CHINA ENCOUNTERS WESTERN IDEAS (1895-1905): A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF YAN FU, TAN SITONG, AND LIANG QICHAO

DISSERTATION

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INTRODUCTION

The Rationale

As scholars today are increasingly aware that the way we approach and understand an idea is cultural-bound, a question that becomes extremely significant is: how are foreign ideas, especially those at odds with the traditional values and world views of a culture, made comprehensible when introduced into that culture?

Not long ago people tended to believe that the intelligibility of some ideas in cross-cultural settings was attributable to the ultimate rationality of human beings or to the very nature of these ideas, ideas which transcended time and culture. Joseph R. Levenson, for example, believed that the persuasive power of Western thought lay in its "general validity." A rational mind ought to make an intellectual commitment to Western values. Thus for modern Chinese intellectuals, the question was only how to overcome their emotional attachments to their tradition.¹

Even today, the practices of international politics, economic, religion, and so

¹ Levenson concluded: "The modern Chinese commitment to the general, of which I have spoken, is the commitment to seek the answers that are 'true'; these thinkers' commitment to the special is their need of answers that are somehow 'theirs.' The first commitment brings many men to intellectual alienation from Chinese tradition, while the second leaves them with an emotional tie to it" (1958, xviii).
forth in the West are still affected, consciously or unconsciously, by the view that the Western ideals and approaches to them are the only correct ones to be followed by the world. The acceptance of the Western standards of freedom and human rights, for instance, is considered part of the fair price the developing countries should pay for receiving generous Western economic aid.

In the field of intercultural communication, scholars who study the rhetorical traditions of non-Western cultures in the past few decades have found convincing evidence for a position that may be called rhetorical pluralism. Robert Oliver, one of early advocates of this view, suggests that if the speech profession is to make a helpful contribution to internationalism it has to stop using rhetoric in the singular and start using it in the plural.

I think the facts of life indicate that there is not just one rhetoric--instead, there are many different modes of thinking, and many different ways in which influence must be exerted if it is to be effective (1962, 79-80).

Huber W. Ellingsworth makes a similar observation: "Each culture has its own styles, and standards which make its system unique." He proposes to view national or cultural rhetoric as

the communication styles of a particular culture, including appropriate themes, modes of expression, standards, purposes, sources, and receivers of communication. Each culture has its own styles, and standards which make its system unique (1969).

After examining a body of rhetorical discourses in the Asian traditions, Mary Garrett concludes:
Many of these materials differ in substantial and provocative ways from the Western tradition; they assume a different audience psychology, value different modes of reasoning, recommend different strategies of persuasion, are grounded in a different cosmology, and espouse different goals and standards for the rhetor (1991, 295-96).

How then can we account for those historical cases of intellectual developments and transformations that resulted from interaction with foreign ideas? The answer can only be found in careful studies of such historical cases.

So far intercultural communication has not engaged in such historical studies. A survey of the past fourteen volumes of Communication Abstracts (1978-1991) revealed that many scholars have approached intercultural communication from a mass media standpoint. They have concerned themselves with issues such as the effects of international broadcasting, the new world information order, the use of new technologies for the instantaneous worldwide transmission of information, the international telecommunication marketplace, and so forth. There are many others, like Samovar and Porter, who have focused on the "interpersonal dimensions of intercultural communication" and have examined "what happens when people from different cultures interact face-to-face" (Samovar & Porter 1991, 2). However, I did not come across any study on the intellectual transaction between a foreign doctrine that was being introduced into a culture, in the form of written discourse, and the audiences of that culture, --an approach that looks at intercultural communication more from a rhetorical discourse point of view. The interaction with another culture's intellectual sources of socioeconomic, political, philosophical, religious, and ethical discourses is an important, usually deeper, stage or aspect of cross-cultural interaction.
It is this stage that grants us access to the rational structures and justifications of a foreign people’s ways of life. It is in this stage that we come to deal directly with the mind of the people in another world. Intellectual interactions with the West have been going on in most of the developing countries in the past century. But it seems that we have left it for historians, philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists to study.

It is our responsibility to study how an idea is being introduced into another culture, for this introduction is itself a communication process. The effectiveness of this introduction can be explained by an intercultural communication perspective. "Intercultural communication theory is predicated upon the existence and recognition of differences between the communicating parties" (Wendt 1982). "[I]t is our belief that effective cross-cultural [interaction] will depend most on ... a respect for differences" (Tilley & Hoopes 1978). We are now increasingly aware of the need to adapt our language, behaviors, and styles to achieve successful intercultural communication. But unfortunately, as Samovar and Porter point out, we often overlook the simple fact that "the ‘steps of reasoning’ are not the same in each culture" (1985, 77). So confident are we in the power of our logic that we become hesitant to think that we should adapt to another culture’s modes of reasoning to persuade the people of that culture. This may be one of the reasons we have ignored this stage of cross-cultural interaction as a relevant subject area.

The survey referred to above also revealed that there have been very few
historical studies of intercultural communication. The encounter between East and West did not start today. How the modern forerunners of the non-Western nations approached and responded to Western intellectual challenges may have subtle effects on present generations. The long-term Communist campaign for Marxist transformation or for sinicization of Marxism in twentieth-century China has contributed to enriching and changing the traditional Chinese ways of communication. How did this campaign get started? James Reave Pusey observes that "China’s first, and most important, ‘scientific’ justification of revolution" was "‘purely’ Darwinian" (1983, 209). If he is right, then, how did this Darwinian framework get accepted in the first place? We will be in a better position to deal with problems of communication with people living in contemporary China if we understand these questions.  

Research Question

China witnessed a rapid, nationwide spread of Western learning after the mid-1890s. This spread was attributable to the impact of a group of intellectual discourses

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2 J. R. Wendt’s study on "human rights as intercultural communication" may be an exception. In this study, he examines the historical basis for two seemingly mutually exclusive dominant perspectives of human rights: the Western "individualist" perspective versus the Russian "communitarian" perspective.

3 Seventy years ago cries for democracy and science similar to those of the Tiananmen Square students were heard in China. Understanding how the Chinese radical reformers of that time presented and argued for the Western democratic and scientific ideas is surely helpful for answering the question of why this campaign has to be started again. It can also help us reflect upon the results of this 1989 student campaign.
which were created to introduce and popularize Western ideas in the 1890s and after.

The central question of this dissertation is: How did these intellectual discourses successfully present as meaningful and argue for these Western ideas, ideas which embodied a completely different world of experiences, to the Chinese of the time?

To answer this question, I will carefully examine three of the most influential Chinese discourses in the ten year period from 1895-1905. They are Yan Fu’s *Heavenly Evolution* (1898), Tan Sitong’s *A Study of Humanity* (1899-1901), and Liang Qichao’s *A New People* (1902-04).

**Why this particular period (1895-1905)?** Through the millennia of Chinese history, there have been three great introductions of foreign learning into China that have involved transformations of Chinese culture: the introduction of Indian Buddhism during the Sui and Tang dynasties (581-907); the introduction of "Western learning" (in the sense of Western science and religion) during the late Ming to the mid-Qing (1573-1795); and the introduction of "Western learning" in a broader sense from the late Qing (1840-1911) forward to the Communist era. Without a doubt, the last one bears the most significant relationship to what is going on in China today.

Although the modern encounter between China and the West began in 1840, Western learning aroused little intellectual response in China till the 1890s. Chang Hao states:

In general it can be maintained that for most of the nineteenth century, after the beginning of contact with the West in 1840, the intellectual impact of the West on China remained superficial. Except for a small number of scholar-officials in positions of official responsibility and a few figures of marginal status in the treaty ports, Western influence had hardly penetrated into the scholarly world
According to Chang's recent definition of the "transitional era" of China, the intellectual transition to the modern world started in 1890s and was sustained, through different stages, to the 1920s. This transition resulted from the interplay of a number of factors. One obvious factor was the influence of Western learning. "[T]he exposure of the transitional generation to Western influence was unprecedented both in its breadth and in its depth" (Chang 1987, 8). However, Western influences must first be meaningfully and favorably understood in order to have an impact on the Chinese mind. A number of intellectual discourses were created during the transitional era which argued for and justified Western ideas. I take the ten year period of 1895-1905, the first stage of the transition era, as the focus of this dissertation. The most important intellectual discourses that contributed to the early widespread acceptance of Western learning generally fell into this period.

Why these three cases? There are several good reasons for concentrating on these three bodies of discourse. First, they were among the first scholarly attempts by the Chinese intellectuals at systematic introduction of Western ideas. Each took a unique approach to modern Western learning. As a "translation" of T. H. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* (1895), Yan Fu's *Heavenly Evolution* is the first Chinese version of a Darwinian work.⁴ Liang Qichao's *A New People* focuses on Western ethics. It

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⁴ However, this is not just a translation. The translator, Yan Fu, claimed that he only paraphrased the original. But actually, he did more than that. As I will show in the study, this so-called translation was in many ways an alteration of Huxley's ideas.
reflected Liang’s preoccupation with "the introduction of the idea of public morality from Western civilization into Chinese consciousness" (Chang 1971, 225). Tan Sitong’s *A Study of Humanity*, on the other hand, dealt more with the scientific and religious aspects of Western learning. As Liang Qichao said, this treatise "was written with the intent of fusing science, philosophy, and religion in a single furnace to make them more useful to human life" (1959, 107). In this treatise Tan Sitong brought in a very complex modern egalitarian outlook. Although the outlook was in fact introduced from various sources, not from the West alone, it purported to have its "scientific" basis in a set of Western concepts such as ether and electricity.

Second, these discourses all achieved great success and had a far-reaching impact on the Chinese intellectual and social movements of their time and later. Together with other discourses of a similar nature, they helped bring about cultural enlightenment and promote intellectual transition in China. Yan’s "translation" of Huxley’s work was a resounding success. Within a very short period of time after its publication, its Darwinian ideas spread rapidly through the country. Many key phrases Yan used in the "translation," such as "the struggle for existence" and "heavenly selection," became the bywords of his day and after.

Liang’s *A New People* also enjoyed great popularity at the time. It was a serial published intermittently over two years (1902-04) in the *Journal of a New People*, for which Liang was also the editor and a major contributor. Largely because of this serial, the journal immediately won over the minds of many Chinese.⁵ Mao Zedong

⁵ The journal was published in Japan and smuggled back into China through the
later recalled that, when he was in primary school, his reading of this journal and another reformist work distracted him from his teaching of the Classes. "I read and re-read these until I knew them by heart" (Snow 1938, 120). Liang was so successful in establishing the ideal of citizenship, which was something new to the Chinese tradition, that he made it "an important and enduring part of the value system of twentieth-century China" (Chang 1971, 304).

A Study of Humanity was published in Japan after Tan's heroic death in 1898. Owing to its extremely radical spirit, Liang Qichao compared it to Issac Newton's iconoclasm (1959, 107). This treatise exerted enormous influence not only on Tan's fellow comrades like Liang, but also on later political movements toward the end of the Qing dynasty.⁶ "At that time we all arose in revolution after reading A Study of Humanity and works of the same sort," recalled a participant in the early Chinese revolution, which later gave rise to the Republic in 1912 (Du Chengxiang, quoted in Xu 1981, 169).

The third reason I selected these discourses is that these authors were among the most eminent figures of the first Chinese intelligentsia in the transitional era. This was so not only because they initiated a trend of conscious, intellectual interaction between the Chinese tradition and Western learning, but also because they were leaders and spokesmen of the reform movement that took place in the 1890s. These authors did not come to Western ideas from purely scholarly interest. They tried to find in treaty ports.

⁶ For a detailed account of this influence, see Wang 1975, 143-55.
them solutions to the problems of their own nation. Although differing in their perspectives, the three men all responded to similar rhetorical situations and concerned themselves with the same set of questions.

To sum up, this study will provide an answer to one of the most significant questions today, that of how foreign ideas are made comprehensible when introduced into a culture. It will contribute to intercultural communication studies not only by expanding our knowledge, but also through its unique approach to the subject (a historical, rhetorical approach). Further, it will be a modest addition to Chinese studies in general, and to the understanding of the Chinese practice of rhetoric in particular, about which the Westerners know relatively little. This study will illustrate the enduring power of the particular forms and techniques of argumentation of the Chinese rhetorical tradition, forms and techniques which have been employed for centuries. These argumentative strategies are so powerful and effective that even an apparently radical revolution of thought has to reflect their influence.

Of course scholars from other areas such as history and literature rather than from communication have done some work on the writings of these three men within their disciplinary context. Historians have provided comprehensive studies of Yan, Liang, and Tan’s works, such as Schwartz’s In Search of Wealth and Power: Yan [Yan] Fu and the West, Chang Hao’s Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China (1971), and Chang Hao’s chapter on Tan Sitong in Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis (1987). They are extremely useful references guides. However, so far as I am aware, there has only been one rhetorical analysis, that being Tzu-yun Chen’s piece
titled "Yen [Yan] Fu’s Translation of Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics*" (1982). I have not found any similar effort to examine Liang and Tan’s rhetorical skills to drive home Western ideas. Even Chen’s analysis is too limited for our purposes here. He concerns himself only with Yan’s stylistic devices, not with his forms of arguments.

What is this rhetorical perspective? To say the least, a rhetorical study of these written discourses requires a particular eye on the conditions that made possible the meaningful transaction and communication between the rhetor and the imagined readers, who may include the rhetor himself. The critic is concerned with how the reader was guided to understand and accept the rhetor’s ideas and how the rhetor adapted consciously to the reader’s world view. The critic assumes that the idea which the rhetor argued would not sound significant or true to the reader unless he justified it in ways conforming to the reader’s expectations.

**Methodology**

One of the basic assumptions of this study is that rhetorical discourses are situation-related. According Kenneth Burke, rhetoric functions not only to define situations for individuals, but also to provide creative strategies for dealing with situations or for solving the problems inherent in the situations (Foss et al 1985, 161-62). This study assumes that a successful rhetorical discourse has to fulfil two general conditions: (1) It is what Lloyd F. Bitzer calls a "fitting" response to a situation of the time in terms of the subject matters addressed, the genres chosen, the kinds of techniques used, etc.; (2) the rhetor’s creative and skillful application of rhetorical
techniques modifies the exigency presented by the situation.

The Rhetorical Situation

This study is grounded in the notion of rhetorical situation. The idea of rhetorical situation was advanced by Lloyd F. Bitzer. He suggested that we view rhetorical discourse "as a response to a situation" (1968, 42). He defined "rhetorical situation" as

a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigency which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigency (43. Cf. 1980, 24).

According to Bitzer, there are three basic constituents of a rhetorical situation. The first is the rhetorical exigency, which is "an imperfection marked by urgency," "an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be," but which is "capable of positive modification" if discourse can generate appropriate decision and action for the modification. The second constituent is the audience, which is "capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change."

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7 In his original essay, Bitzer saw a rhetorical exigency as presented by "objective and publicly observable historic facts" (1968, 46). In one of his more recent articles, Bitzer adds an interest component to an exigency. For him, the kind of observable fact or factual condition that presents an exigency "is necessarily related to interests and valuations" (26). "A rhetorical exigency consists of a factual condition plus a relation to some interest.... Speakers are motivated to create messages when they perceive factual conditions related to felt interests.... A wholly neutral factual condition does not solicit a response; and an interest unrelated to a factual condition has no object. An exigency exists when a factual condition and an interest are jointed" (1980, 28).
The last constituent of the rhetorical situation consists of a set of constraints such as beliefs, attitudes, traditions, and the like, which are "parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigency" (1968, 43-44. Cf. 1980). For example, the inauguration of a President of the United States demands not just any address, but the kind of address that speaks to the nation's purposes and the central national and international problems, and that uses a style marked by dignity.

I would like to modify Bitzer's framework in such a way as to make it a more flexible and a more powerful tool of analysis. There are two reasons for these changes. First, his framework does not recognize the profound influence of discourse traditions. In this study, however, I will show that the three Chinese discourses responded not only to the urgency of the critical events in China at the turn of this century, but also to the need for continuity of a discourse tradition. Second, the audience component in Bitzer's notion of rhetorical situation is surprisingly passive. The audience has little to do with the exigency. It is involved in a rhetorical situation simply by the fact that it is "capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change."

In this study I suggest a more interactive and holistic approach to a rhetorical situation. A broad and active notion of audience is the key to the understanding of this approach. For me, the audience is involved in a rhetorical situation not only because it is available for invited new discourses, but also because it has been the audience for a discourse tradition. The meaning of a rhetorical exigency does not lie
in the "objective and publicly observable historic facts," but rather in the mind of these audience who perceive and interpret these facts. A sense of rhetorical exigency develops when the audience recognizes the "imperfection" or the failure of traditional discourses in explaining a changing world. I further suggest that we see the rhetors as necessary parts of these general audience, sharing with them this sense of rhetorical exigency.

From this perspective, the rhetorical situation is audience-oriented. Both the rhetorical exigency and the constraints find expressions in the audience. The rhetorical exigencies are represented by the audience's concerns, anxiety, frustration, and confusions, which need modification by discourse. The constraints, on the other hand, reflect the audience's expectations of an appropriate discourse in a given circumstance. As the audience is brought up in a particular tradition of discourse it develops expectations about the appropriate forms of discourses, the proper subject matter, and the right modes of argumentation in relation to a certain situation. According to this notion of rhetorical situation, there are two basic aspects of a rhetorical situation: (1) the rhetorical exigencies/the audience's fundamental concerns and (2) the constraints/the audience's expectations. In this sense, the response to a rhetorical situation is no more than a response to these two forces.

In the first chapter, I will discuss the general rhetorical situation in China at the close of nineteenth century which invited the three discourses. I will first examine the formation of a controlling rhetorical exigency. Then, I will explain how this perceived rhetorical exigency, together with other sociopolitical and cultural factors, limited the
kind of audiences that could be addressed and affected the choices of such things as subject matters, genres, and rhetorical and argumentative devices.\textsuperscript{8}

The Rhetorical Exigency

The rhetorical exigency indicates something imperfect and waiting to be addressed. The imperfection may not be inherent in the thing or action itself. It may be caused simply by incorrect approaches or misunderstanding. In this case the rhetorical exigency is modified when the meaningful connection of this thing (or action) with the ideal receives clear articulation and justification by discourses. In any case discourse functions to bring meaning to people’s practical world.

I identify the leading rhetorical exigency in late nineteenth century China as the underlying incompatibility between the perceived modern values such as those of wealth and power on the one side and the Confucian moral ideals on the other. I would like to view this exigency as emerging from the interaction of three basic elements. These were: the unexpected events, such as the Opium wars, caused by the encounters with Western nations; the demand to understand and respond to these events in a meaningful way; and the existing rhetorical tradition of making sense out of such events by referring them to a well-circumscribed meaning system.\textsuperscript{9}

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\textsuperscript{8} I will discuss the rhetor’s choice of the audience under the general consideration of the constraints, for the reason that when we talk about the intended audience we presuppose the presence of another constraint imposed by some sociopolitical factors, which influence the rhetor’s perception of the significant audience.

\textsuperscript{9} In his 1968 article, Bitzer saw a rhetorical exigency as presented by "objective and publicly observable historic facts" (46). He seemed to suggest that certain kinds of objective facts by their very nature can create rhetorical exigencies and therefore
rhetorical engagement covered a range of rhetorical activities from simply naming the situation to complex arguments. Without taking into consideration the internally felt need to understand and to respond to changing environments, it would be difficult to understand why a rhetorical exigency can have an imperative power calling for rhetorical reaction. Without a whole tradition of rhetorical efforts to provide "prescriptive" names, interpretations, and accounts of the changing environments after the first Opium War (1839-1842), and to enforce these names, interpretations, and accounts by effective arguments and justifications, the rhetorical exigency would not have been so clearly and seriously perceived as it was by the three rhetors in the last decade of nineteenth century.10

In accounting for the emergence of the common rhetorical exigency as identified above, I choose to focus on examining the operation of the last factor, "the previous rhetorical engagements." In so doing I assume at once the participation and interaction of the first two elements, "the unexpected events" and "the demand to understand and to respond to them." What is most important is not the historical events, but what they meant. More importantly, how had these events been interpreted, accounted for, and argued about in the dominant rhetorical literature prior

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10 Even so, I will not go so far as to state that rhetoric discourse alone creates rhetorical exigency, as did Vatz, who claims to "take the converse position of each of Bitzer's major statements" (1972). I tend to believe that rhetorical act and rhetorical exigency imply each other.
to the three rhetors considered here? I will mention key historical incidents or events to my readers, not only because they were historical facts but also because they were the heated subjects of political and intellectual discussions of the time.

The Constraints

The rhetorical situation functions not only to present us with a rhetorical exigency, but also to influence our perception of the possible means by which the exigency is significantly modified. Bitzer is right when he says that "A situation which is strong and clear dictates the purpose, theme, matter, and style of the response" (1968, 45). In the second part of the first chapter I will discuss two types of constraints provided by the rhetorical situation of the time: those that influence the selection of the kinds of audience and those that limit the choices of such elements as subject matters, genres, rhetorical and argumentative devices.

Certain external social, political, and communicative conditions play a role in the forming of a rhetorical situation because, along with the perception of the rhetorical exigency, they limit the kind of audience which can be addressed. In theory, the modification of the rhetorical exigency as defined above required enlightenment of the whole Chinese nation and its collective action to build up a wealthy, powerful, as well as morally superior China. However, due to the limitation of the available media of communication, the rhetors of the 1890s who wrote in response to the perceived rhetorical exigency could not speak in front of all Chinese. They had to select the most significant audiences. By 1911 the most powerful audience in China
was, of course, the Throne. However, because of the rigid social and political hierarchy, not everyone could have direct access to the Throne. The increasing circulation of newspapers and periodicals during the 1890s weakened the force of this constraint somewhat for those of humble social and political status, since they could use the modern press to mobilize a public voice, which was, they hoped, strong enough to be heard from below.

The perception of the rhetorical exigency can influence the choice of subject matter or area. However, this is so not only because of the particular nature of the exigency perceived, but also due to the tradition of topical thinking in the Confucian persuasion. In every society, the traditional mode of topical thinking serves as a referential source for the question of how to identify and categorize a problem—e.g., whether a problem is technological or philosophical, and where to look for the solution to the problem. It thus can help the rhetor decide the appropriate subject matter or area when addressing problems. Every culture develops its own way to approach social problems. The Confucian mode of topical thinking in the 1890s led the first Chinese intelligentsia who perceived the rhetorical exigency to believe that China’s problem had its deeper sources in its value systems, in its understanding of certain

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11 This was so not just because the Throne held the ultimate political power to force the people to listen and obey, but, what is more important, he could create a national consensus through the process of what Antonio Gramsci would call "hegemony." George Rude explains: Hegemony is "the process whereby the ruling class imposes a consensus, its dominion in the realm of ideas, by largely peaceful means. This happens through its control of the media of indoctrination in that part of the state he [Gramsci] terms 'civil society': through the press [for traditional China, more relevant to say 'publishing'], church and education" (1980, 23).
moral principles and basic human relations. For them, the previous political discourses that had located China’s problem in statecraft indeed had failed to get at the root of the problem.

The traditional views on rhetorical genres were another important constraint. Due to the profound social and moral implications of the rhetorical exigency, its modification required reorientation of traditional beliefs and demanded formulation of new theoretical frameworks for dealing with new challenges. To be sure, not every genre in the Chinese rhetorical tradition could carry such a great burden.

Another constraint, the traditional modes of argumentation, also played a part in the rhetorical situation. There was a tendency to exploit those argumentative and stylistic techniques which had conventionally been recognized as valid and powerful in the Chinese rhetorical tradition. It is true that the traditional Chinese were capable of using all forms of argumentation which have been utilized in both China and the West. However, not all of them received equal emphasis and encouragement in the rhetorical tradition of China. Adaptation and exploitation of the argumentative and stylistic devices that have been familiar to and recognized by the Chinese constitute the most creative part of the three writers’ rhetoric. In fact, one major concern of this dissertation is with the question of how they used these conventional devices to introduce and argue for Western ideas.

The Case Studies

In the second, third, and fourth chapters, each consisting of a detailed case study, I will examine how the three discourses—Heavenly Evolution, A Study of
Humanity, and A New People—responded to, wholly or in part, the rhetorical exigency by their explication and defense of Western ideas.

It is worth noting that each discourse took a particular approach to the problems perceived. Thus, each rhetor himself also faced a more specific rhetorical exigency, which was in fact the specific question the discourse tried to answer or the meaning gap the discourse tried to bridge. For example, the specific rhetorical exigency in Yan’s Heavenly Evolution can be identified as the conflict in cultural values between the struggle for existence and the Confucian ideal of love and harmony. For Yan, the collective energy in the struggle for existence was the key to the wealth and power of the West.12

In the first part of each case study, I will present each discourse as a specific response to the rhetorical situation of its time. In fact, Yan’s purposeful reaction to the general rhetorical situation began as early as the point at which he decided which foreign text was to be translated. I will discuss the implications of the specific themes and chosen subjects of each discourse in relation to the general rhetorical exigency. The three rhetors tended to persuade the same classes of audiences, applied closely related rhetorical genres, and adapted to the same cultural modes of argumentation. The line of reasoning underneath their choices will be discussed in the first chapter when the general constraints on the rhetors’ decisions are considered, and this explication of their choices of the intended audience, applied genres, and modes of

12 The formulations of these different specific rhetorical exigencies may be explained by the persons’ educational and intellectual backgrounds and by what Chang Hao calls the "existential" situations (1987, 4).
argumentation will not be repeated again in each case study.

The second part of each case study will explore the theme of how rhetoric functions in the search for integration of meaning. This will lead us to see how these rhetors finally achieved their success by modifying, completely or partially, the rhetorical exigency of the time. This part of the study raises several significant questions. How did the rhetor’s creative use of rhetorical strategies make possible each intellectual move or leap necessary to achieving his overall goal of integrating meaning or modifying of the exigency? How did he skillfully ground the Western ideas, which embodied a completely different world of experiences, in the principles of Confucian common sense? What rhetorical strategies did he use to argue for these ideas as the keys to achieving the wealth and power of China, while maintaining the Chinese core values intact?

In the sixth and final chapter, I will generalize the results of these three case studies, trace out some of their implications, and provide recommendations for future studies.
CHAPTER I
THE RHETORICAL SITUATION

I. The Emerging Rhetorical Exigency

After the Sino-British Opium War (1839-1842), China started on the long course of learning the Western methods of wealth and power to achieve "self-strengthening." By tracing the political discourses connected with these self-strengthening and reform movements, we can discover the line along which the rationale of the movements developed. We will, therefore, understand why by the last decade of the nineteenth century this rationale eventually came to threaten one of its original goals, that of maintaining the established social-political order. It is this conflict and others associated with it that constituted a rhetorical exigency to those Chinese around the turn of this century who, while caring about the destiny of these movements, wished to see China remain orderly.

The self-strengthening and reform literatures came down in a continuous line from the tradition of jingshi [world-managing, statecraft] persuasion prior to the first Opium War.¹ The first Opium war did not create a completely new tradition of

¹ According to Chang Hao, "jingshi" and "xiushen" (self-cultivation) are two basic ideals of Confucianism. The jingshi trend of thought that emerged around the turn of the nineteenth century "represented a reorientation of the Confucian scholarship in reaction against the sociomoral indifference of Han Learning, which had dominated the
Chinese discourse. It is true that the participants in the movements started to speak with a new set of terms such as cannon, steamship, mining, power-loom, parliament, and so forth. But their broader concept of wealth and power (fu-qiang) had already found a place in the pre-Opium War jingshi discourses, though at the time it was not used without caution. For instance, the scholar-official Gong Zizhen (1792-1841), a leading figure of the jingshi persuasion in early nineteenth century, believed that social order "rested on wealth" (Whitbeck 1983, 22). His closest friend Wei Yuan (1794-1856) made it explicit: "in this world there is wealth and power without the kingly way. But there is no kingly way without wealth and power" (1983, 36). In 1826, Wei helped He Changling (1785-1848) to compile the eighty-volume Huangchao jingshi wenpian [Compilation of Qing essays on statecraft] in an attempt to provide the state and local governments with systematic solutions to the administrative problems that were confronting them. The significance of this compilation is profound. The essays selected emphasized "professional statecraft and the institutional approach as legitimate and important concerns of Confucian scholars," which "implied that moral cultivation in itself was not adequate to attain practical statesmanship" (Chang 1971, 26).

Besides the concept of wealth and power, others such as shiwu [understanding of the times] and bianzong [reform] which dominated the late Qing reformist rhetoric of the eighteenth-century" (1987, 15. Cf. Chang 1971, 15-34).

Fu-qiang was originally the political ideal of Chinese Legalist school. Han Feizi said: "The enlightened ruler must master the arts of wealth and power" (ch. 47). The Classical Confucians and Neo-Confucians had avoided using this concept.
also received emphasis in the jingshi [world-managing, statecraft] writings in the pre-Opium war era. Gong Zizhen witnessed the decline of the dynasty and called for reform in 1815-16.³

There are no regulations of one ancestor which do not become outdated. There are no opinions of the multitude which do not prevail. Rather than leaving reform to posterity, it is better to carry out the reform oneself (1959, 6. Cf. Wong 25-30).

Four months after the first Opium war, in his preface to the Haiguo tuzhi [Illustrated treatise on the sea kingdoms], Wei called for "learning the superior techniques of the barbarians in order to control them" (1983, 207). This call, as Wang Tao later commented, "heralded" China’s long-term movement toward Western learning (1869, 1:21).⁴ From this perspective, the significance of the Sino-British Opium war was that it hastened the revealing of the dynastic problems and strengthened the already emerging intentions of reform.⁵

"An Unprecedented Situation"

As a matter of fact, for almost twenty-years after the first Opium war the Chinese did not take a serious look at its consequences. According to Yen-p’ing Hao

³ For a historical account of the dynastic decline, see Hsu 1990, 123-30.

⁴ For more detailed discussions of Wei’s association with the tradition of statecraft persuasion in the early nineteenth century, see Leonard 1984, 17-31; Mitchell 1972.

⁵ The so-called Western model could work for the Chinese not because of its transcendent, "universal validity" but rather because the model verified, in a way, the Chinese growing awareness of the practical values of wealth and power.
and Erh-min Wang, "the only one" before 1860 who talked about the "change of situation" due to the Western participation in 1844 was Huang Junzai, a little-known scholar-gentry from Yangzhou (1980, 156. Cf. Pong 1985, 28). But his voice aroused little official sympathy. Toward the end of the second Opium war (1860), a group of scholar-officials started to define and assess the situation. Prince Gong (1833-1898) and certain others proposed to the Throne a new administrative system to deal with "barbarian affairs," including a proto-Foreign Office called the "Zongli Yamen," for the reason that "the present situation appears somewhat different from that of the past" (YWSM-XF, 71:18a). The proposers saw the possibility of "domesticating their [the Westerners'] nature and drawing them over by means of faith and justice."

