THE ATTITUDE OF THE ENGLISH PRESS TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES DURING
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

DISERTATION

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INTRODUCTION

Anglo-American relations in the period before the Spanish-American War had not been uniformly friendly or unfriendly. Each incident or contact between the nations seems to have been viewed not as part of a set pattern of feelings friendly or unfriendly, but rather on its own merits. At times serious friction arose, and at other times the relations were quite friendly.

During the American Civil War expressions by members of the English upper classes of sympathy for the South had antagonized the North. Too, some Englishmen in comparing the causes of the Civil War to those stated as causes of the American Revolution found that the North was violating the tenets of the latter by attempting to govern without the consent of the governed. Great Britain hurt Northern feelings by proclaiming neutrality, thereby asserting its belief that the struggle of the North and South was a war and not merely a rebellion; but the facts soon proved that England was right, and Northern feelings had to conform.

When in 1861 the two Confederate agents Mason and Slidell were taken from the British mail steamer Trent by a United States naval captain, English popular opinion flared at the indignity put upon the flag. Preparations were made war, and troops were despatched to Canada. The United States government had to return the men, and British opinion was placated. But another source of serious friction arose: the British government permitted ships to be built in English shipyards which Charles Francis Adams, the United States Minister in London, showed conclusively were meant for the Confederate navy—William Archibald Dunning, The British Empire and the United States (N.Y., 1914), 55.
ships that later became the cruisers Florida and Alabama and the gunboat
Alexandra. When an ironclad was about to sail for delivery to the South,
Adams finally succeeded in convincing the British government that its
failure to prevent the ship from sailing would be war. Other ships did
escape from England to join the ranks of Confederate raiders of
Northern commerce, notably the Shenandoah. But these vessels escaped
despite the vigilance of British authorities, and public opinion in
the North was not again thus exacerbated.

As the war went on cotton tended to become scarce because of the
Northern blockade of Southern ports, and many employees in English
cotton mills were thrown out of work. But despite this unemployment
these workers were still sympathetic to the North, for they en-
visaged the struggle as one of free against unfree labor.

People in England saw the danger to their country in setting
the precedent of a neutral nation permitting the building of ships
to raid commerce. For, if England were to become involved in a
maritime war other countries could permit the building of raiders to
prey on British commerce. The American House of Representatives did
not miss its opportunity to threaten England with this very danger
when in 1866 it passed a bill permitting the selling of warships to
foreign governments or citizens with whom the United States was at
peace. Consequently England was in a mood to disavow the precedent
by admitting her guilt and paying the bill for damages, the bill to

It is from this work that much of the material in the early part
of this introduction has been taken.
be determined by facts. As a result there met in Washington in 1871 a Joint High Commission. This Commission was to cope with the settlement of the damages occasioned by the *Alabama* and other raiders together with other differences outstanding between the two countries. The treaty as signed at that time provided for a tribunal of arbitration to affix the amount of damages done by such raiders; it was agreed, too, to submit to a mixed commission claims of citizens of each country against the other; the treaty also settled for a minimum of ten years the question of the Atlantic fisheries, agreed to submit for arbitration to the Emperor of Germany the dispute over the international boundary in the Strait of San Juan de Fuca, settled the question of free navigation of the St. Lawrence, Yukon, and other rivers, and other matters.

The tribunal to settle the claims arising from the depredations of the *Alabama* and her sister ships awarded $15,500,000 to the United States in 1872. The other questions were settled in due time, some in favor of the United States and others against her.

The question of the Irish in the United States had also caused some little ill-feeling between the two countries. These immigrants continued to keep opinion stirred against England by their agitation in favor of Ireland and against English "oppression" in the

3. In 1869 Charles Sumner in a speech to the United States Senate asserted that because of the activity of the commerce raiders built in England the Confederacy had been enabled to wage the war two years longer than she would have been able otherwise. Therefore England should pay one half the cost of the war. But as Bemis points out (op. cit., 407) this was asserted not with the idea of ever being able to collect the staggering sum, but rather with the idea of causing England to cede Canada to the United States in settlement of the bill.

4. Reciprocal transit of goods in bond across each other's territories for ten years, and an agreement to have no export duty levied on American timber that was floated down the St. John River.
island. American politicians were not loathe for the sake of votes to play into the hands of this agitation. Mr. Alexander Mackay had seen this connection at as early a date as 1846 when on a visit to the United States. In the subsequent work on his travels he wrote: "In the Irish population of the United States is the true source of the enmity towards this country which is sometimes exhibited. Originating among these, unscrupulous politicians fan the flame to serve their own purposes...." Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1866 drove many Irish to the United States. Here they and their sympathizers planned an invasion of Canada. President Johnson promptly helped to break up this movement, but not before it had done its share both in England and the United States in contributing to ill feelings.

In the presidential campaign of 1886 the British Minister at Washington was inveigled into advising a correspondent that in order to help British interests he should vote the Democratic ticket, which favored low tariff policies. The Republicans published the letter. President Cleveland asked for the recall of the Minister, but his request was refused. He was then given his passports. This action of the United States annoyed Lord Salisbury, in charge of Foreign Affairs, and he would not appoint any other Minister until President Cleveland left office in 1889.

The question of the isthmian canal was also a thread running through Anglo-American relations in this period. In 1850 the two governments had signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which provided

6. Dunning (op. cit., 283) states "by a trick that anything above infantile sagacity would have detected...."
that neither nation would secure or maintain exclusive control over a
canal constructed through any part of Central America. Neither party
would fortify such a canal or any place in the vicinity. Tolls and
charges through any such canal were to be equal to nationals of each
party. This treaty was unpopular in the United States because it was
held to infringe upon the Monroe doctrine.

As time went on and the United States became richer and more
powerful, it came to believe itself more able to build and protect
such a canal. Accordingly steps were taken looking to the abrogation
of the treaty. When in 1878 de Lesseps, the successful builder of the
Suez Canal, secured the right from Colombia to pierce the isthmus,
Americans became excited. In 1880 the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the United States House of Representatives requested in a report
that the President take steps towards abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty. Shortly afterwards Blaine, the American Secretary of State,
attacked the treaty to the English Foreign Secretary, stating that
some changes were necessary. Blaine urged that by the treaty no
favorable treatment was accorded to United States vessels passing
through the canal to the defense of American territory as against
foreign vessels on an unfriendly mission. Looking to the necessity
for the United States to protect itself, Blaine wanted the treaty
amended to give the control and protection of the canal into the
hands of the United States in collaboration with the country in

8 Mary W. Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915, 276.
It is from this work that the material for this treatment has been obtained.
which it would be located. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State under President Arthur, renewed the attack. He stated that Great Britain had committed such acts in British Honduras as would justify the United States in abrogating the treaty. Great Britain denied this and nothing could be done. Nevertheless America was determined to play an important part in the western hemisphere, and efforts to break the compact did not cease. The United States did not wish however to abrogate the treaty on its own responsibility and without England's concurrence, and Secretary of State Olney expressed this view.

There was also difficulty with England because that nation had asserted the right to interfere in disputes between the Mosquito Indians and Nicaraguans. As a consequence Secretary of State Bayard in 1886 directed Mr. Phelps, the United States minister in London to point out to the English government that this assertion of the right to interfere was tantamount to the assertion of a protectorate. This, Phelps was to state, was to controvert the Monroe doctrine and the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The affair was cleared up, however, when in 1894 the Mosquito Indians voted for incorporation into Nicaragua.

Another point of contact and friction was the Behring Sea. There was danger that the fur seals there would be killed off. America had forbidden the killing of females and young on the Pribilof Islands, but could the United States enforce its desires on foreigners who killed indiscriminately in the Behring Sea?

Sea and outside territorial waters? In other words, was the Behring
Sea mare clausum as the United States argued. The question was
arbitrated in 1892 and decided against the United States. Another
arbitration awarded over $400,000 in damages to Canadian sealers
that had been seized by the United States, and the United States
agreed in 1896 by treaty to pay this award.

In 1895 occurred a diplomatic play-at-arms that strained the
bonds of friendship more severely than anything since the Civil
War, strained them to the point where each nation was talking for
a while of war. The boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela had
never been fixed. The question had been in negotiation between England
and Venezuela at intervals throughout the greater part of the nine-
teenth century. Venezuela asserted that Great Britain was constantly
enlarging her limits — into rich lands containing minerals. Nor would
Great Britain permit all of the territory in dispute to be settled
by arbitration. She would submit to arbitration only that territory
outside a line - the Schomburgk line - which had been drawn years
before, but never agreed to by Venezuela.

In July, 1895 Secretary of State Olney sent a note to Great
Britain, in which the Monroe doctrine was brought into the question
and interpreted in a fashion that astounded the British Foreign
Office. Olney reviewed the history of the dispute and said that it
fell within the scope of the Monroe doctrine. He then reiterated
America’s intention not to become embroiled in European politics or
wars. He then expatiated on the relations existing between the
12. The United States did not pay this award until June, 1898. A
discussion of English editorial attitude towards the payment
will form a part of this study.
United States and other nations of the western hemisphere. "The states of America," wrote Olney, "South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States. To allow the subjugation of any of them by an European power is, of course, to completely reverse that situation and signifies the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations to us....To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fist is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why?...It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers." To allow any nation to "convert American states into colonies or provinces of their own," might, he argued, lead to such a partition of South America as we were witnessing in Africa.

Secretary Olney then raised a question and answered it. His answer was of climactic importance to the British government (as well as to Continental nations). He asked whether for purposes of the Monroe doctrine Great Britain was a South American state. He answered that for those purposes no European state was a South American state. He declared that Great Britain as a South American state would have to be differentiated from Great Britain generally. That meant, he went on, that were force used, British Guiana with the use of her own resources would have to settle the matter with

Venezuela. Furthermore, the union between Great Britain and her possessions in the western hemisphere was "inexpedient and unnatural." Would or would not the British government submit the issue to arbitration, asked Secretary Olney.

This unusual document was a statement in effect that the United States would like to see severed the tie that bound any European nation to its possessions in the western world. Clashes of opinion there had been before between England and the United States over questions arising in the western hemisphere, but never had the United States taken such a domineering, belligerent attitude.

When Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, answered after a delay of four months, he said that the Venezuelan boundary had nothing to do with the Monroe doctrine. It was not, he pointed out, a question of colonization nor was it a question of the imposition of the European system in the new world. It was difficult to find a competent arbitrator. He then questioned the soundness of including the Monroe doctrine in international law, for international law was founded on the general consent of nations, and no statesman or nation could intrude a novel principle. He emphatically denied that the union between Great Britain and her possessions in the new world was "inexpedient and unnatural."

President Cleveland thereupon laid the whole matter before Congress, and asked that body to institute a commission to ascertain the facts of the matter. The line it determined upon was to be the legal boundary. If Great Britain asserted claim to anything on the Venezuela side of that line, that would be an act of

14. For. Ral., 1895 (I), 567.
aggression against the United States to be resisted by all the means at its command. In diplomatic language that spelled a threat of war.

Here was bombshell to each nation, for people in neither had suspected that the question was at all close to a crisis. Each nation was stunned. Stock markets in New York plummeted. Then, after the first shock had passed, utterances were heard to the effect that war between the two branches of the English-speaking family was unthinkable. Authors, editors, and dignitaries of the Gospel and prominent men in each country declared that such a war was not to be thought of.

While this controversy was raging in the United States and England a telegram was sent to Paul Kruger, President of the Transvaal. This telegram again changed the situation, and showed, probably, more of the true feelings of each nation. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal to stir up the outlanders against the Boer government had failed. The Kaiser thersupon despatched to President Kruger a telegram in which he congratulated him on having repelled the raid "without appealing to the help of friendly powers." That telegram shocked England.

Here was something to make England forget Venezuela. For danger was now seen to lurk for England much nearer home than Venezuela. England was reminded that dangers arising from her being a European state were much more cogent than those consequent upon her being a South American state.

England had been sensing for a long time that she was not popular on the Continent. She was envied her material prosperity, her possessions flung round the world, her freedom from worry about 15. *Howat*, *op. cit.*, 282, states that the telegram was not a result of impulse on the Kaiser's part, but was rather a "considered act of the German Foreign Office."
invasion, her freedom from the hardships of conscription. Europe was grouped in two large alliances. The American ambassador to London, Thomas F. Bayard, had written his understanding of English desires as early as 1893. "Great Britain has just now her hands very full in other quarters of the globe. The United States is the last nation on earth with whom the British people or their rulers desire to quarrel, and of this I have new proofs every day in my intercourse with them. The other European nations are watching each other like pugilists in the ring." But the Kaiser's telegram acted as the thunderstorm that clears the air. An enemy now loomed up clearly and at close range, for the Kaiser had not only sent such a telegram, but had caused it to be published in the papers the next morning. He had, in other words, flaunted the fact that he was friendly to a nation with which England was having difficulties, and had as much as said that he would co-operate with the Boers against England.

Right then England saw her true position. Her splendid isolation had kept her from making allies while Europe had been grouping itself into two large coalitions. Over a petty scrap of territory in the New World she was on the verge of war with the United States. England knew that the United States felt warmly and belligerently about the Monroe doctrine and that England had already enough territory to tax the sagacity and far-sightedness of her rulers.

It was the knowledge and fears elicited by the Kaiser's telegram, then, that caused England to change her policy towards the

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United States. But the telegram had its effect as well on American feelings towards Great Britain. Expressions of friendship and sympathy for England were commonly made in the United States. The consequence of the Venezuelan dispute was that Great Britain first supplied, in reply to Mr. Olney's request, all the information that it possessed on the Venezuelan dispute. Then when Olney suggested that negotiations be begun at Washington to settle the Venezuelan question, Great Britain also agreed. She retreated from her stand that she would arbitrate only a part of what territory was in dispute, and threw the whole question open to arbitration. The tribunal set up made its award in 1899, setting a line approximately the same as had been suggested by Lord Abernethy in 1844.

There followed then between England and the United States other moves indicating England's changed attitude. Steps were undertaken to secure the signing of a treaty which would provide for the arbitration of all controversies that might arise between the two nations. Mr. Olney and Sir Julian Pauncefote, British ambassador in Washington, actually signed such a treaty in January, 1897. Parliament ratified it, but the United States Senate refused. This veto disappointed many people in each nation.

Nevertheless the good effects of the Venezuelan boundary dispute and the Kaiser's telegram were not dissipated by it. The peoples felt closer together, largely because of the fears England entertained upon suddenly appreciating that she was hated and had

17. Deming, op. cit., 422, says largely because the Senate feared thereby to limit its right to permit arbitration "in particular disputes as they came up."
no real friends. The fact that the two sections of the "Anglo-Saxon" race had come so close to breaking their friendship and had had time to ponder what that would mean also undoubtedly played its part in the now more friendly relations.

This was essentially the condition in which the relations between England and the United States found themselves when early in 1898 events began to point to the possibility of war between the United States and Spain.

For generations Cuba had dangled, delightful and dazzling, before the eyes of Americans. Various plans had been mooted for its acquisition. John Quincy Adams had thought that the island would "gravitate" to the United States. Slaveholders at various times had looked upon it as the "natural" route of expansion. President Polk had offered to buy it and his offer had been peremptorily rejected. In 1854 three American ministers abroad had met together and asserted in a report to Mr. Marcy, the American Secretary of State, that if Spain would not sell the island, then the United States had every right to seize it. This doctrine of the "gentlemanly" highwayman who says "Give or I'll take" was, however, officially denied. In the late fifties Senator Slidell of Louisiana introduced a bill to buy Cuba, but it did not pass.

After the Civil War in the United States theory of the South for purposes of expanding slavery was stifled, but Cuba became no less a problem for the United States, for in 1868 there broke out 15. This remarkable document is known to history as the Ostend Manifesto.
an insurrection against Spanish rule. Much excitement was created in the United States by the stopping of expeditions to Cuba designed to help the rebels, and by the cruel conduct of Spanish officials in Cuba. In the ten-year course of this bloody affair President Grant did at one time sign a proclamation recognizing the belligerent rights of the insurrectionists, but Secretary of State Fish would not issue it.

The case of the Virginius in this insurrection aroused bitter feeling in the United States against Spain. That ship was a gun-runner to Cuba, flying the American flag at the time, although it was later shown to have been displaying it illegally. Apprehended in 1873 by a Spanish gunboat, some fifty of the passengers and crew were summarily shot as pirates. Spain made recompense to the American families thereby left derelict, and promised to reprove the officials concerned, but did not. Other incidents continued to stir American resentment until Secretary Fish himself lost patience and told the Spanish government that if it could not suppress the insurrection, other governments might. A final change of rulers in Spain and the despatch of a new military leader and augmented forces to Cuba did, however, bring peace to the island in 1878 by the Pact of Zanjón.

In the seventeen-year period before the next insurrection broke out, American capital was heavily invested in Cuba. By 1898 it has been estimated it totalled $50,000,000. Sugar was gradually becoming the principal crop, supplanting coffee and tobacco. Most of the
population came to depend on it for their livelihood. The effect of the American tariff law of 1894 was disastrous. As a forty per cent tariff on sugar was levied, dissatisfaction began to spread in Cuba.

Pratt has made a plausible case, however, in Expansionists of 1898 that despite the fact that about $50,000,000 of American capital was invested in Cuba, business men on the whole were not interested in American intervention there. They were, according to Pratt, either indifferent or feared that war would be bad for business, which was beginning to revive after the depression of 1893.

Economics may very well have played a larger part in the revolt which broke out in Cuba in February, 1895 than it did in American intervention there three years later. Cleveland, following presidential precedent, refused to grant the Cubans the rights of belligerency. But the replacement of General Martinez Campos by General Valeriano Weyler brought the Cuban question sharply to the attention of people outside Cuba. The insurgents had refused to fight open battles, had carried on guerrilla tactics, and had devastated the sugar plantations. Their armies were recruited from the great numbers of unemployed. Blaming Spain for their economic woes, they were determined to turn the island into a wasted desert rather than permit Spain to obtain any benefit from it. When Weyler took charge in 1896 he attempted to combat their tactics of rapine and arson by taking people off the plantations. This, he argued, would cause the insurrectionists to surrender or starve. The people taken
off the soil he herded into camps called *reconcentraciones*. In these camps many died of disease and hunger. There was fear in the United States that yellow fever might spread to that country from the *reconcentraciones*. Much criticism of the brutality of Spanish methods followed. American trade with Cuba under such circumstances fell off greatly.

Now enter the scene two forces that contributed to exciting the American public: Exiled Cuban patriots, insurrectionists, and zealots in American seaport cities kept up a more or less constant agitation and propaganda favoring Cuban independence and American participation to effect it. They raised money to keep the insurrectionists supplied. They ran filibustering expeditions from United States ports to Cuba. Attempts, not always successful, to prevent the sailing of these expeditions entailed great expense on the United States government. The Spanish government relied more on preventive efforts of the United States than on its own efforts to capture the expeditions in Cuban waters.

The other influence—"yellow" journalism—was far more important. In 1895 William R. Hearst had acquired the *New York Journal*, aggressive, and unscrupulous, Hearst determined to build the circulation of the Journal. The way to build circulation was to attack somebody or something. He soon hit upon the Cuban insurrection as his God-given *materia*. Here was opportunity enough for invective, "appeals to humanity," and sensationalism in general. In

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19 Bemis, *op. cit.*, 436.
his attempt to build circulation he had a rival in New York City — Joseph Pulitzer of the World. Each of these men spent money freely sending special correspondents and artists to Cuba. That the described incidents (or drawn) were not authentic did not keep them from being printed.

What was the situation in America at this time? Beginning possibly in the early eighties there had been apparent in the United States a spirit of accentuated nationalism and a sensitiveness about the power of the country. The frontier as such ceased to exist by 1890, and there was a desire for expansion, and for the country to "fulfill its mission." In other words, a desire for a larger, stronger navy, a desire to make evident the power of the country. The navy had begun in the eighties to build iron ships. There was a desire to emulate the imperialism then rampant in Europe. If the United States postponed it very long all the desirable sections of the earth would have been annexed by the European countries, would seem to be the way the argument ran in many people's minds. There were certain men of influence in the nineties who favored what Pratt has termed "The Large Policy." Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot

20. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (N.Y.,1931), 67-68, tells of a story in the Journal to the effect that an American woman on an American vessel about to sail from Havana had been stripped and searched by Spanish army officers. Richard Harding Davis wrote the story for the Journal, and Frederic Remington drew the sketch to accompany it. According to Millis the woman was not searched by male officers, but by a police matron; but the editor of the Journal had changed Davis's story. Sensational stories of this type were commonly printed in the rivalry of the the Journal and the World.

21. To be sure there were, as some writers have pointed out, "back areas" yet to be filled in.
Lodge, Albert J. Beveridge, and Alfred T. Mahan were, possibly, the most important. These men were writing about the necessity for obtaining a site for the transcontinental canal. That in turn would bring the necessity to protect it, and there would have to be outposts—Hawaii and some place of strategic importance in the Caribbean! The Republican Party platform of 1896 called for the independence of Cuba.

The arguments of these men must not, however, be permitted to convey the impression that the temper of America at the time was for an economic imperialism. As has been pointed out, Pratt's conclusions do not warrant such an interpretation. What was pervading America at this time, though, was a restlessness, a sensitiveness, a national pride, and what may be termed, for lack of a better term, an "ideological imperialism."

A change of ministry in Madrid in October, 1897 brought into power the Liberals with Señor Práxedes Sagasta as Premier. Now these Liberals as opposition had been criticizing the repressive policy in Cuba, and they set out to effect a change in that policy. General Weyler was, accordingly, supplanted in Cuba by General Blanco. The latter had orders to moderate the system of reconcentraciones. In November the Queen-Regent issued proclamations granting to the Spanish West Indian possessions all rights enjoyed by Spaniards in the peninsula, establishing in Cuba the same electoral laws as were in effect in Spain, and getting under way certain measures looking to autonomy if the Cubans would cease fighting. The Cubans, however, by this time had come to the point where nothing but independence 22.Lodge argued for Cuba; see Forum, XIX, 3-17; Mar., 1895.
would satisfy them. That they hoped for American intervention to help
effect it is indubitable.

In his annual message to Congress in December President
McKinley declared that the United States ought to give this new
Spanish program an opportunity to prove itself. As time went on
General Blanco attempted to set up the government for autonomy. He
encountered much indifference and recalcitrancy, for Spanish citizens
in Cuba feared that autonomy would curtail some of their power, and the
insurgents were holding out for complete independence. But it must be
said that Spain was now taking steps calculated to soothe American
susceptibilities about the condition of Cuba. Meanwhile the reports
from the United States Consul-General in Havana, Mr. Fitzhugh Lee,
could hardly be called sparing in their comments on the misery of the
Cubans.

To summarize, then, we find that just before the Cuban situation
developed to a critical stage Great Britain and the United States had
entered on a new and more cordial phase of friendship. This had come
about largely because Great Britain had had a startling demonstration
that she was alone and hated by Europe. Whereas immediately before this
event she had been involved in a quarrel with the United States and was
attempting to maintain her status as an American nation, Great Britain
now came to believe that problems arising out of her being a European
state were much more cogent and immediate. Therefore she took steps to
patch up her quarrel in the West in the hope that she might make a
close friend of the nation with which she had been so unfriendly. The
23. For. Rel., 1897, XX.
United States at the same time had entered upon a period of accentuated nationalism, marked by a growing restlessness, and a resurgence of the old impulse towards expansion. America, it was felt by many, should play a larger role in the affairs of the world. Spain's troubles with the "Pearl of the Antilles" meanwhile had cost the United States money, effort, and loss of trade and some tempers. But in the fall of 1897 and early weeks of 1898 it must be said that Spain gave every evidence of trying earnestly to settle those troubles.
Chapter I

IMMEDIATE INCIDENTS LEADING TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR

In this condition of affairs, the scene was suddenly shifted to the western hemisphere where two events occurred in February that caused excitement in the United States and abroad - the publication of a letter written by the Spanish minister to the United States, Señor Dupuy de Lôme, to a friend in Havana, and the sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor.

In December, 1897 Señor Dupuy de Lôme had written a personal - not an official - letter to Señor José de Canalajas, editor of the Madrid Heraldo, who was visiting in Cuba. In that letter the Spanish minister had criticized President McKinley's annual message to Congress, and the President himself. He had written: "The message has been a disillusionment to the insurgents, who expected something different; but I regard it as bad (for us). Besides the ingrained and inevitable ill-breeding (grosería) with which is repeated all that the press and public opinion in Spain have said about Seymour, it once more shows what McKinley is, weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a would-be politician (politicastro) who tries to leave a door open behind himself himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoists of his party....I do not think sufficient attention has been paid to the part England is playing. Nearly all the newspaper rabble that swarms in your hotels [hotels in Madrid] are Englishmen, and while writing for the Journal [Mr. Hearst's New York Journal] they are also correspondents of the most influential journals and reviews of London. It has been so ever
since this thing began. As I look at it, England's only object is that the 'Americans should amuse themselves with us and leave her alone, and if there should be war, that would better stave off the conflict which she dreads but which will never come about.

"It would be very advantageous to take up, even if only for effect, the question of commercial relations, and to have a man of some prominence sent hither in order that I may make use of him here to carry on a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the Junta and to try to win over the refugees."

This letter, according to the communication sent by General Woodford, the American minister in Madrid, to President McKinley, was stolen from the Havana post office by a man in the pay of the Cuban insurgents. Dupuy was informed that it had been obtained, and that same day asked his home government to relieve him of his post. The next day, February 9, Mr. Hearst's New York Journal published a facsimile of the letter, having received it from the Cuban Junta of that city. Assistant Secretary of State Day then told the Spanish minister that he was advised General Woodford to ask for his recall; but Dupuy anticipated this action of Mr. Day's by telling him that he had already asked to be relieved of his post.

This incident elicited some little comment from the English press critical of Señor Dupuy de Lôme's words and also of the conduct of the Washington Government. The Pall Mall Gazette stated: "The action of the United States Government in calling Señor Dupuy de Lôme's attention to the door is most proper...no Government could allow a Minister to remain accredited to it who had spoken of its chief persons in the picturesque language used by him....He has every right to his views, as admitted in

1.James Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, 176, 177.
2.For.Rel., 1898, 675.
America, but it is certainly indiscreet to put such views on paper, unless the paper is intended for burglar-proof safe or the grate, and, if they do happen to get out, the Minister must take the consequences." The (Birmingham) Daily Post echoed essentially the same feelings: "The Spanish Minister has admitted the authorship of a letter which is not so much an indiscretion as an outrage upon the head of the nation whose hospitality he has received, and there is really now no way out of it for him but a speedy and ignominious retirement...." The same paper also said that "the letter...was as gratuitous as it is offensive, and it admits neither of explanation nor excuse."

Likewise The Daily Telegraph condemned Señor Dupuy's action, and termed the letter "injudicious and ill-timed." Furthermore, it stated: "A public man in a foreign capital must often deny himself the luxury of making even personal communications to a friend."

The Illustrated London News joined the chorus criticizing the undiplomatic diplomat. "The case of Señor Dupuy de Lome...is much to be pitied; but a diplomatist ought not to write private letters on public matters. What is permitted to him is to say what he likes about them to a companion in confidence....But to write concerning matters of State, with a running commentary of one's Excellency's private views about them - unless, indeed, one's handwriting is as cryptic as Dean Stanley's - seems incredibly imprudent...."

3. Pall Mall Gazette, Feb.11, 1898.
But not all English journals contented themselves with condemning the Spanish minister for having put such sentiments in writing. Several were critical of the attitude taken by the American government. The Spectator, very correct, sporting, righteous, and British, bitterly condemned the action of President McKinley and the "leaders of public opinion" for an incident which was almost certain to produce fresh difficulties between the United States and Spain. It continued: "We say this from a general view of the case, and not from any failure to perceive that the incident ought to have made no difference whatever to the situation. If President McKinley and the leaders of public opinion had been wise they would have set their teeth like iron, and have declared that, come what would, they would pay no attention whatever to purloined private letters, however genuine, and that as far as they were concerned the incident was non-existent." Later in the same discussion of the affair, The Spectator wrote: "It is rather that want of firmness and of savoir faire which has been shown by the present Administration throughout their term of office. The President never seems to have made up his mind what his real policy is in regard to Cuba. He...has never come to close quarters with the question....He may think it easier to quarrel with Spain about the letter than about Cuba."

7. Spectator, LXX, 228, Feb. 12, 1895. The Spectator then went on to state its idea of how the affair might have been managed: President McKinley should have invited Dupuy to dinner and told him that the bad taste and vulgarity of the letter were sufficient proof that it was a forgery.

8. Ibid., LXX, 228, Feb. 12, 1895.
The Speaker was likewise critical of the conduct of President McKinley, declaring that "Señor Dupuy de Lome was expressing his opinion, which is quite a different thing from the official view of a diplomatist. It is eminently discreditable for a President to take notice of such a letter...."

The American government had said that it would demand no formal apology, but rather would rely on Spain's "sense of propriety" to remove the unpleasant impression left by the ex-minister's letter. In commenting upon this, The Graphic became sarcastic: "It is a pity that in the first instance the instruments of the American Government were not restricted by a 'sense of propriety' from the peculiar procedure which they adopted to procure the recall of Señor Dupuy de Lome...."

A third group of papers approached the matter from another point of view — that of the Cuban revolutionists, and the theft of the letter. In the incident they saw a sad lack of decent sportsmanship and a salutary warning to all politicians. The Review of Reviews reproved the United States for admitting such evidence: "This letter was purloined by a Cuban patriot and published by the New York papers. All is fair in love and war, and the insurgents who are fighting for their lives cannot be blamed for striking below the belt....Diplomatists accredited to the United States will do well to follow Mr. Gladstone's rule in times of crisis and never write a line that they are not prepared to see in all the newspapers.

next morning." The *Fall Hall Gazette* bitterly criticized the Cubans: "What will strike everybody is the method of their [Señor Dupuy de Lôme's views] getting out. The Cuban Junta has been doing its best for some time to throw away such sympathy as it gained by reaction from Weyler's methods, and this disreputable trick will finish it."

The *Birmingham Daily Post* hoped that the Spanish Government would recall the minister, but that it would also institute an inquiry as to how a private letter obtained publicity. The *Speaker* likewise spoke in derogatory fashion of the Cubans: "The manoeuvre is not exactly fair fighting, but in the Cuban insurrection all measures seem fair...."

While the publication of Señor Dupuy de Lôme's letter and his consequent resignation were occupying the British press, there occurred another incident which caused hardly less, though more restrained, comment there than in the United States - the sinking of the *Maine* in Havana harbor. On January 12 Consul-General Lee had cabled to Washington that mobs under the leadership of Spanish army officers were rioting in Havana and attacking the offices of the newspapers that favored autonomy. The next day he cabled that

14. *Speaker*, XVII, 189, Feb. 12, 1898. The episode was enshrined in English journals when *Black and White* stated on April 16 that Dupuy's successor, Señor Polo y Bernabés, had "already effaced not a little of the national feeling awakened by the de Lôme incident." That journal stated at the same time that the new minister had spent two years in the United States when his father was minister there during Grant's administration, and that therefore he knew the ways and customs of the country. (*Black and White*, XV, 518, Apr. 16, 1898.)
15. *For. Rel.*, 1898, 1024.
business was suspended in Havana and that he had "heard once yesterday of a few rioters shouting a proposal to march to our consulate. Presence of ships may be necessary later, but not now." Later the same day he informed Washington that United States ships should be prepared to move to Havana promptly. Assistant Secretary of State Day asked him on January 22 "the number and character other naval vessels" in Havana harbor. Lee replied that there were none there at that time, but that two German vessels were expected that month. Two days later Assistant Secretary Day advised Consul Lee that friendly naval visits were going to be inaugurated at Cuban ports and that in conformity with that resolution of the American government, the Maine would reach Havana "in a day or two." Lee was instructed to "arrange for a friendly interchange of calls with authorities." Lee advised Mr. Day to postpone the visit for a few days, to allow Havana to become calm after its excitement. Nevertheless the Maine arrived from Key West at Havana the next morning.

While the ship lay in the harbor friendly visits were paid to it by the Acting Governor-General and his staff. Relations had every appearance of being most friendly. Mr. Day cabled to Lee on February 4 that the Secretary of the Navy believed that for sanitary reasons it might be well to move the Maine out of Havana. Lee thought, how-

15. For Rel., 1898, 1024-25.
16. Ibid., 1898, 1025.
17. Ibid., 1898, 1025.
18. Ibid., 1898, 1025.
ever, that there was no danger "until April or even May." He offered his suggestion too that, considering the possibility of danger to Americans resident in Havana, a first-class battleship should be kept there. Meanwhile Woodford from Madrid informed Secretary of State Sherman that the Spanish government appreciated the friendly character of the visit of the Maine and that it would reciprocate."

Hence the situation at both Havana and Madrid seemed most friendly. The friendly relations were severely jarred, however, on February 15 by the explosion that sent the Maine to the bottom of Havana harbor. The loss in lives was 258 men and two officers. The question immediately arose: was the explosion accidental or planned, and if the latter, who was the agent? The vital question was whether she had been blown up from the outside or the inside, for on this point was balanced the question of responsibility. Immediately after the explosion Captain Sigbee of the Maine had wired the Navy Department his hope that the American public would withhold judgment until further report could be made.

The great bulk of opinion expressed in English journals favored the theory of accidental explosion, and was commendatory of American public opinion in withholding judgment until the court of inquiry (formed by the United States government) had submitted its report. Meanwhile English journals expressed polite sympathy for the United States in its loss. Typical was the leader of the Morning Post on February 17: "It present all is conjecture; and it is perhaps not unnatural that, in the existing state of the relations between the

19. For Rel., 1898, 1027.
20. Ibid., 1898, 1026.
United States and Spain, people should have been found to believe, in the excitement of the moment, that the explosion was caused from outside. A torpedo is not carried about as easily as a penknife, however, and it is difficult to see how one could have been obtained without the connivance of the Spanish authorities, a notion which no one will entertain for a moment. Of course, we know little of the actual effects of torpedoes, but it is difficult to believe that a torpedo exploded outside a strongly built warship would have such an effect on her internal structure as was produced in the case of the Maine. It is far more probable that the explosion occurred on board, and that it was due to accident."

Many other journals deprecated the idea that the Maine had been sunk by Spanish treachery. The Speaker opined that the calamity "seems to be ascribable with most probability to the decomposition of some new and as yet imperfectly tested explosive - Americans being remarkable for daring rather than caution, especially in dealing with new applications of science." The Spectator said: "Treachery, in fact, is violently improbable. It is inconceivable that the Government of Cuba should have sanctioned a crime which would leave their country exposed to the wrath of the United States, without a defender in the civilised world, and it is believed that no private fanatic could

21. Morning Post, Feb. 17, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 196, Feb. 12, 1898. The Daily News expressed its sympathy as follows: "With the community of race between our people and the sufferers, the calamity will send a pang through every British heart." (Daily News, Feb. 17, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 196, Feb. 12, 1898.) The fact that the British were suffering people would cause them to sympathise with the Americans, thought The Standard: "From no quarter will they be assuaged of more profound and heartfelt sympathy than from their British kinmen, if only for the reason that the disaster is one that comes home to use more directly than, perhaps, to other nations, whose traditions are less identified with the fortunes of the sea." (Standard, Feb. 17, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 196, Feb. 12, 1898.)

22. Speaker, XVII, 222, Feb. 17, 1898.
have had sufficient means at his disposal." After stating that America had been inflamed on the assumption that the Maine had been sunk by Spanish treachery, The South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate Mail said succinctly: "Of course, it is inconceivable that the Spanish Government could have had any hand in such a business." The hypothesis that the Spanish government was guilty of complicity was to The Times "too monstrous and too irrational to be entertained."

The Investor's Review mentioned the apathy observable in England over the excitement that had been raised in the United States by the sinking of the Maine, and then went on: "Perhaps this apathy arises to a considerable extent from the general refusal of the English mind to accept the theory that the ship was blown up by a mine laid, treacherously or otherwise...and exploded with deliberate intent to destroy the great ship and her crew. Much as we know about Spanish habits of cruelty, and about Spanish Jesuitry in politics, we have all along refused to accept the decision of the American Committee of Inquiry, and of the American people, that it was a mine, no matter

17. South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate Mail, XLIV, 199, Feb. 19, 1898.
18. Times, Mar. 8, 1898.
how fired, which blew this vessel to pieces...."

Several journals spoke their gratification at the calmness and self-possession evidenced by the United States government in the face of such a provocative incident. The Times after reporting that the disaster "was made the most and the worst of by a very active, noisy, and unscrupulous party," went on: "But the Cabinet has never lost their heads, nor has the President departed from his attitude of grave and watchful reticence." Three weeks later the same paper said

19. *Investors' Review*, XI, 597, Apr. 29, 1898. It is significant that throughout the entire two months during which the cause of the sinking of the Maine was being commented upon in English journals, only one carried any hint that it may have been caused by American treachery. But that expression did not appear in an editorial per se. It appeared in an article or letter - it is impossible to be certain which - in The Labour Leader and was signed "Il Macai." But it may be taken as one of those border-line cases in which opinion expressed by a correspondent (or it might be, in this case, by the editor himself) may be considered the opinion of the editor. "Il Macai," stated that he thought the sinking of the Maine was an accident. Then: "If not, it was more likely American than Spanish treachery. The capitalist crew who can prescribe 'rifles diet' for strikers, and plough up a police platoon with a bomb, will not stick at a few hundred marines [sic]. Therefore, when that old Republican, and most humane of all the Spanish generals, Blanco, got sent to Cuba with conciliatory powers [Don Ramón Blanco y Brenes had succeeded General Weyler as Governor-General of Cuba on October 31, 1897], some dastard feared success, and tried to force U.S. intervention by an outrage on his own countrymen which would excite suspicion against Spain." (Labour Leader, no vol. number, p.133, Apr. 23, 1898.)

20. *Times*, Mar. 8, 1898. Immediately after the accident, The Times had commended Captain Sigsbee upon his good judgment. "No better proof of judgment and self-possession can be imagined than the character of the first hurried telegram in which he informed the Secretary of the Navy of the destruction of his ship. Even at such a moment he had the wisdom to bear in mind the possible consequences upon the masses of his countrymen of the news he was sending home and the forethought to depurate all hasty and premature conclusions as to the cause of the disaster." (Times, Feb. 17, 1898.)
that it would have been hard for Englishmen to keep calm had a
British man-of-war been blown up in circumstances like the Maine,
and then termed President McKinley's attitude "dignified and fair."
The same paper also wrote: "We admire the patience and the reserve of
a democratic Government, in circumstances of provocation and in the
presence of public excitement which it would only have been too easy
to fan into a flame of war."

The Fall Hall Gazette constantly recurred to this same theme.
On February 26 it said: "The one thing essential is for the American
Administration to keep its head, and that it seems to be doing...."
A week later it stated: "The Government of the United States is
acting with admirable dignity and self-possession under circum-
stances of great difficulty...." The Illustrated London News said:
"President McKinley and his Government firmly maintain a guarded
pacific attitude...." And The Graphic thought that "Mr. McKinley's
tactful treatment of that [the Maine] question is eminently
calculated to appeal to the chivalrous instincts of the Spanish
people."

22. Fall Hall Gazette, Mar. 4, 1898.
23. Ibid., Mar. 4, 1898. Later the same paper wrote: "The President and
his Cabinet, it must be admitted by common consent, deserve the
nation-wide backing they have received. They have wholly done away
with the delusion that the Government of a democratic community
cannot face foreign complications with assurance....By refrain-
ing from making capital out of the situation, Mr. McKinley and
his advisers have won the sympathies of Europe to their side far
more surely than by any amount of ultra-patriotic oratory." (Ibid.,
Mar. 9, 1898.
The Saturday Review was unfriendly, uncritical, and cynical towards America during this period, and, in fact, until the war was almost over. Hence, concerning the Maine it did not content itself with commending the United States government on its self-restraint and calmness, but said that it was "shrewdly suspected that the pacific disposition of Mr. McKinley is largely owing to reports from his naval advisers to the effect that America is not in a condition to go to war with Spain with any certainty of immediate and overwhelming success."

On March 28 President McKinley sent the report of the court of inquiry to Congress together with a special message on the matter. The report stated that "the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons." President McKinley said in his message to Congress that he had ordered that the finding of the court of inquiry and the views of the American government on the finding be transmitted to the Spanish government, and that he did not permit himself "to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the friendly relations of the two Governments."

Approval and gratification were the notes struck by this speech in the English press. The Times said of it: "It is composed

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in a temperate spirit, and contains nothing that ought to wound the feelings of the most susceptible of Spaniards." The Pall Mall Gazette wrote in the same vein: "President McKinley's Message to Congress opens to the Spanish Government a broad way of escape, if they choose to take it.... There is not a word in the whole document that need ruffle a feather of Castilian punctilio. And as the Spaniards have put themselves hopelessly in the wrong, they can but take President McKinley at his plain-spoken, yet exceedingly courteous word." The Standard wrote in the same vein: "With... a Message so cordial towards Spain, it should be within the competence of the advisers of the Queen Regent to make suitable amends to the United States for the terrible mishap to the cruiser." The Daily News wrote as follows: "The situation may be stated in summary fashion as follows: "The United States are willing to stifle their resentment for the loss of the Maine, if they receive satisfaction in regard to the future of Cuba. It is a generous compromise, and Spain will do well to be wise in time."

The Daily Graphic thought the message eased the way to a settlement. "President McKinley's dignified appeal to the sense of justice of the Spanish people should strike a responsive chord in the

29. Times, Mar. 29, 1898.
30. Pall Mall Gazette, Mar. 29, 1898.
Peninsula, where sentiments of this kind are usually so much prized. Spain cannot afford to be less handsome than this Amerigano. 33

Mr. McKinley’s Message is an olive branch...." The Manchester Guardian was, however, much less hopeful. It stated: “Clearly Mr. McKinley [sic] is resolved to show that, with all unbiased observers, he regards the disaster to the Maine as an isolated event which shall not, if he can help it, influence his main policy in regard to Cuba. But his silence must not be misinterpreted to mean that that policy has been modified, that he is less resolved than before to intervene in Cuba when the time comes, and restore peace to the island by sweeping away the Spanish dominion that has proved so great a curse....The relations between the two countries therefore remain, to all appearance, as critical as ever."

Several journals expressed themselves to the effect that the sinking of the Maine was not a sufficient cause for war. Apropos of this The Times said that it would be "too monstrous and irrational" to entertain any idea of the "complicity" of the Spanish government, "and, short of that, there can be nothing that is not capable of adjustment with good will on the part of the two 35 Governments." The Review of Reviews was more explicit: "It may be that the Americans may have a good legal claim in international law against the Spanish Government for lack of due diligence in

33 Daily Graphic, Mar. 29, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXII, 381, Apr. 1, 1898.
34 Manchester Guardian, Mar. 29, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXII, 382, Apr. 1, 1898.
35 Times, Mar. 8, 1898.
preventing so cowardly and deadly an attack upon an American ship in Spanish waters; but it is impossible to carry the doctrine of national responsibility further than that. That is to say, the United States might claim compensation; she could not make the explosion a casus belli. Writing after President McKinley had sent his special message to Congress accompanying the report of the court of inquiry, The Standard opined: "War is not now to be apprehended on the issue raised by the explosion." Also writing of the same report, Black and White stated its opinion: "The finding that the catastrophe was caused by an external explosion was bound to increase the feeling against Spain; but that it should spur the

36. Review of Reviews, XVII, 317, Apr. 1, 1898. In the same issue, however, in an item headed "A Historic Parallel," The Review of Reviews told of how at the beginning of the Servian-Turkish War, a Russian had been killed fighting on the Servian side. This, according to the writer, was the spark that lighted up Russian enthusiasm, and made the Russo-Turkish War inevitable. "Just so in the United States. The fate of the Maine has decided the destinies of Cuba....Cuba is America's Bulgaria. As Russia was to Bulgaria in 1876, so is the United States to Cuba in 1898. The Spaniard, like the Turk, is holding on to a province which he has long since forfeited all right to govern. The Cubans, like the Bulgarians, have suffered horribly." (Ibid., XVII, 317, Apr. 1, 1898.)

States to war seems utterly unwarranted."

Thus it is seen that the opinion of English journals concerning the sinking of the Maine was on the whole sympathetic to the United States and favorable to President McKinley and his Cabinet. The predominant feeling was that President McKinley and his Cabinet were cool, dignified, firm, resolute, tactful, and were doing what they could to prevent war and allay the irritated feelings of Americans. For in the minds of many English editors the sinking of the Maine was no just cause for war.

But there were other elements in the picture which, according to at least one English journal, also tended to make friction, if not open flame. At this time Consul-General Lee had returned to the United States from Havana, and was making a series of speeches in the South and East. The Times view the effect of these speeches with alarm. "His intervention will tend to aggravate the bitterness of feeling that has been engendered in the United States by the destruction of the Maine. The loss of this fine vessel...was a

36 Black and White, XV, 454, Apr. 2, 1898. The Saturday Review expressed on two different occasions its fear that the sinking of the Maine might afford the jingoes in the United States an opportunity of overcoming those persons who were peaceably inclined. After stating on February 26 that it was suspected that President McKinley's "Pacific disposition" might be owing to lack of United States preparedness, and that the South American nations did not love the United States, it continued: "But all that will not prevent the jingoes from forcing the President's hand if the smallest scrap of evidence implicating the Cuban authorities were to become public." (Saturday Review, LXXV, 283, Feb. 26, 1898.) A month later in reporting that the report on the sinking was to be presented to the Senate, it expressed its opinion that "the jingoes will do their best to renew the echoes of the explosion in Washington. A really strong president and executive could afford to ignore the capital, which is not the centre of American sentiment." (Ibid., LXXV, 418, Mar. 26, 1898.)
natural cause of suspicion and anger, but to blow up these smouldering fires into a flame at the present critical moment is a rash act, not easily to be condoned by the conscience of a civilized community."

By this same time, however (mid-April), other events had been occurring and the general situation had been so altered and evolved as to cause the Maine per se to be dropped by English journals. It is necessary for the moment to go back and consider the attitude of these journals towards the most important of those events.

About three weeks after the Maine was sunk, March 6, President Representative McKinley asked Joseph Cannon, Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, to see if he could start a bill in Congress to appropriate $50,000,000 for national defence. The bill was passed on March 9. This bill, according to Chadwick, a death blow to the system of autonomy that Spain had been endeavoring to institute in Cuba, for the insurgents there read the handwriting on the wall, and they foresaw the United States making war against Spain. It may also be pointed out that the bill might well shock Spain into a realization that the United States was in earnest and that it was wealthy, otherwise it could not appropriate money in such amounts from the Treasury. In having these effects on the minds of Spaniards the bill might well serve as a move towards peace. And these were the implications of that bill which were commented upon by the English press.

40. Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy, 545.
On March 8 The Times expressed its belief that the bill would serve as a brake on the spirit of belligerency in Spain. "Should there by any desire for war on the part of Spain, which we do not believe for a moment, this evidence of alertness on the part of the United States offers the most effectual check." The Pall Mall Gazette was more warmly expressive in its commendation of the action of the United States government. "The ten millions credit voted unanimously... shows that the Americans believe in action rather than talk at a crisis. They are, indeed, determined to prevent war by being ready for it. The spirit prevalent, besides, is not that of spread-eagleism, but of a resolute intention to fulfill the dictates of a perfectly legitimate ambition - the strengthening of the navy...."

"It is quite possible," opined The Guardian, "however, that this vote may in the end make for peace. The knowledge that the Government are arming may help to keep the Jingoes quiet, and it will effectually preach caution to Spain." After the news had arrived that the bill had passed The Pall Mall Gazette stated that the bill really made for peace, and The Outlook said: "The fact that the United States can vote $10,000,000 for armaments without the slightest inconvenience will give a salutary shock to the Madrid hot-heads."

41. Times, Mar. 8, 1898.
42. Pall Mall Gazette, Mar. 9, 1898.
43. Guardian, LIII (I), 253, Mar. 9, 1898.
44. Pall Mall Gazette, Mar. 10, 1898.
45. Outlook, I, 161, Mar. 12, 1898.
The Speaker said that this appropriation by Congress was "a useful warning to the Spanish Chauvinists that America is not a Power to be trifled with. It would be hard for Spain to raise even a tenth of that amount at the present juncture....Spain is at the end of her resources; the United States are only at the beginning of theirs....For the moment, it gives pause to the war party in America. It gives pause even more effectively to the Jingoists of Spain. And, most of all, it is a warning to those Spanish Conservatives who will not let Cuba take the chance that Señor Sagasta gives her -- that it is, indeed, their last chance -- of retaining their American possession." "The unanimity of Congress, combined with the moderate language employed in debate, will have a wholesome and pacific effect upon enlightened and intelligent opinion," thought The Daily News, but it did not state whether upon opinion in Spain or in the United States.

Only one journal failed to become enthusiastic over this American "move for peace." The Investors' Review lamented that the United States had fallen into an imitation of European nations, and precisely where imitation was undesirable. "We do not believe that this increase in the American Navy was necessary, but if the people think so and feel that they can spend the money, well, they must just do as they please." The same journal continued saying that "American iron masters and engineers now stand a chance of faring as richly as our own. They are quite right to get their innings when they see the

46. Speaker, XVII, 318, 319, Mar. 12, 1898.
chance, and democracies love, above all things, to be fooled out of their money."

While the government at Washington was actively endeavoring to secure "peace through preparation," another move was suggested which might avert the impending hostilities. The Holy See was rumored to be about to offer its good offices as mediator to avert war between Spain and the United States. On April 3 Señor Pío Gullón, the Spanish foreign minister, informed Mr. Woodford that the Pope, acting, it was said, on the suggestion of President McKinley, had proposed to offer his mediation to Spain with the hope that the Spanish government could then proclaim an immediate armistice in Cuba, which would lead to eventual peace in the island. Washington, however, denied that any such suggestion had ever emanated from the President.

Few of the British journals had any great hope of much resulting from this suggested mediation, though several hoped that the delay attendant upon attempts at mediation might be of some value in giving time for the crisis to cool, and for the efforts of other European states to take some effect.

The idea of papal mediation had been mooted before April. In its issue of March 1 The Review of Reviews had dismissed the pope as a possibility. "Even the Pope would be welcomed in such a role, and that by the most Protestant of nations - but for his deplorable infatuation about the Temporal Power which renders it impossible for him to hold the balance even. And failing the Pope there is no other." 49

49. Review of Reviews, XVII, 275, Mar. 11, 1898.
On the occasion of the rumor that the Pope had offered mediation, The Times wrote sceptically, for in any mediation, it said, the parties had to be in substantial agreement. "We cannot therefore profess any very serious regret at the high probability that nothing will come of the Pope's informal offer of his good offices. The differences between Spain and the United States are too great and too substantial to be treated by that rose-water method." It would seem that The Times was almost certainly thinking of the attitude the United States had taken in the Venezuelan boundary dispute in 1895 when it wrote: "The personal character of the Pope stands very high, and if the Americans cared to admit any European mediator in this case they probably would as soon have the Pope as any other. But they are extremely sensitive about European intervention of any kind in an affair which they regard as covered by the Monroe Doctrine."

The Daily Chronicle believed that a great number of Americans would think papal mediation biased: "No doubt there would be a very large body of public opinion in the United States, where about one-eighth of the people are Roman Catholics and a much larger number strongly Protestant, disposed to consider that between a country preponderatingly Protestant and a country in which Protestantism has only a negligible footing, the sympathies of the Papal Court

50. Times, Apr. 5, 1898.
51. Ibid., Apr. 5, 1898. It should be pointed out here that the same paper did nevertheless praise the Pope when later he was credited with having induced Spain to grant an armistice in Cuba. (Ibid., Apr. 13, 1898.)
would infallibly be in favour of Catholic Spain." Black and White made the cynical suggestion that religion was a broken reed. "The barbaric race [Spain] has now turned to the head of its religion, but the Pope is powerless, as religion itself is always powerless before any political differences between important nations. Spain has made her bed, and she must lie on it."

The Spectator expressed surprise at the outburst of anti-Catholic feeling in the United States upon the announcement of the rumor that papal mediation was mooted. "Any Christian Bishop would think himself bound to strive for peace, and a Pope with certainties in Spain and only hopes in America would be apt, if he swerved at all, to swerve to the American side." This same anti-Catholic feeling, however, was taken for granted by The Speaker, and it wrote: "If indeed His Holiness can act purely upon Spain, still the most faithful daughter of the Church in Europe, and can counsel her to accept the American demands without reserve, something might still be effected. But no country on earth - not even our own - is so jealous of Papal interference or, indeed, of Roman Catholicism as America."

That it was unlikely that the United States would accept papal intervention was evident to The Pall Mall Gazette, but it thought President McKinley would be glad of any help: "Mr. McKinley, of course, Daily Chronicle, Apr. 5, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 414, Apr. 8, 1896.
53. Black and White here overlooked or was ignorant of the fact that the reports stated that the suggestion for papal mediation had come in the first instance from President McKinley. (Black and White, XV, 490, Apr. 9, 1898.)
54. Spectator, LXXI, 498, Apr. 9, 1898.
55. Speaker, XVII, 437, Apr. 9, 1898.
would be pleased to see the Pope or anybody else helping to ease the
strain in a quiet way, but he could not go any further." The Daily
Graphic likewise placed little faith in the efficacy of papal inter-
vention, but professed to believe that it might serve a good purpose
nevertheless. "On the other hand, it gives the more opportunity for
the peaceful counsel which are being pressed by our own Government
and by others of the States of Europe."

The next event after the discussion of possible papal mediation
which occupied the English press to any great extent was President
McKinley's message to Congress on the Cuban question, delivered
Monday, April 11. This was two days after Woodford in Madrid had been
informed that the Spanish government had decided to grant an
armistice in Cuba, and the United States had been asked to designate
the nature and duration of this armistice.

It is not a proper function here to discuss or review the
message except in so far as it is needful to understand the comments
that were made passed upon it by the English press. President McKinley
reviewed the situation in Cuba, stating it had caused the United
States "great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality laws,"
and caused loss to United States commerce. Furthermore, he asseverated,
the warfare there had "shocked the sensibilities and offended the
humane sympathies of our people." He declared that United States
capital invested in Cuba had been largely lost. He declared that
there were safe precedents in our national history to justify
the recognition of the independence of the insurgent government in

56. Fall Hall Gazette, Apr. 5, 1898.
57. Daily Graphic, Apr. 5, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 414, Apr. 8,
1898.
Cuba, and referred to President Jackson's messages on Texas in support of his statement. He said intervention by the United States to stop the war there was justifiable on rational grounds, and listed the grounds: humanity, protection of American citizens and property in Cuba, protection for United States commerce and trade, and the fact that Cuba "is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government an enormous expense."

The President then pointed out how these elements of danger and disorder affected the United States, by calling attention to the sinking of the Maine, and said that the court of inquiry had determined that it had been caused by an external explosion. The destruction of that ship, he said, proved that the state of things in Cuba was intolerable. He then quoted from one of President Grant's statements in 1875 on the then existing Cuban revolt, from President Cleveland's last annual message on the Cuban revolt, and from his own annual message of 1897. "Long trial," he said, had proved that present methods could not extinguish the revolt, and then: "In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which gives us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop." Then he asked Congress to empower him to take measures to stop the hostilities in Cuba, "and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary"
for these purposes." Every effort to alleviate the intolerable condi-
tions in Cuba had been exhausted, he said, and then he declared that
the issue was henceforth with Congress. The message had been prepared
before news had arrived of the decision of the Spanish government to
call an armistice, but he mentioned it, and ended his message as
follows: "This fact with every other pertinent consideration will, I
am sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliber-
ations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a
successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving
people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another
justification for our contemplated action."

For quite some time previous to this message to Congress there
had been scattered comments in the English press apropos of Mr.
McKinley's dilemma and his attitude toward it. The most frequent
statement was to the effect that McKinley was a strong man, and that
he was standing firmly and resolutely against being pushed into
hostilities of any kind. On March 5 The Outlook spoke favorably of
his attitude. "President McKinley has a difficult row to hoe, but no
sufficient reason has yet been adduced why he should not be able to
got through with it. It is true that he is without a Secretary of
State [apparently having reference to Mr. Sherman's rumored or real
incapacity], and that most of his assistants know nothing of diplo-
macy. There is also the 'freak' press to be contended against.
Further...there are elections to face. But the President is a level-
headed man, with some knowledge of human nature and a considerable
experience of business dealings. He is aware, too, that New York and
The entire speech is to be found in For. Rel., 1898, 750-760.
Chicago are not the United States, and that the real interests of the
country population - the backbone of the Commonwealth - would be ill
served by a war with Spain for the possession of a place like Cuba."

The Times, in discussing the appropriation of $50,000,000 for
defense, said apropos of Mr. McKinley's conduct: "President McKinley
appears to us to be adhering loyally to the policy of firmness,
caution, and pacific circumspection which he has pursued in regard to
foreign affairs during the first of his four years of office. In
following that policy he has undoubtedly had the support of the sober
and conscientious mass of the American people, but he has had to face
outbursts of popular clamor which a weaker man might have mistaken
for the voice of the country."

The Pall Mall Gazette commented upon McKinley's conduct when
receiving Señor Polo y Bernabe, the successor to Señor Dupuy de
Lôme, although it has already been quoted as illustrative of English
opinion of that incident, it is sufficiently apt to bear repetition
here. "The President is making himself the strong man that his
friends have always maintained him to be. Had he wished to play to
the gallery, he could easily have made a scene at the reception of
the new Spanish Minister, Señor Polo y Bernabe. One remembers
Napoleon I., and Lord Whitworth, and the equally calculated
explosion of Napoleon III. before the outbreak of the war of
Italian Liberation. The courtesies of last Saturday are in
infinitely better taste, and they will not, of course, convey to

50. Times, Mar. 8, 1898.
the Spaniards the entirely false impression that the American Government do not mean business - if it comes to business." Four days after the Maine was destroyed, The Outlook again spoke favorably of the President and of his part in quelling popular resentment in the United States. It mentioned first the many sensational telegrams arriving from the United States, stated that The Outlook had always expressed its doubts of the imminence of war, and then continued: "It is very satisfactory, therefore, to read the peaceful assurances which are now arriving from Washington and New York. It was unjust not to recognize that much of the credit for the transformation of public feeling across the Atlantic is due to President McKinley. Mr. Cleveland undoubtedly played to the gallery over the Venezuela business. His successor has shown that he possesses a more lively sense of responsibility, or, what is as much to the point, greater levelheadedness. Of the first of the American Presidents it is written in the schoolbooks; he never told a taradiddle. The school historians of the future can pay no worthier tribute to the statesmanship of the present occupant of the White House than: He refused to be 'jingoed.'"

