"TREASON MUST BE MADE ODIOUS":
MILITARY OCCUPATION AND WARTIME RECONSTRUCTION
IN NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, 1862-1865

DISSERTATION
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* * * * *

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PREFACE

Historians of the Civil War have gallantly charged up Cemetery Ridge with General George E. Pickett's men too often. They have slugged their way through the Wilderness with Grant until the death and maiming seem a part of their own lives, and they have agonized too many times in the War Department telegraph room with Lincoln and Stanton. In fact, it now seems that everything of importance is known about the tactical and strategic aspects of the military history of the Civil War. Even if another word is never written about the war there are already enough battlefield accounts to satisfy even the most avid student of American military history.

There is also a great amount of scholarly work on the Reconstruction era. Roughly speaking, there are two notable characteristics in almost all Reconstruction literature. First of all, though there may be radical differences in interpretation among authors, most of the studies of Reconstruction concentrate on the postwar years and emphasize political, social, and economic aspects of the period. Relatively recent works by John Hope Franklin, Kenneth M. Stampp, W. R. Brock, Lawanda and John Cox, and
Eric McKitrick all fit this category, as do earlier volumes by historians such as William A. Dunning, Claude Bowers, and George Fort Milton. A number of state oriented studies also concentrate on postwar social, political, and economic events. Secondly, those volumes which do recognize that Reconstruction was as much a part of the Civil War as Chancellorsville and Vicksburg almost invariably focus on the national level, and view the situation primarily from Washington. Charles H. McCarthy and William B. Hesseltine differ on the question of whether or not Lincoln actually had a "plan" of reconstruction, but both wrote from a national perspective. A more recent book dealing with wartime reconstruction, written by Herman Belz, maintains the tradition of observing the reconstruction process through political events in Washington.

In all of this writing covering the years 1861-1877 our knowledge remains deficient about the role of the Union army in both wartime and postwar reconstruction, and, more generally, about reconstruction at the local level. Only a very few articles and full length monographs lend much insight into these aspects of the era. Articles by A. H. Carpenter, Ralph H. Gabriel, Frank Freidel, and Robert J. Futrell give tantalizing overviews of the operation of military government in the South during the war.
but are sparse on actual details of civil-military relations. Along with these relatively few major articles there are also scattered articles in state and local historical publications which deal with wartime occupation and civil-military relations. But these usually fail to view military occupation as a part of the reconstruction process and do not emphasize the ebb and flow of events between Washington and the local level. Two monographs of particular importance do give due recognition to the army's part in wartime reconstruction and do make clear that the confusion and frustrations of wartime reconstruction were portents of what was to come after the war. Willie Lee Rose has written with great detail, perception, and understanding about wartime reconstruction efforts on the Sea Islands of South Carolina, and Gerald M. Capers' study of occupied New Orleans provides valuable insights into the wartime attempt to reconstruct Louisiana.

While scant attention has been given to wartime civil-military relations and the role the army played in wartime reconstruction, it is equally true that the role of the army in postwar reconstruction has been practically ignored. Indeed, although Union troops were stationed throughout the South for varying lengths of time during Reconstruction, no one is still very sure exactly what they were doing there. John Hope Franklin contends that
the army garrisons in the South were so small that they had very little power and influence and that they were relatively inactive during Reconstruction. James E. Sefton has recently taken vigorous exception to Franklin's thesis. Sefton argues that the army, although essentially non-political, was still an important element in the South. His volume, which is an overview of the army's work from 1865 to 1877, emphasizes the army's role as the only enforcer of federal authority in the South. He maintains that "power, influence, and activity are functions of much more than mere numbers." The only element of the army's role in postwar Reconstruction which has received a large amount of attention is the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, known more simply as the Freedmen's Bureau. There is uncertainty, however, about the impact and importance of the Bureau. George R. Bentley concluded that the Bureau "sought too much for the Negro too soon." But William S. McFeely maintains that the Bureau failed the freedmen because it did not push hard enough for the blacks when it had the chance. McFeely says that the Bureau "banked the fires of the freedmen's aspirations" instead of fanning them. An unpublished dissertation by William T. Alderson dealing with military rule and the Freedmen's Bureau in Virginia during
Reconstruction lends strong support to McFeely's position.\textsuperscript{12} But a more recent dissertation by Paul David Phillips which studies the Freedmen's Bureau in Tennessee seems to agree with Bentley.\textsuperscript{13}

The present study was undertaken as a local case history to help bridge the gap—which Rose and Capers have already started to fill—in our knowledge about wartime civil-military relations and reconstruction efforts, and to shed light on the Franklin-Sefton and Bentley-McFeely historiographical disputes. Or, stated another way, the idea was to broaden our knowledge about the non-battlefield activities of the Union army during the war and about the army's role in postwar Reconstruction. This was to be done by examining one location and army garrison in detail and then making some judgment as to how "significant" an impact that particular garrison had on the location it occupied.

The original intention of this study went awry almost at once. Studying the army and its relationship to reconstruction in Nashville during the war became a much more formidable task than originally anticipated. Hence, this study was shortened to include only the war years. The research is completed for continuing the study of the army's role in reconstruction in Middle Tennessee into the postwar years, and the initial project will eventually
be completed. But the wartime study of civil-military relations in Nashville turned out to be an undertaking of sufficient length and, hopefully, significance to warrant full and individual treatment by itself.

Nashville was selected as the focus of this study for several reasons. It was captured by Union forces very early in the war and a comparatively large army garrison remained in the city throughout almost the entire postwar period. Furthermore, Nashville, more so than many other cities in the South, should have been susceptible to reconstruction efforts. It had a diversified economy which linked it as much to the North as to the South. Though slavery was prevalent throughout Middle Tennessee, it was generally not the plantation variety and it was not the dominant institution that it was in areas of the Deep South. Nashville was a city of merchants, artisans, mechanics, and manufacturers surrounded by a rich agricultural area tilled by hundreds of relatively small landowners and slaveholders. If reconstruction failed in Nashville, a city with strong commercial ties to the North and with no evident direct dependence upon slavery, then it could be expected to fail elsewhere. And the reasons for its failure in Nashville might well provide insights into its failure in the South as a whole.
Finally, Nashville was chosen for this case study because of the availability of good source material. Numerous newspapers were published in the city throughout the entire era of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Some of them were in existence only for a year or two, but others ran consecutively for a large number of years. Andrew Johnson was military governor of Tennessee and was in Nashville throughout most of the Civil War. His personal papers were a rich fund of evidence. Also, much Johnson correspondence which is not in his personal papers is liberally sprinkled throughout the *Official Records* and the Lincoln papers. Almost any soldier who fought in the western theater of the war passed through Nashville at one time or another, and many repositories have excellent collections of letters, diaries, and memoirs written by soldiers who were stationed for varying lengths of time in Nashville. The Tennessee State Library and Archives, the Michigan Historical Collections, and the Ohio Historical Society Library all contain numerous such collections. Various types of army records in the National Archives in Washington, though mostly uncatalogued and hard to work with, are voluminous. A perusal of the footnotes and bibliography will readily demonstrate the great number of other relevant sources. In short, the data necessary to give an accurate portrayal of civil society in Nashville,
and the army's impact upon it, was available. It just had to be gathered and interpreted.

In his work on the army's role in postwar Reconstruction, James E. Sefton assumed that wartime reconstruction "was fundamentally different from that of the twelve postwar years." He maintained that the "paramount goal" of speedily concluding military operations against hostile forces overshadowed all political considerations. Only after the conclusion of hostilities, said Sefton, did reconstruction "become the nation's main concern."\(^\text{14}\) The study of wartime reconstruction in Nashville indicates that Sefton's assumption about a sharp break between 1862-65 and 1865-77 is not correct because the military was doing much more than just fighting battles during the war. For example, the Union army in Nashville employed various methods to control a hostile civilian population; it performed many necessary municipal functions within the city after the city government proved virtually helpless; it began to try to provide both short and long term relief for freedmen; and it engaged in politics by supporting a small faction of radical Unionists against all challengers.

Indeed, postwar events in Tennessee cannot be understood without a thorough knowledge of the wartime reconstruction effort and the army's role in it. The whole
political struggle in postwar Tennessee was shaped by wartime events, and the army played an important part in determining those events. Furthermore, there was a basic continuity between the social programs initiated by the army during the war and those continued by the Freedmen's Bureau during Reconstruction. In Tennessee at least, Reconstruction began in 1862, not 1865. Any study which begins in 1865 is automatically lopping off the three years most critical to an accurate understanding of the reconstruction process.

Thus, it is important to see reconstruction as part of the Civil War, not just a postwar phenomenon. The purpose of military occupation in Nashville, New Orleans, and other areas was to restore the Union. The goal of occupation forces, which in Tennessee were symbolized by Andrew Johnson, was to establish loyal state governments which commanded broad local support for loyalty to the federal government. Nashville provided a microcosm of the attempted process of reconstruction and particularly pointed up the difficulties and frustrations encountered by those entrusted with the task. These wartime problems, and the attempted solutions, lend insight into the ultimate failure of postwar Reconstruction.

In several ways, the effort on the part of the Lincoln Administration to re-establish loyal state
governments in the South was similar to the British attempt to restore loyalty in the rebellious colonies during the American Revolution. The analogy is especially close when looking at the difficulties of re-establishing civilian government in the midst of active military operations.

One problem encountered by both the British Ministry and the Lincoln Administration was command and jurisdictional disputes between their military and civilian authorities. Civil administrators, whether British or Unionist, constantly complained that they were being left without adequate military defenses to shore up their civil administrations. They argued, with some merit, that the lack of military force to support their budding governments only served to keep the spirit of rebellion alive amidst the populace. As long as the prospect of redemption remained, disloyal persons were not disposed to return wholeheartedly to their former allegiance. On the other hand, military men retorted, again with some merit, that the disposition of troops and the fighting of the war should be left to them, and that political problems were secondary to winning the war.

Another serious problem was the faulty conception of Loyalism held by the British and of Unionism held by the Lincoln Administration. British authorities constantly
overestimated the extent and strength of Loyalists in North America, especially in the southern colonies. Despite solid evidence to the contrary, the British Ministry continued to believe that Loyalism was a potent force in the colonies and only needed to be protected and organized in order to flourish.¹⁵

The Lincoln Administration was similarly unaware of the fragile, contingent nature of southern Unionism. Lincoln and Johnson, and many others in the North, believed that widespread Unionism in the South had only been temporarily overcome by a conspiracy concocted and carried through by a small minority of secessionists. How, for example, could basic loyalty to the Union be so easily erased in Tennessee? By 1860 Tennessee was certainly in the heartland of America. It was the land of Andrew Jackson, James K. Polk, and John Bell, a state which had strongly supported both the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. The state had strong commercial ties to the North and maintained a strong two party tradition. Indeed, the Whig Party, and in 1860 the Constitutional Union Party, always ran well in the state. No wonder, then, that northerners had misconceptions about the solidarity many Tennesseans felt with the South, and the active support they would give to the doctrine of secession.
Both the British and the Lincoln Administration failed in their wartime efforts to re-establish central control over vast expanses of territory which were in rebellion. When the Revolution ended in 1783 royal authority was completely ousted from the colonies because the British had lost the war. When the Civil War ended in 1865 the South had been defeated militarily, but truly loyal state governments had not been established in any of the seceded states. In Tennessee a civilian state government did come into office in the spring of 1865, but it was not representative of the people of Tennessee. It represented only a small group of East Tennessee Unionists and had very little support from the populace of Middle or West Tennessee. Many of the reasons why the wartime reconstruction of Tennessee ultimately failed can be gleaned from a microscopic examination of the reconstruction process in Nashville.
FOOTNOTES

Introduction


8Franklin, Reconstruction, pp. 119-20.


For a very recent article which discusses some of these problems from the British standpoint, see Patrick J. Furlong, "Civilian-Military Conflict and the Restoration of the Royal Province of Georgia, 1778-1782," *JSH*, XXXVIII (Aug., 1972) pp. 415-42.
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CHAPTER ONE

Prelude

During the summer of 1861, after a bitter struggle within the state between Unionists and disunionists, Tennessee withdrew from the Union and joined the Confederacy. Within a year Federal authority was tentatively re-established over the state's capital, Nashville. When the first Union troops entered the proud city in February, 1862, a touching scene was enacted. Horace N. Fisher, an Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier General William Nelson, who commanded the troops, described the scene:

[A] stout, middle-aged man, with hair well shot with gray, short in stature, broad in shoulder, and with a roll in his gait, came forward and asked, "Who is the General in command? I wish to see him." Gen. [sic] Nelson answered, "I am in command, pray who are you?" And this stout, short man replied, "I am a Union man, thank the Lord; I came from Salem, Mass. [sic], and am mighty glad to see our old flag once more on the State House. My name is Driver; I used to be a sea captain." The General clapped him on the shoulder and said, "I was formerly in the navy, and every good seaman must be a good Union man." Capt. [sic] Driver,—an honest-looking, blunt-speaking man,—was evidently a character; he carried on his arm a calico-covered bedquilt; and, when satisfied that Gen. [sic] Nelson was the officer in command, he pulled out his jack-knife and began to rip open the bedquilt without another word.
We were puzzled to think what his conduct meant. At last the bedquilt was safely delivered of a large American flag, which he handed to Gen. [sic] Nelson, saying, "This is the flag I hope to see hoisted on that staff in place of the d---d Confederate flag set there by that d---d rebel governor, Isham G. Harris. I have had hard work to save it; my house has been searched for it more than once; my wife devised a safe hiding place for it by quilting it into this old calico bedquilt." He spoke triumphantly, with tears in his eyes. Gen. [sic] Nelson accepted the flag with manly emotion and ordered it run up on the State House flag-staff, when all heads were uncovered and the troops presented arms; he swore that that very flag should stay there, night and day, as long as he was in command at Nashville. ¹

THE BEACON LIGHT OF HOPE TWINKLES OUT

Middle Tennessee stretches from the Cumberland Plateau to the Tennessee River. It is a continuation of the fertile Blue Grass region of Kentucky, and is watered by the Cumberland River and its tributaries. Within this middle division of Tennessee a highland rim encircles a basin of rich lowlands in the center of the state. Davidson County, except for its extreme west portion, is located entirely within this basin. Situated in the heart of Davidson County is Nashville. ²

By 1860 Nashville was rapidly leaving its frontier heritage behind and evolving into a distinct urban community. There could be little doubt that the city was on the threshold of becoming a significant cosmopolitan area. Already
the heroic exploits of the city's founders who braved the wilderness to plant a tiny settlement on the banks of the Cumberland were becoming folklore and legend. On the eve of the Civil War the city sprawled out over an area of six square miles. The town and its suburbs contained some 37,000 inhabitants, including large German and Irish elements and a growing Jewish population.3

Evidence of progress met the eye in every direction. In 1858 one of the town's leading citizens noted that "Nashville is improving more at present than I ever knew it before, notwithstanding the complaints about hard times and the stringency of the money market." "So vast have the changes been which have transpired in ten years," reported the 1860-61 city directory, "that those who were familiar with the city then, and have not seen it since, can scarcely recognize that it is the same place."4 There was more truth than exaggeration in these statements.

Overlooking the whole community was the recently completed State Capitol which was built from stratified limestone with a bluish-gray tint and cloud-like markings. Visitors and Nashvillians alike were equally impressed with this magnificent edifice. Another source of pride to the city was a wire suspension bridge over the Cumberland. This imposing structure was 700 feet long and 110 feet above the low water mark.5 The streets of the town were illuminated
at night by gas lamps; during the hot summer months street sprinklers kept down the dust; and though the streets themselves were not paved, brick sidewalks facilitated pedestrian movement. The fire department was no longer a volunteer force, but a paid Steam Fire Department. The city itself was administered by a sophisticated governmental system including a mayor, board of aldermen, and board of councilmen. Of course, not all aspects of municipal administration had progressed evenly toward modernization. Policemen were still non-uniformed. There was no city public health agency. Municipal employees received no formal training for their positions. But the basic thrust of life in Nashville was toward newness and improvement.

Few cities in the West or South in the late antebellum years compared with the Rock City as an intellectual and educational center. At the pinnacle of the educational pyramid were the University of Nashville, famed especially for its medical department, and the Nashville Female Academy. Below these two esteemed establishments were a large number of exclusive private schools. The foundation for the whole educational system was a rapidly developing free public school system. Five daily papers, eight religious publications, a medical journal, and a temperance magazine were published in Nashville in 1860.
During the decade of the 1850s Nashville became an important transportation and communications center. Broad turnpikes and newly constructed railroad lines radiated from the city in every direction. Steamboats regularly plied the Cumberland. And a growing network of telegraphic lines linked the city to Louisville, St. Louis, and New Orleans.\textsuperscript{10}

Because of these transportation and communications advantages, Nashville was the most important agricultural and commercial center in the state. The trade of the city was so vast and important that it was a port of entry, and a regular collector of the port was stationed there. By 1861 over $2,000,000 worth of dry goods was sold annually at Nashville. The wholesale grocery trade had expanded fourfold in a decade. When the Civil War began Nashville was probably the cheapest grocery market in all the Southwest. Indeed, the number and variety of business houses in the city made a most impressive list.\textsuperscript{11}

As for agriculture, Middle Tennessee was a fertile region where cotton, wheat, oats, potatoes, tobacco, corn, and livestock flourished. The livestock in Davidson County in 1860 consisted of 8,939 asses, mules, and horses, 15,940 sheep, 36,940 swine, and 12,708 cattle. In the same year 1,114,901 bushels of corn were raised in the County. Equally impressive figures could be enumerated for other products.
Much of this agricultural produce was funneled through Nashville.¹²

I

Yet in the face of all this improvement, prosperity, and growth, Nashville in the winter of 1860-61 was not a happy city. Like so many other communities, North and South, its social fabric was being shredded by agitation over the momentous political questions of the day. As early as 1856 talk of disunion and civil war in Nashville had been able to dampen the enthusiasm of a Fourth of July celebration.¹³ But it was only during and after Lincoln’s election that the bitter struggle between Unionists and secessionists began in earnest.

The contest between these two factions took place in a series of elections. The first of these was the Presidential election of 1860 itself. In Tennessee this election was fought out along traditional party lines because, as far as Tennessee was concerned, there were only two candidates. One was John Bell, who represented conservative Whig-Unionist sentiment. The other was John C. Breckinridge, who represented Democratic-secessionist sentiment.¹⁴ The result of this election was a Union victory as John Bell
swept the state. In Davidson County, which had been consistently Whiggish since 1847, Bell's majority was 1000 votes.¹⁵

The victory, however, was not total and irreversible. Secession was far from dead in Tennessee. Both sides engaged in a continual war of agitation and denunciation, keeping the city in a constant state of tension. Public meetings called to consider the issues degenerated into so much confusion that no business could be properly conducted at them.¹⁶

By late December, 1861, John S. Brien, a prominent Nashville conservative Unionist, was deploring "the increasing disposition upon the part of the conservative masses of the people, in this state, to embrace the idea of immediate secession by the entire South." "I sincerely fear," he wrote, "that the preservation of the Union is now beyond the reach of all the conservative element of the country."¹⁷

The Democrats who controlled the state government were quick to pick another battle. When the legislature met in January, 1861, it issued a call for an election on February 9, in which the voters of the state could decide whether or not Tennessee would have a sovereign convention to consider secession. At the same time the people were to select delegates to this convention in case it was approved by the voters. It was clear to all that this was to be a vote on Union or Disunion; but, in another sense, it was simply another party fight between the Bell Unionists
and the Breckinridge Democrats. In this election, though, the Whigs were joined by a number of prominent East Tennessee Democrats.18

In Nashville both sides quickly organized by selecting a slate of delegates. Those standing for the Union were Andrew Ewing, Neill S. Brown, and Russell Houston; those upholding the standard of disunion were H. S. Foote, J. J. McCann, and John C. Burch.19 Once chosen, these men engaged in a series of public debates to inform the citizens of the issues at stake.20

The February election was another disappointment for Tennessee secessionists. The convention was soundly defeated, while at the same time a large majority of the Union delegates were elected. East Tennessee went against the convention by a majority of 25,000; Middle Tennessee by a majority of about 1000; but West Tennessee voted for the convention by a majority of 13,000. In Nashville the majority against the convention was only 246, but Union delegates to the convention were selected by majorities of well over 2,000. Thus, many Nashville citizens of all political persuasions did believe it might be a wise idea to hold a convention to consider the situation. But if such a convention was held, they wanted it to be thoroughly dominated by men committed to the Union.21 After the election in Nashville it was easy to "tell the disunionists some distance by the extraordinary length of their faces."22 As Neill S. Brown,
ex-Whig Governor of Tennessee wrote, "The mad waves of secession found an iron embankment around this Commonwealth which defied all their fury." 23

II

During the contest up to this point, Andrew Johnson, Democratic Senator from East Tennessee, was the predominant personality. As the crisis developed, Johnson took a firm stand against secession in several widely circulated speeches. These vehement pro-Union orations had a great impact on Tennessee and the Nashville community. On the one hand, Breckinridge Democrats detested him. Just a few days after he made his first blistering address to the Senate, Johnson was burned in effigy in the streets of Nashville directly in front of the Planters Bank. One Johnson supporter went to the spot the next day and picked up a few charred remains and forwarded the momentos to Johnson. 24

On the other hand, Unionists in Tennessee looked on Johnson as a great hero. After their victory in February they engulfed him with lavish praise. Among those sending their congratulations and thanks to Johnson were many Nashville Unionists who played important roles during the Federal occupation of the city. H. G. Scovel, a prominent real estate dealer who served in the municipal government
during the war, termed Johnson's speeches "the great efforts of the age" and thanked Almighty God for having raised Johnson to such an important position where he could do so much for the Union and Constitution.\textsuperscript{25} Horace H. Harrison praised Johnson's "boldness" and "manly devotion" to the Union. Harrison was born in Lebanon, Tennessee, and began practicing law in Nashville in 1857. He was also a forwarding and commission merchant. In 1863 the military governor of Tennessee appointed him U.S. District Attorney for Middle Tennessee. In 1867 he became a state supreme court judge, and then he served as a Republican representative in the Forty-third Congress. One of his contemporaries said Harrison "was a most elegant gentleman, not especially distinguished for ability as a lawyer, but a good lawyer nevertheless."\textsuperscript{26}

John Trimble and William Shane also praised Johnson. Trimble, a pre-war Whig, was elected attorney-general for the Nashville District in 1836. Before the war he served in both branches of the state legislature. He was a state senator when Tennessee's ordinance of secession passed, but he personally voted against it. He held the post of U.S. District Attorney by appointment from the military governor from 1862 to 1863. In 1865 he was elected as a Republican to the state senate, where he voted for both the Thirteenth and Fourteenths Amendments. In 1867 he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives where he voted for the
Fifteenth Amendment. Trimble released his own slaves during the war even before Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. Shane served on the Nashville Board of Aldermen throughout the entire secession crisis and became city recorder during the Federal occupation of the city.

Many men who previously had been rabidly opposed to Johnson on political grounds now became his admirers. "You have taught men to love you and call you blessed," wrote one of Johnson's closest Nashville confidants, "who have passed their lives in political hostility and opposition to you." One such convert was John Hugh Smith, ex-mayor of Nashville, who was to take the post again during the war. Another was H. S. French, a wealthy Rock City merchant. Still a third was Alexander B. Shankland, who had once been introduced to Johnson but had hated him so much at the time that he made no effort at conversation. Shankland, an old line Whig, was a real estate broker who became city revenue collector upon the Federal occupation of the city.

Johnson was important during the crisis not only because of his strong stand against secession, but also because he was the patronage broker for Tennessee in the Lincoln administration. Tennessee Unionists had won major victories over the secessionists in November, 1860, and February, 1861. Since the Bell men constituted the Union party per se in Tennessee, they had valid expectations of
having patronage liberally bestowed upon them rather than the Democrats. In fact, in order to survive and flourish, the political organization that had developed around John Bell needed patronage. Considering Johnson's pro-Union stand, Tennessee Unionists could be very hopeful about the patronage.

Thus, throughout February and March, Unionists seemed in firm control in Middle Tennessee. They had whipped their bitter enemies in two head-on collisions, and it now looked as though they were going to share in the spoils of victory. On the national level the situation also seemed favorable. Secession had been quarantined to seven states of the lower South. A tier of border slave states—including Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, Missouri, and Tennessee—had all rejected secession and remained in the Union. It seemed altogether possible that these states might serve as a bridge over which the seceded states would return to the Union. Enthusiastic Union men in Nashville began to wear little badges on their coat collars consisting of a small silver shield decorated with thirteen stars and the word "Union," and backed by strips of red, white, and blue ribbon. But almost at once the situation deteriorated for them. There were several reasons for this.

First of all, secessionist Democrats still did not admit final defeat. Shortly after the February election, a
Nashville Unionist wrote Johnson that "The machinations and efforts of the disaffected among us are by no means terminated; of this we are confident. And they have the boldness to proclaim openly that Tennessee will of choice—or of necessity—join in the Southern Confederacy." About the same time the strongly secessionist Union and American proclaimed that "we have undiminished confidence that the intelligence and patriotism of the people of Tennessee will cause them to link their destiny with the Southern Confederacy. Future developments will clearly indicate that Tennessee must go with the South." In short, "the Precipitators" were going to continue doing all they could to keep public passions inflamed.33

Secondly, by early April it was clear to Unionists that Johnson was "misusing" the patronage. Instead of dispensing it to deserving Bell men, he was attempting to build a personal following which he hoped would sustain and perhaps elevate his own political ambitions.34 Nashville provides a case study for Johnson's niggardliness. There were three important positions to be filled: Attorney General for the Middle Division of Tennessee; U.S. Marshal for the Middle Division of Tennessee; and Postmaster at Nashville. Each of these positions was hotly contested between Unionists and Democrats. The first position went to Herman Cox,
Union man."

The second position went to E. R. Glasscock, who was also a staunch Union supporter.

But the third, which was the most important of the three, went to W. D. McNish. The Postmastership was especially important because it controlled appointments to a great many lesser post office jobs throughout Middle Tennessee. McNish had been a clerk in the Post Office for sixteen years and was the only Democrat applying for the job. The fact that the "Post Office Clique" was composed of some of the city's most rabid secessionists, including McNish, made this appointment particularly distasteful to Unionists. John Lellyett, a disappointed Unionist who had had very strong backing for the job, termed the appointment "offensive" and hoped that Lincoln could be persuaded to overrule Johnson on the matter. Another Unionist "was surprised to learn that McNish had received the appointment" because he "did not expect to have a disunionist again forced upon us . . . . Any other appointment would have been more satisfactory. This and such appointments will completely disarm the Union men of Tennessee." 

This is exactly what happened. The loss of complete control of Federal patronage eroded the morale of the Unionist organization in Tennessee. Tennessee loyalists had been denied one of their main incentives for continuing their struggle to save the Union. By the time of the attack on
Fort Sumter, many of them were ready to abandon the Union if they were given a plausible pretext. Lincoln's call for troops provided the excuse. Opposition to "coercion" was used by unhappy Unionists to defend their action and give it at least the appearance of consistency. 39

This suggests a third reason for the eventual collapse of Tennessee Unionism: the nebulous and tenuous character of that Unionism. The mere fact that it could be bought by political patronage tells something of its nature. But the explanation goes much deeper than that. Unionism in the South was not the same type of Unionism found in the North. While northern Unionism was unconditionally opposed to secession, the same thing could not be said for its southern counterpart. 40 Many Nashville Unionists made this abundantly clear. Most of them were for the Union only as long as it could be maintained honorably. It could be so maintained only if the North respected "southern rights," made some concessions to southern demands, and abstained from violence and coercion. John S. Brien, though an avowed Unionist, insisted "that the rights of the South have been violated by the North . . . and that these wrongs ought to be redressed." If they were not, "then the South would be justified, before the world and in the conscience of its people--in availing itself of the only remedy left, for the violated rights and oppression of minorities--revolution." Neill S. Brown warned
Johnson that if violence took place a large number of Union men "would be carried off in a storm." He urged that a "final and fair settlement of the whole question" was absolutely necessary to save Tennessee. The Crittenden proposals, he suggested, would be satisfactory to Tennessee. In essence, these proposals, introduced in the Senate by John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, would have extended the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean and guaranteed federal protection to slavery south of that line. A. W. Putman, one of Johnson's Nashville correspondents, would allow the seceded states to go in peace. "I hope," he wrote, "the incoming Administration may be enabled to avoid collision—"for I should fear a revulsion in the present good Union Sentiment of Tennessee."\[^{41}\]

Continued agitation by secessionists, the loss of lucrative patronage by Unionists, and the conditional quality of Tennessee Unionism all conspired to weaken loyalists in the next secessionist crisis in Tennessee. This crisis came when Fort Sumter was fired upon and Lincoln called upon the states for troops. The pro-Unionist Republican Banner reported that the news of the bombardment of Fort Sumter was "received regretfully by the conservative Union men of the community, while the announcement was greeted by leading Disunionists with exultation."\[^{42}\]
III

Although deploring the Sumter incident and Lincoln's call for troops, at first a few Nashville Unionists grimly tried to hold the line. Some took firm and decided ground for peace, advocated a policy of neutrality, and counseled moderation. On April 16 the Banner urged that the border states stand firm "as long as there is a plank of the old ship of State between us and the angry waves of destruction, and until the last beacon light twinkles out in the distance." It cautioned against unnecessary excitement.

But excitement there was. And it overwhelmed Unionism. The last beacon light of hope was quickly being extinguished. On the 17th the Banner sadly reported that "Excitement and passion is [sic] making rapid inroads into our ranks." On the same day a young Nashville businessman, Henry Clay Yeatman, reported to his wife that "Nashville has been in a high state of excitement for three days past culminating yesterday in a revolutionary flood that has overwhelmed all those feeble lovers of the Union who act from impulse rather than judgement." Yeatman, who worked in the commercial-banking establishment of Woods, Yeatman, and Company, considered himself "a Union man but not a submissionist." He was determined not to "be carried away by sensational dispatches," but he was resolved to "resist
in whatever way most effectual northern aggression when it shall be made plain to me that Lincoln intends to invade southern soil."46

The combination of an increased determination on the part of the North and near hysteria in Nashville soon convinced almost all Unionists of the city that the Union was a lost cause, and that Tennessee's only course was to go with the Confederacy. On April 23 even John Bell, who for so long had stood for sectional harmony, the Union, and the Constitution, capitulated. He was sad, disillusioned, and embittered by recent events. In a speech at the courthouse he "took bold and unequivocal grounds in favor of a united South to resist the invasion not only of Tennessee, but of every Southern state . . . ."47 The next day the Banner fell into line, declaring that the "time for discussion has indeed passed. All are united and enthusiastic in a deep and firm resolve to go forward."48

The staunchly pro-southern Democratic Governor of Tennessee, Isham G. Harris, was quick to take advantage of the new situation. He issued a call for an extra session of the legislature to convene in Nashville on April 25. This body quickly took two very important actions. First, it adopted resolutions authorizing the Governor to enter into a military league with the Confederate States. Secondly, on May 6 the General Assembly passed an ordinance of
secession and submitted it to the people for ratification. The vote on the secession ordinance was held on June 8. The result showed how dramatic the reversal in sentiment in Tennessee was following the events of mid-April. Middle Tennessee's 1000 vote majority for the Union in February became a 50,000 majority for separation in June. West Tennessee's 13,000 vote majority for a convention ballooned to a 23,000 vote majority for disunion. Only East Tennessee held true. There the exertions of Unionists such as Johnson, T. A. R. Nelson, Horace Maynard, and C. P. Temple managed to deliver an 18,000 vote majority against secession. In Davidson County, where Nashville is located, there was better than a 5,000 vote majority in favor of separation from the Union. Only 402 citizens of the county voted against separation. As if to give special emphasis to the state's action, Nashville's City Council began an earnest, but unsuccessful, campaign to have Nashville made the capital of the Confederacy. 49

In effect, the June elections erased party lines in Middle and West Tennessee as both Whigs and Democrats had counselled withdrawal from the Union and accepted the fact of disunion. A sectional conflict pitting East Tennessee against the other two grand divisions of the state now replaced the traditional party rivalry. 50
As soon as the election results were known, Governor Harris issued a proclamation announcing that Tennessee had withdrawn from the Union. Shortly afterward Jefferson Davis officially declared that Tennessee had joined the Confederacy.

IV

In some respects Tennessee left the Union before it officially did so. The defense of sacred southern soil simply could not wait for formal resolutions and actions. There was much military preparation on the state level preceding the June vote on secession. Governor Harris established a military league with the Confederacy in early May. The Governor also busied himself raising and equipping the Provisional Army of Tennessee, which became the nucleus of the Army of Tennessee. And the legislature levied a special war tax at the rate of $8.00 per $10,000 worth of property.

Meanwhile, Nashville was agog with drumming, fifing, confusion, and swirling dust stirred up by the tramp of men learning how to march. As one woman recalled, following the fall of Fort Sumter, "every one commenced planning and trying to do something to aid the South." A group of women devoted their energies to making flags. Volunteer militia companies organized and began drilling in the streets.
City Council appropriated $100,000 to arm and protect the city. Machine shops, foundries, and ordnance works sprang up in the city and began to turn out tons of material and equipment. Military supplies poured in from throughout the state and the Confederacy. Soon Nashville became "the great storehouse and arsenal of the western Confederacy." General Ulysses S. Grant, for example, considered it to be "one of the best provisioned posts in the South." \(^{57}\)

As martial ardor increased, the plight of those few Nashville citizens who remained loyal became proportionally worse. Secessionists in the city, quite logically, did not want citizens of doubtful loyalty in their midst. Intense pressure was put on Unionists to conform—or to face the consequences.

By late April self constituted committees or individuals on their own responsibility were notifying some northern-born citizens to leave the city. Mayor Richard B. Cheatham officially deplored such vigilante actions, and urged that all complaints and suspicions against such people be lodged with him for investigation and appropriate action. A Committee of Vigilance and Safety was organized to work with the police and the mayor in ferreting out disloyalty to the Confederacy. \(^{58}\)

The newspapers in Nashville denied that Unionists were being persecuted, and claimed that they had the utmost freedom
of speech and action. The press deplored "the cock-and-bull stories of a 'Reign of Terror'" in Nashville. These denials simply were not true. By late April, Unionists were indeed living in a state of fear. An East Tennessee state representative reported from Nashville that a great many persons were afraid to express their opinions, and that "threats are driving a good many into secession." "My opinion is," he said, "that we are on the broad road to Hell." At the same time Andrew Johnson's son, Robert, wrote to his father from Nashville that the "Union members held a meeting at my room last night, they are few, but determined to stand to the last." He said he found "a pretty strong Union feeling existing here but it is silenced by the mob and dare not express their sentiments." Union men were "all alarmed and afraid to say anything on the street." The secession election in June was a "mere mockery." A full and free canvas was not allowed, and Union men would not or could not vote.

By late summer the position of Unionists was virtually untenable. In early August the Confederate Congress passed an Act of Banishment. By the terms of this act every male citizen over fourteen years of age residing within the limits of the Confederacy, but adhering to the United States government, had to depart within forty days. Any who remained would be treated as alien enemies, subject to arrest, confinement,
and deportation. Two weeks later the Congress passed a
Sequestration Act which outlined the policy for confiscating
the property of alien enemies.\textsuperscript{63} Nashville authorities soon
evinced a determination to enforce these acts. H. G. Scovel,
a prominent real estate agent and Unionist, was hauled
before the Confederate Court as an alien enemy. The Court
decided that he was not an alien enemy, but it did require
a bond of $10,000 with two good securities for his future
good conduct.\textsuperscript{64}

Nashville Unionists faced persecution not only from
their own neighbors and the Confederate Congress, but also
from the Confederate military stationed at Nashville. On
August 22 the commander at Nashville issued an order for-
bidding any one to leave Nashville, or any place in the
adjoining counties, for the purpose of going out of the
Confederate States without a passport. Passports could be
obtained only from a special committee dominated by seces-
sionists. This committee demanded proof from Confederate,
state, or local authorities that the person applying for the
passport was "worthy of respect," however that might be
interpreted.\textsuperscript{65}

Hounded, closely watched, and persecuted, it is small
wonder that many Unionists gave up the fight. On the one
hand, many went with the Confederacy. As one Unionist
recalled, it was "not strange that many men loyal in heart
when placed in circumstance of peculiar danger and temptation where the Federal Government could not protect them yielded and gave aid and comfort to the rebellion." "Perhaps very few native Tennesseans who were not in the Federal army," he continued, "did not succumb to the pressure of the rebellion and float in treason for a longer or shorter period." On the other hand, dozens fled to safety north of the Ohio River. By the fall and winter of 1861, Nashville Unionists were scattered all over the North, and a few were even in Canada. When these people fled Middle Tennessee, they usually left all their property behind and arrived penniless and jobless in the North. Almost all of them were sustained during the ensuing hardships by their love for the Union, and by the belief that someday they would return home. Probably few of them imagined that their forced exile would be less than six months.

Some few Unionists, of course, did stay in Nashville despite the harrassment. Looking back on the period of Confederate rule of the city, John Carper recalled--no doubt with some exaggeration--that "notwithstanding threats made in the papers to murder his wife and butcher his children," he told the secessionists "they might cut him up in pieces so small that a mouse could carry off the biggest piece of him... but he would talk for the Union." The conversion of Nashville had taken place with amazing speed. In late March it was a pro-Union city,
but certainly by June it had been transformed into a Confederate city. The explanation for this sudden transformation lies in the conditional nature of southern Unionism. Most Nashville Unionists would not organize to fight. They were not committed to coercion to save the Union. Secessionists, however, were willing to organize for battle, and were ready to use force, if necessary, to take Tennessee out of the Union. A secessionist editor undoubtedly spoke for many leading disunionists in Nashville when he said, in early April, that he was ready to pledge himself to the Confederacy and "raise the standard of rebellion against Lincoln's Government here in Nashville." As early as February the Rock City Guards, a secessionist-dominated volunteer militia company, were initiating many new members. When the Fort Sumter crisis came, the Guards quickly adopted a resolution "to oppose to the last extremity" northern aggressions against "the rights of the South, whether made upon Tennessee soil or elsewhere." After mid-April other pro-southern militia companies rapidly organized in Nashville for "home protection." All took to the streets with a bold display of Confederate colors and all adopted extremely martial resolutions. 70

During all of this vigorous secessionist military activity, Unionists in Nashville remained lethargic. Before Sumter there was little reason for Unionists to organize
militarily since they appeared to be in complete command of the situation. After Sumter they were unwilling to organize for a cause in which they no longer had complete faith. Even had some Unionists wanted to organize pro-Union forces, it is doubtful that the pro-Confederate Rock City Guards--already well drilled and armed--would have permitted them to do so. After April 15 energetic men in Nashville who strongly believed in their cause easily overcame less energetic men whose belief in the Union wavered. As one Unionist recalled, "all men cowered before the vagabond bullies of treason."71

V

Despite Nashville's great military and political significance, it was very poorly defended. Believing that Kentucky's neutrality would protect the state from the north, Governor Harris practically ignored Middle Tennessee. He focused defensive efforts on the Mississippi River and neglected the inland rivers and Nashville. When Albert Sidney Johnston took command in the West, he established the center of his line at Bowling Green, Kentucky, some seventy miles north of Nashville. Inexplicably, the forts on the inland rivers at his rear remained in poor condition. Yet their importance should have been obvious even to the most untrained observer. In early November the editor of the
Republican Banner printed a long editorial calling attention to the condition of Forts Henry and Donelson. The editor realized that they were vital to the defense of Middle Tennessee. Such amateur ventures into strategy making, however, only subjected the editor to sarcastic remarks about his being named to supercede General Johnston in command.  

General Ulysses S. Grant considered Fort Donelson "the gate to Nashville." Thus, when the inland forts surrendered to Union forces, Johnston was forced to retreat to Nashville. Johnston was under the impression that a defensive line was being constructed between Nashville and Clarksville. He hoped to make a stand along this line. Only when he arrived in the Rock City did he realize that there were no defenses there. Much of the blame for this failure to provide defensive works must rest with an apathetic Nashville citizenry. Leading citizens refused to lend their slaves for work on planned fortifications. They were so busy getting rich on military contracts that they had little time to worry about the lack of fortifications.

After the fall of Fort Donelson rumor spread in Nashville that "the army would make a stand, and every one who could shoulder a musket must help defend Nashville to the last ditch." But when the Army of Tennessee reached the city in mid-February it was apparent that it was in rapid
retreat. Neither soldiers in the ranks nor Nashville citizens were happy with the decision to give up Nashville. But the army retreated anyway. And in their anger and bitterness at giving up the city without a fight, soldiers "committed all excesses possible." Confederate troops and wagons laid waste to gardens, broke down fences, and ruined beautiful homes.