Five years later the same men, now leaders of the proto-Foreign Office, changed their tone dramatically. They began to call the circumstance "an unprecedented situation" (chuangjiu) (YWSM-TZ, 50:24a-30b). The enemies, as they described them, were not only "well-equipped" foreign troops but such "belligerent," "avaricious" nations that their "greed was like a valley that could never be filled." "The foreign forces are now settled in our capital and entrenched in vital parts of our coastal areas." They "can even reach us through land routes from Tibet, Annam, and Central Asia"--a danger that provincial officials and ordinary people might not be aware of. These descriptions conveyed a strong sense of urgency. The involvement of Prince Gong and his associates in the situation set the tone for a new era. Some official discourses immediately adopted the term "chuangjiu" and its justifications (e.g., YWSM-TZ, 52:16-18; 55:17-26).
"Self-strengthening"

The next question that demanded an answer was: How should China respond to this "somewhat different" or "unprecedented" situation? Among the various proposals, that of "self-strengthening" (zixiang) proved to be the most unequivocal and enduring.

The idea of self-strengthening as the nation's most appropriate course of action under the present circumstances appeared self-evident. David Pong discovered that the idea of self-strengthening in the 1860s and 1870s had subtle relationships with the traditional ideas of shame (chi) and regeneration (zizhen). A sense of shame arises from a realization of one's inferiority to others. For a classical Confucian or a Neo-Confucian, being materially poor and physically weak aroused little sense of shame as far as one was not spiritually and morally so. However, since the jingshi [world-managing, statecraft] tradition in the early nineteenth century tended to view wealth and power as two of the necessary indications of an ideal moral-political order, the sense of shame was broadened. The economic and political inferiority of an area, if caused by its administrators, was indeed a source of shame for both the administrators and the people of that area. To find the cause of inferiority in oneself was a long-standing Confucian tradition. As Confucius said: "The superior man seeks [room for

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6 The term "self-strengthening" first appeared in the classic Book of Change, hexagram one, "The Image."

7 Gong Zizhen, for example, did not regard it as shameful to talk about wealth. But he felt that those officials and scholars who pursued their own good regardless of the suffering of the people were disgracing themselves (1959, 29-30).
improvement or occasion to blame] in himself; the inferior man seeks it in others" (15:20). For a traditional Chinese, a feeling of shame could also be aroused by seeing that his own dignity and principles were being humiliated and offended by others. A man of principle, Mencius would say, "cannot be subdued by force and might" (3b:2).

The self-strengtheners attempted to provoke a national sense of shame in two ways. They elaborated on the injustice of the Western military invasion, the humiliation of China's defeat, and the inequality of the treaties that were signed under coercion. "All who have spirit in their blood have simultaneously uttered their bitter hatred," Prince Gong wrote to the emperor in 1861 (YWSM-XF, 71:18a). Liu Kunyi, Jiangxi's provincial governor, prophesied that the immoral conduct of the foreigners "would result in the wrath of Heaven and the resentment of men" (YWSM-TZ, 41:49b).

But at the same time these self-strengtheners, after "examining the time and assessing the situation," agreed with the imperial court about coming to terms with the enemy. They explained this as the strategies of "renru fuzhong [enduring humiliation in order to carry out an important mission]" and "yangjiing xurui [conserving strength and storing up energy]" (e.g., 55:32; 50:29b). Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), a powerful provincial governor-general, warned and instructed his soldiers every day to "be humble-minded and to bear the humiliation in order to learn one or two Western secret techniques" to make themselves strong (1863, letter to Zeng Guofan). The ancient

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8 Cf. 4:17, 5:26; the Great Learning, ch.9; Mencius, 22a:7.
story of *woxin changdan* became these persuaders' favorite example (e.g., YWSM-TZ, 48:2b; 50:29b; 52:17b). It is about the duke of Yue, Gou Jian, who, after being defeated and humiliated by the state of Wu, forced himself to sleep on brushwood and taste gall everyday for ten years in order to strengthen his resolve to wipe out the political disgrace.

Spokesmen of the Self-strengthening Movement also tried to stimulate an ethical sense of shame by making comparisons between China and the West. Feng Guifen (1809-1874), an early theorist of the self-strengthening and reform movement, was representative of this strategy. In 1862, he described China's humiliation by defeat as calling forth "the most unparalleled anger which has ever existed since the creation of heaven and earth" (1862, 79-83. Cf. Pelissier 1966, 160). This unparalleled anger, however, arose mainly from his observation of China's inferiority to the West. He quoted from a general geography by an Englishman that China's territory "eight times larger than that of Russia, ten times that of America, one hundred times that of France, and two hundred times that of England." Why are they small and yet strong? Why are we large and yet weak? The reason, he explained, was not because China's climate, soil, or resources were inferior to theirs, but because "our people are really inferior." He then suggested that the best way to wipe out this disgrace was "self-strengthening" (Feng 1862, 79-83).

The Self-strengthening Movement came to pursue wealth (*qiufu*), in addition to military force, as its sustained goal in the 1870s and after (Mou 1956/1961, 20-23, 86-122; Hsu 1990, 284-91). This involved establishment of some modern enterprises
that exceeded the immediate military needs, such as merchant shipping (1872), modern mining (1877), and the textile industry (1882). To justify these Western-type, profit-seeking enterprises, the self-strengthening leaders articulated their significance in meeting a pressing need of the empire, i.e., the need to expand the source of revenue in order to establish and maintain a strong military force. They also continued exploiting a national sense of shame. In a memorial of December 1872, Li Hongzhang proposed to open up the China Merchant Shipping Company (Lunchuan Zhaoshang Zhu) so that "in the future both the inland rivers and the open seas will no longer furnish their benefits to foreigners alone" ("Memorials," 20:32a).\footnote{For the origin of this company, see Spector 1964, 238-47 and Feuerwerker 1958, 96-99.} In another memorial of April 1882, Li called for the sanctioning of his project to found a "Machine Weaving Company" in Shanghai. He explained in the beginning that the aim of this company was "to enlarge the source of benefit and to fight against the foreign goods" (43:43a).\footnote{See Feuerwerker 1958, 208-11 and Spector 1964, 249-50 for the origin of this Company.} There is no doubt about how exciting these words sounded to the Chinese.\footnote{Later, Zheng Guanying developed the idea of "commercial warfare" (shangzhan) (1892, 5:39b-54a). He emphasized that the practice of commercial warfare was more fundamental than the practice of military warfare.}

Due to the efforts of the self-strengthening leaders and others who later joined them to argue for the ideas of industrialism and mercantilism, the ideal of wealth and power "gradually gained widespread acceptance as a legitimate goal of state policies"
in the 1870s and 1880s (Chang 1971, 31).

"Institutional Reform" (bianfa)

The further the self-strengtheners went, the stronger the resistance they met from the old ways of thinking. By the 1870s a more concrete and definite idea than that of self-strengthening was needed to justify efforts to build up China’s strength and prosperity in order to meet the unprecedented situation. The radical idea of institutional reform (bianfa) then started to appear in political discourses and self-strengthening documents. The concept of bianfa went back a long way in Chinese history and was associated with two previous bianfa movements, which had unfortunately been accused by the mainstream historians of attempting to rebel against the established order (Duyvendak 1963, vii-ix; Liu 1959, 22-30, 35-37). Among the various Chinese terms for reform, bianfa was probably the strongest. Aware of its iconoclastic connotation and unsavory reputation, the outspoken statecraft reformists like Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan did not apply the term "bianfa."\(^{12}\) Early self-strengtheners were also careful not to use this term directly.

The first to adopt the term officially and seriously was Li Hongzhang. In 1974 he presented a memorial to the Throne addressing a new political tension caused by the Japanese invasion of Taiwan. Li summed up in a definite but earnest tone: "We, living in today’s situation and wishing to improve maritime defense, can do nothing

\(^{12}\) Wei Yuan stated explicitly that "A gentleman will not talk about bianfa rashly" (1983, 46).
about it except institutional reform (bianfa) and using officials of talent" (YWSM-TZ, 99:15a). Again, he reminded the royal reader of the "unprecedented situation" and of the "unprecedentedly strong enemy," whose steamers and telegram "run a thousand li in the twinkling of an eye," whose weapons and machines "are a hundred times finer than ours," and whose artillery shell "can overrun all fortifications." To follow a rut in coping with such a situation and such an enemy, Li said satirically, "is analogous to trying to cure all diseases by one ancient prescription" (99:14a). He also quoted from the Confucian classic the Book of Change to support his point. This memorial initiated a trend of discussing institutional reform in governmental and other settings.

Li’s conception of institutional reform at the time was very limited. In the 1880s and early 1890s, the more radical and resounding voices for institutional reform were heard, not from these self-strengthening leaders, but from the reformist compradores or what Paul A. Cohen called the new coastal reformers, men such as Wang Tao, Zheng Guanying, and Ma Tianzhong (the last two served on the staff of Li Hongzhang) (1976). Such voices were also found among the reformist officials who were influenced by the writings of the new coastal reformists (e.g., Chen Zhi and Tang Zhen) or who received firsthand observation of the West while serving as China’s ministers to Western countries (e.g., Guo Songtao and Xue Fucheng).

Most innovative among their speeches was the call for attention to such Western political institutions as parliament and constitutional monarchy. The "superficiality" of previous efforts at Westernization was now being criticized (e.g., Wang 1883, 103-05). From the view of the most active minds, the source of wealth
and power in the West was not technology nor even industrialism. The source, Chen Zhi claimed, lay in the Western vivuan (parliament), which "combines the monarch and the people into one body, and channels the upper and the lower into one mind" (1896, 301. Cf. Zheng 1892, Preface). While these spokesmen all emphasized communication, interconnectedness, and harmony between the ruling and the ruled as the principle of vivuan (parliament), they ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the other side of the situation, that is, that the institution in the West had been used by the people as a means to check the government.

In fact, the call for "the unity between above and below" (shangxia yixin), which had so often been heard after the Opium wars (e.g., YWSM-TZ, 99:28b), was a traditional Chinese appeal. One can see that the principle of this mutual dependence constitutes the core of the Confucian political ideal of "humane government" and the "kingly way." Thus, these spokesmen, in extolling the Western parliament, were not the priests of something new opposing the way of the ancient sages. On the contrary, Wang Tao said, this constitutional system contained "the lingering spirit of the Three Dynasties and earlier times in China" (Cohen 1974, 221. Cf. Chen 1896, 301).

"The Chinese Ti and the Western Yong"?

The legitimation of the idea of institutional reform opened a door for growing skepticism and anxiety. In response to this tendency, even the radical reformist officials and compradores felt the need to define in principle what could and should be changed within the tradition and what could and should not. All they had to do
was to divide the tradition into the two conventional categories of ti (essential principle) and yong (practical application) or tao (ultimate value) and qi (technical contrivance). The polarity of ti-yong or tao-qi assumed that there were some fundamental principles and relations that were immutable, that were universally true, transcending time and space. These immutable principles and relations were called ti. What could and should be changed was only their yong [applications] in concrete circumstances. Adapting to this ti-yong or tao-qi thinking, the reformists of the second half of nineteenth century confined all the Western-oriented changes to the domain of yong (practical application) or qi (technical contrivance). At the same time, they reaffirmed that the moral teachings of the sages were foremost and would "stay changeless for thousands of generations" (Wang 1883, 100. Cf. Zheng 1892, 115). The fundamental aim of reform was no more than "to apply Western techniques and sciences to protect the way of Yao, Shun, Yu, Wen, Wu, Zhou, and Confucius" (Xue 1879, 1:21b). The various ti-yong approaches up to 1898 were summarized eloquently by Zhang Zhitong, an emerging self-strengthening leader and a great Confucian scholar, into the well-known formula: "Chinese learning for the essential principles, Western learning for the practical applications." Like the reformist compradores and officials before him, Zhang excluded "laws and institutions" (fazhi) from the sanctuary of the immortal, the ti (430). However, he still believed that the Chinese conception of the basic human relations and the ultimate social-political order that embodied them were immutable. He defined Chinese learning, which must be the moral basis of state and man, as the Four Books and Five Classics, Chinese history,
Chinese politics, and Chinese geography. He limited Western learning, which China should learn for its practical benefits, to Western politics, Western technology, and Western history. However, "the essentials in Western learning are political systems, not technology" (424-25, 422). Zhang's well-balanced arguments for this formula were by far the most elaborate and systematic justifications that had yet been provided for the acceptance of Western learning from the standpoint of a renowned power-holder. The arguments proved to be so powerful that Liang Qichao said that the whole nation soon regarded the formula as a "keynote" (1920, 29:113).

Even so, at a deep level the conflict between the two worlds of learning remained. The formula created an even keener sense of incongruity for those who saw through the superficial compatibility. For half a century, the Chinese had been dominated by the line of reasoning that China was like a moral person who had not studied much modern science and technology. Once such a person learned them, he would be virtuous and smart at the same time. Thus, to incorporate Western learning was simply a matter of paying the tuition and devoting the time to the enterprise. Zhang's formula merely continued and exploited this line of reasoning. He boiled down China's problem to that of learning, learning in the sense of adding to knowledge and skills training, not in the sense of fundamental moral reorientation. However, should one decide that one had to learn from the West to change himself fundamentally or had to change himself fundamentally in order to learn, the formula of "Chinese learning for the essential principles, Western learning for the practical applications" became meaningless and ironic.
In fact, more and more Chinese by the end of nineteenth century came to see Zhang's "learning program" for China's achieving wealth and power as nothing but a fallacy or an impossible ideal. Its assumption of a complementarity between the Chinese 体 and the Western 永 was being undermined both theoretically and practically. Some called attention to the concept of "Western 体 [Western essential principles]." Zhong Tianwei, for example, commenting on the dominant view that the Chinese valued 老 and underestimated techniques (yi) while the Westerners emphasized techniques and ignored 老, called it into question by asking: "In actuality, can anyone speak of 老 without implication of its techniques, or speak of techniques without suggestion of their own 老" ("Gezhi shuo"). Later Tan Sitong and Yan Fu also made similar, but much stronger arguments for the existence of Western 体 (Tan 1895b, 389-91; Yan 1902). The perfect complementarity between the Chinese 体 and the Western 永 then started to crack.

Some reformist compradores who accepted the idea of Western 体 but still stuck to the Chinese 体-Western 永 correlation fell into a dilemma. Zheng Guanying serves as a telling example. He recognized that the West also had its own 体 [essential principles] and 永 [practical applications], which he believed had made the West strong and wealthy (1892, Preface). Even so he insisted on the superiority of the Chinese 体 to the Western 体. How was that possible? Zheng reasoned that "the Westerners know nothing about the great 老, they are restrained by their bias." As a result, they had practiced in a hegemonic rather than kingly way. But, it was Confucian common sense that "the hegemonic way will be subjugated at the end by
the kingly way" (1:1b-4a). Despite this sinocentric reasoning, Zheng implied that the Western societies were more rational and reasonable insofar as their methods and institutional systems were concerned. Then the question emerged: How could the strong and wealthy West, which possessed a superior "yong," have a inferior "ti"? How could a weak and poor China, whose "yong" was so inferior, possess a superior "ti"? The question did not accord with the logic of the ti-yong thinking itself.13

China's repeated humiliating defeats by the West and Japan during the 1880s and 1890s also catalyzed the collapse of the Chinese ti-Western yong myth. As if touched by a sorcerer, the "solid ships and effective guns" that had originally been introduced from the West did not perform as expected in the hands of Chinese soldiers during the wars. Ironically, even Zhang Zhitong, who proposed Chinese learning as the foundation, soon realized after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) that the Chinese army's bad habits and poor practices were so deeply-rooted that they could be overcome only by having foreign commanding officers in charge of military training. The Chinese commanding officers could serve only as associates ("Memorials," 40:3-4). Zhang lost his last shred of confidence in his own troops.

13 Wong Young-tzu observes that there were two kinds of explanations given by the late Qing reformists for China's falling behind the West in the development of material civilization. One was that the great Chinese artisans migrated west in order to escape from the tyranny of the Qin (221-206 BC). The other, more reasonable, account was that the Neo-Confucians' overemphasis on metaphysical speculation consequently restrained the development of material civilization (1983, 9).
"Intellectual Enlightenment"

For a half century, the enthusiastic self-strengtheners and early spokesmen for change had tried to keep reforms within some acceptable bounds in order to maintain the traditional social-political order. Up to the mid-1890s, however, this effort met with difficulties. The Chinese situation at the close of the nineteenth century imposed upon the reformist rhetors even more difficult tasks. On the one hand, they had to justify more radical and comprehensive reforms if they wanted China to be saved. The repeated failing of China in its previous efforts at modern reform convincingly showed to the Chinese that China’s real problem did not lie in its yong, but in its ti. China needed a fundamental reform. This felt need ran counter to the original intention of the self-strengthening and reform movements. On the other hand, the rhetors also felt another, more subtle need to maintain the integrity of the traditional world of meaning. The extension of the idea of reform in the 1890s caused a widely perceived crisis of meaning. Traditional theories were losing their powers as effective frameworks for life orientation. China needed the formulation of more dynamic systems of thoughts that could explain the changing world and direct life in this world.

To accomplish this dual rhetorical task, one needed to justify the compatibility of Chinese and Western learning, as the previous self-strengthening and early reformist speakers had tried to. However, with the growing awareness of the existence of Western ti—i.e., the Western political institutions, economic systems, social structures, and the complexes of ideas that justified them, the simple notion of a "hybrid mixture" of Chinese ti-Western yong could no longer be used to explain their
compatibility. For many at that time, the appropriate way to justify a more deeply Western-oriented reform without a loss of orientation was to find connections between the Chinese ti and the Western ti. This, then, became the new dominant rhetorical exigency that called forth discourses that addressed the compatibility of Chinese and Western learning and values from a completely different standpoint.

This was the time of the rising of a generation of modern Chinese intelligentsia, of which Liang, Tan, and Yan were leading figures, a generation which carried the Chinese reform movement forward after the Sino-Japanese War. They dominated the late Qing political and intellectual reform movement of 1895-1898 (also called the Weixin Movement). The movement was characterized by an outcry for more radical and thorough political reforms. For these reformist intellectuals, what China needed fundamentally for self-strengthening and reform was not technical and institutional know-how, but, as Yan put it, the transformation of "men's minds."14 To Liang and his comrades, political reform was important and urgent. But in a long run, the intellectual enlightenment of the Chinese people should be "the first principle of self-strengthening."15

There is no reason, however, to say that the intelligensia of China's transitional

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14 Yan 1898, 65. Cf. 1895, "The Origin of Strength." Some reformist compradores like Wang Tao also shared this understanding (e.g. 1883, 103-05). This argument was justified according to what Lin Yu-sheng called the cultural-intellectualistic approach, which assumes that "a change of basic ideas qua ideas was the most fundamental change." Lin argues that this approach is "presupposed" in the traditional Chinese mode of thinking (1979, 26-8).

era had lost their faith in the Chinese ti as a whole. The time to call for "totalistic rejection" of Chinese tradition, i.e., for complete substitution of the Chinese ti with the Western one, had not yet come; this was to be the articulated task of the May Fourth Movement two decades later. The most revolutionary of these transitional era intelligentsia, who were radical enough to condemn the whole established social-political order (e.g., Tan Sitong) still firmly believed that at base their tradition was universally true. The Confucian "Great Harmony" and the "Kingly Way" still marked their social ideals.\textsuperscript{16} Wealth and power reflected only two aspects of their ideal world, not all. Though they suffered from the conflict between reality and the ideal, their faith in the universality of the Chinese core values and principles made them believe that these values and principles must have shone in the West as well (cf. Tan 1895b, 393). The question was only how to find them there.

At this point the Western moral, social, political, and economic ideas became a charming new world for these intellectuals, not only because these ideas were taken as the true source of Western wealth and power, but also because of the belief that they could testify to the universal tao. With this belief, the first Chinese intelligentsia started to explore this new world and they explored it with a favorable and appreciative eye.

\textsuperscript{16} Wong Young-tzu had demonstrated convincingly that \textit{ta-tong} [Great Harmony] was "an essential aspect of late Qing reformism" (1976).
II. Constraints on the Choices of Audience and of Others

The Growth of the Favored Public Audience

For the high-ranking self-strengthening leaders, the Throne was THE audience. The fate of their proposed Western-oriented adjustments depended upon whether or not they could make the occupant of the Throne nod his head. For the self-strengtheners of lower rank, their intended audience ranged from the Throne, the court officials, and regional officials, to other gentry scholars.

For the treaty-port reformers, the direct audience included the self-strengthening leaders, the gentry-literati, and businessmen in the ports. The reason for the absence of the Throne as direct audience was simply that the reformers had no direct access to it. As Paul A. Cohen observes, they were all confined by "lack of political power and lack of social and cultural standing or legitimacy" (1976, 259). Due to the relatively radical nature of their proposed reform program, the reformers did need to address people of relatively modest status, because their programme could not be accomplished without the people’s active participation in the parliament and in modern economic enterprises.

17 For many of their writings, especially those published in a daily, there is little explicit evidence indicating these reform writers’ intended readers, with the exceptions of the memorials and letters written to the self-strengthening leaders. My description of their readers is based on inference from the contents of the texts.

18 For example, Zheng Guanying realized that not only the cruel and dictatorial officials but also the merchants themselves were responsible for the difficulties in developing China’s modern commerce. Of the latter, "there are many who are ignorant and few with knowledge; many who are false and few who are truthful; many divisive men and few who contribute to unity; many followers, but few innovators ..."
Another factor causing the shift in direct audience was the introduction of the modern press. Certain reformers, such as Wu Tingfang, Wang Tao, and Yong Wing, were the pioneers of modern Chinese journalism. Wu established the first modern Chinese daily, the Chongwai xinbao, in Hong Kong in 1858. In 1874 Yong founded one of the earliest dailies in mainland China, the Shanghai Huibao. In the same year Wang founded the first politically and ideologically oriented daily, the Xunhuan ribao, in Hong Kong, which was an important tribune of late Qing reformism (Fang 1981, 60-72). Before Zheng Guanying published his influential book Warnings to a Seemingly Prosperous Age in 1892, many important theses in this volume had already been well circulated by this daily during the 1880s.

During the early stages of the Weixin Movement of 1895-1898, its spokesmen tried to persuade both the Emperor and the national elite, the gentry-literati. As the movement radiated from the capital to hinterland and littoral cities, the objects of persuasion included the local elite group of gentry-literati. There were reasons for


19 True, there existed during the Qing some traditional, government-supervised periodicals (all called Beijing Gazettes) which were permitted by the Court to copy and publish certain memorials and edicts. But publication was not to be the memorial writer’s original intention. For the Beijing gazettes in the Qing, see Fang 1981, 3-4.

20 Since the Chinese feudal government had long denied the individual’s right to publish a non-government-controlled periodical, these reformers should have been thankful to the environment of the treaty-ports and the connections they had with foreign institutions (missionary societies, commercial firms, government organs, etc.). The ”Nanjing [Nanking] Treaty” (1842) and those following granted Westerners’ freedom of commercial and religious activities in the treaty-ports (Hsu 1990, 189-92). As a crucial part of these activities, the Westerners published Chinese-language religious and commercial periodicals in China long before the native modern press (Fang 1981, 10-48).
working on the gentry-literati. The gentry-literati were in the social position next below the royal nobility, but still on the upper levels of the dominance structure in both town and country. However, they were themselves a complex of hierarchical social strata. Lying at the lowest level was the xiucai group who passed the primary examination held in the towns and received the degree of sheng-yuan or qiansheng. These lower-degree holders, as Philip Kuhn observes, "might easily dominate community life in poor and backward rural areas." The gentry, according to Liang Qichao, consisted of intermediate social forces "connecting the spirit from above and the spirit from below" (1898, 76). On the other hand, the gentry-literati constituted the most educated segment of society; they were respected for their classical learning and literary achievement. These elites, especially the national ones, were supposed to be scholarly-minded and to be willing to listen and participate in the preaching and discussion of the tao.

There was, of course, another reason for seeking to persuade the gentry-literati. The modern intellectual spokesmen had a hard time catching the ears of the Throne due to their humble social status. When they first came on the scene, many of them

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21 According to David Johnson, the gentry’s dominance in Qing was justified on a legal basis. Based upon their degrees and titles, they were granted specific legal privileges such as exemption from various taxes, special treatment in legal proceedings, and the right to wear distinctive insignia of rank. They also enjoyed other customary privileges and benefits. The gentry were qualified to hold office by either examination or purchase (Johnson 1985, 53. Cf. Chang 1955, 32-43).

had just started to climb the conventional ladder of power. Yan Fu’s memorial to the Emperor (1898) had to be first published in the newspaper he founded himself. In April 1895 Kang Youwei (1858-1927, Liang Qichao’s master) and Liang orchestrated the earthshaking event of a Gongche shangshu [public vehicle presenting a memorial] in Beijing, presenting the Censorate with a ten-thousand-word memorial which had gathered the signatures of 603 provincial graduates.\footnote{"Public vehicle" was a nickname for the provincial graduates who had come to Beijing for the metropolitan examinations by public transportation. For this event, see Hsu 1990, 367.} The joint memorial stressed the urgency of institutional reform, but the Censorate refused to forward it to the Throne. In early 1898 when the young, reform-minded Emperor Guangxu intended to grant Kang an audience, Prince Gong stopped this by reminding him of the court rules that permitted no interviews for officials below the fourth civil rank (Hsu 1990, 369).

In a letter Liang explained his reasons for initiating a political daily in Beijing: "Once the discussions of daily events seep into men’s mind, we are not far from the formation of a new social mood" (Yang 1958, 25). The daily named Wanguo gongbao came into being in August 1895 under Liang’s editorship. All the copies were sent free to the gentry-literati in Beijing (Tang 1957). At the same time Liang and his Master Kang also formed a "study society" to promote intellectual interaction and communication among these gentry-literati. This so-called "Society for the Study of National Strengthening" arranged lectures on reform every ten days. It also engaged in the translation of foreign works, publication of newspapers, and the establishment
of such new institutions as libraries, museums, and political schools. Later Kang, Liang, and their comrades continued founding political periodicals and study societies in almost all major treaty cities and in many inland cities such as Changsha and Wuhan. By 1898, the number of study societies reached over forty, and there were more than thirty periodicals in circulation campaigning for political and intellectual reform (Tang 1957).

These new political presses, which were characterized by a critical view of conventions and a passionate outcry for fundamental reform, ignited a hope in many Chinese readers. These publications soon exceeded the pre-1895 periodicals in numbers, circulation, and political liveliness (Lee 1985, 364). The most popular among them was the Shanghai journal *Current Affairs* [Shiwu bao], which appeared every ten days. It achieved an unprecedented circulation of 12,000 in 1896 when the talented editor Liang was in charge (364-65). As a result, Liang gained "considerable fame among the gentry-literati" (Hu, 47). In fact, Liang and his comrades' influence was even more far-reaching. Some local governors such as Zhang Zhitong (Hubei province), Chen Baochen (Hunan province), and Lin Qi (Hangzhou city) ordered their subordinates to read and subscribe to *Current Affairs*. Many school teachers also used the articles of this paper as required readings for their students (Fang 1981, 85; Tang 1984, 174-79).

The agitated readers' reactions should not be ascribed solely to the pen of Liang and others. One reader recalled that Liang's *Current Affairs* in 1896 was "like the explosion of large bomb, which woke many people from their dreams." However,
he explained:

It wasn’t just that Liang Qichao’s writing was good; it was also that what he said seemed to be just what we had stored in our hearts and wished to express ourselves (Bao 1971, 150. Cf. Lee 1985, 364-68).

The Chinese readers of 1896 and 1897 had not yet had any serious intellectual encounter with Western learning. Examination of Liang’s important writings in Current Affairs during this period shows that Liang was still pretty much preoccupied with Western-style institutional reforms. However, it was true that his main concern at this time was with the changing of the old school and examination systems that had served to maintain the hegemony of traditional learning. At the same time Yan, Tan, Liang, and some others were formulating more intellectually powerful "bombs." They knew that the reading public was ready for them.

 Demand for Breakthrough of Subject Area

What subject area should their intellectual "bombs" address? The question was not difficult to answer. The new rhetorical exigency in the 1890s, as described in the first part of this chapter, stemmed partly from the emerging public awareness of the limitations of the dominant subjects of reform discourse. The new generation of reform spokesmen, who sought to modify this exigency, knew where to turn their attention. While they were seeking inspiration from the Western intellectual world, they were not without preconceived objectives, for they were guided, consciously or unconsciously, by Confucian topical thinking.
Topical thinking serves to lead people, in a stereotypic way, to the proper subject areas from which they can find answers to certain kinds of problems. Confucian topical thinking assumed that social and personal problems were due to failure of understanding and failure to conform to the basic virtues and human relations discovered by the sage kings, i.e. the so-called sangong wuchang. These basic virtues and human relations, in turn, embodied the all-embracing tao. Because of this assumption, the teaching of these basic virtues and human relations had been the beginning point of all Confucian education. Adapting to these basic virtues and relations was, of course, not the only way for the Confucian to cope with problems in his social-political life. However, he was certain that this way could effect a permanent cure (zhiben) while the others could only bring about a temporary solution (zhibiao). As a result, Confucian statesmanship emphasized "moral education and transformation" (jiaohua) of the people as well as exemplary leadership. Ruling by institutional measures and laws was considered marginal to the Confucian kingly way.

This mode of topical thinking underwent a significant adjustment in the early nineteenth century. The statecraft persuasions had added a new dimension to the Confucian ideal of practical statesmanship insofar as they talked about it in the sense of institutional arrangements and bureaucratic procedures. He Changling, Wei Yuan, and others distinguished such technical subjects as taxation, the salt gabelle, grain transport, canal shipment, water control, military system, and maritime defense as

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24 Sangang refers to the three cardinal relations: the ruler-subject, father-son, and husband-wife relations. Wuchang refers to the five constant virtues: humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity.
legitimate and imperative issues for Confucian statesmanship. Later Zeng Guofan (1811-1872) suggested adding the category of statecraft to the traditional triad of moral philosophy, textual criticism, and poetical literature as the fourth "dispensable" subject of Confucian scholarship (1920, I:1a; 4a). None of these thinkers tried to deny the primacy of building a statesman's good character. However, they began to speak of institutional arrangements and administrative procedures as another governmental issue that should be dealt with.

Much of the pre-1895 pro-reform political discourse addressed concrete policy issues, which were extensions of the statecraft subjects in the early nineteenth century. The 1888 continuation of the Huangchao jingshi wenbian [Compilation of Qing essays on statecraft] added a new category called "Foreign Affairs" (yangwu), which included sub-categories such as "Diplomacy," "Army and Government," "Educational Affairs," "Commercial Affairs," and so on. Zheng Guanying's Warnings to a Seemingly Prosperous Age (1892) covered a variety of topics of modern administration, such as "The Parliament," "International Law," "Banking," "National Debt," "Commercial Shipping," "Insurance," "The Postal Service," "Telegraph," "Railways," "Mining," and the like. As compared with them, "Institutional Reform" (bianfa) was a relatively general and scholarly subject matter that concerned many reform spokesmen during the period. Unfortunately, these new subjects of discussion did not bring about the hoped-for significant results that would truly have changed the modern fate of China. The Chinese finally came to realize that merely concentrating on these external subject matters without, at the same time, reflecting upon the traditional moral catagories could
give rise only to a stopgap solution.

