Becoming Cosmopolitan: Toward a Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogy

DISSERTATION

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By

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Abstract

My dissertation, *Becoming Cosmopolitan: Toward a Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogy*, names and explores the central features of a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical practice. Global learning, while a popular and laudable curricular goal in higher education, still remains vaguely defined and open to interpretations that detach it from ethical and engaged ends. My dissertation takes as a primary task the theorizing of cosmopolitan pedagogies that will fully and complexly realize the aims of ethical and engaged global learning. Because I am most interested in exploring the benefits and challenges of framing global learning within an explicitly cosmopolitan context, this project takes as a primary task the examination and elaboration of the notional relationship between the global and the cosmopolitan. How, for example, might cosmopolitan questions enrich and complicate contemporary discourse on the global in higher education? What might be gained from a more overt identification of the global with the cosmopolitan in pedagogical work? And, if we admit the usefulness of cosmopolitan frameworks for global learning pedagogies, why is it important that we define our investments as critically cosmopolitan?

Critical cosmopolitanism, as I define it, is a variant of cosmopolitan discourse that resists abstract universal truths about human or global community; thinks the local and the global relationally; insists on a strong and broad ethical concern for the other that does not disregard difference; complicates and decolonizes ways of thinking about social identity and power; and challenges the uncritical commodification of cultural difference. I argue that this iteration of
cosmopolitanism offers a socially relevant and transformative language for global learning, as it is intent on questioning and, ultimately, deterritorializing borders and boundaries that work to reify both identity and location. Because critical cosmopolitan pedagogy additionally seeks to complicate its relationship to abstract and imperial versions of universalism on the one hand, and insular and restrictive forms of civic identity on the other, I believe that it emerges as the most productive and promising of cosmopolitan frameworks for global learning.

In the dissertation, I define what I believe to be the key paradigms and sensibilities of a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. Critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning is marked by three significant conceptual paradigms: a rethinking of the local and global as mutually constitutive and relational, an enlarged and reinvigorated conception of citizenship, and a complex engagement with otherness. It is also my central contention that a critical cosmopolitan orientation—necessarily self-reflexive, heightened in its care and responsibility for the world, and challenging of routine forms of cynicism—is the dispositional goal of critical cosmopolitan pedagogy.

Finally, this project hopes to better understand and answer the anxieties that are inspired by critical cosmopolitan practices and values in pedagogical work. I am interested in one particular response: anxiety about the engulfment and erasure of the local (usually, in the name of the global or “elsewhere”). Without a more complex exploration of the way that anxiety threatens and undermines critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, I believe that we are less equipped to contend with resistance in the learning situation and, as a result, less successful in our efforts to introduce students to new and viable possibilities for cosmopolitan subjectivity, responsibility, and belonging.
Dedication

for my daughter

Eva Angelina Birk-Petri

because

she thinks

with her heart

and

in memory of

my grandmother

Angelina Palladina Hopeck

because

she was the one

who did it first
Acknowledgments

I began another dissertation sixteen years ago. I loved it for what it was: an exploration of the transferential implications and impasses of the pedagogical scene. Then, as now, I was intensely interested in the psychic terrain of teaching and learning, even more specifically the reasons why we make ourselves available—or unavailable—for the transformative potential of education.

It would be too simple to say that I outgrew the critical questions that organized the first dissertation. In fact, I was only beginning to answer them when I found another love interest: global education. While lecturing at Ohio State, I was hired to teach a few courses in a Global Studies program at Franklin University. The program was the cornerstone of Franklin’s general education core, and, surprisingly, it was a profoundly interdisciplinary and innovative curriculum. I began to organize courses that were centered on pressing global issues and concerns for an audience of exhausted adult evening students who were often unsure about the direction of their lives and even less sure about the extent that they wanted to know or care about the complex dilemmas facing the contemporary world. The work was hard, I felt young and evangelical, and those years at Franklin—including a stint as chair of the program—taught me a lot about what it means to be truly transformed by what you teach and learn. I left Franklin an entirely different person.

After I was hired at Otterbein for a full-time position in the English department, I began to think about ways that I could bring some version of ‘world-mindedness’ to the Integrative Studies curriculum, our general education core. At the time, Integrative Studies had been meditating on questions about human nature for nearly thirty years, and I knew that the students had grown tired of the introversion and insularity of the program. I approached the chair of the program and the Dean
of Arts and Sciences, begging for a chance to apply for a grant from AACU (American Association of Colleges and Universities) that would fund a radical revision of the general education core. The grant, *General Education for Global Learning*, would not only help cover the costs of faculty development, it would also identify Otterbein as one of sixteen national institutions pioneering globally-conscious general education programs. The chair and the Dean were both pessimistic: about the idea of curricular revision, about the desirability of turning our general education core outward, and about the rightness of a national stage for our efforts. “I’m not sure Otterbein students want this kind of learning,” one of them told me. I didn’t think that the exhausted returning adult students at Franklin who were underemployed and barely managing mortgages and families wanted that kind of learning, either—but, after years in the classroom with them, I knew better. I understand that parochialism comes easily, but it is also amenable to scrutiny and revision. The vast majority of students are capable of thinking beyond borders and boundaries of all sorts, if they are given room to examine and work through the anxieties that frequently surface when we loosen our grip on the need for borders and boundaries.

So I pressed on at Otterbein, without institutional sanction. And, to my surprise, we won the grant. That began a nearly five-year process of entirely reimagining and reorganizing the general education core at the University. That process—stressful, surprising, and often grueling—taught me a lot about what it means to define global learning for an audience that is unsure about what it means to highlight the global or if it is important to prioritize it in the first place. I will talk a bit about that process in this dissertation, as it shaped my thinking about the necessity of two things: one, defining global learning in ways that align it clearly and specifically with critical cosmopolitan frameworks and, two, understanding and working through the anxiety that is often generated by critical cosmopolitan commitments in teaching and learning.
Meanwhile, as the work and the years piled up, my first dissertation remained undone and languishing. On most days, it seemed like it belonged to someone else, and, when I reread parts of it, I can remember underlining it as if I were learning from it for the first time. This proved an experience both illuminating and disorienting. My life and my interests had taken me in another direction, and, for the longest time, I had no idea how I was going to rewind myself long and far enough to finish the Ph.D.

This is where Marlene Longenecker enters the story. And it is fitting that she is the first person that I acknowledge here, because one of my greatest debts is owed to her. Marlene suggested that I do the unthinkable thing: scrap the first dissertation—all the notes, the writing, the years of sorting, the intense psychic investment—and begin a new dissertation that reflected my live interests. When she first said this to me, I felt my blood leave my body. I didn’t believe I had it in me to begin this arduous process again. I was too old, too busy, too perfectionist, too conflicted about writing to begin again a second time.

But, because Marlene is Marlene and she’s right about most things in life, I actually went home and mulled it over. And it didn’t take me long to realize that this was what I needed to do, even if I had some doubts about my ability to find the commitment in myself again. At some point, I made the choice to go forward. Nothing melodramatic. Just the choice to begin moving. And I’ve been moving—over summers and sabbaticals and occasional weekends—ever since.

So, let me begin my acknowledgments by reiterating that one of my greatest debts is owed to Marlene Longenecker. How can I begin to name what she has made possible for me in the last twenty years? I hesitate to try, because I am afraid that I will fall into the worst sort of blather about what an exceptionally good human being she is. But the problem, of course, is that she is an exceptionally good human being—one of the very best I have ever known—and she is also someone
who won’t let me say as much to her. Which, in my own way, I understand and can appreciate.

Marlene has played a very important role in my life, just as she has for so many others who have gone before me. Yes, there are the things she has taught me, there are the moments of mentoring, there is the fact that she’s directed all I have done at Ohio State. But there is much more that she has given me, although I am sure that she has never sought to give me anything in particular. Marlene has represented a certain way of living to me: open, curious, unafraid of growth and self-evolution, and absolutely free of pretension. She’s an alternative to academic business-as-usual, and, in her own way, a forceful challenge to its most neurotic tendencies. She isn’t driven by monomania or egomania or mania at all. She defines her own terms of value. She doesn’t cordon off her life in the university from her political and ethical priorities. She knows how to live well in—and outside of—academe. She is always surpassing herself. She doesn’t create or thrive in conditions that make other people feel inadequate. And, because she sees students as full human beings rather than ascribed roles, she is loved in unusually full and powerful ways. When I was younger, I thought it was a beautiful way to be. I remember thinking that it was the kind of life that stood a chance of making a person both happy and honest. But I suppose I didn’t imitate Marlene so much as read her as a form of existential permission, an example of what I was allowed to do with my life in and apart from work. Who knows how things might have gone if I had not known her and felt authorized to make my own way (a way that I’d like to think looks a lot like her way on any given day)? There’s no thanking Marlene for this, for this sense and model of possibility. And there’s no thanking her for the personal support and love that she has given me in the last twenty years. My gratitude for Marlene Longenecker is an unending and immeasurable thing.

I want to also thank my two readers—Merry Merryfield and Dorothy Noyes—who have been so patient and supportive with me personally, and such valuable readers of my work. Merry
helped define the field of global education in K-12, and the fact that I have been able to do this project with her on my committee has been a great honor. I realize that Merry has been thinking about every facet of global learning for a very long time, so I know that she is someone who can help me complicate and strengthen my own perspective. Dorry is, as Marlene described her, a brilliant thinker who seems to not only know how to take an aerial view of any idea, she also knows how to risk unorthodox interpretations of it. I love that combination in a person, and I wish I had had a chance to sit with her while I was at Ohio State. I’m glad I get a chance to do it now, even if briefly.

I also want to thank Debra Moddelmog, my fourth reader, for offering to help with the supplemental exam. I knew that Debra’s wide curiosity and compassionate character would make her an ideal reader for this project, and I am grateful that she agreed to share a conversation with me before summer.

Paul Eisenstein, who is now serving as the Dean of Arts and Science at Otterbein, has been an exceedingly good friend to me for about twenty years now, and he has given me so much in the way of encouragement and care. It’s hard to thank him properly for all that he is to me. I know that he’ll minimize and shrug it off, but Paul is one of the people that I most admire in life. Not because of anything particular that he has done (although he has accomplished quite a lot), but because of who he consistently is and the humanity that he brings to every part of his life. He makes me believe that it is possible to live fully and without falsity.

Otterbein’s former Provost, Abiodun Goke-Pariola, was also instrumental in providing institutional and personal support for my completion of this project. I have many roles at Otterbein, and, at times, those roles have made it nearly impossible for me to find time and energy to write. Goke-Pariola did whatever he could, whenever he could, to lessen my burden and open space for me to return to this project. I cannot thank him enough for doing that. There were times when he,
quite literally, was the one making it possible for me to do this. He never doubted me, he always affirmed the value of my thoughts, and he encouraged me to realize my ideas in very real ways in Otterbein’s curricular transformation. My only regret is that he is no longer the Provost at Otterbein, so he will not be able to see the end of this project with me. He has moved on to another life—a life that, I hope, will allow him to feel happy and valued for the visionary person he is—but I miss him and his presence at Otterbein nearly every day that I am there.

Other friends and colleagues at Otterbein deserve mention for their love and help while I was finishing this project. Amy Jessen-Marshall, who is now Provost at Sweet Briar, is a dear friend who made it easier for me to do the rest of my work—in Integrative Studies and Women’s Studies, in particular—because she always trusted my judgment and protected me when I needed it (and hadn’t even thought to ask for it). Her departure from Otterbein is another hard personal loss for me. Sarah Fatherly, the current chair of Integrative Studies, has been a consistent friend and advocate for transformative forms of change at Otterbein. Without her courage and care, I don’t believe that Integrative Studies would have been able to move in the direction of a critical cosmopolitan set of values and priorities. Even more, Sarah is as exceptionally talented as she is modest. Beth Daughterty, a fellow member of the English department, has always been a source of wisdom and optimism for me. I especially appreciate all that she has stepped up to do for me this year. Her generosity—even as she deals with her own worries and deadlines—has allowed me to tend to this project without stress, and I thank her from the bottom of my heart for that.

I also want to thank a few other dear friends who have been loyal and available to me when I needed them to be: Kate Burke, Jean Gregorek, and Craig Mihaly. As I get older, I treasure the friends who have cared for me when I have been most self-doubting and exhausted. They not only reaffirmed their friendship to me during these times, they demonstrated it. And that was sometimes the
crucial—even singular—thing in helping me regain my balance, although I may or may not have been clear enough about my thankfulness at the time. Thank you now.

Everyday I am grateful for the love and friendship of Suzanne Ashworth. It is clichéd to say this, but it is no less true: my life changed when she entered it. Suzanne has been a partner to me in all of this: the work, the writing, the balancing act, the living of my life. She brings me back to myself when I am lost, and she helps free me from a lot of my most ancient fears. This, she does, without much in the way of effort or self-consciousness. She loves me in ways that make me feel as if I can be both whole and happy, which is something that I haven’t been convinced of since I was a child. She convinces me again every day, and I love her for this and so much more.

My family has been a lifelong source of support and encouragement, and I am so thankful for their unconditional love of me. I cannot remember a time in my life when my mother expressed anything even close to disappointment in me. And it’s not that I haven’t given her occasional reason to be. If a path was clear, you just have to know that I would make it difficult. Or unusually long. Or more tortured than anyone would imagine that it could be. My mother has picked me up and put me back together after any number of hard things, and I know that it has not always been easy. But the truth is: I wouldn’t have survived a lot of those things without my mother. The fact of my mother, the physical presence of my mother, the steady love and care of my mother has delivered me from a lot of pain in my life. And there is no way to adequately thank a person for doing—and just being—that. My brother, Fred, and sister, Barbie, have been my steady companions in life. We drew together as children and withstood a lot of unpredictability in our home. We, however, have never been unpredictable in our love or care for each other. I rely on them for encouragement, humor, rescue, and understanding on the deepest of levels. I love them so greatly, and they must know by now that I want their happiness, in some ways, even more than I want my own. I also want to thank
my mother and father-in-law, Carol and Ken Petri, for their enormous love and generosity. They have loved me so well and given my family so much in the last twenty years that I have known them. They are parents to me personally—in addition to their son and granddaughter—and I want them to know how much they have been part of making my adult life better.

Perhaps my greatest personal debt is reserved for Ken Petri, my husband, and our daughter, Eva. Because my time and energy in the last few years were swallowed up by the demands of my full-time academic work and dissertating, I have been less available to them and less present even when I was. This, they know, was not my choice. They also know that I find this sort of imbalance, this level of overwork and over-thought, entirely at odds with the living of a happy and full life. I am not monomaniacal by temperament, so I experience an excess of anything—including the things I love most—as a restriction.

Probably one of my greatest strokes of luck in life was meeting and coming to love Ken Petri. He entered my life when I was a much more cautious creature. At the time, I risked everything intellectually and almost nothing emotionally. And, like all long-standing habits, such a way of life felt natural and right to me. I had no sense of how much more I was able to feel and reveal and claim in myself. Ken was the first person in my life to actually enjoy me, even and especially the dimensions of myself that had threatened others in the past. Seems like a small thing, but, at the time, it was a revelation—and it made possible an adulthood that was a vastly improved and much happier version of anything I had thought was possible for me. For this alone, Ken deserves a gratitude that is larger than anything I can offer here. No doubt about it: he was my game-changer.

Ken has also been a smart and perceptive reader of this project, and I have to thank him for that, too. When he thinks with me, I am always improved. I am not being hyperbolic when I say that he may have the most interesting and imaginative mind that I have ever known. When he gives
his attention to something—even something like critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, which is outside his personal orbit—he opens it up and makes it new. Without his critical and creative input, I know that this project would have stalled and, at times, genuinely sucked.

But, I suppose in the end, when it comes to my love and gratitude for Ken, I think it best to fall back on John Berryman, who came closest to right when he said that “nouns and verbs do not exist for what I feel.”

My daughter, Eva, is nine years old as I finish this. She has never known me to be a person who is not writing or worrying about the completion of a dissertation. Because she is both young and optimistic, she shrugs off the neurotic energy that surrounds both her mother and this process. I’m grateful for that, because I don’t really want to identify with the neurotic energy that I generate. And Eva always helps me see it as something trivial and passing. In ways that I am only now beginning to recognize, this work is very much inspired by her and the relationship she enjoys with the world. My daughter nurtures all that needs care, without exception. And, even though she is more quiet and gentle in her temperament, I have seen Eva become suddenly—and startlingly—passionate when she sees injustice or unnecessary suffering. I mean, this girl can fill with righteous fire when the situation demands it. She doesn’t seem to believe in boundaries or borders. She is impatient and unhappy with hierarchies that she knows are designed to keep people—and all living things—from flourishing as they should. This isn’t the way she’d put it, of course. But I’m her mother, I know what it is, and I love it most in her. Eva isn’t an astral being, but her loving daily life makes me hopeful about the human capacity for authentic compassion, growth and self-renewal. For this reason, and many others that live outside of the language I have, I dedicate this work to her.
Vita

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Introduction
The Case for Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogy

It is especially important to take up the question of cosmopolitan pedagogy at this historical moment. Global learning, once and primarily the curricular focus of K-12 education, is now gaining traction in undergraduate core curricula, and colleges and universities are revising institutional mission statements to include larger commitments to global awareness and, increasingly, world citizenship. The rhetoric suggests that higher education is in the full throes of a paradigm shift. But this newfound attention to the “global” often is unsupported and superficial, lacking convincing philosophical or pedagogical rationales. Even so, the promotion of global learning goals in higher education continues to be understood as a self-evident good. Consequently, larger institutional motives and ambitions for the “globalized” (or, occasionally, “internationalized”) university are permitted to be vague, and there is a sense among some academics that “global” has become the new floating—and, regrettably, empty—signifier in higher education discourse.

To some extent, this is understandable. The appetite for global commitments—both institutional and curricular—has far outpaced the theorizing of globally conscious pedagogies. Because of the theoretical lag, there has been less insistence on making explicit the “philosophical [or] epistemological claims” of global education (Heilman 192). There also has been less interest in

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1 In summer of 2007, The Ohio State University released the findings and recommendations of an Internationalizing the University task force charged with outlining a comprehensive strategy for positioning Ohio State as a “global university.” The task force concluded that a “global mission and aspiration needed to permeate the culture of the university.” That “aspiration” was largely tied to enhanced international visibility for the university brand and its research efforts, more effective student competitiveness in the world economic and cultural marketplace, and an enlarged slate of curricula with an “international” component. Mention was made of the need to prepare students for the challenges of world citizenship, but there was no sense of what that might mean or entail for the larger curriculum and academic culture. We’ll discuss this further in Chapter Two.
exploring the complex pedagogical and psychological demands of educational practices that openly promote a global, or world-minded, outlook. Neglecting a fuller and more critical consideration of these pedagogical investments in the global, academics have consequently underexplored—and under-theorized—a series of key questions: What do we mean when we stress that we are global in “instinct and reflex”? What critical pedagogies support and complicate “worldliness,” or a “self-reflexive mode of being in the world”? And how do we best understand the larger philosophical and political ends of pedagogies that self-present as global in orientation and outlook?

This project is deeply invested in the examination of such questions, questions that seek to more carefully define the motives, ambitions, and complexities of pedagogies that ally with global learning goals. Rather than allow the rhetoric of the ‘global’ to escape scrutiny or specificity, this project is interested in naming—and then advocating for—a more particular and invested reading of the ‘global’ in pedagogical work. As we soon will see, it is the cosmopolitan that attracts my attention, for critical cosmopolitan questions, I will argue, deepen and amplify the ethical aims of global education.

**Global Education: What is it for? Who does it serve?**

Let us start by acknowledging that education is always and necessarily transitive. It does more than take an object in the strictest sense; it also serves as a vehicle for a particular and invested worldview. For the most part, when we teach, we teach for, or on behalf of, larger philosophical, cultural, or political values. Those values may be articulated or implied, they may consciously or

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3 Hannah Arendt first formulated this notion of “worldliness” in *The Human Condition*. William Smith’s “Cosmopolitan Citizenship: Virtue, Irony, and Worldliness” nicely revives Arendtian worldliness for the cosmopolitan political project, a project that significantly shapes this dissertation.
unconsciously shape a pedagogical practice, and they may or may not attach to clearly defined social goods. Whatever the framework, education is best understood as education for something, so it is crucial that academics make explicit the aspirational values that underline their pedagogical work.

It has become increasingly uncontroversial to argue that higher education should teach for global understanding and awareness. Indeed, as Craig Calhoun reminds us, “it is hard [at least in Western academic circles] to imagine preferring to be known as parochial” (89). Inward-looking and insular, parochialism is identified with a certain narrowing of thought and discomfort with complexity. Globalism, on the other hand, is granted wide conceptual and moral room, as it is generally understood to be expansive, robust, and ecumenical in its sensibility. In such a context, education for global understanding and awareness is advertised as a necessary antidote to unobserved parochialism. And then, as mentioned earlier, the larger goals of global learning insert themselves as an unqualified and self-evident good.

But, if we believe that the pedagogical commitment to global understanding and awareness is a central and urgent one for higher education, then we must be more unambiguous about what such a set of pedagogical goals is designed to accomplish. Rather than eschew specificity, we must critically reflect on the values that animate global learning. We also must refuse the closed critical loop that insists on the obvious and self-explanatory virtue of global understanding and awareness. Instead, it is better to open with a more profitable and nuanced set of questions: What is global education for? What ends should global education serve? And how do our pedagogies realize or frustrate the aspirations that we name?

To name but a few examples, education can teach for moral and civic responsibility (Colby et al.), the public good (Kezar et al.), sustainability (Orr), or social justice (Darling-Hammond et al.).
There are, of course, many possible rationales for foregrounding global learning in curricular and pedagogical work, so it is important for us to begin by sorting a few of the more conspicuous defenses of global education. Such a comparison will allow us to articulate more carefully what we intend global learning—in both content and form—to offer to the academy. It will also help us name the philosophical and pedagogical values underlying our own investments in the global.

One of the more common rationales for global education holds that schools and universities are responsible for enhancing the ability of their students to successfully compete in a globalized economy. Dubbed the ‘neo-mercantilist’ position, this defense of global learning emphasizes the importance of training students for an economic market that prizes flexibility and adaptability. Unabashedly vocational in its rhetoric, a neo-mercantilist argument for global education recommends the cultivation of market-friendly skills and competencies. Rather than promote “critical competence for autonomous learning and active citizenship” (Morrow and Torres 47), global education instead understands itself as an extended readying for market participation. This is a highly truncated understanding of what it might mean to teach for global understanding, as global, in this instance, is entirely—and uncritically—synonymous with economic globalization.

Nonetheless, the neo-mercantilist defense of global education has won the support of many key policymakers in the United States, particularly those who serve in state legislatures or affiliate with chambers of commerce. Because of this, colleges and universities that embrace the neo-mercantilist or vocational ends of global education are likely to find themselves feted and financially rewarded. Such an alliance with neo-mercantilist advocates of global education in the public sector

5 See Lamy’s “Global Education: A Conflict of Images.”

6 This is especially true for publicly-funded colleges and universities, as state legislatures are more generally supportive of resource spending that prepares students for ‘a globally competitive economy.’
introduces a significant moral and practical challenge for those academics who support a global curriculum that “celebrates human values rather than market values” (Bates 106) or, even more complexly, a curriculum that interrogates the neoliberal assumptions of economic globalization.

Another rationale for global education is focused more squarely on a commitment to international awareness; indeed, “‘minimalist’ interpretations of global education often claim ‘international awareness’ as the primary curricular objective” (Davies 6). Choosing to define the global as the international, such curricula tend to overemphasize the exploration of cultural similarities and differences rather than the larger moral and political challenges facing the global community.7 Cross-cultural inquiry, often anchored by the discrete study of national or regional cultures, is a common curricular goal, and there is a powerful emphasis on developing intercultural competencies that will serve students in culturally diverse settings at home and abroad. Indeed, internationalist global education recommends a sustained exposure to and engagement with those perceived as cultural ‘others.’ These ‘others’ tend to be identified with national or ethnic cultures represented as “distinct and different wholes” (Robbins “Comparative” 258), so there are real ways in which the internationalist global curriculum relies on fixed and legible understandings of cultural identity.

Even as we speak of the global curriculum that is internationalist in its premise and priorities, it is crucial that we also acknowledge the fact that international education is itself a discrete field and set of practices. When global education self-represents as internationalist, it is easy to confuse and conflate the two. It is easy to presume that global and international education are, in

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7 In ‘Global Education and National Identity,’ Graham Pike argues that American global educators are more prone to emphasize the ‘exploration of countries and cultures,’ while educators in the U.K. and Canada are generally more invested in the discussion of global problems and inequities. Pike suggests that the deep structure of schooling, shaped by national forms of self-representation, accounts for these disparities.
fact, interchangeable projects. This is especially true in higher education, where the drive to ‘internationalize’ the curriculum has been both highly visible and public. Since the end of the Second World War, internationally targeted research and teaching has enjoyed varying degrees of federal funding and support (Title VI, most prominently), and colleges and universities have borrowed liberally from the language of ‘internationalization’ to describe aims as diverse as course offerings in international business, increased study abroad options for undergraduates, and more successful international student retention. This, for many in academe, has been taken for an institutional and programmatic commitment to global education.  

While it is true that global and international curricula share a common interest in promoting cross-cultural awareness, it is important to recognize that the ends of each educational project can differ substantially. International education is generally dedicated to the work and expansion of foreign-language programs, promotion of study abroad and immersion opportunities, and the cultivation of area studies curricula. Because it is primarily focused on building international awareness and intercultural competence, international education is often less invested in encouraging global civic action than it is interested in preparing students for a culturally diverse society or marketplace. While global education can choose to ally itself with critical citizenship practice or devote itself to larger questions about the distribution of global public goods, international education more consistently opts to enhance cross-cultural understanding and awareness. So if we insist on more broadly transformative or radicalizing aims for global education, it is important that we acknowledge that the “increased knowledge or accumulated information of other nations, cultures, 

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8 The Ohio State University, for example, is committed to an internationalist understanding of global education. Again, we’ll discuss this further in Chapter Two, but it is enough to say here that recent reports from the President’s and Provost’s Council on Strategic Internationalization have emphasized the need to “enhance the curriculum [in order to] further incorporate international context.” That context is defined as the “integration of international perspectives.” (3)
and peoples” that is promised by an internationalized curriculum does not always or necessarily guarantee the change of consciousness we seek (Pae 141).

It is also critical to realize that international education, by definition, is structurally indebted to the study of the nation-state: as a culturally distinct collectivity, as a sovereign political entity, and as a viable actor in inter-state relations. Presupposing national frames of self-reference, “international [education] cannot question, or transcend, or even try to ignore as a category, the nation state as such” (Gunesch 267). And, if we assume the modern nation state as our conceptual lynchpin, an unexamined ‘methodological nationalism’ is likely to inhibit pedagogical questioning of the identity and cultural attachments that bind people to the state in the first place.9 Because of this, internationalist global education may be ill-equipped to build new curricular pathways that can trace and reaffirm the complex “macro-interdependencies” of national cultures (Rabinow 258). The pedagogical stakes are high here, for an understanding of these macro-interdependencies works to fundamentally challenge the mythology of the sovereign state and self-contained culture.10

A third rationale for global education insists that the skills and sensitivities of a globally aware person make more likely an intellectually and culturally enriched life. Tying global learning to the more private ends of personal and intellectual enrichment, this defense of global education is more Arnoldian in spirit and more insistent on the usefulness of global competencies for self-enlargement. As a result, what I’ll call liberal-aesthetic global education is often cast as a vehicle for

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9 It is Ulrich Beck who first formulated a critique of ‘methodological nationalism,’ or a “set of explicit or implicit assumptions about the nation-state being the power container of social processes and the national being the key-order for studying major social, economic and political processes” (“Enemies” 21).

10 On, for example, the limitations of mistaking a traditional area studies curriculum for a more intentionally global one, see Lee Anderson: ‘Horizontal interdependencies being what they are, it won’t do to study China as if there were no Latin America or as if there were no Asia.’ (Prewitt qtd. in Anderson 31).
personal refinement, enhanced cultural competence, and worldliness. There are clear bourgeois investments in such a pedagogical narrative, for this narrative is one that tends to stress liberal self-invention through travel and broadened exposure to cultural and aesthetic experience. For this reason, a liberal-aesthetic defense of global education bears a structural resemblance to cultural cosmopolitanism, a variant of cosmopolitan practice that has been both lauded and vilified for “a cultural curiosity [that] reflects a lack of obligation to any community” (Molz 519). And, like cultural cosmopolitanism, liberal-aesthetic global education is believed to appeal to a “privileged mobile elite” whose “aesthetic stance to divergent cultural experiences” (Featherstone 9) positions them to explore and enjoy cultural difference in ways that can be spectatorial.

While I do not want to suggest that neo-mercantilist, internationalist, or liberal-aesthetic rationales for global education are entirely misplaced, I do want to insist that they share one significant failing: they refuse to centralize a larger curricular conversation on the global public good. If a complex consideration of the global public good finds its way into pedagogical practice, it does so tangentially. Because the neo-mercantilist marries global learning to a narrow set of vocational ends, the internationalist enlists it for the cultivation of cross-cultural awareness and competencies, and the liberal-aesthetic claims it for the larger goals of self-enrichment, there is little focused attention on global learning as a critical citizenship project. And, without clear pedagogical priorities that link the global with civic and personal action in the interest of the global public good, there is little chance that global education will promote what Paul Clarke calls “deep citizenship,” or an “ethics of care that is fundamentally about a moral and political engagement with the world that extends beyond the state” (Maira 222).

I’m using worldliness here as a synonym for cultural sophistication or urbanity; I’m not gesturing to Hannah Arendt’s understanding of ‘worldliness’ as a self-reflexive mode of being-in-the-world.
Education for Cosmopolitanism

This project argues that it is possible—and, in fact, desirable—to argue for the value of global learning as a critical citizenship practice. More specifically, this project calls for global education to consider its relationship to the larger goals of global citizenship, a moral and political ideal that centrally advocates for the global public good. Focused on global social change and problem solving, education for global citizenship “affirms a certain kind of global ethic which includes an emphasis on global responsibility” (Dower ‘Trio’ 156). Unlike other variants of global education, education for global citizenship insists that “students should not only be able to understand the world, but they should also have the predispositions and skills needed to improve it” (Lister 113). It is this assigned priority to personal and civic engagement, this underscoring of responsibility for distant others, and this explicit concern with social justice that distinguishes global learning as a critical citizenship project. Encouraging students to “become historical and political actors” in contexts both global and local (White and Openshaw 159), education for global citizenship is decidedly praxis-oriented in its co-prioritizing of awareness and action in pedagogical work. And, if we compare it to other models of global education, it is safe to say that education for global citizenship is driven less by vocational, cultural, or aesthetic values than an ethical investment in human and ecological flourishing and the promotion of transnational forms of justice.

For these reasons, some have noted an obvious affinity between education for global citizenship and cosmopolitan habits of thought and feeling. To be fair, cosmopolitanism—as a philosophy and a practice—has always been identified with the larger impetus to global citizenship, whether that citizenship has been understood as a moral enterprise or a legal status. Fundamentally rooted in Stoic and Kantian conceptions of world citizenship, cosmopolitanism historically has urged “allegiance to the worldwide community of human beings” rather than particular or parochial
identities. There is no doubt that this has put traditional cosmopolitanism at odds with solidarities of smaller scale (whether tribal, familial, or national), but contemporary and reinvigorated forms of cosmopolitan thought have sought to reconcile a heightened care for the world with local obligation and attachment.

In such a context, classicist and cultural critic Martha Nussbaum has repeatedly called for higher education to promote the “cosmopolitan ideal,” an enriched model of citizenship that acknowledges the centrality of one’s obligations to communities both local and global. Arguing that the most ambitious global education should prepare human beings for the aforementioned “deep citizenship,” or moral and political engagement with the world beyond the nation state, Nussbaum insists that efforts to globalize the curriculum and culture of higher education should be consonant with cosmopolitan aspirations.

Academics of various disciplinary backgrounds have been intrigued by the implications of such a cosmopolitan ideal for educational practice, but scholarship has been slow to theorize the critical-pedagogical consequences of these cosmopolitan strivings. For a growing number, there is a general sense that global education is best and most complexly served by an open affiliation with cosmopolitan values and the ends of global citizenship, but there is little consensus on the pedagogical framework or priorities that would best deliver such a goal.

Toward this end, this project takes as a primary task the theorizing of cosmopolitan pedagogies that will fully and complexly realize the aims of a global educational agenda. Because I am most interested in exploring the benefits and challenges of framing global learning within an explicitly cosmopolitan context, this project will take as a primary task the examination and elaboration of the notional relationship between the global and the cosmopolitan. How, for example, might cosmopolitan questions enrich and complicate contemporary discourse on the global
in higher education? What might be gained from a more overt identification of the global with the cosmopolitan in pedagogical work? And, if we admit the usefulness of cosmopolitan frameworks for global learning pedagogies, why is it important that we define our investments as critically cosmopolitan? These are the central questions that shape and define the first four chapters of this project.

In the fifth and final chapter, I will focus our attention on a significant source of resistance and challenge to the critical cosmopolitan pedagogical project: an uncritical allegiance to the local that defends against global forms of awareness, attachment, and responsibility. Such allegiance can unwittingly serve as a conceptual and psychic roadblock that derails critical cosmopolitan versions of global education. But, because it is crucial that people “cross perceptual thresholds,” or risk new ways of seeing, if they hope to cogently respond to the needs of the world (Becker 68), it is important to understand the ways in which unexamined resistance to critical cosmopolitan questions and values can stymie some of the best-intentioned pedagogical efforts to “cross [such] perceptual thresholds.” Without a consideration of the most dynamic obstacles to critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, it is difficult to imagine building—and then sustaining—cosmopolitan commitments in the college or university classroom.

**An Overview of the Project**

My first chapter, “The Landscape of Cosmopolitanism,” begins by introducing the larger philosophical debate that surrounds cosmopolitanism as a politics, practice, and value system. Although it is true that much of the vigorous debate on cosmopolitanism has been centered in the social sciences, academics from various disciplinary backgrounds, humanists most prominently, have begun recently to explore what cosmopolitan questions and practices might mean for political and
cultural work more generally. As I have mentioned, I am particularly interested in the usefulness of a cosmopolitan language and ethic for critical pedagogical work.

The opening chapter will foreground normative cosmopolitan questions—about personal allegiance, civic forms of belonging, and universalistic ethics—as a way of opening new conversation about the difficulties of teaching and learning at the intersection of the local and global. In the course of the chapter, we will explore the complex history, foundational tenets, and rich variation of cosmopolitan theory and practice. We will also concentrate our critical energies on what I believe to be the most promising iteration of cosmopolitan discourse: critical cosmopolitanism. As I see it, critical cosmopolitanism offers the most compelling and productive framework for new pedagogies of global learning.

The second chapter, “Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogy: A Sketch,” outlines the broad parameters of a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy and makes a case for its timeliness and usefulness in conversations about the role of global learning in higher education. However, rather than begin with a positive definition of education for critical cosmopolitanism, I open this chapter with an object lesson that discusses a institutional commitment to global learning that is, in fact, antithetical to critical cosmopolitan priorities. More specifically, I read The Ohio State University’s Strategic Internationalization Plan—a highly visible institutional initiative designed to “globalize” the mission and curriculum at the University—and examine its decision to define the global in terms that are both internationalist and neo-mercantile. Despite the fact that Ohio State is not identifying itself with cosmopolitan goals, it, nonetheless, is willing to lay selective claim to the rhetoric of global citizenship when it wants to imply that its internationalization plan is consonant with public interest and the public good. I share details of Ohio State’s Strategic Internationalization Plan so that readers might better understand what is lost when colleges and universities describe institutional ambitions
for “globalization” (or “internationalization”) in ways that devalue or bury the possibility of critical cosmopolitan commitments. When an institution evacuates global learning of explicit ties to critical citizenship practice, we have to rely on individual faculty to imagine pedagogies that define the priority of the global in other ways. This is certainly possible. It can and does happen. But, ideally, there is consonance between an institution’s stated rationale for global learning and the pedagogies that emerge to support it.

The remainder of the second chapter makes a case for a pedagogical practice that affirms and enacts the central priorities of critical cosmopolitan thought and practice. Borrowing from the definition of critical cosmopolitanism that I introduced at the conclusion of Chapter One, the second chapter broadly sketches the framework for a pedagogy that names and distinguishes itself as critically cosmopolitan. This is important for two reasons: one, we need to be able to explain why it is a cosmopolitan pedagogy—rather than one teaching for purely neo-mercantile, internationalist, or liberal-aesthetic ends—that best delivers on the promise of global learning, and, two, we need to be able to explain why it is important that we identify that pedagogy as critically cosmopolitan—rather than traditionally or culturally cosmopolitan—so that we can build a model of teaching and learning that avoids the pitfalls of false universalism, the erasure of particularity, and the reduction of cosmopolitanism to a lifestyle option.

In the third and fourth chapters, I become more specific about the content and form of a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical practice. Here, I define what I believe are the key paradigms and sensibilities that shape and distinguish a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. Obviously, there are many ways that we might define the priorities of critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning, but I am very interested in theorizing the distinctive characteristics of the pedagogical practice. If we teach for critical cosmopolitan ends, what are we saying about our relationship to the global (and, by
extension, the local)? How exactly are we representing our investments in global learning? What are we choosing to emphasize and de-emphasize in a globally conscious pedagogical practice if we identify with critical cosmopolitanism? And what is the language that is most accessible and best suited for a pedagogy that wants to announce its critical cosmopolitan identifications to students, faculty, and other institutional audiences?

My third chapter focuses on a series of paradigms that provide a distinctive intellectual scaffolding for critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. These paradigms are critical frameworks that shape the pedagogical work as well as distinguish its priorities from other pedagogies that support global learning. As I see it, critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning is characterized by three significant conceptual paradigms: the rethinking of the local and global as mutually constitutive and relational, an enlarged and invigorated conception of citizenship, and a complex engagement with otherness.

Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is also invested in the affective and attitudinal dimension of global learning, as the larger goal of the learning is transformative change in both subjective and social dimensions. In my fourth chapter, I argue that critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning is characterized by three dispositional goals or sensibilities: a capacity for self-reflexivity, an enlarged sense of cosmopolitan responsibility, and a willingness to challenge routine forms of cynicism.

Throughout the first four chapters, it will become evident that this project is consistently interested in the ways that an affective resistance to the ‘global’ shapes educational practice. Such affective resistance is often rooted in unconscious attachments to the ‘local’ and familiar as well as a more generalized anxiety about that which is other or elsewhere. Since resistance is such an understandable (and often productive) response to new forms of knowledge, I believe that we gain
insight when we explore the ways in which both educators and students defend against critical cosmopolitan ways of thinking and knowing in pedagogical work.\textsuperscript{12}

Toward this end, my final chapter, “Cosmophobia: The Anxiety of Elsewhere,” will identify what I believe is one of the most significant sources of psychic and practical resistance to critical cosmopolitan pedagogy: a belief that the global and the local exist in a necessarily antagonistic relation with one another, coupled with a deep suspicion that promotion of the global will require the demotion of the local (here, identified with all that is immediate and familiar). Certainly, there are many other motives for indifference or hostility to critical cosmopolitan values, but I want the final chapter to focus on what I believe is one of the more salient forms of resistance to an enlarged understanding of cosmopolitan citizenship and responsibility in pedagogical work. At the same time and throughout the project, I want it to be clear that I see resistance to critical cosmopolitan learning as a product of anxiety about borders and boundaries: the uneasy demarcation between the close and the distant (what I call “elsewhere”), the familiar and the strange, and the self and the other. Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy must contend in very particular ways with this anxiety and think about ways to redirect its address rather than ignore, minimize, or defend against its emergence in the classroom.

Having said this, I think it does us well to acknowledge the difficulty—even the incongruity—of endorsing the cosmopolitan ideal in American higher education. American

\textsuperscript{12} In this project, I will be reading resistance in a psychoanalytic register. I am primarily interested in unconscious barriers to understanding, and the many ways that our resistance to knowledge is driven by a desire—even a need—to ignore (rather than, strictly speaking, a lack of understanding). Resistance can also be fed by “material inertias” and a lack of exposure to new or more challenging ideas about the world, but this project will focus itself more squarely on the anxieties—both conscious and unconscious—inspired by cosmopolitan teaching and learning.
academics, like Americans more generally, seem inclined to prize and protect localism. Because of this, my final chapter wants to consider the ways that a “fetishizing of the local” (Bérubé qtd. in Williams) might inhibit pedagogical practice from understanding the more complex and worldly dimensions of place. Drawing centrally on the critical geographic work of Yi-Fu Tuan and Doreen Massey, I explore what Salman Rushdie calls “the mighty [psychic] conflict between the fantasy of Home and the fantasy of Away” (55). The fantasy of Home insists on a rootedness that is insular and resistant to difference; the fantasy of Away insists on compulsive movement and a detachment from affiliation.