In the meantime, panic had seized Nashville's populace. Governor Harris helped foster the panic when he rode on horseback through the main streets calling out the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson. "During all Sunday [February 16] from about 10 a.m. when the news of the fall of Fort Donelson reached here, the wildest excitement prevailed in the city." The next day equalled the 16th as a "day of panic and terrified confusion." Many Southern sympathizers, including the governor and legislature, fled the city at once by any means possible. Behind them they left an orgy of looting and plundering. John B. Lindsley, an eminent Nashville scholar and chancellor of the University of Nashville, witnessed the "irregular and disgraceful as well as demoralizing pillage and scramble" for goods. A great crowd gathered at the Confederate Commissary and began to carry off ham and bacon which was badly needed by the fleeing Confederate army. Finally, the looting became so bad that Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalrymen were called
on to disperse the crowd. During the turmoil the "Union men alone seemed to have their wits about them." One Unionist regretted the disgraceful exhibitions by soldiers and civilians alike; "but Still," he said, "they are Somewhat refreshing to a poor Subjugated downtrodden lover of the Union."  

Advance patrols of the Federal army arrived in the suburbs of Nashville on Sunday, February 23. On Monday, Mayor Cheatham and a small delegation of prominent citizens surrendered the city to General Don Carlos Buell. Federal troops formally occupied the town during the next few days.

As first troops arrived on the gunboats, a soldier described the situation:

the bluff above the landing was black with people, but not a sound was heard from those thousands watching with awe the steadily approaching army . . . , the townsfolk were dumb with apprehension; hospital flags everywhere; not a Confederate nor an American flag in sight . . . . We meant business, and were prepared to act on the instant, and the people knew it.

J. B. Lindsley, who was one of those watching the arrival of the Federal fleet, described it as "a noble but distressing sight."

One of the first citizens to greet the arriving Federals was the diehard Unionist, William Driver, who had moved to Nashville after retiring from the sea. Back
in 1831, on sailing for the South Pacific, he had been presented a large American flag. When hoisting the flag he christened it "Old Glory," a term which has symbolized the United States flag ever since. Now, more than thirty years later, Driver extracted that same American flag from his bedquilt where he had carefully preserved it during the Confederate rule of Nashville. With tears in his eyes he gave the flag to the Union officer in command, who then raised it over the city.  

Thus did Nashville become the first Confederate state capital in which Federal authority was re-established.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter One


5Ibid., pp. 32-38, 56.


7Republican Banner (Nashville), Oct. 2, 1861.

8Frank, Five Families and Eight Young Men, p. 84.

31.


Gower and Allen, Pen and Sword, p. 373.


Mary Emily Robertson Campbell, The Attitudes of Tennesseans Toward the Union, 1847-1861 (New York: Vantage Press, 1961) pp. 131, 256, and appendix C.

Republican Banner, Jan. 8, 1861.


Republican Banner, Jan 27 and 28, Feb. 5, 1861.

Ibid., Feb. 7, 1861.


Neill S. Brown to AJ, Feb. 17, 1861, AJP.


H. G. Scovel to AJ, Feb. 12, 1861, AJP.


32 Republican Banner, Feb. 27, 1861.


35 A. W. Putnam to AJ, March 20, 1861, AJP.

36 J. B. Clements to AJ, March 1, 1861, AJP.


38 W. R. Hurley to AJ, March 25, 1861, AJP.


40 Both Potter, Lincoln and His Party, and Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-61 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950) show how northerners overestimated the extent and misunderstood the character of southern Unionism.


42 Republican Banner, April 14, 1861.

43 Ibid., April 18 and 19, 1861; Horn, "Nashville During the War," p. 4.

44 Republican Banner, April 16, 1861.

45 Ibid., April 17, 1861.
Henry Clay Yeatman to his wife, April 17, 1861, Yeatman-Polk Collection, TSLA.

Republican Banner, April 24, 1861. Bell's actions and feelings during the secession crisis are fully described in Joseph Howard Parks, John Bell of Tennessee (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950).

Republican Banner, April 24, 1861.

Ibid., June 27 and 28, 1861; Campbell, Attitudes of Tennesseans, p. 205.


McCarthy, Lincoln's Plan, p. 8; General Marcus J. Wright, Tennessee in the War, 1861-1865 . . . (New York: Ambrose Lee Publishing Company [1908]) pp. 9-10.


Mrs. Irby Morgan, How It Was: Four Years Among the Rebels (Nashville: Publishing House Methodist Episcopal Church South, 1892) p. 9.

Horn, "Nashville During the War," p. 5.

For examples, read the Republican Banner for April, 1861.

Republican Banner, April 24 and 25, 1861.


Republican Banner, April 25 and 27, 1861; [Wooldridge], History of Nashville, pp. 191-92.

Republican Banner, June 2, 4, and 9, 1861.
60. John Williams to Thomas A. R. Nelson, April 27, 1861, Nelson Papers.

61. Robert Johnson to AJ, April 29, 1861, AJP.


64. Republican Banner, Nov. 5, 1861; Nashville Daily Union, April 24, 1862.

65. Republican Banner, Aug. 23 and Sept. 11, 1861.

66. William M. Connelly to Thaddeus Stevens, Feb. 9, 1868, Thaddeus Stevens Papers, Division of Manuscripts, LC.

67. Some indication of the Nashvillians who fled the city can be gained by reading the AJP from Dec., 1861, to March, 1862. Many of the exiles appealed to Johnson to find jobs for them.


69. Richmond, Virginia, went through a similarly complete and rapid transformation. See Thomas, Confederate State of Richmond.


72 Connelly, *Army of the Heartland*, pp. 25-45; Republican Banner, Nov. 2 and Dec. 11, 1861.


78 Lindsley Diary, Feb. 16, 17, and 18, 1862; Connelly, *Army of the Heartland*, p. 136; Horn, "Nashville During the War," p. 10.

79 Lindsley Diary, Feb. 16, 1862; Rees W. Porter to AJ, March 1, 1862, AJP.


CHAPTER TWO

Prelude

As the secession crisis developed in the winter of 1860, southern Senators almost unanimously endorsed the doctrine of secession. Then, on December 18 and 19, 1860, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee rose in the Senate to speak on the main issues of the day. It was one of the memorable speeches of that session of Congress. Its greatness lay not in its eloquence or manner of delivery, but in the position it set forth. No other Senator from a southern state had the courage to make such a statement.

Since we are now, said Johnson, involved in revolution (for there is a revolution, in fact, upon the country,) I think it behooves every man, and especially every one occupying a public place, to indicate, in some manner, his opinions and sentiments in reference to the questions that agitate and distract the public mind. I shall be frank on this occasion in giving my views and taking my position, as I have always been upon questions that involve the public interest. I believe it is the imperative duty of Congress to make some effort to save the country from impending dissolution; and he that is unwilling to make an effort to preserve the Union, or, in other words, to preserve the Constitution, and the Union as an incident resulting from the preservation of the Constitution, is unworthy of public confidence, and the respect and gratitude of the American people . . . . I am opposed to
secession. I believe it is no remedy for the evils complained of. . . . I am not willing to walk out of a Union growing out of the Constitution that was formed by the patriots and the soldiers of the Revolution. So far as I am concerned, and I believe I speak with some degree of confidence for the people of my State, we intend to fight . . . , inside and not outside the Union; and if anybody must go out of the Union, it must be those who violate it. We do not intend to go out. It is our Constitution; it is our Union, growing out of the Constitution; and we do not intend to be driven from it or out of the Union.1

ANDREW JOHNSON RETURNS TO TENNESSEE

The Federal occupation of Nashville lasted throughout the war. With the conquest of the city in February, 1862, the process of reconstructing the city and the state began. The central theme in the history of Nashville from 1862 to 1865 was the effort on the part of Federal authorities to re-kindle the loyalty snuffed out in 1861.

The capture of the northern half of Middle Tennessee in the spring of 1862 made reconstruction a practical issue on the national level. President Lincoln wanted to reorganize loyal state governments quickly. If some of the seceded states could be brought back promptly into the Union, the rebellion would be severely weakened. Radical
change could also be avoided. Lincoln clearly emphasized this second point. In his Annual Message to Congress in December, 1861, he stated that in "considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle." Four months later Lincoln noted that as long as resistance continued, so would the war. And, he said, "it is impossible to foresee all the incidents, which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency towards ending the struggle, must and will come."²

Another reason that Lincoln wanted to move quickly in re-organizing state governments in the seceded states was that he firmly believed reconstruction was an executive responsibility. By acting decisively, Lincoln hoped to forestall Congressional interference in the reconstruction process. There was no constitutional reason why reconstruction should be an executive affair. Congress' claim to control the process was certainly as valid as the President's. By February, 1862, some Republican Congressmen were suggesting that Congress, not the executive, should be in charge of re-establishing civil governments in conquered Confederate states. Prompt action by Lincoln
could weaken the Confederacy, prevent radical change, and keep the reconstruction procedure under his own guidance.

Thus, when the capture of Nashville presented Lincoln with an opportunity to initiate the process of reconstruction under his personal direction, he was quick to respond to the challenge. Less than two weeks after the troops of General Don Carlos Buell occupied Nashville, Lincoln appointed Andrew Johnson as Military Governor of Tennessee.²

Buell, and his successor, General William Starke Rosecrans played extremely important roles in the early history of Federal control of Nashville. Buell, an Ohioan, was a graduate of West Point and a veteran of the Mexican War. At the outbreak of the Civil War he was in San Francisco serving as adjutant of the Department of the Pacific with the rank of lieutenant colonel. Before departing the coast, he was commissioned a brigadier general of volunteers. Upon his return to the East, General George B. McClellan selected Buell to lead the Army of Ohio from Kentucky into East Tennessee. Instead of liberating East Tennessee from Confederate control, however, Buell fought at Shiloh and at Corinth, and was promoted to major general of volunteers. In September, 1862, he moved back into Kentucky to resist the invasion of the state by Confederate forces under Generals Braxton Bragg
and Edmund Kirby Smith. He fought Bragg as the Confederates retreated. Consequently, he was charged with dilatory tactics and removed from command. He took no further active part in the war. 4

Rosecrans, like Buell, was an Ohioan and a West Pointer. But, unlike Buell, he took no part in the Mexican War. In 1854 Rosecrans resigned from the service, and at the outbreak of the Civil War he was the head of an unsuccessful kerosene refinery in Cincinnati. Rosecrans re-entered the service and played an important role in driving Confederate forces out of West Virginia. He served under both Halleck and Grant in the West, and was promoted to the rank of major general. On October 27, 1862, he replaced Buell, and the troops under his command were designated the Army of the Cumberland. As 1862 drew to a close, Rosecrans defeated Bragg at Murfreesboro, and then slowly maneuvered Bragg into Chattanooga. Rosecrans pushed Bragg out of Chattanooga, but Bragg turned on Rosecrans at Chickamauga and severely defeated him. This stunning defeat wrote an end to Rosecrans' military career. He was immediately supplanted in command by Thomas and never held another important military position. 5
Perhaps Lincoln acted too hastily in appointing a military governor for Tennessee. Two major criticisms can be made of the appointment. First of all, it meant there was going to be confusion of command in Tennessee. A senior military commander, Buell, was already in the vicinity. Now there was also going to be a powerful civil leader in the state. With the duties and responsibilities of both officers ill-defined and overlapping, severe clashes of authority were almost inevitable. Throughout the war Federal commanders generally found little need for Lincoln's military governors wherever they were appointed.

The "fighting" generals believed that military objectives should come first: win the war and then worry about political ramifications. They no doubt thought that trying to reach both military and political objectives simultaneously would only serve to weaken their military efforts. Time and energy spent on political activity would only detract from their primary goal of winning the war. Thus, both Buell and Rosecrans sought personal aggrandizement within their geographical area of superiority. This was not necessarily done out of selfishness, but out of a sense of duty. If the Confederacy
was to be defeated, then the war must be left to warriors, not politicians.

At the same time, Johnson had little regard for Buell or Rosecrans and tried to dominate Tennessee affairs himself. To Johnson, political imperatives overrode military ones. His duty was to re-establish a loyal state government in Tennessee. Johnson believed that he needed a great deal of direct control over Tennessee if he was going to achieve his political goal. Thus, both the military governor and the commanding generals assumed that they should be able to manage Tennessee to their own ends. Each believed that his own particular sphere of responsibility was paramount. In short, the appointment of Johnson breeched the military principle that "unity of command within a particular military government is an absolute necessity." Perhaps both political and military control in Tennessee should have been invested in one commander, at least initially. Certainly the Union cause in the state suffered badly from the system of dual command which Johnson’s appointment created.

The second criticism of the appointment is the choice of Johnson to fill the position. He had been a virtual folk-hero with many Middle Tennesseans until mid-April, 1861, but many who had stood with him until then turned
against him after Sumter and joined the Confederacy. These were the people whose loyalty had to be re-kindled. They needed inspiration from someone who could empathize with their decision to go with the South. Johnson was not the man. He loathed everything about the Confederacy. As one on-the-spot observer put it: "He daily thundered incoherent invectives against the 'Hell-hounds of the hell-born and hell-bound Confederacy.'"

Furthermore, Johnson was out of his natural element. His main constituency was always among East Tennessee Democrats. Middle and West Tennessee Democrats had gone overwhelmingly for the Confederacy. Those in Middle Tennessee who stood with Johnson were primarily old-line Whigs. Over the course of Johnson's long political career deep hatred had developed between Johnson and Tennessee Whigs. It was questionable whether even the crisis of war could erase these old political scars.

Johnson's appointment, wrote Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott, would at once be used by the rebels as the means of organizing their party against anything he might attempt. It would also "undoubtedly prevent many men (thro' [sic] false pride) from joining the Union cause." Johnson had, wrote Scott, "in times past controlled a large share of the masses of Tennessee, but many of the
influential men connected with those classes which he controlled are now numbered among his enemies." Scott thought that ex-Whig Governor William B. Campbell might be a better choice. He would not evoke the fear of vindictiveness, persecution, and despotism which Johnson aroused in so many Tennesseans. And he had a large following in Middle Tennessee among pro-Union Whigs.8

Scott feared that Johnson would be assassinated if he went to Nashville. He was not the only one. A Nashville citizen advised Johnson that "great personal hostility exists toward you in West and Middle Tennessee--so much that I do not believe you could safely travel over even the R.R. [sic] lines passing through these two sections." Randall McGavock, a Confederate prisoner at Fort Warren who knew of Johnson's appointment through the Boston papers, recorded in his diary that "the embittered hatred entertained by all good men throughout the State of every party" toward Johnson would greatly impair the "restoration of that peace and quiet that seems to be so much desired by the Federal Adm. [sic]"9

The appointment of Johnson, then, was at least partially counter-productive. Instead of producing loyalty, it served to heighten disloyalty. Brigadier General William Nelson, commander at Murfreesboro, reported to Buell in late July, 1862, that hostility to the United
States government was increasing in the vicinity. This growing enmity, he wrote, "seems settled into a fierce hatred to Governor Johnson, to him personally more than officially, for in questioning many people they cannot point to an act that he has not been warranted in doing by their own showing." "Yet," continued Nelson either in manner of doing it, or that it should be done by him, or from some undefinable course touching him, their resentment is fierce and vindictive, and this country, from being neutral at least . . . , is now hostile and in arms . . . .

Nelson and Buell personally had no love for Johnson and were in a struggle with him for control; yet, there was much truth in Nelson's assessment.

II

There was, however, merit in sending Johnson to Tennessee. He was an obvious and logical choice. Although Johnson's strong Democratic ties weakened him in Middle Tennessee, they were an asset to Lincoln on the national level. The President naturally desired to make the Union cause a bipartisan struggle. He had already dispensed a number of military commissions to powerful northern Democratic politicians. As T. Harry Williams has pointed out, some of these military appointees were
incompetent, but they were still sound investments in national cohesion. The appointment of Johnson to the very important position of military governor greatly pleased northern Democrats. Sending Johnson to Tennessee helped make the war a national, rather than merely a Republican, effort.¹¹

Johnson's vigorous defense of the Union and the Lincoln Administration during the secession crisis and the early stages of the war also made him an admirable choice. In mid-December, 1860, Johnson rose in the Senate and repudiated the whole doctrine of secession. He was the only southern Senator to make such a stand. His speech for the Union had a profound effect in the North, "not because of its eloquence, but because of its startling unexpectedness, its daring positions, its noble patriotism, and the breathless anxiety with which the North was listening--waiting, indeed--for a word of hope from the South." The speech "inspired the bewildered, despairing North with new hope. It was a vivid light suddenly flashed upon the profoundest darkness." Johnson spoke out again and again throughout 1861 against secession and treason. To him secession was an "odious, diabolical, nefarious, hell-born and hell-bound doctrine."¹²
As Johnson assailed secession, he also came to the defense of Lincoln's strong exercise of the executive power. In the Senate on July 27, 1861, for example, he asserted:

In great emergencies, when the life of a nation is in peril, when its very existence is endangered, to question too nicely, to scan too critically, its acts in the very midst of that crisis, when the Government is liable to be overthrown, is to make war upon it, and to try to paralyze its energies. If those who seem to violate the laws of the United States in their efforts to preserve the Government are to be called to an account, wait until the country passes out of its peril; wait until the country is relieved from its difficulty; wait until the crisis passes by, and then come forward, dispassionately, and ascertain to what extent the law has been violated, if indeed it has been violated at all.

He hammered on this theme throughout the speech. A violation of the Constitution "for the preservation of the Government," he said, "is more tolerable than one for its destruction." Even if it is admitted that Lincoln had stretched his powers a bit, said Johnson, "the question on any measure should be, is it necessary now? If it is, it should not be withheld from the Government." Lincoln no doubt greatly appreciated these sentiments.

Thus, Johnson believed in the Union the way Lincoln believed in it and vigorously supported the President's
conduct of the war in its initial stages when Lincoln acted without Congressional authority. Johnson had one more important asset in Lincoln's eyes: both men had the same conception of southern Unionism. On July 4, 1861, Lincoln addressed the Congress. "It may well be questioned," the President said, "whether there is, to-day, a majority of the legally qualified voters of any State, except perhaps South Carolina, in favor of disunion." Lincoln believed that Union men were in the majority in other seceded states, and he specifically mentioned Tennessee and Virginia. He believed that secession had been carried by the bayonet in these two states. Given a free and open election, he believed the people of Virginia and Tennessee would vote against secession. Johnson agreed with Lincoln. The people of Tennessee, he said, "when left to themselves to carry out their own government, and the honest dictates of their own consciences, will be found to be opposed to this revolution." Throughout the South he believed that the popular will had been subverted, and the judgment of the people defied, by usurping leaders. He believed "that the destruction of the Government was deliberately determined upon by wicked and designing conspirators, whose lives and fortunes were pledged to carry it out."
Johnson, like Lincoln, believed it was the duty of the Federal Government to nourish and protect this repressed southern Unionism. Lincoln said that the loyal citizens of a state actually comprised the state; hence, the government was bound to recognize and protect them. Johnson, too, asserted that it was the duty of the government to protect the loyal citizens of the seceded states "in the enjoyment of a republican form of Government."¹⁵ Lincoln and Johnson were in agreement on preserving the Union at all costs, prosecuting the war as vigorously as necessary, and protecting southern Unionists wherever Federal authority could be extended. All of this pointed to Johnson as a natural choice to lead Tennessee back into the Union.

Moreover, during the summer and fall of 1861, Johnson had exhibited a strong personal determination to bring Tennessee back into the Federal fold. In the Senate on March 2, 1861, he had predicted that the states which had already seceded would be brought back into the Union "by coercion of the people; and those leaders who have taken them out will fall beneath the indignation and the accumulating force of that public opinion which will ultimately crush them." And, he added: "The gentlemen who have taken those States out are not the men to bring them back."¹⁶
Governor Harris eventually took Tennessee out of the Union, and almost at once Johnson took the initiative to redeem it.

Johnson was especially anxious to recapture East Tennessee, his homeland, from the Confederates. It is altogether possible that he envisioned the creation of a separate state in East Tennessee, similar to the one eventually formed in West Virginia. Lincoln, too, was convinced of the importance of East Tennessee, partially because he wanted to nourish loyalty wherever he found it, but also because it was a vital strategic location. The capture of East Tennessee would deprive the Confederacy of the use of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, and put a Federal army in a position to threaten the flank of Confederate forces in Virginia. Johnson acted almost as a distinct Secretary of War for the area and busied himself at the War Department and in Kentucky making plans and preparations for an invasion. Both the President and Johnson strenuously urged General Buell, in command of the Department of the Ohio, to liberate East Tennessee. Even General McClellan stressed to Buell the importance of capturing Knoxville and liberating the oppressed East Tennesseans. But Buell, for reasons of personality and strategy, refused to move throughout the fall of 1861 and
the winter of 1861-62. No doubt much of the later enmity between Buell and Johnson stems from Buell's reluctance to at least attempt an invasion of East Tennessee. 17

When the energy and determination of General Ulysses S. Grant delivered portions of Middle and West Tennessee to Federal control, it was only logical for Johnson and Lincoln to scrap temporarily their hopes for East Tennessee and take advantage of an unexpected, but pleasing, situation in the other two grand divisions of the state. There was no debate or discussion within the Lincoln Administration on the propriety of sending Johnson to Tennessee. Johnson's speeches and actions from December, 1860, until February, 1862, indicated to the Administration that there could be no better choice. Lincoln was as eager to have Johnson go to Tennessee, as Johnson was to go there. As one of Johnson's contemporaries in the Senate recalled, Johnson "possessed the unbounding confidence of Mr. Lincoln . . . ." Furthermore, Johnson was glad to leave the Senate and "accept a position in which he could be more directly helpful to the loyal cause." 18

Johnson's personality, like his political affiliation, was both an advantage and a disadvantage as military governor of Tennessee. He was an earnest and forthright man of great natural capacity and tremendous energy.
His zeal, fidelity to the Union, and personal courage were unquestioned. More importantly, he was at his best during turbulent times when he was struggling against overwhelming odds. As Eric McKitrick has shown, Johnson's talents flared most brilliantly when "all the organized forces of society could in some sense, real or symbolic, be leagued against him." In this sense, Tennessee was perfect for Johnson. There is something heroic in his performance in Tennessee. Day after trying day Johnson maintained his headquarters in the heavily fortified and barricaded State Capitol, perhaps occasionally taking one drink too many, but always "ready for legislation or battle as the day might bring forth."\(^\text{19}\) Whether preparing to repel a cavalry attack on Nashville, devising plans for the relief of East Tennessee, or providing food and shelter for the refugees and freedmen who flocked to Nashville, Johnson never left his exposed post.

On the other hand, certain aspects of Johnson's personality put him at a disadvantage. He was harsh, intolerant, humorless, and suspicious. By nature he was belligerent and pugnacious. He also had a very intense dislike of the wealthy, the refined, and the cultivated. He himself possessed none of these qualities and was aware of his deficiencies. As one of his contemporaries noted, "on all occasions his speeches tended
to divide the wealthy and intelligent." He broadcast the seeds of hate and bitterness between classes. An appeal to prejudice was his most effective argument." Yet, his task in Tennessee was to bring society together again, to heal bitterness, to soothe passions. Given his prejudices, this was nearly an impossible chore.²⁰

Johnson was also an inordinately ambitious person. "The passion of his life," said one East Tennessean who knew him well, "was the desire for power. It was a consuming one. Nothing, not even its highest fulfillment, could satisfy it."²¹ His position in Tennessee, however, required the subordination of personal ambition to the greater good of society. What was needed was a good deal of give and take and a deep understanding of and sympathy for humanity. Johnson was incapable of giving and loving. He could only take and detest. This characteristic put Johnson at a tremendous disadvantage during his term as military governor.

For better or worse, Johnson and Tennessee were stuck with each other. Johnson's primary duty as Military Governor was to re-establish a loyal civil government in Tennessee. To this end his commission gave him the power to establish all necessary offices
and tribunals and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. He was to serve "during the pleasure of the President, or until the loyal inhabitants of that state shall organize a civil government in conformity with the Constitution of the United States." Johnson was informed that it was not deemed necessary to give him any specific instructions on how to maintain peace and establish a civil government. Specific instructions would be given when requested. In the meantime, the government was ready to trust his judgment to adopt such measures as circumstances demanded. As a supplement to his civil powers, Johnson was commissioned a brigadier general. This conferred an added dignity to his office, permitted him to perform military functions, and allowed him to command military subordinates. 22

III

Military government is a transitional phase between the open conflict of armies and the return of an established civil government to an occupied area. The fact that Johnson was given high military rank, along with his civil powers, illustrates that military government is a condition of semi-peace and semi-war. And yet, in
the final analysis, military government is also "the rule of force imposed on subjects by paramount military power." In general, military government proceeds through three stages. The first stage occurs while fighting is still going on in a district. During this phase, military government extends no further than the boundaries of the zone of active military operations. Consequently, military government remains rudimentary. In Tennessee this phase lasted from March, 1862, until the spring of 1863. The second stage begins when fighting forces have moved beyond the district. It is during this stage that military government matures and becomes an established institution. This stage in Tennessee lasted from the summer of 1863 until the early spring of 1865, with one brief interruption in the winter of 1864. The final stage begins with the termination of the war and ends when the occupying power declares civil government restored. There was some overlap of the second and third stages in Tennessee because the third stage was compressed into the first few months of 1865 when civil government was hurriedly re-established. 23

By 1860 Americans had had three limited experiences with military government. After the Louisiana Purchase, military government was established in the territory. In
the Floridas, too, the United States resorted to a temporary military government after the Spanish were ousted. Finally, during the Mexican War the United States had its most extensive experience with military government in New Mexico and California.  

If prominent members of the Lincoln Administration had looked back on the military governments in Louisiana, Florida, New Mexico, and California, the one lesson they might have learned was the need for flexibility. It would have been obvious that the form of a military government must be governed by the mission one hoped to accomplish and by the local circumstances one anticipated meeting. The particular culture of an area and the immediate political and strategic imperatives would be controlling factors in creating a military government.

There is, however, no evidence that the Administration looked to the past for guidelines in creating military governments during the Civil War. Lincoln seemed to grasp instinctively the need for flexibility. Military governments during the war were ad hoc creations arising out of immediate circumstances. William B. Hesseltine has pointed out the important precedents which emerged during the first months of the Civil War to make up parts of Lincoln's plan of reconstruction. These precedents occurred in
Maryland, Missouri, and western Virginia. The essence of the experience in these three states was to use military force to establish loyal governments and then to wait for the "true" loyal sentiment in these states to re-assert itself.  

Maryland was, in effect, the first southern state occupied by Federal forces. In the fall elections of 1861 in Maryland, Union bayonets and the illegal votes of Union soldiers insured the victory of the unconditional Unionists.  

Events in Missouri and Virginia provided the clearest precedents for the establishment of a military government in Tennessee. In Missouri, only superior Unionist military power and organization kept the state in the Union. In the early summer of 1861, the Missouri Convention was assembled under the protection of Union forces. This Convention declared the executive and legislative offices of the state vacant, and proclaimed loyalty to the Union as a prerequisite for office-holding. The Convention chose Hamilton R. Gamble, a brother-in-law to Montgomery Blair, Lincoln's Postmaster General, as Governor.  

In Virginia a Unionist government, supposedly representing the entire state, was put into operation at Wheeling. Office-holders in this new government had to
take a Unionist oath, and only Unionists could qualify to vote. Francis H. Pierpoint became "Governor of Virginia," and a "restored" state legislature began holding sessions at Wheeling. This state legislature, acting for all of Virginia, then gave consent to the formation of West Virginia. Illegality and irregularity were the hallmarks of all of these proceedings. The admission of West Virginia by Congress left the Pierpoint government with nothing to govern. It transferred its seat to Alexandria where it continued the legal fiction that it was the government of Virginia.²⁸

The Lincoln Administration believed that Virginia and Missouri could be reconstructed simply by extending the authority of the Pierpoint and Gamble governments over ever-widening areas. This theory did not work in practice, but at the time of Johnson's appointment to Tennessee the failure was not yet recognized. It was simply a logical extension of the experience in these two states for Andrew Johnson to go to Tennessee as military governor and rally the "repressed" Unionist sentiment of the state. In effect, a loyal governor (Johnson) would be replacing a disloyal one (Harris), just as Pierpoint and Gamble "replaced" disloyal governors in their respective states.
IV

Military government during the Civil War was created and enforced on an ad hoc basis without much regard for historical precedent. But the experience gained in the Civil War helped guide all future military governments established by the United States. The reason for this was the publication of General Orders No. 100 on April 24, 1863. This remarkable document, best known as the Lieber Code, marks the beginning of the modern law of belligerent occupation. It embodied the basic tenets by which military commanders were to be guided in their treatment of inhabitants subjected to military government. The famous Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 drew heavily upon it, and Americans in World War II were still being guided by both its words and spirit. 29

The author of General Orders No. 100 was Francis Lieber, a famous politician, scientist, and educator who was born in Berlin, Germany, in 1800. After being arrested twice by German authorities for his liberal views, he fled to England. In 1827 he came to the United States, where he first came to public notice by laying the foundation for the Encyclopaedia Americana, a work which gained immediate public acceptance. By
1835 his fame had become so widespread that he was elected to the chair of history and political economy at South Carolina College. He remained at this institution for twenty-one years, adding greatly to his reputation as a teacher and author. While in South Carolina he produced some of his best known works, *Manual of Political Ethics*, *Legal and Political Hermeneutics*, and *On Civil Liberty and Self-Government*. These volumes were among the first systematic works on political science which appeared in America. In 1857 Lieber left South Carolina and took a position at Columbia College in New York. Here he continued to add to his reputation as a political philosopher as he expanded his interests into international law.  

When the Civil War came Lieber called for a vigorous prosecution of the war. He possessed an "overwhelming nationalism" and viewed the preservation of the Union as a divine mission. He also believed in ending slavery. Lieber was distraught by the confusing and conflicting policies adopted by different commanders as they advanced into the Confederacy. He realized that the ignorance of these commanders in regard to the intricacies of international law regulating military government caused much of the confusion. The only thorough statement of international law in America was General Henry W. Halleck's *International
Law, which was a bulky, expensive, and difficult commentary.\textsuperscript{31}

Early in the war Lieber began to advocate the publication of a concise field manual to guide army officers on the subject of military government. Such a manual, he believed, would help convert the Union army into a smooth-functioning, efficient military machine which could crush the Confederacy. Initially he received little encouragement from the Government. When General Halleck became general-in-chief this official aloofness ended. In August, 1862, with Halleck's official sanction, Lieber prepared a short essay on guerrilla warfare, which was troubling Union officers in the western border states. The small booklet was very favorably received by both Halleck and Secretary of War Stanton. Lieber then served on a committee appointed to devise a code of rules for land warfare.\textsuperscript{32}

The result of this committee's work was General Orders No. 100, which was almost totally Lieber's work. In writing these Orders Lieber relied extensively on Halleck's own work on international law, but he also drew heavily on the experience of Union commanders during the first two years of the war. As Lieber's biographer has pointed out, the final document "was less a rigid legal code than a persuasively written essay on the ethics of
conducting war." In general, the code stated that war should be fought in a conventional manner between uniformed armies. Little mercy was to be accorded partisans and guerrillas, but an occupier was to respect the rights of non-combatants as far as possible. However, the code left two large loopholes which allowed commanders to employ Draconian measures against the civilian population. These loopholes, "military necessity" and "retaliation," permitted a commander to do virtually anything he deemed necessary. For example, according to the Code there was nothing illegal about Sherman's devastating march to the sea.33

One careful student of the Code concluded that Union commanders and military governors attached relatively little significance to it, even though most regulations throughout the rest of the war seem to have been in harmony with it. This was the case with Johnson. He surely knew of the Code, and yet he never made specific mention of it as a basis for any of his actions.34 It was only after the war ended that the Code "began to acquire authority and the extreme veneration of army officers and experts on international law."35

Thus, when Johnson went to Tennessee he had very few guidelines to follow. The paucity of instructions he received from the War Department is an indication that no one really knew what kinds of situations Johnson
might encounter. Nor did anyone know precisely how a military governor should act or what the extent of his responsibilities should be. In the absence of concrete historical precedents, Lincoln and Stanton probably believed it was best to allow Johnson the widest possible discretion in establishing policies. By the time formal guidelines appeared in the form of General Orders No. 100, Johnson had already established policies which he was determined to see through until civil government was restored in Tennessee. Consequently, the military government in Tennessee was molded primarily by the specific responses of Johnson and Lincoln to specific circumstances. Neither historical precedent nor the Lieber Code exerted a noticeable influence on the calculations of either man.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Two


7 Quoted in Hall, Andrew Johnson, p. 78.

8 Thomas A. Scott to Edwin Stanton, March 4, 1862, Edwin M. Stanton Papers, Division of Manuscripts, LC.

9 Ibid.; Jeptha Fowlkes to AJ, May 29, 1861, AJP; Gower and Allen, Pen and Sword, p. 607.


16. Ibid., p. 312.


20 Hall, Andrew Johnson, p. 218; Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, pp. 451-67, contains an excellent portrayal of Johnson.

21 Ibid., p. 452.

22 Edwin M. Stanton to AJ, March 3, 1862, AJP; Stanton to H. Hamlin, President of the Senate, June 3, 1862, in O.R., III, III, p. 106; Stanton to Edward Stanley, Military Governor of North Carolina, May 18 and 19, 1862, in Ibid., I, IX, pp. 396-97. Johnson's instructions were the same as Stanley's.


26 Ibid., p. 23; Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 231-33; Charles B. Clark, "Politics in Maryland During the Civil War," Maryland Historical Magazine, XXXVII (Dec., 1942) pp. 378-99.


29 A copy of the Lieber Code can be readily found in O.R., III, III, pp. 148-64.

31 Freidel, Francis Lieber, pp. 317-27, 541-42; H. W. Halleck, International Law, Or, Rules Regulating the Inter
course of States in Peace and War (New York: D. Van
Nostrand, 1861).

32 Freidel, Francis Lieber, pp. 323, 328-30.

33 Ibid., pp. 333-36.

34 The Lieber Code was published in full by the
Nashville Daily Union, May 23 and 24, 1863. The conclusion
about the Union commanders and military governors was
reached by Freidel, "General Orders No. 100," Birkhimer,
Military Government, and Doris Appel Graber, The Develop-
ment of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), both have
excellent discussions of the Lieber Code.

CHAPTER THREE

Prelude

Once Andrew Johnson arrived in Nashville, he was determined never to surrender the city intact. He wanted to convince Nashville Unionists that Federal authority was re-established permanently in the city, and at the same time demonstrate to Confederate sympathizers that their cause was hopeless. However, in the fall of 1862 General Don Carlos Buell proposed that Nashville be abandoned. Johnson was dismayed and outraged. Granville Moody visited Johnson shortly after Johnson learned of Buell's proposal. Several years later Moody told John Hay, Lincoln's private secretary, about his visit with Johnson. Hay recorded Moody's tale in his diary:

Granville Moody was here this evening & [sic] told a good story abt [sic] Andy Johnson and his fearful excitement when Buell was proposing to give up Nashville to the enemy. He found him walking up & [sic] down the room supported by two friends. "Moody, I'm glad to see you," he said. The two friends left and he and Moody were alone. "We're sold, Moody, we're sold . . . . He's [Buell's] a traitor, Moody," and such. At last suddenly "Pray! Moody!" And they knelt down and prayed, Andy joining in the responses like a Methodist. After they had done he said, "Moody, I feel better. Moody I'm not a Christian--no church,--but I believe

70.
in God, in the Bible, all of it, Moody, but I'll be damned if Nashville shall be given up.¹

CONFEDERATE THREATS AND COMMAND DISPUTES

The positive side of Federal control of Nashville was the effort to create a strong political party dedicated to the Union. This was Andrew Johnson's main goal. Throughout his term as Military Governor of Tennessee he was frustrated in his efforts to return a truly loyal Tennessee to the Union. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that he got off to such a bad start. One reason for this, which has already been mentioned, was the unpopularity of Johnson himself. But there were two other reasons of greater magnitude. One was the continued presence of Confederate forces in the area. Southern sympathizers in Nashville were never deprived completely of the hope that they might be delivered from their Yankee occupiers. The second reason was that Johnson and the senior military commanders in Tennessee could not agree on a concerted plan of action. Until 1863 no one was really sure who controlled the wartime reconstruction process in Tennessee--Andrew Johnson or the commander of the Department of the Cumberland. By the time Johnson consolidated his authority in late 1863, the Union movement was split into two major factions, making any major effort toward reconstruction doubly difficult.
I

As long as Middle Tennessee remained a battleground, there was little hope of making progress toward reconstructing the state. The basis of military government is overpowering force. The ability "to exercise that force and the extent to which that ability is recognized by the people of the district occupied, determines the limits of its authority." This was demonstrably true in Nashville. At least for the first year of Federal occupation, most people in Nashville recognized that the force supporting the military government was not overpowering. Almost all Federal energies had to be devoted to waging war, and military necessity over-ruled most other considerations. Furthermore, as long as there was a chance that Southern forces might sweep triumphantly back into the city at any moment, Nashvillians saw little need to concede more than token submission to Union rule.

During much of 1862 Nashville was practically under siege. At times it was completely isolated from the North. All through the summer and fall Middle Tennessee was harassed both by the mounted troops of Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan and by small groups of irregulars. Union forces tried mightily to destroy these units but could
never pin them down in pitched battle. As one Union officer said about Morgan, "The only trouble is in keeping the freebooter in one spot long enough to catch him." Time after time Morgan punched holes in the Yankees defenses and knocked at the gates of Nashville. Excitement, terror, and alarm prevailed among Union men in Nashville.4

The problem of holding Nashville was compounded by Bragg’s invasion of Kentucky during the fall. When Buell moved north to counter the invasion, there was some talk of abandoning Nashville. Primarily because of Johnson’s obstinate insistence that the city be held, it was not abandoned. But throughout much of September, October, and November it was a "beleaguered city, surrounded by enemies." Skirmishes and cannonading within sight and sound of the city were common.5

Bragg’s sojourn into neutral Kentucky was stopped at Perryville in early October. After his retreat from the Bluegrass State he ordered his forces to concentrate at Murfreesboro, only about thirty miles southeast of Nashville. By mid-December, Bragg had convinced himself that the Yankees would soon retreat, and he would march triumphantly into Nashville. In retrospect it is hard to see how Bragg could delude himself so badly.6 In late December, Rosecrans, who had replaced Buell, moved against
Bragg's forces. The resulting battle of Stones River was a standoff. Bragg realized, however, that he lacked the strength to defeat Rosecrans' larger army and so retreated into East Tennessee.

Although it is now obvious that Nashville was secure from large Confederate armies following Bragg's retreat, people in Nashville at the time were not so confident. In the spring of 1863, one Union soldier wrote to his mother that "There will be within four weeks another terribly bloody battle in this section... As far as I can figure out from the orders and movements, an attack on Nashville is in the offing." Rumors of an impending battle spread through the city. Rebel conscripting operations went on within eight miles of the city, and Confederate cavalry moved in and out of the vicinity with ease. Even the commander at Nashville admitted that the railroads extending south of Nashville were not secure from the enemy. In light of all this, it is easy to understand how dedicated southern sympathizers within the city could cling grimly to the hope of redemption.

Those who doggedly refused to embrace Unionism thought they were about to be rewarded for their fidelity to the Confederacy when, in late 1864, Lieutenant General John Bell Hood led his tattered forces within sight of Nashville. It
was sheer delusion, of course, to think that Hood's forces could drive the Federals out of the city. Yet to people who had lived on hopes, dreams, and hatred of their Yankee "oppressors," this final invasion of Tennessee must have seemed like solid fare. It was reported that some of the most prominent Nashvilleans who had left the city in February, 1862, were returning with the army.\textsuperscript{10} No doubt many in the city hoped to embrace these long-absent friends.

By December there was "Great excitement in Nashville. A battle expected . . . No such times since December, 1862."\textsuperscript{11} While the expectations of those of rebel inclinations soared, Unionists remained confident. In a cruel pun, the Unionist \textit{Daily Times} commented that "One-legged Hood is no doubt hopping mad because he cannot capture Nashville."\textsuperscript{12} A Union officer in the Quartermaster's Department addressed his family in reassuring terms. "We are having great times here," he wrote on the eve of the Battle of Nashville, "No danger or anything of that sort. . . . Our line is immensely strong . . . The Rebs might as well butt their brains against the Rocky Mountains, as attempt to take [Nashville]."\textsuperscript{13} General George H. Thomas was in command at Nashville. In the days immediately preceding the battle "his strong and massive face began to shine with the fierce light of impending battle." When
the battle began he was so confident of success that he casually took the time to chase some small children who were playing outside into their houses. 14

The Battle of Nashville was a disaster for Hood and the Confederacy. One historian has called it the decisive battle of the Civil War. It was perhaps the only major engagement of the War that was not indecisive. 15 Hood's army was virtually annihilated. With its demise all hopes--reasonable or unreasonable--of deliverance for Nashville secessionists came to an end.

