 1815 and 1878, over two dozen congresses and conferences were convened with almost exclusive representation by the great powers, with additional representatives from those states directly affected by the negotiations sometimes granted consultative rights.

Two rules underpinned Concert Era diplomacy and its goal of maintaining European stability. First, the Concert would be a system of great power management. Externally, the other states of Europe would have to accept, one way or another, that they had few rights in determining Europe’s future and that equality would not be extended even as a rhetorical tool. Internally, the great powers agreed to convene and deliberate on equal grounds, and while each could voice their opinions, pursue their self-interests in negotiation, and lobby others to their side, it was expected that negotiated outcomes would represent the will of all the powers and the collective interest of Europe. Second, and closely related to the first, “territorial changes in Europe were subject to the sanction of the great powers.”

By reserving authority over territorial changes for themselves while simultaneously demanding concerted action between them, the great powers hoped to avoid the territorial conflicts that had catalyzed the majority of 18th century wars as well as the Napoleonic Wars. This second rule was further broadened to include the right to stifle, put down, or reverse domestic liberal revolutions, though the need and legitimacy for such domestic interventions would be a source of disagreement in the decades that followed.

155 Elrod 1976:163-6
156 Osiander 1994:232-45
157 Elrod 1976:165
What each congress and conference did specifically is less important here than the institutional form it took and the precedents for multilateral negotiations it set. The Concert of Europe represented what can be termed a procedurally ‘proto-liberal’ international security regime. The Concert of Europe was not a formal institution or organization like the League of Nations or United Nations. It did not have a formal membership roll, an independent organizational structure or headquarters, permanent committees, or voting procedures. Agendas, meeting locations, and processes for negotiations were often determined ad hoc as crises demanding attention arose. Nor was it very liberal in terms of representation. The great powers and only the great powers had a legitimate claim to representation, though states that were party to the crises at hand were sometimes invited to attend. Nevertheless, it established and routinized a set of norms and principles that defined European diplomacy for over half a century, chief among them the norm of peacetime deliberation and the principle of sovereign equality. While conferences were often called to negotiate settlements after conflicts in the 18th century, for the first time in modern history European powers agreed to meet regularly to manage continental security and avert conflicts that might threaten European stability.

Furthermore, these meetings proceeded according to the principle of sovereign equality. Differences in material power certainly existed and often played a role in determining outcomes, but the great powers met on formally equal terms and were accorded an equal voice in deliberations. And though it was not always achieved in
practice, unanimity and self-restraint in achieving it were expected.\textsuperscript{158} Therefore, we can read three meanings into the prefix ‘proto-’ as it concerns the Concert: 1) it was a constellation of norms and principles that only loosely defined the series of congresses and conferences from 1815-1878; 2) though it was procedurally liberal in its principle of equality, its was extremely exclusive in placing all rights of deliberation and decision-making in the hands of the great powers;\textsuperscript{159} and 3) it introduced multilateralism, however constrained in its representation, to European diplomacy and was a forerunner of future, more procedurally liberal international security regimes that would be influenced by the precedents established by the congresses.

Some of the congresses were more successful than others in finding agreement among the great powers, with earlier ones (especially Aix-la-Chappelle in 1818, Trappou in 1820, and Laibach in 1821) deemed better than later ones. The bonds between the great power sovereigns that made the Concert possible began to fray with disagreements over domestic interventions, the Eastern Question, the death of Tsar Alexander I, and, most importantly, the rise of nationalism in Europe in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century. Consequently, the Concert’s immediate influence and usefulness waned over time. However, its persistence as an institutional form through 1878 and its influence on international conferences that came after are indicators of the stickiness of its institutional precedents.

\textsuperscript{158} Rather than provide a list of examples whose details would entail lengthy digressions, I instead will share a pithy quote of Paul Schroeder’s in answer to those requesting evidence of states foregoing material gain to uphold the Concert’s norms: “There are many answers; but the easiest and simplest is, ‘Russia under Alexander I in 1822’” (1994:621).
\textsuperscript{159} Kissinger 1956:268-9
Challenging Stability: Sovereign Bonds Unravel

Most histories of the Concert Era categorize it as a period of general peace and cooperation on the continent, and it is true that the Napoleonic Wars resulted in a commitment to collective security among the great powers and brought 40 years of peace among them. However, Europe was not nearly as stable as this suggests, and a variety of domestic and international issues tested the Concert’s cohesion throughout this period. Political instability in the smaller states of Europe revealed differences in strategies for maintaining the European order; an inability to fence Europe off from the deterioration of the Ottoman Empire threatened to fracture the Concert; and internal liberal reforms among the great powers hastened the deconstruction of collective identifications that had emerged in 1815.

Constitutional movements made considerable headway in Germany after the war, with Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and other German states introducing liberal constitutions in 1818-1819; revolts occurred in Naples and Spain in 1820-21, and again in Spain in 1822; a revolution in Belgium led to its independence from the United Provinces in 1831, though it would remain unrecognized by the Dutch until 1839; and further uprisings occurred in Italy, Germany, Poland, Portugal, and Spain in the early 1830s. In some respects, the Concert’s responses to these issues attest to the strength of the great powers’ commitment to collective security. None of the great powers exploited these conflicts for unilateral territorial gain, which demonstrates a clear break from 18th century practices. Additionally, and despite the sometimes-grave national interests at stake, they

160 Albrecht-Carrie 1968:60-128; Schroeder 1994:583-726
avoided conflict among themselves and responded with concerted action in almost all instances.

At the same time, the Concert’s response to these issues revealed two weaknesses. First, they exposed significant differences in how the great powers believed stability in Europe was best maintained. Austria and Russia often pressed for active intervention to uphold monarchal legitimacy while the British stressed non-intervention whenever possible, with Prussia usually falling into line with its Holy Alliance partners and France oscillating between the two sides. For example, a notable fracture occurred with the Congress of Verona in 1822 authorizing French intervention in Spain to support the monarchy – an intervention Britain refused to endorse. Second, and relatedly, disagreements over intervention contributed to half-measures and indecision on the part of the Concert, as can be seen with the drawn out processes for aiding and recognizing Greek and Belgian independence. Defying conventional wisdom, the Concert actually “allowed revolutions to happen” because European governments, and the great powers in particular, were “mainly conservative, legalistic, and peaceful, restrained by treaties and the rules of the essentially co-operative, consensual game they had learned to play.”

Ironically, the bonds forged among the great power sovereigns, their commitment to the norms and principles of the Concert, and their avoidance of unilateral action prevented them from effectively tamping down revolutions and growing nationalist sentiment in the rest of Europe, which would eventually dissolve their bond from below. The

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161 This fracture ended the goal of annual conferences to address European security issues, and for some marks the end of the Concert. However, its involvement in Greece and Belgium, among other issues, demonstrates its continued momentum after 1822.
162 Schroeder 1994:799 (emphasis in original)
conservative, reactionary nature of Concert Era diplomacy was good for great power peace but ill suited for decisively maintaining the status quo in Europe.

The Eastern Question raised uncomfortable questions about the Ottoman Empire’s place in Europe and the Concert’s role in the Balkans. The Ottoman Empire had been purposefully excluded from the Concert. As a Muslim power exhibiting a foreign political configuration with essentially only nominal control over its European territories, European sovereigns questioned its status as a great power, much less a European great power. However, this left the Concert’s role in the Balkans ill-defined, and the Ottoman Empire’s inability to manage the Greek revolt that began in 1821 threatened the Concert’s commitment to collective action. Early on in the crisis it appeared that the Concert would crumble over the issue – Britain initially supported the Ottomans in order to maintain the stability of shipping lanes in the Mediterranean, Russia wanted war to further weaken the Empire, and Austria, France, and Prussia at once feared Russia’s southern expansion and distrusted Britain’s intentions in the region. Ultimately, however, the Concert survived by remaining faithful to the diplomatic principles and objectives of the Congress of Vienna. Though only slowly and sometimes grudgingly, the great powers – especially Britain and Russia – exercised restraint in negotiating a collective response to the crisis, which involved supporting and recognizing Greek independence while simultaneously ensuring the survival of the Ottoman Empire as a great power in the region.

163 Mitzen 2001:Chapter 6 (dissertation)
Two conclusions can be drawn from the Eastern Question that point to the attenuating bond among the great powers. First, the Concert was unable to ‘fence off’ what it determined to be non-European security issues. It is doubtful that a Concert including the Ottoman Empire would have been able to survive, yet its exclusion left the Balkans as a region over which no member could legitimately claim special rights over regional crises. Austria had taken the lead in Naples, France in Spain, and (to a lesser extent) Britain in Belgium, but leadership in the Balkans was less clear, creating a power vacuum over which the Concert’s norms and principles were less decisive. Second, Russia’s enmity with the Ottoman Empire and its territorial interests in the region drew attention to significant differences in strategic self-interests that would only grow as an obstacle to collective action, foreshadowing the great power war that would break out over the Crimea in 1853.

While instability in the smaller states of Europe and the Eastern Question represented international challenges to concerted action, the rise of nationalist sentiment on the continent – and the domestic reforms it implied – catalyzed internal transformations that further fractured the bond among sovereigns from within. By mid-century all five powers had implemented domestic reforms that heightened the importance and involvement of their domestic populations in foreign policy. If the 1815 British government was already unique among the great powers for its level of domestic representation in government, the passage of the Reform Act of 1832 only further shifted attention to domestic concerns in foreign affairs and reinforced Britain’s commitment to non-intervention in the political revolutions of Europe (with the Near East, where it had
significant strategic interests, remaining an important exception). The July Revolution of 1830 delegitimized hereditary rights in France, the more violent 1848 revolution introduced the short-lived Second Republic before succumbing to the Second Empire, and both embodied many of the liberal national principles that emerged with the Third Republic in 1870. Metternich was toppled and the Austrian crown shaken by revolution in 1848, and in the following two decades Austria would lose wars and territory to Italian and German national unification and grant semi-autonomy to the Kingdom of Hungary (transforming the Austrian Empire into the Austro-Hungarian Empire). Growing nationalist sentiment in Prussia threatened to poison its traditional alliance with Russia over Poland and led to war with Austria and France over the German states. Even Russia, though largely unscathed by the 1848 revolutions, would succumb to domestic agitation by ending serfdom in 1861 and was forced to put down the January Uprising in Poland (1863-5). R.B. Mowat notes that, “By the end of the period 1848-1870, the ideal of national unity had been attained, fairly completely, in all the European states except Austria-Hungary and Russia,” with the latter two still forced to introduce limited reforms and recognize the new importance of nationalism in international politics.

Moreover, while the 1848 revolutions might be considered a European revolution in that most of them had common causes in economic crises, famine, and nationalist rhetoric, they threatened the fragmentation of Europe, forced states to turn their attention inward, and destroyed the homogeneity among the great powers that had been so

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164 1930:2
important in Vienna in 1815. The Concert was established on the legitimacy of monarchy and collective interests in maintaining domestic and international stability among sovereigns with extensive freedoms to manage foreign affairs. Not only did sovereigns become more limited in their ability to dictate foreign policy, but rising nationalist sentiment also resulted in reforms and/or domestic upheavals that evinced changing interests and identities among the great powers. From about 1848 forward, the great powers still espoused the spirit of 1815 and engaged in international congresses and conferences as before, but “dynastic power, where it survived, took on a ‘national colouring’,” and the bonds that had resulted in the Concert’s founding had been permanently rent.

The Strength of Institutional Precedents

Even as the collective identities upon which the Concert was built had greatly dissolved under these pressures by the 1850s, the Concert’s norm of multilateral negotiation premised on the principle of sovereign equality survived. This is not to say it was not severely attenuated. The Crimean War exemplified the breakdown of sovereign unity in the face of strategic national interests; the unifications of Italy and Germany created new great powers; proposed congresses in 1859 and 1863 never materialized; and

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166 Rodney Bruce Hall (1999) identifies this as a critical moment at which national identity came to exert itself on international politics with the shift from territorial sovereignty to national sovereignty. Mark Haas (2005:73-104) points out that the uneven nature of domestic reforms – occurring in Britain and France decades before the three Eastern powers – resulted in an ideological split in Europe that fanned the diverging interests and tensions that arose among the great powers after 1830.
167 Taylor 1954:168
the London conferences in 1864 and 1867 failed to establish a peaceful settlement over the contested territories extending through the German states from Austria to Denmark. Nevertheless, though their successes are considered marginal, the conferences in Dresden (1851) and Vienna (1855), the Congress of Paris (1856), the London conferences (1864, ’67, ’71), and the Congress of Berlin (1878) demonstrate repeated attempts to settle regional disputes in a multilateral fashion. Moreover, the fact that certain states attempted to avoid a multilateral approach in each of these cases but ultimately took part in them (e.g. Russia at the Congress of Paris), suggests the continued power of precedents established in Vienna in 1815. By mid-century, the congress system had become the conventional, routine, and legitimate method by which disputes were settled, either before or after conflict.169 Mowat refers to the period from 1870 to 1914 as the ‘Armed Peace,’ characterized by the maintenance of standing armies in all of the great power states and the divergence of national interests that threatened war on the continent on numerous occasions, but nevertheless a period of general peace – due in part to the restraints imposed by the norms and institutional practices of 19th century diplomacy.170

In other words, a multilateral approach to crisis management and dispute resolution among the great powers had become a critical part of the culture of 19th century European politics, and continued to persist after international and domestic developments had dissolved the bond among sovereigns that initially made it possible.

169 Schroeder notes that by 1848 the spirit of Vienna and the legitimating principle of monarchy upon which it was established had given way to national movements and diverging interests, but that the congress system continued to maintain order in Europe and helped avoid another continental war (1986:12-3; 1994:803); Elrod goes further in referring to the Concert’s norms and principles of diplomacy as the ‘conscience of Europe’ (1976:168).

170 1930:16-32
So while the particular identifications forged among the sovereigns in 1815 were largely gone, the practices and framework of the Concert proved ‘sticky’ even beyond 1878, providing a generic normative and institutional foundation upon which international diplomacy would continue¹⁷¹ – offering an institutional conduit through which international identifications could be constructed among nation states in the following era.

Discussion

The above narrative points to two significant transformations in the social and institutional fabric of European politics.¹⁷² The first was the crystallization of collective identifications among the great power monarchs. Referring again to Alexander Wendt’s four master variables of collective identity, the evidence suggests that all four were present as both causal and constitutive elements of the bonds forged among the monarchs following the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon’s victories on the battlefield and imperial ambitions – and the other great powers’ inability to unilaterally thwart them – made the interdependent relationship among great powers abundantly and painfully clear. The great powers largely ignored this objective interdependence in aborting the first three coalitions in the face of French aggression, but appear to have internalized it with the Fourth Coalition and the cooperation that took place at Vienna in 1815 and the congresses that followed. The Napoleonic threat during the wars and the revolutionary

¹⁷¹ Elrod 1976:174
¹⁷² Schroeder’s Transformation (1994) contains elements of both. While he focuses on changing norms of European diplomacy more broadly, I am attempting to further elaborate this as mutually reinforcing transformations in both the social aspects of changing identifications as well as institutional aspects of formally reorienting diplomatic operating procedures.
agitation that spread across Europe in the decades following defined a *common fate* among the great powers, and became a constitutive element of collective identification among them as they cooperated to sustain monarchical legitimacy in Europe in the first half of the 19th century. After the wars, and with the French Restoration, the five sovereigns stood apart from the rest of Europe as both great powers and monarchies with similar foreign and domestic aims for sustaining monarchical legitimacy and European stability (though, as mentioned above, the varying degree of popular representation with the monarchies would prove divisive). This realization of *homogeneity* in status, governance structures, and political aims contributed to the success of Vienna, where the formal conference was never convened but the five powers were nevertheless able to negotiate terms of the post-war settlement and come to agreement on an enduring congress system among themselves. Finally, *self-restraint* was objectively practiced in the Fourth Coalition – with the powers largely eschewing past practices of direct reciprocity that ensured their own self-interest in order to achieve collective goals – and in the settlement at Vienna. This may very well have catalyzed the obligation felt by the great powers to come to unanimous agreement over various European crises at the various congresses that followed Vienna. Though collective identifications cannot be directly observed, it appears all four variables served as catalysts of collective identifications and became internalized as constitutive elements of the collective identity that resulted.

The second transformation was the reconfiguration of European diplomacy away from the unilateral pursuit of narrowly-defined national interests in contests over territory
and dynastic rights and toward an institutionalized form of great power management. The Concert of Europe represented, for the first time in modern European history, a proactive attempt to negotiate and agree on settlements to avert conflicts before they started. During the 18th century, sovereigns often resorted to conflict first – in order to establish a more favorable negotiating position – and diplomacy after. The congress system reversed this pattern by routinizing deliberation and negotiation prior to the outbreak of hostilities – promoting stability and peaceful conflict resolution. Moreover, it represented a formal forum for negotiation (in the form of congresses and conferences) that operated on the principles of sovereign equality and unanimity in determining outcomes. The details of negotiations in the various congresses make clear that naked power was often used as leverage, and that formal equality was at times just that – formal. But by granting a legitimate voice to the interests of each of the five great powers and relying on unanimous consent as a result of deliberation, crisis resolution moved one step away from determining outcomes based upon near-term power differentials. In sum, the Concert system transformed the norms of European politics by ushering in a wholly new form of diplomacy and crisis resolution premised on the principles of procedural liberalism among the great powers.

A few causal inferences about these two transformations can be gleaned from the above narrative. First, it appears quite clear that the collective identifications forged among the great power sovereigns was a direct result of the emasculating experiences of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It was by all accounts a slow and brutal learning process, but also one that would prove enduring after hostilities ended. Though
the first three coalitions seem to show that Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia had some indication of a common cause, a combination of French military might and – more tellingly – animosity and distrust among the other powers proved their undoing and illustrated that 18th century practices would not give way easily.\textsuperscript{173} Russia sat out the First Coalition and squabbles over military contributions divided the others in the face of French aggression. Prussia did not participate in the Second or Third, with Russia withdrawing early from both and actually forming an alliance with France against Britain in 1807. Only after two decades of near-constant conflict that sapped them of both blood and treasure, only after Austria and Prussia had both experienced French occupation, only after Britain’s attempts to rally the continental powers failed – sometimes spectacularly – on numerous occasions, and only after the occupation of Moscow and Russia’s near defeat against Napoleon’s army did the sovereigns come to fully appreciate their collective interest in restoring peace and maintaining stability in the aftermath.\textsuperscript{174}

If the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were instrumental in the construction of collective identifications among the great power sovereigns, these collective identifications appear to be only slightly less critical for understanding the great leap in European politics that took place with the Concert’s establishment. The specific contours of the congress system cannot be directly explained through the lens of collective identifications – institutional aspects of which were adopted from less formal

\textsuperscript{173} Black (2002:212-31); Schroeder (1994:100-286)
\textsuperscript{174} Schroeder states, “The period 1812-13 therefore involved not only the beginning of the end for Napoleon’s Empire, but also the end of the beginning in the search for a new basis of European international politics…” that eventually crystallized in the Congress of Vienna (1994:445). See Schroeder (445-76) on the final step in the learning process that transformed the shifting alliances of 1792-1812 into a united Fourth Coalition.
norms of diplomacy and negotiation that evolved in the many postwar settlements of the 18th century – but it is difficult to imagine such a thick, unified institutional framework for peacetime diplomacy emerging without them. In other words, the historical record suggests that the great power sovereigns’ unity of interests and purpose in the stability of a peaceful, monarchical European order was a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the Concert’s establishment.\textsuperscript{175} Over two decades of conflict had painfully taught the great powers that their long-term self-interests dovetailed with broader collective interests in European stability; that their foreign policy decisions and fate were inextricably linked with those of the other great powers, which necessitated short-term self-restraint where interests diverged; and that multilateral diplomacy, rather than a network of bilateral relationships, offered the best chance at enduring peace.

Though rejected by Napoleon at the time, Schroeder points to the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont as the final crystallization of unity among the great power sovereigns, which “bound the allies to continue the war for the agreed aims, provided new subsidy arrangements for another year’s campaign if necessary, and most important, united them for twenty years in jointly maintaining peace.”\textsuperscript{176} Further, though evidence of the unity of purpose among the great powers in establishing the Concert is littered throughout the records kept from the Congress of Vienna, an 1818 British memorandum on the treaties of 1814 and 1815 delivered at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle supporting full French participation in the Concert sums it up well:

\textsuperscript{176} 1994:501
“The problem of an universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world has always been one of speculation and of hope, but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can; but you may in practice approach towards it, and perhaps the design has never been so far realized as in the last four years. During that eventful period the Quadruple Alliance, formed upon principles altogether limited, has had, from the presence of the Sovereigns and the unparalleled unity of design with which their Cabinets have acted, the power of traveling so far out of the sphere of their immediate and primitive obligations, without, at the same time, transgressing any of the principles of the law of nations or failing in the delicacy which they owe to the rights of other States, as to form more extended alliances, such as that of March 25, 1815, at Vienna, to interpose their good offices for the settlement of differences subsisting between other States, to take the initiative in watching over the peace of Europe, and finally in securing the execution of its treaties in the mode most consonant to the convenience of all the parties.\textsuperscript{177}

The spirit of Vienna further found its way into the signed Protocol for the same conference, in its second declaration, “That this Union, which is the more real and durable, inasmuch as it depends on no separate interest or temporary combination, can only have for its object the Maintenance of general Peace.”\textsuperscript{178} Again, while the particular institutional aspects of the Concert were the result of careful negotiations, the spirit of the Concert – to unify the great powers in a collective effort to maintain European peace and stability – appears to stem directly from the collective identifications forged toward the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Postwar negotiations were rife with conflicting interests between sovereigns, sometimes threatening renewed hostilities, but the broader unity of purpose among them represented a condition of possibility for the Concert’s establishment and early successes.

\textsuperscript{177} Albrecht-Carrie (1968:41-2). Of interest for the importance of institutional precedence, this memorandum was reprinted for the British Foreign Office in preparation for the peace negotiations following World War I.

\textsuperscript{178} ibid:44
Conversely, the importance of the congress system for collective identifications is visible only toward the end of the Concert Era and into the League Era and, indeed, the Concert did very little for the collective identity among the great power sovereigns. As discussed above, the bond among monarchs reached its zenith in the early congresses at Vienna (1815) and Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), became strained at Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822) as Britain disagreed with the conservative interventionism proposed by Austria, and was all but nonexistent by the time the 1848 revolutions threatened monarchical legitimacy in Europe and war broke out in the Crimea in 1853. Rather, the congress system’s importance lies in the precedents it established for European diplomacy that led to the Concert’s continuation beyond 1848 and provided a blueprint for institutional cooperation in a new era. Even as the spirit of Vienna evaporated in the years preceding the 1848 revolutions and the Crimean War, the congress system continued to operate well into the 1870s. Weakened by the divergent interests and goals of the great powers, the diplomatic norms established by the Concert in the first half of the century nevertheless continued to compel them to meet as sovereign equals to deliberate and negotiate their interests in a multilateral setting. Moreover, even as the congress system slowly faded, the norms and principles on which it was established continued on in new institutional forms in the new era. As will be seen in the next chapter, the Concert’s principles of inclusion and sovereign equality had become routinized in European diplomacy and represented powerful precedents for future deliberations and negotiations, leading to their adoption – and further expansion – in newly crafted international forums, including the Hague Peace Conferences at the turn of
the 19th century and the League of Nations following World War I. In other words, the procedurally liberal institutional practices that resulted from the post-1815 collective identifications among great power monarchs provided the foundations for new, more expansive, procedurally liberal institutions as well as a focal point around which new collective identifications among nation-states could solidify.