In this chapter, I argue that critical cosmopolitanism seeks a relationship to rootedness that is not reactionary, a relationship that allows for a more progressive understanding of what it might mean to live well in place. Because place is so often synonymous with locality, it is crucial for us to imagine a ‘global sense of place’ that is capable of unsettling the dualism of Home and Away. This is important because the inflexible opposition of Home and Away, the antagonism between the local and the global, disallows a richer language for ‘belonging,’ a language that would allow for multiple allegiances and attachments to one’s bounded community and the larger world.

Insisting on a necessary and dynamic tension between the local and the global, I contend that critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is poised to re-imagine loyalty to place. At the same time, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy

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13 For example, a good deal of important work in place studies (especially when it serves environmental education) and service/community-based learning is centered locally rather than globally. There are good practical reasons for curricular and co-curricular attention to the communities in which colleges and universities are situated, but such attention can also crowd out interest in learning about and serving communities and causes that are not local.

14 Doreen Massey’s work is instrumental in this regard; I especially want to think about the implications of this counter-intuitive reading of place—place as unbounded and nonspecific—for critical cosmopolitan pedagogical work.
cosmopolitan pedagogy successfully troubles communitarian assumptions about what constitutes the proper scope of one’s identifications. Because it raises new questions about one’s psychic and conceptual attachments to place, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy problematizes and makes anxious the link between identity and location.

One noteworthy end result of this is the radicalization of the pedagogical goals of place studies, an interdisciplinary field that tends to elevate specificity and, by extension, locality. To illustrate this, the final chapter will read two essays whose authors conceptualize place in ways that sustain or complicate the dualism of the local and the global: David Orr’s “Place and Pedagogy” and Lawrence Buell’s “Space, Place, and Imagination from Local to Global.” Insisting on the mutual implication of the local and the global, my critical cosmopolitan reading of Orr’s and Buell’s essays will attempt to enlarge the critical stakes for pedagogies of place by complicating the ways we imagine—and teach—subjectivity in relation to location.

What This Project Is—and Is Not

Let me start by saying that this project, by definition, is an interdisciplinary one. When I first decided to investigate the desirability of a cosmopolitan framework for pedagogical work, I realized rather quickly that the critical discussion of cosmopolitanism filters through a wide number of disciplinary fields. Indeed, no single discipline or sub-discipline dominates the conversation on cosmopolitan theory and practice. Cosmopolitan discourse is shaped, innovated, and complicated in

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15 Communitarians tend to believe that moral obligations are first and rightly owed to one’s bounded community, not an abstract and disembodied humanity.

many different pockets of the academy. Political philosophers, social theorists, international relations scholars, ethicists, cultural anthropologists, classicists, cultural geographers, cultural studies theorists, scholars of world and transnational literatures: all have reason to explore cosmopolitan categories and frameworks of understanding. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, considering the general academic emphasis on disciplinary specialization and atomization, there is little cross-disciplinary exchange of ideas. Sociologists tend to entertain cosmopolitan questions with other sociologists, political philosophers tend to complicate institutional and legal versions of cosmopolitanism with other political philosophers, and ethicists tend to argue about the content of the cosmopolitan ethic with other ethicists. For this reason, it has been an intellectual challenge to read broadly across these diverse disciplinary fields, isolate shared conceptions and concerns, and construct something that resembles a cross-disciplinary dialogue. I now recognize that a large—and invisible—part of the work of this project was taken up with the critical task of synthesis, or tracking the diverse disciplinary scholarship centered on the theory and practice of cosmopolitanism. My desire to understand cosmopolitanism from multiple and simultaneous vantage points all but guaranteed that I would need to deterritorialize myself and my thinking. So I made the decision to immerse myself in a wide variety of disciplinary languages and, whenever possible, find ways to put them in communication with one another. These cross-border practices were not only central to my critical and work habits on this project; I also believe that they are central to the philosophical core of critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. Such symmetry felt—and still feels—right for the work that I want to do in this field.

Fairly early in this project, I realized that it was not enough for me to think about recruiting general cosmopolitan categories for global learning pedagogies. Because cosmopolitanism is plural and polyvocal, I recognized that it was important to specify the cosmopolitan priorities that were informing my work. Although some have called for the broad theorizing of cosmopolitan
education,\(^\text{17}\) I came to realize that a wholesale and unqualified affirmation of the value of cosmopolitan discourse for global learning pedagogy would be a mistake. For there are, as we shall see, legitimate concerns about the essentialism and moral overreach of traditional cosmopolitanism, just as there are legitimate concerns about the political quietism of cultural cosmopolitanism. Different versions of cosmopolitanism warrant different responses, and not all are equally useful to progressive models of teaching and learning. I knew that I wanted to ally with—or imagine—a version of cosmopolitanism capable of engaging meaningfully with critical vocabularies and pedagogies that serve the needs of the contemporary moment.

Ultimately, it was the theoretical work of the new cosmopolitans that attracted my interest, and, for some time, I imagined that I would be writing a project that underscored the importance of new cosmopolitan ways of thinking for teaching and learning. However, as I read further and more extensively, I came to see the value in promoting the usefulness of a more particular form of new cosmopolitanism. More than any other iteration of cosmopolitanism, I believe that critical cosmopolitanism offers global learning pedagogies the most flexible, expansive, and nuanced understanding of cosmopolitan social practice and subjectivity.

A clear impediment to constructing a well-defined pedagogy is that critical cosmopolitanism is less conspicuous and clearly defined than other formulations of cosmopolitanism. Critical cosmopolitanism is not a familiar theoretical language, even for those who work broadly with cosmopolitanism as a discourse and practice. Many other variants of new cosmopolitanism—vernacular, rooted, and discrepant cosmopolitanisms, to name a few—are far more recognizable to an academic public and enjoy more popularity than critical cosmopolitanism. But, because I was attracted to its promise for pedagogical work, I made the decision to organize, refine, and extend the

\(^{17}\) Martha Nussbaum is most prominent in this regard.
available thinking on *critical cosmopolitanism*. And this sorting, in many ways, helped me establish and secure my own relationship to cosmopolitan theory.

All of this, in some measure, is prelude. Certainly, I worked very hard to synthesize cross-disciplinary conversation on cosmopolitanism, and I worked hard to lay out a working definition of critical cosmopolitan discourse. I did not do this as an end in itself; I did these things so that I might better imagine a global learning pedagogy that is informed by a theoretically nuanced understanding of cosmopolitanism. I wanted to bring some of the most ambitious thinking on cosmopolitanism to bear on pedagogical questions, and, in so doing, I hoped that I might not only inspire greater interest in cosmopolitan discourse but, also, greater interest in mobilizing important cross-disciplinary theoretical work for pedagogical ends.

In this project, I do not imagine pedagogy as a transparent set of techniques that attach to—and serve—course content or a clearly defined set of learning objectives. Rather than see it as a “technical procedure” or portable set of skills, I am interested in understanding pedagogy as a *moral or political practice* that performs important public and cultural work. I do grant that pedagogy is often “assumed to be about processing received knowledge rather than actually transforming it in the interest of the public good” (Giroux 90), but this project challenges such a limited and static conceptualization of the work of teaching. As I see it, pedagogy must be understood as a productive activity because we know that “the work of learning is not so much an accumulation of knowledge but a means for the human to use knowledge” (Britzman “Lost” 4)

And pedagogy, like education itself, is transitive. It advances a worldview and can lend form to a gestalt. It enacts the larger values—and, in some cases, the vision—of the one who educates. Although it may represent itself as processual, it is neither a purely instrumental practice nor a set of freelance teaching strategies that attach to disciplinary content. Pedagogy is a moral and political
practice that can, if one chooses, work to support and help materialize complex, transformational, and socially relevant goals for the work of education.

As a scholarly endeavor, I hope that this project will accomplish a few important tasks. First and foremost, I hope that the work will introduce a new—and urgently needed—set of questions for those who are working to prioritize global learning efforts in higher education. As I’ve mentioned, I am concerned about the paucity of critical frameworks for understanding pedagogical commitments to global understanding, awareness, or citizenship practice. In many cases, pedagogical investments in global learning are under-theorized and over-simplified. This is a significant problem for higher education—particularly for general education programs that are targeted for internationalization—because the culture of higher education is demanding a wholesale “globalizing” of its teaching and learning paradigm in advance of a full critical conversation on the motives and mission for global learning. In my own efforts to imagine new pedagogies and curricular practices that value an enlarged and complicated relationship to the “global,” I have been frustrated by this unreflective practice, by the absent or inconsistent theorizing of the role that global learning might play in more transformative models of liberal education. Because it can feel as if the “global” in global learning lacks shape and boundary, it is understandable that educators under-explore their pedagogical investments in global inquiry. And, because global commitments—both institutional and curricular—are so often assumed to be axiomatic, there is little incentive for educators to think deeply or complexly about the pedagogies that they develop to support them. In this project, by contrast, I intend to theorize a pedagogy that is specific about its understanding of and motives for global learning. I want to build a critical framework and vocabulary for those educators who seek a more clearly articulated and self-aware relationship to global learning pedagogies. I am interested in
making the case for an intentional and informed pedagogical practice: more specifically, I am interested in one that defines its investments in global learning as critically cosmopolitan.

Earlier in the Introduction, I shared a concern about the growing number of educators and administrators who insist on defining global learning and its pedagogies in ways that reinforce its neo-mercantile, internationalist, or liberal-aesthetic ambitions at the expense of a more cosmopolitan promise. I am deeply skeptical of those pedagogical efforts that bracket—or, less perniciously, overlook—the ethical and engaged ends of global learning. Because this project is an effort to formulate a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical practice that attends to ethicality and engagement, I have assigned myself two related goals: first, to argue for the value and relevance of a critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning paradigm, and second, to challenge the dominance of global learning models that posit the primacy of neo-mercantile, internationalist, or liberal-aesthetic educational aims. As I mentioned earlier in the Introduction, my issue is not with the inclusion of neo-mercantile, internationalist, or liberal-aesthetic aims per se, for I recognize that global learning efforts can serve many different pedagogical goals and justify themselves in a variety of ways. There’s no reason that global learning cannot imagine multiple sources of value for its work. However, the willingness to rely wholly upon—and, at times, unflinchingly assume the legitimacy of—neo-mercantile, internationalist, or liberal-aesthetic rationales for global learning is a different and more worrying matter. When global learning efforts bracket the demands of critical citizenship and public work, or when those same efforts ignore or marginalize the complex ethical questions that are raised by global inquiry, I believe that higher education forfeits an opportunity to serve the public good and demonstrate its broader social benefits, benefits that exist beyond those that are individual and economic.
Throughout the project, I do make use of local examples as a way of grounding the theoretical work in concrete practice. These examples, or “object lessons,” are neither serious ethnography nor action research. Instead, they are best understood as illustrative, as case studies that help us examine the often contested climate and context for critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning in higher education. The object lessons will also help us examine the ways that critical cosmopolitan discourse can engender new questions and challenges for faculty who take the goals of global learning seriously.

As you will see, I have chosen not to offer my own teaching as a paradigmatic case study, largely because I remain interested in theorizing the terms of a pedagogy that would have broad utility and applicability for readers. Certainly, my own work in the classroom informs everything that I think here, and there are a number of occasions in the text when a more personal pedagogical narrative felt like the honest and organic thing to offer. But at no time did I set out to write a teaching memoir (especially an accidental one) nor did I want to offer my personal experience as the yardstick by which this theory is found deserving or wanting. If the project is successful, it will be successful because it raises pertinent questions and provides a useful vocabulary for those readers who are looking to better understand their own relationship to global learning and its pedagogies.

I should also point out that this project is not intent on exploring a specific institutional culture or the people who shape it. Although I am very interested in the ways that my home institution, Otterbein College, and my degree-granting institution, The Ohio State University, appear to be defining—and, alternately, defending against—a critical cosmopolitan framework for global learning, I am not looking to document the larger institutional history, dynamics, and processes that may have contributed to such responses. That would take me far afield of my thesis and become another project. It is more accurate to say that I am interested in exploring representative efforts to define global learning and realize critical cosmopolitan learning goals. I am also interested in the way
that institutions and individuals think about pedagogies for global learning—if, in fact, they think about them at all.

This project benefits from the fact that my home institution, like many other institutions in higher education, is deeply invested in rethinking its institutional and curricular commitments to global learning. Thanks to a successful grant proposal that I wrote four years ago, Otterbein has partnered with a small network of colleges and universities that are looking to centralize global learning goals in general education curricula. Because of the visible and public work of this network, Otterbein faculty have been engaged in a multi-year conversation about the role that global learning will play in our core curriculum, the Integrative Studies program.

While is true that many faculty at Otterbein have been eager to understand and teach to a new set of critical questions about global futures, it is also true that an equally sizable number of faculty have been unusually resistant to the curricular reform effort. Interestingly enough, objections have consistently focused on the impossibility of teaching to—rather than learning about—cosmopolitan subjectivity and responsibilities. While it is the case that faculty have raised challenging questions about the curricular priorities of a globally conscious general education core, more surprising have been the intense pedagogical anxieties that have been opened up by a call to attend to more complex forms of global inquiry in the classroom. As we will see, these anxieties

18 The consortium—otherwise known as the General Education for Global Learning network—has been an important arm of the AACU’s (American Association of Colleges and Universities) work in general education reform. Together with sixteen other colleges and universities in the consortium, Otterbein has worked to expand and extend the role of global learning in its core curriculum. See www.aacu.org/SharedFutures for further information.

19 Otterbein’s Integrative Studies program is a comprehensive, four-year general education core that is centered on a shared topic or thematic. For the last thirty years, the Integrative Studies curriculum has been focused on the question of human nature and personhood. In the last two years, a small group of administrators and faculty have struggled to reimagine the shared, or “integrative,” conversation in terms that are more outward and forward-looking. Many of the ‘object lessons’ in this work will center on the faculty response to this effort.
have become manifest in various ways, and, in most cases, they have not understood themselves as
defensive. They are, we have been told, “reasonable responses” to a teaching and learning paradigm
that moves our locus of attention to a more abstract, less immediate, and ambiguously defined set of
cosmopolitan concerns.

Of course, such anxieties about a global learning emphasis—especially when it openly
affiliates with cosmopolitan priorities—are not unique to Otterbein faculty. Many institutions in our
AAC&U network have encountered similar forms of faculty resistance. Some of my network peers
have been surprised and baffled by fellow faculty who refuse to contemplate global learning goals or,
if they support global learning generally, refuse to endorse a curriculum that is purposive about its
commitments to global or cosmopolitan citizenship. Lest it be assumed that it is senior faculty who
would stand as the greatest obstacle to these curricular transformations, it should be said that a good
part of the resistance to critical cosmopolitan frameworks for global learning at Otterbein has been
driven by early and mid-career faculty who distrust efforts to prioritize politically and ethically
committed work in pedagogical practice.20 We’ll discuss this phenomenon further in Chapters Three
and Four, but it is enough to say now that faculty resistance to critical cosmopolitan teaching and
learning is, in many ways, not dissimilar from student resistance to the same: there are anxieties about
the responsibilities and implications of knowledge, discomfort with the various ways that the self can
be put into question, and worry about the destabilizing effect on traditional categories of
understanding and belonging. Part of what I hope to do in this project is address these anxieties
rather plainly, because I think critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning requires a heightened
awareness of all that challenges new and pressing ethical and affective questions about identity, place,
and one’s obligations to distant others.

20 Yes, there was resistance from some senior faculty members, but the resistance seemed to be less about a
critically cosmopolitan orientation for the core curriculum and more about an altered mission for the program.
Coda

As higher education works intently to ‘globalize’ its mission, it is crucial that academics think together about the viability—and desirability—of critical cosmopolitan pedagogies for twenty-first century students who are latent cosmopolitans in the practices of everyday life. Latent cosmopolitans may not be self-consciously cosmopolitan, but they live an integrated and encompassing relationship to globality that calls for further critique. I believe that higher education is well situated to launch that critique. Even more ideally, the academy is positioned to encourage and support the growth of the “citizen pilgrim,” the person of cosmopolitan values and outlook who insists that her learning serve and shape her responsibilities in the world (Falk 27). I want to suggest that the academic humanities, invested in larger conversations about human flourishing and meaning-making, have a decisive role to play in legitimizing the space in higher education for this citizen pilgrim to come into being.

In the end, of course, it is academics who must make the case for critical cosmopolitan pedagogies, and this project is an effort to define the parameters and possibilities of that work. This project is, at the same time, an effort to better understand and answer the anxieties that are inspired by critical cosmopolitan practices and values in pedagogical work. Crucially, we must begin to articulate what we mean when we say ‘global,’ and we must begin to address the complex psychological challenges of opening our pedagogies to new ways of being in—and for—the world. This dissertation opens that conversation.
Chapter One
The Cosmopolitan Landscape

To be a cosmopolitan now is no longer to simply feel oneself a citizen of the world but also, and above all, a citizen for the world.

Daniele Archibugi
Demos and Cosmopolis

Cosmopolitanism tends to be shorthand for a kind of urbanity, cultural sophistication, or worldliness. We are told that the exemplary cosmopolitan figure is cultivated in her cultural tastes and, more often not, bourgeois in her sensibility. Odds are likely that she is a city-dweller, a highly educated professional, and a seasoned world traveler. In other words, the cosmopolitan of popular mythology is believed to “consciously draw from, internalize and display a luxurious cultural capital” (Ong 456). The colloquial understanding imagines cosmopolitanism as a style rather than a discourse, ethic, or practice. And, for this reason, cosmopolitanism has come to be identified with a certain aesthetic hauteur, a social pose.

This commonly accepted notion of cosmopolitanism can be seen as a first barrier to a richer, more nuanced understanding of the pedagogical possibilities of cosmopolitanism. Rather than engage with the ethical and critical complexity of cosmopolitan discourse, colloquial versions of cosmopolitanism accentuate the performance of bourgeois taste and custom. As a result, few people seem prepared to identify cosmopolitanism as an ethical or political practice, and even fewer comprehend its progressive potential and “egalitarian dimension” (Posnock 803).

Nonetheless, we should not be discouraged about our decision to use cosmopolitan categories for pedagogical work. The fact that popular understandings of cosmopolitanism flatten or caricature the cosmopolitan figure should not keep us from exploring the larger social promise of
cosmopolitanism. But, as I see it, if we are interested in a pedagogy that takes seriously the critical and ethical commitments of cosmopolitanism, we will need to make sure that we define our terms carefully. We will need to reframe cosmopolitanism in order to differentiate it from its more common identification with a highly stylized form of consumption. We will also need to make it a priority that we recuperate and foreground the critical aspirations of cosmopolitan discourse.

Another hurdle to our project is the widely-held perception that cosmopolitanism—if it exists as a normative discourse and not merely a style of being—is singular and monolithic. Many critics who are generally familiar with cosmopolitan discourse assume that there is a single, accredited version of cosmopolitanism, and therefore little reason to engage in meaningful debate about its form and content. Such thinking effectively obscures the fact that there are many iterations of cosmopolitan discourse. Cosmopolitanism, like feminism and other theoretical-critical discourses, is plural and polyvocal.

Most cosmopolitan scholarship distinguishes three significant strands in cosmopolitan thought and practice. Ethical cosmopolitanism tends to stress the obligations and loyalty owed to the universal human community. Legal, or political, cosmopolitanism is deeply invested in the creation of global frameworks and institutions that are capable of codifying universal rights and duties. And cultural cosmopolitanism couples an enthusiastic recognition of difference, especially cultural difference, with an appetite for divergent aesthetic and cultural experience (especially when it is the result of travel). These three strands of cosmopolitan thought routinely entangle with one

21 Certainly, academic feminism has faced similar struggles. Popular understandings of feminist thought and practice—even when they’re generally positive—are prone to simplify political critique and action.

22 Typically, the default version of cosmopolitanism is also the most traditional one. A colleague of mine, upon hearing of my project, assumed that I was a neo-Kantian, for she believed that cosmopolitanism had been definitively named and claimed by Kant. She was unaware that there were considerable differences and tensions within the discursive field that surrounds cosmopolitanism.
another conceptually and practically, but it is also true that each strand insists on different priorities for the cosmopolitan project. Ethical cosmopolitanism has a pronounced moral dimension, political cosmopolitanism is centered on institutional and legal reform, and cultural cosmopolitanism emphasizes experiential encounters with those defined as cultural others.

Because the priorities of the cosmopolitan project can differ quite markedly, it is fair to say that cosmopolitanism is a contested term. It is Ulrich Beck who reminds us that “cosmopolitanism is, in fact, another word for disputing about cosmopolitanisms” (“Enemies” 35). Many cosmopolitan thinkers are willing—if not eager—to celebrate this disputability because it makes a productive conceptual ambiguity possible. And because ambiguity works to deny fixed and stable meaning, an ambiguously defined cosmopolitanism is better positioned to resist orthodoxy and doctrinality. This pleases cosmopolitan critics like Robert Fine and Vivienne Boon, who urge us “to resist the proclivity to turn cosmopolitanism into an ‘ism’—that is, into a doctrine, a dogma, an all purpose prescription, a fixed idea” (7-8). Suspicious of the inflexibility of “the doctrinal mindset,” Fine and Boon insist that cosmopolitanism is at its most useful and supple when it is heterogeneous in form. In this, they are not alone. Many other critics agree that the lack of a conceptual consensus on cosmopolitanism is an unexpected asset, as “specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncospomoliian thing to do” (Pollack et al. 577).

I share this desire to extend and complicate the philosophy and practice of cosmopolitanism. As we will see later in this chapter, I believe that there is great value in widening our understanding of cosmopolitanism and, consequently, challenging doctrinal notions about the proper nature and scope of cosmopolitan concern. When we move cosmopolitan thought in unorthodox and unaccredited directions, I believe that we succeed in opening up new forms of political being and possibility, forms of being and possibility that have the capacity to vitalize our pedagogical practice.
Because this project is dedicated to just such a reinvigoration of pedagogical work, it is important to take seriously those discourses of cosmopolitanism that investigate their own definitions and refuse to take the notion of cosmopolitanism for granted.

At the same time, it is possible—and, for many reasons, desirable—to define the ‘coherent ethical perspective,’ or ethos, that underlines most cosmopolitan discourse. I am obviously careful to qualify things here, as we have acknowledged that there are some iterations of cosmopolitanism that foreground aesthetic or cultural values rather than ethical ideals per se. Nevertheless, the vast majority of cosmopolitan discourse and practice relies upon a core cosmopolitan ethic. Put simply, that cosmopolitan ethic requires us to “think and act with strong concern for all humanity” (Calhoun “Social Imaginary” 107); at its most robust, the ethic does not allow us to exclude any person from moral concern. It is fair to say that this obligation to extend one’s ethical commitments beyond national borders is characteristically cosmopolitan, even though we have also acknowledged that cosmopolitan thinkers can differ significantly about the form and substance of those same responsibilities.

In order to survey the critical terrain of cosmopolitanism, this chapter will take on a number of related tasks. First, we will explore the historical and theoretical complexity that has given rise to many varied cosmopolitan discourses. As we move through our discussion, we will visit those central notions that inform cosmopolitan discourse and practice more generally. Second, we will examine a number of prominent critiques of traditional cosmopolitanism: more specifically, its uncritical embrace of an abstract universalism, its collusion with Western and imperial projects, and its elitist pretensions. Finally, we will trace the promising emergence of ‘new cosmopolitanism’—

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23 I will discuss aesthetic or cultural cosmopolitanism—as well as its implications for pedagogical work—more specifically in Chapter Two.
critical cosmopolitanism, in particular—and explore the ways in which this contemporary iteration of cosmopolitan discourse “tries to break with the term’s history of privilege and recuperate it for novel critical uses” (Spyra 6). Because this project intends to rely on critical cosmopolitan categories, it will be important to define what it is most encouraging and progressive about the use of such a theoretical framework, especially for pedagogical ends.

Ultimately, it is my hope that this nuanced overview of cosmopolitanism will help us sort some preliminary thoughts on the usefulness of cosmopolitan ways of thinking for pedagogical work.

**Philosophical Antecedents: Diogenes, the Stoics, Kant**

The earliest stirrings of cosmopolitan sentiment are typically credited to Socrates, who reputedly declared that the “world was his country,” but the first articulation of a cosmopolitan worldview is usually attributed to Diogenes, the best-known Cynic philosopher of the fourth century B.C. Refusing identification with and allegiance to the polis, or local city state, Diogenes insisted that he was better understood as a *kosmopolite*, or “citizen of the world.” Because of the decision to repudiate bounded, or more local, forms of civic belonging, Diogenes was able to represent himself as a “[person] without anchorage” (Fine and Cohen 138). He believed that such rootlessness, such refusal of “anchorage,” would effectively insulate him from arbitrary or uncritical attachment to local habit and custom.

As such, it is right to see Diogenes as “a citizen of the world in the negative sense” (Hayden 13). Diogenes did not seek to advance a positive vision for human solidarity as much as he sought to distance himself from local attachments and norms. This distance, a willful detachment from one’s place of origin as well as the cultural expectations that extend from it, marks Diogenes as the first cosmopolitan to call into question the self-evident virtue of thick local solidarities.
As Martha Nussbaum would see it, Diogenes, bereft of the “comforts of patriotism and its easy sentiments,” comes to embody a heroic “loneliness” in his decision to play outsider to habitual structures of thought and practice (“Patriotism” 7). Crediting Diogenes as a “philosophical exile,” Nussbaum stresses that the earliest *kosmopolite* is an exemplary instance of the way in which “a stance of detachment from uncritical loyalty to one’s own ways promotes a kind of [moral] evaluation that is reason based” (“Cultivating” 58). As Nussbaum sees it, the full exercise of moral reason is made possible by a healthy and skeptical distance from one’s local group identities. However, other critics—like Patrick Hayden—see limited political usefulness for a Diogenic cosmopolitanism that wholly defines itself in opposition to these local identities, rather than one that drafts a more inclusive and robust set of cosmopolitan values.24 As we shall see later, this tension between the so-called ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ versions of cosmopolitanism—one detached and problematizing, the other generative and utopian—continues to shape philosophical and political debate on the rightful character of the cosmopolitan project.

During the course of the next four hundred years, the classical Stoics enlarged and elaborated the ethical demands of the *kosmopolite*. Insisting on a fundamental and shared human capacity for reason, the Stoics stressed that all persons were joined in a universal community that did not recognize civic or political distinctions. This community of persons—often defined as a *cosmopolis*—was described as an ideal alternative to the factional polis or state. Nonetheless, the Stoics were disinclined—or unequipped—to imagine a political or practical form for this cosmopolis. The universal community of humankind was, for the most part, an ethical conception that allowed the Stoics to simultaneously assert the inclusiveness of reason and the shared human subjection to natural law.

24 See, for example, *Cosmopolitan Global Politics*. 
Because all people possess the faculty of reason, the Stoics argued also that all people possess equivalent moral worth. This insistence that human beings, because of some shared capacity, are without moral rank or distinction is a clear and early formulation of universal humanism and, by extension, a prefiguring of later universalizing discourse in human rights. The Stoics, of course, had no legal or political mechanism for ensuring the moral equality of persons, but they did understand that an assertion of the essential unity of humankind would necessitate an enlarged understanding of one’s proper scope of allegiance. Particular and parochial identities, although meaningful in practical terms, did not often allow for an “allegiance to the worldwide community of human beings,” and many Stoics were determined to cultivate a moral sensibility that would “advance the idea of human solidarity across cultural divides” (Hansen).

In order better to illustrate this enlarged understanding of human solidarity, the Stoics chose to draft a model, or spatial representation, of it. The model invites us to imagine ourselves surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first circle encompasses the self, the next extends to one’s immediate family, the next enlarges to include one’s extended family, and then the circles incrementally add one’s neighbors, one’s local peers (or “city dwellers”), and one’s fellow citizens. The final circle, the circle that subtends all of the others, is the circle that encompasses humankind. Martha Nussbaum, elaborating the Stoic position, argues that we would do well to “draw the circles somehow toward the center,” or find ways to “make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern” (“Cultivating” 61).

25 More than any other critic, Martha Nussbaum has written extensively and favorably of this descriptive model, and, largely because of her publicity, it has become an unexpected flashpoint for much contemporary debate on cosmopolitanism.
The model of concentric circles allows for a progressive enlargement of allegiance, beginning with loyalties and affections that are most local and culminating in moral obligations of considerable complexity. The putative world citizen, the Stoics argue, would seek to extend her affinities to the distant other, and, in so doing, realize a higher ethical responsibility than one who chooses to care exclusively for those immediate to her. Critics of this model have taken issue with its developmental presumptions, arguing that “the static and unidirectional movement of affinity from inner concentric circle to outer [does not allow for] the spatial and temporal flexibility of multiple allegiances” (Mitchell and Parker 8). It is true that identities—whether familial, national, or cosmopolitan—are relatively fixed and discrete in the Stoic model, and, because of this, there arises the expectation that one’s identifications can and do move in a straightforward and sequential way, from the more immediate to the abstract. For postmodern critics like Mitchell and Parker, who insist on a more relational and flexible understanding of subjectivity, the spatial metaphor of the concentric circles, with its “sharp and continuous distinctions between national and global allegiances” (14), disallows identities and identifications to entangle with one another in decidedly non-linear or transient ways. We will later see how such an understanding of multiple and overlapping allegiances raises new questions about the presumed link between identity and location as well as the expectation that persons inevitably are scaled to see the global as a final and culminating sphere of concern.

26 Martha Nussbaum has previously commented on the lived difficulty of this: “What I’m wrestling with now is the problem of being a Stoic cosmopolitan with a non-Stoic set of attachments. The ideal of having equal concern for all humanity seems to me good and right. But the Stoic approach, which involves pruning away one’s attachment to the local, is too surgical. Marcus Aurelius writes about trying to overcome one’s feelings at the death of a child. It’s an effort to become invulnerable, and it doesn’t offer a sense of life that is rich enough to be worth living . . .” (McLemee qtd. in Gasper, 1235).

27 Mitchell and Parker argue that contemporary youth are more likely to endorse “transient and flexible understandings of scale and allegiance” as they increasingly claim global solidarities before or in conjunction with local allegiances (28).
The core moral sensibility of Stoic cosmopolitanism—the sense that persons are “free rational beings, equal in humanity, each to be treated as an end no matter where they dwell” (Nussbaum “Kant” 36)—was a significant influence on the work of Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth century philosopher credited with conceiving a political framework for the cosmopolitan project. Arguing that “the peoples of the earth have entered in varying degrees into a universal community,” Kant famously insisted that “a violation of laws in one part of the world is felt everywhere” (108).28 Because the “universal community” is disrupted by injustice and injury, Kant suggested the creation of a new cosmopolitan political order that would be able to secure a “perpetual peace” and the rights of universal hospitality for all persons. This cosmopolitan order, as Kant saw it, was best realized by a world federation of free states that would agree to constrain their sovereignty in order to honor “cosmopolitan right,” or law. Such cosmopolitan law would secure a minimum of universal rights for all persons and, in so doing, temper the absolutist state and its anarchic tendencies to aggress against its neighbors (Cheah 24).29

Foremost among these cosmopolitan laws was the aforementioned right of universal hospitality, or “the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory” (Kant 105). Sharing the Stoic belief that people “[communally] possess the earth’s surface,” Kant insisted that all persons had the right to movement and non-interference. The law of universal hospitality, although practically applicable to travel and migrancy, is more noteworthy here

28 This observation, of course, has become that much more famous because of its predictive power; modern human rights discourse has made a similar point about the worldwide and public reverberation of human rights abuses.

29 Kant, it must be remembered, wrote as a “pre-nationalist,” so his cosmopolitan thinking was not designed to counter nationalist sentiment or forms of belonging. Cheah reminds us of this, so that we might not assume that cosmopolitanism is always and necessarily motivated by a desire to transcend the nation-state as a model (22-23).
because of the ethical presumptions that underlie it. Kant was convinced that universal respect for human dignity, coupled with an acknowledgment that state boundaries and membership are arbitrary fictions, would require a cosmopolitan law able to challenge the exclusionary barriers of civic and cultural identity. In fact, the right of ‘universal hospitality’ was designed to denounce the very idea of the ‘stranger,’ the presumed non-personhood of the alien, who is morally—as much as physically—repudiated by state border control.

As mentioned, Kant is generally acknowledged as the first philosopher to sketch a political and legal framework for cosmopolitanism. Prior to Kant’s work in Perpetual Peace, most cosmopolitan thinkers had emphasized the ethical aspirations of cosmopolitanism, but had neglected to imagine a legal or political order that might conceivably concretize a universal ethic. Kant’s ‘cosmopolitan order’ successfully married the ethical demand and the political realization of it. Even so, it is interesting to note that the contemporary revival of cosmopolitanism in the humanities is largely due to a renewed—and selective—interest in the Kantian universal ethic rather than a more explicit political interest in cosmopolitan governance. Martha Nussbaum, for example, has insisted on the usefulness of Kant for moral cosmopolitanism, but she has hesitated to explore the implications of Kantian cosmopolitanism for political institution-building. On the other hand, the contemporary revival of cosmopolitanism in the social sciences has affirmed Kant’s outspoken commitment to cosmopolitan democratic principles, but there is less engagement with the philosophical complexities of ethical universalism. One thing, however, does remain true: in both the humanities and social sciences, scholars have agreed that “Kant’s cosmopolitan vision needs to be modified, radicalized,
and modernized” (Fine “Taking” 453)—in short, retrofitted— in order to accommodate twenty-first century political and cultural realities.  

The Cosmopolitan Revival

Between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, the rise of the nation-state and burgeoning nationalist sentiment all but guaranteed that there was “a single political identity available for people: [that of] national citizenship.” (Heater “Does” 184). Indeed, people were discouraged from imagining themselves attached to both local/national polities and the broader world community. The modern nation-state effectively colonized the discourse and aspirational reach of civic identity, and citizenship quickly became a matter of rightful national interest. Such an emphasis on territorially-based identities successfully buried cosmopolitan identifications, with the obvious exception of nineteenth and early twentieth century internationalist socialist and feminist movements which continued to organize around broader sites of world struggle.

Soon after the conclusion of the Cold War, however, a revival of cosmopolitanism began to take shape in both academic and activist communities.  If Amanda Anderson is right to say that “cosmopolitanism [has] repeatedly emerged at times when the world [has] seemed to expand in unassimilable ways” (272), then the late twentieth century reinvigoration of cosmopolitan thought appears to have been symptomatic—a clear signal that the political, economic, and cultural landscape had been fundamentally reordered and demanded new categories of understanding. Certainly,

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30 Not everyone is convinced that we must think cosmopolitanism through Kant. Ananta Giri laments that much of the contemporary revival of cosmopolitanism has “drawn [its] inspiration from [this] one trajectory of cosmopolitanism: from the Stoics to Kant” and has chosen not to “build upon different [non-Western] traditions of cosmopolitan thinking and experimentation.” (1278) We will discuss other cosmopolitan “trajectories” later in this chapter.

31 Scott Malcolmson identifies this revival as a primarily “left or liberal” enterprise often accompanied with “a desire to change the world, however modestly” (234).
cosmopolitanism is an ancient idea—and also an atavistic one. It is notable that a notion that asserts some very old ideas about moral and practical allegiance to the larger community of humankind reasserts itself in times of unheralded “expansion.”

There are many possible reasons why we continue to witness this “restoration of cosmopolitan thinking” (Heater “Does” 184). Some have suggested that cosmopolitanism is uniquely positioned to acknowledge and answer the deficits of a nation-state system that has been evacuated of sovereignty and influence. In such a context, new opportunities for alternative—most prominently, world—citizenship have emerged. Others have argued that cosmopolitanism explains an invigorated global public sphere and the rapid growth of global civil society (i.e. NGO’s, transnational citizen networks). Still others have explained that cosmopolitanism is an obvious and necessary philosophical corollary to the lived globality, or ‘cosmopolitanization,’ of people around the world. However it is understood, the ascendancy of cosmopolitan thinking and practice is a complex and multiply determined phenomenon, so it is important that we examine these reasons for a continued cosmopolitan resurgence in greater detail.

The Nation State, Instrumentalized

For many, the diminished effectiveness of the nation-state to “fulfill the basic aspirations . . . [and] promote the well-being of its territorial citizenship” (Falk “Emergent” 16) suggests that the nation-state, as a civic model, is exhausted. While it may not be accurate to say that the state lacks political credibility, it is important to recognize the way in which the contemporary nation-state is often “felt to be inadequate when it comes to dealing with global challenges” (Delanty “Cosmo” 49). Transnational market forces and unrestricted economic globalization have weakened the ability of the nation-state to “defend or promote citizen’s interests,” and the end effect is the increasingly common “disenfranchisement” of citizens (Heater “Does” 182). Citizens in democratic societies
often feel underequipped to influence national policy when that same policy is in conflict with the demands of the transnational market. And the global “democratic deficit” prohibits those same citizens from insisting on transparency or accountability from the transnational institutions (e.g. WTO, World Bank) or market forces that assign national priorities in the first place.

Even more, neo-liberal policy frameworks that “minimize social roles and subordinate the provision of public goods” are often seen as the appropriate response to a market that busily enlists the co-operation of the state in “enhancing the efficiency of capital.” (Falk “Emergent” 16) This co-optation of the civic role, Richard Falk tells us, leaves the contemporary nation-state “instrumentalized” and its citizenry without a reliable voice in collective decision-making. 32

So, despite the fact that national identity is still the “most prevalent single identity frame or reference point” for most people in the world (Gunesch 262), it can be argued that we now face a situation where that identity—based, as it is, on the presumption of national sovereignty and self-determination—is at odds with lived political reality. Many find this contradiction publicly and privately unsettling, and there are various responses to it.

Some, in the face of diminished national sovereignty, insist on a ‘neo-realist’ political solution: the state must entrench its interests, openly battle fellow nation-states for limited resources, and resist the temptation to collaborate with others under the guise of mutual benefit. Because the nation-state has been undermined by external forces it cannot contain or manage, the neo-realist urges distrust and suspicion of the other. Justifiable apprehension about unrestricted global

32 Falk, in a later response, will argue that the instrumentalized state is also a “neurotic state,” insofar as “globalizing pressures induce leaders and parties to embrace policies that contradict their defining ethical identity” (“Revisioning” 56). He, like other political cosmopolitans, calls for a commitment to the “humane state,” or a state that advocates for the necessary simultaneity of domestic and international democratization.
economic forces is simplified into a general suspicion of the global. For this reason, the neo-realist is typically an adamant anti-cosmopolitan.

On the other hand, cosmopolitans, who already “regret the privileging of national identities in political life” (Kymlicka 204), see the demythologizing of the nation as beneficial. They welcome the new and desirable subjectivities and forms of global belonging that result from the diminished centrality of the nation state. This is not to say that cosmopolitanism is supportive of market driven globalism and its predatory interest in a tractable nation-state. In fact, as we will see later, many ‘new cosmopolitanisms’ go to great lengths to distinguish the cosmopolitan project from the global capitalist one, and many are actively involved in joining the cosmopolitan cause to “more popular efforts . . . to establish a modicum of real [national] sovereignty” as a counter to market hegemony (Timothy Brennan 49). For this reason, it is more accurate to say that it is the loosening of “the national imaginary”—whether tied to rigid identity formation or identifications—that cosmopolitans find so promising.

Eager to find ways to re-enfranchise those citizens sidelined by ineffective national and local democracies, political cosmopolitans have called for more robust global governance capable of “extend[ing] democracy to the international level to make up for the perceived failings of the nation-state in the face of globalization.” (Hayden 33). To be sure, Kantian cosmopolitical values find expression in this larger impetus toward cosmopolitan democracy. Not to be confused with world federalism or statism, cosmopolitan democracy urges widespread citizen participation in transnational decision-making bodies and networks.³³ It also calls for a more dispersed and layered understanding

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³³ Calls to reform the General Assembly or create a companion Citizen’s Assembly in the United Nations are representative efforts to ensure more popular control of international organizations. The goal is to “enable the voice of individuals to be heard in global affairs, irrespective of their resonance at home.” (Archibugi “Cosmopolitical” 8)
of civic accountability, insisting that local and global communities collaborate in the protection of the public good. In short, cosmopolitan democracy has been working to recuperate the democratic principles that the nation-state has been encouraged—or compelled—to abandon.

The New Face of Citizenship

If “the nation is no longer the exclusive framework for social, cultural, and political identifications” (Molz 517), then one can infer that the discourse of national citizenship no longer monopolizes “the pathos of solidarity, commitment, and community” (Delanty “Self” 367). Indeed, citizenship in the early twenty-first century is increasingly uncoupled from nationhood, and it is this development, this delinking of nationality and civic identity, that opens room for cosmopolitan forms of belonging and allegiance to emerge.