In summary, for three years the Federals occupied Nashville. Yet at no time during most of this period was their claim to Middle Tennessee unchallenged. This was a serious impediment to the creation of a loyal and legitimate civil government for two reasons. On the one hand, the anticipation of liberation encouraged rebel sympathizers to follow a course of passive resistance, if not outright defiance. On the other hand, the fear that the Confederates might regain the city kept Unionists cowed. John G. Nicolay, the President's private secretary, reported to Salmon P. Chase from Nashville shortly after the Union capture of the city:

The secessionist sentiment is still strongly predominant, and manifests itself continually in taunts and insults to Federal soldiers and officials. The Union men are yet too much intimidated to speak out and act. They still fear
and the rebels still hope that our army will have reverses and that the Confederate troops will return and occupy and control not only this city, but the State. ¹⁶

Numerous other sources confirm that the general tone of the reception accorded to the Union troops in Nashville was chilling and hostile. The disdain for Federals abated very little during the war. ¹⁷

When Nashville ladies walked past Union officers they held their noses. One Union officer caustically commented that he could never discover what “disagreeable thing the atmosphere in our immediate vicinity contained that made it necessary for these lovely women to so pinch their nasal protuberances.” ¹⁸ Some people took great pride in the fact that they had not fled the city when the Yankees took over. "There was a great deal of good accomplished by remaining here and bearing the brunt of this terrible time," wrote one woman. ¹⁹ Citizens in the heart of the city continued to salute and cheer Rebel prisoners who were marched through the streets. ²⁰ Secessionists whispered dire threats in the ears of those who expressed pleasure about the Union occupation. ²¹ In these, and numerous other ways, Confederates in Nashville showed their hatred of Northern occupation. Late in the war the Daily Times wrote that "If a Upas Tree were planted before the door of every rebel in Nashville, the poisonous air exhaled
thence would be far less hurtful than the language daily uttered by traitors on our streets."22 In general, this expresses the sentiment of the city until the very end of the war.

II

Perhaps some of the continued defiance in Nashville could have been overcome had Johnson been able to work in harmony with Buell and Rosecrans. If from the very beginning, the military governor and the commanding generals had presented a united front, rebels in Nashville might not have been so bold. Many, instead of remaining wedded to the rebellion, might have been converted to Unionism. But Johnson and the commanding officers did not work together, and this encouraged disloyal sentiment among Nashville citizens.

There was trouble from the very beginning. Three days after Lincoln appointed Johnson as military governor, General Buell wrote to General George B. McClellan. He was concerned, "to hear that it is proposed to organize a provincial government for Tennessee. I think it would be injudicious at this time. It may not be necessary at all."23

Looked at from Buell's standpoint, this may well have
been true. No doubt he believed that his main purpose should be to defeat the armed forces of the enemy, and that everything else should be subordinated to military necessity. This was certainly a legitimate viewpoint. Anything which detracted from attaining this end would only prolong the war. Trying to establish a civil government in the midst of a war zone would surely be a distraction. And Buell was probably wise enough to foresee that two masters in the same house could only spell trouble—especially when both masters were proud, ambitious, and headstrong.

For Lincoln’s purposes, however, it was essential to re-establish civil governments in the seceded states as quickly as possible. Instead of forcing the people of these states into submission by military rule, it seemed more logical to allow them to begin participating in civil processes again. Thus, the administration would seem more like a benevolent, loving parent accepting back his run-away child with open arms, rather than a stern master demanding submission from his slave. This view, which Johnson also accepted, sprang from Lincoln’s initial conception of the rebellion. Both men believed that the great mass of southerners remained loyal, but that they had been misguided by cunning leaders. Given the truth and an opportunity, most of these people would jump at the chance to rejoin
the Union. This fundamental misconception forced both men to change their views as their expectation failed to materialize.

The extent of Johnson's power, of course, would determine what he could or could not do. He realized that a strong show of military force and a determination to hold Nashville at all costs would inspire Union men in the city and dishearten Confederate sympathizers. Naturally he wanted to know exactly what the limits of his authority were in relation to Buell's. The Lincoln administration failed to provide either man with explicit instructions on this point. It was left for Johnson and Buell to work out their responsibilities between themselves. Within a week after his arrival in Nashville, Johnson wrote Buell inquiring about to whom and to what extent he could apply for military aid. Buell's reply was, on the surface, conciliatory, but it contained an omen of future discord. Buell assured Johnson that the troops under his command "will be instructed to comply with the requisitions which you may in my absence make upon them for the enforcement of your authority as Military Governor." In particular, the provost marshal in Nashville would execute all of Johnson's "requisitions." Then Buell ominously added, "it may be unnecessary to add that any requisitions which would involve the movement of
troops must of course by dependent on the plan of military operations against the enemy."²⁴

Thus, Buell said that Johnson would be supported only as long as that support did not interfere with military operations. This was not what Johnson wanted. He wanted the process of rebuilding the civil government to go on regardless of what happened on the battlefield. For this he needed a force at his disposal, not subject to the whim of another general. After receiving Buell's reply, Johnson sent a telegram to Stanton asking what military force he was to have "to execute such order or orders as in the discharge of my official duties I may deem expedient, prudent, and proper to make."²⁵ Stanton replied that General Halleck had been instructed to place an adequate military force under Johnson's command.²⁶ Taking recognition of the growing dispute between Buell and Johnson, Stanton cautioned Halleck that the officer in command of the force placed at Johnson's disposal "should be a discreet person, who would act efficiently and harmoniously with Governor Johnson."²⁷

This order was ignored because active military operations began in Middle Tennessee. As Buell marched south to join Grant for the Shiloh campaign, he stripped the Nashville area of troops. This made Johnson very uneasy. "This place, as I conceive," he hastily wired Stanton, "has almost been left defenseless by General Buell." The
officer who Buell left in command of the small garrison at Nashville concurred. Stanton relayed Johnson's message to Halleck, who in turn wired Buell about the defense of Nashville. Buell did not think there was any danger of a large scale attack on the city. He did admit that a dash at the city with 15,000 men was possible, and said he would guard against such a contingency. Buell thought Johnson was being a bit unrealistic, but he would see what he could do to ease the military governor's anxiety.

After this crisis, the relationship between Buell and Johnson was barely civil. Military operations remained the paramount concern to Buell. Johnson believed that Buell was purposefully undermining his efforts as military governor by keeping an inadequate force in Nashville. Throughout April, May and June, Buell continued to remove troops from the Nashville vicinity. They were desperately needed to support General Ormsby Mitchel in his drive through Middle Tennessee into northern Alabama. When Buell ordered the 69th Ohio Regiment away from Nashville, Johnson considered it the crowning blow. This regiment, under the command of Colonel Lewis D. Campbell, was raised in Columbus, Ohio, under Johnson's name, and Johnson had personally aided in its formation. Furthermore, Stanton had ordered that the regiment report directly to the
military governor. Johnson wanted it and other troops to remain in Nashville.  

Johnson took his case to Washington. On April 24, he wired Horace Maynard, a Tennessee representative in Congress, to explain what was happening. The removal of so many troops from the Nashville area, he said, "is substantially surrendering the country to the rebels." He had been sent to Tennessee to re-establish a civil government, and yet the means to accomplish this task was withheld from him. Perhaps, said Johnson, it would be better to desist from further efforts if he was not going to have better cooperation. "The effect of removing the troops is visible in the face of every secessionist. Secession was calming down and [a] great reaction in favor of the Union was taking place." Now the tide in Nashville had been reversed.  

Johnson also dispatched a telegram directly to the President. He made it clear that he did not think he was being sustained in his endeavor. "Petty jealousies and contests between generals wholly incompetent to discharge the duties assigned them," he angrily wrote, "have contributed more to the defeat and embarrassment of the Government than all other causes combined." Tennessee could be guided back into the Union easily within a
matter of months if he could "be sustained in carrying out the object of the administration in restoring Tennessee" and if he did not have to be "dependent upon staff officers and brigadier-generals."  

Thus, Johnson believed that a force at Nashville was necessary not only for military reasons but also because of the moral influence it would exert on the public mind. He re-emphasized this in a wire to Stanton. "The very fact of the forces being withdrawn from this locality has inspired secession with insolence and confidence and Union men with distrust as to the power and intention of the Government to protect and defend them." There would be no trouble in Tennessee today, he assured the Secretary, if "there had been a military force left at this place sufficient to meet and suppress any uprising of disunionists. . . ." As it is, the "whole moral power has been lost, and, in fact, we are here now almost in a helpless condition."  

Johnson also informed Halleck of his assessment of the seriousness of the situation. Nashville, he said, "has been left to a very great extent in a defenseless condition, which has kept alive a rebellious spirit that could otherwise have been put down by this time. The problem was not one of troops alone. There was also "a constant struggle
between staff officers, Provost Marshals and Brigadier Generals left in command which has to a very great extent paralyzed all the efforts of the Union men in bringing about a healthy and sound reaction in public sentiment."  

A careful reading of Johnson's letters in the late spring and early summer of 1862 shows that he perceived his problem in Nashville as twofold. First, he needed direct personal control over a sufficient number of troops to enforce his rule. Second, he needed to have control over other military officers in Nashville—if not absolute control, then a substantial amount of influence.

Buell's answer to the charge that he was leaving Nashville and Middle Tennessee defenseless was that the disposition of troops he made was absolutely necessary for the area's defense. He considered this to be "of far greater moment than the gratification of Governor Johnson, whose views upon the matter are absurd." He was simply defending Middle Tennessee from a more advanced position.  

Here, then, was a conflict between two men who were both right. The divergence in their views came from their different duties. Johnson, whose duty it was to re-establish civil government, needed a force at his call. Buell, whose duty it was to defeat the enemy in the field, needed every man he could get and could not afford to let another officer share command over his troops.
The solution to this dilemma was to allow Johnson to raise his own troops and to give him a Governor's Guard. In mid-June, 1862, Stanton authorized him to raise two regiments of cavalry. Three weeks later this authority was expanded to "any amount of Cavalry in your state that may be required for the service." In another two weeks he was authorized to raise all cavalry and infantry necessary for the protection of Tennessee. He was given full authority to draw supplies from the Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Commissary Departments in Nashville. Until the end of his tenure as military governor, Johnson retained a large amount of power to raise troops. Most of the troops that Johnson raised went into the federal service.

The force which remained under Johnson's immediate command was designated the Governor's Guard. On May 13, 1862, Johnson appointed Alvan C. Gillem as colonel of the 10th Tennessee Regiment, which was being raised in Nashville as the Governor's Guard. Gillem was born in Gainesboro, Tennessee, in 1830. In 1847 he entered the United States Military Academy, and graduated four years later. In the decade before the Civil War, Gillem fought against the Seminole Indians and did routine garrison duty on the frontier. He and Johnson became extremely close friends during the early stages of the war, and it was at Johnson's
insistence that Gillem became adjutant general of Tennessee in June, 1863, and brigadier general of volunteers in August, 1863. From then until the end of the War Gillem served Johnson as a politician-general. He led several military campaigns into East Tennessee and western North Carolina and played a prominent role in the reorganization of civil government in Tennessee. In January, 1868, Gillem was appointed to command the Fourth Military District (Mississippi and Arkansas) under the Reconstruction Acts. Always loyal to Johnson, Gillem pursued a very moderate and conciliatory policy.38

Gillem's force was actually Johnson's personal bodyguard. At the end of 1862 Gillem's regiment mustered five hundred and nineteen men present for duty, with about two hundred more men on the sick list.39 Johnson did not consider this an adequate force, and in the spring of 1863 Stanton authorized him to raise a force not exceeding one brigade as a Governor's Guard. By June, 1863, the force under Johnson's personal command in Nashville consisted of two regiments of infantry and two of cavalry. All of the men in these regiments were from East and Middle Tennessee.40 They were frequently ill-disciplined and unruly, often robbing and murdering in broad daylight.41 But at least Johnson now had a substantial force at his disposal which would unhesitatingly obey him.
However, problems about the control and number of troops in Nashville remained until the end of the war. When Rosecrans was ordered to detach a regiment as part of the Governor's Guard, he protested against doing so for two reasons. One was that he could not spare the troops. The other was that he did not like having a force within the garrison at Nashville not subject to his orders. This, he believed was "far more likely to beget discord and trouble than anything else." As late as mid-summer, 1864, the Nashville commander commiserated with Johnson about the shortage of troops at Nashville. But it is safe to say that the situation never again reached the nadir that it had under Buell.

III

Aside from a shortage of troops directly under his control, the other major problem facing Johnson in the summer of 1862 was created by some of the subordinate officers Buell left in command at Nashville. Two of these in particular were Johnson's nemeses. One was Assistant Adjutant-General Oliver D. Greene. The other was Provost Marshal Stanley Matthews. By mid-June Johnson thoroughly detested both of these men. Greene, he said, was assuming
more command authority than even Buell or Halleck would have. And Matthews was "in direct complicity with the secessionists of this place, and a sympathizer with the master spirits engaged in this southern Rebellion." When Matthews was nominated for a brigadier generalship, Johnson wrote Senator John Sherman to protest the nomination. In this letter he restated his charge that Matthews was disloyal. Johnson asked that Halleck remove both of these officers.

On receipt of Johnson's complaints Halleck suggested to Buell that perhaps "it would be best to make some change. I leave it, however, for you to determine." At the same time Halleck told Johnson that if Buell did not afford a remedy, then he would. Buell replied to Halleck that Johnson's charge of disloyalty against Greene and Matthews was "frivolous and absurd." So, for a while Matthews and Greene stayed in Nashville because Halleck did not take any action.

The situation did not improve. Greene especially seemed to enjoy giving Johnson petty annoyances and slights. For example, Greene ordered the Telegraph Agent in the Quartermaster Department not to pay Johnson's telegraph account. When Johnson asked Greene about this, Greene did not even reply. Johnson then asked him again. This
time Greene said he could not in good conscience authorize payment of the account, but that he had referred the matter to Buell. Finally, more than three weeks after Johnson broached the subject, Buell ordered that the account be paid.\textsuperscript{47}

Another instance concerned certain houses which Johnson took possession of as residences for officers of his guard. Buell had ordered that all officers in command of troops should live in camp with their men. Greene wrote to a member of Buell's staff asking specifically if the orders had been changed to allow Johnson to ignore it. He was told that the orders allowed no exception.\textsuperscript{48} Greene then ordered Provost Marshal Lewis D. Campbell, who had replaced Matthews, to evict the officers living in one of the houses. Campbell, a close friend of the Governor's, asked Johnson what he should do. Johnson replied that "it is my intention to continue to hold and occupy the premises . . . for the use and benefit of the Government." And he ordered that Greene's order be suspended. Campbell, therefore, refused to obey Greene's order. Greene had Campbell arrested and appointed a new provost marshal.\textsuperscript{49}

Johnson was outraged, and wrote directly to the President. Greene, he wrote, "defies my authority and issues orders nullifying my acts." Johnson requested the transfer
of Greene "to some post beyond the limits of this State." He also wanted an explicit order from Lincoln allowing him to appoint the provost marshal for Nashville. He believed these changes were "necessary to our successful operations here." In a second letter to Lincoln written the same day, Johnson also complained bitterly that Greene was ordering troops around "directly in opposition to my views and with great damage to the cause." "My opinion is," he continued, "that he is at this time in complicity with the traders here, and shall therefore have him arrested and sent beyond the influence of rebels and traders if he is not immediately removed." Johnson asked to be sustained so that no further damage to the Union cause would be done by Buell and Greene.

This put Lincoln on the spot. He had to choose between his Commanding General and Military Governor. He came down heavily in favor of Johnson, whom he considered "a true and a valuable man--indispensable to us in Tennessee." He did gently admonish Johnson: "Do you not, my good friend, perceive that what you ask is simply to put you in command in the West? I do not suppose you desire this. You only wish to control in your own localities; but this you must know may derange all other posts." Despite this gentle rebuke the next day Stanton authorized Johnson
to appoint his own provost marshal for the city of Nashville, and told him that Greene had been ordered to leave the city at once and report in person to Buell. At the same time, Buell denied he had issued any order about officers living in houses.53

IV

Before the Buell-Johnson imbroglio finally ended with the removal of Buell, the two men managed to have one more serious falling out. This concerned the defense of Nashville during Bragg's offensive into Kentucky. Johnson wanted to hold the city at all hazards; if he had to abandon it, he wanted to destroy it. But Buell was willing to see the city abandoned and left intact, if it would serve a larger military objective.

The Military Governor's position became clear as early as July, when Forrest captured Murfreesboro and then made menacing gestures toward the Rock City. At the time the Nashville garrison was tiny, and there was little hope for reinforcements. Johnson wrote Halleck that "in the event the attack is made we will give them as warm a reception as we know how." If forced to yield, he implied that he would leave the Confederates a nice level site where
someday they might be able to erect a new city. 54

Johnson's reasoning in making an all-out effort to defend Nashville was sound. First of all, he realized the disastrous moral consequences that the loss of the capital would have on Tennessee Unionism. Secondly, he knew there were "numerous secret adherents" in the city who would aid a Confederate attack as long as the sacrifice would not be too great. By showing great determination to hold the town, the Federals could convince southern sympathizers that any effort to redeem it would entail very great sacrifices. Finally, Confederate forces would be reluctant to attack a well-fortified position if they were unsure of inside help from the citizenry. 55 Consequently, Johnson began work on massive fortifications on the hills around Nashville. The key to its defenses was Fort Negley, perched atop St. Cloud Hill. This massive structure had solid stone masonry walls towering twenty-five feet above the ground and bristled with cannons trained on and about the city. 56

When Bragg moved over the mountains from East Tennessee in late summer, Buell retreated to Nashville. Johnson was dismayed at this retreat. His dismay was no doubt increased when Buell advised retreating further toward Louisville. It was reported that Johnson insisted on
destroying the city if it had to be evacuated. Buell, however, maintained that he was in command and declared that the city should be left unscathed. In the midst of the crisis Johnson and Reverend Granville Moody knelt in prayer. When they finished praying Johnson told Moody that, "I'm not a Christian--no church--but I believe in God, in the Bible, all of it, Moody, but I'll be damned if Nashville shall be given up."57

Buell later insisted that he "never intimated to Governor Johnson an intention or wish to leave Nashville without a garrison." He maintained that the decision to hold the place was his own, uninfluenced by Johnson in any manner, because he realized that the political importance of Nashville outweighed any purely military considerations. Colonel J. B. Fry, a member of Buell's staff, supported Buell on this in testimony before the Military Commission instituted to investigate Buell's command.58 Johnson, however, was equally adamant in insisting that the city was held only because he demanded it. The findings of the Military Commission agreed with the Governor.59 On the basis of Johnson's known determination to defend the city, and Buell's lack of appreciation of the Military Governor's position, there is little doubt that Johnson was telling the truth to the Commission.
Accounts of "an obstinate conflict" between the men over whether or not to hold Nashville came out in the local press several weeks later. A ranking officer stationed in Nashville advised Johnson that the press should be censored to prevent the enemy from knowing of such divided councils. This was the crux of the whole relationship between Buell and Johnson. Their inability to act in concert could only provide comfort to the enemy and sow anxiety in the hearts of friends. The constant bickering and divisiveness between Buell (and his subordinates) and Johnson severely obstructed the creation of a civil government in Tennessee.

It is hard to put blame on one man or the other. The problems arose because each man perceived his duty differently. Initially there were no guidelines to direct each man's behavior. Buell's major goal was to defeat the enemy on the battlefield. This led him to certain conclusions as to how he should act. Johnson's guiding principle was to create a civil government in Tennessee. This led him to certain conclusions. It just happened that they never reached the same conclusions. And neither official was unselfish enough to subordinate his principles and conclusions for the general good of the Union cause in Tennessee.
By late fall, 1862, Andrew Johnson had staked out a wide sphere of authority in relation to the commanding general in the Department of the Cumberland. In all his conflicts with Buell he had come out on top. Johnson was now assured of immediate control over a considerable body of troops. Subordinate officers who proved obnoxious to Johnson were removed. Nashville had been held in the face of all hazards, including the desire of Buell to abandon it. The removal of Buell in October seemed to vindicate Johnson's courageous stand in Middle Tennessee. Above all, it was obvious to all but the most obtuse that President Lincoln was going to stand by his appointee. Johnson's authority had been vigorously sustained by the Lincoln administration.

Rosecrans, who replaced Buell, should have recognized that Johnson was a powerful force in Tennessee whose wishes would have to command respect. But Rosecrans seems not to have learned from Buell's experience, and so Johnson had to defend his authority once more.

The specific area of contention between Johnson and Rosecrans was the administration of justice and the enforcement of law in Nashville. This, of course, was only
symptomatic of a larger struggle for hegemony over Middle Tennessee. Rosecrans had been sternly rebuked by Halleck for interfering in the administration of justice in the city. In the letter conveying this rebuke Halleck suggested that the reason for the conflicts of authority between the civil and military officers was that Rosecrans misunderstood the relative powers and jurisdictions of each set of authorities. Halleck's letter was intended to prevent all future misconception. In order to insure perfect harmony in Nashville, Halleck suggested that Johnson be placed in command of all troops stationed there.61

Rosecrans innocently replied that he knew of no conflicts with the civil authorities. He said he would be happy to put Johnson in command at Gallatin, but that "Nashville is too important a post for me to intrust to his command at this time."62 This letter bordered on being impudent. It almost casually belittled the importance of the Military Governor by suggesting that he was not fit to command an important post. It brought a stinging answer from Halleck which re-asserted the superiority of the civil to the military authorities in Tennessee. Halleck's reply also re-stated the Government's wish to have Johnson placed in command in Nashville.63

This brought an apologetic response from Rosecrans.
"I assure you," he wrote, "I have done all I possibly could, consistent with Military safety, to build up and sustain the civil authorities wherever I have had command, especially in Tennessee. No one appreciates the sacrifice and the delicate and trying position of Governor Johnson more than I do." No disrespect was intended by his earlier message, he said. But he stuck to his position that Johnson should not be placed in command at Nashville. It was, said Rosecrans, an enclosed garrison, and his main supply depot. It was full of traitors, spies, speculators, and rascals. "I am therefore, obliged to have it commanded by an able and experienced officer, and to exercise a most rigid military policy."

There was much merit in Rosecrans' position. A commanding officer in the field should at least be able to rest easy about his rear areas and know that his major supply depot is secure. It was especially hard to argue this point with Rosecrans, who had been one of the Union's few successful generals so far. In fact, even the War Department must have realized the justice of Rosecrans' argument because the idea of putting Johnson in command at Nashville was not mentioned again.

Halleck's two stern warnings, however, did convince Rosecrans that he should placate the military governor. He wrote to Johnson assuring him that he would aid him in
every possible way. He asked that Johnson communicate with him "fully and freely" about all matters of conflict and complaint. To get added mileage out of this conciliatory note he sent it to Johnson via the War Department. Johnson, in turn, replied to Rosecrans with an equally gracious letter, and the newly inaugurated era of good feeling continued into late May, 1863. Then in June, Rosecrans moved into East Tennessee in pursuit of Bragg. The sheer distance of Rosecrans from Middle Tennessee could only help to alleviate conflict with Johnson. And as Rosecrans turned his attention to purely military matters, the administration of civil affairs was left more fully in Johnson's hands.

In the battle for authority in Middle Tennessee, Rosecrans managed to hold his own. One reason for this was that he was a successful general until the fall of 1863. But despite his prestige he did not make any encroachments on Johnson's authority. Johnson stoutly managed to maintain the limits of power he had staked out against Buell. He continued to have the full support of the War Department and the President. Lincoln was willing to back Johnson to the hilt, short of putting him in complete command in Tennessee. Had Buell been a winning general or had Rosecrans not been defeated at Chickamauga in September, Johnson's search for authority might not have been so successful.
Power might have gravitated into the hands of a commanding general who continually won battles.

As it was, Andrew Johnson emerged as the predominant force in Tennessee after October, 1863. No commanding general ever again seriously challenged his authority. This was partly because of the more amenable personality of Rosecrans' successor, General George H. Thomas. It was partly because for more than a year after the battle of Lookout Mountain-Missionary Ridge in November, 1863, Tennessee was free from major Confederate forces. This meant that for the first time during the war, civil, not military, affairs in the state might hold the spotlight. It was also partly because Johnson, through his own exertions and encouragement from the Lincoln administration, had made it plain to everyone that he was in Tennessee to stay.

Until Johnson's preponderance was assured, the system of dual command seriously hindered the restoration of a loyal state government. Together with the continued presence of Confederate forces in Middle Tennessee, the divided councils of the military governor and the commanding generals slowed progress toward reconstruction. Yet, in the face of all these obstacles, Andrew Johnson began the work of building a loyal political organization in Tennessee.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Three


7. John Weisert to his mother, March 10, 1863, John Weisert Papers, University of Michigan, Michigan Historical Collections (MHC), Ann Arbor; Lindsley Diary, March 25, 1863.

8. Nashville Dispatch, April 4, 1863; David Millsapugh Diary, April 18, 1863, David Millsapugh Papers, MHC; Francis Everett Hall to his mother, May, 1863, Francis Everett Hall Papers, MHC.


101.
10 Nashville Daily Times and True Union, Dec. 21, 1864.

11 Lindsley Diary, Dec. 1, 1864.


19 Pitch, Annals, p. 579.

20 Nashville Dispatch, Oct. 15, 1863.

21 Hall, Andrew Johnson, pp. 71-72.

22 Nashville Daily Times and True Union, July 22, 1864.

23 Buell to McClellan, March 6, 1862, in O.R., I, X, II, p. 11.

24 Buell to AJ, March 19, 1862, in Ibid., p. 47.

25 AJ to Stanton, March 21, 1862, in Ibid., p. 56.

26 Stanton to AJ, March 22, 1862, in Ibid., p. 58.

27 Stanton to Halleck, March 22, 1862, in Ibid., pp. 57-58.
28AJ to Stanton, March 29, 1862, in Ibid., p. 76.
29Stanton to Halleck, March 30, 1862, and Buell to Halleck, March 30, 1862, both in Ibid., p. 79.
30Connally F. Twigg to AJ, April 7, 1862, AJP; AJ to Buell, April 25, 1862, AJP; AJ to Stanton, April 25, 1862, AJP.
32AJ to Lincoln, April 26, 1862, in Ibid., p. 129.
33AJ to Stanton, May 11, 1862, in Ibid., pp. 180-81.
34AJ to Halleck, June 17, 1862, AJP.
35Buell to Halleck, April 26, 1862, in O.R., I, X, II, p. 129; Hall, Andrew Johnson, p. 52.
36Stanton to AJ, June 21, July 16, and Aug. 1, 1862, all in AJP.
37Ibid., March 28 and Oct. 8, 1863.
38AJ to Alvan C. Gillem, May 13, 1862, AJP; Warner, Generals in Blue, pp. 175-76.
40Order by Stanton, March 28, 1863, AJP; Report of Frank H. Hamilton, Medical Inspector, U.S. Army, June, 1863, AJP. Hamilton reported many of the troops to be in very bad health.
42Roosecrans to Brigadier General Lorenzo Thomas, May 3, 1863, in O.R., I, XXIII, II, pp. 308-09; John F. Miller to AJ, July 1, 1864, AJP.
AJ to John Sherman, June 18, 1862, AJP.

AJ to Halleck, June 17, 1862, AJP.

Halleck to Buell, June 22, 1862, in O.R., I, XVI, II, p. 47; Halleck to AJ, June 22, 1862, AJP.


AJ to Greene, June 23 and July 1, 1862, AJP; Greene to AJ, July 2 and 12, 1862, AJP.

D. Greene to Colonel J. B. Fry, June 4, 1862, and Fry to Greene, June 6, 1862, both in O.R., I, XVI, II, pp. 629-31.

Campbell to AJ, July 8 and 9, 1862, AJP; AJ to Campbell, July 9, 1862, AJP; AJ to Lincoln, July 10, 1862, in O.R., I, XVI, I, p. 119.

Ibid.

AJ to Lincoln, July 10, 1862, in Ibid., pp. 118-19.

Lincoln to Halleck, July 11, 1862, in Ibid., I, XVI, II, p. 122.

Lincoln to AJ, July 11, 1862, in Ibid.; Stanton to AJ, July 12, 1862, AJP; Buell to AJ, July 12, 1862, AJP.


AJ to Buell, Aug. 11, 1862, AJP; Nashville Daily Union, Oct. 29, 1862. Fort Negley was erected on what was before the war a beautiful woodlot where families often went for picnics. Caldwell, Little Girl of the Confederacy, pp. 17, 19.


59 Deposition of AJ, April 22, 1863, in Ibid., p. 697; Findings of the Buell Commission, in Ibid., p. 17.

60 Major William H. Sidell to AJ, Oct. 24, 1862, AJP.

61 Halleck to Rosecrans, March 20, 1863, in O.R., III, III, pp. 77-78.


63 Halleck to Rosecrans, March 30, 1863, in Ibid., p. 191.

64 Rosecrans to Halleck, April 4, 1863, in Ibid., p. 208.

65 Rosecrans to Stanton (for AJ), April 4, 1863, in Ibid., p. 207; AJ to Rosecrans, April 8 and June 1, 1863, in Ibid., pp. 220, 380-81.
CHAPTER FOUR

Prelude

Union troops entered Nashville in February, 1862. Many Nashvileans, however, remained southern sympathizers to varying degrees. Nashville became a center for clandestine pro-Confederate activities. Thus, Federal authorities in the city were presented with a grave security problem. One contemporary, who was a member of the Army Police of the Department of the Cumberland, gave his assessment of the situation:

For many weary months after its occupation by the Federal army, Nashville was the great centre to which thronged all the hordes of smugglers, spies, and secret plotters of treason, whom a love of treachery or of gain had drawn to the rebel cause. The aid and encouragement received from the wealthy Secessionists of the city enabled them securely and successfully to carry out their designs, which, added to its proximity to the heart of the Confederacy, made it a peculiarly advantageous base of operation. Through them, lines of communication were kept open to every part of the South, and the rebel army supplied with valuable goods and still more valuable information. Their shrewdness and secrecy seemed to defy every attempt at detection. The regular pickets, do what they would, found it impossible to prevent the transportation of contraband goods beyond the lines; and it was only when mounted policemen were stationed on every road leading from the city that a noticeable decrease in the operations of these aiders and abettors of the rebellion became apparent.
PURIFYING THE TAINTED ATMOSPHERE

Broadly speaking, the quest for loyalty in Nashville proceeded along two lines. First, there was repression of the disloyal and strong attempts at general control of the population. This might be considered the negative or punitive side of Federal occupation. Secondly, political action was initiated to induce the populace to return to its allegiance to the United States Government. This was the positive side of Federal occupation.

The successful implementation of these tactics depended upon a reasonable amount of cooperation between Johnson and the military officials in Nashville and Tennessee. If they pulled in the same direction, the task of reconstruction would be facilitated. If they worked at cross-purposes and engaged in command disputes, reconstruction would be sabotaged and delayed. Unfortunately for the Union cause in Nashville, until General George H. Thomas took command of the Department of the Cumberland in October, 1863, Johnson and the military commanders participated in a number of heated arguments which paralyzed effective, concerted action.

This chapter will discuss the efforts at repression and population control. Blatant coercion of specific
people was used during the first eight months of Union rule. From then on more general population control replaced suppression of individuals.

Johnson's critics then and now have maintained that he inaugurated a reign of terror in Nashville.² One of his contemporaries noted that Johnson unsparingly exercised the "right of pulling down and setting up."³ There is much truth in this. Johnson did move quickly to quash the influence of secessionists in the city. He believed, as did Lincoln, that the great mass of Tennesseans were loyal at heart. They simply had been misled by conniving leaders. Once these leaders were silenced, then the fundamental loyalty of the masses could re-assert itself and bring Tennessee back into the Union. Therefore, he employed power ruthlessly to suppress disloyalty in the city. His heavy hand fell upon the city administration and other leading secessionists, and upon the clergy, and the press.

I

On May 25 Johnson requested the Mayor, members of the City Council, the city police, and other city officials to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. They refused. City officials, they informed Johnson, had never before taken any oath other than the
simple oath of office to discharge their respective duties faithfully. Furthermore, they had never taken an oath inimical to their allegiance to the U.S. government or the state government.⁴ Such shows of bravado on their part were foolish. As William C. Birkhimer, an authority on military government, has pointed out, "Nothing could be more disastrous to the interests of inhabitants of occupied territory than for them to be made to believe that the invader is there by sufferance, and has no rights which they are bound to respect." Citizens in occupied territory who assume such lofty ground are simply courting disaster.⁵ Two days after the Mayor's refusal to take the oath, disaster struck. Mayor Cheatham was deposed and arrested. The rest of the city administration was ousted and Johnson filled their positions by appointment.⁶ Mayor Cheatham showed his true moral fiber by languishing in jail six weeks before turning his back on the Confederacy and pledging to support the U.S. government.⁷ Cheatham's conversion was exactly what Johnson wanted. By the use of power he hoped to break the back of the rebellion in Middle Tennessee. The problem was that although he could control the actions of men like Cheatham by the application of force, he could not control what was in their hearts.
Johnson also moved against other leading secessionists in Davidson County and the surrounding area. Orders went out to the provost marshal to arrest William G. Harding, Washington Barrow, John Overton, and Joseph Guild. All these men had been important in leading Tennessee out of the Union. Harding was the President of the Military and Financial Board of the State of Tennessee, established under Confederate authority. Overton had openly pledged his substantial fortune to the South. The others were equally involved in the Confederate cause. Harding, Barrow, and Guild were apprehended, but Overton escaped. The captives were sent to Fort Mackinaw, Michigan. In June the men were reported to be in good spirits and enjoying the beautiful scenery and climate of Michigan. But by mid-fall they were eager to be released. In order to return home Harding gave his parole of honor, gave bond of $20,000, and agreed to report directly to Johnson.

The clergy had to conform or else suffer the consequences. Those ministers and churches that remained loyal were not disturbed. The Catholics and Episcopalians were left untouched because they were considered loyal. Some disloyal clergymen departed the city before the Federals arrived. John B. McFerrin, a Methodist minister, wrote
that he "left because my friends thought it advisable, and because General Johnston so counseled. . . . I was known to be a thorough Southern man in sentiment."\textsuperscript{12}

Other Nashville clergymen of southern sympathies stayed in the city. With audacity bordering on stupidity, some of them refused to alter their church services to accord with the Federal occupation. By the middle of June Johnson had had enough of their disloyal sermonizing. He especially worried about the effect these "assumed ministers of Christ" had on the women of Nashville. He noted that they had "done more to poison and corrupt the female mind of this community than all others, changing them from women and ladies to fanatics and fiends."\textsuperscript{13} So, Johnson requested six ministers to take an oath of allegiance. When they refused, Johnson ordered the provost marshal to arrest them and confine them in the State Prison. Included among those arrested were two of the most prominent churchmen in the city, Samuel D. Baldwin (a Methodist) and R. B. C. Howell (a Baptist).\textsuperscript{14}

By late July, when it became obvious that the ministers still would not take the oath, Johnson wrote to the Governors of Ohio and Indiana. He asked if each one could take several of these "rabid secessionist preachers" and put them in some camp or prison "where they cannot exert an evil influence on others and at the same time receive only such treatment
as traitors deserve." Four of the six eventually ended up in Camp Chase, Ohio. One, who was seriously ill, remained in Nashville under house arrest. The sixth was sent south of the Federal lines. When those bound for the northern prison left Nashville, one of the preachers boldly told those who collected to see them off, "Don't forget God, Jeff Davis, and the Southern Confederacy." But after a few months in Camp Chase this militancy disappeared. When Johnson offered the men stringent paroles, they all readily accepted.

News censorship and suppression were practiced widely during the Civil War, both in the North and South. The press was as influential then as now in stirring up hatred and hysteria and in changing men's minds. Indeed, without newspapers the task of the secessionists would have been far more difficult. No institution did more to alter the attitude of southerners toward the Union that the secessionist press. Johnson and other military authorities were well aware of this, and heavily censored and managed the Nashville press.

When the Federals captured Nashville, most members of the press looked to their own safety and hastily abandoned their offices. However, several secessionist editors remained in the city. James T. Bell, editor of
the Nashville Gazette, and Ira P. Jones, editor of the Republican Banner, were arrested for treasonable and seditious language and conduct. With the disloyal press out of the way, Johnson built up a core of loyal papers under staunch Unionists. S. C. Mercer, "a talented writer sound on all the great natural questions of the day," was imported from Kentucky. As Mercer himself admitted, he edited the news "under the auspices of Governor Johnson" and gave "zealous support to the Union cause and the war policy of the administration." Benjamin C. Truman, Johnson's long-time friend, also edited a Nashville paper which always "stood up squarely" for Johnson.

Although Nashville's domestic press was purified, journals and papers from other cities still circulated in the city. Some of these offended Unionist sensibilities. One was the New York Freeman's Journal. This paper contained articles which attacked prominent Nashville Unionists, praised Lee while ridiculing Hooker and Rosecrans, and tried to seduce Catholic families away from their allegiance to the Union. "It is," wrote one Nashville Unionist, "full of treason, abuse, fault-finding, and lying." One Nashville Unionist editor asked if the Nashville papers would "be permitted to publish such articles? Certainly not, and they should not." On July 27, 1863, the Union post commandant
ordered that the sale of the *Journal* be discontinued and that all copies already in the city be confiscated. Individual copies of the paper continued to circulate in the city, but by and large, Nashvilleans read only what Johnson and the military authorities wanted them to read during the war.²²

Looking back on the first ten months of Federal occupation, J. B. Lindsley recorded his impressions in his diary. "So ends this year of the horrors of war," he wrote, "forever memorable in the Annals of the world, as stamping indelibly upon the northern factions the mark of Cain. Unable to conquer, they endeavor to exterminate a people."²³ This was, of course, an extreme overstatement of Union policy. Yet, Nashvilleans were justifiably frightened by Johnson's determination to hold the city at any cost and to break the grip of secessionist sentiment in Middle Tennessee.

II

Along with the explicit repression of prominent Confederate sympathizers, Federal authorities in Nashville employed general population control measures. Nashville was in the heart of enemy territory. It was also usually in the
rear of a large Union army, whether it was Rosecrans at Murfreesboro or Sherman on his way to Atlanta. Since Nashville's population was never loyal during the war, it was obvious that some measures were necessary to prevent the citizenry from giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

One young Nashvillean recalled that "every precaution was thrown around the place to prevent any communications between the citizens and the southern army."24 One precaution was a system of passes and permits regulating movement in the city. In late January, 1863, the post commander at Nashville issued an order which said that "no passes will be given to go outside the Picket lines of this city except to persons of known and undoubted loyalty."25

The pass system was not foolproof. One problem was that persons who obtained passes for their private use could loan or sell them to others. The military authorities had no way of knowing the loyalty of those who bought or borrowed passes, but the presumption was that they were disloyal.26 Another problem was to keep disloyal persons, who were hiding behind the mask of loyalty, from obtaining passes. Two young Nashville belles, Susan and Mary Elliott, acquired passes through the influence of their Yankee uncle, Lieutenant Colonel G. T. Elliott, despite the fact that their father and two brothers were in the Confederate service.
The pass said they were not to return to the city without express permission from headquarters. When they tried to move back into the city without permission, they were arrested. They were carrying a number of contraband letters to people in Nashville.\textsuperscript{27} No doubt others got through without being caught. Despite such abuses, the pass system helped to keep Nashville's population under the watchful eye of the military.

Control of the mails and manipulation of the postal service patronage were other tactics adopted to prevent Nashvilledians from aiding and comforting the enemy. Nashville was such an important political-military center that the enemy had to be denied easy access to the city's inner workings. This required censorship of the mail. At the same time it was hoped that a careful distribution of the post office patronage would aid in building a loyal foundation in Middle Tennessee.

The postal services of Middle Tennessee were disrupted by the Union occupation of Nashville. Johnson soon found himself pressed to have post offices re-opened within the Federal lines. He thought that a resumption of postal services would aid the Union cause because he would "see that good Union and reliable men only are put in offices which can be opened with advantage to the Government."\textsuperscript{28} The feeling was that the circulation of "proper" intelligence
would surely aid the Union cause. The rebels, however, also knew the morale and propaganda value of mail. They tried to disrupt all Union mail agencies. But where Union military forces were stationed, mail facilities continued to function. In mid-summer, 1864, the Postmaster at Nashville, A. V. S. Lindsley, reported to Johnson that almost all employees in the post office were ex-Union soldiers or refugees.