**Alternative Narratives**

The above narrative is not without its critics. In particular, there are those who challenge the notion that the Concert emerged from collective identifications among the great powers that unified them with a common purpose for continental peace and stability. Therefore it is necessary to address the more common rationalist accounts for the unprecedented peace and cooperation that occurred during the first half of the 19th century and, more specifically, highlight the shortcomings of such accounts.

To start, neither of the two sides of the realist coin – balance of power and hegemonic stability – appears to offer a satisfactory explanation. No single hegemon emerged from wars to tailor a new order in its favor, and the Concert took shape and achieved early successes without a clear leader. Additionally, two aspects of the postwar system speak to a balance of power argument’s inapplicability. First, the distribution of power was clearly unbalanced following Napoleon’s defeat. Britain and Russia emerged from the wars much more powerful than Austria, Prussia, and (of course) France. Little would have stood in the way of Britain laying greater claims on the Low

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179 See Jervis (1985:60-2) and Slantchev (2005:573-5) for a more detailed refutation of balance of power logic in the Concert’s formation.
Countries or Russia expanding further west beyond Poland. Second, even if bipolar balancing could have deterred the territorial desires of each in turn, the universal nature (among the great powers) of the Concert decisively cuts against this logic. Britain and Russia did not become two poles of power in competition with one another, nor did either work to forge short-term alliance blocs against the other. Russia’s attempt at such an arrangement in the form of the Holy Alliance never solidified into a direct alternative to the Concert and there is no evidence of Britain attempting to construct a similar regional alliance in the west. Rather, the Concert became an institutional focal point around which all the great powers of Europe were united in a long-term alliance arrangement – not against a larger external threat, but against the fallacies of the past and future aggression and revision on the continent.

A more plausible rationalist alternative is what might be termed a balance of interest logic presented by Branislav Slantchev that couples realist assumptions of narrowly-defined self-interest with a new incentive structure that came with the postwar order. Slantchev argues that the Concert took shape and peace was maintained for decades after 1815 not because the interests of the great powers had changed, but because the postwar European map and the presence of standing armies allowed for a peaceful divvying of territory and spheres of influence that satisfied each power in turn. According to this logic, territorial competition was the driving force behind 18th century conflicts as sovereigns vied for wealth and power, and this interest in territorial aggrandizement did not change after the wars.180 Distinguishing the eras, rather, was the

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180 Slantchev (2005:566-8)
combination of fewer small states populating the European map and the presence of standing armies that could credibly deter expansion, resulting in a balance of interests in which each great power exerted control over interlocking spheres of influence with well-defined and credibly protected boundaries, creating a “self-reinforcing equilibrium.”

Essentially, the Concert represented a cartel among the great powers that was largely a result of happenstance – a lucky convergence of self-interests that was ultimately short lived and unlikely to emerge again.

However, his vague notion of “narrow self-interest” – a critical assumption underpinning his argument – ultimately represents a moving target, raising uncomfortable questions. Slantchev criticizes Paul Schroeder for brushing over instances of narrow self-interests that threaten his broader conclusion that the norms of European diplomacy had shifted toward collective security, yet he finds himself in a similar position. Taking Russia as an example, why did it not push the Saxony issue more forcefully in 1815, why did it not act unilaterally on the Greek issue in the early 1820s, and why did it not push Prussia to join it in resisting the Belgian issue in 1830 – all cases in which Slantchev states unilateral action would have been in Russia’s immediate interests? To explain these discrepancies (among others), Slantchev states that while it may have been in Russia’s immediate interests to act more aggressively, it was in Russia’s long-term interests to restrain its self and maintain the Concert. Yet, in 1853, Russia reversed this logic and pursued immediate interests in the Near East – Concert be damned. Little in

\[181\] ibid (567)
\[182\] ibid (566)
\[183\] ibid (584, 594-5)
the way of changes in the broader incentive structure of European politics can explain this shift, which reveals a more general weakness in how rationalist scholars conceptualize self-interest.

This is an example of a rationalist technique of interest elasticity that has been used time and again to discount collective identifications. When actions are taken that go against collective interests, it disconfirms the collective; when actions are taken that conform to the collective interest, they merely represent long-term self-interests rather than any broader identification of interests – even when the stated reasons for restraint are couched in the collective discourse and the actions support collective goals. To some extent this is an empirically irresolvable issue that allows each side to fall back on his/her theoretical assumptions. However, particularly in the case of the Concert, nettlesome questions remain for rationalist explanations. In a fluid competition for power that can shift quickly and unexpectedly, upsetting carefully constructed incentives structures (e.g. deterrence ability), why would sovereigns forgo immediate gains for promises of long-term gains that may prove empty? Where does the trust that other powers will practice the same self-restraint in the future come from? And, maybe most importantly, why would power-seeking sovereigns trade opportunities for territorial aggrandizement in order to maintain the status quo? Do the threats that present themselves within each sphere of influence outweigh the threat of another great power defecting (or the opportunities presented by defecting) from the Concert’s rules and norms for its own advantage? The answers to these questions are clear from a collective identity perspective, but they require a great deal of circular argumentation about short vs. long-
term interests for rationalist explanations to remain credible. This may be why Robert Jervis, in trying to explain the Concert in terms of the security dilemma, offense-defense balance, and payoff structures – and before constructivism introduced notions of collective identity in international politics – begins an article on the subject by stating that major wars can lead “to unusually close bonds among the states of the counter-hegemonic coalition, even though disputes and hostilities within the coalition never disappear.”\(^{184}\)

Self-interests certainly inserted themselves, sometimes belligerently, at many junctures during the Concert’s formation and operation. Additionally, the design of the Concert’s institutional framework introduced rational incentives for sovereigns to cooperate.\(^{185}\) Yet rationalist explanations fall short in their attempt to account for the radically new European order that took shape after the Napoleonic Wars. The unprecedented unity of purpose at Vienna, the cooperative approach to resolving disputes across the continent at various congresses, and the self-restraint exercised by the great powers at important junctures that could have dissolved the Concert cannot be satisfactorily explained by pure self-interest, exogenous shifts in technology, etc. The pace at which collective identifications among the sovereigns of Europe dissolved following the Concert’s early years is a matter for debate that is not resolved here (though reasons for its dissolution have been addressed). However, the presence of collective

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\(^{184}\) Jervis (1985:60)

\(^{185}\) See Lindley (2004) on the importance of transparency for the Concert’s early successes.
identifications that provided the impetus for the Concert and contributed to its early successes has, I believe, been clearly shown.\textsuperscript{186}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The Concert Era bridged two significant transformations in European politics, the first of which was the shift away from the self-regulating balance of power of 18\textsuperscript{th} century Europe to a new order premised on great power management. The Napoleonic Wars left the sovereigns of Europe materially devastated and psychologically emasculated, and though they would remain suspicious of each other’s intentions and often compete with one another for territory, power, and influence on the continent and elsewhere, they were united by a collective interest in the maintenance of European stability. Put another way, they formed an ‘in-group’ that engendered a mutual recognition of each other’s status as great powers and as sovereign equals and prompted them to practice self-restraint in sustaining collective action by subordinating (at times) traditional self-interests for those of the group. Institutionally, this resulted in the Concert of Europe, which, through a series of congresses and conferences, collectively managed the crises of Europe and sustained nearly 40 years of great power peace in Europe.

Though its roots can be traced back to the French Revolution, the second transformation took place mid-century with national self-determination displacing Procedural liberalism’s importance for establishing enduring precedents of international diplomacy is most evident in the years following the Concert Era, and thus alternative explanations for its role in my broader narrative can be found in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{186} Procedural liberalism’s importance for establishing enduring precedents of international diplomacy is most evident in the years following the Concert Era, and thus alternative explanations for its role in my broader narrative can be found in the next chapter.
dynastic rule as the legitimating principle of European governance. By 1850 the Congress of Vienna was a fading memory, and by 1870 the collective identifications among the great power sovereigns had evaporated and national interests eclipsed collective ones. The Concert suffered in two major respects. First, of course, was the divergence of interests among the great powers, which severely limited the effectiveness of the congresses and conferences that took place after 1848. Second, whereas the Concert had embodied both an international order and an international security regime prior to 1848, by 1870 a system of treaties had displaced the Vienna Final Act’s role in arbitrating territorial revisions. The Concert would continue to function as the legitimate framework for international order but, though the London Protocol of 1871 would attempt to reassert the authority of Vienna, direct matters of security became ‘privatized’ in bi- and trilateral treaty obligations that essentially replaced great power collective action.

Despite these weaknesses, however, the Concert’s ultimate importance for this dissertation lays in its survival as a form of multilateral diplomacy that would continue to operate through 1878 and serve as a foundation for diplomacy in the years after. From 1815-1878, the trend concerning collective identity demonstrates a relatively strong international collective identity forged among the great power sovereigns that slowly dissolved under the pressure of rising national identity and strategic interests (particularly in the Near East). Yet its legacy continued beyond the mid-19th century through the loose, ‘proto-liberal’ normative and institutional framework it constructed in the Concert

187 Bridge and Bullen 2005:4
of Europe. Though the specific bonds among sovereigns that made the Concert possible were gone, and though specific security issues were increasingly dealt with through a complex network of bi- and trilateral treaties, its precedent for multilateral negotiations premised on the principle of sovereign equality among participants proved institutionally sticky in the congresses and conferences of the Concert through 1878, and through more inclusive international conferences in the future. In other words, the culture of international politics had changed in that states expected major international issues to be dealt with multilaterally, limiting the ability of states to pursue territorial revisions or other strategic interests in a unilateral manner.
Chapter 4: The League of Nations Era

During a tumultuous period of industrialization, nationalism, and domestic transformation in the latter half of the 19th century, the culture of multilateralism established during the Concert Era provided a blueprint for diplomacy that helped sustain order in the international system during the League Era and promote international collective identity formation along procedurally liberal lines. As sovereign equality among great powers became solidified as a routinized and legitimating principle of European diplomacy during the Concert Era, smaller states in Europe and elsewhere began demanding an equal seat at the table. The recognition of such rights was a first step in the development of an international collective identity that extended beyond the European powers, and was originally institutionalized with the Berlin Conference and Hague Peace Conferences, whose conventions were among the first formal attempts (along with the Geneva Conventions) to establish an enduring body of international law governing warfare.

World War I, however, revealed the limitations and ephemeral nature of generalized principles of multilateralism in the absence of a solid, institutionalized international security regime. It also illustrated the thinness of collective identifications constructed on largely discursive principles, and exposed the weakness of
institutionalizing laws of war multilaterally while leaving the direct implementation of international security to bi- and trilateral treaty negotiations. The devastating nature of the war, though, spurred a greater commitment to collective action and self-restraint among the victors and brutally exemplified the need for concomitant institutions to sustain these principles, resulting in a multilateral security treaty establishing the League of Nations. Though it ultimately failed to maintain international peace due to a variety of reasons discussed below, the League nevertheless embodied and reinforced a sense of international collective identity that would largely determine the battle lines of World War II and the contours of the postwar order.

**The League Era, 1880s-1939**

What Mowat terms the Armed Peace,\(^{188}\) from the 1870s through World War I, was a tumultuous period in international politics. Nationalism had gripped Europe and matters of foreign policy were increasingly filtered through the domestic sphere, in some cases because of domestic institutional reforms that had enfranchised a greater proportion of the population and in others simply because of the growing importance of popular opinion and protest.\(^ {189}\) The autonomy enjoyed by the great power sovereigns during the early 19\(^{1}\)st century eroded as the principles of territorial sovereignty and dynastic rule were replaced by notions of national sovereignty and popular will, often resulting in conflicting national interests and a general suspicion of collective action that is best exemplified by Otto von Bismarck’s pursuit of German security through a system of bi-

\(^{188}\) 1930:16-32  
\(^{189}\) Taylor 1954:256-64
and trilateral treaties. Additionally, during this period European states aggressively competed for colonies and influence in Africa and Asia, which became a source of conflict between the European powers and a method by which nationalism and the institutional structure of the Western state were transmitted to foreign societies.

Despite the political transformation brought on by nationalism and the divergence of national interests, however, the normative and institutional legacy of the Concert Era affected the international order in two significant ways. First, it established a deliberative approach to issues of international order that encouraged states to negotiate and construct a body of international law on the conduct of war and peaceful dispute resolution. Second, its principle of sovereign equality justified the demand for representation by non-great powers, both in and outside Europe, in multilateral negotiations. Even with a lack of clear collective identifications among states during the early League Era, the cultural legacy of the Concert Era promoted cooperation among states on issues of international concern and cast suspicion on those who attempted to work outside its framework, and contributed to maintaining relative peace from 1870-1914.

Of course we know the Armed Peace was not to last. During this period states operated according to the culture of multilateralism on broader issues of international order but specific issues of international security remained ‘privatized’ in a complex network of treaties, which helped a regional crisis in the Balkans escalate into a world war. Just as the Napoleonic Wars resulted in an emasculating learning process that introduced collective action to the continent, World War I would expose the weaknesses of prewar diplomacy and compel states to construct a more thorough international
security regime in the League of Nations, founded on the collective identifications among nation-states that emerged from the conflict. In some ways the League was stronger than the Concert had been – it was more deeply institutionalized, provided representation to the ‘civilized’ states of the world rather than just the great powers of Europe, and was constructed by governments that represented (however imperfectly) the national will rather than that of sovereigns. In some ways the League was weaker – Germany’s response to defeat was less conciliatory than that of France in 1815, the League’s greater membership and geopolitical purview rendered it less cohesive and responsive than the Concert, and leaders exercised less autonomy in crafting negotiated settlements as representatives of peoples rather than sovereigns. Nevertheless, it engendered an international collective identity with much deeper roots in the domestic sphere than those of the Concert and further institutionalized a culture of multilateral deliberation among sovereign equals. Its failure in 1939 would only be partial in that it 1) ultimately defined World War II as a war between the defenders of the international order and those determined to revise it, and 2) provided an institutional blueprint for the United Nations and the postwar order.

*International Order without International Security: Conferences during the Armed Peace*

By the end of the Concert Era national sovereignty had displaced territorial, or dynastic, sovereignty as the legitimating principle of governance.¹⁹⁰ During this period government structures, including the diplomatic corps, underwent extensive

¹⁹⁰ Hall 1999:168-72, 211-3
bureaucratization in most European states, professional standing armies became the norm, and the virtual monopoly great power sovereigns had wielded in foreign policy (excepting Great Britain) loosened as domestic reforms compelled them to yield influence to newly enfranchised populations. In other words, the ‘unitary actor’ model for the state that more or less fit early 19th century Europe became attenuated as leaders turned attention inwards to attend to the (often conflicting) demands of their domestic populations. Though often lauded as a progressive transformation for domestic governance, the emergence of nationalism as a guiding force in foreign policy threatened to fracture the semblance of order and collective action that had been achieved with the Concert.\textsuperscript{191} Moreover, diverging interests on the continent and suspicions of others’ intentions were only exacerbated as European states extended their competition abroad in the scramble for African and Asian colonies.\textsuperscript{192} Still, it appears that the culture of multilateral deliberation not only continued, but also expanded in terms of participation during this era, as illustrated in three major international conferences that took place over three decades – the Berlin Conference (1884-5) and the two Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907).

On its face the Berlin Conference – essentially purposed with carving up the continent of Africa and its peoples among the European powers – might seem like an odd example of the liberalization of international politics. Setting aside its vulgarly imperial intentions for Africa, however, the conference clearly illustrated the readiness of the European great powers to deliberate collectively with other states to avoid crises over

\textsuperscript{191} Taylor 1954:256-64
\textsuperscript{192} Bridge and Bullen 2005:227-33
colonial trade and territorial claims. While retaining the Concert’s practice of multilateral negotiations among formal equals, the conference broke from the Concert’s tradition of great power management by inviting a dozen European states, the United States, and the Ottoman Empire to send representatives to Berlin. Rene Albrecht-Carrie notes that the “tone of the gathering reflected the acceptance of the equally legitimate right of all to imperial activity,” and that this collective recognition, along with a shared interest in avoiding colonial wars, ensured a relatively peaceful resolution to colonization in sub-Saharan Africa.193 With the Berlin Act of 1885, the states of Europe194 avoided war over Africa by collectively agreeing to recognize the (ostensible) independence of the Congo, implement a free trade zone across sub-Saharan Africa, and establish legal rules for making and maintaining territorial claims.195

The Hague Peace Conferences were both more widely attended and more wholesome in purpose than the Berlin Conference, though somewhat less successful in their outcomes. The first conference, proposed by Tsar Nicholas II, convened in 1899 with 26 powers represented – 20 European states as well as the United States, Brazil, China, Japan, Persia, and Siam – and with the express purpose of ensuring international peace. More specifically, the conference intended to reach collective agreement on three issues: 1) disarmament, 2) international laws of war on land and at sea, and 3) an international framework for dispute resolution.196 Negotiations were premised on formal equality with each state receiving one vote and agreements requiring general unanimity.

193 1968:310-11. Agreement on territorial claims in Northern Africa would not be as easy, exemplified in the Moroccan Question and Fashoda Crisis.
194 The United States did not attend.
196 Best 1999:624-33; also see Scott 1909.
(though states were allowed to submit reservations during ratification). Ultimately, the conference was successful on the second issue, building upon the Geneva Convention of 1864 to further codify international law concerning the declaration and conduct of war; partially successful on the third, establishing the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but without obligatory arbitration; and a failure on the first.

The second conference, proposed by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 and officially initiated by Russia two years later, convened in 1907 in order to reaffirm and extend what had been accomplished at the first conference. At the behest of the United States, all the Latin American states except Costa Rica and Honduras were represented alongside those states from the first conference, for a total of 44 participants. Again, all states were accorded equal status with one vote and there was again a requirement of general unanimity. The outcome of the second conference was similar to the first: international laws of war were further codified and extended to include condemning the use of force in cases of sovereign debt collection (a matter of particular concern for the Latin American states); the jurisdiction and processes of the Permanent Court of Arbitration were addressed in greater detail, though efforts to establish a court with permanent judicial seats (the International Prize Court) and mandate obligatory arbitration were unsuccessful; and little agreement was made on disarmament beyond

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197 Costa Rica adhered to the conference’s outcome but did not send a representative and Honduras was invited but, distracted by domestic unrest, their delegates did not arrive in time to participate in the negotiations (Scott 1908:14).

198 Interestingly, many of the ‘great’ powers – including Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and France – were in favor of both efforts. However, they were met with resistance from Austria-Hungary and Germany, which claimed that the proposals were too vague, and from smaller states that were concerned about unequal representation. Thirty two states spoke in favor of obligatory arbitration but the matter was
the laws of war limiting the deployment of particular weapons (e.g. chemical weapons). 199

These conferences suggest that, even in the absence of strong collective identifications, the culture of international politics during the Armed Peace engendered an extension of the normative and institutional legacy of the Concert by widening and deepening the procedurally liberal characteristics of the international order. Breaking from Concert tradition, these conferences incrementally expanded representation from the European great powers to include a variety of smaller European powers and states outside of Europe in what Kraus Schlichtmann regards as a “change from the limited, traditional European ‘concert of nations’ to a ‘comity of nations’, proclaiming universal norms and values.” 200 Additionally, the Hague Peace Conferences formalized deliberations by establishing commissions on each issue addressed and extending an equal vote to all participants in crafting the final agreement, constructing what Walther Schücking considered the first institutional elements of a wider political union among nations. 201 In other words, the norm of multilateral deliberation was extended to include more states and greater equality in negotiations, leading – from the peace conferences – to a body of international law that would survive future conflicts and be subsequently built upon in later decades. To say that this culture of multilateralism and the resulting conferences sustained peace during this period would be to claim too much, but they no doubt contributed to it.

tabled due to the objections of nine others, illustrating the effective application of unanimity in crafting the agreement. See Klein (1974:39-62) and Scott (1908:24, 1909:319-85) for more on this point. 199 See Scott (1908) for a detailed report on the outcomes of both conferences. 200 2003:377 201 1918/2007
Still, the conferences and the scope of negotiations implied a weakness that would prove disastrous in 1914. Even as broader issues of international order were dealt with collectively, specific issues of international security were primarily addressed through a network of bi- and trilateral treaty agreements in Europe that fragmented the continent – while international order was attended to publicly, security issues remained privatized. In an era of fluid national(-istic) interests, general distrust of others’ intentions, and colonial competition, the treaty system that developed after 1870 – and famously championed by Germany’s Bismarck – deepened the fault lines partitioning the map of Europe.²⁰²

Though many alliances were established and revised during this era, they came to solidify into a web of treaties that would define the battle fronts of World War I, including alliances between Germany and Austria (1879, with the addition of Italy in 1882), France and Russia (1892), France and Great Britain (1904), and Great Britain and Russia (1907).

When war broke out in the Balkans in 1912, an attempt was made to revive the Concert with a conference among the great powers in London. However, the polarization between the powers – especially Britain and Germany – overshadowed its accomplishments, which were too weak to prevent a second Balkan war in 1913, and foreshadowed World War I.²⁰³ When hostilities commenced in July of 1914, the fragility of an international order without a commitment to collective security became apparent. The many existing alliances, which were constructed to ensure the security of their signatories, ironically served as force multipliers that amplified a regional conflict into a

²⁰³ Bridge and Bullen 2005:319-22
world war. The third Hague peace conference, originally scheduled for 1914 and then delayed to 1915 after hostilities broke out, never took place.

*World War I: Forging International Collective Identifications among Nations*

Though the mutual recognition among states as sovereign equals engendered by multilateral conferences during the Armed Peace suggests an international collective identity sustained by these institutional practices, the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Serbia on June 28, 1914, and the rapid domino effect of alliances that led to general war illustrate its thinness in the face of national and imperial ambitions.204 During five intense weeks of diplomacy known as the July Crisis all of the great powers in Europe took pains to cast themselves in the ‘right’ according to international law, but it was apparent that none of them – except possibly Great Britain – was fully committed to maintaining the peace. Aside from the socialist protests to war that sprang up across the continent, the possibility of war was in many respects romanticized as an opportunity for national glory.205 There was a general consensus that a war would be relatively painless and short and that the boys would be “home before the leaves fall,” or “over by Christmas at the outside.”206 None foresaw the trench warfare that would seize the Western Front barely over a month into the conflict, or the massive casualties – both military and civilian – that would pile up on both fronts. The war continued for four devastating years, draining states of their able-bodied men, their delusions of glory, and

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204 Osiander writes that “1914 must be seen as a key date in the history of international society,” as World War I resulted from the Concert’s erosion and crystallized support for a new collective security regime (1994:249, also see 248-53).