On April 1 The Review of Reviews also took opportunity to commend President McKinley for his "gravity" and "prudence" in speaking of the relief that the United States had sent to the reconcentrados in Cuba and of their horrible condition and continued: "President McKinley and his Cabinet have acted throughout with a gravity and a prudence which have won them golden opinions both at home and abroad. They have done everything to avoid war...."

61. Fall Mall Gazette, Mar. 14, 1898.
63. Review of Reviews, XVII, 318, Apr. 1, 1898.
Black and White likewise added its modicum to the praise that was being expressed in England for President McKinley and his conduct, commending him for his "dignified attitude," which entitled him, according to Black and White, "to the respect of all sane-thinking men." The Guardian likewise expressed its trust in the President, but this journal contrasted its belief in him with its misgivings about Congress. "If the last word on the American side rested with Mr. McKinley we should be more hopeful. But unfortunately, under the United States Constitution, it is Congress, not the President, that has the right to declare war."

With President McKinley's message on Cuba there came some discordant notes in this paean of praise. Many of the English journals, to be sure, continued to speak of him as moderate, strong, temperate, but also such words as "disappointing," "irresolution," and "weakness," were applied to this speech. Some of the journals also pointed out that McKinley had paid but slight attention to the fact that Spain had granted an armistice.

Of the first papers to comment on the speech The Pall Mall Gazette was the most whole-heartedly and the most consistently enthusiastic. On April 12 it said: "President McKinley's anxiously-expected and long-delayed Message may properly be described as a strong but temperate statement against Spain and for the United States." It commented favorably, too, upon McKinley's having turned the responsibility over to Congress. It stated further that it was useless to argue with the Spaniards.

64. Black and White, XVII, 454, Apr. 2, 1898.
65. Guardian, LIII (1), 506, Apr. 6, 1898.
in their present temper, and that America’s demands were really the demands of the informal Concert of the world’s civilization. If President McKinley sees that as clearly as the man in the street it is surely no wonder. And, if, seeing it, he concludes that the resources of diplomacy are exhausted, that is the only obvious conclusion to be drawn from the facts of the case. In view, therefore of all the circumstances it would be idle to pretend that there is still much hope of a peaceful settlement of the Cuban question.” Spain’s attempt to put down the Cuban insurrection had failed, and so “Cuba’s powerful neighbour naturally and rightly holds that the time has come when an end must be put, once and for ever, to an intolerable state of things. Would any European nation - would the British nation in particular - have taken more time or exercised more patience than the United States in arriving at that conclusion? We think not.”

The Times, less whole-heartedly enthusiastic, stated that President McKinley had made a very plausible argument for intervention, but then went on to raise the question of where the right of intervention as distinguished from remonstrance became possible. It bewailed McKinley’s surrendering the initiative and ceasing “to resist any further the usurpation of Congress.” And about the President’s having mentioned that an armistice had been granted, The Times, instead of criticizing McKinley for not having given it an opportunity to prove itself, merely stated that he had referred to it “not very warmly,” and then threw the responsibility upon Spain for not having been able to grant it long before.

66. *Fall Hall Gazette*, Apr. 12, 1898.
The next day The Times feared that, the President having surrendered his initiative to Congress, his moderation would "be overridden at any moment by the rashness and violence of a Congressional majority unacquainted with diplomatic usages and indifferent to the public opinion of the rest of the world." Two days later it returned to the connection between the message and the declaration of an armistice in Cuba. "The President's Message has settled nothing. It has not precipitated war; but, on the other hand, it has not brought peace any nearer, and it has, perhaps, diminished the good effect that was at first produced by the proclamation of an armistice....The concession of an armistice by Spain, whatever may be the response to it by the Cuban insurgents, is a pacific overture, and it is to be regretted, though it is hardly surprising, that it has produced so slight an effect upon American feeling." The Standard professed to believe that while the speech could not be said to have conduced to peace, it did not seem likely either to bring about a rupture. And it said that, following the language "of an ingenious French critic" (whom it did not name), the speech might "even diminish the risk of warlike impact by interposing a sort of wordy buffer."

The Globe was more openly critical, and said: "Throughout the uninspired and tedious verbiage of a State document of almost

68. Times, Apr. 13, 1898.
69. Ibid., Apr. 15, 1898.
unexampled prolixity, there is no trace of any definite purpose, or 71
clearness of vision."

St. James’s Gazette was likewise not much impressed by the 72
message. "It is the easiest thing in the world to understand that the
President’s Message on the Cuban question has disappointed everybody.
The recognition of Cuban independence seems to be no remedy. Neither
the Spaniards nor the insurgents are prepared to submit to be
governed on the Egyptian model. What remains? We know very well
what would remain if the United States were a European Power
governed by a Pitt or a Bismarck. A war of conquest would remain. But
it is very doubtful whether the United States are prepared for that
work, whether in spirit, or by the possession of the necessary means."
The Daily Telegraph stated that the message had satisfied neither the
peace party nor "the Forwards." "Irresolution is, unfortunately, the
chief characteristic of the Message." The Yorkshire Herald was
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critical of the President, point out that while he had declared that
intervention must take place in order to put an end to hostilities,
Spain had herself, at her own instance, terminated hostilities! "Were
the warships of the United States now to put to sea, they would find
no belligerents to separate, while they would only too probably
commit their own Government to war. The duty of the moment in the
United States, as in Spain, is to try to evolve out of the existing
74
truce a lasting concord."

71. Globe, Apr. 12, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 446, Apr. 15, 1898.
72. St. James’s Gazette, Apr. 12, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 446,
Apr. 15, 1898.
73. Daily Telegraph, Apr. 13, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 445,
Apr. 15, 1898.
74. Yorkshire Herald, Apr. 13, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 446,
Apr. 15, 1898.
The Guardian took occasion to place upon the shoulders of General Woodford the main responsibility (and desire) for keeping the peace, thereby implying that the United States Minister in Madrid was by now of more significance in keeping peace than President McKinley. "Meanwhile further scope is given to the laudable efforts of General Woodford, the American Minister at Madrid, who has worked steadily and perseveringly in the interest of peace. If war is ultimately averted, it will be largely due to the wisdom, temper, and moderation which he has uniformly displayed."

The weeklies, with more time to ponder the message, showed themselves more judicious in commenting upon it than did most of the dailies. The Investors' Review while admitting that there was a labored weakness about the message, still could say "and yet there seems to be a definite enough purpose behind the mass of verbosity." It then continued, criticizing Mr. McKinley not so much as McKinley as a member of the group of American statesmen. Mr. McKinley, it said, viewed the Cuban question only from the point of view of the United States, "and the greatest weakness of his deliverances arises from his ignorance of Spanish and Spanish ideals. That he should still be optimistic about peace and accord between his country and Spain over Cuba is a striking proof of the isolation in which American statesmen exist." The Economist took this occasion to analyze Mr. McKinley as well as some of his motives. "President McKinley is a good man of an ordinary type, who

75. Guardian, LII (1), 549, Apr. 13, 1898.
does not desire the responsibility of war, but strongly wishes to liberate Cuba from what he regards as a cruel and destructive dominion. He is moreover, sincerely of opinion that it is his duty as chief of the executive to carry out the wishes of the American people, who he is aware from a traditional dislike more hostile to Spain than to any other Power in the European world. He has therefore allowed Senor Sagasta all the time he could, and when he felt at last compelled to send his Message, he carefully avoided speaking of war, and left the Madrid Government as he thought a final chance of escape from an impossible situation. He was obliged to threaten intervention, or his party would have rebelled, but he avoided what he was told were the dangerous phrases 'war' and the 'independence of Cuba.'" In commenting upon McKinley's having turned the issue over to Congress and awaiting their action, it said: "The President probably hoped that the Spanish Government would at the very last moment give way, a hope encouraged by the final concession of an armistice, and it is difficult to us to believe that for this hope he had absolutely no ground." We see here, in The Economist, certainly no very unfriendly attitude, and a desire to exculpate what others may have considered weakness in the President.

The Outlook said that while diplomacy had failed, it was from no "discoverable deficiency in Mr. McKinley. In this matter of Cuba he has displayed an ability, a dignity, and a clear-sighted firmness which rank him with any of the diplomats of the Old World. 77. Economist, LVI, 578, Apr. 16, 1898."
But then America is not Europe, and if now he has transferred the controversy with Spain from the Executive to the Senate, he has only acted on lines laid down by the Constitution of the United States in provision for such contingencies." Punch was equally kind to the President, for in its first weekly issue after the message to Congress, it showed him in a struggle with the Jingoers. In a full-page cartoon entitled "President McKinley and the Jingo Bird," the President was shown holding by a chain an American eagle dressed in the Stars and Stripes, and was apparently having a hard time of it. His coat tails were standing out behind him, from the wind raised by the bird's fluttering.

The Spectator, while admitting that the message was not a great state paper, said "the Message is not unworthy of the American Executive and the traditions of Lincoln and Washington. Its language is certainly not more highly pitched than that of our Ministers when making representations to the Porte in regard to Armenia." The Statist gave as its opinion that: "The conduct of the war by Spain has been inexcusable. And thus, whether we look at it from a purely humanitarian or from the strictly American point of view, that the island lies just off the continent, and the conflict imposes sacrifices and burdens upon the American Government, it is difficult for any impartial person to deny that the President makes out a good case for intervention." It then went on to say that if the

78. Outlook, I, 336-337, Apr. 16, 1898.
79. Punch, CXIV, 170, Apr. 16, 1898.
80. Spectator, LXX, 529, Apr. 16, 1898.
insurgents accepted the amistice, then the influence of the American, Government on one side, and the European powers on the other "ought to be able to bring about the pacification of the island...."

Later comments on the speech included a definition of President McKinley as a puppet in the hands of his financial masters. The Labour Leader, a Socialist paper, had this to say: "Fortunately, war does not suit the book of American financiers, and so McKinley is doing his best to ward it off. The press of this country are lauding him as the strong man of the situation. As a matter of fact he is a mere puppet in the hands of the masters. Were they to say war he would howl for it with the loudest, but because they are against it, so, too, is he performe." The Guardian, even after war had broken out, took occasion to berate McKinley for having shirked his responsibility by turning over the question of intervention to Congress. "Mr. McKinley has evidently that faculty of believing what he wishes which has been attributed to a greater man. To some observers it seems that it is he who is the real author of the war - at all events, that it is he who has determined that it shall come at this precise moment. With the help of the Speaker he might have made a declaration of war by Congress very difficult, and the delay thus caused would have given time for the feeling in favour of peace, which according to some authorities is really strong in the American people, to grow into proportions of which even the Senate must have taken heed. This chance Mr. McKinley threw away by that message of abdication which

81. Statist., XII, 635, Apr. 16, 1898.
82. Labour Leader, no volume no., p. 184, Apr. 23, 1898.
invited Congress to come to an immediate resolve. It may be that the President thought that the House and the Senate would balance one another, and so make such a resolve unattainable. He hoped, in fact, that others would take over the responsibility which he shrank from bearing any longer in his own person." But then it went on to say that a policy of persistence might have involved McKinley "in very grave risks. To break up a great political organization is in the United States a crime of the first order, and the Republican party might easily have gone to pieces had the President strained its allegiance any further. He would have been a greater man had he disregarded this danger, but, after all, nations are for the most part governed by men who stop far short of greatness. Finding that he had made war inevitable, Mr. M. McKinley has naturally taken up the pleasant theory that the instrument of Providence has been Spanish misgovernment in Cuba, not American mismanagement at Washington."

To summarize briefly, then, the opinions expressed about President McKinley both before and after his message to Congress on Cuban intervention, it has been seen that before the message, there was almost unanimity in the English journals in support of his attitude and in commendation of his character. With the message, however, came a change. He was now, at least by some journals, accused of weakness, of shirking his responsibility, of irresolution. The English press, on the whole, apparently felt that the Executive should be the leader in the American government, and when he took a.

93. *Guardian*, LXX (I), 616, Apr. 27, 1898.
course of action that allowed that press to believe that he was no longer the leader, it condemned him for it. Another reason for condemnation was that the press looked upon the President as pacific, as the agent that was doing his best to avert war, and when by his message to Congress he placed the matter of intervention in the hands of that body, which the English press considered jingoistic, the press was disappointed. A few journals did not hesitate to point that by the time the message was delivered, all the American demands upon Spain in regard to Cuba had been met, and the ground having been cut from under President McKinley, the message was gratuitous. It must not be assumed, however, that the English press was opposed to United States intervention in itself in Cuba. What was objected to was McKinley's method of permitting that intervention to be brought about, for it will be seen when the attitude of the English press towards United States intervention is discussed that the great majority of journals in England favored it.

In dealing with English attitude towards United States intervention in Cuba it must not be assumed that discussion in the United States - and, in consequence, in the English press - setting intervention in Cuba was begun in 1898. There had been talk of annexation by one method or another throughout the nineteenth century. It is only for purposes of this paper, dealing as it does with the Spanish-American War, that the discussion is begun in that year.

That there various attitudes represented in the English press towards United States intervention in Cuba goes without saying. In those journals that favored it the reasons given were that Cuba had
been cruelly governed, that Spain was decadent and that the United States was going to help the cause of humanity and progress and liberty, and that a continuous riot could not be tolerated in anyone's neighbor's backyard, and that American interests had to be protected. Such reasons formed the burden of argument of those journals that approved of United States intervention in Cuba. Those journals that disapproved brought forth arguments to the effect that intervention was the action of a strong, healthy nation "picking on" a smaller, weaker one, that intervention had been hurried on for material reasons, and that political reasons had played their part. Others were critical of the method, stating that the United States had been contemptuous and brusque in her treatment of Spain.

There were several journals which in the early days of 1898 expressed the hope that the United States would give the plan for Cuban autonomy a trial. On January 22, The Speaker, after stating that the correspondent in the United States of The Times had stated there was a chance of American intervention in Cuba, went on to hope the President "stay his hand yet awhile," but based this hope, not on anything having to do with Cuba, but on the fact that intervention might in the existing condition of Spanish politics cause a general collapse in Spain, and concluded: "In the interest of humanity, that is far more to be dreaded than anything now likely to happen in Cuba." The Outlook, between the time Dupuy's letter was exposed and the sinking of the Maine, said that while there were many people in the United States who would welcome war,
it could not believe that President McKinley or any other serious politician thought of it. For, it asked, what is there to fight about? "If the latest news from Madrid be correct, Señor Sagasta's Government is prepared to extend its scheme of autonomy in the most liberal way. This is bound to have its effect, not only on the large and influential moderate section of the Cuban population, but on public opinion in the United States." It then went on to say that "responsible men in the United States are influenced against an appropriation of Cuba by the consideration...[that] there are 'too many niggers on it.'" The Times expressed the belief that if Spain were enabled to "make a fresh start from her own proposal and to work a real autonomy honestly and fairly, that solution would be the best for all parties concerned. It would...relieve the United States from having to undertake a responsibility from which thoughtful Americans shrink. The only sufferers would be self-seeking persons in Spain who make personal profit out of misgovernment and the pride of the mother country, and similar persons in America whose aims are no whit more respectable."

But after war had been begun, the same journal stated that if Señor Horect (Spanish Minister of Colonies) had been given from three to six months Mr. McKinley's objects would have been attained most critical without war; but that at the moment the Maine was blown up. "It was no longer possible for the United States to give Spain the time she..."
needed - and she would no doubt have needed far more than any she was likely to be allowed - to establish autonomy and restore peace in Cuba. It was as impossible for the Spanish Government, with its destinies trembling in the balance, to impose a policy of concession and apology on a high-spirited and obstinate race always prone to cherish suspicions of its rulers."

The possibility of American intervention in Cuba began to bulk large in English journals after, roughly, March 1, 1898. On that date The Review of Reviews, after referring to a false report that Señor Sagasta had rejected Prince Bismarck's suggestion that the Cuban business be referred to the Pope, stated: "For instance, the Cuban question is one in which the American Government has unquestionable grounds for declaring war against Spain. The way in which the Spaniards have misgoverned the island has caused the United States so much injury that the American Government would be fully justified in intervening by force of arms to bring the long agony of Cuba to an end."

The Spectator, speaking about Spain, stated: "She is merely proving day by day her incapacity to deal with the Cuban problem. Yet this incapacity is the very basis of the American claim to intervene." The Spectator then continued: "Which course will the Americans choose? Will they allow an island which is not very much farther from Florida than Jersey is from Hampshire to be turned into a permanent hell-upon-earth? Or will they go to war to secure some

97 Times, May 9, 1898.
98 Review of Reviews, XVII, 277, Mar. 1, 1898.
amelioration of the situation?" Two weeks later the same journal said:  
"The thing urgent is a limited though important one, - that Spain should depart, she having forfeited her rights by allowing oppression as bad as anarchy, and that, and nothing less, is what the American President will demand."

After discussing the Cuban rebellion and the Spaniards' inability to see that that colony should not be a source of tribute, The Guardian said of the people of the United States: "Whatever may be thought in Europe, their own view of the matter is that so long as Cuba is quiet they have no objection to its being a Spanish colony; but that if it is to remain the theatre of a sanguinary civil war they will have no choice but to take measures to bring the conflict to a close."

The Sketch, discussing where English sympathy would lie in case war broke out, said: "In fact, so far as it takes any interest in the matter, the British public would like to see the often oppressive and always incapable Spanish Government of Cuba replaced by some more progressive Power, and would welcome a change of owners."

99. Spectator, LXXX, 365, Mar. 16, 1898. After this series of statements which to all appearances supported possible intervention by the United States, The Spectator went on to say: "In our belief, America will not allow Cuban anarchy to continue, and in spite of the very grave reasons which exist for non-intervention, she will before long take naval and military action."

100. Ibid., LXXX, 435, Mar. 26, 1898.
The Fall Hall Gazette, after stating that its New York correspondent had declared that friends of the President said he was bent on the independence of Cuba, said that while Englishmen might "express chivalrous feeling for the unhappy Queen-Regent," and a certain sympathy for Señor Sagasta, went on: "But personal considerations in a question like the Cuban are just those that ought to count the least. The American people cannot be expected to tolerate anarchy and oppression within a short distance of their sea-board. They would have spoken the final word long since, as even the Spaniards must know, were it not for Washington's wise doctrine that the United States should be self-contained." The same journal then went on to belittle the capacity of the Latins as colonizers: "There remains, nevertheless, the permanent incapacity of the degenerate Latin to maintain order except at the point of the bayonet, or to rule a dependency on the most rudimentary principles of finance or police. The island has been devastated until from the 'Pearl of the Antilles' it has become a wilderness. The cry of the suffering Cubans has run through the United States....Spain has made Cuba a standing reproach, and she will have to go."

The Graphic on April 2 said that if the Maine question were all, there would be a possibility of a peaceful settlement. "But unhappily the issue is a much broader and deeper one. Spain cannot reconquer Cuba, and she dare not abandon the slender hold she still retains on the island. On the other hand, the United States cannot tolerate a

103. Fall Hall Gazette, Apr. 1, 1898.
near her shores the chaos and misery which now reigns in Cuba." The
Graphic then, without giving reasons for its opinion, passed an off-
hand judgment having failed: "Autonomy has been tried and failed.
There is no other practicable step but the granting of independence
to the island, and this Spain refuses."

The Times was pessimistic about the kind of administration that
Spain had been giving Cuba: "Nothing could be worse, nothing more
hopeless, from every point of view than the Spanish administration —
especially since the military element has become completely dominant —
of the rich possession that used to be called 'the Pearl of the
Antilles....' If Cuba could attain to any form of respectable self-
government under the flag of the mother country, it would be the best
thing that could happen both for herself and for her neighbors, and
there is scarcely a gleam of hope that this solution is still
possible." Four days later the same paper stated: "It cannot be
denied that there is material enough of every kind to make out a
formidable indictment against the treatment of Cuba by her Spanish
masters."

The Guardian commented in the same strain. "It is impossible
to deny that the Americans have good reason for a quarrel with
Spain. The large island of Cuba lies just off the southern point of
Florida, not quite so near to the States as Ireland is to Great
Britain, but almost as much within the horizon of personal

105. Times, Apr. 2, 1898.
106. Ibid., Apr. 6, 1898.
interest and knowledge. It is the 'Pearl of the Antilles,' a fair and fertile island, capable of being a pleasant and profitable neighbour to the great Republic. But for years it has been the scene of cruel warfare and wasting desolation."

The same sentiment found expression in The Graphic. After saying that Spain might believe that civil war would be less disorganizing than a war with the United States, that journal went on: "On the other hand it is impossible for the United States to take any other view of the situation than that the continued presence of Spanish authority in the New World is intolerable. Unwarned by the loss of her Continental Colonies, Spain has pursued a policy in Cuba which for seventy years has been an unbroken record of cruelty and oppression. She has brought the island to the verge of ruin, and by this has not only outraged the moral sentiment of the United States, but has seriously affected the commercial interests of the mainland. This consideration, apart from many exasperating incidents, justifies the attitude of the United States. It would really be a crime to postpone the only possible solution of the Cuban problem, for if Mr. McKinley does not expel the Spaniards now one of his successors will have to do so later on, and in the meantime another sanguinary chapter will have been added to the tragic story of the island's woes."

The Times on April 13 again recurred to its theme that the condition of Cuba was impossible: "It is beyond doubt that the situation in Cuba has become intolerable, that Spain has shown herself unable to govern it, and that the United States must take some effective step."

107. Guardian, LIII (I), 513, Apr. 6, 1898. But after this statement The Guardian modifies its stand by stating that Spain had also good reason for rejecting the idea that she either restore order in Cuba or evacuate the island. ( Ibid., 513.)

incapable of restoring order in her great colony, and that the people
of the United States are amply justified, both on grounds of humanity
and for more material reasons, in demanding the abatement of an inter-
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national nuisance."

The Investors' Review two days later stated: "We have no desire
to injure Spain, nor any hostility towards Spain, but we cannot shut
our eyes to the fact that Spain has failed completely and absolutely
to govern any dependency it ever possessed, wisely and to good
purpose." It then went on to point out that the consequences of "her
cruel and selfish maladministration" were still visible all over the
territories once forming part of her colonial empire, and continued:
"Spain has failed, then, and deserves no sympathy whatever at our
hands for the loss of what remains of her once glorious empire in the
new world." The Investors' Review could understand that Spanish pride
prompted her to try to continue to hold on to Cuba. "But that does
not alter the fact that they deserve to lose it. Their misrule and the
rapacity and corruption of the governors they have sent to Cuba have
turned that fair island into a place of devastation and the home of
110
misery."

The Spectator returned to the question on April 16 opining that
it was too bad that those Americans who then desired peace should not
have tried to convert earlier their countrymen who had been
belligerent in their attitude towards Spain, but then said that it did
not want its meaning mistaken. "We do not for a moment suggest that

109. Times, Apr 13, 1898.
the thinking and peace-loving people in America should have refused to
demand a change in the policy of Spain. We hold that they were morally
justified in taking the opposite course, and we trust and believe that
in the like circumstances our people would have done as they did. The
conditions of Cuba imposed a duty on the American people, and they
recognised that duty. But they wanted, naturally enough no doubt, to
carry out this duty and at the same time avoid the horrors and losses
of war. Unfortunately, that was not possible. When you order a man to
stop ill-treating a woman or a child, and he refuses, and continues
his ill-treatment, it is impossible to avoid knocking him down."

Black and White, with words approaching acridity, suggested that
the only way to peace was a humbling of Spain’s pride. "It is still
difficult to see any way out of the Cuban difficulty than that
offered by a war between the United States and Spain. The latter
country’s vaunted pride appears to be a principal obstacle to peace;
and until that pride be abundantly humbled, it appears the benighted
nation will not awake to its present significance and true position
in the civilized world. That a people unequal to controlling their
own dominions, that a people who starve women and children to death
by thousands, and regard their sneakguardism and brutality as a feat
of arms, should have the temerity to stand before any great Power a
moment must appear astonishing to British or American minds; but the
truth is that Spain now stands divided against herself."

111. Spectator, LXXX, 532, Apr. 16, 1898.
112. Black and White, XV, 518, Apr. 16, 1898.
The Graphic, again, on April 16, said: "The question is one exclusively one of humanity and political expediency," and then went on to criticize those writers who were speaking of the trouble in Cuba as a struggle between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races. After that it rehearsed what the United States had tolerated for the preceding three years. "The insurrection cannot be extinguished by the Spanish troops, and the Spanish troops cannot be expelled by the insurgents. The result is that the island has become a permanent battlefield."

Citing cases of their recent intervention - in Crete and of the Russians intervening against the Turks in the war with Servia, it stated that the United States had even more justification for intervening in Cuba, for what was going on there not only shocked the moral sense of the inhabitants of the United States, but touched their pocketbooks as well. It further stated that "the duty of the United States to take action is clear. The task of pacification devolves upon her by right, and it is a right of which she cannot divest herself."

Discussing the right of the United States to intervene, The Economist said that it would be futile to maintain that the United States had no right to intervene in Cuba. "Every State has a right to decide for itself when its interests are seriously imperilled, and, if it gives fair warning, to exert its force to put an end to a dangerous situation of affairs... Nor is it quite fair to say that in intervening on moral and humanitarian grounds, America is introducing a new.

113 Graphic, LVII, 456, Apr. 16, 1898.
practice into international affairs. All religious wars have been based
on the same principle, be it sufficient or insufficient, and it was
only yesterday that all Europe was asked to destroy Turkey, and very
nearly granted the petition, because the Sovereign of Turkey had
massacred fewer persons that have perished in misery from the misgovern-
ment of Cuba." It then went on to say that Spain was "in the wrong be-
cause she has oppressed Cuba, not because she has refused to submit to
dictation from a humane, but, nevertheless, from her point of view, an
interfering Power."

The Outlook said that people were asking who was to blame for
caus[ing] war to seem probable, the President for throwing down his
responsibility, or Spain for her stiff-necked pride. The Outlook
pointed out that there was another view. "Cuba has been a disgrace to
Spain and a deep offence to the United States for thirty years, and if
our kinsmen are open to reproach, is it not rather on the score of a
too long tolerance of the iniquities of Spanish rule within a hundred
miles of their own shores?" Then discussing the objections that
opponents of intervention were bringing up, The Outlook pointed out
that the difficulties might prove less formidable than expected. "The
considerations that warrant the task on which the United States is
entering are these: that so horrible is the condition into which Cuba
has fallen that any change - any change - any change must need be for
the better...."

114. Economist, LVI, 576, Apr. 16, 1898.
115. Outlook, I, 336, 337, Apr. 16, 1898.
The Speaker after saying that it did not "pretend to approve of the manner in which American politicians have handled the dispute over Cuba" or the rough methods of American diplomacy, and after stating that there had undoubtedly been exaggerations "in the New York press of the steps taken by Spain in order to crush the insurrection in its great Western possession," continued thus: "But, allowing for all these exaggerations, the fact remains that the situation in Cuba has for years past been an intolerable one. An island of magnificent fertility has been converted, either by the weakness or the misgovernment of Spain, into something like a hell upon earth. A civil war, as ruthless and cruel as any waged in the Middle Ages, has been carried on intermittently for half the lifetime of a generation... whilst Cuba has steadily drifted from bad to worse.... Nor have there been any certain signs that the disorders were coming to an end."

A week later The Outlook returned to the subject. After saying that because of kinship English sympathies were on the side of the United States, it went on, again justifying American intervention in Cuba. "And besides the rightful claims of kinship, there is a wide recognition that, in driving Spain out of Cuba, the United States is not only freeing her neighbourhood of an intolerable nuisance, but is also freeing the Cubans from intolerable misrule; both of them tasks such as we have often undertaken with scant apologies to our critics. We go all the way with Sir Frederick Pollock when he declares that "from the point of view of strict right and business the Cuban question is, for the United States, simply how long a nation is bound

116. Speaker, XVII, 492, Apr. 23, 1898.
to tolerate a nuisance at its own door. The complaint against the Spaniards is not that they govern Cuba badly, but that they cannot govern it at all; and this to the manifest damage of the Government and citizens of the United States."

A week later The Outlook had recourse to American history to show that Spain was bound to be expelled from the Western Hemisphere, saying, as it did, that when the United States was made a unified nation in the Civil War "the extrusion of Spain from the Western hemisphere became inevitable. And because Spain is proud with the pride that would rather break than bend, and because her dynastic necessities prohibit a submission by which the revolutionary party would be quick to profit, her extrusion can be effected only at the cost of war....It is a conflict of peoples provoked by the fundamental antagonism of method, idea, and aspiration. It is a struggle between a dying civilization which at its best knew no logic but the logic of the sword, and a new civilization which, because it abhors the sword, is resolved to rid the world - its own frontiers at any rate - of the rule of the sword."

The Statist was equally friendly toward the idea of United States intervention. It said, speaking of the feelings of the British people: "They feel that, mistake or no mistake in diplomacy, in other matters the government of Cuba has been atrociously bad, Spain has proved herself incapable of governing the island...."

The editor of To-Day was equally frank in declaring misgovernment of Cuba as a justification of the intervention. He began an

117. Outlook, I, 369, Apr. 23, 1898. Sir Frederick Pollock (1845-1937) was at this time Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford.
118. Ibid., I, 366, Apr. 23, 1898.
119. Statist, XLI, 676, Apr. 23, 1898.
article by stating that there were some few people who still sympathized
with Spain—because she was the smaller, the poorer, and did not wish
to fight, and was certain to be beaten. Also there was some sympathy
for that pathetic figure, the Queen, "but none the less sympathy with
Spain is misplaced sympathy. There is every reason to suppose that we
have not heard a tithe of the horrors for which Spain has been
responsible in Cuba. We have heard more than ten times enough to
justify the action of the States. The national cruelty, visible even
in its amusements, reaches its height in the misgovernment of Cuba.
No man can read the list of Spain's iniquities there without feeling
that punishment is due, and without hoping it will be swift and cer-
tain." The next week the editor of To-Day was equally outspoken in
his support of the United States as against Spain. "If there is any-
thing which thoroughly deserves to be called morbid it is the
sympathy of any Briton with the cruel, theatrical, lazy, faithless,
twopenny-coloured Spaniard." He then declared that the friends of
Spain were saying that the reports of the atrocities in Cuba had
been exaggerated, but the editor proceeded to deny that. "An
absolutely accurate newspaper report is a rare thing, but to bring a
charge like this without quoting the facts is futile, and the more
futile when one knows that in the case of Cuba much had to be
suppressed because it was too awful and revolting to be put into
print. They forget the fact that in the case of Cuba the camera has
given its evidence."

120. To-Day, XVIII, 401, Apr. 30, 1898.
121. Ibid., XIX, 15, May 7, 1898.
The same kind of sentiment was finding expression the second week in July, even after the battle of Santiago. The *Yorkshire Herald* said at that time that some people were asking why the United States did not stop; and the *Herald* answered by saying that that would only make things worse. "Spain had ample warning. The United States were very patient. They waited for four [sig] years. Nothing came of it. Spain pursued her criminal course - her course of infinite barbarity - during all that time. She insists on pursuing it still."

This array of evidence shows that the bulk of editorial opinion in England believed that United States intervention in Cuba was justifiable because Spain had governed Cuba badly and cruelly, and because Spain was decadent, poor, and was in no position to correct the evil to reconquer Cuba. The disturbance going on in Cuba was annoying to the United States and harmful to business. The sooner Spain was ousted from her control of Cuba the better. So ran the arguments of those who believed intervention justified.

But between believing that the United States had justice on her side and believing that the particular way in which the United States intervened and the time at which she did it there is some distance. And several journals criticized the United States for her method or for hurrying along her intervention. These included even some who supported intervention per se as justifiable. The arguments against the method or time of intervention were based on the belief that politics was being played within the United States to cause intervention, on a belief that

122. The insurrection broke out in Cuba in February, 1895. What event the editor of the *Yorkshire Herald* was thinking of is, of course, not ascertainable.
America had not sufficiently understood the serious nature of war, and on a belief that in rushing into war America might carelessly or unwittingly have lighted a powder chain that might explode all over the world.

As early as March The Speaker, while stating that the question of war or peace depended on Spain, went on to say that while the financial interests in the United States favored peace, political considerations favored war, for the Republican party had been losing states. "The Democratic party favours action, and independent opinion is coming to favour it too. The Republican party has been losing States, and cannot afford to show executive weakness. But President McKinley, from all we know of him, is personally a weak man; and, politically, more is to be got by pacifying rebellious Republicans in the Middle West and down East than by falling in with the views of the large capitalists and of New York bankers." Continuing then on the idea that party politics were tending to push the country into war, The Speaker wrote: "We must not regard the Jingo of Congress as we regard our own Jingo. They are not mere music-hall patriots or platform rhetoricians. A Senator almost always, a member of the Lower House generally, is an experienced and astute political manager, with a keen eye for party losses and gains. We may fairly suppose that a good many of the Jingo Congressmen have the next election in mind. Now we know that the mass of the Democrats — putting aside the seceded Gold Democrats — favour war; we suspect the Silverite theories make for it,

124. Speaker, XVII, 377, Mar. 25, 1898.
because Mr. Bryan's disciples can easily bring themselves to believe that financial stress will somehow lead the Government to remonetise silver and get rid of its dependence on Europe for the basis of its bank-note circulation....The Republican Jingoes...may be hoping to catch the independent vote. A Chicago paper is reported some time ago to have said that 'war would put an end to Republican mugwumpery.'"

The Guardian, which as well as The Speaker, as has been seen in the last few pages, believed that intervention was justified, and believed too that it was being caused, as a matter of fact, by political manoeuvrings within the United States. In an editorial of April 20, The Guardian stated: "Let us be just even to the Jingoes. If they talk like madmen they act like men of business. What really moves them is neither compassion for Cuban wrongs nor indignation at Spanish injustice. 'The vote in the Senate,' we read in the New York Tribune, 'is the triumph of the Democratic, Populist, Silverite, and Radical pro-Cuban coalition.'"

125. Speaker, XVII, 410, Apr. 2, 1898.
126. Guardian, LIII (I), 580, Apr. 20, 1898. This refers to the vote in the Senate on the Joint Resolution, which demanded on the part of the United States that Spain "relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba," and empowered the President to use the forces of the United States to carry the resolutions into effect. Amendments were added providing for the recognition of the republic of Cuba "as a free, independent, and sovereign power," and denying any intention on the part of the United States of attempting to obtain sovereignty or dominion over Cuba. The final vote was 67 to 21, Republicans, Democrats, and Populists voting in the majority, and 19 Republicans and 2 Democrats in the minority. (F.A. Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Diplomacy, 583-584.)
The Guardian then continued: "Efforts to embarrass the Administration are at the bottom of the Senate's action," says the New York Herald; and when we note that Mr. Bryan employed much of his time in lobbying in support of the Foraker amendment and recall the place that Mr. Bryan holds in American politics, we need no confirmation of this statement....In the United States, at all events, silver is at the bottom of pretty well every mischief."

The Daily News was less specific, and merely laid the blame on the "Jingoism." "The Jingo party in the Senate, the party of war at any price, have won the day. According to our Correspondent, their great fear was lest Spain should yield, and it was to prevent such a calamity, as they would consider it, that they proposed to address Spain in the language of menace."

The Guardian, a few days later, commented in much the same strain. "So long as no concessions were made to the insurgents the United States were fairly satisfied to let things slide. The forces that hurried them into action were autonomy and the armistice - the discovery, as an American politician put it, with characteristic and engaging candour, that if they did not fight at once, there would be nothing left to fight about." The Guardian went on from here, how-

127. Foraker "amendment" is ascertainable; Senator Foraker of Ohio introduced the resolutions in the Senate referred to in note 126, supra.


ever, to add that because of the long that Spain had misgoverned Cuba, the politicians could, when they wished "to hurry on war," find an auxiliary in the hatred the American felt for such misgovernment.

As has been pointed out previously, both The Guardian and The Outlook believed that the United States had justice on her side in intervening in Cuba. Yet The Outlook also expressed the belief that America might have hurried on the war unduly. In its issue of April 30, The Outlook stated that many English people were wondering if the Americans had not been hasty. "In Egypt," said Sir Alfred Milner in a famous passage, "the case for Perseverance holds the field." Might not a little more patience and a little less peremptoriness on the part of America have gained the victory? To invoke the arbitrament of war without full cause is an awful thing, and the United States has yet to show that it has not played the disastrous part of the Young Man in a Hurry." The Outlook then gave two quotations which, it asserted, amply illustrated this point of view. Mr. Evelyn Ashley was quoted as having said: "The Americans are doing the right thing in the wrong way; the Spaniards are doing the wrong thing in the right way." "A City man" was quoted as having said: "I hope Spain will dust the floor with the Yankees, and then get a thumping licking."

Another point of view likewise critical of the United States, and which found some little expression, accused the United States of having acted lightly and in an irresponsible manner in having gone to war. This point of view was based on two considerations: that war

130. Guardian, LIII (1), 616, Apr. 27, 1898.
131. Outlook, 1, 400, Apr. 30, 1898. Mr. Evelyn Ashley (1836-1907), statesman and author, was at this time mayor of Romsey.
itself is a terrible thing to be undertaken only after much provocation and much consideration, and also that America in warring on Spain had not been sufficiently considerate of the possibility of lighting a general conflagration.

The Speaker, after pointing out that war would ruin Spain, burden the finances of the United States, and injure the Cubans more than benefit them and that England's own interests might be compromised, went on "[we believe] that European complications may be set up which will constitute a new and lasting danger to the peace of the world."

The Economist, in discussing whether the war might spread, stated that whatever view might be taken of the war "there can be no doubt that with so much gunpowder lying about it is most unfortunate for the world."

The Guardian was more explicit on this point of thoughtlessness for the safety of the world. "The most wonderful thing about this war is the apparent absence in the United States of any feeling of uneasiness in regard to the step they have taken. This is not said with reference to its immediate and to all appearance inevitable result. We are not thinking of some turn of fortune by which the weaker combatant may gain an unlooked-for-advantage over the stronger. What we have in mind is the strange indifference to the responsibility which must rest on any nation which of its own free will begins a war in a world in which there is such an accumulation of explosive material on every side. Other nations have scattered matches about the powder magazine, but it has been left for the United States to deliberately set one alight."

132. Speaker, XVII, 468, Apr. 16, 1898.
133. Economist, LVI, 612, Apr. 23, 1898.
134. Guardian, LII (1), 616, Apr. 27, 1898.
But along with criticisms of the method or possible consequences of intervention went some which were critical of the reasons, motives, and purposes of the United States. The reasons for criticism on this score were that intervention was being instituted because of pressure from financial or industrial interests, that the United States was meddling, or that it was a war of aggression. It is in these expressions of opinion, it must be admitted, that are found the most vigorous and recrimination. Many of the journals at one time or another criticized America on these grounds, but the most conspicuous was The Saturday Review, which before and during the early months of the war was extremely critical of and unfriendly to the motives and abilities of the United States. Another journal, The Labour Leader, was also critical of the United States and cynical about its motives.

As early as February the belief that the United States had ulterior motives towards Cuba began to be pointed out. The Investors' Review said that President McKinley having warned Spain of the dangers lurking in a continuance of the war in Cuba, Spain would do well to heed the warning, for, continued that journal: "There is in America a strong financial as well as political interest in the Cuban question. An influential syndicate is ready for the exploitation of the island, and if its pacification is not secured soon, the time may come more quickly than is expected when the Executive Government [sic] will be unable to
resist the pressure put upon them for intervention in Cuba...."

The Speaker in the same month was not explicit but hinted at
at ulterior motives somewhere back of the scenes, manipulating the
United States into intervention. It said that if the United States
had meant to intervene on the grounds that American interests in
Cuba were considerable, or that many Cuban planters were American
citizens, or that the war had been conducted in a way disgraceful
to humanity—then the United States should have done so a year or
two before. It conclusion was: "Indeed, pro-Cuban sentiment in the
United States has exhibited curious fluctuations which suggest that
it has been very largely factitious." Further than this the Speaker
did not go, but the statement does hint at some undercover agencies,
working to promote intervention.

Somewhat later, apropos of the consideration being given in
Congress to the bill to appropriate $50,000,000 for defence, The
Yorkshire Herald said there was much enmity between the natives
of the two countries. It then went on to state that the United States
had developed a habit of meddling. "The Government of the United
States has of late years been tending more and more to interfere in
the business of other States on and close to the American Continent,
and that policy of intervention has in Cuba brought the Americans into
direct collision with the Spaniards....The suppression of insurrec-
tion is an expensive operation, and it appears that the work of

crushing revolts is in the future to be rendered all the more embarrassing by the interference of the Government of the United States."

The Speaker became more explicit about economic interests when on March 12 it stated: "The United States cannot remain permanently indifferent to the fate of Cuba, if only for economic reasons." It went on to a consideration of the strategic value of Cuba, and the suggestion that had been made that the United States buy the island. In the same article it stated that forty years previously Cuba had been regarded by the slaveholding element in the Union "as a Naboth's vineyard" to be annexed peaceably or forcibly. "Times have changed since then, and humanitarian sentiment has replaced the desire to spread the blessings of popular government, while a new order of financial and economic considerations has been substituted for the desire of the slaveholders to find new lands for the employment of their human capital...."

Of all the journals that criticized America in this year The Saturday Review was the most consistently antagonistic and the most bitter. For that reason it will be quoted more at length than almost any other journal. In the issue of April 9, in a leading article entitled "American Morality", it went into a long discussion of the relative strength of the United States and Spain, of the relative value of their contributions to history, the damage that Spanish war vessels could do temporarily to American shipping, and of American responsibility for the continuance of the insurrection.

137. Yorkshire Herald, Mar.1, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 291, Mar. 11, 1898.
138. Speaker, XVII, 313, Mar. 12, 1898.
in Cuba; it also quoted from the Biglow Papers. This interesting article began by admitting that there was no doubt that Spain was a decaying nation and the United States a growing one, and that by the laws of "landgrubbing" the stronger had the right to despoil the weaker. It then continued: "but in the name of common honesty let us have no cant about it. We are told that America represents the cause of civilization, humanity, progress, while Spain represents mediaeval barbarism and cruelty. We should like a little better evidence of the proposition." There was no proof, it continued, that American filibusters and carpet-baggers would make for improvement in Cuba. If both nations should be wiped out "to-morrow", it asked, which would be missed the most — the iron, corn, oil, and pigs (of the United States) or the poetry of de Vega, the paintings of Velazquez, and the prose of Cervantes. The United States might conquer Spain, but in things military the name of the Cig Campeador would outlive that of the conqueror of Cuba. Hence The Saturday Review declined to join in the "cry of sympathy with America in her war of aggression on Spain. Our sympathies are frankly with the weaker power, which has surrendered everything but the national honour in its endeavour to avert the calculated wrath of its powerful opponent." Speaking of possible European intervention, this journal bemoaned that there was no longer any conscience of Europe, because the senses of Europe had been dulled by Teutonic barbarity, hence the annexation of Cuba would undoubtedly be accomplished (but only in time — for Spain was not a
negligible quantity). Then drawing the picture of America picking a quarrel with Spain, it continued: "It is not flattering to civilization to contemplate, in the closing years of the nineteenth century the spectacle of seventy-two millions of people playing the armed highwayman with a nation of seventeen millions; a people that poses as the champion of freedom and right all the world over taking advantage of an insurrection which it had done so much to provoke and to maintain, in order to seize territory to which it possesses no claim and to invade an island to which it had not been invited by insurgents, or by autonomists, or by royalists." It then quoted from the Biglow Papers, and concluded that as the Republic was much larger than at the time of the Mexican War, its "rights" seemed to have "increased in proportion." Then, stating that it had no desire to say unpleasant things about the United States, it admitted that in the line of removing one's neighbor's landmark, England had done something herself, and that The Saturday Review had no desire to pose as censors, but then went on to criticize those English papers that were sympathizing with the United States. "But when we find the bulk of the English newspapers calling on us to admire the attitude of the United States and to accord our moral support to the Washington Government, it is time to protest."

The Times, which was on the whole favorable to intervention, and friendly to the United States throughout the year 1898, saw however that there were other forces than humanitarianism motivating that intervention. On April 14, three days after President McKinley's

139. Saturday Review, LXXXV, 479, Apr. 9, 1898.
message to Congress on the Cuban question, The Times asserted its belief that most Americans probably supposed that their Government occupied the position of a disinterested power. "But it is very doubtful whether it is the position contemplated by those who have worked upon American humanitarian sentiment. The latter, it may be observed, dwell quite as much upon the losses inflicted upon American commerce by Cuban disorder, and upon the assumed responsibility of Spain for the sinking of the Maine, as upon the right of the Cuban population to self-government."

The Saturday Review returned to the charge in its next weekly issue, April 16. The leading article that week given over to berating the United States was entitled "America the Bully." This time it said that those who knew the facts knew that Spain had "yielded to every reasonable demand made upon her..." Congress, it said, had virtually declared war on Spain, because for two years Spain had failed to put down an insurrection of the Cubans, "owing to their being liberally supplied with money and munitions of war from United States territory."

To keep from being accused of being biased on this issue, it quoted from the American, Mr. E. J. Phelps, who The Saturday Review said, had asserted that the rebellion would have died long ago from exhaustion had it not been supplied from the United States. The Saturday Review also asked what the North would have said if during the second year of the Civil War England or France had stepped in and said that there must be a stop to it. It then went 140. Times, Apr. 14, 1898.
on, referring back to another "landgrabbing" war in which the United States had engaged: "The war waged in Mexico half a century ago for
the purpose of stealing the territory of a neighbouring Republic
(the Monroe doctrine was invented for the purpose of protecting
these helpless Republics from European rapacity and greed) was bad
enough; but what will history say to the long-drawn-out agony of
Cuba, financed and engineered from American soil for the purpose
of enriching a New York syndicate, who, having got hold of a big
thing in Cuban 'real estate,' are 'operating for a rise?'" Then,
referring to phrases applied to the United States by Prince
Bismarck's newspaper, such as an "incendiary Republic," a
"Republic of evil repute," and a "State where the brutal and
hypocritical democracy has the lead, where the venality of
officials, the fraudulent appropriation of public money, and
rowdyism and lynch law are the order of the day" - then The
Saturday Review asked in its turn if it were any wonder such terms
were applied to America. That journal then turned to scorn America's
ability to carry on war, and asked, in the light of future events,
what was almost prophetic: where is the commissariat, the artillery,
the transport, and the officers. Then, less prophetic, as events
turned out: "There is such a thing as getting a wolf by the ears, and
America may find before the summer is out that in starting a war of
aggression on Spain she has been guilty not only of a crime against
141 humanity, but also of a stupendous national blunder."

The Labour Leader alleged that it saw the hand of United States
141. Saturday Review, LXXXV, 512, Apr. 16, 1898.
capitalism in the Cuban question, but in a manner quite different from the role assigned to it by The Saturday Review. In other words, capitalism in the United States did not want war because that would be bad for "business." Therefore McKinley was being kept from going ahead. "Seldom has there been so conclusive a proof of the inefficiency of popular feeling when opposed to commercial interests. The vast majority of American citizens are sick of Spanish rule in Cuba and are outraged by the sinking of the Maine. Throughout the different States of the Union troops for a Spanish war could easily be enlisted by the hundred thousand. But Labour is so productive and exploitable in America that the capitalists there actually prefer the bloodsucking of 'peace' to the blood-letting of war. So you have the remarkable picture of the nation struggling towards war, and the capitalists actually masquerading as angels of peace."

The Guardian, somewhat more restrained in its comments than either of the two foregoing papers, after having stated that the Senate resolution(s) went much farther than the House resolution (authorizing and directing the President to intervene to secure peace and order in Cuba), went on to say, anent the impertinence of the United States: "It is true that the language even of the House resolutions is insulting to Spain, but then, as the New York Evening Post justly observes, 'there is not a nation on earth which Congress has not insulted.'"

The Standard accused the United States of "departing, wrong-

142. Labour Leader, no vol. number, p.1, Apr. 16, 1898.
143. Guardian, LIII (1), 580, Apr. 20, 1898.
fully and unwisely, from the principles which have hitherto been
respected in the relations between civilised nations. Not for the
first time, unhappily, a certain deliberate contempt for the amenities
of intercourse is apparent in the Washington methods. Granted that
those to whom the Republic entrusts the management of Foreign Affairs
conscientiously persuade themselves that they are doing the right
thing, they have an unfortunate propensity for doing it in the
wrong way."

The *Guardian* thought United States Congressmen should not have
directed against the Spanish Government "the vulgar abuse" that they
did (when discussing the President's Cuban message). "In the New
World the courtesies of war seem now to be confined to professional
soldiers. The American civilian rates his adversary in terms which
would please the fancy of an angry costermonger."

The *Spectator*, after opining that if ever a nation had the right
to intervene, America had that right in Cuba, and after denying that
America had been precipitate, took occasion to point out that there
were other motives than those of humanity behind United States inter-
vention. "The desire to obtain the control, if not the possession, of
a great and rich province has no doubt been at work, and speculators
and adventurers have 'run' the Cuban atrocities for all they are worth."
But Spain had given these men ground to work upon. If Spain had kept
her house in order she would be no more interfered with than Holland.
"As a nation the Americans stand absolved from entering upon the
war in an evil spirit."

145. *Guardian*, LIII (I), 580, Apr. 20, 1898. 146. *Spectator*, LXX, 564,
Apr. 23, 1898.
In its next weekly issue after the one previously quoted, The Saturday Review, in a leading article entitled "The 'Moral Sense' of America", waxed sarcastic. After reporting that the United States had decided to go to war with Spain because Spain had shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, it continued thus: "It is an elevated and touching sentiment, and one calculated to bring a blush to the cheek of those sordid and brutal European despots which go to war for such common things as self-interest and self-aggrandisement. Mr. Pockeniff rebuking vanity and selfishness never struck a more beautiful attitude." It then went on to belabor President McKinley for shocking the moral sense of others - by declaring in one month that he would not fight an unholy war for Cuba, and in the next month surrendering his Constitutional power to Congress. It then asked what people would think if a European power had fed rebellion in a weaker neighbour for over half a century, and had then stepped forward and said that its moral sense had been shocked, and that the weaker neighbour would have to relinquish sovereignty; that that is precisely what America had done.

In another leading article in the same issue entitled "The Blatant American", The Saturday Review quoted from a letter which Mr. Michael Davitt, M.P., had written to the Daily News a few days before, and in which Davitt had stated his belief that the ruling classes in England secretly wished success to Spain, and would rejoice if Spain were to win the war. The Saturday Review then.

147. Saturday Review, LXXXV, 547, Apr. 23, 1898.
proceeded to say that there was reason to think that Mr. Davitt was right in this, and gave its reasons for so thinking. "Firstly, because the ruling classes are the truly patriotic English public; secondly because they are at heart naturally aristocratic and not democratic; and thirdly because they appreciate in others what they themselves possess - manners." Also the ruling classes knew that American school children were taught that England was their traditional enemy. Then The Saturday Review continued: "It is a question of manners. We are disgusted with these raw, vulgar, blatant Americans who scour Europe in search of their self-respect, and cannot conduct a mere legal case with decency. On that side of the Atlantic there has been fire and fury and breathings out of threatenings and slaughter; on this side [meaning, here, Spain] there has been a stern and dignified silence." The article then went on to report the statement made by a seaman on the Iowa about Captain ("Fighting Bob") Evans having said that if they would give him the Iowa and send him to Havana he would make Spanish the most popular language in Hell for the next ten years, and to contrast that statement with the conduct of Admiral Villamil, the commander of the Spanish torpedo boat squadron when he was about to sail from Cadiz; he took his men to the Shrine of the Virgin and had them take an oath not to return to Spain unless victorious. The Saturday Review made it amply apparent that it believed Admiral Villamil's conduct far superior to that statement of Captain Evans, and went on to
state of the ruling classes in England that "in this matter of manners
they most distinctly prefer Castile to Connecticut."

In the same article The Saturday Review took occasion to
criticize the predominant English attitude, which favored the United
States. Having stated that Spain had been insulted, it went on:
"Spain, proposing to wipe out that insult with blood, without the
slightest hesitation takes up the big bully's gauntlet. Sixteen
millions of people and a low Treasury, against sixty millions of
people with boundless resources - that is how the matter stands!
And it would seem that we English, who are generally on the side
of the 'little um' in a stand-up fight, are on the side of the
'big um'; - on the side, so to speak, of the big cad in his fight
with the little gentleman. There are special reasons for this no
doubt. There is the 'atrocities' cry, the 'blood-thicker-than-water'
cry, the 'no popery' cry, and various other similar catch-words and
cant phrases dear to the Anglo-Saxon-Protestant hearts in moments
of ebullition, and especially so when there is a renewal of the
long, long struggle between the antagonists whose antipathy has
stained the earth with blood these two thousand years."

In its next issue, April 30, The Saturday Review, after
tending to justify the attacks of Elizabethan seamen on the Caribs,
went on to contrast those attacks with the one America was making
on Spain. "To-day America's action, unfortunately, we can fairly
say justly, suggests the attitude of a huge and boastful bully
attacking an effete and gentlemanly old roué, with whom one cannot
help sympathising in spite of his sins, especially when the bully, not content with thrashing his feeble old opponent and stripping him of his kudos, bellows out with tears and protestations that he does it unwillingly and with the highest moral purpose. The impression is deepened by the fact that the gentlemanly and dignified Spaniard fearlessly meets his big and blustering opponent, though without a reasonable hope of repulsing him."

On the next page The Saturday Review stated that a Frenchman had used the words "heroic folly" to describe the action of the United States in the Cuban business; but The Saturday Review expressed the belief that Mr. Joseph Cowen in the Newcastle Chronicle was closer to the truth in describing American action as "not humanitarianism in heroics but hypocrisy in hysterics." In the same issue a leading article entitled "The American Braggart", The Saturday Review referred to a despatch sent by the American correspondent of The Daily Chronicle in which it was stated that in some quarters in America there was a "decided tendency to scoff" and that in other quarters there were "scares" that were "neither dignified nor reasonable." Then The Saturday Review, commenting on this despatch, asked: "But what, in the name of dignity and reason, did he expect. From the first stage of this blackguardly business the demeanour of the blatant section of the American people has been such as would have disgraced Greece in her last year's campaign."

149. Saturday Review, LXXXV, 581, Apr. 30, 1898.
150. Ibid., LXXXV, 582, Apr. 30, 1898.
151. Ibid., LXXXV, 585, Apr. 30, 1898.
Much as has been quoted from the unfriendly Saturday Review, that journal was not unique in that temper. Another was voluminously and bitterly critical at this time of the course being pursued by the United States - The Labour Leader. In a long discourse on the war in the issue of May 7, in what was a regular department entitled "Between Ourselves" and signed "Keir," The Labour Leader echoed many of the same opinions that have already been quoted from The Saturday Review. For in that issue "Keir" found that Mr. Michael Davitt had come near speaking the truth when he said that the English sentiment was anti-American. "This is specially true," wrote "Keir," of business circles. It is not that people lack sympathy with the Cubans, but they have not forgotten Venezuela and the sealing question. The American brag and bluster, too, are very repulsive. It may be necessary for a big lusty youth of seventeen stone to chastise a decrepit, shrunken, high-spirited old man of seventy stone, but the feat is not exactly one to boast about." Thus far The Labour Leader followed The Saturday Review fairly closely. It continued then: "Personally all my sympathies are with the Cubans - that they are entitled to self-government is not to be denied - but I cannot believe in the purity of the American motive.... American statesmen by their insolent manner seemed determined to provoke conflict. The American man on the street is doubtless honest and sincere in his zeal for Cuban freedom, but he is simply shouting - without knowing it, of course - at the prompting of others." Then The Labour Leader came to express the idea that

152. This was, presumably, "Keir" Hardie, the editor, although "Hardie" never appeared with "Keir" as part of the signature.
financial interests in the United States had been fomenting the insurrection in Cuba. "The rebellion in Cuba in the present instance was fomented and financed by the American Sugar Trust, who made millions by the destruction of the sugar-cane plantations of the island." It then accused the "ruling classes" in America of diverting the gaze of the people there from the ills at home, and upon the "wrongs of someone else far enough away." "When the people of the United States have rid themselves of the Thugs who are throttling American liberty and enslaving the American people, time enough then to spend blood and treasure in removing the woes of others. These remarks are not prompted by any spirit of hostility to America. The people of the States are acting exactly as our own people do at home under like circumstances. It is a device of the ruling classes of the world to divert attention from evils at home by concentrating the gaze of the people on the wrongs of someone else far enough away, and I regret exceedingly to find the people of the States no wiser in this respect than the stock from which they have sprung in these older nations." Then contrasting the action of Spain and the United States towards anarchists, it found little difference: "The action of Spain in torturing her prisoners is alleged as a reason why Socialists should wish to see her beaten. It seems to be forgotten that if Spain has shot her Anarchists America has hanged them; and if Spain shoots down starving riotous peasants, America does the same for starving but not riotous colliers.... Where a people is struggling for supremacy our sympathies as Socialists must always centre there; when two sets of corrupt impostors are contending for supremacy, I
cannot for the soul of me grow enthusiastic over it, nor do I see why anyone should."

In the same article, "Keir," sarcastic, pitied the Cubans because people from Wall Street had formed a regiment. "Wall Street," we read, "has raised a regiment of its own, consisting of 500 stockbrokers, bankers, and clerks." The Cubans will have need for all our sympathy when these men are done 'freeing' it." "Keir" also referred to President McKinley as "the puppet of the Trusts", who "was finally hustled into doing as he was told." Then passing in review some of the ills existent within America, "Keir" continued: "It is a sorry business. Had the freedom of Cuba alone been the object in view there are peaceful methods enough to have accomplished that purpose apart from the dread arbitrament of war. It cannot be the poverty of Cuba which has stirred the hearts of American statesmen. They will find plenty of that to engage all their energies in the New York Bowery or the 19th Ward of Chicago. Nor can it be the sacred freedom of the Cubans which spurs them on; the blood is scarcely dry of the miners shot down in Pennsylvania by a posse of sheriffs, last year, for no other crime than that of marching along a highway. No need to go to an island in the Carribean [sic] Sea for wrongs requiring to be righted; America has them in plenty within her own shores. I am not to be understood as saying that we on this side of the Atlantic are not guilty of similar folly. Our expeditions and agitations to put right the wrongs of various peoples is of a piece with this of the States, and people are going frantic now over a myth, just as they
have done before....Desiring as I do to see Cuba freed, I frankly declare that I have not the slightest sympathy with this American-made war, nor do I believe in the motives which inspire it. May it soon be over!"

From the expressions that have been quoted and paraphrased it will be seen that English journals were by no means unanimous in favoring the idea of intervention in Cuba, or in approving of the method or motives. Many journals became at times critical of American conduct, while remaining on the whole friendly to intervention. Some, however, were intransigent, and criticized consistently, expansively, in detail, and bitterly. But such journals were a very small minority.

The majority of English journals favored not only the idea of intervention, but approved warmth of the motives. America was idealistic, was acting for humanity and liberty, loved peace and order, hated anarchy and oppression, was on the side of progress, was disinterested, and was setting a salutary example to Europe — such were the arguments used by those in England who approved of America’s motives.