Historically, cosmopolitanism has been identified with world citizenship as both a moral and political enterprise. And, as we have seen, the aspirational citizen of the world “has [long] been part of the utopian imaginary of the Western tradition” (Turner “Virtue” 48). However, until the post-Cold War era, modern citizenship discourse had been effectively colonized by the nation-state, and the traditional citizen had been understood to “have concrete rights against, and duties to, a specific sovereign state rather than voluntary and inexact duties to the rest of humanity.” (Linklater 23). Such an exclusively territorial and ‘bounded’ notion of citizenship has been responsible for the consolidation of national identities that are both inclusionary (based on shared entitlements and mutual obligations) and exclusionary (based on the refusal to extend those entitlements and obligations to those who live outside of territorial limits).

David Held is most significantly identified with this call for multiple citizenships, or sites of political responsibility.
For this reason, we would do well to understand citizenship as both a legal status conferred by a state and an identity formation that justifies special allegiance and loyalties to particular communities of persons. It is especially important not to underestimate the affective dimension of civic identity, for it is this emotional investment in the idea of citizenship that secures a felt sense of belonging (to a community, to a place) as well as larger forms of group solidarity. Citizenship “gives voice and structure to the yearning to be part of something larger than ourselves” (Kingwell qtd. in Carfagna 97), and, until recently, that “something larger” was likely to be conceived as a national polity.

There is no question that globalization is now challenging these traditional forms of national civic identity and attachment. Whether we praise its promotion of cultural hybridity or condemn its erasure of particularity, globalization is rewriting our relationship to civic belonging. Alternative models of citizenship—deterritorialized, flexible, layered—are emerging at the same time that exclusively national frameworks for civic participation and obligation are becoming less persuasive. Some of these alternative models are clearly responding to transnational flows and forms of mobility, or what some call the “new migration.”35 Certainly, the diasporic subject—the refugee, guest worker, or émigré who recognizes civic and cultural attachments to more than one nation—compels a new vocabulary for citizenship. So does Aihwa Ong’s ‘flexible citizen,’ an entrepreneurial migrant who is more committed to her work and career than to any particular national identity. Other models of global citizenship, however, are not tied to migrant experience (whether voluntaristic or coerced) but are imagined primarily as an antidote or a supplement to sluggish national models of citizenship.

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35 Susan Stanford Friedman argues that the ‘new migration’ is characterized by indistinct boundaries between “a homeland and a hostland” and “a blurring that supplants the older forms of linear migration with newer forms of sedimented and multiply communal identities.” (10)
These last models of global citizenship emphasize the ethical imperative to extend one’s civic duties and responsibilities beyond the bounds of one’s nation and generation.

Because we know that cosmopolitanism has sustained a long-term and robust commitment to world citizenship, it probably should not surprise us that it has found itself resurrected as a twenty-first century ethic and politics. Cosmopolitans maintain that world citizenship is, first and foremost, an ethical commitment that recognizes that one’s “primary allegiance [should be] to values, not states” (Falk “Emergent” 27). Put another way, the world citizen champions that “one’s loyalty [should be] to all that is human” (Heilman 194) rather than to the particularistic ties of national or cultural identity. Because of this, the question—“What would it mean to be loyal to the world?” (Posnock 805)—becomes a central and vexing one. Is it necessary to first feel “outrage at social injustice,” as Oxfam insists the putative world citizen must, or is it possible for fellow-feeling to inspire quieter forms of solidarity with the world’s people? Does loyalty demand more direct forms of action and involvement with political institutions or networks that give voice to global concerns? Or is it possible for one to focus one’s loyalties on particular issues or problems, whether local or transnational, that have global implications? Is loyalty to the world, in the end, loyalty to the global public good? How do we decide what might constitute the global public good, what might be deserving of our first loyalty, when that same good is in conflict with local or regional needs? Such questions proliferate when cosmopolitanism seeks to define the ideal form of loyalty, or allegiance, to human values.

Insisting that “one’s ethical obligations to the rest of the human race can [and often do] override one’s obligations to fellow citizens” (Linklater 26), we can say that the discourse of world citizenship is relatively convinced of one thing: human beings are responsible, even immediately answerable, to the needs of the global community. This cosmopolitan extension of rights and
obligations to human beings otherwise excluded from one’s immediate or local concern significantly challenges the presumed moral supremacy of the “bounded community.” It also, as we shall see in Chapter Five, foundationally troubles the self-other binary that authorizes persons to diminish responsibility to those who are defined as “strangers,” or distant others.

As I have mentioned, world citizenship must also be understood as a political or legal ideal. Some argue that a model of world citizenship is a cosmopolitan folly, unrealistically utopian and fundamentally fallacious. Critics like to point out that we do not have a world-federalist state to which we might make moral or political claims, we do not have global institutions that can secure compliance with cosmopolitan law, and we do not have formal mechanisms in place that would allow world citizens to participate in the collective decision-making central to the democratic process. In response, political cosmopolitans argue that “we ought to create global institutions through which global community [and] global concerns might be expressed” (Dower “Yes” 31). Such institution-building is certainly one way that global citizenship might be practically realized. But it is also important to value the very significant and diffuse participation of citizens in contemporary global civil society. Informal and vested in the work of global governance, popular global citizen action and transnational networks appear to flout the notion that “you have no responsibility for the world because there’s no world state to enforce that as a matter of obligation” (Waldron “Teaching” 40). In part because of this, Jeremy Waldron insists that it is better to frame global citizenship as “an idea regulating our actions” (“Teaching” 41) rather than as a formal expression of civic rights and obligations that finds an analogue in national models of citizenship.

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36 Governance, we are reminded, is different from government. It is a “mode of political rule in which power is exercised by multiple actors” (Delanty “Cosmo” 39) and “[t]he minimum framework of rules necessary to take global problem is guaranteed by diverse institutions” (qtd. in Davies et al. 72). Governance, by definition, is decentralized and reliant on informal networks of power.
If global citizenship is a regulatory idea, if we are asked to affirm an ethic in advance of its institutional realization, then cosmopolitanism is, at bottom, a project that promotes a visionary model of citizenship “rooted in the future, the not-yet.” (Falk “Emergent” 27) Global citizens act with an understanding that the cosmopolitan ideal is shaped and realized by ethical commitments to a preferred future, regardless of the structural antagonisms of the present.

Always Already Cosmopolitan

We already are and have always been cosmopolitan, though we may not have always known it.

Sheldon Pollack and Homi Bhabha
Cosmopolitanisms

At the same time that we are witnessing a reconfiguration of national identity and habits of citizenship, the lived reality of the twenty-first century individual is slowly opening up to what many call the “cosmopolitanization” of everyday life. Cosmopolitanization has been variously described as the way that “we experience ourselves integrated into global processes and phenomena” (Beck “Enemies” 28) or the “vernacular, everyday understanding of the globally interconnected nature of the world” (Mitchell and Parker 28). It is not to be mistaken for cosmopolitanism itself, for cosmopolitanization is a byproduct of everyday cultural practices that continually reveal the interpenetration of the local and the global. Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is a discourse and normative ideal that is commonly centered on the realization of global citizenship.

The cosmopolitanized individual is not an intentional cosmopolitan; she does not consciously construct a cosmopolitan identity or align herself with cosmopolitan moral or political commitments. Instead, she is cosmopolitanized, or made cosmopolitan, by her imbrication in global cultural interdependencies and commercial flows. Everyday practice naturalizes her as a part of the global. Consequently, the cosmopolitanized individual lives an unselfconscious relationship to
globality. She is not necessarily reflexive about the way in which her identity has been shaped by “global processes and phenomena,” and, for this reason, her cosmopolitanism is best described as latent.

Because globalization has effectively rewritten the way that we experience ourselves in relationship to both the local and the global, Ulrich Beck argues that cosmopolitanization must be seen as an “unintended side effect of globalization” (“Enemies” 25). For globalization is not only a large-scale social and economic phenomenon, it is also a catalyst for what Beck calls internalized globalization, or “globalization from within.” Beck sees this internalized globalization as a form of interpellation: “my life, my body, my individual existence become part of another world, foreign cultures, and global interdependencies without my realizing or wishing it.” (Vision 19) We can regard this process—whether it is conscious or unconscious—as cosmopolitanization by another name.

Cosmopolitanization arises in a variety of cultural and material contexts. An individual might be cosmopolitanized as a result of migrant experience, whether that experience was voluntaristic or coerced. An individual might also be cosmopolitanized by ordinary practices, habits of consumption, and social encounters that are transcultural—or, more colloquially, global—in character. Of course, these sources of cosmopolitanization are not mutually exclusive, and we wouldn’t want to draw a line too sharply between them. The migrant experience does not transcend the micro-practices of everyday life. Still, we do not want to erase all distinctions between a cosmopolitanized identity that develops in response to migration or exile and one that arises from

Vertovec, like Mitchell and Parker, argues that recent generations have an “inherent sense of globality” and, thus, a more thoroughly cosmopolitanized existence (4).
the consumption of goods and services from other parts of the world or immersion in transnational social networks.

A number of critics point out that cosmopolitanization has become increasingly characteristic of the world's transnational population, a growing group of persons who “develop identities based on movement and connection across space rather than intimate association with specific places” (Hiebert 211). Transnationals—whether they are refugees, migrants, diasporic peoples, émigrés, or ‘flexible citizens’—often do not identify with a single “national space” nor do they construct a civic identity that entirely squares with location. Some transnationals may be involuntarily “integrated into global processes and phenomena”—that is, made mobile and adaptable—in response to economic or political distress. Other transnationals, like the entrepreneurial ‘flexible citizen,’ are nomadic by professional choice. In either case, the migrant or transnational is made acutely aware of her complex entanglement in the circulations of global commerce, labor, and cultural forms, and, in this, they can be said to be cosmopolitanized.

As mentioned, cosmopolitanization can also be the end product of everyday cultural practices and social interactions that bring—or appear to bring—the global in closer contact with the local. Popular culture is especially adept at promoting this “vernacular understanding” of globality, and the resulting cosmopolitanization is sometimes named as a “banal” form of cosmopolitanism. Whether it is made manifest in the consumption of food, clothing, and popular cultural forms from other parts of the world, or whether it surfaces in the prominence of global social and professional networks and the proliferation of new world media in communication, such cosmopolitanization

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38 These subjects, ignored by traditional or elite versions of cosmopolitanism, are sometimes identified with “discrepant cosmopolitanism.” First coined by James Clifford, discrepant cosmopolitanism is a form of subaltern cosmopolitanism, best understood as a “more complex, humane understanding of hybrid realities” (365).
reveals that the “experiential space of the individual no longer coincides with national space” (Beck “Enemies” 29). I do not dispute the increasing prevalence of these banal forms of cosmopolitanism, but I want to be clear that I see such cosmopolitanization as a more likely outcome for the affluent, who have the resources to consume a wide variety of cultural goods, manage technologies, and travel for personal and professional gain. Beck, on the other hand, wants to insist that cosmopolitanization is the inevitable end of the insistent and irreversible advance of globalization, so, as he sees it, there is no experiential or material space that exists apart from it. Regardless of one’s class position or location, Beck contends that cosmopolitanization is the assured outcome.

For this reason, Beck declares confidently that “reality is becoming thoroughly cosmopolitan.” Addressing a highly educated and affluent readership, Kwame Anthony Appiah agrees and adds “that the odds are, culturally speaking, you already live a cosmopolitan life, enriched by literature, art, and film that comes from many places, and that contains influences from many more” (“Ethics” 113). But, whether we call the circumstantial effects ‘cosmopolitanization’ or ‘actually existing’ cosmopolitanism, it is important to avoid what Beck rightly names as the “cosmopolitan fallacy.” An experiential, or lived, relationship to globality must not be taken for a cosmopolitan consciousness. Cosmopolitanization doesn’t “necessarily stimulate a feeling of cosmopolitan responsibility” (Beck “Enemies” 29), and transnational practices do not guarantee

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39 Henry Jenkins believes that increased “transcultural flows of popular culture” have made all of us “pop cosmopolitan.” As Jenkins sees it, pop cosmopolitanism is an unreflective form of cosmopolitanism, so it bears a strong structural resemblance to Beck’s notion of cosmopolitanization. See his “Pop Cosmopolitanism: Managing Cultural Flows in an Era of Media Convergence.”
There is an important distinction between the ‘cosmopolitanized’ character of everyday life and the larger ethical commitment to cosmopolitan values, like the betterment of the global public good or the realization of transnational justice. Border crossers are not abstract universalists, and we would do well to question their conflation.

Nonetheless, some critics argue that ‘pop cosmopolitanism’ is a “first significant step toward global consciousness” (Jenkins 133), and Beck himself is optimistic that ‘cosmopolitanization’ can provoke a necessary dialectical encounter between cosmopolitanism and parochialism. The prevalence of cosmopolitanization—the fact that an increasing number of people experience themselves as seamlessly “integrated into global processes and phenomena”—challenges the presumption that parochialism is the framework that best or necessarily captures our self-identity. And cosmopolitanized experience complicates the notion that, once we are located and attached to a place, we are incapable of sustaining complex—and, at times, conflicted—identifications with other physical places and cultural contexts.

Regardless of the progressive potential of latent cosmopolitanism, one thing remains true: the revival of interest in cosmopolitan thought is, in part, due to the critical need to theorize this lived and ambivalent condition of globality.

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40 Cheah on the ‘already existing’ cosmopolitanism of the transnational migrant: “It hasn’t been ascertained whether the purported feeling of belonging to the world is analytically distinguishable from long-distance, absentee national feeling.” (37)
Recuperating Universalism?

The idea is to show a purposeful concern for all humanity without ignoring difference. [Cosmopolitanism] may amount to a highly provisional universalism.

Scott Malcolmson

The Varieties of Cosmopolitan Experience

Although many believe that contemporary cosmopolitanism offers a relevant and material response to shifting geopolitical realities, it continues to face significant philosophical challenges as it struggles to retain a universalistic core in a decidedly post-universalist critical world.

In traditional cosmopolitan thought, ethical universalism—“obliging us to respect others as matter of principle” (Beck “Unpacking” 22)—trumps any particularistic ethic that would require moral allegiance to kin and culture. As such, cosmopolitanism “deterritorializes respect” (Mitchell and Parker 65), and tends to distrust affiliations that interfere with the recognition of primary commitments to humankind. As we have already noted, national loyalties and attachments, encouraged by territorial notions of citizenship, come under particular suspicion and scrutiny because of this universalistic ethic; indeed, patriotic sentiment is often—and most famously—contrasted with cosmopolitan virtue.41

For many, it is axiomatic that human beings owe one another foundational forms of respect and concern because all persons share membership in a human community.42 Human rights

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41 See, for example, the collection For Love of Country? Ed. Martha Nussbaum. Boston: Beacon Press, 2002. Nussbaum’s widely reprinted essay, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” is followed by the commentary of fifteen respondents who, for the most part, take issue with Nussbaum’s demotion of national belonging and allegiance.

42 Many, of course, have been more specific about possible grounds for human commonality and concern. The Stoics and Kant may have highlighted our rational affinities, but others have argued for more embodied sources of shared experience. For example, it can be argued that all human beings inhabit bodies (Spyra), those
discourse, like that codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, often begins with the assumption that all persons, by virtue of their common humanity, are entitled to certain minimum rights and standards of living. Such thinking may rightly be called ‘universalist’ because it names and elevates the common needs of the members of the group, and such thinking may rightly be called ‘cosmopolitan’ because it recognizes a global sphere of responsibility and shared moral duty.

In just this way, cosmopolitanism and universalism imply one another. The notion of world citizenship has no purchase without prior agreement that the ‘world’ constitutes a viable community of members who have reason to identify with one another. Without this universalist premise, world citizenship as a moral or political enterprise is groundless, for the members of the global community must assume some minimally shared sense of identity and obligation in order to foster primary forms of civic belonging. This is not to say that human communities require identicality as a precondition for solidarity, but it is to say that group affiliation relies heavily on the perception of kinship and common purpose. Of course, such perceptions can be easily manipulated. And it would be wrong to ignore the many ways in which identity formation—whether individual or collective—relies on exclusionary thought and practice in order to lend the perception of inclusivity. But our earlier point remains no less true: cosmopolitan forms of allegiance and belonging tend to depend on a universalistic premise of some form, the “notion of common humanity that translates ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties towards others” (Lu 245).

bodies are vulnerable to suffering (Liu, Turner), or those bodies open us to or invite unwarranted violence (Scarry, Butler).

43 The UDHR goes on to suggest that all persons are endowed with “reason and conscience,” and it is this shared capacity for rational thought and moral judgment that grounds our community.

44 See especially Judith Butler’s work on this in “Universality in Culture.”
Even as we recognize that the core value of ethical universalism is a challenge to the ethical particularism of national or parochial sources of meaning (Lu 245), we must also acknowledge that it is a challenge to the contemporary cultural politics of identity and difference. For universalism, by definition, presupposes the value of commonality over and above the fact of specificity. Traditional cosmopolitanism, allegiant to the needs of the human community rather than solidarities of smaller scale, demands an ethical attention to the rights and obligations owed to all persons. This universalizing claim, this moral duty to esteem common humanity, overrides particular—and, for some, “too-protectionist” (Anderson 266)—forms of identity and attachment.

Whether post-structural, post-colonial, feminist, postmodern, or queer, a substantial number of critics have questioned the grounds for such a universalist ethics or politics. Many critics of the left, “attached to culture in an anti-universalistic sense,” have insisted on reading culture as difference, as necessarily and rightly particularistic in its attention to specific identities (Robbins “Feeling” 72).45

Post-colonial critics, keenly aware of the imperial pretensions that often are smuggled under the cover of a universalist project, have sought to expose universalism as a screen for the invested particularity of the Western political and economic subject. There is certainly reason to worry for the “thick Eurocentric bias” that often accompanies universalist discourse, as universalism has historically served the ends of liberal Enlightenment projects that conflate “universal man” with a more recognizably bourgeois and Western version of the same. (We shall see later that cosmopolitan

45 Though the “celebration of difference” (Posnock 804) has opened very real political space for the disenfranchised, it is has also discouraged critical conversation of the progressive possibilities of universalism (most notably, in the field of human rights). Bruce Robbins, in particular, has commented on the ways in which the left-progressive “romance with difference” has deterred the academic left from a more serious and sustained engagement with human rights discourse. See Feeling Global.
discourse that ignores its complicity with ahistorical and false universals will prove vulnerable to the same criticism.)

Feminist critics also have suggested that universalism, with its traditional “properties of mastery, distance from experience, indifference to specifics, and concern for absolutes in human life” (Pollock et al. 583), is implicitly masculine. Resistant to more embodied or situated forms of identity, liberal universalism has been accused of mistaking—and then promoting—a “generic and genderless” citizen as a normative one (Spyra 1). In this way, universalistic discourse obscures the ways in which the structural inequalities of power differently position the gendered subject. A ‘top-down’ universalism, eager to erase specificity, cannot account for the inherently variable subjectivities that arise in and from gender, racial, and cultural difference.46

In response to these objections to traditional universalism, cosmopolitanism has been challenged to imagine a different relationship to its own universalist legacy. In fact, Giri insists that a contemporary “rethinking of cosmopolitanism [necessarily] involves rethinking universality.” (1284) For this reason, a good deal of the most recent and complex critical work on cosmopolitanism is also entangled in the larger debate on universalism. Cosmopolitans have been forced to decide what role—if any—universalistic values might play in a preferred cosmopolitan future.

Scott Malcolmson has suggested that cosmopolitanism, like essentialism before it, might opt for a “strategic bargain” with universalism.47 Put another way, cosmopolitanism might do well to

46 Feminism, of course, has had to contend with its own universalist impulses. I want to argue that cosmopolitanism, like feminism, does well to recognize its own plurality and reject the ‘abstract, sovereign subject’ that reinforces much traditional universalistic thought.

47 Unlike essentialism, though, cosmopolitanism is focused on “the skills and practices that propel individuals and groups beyond the confines of restricted or circumscribed identities.” (Anderson 266) Anti-essentialist by definition, cosmopolitanism challenges the fixity of categorical thinking.
understand the political and practical necessity of engaging “highly provisional” understandings of universalism as a way of retaining a “purposeful concern for all humanity without ignoring difference.” (234) A “highly provisional” universalism would combat imperial and orientalist tendencies to overrun cultural specificity at the same time it underscores the broad political significance of universal claims. It might also offer a way for cosmopolitans to parse universalism in ways that feel self-reflexive and problematizing. Ideally, a “strategic bargain” with universalism would allow cosmopolitanism to “[argue] that universalism is necessary or practically desirable” at the same time it recognizes that “exclusion and violence will nonetheless attend any projection of unity and commonality” (Anderson 265).

In a similar vein, Bruce Robbins suggests that cosmopolitans should strive to avoid “disqualify[ing] universalism in the hopes of finding a ‘clean universalism’ independent of all partial powers and agents” (“Feeling” 75). Insisting that “all universalisms are dirty,” Robbins urges cosmopolitans to embrace an impure version of the universalistic ethic with the full understanding that it is, at its best, a “striving to transcend partiality that is itself partial.” (“Comparative” 259). As Robbins would see it, a “looser and more self-conscious” affiliation with universalism has the real potential to “shake it [free] . . . from the rationalist universality with which it has been entangled since Kant” (“Feeling” 63). And, universalism, we are reminded, needn’t be understood as a “Western invention or privilege” (“Comparative” 259). If it is convinced of its own purity and disinterestedness, it is because the West has deployed universalism for ethnocentric ends that first require such a self-conception.

Judith Butler also agrees that we need to resist acceding to “conventional formulations” of universalism, for universalism is far more “postulated and open-ended as an ideal” than traditional universalists would have us believe. Arguing for a more “expansive formulation of universality,”
Butler rescues the unrealized potential of the universal from those who would claim it for more exclusionary projects. The universal, she argues, is best “articulated through challenges to its existing formulation,” through challenges “from those who are not covered by it, who have no entitlement to occupy the place of the [universal subject], but who nevertheless demand that the universal as such ought to be inclusive of them.” (“Universality” 48) Such a “processual, open, and contingent understanding of the universal” (Mitchell and Parker 9) compels us to understand universality as a “horizon rather than a foundation” (Anderson 281). It also troubles an easy reduction of the universal to the absolute, which, for good historical reason, has been over-identified with a Western episteme.

Butler’s recuperation of the utopian potential of universality has important implications for the cosmopolitan project, for cosmopolitanism is equally committed to the unrealized and “not-yet” in political and psychic life. At the same time, if we acknowledge that universality and particularity “are always implicated in the other” (Harvey 559), we effectively complicate any notion of universalism that is intent on ignoring difference and specificity. Contrary to prevailing thought, universalism is itself both situated and partial. And, for this reason, we need to grant that there may be any number of “conflicting contextual universalisms” that might underline and animate the cosmopolitan project (Beck “Vision” 26).

**Critiques of Cosmopolitanism**

Cosmopolitanism isn’t hard work; repudiating it is.

Kwame Anthony Appiah

*Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*

As we have just seen, a number of critics have interrogated the universalistic underpinnings of a cosmopolitan project that “ignores difference in power and circumstance” (Hansen). In
response, cosmopolitan thinkers have re-theorized the shape of a universalistic ethic, and I’d argue that cosmopolitanism and universalism have been complicated productively by the effort to make both responsive to specificity.

Even so, there are other substantive critiques of cosmopolitanism—as both philosophy and practice—that deserve our critical attention. These critiques are important stumbling blocks for any cosmopolitan project, as they challenge the ideological investments of unself-reflexive cosmopolitan thought. So, because we are interested in the pedagogical implications of a cosmopolitan worldview, I would argue that it is important for us to consider the practical and moral limitations of particular cosmopolitan values.48

Perhaps the most enduring indictment of cosmopolitanism accuses it of a willful and dangerous detachment from the world of social belonging. When the cosmopolitan is described as a “de-situated subject [who] shoulders no ties, loyalties, or affiliations to any one community or nation” (Rosenfeld qtd. in Molz 519), she is frequently taken for a selfish individualist whose primary task is the avoidance of obligation to the “real world of blood and belonging.” (Lu 250) The underlying assumption is that it is untenable to “belong” to the human community as a whole, so the cosmopolitan is denounced for her quixotic allegiance to a colorless and insubstantial abstraction. Communitarians, who argue that “ethics are, should, and must be rooted in strong communities” (Gasper 1236), are particularly skeptical of the thin solidarities of the cosmopolitan, and most, like Benjamin Barber, are convinced that cosmopolitan values effectively “rob us of our concreteness and immediacy” (36). Cosmopolitan strivings, we’re told, distract us from the attachments that ought to

48 As we will soon see, many of these critiques are answered by the “new cosmopolitans,” a loosely affiliated group of cultural critics who complicate both the premises and ends of traditional cosmopolitan discourse.
command our priority, and, as the critics would have it, cosmopolitans seek a superficial allegiance to the world in order to avoid the complex duties of the immediate and local.

Interestingly, current objections to the public and private detachments of the cosmopolitan individual echo earlier critiques of the bourgeois cosmopolitan of the eighteenth century, a person “negatively identified with the privileged mobile elite” (Molz 519). The bourgeois cosmopolitan, typically understood as a man of the leisure class “in restless pursuit of experience, aesthetic sensations, and novelty” (Featherstone 1), emblematizes a particular type of cosmopolitanism, but, as often as not, it is this type that continues to prevail in the popular imagination. In fact, the stereotypical understanding of the cosmopolitan—cultivated, urbane, and culturally sophisticated—is very much inspired by this historically specific bourgeois figure. Then, as now, the worry is that this version of cosmopolitanism opts for aesthetic spectatorship rather than civic commitment, liberal self-invention rather than social responsibility, and touristic pleasure rather than a fuller engagement with cultural difference.

The presumably bourgeois appeal of cosmopolitanism continues to offend critics, who frequently denounce cosmopolitans as elitists with “the class consciousness of frequent travellers” (Calhoun 89). The ready assumption is that a cosmopolitan outlook is “another expression of privilege [that] speaks to a certain class of global elite” (Cornwell). This, it can be argued, is a fair assessment—even important class critique—of some versions of cultural or aesthetic cosmopolitanism, variants of cosmopolitanism that privilege cross-cultural encounters with difference. And there is no denying that consumption and travel, “the easy face of cosmopolitanism” (Calhoun 105), are made more accessible to the affluent class. But, as the new cosmopolitans will soon remind us, this does not imply that a cosmopolitan ethic or politics is inherently elitist. In fact, larger cosmopolitan claims about global responsibility and justice are more
obviously and fiercely egalitarian than elitist, so a good deal must depend on the motives and aims of a cosmopolitan practice.

Other critics have rightly condemned the selective appropriation of cosmopolitan ideas for neo-colonial and imperial projects. Because cosmopolitanism has historically and successfully served imperial ends,⁴⁹ there are worries about its easy applicability to contemporary ventures that seek to justify dominant world economic or political interests.⁵⁰ Indeed, Craig Calhoun observes that “the cosmopolitan ideals of a global civil society can sound uncomfortably like those of the civilizing mission behind colonialism” (92). When cosmopolitanism is tied unproblematically to metropolitan centers and the periphery is reduced to the “backwardly traditional” (107), cosmopolitan discourse recapitulates a thoroughly colonial logic. As such, cosmopolitan projects—even cosmopolitan projects that believe themselves to be decolonial in some way—can mask imperial and hegemonic objectives.

In a similar vein, critics have attacked contemporary cosmopolitanism for its unexamined affinities with market-driven globalism and neo-liberalism. Insisting that “the cosmopolitanism of democratic activists is not always clearly distinct from that of global corporate leaders” (Calhoun 89), a number of left-progressive critics have questioned the political usefulness of a project whose interests often dovetail with those of global capitalism. The most significant worry for many of these critics is the cosmopolitan distrust of nationalism; in fact, Bruce Robbins openly regrets that “when cosmopolitans at the core condemn nationalism at the periphery, they are acting in unreflective accord with the interests of world capitalism.” (“Feeling” 67) Because we have few supranational

⁴⁹ Antonio Gramsci, for one, insisted that the Roman Catholic Church was able to make good rhetorical use of cosmopolitanism for its medieval empire-building.

⁵⁰ For example, there are worries that self-described humanitarian interventions (e.g. in Kosovo) are less about cosmopolitan peacekeeping than the imposition of dominant world military and political authority.
institutions that can oversee and restrain global market forces, the nation-state may be needed to oppose the predations of global capital. Moreover, if cosmopolitanism cannot distinguish itself from—and, when necessary, contest—economic globalization, it is vulnerable to the charge that it is a hollow “political utopia” (Brennan 45), pretending to be an unalloyed good while in fact fostering market-driven globalism and inadvertently positioning itself as “global capitalism’s official line” (Robbins “Feeling” 154).

A final critique of cosmopolitanism accuses it of a mistaken idealism or utopian irrelevance. This criticism is most commonly levied by those who believe that global citizenship, whether understood as a moral or political ideal, is disconnected from the lived conditions of persons and states. Some on the political right argue that cosmopolitanism poses a danger to a more pragmatic and neo-realist conception of power, as cosmopolitan values effectively override much of what passes for national self-interest. On the other hand, there are those on the political left who argue that cosmopolitanism is still too wedded to its Enlightenment-era belief “in the inevitability of moral and intellectual progress guided by reason” (Lu 247). This faith in rational human perfectibility convinces some critics of the left that cosmopolitanism is naïve in its conception of the subject and mistaken in its idolatry of reason. Thus, in a rare critical convergence, one finds philosophers of both the political right and left who contend that cosmopolitanism is a misguided utopianism that obstructs clearer political thinking and action.
Cosmopolitanism Modified: Critical Cosmopolitanism

The point of a rooted, situated, national, vernacular, critical cosmopolitanism is to *bring cosmopolitanism down to earth*, to indicate that cosmopolitanism can deliver some of the goods ostensibly only provided by patriots, provincials, parochials, populists, tribalists, and above all nationalists.

David Hollinger

*Not Universalists, Not Pluralists: The New Cosmopolitans Find Their Way*

Within the last decade, a loosely affiliated group of cultural critics, the ‘new cosmopolitans,’ have sought to complicate traditional readings of the cosmopolitan project and, in the process, answer many of the usual charges levied against cosmopolitanism. These post-structural and post-colonial critics, rightly suspicious of what Timothy Brennan calls the “specious mastery of the whole,” have argued for a situated model of cosmopolitanism that refuses both the imperial sweep of universalism and reified attachments to the local or national. As I see it, this new “particularized and pluralized” cosmopolitanism bodes significantly well for cosmopolitan pedagogical work, in part because it challenges oversimplified understandings of what constitutes the global and in part because it acknowledges the complexity of our civic and cultural identifications and subject positions. For these reasons, I believe it is important to explore and evaluate the new cosmopolitan contribution to the larger conversation on globality.

Noticing the ambivalence of many new cosmopolitans to traditional cosmopolitan discourse, David Hollinger has remarked that:

> one of the most prominent features of [new cosmopolitanism] is the reticence of most of the discussants about the label cosmopolitanism. This reticence is displayed in the frequency and earnestness with which its apparent adherents modify the naming noun with one or more of remarkable string of adjectives: vernacular, rooted, critical, comparative, national, discrepant, situated, and actually existing.

(228)
The furious modifying of cosmopolitanism—what David Harvey calls the “hyphenating” of it—is the end effect of a larger effort to produce a working form of cosmopolitanism that is “local and conjectural rather than universal” (Robbins “Feeling” 7). Generally speaking, new cosmopolitans are invested in significantly rethinking Western and rationalist versions of universalism. This has engendered interest in defining a cosmopolitanism that enjoys a more productive and less vexed relationship with situatedness.

Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “rooted,” or partial, version of cosmopolitanism is probably the most widely-known formulation of this new cosmopolitan critical perspective. Rooted cosmopolitanism understands itself as situated in local identity and practice and, for this reason, Appiah argues that it is able to successfully reconcile an old “conflict between local partialities and universal morality” (“Ethics” xviii). Whereas a traditional cosmopolitan would argue for the importance of a “universal morality” that interrupts a person’s unexamined preference for kin and country, rooted cosmopolitanism insists on recapturing and reauthorizing one’s ethical obligations to the familiar. This does not mean that the needs of the local subordinate the global, as they might for a patriot or particularist. Instead, the rooted cosmopolitan reinvests the local with the same priority as the global. This extension of the traditional cosmopolitan sphere of concern invites the particular to claim a moral equivalence to the universal, and, for Appiah, such a reconfiguration ensures that the needs of the universal do not trump the needs of the local or the bounded. If traditional cosmopolitanism was the antidote to excessive parochialism, then rooted cosmopolitanism becomes the antidote to an excessive and sprawling universalism that refuses to account for particular loyalties or affections. Critics of Appiah acknowledge that his contextualized understanding of cosmopolitanism is admirable in its desire to mediate between the global and the local, but they also warn us that a rooted cosmopolitanism may err too far in its desire to protect the value of partiality.
And partiality is already an easy priority for most people, unlike universality, which requires a more active and challenging engagement with that which is distant and unfamiliar.\footnote{See Leib’s “Rooted Cosmopolitanism.” Leib argues that Appiah, in his eagerness to reclaim local obligation, creates a more “pallid” version of cosmopolitanism that shrinks from making more challenging moral demands of the individual and, in so doing, unwittingly accommodates familiar prejudices. Robert Fine expresses a similar and more general worry about some versions of new cosmopolitanism: “I criticize the new cosmopolitanism not for being cosmopolitan but for not being cosmopolitan enough. . . [New cosmopolitanism] leaves intact a conventional notion of belonging, in which individuals know intimately the contours of their world, and it only supplements this sense of belonging with a universal element.” (Cosmopolitanism x-xi)}

Similarly vested in new cosmopolitan challenges to a false and ahistorical universalism, Homi Bhabha advances the notion of a “vernacular” cosmopolitanism, “where locality insists on its own terms, while entering into larger national and societal conversations” (139). Bhaba’s vernacular cosmopolitan lives in “the in-between,” an interstitial and culturally hybrid space that challenges the one-size-fits-all cosmopolitanism championed by the metropolitan core. And, in this liminal space, the vernacular cosmopolitan engages a kind of outlaw cosmopolitanism, testifying to both the reality of “hybrid conditions of inter-cultural exchange” (139) and the falsity of the sovereign state and self. Unlike Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism, Bhaba’s vernacular cosmopolitanism allies itself more explicitly with the subaltern, or those persons occupying a marginalized position vis-à-vis dominant and hegemonic power structures. Nevertheless, it is true that both the rooted and vernacular understandings of cosmopolitanism challenge prevailing universalistic—and, to a large extent, Western—notions about the ideality of detachment and transcendence of the local.

Although rooted and vernacular cosmopolitanism opens new conceptual space for cosmopolitan projects generally, my project is especially invested in the possibilities of yet another iteration of new cosmopolitan discourse: critical cosmopolitanism. A small but growing number of thinkers—among them, Paul Rabinow, Gerard Delanty, Walter Mignolo, and Michael Berube—have
identified critical cosmopolitanism as the most promising modification of cosmopolitanism, as it sustains the ethical charge of the cosmopolitan project without erasing particularity, difference, and local forms of collective attachment. In the next chapter, I will explain why I want to recommend a critical cosmopolitan framework for global learning and pedagogical work, but, before I do this, it is important to define critical cosmopolitanism.

As I see it, the cultural anthropologist Paul Rabinow provides us with one of the most generative—and provocative—readings of the critical cosmopolitan project. Although Rabinow has not written extensively about critical cosmopolitanism, he did attempt to broadly outline its central concerns and priorities in his seminal essay, “Representations are Social Facts: Modernity and Postmodernity in Anthropology.” In that essay, Rabinow argues the merits of a specific iteration of cosmopolitan discourse—what he calls critical cosmopolitanism—and hails the critical cosmopolitan intellectual as a figure who is uniquely equipped to interpret the complex realities of this cultural moment.

Rabinow opens with the assertion that critical cosmopolitanism is committed to ethicality as a “guiding value.” Unlike other versions of cosmopolitanism that assign a higher priority to diverse cultural experience or an enhanced “understanding” of the other, Rabinow insists that critical cosmopolitanism is marked by a pronounced ethical orientation, or intense investment in ethical inquiry and action. Now, we also know that a more traditional and universalistic cosmopolitanism also sees itself as ethically committed, so it is important for us to be more specific about the ethical charge of critical cosmopolitanism.

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52 This essay, it should be noted, is not centered on critical cosmopolitan questions. For the most part, “Representations are Social Facts” is preoccupied with the discourses and practices of modern representation. Rabinow’s theorizing of critical cosmopolitanism arrives late in the essay and it totals three paragraphs; nonetheless, I believe that Rabinow’s sketch is highly suggestive.
Rabinow argues that the critical cosmopolitan is powerfully opposed to what he calls “inflexible moralisms,” or moralisms that conceal imperial and absolutist tendencies. This, in itself, may not be a remarkable opposition—even imperialism and absolutism do not, as a rule, promote themselves as imperial and absolutist—but Rabinow is staking this ground for two reasons. First, he wants to establish critical cosmopolitanism as an oppositional discourse. Critical cosmopolitanism refuses to collude with political or moral orthodoxies, and it calls into question the naturalized assumptions that underlie many popular ethical claims, especially those claims that help “sovereign powers” manufacture compliance. Second, Rabinow wants critical cosmopolitanism to challenge traditional cosmopolitan investments in the inviolability of “universal truths.” Because traditional cosmopolitanism often relies on an uncomplex and unexamined universalistic premise, it can flatten ethical complexity in favor of a more pure—and “inflexible”—moral imperative. Rabinow asks us to be “suspicious” of this moralism, for it—like classical universalism—refuses to contend with particularity and heterogeneity.53

Critical cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is mindful of the need for ethical inquiry and action in an increasingly interdependent and unequal world, but it is not wedded to an absolute understanding of moral verity. The critical cosmopolitan foregrounds her ethical investments in a transformative political project—a project that proposes an “alternative to territorial politics and consciousness” (Turner “Virtue” 46)—but the critical cosmopolitan does not ground her ethical obligations in an abstract and falsely universalizing conception of “common humanity.” Instead, she

53 Rabinow’s critical cosmopolitan figure is a deeply “suspicious” one: she is, at various times, “suspicious” of sovereign powers, universal truths, overly relativized preciousness, local authenticity, moralisms high and low, and imperial tendencies in herself and others (258). Rabinow’s “hermeneutics of suspicion” contrasts with what many believe to be the fundamental “cosmopolitan mood of optimism” (Anderson 269). It should be noted that Rabinow’s suspiciousness is not driven by paranoia about the enlargement of one’s moral horizons (as is the case for many anti-cosmopolitans), but rather by his discomfort with uncontested power and its ability to manipulate the moral ground.
recognizes the need for what Bruce Robbins calls an “ethics of the everyday,” a more situated ethical framework that acknowledges an important and productive tension between the universal and the particular, the distant and the familiar, and the spatial economies of the global and the local. Rather than set an inclusive universal morality against an exclusive particular one, a critical cosmopolitan ethic opts to sustain a tension between the two, and, in so doing, makes it impossible to idealize either.

Continuing to resist the oversimplification of binary thinking, Rabinow goes on to argue that critical cosmopolitanism is “highly attentive to (and respectful of) difference, but is also wary of the tendency to essentialize difference” (258). Unlike more traditional forms of cosmopolitanism, critical cosmopolitan discourse takes seriously the material and psychic implications of difference, but, rather than anchor difference in an identity politic, the critical cosmopolitan wants to think difference non-hierarchically. In other words, the critical cosmopolitan resists the temptation to fetishize difference, just as it rejects the deployment of difference as a means for sorting the world into hard binary oppositions. Attention to difference—or particularity—need not inspire dualistic thinking. It also need not preclude a consideration of the ways in which particularity is crossed—and, a greater or lesser degree, shaped—by its complex encounter with others.

For this reason, Rabinow aptly defines critical cosmopolitanism as an “ethos of macro-interdependencies, with an acute consciousness (often forced upon people) of the inescapabilities and particularities of places, characters, historical trajectories, and fates” (258). Again, this is an ethos that sustains an important tension between that which is “macro-interdependent” (and, therefore, shaped by larger global forces) and that which is historically and contextually specific. Unlike traditional cosmopolitanism, which tends to reinforce the formative hand of “macro-interdependencies,” critical cosmopolitanism emphasizes the dynamic and fluid relationship between
macro-interdependencies and the “particularities” of social location, the local realities and histories that often complicate the hegemony of the global.

Extending Rabinow’s thinking, I want to define critical cosmopolitanism as a discourse that: resists abstract universal truths about human or global community; thinks the local and the global relationally; insists on a strong and broad ethical concern for the other that does not disregard difference; complicates and decolonizes ways of thinking about social identity and power; and challenges the uncritical commodification of cultural difference. Let’s think more specifically about these defining characteristics.

Gerard Delanty has called critical cosmopolitanism “post-universalistic,” but I believe that it is more productive to understand it as a discourse that is suspicious of extravagant claims about the abstract universal (Turner 46). The notion of a “post-universalistic” cosmopolitanism implies that cosmopolitan discourse can speak from a space that has fully transcended the universal. In this way, post-universalism, like post-feminism or any other “post-,” wants to promise a radical break with its philosophical parent. The “post” in post-universalism insists that we can think more complexly about the relationship of the universal and the particular only if we think from a place entirely exterior to the universal.