205 Walters 1952:16-7

206 Tuchman 1962:112 and Graves 1929:67, respectively.
their confidence in the network of bi- and trilateral treaties that were meant to ensure peace.

The causes of the war are as well catalogued, researched, and debated as its many battles, but there is general agreement on at least two points. First, the lack of a collective security regime for Europe, much less the international system, and the reliance on dyadic security arrangements were permissive causes for war. The decades leading up to the war exhibited neither normative nor institutional support for a collectively constructed and managed security regime, but rather a system highlighting national self-interests, mutual distrust, and colonial competition. Second, the war illustrated that the domestic transformation from dynastic rule to a more ‘rational’ and ‘enlightened’ nationalism did not immediately translate to a more rational and enlightened foreign affairs. If anything, the passions of the masses and the weight of public opinion may have exacerbated diplomatic tensions and complicated efforts to negotiate peace during the July Crisis and after the war had started. These points suggest that peace could only be maintained through collective security, and through constructing an international system that reflected the principles of national collective identity on a global level.

This appears to be precisely what the victorious powers had learned when hostilities ended with the armistice of November 11, 1918. President Woodrow Wilson famously declared the need for a covenant among nations to ensure international peace in

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207 Kissinger caustically refers to the network of security treaties and militarization during this era as “the political…” and “the military doomsday machine[s],” (1994:168-217).
208 Paul Schroeder notes that many domestic policies implemented in the latter half of the 19th century to address national discontent “tended to promote rivalry between states, especially in the economic arena” (1986:4).
209 Kissinger 1994:218-22
his Fourteen Points speech in January of 1918, but the idea had already been circulating in Europe since 1915. In May of 1915 the British League of Nations Society was founded and drew immediate support from the British government. By 1918 both Britain and France had discussed the idea for the League of Nations in detail and established commissions to draft frameworks, with the French proposals calling for a robust, permanent institution with the independent power to enforce peace.²¹⁰ And the Paris Peace Conference opened with a resolution, adopted by its 32 represented states, that called for a League of Nations that “should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied upon to promote its objects.”²¹¹ These collective security efforts were complimented by an additional commitment to national self-determination. After the war the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires ceased to exist, introducing new states in Eastern Europe, an independent Turkey, and a collection of Middle Eastern protectorates; Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States gained independence as well. National self-determination – at least among ‘civilized’ peoples – was an integral part of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and was strongly advocated by Great Britain, France, and the vast majority of those represented at the Paris Peace Conference.

Yet, while the learning process that followed WWI brought cohesion among many states in the international system, some of the system’s most notable members harbored distrust and/or enmity toward the new international order. Despite Wilson’s critical role in establishing the League and advocating national self-determination, the American people and their legislative representatives remained deeply suspicious of

²¹⁰ Walter 1952: 15-39
²¹¹ Ibid:32
entangling themselves in the affairs of Europe and the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{212} On November 19, 1919, the US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles by a vote of 38-53, effectively keeping the US out of the League. Germany was neither invited to join the League after WWI nor did its population display much support for the new international order. Like France in 1815, Germany was blamed as the primary belligerent power, was saddled with extensive reparations, and lost territory after the war. Unlike France in 1815, Germany had not been entirely defeated in 1918 and it was never occupied by foreign powers. Following the war Germany was mired in debt and forced to disarm, experienced political instability under the new Weimar Republic, and suffered from the misperception that, if the Social Democrats had not forced the Kaiser to abdicate and had not accepted the punitive and gravely demoralizing Treaty of Versailles, the German Empire may have won the war – or at least negotiated a peace commensurate with Germany’s (self-perceived) status in Europe.\textsuperscript{213} So while France had accepted its defeat and worked to integrate itself into the Concert system, Germany remained a “house divided” against itself and unwilling to fully accept the new status quo.\textsuperscript{214} Finally, the Soviet Union was ideologically opposed to the composition and purpose of the League and the international order it created, and was not invited to attend the Paris Peace Conference. Though it realized the strategic value of membership, unsuccessfully negotiating membership in 1919 and later joining in 1934, the Soviets pointed to the Western Powers’ extensive colonial holdings as evidence of their imperialism and viewed

\textsuperscript{212} See Cooper (2001) on the domestic debate over the League treaty in the United States.
\textsuperscript{213} Reynolds 1939:56-62; Shirer 1959:52-79
\textsuperscript{214} Shirer 1959:59; Osiander 1994:309-15
the League as an attempt to dress their imperialistic policies with international legitimacy. The disinterest and/or hostility expressed toward the new international order by three of the world’s most powerful states does not negate the accomplishment of collective action manifest in the League, but it does highlight its primary weakness.

Collective identity is a difficult thing to measure precisely, and determining its salience for each state after WWI would be a book of its own. Nevertheless, the proposals made and actions taken in 1918-20 appear to reflect an international collective identity forged in the aftermath of WWI. A large majority of states, mutually recognizing each other’s status as sovereign equals and sharing a collective interest in the stability of the international system, were committed to constructing an international order premised on collective security and the peaceful resolution of international disputes. Importantly, and unlike the early Concert Era, this was an identity shared among governments directly representing, however imperfectly, domestic populations rather than purely sovereign interests. Whereas the collective identifications in 1815 were salient among only a small elite that wielded tremendous autonomy in international politics (though less so in Britain) and were ultimately dissolved by the rise of nationalism in Europe, the international collective identity that emerged from WWI had roots that were more deeply embedded in the domestic populations of states. In other words, international collective identifications drew strength and legitimacy from the fact that they were perceived to be constructed upon national collective identity, which had become the legitimating
principle for the international system, and represented it at the global level. They contributed to a political culture that solidified norms of collective action, exerting influence on the interests and actions of those that embraced notions of international community and limited the available diplomatic options of those who did not. While these identifications, too, would partially unravel due to the lack of salience in a few important states and conflicting national interests, from the perspective of this dissertation this represented something of a Lakatosian ‘progressive problem shift’ in the trend toward global collective identity formation.

Finally, as in the Concert section, it is important to identify some of the limitations of collective identity in the 1920s. First, the international collective identity forged by WWI was one among self-governing, ‘civilized’ states who shared a mutual recognition of sovereign equality. Territories under direct colonial rule, including most of Africa and parts of Asia, were not recognized as legitimate actors and thus not accorded formal standing, which excluded a significant portion of the world’s population from the international order’s diplomatic discourses. Second, collective identity following WWI was ‘looser’ than that in 1815 in that it essentially bound a large number of states with a commitment to the generic principles of collective action and sovereign equality, rather than 1815’s more specific bonds for European stability and the legitimacy of monarchy shared by the great powers. At the same time, most states during this era

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215 U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain (Lloyd George), France (Georges Clemenceau), and Italy (Vittorio Emmanuele Orlando) all stressed that international society could only be built upon the mutual recognition of equality among independent nations and the will of their peoples (Osiander 1994:254-76).

216 The League extended membership to Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa – all British dominions at the time – due to their relative autonomy in domestic governance.

217 Osiander 1994:267
could not claim to fully represent their domestic populations. Some had autocratic governance structures, and even the many ‘democracies’ often denied enfranchisement to large portions of their populations due to gender, race, or other qualifications. This indicates the elite-driven nature of politics at the time, which suggests that international collective identifications – while certainly laying deeper roots than during the Concert Era – still lacked extensive penetration at the level of domestic society. Additionally, as mentioned above, the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union were not a formal part of the new international order in the early 1920s. The US certainly shared many of the norms and values espoused by the League, but this did not translate to its accepting a commitment to collectively maintaining international stability. The ideological divide between the victorious powers and the Soviet Union more starkly evinced a lack of identification, and the mutual enmity between the League members and Germany did the same, though for different reasons. Finally, and as with each step in the progression detailed in this chapter, the identifications that did solidify among the large majority of states in the international system were neither totalizing nor permanent. Though WWI catalyzed a learning process that resulted in a deeper commitment to collective interests and international peace, international collective identifications often conflicted with the interests and goals that emerged from national identities. That the League members saw themselves as like actors (homogeneity) bound by a common fate, recognized the need for collective action (interdependence), and exercised self-restraint in accepting the negotiated terms of the League attests to the growing salience of international collective identity in the early 1920s, even as the infighting and squabbling that would take place
over the next two decades exemplifies the competing influence of national interests and identity that remained prominent.

The League of Nations

Established at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the League of Nations was an ambitious attempt to rationalize international politics through the construction of international governance structures premised on international law and collective security. Whereas the Hague Conventions had widened and deepened the liberal characteristics of the Concert by extending recognition to a greater number of states and codifying international laws of war, the League institutionalized these changes in a permanent organization and applied them toward a more thorough international security regime. It’s Covenant established three primary goals: 1) to advocate open diplomacy and establish collective security as the legitimate method by which international law should be enforced; 2) to reach a negotiated settlement for general disarmament to decrease the likelihood and destructiveness of war; and 3) to construct a permanent court charged with arbitrating international disputes in order to avoid open conflict. Toward this end the Covenant created a permanent international security organization with a Secretariat, Council, and Assembly to negotiate and formally approve international laws and resolve disputes between states. The Assembly met annually and represented all states, with each receiving one vote, while the Council met five times annually in addition to emergency meetings and was limited to four permanent members (France, Great Britain, Italy, and

218 For a detailed account of the League’s documents and evolution, see Walters’ (1952) two volume history.
Japan) and four rotating members– ostensibly to create a more nimble executive structure, but in reality reflecting the greater power the stronger states wielded and the greater obligations they would be expected to fulfill. Following its first meeting in 1922, the Permanent Court of International Justice represented the judicial branch of the League and was charged with arbitrating international disputes. In terms of membership, there were 32 original members to the League, over a dozen more were extended invitations to join immediately, and at one time or another nearly 60 states claimed membership – including 4 from Africa, 18 from the Americas, 8 from Asia/Middle East, and 26 from Europe, as well as Australia and New Zealand.

Institutionalizing the procedurally liberal principles of the Hague Conferences, as an organization the League represented a tremendous shift toward procedural liberalism in international political deliberations.

The League succeeded in establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice and further codifying international law through a series of agreements during the 1920s, but politically it can be judged largely as a failure. The Washington (1922) and London (1930) Naval Treaties offered some success in limiting naval armaments, but they ultimately collapsed after Japan’s withdrawal in 1936, and further disarmament negotiations were continually delayed due to disagreement over its scope and verification, with only Britain and France taking serious strides toward the League’s goals in the early 1930s – and then primarily for domestic political and economic reasons. Additionally, the League’s call for collective action, while agreed to in principle

219 The number of nonpermanent seats would later increase to six, nine, and finally 11 seats by the end of the 1930s.
222 Walter 1952:361-76
by its members, was too vague and enforcement too inconsistent to succeed on the larger
security issues of the time. Though early successes were made in the 1920s, by the 1930s
the League had become largely ineffective in the face of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria
in 1931, Italy’s war with Abyssinia, and Germany’s rearmament and annexation of
Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938. There are several causal factors one could point to
in explaining the League’s impotence, but two stand out as especially important,
particularly in light of the loose international collective identity that underpinned the
League’s legitimacy.

First, the contentious negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference severely tested
the amity that characterized its commencement, leaving some states disillusioned by the
process. Though Wilson’s Fourteen Points offered a point of departure, there was no
formal agenda and a split was evident between those supporting a Wilsonian vision that
put the past behind in constructing an international order premised on universal
participation and consensus, and those who sought to weaken Germany through territorial
adjustments, disarmament, and reparations. The resulting Treaty of Versailles
embodied a compromise that left all parties dissatisfied. Great Britain and the US
lamented the punitive nature of the peace – particularly the ‘war guilt clause’ that placed
the war’s blame entirely on Germany, France worried that the peace left Germany too
powerful and that the wooly language of collective security was insufficient to deter
future German belligerence, and Italy felt shortchanged in only receiving some of the

223 Walters 1952:32-39
territorial promises made in the London Pact for its participation in the war. Further, the negotiations were premised on formal equality among the states represented, but, as had been done in Vienna in 1815, *de facto* decision making power was consolidated in the hands of the Council of Four (France, Great Britain, Italy, and the US) plus one (Japan), leaving many smaller states feeling disenfranchised. While states entered the negotiations bound together with a collective interest in constructing an order premised on international law and collective security, by the conference’s conclusion they had exposed significant differences in *how* such an order should operate. In justifying the treaty, Wilson wrote to his wife that, “This is our first real step forward, for I now realize, more than ever before, that once established, the League can arbitrate and correct mistakes which are inevitable in the treaty we are trying to make at this time.” But in hindsight it appears that the damage done in Paris could not be fully rectified, and that the League was politically crippled from the start.

Second, while there had been a general assumption that Germany would join the conference after preliminary negotiations concluded, it was neither invited to Paris nor initially invited to join the League. This had the immediate consequence of ostracizing Germany and sowing domestic discontent. The Soviet Union’s exclusion from the conference was understood on the grounds of ideological differences, but the new German government appeared ready to embrace the new international order. To what degree this was a true willingness on Germany’s part to enmesh itself in a new collective

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224 Osiander 1994:282-308
225 ibid:279-80
226 Kissinger 1994:234
227 Osiander 1994:281-2
security regime is debated, but Germany’s exclusion and the punitive nature of the Treaty of Versailles poisoned German public opinion, resulting in a potentially self-fulfilling prophecy viewing Germany as a revisionist state. In 1922 Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Rapallo, which opened economic and military cooperation between the two ‘pariah’ states that would continue through 1932 and foreshadowed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939.  Both Germany (1924-33) and the Soviet Union (1934-9) would eventually be (temporary) members of the League, but it is clear in their criticisms of the League – particularly after Hitler’s ascension to power – that neither shared in the collective purposes of international peace and liberal nationalism. Finally, the Treaty of Versailles played only a partial but nevertheless significant role in the rise of fascism in Germany, which ultimately gave Japan an ally, Italy a leader, and the Soviet Union a strategic partner, setting the stage for World War II.

Despite its extensive political shortcomings, the League still reshaped the norms and institutions of international politics and advanced collective identifications and procedural liberalism in important ways. Constructed from the disappointments of WWI, the League embodied a shared interest in not only collectively managing points of international law, but also committing states to the ideal of collective security. Establishing a permanent organization for these purposes, the League institutionalized multilateral norms and practices of diplomacy that further instilled these values in the populations of many of the member states – as a collective ideal if not yet an attainable reality. In other words, it institutionally solidified the changes taking place in

228 Nekrich 1997:1-43
international political culture, providing a cosmopolitan touch point from which efforts at collective action could be attempted and an impediment to states wishing to contravene the new international order.

This is clear in the League’s two primary accomplishments. First, it institutionally established and legitimated an international order premised upon procedurally liberal processes of diplomacy and crisis resolution and successfully defined its members and latent supporters (e.g. the United States) as status quo powers, or preservers of international peace and stability. As both the embodiment of collective identifications among its supporters and an institutional site of identity reinforcement, the League’s position as an index of international legitimacy had a strong influence over prewar crises and WWII itself. Even as they prepared for a war that would seek to redefine the international system, Germany, Italy, and Japan recognized the cultural atmosphere they were operating in and went to great lengths to couch their rhetoric in the legitimizing language of collective security. For example, prior to the war the three ‘revisionists’ collectively engineered a (ultimately unsuccessful) propaganda campaign that claimed that the League had been corrupted by communist influences and identified themselves as the truly conservative powers upholding the spirit of the League.229 And when hostilities commenced the League represented a focal point around which states could rally in opposition to Germany’s invasion of Poland, the threat of which was less about the immediate material advantage it might give Germany and the Soviet Union than the challenge it presented to the international system – if Poland, then why not

229 Walter 1952:702-8
Czechoslovakia, Britain, or France? This sense of common fate established WWII’s fault line between fascist revisionists and the international order’s defenders, with the Soviet Union – which essentially distrusted and detested both equally – playing both sides to its advantage.

Second, the League provided a clear blueprint for the post-WWII international order. Less than two years into the war, and before the US had even become militarily involved, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met at sea to outline the guiding principles for the postwar order, issuing a joint declaration later known as the Atlantic Charter. Replicating almost word-for-word the guiding principles and goals of the League of Nations, the Atlantic Charter was readily embraced by the Allied Powers and allowed for the relatively rapid genesis and design of the United Nations, whose establishment predated the end of hostilities in the Pacific. It is difficult to imagine negotiations commencing so early and coalescing around the norms, principles, and procedures enshrined in the UN Charter so rapidly without the normative and institutional precedents established by the League.

Ultimately, the glaring failure of the League of Nations to forestall another world war overshadowed its successes. Immediately concerning the era in which it existed, it at once institutionally embodied norms and principles of procedural liberalism that formed the core of a nascent international collective identity that predated but ultimately

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230 Bevans 1969:686-7, 697-8
231 Georg Schild notes that agreement was quickly reached on the League of Nations’ guiding principles, while deliberations between 1941 and ‘45 focused almost exclusively on pragmatic considerations of institutional design and enforcement (1995:26-34). In other words, the Atlantic Charter suggested a ‘League of Nations 2.0,’ embodying the same norms and principles while optimizing the organization’s stability and effectiveness.
crystallized after WWI; reproduced and reinforced these collective identifications to such a degree as to render the battle lines of WWII fairly obvious on September 1, 1939; and provided a blueprint for the postwar order. In the broader narrative of this dissertation, the League represents a critical link between the fairly exclusive collective identifications and proto-liberal regime of the Concert Era and the more broad-based and institutionalized collective identifications and procedural liberalism of the UN era, a link without which the modern era would not have been possible in its current form.

Discussion

In sum, the broader era discussed above can be divided into two ‘turns,’ with WWI as the pivot from one to the other. Each offered significant – if only incremental – contributions to the broader evolution of international collective identifications and procedural liberalism that lies at the empirical heart of this dissertation.

The ‘Armed Peace’ from the 1870s to WWI demonstrated the simultaneous deconstruction of Concert Era international collective identifications and the expansion of procedurally liberal approaches to international order, albeit in limited form. The steady rise of nationalism in Europe during the 19th century at once offered the possibility of deeper manifestations of collective identifications at the international level (among peoples rather than just sovereigns) while presenting hurdles to its realization, at least in the near term. More precisely, the ‘nationalization’ of Europe rendered the Concert Era collective identifications moot, with the sovereign’s will – and the understandings,

\footnote{Mowat 1930:16-32}
agreements, and attachments that went with it – increasingly challenged and informed by a burgeoning popular will that often had a very brief history and few corollaries to the sovereign’s designs. Thus, existing identifications were displaced by the potential for deeper identifications among peoples. However, the brief histories of interaction among nations, often contentious over issues of trade and colonization, offered little foundation for this potential to be realized in the near term.

At the same time, this period demonstrated a general adoption and deepening of procedurally liberal elements of the Concert in establishing the broad contours of international order and (formally codified for the first time) international law, though with an extremely limited scope. Conferences in Berlin (1884-5), and The Hague (1899), Geneva (1906), and again in The Hague (1907) evinced a commitment to multilateralism and equality among states in resolving crises and establishing international law, and each had successively greater participation as an increasing number of non-European nations were invited to attend. Even as the effects of nationalism were reconfiguring domestic governance structures and foreign policy goals, the norm of equality in international negotiations carried over from the Concert and participation was successively expanded. However, though important in their own right, the conventions adopted in these multilateral forums nevertheless paled in significance to the network of bi- and trilateral treaties that defined European security at the time. While the general principles of international order were negotiated openly in these multilateral forums, the more immediately important concrete security arrangements between states were formed.

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233 Taylor 1954:270-8
through bilateral, and often secret, diplomatic channels. So while elements of Concert Era procedural liberalism were kept alive and advanced in important ways, their significance during the Armed Peace is drawn less from their immediate effects than from their continued, somewhat latent, existence in the diplomatic discourses of Europe even as nationalism was throwing Europe into upheaval.

The second ‘turn’ came with the aftermath of WWI. It was generally recognized that the retreat to 18th century-style security alliances had directly contributed to the rapid march to war during the July Crisis,\textsuperscript{234} and the nations of Europe ultimately underwent a similar learning process that the sovereigns of Europe underwent with the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. What WWI lacked in duration it made up for in destructiveness, the upshot of which was a sense of collective identity among many of its participants that echoed the ‘spirit of Vienna’ in 1815 and the construction of a formal international security organization to embody it.

Reading this chapter’s narrative through Wendt’s four master variables of collective identity suggests that all four were present as existing objective conditions of possibility for collective identifications during postwar negotiations. The rapidity with which an assassination in the Balkans triggered treaty obligations that drew the continent of Europe and eventually most of the world into total war, as well as the inability of any one nation to resolve the crisis or unilaterally dictate postwar terms, clearly demonstrated the *interdependence* of the European powers and those non-European nations that felt compelled to enter the conflict. German aggression during the war and the threat of

\textsuperscript{234} Tuchman 1962
similar future wars due to the growing reach of industrialized military conflict defined a condition of *common fate* among nations.\textsuperscript{235} With the collapse and breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, basic elements of *homogeneity* existed among the states populating the international system (among what the League Covenant termed ‘organized peoples,’ which excluded colonial holdings), providing yet another objective condition upon which collective identifications could be constructed. Finally, the cooperation and *self-restraint* practiced during the war among the Allied powers in collaborating in a concerted effort against Germany – almost taken for granted in the literature on the war even though such self-restraint, as the last chapter illustrates, would have been very unlikely just a little more than a hundred years prior – defines the fourth condition of possibility.

More importantly, negotiations in the aftermath of the war (to which, significantly, Germany, Austria, and the Soviet Union were not invited) suggest the subjective awareness of these conditions and their constitutive role in constructing collective identifications among the participants. Indeed, the justification and purpose of the newly established League of Nations were founded upon this awareness: an increasingly interdependent community of nations forced together by a common fate must bind its members to a commitment to non-violent conflict resolution and to the collective security of other members if hostilities arise. The wording of the League Covenant, the language used in diplomatic communications about the League, and the participants’ willingness to be bound to the Covenant’s norms and rules indicate a sense

\textsuperscript{235} The relationship between the increasing destructiveness of war and collective identifications, and how this relates to Daniel Deudney’s *Bounding Power* (2007), is addressed in Chapter 6.
of collective identity among them – however fragile it may appear from the purview of the present day international community.

*Alternative Narratives*

The primary difficulty in defending the narrative above lies in the relative thinness of international collective identifications and weakness of the League vis-à-vis existing national identities and the power of the state during this era. Though the evidence suggests that the postwar negotiations took place within the context of a budding international collective identity among its participants that advanced notions of collective security and non-violent conflict resolution, they also took place within the context of still much stronger national identities whose interests often worked at cross purposes with collective ones as well as one another’s. The collective purposes that engendered general amity among the participants toward one another was immediately challenged by disparate national interests in how to deal with Germany, resulting in a treaty that created fissures between the European powers, caused the United States to retreat, and made it all but impossible for Germany to follow the path chosen by France in 1815. Furthermore, Byron Dexter laments the way in which further squabbling in the years following the treaty led the allied powers to squander the “years of opportunity” (1920-26), with the Locarno treaties representing British disengagement from the continent and a lasting rift between allies that set the stage for German remilitarization. By the 1930s international identifications that still defined the general norms and

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236 1967
principles of many of the League’s participants had become further frayed in practice, and the League continued on more in form than in function.