In early April The Pall Mall Gazette said it seemed inconceivable that Spain would back down from her "never, never" attitude, and deprecated the idea that an armistice would be effective. It then stated: "America will not be acting either for Spain or for the insurgents, but the humanity which they do not understand and the business which both ruin."

153. Labour Leader, no vol. number, p. 155, June 4, 1898.
154. Pall Mall Gazette, Apr. 7, 1898.
Black and White expressed its sentiments on the subject in a front-cover cartoon. A man in conventional bull-fighting costume, meant to represent Spain, was shown flying at a comely girl named "Liberty." But Uncle Sam, with the Stars and Stripes in one hand, and a sabre outstretched before the assailant in the other, is presumably the one who is shouting the title of the cartoon — "Hands off!" The Daily Graphic summed up the situation thus: "Whichever way we look, war is unavoidable. The armistice has already failed because the rebels, foreseeing that the United States is bound to intervene on their behalf, have refused to have anything to do with it. The civil war consequently continues, and the necessity for armed intervention remains operative. In these circumstances Congress is only pursuing a frank course in recommending intervention (1) at once, (2) for the Cubans, and (3) against Spain."

The Investors' Review was more outspokenly in unison with what may fairly be called the predominant American feeling on the matter. It said: "It is only fair to the United States to recognise that the sentiment of the general body of the people is in the main a noble one. They desire to free Cuba, not to conquer it; not to make it a field to be exploited by the unscrupulous financial element far too much in evidence in American affairs...."

The Spectator denied vehemently that the United States was intervening for "landgrabbing" purposes. "We sincerely trust that

155. Black and White, XV, 485, Apr. 9, 1898.
156. Daily Graphic, Apr. 13, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 446, Apr. 15, 1898.
during the coming war no visible section of Englishmen will be foolish enough to fall into the error which the Americans have so constantly fallen into in regard to ourselves, and will accuse the United States of desiring to 'grab' this or that possession of Spain." Undoubtedly, that journal continued, there would be certain parties in the United States that would view the war from the standpoint of "loot." But that would not be the real impulse of the American people. They are no more landgrabbers than we are. We have hitherto passed by all such slanders with contempt, and it is now greatly to be hoped that no section of our Press, following the bad example of the American newspapers, will try to retort with a schoolboy *Tu quoque*.

The Speaker was blunt and to the point in discussing America's intervening for the sake of humanity. "Spain is incompetent, corrupt, decadent; she is expiating the sins of centuries. The United States is intervening in the cause of humanity, and setting a salutary example.

158. *Spectator, LXX, 532, Apr. 16, 1898.* This quotation, it must be said, has somewhat the ring of endeavoring not to aggravate any ill-feeling that might have sprung up between the two countries in the past by the conduct of Americans in calling Englishmen land-grabbers.
to Europe." The Graphic was equally pointed in its comments on the motives of intervention. Of the United States that journal said: "No one can blame her, and many will applaud her. Military glory is not to be won by beating Spain, and it is not for that or even for an extension of her dominion that the United States will fight. Her object is to give peace and a stable Government to a spot on the earth's surface which has scarcely known either the one or the other throughout its history. If wars are to be waged at all they could not be undertaken in a better cause."

The Spectator, at the beginning of the war also, spoke of the United States as "the first nation which has risked a great war to stop a great oppression." The Speaker at the same time stated that while it could not approve of the methods by which American politicians had handled the Cuban question, and could not justify "some of the rough and ready methods of Transatlantic diplomacy."

159. Speaker, XVII, 468, Apr. 18, 1898. About this same time (Apr. 22, 1898) The Jewish Chronicle did not speak directly of "good and righteous government" as resulting from American intervention in Cuba, but from the wording of its comments on the Cuban insurrection it may fairly be judged that that journal believed that those things would redound to Cuba as a consequence of intervention; in other words, that intervention would help to affect the aims for which the insurgents had been fighting. It wrote: "We Jews...from whom persecution and misgovernment have taken the heaviest toll, cannot forgo a feeling of sympathy for the gallant and sanguinary struggle for freedom that has devastated a once prosperous island; a large area won back for good and righteous government is so much gained in the cause of human progress." The Jewish Chronicle then went on to bemoan the fact that "Civilisation must proceed on a powder cart and freedom be won at the point of the bayonet." (Jewish Chronicle, no vol. number, Apr. 22, 1898 - 5658, p. 17

160. Graphic, LIVII, 498, Apr. 23, 1898.

161. Spectator, LXXX, 585, Apr. 23, 1898.
in the Cuban dispute the people of the United States were "in the main in the right, and the people of Spain in the main in the wrong."

Speaking then of the "intolerable situation" that had existed in Cuba, it stated that the nation that stepped forward to end it was "performing a great work of humanity, and must command accordingly the hearty sympathy of all those to whom the cause of humanity is dear." It said too that there could not be any doubt that the war was being waged for a good end. Black and White stated on April 23 that only a miracle would prevent war, and went on to opine: "At this crisis it is well to point out to those who resent America's attitude as one of hectoring and offensive nature, that her action is all for humanity."

The Outlook stressed the disinterestedness of the United States and deprecated the notion that intervention was due to the policy of "grab." It said that the United States, while hating to use the sword would do so in order to put an end to the rule of the sword in its own neighborhood, it continued: "Only from this point of view shall we understand the origin and issues of the war on which these nations have entered. To ascribe it to a policy of "grab," to impeach the disinterestedness of the people of the United States, is to ignore the entire history of the quarrel, and to speak cheaply of the blood which runs in one's own veins." The Investors' Review, in discussing the

162. Speaker, XVII, 498, Apr. 23, 1898.
164. Outlook, I, 368, Apr. 23, 1898.
new taxes that America was going to impose to raise war revenue, said
that it would have to be admitted that the nation was in earnest in the
matter of driving the Spaniard out of the western hemisphere, and that
without doubt it would succeed. "Whatever follows, humanity must gain by
their triumph."

The National Review took an interesting way of reiterating its own
statement that United States intervention was not motivated by a desire
for land. In its issue of May, 1898 it reprinted an expression of opinion
that it had printed originally in January, 1897. The National Review
stated its belief in May, 1896 that this opinion did justice, but no more
than justice to the action being taken by the people of the United States.
In that expression of opinion, we find: "There is no more 'land-grabbing'
in the Cuban agitation in America than there is in the Armenian agitation
in England [a footnote to this statement read: "Since this was written
Captain Mahan has cogently pointed out the strategic merits of Cuba, and
has undoubtedly influenced American opinion."] and the possibility that
intervention might lead to the incorporation of Cuba in the Union by the
desire of the Cuban people has had a most prejudicial effect upon the s
strength of the movement. Any number of Americans of all shades of
politics express the sentiment, 'I would intervene like a shot if we could
count on keeping clear of Cuba after Spain had been cleared out'; while
others have said, 'I would not have anything to do with the
movement for intervention if I thought it involved

166. The article referred to here, "A Strategic Study of the Caribbean
1897."

annexation."

As an offset to these expressions that American intervention would help the cause of humanity in Cuba, and bring liberty and progress it may be permissible to cite a dispatch from The Chicago Tribune (date not given) which was summarized in Vanity Fair, to the effect that a negro had been burned to death in Mississippi for the negro's attempt to kill a Mrs. Parish. Upon this Vanity Fair commented sarcastically: "And these are some of the people who cannot endure Spanish cruelty in Cuba! But (I hope) neither these incendiaries nor Mr. Hearst and his favored correspondent really represent the great American People. I am sure they do not. They cannot." Immediately before this comment in Vanity Fair there had appeared the story of a Cuban "patriot", whose band had captured forty Spaniards, and when questioned as to what they had done with them, had replied: "Cut off their heads!" This was used by Vanity Fair to satirize Mr. Hearst's anxiety and America's determination to help the "liberty-loving" Cuban insurgents.

After hostilities had begun The Pall Mall Gazette expressed its approval of the purposes of intervention in a cartoon; it showed an ugly, black bird (possibly meant to be a vulture) on the ground, holding down a rabbit marked "Cuba." An eagle was attacking the black bird. The title was: "Let Go!" (The United States, Spain, and Cuba)."

169. Vanity Fair, LVI, July 7, 1898.
170. Pall Mall Gazette, Apr. 26, 1898. Throughout 1898 The Pall Mall Gazette was friendly and sympathetic to the United States. So it may be taken, without much danger of contradiction, that this cartoon was meant to approve the action of the United States - despite the fact that the natural historian would argue that the eagle was driving off the other attacker so that (the eagle) might devour the rabbit!
The misunderstanding that arose over the question of just when war began caused comment in a few English journals. The President had signed the joint resolutions on April 20, whereupon the Spanish minister had asked for his passports, and Mr. Woodford had asked for his. The blockades of Havana began on April 22. But war had not been declared. Not until April 25 did President McKinley ask for, and Congress grant, an actual declaration of war. President McKinley, according to Millis, appears to have thought that armed intervention could be carried out without having a war. But between April 20 and 25 American naval vessels had been capturing Spanish traders.

The Standard on April 26 ridiculed Congress for acting at the bidding of McKinley and ante-dating the declaration of war. Whereas war had existed since April 21 according to The Standard, Congress only stated that fact "yesterday." "From one point of view this is the solemn affirmation of a truism. When the ships of one country chase the ships of the other in the open sea; when all arrangements for direct intercourse between the two Governments have broken down; when one is in possession of a peremptory demand from the other which, it is expressly stated, is to be enforced by hostile action, and when a long stretch of coast is besieged by a fleet, and the access of neutrals is prevented, it requires some courage in casuistry to regard the relation of the embroiled nations as in any need of definition. But apparently it has occurred to Mr. McKinley

and his advisers that a formality had been neglected which ought to be observed — even a few days after date."

The Graphic likewise was somewhat sarcastic in its comments. It stated that among the humors of the crisis, none was more ludicrous than the questions as to how and when war began. "Admiral Sampson had already captured a few miserable 'galleons' when these queries arose. As they touched the legality of the seizures, and thus threatened international complications, it was necessary to take a decision. The procedure of the United States has been rather perplexing. On the one hand she declares that Spain virtually declared war when she handed General Woodford his passports; and on the other hand she finds it necessary to declare war herself. Then, in order to show that her theory is more correct than her practice, she ante-dates her own declaration by several days, and arbitrarily declares that vessels which sailed in ignorance of her undisclosed theory are liable to seizure. However, the upshot is that war has been formally declared and so far the proceedings have been regularised."

Two journals on the other hand tended to exculpate America's actions in this matter. The Daily Chronicle, in summing up its discussion of the action of the U.S.S. Nashville in firing on the Busanventura before war was declared, said that American lawyers seemed inclined to yield up the whole batch of Spanish vessels captured by Americans. "What is quite clear," The Daily Chronicle 172, Standard, Apr. 26, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 507, Apr. 29, 1898. 173, Graphic, LVII, 530, Apr. 30, 1898.
continued, "as an international matter, is that a 'state of war' may perfectly well exist without or before a 'declaration of war,' and that the delivery of passports to a minister, even if it followed on heated remonstrances and threats, is not an act of war, and does not of itself produce a state of war." The Fall Hall Gazette likewise wrote in an exculpatory strain. It said: "With the formal Declaration of Congress in response to the President's request, an awkward state of things comes to an end. It was necessary, we may as well point out once more, to give Mr. McKinley full powers, and it was also highly desirable as making all parties concerned quite sure as to how they stand....But the Declaration does not in any way imply that a wrong was done in beginning hostilities before its appearance; except in so far as it authorizes the President to do certain things it is purely declaratory. War has existed since Thursday, and Congress merely says so for the sake of convenience."

There was one other aspect of the approaching conflict that caused comment in English journals before hostilities of any magnitude broke out. That was the fact that neither the United States nor Spain had signed the Declaration of Paris, that code of international law drawn up at the Conference of Paris at the end of the Crimean War. England, with her large carrying trade was naturally much concerned as to how neutral shipping would fare. Would either

175. Fall Hall Gazette, Apr. 26, 1898. Thursday fell on April 21.
176. The provisions of the Declaration of Paris were as follows:
   "1. Privateering is, and remains abolished. 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with exception of contraband of war.
   3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." See J.B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, VII, 562.
country commission privateers? Would a neutral flag protect the enemy's goods against seizure? Would neutral goods not contraband of war be safe against seizure while being carried under the enemy's flag? Before the war broke out English journals were principally concerned with speculating on what the conduct of each nation would be. After the war broke out and it was learned that each nation would adhere to the principles of the Declaration of Paris opinions were expressed commendatory of this action. It is in this chronologic order that the attitude of the English journals will be traced.

Early in April The Shipping and Mercantile Gazette and Lloyd's List, after mentioning that neither of the possible combatants had agreed to sign the Declaration of Paris, went on to a discussion of "free ships, free goods," and was worried about the prospect. "It is true that the United States has at times made treaties accepting the free ship free goods rule, and has also somewhat committed itself to accepting in principle the last three Articles of the Declaration, but we do not see that this will materially interfere with its rights of relying and acting upon the old usage of the sea."

The next day The Times said in a leading article that the consequences of war could not be blinked at. It stated that there was an active movement for fitting out privateers in Spain, and that some foreigners, especially Frenchmen, were believed to be eager to engage in this enterprise. Thus, The Times feared, the commercial
interests of all nations would be affected.

The Spectator stated that Spain believed in "guerilla," and that if her fleets were destroyed, she would yet have two hundred to three hundred privateers. They might raise havoc with American shipping, and make the waterways of the world unsafe. The Times said on the same day that reversion to privateering and the searching of neutral vessels for the enemy's goods "would most gravely embarrass all commerce and especially our own, which is far the greatest in the world." It then discussed a letter written by Sir George Baden-Powell, which it printed in that day's issue, and which suggested that England set aside the Declaration of Paris and call privateering piracy if British ships were molested. The Times professed to see no reason why other nations that had signed the Declaration of Paris should not join England in this kind of action.

The Pall Mall Gazette stated that neither nation would wish "if only for prudential reasons, to irritate neutrals by any high-handed action of this nature [privateering]." And in commenting upon The Times's suggestion The Pall Mall Gazette continued, stating that England could not join any such Concert for it might be used "by some kind friend to force us into some unnecessary and fatal quarrel with the United States. We must retain a complete independence of action, but there is certainly room for a friendly declaration of the kind, couched in terms expressive of our view that there is

178. Times, Apr. 8, 1898.
179. Spectator, LXX, 533, Apr. 16, 1898.
180. Times, Apr. 16, 1898.
no great likelihood of any such treatment of us by either side, and that we only do it as a precaution. Our captains, also, must know what to do in case of an emergency that may present itself at any moment."

The Saturday Review, so often during this period less tractable and more irascible than other journals, stated bluntly that Spain would not find her commerce-destroying very lucrative: "American goods will be shipped under the British flag, and if they are touched or seized there will be trouble. Here lies infinite possibility of complication with England."

The Pall Mall Gazette again spoke favoring the protection of British interests, but still in no assertive or petulant way. "The nation should look to the Government to see that British interests are adequately protected, and British rights clearly defined, in a struggle between two nations neither of which is bound by the Declaration of Paris. In all circumstances the rights and duties of neutrals have to be interpreted by the not very brilliant light of that congeries of customs, precedents, declarations, and mutual contradictions which, with unconscious irony, calls itself international law. We hope, therefore, that Ministers, with the help of their legal advisers, have made up their minds as to the line to be taken in circumstances which may easily arise, and which, as a matter of fact, will almost unavoidably do so."

181. Pall Mall Gazette, Apr. 16, 1898.
183. Pall Mall Gazette, Apr. 20, 1898.
This feeling of tension and nervousness about the chance that the United States might not live up to the provisions of the Declaration of Paris was broken suddealy when the United States government announced that it would abide by those provisions. Then the comments in English journals reflected relief, contentment, and praise for this action. The Daily Telegraph expressed on April 20 its contentment that the United States was opposed to the use of privateers. The Pall Mall Gazette expressed its satisfaction that America had declared against privateering, and said that Spain might be expected to follow suit.

"Neutrality thus secures every chance at the outset, and every endeavour will be made to maintain it during the hostilities."

The Times commented the same day on A.J. Balfour's having informed the House "yesterday" that the American Government had assured her Majesty's government that it would adhere in the coming conflict to the principles of the Declaration of Paris. It said: "we are convinced that [America's policy] would be dictated by a far seeing and enlightened self-interest. The sympathy for the United States felt in this country cannot but be strengthened, especially among the commercial community, by the sense of relief thus afforded from some of the dangers and inconveniences which neutrals have to suffer." It then went on to discuss Spain, stating that any refusal on her part to declare that she would abide by the

184. April 26; see For. Rel., 1898, 772-773.
186. Pall Mall Gazette, Apr. 22, 1898.
same principles would place her in an invidious position.

The Outlook on April 23 also commented favorably upon America's decision not to use privateers. "We have yet another ground of warm sympathy in Mr. McKinley's wise refusal to attempt to enforce the right to search for and seize an adversary's goods under neutral flags. In thus denying herself the use of a powerful weapon of offence rather than embarrass the trade of neutral Powers - amongst whom England ranks first, and therefore benefits most - the United States gives proof that she has entered upon her arduous task in no vindictive spirit, and that in so far as she is concerned, the war shall be conducted with a minimum of wanton waste and suffering. It is to be hoped that in her own interests Spain will follow suit."

187. Times, Apr. 23, 1898. The Times that same day however carried a news item from Liverpool that shipping houses in that city had been assuring clients that there was no danger of interference with commerce between Liverpool and the United States, but that there was nevertheless a continued disposition to send goods to the United States via Canada. Apparently this item had been despatched to The Times before news of America's statement had reached Liverpool. On this same day, The St. James's Budget, a weekly, apparently having gone to press before news of America's declaration had arrived, commented on the privateer question. It suggested that privateers be denominated pirates, and forbidden the use of British ports. Other powers would undoubtedly join Great Britain in this action, and privateers would be restricted to the use of their own ports, which, incidentally, would work out to the advantage of Spain, which had ports in the West Indies and in the Philippines from which to raid American commerce. The St. James's Budget, however, did not take very seriously the fear that America would engage in privateering, for, it said, that country had insisted throughout its national existence that free ships make free goods.

188. Outlook, I, 369, Apr. 23, 1898. Another pronouncement of the State Department of the United States drew the commendation of at least one English journal - The Pall Mall Gazette. That journal spoke favorably of America's decision to allow Spanish vessels to leave American ports as late as May 21, and to unload in American ports if they had sailed before April 21. The Pall Mall Gazette stated that that action "shows that there is every desire to be fair and generous." (Pall Mall Gazette, Apr. 27, 1898.)
As late, however, as April 30, The Saturday Review was criticizing the action of the United States in having seized a Spanish merchant vessel, The Buenaventura, near Key West. Scoffed that journal: "The Yankees seem eager to give the world early and full knowledge of the blackguardly character of their war with Spain. In seizing the 'Buenaventura' [sic] before even the time fixed by themselves for the earliest possible outbreak of hostilities had expired, they not only outraged the most elementary principles of justice, but also showed themselves to be canting hypocrites of the very first water." The Saturday Review insisted that the United States had refused to sign the Declaration of Paris because it did not provide for the entire abolition of capture at sea of private property except contraband and breach of blockade. "The rest of the world was left in a state of grovelling admiration of the high-minded Republic across the Atlantic; Washington meant that effete and barbarous Europe should be properly ashamed of itself. The seizure last week of the trading vessel off Key West looks odd in the light of this Pecksniffian virtue."

But, if we are to speak of English journals in general, their attitude previous to America's declaration that she would adhere to the principles of the Declaration of Paris, was one of concern and worry as to the possible effect of war upon British commerce, and one of relief, contentment, and commendation for the United States afterwards.

There is one more topic to be treated before dealing with the war proper. There was in English journals both before and after the war.
broke out some little discussion of just what kind of neutrality England should observe. In other words, should it be a "strict" neutrality or a "benevolent" one? Should the predominant sympathy for the United States extend in England be permitted to sway the attitude of the English towards the combatants? On this subject the journals were not unanimous, but the predominant belief expressed was that England should, despite her friendly feelings for the United States, make no distinction in her treatment of the combatants.

The Times as early as March 28 expressed itself, though not too explicitly, to be sure. In discussing the possibility that war might break out, it said that if it did "we shall not of course forget, whilst maintaining the duties of neutrals towards both, that one of them is knitted to us by the ties of blood." On April 16, The Outlook, recalling the difficulties arising from the affair of the Alabama during the Civil War in the United States, spoke thus gently: "Until Spain and the United States are actually at war our shipowners and gunmakers are free to sell their wares to either or both, with the fine absence of political conscience which distinguishes these branches of industry, but not after war has been declared; and we may hope that the lesson of the Alabama is still sufficiently fresh in memory to warn us off this source of danger."

It was the The Spectator which proposed what might be called a "benevolent" neutrality. On April 23 it stated that while the

190. Times, Mar. 28, 1896.
attitude of Englishman would be one of sympathy with the United States. England would criticize the States as a matter of course, because England would expect more of her own blood brothers than of Spaniards. The attitude of the government (of England) would be one of neutrality. "But neutrality is of many kinds, and must vary with new conditions. In laying down the conditions which will govern their neutrality we do not ask that the Government should do anything which will injure Spain in the struggle, but we feel sure that if a choice between two courses has to be adopted, the Government will be expected by public opinion here to adopt the course which will show friendliness to the United States. We shall refrain from taking either side, but if it is necessary to show a bias the bias must be towards the States."

Whether The Speaker had advance information that The Spectator was going to give utterance to such an expression is undeterminable, but on the same day it went on record as opposing any such attitude for England. After stating that as a matter of course Great Britain would stand by the United States if there came a question of a European alliance against it, The Speaker went on: "But whilst they are fighting a war of liberation, they can neither ask nor expect our active intervention. Our duty is to maintain not a nominal but a real neutrality....Nothing can justify a departure on our part from the rules of fair-play. If we are to observe, as some have proposed, a one-sided neutrality, we shall simply be taking sides in a war in which we have not the courage to engage openly." Further, it was

said, the people of America would not desire that England should
follow any such policy; " Honour compels us as neutrals to observe the
laws of the duello."

Her Majesty's government proclaimed its neutrality on April 26, 1898. On the following day The Pall Mall Gazette, in discussing the
case of the U.S.S. Somers, which had been detained by the British
authorities, spoke its approval of the action as representative of an
attitude of strict neutrality. "Our neutrality made it necessary for
her to leave at once; it also made it impossible for her to get a
crew at once. The result is that she cannot leave at all and is out
of action for the rest of the war. It is rough luck, but rules are
rules, and there is no fear of any responsible person complaining."

The Guardian also spoke against a "benevolent" neutrality, and
in favor of a "strict" one. It stated that the rights and duties of
England would "be a subject of much imperfectly informed discussion.
At present some of our countrymen seem ignorant of such elementary
facts as that a voluntary contract between certain Powers does not
bind Powers that are not parties to it, and that a 'benevolent'
neutrality - meaning a neutrality in which rules are made for the
benefit of one combatant, and then, with a sanctimonious affectation
of impartiality, applied to both alike - is only a cowardly and
underhand belligerency. There is no fear, however, that the Govern-

was detained at Falmouth, England. It was not released to the
United States until December, 1898, and then only on the
United States giving assurance that were hostilities to be re-
newed it would not be used. (*Pall. Rel.*, 1898, 1006-1007.)
ment will be misled by any such transparent glosses. The only course
for neutrals to follow when war has actually begun is one of strict
conformity with precedents."

The Daily Telegraph also decried "benevolent" neutrality. It
discussed the point whether the English proclamation of neutrality
would work to the advantage of one combatant more than to that of
the other, but concluded that this point could not be argued about,
because the proclamation was of general application. "As for the
cry raised, that, in view of the widespread sympathy in England with
the United States, we should adopt a 'benevolent neutrality' towards
the latter, it means, if it has any meaning, that we should concede
privileges to America which we withhold from Spain. Apart altogether
from regard for fair play, and from the fact that America neither
asks nor expects this favour, such a proceeding on our part would
furnish Spain with a casus belli against us." It then went on to say
that the first result of the English declaration of neutrality had
worked to the detriment of the United States; the detention of the
Somers for the duration of the war. The Morning Post was equally
definite in its stand against anything but a strict neutrality.

"Our Government is, happily, as the Queen's Proclamation says, 'on
terms of friendship and amicable intercourse' with each of the
belligerent Powers, and merely sentimental reasons can impel our

196. Guardian, LIII (1), 609, Apr. 27, 1898. Apparently this article went
to press too early to be corrected in the light of the publica-
tion of the English proclamation of neutrality.
29, 1898.
people to incline to one side rather than the other." The Globe gave
as its opinion that an attitude of benevolent neutrality implied a
"malevolent" neutrality also. This adoption of a benevolent
neutrality it called a cowardly way of making war. "We should be
sorry to see this country making common cause with the United States
in the demand for Cuban independence, but we should a thousand times
rather see her go to war, even in support of what we conceive to be
a mistaken policy, than resorting to the pusillanimous expedient of
'benevolent' (or 'malevolent') neutrality."

The Investors' Review mentioned that complaints had been made be-
cause the British government had not declared coal contraband of war,
but said that if it had "its motives would have been misunderstood,
and it would have been accused of favouring America at the expense of
Spain." It then went on: "The main thing is to insist on its [the
Proclamation of Neutrality] impartial enforcement. Spain may deserve
nothing special at our hands, but at least she is entitled to strictly
legal and just treatment as a belligerent; and benevolence may be
mixed with our neutrality to America without straining official pro-
clamations, which must descend to farce and worse if their provisions
are not carried out with the utmost impartiality."

198. Morning Post, Apr. 27, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 509, Apr. 29,
1898.
The Times recurred to the question of neutrality when on May 2 it stated that the prevailing sentiment of Great Britain was that to which the Duke of Devonshire had given expression: "We have no rights and no interests which prescribe to us any other course than that of the strictest neutrality."

The Guardian took more than one occasion to voice its opinion on the proper attitude of Englishmen towards neutrality. It said that there were no doubt strong inducements to sympathize with the United States because of a strong sense of kinship and because the war had been caused "by simple humanity." "But the sense of kinship ought not to alter our view of plain facts, though it may rightly indispose us to put that view forward where it is not a matter of duty. England is a neutral Power, and Englishmen will do well to bear this in mind when they are tempted to take sides in their comments on the present conflict."

201. Times, May 2, 1898. The eighth Duke of Devonshire, Spencer Compton Cavendish (1833-1908), was President of the Council in Salisbury's coalition government.

202. Guardian, LIII (1), 653, May 4, 1898. On May 21, Black and White, while not discussing directly the question of benevolent or strict neutrality, did draw attention to what it believed were violations of neutrality by other nations. This by implication, could be viewed as an argument for strict neutrality by England. The occasion for Black and White's pronouncement was the coaling of Admiral Cervera's fleet after it had crossed the Atlantic and put in to Martinique and Curacao for coal and provisions. "Meantime the Spaniards are getting coal, and it is tolerably evident that the authorities both at Martinique and Curacao [sic] have been affording the Spanish vessels very considerable facilities not only in the matter of coal, but also with respect to provisions. This is to say that neither the French nor the Dutch are rigidly regarding their neutrality, and is a circumstance that America can hardly be expected to forget after the war is ended." (Black and White, XV, 678, May 21, 1898.) Chadwick, Rel. of U.S.-and Spain-Span.-Amer. War, I, 255, states that the governor of Martinique would give the Spanish fleet no coal, but that the fleet did get coal at Curacao (less than 1000 tons).
From this review of the attitude of English journals towards neutrality and towards whether or not England should adopt a "benevolent" or a "strict" neutrality, it is amply evident that the overwhelming number of them favored a strict neutrality. Only one journal in fact, The Spectator, went so far as to broach even the idea of any other attitude. Most of the journals expressed their sympathy, for one cause or another, with the United States, but still insisted that the attitude of Englishmen should be one of strict-to-the-letter neutrality. It may be added that neither belligerent did anything that made Englishmen explore their neutrality.

With this, then, is ended the consideration of the events that preceded the war itself. To sum up some of the attitudes represented by the English journals during this period of increasing tension between the United States and Spain it may be said that the great majority of these journals sympathized with the United States in most of the incidents and events discussed. That the Spanish rule in Cuba had been inept, harsh, and cruel the English journals agreed almost unanimously. They approved of United States intervention there with almost as much unanimity, although to be sure there was some disagreement about the manner or time of intervention.

This sympathy for the United States in her difficulties with a troublesome neighbor was not maintained at a constant pitch. Rather did it increase, both in warmth and in the number of journals that professed to feel it - as one event or incident followed another.
At the beginning of the period studied there was mention of an Anglo-American alliance. Yet as time passed and as the United States saw herself more and more involved with Spain—whose religion and vast possessions had antagonized Englishmen in the sixteenth century—the feeling of Anglo-American kinship became more openly expressed. This fact is of main importance in this study, for it is indicative of the trend of the attitude of English journals throughout the Spanish-American War—an increasing feeling of kinship, of the common background, language, religion, "race", of the two nations, and a wide-spread discussion of and desire for an alliance. Thus the period between the publication of the stolen letter written by Señor Dupuy de Lôme and the outbreak of hostilities is a pregnant one.

This is not to say, however, that good feelings between the two nations were conceived with the Dupuy incident and progressed from there. There were many things before February, 1898 tending towards a good feeling between the two English-speaking nations. But it was, to put it simply, when England began to feel her isolation as a burden rather than a glorious mantle, and when the United States began to take steps that were bound to bring her into closer connection with Europe—it was at that time that good feelings began to grow. But what was discussed of sympathy, friendship, and alliance previous to the outbreak of important hostilities was merely the beginning, and it is our task now to move into the war itself and to follow the threads of these manifestations of friendship which have been seen to be increasing—both in extent and in warmth.
Chapter II

The War

In this chapter the purpose will be to deal with the attitude of English journals towards the unpreparedness of the United States, then with their attitude towards the main events of the war. No attempt will be made to trace the discussion of every military or naval move or incident, for it is felt that that would stultify the study and throw in a mass of more or less irrelevant material. Hence only the main military and naval incidents - the Battle of Manila, Cervera's crossing the Atlantic, and the land and naval battles of Santiago - will be discussed.

English journals were much concerned in the period just before war broke out and after war began as well about the unpreparedness of the United States and of possible consequences of it. In the discussion of what English journals had to say about the Cannon Act, appropriating $50,000,000 for defense, the question has been bordered upon already, for as has been pointed out, several English journals believed that this strengthening of the defenses of the United States would be a move for peace by impressing Spain with America's unlimited resources, and by showing Spain that she would be ready for war. But the expenditure of this $50,000,000, $30,000,000 of which was appropriated to the Department of the Navy, did not suffice to convince English editors that the United States had prepared herself for war. The comments ranged from blank wonder and amazement at America's making war when so inadequately prepared, and at the methods America adopted for making war, to statements concerning America's inability to deliver a crushing blow, down to speculation
as to what would have happened if the United States had permitted itself to drift into war with England over the Venezuelan affair in 1895 or with a first-class power in 1896.

In commenting on the rumor that the Pope had offered to mediate between Spain and the United States, The Daily News had something to say about unpreparedness in the United States. "Whatever the event, as between the United States and Spain, the preparations of the former Power will afford a good test of the national system for "improvisation" in war. With the Americans, unpreparedness for war is a principle based on the idea that all things needful in this respect can be done, so to speak, in four-and-twenty hours. They have no fleet, as we are unfortunately obliged to understand the term in Europe, and no standing army. They are practically without fortifications, stores, arsenals. Yet they are quite ready to begin. If they have no torpedo catchers, they remember that they are the first yachtsmen in the world, and they have dodged up some of the fastest crafts in the country for this service. The vessels are to be partly manned by the Naval Reserve, consisting of young men of good families, who have had their training as yachtsmen. This has all sprung out of nothing, and yet, with national enthusiasm, energy, resource, and above all, inventiveness, it will probably answer exceedingly well should the worst come to 1 the worst."

The Daily Graphic was more astounded at the measures that the United States took to wage war. "Buffalo Bill, the cowboys, the

Sioux, the black regiments, the Yale and Harvard undergraduates, the stockbrokers of Wall Street, the yachtsmen of the Hudson, the shop assistants of Mr. Tammany's dry goods store — these are only a few of the corps which the national emergency has mobilised. It is astounding, it is characteristically American, and it is not impossible that it may be exceedingly effective."

Less than a week after the President had signed the resolutions calling for intervention in Cuba, The Morning Advertiser spoke of the possibility that Congress might learn a lesson "in the unwisdom of overweening self-confidence." It stated further that the ultimate issue of the war was in no question. "But it is becoming transparently evident how unprepared the States are for the military operations necessary for striking a crushing blow."

The next day the same paper spoke most discouragingly of America's ability to wage war. "From a military point of view the United States is at present almost ludicrously unprepared for a serious war, judging by European standards. Such an army as could now be set down in Cuba, apart from the risk of the proceeding with the command of the sea uncertain, would have to occupy entrenched positions instead of trying a pitched battle, and would probably be decimated by sickness."

The Saturday Review, in conformity with its attitude towards America until some time after the war had been under way, was on un-

the United States until some time after the war had been under way, was on unpreparedness more explicit than most of the other English journals. "America, having made no preparations for completing the task she so arrogantly undertook, has no power to lay the storm she raised. Her finances are disorganized; her 'national army' is a mere mob; her navy is heroic in bombarding earthworks from a safe distance. Her statesmen have 'shown off their capabilities' as architects of ruin. They have lighted the torch of war without counting the cost or considering how the flame was to be extinguished."

Three weeks later the same journal returned to the attack on American unpreparedness, stating that the inefficiency of American forces was admitted everywhere, that there was artillery without guns, cavalry without horses, and infantry without rifles. "It is no wonder the Americans are asking what would have been the fate of their country if they had blundered into real war with a Power that could strike quickly and directly."

The Sketch, in discussing the suggestion made by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, colonial secretary, that there be formed an Anglo-American alliance, took opportunity to belittle America's ineffectiveness as a possible military ally. After stating that some Americans had said that

5. *Saturday Review*, LXXXV, 585, Apr. 30, 1898. The same journal then continued to a more general condemnation of the United States: "America can reduce Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines to anarchy. Has she any means of restoring order or good government? We said at the outset that this war was a crime against humanity; the Americans themselves seem bent on proving by their incapacity to organize anything like a campaign that it is a hideous blunder as well." (Ibid., 585-586.)

Chamberlain’s speech was a suppliant plea for American help. The Sketch went on: "Certainly the present time is not one at which England would beg for American help, seeing that the States, owing to their unprepared condition, have having their work cut out to stalk such a dragon of a Power as Spain. One American journalist proudly declares that the United States will not consent to help England to smash the Mahdi, overawe the Boers, or defend the Dervishes. This is doubtless true; and one might also say that, if the United States had consented to help in each or all of these three enterprises, it passes the wit of man to see how on earth they would set about doing it."

The Speaker also commented on this lack of preparation in the United States and compared the disorder to that obtaining in the early days of the American Civil War. "The blunders of organisation and commissariat, leaving the men without rifles and the horses without bridles, which are inevitable in a country which has to produce an army in a hurry and where every mishap is published to the world, are curiously reminiscent of the beginnings of the War of Secession. So is the indiscipline, certain to be found among raw recruits not yet adequately officered, which is complained of among the troops now at Tampa."

The folly of a government being forced into war when unprepared struck The Graphic. "The avowed object of the United States is to

7. Sketch, XXII, 302, May 25, 1898. Chamberlain’s speech had been delivered to the grand committee of the Birmingham Liberal Unionist Association on May 13. The speech itself and newspaper comments upon it will be considered under the discussion of the possibility of an Anglo-American alliance.

8. Speaker, XVII, 659, May 26, 1898.
liberate Cuba from Spanish rule, and they have so far only succeeded in
inflicting still greater misery upon its inhabitants. The American fleet
is not constituted in a manner to fit it to fight at great advantage
with Spain. It had no adequate force of cruisers — unless we suppose
that these it possesses have been employed with the extreme of inepti-
tude — to signal the approach of Admiral Cervera, or to observe his
movements. The result has been that the Spaniard was able to upset
completely the plans of his enemies."

The Sketch again discussed the lesson that the people of the United
States would learn as a consequence of having tone to war unprepared.
After mentioning the lack of discipline among the troops, it continued:
"But this delay and unreadiness will teach the people of the United
States a much needed lesson, which we may well pass on to ourselves —
namely, that a nation must be ready at all times, and that money and
men and all resources may exist in profusion and yet never have a
chance of getting to work at all. The great American Civil War has left
a legacy of warlike feeling, but apparently the lesson of Bull Run has
been forgotten — namely, that a raw army may be good for defence, but
is almost useless for attack." The Sketch then said that if the United
States had fallen into war with a naval power "something would have
happened before Manila, and it would have happened at New York."

This same idea gave the editor of The Outlook an opportunity to
indulge his certain sense of British naval superiority. "We wonder

10. Sketch, XXII, 289, June 6, 1898."
whether since the struggle with Spain began it has ever occurred to those Americans who screamed for war with this country over the Venezuela business what an exceedingly awkward position the United States would have been in had Great Britain actually been provoked into hostilities. In the present conflict, America, the Unready, has only had to meet Spain the Unready. But think where the Americans would have been had a Great Power been the foe!"

The Outlook also spoke disparagingly of the military or naval assistance that the United States would be able to furnish to Great Britain in case the two countries were to effect an alliance. "It is not a point which it is pleasant to dwell on; but it is worth making, perhaps, when there may be a disposition in the journals of the baser sort on "the other side" to suggest that because Englishmen are enthusiastic over the idea of an Anglo-American Understanding, and would be glad to have American co-operation in the Far East, they are a feeble folk, disposed to come cap in hand to the United States."

The Fall Hall Gazette, friendly and encouraging to the United States as almost always throughout this period, spoke of the war not living up to people's expectations of modern war, in that it had taken time for blows to be struck because neither side was ready. Lack of preparation and the delay consequent upon it, believed The Fall Hall Gazette, all told in America's favor. "Neither belligerent was anything like ready when the war began; but the delay tells solely for America.  

11. Outlook, I 612, June 16, 1898.  
12. Ibid., 612, June 1, 1898.
She is capable of making up arrearage and she has been doing it, while Spain is not and has not been; what is more, she can't and won't even now, and America is therefore able to make all quite certain before she hits."

In general, even before the fighting forces of either nation had had an opportunity of showing their erites, English opinion held Spain's ability in war in mean estate, and America's in high. An expression of opinion made before the war and not connected with it may be taken as, in large measure, typical of the attitude of English journalists towards Spain's ability. The Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, Audaz, had been cruising off the coast of England at full speed (reported as 25 knots) when her bow was struck and broken in "by a wave and wind." The ship had to put in to Waterford harbor in distress.

Black and White in reporting the affair said: "The ubiquitous reporter was told great stories of her prowess. 'This war vessel,' he says, 'is a splendid specimen of marine architecture, and possesses a power of movement equal to the very highest type of British naval torpedo-destroyers. Her crew is regarded, we understand, to be second to none, and, when she is refitted in her own country, promises to give a good account of herself in any waters.'" Then continued the editorial: "Spain's torpedo-destroyers are about the only good thing in her navy, but that they are equal to the very highest type of our vessels of the same class - well... 'There are two words about that.'"

14. Black and White, IV, 455, Apr. 9, 1898.
There were also comments on the inability of Spain to handle the modern machinery of warfare. The Spectator, after stating that the two navies were about even on paper, inasmuch as the Maine had turned the balance, went on to say: "But though on paper the two navies may be equally matched, we do not doubt that the sea-qualities of the Anglo-Saxon will make the American vessels, ship for ship, infinitely more formidable fighting engines than the Spanish. The Spaniards are a brave race, but unless they have suddenly changed they have little idea of handling and organising such complicated machines as modern ships of war."

After the President had signed the joint resolutions calling for intervention in Cuba, The Times called attention to the possible mismanagement on the part of the Spanish. "Nothing is known of the strategical plans of the Spanish Government. It is quite possible that the naval and military forces of Spain, considerable as they are, may be so mismanaged as to lead to an early and inevitable collapse."

Black and White also scorned Spain's ability in war. After stating that Spain was on the threshold of war and bankrupt - in money, credit, and in brains, that journal continued: "We need not dwell on Spanish military methods. It is enough that they have utterly, hopelessly failed before a ragged rout of under-fed, ill-armed, half-starved insurgents [in Cuba]. In the Philippine Islands, another of Spain's colonial possessions, an utterly feeble race have similarly defied their masters, and with equal success."

15. Spectator, LXX, 530, Apr. 16, 1898.
17. Black and White, XV, 582, Apr. 30, 1898.
The Saturday Review, critical and unsympathetic to America as it was, nevertheless, did not allow this bias to warp its judgment into believing that Spain's fighting forces were able. While it spoke favorably of the morale and mettle of the Spaniard as a soldier, it concluded that Spain would have to find a directing brain if she were to be successful, and that the outlook was not encouraging to the 18 Spaniards.

But not all editorial comments were to the effect that the war would be in the nature of a joyous celebration for America. The Times, on April 26, after stating that thinking in the United States already knew that the war was not going to be a "picnic", went on: "Of course it is possible that the Spaniards may blunder egregiously. They may do all the things they ought not to do, and deliver themselves into American hands. But it is not wise to reckon upon their dementia, and if they play their cards even fairly well the fight is likely to be one calling much more for calm determination and staying power than for excitement and enthusiasm."

The Speaker stated that the resources of America put the issue out of doubt, but then went on almost with prescience to say "but if the supplies of the garrison of Cuba prove to be greater than has been anticipated, a land campaign and heavy sacrifices are inevitable."

Dewey's guns at Manila on May 1 gave a conclusive answer to all this speculation. Spanish inefficiency was demonstrated no less con-

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20. Speaker, XVII, 531, Apr. 30, 1898.
clusively than American efficiency. While one passage has been cited showing that there was in England the belief that "Anglo-Saxons" would certainly prove superior on the sea, the outcome of this battle caused many more editors to express the same belief - that the sea had been an element on which Anglo-Saxons has always put forth their efforts to advantage. There was also a warmth of sentiment arising from the workmanlike way in which the Americans at Manila had carried out their assignment. In this, English editors saw an indication that American sailors took after their Anglo-Saxon ancestors, the Elizabethan sea-dogs who had crossed "the line" into Spanish possessions in the New World to beard the enemy, and who had demolished the naval power and prowess of Spain, the Armada. Americans became worthy sons of those Anglo-Saxon forebears. In many of the editorial comments made during the war, the connection was made closer between England and the United States by applying "Anglo-Saxon" to both countries.

On April 30 The Spectator recorded that the United States fleet had left Hong-Kong and that the Spanish fleet was at "Manilla." An engagement might be expected in a few days. It then stated that it was possible that the Spanish squadron would defeat the Americans, "but without pretending to the knowledge of experts, we look upon it as a

21. This spelling of Manila is indicative of the general and widespread ignorance of much of the geography and many of the place names that were forced into cognition by events in the war. Cf. President McKinley's statement to his friend N.H. Kohlsaat: "When we received the cable from Admiral Dewey telling of the taking of the Philippines, I looked up their location on the globe. I could not have told where those darned islands were within 2,000 miles!" (Kohlsaat, From McKinley to Harding, 68.)
law that when Anglo-Saxons open fire upon the water, their flag will be found flying after the engagement. We see great difficulties before the 22 Americans, but they will not come from the Spanish battleships."

Full accounts of Dewey's destruction of Admiral Montojo's fleet at Cavite were slow in reaching Europe. But on May 4 The Times could write: "There can be no doubt that the American squadron displayed high courage in forcing the entrance of a hostile and difficult harbour and in attacking the Spanish ships, which, though in every way less formidable, were protected by the guns of the forts, and so far as the 23 assailants were aware, by torpedo mines." The Guardian on the same day was not surprised at the outcome: "The Spaniards fought as Spaniards have always fought, but no amount of courage will make head against equal bravery displayed by a force greatly superior in arms and probably in naval skill."

The suddenness of the blow struck by Dewey impressed The Investors' Review. "A more sudden blow has never been delivered by one Power against another under such conditions, for the United States squadron had to fight the land fortifications and the Spanish ships at one and the same time and that it overcame both after a very brief conflict is proof of Spain's unpreparedness and decayed vitality almost as much as of American prowess."

The Spectator combined a glowing pride in this fulfillment of the mission of the Anglo-Saxon race with a Christian forgiveness of the

22. Spectator, LXX, 612, Apr. 30, 1898.
23. Times, May 4, 1898.
enemy and a paternal hope that he might profit from his chastisement. "We rejoice in the efficiency of the American representatives of our race, because we believe that, failing the Anglo-Saxon, the wronged of the world will find no defender; we exult in his skill, his preparedness, and his daring; but we cannot, nevertheless, feel for Spain, and hope that her people may yet commence a brighter and more humane career."

The Graphic stressed the lack of preparations on the part of the Spaniards, saying that Dewey might still be cruising the China Sea if the Spaniards had taken some preparations at Manila and sarcastically commented: "But preparations are for the calculating and upstart Anglo-Saxon. The Spaniard is still too mediaeval for them. Manana is still the measure of his foresight, and in these days of wires and wheels manana translates into ruin." It then passed a compliment on the Spaniard's fighting mettle: "But if the Spaniard disdains preparations he has not lost his fighting instinct, or his dogged spirit of 'no surrender.'"

More openly congratulatory to the Americans was The Outlook. After discussing the horrors of the battle it went on: "Putting the ghastly side of the business out of mind for the moment, we have nothing but congratulations for the Americans. On the facts at present available, Admiral Dewey and his officers performed a feat worthy of the old sea-dogs from whose stock their nation sprang. On

27. Graphic, LVII, 556, May 7, 1898.
getting the word to engage the enemy, they appear to have slipped
across from Mers Bay at such speed that their arrival at Manila came
as a surprise to the defenders. When one looks at a chart, and
remembers the strength of the tide and the favorable positions in
which the outlying batteries were placed, the dash past Corregidor
Islands [sic] in the dark, in contempt of possible torpedoes and mines,
is something that stirs the blood."

The Saturday Review, to whom the news of Manila Bay did not bring
the same responsive thrill, retreated, in Victorian dignity, into
condemnation of the United States which should have been ashamed of its
victory over so enfeebled an antagonist. Reminiscently recalling the
British agenies when the Venetian Republic was extinguished by
Napoleon, it quoted Wordsworth’s Ode:

"And what if she have seen those glories fade,
Those titles vanish and that strength decay,
Yet must tribute of regret be paid
When her long life has reached its latest day.
Men are we, and must grieve when even the shade
Of that which once was great is passed away."

Then, continuing in the same strain: "This feebleness of that
once great world-power, Spain, makes it the more difficult to
appreciate the self-glorification of victorious America. Spain is so
weak, so sunk from her high eminence, that pity of her fate is the
natural feeling; and we wonder that the Americans are not half
ashamed of making war on so helpless an antagonist. It is as though
we saw a grown man beating a child or a nonagenarian. At Manila the
Spanish ships were all wooden - there was not one protected cruiser -
and mostly about one-fifth of the size of their opponents. The big

28. Outlook, 1,417, May 7, 1898. Corregidor Island lies in the entrance to
Manila Bay. The Spaniards had cannon set up there, but Dewey
slipped past unmolested.
American protected cruisers, with their powerful modern armament, had, of course, no difficulty in turning and sinking the fragile Spanish cockle-shells. But America has no misgivings; she raises a deafening war-whoop of victory. It was President McKinley, not a yellow journalist, who, according to the 'Daily Telegraph,' thus commented upon the victory to a member of Congress: — 'The battle waged by noble Dewey was one of the greatest naval victories of modern times, and will go down to history with the achievements of Paul Jones, Farragut, Nelson, Perry, Dick Grenville, and other heroes whose names will never die.' This astounding juxtaposition of names, this strange overestimate of victory which, had the Americans had the feeble Spanish fleet and the Spaniards the strong American cruisers, would have been nothing remarkable for Spaniards to accomplish, is a characteristic example of the kind of thing which provokes, and will always provoke, the criticism of the 'Saturday Review.'

A more friendly, sympathetic, almost adulatory view towards America was taken by The Pall Mall Gazette which spoke of Spanish bravery, and then continued: "But, though the Americans were not so hard put to it, their heroism was as great as could be desired; shot and shell fell thickly enough among them, but they went right to the splendid and crushing end. Admiral Dewey, of course, has made his reputation. He ran past Corregidor almost as if it had not been there, he found the Spanish fleet just where and when he meant to, and

29. Saturday Review, LXXXV, 605, May 7, 1898.
anticipated any intended movement out to the stronger post at Subij, and he fought his battle with perfect coolness, thoroughness, and daring, changing the mines and forts. The Spanish fleet, of course, was hopelessly outclassed, but mines and forts on paper might have redressed that deficiency very largely. The Admiral seems to have risked them in a manner worthy of his master, Farragut. Perhaps he calculated upon the weakness and deficient preparations and faulty execution of the Spaniards; but, if so, he played the true naval game. It was by counting on the shortcomings of his enemies that Nelson made his greatest victories so complete."

The Yorkshire Herald inclined towards sympathy for the defeated rather than praise for the victor, and spoke about the wretched ships the Spaniards had used. "The hundreds of brave men who were killed in Manila Bay died with a courage honourable to themselves, but the honour of Spain was compromised by their death, for the weapons they fought with and the ships they manned were so useless as to afford them no protection."

The Times returned on May 9 to a discussion of the battle of Manila, and was enthusiastic over Dewey's exploit and his way of having carried it out. The Spanish fleet, it said, had trusted to the strong position of Manila and to fortifications which guarded the entrance to the bay. "Admiral Dewey, showing himself worthy alike of the great traditions of the navy of the United States and of his kinship with the race

30. Pall Mall Gazette, May 9, 1898. Commodore Dewey was created rear-admiral on May 7, 1898. (Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War, I, 213.)
that produced Nelson, courageously set at naught the menace of the permanent defences and the possibilities of torpedo mines. He may have had information more or less trustworthy, that the Spaniards had neglected their opportunities, or he may simply have acted on the well-founded belief that he might count upon this defect in the Spanish national character."

The next day The Times took occasion to contrast the Spanish and American sailors at Manila. It spoke of the courage of Spanish seamen being beyond question, "In the disastrous fight at Manila it rose to positive heroism, since they continued to fight while their ships were sinking, with guns incapable of reaching the enemy whose fire told so fatally upon their own antiquated vessels. But their most desperate valour is powerless against heavy odds of equipment, backed by courage not less high, and probably more tenacious than their own."

The Statist was shocked by "so complete, so sudden, and so dishonourable a collapse as has taken place. Nobody beforehand could have believed that absolutely nothing would be done to protect Manila, even when it was known that an American squadron was advancing to the attack."

32. Times, May 9, 1898.
33. Times, May 10, 1898.
34. Statist, XII, 799, May 14, 1898. Admiral Montojo, while in command of the Spanish fleet at Manila, did, as a matter of fact, know that an American fleet was approaching. See the proclamation advising Spaniards in the Philippine Islands that war had broken out and that an American squadron was preparing to come to the archipelago, in Chadwick, Hist. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War, I, 158-160, note 1. This proclamation, dated April 23, was read to the ships' companies of Commodore Dewey's squadron on April 27, the day that squadron left Hirs Bay, near Hong-Kong, for Manila. Actually, Admiral Montojo was without torpedoes to mine the harbor or the entrance to it. See Chadwick, Ibid., I, 157.
To-Day wrote of the battle in much the same way that it
characterized the Americans' conduct: "business-like." The Americans
seem to have been particularly quiet and business-like. They fought
for two hours, and, as by that time victory was certain, and they
were getting hungry, they retired and had breakfast and a rest. They
began again very little later than the usual office hour, and put in
some good work, handling their guns as coolly as at target practice.
Speaking quite seriously, the men who fight as the Americans did are
dangerous men. The chivalrous, slightly hysterical people, who take
solemn oaths, and talk about their blood, and the amount of it which
they are prepared to shed, are generally less dangerous."

But whatever the enthusiasm of other journals, whatever their
attitude of congratulation, The Saturday Review was still belittling
to America. "America herself by her excessive jubilation at the de-
feat which was inflicted by the well-equipped squadron of modern
cruisers under Admiral Dewey upon a few old wooden tubs at Cavite
that had no competent gunners on board, shows that considerable
nervousness as to actual results was hidden under all the bluff and
brag with which she entered on the war." It really praised the
Spaniards far more for their valor than it did the Americans for
winning the battle; witness: "The lamentable incompetence of Spain's
preparations in the Philippines must not blind us to the splendid
courage of the officers and men on the feeble little Spanish fleet.
They never had the slightest chance; but the advance of the wooden
'Reina Christina' against the vastly superior protected cruisers of
America was magnificent, if it was not war; and the sinking of the
'San Antonio de Ulloa' with colours nailed to the mast and guns
firing to the very end, was worthy of the best traditions of Spanish
chivalry. The American commander displayed a thorough knowledge of
his opponents when he disregarded the possibility of mines or the
ill-directed shots of the batteries and ran into Manila harbour; but
he cautiously took up his position at a distance practically out of
range of the guns of the Spanish ships and with his superior ordnance
riddled their wooden sides with absolute impunity. The gunnery of the
Americans seems to have been excellent, but the demands on their
35 courage were certainly of the smallest kind."

Some of the same things that The Saturday Review had discussed
were mentioned by The Guardian, but with what a difference of attitude
towards the two combatants! After stating that the full details of the
battle were available, it went on: "The additional information they
impart only tends to increase our respect for the combatants. The bold
strategy of Admiral Dewey and the desperate gallantry of the Spaniards
both claim our admiration. The fight was by no means a walk over for
the one or a tame surrender for the other. Admiral Dewey had to enter
an unknown harbour which he had every reason to believe was mined with
torpedoes and protected by forts; but he took his chance, steamed
36. Saturday Review, LXXV, 645, May 14, 1898."
boldly in, and was successful. The Spaniards, on the other hand, knew very well that the home government had left them nothing but old ships with obsolete armament and insufficient ammunition; but they nailed their colours to the mast, and every ship went to the bottom fighting to the last."

On May 28 The Saturday Review stated that the New York Sun was indignant at the statement in The Saturday Review that the Spanish ships at Manila were all wooden. The Saturday Review admitted that that statement had been copied from a Spanish newspaper, and that the truth was that "a number of them were of wood with a slight amount of protection." The Saturday Review then went on to characterize as very American the attitude of the Sun, which had added together the tonnage of the different vessels. "It is, of course," continued The Saturday Review, "notorious that the Spaniards were under-manned, under-armed and totally unprepared; but the Americans, anxious to get some credit for the 'great victory,' do not take heed of a little dishonesty in order to justify their brag."

The Saturday Review concluded its argument by still "proving" itself correct. "The fact was that the 'Olympia' and 'Baltimore' alone were more than a match for the whole of the Spanish vessels at Cavite, and even without these two ships, the rest of the American ships were stronger than the Spaniards. It is a 'braggart America' indeed that boasts of such a victory."

36. Saturday Review, LXXV, 701, May 28, 1898. The Olympia was Commodore Dewey's flagship, 5,870 tons, and the Baltimore, the next largest ship in his fleet, 4,413 tons. (Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span. Amer. War, I, 169.) On April 30, 1898 The Saturday Review had published a leading article entitled "The American Braggart," LXXV, 585-586.
On this occasion, The Saturday Review did not stand alone in depredating America's conduct, but her ally, The Review of Reviews was somewhat more gentle and less contumacious. "The American people, long unaccustomed to the intoxication of naval victories, went wild with ecstatic rapture over the exploit of Dewey. The firstictory in war has the same effect on the head of a pacific people as a bumper of champagne upon the brain of a teetotaler. The fact that the destruction of the Spanish ships, however necessary an act, was more like the execution of a criminal than a serious combat between two navies, was ignored; nor did the subsequent intelligence that the Americans had not lost a single man in the contest in the least abate the popular delight."

The Economist, speaking of the possibility that the Spanish government might be punished for failing in the war, discussed the situation at Manila on the occasion of the battle. "In Manila nothing was ready, the artillery fire was quite ineffective, not one American being killed, and none of the mines blew up till the American engineers exploded them."

Much later, in August, The Sketch issued one of the last comments on the Battle of Manila itself. Mr. Cunningham-Graham, it

39. Review of Reviews, XVII, 530, June 1, 1898.
40. Economist, LVI, 723, May 14, 1898. The Fall Wall Gazette on the same day spoke of the same administrative inefficiency and included in its discussion a novel method of retribution for members of the Spanish government: "The members of the Spanish Cabinet ought to have been on board the Spanish ships. Nothing would have been more fitting than that they should have shared the fate that their wretched incompetency and criminal neglect have brought upon some hundreds of their gallant countrymen. (Fall Wall Gazette, May 14, 1898.)
seems, had stated that the Americans at Manila had destroyed the Spanish fleet with ease because the gunners were Englishmen who had been "decoyed" from Her Majesty's service. The Sketch demolished this statement with no less deadly accuracy than that of the American artillery. "It turns out that there are just eight British seamen in Admiral Dewey's squadron, and not one of them is a gunner. The fact is that the Americans are remarkably expert in gunnery, but it is a fact unknown to Mr. Cunningham-Graham. He might have reflected that the accurate shooting of Admiral Dewey's men did not account on his hypothesis for the accurate shooting which destroyed Admiral Cervera's ships. But, then, Mr. Cunningham-Graham does not reflect. He happens to feel Spanish, and he writes the first silly thing that comes into his head."

From this consideration of the treatment given the Battle of Manila by English editorial writers it may be seen that in general they exulted at the outcome of the battle. Because, as has been seen, their sympathies were with the United States as against Spain, they were glad that the Americans had won this initial and signal victory. With most of the editors the fact that the Spanish fleet was heavily outclassed did not weigh heavily. More important to their minds was the fact that the United States had won a naval victory and in so doing had destroyed a Spanish squadron. There was much favorable discussion of American efficiency and workmanlike methods of attack, and the excellent gunnery; adversely there were expressions of condemnation for Spain's inefficiency and lack of preparations, especially

41. Sketch, XXIII, 60, Aug. 3, 1898. Robert Bontine Cunningham-Graham (1852-1936) wrote among other titles A Vanished Arcadia (1901), Hernando de Soto (1903), and a Life of Bernal Díaz del Castillo (1915).
incompetence of the Spanish commander in the Philippine Islands, who had known that an American fleet was advancing to attack Manila. Also the British journals were struck by the negligence of the Spaniards in having allowed the American fleet to pass through the relatively narrow entrance to Manila Bay without bombarding it with the guns mounted on Corregidor Island. It would seem that English editors came to believe that any nation so inefficient and inept deserved its fate.