I would argue that such a post-universalistic conception of cosmopolitanism disregards the way in which the universal and the particular are always and necessarily imbricated in one another. The universal and the particular are mutually informing. They exist in a dialogic—not dualistic—relation. Thus, a post-universalistic cosmopolitanism reinforces the terms of a binary opposition that has been effectively challenged by a more nuanced critical cosmopolitanism. A post-universalistic cosmopolitanism also implies that we can organize strong and broad ethical concern for the other without engaging or entangling with the universalistic, but this seems to me conceptually confused.
For whenever we trouble and enlarge the boundaries of moral concern, we are trafficking in some way with a universalizing discourse. That is not the same thing as saying that we are compelled to speak in abstract and unexamined ways about universalism; as we have noted, there is room for universalism to define itself in ways that are “highly provisional,” “loose and self-conscious,” or “postulated and open-ended.”

It is my contention that critical cosmopolitanism maintains a conditional and guarded relationship to universalism. Unlike traditional forms of cosmopolitanism that are grounded in classical and Enlightenment traditions, critical cosmopolitanism resists the impulse to totalize and arrogate universal values for highly particular ends. In this respect, critical cosmopolitanism is self-critical and problematizing in its relationship to universal truths. This, again, is not to say that critical cosmopolitanism refuses any affiliation with universalism, for it acknowledges that not all universalisms are absolute. And parochialisms, Catherine Lu reminds us, are just as susceptible to absolutism and imperial ambition. The cultural enclave, the religious or ethnic group, the nation itself: all are capable of the drive to totalize. Critical cosmopolitanism is resistant to absolutism in whatever form it takes.

Because cosmopolitanism opens conceptual and practical space for global solidarities, there is a common and mistaken assumption that cosmopolitanism is—or must be—adversarial to local identities and identifications. Deferring to the logic of exclusive opposition, the global and the local

54 See Scott Malcolmson’s “The Varieties of Cosmopolitan Experience,” Bruce Robbins’s Feeling Global: Internationalism in Distress, and Judith Butler’s “Universality in Culture.”

55 Especially when they “espouse the inherent superiority of a certain racial or national group,” Lu argues. See “The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism” (253).
often are polarized and pitted against one another,\textsuperscript{36} and traditional cosmopolitanism has then felt obligated to insist on the domination of the global. Rather than honor a more inclusive opposition of global and local, a “this-as-well-as-that principle” (Beck “Enemies” 19), traditional cosmopolitanism often finds itself hampered by a dualistic logic that denies the value of particularity, embodiment, and locality.

Critical cosmopolitanism, however, invites an existing tension between the global and local to become productive and dialogic. Insisting on a dynamic and dialectical relationship between global and local attachments, critical cosmopolitanism argues that a more ambitious cosmopolitan practice “[arises] out the encounter of the global with the local and the national” (Delanty “Citizenship” 47-48). Rather than assume the subordination of the local to the global, critical cosmopolitans look to “capture cosmopolitanism for the local [and] localize its universal reach” (Mazlish 103).

What does it mean to “localize” or “particularize” the cosmopolitan project? Among other things, it means that cosmopolitanism must “pay attention to the social contexts in which people are moved by commitments to each other” (Calhoun 92). Rather than decry or diminish the significance of local allegiances, critical cosmopolitanism considers the ways in which those attachments complexly situate a person and shape her commitments to the larger world. This is not to say that critical cosmopolitans argue for a kinder and gentler parochialism. Instead, critical cosmopolitans recognize that local identities inform and are informed by global or transnational identifications, so “[the pull] of particularist obligations against the pull of cosmopolitan obligations is subject to

\textsuperscript{36} Of course, Ulrich Beck argues that methodological nationalism has a particular investment in the opposition of the global and the local. Refusing any dialectical interplay between the nation and the world, methodological nationalism is free to insist on the purity and inviolability of national categories of understanding. See “Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies.”
constant negotiation and contestation‖ (Dower “Trio” 163). Because the one implies the other, the local and the global necessarily exist in a dialogic relationship, and it is an emphasis on this interrelation that marks critical cosmopolitan approaches to civic allegiance and action. 57

Despite this desire to open a “new dialectic of local and global questions” (Beck “Vision” 14), there is no denying the practical difficulty of unsettling binary logic. Although we might live in what Paul Rabinow calls the space of the “in-between,” a space suspended between the global and local, it is also true that “we seem to have trouble with the balancing act, preferring to reify local identities or construct universal ones” (258). Rabinow rightly recognizes that the liminality of the “in-between” can be as unsettling for the traditional cosmopolitan as the parochialist, for we are ill-equipped to interpret the lived and often contradictory conditions of globality. Indeed, the lived “tension between the claims of the tribe and claims of the human” (Hollinger 233) makes it all too easy to mistake the two for mutually exclusive and competitive attachments. Whether we call our options tribal and human, or local and global, the terms seem to beg a choice between one and the other. The “both-and” does not seem a possibility.

Critical cosmopolitans clearly understand the ways in which this binary thinking, this standing opposition between “the tribe and the human,” disallows traditional cosmopolitanism from acknowledging that identities and identifications are always multiple and layered. In fact, people routinely “straddle the global and local spheres in terms of personal identity” (Gunesch 256), and “a density of overlapping allegiances” to communities both global and local is an increasingly common experience of civic belonging. Indeed, “there are many key identifications around which a person

57 The dialogic relation between global and local can be opposed to the monologic imagination, best represented by the “national perspective . . . which excludes the otherness of the other.” (Beck “Enemies” 18)

This point will be taken up again and at length in Chapter Five.
might at one time or another politically mobilize” (Vertovec 12), so a more nuanced cosmopolitanism avoids proferring the false choice of either a national or a cosmopolitan consciousness. Rather than dichotomize local and global identifications, critical cosmopolitanism allows for multiple affiliations and fluid social identities that cross local, national, and global spaces.

At this point, we ought to take note of the critical cosmopolitan skepticism of ‘impartialist’ morality, or the fictive notion that “the standpoint of the moral agent is independent of all social particularity” (Erskine 474). Toni Erskine offers a foil to this impartialist morality. She calls for an “embedded cosmopolitanism” that acknowledges that “the standpoint of the moral agent is located in the multifarious communities to which she belongs” (474). An embedded cosmopolitanism challenges the traditional and unproblematic assumption that we cannot care for the whole if we are at all identified with the particulars of our own situation. For Erskine argues that we are always “embedded” in context, we always exist in situation, and our moral standpoint is always stationed—-even if it is not itself stationary. Erskine also reminds us that “bounded communities, including states, [do not] have an exclusive capacity to define the moral agent” (475). We are, in fact, “embedded” in multiple communities, with “intersecting and overlapping morally relevant ties.”58 The complexity of such identities and identifications suggests that a traditional cosmopolitanism that too neatly partitions the local and the global, that ignores the ways in which we experience plural loyalties and spheres of moral concern, is a reductive and misleading account of lived experience. Because critical cosmopolitanism does acknowledge our practical and moral embeddedness, it is better positioned to help us understand the ways in which our standpoint shapes our commitments to a myriad of communities. Absent this supple reading of the relationship between situatedness and

58 Because we share overlapping membership in many “morally constitutive” communities, Erskine argues that a web is a more apt metaphor for our layered civic and personal identity than that of concentric circles (as first argued by the Stoics and amplified by Martha Nussbaum).
moral agency, traditional cosmopolitanism is beholden to defend transcendent moralities, or moralities of imagined detachment, against excessively partial attachments and loyalties.

Because cosmopolitanism, like identity, is best understood as plural, critical cosmopolitans have also stressed the need to “expand cosmopolitanism beyond its usual association with the West, metropolis, and the intellectual” (Anderson 273). Unlike traditional cosmopolitanism, which has stressed its Western intellectual heritage, critical cosmopolitanism has sought out alternative histories of cosmopolitan thought and practice.59 This has allowed “non-European, nonelitist, and ineligible versions” (Robbins “Feeling” 156) of cosmopolitanism to circulate more widely and “see from the peripheries of global centers of power and wealth” rather than the metropolitan core (Cornwell).

Even more ambitiously, new cosmopolitan critics like James Clifford and Homi Bhabha have insisted on “leaving open the question of the center and periphery in intellectual debates” about cosmopolitanism (Pollock et al. 584). As a result, “discrepant” or “vernacular” voices that are otherwise relegated to the margins have a hand in shaping and steering cosmopolitan priorities as a whole. Better representing the lived experiences of diverse peoples, this “plurality of situated cosmopolitanisms” has successfully complicated the cosmopolitan imaginary defined by Western philosophical and political values.

Perhaps more consistently than any other critic, Walter Mignolo has urged critical cosmopolitanism to “reconceive cosmopolitanism from the perspective of coloniality” ("Many

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59 Sheldon Pollack, for example, contrasts Roman and Sanskrit cosmopolitanism in “The Cosmopolitan and the Vernacular in History.” Roman cosmopolitanism, he argues, was advanced by coercion and conquest, while Sanskrit cosmopolitanism was voluntaristic and “never attempted to transform the world into a metropolitan center.” The “modalities” of these worldly practices were quite different, although both “stimulated the feelings of living in a large world.” In “Cosmopolitanism and Beyond,” Ananta Giri similarly stresses the ways in which Indian cosmopolitan “yearnings” consistently have recast a relationship to both rationality and universalism.
Faces” 723). Rather than accede to a cosmopolitan project that is driven by global design, or the “will to control and homogenize,” Mignolo promotes a critical cosmopolitan project that emanates from coloniality, or the exterior of modernity. Identified with “border thinking” and “border epistemologies,” such a critical cosmopolitan project decolonizes the imperial idea of humanity that the West has offered as a basis for universality. It also uncouples itself effectively from transcendent global designs—what others might call “cosmopolitanism-from-above”—and insists instead on a critical and dialogic encounter with those who have been othered by the discourses of modernity. For this reason, critical cosmopolitanism is an important antidote to traditional cosmopolitan projects that reify the global or universal as the experience of the paradigmatic Western subject.

Just as critical cosmopolitanism is wary of an unexamined investment in abstract universal or imperial design, it is also wary of popular tendencies to frame cosmopolitanism as a lifestyle option. We have already acknowledged that there are versions of cultural cosmopolitanism that have been appropriated for more bourgeois ends, whether of a transnational capitalist class seeking economic and personal mobility or of a frequent traveler seeking stimulation and novelty in touristic adventure. When it advertises its interest in the stylistic trappings of “worldliness,” cultural cosmopolitanism bears a striking resemblance to more colloquial understandings of cosmopolitanism that identify it with the metropolitan tastes and unrestricted mobility of the elite. Critical cosmopolitanism is fundamentally opposed to such a reductive and bourgeois version of cosmopolitan practice, as it is deeply skeptical of the many ways in which cosmopolitan subjectivity can—and often is—repurposed as “the next significant new brand” (Binnie 129). We might call this commercial

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60 Mignolo believes that traditional cosmopolitanism—as well as the popular project of global citizenship—are allied unproblematically with the “rhetoric of modernity.” Casting itself as a model of salvation and development, modernity represses that which is believed to be external to itself (racism, oppression, difference more generally). Traditional cosmopolitanism follows suit when it insists on the value of a universal vision for those it excludes from meaningful participation in the creation of that vision.
appropriation of cosmopolitanism a form of ‘cosmopolitanism for hire.’ For, when it is packaged and promoted as a bourgeois consumer identity, cosmopolitanism becomes both commodified and stylized. It also merely exoticizes—rather than explores and honors—cultural difference.

Popular cosmopolitanism may be especially liable to “decontextualize the consumption of cultural goods” when it encourages the facile appropriation of cultural products and practice—food, music, clothing, design—from around the world. The conspicuous consumption of such cultural goods is often believed to enhance cosmopolitan capital, as those goods testify to one’s easy familiarity with that which is exotic or strange. Unsurprisingly then, popular cosmopolitanism can have difficulty distinguishing “between orientalist fantasies and a desire to honestly connect and understand an alien culture” (Jenkins 127). If we grant that “orientalist fantasy” is driven by the desire to incorporate and, consequently, manage the other, we might ask if it is possible to cleanly separate this fantasy from most commercial encounters with cultural difference. Indeed, Mark Cheetham reminds us that when “otherness is readily made into an item for sale,” it is “largely neutralized” (“Alienated Cosmopolitans,” par. 4). And, because neutralization works to effectively contain the strange or different, it promises the consumption of the cultural other without complication or engagement.

For this reason, Jonathan Ong suggests that we would do well to understand a popular lifestyle cosmopolitanism as “instrumental,” for it “makes use of one’s knowledge of the world to promote oneself . . . [and] uses otherness for the sake of the self and to further delineate self from other” (456). Such an instrumental use of cosmopolitanism evacuates it of political and ethical urgency, as cosmopolitan knowledge is chiefly enlisted in the service of self-promotion and self-

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61 Here, Henry Jenkins pointedly asks: “Does the ability to dance to the Other's music lead to any real appreciation of their social condition or political perspective?” (127)
advancement. Indeed, the lifestyle cosmopolitan enjoys a social identity that is predicated on the overt display of cosmopolitan capital and its latent class aspirations.

Because critical cosmopolitanism underlines the value of public engagement and transformative action, it is entirely at odds with a lifestyle cosmopolitanism that understands cosmopolitan subjectivity as a social performance. Of course, traditional forms of cosmopolitanism would have similar objections to this bastardized version of cultural cosmopolitanism, but I argue that critical cosmopolitanism is especially antagonistic because of its disinclination to affiliate with projects that celebrate the dominant values of the marketplace and the goal of status improvement. Again, the ethical commitments of critical cosmopolitanism—marked, among other things, by the desire for more just local and global communities—make plain that it is incommensurate with a popular cosmopolitanism, which is characterized primarily by its stylized and consumerist relationship to cultural otherness.

In closing, I want to reiterate my belief that critical cosmopolitanism offers a revitalized and rich language for the cosmopolitan project. I believe that it best contends with critically complex questions about the entanglement of identity, location, and allegiance. It also is a vocabulary that enormously enriches the ethical and political reach of cosmopolitan pedagogical work, and, for these reasons, it will serve as an important conceptual framework for the exploration and elucidation of cosmopolitan education to follow.
Chapter Two
Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogy: A Sketch

The central question for cosmopolitan education is not one of the creation of world community or government, but: What does it mean to be a human being in the world we inhabit? And how should human beings respond to this kind of world?

David Hansen
The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Education as a Response to a Changing World

In the Introduction, it was first argued that cosmopolitan education—that is, global education dedicated to the ethical and political ends of global citizenship—is a preferable model for global learning because cosmopolitan questions foreground a commitment to global public goods as well as the ethical ends of transnational justice. However, it is cosmopolitan pedagogy, or teaching that is informed and animated by cosmopolitan values, that must conceive and realize the larger ambitions of cosmopolitan education. It is also cosmopolitan pedagogy that must anticipate and contend with practical forms of resistance to cosmopolitan subjectivity as well as enlarged notions of cosmopolitan responsibility or care. For these reasons, it is important now to turn our attention to the exploration of a cosmopolitan pedagogical practice that is capable of articulating new and ethically challenging questions about one’s identity and location in the world. How might we best define this cosmopolitan pedagogy? How might our newly complicated understanding of critical cosmopolitanism—as both a philosophy and practice—help inform the pedagogical goals of cosmopolitan education? And how might we begin to name the key paradigms and sensibilities of a cosmopolitan pedagogy that openly affiliates with these critical cosmopolitan values?

Let us begin by reiterating the reason that this project self-identifies as cosmopolitan rather than global in its pedagogical ambitions. While it is true that global education is committed to a
broad interdisciplinary knowledge about the world, it is not compelled to foreground the ethical
dimension of its work or link it to the larger responsibilities of citizenship. Indeed, we’ve already
noted that global learning can serve many different curricular and pedagogical ends—and those ends
can be detached from or indifferent to the complex ethical demands that underlie critical citizenship
practice. The rejection of an ethical or civic emphasis may be explicit: as, for example, when a
“globalized” curriculum or course advertises itself solely as a vehicle for enhanced professional
advantages and social advancement. A university initiative, curriculum, or course might also choose
to identify with the larger project of internationalization as a way of avoiding any expectation that it
intends to centrally vest in the ethical and engaged ends of global learning. When the rhetoric
consistently is centered on the “internationalized” goals of the learning experience, curricular and
pedagogical efforts tend to downplay the role of critical citizenship practice and overemphasize
cross-cultural forms of inquiry.

So what are we to make of the fact that a number of prominent colleges and universities—including The Ohio State University—are relying on the rhetoric of internationalization to describe
and organize their efforts to globalize the curriculum? When colleges and universities represent their
global commitments in terms that privilege cross-cultural inquiry and enhanced opportunities for
international travel, it suggests that cosmopolitan priorities are not shaping curricular or pedagogical
design. When global teaching and learning in higher education is shaped by an internationalist
framework that defines the “global” in ways that minimize—and, often, exclude—the thought,
practice, and values of cosmopolitanism, such a vision is rejecting a correlation between global
learning, the extension and deepening of ethical commitments, and the priority of critical citizenship
practice. Whatever the curricular and pedagogical benefits of the internationalist framework for
global learning, I believe that those benefits are compromised when an institution abandons the vital
task of preparing students for new forms of subjectivity, belonging, and responsibility in ethico-political contexts. And my concern is that an internationalist emphasis encourages curricular design and pedagogies that define global learning in ways that deradicalize it and its potential to inspire social change and action.

Object Lesson: The Ohio State University’s Strategic Internationalization Plan

A recent institutional initiative at The Ohio State University illustrates this popular move to define global learning—and the commitments that attend to it—as internationalist, and, in so doing, diminish the possibility that cosmopolitan values might shape and animate education. I want to think about what Ohio State forfeits when it aligns itself with a mission and rhetoric that embraces a “minimalist” interpretation of global learning that refuses to directly concern itself with social justice or critical citizenship practice.

As I mentioned in the Introduction, Ohio State recently charged a President’s and Provost’s Council on Strategic Internationalization with the larger task of enhancing the institution’s “international stature.” Such a goal is often a multi-faceted one, as “international stature” can be measured by indicators as various as an enhanced international physical presence (i.e. strategic “gateway” sites in foreign countries), the increase of international faculty and students, and the creation of university-wide interdisciplinary research programs that focus on major international issues. The first “specific goal” of the university’s internationalization effort, however, was centered on “increasing the international experience” for all students. This is not unusual.

Internationalization efforts rarely ignore the curricular and co-curricular student experience and, in

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62 Convened in 2008, the Council appears to be comprised of upper-level administrators: Deans and Associate Deans of selected Colleges, and Vice and Associate Vice Provosts. It reports directly to the President and Provost of the University.
most cases, institutions will want to lead with change efforts that make global commitments readily apparent to undergraduates (and, when applicable, graduate and professional students).

The report opens with the recommendation that Ohio State strive to build meaningful “international experiences” for all of its students. We are told that students will realize these “international experiences” in two ways: one, they will have a chance to enroll in a growing number of courses that “incorporate the international context” and, two, they will be provided increased opportunities to study abroad (3). The report affirms that an internationalized curriculum as well as expanded options for education abroad will help to guarantee that Ohio State students “thrive in international social and work environments” (3). Such a goal is an entirely recognizable one for study abroad and international exchange programs, many of which are designed to help students develop “their cultural horizons or career prospects” rather than “a primary, explicit, and concrete orientation towards learning for active citizenship” (Davies and Pike 70). What I find interesting is that the “internationalized” curriculum at Ohio State has been asked to share the same institutional objectives as the study abroad or foreign exchange experience that exists largely to enlarge a student’s “cultural horizons or career prospects.” There are no learning goals in the report that underscore the importance of socially or politically transformative and engaged forms of global inquiry.

We are told that the proposed “internationalized” curriculum at Ohio State will seek to “integrate international perspectives into existing and new courses taught on campus” (3). These “perspectives,” quite tellingly, are focused on personal and professional adaptability in diverse cultural settings, effective communication “across linguistic and cultural boundaries,” an enhanced

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63 An increasing number of study abroad administrators and international educators are beginning to question this role for study abroad programs. As we will see later in the next chapter, there is a desire to see study abroad take seriously the goals of global civic engagement, service learning, and citizen diplomacy. See The Handbook of Practice and Research in Study Abroad: Higher Education and the Quest for Global Citizenship.
understanding of the “international dimension” of one’s disciplinary program, and “familiarity with
the major currents of international change and issues they raise.” 64 Because such curricular and
pedagogical priorities are borrowed wholly from international education, there is a consistent focus
on preparing students for cross-cultural and cross-linguistic encounters. Ohio State’s Office of
International Affairs 2010 Strategic Plan supports and underlines this goal, as every metric that
supports the goal of internationalizing the “learning process and experience” is centered on
“increasing the percentage of OSU undergraduates participating in an educationally integrated
international experience to 50 percent or greater and assuring the availability of such programs for all
who wish to participate in Education Abroad” (20). And all of the aforementioned “international
perspectives”—later renamed “global competences”—are designed to enhance the ability of students
to comprehend and adapt to diverse cultural settings. For this reason, students are consistently
encouraged to assume that study abroad is the culminating intercultural experience and the most
salient expression of world-mindedness.

In the Strategic Internationalization Plan, there is also a powerful emphasis on professional
preparation—and, consequently, economic and social mobility—as the disciplines are called upon to
highlight the international dimension and implication of their work. This is primarily marked by an
increase in international content in coursework in the hope that “students will become conversant
with the international dimensions of their field of study and [come to be] fully prepared to work
within an international setting” (Alutto). Obviously, this is not a trivial goal, and, as one goal among

64 William Brustein talks about these perspectives in “It Takes an Entire Institution: A Blueprint for the Global
University.” These perspectives are borrowed from the 2004 National Association of State Universities and
Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC) Task Force Report: A Call to Leadership: The Presidential Role in
Internationalizing the University. Admittedly, Brustein’s essay is designed to help institutional thinkers organize the
“constituent components of a global university” (249). It is not a piece that reflects complexly about the role
of global learning in academe, and, when it does turn its attention to curricular and pedagogical matters, it is
primarily focused on the internationalization of disciplinary programs. And disciplinary programs are
internationalized in proportion to their investment in education abroad.
many for global teaching and learning, it is both practical and wise. The problem is that this goal—like that of education abroad—defines the institution’s commitment to global learning in ways that minimize preparation for public life and agency, and, instead, emphasize more privatized forms of personal and professional enhancement. And, even when global citizenship is fleetingly invoked, it is consistently tied to “professional opportunities and lifestyle options more than political and social responsibility and engagement” (Schlatte 16).

All of this decidedly aligns Ohio State’s institutional commitments to global learning with internationalist—and, at times, neo-mercantile—ends. Again, there is no mention of global learning efforts that advance a larger ethical or civic purpose. Indeed, there appears to be a willful refusal to tie the emerging “internationalized” curriculum to critical citizenship practice.

At the same time, the President and Provost’s Council makes the curious decision to open the final report with an epigraph that calls for the “global university” to serve the ends of active national and global citizenship. Excerpted from an earlier report of Ohio State’s International Programs Task Force, the epigraph reaffirms that a “world-class university” is obligated to help its students “prepare to function in a global marketplace and to be nationally and globally informed and engaged citizens.” (1) While the neo-mercantile emphasis on economic advancement is reiterated and reinforced throughout the President and Provost’s Council report, the cosmopolitan aspirations are not. In fact, the epigraph provides the only mention of citizenship practice or civic engagement in the entire document. So why would the Council construct an institutional and curricular

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65 The Task Force enjoyed broader institutional representation than the President and Provost’s Council; members of the Task Force included faculty, program directors, university administrators, and students.

66 Usually there are worries about joining neo-mercantile and civic learning goals in this way. Zemach-Bersin notes that “there is a danger that if promoted in conjunction with themes of personal advancement and
blueprint for global learning, scholarship, and outreach that relies heavily on the rhetoric of internationalization, but then feel it necessary to open the document with a cosmopolitan call to action? This is a question that interests me. Because the epigraphic priority of “informed and engaged national and global citizenship” is disconnected from the goal-setting of the final report, the opening would appear to be a strictly—and significantly—rhetorical move. There is no doubt that it is designed to insinuate an institutional interest in teaching and learning for the public good, and, in this way, we can read the epigraph as a tangible register of Ohio State’s desire to be understood as an institution that is not wholly focused on the more traditional tasks of internationalization. We can read this epigraph as a tangible register of Ohio State’s desire to also deliver on the public mission and interest of the land-grant university.

Similarly, in a short piece written for the Office of Academic Affairs in-house publication *Key Notes*, Provost Joseph Alutto reiterates Ohio State’s commitment to redefining itself as a “global university,” and, once again, the skills of global competence are presented as formative goals for the student learning experience. And, then, without explication or exemplification, Aluttto ends that piece with an insistence that the Strategic Internationalization Plan is designed to “ensure that Ohio State’s students leave [the University] as globally competent citizens.” The five constitutive skills of global competence continue to be vaguely and sporadically tied to citizenship and engagement, although there is no articulation of what this means for the “transformative enhancement” of the curriculum. How, quite simply, is citizenship understood? Does the learning experience seek to introduce and, when necessary, complicate the relationship between local, national, and transnational forms of citizenship and social belonging? What is the link between education abroad and an consumerism, global citizenship will appear to be a commodity with the primary function of allowing Americans to succeed economically, socially, and politically in the globalizing world” (317).
increased sense of social responsibility? Why is a student who is more competitively positioned in the global economic marketplace more likely to consider or pursue forms of global engagement?

These questions remain unasked—and unanswered—because the Strategic Internationalization Plan only selectively borrows the rhetoric of global citizenship in order to increase the perception that students will be encouraged to engage in public work and committed action across national and cultural differences.

Even though there is an occasional affirmation of the value of global citizenship, I would not be quick to conclude that Ohio State is any way ambivalent about its stated rationale for globalizing the institutional mission and curriculum. I believe that Ohio State is primarily interested in internationalist and neo-mercantile rationales for “globalizing” the learning experience and secondarily interested in learning that contributes to cosmopolitan forms of engagement. If anything, it is likely that the President and Provost’s Council saw the goal of “informed and engaged national and global citizenship” as a derivative one, made possible—if not probable—by the “international experiences” of the revised curriculum and study abroad option. This is a common and erroneous assumption, and, in Chapter Three, we will talk more about why it is that many academics are eager to imagine an “informed and engaged” civic identity as the unproblematic end product of international education and study abroad experience.

There are other interesting semantic choices: in earlier drafts of the Council’s report, the authors call for increased attention to global—rather than international—issues and change efforts. The late swap of modifiers names a new priority for the work, and helps us understand what this institutional and curricular push to globalize is designed to do. It seems that the Council made a conscious decision to pull away from a language that more readily allies Ohio State’s global teaching, learning and research with the ethical and engaged ends of citizenship practice. Of course, the signifier ‘global’ doesn’t have to guarantee cosmopolitan aspirations, but the signifier ‘international’ is generally understood to focus on comparative or cross-cultural inquiry rather than the shared moral and political challenges of citizenship.
Making the Case I: Cosmopolitan Pedagogy

The Ohio State University may have decided to define its global learning commitments in ways that privilege an internationalist emphasis over a cosmopolitan one, but the truth is that many more colleges and universities are unspecific or woolly about their rationales for adopting global commitments in the first place. As I see it, a “globalized” curriculum or course that does not specify its goals, or remains silent about its conception of the global and its motives for prioritizing it, undercuts its ethical reach and possibilities in the same ways as a “globalized” curriculum or course that solely endorses neo-mercantile, internationalist, or liberal-aesthetic ends. We cannot presume that a vaguely defined “global” or “internationalized” curriculum is interested in the pedagogical exploration of a cosmopolitan ethic, either. It bears repeating: global learning is not necessarily committed to cosmopolitan values or priorities. One does not imply the other. At the same time, it’s hard not to see the ways in which it might be politically expedient to behave as if the two were somehow synonymous. If global learning can insinuate a relationship to ethicality and engagement without naming a commitment to either, educators can imply cosmopolitan intentions without building a curriculum or pedagogy that realizes them.68

68 There are many reasons why it might be politically advantageous to leave open the question of one’s ethical commitments in global learning. Because organizations like the NAS (National Association of Scholars) and individual thinkers like Stanley Fish (who will surface in Chapter Four) insist on a necessary disconnect between learning and “moral and civic capacities,” faculty can grow fearful that naming the ethical priorities of their teaching will contaminate the educational process. If you stay silent about your interest in the ethical implications of global learning, you effectively dodge this criticism. At the same time, because institutions are eager to highlight larger commitments to transformational models of civic engagement and action, faculty can feel that it important to not deny their interest in a more ethically motivated version of global learning. The increasingly popular ‘education for global citizenship’—like most citizenship education—has a decidedly ethical dimension, so when institutions choose to highlight the rhetoric of ‘global citizenship,’ they must also trust that faculty will not oppose ethical priorities in their teaching. Because of these contradictory demands, faculty can—and do—benefit from an unspecified relationship to global learning.
For these reasons, I am hesitant to endorse a pedagogical practice that believes that is sufficient to self-identify as “global” in its aims and interests. I am also reluctant to endorse a pedagogical practice that is content to ally itself with an undifferentiated form of global learning. As I’ve stated, I am interested in pedagogies that articulate a more particular, more invested, and more intentional relationship to global learning; more specifically, I am interested in pedagogical work that advances larger ethico-political questions about one’s identity, place, and responsibilities in local-global contexts. These questions focus global learning on a distinct set of pedagogical goals that I would best describe as cosmopolitan.

We’ve already suggested that cosmopolitanism is best understood as an ethos, or an ethic that fundamentally organizes a person’s values and outlook. When global education chooses to emphasize the ethical implications of its curricular investments—typically, in a stated commitment to the ends of global citizenship—it assumes a cosmopolitan character. Global learning that underscores its ethical engagement with persons and problems that exceed the boundaries of the territorial state is, de facto, cosmopolitan in its premises. Such learning may not self-describe as cosmopolitan, but it is nonetheless conceptually and practically bound up with cosmopolitan frameworks of understanding. For example, “education for global citizenship”—a formulation of global learning that is as popular as those that are more explicitly internationalist—is essentially indebted to cosmopolitan theory and praxis. When college and university faculty emphasize their desire to prepare students for “the challenge and responsibility of global citizenship” (Wittenberg University) or make manifest the link between “preparing students to be world citizens [and] global education” (Fairleigh Dickinson University), they are affirming a cosmopolitan set of pedagogical commitments.69 And this project is

69 I understand that, in some cases, these commitments may only be rhetorical. As we’ve mentioned, institutions may claim global citizenship as an educational goal simply because it is an effective way to suggest
interested in clearly articulating and making visible what it means for those in higher education to identify with such cosmopolitan strivings.

However, I also want to make sure that this project addresses educators who are generally interested in and supportive of global learning but have no clear philosophical or pedagogical rationale informing their work. These educators may not scrutinize what is meant by “globalized” teaching and learning. They may assume that the “global” has already been defined by international education. They may so thoroughly homogenize the global that it winds up referring to any place other than the one where they are standing. I want to offer an alternative.

This project argues that cosmopolitanism offers these educators a useful, timely, and descriptive language for global learning goals and pedagogies. Because it ties global inquiry to social citizenship, cosmopolitan education can encourage faculty and students to address the pressing moral and political challenges of the historical moment. Because it enlarges one’s scope of moral concern to include those who live outside of one’s spatial and temporal boundaries, cosmopolitan education can encourage new forms of ethical deliberation and social responsibility. And, because it challenges reified notions of civic and personal identity, cosmopolitan education can encourage new subjectivities and forms of belonging that cross the local and the global.

So, while it is fair to call cosmopolitan education a species of global education, I want us to also consider what might shift paradigmatically when we first and primarily define our curricular commitments as cosmopolitan. Rather than assert a general priority to global learning, I am

larger institutional attention to the global public good, but there is, nonetheless, a framework/language in place for naming these priorities.
interested in what education for cosmopolitanism might liberate, both philosophically and pedagogically.\footnote{My use of the verb ‘liberate’ is a deliberate one, as it shares an etymological root with the word ‘liberal’ and, by extension, the aims of liberal education. Martha Nussbaum makes this point when she reminds us of Seneca’s injunction to educate oneself in the direction of liberation and the overthrow of habit or convention. See “Liberal Education and Global Community.”}

**Making the Case II: Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogy**

At the same time, I need to caution that it is not enough simply to insist on the desirability of a cosmopolitan framework or ethic for pedagogical work. Because we have acknowledged that there are, in fact, many discourses of cosmopolitanism, it is important to avoid describing cosmopolitan pedagogy as if it were a straightforward and self-evident consummation of cosmopolitan priorities. Cosmopolitan priorities can differ—in some cases, differ quite markedly—so pedagogies that are committed to cosmopolitan values must also be prepared to specify their working understanding of cosmopolitanism. Just as it is right and useful to define what the ‘global’ points to in global education, it is right and useful to explain the way in which we intend ‘cosmopolitan’ to modify pedagogical practice. If we do not do this, if we ignore the ways in which cosmopolitanism is both plural and heterogeneous, then we risk the possibility that our terms will be oversimplified. We also run the risk that our pedagogy will be identified with philosophical or political priorities that we do not share. This is especially important because cultural cosmopolitanism—too frequently focused on the exoticization of the cultural other or reduced to the “easy face” of consumption and travel—tends to serve as the most popular signification of cosmopolitanism. If we do not specify the values that shape our cosmopolitan pedagogical practice, the ready assumption will be that we are teaching in some way to the ends of cultural cosmopolitanism. And, while there is reason to support the divergent thinking and openness to
cultural difference that characterizes the more compelling forms of cultural cosmopolitanism, there is no reason to believe that cultural cosmopolitans will necessarily experience a heightened sense of responsibility to the communities they both inhabit and explore. It is an important paradigmatic shift to move from “world openness to the assumption of moral responsibility for distant unknown others” (Kennedy 34). And, while we cannot guarantee or insist that students “[assume] moral responsibility for the distant unknown other,” I do think we can—and should—build pedagogical practices that examine and take seriously the linkages between ethicality and engagement in local/global contexts. It is important that we resist pedagogical practices that—wittingly or unwittingly—reinforce cultural cosmopolitanism as our single aspirational end.

This is one reason that I recommend that educators who are interested in cosmopolitan pedagogy clarify their foundational assumptions about and investments in cosmopolitan discourse. Rather than stake a more generalized interest in cosmopolitanism, I believe that educators would do well to identify with particular projects, particular commitments, and particular aspirations in cosmopolitan thought and practice. The framework, I’m convinced, matters. And, as I mentioned at the conclusion of Chapter One, this project argues that critical cosmopolitanism, an iteration of cosmopolitan discourse that complicates its relationship to abstract and imperial versions of universalism on the one hand, and insular and restrictive forms of civic identity on the other, is the most productive and promising of cosmopolitan frameworks for global learning.

I use the word “framework” deliberately. For, while I know that critical cosmopolitanism can be the object of academic research and inquiry, I am more interested in the larger pedagogical implications of a critical cosmopolitan ontology and outlook. I’m not insisting that one should teach
to cosmopolitan content\textsuperscript{71}, and I’m certainly not recommending that one should teach critical cosmopolitanism as if it were an article of faith or a creed. Instead, I want to ask: what happens when we open up critical cosmopolitan categories for pedagogical work? How might a critical cosmopolitan vocabulary introduce and frame new questions for global educators? How might a critical cosmopolitan rethinking of the relationship of the global and the local—as geographical scales, as sites for citizenship practice, as sources of identity and belonging—alter the terms of teaching and learning? And how might higher education—both in the disciplinary majors and general education curricula—benefit more generally from a clearer relationship between global learning and critical cosmopolitan values?

I would like to say some general things here about the distinctive and ambitious critical ground of a pedagogy that is animated by a critical cosmopolitan framework. As we discussed at the conclusion of Chapter One, critical cosmopolitanism is a discursive practice that resists abstract universal truths about human or global community; thinks the local and the global relationally; insists on a strong and broad ethical concern for the other that does not disregard difference; complicates and decolonizes ways of thinking about social identity and power; and challenges the uncritical commodification of cultural difference. This framework provides some broad priorities for critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, and I want to mention them here before we focus our attention on more specific features.

Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, by definition, must be self-problematizing. Because it troubles so many orthodoxies—about the scope of universalism, binary thinking about place and scale, the inevitability of exoticizing or engulfing the other—a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical practice must

\textsuperscript{71} This would only reinforce the notion that some disciplines more than others—typically, those in the social sciences—have a vested interest in investigating the usefulness of cosmopolitanism for teaching and learning.
strive to be self-reflexive in its approach to teaching and learning. In other words, it must be willing to submit itself to scrutiny.\textsuperscript{72} When critical cosmopolitan pedagogy sees itself as animated by “an interrogative spirit that punctures certitudes” (Posnock 802), it becomes possible to risk new questions about old, familiar habits of thinking. I believe that this risk undoes intellectual rigidity and opens space for us to approach critical cosmopolitanism as an “alternative imagination” rather than another dominant discourse. If critical cosmopolitan pedagogy aims to be self-problematizing, it must also resist the temptation to uncritically borrow categories and concepts that undermine conventional thinking about the relationship between identity and location. Unfortunately, some forms of global learning—and ways of thinking about globality—do this very thing: they reinforce identity as always already “territorialized,” and, therefore, incapable of permeability or extension. When this is the case, we not only come to see ourselves as subjects fixed in and regulated by place, we also learn that persons in cultural and geographical locations other than our own are similarly “territorialized.” This can not only encourage “static, reified, and bounded imaginations of place and home” (Pollack “Cosmopolitanisms” 579), it can also inhibit more flexible thinking about belonging and citizenship—\textit{even} if the pedagogies ally with the ends of global learning.

Consequently, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy must be \textit{deterritorializing}. In other words, it must work to unsettle and rethink attachments to boundaries and borders, for these attachments often secure forms of identity and understandings of place that are essentialized and impliable. Deterritorialized thinking, on the other hand, is heterodox and open to the “crossing of perceptual thresholds” (Becker 68). Such thinking has clear practical and philosophical implications for critical cosmopolitan learning, but let us debunk a myth about it first. Deterritorialization does not require

\textsuperscript{72} As critically cosmopolitan educators, “we should be building in reflexivity—about the culturally constructed nature of one’s self, one’s home society, and our understanding of the larger world.” (Skelly 29)
the self to be rootless, abstract, and without ground; instead, deterritorialization encourages self-definition that does not reduce to territorial forms of identity (typically, national citizenship). We know and understand that subjects are situated. People do live—and learn—on location. But, to see oneself as deterritorialized is to affirm the plasticity of identity. It is also to acknowledge the many ways that we are shaped by all that we exclude from consciousness or care. For identity is not only about location; it is also about dislocation and relocation.73 As such, the task of critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is to resist the reinforcement of borders and boundaries that uphold static notions of personal, civic, and even institutional identity. In critically cosmopolitan teaching and learning, the self is encouraged to see itself as outward-looking and relational in its constitution. The discursive practice of citizenship recognizes multiple and overlapping sites of political and social responsibility. And, in an institutional context, critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning promote the free circulation of disciplinary knowledge, cross-border practices, and what some have called “despecialization.” In this way, deterritorializing the academy helps challenge institutional inertias as well as the inclination to understand the disciplines as sovereign—and “territorial”—enclaves.74 All of this squarely allies critical cosmopolitan pedagogy with the tenets of interdisciplinary teaching and learning: a commitment to cross-disciplinary insights, support for dialogic—rather than monological—forms of imagination, and a willingness to generate new knowledge outside of traditional disciplinary boundaries.

73 James Clifford makes a similar point in his essay “Mixed Feelings” (369).

74 As Cloke and Johnston rightly have observed, “fields of knowledge are the equivalent of tribal territories” and it can be easy for those who over-identify with a single discipline to fall into binary thinking. (4)
Another crucial task for critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is the *unsettling of binary thought and logic*. Because the terms in a binary are understood as oppositional and averse, they tend to support a logic and practice of domination. A binary quickly establishes itself as a hierarchy, and then the terms harden into fixed positions of value or deficiency. In this way, “you uncritically accept accounts of power relations simply by endorsing binary thinking” (Cloke and Johnston 12).

This denies us the ability to define the terms in a binary as inclusive of or implicated in one another. It also frustrates the desire to see the terms non-hierarchically. Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy has particularly good reason to challenge the prevalence of binary logic, for it is binary logic that insists on the mutual exclusion of global and local as well as self and other.\(^75\) And it is this logic that prohibits us from recognizing the conceptual complexity and relationality of terms like place, scale, and identity. Contrarily, “an understanding of the world in terms of *relationality*, a world in which the local and global are really and mutually constituted, [would] challenge separation of the binary” (Massey *Space* 184). If critical cosmopolitan pedagogy emphasizes that the local and global—or, as some would have it, here and there—are internally related, the self-evidence of binary thinking is called into question. Similarly, if critical cosmopolitan pedagogy refuses to dichotomize self and other, it not only complicates commonsensical understandings of identity (based, as they often are, on the repudiation and exclusion of the other), it also destabilizes the binary logic that would have us believe that subjectivity is never truly inter-subjective. In short, binary thinking—about place, scale, and identity—obstructs the dynamic and conceptually nuanced inquiry that distinguishes critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning.