This is precisely the point that realists make in deriding the idealist discourses and the institutional framework of the League as a naïve and dangerous attempt to pacify and order an international system of anarchy among self-interested states. There may be no other topic on which there is such a high degree of consensus within a research paradigm than on the failures of the League of Nations within realism, and it is a topic conventionally thought to play right into the realist wheelhouse. There is no room in realist accounts for identifications or interests beyond the nation or for meaningful political institutions beyond the state, and thus the League seemingly provides a perfect example of misguided foreign policies that, in attempting to deny the principles of a self-help anarchic system, invited infighting and institutional impotence, and ultimately ended in catastrophe. Indeed, E.H. Carr advanced this thesis in his damning critique of post-WWI idealism and the League, out of which the realist paradigm was born in International Relations.\(^{237}\)

However well realism seems to explain the failures of the League, though, it is left unable to account for its genesis. What motivated the language of collective security, comity among nations, community of nations, perpetual peace, etc., that pervaded the lead up to and much of the postwar negotiations? The talk itself may be cheap, but the commitments made in the League Covenant were not without cost. Why would nations commit to such an institutional arrangement if they knew it would likely renege, and

\(^{237}\) Carr 1939. I leave the paragraph otherwise without citation because it could very well include every single realist account of the interwar period.
suffer the potential reputational effects, in the future? Why did the United States so strongly object, and ultimately reject League membership, when this ‘cheap talk’ was compromised by the exclusion of Germany, Austria, and the Soviet Union from the Paris Peace conference and the punitive nature of the Treaty of Versailles? This suggests that the significance lies not in whether or not the internationalism popular at the time was naïve, but rather that – naïve or not, doomed to failure or not – it existed. So while realism – itself born out of the failures of the League – is apparently secure in its interpretation of the League as a misguided and naïve attempt at a pacific world order, it falls short in addressing the League’s genesis and the internationalism underpinning it at the time.

Rational institutionalist theories fair somewhat better, but still fail to explain the underlying collective identifications and purpose of the League. From this perspective the League can be explained as an attempt to realize the absolute gains of institutional cooperation, or to ‘lock in’ an international system preferred by the victors. Yet they, too, fail to account for the internationalist discourse driving cooperation among the victors and the establishment of the League. As similarly argued in greater detail in the prior chapter, theoretical accounts bound by rational self-interest appear to fall short in explaining, short of naivety, the driving motivation of the language and institutional principles adopted after the war.

Carr criticizes this ‘harmony of interests’ idealism at great length precisely because of its influence in defining the postwar peace – and because of its thinnest and fragility relative to national interests. For example, Keohane 1984 and Ikenberry 2001. See, for example, Rosenau (1968), Kratochwil (1982), Milner (1992), and Abdelal et al (2009) on the elasticity of the ‘national interest.’
Ultimately, however, the essential point is not whether or not international identifications were eclipsing national ones or if international institutions were displacing the state – they were not. The point is that international collective identifications emerged out of WWI that, despite their almost immediate weakening in the face of divergent national interests, would allow similar identifications to reemerge almost immediately after World War II began. The point is also that the League of Nations, despite its ultimately failure in forestalling another war, represented a formal, nearly universal international security regime established along procedurally liberal lines; that it borrowed heavily from the normative precedents set by the Concert of Europe and the late 19th-early 20th century conferences discussed above; and that it would be adopted as a ready-made blueprint for the post-WWII international order.

**Conclusion**

The League Era is most famously known for its failures. Efforts to construct a body of international law that could solve interstate disputes were dashed by diverging national interests and a network of security treaties that proved explosive in World War I, and the ‘never again’ mentality that excited idealistic hopes of a pacific international order premised on collective security was paralyzed by its own vagueness and exploited by a handful of states with imperial ambitions. Nevertheless, the era captures a significant transition in international politics. The culture of international politics underwent extensive changes as the identity relationships within and between states transformed. During the Concert Era the emergence of nationalism eroded the collective
identity among great power sovereigns, but by the turn of the century it became an integral part of establishing new international identifications. The legitimacy of governments as representatives of their populations provided legitimacy to international efforts to codify laws of war and justified the inclusion and formal equality of all self-governing populations in international deliberations. Following the disappointments of WWI, shared interests in international peace and national sovereignty resulted in a commitment by the large majority of states to collective security. The era’s institutional developments were no less significant. Working from the Concert’s model of multilateral deliberation, the Hague Peace Conferences put into practice the procedurally liberal principles of equality and inclusion in developing an extensive body of international law among ‘civilized’ states, and the League institutionalized these principles in a concrete international security regime premised on collective security.

Even as these developments addressed the shortcomings of the Concert Era, however, they revealed shortcomings of their own. International collective identity founded upon the mutual recognition of the rights and legitimacy of national identity (rather than dynastic rule) certainly lent greater legitimacy to international deliberations, but it was also more fractious. Collective interests were often subordinated to national ones and some of the most powerful states in the system did not accept the constructed order. Additionally, it was an identity that did not recognize colonially subjugated peoples, who were excluded from the purview of international society. These shortcomings are more visible in the institutional practices of the era. Most colonies were excluded, formal equality was often neglected in practice, and the laws and
agreements made with The Hague Conventions and the League failed to forestall the world wars.

The broader point, however, is to recognize the overall ideational and institutional evolutions taking place since the Congress of Vienna. The somewhat small shifts in identifications during the League Era appear more consequential when viewed relative to the much less favorable conditions of 18th century international norms, or as foundational developments in the construction of the present day international community. The same holds true institutionally. Inis Claude, in his own work on the evolution of international governance, asserted that the Concert and ‘Hague System’ were important predecessors to the League, going so far as to label the century from the Congress of Vienna (1815) to WWI (1914) the “era of preparation for international organization.”241 And Chadwick Alger deemed the United Nations “a child of the League of Nations,” which he viewed as an experiment whose successes and failures made a more robust international security organization possible.242 If realism was born out of – and its popularity first established upon – the failure of interwar idealism and the irresistible force of self-interest, the WWII victors (the Soviet Union aside) did not get the memo. Though more thoroughly accounting for the realities of power politics, the UN was established upon an almost word-for-word adoption of the League’s founding norms and principles. In this way, the League Era represents a progressive problem shift in regard to the two trends that are traced in this analysis. Just as the League Era built upon the Concert Era, the United Nations Era would build upon the League, addressing some of the shortcomings of the

241 1956:36 (emphasis in original)
242 1995:4
interwar period while simultaneously drawing discursive attention to its own normative and institutional contradictions and weaknesses.
Chapter 5: The United Nations Era

Even as the League of Nations was roundly criticized as unrealistic and even dangerous in its idealism, the United Nations not only reaffirmed virtually all of its fundamental principles and laws but in fact expanded upon them, encouraging states to embrace notions of international community more deeply than before. Whereas The Hague Peace Conventions and League of Nations had institutionalized the laws of war and collective security, respectively, the United Nations extended into other issues of global governance with its associated organizations dealing with economic and social issues of international trade and finance and human rights. Despite some initial resistance, the culture of national self-determination and sovereign equality carried forward from the interwar period catalyzed the decolonization movement that, for the first time, made the international system truly international. National interests and power politics were a hallmark of this era just as they had been in the past, and the Soviet Union does not appear to have shared in the collective identifications on which the order was established (though it participated to its advantage), but ideological and territorial conflicts were increasingly circumscribed and filtered through discourses of international community and liberal institutional constraints. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War the growing importance of democratization, UN reform, and issues of human security in
diplomatic discourses provides initial evidence that national and international collective identities – often at odds in the 19th and 20th centuries – are fusing to exhibit characteristics of global collective identity. *If these trends continue*, this would lead us to expect the state to increasingly play an intermediary role between local populations and global governance structures, and national identities to become increasingly subsumed by broader global identifications.

**The United Nations Era, 1945-Present**

Efforts to establish a new international order began long before hostilities ended in 1945. American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously told Congress, “This time we shall not make the mistake… of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, as we fight together to get the war over quickly, we work together to keep it from happening again.” Diplomatic efforts began in earnest shortly after Adolph Hitler’s unsuccessful invasion of Russia in 1941 and gained steam as the war turned in the Allies’ favor. Indeed, by the time world leaders met in San Francisco in 1945 to establish the United Nations, agreements had already been reached at Bretton Woods to construct the postwar economic order and form the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The Tehran (1943), Dumbarton Oaks (1944), and Yalta (1945) Conferences brought Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (with China’s Chiang Kai-shek sometimes playing an

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243 Luard 1982:35-6
ancillary role) together to determine the postwar security landscape, ensuring a semblance of great power cooperation in San Francisco.

Rife as it was with power politics, ideological discord, and political gamesmanship, the resulting international order nevertheless demonstrated a collective interest in international stability and a shared commitment to self-restraint in promoting it. Confrontations in Europe and the ‘periphery’ that defined the Cold War severely attenuated these collective bonds on numerous occasions, especially as the Soviet Union never fully accepted the legitimacy of the liberal order, but states largely remained committed to a culture of diplomacy inherited from the League Era that emphasized mutual recognition, multilateral deliberation, and negotiated settlements. These principles were codified in the UN Charter and its associated organizations, which not only reaffirmed but also strengthened the blueprint provided by the League of Nations by ensuring greater great power participation, clearer language on the constitution and enforcement of collective security, and a more explicit procedural framework that granted the Assembly more autonomy. These revisions to the League, especially the last one, were to have profound ramifications. As it was no longer limited in its purview to specific issues of international security as it had been under the League, the Assembly played a decisive role in legitimizing the decolonization movement, which ultimately led to the international system of states becoming truly international for the first time. Moreover, this opened the floodgates for the UN to address broader issues of human  

244 Nuclear weapons and the resulting logic of mutually assured destruction certainly contributed to the ‘cold’ nature of the Cold War, but it must be remembered that their advent and first use only came after four years of collective action and deliberation that resulted in the UN’s founding in June of 1945. This suggests that nuclear weapons proved an important enforcer of the peace but not an initial catalyst for the relatively stable post-WWII international order.
rights and further involve itself in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The UN’s post-Cold War attention to human security issues, in addition to democratization and institutional reform, suggests that – even as international collective identities appear to be solidifying around the sovereign equality of nation-states and a collective commitment to international stability – there is a budding discourse advocating the individual’s legitimate standing in global politics.

*Doubling Down on Collective Action: Collective Identity among Nation-States*

Less than two years into World War II and before the United States even became militarily involved in the conflict, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met at sea in the summer of 1941 to outline the broad principles of a postwar settlement, issuing a joint resolution that became known as the Atlantic Charter. The Charter contained eight goals, which included forswearing aggrandizement (“territorial or other”), reaffirming national self-determination, committing to open trade and economic cooperation, and establishing a peace that would “afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want,” guarantee freedom of the seas, and encourage disarmament.245 A little more than a month later the Inter-Allied Council issued a statement from London in support of the Charter246 and on January 1, 1942, in Washington, DC the “Declaration of United Nations” echoed its support with the

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245 Bevans 1969:686-7
246 Department of State Bulletin, September 27, 1941. The Council was composed of the governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Soviet Union, the UK, and Yugoslavia, as well as the ‘Free Frenchmen.’
signatures of 26 states, laying the groundwork for diplomatic negotiations to commence. Over the next three and a half years, intense negotiations would take place – primarily among the Big Three (the Soviet Union, UK, and US), but with input from China and others – to construct, before hostilities ceased, an international order and institutions that reflected the Atlantic Charter’s principles. These efforts culminated in the San Francisco Conference in 1945, where 51 states further negotiated the terms of the UN and signed its Charter on June 26th – 68 days before Japan’s formal surrender on the deck of the USS Missouri signaled the end of WWII.

The negotiations for a new international order were punctuated by a variety of disagreements over normative and institutional issues that implied differences in national interests, but what catalyzed the relatively swift consensus – during wartime no less – on the UN’s framework and its reaffirmation of a procedurally liberal approach to multilateral deliberation and collective security? Two motivations suggest themselves here. First, the international culture engendered in the League of Nations appears to have sustained through the conflict. Whereas the Concert of Europe demonstrated a deep dissatisfaction with 18th century European politics and a clean break from prior practices, and the League Era resulted in a major re-conceptualization of international politics with the greater participation of smaller states and a broadening political domain that stretched beyond Europe, following WWII most states appeared committed to the basic principles established by the League and were more interested in revising the League in order to

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247 Bevans 1969:697-8. Aside from Inter-Alliance Council members and the US, this included Australia, British India, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, and South Africa. Twenty one additional states – primarily from South America and the Middle East – would sign the Declaration of United Nations prior to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.
strengthen it rather than instigating a significant political or cultural transformation. The similarities between the League and the UN are striking (see below), evincing a continued collective interest by a majority of states in the system to an order premised on mutual recognition of sovereign equality and multilateral deliberation. This is intimately connected to the second motivation – that WWII was not a traditional war over territory and material power (though these were certainly the immediate stakes of the ‘game’) so much as a rejection of the League’s political culture by a coalition of fascist-imperial states (with the initial cooperation of the Soviet Union) and an attempt to thoroughly reshape the international system. In other words, ideology played a more significant, defining role in determining the war’s battle lines and alliances than it ever had before. Ultimately, those states that claimed to be defending the League and its normative principles were victorious, and the emasculation suffered at the hands of the Germans, Japanese, and (to a much lesser extent) Italians certainly exposed the weaknesses of the League’s collective security framework but did little to shake confidence in its basic premises. As the tide turned against the Axis powers after Germany’s unsuccessful invasion of Russia and the US’s entry into the war, the Allies, associated powers, and many of the remaining states in the system recognized their shared interest in reconstructing a procedurally liberal international order.

To claim that the post-WWII environment evinced international collective identifications predicated on sovereign equality and collective security is not to paper

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248 Schild 1995:26-34
249 Ideological discourses were highly prevalent in public debates and diplomacy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, but it is clear that they had little effect on coalition formation, and that only the credible threat of Napoleon’s imperial ambitions (i.e. a territorial threat) brought the other great powers into alignment against France (Shroeder 1994:53-476).
over the significant differences in national interests among states that persisted, or to ignore the fact that – as with the League of Nations – the Soviet Union would acknowledge and participate in the UN’s institutional bodies while never sharing a collective commitment to its principles nor accepting the legitimacy of a liberal international order. The urgency surrounding the wartime negotiations suggests a prescient recognition of the political obstacles facing the international system following World War II. Even in San Francisco there were serious disagreements about membership – or who would be recognized as part of the international community – in 1945, with some states, including many from Latin America, urging universality while others wishing to exclude the Axis and associated powers. Additionally, the language used in the Atlantic Charter had raised hopes among the less powerful states in the system of an equitable international order in which they would play a significant role. However, with the adoption of the Charter and the power politics that dominated the UN’s first years (and continues to exercise a strong presence), it became clear that the system would remain unequal in important respects and, though they would have a voice in the Assembly, the smaller states would be forced to acquiesce to the great powers’ designs. So while collective interests in the broader postwar order persisted, discord over its manifestation in institutions that only imperfectly implemented it resulted in a serious fracture between the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds, most visibly manifested in the Group of 77 and non-aligned movement.

250 Luard 1982:63. The block on Italy and associated powers was maintained until 1955. Japan and the ‘two Germanies’ gained membership in 1956 and 1973, respectively.
251 Luard 1982:93-104
A more important weakness in collective identifications is evident in the ideological gulf that ultimately resulted in the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s relationship with the other Allied powers had been strained even before the war, and disputes over occupied territories in Europe and Asia immediately following Germany and Japan’s surrenders further poisoned East-West diplomacy. While territorial aggrandizement had been renounced in the Atlantic Charter, both sides were suspicious of the other establishing puppet regimes in the territories they occupied.\footnote{Kissinger 1994:423-45} And for good reason – foreshadowed by its hard diplomatic stances during the wartime conferences, it became increasingly clear after the war that the Soviet Union did not fully share in the collective bonds that underpinned the new liberal order. The Americans and Soviets shared a commitment to the basic principles of mutual recognition, sovereign equality, and collective security, but the ideological gulf between how each sought to translate them into a specific international order established a deep and enduring separation. Specifically, the Soviet Union was suspicious of the way in which the US positioned itself as the ‘first among equals,’ placing its economy at the center of the Bretton Woods agreements and actively promoting capitalistic markets and either pro-democracy or anti-communist regimes abroad. Conversely, the US viewed Soviet influence in Eastern Europe as a blueprint for the Soviet Union’s broader international designs and a threat to US security. This draws attention to how, due to the ambitious postwar plans envisioning an extensive framework of international institutions and law that penetrated states more deeply than ever before, domestic regime type became a crucial aspect of international
security discourses. This ideological tension and the new importance of regime type meant that neither the US nor the Soviet Union could accept the legitimacy of the other’s specific vision for achieving these basic principles. The confrontations between the US and Soviet Union and their proxy wars in the ‘periphery’ that defined the Cold War are too well known to recapitulate here,\(^{253}\) but it is clear that the collective identifications salient among the majority of states in constructing the postwar order failed to find traction in one of the two superpowers in the system until after the Soviet Union collapsed.

Even so, the collective identifications forged by WWII and the cultural legacy of the League persisted as the large majority of states remained committed to its basic principles. From the start of negotiations there was not a single proposal to return to an 18\(^{th}\) century self-regulating balance of power or establish an order without a prominent institutional framework; and though a semblance of great power management remained in the UN Security Council as it had in the League’s Council, excluding the other states in the system was never seriously considered.\(^{254}\) Political studies have an eye for conflict, and history is often sexier when focused on enmity rather than amity, but the speed and consensus with which the UN was established suggests the durability and growing strength of an international culture premised – at least in its broad contours – on shared notions of interdependence among like-minded nation-states bound by common fate, which promoted self-restraint among states to eschew short term national interests in

\(^{253}\) See Gaddis (2005) for a fresh approach to understanding the Cold War. See Hopf (1994) for an excellent, more focused, analysis of US deterrence strategies in the periphery.

\(^{254}\) Luard 1982:17-36; Kissinger 1994:394-422
pursuit of more collective principles of cooperation, international law, and collective security.

*The United Nations*

As previously mentioned, the UN represents a revision of the League of Nations more than a political transformation after WWII – an attempt to reaffirm the League’s political culture while strengthening its institutional efficacy. The similarities between the two are striking: the League’s Council was replaced by the Security Council, its Assembly continued as the General Assembly, the Permanent Court of International Justice was succeeded by the International Court of Justice, mandates gave way to trust territories and the Trusteeship Council, and the League’s concern for economic and social issues became institutionalized in a variety of UN and associated organizations.²⁵⁵ Yet the adopted revisions were intended to make the UN a more robust and effective organization than the League, five of which were particularly important.²⁵⁶ First, the UN’s voting procedures would require a majority or supermajority (depending on organ and issue) for passage²⁵⁷ rather than the higher bar of unanimity set by the League in order to avoid gridlock on divisive issues, watered down resolutions, and the charges of hypocrisy leveled at the League when it violated its own voting rules in expelling the Soviet Union in 1939 with the approval of only seven of the Council’s fourteen


²⁵⁶ Luard 1982:3-16

²⁵⁷ Though the ‘Permanent Five’ exercise veto power over Security Council resolutions.
members.\textsuperscript{258} Second, the UN Charter was signed by all of the (non-Axis) great powers, and Germany, Italy, and Japan would be admitted at later dates. The US’s refusal to ratify the League Covenant and the exclusion of Germany (until 1924) and the Soviet Union (until 1934) had severely weakened both the League’s credibility as a collective security organization and its ability to enforce League policies, so it was believed a more inclusive organization would temper revisionist ambitions similar to those that destabilized the League in the 1930s. Third, institutional rules of order were implemented in a way that lent the Assembly and Council an atmosphere of international legislative bodies rather than loosely organized conferences, which, it was hoped, would encourage states to submit resolutions on a more regular basis (and de-emphasize the crisis atmosphere of the League) and provide continuity to the UN agenda. Fourth, the language of collective security and enforcement was made more explicit and allowed, by a two-thirds vote, the UN Security Council to authorize concrete economic and/or military responses to violations of international law. Finally, the UN established the Trusteeship Council with the express purpose of assisting colonial territories in achieving self-government and independence\textsuperscript{259} and empowered the Assembly to address issues not directly pertaining to international security. Though Britain and France would later seek to circumscribe the Trusteeship Council’s interpretation of self-determination, this revision was crucial in making decolonization a focal point of UN business in the decades following WWII.

\textsuperscript{258} Walter 1952:806-8; though there were zero ‘no’ votes (the other seven were either absent or abstained), some claimed that the unanimity rule had been breached.

\textsuperscript{259} The idea of national self-determination was a centerpiece of Wilson’s Fourteen Points but the phrase never appeared in the League’s Covenant. Its codification – and inclusion in formal international law – did not come until the UN Charter in 1945 (Kirgis 1994:304).
Further, the UN’s establishment represented a slightly more procedurally liberal international security regime than the League. Though its membership rules were similar to those of the League by welcoming all ‘peace loving,’ self-governing states, the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly’s work toward decolonization led to the first truly international system and ultimately resulted in virtually universal membership among sovereign states in the UN. By expanding the Assembly’s agenda to formally include a wider purview of economic and social issues and introducing a host of UN and associated organizations to address them, the UN granted its most representative organ greater freedom in establishing international law (albeit in a non-binding capacity). Since 1945 the UN General Assembly has been an incubator for an extensive body of international law dealing with a host of political, economic, and social issues, many of which were never part of the League Assembly’s jurisdiction or agenda. Additionally, the UN’s express purpose of respecting human rights and freedoms, its 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and follow-on declarations expanding on these issues serve as precursors to a much more radical interpretation of universality. Since the Cold War the UN has played a leading role in advocating issues of human security and set precedents for humanitarian interventions (see below) by acknowledging the legal standing of individuals and sub-national groups as legitimate subjects of international law, if not (yet?) participants in its construction.260

Though still in its infancy, this holds the possibility for a fundamental transformation of the UN system and the broader international order from international to

global governance. The only point on which the UN appears to ‘regress’ in procedurally liberal terms has to do with the shift from unanimous to (super-)majority voting rules. Though by itself this did not introduce new inequalities into the institution’s framework, the Permanent Five’s insistence on holding a veto power in the Security Council – a compromise necessary to ensure great power participation – did, granting them a safeguard against resolutions they disagreed with in the UN’s most powerful body that was not made available to the 187 other members. Though still far from representing the ideal form, on balance the UN appears to exhibit greater characteristics of procedural liberalism than the League in institutional form and, especially, in practice.