Meanwhile, through the first eighteen months of Federal occupation the army censored the mail but sent inoffensive letters through the lines. Then in August, 1863, the post commander at Nashville ordered that letters received by the army for transmittal through the lines into enemy country would no longer be forwarded. Instead, they would be sent to the Dead Letter Office in Washington. With twenty to forty thousand letters being mailed daily at Nashville, there were bound to be some information leaks. But postal censorship and control by Unionists deprived the rebels of valuable information, facilitated the dissemination of loyalist papers and propaganda, and lowered morale among those in the Confederate ranks who had friends and families in Middle Tennessee.

A third method of population control was embodied in a proclamation issued by Andrew Johnson late in the war. By this edict all able-bodied males in the state between
the ages of eighteen and fifty were to be enrolled. Once enrolled they would be subject to military duty in the state militia and "liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States when called out by the President of the United States or the Governor of the State."

The proclamation designated magistrates in the civil districts and wards of the state as the enrolling officers. This measure forced men openly to choose sides. They could not remain neutral. Southern sympathizers who resided comfortably within Federal lines detested this decree. In several districts the enrolling officers hesitated to begin the enrollment because they feared violence. Many friends of the Confederacy reportedly went South rather than cooperate with the Federal government in any way. The enrollment proclamation helped cleanse Tennessee of disloyalty. By driving away some of those of doubtful loyalty, Unionism became that much purer. And the mere fact of enrollment enabled the military to keep closer tabs on those who remained behind.

This proclamation, though seemingly harsh on those who perhaps tried to stay neutral, was in accord with the Lieber Code. The Code allowed subjects of the enemy to be forced into the service of the victorious government after
there had been a "fair and complete conquest of the hostile
country or district," and if the victor intended to keep
the district permanently.\textsuperscript{36}

The Lieber Code was often based on actions already
taken in the field by Union commanders. In three different
sections it gives a commanding general the right to force
the citizenry in hostile areas to take oaths of allegiance,
and any other pledge the general "may consider necessary
for the safety or security of his army. . . ."\textsuperscript{37} In Ten-
nessee Andrew Johnson and the high army command had insti-
gated oath-taking procedures long before publication of
the Code.

In fact, oath-taking was a nation-wide phenomenon
during the Civil War.\textsuperscript{38} In many places in the North persons
were required to take oaths drawn up on the spur of the
moment by local officials and commanders to fit local cir-
cumstances. Cabinet secretaries, pensioners, applicants
for passports, shipmasters, and thousands more were all
required to take oaths in the North. But it was in the
South where loyalty tests and oaths found their most frequent
application. As Federal commanders moved South, they
"found loyalty oaths a ready weapon with which to cow
civilian populations."\textsuperscript{39} The process began in Tennessee.
In the summer of 1862 Johnson issued an order which said that all persons arrested for using treasonable and seditious language who refused to take the oath of allegiance and give a $1,000 bond for their future good behavior, would be sent south of the Federal lines. If they returned they were to be treated as spies. At first, however, there was little chance to enforce this order. For one thing, almost all energies had to be devoted to saving the city from the Confederate forces of Morgan and Forrest. Furthermore, Buell believed in more gentle treatment of the civilian populace. But by late November temporary security was gained for the city, and Buell was replaced by General Rosecrans.

Johnson and Rosecrans showed promise of being able to work together. Toward the end of November they developed a plan for requiring bonds and sureties for good behavior. The plan went through several modifications, but, in essence, a person was allowed to take the oath of allegiance or a non-combatant's parole. Whichever he took, he had to give bond of a certain amount, with approved surety, to assure his adherence to his oath or parole. Having done this, the citizen was given a guarantee of protection by the military authorities. Anyone failing to take the oath or parole was to be banished from the Federal lines.
The principal and his surety did not have to deposit money to satisfy the bond. Instead, a fixed amount was to "be levied and made of all [their] respective lands and tenements, goods and chattels" only if the person misbehaved. The bond was void if the person kept the peace and did not give aid and comfort to the enemy.\(^42\)

At first this plan was to be applied to every citizen, irrespective of his past political predilections. One obvious advantage to this scheme was that thereby the past, in a sense, would be wiped out. All would resume their allegiance and start anew, thus erasing "odious" distinctions which served to keep passions inflamed.\(^43\) However, loyal Union men were aghast at this plan. They wanted preferential treatment. They did not want to be classed with those persons of rebel sentiments.\(^44\) Consequently, the plan was limited to the pro-rebel element of the population. On December 30, 1862, Rosecrans ordered that all citizens of Nashville and Davidson County who had aided the rebellion by word or deed should come forward within two weeks to "make bond and oath, according to the forms provided and heretofore published by military authority." Any who did not would be "summarily dealt with, by fine, imprisonment, or exclusion from these lines."\(^45\)
Evidently few persons responded to the bond and surety plan. Many probably hoped that this measure, like the one Johnson proposed in the summer, would not be enforced for one reason or another. Rosecrans, however, was determined to pursue the policy. A little more than two months after his order of December 30 he issued a General Order on the subject. There were within the Federal lines, said Rosecrans, "many helpless and suffering families whose natural protectors and supporters are in arms against us." It was not the duty of the U.S. authorities to feed, clothe, and protect these people. It was therefore ordered that all whose "natural protectors" were in the rebel service were to prepare themselves to be sent South within ten days, as were all those "whose sympathies and connections are such that they cannot give the assurance that they will conduct themselves as peaceable citizens." All who took the non-combatant parole or the oath of allegiance and gave the requisite bond could remain at home.46

Again there was little response in Nashville. But this time the order was enforced. In mid-April, 1863, between seventy-five and one hundred people of "well-known rebellious views and decided hostility to the Government" were arrested by the military. This action created
consternation among southern sympathizers. On the heels of these initial arrests General Robert B. Mitchell, temporarily in command at Nashville, published a strongly worded order. Sympathizers with the rebellion, he said, apparently consider their political sentiments more important than the "obligations imposed upon them by their residence and protection within the Federal lines." Consequently, all whites who had not previously taken the oath or parole, or who were not known Unionists, had to subscribe to the oath or parole and file bonds with sufficient securities within ten days. Those who did not would be sent South.

This time there were results. There was already great alarm in the community caused by the recent arrests. The newspapers now reported a great rush to comply with Mitchell's order. Within a week Mitchell had to triple the number of clerks detailed for taking oaths and paroles. By May 8, some 6,623 had taken the oath and 721 the parole. Others in the vicinity, whose support for the Confederacy overshadowed all else, accepted banishment. Many were exiled north of the Ohio River, but others were sent south.

Banishment was a very common punishment for recalcitrants during the Civil War, but it had taken Federal authorities in Middle Tennessee more than a year to begin
applying it vigorously. Even then it was not really a harsh policy because citizens were offered a realistic alternative. By merely accepting the obligation of temporary allegiance, Middle Tennesseans could gain the advantage of military protection for themselves and their property. All they had to do in return was to remain peaceful. In short, the policy was not completely without advantages to the citizenry. 51

III

Johnson and Rosecrans were in agreement on the policy of submission or banishment. On other methods of population control, however, they quarreled bitterly. One of these was the employment of an Army Police to root out disloyalty. Their disagreement over the Army Police was so sharp that at times it seriously hampered the quest for loyalty. 52

When Rosecrans replaced Buell and came to Nashville, he created a force of military police. This secret service was under the direction of William Truesdail. Truesdail was born in New York but grew up in Erie, Pennsylvania. Here he held several minor elected offices and engaged in merchandizing and real estate speculations. Eventually, he became a railroad man. When the Civil War began he and
two other men were in the process of constructing a rail-
road from New Orleans to Houston. After the firing on
Fort Sumter, Truesdail went to Missouri where he served as
a military railroad superintendent and military contractor.
Under Brigadier General John Pope, who commanded the Army
of the Mississippi from February to June, 1862, Truesdail
was placed in charge of the police and secret service, the
scouts and couriers, and the forwarding of the mails and
dispatches. When Rosecrans assumed command of the Army of
the Mississippi in June, 1862, Truesdail retained his
position. And when Rosecrans went to the Army of the
Cumberland, Truesdail went with him. His official title
was Chief of Police in the Army of the Cumberland. Trues-
dail soon established his own Police Court.\textsuperscript{53}

In the eyes of Truesdail and his policemen, Nashville
was "swarming with traitors, smugglers, and spies . . . .
The city, in fact, was one vast 'Southern Aid Society,'
whose sole aim was to plot treason and furnish information
to the rebel leaders." The Army Police believed it was
their duty to "purify this tainted atmosphere."\textsuperscript{54} The
Police did help control smuggling, pick up deserters,
recover stolen government property, and expose disloyalty.
Their most famous exploit was bringing Dr. John Rolfe
Hudson to justice. Hudson was a prominent physician who
adopted a facade of loyalty to divert attention from his numerous disloyal activities. Through an elaborate system of entrapment the Army Police managed to expose him and have him banished beyond the Federal lines.\textsuperscript{55}

However, the methods employed by the Army Police were often so unscrupulous that many citizens, loyal and disloyal alike, were offended. For example, a small number of brokers in Nashville speculated in Confederate money. Federal authorities in the city made no effort to curtail this relatively harmless activity. Then, in mid-January, 1863, without any published orders, or even private notification that the traffic was illegitimate, the brokers were all arrested by the Army Police. The staunchly loyal Daily Union had "no doubt that the traffic is mischievous, corrupting, and disloyal in its tendencies and ought to be interdicted; but the summary proceedings of the police seem to us altogether oppressive and unnecessary." The proper way to have brought speculation in Confederate money under control, the paper said, was a published order prohibiting the circulation of Confederate currency.\textsuperscript{56}

There was also more than a hint of suspicion that the Army Police used their vaunted position to engage in cotton speculation and illegal seizures and confiscations. Furthermore, there is good evidence that they tried to control the press through bribery.\textsuperscript{57} Even an apologist
for the Police admitted that "errors and wrongs may have been committed by its officials; many arrests may have been made without good reason therefor, and many goods seized that ought to have been untouched; true, many bad men may have wormed themselves into its service . . . ." 58

Johnson was one of the most avid critics of the Police, and especially of Truesdail. Truesdail, said Johnson, is "a great misfortune to our cause in this section of the country." "Since I have been discharging the duties of Executive of the State," continued Johnson, "I have refused and rejected the applications for the release of fifty convicts confined in the cells of our State prison, who are better and more worthy men than he is." The Governor believed that Truesdail's Police had done much damage to the Union cause in Nashville. Their operations, he said, were "most decidedly averse to a restoration of a correct public sentiment." Their summary method of handling "the persons and property of citizens, have not only excited a feeling of indignation among the more conservative portion of the community, but have greatly impaired the confidence of the loyal men . . . ." It was to these classes of men, Johnson pointed out, that "we look for active support, in the correct intentions of the government." Furthermore, said Johnson, the Army Police were extraneous. There was
already ample machinery in Nashville for the proper execution of the laws—United States attorneys, courts, and marshals, a municipal government and police force, and a post commander and provost marshal. The use of a secret military police simply undermined the authority of these institutions.

Rosecrans stoutly refused to remove the Police or even bring them under control. He denied all the complaints against them. He said that the complaints "have generally come from smugglers and unscrupulous Jews, who have been detected in contraband trade, and their property confiscated." In the spring of 1863 Rosecrans appointed a special inspector, Captain Temple Clark, to investigate the Army Police. Clark had once served on Rosecran's staff, but was employed on Johnson's staff at the time of his investigation. Clark's report maintained that the Police were highly advantageous to the government. He could find no evidence of the misbehavior of which Johnson and others complained. The validity of this report is hard to assess. In the light of all the evidence from other sources of illegal activities by the Army Police, it seems reasonable to conclude that it was a whitewash. However, it is probably equally true that the critics of the Police overstated their argument, too.
In any event, the Police remained in Nashville until Rosecrans was removed from command in October, 1863. In the interim, Unionism had suffered. The editor of the *Daily Union* spoke for many loyalists when he wrote that "we thank God devoutly in behalf of oppressed loyalty" for the abolition of the Army Police.62

Another matter over which Johnson and Rosecrans were at odds was the use of military commissions. These were one of the foremost methods of military control over civilian populations in the South. Wherever Union armies went, military commissions went with them. These military courts took cognizance of cases involving both civilians and the military, including violations of the laws of war and all civilian breaches of military orders and regulations. They would also try civilians for crimes and offenses recognizable by local courts where the local courts were not open.63 Military commissions met in Nashville throughout the war. However, during the first year and a half of Federal occupation, they created as many problems as they solved. These commissions, of course, operated side-by-side with Truesdail's hated Police Court, which also tried civilians.

For Andrew Johnson's purposes it was important for civil courts to begin functioning in Tennessee as soon as possible. This would be an important step toward the
re-establishment of a legitimate civil government. By May 1, 1862, Johnson had made significant steps toward the revival of civil courts in Nashville. Circuit, chancery, and magistrates' courts were daily holding sessions. Early the next year Johnson made arrangements for the reopening of the Criminal Court of Davidson County. 64

Thus, by the time Rosecrans arrived in Nashville two separate court systems were organized and operating. It did not take long for friction to develop between the military tribunals and the civil courts. One of the first altercations occurred in November, 1862. The case was trivial since it only involved the breaking of a municipal law. Brigadier General James P. Negley, commander of Union forces at Nashville, ordered the provost marshal to direct the city recorder to annul all proceedings in the case. The reason for the request was that the suit had already been disposed of at Army Headquarters. The city recorder, William Shane, refused to comply. He said the provost marshal and recorder did not have concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the laws of the city were violated. He declared emphatically that the Recorder's Court was the sole tribunal for the trial of offenses against the city. 65

Here was a clear conflict between the powers of the civil and military authorities at Nashville.
The situation got worse. Where cases arose which were apparently cognizable under either civil or military law, there was a scramble for jurisdiction. Johnson favored the civil courts because exalting them over military tribunals would have a salutary moral and political effect. Rosecrans, who did not have much regard for Johnson's authority in the first place, not only wanted to uphold his own authority and prestige, but also wanted to win the war first and then worry about political and moral ramifications.

The War Department finally intervened to try to unsnarl the legal mess and conflicts of authority in Middle Tennessee. On March 30, 1863, General-in-Chief Halleck sent Rosecrans detailed instructions to guide him in his relations with the civil authorities of Tennessee. These instructions came down heavily on the side of the newly constituted civil courts. The civil authorities, said Halleck, were to be respected. The military forces of the United States "will not interfere with the authority and jurisdiction of the loyal officers of the State government, except in case of urgent and pressing necessity." All civil and criminal cases cognizable under the laws of Tennessee and the United States were to be tried in the state and federal courts re-established in Tennessee. 66
Despite these specific orders legal conflicts continued as long as Rosecrans remained in command. Only after Rosecrans was relieved did the military give proper recognition to the civil courts of Middle Tennessee. In early 1864 the officer in command at Nashville ordered that "Hereafter the Military Authorities of this District will refrain from taking action in, or in any manner interfering with matters which properly and exclusively belong to, and should be adjusted by the civil tribunals of the country."\(^{67}\) This order was followed. One notable example will suffice to show its application. A white man, William C. Taylor, was brought before a military commission in Nashville for maliciously killing a black servant. Taylor entered a plea of not guilty, but also argued that he should be tried in the criminal court established under the authority of Governor Johnson in the county where the alleged crime was committed. The Army's Judge Advocate argued strenuously against this. But the members of the commission ruled in favor of the defendant, saying that there was a properly organized civil court which held jurisdiction over the crime.\(^{68}\) The Union press of Nashville greeted this decision as a significant victory for Johnson's civil government.\(^{69}\)

The conflict between the civil and military courts was finally settled in favor of civil authority. But before
this was done much damage had been inflicted on the Union cause in Nashville. The struggle for jurisdiction between Rosecrans and Johnson had engendered bitterness and hostility between the two officials which prevented single-minded concentration on the problem of establishing a loyal state government.

IV

The use of retaliation was another means of control resorted to by Federal authorities. "The law of war," says the Lieber Code, "can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations of which it is a branch." Retaliation, though, should never be used as a measure of "mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution and moreover cautiously and unavoidably." 70 Here again actions taken by Andrew Johnson were in accord with the Code, but actually preceded its publication. Ten weeks after assuming the position of military governor, Johnson issued a proclamation designed to put a stop to guerrilla outrages against Union citizens. Every time a Union man was mistreated by "marauding bands," said Johnson, "five or more rebels from the most prominent in the immediate neighborhood shall be arrested, imprisoned, and otherwise
dealt with as the nature of the case may require." If the property of Unionists was destroyed, "full and ample remuneration" was to be made from the property of rebels in the vicinity who "have sympathized with, and given aid, comfort, information or encouragement to the parties committing such depredations." Later in the war regular army officers stationed in Nashville issued similar orders. One Confederate considered such orders a return "to the ages of barbarism." 71

Another aspect of Johnson's use of retaliation was the taking of hostages to exchange for Union captives held by Confederates. On June 5, 1863, Johnson reported to Lincoln that seventy of his beloved fellow East Tennesseans were in prison in Mobile, Alabama. Some of these captives were among "the most respectable and valuable citizens" of that section. They were, Johnson said, being "treated with more cruelty than wild beasts of the forest." Johnson said that he had taken steps to "arrest seventy vile secessionists" in the Nashville area to offer in exchange for the East Tennesseans. "Does this meet your approval?" he asked. Stanton replied to this letter, saying that the President fully approved of his "proceeding of reprisal against the secessionists." Johnson then asked Halleck to arrange an exchange of prisoners. The military governor continued to
use this retaliatory tactic throughout the war. In at least some instances it proved to be effective.\textsuperscript{72}

Levying special assessments and contributions on the civilian population was employed by Johnson as a method of population control. The Lieber Code is curiously vague on this point.\textsuperscript{73} But, as usual, Andrew Johnson was decisive and precise. One of his contemporaries observed that he "levied at his will heavy assessments of money on the wealthy secessionists of Middle Tennessee."\textsuperscript{74} As early as August 2, 1862, some Nashville newspapers suggested levying assessments on rich secessionists of Davidson County. Less than three weeks later Johnson sent a letter to a number of citizens demanding that they contribute money to relieve the destitute families in Nashville. The money was to be paid within five days to James Whitworth, the judge of the County Court.\textsuperscript{75}

Among those asked to contribute were some of the wealthiest men in Nashville. One was Mark Robertson Cockrill, an agriculturalist noted for his stock-raising. In 1851 his herd of merino sheep was awarded a prize for growing the finest wool anywhere in the world. A few years later the Tennessee Legislature presented him with a gold medal in recognition of his agricultural expertise.\textsuperscript{76} Another was Byrd Douglas. He and his brother were known
as the "Cotton Kings of Nashville." Some indication of their wealth is given by their order to destroy over $4,000,000 worth of cotton belonging to them rather than have it fall into Yankee hands. In January, 1861, Byrd Douglas sent the Governor of South Carolina a substantial check to be used as he saw fit. Along with the check he enclosed a letter saying he had five strong sons who would serve "with you and your noble people, at my expense, when you may need them if it be before their native State ..., shall require their services." And if some of these sons should be killed by the enemy, he had "two intelligent negro men, who would willingly and efficiently fill any vacancy." Men like Cockrill and Douglas could well afford to pay assessments.

The five day limit set by Johnson was ignored by most. In mid-December Johnson issued a proclamation making new assessments. A month later the comptroller of the state reported that some had paid promptly, but others had not. In late February the Nashville post commander ordered the 1st Middle Tennessee Infantry to enforce the assessments made by Johnson. If a person refused to pay, his available property was to be seized. Here again, as with the taking of oaths and paroles, the open application of force induced a quick response from the recalcitrant citizenry.
The disloyal citizens rapidly began to pay their assessments. 79

Johnson levied these assessments without any express authority to do so. One indication of how firmly committed the Lincoln Administration was to Johnson's reconstruction efforts in Tennessee was its response to these exactions. On April 3, 1863, Johnson received specific instructions on the subject from the War Department. These said that under his authority and commission as military governor, he had virtually unlimited power to impose taxes and exactions on disloyal persons for the purpose of maintaining his government. 80 The government was going to stand by Andrew Johnson in all that he did if it would help re-establish a loyal state.

Some have claimed that these assessments, "imposed under the plea of charity for the needy," were the first step in Johnson's policy of "punishment, disgrace, and impoverishment" of the rich. 81 This judgment is unwarranted. The need for the levies was real. Thousands of poor people were huddled in Nashville under the most appalling circumstances. Food, fuel, shelter, and clothing were enormously expensive. If some relief was not provided many would die during the winter from starvation and exposure. Between August 23, 1862, and January 9, 1864,
the amount collected by these special levies was $22,372.95. There is good evidence that every penny of this was distributed to the wives and dependents of Federal and Confederate soldiers, refugees, and resident poor. If anything, there should have been more levies for larger amounts more promptly and forcefully collected to alleviate their suffering.

Several factors prevented this. One was the unsettled condition of Middle Tennessee caused by the continual presence of Confederate forces—both regular and irregular. This meant that for long periods of time all efforts and troops were devoted to the actual defense of the city. This was especially true during the summer and fall of 1862 when Nashville was virtually under siege.

A second factor preventing forceful action against rich secessionists was the special protection given to property by Buell. When Mayor Cheatham surrendered the city to Buell, he received assurances that the liberty and property of all citizens would be sacredly respected. Buell kept this promise. One Nashvillian spoke glowingly of "the just appreciation of and observance of the private rights and property of the people upon the part of the whole army." He believed that this policy would "win the admiration of both the friends and former enemys [sic] of the Union," and
lead to a revolution in public sentiment which would bring Tennessee back into the Union in a hurry. This did not happen. Instead, leading rebels in the city and throughout Middle Tennessee remained defiant, especially since Confederate forces held out the hope of deliverance.

It did not take some men long to conclude that Buell's policy of special protection and favoritism toward Confederate sympathizers was bankrupt. Reuben D. Mussey, who was to play an important role in recruiting black troops in Nashville, was one of those who disagreed with Buell's policy. He wanted a halt to Buell's "rosewater policy." "We have stood guards over Rebel property long enough," he said. "Gen. [sic] Buell has endeavored to make his Corps a mere Police for the better protection of Rebels." A letter signed "Civis" appearing in the Daily Press said about the same thing. Johnson, of course, reached the same decision by August. However, it was only after Rosecrans replaced Buell and Middle Tennessee was temporarily secured from Confederate attack that Johnson's fiat could be enforced.

The dispute between Buell and Johnson over protection of secessionist property helped divide Unionist ranks and slowed the return of loyalism. Favoritism toward and protection of southern admirers and their property continued
throughout the war. But it never again reached the level it attained under Buell.

Confiscation was similar to the use of assessments. Unlike assessments, confiscation was sanctioned by Congressional law. Mussey, who favored sterner treatment of rebels, looked at confiscation as an "indispensable adjunct to our arms." Indeed, confiscation is a form of coercion. It impairs the enemy's ability to resist while at the same time it increases the means at the disposal of the appropriating government for carrying on the war. The execution of the Confiscation Acts as passed by Congress did not fall within the province of the military. But a Presidential order empowered military commissions to seize and use and real or personal property "which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands, as supplies, or for other military purposes . . . ." Union authorities in Nashville frequently employed confiscation, The United States District Marshal, E. R. Glasscock generally carried out the procedure. Confiscated property included books, a stock of hats, shoes, pipes, sides of bacon, gilt ornaments, silk and cotton handkerchiefs, private homes, furniture, and business houses. This by no means exhausts the list. Glasscock sold many of the confiscated goods at public auction, with the proceeds
going to the United States Treasury. The military used some confiscable property instead of selling it. For instance, the army took over two gun factories in the city and used them as military hospitals. It also used the confiscated Methodist Publishing House as a government printing house. Here, then, was one more way in which disloyalty suffered.

V

During the course of the wartime occupation of Nashville, numerous other expedients were used to control the civilian population and make disloyalty unpleasant. In the fall of 1862 an attempt was made to disarm the citizenry. The post commander ordered that all arms and munitions of war were to be turned in at headquarters. A $25.00 reward was offered for information concerning concealed arms. Slaves were guaranteed military protection if they provided such information. Another military directive required all citizens residing within Federal lines "to report to the nearest Provost Marshal every arrival of guests at their houses from day to day, within one hour from the time such arrival occurs . . . ." However, the main efforts at population control were a system of passes and permits; censorship of the mails;
enrollment of men into the state militia; the taking of oaths and non-combatant paroles; the use of a secret detective force; military commissions; retaliation; special assessments; and confiscation. Combined with the initial suppression of leading secessionists, these tactics made life in Nashville uncomfortable, at best, for those who adhered to the Confederacy. While Unionists suffered some inconvenience from these measures, their discomfort was slight in comparison to the plight of harassed and beleaguered rebels. To avoid the pressure, some southern sympathizers accepted banishment; a few no doubt converted to Unionism; most bent to Federal authority on the outside, but remained sullen and unhappy captives praying for deliverance by Confederate forces.

A man could be forced to take an oath of allegiance, but this did not mean that he believed in it. As one man who had four or five sons in Confederate service put it, "I can tie my hands, my feet, or my tongue by the oath I have taken, but I cannot prevent my heart from going out towards my boys." This was the dilemma of Federal efforts to rebuild loyalty in Nashville. A man's demeanor could be controlled by threat of punishment, but this did not necessarily change his true feelings. "You may paint a
crow white or red," said one radical Unionist, "but that won't prevent him from stealing your corn." Somehow positive alternatives to disloyalty had to be offered. Repression alone would not re-kindle heart-felt loyalty.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Four

1Fitch, Annals, p. 489.


3Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, p. 406.

4[?] Hays, City Recorder, to AJ, March 27, 1862, AJP.

5Birkhimer, Military Government, p. 3.

6AJ to Stanley Matthews, Provost Marshal, March 29, 1862, AJP; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, p. 15.

7Richard B. Cheatham to AJ, May 12, 1862, AJP.

8AJ to Stanley Matthews, Provost Marshal, March 31, April 1, 2, and 16, 1862, AJP.

9Gower and Allen, Pen and Sword, pp. 646-47.

10See AJP, Sept. 25, 1862.


12O. P. Fitzgerald, John B. McFerrin: A Biography (Nashville: Publishing House of the M. E. Church, South, 1883) pp. 269-70. During the war McFerrin was in charge of all Methodist missionary work in the Army of Tennessee.

13AJ to General [Jeremiah T.] Boyle, Aug. 4, 1862, AJP.

144.
14 Nashville Dispatch, July 1, 1862.


16 See the paroles of Samuel D. Baldwin, Reuben Ford, W. D. F. Sawnie, and W. H. Wharton, all in AJP for Oct., 1862. The military in Nashville cooperated with Johnson in his suppression of disloyal churches and clergymen. For example, the post commander ordered that the control and occupation of the Second Presbyterian Church be reserved for loyal people alone. Nashville Daily Union, Aug. 9, 1862.


19 Clayton, History of Davidson County, p. 241; Nashville Daily Union, April 16, 1862.


21 Benjamin C. Truman to AJ, Nov. 12, 1863, AJP.

22 Daily Press and Times (Nashville), May 29 and 30, July 15, 21, 24, and 28, and Aug. 2, 1863. The press was also controlled in Memphis by Union authorities. See Parks, "Memphis Under Military Rule," pp. 33-34.

23 Lindsley Diary, Dec. 31, 1862.

24 Narrative by John P. W. Brown, John Preston Watts Brown Collection, TSLA.

26. Ibid., Jan. 27, 1863; Acting Provost Marshal General Bracken to Provost Marshal Hunter Brooke, Jan. 20, 1865, Department (Dept.) of the Cumberland, vol. 120, Letters Sent (LS), Record Group (RG) 393, NA.


28. AJ to First Assistant Postmaster General, April 24, 1862, AJP.


30. A. V. S. Lindsley to AJ, July 7, 1864, AJP.


33. For an example of the anxiety caused by not hearing from one's family and friends, see Fitzgerald, McFerrin, pp. 280-81.


37. Ibid., pp. 151, 161, and 164.


39. Ibid., p. 35.
40 Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1862, p. 766.


43 Nashville Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1862.

44 Ibid., Dec. 4 and 5, 1862; Hyman, Era of the Oath, pp. 39-40.

45 Nashville Daily Union, Jan. 11, 1863.


47 Nashville Daily Union, April 14 and 15, 1863; Nashville Dispatch, April 18, 1863.

48 Nashville Daily Union, April 22, 1863.

49 Ibid., April 25 and 26, May 9 and 27, 1863; Lindsley Diary, April and May, 1863; Special Order No. 102, May 3, 1863 (enclosed with John C. Andrews to AJ, Jan. 16, 1865), AJP.


52 Rosecrans' biographer says that the operations of the Army Police proved to be the "most trying common problem" between Rosecrans and Johnson. See Lamers, Edge of Glory, p. 256.


54 Fitch, Annals, p. 373.
55Ibid., pp. 504-15; Horn, "Confederate Underground in Nashville."

56Nashville Daily Union, Jan. 17, 1863.

57Rosecrans to AJ, April 4, 1863, AJP; Benjamin C. Truman to AJ, Nov. 12, 1863, AJP; Nashville Daily Union, Oct. 30 and 31, and Nov. 3, 1863; Hall, Andrew Johnson, pp. 78-79.

58Pitch, Annals, p. 351.

59AJ to Richard Smith, Nov. 2, 1863, AJP; AJ to Rosecrans, Jan. 11, 1863, AJP.

60Rosecrans to AJ, Jan. 17 and April 4, 1863, AJP.

61Pitch, Annals, pp. 353-56.


64Nashville Daily Union, May 1, 1862, and Jan. 24, 1863.

65Provost Marshal A. C. Gillem to City Recorder John [William?] Shane, Nov. 7, 1862, AJP; Shane to Gillem, Nov. 7, 1862, AJP; Gillem to Shane, Nov. 7, 1862, AJP.


67Nashville Daily Union, Jan. 9, 1864.

68Nashville Daily Times and True Union, April 13, 1864.

69Ibid., April 14, 1864.

Nashville Dispatch, May 11, 1862; Nashville Daily Times and True Union, June 23, 1864; Gower and Allen, Pen and Sword, p. 642. In Memphis Confederate sympathizers were also held accountable for the acts of Confederate forces. See Parks, "Memphis Under Military Rule," p. 49.


Nashville Daily Union, Aug. 2, 1862; Nashville Dispatch, Aug. 21, 1862.

Gower and Allen, Pen and Sword, p. 325; Mooney, Slavery, p. 198.

George H. Armistead, Jr., "He is a Great Rascal," A Sketch of Byrd Douglas," THQ, XXVII (Spring, 1968) p. 38; Nashville Union and American, Jan. 25, 1861.


Ibid., March 1 and 3, 1863.

Assistant Secretary of War P. H. Watson to AJ, April 2, 1863, in O.R., III, III, p. 115.

Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, p. 407.

Republican Banner, Sept. 19, 1872.

Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1862, p. 596.


R. D. Mussey to William Henry Smith, March 6, 1862, William Henry Smith Papers, The Ohio Historical Society (OHS), Columbus; Daily Press and Times, July 2, 1863.


The Nashville press teems with notices about confiscations and sales. There is some hint that confiscation was used for private gain. For example, the house of Sterling R. Cockrill was valued at over $30,000, yet at a confiscation sale it was sold for $5,600 to Joseph S. Fowler, who was Comptroller of the State. See the Nashville Daily Times and True Union, Aug. 31 and Sept. 2, 1864. For the gun factories see Daily Press and Times, May 15, 1863 (a list of Army hospitals) and the Nashville Daily Union, May 27, 1862. For the Publishing House, see House Ex. Docs., 39 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, Pt. 1, pp. 595-604.


Ibid., April 15, 1863.

Quoted in Clayton, History of Davidson County, p. 433. For another statement expressing similar sentiments, see R. B. C. Howell to AJ, Aug. 6, 1862, AJP.

Quoted in Hall, Andrew Johnson, p. 163.
CHAPTER FIVE

Prelude

On March 3, 1865, Andrew Johnson resigned his commission as Brigadier General of United States Volunteers and Military Governor of Tennessee to accept the Vice Presidency. Secretary of War Stanton extended the Government's thanks to him:

In one of the darkest hours of the great struggle for national existence against rebellious foes, the Government called you from the Senate and from the comparatively safe and easy duties of civil life to place you in the front of the enemy, and in a position of personal toil and danger, perhaps, more hazardous than was encountered by any other citizen or military officer of the United States. With patriotic promptness you assumed the post, and maintained it under circumstances of unparalleled trials, until recent events have brought safety and deliverance to your state, and to the integrity of that Constitutional Union for which you so long and so gallantly perilled all that is dear to man on earth.1

"LENIENCY IS CONSTRUED INTO TIMIDITY"

Andrew Johnson's primary responsibility in Tennessee was the creation of a loyal state government. When
Johnson arrived in Nashville on March 12, 1862, he was committed to a policy of moderation and conciliation. The basis for this initial policy was his belief that most Tennesseans were essentially loyal. Once the leaders of the rebellion were removed, Johnson believed, most people would see the error of their ways and gladly return to their old allegiance. It took Johnson about six months to realize that the Nashville citizenry construed leniency and moderation as weakness rather than kindness. His mild policy failed completely.\(^2\)

Once Johnson acknowledged that his initial policy was bankrupt, he changed dramatically. In the fall of 1862 he increasingly took a hard line against those who continued to adhere to the rebellion. This about-face by the military governor shattered the fragile base of Unionism which had survived up to that point. Some Unionists agreed with Johnson's new hard stand against treason. But many others, including some of the most prominent men in the state, continued to advocate a policy of forbearance and clemency toward their erring neighbors. The Emancipation Proclamation exacerbated beyond repair the split between these two wings of the Union party in Tennessee. Although the Proclamation did not specifically apply to Tennessee, the Johnson wing of the Union party supported it and began to advocate the
abolition of slavery in Tennessee. The other wing of the party opposed emancipation—or at least the manner in which it was accomplished. Thus, by the summer of 1863 there were actually two Union parties in the state.

At the very end of his term as military governor, Johnson did manage to restore a loyal state government in Tennessee. But this was done in a highly irregular manner, and the small faction which controlled the state government did not represent the majority of the people of Tennessee. For propaganda purposes, the fragile loyal state government in Tennessee could be viewed as the crowning achievement of Andrew Johnson's heroic stand in Tennessee. In reality, however, it represented an inglorious defeat of Johnson's efforts. When the war ended there was a shadow of loyalty in the state, but not much substance to it. Loyalty, in any broad sense, had not been rekindled in Tennessee. Unionism had prevailed on the battlefield, but not in civil society.

The philosophy behind sending Andrew Johnson to Tennessee was neatly summarized by Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles about the time that Johnson discovered that the
philosophy was no longer appropriate. "Instead of halting on the borders, building intrenchments, and repelling indiscriminately and treating as Rebels—enemies—all, Union as well as disunion, men in the insurrectionary region," wrote Welles, "we should I thought penetrate their territory, nourish and protect the Union sentiment and create and strengthen a national feeling counter to Secession." This is exactly what Johnson set out to do.

Soon after he arrived in Nashville, Johnson spoke to the people of the city and the state. The state government, he said, had disappeared. The executive and the legislature had fled, and the judiciary was in abeyance. "The great ship of state ... has been suddenly abandoned by its officers and mutinous crew, and left to float at the mercy of the winds." In this lamentable crisis, the national government had appointed him military governor of the state. It was his duty to "preserve the public property of the State, to give the protection of law actively enforced to her citizens, and, as speedily as may be, to restore her Government to the same condition as before the existing rebellion." He invited all Tennesseans to join with him in accomplishing this. In the interim, he would appoint men to fill abandoned positions in the state and country governments "until their places can be filled by the action of the people."
Johnson closed his address with a concise statement of the policy he intended to follow:

To the people themselves, the protection of the Government is extended. All their rights will be duly respected, and their wrongs redressed when made known . . . . The erring and misguided will be welcomed on their return. And while it may become necessary, in vindicating the violated majesty of the law, and in reasserting its imperial sway, to punish intelligent and conscious treason in high places, no mere retaliatory or vindictive policy will be adopted. To those, especially who in a private, unofficial capacity have assumed an attitude of hostility to the Government, a full and complete amnesty for all past acts and declarations is offered, upon the one condition of their again yielding themselves peaceful citizens to the just supremacy of the laws.  

Two months later, on May 12, this policy was publicly restated. The occasion was a mass meeting of Union sympathizers in Nashville. Johnson himself and ex-Governor William B. Campbell addressed the assemblage. Campbell, who was chairman of the meeting, delivered the keynote address. His speech obviously expressed the views of the military governor as well as his own. "We invite all to help us in restoring the supremacy of law over Tennessee, and reinstating her in all the privileges and immunities of the Union," said Campbell. All "deluded fellow citizens" would be cordially welcomed back and protected, he continued. Property rights, also, would be respected. "The Government intends no sweeping confiscation, no wild turning
loose of slaves, against the revolted States." "We bear no malice toward any one," concluded Campbell, "but deep sympathy for the deluded . . . . The Federal Government will pursue a kind, liberal, and benevolent policy toward the people of the South, to bring them to the Union." To facilitate Tennessee's return to the Union, the meeting selected a State Central Union Committee "with whom the friends of the Union in various parts of the State may put themselves in communication." 5

Johnson's policy, then, consisted of three parts. One was the repression of conscious disloyalty. The second point was to welcome back all those who would willingly renounce their past errors. Finally, he wanted to initiate political action, making appointments first, but then replacing his appointees with properly elected officials. Those who had steadfastly adhered to the Union, as well as those who would be returning to their allegiance, were to compose the political base of support. This was a coherent policy, and Johnson moved quickly to implement it.

Johnson's handling of Tennessee prisoners of war clearly illustrated his willingness to welcome back his deluded fellow Tennesseans. Throughout March and April letters poured into Johnson from Tennessee soldiers confined in northern military prisons. These men desired to
take the oath of allegiance and be pardoned. Johnson considered these soldiers perfect examples of "misguided fellow citizens" who now saw that the rebellion was an error.6

In late March Johnson appointed Connally F. Twigg, a prominent Middle Tennessee judge, as his personal agent to visit Camp Chase in Columbus, Ohio, to investigate the prisoner problem. Twigg reported to Johnson that he had visited the men confined in Camp Chase and was convinced that a large number of them would gladly take the oath and become loyal citizens. Others, he said, only want to be paroled. Those desiring a parole "stand upon what they conceive to be a 'point of honor' having, as they say, taken an oath to support the So. [sic] Confederacy, if they now take the oath of allegiance to the general government, it would be 'cross-swearings.'" Men in this latter class merely want "to have their liberty and go home but with the privilege of remaining harmless rebels, until exchanged . . . ." Twigg believed these men should remain in prison where their harmlessness could be assured. He suggested action only in cases where the prisoner was "loyally disposed and willing to attest it by the sanction of their oaths." A week later Twigg wrote Johnson again. He had received between five and six hundred communications from
Tennessee prisoners, many of them signed by more than one person. "I would guess," he wrote, "that the larger proportion of them are anxious to be released upon their parole of honor" rather than "take the oath and become loyal citizens." This was an ill omen, since it indicated that most Tennessee prisoners were not yet ready to return to total allegiance.

In mid-April Johnson wrote Stanton. He said that the release of those Tennessee prisoners of war who "express a strong desire to renew their allegiance to the Government and become true and loyal citizens" might be beneficial to the Union cause in Tennessee. Johnson believed that the reappearance of these men among their friends and relatives would "exert a great moral influence in favor of the perpetuity of the Union." Johnson reiterated this in a letter to Lincoln. The release of these men would "to a great extent make secessionists dependent upon Union influence." He bluntly told Lincoln that he wanted sole control over the question of releasing Tennessee prisoners. Many of the cases, he said, "ought to be well considered before releasing them. Many of them should be dealt with severely, while others should be treated with great leniency."  