But over and above the satisfaction consequent upon an American victory, other aspects of that victory pleased English editors, for the victors at Manila, who had done their job so splendidly, were Anglo-Saxon, were descended from men who time and time again had worsted Spain on the sea. English editors were pleased to note that the American "half" of the "Anglo-Saxon" race was carrying on the traditions of the older half, was belaboring the Spanish according to the accepted formulae of the Elizabethan sea-dogs and of Nelson. The fact that this "kinship" was making itself evident in actions pleased several English editors. The discussion of the possibility of an Anglo-American alliance, which had been going on in some quarters previous to the battle, was given impetus by this sense of kinship, for after all, the "Anglo-Saxon," whether English or American, was the heir of a common glorious historical background. The American had shown this in battle by doing as their forebears had done against a historic, traditional enemy.

Not all comments, however, were exulting, or laudatory of Americans. The Saturday Review, in conformity with its attitude
critical of the United States at this period, and The Review of Reviews gave no medium of praise to the United States for its feat. In those journals there was no talk of the Anglo-Saxon race being one in two parts, no discussion of kinship, no meeting of alliance. The United States had whipped a much weaker opponent, and did sadly to rejoice. The editors of those journals did not rejoice either.

The next incident of importance that attracted any great attention in British editorial columns was Admiral Cervera's voyage across the Atlantic and final "holeing in" in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. The Spanish squadron left the Cape Verde Islands on April 29. The larger ships towed the torpedo-boat destroyers, and trouble was experienced with broken tow lines. By May 10 an average of but 6 1/2 knots an hour had been covered, "a slowness which," Chadwick states, 42 "it was impossible for the American authorities to anticipate." The Furer and Terror were despatched to Martinique, but were refused 43 provisions by the governor. The captain of the Furer informed Admiral Cervera that Admiral Sampson and his squadron were in the neighborhood of Puerto Rico. Then, after a council of war, the Spanish admiral decided not to follow his orders to go there, but to go to Curaçao for coal. The cruiser they had been advised would be awaiting them was not there, and less than 1000 tons of coal were available. From there the Spanish fleet went to Santiago de Cuba, into

42. Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War, I, 250. It is from this work that the account here given has largely been taken. 43. Ibid., Span.-Amer. War, I, 250. 44. Ibid., Span.-Amer. War, I, 255.
which harbor they slipped on the morning of May 19.

Partly because of the area of which Cervera might avail himself and partly because of the slowness of his ill-found squadron, he was not discovered until after he had entered Santiago. Meanwhile there had been something akin to panic on the Atlantic coast of the United States for fear he would appear there and bombard the cities.

Unlike the expressions of opinion about the Battle of Manila, the comments on Cervera's crossing the Atlantic had no general theme or tone. They ranged from comments about people on the American seaboard being panic-stricken, to the belief that Cervera seemed to be a good strategist.

Black and White opined anent Cervera: "And her [Spain's] faulty naval tactics are happily hastening the end. The fate of Spain's fleet which is now steaming, or supposed to be steaming, to Porto Rico is sealed in advance, both by the ridiculous procrastination of those responsible for its movements and by the futile manner in which the country's forces have been divided."

Despite the fact that, as has been said, Admiral Cervera sailed from the Cape Verde Islands on April 29, as late as May 11, so little was there known of his movements, that The Daily Graphic was able to state that his fleet had returned to Cadiz from the Cape Verde Islands. The Daily Graphic then went on: "The apparent

45. Black and White, XV, 616, May 7, 1898. The reference to the division of the Spanish forces is to Rear-Admiral Canara's having been ordered to remain in Spain.

46. Daily Graphic, May 11, 1898. Actually, on May 11, Cervera was almost as far west as the island of Martinique. (See Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War, I, 231.)
reluctance of the Spaniards to come to close quarters in the Atlantic is calculated to prolong the present ineffective sparring for a very long period."

Three days later Black and White, which had previously stated that the Spanish fleet was steaming or was supposed to be steaming to Porto Rico, reported the security of the Spanish fleet in Spanish waters, and went on to say that "there is reason to hope the Spanish Armada may rise comfortably within its own ports, and so pass to the limbo of things forgotten with dignity and with safety. For twelve whole days the Spanish admiral has been lost to view...But if ever discretion was the better part of valour it is to-day so far as Spain is concerned. Protracted fighting is madness, and must only entail useless loss and suffering on the weaker nation."

On May 20, before news had reached England that Cervera had arrived at Santiago de Cuba, The Westminster Budget, writing apropos of Cervera's having gotten his fleet to the Caribbean Sea without the United States authorities having known it, spoke in congratulatory manner of Cervera: "Admiral Cervera seems to shape well as a strategist, and the United States are considerably fluttered by the workmanlike way in which he has recoiled at Martinique...."

Gloominess over Cervera's prospects, however, characterized the comments in The Times. If he were to be of service, it said, right then was his time, while the enemy was leaving Havana to close

48. Black and White, XV, 643, May 14, 1898. It seems possible, however, that Black and White was here discussing the fleet under Rear-Admiral Cameron's command, which had been kept in Spain.
49. Westminster Budget, XI, 5, May 20, 1898. As has been pointed out above the governor of Martinique had refused coal to Cervera's fleet.
around Santiago. But: "There is, indeed, from a Spanish point of view, but too much reason to fear that the national failings are exhibiting themselves in want of organisation and combined action - a state of affairs which may easily place Cervera in the same straits in which Admiral Montojo so recently found himself and with similar disastrous results."

The Spectator now looked for a naval battle. "The danger of entering the harbour may be too great, but if the feat is possible the American captains, unhampered as they are by orders, and inflamed by the popular appreciation of Admiral Dewey's exploit, are just the 51 men to run a considerable risk."

The Graphic mentioned the chagrin felt by some Americans that Cervera had been allowed to slip into Santiago de Cuba unobserved and unhindered, and then went on to belittle American efforts in the war. "It is undoubted that the American operations had been conducted with little wisdom, whether the fault lay with the Board of Strategy in Washington or was attributable to the commanders on the spot." In the same article it said about Cervera that his position in Santiago would seem to be weaker than when he was large in the Caribbean. And if he escaped he could hardly fail soon to be crippled for want of coal. He might have been counting on the arrival of Admiral Cámara's fleet, but it seemed quite probable that

50. Times, May 26, 1898.
51. Spectator, LXX., 745, May 28, 1898.
he would be shut up in Santiago or brought into action.

The Speaker, in reporting the mystery of Cervera's whereabouts until he appeared at Martinique, told of the partial panic which had spread along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. After having told of manifestations of the panic it said "and from all quarters came news of the appearance of strange craft in unaccountable places, until the Atlantic seemed to be all-pervaded by the countless ships of a modern Spanish Armada. Sensationalism held unchecked sway, and for a time all sense of reason, of distance, or of proportion appeared to be lost." But then The Speaker, instead of criticizing the American authorities, pointed out aspects of the incident that tended to exculpate them. "Amateur critics drew attention to the profound strategy of the Spanish Commander....Faulty scrutiny on the part of the United States fleet was said to be the cause of this great Spanish success, although a moderately scientific use of the imagination would have suggested the difficulty of effectively observing a semicircular area of sea 500 miles in radius." In the same article The Speaker analyzed Santiago as a refuge for Cervera's fleet, and found Cervera wanting.

52. Graphic, LVII, 662, May 28, 1898. In its criticism of America's conduct of the war, The Graphic continued from the sentence quoted above: 'The blockade of Cuba was certainly a legitimate and normal operation, but the various bombardments of Matanzas, and of Cardenas, Cienfuegos, and San Juan de Porto Rico, and such attempts of the Cussie to land arms for the insurgents, were foredoomed to be ineffectual. They were taxed energy and wasted resources, and yet will not affect in the smallest degree the result of the war.' Ibid., 662.

53. Speaker, XVII, 693, June 4, 1898.
for having chosen that particular harbor. "There is probably little available coal, and there are certainly few naval resources.... On the other hand, the entrance is extremely cramped, requiring careful navigation, and entailing upon an issuing force slow movement in a single column line ahead. On the whole, Santiago Harbour is just the position which a superior fleet would wish its antagonist to enter." The Speaker then deprecated the capacity shown by either side in West Indian waters. "A small Spanish force, probably ill-found and short of coal, has succeeded in monopolising the energies of a vastly superior fleet. If the former is in Santiago Harbour, it will be lost when the Americans land troops and take the place, following the procedure always necessary in such cases."

The Graphic criticized American aptitude. "The American fleet is not constituted in a manner to fit it to fight at great advantage with Spain. It had no adequate force of cruisers - unless we suppose that those it possesses have been employed with the extreme of ineptitude - to signal the approach of Admiral Cervera, or to observe his movements. The result has been that the Spaniard was able to upset completely the plans of his enemies."

54. Speaker, XVII, 693, June 4, 1898.
55. Ibid., 694, June 4, 1898.
56. Graphic, LVII, 722, June 4, 1898. Apparently The Graphic was not in possession of the facts when it stated later in the same article that one of the two factors that contributed to Cervera's success was "speed"; the other factor was that he had clouded his movements from the Americans.
The *Saturday Review* did not comment on Cervera's crossing the Atlantic, but indirectly congratulated him for his "dodging" and arriving there, and in like manner cast obloquy upon the Americans for having allowed him to "dodge" so well. "We are promised another great battle very shortly, but Admiral Cervera seems to be such an adept at dodging that we shall not be surprised if Commodore Schley finds that he is not in Santiago Harbour at all."

*The Sketch*, along with *The Speaker*, also deprecated the ability that had been shown by the fighting forces of each combatant. "The disappearance of the Spanish squadron and its perfect success in eluding its superior enemy would seem to point to naval surprises in the next war; but, then, Admiral Sampson is not, perhaps a fair sample of the commanders a great Naval Power could set over its fleets, for, without doubt, he has followed his namesake in being more noted for strength than for sight, and a few of Mr. Kipling's destroyers might conceivably throw his incongruous assemblage of marine monsters into a hopeless flurry." *The Sketch* then went on to speak of the need for the destroyers being manned by men of such calibre as former British commanders, Nelson or Cochrane. "They don't make Nelsons in Spain. What a chance to waylay the big Oregon on her long voyage; and what a chance to intercept the Spanish squadron before it reached a friendly port—and both chances missed!"

57. *Saturday Review*, LXXXV, 734, June 4, 1898.
The Sketch belittled the ability of the Spaniards in handling boats and machinery when compared to the Americans. "They have not either the lawless daring or the mechanical interest of the sailor of Anglo-Saxon blood. And so it is not unlikely that Admiral Cervera, skillfully as he has got into his harbour, will find it hard to emerge, and perhaps meet the fate of Ting (if that was his name) at Port Arthur, cut off by land and blocked in by sea."

Because it was not decisive, Cervera's crossing of the Atlantic stirred comment than the Battle of Manila. What comment there was was much less grouped on two sides. Because there was more room to speculate on Cervera's crossing, that is what English editors did. But while some believed that Cervera had proved himself a good strategist in steaming across the Atlantic undiscovered and in secreting himself in Santiago harbor, nobody went so far as to say that they believed he could emerge and defeat the American fleet. He had been successful in one assignment, but the belief was, apparently, that this was the last time he would be successful.

With the outbreak of hostilities the American ships in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea captured some Spanish merchant vessels, but shortly their work settled down into the routine of keeping a blockade on Cuba, with occasional bombardment of towns. There were scattered criticisms of America's use of a blockade, based on the consequent suffering inflicted on the Cuban non-combatant population. This drew the fire of The Saturday Review, which

59. Sketch, XXII, 289, June 8, 1898.
accused the United States of now inflicting suffering upon the very
ones for whose sake America had protested it entered the war. These
tactics, it asserted, were not creditable to American manhood; why
not attack and have Americans themselves suffer and pay the cost,
rather than throw the burden on the starving "pacifists," both men
and women.

One episode in the monotony of holding blockade enlivened life
for both the Americans and the blockaded Spaniards. On the night of
June 3 Naval Constructor Hobson and five other men took a U.S.S.
collier, the Merrimac, into the narrowest part of the entrance in an
endeavor to sink it athwart the passage. The Merrimac was sunk (in a
position later found not to block the channel) amid the fire of the
shore batteries of the Spaniards and a brisk rifle fire. After the
six men had left the Merrimac Admiral Cervera came down the harbor
in a steam launch and made them prisoners.

Comment by British editors on this exploit was uniformly
commentary. After stating that there was a need for "six" men to
assist Hobson, The Spectator went on: "Instantly every officer on
the 'New York' and hundreds of men offered themselves, and so great
was the eagerness, that when the 'Merrimac' was searched, stowaways
were discovered who had to be removed by force. Men who have risen to
that temper do not fail.... The incident is sufficient of itself to
indicate the certain result of the war. You cannot beat a nation

60. Saturday Review, LXXXV, 606, May 7, 1898; also see Ibid., 649, May 14,
1898. Also see Westminster Budget, XI, 5, May 20, 1898.
61. Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer War, 1, 344.
whose officers and men are equally ready to perish in forlorn hopes if only they can advance the national object."

Another view of the matter was taken by The Speaker, which stressed possible causes and consequences of the feat rather than the bravery of the men engaged in it. "The feat may have been intended as a sedative to American popular impatience....But its chief value... lies in its effect on Spanish opinion. Both at Santiago, and to all appearances at Manila, resistance is hopeless, and Spain must soon be led to see it. Spanish statesmen of all parties, however, are still obstinately blind."

The contrast between the disgraceful conduct of the press of the United States and the conduct of both of the principal actors in the feat impressed The Outlook. "The one bright spot in the picture is the splendid gallantry displayed by Lieutenant Hobson and his comrades in the Merrimac affair, and the chivalrous courtesy, as of a soldier of Old Spain, displayed by Admiral Cervera."

Even The Saturday Review, loathe as it was to say a decent word for the Americans, and consistent as it had been in condemning them, was moved by Hobson's heroism to admit that: "No doubt the Americans, in their turn, are capable of consummate bravery," and to admit that his was a notable act of daring in a service which, all the world over, has been conspicuous for its acts of splendid courage. This American

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62. Spectator, LXXX, 809, June 11, 1898.
63. Speaker, XVII, 718, June 11, 1898.
64. Outlook, I, 577, June 11, 1898.
Lieutenant and his crew of seven [1] sailor-men are worthy of our sincerest admiration, and they ought to receive all the honour their country can bestow." But The Saturday Review could not, however, bring itself to praising the Americans alone, and continued: "The Spaniards, no less than their own countrymen, were quick to appreciate the courage of the gallant band....Brave himself, Admiral Cervera honoured bravery in his enemies; courteous himself, Admiral Sampson appreciated this fine courtesy of his foe."

In the lack of trained men and of preparations the Americans had to wait until June 14 before they could dispatch from Tampa a military force with General Shafter in command to act against the city of Santiago. The objective of this expeditionary force was, obviously, the capture of Santiago and thus either taking Cervera's fleet or driving him out of the harbor to face Admiral Sampson's guns.

Meanwhile editors in England had been commenting on America's chances of success, on her unpreparedness, and on her slowness in being able to launch a land campaign in Cuba. On May 14 The Spectator, in a long discussion devoted to the war, forecast the course of the campaign as it would be conducted in Cuba. Cuba would be "rushed" by an army of sixty thousand men. "Of these, it is true only ten or fifteen thousand will be regular troops; but have the Spanish Generals any satisfactory evidence that their own compulsorily raised recruits are better soldiers than the American volunteers? It may be seriously doubted. Genius, of course, and military genius more especially, is of 65. Saturday Review, LXXV, 765, June 11, 1898.
no country, and the Spaniards in Cuba may throw up a Napoleon; but apart
from that contingency, the picked young men of the States, chosen by
voluntary selection, should be better soldiers than the conscripted lads
of Spain, who in thousands of cases were shipped with the smallest
tincture of military training. They are no more veteran troops than the
Americans. As for fever, of which the prophets make so much, the
volunteers are half of them from the swampy riverain territories of the
South, and why should they dread the miasma of Cuba any more than their
own? The Spaniards, as far as we can form an opinion, will die in heaps,
as bravely as the crew of the "San Juan de Ulloa" died — that is, as
bravely as any men have ever died anywhere — but will be defeated.
American artillery is no better than Spanish, but it is never
misdirected."

66. One of the Spanish vessels sunk by Dewey at Manila.
67. Spectator, LXX, 681, May 14, 1898. It was just before this time that
Runch published a poem satirizing patriotic excesses in the United
States; it was entitled "The Patriot U.S.A.", and was introduced by
the statement taken from The Daily Mail that farmers in Westchester
County, New York, had been killing their Spanish fowl: "Colonel
Green, of the Fortchester Infantry, says he has killed six Spanish
roosters which he owned, and that his neighbours are following his
example."

"Here's three times three for Colonel Green
And Westchester farmers all!
The bravest patriots ever seen
To answer duty's call!
They might not meet the Spanish fleet
On the high seas check by jowl,
So with bowie and knife they began their strife
And slaughtered the Spanish fowl!

They avenged the Maine on the farmyard don
Who dared in their ears to crow,
And his wives and chicks were set upon
With many a deadly blow!
E'en the hapless egg could no quarter beg
As it crunched 'neath the stalwart heel,
And the chick unborn must have known the scorn
That all honest patriots feel!" (Cont'd on p.154)
The Saturday Review recorded on May 14 that the invasion of Cuba had been postponed once more. "The attack is now reported to be made on Puerto Rico, where there are few soldiers and miserably weak defences. There is a great deal of caution in American courage, one cannot help thinking. They like their adversaries to be inferior to them in numbers as well as equipment. General Shafter boasts that he could easily take Havana with six thousand men. We should like to see him try that easy task; but...he seems to be more anxious to supply a subject of copy to the Yankee press than a target to Mauser rifles in the hands of the 68 half-starved but indomitable Spanish infantry."

Two weeks later, however, The Spectator took up the cudgel for the Americans, tending to exculpate them for their slowness. "The difficulties encountered at Tampa in the way of organization are very great, and in some quarters the army in Florida is described as a disorganized mass of rather rowdy loafers; but precisely the same things...would be true of any large camp of men, whatever their nationality."

67. (Cont’d. from p.153)

"Here’s three times three for Colonel Green
And that rooster-slaying band,
Who showed the foe what men may mean
When threatened their native land!
And the Eagle’s cry well nigh bust the sky
As he soared o’er the foreign crew,
And in proud Madrid men their faces hid
When they learned what Revenge could do!"

The poem was accompanied by a cartoon showing a farmer in a barnyard looking at a rooster and some hens at his feet. The cartoon is entitled: "Owner of Spanish Poultry. 'Guess I’ll kill those Fowls, anyway!'" (Punch, CXXIV, 214, May 7, 1898.)

68. Saturday Review, LXXV, 645, May 14, 1898.
The Americans will very speedily surmount all these obstacles. They have no scruple whatever in enforcing discipline; they must have among them many thousands of volunteers, whether native or German born, who at least know what ought to be done; and once in the face of an enemy the raw regiments will make up by devotion for the want of skill and experience." Then speaking of the battle which would ensue: "we find it difficult to believe that a few months' drill can have turned half-fed Spanish conscripts into the fighting superiors of hardy American 69 volunteers, generally older men by at least five years."

Not lack of preparations nor caution impressed The Standard, but rather the gravity of war. "As the war goes on, both parties must begin to realize that it is likely to involve sacrifices and difficulties greater than at first appeared. The Americans, who welcomed the beginning of the campaign with a light heart, are discovering that war, even with a relatively weak opponent like Spain is a serious business....Instead of a short, rapid, exciting campaign, diversified with brilliant victories in quick succession, followed by the speedy surrender of the foe and a glorious peace, there seems a prospect of a long series of indecisive, tiresome, and expensive operations, in which there is little glory to be won, and continual sacrifices to be incurred. But the Americans are at least buoyed up by the hope that in the end they must win. "Santim, they will obtain some compensation for their costly labours. The Spaniards have no such 70 consolation."

69. Spectator, LXX, 749, May 28, 1898.
70. Standard, June 2, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 676, June 3, 1898.
Somewhat in the same tone was an expression of opinion by The Speaker. It feared for the loss before Santiago of American lives from the unhealthfulness of the season. "A landing near Matanzas or Havana, following an effective blockade of the Cuban ports, would have seemed more consonant with the original scheme and better calculated to bring the war to a speedy end. It may be, of course, that early in the war the American strategists fell into the mistake of underrated the Spanish capacity for resistance. They were clearly mistaken as to the numbers and ability of the Spanish insurgents, and as to the resources of Havana."

Of the intention to fight around Santiago, The Speaker, after stating that it would be largely bush-fighting, in which the Americans would be less unevenly matched than in the open field, continued: "The one thing certain about the Spaniards is that, whether with cannon or rifle, they are amazingly bad and wasteful marksmen. The end, at most, can only be an affair of two or three months - at least in Cuba."

71 Speaker, XVII, 721, June 11, 1898. The discovery by the American forces that the Cuban insurgents were of very little help in a military way, and the American revulsion of feeling towards the insurgents was much discussed in English journals. Concerning the resources of Havana, Chadwick states that it is not to be doubted that Admiral Sampson would have renewed his proposals to shell the city (after they had been once negatived) from the vicinity of Chorerra had not the Navy Department decided that the naval forces should wait for the expected arrival of Cervera. (Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War., I, 88.)

72 Speaker, XVII, 721, June 11, 1898.
On June 17 The Times stated that America's work of dispatching from 15,000 to 20,000 men from Tampa "is not an easy task in the absence of previous organization." But on the other hand, it stated, the dispatch of such a force did not compare "with the immense bodies of troops sent by Spain to Cuba."

On the same day in recording that marines had been landed at Guantanamo, The Times opined that it was not clear what advantage was to be gained by such a move.

The Speaker commented in the same strain about this landing of marines. "It is not obvious to the civilian mind why Guantanamo should be attacked at all, or that the Americans will be greatly bettered when it is taken; still less why six hundred marines should have been put ashore to face continual guerilla attacks before the arrival of an adequate supporting force. Presumably the hope is that a success of any sort will be another reason for Spain to accept the inevitable, and that as Havana is immensely stronger than was expected, success must be obtained elsewhere on cheaper terms."

73. Times, June 17, 1898. The Saturday Review suggested that in the interests of his country, General Greely, the head of the American censorship, be removed from his office for having given out information that the 27,000 Americans had sailed from Tampa to land in the neighborhood of Santiago de Cuba. (Saturday Review, LXXXV, 765, June 11, 1898.) The men did not actually sail until June 14, although there had been a false start, called off because of reports of a Spanish squadron in the Bahama Channel, on June 8. (Chadwick, Rel. of U. S. and Spain, Spain.-Amer. War, II, 18-19.)

74. Times, June 17, 1898.
75. Speaker, XVII, 749, June 18, 1898.
The Spectator at this same time was solemnly, soberly pessimistic about Spain's chances. After discussing President McKinley, his inexperience, and his desire to save American lives, and also the lack of experience in the United States in raising and supplying an army, it went on to say: "All this tells in favour of Spain, and yet we all know that nothing will come of these advantages. They were quite as great when General Weyler landed in Cuba, and yet the insurrection was not suppressed. The Spaniards will fight and will die, but they will make some blunder, or be short of some munition, or expect some impossible interference, or they will be betrayed by their own subjects, or they will be abandoned by their own Government, and all their courage and their efforts will be spent in vain. The Parliament of Madrid, instead of providing for the war, will discuss its causes; the Admiralty, instead of strengthening its Fleet, will conceal all facts as to its condition; the Government, instead of arming Spain, will prepare elaborate proofs that the Americans have broken some international rule about which nobody cares, and which until they care has no operative 'sanction.'... Everybody asks who cut the dyke, the Queen-Regent, Cánovas, Sagasta, Marshal Campos, or General Weyler? But nobody carries so much as a stone to fill up the gaping fissure. Spain wants a hydraulic engineer, and has got gentlemen who talk about the harm that rats can do, and have done, to dyke systems. If she does not bestir herself, the sea will be on her in flood."

76. Spectator, LXX, 850, June 18, 1898.
The American attack on the posts flanking Santiago began on July 1. These posts were San Juan Hill, Kettle Hill, and El Caney. And it was in the struggles before Santiago that the American forces, and the world, were shown the first example during this war of the Spaniard as a formidable foe.

The Saturday Review stated that Santiago had been rapidly invested by the American forces, and then expressed a measure of confidence in the Spanish defenders. "The authorities in Santiago have had ample warning, and if the Spanish soldier puts his back to the wall and fights a good fight the capture of the city and the ships will not prove a simple matter. So far, it is not the common sailors or soldiers who have failed; all the disasters that have overtaken the Spaniards have had their origin in the official corruption that has been sapping the strength of Spain through long years." That the Spaniard was showing rather more ability in defending Santiago than on any previous occasion during the war was commented upon. The Speaker wrote: "The operations at Santiago de Cuba have not as yet led to much, though a great battle is imminent; but they have given the American troops - especially Roosevelt's Rough Riders - and the war office some severe lessons on the conditions of actual warfare."

The opinion that the American attack was not a pleasant junket was expressed by To-Day. "The advance on Santiago, though the skirmish ended in victory for the Americans, should do something to dispel the carelessness which arises from over-

77. Saturday Review, LXXVI, July 2, 1898.
78. Speaker, XVIII, July 2, 1898.
confidence and from previous successes. The country provided plenty
of cover, and it was unwise to march through it without scouts, and
with noise going on in the ranks."

Ironically, enough, there was published in Punch on July 2, the
very day before Admiral Cervera's squadron was destroyed by Admiral
Sampson, a satire in doggerel on American inactivity.

79. To-Day, XIX, 271, July 2, 1898.
80. "A Song of Inaction."
(After one of Dr. A. Conan Doyle's "Songs of Action."

"There was a sanguinary war out West -
(Wake 'em up, shake 'em up, try 'em on the transports)
There was a sanguinary war out West,
And the cocktail-bars were going their best;
   Ho, the jolly fighting braves
Playing poker by the waves,
All beside the Cuban Sea!

The leaguer it loll'd by Tampa Bay -
(Prog 'em up, jog 'em up, put 'em on the war-path)
The leaguer it loll'd by Tampa Bay
Nipping by night and napping by day;
   Ho, the gunners so slack
   They can barely lunch a black,
All beside the Cuban Sea!

The regulars danced to the military band -
(Screw her round, sluie her round, every stitch a-straining)
The regulars danced to the military band,
Steel on the heel and kid on the hand;
   Ho, the men of warlike arts
Working havoc with the hearts,
All beside the Cuban Sea!

The Tailoring Boss sat tight at home -
(Rake 'em up, fake 'em up, worry on the war-paint)
The Tailoring Boss sat tight at home -
And Sampson he sat tight on the foam;
   Ho, the gallant volunteers
With their tunics in arrears,
All beside the Cuban Sea!  

(Cont'd on p. 161)
San Juan Hill, El Caney, and Kettle Hill were in possession of the Americans by nightfall on July 1, albeit they had suffered heavy losses. These positions commanded the northern and eastern sides of the city of Santiago. That night Admiral Cervera telegraphed to Governor-General Blanco at Havana asking for instructions, and stating that he and his captains believed a sortie of his squadron from the harbor would appear as flight and that therefore it was repugnant to them. In telegrams of that night and the next day Blanco issued and reiterated orders for Cervera to take his

80. (Cont'd. from p. 160.)

"General Miles he has come on tour -
(March 'em out, march 'em out, put 'em through their facings)
General Miles he has come on tour,
And General Miles he is slow and sure;
Ho, the marshal man of blood,
    See him chew the careful cud
All beside the Cuban Sea!

There are sad salt tears on the best girls' cheeks -
(Row 'em out, tow 'em out, stuff 'em in the steerage)
There are sad salt tears on the best girls' cheeks,
For the heroes have sailed after eight short weeks;
Ho, the shouting throats are thick
    For the warriors will be sick,
Sick upon the Cuban Sea!

They have gallantly weathered the glassy main -
(Row 'em in, tow 'em in, beach 'em through the breakers)
They have gallantly weathered the glassy main;
And they're safe on terra cotta again;
And before the year is through
We may hear of something new

Somewhere by the Cuban Sea!"  (Punch, CXIV, July 2, 1898.)

81. Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War, II, 122.
squadron out of the harbor. Due to difficulties in embarking the
crews Cervera was not ready to steam out until July 3.

On Sunday morning, July 3, Admiral Cervera in the Maria Teresa
led his squadron out of Santiago. The narrowness of the channel
necessitated that the Spanish ships should issue in single file and
at slow speed. The Spanish ships then turned west and ran along the
shore. But the blockading squadron immediately gave battle and
chased them. By two o'clock the entire Spanish fleet had been either
sunk or beached. This loss practically put an end to Spain's naval
power, for she had left now only the fleet in Spanish waters under
Admiral Camara.

The naval battle of Santiago elicited a veritable stream of
comment. Almost every expression of English opinion was favorable
to the Americans. In fact, even The Saturday Review was forced by
this event to admit some good in the Americans.

The Standard commented succinctly upon the effectiveness of
"nerve" in war. "Nothing tends to make less extreme the folly which
committed the last hope of Spain to such a position. The case
illustrates the wonderful good luck which in war waits upon
audacity. The very boldness of the American attack produced a
result on which no one could have calculated beforehand." Supreme
pride in the naval ability of the Anglo-Saxon race dictated the

83. Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War, II, 123-124.
83. Ibid., Span.-Amer. War, II, 133, states that their speed could not
have been over six or seven knots, for at higher speeds they
would have towed under the pilot boats that they had tied
alongside.
84. Standard, July 4, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 35, July 8, 1898.
comment of The Pall Mall Gazette. "When all allowance has been made for the unquestionable superiority of the American ships, guns, and gunners, the naval battles of Manila and Santiago will be remembered as achievements which stamp the American Navy as worthy of that Saxon stock of born seamen from which it has sprung, and we are not aware that there is any higher praise that can be given it."

The commonness of ancestry of England and the United States was also a large part of the theme of Vanity Fair. "It is not unnatural that the British nation should feel a share of that joy which is being expressed all over the United States at the decisive victory of the American fleet; nor surprising that we should share their pride in their triumph over the Spaniards. We are of the same blood, we speak the same tongue; much of our good stock has gone to make the Yankee arm strong to deal the effective blow; and in this defeat of Spain by the United States of America the power and the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race has been 'sort of' demonstrated. Coolness in the heat of battle, dogged obstinacy, the indomitable pluck - these are the attributes of a race which, in the good time to come, must dominate the world, attributes which have been shown to have done anything but decrease. And all these qualities have been shown by the American - so far as it was possible to show them. Cool in the consciousness of their superiority, brave in the belief that they were fighting in a good cause, the American has practically conquered Spain; and the result is more gratifying in that we have 85. Pall Mall Gazette, July 5, 1898.
expected it and hoped for it throughout. The dying nation, of which Lord Salisbury spoke, could make no stand against the virility of that newer branch of the Anglo-Saxon race; and Spain's defeat may be taken as prophetic of future history."

The naval battle of Santiago gave to The Spectator also an opportunity to express its pride in the American section of the Anglo-Saxon race. "The first thought of all Englishmen...is that the American fleet did its work splendidly. The whole performance of Admiral Sampson's fleet was in accordance with the best traditions of the Anglo-Saxon navies, and every Englishman has read of their doings with a flush of pride. There was the old hard-pounding such as the Elizabethan sea-dogs used, and the same curious mixture of steadiness and daring, coolness and reckless dash. No doubt the comparative strengths were very different, but as one reads of the Spanish ships tearing full-speed up the coast of Cuba closely pursued by the relentless Americans, who poured in a continuous and well-directed fire, it is impossible not to think of the Armada as it passed up the Channel in flight, Drake's ships hanging on its flank and riddling the Spaniard's hulls with their ceaseless fire, - a fire which, as on last Sunday, always hit and always did damage. In a word, the moral aspects of what was almost the first, and may be the last, fleet action between Spanish and the English races were very much alike. In both cases it was the man behind the gun who, in the last resort, won.

86. Vanity Fair, LX, 11, July 7, 1898. On May 4 Prime Minister Lord Salisbury spoke before the Primrose League, and in the course of his remarks said that the nations of the world could be divided into the living and the dying. Not all of the dying nations were non-Christian. He did not mention any specific nation as living or dying; hence there was much speculation whether he meant Spain to be placed among the dying. See The Times, May 5, 1898 for a report of the speech.
the battle."

Management and the ability to sail ships struck The Speaker forcibly. "The battle — notably the episode of the despatch-boat Gloucester and the torpedo-destroyer Terror — affords fresh evidence that management and seamanship retain their supremacy over the mere machinery of warfare." In another department in the same issue The Speaker praised American seamanship. "The American fleet was not to be caught napping....The greatest credit is due to the American Navy for the manner in which this operation was carried

87. Spectator, LXXI, 37, July 9, 1898. In the same issue The Spectator took another occasion to revel in the ability of the sons to imitate the mother. "The battle shows that the American Navy is a most efficient fighting machine. We did not want to be told that here, for we knew it already and realized of what stuff the lion's whelps were made." Then followed expressions of belief that the American Navy could whip either the French or the German. No doubt by all the rules the French Fleet is ten times as strong as the American, and ought to be able to eat it up at one mouthful. But if it came to the necessity, American ships would be able to destroy French ships of vastly superior power. "As for the German and American Navies, there can of course be no comparison. The Germans are fine sailors and brave men, but a naval struggle between the United States and Germany would be very short and very complete....The English have a habit of winning at sea, and the Americans have shown us that they have inherited the habit to the fullest possible degree." (Ibid., LXXI, 37, July 9, 1898.)

88. Speaker, XIX, 33, July 9, 1898. The Gloucester, Lieutenant Commander Mainwright, was a yacht that had been armed, and was ruffling its place in the line of blockading ships. The Terror had been disabled on June 22 by the St. Paul, and it took a month to repair her. Hence it was not at the battle of Santiago. At that battle the Gloucester engaged the torpedo-boat destroyers Aurora and Flirtón. For Mainwright's account, see Gladwick, Rev. of U. S. and Spain, Span.-Am. War, II, 143-145.
out. Like the exploit of Admiral Dewey, this sea fight off Santiago has proved that the British sailor has in his American kinsman a worthy ally and rival. So far as her fleet is concerned, America has no need to fear comparison with any other country in the world."

The naval battle of Santiago threw The Saturday Review off one stride and into another, for it too now praised the Americans. It was the belief that the Americans had acted as Englishmen would have acted that made The Saturday Review speak commendingly of them. "It is impossible not to feel a certain pride in these achievements of men of our own race. Every Englishman, too, will remember that it was the possession of this same quality of fine marksmanship which Americans display that gave us our victories both on land and sea from Crecy to the Crimea. And something peculiar and noble happened in this fight which showed in a far higher way the kinship of the two peoples. While the 'Texas' and the 'Oquendo' were fighting, 'a mighty explosion' shook the 'Oquendo', and the crew of the 'Texas' cheered. 'Don't cheer,' shouted Captain Phillip, 'the poor devils are dying.' It seems to us that this expression of tender and sympathetic humanity is just as fine as the 'Kiss me, Hardy,' of the dying Nelson." Again The Saturday Review spoke of race kinship: "The whole story touches us immensely; the American sailors have indeed deserved well of their country. Commodore Sampson sent sailors ashore to protect the survivors of the Spanish crews from the Cubans; we learn too that he treats Admiral Cervera with the greatest deference.

89. Speaker, XVIII, 25, July 9, 1898.
and consideration. That is the kind of conduct that Englishmen are compelled to admire and in men of our own race feel thankful for."

In this same issue The Saturday Review said: "On sea the American achievements have only been limited by the capacity for resistance of their enemy...."

The Pall Mall Gazette had a comment to make on the naval battle, which, while it did not directly concern the Americans, spoke volumes on Spanish inefficiency or corruption. It stated that after the battle Admiral Cervera had been asked about the big guns of the Cristobal Colon, and that he had replied: "She has no big guns. They are in Italy, or in the pocket of the Chief of Ordnance." The Pall

90. Saturday Review, LXXXVI, 33, July 9, 1896. Now that Americans, in the belief of The Saturday Review, were showing themselves to have the same good characteristics as possessed by Englishmen, The Saturday Review praised them. But then, without its favorite butt for acridity, The Saturday Review whirled on the French, deploring the cowardly conduct of French sailors on the occasion of the sinking of the Bourgogne. The Bourgogne, a vessel of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, collided with the Cromarty-shire off Newfoundland on July 4, 1898, and sank shortly thereafter. Of 800 passengers and crew only 169 were saved. There were news reports of the cowardice of the French sailors in saving their own at the expense of the passengers' lives. Apropos of that conduct The Saturday Review now said: "After all the worst British hypocrisy - the hypocrisy for instance that allowed Lady Hamilton to starve in spite of Nelson's prayer - is better than this accursed French soullessness." (Ibid., LXXXVI, 33, July 9, 1898.)

91. Saturday Review, LXXXVI, 37, July 9, 1898.
Yall Gazette then elaborated on this statement. "This brief but bitter indictment goes to the root of the cause of Spain's humiliation today. It may be paraphrased thus: The Cristobal Colon having been built in Italy, one of two things has happened: either the Spanish Government is too negligent to see that she was provided with the proper armament, or else the guns have found their way into the pockets of a high official in the form of cash."

In its next weekly issue The Saturday Review again returned to the theme of praiseworthy American characteristics. It mentioned the splendid qualities of the American "Fighting Bob" Evans after he had helped to destroy Cervera's squadron; for he had kept the shipwrecked Spanish sailors who were floating in the water from being shot by Cuban insurgents on the shore.

It is worth point out, too, that once The Saturday Review changed its attitude towards Americans, it fairly piled up examples of American characteristics that were praiseworthy. After having criticized the French sailors for their conduct at the time the Bourgogne sank, in the next issue it contrasted this conduct with that of American sailors when their ship took fire. It seems that when on July 8, 1896, the American steamship Delaware caught fire off Philadelphia, the Captain formed a line of his men, and marched the

93. Saturday Review, LXXXVI, 65, July 16, 1898. It is interesting to note in the light of the change of attitude evinced by The Saturday Review, that on April 23, 1898 (LXXXV, 546) it had professed to believe Captain Evans beneath contempt for having said that if the United States government would give him a ship and allow him to go to Havana, he would make Spanish the most popular language in hell for the next ten years.
passengers through that line to the life-boats, the Captain, meanwhile, threatening to shoot anyone who started a panic. The Saturday Review pronounced sentence: "The contrast of this behaviour with that of the French and Italians on the 'Bourgogne' is emphasized by one little incident that since came to light. A lady with a child tried to get out of the line and hurry to the gangway. 'You needn't hurry, ma'am,' said a sailor; 'we're American seamen and will see that all the women and children get off."

A month later one of the last expressions on the naval battle of Santiago was made when The Sketch, after stating that it looked as if the war were over, wrote: "It was fatal rashness to allow his [Cervera's] ships to rush out on the guns of battleships."

The attitude towards the naval battle of Santiago was in almost all English journals one of satisfaction—for one reason or another. Some were satisfied because Spain's naval power had been annihilated. Others were satisfied that the other half of the "Anglo-Saxon" race had so well upheld the traditions of that race, in whipping the traditional enemy. It was the fact that Americans had acted almost as well as Englishmen that caused The Saturday Review, after so much and varied criticism, to wax commendatory and enthusiastic. Thus there dropped out of the number of English journals the most consistent, stubborn, and bitter of America's critics. There were after this time, to be sure, journals that criticized the United States for this or that, but there

94. Saturday Review, LXXVI, 65, July 16, 1898.
95. Sketch, XXIII, 173, Aug. 17, 1898.
was not one that consistently criticized the United States as
The Saturday Review had done for months.

Truly when the battles of Manila and Santiago had been fought
America had a much better "press" in England than it had had for a
long time, at least as far back as 1895, following the crisis over
the Venezuelan boundary.

English press opinions on the campaign to take Santiago after
Cervera's destruction fall into four categories: praise of General
Shafer's conduct of the campaign, condoning of it, criticism of
it, and, finally, criticism of the Spaniards and their ineptitude.
Of the three great episodes of the war - Manila, Cervera's destruc-
tion, and the land campaign at Santiago, the last named is the only
one that drew any body of criticism of Americans from English
journals.

The Pall Mall Gazette, always sympathetic, stated on July 15:
"General Shafer and his command may...be congratulated upon the
conclusion of a difficult and dangerous enterprise in which the
United States troops have not disappointed the highest expectations
of their countrymen." And, now that The Saturday Review had turned
from its policy of constant carping, it too, spoke favorably of the
conduct of American soldiers: "Her raw troops, led by officers as
raw as themselves, have done wonders. At the beginning they lacked
almost everything needful; they suffered terribly from the climate
Pall Mall Gazette, July 15, 1896.
and from mismanagement in high places; their landing, their march on
Santiago, and their storming of the heights to the east of that city,
constituted a feat of arms such as few nations can boast of."

The Speaker, in discussing the wretched conditions in General
Shafer's camp before the surrender of Santiago, said that if Admiral
Cervera had known the true state of things in that camp he would not
have embarked upon his sortie out of the harbor. The Speaker then
went on, however, to condemn General Shafer because of the
obstacles under which he was working—climate, impassable roads,
defective organization.

From there the comments went on into criticisms of Shafer.
The Times stated that the American commissariat and hospital
departments were mismanaged. But so too were the operations in the
field. The Americans did not use artillery when it was logical,
they attacked the front instead of the flanks of their enemies,
and they were ignorant of the country. Finally, General Shafer
was reflected upon discreditably.

A week after the previously-recorded condemnation of General
Shafer, The Speaker took sides against him. After saying that
if the Spanish forces defending Santiago were in a serious plight,
it opined that "the American troops besieging the city were hardly
in better case. That a grave tactical blunder was committed by
General Shafer when he undertook the operations against Santiago

97. *Saturday Review*, LXVII, 37, July 9, 1898.
98. *Speaker*, XVIII, 35, July 9, 1898.
is now generally admitted." But The Speaker then tended to palliate this criticism by saying that probably it had not been General Shafter's fault, but rather that of the politicians in Washington. Had General Shafter withdrawn his troops from before Santiago after Cervera left "he would have acted with the sagacity of a great general. But he was hampered by political considerations."

The Sketch likewise criticized General Shafter in discussing Spanish ineptitude and negligence. "Nothing is more evident than the facts that, against a capable General, the rash attack of General Shafter would have met with disastrous repulse, and that before a properly provisioned stronghold his army would have melted away with disease, and hardly escaped from utter ruin. The storming of intrenchments against magazine-rifles and smokeless powder has even less business to succeed than Grant's assaults on Lee...."

Criticisms of the Spaniards' conduct of the operations may be quoted to throw additional light on the campaign around Santiago. These criticisms formed a chant of ineptitude. The Pall Mall Gazette, said, apropos of a statement it made that the Madrid cabinet was washing its hands publicly of the responsibility for the surrender of Santiago that "the real responsibility must rest upon the

100. Speaker, XVIII, 65-66, July 16, 1898.
Administration which left the second city in Cuba inadequately prepared to resist the American attack." The Times opined that in the land battle of Santiago the Spaniards seemed "once more to have thrown away their chances...." When the Americans were miserable in shoe-deep mud in their trenches the Spaniards did not attack. They erred time after time. The Sketch played on this same chord, stating "it was negligence that left the garrison of Santiago so ill supplied that it had to surrender to an enemy of only equal strength, crippled by fever and checked by strong defences."

The Review of Reviews pointed a finger of accusation at the Madrid government. "The destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet and the extraordinary capitulation of Santiago to a force numerically inferior, while her garrison had still six weeks' supplies and 140 cartridges per man, convinced even the featherheads who masquerade as Ministers at Madrid that their pretense of

102. Pall Mall Gazette, July 21, 1898. Earlier this same journal quoted Admiral Cervera as having said that the heavy guns for the Cristobal Colon (one of his vessels destroyed at Santiago) were either in Italy or in the pockets of the officials. The Pall Mall Gazette then went on, discoursing on the Spaniards' inaptitude throughout the war, "it is the old story. The old saw of procrastination and peculation, peculation and procrastination...which has been the besetting sin of Spanish administration ever since the healthy stimulus of fighting for national life against the Moors was replaced by harrying the Indians for gold." (Pall Mall Gazette, July 12, 1898.)

103. Times, Aug. 16, 1898.
104. Sketch, XXIII, 73, Aug. 17, 1898.
There remains one incident of the war to treat. On June 15 Admiral Camara wrote from Cadiz to the government that his ships were unready as yet to embark on the venture, already ordered, to attack the American coasts. But on that same day orders were being made out for gun to go to the Philippine Islands. Chadwick states, after an examination of Camara’s orders, that his expedition was never intended to fight Dewey’s force, but was meant rather as a show of Spanish sovereignty in the islands, designed to keep the United States from asserting claim to them while peace terms were being discussed. For his instructions stated, "always trying to operate carefully, as the ordinance prescribes, so as to obviate all encounters which have no prospect of success...."

Admiral Camara left Cadiz on June 16, without enough coal to carry him to the Philippines. When he arrived at Port Said he was refused coal by the consul-general on the grounds that he had enough to get to a home port. On June 29 he was ordered away from Suez, for he had already spent his twenty-four hours allowed belligerents. After passing through the Suez Canal and going a

105. Review of Reviews, XVII, 220, Sept. 1, 1898. Interesting in light of the fact that this was the one campaign of the Americans that drew criticism from English journals is the fact that according to the Berlin correspondent of The Times, after this campaign: "The American Militia having, according to the German Military Attaché in Cuba, given proof of such great valor and of 'elan' in attack, the supercilious tone of German criticism has abated, and in its place has appeared a spontaneous and generous acknowledgment of the military capacity of the United States army. (Times, July 20, 1898.)

106. Chadwick, Rel. of U. S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War, II, 386–389.
short distance into the Red Sea, he turned back through the Canal, on his way home, having been recalled.

The comments on Camara’s expedition discussed it either as senseless or as ludicrous. The Times state "the suspicion that the Spanish Government still relies rather upon creating the illusion that it is about to do something than upon serious preparation for striking a real blow. Admiral Camara’s singular naval promenade is probably more or less of a theatrical character. It is meant to serve the double purpose of impressing the United States and of satisfying public opinion in Spain.... The million pesetas wanted, we presume in cash, to pay his passage through the Canal might certainly be more usefully employed than in making a demonstration which alarms no one and comes too late to be effective for the relief of Manila." A few days later The Times, in saying that apparently Admiral Camara was still at Port Said, continued: "Why they are there is one of the unfathomable mysteries of Spanish tactics. It might have been thought that repairs could be better and more conveniently carried out in Spanish ports, yet Admiral Camara appears to have gone to Port Said for no other purpose than to refit."

107 Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War, II, 386.
108 Chadwick, Ibia, II, 388, gives 64,000 as the amount of the canal dues, both ways.
109 Times, July 2, 1898. In the same article The Times, commenting on the Spanish conduct of the war in general, said: "The Spaniards have carried on the war much as they carried on the suppression of the Cuban revolt - that is to say, as if it were so pleasant a game that it would be a pity to bring it to an end."
Another aspect of the senselessness of Admiral Camara's having withdrawn his fleet from Spanish shores struck The Leeds Mercury. It said that "the coasts of Spain are absolutely at the mercy of the 110 invaders." Black and White was more pungent. "Slowly the net closes round Spain, and her struggles daily lack more rhyme and reason. What, for instance, can be the sense of the last performance of Camera's [sic] ridiculous squadron." It then, too, mentioned that Spanish coasts were left unprotected. As early as July 2 The Spectator, in speaking of the destination of the fleet, placed "to the Philippines" in quotation marks, as if it either doubted that it would ever reach there, whatever the intention of the Spanish authorities to despatch the fleet to the Philippine Islands, or that it was ever seriously contemplated sending it there.

The uselessness of Camara's fleet wherever it might go struck The Sketch, for, it said, "if it goes to Manila, it will probably find the place in American possession, and share the fate of Montojo's squadron; if it comes back, it will hardly suffice to protect the Spanish coasts from annoying, if not very dangerous attack. To send it to Cuba would be obvious ruin."

Punch made a joke in rhyme of the whole expedition, entitled "Camara Obscura": "Men marvelled whither he was gone; Small wonder, for I swear That all the time the valiant Don Was neither here nor there."

110. Leeds Mercury, July 5, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 36, July 8, 1898.
111. Black and White, XVI, 5, July 2, 1898. 112. Spectator, LXXXI, 6, July 2, 1898.
113. Sketch, XXII, 586, July 30, 1898.
114. Punch, CXV, 36, July 23, 1898.
Black and White commented humorously that Camara's squadron was "the one bright little joke of the struggle; it has not, indeed, absolutely started for the Philippines...."

Santiago surrendered on July 16. By the terms of the surrender the Spanish troops were to be transported by the United States to Spain, and Spanish officers were to be permitted to keep their sidearms. Less than a week after the surrender, the Spanish government asked through the French ambassador in Washington, M. Jules Cambon, for the terms on which the United States would end the war.

115. Black and White, XV, 834, June 25, 1898. Black and White then continued sarcastically concerning another Spanish naval "manoeuvre": "we are told in a Spanish journal that the reserve squadron laden with 'thousands of troops,' has actually got up steam, and proceeded without aid or harm, as far as Cartagena. This daring feat has naturally given everybody concerned much pleasure, and should result in a flutter of decorations for those who have achieved it." (Black and White, XV, 834, June 25, 1898.) A whimsical, sarcastic paragraph from The Pall Mall Gazette illustrates the contempt in which the editor of that paper held the Spanish navy even before Cervera's destruction. On May 28 he wrote: "While Commodore Schley is watching (or watching for) Cervera's ships in Cuban waters, the Cadiz fleet is leisurely whittling away the time in target practice. Thus we learn today that the Carlos V. has been trying her 28-centimetre guns outside Cadiz harbour; having first taken the precaution, no doubt, of sending out a torpedo-boat to see that no United States ship came within the line of fire. The results of the firing were, we are told, excellent; that is, the shots hit nothing; and this kind of practice is all that a Spanish naval commander could wish for. But what does it matter? Are their ships not invulnerable?" The Archbishop of Toledo has said it, and he is quite as good an authority on the capacity of the fleet as any Spanish admiral. We hope that no account of the exploit of the Carlos V. will be telegraphed across to Commodore Schley; it might give him a shock, and good men are too scarce to be sacrificed recklessly." (Pall Mall Gazette, May 28, 1898.)

116. For complete terms of the capitulation, see Chadwick, Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-mer. War, II, 245-247.
The negotiations thus set in train culminated in the protocol of peace, signed on August 13.

The protocol provided that Spain was to relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba,cede to the United States "Puerto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Iadrones to be selected by the United States." The United States was to hold the city and bay of Manila "pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines." Spain was immediately to evacuate Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other islands in the West Indies. Provision was made for peace commissioners to meet in Paris not later than October 1. Hostilities were to cease with the signing of the protocol.

English comments on the protocol were varied. Several journals hoped that America would be generous to her defeated enemy. When the terms of the protocol became known many were pleased that America had been so lenient and generous to her defeated enemy. Several congratulated America on her successful termination of the war.

Some time before the capitulation of Santiago Pursik printed a full-page cartoon expressing satisfaction that peace was soon coming. The cartoon was entitled "A Welcome Intruder," and showed the angel of Peace carrying a dove in her right hand held against her breast, and holding aloft in her left an olive branch. She was stepping between Uncle Sam and a Spanish don (arrayed in the conventional costume of a bull fighter). Uncle Sam and the Spaniard each held a knife in his
right hand; they were in threatening postures, facing each other.

When it began to appear inevitable that Spain would have to make peace, hopes were expressed in English journals that the United States would be generous to her defeated foe. The Manchester Guardian as early as July 5 said: "It is surely not asking too much from a generous nation like the United States that she should herself offer peace on terms as little humiliating as possible, so making the way smooth for the Spanish Government, if it shows any disposition to listen to reason," while The Times stated that it would be interested to see "whether the humanity which has marked the conduct of the Americans will be extended to the vanquished when they sue for peace. There could be no more honourable ending to a war which both sides have waged in ways creditable to them than a settlement which disproved the charge that the modern conqueror drives a harder bargain with his foe than was common in times when war was less humane."

Considerably later The Speaker gave expression more succinctly to the hope by stating that "all friends of the two peoples would wish to see the victors use their strength mercifully."

On July 14 The Times thought that: "Public opinion in the United States has been favorably impressed by the gallantry of the Spanish sailors and soldiers, and we do not believe that intolerable conditions would be exacted from a brave enemy frankly suing for peace." The fear, however, that certain Spanish officers, Marshal

118. Punch, CXIV, 383, June 18, 1898. 119. Manchester Guardian, July 5, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 36, July 8, 1898. 120. Times, July 7, 1898. 121. Speaker, XVIII, 129, July 30, 1898. 122. Times, July 14, 1898.
Blanco among them, might insist on continuing the fight caused The Speaker to opine: "Unless therefore, the Cabinet at Washington is prepared to grant exceptionally favourable terms to the Spanish, it is difficult to see how the Government at Madrid can put an end to the conflict."

The Times did not wish to see the United States exact a heavy monetary tribute from Spain: "America will probably do well to relinquish her claims to monetary compensation on a scale commensurate with her expenditure."

Along with hopes that America would be generous went assertions that she would be, and later statements that she had been so. The fact that she had been generous was a subject of much satisfaction to English editors. On July 15 The Times said: "On the American side success will prompt generous treatment if peace be sought at once...."

The Pall Mall Gazette termed "from every point of view excellent" the stipulation in the protocol that the Spanish troops should be returned to Spain. The Saturday Review, after expressing its certainty that the United States would not play the part of Shylock, said: "The Americans are naturally quick and generous in their sympathies...." The terms would be hard for Spain to bear "but if our knowledge of Mr. McKinley is right, he will not exact the uttermost farthing." A week later it said: "President McKinley is

123. Speaker, XVII, 65, July 16, 1898. 124. Times, July 28, 1898. It will be noted that this piece of "advice" was given before the terms of the protocol could have been known.

127. Saturday Review, LXXXVI, 29, July 30, 1898.
sincerely anxious to make the way as smooth for the Spanish Government as he consistently can...

Black and White on August 6 thought: "President McKinley means to be lenient, and he is wise....."

The Outlook was glad that America was breaking a tradition. Of the peace terms it said: "In the first place they establish for the United States the honourable title of being the first Power to break with the merciless tradition...that a victor State may exact from its beaten foe any penalty in treasure short only of irretrievable ruin....

So, then, in declining to exact from Spain a pecuniary forfeit, over and above the cession of territory, and in thus breaking what threatened to become a maleficient tradition, Mr. McKinley has done civilization good service." "We must say that the Washington Government have not, under the circumstances, dealt with the defeated foe ungenerously," was the dictum of The South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate Mail. "The present terms of peace are certainly not unduly severe," opined The Speaker, and The Sunday Magazine said that "in spite of all provocation, the American temper is on the whole very moderate." Considering the provocation to the levying of an indemnity, argued The Pall Mall Gazette: "The American terms are by no means niggardly. The writing off of American claims for losses in Cuba, including the Maine, against Spanish claims for pesetas

128. Saturday Review, LXXXVI, 29, July 30, 1898.
129. Black and White, XVI, 163, Aug. 6, 1898.
130. Outlook, II, 4, Aug. 6, 1898.
131. South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate Mail, XLV, 171, Aug. 13, 1898.
132. Speaker, XVIII, 195, Aug. 13, 1898.
gone to bad, certainly leaves Spain no cause for complaint."

Finally, Black and White professed to see in the generosity of the terms of the protocol another reason for Anglo-American friendship: "America's demands and conditions are in every respect reasonable, and if a further bond of friendship were to seek between this country and our Anglo-Saxon brothers it might be readily found in their self-restraint in the hour of victory."

Several papers took occasion to congratulate the United States on having won. The Speaker said: "Yet the ultimate victory of the United States is assured, and English public opinion rejoices at the fact.‖ "The American people know that in the hour of their success they enjoy the sympathy of their kinsmen in this country,‖ was the statement of The Standard. Somewhat later The Standard returned to the same strain. In speaking of the American people it said "we can honestly congratulate them on bringing to a successful close their first important campaign beyond the seas that wash their shores; and we can share with them the satisfaction they feel in a success mainly achieved by their skill and enterprise on that element which has been the scene of the most splendid triumphs of the Anglo-Saxon race."

Speaking of the message which Her Majesty's government had instructed Sir Julian Pauncefote to communicate to the Cabinet at Washington, congratulating the United States on the termination

of the war, The Pall Mall Gazette said: "This graceful act just sets
the seal of official approbation upon the general sympathy manifested
in this country for the cause of the United States...."

As has been seen from this discussion the opinion in English
journals was almost unanimous that in the terms of peace granted
Spain by the protocol the United States had been generous. And that
gratified English editors, for they considered that in being
generous under such circumstances America was showing "the right
spirit." They were also congratulatory to America for having won the
war. In that, some of them saw the proper victory, the victory of the
Anglo-Saxon over the Latin. Altogether it is safe to say that if the
general warmth of feelings which sprang up between the two races in
the early part of the war was strengthened by the American feats of
arms and the conduct of American soldiers and sailors, the peace
terms granted to Spain added their need to the increasingly
friendlier feelings between the two nations. England was proud of her
"off-spring" - and, pari passu, friendly and sympathetic to her.

But the signing of the protocol meant for English journals not
only gratification because of the leniency of the peace terms America
had offered to Spain and because of America's success in the war, but
the fruition as well of a desire repeatedly expressed that Spain had
better ask for peace. Spain, it was asserted at the beginning of the
war, had no chance of success. It was a nation of less than twenty
139. Pall Mall Gazette, Aug. 30, 1898.
million inhabitants fighting one of nearly seventy million. Spain was poor and America rich. Spain was mediaeval, and although she had resources, they were undeveloped, whereas America was industrial and commercial. It was believed and stated early in the war that Spain was doomed to defeat. The urgency for her to make peace was stressed, however, more after Dewey's exploit at Manila, still more after Sampson's at Santiago, and still more after Shafter's at Santiago. To trace the number of editorials in which this hope and suggestion to Spain were made may be interesting. A few were written in April; many in May, shortly after Manila; a few in June when there was little happening that was crushing to Spain; but such comment rose to a crescendo in July after the two battles of Santiago, and dwindled off in August, when Spain had actually asked for terms.

As early as April 2 The Statist said that if Spain did not meet Mr. McKinley halfway, her destruction would be on her own head. At the same time it said of Spain that "she must know that single-handed she cannot fight the United States...." And a week later the same journal opined about Spain: "If she draws the sword she will be utterly ruined if the United States wishes to press its advantage to the utmost." The Investors' Review said: "Victory for Spain - ah, that seems impossible. For centuries her lot has been defeat."

This same prediction of defeat for Spain and advice to her to make peace broke into chorus when the news of Admiral Montojo's

140. Statist, XLI, 555, Apr. 2, 1898. 141. Ibid., XLII, 600, Apr. 9, 1898. 142. Investors' Review, XI, 468, Apr. 8, 1898.
defeat became known. The *Yorkshire Herald* then said: "After such a reverse Spain cannot, with any show of reason, keep up the struggle."