It is not surprising that the new rhetorical exigency emerging in the mid-1890s required a breakthrough in the subjects of discourse. The above reform subjects restricted the room for thinking, because their coverage was categorically determined and thus could offer nothing more than external solutions. For the emerging Chinese intelligentsia who tried to promote more fundamental and permanent reforms, there was nothing more significant than exposition and explanation of the dynamic virtues and human relations that underlay the Western social, political, and economic reality. There was no more important and morally imperative task than for these intellectuals to restore the true meaning of the tao.

Expectation of Rhetorical Genres

When the early self-strengtheners' eyes focused only on the Throne and a small number of power holders, the two useful rhetorical genres for them were memorial and letter. Later reformist rhetors turned to public audiences. They made heavy use of three of the conventional genres of Chinese rhetoric: yi [discussion], lun [argumentation], and shuo [explanation, persuasion].

25 The reader should keep in mind that the traditional Chinese theory of rhetorical genres provided no specific rules but only general principles for the writing of these three genres. As is shown below, these general principles concerned the purpose of writing and the nature of style. There were no unified formats for their writing. Students learned how to write in a particular form principally by imitating and following good models taken from previous writings of the same sort. As rhetorical genres, these three forms all applied and exploited both argumentative and stylistic techniques.
The rhetorical genre known as yi [discussion] appeared to be more prevalent than the other two by the 1890s. The yi originated from a form of memorial. Later, the genre was used also for "private discussion." According to the great ancient Chinese literary and rhetorical critic Liu Xie, the yi differed from other forms of memorial by its distinct purpose: "to maintain a difference of opinion" on a policy or statecraft issue (Liu 1970, 176). It was often practically oriented, judging a case as it stood and being written in a pithy style. Although the yi, like other Chinese rhetorical genres, "must be based on an adoption of the Classics as pivot," a strong scholarly taste was not necessary (193-95). On the other hand, the writing of yi did require special and technical knowledge. For example, "[W]hen dealing with worship and sacrifice, the writer should know thoroughly the rites connected with it, and in military matters, he should be versed in the art of war" (194). Because of these recognized characteristics, it is not surprising that the genre of yi attracted many political-oriented reform writers of the late Qing.

Another reason for the popularity of this genre in the late Qing may be purely rhetorical. By calling his writing an yi [discussion] the writer implied that he was expressing personal opinions and, therefore, admitted the possibility of making mistakes. Personal opinions were not always, nor necessarily, right. The use of this genre, therefore, could serve to alleviate the risk of political consequence. Xu Fucheng (1828-1897), for example, told readers that his Humble Discussions on the

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26 In the preface to his An Accurate Differentiation of Literary Genres (1570) Xu Shizeng noticed the co-existence of two kinds of yi: the zouyi [discussion presented to the Throne] and the siyi [private discussion] (1965, 132-33).
Management of Foreign Affairs (Chouyang chuovi) was merely "personal arguments based on a moment's enthusiasm" (Preface). Feng Guifen (1809-1874) also said that his Plain Discussions in the Jiaopinglu Studio (1862) reflected his "personal discussions" and "personal thinking." Among all these discussions, he hoped, "some might occasionally hit on a good and feasible idea" (Preface, 69-70).

Around the second half of nineteenth century there were also a considerable number of reform discourses which adopted the forms of lun [argumentation] and shuo [explanation, persuasion]. In the Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons, Liu Xie joined these two forms into one category, "lun-shuo." "The lun performs the function of establishing what is true and what is not." It went further than the yi in that it did not merely stop with discussing the case as it stood. "It goes over all available tangible evidence and pursues truth to the realm of the intangible" (1970, 143). Thus, the lun writer, when addressing something, was in fact concerned with its tao, not the thing itself. Besides, lun emphasized the soundness and coherence of reasoning and argumentation.

Hence its ideological content should be coherent and its language free from verbosity; it should bring the mind and the reason together in perfect accord and leave no sign of patchwork in the organization; the expressions it employs should be so intimately coordinated with the thought that the enemy is baffled as to where to attack. In these qualities consists the essence of the lun. In a lun, it is as if one were splitting wood; the main thing is to split it according to its grain (143-44).

In the Chinese rhetorical tradition, the lun was often used for argumentation on
controversial policy issues. It was also the major instrument for theory-building.

The other rhetorical genre, shuo [explanation, persuasion], stemmed from the pre-Qin sophistic tradition. The speakers of this tradition, the so-called "wandering persuaders" (youshuo), strove to win over the princes by their "three-inch tongues" and their eloquence. The crucial requirement for a successful shuo, according to Liu Xie, "is to present at an opportune moment ideas which are crystal-clear and true" (Liu 1970, 147). In its later development, the genre tended to emphasize the explanatory function and shuo became the name for expository essays. A contemporary scholar in mainland China has observed that the shuo writings after the Tang (618-907) and Song (960-1279) tended to be "theoretical in nature." But they were more expository and explanatory than argumentative (Chu 1984, 318).

Many lun and shuo which addressed China's political and economic modernization tended to argue and explore the profound implications of dealing with these matters. Ma Jianzhong's Fumin shuo [On Enrichening the People] (1890), for example, was not concerned primarily with how to make the people rich, but with the significance of doing so.

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27 E.g., Heng Kuan's famous Yantie lun [Debate on Salt and Iron] of the Western Han (206 BC-AD 8).

28 For this tradition see J. L. Kroll 1985-87.

29 E.g., the well-known essay Shishuo [On the role of the teacher] by Han Yu (768-624).

30 Works whose titles did not provide explicit indication of their genre, though they addressed concrete statecraft issues, are better referred to as lun or shuo rather than yi if they tried to lead the readers to some profound conclusions. Zheng Guanying's Warnings to a Seemingly Prosperous Age (1892) is one such work.
The interest in lun and shuo grew considerably in the 1890s when the reform movement developed in depth. During the political and intellectual movement of 1895-1898, lun and shuo became the two favorite forms of writing for the rhetors of the Chinese intelligentsia, among which Liang, Yan, and Tan were three of the most important and energetic lun and shuo writers. Their radical and intellectual approaches were not the only reasons for their choice of these forms. The terms lun [argumentation] or shuo [explanation, persuasion] conveyed a tone of self-confidence. Those who called their writings a lun or shuo instead of a yi [discussion] appeared to possess a stronger sense of commitment and to be willing to take more responsibility for what they said. China’s situation at the end of nineteenth century did not favor those sitting home writing personal opinions. This was a situation in which someone must stand out and speak loudly for the sages and the people. As Liang Qichao put it: "One must intend to use one’s words to change the world. Otherwise, why utter them?" (IV, 11:47) For the new reform spokesmen who struggled for political and social recognition and for the fulfillment of their ideals, their application of the more direct and more aggressive forms of lun and shuo to propagate their ideas was understandable.

**Expectation of Argumentative Forms and Stylistic Devices**

What forms of argumentation were the late Qing self-strengthening and reform

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31 Although Liang gave the name "Bianfa tongyi" [General discussion on reform] to his serial which was published in the journal Current Affairs from 1896 to 1897, this serial in fact consisted of a series of lun.
spokesmen expected to use when engaging in argument and persuasion? Even the most original and gifted rhetors such as Liang Qichao had little choice but to adapt the conventional Chinese modes of argumentation for their own persuasive ends. These recognized and preferred modes of argumentation were; argument from consequences, argument from authority, argument by historical example, argument by analogy, and a distinctive form of reasoning called the Chinese chain-reasoning or the "Chinese sorites." My examination of the late Qing self-strengthening and reform movement arguments indicates that the syllogism did not hold a significant position in their reasoning.

Argument from consequences was one of the earliest recognized types of arguments used to establish doctrines in Classical China. Mozi (fl. 468-376 BC) claimed that every doctrine must be able to stand three tests. One of this is the test of its applicability. "It [the doctrine] is to be applied by being adopted in government and its effects on the people being shown" (ch.35, 194). Argument from authority was in substance what Zhuangzi (fl. 369-286 BC) called "chongyan," which meant citations taken from valued predecessors. Such citations, for Zhuangzi, were "designed

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32 For an overall discussion of these types, see Garrett 1991, 299-302; and Bodde 1938, 223-32.

33 Although the Confucians were criticized by the Moists for failing to meet the Moist standards, they were also concerned about the applicability of a doctrine. Chad Hansen observes that the three tests formulated by the Moists (the test of the basis, verifiability, and applicability of a doctrine) "are just a survey of the common techniques for establishing doctrines regularly found among intellectual circles in ancient China" (1975, 270).
to put an end to disputations" (ch.27).\textsuperscript{34} Argument by historical example differed from argument from authority in that it cited facts instead of words.\textsuperscript{35} Mozi proposed to argue based on the deeds of the former kings and to verify arguments by the testimony of the ears and eyes of the multitude (ch.35). Argument by analogy was a major form of reasoning applied by the Classical Chinese rhetors. Xunzi (fl. 298-238 BC), for instance, projected a number of analogies in his "Encouraging Learning" (ch. 1). Analogical expression covered almost half of the discourse.\textsuperscript{36}

The Chinese chain-reasoning was a concise form that linked a series of parallel statements whose meanings were believed to emerge in pattern or in sequence. Each statement in the chain consisted of two parts, the first serving as the condition of the second, a pattern often translated as "When ... then ...". The second (or the subsequent) part of a statement, in turn, became the first (conditional) part of the next statement. Though in appearance like the Western sorites, such a chain of reasoning had little to do with syllogistic deduction. It reflected the Chinese experience of the

\textsuperscript{34} In the pre-Qin periods direct citation from classics was a common practice. According to the statistics provided by the well-known Chinese linguist Wang Li, the Analects quotes twice from The Book of Odes and twice from The Book of History. Mencius quotes twenty-six times from The Book of Odes and twice from The Book of History. Among the pre-Qin scholars, Xunzi’s citations from the classics are the most numerous. He quotes seventy times from The Book of Odes, twelve from The Book of History, three from The Book of Change, and twenty from the Zhuanyue (1964, 1296-98).

\textsuperscript{35} For an example of this type of argument, see Mencius, 1a:3.

\textsuperscript{36} For discussions of Mencius’s and Li Si’s uses of analogy in argument, see Lau 1963 and Bodde 1938.
pattern or sequence of events.\textsuperscript{37} A classical example of the practice of this reasoning was provided by the \textit{Analects} in which Confucius tried to rationalize the need for the "rectification of names" (13:3).\textsuperscript{38}

The rhetorical practice in the nineteenth century in general and the \textit{yi}, \textit{lun}, and \textit{shuo} writings in particular continued to exploit these major forms of argumentation in China. All the \textit{jingshi} [world-managing, statecraft], self-strengthening, and reform arguments in the nineteenth century were varieties of argument from consequences. They were themselves justified by an overall pragmatic concern with the realization of Confucian personal and social ideals, which Chang Hao believed to be "the central motive of Confucianism" (1971, 9-10). Indeed, anyone who justified Western learning during this time demonstrated its practical values and its significance as the means for achieving Confucian moral ideals.

The \textit{jingshi}, self-strengthening, and reform rhetors also appealed to the authority of the classics. Zhang Zhitong, for example, cited more than one classic to justify reform and learning from the West:

"When a system is exhausted, it will be modified...." That is the idea in the \textit{Book of Changes}. "In instruments we do not seek old ones but new." That is

\textsuperscript{37} This chain-reasoning was quite popular in Classical China. For a discussion of the nature of this practice, see Garrett 1983.

\textsuperscript{38} These types of argumentation are believed to form the traditional Chinese modes of reasoning not just because the Chinese used them. They were also used in the Western tradition, with the possible exception of the Chinese chain of reasoning. The unique element of the above types is the rational validity that the traditional Chinese assigned to them, which those in the Western rhetorical tradition held them to be extralogical contrivances.
the idea in the Book of History. "Knowledge exists among the four barbarians." That is the idea in the Commentary on the Chunchiu. ... That is the idea in the Book of Rite ... in the Analects ... in the Great Learning ... in the Mencius (1898, 430-431).

Historical examples were another important source of their justifications. The same Zhang Zhitong wrote:

Chinese history itself is full of institutional changes: from feudal states to unified empire; from recommendation to examination; from the fu-ping militia to mercenary army; from chariot warfare to cavalry and infantry warfare; from ancient taxes to modern taxation; and from barter trade to cash exchange.... Numerous examples of innovations can be found even in our Qing period ... (431).

Many analogies were created by the persuaders to support their reform proposals. A vivid example was Li Hongzhang's above-mentioned comparison of those who insisted on following conventional wisdom to cope with the current situation to the medic who expected to cure all diseases by one ancient prescription. In the nineteenth century, among the various examples of the Chinese chain-reasoning, none was more appropriate for reformist thought than the one drawn from the Book of Changes:

Qiong ze bian;
bian ze tong;
tong ze jiu.

[When a system is exhausted, it will be modified;
when it is modified, it will work;
when it is working, it will endure]

Since the three discourses I will analyze all involve heavy use of parallelism
and antithesis, these two stylistic devices, though they are not types of arguments, deserve particular attention here. In the Chinese rhetorical tradition, parallelism is more than what Quintilian called "rhetorical ornament" (1920-2, VIII, iii, 5-6). The Chinese chain of reasoning was usually expressed in parallel sentences. The parallel structure created for the reader the impression of a "powerful progressive forward movement" (Bodde 1938). It has been generally recognized in the Chinese and Western rhetorical traditions that the appropriate use of parallelism can help strengthen the emotional appeal of a speech. One can hardly remain unmoved by the way Mencius articulated what a great man should be:

Ju tianxia zhi guangju,
Li tianxia zhi zhengwei,

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39 According to Karl S. Y. Kao there are up to twenty-nine types of parallelism and antithesis in the Chinese rhetorical tradition (1986, 128). Chinese rhetors’ tendency to employ a great deal of parallelism and antithesis in argumentative discourse can be explained by the particular features of Chinese characters. Chinese is a monosyllabic, isolating language: each character denotes only one syllable. It is also grammatically uninflected and, therefore, free from the burden of cases, genders, moods, tenses, etc. With these qualities, Chinese is the ideal language for parallelism and antithesis. Further, the lack of inflection allows for conciseness but pays the price of ambiguity. As a result, a Chinese word, while enjoying a multiplicity of meanings, usually also has a wealth of synonyms. For example, as listed in the Erya vishu, there are thirty-nine synonyms for the term "ta" [big] (I:2b-5b). This makes it extremely easy for a Chinese writer to formulate syntactically parallel and antithetical sentences and phrases. The parallelism and antithesis in Chinese not only creates a visual beauty of regularity and balance, but also can produce significant auditory effects. In a syntactically parallel and antithetical expression, the number of characters (syllables) in each line naturally decides its basic rhythm. Since every Chinese character is pronounced in a fixed tone, the writer can purposefully create a musical sense of modulation by choosing characters with different tones and by arranging them in a particular order. The wealth of synonyms in Chinese makes it easy for the writer to pick words solely according to considerations of modulation and rhyme. For further discussion, see Liu 1962, 3-47; Ching 1975.
Xing tianxia zhi dadao....
Fugui bunen yin,
Pinjian bunen yi,
Weiwu bunen qu,
Ci zhi wei dazhangfu.

[He who dwells in the wide house of the world,
who stands in the correct station of the world,
who walks in the great path of the world....
He who cannot be dissipated by the power of wealth and honors,
who cannot be influenced by poverty or humble stations,
who cannot be subdued by force and might
--such a person is a great man] (3b:2. Chan’s trans.).

Parallelism is more clearly seen as a rational or persuasive device when used to string together analogies or historical examples of the same kind. This usage is quite common in the pre-Qin philosophical discourses.\(^4^0\)

Antithesis differs from parallelism in that it consists of only two syntactically contrasting sentences or phrases. When antithesis is formed by such contraries as "Heaven" and "Earth" or "mountains" and "rivers" it functions as a parallelism as well. Its relationship can be expressed thusly: "What a contrast, yet what a perfect match."
Its real point is harmony rather than conflict. However, when antithesis consists of such opposites as "good" and "bad" or "great" and "small" it imposes a clear-cut moral

\(^4^0\) For example:
Budeng gaoshan, buzhi tian zhi gao ye;
Bulin shengu, buzhi di zhi hou ye;
Buwen xianwang zhi yiyan, buzhi xuewen zhi da ye.
[If you do not climb a high mountain, you will not comprehend the highness of the heavens;
if you do not look down into a deep valley, you will not know the depth of the earth;
and if you do not hear the words handed down from the ancient kings, you will not understand the greatness of learning] (Xunzi, ch.1).
choice upon the reader.

Since parallelism and antithesis could be used to make an emotional and rational appeal, the late Qing self-strengthening and reform rhetors had a great tendency to apply them. Zhang Zhitong, for example, used syntactically parallel sentences to link up ten past cases of institutional reform (see the first part of this chapter). The readers were impressed not only by the amount of evidence, but also by the great eloquence and learning of the rhetor who could easily present such a number of examples by parallel sentences.
CHAPTER II
YAN FU’S HEAVENLY EVOLUTION (TIANYAN LUN)

Yan Fu spent the summer of 1896 translating Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics*, which he called "Tianyan lun" (literally, "On Heavenly Evolution").¹ According to James Reeve Pusey, Yan discussed Darwin and Darwinism for fifteen years before he wrote this work. The event that finally caused him to translate Huxley’s work was "China’s shattering defeat in the Sino-Japanese War" in 1895 (1983, 5). In 1897, Liang Qichao received from Yan a draft copy of this translation, and he in turn showed it to his teacher, Kang Youwei. Master Kang, a leading modern Chinese reformer, was so impressed by the translation that he said he "had not seen a man of such calibre" (Lang’s letter to Yan, 1897). The "man" he meant was Yan, not Huxley. Kang fully understood the difficulty of translation. The names of both Yan Fu and Huxley soon reached all China when *Heavenly Evolution* finally was published in 1898. This translation created a new national mood favoring self-strengthening and reform. The *People’s Journal* reported in 1905: "Since the birth of Mr. Yan’s book, the ideas of *wujing* [things’ struggle] and *tianzhe* [heavenly selection] have struck root in men’s hearts. The people’s spirits have taken on an altogether new aspect" (Fang 1981, 103).

¹ For the controversy over exactly when Yan started this work see Pusey 1983, 470, n11; Chen 1982, 113.
How was this possible? The answer has to be found in Yan's presentation of Huxley's ideas as a significant solution to the rhetorical exigency of the time, i.e., the fundamental moral conflict between the seemingly successful modern values and the long-held Confucian ethical goals. In this chapter, I will suggest that we understand Yan's success with this translation as due to the factors listed below:

1. a fitting response to the rhetorical situation;
2. a tendency towards creative translation;
3. preference for the Chinese modes of argumentation.
4. argumentation for the struggle as an understandable, natural phenomenon;
5. justifications of the struggle as a meaningful means to the conventional end of life;
6. an implicit critique of the existing political system;

I. A Fitting Response to the Rhetorical Situation

Huxley's Arguments

Why did Yan choose Evolution and Ethics? Huxley's Evolution and Ethics was a Romanes lecture delivered at the University of Oxford in 1893, as the second of the annual lectures founded by Mr. Romanes. Since Huxley's audience at Oxford was "highly select and cultivated," at the request of his critics Huxley wrote the "Prolegomena" the following year "in the simplest language" to elucidate a number of propositions set forth in the lecture (Preface, vii-viii). Both the address and the
Prolegomena were published in 1895, the last year of Huxley’s life (cf. Chen 1982, 113).²

What was this lecture about? Even in his last years, Huxley still performed his self-assigned role as Darwin’s “bulldog” and argued the theories advanced by Darwin. But here he also concerned himself with something he considered "the most important and the worthiest," that is, ethics (Preface, vi). According to Benjamin Schwartz, his "overwhelming preoccupation is that of protecting human ethical values against the efforts to create an "evolutionary ethic" (1964, 100). He was in the position of attacking the fanatical individualism of his time, which "attempts to apply the analogy of cosmic nature to society" (82). Evolution "is full of wonder, full of beauty," but at the same time, "full of pain" (53). "My lecture," confessed Huxley, "is really an effort to put the Christian doctrine that Satan is Prince of this world upon a scientific foundation" (Bibby 1959, 51). His central theme is that "cosmic nature is no school of virtue" (75).

Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process ... The ethical progress of society depends not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it (81-3. Cf. Schwartz 1964, 100-01).

² Yan translated both works, making the "Prolegomena" a lengthy "Introduction" to the lecture.
Implications for the Burning Issues and for the Concern with Tao

But what did this lecture have to do with China at that time? In his own preface to the translation, written in the autumn of 1896, Yan said that

The purpose of this book of Huxley's is to correct the abuses of Spencer's laissez-faire. Many of its arguments are in accord with what our ancient sages have said. Furthermore, matters such as self-strengthening and the preservation of the race are reiterated in it. That is why I spent the long weary days of the past summer translating it (1321. Chen's trans.).

Yan's understanding of Huxley's purpose may be too narrow. However, Huxley did argue for a kind of moral activism. Yan's statement that Huxley is concerned with the issues of self-strengthening and the preservation of race could mislead the reader into thinking of these as Huxley's real issues. They were not. Even so, there was much in Huxley's expounding of the ideas of evolution that related to these concerns. Huxley surely had more in mind. But for Yan, it was the argument for moral activism and the relevancy to "self-strengthening and the preservation of the race" that basically drew him to Huxley's text.

This approach to Huxley's work clearly reveals Yan's preoccupation with the rhetorical exigency of his time. In fact, as I will demonstrate later, Yan used Huxley's Darwinian terms to awaken the Chinese to their dangerous situation and to promote more radical reform and national struggle for existence. Huxley's sermon on ethical commitment served to elevate the Chinese sense of interdependence and devotion to the social good, which Yan believed to be necessary for the forming of a strong, fitting nation (cf. Yan 1895b).
A more subtle reason for the choice of Huxley's text may be that Yan saw the text as a Western approach to tao. In traditional China, tao was universally understood as the ultimate principle governing the processes of the cosmos. In part, Yan saw Huxley's book as an attempt to explain this principle and the cosmic process. Indeed, many of Huxley's basic assumptions were "in accord with what our ancient sages have said," and Yan was trying to make them even more so. According to Yan's translation, "Although heaven ever changes, there is something changeless moving within it. What is it that is changeless? It is called heavenly evolution" (I:1). Why Yan referred to it as "heavenly evolution," and exactly what this added meant, were left as questions. But for Chinese who had studied the Book of Changes and the Taoist Daode jing, there was little doubt about the ever-changing nature of the universe and the existence of the permanent principle and source of the ever-changingness. Again, Yan tells us, "Darwin's book says that species in their multiplicity originally were one" (1895b, 5). What a great testimony "Darwin" gave for what Laozi had said more than two thousand years ago: "The tao gives birth to one, and one to two, and two to three, and three to the ten thousand things" (ch. 42). In traditional China, tao was also understood as the fundamental source of ethical order, social harmony, and basic human relations. If, like Yan, we focus on Huxley's concern with a social ideal and his attack on fanatic individualism, we could surely find even more that would fit the perspective of the ancient Chinese sages. In short, Huxley's text, whose subjects ranged from nature to society, could be seen as presenting the Chinese with a fairly balanced picture about how the West approached tao. Its translation could
revolutionize the Chinese readers’ outlook on their natural and social world, and yet would not lead them to loses their fundamental tenets of faith.

**A Brief, Vivid, and Almost Poetic Account**

Yan’s preoccupation with the Chinese modes of discourse and argumentation may be another reason for Yan’s choice of Huxley’s text. Yan might have tried to translate Darwin’s *Origin of Species*, the book that, reported Yan, "has given men new eyes and ears and have changed their thinking more even than did the science and astronomy of Newton" (1895b, 5). But Yan was not fundamentally interested in biology. Apart from this, the great length of this volume, its scrupulous empirical investigation, and its painstaking scientific classification might have been the factors that eventually drew him back. Yan later did translate two chapters of Herbert Spencer’s *A Study of Sociology*. The author was another great Darwinian hero for Yan. In one of his commentaries on *Evolution and Ethics*, Yan said that "Spencer’s writings are abundant, profound, and vast. They cannot be hastily translated" (Schwartz 1964, 98).

Among the various Darwinian works, Yan chose Huxley’s lecture on "Evolution and Ethics." The subjects were probably not the only considerations. The lecture, as commended by Benjamin Schwartz, contains "a brief, vivid, and almost poetic account of the main tenets of Darwinism" (1964, 101). Huxley’s imagination and eloquence found expression in his use of metaphors and analogies. For example, he believed that "only in the garden of an orderly polity can the finest fruits humanity is capable of
bearing be produced" (Huxley, 55). The opening words of his "Prolegomena" invite the reader to "the countryside visible from the windows of the room in which I write" and to imagine its natural history. Again, he began his Romanes lecture with "a legend of a bean-plant." His audience was asked to accompany the hero, Jack, to climb the bean stalk in order to discover a strange new world. Schwartz comments that Yan felt "a trenchant power which no amount of purely scientific discourse would convey" in reading these vivid descriptions and illustrations (1964, 101). The lecture was not a model type of scientific discourse in the Western tradition. But because of this, it was closer to the Chinese expectations for an argument (lun). Those analogical and poetic expressions, though not sounding especially scientific to the Western readers, were argumentative for Yan. And he was to make them, as well as the other parts of the lecture, sound even more poetic and elegant, and to bring them even closer to the Chinese expectations for argumentation.³ That was why Wu Rulun, who wrote the opening preface for Heavenly Evolution, could claim that Yan's prose had carried Huxley's work almost to the level of the philosophical treatises of the late Zhou (1111-249 BC) (Wu's Preface, 1318).

Appealing to the Elite

Huxley's intended audience might have had little to do with Yan's selection of this text. Yan wanted to appeal to those who were intellectually mature. His intended audience included the elite group of gentry-literati, the sophisticated intellectual and

³ For a discussion of Yan's poetic and elegant style of translation, see Chen 1982.
literary minds, and "those Chinese who have read many ancient books." Yan decided to use classical Chinese (guwen) for his medium of translation, a dignified language that would appeal to these audiences. His style turns out to be, as Schwartz puts it, "a happy combination of precision and richness, terseness and profundity, clarity and elegance" (1964, 93). But for schoolboys and those who had not steeped themselves in ancient books this was not an easy-to-read style. Liang Qichao once questioned Yan about this aspect of his style, remarking that "Unless profound and abstruse books of this type are rendered in a flowing and incisive style, how can our students profit from them?" Yan replied that

The books with which I concern myself are profound and abstruse. They are not designed to nourish schoolboys and I have no hopes of their deriving profit from them. I have translated precisely for those Chinese who have read many ancient books (Journal of a New People, 1903, no.1. Cf. Schwartz 1964, 94).

Yan had reasons for this choice. He was not a social radical. What he wanted was intellectual enlightenment, not social revolution. But to educate the whole nation, those who were in the position of educating should be educated first. Yan tried to enlighten his countrymen with new, yet time-honored and profound ideas. These

4 The audience was not the only reason behind Yan's decision to use classical Chinese. Schwartz lists the following five reasons: (1) the whole bai-hua [vernacular] movement still lay in the future; (2) Classical Chinese is an appropriate medium for interesting the educated literati; (3) the classical style is adequate for matters of serious philosophic concern and simultaneously provides an aesthetically satisfying vehicle for this concern; (4) Yan Fu's flair for elegance may reflect his own aesthetic bent and his pride in his own virtuosity; and (5) using the noblest style of prose can demonstrate that Westerners are not inferior to Chinese in terms of literary and philosophical achievements (92-4. Cf. Chen 1982, 115).
profound ideas, for Yan, could not be transmitted adequately in simple, plain language.
(This, of course, is Yan’s personal opinion.) Yan’s own commitment to the stylistic
school of Tong cheng was partly responsible for this opinion.\(^5\) In fact, Yan’s
translation, at least in the case of Heavenly Evolution, was so successful that,
ironically, it attracted many who did not share his immediate concerns to read it,
including many schoolboys.

Conflicts with the Chinese Views

Huxley’s vision of reality ran into collision with that of the Chinese in two
fundamental aspects. Yan was perfectly aware of these conflicts. As a Darwinian,
Huxley acknowledged that the struggle for existence was a necessary means for
survival in the ruthless state of nature. But struggle (zheng) had long been a dirty
word for the Chinese. Confucius taught that a superior man "does not contend" (3:7).
Xunzi regarded struggle as a "disaster" (ch.10). The Taoists went further to preach
"the virtue of ‘non-struggle’" (Daode jing, ch. 68). Confucianism and Taoism were also
philosophies of survival, and nobody could say that their notions of ‘non-struggle’
were not the traditional Chinese ways of being strong and superior. Had not Confucius
called for "making the distance people submit" by cultivation of civil culture and

\(^5\) Writers of this school considered themselves to be the lineal successors of the
Tang (618-907) and Song (960-1279) classical prose tradition. This school, emerging
in the eighteenth century, favored linguistic clarity, simplicity, and purity. It arose as
"a revulsion against the colorless and formless notational style of the Qing Empirical
Research school, as well as against the florid and exuberant rhetoric of the ‘double-
harNESS style’ of the Six Dynasties [420-589]" (Schwartz 1964, 93).
virtue? (16:1) Were there not the profound statements of Laozi that "To yield is to be preserved whole" and that "The softest things in the world overcome the hardest"? (ch. 22; 43) However, for Yan, these ways to survive and to "struggle" no longer worked to protect China from the current international competition.

Alas! here indeed we see the artistry with which the Sages built our empire, put down contention and quelled disorder. And it is because of such artistry that our people's knowledge has steadily decreased and their power day by day declined. The Sages never realized that in the end they might render us incapable of contending with foreign nations for another day's existence (1895. Pusey's trans).6

The other conflict is more subtle and deserves more discussion. Huxley was definite on the point that "the ethical process is in opposition to the principle of the cosmic process" (31). But for the Chinese, the tao had to embrace at once both cosmic and ethical processes. In the traditional Chinese view, nature could never be totally amoral. Mencius's notion of vital force (haoran zhi qi) that "fills up all between heaven and earth" and "is accompanied by righteousness and the Way," and his conception of natural compassion as the germ of humanity (ren) are well known (2a:2; 2a:6). Laozi's assertion that "Heaven and Earth are not humane (ren). They regard all things as straw dogs" (ch.5) may lead some to think of his cosmological view as "amoral." But in fact, Laozi's tao was nonetheless purely natural. He in fact advocated an extreme merging of the natural and moral spheres. His central theme in the Daode jing, as identified by Sung-peng Hsu and Cristian Jochim, was no more than

6 For more discussion of this conflict, see Pusey 1983, 54-56, 60-62; Schwartz 1964, 54-56.
"that of condemning the assertive use of the will as the cause of all unnecessary suffering in the world" (Jochim 1981, 226). The Confucian Xunzi is known as one of the earliest Chinese philosophers to attempt a "naturalistic" interpretation of heaven and a pessimistic view of human nature (see ch.17, 23). In this sense he may be called the Chinese "Huxley." But he also appealed to the ethical and spiritual notion of Heaven, arguing that "to reform oneself and to transform others is what is meant by heavenly virtue (tiande) (ch. 3), and that "Heaven and earth give birth to the good man, and the good man orders Heaven and earth" (ch.9).