At first Lincoln withheld the power of executive clemency from the military governor. But Johnson was
informed that when the right time came, the exercise of
clemency would be left to his judgment and discretion. The
time came in early August when Johnson was given authority
to control the release and exchange of Tennessee prisoners. Johnson appointed William B. Campbell to visit northern
prisons and determine which Tennessee prisoners should be
released and the terms of release. "All prisoners not
officers," said Johnson, "who are willing to take the oath
of allegiance and give bonds will be released upon parole
to report to the Governor of Tennessee, and all who refuse
to do so will be retained in prison or exchanged." Johnson had good reason to hope that a large number
of prisoners would take advantage of his generosity. In
June Nashville papers reported that "a great many Tennessee
soldiers," who had deserted the rebel armies, were present-
ing themselves at the Capitol to take the oath of allegiance.
This was evidently a common occurrence throughout the war. Yet, there is no evidence that released prisoners had much
impact on the course of wartime Unionism in Tennessee.
Many probably took the oath without putting much faith in
it. Once safely back home, they simply remained passive
rather than actively support Johnson's budding Union
government.
Meanwhile, Johnson was trying to get a Union party started in Tennessee. His first step was the appointment of other high state officials. Edward H. East was appointed Secretary of State; Joseph S. Fowler, Comptroller; Horace Maynard, Attorney General; and Edmund Cooper, private secretary. All of these men were strong Unionists. East, for example, was a Whig member of the General Assembly in 1859 and 1860 and an active campaigner for John Bell in the Presidential election of 1860. When Tennessee seceded, East, a man with an apparently inexhaustible fund of humorous anecdotes which he loved to tell on the slightest occasion, adhered to the Union. Fowler was such an outspoken Unionist that he was forced to flee Tennessee during the brief Confederate rule. He left all he had behind, but, he wrote to Johnson at the time, "I suppose we may soon return." "I intend," he had told Johnson, "to make an application for a situation in the government . . . , those who have stood firmly for the government when it cost so much to do it, should be preferred to those who basely deserted it." Fowler now had his reward. Maynard and Cooper were equally deserving of positions in the embryo Union government.

The first of Johnson's reconstruction effort in Middle Tennessee came barely two months after his arrival
in Nashville. It will be recalled that one important aspect of restoring loyal government in Tennessee was reopening the courts. Johnson called for an election for judge of the ninth circuit (which included Nashville) to be held on May 22. The mass meeting of Unionists on May 12 was organized, in part, to generate enthusiasm for this election. The Unionist candidate for the judgeship was Manson M. Brien, "a thorough straightout loyalist." A fifty year old native Tennessean, Brien was an ante-bellum Whig lawyer who joined the Republican Party during the war. He remained one of the stalwarts of Johnson's wing of the Union party throughout the war. Brien's opponent was Turner S. Foster, a "fierce and intolerable Rebel." Foster had been Secretary of the Confederate Passport Office in Nashville. It was reported that Johnson was determined not to interfere in any way with the election. Perhaps he should have, because the results were disastrous to the Union cause. Foster won the election by two hundred votes. 15

What followed was farcical. Johnson gave Foster his commission, but on the same day had him arrested for disloyalty. Johnson then appointed Brien to fill the vacated judgeship. Foster, a delicate man who suffered from inflammatory rheumatism, was shipped off to Camp Chase.
Before winter set in, however, he was released on a parole of honor. A special condition of his parole was that he secure the release and exchange of Edmund Cooper, who had been captured by Confederates before he could assume his duties as Johnson's private secretary. Foster journeyed to Richmond and managed to effect the exchange, and so was permitted to remain at his home, under parole, during the remainder of the war.\(^{16}\)

Johnson had acted too hastily in calling this election. He had seriously misjudged the spirit of the Nashville populace. There was no excuse for such a mistake. Randall McGavock, still lodged in Fort Warren, hundreds of miles away from Nashville, had accurately predicted that Johnson would not be able to hold a successful election in Tennessee.\(^{17}\) If McGavock could sense this, certainly Johnson should have been able to. With all his other problems, Johnson had now managed to expose how fearfully weak the Unionist sentiment in Middle Tennessee really was.

There was also to be an election test of Union sentiment in West Tennessee during 1862. It ended as badly as the May election in Middle Tennessee. Chances are Johnson was not eager to hold another election in Tennessee, but he was pressured into it by Lincoln. As early as July the President had written Johnson on the matter of elections.
He strongly desired a favorable Unionist vote of some kind in Tennessee. Such an election, he said, "would be worth more to us than a battle gained." Johnson, however, did nothing to organize another test of Unionist strength.

Then in the fall of 1862 Lincoln applied pressure to Johnson again. He desperately wanted at least one of the southern states to be reconstructed as a vindication of his policy of placing reconstruction in the hands of military governors. A successful reconstruction of any state would also bear favorably upon the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation of September 22. On October 21, Lincoln addressed a letter to "Ulysses S. Grant, Andrew Johnson, and others." He wanted these men to hold elections in Tennessee for "members to the Congress of the United States particularly, and perhaps a legislature, State officers, and a United States Senator." He urged them to "follow law, and forms of law as far as convenient; but at all events get the expression of the largest number of people possible." However, Grant and Johnson should insure that only good Union men were elected. Johnson could not very well ignore the wishes of the President again. In early December he issued a proclamation calling for an election of representatives to the 37th Congress from the Ninth and Tenth Districts. Both of these Districts were
in West Tennessee which was under the control of Union forces. No proper election was ever held, however, because a raid by Forrest disrupted all the plans. It was perhaps just as well that Forrest did intervene, since West Tennessee had displayed very little Union sentiment.  

II

During the spring and summer of 1862 Johnson repressed the leading secessionists in Nashville. He tried to win the hearts of the people by welcoming back Tennessee prisoners of war and rebel deserters, and he took the first hesitant steps toward re-establishing normal political operations in the state. Despite his best efforts, the Nashville citizenry remained implacably committed to the Confederacy. The same conditions prevailed in West Tennessee. By late summer Johnson concluded that his lenient policy was a failure. He dramatically switched from a policy of gentleness toward southern sympathizers to one of harshness.

W. H. Sidell, a major in the 15th U. S. Infantry and Acting Assistant Adjutant General in the District of the Ohio, had a protracted conversation with Johnson on the last day of July. He reported to Buell's chief of
staff that recent observations had changed Johnson’s ideas in regard to treating rebels. At one time Johnson had advocated leniency, but he now believed that rebels “must be made to feel the burden of their own deeds and to bear everything which the necessities of the situation require should be imposed on them.” 21 Several days later Johnson wrote to General Jeremiah T. Boyle, who was in command at Louisville. “I concur with you most fully,” said Johnson, “in regard to expelling and putting to the Sword all traitors who continue to occupy a hostile attitude to the Govt. [sic] ... Treason must be made odious, traitors punished and impoverished.” Two weeks later Johnson dispatched a similar note to General George H. Thomas. “Leniency,” he said, “is construed into timidity, compromising to conces- sion, which inspires them with a confidence & [sic] keeps alive the fell spirit of Rebellion.” 22

This sudden switch in policy by the military governor had momentous consequences for the future of Unionism in Tennessee. Until late summer all Union sympathizers had worked together; afterwards they pulled in opposite directions. The division among Unionists became so deep that it assured the doom of any broadly based, popular Unionist party in Tennessee. One faction, known as radicals, was led by Johnson. These men sided with the Lincoln
Administration and favored a vigorous war effort. They advocated a policy of harsh treatment toward rebels. One aspect of this harshness was to deny secessionists political rights; another was an insistence upon emancipation in Tennessee. The Emancipation Proclamation specifically excluded Tennessee from its effects, yet Tennessee radicals favored abolishing slavery in their state. Radicals also followed a policy of reward and favorable treatment toward those who had remained steadfastly loyal to the national government from the beginning.

Conservative Tennessee Unionists were opposed to this program. They continued to favor lenient treatment of rebel sympathizers. They were willing to make peace with the South, or were at least willing to accept the southern states back into the Union with no conditions attached. They especially deplored the Administration's advocacy of emancipation. To men with conservative minds, emancipation reeked with revolution. This conservative faction was led by William B. Campbell, Bailie Peyton, and Emerson Etheridge.

Campbell had served as a captain in the Seminole War and commanded the 1st Regiment of Tennessee Volunteers during the Mexican War. Between these two wars he had joined the Whig Party and served six years in the House of Representatives. In 1851 he was the Whig candidate for
governor and ran on a platform fully supporting the compromise measures of 1850. He was elected. At the end of his term he retired to private life, making his home at Lebanon. During the campaign of 1860 he favored John Bell and vigorously opposed secession. When secession came, he was the most distinguished Middle Tennessean to remain loyal to the Union, even though Confederate authorities offered him a high military command.  

Bailie Peyton was almost as well known as Campbell. He, too, served in the Mexican War and became a prominent Middle Tennessee Whig. He had served three terms in Congress and was a Whig presidential elector in 1860. Emerson Etheridge, from Dresden, Tennessee, was another prominent pre-war Whig. Like Campbell and Peyton, he had served in Congress before the war. When the war broke out, he took a firm stand for the Union, and was forced to flee the state. He went to Washington where he became clerk in the House of Representatives. Throughout the war he had a large following in Tennessee.  

Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862. This was about the same time that Johnson began to advocate a more stringent policy toward secessionists and emancipation in Tennessee. Some Nashvillians had been in favor of a severe policy toward rebels
and emancipation from the very beginning of Federal occupation. On May 1, 1862, for example, William Driver wrote a letter to one of his brothers in Salem, Massachusetts. "Never was a greater mistake made by man," he wrote, "than to hope by mild means to kill treason, particularly a treason like the present one, the offspring of luxury, indolence and insanity." Driver believed that it was "more than useless to think this war will end until the cause thereof is removed." The cause, he said, was slavery. Manson M. Brien, the Union candidate for circuit court judge in May, later maintained that he reached the same conclusion long before Johnson did. Johnson probably opted for emancipation in the early winter of 1862. On December 3, 1862, the Daily Union, Johnson's mouthpiece in the city, came out strongly in favor of emancipation.26

By the spring of 1863 the dividing line among Unionists in Tennessee over emancipation was obvious. The split was clear even in the Nashville Union Club. The Union League was founded in the North in 1862 as an arm of the Republican Party. As Federal control spread throughout the South, local chapters of the League were formed.27 In Nashville the press began agitating for the organization of such a club in mid-fall, 1862.28 It is probably more than coincidence that the League grew at the same time that Andrew
Johnson took a hard line toward secessionists and on the question of emancipation. In any event, in late January, 1863, a Union Club was formed in the city. This was, in effect, a Johnson Club, designed to support the governor. The President of the Club was Mayor John Hugh Smith, and the Secretary was Horace H. Harrison, Johnson's appointee to the post of United States District Attorney for Middle Tennessee. 29

The Club's commitment to a radical posture was set forth within a week after its founding. On January 30, the Club unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the appointment of any man to any office in the state who had not been an unconditional Union man since the very beginning of the rebellion. 30 This meant that "deluded fellow citizens" would no longer be welcomed into Unionist ranks on equal terms. Johnson's promise to grant "a full and complete amnesty for all past acts and declarations" was revoked. Henceforth, special consideration was to be given to those who had adhered to the Union at all costs. This, of course, was anathema to conservative Unionists who had more empathy for their erring brethren.

In April, 1863, the Nashville Union Club adopted both a Constitution and a Declaration of Principles. These formalized the radical character of the organization. The
Constitution stated that no one was to be admitted to the Club except those who had been loyal since the rebellion began. It also pledged all possible aid to Federal authorities in re-establishing Federal control in Tennessee.\textsuperscript{31}

The Declaration of Principles called for a vigorous prosecution of the war. As punishment for their treason rebel masters should be deprived of their slaves and all other property. Furthermore, they should be punished by being denied political rights for a long time after the war ended. The Declaration also said that the Club would give every possible inducement to the immigration of loyal, freedom-loving citizens. It was hoped that these immigrants would, in effect, replace those who had aided the rebellion.\textsuperscript{32}

The importance of this Declaration of Principles cannot be over-emphasized. It set forth a threefold program that was followed well into the era of Reconstruction. One aspect of the program was to punish treason by impoverishment. This meant that Johnson's earlier promise to protect property was now broken. A second element was to deprive traitors of their place in the body politic. Finally, immigrants from the North and Europe would be encouraged to settle in Tennessee. These Union-loving citizens would take the political and social places of those who had sided with the rebellion.
Native Nashville Unionists had good reason to put high hopes on immigration. A sizeable bloc of the German contingent in Nashville was extremely radical. The Germans formed their own Union League in Nashville in August, 1863. Four months later they adopted a formal set of resolutions. These resolutions indicted slavery as "contrary to reason and repulsive to humanity." The institution formed "the one hideous spot on the proud escutcheon of the American Union" and brought blessings to no one, "neither to the white nor to the black population of the country." Hence, the Germans called for the immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery throughout the whole Union. The resolutions also declared "for the confiscation of rebel property being made unconditionally, and without any reservation whatever." These radical positions went beyond what the Lincoln Administration was willing to accept at the time.

It is difficult to determine exactly how widespread radical Unionism was in Middle Tennessee. In late April, 1863, the radical Daily Union reported that the Nashville Union Club had almost 800 members. Considering the source of the information, this was perhaps an exaggeration. What is known is that many of the Club's members were not even residents of the city. For example, in August, 1863, two members of the 18th Michigan Infantry joined the League.
There was a close connection among the army, Andrew Johnson, and the Union League. On the evening of August 29, 1863, a meeting of the League was held at the State Capitol to celebrate—prematurely, as it turned out—the taking of Fort Sumter. The assemblage was addressed by an East Tennessee colonel, a Michigan captain, and the general in command at Nashville. Then the crowd moved on to the residence of the military governor, where Johnson treated the serenaders to an hour long oration.35

Conservative Unionists believed in the Union but did not believe in the policy enunciated by the Union League and the military governor. One of these men was William S. Cheatham. He was a member of the Nashville City Council before the war, and had stayed with the Union. When Johnson appointed a new city government, Cheatham was made a member of the Board of Aldermen. Cheatham was also a charter member of the Nashville Union Club. But in a public letter in late May, 1863, he explained that the Club "advocated views from which I dissent." He desired that Tennessee should "emerge from the present horrible civil commotion with unsullied honor and her institutions as our Fathers made them." Any attempt to change these institutions was akin to desecration and sacrilege.36

Emerson Etheridge also opposed tampering with the institution of slavery. When he was offered a Federal
judgeship, he flatly rejected it. His reason was Lincoln's stand on emancipation. He considered this to be "treachery to the Union men of the South." Any southern man, he said, "would be disgraced to accept any appointment under the President unless in . . . military service." In the spring of 1863 Etheridge attacked Lincoln "and his peerless military subordinates" with scorn and anger. His opposition to Lincoln and Johnson was based on deep philosophical differences. The Administration's proposal to end slavery was truly a revolutionary scheme, and Etheridge was no revolutionary. Neither were many other Tennessee Unionists. The extent to which they were willing to go to show their displeasure with the Lincoln-Johnson regime became clear in August, 1863.

August 4 was a constitutionally set election date in Tennessee. In July Johnson's supporters requested the governor to issue writs of election. Johnson, remembering his futile experiences with elections in 1862, declined. He said that until East Tennessee was redeemed, sufficient Union strength could not be established. However, Etheridge proceeded, on his own initiative, to hold an election for governor in Shelby and Bedford counties. In this abortive coup attempt, William B. Campbell was "elected" Governor. Johnson simply ignored this embarrassing incident, and though
Etheridge journeyed to Washington to try to persuade Lincoln to recognize Campbell, nothing came of it.\textsuperscript{39} Nothing, that is, except to expose the fracture among Tennessee Unionists. Having temporarily lost in Tennessee, Etheridge carried his anti-Administration campaign to Washington. At the opening of the 38th Congress he was the acting clerk of the House of Representatives. Using the influence which this position gave him, he attempted to create in the House a controlling coalition of Democrats and conservative border state Unionists. He hoped to do this by invalidating the credentials of several Republican House members. This "Etheridge Conspiracy" failed.\textsuperscript{40} But Etheridge was to continue his crusade against the revolutionary designs of the Lincoln Administration.

By the fall of 1863, then, there was little hope for concerted effort among Tennessee Unionists to re-establish a loyal state government. There was no longer any agreement on what a loyal state government would be. One faction of loyalists maintained that such a government had to be controlled exclusively by unconditional Union men, and that it could not support the institution of slavery. The other faction desired a return to the status quo before the war. There was simply no way to harmonize these conflicting views.
Despite the obvious rift in Unionist ranks, Johnson could express himself in "cheering terms in regard to the general condition of Tennessee" in September, 1863. The reason for his good cheer was Major General Ambrose E. Burnside's capture of Knoxville in early September. This seemingly signified the permanent expulsion of Confederate forces from most of Tennessee. With staunchly pro-Union East Tennessee now under Federal control, Johnson thought about holding elections again.⁴¹

Lincoln, too, was aware of the possibilities now open to Johnson. On September 11 he wrote Johnson urging him not to lose a moment's time in reinaugurating a loyal state government. This letter is important because it shows that Lincoln and Johnson were in perfect accord on two key points. One was that only unconditional Union men should have political power in Tennessee. Lincoln emphasized that firm friends of the Union must control the new government. "The whole struggle for Tennessee will have been profitless to both State and Nation," wrote Lincoln, "if it so ends that Governor Johnson is put down and Governor Harris is put up. It must not be so." All but trustworthy loyal men should be excluded from the work of reconstruction.⁴²
The second point on which the two men agreed was emancipation. By the fall of 1863 Johnson was "thoroughly in favor of immediate emancipation both as a matter of moral right and as an indispensable condition of the large immigration of industrious freemen which he thought necessary to repopulate and regenerate the State." Lincoln wrote in his letter of September 11 that "I see you have declared in favor of emancipation in Tennessee, for which may God bless you. Get emancipation into your new State government constitution and there will be no such word as fail in your case." Thus, it was clear to both men that emancipation should be a pre-condition for reconstruction. Tennessee would never be permitted to return to the Union under its old constitution.

Johnson quickly replied to the President's comforting letter. To insure that there was no mistake about his power to reorganize a civil government in Tennessee, Johnson wanted specific instructions from the President "to exercise all power necessary and proper to secure to the people of Tennessee a republican form of government." The military governor also reassured Lincoln that he had "taken decided ground for emancipation—for immediate emancipation, from gradual emancipation. Now is the time for settlement of the question." Two days after Johnson requested this specific grant of authority he received it.
These high hopes for rapidly bringing Tennessee back into the Union were smashed when the Confederates began offensive operations in East Tennessee in early November. This made it impossible to mobilize the support of loyal East Tennesseans behind any election effort. But Johnson's flurry of activity in September, 1863, is important. For one thing, it shows how much the President and his appointee were thinking alike on the key issues in Tennessee. Furthermore, it indicates that Johnson did not perceive his situation as hopeless. The growing disaffection within the ranks of Union supporters would not deter him from following a hard line policy. After all, he knew he could depend on the President and the mountaineers of East Tennessee to sustain him. With such backing, Johnson probably calculated that he needed only minimal support in the Middle and Western Divisions of Tennessee to reconstruct the state successfully. By relying so heavily upon East Tennessee Johnson would be sure that a re-organized state government would be unconditionally loyal. And by the beginning of 1864, the creation of an unconditionally loyal state government was an all-consuming goal for the military governor and his radical followers.
IV

On December 8, 1863, Lincoln issued his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction. This consisted of two parts. One outlined a method by which loyal governments might be reorganized in the rebellious states. This was Lincoln's famous ten percent plan. The other part offered amnesty to individual southerners. Taking the amnesty oath gave a person his full political and property rights, except slave ownership.

This Proclamation provoked a heated debate in Tennessee. Some Tennesseans believed the amnesty offer was just and liberal; others thought it was unjust and illiberal. One Middle Tennessee woman commented that the amnesty oath was "creating considerable excitement. Sentiment is very much divided, even among the loyal about it." Conservative Unionists took heart. This benevolent policy, if followed, might well put them in control in Tennessee. Andrew Johnson and his followers were not happy with the President's pronouncement. They were not eager to extend the suffrage to men who were not unconditional Unionists.

Radicals feared that the amnesty plan might undermine their position in Tennessee. The radical Daily Times and True Union expressed the sentiments of many staunch
Unionists in regard to taking the amnesty oath: "Such a process is a cheap way for treason to avoid punishment . . . . Why should loyal people needlessly place themselves in the power of men who so recently have been their deadly foes?" Rebels, the paper said, had "no right to demand citizenship as a recompense for oath-taking." It galled radicals to see men who were under indictment for treason and conspiracy have the indictments withdrawn the moment they took the oath. It irked the radicals that men could have proceedings of confiscation against them discontinued by merely taking an oath.

What bothered radicals more than anything else was that many people took the oath in bad faith. "A number of rebels come to Nashville daily and take the oath of amnesty," wrote the Daily Union. "Some of them take it with 'wry faces.' The fact is, they are like the fellow that, on a wager, eat the crow. They can 'eat crow;' but d--d if they have a hankering for it!" There was no spirit of penitence or genuine repentance in taking the oath. As one radical put it, "No patriotism, no love of country and kind, no noble sentiment of returning loyalty" accompanied the oath-taking.

Nashville radicals were soon asking Johnson if he could persuade Lincoln to make the Amnesty Proclamation less favorable to rebels. In mid-May, 1864, Johnson wrote Lincoln
about the matter. The amnesty provisions of the December 8th Proclamation, said Johnson, will be "seriously detrimental in reorganizing the state government." All amnesty did was keep alive the rebel spirit—it reconciled no one. Hence, Johnson requested that Tennessee be excepted from the operation of the amnesty proclamation. He suggested that all pardons granted to Tennesseans be upon the direct application of those desiring it to the President. "The influence will be better and they will feel a much greater obligation to the Government." 50

Lincoln did not except Tennessee from the proclamation. But even before Johnson had made this appeal the President had allowed him to alter substantially the operation and effect of the amnesty oath in Tennessee. Just a month after the issuance of the proclamation, Johnson wrote to Horace Maynard. There were going to be county elections in some parts of Tennessee in March, he said. Johnson commented that he wanted to subject all voters in those elections "to the severest test." Shortly thereafter he issued a proclamation which spelled out what he meant. All who wanted to vote in March had to subscribe to a rigid oath. They not only had to swear to support and defend the Constitution, but also had to "ardently desire the suppression of the present insurrection and rebellion against the Government of the United States, the success of its armies and
the defeat of all those who oppose them." Further, they had to swear that they would "hereafter heartily aid and assist all loyal people in the accomplishment of these results." 51

Johnson's oath went far beyond what was required in the Amnesty Oath. It virtually denied the suffrage to ex-Confederates who had taken the President's oath. Even many conservative Unionists would have to swear falsely to take it, since many of them did not honestly "ardently desire" the suppression of the rebellion. If Johnson's plan was followed, the March elections would be totally in the hands of unconditional Union men. Conservative Unionists and ex-rebels soon made their opposition known. 52

Would Lincoln sustain Johnson? Or would he say that taking his own Amnesty Oath was sufficient evidence of loyalty and the only qualification necessary to enjoy the suffrage? A week after Johnson issued his proclamation, Horace Maynard explained Johnson's plan to the President. There were two main criticisms of Lincoln's Amnesty Oath in Middle Tennessee, said Maynard. One was its "excessive liberality to rebels." The other was its "placing in the same category repentant rebels & [sic] men always loyal." This second criticism was the most bothersome. The "expressions of repugnance" by loyal men to being placed on a par with ex-rebels were "too strong to be disregarded."
To obviate this criticism, said Maynard, Johnson had devised his own oath, which was "quite satisfactory to the Union men, but greatly to the disgust of secesh & [sic] semi-secesh." Maynard concluded his letter by advising the President that he would probably be asked to interfere in the matter.

"This I hope you will not do." 53

Maynard was a good prophet. On February 20, 1864, Warren Jordan, a conservative Unionist from Cheatham county, wrote to Secretary of State William Seward. "In County and State elections," Jordan asked, "must citizens of Tennes-see take the oath prescribed by Governor Johnson, or will the President's oath of amnesty entitle them to vote?" Lincoln personally answered Jordan. "In County elections," said the President, "you better stand by Governor Johnson's plan. Otherwise you will have conflict and confusion. I have seen his plan." 54 The governor's proclamation was "entirely satisfactory" to Lincoln as a test of loyalty for voting privileges in Tennessee. He saw no conflict between his own oath and Johnson's. He knew that the purpose of Johnson's plan was "to restore the State government and place it under the control of citizens truly loyal to the Government of the United States." 55 If Johnson's plan would create such a government, then Lincoln was ready to bow to the military governor's judgment.
The county elections in March were generally farcical. Three days after the election in Davidson County the Daily Union confessed that "we might as well speak out plainly, and confess to the world, that what was called an election . . . at least so far as Nashville is concerned, was a serious farce." The vote was very light, and the results were too rigged to be satisfactory. Only about 2000 votes were cast in all of Davidson county. Many of those who did vote were non-resident soldiers and government employees. In many other areas of the state the elections were conducted under military "supervision and protection."56

Two particularly important points about this March election in Nashville stand out. One is that after two full years of Federal control, the city was no more loyal than when Yankee troops first entered it. Andrew Johnson's best efforts had come to nought. The second major point is that the election was held under the military governor's plan, not the President's. Both men were committed to the establishment of an unconditionally Union government in Tennessee. Their commitment to this end was so deep that Johnson was willing to subvert a Presidential program, and the President was willing to have it subverted. Continued intransigence on the part of Tennessee citizens merely seemed to strengthen the resolve of Lincoln and Johnson to make Tennessee a thoroughly Union state—no matter what the cost.
The March, 1864, election demonstrated that staunch Unionists were going to be favored with special political privileges. They were also going to receive special economic consideration. This was amply demonstrated by the changing nature of two Boards of Claims established in Nashville by military authority.

For at least the first year of Federal occupation all foraging done by Union troops was attended by much risk from Confederate forces. Consequently, the object of foraging parties was to load their wagons and return to Nashville as quickly as possible. It was often impossible to give correct forage vouchers and receipts. Now, as the Federal occupation gained permanency, the various departments of the army were flooded by an "incessant inpouring of 'Irregular Accounts.'" Something had to be done to relieve the departments of the responsibility for settling these accounts, and to conciliate—as far as proper—those who had suffered.57

On March 13, 1863, General Rosecrans established a Board of Commissioners to investigate and report "upon the damages sustained by the citizens of Nashville and vicinity
from the occupation of the place by the military forces of the United States." The Board was composed of two military officers and three Nashville citizens. The civilian members were Russell Houston, William Driver, and Horace H. Harrison.\textsuperscript{58} The choice of these three men suggests that they were actually chosen by Johnson, since all were prominent in the unconditional Union party he was trying to build.

Rosecrans initially instructed the Board not to consider the question of loyalty or disloyalty. Several weeks later Rosecrans amended his instructions. All persons presenting claims had to file an explicit statement of citizenship. Those who acknowledged themselves to be United States citizens would have their claims considered first.\textsuperscript{59} Many citizens flocked to the Board to present claims. For example, John B. Lindsley put in claims for damages done to the University of Nashville. Later he filed his declaration of citizenship. Day after day he returned to the Board to press the University's claims. Finally the chairman of the Board promised to give him proper certificates respecting the claims.\textsuperscript{60} By November 1, 1864, almost 1500 people had submitted claims for a total of $2,620,367.02.\textsuperscript{61}

Radicals were not happy with this Board. The Daily Union complained that many of the claimants were notoriously disloyal. "We say that the Government should proclaim its
determination to receive no claim for charges from rebel sympathizers." The paper believed that disloyal claimants should "feel to their dying day, the foolish criminality of their treason." William Driver said that the Board, "under the mild conciliating order of General Rosecrans soon found that nearly all claimants for sums of any considerable amount were Rebels." Of all amounts claimed, Driver estimated that fully three-fourths belonged to disloyal people who had "done all in their power to destroy our government."  

This situation persisted until the fall of 1864, when General George H. Thomas dissolved the Rosecrans Board and established one of his own. Four military officers and one civilian, William Driver, were appointed to the new Board. One can again assume that the choice of Driver was Johnson's. The Board was to "take evidence as to the loyalty of claimants" and "award damages only to those of whose loyalty they are satisfied." Since Driver was the only Board member qualified to pass on the loyalty of a claimant, radicals could now breathe easier. When wealthy secessionists henceforth presented claims, Driver simply marked them Rebel or disloyal, "which should," he said, "forever void all claims they may have filed against the government of the United States."
By the fall of 1864, then, it was obvious that the radicals were serious in their efforts to keep ex-Confederates and conservatives subservient. Only unconditional Union men were to profit—politically and economically—from the re-establishment of civil government in Tennessee. Rewards were to be given to those who "deserved" them. The mere taking of an amnesty oath was not enough. Loyalty in Tennessee was to be proven more by past action than promises for the future. Erring and deluded fellow citizens no longer merited consideration. Their property and political rights no longer had to be respected. The position reached by Andrew Johnson in the fall of 1864 was a long way from the policy first set forth in March, 1862.

VI

The Presidential election of November, 1864, brought another crisis to Tennessee Unionism. Johnson had been nominated for Vice President at the Republican nominating convention which had convened in Baltimore in early June. It was, therefore, very desirable for Tennessee to vote for the Republican ticket in the November election. A large vote in Tennessee for the Lincoln-Johnson ticket would vindicate the policy pursued by both men. Besides, it was
possible that the Republicans would need every electoral vote they could get in order to claim victory in November.

The split in the ranks of Tennessee Unionists made a large Lincoln-Johnson vote appear doubtful. In fact, there was real worry about whether or not they could win a free and open election. R. D. Mussey, who was in charge of recruiting black troops in Nashville, jotted down his thoughts in August. "In case of Election," he thought, "the men who own these Slaves and 'Conservative Union' men and those who have taken the Amnesty Oath will vote together and against the Administration. The result of an Election is today feared by the Union men of the State." 65

They had good reason to be afraid. In September a "Constitutional Union Club" was established in Nashville. This Club was dedicated to the election of General George B. McClellan, the Democratic peace candidate. McClellan electors, including William B. Campbell and Emerson Etheridge, were selected. Conservative Unionists were so confident of success that one of the Nashville papers, the Daily Press, came out openly in favor of McClellan. This paper savagely criticized the military governor. One headline declared "Governor Johnson a Usurper and Oppressor," and editorials talked of "the infamous proceedings of Andrew Johnson." 66
Radicals considered McClellanites worse than rebels. One radical suggested sending them south beyond Federal lines.67 This proposal was a little too radical even for Johnson. But the military governor was not opposed to vigorous action in order to secure a Republican victory in Tennessee. On September 30 he issued another proclamation which set forth a new test oath to be taken by prospective voters. This oath was even more stringent than the one that had controlled the March elections. A voter had to swear to uphold the Constitution, and say that he would "sincerely rejoice in the triumph of the armies and navies of the United States," and in the defeat of the Confederacy. Furthermore, a voter had to "cordially oppose all armistices or negotiations for peace with rebels in arms" until the rebellion was crushed. The proclamation also stated that soldiers were entitled to vote without oath or registration, and that polls would be open for their convenience.68

The same formula employed in March was thus to be re-used in November. The new oath would disfranchise all ex-Confederates and most Conservative Unionists. Soldiers would again be trooped to the polls to swell the aggregate vote and to ensure that the "right" side won. Radicals were also willing to employ violence in their cause. For example,
on October 21 a meeting was held in Nashville "composed of over one hundred McClellan soldiers from the hospitals, the invalid corps, and the army in the suburbs, about three hundred government employees, and about one hundred citizens." Suddenly about thirty soldiers, "yelling like demons, with loaded weapons, and charging bayonets," burst through the doors and broke up the meeting. The soldiers were from Battery D, 1st Tennessee Light Artillery. They later claimed that no one, including Johnson, knew of their intentions to disrupt the meeting. Although there is no concrete evidence that the disruption was planned by radical Nash-villeans, it is hard to believe that it was not. The fact that the confessed rioters were not punished lends credence to this assertion.

The combination of Johnson's oath and the use of terror tactics drove Conservatives to appeal to the President for protection. In mid-October the Conservatives sent a representative to Washington with a formal protest. Lincoln rejected it curtly, saying that he expected to let friends of McClellan manage their side of the election in their own way, and that he would manage his side in his way. Lincoln said he did not perceive any menace of violence or coercion towards any one in Johnson's plan. When this unsatisfactory answer was made public, Tennessee Conserva-tives wrote the President another letter. They deplored the
despotic powers assumed by Johnson and the use of violence to stifle free speech and the right to assemble. In view of the fact that "our people are overawed by military power, the laws set aside and violated with impunity," and in view of the fact that they had appealed in vain to the President, they announced that the McClellan ticket in Tennessee was withdrawn. "There will be no election for President in Tennessee in 1864," they wrote. "You and Governor Johnson may 'manage your side of it in your own way,' but it will be no election."\(^7\)

Once again the President sustained his military governor. Once again the unconditional Union party in Tennessee won an election. Once again the election bordered on being a farce. In Nashville, for instance, the vote for Lincoln and Johnson was only 1,317, while somehow twenty-five McClellan supporters managed to sneak in their ballots.\(^7\)

In the end, the electoral votes of Tennessee were not needed for a Republican victory. Congress therefore rejected Tennessee's electoral vote on the grounds that the state was in rebellion and could not have held a legal election.

VII

Events in Tennessee reached a climax in the winter
of 1864-65. As one of Johnson's contemporaries recalled, Johnson "had been elected Vice President, and his term as Military Governor was to end on or before March 3d. His ambition was to carry to Washington his own State, as a reconstructed member of the Union, and present it as a rich jewel to the nation."72 There seems to be a good deal of truth in this assertion because suddenly Johnson was more eager than ever to establish a loyal government in Tennessee.

Johnson directed Union executive committees in the three grand divisions of the state to issue calls for a convention to meet in Nashville on December 19, 1864. The purpose of this convention was the restoration of civil government in Tennessee. The meeting was delayed by Hood's invasion of Tennessee. On December 30, following the virtual annihilation of Hood's army, General Thomas wrote Johnson saying that the enemy was entirely driven out of Tennessee. He respectfully suggested "that immediate measures be taken for the reorganization of the civil government of the State." Johnson replied that steps "have been taken and every effort will be made to carry them out, for the reorganization of the State."73 The delayed convention finally met on January 9, 1865.

Some five hundred unconditional Unionists attended this January convention. Many of them were irregularly
selected and some simply came on their own responsibility. Most of them represented the old Whig party and had little or no political or judicial experience. Federal soldiers— that is, Tennesseans serving in Tennessee units—comprised more than half the membership. It is questionable if this convention truly represented Unionist sentiment in Tennessee. As one East Tennessee Unionist put it, it "was a misnomer . . . in the graver sense of the word, to designate this meeting as a Convention. It was simply a mass meeting."74 Yet this body adopted a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery and set up a procedure for restoring civil government in Tennessee.

The convention made provisions for the abolition amendment and a schedule for re-creating civil government to be submitted to the people for ratification on February 22. This schedule repudiated the ordinance of secession and the military league with the Confederacy; declared null and void all acts of the state government after May 6, 1861; ratified Johnson's appointees to civil offices; gave the first legislature which assembled under the revised constitution the power to determine suffrage qualifications; and provided for the election of a Governor and General Assembly on March 4. The convention also nominated William G. Brownlow of East Tennessee for Governor.75
Johnson was ecstatic over the work of the convention. He particularly was pleased by the adoption of the anti-slavery amendment. But he could not have been pleased by the small number of Nashvilleans who turned out to vote for it. The amendment was ratified in the city by a vote of 1349 to 4. The Daily Times and True Union noted that it was a shame that a city of 25,000 permanent residents gave so few votes "to the cause of the Union and civil law." This was the final proof that Nashville, despite the best efforts of the military governor, remained a disloyal city.

Both the amendment and the schedule were adopted in Tennessee. In accordance with the schedule, an election was held on March 4. William Brownlow was elected Governor. At the same time a General Assembly was chosen. Slightly over 10% of the number of voters in 1860 took part in the election, so Tennessee now qualified for re-admission to the Union under Lincoln's 10% plan. The day before Brownlow's election, Andrew Johnson resigned as Brigadier General of Volunteers and Military Governor of Tennessee to accept the Vice Presidency. On April 5, Brownlow was inaugurated as governor of Tennessee. After three years of military occupation, Tennessee returned to civil government.

Outwardly, Johnson had fulfilled his main duty as military governor. Tennessee now did have a loyal state
government. But this government was dominated by a small faction of radical Unionists and did not have broad support throughout the state. Johnson had not created a feeling of loyalty among the people of the state. The great majority of them had little love for Johnson and his stringent policy toward "traitors." They had little love for the new state government, which was the result of that policy both during the war and into the post-war years. The new government gave the illusion of loyalty in Tennessee. But Johnson and Lincoln had defined loyalty so narrowly that their political action actually became repressive rather than inspirational. In reality, loyalty--the way Johnson and Lincoln defined it--was no more widespread in March, 1865, than it had been three years previously. In a very real sense, then, Johnson's tenure as military governor had been a failure.

Johnson's failure was especially obvious in Nashville. The city had been under continuous occupation for more than three years. Yet the city never acknowledged fealty to the military governor and his brand of Unionism. Perhaps the larger lesson to be drawn from the Federal occupation of Nashville is the futility of trying to effect significant changes in attitude through military force. Johnson's policy of punishment and sternness gained few, if any,
converts to the Union cause. But it did alienate many men who had believed in the Union cause when Johnson first came to the city. Instead of strengthening Unionism, repression and radical Union politics only weakened it. Conservative Unionists were not necessarily appalled by military government per se. What did outrage them were the radical changes and the repressive policies the military government in Tennessee pursued. Military government, as practiced by Johnson and Lincoln, convinced many men that the United States Government was no government at all.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Five

1 Both General Sherman in Memphis and General Banks in New Orleans tried conciliatory policies which, as in Nashville, failed. See Parks, "Memphis under Military Rule," and Capers, Occupied City.


3 Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1862, p. 764.

4 Ibid., p. 765; Nashville Daily Union, May 17, 1862.

5 Read the AJP for March and April; Nashville Daily Union, April 16, 1862.

6 Connally F. Twigg to AJ, April 1 and 7, 1862, AJP.


9 AJ to Secretary of War, Aug. 9, 1862, and AJ to Lorenzo Thomas, Aug. 9, 1862, both in Ibid., p. 362.

10 Nashville Daily Union, June 7, 1862; Millsapough Diary, July 21 and Nov. 19, 1863.


12 Alexander, Political Reconstruction, p. 25; Pitts, Reminiscences of an Old Lawyer, pp. 7-8.

197.


18. Ibid., pp. 470-71. Lincoln also badly wanted elections in North Carolina, Louisiana, and Arkansas during the fall of 1862. See Belz, Reconstructing the Union, p. 105.


21. AJ to General Jeremiah T. Boyle, Aug. 4, 1862, AJP; AJ to Thomas, Aug. 16, 1862, AJP.


23. Ibid., pp. 241-45; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, p. 158.

24. Ibid., p. 87.


29 Letter of three man committee of the Nashville Union Club, Jan. 31, 1864, AJP.

30 Nashville Daily Union, April 23, 1863.

31 Ibid.


33 Ibid., April 23, 1863.

34 Millspaugh Diary, Aug. 31, 1863.

35 Nashville Dispatch, May 22, 1863.


40 Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, p. 106.


43 AJ to Lincoln, Sept. 17, 1863, in Ibid., p. 819.


Nashville Daily Times and True Union, May 26, 1864.

Ibid., May 5, 9, and 12, and July 9, 1864; Nashville Daily Union, Feb. 23, 1864.

Ibid., Jan 10 and March 2, 1864.

S. C. Mercer to AJ, Feb. 20, 1864, AJP; AJ to Lincoln, May 17, 1864, AJP.


Joseph Fowler to AJ, Feb. 19, 1864, AJP; Alvan C. Gillem to AJ, March 11, 1864, AJP; Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty, p. 51.

Basler, Collected Works, VII, pp. 183-84.

Warren Jordan to Seward, Feb. 20, 1864, AJP; Lincoln to Jordan, Feb. 21, 1864, AJP.

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Report of the Nashville Board of Claims, Entry #953, RG 92, NA.

Ibid.

Journal of the Driver Board, Entry #949, RG 92, NA.

Lindsay Diary, March 25-July 30, 1863.

Report of the Nashville Board of Claims.

Ibid.; Nashville Daily Union, July 26, 1863.

Record of Board of Claims, Entry #952, RG 92, NA.

Report of the Nashville Board of Claims.
See the essay by Mussey in RG 393, Dept. of the Cumberland, vol. 222, LS. Though undated, this was apparently written in August, 1864.

_Daily Press and Times_, Sept. 21, Oct. 11 and 12, 1864.

_Ibid._, Nov. 5, 1864.

_Basler, Collected Works_, VIII, pp. 65-68.


_White, Messages_, V, p. 386.

_Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee_, p. 411.


_Alexander, Political Reconstruction_, pp. 16-18, 26; _Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee_, p. 409; _Alexander, "Whiggery and Reconstruction,"_ pp. 295-97.


_Folmsbee, Corlew, and Mitchell, A Short History_, p. 346; _AJ to Stanton, March 3, 1865_, AJP. Between _AJ's_ resignation and Brownlow's inauguration, Edward H. East, the Secretary of State, performed the functions of the Governor's office. See _Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee_, p. 84.