Just as the League’s failures became a source of disillusionment toward the end of the interwar period, the UN has received its fair share of criticism for falling short of its ideals. However, the relativity in assessing the UN points to two very different conclusions. When judged in light of its stated principles and ideals, the UN has failed in a number of respects: the veto power held by the Permanent Five ensured that “the raising of Cold War issues at the United Nations [would provoke] only bitter and sterile debates,” paralyzing the UN on the most important issues in international security until the early 1990s;\(^\text{261}\) the privileged position of the Permanent Five in the UN Security Council reaffirmed the special status accorded to the great powers, which stands in contradiction to the UN’s principle of sovereign equality; and the UN often appears hapless when addressing the long-term instability and nation-building requirements in various poverty-stricken regions around the globe, including Sub-Saharan Africa and

\(^{261}\) Smith 1998:79; the UN’s involvement in the Korean War was only possible due to the Soviet boycott at the time.
Central Asia. Shifting the benchmark for success to the other end of the spectrum, however, drastically changes the assessment. Imagining a counterfactual history in which the UN was nonexistent rapidly draws attention to its successes: the General Assembly’s championing of decolonization; UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, which have, overall, been judged in a positive light, as well as the more general institutional role in maintaining lines of communication between states, providing a forum for debate and the creation of international law, and reinforcing norms of multilateralism and peaceful dispute resolution. What is important here is that the UN, despite its shortcomings, appears to represent a progressive problem shift – in institutional form and effectiveness – over the League of Nations.

Decolonization and a Truly International Community

Two political transformations took place during the UN Era that had profound effects on the dual trends that concern us here, the first of which was decolonization. On December 14, 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, proclaiming “the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.” The League mandate system had expressed a paternalistic goal of

262 Robert Jackson (1990) analyzes how the UN’s commitment to the territorial status quo in Africa has actually contributed to greater political instability and warfare by legitimizing the sovereignty of ‘quasi-states’, resulting in what he terms ‘juridical’ or ‘negative’ sovereignty (as opposed to ‘empirical’ or ‘positive’ sovereignty) that artificially props up dysfunctional governments and unsustainable territorial boundaries.
263 See, for example, Durch, ed (1993).
264 The second being the end of the Cold War, addressed in the next section.
265 UN General Assembly 1960
helping colonized peoples achieve self-government\textsuperscript{266} and the UN’s explicit references to self-determination placed greater pressure on colonial powers to transfer sovereignty to their colonies, but not until the 1960 declaration were colonial holdings deemed to be in contravention of international law. Though its passage came only after the majority of early 20\textsuperscript{th} century colonies had gained independence, the declaration was a powerful formal indictment of imperialism and represented a significant shift in both institutional practices and identity relations in international politics.

As Neta Crawford convincingly argues, the 1960 declaration was the culmination of an evolution in normative beliefs driven by ethical arguments against colonial practices.\textsuperscript{267} The colonization of the Americas in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries was notable for the unbridled use of power in subjugating and/or exterminating (especially in what is now the US and Canada, which are often referred to as ‘settler colonies’\textsuperscript{268}) native populations in pursuit of resource exploitation on the continents. The ‘savage’ nature of the natives empowered Europeans to classify them – through both religious and economic discourses – as essentially sub-human ‘Others’ in that any rights accorded them followed from the generosity of the colonizers rather than their recognition as legitimate actors with inherent socio-political or legal standing.\textsuperscript{269} Over time the ethical premises of this dominant discourse came under attack, leading to movements in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th}

\textsuperscript{266} Though some have pointed out the less idealistic aim of redistributing the colonial holdings of the Central Powers after WWI. Haas (1952) interprets the League mandate system as a compromise that took into account a variety of issues, including anti-colonial discourses, the changing capabilities of colonizers and colonized, and the desire of some Allied states to retain control over colonial territory and resources.
\textsuperscript{267} The following is a very brief recapitulation of her findings. See Crawford (1993, 2002) for a detailed analysis.
\textsuperscript{268} Johnston and Lawson (2000)
centuries that resulted in the abolition of the slave trade (and, later, slavery) and
limitations on forced labor.\textsuperscript{270} Though colonial practices remained brutal by today’s
standards, by the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century colonial discourses had transformed the status of
the colonized into ‘uncivilized’ savages in need of paternalistic care and development,
establishing an ethical foothold for self-determination norms to be applied to colonial
holdings in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century that would take institutional form in the League’s mandate
system and the UN’s Trusteeship Council.

While explanations for decolonization surely include pragmatic considerations of
changing interests and capabilities as well,\textsuperscript{271} the resulting normative shift in how
colonial territories and peoples were understood provides a powerful lens through which
we can interpret the evolution of international political culture. The 1960 declaration
passed by a vote of 89-0-9; over half of the members of the UN were former colonies,
and even those states retaining colonies chose to abstain rather than vote against the
resolution. Imperialism had waxed and waned over the course of recorded history, but its
legitimacy was, for the first time, roundly rejected by the vast majority of the
international community. It appears clear that, by 1960, the culture of international
politics had firmly shifted toward national self-determination, the mutual recognition of
sovereign equality among all states regardless of their state of civilization or

\textsuperscript{270} Crawford 2002:159-200; Davis (1984) argues that the shift from a discourse of slavery to one of
emancipation marks a critical step in human progress.

\textsuperscript{271} See Crawford (1993:46-8) for a fairly exhaustive list of competing explanations. Of primary interest is
her discussion on the interaction effects between material and ideational factors (56-7).
development, and a truly international order. In other words, the universality that was strictly confined to the great power monarchs during the Concert Era and to the ‘civilized’ or ‘self organized’ nations of the world during the League Era had finally been unbound to encompass all the nations of the globe, extending to them the opportunity to share in the collective identifications and principles, norms, and rules that constitute what is commonly termed the international community.

The institutional effects of this shift are readily apparent. Whereas the UN had 51 founding members in 1945, membership quickly expanded to 99 in 1960, 144 in 1975, and 192 today. Decolonization created dozens of new states, primarily in Asia and Africa, and gave their populations a sovereign voice in a variety of international organizations and an equal vote in the UN General Assembly. For the first time in history the international order was composed of like units (states) that were formally recognized as sovereign equals within a procedurally liberal international security regime. Moreover, this institutional recognition engendered an identity relationship of mutual recognition that encouraged states to operate within a framework of multilateral deliberation and practice self-restraint in pursuing national interests. In part due to the advantage of numbers held by non-great powers in the General Assembly, traditional definitions of international security that focused on immediate crises between powerful countries were expanded to include a host of additional issues, including peacekeeping in regions of instability, development assistance to poorer countries, and social policies.

Decolonization would not be complete for several decades and the UN Trusteeship Council would not disband until 1994, but in 1960 the conversation had decisively shifted from ‘if’ to ‘when’ remaining colonies would gain independence.
designed to improve education, health services, and human rights. The Cold War is more often remembered for conflict and brinksmanship between East and West, with the non-aligned caught in the middle. This, however, is to ignore the many ways in which the UN Assembly has circumscribed traditional notions of national interest in defining international social, economic, and political rights and obligations – through both institutional constraints on behavior as well as a deeper ideational transformation resulting in the growing salience of international community.

Even as decolonization contributed to ‘solving’ the problem of exclusion in international politics by recognizing the independence of former colonies, its accomplishment brought new tensions to the fore. It certainly exacerbated enduring tensions over the disparity of economic and military power among states formally occupying an equal position in international affairs. Even if liberal theory could justify equality among individuals based on the similar abilities and capacities of the average human being, a similar conclusion cannot be drawn among states due to their considerable variation and disparity in capabilities.\footnote{Klein 1974:1-38} This tension had been specifically addressed in the construction of the UN Security Council, which recognized the privileged position of the great powers as states deserving special rights in return for their ability to shoulder special obligations, but the expansion of UN membership after decolonization only lent greater force to the General Assembly’s expanding agenda whose resolutions, if not formally binding, increasingly defined the contours of international law. Moreover, decolonization and the proliferation of ‘microstates’ has
drawn greater attention to the incongruence between equality among states and equality among individuals. Itself a projection of liberal principles of individual equality to the international sphere, the equality principle of ‘one nation, one vote’ creates inequalities among individuals by granting similar voting weights to, for example, Palau (population 20,000) and India (population 1,200,000,000). These tensions, caused by disparities in both material capabilities and populations, led to a series of reform efforts during the Cold War that were ultimately unsuccessful, but which would train greater attention on individual and sub-/transnational group rights in the post-Cold War era. But as we have seen at various stages throughout these empirical chapters, when these contradictions are considered within the broader evolution of identities and institutions over the last two centuries, they appear to represent a progressive problem shift in that they only gain salience within the context of preexisting – if relatively thin and fragile – collective identifications and international cultural and institutional norms.

Post-Cold War Developments: the Promise for Global Collective Identity

The Cold War came to an end with a whimper rather than a bang. There was no major war between great powers, no revisionist challenge to the status quo, and no impetus to radically revise the international order. The Soviet Union dissolved rather quietly, many of its newly independent states (especially in Eastern Europe) embraced Western ideology and domestic governance structures quite readily, and they all more or

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274 Voting schemes weighted according to capabilities and/or population were the most popular topic for reform. See Newcombe et al (1977) and Dixon (1983) for comparisons of proposed or potential weighted voting schemes.
less accepted their new place in the UN and the broader liberal international order. Though a global power in its own right, the Soviet Union had often been considered the ‘junior’ of the two superpowers in material power and, even more so, in international influence and institutional standing, so its collapse was greeted with less hostility and fear than relief and triumph.\textsuperscript{275} Despite the paternalism and arrogance it implied on the part of Western powers, the Eastern Bloc was welcomed (back?) into the ongoing liberal project of international governance and community that began, if not with the Concert of Europe, at least with the League of Nations.

 Yet, even without the terrible loss of blood and treasure that propelled the desire to reform the international order in 1815, 1919, and (to a lesser extent) 1945, the end of the Cold War stimulated discourses that sought to significantly revise the international order. Importantly, however, these proposed revisions were intended to further deepen and expand the collective action and procedural liberalism engendered in the post-WWII order. Just as decolonization institutionally and normatively extended the domain of UN membership and the mutual recognition of sovereign statehood to include virtually the entire globe’s population and territory, the end of the Cold War represented a second major transformation that brought about conditions necessary for the traditional division between national and international politics – and national and international identities – to become blurred as issues of global governance and community became increasingly salient in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Specifically, three trends in this direction stand out over the last 20 years – democratization, proposals for UN reform, and the rising import and

\textsuperscript{275} Fukuyama 1992
legitimacy of human security concerns. Here I will touch on these three trends, saving a
discussion of their connection to global collective identity formation for the next section.

While the rise of nationalism in 19th century Europe replaced dynastic rule and
territorial sovereignty norms with those of popular sovereignty, democracy represents a
clearer indicator of popular governance in the 20th century; and though the number of
democracies grew during the Cold War, the number (and proportion) of democracies in
the system has grown more rapidly since the mid-1980s (see graph below). Reflecting the Polity IV data in Graph 5.1 below, Freedom House measures found that in 1975 there

Graph 5.1: Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2009\(^\text{276}\)

\(^{276}\) The graph is from the Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV project (Marshall and Cole 2009:11).
40 ‘Free Countries’ (25% of total), 53 ‘Partly Free Countries’ (34%), and 65 ‘Not Free Countries’ (41%). In 1988 – immediately preceding the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc – their measurement displayed 60 free (36%), 39 partly free (23%), and 68 not free (41%), and, in 2009, 89 free (46%), 58 partly free (30%), and 47 not free (24%). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008 roughly corresponds, with 48% of countries and 50% of the world’s population demonstrating ‘full’ or ‘flawed’ democratic governance and the remainder ‘hybrid’ or ‘authoritarian’ governance. Approximately 50% of the world’s countries and population may appear unremarkable at first glance, but it becomes more significant when considering: the proportion of democracies has doubled since 1975; democracies account for well over two thirds of global GDP and military expenditures; and, most importantly, democracy has become something of a standard of domestic governance toward which non-democracies are expected to move. Ultimately, democratic governance structures suggest that democratic states represent the general interests and popular will of their populations, and the more faithfully they do so, the more states serve as a conduit between individuals and international institutions.

277 Freedom House 2010
278 Economist Intelligence Unit 2008:2
280 In 1997 the Inter-Parliamentary Union (or IPU, which has a current membership of 155 states) issued the Universal Declaration on Democracy in support of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Democratization” (1996), and the UN Development Programme includes an office of Democratic Governance to promote democracy and transparency. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that “Democratization is not a spectator sport” (Ki-moon 2008).
At the international level, the end of the Cold War brought calls for major UN reform. The non-great powers had always been dissatisfied with the UN Security Council’s exclusiveness, the Permanent Five’s veto power, and the General Assembly’s lack of teeth. Additionally, decolonization and the growing number of ‘microstates’ in the UN drew attention to the incongruence between equality among states and equality among individuals. Efforts at reform during the Cold War were more often than not caught in the ideological gridlock that defined the period and even in the last 20 years reform is no further along than the proposal stage, but the recognition that reform is necessary has been gaining momentum. Reform proposals, moreover, overwhelmingly seek to extend the equality and universality principles of procedural liberalism rather than circumscribe them. In terms of equality, efforts have focused on reforming the UN Security Council to make it more representative and/or further empowering the General Assembly, where states wield formal equality in voting. More provocative have been proposals for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA), which would (in most proposals) be an advisory body to the General Assembly composed of representatives – proportional to countries’ populations – directly elected by domestic parliaments and/or direct elections. Akin to the US’s House of Representatives or the EU’s European Parliament, but without initial voting power, the UNPA would provide direct representation for the world’s population complimenting the current ‘one nation, one vote’ state-based

281 The former has already gained support in principle by the Permanent Five, though there are sharp disagreements about how representation should be expanded. Regarding the latter, the UN General Assembly already has declared the power to take up immediate threats to international peace and stability and pass binding resolutions by a two-thirds vote in instances when the UN Security Council fails to act on the matter (i.e. initiative remains with the UNSC) (UN General Assembly, 1950), though the legality of this resolution remains unclear under the Charter.
membership. UNPA proposals have been floated since the end of the 19th century and were often ridiculed as pipe dreams, but since the end of the Cold War it has drawn support from the European Union, the Pan African Parliament, and Canada.\textsuperscript{282} Though these UN reforms have been unsuccessful to date, they demonstrate a rising awareness – particularly among Western states – that reform is necessary, and that the momentum for reform is uniformly focused on greater equality among members and the possibility of expanding membership beyond nation-states.

More concretely, the end of the Cold War brought with it a paradigm shift in the way international security is understood, opening discursive space for issues of human security that draw attention to the security needs of individuals and sub-national groups. Introduced into diplomatic vocabularies with the 1994 UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report, human security represents a ‘universal’, ‘people-centered’ approach to security that the report broadly defined as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression… [and] protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.”\textsuperscript{283} Since 1994 the concept has been defined, narrowly and broadly, in a variety of ways and criticized for its conceptual ambiguity,\textsuperscript{284} leading the UN to largely discontinue its use in the last few years.\textsuperscript{285} However, despite its ambiguities or whether the phrase will ‘stick’ in diplomatic discourses or be replaced

\textsuperscript{283} Human Development Programme 1994:23
\textsuperscript{284} Gary King and Christopher Murray offer what might be the narrowest definition of human security as “the number of years of future life spent outside a state of ‘generalized poverty,’” (2002:585) while Roland Paris interprets human security as a broad research category addressing both the military and non-military insecurities facing individuals and sub-national groups (2001:96-102). King and Murray, Paris, and Martin and Owen (2010) express deep concerns about the lack of consensus and clarity in defining the term.
\textsuperscript{285} Martin and Owen 2010:212-6
with a more satisfying term, the basic *idea* of human security – that the security concerns
of individuals, including civil conflict, political repression, poverty, and disease, are
legitimate matters of international security – has been generally accepted by the
international community and routinized in the business of the UN. The concept of human
security has been instrumental in, among other things, establishing the International
Criminal Court, justifying humanitarian interventions, and motivating efforts to reduce
poverty, decrease the prevalence of HIV, and bring agricultural trade to the fore in World
Trade Organization negotiations. Most importantly, it has engendered a relatively quiet
yet significant shift in the culture of international politics by legitimizing the status of
individuals and sub-/transnational groups as subjects of international law, and in so doing
challenging the state-centricism of international politics and calling into question the
principle of sovereignty underpinning it.

**Discussion**

In many respects the post-WWII order represented a doubling down on the
principles and norms underpinning the League of Nations. Negotiations among the
Allied and associated powers began almost immediately after hostilities commenced, and
there was little debate among them about the contours of the order they envisioned. It
took a few years to hash out the institutional details of what would become the United
Nations, particularly when it came to the rights and responsibilities assigned to the great
powers, and the roles of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the postwar order were
not fully defined until after the war ended. However, it was clear from as early as 1941 that the Allies believed that the League’s guiding principles were a valid foundation to build upon, despite its institutional failures. Thus, the postwar negotiations and resulting United Nations reaffirmed the League’s commitment to attaining international stability and collective security among a community of like-minded nations.

If anything, the post-WWII order was more robust than what came before. Whereas the United States had retreated from European affairs following the Paris peace conference in 1919 despite supporting the broader principles on which the League was founded, it now appeared to view its national interests through the lens of a collective interest in international stability and security (on its own terms, of course) and assumed the lead in constructing a stable peace and signaling its unwavering support to its European allies. Germany and Japan were soundly defeated, occupied, and demonstrated a willingness to join the international community on the Allies’ terms, which stands in stark contrast to German dissatisfaction and eventual revisionist intentions during the interwar period. And the United Nations represented a much more measured and practical institutional forum for maintaining international order than its predecessor, as well as a much more thorough one in addressing economic, social, and cultural aspects of international security. The participation of many former colonies, in particular, and growing discourses against colonization further demonstrated the deepening commitment to the procedurally liberal principles of universality and equality found in the UN.

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286 Schild 1995
287 Ikenberry 2001:163-214
288 See Neta Crawford (2002) for an excellent analysis of anti-colonial discourses following WWII.
Though the Soviet Union and its satellites, despite their participation in the UN, clearly remained outside the solidifying liberal international community, and though mainland China would find itself in a similar position shortly after WWII, much of the rest of the world appears to have embraced the notions of international community and collective security that were manifest in the UN and its associated institutions following WWII. This becomes abundantly clear when we consider the causal and constitutive elements of collective identification and the procedurally liberal characteristics of the UN.

Wendt’s causal variables of collective identification\(^{289}\) were even more clearly evident in 1945 than in 1919. A second war within a thirty year period that dragged nearly every country into the world into conflict was an unambiguous indication of the interdependence that existed. The destructiveness and global reach of military conflict coupled with the alliance structures that existed prior to each war demonstrated how the decisions and behaviors of a handful of states could quickly engulf the entire globe.

Additionally, the aggressiveness with which Nazi Germany and its allies pursued their nearly limitless ambitions evinced a condition of common fate among those states outside the Axis. The basic elements of homogeneity among ‘civilized’ nation-states that defined the boundaries of the international community following WWI still pertained after WWII, and was further expanded as former colonies gained their independence and new nation-states joined the community. Finally, as a permissive and necessary condition for collective identifications to cohere, self-restraint was evident in the setting aside of specific, individual national interests among the non-Axis powers in order to collectively

\(^{289}\) 1999:343-66
combat Nazi and Japanese imperialism. While these collective efforts may at first appear to be the ‘obvious’ reaction to Axis aggression, we need only look back again to the many tragic failures of collective action during the Napoleonic Wars as a reminder that collective action, which requires states to forego more immediate opportunities to take advantage of those in a weaker position than themselves, is not necessarily as ‘obvious’ or easy to achieve as it appears in hindsight. Thus, we can comfortably conclude that the conditions necessary for collective identifications to adhere, or the potential for collective identities to form, were clearly evident.

More importantly, the narrative of this chapter suggests these objective conditions translated into a subjective awareness of the collective, evinced in the international response to Axis aggression and the tenor of negotiations over the postwar international order. The non-Axis powers demonstrated an awareness of their interdependence in matters economic, socio-political, and military; recognized that they found themselves in the ‘same boat’ during the war and could very well be commonly bound to the success or failure of the postwar order, and encouraged the participation of all self-governing nations as legitimate members of an international community charged with working together to form a stable, peaceful international order. The result was an unprecedented level of self-restraint in negotiating the contours of the postwar order and establishing the United Nations on procedurally liberal principles. Bids for territorial self-aggrandizement – particularly on the European continent – were largely absent; demands for reparations were far fewer than following WWI; and though Germany and Japan were

290 Which was only heightened by the threat of global nuclear war in the years following WWII. See Deudney (2007) for more on this point.
occupied following the war, the purpose of occupation was geared toward assimilating them into the international community as strong allies and bulwarks against the perceived Soviet threat rather than toward enriching the occupying countries.

Institutionally, the procedurally liberal nature of the United Nations is readily apparent. In no other international institution has *universal* ity been manifest to a greater degree. While The Hague Conventions attempted to enshrine universality of participation as a guiding principle of international negotiation and the League of Nations applied it more widely than ever before, only with the UN and its subsequent push for decolonization has universal participation among nation-states become a reality. The UN’s extension of *equality* among states is less clear cut but no less important. Drawing lessons from the League on the pragmatic realities of power differentials and the unequal distribution of rights and responsibilities this demanded, the UN granted pride of place to the five great powers in the form of permanent, veto-wielding seats on the UN Security Council. However, also recognizing the relative impotence of the League Assembly and the lack of clarity in its mission, the UN greatly expanded the formal purview of the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs and granted it much greater influence in shaping the UN agenda. Traditional notions of international security focusing on standing armies, weaponry, and the laws of war were stretched under the UN to encompass a wide array of issues economic, social, and political. Though often derided for the non-binding nature of its resolutions, the General

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291 Klein 1974:1-38
292 Alger 1995:8-10
Assembly was the primary institutional catalyst for decolonization following WWII and for drawing attention to human rights and security issues following the Cold War.

Finally, it is important to note that I am not proposing that international collective identifications and the United Nations trumped nationalism or the power of the state during this era. Power politics was certainly alive and well. Private interests permeated the postwar negotiations, minor territorial claims (primarily against Germany) were successfully lobbied for, and Britain, France, and a handful of other powers initially attempted to hold onto their colonial holdings, only relinquishing their claims when faced with growing discontent and insurgencies within their colonies and international condemnation without. Additionally, the United States’ push for multilateralism was in part driven by a desire to ‘lock in’ their position as the preeminent power in the system, and their strategic interests during the Cold War led to interventions and neocolonial practices that operated largely independent of international norms and laws. And the Soviet Union – while accepting membership in the UN – refused to accept the underlying liberalism of the international order and attempted to carve out its own sphere of influence, or regional international community, in Eastern Europe and central Asia. Indeed, the postwar era witnessed economic competition, proxy wars in the ‘periphery,’ and many of the same techniques of leveraging power in negotiations that have been a mainstay of international negotiations for centuries.