The *Daily Telegraph* quoted as much more applicable to Spain than to "the most powerful nation on earth" a warning that Lord Salisbury had uttered to Parliament at the opening of its last session: "However strong you may be, whether you are a man or a nation, there is a point beyond which your strength will not go. It is courage and wisdom to exert strength up to the limit to which you may attain, it is ruin and madness to allow yourself to pass it." The *Graphic* thought irretrievable disaster in store for Spain if she persisted in the fight: "Disasters which might wipe Spain from the catalogue of nations would only superficially and temporarily affect the immense resources of the great American Republic. To prolong the struggle in these circumstances is little short of madness."

The * Pall Mall Gazette*, in its often pungent style, said: "Nothing whatever is to be gained by any Macawberish inaction, simply because nothing favourable can conceivably turn up. Events will move, however distasteful they may be to the Spanish Government." On the next day the same paper said: "We observe that all manner of papers are pointing out that it is the duty of every patriotic Spaniard to urge the advisability of throwing up the sponge." That paper thought that this action was "very wise indeed."

146. *Pall Mall Gazette*, May 11, 1898.
147. *Pall Mall Gazette*, May 12, 1898.
Black and White resorted to an adage: "But if ever discretion was the better part of valour it is to-day in so far as Spain is concerned. Protracted fighting is madness, and must only entail useless loss and suffering on the weaker nation." The Economist, after stating that much was being made of the point of honor and Spanish feeling on the question of making peace, gave its opinion: "It is no disgrace to a man armed with a sabre to shrink before a man armed with a revolver, and the disparity of resources between the two combatants is much greater than that. It would be much more reasonable to accept accomplished facts...."

The Manchester Evening News likewise referred to the greater resources of the United States as the deciding element in the fight, for that paper said that "the resources of the United States are practically unlimited. That is the element in the situation which will decide the fate of the struggle if it is obstinately continued." To-Day said: "No friend of Spain can wish the contest to be protracted; a decisive defeat would be more to her interest than an insignificant success, and the sooner the war is finished the better for her." The Statist, after stating its belief that President McKinley would probably wait until the cool season to land a large force in Cuba, went on: "It is to be hoped that long before then Spain will recognise that the struggle is hopeless; that the longer
she protracts the greater will be her loss and the more completely 152
will she compromise her future...." The same journal stated again
the next week that the best thing Spain could do was to yield at
153
once.

June, with relatively little naval and military activity,
brought fewer such comments, but did not stifle them altogether.
The Times said on June 6 that the Spanish fight was clearly lost.
Cuba was lost to the Spaniards in any event, "and all that remains
to ask themselves is whether they will add to that loss other and
154
perfectly gratuitous disasters." Five days later The Speaker asked
rhetorically whether it would "not be well for Spain to agree with
the Powers that 'honour is satisfied' by the virtual capture of
155
Admiral Cervera's fleet, and to make the best terms she can."
Discussing the fact that Cervera was blockaded in Santiago, To-Day
said: "It is time that Spain should pause and reflect whether, under
existing circumstances, any good can possibly be served by pro-
longing the struggle. The chances of war are notoriously uncertain,
but with Cervera trapped with his ships in Santiago, all hope for
Spain has vanished. Cuba is already practically lost. More losses
will follow if the war goes on....Spain should accept the inevitable
with the least possible loss of territory and of valuable lives. If

152. Statist, XLI, 846, May 21, 1898.
153. Ibid., XLI, 874, May 28, 1898.
154. Times, June 6, 1898.
155. Speaker, XVII, 721, June 11, 1898.
she goes further she is very likely to fare worse." The Times thought somewhat the same thing and said that "the view taken in Madrid...is that, although peace is desirable, the worst way of getting it is to ask for it. That attitude would be more intelligible were there any evidence that Spain is making efforts which might place her on more equal terms with her adversary."

After the American attack began on Santiago, and with the rumors that Commodore Watson was to be sent to Spain, and with the destruction of Cervera’s squadron, hopes and advice to Spain that she would cease such a suicidal struggle mounted to their peak. Practically every one of the important papers gave expression to this sentiment at one time or another, and some of the journals, notably The Times, voiced it on numerous occasions.

The Saturday Review on July 2, discussing the possibility that an American squadron might be sent to bombard the coasts of Spain, said that that might eventuate in revolution in Spain. "That means more war — hopeless, suicidal war; and what all humans and sensible men desire, in the interests of everybody, is the advent of an honourable peace." The Times said that it was a pity "such worthy foesmen" could not come "to an arrangement on the inevitable basis."

On July 5, discussing Cervera’s defeat, the same paper said: "Over-powered after an heroic defence, her [Spain’s] only course now is, as her friends even in the French Press urge her, to seek a peace.

156. *To-Day*, XIX, 175, June 11, 1898; *To-Day* recurred to this same theme the next week; see *bid.*, XIX, 207, June 18, 1898.
which, even if onerous, cannot now be dishonourable." The Morning
Advertiser spoke commandingly of an article in the Paris Temps. "There
is not an hour to lose, it declares, for the negotiation of peace. It
will be well if the advice is speedily taken. Doubtless the necessity
must be a bitter sorrow to a proud and gallant people; but it is
folly, not true courage to persist in a struggle which can only entail
accumulated disaster," and continued: "Nothing can be gained by e-
laying to treat for peace."

The Daily Chronicle, in saying that Señor Sagasta had declared
that the war would go on to the bitter end, commented: "One would have
thought there was bitterness already. But the man who, being at the
head of affairs, is to-day capable of giving utterance to such a
sentiment, hardly deserves the title of statesman." The Daily Telegraph
spoke in somewhat the same tenor: "Spain, if her statesmen have any
fragments of political wisdom left, will make terms with her adversary
quickly... The Spaniards have vindicated their honour, it is time that
they considered their interests." The Morning Post struck the same
note: "Spain has done enough for honour; she has proved that the courage
and chivalry of her race have not degenerated, and she has everything
to lose and nothing to gain by continuing the struggle." The comments
of The Daily News were essentially the same: "Every day that Spain pro-

160. Times, July 5, 1898. 161. Morning Advertiser, July 5, quoted by
Public Opinion, LXXIV, 36, July 8, 1898. 162. Daily Chronicle, July 5,
quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 36, July 8, 1898.
163. Daily Telegraph, July 5, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 36, July 8,
1898.
164. Morning Post, July 5, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 36, July 8, 1898.
longs the war she adds something to the price which she must ultimately pay for peace." The Manchester Evening News said that "the end cannot now be long in coming, and the sooner the better for Spain and the rest of the world." The Daily Graphic professed to believe that: "The time has come for that higher patriotism which can take account of the enduring interests of the nation, and can resolve that the passions of the moment shall not be indulged at the expense of the irreparable ruin of an ancient and high-spirited people."

The Leeds Mercury asked: "What more can honour demand?", and then went on: "To continue such a struggle ...is sheer madness." Vanity Fair opined of Spain: "She must, unless she be bereft of all reason, sue for peace." The Investors' Review stressed the question of honor: "What more can Madrid ask for? Is it not more honourable and more courageous to close a hopeless struggle than to continue fighting, which only accumulates increasing heaps of the killed?"

To-Day, after the statement that the condition of Spain from the beginning of the war was hopeless, said: "It is time to end it all."

Black and White, so often pungent and more original than some of the other journals, remarked: "Truly, at this juncture, we wish that for once the Spaniard would be true to his favorite word of mañana -

166. Manchester Evening News, July 5, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 37, July 8, 1898.
168. Leeds Mercury, July 5, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 36, July 8, 1898.
169. Vanity Fair, LX, 10, July 7, 1898.
170. Investors' Review, XII, 11, July 8, 1898.
171. To-Day, XIX, 303, July 9, 1898.
and ask for Peace to-morrow. She has shed enough blood, she has scattered enough millions; surely, now, she may be permitted to march out of her citadel of obstinacy with all the honours of war."

Punch showed graphically, if not the hope for peace, at least the fact that Spain was hopelessly outclassed (and that, by inference, she had better make peace). A half-page cartoon showed Columbia and a Spanish woman having a tug of war over a chasm. Columbia held the rope only in her left hand, and appeared not to be exerting herself, while in her right hand she held a sabre. The Spanish woman was pulling with both hands, obviously exerting herself strenuously, and held a stiletto in her mouth.

The Statist said of Spain: "To continue a hopeless struggle without the least chance of bettering the position is clearly a crime. And therefore it is the plain duty of the Spanish Government to open communications with the United States at once." The Graphic, pointing out that the United States had full command of the sea, and that while getting ready to reduce Havana they might have their fleet range up and down the Spanish coasts, and seek out Admiral Cunradt's fleet, commented: "This being the situation, the commonest dictates of prudence, not to speak of patriotism, should induce the Spanish Government to sue for peace at the earliest possible moment," and then stressed the point that if Spain waited until the United States had organized a force powerful enough to take Havana...

173. *Punch*, CXV, 1, July 9, 1898.
she would have no means of bargaining.

The Times pointed out the dire consequences that might ensue if Spain chose to continue to fight - the possibility of American fleets bombarding Spanish ports, possibly anarchy in Madrid, a republic arising in Valencia or Andalusia, or a Carlist revolt in the Biscay provinces or in Navarre. "To bring about such a state of things," it believed, "through sheer purposeless procrastination - the curse of the Spanish character...would be an act of criminal folly." And the next day the same paper said: "Nowhere on the political horizon is there a gleam of hope that the situation can improve for Spain while she declines to ask for peace. Everywhere, on the contrary, both at home and abroad, all the omens point to steadily accumulating national difficulty and distress," and two days later still uttered this rather bitter condemnation of the Spaniards: "They are a people of high spirit and impracticable temper, who have been remarkable for their knowledge of the conditions of any problem with which they have had to deal."

The Speaker stated that Spain's only chance of success had depended upon retaining command of the sea. But even though she had now lost that, the war might yet last several months if Marshal Blanco would not listen to advice from Madrid. The Graphic played

175. Graphic, LIX, 36, July 9, 1898. 176. Times, July 11, 1898.
177. Ibid., July 12, 1898. 178. Times, July 14, 1898. The Times was so excited about the necessity of Spain's asking for peace that it recurred to the theme on the next and succeeding day, also on July 18 and July 21.
179. Speaker, XVIII, 66, July 16, 1898. In another department in the same issue, The Speaker said that if Spain were to make terms at all, "She had better make them at once..." (Ibid., XVIII, 66, July 16, 1898.) And on July 23 the same journal said: "But Spain is so nearly at the end of her resources that it is madness for her to continue the war." (Ibid., XVIII, 93, July 23, 1898.)
on the same chord, and thought that if wise counsels could prevail in Spain "the conclusion of an honourable peace will put an end to hostilities which can never now be of advantage to the Spaniards."

To-Day opined: "The day of Spain is past, and the sooner she recognizes the fact the better; the longer the wait, the harder the terms, and the more terrible will be the fall."

Naturally, when the belief and hope had been so widely held among English journals that Spain would make peace, there was relief among them when it was ascertained that Spain had actually asked for terms. Then they complimented Spain on the step she had taken.

The Times said: "No sensible persons in any part of the world can feel surprise that Spain has at last bowed to the inevitable. She has long since attained the only object of the war which the more enlightened of her citizens professed to have in view - the vindication of the honour of her arms." Spain, it continued, had now to face the facts of the political situation "with the same frank courage which has earned the respect of the Americans in the field." The Fall Hall Gazette congratulated Spain, but in a not very flattering way: "For the present it is enough that Spain has done the right thing for the first time during the war, and that victors and vanquished are within measurable distance of peace."

182. Times, July 27, 1898. On the next day The Times stated that if the negotiations for peace were to have any good result Spain would have to learn at once that she would have to make sacrifices "very trying to her patriotism and to her pride." (Ibid., July 28, 1898.) And on the next day it admonished Spain to be prompt in making peace; for, it urged, there were men in the United States who would appeal to the temper that would be aroused in the States if Spain were obstinate or guilty of bad faith. (Ibid., July 29, 1898.)
183. Fall Hall Gazette, July 27, 1898.
The Westminster Gazette, after having spoken about Spain's having done enough for honour, and about the bravery of her soldiers and sailors, said: "It now remains for Spanish statesmen to show a little moral courage. The situation, it cannot be disguised, is one of great difficulty." The Speaker believed that Spain had better make haste in negotiating peace. "The danger of the moment is that the slowness of Spain may provoke a new outburst of Imperialism in the United States, which would send up the American terms with a run." But whatever the hard terms America might set, Spain had no recourse but to accept them, stated Black and White bluntly, speaking of the move for peace: "This move has not been made a moment too soon; in the belief of most it is a good many months too late. Before the annihilation of Cervera's fleet Spain had a much greater chance of negotiating a most advantageous peace; now, with her power at sea practically non est, she cannot complain of whatever hard times America may set."

As the negotiations which led to the signing of the protocol seemed to be drawing near an end, English journals were obviously pleased at the prospect of actual peace. Black and White in stating on August 13 that there seemed no doubt that peace was a matter of a few days (actually, as has been seen, the protocol was signed the day before; but Black and White as well as the Graphic and To-Day

185. Speaker, XVIII, 129, July 30, 1898.
186. Black and White, XVI, 131, July 30, 1898.
which are mentioned below apparently was written at least two days before the date appearing on any issue) continued: "Never was a case where the dictates of common sense and common humanity made more directly for immediate cessation of hostility, and unhappy Spain must use what scattered wits remain to her and accept the terms submitted." The Graphic was also relieved that negotiations were so close to an end: "There seems to be no difficulty in the immediate signature of preliminaries and referendum, provided an armistice is also agreed upon. Let this be done at once. There is no valid reason to be urged against it, and the good sense of the whole world is in favour of it."

To-Day was pungent, and referring back to the boast made at the beginning of the war by some Spaniards that Cuba would not be given up until the last drop of Spanish blood was shed, said: "And so that last drop, about which there was so much talk at the beginning of the war, is not to be shed after all, and its refusal to shed that last drop is almost the only sensible thing that Spain has done since the war started."

188. Graphic, LVIII, 218, Aug. 13, 1898.
189. To-Day, XX, 47, Aug. 13, 1898.
Chapter III

The Peace Conference

Following the stipulation in the protocol of peace, the commissioners of peace met in Paris on October 1. The instructions to the American commissioners signed by President McKinley stated that the island in the Ladrones which the United States had selected for its own was Guam. No compensation was to be made for public property in Cuba or in any of the territories to be ceded to the United States. But if the Spanish commissioners insisted on such compensation, then the United States commissioners were to enter a bill of indemnity for the cost of the war. Of the Philippines the instructions demanded the island of Luzon and the right of entry into Philippine ports for American ships on the same terms as Spanish ships. Only as difficulties arose in the Philippines during the peace conference did President McKinley decide to demand the whole of the archipelago, and did so on October 26.

The first item of moment to be discussed at the Peace Conference was the demand put forward by Spain that the United States assume the Cuban debt. A large part of this debt consisted of expenses incurred by Spain in her attempts to subjugate the Cuban insurrections. The United States commissioners received at 1. For, Rel., 1898, 904-908.
2. Ibid., 1898, 937-938. Telegram, Hay to Day.
Paris instructions to assume none of the debt, and to refuse to agree to have the debt taken over by whatever government should finally take over sovereignty in Cuba. Finally the Spanish commissioners agreed not to refuse “to consider any articles as to Cuba and Puerto Rico which contain no provision for the assumption of indebtedness by the United States or Cuba or both...” The approval of such articles was to be subordinated to that of the others which would make up the complete treaty.

The comments in the English journals on this aspect of the work of the commissioners are interesting. Some merely discussed the question without giving a statement of opinion regarding the Spanish or the American stand. But of those which expressed an opinion on the correctness of the stand taken by either nation, all expressed either sympathy with America’s refusal to assume the Cuban debt or indignation at Spain’s requesting it.

Even before the Peace Commission met The Economist discussed the Spanish anxiety that the United States assume the Cuban debt, and expressed the following: “It stands to reason that the United States will not relieve Spain of any part of the Cuban Debt, as they have neither demanded any war indemnity nor asked her to pay the very heavy claims that American citizens have lodged in the State Department of Washington for damages suffered at the hands of the forces and authorities of the Spanish Government in Cuba during the civil war from February, 1895 to April, 1896.” Black and White said of

assumption of the Cuban debt: "America will not consent to do this, and very rightly, too. It is generally believed that the bold front of Spain in demanding so egregious a concession is intended solely for the gallery....But the 'bluff' will not deceive anyone who knows how much Spanish talk is worth, and the States Commissioners are to be 5 applauded for the firm stand they are making."

The Outlook thought Spain's suggestion "a particularly bad 6 joke." The Speaker went into the history of the doctrine that the debt incurred by a ruler binds his successors, and then expressed its opinion: "In our view, it is monstrous that a tyrant or a military usurper should be able to burden future generations of men simply because he is in possession of the machinery of government....The Americans are at least determined that the hitherto accepted doctrine shall not be pressed any further....The object of the Spanish Government in thus creating a separate Cuban debt was two-fold; firstly, to punish the Cuban people, and, secondly, to arrange for a cheap re-treat in the event of their being driven out by America. The debt was, in fact, charged on Cuba largely with the object of saddling it upon the United States....Under these circumstances we trust that America will, while assuming the sovereignty, refuse to pay any part of the debt which has not clearly been spent on public works to be transferred by the Government or otherwise for the development of the island. The balance is in essence a debt of Spain, not a debt of Cuba, and the bondholders deserve no better treatment than other

5 Black and White, XVI, 507, Oct. 22, 1898.
6 Outlook, II, 355, Oct. 22, 1898.
bondholders of Spain. By so doing the United States will make a very useful precedent, of which tyrants and their financial advisers will do well to take note."

In another department in the same issue The Speaker said the debt was "morally, no more chargeable on Cuba than the Confederate States' debt was on the Federal Government...." The Times said that Spain could not but yield on the Cuban debt, and that America could set her own terms. The Investors' Review stated that it was not a Cuban debt, but a Spanish one. No money had been raised in Cuba and spent in its interest. "Spain, in its successive attempts to destroy the spirit of liberty and independence in the Cubans, imposed upon the revenues of the island the costs of its various wars. To call this a Cuban debt is a misnomer." Hence it was not for the United States to assume. Furthermore, opined The Investors' Review, there was nothing in Cuba to show for a portion of this money.

Clearly, then, said the journals in England which expressed an opinion on it, the United States was doing right in not agreeing to assume the Cuban debt. That this was a unanimous opinion has been shown by the foregoing quotations.

As has been pointed out, the next thing after the discussion of the Cuban debt that occupied English journals to any degree was

7. Speaker, XVIII, 476, Oct. 22, 1898.
8. Ibid., XVIII, 474, Oct. 22, 1898.
10. Investors' Review, XII, 656, Nov. 11, 1898.
the question of the disposition of the Philippine Islands. There had been insurrection in the Philippine Islands before the Spanish-American War. Because Spain did not fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Biaconbato, which ended that insurrection, Emilio Aguinaldo and other leaders of the rebellion had removed to Singapore where they plotted return. In May, 1898 the U.S.S. McCullough, used by Dewey as a despatch boat between Manila and Hong-Kong, carried Aguinaldo to Manila.

Beginning at that time the insurgents against Spanish rule increased in numbers and carried on guerilla warfare outside Manila. Mr. Long, Secretary of the American navy, cabled Dewey on May 26 that it was desirable "not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future." American army men and supplies were sent to reinforce Dewey. The city of Manila did not fall to the American joint naval and military attack until August 13. During the peace negotiations in Paris the role that Aguinaldo was to be permitted to play remained a puzzling problem.

The amount of discussion on the Philippine question in English journals during the peace negotiations took on proportions that dwarfed that on the Cuban debt. For the English press attached great importance to this vestige of Spain's overseas colonial empire. Was Spain to be permitted to keep the islands? Was the United States to

12. Ibid., Span.-Amer. War, II, 366.
take only a coaling station or only the island of Luzon? Either of these solutions might permit a continuance of the same kind of mis-
government that Spain had perpetrated in Cuba, for Aguinaldo was
active and insistent upon independence from Spain. If the United
States were to withdraw from the islands, that would sanction such
conditions as had caused the States to intervene in Cuba. Clearly
impossible, said the majority of the English journals. Furthermore,
in Spain’s weakened condition the Philippines placed back under her
sovereignty might turn out to be a bone of international contention
among powers that wanted coaling stations or colonies, if the United
States did not. On the other hand, if the United States took the
entire group of islands, none of the aforementioned difficulties would
arise. And there would be as well other advantages arising from
America’s sole and entire possession. America in the Philippine
Islands would be more interested in the maintenance of the open door
in China. In other words, England would in that case have in the Far
East a partner if not an ally who would stand in that part of the
world for the policy that England had been attempting to effect.
Furthermore America’s administration of the islands would be such
as to benefit the natives. In other words, America would be shouldering
that much of the white man’s burden, would be assisting England in this
mission of those who were “advanced.”

The Philippines first occupied the attention of an English journal
after war broke out when on April 30, The Spectator reported that the
United States fleet had left Hong Kong to attack Manila and stated that
as a consequence of the battle America might take the islands. Then The
Spectator carried a sentence the last two clauses of which may well serve as the topic of this discussion on the Philippines. "As the Americans cannot keep the islands, and as all the Great Powers desire them, their ultimate fate is one of the most curious problems of the 13 war."

After the Peace Conference met many were the journals that wrote expressions of opinion to the effect that Spain could not but yield the Philippine Islands. Many such expressions referred directly to Spain's inability to wage war in order to keep the Philippines. Of the Spaniards The Saturday Review said: "It is useless for the Spaniards to talk big now that the war is ended and they have received a thorough beating. Bombast with nothing behind it will not serve them in the least." A week later, speaking of the tendency of the Spanish commission to postpone to "to-morrow"; and the threat of the Americans to withdraw from the Conference and use force, the same journal said: "It would really be more dignified for Spain to recognize now, as she will have to do later, that her Colonial Empire is gone for ever; to wash her hands of it and of the 15 Conference...."

The Pall Mall Gazette thought that for the Spaniards to resort to hostilities again would be madness. In mentioning that the Paris Temps was worried about a new outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Spain, it continued: "Does the Temps think Spain and Señor

15. Ibid., LXXVI, 523, Oct. 22, 1898.
Sagasta utterly mad? It is quite possible that Spain may kick against the Philippine settlement....But of this we may be sure; that these hostilities at the most would be purely nominal - a rupture by Spain, a demonstration by America, and Senor Sagasta calls upon his countrymen to note that he is constrained to bow to brutal force." "But if the United States commissioners make it clearly understood that their demand practically amounts to an ultimatum, Spain must give way, or she will be ruined," was the dictum of The Statist. The Speaker, mentioning rumors that there might be a renewal of the war, said:

"That contingency may be disregarded. Spain is in no condition to fight again, as nobody knows better than her veteran Minister, 18 Sagasta." The Daily Chronicle said, apropos of the same rumors:

"But we do not believe that Spain will pursue such a preposterous policy. If she really proposes to do so, she will certainly consult some of the Powers first, and whatever Power is consulted will assuredly urge her not to commit suicide."

The Saturday Review said, three weeks later than the above expression: "But the deadlock is only a diplomatic deadlock; a solution will be found, for the simple reason that Spain cannot make her resistance effective. What is more important, she has not been able to induce any of the European Powers to come to her assistance....It follows, therefore, that Spain will have to yield

17. Statist, XLII, 654, Nov, 5, 1898.
18. Speaker, XVIII, 535, Nov. 5, 1898.
with the best grace possible, lest a worse thing befall her...." And the next week, apropos of the Spaniards' reaction to the American offer of $20,000,000 for improvements in the Philippine Islands, the same journal said: "But it can only be decided in one way; Spain will have to submit with the best grace possible...."

The Times had a rather long, but good, summary of the whole question. Therefore it will be worthwhile to quote it in extenso. "Spain is in no position to stand out for better terms than the victors choose to impose, and their determination in the matter of the Philippines has long been clear." Then speaking of the Spaniards' having accepted the offer of $20,000,000 for improvements which Spain had put into the islands, it went on: "Though the arrangement is one more blow to national pride, it may be softened by the consideration that there is no means of escape, and that no sacrifice which Spain might make by provoking a renewal of hostilities could do more than add to her loss. There is no dishonour in yielding in circumstances so completely precluding all idea of resistance. Another and more prosaic consideration which may help to reconcile Spaniards to their fate is that the restoration of order in the Philippines and the establishment of a government capable of paying its way is a task far beyond the strength of Spain in her present crippled condition. Her finances are sufficiently embarrassed without an attempt to continue the government of the islands at a loss; so

21. Ibid., LXXVI, 691, Nov. 26, 1898.
that taken all round the abandonment of sovereignty may be accepted as an evil not without serious mitigation."

The Investors' Review also spoke of prostration. And no one came to Spain's aid or lifted a finger to help her. "She lay prostrate, alone and in great measure unpitied, and therefore had to submit."

The Daily News said on the question of the surrender of the Philippines that it could have been solved in but one way. "Spain has no internal means of resistance... Therefore, what the United States demands, Spain must necessarily yield."

There were also expressions of opinion which, while not referring by name to Spain's inability to back by force her refusal to yield up the Philippine Islands, did nevertheless state that, for whatever reason, Spain would have to grant America's demand. The Outlook, reviewing the Congressional elections in the United States, said that inasmuch as the Republicans still held control, President McKinley might very well believe that he had the country behind him in his demand for the Philippine Islands. "In these circumstances the Queen Regent's Commissioners in Paris might as well make up their minds at once to give way to their American colleagues." The Speaker also took the attitude that Spain could do nothing but render up the Philippines. The Speaker stated that deadlock had come in the conference when the Spaniards declared that their government had not understood the protocol to state that there was a chance the

22 Times, Nov. 29, 1898.  
23 Investors' Review, XII, 764, Dec. 2, 1898.  
25 Outlook, II, 450, Nov. 12, 1898.
Philippines would have to be surrendered. The comment of The Speaker was pointed: "The American reply will not be given till to-day at the earliest, but nobody supposes that it will make any concession, or that Spain can do more than 'protest and go home.' In argument her pretensions are baseless, and circumstances make them futile."

The Saturday Review, after stating that there was an air of tragedy about seeing a proud nation like Spain stripped of her colonial empire, said nevertheless, that Spain would be forced to give up the Philippine Islands.

English journals also gave - in unstinted profusion - their reasons why the United States should keep the Philippines. These reasons were various; several were phrased in general enough fashion such as "right of conquest," "America's responsibility," and "Anglo-Saxons do not give up territory they have once taken." Others were much more specific; one urged the danger in case any other power or powers became interested in the Philippines. The reason most often mentioned, however, was the responsibility that America had assumed towards the natives. America had broken down and destroyed the only government, the only restraint against anarchy that existed in the islands - the Spanish. Now she could not wash her hands of this responsibility by forsaking the islands. It was her plain duty to take the Philippines because she had left them subject to disorder.

Two papers - at widely separated times - stated that the

Philippines belonged to the United States by right of conquest without much comment on the matter. The Times on May 12 stated that "if the Philippine Islands were to pass virtually into control of a great Power or Powers the United States might well ask who had so good a right to their succession as the United States." Black and White said months later that "Washington does seem to have earned its title to possession, and the Philippines are simply the fair spoil of the conqueror."

The Pall Mall Gazette at one time stressed the responsibility: "Unquestionably America has accepted a heavy responsibility in turning her back upon the traditional principle of abstention from over-sea enterprise. But Englishmen, who are not in the habit of shirking responsibility, will like their kinsmen none the less for that, and will even recognize in their decision to go forward the influence of the blood which is common to both nations."

The Saturday Review in one issue was equally general in its discussion, saying "we have yet to hear of any instance in which the United States has laid hold of territory and then voluntarily let it go. So the Philippines will go to America...."

Several journals were concerned with the danger that would arise if the United States did not take the Philippine Islands - for then European nations would vie for them. The Philippines would be-

29. Pall Mall Gazette, Dec. 6, 1898.
come the apple of discord. The Speaker brought forth this idea as early as May 7. After mentioning several reasons that the United States had for keeping the islands, The Speaker went on to say that possibly the European Powers would propose some arrangement whereby Spain would retain her sovereignty. "That will no doubt, be distasteful to America; but it remains to be seen whether the cooler heads among her statesmen will care to change her destiny and embroil her with Europe for the sake of so unexpected a prize. It is a most embarrassing question - embarrassing enough to America, but far more so to Europe; and its settlement is one of the gravest problems which the war has set up for the world. Probably it would be less dangerous for the peace of the world for America to keep them than to exchange them or give them away."

The Guardian, in proposing that the United States would have to keep the Philippine Islands, opined that she could not give them to any European power, for by that action she would make an enemy of each of the other powers. That President McKinley wished to annex the Philippine Islands was, according to The Outlook, "pretty certain because there is authentic evidence that he is keenly alive to [the fact]...that if America now withdrew from the Philippines they would

31. Speaker, XVII, 566, May 7, 1898.
32. Guardian, LIII (1), 693, May 11, 1898. The Guardian also said in the same article that the United States could not give the islands back to Spain, for the same reasons that made her object to Spanish rule in Cuba were operative in the Philippines, and that she could not give them to Japan, for that would be too valuable a prize to give to men of a different color! (Ibid., LIII (1), 693, May 11, 1898.)
become straightway the cockpit of Europe...." "This is the time to prevent once for all the dangers of a Philippine scramble in the future," said The Pall Mall Gazette, favoring United States retention of the islands. The Investors' Review gave as its opinion that the United States could not have taken one island and leave the rest to Spain.

"That would merely have meant that every Power eager to get a foothold among the islands would have bought or driven out Spain from what was left to her."

But a much more often-used argument for the United States taking the Philippine Islands was based on English conception of the duty of the United States. The Philippines were not able to govern themselves, Spain could not give them an effective government, and if the United States turned its back on them, after having destroyed what semblance of government there had been in the islands, anarchy would result. There was here a responsibility, which according to many English journals, America could not shirk.

As early as May 4 The Morning Advertiser raised the question of turning the islands back to Spain. "Are they to be eventually given back to Spain, to be permanently retained by the United States, or to pass, by arrangement to some other Power? The first solution does not altogether a likely one after the American outcry against Spanish misrule, but any other is likely to involve international complica-

tions." For the United States to give up the Philippines after having abolished a government, bad though it was, would be a baseness, argued The Spectator. "She had better even partition the islands among the Great Powers, though, as we maintain, she is bound, having upset a bad civilization, to provide a good one, and not to shirk responsibilities which, from the moment Admiral Dewey broke into the harbour of Manila, she took upon herself."

The Daily Telegraph said that "by pulling down what frail fabric of government already existed, the United States could not escape responsibility for the future regulation of the island[sic]."

The Investors' Review believed that since Aguinaldo had grown so strong and had "shown such doubtful intentions as to make his presence a constant menace to Manila" that all of the island of Luzon should be taken. Then of Aguinaldo The Investors' Review continued: "Such a man could not be trusted not to sell his birthright to the Germans, the Russians, or the French. When the day for decision comes, therefore, it will be all or nothing and the States must take all, whether they like it or not. Then the natives will have to be subdued." A week later the same journal said that if Aguinaldo's wishes to have the United States withdraw from the Philippine Islands were heeded it would leave the islands either to anarchy or to the first European nation that wanted to annex them.

38. Daily Telegraph, Nov. 15, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 638, Nov. 18, 1898.
It then stated that the "devotees" of jingoism "are hushed by the
nearness of the new and heavy responsibilities placed upon them.
But they cannot escape these; they must face them, and will, doubt-
less, successfully cope with them." Somewhat later The Investors' 
Review said that the United States could not help itself. "In
destroying the feeble, but still only effective, supreme or civilised
authority in these islands the United States became morally bound to
prevent the consequences likely to fall on such law-abiding citizens
as were bereft of protection through their victory. To leave the
islands now would be to open the way to massacres and a state of the
utmost lawlessness. The moral sense of the United States forbids them
41
to do any such thing."

The Outlook likewise expressed on several occasions this same
point of view, stating that "the United States has made herself de
facto responsible for life and property in these islands. This is a
grave responsibility, and it certainly will not be discharged by an
ignominious flight just when the responsibility begins to weigh. No
amount of moral platitudes upon the obligations of good faith would
serve to cover the naked fact that, having taken up the sword in the
cause of good government, the United States only succeeded in
abolishing what little government did exist, to make way for sheer
42
anarchy." The Outlook returned to the same question somewhat later.

After learning that M. Cambon had been requested to ask for terms of
40. Investors' Review, XII,407, Sept. 23, 1898. 41. Ibid., XII, 619, Nov. 4, 1898.
42. Outlook, I, 712, July 9, 1898.
peace, The Outlook said that the Philippine Islands would be the crux of the negotiations. But there was no need for difficulty if two considerations took precedence over all others: that the United States could dispose of the islands without hindrance from European Powers, and "that the United States is under obligation to see to it that the Filipinos [sic] are secured in good government." If Spain were re-admitted to sovereignty the same conditions would ensue which obtained in Cuba and which caused the United States to go to war. The only solution was to take the whole group, and hold them until in the judgment of the United States they were ready for self-government.

The Graphic also expressed itself forcibly on this question. "To return them to Spain would be to give away the whole humanitarian case for the relief of Cuba, and hence for the war itself. The Philippines in Spanish hands have suffered quite as much as Cuba, and it will be impossible for the United States to hand them back to a regime the evils of which are the sole justification of the present war." Again, during the peace negotiations, The Graphic argued this same way. President McKinley had only two courses - to keep the Philippines, or to return them to Spain. To have handed them over to Aguinaldo and his banditti would have been criminal. "If Spanish rule is too corrupt and tyrannical to be any longer tolerated in the West Indies, how could American statesmen have made pretense that it would be quite a different character in the East Indies?"

The Times also had much to say on this question of America.

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43. Outlook, I, 805, July 30, 1898. 44. Graphic, LVII, 586, May 14, 1898.
45. Ibid., LVIII, 398, Nov. 5, 1898.
taking the Philippines to prevent disorder within them. Speaking in
July of Cuba and of the Philippines, it said: "In both countries
there is a large insurgent population whose future will have to be
taken into account. Probably the best thing for the world at large
and for these populations themselves would be that America should
boldly assume the burden of giving them a strong and honest Govern-
ment through her own officials....But it is pretty clear that if
Spain were recognized by America as mistress of the Philippines she
would have to engage in a war of reconquest which might be attended
by the most serious consequences to American and other inter-
national interests in the Pacific, and would almost certainly give
rise to angry disputes between the two nations as to the treatment
of the 'rebels'...." Later The Times said that "the American
conscience cannot rid itself of a sense of responsibility for the
human wreckage of a State which American arms have crushed." In
August, discussing the American peace commission and its work, The
Times said that it seemed "almost inevitable that the permanent
occupation of Manila by the United States, and a fortiori the
occupation of any larger portion of territory, must involve a
responsibility, which cannot easily be repudiated, for the
tranquillity and good order of the whole archipelago." The Times
asserted that "conquest has its duties as well as its rights, and
a Power which has overthrown a civilized Government, however im-
perfect, is morally bound not to leave anarchy in its place." Still later, during the sessions of the peace conference, The Times again reverted to this same problem: "But the manifest inability of the Spanish Government to exercise effective dominion over these islands has compelled the Americans to recognize to the fullest extent the responsibility involved in the victory which not only placed Manila in their hands but paralyzed the authority of Spain throughout the archipelago. It is seen to be impossible to leave the destinies of the Philippines at the mercy of the insurgents."

The Guardian was much distressed early in the war that there were people in the United States who favored fighting the war merely to drive the Spaniard out of Cuba and the Philippine Islands and then allowing the insurgents to set up the kind of government they would. After mentioning the arguments used by such people, The Guardian went on to demonstrate the wrongness of it all. "The reasoning is excellent, but it leaves out of sight two important considerations. The first is that no Power has a moral right to destroy without building up. If the United States drive the Spaniards from the islands they are bound not to give them over to anarchy, and as yet there is nothing to show that the insurgents have any facility of government." By August, however, The Guardian, while still concerned with the fate of the Philippines (that of Cuba having been settled by the protocol), was pleased to think that the problem was in the way of settlement according to its

48. Times, Aug. 27, 1898. 49. Ibid., Nov. 1, 1898.
50. Guardian, LIII (1), 833, June 1, 1898.
wishes and stated that "it may be taken for granted that the islands will pass as completely from the rule of Spain as Egypt and Cyprus have passed from the rule of the Turk. Whatever the Americans may think of the Philippine insurgents, they cannot abandon them to the mercies of their former masters. Still less can they let them go their own way, after the manner of Hayti or Nicaragua, and at the same time undertake to protect them."

The Speaker also used the "moral obligation" argument in urging that America take the Philippine Islands. After stating that the United States had crippled the Spanish government and were not to be blamed for that because "the war was just and unselfish," The Speaker continued: "But righteous acts bring their consequences as well as unrighteous, and it is not for the Great Power of the West to shrink from consequences because they are burdensome.... For the Philippines themselves, as for the Archipelago [sic] the change from Spanish to American rule will be a change from darkness to light." Two weeks later The Speaker said that the deadlock over the Philippine Islands could not delay the settlement in the peace conference for long, because the words of the protocol could not be construed by Spain to mean anything but surrender of the islands. "Looking at the hard facts, the justification of the United States is complete. An occupation of only part of the islands would raise all the difficulties as to the prevention of filibustering - not to speak

52. *Speaker*, XVIII, 535, Nov. 5, 1898.
of smuggling - which were expressly alleged by the United States Government as furnishing one of the reasons for intervention in Cuba. The certainty of such difficulties is increased by the fact that the islands have long been in insurrection, and that the Spanish Government has shown itself unable to restore order....Now that another case of anarchy is forced upon the notice of its Government, is that Government to withdraw and leave the islands to be scrambled for by the Powers of Europe, to the detriment of American interests...?"

The Pall Mall Gazette said that with every wish to deal gently with the Spaniards President McKinley "will find it very difficult to insure the tranquillity of the islands without some sort of control by the United States." At the time during the meeting of the peace conference, when it became rumored that America would demand the Philippines entire, The Pall Mall Gazette gloated in the news. "This policy...will set forth a policy worthy of a great people. In the end the Americans would have been bound to annex one group after another, if only for the sake of the public peace. No settlement would be secure while an island over the way was in the hands of half-breed filibusters."

Possible disorder or anarchy resulting from the United States not taking the Philippine Islands were not the words used by The Saturday Review, but it did, in no less vigorous terms than other journals, express the desirability of having the United States take the islands. After rehearsing examples of Aguinaldo's ignorance it

stated that it was "evident that the United States will have to take
over the Philippines along with Cuba and Porto Rico. The Filipinos
cannot stand alone; the United States must accept the situation and
make the best of it." Two weeks later The Saturday Review continued
in the same line of thought: "[The Cubans or] the Filipinos are quite
as fit for self-government as a plantation of Louisiana negroes, and
the country that has conquered them must govern them."

If English journals confessed to believe that the United States
would have, for one reason or another, to take over the Philippines,
they were delighted at the prospect that the United States would take
them over. The great majority of expressions of this delight were made
either just after America's first expression of interest in the
islands or during the meetings of the peace conference. To be sure,
however, there were also such expressions made throughout the course of
the war. But there were, so to speak, "periods" of interest in
the fate of the Philippines.

The Times right after the Battle of Manila said of America's
continuing to hold the Philippines that "on many grounds such a solu-
tion would certainly not be viewed with disfavour in this country...."

56. Saturday Review, LXXXVI, 394, Sept. 24, 1898. After stating that in an
interview with a representative of Reuter's news agency Aguinaldo
had declared for absolute independence, The Saturday Review con-
tinued: "He did not understand any other; he did not know the
British system of Colonies and Protectorates; he did not know the
American system of State autonomy; he did not even know whether
Australia was or was not an American colony. It is evident from
this colossal ignorance that President Aguinaldo would make a first-
class diplomatist." (Ibid., LXXXVI, 394, Sept. 24, 1898.)
57. Ibid., LXXXVI, 458, Oct. 8, 1898.  58. Times, May 4, 1898.
And five days later it said that if America determined at the end of
the war to take over the Philippines "we should welcome that as the
best solution of the problem for all parties concerned." Of such a
solution The Fall Hall Gazette said: "We can only say that there are
many things this country would less gladly see," while Black and
White said of the United States in the Philippines: "We, at least, may
welcome her there heartily enough...." The Outlook was pleased at
the prospect and urged that England support America in the Philippines:
"Let her retain them; let England frankly support the retention, be
the opposition on the part of the other Powers what it may...."

The Standard spoke less strongly but no less concretely: "It
need hardly be said that the occupation of Manila and its Dependencies
by the United States would be much more agreeable to us than their
possession by any other nation....Certainly, no discouragement will
come from this country to any manifestation of American opinion in
favour of retaining the Philippines." Bluntly and succinctly the
editor of The Spectator wrote down his opinion: "We think the
Americans will keep the Philippines, we hope they will most heartily,
and we can show that they have the means of doing so with little
trouble to themselves....We hope the Americans will keep the
Philippines, and that they can keep them we have no doubt whatever."

59. Times, May 9, 1898. 60. Fall Hall Gazette, May 9, 1898.
64. Spectator, LXXX, 646, May 7, 1898.
These were the comments made immediately after the Battle of Manila. But the passing of time did not modify or cool English enthusiasm for America's taking the Philippine Islands. The Times recurred to the question in July and said: "We have said from the first that this country would feel no jealousy whatever if the United States were to take possession of the Philippines...." The Daily Graphic, about the same time, said practically the same thing: "Great Britain would be quite willing to see the Americans in possession of that group of islands...." And after listing the terms of the protocol, The Spectator took occasion to say: "As our readers know, our hope is that America will accept her responsibilities in the Philippines...."

The Daily News was not so positive or enthusiastic, but raised no objections: "So far as British interests are concerned, we have nothing to fear from the annexation." The Guardian spoke of the European powers' disliking the prospect that America might take over the Philippines, and continued: "Englishmen do not share the feeling... and they look on an American harbour there as only less valuable than one belonging to themselves."

During the meetings of the peace conference statements of England's joy or at least willingness that America should take over the Philippines were made by several journals. The North British Daily

65. Times, July 18, 1898. The Times paraphrased this feeling on Sept. 3.
69. Guardian, LIII (II), 1281, Aug. 24, 1898.
Vail, speaking of the shift of the Philippines from Spanish to American sovereignty, said: "In this country we view the change with equanimity.... We may welcome the United States as a good neighbour, who will work with us for justice, peace, and progress in the Far East." The Times recurred to its previously asserted sentiments.

"This country, as we have said from the outset, regards with no jealousy whatever the assertion of American authority in the Philippine Archipelago.... We would rather see the Philippines in the hands of our American friends than in those of any European Power."

In discussing the results of the Congressional elections The Speaker said that America would have hesitated to take the Philippines "only if an imperative mandate to the contrary from the electorate could weaken her efforts. As that mandate has not been given she must go on; and, recognising all the difficulties before her, we still welcome her decision as the best thing for the welfare of the world."

From the discussion of the problems that arose during the peace conference it will be seen that English editors, for the most part, were well pleased at the terms that America had made with Spain. They were pleased that America had given her opponent easy terms. An Anglo-Saxon nation would not kick a man when he was down. And in this America had "lived up to her ancestry," and had incidentally drawn closer the bonds of sympathy that were binding...
the two nations together. There was no reason, said the editors, why
America should assume the debt which Spain had contracted and called
the "Cuban debt," and America had gratified the editors in not
assuming that debt. The terms of the protocol relating to the
Philippines were clear, and America was not only not exceeding these
terms in demanding at the conference the islands, but had pleased
English editors in so demanding them. There were many expressions of
the editors' pleasure that America was taking this step. Hence, on the
whole, the treaty that was drawn between the two countries was a just,
a good, and a reasonable treaty. That this treaty opened problems for
the United States, the editors admitted, but they stated too, that the
terms of the treaty were good terms. In the ensuing section of this
work the task will be to consider some of the problems raised by the
73
war and by the treaty ending it.

73. An amusing story was told in St. James's Budget concerning the
tricolored ribbon that was affixed to the seal on the treaty. The
commissioners of both countries expressed the desire to show
gratitude to France for the courtesy that had been extended to
both countries, by placing a tricolored ribbon under the seal.
In the French Foreign Office, however, no such tricolored ribbon
could be found. At this juncture one of the department heads in the
Foreign Office instructed a messenger to go to a confectionary, buy
some chocolate cakes, "and be sure you ask them to tie them up with
a tricolour ribbon. With that bit of confectioner's ribbon the
'Treaty of Peace between Spain and the United States was sealed."
(St. James's Budget, XXVI, 4, Dec. 30, 1898.)
American Imperialism

Certain problems arose during and as consequences of the war that must be treated— if intelligibly—as special topics rather than chronologically. Such topics are the imperialism consequent upon the American victory; the relation of the United States to the "open door" policy in China; the possibility of European intervention in the war or in the making of peace; and the mooted Anglo-American alliance. What English editors wrote about American imperialism will be the subject of the present chapter.

The consequences of the Spanish-American War would seem to be out of proportion either to the declared purpose of the United States upon entering the war with Spain or to the length of the conflict. The United States had been an isolationist nation. It had steadfastly refused to become involved in European politics or wars. It had refused to join the ranks of those powers which were seizing possessions in far-flung parts of the world. On the other hand by one of the foundation-stones of her foreign policy, the Monroe doctrine, she had stated that she would not interfere with possessions held in the New World by European nations.

But now the centuries-old Spanish empire was being disrupted. It was falling to the western branch of the "Anglo-Saxon race. Specifically part of that empire lay in the New World, where America had for decades denied herself. How would English editors look upon
this development? Would they be pleased to see it go to the United States? Or would they resent this rival in the field of empire? To phrase the question more specifically: how did English editors believe that the advent of America as a colonial power would affect the material interests of England—English industry and commerce? Too, how would this development affect the position of England on the chessboard of international politics?

Previously the United States and England had points of contact only in the New World—in Canada, British Guiana, Jamaica, British Honduras, and so forth. And as has been seen earlier in this study, even within that limited area in which the two countries held territory, there had arisen at times sharp differences of opinion, and even talk of war. Now, however, those points of contact were to be flung over the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. How would English editors view this new aspect of Anglo-American relations?

England wanted America to take and keep these Spanish possessions. That has already been pointed out in the discussion anent the fate of the Philippine Islands. Progress, civilization, education, liberty, and increased trade were seen as benefits to be reaped by mankind as a consequence of this innovation in American policy. "The weary Titan," as the editors often referred to Great Britain, was in his civilizing mission now to have a partner, the younger branch of his own family. America was now to step forward and shoulder her part of the burden that England had so long been bearing.

But English editors did not permit their good will towards the
enterprise to blind them to the problems that would confront America as a consequence of this new step. For America had no experience in governing the "lesser" races. Some editors voiced the opinion that the new tasks and responsibilities would bring out the best in American character and would give Americans a more proper estimate of their (important) position in the world. Some thought that to have difficulties and complications would chasten Americans, for they had always been too self-contained and self-sufficient. An army would have to be recruited and maintained to protect and police the new possessions, and this by a people that had always been suspicious of a large standing army. Further, there would be the expense of a greatly strengthened navy. Some editors were gloomy in advance over the prospect thus facing America. For many of them believed that these problems would not be easy of solution. Others, with an eye on America's recent internal political history, believed that the United States would have to form a civil service to rule the empire. Were the men in this civil service carefully selected and well paid, there would be little corruption, and America's colonial empire would be efficiently managed. The men who favored this policy were obviously thinking that if America followed English precedent her empire would stand a good chance of being a successful one - almost as successful a one as the British. Furthermore, this necessity of managing an empire would tend to make Americans less critical of the English and would tend thus towards closer Anglo-American relations.

But the chorus of editors was not all singing in the same key.
There were a few discordant notes. Some editors professed to see in America's imperialism only a manifestation of America's cocksureness and high-handedness. One paper criticized it on the score that it was "dollar" imperialism, brought about by the industrial and commercial magnates in the United States to serve their own ends.

That America was casting loose her old moorings and was on the way to becoming a world power was early seen and much commented upon. Beginning with the Spanish-American War, it was said, America would never be the same as before. There were many general remarks on this development together with more specific comments, in which America's action in connection with the Monroe doctrine was specifically commented upon. It will be more feasible to discuss the general comments first, and then the more specific ones.

Blackwood's Magazine stated in the issue of May, 1898 that America was sailing out to be a world power, and then was sufficiently vague in its/upon this action. "Whether the start has been well made, with sagacity, with dignity, with due circumspection and preparedness against internal disturbance, for example, is for the Americans to consider. For our part, we must acknowledge that the movement is perfectly natural, if not 'mysteriously' imperative; and also entirely their affair."

The Review of Reviews, in telling that certain Americans believed that Mr. McKinley had tied his government's hands to begin with, and that these Americans were saying that to annex Cuba after

disclaiming any intent to exercise sovereignty would be "an act of aggression, an act of dishonour," went on, almost with prescience to say; "No doubt such things are said. Equally is it beyond doubt that they were sincerely believed. But we shall see. The force of circumstances is more powerful than the words of presidents. The Americans are now going into Cuba. Even if they come out again they will never be again what they were before....For if Cuba lies outside and they have gone to Cuba, the pressure to go elsewhere outside will be increased. The Cuban precedent will constantly be invoked to justify intervention elsewhere. The making of their foreign Empire has begun. It is this that constitutes the supreme importance for us of the action taken by the American Government in the matter of Cuba." This would mean, it stated, that for the first time England's monopoly of the representation abroad of the English-speaking world was broken into.

The Spectator as early as May 7 stated its belief that the United States would hesitate to give up the Philippine Islands because those islands would enable the United States to strike hard on the Chinese coast to maintain its trade there. "To retain them is, of course, to give up their traditional policy of non-interference in the politics of the world; but we confess we have not much faith in self-denying policies of that kind. To shake down an ancient European throne is surely interference with Europe of a definite kind, and they are doing that already."

"If the very day," The Review of Reviews stated in its next issue, "before Dewey opened fire on the Spanish ships...any one had predicted that the American people, or any section of them, would listen to the suggestion that they should undertake the perilous and costly enterprise of governing a dependency at the other side of the Pacific Ocean, he would have been scouted as a lunatic by all intelligent observers both within and without the United States. Nothing, he would have been told indignantly, was more utterly opposed to American ideas.... His prophecy, incredible though it would have seemed, would nevertheless have come to pass."

In its issue of the same month The Sunday Magazine also mentioned this new path that Americans would be compelled to hue. "Experience has shown that in spite of their desire they cannot stand apart from the rest of the world, that the interests of America and its duties cannot be confined to the American continent. If the war continues as it has begun, the statesmen of the Republic will be strongly tempted to strike out a new policy and to abandon the old principle of reaction." That paper then went on to mention the compulsion that Americans would feel to keep Cuba, and the temptation to keep the Philippine Islands, the latter "to repay themselves for what the war must cost them." The Economist defined the change in American policy succinctly if not exhaustively by stating"let us understand that if on the European side the war issues in the decay of a once great Power, on the other side of

4. Review of Reviews, XVII, 531, June 1, 1898.
5. Sunday Magazine, XXVII, 431, June, 1898
the Atlantic it involves nothing less than an American Revolution."

As time went on, the English editors had opportunity to perceive more of the consequences of the change in American policy inherent in the war. On August 6 The Spectator, after stating that the world would be different after the war, went on: "America has given up her Continental isolation, and become a World-Power with a great Navy." On the same day The Saturday Review stressed America's embarrassment in her new position, without, however, extending any sympathy. The war had been a deception for the United States, it said, for the Cubans were "vile," and the Filipinos were as ready to attack the United States as Spain. "It is a case where the victor is more embarrassed than the vanquished. And yet even the American probably does not realize how far he has departed from the traditional policy of the Republic, and that there is no retracing his steps. For good or for ill the States are now in the midst of that melee of warring, jarring peoples which we call the comity of nations. We trust they will like their new experiences."

The Times spoke of the difficulties opened up for Americans by the Antilles and the Philippines and then continued: "These islands may be taken just now as the symbol of an American awakening and of the entry of the Republic upon a new career which - Philippines or no Philippines - she is henceforth bound to follow."

The Guardian, recurring to history for its parallel, believed that the Spanish-American War threatened to disturb European politics as

7. Spectator, LXXXI, 170, Aug. 6, 1898.  
8. Saturday Review, LXXVII, 162, Aug. 6, 1898.  
much as the Franco-Prussian War. "Inconsiderable as it is in itself by the side of that conflict of giants, it is equally the revelation of a new force of the first order. In every fresh combination of the Great Powers the United States will have to be taken into account."

The Pall Mall Gazette also had reference to the Franco-Prussian War. After discussing the disposition of the Philippine Islands, it went on: "But we believe that on moral, political, and economic grounds the trend of American feeling is unmistakable, and it will not surprise us if, as the defeat of France crowned William I. German Emperor, the defeat of Spain establishes the United States as an Imperial Power."

Several months later The Daily Telegraph, discussing the decision of America to take the Philippine Islands, said: "For America the choice was a momentous one, inasmuch as it implied, not perhaps immediately, but ultimately, the abandonment of that policy of isolation which she had pursued since the War of Independence, and which has ensured her peace with the outer world, and relieved her from the burden of maintaining a standing army and a large fleet. The Americans, however, took their resolution with their eyes open to all the consequences it 12 entailed."

At the same time The Speaker in discussing the deadlock in the peace conference over the Philippine Islands opined that Spain would have to yield, for the protocol was plain on the matter, and then

11. Pall Mall Gazette, Aug. 27, 1898.
continued: "And so the Philippines...pass under the control of the most enterprising of peoples, and the Republic of the West abandons the principles of its founder and enters on a new phase of its career."

In December, The Speaker, in commenting on President McKinley's annual message to Congress, said that "one great conception stands out from it. America can never again be regarded as self-sufficing, developing her own resources and confined mainly to her own problems. She comes before the world as a great colonial Power, the educator of backward peoples, preparing them for self-government or opening them up to the civilizing forces of the West. And she stands out as a great commercial not merely supplying older nations with raw material, but competing with them in new markets today, and tomorrow in their own. She takes her stand beside England on the sea and in the Far East....She becomes an important military and Naval Power; she takes up some of the burdens, along with the career, of the great states of Western Europe."

The Daily Telegraph combined the idea of America's becoming a power in world politics with that of her taking sides with England against possible opponents. "America was always a potential factor in the affairs of the world, and recent events have made her an actual factor. A new piece has been added to the board, and it is tolerably certain that the new piece will be found in combination with ours, rather than with those of our possible adversaries."

Along with these general statements about the United States be-

13. Speaker, XVIII, 593, Nov. 19, 1898.
coming an imperial power and cutting her old leading strings were many specifically mentioned the effect on the Monroe Doctrine of this development. The Spectator after saying that if America were to take the Philippine Islands, it would be a permanent occupation and would lead to "entanglements with European Powers," went on: "It is idle for any American to suppose that the Stars and Stripes can be kept waving in Manilla [sic] in absolute indifference to what is happening on the mainland of Asia, where American trading interests are already so large. The Americans are ambitious, aggressive, little prone to be quietly beaten in a fight or a bargain....Settled at Manila they would be forced to take their hands in the struggle for 'territorial compensations,'  

They may talk Monroe, but they would act jingo."

Punch, while the negotiations for the protocol were progressing, displayed graphically the European idea of America's becoming an imperial power in a full-page cartoon entitled "Doctrine and Practice." Dame Europa was shown standing in a garden, drawn up in haughty and quizzical style, facing Uncle Sam, who is standing in jaunty fashion, with his legs apart, and his hands in his trousers' pockets. "Dame Europa (coldly). 'To whom do I owe the pleasure of this intrusion?'

Uncle S. 'Ma'am - my name is Uncle Sam!'  

Dame Europa. 'Any relation of the late Colonel Monroe?'"

The Graphic not only mentioned the Monroe Doctrine, but hinted at some of the consequences of America's scrapping it." Thus the Washington

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16 Spectator, XVIII, 6, July 2, 1898.
17 Punch, CXV, 55, Aug. 6, 1898.
Government is compelled, malgre lui, to rip up the very last shreds of the Monroe Doctrine and to accept all the penalties attaching to world 18 power."

Black and White based its comments on political considerations within the United States. After the peace treaty had been signed, it stated that there was much feeling in the United States against taking the Philippine Islands. "The Philippines are desirable; possession of them is lawful, but is it expedient? That is the question American politicians are asking themselves. Beyond the expense of guarding and 'running' them, there are grave matters of international moment to be taken into account. And there is that eternally persistent Monroe Doctrine, which, strive as they can, American statesmen cannot forget."

The Economist was more pointed in its comments than any of the journals just quoted on what dropping the Monroe Doctrine would mean to America. "The most obvious result of a policy of annexation will be to drag the United States from their comparative isolation into the world-politics of the European Powers. This would, of course, involve the practical renunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, on the intelligible ground that one cannot eat one's cake and have it. If the United States are to interfere with European and Asiatic affairs, Europe must and will interfere in American affairs, North and South. The vast and wealthy continent of South America will no longer be locked against the world

18.Graphic,LVIII,466,Oct.8,1898.
of enterprise and colonization in Europe. The Outlook, even though it wrote before The Economist, was even more specific about consequences.

"Our advice to our cousins...is to remember the fable of the dog, which, on crossing a bridge, dropped his piece of meat in order to snap at a promising reflection of it in the water. So long as the Monroe Doctrine is kept intact, the United States can fairly expect to keep trespassers off South America. If the Philippines be retained, the German Emperor may be sending the 'mailed fist' to La Plata one of these days."

It is interesting to note that while English editors commented much on America's breaking loose from her nation-old policy of a self-imposed exclusion from world possessions, most of the editors wished America well in her new venture.

As early as March The Sketch expressed a desire to see a change of owners in Cuba and some progressive power take control there. Speaking of Hawaii and Cuba it said: "These are toothsome but large morsels, and there would be far less danger of a collision over small matters when each nation had its own considerable colonial interests to foster." As for the Sandwich Islands or Cuba, it went on to say, no Englishman "who counts" here

20. Economist, LVI, 1003, July 9, 1898.
21. Outlook, I, 432, May 7, 1898. It is interesting to quote/something which The Saturday Review had written before hostilities broke out and before the question of the Philippines or the Monroe Doctrine had been breached. "The quarter of a million German 'uitlanders' in South Brasil will not always be content with the present state of affairs, and if Berlin backs up their demands and extends its protectorate, the Monroe Doctrine may involve not bullying but some actual fighting."
22. Only one journal expressed any desire for England to take over any of the possessions of Spain. The Saturday Review (LXXXVI, 225, Aug. 20, 1898) censured Lord Salisbury for not having proposed to the United States English co-operation in placing the government of the Philippines on "an assured basis"; for, said that journal, the Americans would be only too glad to let England have a coaling station in their new possessions in exchange for such help.
wants to oppose the United States. "We shall be ready enough to welcome a
kindred nation, with aims and interests corresponding to our own," said
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The Guardian.