See the protest to Lincoln by Tennessee Conservatives concerning the Presidential election of 1864, in _Basler, Collected Works_, VIII, pp. 59-61.
CHAPTER SIX

Prelude

In late July, 1864, the Nashville City Council made preparations for a gala Fourth of July celebration in the city. The chairman of the Committee of Arrangements, William S. Cheatham, extended an invitation to Reuben D. Mussey to participate in the celebration. Mussey was colonel of the 100th United States Colored Infantry, and in charge of the organization of black troops in Nashville. Mussey replied to Cheatham on July 3rd:

I have the honor to acknowledge an invitation for "the pleasure of my company at the Celebration of our National Anniversary on the ensuing Fourth of July, at Fort Gillem on Jefferson Street extended." The invitation was dated June 30th. I answer at this late moment because I have been disposed to give you all possible opportunity to invite also the troops with whose organization I have been connected, and who today form the largest portion, numerically, of the forces at Nashville. Your Committee has seen fit to omit them from its invitation to parade. . . . As these troops are orderly, present a good appearance, and are, considering their opportunities, well drilled, your conduct in omitting them and inviting me . . ., either is studiously insulting, or betrays a lamentably limited experience of honorable sensibilities. I cannot, Sir, accept any invitation to a military display where other Colonels march their troops while mine are excluded. The Declaration of Independence, whose formal adoption makes the
Fourth of July sacred, affirms as an axiom that ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL. And until you, sir, and your committee learn this fundamental truth, till you can invite all the defenders of their country, to participate in your celebration, be they black or be they white, your "celebrations of our National Anniversary" are mocking farces, insults to the illustrious dead, and blasphemy to Him . . . 1

THE ARMY AND THE BLACK MAN

Slavery was the one Tennessee institution permanently affected by military occupation. The institution officially came to an end on March 4, 1865, when the "people" of Tennessee adopted a constitutional amendment abolishing it. In reality, however, slavery had been abolished long before this by the activities of the United States Army. Wherever the Army went in Tennessee, the institution simply disintegrated. By the fall of 1863, far-sighted people realized that slavery was doomed in the state even though Tennessee was explicitly exempted from the Emancipation Proclamation.

Although the institution died during the war, the overall attitude and intellectual outlook which supported slavery did not change. The institution—the external form—was altered; but racism—the inner core—remained untouched. A few people in Nashville took abolition seriously and tried to overcome their racial fears and
hatred. But they were a very small minority, and most of them were people of northern birth.

I

Slaves came to Nashville with the first settlers. As agricultural operations increased in the area, the number of slaves increased accordingly. In Davidson County by 1860, there were 14,790 slaves and 1,209 free blacks in a total population of 57,055. The number of slaveholders in the county was 2,153. Most of these masters owned less than 100 acres and fewer than five slaves. Thus, in the immediate pre-war years, Davidson County slaveowners were generally farmers, not planters. Slaves were not regarded as producers of staples, but rather as "handy men."4

In 1860 there were 719 free blacks in Nashville, and probably that many more nominal slaves who were virtually free. Despite the fact that some of these men and women had managed to accumulate considerable wealth, their position was not a pleasant one. Some of the members of the Tennessee legislature of 1859-60 made an intensive effort to banish free blacks from the state. The general trend in Tennessee was toward debasing free blacks back to the slave level. One scholar conjectured that these
free men and women would have been forced to leave the state or return to slavery had the Civil War not intervened.⁵

When the Federal Army arrived in Middle Tennessee, some blacks began to assert their freedom. As early as June, 1862, some slaves left their masters and went to the Federal Army. As the war continued, this process accelerated. By the fall of 1863 slaves in Middle Tennessee were virtually unmanageable. In November, one woman wrote that her mother's slaves were "growing more and more unruly." They were insolent, "perfectly trifling [in] every way," indolent, and disobedient. "Oh! these wretched--wicked Yankees!" the woman continued. "If they would only see the terrible effect of their teachings, upon the negroes." Slaveowners actually expected their slaves to just pick up and leave. To prevent the loss of their slaves, some masters took their "property" from Tennessee and went further into the interior of the Confederacy.⁶

Being within Federal lines did not guarantee absolute security for either slaves or free blacks. Masters were not without recourse in attempting to recover their slaves. Recapturing slaves within the city and then spiriting them away to the Deep South was a profitable venture. Several members of the city police in Nashville engaged in this
lucrative business. So did the sheriff of Davidson County. Slaveowners would solicit the aid of the night police or the sheriff in catching their fugitive blacks. The police would arrest the blacks and turn them over to the supposed owner in return for a sizeable reward. For example, William Mayo, a night policeman, received $66,00 for arresting four blacks. The practice became so infamous that the Nashville provost marshal warned the city marshal that if any "of the policemen of Nashville are again caught engaged in arresting, as fugitives, any slaves of rebel masters, I will take the case into my own hands, and give them a term in the city prison." 7

Slaveowners could also appeal to military officers in Nashville for the recovery of fugitives. A brigadier general stationed in Nashville in the fall of 1862 recalled that slaveowners gave him no rest. Every master who called on him, said the general, was "a prodigy of patriotism and devotion to the Union. He wants his negro, as he says, not for his value, but to gratify a longing mother, who ardently desires that her son shall return to her and to slavery. The kind-hearted owner only wishes to oblige her." 8

Some military men in the Nashville vicinity during the war had little sympathy for the black refugees huddled in the city. Such men were often willing to help slaveowners
recover their property. Major General Lovell H. Rousseau was one of these. Rousseau, a Kentucky lawyer and politician before the war, was a dedicated opponent of secession. When war broke out he recruited Kentucky volunteers for the Union, and was mustered in as colonel of the 3rd Kentucky Infantry in September, 1861. He saw service at Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesboro, in the Tullahoma campaign, and at the end of the Chickamauga campaign. His rank rose steadily until his promotion to major general in October, 1862. From November, 1863, until November, 1865, he commanded the districts of Nashville and of Tennessee.9

"The military authorities," said Rousseau, "will have as little to do with slaves as may be in the discharge of their duties as soldiers, it being considered best to allow masters and slaves to settle their own affairs without military interference." Rousseau disliked the fact that children and elderly black men and women were brought to Nashville where they became a charge to the government, "consuming the rations of soldiers, whilst they are utterly useless to the authorities."10 He also opposed the impressment of slaves into the military service. This was a common practice in Middle Tennessee and brought numerous complaints from the citizenry. Rousseau tried to stop these forced enlistments.
He assumed that such enlistments were against government policy since the state was not included in the Emancipation Proclamation.\textsuperscript{11} When slaveowners came to Nashville asking permission to take their slaves back to their homes in the country, Rousseau was frequently amenable to them. He would give direct written orders to his military subordinates to have the fugitives returned to their masters.\textsuperscript{12} Rousseau's policy was contrary to the Lieber Code. This Code specifically stated that if a slave held by the enemy is "captured by or comes as a fugitive under the protection of the military forces of the United States, such person is immediately entitled to the rights and privileges of a free man." The Code said that to return such a person "into slavery would amount to enslaving a free person, and neither the United States nor any officer under their authority can enslave any human being."\textsuperscript{13} Rousseau's policy also ran counter to the government's policy as set forth by Johnson. By the time Rousseau took command in Nashville, the intention of the government to end slavery in Tennessee was clear. Johnson had taken a strong stand in favor of emancipation—a stand which he steadfastly adhered to until the end of the war.

Needless to say, men of antislavery sentiments were appalled at Rousseau's behavior. A two man Senate committee
appointed to investigate the condition of black refugees in the Department of the Cumberland severely criticized him. The entire course pursued by Rousseau, they said "has done great injustice to the policy of the government in regard to colored refugees; great injustice to colored refugees themselves; and certainly great injustice to himself as an officer of merit . . . ." His official conduct toward black refugees had been "absolutely bad or seriously questionable." The Senate committee considered Rousseau "wholly unfit for his present command, or for any command where the care and safety of colored refugees can, by possibility, become the subject of his official action." Mussey, a New England abolitionist engaged in organizing black troops in Nashville, was equally critical of Rousseau. 14

In summary, merely reaching Federal lines did not ensure freedom for black refugees. Unsympathetic city officials and army officers could frustrate both the aspirations of the individual fugitive and the policy of the United States Government.

II

If being within Federal lines did not guarantee freedom for black men and women, even less did it ensure
fair treatment. Blacks were especially maltreated during the first eighteen months of Federal rule in Nashville. This was the period when the city was most seriously threatened by Confederate forces. It was also before the government's policy toward slavery in Tennessee had been made clear. Consequently, under the guise of military necessity, blacks were often treated ruthlessly by the military authorities. The most notable manifestation of the maltreatment was the wholesale impressment of blacks for work on the city's fortifications. One Middle Tennessee woman who was aware of how badly the military treated blacks in Nashville was amazed that slaves still wanted to go there. "The negroes will run to them," she wrote,"from good homes of kind masters & [sic] yet love the Yankee for his meanness."  

Impressments in Nashville began in the summer of 1862 and took place intermittently until the fall of 1863. The first impressment in August, 1862, called for 1000 slaves to construct strong fortifications around the city. Each slaveholder in Davidson County was to furnish a specified number of slaves. The master had to provide his impressed slaves with daily subsistence, and axes and spades. The term of service, and the mode and terms of payment, were to be determined "at the pleasure of the Government."
The second impressment, which came in October, 1862, was more general in nature. The commander of city patrols was ordered to "impress into service every Negro you can find in the Streets of this City who can not prove that he is owned by any person loyal to the government of the United States and residing in and about the City." Such blacks were to be turned over to the chief engineer on Buell's staff for work on the fortifications.17 Nothing was said about length of service or payment of wages. Nor was any special protection afforded to the numerous free blacks who resided in the city. Military patrols simply began swooping down on the favorite haunts of black people, and arresting as many of them as they could.18

A third major impressment took place in August and September of 1863. Two thousand five hundred blacks were needed to work on the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, which was being built under Andrew Johnson's direction.19 By now the military had developed its impressment techniques. The patrols would wait until Sunday morning and then raid the black churches in Nashville. In the course of one such raid, a black man was shot and killed. Others, who had passes exempting them from impressment, saw soldiers confiscate their passes and burn them. The blacks were told that if they tried to escape, they would be shot.20
The army was not the only agency which impressed blacks. In January, 1863, the Nashville post commander gave permission to the municipal authorities "to impress vagrant negroes into the service of performing scavanger duty in the city, so far as it can be done without impeding the operations of the military impressing patrols."21

By the fall of 1863, black men--free and slave--were hunted daily by impressing patrols through the streets of Nashville. The Nashville Dispatch remarked that the blacks in Nashville had been pressed into government service so often that they had become accustomed to it, and really did not mind it "so long as they get enough to eat." The Daily Union reported a colloquy which transpired in a black barbershop:

"Jim, what's the difference between General Lincoln and General Negley [the Nashville post commander]?
"Go away, fool nigger, dey's no difference, ever I heard of."
"Oh, yes, dey has; General Lincoln started de irrepressible conflict, and General Negley started de pressible conflict."22

The impressment of black men by the army would not have been so disreputable had the blacks been fairly treated. Fair treatment would have included reasonable living conditions and regular wages. In theory they received both; in practice they got neither. For example,
between August, 1862, and April, 1863, the amount due blacks for work on the fortifications was $35,858.50. Of this amount, only $13,648.00 was paid. Fewer than 3000 impressed blacks were employed during this time span. Between six to eight hundred of them died. This was certainly an extraordinary mortality rate. The reason for it was that the men were given no shelter and were fed poor quality food. About the only kindness the army exhibited was to provide coffins for the blacks who died.23

The army did have legitimate problems in trying to pay the impressed laborers. One problem was that the disbursing officers did not know whether to pay the blacks themselves or their masters. If the blacks were slaves of loyal Tennesseans, then the pay was supposed to go to the master. If they were the slaves of disloyal persons, then the blacks were to receive the money themselves. But it was often nearly impossible to determine whether the blacks belonged to loyal or disloyal owners.24 Another problem was that there was no way for relatives and families to draw the pay the government owed deceased blacks. As one disbursing officer put it, if "a wife comes with a certificate issued to her deceased husband for labor, we have to refuse payment, for the reason there is no one authorized to sign his name to the receipt roll."25
No doubt the blacks laboring upon the fortifications knew little about these impediments. What they did know was that they were not being paid. The Senate committee investigating refugee conditions in Tennessee concluded that blacks were greatly demoralized by "the extraordinary delays in paying the wages for the labor of the refugees, where the wages are finally paid, and the criminal neglect or refusal to pay at all, as often occurs when the labor has been performed on the defences [sic] of Nashville." 26

They surely had good reason to be demoralized. Blacks impressed and put to work on the fortifications were virtually slaves. They fled their old masters only to be re-enslaved by a new one, the Union Army. And yet, there was a difference. Under the new master they were, at least in theory, treated as men. The new master held out the promise of freedom and manhood. Blacks were eager to help out in the push for freedom despite all their privations. The chief engineer at Nashville reported that the "negroes have as a general rule been faithful and diligent--far more so than could reasonably have been expected considering the circumstances of exposure and privation of proper clothing, blankets, etc. under which they were at first employed." The chief engineer also reported that once when Nashville was in imminent danger of attack, the blacks "cheerfully
and zealously turned out, after a hard day's labor, and labored all night, or nearly so, strengthening the defenses." And the workers "with a certain degree of enthusiasm, pledged themselves to maintain a part of the line with their axes and other implements, against the anticipated rebel attack."27

Thus, despite their ill-treatment and temporary demoralization, black men in Nashville retained a large amount of spirit and enthusiasm for the Union cause. It was a fool-hardy policy which did not take advantage of this elan. In the fall of 1863 the government finally resolved to begin putting Tennessee black men to better use: organizing them as soldiers.

III

The arrival of Major George L. Stearns in Nashville in September, 1863, signaled the government's determination to recruit black troops in the Department of the Cumberland. Stearns, a Boston merchant, had long been an advocate of emancipation. He was on intimate terms with other leading Massachusetts abolitionists such as Governor John Andrew and Senator Charles Sumner. He was also a strong supporter of John Brown, and gave him generous financial aid throughout the late 1850s. Stearns had
helped finance Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. When Brown was captured, Stearns feared that he might be sent to Virginia for trial for complicity. He temporarily fled to Canada to avoid this danger.

During the secession crisis Stearns stood firmly against compromises or concessions. As soon as Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, he set about enlisting black troops for Massachusetts regiments. He was commissioned an adjutant general with the rank of major and was given authority to recruit black regiments anywhere in the country. In mid-August, 1863, he was ordered to Nashville to organize the large number of blacks who had collected in the rear of Rosecrans' army. Stearns was pleased with this assignment. "I am most happy to go," he wrote, "I have determined either to burn slavery out, or be burnt by it myself... this war was a civilizer, not a barbarism. The use of the musket was the first step in the education of the black man."28

Shortly after Stearns began operations in Nashville, a thirty year old regular army officer, Reuben D. Mussey, was detailed to duty as mustering officer for colored troops, and directed to cooperate with Major Stearns in the organization of black regiments. Mussey was a Dartmouth College classmate of John Eaton, Jr., whom Grant had chosen
to deal with the contraband problem in the upper Mississippi River Valley. Mussey was also the first regular army officer to volunteer for the service of enlisting black troops. When Stearns resigned in January, 1864, Mussey assumed top command in the work of organizing black troops in the Nashville vicinity.29

Like Stearns, Mussey had opposed all compromise with the South during the secession crisis. He cursed mightily about a rumored withdrawal from Fort Sumter, and actually looked forward to war. From the start he believed that the war was being fought over slavery. "If we would conquer in this war," he wrote in mid-summer, 1862, "we must value the Union as everything and Slavery as nothing. We must abandon the Institution to its fate . . . Oh this war--fraught with so much suffering and sorrow--I can rejoice in it--for it is a war for Freedom and Human Rights." In particular, he viewed the use of black troops as indispensable. His assignment to aid Stearns was just what he wanted, because he considered organizing black soldiers the "sacred work of raising a fallen Race." Only by making soldiers of the blacks, he thought, could slavery be destroyed and blacks elevated to the position of citizens. From the fall of 1863 until the end of the war, Mussey personally commanded the 100th United States Colored
Infantry (U.S.C.I.). This regiment was composed of the first black men openly recruited in Kentucky.\textsuperscript{30}

Stearns and Mussey began their work shortly after radical Unionists started advocating emancipation in Tennessee. Even among those Unionists who adhered to Johnson's policy there was still some doubt about the propriety of freeing the slaves and organizing black regiments. Mussey reported that Stearns' work "was, if not opposed, regarded with distrust and suspicion by influential loyal Tennesseans . . . ." Others, however, gave him support from the beginning. Stearns undertook a public relations campaign to win additional converts. He made personal appeals, organized public meetings, and submitted articles to newspapers on the subject. Two of his agents were chiefly employed in influencing public opinion.\textsuperscript{31}

During the late fall and winter of 1863, Stearns established harmonious relations with the radical wing of the Union party in Tennessee. By mid-October, 1863, both he and Mussey gave optimistic assessments of the situation. Mussey wrote to Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase that he had seen "considerable of the Union men of Tennessee and they are all anti-slavery men. They regard slavery as dead and will oppose in the resuscitation of their State Government the introduction of slavery." On the same day
Stearns wrote to one of his closest friends that the leading slaveholding Union men of Tennessee now clearly saw "that their political and social existence here depends on the abolition of slavery and the control of the state by the Union men. Therefore they have entered most heartily into my plans for the organization of colored regiments and are daily in consultation with me." By January, 1864, even General Rousseau realized that "Slavery is virtually dead in Tennessee, although the State is excepted from the emancipation proclamation."  

Although Stearns and Johnson agreed on freeing the slaves and raising black regiments, they differed on the question of which one of them should control the process. When Stearns arrived in Nashville, he immediately went to see Johnson. He reported that the military governor was "well disposed, understands the subject, and will co-operate and advise me." But several days later Stearns wrote to a friend that the governor was opposed to his work. Stearns said he was "laboring to bring him [Johnson] over to the faith . . . ." Meanwhile, Stearns wrote to Stanton that if he took "all the able-bodied colored men willing to enlist I can get large numbers. Governor Johnson objects, and will telegraph you."
Johnson's telegram explained the problem. Johnson wanted to raise black troops "first, to employ them on the Government works where needed, and then convert them into soldiers." "We need more laborers now," he explained, "than can be obtained for the prosecution of works that are indispensable to sustain the rear of General Rosecrans' army." Yet "Major Stearns proposes to organize and place them in camp, where they, in fact, remain idle. This will to a very great extent impede the progress of the works and diminish the number of hands employed. All the negroes will quit work when they can go into camp and do nothing." Thus, said Johnson, he personally needed to have control over the organization of blacks. "I must be frank in stating my opinion," he told Stanton, "that Major Stearns' mission, with his notions, will give us no aid in organizing negro regiments in Tennessee." 34

The difference between Stearns and Johnson was clear. Stearns wanted black troops used as soldiers and sharing labor and combat assignments equally with white troops. Johnson wanted black troops to serve primarily as laborers, thus leaving more white troops free for combat duty. Stearns wanted to organize black men because they were men and entitled to full equality, including military service; Johnson wanted to do it because it was an expedient thing to do to help the Union Army.
As in so many other disputes involving Johnson, the Lincoln Administration once again fully supported its military governor. When Stanton received the first inkling of difficulty between Stearns and Johnson, he telegraphed Stearns not to act contrary "to the wishes of Governor Johnson in relation to enlistments without express authority for so doing from this Department." After receiving Johnson's communication, Stanton again wrote Stearns. "If any difference of opinion exists or shall arise between Governor Johnson and yourself respecting the organization and employment of colored men in the State of Tennessee," Stearns was told to "conform your action to his views." If he could not work with Johnson, then he should leave Nashville and proceed to Cairo, Illinois, to await orders.\(^{35}\)

Stanton also wrote to Johnson, assuring him that Stearns was his subordinate, "bound to follow your directions, and may be relieved by you whenever his action is deemed by you prejudicial." The War Department, said Stanton, relied totally upon Johnson's judgment in matters relating to the people of Tennessee, "whether white or black, bond or free." Additional support came the same day from Lincoln himself.\(^{36}\)

Stearns could not work comfortably within the limits set down by the War Department and the President. He soon returned to the East, and resigned his position. Mussey was
left behind to carry on the work of organizing black troops. Little is known about the relationship between Mussey and Johnson. Evidently they got along quite well because Mussey served as Johnson's private secretary from Lincoln's assassination until November, 1865. No doubt Mussey learned from Stearns' experience not to challenge the military governor's authority. Having accepted the fact that he was subordinate to Johnson, and that Johnson would be the ultimate arbitrator as to how and when black troops were employed, Mussey organized black regiments in Tennessee without much interference from the military governor.

IV

Lincoln established the general guidelines used in recruiting blacks in Middle Tennessee. First, all blacks who enlisted would be free at the expiration of their term of service. Secondly, slaves of loyal citizens could be enlisted with their master's consent. Thirdly, either Johnson or Rosecrans could order enlistment by conscription or the voluntary enlistment of slaves of loyal citizens without their master's consent. Owners who lost slaves in this manner were eligible to receive compensation "not to
exceed the sum authorized by law as bounties for volunteer
service."37

Stearns, after getting Johnson's approval, issued
specific instructions for recruitment in the Department
of the Cumberland which followed Lincoln's guidelines.38
In one respect these instructions proved inadequate. Loyal
masters were not tempted to allow their slaves to become
soldiers. The bounty which owners would receive did not
compensate for the loss of a slave. Johnson soon wrote
Lincoln asking authority to offer $300.00 "in addition to
the present bounty, to loyal masters consenting to their
slaves entering the service." This, said Johnson, "would
be an entering wedge to emancipation and for the time
paralyze much opposition to recruiting slaves in Tennessee."
It would also "reward the loyal owner and punish the rebel
and traitor for as to his slaves we shall ask no questions
nor make any promises."39 Lincoln quickly approved
Johnson's request.40

Once the enlistment procedure was clarified, officers
had to be procured. All commissioned officers in black
regiments were to be white men. Stearns established an
Examining Board in Nashville to screen applicants for
officers' positions. One officer who applied for a position
in the black service remembered that he "spent five rather
anxious hours" before the Board. Another spent four hours with the Board. His exam was a "continuous roll of questions, taking all of the common English branches, the school of the soldiers, the school of the company, of the battalion and the brigade, the United States Army regulations also." The officers on the Board took turns grilling him. When "one was tired or had exhausted his fund of questions another would be ready with a quiver full of arrows to fire at me." 41

Despite the precaution of having a Board weed out poor prospects in advance, some of the white officers who found their way into black regiments turned out badly. Mussey attributed "this defection to two causes--Getting their heads turned by promotion and too great laxness of inquiry into character by the Board that examines them." 42

"Dusky Lincolniters" 43 responded enthusiastically to the chance to become soldiers. Black regiments filled up rapidly, and soon recruiting operations extended far beyond Nashville. One of Stearns' staff officers wrote that as "fast as we obtained recruits they were formed into regiments, offered, and sent to the front. When men became scarce in the city we made trips into the country, often going beyond the Union picket lines, and generally reaping a harvest of slaves." 44 The first regiment of black troops
marched through Nashville's streets on October 2, 1863. The novelty of armed black men evoked much comment--pro and con--about the Administration's policy in raising them. A few days later when another regiment passed through the town Johnson commented that "they look and behaved well."45

A year after recruiting operations began, Mussey advised that no more regiments be formed in Tennessee. Recruiting could continue, he said, but there were simply not enough black men left to warrant the formation of new regiments.46 Ten regiments of black troops had been wholly or partially filled in the Nashville vicinity within twelve months' time. These included eight regiments of infantry, one of light infantry, and one of heavy artillery.47 One of these regiments was the 15th U.S.C.I., commanded by Colonel William Inness. A quartermaster officer in Nashville considered this regiment "a splendid body of troops."48 Another was the 12th U.S.C.I., commanded by Colonel Charles R. Thompson. This regiment was largely composed of laborers upon the fortifications of Nashville. Mussey reported that "the change from the irregular and irresponsible treatment they received as laborers to that they had as soldiers was very grateful to them."49 A third black regiment was the 101st U.S.C.I. This regiment, authorized in February, 1864, contained men unfit for field duty but who could perform fatigue duty. Its commander was Colonel Robert W. Barnard.50
Black troops suffered from a number of inequities. For example, they received less pay than white troops, and they were usually ignored on social occasions. But, the most obvious inequity was that they did a disproportionate amount of fatigue and garrison duty. Mussey believed that blacks should be given "their fair share of active service [to] prevent their being chained down to the mere drudgery of camp work." Yet, the only important battle in which Tennessee black regiments participated was the Battle of Nashville in December, 1864. They fought very well in the battle. Mussey was a prejudiced observer, but his ecstatic praise for the black troops was justified. Mussey wrote to Johnson that the "behavior of the Col'd [sic] Troops . . . was fine. White and black assailants of the Rebel work lay side by side. The white troops have admitted them to the Fraternity of fellow soldiers," General Thomas, who had believed that blacks would not fight out in the open but only behind breastworks, changed his mind after the battle.51 Had the war continued much longer, blacks might well have been given additional combat responsibilities in the Department of the Cumberland.

It is hard to look back on the plight of black men in Nashville during the Civil War without being amazed. Throughout the war period some Union officers
treated them very badly. Rousseau "constantly sanction[ed] all the barbarisms of Slavery." Major General William T. Sherman adamantly opposed the organization of black troops and hindered the effort. He was not sympathetic to the idea, as Mussey put it, that "the Negro is to be made a man by first being made a soldier . . . ." Numerous officers indiscriminately impressed black men. Stearns reported that when he first arrived in Nashville blacks were "treated like brutes; any officer who wants them, I am told, impresses on his own authority, and it is seldom they are paid."\(^{52}\) Conditions improved noticeably when Stearns and Mussey came to Nashville in the fall of 1863. But even with these sympathetic men in the city to guard their interests, blacks continued to suffer from discrimination.

Despite these unfortunate conditions, blacks exhibited a remarkable spirit. Nothing the white man did seemed to dampen permanently their enthusiasm for the Union cause. They worked on Nashville's fortifications for months on end without pay, and watched hundreds of fellow black men die while they labored. Yet they did not complain much. When the opportunity came to be soldiers and actually fight for their own freedom, they readily responded. Anything which black men could do in their own behalf, they were ready and willing to do.
There was an essential **continuity** between the army's work on behalf of the freedmen in the late war years and the work of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (Freedmen's Bureau) during the Reconstruction period. Many of the activities of the Freedman's Bureau actually began before the end of the war. During late 1863 and 1864 the army in Nashville moved to provide relief for black refugees, undertook educational programs for blacks, and instituted a system of contract labor. All of these programs were continued on a larger scale in the post-war era.

Black refugees crowded into Nashville almost as soon as the Federal occupation began. By the fall and winter of 1863 the city was virtually overrun with them. They lived under conditions of indescribable filth, squalor, and deprivation. The *Daily Times* was worried that the swarms of blacks would starve or freeze to death during the winter. The City Agent of the Pest House, Spencer Chandler, expressed concern that the black population would be ravaged by diseases. He noted that when a case of smallpox was discovered in one of the refugees' crowded hovels, "the inmates scatter themselves in various parts of the city, and
carry the disease with them, while other negroes, finding a vacant room (that left by the diseased negroes) soon fill it up again, and thus is this dreadful disease spread from place to place . . . ." Joseph G. McKee and M. M. Brown, two agents for a northern benevolent society that was trying to relieve suffering among refugee blacks, reported that it was impossible for most blacks in the city to find remunerative employment. This left the blacks two choices. They could depend on public charity, or they could resort to crime for the means of subsistence. Blacks, the two men said, "occupy old and decayed buildings and cellars and outhouses as dwellings and from the insufficiency of shelter and the scarcity and high price of food, suffering must ensue from their present condition." 53

The Daily Times, Chandler, and Brown and McKee all agreed that the military authorities had to intervene to relieve the suffering. As early as July, 1863, Chandler conferred with Johnson about establishing a contraband camp at some healthful locality outside the city. McKee and Brown suggested the same thing. The interest of all parties, they suggested, "might be promoted by separating them [contraband] from present corrupting influences, into a missionary camp, managed and taught by benevolent Christian enterprise and furnished in material support by the Government." 54
The army did not respond immediately. Attempts were thus made to organize private charities within the city. In December, 1863, concerned white people held a meeting to organize a society for the relief of freedmen. Later in the month a similar society was organized by black citizens. Northern benevolent societies, such as the Pennsylvania Freedmen's Aid Association, the Western Freedmen's Aid Society, and the American Missionary Association, provided as much aid as they could. But by February, 1864, it was obvious that these private resources alone could not cope with the problem. Mussey noted that although the labor of the benevolent societies was valuable, it was inadequate to meet the needs of black refugees. On February 4, Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas ordered that a "camp for the reception of contrabands will at once be established in the vicinity of Nashville, Tennessee." He told the Quartermaster's Department to furnish "all the materials and supplies necessary to shelter and protect the negroes destined to be located in this camp." Other staff departments were to "issue all supplies necessary for the wants of these people on the requisition of the officer in charge of the camp." Thomas appointed Captain Ralph Hunt of the 1st Regiment of Kentucky Volunteers to command the camp.
Walter T. Carpenter, the Nashville agent of the Freedmen's Committee of the Indiana Yearly Meeting of Friends, was greatly pleased by Thomas' order because it would centralize his labors. Instead of distributing supplies thinly throughout Middle Tennessee, he could now direct all his efforts to one location. For two months after the establishment of the camp, Carpenter made almost daily trips to it to distribute supplies. No matter what quantities of goods he took with him, he never seemed to have enough. Other benevolent societies also contributed supplies to the camp. But, in the end, whether or not the contraband camp prospered depended on the amount of support the military authorities gave it.

The camp did not prosper. The two man Senate committee sent to investigate the condition of freedmen in Tennessee concluded that "this colored refugee camp has been, and is, grossly neglected in all things necessary to the reasonable care and comfort of its inmates." "We are free to say we have never witnessed an aggregate of wretchedness and misery equal to that we were here called to look upon." The main problem was the military commander of the camp, Captain Ralph Hunt, who was a grafter. He personally kept a store in Nashville. When he drew supplies from government departments most of them went into this store for
sale rather than to the contraband camp. Hunt's successors were little better. The committee concluded that "none of them had any sympathy with the subject of their charge . . . , all they did do was mere eye-service, all of them carefully omitting to do anything to-day that could be deferred until to-morrow." The officers in charge were not "intelligently mindful of the condition of the refugees, or of what is due to them or ought to be done for them." In many cases, the committee reported, these officers "used their authority not only not to ameliorate their condition, but to add to their sufferings . . . ." Evidently blacks began to purposefully avoid going to the camp. In early April, 1864, the provost guard in Nashville began to make raids upon vagrant blacks in the city to get them to the camp. 59

Despite the wretched nature of the Nashville camp, and other similar camps the committee visited in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama, the Senate committee did not regard the concept of government aid to refugee blacks as a total failure. "The policy, or rather purpose, of the government in attempting to provide for the wants and ameliorate the condition of these unfortunate refugees," they said, "is a wise and philanthropic one, growing out of individual necessities on the one hand, and the highest possible public
duty on the other." Government aid to blacks was a new experiment. "It is an enterprise entirely novel in its character, for which there has never before been either occasion or precedent." Even in the best hands the camp would have experienced difficulties. The committee noted that the experiment thus far shows more what might be accomplished under judicious management than what has been accomplished. In its failures it is full of suggestions and instructions as to what might be done for the present comfort and ultimate welfare of the refugees under well-devised and well-regulated agencies of this kind.

The key to success in the experiment was to have sympathetic men conduct it. "As in all other great enterprises, success must depend upon the good sense and good faith of those intrusted with the execution of the work." If "sound-judging, sagacious, energetic, and philanthropic men are chose permanently for the work," they believed the experiment would work. 60

There was in Nashville a man who possessed exactly those qualities which the committee deemed necessary for successful operation of the government's welfare experiment. He was Reuben D. Mussey. Officially, Mussey had nothing to do with the contraband camp. But Mussey was sincerely interested in the welfare of black people, and
he was eager to participate fully in the experiment. In the fall of 1864, Mussey proposed the creation of a Superintendent of Freedmen in Tennessee who would have wide latitude in dealing with freedmen's problems. No doubt in making the proposal Mussey believed that he would make an ideal Superintendent. In early February, 1865, Mussey was appointed to the Superintendency of Freedmen in East and Middle Tennessee.\textsuperscript{61} Black people now had a true friend in a position of considerable power. His appointment held great promise for the future of the government's experiment in the post-war period.

Writing long after the war, John Eaton, Jr., in charge of freedmen's affairs in the Mississippi Valley, wrote that the army, despite all its other wartime duties and problems, "accomplished practically all that could be done to free, feed, shelter, and protect the Negro and give him medical attention."\textsuperscript{62} In Nashville during most of the war the army failed to provide much relief for suffering black refugees. The experiment in easing their physical miseries floundered for the first year because unsympathetic men had conducted it. As the war came to a close, dedicated, understanding men took control, and these men were to remain in charge during much of the Reconstruction
period. If the government's resolve continued, there was indeed an excellent chance that the army in Tennessee might be able to do much good for the freedmen.

VI

The army had a tremendous impact in introducing the black man to formal education. This was especially noticeable during Reconstruction. However, at least in Nashville, the educational foundation was laid down during the last eighteen months of the war.

A Union soldier from Michigan stationed in Nashville no doubt expressed the sentiments of many Union men on the connection between emancipation and education. He believed that something more than mere abolition was necessary. Abolition, he thought, "only half completes the work. It is like turning the hogs out of your kitchen. They must be taken care of or they will break into your parlors." Ex-slaves, he wrote, "must be thoroughly educated or they must be colonized before anything can be effected." 63

No one believed this more firmly than George L. Stearns and Reuben D. Mussey. Both men rejected colonization but placed tremendous faith in education. "Major Stearns' policy," said Mussey, "was wise and large. He deemed the
question of colored troops to involve the question of the elevation and improvement of the race . . . . Thus, Stearns tried "to establish and foster a desire for education among the colored troops and among the colored people." He procured teachers and money for black schools. He directed the chaplains of the various black regiments to make the education of the men in these regiments "the principal part of their duty." In February, 1865, Mussey reported that each regiment of blacks had some educational arrangements under the charge of its chaplain. 64

Stearns and Mussey aided the northern benevolent associations in their educational efforts. By February, 1865, there were four schools in the city maintained by the northern societies, with strong support from the army. A fifth school was scheduled to open in the near future. Every day hundreds of eager pupils received instruction in these schools. 65 The joint benevolent society-army schools were far from perfect. The accommodations were cramped. There were never enough teachers. There were shortages of books and stationery. Teachers were never assured of rations. Mussey tried to have all of these deficiencies corrected. 66 In the meantime, black people in Nashville were at least getting a taste of education. By today's standards they were not getting much. But in
comparison to anything they had ever had before, they were becoming educated.

During the war the army in Middle Tennessee also took the first steps toward integrating blacks into a contract labor system. The wartime efforts toward establishing a free labor system yielded meager results. The important point, however, is that a beginning was made which pointed the way toward Reconstruction work by the Freedmen's Bureau.67

On April 18, 1863, Stanton sent Johnson a detailed set of supplemental instructions. Among other things, Johnson was ordered to "take possession of all abandoned lands and plantations that may come within your power, and lease them for occupation and cultivation upon such terms as you deem proper . . . ." He was also to "take in charge all abandoned slaves or colored persons who have been held in bondage, and whose masters have been, or are now, engaged in rebellion . . . ." He was to "provide for their useful employment and subsistence." Able-bodied blacks, Stanton suggested, could be employed on fortifications and other public works. For this labor they were to be paid "reasonable wages." The military governor was to "take measures to secure employment and reasonable compensation for the labor" of all those not employed on public works or fortifications.68
The implication of these instructions was obvious. If Johnson had both land and laborers, it was only logical that the blacks should be put to work on plantations for regular wages. In case Johnson missed this implication, Stanton elaborated on the subject for him. The blacks, Stanton wrote, "had better be set to digging their subsistence out of the ground." He suggested that the military governor put as many contrabands as he could on abandoned plantations. "If some still remain," Stanton continued, "get loyal men of character to take them temporarily on wages to be paid to the contrabands themselves." Naturally, if any blacks voluntarily made arrangements to work for a living, Johnson was to leave them alone.69

Johnson generally disregarded these instructions. This disregard was not purposeful. He simply believed he needed all the able-bodied men he could get to work on the fortifications in Middle Tennessee. Furthermore, when Major Stearns came to Nashville in September, 1863, the number of available black men for such experimentation was reduced still more. Instituting a plan of contract labor also required a great deal of time and effort, and the military governor had little of either to spare. Consequently, blacks who could avoid being impressed to work on Nashville's defenses, and those who had no desire to become soldiers, remained idle.
Pressure to put idle blacks to work on plantations began to build during the winter of 1863-64. The Dispatch expressed the sentiments of many Nashvillians in regard to unemployed blacks in the city. Let persons "wishing to employ them," it said, "take them, upon proper guarantees, and put them to work where they can be making a support for themselves instead of being fed and clothed [sic] at Government expense. Crop time is coming." It had been several years since Middle Tennessee had produced a regular crop. Now, with the state seemingly cleared of Confederate forces, it was time to put Middle Tennessee back on the road toward agricultural prosperity.

The army responded to this logic. On February 4, 1864, the same day the contraband camp was established, Adjutant General Thomas issued regulations for the government of freedmen in the Department of the Cumberland. All male blacks coming within the Federal lines capable of bearing arms would be mustered into service. Other blacks would "be required to perform such labor as may be suited to their several conditions, in the respective staff departments of the army, on plantations or farms, leased or otherwise, within our lines, as wood-choppers, teamsters, or in any way that their labor can be made available." Loyal citizens could apply to the commandant of the contraband camp for
permission to hire blacks in the camp. These employers were to sign written contracts with the blacks. The contract was to be for at least one full year, and the employer agreed to pay, feed, and treat humanely all the blacks he hired. If enough loyal citizens could not be found, then district commanders could "designate such abandoned or confiscated plantations or farms as they may deem most suitable to be worked by the negroes, upon such terms as in their judgment shall be best adapted to the welfare of this class of people . . . ." Thomas' order gave district commanders specific authority to lease abandoned plantations to loyal citizens. Finally, the regulations established a wage scale for employed blacks.\textsuperscript{71}

This order remained a theoretical framework rather than a working plan in the Nashville vicinity. There is little evidence that many blacks around Nashville went to work under the provisions of this order. To the south, around Pulaski, Tennessee, a few officers took a "creditable interest" in the undertaking, and some blacks went to work on plantations. But in the Rock City, hundreds of blacks remained unemployed at the contraband camp, languishing in dilapidated Sibley tents, because the officers in command had little interest in the project.\textsuperscript{72}
During the war there was really very little opportunity to put a contract labor system into operation. The uncertainties and confusion of wartime conditions simply did not allow for a stable labor system in Middle Tennessee. While fighting raged on, the army could devote little energy to projects which were not directly associated with the prosecution of the war. The wonder is that military authorities did as much as they did in providing for refugee blacks. True, the positive accomplishments were few. But important ideas were developed. Experimental projects in aid, education, and labor were tried. These gave direction for the post-war energies of the nation in dealing with the freedmen, and provided an essential contiguity between war and peace.

Toward the end of the war, Mussey reflected on the subject of government supervision of the freedmen. "Where," he asked, "should this supervision be? In the hands of the civil or military authorities? While the question undoubtedly is properly a civil question, the actual facts are that unless the Military exercise this supervision none will be exercised . . . ." Mussey knew that in Tennessee civil authority "rested in and flows from the Military Governor whose authority is supported by the machinery of armies rather than Courts." In post-war Tennessee the
state government continued to be supported by armies rather than courts. And the army retained a large degree of control over the supervision of freedmen's affairs. Wartime experimentation gave military authorities a blueprint for action.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Six

1 Nashville Daily Times and True Union, July 6, 1864.

2 Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation, pp. 200-01; Caleb Perry Patterson, The Negro in Tennessee, 1790-1865 (Austin: University of Texas Bulletin No. 2205, 1922) p. 11.

3 Polmsbee, Corlew, and Mitchell, A Short History, p. 217; Chase Curran Mooney, "Slavery in Davidson County, Tennessee" (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Vanderbilt University, 1939) p. 32; Campbell, Attitudes of Tennesseans, pp. 258-59, 263.

4 Mooney, "Slavery in Davidson County," p. 57.


6 Nashville Dispatch, Aug. 9, 1862, and July 28, 1863; Trimble, "Behind the Lines in Middle Tennessee," p. 65; Lindsley Diary, Nov. 15, 1863; Gower and Allen, Pen and Sword, p. 636; Report from the Office of Chief of Army Police, Feb. 11, 1863, AJP.