The Neo-Confucian scholars also sought a cosmic sanction for their ethics. Among the most important and enduring perspectives they established was that stressing the idea of production and reproduction as the principal feature of the cosmic process and identifying this all-embracing creative quality with ren [humanity] (Chan 1963, 521). This cosmological view found a basis in the Confucian classic Book of Changes. Cheng Hao (1032-1085) gave a profound explanation of this view:

"Change means production and reproduction." This is how Heaven becomes the Way. To Heaven, the Way (t'ao) is merely to give life. What follows from this principle of life-giving is good. Goodness involves the idea of origination (yuan), for origination is the chief quality of goodness. All things have the impulses of spring (spirit of growth) and this is goodness resulting from the principle of life. "That which realizes it is the individual nature." Realization is possible only when the myriad things fully realize their own nature (532).

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7 According to Wing-tsit Chan, after the Han (206 BC-AD 220), Xunzi "was largely neglected until the nineteenth century" (1963, 115).


9 Ibid.
Another Neo-Confucian philosopher, Zhang Zai (1020-1077), took a more dynamic perspective and saw the universe as nothing but the perpetual interfusing and intermingling of the qi [vital forces]. This ultimate stuff and creative force of qi, however, had "inherent vital and moral-spiritual qualities as its 'nature'" (Chang 1987, 81). According to Wing-tsit Chan, Zhang was "the first Confucianist to have made a clear-cut distinction between the Principle of Nature [Heaven] and human desires" as the sources of goodness and evil (1964, 509). However, for Zhang, the Principle of Heaven and human desires were nonetheless themselves derived from two ontologically different sources. The distinction was possible because "Stillness and purity characterize the original state of qi. Attack and seizure characterize it when it becomes desire [upon contact with things]" (Zhang Zai, 510). Both Cheng Hao and Zhang Zai advocated a kind of restraining, inhibitory morality for the cultivation and realization of one's heavenly endowed nature.10

In the Qing (1644-1912) many influential Confucian thinkers spoke of ethics in more realistic terms. They rejected the Neo-Confucian distinction between principle and desires. For them, "Principle is a latent principle for activities," and it had to be seen in terms of emotional needs and biological desires (Wang Fuzhi, 700). Further, desires were the means of preserving life given by Heaven and Earth. Principle "can never prevail when feelings are not satisfied" (Chan 1963, 710). For those holding this

10 Both believed that everyone could achieve sagehood simply by cultivating and realizing their heavenly endowed natures. It is in this sense that Cheng Hao claimed that "The investigation of principle [of Heaven] to the utmost, the full development of nature, and the fulfillment of destiny--these three things are to be accomplished simultaneously" (531).
perspective on moral realism and activism, humanity and other conventional values continued to be seen as characteristic of the cosmic process of production and reproduction.

It is true that the Chinese people confronted a deep paradox in the late nineteenth century, that between a tough-minded reality and the ethical ideal. This was the same one that troubled Huxley. But it posed a more desperate question to the Chinese: "What do you want: life or morality?" The classical answer given by Mencius was that, if this become the case, we should "give up life and choose righteousness" (6a:10). But was this the only way?! Huxley’s work by itself could not solve China’s problems. The Chinese had a reason a hundred times stronger than that of Huxley to curse the morally indifferent law of the survival of the fittest because they were now its victims. And they had every reason to applaud Huxley’s ideal of the survival of the "ethically best" (81). Then what? But at the least, the dichotomy of Evolution and Ethics gave Yan a chance to work on the rhetorical exigency of his time. If Yan could work out some middle path to resolve Huxley’s paradox—that between life assertion and moral need—he, at the same time, could help the Chinese make their decisions. He could help create a new doctrine of struggle, dynamism, and energy which, he believed, was necessary to achieve the wealth and power of the nation, while in the meanwhile preserving the faith in fundamental cultural values.

James Reeve Pusey is right when he says:

Yan Fu translated the best book he could find to instill awe for evolution, to deliver Darwinian warning, and to inspire in response the patriotic spirit ... that alone could bring Chinese into the active unity that was strength [physical,
ment, and moral strength], the unity that alone could preserve China in her struggle for existence (1983, 173).

II. A Tendency toward Creative Translation

This unity is not given by Huxley. Yan had to work it out. He replaced the original dualistic title "Evolution and Ethics" with a monistic one, "Heavenly Evolution." This, of course, was only the beginning.

Before translating, some general decisions concerning the methods of translation had to be made from the outset. Yan wrote an explanatory note entitled "Yi liyan" [Remarks on translation] explaining how he translated Evolution and Ethics.\textsuperscript{11} In the opening sentence, Yan set up three criteria for a good translation: xin [fidelity], da [readability], and ya [elegance]. To justify the last criterion, he quoted from Confucius: "Where language has no refinement, the effects will not extend very far." Although the appropriateness of these standards is questioned by some modern scholars (e.g., Zhao 1969; Huang 1978), these standards, as noted by Tzu-yun Chen, did make sense to the Chinese at that time (1982).\textsuperscript{12} Then Yan explained his general decisions about the methods he used for this translation. The consideration of readability appears to be the most important factor behind those decisions. These

\textsuperscript{11} "Yi liyan" was published along with the translation.

\textsuperscript{12} In his illuminating article "Yen [Yan] Fu's Translation of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics" (1982), Tzu-yun Chen analyzed certain aspects of Yan's style, the format of Heavenly Evolution, and his particular translation strategies, such as "translation by substitution," "translation by parallelism," "translation by vivification," and "translation by wit."
decisions, as we will see, reflect Yan’s tendency toward what may be called creative translation.

One decision Yan made was to use the classical style, which we have mentioned earlier. For Yan, classical Chinese not only was elegant, but also could contribute to better readability. Yan explained that "in using the style and syntax of the pre-Han period one actually facilitates the comprehension of the subtle principles and abstruse phrases [of the translated text]." This, of course, would hold true only for the educated readers. But even so, the explanation still sounds strange to people today. We can trust Yan, because a parallel is found in the history of English. Tzu-yun Chen observes that, in the Renaissance period, when English had been established as the language of popular literature, "there was still a strong tradition that sanctioned the use of Latin in all the fields of knowledge" (1982, 116). People still looked at the vulgar tongues as "immature, unpolished, and limited in resource," and felt that "they could not express the abstract ideas and the range of thought embodied in the ancient languages" (Baugh 1963, 244). Since classical Chinese was more distant from modern English than was the vernacular Chinese in matters of linguistic structure, Yan could gain another advantage by choosing classical Chinese. He was able to reconstruct more radically the original grammatical structure and syntax and, as a result, to attain more freedom to express his own understanding of and feeling for the English text.

Another important decision, consistent with the first, was to use paraphrastic translation rather than literal translation. Schwartz calls Yan’s translation "an abridged summation of the original" (1964, 95). How did Yan do this? Yan explained that "the
translator first grasped the meanings of whole sentences or passages in spirit and then communicated them naturally in idiomatic language." This method was not new in the Chinese tradition. Students of the classics had been encouraged to grasp the essential meanings of the ancient sages, to express these meanings in their own language, and to apply them to their daily lives. The Neo-Confucian master Wang Yangming (1472-1529), for example, warned his students that "they could never really grasp the meaning of the classics if they studied and even memorized them as a body of literature irrelevant to their daily lives" (Tu 1976, 150). Understanding the legitimacy of this practice in the Chinese tradition, we understand why Yan gave full play to his preoccupation with China's exigency as he interpreted Huxley's message. We also understand the comfort Yan found in the use of questionable techniques to create better sense out of the English text, such as adding something new to the text, omitting passages, or replacing them with something more familiar to the Chinese. Yan had good and legitimate reasons for doing these things; he was bringing the Western sage closer to the Chinese readers.

The third decision was to continue another common practice in the Chinese tradition, that of writing commentaries.

Whenever I find in other books similarities to and differences from this book, I will put them into my commentaries for your reference. Occasionally I also express some of my own opinions, with the hope of emulating what the Book of Odes calls "yingqiu" and the Book of Changes calls "lizhe" [mutual assistance of friends] (1322. Chen's trans. 1982, 115).\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{13}\) "Yingqiu" alludes to the line in the Book of Odes: "'Ying' they cry, each searching its mate's voice" (Waley's trans. 204). According to Tzu-yun Chen, the two
Yan added commentary to the end of almost each chapter of *Heavenly Evolution*. Some of these commentaries are even longer than the chapters themselves. With these commentaries, Yan was able to place himself outside the text. This was necessary if he wanted to accomplish more than his paraphrastic translation could possibly allow. As we will see later, commentary became the means for Yan to invite Herbert Spencer and others to rectify Huxley's "too narrow" views. Spencer was significant because he "has written books and composed treatises which embrace heaven, earth, and man under one principle" (Yan's own preface, 1320). Yan referred to Spencer's all-embracing principle so much in his commentaries that Schwartz has gone so far as to say that *Heavenly Evolution* "consists of two works--a paraphrase of Huxley's lecture[s], and an exposition of Spencer's essential views as against Huxley" (1964, 103). Yan's commentaries served as a guide to reading Huxley. He understandably continued to reiterate the issues of "self-strengthening and the preservation of the race" allusions here simply mean that Yan's opinions are suggestive and that he invites his readers to discuss them with him (1982, n15).

14 I agree with Chen and Pusey that Schwartz has overemphasized the importance of Spencer to Yan (Chen 1982, 115; Pusey 1983, 158-62). Yan did not completely accept Spencer. Though Spencer may indeed have been greeted in America first and foremost as "the shining light of evolution and individualism," as has been asserted by Richard Hofstadter (1955, 35), only Spencer's view of the "social organism" and his belief in the existence of an all-embracing law were emphasized by Yan. For Yan, Spencer was first and foremost a scholar studying groups (see Pusey 1983, 64, for more discussion). Indeed, in his commendations Yan made Spencer, Huxley, and many others "his footnotes," borrowing the words of Lu Xiangshan (1139-1193) that "If in our study we know the fundamentals, then all the Six Classics are my footnotes" (Pusey, 159; Chan 1963, 580).
in the commentaries. As a result, his *Heavenly Evolution* has in reality changed the original focus and concern of Huxley's text.

The last decision Yan made was to change Huxley's format. This adjustment, too, had something to do with enhancing the readability of his translation. Huxley's "Prolegomena" is divided into fifteen sections with a Roman numeral marking each. His long lecture on "Evolution and Ethics" is also divided into sections, marked simply by double spacing without chapters numbers. Tzu-yun Chen notes that in Yan's time "the practice of paragraphing was not popularly adopted" (1982, 116). This does not mean that Chinese readers of that time and before liked to read long paragraphs. To deal with a long and sophisticated discourse, the writer usually divided it into chapters according to the natural unit of expression or the subject of discussion. Thus Yan had a choice: to create very long paragraphs to reflect the original format, or to change the format to make shorter chapters. Yan chose the latter. He redivided the original eight sections of Huxley's lecture into seventeen chapters, and the fifteen sections of the "Prolegomena" into eighteen chapters. Each chapter in the new version is about the same length, consisting of no more than three paragraphs. Most are only two paragraphs (21 out of 35). Further, Yan accepted the suggestion of Wu Rulun, his mentor for matters of style, that he give a title to each chapter. According to Yan,

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15 Zhang Zhitong's *Exhortation to Learning* (1898) is perfect example of this practice.

16 The title of each chapter is in fact supplied by Wu (see Yan's "Sample Remarks on Translation," 1322).
Wu's suggestion was made on the basis of "following the convention of the philosophical treatises in the Classical periods" (1322).

The following tables illustrate the differences between the two formats at a glance. These two tables are reproduced from Tzu-yun Chen's article, with one change as indicated at the end of the first table (1982, 118-19):
### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T.H. Huxley</th>
<th>Yan Fu</th>
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<tr>
<td>Prolegomena</td>
<td>Introductions to Essays on Evolution, Vol.I</td>
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<th>Chapter</th>
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<td>6-7, 11, 8-9</td>
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<td>2. An Exposition of Evolution (<em>Guangyi</em>)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. The Tendency towards Variation (<em>Quyi</em>)</td>
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<td>4. The Intervention of Man (<em>Renwei</em>)</td>
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<td>5. Antagonism between Art/Nature (<em>Huzheng</em>)</td>
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<td>6. Human Selection (<em>Renzhe</em>)</td>
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<td>V</td>
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<td>VI</td>
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<td>8. Utopia (<em>Wutuobang</em>)</td>
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<td>9. Elimination of the Superfluous (<em>Taifan</em>)</td>
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<td>11. Bee Society (<em>Fengchun</em>)</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>12. Human Society (<em>Renchun</em>)</td>
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<td>4-6</td>
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<td>XI</td>
<td>14. The Defeat of Self-Restraint (<em>Shubai</em>)</td>
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<td>XII</td>
<td>15. Summary of the Preceding Chapters (<em>Zuizhi</em>)</td>
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<td>XIII</td>
<td>16. Progressive Modification of Civilization (<em>Jinwei</em>)</td>
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<td>XIV</td>
<td>17. The Good of Society (<em>Shanchun</em>)</td>
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<td>XV</td>
<td>18. Resumption of the Cosmic Process (<em>Xinfan</em>)</td>
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* In Tzu-yun Chen’s table, Yan’s chapter 3 is shown as including paragraphs 10-11 in the first section of Huxley’s text. This is a mistake. In fact, Yan changed the original order by moving the eleventh paragraph up to his second chapter. See my analysis in the next section.*
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<td><strong>Essays on Evolution, Vol. II</strong></td>
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<td>Chapter</td>
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<td>2. Suffering <em>(Youhuan)</em></td>
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III. The Preference for the Traditional Chinese Modes of Argumentation

In Yan's creative translation he exploited the traditional Chinese modes of arguments so as to make Huxley's ideas comprehensible and persuasive in the Chinese context. The two most obvious modes Yan exploited are argument from authority and argument from consequences. Yan was inclined to choose, directly or indirectly, well-known terms, phrases, and statements from the Chinese classics to render Huxley's ideas. This, of course, is more than a simple translation of the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. Yan's tendency to apply argument from consequences is evident in his having Huxley "reiterate" the issues of "self-strengthening and the preservation of the race" and in his implicit justification of the struggle for existence as a meaningful means to achieve the traditional Chinese moral ends. In addition, Yan often added definitions, examples, and discussions to the original or omitting passages from it in order to facilitate and strengthen his interpretation.

In this section, I will illustrate Yan's tendency to adapt Huxley's text to the traditional Chinese modes of argumentation by comparing a set of Huxley's arguments which Yan accepted in toto and his translation of them.

Huxley, characterizing himself as "an agnostic determined to follow reason in all matters of the intellect," followed reason in explaining how the single cosmic process of evolution could be the cause of the variety of life forms and activities in the world--the question of the one and the many (Goldenweiser 1932). This reasoning took place in the second half of the opening section of Huxley's "Prolegomena." The
whole course of the argument moves through three logical phrases. The first began
with statements quite typical of the prevailing mechanistic view of nineteenth-century
Western natural philosophy and science.

As a natural process, of the same character as the development of a tree from
its seed, or of a fowl from its egg, evolution excludes creation and all other
kinds of supernatural intervention. As the expression of a fixed order, every
stage of which is the effect of causes operating according to definite rules, the
conception of evolution no less excludes that of chance (6).

By saying this, however, Huxley ran into a troublesome question about the FIRST
cause, the question that still dominated the philosophical and scientific thinking of his
time. He simply could not get away from it.

It is very desirable to remember that evolution is not an explanation of the
 cosmic process, but merely a generalized statement of the method and results
of that process. And, further, that, if there is proof that the cosmic process was
set going by any agent, then that agent will be the creator of it and of all its
products, although supernatural intervention may remain strictly excluded from
its further course (6).

Huxley was led by the powerful logic of design, the same logic that made Asa Gray
insist that "the argument for design, as presented by the natural theologians, is just as
good now, if we accept Darwin’s theory, as it was before that theory was promulgated"
(1963, 70-1).

Huxley then moved on to the second phase and accounted for the three
interrelated "tendencies" in this world of life:

All plants and animals exhibit the tendency to vary, the causes of which have
yet to be ascertained; it is the tendency of the conditions of life, at any given
time, while favoring the existence of the variations best adapted to them, to oppose that of the rest and thus to exercise selection; and all living things tend to multiply without limit, while the means of support are limited; the obvious cause of which is the production of offspring more numerous than their progenitors, but with equal expectation of life in the actuarial sense. Without the first tendency there could be no evolution. Without the second, there would be no good reason why one variation should disappear and another take its place; that is to say there would be no selection. Without the third, the struggle for existence, the agent of the selective process in the state of nature, would vanish (7; emphasis added).

In this part of the argument Huxley carefully chose his terms to justify the tendencies he identified. Actually Huxley did not go any further than commonsensical notions in respect to "the conditions of life" and appealing to induction, the generally recognized procedure in all natural sciences of his days, by claiming to observe what "all plants and animals exhibit." His modest language was appropriate, for, while leaving room for the divine Creator, he removed himself from the position of claiming to know directly and absolutely the truth and cause of these tendencies.

Huxley went on to the third phase:

Granting the existence of these tendencies, all the known facts of the history of plants and of animals may be brought into rational correlation. And this is more than can be said for any other hypothesis that I know of (8).

After mentioning some hypotheses about the origin of the universe, Huxley said: "That our earth may once have formed part of a nebulous cosmic magma is certainly possible, indeed seems highly probable; but there is no reason to doubt that order reigned there ...." He finally arrived at Kant's suggestion:
It may be that, as Kant suggests, every cosmic magma predestined to evolve into a new world, has been the no less predestined end of a vanished predecessor (8-9).

The above reasoning, with its mechanistic tone and implications concerning an original Creator, is typically Western. Only those who came out of the nineteenth-century Western intellectual and scientific tradition could fully appreciate such an argument.

When we turn to Yan’s version, we find that not only the concrete arguments but also the order between them have been changed. Yan cut the original argument into two basic sections. He also readjusted the original order by giving priority to the discussion of the traditional hypotheses about genesis, the last phase in Huxley’s procedure. Yan’s paraphrase of the first section has three relatively independent parts. The first is of Yan’s own making, being a concrete illustration of the single cosmic process of evolution. The second and third have their counterparts in Huxley’s last and first phases of the argument. These three parts constitute most of the second chapter of Yan’s "An Exposition of Evolution." Yan gives special treatment to the other section, the second phase of Huxley’s argument, making it an independent chapter (ch. 3) entitled "The Tendency towards Variation."

In Yan’s "translation" of the first section, parallelism and antithesis were applied to facilitate transition from one part of argument to the next and to promote attention and emotional response to the new subject. The discussion and evaluation of the conventional hypotheses was initiated by a parallel statement:

Since ancient times, every one speaks about Heaven from one perspective, every school follows one theory to argue about transformation.
The return to the subject of evolution was suggested by the following emotional words:

Alas, a giant tree that shoots up to shake the earth grows out of a small seed. The Peng bird whose wings becloud the sky comes from a tiny egg.

Here, I am not suggesting that Yan accomplished his transitions solely by such stylistic devices. The internal connections which make the transitions fundamentally possible have to be there. But it is true that, after Yan's reorganization, the original logic of the original order is no longer present in the Chinese version.

Changes appear in each specific part of the argument as well. Let's read the first part of Yan's argument:

All principles of movements are what essentially account for the ceaseless transformation. They are observable and examinable everywhere: from the smallest like those which walk on tiptoe and grow invertedly to those as great as the Sun, Moon, Heaven, and Earth; from the hidden fact about the excitement and fanaticism of our spiritual thought and mental state, to the obvious fact that our political customs and literary expressions have been developed and changed in history.\(^{17}\) We can sum up their essences in a word: HEAVENLY EVOLUTION....

This is a telling example of Yan's tendency to use argument by examples, because none of this argument is in the original text. With these manufactured examples, Yan tried to shoot two birds with one stone. He not only supported Huxley's view, he also expanded it radically by presenting a whole range of examples---i.e. the second range---that Huxley would think of as opposing cases. Yan in fact

\(^{17}\) These two kinds of examples are presented by Yan in two pairs of sentences, each marked by a mixture of antithesis and parallelism.
supported his own ideas, not that of Huxley who had fought so ardent against the attempt "to apply the analogy of cosmic nature to society" (82).

Yan turned to discuss and evaluate certain hypotheses in the second part of argument. This part is in fact a paraphrase and elaboration of the following paragraph from Huxley:

Such hypotheses, for example, as that of the existence of a primitive orderless chaos; of a passive and sluggish eternal matter molded, with but partial success, by archetypal ideas; of a brand-new world-stuff suddenly created and swiftly shaped by a supernatural power; receive no encouragement, but the contrary, from our present knowledge ...(8).

Yan's paraphrase and elaboration reads:

Since ancient times, every one speaks about Heaven from one perspective, every school follows one theory to argue about transformation. Some may say that, before heaven and earth were separated, the universe was nothing but chaos, dim and sticking. After its being cut open, the light and pure ascended while the heavy and turbid descended and coagulated. Others may say that, in the beginning of history, there was God who made man with mud, created sun for light, and brought into being everything down to the various kinds of vegetation, the flying and crawling creatures. God, it is said, issued orders and created things from without. Still others may say that the world has constantly been observed and judged from above. Auspicious and ill fortune are in fact rewards and punishment from supernatural powers. Although they sound beautiful, the truth of these stories can never be proved....

Yan's paraphrase is, without a doubt, more vivid. However, to me, what is more significant in this paraphrase is Yan's reinterpretation of the original hypotheses so as to make them seem more similar to the ancient Chinese cosmological views. This
reinterpretation did not result in a radical reconstruction of Huxley's text, because some basic types of creation myths and tales are shared by all ancient nations.\(^{18}\)

This method of reinterpretation is what Tzu-yun Chen calls "translation by parallelism." In his study of Yan's methods of translation, Chen identifies this as one of Yan's favorite methods: "Where Huxley uses an allusion [or example], Yan, whenever possible, supplies his readers with its equivalent from the Chinese classics" (1982, 125-27). In regard to the first hypothesis Yan described, the notion of an original chaos is found in both Eastern and Western literatures. However, the phrase "cut open" is definitely an allusion to the Chinese myth of the first creator named Pan Gu who "chiselled the universe out of Chaos" (Werner 1986, 76). The view that the light and pure ascended to form heaven while the heavy and turbid descended and condensed to form the earth, too, has an early reference in the third chapter of Liu An's Huainanzi (2nd century BC) entitled "Astronomy," where almost the same words are found (3:1a). One may think that the second hypothesis, which appears to combine Huxley's second and third cases, was drawn from the Biblical Genesis. However, it would not sound totally alien to the Chinese, because in China there is a well-known legend about another personal creator, Nu Wa, who "molded yellow earth and made man" (Liezi. Cf. Werner 1986, 81). The last possibility, that of a constant intervention by supernatural powers, is added to the text by Yan. Dong Zhongshu (198-106 BC), the great Confucian philosopher of the Western Han (206 BC-AD 8),

\(^{18}\) For discussion of the widespread belief in certain basic myths and tales among ancient nations, see Vico's New Science (1744/1961).
is representative of this view. From the eleventh century on, however, the Neo-Confucians and other later schools tended to ignore the notion of divine rewards and punishments. They were inclined to accept the tao (or the Principle) of Heaven, which was both spiritual and ethical, as the governing principle and creative force of the universe. The tao was self-evident and self-sufficient, it was not created but creating. It is this view that accounts for Yan’s bias in his later approach to Huxley’s words concerning the possible Agent or Creator of the cosmic process.

The third part of Yan’s argument reads:

Alas, a giant tree that shoots up to shake the earth grows out of a small seed. The Peng bird whose wings becloud the sky comes from a tiny egg. Their weeding through the old to bring forth the new and their bodily metamorphosis were merely the product of progressive evolution. There are yet changeless principles operating with the whole process, which is consequential but not created, constant and not unusual. Suppose the universe must have a God, then evolution is His function. . .

What a great change Yan made in the original and how little had been added to the Chinese reader’s knowledge by his translating evolution as God’s function instead of

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19 See his Chunchiu fanlu, passim, especially 8:11a-b.

20 Zhuzi (1130-1200), the most influential Confucian master after Confucius and Mencius, said the following: "When Heaven gives an order, it is something like ‘The Lord on High is greatly infuriated’[The Book of History, "Hongfan" (Grand plan), sec.3.]. It is simply that according to principle it should be so. Nothing in the world is honored more highly than principle, and therefore we call it the Lord" (Chan 1989, 215).

21 According to Cheng Yi (1033-1107), one of the pioneer thinkers of Neo-Confucianism, "It is the Way that spontaneously produces and reproduces without end." Again, "Heaven and Earth create and transform without having any mind of their own" (1973, 553; 571). They create and transform simply because this is their way.
as the product of a hypothetical God's creation. If evolution were God's function, then God could not design evolution, just as he could not design his own function. Then what might that hypothetical "God" be if his function were demonstrated by the evolution of things? Is that just another way to present the traditional Chinese notion of Heaven or the tao, which was mystical in a sense and which had been generally perceived as the process of "ceaseless generation and regeneration" (shengsheng buxi)?

The beginning two lines of this part of the argument introduce two analogies. To understand their functions, let's first glance at the original text:

As a natural process, of the same character as the development of a tree from its seed, or of a fowl from its egg, evolution excludes creation and all other kinds of supernatural intervention.

In Huxley's text, the "development of a tree" and "of a fowl" are the two concrete examples used to illustrate the process of evolution. Their relationship to the exemplified is clearly indicated and well secured by the grammatical mechanism "of the same ... as ...." In Yan's translation, however, such linguistic determinacy disappears. Further, Yan appears to use these two cases to facilitate a poetic rather than a logical mode of expression. This is why I prefer to see them as analogies.

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22 Yan seems to have adapted here to a particular Chinese poetic mode of expression, xing. Xing shares many characteristics with another Chinese poetic mode, bi [metaphor, analogy]. According to Karl S. Y. Kao, xing differs from the latter in two respects: "(1) the 'vehicle' (normally a natural phenomenon or an external situation) is always given first, with the function of evoking the 'tenor' (normally a human phenomenon or an internal situation) and (2) the 'semic identity' between the two terms is often cryptic and ambiguous or equivocal to the uninitiated" (1986, 126-27).
instead of examples. Indeed, Yan here was not so much concerned with logical connection, as with the expression of feeling stimulated by imagination and association. What a contrast between a small seed and a giant tree that shoots up to shake the earth, and between a tiny egg and the Peng bird whose wings becloud the sky! And then what a miracle which evolution has performed on nature! This kind of "creation," however, is itself natural, observable and traceable. While the cool, scientific-minded Huxley tries to reduce all natural phenomena to the expression of a "fixed order," Yan appears to be of the opposite mind. He is appraising the marvelous creativity of tao. Tao is changeless, but look what it has done! Of course, Yan here also uses the "giant tree" and the "Peng bird" as examples, since the dividing line between example and analogy is not always clear in Chinese rhetoric. But we need to be aware of the limitations of this approach in explaining the persuasive effects Yan attempted to achieve. This is because Yan's fundamental goal in this passage was not to provide examples of a phenomenon, but to yield insight into reality, into the "changeless principle," the tao.

Yan also brought about great changes when paraphrasing Huxley's argument about the three tendencies of the cosmic process, but the above examples are sufficient illustration of Yan's tendency to adapt Huxley's arguments, whether problematic or not, to the Chinese modes of argumentation. But I would like to add a final remark on Yan's tendency to use parallelism and antithesis. In the three parts of his argument just discussed Yan applies parallelism and antithesis three times. They all play an active role in presenting his case. Their creation is attributable to both Yan's cultural
background and his genius. Huxley would never have thought that his two examples could form such a beautiful matching parallelism as

A giant tree that shoots up to shake the earth ...
The Peng bird whose wings becloud the sky ...

and

... grows out of a small seed
... comes from a tiny egg.

Without a particular interest in the creation of parallelism and antithesis and without some poetic sensibility a translator could easily miss such an opportunity to mingle rigid scholarly thinking and the productively poetic imagination. In fact, the same spirit and way of expression can already be found in the poetic lines of the Taoist classic *Daode jing*:

A tree as big as a man’s embrace grows from a tiny shoot.
A tower of nine storeys begins with a heap of earth;
The journey of a thousand miles commences with a single step (ch.64).

Yan’s stylistic readjustment was a contributing factor to *Heavenly Evolution*’s success in persuading the sophisticated intellectual and literary minds—for whom the book was intended—which valued literary and poetic achievement so much as to regard it as a necessary constituent of scholarship. Both young and old encountered a "soul-stirring" force when reading this work.
IV. An Understandable Natural Phenomenon

In this and the following sections, I will focus on analyzing Yan's rhetorical skills in presenting and arguing for the Darwinian idea of the struggle for existence as discussed in Huxley’s work.

Redefining the Cosmic Struggle in Chinese Terms

In the first chapter of volume one, "The Observation of Changes," Yan redefined the Darwinian idea of the struggle for existence in Chinese "naturalistic" terms. His opening lines followed Huxley’s picturing of the "state of nature." The readers were immediately brought into the scene:

Huxley sat alone in his house in the south of England; with mountains behind him and fields before. The scenery outside his windows was as clear as if at his fingertips...²³

When the Chinese readers looked outside with Huxley through his windows, however, they saw something different from what they were used to from reading the mainstream Confucian and Taoist literatures. "The grasses and interlocking grasses and rattans contending with one another for the possession of a small patch of surface soil," "the fierce sun of summer," "the terrible frosts of winter," "the furious gales," and all sorts of "animal ravagers," all spoke to the readers of the ruthless "struggle"

⁰²³ Huxley’s opening words read: "It may be safely assumed that, two thousand years ago, before Caesar set foot in southern Britain, the whole countryside visible from the windows of the room in which I write, was in what is called 'the state of nature'" (1).
of nature. Obviously, this picture does not match the Chinese perception of a nature that is harmonious and kind. Immediately after this presenting picture, Yan added a sentence of his own:

All these creatures are merely fulfilling their heavenly-endowed capacities, in order to preserve their own species (I:1. Cf. H: 2).\textsuperscript{24}

The inharmonious picture of nature appeared acceptable after being so defined as to fit the Chinese mode of thought. According to this mode of thought, a behavior could hardly be justified as morally wrong or as going too far insofar as it was taken to fulfill a heavenly-endowed nature and to satisfy the basic need of preserving life.