\(^{75}\) For a more thorough treatment of the perceived opposition of global and local, see Chapter Three. For an analysis of the anxiety that circulates around a more progressive and “global” sense of place and belonging, see Chapter Five.
In a similar vein, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy challenges absolutism in all of its intellectual and practical forms. Not only does critical cosmopolitanism question the role that absolute versions of universalism and “inflexible moralisms” play in traditional cosmopolitanism, it also unsettles absolute or fixed notions of what constitutes cosmopolitanism in the first place. As we’ve discussed, this is a significant advantage of critical cosmopolitan pedagogy: it recognizes a plurality of situated cosmopolitanisms rather than a single and monolithic one. This invites cosmopolitanisms from above and below, as well as Western and non-Western contexts, to shape and complicate conversation on identity and belonging in the classroom.

Like other emancipatory pedagogies, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is marked by its larger commitment to explore the ethical and political implications of knowledge production. We are, as the truism suggests, responsible for what we know. As teachers and learners, we represent—and often translate—knowledge for others. Emancipatory pedagogies not only openly acknowledge this work, they also invest in transforming knowledge in the interest of the public good. So too, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy links the production of knowledge with its potential to revitalize public life, critique and redress structural inequities, encourage transnational solidarities, and imagine and work for alternative futures. This, I would contend, is the ethical charge of critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning. I admit that it is also the ethical charge of many other anti-oppressive and radical pedagogies, but critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is the only global learning pedagogy that commits—as Rabinow first suggested—to “the ethical as a guiding value.” And, if we affirm that ethicality is primarily concerned with the relationship between otherness and responsibility, then I believe that critical
cosmopolitanism offers us a crucial framework for understanding otherness and responsibility in more expansive and complex ways.\textsuperscript{76}

Finally, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is deeply invested in the \textit{relationship between ethicity and engagement}. The bias, as Gandhi first urged, must be toward action. While a heightened attention to ethical inquiry in the classroom is a central feature of critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning, it is important to join that inquiry to equally vigorous efforts to promote social change. In other words, it is especially important for educators to resist the temptation to uncouple awareness and action.\textsuperscript{77}

Action, of course, need not be over-identified with formal political activism. Action can be imagined in other, equally productive, ways. We know, for example, that engagement serves as a synonym for action in a variety of disciplinary settings. And engagement—with its emphasis on conscious intention, informed participation, and individual agency—is an important pedagogical goal for global learning efforts that want to invite students to play more meaningful roles in public life. However, engagement in public life is not synonymous with localism, and a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical practice should work to enlarge student understandings of what might constitute a public sphere or lived world. Transnational public spheres—especially those that communication and electronic technology make possible—are sites for belonging and solidarity as well as committed action.

Furthermore, critical cosmopolitanism has helped us understand that contemporary public life is not shaped exclusively on a local or global scale. Because the local and global are dialogic and co-constitutive, public life must also be redefined—and rescaled—to accommodate political and social realities that are both hybrid and layered.

\textsuperscript{76} The later writings of Jacques Derrida reinforce this point. See Mustafa Dikee’s “Extending Hospitality: Giving Space, Taking Time” (3).

\textsuperscript{77} This may be especially true for humanists, who tend to be singularly charged with advancing perspectival or cross-cultural awareness in globalized curricula.
As I mentioned earlier, this chapter was designed to introduce the broad parameters of a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. The next two chapters will think more carefully about the distinctive features of a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. More specifically, the next two chapters will define and explore the key paradigms and sensibilities that shape critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning. Attention to paradigmatic thinking will help us name the conceptual framework and intellectual character of the pedagogy. Attention to the sensibilities, or critical dispositions and habits of mind, that inform the pedagogy will help us understand the powerful perceptual and affective dimension of critical cosmopolitan learning. Whether we are focused on key paradigms or sensibilities, I hope that the conversation that follows will help the reader gain a greater understanding of the sort of priorities and commitments central to critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning. In the process, I want to provide the reader with a greater sense of the possible, for it is my contention that critical cosmopolitanism offers us a complex, transformational, and socially relevant language for pedagogical and curricular transformations in global learning.
Chapter Three
Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogy: Paradigms

Since I want to argue the importance of understanding cosmopolitanism as “a way of approaching our situation and predicament” (Hansen et al.), we ought to begin by acknowledging the heuristic value of critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. Critical cosmopolitanism, as a “mode of making meaning,” offers a *perspective*, or “a lens through which an individual [might] interpret the world” (Lu 50), as well as a *language* for describing the goal of engagement both within and beyond the parameters of the local. Thanks to such versatility, critical cosmopolitanism provides an important analytical tool for global learning efforts that see themselves as strictly descriptive as well as those that are more explicitly problem-solving. But even this does not exhaust the usefulness of a critical cosmopolitan framework for education. Because it is also an aspirational discourse, critical cosmopolitanism can help us name the underlying ethico-political motivations and ambitions for our pedagogical practice. For all these reasons, we would do well to understand critical cosmopolitanism as both an analytic and an approach, a critical schema and a normative vision.

With this in mind, I’d like to begin by thinking about a number of key conceptual paradigms that inform critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning. Generally speaking, we know that a paradigm, or theoretical framework, helps to organize a conceptual landscape. As the gestalt of concepts and practices that structure current thinking and lay out future direction for a domain of knowledge, a paradigm offers a critical architecture for intellectual work. In this respect, the key paradigms of critical cosmopolitan pedagogy shape the learning objectives, forms of inquiry, and central problematics of an educational practice that aims to aligns global learning with critical cosmopolitan thought.
I argue here that critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning is marked by three key conceptual paradigms: *a rethinking of the local and global as mutually constitutive and relational, an enlarged and reinvigorated conception of citizenship, and a complex engagement with otherness.* I recognize that these individual paradigms play an important and highly visible role in many other pedagogical projects, so I am not claiming that they are, in and of themselves, unique to critical cosmopolitan models of teaching and learning. What I find most compelling about critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, however, is that it integrates these frameworks—and later, I will argue, a set of sensibilities—in the service of a more progressive model for global learning. It is the integrative impulse that I want to champion here. I also want it to be clear that I do not believe that these paradigms exhaust the intellectual reach of critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning, but I do believe that they accurately represent the distinctive and ambitious critical ground of the pedagogy.

**Rethinking the Local and Global as Mutually Constitutive and Relational**

It has become commonplace to set the local and global in opposition to one another. Hopelessly polarized and antagonistic, the two terms are expected to repudiate one another in theory and practice. Moreover, it is supposed that the dominance of one term will necessitate the depreciation of the other. If you build a curricular or pedagogical practice that makes a priority of global learning, the ready assumption is that local learning will be demoted. Often enough, the stated worry is that pedagogical attention to the global will diminish our ability to identify with—and tend to—the concerns of the local. The global, we are told, will both overwhelm and undervalue the communities and conversations that are more immediately in need of our attention and care.

This worry about the tyranny of the global tends to be exacerbated when the global is allied with the cosmopolitan, as we’ve seen that cosmopolitanism historically has been charged with a certain indifference—and, at times, hostility—to local identities and identifications. Critics of the
right point to the intellectual and class elitism of the putative “man of the world,” while critics of the left are leary of the overreaching or totalizing aims of traditional cosmopolitanism. Both fret about the erasure of localism or lived particularity. Both distrust global commitments that appear to prize universal order and abstract idealism. Both suspect that cosmopolitanism will undermine the specific solidarities that organize people’s sense of identity and location in the world.

Thinking Otherwise: Beyond the Local/Global Binary

This reading of cosmopolitanism—as necessarily averse to the affective and concrete ties that shape social life, as hegemonic in its desire to realize a global monoculture—is best understood as an indictment of a particular strand of cosmopolitan thought and practice rather than an accurate description of cosmopolitanism *in toto*. For, while it is true that a more traditional—and unselfconscious—cosmopolitanism can be falsely universalizing and imperial in outlook, a new critical cosmopolitanism is invested in *thinking the local and the global relationally*. Because this project is openly committed to a critical cosmopolitan framework, it too is interested in imagining a more dialogic and dynamic relationship between the local and the global. For this reason, it is my contention that a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy must be committed to an unsettling of the traditional and highly reified opposition of local and global. Critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning must work to complicate—and, ideally, unseat—the binary logic that demands that we rigidly oppose the local and the global.

I understand that a call for a global learning pedagogy that does not immediately prioritize its relationship to the global may seem counter-intuitive, especially because we began this project with the suggestion that cosmopolitanism offers a significant and specific language and rationale for global

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78 Because the first assumption is that the cosmopolitan subject is a privileged, educated, and mobile member of the bourgeoisie, the concomitant historical assumption has been that that subject is a masculine one.
learning. The problem, as I see it, is that too many educators go on to infer that cosmopolitan education is *entirely* dedicated to the promotion of global—rather than local or national—forms of inquiry and citizenship practice. Such a reading of cosmopolitanism assumes the clear ascendancy of global categories and frames of reference, whereas a more critical cosmopolitan framework—wary of the potential for false universality—stresses that it may be wiser to see “the global [as] decisive without necessarily dominating all the time” (Gunesch 256). Because critical cosmopolitan pedagogy insists on seeing the global and the local in relational terms, and because it underscores the ways that the global and the local implicate and inform one another, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy denies an understanding of the global as a transcendent category. And this, I believe, is a good thing. A transcendent understanding of the global—common enough in traditional forms of global education and cosmopolitan discourse—is often every bit as fetishistic in its approach to the global as more romantic versions of localism are infatuated with the local. Critical cosmopolitanism continues to remind us that the global and the local are mutually constitutive terms. So the move to fetishize, or overvalue, either term is short-sighted at best and represents an error in logic in the main. When we decide to challenge a binary logic that insists on mutually exclusive identities and a hierarchical understanding of difference, I believe that we open room for something more dynamic and relational to emerge. In short, we enable a “new dialectic of local and global questions” (Beck “Enemies” 41).

So what might characterize a dialogic and dynamic relationship between the local and the global? And how might we more productively imagine a pedagogy that refuses to polarize the two terms? Let me offer two ways of seeing it.

Robert Fine, on the one hand, suggests that new cosmopolitan projects are characterized by their desire to “reconcile the idea of universal species-wide human solidarity with particular solidarities that are smaller and more specific than the species” (“Taking” 462). In other words, Fine
argues that new versions of cosmopolitanism strive to reconcile the universal character of the global with the particularisms of the local. In an ideal form of new cosmopolitanism, the global and the local would be harmonized, or brought into a more cooperative relationship. Global and local solidarities would enhance—rather than compete with—one another. Thus, a dynamic new framework for cosmopolitanism would successfully integrate the two terms. A critical cosmopolitan pedagogy that borrows Fine’s understanding would see its task as one of resolution and mediation, for the reconciliation of the global and the local would require that the two terms be made fundamentally compatible and accommodating of one another.

Gerard Delanty, on the other hand, suggests that we are better served if we conceive of the global and the local—and, by extension, the universal and the particular—in a kind of “tension” with one another. This tension, he proposes, might be seen as “the basic animus of cosmopolitanism” (“Imagination” 35). The global and the local are not perfectly reconciled in a new cosmopolitan vision—nor does Delanty suggest that they should be. For, when the global and the local are held in an important and productive tension, they are able to challenge as well as confirm one another. It is not presupposed that the global and the local—or the universal and the particular—will readily find middle ground that preserves the values and interests of both. Thus, a new cosmopolitan pedagogy that borrows Delanty’s understanding would see the global and the local in a constant negotiation or contestation with one another.

So, while it is true that both Fine and Delanty credit new cosmopolitanism with a more dynamic understanding of the relationship of the global and the local, Fine wants to see that dynamism as synthetic in character, while Delanty wants to see it as more synergistic. As I see it, a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy that imagines a meaningful interplay of the global and the local could conceive that interplay in terms that stress reconciliation or negotiation. More of my own thinking, however, has been aligned with Delanty, as I have found that the global and the local interpenetrate
in ways that are not always predictable or harmonious. Furthermore, the two scales do not dissolve when they interact. They impact and reconstitute one another—underlining, once more, the fact of their permeability—but they are not free of competing priorities or values. This is why I believe that we would do well to characterize the relationship between the global and local as synergistic and dynamic in character.\textsuperscript{79}

\textbf{Object Lesson: Rethinking the Global/Local in Otterbein’s Integrative Studies Curriculum}

I say all of this with a keen understanding that popular mythologies of the local and the global—never mind traditional and universalistic cosmopolitanisms—tend to insist on the exclusive opposition of the terms.\textsuperscript{80} Since the local and the global are frequently positioned as antonyms, it should come as no surprise that educational practice tends to honor, rather than trouble, that polarization.\textsuperscript{81}

Whether witting or unwitting, curricular structures can both manifest and reinforce this dichotomous logic. Such curricula tend to flag and isolate courses that prioritize a “global perspective” (Otterbein; DePaul), “global awareness” (Rutgers; Arizona State), or “global understanding” (Penn State; George Mason). Sometimes a “non-Western perspectives or cultures” requirement (Ohio State; University of Virginia) can function as an equivalent and stand-alone

\textsuperscript{79} It is also true that “synergy involves finding ways in which different factors in a situation can provide ideas for action that are beyond the reach of each factor on its own” (A Brennan 143). There is no necessary “merging of insight.”

\textsuperscript{80} Even the popular “think globally, act locally” slogan assumes that thinking and action need to be parceled between the two different arenas. Language does not help us name the global and local—or thought and action, for that matter—as more integrally connected.

\textsuperscript{81} Later, in Chapter Five, I will explore the binary logic that first persuades us that pedagogical attention to global knowledge necessarily will subordinate local knowledge.
exercise in global inquiry. In any case, these courses flagged as globally conscious are not opposed to another set of courses that foreground attention to local knowledge. But that, I want to suggest, is neither necessary nor the point. The courses that do not self-identify as globally conscious, or are not specifically flagged by faculty or administration as globally conscious, are not presumed to be globally conscious. They are, as it were, unmarked. And, when we construct a curriculum that marks a minority of courses as “globally conscious,” the majority of unmarked courses become identified—conceptually and practically—with that which is not global.

Because we tend to see the global in a binary context, we assume that those courses that are not marked global are, in fact, local. It is the local that stands as the unmarked—and unremarked—term. Since the unmarked term in a binary opposition assumes a normative character, the local becomes a generic standard, or a “default value in a system of social or cultural exchange.” In just this way, an institution that anchors its “global” commitments in a subset of courses or requirements erects a curricular architecture that relies upon and affirms a binary logic. It is inconsequential whether or not that is the intention of those who design the curriculum. Most see the addition of global awareness or perspective courses as an important antidote to parochialism and insularity—and they are not wrong to want to challenge that in general education courses in particular. However, I am arguing that another often unobserved outcome of explicitly naming—and, in some fashion, segregating—globally conscious courses is a curricular framework that is both binary and unusually stubborn to change.

Courses in Non-Western history or cultures are often assumed to represent the “global” in a more immediate or unmixed way. This is because the Western experience continues to be taken as the paradigmatic one, the experience that exists apart from—or in contradistinction to—the global. The global, we will see in Chapter Five, is frequently imagined as a geographical or conceptual “elsewhere.”

See The Unmarked Categories: Exhibition + Knowledge Production at http://unmarkedcategories.blogspot.com
Let me cite an example from my home institution. Otterbein’s Global Perspectives requirement was a late addition to the Integrative Studies curriculum; it was designed to compensate for the largely Western emphasis of the other required courses in the program. Because the Global Perspectives courses were marked as “global” in their orientation, the rest of the unmarked Integrative Studies curriculum was liberated from the need to think comparatively about cultural phenomena, study critical issues that crossed national, cultural, and disciplinary boundaries, or prioritize global civic engagement. This is not to say that Integrative Studies courses outside of the Global Perspectives sequence were hostile to global inquiry or obsessively local in their interests. Sometimes they were, sometimes they were not. Unfortunately, though, one consequence of segregating the Global Perspectives requirement was that the rest of the core curriculum was categorically marked as differently scalar or, in some measure, non-global. And, for the reasons that I’ve just discussed, this isolation of the Global Perspectives requirement pressed the curriculum into a binary framework, a framework that, over time, began to feel both self-evident and immutable. This later made it that much more difficult for Otterbein to imagine the terms of a core curriculum that was critically cosmopolitan, or simultaneously global and local in perspective. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the organizing principles of our long-standing curriculum worked to discourage—and, in some cases, prevent—faculty and students from conceiving socio-civic identities and identifications as multiple, layered, or fluid in form. Because it assumed the non-coincidence of the global and local, our curricular structure fought a more flexible understanding of both subjectivity and belonging. And this structure stymied efforts to teach and learn about the contemporary situation in more nuanced, complex, and accurate ways.

84 I mean this quite literally. Our history requirement is a course in Issues of the Western Experience. Until recently, one of our first-year composition courses was titled Growing Up in America. And, despite the programmatic emphasis on human nature, our courses in the arts have a decidedly American and European focus.
But it’s also true that global learning pedagogies can reinforce the binary opposition of the global and the local—even if curricular structures do not. Faculty at Otterbein who expressed some apprehension about the new “global” emphasis of the Integrative Studies core were frequently worried that they would be compelled to imagine pedagogies that were wholly global in outlook (and, therefore, exclusively focused on the geographically distant and culturally strange). Insofar as faculty perceived—and often described—the local as a spatial register of the Same, it became that much easier to position the global as the Other. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the ready assumption of some faculty was that a globally conscious curriculum would deny them the opportunity to teach to—or take comfort in—the Same.

In an unusually anxious public forum on the proposed curricular reform, one faculty member rose to remind the audience that, even with a new global learning emphasis in Integrative Studies, they would “still be able to teach to more familiar questions” in the disciplinary majors. This comment was a telling one, for it made clear that, for many, the binary opposition between the global and the local was, in the end, fixed and foundational. Unless specific global learning goals were attached to a course, faculty insisted that it was their prerogative to remain local—or, more interestingly, attached to “familiar questions”—in their pedagogical work. One or the other, here or there, the familiar or the strange: this was how the lines of interest and allegiance were drawn. And the reassertion of such a binary, it turned out, was reassuring to many faculty in the audience. It was one of the first hints that I had that a more dynamic and critical cosmopolitan conceptualization of the relationship of the global and the local would not necessarily be received as a pedagogical gain.85

85 We know that it was reassuring because the comment ended an extended round of hostile questioning, most of it directed at the presumption that faculty could—and would want to be—entirely “global” in their pedagogical practice.
Even as I recognize the desire of some to see the global and local as antithetical, I want to acknowledge that there are other academics who insist on the “global” priorities of their pedagogical work. Many of those same academics will acknowledge that when they describe their pedagogy as “globalized,” they mean to say that they are sustaining a simultaneously local and global approach in their teaching practice. The “global,” I have been told, functions as a kind of shorthand, a way of naming the addition of a new and broader set of “global” interests to an already existing set of more proximate concerns or “familiar questions.” Certainly, I understand—and support—the desire to imagine a more productive interplay of the global and local. But, as I see it, when we unproblematically rely on the signifier “global” to encompass that which we also imagine to be local, we face the same problem that we do when we use the generic he: we are forced to rely on one word to mean something exclusive and inclusive at the same time. And, because the local and global are often read as antonyms of one another (and, therefore, antagonistic in some fundamental way), it becomes that much more difficult to imagine a “global” set of pedagogical concerns that is also committed to—and defined by—a meaningful and critical localism if we solely rely on traditional rhetoric about the global.

This is one of the most significant advantages of a critical cosmopolitan language, especially when we are characterizing our pedagogical practice. Critical cosmopolitan discourse refuses to define the ‘global’ as the other of the local. It foregrounds the fact that the local and the global are always implicated in one another and related internally. It underscores the complex interplay between local and global scales and communities. It destabilizes the matter-of-factness of the binary. When we imagine pedagogies as critically cosmopolitan, we create courses and curricula that construct new ways of representing the “in-between”—the complex lived space that defines itself as simultaneously global and local. When pedagogies rely on a critical cosmopolitan framework, they
invite students to draft a new and productive language that is capable of describing the contemporary relationship between identity and location. Such pedagogies invite students to imagine new identifications, questions, and forms of representation for the space that emerges “in-between” the traditional scales of the global and the local. And, in so doing, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy challenges the self-evidence of dualistic thinking about place, a problem that we will return to in Chapter Five when we consider the anxiety that is inspired by pedagogical efforts to accredit and inhabit the spatial and social register of the “in-between.”

**An Enlarged and Invigorated Conception of Citizenship**

Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy also is marked by an *enlarged and invigorated conception of citizenship*. Rather than define citizenship entirely as a legal status that is conferred on persons who are territorially bounded, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy begins by understanding citizenship as an active practice. This does not negate the legal dimensions of citizenship, but it does acknowledge that a growing number of people who engage in public work across national and cultural differences see that work as critical citizenship practice. Certainly, the ability to participate in and shape public life—especially in transnational and global contexts—has been facilitated by the growth of “civil society,” or “the realm of cooperative public engagement that involves individuals acting collectively and independently from the state” (Hayden 7). Because these voluntary and informal networks of non-state actors work on behalf of a wide variety of issues, we are right to imagine that “civic activity is now social, not just political” (Cogan 138). And because we continue to witness the rise of public participation in civil society, we are right to rethink citizenship as something more than an occasional and formal exercise in political decision making (i.e. voting). Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy expands our understanding of citizenship to include “direct involvement in public life, not
spectatorship” (Cogan 139), and, in so doing, it invites new conceptions of social participation and commitment.86

It is also true that critical cosmopolitan pedagogies call into question orthodox thinking about citizenship practice and work to “problematize the notion of citizenship itself” (Lapayese 497). Rather than accede to more limited and quiescent understandings of citizenship, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy encourages students to imagine new identities and tasks for the 21st century citizen. In this way, critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning refuses the “passive contemplation of citizenship,” just as it challenges the popular notion that citizenship is a devitalized and static identity.87

Such pedagogy introduces the possibility that the “good” citizen might be less compliant and docile than is often supposed. In fact, the more effective citizen may be better understood as protesting or dissident. The person who “both critiques and affirms human rights” (Maira 222) or successfully “contests the prevailing arrangements of power” (Sparks 83) may manifest a more active and energetic investment in citizenship practice. For this reason, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy recognizes the necessary role of oppositionality, the production of counter-discourses (and counter-publics), and the interrogation of notions of citizenship that encourage accommodation rather than deliberation and dissent.

86 Ulrich Beck has suggested that “whoever has access to the Internet is automatically transformed into a citizen of the world” (“Enemies” 39). The use of social media and networking as a civic tool certainly complicates traditional notions of citizenship practice, especially those that tie it to formal political participation in local contexts. Students may not initially see Facebook groups as forms of public engagement or civic organizing, but they represent another way of enacting critical citizenship practice.

87 Citizenship, Peggy McIntosh reminds us, is associated with “obligations, docility, obedience, and good behavior. . . It is not necessarily heroic, expressive, or creative. It is seen as involving responsibilities, duties, and what must be done without the status of social reward.” This notion of citizenship contrasts powerfully with the concept of leadership, which is defined as “muscular, tough, interesting, stimulating, and rewarding. . . Leadership is seen to enable individuality and special status.” (27)
The Rhetoric and Reality of Global Citizenship

What do we mean by global citizenship? If we can’t answer that question entirely to own our satisfaction, then these issues belong in discussion of schooling practices and curriculum.

Nel Noddings
Educating Citizens for Global Awareness

As I discussed in Chapter One, cosmopolitanism is generally identified with the move toward global citizenship, or a “moral and political engagement with the world that extends beyond the state” (Clarke qtd in Maira 22). That engagement can defined in primarily moral terms—especially if we embrace global citizenship as a regulative ideal—or it can be attached to legal or institutional ends. In either case, global citizenship provides a framework for enlarging the ethical, rather than the political, boundaries of community.

What are the practical implications of enlarging the ethical boundaries of community and, by extension, the responsibilities that are owed to fellow members of one’s community? Because traditional understandings of citizenship assume that persons are anchored in bounded communities, one’s rights and responsibilities are typically territorialized. The idea of global citizenship obviously challenges and transgresses territorial identities, and, with it, the notion that one’s ethical obligations are clearly delimited by geography. As we mentioned in Chapter One, global citizenship not only introduces new forms of social belonging and allegiance, it also introduces new relational responsibilities, especially between people who do not share the same local group loyalties and identities.

For this reason, global citizenship tends to directly concern itself with social justice, whether that justice is secured through diffuse and flexible forms of popular global participation, supranational cosmopolitan institutions, or organized local, regional, and transnational networks. Generally, global citizenship encourages individuals to act in the interest of the global public rather
than lead with territorial politics and consciousness. Such action is typically characterized as evidence of the expansion of one’s moral concern, as well as a way of underscoring the dignity of all human beings. Therefore, advocates of global citizenship are prone to accentuate its ethical dimension and, at times, counter-pose it to the moral partiality of local and national forms of belonging.

As I’ve mentioned repeatedly in this work, I recognize that there has been a significant movement in higher education to claim global citizenship as an institutional, curricular, and pedagogical goal. More often than not, colleges and universities that name global or international commitments in their mission statements are also clear about their desire to join those commitments to the larger task of global citizenship, even if vaguely. General education programs that emphasize global learning objectives often tie programmatic goals to the ends of global citizenship. And individual faculty increasingly enlist the language of global citizenship to explain the learning goals of courses that identify as “global” in perspective or practice. Because of this, many feel that we’ve become convinced of the value of teaching for global citizenship and, one would assume, cosmopolitan values.

A growing number of co-curricular programs—study abroad initiatives, in particular—are also making plain an interest in preparing students for active global citizenship. This is evidenced by the growing use of the rhetoric of global citizenship in programmatic mission statements, the naming—and renaming—of study abroad offices as “Centers for Global Citizenship,” the increasingly common Global Citizen scholarship awards that are helping to underwrite the costs of study abroad, and the prominent appeal to the ends of global citizenship in promotional literature and press releases.88

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88 To cite one representative instance: a promotional web page on Ball State University’s study abroad program is topped with the banner “Global Citizenship: More Ball State Students are Studying Abroad.” In both the
Professional organizations reinforce this causal link between study abroad and enhanced global citizenship practices. At the 2009 American College Personnel Association (ACPA) national meeting, a pre-conference workshop titled Creating Global Citizens: The Role of Study Abroad asserted plainly that “one component of becoming a global citizen is participating in study abroad.” In an advance summary of the workshop, the facilitator, Elizabeth Liebschutz-Roettger, remarked that “global and cultural fluency” was, in fact, the most important prerequisite for meaningful global citizenship education. Such fluency could be developed in the curriculum through “venues such as international and cultural course offerings [and] culture diversity requirements in general education” or, even more emphatically, study abroad. Certainly, Liebschutz-Roettger’s language echoes that of The Ohio State’s Strategic Internationalization Plan. But, unlike Ohio State, who more explicitly ties its vision of a globalized university to the goals of internationalization, Liebschutz-Roettger imagines that she is recommending an institutional plan for global citizenship education. “Global and cultural fluency”—sometimes identified as “global competence”—is the cornerstone of this education for global citizenship, but these “fluencies,” once again, are tied to cross cultural understanding and cross-linguistic skills. There is no clear articulation of what a global citizen—rather than, say, a corporate manager transferred to Shanghai or a frequent world traveler—might require from her curricular and co-curricular learning experiences. I see this as a significant problem for pedagogical efforts that, on one hand, endorse the broad goal of global citizenship, and, on the other hand, promote the cultivation and assessment of global fluencies or competences that are primarily focused on preparing students for cross-cultural encounters and sensitizing them to cultural difference.

headline and the article, there is an unproblematic association between increased student participation in study abroad programs and engaged citizenship practice.
More than global fluencies, “global competences” are becoming increasingly popular as indices of global awareness and global readiness. Generally understood as a set of intercultural skills and aptitudes, global competences are frequently billed as necessary and sufficient preparation for the task of global citizenship. In fact, there is a growing elision between global competence and global citizenship, and I want to remark on this before we go forward.

In a recent lead story in On Wisconsin, the University of Wisconsin announced the findings of a Global Competence Task Force that was charged with drafting an institutional definition of global competence as well as assessment measures for it. The Task Force did make an effort to imagine a more expansive understanding of a “global mindset,” but the bulk of the report focused on the vocational and personal benefits of acquiring a set of global competences. For example, the Task Force recommended that all Wisconsin undergraduates should be required to keep a “global portfolio” that, among other things, would “outline how [relevant] global activities and courses can translate into global abilities that would be attractive to future employers or graduate schools” (27). This kind of work not only instrumentalizes the competences, it underscores their primary importance as a means of improving one’s market or professional flexibility. Little mention is made of the need to prepare students for the complex challenges of 21st century citizenship.

Similarly, the University of North Carolina’s Tomorrow Commission recently “affirmed [the institutions’s] responsibility to provide its students with the knowledge, skills, and experiences to become informed and productive citizens of the state, the nation, and the world.” Such a clear emphasis on multi-dimensional citizenship would seem to warrant a robust curricular commitment to cosmopolitan learning. Instead, the University of North Carolina decided to underline the

* Interestingly, the goal of “global readiness” has been powerfully embraced by the corporate and consulting community. Global readiness measures the cultural knowledge and sensitivities required for successful interaction and work outside of the home environment. See the Global Competence Aptitude Assessment test developed by Global Competence Excellence LLC, a consulting firm, at www.globalcompetence.org.
significance of global readiness, and then they define that global readiness as the “enhancement of
global competitiveness for the institution and its students” and “the preparation of students for
successful personal and professional lives in the 21st century.” So, although there is an explicit
institutional interest in readying students for full participation in public and civic life, the goal of
“global readiness”—especially as North Carolina explains it—effectively detours the university from
delivering on that promise. This is because the goal of “global readiness” is too frequently aligned
with outcomes that focus on individual and privatized ends. In the same document, the University
affirms that it will “equip [students] with the tools they will need to adapt to the ever-changing
world,” but, again, this goal emphasizes the importance of adaptability rather than active engagement
or intervention. Education for citizenship is not an education in adaptive measures; it is an education
that galvanizes students to informed and responsible action. Unfortunately, as both the University of
Wisconsin and the University of North Carolina demonstrate, the rhetoric that surrounds “global
competences” downplays—and, to a greater or lesser degree, demotes—the ethical and engaged ends
of global learning.

I don’t want to deny that an effective global citizen would benefit from enhanced
intercultural competences, but I believe that preparation for critical citizenship practice also relies on
the cultivation of specific knowledge, skills, and dispositions that can inspire and assist in the work of
public engagement. If we are preparing students for critical citizenship practice, if we want to link
global learning to active forms of social and civic participation, if we want to underline the
importance of ethical frameworks and questions in our study of globality, then I believe that we must
question the adequacy of curricular goals that stress competence and competitiveness. This is
especially important because the goals of global competence often encourage the “training of people
to interact with, and open themselves to, other cultures,” so that they can “build relationship capital”
(Hunter 5). That “relationship capital” might increase one’s job prospects or social network, but it is
also recommended as a form of “soft political power” that “exhibits and shares a nation’s or cultures key values” (ibid. 5).\footnote{Bill Hunter et al. first suggested that globally competent Americans might leverage “soft power” in international settings and, in so doing, make the exercise of “sharp power less likely.” Sharp power, of course, is associated with military force and coercive economic structures. The globally competent American, Hunter argues, is a more humane and attractive ambassador for American values and ideals. Interestingly, Hunter went on to help found the Global Competence Excellence LLC, a consulting and testing firm that specializes in measuring the external and internal global readiness of American military personnel, corporate professionals, and undergraduates seeking education abroad.}

Some have asked if the increased reliance on the rhetoric of global citizenship shouldn’t warrant more optimism about the latent cosmopolitan potential of teaching and learning in higher education. The problem, of course, is that institutional, curricular, and pedagogical initiatives do not often examine what they mean by global citizenship. In the case of the ACPA’s pre-conference workshop, a stated commitment to global citizenship substitutes for a general interest in cross-cultural understanding, enhanced opportunities for student mobility, or education abroad. In the case of The University of North Carolina, the commitment to global citizenship is trumpeted in a mission statement and promotional literature, but otherwise goes unexplained in the curricular and pedagogical work of the institution. In too many instances, the rhetoric redefines global citizenship as a lifestyle choice or a byproduct of openness to international experience, and the ethico-political dimension of global citizenship is eviscerated.

This is not to say that we ought to ban the rhetoric of global citizenship in our curricular or pedagogical work. Generally speaking, I believe that academics are interested in the language of global citizenship for an important reason: such language ties global learning to educational ends that are ethical, engaged, and socially transformative. An open affiliation with the task of preparing students for global citizenship allows academe to refuse a reductively neo-mercantilist, internationalist, or liberal-aesthetic mission. It also underlines and enlarges the historic civic role of
higher education—especially that of public universities—and, in so doing, affirms the continued importance of the public interest. And, even though our understanding of what constitutes global citizenship may remain an open question, the language of global citizenship, nonetheless, seems to be a legible way of naming the desire for commitments and responsibilities that exceed the nation-state. So these are important reasons to encourage the continued—and, to some extent, exploratory—use of the rhetoric of global citizenship in curricular and pedagogical contexts. We now need to do more to compel a larger conversation on what we mean when we appeal to the value of global citizenship. We also need to think more seriously about the centrality of ethico-political questions for education for global citizenship, and, when those questions are absent, we need to reconsider our willingness to promote institutional, curricular, and pedagogical initiatives as consonant with the ends of global citizenship.

At the same time, I want to suggest that we would benefit from an even bolder move: the exploration of a model of citizenship identity and practice that includes a commitment to global citizenship but also affirms other forms of civic belonging. In other words, I am suggesting that we enlarge our view once more, and explore what is gained by thinking citizenship from a critical cosmopolitan perspective.

**Thinking Otherwise: Critical Cosmopolitan Citizenship**

I do not recommend education in critical cosmopolitan citizenship because global citizenship is an unproductive, futile, or tired aspirational goal. The fact that colleges and universities are struggling with what it means to prepare students for informed and responsible global citizenship is noteworthy, and I want to continue to support that exploration. But it is also true that I have come to believe that new and even more complex conversations about critical citizenship practice
become possible if we borrow a cosmopolitan language to describe both the socio-political realities we face as well as the pedagogical goals we want to achieve.

In what ways might the goal of critical cosmopolitan—rather than global—citizenship introduce new and compelling questions for pedagogical practice? As I have mentioned in this project, I believe that critical cosmopolitanism is a discourse that acknowledges that we can occupy a multiplicity of subject positions, civic identities, and forms of belonging. Unfortunately, when we imagine global citizenship as the “other” to local and more immediate forms of civic belonging, we feed a binary understanding of civic identity and practice that inhibits our ability to maintain multiple sites of political responsibility. And the truth is that an increasing number of contemporary citizens feel responsible for—as well as invested in—various communities of fate and choice: local, sub-state, national, and transnational. We know that national allegiance no longer monopolizes civic attachment and obligation. We know that many people—especially young people—understand scale and allegiance as flexible and transient. This means that our affinities of scale, or civic attachments and commitments, are capable of shifting, overlapping, and reconstituting themselves in novel ways.

So how do we represent this new understanding of citizenship as multiple, evolving, and elastic? I am not sure that the notion of global citizenship adequately captures the complex and heterogeneous nature of contemporary citizenship, for too often global citizenship is positioned as an alternative or more expansive form of civic identification than local or national ties. Critical cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, insists on the multi-dimensionality and variability of contemporary citizenship. And, because we can acknowledge that “identity is complex and multiple,” we must also “allow for multi-placed, multi-scaled and multilayered forms of [civic]

91 See Mitchell and Parker for the most persuasive account of this.
identification” (Molz 520). We must allow for civic attachments and obligations that transgress local, national, and transnational boundaries

Unfortunately, the national versus global citizenship debate—often erroneously represented as the battle between patriotism and cosmopolitanism—is “predicated on the false premise that you can’t have both . . . that’s why cosmopolitan citizenship is the only kind of citizenship that makes sense” (Davies and Pike “Global Citizenship” 67). Critical cosmopolitan citizenship recognizes that “human loyalties are sub-state and transnational, as well as national, in orientation” (Linklater 29), and, for this reason, it is able to affirm the significance of global or transnational forms of citizenship at the same time it underscores the value of civic attachment in more bounded communities. It is important that we affirm multiple forms of citizenship, that we refuse to “draw sharp and continuous distinctions between national and global allegiances” (Mitchell and Parker 10), because such distinctions only reify place-scales and ignore the ways in which they are related to one another.

Critical cosmopolitan citizenship, however, allows students to own simultaneous and diverse forms of civic belonging and responsibility. It also encourages students to reject any understanding of citizenship that is predicated on a false choice between local, regional, or national identifications and global or transnational commitments. For these reasons, I believe that a critical cosmopolitan—rather than, strictly speaking, ‘global’ or ‘local’—model of citizenship offers an especially useful and robust model of civic engagement for critical pedagogical work. Because we can recognize the permeability and interdependence of the global and the local, we are capable of seeing public participation as something that impacts multiple socio-spatial locations. This reaffirms that we “have the capacity to live ethically in both the global and the local, in the proximate and distant

* Increasingly, service learning initiatives are trying to find a language for this “global/local” dimension of engagement. A critical cosmopolitan framework would be a great help here, as it represents the global and the local as internally related and, thus, in a complex dialogue with one another.
simultaneously” (Szerszynski and Urry 471). And, because we can “perceive the temporal, hybrid, and constructed nature of contemporary identities,” we are less likely to be “reliant on ongoing, received structures of meaning” that tell us that we must belong to a single territorial polity in order to be legible to others and delimit our responsibilities (Mitchell and Parker 11).

It is also true that critical cosmopolitan citizenship, like global citizenship, is fundamentally different from territorial brands of citizenship politics because “it is not based on practices of exclusion, partiality, and discrimination but, rather, on an expanding sense of inclusion, impartiality, and non-discrimination.” (Whitehead 507) This means that a cosmopolitan citizen “will have no other group in contrast with whom they can consolidate their group identity” (Heater “Cosmopolitan Thinking” 185). In other words, because critical cosmopolitan citizenship is not founded on an exclusionary premise, there is no clear “other” against whom the cosmopolitan citizen can define herself. Indeed, the cosmopolitan citizen maintains multiple sites of political responsibility and attachment. This makes it that much more difficult to imagine citizenship as an opportunity to exercise “exclusionary entitlements.” Certainly, some critics have questioned the viability of a citizenship model that does not secure civic identity or group loyalty without an excluded other.93 Who does the critical cosmopolitan define herself against? Without the benefit of a larger non-citizenry, how does she understand the limits of social responsibility? Does the lack of an excluded other precipitate what Ulrich Beck calls an “exclusion crisis,” and, if so, how does the would-be critical cosmopolitan resolve this? These are important pedagogical questions, as they go to the complexity of socio-spatial forms of belonging, political responsibility, and identity formation in the

93 Charles Taylor, a communitarian critic, asserts that “the societies that we are striving to create require strong identification on the part of their citizens; they need a strong sense of allegiance. This is not only commitment to common project, but also a special sense of bonding among people working together... Modern democratic states require a great deal of their members, demanding much greater solidarity toward compatriots than toward humanity in general” (120) And Anthony Appiah, a cosmopolitan sympathizer, asks it another way: “Do we need an out-group to generate the binding energy that every in-group needs?” (“Ethics” 98)
21st century. Such questions inform critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning, and, as I see it, they are questions that rightly complicate more traditional forms of global education, especially global learning that dichotomizes and reifies the spaces of the global and local.

In many ways, I believe that the critical cosmopolitan citizen offers us a radically expanded and experimental version of civic identity. She does not “look nostalgically at the political citizens of the past, but opens up possibilities for a politics and citizenship of the future” (Skelly 24). Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy benefits from this forward and outward-looking approach to participation in public life, for teaching and learning is given the opportunity to be both speculative and utopian. The critical cosmopolitan citizen can “stretch the spatio-temporal matrix” (Whitehead 150), and redefine belonging not only to distant places but also for future generations.

A Complex Engagement with Otherness

The other is the horizon of selfhood.

Richard Kearney
*Strangers, Gods, and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness*

Critical cosmopolitan questions about the constitution of self and other, or the relationship between inclusive and exclusive forms of identity and belonging, powerfully shape and inform critical cosmopolitan pedagogies.