7 Ibid.; Fitch, Annals, p. 540; Nashville Dispatch, Feb. 27, 1863.

8 Palmer, Personal Recollections, p. 131.


10 Nashville Dispatch, Feb. 19, 1864.
Rousseau to General William Denison Whipple, Jan. 30, 1864, in 0.R., I., XXXII, II, p. 269; Complaint from two citizens to Major George L. Stearns, Oct. 6, 1863, AJP; Trimble, "Behind the Lines in Middle Tennessee," p. 71.


15 Trimble, "Behind the Lines in Middle Tennessee," p. 65.

16 Nashville Dispatch, Aug. 22, 1862.

17 Order by General J. S. Negley to the Commander of City Patrols, Oct. 14, 1862, Vertical File Material #1208, OHS.

18 Nashville Dispatch, Oct. 16, 1862.

19 Ibid., Aug. 23, 1863.


21 Nashville Daily Union, Jan. 15, 1863.

22 Stearns, Stearns, pp. 324-25; Nashville Daily Union, Oct. 25, 1862; Nashville Dispatch, April 26, 1863.


24 Captain J. S. C. Morton to AJ, Dec. 5, 1863, AJP.


26 Ibid., p. 21.
27 Captain J. S. C. Morton to Mussey, Dec. 4, 1863, AJP.

28 Stearns, Stearns, p. 308.


31 Ibid., pp. 763, 772.

32 Mussey to Salmon P. Chase, Oct. 18, 1863, Salmon P. Chase Papers, Manuscript Division, LC; Stearns, Stearns, p. 314; Fousseau to W. D. Whipple, Jan. 30, 1864, in O.R., I, XXXII, II, p. 268.


34 AJ to Stanton, Sept. 17, 1863, in Ibid., pp. 819-20.

35 Stanton to Stearns, Sept. 16, 1863, in Ibid., pp. 816-17; Stanton to Stearns, Sept. 18, 1863, in Ibid., p. 823.

36 Stanton to AJ, Sept. 18, 1863, in Ibid; Lincoln to AJ, Sept. 18, 1863, in Ibid.

37 Stanton to Stearns, Sept. 16, 1863, in Ibid., p. 816.

38 Stearns to Stanton, Sept. 25, 1863, in Ibid., p. 840.

39 AJ to Lincoln, Sept. 23, 1863, AJP.

40 Nashville Dispatch, Nov. 5, 1863.

42[Mussey] to Brigadier General Tillson, May 17, 1864, in RG 393, Dept. of the Cumberland, vol. 220, LS.

43Francis Everett Hall to his sister, Nov. 8, 1863, Hall Papers.

44Stearns, Stearns, pp. 313, 316.


50Ibid., pp. 764-65.


53Nashville Daily Times and True Union, Sept. 17, 1863; Nashville Dispatch, Dec. 9, 1863; Joseph G. McKee and M. M. Brown to AJ, Nov. 3, [1863], AJP.

54Ibid.; Nashville Daily Times and True Union, Sept. 17, 1863; Nashville Dispatch, July 9, 1863.

56 Sen. Ex. Docs., 38 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 28, pp. 1-2; see the essay by Mussey enclosed with Mussey to AJ, Feb. 20, 1865, AJP.

57 Diary of Walter T. Carpenter, Feb. and March, 1864, OHS.


59 Ibid., pp. 3-5, 23; Nashville Daily Times and True Union, April 11, 1864.


63 John W. Nicholson to his wife, March 20, [1865], John W. Nicholson Papers, MHC.

64 Mussey to Major C. W. Foster, Oct. 10, 1864, in O.R., III, IV, pp. 771-72; Mussey to AJ, Feb. 20, 1865, AJP.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 One scholar has noted a similar contiguity in Louisiana between the contract labor program of the army of occupation and that employed by the Freedmen's Bureau. See J. Thomas May, "Contiguity and Change in the Labor Program of the Union Army and the Freedmen's Bureau," Civil War History, XVII (Sept., 1971) pp. 232-45.


69 Hall, Andrew Johnson, pp. 207-08.

70 Nashville Dispatch, Jan. 29, 1864.

72 Carpenter Diary, Feb. 26, 1864.

73 See the essay by Mussey enclosed with Mussey to AJ, Feb. 20, 1865, AJP.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Prelude

One of the greatest enemies faced by the Nashville army garrison was venereal disease. Prostitution flourished in the city, and many hundreds of soldiers ended up in hospitals with syphilis or gonorrhea. In late summer, 1863, the army moved to curtail the sex trade. One young Michigan soldier wrote his mother about the harlots of Nashville, and the military's effort to control them:

There is another institution that I will speak of just to show what kind of a city the south praise and call the "flower of Tennessee." (I pray God to keep all such flowers out of my garden, and out of my hands) it is the institution of prostitution, sanctioned by law, and licensed by military authority, there is one street running the whole length of Nashville where evry [sic] house is kept by courtesans, and there are many others scattered through the city on evry [sic] st. [sic] this st. [sic] is called "Smokey-row" and there are men four in a squad, scattered all along the st. [sic] and in the largest houses to keep peace, among the soldiers that frequent the places they are called the "Patrols" [sic] and are there all of the time day and night; there is a hospital kept by Uncle Sam where these courtesans are brought evry [sic] ten days, and examined by the Surgeon if found to be sound they are given a license for ten days for which they pay one dollar, if not they are kept there and doctored until they are; there are between

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1,400 and 1,500 licenses given evry [sic] ten days, this money goes to pay the expenses of the hospital; there are a great many kept by officers who do not get licenses, making in all over one and a half thousand of these abominable, low, vile, meane [sic], illugaten [?], lewd, wanton, dissolute, licentious, vicious, immoral, wicked, keepers of hell-holes; I should need [sic] a Websters-dictionary to find words enough, and then I could not find them bad enough, to express my hatred of these beings calling themselves women but I wont' [sic] disgrace the name of women by applying it to them, and when I say that they are unworthy the name of b--h, I do not say it simply to express my hatred toward them, but because I believe in the sight of an omniscient [sic] God, that they are beneath the dumb-brute that we call b--h."

"THE CITY GOVERNMENT EXISTED BY MILITARY AUTHORITY"

Nashville had three masters during the Civil War: the military government, the commanding general of the Department of the Cumberland, and the city administration. This was a very unequal triad. The main struggle for power within the city was between Andrew Johnson and the commanding general. By late 1863, this contest had been decided in Johnson's favor. The overriding importance of these two masters should not obscure the fact that a municipal government functioned throughout the entire Federal occupation.
The city government in Nashville at the time of the Civil War consisted of a mayor, Board of Aldermen, and Board of Common Council, all elected by the people. There were one alderman and two councilmen for each of the city's eight wards. Being an alderman was a greater honor than being a councilman. The two boards meeting in convention composed the City Council. The City Council elected all other city officials, including the tax assessor, revenue collector, marshal, wharf master, and superintendent of the workhouse. During the war Johnson appointed all the aldermen and councilmen. They in turn elected the mayor as well as all other city officers.

In power and influence, the city administration was clearly subordinate to both Johnson and the commanding general. Despite its subordinate status it tried to continue normal operations in the city. It was beset with a host of problems which were either created or exacerbated by the war. The city administration by itself proved inadequate to cope with these problems. Consequently military authorities aided the city government in dealing with municipal problems.

William Birkhimer has pointed out that in conquered territory "whatever of the civil authorities are permitted to perform their functions, it is . . . , for the
benefit of the conquered [sic] as an act of grace on the part of the conqueror [sic], and at most for his convenience." The conqueror gains two advantages by allowing local municipal administration and law to operate. One is that it relieves the conqueror of the onerous functions of civil government. The other is that it "tends to secure the happiness of the governed and consequently their contentment." In theory the conqueror is left free to pursue other objectives, while the business pursuits and social relations of the people are as little disturbed as possible. Of course, officials retained in office would be strictly subordinate to military authorities and often their actions would be dictated by their military supervisors.²

The theory of mutual accord between conqueror and conquered usually broke down in practice. In New Orleans Federal military authorities were willing to allow the municipal government to continue in office. But the city officials proved obstinate. Within a month the government was deposed and replaced by military personnel. In Memphis the story was much the same. Here, John Park, the pre-war mayor, remained at his post after the city's capture. Park, however, was both inefficient and disloyal. Finally, in 1864, the military suspended Park and established military
government in the city. All of the blame for these breakdowns did not lie with the municipal authorities. As one scholar of Federal occupation policy has noted, Federal commanders were generally very intolerant of local municipal governments from the beginning.4

The difference in Nashville was Andrew Johnson. Had Buell or Rosecrans been the final arbitrator, chances are the course of events would have been similar to that in New Orleans and Memphis. But Johnson was committed to the restoration of civil government in Tennessee. It was important for political purposes to have a civil government functioning in the state's capital. When Nashville city authorities refused to take an oath of allegiance, Johnson swiftly deposed them. He did not, however, replace civil government with direct military rule. Instead, he appointed loyal civilians to fill the positions of the deposed officials. In Nashville, then, at least the facade of civil rule was maintained.

The change in personnel between the immediate pre-war elected city government and the Johnson appointed government of April, 1862, was almost complete. In the Board of
Aldermen, all but one man, William S. Cheatham, were replaced by Johnson. In the Board of Common Council, everyone was replaced, though one member of the board, William Shane, did become city recorder in Johnson's new government. Only about half a dozen initial Johnson appointees had served in the city administration during the preceding decade.  

The usual time for city elections was late September. Every year at that time Johnson reappointed city officials. He made his last municipal appointments in September, 1864. These men served until shortly after the end of the war. There was a striking continuity between his first and last appointees. Five of his original eight appointees to the Board of Aldermen were still serving in that body at the end of the war. Only four of the original sixteen members of the Board of Common Council were still serving in that body in 1865, but two others had moved up to the Board of Aldermen. Furthermore, one alderman, William S. Cheatham, had become a councilman. Cheatham's demotion may well have been the result of his opposition to the radicals' program.

Nashville's mayor under the Johnson regime was John Hugh Smith. Smith was an ante-bellum Whig who became a Republican during the war. He became a member of the Nashville bar in 1843 and was elected mayor in 1845. He
served as mayor through 1852, and in 1853 was elected representative from Davidson County to the State General Assembly. In 1859 Smith ran again for mayor of Nashville, but was defeated by a scant twenty-two votes. During the secession crisis he took a strong pro-Union stand, and praised Johnson's stout defense of the Union. Smith was one of the aldermen originally appointed by Johnson. In the organization of the Johnson appointed city council, Smith was elected mayor. It is doubtful that he would have been elected mayor without Johnson's prior approval. After all, Smith was the perfect man to give legitimacy to the new municipal government. He was obviously a popular man in Nashville. Furthermore, since he and Johnson were from different political parties, it gave a bipartisan appearance to the effort to revive loyalty in the city.

Smith knew that accepting the position of mayor was not going to increase his popularity in Nashville. "I knew when I accepted the office," he said, "that for a while I would be an object of odium to many of my fellow citizens." He accepted the office, he said, because he believed that "when reason and loyalty" returned to the city, he would be thanked for continuing civil government and thus preventing martial law.
For all intents and purposes, however, the city was under martial law during the war. The men composing the city administration were allowed no illusions about their position. They were made aware from the start that they were at the hands of Andrew Johnson and the military. In early May, 1862, the Board of Aldermen passed two acts designed to suppress disloyalty in the city. One of them amended the city revenue laws so that "hereafter no free white person or persons shall be permitted to carry on any business or exercise any privilege whatever . . . , without first applying to the City Recorder and taking an oath of allegiance and fidelity to the Constitution . . . ." The other act was "A Bill to Suppress and Prevent Treason, Sedition, and Breaches of the Peace." This was a rather vague law which forbade language or actions "calculated to incite treason, rebellion, sedition, or offend loyal citizens . . . ." 10

These two bills went to the Common Council for approval. Instead of being swiftly approved, they were laid on the table. In late May the Common Council debated the bills again. Mayor Smith spoke to the councilmen. He said that Johnson had decided if the council did not pass the bill to amend the revenue laws, he would be compelled to take things in his own hands. Smith stated that "if the Council
refused to make loyal men of the citizens of Nashville, Governor Johnson would find the means to do so." The council promptly passed the bill. At the same meeting the Common Council passed the bill to suppress treason after making two minor amendments in it. The Board of Aldermen unanimously accepted the two amendments.\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, both bills became law, but not without the use of pressure from the military governor. By June, 1862, the Common Council had learned its lesson. When a councilman introduced a bill to repeal an act prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors in the city, he was quickly reminded by another councilman that the act was originally passed at the request of the military authorities. The second councilman urged consultation with these authorities before repealing the act. This course of action was readily agreed upon.\textsuperscript{12}

In September, 1862, alderman H. G. Scovel, the prominent Unionist Nashville real estate dealer who had been persecuted by the Confederates before the Federal occupation, freely admitted that "the City Government existed by military authority." Just before the end of the war alderman William Driver acknowledged that city council's status had not changed. City council, he said, holds "the position of a military board." About the same time the \textit{Daily Union},
looking forward to the return of peace, reminded members of the city government that they would "not much longer be above respecting the voice of the people." Throughout the Federal occupation, then, the city government remained under the heel of military authority.

II

Nashville was a miserable place during the war. Rats, flies, and mosquitoes plagued the community. At time flies were so plentiful that the simple task of letter writing became a difficult chore. In the summer the heat and dust were nearly unbearable. On some spring days the dust above the city actually darkened the sunlight.\(^{14}\) In the winter cold and snow caused great suffering among the populace, especially the poor. Shelter, clothing, and fuel were all in short supply and very expensive. A crime wave seized the city, making residents afraid to venture out at night. The streets fell into disrepair and became clogged with filth and trash. The health of the city declined markedly. Drinking and prostitution flourished, indicating a general moral decline in Nashville. A greatly depressed economy made all of the city's misery even harder to bear. The
capstone of the city's wartime wretchedness was a disastrous flood in the spring of 1865 which made Nashville look like an island in a vast lake.\textsuperscript{15}

Nashville's city government struggled with these problems throughout the war. The city supposedly had its regular income from taxes and court fees. But as early as December, 1862, Mayor Smith reported to the Board of Aldermen that the city treasury was unable "for want of means, to pay the officers, employees, and the indispensable ordinary expenses of the city." The reason, he said, was the "inability or indisposition, or both, amongst the tax payers to pay their taxes."\textsuperscript{16} In short, before the Federal occupation was a year old, the municipal government lacked sufficient funds to cope with the serious problems which beset the city during the war.

The only place to turn for assistance was to the military governor and other military authorities. From the start, the military was intimately involved in trying to solve municipal problems. Without this cooperation the city would have been in a more deplorable condition than it was when the war ended. It was, of course, to the army's benefit to have a clean, healthy, orderly city. What was good for the populace was also good for the army.
One of the most important joint municipal-military efforts was providing fire and police protection for the city. Fire protection was especially important to the army because Nashville was a huge supply depot for Union forces. By March, 1863, the military was convinced that the city's fire department was inadequate to protect the city. Consequently, the post commander ordered the city fire department to double its effective force and to purchase any amount of hose needed. This was to be done at the expense of the national government. When the city fire committee consulted with the military authorities about the purchase of two thousand feet of hose, it was told that the army itself would make the purchase for the city. Military authorities eventually decided it would be safer to handle the entire matter themselves rather than depend on the city. The chief quartermaster in Nashville observed that an "efficient fire department in a crowded city is absolutely necessary to safety." The fire department in Nashville, he said, "was wholly inadequate to the purpose." So he organized his own fire department.17

Policing the city was also a combined civil-military effort, with the lion's share of the responsibility falling to the army. Perhaps this was only fair, since Union soldiers and government employees contributed greatly to
the amount of crime in Nashville. Beginning in the summer of 1862, military authorities issued a never-ending stream of orders designed to keep all soldiers, except those on duty, outside the city, especially at night.\(^18\) The mere fact that these orders had to be issued and re-issued implies that they were not very effective. The army also tried to disarm both citizens and off-duty soldiers in order to curb violence on the city's streets and alleys.\(^19\)

Meanwhile, the army accepted an ever larger responsibility for policing the city. No doubt this was partly by choice, but it was also partly because the municipal government abdicated some of its responsibility. In mid-August, 1862, one of the city policemen died. Resolutions were introduced in both the Board of Aldermen and the Common Council to fill the vacancy. Both bodies defeated the resolution. The reason was that it was thought unnecessary to pay a new city policeman when there was such an efficient provost guard in the city. A month later steps were taken to dismiss all the city's detective police from office.\(^20\)

By the fall of 1862 there were only eighteen night policemen patrolling the entire city. The small city police force obviously needed help in controlling crime. In November, the Dispatch suggested that the post commander detail forty to sixty men to patrol the city at night under
the guidance of the city police. The city council accepted the suggestion and appointed Mayor Smith to consult with General Rosecrans, who agreed to help police the city. Nashville was divided into northern, central, and southern districts for purposes of police administration. A squad of soldiers was detailed for each district. By mid-December they were patrolling the streets, commanded by Nashville night police.\textsuperscript{21} The press initially praised the new police arrangement. But within two weeks problems had developed. Those soldiers assigned to aid the night police began to roam the city during the day drinking, robbing, and insulting citizens.\textsuperscript{22}

Throughout the war the best efforts of the army and city government to police the city failed. Thefts continued at an unprecedented level, and the streets were not safe after dark. "The city," reported the \textit{Daily Times and True Union} in November, 1864, "swarms with a host of burglars, brass-knuck and slingshot ruffians, pick-pockets and highwaymen, who have flocked hither from all parts of the country." It was plain, the paper continued, "that neither the military nor the municipal police is near as strong as it should be." Several months later the same newspaper stated that the "carnival of blood still reigns
unchecked in Nashville. There was much truth in this assessment of the crime rate in the city.

Another problem which the city administration was unable to solve was the filthy, unhealthy condition of the Rock City. Trash and garbage threatened to engulf Nashville by the summer and fall of 1863. As the Daily Press put it, the sewage system of the town was "frightfully defective." "Contaminating filth," it said, spread its "vomitive quintessence" into every corner of the city. "If we are to submit to the exhalations from dirty cellars and back premises another month," the paper continued, "all the good-smelling extracts ever compounded by the great Lubin would fail to restore our nasal organs to their natural functions, nor would all of the Plantation Bitters in the country bring back our appetites." "Shall we be stunk to death?" the paper asked. It suggested that if the city government could not clean the city, then the job should be entrusted to the military.

In pre-war years Nashville's streets had been cleaned and kept in order by workhouse criminals and slaves hired by the year. By 1863, however, slave labor was no longer available, and white and black criminals in the workhouse were quickly "liberated" by recruiting officers "to enter the service of Uncle Sam." The city also had no money
with which to pay laborers. Hence, the city government appealed to individual citizens to clean their own premises. In June, 1863, Mayor Smith urged citizens to pile garbage and filth in heaps near streets and alleys where it could be hauled away by government wagons furnished by the post commander. Smith said that if citizens did not voluntarily respond, "a more expeditious power will be applied." 26

Citizens failed to respond, and a more expeditious power—the military—was applied. In January, 1864, the post commander, noting that municipal regulations failed to keep the city clean, ordered the "occupant of every house daily [to] sweep or scrape clean the pavement or sidewalk in front of his building" by 9 a.m. Government wagons would pick up the piles of debris. 27

Some Nashville citizens were not happy about the city's abdication of responsibility in this matter. Two months after the army took over the task, a Nashville doctor complained that "foul and fetid accumulations of decomposing matter have increased, and are daily augmented to a fearful extent." The military authorities were employing "all the surplus labor at their command to repair and purify the streets and allies [sic]," but their praiseworthy exertions had evoked no concert of action from the municipal government. The physician believed that the city government should
be leading in cleaning the city, not standing on the sidelines. The Daily Union also criticized the municipal authorities for ignoring their duty.28

Such criticisms were unfair. The municipal government simply did not have the money or manpower to keep the city clean. Furthermore, individual citizens were not entirely blameless for the problem. One Union soldier informed his sister that the army had taken charge of cleaning the city. "The people," he wrote, "have grown very careless and slovenly and it has rendered it highly necessary for such a thing to be done."29 Under the circumstances the army was the only agency available with the resources to clean the community.

On March 22, 1864, Captain W. D. Chamberlain of the 29th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry was placed in charge of cleaning up Nashville. Chamberlain pursued the task with vigor, and he soon had squads of soldiers hard at work cleaning the city streets. Within a month there was noted improvement. In May the Daily Times and True Union observed that "Nashville presents quite a clean appearance just at present." In June the Daily Union complimented the military for "the excellent condition of the streets at present."30

Once the city was thoroughly cleansed, the army cleaning apparatus apparently fell into disuse. During the
first months of 1865 complaints about the city's filth again appeared in the papers. For example, horse carcasses lay rotting in the city cemetery and on the main streets. So army personnel again assumed responsibility for cleaning the city. This time they were aided by municipal laborers.31

The army managed to prevent Nashville from being literally buried with garbage, but it did not keep the city immaculate. It received too little aid from the municipal government; the citizens personally had become careless and untidy under wartime circumstances; and the army itself, more concerned with fighting than cleaning, rarely devoted full attention to the problem. Conditions in the winter and spring of 1865 seem to have been little better than those of two years earlier.

The army also became the guardian of the city's health when specific problems arose. Nashville was swept by a smallpox epidemic almost yearly during the war. The municipal government seemed incapable of dealing with this problem. In the fall of 1863 smallpox appeared in the city. A proposal introduced in the Board of Aldermen calling for the establishment of a permanent board of health, composed of one physician from each city ward, was not acted upon.32

So again an important municipal function fell to the military authorities by default. On November 21, 1863, the
Nashville post commander noted that smallpox was spreading in Nashville. He ordered that "all persons, citizens as well as soldiers, are hereby required to have themselves vaccinated at once." Free vaccinations would be provided by army medical officers at two different locations. The epidemic continued despite this order. In January, 1864, the commander ordered that all smallpox cases be promptly reported to the Acting Assistant Surgeon. The afflicted individuals would then be transported to a smallpox camp, established by the army, for treatment. Finally, in near desperation to check the epidemic, the commander issued an order for the provost marshal "to arrest any persons who are not vaccinated at the end of one week from the date of this order and convey them outside the picket lines of the post." 33

It is impossible to tell whether the army's efforts finally managed to curtail the epidemic, or whether it simply died out naturally. Nor does it much matter. What is important is that the army became entangled in yet another municipal problem because city officials lacked the resources and the resolve to tackle it themselves. No wonder military authority had so little patience with municipal governments. Nashville's government proved inefficient and incapable of dealing with wartime problems.
Only the army responded with a reasonable amount of ability and energy. To the army's way of thinking, the whole matter probably would have been greatly simplified if the city government had been disposed of at the beginning.

III

Along with providing fire and police protection and keeping the city clean and healthy, the army faced several other major municipal problems. One of these was to control drinking and prostitution. Drinking and prostitution were not really distinct problems. Not only did they go hand-in-hand, but they also were intimately associated with the crime, disease, and filth which inundated the city.

"Nashville whiskey," said the Dispatch, "appears to have a very bad effect upon the soldiers in our midst." Large numbers of drunken soldiers were present at all times, "creating a disturbance, stealing fruit, and committing all kinds of unlawful acts." The paper urged the provost marshal to take action.34 The paper might have added that liquor did not discriminate against soldiers alone—it had an equally pernicious influence upon civilians.

In June, 1862, the provost marshal issued the first of a long series of orders designed to bring drinking
under control in Nashville. This order prohibited the sale of all "ardent spirits or other intoxicating drinks." Less than two months later the military authorities, at the point of a bayonet in some instances, tried to close all liquor stores in the city. A week later the provost marshal again prohibited all sales of intoxicating beverages "in the city of Nashville and vicinity." Complete prohibitions of this type simply did not work. For example, in April, 1863, the city police made 363 arrests. Two hundred and thirty-five of these dealt with cases involving drunkenness, drunkenness and disorderly conduct, or tipping.35

Military authorities then took a new approach. They tried partial prohibitions. In August, 1863, the post commander ordered all liquor saloons, bars, and drinking houses to close punctually at 10 p.m. Two months later the commander decreed that saloons and bars were "allowed to sell Ale and Beer to enlisted men, but not anything stronger."36 These did not alleviate the drinking problem either--among soldiers or civilians.

So it was back to total prohibition. In late December, 1863, all sales of liquor in the city, wholesale and retail, were forbidden. Four months later this mandate was modified. Parties who filed bonds in the provost marshal's
office could sell liquor to citizens and officers, but no liquor of any kind could be sold to enlisted men or government employees. All those who posted bonds would have to pay a tax of $10.00 per month.  

But nothing worked. On June 7, 1864, a large number of the 2nd Kentucky Regiment "having imbibed too freely of the ardent, notwithstanding sundry and divers [sic] military orders to the contrary, posted themselves on the corner of Church and Cherry Streets and assaulted every negro who attempted to pass." Such liquor-induced incidents were a daily occurrence in Nashville throughout the war. The military could issue all the orders it wanted, but civilians and soldiers were going to get drunk and raise havoc. The best the military could do was to arrest the offenders. It could not prevent people from becoming offenders.

The army was no more successful at ending prostitution in the city. Nashville had always had its fair share of women of ill fame. In 1860, Nashville census-takers, for some unknown reason, took it upon themselves to count the prostitutes in the city. Two hundred and seven women admitted to being professional whores. Most were white, but several were mulattos. The business was evidently quite profitable. One mulatto madam in 1860 owned $3,500
worth of real estate and $200 worth of personal property. She also owned one slave. So lucrative was the business that, at least in one instance, it became a family undertaking--Sarah Morgan and her three daughters were all prostitutes. 40

The Nashville city fathers were aware that their city housed a large number of prostitutes. Several days before the firing on Fort Sumter an alderman introduced a bill calling for the amelioration of the evils of prostitution in the city. No doubt the bill was forgotten in the commotion brought on by the war--the glory of fighting easily overshadowed the evils of fornication. Several months after the beginning of Federal occupation alderman William S. Cheatham introduced a new bill for the control of prostitution. As in many other municipal matters, however, the city council proved incapable of energetic and decisive action. 41

The military once again assumed control over a municipal problem. It was virtually forced into accepting the responsibility for dealing with the prostitutes. Army units stationed in Nashville were literally being decimated by venereal disease. Prostitution was concentrated in a section of the city known as "Smokey Row," "a foul breathing
hole of hell, which is belching forth its pestilential breath." Among Union soldiers there was an "old Saying that No Man Could be a Soldier unless he had gone through Smokey Row . . . . they said Smokey Row killed more soldiers than the warr [sic]." The Daily Press reported that there were hundreds, and probably thousands, of soldiers in hospitals who would have been in the field except for the existence of "Smokey Row." During 1863, "an unmitigated source of annoyance" to the post commander was "the constant complaints of the various commanders of Corps, Divisions, Brigades, Regiments, and Companies and the Surgeons of Regiments as to their men being kept in the Post and the various Field Hospitals of the Department for the treatment of venereal disease."

In mid-summer, 1863, elements of the Nashville press called upon the civil and military authorities to do something about the women who were scandalizing the town and ruining the health of so many soldiers. The complaints of Union officers and righteous citizens finally attracted the attention of the commander of the Department of the Cumberland, "who, in a preemptory manner demanded that some plan should be adopted to rid the Army of this malady." The post commander at Nashville decided to banish the prostitutes
from Nashville. Total prohibition—whether of booze or
prostitutes—seems to have been the initial military reaction
to bothersome problems.\textsuperscript{43}

In early July army patrols began rounding up licentious
females. They were to be put aboard steamers and sent North.
Within a few days some three hundred of the city's "wayward
daughters" were corralled, and another one hundred and fifty
were expected to be taken. The press praised this plan,
and suggested that the military authorities should do even
more to restore Nashville's good order and security.\textsuperscript{44}

The deportation scheme ran into problems from the
start. One problem was that the plan was limited to white
women. There were fears that black strumpets would quickly
replace the white ones. Black prostitutes brazenly paraded
the streets and public square at all hours of the day and
night. They were even more obnoxious to the white citizenry
than the white prostitutes. Another problem was that the
military patrols inadvertently arrested several respectable
Nashville ladies while rounding up the prostitutes. This
did very little to enhance the army's prestige among native
Nashvilleans. Still another hitch in the plan developed
when many prostitutes suddenly got married. Marriage trans-
formed them into "decent" women, thus excluding them from
the deportation order. Some who married on the spur of
the moment had previously figured prominently in police proceedings against prostitutes.\textsuperscript{45}

All of these problems were overshadowed by a much larger one: there was no place to unload the prostitutes. The steamer carrying its feminine cargo went to Louisville, but the authorities there refused to accept any such commercial articles. The boat pushed on to Cincinnati. Here, too, the thought of hundreds of prostitutes flooding the city appalled the city fathers. Cincinnati would not accept the cargo either. The end result of all this was that the Secretary of War intervened and ordered the whore-laden steamer returned to Nashville where its human cargo was dumped upon the streets.\textsuperscript{46}

Sickness among the army garrison increased at once, and the old complaints were renewed. The provost marshal, Colonel George Spaulding of the 18th Michigan Infantry, devised a new scheme for controlling prostitution. Rather than abolish it, the army would license it. Spaulding proposed that prostitutes be compelled to report to a medical officer for an examination. If they were free of venereal disease they would pay a license fee and submit to periodic medical examinations. If a woman was diseased or became diseased, she would be sent to a special army
hospital for rehabilitation before being permitted to go back to work. The money collected from license and examination fees would support this hospital and another one for diseased soldiers. 47

Military authorities procured an old brick building in a secluded part of the city and converted it into an examination room and hospital "for the reception of vale-tudinarian females from the unhealthy purlieus of Smokey [Row]." It was a bit ironic that the building had once been the property of the Catholic Church and the residence of a bishop. 48 In any event, the army's new social program began in early fall, 1863.

By January, 1865, almost four hundred women had been licensed. Some of these, however, had left the city, ten had died, a few had married, and still others had simply ceased reporting for their examinations. Thus, in January, 1865, the total number of licensed females who were reporting for examinations was actually less than two hundred and fifty. Over one hundred other women had reported for their initial examination, but then failed to obtain a license. Two hundred and seven prostitutes had been treated for venereal disease, primarily syphilis and gonorrhea, as of January, 1865. 49
The army surgeon in charge of this prostitute-control program believed that "as far as the prostitutes themselves are concerned, they are not only not dissatisfied with it, but the better class would regret to see it abolished . . . . all but a few of the most abandoned are pleased with it and its effects." The army also profited from the program. Complaints about venereal disease were no longer made to the post commander because the problem was virtually eliminated in Nashville. The army, said the surgeon, derived "the greatest benefit from the Sanitary measures which they were helping to sustain." The program saved thousands of men from the sick lists, thereby promoting the efficiency of the army. The plan worked so successfully that army surgeons from other cities traveled to Nashville to examine the workings of the program. 50

There is no evidence that the army tried to control liquor and prostitutes as a moral crusade. Instead, military authorities grappled with these problems out of self-defense. Drunken and diseased soldiers were of little value to the army. The havoc induced by drinking and whoring interfered with efficient military operations. The army had to intervene to prevent the wholesale demoralization of the troops stationed in Nashville.
Overshadowing all other municipal problems was the economic stagnation of the city. During the war, Nashville was beset by both a depression and inflation. The city was isolated from both its customary markets and its normal producing area. Almost all aspects of Nashville's usual peacetime economy languished, and prices for the necessities of life rose throughout the war. The economic conditions, of course, fell hardest upon the thousands of poor white and black refugees who crowded into the city. The army, though contributing to the unhappy economic situation, was unable to alleviate much of the suffering.

The economic dislocation of Middle Tennessee began long before the Federals occupied the area. There were two causes for the economic distress. One was a general crop failure in the late 1850s and early 1860s. The other was the uncertainty created by heightened political tensions following Lincoln's election. The business directory for 1860-61 spoke of "the stringency which has for some time prevailed in financial and commercial circles, and the comparative quiet which has reigned in the various departments of trade." In mid-summer, 1860, Henry Clay Yeatman,
a budding Nashville entrepreneur, began working in the city. He complained to his wife that "there is very little doing in the way of business." Following Lincoln's election he wrote her again, saying that business prospects were "very unpromising as it appears certain that one or more of the Southern states will certainly leave the Confederacy." One of Johnson's many Nashville correspondents summed up the situation in the spring of 1861. Political difficulties and last year's crop shortage, he told Johnson, render "all business and financial matters gloomy indeed in Middle Tennessee . . . ." These sentiments were echoed by Nashville's press.52

The economy did not improve after Tennessee seceded. Business remained very slack. One reason for this was that shippers could not use the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which was Nashville's main link to the North. Another reason was that southerners purposefully eschewed ordinary commercial ties. For example, the Nashville Banner urged the South to send cotton to southern ports only. And, of course, with the enemy menacing the borders of Tennessee, trade was inexorably compressed into ever narrower channels. In the fall of 1861, Nashville's mayor spoke of "the depressed conditions of property and trade," "the stringency of the money market," and the small profits being made by merchants and businessmen.53
These economic problems led to a rapid increase in prices. For instance, by mid-summer, 1861, the high price of coffee had induced many housekeepers to mix equal parts of rye and coffee. Naturally, inflated prices struck hardest at the poor. "Something must be done, and that quickly," urged the Republican Banner, "for the relief of the poor of Nashville. The amount of suffering in our city, at this moment, is scarcely known to the community at large." The paper suggested the formation of a free market to relieve the distress. This was done.54

Thus, when Union troops entered the city in February, 1862, Nashville was already in deep economic trouble. In April the Dispatch commented that the "most complete stagnation prevails in every pursuit." The cotton and tobacco trade illustrated this. Between September, 1861, and June, 1862, cotton warehouses in Nashville received 8,672 bales. The year before they had received more than double that number during the same months. By July, 1862, there was not a single bale for sale in the city. The tobacco trade was in even worse straits. Tobacco receipts were less than a third of what they had been a year previously. Nashville's once prosperous wholesale and retail grocery market was also in serious trouble. Prices, too, were abnormally high when Federal authority was re-established in Nashville.
Chickens which had once sold for fifteen or twenty cents now sold for more than double that. Fish and game sold for 100-200% above the price of a year before. The Dispatch prophesied in mid-August that "it will require a long time to regain the prosperity we have heretofore enjoyed." This prediction came true. Nashville did not recover economically until well into the Reconstruction period.55

V

The disruption of trade caused by the war was not overcome during the course of the conflict. There were several very good reasons why Nashville's economy did not recover while the fighting continued. One reason was the disruption of the labor supply in Middle Tennessee. Another reason was the devastation of Middle Tennessee by contending armies. A third was military control of the transportation system. Fourthly, the rapid depreciation of southern state currencies added to the economic woes. Finally, and most importantly, a steady stream of Presidential, Treasury Department, and military regulations hampered all attempts to revive the economy.

Middle Tennessee exhibited signs of devastation within a month after Union troops occupied it. In late March, 1862,
John B. Lindsley sadly noted in his diary that the "different roads leading from the city look very desolate, fences on many farms are destroyed, farmers afraid to plant, no work doing." Certainly some of this devastation was caused by southern troops as they retreated from Middle Tennessee. One plantation owner reported, for example, that the southern army, as well as Buell's, impressed horses from him. 56

As the war progressed, Middle Tennessee became increasingly desolate. Much of the ruin was clearly due to Union foraging and indiscriminate pillaging. A Union brigadier general, who marched and fought throughout Middle Tennessee in the summer and fall of 1862, said that Federal troops "have lived upon the country, and have really desolated it ..., the country is exhausted." When foraging parties went out from Nashville, he said, they were to bring in all the stock they could find. "Under this system," he continued, "all suffer, rich and poor; of all methods of providing for any army this is the most wasteful." A private agreed. He admitted that foraging "seems rather hard" on the populace, but rationalized it by saying that nearly every family in the Nashville vicinity sympathized with the rebellion. Another soldier wrote in the spring of 1863 that it was "really sad to see this beautiful
country here so ruined." He found it hard to believe that people could still live in the area. "There are no fences left at all. There is no corn and hay for the cattle and horses, but there are no horses left anyhow and the planters have no food for themselves." By 1864, there were so few horses, mules, and oxen left in Middle Tennessee that few crops could be produced. Indeed, some Middle Tennesseans whose corncribs and smokehouses had been emptied by Union troops faced the threat of starvation. 57

Legal impressments and foraging were bad enough, but the problem was compounded by Union pillaging and robbing. Prowling soldiers "began taking clothing and household articles, especially shoes, women's dresses, jeans, linseys, and uncut cloth." They also burned homes and barns for no apparent reason. In these, and other ways, undisciplined Union troops made life miserable within Union lines in Middle Tennessee. One female rebel sympathizer said, with some exaggeration to be sure, that "the Goths, vandals, and Huns all combined were not more merciless or savage than the Yankees." "Our life here in this subjected country," she said, "is not life--it is mere existence--breathing, eating & [sic] drinking." 58

Francis Lieber, author of the Lieber Code, was alarmed at reports of wanton destruction of property by Union
soldiers. "It does incalculable injury," he said. "It demoralizes our troops; it annihilates wealth irrecoverably, and makes a return to a state of peace more and more difficult." Some Nashville Unionists realized that the inexcusable destruction of property stirred a spirit of revenge among the people who were affected. One Unionist was appalled that Federal soldiers had "entered private houses and robbed peaceable, unoffending citizens of their clothing, bed clothing, Household furniture, etc." Women had been deprived of their jewelry and subjected to insults. "This wholesale plundering and pillaging through the country while it causes great suffering among the people," he wrote to Johnson, "drives thousands to desperation, and causes a great many to enter the southern army--will also greatly demoralize the Federal soldiers." Union officers were aware of the problem. Throughout the war they issued orders designed to bring Federal soldiers under control. There is little evidence that their orders ever had much effect. Illegal foraging and robbing continued till the end of the war. Combined with legal foraging and impressments, this contributed to the desolation of Middle Tennessee.

Another factor adding to the economic distress was military control of transportation. In November, 1862,
the *Daily Union* reported that persons "desiring to send goods over the Louisville and Nashville Railroad are in a great fever, because the Government monopolizes the freight trains for Army use . . . ." The *Dispatch* agreed that one problem with business was that it was almost impossible to secure the transportation of supplies over the Louisville and Nashville. When the government took over the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad in August, 1863, the press "anticipated that the road will be efficiently worked for the benefit of the government and army of General Rosecrans." 62 Along with the railroads, the army also controlled water transportation to and from Nashville, and could arbitrarily prevent private freight from being conveyed on it. 63 Merchants complained about the difficulties of transportation, but there was little they could do to alleviate the problem. Military officers knew that prohibiting the shipment of private goods by rail and water would raise a howl of protest. But at times the military situation allowed no alternative. 64

Depreciation of southern state currencies added to the financial chaos in Nashville. When the Federals occupied the city, Nashville businessmen simply refused to receive these currencies at par in ordinary transactions. Placards appeared on many hotels and business houses saying
"No Southern Money Taken Here." The Dispatch carried on an earnest campaign to bring Tennessee and other southern currencies up to par. It urged businessmen to cease their discrimination against these monies. But, the discount on non-Tennessee southern currencies became so great that by September, 1862, even the Dispatch would not accept them as payment for debts. By the summer of 1863 some branches of the municipal government refused to accept Tennessee currency as payment for taxes and fines. The depreciation of these currencies became even greater when the government ordered that all purchases of cotton and tobacco be paid for in greenbacks.

Panic stricken Nashville merchants held public meetings to discuss the confused state of local currencies. They appealed to Johnson for help. And Johnson and the merchants met with bankers on the subject. Nothing arrested the decline of southern currency during the war. The result was a severe monetary stringency which made it difficult to transact customary business.