293 International pressures which were evident in the virtually unanimous adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, with the remaining colonial powers choosing to abstain rather than vote against.
294 See, for example, Ruggie 1982 and Ikenberry 2001.
However, the point is that the preeminence of self-interest and power politics in determining behaviors and outcomes has been more greatly influenced and circumscribed by collective interests and institutions in the UN era than in any time in the past. In some cases self-interest was foregone in favor of the rules and norms of the international community, as was evident at times during the decolonization movement. More importantly, self-interests in themselves have often been defined by collective interests in maintaining international order, as is suggested in the initial acceptance of the UN Charter’s collective mission, the decolonization movement, and justifying domestic interventions to protect collective notions of human rights and security. So while national loyalties certainly continue to outweigh international or global ones, and while state power continues to trump that of international institutions, national identities have increasingly been influenced, informed, and shaped within the context of the international community – particularly since the end of the Cold War, as collective interests in protecting human rights and international stability have justified interventions that violate traditional notions of sovereignty with increasing frequency. Though the salience of international identity and law often remains secondary to national ones, the UN era embodies an international order whose rules and norms cannot be understood in purely rational, state-centric terms. Instead, it suggests that in order to fully understand the evolution of international politics since WWII (or even 1815) we must recognize the significance of the slow and incremental but ever-stubborn emergence of international identifications and the institutions that embody them.

295 Crawford 1993:37-61
Conclusion

In many respects the post-WWII international order was a reaffirmation and extension of the normative and institutional practices of the League Era. That it was negotiated and largely set in place before the war concluded suggests that the international political culture and collective identifications of the interwar period, premised on the mutual recognition of sovereign equality, multilateral deliberation, and collective security, had survived and strengthened in the face of the revisionist challenge posed by Germany, Italy, and Japan – though the Soviet Union remained, normatively if not institutionally, on the outside looking in. The institutional structure of the UN, and especially the greater autonomy and policy purview granted to the General Assembly and the Charter’s express commitment to self-determination, reflected the member states’ desire for a more effective and more procedurally liberal international security regime. Additionally, decolonization accelerated after WWII and a host of newly independent states became members of the international community. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc – more than three centuries after the Peace of Westphalia – the international system is composed entirely of independent states operating within the norms and institutional framework of a liberal international order, suggesting that the collective identifications states share as political entities, mutually recognizing each other’s legitimacy and sovereign equality, is truly international for the first time.
Even as the end of the Cold War drew the post-Soviet and Eastern Bloc states more closely into the international community and solidified collective identifications among states, the fading threats of great power war and nuclear holocaust opened discursive space for renewed efforts to revise the international order, including 1) promoting domestic democratic governance, 2) reforming the UN to further democratize decision-making and introduce population-based (and possibly non-state based) representation through a Parliamentary Assembly, and 3) actively addressing issues of human security that had traditionally been the jurisdiction of states. All three, moreover, suggest a shift toward global governance. Post-Cold War democratization has been promoted through explicit references to the inherent rights of individuals to representative government. Though the UN’s support of democracy always carefully acknowledges the sovereignty of states in determining domestic political reforms, its active promotion of democratic governance (e.g. UN Development Programme’s Democratic Governance Group) and its interest in advancing human and political rights implies a growing commitment to the individual, rather than the state, as the “ultimate unit of concern.”

While it is believed that more representative (democratic) governance would result in states more faithfully representing their people in the UN, reform efforts that seek to break the institution’s state-centricity by introducing population-based representation would go further by providing direct representation to the global population. Though such a body would play a purely advisory role for the

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297 Pogge 1992:48
General Assembly (at least initially), it would represent an unprecedented step toward introducing a global perspective to international politics.

Despite their potential, democratization has moved forward only slowly and UN reform almost not at all. However, the growing focus on human security issues has not only established the legitimate standing of individuals and groups under international law, but it also represents a potential catalyst for moving democratization and UN reform forward. Policies in pursuit of human security ideals – the ICC, humanitarian interventions, poverty and disease alleviation, etc – have cemented individuals and groups as legitimate subjects of international law whose rights at times, and as evidenced in the changing norms and policies of humanitarian intervention,\(^{298}\) supercede those of states. This in itself represents a radical change from prior international norms and practices. But given the strong normative commitment to procedural liberalism in modern international political culture, it appears likely that this fact can be used as rhetorical leverage in advancing democratization and UN reform – if individuals are subjects of international law, then a case can be made for their legitimate right to a more direct form of representation.

Of course it is at this point on global governance that I have left our historical analysis and begun conjecturing about potential outcomes in the future. Two decades is a relatively short period of time in international history and many of these proposed reforms are just that – proposals. Nor do global governance structures imply global collective identity. However, even the plausibility of such institutional reforms attests to

\(^{298}\) Finnemore 2003
the tremendous evolution of international political culture over the last two centuries. Just as Inis Claude argued that the century from 1815 to 1914 – the “era of preparation for international organization” – was necessary for the League and the UN, Chadwick Alger has argued that the League and the UN – the “era of preparation for global governance” – have been crucial in developing the principles, norms, and institutions necessary for ‘higher’ forms of collective action and governance. Further, the proposals themselves imply the potential existence of cosmopolitan, or global, identifications driving reform efforts. Though this only suggests the potential for global collective identifications, and though it is unlikely that a global congress or world government will supplant states as the focal point of governance anytime soon, this highlights the fact that modern international politics has witnessed an unprecedented shift in attention toward individual rights as a critical component of international security, evincing the potential for a gradual shift from ‘international’ politics and governance to ‘global’ politics and governance.

299 Claude 1956:36 (emphasis in original); Alger 1995:7 (emphasis in original)
Chapter 6: Procedural Liberalism and Collective Identity Formation

The last three chapters provide an empirical investigation of the dual trends of international collective identity formation and procedural liberalism in international security organizations. The historical narrative suggests a mutually reinforcing relationship between the two. On one hand, collective identifications that emerged from the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War provided the conditions necessary for states to cooperate in the construction and expansion of institutions based upon shared principles and norms of procedural liberalism. On the other hand, the institutions and the principles and norms they embodied in each instance established precedents of international diplomacy that 1) largely arrested ‘backsliding,’ much like a ratcheting screwdriver, to less institutionalized forms of diplomacy in each successive era, 2) provided institutional forums that socialized participants to regularized peacetime negotiations, and 3) offered a normative and institutional blueprint upon which succeeding international orders could be constructed.

Neither trend can be fully understood independently of the other, and only by taking in the broader trend, or longue durée, can we appreciate their significance. The incrementally greater depth and breadth of collective identifications that emerged in each successive era was made possible, at least in part, by the evolution of increasingly
procedurally liberal institutions that provided an ever-thickening foundation of principles and norms upon which collective interests could coalesce, while each step in this very institutional evolution required an initial collective interest and commitment to international stability and order that stemmed from strengthening collective identifications. Moreover, observing any one of the three eras in isolation might give us cause for pessimism. In each of the first two eras we see the optimism of collective interests and international cooperation ultimately dashed by domestic upheaval and interstate conflict. And the persistence of national self-interest, unilateral action, and political gamesmanship often overshadows the partial successes of collective action in the modern era. However, when we take in the longer view since the French Revolution, we can more easily appreciate the tremendous transformation that has occurred in international politics: a largely self-regulated balance of power system among a handful of dynastic sovereigns under which slavery, colonization, and territorial aggrandizement were legitimate and common practices incrementally giving way to today’s international community in which collective interests in international stability maintain a highly-regulated, procedurally liberal order among sovereign equals that both informs the interests and limits the behaviors of even the most powerful states in the system. Though the nation-state still maintains preeminence in international affairs and national self-interests often conflict with and trump collective ones, the growing salience of political collective identifications and institutions beyond the nation-state has been undeniably persistent and increasingly significant.
However, the prior three chapters have only taken us so far. They have drawn empirical inferences about the relationship between the two trends, but they do not provide a specific explanation or theory for their mutual reinforcement. This raises two distinct questions. First, how do collective identifications promote the construction of procedurally liberal international institutions and, second, how do procedurally liberal international institutions promote collective identity formation? While both imply interesting and important causal hypotheses, for both pragmatic and scholarly reasons I will bracket the former in order to train attention on the latter. Quite frankly, fitting an analysis of each causal arrow into a single chapter would leave us with two partial explanations, and a thorough investigation would require spilling over into a second book. The second question is also more interesting in important respects. The effect of collective identifications on institution building appears to be somewhat more intuitive, and the incentives they create for cooperation and conflict resolution have already been discussed in Chapter 2.300 Conversely, though the generic socializing effects of institutions have been studied in some detail in recent years,301 the specific effects of procedurally liberal institutions on collective identify formation have yet to be explored in detail.

Linking this research question with the definition of progress presented in Chapter 2, what follows is an explanatory theory for how the defining principles of procedurally liberal institutions – equality and universality – promote global collective identity formation. This requires two steps. The first is to explain how involvement in

300 Specifically, pp. 58-64.
301 See, for example, Johnston (2001), Checkel (2005), Schimmelfennig (2006), and Finnemore (2009).
procedurally liberal institutions serves to solidify, deepen, and ultimately create collective
identifications among participants, for which I focus on the causal effects of the principle
of equality in institutional decision-making. This step is crucial in establishing the
socializing effects occurring within such institutions, but does not explain how procedural
liberalism can promote the ‘scaling up’ of identities from the national to the international,
and potentially to the global. The second, and less intuitive, step requires explaining how
procedurally liberal institutions encourage ever more inclusive membership toward the
global, for which I focus on the causal effects of the principle of universality. This step
elucidates how the rhetorical commitment to universality creates pressures, both internal
and external to the institution, to incrementally expand representation over time. Taken
together, I aim to show how these dual effects combine to deepen collective
identifications among an ever-growing number of participants.

Importantly, this theory has a few implications for the historical narrative
presented in the last three chapters, but its greater value is found in predicting the efficacy
of international identifications and the potential for the construction and solidification of
global identifications into the future. This is quite simply due to the relative youth and
slow evolution of procedural liberalism in international politics, beginning with its fairly
thin embryonic form during the Concert Era and its shaky institutional manifestation in
the League. Only in the modern era, when the principles of equality and universality are
still only imperfectly manifest in international institutions, has procedural liberalism
matured to a point where it appears to be exerting a more powerfully independent,
distinctly observable influence on collective identity formation. Therefore it is not a
coincidence that the causal inferences drawn between security institutions and collective identifications were weakest during the Concert and only become firmly apparent in the modern era. As the independent variable (procedural liberalism) has grown stronger in successive institutional orders, so too has its effects. In other words, as (or if) international institutions continue to more closely capture the principles of procedural liberalism, we should observe a concomitant rise in the causal effects they exert on identity formation into the future.\(^{302}\)

In order to unpack this explanatory theory in an orderly and logically coherent manner, the chapter unfolds as follows. First, I briefly reflect on what appear to have been necessary conditions – specifically globalization and military conflict – for international collective identity formation over the last two centuries and explore their role in future identity formation. Finding these conditions to be left wanting both empirically and normatively, I then present hypotheses for the institutional effects on collective identity formation. This includes developing the ‘internal’ dimension of the theory, or how the principle of equality within institutions promotes collective identity formation, as well as the ‘external’ dimension of the theory, attending to how the principle of universality promotes an ever-expanding domain of institutional participation. Finally, I discuss the implications my theory holds for the rise of international collective identity over the last two hundred years and, particularly, the potential for global collective identifications in the future.

\(^{302}\) It is also important to note, as mentioned in the introduction, what follows is not a secular theory of system evolution, but rather a theory developed to explain the specific history of international politics over the last two centuries. Though the trends have initiated a path dependence of their own, there is nothing inherent or irreversible in their continued development.
Necessary Conditions?

Though our attention has been trained on trends in collective identification and institutional structures, their progression in the empirical chapters clearly relied on two conditions given little direct attention thus far. The first is technological innovation and the broader contours of globalization that greatly accelerated with industrialization throughout the 19th century. The second is the close correlation between collective identifications and war, with major surges in identifications immediately following massive conflicts. While both are important elements in the broader history, neither do an adequate job of explaining the endurance or direction of the patterns we see in identifications over the last two centuries.

Globalization\textsuperscript{303} clearly represents a necessary condition for the trends in both international institutions and collective identity formation. It is not a coincidence that the proliferation of international institutions dovetailed with the advance of technology through the 19th and 20th centuries, and it is no secret that the locomotive, automobile, and airplane, as well as the telegraph, radio, television, and the internet have all greatly contributed to ‘shrinking’ the world we live in and exponentially increasing the density of global interaction. There may be no better example of the permissive role of technological innovation than Benedict Anderson’s book on nationalism. Though nationalism was ultimately the product of a variety of very specific cultural and political

\textsuperscript{303} Which I minimally define as the exponential rise in interaction density at the international level since the early 19th century, catalyzed by the precipitous advance of technology in such fields as communications and transportation.
developments in early modern Europe, it was only made possible through the proliferation of print capitalism, which itself stemmed directly from the advent of the printing press.\(^{304}\) And the close encounters with other cultures made possible through media, and particularly audio-visual media in the 20\(^{th}\) century, have been shown to have enduring, direct effects on collective identity formation that test traditional national boundaries.\(^{305}\) It is thus difficult to imagine that the institutions and social relationships that took shape over the last two centuries could be sustained without the material means to communicate and interact. No globalization means little social interaction across distances, which means no opportunity to form the social relationships necessary for governance or collective identity formation at the international or global level.

Additionally, globalization introduces destabilizing pressures on existing political orders. The introduction of new technologies for communication and transportation shift the political landscape by enabling new patterns of regularized social, economic, and political interaction. Once established, though, institutional structures and social relationships tend to become ‘sticky’ and resist significant revision. As globalization advances, institutional frameworks and patterns of interaction become successively more outdated and ill suited – in both scope and domain – to address social and political needs, resulting in pressures for change.

Though technological innovation certainly precipitates change and introduces the possibility for new institutional structures and networks of social interaction as

\(^{304}\) Anderson 1983

\(^{305}\) See, for example, McAlister (2005), and pp. 155-97 in particular for a mass media account of the American-Israeli special relationship.
interdependence increases, it tells us little about their form and content. As Daniel Deudney points out, “[t]echnological change produces rising levels of interdependence across larger spaces. This interdependence is both economic and strategic-military, *both productive and destructive.*”\(^{306}\) Many of the same technologies that provide new opportunities for economic trade and social interaction can easily lead to cultural clashes and more destructive conflict. In other words, globalization represents a permissive condition for collective identification – necessary but certainly not sufficient.

A second and more immediate condition for the successive surges in international collective identifications has been that of large-scale military conflict. As Ernst Haas’ analysis of complex learning makes abundantly clear, there is no more immediate and jarring experience than war to expose the failures of prior behaviors and motivations and catalyze new modes of thought.\(^{307}\) Though it took over two decades of almost constant continental conflict to crystallize in the minds of European leaders and translate into collective action, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars resulted in the recognition of collective bonds and interests among the European great power monarchs and significantly transformed European politics for nearly a century. While the procedurally liberal principles that were very imperfectly represented in the Concert of Europe continued to operate in constructing the broader contours of international order, the Concert’s collective bonds were broken by the rise of nationalism and diverging national interests, and only after the relatively swift and enormously destructive Great War did the salience of internationalism and collective security powerfully exert itself in

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\(^{306}\) 2007:211 (emphasis added); see also pp. 193-214.  
\(^{307}\) 1997:5-9
the consciousnesses of world leaders and in the resulting postwar institutional structure. And World War II might be said to have catalyzed a deeper commitment among League participants and sympathetic powers (e.g. the US) to collective action to maintain international order and stability after the failure to contain and/or deter revisionist aggression.

The role of war and the uncertainty, the cost in blood and treasure, and the sometimes-emasculating effects it introduces cannot be ignored. War, the threat of war, and its associated security form the central problematique of international politics and international relations scholarship, and they are a central motivation for the collective identifications that hold societies together. However, there are at least three points – two empirical and one normative – that call into question war as a necessary condition for collective identity formation at the international or global level.

The first is the relatively peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc and their rapid integration into the liberal international order. Largely unexpected in the scholarly literature, particularly in its swiftness, the abrupt end of Cold War antagonisms was met with an extraordinary surge in internationalism. Since the end of the Cold War, the term ‘international community’ – a speech act suggesting international collective identifications – has saturated diplomatic discourses more than ever before, international peacekeeping operations have increased considerably in size and scope, and the United Nations has greatly expanded its purview in defining human security as an

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308 See, for example, Lebow and Risse-Kappen (eds, 1996) for a ‘postmortem’ analysis of IR theory in light of the Soviet Union’s dissolution.
309 Ellis 2009:1-5
international security issue and imposing normative obligations on states to protect and provide for their citizenry. While this is only one data point, it suggests that, while war certainly catalyzes cognitive learning and can at times be an ‘efficient’ promoter of collective identifications, it does not represent a hard necessary condition.

Possibly a contributing factor to this peacefully-driven deepening of collective commitments, a second point concerns the advent of nuclear weapons. Though unanimous agreement on the issue remains elusive, the pacifying effects of nuclear weapons has long been appreciated by foreign policy makers and scholars alike. The logic of Mutually Assured Destruction is often credited with keeping the Cold War cold, feeding arguments for more rather than less proliferation in order to promote peace. While the degree to which nuclear weapons represent a deterrent to major war continues to be debated, the realities of MAD encourage leaders to rely on (or at least consider more seriously) alternative methods for addressing the heightened interdependence that comes with globalization. Nuclear war certainly remains a possibility, and will remain as long as states have such weapons. However, we should expect its great costs to continue weighing heavily on policy makers as they maneuver within an ever ‘shrinking’ world and an increasingly close-knit international community.

While the first two provide empirical justifications for questioning the role of war as a necessary condition for collective identity formation into the future, the third point is a normative one. Though war has shown itself to be a very capable catalyst in the

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310 See Stahn (2007) on the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect norm – which obligates the international community to intervene when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its population from mass atrocities – and issues regarding its practical enforcement.
311 Waltz 1981
312 Deudney 2007:144-64
preceding historical analysis, there is something deeply unsatisfying about relying upon it for future identity formation. This creates something of a normative imperative to explore alternative routes by which it can be achieved. This is, after all, a study of progress. And, indeed, the advent of nuclear weapons and the declining probability of major war may very well introduce conditions necessary to allow alternative pathways for learning and identity formation to run their course.

This section has advanced the argument in two ways. On one hand, globalization (in the thin sense defined above) and major war have been instrumental in the dual trends charted in the previous chapters. Without globalization there would be little ability to forge the international identifications we see today, and we can conclude with some confidence that without the harsh lessons of major wars these identifications would not have evolved in the way they have. On the other hand, globalization remains a permissive but insufficient condition for the evolution of international politics over the last two centuries, and war remains an efficient but not necessary condition – particularly in light of the declining probabilities of major war even as globalization accelerates. Therefore, in the next section I lay out a theory that harnesses these globalizing forces and provides an alternative to war as a catalyst for complex learning and identity formation.

**Procedural Liberalism and Collective Identity Formation**

What follows is one such alternative – a theory elucidating how institutions that embrace the procedurally liberal principles of equality and universality can promote
collective identity formation among members while simultaneously introducing pressures to expand participation, thus providing an engine for global collective identity formation into the future. Therefore it is necessary to stipulate the specific causal mechanisms by which procedural liberalism incrementally promotes global identifications.

My argument is motivated by an appreciation of G. John Ikenberry’s work on U.S. hegemony and the current liberal international order. Ikenberry has argued that the durability of the international order constructed after WWII and reinforced with the thaw of the Cold War rests on the U.S.’s decision to institutionalize, rather than dominate or abandon, the postwar order in a way that reflected its own domestic institutions.313 By constructing an institutional framework based on liberal principles of governance, the U.S. credibly committed itself to restraining the use of its considerable power advantage and created incentives for other states to bandwagon with rather than balance against it. Moreover, the order “exhibit[s] constitutional characteristics” that serve to influence the strategic behaviors states adopt in competition with one another, implying that its ‘lock in’ effects may continue even after the decline of U.S. hegemony.314 In this way, the institutional framework of the current liberal order not only contributes to the durability of U.S. hegemony, but also domesticates the international in important ways by tempering the logic of anarchy and constraining the strategies by which states pursue power.

313 Ikenberry (2001:6-7)
This in itself underscores the influence of international institutions in shaping political outcomes, but in providing an institutional alternative to realist accounts of international order Ikenberry’s rationalist account neglects the important social aspects of multilateral institutions. The virtues he ascribes to a multilateral international order – establishing mutually agreed upon rules of the game that place limits on the exercise of power and prove resistant to change\textsuperscript{315} – are important in their own right, but are only part of the equation. In a brief article entitled “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” Vincent Pouliot draws attention to the ways in which multilateral institutions exert procedural effects that habitualize deliberation, encourage cooperation and moderation, and grant legitimacy to adopted policies independent of their substantive content.\textsuperscript{316} Additionally, the literature on procedural justice and fairness highlights the importance of process in determining the legitimacy of institutional decisions and the level of trust and commitment actors hold for institutional bodies,\textsuperscript{317} and that granting equal voice and respectful treatment to all participants can heighten both.\textsuperscript{318} In other words, the practice of multilateralism can socialize actors to establish patterns of interaction that promote cooperation and further multilateralism, and even incubate “political friendship among peoples.”\textsuperscript{319}

Many other conclusions drawn in the socialization literature suggest that institutional effects go deeper as well. Beyond their role in stabilizing and ordering political interaction, institutions are socializing arenas where communication and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{315} 2000:31
\item \textsuperscript{316} Pouliot 2011
\item \textsuperscript{317} Blader and Tyler 2001; MacCoun 2005
\item \textsuperscript{318} MacCoun 2005:172
\item \textsuperscript{319} ibid:22, quoting the title of Lu (2009).
\end{itemize}
interaction can lead to changes in the behaviors and interests of participants.\textsuperscript{320}

According to Jeffrey Checkel there are two distinct ways we can understand institutional socialization:\textsuperscript{321} either as promoters of socialization in their ability (akin to epistemic communities)\textsuperscript{322} to shape domestic discourses that affect leaders’ interests and beliefs, or as sites of socialization, where the intensity and/or repetition of interaction encourages elites to adopt new social roles that lead to changing interests and beliefs. Here I focus on institutions as sites of socialization, but go further by drawing attention to the socializing effects that institutional rules and principles exert in governing interaction among participants.

This is an important distinction. Institutions are not merely passive forums for political interaction where the intensity and/or repetition of interaction may lead to socialization; institutional arenas can actually channel socialization processes toward particular outcomes \textit{by structuring participant interaction according to particular rules and principles}. More specifically, I argue that procedurally liberal institutions structure socialization processes in a way that proves conducive to collective identity formation.

In support of this claim, I present two hypotheses for how procedural liberalism, manifest in institutions, spurs global collective identity formation. First, I hypothesize that procedural liberalism’s \textit{principle of equality} governs participant interactions in a way that promotes norms of collaborative decision-making and encourages them to forge collective identifications. By formally dispersing decision-making authority among


\textsuperscript{321} Checkel (2005:805-8)

\textsuperscript{322} See Haas (1992) and the rest of \textit{International Organization} (1992, issue 1) for an introduction to epistemic communities.
participants, institutional equality forces actors to resort to collaboration and consensus-building in order to achieve desired outcomes, exposing them to processes of social influence and persuasion that can alter both their behavior and interests. Second, I hypothesize that procedural liberalism’s *principle of universality* continually challenges the boundaries of existing institutional frameworks by lending force to accusations of hypocrisy that demand successively larger, more inclusive domains of institutional participation. When procedurally liberal institutions achieve outcomes that directly affect populations that do not have institutional representation, they open themselves to attack from actors within the institution itself and/or from disenfranchised populations, both of whom can employ the principle of universality as a weapon against exclusion. Taken together, these principles establish a two-step process toward global collective identity formation – institutional equality promotes collective identification among participants within institutions, while pressures for inclusion encourage the ‘scaling up’ of institutional frameworks toward greater universality, such as from the regional to the international, and toward the global.