After introducing the two most characteristic features of Huxley's concept of "cosmic process," i.e., the struggle for existence and natural selection (Yan called it heavenly selection), Yan provided these concepts with an additional definition:\textsuperscript{25}

The so-called selection by heaven is the selection by nature. It is not selection in a normal sense. This is just like things that struggle without the intention of doing so, but this struggle is indeed the most powerful struggle in the world (I:1. Cf. H: 4).

\textsuperscript{24} I will use two forms of citation here and below. For Yan's text, due to the existence of various editions, I will indicate the chapter and volume of the source, while for Huxley's text, I will indicate the specific page. Abbreviated reference is used for Yan's text; for instance, I:1 for chapter 1, volume I. The two volumes of Tianyan lun correspond to the "Prolegomena" and "Evolution and Ethics" in Huxley's text. "H" indicates a reference from Huxley's text. Throughout this paper, the translation of Yan's translation into English is mine unless noted otherwise.

\textsuperscript{25} While Yan used the somewhat familiar term tianyan [heavenly evolution] to render "cosmic process," he chose to create two terms for "the struggle for existence" and "the natural selection," i.e., wujin [things' struggle] and tianze [heavenly selection]. For his coining of these two Chinese terms, see his Explanatory Note (1322).
This definition echoes the internal logic of Laozi’s well-known saying that "the Tao in its regular course does nothing [for the sake of doing it], and so there is nothing which it does not do" (ch. 37). With this definition, Yan brought Huxley’s notion of "cosmic process" into line with the traditional concept of tao. From this perspective, all the cruel, inhumane connotations that had conventionally been associated with the term "struggle" can now be seen as nothing but human opinion or a judgment imposed upon nature.

**Extending the Simple, Biological Account of Struggle**

Yan’s next step was to extend Huxley’s account of the origin of the struggle for existence in such a way as to make a subtle connection to what had been regarded as the most sacred virtue and honorable conduct in Chinese tradition. What causes the struggle for existence? For Huxley, the inevitability of this phenomenon lies in the problem of insufficient supply due to unrestricted multiplication. Yan appears to accept this Malthusian account. To create an even acuter impression of the problem and of the dialectical tension between the tendency to multiply without limit and the limited means of supply, Yan often presents these two conflicting situations in pairs of concise, antithetical clauses, such as

Yi youya zhi zisheng
Yi wuya zhi chuanyan
[using the limited production]
[to support the endless life transmission] (I:3).

Yi youxian zhi dichan
Gong wuxian zhi zisheng  
[using the restricted means of supply]  
[to meet the boundless demand of life] (I:9).

Sheng zhi shi wuya  
Feng sheng zhi shi youya  
[life is boundless],  
[the means of livelihood is limited] (II:16).

Use of this antithetical device which brings the two uncompromising elements into a direct confrontation is Yan's own contribution. In fact, Yan did more than this to sharpen Huxley's Malthusian argument. In his commentary on chapter 3, volume I, Yan resorted to statistics, formula, and tables, which were not yet commonly used by the Chinese, to illustrate how miraculously fast creatures could multiply if circumstances permitted.

For Yan, Huxley's problem lies not in his account of the dialectical tension, which in turn explains the inevitability of the struggle for existence, but in the way he attributed this natural tendency to multiplication. To Huxley, multiplication is a "mighty instinct," and being such, it needs no further explanation. Yan did not follow this simple, biological account, but chose to trace out the conventional moral implications of production and reproduction. Many times in both his translation and commentary, Yan suggested that production and multiplication were the crystallization of love, a suggestion that is totally absent in Huxley's text (see I:3, 5c, 9, 13, 15c. Cf.

26 The conception of this "mighty instinct" accounts for Huxley's notion of Satan. With this conception Huxley was able to "put the Christian doctrine that Satan is Prince of this world upon a scientific function" (Bibby 1959, 51). See also his passage quoted below.
H: 7, 20, 28). For example, Yan stated that "all creatures love their offspring, this is why they can produce and reproduce their species" (I:5c). Furthermore, the Chinese terms he used to translate "multiplication," such as sheng [production, reproduction], ziru [production and breast-feeding], and zisheng [production, multiplication], are all quite passionately-colored and suggestive of a "great mother love." Love, rather than the instinct of a "production machine," was the internal motive force of multiplication, and therefore the deeper cause of the struggle for existence. Now the originally naked, relentless law of nature is covered by a veil of tender sentiment.

Still, even this love is not the "final cause" for Yan. He appears to be willing to see the great virtue of Heaven and Earth in production and multiplication, though this means an even greater violation of the original logic of Huxley's text. This intention is clearly shown in Yan's treatment of the beginning paragraph of section 7 in Huxley's "Prolegomena." The original read:

But the Eden would have its serpent, and a very subtle beast too. Man shares with the rest of the living world the mighty instinct of reproduction and its consequence, the tendency to multiply with great rapidity. The better the measures of the administrator achieved their object, the more completely the destructive agencies of the state of nature were defeated, the less would that multiplication be checked [by a natural struggle] (20).

In Yan's translation, we read something completely different:

The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is production and reproduction. All living beings produce and feed their offspring, enjoy sexual intercourse, and protect what they love. Such a nature is shared by both uncivilized and

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27 Hereafter "c" marks a reference to Yan's commentary.
The first sentence is an indirect quotation from the classic *Book of Changes* ("Ta zhuan," 2:1, 328). What is originally an allusion to man’s "original sin" is now changed into praise of the great virtue of Heaven. In Huxley’s text, the "mighty instinct" of reproduction, which in his dichotomy of cosmic process and human administration is related to the most primordial natural tendency, is like heavy, dark clouds threatening both nature and human society. It is in Huxley’s ethics the potential source of all immoral conduct in the world. In Yan’s translation, however, this "mighty instinct" is replaced by the all-embracing mercy of Heaven. The productive virtue of Heaven brings to this world the prosperity of species and the blessedness of family life. The struggle for existence, though an unfortunate and inevitable fact, tends to promote a sense of sympathy and forgiveness when understood as the struggle for fulfilling something that is kindly endowed by Heaven.

What is even more subtle is the way Yan introduces Huxley’s concept of administration (*zhi*) to account for the problems of flood, drought, hunger, and cold, which for Huxley would have been a stereotypic occasion to condemn the "destructive agencies of the state of nature." One is immediately given the impression that those problems are not problems of nature, but of human administration, a typically Chinese approach to social problems.  

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28 This is reminiscent of the statement of the pre-Confucian text *Shu ching* [The book of history] that "It is not Heaven that is not impartial, but men ruin themselves [by deviating from it]" (V, 27:21); and the Declaration of King Wu who was defending
as a social process, is introduced by Huxley as a counter to the destructive process of nature, while Yan used it as a basis to excuse Heaven from blame.

**Recasting the Cosmos/Ethics Dichotomy**

Yan went on to undermine Huxley’s cosmos/ethics or nature/society dichotomy by introducing the Chinese concepts of *xing* [nature, endowment] and *chun* [group]. Huxley speaks of two co-existing, but mutually exclusive struggles in the following passage:

To the struggle for bare existence, which never ends, though it may be alleviated and partially disguised for a fortunate few, succeeded the struggle to make existence intelligible and to bring the order of things into harmony with the moral sense of man, which also never ends, but, for the thinking few, becomes keener with every increase of knowledge and with every step towards the realization of a worthy ideal of life (54).

Underlying this distinction between the struggle for bare existence and the struggle for a moral life is a long-standing Western view of a ceaseless, uncompromising conflict between the two poles of flesh and spirit, emotion and reason. Yan’s translation of this passage runs as follows:

The first struggle is for the means of life ("zheng fu qi suoyi sheng"); the second struggle is for a worthy life ("zheng fu qi bu xusheng"); while its more
advanced form is for perfect fulfillment of heavenly endowments, so that they won't be covered up during the course of life (II:3).

The original two kinds of struggle have now become three, and yet the original two courses of life are reduced to one. What actually takes over is the traditional Chinese view of an ideal course of life, the course that had its definite end in a perfect unity of Heaven and man. The key phrase is "perfect fulfillment of heavenly endowments." It suggests that this ideal course of life is only a progressive unfolding of heavenly endowments. The so-called moral life is therefore merely a "more advanced form" than the material life in terms of this fulfillment.

For Huxley, the ethical process and its product, i.e. social organizations, are born to check the cruelty of the state of nature and "the ‘ape and tiger’ methods of the struggle for existence" (52-3). Yan found in the Confucian classics a counterpart to the Western concept of social organization, i.e., chun [group]. According to Xunzi (fl. 298-238 BC), man was superior to all the animals because man could form groups. Humans could group because they had morality (yi) (ch.9). The Confucian term "chun" always carried such an implicit moral connotation. After Xunzi, this ethical concept in the mainstream Confucian tradition was tied to the conviction of man's

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29 In the Christian tradition, the notion of the unity of Heaven and man also expresses the perfect ideal of human life. However, the achievement of this unity does not rely upon the development of man’s nature, but requires total commitment to an ethical and spiritual life. This is what Jesus suggested when he said in The New Testament: "If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? And if you greet only your brothers, what are you doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that? Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:46-48).
natural goodness (although Xunzi himself did not see this connection). It is in its second implication, that of man’s natural goodness, that the concept of chun [group] does not match Huxley’s concept of social organization. To solve this conflict, Yan had Huxley advocate the Chinese concept of chun.

Actually, in most of the discussions of chun in Tianyan lun, Yan still followed Huxley’s dichotomous structure. Insofar as the cosmos/ethics, nature/society dichotomy could function to make a clear distinction between human love and the "ape and tiger’ methods of struggle," Yan had no problem with this structure. However, Yan did try in various ways to remind the reader that this dichotomy in fact did not exist.

Yan, again, resorted to the notion of our heavenly-endowed nature to erode this dichotomous structure. Both Huxley and Yan believed that social organization was not unique to humans. In the section discussing the society of the bees, Huxley also mentions the example of ants (23-5). In Yan’s version, six more species of birds and beasts are added (I:11). However, Yan’s examples are used to argue for the natural basis of chun, while Huxley’s are to illustrate what he would call the "organic necessity." Yan emphasized repeatedly that the grouping of men, or the human social and ethical life in Huxley’s sense, must have a heavenly-endowed nature or a kind of natural mechanism for its own being ("tianji zi ziran," "ziran zi ji") (I:5c, 12, 13, 15; II:2. Cf. H: 26, 27-8, 35, 51). This faith was a commonplace of the Chinese tradition: anything that emerged naturally must have a nature or principle in itself and a deeper source in the way of Heaven.
Yan also posed himself as an orthodox critic and in his commentaries directly challenged the basis of Huxley's dichotomous structure. He tried six times, either by quoting Spencer or directly stating his own opinions, to rectify the "too biased and narrow" view of Huxley who saw an uncompromising conflict between a group [organization] and the individuals. For Yan, the truth or "the most common cases in the studies of groups [sociology]" was that an ideal group or a perfect ethical life could and must at once benefit oneself and others (I:14c, 15c, 17c, 18c; II:15c, 16c). The implication is clear: the so-called "ape and tiger" methods not only harmed the group but also violated the very nature of life.

In a paragraph almost re-written by Yan, in which Huxley is made to eulogize chun as the most brilliant show of a heavenly-endowed nature, the "artificial" wall separating an ethical process from a natural process collapses:

Today, men are, of course, most intelligent among the ten thousand things in the world. However, their heavenly-endowed nature is not yet widely opened, and their intelligence is still not brought into play, if they are unable to group. It is not that men can group; it is that they have to group (II:2. Cf. H: 51).

Obviously, to Yan, the traditional ideal course of life can be brought to completion only in chun [group]. With the disintegration of the cosmos/ethics dichotomy, all the defenses Huxley brought to support the ideal and glory of an ethical and social life automatically are turned to support the conventional conception of the nature and purpose of life.
A Natural-Moral Approach to the Origin of Social Organization

What makes a human social organization or chun possible? Both for Huxley and Yan, their assumptions of the relationship between the natural and ethical process could not be fully justified on their own terms until they gave a reasonable and clear answer to this unavoidable question. About the origin of a human social organization Huxley said:

The check upon this free play of self-assertion, or natural liberty, which is the necessary condition for the origin of human society, is the product of organic necessities of a different kind from those upon which the constitution of the hive depends (28).

The so-called "organic necessity" was a popular concept in Huxley's day. The concept allowed one to explain the operation of things from the perspective of a system without necessarily inquiring into their ultimate nature. Thus, those who denied the existence of God and also rejected the goodness of human nature could still use this notion to defend the necessity of ethics. It was the need for the operation of human society and for a mind that was rational enough to understand this need that created the ethical order of human society. For Huxley, the most important organic necessity for a member of a human society was the tendency "to reproduce in himself actions and feelings similar to, or correlated with, those of other men."

Man is the most consummate of all mimics in the animal world; none but himself can draw or model; none comes near him in the scope, variety, and exactness of vocal imitation; none is such a master of gesture; while he seems to be impelled thus to imitate for the pure pleasure of it. And there is no such another emotional chameleon. By a purely reflex operation of the mind, we
take the hue of passion of those who are about us, or, it may be, the complementary color (28).

Every sentence in this passage is directed to account for this tendency to reproduce actions and feelings from the perspective of "a pure reflex operation of the mind" and a fundamental drive for "pure pleasure." When Huxley finally termed this organic tendency an "artificial personality," his intention to separate this "artificial personality," which was primarily responsible for the origin of human society, from man's natural tendency is apparent.

In Yan's translation, we read the following:

By the nature of Heaven and Earth, man is most capable of grouping among all in the world. Since his nature comes from Heaven, there must be something in it that serves to check self-assertion. It is a principle of nature that all creatures love their offspring, otherwise their species would have disappeared long ago. However, the affection toward children develops most strongly in man. His species appear most precious. The parents of man spend the longest time in nurturing and protecting their children. Therefore, their devoted love is the deepest. They then extend their love to those of the same kind, even to those they originally do not love. This is why the saying goes that loving children is the beginning of ren (1:13).

The dramatic change Yan made to the original in this translation is a telling example of how a Western mode of reasoning gave way to the Chinese natural-moral mode. Since "all creatures love their offspring," men form their family from this love and by extending it they form a bigger group and then society, --so plain and natural! As compared with this, all appeals to "a pure reflex operation of the mind," a drive for "pure pleasure," and an "artificial personality" appear awkward, affected, and arbitrary.
Significantly, this was the same approach Yan took to explain production and reproduction. He left no basis for a nature/ethics structure.\footnote{If, in Huxley, the two mutually exclusive forces of self-assertion and self-restraint also shared the same motive, this motive could be explained only by the loose notion of the so-called "insatiable hunger for enjoyment." This notion, for Huxley, was "one of the essential conditions of success in the war with the state of nature outside; and yet the sure agent of the destruction of society if allowed free play within" (27). In fact, the notion of happiness or enjoyment had long been regarded as the basis of Goodness in West, as had the notion of love in China.}

V. A Meaningful Means to the Conventional End of Life

Adding the Issue of Preserving a Race

Yan’s goal was not only to make the struggle for existence an understandable natural phenomenon, but also to justify it as a meaningful way of achieving the traditional Chinese ideal of life. This moral justification is introduced in several steps. He first created a concern with the preservation of race. In so doing he had Huxley’s work take on one of the burning issues of his day. His implicit arguments in this respect are essentially arguments from consequences.

For Yan, social organization was itself completely subject to the law of cosmic process.\footnote{Huxley, on the other hand, was definite on the point that "the ethical process is in opposition to the principle of the cosmic process" (31). In one occasion, he did talk about "the struggle for existence in society." But what he really meant "is a contest, not for the means of existence, but for the means of enjoyment" (40).} Thus, far from being a safe harbour from the struggle for existence, a human society must struggle and progress steadily in order to survive and to be selected by this process. Yan said in his own Preface, which explained his motives
in translating the book, that one of the important purposes of Huxley's book was its "reiteration of the issues of self-strengthening and the preservation of the race" (1321). This is in fact Yan's purposefully garbled interpretation of Huxley. "Self-strengthening" is not the issue of Evolution and Ethics. Only in a very broad and indirect sense did Huxley care about the preservation of race. But to put it precisely, Huxley, being not a social Darwinist, was concerned with protecting a social organization from the individuals' tendency to self-assertion, not with preservation of a race. According to his system, the former belongs to an ethical process, the latter to a cosmic process. In any case, the "reiteration of the issues of self-strengthening and the preservation of the race" was an important key to the great success of Yan's Heavenly Evolution.32

Yan had Huxley "reiterate" these issues without changing the original face of discussion in several ways. His adoption of the loose and vague Chinese term "chun" [group] tends to confuse two different concepts in Huxley's thought: social organization and natural race. It appears quite natural and logical that Yan raised the issue of the "preservation of a chun" (in both the of the preservations of a race and a social organization) immediately after his first introduction of Huxley's argument for the inevitability of the struggle for existence. He raised the issue in his commentary to chapter 3, volume I, nine chapters prior to his introduction of Huxley's raising the issue of the preservation of a human social organization. In this commentary, Yan

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32 Yan in fact did not contradict the original concern to preserve social organization, but simply broadened it to include an additional concern for preservation of the race.
continued to support Huxley’s argument for the inevitability of the struggle, and finally reached a conclusion about the truth of the current world situation, in a mixed tone of classical Chinese legalism and social Darwinism:

Due to the fact that the accumulation of those means of livelihood is restricted by circumstances, those [individuals and groups] with better tactics and methods (shu) gain further means of livelihood and get rich, while those with worse tactics and methods gain less and become exhausted. The rich are on the way to prosperity, whereas the exhausted come close to extinction.

The issue of "the preservation and evolution of a chun" (baochun jinhua) was then raised, not directly by Yan, but by those who had "an insight into subtle matters" and who could understand this "soul-stirring" fact. Yan said at the end: "Those who engage in high-sounding talk about the difference between great China and barbarian nations can do little good for understanding the facts."

After Yan introduced Huxley’s notion of social organization, which in Huxley’s text was perceived as being in an almost exclusive confrontation with its members’ destructive tendency toward self-assertion, Yan frequently reminded his reader of the external threat, the one from other groups or social organizations. On two occasions the struggle with other groups was pictured as the goal of harmony within the group (I:12, 14. Cf. H: 26, 31). Yan also added two significant passages to the ends of chapter 15 and 16, volume I, describing with deep feelings the current state of the "scorching" struggle among nations. In two commentaries he even placed China in

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33 The original text does not show this means/goal relationship. The restraint and cooperation within a social organization is conceived merely as "a distinct advantage over the others" (26).
direct confrontation with the powerful aggressive forces of Western and Japanese imperialism (I:7c; II:14c).

**Applying the Criteria of Traditional Ethics**

When Yan applied the criteria of traditional Chinese ethics, rather than those of social Darwinian evolutionary ethics, to weigh the strength of a chun (as both a race and a social organization) in the struggle for existence, his adaptation to the traditional view and orientation toward life was complete. This application is extremely significant because, according to the particular ethical orientation of Chinese culture, only when a Chinese understands that what he fights for is not merely "bare existence," nor even the victory of the "strongest" in a physical or biological sense, but also a lofty ideal, can the struggle make perfect sense to him.

Yan should have thanked Huxley for all his beautiful justifications of the concept of social organization. However, Huxley never said that organization was the only key to the success of a species or race in the struggle for existence. Nor did he point out in a positive tone that commitment to a social organization could completely overcome the tendency to self-assertion, though this remained an ideal to Huxley. On the contrary, Huxley stated clearly that "The strongest, the most self-assertive, tend to tread down the weaker" (81). He preferred to see the ethical tendency toward self-restraint and the natural tendency toward self-assertion as two dialectical forces co-existing during the entire history of human beings (e.g., 30-3, 52, 54).
In Yan, the ultimate victory was definitely and consistently on the side of those governed by ethical and social tendencies. He repeatedly emphasized such a view, a view which found no basis in Huxley’s text: "The process of heavenly evolution will preserve those capable of grouping and destroy those who are not; preserve those adept in grouping and destroy those who are not" (I:13c, also I:11, 15; II:16. Cf. H: 25, 35, 81). A particularly telling example of Yan’s belief in the ultimate triumph of the ethical and social tendency is found in chapter 16, volume II. In Yan’s original manuscript, after translating a passage on the process of nonhuman natural selection, Yan added the follow sentence: "Thus those who are good at self-assertion usually have greater advantages in preserving themselves, while those who are not are usually on the verge of extinction; we have no alternative" (1471). Before the publication of the translation, however, a critical term in this sentence was dramatically changed; it now reads:

Thus those who are good at **preserving a group** usually have greater advantages in preserving, while those who are not are usually on the verge of extinction; we have no alternative (II:16).

In the first case we meet with a sort of passive, helpless feeling in face of the Darwinian morally indifferent law of nature. In the second case, however, any reference to this natural law is gone and further, the same passive tone in the last clause appears even to mock this law. After this sentence, Yan implied that, as a logical conclusion of this unavoidable trend, men could finally reach an ideal in which the ethical and social process "played a single role" in the world.
In his commentary on the same chapter, Yan also appealed directly to the readers' own moral and intellectual judgments by simply categorizing the two antagonistic tendencies--i.e., self-assertion and self-restraint--in a traditional way as the "emphasis on force" (shangli) and the "emphasis on virtue" (shangde). The persuasive power of this categorization can be understood from the view of what Kenneth Burke calls the "magic decree" of naming, which assumes that names for objects function prescriptively to provide us with "cues as to how we should act toward these objects" (1935, 176-77). From the time of Confucius and Mencius on, the emphasis on force has been perceived as the way of harsh government ("kezheng," Confucius) and the despot ("ba," Mencius). The Chinese believe that such a way can achieve only a temporary victory, due to its failure to change the people's minds. Only the emphasis on virtue, the way of humane government (renzheng) and the virtuous king (wang), the way by which the ruler convinces the people of moral principles by his own moral conduct, can triumph at the end.

Conflating the Notions of the Fittest and the Ethically Best

Yan went further to underline the crucial powers of traditional Chinese values such as love in the cosmic struggle for existence. This further adjustment was necessary because, as I have discussed in the last section, the original concept of social organization in Huxley's text was based on a notion of "sympathy," not on the notion of love. The former primarily involved a pure intellectual function or "a pure reflex
operation of the mind." In his commentary on chapter 13, volume I, Yan quoted from a famous Han historian, Ban Gu (AD 32-92): "We are unable to group if we fail to love, we won't surpass things in the world if we are unable to group ...." Appearing to be struck by the profundity of this ancient wisdom, Yan said: "I personally believe that these words must have come from the ancient sages long before Ban Gu. Ban's knowledge was not good enough to make such a great point."

At almost the end of Evolution and Ethics, Huxley distinguished two kinds of the strongest: the "fittest" in the cosmic struggle for existence and the "ethically best" with respect to social processes (80-2). However, Huxley did not suggest which one would eventually prevail over the other. In the Chinese version, Yan justified an ultimate harmony between these two dichotomous notions of the strongest. He first changed the Darwinian issue implied by the concept of the fittest by claiming that "those who are good at preserving a group usually have greater advantages in preserving themselves ...." He then, following the logic suggested by this claim, turned to discuss the ethically best in the sense of the "best at preserving a group." Now, in explaining what the best would be, his adaptation to a conventional Chinese view came to a full expression: "For those [groups or species] who embody the values of virtue, worthiness, humanity, and righteousness, their being is most superior and excellent ...."

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34 Since humanity (ren) is such a core principle of Chinese culture, after Yan's paraphrasing Huxley's meaning system into that of the Chinese, all descriptions of the so-called "ape and tiger" methods can somehow be characterized as non-human (non-ren), and all accounts of the tendency toward social organization and human administration can be viewed as manifesting this principle.
Immediately after this account Yan added a passage describing the great powers these best groups would enjoy. This passage consists of two pairs of antithetical sentences:

Thus externally, they are completely safe from all kinds of attacks and influences from things outside; internally, their people adapt to changes of situation and flourish constantly. Externally, they have things serve their purposes; internally, they have those who retain love and remove selfish desire depend on each other for existence (Cf. H, 81-2).

The meaning is clear and appealing: those who embody the conventional values are not only the best but also the strongest in the struggle for existence. Right is might. This is without a doubt the mainstream Confucian position on this issue.

The significance of Yan’s Heavenly Evolution, at a time when China was confronted with an embarrassing situation in modern international competition, was its justification for the Chinese of a struggle for the survival of their nation while fulfilling their traditional ideal of life. The struggle for existence, therefore, according to Yan, was not something to be avoided or to be condemned. It was indeed the moral choice every Chinese should make, if China was to be saved from annexation and if the moral ideal were to be fulfilled.

VI. Implicit Critique of the Political System

It is interesting to see that the idea of evolution, once established, immediately turned into an effective weapon of critique against the Chinese tradition. In a passage added by Yan, he argued from consequences for the need to change: "In today’s situation, all those who are feeble and incompetent to change can never come to be the
fittest. They, instead, rely totally upon the selection of a cosmic process, and will wither away day by day" (II:16). In regard to what made China "feeble and incompetent to change" and therefore fail to be the fittest, Yan, like many other thinkers of the time, could not remain silent about the existing political institutions. He added a passage of his own to the end of chapter 17, volume I:

In regard to the art of government today, ... the fittest must be in charge of the external business of diplomacy and the internal business of civil administration. Further, he must go forward hand in hand with time, flow and never rest stagnant. With such a government, we can not only achieve the goal of wealth and power, we will also improve our species .... (cf. H, 42)

Yan took a brand-new approach to the notion of an ideal ruler. He was talking about the "fittest," no longer the "son of Heaven" who received the true mandate of Heaven, nor the sage king who embodied perfect virtue. According to this new approach, the ruler should be selected by competition. Yan’s real concern was with an ideal political system, a system that could maintain and guarantee that the fittest were always in charge in constantly changing situations.

Just before the passage just quoted Yan elaborated on Huxley’s notion of "artificial arrangements." Huxley’s words read:

Were there none of those artificial arrangements by which fools and knaves are kept at the top of society instead of sinking to their natural place at the bottom, the struggle for the means of enjoyment would ensure a constant circulation of the human units of the social compound, from the bottom to the top and from the top to the bottom (41-2).
Huxley simply mentioned this notion of "artificial arrangements," without further explanation of what they were. In Yan's version, however, a remarkable passage was added to elaborate on this notion. It began with the remark: "What is most unfortunate for social administration is not that the worthy cannot rise from the bottom, but that the unworthy do not sink from the top." Yan provided some examples of the factors that contributed to keep those on the top from falling, such as family status, relatives, help from friends, bribes, adherence to convention, and the ignorance and selfishness of those governing -- all referring more to the Chinese situation than to the Western. Then Yan, applying the analogy of heavy things in the water to the unworthy, conceived of these factors as a kind of float or lifebuoy that were tied to the heavy things to keep them on the surface of the water. However, "If one day all these artificial restraints are taken away," Yan predicted, "those heavy things will immediately sink to their natural places." In his commentary on this chapter, he again reaffirmed this belief in a way that seemed as though he were merely making a comment on Huxley's idea:

In this chapter of Huxley's, the so-called "taking all the artificial restraints away" is the most difficult thing for people to do. However, their country will get strong and their species progress if they can overcome this difficulty.

Obviously, the principle to which Yan consistently appealed is that of nature. It is this principle that actually grounds Yan's social "Darwinian" argument for the establishment of an ideal rulership and political system. In Huxley's words, we can also sense an appeal to "nature." However, for Huxley, this "nature" is in fact a social
and ethical tendency, i.e., the tendency to contest for "the means of enjoyment," not for the means of existence (cf. 40-2).

Yan’s implicit evolutionary critique is also grounded, in a more subtle way, in a conventional sense of the "social good." His unspoken charge was directed at the "selfish nature" of the Chinese system of political institutions. The problems with this system did not lie in such factors as "relatives" and "friendship" in and of themselves. The problem was that these factors, together with others, had been used artificially to maintain an unworthy ruler and government over the people, therefore making the whole country the family of a single man, and turning his interests into public ones.35

In one place Huxiey made a comparison between collective and individual despotism (22-3). Yan changed this passage into a comparison of the European and Asian political systems. His political critique was implicit in the ways he characterized both systems. He described the principle of the modern Western democracy and parliament with a famous line from the classic Book of History which was regarded as an expression of classical Chinese Populism: "Heaven sees as my people see, Heaven hears as my people hear." This principle was contrasted with the autocratic principle which, Yan believed, dominated the Asian mode of government, the principle that "all under Heaven dare not overstep the despot's will" (I:10).36

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35 It is from this perspective that Yan suggested going beyond the Confucian tradition of qinqin [loving relatives] and zunzun [respecting the honorable], and adopting certain methods of government proposed by classical Mohism and Legalism. He even believed that the modern democratic system in West embodied the practice of these ancient Chinese methods (I:17c).

36 It is worth noting that Yan did not attempt a direct and frontal attack on the
In the last chapter, entitled "Evolution," Yan interpreted and elaborated with great enthusiasm on Huxley’s notion of "combatting the cosmic process" (H. 83). Yan translated this notion as "combating with Heaven." To avoid any association with the cosmos/ethics dichotomy, Yan immediately added an explanation after he put forward the idea of "combating with Heaven":

What is called combatting with Heaven is not to act against the law of Heaven and nature, and therefore to become something inauspicious and irrational. The tao [of men] is to follow and exhaust things’ nature. That is how we can know how to change the harmful into the good (cf. H, 83).

Wu Rulun, in his preface to Heavenly Evolution, explicated this idea as follows:

Man must resist heaven [or nature], using to the full his heavenly endowed abilities, and ever renewing his efforts, so that his country might exist forever and his race never suffer decline. This is what is called struggling for victory over heaven. And yet man’s struggle with heaven and man’s victories over heaven, are both the results of the working of heaven. Thus it is that heavenly action and human endeavor both are part and parcel of heavenly evolution (1317. Pusey’s trans. 172).

The idea of combating with Heaven gave Yan something more to say about the secret of West. The West won because "China trusts to fate; the Westerners rely on human strength" (Yan 1895, 3). Heavenly evolution would continue without China. The tao would shine in the West anyway. However, by allowing the world to continue in this

"selfishness" of the existent political system in either his translation or his commentaries. His political critiques appear mild and cautious when compared to the critiques by Tan Sitong and others of his generation.
way the Middle Kingdom would give up all its rights, all its principles, and all its responsibilities toward mankind. The Chinese must fight and be willing to fight!

Both Huxley and Yan’s texts end by citing the same part of Alfred Tennyson’s poem:

It may be that the gulfs will wash us down,  
It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles,  
....

Yan translated these lines into classical Chinese verse with four characters to a line:

Gua feng cang hai,  
Feng bo mang mang,  
Huo lun wu di,  
Huo da xian xiang.  
....