I have been careful to argue that critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is *complexly engaged with otherness* for a number of reasons. First, it is important to understand that there are many ways that we can define the “other,” and the distinctions are critically significant. We can, for example, talk about others in the most colloquial sense, understanding it as shorthand for other people who have material lives and exist independently of our perception of them. We can talk about the other in a more sociological sense if we define it as an “abjected effect of a ‘power’ that works through
exclusion, hierarchy, and projection” (Dikecs 7). A person, in such a conception, does not “other” herself; she finds herself othered because she is disaffiliated or stigmatized by a society or group. We can also talk about yet another version of the other that is informed by psychoanalysis. Such a version would understand the other as the ego’s projected or phantasmatic conception of a person.94

Now it is true that cross-cultural learning is generally invested in the study of other people, or people who are believed to be culturally different from oneself. Cross-cultural learning is also interested in challenging the ostracization and subordination of groups that have been othered by dominant culture. No doubt about it: this is important political and pedagogical work. However, critical cosmopolitan education is additionally interested in examining the social and psychic processes of inclusion and exclusion that allow one to postulate the category of the other in the first place.

For we know that coherent identity is often—and, some would argue, only—achieved through the process of excluding and denigrating forms of otherness. We have to come to understand that “identity is a narrative: a story people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not)” (Yuval Davis 202). Identity is deeply invested in the question of the other, so a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy needs to more fully explore the way that the category of the other is imagined, deployed, and complicated in identity formation.

At the same time, it is important that we understand that critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is equally engaged with more radical forms of otherness, or alterity. It is also possible to see the other

94 Psychoanalysis distinguishes between an other and the Other. The Other tends to represent the symbolic order, or the field of language that exists outside of and constitutes the self. It has some ties with the radical alterity that we will soon discuss—largely because it cannot be assimilated—but the psychoanalytic conception of the Other is the product of signification alone.
as “that which is outside what can be claimed by the self,” and, therefore, irreducible (Frosh “Melancholy” 375). For Emmanuel Levinas and other philosophers of alterity, “the Other lies absolutely beyond [one’s] comprehension and should be preserved in all its [radical] strangeness” (Davis 3). Western philosophy, however, has proven incapable of allowing the other to remain other—in other words, to remain incomprehensible and unknown. Levinas argues that conventional philosophy continues to look for ways to domesticate or annul the other, reduce it to the same, and “offset the shock of alterity” (ibid. 40). The challenge for critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning is to think about radical otherness in ways that “protect the other from the aggressions of the same, analyse the possibilities and conditions of its appearances in our lives, and formulate the ethical significance of the encounter with it” (ibid. 3). In other words, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy should desire and encourage the otherness of the other as a way of putting the self in question.95

Engaging with the Other

Many versions of cosmopolitanism—especially cultural cosmopolitanism—stress the importance of an “openness to all forms of otherness, usually associated with an appreciation of, and interaction with, people from other cultural backgrounds” (Hiebert 212). This “openness to the other” has been likened to an “aesthetic” (Wilson 355), and it tends to be associated with an appetite for divergent cultural experiences and a generalized receptivity to difference. This is the likely way that a “complex engagement with otherness” would be understood in a traditional cosmopolitan pedagogy.

Ulf Hannerz is the perhaps the most vocal and insistent advocate for the cultivation of a “more genuine cosmopolitanism” that is “willing to engage with the other” (“Cosmopolitans” 239).

95 The stranger, we will see, is the most emblematic figure of alterity, or radical otherness.
For Hannerz, such engagement “entails a certain metacultural position,” an ability to transcend the particularities of one’s home culture and engage with a plurality of cultures and customs. Although Hannerz sees the ideal cosmopolitan figure as highly mobile, he does not believe that mobility alone guarantees a cosmopolitan orientation, for it is possible for a traveler to refuse the “metacultural position” that Hannerz believes is crucial for authentic cosmopolitanism. The “metacultural position,” is, in fact, an “orientation” that must be cultivated by the acquisition of intercultural competencies and the development of a more personal “readiness,” or “an ability to make one’s way into other cultures, through looking, intuiting, and reflecting” (ibid.)

Hannerz’s deep appreciation of the value of cultural diversity and divergent experience would later inspire John Urry’s model of “aesthetic cosmopolitanism,” an iteration of cosmopolitanism that presents the ideal cosmopolitan figure as a curious, open, and reflexive subject who delights in and desires to consume difference. Educators that want to teach for cosmopolitan ends may see such “aesthetic cosmopolitanism” as the pedagogical goal, as it encourages a more expansive interest in that which is unfamiliar and unknown. And, in this, it seems to support a less fearful and fitful relationship to otherness. But there are limitations to this perspective, and we need to be mindful of them as we develop our pedagogical practice.

Unlike many forms of cultural cosmopolitanism, critical cosmopolitanism is aware of and concerned about the tendency to appropriate the other, especially when that other is consumed as part of a larger and unobserved experiential encounter. Critical cosmopolitanism also acknowledges that “diversity can be packaged for consumer tastes” and, as a result, “most people claim only the familiar parts of what diversity has on offer” (Calhoun “Class” 104). Indeed, a full encounter with the other might not only be estranging, it might also prove “acutely difficult,” for there is frequently “real

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96 See Urry’s Consuming Places for a more comprehensive formulation of aesthetic cosmopolitanism.
discomfort” in the process of coming to know difference (Heilman 196). Such discomfort is rarely mentioned in cultural cosmopolitan accounts of culturally diverse encounters, as the constitutional openness of the cosmopolitan is believed to protect her from uneasiness and anxiety. But discomfort and anxiety are affective responses that we want to anticipate and understand better if our critical cosmopolitan pedagogy intends to engage fully and complexly with otherness.97

**Stranger Danger**

The stranger is a bearer of a new kind of freedom. It is dislocating to encounter the strange.

Richard Sennett  
*Cosmopolitanism and the Social Experience of Cities*

As I mentioned earlier, the stranger stands as an emblematic figure of an unassimilable otherness. Indeed, the stranger personifies otherness. The stranger is the subject that the self can’t recognize. The stranger is the other that the self cannot comprehend with the frameworks that it has been given. The stranger, much like the conceptual frame of the “global,” exists elsewhere, in the space where we are not. For these reasons, the stranger represents a radical form of alterity and “operates as a limit-experience for humans trying to identify themselves over and against others” (Kearney 3).

Certainly, there are anxieties that are generated by sustained attention to the stranger, or distant other, in critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. Although I am interested generally in the ways that human beings manage and limit their encounters with otherness, I am here focused on pedagogical encounters with difference, especially those encounters with ‘others’ who are represented as strangers in distress. If cosmopolitanism is a “deliberate attempt to make space for the stranger” (Ossewaarde

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97 Megan Boler calls for a pedagogy of discomfort in her *Feeling Power*. Such a pedagogy would work through anxieties about ambiguity and uncertainty as well as defensive anger in response to change and fear of loss.
384), a stranger that traditionally has been characterized as a figure of civic and moral exclusion, then
critical cosmopolitan pedagogies challenge the reactive boundary-making of citizenship and identity alike.

Indeed, a critical cosmopolitan perspective must acknowledge what Ulrich Beck calls the
“otherness of the other.” Put another way, we must learn to let the other be as other. This means
that we must allow for the alterity of the stranger, the ways in which the stranger profoundly
provokes us, and the ways in which the stranger delivers us to the site of the uncanny—a place that
embodies “strangeness and the destabilization of borders, frames, and boundaries” (Royle
“Thinking” 10). Indeed, the stranger seems to disrupt the very coherence of the subject, and, for
Sharon Todd, this can be a “traumatizing” event, as “one risks altering one’s self-perception and
one’s place in the world, and risks losing one’s bearings and conventions” (11). For all of these
reasons, pedagogical resistance to an encounter with alterity is not unexpected and, in many ways, it
should be entirely understandable why a person might become resistant as a way of minimizing
trauma and unsettlement.

We also can recognize why the larger temptation in pedagogy is to ‘exclude the otherness of
the other’ as a way of simultaneously familiarizing the strange and containing the political and psychic
anxieties raised by it. For we have every reason to believe that a “vigilant attentiveness to the Other”
(Beck “Society” 21) will require something radically different of pedagogical work. Perhaps the
central and most pressing pedagogical question is: how are we to be “ethically attentive to
strangeness” in a way that does not obviate alterity or escalate anxiety?

Here I believe that Emmanuel Levinas’s work on radical alterity can provide critical
cosmopolitan pedagogy an important critical language for understanding the un-assimilability of
otherness as well as the moral claims raised by the stranger. For Levinas, justice is very much tied to
an “openness to the other beyond the same,” or a refusal to dissolve the other in the “ontology of
This is one way of preserving our fundamental responsibility to the other, a responsibility that Levinas insists is prior to subjectivity itself. Of course, in order to fulfill such responsibility, we would need to find a way to acknowledge radical otherness without incorporating or diluting it in the registers of the same. We also need to find a way to hold ourselves accountable to the stranger, despite the fact that we are accustomed to seeing others as “sources of responsibility” only if they are within our universe of moral concern.

**Attending to the Other**

Respect of the other’s otherness is where education originates.

Deborah Britzman

Because I believe that critical questions about one’s relationship to otherness and alterity are central to critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, we ought to consider the difficulty—and the anxiety—raised by these pedagogical “attempts to make [psychic and moral] space for the stranger.” Put another way, we ought to consider what a “vigilant attentiveness to the Other” might mean for critical educational practice. Should critical cosmopolitan pedagogy encourage empathic identifications with the stranger? Should it insist on compassion for the suffering other? Or is it more important to “acknowledge strangeness within the self” as a way of unsettling the self/other binary in the first place? Put simply, what is at stake when we think together about our relationship to responsibility and otherness, an intersection that Jacques Derrida has insisted is the site of ethicality itself?

More often than not, empathy is presumed to “lead to a better kind of responsivity and . . . responsibility [for the other]” (Todd 43), but many critics—including Troy Jollimore, Deborah Britzman, Megan Boler, Dominick LaCapra, and Sharon Todd—have questioned the assumption that such empathy can be rightly demanded or directed in pedagogical situation.
Boler argues that passive empathy “produces no action toward justice” nor does it “engage the [student] in an encounter with strangeness and the uncanny” (169). Instead, passive empathy encourages a safe and untroubled identification with a suffering other. It works to reassure a person that the other—as well as the suffering that the other experiences—is legible and familiar. This becomes a way that “the more privileged [can] incorporate their sense of the other in order to keep their own identities uncontested and immutable” (Britzman “Lost” 87). Troy Jollimore additionally worries that empathy and other expressions of compassion allow a privileged person to “take pleasure in [her] own sense of empathy and virtue rather than do the hard work of coming to a genuine understanding of what the other requires” (378). This understanding may demand a deeper investigation of “the nature of subjugated knowledges” than the privileged may think it necessary to acquire (Bates 107). It may also demand that the privileged reject instrumentalizing the other as the price of understanding her. For instrumentalization is designed to guarantee that that other meet moral expectations as well as provide appropriate forms of gratitude or reciprocity.

Instead, Dominick LaCapra has suggested that we seek what he calls empathic unsettlement, a willingness to "be responsive to the traumatic experience of others" (“Writing” 41), at the same time that we insist on an empathy that "resists full identification with, and appropriation of, the experience of the other” (ibid. 79). If we “recognize that another’s loss is not identical to [our] own loss,” LaCapra believes that we open room for a fuller and more honest encounter with the alterity of the other (ibid.).

In the classroom, however, I do understand that the cultivation of a “compassionate imagination,” or the capacity to recognize and empathize with the unwarranted suffering of another, appears to be a more popular and direct route for encouraging students to consider the extent of their responsibility to the other. Martha Nussbaum famously argues that such an imagination is a
prerequisite for the development of a cosmopolitan sensibility. But there are rightful worries that such an imagination is deeply dependent on the “generous imaginings” of the privileged and, thus, “the fate of another person [becomes] contingent on the generosity and wisdom of the imaginer” (Scarry 106).

Certainly, it is important for a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy to openly confront these questions about our relationship and responsibility to the other. It is also important for a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical practice to acknowledge the many ways in which we are deeply strange to ourselves (Robbins “Feeling” 21). For it not only the other that eludes our understanding, it is also the self. And, if educators and students could allow this truth to trouble the self-other binary that allows for no relationality or learning from the other, opportunities for meaningful solidarity might become possible. Not a solidarity based on identicality, but a solidarity based on the shared experience of precarity as well as the “shared feeling for dignity in the face of the inevitable vulnerability of existence” (Edkins “Humanitarianism” 257). Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy speaks to ethicality—the relationship between otherness and responsibility—in this voice and with this hope.

See *Cultivating Humanity* for a more thorough defense of the role of literature in securing ‘compassionate imagination’ and, by extension, civic responsibility.

Especially the unconscious, which Lacan insisted was another name for the Other.

See Judith Butler’s *Precarious Life* for a considered reading of the way that human community is made possible by vulnerability and loss. And see Nancy Ettlinger’s “Precarity Unbound” for a fuller conversation on the role of precarity in shaping the human need for essentialist thinking.
Chapter Four
Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogy: Sensibilities

Here is the point when it is right to acknowledge that cosmopolitanism is, also and foundationally, a disposition. Although we have recognized that the historic aspirations of cosmopolitanism have privileged moral or legal ends, Ulf Hannerz argues that it may be better understood as a ‘perspective, a state of mind, or . . . a mode of managing meaning’ (238). This sense that cosmopolitanism first and foremost is an orientation is especially relevant for efforts to imagine critical pedagogies that model or encourage a cosmopolitan outlook. For if we understand cosmopolitanism as a “way of thinking about change . . . [and] characterizing our being-in-the-world” (Hansen et al.), if we understand cosmopolitanism as a desirable orientation rather than a fixed set of ideas or content area, then we authorize the cosmopolitan pedagogical project to invest in the critical dispositions and habits of mind central to meaningful cosmopolitan citizenship rather than content-driven outcomes. This is not to say that substantive global knowledge—largely focused on the acquisition of information and attainment of competencies—is an unimportant facet of cosmopolitan education, but critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is also and uniquely attentive to the ways in which cosmopolitanism is itself an orientation, an outlook, a “perceptual” framework for understanding subjectivities and solidarities that are not entirely local.

Global educators have long stressed the need to address the “perceptual” dimension of all global learning. Roland Case, in particular, has emphasized the significant shaping power of this perceptual dimension for globally conscious education. As Case sees it, the perceptual contribution is best defined as the “various intellectual values, dispositions, and attitudes that distinguish a parochial perspective from a broad-minded perspective” (320). These “values, dispositions, and
attitudes” crucially inform—and, not infrequently, decide—the receptivity of a student to larger and more challenging questions about global and transnational responsibility. This much we know. However we define it, the “broad-minded perspective” is made more likely when academics foreground and support those attributes that affirm the value of world-mindedness. More difficult, I would contend, is the task of naming the “values, dispositions, and attitudes” that specifically lend the critical cosmopolitan pedagogical project its practical and ethical resonance.

It is my central contention that a critical cosmopolitan orientation—necessarily self-reflexive, heightened in its care and responsibility for the world, and challenging of routine forms of cynicism—is the dispositional goal of critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. This orientation is shaped by powerful perceptual and affective factors, some clearly more conscious than others. So, if a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is the goal, we must examine the forces that combine to recommend or reject a cosmopolitan outlook.

A Capacity for Self-Reflexivity

Perhaps the attribute that is most clearly foundational to a critical cosmopolitan orientation is self-reflexivity, or the capacity to critically examine and reflect upon one’s habits of thought and feeling. Arguing that cosmopolitanism is a “disposition characterized by a reflexive relation to one’s identity [as well as] a refusal to accept the given situations in which one finds oneself” (“Citizenship” 45), Gerald Delanty explicitly links self-reflexivity with the larger and uncommon ability to be critical of one’s habits and convention. In so doing, Delanty draws attention to one significant requirement of self-reflexive thinking: we must be able sustain some intellectual and emotional distance from the

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101 Case catalogues what he believes to be five key elements of the “perceptual dimension” of global education: open-mindedness, anticipation of complexity, resistance to stereotyping, inclination to empathize, and nonchauvinism (320).
“naturalness and inevitability that surrounds our own practices” (Nussbaum “Cultivating” 55). This is, without doubt, a difficult psychological task, as self-reflexivity not only asks us to observe our habits and values in ways that are defamiliarizing, but it also asks us to evaluate the unexamined moral assumptions that guide our thinking and feeling. Because cosmopolitan values accentuate “critical and transformative self-understanding” (“Citizenship” 45), it is crucial that cosmopolitanism embrace such an openly self-reflexive relation to identity.

Other critics, like Bryan Turner, also emphasize the central significance of self-reflexivity for the cosmopolitan project. However, Turner is more specific and, ultimately, more challenging in his reading of it. As Turner understands it, cosmopolitanism requires a “reflexive distance from one’s homeland,” or an effective “intellectual distance” from local affiliations, in order to open room to contest “one’s own cultural context and other cultural values” (“Virtue” 57). In and of itself, this distancing effect is not incompatible with self-reflexivity, for self-reflexive thinking is often estranging from that which is familiar. Turner, however, chooses to identify this capacity for “reflexive distance” with a form of “cosmopolitan virtue”: irony. Contending that the cosmopolitan disposition is necessarily an ironic one, Turner contends that an “an ironic skepticism and distance from one’s own traditions” can invite new and unpracticed identifications with other traditions or values.

Even so, it is fair to worry that the achievement of ironic distance on one’s situation—like irony itself—is a bit unpredictable as a moral or political motivator. William Smith makes this point when he observes that “an ironic disposition can inform the way we think about our commitments, but it will not necessarily make us more likely to act on our commitments” (41). Put another way, if a reflexive relationship to one’s identity is understood entirely as an ironic one, then “introspection and apathy” may prove just as likely and reasonable an outcome as “care and engagement” (Smith 42).
Such is the inherent ambiguity and double-edged character of irony. For this reason, I argue that critical cosmopolitan pedagogy must define self-reflexivity in ways that mobilize its progressive potential—in short, its ability to catalyze transformative thought and action—rather than its observational acuity solely. When self-reflexivity is entirely ironized or uncoupled from engagement, our willingness to “act on our cosmopolitan obligations” may begin to feel optional. And, while I can acknowledge that certain forms of global education might be satisfied with the ends of awareness-raising, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy encourages self-reflexivity as a first intellectual and political exercise.

Now would be a good time to concede that self-reflexivity bears a structural resemblance to perspectival consciousness, an oft-cited perceptual goal for global education. First defined by Robert Hanvey, perspectival consciousness is generally understood as “the awareness that one’s worldview is not universally shared nor necessarily right” (Burnouf 50). Pointing out that a perspectival consciousness encourages an individual to accept that “[his or her] view of the world has been and continues to be shaped by influences that often escape conscious detection,” Hanvey explains that a good part of exploring one’s worldview entails making conscious the ideas and values that are deciding one’s being in the world. Indeed, perspectival consciousness, like self-reflexivity, relies on the willingness of the individual to self-interrogate and, when necessary, “doubt the unqualified goodness of one’s own ways” (Nussbaum “Cultivating” 83). For this reason, it is an important opening gambit in critical cosmopolitan pedagogical practice. Before students can imagine their lives in a cosmopolitan context, they must be offered a space in which they can articulate and examine the values that they believe are central to their own identity. Pedagogical work begins with such ‘local knowledge’, not only because it is ready and familiar, but also because it exists in a necessary and dynamic relationship with the global. Like new cosmopolitanism more generally,
critical cosmopolitanism underscores the importance of seeing local and global identities as synergistic, and this is why a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy must open teaching and learning to questions that complicate the link between social location and subjectivity. Indeed, identifying that one has a situated perspective and that one’s value system is a particular one is a crucial first step in engaging with multiple and competing perspectives in local, national, and transnational communities.

Even so, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy must be wary of ignoring the role that power and social location play in shaping one’s perspectival consciousness (Merryfield “Decolonizing” 280). Material or political privilege can deter a deeper understanding of non-dominant or denaturalized worldviews.¹°² Such privilege can generate powerful—and often unconscious—forms of resistance to critical cosmopolitan pedagogical work that examines the partiality and protectionism of perspective. There can also be an unacknowledged class dimension to self-reflexivity. Educators need to recognize that the task of critical self-reflection can be differently encouraged and sanctioned for those with more social and cultural capital.

For all these reasons, we need to acknowledge that perspectival consciousness, like self-reflexivity, may serve as a crucial consciousness-raising tool, but it offers no guarantee that it will inspire commitment to meaningful change or action in the world. Cosmopolitanism, however, is an ethos generally dedicated to the premise that one is obligated to “try to make the world something other than what it is” (Harvey 560). Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, in turn, needs to understand

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¹°² Grant Cornwell laments that “[increased] understanding should entail an ethical unwillingness to continue to enjoy and benefit from privilege,” but there is no necessary correlation between the revelation of one’s role in perpetuating systems of privilege and one’s desire to disown that role.
self-reflexivity or the cultivation of a perspectival consciousness as an impetus for more transformational and involved forms of growth.\textsuperscript{103}

I do understand that there are a number of critical pedagogies that appear to be entirely satisfied with the dispositional goal of self-reflexivity. This can present as a challenge for the critical cosmopolitan educator who is interested in harnessing the hard work of self-interrogation for more decidedly ethical or political ends.

Perhaps the traditional humanities educator faces this challenge more acutely than most.\textsuperscript{104} Insofar as the disciplinary humanities are expected to cultivate and champion the habits of self-inquiry, traditional humanities educators may believe that they are required to place a priority on self-reflexivity or perspectival thinking in their pedagogical work. Whether humanities students trouble their assumptions outright or by way of a pedagogical encounter with identified “others,” they are often encouraged to keep questions and complications trained on their own subjectivity. And, while there is absolutely nothing trivial about the pedagogical work of self-reflexivity, its ethical reach would be enhanced considerably if students and educators were challenged to translate self-interrogation into new forms of being and doing. My worry is that self-reflexivity that does not culminate in concrete and lasting transformations—in one’s self, in one’s actions in the world—runs the risk of solipsism. And critical cosmopolitanism, by definition, denounces the practical and moral sufficiency of self-absorption and self-interest.

\textsuperscript{103} Ania Spyra amplifies this: “Transformation, as freedom of movement and change, rests at the heart of any definition of cosmopolitanism” (7).

\textsuperscript{104} I’m focused on the traditional humanities educator here. I recognize that many who work and teach in the humanities are interested in intellectual work that more complexly contextualizes and demythologizes the “self.”
Object Lesson: Radicalizing Self-Reflexivity in Otterbein’s Integrative Studies Curriculum

At my home institution, we faced a significant challenge to our curricular revision from a small group of humanists who were deeply concerned that a globally conscious general education core would devalue the self-reflexive goals that historically have shaped the program as well as the traditional humanities. In a college-wide email, one faculty member expressed worry that a “strong, and perhaps exclusive, emphasis on the theme of the World and of society . . . would marginalize or dismiss one of the central goals of a liberal arts education: to foster each individual student’s effort to come to terms with his or her own life, his or her own being in the world and in relation to what is ultimate” (personal communication, 4 October 2009). Faculty were warned that curricular attention to the global would inevitably “marginalize or dismiss” the deeply personal, even existential, tasks of liberal learning. Without a primary emphasis on “an individual student’s effort to come to terms with his or her own life,” we were told that a general education curriculum would fail to deliver on the primary purpose of the liberal arts. And that purpose, as it appears to be represented here, is the deepening and complication of the self qua self. Even more, because subjectivity is made synonymous with interiority, a curriculum that takes seriously the complexities of "World and society" (sic.) is imagined to devalue the crucial and critical work of self-reflection. Insofar as the self engages its social and historical conditions, we are told that it is distracted from a fuller consideration of its inwardness. And, for this reason, the author suggests that the decision to prioritize global forms of inquiry in Integrative Studies is "equivalent to the dehumanization and despiritualization of our curriculum” (ibid.)

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105 As I’ve mentioned, the Integrative Studies curriculum has been focused on the question of human nature for over thirty years. This emphasis has allowed the humanities to dominate the required courses in the core (five of the ten are centered in the humanities; comparatively, there is only one social science, one arts, two science, and one global perspectives requirement).
This argument is interesting to me because of its many presuppositions. Most significantly, it appears to call for a curricular and pedagogical practice that returns all inquiry to the self, and the world—however that is understood—is externalized as a problem for the self to accept or decline. Pedagogically speaking, the self is encouraged to prioritize its own introspection, its own habits of mind and feeling, and its own spiritual progress. When realized in the general education curriculum, it is hard not to see it as a highly traditional and deeply introverted humanist project. Such a project is troubling, not because it underlines the value of self-reflective work, but because it fetishizes the self as agent entirely outside of culture and history. Self-reflexivity, in such an instance, directs the self to investigate its own being, and then that being is encouraged to understand and question itself apart from its social conditions. If we decide to make visible an engagement with “the world and society” we are told that the self suffers and is dislocated from its primary existential tasks. If the curriculum is outward-looking in any way, we are warned that it invites “dehumanization”—presumably, in terms of what students learn as well as the form that that learning takes.

Obviously, the “world” is described here in largely mechanistic ways. It—and, by extension, global inquiry—are counterposed to individual actors who seek an unmediated and authentic relationship to their lives. Too readily imagined as a hegemonic structure, the “world” is cast as an enemy of human inwardness, freedom, and particularity. And self-reflexive work—identified here with an “individual student's effort to come to terms with his or her own life”—is presented as the rightful antidote to such “depersonalization and despiritualization.” Some of this, as I have mentioned, is the product of a traditional humanist romance with the individual self, where the self is constrained by—and set in some necessary opposition to—the social. But some of this is also the product of a larger worry about the loss of the local instance, whether particularity of place or person. The global continues to be read as a metonym for engulfment. It continues to be over-
identified with structural forms of domination that disallow heterogeneity and meaningful resistance. Thus, when we reinforce an antagonism between the “world” and a more inward self, we wind up reviving the old dualism of structure and agency, the inflexible opposition of the macro-social and the micro-individual.

A critically cosmopolitan pedagogy, however, insists on the mutual implication of self and world. Because the self is situated—not placed, as a vase might be set on a table—we need to teach for a greater understanding of the way that the self informs, and is informed by, its context. For this we know: it is neither possible nor desirable to examine the self apart from the social and historical conditions of its emergence (Butler Account 7). That requires us to see the task of self-reflexivity as less of an end than a means, a pedagogical invitation to engage and enlarge the subject’s frame of reference rather than affirm its desire to self-enclose and seclude itself within its own thought.

An Enlarged Understanding of Cosmopolitan Responsibility

For this reason, another defining feature of a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical orientation is an enlarged understanding of cosmopolitan responsibility. As I see it, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy does not seek to prescribe a student’s personal or social responsibilities, but it does take seriously the notion that persons are accountable for actions that contribute to unjust outcomes. It also takes seriously the notion that persons might have positive obligations—in other words, a responsibility to help others in distress—even if they have not contributed to the reason for the distress.

106 That context, I have argued, is best understood as cosmopolitan in character, so we should always work to see the self in conversation with global-local contexts that admit multiple and flexible forms of belonging and identification.
This pedagogical approach does not negate other ways of understanding responsibility. It only underlines the fact that responsibility can be—and often is—something other than an elective moral choice. I say this because it is not uncommon for responsibility to be imagined in these more voluntary terms. Many people believe that they have an option to own or disown responsibility for the environmental impact of their consumption rate, transportation, size of family, or diet. Some of the prevailing and popular discourse on personal and social responsibility in higher education reinforces such thinking, as a student is encouraged to tie responsible action to those choices that she has elected to value and investigate (i.e. issues of academic integrity or the excellence of her work and work ethic). 107

Sometimes responsibility is a voluntary matter. But sometimes one is responsible even though one has not intended to cause harm (as in the case for much structural injustice), one has played a less directive role in orchestrating an unjust outcome, or one has not benefited from the process that contributed to the unjust outcome. This understanding of responsibility is more diffuse and difficult to track, but it is an important component of any ethical exploration of transnational obligations as well as the obligations that extend from any encounter with hierarchical forms of difference.

It is important to recognize that critical cosmopolitan learning emphasizes responsibility as something that people extend to one another because our lives interdepend and are implicated in one another; responsibility is not something that relies on the goodwill of some to recognize the suffering of others. This is too unidirectional, too voluntary, and often too paternalistic in its assumption

107 Some of the AACU’s work in the Core Commitments: Educating Students for Personal and Social Responsibility initiative is focused on these personal moralities. The moralities are centered on institutional forms of honor as well as the ethics of quality work and high productivity.
about the need for rescue rather than care. Doreen Massey, a prominent cultural geographer, explains it this way: “Responsibility in some accounts can be read in terms of a one-way-ness which itself arrogates unto the 'responsible' figure the superiority of a position of power. What is perhaps crucial is the more complex issue of implication; it is this which thinking relationally (the mutual constitution of the global and the local) can bring to the fore” (For Space 194). Massey stresses the fact that the near and far are constitutively related, mutually implicated, and co-responsible for one another. Thus, the “one-way-ness” that structures many understandings of responsibility—especially when it is coupled with aggressively advertised forms of rescue—can prop asymmetries of power, as well as prevent people from choosing to act in the name of a relational ethic.

For this reason, I believe that critical cosmopolitan pedagogy invites a more nuanced reading of the motives for and expression of responsibility. It also entertains the idea that our ethical obligations might extend to those who normally are excluded from our moral horizons, and they might extend for reasons that are not grounded in charity or pity.

Unlike other forms of global education that may privilege cross-cultural inquiry or the acquisition of global competences, critical cosmopolitan learning foregrounds an exploration of the complex ethical obligations that persons may owe to the human community or, alternatively, the global public good. These obligations have been described as “solidaristic,” as they encourage “substantive ethical obligations across national boundaries” (Gasper 1230). We know that such solidaristic obligations frequently join ties of solidarity with a more generalized responsibility for the other. That solidarity can be thick or thin, but it tends to be grounded in some version of a

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108 Friedrich Nietzsche believed that rescue often conceals the desire for domination. See The Will to Power.
universalistic ethic. And, as we have discussed, the critical cosmopolitan rethinking of universality has opened important ways of imagining a more situated and contextual version of these moral ties.

Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy benefits from such an invigorated understanding of responsibility, but, as we have seen in Chapter Four, there are also significant challenges to an educational practice that insists on complicating straightforward understandings of what we might owe the other. Pedagogically speaking, the other marks a threshold of accountability, and, when that threshold begins to migrate, identity—based, as it so often is, on clear markers of inclusion and exclusion—begins to feel indistinct and besieged. Enlarged responsibility to the other presents real moral and ontological difficulties for the subject, and critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning can provoke pedagogical crises that cannot always be managed or contained. For it is one thing to grant the other his or her alterity, but it is another thing to assume responsibility for the life and well-being of an other who is both unknown and unknowable. Such responsibility often invites powerful forms of anxiety, despite the fact that Levinas consistently reminds us that responsibility for the other shapes the very structure of subjectivity.

As we speak, I hope that it is becoming increasingly clear that these questions of cosmopolitan responsibility—and, in a related way, cosmopolitan solidarity—are tangled unmistakably in a larger philosophical conversation on global justice. If we, in fact, “owe duties of justice to all persons of the world” (Hayden 50), then what Samuel Schleffer calls our “general responsibilities” to all persons match or outweigh the “special responsibilities” that attach to those in our more immediate network of concern. The achievement of global justice then becomes a challenging distributive problem, as there is no clear consensus how those with “special responsibilities” to the affluent should approach and differently privilege “general responsibilities” to
the larger human community, particularly the global poor. ¹⁰⁹ A number of cosmopolitan thinkers—Peter Singer, Thomas Pogge, and Peter Unger, to name a few—have focused a good part of their critical work on this question of global justice, and nearly all have concentrated on the moral imperative to redistribute global wealth and resources in ways that challenge traditional measures of individual or state accountability.

While some disciplines can engage the questions that surround global justice rather directly, many disciplines ask few questions about justice as a moral or practical ideal, and even fewer extend questions of justice outside of bounded communities. Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy opens a more challenging conversation about the reach of transnational justice as well as the complex relationship between competing versions and scales of justice. How does one reconcile the fact that what is just for distant others may require an altered—and, conceivably—diminished set of entitlements at home? Entitlements often represent themselves as rights—the right to consume without limit, for example—and so, for many citizens in democratic cultures and market economies, the protection of entitlements often feels like a form of justice.

Certainly, social justice pedagogies have been invested in and “marked by a moral concern with those who have been 'othered' and marginalized” (Todd 1), so I want to be clear that there is no shortage of pedagogies that foreground questions about equity and social exclusion. As I see it, however, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is a social justice pedagogy that focuses squarely on the ethical relationship between persons who live in different socio-spatial locations, share complex practical and moral challenges, and, thus, owe one another foundational forms of responsibility. It is

¹⁰⁹ For this reason, Thom Brooks argues that “the plight of the global poor is perhaps the leading moral problem of our time.” See the Introduction to *The Global Justice Reader* (xvii).
a social justice pedagogy that explores what it means to foreground a relational ethic in education for global learning.

**Thinking Otherwise: Responsibility Reconsidered**

As critical cosmopolitan education foregrounds significant questions about a heightened care for the world, it is important to resist focusing cosmopolitan responsibility on the exclusive care of human persons. In fact, a growing number of cosmopolitan thinkers are eager to extend ethical accountability to the “world” in the most expansive sense of the word. And I would agree that a more robust sense of cosmopolitan responsibility would include concern for non-human animals, the natural environment, and future generations.

The question of human responsibility for the well-being of non-human animals is a question that goes to the heart of how political communities ought to govern their treatment of these animals. What is morally owed to them? Do non-human animals merit justice rather than charity? In *Frontiers of Justice*, for example, Martha Nussbaum is keen to extend theories of justice to non-human animals, arguing that we need enlist a capabilities approach in order to guarantee cross-species dignity and “do justice to the complexity of animal lives and their strivings for flourishing” (407). She is part of a small but growing group of cosmopolitan thinkers who are refusing to instrumentalize non-human animals, and their work is generating a paradigmatic shift in what we believe is the proper scope of moral concern and, therefore, accountability.

Other cosmopolitan thinkers have focused more extensively on the link between sustainability and global justice, arguing that we should work to “green” cosmopolitanism and “build

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110 Nussbaum is also refining her thinking on human capabilities, or “minimum core social entitlements,” so that persons are allowed an “ethically attuned wonder before each form of animal life” (406).
Ecological citizenship into being a citizen in this world” (Bendik-Keymer 10). Ecological citizenship, it is argued, requires a moral relationship with the natural world and, because of this, environmental justice emerges as a cosmopolitan priority. Ecological thinking also provides us another way of describing critical cosmopolitan approaches to relationality. David Selby, for example, points out that popular cosmopolitan thought about the value of interdependence can actually prove highly reductive, as interdependence can still “assume an intricate relationship between still separate parts” (89). However, ecological thinking, like critical cosmopolitan discourse, is intent on seeing “the phenomena themselves as processes rather than static components” (ibid.). Such thinking radicalizes the way we conceptualize interdependence, for interdependence is not only re-imagined as necessarily relational and enfolded, it is also recognized as a processual state that can both support and frustrate the demand for equity.\footnote{We should be aware that the desire to see interdependence as “a [state] of reciprocity or mutual dependency” can also be misleading, simply “because many global interconnections reflect grossly unequal dependencies” (Case 320).}

Still other thinkers have reminded us that cosmopolitan responsibility must answer to the demands of intergenerational justice or equity, as “measures intended to improve the prospects of future generations do not represent optional benevolence on our part but are demanded by elementary considerations of justice” (Barry 117).\footnote{Perhaps the largest challenge to intergenerational justice is what Roland Case calls “presentism,” or “a preoccupation with the interests and well-being of current generations to the exclusion of the interests of persons yet to be born into the world.” (324) Insofar as cosmopolitan classrooms centrally advocate the value of sustainability, they will conceptually and practically come up against the prevalence of presentism.} What constitutes our responsibility to future generations is an open and complex question that I believe critical cosmopolitan education is well-situated to ask. Brian Barry suggests that it is helpful for us to understand sustainability as the most significant “inter-temporal distributive question”—that is, the most pressing ethical issue for those concerned with intergenerational justice— but he believes that we will benefit if we leave the core
concept of sustainability amenable to revision and reinterpretation. So, we might begin with the assumption that “there is some X whose value should be maintained, in as far as it lies within our power to do so, into the indefinite future,” but we would “leave open for dispute what the content of X should be” (ibid. 101). We might ask: Are we required to provide equal opportunity for future generations? Are we required to “provide future generations with the opportunity to live good lives according to their conception of what constitutes a good life” (ibid. 104)? Are we required to safeguard natural capital and, if so, are we required to provide a stock that is equivalent to what we possess? Such questions might directly or indirectly inform curricular design and pedagogical practice, and it is important that they not be claimed by any single discipline. The physical and natural sciences might raise questions about sustainable resources, the social sciences might raise questions about equal opportunity and the preservation of human flourishing, the humanities might raise questions about the terms and texture of a “good life” (or what some philosophers would rather call a “livable life”), and the arts might raise questions about the way we represent our relationship to futurity more generally. Because critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning is able to understand responsibility as something that is inter-temporal, I believe that it is positioned to complicate our relationship to distance as well as duration.

**Reining in Responsibility**

There are those who suggest that a certain missionary or proselytizing zeal underscores pedagogical efforts to explore and validate an enlarged sense of cosmopolitan responsibility. Not infrequently, there is deep suspicion that opening one’s pedagogy to questions about extended ethical commitments will diminish the ability of education to deliver on the promise of disinterestedness and
value-neutrality.

As we’ve discussed, this conception of pedagogy refuses to recognize it as a moral or political practice. It also ignores the fact that the “university has always taught (by which I mean examined, evaluated, posited and reinforced) values . . . it not only examines values, it also produces power-laden and value-ridden discourse” (Morrison 4). When we insist on understanding pedagogy as a relatively transparent set of techniques that attach to—and serve—a clearly defined set of learning objectives, it is easier to insist that pedagogical attention to cosmopolitan notions of responsibility is an abdication of the pedagogical enterprise. But, again, this sense that questions about one’s scope of responsibility—to the other, to one’s historical moment, to the futural—are extrinsic to the proper task of teaching is the product of a particular, even if unspoken, premise about the nature of pedagogy in the first place.

It should not be surprising, then, that there are faculty and students who are reluctant to think more seriously and expansively about cosmopolitan versions of responsibility. There is the familiar assumption that talk of responsibility compels responsibility, so some faculty are hesitant to play any role in generating ethical obligation for others. Of course, there is a measure of legitimate concern here, as a more directive form of social justice pedagogy does “risk becoming a form of rhetoric, a form of persuasion that presumes that those who are subject to it do not already know what they need to act morally” (Todd 7). This, however, is not representative of a critical cosmopolitan relationship to ethicality or responsibility. I argue that a critical cosmopolitan educator does not “give up on the capacity of education to be transformative as an ethical practice” (ibid. 8), and that means that it is important for critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning to sustain open

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113 We’ll see this argument again at the end of this chapter when I read Stanley Fish’s *Save the World on Your Own Time.*
and honest dialogue about the way that we conceive of our responsibilities. The dialogue is transformative territory.

**A Resistance to Routine Cynicism**

Finally, I argue that critical cosmopolitan pedagogy must take seriously the many ways that cynicism undercuts the ability of educators and students to entertain cosmopolitan questions and commitments in the classroom. Refusing belief in the virtue and efficacy of action, cynicism stands as a powerful obstruction to the praxis-oriented goals of critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning. For this reason, I believe that critical cosmopolitan pedagogy must carefully examine—and, ultimately, learn how to challenge—cynical presuppositions and postures.

When I phrase things in this way, I understand that it might seem that I am defining a key characteristic of critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning in the negative. Let me clarify. I am not suggesting that the ideal critical cosmopolitan classroom is marked by the absolute absence of cynicism. I do, however, believe that a successful critical cosmopolitan pedagogy will seek to blunt the impact of routine forms of cynicism, and, in so doing, increase the likelihood that students will begin to see themselves as viable historical and political actors. Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy ought to **challenge and resist**—not unduly demonize and purge—routine forms of cynicism when they emerge in the classroom. Seeking to eradicate cynicism in the pedagogical situation is excessively directive, especially if we choose to understand cynicism as a complex defensive formation rather than a straightforward exercise in obstructionism. And, as will become clear, I choose to see cynicism primarily as a defense against the difficulties and risk of action. It, therefore, becomes the task of critical cosmopolitan pedagogy to complicate the conscious and unconscious motives of routine cynicism, rather than strive to banish cynical attitudes from the classroom altogether.
Defining Cynicism

I understand that cynicism has been defined in a wide variety of ways for an even wider set of social contexts. Let me also make clear at the onset that I am interested in exploring the pedagogical implications of modern cynicism. Modern cynicism is generally understood as a cynical sensibility that is both informed by and disillusioned with contemporary social conditions. Fundamentally disappointed in the possibilities of meaningful social transformation and political change, the modern cynic is intensely ambivalent about participation in public life. She is not only distrustful of those who occupy positions of political power, she is also likely to distrust popular efforts to shape public policy or better the social welfare. This is because the modern cynic is deeply skeptical about the capacity of individuals and groups to effect large or lasting changes in the conditions that shape their everyday lives.