While negotiations were progressing towards the signing of the
protocol, The Investors' Review commented upon the spread of the
sentiment in the United States for the annexation of Spain's insular
possessions. "We are not surprised at the spread of this sentiment, and
in some lights welcome it. The American people would not be of the same
race as ourselves if this desire did not show itself and become strong
with success. We, at any rate, cannot throw stones at them if they do
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lay hold of these conquests and stick to them...." "The people of the
United States, at any rate, may feel assured that they have the good
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wishes of this country in their new career," said The Times much later.

The North British Daily Mail, speaking of the transfer of owner-
ship of the Philippines, said: "In this country we view the change with
equanimity....We may welcome the United States there as a good neighbor,
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who will work with us for justice, peace, and progress in the Far East."

That many English editors not only were glad that America was be-
coming an imperial power but espoused the idea that Britain wanted any
of the Spanish possessions is attested by several expressions of opin-

25. Investors' Review, XII, 74, July 22, 1898.
27. North British Daily Mail, Nov. 1, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 580,
Nov. 4, 1898.
ions. At various times during and after hostilities suggestions were made in the United States that the Philippine Islands be traded or given to Great Britain. Among one such suggestion that the islands be given to Great Britain in order to cement the Anglo-Saxon Alliance, The Daily Mail uttered an unequivocal negative. "We cannot but feel flattered as a nation by this fresh proof of friendship from the people of the United States. The mere suggestion shows that they trust us implicitly. But the trouble is that we do not want the Philippines. In view of our daily increasing empire in Africa, and of our obligations in China, we shall do well to avoid unduly stretching the bow."

The Spectator said that it hoped America would keep the Philippines. Now it was most unusual in the heyday of the cult of Kipling, Froude, and Dilke and other abettors of empire to find any expression to the effect that Britain had already too much empire, that the far-flung empire had been flung too far. Yet that is what The Spectator then went on to admit too, that England needed an ally in carrying the "white man's burden." "She [America] will govern them well enough, much better than any Power except ourselves, and we have more of the world's surface than we can well manage....The envy we excite is already excessive that we fear there is already a faltering at the centre of affairs, produced not by timidity, but by a just sense that for England to do anything anywhere is to stir the water which envelops the world, and drive a wave upon some coast it is not intended to attack. It would be a relief if another English-speaking Power would 26. Daily Mail, May 4, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 542, May 6, 1898.
take up a portion of our task, and in taking it, perform the duty of repaying something to the world which yields her such advantages. The 'weary Titan,' in fact, needs an ally while traversing 'the too vast orb of his fate,' and the only ally whose aspirations, ideas, and language are like his own is the great American people."

While the fate of the Philippines was still unsettled The Spectator again expressed its opinions on their disposition. If left independent they could become a new Hayti. They could not be handed over to either France or Germany. "The handing over of the Philippines to England must also be struck out of the list of possible alternatives. We do not want the islands, and if we did it would not be wise to take them." Then recurring to the connection between the Philippines and an Anglo-American understanding, it said: "We mean the world to realize that our sympathy for, and understanding with, America was not based upon any expectation of favours to come. The world must be taught that the foundations of the race alliance have been laid upon something much stronger than self-interest. The only course that remains is for America to retain the islands under her own direct control."

29. Spectator, LXX, 646, May 7, 1898. The quotation then continued by explaining why other nationalities could not be allies of England in the business of empire: "The Frenchman is too fickle, the Russian is too full of guile, and the German too harsh in his treatment of all who do not think that to be drilled is the first, if not the only duty of man."

It may not be gratuitous to point out that as early as 1898 the dangers were clearly recognized of creating trouble in one part of the British Empire by making a move in another.

30. Spectator, LXXXI, 136, July 30, 1898. As opposed to these statements that England did not want the Philippine Islands must be placed one that professed to believe a good one, Mr. Andrew Carnegie's suggestion that England trade her West Indian islands for the Philippines. "The position of the (Cont'd on p. 237)
English editors were amply aware though, while welcoming the United States into the ranks of imperial powers, that such a new development in American policy was going to mean many complicated problems to be solved. America's inexperience in handling partially civilized or uncivilized peoples was a handicap. The Cubans and Filipinos seemed to many editors to be particularly troublesome because of their disappointing experiences with the Spanish government. Left free these possessions would hastily degenerate into anarchy. Verily, America had cut out a difficult task for herself.

Because of the different status which these possessions were to occupy under the American aegis, the English attitude towards them as problems facing America will be dealt with separately. Of course a distinct separation will not always be possible because the editors did not themselves deal always with the subjects separately. Nevertheless, the attempt shall be made.

The Speaker as early as February, 1898, said that "the acquisition of Cuba would be eminently embarrassing to the United States. The acquisition of, say, two ultra-Catholic States with a foreign and partly...

30. (Cont'd from p.236) British West Indies, if the markets of the United States are closed to them, as they probably will be under the new colonial policy of the Americans, will be even more deplorable than at present, and already there is a feeling amongst our colonists in favour of annexation to the States. On the other hand, the possession of the Philippines might be of great value to us in our Eastern dominions. Mr. Carnegie's idea seems excellent." (South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate Mail, X.V, 255, Sept. 3, 1898). The Outlook did not go so far, but suggested that if the Philippines were to be disposed of, England should "have a say on the subject." Outlook, 1, 233, May 7, 1898.
Negro population to the Union, and of four Senators to the already unmanageable majority in the Senate, would present a new set of problems in the conduct of American politics. As a protected Republic the island might be more manageable; but we see no reason to suppose it would be much better governed than Venezuela or Uruguay."

Three weeks later it returned to the same subject, and after stating that before the American Civil War Cuba would not have been nearly "so inconvenient a possession as today," went on: "But Cuba today would be far more embarrassing as a State of the Union than New Mexico, which has been qualified for admission as a State for many years past, but remains a territory because of the large element of Mexican Roman Catholics in its population. What would the "A.F.A.," founded to keep native Americans free from the control of a foreign and priest-ridden electorate, say to a measure which would put two Spanish Roman Catholic into the Senate?" Still later The Speaker foresaw brigandage becoming rampant in Cuba, but was hopeful of American ability to cope with it. There will be "more brigandage than there has ever been in the worst parts of the Far East. But there will also be an inrush of American planters and traders; and we can trust Americans to put down disorder with a strong hand when they have a mind to. For, said The Speaker, "by troops or police or Vigilance Committees, order will be kept in Cuba."

31. Speaker, XVII, 224, Feb. 19, 1898.
32. Speaker, XVII, 319, Mar. 12, 1898.
33. Ibid., XVII, 597, May 14, 1898.
Again, speaking of the embarrassment that Cuba would cause the United States, The Speaker said hopefully, however, that there were few modern nations that had "shown the assimilative power of the American Union."

The South American Journal was also concerned over the problem of the future of Cuba. "It is easy to perceive that some of the Americans' greatest difficulties will begin when the war is ended. To hand over Cuba to the independent control of the natives will be to incur the risk of the island developing into another Santo Domingo or Hayti, a turbulent 'Republic of Opera Bouffe.' On the other hand, the Americans have declared that they will never annex Cuba, and the temper of the natives is such that they will not readily brook the surveillance and interference which necessarily must exist in a protectorate."

"Free Cuba, left to herself, will be a smaller Venezuela or Haiti," said the Sketch. "If the Americans try to control their clients, how long will it be before an American General is, more effectively and humanely perhaps, finishing the work that Weyler left undone, and scientifically exterminating the remnant of the Cuban Republicans?"

A month later The Sketch stated that some journals in the United States were discussing the next move in American expansion and had even had "the enormous bad taste" to suggest Canada, and deprecated the idea that America would take any such step, at least for a long time to come. "Cuba is a big bite, and will take much chewing to re-

34. Ibid., XVII, 437, Apr. 9, 1898.
35. South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate Mail, XLV, 29, July 9, 1898.
36. Sketch, XXIII, 173, Aug. 17, 1898.
due it to a properly digestible condition."

The Times said of the Cuban rebels continuing to fight after the protocol had been signed: "It may prove troublesome business to put down an insurrection against all settled government whether Spanish or American, but the American people have put their hands to the plough and will not turn back because the difficulties turn out to be greater than they had anticipated."

English editors also saw difficulties confronting America from her having anything to do with the Philippine Islands. Only a month after the battle of Manila, The Review of Reviews was discussing "The Fate of the Philippines," and said that when the reinforcements reached Dewey "it is probable his troubles will begin. The Americans have not got the Philippines. It is rather the Philippines that have got them."

The Speaker, after stating that America would eventually take over sovereignty in the Philippines, spoke in oracular fashion, stating that America...will be at the beginning of difficulties without a parallel in her history." The Economist wished that Americans "should act with their eyes open, and a full sense of the magnitude of the tasks before them." The Times warned that the United States was going to find many difficulties in ruling strange peoples and that they would not be solved when "the Spanish flag is hauled down and the Stars and Stripes hoisted in its place." The Yorkshire Herald opined of the United States

37. Sketch, XXII, 536, July 20, 1898.
38. Times, Aug. 25, 1898.
39. Review of Reviews, XVII, 532, June 1, 1898.
40. Speaker, XVII, 721, June 11, 1898.
41. Economist, LVI, 1070, July 23, 1898.
42. Times, Dec. 12, 1898.
taking the Philippine Islands: "That they will repent of their bargain at an early date is a consequence which no one can prophesy; it is already pretty obvious...."

Along with these comments on the difficulties that America would have in the Philippines there were those in which Cuba and the Philippines were linked as being apt to be equally troublesome. After asking what the United States Government was to do with the Cuban and Philippine insurgents, The Guardian summed up: "Neither of them are in the least fitted for independence; neither of them seem likely to adorn a position of dependence." The Sketch having stated that Cuba would take considerable chomping to make it digestible to the United States, continued: "The Philippines are well fitted to become a bone of contention. And unbiased observers will be rather surprised if the United States do not have to wage a few 'little wars' on the Garcias and Aguinaldos of their new possessions or protectorates within a few years." The Times did not mention the possibility of "little wars", but was hardly more sanguine opining that the "future government of Cuba and the future disposition of the Philippines are problems... which cannot but tax severely the fortitude and patience of the American people as well as the statesmanship of her rulers."

Coupled with concern over the troubles America was going to encounter when she took Cuba and the Philippine Islands from Spain, went a solicitude on the part of the editors of English journals that America

44. Guardian, LIII (II), 1217, Aug. 10, 1898.
45. Sketch, XXIII, 173, Aug. 17, 1898.
46. Times, Aug. 20, 1898.
should cope successfully with them. This caused them to advise America rather freely on how to administer her new acquisitions if not possessions. This advice must not be considered as unfriendly or as having been given in any attitude of superiority, or of one who was talking down to America. It was given by most of the journals in no supercilious attitude, but rather because the editors were sincerely anxious that America should be a successful colonial power. As has been seen the editors of the journals wanted America to take the Philippines when America had not yet expressed herself. This desire was part and parcel of the friendship that we have seen evident in the overwhelming majority of the expressions of opinion printed in the year 1898. It needs no pointing out after having come this far in this study that Anglo-American relations were extremely close in 1898. For England wanted not merely friends, but strong friends. More, she wanted friends with naval and coaling stations scattered around the world. What could be more to her purposes than that the United States should own and continue to own (by governing them well) Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands, the latter in such a strategic position to help the Anglo-Saxon countries to consummate their will in China. These considerations may help to understand English solicitude that America so govern her new-found colonial empire as to be successful.

Because in the resolutions leading to intervention in Cuba the United States had disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty over Cuba, there was considerable speculation in English journals as to how the United States would handle "the Cuban question." Would she forget her self-limiting resolution, would she hold to the letter of it
and set Cuba up as a free state, or would she maintain a protectorate over the island?

One journal professed to believe, even before war broke out, that the Cuban problem might be solved if Cuba should be governed as Samos was governed. "If the Cubans, like the people of Samos, had what institutions and all the independence they pleased should not Spain, like Turkey, be content with the flying of her flag, the presence of a captain's guard, and an arrangement as to the island's debt?"

The Spectator believed the status of Territory with a Federal Commissioner would be the solution to the problem. "But if America... should annex, we trust she will not precipitately admit Cuba as two States. It would be far better to place the Territory of Cuba under a Federal Commissioner for a fixed term of years (say twenty), and not until that time has elapsed consider the question of admission to the Union. Admission into the Union at once means, in all probability two Senators nominated by the Sugar Trust and two by a Tobacco Combine. That is not a result that will do anyone any good. Material things go very fast in America, and ten years will doubtless see Cuba rich and populous, but twenty years will be wanted to turn the Cubans into capable citizens. But though this is our wish, it is not what we think will probably happen. It is far more likely that Cuba will become a Spanish-American Republic of the regular type."

47. Outlook, I, 323, Apr. 16, 1898.
48. Spectator, LXXX, 532, April 16, 1898.
When the terms of the protocol had been signed, The Daily Chronicle spoke of the American Cabinet's "problem of imposing domestic peace upon Cuba," and then continued: "We do not expect this will be so hard a task as it now appears. The insurgents will scarcely be so very foolish as to refuse to obey American orders, and the influx of American capital and energetic traders will have a wonderfully pacific effect."

In the course of his annual Message to Congress, given on December 5, 1898, President McKinley discussed the future government of Cuba: "As soon as we are in possession of Cuba and have pacified the Island it will be necessary to give aid and direction to its people to form a government for themselves. This should be undertaken at the earliest moment consistent with safety and assured success." This statement made The Pall Mall Gazette jubilant, but that journal admitted that practical circumstances might prevent America from effecting her good intentions. Discussing the speech The Pall Mall Gazette said: "Thus the seal of official recognition is set upon the doctrine that the United States went to Cuba for the Cubans' sake and not in lust of conquest. There is no reason whatever to doubt the entire good faith of that declaration. Circumstances, however, alter cases, as this country has found in Egypt, and it will be no reproach to America if it should turn out, after all, that the Spaniards were right in regarding the Cubans as incapable of self-government, and if America were

50. For. Recl. Lxxvi, 1898.
compelled to reconsider the self-denying ordinance which she has im-
posed upon herself."

Vanity Fair fairly well echoes these same ideas two days later.
"This is the frank and honourable remission of a promise, and it might be well for far older nations than the United States of America to take the lesson thus taught them to heart. Whether, however, the estab-
ishment of self-government in Cuba will succeed is another matter.
It will probably be found that, as we have had to deal with Egypt, so will America have to treat Cuba; and we do not feel at all sure that an American protectorate would not be the best thing for all concerned."

The Spectator, drawing a parallel from England's experience in Egypt, was, however, not overly optimistic. "The Cuban population is less, not more capable of self-government than that of the Spanish Republics on the mainland, yet not one of those conforms to the ideal standard of tranquillity and stability laid down by the President. In any case there will be a period during which, though Cuba has a native Government, the Americans will control the situation as we do in Egypt by the presence of a garrison." The Spectator then went on to express a specific bit of advice on the technique of governing Cuba. "That being so, they should at once clearly lay down - as Lord Granville did in Egypt - that in the case of any serious difference of opinion between the views of the local Executive and the views of the Government of the United States, it is the views of the latter.

51. Pall Mall Gazette, Dec. 6, 1898.
52. Vanity Fair, LX. 408, Dec. 8, 1898.
that will prevail. Unless such a notice is firmly and promptly given, it may take American shells to clearly define the relative positions of the two Governments."

The Review of Reviews, in presenting some general considerations on what America would have to do in running her empire, said that possibly the most useful suggestion was that America treat her colonies as the French did - as annexes of the navy. "They are deservedly proud of their fleet. Their admirals are not the nominees of party bosses. There is no democratic nonsense about discipline on board American men-of-war. If they run the Philippines on the same lines that they run the fleet, treating their colonies as being what in truth they are, the mere annexes and bases of their navy, they may extricate themselves with credit from a very difficult and delicate position."

Several journals expressed their opinion on a step that America should take to ensure the successful administration of her empire. America would have to create a Civil Service.

The discussion of the necessity of Civil Service reform that had been agitating the people of the United States and the disgraceful treatment of the Indians were plainly in the minds of these editors.

53. Spectator, LXXI, 254, Dec. 10, 1898. One paper suggested that Cuba be used as a refuge for the Negroes within the United States. "The States have within their present borders a 'black trouble' which they might see a way to mitigate did they possess Cuba. That island would hold many millions of Negroes were it found necessary to deport them for the sake of internal peace and order within the Union." (Investors' Review, XII, 75, July 22, 1898.)

54. Review of Reviews, XVIII, 220, Sept. 1, 1898.
They feared that the American Colonial Empire might be made subject to such inefficiency and corruption. In administering her new possessions, it was argued, America should follow the British model. The assumption was that England had developed the most effective and workable kind of organization for handling colonies, and that America should, naturally, pattern her own after the best.

After stating that America would be able to put down the insurgents in Cuba, but that the half-breeds in the Philippines would be a different matter, The Speaker continued: "We believe the American nation can do most things that it has a mind to. But if it means to govern the Philippines successfully, it must give them a permanent civil service, a permanent colonial army, and an administration free from the scandals which have made its dealings with the Indians a lasting reproach."

The Spectator dealt with this need of a Civil Service at some length. "The greatest political want of America is a band of trained civil servants, - men who have from their youth up been dedicated to the public service, and whose whole training is intended to make them upright, uncorrupt, and independent instruments of Government, both in the highest and lowest offices of State. America has an opportunity for organizing such a body of men for the government of Cuba and the Philippines." The same journal then went on to discourse on some of the internal workings of such a system, and pointed out that the younger men should be given to understand that "they have entered a profession that will protect them and provide for them through their lives, and in a few years an Administration would be created that

55. Speaker, XVII, 597, May 14, 1898.
would make Cuba the wonder of the Spanish-American world."

The Daily News, assuming English superiority in such matters said: "The Washington Government will have quickly to create a new Colonial Department. It will be interesting to see whether in doing so they find they can improve on the British model."

The Speaker returned to the subject after it was practically certain that the United States was going to take over the Philippine Islands. "There will have to be a colonial bureau at Washington, with a permanent staff independent of party politics; and much more regulation will be requisite within the colony than the American pioneer has ever yet been disposed to stand."

To conclude this discussion on the desire of the English journals that the United States might be successful in her administration of her new acquisitions nothing better can be done than to quote from a discussion entitled "America's New Empire" which appeared in The Spectator. It is quoted rather fully here because it sums up so neatly and well the attitude of the majority of English editors. England wanted America to be successful as a colonial power. Advice as to how to run the "empire" was being given in a friendly, sympathetic way. The "empire" must not be run for profit, but for the advantage of

56. Spectator, LXIII, 136, July 30, 1898. The Spectator then expressed the belief that American cities, seeing the success of this model, would imitate it in their own administration.
58. Speaker, XVIII, 593, Nov. 19, 1898. The Speaker, as well as The Spectator (ibid.) thought that one of the results of such an administration would be a stimulus to American cities to initiate civil service reform.
those being ruled. Referring to the new "empire", The Spectator wrote: "Will she so occupy it and rule it as to increase the happiness of the races that dwell within it, and to develop and improve her own polity, or will she make the first grand failure of the Anglo-Saxon race in the government of inferior races? Will she, that is, apply herself earnestly and with single-mindedness to her great task, or will she, through a mixture of moral timidity, self-distrust, and blindness to her true destiny, half refuse, and so wholly spoil, the great opportunity thus presented to her? Englishmen trust and believe that America should in the end choose the true path, but they are necessarily most anxious that at this the critical moment, the moment of the first step, America should make no false start. We do not seriously fear that Britain's anxiety lest America shall neglect to take up her responsibilities is in any great danger of being misunderstood in the States...If America failed, as the Continental Powers have failed, to rule tropical possessions, the gain from a narrow, selfish standpoint would be ours. But we are glad to think that no such feeling exists here, and that there is no section of British opinion which does not desire that America shall succeed in the development of her new Empire. We ask them, the people of America to believe that the advice and encouragement so eagerly and strongly pressed upon them from this side is absolutely genuine and sincere." Then referring to an article in Scribner's Magazine by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and to Mr. Benjamin Kidd's recently published book the Control of the Tropics, The Spectator said that these expressions of opinion constituted England's
"appeal to America." "It is an appeal neither selfish nor interested, and if it fails our disappointment will be, not that this country has suffered, but that our own flesh and blood have preferred the smug safety of their vast parish to the responsibilities and duties of a wider outlook, moral and political." America, it said, must set up a government "for the benefit of the peoples governed....America should not look to making any direct gain out of her possessions."

In another department in the same issue this last idea was elaborated. "We have pointed out elsewhere how important it is that America should do nothing to shirk her full responsibilities in the matter, and how, if she is wise, she will adopt the English, rather than the Continental, system of holding colonies. Under the English system what is sought for primarily and essentially is the advantage of the colony. Under the Continental system what is sought is the advantage of the mother-country. Yet, strangely enough, so form is Providence of a paradox, the mother-country only really benefits under the system which ignores her advantage."

Other aspects of America's becoming an imperial power interested English editors. They foresaw, for instance that there would be consequent internal problems, that a large army and navy would be needed, that there would be constitutional problems, that increased taxation would have to result.

After asking on August 5 if there were to be peace "mañana", The Investors' Review continued as follows: "There can be no peace, however,

for the Union for a long time to come, no matter what compact is made with Spain...." Then reporting that President McKinley was on the point of asking the Senate to empower him "to maintain at least 100,000 men on war footing," that journal stated: "He will want all this number of men, and perhaps a good many more, before the new wars upon which he must enter are concluded." The next week the same journal stressed the financial aspect of owning an empire, and then went on to muse on the possible internal conflicts in the United States. "This empire must inevitably bring to the American people great increases in taxation and probably large additions to the public debt. It is never a cheap business, though, 'running an empire,' as we begin sadly to acknowledge in the old country. How the very mixed democracy of the Union will behave under the increased demands made upon it we dare not at present try to forecast; but, looking into the future by help of theushlight of history, we cannot help being apprehensive of many chances and divisions that may disturb the internal peace of the republic in a way no faction fight between workmen and employers, between the masses and the millionaires, ever has done or is likely to do."

The Times stressed the expense consequent upon an imperial policy. "The people of the United States have entered, unconscious of what they are doing, upon a career of empire and conquest, and they must not be astonished when they find, as they will, that a heavy price has to be paid for it. It is impossible to retain and to administer possessions..."
like Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines without an army and a
navy on a scale never hitherto contemplated by our kinsmen beyo
the Atlantic."

The *Pall Mall Gazette* spoke of the need for a reorganization
of the army, offering as its reason that when it had been put to
the test (during the war) it had been found wanting, whereas the
navy had performed in distinguished fashion. The Navy would also
have to be enlarged. "The addition of more ships to the American
navy will be useful also to our own, for it will stimulate in us a
friendly rivalry that will, we hope, be the forerunner of friendly
64 co-operation."

The *Speaker*, in commenting on President McKinley's annual message
to Congress in December, 1898, in which he requested an enlarged army
and navy, deplored, however, fears of militarism in the United States.
"It is not wonderful that the new responsibilities assumed by the Repub-
lic should be held to necessitate a great increase of the navy and an
army four times its present size, but even that is so much smaller
than is the case in any country of Europe, that we may fairly dismiss
the fears of militarism that beset some observers, both in America
65 and in Europe."

The realization of the tremendous cost of keeping a colonial
empire caused the *Saturday Review* to wonder whether the Americans
might not sell theirs. "It is impossible to say yet whether the

64. *Pall Mall Gazette*, Nov. 28, 1898.
Missing page 253
a big navy for use against the people of the States should occasion arise."

Discussing the problems likely to arise as a consequence of the United States annexing the Philippine Islands, The Speaker mentioned some internal ones, stating that "there will be a legal and constitutional difficulty as to whether the islands can be held as dependencies, or as anything but territories destined in course of time to be transformed into states."

But, despite the fact that America would have to face innumerable problems, both internal and external, as a consequence of having gone into the "empire business," certain English journals expressed the belief that running such a business would be good for America. The Investors' Review, in speaking of the necessity of America's holding Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, said: "The States had to undertake this job, and we believe good will come to them for having undertaken it, but the good may neither be an overflowing treasury nor an immediate expansion in commercial prosperity." The Speaker, after wondering what the effect of the Philippines would be upon the United States, continued: "We quite admit that there is an immediate possibility of native wars and monopolist nabobs, and a standing fear of militarism. But we believe that the Republic is so big compared with its Indies that they cannot do it permanent harm; that they will even-

68. Labour Leader, 172, May 21, 1898.
69. Speaker, XVIII, 195, Aug. 13, 1898.
70. Investors' Review, XI, 774, June 3, 1898.
tually call out the best capacities of its best citizens, and give the American people the consciousness of a new mission in the world."

English editors while expressing their belief that this new-found career of imperialism would cause America difficulties, professed to see in the development of American foreign policy a benefit to those "lesser races" which would be governed, and to the world at large. For America was now to begin a career that England had been following for years, that of lending out her energies to lift up the uncivilized peoples of the world. Anarchy which had long reigned would be replaced by order and justice. Progress and civilization and education would be fostered. Darkness would be changed to light. But along with these idealistic arguments went the expression of belief that the United States empire would not be the only section to benefit. For trade would benefit also, and it was expected (and hoped) that England would reap her share of this increase of trade. From the comments in the journals it must be assumed that English trade was calculated to benefit for two reasons because America was taking over large sections of Spain's colonial empire. One was that the progressive measures instituted by the United States such as education and law and order under a peaceful regime would result in more commerce for the world; the other was the expectation (and hope) that the United States would enforce the "open door" in her empire, thus allowing equal competition there as opposed to Spain's exclusivist policy. This "open door" policy would benefit England with her large productive capacity in manufactures. Another reason that English editors were delighted at the prospect of 71. *Speaker*, XVIII, 594, Nov. 19, 1898.
America's becoming an imperial power concerned the Pacific Ocean area; if America were to hold the Philippine Islands she would be in a position to help England in the Far East - with diplomatic support at least and possibly with actual physical force if a crisis arose there.

The first of these factors - idealistic - will be discussed presently, the question of the "open door" in the next chapter, while the discussion of the possibility of America's supporting English policy in the Far East will be considered in the chapter on the mooted Anglo-American alliance. But the benefits to flow from America's founding a colonial empire - idealistic and practical - ran so together in English editors' minds that it will not always be possible to make a distinct division.

The Speaker said as early as May 14 in speaking of the Philippine Islands: "That the islands should pass into the hands of a Power that can develop them is unquestionably a gain to the world." At this same time Punch carried a full-page cartoon pregnant with two possible meanings: that America in considering keeping the Philippines was looking to her own advantage, and that she would by keeping the islands do them good. The cartoon was entitled "The Prize Hand," and showed Uncle Sam in riding boots, trousers of striped material and shirt of starred material with a cartridge belt across his chest, and a gun slung on his back, holding a large box of Manila cigars. The subscrition read:

"Uncle Jonathan. 'These look very nice! Wonder if they'll be the better 73 for keeping.'"

72 Speaker, XVII, 597, May 14, 1898.
73 Punch, CIX, 223, May 14, 1898.
The Sketch, after stating that the United States should keep all the Spanish colonies except Ceuta and Melilla, went on: "Our American cousins will bring these colonies in line with newer ideas of government, and will make them happier countries to live in." The Speaker was likewise sanguine as to the effects of American rule. "We believe ourselves that the American dominion in these islands [Philippines] will eventually be a gain to the wealth and happiness of the world."

The Economist after stating that while America had thought to find the Cubans ready for self-government she had found there only half-breeds, went on: "But even self-interest will dictate the proper development of Cuba resources, and the desolated plantations will once again flourish and produce wealth as they have never produced it before. The laws, too, will be just and well-administered. Cuba, in short, stands to gain as a result of annexation to the United States."

The Times, at the time Spain asked for peace terms, said about the populations of Cuba and the Philippine Islands: "Probably the best thing for the world at large and for these populations themselves would be that America should boldly assume the burden of giving them a strong and honest Government through her own officials."

The Spectator was more expansive and explicit. While negotiations leading to the signing of the protocol were being conducted, it gave as its opinion that the United States should demand Cuba, the Philippine

74. Sketch, XXII, 175, May 25, 1898.
75. Speaker, XVII, 660, May 28, 1898.
76. Economist, LVII, 831, June 4, 1898.
77. Times, July 27, 1898.
Islands, and Puerto Rico, and that the United States alone should decide their ultimate fate (whether to keep them or sell or trade them to some other power). Unless these principles were insisted upon, "America may find that the war, instead of having been a blessing to the inhabitants of the Spanish colonies has turned out a curse, and instead of a movement in the direction of humanity and civilization, an actual step backward. In our belief, it is alike the destiny and the duty of the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race to govern and convert to civil uses the inferior races. Our race is meant to do in the world the work of foreman and ganger, and in doing so not only helps the peoples controlled and directed, but also gives its own nature its true development."

The Pall Mall Gazette said that America was standing "upon the threshold of a new life. That she will live it wisely and well is the unanimous hope of the people of this country, who believe that they see in this evolution of the United States an additional force among the dynamics of the nations which will make for righteousness, freedom, and the good government of the world."

The Economist spoke highly of the "wisdom and magnanimity of President McKinley" as shown in the kind of peace terms he asked of Spain, and continued: "It is felt that...the Government which granted such easy terms to Spain will not prove, if it enters into the vast sphere of European interests, an unscrupulous or meddling Power. That is so much gained for the international morality of the world, which

76. Spectator, LXXI, 136, July 30, 1898.
79. Pall Mall Gazette, Aug. 13, 1898.
stands in need of all the additional moral force it can acquire. We will not say that we are entirely without misgivings, but, on the whole, we think there maybe a good reason to hope that the decision of the American people will be a decision making for the general well-being of the world."

The Spectator said in August that before the year was over, America would find herself in possession of an overseas empire. "Long may she rule it in the interests of humanity and justice." During the meetings of the Peace Commission, The Economist expressed "hopes" that America would do right by her new possessions: "We hope that if the Republic takes up a new policy, she will do so purely in the interests of humanity and the higher civilization." At the same time The Speaker wrote more positively: "Cuba and the Philippines have found protectors, but they have found masters too. They will be well governed, but anarchy will not be tolerated." Two weeks later the same journal in discussing the kind of government that the United States would set up in the Philippines said: "The islands must be administered by Americans - not primarily for Americans, but for the islanders and the civilized world at large." The Spectator somewhat later was equally firm in its expression of opinion, stating that "the Filipinos require government from above for at least a century."

80. Economist, LVI, 1211, Aug. 20, 1898.
82. Economist, LVI, 1587, Nov. 5, 1898.
83. Speaker, XVIII, 534, Nov. 5, 1898.
84. Speaker, XVIII, 593, Nov. 19, 1898.
85. Spectator, LXXXI, 763, Nov. 26, 1898.
When the Philippine question had been settled at Paris, The Daily Chronicle exulted: "America...has chosen the narrow path of duty which always attracts the brave mind. She has now to show it is in her power to bestow upon her new possessions a strong, an honest, an enlightened rule. For our part we have never for a moment doubted that she will do so in full measure."

And after the treaty of peace had been signed The North British Daily Mail writing on America's job as an imperial power, said: "That they have British goodwill goes without saying. Apart from sympathies of race and language, we believe the extension of American influence to be a beneficent factor in the world's progress." At the same time The Outlook said there was enough of uncertainty that the peace treaty would be ratified in each country "to create anxiety in the minds of those who desire to see the United States settling down to the great task she has taken over from the decrepit shoulders of Spain, the task of ruling an Empire to the benefit alike of ruler and ruled."

There were several expressions of opinion in which the combination of joy at the idealistic and at the practical aspect of America's founding a colonial empire was rather neatly expressed. Don Quijote and Sancho Panza sauntered together through the visions of English editors when they confronted this problem. To read such expressions is to understand that motives were mixed in their minds. The Spectator carried a good example of this when it wrote that "we may, we think,

welcome a verdict under which America pledges herself to share with us in the difficult task of civilizing dark races and keeping the world open to all men's commerce." The Speaker was also capable of an able synthesis. "The Americans are perfectly capable of governing the Philippines, and the task will call out the finest qualities of the race. For the Philippines themselves, and for the Archipelago, the change from Spanish to American rule will be a change from darkness to light. These islands, like Cuba, though in a smaller degree, are capable of immense material improvement under strong and equitable administration. Their trade with Great Britain, already considerable, might be largely increased and the duty of holding them would give us a friendly ally in the political complications of the Far East. An Anglo-American Alliance, more than any other, makes for the peace, the freedom, and the happiness of mankind."

But probably the best statement of the mixture of motives that caused English editors to be gratified at the prospect of America's becoming a colonial power was made in a leading article in The Statist. The writer of that "leader" said: "I have never made any secret of my personal opinion that it would be an immense advantage to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines if they were taken over by the United States, and that the United States in becoming a world-power would materially help forward the progress of civilization." He then gave as his opinion that Spain had dwarfed the growth of her colonies, and that they had drained her of blood and money. But under the United States the resources of the colonies would be developed; education and civilization introduced, and

89. Spectator, LXXXI, 674, Nov. 12, 1898.
90. Speaker, XVII, 335, Nov. 5, 1898.
trade would expand. "In the broader aspect of the matter, the new departure of the United States will bring an immense and a most welcome assistance to the cause of peace and good government all over the world. At present the great Continental military States have far too much influence in international affairs. They are checked in their grasping ambition only by the British Empire." The writer then rehearsed England's inability to do anything for the Armenians, Greeks, or Chinese, because England might have been opposed by Germany, Russia, and France. "It will be different when the United States has a potent voice in international events. Then another country with free institutions, with the desire to extend trade, with the wish to prevent war, and with the earnest determination to help forward civilization, will have as much interest as ourselves to prevent aggression without war."

Another aspect of America's becoming an imperial power struck some of the editors of English journals. Some of them professed to believe that America would be forced thereby to change her attitude towards Great Britain as an imperial power. Previously, they said (or implied) America had been ready and quick enough to point an accusing finger at this or that action of Great Britain's in administering her empire. Now that America herself was to be involved in the same difficulties and complications she would be less prone to criticize another. She would no longer be able to occupy the judge's bench, but would be amply busy as an actor in the play. This, thought some English editors, would be a beneficent development, one to gratify Englishmen.

The Spectator was rather explicit on this point. After stating that "the future of the world will depend greatly upon the political character of Americans," that journal went on to state that by 1950 they would have so increased in numbers and power as to be able to defeat any single nation except perhaps the Slavs. "To fit the Americans for that destiny the first necessity is that they should before they are irresistible, have difficulties, dependencies, complicated and urgent relations with the remainder of mankind. At present everything is too easy for them, and they all live too much to themselves, 'comparing themselves with themselves' as the Scripture has it, till they have no idea of equals, and see their own powers as well as rights through one medium and their rivals' through another.... The Spanish war will teach them much, but to be fit for their great work Americans must learn how to govern as well as how to be governed; must add to their splendid patriotism the English gift of cold and lofty tolerance; must learn how to keep subordinate governments as clean of corruption as their Supreme Court is; must, above all, learn the lesson none have yet learned except the English how to keep dark races subject while they are being educated without incessant menaces of force. You cannot train great men if their lives are to be one long protracted 'good time;' and if is because Americans will need great politicians, great diplomats, great administrators, that we desire to see them come out of themselves and take up their share of the world's governing work."

The Review of Reviews, speaking in the December issue of the Spectator, LXXI, 105, July 23, 1898.
almost unanimous condemnation in Europe of the hypocritical character
of the United States because of the terms they were exacting of Spain;
continued: "We, who know how the English-speaking folk are capable
of being aroused by humanitarian appeals, can understand our American
kinsmen, and we hope that after this experience of the immense contrast
which events often enforce between the resolutions with which wars are
begun and the acts with which they are concluded, may lead to a more
charitable frame of mind on the part of American critics of British
policy."

As has been amply evident from a reading of this chapter on
imperialism, the great majority of English editors were most cordial
and encouraging to America's imperial aspirations. They were gratified
that America was to shoulder a part of the white man's burden, that
America's commercial policy would benefit English commerce and industry

93. Review of Reviews, XVIII, 539, Dec. 1, 1898. On January 14, 1899 the
Spectator quoted with warm approbation from a letter written by
Rudyard Kipling to the New York World on the imperialist policy of
the United States. Kipling stressed in the letter the fact that
Great Britain would "understand and appreciate" America the better
for the latter's requisite tasks as an imperialist power. "When
America sets her hand to administer with show of force races helpless
in themselves for good government, when she creates roads,
drains, schools, hospitals, and an elementary form of justices in
countries where they do not now exist, using her best men freely
for the work, she will I fancy find herself better understood and
appreciated by Great Britain than she is today. After a nation has
pursued certain paths alone in the face of some slight misrepresenta-
tion, it is consoling to find another nation (which one can address
without a dictionary) preparing to walk along the same lines as,
I doubt not, the same ends." The Spectator expressed its satisfaction
that Kipling had sent his letter to a "Yellow" journal, and continued:
"readers of a Jingo Press all the world over need to be reminded that
empire has its duties as well as its rights." (Spectator, LXXII, 39,
more than had Spain's exclusivist policy, and that America would be in
the Far East a support to England.

But there were some editors who saw no reason to be gratified.
They criticized the aims and the methods of America during and after
the war. Expressions of disapproval of America's conduct were found
much scattered in English organs - criticisms of this or that aspect
of America's gestures leading towards empire. For this reason and
because the bulk of English editors favored America's imperialism,
the criticisms were not found to be grouped around specific questions,
but rather were concerned with various objections or drawbacks to
America's becoming a nation with an empire.

Immediately after hostilities broke out The Guardian voiced amaze-
ment at the United States giving up an isolation that was enviable.
After commenting on America's lacking a sense of the responsibility
that had to devolve upon any nation that would make war when there was
so much "explosive material" throughout the world, it went on: "And
what is quite as strange is the positive joy with which the American
people seem to have abandoned an isolation which in their case was in-
deed splendid, and to have committed themselves to the troubled waters
and conflicting currents of European politics. Absolutely unassailable,
with a vast territory lying wholly within a ring fence, having no neigh-
bors from whom anything is to be feared, and two oceans to bring the com-
merce of the world to their feet - they have deliberately elected to risk
the permanence of these incomparable advantages in order to become one
among the Powers of the Old World. Surely, never did a nation so strangely
misread the plain lesson of its own position and its own history."

94. Guardian, LIII (1), 616, Apr. 27, 1898.
Not incoherence, but fear of the lines along which America's imperialism might develop was uppermost in the mind of the editor of The Investors' Review. If the American people allowed themselves to be carried away by their success "a new order of things will arise in the great Republic of the West, which may end in changing the whole cast of its Government, and must certainly, as we have more than once said, convert it into a great naval Power interested in innumerable disputes in all parts of the world. It will be no longer 'America for the Americans', in the old sense, it may become 'China for the Americans'; it might even become 'All the West India Islands for Americans.' Should differences arise between England and the States in the future, the Government in Washington might paralyse us at critical points in our disputes with other European Powers by simply throwing their weight into the opposite scale by threatening us at some point near."

The Review of Reviews also feared some of the consequences of America's imperialism. It discussed the New York Journal's program for the American people, in which it was predicted that in the (indefinite) future the West Indies, British included, would "give fealty" to the United States. The Review of Reviews expressed its fear of an aggressive American foreign policy thus: "Our chickens may some day go to roost in Uncle Sam's hen-house; but that is no reason why John Bull should not quail when he sees some chicken-stealing coon prowling round his hen-coop."

After the protocol had been signed The Guardian, while not writing

95. Investors' Review, XII, 74, July 22, 1898.
of the incomprehensibility of American people forsaking their isolation as that paper had at the beginning of the war, still did border on that idea, for it wrote that the thoughtful people in America were those who were hesitant about acquiring an empire. After asking what the United States would do with the Spanish possessions, it continued: "American opinion is strongly divided on the subject. That portion which makes most noise and is most conspicuous to foreign countries is all for annexation....But another portion - perhaps larger, certainly more thoughtful and instructed - holds back. It sees the greatness of the change and dangers and difficulties involved, and hesitates before the plunge. Those who feel this think more than they speak."

In its September issue the Review of Reviews gave as its opinion that America "would have done better not to have ventured into these tropical regions," but went on to state that having decided to go there, it should have taken everything in the neighborhood of Asia from Spain in order to give itself freedom to administer well those possessions it had taken "'In for a penny in for a pound.'" The Daily News likewise thought it would be better if the United States did not take the Philippines, but based its argument rather on moral grounds than on the practical one of the ability to govern effectively. For America had accomplished her aims in intervening in Cuba. "It would be an act of extreme generosity to leave Spain in possession of - or, at any rate, in sovereignty over - the Philippines. But generosity is often the best policy...if they were content with the rewards for their labours, the United States

98. Review of Reviews, XVIII, 220, Sept. 1, 1898.
would set an example of conspicuous magnanimity to the world."

Some journals expressed their opinion that the United States was going to the Philippine Islands for profit—in dollars and cents.

Black and White carried a full-page cartoon to convey this idea to its readers. Uncle Sam was shown in golf tags, getting ready to tee off. The ball was teed on "Manila," around which were sniffing five dogs, "England," "Russia," "Germany," "France," and "Jap." Uncle Sam's caddie, who was standing behind him, was "Capital." The caption read:

"Uncle Sam: 'One - Two - Th-1.'"

The Labour Leader commented on this same aspect of American imperialism. "To a naval Power, such as the United States, this Philippine cluster is invaluable; and to a capitalistic and colonizing Power—the United States again—the archipelago, with its tropical riches in hemp and sugar and coffee and indigo and tobacco and dark-skinned 'raw material for profit,' has the usual temptations." The cartoon in Punch previously described in connection with the idea that America would benefit the subject peoples and the world by becoming an imperial power, is also appropriate here as expressing an idea that Uncle Sam was to profit by keeping the box of Manila cigars.

The cocksureness, the light-heartedness and the high-handedness with which the United States was conducting itself struck The Saturday Review. After saying that "the unfit Spaniards...have dropped the rod of colonial empire, and the Americans, somewhat cocksure of their fitness..."
have nimbly picked it up," that journal expatiated: "It is in the na-
ture of youth to be cocksure, and it would be useless, even if it were
wisdom, to preach down the assertive confidence of this young imperial-
ist. But there are many friends of America, both here and at home, who
look with no little misgivings upon the destiny which she is so light-
heartedly shaping for herself. But we cannot help remembering that
she entered upon her career of conquest in high-handed fashion, that
there was something of the bully in her address to Spain, and something
of the tyrant in her treatment." The Saturday Review then went on to
an arraignment of America's intervention in Cuba and of her military
inability.

The prevailing opinion in English newspaper and magazine offices
was, as has been amply shown in this chapter, friendly and encouraging
to America in undertaking to found an empire. The editors on the whole
favored the establishment of an empire and urged America to take those
possessions of Spain that she desired. They made suggestions how best
and most successfully to govern and administer such possessions. Problems
would arise, yes, but America they believed would, given her character-
istics of an Anglo-Saxon race, be amply capable of solving those problems

103.Saturday Review, LXXVI, 724, Dec. 3, 1898. This same journal had also
earlier in the year expressed its sadness at the loss by Spain of
the remnants of Empire by saying that a part of Wordsworth's "Ode to
the Venetian Republic" was "far more justly applicable to Spain."
"And what if she have seen these glories fade,
Those titles vanish and that strength decay,
Yet must some tribute of regret be paid,
When her long life has reached its latest day.
Men are we, and must grieve when even the shade
Of that which once was great is passed away." (Saturday Review,
LXXV, 605, May 7, 1898.)
satisfactorily to herself and to the governed peoples. Furthermore, America's rule in these new possessions would be a benefit to all concerned and to England and the world at large. For the "colonies" would be well governed, and education, civilization, roads and sanitation - "progress," in short - would be fostered. There would be instituted a regime of law and order dominated by justice to supplant an anarchy that had prevailed under Spain's sovereignty. Out of all these improvements, it was hoped, would come increased commerce and that of this England would get her share.

In other words, the attitude towards American imperialism was of a piece with the attitude on all things during and after the war - sympathy with and encouragement for American aims and methods. For England wanted the larger section of the Anglo-Saxon race to be strong and successful. This desire was not entirely unselfish, for a large section of editors believed that America was the best partner for an alliance with England, and naturally they favored building that prospective partner into as strong and able a one as possible. The discordant voices, not favorable to American imperialism or questioning this or that aspect of it, were relatively insignificant in number. Their comments were scattered and remind one of the crack of rifle fire interjecting itself into the chorus of solid booms of the artillery. England wanted America to have an empire.
Chapter II
THE OPEN DOOR

A subject closely related to imperialism and on which English editors expressed much opinion was the "open door." Was the "open door" policy to prevail in China and if so, by what agency? Also when discussion arose about whether the United States was going to take the Philippine Islands, there was much discussion as to what tariff policies America would institute there. Would the old exclusivist policies of Spain be continued? English editors as a group hoped not. Would the rates of the Dingley tariff be applied to imports into the Philippines? English editors likewise hoped not. They hoped that free trade would be inaugurated in the islands.

For months before the Spanish–American war broke out and during the war certain journalists were much occupied with two themes: the increasing severity of the competition being given to the English by foreign trade, and whether or not the policy of the "open door" was to be applied in China. China was considered a practically virgin field.

1. South American Journal, XLIV, 311, March 19, 1898; 351, March 26; 567, May 21; 699, June 18; 693, June 15; XLV, 171, Aug. 13; 255, Sept. 3; 367, Oct. 1; 395, Oct. 8, 1898, and Economist, LVI, 43, Jan. 8; 358, Mar. 5; 469, Mar. 26; 1319, Sept. 10; 1457, Oct. 8, 1898; also Investors' Review, XI, 569, April 22, XII, 723; 324, Nov. 25, 1898.

2. Economist, LVI, 110, Jan. 22; 364, March 12; 419, March 19; 1007, July 9; 1450, October 8, 1898.

National Review, XXX, 57, 815; 821; XXXI, 787, Aug. 9, 1898; XXXII, 12, Sept., 1898.

Graphic, LXVII, 94, Jan. 22; 278, Mar. 5; LXVIII, 146, July 30, 1898.

Guardian, LIII (I), 33, Jan. 12; LIII (II), 1193, Aug. 3, 1898.

Speaker, XVII, 191, Feb. 12; 315, Mar. 12, 1898.

Daily News, Jan. 11; Jan. 26, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 97, Jan. 14, and 99, Jan. 28, 1898; Statist, XLI, 19, Jan. 1, 1898; 60, Jan. 8; 379, Mar. 5; 423, Mar. 12, 1898.

Times, Apr. 4, 1898; Investors' Review, XI, 846, June 17, 1898; Spectator, LXXX, 101, Jan. 22, 1898; Black and White, XV, 486, Apr. 9, 1898; Westminster Budget, XI, 5, Feb. 18, 1898; Daily Telegraph, Mar. 21, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 351, Mar. 25, 1898; Sketch, XXIII, 82, Aug. 3, 1898; Punch, CXIV, 74, Feb. 12, 1898; Illustrated London News, CXII, 1, Jan. 8, 1898; supplement; and Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 23, 1898.
for commerce in which, if given an equal opportunity with other nations, England might hold her own and help to keep her factories busy. England with her ability to produce manufactured goods rapidly and cheaply had declared she favored the "open door" in China, that England did not want territorial concessions or advantages in China, and that she did not want the other powers to block off in China "spheres of influence" in which exclusivist trade policies would be effected. England wanted trade into China to remain if possible free to all nations, and if not that, then at least that the tariffs imposed should be equal for all nations. Other powers, however, had proved recalcitrant. Russia at Port Arthur and Germany at Kiaochow had demonstrated their scorn for the "open door" policy, their preference for spheres of influence. England was in danger of seeing trade barriers erected against her exports going into China. Hence it was that England looked for an ally in the policy of effecting the "open door" there. The United States was considered a likely ally in such a move, because although the States had erected a high tariff wall around themselves, yet they had tremendous productive capacity that would find an outlet did freedom of trade or at least equality of trade prevail in China. Hence England (and ipso facto English editors) would be gratified if America were to get control of the Philippine Islands, for that would mean a United States' naval station just 723 statute miles from Hong-Kong. With that advantage America would be able to speak effectively on the policy of the "open door" in China.

Thus it can be seen that English and American interests in the Far East were dovetailing. England wanted the open door in China,
and America in the Philippines might help her get it. English editors threw their (moral) support to America in getting the Philippine Islands. Furthermore the editors hoped that America would institute an "open door" of her own in the Philippines.

The great majority of English journals would seem to have taken it for granted that America wanted the "open door" in China, for they did not point out the need or source of desire in America for it. A few did, however, discuss the reasons America desired the open door. The *Economist* quoted figures showing the large increase in trade between the United States and China in the years 1888 to 1897, and then drew attention to two points of interest. "One is that the demand for American cotton goods comes especially from Manchuria and the North of China generally, where Russia is striving to obtain a predominant position, and the other that the value of the exports from the United States to China are at present 50 per cent greater than those from Germany. Obviously, therefore, the States have good reason to support our policy of the open door." In a later article the *Economist* said that the United States needed markets for the mills in that country could produce in eight months what the people could use in twelve. "For these markets the American people look mainly in the Far East, and especially in China. The fear of the Chinese markets being closed by the action of Germany, Russia, and France has been a formidable factor in prompting the United States to a spirited foreign policy in the Orient."

The Economist then went on to read the United States a lesson in protection: "Logically, of course, the United States, a rigid Protectionist country, have no right to complain because European countries are simply carrying out in the East doctrines which are identical with those that have inspired American policy at least since the close of the Civil War. But nations are not governed by logic, and there is evidently an apprehension on the American side that the Chinese market may be closed by Europe." The Investors' Review, discussing a Summary of Finance and Commerce issued by the United States Bureau of Statistics, said that American sales to China in 1898 would show an increase of more than 300 per cent over those of 1899, and then continued: "Doubtless we shall hear more of American influence in China when she has got out of her present contention with Spain.... There will be an immense development of trade, in which the United States will largely share... It said too that "assuredly there will be a great deal of railway building, and the United States may look to providing a large part of the locomotives and other necessary plant. All this gives America a great interest in the country, and more particularly, in supporting the policy that England has enunciated...."

The greater number of English journals, however, in discussing America and the open door in China, stressed the common interests that England and America had in China and in the "North Pacific." England and America, they said, had sufficient at stake in that portion of the globe to work toward a common goal. Inasmuch as each was interested in having the Chinese door kept open, and in preventing spheres of influence

from being set up, the two nations could work as one.

The Times, sympathetic and encouraging to the United States throughout the period covered by this study, said on one occasion before the war broke out and speaking of the relation between the two countries: "The relation...is not, and ought not to be, one of sentiment only. The two great English-speaking communities have immense, permanent, and increasing interests in common, and recent events have strongly illustrated this community of interests in the Far East. Commerce and civilization in those lands and seas mean far more to the English and the Americans, who were the first to open them up to Western intercourse, than they can possibly mean to Powers which look immediately and chiefly for political domination and which do not understand the policy of the open door. There never was a time when it was more clearly necessary for all countries that are interested in keeping the trade of the Far East, with all its boundless possibilities of future development, from being fettered by the policy of Continental tariffs to stand firmly together. We can hardly doubt that the American people will take this view when it has been fairly presented to them, and no one can suppose that they are not and will not be more and more a powerful element in the politics of the Pacific."

Some time after the Battle of Manila, The Times, speaking of America becoming an imperial power said: "There is not, and there can not be, any serious ground for rivalry in this sphere between our kinsfolk on the other side of the Atlantic and ourselves. We have large commercial interests in common, in the Far East and elsewhere, which

7 Times, Mar. 29, 1898.
the policy of either Russia or France, not to speak of other Powers, would menace, if the ascendancy of those who demand 'open doors' is not maintained."

At the time hostilities broke out The Outlook listed the reasons for English sympathies being on the side of the United States, and among these was the statement that "in the Far East and Africa our cause must be increasingly theirs - the cause of free and open commerce."

Three weeks later, discussing the disposition of the Philippines, The Outlook said that if the United States desired to keep them there could not be two answers for England to give. "If, looking round the world, and seeing how vital to her future is the maintenance of the Open Trade Door in Asia and Africa, the United States should now see the need for a change in her traditional policy of non-intervention with outside affairs, England's attitude can be no other than one of sympathetic encouragement."

Black and White believed that England and the United States should work together for the "open door", but thought that Anglo-Saxon statesmen would have to be vigorous. After stating that England would welcome the United States in the Philippines "heartily enough," it went on: "America is a strong supporter of the 'open door' in practice as well as theory, and the spread of Anglo-Saxon methods in the Far East must redound to the credit of humanity sooner or later if only we have

6. Ibid., May 13, 1898.
7. Outlook, p. 369, April 23, 1898.
Anglo-Saxon statesmen strong enough to push for it and able enough to estimate Russian diplomacy and Russian promises at their value."

The Economist after "demonstrating" why England and the United would not have friction over South America went on: "On the other hand, Great Britain and America want very nearly the same things in the Far East, namely, peace, order, and freedom to trade everywhere at will, subject only to Custom House duties enforced against all nations alike. These things can be secured if the two nations are allied, and they have a strong interest in securing them....The interest of America in China as the great future market is of the strongest kind, and is precisely the same as that of Great Britain - namely, to keep the market open. The two countries therefore are almost forced into partnership."

Later The Economist said: "We shall welcome the appearance of a new Power in the North Pacific with interests similar to our own."

The Globe mentioned the influence that England's "benevolent neutrality" and America's hope for the "open door" in the East had had upon the American mind. "The benevolent neutrality which has been observed by our Government in the pending war, and the hope that we may succeed in keeping an open door for trade in the Far East, have made a strong impression upon the American mind, and, for the time being English friendship is highly valued." In some ways this quotation shows more clearly than an open statement might have the attitude held in England towards America and the "open door" in the Far East.

13. Ibid., LXV, 1070, July 23, 1898.
In the policy of the "open door" The Graphic saw sufficient reason for the United States and England pooling their resources. After stating that if America became a colonial Power that would be a basis of an Anglo-American alliance, it went on: "But even without this, it is becoming increasingly evident that in what has been called 'the policy of the Open Door' Great Britain and the United States would do well to pool their resources. The Americans are becoming a great exporting nation, and they cannot but regard with disfavor the economic policy of the Powers which are now engaged in acquiring colonies among the open markets of the world."

America's fleet in the Philippines could help England to keep the open door in the Far East in return for the service that Americans believed England had rendered in keeping European Powers from forcible intervention in their quarrel with Spain - thus ran the argument of The Guardian. The same sentiment of common action by England and America was voiced by The Pall Mall Gazette. "American interests in China are, in fact, fundamentally the same as those of England, that is to say they are not territorial but commercial; and Americans are beginning to perceive, not dimly, that the day may come, and that speedily, when the two nations will have to stand shoulder to shoulder in defence of their common cause."

Although the expressions of opinion favoring the United States taking the Philippine Islands have already been considered, there were

15. Graphic, LVII, 710, June 4, 1898.
17. Pall Mall Gazette, Aug. 13, 1898.
several such expressions that so closely connected the question of American possession of the Philippine Islands with that of the open door in China that they are considered particularly apt at this point. *The Spectator*, speaking of the "Tale of the Philippines," said of the United States: "They will, we believe, from the first hesitate to give up the Philippines, partly because the islands will provide admirable stations for their fleet, but chiefly because they are determined that China, which is their biggest natural foreign market, shall not be closed to their trade. They must be ready to strike, if need be, on the Chinese coast, and to strike hard, and seeing that, they will not give up the islands which offer them impregnable defences for their dockyards, their coal-vaults, and their arsenals." Practically every English newspaper and journal resented the conduct if not the presence of the German naval vessels at Manila while Dewey was blockading that city. But contrary to this general opinion *The Investors' Review* was so anxious that America and England work hand in glove in China and that America have the Philippines that it could write: "It is consoling to notice that events are shaping more and more towards a gradual fusion of interests, and co-operation between the United States and ourselves in the Pacific. From this point of view it is excellent news that the Germans are sending a squadron of observation to Manila, with a view perhaps to raise objections to the presence of the United States there as ruler by right of conquest. By all means let the Germans assume an attitude of protest there. In *The Spectator*, XVII, 646, May 7, 1898."
doing so they will more and more alienate the United States from Continental Europe and help to convince American statesmen that England alone, with her free, impartial and liberal commercial policy, can be their friend, can help them to obtain a share in the great trade which the development of China, now to be begun and by no means or another carried out, is sure to create."

The Outlook also added its voice to this chorus, urging that to the end of being able to act effectively in the Philippines America should keep all of the Philippines stating that if America is to have a voice in the settlement of the great questions of the Far East, she must speak from the vantage-ground of the Philippines, but her voice will come short of its persuasiveness unless she be sole mistress there."

The Spectator said anent the decision of America to take the Philippines "we may, we think, welcome a verdict under which America pledges herself to share with us in the difficult task of civilizing dark races and keeping the world open to all men's commerce." The Morning Advertiser went further and spoke openly of a "powerful ally." After stating that it was not disposed to consider the consequences of the United States entering trade in the Far East, it exulted that "the utmost that can be said at present is that in our future commercial relations with the countries in that quarter of the globe the fact must not be lost sight of that we have now a powerful ally in the prosecution of our

20. Outlook, II, 100, Aug. 27, 1898.
21. Spectator, LXXI, 674, Nov. 12, 1898.
demands for an unfettered trade."

The activities of Russia in Port Arthur had worried English editors during 1898. Hence it is not surprising to find editorial expressions, if not to the effect that England and the United States would work hand-in-glove in China towards the "open door" policy, to the effect that the United States would soon check Russia in her designs in the Far East. The Sketch, after drawing up reasons why the outlook for Russia was not a cheerful one, said: "The outlook, then, is not brilliant for Russia. The United States are coming on the scene in the Far East, and their obvious interest is to prevent Muscovite encroachment on their trade." A cartoon in The Pall Mall Gazette expressed the same idea that Russia might not find the United States malleable. It showed Uncle Sam reading from a sheet of paper on which were printed the words: "China," "Fort Arthur," "Open Door," and "Philippine Islands." The Tar was leaning towards Uncle Sam hands clasped, and in a pose meant to portray that he was protesting friendship for Uncle Sam. The caption read: "Cousin Jonathan to the Tsar:—'All right, my friend, you may soon have the chance of proving it—in the East.'"