[Hoist sail upon the deep blue sea.  
Great wind and waves stretch out forever.  
Perhaps we shall sink in the bottomless depths.  
Perhaps we shall reach the Immortal’s shore]  
.... (Pusey’s trans. 168)

Both the original and the translation suggest that one can choose only one of the two possible futures. For Huxley, it was either virtue or moral degeneration. For Yan, it was also life or death for the whole nation, and the struggle for existence was the only solution.
CHAPTER III
TAN SITONG’S A STUDY OF HUMANITY (RENXUE)

In a letter to Yan Fu in the spring of 1897, Liang Qichao called Yan’s attention to Tan Sitong, a young man of "extraordinary talent," and to his manuscript Renxue [A study of humanity], "whose first part alone surpassed all the old learning in China" (43). Tan wrote this manuscript in late 1896 and early 1897 and then allowed it to be circulated among his close friends, including Liang. One copy of this manuscript later followed Liang to Japan when he was in exile and was published there, three months after Tan’s heroic death in 1898, in his Qinyi bao [The China discussion], in thirteen installments between 1899 and 1901.

A Study of Humanity distinguishes itself from all traditional learning largely by its effort at a original egalitarian interpretation of the traditional concept of ren [humanity] and its unprecedentedly bold critique of the three bonds (between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife) and the five relationships (in addition to the above three, the relationship between elder and younger brother and the one between friends), which generations of Chinese had accepted without question. In his treatise, Tan called those who governed China over the last two thousand years "great robbers," who were "in a position to squander all that is produced by the sweat of people’s brows to provide for their own enjoyment, vanity, profligacy, lust, and killing" (ch.29;
The three bonds and five relationships were merely means employed by the tyrants "to control people's bodies and minds" (ch.30). Tan also condemned the traditional father-son relationship for its working only to legitimize the right of the father to oppress the son, and he accused the conventional husband-wife relationship of making the wife a house slave (ch.37). Of the five human relationships, Tan only favored friendship, for "friendship alone is the least harmful and the most beneficial to people, and has the least pain and the most happiness."

What are the criteria? The first is "equality," the second is "liberty," while the third is "freedom to vent one's feelings." All in all, the significance of friendship lies in having autonomy (ch.38).

Tan's extremely critical spirit and his awareness of the egalitarian principle were not only demonstrated in his rejection of the three bonds and five relationships, in his espousal of popular sovereignty against autocratic monarchy, and in his advocacy of women's emancipation, but shown in his proposals for the absolute freedom of commodity circulation and for a universal unity with all national boundaries cast aside. So radical and liberal was Tan's mind that even the outspoken reformist Liang Qichao acknowledged that "his thought has exceeded all we can reach and he has said all we do not venture to say" (1984, 195). Tan truly believed in the principle of equality. Indeed, he fought for it even at the cost of his life. Both for his radically liberal spirit and for his political iconoclasm, Tan was captured and sentenced to death by the Empress Dowager's court when he was thirty-three. He was praised by Liang Qichao
as "China’s first martyr to shed his blood for the cause of the nation" (Preface to A Study of Humanity).

Tan Sitong was, indeed, a reformist thinker of "extraordinary talent."¹ Despite the fact that he never went abroad, he was among the early advocates of the idea of "jìnbìan xīfà" [wholesale adoption of Western methods] (1895a, 297). Tan had no contact with modern Western democratic theories because translations of them were not available in his day. At the time, Liang Qichao said, Tan had "never so much as dreamed of the title of Rousseau’s Social Contract," but many of his ideas "unwittingly coincided" with it (1920, 110). Although regarded by some as one of the last Chinese thinkers who belonged to the "period of classical learning" (e.g. Oka 1955), Tan’s writing inspired and promoted the revolutionary spirit of many who were to build a new China in this century.² Even the young Mao Zedong, who appeared to break with the old tradition, had high respect for Tan: "The writings of Tan Sitong in the past and the writings of Chen Duxiu [founder of the Chinese Communist Party] nowadays revealed such great minds of daring and resolution that they are hardly equaled by any of today’s vulgar thoughts" (Li 1980, 104).

¹ A son of the governor of Hubei province brought up in the atmosphere of Chinese traditional thought, he still sounded fairly sinocentric in 1889, asserting that China’s goal of restoration could be accomplished only by recapturing her spiritual and material heritage and by adhering to the principles of government based on virtue and sincerity (103-08; Chan 1984, 4-5). After the Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95, however, he soon became one of the most unwavering spokesmen of reform in China at the close of the nineteenth century.

² For a detailed account of Tan’s profound influence on later political movements toward the end of Qing dynasty, see Wang 1975, 143-55.
It is generally recognized that Tan’s *A Study of Humanity* drew upon various sources of thought such as the seventeenth-century heterodox thought of Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692), the philosophies of Mozi and Zhuangzi, the Huayan and Weishi teachings of Buddhism, as well as Christianity and Western natural science.³ In this case study, I will confine myself only to Tan’s interaction with Western ideas. His interaction with Western scientific and religious concepts proved to be an important contributing factor to the success of *A Study of Humanity*. Tan’s powerful argument for these concepts in his treatise, however, is more than arguments for a Western solution to China’s exigency. The success of this treatise can also be ascribed to his application of the conventional rhetorical techniques to build a significant parallel between the Western scientific and religious concepts and the Chinese traditional concepts. Although Tan employed such scientific concepts as ether and electricity and the religious concept of the soul to undermine the structure of the traditional Chinese social-political hierarchy, he successfully suggested that the principle of equality had been discovered long ago in the Chinese tradition, but unfortunately the Chinese of later days failed to carry it forward. Tan simply rediscovered this principle, he did not import it in toto from the West or elsewhere. He created a revolutionary consciousness, the consciousness of the principle of equality, out of Chinese traditional thought itself.

³ For Tan’s own account of his intellectual sources, see the introductory chapter of *A Study of Humanity*. 
A Study of Humanity is divided into two parts and fifty chapters (or long paragraphs). The first part, consisting of thirty chapters, contributes to building a theoretical framework that allows Tan to see the connection between the idea of humanity and the modern principle of equality. The second part is principally the application of this framework to a vigorous political and social critique. This case study is concerned only with the way in which this framework was formulated. In my view this theoretical framework had already taken shape by the twentieth chapter. For this reason, my analysis is based on the first twenty chapters.

This case study consists of three parts. First, I will discuss how Tan was motivated to present Western scientific and religious concepts and views in response to the rhetorical exigency of his time. In the second part, I will compare the nature of the modern Western view of equality and that of the traditional Chinese view of ren [humanity], since Tan tried to identify the latter view with the former. I will also compare the concept of ether in the Western scientific tradition, which is also a central concept in Tan’s treatise, and its counterpart qi in the Chinese philosophical tradition. In the third part, I will analyze Tan’s rhetoric as he made the Western scientific and religious concepts appear meaningful in the Chinese context and derived from them a modern, revolutionary principle of equality.

I. An Active Response to the Rhetorical Situation

It is not difficult to understand why such a radical treatise came into being at the end of the nineteenth century. China’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese war
(1894-95) shocked Tan into reexamining many of his previous beliefs. He began to search for a new identity (1895a, 297; cf. Liang 1899, 37-8).

Tan saw China's problem as essentially the problem of conceptions of human relationships and the problem of the Confucian ethical codes.

Nowadays, there is much talk about reform in China and in other countries in the world. But with the five relationships remaining unchanged, there is no way for us to start practicing the great truths and fundamental principles, let alone to abolish the three bonds (ch.38).

In a letter of 1896, Tan told his friend that he was thinking about developing "a theory of breaking free of all toils" (1954, 446). However, such a task must be undertaken with particular care. Because, as Tan explained in another letter of early 1897, "[h]ad I not meticulously traced the source of xing [nature] and tian [heaven] I would not have been able to write of the phenomena concerning the disaster of the past several thousand years and the reasons why today we ought to sweep away all obstacles and to break free of all toils" (1954, 343).

Tan began with an inquiry into the very nature of the cosmos. He sought to discover an ultimate order and relation in the universe that was governed by the principle of equality and interconnectedness. Once such an order and relation were found, Tan was able to dissolve the existing hierarchical structure of human relations. This is because it is inconceivable to the Chinese that a social/political order that is right and proper does not have to be modelled on and accord with the cosmic order.
Western natural sciences and Christianity then became important sources of authority for Tan in the formulation of his new cosmology (Shek 1976). He learned scientific concepts such as ether and electricity from missionary journals and translated works on physics and other fields of Western sciences. He found great pleasure in meeting with the English missionary John Fryer, head of the translation section of the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai, who introduced him to fossils, adding machines, the X-ray, and a device for measuring brain waves (1896, 317). Tan was also fascinated by the booklet Zhixin mianbing fa [Method of avoiding illness by controlling the mind], which was the English missionary John Fryer’s translation of Henry Wood’s Ideal Suggestion through Mental Photography (1893). Whether or not Tan truly understood these scientific concepts and religious views from the West, he did find support from them for a cosmic principle of equality that was incompatible with the existing hierarchical order of Chinese society. Tan was not the only one to seek cosmic sanction for modern social and political reforms. Before him in China there was Kang Youwei, not to mention a whole generation of Enlightenment thinkers in the West (Li 1984).

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4 According to Liang Qichao, Tan had studied mathematics and other Western sciences since childhood (1971, 66-9). In 1893, a year before the Sino-Japanese war, Tan bought a number of translations of Western scientific and religious works from the Jiangnan Arsenal. His interaction with the Western scientific and religious traditions prior to the Sino-Japanese war sheds light on the fact that after the war Tan developed intellectually into an eclectic who, as Liang commended, tried to integrate science, philosophy, and religion into one comprehensive system (ibid).

5 Buddhism was also an important source for Tan in his construction of a new cosmology. But Tan believed that even Buddhism could only be revitalized by means of Western learning (A Study of Humanity, ch.17).
The Traditional Subject of Humanity (Ren)

Tan did not create a new name for his new cosmic principle. He called his treatise "a study of ren [humanity]," not a study of Buddhist compassion, or Christian love, or even Newtonian law, which, he believed, were essentially the same (A Study of Humanity, ch.1). One reasonable explanation of this was that Tan consciously or unconsciously followed the logic of orthodox Chinese topical thinking. In the Neo-Confucian tradition of discourse, ren was discussed more than any other topic. As Chang Hao points out, "ren [ren] not only crystallizes a moral ideal, but also symbolizes a world view often characterized as the 'unity of Heaven and man'." It "represents not only a human world of love and care, but also a cosmos overflowing with life, with the vitality to 'generate and regenerate'" (1987, 80, 82). Tan believed, as did other Confucian scholars, that "Humanity is the source of heaven, earth, and the myriad things" ("Theses in A Study of Humanity"). While his intention in this treatise was to inquire into the source of nature and heaven, it was quite natural for him to choose humanity as his subject of study.

Of course, Tan wanted to show, by applying the term ren, that the principle of equality was indeed universal, not simply a Western or a Buddhist invention. A more plausible explanation for his choice of this centuries-old subject may be that Tan did

6 Liang said in his preface to Tan’s treatise:
Nan-hai [Kang Youwei] taught his disciples "to take the pursuit of ren [humanity] as their essential task, and his One-world philosophy as their guiding principle ...." A Study of Humanity is a work which elaborates these ideas ....
This passage is misleading, for it overemphasizes Kang Youwei’s influence on Tan’s choice of a humanistic subject for study.
not consider himself a iconoclast at all. His appeal to the authority of ren [humanity] was not a mere self-protective device. Nor was it, as some might think, "a mere pretext, a mere formality," "simply using Confucian bottles for his Western wine, putting up a dog's head to sell his sheep meat" (Cai 1947). Tan really believed that ren [humanity], which essentially meant love, was what fundamentally made men equal with each other. "Reform is necessary," Tan said, "not because our ancient way needs to be changed, but because we must change the way of later people who replace the right by the wrong and mix the spurious with the genuine" (1895b, 394).

In his argument for an egalitarian view of ren [humanity], however, Tan had to solve one fundamental problem. The scientific concepts such as ether and electricity which Tan introduced to support his view had long symbolized a mechanistic world view in the West. They appeared totally unrelated to the Chinese view of humanity, which was ethical and spiritual in nature. In the next section, we will see that even though Tan might have simply used moral, spiritual bottles for his mechanistic wine, he still had the problem of presenting a mechanistic world view to the Chinese, who had traditionally oriented toward a moral, spiritual rather than a scientific perspective on the world.

II. Equality, Ether, and Their Chinese Counterparts

The Scientific View of Equality and the Concept of Ether

A modern principle of equality was put forward by the Western Enlightenment thinkers in the name of natural law. In the beginning of his Discourse on the Origin
and Foundation of Inequality (1755), Rousseau wrote that "[t]he Philosophers who have examined the foundations of society have all felt the necessity of returning to the state of nature, but none of them has reached it" (38). The fact, however, is that the other philosophers with whom Rousseau disagreed simply did not reach his conception of the state of nature. Like Locke, Voltaire, Montesquieu and many others, Rousseau started with "fundamental axioms" about man's natural rights and deduced from them a revolutionary system of politics (Randall 1976, 262).

This naturalistic tendency was in part an outgrowth of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution. Discovery of the laws of Nature (e.g. the Newtonian law of gravitation) provided grounds for formulating new systems of values and new cosmologies (Koyre 1957, vii-x, 1-3). Throughout the eighteenth century there was a consensus that "the scene of human life was set in a great, fixed, geometrical and mechanical order of nature" (Randall 1976, 274). "Machine" became a universal metaphor. Although many liberal thinkers did not agree with the radical materialist La Mettrie that man was a machine or a plant (for plants, too, were machines), they accepted the analogy as logically valid. Voltaire, for example, believed in the omnipresence of unchangeable physical principles (1962, 120-21). Locke viewed the laws of association, which determined the stream of mental events, as "the mechanics of the mental" (Rapaczynsk 1987, 134-36). The dualist Rousseau tended to believe that the laws of mechanics could explain nothing about "purely spiritual acts." However, he was "aware of precisely the same things in the human machine, with the
difference that nature alone does everything in the operations of an animal, whereas man contributes, as a free agent, to his own operations" (1987a, 44-45).

The modern principle of equality that "man is born free and equal" thus was naturally derived from this mechanistic and naturalistic world view. For Locke, "creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without Subordination or Subjection" (1690, ch. 2, sec. 4. Cf. Rousseau 1987a, 65). This modern, naturalistic principle of inborn equality, however, did not exclude the traditional, theological principle that man was created free and equal, just as the democratic and liberal thinkers of the Enlightenment, with exception of the emerging materialists in the Encyclopedia circle, did not reject the Newtonian God as the first Mover of the universe. "All that belongs to nature is uniform, immutable, the immediate work of the Master," said Voltaire (1962, 272). The fifth chapter of Locke’s second Treatise of Government reads:

Whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us, that Men, being once born, have a right to their Preservation ...: Or Revelation, which gives us an account of those Grants God made of the World to Adam, 'tis very clear, that God ... has given Earth to the Children of Men, given it to Mankind in common.... (sec.25)

Ether was an extremely important concept in the nineteenth century scientific tradition of the West. Its scientific conception represented "the most portentous train of thought" within the field of physics during that time (Gillispie 1960, 435). The term "ether" was first used by the Greeks in the sense of blue sky or upper air. In
Descartes' picture of the cosmos, ether was a "subtle matter" occupying the interstices of gross matter (see Williams 1987; Whittaker 1951, 1-11). The concept did not garner much attention from the Newtonian physicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for they assumed that the gravity of a body could act at a distance upon another body without any physical intermediary.

The issue of ether became increasingly significant after Thomas Young in England and Augustin Fresnel in France successfully suggested a wave theory of light in the early nineteenth century. It seemed obvious that if light moved like waves it must move by some material medium. Space must be filled with such a material medium through which the power of light was transmitted. This medium was the ether. The wave theory was further supported by the electromagnetic theories proposed by Michael Faraday in the 1840s and 1850s and by James Clerk Maxwell in the 1860s and 1870s (Williams 1987). In the late nineteenth century, ether was generally described as substantial, ponderable, elastic, and transparent, and as always in a state of vibration and undulation. It was seen as "possessing the elasticity of fluid or solid matter and as sufficiently ponderable for its elasticity, tenacity, and density to be calculated" (Benson 1984, 830).

The nineteenth century conception of ether was an extension of the Newtonian mechanistic world view, though many physicists at that time, based on their new observations and experiments, no longer believed that the ether obeyed the Newton's laws. The century witnessed a trend of relating all physical and mental transactions to the fundamental medium of ether. Ernst Haeckel, for example, insisted on the
"fundamental unity of affinity in the whole of nature, from the simplest chemical process to the most complicated love story" (Haeckel 1901, 229; Benson 1984, 835).

The Organic View of Ren [Humanity] and the Concept of Qi

Contemporary scholars generally agree that Confucianism views all things in the world not only as born out of the same ultimate source, but also as closely linked throughout human life. While the classical scientific view of the West, according to Ilya Prigogine, tends to resolve life into "molecules, atoms, elementary particles," the Confucian tends to conceive of these molecules, atoms, and elementary particles as constituents of life (1980, xiii). For the Confucian, this vitalistic interconnection is not only real but also sensible in mind. So Mencius believed that the "feeling of commiseration," "the mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others," was foundational for all human beings, and that this particular feeling of the mind was "the beginning of ren" (Mencius, 2a:6). The Neo-Confucian philosophers laid a metaphysical basis for this organic view of humanity. As Wing-tsit Chan observes, humanity meant to them "a feeling for life" (1969, 530). According to Zhu Xi (1130-1200), humanity was the mind of Heaven and Earth which produced things. "In the production of man and things, they receive the mind of Heaven and Earth as their mind" (Yulei, 95:10a). They thus shared with Heaven and Earth this feeling for life. In its long course of evolution, this organic view witnessed little change in its basic assumption of the common origin and interconnectedness of lives, though people in
different periods may have had different conceptions of the origin and basis of this interconnection.

After the seventeenth century, many Confucian scholars tended to favor a qi-based organic view. Understanding qi as the ultimate constituent of the universe, they regarded ren [humanity] as the intrinsic nature of qi, rather than the abstract Principle of Heaven. In fact, this view has its early sources in Neo-Confucianism and even in classical thought. The concept of qi already received a clear expression in the classic text Guanzi. It describes thusly: qi is "so small that nothing can exist within it ... so large that nothing can exist outside it"; "floating between Heaven and earth"; "never to be restrained through physical force ... never to be summoned by one's call" (16:1b-7a). Qi was also perceived as vitalistic: "Therefore it is said that when the qi is present, things live; when not, they die...[it] is the essence of things that gives them life ... Below it gives life to the five grains; above it creates the ranked stars" (4:9b; 16:1b). Further, the classical Chinese believed that the qi that formed a human body could communicate freely with the qi outside. The ancient Chinese medical book Huangdi neiijing suwen (c. 206 BC-AD 220) said:

From earliest times the communication with Heaven has been the very foundation of life; this foundation exists between Yin and Yang and between Heaven and Earth and within the six points [the four points of the compass, the zenith and the nadir]. The qi prevails in the nine divisions, in the nine orifices, in the five viscera, and in the twelve joints; they are all pervaded by the qi of Heaven (1:3, 105).

In the eleventh century, the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhang Zai (1020-1077) established a philosophy of qi-based monism. His concept of qi was all-embracing.
It constituted everything in the universe. Even "Heaven is nothing but the restless qi that moves the myriad things and produces [everything]" (Chuanshu, 11:5a. Cf. Kasoff 1984, 40). Seventeenth-century Confucian thinkers such as Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) gave qi a more dynamic interpretation. They conceived of the world as constantly flourishing and transforming. This vitalistic process was attributable to the "ceaselessly generating and regenerating" power of qi.

However, all the Confucian schools mentioned above had carefully kept this organic view of humanity away from an absolute idea of equality. The Mencian doctrine of love with distinctions had long been vigorously defended. "It is the nature of things to be unequal," Mencius said. "If you equalize them all, you will throw the world into confusion" (3a:4. Chan trans.). From the view of the Neo-Confucians, a perfect world of humanity has to be maintained by a system of hierarchical relations, i.e., the three bonds (of ruler-minister, father-son, and husband-wife) and the five relations (the three bonds plus the relations between younger and elder brothers and between friends).

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7 The Neo-Confucian scholar Yang Shi (1053-1135) explained this doctrine well: "As we know, the principle is one, and that is why there is love. The functions are many, and that is why there is righteousness.... Since functions are different, the applications [of ren] cannot be without distinctions" (quoted in Chan 1963, 499).
III. Arguments for an Egalitarian Principle of Humanity

The Logic of "A Study of Humanity"

Tan set forth twenty-seven theses in the introductory chapter of *A Study of Humanity*, itself entitled "Renxue jieshuo" [Theses of *A Study of Humanity*]. The first and also the leading thesis reads:

The most fundamental meaning of humanity is interconnectedness. The concepts of ether, electricity, and the power of mind all indicate the means of interconnectedness.

Tan did not state in the beginning that the most fundamental meaning of humanity is equality, which is really what he wanted to argue. Instead, he affirmed the more conventionally recognized relation between the notion of humanity and the notion of *tong* [interconnectedness]. In the third thesis, Tan further explained the meaning of interconnectedness by Zhuangzi’s saying that "the Way unites all as one without obstruction" (ch. 2). In the seventh thesis, Tan finally introduced the concept of equality by the established notion of interconnectedness: "Interconnection is expressed as equality." Tan connected all the above concepts by a Chinese chain-reasoning, but in a reverse order, in the twenty-fourth thesis:

Equality means all being One. When there is oneness, there is interconnection. When there is interconnection, there is humanity.

If, in Tan’s logic, the concept of interconnectedness and oneness play the necessary role of what Aristotle called the "middle term," interconnection is also the key term
of Tan’s rhetoric (1973, 41a1-5). It is by extending and elaborating the interconnected, organic notion of humanity to the utmost that Tan is able to interconnect the traditional perspective of humanity and a modern perspective of equality. Now, the concepts of ether, electricity, and mental power are Tan’s means. He used them to illustrate the principle of interconnectedness. In fact, he used them to break through the cognitive barrier between the traditional notion of humanity and the idea of equality.

The whole procedure of Tan’s egalitarian argument in *A Study of Humanity* can be summarized in three steps. In the first step, Tan built up a vitalistic notion of interconnection through the argument about ether. In the second step, he established a more radical notion of interconnection in the sense of immediate flow of sensation by the argument about electricity. In the last step, he introduced an even more radical notion of interconnection between souls or minds from the argument about mental power. The last notion of interconnection finally bridges, as a middle term, the traditional view of humanity and the modern perspective of equality.

**Argument of Ether**

As expected by conventional Chinese procedures for starting a serious argument, the first chapter of *A Study of Humanity* begins with a "rectification of the name" of ether. However, what Tan actually rectified is the concept of qi, while the term "ether" appears as a mere arbitrary "name":
The phenomenal world, the world of the void, and the world of sentient beings are permeated with something extremely vast and minute, the cohesive, penetrative, and connective power of which embraces all things. Its form eludes the eyes; its sound, the ears; its taste, the mouth; and its smell, the nose. For want of a better term, let it be called "vital" [ether].

Except for the last sentence, this opening passage could have been taken out of any Western scientific work on ether from the second half of the nineteenth century. It could have also been taken out of any traditional Chinese work on qi--from the classical Mencius or Guanzi to a Neo-Confucian treatise on the subject. The key terms in this passage are the three particular functions of this "something": cohering, penetrating, and connecting, which in China had been stereotypic descriptions of the powers of morality. These terms suggest a connection that is significant for understanding the passage immediately following in which Tan turned to view ether's function from the perspective of love.

When it [ether] reveals itself in function, Confucius calls it "humanity" [humanity], the "ultimate source," and "nature"; Mozi calls it "love without discrimination"; the Buddha calls it "the ocean of nature" and "compassion"; Jesus calls it "soul," "you shall love your neighbor as yourself," and "love your enemies like friends"; and natural scientists call it the "force of love" and the "force of attraction"--all refer to this thing (ch. 1).

Like the nineteenth-century philosophers of science in the West, Tan attempted to reduce all phenomena, both ethical and natural, spiritual and material, to the functioning of ether. While Tan did not pass any judgment in regard to whether Confucius, Mozi, Buddha, Jesus, or a natural scientist spoke more truthfully than the others, his inclination toward a moral-spiritual approach to ether's function is apparent.
This is so not only because he let this approach carry the greatest weight in the passage, but also because the only seemingly mechanistic approach, the so-called xili [force of attraction], which Tan put in his last category, was for him nothing but "another name for the force of love" (ch. 10).

Tan was neither the first nor the only one in China to apply the metaphor of the "force of love" to physical forces such as the "force of gravitation" and the "force of electronmegnatism." It was quite common for the modern Chinese campaigners for Western science in the late nineteenth century to propagate and popularize scientific knowledge of "natural laws" by interpreting them within a traditional framework. Kang Youwei, for example, wrote in 1886: "Someone says to me: needles, mustard seeds, and lodestones are without intelligence, and yet they can attract (and repel) each other. These possess the love-and-hate-matter (aiwu zhi zhi) but are without the intelligence-matter (zhi zhi zhi)" (176).

Tan moved on to discuss how ether functioned to create man, society, and the whole world:

Nothing is as close to a man as his own body, made up as it is of two hundred-odd bones with muscles, blood vessels, and viscera. That these are formed, held together, and do not fall apart can be ascribed entirely to ether. One body gives rise to the relationships of husband and wife, father and son, younger and elder brothers, ruler and subjects, and friends. One body gives rise to the relationships of the family, the state, and the empire. That they are bound together and do not draw apart can be ascribed entirely to ether. We distinguish the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and the body; that the eyes can see, the ears can hear, the nose can smell, the tongue can taste, and the body can feel can be ascribed entirely to ether. Nothing is as close to the body as the earth, which is formed through the cohesion of particles. How is this cohesion possible? Ether alone makes it possible (ch. 1).
Then follows a long passage explaining the formation of the hierarchical systems of
the cosmos. It starts with the "mutual attraction" between the earth and its moon; then
the "mutual attraction" within a "world (solar system)," a "chiliadic world (Milky Way
system)," an "ocean of worlds," a "nature of worlds," a "species of worlds," a "lotus
world," and finally an "ultimate source [yuan]." However, "even skillful calculations
can hardly count the number of ultimate sources; for there is no end of them." While
the explanation, applying terminology from Western astronomy and Buddhist
cosmology, tries to picture for its readers how complicated and vast the universe is and
leaves them with an unanswered question, it frequently draws them back to a definite,
simple conclusion. These hierarchical systems of cosmos "are all attracted and do not
draw apart" and this can be "ascribed solely to ether [qi]."

Tan had made a subtle change in the conception of ether. In the West, the
modern hypothetical concept of ether emerged and developed primarily as the medium
or transmitter of power, not as the basic stuff of something. But in the above
discussion, ether functioned primarily to form things and, more accurately, to create
lives in the world. This reconstruction was significant for the establishment of a
humanistic image of ether. There is little doubt that the humanity of ether, by its very

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8 Western scientists before the 1880s generally believed that gross matter itself
could not be reduced to ether. In the 1880s some scientists discovered that certain
closed material currents, such as smoke rings, are extraordinarily stable. Gross matter
could then be viewed as "complicated combinations of intertwined ether vortices" (see
Williams 1987; Whittaker 1951, 279-303). This discovery brought about a
revolutionary conception of matter. There is no information on whether Tan had read
about such discoveries. Even if he had read them, he still perceived wu [thing, matter]
in a very traditional way.
definition, would be seriously questioned if ether remained a passive mediator and did not participate in active life creation. In fact, the above discussion of the genesis of man and the universe did not go beyond the Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai’s conception of the moral-spiritual and vitalistic qi, which always engaged in ceaseless creative generation and regeneration of life. It was in the context of this qi that Tan could justifiably conclude that "humanity [not the mechanical force of attraction], the function of ether, is to give birth to heaven, earth, and the myriad things, and to interconnect" (ch. 4).

Misled by Tan’s exploitation of the Western concept of ether and by his elaboration on its function of "attraction," some contemporary scholars tend to believe that the whole argument of A Study of Humanity is based on a view of mechanical materialism. They read Tan’s concept of humanity in terms of mechanical law. The problem with this arbitrary reading results from a failure to approach Tan’s concept of ether from the traditional perspective of vitalistic qi. In A Study of Humanity, the notion of humanity finally came to be illustrative of and comparable to a modern perspective on equality, but not because Tan changed its intrinsic meaning and implications in order to adjust it to the reality construed by modern mechanical materialism. It is because he reconstructed, whether consciously or unconsciously, the world according to the Western mechanical mode of thinking into a world meaningful

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9 Li Zehou, a well-known scholar in mainland China, is representative of this approach. Since the 1950s he has been trying to see Tan as basically a materialist. He says: "By substituting ‘qi’ with ‘ether,’ Tan also replaces the vague notion of the ‘going and undergoing of qi’ with the modern concept of mechanical movement" (1977, 224).
and acceptable to the Chinese of his day. That is the dynamic, vigorous world full of living beings.

Tan left little doubt about his traditional stance when he finally claimed that his dynamic, vigorous world view was based on an ether that was itself vitalistic:

Within something as small as a leaf, or even a speck of invisible dust, there are mountains, rivers, animals, and plants. The piece of land that I stand on, for instance, is itself an earth in miniature. Within something as minute as a drop of water, thousands and millions of ever-multiplying micro-organisms are ever present. As a result of ether, even among the most microscopic of substances bordering on nothingness, there is none that does not have within it micro-organisms that float and exist in the atmosphere (ch. 1).

Tan had fundamentally reconstructed the Western conception of ether by highlighting its moral-spiritual functioning and describing it as the ultimate source of life. Tan’s ether became an out-and-out Chinese qi, with only its transliterated name vitai remaining to stand for Western natural science. However, by using this foreign name, Tan gained the advantage of using the scientific ethos of Western learning to justify the traditional Chinese qi-based cosmic view.

From a rhetorical standpoint, the significance of this argument from ether, presented mainly in the first chapter of the treatise, is that it builds up a basis for the ensuing acceptability of the applications of the all-embracing concept and metaphor of humanity. The vitalistic rather than mechanistic notion of interconnectedness and oneness Tan suggested here already undermines a traditional hierarchical view and implies a naive notion of equality, as was reflected in Kang Youwei’s teaching that "all multiplying living beings share with us the same qi. We must love them with the
mind of humanity, treating all men and things as they are naturally entitled to be" (1968b). For Tan, however, comprehending this notion was only the first step in understanding his overall argument for a radical perspective on equality.

**Argument from Electricity**

In the second stage of argument—the argument from electricity—Tan makes meaningful a radical notion of humanity expressed as the "immediately flow of sensation throughout the universe." This view of humanity, while assuming the existence of superficial boundaries between things, posits at the same time an underlying interpenetrable structure of the world. The concept of electricity, which appeared to disregard the existence of any bond, provided Tan with a strong support for this underlying structure. The argument from electricity allowed Tan to substantialize the former somewhat abstract argument from the penetrating *qi*-ether, now sensible and testifiable in daily life.