Some cultural critics insist on identifying this sensibility with the vagaries of “modern consciousness,” while others prefer to argue that the contemporary cynic represents a “typical postmodern character . . . alienated from society and his own subjectivity” (Bewes 2). This project, however, is not looking to unearth the origin narrative of the modern cynic. Such a task would not be immediately relevant for this work. Whether we see her as the product of mass civic malaise, postmodern exhaustion, or a diminished belief in progress narratives generally, what’s crucial is that we recognize the modern cynic as a historically and culturally specific figure. She emerges in a contemporary social context, and she imagines that her cynicism is a deserved response to the complex political conditions that define—and appear to devitalize—modern public life.

114 See the work of William Chaloupka (“the modern cynical citizen is now a mass figure”) and Wilbur Caldwell (“mass cynicism is ingrained as part of modern consciousness”).
As such, we must not confuse modern cynicism with the cynicism of antiquity. The ancient Cynics—Diogenes, in particular—sought to rebuke conventional values by launching highly satiric and scandalous attacks on social custom. Iconoclastic in thought and shameless in behavior, the earliest Cynics were powerful adversaries of dominant culture, and they sought to offend the truths that were promoted by the philosophical elite. As such, the first proponents of Cynicism were philosophically and politically renegade. They were engaged in an open—even “missionary”—struggle for the right to detach virtue from propriety, and then define virtue in unorthodox and freethinking ways.

Despite its dissident status and powerful criticism of conventional forms of philosophical and political authority, we need to understand the cynicism of antiquity as a discourse significantly shaped by the historical and intellectual traditions of formal philosophy. Over time, however, the “vernacularization” of the term moved it in the direction of something less parodic, less politically edgy, and less oppositional in its character. By the twentieth century, the modern cynic had become identified with a reflexive brand of negativity (or what some have called an “addiction to complaint”), a preference for sarcasm and sardonicism, and a firm disbelief in human goodness or sincerity. Because the modern cynic so often appeared constitutionally distrustful of the motives of

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115 “Deface the currency” was Diogene’s mantra. Read literally or figuratively, it suggests that Diogenes—and the early Cynics—were interested in exposing and scorning the falsity of everyday habit.

116 The Cynics questioned “proper” and conformist understandings of virtuous behavior, just as they denounced those who saw the acquisition of “property” and wealth as the rightful aim of the good life.

117 The one exception is Peter Sloterdijk’s kynicism, a modern rehabilitation of the spontaneous and quick-witted cynicism of Diogenes. Sloterdijk’s kynic is a comic figure, ironic in tone and eager to lampoon power and privilege in all of its guises. As such, Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert might qualify as kynics, but not cynics in the way that I will be describing them here.
others, it was not long before modern cynicism became synonymous with a thoroughgoing pessimism and, at times, misanthropy.

This, of course, is the common and greatly simplified reading of modern cynicism. Whatever its easy appeal, there is no denying that it reduces the cynic to a character type. It also flattens or disappears some of the more complex dimensions of the modern cynical sensibility. When we choose to define the modern cynic solely as a biting ironist or a staunch malcontent, we overlook the nuanced—and often unconscious—motives for most ordinary forms of cynicism. For this reason, if we hope to address cynical resistance to critical cosmopolitan forms of teaching and learning, it will be important that we refuse to caricature the cynic or the reasons for her cynical response.

At the same time, it is also important that we recognize that modern cynicism is not a coherent philosophy or doctrine. Cultural critics tell us that it is better understood as a sensibility, or a characteristic attitude or outlook. And, broadly speaking, I think that we can suggest that a modern cynical sensibility manifests as a “condition of disillusion,” an unspecific “antagonism toward the world” that also rejects all efforts to improve it (Bewes 1). Put simply: the modern cynic is disappointed in institutions, structures, and persons that seem impervious to change—and, therefore, she disengages. Such a sensibility presents a clear challenge to critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, as critical cosmopolitanism seeks a more mindful, expansive, and engaged relationship with institutions, structures, and persons in both local and global contexts. The cynical disposition, marked by disillusion and estrangement from the other, rejects the fundamental premises of a critical cosmopolitan subjectivity, and, because of this, it is important that we try to shed some light on the nature and character of this particular disposition.

As I’ve mentioned, one of the most visible hallmarks of the modern cynic is her mistrust of popular efforts to affect meaningful social transformation. Convinced of the inflexibility of
dominant political structures and institutions, the modern cynic “doubts the possibility of collective action or social change” (Mazzola 4). However, it is also true that she tends to question the viability of political agency more generally. Such skepticism about the ability of individuals or groups to impact the social conditions in which they find themselves justifies a withdrawal of interest in public and political life. To be sure, this retreat is emboldened by larger cultural forms of alienation; it is not simply an idiosyncratic response to more personal forms of obstruction.

Modern cynicism is quick to naturalize indifference and inaction in the face of complex and intractable social problems. Indeed, the modern cynic, distrustful of efforts to repair and revitalize the conditions of public life, “dismisses as futile the discourse of critique and the call for social transformation” (Giroux 2). The perceived “futility” of engagement frequently convinces the cynic that those who are motivated by ambitious ideals—and what may feel like a naïve attachment to the possibilities of social betterment—are quixotic in their struggle for meaningful change. In this way, the modern cynic succeeds in protecting herself from the hazards and uncertainty of action.

To be fair, indifference and inaction often feel like a proper and proportionate response to the modern cynic. The cynic is not necessarily cynical because she takes an active pleasure in indifference. Rather, because she “foresees a future in which individuals have little chance of fixing their problems or improving their conditions in life or at work” (Mazzola 4), the cynic has reason to believe that action is futile or, worse, a placebo effect. In just this way, the modern cynic becomes a sedentary figure. Disinvesting in political and pedagogical projects that hold out some promise of addressing the social problems that shape everyday life, she rejects the critical cosmopolitan belief in agency. Contrary to the energetic and public dissent of the early cynics, the modern cynic typifies self-enclosure and listlessness.
Hence, the modern cynic has been variously characterized as “apathetic and introspective” (Bewes 1), “passive and self-divided” (Mazzola 7), and “detached and melancholy” (Caldwell 28). Opting for “a flight into solitude and interiority” rather than an engagement with the world (Bewes 1), the modern cynic rejects involvement with and responsibility for the conditions that shape public life.

For all of these reasons, modern cynicism represents a sharp challenge to pedagogical efforts to imagine a new vocabulary for critical cosmopolitan subjectivity as well as new roles for cosmopolitan citizenship. Insofar as it is a vocal and reliable opponent of public engagement, modern cynicism diminishes the civic potential of learning that culminates in collective action. Insofar as it distrusts and disbelieves in the possibilities of political change, it inhibits people from a deeper and more complex understanding of their own agency. Insofar as it doubts the feasibility of large-scale social transformations, it disallows education from shaping a decisive response to the social needs of the moment. Insofar as it encourages the individual to embrace privatized notions of responsibility, it deters her from exploring more collective forms of mutual obligation and solidarity. And, more generally and perhaps more worrying, a modern cynical sensibility can effectively discredit the moral and political usefulness of broaching critical cosmopolitan questions in the pedagogical situation in the first place.

**Object Lesson: Otterbein’s Senior Year Experience in Global Citizenship**

Because I want to be sure to focus my attention on the form of cynicism that I believe presents the greatest challenge to critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning, I am especially interested in the pedagogical impact of what has been called *routine cynicism*. Routine cynicism is best understood as an automatic and unthinking version of modern cynicism, a reflexive form of cynical

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118 Henry Giroux says it another way: “socially engaged citizenship [is] the refusal of political cynicism” (2).
response that “has lost the ability to choose when to be cynical” (Caldwell 25). In the pedagogical situation, routine cynicism is familiar, habituated, and often unrecognized. Frequently, it is accepted as a predictable response to learning that demands a more strenuous and self-aware relationship with ethicality and engagement. Perhaps for this reason, teachers and students accommodate—and, at times, sympathize with—eruptions of routine cynicism in classrooms that identify with social justice pedagogies or more transformative learning goals. This certainly presents a formidable obstacle for critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning.

Let me offer an example from my own teaching. Each spring quarter for the last six years, I’ve taught a senior seminar in Global Citizenship, and each year I am surprised anew at the pervasiveness of student disillusionment. A fairly constant number of students seem exhausted by pedagogical efforts to critically examine and respond to pressing social, political, and economic challenges shared by the global community. And these same students increasingly take refuge in routine forms of cynicism. In the spring of 2009, I was faced with a particularly difficult group of graduating seniors; in fact, they were among some of the most unabashedly cynical students I’d ever had. To make things that much more difficult, the most insistent cynics were also some of the most interesting and intellectually gifted students that had enrolled in the seminar.

After weeks of frustration and a growing sense that the class was sputtering, I made the decision to foreground—even “out”—the cynicism itself. I called off a scheduled mid-quarter conversation, and asked students to spend two class periods exploring the roots of their disillusionment and resignation.119 I wanted to know why many were convinced that “the problems were beginning to feel unfixable,” “human suffering just seems to be a fact of life,” “it’s ridiculous to

119 Dawn Sckorczewski calls this a “freeze frame,” or “a process through we examine student-teacher interactions in a classroom by stopping the action to talk about what is happening at any given moment.” (40)
expect college students to feel responsible for things that they’ve never seen and don’t understand,” and “there’s no way that my action on any of [these issues or problems] will amount to any positive change that I’ll get a chance to see” (student responses, 2009). I also wanted to know why a minority of students in the class seemed increasingly dismissive—and, at times, derisive—of other students who seemed to be serious about the work of the course. At times the dismissal and derision extended to me. After I described what I believed I was seeing, a number of students expressed surprise that I had chosen to represent them in this way. Many of the most cynical students did not believe themselves to be resistant or hostile to the goals of the course. In fact, a number of students felt it suddenly important to affirm the abstract value of what we were doing together.

For two class periods, we talked in unusually candid ways about the fears, anxieties, and sources of resistance that kept many of these students attached to their cynicism. We talked about the ways that students actually felt threatened by enlarged commitments to the world outside themselves. One student told the class that she was “scared to care about things that [she] couldn’t control.” Another student who was a graduating senior admitted that he had “no time for commitment,” and he felt that “the class was forcing him to feel badly about the fact that [he] was focused entirely on [himself].” Even though I had neither required nor urged commitment, a number of students agreed with him. They felt that it was impossible to learn about large and persistent structural inequities, and not feel interpellated—as ethical subjects, as citizens of any scale, as practicing Christians, or as college-educated persons. This was an important insight because it helped make clear that many of the more consistently cynical students in the seminar were, in fact,

120 The open hostility really surprised me. I’m not a polarizing figure in the classroom, so I do not get that very often. And, even though it was true that we tackled many complex and serious subjects in that seminar, I continually talked of my optimism (both in their generation and the larger human capacity to repair situations that we can agree are unacceptable). So the hostility—and the persistent exasperation with peers who were committed to more engaged problem-solving—was both uncomfortable and puzzling.
defending against such an interpellation. In fact, routine cynicism was serving as a highly functional form of defense, as it appeared to absolve otherwise intelligent and ethically conscious students of the need to “care about things” that they believed they couldn’t control or reconcile with basic forms of self-interest. As a class, it then was important that we spoke about the specific forms of practical and psychological protection that cynicism offers, and the many ways that it has become an acceptable—if not unobserved—response to disappointments that students have come to see as inevitable. Many students expressed exasperation with the “pointlessness” of public action or engagement that seems, as one student put it, “to burn people out without allowing them to feel that they’ve done anything of consequence” (student writing, 2009).

My decision to interrupt the seminar for a meta-conversation on the cynicism that was, in fact, controlling it stands as one of my better—and more instinctive—pedagogical moves. An honest and difficult confrontation with our collective need, even desire, for the safety of the cynical position opened the class to a new understanding of what many of us were actually afraid to allow: the space for meaningful and purposive action. Without naming this surprising anxiety about action itself, I have reason to believe that many students in the course would have felt fortified in their cynicism.

Since that seminar, I have considered the benefits of building an earlier conversation on cynicism into the next syllabus for this seminar. What if I chose to anticipate—rather than react to—the emergence of cynical attitudes and built a pre-emptive conversation into the syllabus? Would this encourage self-reflexivity and discourage an unexamined cynicism about critical cosmopolitan efforts to engage global learning for ethical and engaged ends? Perhaps. But maybe the cynicism has to emerge first, organically as it were. Then it can be addressed as a live and contextually specific phenomenon, rather than an abstract or conjectural problem. Although I have taught this seminar
five times in six years, I have already said that my last group of students were the most entrenched in—and public about—their cynicism. So I would wager that part of the reason that my meta-conversation on student cynicism was successful was because I was directly responsive to the pedagogical situation in which I found myself. I did not invite the members of the class to examine and challenge a hypothetical form of student cynicism, nor did I ask the seminar to assume the validity and complexity of a routine cynicism that was not visible in the learning situation.

**Object Lesson: Revised Learning Goals for Otterbein’s Integrative Studies Program**

I admit that it is difficult to know how to respond to open and unapologetic student cynicism. It can sabotage the best efforts to create more aspirational critical cosmopolitan learning experiences, and it can quickly kill the desire of even the most motivated students to engage with the difficult complexities of the worlds outside of the classroom. And, because routine cynicism tends to norm itself, and, in so doing, recuse itself from sustained critical examination, it can be demanding to address it directly in pedagogical situation. But equally challenging, I want to suggest, is the open and unobserved cynicism of faculty peers and colleagues.

Let me offer another example. Early in the curricular revision of Integrative Studies, we brought forward a new and proposed set of learning goals and outcomes for the program. Historically, the program—focused on the shared topic of human nature—has had very few learning goals, and they are generic in form and spirit. The revised learning goals, however, were numerous, specific, and underwritten by a clear philosophical and pedagogical investment in critical cosmopolitan thought and practice. Certainly, there was a good amount of general anxiety about the introduction of new accountability measures in the program, but there was, more interestingly, a rather particular set of anxieties that coalesced around a handful of the learning goals and outcomes. It was the goals and outcomes that underlined the efficacy and desirability of responsible action that
aroused the most opposition and, at times, suspicion. Indeed, there was a surprising amount of worry that the pedagogical values of individual faculty would be compromised if the college allowed for a more generative understanding of—and commitment to—global and local forms of responsible action in the core curriculum.

During the course of the curricular revision, a powerful opposition trained itself on a learning outcome that not only encouraged an enlarged sense of cosmopolitan responsibility, but also proposed a more self-aware and self-critical relationship to cynicism. Attached to the fifth and final learning goal for the new program, the outcome originally asked “students [to] challenge complacency and cynicism as a sufficient response to the pressing problems of the twenty-first century.” A group of faculty had talked at length about the optimal phrasing for this outcome, and we had decided that we didn’t want to recommend that students reject complacency and cynicism as a response. For many of the reasons that I discussed earlier, we felt that rejection of cynicism was too directive, and we were concerned about insisting on a single and mandatory attitudinal response. The better verb, we decided, was challenge, as it captured the intellectual and affective valence that we hoped would characterize the teaching and learning in the Integrative Studies program. We argued that the more successful global learning curriculum would encourage students to call into question the self-evident value of cynicism and related forms of inertia. Especially in light of the curricular emphasis on responsible action, we hoped that cynicism and complacency would come under a closer pedagogical scrutiny than might typically be the case.


122 I do believe that the modifier “sufficient” is an important one. The original outcome asked students to challenge complacency and cynicism as a sufficient response to pressing problems. It didn’t ask students to condemn the response in itself, but, rather, rethink the common perception that cynicism is an adequate and commensurate response to complex problems of economic inequity, resource depletion, and social and political oppression.
Interestingly enough, our choice of verb attracted little or no interest. More faculty members were distressed by what they characterized as a more general and “unnecessary” critical attention to complacency and cynicism in the learning goals, and they questioned the seeming programmatic desire to “deny students their cynicism.” After a reminder that the learning outcome encouraged a challenge—rather than rejection—of cynical attitudes and complacencies, some faculty insisted that we had no good pedagogical reason to even question a student’s right to her complacency. One faculty member insisted that cynicism, like skepticism, is an often valid and helpful response to political situations that appear unworkable and immovable. Cynicism, of course, is not the same thing as skepticism. Generally speaking, skepticism is a method, or a provisional approach to truth claims. Cynicism, as we have discussed, is best understood as a disposition, or a characteristic outlook. However, because the two terms are so often conflated with one another, it is not uncommon for cynics to imagine that they bring a vitally important skepticism to dominant and over-simple understandings of power, structure, and agency. This seems to be especially true in academe, where a skeptical disposition is critically advantageous. Certainly, I understand and support the skeptic’s desire to trouble orthodoxies and commonsensical truths, but that should not be confused with the cynic’s refusal to grant practical value to action, agency, and resistance. Because I want to promote a pedagogical vision that demythologizes complacency and inaction rather than critical questioning and doubt, it is very important to challenge this common conflation of cynicism and skepticism.

After considerable discussion and feedback collection, the decision was made to rewrite the learning outcome so that the reference to “complacency and cynicism” was struck. Some faculty, consistently opposed to the larger pedagogical priority of engagement and action, wanted the

123 Here, I am not discussing philosophical skepticism, a distinct and more robust version of incredulity to truth claims.
outcome removed altogether, but other faculty members were persuaded to accept language that was more general in its ambitions.\textsuperscript{124} As you will see in Appendix A, the new learning outcome now reads: “Students explore the value of purposeful action in the face of the pressing problems of the twenty-first century.” This compromise wording is interesting for what it does—and does not—encourage in the pedagogical situation. We reaffirmed “the value of purposeful action,” especially in a curriculum that empowers students and faculty to confront the significant moral and political challenges of the contemporary moment, so one might safely assume that this wording has underscored the centrality of critical cosmopolitan goals. And, on one level, this is true, as there is an articulation of the larger purpose of joining ethicality and engagement, and an acknowledgement of the significance of informed action. At the same time, however, the verb in the learning outcome no longer invites students to consider or challenge the easy—and increasingly popular—appeal of cynicism or complacency. The revised verb instead asks students to more benignly “explore” the value of purposeful action.

Although I understand that the semantic struggle over this single learning outcome may seem inconsequential, I offer it as an object lesson for our conversation on the pedagogical response to cynicism. That single outcome was an unexpected flashpoint for faculty who were opposed to a more demanding and engaged set of pedagogical commitments. And, in the course of the dispute, cynicism surprisingly emerged as an ethical referent. Faculty who wanted the curriculum to detach itself from any stake in student attitudes toward—or desire for—action argued that global learning efforts were actually enhanced when our learning goals were indifferent to student cynicism. In the

\textsuperscript{124} It was very helpful to point to the mission statement and the newly minted Strategic Plan for the College. Both documents underscored a long-term institutional commitment to service and ethical action, so we could argue that the critically cosmopolitan emphasis of the revised Integrative Studies program is consonant—and not at odds—with our institutional identity.
end, we altered the language of the learning goal, not because we agreed with this argument, but because we would have lost the affirmative votes that we needed to secure the passage of the revised mission and goals if we did not remove the language that directly challenged cynicism and complacency. In other words, I accepted that students would “explore the value of purposeful action” rather than challenge the appeal and adequacy of cynicism and complacency, as a way of saving the full curricular revision a defeat on the Faculty Senate floor.

**Stanley Fish’s “Save the World on Your Own Time”**

Although faculty at Otterbein did not appear to be reading or otherwise deploying the central tenets of Stanley Fish’s *Save the World on Your Own Time*, that text could have been an effective manifesto for those who sought to renounce the critical cosmopolitan investments of the new general education core. It especially would have proven useful to those who hoped to sever the link between educational practice and public forms of engagement and action. It is, I argue, a text that sustains a deeply cynical relationship to pedagogies that encourage a broad and active engagement in public life. The “world,” as Fish sees it, is not only a synonym for globality; it is also a synonym for public life more generally. Because of this, I want to say something about the book, for I believe it adeptly dramatizes the opposition to critically cosmopolitan teaching and learning.

The title of the text telegraphs Fish’s thesis quite nicely: educating for social change is extraneous—if not antithetical—to the mission of higher education. The job of higher education, as Fish sees it, is the transmission of disciplinary knowledge. More specifically, Fish argues that the pedagogical task is a well-demarcated one: “introduce students to bodies of knowledge and traditions of inquiry that had not previously been part of their experience and equip those same students with the analytical skills that will enable them to move confidently within those traditions and engage in
independent research” (12). Passing on knowledge and conferring skills: these are the rightful ends of educational practice and “appropriate forms of pedagogical behavior.”

Because he sees the pedagogical mission of higher education as the cultivation of purely intellectual virtues, Fish calls on faculty to take up the task of “academicizing” the tasks of teaching and learning. The verb is to be read literally, as Save the World urges a restoration of proper academic values to the academic enterprise. And academic values, as Fish would have it, are focused squarely on the dispassionate pursuit of knowledge and the “pursuit-of-truth business.” Both knowledge and truth, we are told, are degraded when they detach from a disciplinary anchor, even more so when they are asked to serve the ends of social action or transformation projects. Therefore, Fish insists that “to academicize a topic is to detach it from the context of its real world urgency, where there is a vote to be taken or an agenda to be embraced, and insert it into a context of academic urgency, where there is an account to be offered or an analysis to be performed” (italics added, 27). Fish draws his line sharply here: real world urgency is fundamentally distinct from and, on some level, antithetical to academic urgency. The university that understands its proper social mission is an institution that will erect a firewall that forbids real-world causes and agendas from contaminating the pedagogical task.

In Save the World, Fish is especially dismissive of those academics who mistake teaching—defined as the “mastery of a craft”—for a moral and political practice. He repeatedly condemns faculty who “have the aim of bringing about particular effects in the world” (55), “envision themselves as agents of change or designers of a transformative experience” (53), and “engage their students in discussion designed to produce action in the world” (169).125 As Fish sees it, academics who teach for “moral, political, or existential commitments” that exceed the limited and focused

125 Here, Fish echoes Harold Bloom’s work in The Western Canon. And Henry Giroux’s castigation of Bloom is also applicable to Fish: “The political irrelevance of the intellectual is source of distinction rather than embarrassment, so [Bloom] showers contempt on those academics who would bridge world of higher education and public life” (86)
ends of the academic enterprise are guilty of hijacking academe for highly personal causes and agendas. Insofar as they appropriate the resources of the university for purposes that are decidedly non-academic, Fish believe that such faculty betray the larger practical and moral mission of the university. For if the academic enterprise is to be “true to itself,” Fish insists that it must be “self-referential, stuck on itself, [and] must have no answer whatsoever to the question ‘What good is it?’” (55). Tautologically, it would seem that education is good for the sake of education. If students do cultivate “the successful practice of ethical, social, and political virtues,” it is entirely the result of what Fish calls “contingent effects,” or those unintended and unpredictable encounters with texts or teachers who “strike a chord” that they did not mean to play.

Throughout the text, Fish is consistent in his refusal to see higher education as a public good rather than a private one. And, because of this, Fish is incapable of granting colleges and universities the moral and practical room to commit to larger institutional goals that serve the public interest, the needs of democratic culture, or the ends of civic responsibility. Higher education can only tend to “academic values,” and these values are focused solely on disciplinary knowledge production and dissemination. Those disciplines that take political or ethical inquiry as a direct object of study are, of course, permitted to raise questions about political and ethical matters. But, even though, say, departments of political science are authorized to analyze and argue about the nature of civic responsibility, the only responsible action that should result is “the rendering of an academic verdict.” Students dissect arguments in Fish’s ideal classroom; they do not generate knowledge in order to make that knowledge actionable or transformative for the self in/and the larger world.

Again, Fish does not conceal his contempt for faculty who see education as a moral and political practice. He believes that any educator who teaches because of a larger wish to “make the

126 Or, as Steven Kellman has suggested: “Fish defends the Ivory Tower on the grounds that it is an Ivory Tower.” (Chronicle of Higher Education, 2008).
world better” is both naïve and deluded. As Fish sees it, these faculty have misunderstood the purpose of teaching and learning, for education must be “unconcerned about its usefulness in the world.” (56). He also insists that educators who teach for socially transformative ends are intent on converting the classroom to a “soapbox.” Sadly, Fish displays no subtlety here. Committed teaching, engaged teaching, any teaching that is motivated by a desire to affect social change: all of these pedagogies are caricatured as fussy “agendas of moral improvement” and maniacal ideological crusades. Fish does not allow for pedagogies that raise—rather than answer—difficult questions about the ethical implications of knowledge. He assumes that an educator that invests in the value of praxis is an educator who seeks to impose a set of particular political and moral beliefs. And one of those beliefs is in the necessity and efficacy of action.

Despite the fact that many of the same educators who affirm socially transformative ends for education also see their pedagogies as dialogic, Fish simply cannot allow for the possibility that engaged teaching and learning can be something other than prescriptive.127 And the pedagogical trip wire is always the concern with “real world urgency,” the attentiveness to agency, the desire to create knowledge that might have “effects in the world.”

Throughout the course of Save the World on Your Own Time, Fish continues to plead for the uncoupling of knowledge production in the academy and interventions in public life. In so doing, he repeatedly denies the civic potential of learning that culminates in collective action. However, Fish does not argue for the impossibility—or even the undesirability—of political or social change as a whole. Instead, he argues that higher education has no practical or ethical interest in encouraging such change because it would conflict with the larger academic priorities of disinterestedness and

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127 There is a certain cynicism in this move as well. Anthony Mozzola points out that “the cynic's most characteristic gesture is to doubt the sincerity of other's speech, while refusing to take at face value other people's accounts of their motives or actions.” (4)
inutility. In this, Fish epitomizes what Timothy Bewes calls a “temperament of aestheticism,” a temperament that “betrays an elevated and sublimated scale of values, for which the abstractions of truth and integrity are of greater consequence than political virtues of action and imagination” (2) This temperament, Bewes suggests, is a cover for modern cynicism, as it celebrates the depoliticizing of intellectual work and assumes the contaminating effects of action on the pursuit of truth or preservation of integrity. We already know that Fish believes that “real world urgencies” have an intrusive effect on the “pursuit-of-truth business” in academe. We also know that Fish identifies academic integrity with a kind of ideological purity and political disinterestedness. This is not a trivial set of conclusions. Ultimately and regrettably, I believe these conclusions are cynical, as they are designed to justify an academic retreat from involvement with and responsibility for public life. The disconnect between knowledge production and action is especially troubling, for Fish discourages academic inquiry from not only exploring a critical vocabulary for shaping public life, he also discourages it from seeing itself as agentic and capable of affecting meaningful social transformation.

For all of these reasons, Save the World on Your Own Time is a deeply cynical book about the mission and purpose of higher education. To be fair, Fish does not devalue the scholarly and pedagogical endeavors that constitute academic work. But Fish does welcome the possibility that higher education might fully detach itself from action and engagement in public life. This, of course, is a quintessentially cynical gesture: the veneration of an inward-looking, or wholly “self-referential,” identity coupled with a self-conscious distancing from social and political engagement. It is entirely at odds with a critical cosmopolitan pedagogy that strives for better and more vital ways to address those social problems that shape ordinary life in global/local contexts. Underscoring the ethical significance of public commitment and social responsibility, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy refuses

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128 He is not anti-intellectual or anti-academic, so his cynicism is not borne of a fundamental distrust of the academic enterprise or the labor that serves it.
to see the work of knowledge production as insulated and innocent—because, empirically, it is not and, ideally, it should not be. In so doing, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy rejects the cynical premise that underlies and upholds *Save the World on Your Own Time*.

**Anxiety and/about Futurity**

Before we conclude this chapter and begin to explore forms of resistance to critical cosmopolitan education, I do want to say something about the relationship between cynicism, anxiety, and futurity. Interestingly enough, anxiety about the efficacy of action is both generated and contained by cynicism. Since we already know that cosmopolitan forms of citizenship demand engagement with rather than withdrawal from the complex demands of justice and moral responsibility, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy must speak to the ways that the ego is fundamentally threatened and made anxious by enlarged commitments to the world outside itself. 129 Simply put, routine cynicism is defensive. And, for this reason, cynical resistance to critical cosmopolitan learning is better understood as a symptom of *particular* anxieties (about, say, the capacity for meaningful action or the engulfing experience of the ‘global’), rather than a ‘rational,’ or simply ‘cautious’ or ‘skeptical,’ response to pedagogical and political difficulty. As we’ll see in Chapter Five, anxiety about the fluidity of borders and boundaries—whether those boundaries define scale, place-attachment, citizenship, identity, or responsibility to the other—arises as a significant anxiety in critical cosmopolitan learning. Cynicism helps tame that anxiety by insisting on the immutability of current political conditions and socio-spatial attachments, as well as the fixity and passivity of the subject.

129 Deborah Britzman tells us that learning is *always* felt as a threat to the ego, as a narcissistic injury (“Lost” 47). I want to suggest that the fluidity and multiplicity of critical cosmopolitan identities and attachments can be especially unsettling, even traumatic, to the ego insistent on fixity.
However, there is one other anxiety that I want to link quite specifically with the rise of cynicism. As I see it, cynicism emerges as an especially useful guard against pedagogies that invest in the imagination and creation of alternative futures.

It is true that modern versions of cynicism are antagonistic to the space of the unrealized and the ‘not-yet,’ the future-directed and utopian sensibility that is central to the cosmopolitan outlook. In fact, Ulrich Beck suggests that a “socially sanctioned hostility to the future” underlies a good deal of what passes for cynicism, for the cynic insists on the impossibility of meaningful alternatives to the present. Indeed, the cynic is said to be one who is prematurely disappointed in the future. And, insofar as she rejects the future as an “affective investment,” the cynic disqualifies herself from imagining realities that might be more just, humane, or flourishing than the present.

Why is it important to value the futural? Because, as we discussed earlier in this chapter, the foreclosure of the future, or the refusal to invite an unforeseeable “future-to-come,” entraps us in a present that is paralyzed and incapable of transformation. It also absolves us of a primary responsibility to restore futurity for others as well as ourselves. This, of course, explains why a “socially sanctioned hostility to the future” is so appealing and powerful. Such hostility protects us from the burden of responsibility—especially more radical forms that insist on an ethical obligation

130 It is Ulrich Beck’s work on the ‘cosmopolitan condition’ that most forcefully articulates a commitment to a utopian and globally shared future (more specifically, see ‘Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies’ and Cosmopolitan Vision)

131 Interestingly, Lawrence Grossberg suggests that our culture is especially hostile to and dismissive of youth culture because youth represent “the very necessity of a commitment to the future.” (117) Because this is true, he argues that “the war on youth is about erasing the future as a burden on the present.” (118) Sunaina Maira echoes Grossberg when she observes that youth “symbolize a given society’s anxieties and hopes about its own transformation” (206) and, thus, must be made to feel liminal in present social and political contexts.
to the future stranger—as well as the anxiety of the unforeseen. Cynicism welcomes this hostility, trades on it, and allows it to energize resistance to transformative practice.

But, as I consistently argue in this project, we need to see critical cosmopolitan pedagogy as open—not hostile—to the future. Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy needs to offer learning that protects the rights of students—and faculty—to work for futures that don’t inevitably disappoint. This is not always easy, as there is always evidence of the frustration and obstruction of emancipatory projects. This is why critical cosmopolitan pedagogy shouldn’t feel morally superior to cynicism, but, instead, acknowledge its defensive character, challenge its premises, and examine the many ways it is designed to protect us from the difficulty and risk of action.
Chapter Five: 
Cosmophobia, or The Anxiety of Elsewhere

Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy aspires to unsettle and transform the frameworks by which we understand our relationship with and responsibility to the lived world. Both educators and learners are invited to define new ways of imagining the social and psychic dimensions of identification and belonging. But, although the pedagogical goal is straightforward, the invitation is not uncomplicated. Often there is hesitation, there is resistance, and there is repudiation.

How might we begin to explain the “learner’s [and teacher’s] refusals to take up the knowledge on offer?” (Pitt 51) What stands behind the pedagogical refusal to reconsider and, when necessary, rethink one’s relationship to borders and boundaries? What stands behind the unwillingness to contemplate extending responsibility to all that has been excluded from moral concern? How do we explain the most persistent and direct obstacles to critical cosmopolitan learning? These are questions worth asking at this moment in the project.

For I believe that it is important for us to also take seriously the forms of resistance that meet—and often seek to derail—the critical cosmopolitan pedagogical project. We spent Chapters Three and Four defining the key paradigms and sensibilities that shape critical cosmopolitan learning, and, while I believe that this foundational work is important for any effort to imagine a new pedagogical practice, I think that it is also necessary for us to explore the powerful counter-forces that threaten and undermine critical cosmopolitan education. For resistance to learning teaches us something about the limits of acceptable knowledge, as well as the capacity of the ego to reform and reconstitute itself after it has been given any insight that threatens its bearings. Our desire for ignorance, Constance Penley reminds us, is best understood as “an active excluding from consciousness (that is, repression) whatever it does not want to know” (135).
I should be clear that I do not believe that counter-forces to critical cosmopolitan education are entirely on the side of the student. Although I do understand the role that an antagonistic student can play in obstructing any pedagogical situation, pedagogical resistance does not easily reduce to student apathy or hostility. The fact is that educators are just as prone to resist and reject any pedagogical practice that prioritizes “whatever it is that [the educator] does not want to know.” And, as we have seen in this project, it is often faculty who insist on the undesirability—and, at times, impossibility—of critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning.

More often than not, such resistance to critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is fueled by deep and unexamined forms of anxiety. I have argued that I believe that this anxiety tends to manifest itself when we challenge the borders and boundaries that enclose, as well as differentiate, one’s identity and understanding of place. Part of our challenge is to take seriously the emergence of such anxiety in critical cosmopolitan education, for anxiety is not a trivial psychic response. Anxiety feeds and naturalizes resistance, and resistance, even if it is little understood, brings learning to an abrupt halt.

Because anxiety inspires defense—or what we might otherwise call resistance—we are right to see anxiety as an effective form of psychic evasion and a means by which the ego justifies a retreat from danger. Indeed, defensive mechanisms and behaviors are designed to offer full protection from the experience of anxiety, and, for this reason, it is fair to assume that a defensive posture—a refusal to engage with the uncomfortable or the unfamiliar—is often an indicator of and front for anxiety. Of course, people have very good and non-neurotic reasons for rejecting ideas that they believe are untenable, but I am interested here in the way that educators and students resist in order to manage psychic conflict (Pitt 48). I do not want to read anxiety as a source of willful obstruction as much as a complex psychic response to perceived threats to one’s ego identity. Part of the problem, though, is that “learning must always put the ego in question” (Britzman 43) and, for this reason, Anna Freud
is right to observe that “there can be no education without anxiety” (qtd in Britzman, 46). Critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning is not unique in its generation of pedagogical anxiety, but it does inspire particular anxieties that warrant our attention. And, because we know that “in anxiety, one feels uncanny” (Heidegger qtd in Royle 4), we need to continue to think carefully about the disorientations and dislocations that critical cosmopolitan pedagogy can inspire. We have already discussed the ways that a disturbance of what is properly inside and outside—say, the self and the other—can unsettle the order and sense of identity. But it is also true that a disturbance of socio-spatial boundaries—say, the imagined line between here and there—can provoke anxiety and a sense of uncanny strangeness. It is to this dilemma that we will now turn.

The Anxiety of Elsewhere

The local requires a new location in our thinking, as well as our everyday life.

Bruce Mazlish
_The Global and the Local_

One of the first—and most passionate—objections to Otterbein’s decision to open its core curriculum to critical cosmopolitan questions was led by faculty who were concerned that they would be denied the pedagogical space to explore local knowledge and commitments. At a number of open forums and Common Hour conversations¹³², a sizable group of faculty expressed worry that a cosmopolitan curriculum would complicate or discredit efforts to value more “immediate,” “personal,” or “embodied” forms of knowledge. One faculty member from the humanities was skeptical of pedagogical commitments that would elevate an “abstract” concern with global issues

¹³² Common Hour conversations are publicly held, open to all faculty, and encouraging of open dialogue on issues facing the campus community. They also serve as a regular forum for the discussion of pedagogical matters, so a number of Common Hours were set aside for the examination of the revision of our general education curriculum.
and problems over and above a more “meaningful” encounter with the issues and problems that concern one, presumably, as an individual firmly embedded in a location. Another faculty member from the natural sciences questioned the pedagogical wisdom of focusing student attention on global problem-solving when there were “local environmental crises to be solved.” Most faculty were openly sympathetic with those who felt that a cosmopolitan emphasis would rob the pedagogical experience of its lived immediacy (in both form and content), and there was genuine worry that the college was, in fact, encouraging a set of curricular and pedagogical goals that would detach faculty and students alike from more robust attention to local priorities.

Because Otterbein, like many other colleges and universities, has a significant investment in the promotion of service learning and civic engagement, there was particular worry that a cosmopolitan emphasis in our core curriculum would diminish faculty and student interest in designing meaningful co-curricular partnerships with local groups and organizations. Faculty expressed a concern that students would be all too willing to trade the “difficult and immediate” commitments of community-based research or service learning for the “abstract and less demanding” commitments of the global curriculum. “The goal of global citizenship,” one faculty member insisted, “will ask less of our students.” Local forms of civic engagement, it was argued, would require students to make and deliver clear promises to community partners.

Still other faculty members were skeptical of the homogenizing and hegemonic reach of a globally focused curriculum. It was presumed that the needs of the local would not only be demoted, but also made vulnerable by the introduction of global inquiry. The global—here understood as something akin to a monoculture and identified with the inexorable rise of capital and institutions that are unresponsive to the needs of local communities—threatened the fragile and besieged places in which people lived out their lives.
Throughout this early institutional conversation, a common theme began to emerge: the global was best understood as a formidable opponent of the local. Curricular and pedagogical efforts to move our general education core in the direction of a more critically cosmopolitan set of goals were designed to deracinate local priorities, problems, and possibilities.

The anxieties, of course, were real, but they were fueled less by an apprehension about the value of critical cosmopolitan knowledge or understanding than what we can see now as an agonistic conception of the relationship between local and global interests. Many faculty insisted first on the inevitability of the binary divide and then on the necessity to protect the local from the encroachment of the global, for it seemed apparent to many that pedagogical attention to the global—whether the global was synonymous for cosmopolitan or something more diffuse—would demand a radical demotion of the local. And, as we’ve seen, this is a common worry when the local and the global are reified and made exclusive to one another.

Interestingly, an insistence on the antagonism of the global and local also works to contain the anxiety that is generated by the very idea of “elsewhere.” For “difference produces great anxiety,” Jane Gallop reminds us, “and polarization, which is a theatrical representation of difference, tames and binds that anxiety” (93). The strict polarization of global and local is a way of curbing the uneasiness that tends to accompany more complex forms of difference. And, as we will see, the difference between global and local does not present as a straightforward binary, but, rather, gives rise to a more nuanced and mutually implicated relationship.

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133 I use the word “elsewhere” here to refer to unfamiliar and unknown space. It works as a synonym for the global, but it is not only about the global. It is also a way of describing what lies outside of place, what place excludes, what place sees as other to itself.
For this reason, I will first explore the binary logic that persuades us that pedagogical attention to global knowledge necessarily will subordinate local knowledge. Such an antagonism between the local and the global—especially when it is naturalized and absent of scrutiny—not only obstructs critical cosmopolitan pedagogical efforts, it also diminishes the effectiveness and validity of global learning more generally.

Troubling the Binary: The Binary Machine

Inertia backs us into binary way of thinking that is comfortable even though it no longer applies. In contrast to these tendencies to revert to binary thinking, a cosmopolitan citizen has to maintain a commitment to complexity, to competing multiple perspectives.

Grant Cornwell and Eve Stoddard
Globalizing Knowledge

Like most dualities that structure Western thought, the opposition of the global and the local is fed by a larger and more pernicious over-reliance on binary models of thinking. Assisted by the “strong categorical assumption that nothing else can be one thing and its opposite at the same time” (Olsson, qtd. in Cloke and Johnston 9), binary thinking insists on a strict opposition of terms, as well as what Barbara Johnson famously identifies as the repression of difference within the terms themselves. In this way, binary logic secures identity in and through exclusion: the terms of a dualism are forced to repudiate one another and, as a result, identity comes to decisively lean on the construction of a pre-given “other.”