22. Morning Advertiser, Dec. 12, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 776, Dec. 16, 1898. It is interesting, in the light of the accumulation of evidence just cited to show that England preferred to support a nation which would, England believed, stand for the policy of the "open door" as against those that favored spheres of influence in China, to find a statement professing to believe that Germany's having taken Kia-Chow was a step in upholding free markets in China. The Graphic said, "In the future we may expect to see Great Britain and Germany acting more or less hand-in-hand in China for the upholding of the doctrine of free markets with which the interests of both powers are so strongly identified." (Graphic, LVII, 126, Jan. 30, 1898.)

23. Sketch, XXIII, 310, Sept. 7, 1898.

24. Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 22, 1898.
On December 5 President McKinley delivered his annual Message to Congress. On that occasion he said that the United States had not been forced to become an actor in the Chinese scene because of the prospect that America's "vast commerce" would "not be prejudiced through any exclusive treatment by the new occupants...." He then went on, however, to express the idea that America might, under certain circumstances, be forced to become an actor in that scene. After mentioning that Kiaochow, Wei-hai-wai, and Port Arthur and Talienwan had been leased, he said that "if no discriminating treatment of American citizens and their trade be found to exist, or be hereafter developed, the desire of this Government would appear to be realized." This obviously meant that if attempts were made to close the Chinese door, America might readily take steps to keep it open.

These remarks occasioned a flurry of comment in English editorial offices. Almost every comment showed gratification that the President was in effect, while expressing a policy purely American and indigenous in origin, aligning the United States with England in her Chinese "open door" policy.

In only one comment made on these words of President McKinley was there any trace of acerbity. The Daily News said dryly: "The President like a good Protectionist, is fond of reciprocity. There is a conspicuous absence in his remarks of any illusion to free trade."

25. Foreign Relations, 1898, LXXII.
All the other journals, however, were either frank in the expression of their pleasure or were at least noncommittal. Speaking of the President's words, The Pall Mall Gazette said: "That declaration brings the States into line with us, prospectively, if ever that time should come when we have to speak with our enemies in the gate, that is to say, in the Open Doorway. Such common action will be rendered all the more easy by the prevalence of such mutual good feeling between the two kindred nations as happily exists at the present time, and to which the Presidential Message bears emphatic testimony." The Daily Chronicle stated exultingly: "President McKinley announces uncompromisingly that American policy in the Far East is for the 'open door.'" It then continued, showing its approbation of McKinley's words by criticizing Lord Salisbury: "We may be permitted to interject that day after day, while Lord Salisbury was allowing the door to be closed, we reminded him that American opinion would support him in precisely this manner if he could only summon up the courage to stand fast."

Vanity Fair did not limit itself to praising by criticizing someone else, but was warm in its expression: "As it really is, President McKinley has done exactly what sensible men hoped for and desired.... He has confirmed the fact that American relations with England are of the most friendly, and he has shown his determination to uphold the policy of the open door in China." The Speaker was commendatory, but only by indirection, stating that "the reference to the Far East makes it clear that American policy in China corresponds with our own."

27. Pall Mall Gazette, Dec. 6, 1898.
29. Vanity Fair, LX, 405, Dec. 8, 1898.
The Saturday Review commended President McKinley (and itself) for having pointed out the same fact a week before, for showing that the friendly feelings then existent between England and the United States could "only be maintained upon a basis of reciprocal advantages in material interests....Hence...his references to China, in which he indicates with all clearness that in matters of trade and tariff the American Government will put itself in line with Great Britain in resenting any form of exclusive treatment."

The Spectator, quoting the words "if no discriminating treatment of American citizens and their trade be found to exist or be hereafter developed, the desire of the Government would appear to be realized," commented favorably: "In other words, America insists upon the 'open door.' The language is both civil and cautious, but the meaning is quite clear."

The Times had said repeatedly that England would feel no jealousy if the United States were to expand in the Far East. It said this, it had pointed out, on the assumption that America would back English policy in that quarter of the globe. So now The Times took occasion to congratulate itself on the fact that American policy seemed to be in a way of measuring up to the assumptions of The Times. "In this country, no jealousy has been provoked by the natural desire of the United States, an advancing and expanding Power, to acquire points of vantage, outside the limits of the American continent, as naval stations

and as openings for trade. At the same time, we have assumed that in taking up such a position the Washington Government would be actuated by the principles which are laid down, in relation to the spheres of European influence in China, by President McKinley in his Message to Congress. The absence of 'exclusive treatment' is the foundation of our own commercial policy in the colonies and dependencies of the British Crown, and we have a right to look for reciprocity of conditions from the United States as a colonial Power."

With this consideration of English editorial attitude towards America and the "open door" in China, it is possible to discuss what that attitude proved to be about America's trade policy in the Philippines. After the Battle of Manila there were speculations on how America would comport herself in the islands. Englishmen preferred, as has been said, that the policy instituted should be that of the "open door." Some editors did not hesitate to threaten dire consequences did America erect a tariff barrier around the islands.

Early in May, The Daily Graphic wondered. "For our part, we should not be sorry to see the United States flag permanently planted somewhere in the Far East, but, in that event, how should we manage about the Open Door?" The Times said that England could not look with indifference upon the acquisition of the Philippines by either France, or Russia, or Germany, though we have enough on our hands not to care to add to our responsibilities in that quarter, unless we should be compelled to do

33. Times, Dec. 10, 1898.
34. Daily Graphic, May 6, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 542, May 6, 1898.
so in order to prevent the islands from being used to obstruct the development of open trade not only within but far beyond their own borders." It then went on to say, however, that: "We could contemplate their possession, however, by the United States with equanimity and, indeed, with satisfaction," thereby suggesting at least, the belief of The Times that America would do nothing "To obstruct the development of open trade."

The Outlook was more brusquely outspoken on this question. It stated that if the United States adopted the high tariff policy in her colonial empire then she would sacrifice the Anglo-American Alliance. "England's policy is equality of opportunity. She practises that policy in all countries under her flag, and she will enforce it in China. But how could the United States co-operate - and one of the chief purposes of the projected alliance is to secure this co-operation - if in her own outside territories she shuts the door to all save her own traders?" American possession of the Philippines should be for England "nothing but gain," said The Daily News, and then: "In saying this we assume that the United States will not extend their exclusive tariff laws to the Colonies, but will allow the manufacturers of the world free access to them." The Times recurred to the question, stating that England would have no jealousy if Americans asserted their authority in the Philippines. "We have gone, of course, on the assumption that our unity of interest in that quarter of the globe depends upon the maintenance of the 'open door.' Whatever may be the tariff system

35. Times, May 9, 1898.
adopted by the Americans at home, we trust they are far too intelligent
not to take warning from the example of disastrous failure exhibited by
38
the colonies of France under a policy of strict protection." The
Standard spoke in the same general vein, but instead of stressing in-
telligence spoke of the economic groups in America that would work to-
wards her keeping an "open door" in the Philippines. "Whatever may be
the stubbornness of the American faith in protection as regards the
sphere of Home Production, the manufacturers and exporters on the other
side of the Atlantic have the same inducement as operates in this
39
country to assert the policy of the Open Door."

Secretary Hay's statement suggesting that equal tariffs would be
established in the Philippine Islands for all nations, including the
United States, issued in November, settled that question for English
editors, but provoked in them much comment on the statement itself.
The Pall Mall Gazette, stated that "America's colonial policy in the
Pacific is that of the open door. It is a wise decision on every
ground, in the interests of the prosperity of the Philippines them-
selves, and as securing the goodwill of nations really friendly to
America." In the same editorial the following was written: "This is
a bold step for a Protectionist nation like the United States, and a
Protectionist President like Mr. McKinley, to take especially when we
come to consider the probable effect in the era on Dingleyism and
40
McKinleyism at home." Two days later the same paper recurred to the

38. Times, Nov. 12, 1898.
40. Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 22, 1898.
same topic, opining that while this announcement by Mr. Hay did not mean free trade, "it is certainly the open-door, equality for all." 41 The Times on this same door was pleased; its assumptions as to America's policy in the Philippines had been proved correct. Commenting on Mr. Hay's announcement of policy, it wrote: "For all international purposes that is the policy of the open door. Economical purists may argue that, as the tariff must operate in restraint of trade, the door is to be regarded as very partially open; but, whatever force there may be in that argument, it is of purely domestic application....The precise footing upon which goods enter the Philippines is internationally of no consequence so long as the footing is the same for all....What is of consequence is that all nations shall compete upon equal terms for whatever trade the Philippines have to offer. That equality of opportunity would be secured by the arrangements described by Mr. Hay just as truly as it would be under a purely 42 free trade system."

The Daily News, however, did not follow the argument that it meant "equality of opportunity," and wrote: "Enthusiasm for American expansion will be considerably abated if it means the proportionate 43 extension of the Dingley tariff." The Economist stated perfunctorily that it was "welcome news," and then went on to state its opinion that probably the tariff when framed would "favour the classes of commodities which the United States is best able to supply." But, then, this was a

41. Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 24, 1898.
42. Times, Nov. 24, 1898.
form of discrimination indulged in by all countries in framing commercial treaties—except England. Further, The Economist argued that America in adopting this policy had been guided by expediency; this liberal commercial policy would blunt opposition to acquisition of the Philippines by the United States, and moreover, the United States "would have stultified themselves if, while joining in the demand for open doors in the Far East, they had inaugurated their advent there by slamming the door into the possession of which they had entered, in the face of all nations."

The Graphic believed that President McKinley was going to try a great economic experiment by establishing "the free trade régime" in the Philippines. "This experiment cannot but have excellent results. It will be a fruitful example to the other Powers in the Far East, most of whom are still groping in economic obscurantism, and it may react on the United States to the confusion of its hard shell, McKinleyism." The Speaker said that such a step was hardly the way to develop a new market, but condoned America's action by stating that "it is clear that, when an uncivilized country is dealt with by new masters, a tariff is the safest means of taxation, and may be the only means of raising an adequate revenue. The important thing is that it should be a tariff for revenue alone." In another department in the same issue The Speaker was

44. Economist, LVI, 1688, Nov. 26, 1898. The Economist also, continuing its argument that America's policy was guided by expediency, stated that had the Philippines been treated as integral parts of the Union there would have ensued the obligation of admitting the products of the Philippines free of duty, and the tobacco and sugar interests in the United States would have fought such a move.

45. Graphic, LVIII, 680, Nov. 26, 1898.
46. Speaker, XVIII, 613, Nov. 26, 1898.
more explicit. "From the most selfish point of view, Free Trade is always the best policy. But Protectionists do not acknowledge that truth, and the Administration of the United States is in the hands of Protectionists. It is from the generous sentiment of the American people rather than the enlightened finance of American politicians that we must look for free trade with the Philippines."

The Saturday Review was not enthusiastic over Mr. Hay's statement. Speaking of the "open door," it said: "But that phrase has a transatlantic meaning of its own. At Washington the 'open door' means that the American tariff applies to everybody, even Americans. It is simply the open door of the American custom-house." The Times phrased the difference between the "open door" and "free trade" neatly. "The door, in other words, will be as open to every other nation as to the United States, but it will not have for anybody the wide openness which we call free trade...It must be admitted that the arrangements projected for the Philippines are as far from constituting protection for American citizens against the world as they are from a system of pure free trade." The Morning Advertiser thought that the policy would help British trade. "The amount of the customs duties is of very little moment provided that all imports have to pay them equally, whatever their origin may be, and this equality of opportunity will be a great boon to our trade."

As late as December 3, The Spectator was writing not only as if

47. Speaker, XVIII, 621, Nov. 26, 1898.
49. Times, Nov. 29, 1898.
50. Morning Advertiser, Nov. 29, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIV, 703, Dec. 2, 1898.
Mr. Hay had not made his announcement, but as if he (or someone else in
the United States) might have declared for protective tariffs in the
Philippines. In speaking of the fact that a protective tariff would
make for the American manufacturers a close preserve of the Philippines,
it wrote: "Yet, reasonable as this may seem to a people accustomed as
are the Americans to Protection, it means ruin in the case of a depend-
ency. Spain governed her colonies on that principle, and look at the
result. They were destroyed commercially by their dependence on the
mother-country. If America seeks to make her new Empire her tied cus-
tomer she will infallibly ruin her tropical possessions." Then con-
tinuing, it disclaimed any self-interest in giving this admonition:
"We say this not because we want an open market in the Philippines.
America need not, and ought not to, think for a moment about our sus-
ceptibilities, - we shall do very well whatever policy she adopts."

On December 6, 1896, Mr. Lyman Gage, Secretary of the Treasury,
submitted the annual report of his department. In this report he
made the following recommendation: "The restriction of the trade be-
tween the United States, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii and the coasting trade
of those islands to vessels of American registry." His justification
for this proposal was that it was "drawn from the current practices of
our maritime competitors." At this The Times was indignant. "We have
not the least notion what Mr. Gage can mean by this statement. This
country, we suppose, is the most important of all the 'maritime com-
petitors' of the United States, and whatever we, like others, may have

52. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the year 1896, LXXIII.
done a century ago, we have for many years past renounced the attempt
to give any exclusive, or even differential, advantages to our shipping
at home or abroad. It will be unfortunate if the views of the Treasury
report should find favour with Congress, though the American and coasting
trade of Puerto Rico and Hawaii may not be in itself of very great con-
sequence. But, if the policy laid down in the report of the Secretary of
the Treasury is to prevail, it is plain that all the conquests and de-
pendencies of the United States in the future, so far as they become
subject to Congressional legislation, must be in bondage to a system
of exclusion which will aim at securing all commerce and carrying busi-
ness for the American merchant and shipowner. That is not what we
hoped for when we saw without regret the downfall of the colonial em-
pire of Spain. That is not what we attempt ourselves in the vast ter-
ritories of the British Empire where 'an American seagoing merchant
fleet' will find the fullest freedom of access and the largest scope
for trading intercourse....But it must not be supposed that we are
prepared to approve the adoption of an exclusive policy in regions
with regard to the destinies of which we might have claimed a voice."

This is one of the most open statements that was found of England's
interest in seeing the Spanish empire broken up. It seems of a piece
with the activities prompted by envy of Philip II and his overseas em-
pire, and of Cromwell and his expedition against Jamaica, and of the
motives that wrung from Spain the Asiento at the Treaty of Utrecht. In
other words, Spain, with her exclusivist policy of trade into her colonies
was still an enemy of England, who was proclaiming for freedom of trade
53. Times, Dec. 8, 1898.
all over the world.

On the last day of the year, Punch carried a column headed "Wonders of the New Year," in which President McKinley was represented as wondering "If the British lion will take kindly to my tariff scheme."

England had announced her policy of the "open door" for China early in 1898. She had tried hard to get the Continental countries, particularly Germany and Russia, to agree with her. As the year wore on, however, there appeared to be less and less chance of success in that direction. The friendly feeling that sprang up between England and the United States even before the Spanish-American War began seemed to her an opportunity to enlist an ally in that project. She was glad to see Spain lose her empire, Spain the traditional enemy, that insisted on running that empire on the principles of the old mercantilism and on excluding foreign traders and ships from the ports of that empire. England believed that with large portions of the Spanish empire in American hands English trade would stand more chance of carrying on business there. England was also glad that the other section of the Anglo-Saxon race was the particular power that was going to possess that empire, because with the possibility of alliance, she wanted her ally to be strong in naval and coaling bases in various parts of the world. But more than that England wanted the United States to have some of those bases near to China so she could speak effectively in support of the "open door" policy there. Hence the delight of English

editors when the United States decided to exact the Philippines from Spain, when President McKinley declared for the "open door" in China, and when it began to appear that the United States would declare the "open door" policy effective in the Philippine Islands, for all three developments fitted directly into England's desires. Here was promise of increase of trade both in China and in the Philippines. In this light becomes understandable the indignation of one of the most powerful organs in England at the possibility that English ships might be shut out of the trade between the United States and Puerto Rico and Hawaii and the coasting trade of those islands. If such were to be the trade practices of the new owner, then English trade would be no better off for the war. Possibly, even, England had backed the wrong horse in urging America to take the islands, for England might herself have demanded a voice in their disposition. In other words while it is impossible to say that there was no element of unselfishness in England's wanting America to take Spain's possessions (and Hawaii as well), it is definitely possible to state that selfish motives did enter into English encouragement of the United States before, during, and after the war. It was from the consequences of the war that England was expecting to profit. The fact that President McKinley expressed his belief that America would do well to support the "open door" policy in China was part of England's reward for her support and encouragement. English editors were delighted. Likewise were they delighted at the prospect of the "open door" in the Philippine Islands.
Chapter III
EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

But not everything in these months before, during, and after hostilities was to go according to England's desire. There were storm clouds on the horizon more than once, and England had to take thought for the present and for the future, for throughout these troublous months there were rumors of intervention by one or more Continental powers on the side of Spain against the United States. Each of the large powers had its own reasons for not wanting to see Spain crushed and divested of its possessions. All of them except France had an interest in not seeing the principle of monarchy humbled. Further, the Queen-Regent, Christina of Spain was a Hapsburg, and Franz Josef had an interest in her and her son, still a minor. Germany wanted a coaling if not a naval base in the Far East, to serve as an emporium on the long journey from Kiel to Kiaochow. Russia had no desire to see a strong power rear its head in the Pacific. For both Germany and Russia, Spain's colonial holdings were safe in her weak hands, but not in the hands of a strong, vigorous, growing nation. And Frenchmen held enormous quantities of Spanish bonds. Hence it was possible that any one or a coalition of these powers might attempt to prevent Spain from being humbled and despoiled.

What would England do in such an event? What would be the effect upon the United States? The United States was undoubtedly, in the minds of English editors, the nation best fitted to become England's partner in an alliance. By language, traditions, and race, and what was more important, by the ability to help in commerce and war, the United States
was the most likely ally. Would England stand by and permit a European
nation or group of them to endeavor to work their will on this potential
ally? Or would England "take arms against a sea of troubles," and at-
ttempt to preserve the United States in its strong state?

The answer, it must be stated, was not vacillating, weak, or hesi-
tant. The overwhelming majority of the expressions of opinion either
supported America by deprecating the possibility of European interven-
tion, or went further and said that if it occurred England would actu-
ally align herself with the United States and help her to fight off
the attackers.

The discussion of the question of the possibility of European
intervention will be divided into five divisions: the discussion of
the wave of rumors of intervention that took place when hostilities
were considered inevitable and just after they broke out, the dis-
cussion to the effect that intervention would not occur, the dis-
cussion of the possible meaning of the presence of the German naval
vessels at Manila, the statements to the effect that if the United
States were attacked England would assist her, and finally, the dis-
cussion of the revivified rumors of intervention in November when it
became known that America had definitely demanded the Philippine Islands.

On March 19, The Spectator, in stating that the move towards war
seemed to be slowing down, mentioned as an explanation the possibility
that some indirect hints had been given to the United States government
from Paris, or Vienna, or from St. Petersburg. The Spectator commented:
"This clearly means that the American Executive realizes that if it goes
to war with Spain it may conceivably find itself face to face not with
Spain alone, but with a combination of Powers which, even if not inclined to intervene actively at once, may make the general outlook cloudy and precarious." The Speaker a week later deprecates the chances of war and hoped for peace, but deprecated still more European intervention. "We can imagine nothing more certain to provoke hostilities, nor to bring the United States permanently into the politics of Europe." The Pall Mall Gazette also believed that European intervention would determine the American people to war. "It is... quite certain that if one thing could make the American people more determined than they are now, it would be the suspicion of European interference."

There were also steps taken at this time by European Governments, which while not constituting positive intervention, were nevertheless taken with a view to having the two disputants arrange their quarrel without resorting to hostilities. On April 6 the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Italy jointly addressed to President McKinley "in the name of their respective Governments, a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guaranties for the re-establishment of order in Cuba."

The Times said that about this action, just as The Times had an-

1. Spectator, LXX, 397, Mar. 19, 1898.
2. Speaker, XVII, 377, Mar. 26, 1898.
3. Pall Mall Gazette, Apr. 16, 1898.
ticipated, it "failed to produce any beneficial effect." The Times then came close to gloating, and certainly was unctuous. "In fact it seems to be due only to the participation of the British Ambassador that it has not actually aggravated the situation. The American nation, we are glad to see, has been quick to understand that Sir Julian Paunce- fote could have had no share in any action designed to exercise undue pressure upon its decisions at so critical a moment in its history."

A few days later The Times commented upon the fact that the Spanish Government was sending a note to the other powers, in which Spain explained its case. The Times opined that it was certain that the powers would not intervene. The next day the same paper said that it did not believe the rumor of European intervention to prevent the United States from ending anarchy in Cuba, "and if anything of the kind were proposed or attempted, this country would assuredly be no party to it."

The Outlook, though involved in its sentence structure, did convey the idea that it believed Europe would not intervene against the United States. After asking how Mr. McKinley could refrain from the use of force in Cuba after having sent the kind of message to Congress that he did, that journal answered its own question: "Only if Europe, all or

5. Times, Apr. 9, 1898.
6. Times, Apr. 15, 1898.
7. Times, Apr. 16, 1898. The Times then proceeded to exercise a restraining influence upon any souls who might be overly anxious for an alliance with the United States: "But it is even more absurd to suggest that, because the honest indignation, aroused in the United States by the disastrous errors of Spanish policy in Cuba, has a large amount of sympathy among the people of these kingdoms, the British Government ought to rush into an armed alliance with the United States for the settlement of a question in which we have no immediate concern. This is another instance of the hair-brained folly which endeavored to involve us in a war on behalf of Greece against Turkey...."
in part, threatened armed intervention on behalf of Spain might be paused; but thanks to the curious instinctive homage of the Old World to the United States, all unarmed though she be — homage as to the Power which holds the Future as its realm — Europe is hardly likely to go beyond the benevolent word it has already said for Spain."

The Yorkshire Herald had a surprisingly present-day ring, tying together as it did the possibility of European intervention against the United States and the forcible smashing of the Monroe Doctrine:

"The event which might bring more than one European Power to the side of Spain would be the discomfiture of the American forces.... Were Spain to achieve such a triumph as would oblige the United States to sue for peace, there would be a collective attempt by Continental Europe to secure the repeal of the Monroe Doctrine, and the attempt in such a case might succeed."

The possibility that practices be affected by one or the other of the belligerents that might antagonize Europe was considered by The Pall Mall Gazette, and dismissed. "Happily it seems that no power is likely to be forced out of its neutrality immediately by any awkward incident. America has made a most satisfactory declaration as to privateering and blockade, as she might have been counted on to do; and Spain may be expected to follow suit."

The Economist was not so optimistic. On April 23, it wrote that the European powers were "anxious" to keep out of war, and would not

5. Outlook, I, 337, Apr. 16, 1898.
7. Pall Mall Gazette, Apr. 21, 1898.
affront each other if possible, "but still America cares about nobody, and Spain is nearly desperate, and their collision may produce consequences of which the most far-sighted never dreamed....Whatever view may be taken of this war...there can be no doubt that with so much gunpowder lying about it is most unfortunate for the world."

In its July issue The National Review told of the "plot" that had been in the making to create a European question out of the Cuban one. According to this journal, France, Austria, and Russia were willing and anxious to intervene, and asked Germany, who, of course, assented because of fear that the United States might become a great naval power. When the plot was mooted in London, Lord Salisbury was recuperating his health abroad; Mr. Arthur Balfour was acting as Foreign Secretary and to him and to Sir Julian Pauncefote "primarily belongs the credit of appreciating the full proportions of this plan of 'friendly mediation' which, if successful, could spell nothing but disaster for the English-speaking nations. Mr. Balfour's well-known sentiment towards the United States reinforced his solicitude for British interests. So the attitude of this country intimated to all whom it might concern that Great Britain would under no circumstances be a party to anything that might be even constructed as unfriendly to the Washington Government, and it became tolerably apparent that the British dissented from the Continental view that the American desire to suppress a hell in Cuba was a piece of wanton aggression. Possibly some of the 'promoters of peace' would have proceeded in their beneficent purpose if they could have secured the benevolent neutrality of this country, but even then this was seen to be out of the

question, and the general expression of opinion in the British Press of all parties, headed by The Times, showed the "combine" that it would be dangerous for them to threaten the States."

After this flurry of excitement about the possibility of European intervention before and just after hostilities broke out, there came a lull which was broken in May, and from then until the signing of the protocol in mid-August there was an almost steady stream of comment on the possibility that the war might spread. What will be dealt with in the next few pages will be the discussion that went on about the intervention being mooted because of any one of various reasons. The disposition of the Philippine Islands was one of the most often-mentioned causes for intervention. These islands European nations hated to see fall into the hands of the United States. Commodore Watson's talked-of expedition to the Spanish coasts was another cause of such discussion. Spain's hope that intervention might save her from what appeared to be inevitable disaster was also much in the minds of the editorial writers, but they usually discussed it as vain. The possibility that Germany might take a hand in the war and comments on her naval vessels being at Manila will be dealt with separately because it forms a distinct unit which attracted more attention than any other one episode of the kind.

It must be borne in mind when considering this talk-of intervention

12. National Review, XXXI, 639, July, 1898. The National Review continued by saying that the "combine" then dissolved, "leaving so few traces behind that its 'organizers' have been embarrassed to circulate semi-official dementis of its existence, and it is nowadays treated as a 'malignant invention of the British,' who wish to embroil France or Russia or Germany, as the case may be, with their dear friend the United States."
in the Philippines that the fate of those islands was for a long time undecided. From the time Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila until the last day of October, when the American commissioners in Paris demanded the cession of the entire archipelago, foreign nations had no inkling as to what was to be done with them. There was fear that the United States would take them all. This worried foreign statesmen, for with the course of the war it was seen that the United States would become a second - if not a first-class naval power. And that development would seal the future ownership of the Philippines.

During the war the Americans had merely destroyed the Spanish fleet and blockaded Manila. That city did not fall to their forces until the day after the protocol was signed. Even after that event American sovereignty could not be said to exist over any more of the two thousand odd islands than a part of Luzon, in which Manila is located.

Now foreign powers would undoubtedly have liked a share in the islands. With the rush “to open up China” or even to obtain a foothold in that nation, coaling and naval bases as close as the Philippine Islands were much desired. What was to happen to the islands? Would the United States give them back to Spain (in which case Continental nations might obtain cessions from Spain as compensation for their friendship in causing the United States to return them), or would the United States sell them, or would she be amenable to coercion such as Japan had had to suffer after her war with China - and give up part of the fruits of her successful war?
The news of the battle of Manila was the match that set off the train of speculation, envy, and fear if not belligerency in Continental Chancelleries, and which was discussed in English journals. The Times on May 2 was worried about possible difficulties arising out of the war's having spread to the Philippine Islands and stated "there is a certain amount of risk that this development of the war in a new quarter may be followed by an accentuation of the jealousy of American policy that is shown in the Continental newspapers....The ejection of Spain from the Philippines would import a new element of disturbance." The Economist, while discussing what the United States might see fit to do with the Philippine Islands, believed that the Continental Powers would not intervene at once, but: "If the Continent intervenes at all it will be to regulate the terms of peace and even that is more a guess than a prediction. It is by no means certain that the United States, confident in their immunity from invasion, will permit even the whole Continent to interfere, and quite sure that they will regard such interference as a deadly affront."

The Spectator said at the same time that there was no chance yet of intervention, "But we notice that the disposition to intervene increases. It is natural that it should, for the Governments are worried." Then speaking of American attitude the same journal said, "She does not mean to retire empty-handed because Europe is in a fume."

As illustrative of what the Paris correspondent of The Times wrote

13. Times, May 2, 1898.
15. Spectator, LXXX, 641, May 7, 1898.
to his paper at this time, is his statement that "men of weight" in France were finding it hard to understand why the United States which was fighting to free Cuba should want to keep the Philippine Islands. The only conditions, said this correspondent, which would be understood on the Continent would be that the United States should give them back under Spanish sovereignty. The next day The Times wrote that it could be doubted "whether any concert of the Continental Powers is possible for the purpose of attempting to apply coercion to the United States." England not only would not join, but might feil such a coalition.

"France, Germany, and Russia would think twice before trying to apply to the United States treatment which they might have found it very difficult to carry far even in the case of Japan, and which, if successful, would in all probability lead to grave dissension over the division of the spoil." In the same leading article The Times also said: "What maybe the ultimate fate of the Philippines depends upon events, but if the Continental Powers think of interfering they had better determine to play a very straightforward game, and to attempt no advantage for themselves under the guise of keeping the islands neutral ground."

The Statist was scornful of the chance for intervention, considering the circumstances. If Great Britain would act with the Continental Powers, they might compel the United States to get out of the Philippines. "But if, as is perfectly certain, the British Empire will not

17. Times, May 13, 1898.
18. Times, May 12, 1898.
do anything in any way hostile to the United States, does any serious
man suppose that the Continental Powers will dare to attack the United
States?"

That Americans would become tired of effort without dramatic effect
was evidently the opinion of European politicians, said The Spectator,
and that when they did so, the moment for intervention would have ar-
rived. "The Continentals do not, we fancy, understand either the dour
persistency which lies at the very root of the American character, the
intense pride the Americans feel in their national position, or the
reluctance with which they would make peace with Spain on any terms
which implied even an approach to compromise....They might recede,
being a sensible people, before a Continental coalition, but they are
just as likely to dare even that, trusting to the impossibility of in-
vasion...."

The Saturday Review was however in line with its conduct in other
matters regarding the United States, not so optimistic about the chances
of America being able to fend off a coalition, but said that the powers
feared Great Britain and the United States. That journal said, early
in July, that France, Germany, and Russia were determined to do what
they could to keep the Philippine Islands from going to the United States.

20. Spectator, LXXI, 749, May 28, 1898. The Novosti of St. Petersburg, gave ex-
pression late in June to one of the most outspoken and threatening of
the appeals for European intervention. After saying that "America must
voluntarily submit her pretensions to a tribunal of the Powers," The
Novosti then continued: "America cannot avoid doing this, as her posi-
tion with two long and exposed coast lines is not such as could with-
stand the combined fleets of two or three European Powers. Let Europe
raise her mighty voice and restore that peace to which mankind looks
for the only peaceful expansion and for the triumph of civilization." (The Novosti, June 25, quoted by The National Review, XXXI, 456, Dec. 1898). The National Review printed this in its December issue as (Cont'd p. 306)
"It is not that they fear the United States, but throughout Europe the United States and Great Britain are now considered (somewhat prematurely) to be the same nation as well as the same race. Any chance, however remote, that the Philippines might fall to Great Britain will drive France, Germany and Russia into an instant combination to defeat that chance." In direct contrast to this, The Statist, said just a week later that it did not believe any nation would try to seize any of the Philippine Islands if the United States were to intimate that it would regard such a step as unfriendly. No Continental power, believed The Statist was ready to quarrel with the United States.

America was a civilized power, and therefore the fruits of conflict should not be taken from her, was the gist of the argument of The Outlook. After stating that the terms of peace were for America to prescribe, it continued: "Moreover, there is no case of Japan and China or Turkey and Greece; there must be no filching of the rightful gains of war such as the world witnessed after the Treaty of Simonoseki [sic] and no intervention such as might be excusable if the United States, like Turkey, were a barbarian Power." The Economist likewise thought that the solution was for America to make herself. After asking what Americans were to do about the Philippine Islands, it said: "Whatever the solution we feel that it must primarily be a solution by America and Spain, and not by the Powers of Europe, who have, indeed, their commercial interests

20 (Cont'd from page 305) a part of its "proof" that there had been a plot of the Continental nations to intervene, but that it had been foiled by Great Britain's refusal to join. 
21, Saturday Review, LXCVI, July 1, 1898.
22, Statist, XLII, 54, July 9, 1898.
23, Outlook, I, 776, July 23, 1898.
in the Philippines, but who have no adequate claim to say how those
islands shall be governed or to whom they shall belong. The right of
conquest here must be regarded as final, and it will be so regarded."
After the Protocol had been signed The Times wrote in essentially
the same tone. This time, however, it was able to point to France as
having the "correct" attitude, that of permitting America to settle the
terms as she saw fit. The Times said: "In some quarters on the Continent the
opinion seems to be held that in the discussion of this problem the views
of certain European Powers are entitled to be heard, but perhaps the
more prudent view is that which is said to prevail in France to the
effect that the prerogative right of the United States to settle the
matter for herself is not to be lightly disregarded."
Germany, however, took somewhat more overt action than other
European nations, and occasioned much more concern about its intentions.
It was at this time that the Kaiser was starting to build Germany into
a naval power, and the possibility of another such power as the United
States in the role of a rival was not pleasant, and as has been said,
from Germany to Kiaochow was a long distance, and a coaling base in
the Philippines for German naval vessels would be a most useful aquisi-

25. Times, Aug. 20, 1898. So far had French opinion swung away from Spain
and towards the United States that The Temps, a leading Paris daily,
warned Europe not to meddle in the discussion of the disposition of
the Philippines, for, according to a news item written by the Paris
correspondent of The Times: "A maladroit intervention would inevi-
titably ensure the triumph of Chauvinism, in spite of Mr. Carnegie
and Mr. Carl Schurs and the prudent men who would renounce the
Philippines, not because they are afraid of responsibilities nor be-
cause of any blindly logical desire to adhere to American tradition
by the application this time to themselves, of the Monroe Doctrine,
but because they have seen in Europe the economic risks of the im-
perial and military temper with its crushing burden." (Times, Aug. 24, 1898)
tion. For the same reason that the possession of the Philippines would enable America to speak with a voice of more authority in China, so, too, would German possessions there enable Germany so to speak.

Shortly after Dewey demolished the Spanish fleet at Manila, German naval vessels began to arrive in the harbor. Three men-of-war and a transport were present by May 12. These men-of-war were ostensibly in Manila to protect their nationals and property. But the English journals pointed out that there were more men on the vessels than there were Germans in Manila. There were several incidents that occurred at Manila to make Americans and Englishmen suspicious of German purposes. These irritating incidents will be considered in order as they occurred.

English journals in commenting upon the presence and possible intentions of these German vessels were almost to a unit unfriendly or critical of the Germans or at least friendly and sympathetic to the Americans. It must be remembered that by the time Germany had forsaken Bismarck's policy of fulfilling the role of "a land rat," and was following "the large policy." The Kaiser's naval program was beginning seriously to worry England as to the ends he had in view. Trade competition from Germany was also a concern and added source of friction. These sources of fear and suspicion were not palliated by the attitude of journals in each country towards the government and press of the other."

26. War vessels of other nations were also present; British, French, and Japanese, to the actions of which no exception could be taken (Reuter, Anglo-American Relations, 132.)

27. For The Saturday Review to refer to Kaiser Wilhelm II as "Fitsles William" was hardly calculated to soothe the feelings of the great mass of Germans. Epithets of equal virulence were commonly used by journals on each side. It was at this time (1898) that Mr. Joseph Chamberlain attempted the German alliance and failed, largely because of these divergences. (See May, The Origins of the World War, I, 129).
The Daily Chronicle, which favored a firm foreign policy and a show of friendship with the United States, said about rumors of "starting action" by Germany early in May that the English government "must see that no European interference of the kind that is hinted at is allowed. If anyone is to help in the policing [sic] of Manila, it is we who have the best right to do so, and we alone could do it by friendly arrangement with America, and without any suspicion of self-seeking in the matter."

The Pall Mall Gazette did not throw the responsibility upon the English government, but in the first instance upon the American. "The Kaiser has a curious capacity for political advertisement. The movement of his Pacific squadron has reminded the world that he has a fleet....But it does not follow that he has serious intentions on the Philippines. The Americans would most certainly resent Kia-chauing in that quarter, and our sympathies would be with them in the most vigorous form." The Times was equally scornful, not of the Kaiser, but rather of Germany's explanations of suspicions that were entertained concerning the purposes of the German fleet in Manila, saying "we must point out that there is an amusing audacity about the attempts made in Berlin, to show that any suspicions which might be entertained at Washington are due entirely to the malicious attempts of the English Press to sow dissension between the two countries." The Times commented that this was an old trick used by Continental countries "when they find it difficult to explain either words or actions of their own."

29. Pall Mall Gazette, June 16, 1898.
30. Times, June 17, 1898.
The next day The Times carried in its column on foreign news the statement made in New York that the suggestion that England was trying to make trouble between Germany and America found no credence in New York. The Times then went on to say that if any hint in the press elsewhere had occasioned "disquiet" it was that put forth by the (Berlin) Marine Politische Correspondenz. That paper had stated: "For the same reasons which justified us in demanding the cession of a harbour in China, we must claim another from the Republic of the Philippines which to all appearance will be the issue of the present development of affairs."

The Times' comment on this was: "That is what in sporting circles is known, we believe, as 'a straight tip.' Our dear German friends really presume rather too far upon the ignorance or the credulity of the world."

It was at this time that open threats began to appear in the English press. England would stand with the United States if Germany took hostile steps in the Philippines. Undoubtedly it was the article in the Marine Politische Correspondenz that caused the wave of excitement in English journals just then. Two of the German vessels in Manila had greater tonnage than any of Dewey's. Admiral Camara was on his way across the Mediterranean, presumably destined for the Philippine Islands. This fleet such as it was, would throw the balance heavily against Dewey and in favor

31. Times, June 17, 1898. 32. Quoted by Times, June 17, 1898. Berlin date not given. 33. Times, June 17, 1898. 34. Reuter, Anglo-American Relations, 140. 35. Chadwick (Rel. of U.S. and Spain, Span.-Amer. War, II, 386) holds no high opinion of Admiral Camara's fleet. Three of the destroyers had to be towed through the Mediterranean, and when tow lines broke collisions occurred which damaged machinery.
of the combined German-Spanish fleet.

On June 18 The Economist said that it was natural that the Americans should view with some excitement the German fleet and marines in the Philippines, but stated its opinion that the excitement was unjustified. Germany would ally with Spain only to gain something, and there was nothing to be gained. The Economist now, contrary to its earlier opinion, thought that the Kaiser would not at the end of the war forbid America to take the Philippines or demand any of the islands for himself. "The Americans on the first supposition would resist, declaring with justice that the islands by all recognized laws of war belonged to them, and on the second supposition they would be supported by Great Britain, which, though she may not be ready for a formal alliance with the Union, is not disposed to see the States, insulted and despoiled merely to further the ends of German ambition...It is much more probable that the Emperor who thinks that whenever he is quiet he is forgotten, is advertising himself in his usual way, and at the same time reminding his people that a fleet is a very grand thing...."

On the same day The Outlook took a more serious view of the situation.

"We appreciate Germany, but we appreciate the United States more; and

36. Reuter, op. cit., pp. 140-144, states that the American situation in Manila was most critical from June 26 to July 1, but does not state just why it was so between these dates. She does state, however, that on July 27 Dewey cabled to Secretary Long that a threat against the coast of Spain might cause Admiral Cervera to be recalled to Spain. It can only be stated that there was more comment around June 18 in English journals to the effect that England would support the United States against German intervention than there was at any time later in the month.

37. Economist, LVI, 902, June 18, 1898.
therefore until we are assured that the Emperor William has nothing more in mind than the well-being of the handful of gentlemen at Manila who own him Kaiser, it would not be amiss if Admiral Seymour were to drop anchor alongside Admiral Dewey. The Spectator on the same day spoke in the same sense. "Americans look on gloomily, muttering under their breath that the war is between them and Spain, and nobody shall interfere, and the British look on quietly, quite sure that if a collision occurs the last word will rest with them. The German Emperor, of course, means nothing but friendly observation; but would it not be expedient to send a couple of cruisers to Manila [sic] to join in the friendly observation, - and reinforce Admiral Dewey if attacked?"

The Speaker on June 18 was non-committal, merely stating that the best hope for peace lay "in the rumors, caught at hopefully by a section of the Press but officially denied, that Germany means to intervene at Manila for other purposes, than the protection of her own citizens."

This excitement died down rather rapidly however. On June 26, The Pall Mall Gazette could write that Germany's assertion that there were fourteen large German or Swiss firms doing business in Manila and that they needed protection was "a more or less ingenious 'try on.'" The Germans had "the right to demand the establishment of a stable form of government after the war is over. But they cannot expect to accomplish another Kiao-chau in that quarter. No missionaries have been mur-

38. Outlook, I, 609, June 18, 1898.
39. Spectator, LXXX, 845, June 18, 1898.
40. Speaker, XVII, 749, June 18, 1898.
dered, for one thing; and, for another, Admiral Dewey is the man in possession." And on July 2 The Times spoke of reinforcements being sent to Admiral Dewey because Camara was going to Manila, and added: "It cannot do any harm to reinforce Admiral Dewey, were it only to keep the American force in Philippine waters up to the scale of German preparations to safeguard the interests of some three score German subjects." And on the same day The Pall Mall Gazette was bitter in its criticism of German activity, but did not go so far as to suggest that England side with America. "It is all nonsense for the Cologne Gazette and the rest of them to say that Admiral von Diederichs knows how to behave, and that he is keeping strictly within his rights. Technically, he may be - in reality he is grossly exceeding them; and his presence in the bay is encouraging the obstinacy of the Spaniards to persist in a struggle which is even more utterly hopeless out there than it is elsewhere. If the Kaiser's Government really means to observe a prudent abstention as between the United States and Spain in the Philippines, that intention is wantonly belied by its present action."

Several events in the first week of July show strained relations between America and English newspapers on the one side and German on

41. Pall Mall Gazette, June 26, 1898.
42. Times, July 2, 1898.
43. Pall Mall Gazette, July 2, 1898. On the same day Black and White suggested that more British vessels be sent to Manila, but with no idea of co-operating with the Americans there; rather "to counteract German or other influences, and preserve our prestige." (Black and White, XVI, 3, July 2, 1898.) The Saturday Review also hoped that England would send a naval force to Manila to correspond with the amount of English trade in the islands. (Saturday Review, LXXXVI, 2, July 2, 1898.)
the other. Likewise Ambassador Andrew D. White believed that German
and American public opinion was sufficiently excited to devote a
Fourth of July speech at Leipzig to an attempt to allay it. On July 7
occurred the affair of the *Irene*, a German cruiser, in Subig Bay, which
annoyed Dewey and occasioned comments in the journals. The *Irene*, in
Subig Bay, near Manila, had prevented the Philippine insurgents from
attacking Isla Mayor. Dewey sent the *Concord* and the *Raleigh* to the
scene, and not until they opened fire on the fort on the island did the
*Irene* withdraw.

On July 3 the correspondent of *The London Times* in Berlin sent to
his paper several extracts from German papers commenting on the English
attitude and on the Philippine question. Many German papers, according
to this correspondent, were complaining about *The Times* reprinting
"*extracts from New York journals which express the profoundest mistrust
of German intentions with regard to Manila.*"

On July 4 Andrew D. White said in his speech at Leipzig that there
was no ground for the suspicion that the German Government was hostile
to the United States. He maintained that the real opinion of Germany
was not only not hostile to the United States but favorable. *The Statist*
was sceptical about his statement concerning German public opinion, but
agreed that the German government was not unfriendly. It stated its be-
lief that there was a strong body of German opinion unfavorable to the
United States. But the German government could gain nothing by being un-
friendly to the United States.... And lastly, Germany is wise enough to
*44 Times*, July 4, 1898.
see that if the United Kingdom is prepared to act in a friendly spirit towards the United States, it would not be wise on the part of the Continental Powers to pick a quarrel with that country." The German ships at Manila merely meant to The Statist that Germany was on the look-out for a coaling station. Possibly she hoped to be able to obtain one of the Philippine Islands from Spain when peace was made.

On July 14 The Times, discussing the fact that for the moment at least there had been a swing in Madrid away from the desire for peace, said about the Subig Bay incident: "Another element which may have had a share in the change of opinion that has taken place at Madrid is the fact that the Germans have very nearly come into collision with the Americans in the Philippines....The interference thus attempted was afterwards explained as dictated by considerations of humanity." The Times then went on to deprecate the chances of Germany intervening on Spain's side. "If the Spaniards imagine that any aspirations the Germans may cherish of acquiring a position in the Philippines will lead to an alliance directed against United States, the pacific tone assumed by the Berlin Press under higher inspirations, as well as the result of the incident we have mentioned, ought to be enough to undeceive them." Spain's power having been broken, it was unlikely that those powers that encouraged but did not help her at the beginning of the war would strike a blow for her now.

On the next day The Times recurred to the incident of the Irene.

45. Statist, XLII, 55, July, 9, 1898.
46. Times, July 14, 1898.
and wondered what explanation Germany would give. Possibly Germany would state in defense of that action that she believed it would be humanitarian to allow the Americans to take the island rather than the insurgents. "This may serve to gloss over a rather disagreeable incident, yet the world cannot forget that Germany has not on other occasion shown herself to be powerfully swayed by humanitarian motives, and that reasons of a very different nature were originally assigned for the presence of her ships at Manila."

The Pall Mall Gazette took a different view of the effect that German interference at Manila was having on the United States. It said that the irritation being aroused thereby in the United States should be an added reason why Spain should listen to reason and make overtures for peace.

The Saturday Review, which by this time (after the naval battle of Santiago) had begun to say things not uncomplimentary about the United States, was positive and explicit on what German intervention in Manila would bring upon Germany. "Those who think America will be restrained by German bluff or by Franco-Russian manœuvres do not understand her or her people. The seamen on the German ships, it appears, are fraternising with the Spaniards in Manila. And it may well be that William the Witless takes it for granted that he can curb America's onward progress when he pleases or at least share in the booty her arms may win. But the War Lord is mistaken in this assumption. The Americans are not a people that can be bullied, and the slightest attempt on his part to bully

47. Times, July 15, 1898.
48. Pall Mall Gazette, July 15, 1898.
them would result in a war which would quickly enlighten him as to the limits of German power."

The Speaker was all at sea anent the "statesmanship which permits German men-of-war to play this strange part in a contest in which they are supposed to be neutrals, and we imagine that some explanation will be offered by the German Government...", but in another department in the same issue it was more explicit, stating that "the interference of the German Squadron in the islands, and the German press, are making the conclusion of peace more difficult by worrying the pacific section of the American people into Imperialism."

The Outlook said that Americans would soon run their flag up over Cuba and the Philippine Islands, and that no one would dare to dictate to them, but that if such a dictation were attempted the fact that England would be no party to it "the world-wide fraternization of the two halves of the Anglo-Saxon race on Independence Day is a significant pledge."

As time went on and no new "incidents" occurred, The Times became more hopeful. On July 31 it reported that Commodore Watson's instruc-

49. *Saturday Review*, LXXXVI, 68-69, July 16, 1898. The *Saturday Review* after stating in this same leader that it had never doubted America's strength, went on to say that "on the contrary, over the Venezuela question we warned our countrymen that ultimately we should be beaten in a struggle with America. It was our conviction of America's enormous strength that led us to deplore her aggressive humour:

    "'Tis excellent
    To have a giant's strength, but tyrannous
    To use it like a giant." (Ibid., LXXXVI, 68, July 16, 1898)

50. *Speaker*, XVIII, 56, July 16, 1898.
51. Ibid., XVIII, 64, July 16, 1898.
52. *Outlook*, I, 741, July 16, 1898.
tions called for his going to the Philippines if there should arise any question of America's right to dispose of them. "It may be assumed that this announcement will not weaken the disposition at Berlin to cultivate friendly relations with America and to make light of the 53 escapades of the German ships at Manila."

"That the United States," said The Outlook, "is entitled to dispose of the Philippines without let or hindrance from the European Powers might go without saying were it not that Germany has ostenta-
tiously laid herself open from the outset to the charge of interference with the belligerent rights of the States....But, in any case, England's wisdom will consist in resisting any and every attempt to compel the 54 United States to do otherwise than she would with the Philippines."

The Pall Mall Gazette was not nearly so sanguine about the advisability of England's extending support to the United States, and merely said that taking over the Philippines would be a "large order" for the United States, "even if there were no possibility of complications with European 55 Powers."

The National Review was at a loss to explain Germany's intentions in the Philippine Islands. After discussing the Subig Bay incident and Germany's actions in general in the Philippines, that journal said; Germany, like other nations, acts with a single eye to her own interests, and her policy is usually far-seeing and firm....But with regard to the Philippine Islands one asks oneself que diable allait elle faire dans sette

53. Times, July 21, 1898.
54. Outlook, I, 605, July 23, 1898.
55. Pall Mall Gazette, July 27, 1898.
and no satisfactory answer has yet been given to the conundrum."

Manila fell to the American forces on August 13, the day after the protocol was signed in Washington. During the action the Governor-General, Señor Augustin - was enabled to escape on a launch of the Kaiserin Augusta, by which German man-of-war he was then taken to Hong-kong. This episode caused a modicum of comment in the English press. The Manchester Guardian said it might be questioned whether the German commander at Manila had not overstepped "the limits of neutrality." The Guardian then proceeded to minimize the effect of Germany's interference. "The protection accorded by the Germans to General Augusti [sic] is only another move in the diplomatic struggle between France and Germany for influence in the Peninsula. From German interference in the Philippines the United States have nothing to fear." In depriving the United States of the person of the most important prisoner their forces have had the chance of making, the German Admiral has come uncommonly high to committing a flagrant breach of neutrality as international law understands it," said The Pall Mall Gazette. The Outlook looked upon the incident as proof that Germany was looking about for an excuse to intervene in the Philippine Islands. But: "One result of Admiral Diederich's officiousness will be to deepen the resolve of the United States to hold fast to the Philippines." Discussing the incident and the attitude of Americans towards it, The Daily News said: "The very last nation for whose opinion they would care is Germany, for they are tired of German hostility, and indignant at the

58. Pall Mall Gazette, Aug. 17, 1898.
59. Outlook, II, 55, Aug. 20, 1898.
removal of the Spanish Governor from Manila on a German ship."

With the capture of Manila ended overt actions there by Germans calculated to annoy Americans or Englishmen. Their presence there in such large numbers to protect a relatively insignificant number of German subjects had excited the suspicion of both Americans and English. Further, certain acts of the German naval forces there had irritated the peoples of both countries. And English editors had supported America throughout. In fact, they had written all during the episode in a manner almost as friendly to America and as jealous of her rights as a combatant as if the two countries had actually been in an alliance.

The next occasion upon which English journals became excited at the talk and possibilities of European intervention occurred when America demanded the cession of the entire Philippine archipelago. This happened, as has been said above, at the end of October, and in the early days of November the newspapers were much concerned about the chance that Europe might attempt to keep America from her spoils of war. How much real danger of intervention there was it is difficult to say. But the fact that concerns us here is that many English journalists knew that there were rumors of it and that they expressed opinions on it.

While these rumors were in circulation, English editors, as earlier, were a unit in deprecating the possibility of European intervention. The nations which had not helped Spain, they said, when she had naval and military strength would certainly not help her now. America was a proud sensitive nation which would surely resent any interference. Although

there were those in America who were dubious about the advisability of taking the Philippines, any attempt at dictation from abroad would unite the nation behind the President in favor of annexing them. Further, the European nations had reason to fear that Great Britain might side with the United States were any attempt made to coerce her.

On November 1 The Times played down the possibility that France would intervene on Spain's side. "Spain...is discovering, day by day, that the sympathy of France has had to yield to the cogency of events, and that, after all, French sympathizers can only tell her to submit to the inevitable. Unfortunately for her, she must bow to a fate which has overtaken her before, and from which no kindly feelings on the part of neighbours, who, of course, have never had the slightest notion of drawing the sword in her behalf, will avail to deliver her." No European Power would be so foolish," said The Liverpool Mercury, "as to contest the rights of the United States by force, and it may be confidently predicted that the difficulties which have arisen in the course of the Peace negotiations will not lead to war." The Pall Mall Gazette dismissed cavalierly the "grumblings" of Germany's press. "The general German moral is that Europe 'cannot be indifferent to' the fate of the Philippines. But it is the way of most of the German Press to grumble at anybody else's colonial performances, and it means just nothing."

The Times, in referring to the fact that the Spanish Commissioners had said that they were going to leave the matter to the judgment of "the public conscience," commented: "The public conscience may perhaps

61. Times, Nov. 1, 1898.
63. Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 3, 1898.
be aroused in certain quarters, such as Germany and Russia, where a different solution of the [Philippine] question was hoped for, but it is more than doubtful whether Spain will find in these quarters anything more than platonically sympathetic." Later, while the discussion of the Philippines was still going on, the same journal said of Spain: "She has discovered that there is no backing for her in any quarter."

The Pall Mall Gazette used a historical reference to express its scorn of the chance of European intervention. "Sympathy Spain, no doubt, has in many a Continental nation, but it takes a good deal to transform sympathy into the healthy bones of Pomeranian grenadiers."

The Economist, discussing the possibility that the powers of Europe were considering acting towards America as they had acted towards Japan after her war with China, and take away the spoils, said it did not believe that the powers had such an idea. "But any attempt to forcibly interfere with what the United States propose to do in the Philippines would, we assert, seem to the American people as a piece of impertinence, which would probably convert the most ardent anti-annexationist

64. Times, Nov. 4, 1898.
65. Ibid., Nov. 17, 1898.
66. Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 15, 1898. Just at this time the Kaiser was returning from his visit to the Sultan of Turkey and to the Holy Land. It was rumored that he was going to stop at Cadiz. The Pall Mall Gazette commented twice on this rumor. On November 15 it said: "The Hohenzollern [the Kaiser’s yacht] has probably a bitter disappointment in store for Spain, if Spain is building on the Cadiz call." On November 18 it reported that the Kaiser had decided to not go to Cadiz, and expressed the possibility that he may have thought it injudicious to drop anchor at Cadiz. "We really cannot say. The only certainty is that his omission of Cadiz is all to the good; it should remove any false hopes that may have been formed at Madrid, and help the pace of the Paris Peace Commissioners."
into a stout advocate of annexation." America was not standing for a half-and-half policy, said The Pall Mall Gazette, but meant business.

"And the growing Anglophil tone of the German press does not look as though Germany would wish to annoy this country, as by Philippine interference she would." The next day the same journal used stronger language than the word "annoying" declaring that no European State is in the least likely to burn its fingers for Spain, more especially as they must all know that if it came to a question of allies, America would not lack powerful backing." This obviously referred to English "backing." The Spectator likewise was of opinion that Europe would not, for the sake of the Philippines, risk such a danger. "We are unable to believe that any Power contemplates a defence of Spain by force of arms at the risk of Great Britain joining forces with her natural ally," but it expressed the belief that Europe might take other steps in an attempt to assure its desires: "We take it to be certain that an attempt will be made to bring heavy diplomatic pressure to bear on Washington....If the Continent threatens President McKinley with interference, the whole American people will support him in a reply which, however, moderate in words, will be in essence a clear defiance."

In its December issue The National Review in discussing the story of the rumors of intervention said rather smugly: "During the last few weeks feeling has run very high in every Continental capital against the ac-

67. Economist, LVI, 1587, Nov. 5, 1898.
68. Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 10, 1898.
69. Ibid., Nov. 11, 1898.
70. Spectator, LXXI, 677, Nov. 12, 1898.
quisition of the Philippines by the United States, and if the Govern-
ments had had the courage of their convictions, there would have been
a Philippine Concert."

Often during the excitement over the possibility of European inter-
vention (always on Spain's side) English editors had threatened that such
a move would bring England in on America's side of the conflict. In other
words, England did not want European nations to benefit from the division
of Spain's colonial empire. For this mooted intervention was almost al-
ways aimed at obtaining something material as payment. The reasons why
England did not want the other nations to profit from the break-up of that
empire were largely three. England thought that she would profit in com-
merce if America took the possessions; she wanted apower in the Philippines
that would help her support the policy of the open door in China, and too;
it was possible that in the maturing of time England and America would
form an alliance, and England at this time was supporting America for
the sake of continuing and further cementing the good feelings existent
between the two, and for a material reason also; in case she was going to
have an ally she wanted that nation to be strong against the possibility
of war.

In the light of these desires English threats to join with America
in case of European intervention become understandable. Statements to

72 To be sure, the monarchies of Europe did not relish the prospect of
one of their number being humbled, particularly as the Queen-Regent
of Spain was a member of one of the oldest royal families in Europe,
but to save that Queen-Regent from humiliation was not often the only
or even the principal reason for European capitals discussing the
feasibility of intervention.
this effect were made from before the time the war broke out until
last rumors of intervention were heard during the meetings of the pev
commission. The Review of Reviews began as early as April 1; after
saying that America needed "No help to whip the Spaniard," that journal
continued: "But she may welcome our support in combating any disposition
on the part of European Powers to help Spain..." As the aspect of
things grew darker, The Spectator was picturesque and dramatic: "As a
matter of fact, if America were really attacked by a great Continental
coalition, England would be at her side in twenty-four hours." The Fall
Mall Gazette was less committal, but still friendly to the United States
stating "the powers know that this country is not going to take an anti-
American line." After the joint resolutions calling for intervention
had been signed by President McKinley, The Speaker was hardly less ex-
plicit, though less dramatic than The Spectator had been. "That Great
Britain would, as a matter of course, stand by the side of the Republic
if any question of a European alliance against the Anglo-Saxons of
North America were to be raised, need not be said. We have had our
causes of difference with the United States, but they have never, even
in the moments of sharpest stress, obliterated the sense of kinship,
and we could not look on unmoved if any great misfortune were to befal
a race so closely and so permanently allied with our own."

A week after the Philippine Islands had been injected into the war
to make even more cause for intervention, The Economist said about the talk

73. Review of Reviews, XVII, 319, Apr. 1, 1898.
74. Spectator, LXX, 501, Apr. 9, 1898.
75. Fall Mall Gazette, Apr. 15, 1898.
76. Speaker, XVII, 498, Apr. 23, 1898.
of intervention that was going on: "All that seems to us, if not nonsensical, at least singularly rash. The Continent, as a whole, is not united, is much afraid of a general war, and with England looking on in a very uncertain mood, is not in the least likely to make that war a maritime one. The risk would be too great, and the profit too small." The Statist said essentially the same thing: "It is one thing for Russia, Germany, and France to combine to dictate to Japan; it is another thing for them to combine to dictate to the United States, especially as the British Empire would certainly then have something to say in the matter."

On May 13 Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Colonel Secretary, said startling things in the course of a speech given before the Grand Committee of the Birmingham Liberal Unionist Association. Speaking of the danger of a European combine against England, he said that the same group was also a threat against the United States. Then he uttered a sentence that startled the world: "I go even so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if, in a great and noble cause, the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance."

This frank statement elicited comment in the English press. The Pall Mall Gazette declared that "he approves, as every Englishman must, our taking sides with the United States in the event of the hostile intervention of Europe in favour of vanquished Spain." The Statist wanted

77. Economist, LVI, 682, May 7, 1898.
78. Statist, XLII, 809, May 14, 1898.
79. Times, May 14, 1898.
80. It will be discussed at more length in the consideration of an Anglo-American alliance.
81. Pall Mall Gazette, May 14, 1898.
to know if Chamberlain intended that the public should understand that
the English Government had made up its mind to resist at the end of the
war any attempt of the Continental powers to intervene between the United
States and Spain. If so, had such an intimation been made to President
McKinley? "On April 30 this Journal recommended the adoption of such a
policy. If it was Mr. Chamberlain's good fortune to announce that the
Cabinet has adopted it, the country will certainly support the Ministers
with enthusiasm....The British people would not look quietly on if the
Continental Powers were to attempt to put a humiliation upon our American
kinsmen, and though the people of the United States may feel themselves
strong enough to resist even a Continental coalition they could not but
welcome the friendly assistance of the British Empire."