Tan did not make a move toward a mechanical world view by using the concept of electricity, a concept which appeared to reflect even more than ether the nature of the nineteenth-century Western mechanical materialism. Instead, he made the metaphor that "electricity is nerve or cranial nerve" crucial in his argument. Again, the appropriateness of this metaphor has to be understood in the context of his time. Influenced by the *qi*-based organic view, Tan's contemporaries tended to see electricity as a function of *qi* and to identify it in essence with *ren* [humanity], the force of love. For example, Kang Youwei said: "The mind that cannot bear to see the suffering of
others, which is indeed ren, electricity, and ether, is shared by all men" (1968a, 1:2a). Again, "Spirit is electricity with consciousness. The electric light can be transmitted everywhere, and spiritual energy can act on everything" (1956, 2-3). Tan shared the "confusion" of this concept. His particular references to the commonplaces between electricity and nerve appear to justify the metaphor he used. In addition to the physical similarity between "the distribution of cranial nerves" and "the spreading out of electric wires in all directions," they both "function very responsively," and "act very rapidly" (ch. 2-3) However, electricity does not necessarily confined itself to a body, "it embraces and permeates everything." With the analogy between electricity and a nerve system within a body, Tan made an inferential leap to the vision of an extended, universal body.

We know that the cranial nerves connect the five sense organs and all the bones to function as one; we should also know that electricity connects heaven, earth, the myriad things, others and self into one body (ch. 2).

The notion of universal body was not new. Neo-Confucian scholars such as Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers, and Wang Yangming had ardently argued that the feeling of ren [humanity] connected heaven, earth, and all things as one body (Chan 1963, 497-99, 523-25, 530, 675, 685, 690). Now, when Tan substituted for the conventional term "ren" the scientific word "electricity," he did not try to dehumanize or amoralize this notion of universal body, but substantiated it.

Tan tried to test the validity of universal humanity by using the human body as an example. "When something touches our body, we feel the contact ... How can
we feel it? Because our brain senses it" (ch. 3). Interconnection within our body is immediately assumed by the very fact of this sense, for "it is not our brain but the tips of our hands and feet which make the contact." A particular view of humanity applied by traditional medicine was then introduced:

Those who are suffering from paralysis, however, cannot feel, as their electric wires have been damaged and are no longer able to pass messages to the brain; the body, though one, is as if divided into different [alien] regions. That is why physicians regard paralysis as bu-ren [non-humanistic]. Since bu-ren is one body functioning like different regions, then ren [humanity] must be different regions functioning like one body (ch.3).

This is the same kind of analogy the Neo-Confucian scholars had used for their argument for one universal body (e.g. Chan 1963, 530). In the case of traditional medicine, the term "ren" was employed to describe a harmonious and organic state of an internal body. The view of humanity that regards everything as possessing humanistic characteristics extends into the human body, seeing every part of it as an individual who "feels" the others empathetically. The validity of humanity is thus verified not only in that we can sense the state of interconnection in ourselves, but also in that the sense itself is crucial to our health.\textsuperscript{10}

Now, as Tan made so apparent the image of a universal body, which consisted of the vitalistic qi and was connected internally by electricity, he tended to extend the notion of the immediate flow of sensation within a human body to be the ideal of

\textsuperscript{10} Tan did not start his discussion on humanity until he could account for the interflow of sensation. This fact suggests that Tan adhered to the conventional use of the term ren. In the Chinese tradition of discourse, any appropriate use of this term has to do with feeling. Tan did not use this term in the sense of mechanical law.
society and of the whole universe.\textsuperscript{11} As he supported this notion Tan’s language became especially conventional. He no longer stressed the "mutual attraction" of ether; rather, "humanity alone exists in heaven and earth" (ch. 5). By this he referred to the ultimate Being of this stream of humanistic sensation which accounted not only for the cooperative "action" of things but also for the "mutual attraction" of ether itself which produced those things. Tan found from the teachings of the Confucian classics a strong support for the idea of interflow of sensation throughout the universe.

That is why when a thought emerges, whether sincere or not, it is seriously judged by ten hands and ten eyes, and when something is said, whether good or bad, people a thousand li away will react to it. Nothing reveals more than what is minute: facial expression reveals the slightest intentions. Nothing is more clearly seen than what is hidden: living in solitude is like living in public. As we can influence others to share our thoughts through our mental power, so we can know the integrity of the person we encounter by observing how his thoughts originate. There is, in the first instance, no barrier between others and the self: it is as if we can see each other’s heart (ch. 2).

Tan may have gotten the same idea from his reading of the Chinese translation of Henry Wood’s Ideal Suggestion through Mental Photography, which argues that the mind has an "affective power" to "communicate with, influence, and stimulate other minds" (Shek 1976, 201). However, he chose to express it in a classical way. The above passage simply paraphrases the following well-known commonplaces from the

\textsuperscript{11} It is significant that Tan, basing himself upon this medical metaphor, directly and indirectly developed two levels of moral critiques, which receive elaboration in the second part of his treatise. The first was directed against those who "wrongly draw boundaries, seeking only to benefit the self without helping others" (ch.3). The other critique was fired at the morbid state of a society that failed to allow within itself the immediate flow of sensation and feeling.
Confucian classics. These sacred adages are organized in such a way as to produce a fine parallel structure.

Master Tseng said, "What ten eyes are beholding and what ten hands are pointing to—isn’t it frightening?" (Great Learning, ch. 6. Chan trans.)

The Master said: "The superior man abides in his room. If his words are well spoken, he meets with assent at a distance of more than a thousand li. How much more then from near by! If the superior man abides in his room and his words are not well spoken, he meets with contradiction at a distance of more than a thousand li. How much more then from near by! (Book of Changes, "The Great Treatise," ch. 8)

There is nothing more visible than what is hidden and nothing more manifest than what is subtle. Therefore the superior man is watchful over himself when he is alone (Doctrine of the Mean, ch. 1. Chan trans.).

[O]ther people see him as if they see his very heart (Great Learning, ch. 6. Chan trans.).

The notion of immediate flow of sensation already suggests a radical notion of equality, which finds its clear expression in the phrase "different regions functioning like one body." However, for Tan, this notion of equality is not yet sufficiently comprehensive. As will be suggested in the argument from mental power, this notion is still limited by the vision of a natural body and assumes distinctions among its parts.12

This radical view of humanity lay a solid basis for his critique of a nominalistic mode of thinking (see ch. 8-11). "Names are responsible for the confusion of

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12 According to Chang Hao, the notion of immediate flow of feeling was already clearly expressed by the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhang Zai and his followers centuries ago (1987, 94-5). In view of this, Tan’s radical view of equality in this stage still remains in a traditional framework.
humanity' (ch. 8). In actuality, the names (ming) Tan referred to were not names in general. They were "status (mingfen)" and norms. For Tan, such names were generated to create differences, to rank status, to define the good and bad, and to distinguish the close and the distant. They thus by their very nature violated the holistic principle of humanity. When names were regarded as a doctrine (jiao) and established as changeless principles, they became an evil root of moral, political, and social inequalities and unfairness (ch. 8).

In chapters nine through eleven Tan tried to provide a concrete outlook on how the good and bad had been created and maintained by means of this nominalization. Here Tan was appealing directly to the logic and ethos of the seventeenth-century critical view of human nature. While a detailed analysis of this appeal is beyond the scope of this chapter, it should be pointed out that Tan's critique of "names," like Wang Fuzhi and others' critique of the Neo-Confucian li (principle), focused upon the ethical aspect of social differentiation, as embodied in the conventional norms and rules of human relationships. Tan still took for granted the existence of a hierarchical "natural order" (tiaoli). Only the "erroneous creation" of differences and the "arbitrary confusion" of this natural order were his targets in this stage of argument. This natural

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13 In accounting for the root of social evil, Tan was not concerned as much with the cause of evil personalities as with the cause of the wrong ways of thinking that underlay immoral activities. In A Study of Humanity, two interrelated ways of thinking were under attack. One is the preoccupation with "names" and the other the preoccupation with the body (tiao), --both analytic in nature. For Tan, while the former prevented people from seeing the natural interconnection of lives, the latter concealed the reality of interconnection between minds.
order, however, came to be problematic not only as a name but also as a substance according to the transcendental view he developed in the next stage.

**Argument from Mental Power**¹⁴

In this final stage of the argument, Tan justified an even more radical notion of humanity, characterized by its absolute interconnectedness of sensation without the limitation of the body. The key to this argument is his construction of the soul as ether's "unborn and undestroyed sense." Tan's idea of mental power was heavily influenced by Henry Wood's *Ideal Suggestion through Mental Photography*, which had been translated into Chinese by the missionary John Fryer under the pragmatic title *Zhixin mianbing fa* [Method of avoiding illness by controlling the mind] (Shek 1976).¹⁵ The booklet basically argued that the mind possessed the unlimited power to unite one person with others and with the myriad things in the universe. Through this work, Tan said in 1896, he began to have some ideas about the source of Western

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¹⁴ Tan's concept of mental power is quite complicated. His elaboration of it sometimes goes beyond his central concern with equality. In the following I will concentrate on those aspects of his argument that have significance for his establishment of a radical idea of equality.

¹⁵ *Zhixin mianbing fa* is composed of two parts, the first being a treatise on the power of the mind while the second consists of twenty-seven five-character chants, each with accompanying explanations. These chants are unmistakably Christian in tone (Shek 1976). John Fryer's translation is by no means faithful. Paul A. Cohen describes a method of translation commonly employed by missionaries in the nineteenth century. First, the foreign missionary would translate the original text orally to his native assistant. Then the assistant would convert the colloquial version into literary Chinese. Finally, if the missionary were sufficiently skilled, he would read over the literary version for accuracy and clarity of expression. John Fryer was "the man who exploited this method to the fullest extent" (1978, 578-79).
teachings (318). But the fact may be that he found something in the Western sources that justified the moral-spiritual approach to the Western scientific concepts he learned earlier. Tan recommended this work to his teacher Ouyang Zhonggu for its potential to cure China's illness (1896, 320). Even though he had such a high opinion of this work, as Chang Hao observed, he appealed more to the teachings of Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism in articulating his belief in the power of mind (1987, 84).

The force of mind in the context of A Study of Humanity refers primarily to a spiritual power transcending and penetrating time and space. Tan described it by two Buddhist phrases: "the interconnecting of the future, present, and past (sanshi yishi)" and "the interpermeating of the one and the many (viduo xiangyong)." When Tan engaged in concrete defense of this transcendental and penetrative mental power, however, he had to rely again upon the concept of the all-embracing and permeating qi-ether.

His argument starts with articulating the notion of ether as "unborn and undestroyed" and also as "infinitesimally born and destroyed." The two notions emphasize both sides of the vitality of ether. With them Tan made a clean break with a mechanical world view. The notion that ether can be neither born nor destroyed is argued principally by examples. In chapter twelve, a total of seven examples drawn from human life and natural phenomena were provided.

Water, for example, gradually dries up when heated; it is not destroyed but has merely been decomposed into a kind of light qi [hydrogen] and the qi of maintenance [oxygen] .... A candle, for example, burns itself out after a long time; it is not destroyed but has been changed into qi, liquid, and matter ....
Finally, all that had been traditionally regarded as phenomena of birth and death were reduced to the "composition and decomposition" or the "formation and transformation" of ether. Interestingly, insofar as these daily examples were concerned, Tan did not use the term ether but did refer to the concept of qi explicitly and often. It may appear to some contemporary scholars that Tan was applying the modern law of conservation of energy to rectify the traditional unscientific view of life and death. He in fact did not go against the vitalistic view in and of itself. What he tried to establish was the notion of a life that transcended the dimension of time, and a view that saw all concrete lives and deaths as merely the formations and transformations of this true being's external body.

Tan's tendency to gain access, by referring to the ever-transformative and immortal qi, to the temporal transcendence of ether is further shown in his construction of the notion of ether's "infinitesimal birth and destruction." The so-called "infinitesimal birth and destruction" meant that ether in itself always underwent what modern biology would call "a process of metabolism."

Things just born are then destroyed; things just destroyed are then born. The time between the succession of the born and the destroyed is so short that it cannot be any shorter, and so close that it cannot be any closer. For then it merges into one and becomes the unborn and the undestroyed (ch. 15).

Tan had quoted from various sources to make sense out of this micro approach to the life process of ether. He referred to the Buddhist idea of transmigration and also cited Confucius and Zhuangzi's statements on the ever-changing nature of the world (see ch. 15). However, it is Wang Fuzhi's dynamic idea of "daily renewal (rixin)" that Tan
basically drew upon (see ch. 16-19). In fact, Tan’s notion of the "infinitesimal birth and destruction" goes further than Wang’s dynamism of "daily renewal." While Wang’s idea suggested that only the presently existent was real, thus denying the validity of the past and future, Tan reached the opposite conclusion by the same logic. "To me, ‘today’ implies its nonexistence" (ch. 15). The reason for this difference is that Tan took into account the small time distance from the moment when something happened and the moment when it was being sensed. Considering the time necessary for transmitting light and sound through the air and through the human nerve system, by the time the brain recognized the image and the sound, "it is an image already past ... it is also a sound already past" (ch. 17).

The above two arguments about ether’s "unbirth and undestruction" and "infinitesimal birth and destruction" bring about a balanced view of the temporal transcendence of life. They are in fact instances of what Kenneth Burke called "casuistic stretching," the process of "introduc[ing] new principles while theoretically remaining faithful to old principles" (1959, 229-32). The traditional views of a life circle no longer accounted for this transcendental life, for its being not in time. It was either the infinitesimal born and destroyed, whose true being could never be caught in time; or the unborn and undestroyed, which had no yesterday, today, or tomorrow. It

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16 According to Wang’s famous doctrine of "daily renewal," due to the creative process of qi things receive their nature (xin) and the so-called Mandate of Heaven (ming) not only at the moment of their birth, but at every moment of their growth as well ("Shangshu yinyi").
is this new perspective that gives meaning to the Buddhist notion of the "interconnecting of the future, present, and past."

It is at this point that Tan's advocacy of the immortal soul came to make sense. While some scholars were perplexed at this "idealistic" and "religious" turn, Tan taunted: "Mean scholars and bigots, upon hearing 'soul,' are left speechless and consider it as absurd. How can they know that the essential nature of soul is not born or destroyed" (ch. 13). The soul, for Tan, was nothing more than the embodiment of the unborn and undestroyed. Although Tan's argument for such a soul is appears rigorous and valid, he is opening up a new horizon, one on which the physical body came to be viewed as less significant, because it was now seen as merely the temporal and external form of a true life. Tan implied that even the scientific definitions of life were questionable from this perspective. The modern chemical definition of life, which assumed "the composition of certain amounts of forum, aurum ....," and the medical definition, assuming "the functioning of blood and breath," reflected views focusing upon the body, thus explaining only lives of short duration (ch. 13, 16).

Tan went further to make the soul universally applicable to both human and nonhuman beings. Once the notion of the universal soul is accepted, the radical idea of the absolute interconnectedness of sensation without the confinement of the body becomes meaningful as the true interpretation of humanity. It should be pointed out that Tan's concept of soul or mind still has to do with sensation (zhi). Although his argument from the "all-embracing and permeating" electricity had already provided a sense of the interconnectedness of sensation, the sense was meaningful because the
metaphor of extended body constituted its background. Where a more radical view of equality was concerned, Tan preferred to appeal to a sense of pure sensation without relying upon the notion of body. He defined the soul as "ether's unborn and undestroyed sense" (ch. 14).

Tan found himself unavoidably confronted with the question: "How do you know that things have senses?" On one occasion he asserted that "humanity at its height is certainly omniscient" (ch. 5). Tan certainly did not sound ridiculous to those who had long been convinced that truth was "essentially moral" (Chan 1967, 13). He thus shifted the original epistemological question into one of ethics. Those who did not know should feel ashamed of not being morally superior. In chapter 14, Tan directly argued his position from an organic and holistic perspective. "How can we prove that things have senses?" They have dispositions. Then, "How can we prove that they have dispositions?" Tan replied with a Chinese chain-reasoning:

We say that they have **likes and dislikes**. Since they have likes and dislikes, they feel **repulsion and attraction**. As they feel repulsion and attraction, they therefore have **similarities and dissimilarities**, and as a result of that, they have **composition and decomposition, production and extinction** [emphasis added].

This chain of reasoning appears to state its premise at the beginning. It in fact puts the clearest and simplest notion at the end. In other words, it reasons from a hypothesis, and the definiteness of this hypothesis relies upon the clarity of the "conclusion." From a Western analytic and logical point of view, a vital defect of this chain of reasoning is probably that it tries to bridge the two unbridgeable dimensions
of phenomena. From this standpoint, natural phenomena such as similarities and
dissimilarities have nothing to say about such mental phenomena such as likes and
dislikes; nor the other way around. From the Chinese organic viewpoint, however, Tan
did not stretch the bounds of acceptable metaphorical language when putting these two
kinds of phenomena into a chain of reasoning. It was not categorically wrong for him
to compare such things as "sunflowers leaning towards the sun, metal absorbing
electricity, fire flaring upward, and water flowing downward" to humans who sensed
their objective and acted toward their goal. So he had reason to ask: "Can it be that
in man, such things are called senses, but in things, they are not called senses?"

Tan's next step was to downplay the uniqueness of human senses. "What are
these so-called senses?" As people generally believed that senses related to the
functioning of the heart or the brain, Tan took a closer look at them. The heart was
no more than the organ "controlling the circulation of the red and purple blood," and
the brain was but a thing that looked dull, "grey, greasy, and furrowed and uneven like
the kernel of a walnut." These empirical pictures, of course, did not show at all what
human senses were. Tan had to ask why the heart was able to control the blood and
how such a brain functioned. He thus came full circle: "Is it not still a question of
likes and dislikes, repulsion and attraction?"

The basic idea Tan tried to argue here was that all fundamental aspects of
human nature, such as having senses, must also be shared by other creatures and
things. Although sounding logically fantastic, the argument found its appeal in the faith
of the time that all human and nonhuman beings were essentially creatures of vitalistic qi.

Now, as we say there are senses, and as senses originate from ether, then both senses and ether are unborn and undestroyed. The soul is ether's unborn and undestroyed sense. To say that things have no soul is to say that they have no ether. Can this be possible? (ch.14)

All souls, when reduced to the sense of ether, are essentially one. The radical idea that all things are interconnected in spirit or mind can thus be justified.

Given this interconnectedness, Tan was then able to expose the fundamental problem of the hierarchical structure and order of traditional ethics and politics. The problem of this structure and order was its building upon an illusion caused by a wrong way of thinking. "Preoccupation with the body gives rise to practically all sorts of deceptions." "People's inability to transcend the body gives rise to close or distant relationships which in turn engenders differentiations" (ch. 14). Tan believed that this mental preoccupation with the body originated from the awareness of the self or the ego, which was in fact awareness of one's own body. "Relativity is born of differentiation, which in turn is a result of having the notion of self" (ch. 17). He stated explicitly that one should first eliminate the sense of the self in order to interconnect the self and others (ch. 45).  

17 The German philosopher Jean Gebser constructed a similar critique of the dominant mental structure in the modern West, which, he believed, resulted fundamentally from spatial awareness and self-consciousness. He called this structure "the three-dimensional consciousness structure" or "the Mental structure," as against "the Archaic Structure," "the Magic Structure," and "the Mythical Structure" (1949/1986, 73-97).
self, one becomes totally free from spatial constraints. It is this sense of spatial
transcendence that explains the Buddhist notion of the so-called "interpermeating of
the one and the many."

Once the soul is identified as really true and universal, any differentiation in
terms of status (names) and the natural body becomes meaningless. A radical view
of equality thus emerges. However, this view does not stress individuality and
independence; on the contrary, it emphasizes interconnectedness and oneness. By
identifying oneself with the whole, one completely frees himself while at the same
losing his own ego. Only from this radical view of equality can one fully recognize
and appreciate that "humanity alone exists in heaven and earth."

For Tan, only those driven solely by this humanistic flow of sensation will
shoulder the responsibility of "saving all lives in the world" (ch. 44). Only these
people dare to challenge death, only then "will be prepared to die for righteous causes"
(ch. 13). Tan demonstrates the validity of this radical notion of humanity not only
with his carefully formulated argument, but also by the sacrifice of his blood and life.
CHAPTER IV
LIANG QICHAO'S A NEW PEOPLE (XINMIN SHUO)

Liang Qichao, the leading character in the third rhetorical event to be considered here, once asked his Master Kang Youwei about the way to order the world. The Master answered: "Take the group as your body and take change as your action (Yi chun wei ti, yi bian wei yong). If these two principles are established, the world can be kept in order for ten million years." Liang was confused by these

1 Liang was not a translator. He never claimed to have translated a Western intellectual text. Liang simply introduced and propagated Western ideas. In addition to this, he differs from Yan Fu also in that his introduction of Western ideas during the period of exile in Japan (1898-1907) was not based on original works, but on the Japanese translations and interpretations of them. So it was actually the Japanese Western ideas that Liang in this period came to contact with and respond to. It was possible that the Japanese scholars might have ignored some Western ideas that could benefit the Chinese. Liang had no chance to meet these ideas simply because the Japanese did not introduce them. For those Western ideas available for Liang to learn from the Japanese sources, Liang might have learned them from Japanese paraphrastic translations like Yan’s translation of Huxley’s work. Or he might have learned them from strict translations. But even for the second case, we can hardly expect that those strict translations would convey the exact picture and meaning of the original. From this perspective, it is without doubt that Liang’s understanding of Western ideas in this period might have been affected and restrained by the Japanese sources. But even so we cannot downplay the role played by Liang himself. Liang did not unreservedly introduce all that Japanese had introduced. He introduced to the Chinese only those he considered good and beneficial to his nation. For this reason, and also for the convenience of discussion, I would like to ignore the Japanese influences. This ignorance should not cause a vital damage to the themes I tried to establish in this dissertation.
profound and abstract words. He understood them when he later saw Yan Fu's *Heavenly Evolution* and Tan Sitong’s *A Study of Humanity*. "Lamenting the fact that so few men of patriotic spirit had as yet been able to hear Mr. Kang’s theories or see the great works of these two gentlemen," he decided in 1897 to write a long treatise to proclaim his master's doctrine and its substantiation by these two new enlightening books (IV:1727; Pusey 1983, 107-08). He completed only part of this project. During his years of exile in Japan, Tan carried the dual themes of group and change into his writing of *A New People*. Its whole teaching can be sum up in one sentence: Take the whole Chinese nation as your body, and take moral reform as your action.

As a serial published in the *Journal of a New People* intermittently over two years (1902-04), *A New People* was written for the particular purpose of systematic introduction of the modern Western virtues into the Chinese mentality. A former Chinese minister to Japan, Huang Zhunxian, wrote to Liang Qichao after reading this serial:

*A New People* talks about human rights, liberty, dignity, self-government, grouping, etc. These are all the things in our minds that we want to say, but that can all come out only through your forceful pen. What brilliant thoughts and great expositions! I dare to announce to the public: Even Jia [Yi] and Dong [Zhongshu] had no such insights, and even Han [Yu] and Shu [Shi] could not write things such as these (Ding 1959, II:282).²

² Jia Yi and Dong Zhongshu are both prominent thinkers in the Han (BC 206-220 AD). Han Yu and Shu Shi, great writers of the classical prose, are leaders of the Tang (618-709) Song (960-1279) Classical Style Movements.
Huang was among Liang's most respectful seniors, a reform-minded official and also a well-known poet. This praise should not be taken as mere flattery.

One of the great leaders of the later New Cultural Movement (1915-1925), Hu Shi (1891-1962), recalled that for about twenty years before 1922 "there were very few scholars who were not influenced by his [Liang's] writings" (1922, 180)."The serial A New People," he said, "opened up a new world for me. It convinced me that there were other extremely advanced nations and cultures in the world besides China" ("Sishi zishu," 89-93).

Liang fled China after the failure of Wuxu political reform in 1898 and he continued publishing journals campaigning for reform in Japan. His journals, Pure Discussions (1900-1901) and Journal of A New People (1902-1907), were smuggled back to the mainland and reprinted ten or more times in local areas. They soon became the most influential journals in China at the turn of this century.4 The most

3 Another active figure in the movement, Guo Muoruo (1892-1978), had the same remark on Liang's intellectual discourses in the early twentieth century. Guo said that almost all the youth at that time, whether for or against, had been baptized by his thoughts and words. "Liang was the most powerful spokesman of the era of the capitalist revolution" (1939, 168). Guo later became an ardent follower of the Chinese communist party. Hu, on the other hand, spent his life fighting for a free China. Although they had chosen different ways, they both acknowledged the early enlightenment they had received from Liang.

4 Cao Juren, a scholar in mainland China, recalls: "Xinmin congbao [The journal of a new people] was published in Tokyo, Japan, but its distribution was so wide that it reached into poverty-stricken villages and remote places.... It took a month to reach our family village, 400 lǐ from Hangzhou, by post, yet my late father's thought and writing style were influenced by Liang Qichao; so far away as Chongqing and Chengdu, the Xinmin congbao leapt over the "three gorges" [of the Yangzi River] and penetrated, changing the perceptions of the gentry" (1976, 32. Quoted in Lee & Nathan 1985, 370).
distinctive feature of Liang’s journals was his introduction of Western ideas with great enthusiasm.

I. Moral Revolution as the Ultimate Solution

The Traditional Issue of Renovation of the People

There is no question that this serial was written in response to the rhetorical exigency of its time. In the first issue of the Journal of a New People (1902), Liang announced the central goal of this journal:

This journal draws upon the idea of xinmin [renovation of the people, new people] in Great Learning, with the faith that in order to improve our nation we must first improve our people. The reason that our nation fails to pull itself together is that our people lack public virtue and that their wisdom has not yet been enlightened. This journal takes it to be its primary task to solve this problem. It tries to formulate guiding principles of moral education by mediating both the Chinese and Western ethics, and by gathering together a wide range of political theories and learning and making them the basic texts of intellectual enlightenment.

This announcement also explains why Liang wrote the serial A New People. Liang understood that to save China one should rely neither upon "the temporary arising of worthy monarchies and worthy ministers" nor upon "the emergence of a couple of heros from the public," but upon "the virtue, wisdom, and energy of our four billions of people." "Napoleon was a great commander. However, if given only lazy soldiers, he could not defend himself against even African primitives. Columbus, who was such a great navigator, could not cross even a small river if in a rotten boat" (A New
"Having a new people, why do we need to worry about not having a new system, about not having a new government?" (2).

A new people, for Liang, was first of all a morally new people. Liang tried to save China by a new moral practice. His campaign for "moral revolution" was, of course, anti-traditional. But its basic assumptions, that morality was the way for China, that moral education and renovation of the people were the keys to the building of a superior and strong nation, were essentially Confucian. His serial about a new people tried to introduce a complex of modern Western virtues. It attempted to promote in the Chinese a modern sense of nation, an enterprising and adventure spirit, a feeling of rights and liberty, and the like. All of these were very self-assertive virtues. Liang put them in the category of "public morality," while placing the traditional self-restraining virtues such as humanity, filial piety, and loyalty in the category of "private morality." For Liang, it was public morality, not private morality, that China needed the most. Private morality was of course necessary for the moral existence of an individual. But it was public morality that was necessary for both the moral existence and the survival of the Chinese nation. Like Yan Fu, Tan Sitong, and many of his comrades, Liang did not see a fundamental contradiction between these two sets of virtues. "Public morality and private morality," Liang said, "are not mutually exclusive terms, they are mutually inclusive terms" (A New People, 118). The guiding principles of moral education could be formulated "by mediating both Chinese and Western ethics."
We will now explore the question: How did Liang, by exploiting the Chinese modes of argumentation, present and argue for those modern virtues that were apparently antithetical to the traditional Chinese ethics? The serial *A New People* consists of twenty relatively independent chapters. The first four explain the rationale, basic themes, and implications of this serial for a new people. The fifth chapter introduces and discusses the central concept of "public morality." The rest of the chapters, with the exception of chapter eighteen, "On Private Morality," are intended to discuss a particular virtue belonging to public morality or a particular aspect of the modern citizenry. They are, respectively, "a modern sense of nation," "an enterprising and adventurous spirit," "the sense of rights," "liberty," "self-government," "progress," "dignity," "grouping," "profit-making," "perseverance," "sense of duty," "militarism," "the spirit of people," and "political competence." Since a complete survey of the whole serial is unnecessary, the following analysis will focus basically on five of the most important chapters: "On Public Morality," "On a Modern Sense of Nation," "On an Enterprising and Adventurous Spirit," "On a Feeling of Rights," and "On Liberty," which were written in the period from March to May 1902.

II. Arguments for Public Morality

Public Morality

Every Chinese in Liang's day would have agreed that ethics functioned fundamentally to maintain harmony within a group, which was the point both the
Confucian sage Xunzi and Yan Fu had made so clear. But not every Chinese would have accepted that the West had a better morality because its groups showed more cohesion and efficiency. Liang had to make this point if he insisted on a moral approach to China's problem. In his chapter on "Public Morality" (ch.5) Liang argued that the West had a better morality because its morality was concerned more with public interests. His opening paragraph redefined the Chinese concept of de [morality, virtue]:

One of the things our people most sorely lack is public morality. What is public morality? It is that which makes a group a group, and a nation a nation. It is the morality on which group and nation stand. Man is an animal good at grouping (this is a saying of the Western scholar Aristotle). If men do not group, how are they better than birds and beasts? But success in grouping does not come to those who simply raise empty shouts of "Group! Group!" There must be something that runs through a group and ties it together before the actuality of a group can appear. That thing I call public morality (12. Pusey's trans., 238).

There was nothing new in this definition of public morality, except that Liang quoted from Aristotle instead of the Confucian sage Xunzi for support, that he called this morality "gongde" [public morality] instead of "de" [morality] in general, and that, most surprisingly, he claimed that public morality was what the Chinese "most sorely lack." Then, what about the long, rich moral tradition of Chinese culture? Liang

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5 Xunzi taught: "He [Man] is not as strong as the ox, nor as swift as the horse, and yet he makes the ox and the horse work for him. Why? Because he is able to organize himself in society and they are not. Why is he able to organize himself in society? Because he sets up hierarchical divisions. And how is he able to set up hierarchical divisions? Because he has a sense of duty. If he employs this sense of duty to set up hierarchical divisions, then there will be harmony" (ch.9. Watson's trans. 45).
advanced another concept, "side" [private morality]. Private morality referred to those moral values that functioned to "achieve the moral perfection of an individual personality," while public virtue referred to those moral values that functioned to "promote the cohesion of a group." The problem with Chinese culture, Liang said, lies in "its overemphasis on private morality at the cost of public morality." To justify this view, Liang first referred back to well-known teachings from the Confucian classics:

For instance, the nine virtues advanced in "The Counsels of Kao Yao" [in the Book of History]; the three virtues set forth in "The Great Plan" [in the Book of History]. In the Analects, the so-called "being benign, upright, courteous, temperate, and complaisant" [1:100]; the so-called "mastering oneself and returning to propriety" [12:1]; the so-called "speaking sincerely and faithfully and acting honorably and carefully" [15:5]; the so-called "being strong, resolute, simple, and slow to speak" [13:27]; the so-called "giving few occasions for blame in one’s words and giving few occasions for repentance in one’s conduct" [2:18]; the so-called "recognizing the mandate of Heaven and knowing the force of words" [20:3]. In the Great Learning, the so-called "knowing what to abide in" and "being watchful over oneself when alone" [ch.1, 6]; the so-called "allowing no self-deception and satisfying oneself" [ch.6]. In The Doctrine of the Mean, the so-called "loving learning, practicing with vigor, and knowing how to feel shame" [ch. 20]; the so-called "being cautious over what he does not see and apprehensive over what he does not hear" [ch.1]; the so-called "cultivating to the utmost a particular goodness" [ch. 23]. In Mencius, the so-called "preserving what is in one’s mind and nurturing what is in one’s nature" [4b:28]; the so-called "examining oneself and forcefully exercising forgiveness" [7a:4]. The teachings of traditional ethics such as these have elaborated on private virtues to the utmost (12).