Such binary oppositions rarely allow both terms to claim positivity for themselves. More often than not, one term is endowed with presence and value while its opposite is presumed to be both absent and devalued. Opposition quickly hardens into hierarchy, as one term is assigned a
subordinate—and, typically, inert—role in the dualism.134 For this reason, Cloke and Johnston remind us that binary thinking is rarely symmetrical, and it becomes easy to “accept uncritical accounts of power relations simply by endorsing binary thinking.” (12) Even more, because there is “a pervasive tendency to align and conflate different dualisms . . . in order to elide their differences” (Sayer 283), hierarchical oppositions tend to reinforce one another and heighten the perception of inviolability.135

Generally speaking, binary frameworks are unequipped to accommodate dualities that do not neatly polarize. Andrew Sayer, for example, reminds us of the way in which the powerful “illusion of binary opposition” encourages the [regular] misrepresentation of binary terms as reified and mutually exclusive. In such an “illusion,” separation and difference are over-emphasized, and the prima facie assumption is that binary terms [will prove] contradictory. Some dualities may, in fact, be antonymic, but Sayer suggests that many more dualities are better understood as continua rather than dichotomies (285). In other words, as Sayer describes it, the terms of a binary are more likely to presuppose or mutually constitute one another than categorically oppose one another. Identity—even for those terms caught in the most polarized of binary oppositions—is chiefly relational, porous rather than rigid, and interdependent in character.136

134 Here, for example, Helene Cixous argues that the sexual binary serves as the exemplary instance of dichotomous thinking: “every theory of culture, every theory of society, the whole conglomeration of symbolic systems . . . is all ordered around hierarchical oppositions that come back to the man/woman opposition. [The opposition to woman] is the classic opposition, both hierarchical and dualist.” (279)

135 Andrew Sayer, a prominent British cultural geographer, suggests that “when dualisms are aligned, [they] are at their most dangerous. What impresses us about such thinking may have more to do with its simplicity and symmetry than its ability to interpret the world.” (284)

136 Of course, this desire to “show how the excluded other is embedded within primary identity” is quintessentially deconstructive (Gibson-Graham, qtd. in Cloke and Johnston 16).
For this reason, it is more productive to see binary oppositions as “inclusive” rather than “exclusive.” Exclusive opposition, staked on an inflexible binary logic, prevents us from exploring the ways in which the terms of a dualism assume and implicate one another. On the other hand, inclusive opposition allows us to honestly and fully represent dualities—like space and place, global and local, us and them—as more pliable and less stable than is generally believed. And, when binary oppositions are troubled in this way, when the terms of a dualism are opened for trespass, new conceptual—if not paradigmatic—space becomes available for critical thought and, for our immediate purposes, pedagogical exploration and work.

**Troubling the Binary: Local contra Global**

We need to recognize that the local/global relation is an abstraction from more complex socio-spatial relations . . . [it is] a construction which simplifies, silences, and can be turned to useful ideological effect.

Kevin Cox
*Local: Global*

Earlier in Chapter Three, we pointed out that the local and the global are often locked in a bitter binary opposition that admits little or no conceptual overlap. Whether we conceive of the local and global as topographical or socio-spatial categories, there has been a persistent tendency to imagine them as “separate objects which impact one another, like billiard bills” (Cox 181), rather than see them as conceptual fields that are more inclusive and mutually constituting. In characteristically antonymic ways, the local and the global are thought to collide—rather than collude—both in the way people think about them and how that thinking manifests in lived reality.

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137 As we’ve mentioned, Ulrich Beck insists that an *inclusive* reading of binary opposition characterizes methodological cosmopolitanism, the research and theorizing of new forms of social organization in a post-national world, while an *exclusive* reading of binary opposition bolsters the ends of methodological nationalism. See “Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences” for a fuller discussion.
Kevin Cox suggests that globalization may have played a hand in “congealing” this distinction between the global and the local, as globalization is often reductively defined as the domination of global culture and capital. When globalization is read in this way, when it is characterized as inescapably hegemonic, local cultures and economies have no choice but to be “transformed”—or, less benignly, undermined—by the demands of a global market. And, because an inflexible binary logic requires one term to colonize the other and evacuate it of any independent value, it is easy to argue that global systemic forces—whether identified with globalization or cosmopolitanization—are determined to erase local or lived particularity. In just this way, the global is taken for the self-evident enemy of the local, and the two binary terms are pressed into a zero-sum struggle that allows only one term to prevail.

If the local and the global are understood as necessarily antagonistic, we know that the terms will be ensnared in an exclusive opposition that denies the possibility of productive and mutual implication. Within such a dualism, the local is usually afforded two options: one, it can allow itself to be overwritten by global forces and processes and, in so doing, disappear under the signifier of the global or, contrarily, it can offer itself as a remedy for the predations of globalization. Binary logic compels the local to either sacrifice itself to or exile itself from the global. The global is similarly handcuffed: it can either allow itself to be denounced as that which is “un-located [and] nowhere” relative to the clear coordinates of the local or it can insist on its essential ability to trouble and transcend the parochialism of the local. In either case, the local and the global are forced not only to oppose one another conceptually, they are obliged to sort a hierarchical relation with one another. And we have seen the ways that this antagonism runs counter to a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical

138 Note, for example, the Wikipedia entry for globalization: globalization is “the process of transformation of local or regional phenomena into global ones.” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization>
project that defines the global and local as internally related to one another or, more productively, implicated in a local-global nexus.

It is also important to note that this local/global binary has been conflated with other equally reified binary oppositions—as, for instance, space and place, the universal and particular, home and away, and self and other. Such unexamined parallelisms make it that much more difficult to conceive of the local and the global in non-polarizing ways. The local, for example, has become identified with place, particularity, traditionalism, and subjectivism, while the global has become identified with space, universality, modernity, and objectivism. The local is imagined to be associatively thick, while the global is imagined to be associatively thin. The local is defined as a site for “social rootedness and continuity” (Agnew 83), while the global is understood as a placeless abstraction. The local is believed to be culturally authentic, while the global is described as falsely universal and homogenizing in character. The local protects the possibility of an unmediated relationship to the historical past, while the global is oriented to an unspecified and evolving future.

As one reviews the parallelisms, it quickly becomes apparent that the exclusive opposition between local and global relies significantly on the duality of space and place. Indeed, as John Agnew points out, “the language of geographical scale and the language of space and place are often elided” (82). When the terms uncritically collapse, the local is fully identified with place, just as the global is conflated with space. And then, Doreen Massey tells us, “the counter-position of the local and global resonates with an equation of the local with realness, with local place as earthy and meaningful, standing in opposition to a presumed abstraction of global space” (For Space 183). When likened to place in this way, the local is not only imagined as “earthy and meaningful,” it is also

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140 Hence, the local is identified with permanence and the global is identified with the ephemeral.
“enclosed and humanized” (Tuan “Space” 54) and introduced as a “secure ontological thing” (Cresswell 39). Likewise, when the global is characterized as “an abstraction of space,” it is imagined to be undifferentiated and absolute in its distance from lived experience.

Such elisions matter enormously. The local and the global may present as simple matters of geographical scale, but, when they are made synonymous with socio-spatial categories, they resonate and are inflected in new ways. Indeed, the local and global begin to signify differently when we assume that the terms are, in fact, another way of naming place and space. This is not to say that our understanding of the local and global would be strictly descriptive and unambiguous if not for this confusion with place and space. We’ve just discussed, for example, the fact that the local and global are aligned with other binarisms that also shape and modify our sense of the terms. And, because of this, there is no denying that the local-global binary is over-determined and, in most cases, oversimplified. However, it is the conflation with place and space, the bundling of the social and the spatial, that introduces a dense and complex set of associations that make it especially difficult for us to know exactly what we mean—as well as what we feel—when we evoke the local and global.

So I argue here that this confusion of terms has significant implications for a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical project that looks to redefine and complicate the relationship between the local and the global. If the local is understood as a proxy for place and the global a proxy for space, pedagogical resistance to critical cosmopolitanism cannot simply be read as an anxiety about the introduction of global questions and frameworks. In fact, the introduction of the global—and I am clear here not to say dominance of the global, as a more traditional cosmopolitan might—invites a larger unsettlement about the meaning of spatiality itself. In such a context, a defense of the local might be better understood as a defense of a particular idea of—and relationship to—place.
Similarly, anxiety about the global may be better understood as a more generalized unease about conventionally dominant and arid notions of space.

What does this mean for critical cosmopolitan pedagogical practice? Among other things, it means that we must confront what is at stake when we rethink and contest the conventional binaries that underlie the local and global as well as place and space. It also means that we must be mindful of what the local and global may represent as sites of psychic investment. If the local is imagined as an instantiation of place, and we acknowledge that places are seen as “fundamental in expressing a sense of belonging for those who live in them, and for providing a locus of identity” (Hubbard 5), then a pedagogy that argues for a radically reconceived relationship of the local and global is a pedagogy that is likely to unsettle our sense of “natural embeddedness and unthinking attachment” to place (Hedehoft xi). However, as we will soon see, critical cosmopolitan pedagogy does not do away with the idea of place. Instead, it enlarges and opens it, so that it might make possible new forms of belonging and attachment.

**Belonging and Place-Attachment**

We believe in advance that everyone belongs somewhere, that there is no alternative to belonging. But it becomes more complicated as soon as we ask what it means to belong, or how many different ways of belonging there may be.

Bruce Robbins
*Comparative Cosmopolitanisms*

All persons need—and deserve—to feel that they are meaningfully embedded in communities of place or choice.141 Andrew Hollinger reminds us that the need to belong to

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141 Here, I want to gesture to Marilyn Friedman’s distinction between communities of place (the bounded communities into which one is born) and communities of choice (those communities that one voluntarily enters or forms).
“solidarities smaller than the species” may well be a “primal” one, as human beings seek attachment and relatedness with other persons as a way of anchoring identity. Indeed, belonging is rightly understood as a “fortuitous compound of being and longing” (Hedehoft ix), a tacit promise of existential security and a testament to the steady human yearning for solidarities that are both certain and unreserved. We seek to belong to places, to communities and cultures, that affirm and underline our ontological primacy. This is why, I will later argue, critical cosmopolitan attachments—attachments that both underline and exceed the bounds of the immediate and the intimate—present such a practical and psychological challenge for a subject constituted in and claimed by traditional versions of place. Unsurprisingly, these attachments can complicate pedagogical work, as they often require a radical reconsideration of what we find most essential and true about belonging. And this can induce no small amount of anxiety.

Figure 1: Aria Ahmed. Sense of Belonging exhibition. Bonington Gallery, Nottingham Trent University. January 2009.
For belonging, it seems, is a thick notion. And there is no doubt that the desire to belong, the desire for an uncomplicated attachment to persons and place, is unconsciously steered and, in some sense, pre-political. The ego, after all, is first constituted, and then consoled, by its attachments. The ego seeks out libidinal ties that will secure its own self-definition. The ego is attracted to the idea of emplacement, the idea that one might belong fully and fixedly to a bounded place, because the ego is itself invested in bounded versions of identity. Belonging, in other words, appears to answer simultaneous—and entangled—psychic needs for seamless coherence and rootedness.\textsuperscript{142}

And there is, Bruce Robbins tells us, no “alternative to belonging.” There is no way to be or belong nowhere. Edward Casey insists that “to be at all—to exist in any way—is to be somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be in a kind of place” (ix, italics added). We cannot then avoid belonging to place, for identities are always constructed on location. Place, in fact, is the “contested terrain in which we work out our identities” (Gaudelli, qtd. in Hansen), so it is important for us to not overlook the ways in which belonging to a place is inseparable from the grounds of subjectivity itself.

Psychoanalysis—a critical language ordinarily committed to the exploration and complication of human subjectivity—does not offer an especially productive reading of this interplay of identity and location. Indeed, Nel Noddings laments that “people searching for an identity express the old question asked by Oedipus, ‘Who am I?’ but the next Oedipal question ‘Where do I belong?’ does not find any ground in psychoanalytic theory, which constructs the mind as its own

\textsuperscript{142} The prevailing expectation is that identity and place will present as stable, coherent, and un-contradictory. Of course, when they are defined in just this way, place and identity effectively restrain and reinforce one another.
place‖ (Walter qtd, in Noddings 68).143 Perhaps because psychoanalysis understands the psyche as itself topographical, it tends to overlook the ways in which the psyche is complexly shaped by its identifications with and attachments to place. Psychoanalysis has also under-explored the powerful unconscious desire to belong to places that protect the ego from anxiety.144

But, despite this scant critical attention to subjectivity and socio-spatial formations, it is my contention that psychoanalysis does offer a useful and compelling language for understanding the phantasmatic underpinnings of place-attachment. The phantasmatic, as Laplanche and Pontalis remind us, “governs and dynamically structures the whole psychic life of a subject” (317). More specifically, the phantasmatic intervenes, shapes—and, at times, deforms—external reality in the image of psychic reality. In this way, it effectively blurs the contents of outside and inside. For this reason, Jacqueline Rose suggests that the phantasmatic is that which “haunts and contests the borders which circumscribe the construction of stable identity” (“Force,” qtd. in Butler, 188). Place-attachment has a powerful phantasmatic dimension because the attachment, or affective bond, is thoroughly bound up with real and imagined borders of both scale and subjectivity.

Lucy Lippard tells us that the “pull of place” is compelling for all of us because we are driven by what she calls a “mystical search for the axis mundi, a center, a place for something to hang on to” (27). And place, as it is been mythologized, is just such a “center,” a fixed and reliable pivot in a life and world marked by uncertainty and flux. Promising social cohesion and security of identity, place presents as the “geographical component of the psychological need to belong somewhere” (Lippard 7).

143 Noddings goes on to argue that this second Oedipal question—*Where do I belong?*—is rightly centered in “any thorough consideration of global education” (68).

144 It may be that psychoanalysis relies more extensively on the intrapsychic or intersubjective dimension of experience. Place is often a backdrop for psychic realities.
Yi-Fu Tuan has further explored the experiential and affective dimension of this human attachment to place. Arguing that place is a “center of felt value where biological needs are satisfied,” Tuan consistently highlights the ways in which place is experienced as both embodied and enclosed. Unlike space, which is felt to be diffuse and motile, place is marked by rootedness and involvement. “What begins as undifferentiated space,” Tuan tells us, “becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value” (“Space” 6). Space is here identified with unrestricted movement, and place is understood as a pause in that movement, a decision to ascribe and invest space with meaning. Place, then, is read as “meaningful location” (Cresswell 7), and it is human beings who insist on creating these “centers of felt value” as a way of anchoring subjectivity in dependable and legible forms of meaning.

Tuan freely admits that places occur at different scales, for human beings can emplace themselves in surprising and uncustomary ways. Indeed, a favorite armchair or the entire earth can be taken for a “center of felt value,” an occasion for place-attachment, if it is capable of exciting an affective bond. Tuan aptly names this bond between people and place “topophilia,” and, like other humanist geographers, he is especially interested in exploring the psychosocial dimension of such topophiliac attachments.

And so is this project. Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy is deeply invested in exploring how it is that we claim “centers of felt value.” Because we often conflate a sense of place with our geographical location, we have a tendency to believe that place-attachment is only possible on a local and immediate scale. This begs a series of questions that ask more pointedly about how we come to feel affection and affiliation for a site in the first place.

How, we might ask, does a place—any place—become a site of investment and interest in the first place? Why do people identify so powerfully and often so uncritically with those places that feel familiar and immediate? Is familiarity the catalyst for place-attachment? Can place-attachment
serve defensive ends as readily as more affirmative ones? And what is the relationship between place and home, two equally idealized sources of attachment and rootedness? These questions, focused on the complex human relationship to “centers of felt value,” are important ones for critical cosmopolitan pedagogy, for the local, as we have noted, continues to be allied—conceptually and practically—with place in ways that deny and defend against the intrusion of the global. And that makes it difficult to build a pedagogy that extends commitment and care to multiple scales and communities. Just as importantly, it makes it difficult to imagine “feeling at home in the world,” particularly if we have been led to believe that place-attachment requires and authorizes a withdrawal from difference and “incuriosity toward the outside world” (Tuan Space “159”).

The Consolation of Hearth

Home is a fantasy of wholeness and certainty.
Iris Marion Young

*House and Home: Feminist Variations on a Theme*

The construction of place, Tim Cresswell tells us, is itself a construction of “homeliness,” as home represents a sort of exemplary instance of place as a “center of meaning and field of care” (24). When we attach to place, we are, in ways both explicit and implicit, underscoring our desire for homeliness, or what Tuan calls the hearth, a “small, circumscribed place [that is] accessible only to experience” (“Intro” 319). Unmediated and authentic, the hearth is a place where one is promised an easy and unproblematic sort of rootedness. For this reason, even though it offers practical access to a small neighborly community, the hearth always remains a highly idealized and phantasmatic construct.

Romantic depictions of the hearth, or homeliness, owe much to Martin Heidegger’s seminal work on dwelling. As Heidegger sees it, dwelling is “the basic character of Being,” as it embodies an ontological need for meaningful presence. And we build homes—and, to a certain extent, small
communities—not to provide shelter in the strictest sense, but in order to realize dwelling. Heidegger’s famous Black Forest farmhouse, imagined as the “mystical upshot of natural processes” (Buell “Space” 66), stands as a prime example of this ambition, a place capable of grounding material and spiritual strivings. It also promises a form of refuge for persons who seek a more authentic rootedness, an assurance of interiority, in a world that increasingly demands that the self externalize and fabricate itself for the other.

Perhaps in part for this reason, Tuan reminds us that there is “consolation in the hearth.” (“Cosmos” 7) Consolation, of course, also implies that the home or dwelling is a site that cures the subject of grief and the sensation of loss. There is an expectation that the home—understood necessarily as “a small, circumscribed place [that is] accessible only to experience”—can relieve distress and anxiety that presumably originate(s) outside of the home itself. If we grant such an expectation, other more complicated questions seem to follow: what grief or privation creates the need for consolation that only—or best—can be answered by the hearth? In what ways does homeliness (and, by extension, place attachment) assuage anxieties that appear to threaten the self from elsewhere? And to what extent does “elsewhere” itself—as both an idea and a location—present as a source of ready-made anxiety or a catalyst for consolation?

A number of cultural critics have suggested that contemporary social reality—marked by “fragmentation [and] social disruption” (Massey), “the decline of community” (Tuan), the “spatial colonization” of modernity (Buell), and the “unsettling flux” of global capitalism (Harvey)—is also responsible for an “endangered sense of homeness.” (Hannerz “Where” 223) Whether we understand it as a signifier or material reality, contemporary “homeness” is often represented as

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[Feminist critics have questioned this easy equation of home and sanctuary. Not all women feel protected or fortified in the hearth as Tuan (and other humanist geographers) would define it. It’s important to keep this in mind as we explore the compelling mythology that surrounds homeliness and, by extension, place. See Gillian Rose’s *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge.*]
besieged, threatened by external realities that insist on fluidity, mobility, and permeability. Again, we are told that these realities originate elsewhere—they are, it would seem, always trans-local—and the hearth stands as a refuge of last resort for the beleaguered.

David Harvey famously argues that it is time-space compression, or the erosion of spatial and temporal boundaries, that encourages people to seek security and stasis, especially in places that advertise themselves as durable and un-contradictory. Because we “search for secure moorings in a shifting world” (*Condition* 302), Harvey suggests that we are drawn to locations that promise to protect coherent identity and defend against displacement or dislocation. And, since dislocation is often experienced as a practical and existential threat, it is not unsurprising that people are fiercely interested in ensuring essentialized versions of place. Essentialized versions of place are both static and inalterable. Like Lippard’s “axis mundi,” they organize and fix meaning. An essentialized sense of home promises protection from the feeling of unbelonging. And, perhaps most significantly, it appears to immunize the subject from precarity.

This, in no small measure, accounts for the desire—even need—to fetishize the familiar and local. At the same time, we must acknowledge that this “myth of the virtuous local” (Mazlish 95) can encourage resentment and distrust of globality or cosmopolitanism. The romanticization of the local as “bounded authenticity” can obstruct hope for a “wider politics” (Massey “Space” 182), promote sedentariness, and incite the stigmatizing of outsiders. And there are justifiable worries that

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146 Even as Harvey diagnoses the palliative powers of place in a postmodern landscape, he condemns the way in which these attachments to the bounded community encourage reactionary exclusivity.

147 But, to be clear, the “fact that we study localities doesn’t mean that we fetishize the local” (Massey “Locality” 279). The fetishizing is supplemental.
the essentializing of place—generally identified with local attachment and homeliness—can also appeal to parochialism, intolerance, and xenophobia.¹⁴⁸

Certainly, critical cosmopolitan education encounters students who embrace this reactionary and even totemic sense of place, who insist on protecting the home(land) from the invasion of others, who “deliberately narrow life to one’s own culture and corner of the world” (Tuan “Cosmos” 139). It is an anxious response, this desire to guard the territorial borders that stabilize identity and location. It is also a pedagogical response that we can question and complicate, for there are other more productive ways of understanding and being in place. And we can start by thinking about what it might mean to see place and space—as well as the local and the global—as less antonymic, more dynamic, and surprisingly relational.

**Inhabiting the World**

What does it mean to be placed in the world? How do human beings make the world a home?

Paul C. Adams, Steven Hoelscher, and Karen E. Till

*Place in Context: Rethinking Human Geographies*

In his “Place and Pedagogy,” David Orr laments the fact that contemporary Americans have become a “deplaced people,” a people with little knowledge of—and commitment to—the places that sustain their daily lives. Alienated from both natural and built environments, contemporary Americans often lack a sense of place as well as the place-attachments that follow from it. Because of this estrangement, Orr argues that education must play a crucial role in helping people “reinhabit” places that have been rendered unnecessarily abstract and mystified. Orr freely admits that such knowledge is “remedial,” but he takes it to be a primary task of pedagogy to reintroduce disaffected students to the ethics and pleasures of “living well in place” (“Place” 126).

¹⁴⁸ Tim Cresswell summarizes the concern of David Harvey here: “place can be an exclusionary force when people define themselves against threatening others” (62).
In his essay, it is fair to say that Orr works with a fairly traditional understanding of place. Bounded and territorial, place is repeatedly described as location on “a human scale” (ibid.). Such an emphasis suggests that Orr sees place-formation and attachment as an ineluctably local affair, for a “human scale” is generally taken to be both accessible and perceivable. The global—and, in some cases, even the national or regional—are not believed to scale in the same way, so Orr does not contemplate what it might mean to teach for the “reinhabitation” of a place that is something other than local and determinate.

This may be due, in part, to his distinction between inhabiting and residing in a place. A resident of a place, Orr argues, is a “temporary occupant, putting down few roots and investing little, knowing little, and perhaps caring little for the immediate locale beyond its ability to gratify” (130). The resident, in other words, is marked by a willful detachment from her “immediate locale” and the communal values that shape it. She opts for a shallow affiliation with place—a thin sense of belonging—rather than a more substantial and serious engagement with the larger community. An inhabitant of a place, on the other hand, “dwells . . . in an intimate, organic, and mutually nurturing relationship with [that] place” (ibid.). Unlike the resident, the inhabitant possesses “detailed knowledge of a place, the capacity for observation, and a sense of care and rootedness” (ibid.). Inhabitants are home-makers, capable of attaching care and commitment to a place of primary identification. They are also keen to cultivate a useful and deep knowledge of that same place, for they are invested in its welfare and flourishing. While residents are disinterested spectators, inhabitants are active participants in the constructed life of a place.

149 In other contexts, this phenomenon has been called delocalization, as the assumption has been—and is usually—that a progressive loss of interest in place will weaken one’s attachments to locality. Delocalization has also been linked to the flexibilization of labor in the global market, as impermanent work conditions tend to encourage indifference about physical place. See Richard Sennett’s “Cosmopolitanism and the Social Experience of Cities.”
I believe that Orr’s distinction is a useful one, for the contrast between resident and inhabitant reminds us that there are diverse ways of understanding what it means to be emplaced. Rather than assume that one’s identifications follow from one’s location, Orr points out that people are quite capable of refusing affect and loyalty to those places where they are physically situated. Not everyone, he reminds us, seeks to dwell in an intimate or symbiotic relationship with a geographically bounded community. Whether it is by choice or design, some are more satisfied to remain aloof and unaffiliated. At the same time, Orr wants to argue that inhabitation is something that—quite literally—can be learned. If a person is willing to be educated and enlightened, she can achieve a more committed and less casual relationship to the place(s) that supply and gratify her. It is quite possible to affirm a desire for inhabitation.

For this reason, I’m interested in asking what it might mean to widen Orr’s framework in the service of a critical cosmopolitan pedagogical project. If we refuse to localize place, for example, what becomes of Orr’s distinction between the resident and the inhabitant? Is it possible to speak meaningfully of the need to inhabit the world in new ways? And, if we can, how might we teach for this revised and enlarged understanding of inhabitation—an understanding that allows for a critical cosmopolitan sense of place and belonging—in a cultural context that insists on the microcosmic nature of all place-attachment?

This is clearly no small task. Because we’ve seen the ways in which place—and, by extension, the local—monopolize the language of belonging and fellow-feeling, it can be quite difficult to imagine a relationship to the larger world that feels something other than hypothetical. Benjamin Barber, for example, contends that the putative global citizen is asked to embrace “levels of abstraction and disembodiment that most people would be unwilling to muster” (34) Similarly, Michael McConnell insists that “humanity at large . . . is too abstract to be a strong focus for the affection.” (81) Like many others, Barber and McConnell define communities of concern that are
larger than the local—or, more accurately, unbounded—as necessarily “abstract”: that is to say, unreal, insubstantial, even theoretical. Persons, we are told, are only prepared to attach to small and intimate communities of concern, and “globality isn’t an emotionally convincing substitute for more national forms of belonging” (Hedehoft xviii). Even David Hansen, who makes an otherwise eloquent case for cosmopolitan education, laments that “I can think like a cosmopolitan, but I'm not convinced that I can feel like one.”

On the other hand, it would seem that if an inhabitant of a place is able to easily call up this attachment or affective bond, it is partly because the scale is imagined to be smaller and partly because the members of the community are led to believe that they have shared affinities. It would seem that solidarity, as well as fellow-feeling, insist upon “concern for a particular delimitable community” rather than “an undefined orientation towards humanity” (Derpmann 304). Bruce Robbins, however, has questioned the self-evidence of this thinking: “If people can get as emotional as [Benedict] Anderson says they do about relations with fellow nationals they never see face-to-face, why not with those who are not fellow nationals, people bound by some other sort of fellowship?” (“Feeling” 70). In other words, Robbins wants to know why it is that solidarity and attachment must stop at the borders of the locality or nation. Indeed, “if you can say yes to the nation, you can say yes to units larger than the nation. If cosmopolitanism were too big, then the nation would be too big as well” (Robbins “Intro” 5). Once we move away from our home and most immediate community of care—this, of course, is even smaller than one’s locality—we are, de facto, extending affinity and attachment to others that we do not know. If we can generate solidarity and fellow-feeling for those others who live in imagined localities and nations, is it not possible that we can generate solidarity and fellow-feeling for those who live in imagined worlds as well?

See Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities for the most comprehensive explanation of this.
Despite Robbins’s fair question, I want to suggest an alternative reading, yet another way of understanding what might be required in order for a person to see herself as an inhabitant of the world. It is difficult to know if our inability to experience meaningful trans-local or global solidarities and attachments *precedes or follows* our inability to imagine a sense of place that is unbounded and radically open. How much of our inability to inhabit the world—or meaningfully attach and build solidarities with others—is the product of a very particular conceptualizing of place? What if we are able to redefine place and, by extension, the local? What if we no longer, say, see place as insular and static? What if we de-essentialize and deterritorialize place? If place is opened up—conceptually and practically—will new identities and forms of belonging become possible? Is it possible that critical cosmopolitan subjectivity, marked by an ability to inhabit multiple scales of affiliation and attachment, will feel like a less threatening and more dynamic way of living and learning in place?

**Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogy and a Global Sense of Place**

[We are interested in] a sense of place which is extroverted, which includes a consciousness of its links with the wider world, which integrates in a positive way the global and the local.

*Doreen Massey*

*For Space*

Grant Cornwell and Eve Stoddard tell us that contemporary students “have to learn to locate themselves and think critically about their own positionalities” (“Geoethics” 33). Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy values this exercise, as it encourages self-reflexive inquiry and a deeper understanding of what it means to be situated in a particular social, historical, and cultural location. And all knowers are, in fact, situated. Critical cosmopolitan pedagogy also seeks to unsettle the binary logic that demands the rigid opposition of the local and global. As we have discussed, this opposition, fed by an equally powerful understanding of place and space as mutually exclusive,
encourages students to reductively read the local and global as contested, the local as platial (and, therefore, a “center of felt value”), and the global as abstract and immaterial.

We can, however, understand place in a much more progressive and nuanced way. We can challenge conventional understandings of place, and, in the process, liberate the local from excessive inwardness and a false belief that it is entirely detached from the global. If we do this, we not only make possible a mutually constitutive and relational understanding of the local and global, we also can address and redirect anxiety about the engulfment of the local by the global.

Many thinkers—some cultural geographers, some cultural critics, some philosophers that seek a reinvigorated understanding of our lived relationship to the natural world—have helped to redefine place for a cosmopolitan age. Here, I want to focus on two thinkers that I believe offer promising new readings of place that can contribute to an intellectually vital critical cosmopolitan pedagogy: Lawrence Buell and Doreen Massey.\(^{151}\) There are two texts in particular—Buell’s essay “Space, Place, and Imagination from Local to Global” and Doreen Massey’s *For Space*—that offer us a new vocabulary for comprehending not only place, but also the relationship between the local—as a paradigmatic sense of place—and the global.

Both Buell and Massey see place as socially constructed. That is to say, both believe that places are not “secure ontological things rooted in notions of authenticity” (Cresswell 39). Places do not have single, essential identities, nor are places pre-given and incapable of change. Such a reconceptualization of place challenges conventional—and, to some extent, commonsensical—notions about place as a static and fixed site of meaning. Places, instead, are seen as sites of tension and contradiction. They are not “internally introspective bounded unities” so much as sites of

\(^{151}\) Lawrence Buell is a Professor of American Studies at Harvard and one of the world’s most prolific and perceptive theorists of ecocriticism. Doreen Massey is a Professor of Geography at the Open University in England. Her work in critical cultural geography has shaped thinking about globalization, space and time, and feminist geography.
multiplicity and difference. And, because they are riven with multiplicity, we must negotiate what Massey calls the “throwntogetherness” of community. Because place is “internally multiple,” we must avoid seeing it—and the local that stands in for it—as homogeneous in ways that space is not.

Defining place as socially constructed also allows us to read place as unbounded and open. A de-essentialized version of place does not synonymize place with enclosure, so there is room to understand place as porous and absent of more traditional territorial forms of boundary. Massey insists that we do not have to see place “in counterposition to the outside” (“Space” 183), and this allows us to construct new understandings of place that “interact with other places rather than [counterpose] to them” (Buell 92). Indeed, locality is not “place-bound,” but, instead, is place-based.

All of this allows us to see place as networked, as linked to places beyond itself, as a locus of social relations and understandings, and as a “multivocal and multilocal nodal point” (ibid.) rather than a “closed community of traditional regionalist imagination” (ibid.). Places are, in fact, marked by movement and linkage. This is why Massey insists that it is only phantasmatic places that are introverted. Places are, by definition, extroverted, and defined by relationship rather than autonomy and self-sufficiency.

Both Massey and Buell also emphasize the dynamic and fluid nation of place. They believe it is better described as “eventmental,” or something in process, than established and fully formed. This obviously contradicts a popular understanding of place as a refuge from the flux and uncertainty of an increasingly globalized world. Place is constructed out of things from everywhere, Massey reminds us, so it is pointless to imagine place as external to space. It is also pointless to see place as a site where one can expect to be defended from the process of becoming. Places change, and they construct alternative futures. It is not only space—and, by extension, the global—that is open to futurity.
Interestingly, both Massey and Buell believe that a radically redefined understanding of place makes possible what might seem oxymoronic to some: a global sense of place. Because place is no longer tied to insular forms of locality and because place is understood as “routed rather than rooted,” we are able to see the global and local as more powerfully interrelated. In fact, a global sense of place eradicates the very idea of the local/global binary. It also makes possible new forms of belonging and inhabitation that are open to both here and elsewhere. The local is now open and relational. It is also outward-looking rather than introverted. This does not guarantee an end to the anxiety that the global can inspire nor does it guarantee that students will see the local as happily deterritorialized. But I do believe that this complex way of redefining place makes it possible for critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning to suggest that the local and the global are equally important sites for attachment and belonging. In a critical cosmopolitan framework, the local and the global are synergistic, interrelated, and conceptually merged. And that makes it easier for us to see the elsewhere as already here, as already embedded in our identity, community, and home.
Epilogue
Thinking and Teaching Otherwise

There is no reason to see this project as a purely theoretical exercise, even though I readily acknowledge that I have had to rely on a good amount of cross-disciplinary theory in order to make a case for critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. I wrote this dissertation because I felt that the global learning pedagogy that I valued was missing a conceptual framework and language. So I set about building a critical vocabulary that I hoped might resonate with other global educators who were also interested in exploring cosmopolitan ideas and values in a pedagogical context. But, at the same time, I also imagined this work as a sort of intervention, a project designed to convince readers to think about the way that they define global learning and take seriously the way that others are defining it in higher education.

I am pleased that Otterbein University has constructed a general education core that underlines the core values and priorities of critical cosmopolitan learning. Although we have not yet launched the curriculum, we do have a promising scaffolding of learning goals and outcomes in place. And that scaffolding—couched in a language that invokes the key paradigms and sensibilities of critical cosmopolitanism—has inspired a new curriculum that foregrounds ethicality and engagement in global learning. The new curriculum is also attentive to the way that the global and local are mutually implicated and co-constituted, but, because faculty do not yet have a way of naming that as a foundational idea, we continue to struggle a bit with the perceived primacy of the global (and the anxieties that that can inspire). This is why I believe that a critical cosmopolitan language is so useful and necessary, and it is my hope that my work will motivate a fuller
conversation about the framework that we are adopting. If faculty have a more comprehensive sense of what it means to define global learning as critically cosmopolitan and teach to these ends, I believe that the program has the opportunity to radicalize student understandings of identity, belonging, and responsibility in local/global contexts.

During the course of writing this dissertation, I have visited the websites of countless other colleges and universities that advertise institutional and curricular support for global learning. As I see it, one of the few institutions that would appear to understand and support a critical cosmopolitan approach to global learning is Macalester College. Again, Macalester does not identify its work as critically cosmopolitan, but they have built an impressive Institute on Global Citizenship that aims to “promote learning, scholarship, and service focused on civic engagement and global leadership locally, nationally, and internationally.” Macalester foregrounds their desire to “prepare students for lives as effective and ethical ‘global citizen-leaders,’” so there is a clear priority accorded to the ethical and engaged dimension of citizenship practice. There is also an institutional commitment to think about civic action in local/global contexts rather than assume a dichotomy between local forms of engagement and global service. Macalester has made plain that it is interested in encouraging students to understand the way that “their ethical commitments shape the work they do and the meaning they attach to it,” and that work—as the institution defines it—is for the world, rather than a more individualistic and purely vocational end. That’s not to say that Macalester is indifferent to professional preparation, but they are very much dedicated to tying their global citizenship initiative to public work, civic engagement, and public scholarship.

So what would it take for more colleges and universities to open a dialogue on the benefits of critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning (especially for general education curricula and curricula that openly ally with global learning)? And what would it take for more colleges and universities to
institutionally “globalize” in a way that is consonant with a critically cosmopolitan outlook? Because, as I see it, academic culture, broadly dedicated to the public good and social action, is particularly well-suited to realize critical cosmopolitan values in its mission as well as its pedagogy.

Certainly, national professional organizations that provide leadership in higher education can play a significant role in enlarging and complicating the current conversation on global learning. The AACU (Association of American Colleges and Universities) is well-poised to do this work—in part, because the AACU has been deeply interested in redefining general education for a global century and, in part, because the AACU is one of the few professional organizations that remain committed to the centrality of ethicality and engagement in liberal learning. As a professional organization for presidents of all types of degree-granting institutions, the American Council on Education (ACE) is also in a fine position to encourage new ways of defining global learning in higher education. A new ACE initiative, At Home in the World, is designed to encourage collaboration between diversity/multicultural education and international education, and, thus, in its own way, the organization is striving to acknowledge the hybridity of the local and global. This is a promising direction, but I believe that the ACE would do better to question the highly traditional understanding of internationalist education that they represent as the most desirable—if not only—framework for global learning.

Other organizations, like Project Pericles, provide more focused support for those institutions that are interested in “including social responsibility and participatory citizenship as an essential part of educational programs.” Project Pericles, however, is deeply attached to civic action and engagement in local communities, so there is little conversation about the relationship of the local or national to the transnational. It may be that Pericles sees itself as an advocate for a stronger American democratic culture, but I believe that there is room for the organization to understand the
ways in which local or national citizenship practice is also implicated in global or transnational processes and flows. And Project Pericles is well-situated to help student-leaders “recognize the ways in which [their] own economic, social, and environmental decisions and actions affect distant others, often located well beyond the national boundaries within which traditional brands of citizenship have been constructed” (Whitehead 502).

I need to also mention that it is possible to receive grant funding for institutional initiatives that highlight a more globally conscious set of goals. The Luce Foundation makes plain that it is interested in “increasing the American capacity for international understanding,” and, toward that end, it has funded a handful of global civic engagement initiatives (most recently, one at Bluffton College). The Luce Foundation has also underwritten support for the AACU’s *General Education for a Global Century*, so they appear to have a sustained interest in funding initiatives that foster global awareness and action. The Ford Foundation is enormously diverse in its funding targets, but one grant program that has immediate relevance for critical cosmopolitan education is their *Building Knowledge for Social Justice* initiative. Similarly, the Spencer Foundation supports a grant program that they call *New Civics*, an initiative that centrally values civic action and stresses the need to educate students for new forms of 21st century citizenship. The Lilly Endowment, on the other hand, is interested in funding institutional initiatives that foreground the relationship between religion, ethicality, and community involvement. Lilly appears to be open to a more expansive definition of civic involvement, as they fund programs—like the *Lilly Project for Vocation and Ethical Citizenship* at Macalester—that emphasize the interrelationship between local and global change.

However, perhaps the most important and first step in encouraging a wider discussion on critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning is the publication and distribution of this project. When I have presented these ideas at AACU conferences, many people have asked where they might find a
longer and fuller version of my thinking on critical cosmopolitan pedagogy. Until now, I did not have such a work to offer, so conference attendees were forced to leave with handouts and scattered presentational notes. This was certainly less than ideal, and I knew it. Thanks to my own challenges in leading curricular change at Otterbein, I am aware how difficult it is to introduce a framework for critical cosmopolitan teaching and learning without a full and clear context. So, while I wrote this work to satisfy the requirements of the Ph.D., I also wrote it so that I could begin to make these ideas available and useful to others. And, if it achieves that goal in some part, I will feel that I have done good work in the world.
Bibliography


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Appendix A
Integrative Studies program: mission statement and goals
Otterbein College (March 2009)

MISSION: The Integrative Studies program aims to prepare Otterbein undergraduates for the challenges and complexity of a 21st century world. It foregrounds interdisciplinary and integrative skills, competencies, and ways of knowing and is committed to the premise that one’s learning should serve and shape one’s responsibilities in the world.

Goal One: To inspire intellectual curiosity about the world as it is and a deeper understanding of the global condition.

Outcomes:
1. Students can articulate the historical and contemporary significance of global interconnections and interdependencies in human, natural and physical worlds.
2. Students explore and analyze the dynamic relationship of global and local issues or problems.
3. Students understand sustainability as an economic, social and environmental practice.
4. Students imagine and critically explore likely and alternative global futures.

Goal Two: To assist students in cultivating intercultural knowledge and competencies.

Outcomes:
1. Students gain enhanced understanding of the diversity of ideas, beliefs and practices across cultures and throughout historical eras.
2. Students gain enhanced understanding of the cultural diversity that shapes local communities.
3. Students recognize the interactive and dynamic relationship of global and local communities.

Goal Three: To promote active and critical reflection on the human self and its place in the world.

Outcomes:
1. Students study the self and the ways in which it is situated in human, natural, and physical worlds.
2. Students analyze and reflect on their own sources of identity and values.
3. Students explore enduring and contemporary questions about human meaning and purpose.
4. Students recognize and engage with that which is other or unfamiliar to them.
**Goal Four:** To challenge students to critically examine their ethical responsibilities and choices in both local and global contexts.

*Outcomes:*

1. Students affirm the value of an enlarged ethical responsibility to other persons, the natural world, and future generations.
2. Students explore and engage their relationship to the global public good as well as the larger goals of human and ecological flourishing.
3. Students appreciate sustainability as an economic, social and environmental value.

**Goal Five:** To encourage purposeful public engagement and social responsibility.

*Outcomes:*

1. Students demonstrate the intellectual and practical skills necessary for meaningful work and active participation in the local community and the larger world.
2. Students investigate multiple and evolving forms of civic identification and belonging, with particular attention to the practice of citizenship in local, national and global contexts.
3. Students explore the value of purposeful action in the face of the pressing problems of the 21st century.
4. Students come to see themselves as responsible, engaged and informed persons, capable and willing to act in ways that will improve or reshape the world.