On May 28, in tracing the efforts of France since the signing of the
Treaty of the Pyrenees to exert influence on the government of Spain,
The Spectator remarked that Spain owed much money in France, and that this
might be one factor that would prompt France to intervene in the war.
France would not stickle at fighting the United States alone, but "knows
now that she must fight us also if she attacks the States."

82. Statist, XLIII, 339, May 21, 1898.
83. Spectator, LXXX, 751, May 28, 1898. One journal, The Guardian, while not ex-
pressing in so many words England's willingness to go to war did any
European nation take up Spain's fight, did speak in a satisfied manner
of England's having prevented such an intervention earlier in the war:
"For this the American press has been abundantly grateful, and the
happy result has been to draw the ties of friendship between the two
nations much more closely than they have ever been drawn before."
Guardian, LXXXIII (1), 876, June 6, 1898. The National Review took a like stand
on England's having prevented European intervention early in the war
by refusal to join the European powers: "As the story leaks out,
Englishmen of all classes will congratulate themselves that at a most
critical moment in our history our Government abstained from making
a hideous blunder, the folly and calamitousness of which we can now
all see."
After Spain's naval power had been all but destroyed at the Battle of Santiago, The Outlook was alarmed at the supposed danger of German intervention at Manila. After asking what the English government meant to do about it, it declared: "One thing will do itself. The Anglo-American understanding is already a fact; it becomes a pact the moment Germany shows her hand at Manila."

England had already declared its intention of standing by the United States, said The Statist on July 9, so "no Power or combination of Powers will be strong enough to prevent the States from keeping what it conquers and consequently there seems no ground for apprehending that the termination of the war will lead to complications with other nations."

These expressions of opinion that favored English assistance to the United States in case any other nation should help Spain or attempt to prevent America from keeping the fruits of her victory, taken together with others of the same cast of thought cited earlier, show that English editors during and after hostilities did not desire that England should maintain merely a polite friendliness towards the United States. Expressions of friendship were very good, but English policy should not limit itself to such expressions. If America were attacked, or were thwarted in her attempt to collect her just fruits from the war, then England should take active steps to fight off America's enemies. More significant, however, is the fact that they favored this policy without the United States government having asked England for help in such contingencies. In other words, so friendly was editorial opinion to the

84. Outlook, I, 714, July 8, 1898.
85. Statist, XLII, 43, July 9, 1898.
86. See supra.
United States that the editors wrote as if a formal binding alliance had already been effected between the two nations. There was no official agreement between the two nations. But England did not want other nations (European nations, already allied) to become stronger by absorbing any of Spain's colonial possessions. To prevent their becoming stronger by such accretions, many English editors favored a war on them. Verily, the idea of the alliance of Anglo-American peoples had gone a long way towards accomplishment - at least on one side of the Atlantic - if the sentiment of a people may be judged by reading their journals. What the officials of the English government would have done had provocation come to pass is beyond the scope of this paper.

Not one journal examined actually favored a policy of permitting intervention by European powers. Many favored action by England if such intervention were attempted. The motives for such suggested action varied. A few editors favored England's taking steps to protect her own present (or future) interests. But the great majority of them urged that England act to help America.
Chapter IV

England Wants a Partner

England did not look with confidence on her international position in 1898. Several aspects of international affairs worried her. The great Continental powers were grouped in alliances, Russia and France in the entente cordiale, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy in the Triple Alliance. Difficulties with Russia, Germany, or France might conceivably force England into war with either of these groups. With Russia there had been difficulties in the Far East and over the Straits; and Russia was not yet seen to be the papier maché that Japan was to prove her in 1904 - 1905. Neither Russia nor Germany seemed willing to abide by England's desire that the "open door" should prevail in China and that spheres of influence be not set up.

England had been stunned and frightened in January, 1896 at the Kaiser's telegram to President Paul Kruger congratulating him on his success in having repelled Jameson's raid without recourse to friendly powers. Did this mean that Germany was in agreement with the Boers, England's potential adversaries? Germany was making friendly gestures to Turkey and to the Mohammedans. On his trip to Palestine in 1896 the Kaiser announced himself the friend of the Mohammedans. England had millions of Mohammedan subjects throughout the East, so what ulterior motive did the Kaiser have for making this statement? Germany's "forward policy" was manifesting itself in its resolution to build a navy. England was made uneasy thereby. For why did Germany want such a large navy? Could it be to threaten
England's commercial and colonial supremacy?

With France there were territorial questions in Africa, and the Fashoda crisis in 1898 brought the two countries perilously close to war. Furthermore, French resentment over the continuing English control of Egypt still smouldered.

England knew at this time that Europe envied and hated her and America. Europeans envied Englishmen and Americans their material prosperity, their freedom from conscription, and their freedom from fear of invasion and alarms.

This was the aspect of affairs when Mr. Joseph Chamberlain began to express doubts of the feasibility of further maintenance of British isolation. For sea power was expensive, and could England afford to build and maintain a navy requisite to protect her empire against an envious Europe? Overtures were made to Germany looking to an alliance, but such an alliance could not be effected.

It happened at this time, though, that England was not alone in tiring of her isolation. For America, too, was beginning to look abroad; even before the Spanish - American War she had looked with desire upon Samoa and Hawaii. England might well have looked to this newcomer as a make-weight to help her balance European envy. This young and vigorous nation would likewise be subject to the same envy and hatred now - for being a possessor nation, as well as for other reasons.

Positive benefits were seen to inhere in an alliance with America. That country had tremendous acreage devoted to grain. She also had the capabilities of building a large navy and thereby protecting England's food supply in war-time. Further, she could help
make England's voice effective in the question of the Chinese "open
door" - especially if she were to take the Philippine Islands.
England and America had advantages that would help to make an
alliance work - advantages not available to European nations -
common race, language, law, religion, and historic traditions.
Together they would support each other in their desire to advance
progress, liberty, and civilization throughout the world.

Hence it was said that England and America would make an
invincible pair to offset the "reactionaries" of Europe, to offset
the exclusive traders of Europe, and those envious nations that
sated the "progressive" once owning far-flung possessions. England
wanted America to become an imperial power and thought an alliance
with her, or at least a good understanding, would be desirable.

Not all the overtures were made by England, however. The
possibility that Europe might war on England in 1896 had helped to
quiet the agitation over Venezuela, and had evoked expressions of
friendship between England and America. As has been said, the
feelings of America towards England after that time had been on the
whole friendly, even though the Senate had rejected the Arbitration
Treaty in 1897.

After the Spanish - American War began America felt the need of
a friend. Her condition of unpreparedness showed her that she might,
for a while at least, be made to suffer at the hands of a strong,
well-prepared antagonist. This fear, together with the discussion in
Europe of the possibility of intervention on the side of Spain, made
her desire the friendship of a strong nation that sympathized with
her views. The belief that England had refused to join in an attempted coalition against her at the beginning of the war brought out in America a wave of warm feeling for the "mother country."

Hence the wooing between England and America for friendship during the war was actual. English editors had expressed their sympathy for America's aims in intervention in Cuba. They had commented enthusiastically on her victory at Manila over the fleet of "inept," "medieval," "decadent," Catholic Spain. America in turn made an overt manifestation of this friendly feeling for England.

The American government had not appropriated the money to pay the damages awarded British sealers for seizure in the Bering Sea, which award had been fixed by the joint commission in 1896. This sum, £473,151.26, was finally appropriated on June 15, 1898. This action was variously received by the English press. The majority, however, saw in it a gratifying sign of the warmth of feeling felt in America for England. The Times was particularly pleased by the fact that Senator Lodge, formerly an enemy of Great Britain, had himself suggested the payment. "That the sympathy with the United States which is the general attitude of this country is fully appreciated in America is proved by the gratifying change of tone in treating of English affairs, as well as by such striking incidents as the proposal to pay the sum due under the Bering arbitration made by none other than Mr. Lodge, hitherto found among our detractors."

2. Times, Apr. 30, 1898.
The Saturday Review did not miss this opportunity to point the finger of scorn at America for this "indecent" gesture. "The action of the Senate last week in promptly voting the half million dollars due to Great Britain under the Behring Sea award, which ought to have been paid long ago, savours strongly of the methods of the political boss who is accustomed to gain support by bribes."

When the bill was finally made law, other comments followed. The Speaker was pleased. "The unanimous acceptance by the United States Senate of the special resolution of the House of Representatives...is a striking sign of the change of American feeling towards England, which is daily evinced in a variety of less conspicuous ways." The Saturday Review was again sarcastic. "We are asked to dissolve in emotion at a fresh development of the Anglo-Saxon blood brotherhood, because the Americans 'unanimously' resolved...after only a few years' shirking and evasion to pay the little bill that has been so long owing....We do not see why we should display emotion on being paid an outstanding debt, the payment of which the debtor has exhausted every legal and illegal subterfuge in endeavouring to evade...."

4. Speaker, XVII, 749, June 18, 1896.
5. Saturday Review, LXXXV, 806, June 18, 1896. The same journal (ibid.) wrote in the same paragraph: "We have always been told and have been willing to believe that 'the great heart of America was sound,' but we have unfortunately had repeated proof that 'great heart' of the Washington politician was corrupt and ill-disposed towards us, and we can only judge by results. If the honest American has gained permanent victory over the dishonest politician both countries may well rejoice." And on May 21 it had written about the United States: "Whilst we stand between them and the scarcely concealed hostility of the majority of the European Powers, they will endeavour to

(Cont'd. on p. 335)
The award to British sealers for seizures had not, however, closed the seal question. For the seals were not yet properly protected. In response to a proposal put forth by the United States government that a four-power conference be held to settle the point, Canada was not willing to have Russia and Japan included, and the British government, willing itself, had to demur. As a consequence, a protocol was signed on May 30, 1898 by Sir Julian Pauncefote and Sir Louis Davies, Canadian Minister of Marine and Fisheries on England's side, and by J.W. Foster and J. A. Kasson, Special Commissioners for the United States. That protocol provided that a Joint High Commission should settle the twelve outstanding grounds of difference relating to Canada between the United States and 6 England. The Commission was to meet in Quebec.

5. (Cont'd. from p.334)
secure our friendliness by such transparent transactions as the payment of the Behring Sea award, and bland assurances of esteem. But the moment their difficulties are at an end, and Cuba is won for the Union, they will doubtless resume their favourite pastime of "wisting the Lion's tail." (Ibid., LXXXV, 669, May 21, 1898.)
6. The differences were: the protection of fur seals, Atlantic and Pacific coast fisheries, the Alaska boundary, the transit of merchandise "from one country to be delivered at points in the other beyond the frontier," alien labor laws, mining-rights, reciprocal customs concessions, the agreement about the Great Lakes of 1817, the marking of the frontier, the taking of prisoners "in the lawful custody of the officers of one country through the territory of the other"; and finally, "any other difference not included in the foregoing specification." See R.B. Mosvat, The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States, 278, from which the material for this discussion has largely been taken.
Naturally comments on this meeting were varied. Almost all of the journals were favorable and cordial. Many commented upon this new move as indicative of good feelings. The personnel was considered for the most part able and willing to co-operate for a successful issue, and the agenda as permitting one. By far the greater number of comments, however, rather than limiting themselves to the Conference itself, looked beyond and to its consequences. Some hoped it would lead to a closer understanding and more friendly relations with Great Britain, and some even expressed the hope that it might prove the first step to an alliance.

The Times was much pleased at the signs of a better understanding as illustrated by this agreement to confer. "The anxiety to appreciate each other's point of view," said The Morning Post, "which did not exist three months ago and which now prevails, is a matter for congratulation." This same line of thought occupied The Review of Reviews. "The transformation that is wrought when there is a change in what may be called the moral temperature of the negotiators is aptly illustrated by the success that has attended a Conference held between the representatives of Great Britain and Canada and those of the United States... For years past the relations between the Dominion and the Republic have been somewhat of a hedgehoggy order.

7. Times, June 1, 1896.
8. Morning Post, June 1, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXII, 807, June 3, 1896.
9. Review of Reviews, XVII, 533, June 1, 1896. The Review of Reviews apparently had received misinformation about what had occurred at the time the protocol was signed, for it wrote, continuous with the above quotation: "It is now said that owing to the more cordial feeling that exists... all the outstanding difficulties have been satisfactorily dealt with. Several of them have been settled for good, while in the case of others a workable modus vivendi has been arrived at. Cordiality between nations is like oil in machinery - it keeps the bearings from heating and makes it possible for the engine to work."
Speaking of the agreement The Investors' Review said "it is a significant and gratifying indication of the cordial relations now existing between the United States and Great Britain...." and "there should be no serious difficulty in maintaining and strengthening the good understanding now established...." The Times recurred to the question: "The appointment of Lord Herschell, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and three other distinguished Canadian politicians... comes to us this morning as a fresh reminder of the cordial relations between us and America."

"Among the good results of the late war," opined The Yorkshire Herald, "the friendly feeling it has created between this country, Canada, and the United States is one of the most important." But on the same day The Standard assigned a different cause for the Conference, stating that it "was arranged long before the first gun was fired from an American gunboat, and, indeed, before the diplomatic duel began which resulted in the descents on Cuba and the Philippines. It owed its origin partly to the Anglo-American negotiations over the Bering Sea seal fishery, and partly to the gathering of colonial statesmen in London in connection with the Jubilee celebration last summer; and it would have taken place long ago but for the absorption of the Washington authorities, during the past few months, in their quarrel with Spain."

The Speaker was almost rhapsodical. After mentioning the problems to be dealt with, it exulted: "One section alone of the Commission's programme would be quite enough for an ordinary treaty. It is a striking proof of the new relations between Britain and America that it should be possible to attempt a settlement of the whole at once."

In discussing President McKinley's annual Message to Congress in December, The Fall Hall Gazette was enthusiastic over the President's reference to the work of the Commission. "Particularly satisfactory is the expression of the 'earnest wish' of the American Government to 'remove all sources of discord and irritation' in its dealings with Canada. Verily we are far enough in the spirit from the discourteies of the Olney despatch and similar twistings of the Lion's tail, which used to elicit occasional growls of dissatisfaction from that long-suffering quadruped."

Expressions on the agenda of the Conference were equally cordial and optimistic. To The Fall Hall Gazette the fact that all questions on which there was a difference of opinion were to be discussed was in itself a reason for optimism. "The hitch on previous occasions usually came about owing to the bringing up of one thing at a time; necessarily in that case each side thought almost exclusively of scoring that particular point. The association of all the questions means that the wish to make a clean job of it and be thorough friends is at least as prominent, and that is the way to do business." "The task of the

14. Speaker, XVIII, 246, Aug. 27, 1898. The same journal then went on to point out various reasons why it believed the Commission should be a success.
15. Fall Hall Gazette, Dec. 6, 1898.  16. Ibid., June 1, 1898.
Commissioners at Quebec should be comparatively easy," thought The Morning Post, "as, fortunately, there is no serious question in dispute - nothing which cannot be solved by friendly feeling and fair play, which are precisely the sentiment that may be expected to animate both parties in the case."

Many journals hailed this Conference as a first step - or one more step - on the road leading to a closer Anglo-American understanding. It was symptomatic of the fact that England and the United States were going to work together for common ends. Some journals believed that an alliance might well be the final result of the Conference.

After rejoicing that the President was to be authorized to appoint Commissioners, The Outlook continued: "There will soon be much for both the United States and ourselves to do in common the wide world over - notably just now in defence of the principle of the Open Door...." The Sunday Magazine said that Canada had done well to establish such a tribunal and: "We, too, must have a court of the same kind.... Sentiment is excellent; but sentiment must be made effective." "This Commission," wrote The Review of Reviews,"...may be regarded as the germ of the Parliament which will some day contain representatives of the whole English-speaking world....It would be thoroughly in keeping with the genius of our race and the gradual evolution of our political constitution if out of this American-Canadian Commission there should ultimately develop a great Congress or Parliament which the English-speaking race would recognise as their

17. Morning Post, June 1, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 667, June 3, 1898.
18. Outlook, I, 386, Apr. 30, 1898.
supreme authority."

The Investors' Review believed that the Conference would do good, even though an actual alliance might not come of it. "At present there need be no talk of an alliance. That may or may not come. But there should be no serious difficulty in maintaining and strengthening the good understanding now established between the two great English-speaking countries." The Fall Hall Gazette expressed a more hopeful attitude for consequences over the long term. After stating that an alliance was not desired then, it said that the "kinsmen" were gravitating together slowly, and that the Commission would play its part in removing obstructions in the way of this gravitation. "The Commission starts with good omens, and will undoubtedly do very practical work indeed, and then the natural law of gravity will be free to act." Black and White likewise looked to a long period (fifty years) before an alliance could be formed, and quoted the proverb: "Wise, surely, is the man who from the tiny beginning can foresee the end." But the first link had been formed by the resolution to hold this Conference.

The Outlook thought that the conclusion of the agreement "raises high hopes with regard to an eventual Understanding between this country and America. The settlement of the difficulties between the States and Canada...will be a great thing, and it is so eagerly looked

22. Fall Hall Gazette, June 4, 1898.
23. Black and White, XV, 738, June 4, 1898. In the light of conditions to-day, part of what Black and White wrote in that article is almost pathetic: "The keynote of the future is arbitration. The honour of the future will be for those countries who are the earliest to realise this."
forward to because it may lead to a greater." A cartoon in the same issue showed graphically what this "greater" thing would be. It was entitled "The Music of the Future!" Mr. Chamberlain was shown standing in the foreground, playing what appeared to be a mediaeval harp, which was labelled "Anglo-Saxon Unity," and from which was pendant a ribbon labelled "Manchester Speech." To his music were dancing John Bull, Jack Canuck (in the center), and Uncle Sam, arm in arm. Over their shoulders and heads was a ribbon labelled: "Alliance." A diminutive figure in the background was labelled "Latin." Under "The Music of the Future" were the following lines:

"Chamberlain strikes the popular chord. 25 Yes! And Jack Canuck's the connecting link!"

Discussing the Conference again The Outlook said: "It is, in a word, a unique opportunity to clear the boards of the local hindrances to a more perfect Anglo-American amity."

If the questions at issue could be settled, said The Manchester Guardian: "It would unquestionably pave the way for closer relations with the United States - not a formal alliance of the Continental type,

24. Outlook, I, 545, June 4, 1898.
25. Ibid., I, 555, June 4, 1898. The cartoon was the work of a Canadian, Mr. Mengough, but was reproduced and referred to in The Outlook, and therefore has been considered to represent the editorial opinion of that journal.
26. Outlook, I, 695, July 2, 1898. The Outlook was confident that the Conference would be held, and continued from the above-quoted sentence: "We refuse to take seriously the little freak of the Appropriations Committee of the United States Senate in recommending the omission of the item of $50,000 dollars towards the expenses of the Conference." Needless to say, the Senate restored the item to the appropriation bill. In its next issue, The Outlook recurred to the subject of the Conference: "If Lord Moreschall, Sir Wilfrid Laurier [Canadian Prime Minister], and their United States colleagues can bring to an end the fisheries and boundary bickerings which make so much mischief along the forty-ninth parallel, Anglo-American accord will have taken a great leap forward." (Ibid., I, 715, July 9, 1898.)
but a general understanding, which would be infinitely more effectual in keeping the peace of the world."

In a leader published just before the Conference convened, The Pall Mall Gazette wrote what may fairly be taken as a summary and digest of English editorial opinion towards the possible consequences of the Conference. "It is a visible sign to all whom it may concern that the two nations mean to bury superficial differences for the sake of attaining that fundamental unanimity without which treaties and alliances, no matter how formally they may have been signed and sealed, can have no enduring vitality. For that reason, if for no other, the Quebec Convention is fortunate in its opportunity. It is not necessary to be in any hurry to assume that its deliberations and decisions will be the immediate forerunner of any formal alliance between the two countries. That may or may not come to pass in the fulness of time. What is of far greater importance is the clearing of the ground, without which any alliance worth having, whether formal or informal, would be difficult, if not impossible. Towards the attainment of that end the Quebec Convention is unquestionably a step - and a long step - in the right direction."

English hopes for the success of the Conference were, however, disappointed. The first meeting at Quebec in August, 1898 was adjourned to Washington in February, 1899, at which city it adjourned permanently. The Alaskan boundary awoke differences that could not be compromised.

In his annual message in 1899 President McKinley said that much progress had been made toward the adjustment of many of the questions "when it became apparent that an irreconcilable difference of views was entertained respecting the delimitation of the Alaskan boundary."

But the fact that such a conference could be called served a purpose in 1898 of contributing to the good will felt in each nation towards the other. That it did not prove the forerunner of an alliance is a criticism of the lack of prescience rather than of desire on the part of those English editors who professed to believe that it would so prove itself. Along with these two incidents that were commented upon as possible steps towards an alliance many other comments were made on the possibility, feasibility, and necessity of an Anglo-American alliance and of the benefits to be derived from it. Some editors pointed out why it was possible. Some favored making such an alliance as soon as possible. Others thought that it might mature in the course of time. Some elaborated the conditions on which it could eventuate. Many, while favoring an Anglo-American understanding or "friendly relations," believed that a formal binding alliance should not be attempted, and argued that a friendship and unity of aim were much more important to England and America than a signed document.

Several journals devoted space to considerations of the things that England and America had in common and which would argue for the accomplishment of an alliance. The Critic, exceedingly anxious for such a union of the two nations, stressed the importance of language as against race. "The supposed objection to an Anglo-American alliance..."
contained in the mixed origin of the Republic's population is of little moment. Race counts for nothing beside language. Many of the numerous foreigners who settle down as British subjects or American citizens may feel no affection for the country of their birth and those who do seldom transmit it to their children." One of the strongest bonds is language, The Critic went on to say, and a common literary heritage. An American, the editor wrote, thought of Shakespeare as his equally with an Englishman. He then went on to stress the importance of a like sense of humor. "When two nations can appreciate each other's jokes, they are fairly beyond the reach of misunderstanding. The Pink 'Un sells well in America, and the Police Gazette, I am told, has its vogue in England. These are the things that weigh."

"The difficulty," said The Times, "...is not to find reasons why we should be allied. They are palpable. Our interests, our language, our attitude on religious and moral subjects, our traditions, and no small part of our laws and of our social habits are the same. The difficulty is to find reasons why we should not be allied."

From statements of this nature it was an easy step to saying that England would like an alliance. It is interesting to note that most of such expressions were made in the middle or in the latter half of the year 1898. Several reasons may be held to account for this. As the year wore on England saw more and more danger that her policy of the "open door" in China would not be accepted by continental countries. Another reason

31. Times, Sept. 9, 1898. As will be pointed out later The Times had not always been of such opinion.
might be the fact that as the war went on Americans had been able to show their ability to fight on the sea, and that England would want an ally that in wartime could protect the ships carrying foodstuffs from America to England. For America would be the most easily accessible granary in case of war. A reason still more immediate might be the speech given by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain on May 13 at Birmingham, in which he favored an Anglo-American alliance.

The word alliance was not always used in English journals. "Union," "permanent friendship," "good understanding" were words also used. Nor did English journals begin to talk of such union only after the war began. The Speaker in March in a leader entitled "An Anglo-American Alliance," sought to prove by a reference to history that England had been friendly to America for years and had been desiring a union with her. At the time of the Venezuela controversy, it stated, not a word was uttered in England that would "inflame" the controversy. To point out the difference in English feelings towards Germany The Speaker then went on to say that English self-control had on the other disappeared when the "aisor took up a hostile attitude towards England. "The remembrance of these facts must convince Americans that there is in this country the most sincere desire for the permanent union of the two nations. For many a year past such a union has been dreamt of and longed for by the best men in both countries....Whatever may be the actual state of the relations of the Governments of London and Washington with regard to the idea of an Anglo-American agreement, the American people may rest assured that, if they wish it, the people of Great Britain with it also."

32. Speaker, XVII, 347, 348, Mar. 19, 1898.
Shortly after war broke out, The Daily Chronicle was outspoken in its desire for an alliance. "It may be many a year before there is offered to us so ready, so historic, an opportunity for wiping out all the results of past blunders and misunderstandings, and for knitting together in an enduring alliance the whole of our great family of the 33 English speech."

In a speech given in Birmingham on May 13 Mr. Joseph Chamberlain spoke gloomily about England's prospect in the face of a hostile Europe, and then continued: "What is our next duty? It is to establish and to maintain bonds of permanent amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic. There is a powerful and a generous nation. They speak our language. They are bred of our race. Their laws, their literature, their standpoint upon every question, are the same as ours. Their feeling, their interests in the cause of humanity and the peaceful developments of the world are identical with ours. I don't know what the future has in store for us; but this I do know and feel, that the closer, the more cordial, the fuller, and the more definite these arrangements are, with the consent of both peoples, the better it will be for both and for the world - and I even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if, in a great and noble cause, the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon 34 alliance."

After this speech comment in English journals on the desirability of an Anglo-American alliance became more frequent. The concluding words

33. Daily Chronicle, Apr. 27, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 510, Apr. 29, 1898. 34. Times, May 14, 1898. John Hay wrote to Senator Lodge that after the speech Chamberlain had said that he "didn't care a hang what they say about it on the Continent." (Thayer, John Hay, II, 169.)
of one of the prayers of the chaplain of the United States Senate were as follows: "Knit the hearts of the two peoples who speak the English tongue more and more strongly together that we may work out the mighty problem of the highest civilization for the whole earth." The Spectator, after stating that the words like those of all extemporaneous prayers, were weak in form, said "but the underlying idea is sound enough, and we believe, represents, not a mere evanescent enthusiasm, but a fact."

In its preceding issue The Spectator, in discussing Mr. Chamberlain's speech said: "There is nothing we desire more strongly than a true understanding between the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race. We desire it not merely because it will make us and the Americans, whom we regard as part of ourselves, so strong as to be almost invulnerable, but because we believe it will be fraught with good consequences for the whole human race. It will be a guarantee that civil and religious liberty shall be firmly established in the world....Therefore we welcome anything that makes for the strengthening of the Anglo-Saxon race, not as a security merely for the English or the Americans, but as a security that the best tendencies in social and political life shall be given full play."

The Statist said that an alliance with the United States or an understanding, or a general agreement "would be different altogether from an alliance with any other power. We believe that nothing would conduce more to the welfare of the British Empire and the United States both than a good working agreement."

On July 2 the preface to Punch carried a letter "From Mr. Punch, "Far Path, Cradle of the Deep, to Himself, 85, Fleet Street," which purported to report an interview between "Mr. Punch" and "Columbia." Mr. Punch had said: "Your people and mine come of the same stock, the kind that don't wear its heart on its sleeve, or jump down other people's threats. But when the pinch comes we are there or thereabouts....And if this war does no other good, it will be worth every dollar you drop over it if it proves to the world that in the future we are to stand or fall together."

The South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate Mail mentioned a letter written by an English lady favoring the alliance and said that "it is to be hoped that it will have some effect in leading to the object desired."

Speaking of the Anglo-American Committee which had been formed in London, The Pall Mall Gazette said: "Its organizers have only to continue as they have begun to have a most excellent influence upon popular opinion." The Saturday Review, changed though it was by mid-July, could not yet bring itself to speak of "alliance." Speaking of England as the "weary Titan," it said that he "suddenly finds standing by his side a stalwart son, who...seems inclined to say, that the old Titan shall always have at least a fair field, and perhaps, if the worst comes to the worst, some little favour."

36. Punch, CXIV, 3-4, July 2, 1898.
39. South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate Mail, XLV, 29, July 9, 1898.
40. Pall Mall Gazette, July 14, 1898. The Anglo-American Committee was formed in England to foster the idea of alliance with the United States.
41. Saturday Review, LXXXVII, 69, July 16, 1898.
In wondering what effect the making of peace would have on Anglo-American relations, *Vanity Fair* opined that Americans should not wonder at the fact that Englishmen had not shown towards the United States "real national feeling," or "great wave of love," for Englishmen had been brought up in the faith in Anglo-Saxon unity, whereas Americans had the zeal of converts. Englishmen were just as anxious as ever to be allied with the United States.

In September Mr. Joseph Chamberlain visited the United States and when interviewed in New York harbor spoke in favor of a good understanding between the two nations. *The Statist* supported this sentiment: "We fully agree with him in everything he says respecting a good understanding with the United States, and we sincerely hope that he will contribute to bring it about while in the United States...."

*Punch* carried two cartoons in November indicative of its feeling on the matter of alliance. One was entitled "Doth Not a Meeting Like This Make Amends!" It showed a scene in front of a public house. Seated on a bench were two sailors, raising their glasses as if to toast. Mr. Punch was standing in front of them. The caption was: "Punch (Landlord of the 'Two Cross Flags'). 'Fill up, my hearties! It looks like "dirty weather" ahead, but you two — John and Jonathan — will see it through, together!'" The other was apropos of the visit to the White House of Lord Hershell, the English member of the Quebec Conference. It was entitled "Laundress Hershell at the White House," underneath which was "Stiffening Anglo-American Ties." A man

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42 *Vanity Fair*, LII, 99, Aug. 11, 1898.
43 *Statist*, LII, 381, Sept. 10, 1898.
44 *Punch*, CXV, 247, Nov. 26, 1898.
(not labelled) was shown ironing neckties, and he had alongside him 45
a pot of "Fraternal Starch."

On the last day of the year The Saturday Review came to speak of
the alliance in terms of desire. "We wish very much to believe in the
Anglo-American alliance; but experience teaches us that a thing is
not true, because it would be very nice if it were true."

Not only did English editors point out, however, that England
would like an Anglo-American alliance. There was, they argued, a firm
basis in material interests for such an alliance. They expatiated on
the benefits that each country would receive. Now that the United
States was becoming an imperial power, and particularly in the Far
East, the two nations could serve each other's interests to good
effect.

Hardly were the full details of Dewey's exploit at Manila known
when The Statist was praying that England and the United States could
work well together in the Far East. If the United States retained the
Philippine Islands and at the same time annexed Hawaii, The Statist
said "it will be in a position to play a very important part in the
Far East. If only a thoroughly good understanding could be arrived at

45. Punch, CXV, 249, Nov. 26, 1898. A month later Punch recorded in a cartoon
the ill-success of Chamberlain in forming an alliance. There was no
reference to an alliance with any one country, hence it may be
taken as a comment on Chamberlain's failure to obtain an alliance
with either the United States or Germany. It was entitled "A
Pantomime Rehearsal." The scene was on a stage. At the rear was a
false store front, on which appeared the lettering: "J. Bull General
Dealer." In the foreground was a large box labelled "Alliances;" a
man dressed as a magician was holding over the box a sword labelled
"Pushfulness." The stage manager was standing off a few feet,
looking on. In the subscriture Salisbury as stage manager was
saying: "That trick of yours does not seem to work, Mr. Harlequin."
Chamberlain was saying: "Well! I've waved my wand long enough.
There must be something wrong with the machinery." (Punch, CXV, 290,
Dec. 24, 1898.)

between this country and the United States, and could be maintained, the occupation of the Philippines by the United States would, without exaggeration and without boast, enable the two great English-speaking peoples to determine what policy should be pursued in future in the Far East.... Therefore a close alliance of the two English-speaking peoples would keep China open to the trade of the world, would prevent the military Powers from pursuing the policy of grab.... Two weeks later The Statist itself, in discussing the favorable reception that had been accorded in the United States to Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion of an alliance, said: "An understanding, then, to use no stranger word, between the two great English-speaking peoples for preventing wars, conquests, encroachments, disturbances in the Far East, seems to be desirable for both."

The Graphic was more succinct regarding the United States' need of an alliance. "Should the present war result in the United States becoming a colonial Power a basis for agreement will be at once supplied, since the alliance of another Power would then be essential to the Americans." Equally direct was The Guardian. If the United States retain the Philippines, it stated "she cannot fail to be a puissant force in the China Seas, able to give, but also needing from others, support in the active rivalry with Russia, France, and Germany. In this, though it is quite possible that their interests may sometimes clash, there will be much to draw together the two nations...."

47. Statist, XLI, 770, May 7, 1898. In its next weekly issue The Statist repeated the same kind of argument. (Statist, XLI, 809, May 14, 1898.)
48. Ibid., XLI, 848, May 21, 1898. 49. Graphic, LVII, 710, June 4, 1898.
50. Guardian, LIII(1), 876, June 8, 1898.
The Economist said that the two nations wanted "very nearly the same things in the Far East, namely, peace, order, and freedom to trade everywhere at will, subject only to Custom House duties enforced against all nations alike. These things can be secured if the two nations are allied....The two countries, therefore, are almost forced into partnership, and though a partnership is not exactly an alliance, the distance between them is not very wide." After stating that Americans believed that England had kept the European powers from intervening on the side of Spain and that they were grateful, The Guardian then wrote that "an American fleet in the Philippines may be able to return the service by helping us to keep an 'open door' in the Far East. These are reciprocal obligations which may serve as a solid ground for alliance." "It would be not at all astonishing," said The Speaker, "though it would be most gratifying, if the sentiment of union in the Anglo-Saxon race led to a friendly partnership in the new markets of the Far East."

Speaking of the entrance of the United States into the eastern hemisphere, The Daily Telegraph said that it made "the need of a complete and permanent entente between the two great English-speaking peoples more imperative than ever."

By December The Saturday Review had come to a point where it could write of an alliance. It said that such alliance was impossible, and spent its spleen and vituperation on what it scornfully termed

53. Speaker, XVIII, 621, Nov. 26, 1898.
"sentiment," and "international cent." If there was to be an alliance it should not be based on "the mushroom growth of sentiment" which had lately sprung up between the two countries, for The Saturday Review doubted the genuineness of America's friendship. An alliance should be based on solid, material grounds. "We are deeply anxious that England and the United States should be agreed, but we are still more deeply anxious that they should find agreement upon a solid basis. Let us be frank. Let us put aside hypocrisy and say outright that we expect mutual gain in material interests from this rapprochement.... An alliance is not possible; an alliance would gall like a fetter, almost as soon as it was forged. But we can have a free working agreement to help each other where help is possible."

Writing on President McKinley's annual message to Congress in December, 1898, Vanity Fair was jubilant. "In the Presidential reference to Far Eastern affairs there is a great deal more than meets the eye; and if this be taken in conjunction with the remarks upon Great Britain, it will readily be seen that upon the slightest sign of a broken French or Russian promise, England and America should be

55. Saturday Review, LXXXVII, 725, Dec. 3, 1898. Continuous with the above The Saturday Review wrote: "This kind of agreement, indeed, is at present in force. For the American Commissioners in Paris are making their bargain - whether they realise it or not - under the protecting naval strength of England. And we shall expect, to be quite frank, a material quid pro quo for this assistance. We shall expect the States to deal generously with Canada in the matter of tariffs; we shall expect to be remembered when she comes into her kingdom in the Philippines; above all, we shall expect her assistance on the day, quickly approaching, when the future of China shall come up for settlement. For the young imperialist has entered upon a path where she will require a stout friend, and lasting friendship between nations is to be secured, not by the frothy sentimentality of public platforms, but by reciprocal advantages in their solid material interests."
ready to go hand in hand. The Message to Congress of 1898 is the most
56
satisfactory that Englishmen have ever read."

On December 12 The Daily Graphic said that the colonial experiment
of the United States "assimilates the political destinies of the two
nations, brings them closer together, renders their co-operation more
necessary, and thus brings further within the field of practical
politics that dream of all good English and American citizens - Anglo-
57
Saxon union."

But though many English editors voiced their desire for an alliance
or an understanding and showed how such a union would benefit both
countries, almost none of them expressed himself in favor of a formal
alliance patterned after the European model. Undoubtedly there were
many reasons for this. America's historic policy of making no
"entangling alliances" must certainly have played its part in keeping
English editors from urging one upon her for fear of frightening off
the hoped-for partner. A consideration that may have influenced the
minds of some other editors was England's own cynics. Although the
splendor of isolation had lost some of its glamour, England was not yet
ready to make an agreement that might fetter her freedom of action.
She wanted a partner, yes, but she did not want that friend bound by

56. Vanity Fair, XL, 406, Dec. 8, 1898. In his message President McKinley had
said that the relations of the United States with Great Britain
"have continued on the most friendly footing." He also mentioned the
"tact and zeal" with which Great Britain's consular and diplomatic
representatives had cared for United States property in Spanish
jurisdiction during the war. (For Rec., 1898, LXXVI.) His intimation
that as long as discrimination was not practiced in the Chinese
trade by European powers the United States would have no reason to
interfere there, has been quoted above.
too close a compact. Some editors, moreover, actually pointed to the unfaithfulness of some of the partners in European alliances as showing the futility of such agreements. Friendship and confidence founded upon having many things in common — as England and America did have — they were the best guarantees of permanence in partnership.

Speaking of the possibility of an agreement with the United States, The Speaker was dubious, however, of an alliance. "We do not know that a specific alliance to deal with a particular question is the best way of bringing about such an agreement. Formal alliances are like leases, they come to an end in time." It then went on to express its faith in "mutual friendship and confidence...strengthened by a Treaty of Arbitration...."

At the outbreak of war The Outlook wrote that "in urging that England's sympathy should be given, heart and soul, to the United States, we are not to be understood as urging an immediate alliance. An Anglo-Saxon alliance we may hope some day to see....In the meantime a good understanding with our kinsmen across the Atlantic...." In its next issue The Outlook said that an "understanding" was much nearer as a result of the war.

In its May issue The Review of Reviews laid down terms necessarily antecedent to the making of an alliance. When the editor wrote the following he was obviously thinking of Olney's argument in 1895 that the British Empire was not an American power. "It is difficult to see how any alliance can be thought of until the United States recognise the American status of the British Empire. At present, as we

have only too much reason to remember, there are many Americans, especially among those who are most ostentatiously American, to whom England as an American power is only one degree less hateful than Spain. To them the elimination of the Spanish factor from the West Indies is chiefly valuable as clearing the way for an equally decisive ejection of John Bull from Jamaica, and from Canada, and all her other colonies in the New World. We are held to be outside the Monroe Doctrine. We hold, of course, that we are inside it; and until this position is frankly admitted there is not much chance of an alliance, for our ally must not spend his time dreaming of the day when he can assist in dismembering our Empire."

Commenting on Chamberlain's Birmingham speech of May 13, The Pall Mall Gazette expressed its opinion that the speech had been received in the United States "with gratifying good will, but with characteristic common sense. No American paper believes in the immediate conclusion of an alliance, merely that events are working in that direction." The Spectator, discussing the same speech, said that "any plan for a formal alliance is a minor matter....As we have said...no one, either here or in America, wishes to rush offhand into a formal alliance. It is quite enough to have realised that in the last resort the two peoples mean to stand or fall together." In its column on the same speech The Statist was sceptical of the possibility of an alliance being effected immediately. "It is hardly probable that an alliance such, for example, as exists between France and Russia, or as for many years has

61. Review of Reviews, XVII, 457, May 2, 1898.
63. Spectator, LXX, 715, May 21, 1898.
existed between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy can be concluded immediately with the United States. Foreign alliances are contrary to the traditions of the American Government, and they are not in harmony with our own practice for nearly half a century. But an understanding, ay, even active co-operation for a definite purpose in a definite field is very possible, and ought to be practicable."

On May 25 The Sketch wrote: "Nobody expects a sudden alliance between the two great Anglo-Saxon Powers," and then stated, however, that it was fair to look for common action. "Further it is only fair to expect that...Americans will give the Lion's tail a rest for a generation or two....Surpout, point de sède!"

"There will be no alliance," said The Pall Mall Gazette, "just yet anyhow; we know how worthless the alliances of Europe are likely to prove at a pinch, and neither nation is foolish enough to be precipitate. But there will be something better, the recognition of essential unities and a rapidly consolidating sense of common interest and brotherliness."

St. James's Gazette said that "if the Americans are ready to give us credit for our friendly policy towards them, and to reciprocate it, they will find the British people firm allies at need, with or without any binding or formal documents." The Globe stated succinctly that "it is only a rapprochement, and may never ripen into anything more definite."

64. Statist, XLI, 230, May 21, 1898.
65. Sketch, XXII, 202, May 25, 1898. At this same time The Clarion hoped that an Anglo-American-Japanese alliance might be affected. "It would certainly give the surest possible guarantee for the maintenance of the world's peace." (Clarion, May 28, 1898.)
66. Pall Mall Gazette, June 1, 1898.
67. St. James's Gazette, June 1, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 667, June 3, 1898.
68. Globe, June 1, quoted by Public Opinion, LXXIII, 667, June 3, 1898.
The National Review spoke tersely: "As we value friendly relations with our American cousins, let us cease to discuss an alliance until we hear that Mr. Bryan, e.g., has espoused the cause in his native city of Lincoln, Nebraska, with an enthusiasm equal to that displayed by Mr. Chamberlain in the Town Hall of Birmingham. As it takes two to make a quarrel, so it takes two to make an alliance."

"There is no rush for an alliance to-morrow; hasty welding would only give a machine which would crack at the first or second strain," opined The Pall Mall Gazette, which, as has been evident, was most friendly to America. "What Englishmen want to see between their country and the United States is much more than a mere alliance; it is a solid and enduring friendship 'all along the line,'" was the dictum of The Speaker. The Sunday Magazine stressed the desirability of sympathy rather than of an alliance: "If there is no actual alliance between the United States of America and ourselves, there is a sympathy on both sides of the sea that is stronger and more enduring than any paper treaty."

"There is no necessity whatever for the two countries," The National Review pronounced solemnly, "to gush about one another, or...

70. Pall Mall Gazette, June 4, 1898. On June 14 the same paper said: "We do not look for an offensive and defensive alliance; such a relationship is not called for, at any rate at the present." And on July 5: "We need not be in a hurry; but it would be equally foolish not to brace ourselves up to our joint responsibilities." The Outlook at this same time posited the effectuation of the alliance upon German interference at Manila: "The Anglo-American understanding is already a fact; it becomes a fact the moment Germany shows her hand at Manila." (Outlook, I, 714, June 18, 1898.)
71. Speaker, XVII, 749, June 18, 1898.
to arbitrate with one another, to yacht race, or to enter a documentary alliance, but whenever their own interests...permit, they should lend each other mutual moral support, and should consistently decline to give aid and comfort to their numerous enemies by internecine quarrels." The *Pall Mall Gazette*, which previously had merely said not to hurry the alliance, gave more specific reasons, hoping that England would not "create complications in Europe by a binding and treaty-defined alliance with a Power which is outside the pale of European politics."

"We trust," said *The Spectator*, "...that the American public will clearly understand that we are not seeking a hard-and-fast political alliance, nor are we anxious to combine with them to prosecute our and their selfish ends. That is not the sort of alliance we want. We have no desire to go beyond the acknowledgment of the fact; for fact it is, that if either we or the States ever get our backs to the wall the other

74. *Pall Mall Gazette*, Oct. 8, 1898. The next month *The Pall Mall Gazette* wrote that Captain Pagot (English) had spoken at the banquet given in New York City to honor General Miles, and had said that in the future when he saw the American flag on a ship he would know that there was a brother seaman, if not an ally. Said *The Pall Mall Gazette*: "If he had definitely pinned himself to the word 'ally,' the remarkable enthusiasm would have been no less great in the heat of the moment. But in cooler blood both sides remember that 'ally' is a big word, which is all the better for keeping. Good feeling consolidates itself all the more surely if no precipitate attempt is made to press it into official shape." (*Pall Mall Gazette*, Nov. 14, 1898.)
Anglo-Saxon will be at his side."

A few editors saw little actual assistance to be derived from the United States even if the two nations were allied. The Guardian stated that there was little harm in dwelling on such an alliance "if we are careful not to exaggerate the immediate benefits to be derived from it. It can do little or nothing for us in our present difficulties. The United States, we may be sure, will not give us any help in a purely European quarrel, and we question whether much is to be expected from them even in an Asiatic quarrel." The Spectator was more specific:

75. Spectator, LXXXI, 725, Nov. 19, 1898. Whether this alliance or understanding or union was to be formal or not, the friendship between the United States and England at this time was thought to be sufficiently close to allow several English editors to state that European nations feared it or feared that it might mature into an alliance. This fear arose, of course, from the fact that it would combine two of the strongest nations in the world, possessing a like policy for peace, and unlimited resources for war. European nations had reason to fear such a combination, for it might be able to win its will in Asia and Africa. It would also preclude any attempt by Europe to break the Monroe doctrine. When such an alliance became effective the question of the open door in China would be thereby settled. In war time England would be at much less a disadvantage than if not allied with the United States, for America would undoubtedly, having become a colonial power as a consequence of the war, build a large navy to protect her possessions. Thus she could convoy ships to England. Thereby would vanish the hope of would-be conquerors of England—the ability to drive England to her knees by starvation. Significant, too, is the fact that Spaniards during the war were on several occasions unfriendly to English subjects either because England had been sympathetic to the United States or because they believed an Anglo-American alliance an actuality. The Irish in America were also reported to be concerned over the close Anglo-American friendship. For information on these subjects, see the following:

European fear: Times, Apr. 28, June 25, July 20, Sept. 9, 1898.

Vanity Fair, LX, 10, July 7, 1898.

Spectator, LXXXI, 610, Apr. 30; LXXXI, 714, May 21; LXXXI, 75, July 16; LXXXII, 677, Nov. 12, 1898.

To-Day, XIX, 239, June 25, 1898.


Spectator, LXXXI, 724, May 21, 1898.

Irish:

Spectator, LXXXI, 745, May 28, 1898.

Economist, LVI, 794, May 28, 1898.

76. Guardian, LII(1), 741, May 18, 1898.
"Suppose that France and Russia were to go to war with England over the Chinese question, and the United States wished to help us, what could they do for us? Their fleet might be of some assistance, but it would mostly be needed to protect their own coasts; their lack of cruisers would prevent them from protecting the corn supply. Money and untrained men and popular enthusiasm they could furnish, but we should have more of these than we knew what to do with already. An Anglo-American alliance may be impressive from its size, but it will not frighten any modern State unless it is organised to fight."

The Outlook had reference to history in phrasing the same idea. Pride if not pleasure is apparent in its dictum. "We wonder whether since the struggle with Spain began it has ever occurred to those Americans who screeched for war with this country over the Venezuela business what an exceedingly awkward position the United States would have been in had Great Britain actually been provoked into hostilities. In the present conflict America the Unready has only had to meet Spain the Unready. But think where the Americans would have been had a Great Power been the fool."

But if the greater number of English editors wanted an alliance or a friendly understanding or an expression of unity of purpose with the

77. Sketch, XXI, 416, June 29, 1898.
78. Outlook, I, 612, June 18, 1898. The Outlook in the same department tried to point out to some American newspapers that England was not the humble suppliand for an alliance. Referring to the sentiment expressed above it said: "It is not a point which it is pleasant to dwell on; but it is worth making, perhaps, when there may be a disposition in the journals of the baser sort 'on the other side' to suggest that because Englishmen are enthusiastic over the idea of an Anglo-American Understanding, and would be glad to have American co-operation in the Far East, they are a feeble folk, disposed to come cap in hand to the United States." (Ibid., I, 612, June 18, 1898.)
United States, unanimity was not present. There was still a minority of two. The Saturday Review and The Labour Leader viewed with no satisfaction or exultation such a prospect. The Labour Leader was not violently hostile; it contented itself with pointing out cynically the crass material objectives of a union of the two peoples. The Saturday Review was seldom placid or gently cynical about anything; it expressed itself vehemently and vociferously.

The Labour Leader quoted extensively from a letter written by ex-Governor Altgeld (of Illinois) to The New York Journal in which Mr. Altgeld pleaded with Americans not to make an alliance. The Labour Leader said about the letter: "These are words of wisdom, to which the American people would do well to give heed....It is because America is strong that England wants her for an ally. Were the States small and struggling our statesmen and our soldiers would have no concern in them, save in so far as they might be added to our great and glorious Empire."

On November 19 The Labour Leader wrote that "the capitalists of Britain and America will combine to hurl ships and regiments at any other power who disputes the claim of Britain to Egypt or of America to the Philippines. Doubtless Britain would not object to collaring some of the Philippines herself. But we are in a tight corner, and an American alliance is not to be despised."

79. Mr. Altgeld said that America's future was too bright for her to go into partnership with any nation. America would be eclipsed as soon as she went into such a partnership. "Besides, such an alliance would increase the opportunities of the international vultures that now prey upon us." It was the business of the United States "to keep out of those European disputes that are unworthy the notice of free men."

80. Labour Leader, no volume number, July 30, 1898.

81. Labour Leader, Nov. 19, 1898. The above quotation continued: "May, give America ten years of constant armament, and America and Britain could capture and garrison every capital city in Europe, from Lisbon to St. Petersburg...The alliance of Britain and America puts a limit to the 'expansion' of lesser folk."
On May 14 The Saturday Review published a leading article entitled "The Bread Riots in Italy and Spain," in which it pointed out that because the price of bread had been forced so high there had been riots in which people had been killed in each country. The price had been boosted by a combination of New York and Chicago millionaires. The Saturday Review took this opportunity to belittle the attractions of an alliance. "The poorer classes in England who feel the pinch of wheat at nearly sixty shillings a quarter, resulting in bread at 7 1/2 d. instead of 4 1/2 or 5 d. the loaf, will not easily discover the attractions of an alliance with a Republic which permits rich syndicates to 'corner' the staff of life, and may be pardoned if they consider their Transatlantic kin in reality anything but kind. The sudden affection for England which has sprung up in America since the war began might express itself more convincingly than in an organized attempt to lighten the pockets and empty the bellies of our poor."

The next week, discussing Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham, The Saturday Review returned to the tilt. The idea of an alliance with the United States seemed "the most vague of dreams." The United States would appear friendly as long as it felt the need of benevolent neutrality. "Whilst we stand between them and the scarcely concealed hostility of the majority of the European Powers, they will endeavour to secure our friendliness by such transparent transactions as the payment of the Behring Sea award, and bland assurances of esteem. But the moment their

82. Saturday Review, LXXXV, 649, May 14, 1898. This may be taken as illustrative of the tendency of The Saturday Review to carp. It is needless to point out that the Federal government of the United States had no hand in the attempt by Joseph Leiter et al. to corner the market in wheat.
difficulties are at an end, and Cuba is won for the Union, they will

doubtless resume their favourite pastime of twisting the Lion's tail."

On December 3 The Saturday Review said that England had kept her
fleet in readiness after the Fashoda crisis because the Philippine
question was unsettled. It was of material importance to England to
see to it that the Philippines fell into the right hands. There was
much kinship between the two nations, admitted The Saturday Review, but
until "yesterday" the Americans hated England; then they found friend-
ship for her, possibly because they needed a stout friend. "But what we
do condemn and condemn most vigorously is the slobbering cant which has
gathered round the recent rapprochement of the two peoples." This
friendship, it said, "is founded upon a shallow sentimentality."

On the whole and with only two outstanding exceptions (which prove
the rule) English journals believed an alliance or partnership with
the United States would be a good and beneficial development. England
in 1898 was looking for a partner to offset groupings of European
powers. Her once boasted "splendid isolation" no longer seemed so
desirable in the face of possible war with one or another of the
Continental alliances. England was worried. But America was in the way
to become a colonial power by the fruits from her war with Spain. That

83. Saturday Review, XXXV, 669, May 21, 1898. It is interesting to point out
here that the Kaiser, whom The Saturday Review termed "William the
Witless," predicted essentially the same thing. (C.P. Cooch and H.W.
V. Temperley, ed., British Official Documents on the Origins of the
War, 1898-1914, 11 vols. [London, 1926 ff.] II, no. 53, 34.) Two weeks later
The Saturday Review hoped that "when the time comes for intervention,"
England would make Spain's "submission" as easy as possible. "Spain may
be a poor and decaying nation, but her goodwill is still worth some-
thing to England, whilst the interested pretences of friendship of the
United States are worth less than nothing." (Saturday Review, LXXXV, 794,
June 4, 1898.)

84. Saturday Review, LXXXVI, 724, Dec. 3, 1898.
would necessitate America's building a stronger navy, which would be most useful to England in protecting her food supply across the Atlantic in war time. England also wanted the open door policy to be effected in China to help accommodate her large productive capacity of manufactured goods. With a naval base in the Philippine Islands, the United States could reinforce English policy in China effectively. Further, England and America had things in common that might be considered natural bases for the assured working of an agreement between the two nations - "race," language, literature, law, religion, and traditions. Yes, America would be the ideal partner, and England was wooing her.
Conclusion

One is struck by the great number of English editors who were friendly to the United States immediately before, during, and after the Spanish-American War. As the war went on the number of friendly editors and the warmth of their sentiment increased. In the latter part of the war the one journal that had been uniformly critical, derogatory, and unfriendly to the United States denied that it had been unfriendly. The majority of English editors praised the aims and methods of the United States. Matters of detail were occasionally criticized, to be sure, but on the whole English editors supported America wholeheartedly.

The reasons for this are interesting. There was evident in some of the journals the traditional English hatred of Spain - Catholic, priest-ridden, decadent, inept, mediaeval Spain - hatred based on the same things as had been that of the Elizabethans when they "crossed the line" on raids into the overseas domains of Philip II, and when they turned back the Spanish Armada. A Protestant, English-speaking nation was fighting a Catholic, Latin one, and it was natural that English sympathies should be on the side of the former. Spain was a traditional enemy, and now that the other section of the English-speaking peoples were involved in a struggle with that same enemy, the mother country wanted the "daughter nation to conquer.

English journals also rejoiced at the prospect of their blood brothers, their "Anglo-Saxon" brothers, winning a war which had been begun for humanitarian purposes. The light of liberty and freedom was being kept burning by Anglo-Saxon peoples. There were only occasional references to ulterior motives on America's part. Most of the English
journals stressed the idealistic ones.

The question arises whether all this support and enthusiasm for America's cause was entirely disinterested. Was it altogether unselfishness on the part of the English editors, or were they having an eye to the benefits that would accrue to England? The consequences of the war would appear to have been highly satisfactory to England, for England in 1898 was feeling, to her detriment, the trade competition of other countries, particularly of Germany and the United States. Those countries with their use of machinery and mass production were threatening England's industrial supremacy. Figures on exports showed that those countries were producing more cheaply and consequently taking England's markets. Now the Spanish colonies were still being conducted according to the tenets of mercantilism, exclusivism. English goods could find entrance only after paying high tariffs. Those colonies were, to all practical purposes, a closed preserve for Catalanian industrialists and shippers. Were the United States to take them there was the hope, openly enough expressed in English journals, that they would be open to the trade of all nations on equal terms. True, America was a protectionist nation, but possibly she would treat her colonies differently, inasmuch as they would probably not be admitted into the Union as states.

Africa had been largely partitioned and exclusivism in trade had been effected there by the European nations. Consequently that had not greatly benefited English industry. But there was one large market with millions of potential customers that was, as yet, practically untouched. Was that, too, to have tariff walls erected around it, shutting out English products? England hoped not, and in 1898 had declared her policy of the
"open door" in China. That policy was in danger of being controverted by Russia and Germany. England needed an ally to help her enforce the "open door" policy there. The danger that the United States would also set up "spheres of influence", with tariff barriers, in China was negligible. But America had for years exported goods to China, and had substantial interests there, which English journalists believed she would struggle to protect. The obvious thing therefore was to get the United States to take the Philippine Islands. That would help England, for she would then have a supporter very near to China. A naval base in Manila, which the United States would undoubtedly institute, would be a most useful adjunct to the British navy. That would enable the two nations to speak with effect on the Chinese coast. England wanted America in the Far East to reinforce her own policy there. It would even more closely fit England's desires were the United States to establish the "open door" in the Philippine Islands.

When rumors that one or more European nations would intervene to help Spain, or to prevent the United States from collecting the fruits of her victory, English editors sided with the United States and either deprecated the rumors of such intervention or declared flatly that if it came to pass England would stand by the side of the United States in repulsing the "common" enemy. They were determined that America's actions during the war or when making peace were not to be impeached by any European power.

England had had cause before the Spanish-American War to worry over her relationship to the United States in the western hemisphere. The Olney interpretation of the Monroe doctrine had been alarming. True, there had been a peaceful settlement of the Venezuelan question. But in
the limited fields of Canada, British Honduras, British Guiana, and
Jamaica trouble might flare again. During and after the war, however,
when it was seen that the United States was to play her role not merely
in the western hemisphere but in the world, and that she would have
thereby many more points of contact with Great Britain - then,
paradoxically enough, relations became most friendly, for in these new
fields, opened to the United States as a consequence of the war, English
editors believed the United States would not be a rival or source of
friction, but rather a friend, supporter, and possibly even an ally.
There were, to be sure, a few expressions of warning to their countrymen
not to be overly sanguine concerning the depth or duration of the friendly
feelings of the United States. But the great majority of editors were
extremely hopeful that this friendship would be deep and abiding. To
English editors who were more optimistic America had been reciprocating;
she paid a money debt that had been owing for some time, and the two
nations had agreed to settle all outstanding differences among Canada.

England was feeling in 1898 that isolation was no longer so
splendid. Five of the most powerful nations of Europe were grouped in two
leagues, and England was having differences with Germany, France, and
Russia in different parts of the world. What more natural, then, that
England should turn to the larger portion of the "Anglo-Saxon" race in
quest of an ally. Most journals favored such an agreement with the United
States to help ensure the success of some aspects of English foreign
policy, the "open door" included, and to serve as a threat against either
of the European alliances that might become presumptuous. This Anglo-
American alliance, English editors believed, would be the capstone to all
the other and subsidiary effects of the war. Language, "race," history, and traditions the two nations had in common. They were also nations that upheld progress, civilization, and freedom. It would be proper for them to be allied. Ideas differed as to what form the alliance should take. Opinions ran from a merely friendly agreement to a military alliance fashioned on the European model.

But though formal alliance did not issue from the war, England could still feel gratified that the United States was so much more friendly than she had appeared say late in 1895. Then there had been talk of war. Since 1895 the international position of England had not become better, and might be said to have become worse. Hence England with a practical if informal rapprochement with the United States had at least some compensation for her courting. And English editors, it may be said, had done their share in contributing to that development by their sympathy, friendliness, encouragement, and even, were it needed, promise of forceful support to the United States during the war. England did not come out of the Spanish-American War empty-handed.
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AUTobiography

I, John Herman McKinn, was born in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, February 21, 1901. My primary and secondary education was received in Buffalo, New York, and Youngstown, Ohio, public schools. In 1924 I was graduated from Cornell University with a Bachelor of Arts degree. From 1926 to 1929 I taught Spanish at the University of Nebraska, and in the latter year received the degree of Master of Arts. From 1929 to 1932 I was associate professor of modern languages at James Millikin University, Decatur, Illinois. In 1936 the University of Cincinnati awarded me the degree of Master of Arts. Since 1936 I have been graduate assistant in history at The Ohio State University.