Finally, the economy of Middle Tennessee was hampered by a multiplicity of regulations governing trade. Only the President and Congress had original authority to regulate and license trade with the Confederacy. The government, however, failed to establish a balanced, unified
policy in regard to trade with the enemy. It oscillated between nearly complete prohibition of trade with the South and almost free intercourse. As the government pursued its unsteady path, a maze of Congressional acts and Presidential proclamations flowed from Washington. These had to be interpreted by the Treasury Department and its agents, and by military commanders. The resultant web of ever-changing orders and regulations often confounded merchants.68

Even when Nashville businessmen understood the government's regulations, they were not happy with them. For example, Treasury regulations issued during the summer of 1863 restricted Nashville's customary wholesale trade and limited the city to "a little picayune retail business." Merchants knew this would prevent their usual customers from making their purchases "in their natural and legitimate market--Nashville." Instead, customers would be driven to rival cities, especially Cincinnati and Louisville, for their supplies. Dismayed merchants held public meetings in Nashville and took their appeal directly to Secretary of the Treasury Chase. The press joined in the campaign to have the "inconvenient restrictions" removed. The Daily Press wondered why Nashville's trade was being strangled, while that of cities north of the Tennessee
border was being promoted. "Ought not our merchants," it asked, "to have the benefit of their natural and legitimate trade? and will it not be wrong to deprive them of it, if it can be avoided?" 69

Eventually, through the intervention of Governor Johnson, restrictions on the wholesale trade of Nashville were relaxed. 70 This afforded some temporary relief. But the basic problem of confusing and complex regulation remained. The cotton trade, said the Daily Union in December, 1863, "is only sick of too much dieting and doctoring. Fresh air and freedom of limb would restore it in a few weeks to vigorous health and great usefulness." The "entire cotton nursing system, as well as the network of Chinese restrictions thrown around every other branch of trade," should be discarded. 71 Early in 1864 General Grant loosened the restrictions on the cotton trade. True to the Daily Union's prediction, cotton flowed into Nashville throughout the spring. 72

Restrictions on other branches of trade remained intact. In the fall of 1864 a meeting of merchants declared that "the interests of Nashville and its citizens are placed in jeopardy by undue restrictions on trade . . . ." Just before the war ended, Mayor Smith suggested that the city council appeal to General Thomas and Governor Brownlow to
have all military restrictions removed from the city's trade. Thus, right up through the spring of 1865 Nashville's trade was repressed by Treasury Department and military regulations. There can be no doubt that "the network of Chinese restrictions" erected around the city's trade contributed to Nashville's serious economic problems.

The most obvious aspect of the economic dislocation in Nashville was inflation. Prices for both luxuries and necessities remained abnormally high throughout the war. These high prices fell hardest upon the black and white refugees who lived in Nashville. The municipal government was unable to provide succor for these unfortunate people. But the army tried to ease their condition in several ways. The Quartermaster's Department in Nashville employed hundreds of female East Tennessee refugees, thus keeping them off public charity. Military barracks were temporarily turned over to refugees so that they would at least have a place to sleep. Military authorities provided free transportation to the North for white refugees, where they might escape the high prices and make a new beginning in life.

Late in the war the army also attempted to set prices for fuel and provisions. The provost marshal tried at least twice to establish maximum prices for beef, mutton, flour, vegetables, butter, wood, and many other items. His
orders had little effect and often made a bad situation worse. For instance, flour sold for $25 a barrel. The provost marshal set the price at $15 per barrel. This "did not abate the price but suddenly put the article out of market. Nobody had any to sell."75 Despite army efforts to help, refugees in the city remained in deplorable condition. They had little food, fuel, clothing, or shelter. Sickness prevailed among them, and during the winter of 1864-65 a number of children died from cold and exposure.76 The army simply did not have the manpower or time to give adequate attention to the plight of refugee civilians, white or black.

VI

For practical wartime purposes, the municipal government in Nashville was of little use. It was overwhelmed by the problems created and intensified by military occupation. It could not provide adequate fire and police protection. It could not protect the health and morals of Nashville's citizenry. It had no power to try to solve the economic problems which beset the city. Unable to be of much help itself, the city government willingly allowed the army to assume the dominant role in community affairs.
Protest against military usurpation would have been futile in any case, since members of the city government held their positions by the grace of military power.

It would not be fair, however, to say that maintaining at least the illusion of civil authority was without any benefit. It gave a certain legitimacy—feeble though it may have been—to Andrew Johnson’s political role. This was important for propaganda purposes. Furthermore, the fact that civil government functioned throughout the war made the transition from war to peace remarkably easy. When the war ended, municipal authorities exhibited a tremendous vitality and sense of purpose. It is hard to imagine that they would have been able to assert themselves so forcefully had they started from scratch in 1865 after a three year gap in civil government.

It is important to recognize that the military could not solve Nashville’s municipal troubles either. While fighting continued, the army did not have the time, manpower, or inclination to deal adequately with civilian problems. Most of its efforts to cope with municipal problems ended in failure or, at best, only partial success. The simple fact is that while the chaos of warfare reigned in Middle Tennessee, the difficulties faced by Nashville were insolu-able. Neither civil nor military authorities could bring
relief to the city. Only peace could bring an end to the community's distress. Only then would problems magnified by wartime conditions be reduced to a manageable size. When peace came, civil government was in existence, ready to begin the task of bringing prosperity and social order back to Nashville.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Seven

1 Franklin H. Bailey to his mother, Nov. 17, 1863, Franklin H. Bailey Papers, MHC.


3 Capers, Occupied City, pp. 60-66; Parks, "Memphis Under Military Rule," pp. 32, 56.


6 Ibid., p. 124.


9 Nashville Dispatch, June 11, 1862.

10 Ibid., April 29 and May 8, 1862.

11 Ibid., May 9, 23, and June 11, 1862.

12 Ibid., June 14, 1862.


14 Ibid., March 16, 1865; Nashville Daily Times and True Union, May 30, 1864; Francis Everett Hall to his mother, June 15, 1863, Hall Papers.

292.
15 Daily Press and Times, March 6, 1865; Nashville Daily Union, March 9, 1865.

16 Nashville Dispatch, Dec. 11 and 13, 1862.


18 Nashville Daily Union, Aug. 1, 21, and Dec. 12, 1862; Nashville Dispatch, Sept. 19, 1862; Nashville Daily Times and True Union, March 16, 1865.

19 Daily Press and Times, Aug. 6, 1863.


21 Ibid., Nov. 19, 26, 28, Dec. 11 and 12, 1862.

22 Ibid., Dec. 21, 1862, and Jan 4, 1863.

23 Daily Press and Times, Sept. 14, 1863; Nashville Daily Times and True Union, Nov. 21, 1864, and Feb. 7, 1865; Francis Everett Hall to his sister, April 11, 1864, Hall Papers.


25 Nashville Dispatch, Jan. 28, 1864.

26 Ibid., June 12, 1863.

27 Ibid., Jan. 27, 1864.

28 Nashville Daily Union, Jan. 28 and March 22, 1864.

29 Francis Everett Hall to his sister, April 11, 1864, Hall Papers.

30 Nashville Daily Union, March 24, 30, May 7, and June 23, 1864; Nashville Daily Times and True Union, May 4, 1864.

Republican Banner, Oct. 23, 1861.

Nashville Daily Union, Nov. 27, 1863; Nashville Dispatch, Jan. 27, 1864; Nashville Daily Times and True Union, Feb. 27, 1864.

Nashville Dispatch, Aug. 28 and 29, 1862.

Ibid., Sept. 1 and 11, 1862, and May 13, 1863; Nashville Daily Union, June 10, 1862.

Daily Press and Times, Aug. 6 and Oct. 6, 1863.

Nashville Daily Union, Dec. 27, 1863, and April 22, 1864.

Ibid., June 7, 1864.

Similar attempts by the army to control liquor in New Orleans also failed. See Capers, Occupied City, p. 205.


Republican Banner, April 10, 1861; Nashville Dispatch, June 11, 1862.


Nashville Dispatch, June 20, 1863; Sanitary Report of the Prostitutes of Nashville.

Daily Press and Times, July 10 and 14, 1863.
45 Ibid., July 10 and 16, 1863; Nashville Dispatch, July 9 and 12, 1863.

46 Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, p. 770.


50 Ibid.; Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, p. 770.

51 Occupied New Orleans also suffered from the effects of depression and inflation. See Capers, Occupied City.

52 Gower and Allen, Pen and Sword, p. 572; Nashville Directory For 1860-61, preface; Yeatman to his wife, July 13 and Nov. 14, 1860; A. J. D. Thurston to AJ, March 11, 1861, AJP; Nashville Union and American, Feb. 2, 1861; Republican Banner, March 30, 1861.

53 Ibid., April 25, July 4, and Oct. 2, 1861.

54 Ibid., Aug. 8, Nov. 30, and Dec. 10, 1861.

55 Nashville Dispatch, April 16, 20, May 4, June 22, July 6, 31, and Aug. 10, 1862.

56 Lindsley Diary, March 28, 29, 1862; Mark Cockrill to AJ, Aug. 21, 1861, AJP.


58 Ibid., p. 106; Trimble, "Behind the Lines in Middle Tennessee," pp. 63, 79.

60[?] to AJ, Oct. [?], 1862, AJP.

61 Nashville Daily Union, July 30, 1862; Nashville Dispatch, Feb. 19, 1864.


65 Nashville Dispatch, April 14, May 10, June 9, July 10, Sept. 6, and Nov. 25, 1862; Nashville Daily Union, April 22, 1862.

66 Nashville Dispatch, Aug. 9, 1863.


70 Nashville Daily Times and True Union, Sept. 15, 1864.

71 Nashville Daily Union, Dec. 27 and 30, 1863.


73 Daily Press and Times, Sept. 29, 1864, and April 12, 1865.
74 Ibid., Sept. 30, 1863; Nashville Daily Times and True Union, April 11, March 15, 1864.

75 Ibid., Nov. 29, 1864, Jan. 25, 1865; Nashville Daily Union, Dec. 10, 1864.

76 Ibid., Nov. 24, 1864.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Prelude

The end of the war in Nashville, as in so many other places in the nation, was a strange mixture of joy and sorrow for Union-loving citizens. The exultation and celebration occasioned by the fall of Richmond turned into gloom and dismay at the news of Lincoln's assassination. A Union officer in Nashville vividly described this intermingling of emotions which occurred in that city between April 10-15, 1865:

On the morning of April 10, 1865, the anxious waiting was brought to rest by the glad news of [Lee's] surrender. The end had come, and the joy of it brought out wild demonstrations of delight and shouts of victory from thousands of Union soldiers encamped at Nashville. . . . We must celebrate was the spontaneous sentiment of the loyal army and the loyal citizens of Nashville; and Saturday, the 15th of April, was fixed as the day to give expression to the exultation of triumph that took possession of us all; for it seemed that the winter of our discontent [had gone?] and the glorious summertime of peace had come.

And so on the appointed day Nashville put on her brightest robes to shine beautiful in this hour of the nation's joy. It was a rare spectacle of patriotic splendor, well fitting the occasion. The army was to march in grand review, accoutred as for war. It was a brilliant and inspiring sight to see the different commands marching to
take position in the great line of march. Bands of music and fife and drum broke the air with soul-stirring music. The infantry and artillery were marching in separate columns. I was riding at the head of the column of artillery. . . . and saw a horseman riding toward me at a rapid gallop. [This rider brought the news of Lincoln's assassination]. For a moment this appalling announcement so staggered me and benumbed my senses that I was speechless and reeled in my saddle, nearly overcome. It was a dreadful moment to meet, and the shock of it affected me the remainder of the day. . . . The rank and file were now getting hold of the dreadful news, and the glad acclaim of the morning soon subsided into subdued murmurings of resentful discontent. The beautiful flags, which had floated triumphantly in the breezes, were dropped to half-mast. Joy was turned to sorrow and hilarity to grief. Further proceedings in the program of the day was [sic] stopped, and the troops were sent back to their quarters. . . .

And now came a rallying from the first shock of this awful calamity, and with a deeper sense of irreparable loss, and it awakened the deepest indignation, increasing as the hours passed on, till it reached the flood gate of such intensity that many of the well-known southern cities [citizens] sought safety in hiding. Some less cautious in speech declared their satisfaction and were shot dead on the spot by an outraged soldiery.1

CONCLUSION

The occupation of Nashville by Union forces during the Civil War clearly demonstrates that Reconstruction began in 1862, not 1865. The city was captured in February, 1862, and within two weeks Lincoln appointed Andrew Johnson military governor of Tennessee. Johnson's primary task was
to re-establish a state government in Tennessee which would command broad local support and which would be loyal to the federal government. Certainly this was the essence of the whole reconstruction process. Thus, Johnson's arrival in Tennessee clearly marked the beginning of Reconstruction.

Lincoln was eager to have Johnson go to Tennessee, and Johnson was just as eager to go, because they, along with many other northerners, misunderstood southern Unionism. Lincoln and Johnson both assumed that the people in the southern states, especially those in the Upper South, were basically loyal, and that they had only been momentarily overwhelmed by a well-organized minority of secessionists. They could not believe that many Tennesseans felt any deep-seated love for, or allegiance to, the Confederacy. Once a Unionist rallying point had been established in Tennessee, Lincoln and Johnson believed that Tennesseans would flock back to their former allegiance and that the state could be quickly restored to its original place in the Union.

Andrew Johnson was supposed to be the rallying point. He returned to Tennessee from Washington determined to follow a very conciliatory and magnanimous policy toward what he considered his deluded and erring fellow Tennesseans. He indicated that only the leaders of the rebellion would suffer any punishment. He promised all others that there
would be no retaliation or vindictiveness against them if they returned to their former allegiance. They would be protected in both their property and political rights. In essence, Johnson said that once those persons who had embraced secession renewed their allegiance to the federal government they would be treated on equal terms with those persons who had remained loyal all along.

Johnson was surprised by the results of this lenient policy. Practically no one rushed to him to accept his forgiveness. Instead, most Tennesseans interpreted his leniency as a sign of weakness on the part of the military governor and the federal government, and continued to adhere to the Confederacy. It took Johnson less than six months to conclude that his initial policy was an utter failure. Hence, he adopted a new policy which became evident in August, 1862. The initial policy of forbearance and clemency toward secessionists was replaced by a policy which demanded an increasingly vigorous prosecution of the war, the abolition of slavery in Tennessee, and the denial of civil and political rights to secessionists. Johnson's new policy was based on proscription and punishment for the disloyal and very favorable treatment for the loyal, especially those who, like himself, had remained loyal throughout the entire secession crisis.
Johnson's harsh policy was as much a failure as his lenient one. It gained very few converts while at the same time it alienated many conservative Unionists who continued to believe in a moderate policy toward Confederate sympathizers and who opposed the Lincoln Administration's emancipation policy. The stage was now set for the postwar alliance between ex-Confederates and conservative Unionists against radical Unionists which was to be at the heart of Tennessee's postwar political troubles. Instead of bringing harmony to Tennessee, Johnson's efforts intensified bitterness and dissension among Tennesseans. These intense hatreds created under wartime conditions continued to fester long after the war, thus preventing the state from returning to normal social and political conditions.

The harsh policy adopted by Johnson in the fall of 1862 did result in the formation of a new state government in the spring of 1865 which was loyal to the federal government. But it did not command widespread support throughout the state. A very small faction of radical Unionists from East Tennessee dominated the new civil government. It had practically no support in the other two grand divisions of the state which contained the bulk of Tennessee's population. Thus, Johnson did not achieve his goal of creating a loyal
and popular state government. In this sense, the wartime reconstruction process in Tennessee was a failure.

Simply stated, the reason for Johnson's failure was the continued intransigence of Confederate sympathizers even when they had the chance to return to their allegiance to the federal government under most favorable circumstances. Their recalcitrance persuaded Johnson to try a harsher policy, which, in turn, drove a wedge between radical and conservative Unionists. The split in Unionist ranks meant that any government formed by the Johnson wing of the Union party in Tennessee would automatically be denied broad popular support.

Why, then, did Confederate sympathizers remain so opposed to renewing their allegiance to the Union? The most obvious reason is that southerners believed their cause was just. A struggle dressed in the silks of truth, justice, and freedom is not one to be lightly abandoned after the first setback. But there were other reasons, too. One of them was that the Union army was never able to completely destroy the Confederate forces in Tennessee and thus remove all hopes of deliverance which supporters of secession continued to hold. This was particularly noticeable in Nashville which was threatened as late as
the winter of 1864 when General John B. Hood's forces laid siege to the city. Although it is obvious in retrospect that the Confederates never really had a chance to recapture Nashville after 1863, this was not clear to those in the city at the time--Unionist or secessionist. As long as there was a chance that Confederate forces might sweep back into the city at any moment, most Confederate supporters saw little need to make anything more than temporary adjustments in behavior to appease federal authorities.

Johnson was also frustrated by a series of command disputes with the senior military officers in Tennessee, especially Generals Buell and Rosecrans. These disputes arose because the military governor and the commanding generals had very different ideas about the order of priorities in Tennessee. The commanding generals believed that the war should be fought and won first, and then political problems could be dealt with later. Quite reasonably they believed that they should have ultimate control in Tennessee, at least until the Confederacy was defeated. But Johnson, whose main duty was political, believed that fighting the war and re-establishing civil government could go on simultaneously if only he was given direct control over the entire process. The result was that there was too
little concert of action between military and civil authorities in Tennessee. Instead of presenting a united front against secession, the military governor and the commanding generals frequently spent a good deal of their time and energy struggling for control with each other. Command bickering among Union authorities fostered and encouraged disloyalty because it seemed to indicate weakness and indecision in the federal government's determination to utterly destroy the doctrine of secession.

A third reason why many secessionists hesitated to desert the Confederacy was Andrew Johnson himself. In the spring of 1862 Johnson, a prewar Democrat, was popular in East Tennessee, where Unionist sentiment was very strong, and with the Lincoln Administration. But he was not popular in Middle and West Tennessee where secessionist sentiment almost universally prevailed. During the secession crisis of 1860-1861 Democrats in those two divisions of the state came to hate Johnson with unparalleled intensity because of his pro-Union stand. Whigs had never cared much for Johnson and now secessionist Whigs found even greater cause to dislike him. On the other hand, pro-Union Whigs found themselves drawn into an uneasy alliance with a man whom they had previously detested. This unpromising political situation handicapped Johnson's efforts in Nashville from the start. Johnson's lenient policy of the spring and summer
of 1862 might have had more of a chance for success in the hands of a Unionist Whig, such as William B. Campbell. But it seems that any policy which Johnson adopted was doomed from the start simply because he had no pre-existing political base upon which to build.

Johnson did, of course, try to build a political base of support after he arrived in Middle Tennessee. He tried to establish a new power elite in Nashville by deposing the pro-Confederate city government and appointing an entirely new one. Unfortunately for Johnson almost all of Nashville's leading citizens supported the Confederacy. Thus, when he appointed a new city council he was forced to rely on men of little standing in the community who had had very little previous governmental experience. The only man in Johnson's city government who was really both popular and experienced in municipal affairs was the mayor, John Hugh Smith. It is fair to say that Johnson's appointees were never accepted by the Nashville community as anything but a puppet government.

The first postwar municipal election in Nashville was held in late September, 1865. In this election only one of Johnson's appointees was returned to office. The character of the newly elected city government was obvious to all.
For instance, the new mayor was W. Matt Brown, who received 1129 votes. Brown was an ante-bellum Whig who became a Democrat after the war. He had been the city marshal when Johnson asked Nashville's city officials to take an oath of allegiance. Brown refused to take the oath. He later claimed that he had never voted for secession and that he had always been a Union man, but it is also true that he did not actively support Johnson's efforts in Tennessee. The second leading vote-getter in the election for mayor was F. O. Hurt, an avowed secessionist who had served on the Committee of Vigilance and Safety during Confederate rule of Nashville. Hurt received 654 votes. John Hugh Smith managed to get only 302 votes in the election. Richard B. Cheatham, who was the mayor of Nashville at the time of its capture by Union forces and who had refused to take an oath of allegiance, was elected to the Board of Aldermen. In the organization of the city council he was selected president of that body.2

The failure of Johnson's new power elite to attain popular standing among the populace during the war had two important implications for the army. First it meant that Nashville's population remained basically disloyal and so steps had to be taken to keep it under control. Secondly, it meant that the city government could not perform its
customary municipal functions. Even the best government will not be very efficient without the support of those it is intended to rule. Thus, out of necessity, not choice, the army took over many municipal duties which otherwise would have been neglected during the war.

The army employed a wide range of population control measures in Nashville. These included, among others, a system of passes and permits, censorship, military commissions, retaliation, special assessments, confiscation, and the taking of oaths and non-combatant paroles. Two points about the army's population control measures need to be emphasized. One is that though they may have momentarily changed the demeanor of many Nashvillians, they did not change any basic beliefs. Punishment and reprisal by the army did not convince many Nashville citizens that the southern cause was unjust.

The second point about the army's population control methods is that while they did not gain many converts to the Union cause, neither did they allow Nashville's populace to give much active aid to the Confederacy. By keeping a close watch on the civilian population the army prevented even the hint of rebellion among Nashvillians. That is, the army contributed to the stability of Johnson's military
government by automatically precluding any attempted over-
throw of it by Confederate sympathizers inside Nashville.

The army no doubt would have preferred to stay out of
municipal affairs completely. To an army engaged in active
military operations municipal chores are only an extra
burden which it would just as soon do without. But when
Johnson's appointed city government abdicated its respons-
ibility for almost all municipal problems for lack of
resources and community support, the army had no choice but
to move in and grapple with these problems. Consequently,
the army found itself dealing with problems of fire and
police protection and waste collection and disposal. It
also became the guardian of the city's health and morals.
Furthermore, the army attempted to alleviate the economic
distress of the city which, paradoxically, it had helped to
create.

The army achieved a mixed record in dealing with
community affairs. It did not solve any of the problems
completely, but, then, neither did it allow these problems
to overwhelm the city—or, for that matter, the army. Al-
though the army did not eliminate any of the municipal
problems which it faced, it did at least keep them to a
manageable size. Had the army been less diligent than it
was, Nashville would have been a very sorry place indeed after the war ended.

The military occupation of Nashville was significant in an immediate sense because it kept Nashville secure as the most important supply base for Union forces in the western theater. But, in general, the occupation had only a limited impact on long term change. When Confederate forces finally surrendered the people of Nashville really felt no differently toward the Union than they had in the early spring of 1862. They were willing to renew their allegiance to Washington simply because their cause had been defeated militarily, not because they had been convinced that their cause was wrong.

The one institution in Tennessee which military occupation did significantly affect was slavery. It is important to remember, however, that only the institution was altered while the attitudes which supported it remained basically intact. Although Tennessee was specifically excluded from the Emancipation Proclamation, slavery ended there during the war just as it did in the rest of the South. The demise of slavery in Tennessee can be directly attributed to Andrew Johnson and the Union army. When Union forces entered Tennessee slavery simply began to disintegrate. Many slaves just left their masters and sought refuge behind Union lines. Others who remained with their masters
became increasingly unmanageable and independent in thought and action. Furthermore, by September, 1863, Johnson had made it obvious that abolition would be a pre-condition for reconstruction. By then Johnson, as part of his hardline policy, was committed personally to emancipation.

Equal in importance to the actual destruction of slavery was the fact that the army began to take the first hesitant steps toward bringing black men and women into the mainstream of American life. The army initially tried to bring physical relief to destitute blacks by placing them in contraband camps where it was hoped they could be conveniently and efficiently cared for. These camps were merely expedients. The army sought more permanent relief for the freedmen by encouraging them in educational pursuits and by establishing a framework for a postwar free labor system. These wartime social programs were actually forerunners of similar programs run by the Freedmen’s Bureau in the postwar era. The army achieved few real accomplishments in these endeavors during the war because its main energies were devoted to winning the war. But the mere fact that the army tried these programs smoothed the transition from war to peace in Middle Tennessee for both blacks and whites.
The failure of wartime reconstruction in Nashville was not due to lack of support from the President. No matter what policy Johnson followed, or which generals he quarreled with, he always had the unwavering support of Lincoln. Initially Lincoln hoped that his prompt action in sending Johnson to Tennessee would bring that state back into the Union after only minimal disruption of customary federal-state relations. Such an eventuality would weaken the Confederacy and keep the reconstruction process firmly in executive hands, where Lincoln strongly believed it belonged.

The expectation of a quickly restored Tennessee held by both the President and the military governor turned out to be a delusion. Instead of returning to their allegiance Tennesseans remained defiant. Thus, Lincoln's hopes of forestalling Congressional "interference" in the reconstruction process proved futile. As Congress sought more and more control over the process, culminating in the Wade-Davis Bill in July, 1864, Lincoln found himself more and more deeply committed to his military governors if he was going to maintain his own authority over reconstruction. What Lincoln needed above all else was success in one of the states where he had appointed a military governor.
The successful reconstruction of even one southern state would lend credibility to his own policy and severely undermine Congressional claims to the control of the reconstruction process.

Nothing shows Lincoln's eagerness for success and his deep commitment to Andrew Johnson's effort in Tennessee more than his willingness to subvert his own announced plan of reconstruction of December 8, 1863. This plan offered amnesty and the restoration of political and property rights to almost all Confederates and set forth Lincoln's famous ten percent proposal. Although Tennessee's new civilian state government eventually was formed under the aegis of the ten percent proposal, the amnesty part of Lincoln's plan only went into limited operation in Tennessee. Since Lincoln's amnesty proposal would have benefitted conservative Unionists and Confederate sympathizers, men in the Johnson wing of the Union party in Tennessee were not happy with it. Lincoln's plan would not have punished disloyal persons enough to suit Johnson and his followers. In fact, if the President's plan had been followed to the letter, it might well have resulted in depriving radical Unionists of their supremacy in Tennessee. Johnson asked Lincoln to exclude Tennessee from the provisions of his plan, just as Tennessee had been excluded from the Emancipation Proclamation.
Although Lincoln would not specifically exclude Tennessee, he did allow Johnson to alter the operation and effect of the amnesty oath in Tennessee to such an extent that, for all intents and purposes, Tennessee was excluded from his plan.

Johnson altered the President's amnesty provisions—with Lincoln's approval—by requiring prospective voters to take a special oath before they could exercise the franchise in Tennessee. The amnesty oath proposed by Lincoln would have allowed secessionists to recover full political and property rights (except slaves) by merely swearing to be loyal in the future. But Johnson's oath prevented all Confederate sympathizers, and a good many conservative Unionists as well, from exercising political rights in the state. Like the "iron-clad" oath contained in the Wade-Davis Bill, the additional oath required by Johnson had the net effect of leaving reconstruction in Tennessee in the hands of those who had been Unionists from the beginning of the conflict.

Thus, although Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction was moderate and liberal if taken at face value, in Tennessee the actual operation of the amnesty provisions was more in accord with the harsher policies of
both Congressional and Tennessee radicals. In the end, Tennessee was restored in the spring of 1865 by the combined use of the liberal ten percent portion of the President's plan and the more rigid test of loyalty hoped for by Congressional supporters of the Wade-Davis Bill. What this means is that wartime reconstruction policy was often extemporized on the spot and can best be understood on the operational level—that is, in Nashville rather than Washington. No matter what was said, proclaimed, or enacted in the nation's capital, what actually happened during wartime reconstruction, at least in Nashville and throughout Tennessee, was often the result of improvised policy at the local level.

In retrospect it seems clear that the attempt to re-establish a truly loyal and representative state government in Tennessee during the war was, at bottom, futile. It might well have been best to postpone all reconstruction efforts until after the war. Perhaps Andrew Johnson should never have been sent to Tennessee, and the state left entirely in military hands for the duration of the conflict. Certainly it is hard to see how the end result could have been much worse in terms of bitterness and hatred.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Eight


BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following abbreviations are used in this bibliography for the sake of brevity:

AHR  The American Historical Review
ETHSP  East Tennessee Historical Society Publications
JSH  The Journal of Southern History
LC  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
MHC  Michigan Historical Collections, Ann Arbor, Michigan
MVHR  Mississippi Valley Historical Review
NA  National Archives, Washington, D.C.
OHS  Ohio Historical Society, Manuscript Division, Columbus, Ohio
THM  Tennessee Historical Magazine
THQ  Tennessee Historical Quarterly
TSLA  Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tennessee
Primary Sources

Manuscripts

The most important manuscript source used in this study was the AJP. These contain a great deal of material relating to the Unionist cause in Tennessee during the secession crisis of 1860-1861 and throughout the war. During Andrew Johnson's reign as military governor of Tennessee his papers increasingly represent the radical Unionist viewpoint. The greatest weakness of the AJP is that there is almost nothing in them representative of secessionist or, after the fall of 1862, conservative Unionist sentiment. Since Johnson's personal position in Tennessee was a blend of military and civilian responsibilities, his papers provide excellent material for the study of civil-military relations in Nashville during the war.

Two diaries proved especially helpful. One was the diary of John B. Lindsley (TSLA). Lindsley, a prominent Nashvillian, lived in the city throughout the entire war and kept almost a daily record for most of the period. His jottings provide good insights into civilian life in occupied Nashville. The diary of Walter T. Carpenter (OHS),
an agent of the Freedmen's Committee of the Indiana Yearly Meeting of Friends who was in Middle Tennessee during the first three months of 1864, gives a good account of the joint effort by the missionary societies and the army to provide for refugee freedmen.

Numerous manuscript collections were helpful in specific ways. The Thomas A. R. Nelson Papers (McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville, Tennessee) contain excellent information on Unionist sentiment during the secession crisis and nicely complement the AJP for the early 1860s. The John Preston Watts Brown Collection (TSLA) contains an account of the very earliest days of Union occupation in Nashville. The William Henry Smith Papers (OHS) contain several very frank letters from Reuben D. Mussey, the Dartmouth educated regular army officer who was instrumental in recruiting black troops in Tennessee. Several letters in the Yeatman-Polk Collection (TSLA) from Henry Clay Yeatman to his wife mention the economic woes afflicting Nashville in 1860-1861 and illustrate the tenuous nature of a typical southerner's loyalty to the Union. Several items in the Buell-Brien Papers (TSLA) also demonstrate the limited commitment most Tennesseans felt for the Union. The William F. Palmer Collection (The Western
Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio) contains the "Sanitary Report of the Condition of the Prostitutes of Nashville, Tenn. [sic]," which describes how the army attacked a serious moral problem in Nashville. One of the orders for impressing blacks in Nashville which is not readily found elsewhere is located in Vertical File Material #1208 (OHS). There is a biographical sketch of Horace H. Harrison, a prominent Nashville radical Unionist, in the TSLA. Scattered letters from Tennessee Unionists can be found in the Salmon P. Chase Papers (LC), the Edwin M. Stanton Papers (LC), and the Thaddeus Stevens Papers (LC). Especially important in the Stanton Papers is the letter from Thomas A. Scott telling why Andrew Johnson should not be sent to Tennessee by the Lincoln Administration.

Some of the best information on civil-military relations in Nashville came from soldiers serving in the ranks and officers below the level of general. Knowing and understanding these men is a key to catching the true flavor of the Civil War era. They often commented on the joys and sorrows of garrison duty, municipal problems, slavery, black refugees, and black troops, the Union League, the devastation of Middle Tennessee, important personalities, inflated prices, and many other topics which seemed important to young men hundreds of miles from home. A number of
manuscript collections in the MHC from common soldiers proved most helpful. These included the papers of Issac Newton Demmon, Franklin H. Bailey, Francis Everett Hall, Morris Stuart Hall, David Millsapugh, John W. Nicholson, Henry Albert Potter, and John Weisert. The John W. Fillmore Diary (OHS), memoirs of Benton E. Dubbs (Civil War Collection, TSLA), and James C. Malone letters (Civil War Collection, TSLA) also presented good information for viewing civil-military relations from the army's position.

The Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General (Record Group 92, NA) contain all the records from the various Boards of Claims established under army auspices in Nashville. The changing nature of the membership and the instructions governing the different Boards of Claims helped chart the course of radical Unionism in Middle Tennessee. The Records of United States Army Commands (Record Group 393, NA) are voluminous and hard to use. Searching through the records of the Department of the Cumberland looking for specific information on Nashville was like looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Much of the information found in these records, such as military orders, is generally more readily accessible from Nashville newspapers. This Record Group becomes much more important for the postwar era when Nashville newspapers were
not so directly concerned with military items. However, for the wartime years, this Record Group was important because it contains a number of letters and thoughtful essays written by Reuben D. Mussey. Information in "Returns From U.S. Military Posts, 1800-1916: Nashville, Tennessee, December, 1862-December, 1873" (Microcopy No. 617, Roll 832, NA) sheds light on the size of Johnson's special Governor's Guard and gives figures for the entire army garrison stationed in Nashville during the war. However, troops moved in and out of the city so frequently and in such large numbers that it is impossible to state accurately how many troops were in Nashville at any given moment.

Government Documents

The Report of the Secretary of War, issued annually by the War Department, contains only occasional specific references about the army in Nashville. But these reports are useful for keeping the Nashville situation in perspective with the total Union war effort. "The Report of the Commissioners of Investigation of Colored Refugees in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama" (Senate Executive Documents, 38 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 28) is crucial for an understanding of
the army's relationship to the black man in Middle Tennessee. It recounts the early abuses of the black man by the army and then describes the first awkward steps taken by the military to bring relief to destitute refugee blacks.

Newspapers

As a quick glance through the footnotes will show, Nashville newspapers were of prime importance in this study. For the period preceding Tennessee's secession the Republican Banner presents the Unionist viewpoint and the Nashville Union and American the secessionist viewpoint. The conversion of the Republican Banner to secession following the events of mid-April, 1861, is a perfect mirror of what was happening simultaneously within a large segment of Nashville's population which had previously adhered to the Union.

All newspapers in the city halted publication upon federal occupation. One of the first new papers to begin publication in Nashville was the Nashville Daily Union, which commenced publication in April, 1862. The initial editor was S. C. Mercer, a radical Unionist from Kentucky. When the proprietors of the paper failed to give Mercer complete freedom of expression he quit. This was in December, 1863, and from that point on the Daily Union represented very
conservative Unionist sentiment. In the Presidential election of 1864, for instance, it openly supported the Democratic nominee, George B. McClellan. Mercer, with strong support from Johnson, took over the editorship of a new paper, the Nashville Daily Times and True Union, which began publication in February, 1864. This was a radical Unionist paper and unalteringly supported both the Lincoln Administration and Johnson. In between these two papers were two others which were not so extreme in their editorial policies. Both the Nashville Dispatch and the Nashville Daily Press and Times (also known simply as The Daily Press) were essentially conservative Unionist in sentiment, but were not nearly so rabidly and openly opposed to radical Unionists as was the Daily Union.

It was essential to read the Nashville newspapers in order to unravel the wartime political history of Middle Tennessee and to detail the increasing alienation between Johnson and conservative Unionists. The papers also contained a pleasantly surprising amount of information about the army and civil-military relations within the city. For example, almost any military order which affected the city in even the smallest way was printed verbatim, and frequently editorial comment was appended. The papers also printed a great deal of military correspondence, as well as letters
from ordinary citizens commenting on a wide variety of problems and situations created or intensified by army occupation. Municipal problems, from filth and drunkenness to hordes of black refugees and inflated prices, were all covered in profuse detail in the papers.

Printed Primary Sources

President Lincoln's thoughts and opinions are set forth in James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (9 vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896-1898) and Roy P. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (8 vols.; New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953). In the Collected Works there is also a great deal of correspondence from Johnson and lesser amounts from other Tennessee Unionists, both conservatives and radicals. Additional information on what might be called the view from Washington in regard to Johnson in particular and Tennessee affairs in general can be found in: Howard K. Beale and Alan W. Brownsword (eds.), Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson (3 vols.; New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1960); James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to Garfield (2 vols.;

Two older histories of the Nashville area contain information no longer readily available elsewhere.
[John Wooldridge], History of Nashville, Tennessee . . .

(Nashville: Publishing House of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1890) and W. W. Clayton, History of Davidson County, Tennessee, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers (Philadelphia: J. W. Lewis Co., 1880) were both particularly valuable in identifying otherwise obscure figures and in understanding prewar civil society in Nashville. Both, however, pay little attention to the actual war years. Also very useful in trying to reconstruct what Nashville was like in 1860-1861 was the Nashville City and Business Directory For 1860-61 (Nashville: L. P. Williams & Co., 1860). Likewise, Singleton's Nashville Business Directory For 1865 (Nashville: R. H. Singleton, 1865) provides good insights into the impact of three years of military occupation.

The beginning and the end of the Civil War in Tennessee are covered in the correspondence of Governors Isham G. Harris and William G. Brownlow. This can be found in Robert H. White (ed.), Messages of the Governors of Tennessee (6 vols.; Nashville: The Tennessee Historical Commission, 1952-63). White's commentary accompanying the documents in these volumes can be read with great profit since it helps untangle the confusions of Tennessee politics. To fill in the gap between Harris and Brownlow, one must
read the AJP supplemented by Frank Moore (ed.), *Speeches of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1865) which contains some of Johnson's prewar and wartime speeches.

Lieut.-Col. [sic] Horace N. Fisher's "Reminiscences of the Raising of the Original 'Old Glory' Over the Capitol at Nashville, Tenn. [sic], on February 27, 1862," *The Essex Institute Historical Collections*, XLVII (Jan., 1911) pp. 96-100, is a description of the arrival of the first federal troops in Nashville. [Captain William H. Gay's] "Lincoln's Assassination; How Nashville Heard the News," *THM*, V (April, 1919) pp. 38-39 is a good account of those few days in April, 1865, which symbolized the beginning of the end of the wartime occupation of the city.

No study of the Civil War can be made without reference to *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (4 series, 70 vols., in 128 vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901). These volumes contain a great amount of correspondence relating to Nashville and Tennessee written by Lincoln and high Administration officials, Johnson, and leading military men. The *Official Records* was especially important in detailing and understanding the command
disputes which hampered Unionist efforts in Tennessee. Despite the fact that these volumes are hard to use they were as crucial to this study as the AJP and the Nashville newspapers. The pertinent volumes of *Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events* (42 vols.; New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1862-1903) present excellent factual summaries of events affecting Nashville and Tennessee.

Several older biographies contained important information. Included were O. P. Fitzgerald, *John B. McFerrin: A Biography* (Nashville: Publishing House of the M. E. Church, South, 1888), F. A. Mitchel, *Ormsby MacKnight Mitchel, Astronomer and General: A Biographical Narrative* (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1887), and Frank Preston Stearns, *The Life and Public Services of George Luther Stearns* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1907). McFerrin was a pro-Confederate Methodist minister who fled Nashville on the approach of Union troops. Mitchel was a Union general who was stationed in Nashville during the hectic days of the summer and fall of 1862. Stearns was the Union army major who began organizing black troops in Nashville in the fall of 1863. Although these biographies were not written in the critical vein of modern day biographies, they often incorporated original correspondence to and from the subject of the biography.
John Fitch's *Annals of the Army of the Cumberland* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1864) is the main source on the Army Police in the Department of the Cumberland. However, Fitch was a member of the Army Police and is very biased in their favor. Any evaluation of the Army Police should be supplemented by reading the unfavorable comments about them in the AJP and the Nashville newspapers.

John Eaton's *Grant, Lincoln and the Freedmen: Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907) is an excellent firsthand account of the army's wartime work with the freedmen in the Mississippi Valley. Much of the work done by Eaton and the army along the Mississippi had important ramifications in Middle Tennessee, and this volume explains, in part, why and how certain programs were undertaken in the Nashville area.

*The Life and Letters of Francis Lieber* (Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1882), edited by Thomas Sergeant Perry, contains comments on military government and wartime civil-military relations by a man who was an acknowledged authority on the subject. Much of what Lieber said and believed was eventually incorporated into official Union policy, particularly as set forth in General Orders No. 100.

A number of published journals, diaries, and letter collections of Civil War soldiers and low ranking officers augmented the similar manuscript sources which were used. On the Confederate side, both William T. Alderson (ed.), "The Civil War Diary of Captain James Litton Cooper, September 30, 1861 to January, 1865," *THQ*, XV (June, 1956)


Three accounts by women Confederate sympathizers presented a picture of the army as it was viewed by the enemy. Mrs. Irby Morgan, How It Was: Four Years Among the Rebels (Nashville: Publishing House Methodist Episcopal Church South, 1892) gives a good description of the preparations for war in Nashville following the firing on Fort
Sumter and recounts the sadness and gloom which accompanied Nashvilleans as they fled from the federal advance in February, 1862. Mrs. James E. Caldwell, A Chapter from the Life of a Little Girl of the Confederacy (Nashville: The Parthenon Press, [1936?]), was just a young girl living in Nashville during the Civil War but she has some wonderful anecdotes to tell which span the years between the arrival of the first federal troops and the battle of Nashville. Sarah Ridley Trimble (ed.), "Behind the Lines in Middle Tennessee, 1863-1865: The Journal of Bettie Ridley Blackmore," THQ, XII (March, 1953) pp. 48-80, is a story of the abuse, insult, and injury which Middle Tennessee civilians suffered at the hands of undisciplined Union troops. It also contains information showing how slavery simply disintegrated in the countryside under the impact of federal occupation.

Three sources were indispensable in identifying and trying to understand leading Tennesseans of the era. The best of the three is Oliver P. Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee From 1833 to 1875, Their Times and Their Contemporaries (New York: The Cosmopolitan Press, 1912). Temple, an East Tennessean seemed unerringly to take the measure of a man, whether friend or foe. His description and analysis of Andrew Johnson is unsurpassed and conforms perfectly

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