These mechanisms can work at any level of political interaction, from the local to the global. Given the state-centrism of modern international politics, however, my empirical focus is trained on procedurally liberal international institutions as salient proxies for procedural liberalism, though it does introduce some inevitable slippage between theory and practice. Procedural liberalism’s principles of equality and universality represent ideals to which all international institutions, more or less, fall short. Yet deviations in institutional equality do not completely erase the socializing effects
equality has on participants; and pressures toward universality are, short of its global ideal, always present to some extent. More importantly, though, procedurally liberal international institutions’ role as proxy should be understood as historically contingent. If and when the state’s privileged status in global politics falls into question due to strengthening global identifications, nuclear holocaust, or other circumstances, international institutions as proxy may give way to new local and/or global configurations of representation and decision-making. Additionally, the realities of international institutional participation currently delimits the process of collective identity formation to state elites, which empirically conforms to the emergence of international (rather than global) community exhibited over the last two centuries. The socializing influence of procedurally liberal institutions is most effective on those who determine interests and are immediately represented within the institution, and is attenuated as degrees of separation are introduced. The ‘international’ nature of global politics today draws attention to the fact that state governments serve as an intervening barrier between individuals and international decision-making. While collective identifications that result from interaction within international institutions may very well penetrate domestic society, particularly societies with representative forms of government, as long as the primary institutions of global governance continue to represent states rather than individuals, my argument – in the near term at the very least – is restricted in application to collective identifications among those more immediately represented in the decision-making process – state elites.
Equality and Collective Identity Formation

Procedurally liberal international institutions are not just forums for negotiation among self-interested actors, nor are they merely reflections or manifestations of collective identifications between state elites. Rather, their commitment to institutional equality exerts a socializing influence that serves to strengthen existing collective identifications and promote new ones. This argument requires three steps. First, I define what constitutes institutional equality. Second, given the abstract and difficult-to-measure nature of collective identifications, I revisit the indicators by which to approximate it. Third, I elucidate the causal pathway from institutional equality to collective identification.

Institutional equality is simply a measure of those rules of institutional procedure, usually formalized in charters and/or treaties, that generalize membership rights and obligations with equal application to all participants. While the primary focus of my argument rests on equality in voting procedures, it is worthwhile to note that institutional equality also extends to the rights of agenda setting and the purview of enforcement mechanisms. As an ideal type, institutional equality stipulates equality in vote-weighting, agenda setting power, the application of enforcement mechanisms, and burden-sharing of institutional obligations and costs. In practice, institutions can be measured against this

323 Akin to Ruggie’s (1992:571) qualitative definition of multilateralism as “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct – that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.”
ideal to determine the extent of equality in the institution, with special attention paid to equality in voting procedure in its promotion of collective identification.

Operationalizing collective identity is not so clear-cut, inevitably introducing slippage between concept and measurement. This is due to the fact that, though constituted as a shared sense of attachment, collective identities exist only in the minds of those who share in them. That is to say, the salience of collective identifications will vary between actors and contexts, and could only be directly observed and measured by ‘getting into’ actors’ heads. Alternatively, observing the social roles actors adopt in consequence of collective identifications would provide an indirect measure; however, this often requires conjectures about actors’ intentions, which become especially messy when particular social roles could potentially reflect any number of interests, or when it is unclear whether the assumed role is due to identification or consequentialist logic. While the operationalization I employ does not completely avoid issues of intentionality, it does include objective indicators to strengthen the measurement. Introduced in chapter 1 and employed in the prior empirical chapters, I have adopted Wendt’s four ‘master variables’ for collective identity formation: interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint. The first three are efficient causes of collective identification, understood as objective conditions that induce actors to perceive them subjectively in ways that encourage identification. The fourth is a permissive cause and necessary condition for collective identification, by which actors practice restraint in pursuit of their interests in

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324 I chose not to stipulate a hard and fast cut-off between ‘liberal/equal’ and ‘illiberal/unequal.’ Given the sometimes contortionist-like skills of those who write institutional charters, any particular cut-off would be met with exceptions. And given that I am not coding, quantifying, counting, or aggregating data based on these benchmarks, there is little reason to provide what would ultimately be an arbitrary cut-off.

325 Wendt (1999:343-63)
order to build trust and convey a commitment to achieving collective ends. Of course Wendt presents these as independent variables, rather than direct evidence, of collective identity. However, when the objective conditions of interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity are intensified, and self-restraining behaviors are encouraged, collective identifications become likely. So while ultimately collective identification is dependent on its reciprocal acknowledgement among actors, if institutional equality can be shown to intensify these objective conditions and promote self-restraint, then we can infer that it heightens the probability of collective identity formation.

Institutional equality creates a social arena in which states are compelled to deliberate and collaborate in the decision-making process. Regardless of the specific requirements for decision-making (e.g. majority, supermajority, unanimity), when no state has more say than any other, they are forced to continually work with other states in order to realize their goals. If we stop here, we are left with the traditional rationalist argument that egoistic actors will strategically seek consensus on issues where interests converge, engage in logrolling to mutually realize divergent interests, or act unilaterally outside the institution if agreement cannot be reached. However, once engaged in processes of institutional decision-making, state elites also become enmeshed in social environments that create new incentive structures that can alter state interests and identities. This suggests that over time states will come to shape and adopt a normative framework for interaction within the institution that is strongly influenced by the institutional rules in place. In the case of institutional equality, this can mean developing
norms of deliberation and collaboration that are conducive to collective identity formation.

More precisely, institutional equality spurs the construction of collective identifications through two micro-processes of socialization, persuasion and social influence. Akin to traditional understandings of socialization, complex learning, and internalization, persuasion is a process that “involves changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion.” Social influence, on the other hand, constitutes a ‘thinner’ process of socialization, by which actors adopt behaviors in response to social rewards and punishments. Entailing a consequentialist logic of norm adoption similar to that of Frank Schimmelfennig’s rational actor model of socialization, pro-norm behaviors are not reflections of internalized beliefs, but rather motivated by a desire to accrue social status or avoid criticism – or what Johnston terms ‘backpatting and opprobrium.’ Yet, when operating under the conditions of institutional equality, both processes can lead to the intensification of interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity, and encourage states to practice self-restraint.

Through the processes of social influence, institutional equality creates incentives for state elites to adopt behaviors that conform to norms of deliberation and collaboration in order to attain their goals. Not only can non-conforming behavior lead to sub-optimal outcomes in terms of a state’s original interests (the materialist logic of pro-social

326 Though these processes have appeared in various works on socialization, I adopt the definitions and framework laid out by Alastair Johnston (2001).
327 Johnston (2001:496)
328 (2006)
behaviors), but such behavior is also likely to elicit forms of social approbation that harm its status and social power in the institution. If regarded as ‘selfish’ or not a ‘team player,’ other elites may negotiate agreements and shape policy without the uncooperative elites’ input, label them ‘obstructionist,’ or socially isolate them from the decision-making process. In adopting behaviors that conform to institutional incentives, however, elites not only realize the material benefits of shaping policy and logrolling in pursuit of their interests, but can also achieve status within the institution as a player that can be counted on as a power broker, middleman, or swing vote. By accruing a positive status position through policy deliberation and collaboration, elites maximize their maneuverability and can forge closer relationships with other elites. Additionally, the reputational costs of hypocrisy help prevent ‘backsliding’ into non-conforming behavior or policy defection, thereby strengthening trust between members and catalyzing a ‘virtuous circle’ of pro-norm behavior.

As elites become socialized to practice norms of deliberation and collaboration through the process of social influence under conditions of institutional equality, the intensity of interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity is likely to rise. Pro-norm behavior should result in elites reaching cooperative agreements on policy that require coordination and trust more frequently, which can deepen interdependence between participants; as cooperation advances and member states position themselves more closely in terms of policy, they should increasingly be bound by common fate in that third parties will more likely view them as aligned; and the alignment of policies and

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329 See Gilpin (1981), for example, on the importance of status in international politics.
330 Pouliot 2011:20
adopted social roles in response to cooperative agreements should contribute to heightened homogeneity between member states. While the specific implications of particular patterns of cooperation will certainly vary, when aggregated a general trend toward objectively greater interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity is very likely over time. Additionally, processes of social influence can also incentivize the practice of self-restraint. Though self-restraint in this manner would ultimately be self-serving, it may still convey a level of trust and familiarity that encourages reciprocation. Even as these practices initially reflect self-interested purposes, they can create social conditions conducive to identification. Identities are, after all, accomplishments of practice that can take hold over time through the repetition of pro-social behavior among actors. What we can draw from the processes of social influence is that, even under socializing conditions that do not directly alter the basic interests and identities of institutional participants, institutional equality can structure social interaction in ways that can still promote conditions favorable to collective identity formation.

The process of persuasion is both more powerful in its ability to effect interest and identity change and more elusive empirically. Though the latter ultimately tempers my operationalization of collective identity, persuasion nevertheless elucidates a clearer pathway between institutional equality and collective identification. Johnston explicates three general conditions under which persuasion is likely: intense deliberation, especially when environmental cues promote critical reflection; close affective attachments to the persuader; and characteristics internal to the persuadee. Of these three, the influence

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331 2001:496-7
of institutional equality is obviously greatest in the first, only indirect in the second, and only minimally present\textsuperscript{332} in the third. By providing strong incentives for deliberation in decision-making processes, institutions that operate according to the principle of equality should be more likely to produce persuasive socialization than other institutional forms. More specifically, given that states are encouraged to generalize their interests and policy positions by resorting to rational argumentation in order to gain support and agreement (especially under rules that require consensus),\textsuperscript{333} persuasive socialization should be channeled toward the construction of collective interests and identifications under conditions of institutional equality. Additionally, in a less direct form of persuasion, collaboration initially undertaken for strategic purposes can, through repetition, become internalized over time – through more intimate deliberations between cooperative partners who have formed bonds of trust, a sense of ownership in collaborative outcomes that may lead coincident interests to become collective ones, or more thoroughly through habit.\textsuperscript{334} While rationalists would label persuasive efforts as mere rhetoric or cheap talk, the very fact that states employ such tactics implies their usefulness in genuinely altering the interests and beliefs of other participants.

When channeled through the incentive structure of institutional equality, persuasion intensifies objective conditions of interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity and encourages self-restraint by directly producing collective

\textsuperscript{332} When actors internalize priorly expressed beliefs in order to avoid the affective discomfort of hypocrisy (Johnston:2001:497), even when these beliefs were only expressed to advance strategic interests (i.e. social influence). However, this could just as easily be viewed as a barrier to persuasion, since it might increase actors’ resistance to belief updating.

\textsuperscript{333} Risse 2000

\textsuperscript{334} See Hopf (2010) on the logic of habit in sustaining cooperation.
identifications. In a setting of deliberation, processes of persuasion become focused on reaching consensus. *Successful* persuasion in procedurally liberal international institutions should thus often result in the redefinition of interests and identity toward collective ones as actors reach consensus on collective goals and policy initiatives. This, in turn, should have a similar – and much stronger – effect on the conditions for collective identity to that of social influence, since adopted pro-norm behaviors will be the result of internalized beliefs rather than strategic ones and therefore more thorough and durable. This is much the same for self-restraint. Persuasion that results in collective attachments between elites should encourage them to redefine priorly held self-interests in terms of new collective ones, leading to practices that constitute self-restraint in relation to priorly held beliefs. Ultimately, successful persuasion – specifically when channeled through the incentive structure presented by institutional equality – goes beyond promoting the conditions necessary for collective identification by directly constituting it.

This ‘deeper’ effect of institutional equality on collective identity formation is more powerful and enduring than social influence, but its value is tempered by its rarity. Persuasion appears to be a relatively infrequent outcome of institutional interaction compared to the prevalence of egoism and other behaviors adopted through social influence in institutional settings. Additionally, such successes will often be confined to particular issues or only affect a subset of institutional members. However, institutional equality may offer greater opportunities for persuasion to take place than in alternative forums. Given the greater policy legitimacy and perceived fairness that results from
formally removing power considerations from the decision-making process (even as they often hang heavily just outside the conversation), it stands to reason that actors may additionally be more open to reasoned deliberation and persuasion when conducted between formal equals. Regardless, processes of persuasion that are pursued under conditions of institutional equality that incentivize deliberation and consensus should be, when successful, highly effective in constructing durable collective identifications.

Therefore, institutions that adopt procedurally liberal practices, and specifically institutional equality, can become sites of socialization by structuring participant interaction in a way that actively promotes collective identity formation. The incentives to engage in deliberation and consensus-building that result from formal institutional equality encourage participants to engage in pro-social behavior conducive to collective action. Whether the adoption of pro-social behavior is largely strategic (social influence) or more thoroughly internalized (persuasion) will certainly affect the relative salience of collective identifications vis-à-vis traditional self-interests. However, both provide opportunities for identifications to take hold when institutional rules (i.e. equality) promote deliberation and consensus-building.

*Universality, Perceived Hypocrisy, and the ‘Scaling Up’ of Procedural Liberalism*

Having established a causal connection between institutional equality and collective identity formation among participants within institutions, we now turn to the second empirical issue – addressing the self-reinforcing nature of procedurally liberal

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335 Pouliot 2011; Blader and Tyler 2001; MacCoun 2005
institutions to create upward pressure that projects its principles into successively larger, more inclusive domains of social interaction. Emerging as a philosophical position during the Enlightenment, procedural liberalism first developed domestically in Britain, France, and the newly formed United States in the late 18th century. Concurrent with the proliferation of liberalism at the domestic level, 19th century Europe witnessed the implementation and expansion of procedurally liberal principles in international institutions at the regional level, extending to an international domain in the 20th century, particularly after World War II. And today, though states continue to maintain a virtual monopoly on international institutional membership, we are observing the very early stages of what might be a further deepening of institutional inclusiveness as international institutions increasingly turn attention to the individual, as opposed to the state, as the primary unit of political concern. At each step the intensification of interaction resulting from globalizing pressures have forced existing institutional structures to respond by either reforming existing institutions toward greater inclusion or creating more inclusive, overarching institutional frameworks. If the intuition of this project is correct, pressures should only continue to mount toward expanding the domain of institutions from the international to the global. What explains this continued scaling up of institutions, and specifically procedurally liberal institutions, and is its path dependence really directed toward a global institutional framework?

By far the most popular explanation for the liberal turn in international politics points to the domination of international politics by the liberal, Anglo powers – Britain and the United States – since the Napoleonic Wars. Indeed, though they vary
considerably in terms of the underlying mechanisms at work, the diversity of approaches that support this conclusion is amazing. Hegemonic stability theorists explain the liberal turn as a product of British and American hegemony, in which the great powers that were in charge of establishing the contemporary international order did so in their own image.\textsuperscript{336} Neo-Marxists ascribe it to the natural progression of cultural and economic hegemony by those who occupy a materially dominant position in international politics.\textsuperscript{337} Neo-liberals tend to see it as the successful expansion of the normatively desirable rationalization of international politics toward liberal cooperation.\textsuperscript{338} And constructivists appear to largely follow the same tact, explaining the liberal turn through, among other mechanisms, the internationalization of domestic liberalization in the U.S. and Western Europe and the transnational imitation of and socialization to Western practices.\textsuperscript{339}

The dominant position of liberal Western powers over the last two centuries undoubtedly played a major role in the expansion of procedural liberalism internationally. However, as many of these works detail in their own frameworks, identifying the causal mechanisms is a bit trickier. There seem to be as many instances of liberal states attempting to establish illiberal policies internationally as there are instances of them promoting liberal ones, with the colonization of Africa possibly the most disturbing example. Though the proliferation of procedural liberalism has surely been the combination of numerous factors whose importance has ebbed and flowed between times

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{336} Gilpin 1981, Ikenberry 2001
\item \textsuperscript{337} Gramsci 1971, Cox 1987
\item \textsuperscript{338} Keohane and Nye 1977/89, Keohane 1984, Russett and Oneal 2001
\item \textsuperscript{339} Hall 1999, Bukovansky 2002; Finnemore 1996
\end{itemize}

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and contexts, here I call attention to one that is generated by institutional structures themselves and, though promising, appears to be neglected by much of the IR literature—namely, the role of perceived hypocrisy in mobilizing support for the projection of procedurally liberal institutions into successively larger, more inclusive domains of social interaction. Rather than representing a competing explanation for the internationalization of liberal domestic structures by powerful states, accusations of hypocrisy offer a mechanism for change that lends further strength and specificity to the causal narrative. This requires first defining what is meant by perceived hypocrisy and, second, identify how procedural liberalism’s commitment to universality lends support to particular accusations of hypocrisy that encourage greater institutional inclusion.

Hypocrisy is an inconsistency between one’s professed beliefs and actions. For example, when states decry the protectionist policies of others while maintaining similar policies of their own, espouse a commitment to human rights even as they violate them at home or abroad, or pay lip service to the equality among states while simultaneously protecting their privileged position in the international order, they are guilty of hypocrisy. It exists at all levels of social action, especially international politics, and is not a new concept for IR theory. Hypocrisy has been employed in order to characterize modern international politics, identify institutional weaknesses, and understand its role in sustaining collective action. Additionally, Mlada Bukovansky and Martha Finnemore have recently highlighted the damaging effects of hypocrisy on the legitimacy of

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341 See Krasner (1999), Weaver (2008), and Lipson (2007), respectively.
institutions and states. However, the negative consequences and impetus for change that result from the hypocritical behaviors of actors are not an immediate result of hypocritical actions in themselves, but are rather due to the response to perceived hypocrisy that others choose to adopt. Hypocrisy has far fewer consequences if it is not seen or if others do not interpret an actor’s behavior as hypocritical; its corrosive effects, particularly on institutional legitimacy, are more directly a consequence of its recognition by others and the dissatisfaction or disillusionment it arouses. So understanding how hypocrisy weakens legitimacy requires appreciating how perceptions and accusations of hypocrisy gain the traction necessary to effect change.

The perception of hypocrisy, then, is another’s belief that an inconsistency or incongruence exists between an actor or institution’s professed beliefs and actions. This distinction may appear to be small, but it is a very important one. It draws attention to the fact that the causal effects of hypocrisy have less to do with the beliefs or actions in question than with others’ response to them. This renders an ‘objective’ judgment as to what constitutes hypocrisy a moot point. What matters is not whether or not certain statements or actions are hypocritical, but rather how they are subjectively or intersubjectively interpreted by other actors. It places causal emphasis on the response rather than the initial action.

In some cases perceptions of hypocrisy are digested quietly – possibly spurring discontent that can erode confidence or legitimacy, but leading to no collective response. In other cases, however, the response is more vocal in the form of accusations of

342 Bukovansky (conference paper, 2005), Finnemore (2009)
hypocrisy. Accusations of hypocrisy can be defined as discursive weapons that draw attention to the legal and moral inconsistencies of actors and/or institutions in an attempt to instigate change. They are not idle observations of hypocrisy, but rather intentional efforts to cast light on perceived injustices, or *speech acts* that provide a discursive focal point for collective action. Specifically, they rely on rational and ethical argumentation in order to trigger social mobilization, seeking to inform or influence others’ understandings or opinions about particular actors or institutions. Accusations of hypocrisy can take many forms, such as whisper campaigns, public challenges, formal requests for reform, etc.; they can seek a variety of outcomes, such as changes in behavior or beliefs, policy changes, institutional reforms, disempowerment of rivals, etc.; they can vary in their approach, from gentle persuasion to calls to arms; and they result in varying levels of success. And though they may most often be employed by less powerful actors, they are readily available to all.

Importantly, they do not – in and of themselves – provide an explanation for greater institutional inclusion over time. Accusations of hypocrisy represent a generic mechanism for change, not a specific cause. However, I hypothesize that procedurally liberal institutions are more vulnerable to the effects of such accusations due to the principle of universality that is usually associated with them.

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343 See John Austin’s (1962) foundational work on Speech Act Theory, and Wæver (1995) and Balzacq (2005), among others, for its application to international relations in the securitization literature.
344 James Scott’s (1985) *Weapons of the Weak* is called to mind.
345 As Immanuel Wallerstein notes, “In general, in a deep conflict, the eyes of the downtrodden are more acute about the reality of the present. For it is in their interest to perceive correctly in order to expose the hypocrisies of the rulers. They have less interest in ideological deflection” (1974:4).
This is due to the fact that the principle of universality consistently exposes liberal institutions to accusations of hypocrisy, and will continue to do so as long as global affairs are not managed globally. Procedural liberalism’s ideal of universality\textsuperscript{346} creates a benchmark that most governance structures fail to achieve in practice. In general, states jealously guard their institutional powers and are often resistant, at least initially, to diluting them with the introduction of additional participants. As globalization intensifies and expands patterns of interaction that include new issue areas and new actors, the gap between ideals and practices widen. Consequently, this introduces inconsistencies between espoused ideals and practices that consistently leave procedurally liberal institutions open to accusations of hypocrisy.

Further, when accusations premised on the principle of universality successfully result in institutional expansion or new, overarching institutional frameworks, it stands to reason that new participants to the institution might advocate other procedurally liberal principles as well, specifically institutional equality. In this way, accusations of hypocrisy that capitalize on the principle of universality can, when successful, lead not only to the scaling up of institutions but also – whether due strategically to fears of new accusations or to a real commitment to procedural liberalism – their further liberalization, making them more vulnerable to future accusations if/when their participation remains exclusionary in the eyes of participants or the disenfranchised.

This immediately leads to questions about the conditions under which accusations of hypocrisy, and particularly those mobilized by universality, are most likely to lead to

\textsuperscript{346} See Tan (2000:194-202) for an in-depth discussion on liberalism’s commitment to universality.
institutional reform or the creation of new overarching institutional frameworks. Though the contextual factors of a given case will introduce considerable variation, we can identify at least a few variables that should help predict the probability of success, such as:

- The extent to which the accusation’s rationale is readily accessible to others. In other words, do others (within or outside the institution) interpret the indicted institutional practices to be hypocritical?
- The relative salience of the accusation. To what extent are the hypocritical practices perceived to be in violation of the principles and norms of the institution?
- The sincerity of the accusers. Are they leveling legitimate grievances or grasping for straws?\(^\text{347}\)
- The perceived standing of the purportedly disenfranchised. Is it conceivable to think of them as legitimate participants in the institution?
- The relative degree of reform necessary to address the grievance. Do the costs and uncertainty of institutional reform outweigh the desire to bring ideals and practices into greater alignment, or to avoid the social costs of perceived hypocrisy?

While this list is far from exhaustive, it provides scope conditions for when accusations will most likely be successful. Intuitively, we can predict that the probability for success will be high when the accusation is readily acknowledged, interpreted as a significant transgression of institutional principles, leveled by a credible individual or group that speaks for a population with a legitimate case for inclusion, and can be addressed with reforms that do not significantly alter institutional practices and procedures; and that probabilities will lessen as these vary.

Regardless of the outcome of any individual accusation, if my hypothesis is borne out it would confirm the independent role procedural liberalism plays in promoting the scaling up of international institutions from regional and exclusionary to more

\(^{347}\) See Austin (1962:14-5) on the importance of the sincerity condition.
international and universal. However, one more step is necessary in the move from procedurally liberal international institutions and international collective identity to global governance and identifications. While the empirical record over the last two centuries draws our attention to the proliferation and solidification of procedurally liberal international institutions, international politics engenders a two-level game that complicates an analysis of universality while simultaneously providing a potential link between the international and the global. At the domestic level, the principle of universality applies to the individual’s right to direct participation or representation in national decision-making bodies. At the international level, states are often viewed and treated as collective individuals that deserve the recognition and rights implied by universality. While this is most often thought of as a simplifying analogy,\(^{348}\) it has been reified in the language and practices of international politics, sparking tension over the incongruence between sovereign equality among states vs. sovereign equality among individuals.\(^{349}\) In international politics the former has traditionally overshadowed the latter. However, as sovereign equality among states has become more prevalent in the formal rules and principles of procedurally liberal international institutions, the issue of sovereign equality among individuals has gained greater attention and increasingly incited accusations of hypocrisy against the state-centrism of global politics. This is most evident in the UN’s concern for individual rights in its charter and follow-on declarations, and in the increasingly visible human security movement.\(^{350}\) While treating individuals

\(^{348}\) Cf. Wendt (2004)

\(^{349}\) Klein (1974:1-9)

\(^{350}\) See Paris (2001) for an introduction and overview.
as subjects of international law is a far cry from recognizing them as direct participants in core international institutions, this indicates that, as the idea of sovereign equality among states gains greater currency in international politics, the issue of sovereign equality among individuals should become more salient over time.

The specific process by which this might occur is open to speculation. One could imagine the gradual adoption of a federal model of representation in global governance structures, catalyzed by accusations of hypocrisy against the state-centric nature of global governance as they gain salience. This might entail providing membership in institutions to newly elected officials who directly represent the global population (by district or a proportional system), independent from national boundaries – initially as observers but eventually as voting members. Or possibly, akin to the American Congress, directly electing such officials to a decision-making bodies that parallel those already representing states, though at least initially one with little institutional power. These are only musings about what might occur, but they do represent new potentialities in the social and institutional configuration of international politics. While my empirical focus remains on the shifts that have taken place over the last two centuries, which have largely concerned issues over state-based participation in institutional bodies, the logic of the principle of universality nevertheless implies continued pressure toward global, as opposed to international, governance structures.
A Forward Looking Theory

The above presents a theory for how procedurally liberal institutions spur collective identifications among participants and provide discursive space for accusations of hypocrisy to spur successively greater domains of institutional inclusion, thus providing an engine for global collective identity formation (i.e. political progress). As a practical matter, we should expect the theory’s efficacy and significance to be a rough function of three variables. First, to what degree is international politics institutionalized? For an institutional theory to gain traction institutions must first be present and exerting influence upon the interests and behaviors of states. Second, to what degree do the relevant institutions conform to the principles of procedural liberalism, institutional equality and universality? All else equal, we should expect the theory’s explanatory power to increase as the degree to which the relevant institutions ascribe to procedurally liberal principles increases. Finally, to what degree are alternative methods or venues of international interaction and conflict resolution available or desirable? We should generally expect states to reserve their right to pursue their interests through methods they find most advantageous, whether they be uni-, bi-, or multilateral. As alternative methods become exhausted or less desirable – e.g. as globalization makes it more difficult for all but the most powerful states to operate unilaterally, or as the advent of nuclear weapons has greatly affected the desirability and probability of major war – institutional forums might be expected to take on a more central role in structuring and shaping political interaction.
These conditions suggest that the applicability of the above theory, and the ability to thoroughly test it, lies in the immediate post-Cold War period and into the future. Put another way, the preceding empirical chapters were instrumental as an inductive approach to theory-building in this chapter but, in addition to the major problems associated with developing and testing a theory with the same cases, they do not present the most fertile ground for testing it. The empirics illustrate the power of institutions in arresting normative backsliding between eras, but the relative weakness of institutions and thinness of their procedural liberalism through much of the historical narrative implies a more limited role in affecting identifications than we should expect in the present and immediate future. Though it laid important groundwork for what came after, the Concert of Europe was neither a formal institution nor very procedurally liberal. The League of Nations introduced a bit more traction, particularly in reinforcing the post-WWI commitment to collective action among its participants and limited disarmament in the 1920s, and acknowledging – though mostly only in principle – the rising chorus of voices calling for national self-determination and inclusion into the international community through the Mandate system. However, only in the United Nations Era do we see international institutions operating with greater influence and more closely according to procedurally liberal principles. Thus, the empirical chapters have charted the evolution of procedurally liberal institutions from their embryonic stages during the Concert to their more ‘mature’ form today and inferred the contours of the causal link between institutions and identity, and the evidence suggests that the above theory could very well

351 See King et al (1994), Brady and Collier (eds, 2004), and George and Bennett (2005), among others, for general agreement on this point.
play an increasingly important role in a causal narrative, but they do not provide adequate cases for thoroughly testing the theory.

Having established a normative and empirical definition for international political progress, charted the evolution of procedural liberalism and collective identifications over the last two centuries, and inductively constructed a theory to explain one direction of the causal link between the two, testing the theory with contemporary cases – certainly the next logical step – is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study. However, this does not preclude concluding with some of the expectations the theory produces.

Specifically, we should expect the deliberative processes of procedurally liberal international institutions to deepen the objective conditions of interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity, encourage the practice of self-restraint, and promote their subjective recognition among participants. In a comparative analysis, this should prove much more apparent in those institutions with greater institutional equality in terms of voting, agenda setting, and the application of enforcement mechanisms. Additionally, we should expect to see disenfranchised actors, with or without the discursive support of institutional members, waging public campaigns for a seat at the table in institutions whose agenda and policies affect them. Again – and quite importantly for the strength of the theory – comparative analyses should reveal 1) a greater level of social mobilization behind accusations of hypocrisy and 2) a greater rate of successful institutional reform toward inclusion when lodged against procedurally liberal institutions.

More broadly, we should see the continuation of the institutional and identity trends observed in the empirical chapters. This should include increasing levels of
collective action in the United Nations; incrementally greater access to and participation in the UN and other international institutional bodies; a broadening scope of international institutional jurisdiction over global political issues, and local ones when they transgress UN law; and a deepening attachment to the international community and global governance structures by state elites and, eventually, broader populations. Indeed, initial evidence of some of these shifts is already apparent. Since the end of the Cold War and the deep international divisions it represented, the UN has become much more active in drafting and collectively enforcing international law, with recent examples from Sudan, Libya, and possibly Syria and Iran, and it has granted greater access to NGOs and has gradually taken more serious proposed reforms that would, for example, loosen the exclusiveness of the UN Security Council or introduce population based representation (in some form) to the organization. It is more difficult to give an ‘eyeball’ estimate of the degree to which political identifications have shifted, but research into recent initiatives to codify and enforce human security standards and the Responsibility to Protect norm may very well be promising.

On the flipside of the coin, these predictions imply the theory’s falsifiability. In particular, examining the indicators of collective identity formation in comparative analyses between institutions with varying degrees of institutional equality may reveal little or no causal connection between the two. A similar analysis may reveal unexpected patterns in institutional participation over time, or in the prevalence and/or success of accusations of hypocrisy against various institutions. Additionally, broader indicators might include actors – and particularly powerful states – exiting procedurally liberal
institutions, institutional reforms that further centralize decision-making power, or fractures emerging between UN members that slow the pace of collective action we have seen over the last 20 years, as is predicted by many balance of power theorists.

Conclusion

Taken together, this discussion indicates that procedural liberalism may play an important, independent role in promoting global collective identity formation. The first causal step elucidates how procedurally liberal institutions encourage collective identity formation among institutional participants. Institutional equality compels states to engage in deliberation and collaboration in order to achieve their interests, channeling socialization processes in ways that intensify interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity and encourage self-restraint. The second step explicates how the principle of universality promotes liberal institutional expansion toward successively greater domains of inclusiveness. Given the gap between procedurally liberal institutional ideals and practice, liberalism spurs accusations of hypocrisy that advocate greater enfranchisement. In short, institutional equality promotes collective identity, while universality introduces pressures to expand it through greater institutional participation.

This is a generic institutional theory that can be applied to any level of governance, though its application to international institutions remains the focus of this study. It details how specifically procedurally liberal international institutions structure participant interaction in such a way as to encourage collective identity formation, and how the very principles they are constructed upon leave them vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy that create incentives for members to broaden membership as the scope of
institutional agendas and policies expands. Ultimately, it provides an engine for continued international, and potentially global, collective identity formation as an alternative to the conflict-driven identity formation of prior eras. Given the growing importance of global governance structures in international politics, it at once reveals the socializing power of procedurally liberal institutions and implies a normative imperative to their continued promotion.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

International relations (IR) scholarship, like all social scientific scholarship, is inherently both empirical and normative. The proximate motivations and stated reasons for our research endeavors are often couched in a desire to explain how the world works, but this in itself usually stems from a deeper, less visible desire to have a positive impact on the world we live in. As Robert Cox has famously noted, “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”\(^{352}\) Despite the greater attention usually paid to the empirical side in IR theory (often to clothe our theories and findings in objectivity or even-handedness), it is the normative aspect of our research that infuses purpose and meaning. This purpose can take many forms – contributing to the accumulating collective knowledge of how the world works with theoretical models and empirical evidence, offering prescriptions for effective policy-making given the apparent empirical realities that exist, or explicitly advocating normative positions to be adopted, among many others. What is important, however, is that we do not forget the fundamental motivations that drive our research and make us social scientists.

When we recognize the inherently normative dimension of IR, it is easier to see how the idea of progress lies at the very heart of what we do as social scientists. It is in many ways the ‘ultimate’ question motivating our research endeavors. The ideal, or at

\(^{352}\) 1981:128 (emphasis in the original)
least the ideal we imagine to ourselves, represents a point of departure for what we choose to analyze and how we present our findings. Admittedly, the rapid specialization of our field leads most scholars to take only very small bites of the normative apple. How can international institutions be reformed so they operate more efficiently, effectively, or fairly? Or, how should states or leaders operate in order to maximize their desired goals or to avoid violent conflict under given circumstances? But this in no way diminishes the importance of the larger question of political progress and, indeed, may only serve to remind us that the question can and should at times be addressed more holistically. What constitutes political progress, and for whom? Particularly given the realities of how the world has and does work, how can it be achieved?

The latter question also reminds us that our research endeavors are reflexive in nature. Our very notions of progress are constructed within the context of what we think we know about the world, and (we hope) our research results have at least some small impact on how it operates. The empirical and the normative, the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, are engaged in an ongoing conversation that constitutes and gives meaning to one another.353 It is in this way that social scientific research, including that on international politics, is a living, breathing enterprise. How we write about the world both empirically and normatively has a direct effect on the future empirical and normative trajectory of political thought and change.

Thus, the question of progress is more than a source of motivation for social scientists; it possesses significant practical importance as well. Policymakers know better

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353 See Price (2008) for an excellent exposition on the subject.
than researchers that the decisions they make must strike a balance between the realities of the world with which they are presented and the normative goals they hold or with which they are charged to advance. Though policymakers have many other sources of input beyond IR scholarship, it certainly influences their worldview at many junctures in their academic and professional education. This holds importance at at least two critical points. The first is in the development of their normative goals; what is their conception of the ideal, and for whom? The second is in their view of how the world works; what are the operating principles of international politics, how should I expect others to react in given situations, and therefore how can strategic and, ultimately, normative goals be advanced?

Unfortunately, mainstream IR has largely neglected the idea of progress in international politics. Following World War II a division of labor took hold between IR and political theory, with the former attending almost exclusively to empirical issues of international politics and the latter attending to normative ones. The inherent synthesis has been broken. American IR scholarship over the last 60 years has provided a veritable cornucopia of empirical theories and data to help policymakers understand how the world works, but scholarship that contains explicit normative arguments remain marginalized. At the same time political theory has specialized toward normative questions of international ethics and morality with few explicit connections to the empirical findings in IR. Thus synthetic, praxeological approaches have been neglected, the idea of progress has fallen through the cracks, and policymakers are left to piece together holistic

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354 See the Chapter 2 (pp. 49-51) for the notable exceptions of Adler and Crawford (eds, 1991) and Haas (1997).
approaches from the many disparate empirical and normative theories from both subfields.

More subtly, the implied ethics and morality of empirical IR theory and the assumptions they make about other states’ interests and motivations can exert significant influence over policymaking. This is exemplified in one of the most important issues in international politics today – how will leaders and states react to the gradual shift in relative material power away from the West, which may weaken or break the hegemony enjoyed by European states and the United States over the past several centuries? If leaders were to adopt the basic premises of neorealism and the expectations they create, we should expect different beliefs about what constitutes progress, to what extent it can be achieved, and how policy should thus proceed than if they were to adopt those of, say, rational institutionalism or liberal constructivism. In other words, current IR theory not only lacks explicit normative underpinnings, but its empirical assumptions and implicit normative implications can strongly influence both the empirical and normative trajectory of policymaking.

Regardless to what extent IR scholarship has shaped or been shaped by it, the conventional wisdom in both academia and elsewhere appears to be pessimistic on the question of progress in international politics. The two world wars of the early 20th century, the power politics of the Cold War, and the seemingly interminable political gamesmanship that continues to plague international politics certainly give us pause when we look for signs of progress. Additionally, since World War II academics and policymakers have been steeped in IR scholarship long dominated by power politics and
rational self-interest. The two appear to have perpetuated a vicious cycle. Disillusionment with the potential for progress in international politics resulting from two devastating world wars gave life to Realism in IR theory, whose theoretical principles and assumptions have, to some extent, reified themselves in the practices and policies adopted by world leaders.

Yet, when taking a longer view of history by delving into the political practices and norms of the past few centuries, it appears this pessimism is largely unfounded. It is easy to become frustrated by the foot-dragging and corruption in the United Nations, the bullying of weaker states by stronger ones, or the gamesmanship of various countries in their creative interpretations of economic agreements. However, we have come a long way since the 18th century, when territorial expansion, colonization, slavery, and many other now-abhorrent practices were not only commonplace but venerated as legitimate methods for enhancing state power. We often take for granted that we now live in an international community that regularizes and stabilizes international politics and limits the use of power like never before. Present day international politics falls far short of Utopia, but it is hard to deny that we have actually witnessed a tremendous amount of political progress over the last few centuries.

Moving from intuition to rigorous analysis, this dissertation has sought to explore these developments, bridging the division of labor in our field by offering an explicitly normative and empirical analysis of progress in international politics. This necessitated a three-pronged approach that defined the normative dimension of political progress,
presented empirical evidence for its past accomplishment, and proposed an explanatory theory for its continued accomplishment.

Chapter 2 advanced global collective identity (CFI) as a benchmark for progress. Politics is a processual and procedural beast, so rather than measuring its progress substantively, I chose to measure it according to the configurations and patterns of interaction that can sustain political order and create the conditions necessary for the more commonly referenced substantive objectives of, for example, social and economic welfare. My argument draws on the more generic benefits of collective identity for some of the most difficult problems in international politics – collective action, distributional conflict, and social stability – in order to highlight the desirability, or progressiveness, of GCI. By engendering identifications between nations and between individuals, self-interests increasingly become informed and shaped by collective ones, which incrementally ameliorates these overarching problems and allows for greater deliberation and consensuality in international politics.

The empirical chapters demonstrated this evolution in international collective identifications over the last two centuries, illustrating the surge and decline – rather than linear – progression of identifications over time. Replacing the dynastic, self-regulating balance of power system of 18th century Europe, the Concert of Europe was a manifestation of collective identifications binding the great powers together in an attempt to collectively manage, order, and stabilize continental politics. Unsuccessful in their collective bid to maintain the status quo, rising national sentiment and great power infighting led to the steady fraying of these identifications toward the end of the 19th
century. However, collective interests and purposes were reborn out of the devastation of World War I, bringing much of the ‘civilized’ world into a covenant for the promotion of international peace and stability. The global depression of the 1930s weakened these bonds and the rise of a few powerful revisionist states dashed the hopes for peace, but the collective identifications during the League of Nations Era were renewed and strengthened following World War II. During this period most often defined by Cold War antagonisms, collective agreement on the basic principles of a new international system – interstate equality and self-determination, among others – was stronger than ever before, resulting in the proliferation of multilateral organizations and decolonization, which made the international system truly inter-national for the first time. The end of the Cold War brought with it a reaffirmation of collective purpose among states, discursively captured in the notion of ‘international community,’ that has brought an unprecedented level of deliberation and cooperation to international politics and implies the potential for a shift from the solidification of international identities between states toward the construction of truly global collective identifications among peoples.

Additionally, the empirical chapters explicated a second evolution of growing procedural liberalism in international politics that strongly correlated with collective identifications. The Concert of Europe represented a proto-procedurally liberal international institution, regularizing peacetime deliberations between the great powers and establishing formal equality in among them. Though the collective bonds among sovereigns weakened over time, the institutional precedents of the Concert carried over into the multilateral conferences at the turn of the 19th century that complimented the
Concert’s norm of equality with one of greater universality of participation. With the failure of ad hoc multilateral conferences to prevent major conflict, the League of Nations fully embraced interstate equality and universality in the participation of all self-governing nations in order to promote a more robust model for international peace and cooperation. Of course it failed in its primary purpose, but as Chapter 4 illustrated, it set a precedent of its own that carried through World War II. When postwar peace negotiations quickly began in 1941 – closer to the outbreak of the war than its end – the League served as direct blueprint for the United Nations. Though the UN would insulate the great powers from complete interstate equality in deliberations with the UN Security Council, its other bodies were more universal in representation than its predecessor, and the scope of political, economic, social, and cultural issues they addressed multilaterally dwarfed the efforts of the League. This is no more apparent than in the post-Cold War era, in which state sovereignty is increasingly challenged by the collective decisions of the international community.

Taken together, the historical narrative revealed a strong correlation between the two trends and drew cautious inferences about their relationship. The patterns of their evolution were certainly different. Surging collective identifications usually resulted from large scale conflict (excepting the end of the Cold War), with identifications gradually weakening as interstate discord mounted over time. Procedural liberalism, on the other hand, evinced a step progression, with the Concert introducing a minimal level of procedural liberalism, followed by steps ‘up’ with multilateral conferences, the League of Nations, and eventually the United Nations. Inferentially, we initially see violent
conflict as a major catalyst for collective identifications, and institutional structures as manifestations of collective purpose. However, by the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, it appears institutions themselves may have begun exerting influences of their own. First, the norms or precedents they set for international deliberation were ‘sticky,’ in that they operated as a ratcheting mechanism preventing backsliding into past, less deliberative methods of negotiation and deliberation. Second, from at least the League forward though only weakly at first, they offered deliberative forums that advanced collective purposes and promoted further liberalization in the future. In this way, it does not appear to be coincidence that the overall strength of identifications and the depth of institutional procedural liberalism increased between eras and has gained greatest strength following the peaceful end of the Cold War.

For the third prong of my theory of progress, Chapter 6 offered an explanatory theory inductively generated from the historical narrative. Bracketing the effects of collective identity on the construction of international institutions, I trained attention on the effects specifically \textit{procedurally liberal} institutions exert on collective identity formation. While international institutions generically have wide ranging effects on interstate deliberation, I theorized that institutions adopting procedural liberalism’s principles of equality and universality exert particular effects that promote collective identifications and greater inclusivity in institutional participation. Specifically, institutional equality structures deliberations in a way that can socialize participants – through both social influence and persuasion – to pursue collective goals and form collective bonds over time. The expectation universality simultaneously exerts pressure
on institutions to allow for the participation of all relevant actors, thus providing discursive leverage (through accusations of hypocrisy) to disenfranchised actors’ attempts to gain recognition. Taken together, procedurally liberal institutions can both promote collective identifications and expand the boundaries of identifications to become more inclusive over time.

The most basic implication of this theory is that the question of progress is of supreme importance to IR and must no longer fall through the cracks. My empirical chapters illustrate that significant, structural changes are not only possible in international politics, but that they have been incrementally occurring for at least two centuries. This raises uncomfortable questions for, particularly, rationalist theories in IR, whose assumptions tend to incorporate self-sustaining logics of anarchy and self-help that make significant, durable change unlikely or impossible. Still other theories can account for change in the international system, but they often neglect the important normative underpinnings that remain implicit. As the study of politics is inherently both empirical and normative and given the continual change that characterizes most periods in history, it is apparent that fresh theorizing on the question of progress is necessary.

While the immediate impression taken from this study may be optimism, it also suggests that policymakers must proceed cautiously and learn from the past. International politics do appear to be getting ‘better’ when viewed over the course of the last two centuries. However, my argument is not a teleologic one. Though the path dependence and precedents that have been established may continue to provide
momentum into the future, history is littered with examples of sudden shifts in systemic evolution. In terms of practical policy, continued progress – short of large scale violent conflict – may depend on the continued proliferation and strengthening of procedurally liberal institutions. By actively embedding states and other actors more deeply in procedurally liberal institutional structures, policymakers can create more opportunities for collective identities to form and reproduce.

Additionally, this analysis provides many avenues for future research. Most obviously I hope it has resuscitated the study of progress in IR. I have offered only one of many ways in which to define and measure progress. Though I am particularly fond of it, I have no doubt there are other, possibly more satisfying and robust, theories yet to be written. More specifically, there are a number of important questions that could not be addressed at length above. Why and how have major conflicts resulted in surges of collective identity formation? How does collective identity affect the likelihood and structure of international institutions? What socialization effects do non-procedurally liberal institutions produce? And there are certainly many others. My project has been an ambitious one and certainly touches on many areas of research, thus I hope if nothing else it provides fertile ground for future research in the field.

The question of progress in international politics is as slippery as it is important for our understanding of the political world. It is a know-it-when-I-see-it type of concept but everyone’s intuitions tend to lead them to different conclusions – both about what constitutes progress as well as the degree to which it has been achieved. This dissertation
has been an attempt to bring progress back into the IR conversation and expose it to more rigorous analysis. There is much to be disappointed with in history and in the everyday workings of international politics, but my research suggests that there has been progress. It has come only incrementally and in fits and starts, but few would trade the established international norms and practices of today for those of a couple of centuries ago, only a century ago, or even 50 years ago. Specifically, international politics exhibit a level of collective identification and community unprecedented in world history, civilizing and institutionalizing international interaction in ways thought impossible in earlier eras. On the other hand, international politics, like all social arenas, are an ongoing accomplishment of practice that must be sustained through everyday interaction and adherence to the norms and principles of the system. Thus, policymakers will continue to play a critical role in the future evolution of the international system and, if my conclusions are correct, IR scholars would do well to advocate sober self-restraint and procedurally liberal practices in international politics – practices that have the power to continue making the seemingly impossible possible.
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