For Liang, however, the teachings of traditional ethics could never produce a morally perfect man, though they were comprehensive enough to teach a man how to live a good individual life. To illustrate, Liang made a comparison between traditional Chinese ethics and modern Western ethics. On one side was Chinese ethics, which dealt basically with the five human relationships; father and son, husband and wife,
elder brother and younger brother, ruler and subject, and friend and friend. On the other side was the Western ethics, which had three sub-categories: family ethics, social ethics, and state ethics. While the Western family ethics covered at once the father and son, husband and wife, and elder brother and young brother relationships, the relationship between friends was by no means the fundamental subject matter concerned by Western social ethics, nor was the relationship between ruler and subject the fundamental subject matter of Western state ethics. Social commitment was more than commitment to friends. For example, Liang said, the hermit, though isolating himself from other people, "still has an unshirkable duty toward the society" (13). It would be even more absurd to reduce a modern citizen's political involvement to the ruler-subject relationship, for neither the ruler nor the subject should own the whole nation. Further, the commitment between the ruler and subject would still be considered a relation between two individuals if it were taken in the Confucian sense that "A ruler should employ his ministers according to the principle of propriety, and ministers should serve their ruler with loyalty" (Confucius, 3:19). Liang concluded from this simple but clever contrast that "Traditional Chinese ethics stresses the relations between one individual and another; the new ethics of the West stresses the relations between an individual and his group" (12). All of a sudden, Liang made traditional Chinese ethics no longer appear in a favorable light. It was modern Western ethics, not tradition Chinese ethics, that was the happy land of collectivism.
Modern Western ethics appeared, by this comparison, not only more comprehensive but also superior insofar as it demanded self-transcendence to a greater degree.\textsuperscript{6} Liang’s next step was to bring the traditional practice of moral cultivation to trial, for this practice had produced "too many self-styled ‘good persons’ who cared only about keeping themselves away from error" (13). According to Liang’s logic, if one merely remained harmless to another, one already was doing harm to one’s group. He put forward several metaphors and analogies to argue this point. Are these self-styled "good persons" who pay no duty to their group not like "vermin" in the body of the group? Are they not like a "debtor" who keeps borrowing but never tries to pay back? But more to the point, are they not like "irresponsible sons toward their parents"?

What do the parents do for their children? They produce, nurture, protect, and educate them. Being a son or a daughter, one has the responsibility of repaying their parents’ grace. If every son or daughter fulfills his or her duty, the more sons and daughters, the happier are the parents, and the more prosperous is the family. If not, then the more sons and daughters, the heavier burden bearing on the family. It is the first commandment of private morality, as is known to all, that a son or a daughter will be considered unfilial if he or she takes no responsibility for the parents. The grace one receives from one’s group or the people receive from their nation is the same kind of grace a son receives from his parents. Group or nation is that to which we devote our wisdom and energy and to whose care we commit our property and life. Our

\textsuperscript{6} Liang’s distinction of private morality and public morality comes close to Rousseau’s differentiation between "the will of all" and "the general will." In his epoch-making \textit{On the Social Contract} (1762), Rousseau said: "There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will. The latter considers only the general interest, whereas the former considers only the general interest, whereas the former considers private interest and is merely the sum of private wills. But remove from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each other out, and what remains as the sum of the differences is the general will" (1987b, 155-56).
body could not exist in this world even for one day without the group or the
nation. Therefore, dedicating ourselves to the service of our group and our
nation is the responsibility of all men. By giving up this responsibility one in
fact becomes a pest of one’s group and nation, no matter how good or evil one
is from the perspective of private morality. Suppose there were a family with
ten sons. Some became monks, leaving the family. Others indulged in playing
chess or in drinking. The former sought for the tao, while the latter failed to
attend to their proper duties, --how morally divergent two kinds of conduct.
However, in regard to the fact that they both abandoned the duty of taking care
of their parents, they committed the same crime according to the Confucian
ethical code. With this understanding, we indeed should classify those who
care only about the moral perfection of their own personality into the same
category of unfilial descendants. To judge them by the principles of public
morality, we can go so far as to say that they have committed monstrous
crimes against their groups (14).

Liang was appealing to a moral court. He stressed the "grace" of a group to its
members and the members’ moral duty to pay back the debt of gratitude to their
group. All he said was well justified by the principle of filial piety, "the first
commandment" of the Confucian morality. How Chinese is his argument. However,
he used this very argued to go beyond the bounds of traditional ethics. Liang used the
principles of tradition to bring about change. This rhetorical strategy, in fact, runs
through his whole discourse.

A Modern Sense of Nation [Guojia sixiang]

In the next chapter (ch. 6), "On the Modern Sense of Nation," Liang further
argued that the fundamental problem of China’s lack of public morality, in fact, did
not lie in its lack of sense of responsibility toward group, but in that it did not even
have a modern sense of group at all. At the time when Liang cited the classical
sermons on what he called "private morality," he did not cite the other side of the
story. He did not quote from Xunzi's argument for chun [grouping]. He did not mention Confucius' famous maxim that "A man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others," which, as Wing-tsit Chan remarks, was "the Confucian golden rule in a nutshell" (6:28. Chan 1963, 31). He did not mention Mencius' teachings such as "taking up upon oneself the heavy charge of the kingdom" (5b:1) and "rejoicing in the joy of his people, mourning at the sorrow of his people" (1b:4). The Chinese were truly concerned about their group. But for Liang, this concern, however strong, was fundamentally different from the Western people's concern with a modern nation. This was because the Chinese notion of group, when understood as a family, a social, or a political organization, was such a hierarchical group that only a few were morally and politically authorized to represent it. In actuality, this notion of group embodied the will of the few rather than what Rousseau called "the general will." Liang, of course, did not think that one could attain public virtues by remaining in the service of such a group.

In this chapter, Liang tried to establish a modern concept of nation. He did so by placing this concept in contrast with two powerful concepts in the Chinese tradition--chaoting [the imperial court] and tianxia [all under heaven]--these often being used in the sense of nation. To explain the distinction between a nation and an imperial court, Liang applied the analogies of company and village:

If we compare a nation to a company, the imperial court is like the office of this company, and the governor of the imperial court is like the general manager in charge of the office of this company. If we compare a nation to a village, then the imperial court is like the guild hall of this village, and the governor is like the person in charge of this guild hall. Is the office set up for
the company or the company founded for the office? Or is the guild hall built for the village or the village established for the guild hall? The answer is so obvious and indisputable (16).

Then, is the imperial court set up for the nation or the nation set up for the imperial court? If the answer to this was also obvious and indisputable, the view which saw the emperor as the nation was indeed two steps away from the truth. Liang quoted from Louis XIV, who claimed that "I am the country." This saying, Liang said, had met with such great social resistance in the West that even a little child would spit on it and revile it. But people in China, Liang was surprised to see, felt this saying to be perfectly normal.

Liang next tried to approach the modern concept of nation from the perspective of loyalty. "There are two unalterable principles in our China, namely, loyalty and filial piety. However, we can understand the complete meaning of loyalty only if we understand it in the sense of 'loyalty to one's nation.' We will be biased if we take it to be 'loyalty to one's ruler.'" In the following, Liang used syllogistic reasoning to reduce the notion of "loyalty to one's ruler" to absurdity:

The virtues of Loyalty and filial piety constitute the most crucial parts of a moral personality. If one misses either one of them, our society will not call him a man. If we think of loyalty to be loyalty only to a ruler, then what about those supreme rulers who do not subordinate themselves to anyone in this world? Are we not closing off the road for their achieving the virtue of loyalty and, therefore, imposing on them the inherent deficiency of not being able to have a full personality? Moreover, what about those modern citizens of such countries as America and France, who do not have their own monarchy? Are we not excluding them from sharing this virtue and, therefore, granting them no right to be human beings? (18)
Therefore, we must be loyal to the nation to which we belong, since a man must have loyalty and this loyalty must be loyalty to something. Such a nation would allow no individual dictators. Liang thus reasoned from the "unalterable principle" of loyalty to a modern sense of popular sovereignty.

To a modern Western reader, Liang’s reasoning may sound strange. This is so not because Liang did not follow the rules of the syllogism correctly, but because the first premise by which Liang tried to reduce the traditional concept of loyalty (loyalty to a ruler) to absurdity did not sound right and proper in and of itself. The question is why a man must have loyalty, for loyalty does not sound like a modern virtue at all. Loyalty relies upon one’s emotional rather than rational choice, and it demands unconditional commitment to personal relationships, such as relationships to a master, to an owner, and to a friend. It appears that Liang was making a categorical mistake by continuing to use this concept when attempting to go beyond all interpersonal relationships. However, if we understand that this was an extremely powerful concept in the entire Chinese tradition, and if we turn to see how the nineteenth century Western philosophers of science still relied upon the concept of piety in a natural theological sense to promote intellectual change, we will understand that it was really a clever choice on Liang’s part to exploit this concept to facilitate meaning transitions. Thus, when Liang tried to reconcile the traditional concept of loyalty with the modern concept of nation, he appeared only to complete rather than to destroy the traditional understanding of loyalty. He was simply turning it from a private virtue to a public virtue.
The idea of Confucian universalism, often expressed in the phrase "all-under-heaven" (tianxia), was a more subtle obstacle to understanding the modern concept of nation. Liang did not think of all-under-Heaven as a group. All-under-Heaven assumes that there is only one ultimate group in the world. But only one group was not a group at all, for, according to Liang, a group existed in relation to another (17). Why do we have to have nations? Liang’s argument is very pragmatic. "The religionist argues the ideas of the state of Heaven, of grand harmony, of all living creatures, of universal love, and universalism. Are these not morally sublime? But when these ideas come down from the world of ideal to the world of practice, are they applicable in regard to today’s situation?" The answer was no. Liang further argued from an evolutionary perspective: "Insofar as the present is concerned, competition is the mother of civilization. Once competition stops, the progress of civilization will stop as well." Since we cannot allow the development of civilization to stop, we cannot stop competition. We must have nations because, according to Liang, a nation was the largest group in the world and competition reached its highest stage in the struggle between nations. "We can accomplish nothing with all our national borders being destroyed" (18). This "nothing" was really nothing in the view of Liang: no progression, no evolution, no survival. So it was nationalism, not universalism, that could save China. However, Liang did not reject the idea of all-under-Heaven in toto. The Confucian Grand Harmony and universalism were still a feasible social ideal for the future. Liang only questioned their practical value for the situation here and now.
An Enterprising and Adventurous Spirit

In chapter seven, "On An Enterprising and Adventurous Spirit," Liang tried to make this spirit a public virtue as well. He stated in the beginning: "There is more than one reason why European peoples are stronger than the Chinese, but the most important is that they are richly endowed with an enterprising and adventurous spirit."

This statement is followed by a number of examples taken from the modern history of the West.

After the disintegration of the Roman empire, Europe suffered from overpopulation. People were in a desperate situation of conflict. There was a man who tried overseas explorations four times and who traveled ten thousand miles alone. He remained indomitable and unyielding when the boatmen with him were becoming so disappointed and resentful about his enterprise that they tried to kill him and drink his blood. Eventually he discovered America and opened up a new world for the people. This man was Columbus, a Spaniard. When the Papal power in Rome reached its peak and had all the monarchies lying prostrate before it, a priest boldly posted his Ninety-five Theses to the church door, denouncing the evil deeds of the old church and appealing to all under Heaven by his proposed ideas. Though arrested and put to trial by the religious court, he defended himself unflinchingly against the serious charges from the Pope and many monarchs. His indefatigable spirit finally enabled him to initiate a long course of struggle for the freedom of faith and to contribute to the well-being of mankind. He was Martin Luther, a German.... (23)

Liang also mentioned the Portuguese Magellan’s round-the-world navigational expedition, the Englishman Livingstone’s exploration of the Sahara desert, the fight of the Swedish king Adophus and his soldiers’ for the survival of Protestantism, Peter the Great’s reform, the British Constitutional War led by Cromwell, the American War of Independence led by Washington, the expansion of the Napoleonic empire, the Dutchman William Egmont’s heroic struggle for national restoration, president
Lincoln's fight against a slavery system, and finally the Italian national movement directed by Mazzini (23-5).

Liang went through the modern histories of Western nations and, at the same time, made these histories into stories of enterprise and adventure. He therefore well demonstrated the point that Western peoples "are richly endowed with an enterprising and adventurous spirit." But this was not the only point Liang tried to make through these examples. He also suggested that "European peoples are stronger than the Chinese" and that enterprise and adventure were public virtues. One can hardly miss the moral tone when reading the cases Liang presented. Liang did not leave the impression that the spirit of enterprising and adventure was generated merely from self-assertiveness. On the contrary, he told us, Columbus undertook his enterprise for the noble purpose of exploring a new world for mankind; Martin Luther's fighting against the Pope was for "the freedom of faith" and "the well-being of mankind"; Adolphus's defense of Protestantism was for both mankind and God; and Peter the Great's reform was for his people. Liang was implying that all these so-called enterprises and adventures were in fact enterprises and adventures for justice. Without such a moral tone, these cases could hardly suggest to the Chinese that the West was stronger than China. An enterprising and adventurous spirit alone could not make a man strong at all from a traditional Chinese point of view. It even could not have guaranteed one's success, because one could attribute the success of Columbus, Magellan, and Livingstone to mere fortune or accident. How could one appreciate Adolphus, Peter the Great, and Napoleon if one were told that they had steered their
nations along the course of adventure simply to maintain and expand their despotisms? Even for such modern heros as Martin Luther, Washington, Lincoln, Mazzini and others, the significance of their religious and political enterprises would be discounted if these enterprises were seen as arising merely from a momentary emotional impulse.

Liang, next, was to give an account of what he believed to be the four interconnected sources of an enterprising and adventurous spirit, namely hope, zeal, wisdom, and courage. In a discussion of how hope gave rise to this spirit, Liang first told a story about Alexander the Great. At the time when Alexander the Great was about to go on an expedition to conquer Persia, he distributed all his jade, silk, and even his children to his ministers. "What's left to you, then?" the ministers asked. The emperor replied: "I leave one thing for myself, hope" (25). This story was appropriate for the issue Liang tried to raise here. To demonstrate that "the greater one's hope, the stronger one's intention to be enterprising and adventurous," Liang provided two other examples. In ancient times the duke of Yu, Gou Jian, was capable of sleeping on firewood and tasting gall for ten years because he was waiting for the opportunity to overthrow his nation's enemy. Moses could lead the Israelites to undergo hardships in wandering through the desert for forty years because these people carried in their hearts the Promise of "the happy land of Canaan covered with juicy ripe grapes and flowing with sweet milk and honey" (25-6). For Liang, hopes would not be fulfilled automatically. One must pay for the realization of one's hope, and "being enterprising and adventurous is the price" (26).
Another source was zeal. Here Liang used the term "zeal" (recheng) in the sense of zealous love or a single-minded passion. Again, Liang began his discussion with a story, this time taken from the "Biography of General Li [Guang]" in the Records of the Historian (100 BC). It was said that when General Li went out to hunt, a giant rock lying in the grass appeared to him like a tiger. Li shot at the rock and the arrow went into the rock so deeply that even its feather was submerged in the rock. When the General found out that it was a rock, he tried to shoot the rock again. But he no longer was able to make his arrow penetrate into it. So touched was he by this story, Liang said, that every time when he read it he could not help but sigh that "human beings have no defined capacity, one’s capacity is proportional to the degree of one’s zeal" (26). This time, however, he added that "zeal, when it reached to its peak, could drive people along on the way of adventure and enterprise" (27). He cited from a Western scholar: "Woman is weak, mother is strong." How could a weak woman turn to be a strong mother? "Because of the single-minded, extremely zealous love for her child." With this love, the mother "can go alone in the mountains and even the roars of tigers and wolves and the haunting of demons and monsters will not frighten her into withdrawing." Liang continued to use examples from both Chinese and Western histories to show the overwhelmingly, driving power of such a zealous love:

Zhu Shouchang abandoned a government post and reconciled himself to begging for his bread and trudging in wind and snow, because he loved his parents. Yu Ranzhi posed as a slave with his body painted and his hair in disarray, for he loved his sovereign prince. Statesman Zhuge Liang went on an expedition in spite of illness, and did not look back after taking a tearful
leave from Wuzhangyuan, for he loved his intimate friend. Cromwell risked universal condemnation by putting his emperor to death, and disbanded the Parliament twice without fear of being suspected of practicing autocracy, for he loved his people. Lincoln resolutely decided to liberate black slaves, disregarding the danger of civil war, for he loved the principle of justice and fairness. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Protestants fought against the Papal authority with indefatigable spirit. Thousands of them died for the cause without regret at the end, for they loved God and freedom... (26-7).

Love, therefore, was the key to the understanding of the cases mentioned above. It was also the key to the understanding of Columbus, of Martin Luther, of Magellan, of Livingstone, of Adolphus, of Peter the Great, of Washington, ..., and to the understanding of all the social, political, and religious enterprises and adventures that had made the modern West. Now, given such zeal and love, one could hardly see the Western spirit of enterprising and adventure as morally neutral. It was indeed a public virtue.

By making wisdom the third source of an enterprising and adventurous spirit, Liang added an intellectual component to this spirit. He argued by examples that fear must be a product of ignorance. According to him, since they did not know the truth, children and women were afraid of ghosts, and primitive people dared not go beyond what was told them by divination. Liang also appealed to the authority of tradition by pointing out that the Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming (1472-1529) had already provided the basis of this idea in his famous doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action. Liang again referred back to Western cases:

Columbus dared to sail westward across the Atlantic ocean because he was so confident in his understanding of the shape of the Earth that he believed that
there must be a Paradise at the other shore. William Gladstone insisted on proposing Irish home rule because of his faith in nationalism and in the principles of freedom and equality. He therefore understood that England and Ireland could not live in peace with each other if autonomy were not given to the Irish people... (28).

Liang was making the Chinese look even worse now. The Chinese knew relatively little about the world’s geography; their knowledge of modern politics, modern ethics, and many other things such as science and technology was also relatively poor. How could they fight with such peoples whose spirit was not only driven by hope and emotion but also guided by knowledge?

Liang acknowledged that there was a final and natural basis for the spirit of enterprise and adventure; this was what he called courage. It is easy to understand that the undertaking of adventure always needs courage. Liang noted that Napoleon said that "the word ‘difficulty’ can only be found in a fool’s dictionary" and that "the French people have no use for the word ‘unable’." Liang also quoted from the famous English admiral, Nelson. Nelson said at the age of five: "Fear? I never saw fear, I do not know what it is!" (28). These words of a five-year-old child, Liang remarked, already showed that he would become a great man in later years. Why did Liang use the example of a five-year-old kid? Of course, he was not trying to find excuses for

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7 Liang also told the story in which those words of Nelson took place. "He once went to wander alone in the mountains when he was five years old. During his wanderings, a storm broke out, and when night fell he did not return home. Thereupon his family sent people to look for him. They finally found him sitting alone in a shanty on the top of a mountain. Later his grandmother scolded him for his eccentric behavior and asked him why even such a terrifying phenomenon as the storm could not make him go home." Nelson said those words in reply to his grandmother (28. Chang’s trans. 1971, 187).
the failure of the Chinese people. He was not suggesting that the Western people were born to be great nor that they were naturally more courageous than the Chinese. He, in fact, suggested by this example that this spirit of enterprise and adventure did have a basis in man's nature. If this spirit was truly a virtue, its assertion and cultivation must not involve turning against man's nature. This, of course, was the mainstream Confucian argument.

Liang eventually came to make the Western spirit of enterprise and adventure a sound virtue. Why these four sources? Why not just courage, which was certainly considered a virtue in both the Chinese and Western traditions? While hope as a necessary component is understandable, why zeal and wisdom? Western perspectives might have suggested to Liang, from various approaches, all of these sources. Modern voluntarism from the West, for example, might have suggested to him something about the driving power of zeal and will. However, it certainly would not suggest that he synthesize zeal with wisdom, a rational component. It was primarily his own tradition that led him to bring all these four factors together and to see them as interconnected with each other. It was the Confucian tradition that emphasized the triad of "wisdom, humanity, and courage," and that preached that "The way of the superior man is threefold ... The man of wisdom has no perplexities; the man of humanity has no worry; the man of courage has no fear" (Analects. 14:30, 9:28). In such a tradition, where courage without humanity and wisdom could never be appreciated, and where humanity and wisdom had long been "like two wings, one supporting the other," it
would make little sense to say that courage, if it were a virtue at all, could stand alone without the presence of humanity and wisdom (Chan 1963, 30).\(^8\)

Liang's adaptation of his cultural perspectives so as to justify the Western spirit of enterprise and adventure is also evident in the fact that he had individuals' self-assertion play little role in those cases of enterprise and adventure. Liang's account of hope, for example, gave little room for individuals' pragmatic goals. According to the examples Liang gave, Gou Jian and Moses' hopes were pragmatic, but nevertheless individual-oriented. Liang did say that "everyone carries his own hope and runs along on an endless journey" (26). But he also suggested in what immediately follows this statement that all these individual journeys would connect, in one way or another, with the "course of civilization." Liang's real concern was not with the realization of individuals' pragmatic hopes, but with the continuity and advancement of civilization.

A Sense of Rights

In chapter 8, "On a Sense of Rights," Liang tried to promote a sense of rights in the Chinese, assuming that an ardent sense of rights was a vital element of public virtue and of a modern citizenry. According to his note, this chapter was basically a description of the main themes of The Struggle for Law (1872) written by a German jurist Rudolph Von Jhering (32). This is the only case in Liang's work in which Liang

\(^8\) According Wing-tsit Chan, "The dual emphasis [on humanity and wisdom] has been maintained throughout history, especially in Tung Chung-shu [Dong Zhongshu] (c.179-c.104 BC) and in a certain sense in K'ang Yu-wei [Kang Youwei] (1858-1927)" (ibid).
spent a whole chapter interacting with a particular Western intellectual discourse, probably through a Japanese translation.

It is the central theme of Jhering’s *The Struggle for Law* (1872) that the struggle for one’s rights is both "a duty of the person whose rights have been violated, to himself" and "a duty which he owes to society" (1879, 29; 64). For Liang, Jhering’s approach was significant in two respects. Jhering was preaching the philosophy of *fighting-back* and, what is more important, he was preaching it in an extremely moral tone.⁹ He was arguing that an attack upon an individual’s legal rights was at the same time an insult to his personality and that the individual was consequently under a *moral duty* to repel the attack. Ethics, "far from rejecting the struggle for law, enjoins it as a duty" (130). It is not surprising that Liang chose Jhering’s from among the various Western ideas of rights. He believed that Jhering’s work could serve as exactly the kind of medicine China needed to cure its illness (*A New People*, 32).

To establish Jhering’s theme that the struggle for rights was a matter of a person’s duty to himself, Liang first argued that the feeling of rights was endowed by nature. He used Jhering’s analogy of "moral pain" to make the point.

Man has four limbs and five internal organs [heart, liver, spleen, lungs, and kidneys]. They are important elements in the condition of our physical life.

⁹ Unlike many juristic theories which saw law "only as a condition of peace and of order," Jhering claimed that "The law is a warfare" (3). Rights could be obtained and maintained only through struggle. He attacked "the morality of convenience and ease" and "the practical philosophy of life, which preaches but the policy of the coward" (54, 51).
When we feel discomfort in the liver or lungs or in a finger or toe, we are anxious to cure the suffering. Physical pain is the signal of a disturbance in the organism, of the organism’s being invaded by outside forces. The cure we demand is to fight against the offender for self-preservation. The very same is true of the spiritual and moral pain caused by outside offenses. Those who have a feeling of rights, once being offended, will experience a stitch in the mind that is so strong that they are immediately compelled to fight against the cause which produces it. Those who feel no physical pain when their bodies are being hurt must be apathetic. For those who are insensitive to the violation of their rights, we can also think of them as apathetic (32. Cf. Jhering, 38-9, 57).

Liang quoted an example from Jhering’s text to show how this sense of rights worked:

An Englishman traveling to the continent will usually engage himself in refutations and arguments in the situation of being duped by inn-keepers and backmen. He will, in case of need, postpone his departure, remain days in the place and spend ten times the amount he refuses to pay. The people who do not understand him laugh at him. However, one should know that, in the few shillings which the man defends, the great England lives, and that fundamentally upon rich ideas and acute feelings of rights, the Englishmen build their country. Place an Austrian of the same social position and the same means in the place of the Englishman—how could he act? He will probably pay and leave in avoidance of all the troubles. But, in the few pieces of silver which the Englishman refuses and which the Austrian pays, there lies concealed more than one would think, of England and Austria; there lie concealed centuries of their political development and of their social change (33. Cf. Jhering 62-3).

Jhering, too, had tried to find the secrets of England’s success, which made this example particularly significant for Liang. To emphasize it, Liang cited it in the form of direct quotation. This is one of the very few cases found in the whole chapter in which Liang cited directly from Jhering. This short but vivid example was truly worth pondering for both the Austrian and the Chinese. In the original text, Jhering placed
this example at the end of his first argument, i.e., the argument for fighting-back as a personal duty. For Liang, however, the problem had not yet been solved, for the value of fighting for personal rights involving a few shillings remained questionable from the perspective of Chinese ethics. The Chinese, too, would judge the consequences of this struggle in the light of moral dignity. They, too, could not bear moral pains with patience. However, in this case, the moral pain would be more likely to be caused by deviation from the cultural norm that stressed harmony rather than conflict, and by destruction of a gentlemanly image which may have been established over years. For them, a more crucial question about this case would be: if a human right cannot bring about any good to commonwealth, why should we care? Realizing the limitation of this example for persuasion, Liang provided his readers with another example, one which he believed to be more significant and convincing.

If one suspects that this case is insignificant, let’s speak of a more considerable one. Suppose there are two nations. One of them has, contrary to law, taken from another a square mile of barren, worthless land. Shall the latter remain silent or shall it fight and even go to war? ... From the nation which allowed its neighbor to deprive it of one square mile of territory with silence, ten square miles, a hundred, a thousand also would be taken, until nothing remained to it to call its own, and it had ceased to exist as a state ... (34. Cf. Jhering 24-5).

This example of a square mile was also drawn from Jhering. It is important to know that Jhering used this example long before he applied the example of a few shillings. We may view these two examples as demonstrating two categorically different cases: assertion of national rights and assertion of personal rights. In Jhering’s argument, the example of a few shillings carries more weight than the example of a square mile. In
Liang’s case, however, Liang introduced the example of a square mile as "a more considerable one." Why such different treatments? It is worth analysis.

One obvious cause of this difference may be the differences between these two men’s preoccupation. "The individual is the starting point of Jhering’s philosophy" (Hedemann 1932, 400). His major concern was with the struggle for personal rights, not for national rights. The example of a square mile was significant to Jhering simply because it could be used to introduce the argument for assertion of individual rights. Since it is so commonly recognized that "a nation should have resources to arms, for the sake of a square mile of territory," then, "why not also the peasant for the sake of his strip of land?" (Jhering, 25) However, for Liang, the assertion of individual rights was not the issue, but the assertion of a nation’s rights or a group’s rights. Individual rights in the case of a few shillings was important, because it had a potential effect on a nation’s condition for survival. Assertion of Rights, for Liang, could never be a mere personal matter. Giving up assertion of rights could lead to giving up a whole nation’s right to survive.

Jhering had appealed to one of the most fundamental principles of moral and legal judgment of his time: the inviolability of individual rights. Any infringing upon individual rights, to him, was both unjust and illegal. It was based on this principle that he asserted: "resistance to injustice, the resistance to wrong in the domain of law, is a duty of all who have legal rights to themselves" (28). Liang, too, tried to resort

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10 No wonder we read very self-assertive lines in Jhering’s moral arguments. He claimed:
to the moral principles of his time, which stressed the primacy of the group over the individual. Thanks to Jhering’s one square mile example, Liang had a way to connect assertion of individual rights to the public interests of a nation.

There was, of course, a very practical reason why Liang had to arrange Jhering’s examples as he did. From the hypothetical example of one square mile, Liang now could turn naturally to address the exigency of China, whose thousands of square miles were unfortunately being taken and occupied by other nations. Liang compared China with Japan, with the same intent with which Jhering compared the Austrians and the Englishmen. Liang compared the two nations’ attitudes toward the issue of national rights to territory.

Forty years ago an American warship reached Japan and tried merely to survey its seashore. What happened to the Japanese people? All Japanese, whether they were officials, literati, peasants, workers, merchants, monks, or laymen, glowered at the enemy and gnashed their teeth in hatred, raised their hands and shouted, the whole nation rose like a growing wind and surging waves. With such a national sentiment of rights Japan finally protected its lands and achieved its success in reform. During the same period in China, our Yuan

If mere chance were to put me in possession of an object, I might be deprived of it without any injury to my person, but it is not chance, but my will, which establishes a bond between myself and it, and even my will only at the price of the past labor of myself or of another; --it is a part of my own strength and of my own past, or of the strength and past of another, which I possess and assert in it. In making it my own, I stamped it with the mark of my own person; whoever attacks it, attacks me; the blow dealt it strikes me, for I am present in it. Property is but the periphery of my person extended to things (55).

It is quite understandable that the above self-assertive voice did not find echoes in Liang’s version of the argument. In a nation where the periphery of an individual was not clearly defined at all, how could one expect to extend this periphery to the things he owned or created? Using the mine-is-mine principle for moral judgment was ridiculous for the Chinese.
Ming Park was burned by other people, we were compelled to sign the humiliating Nanking Treaty, to cede Hong Kong, and to open five coast cities. But what happened to the feeling of our people? ... To sum it up in a sentence: we have no sense of rights at all! (34-5)

If the example of a few shillings did not make the Chinese feel any discomfort, the above comparison was bound to put them to shame. They should feel ashamed of not having fought back as strongly as did the Japanese, and ashamed of not having a sense of rights. However, it was the sense of national rights that was in question, not the sense of individual rights.

Liang also introduced the other part of Jhering’s argument, the argument for fighting-back as a social duty. This time he adopted Jhering’s battle example, with some minor changes:

... If there are a thousand men in a fight, the defection of one may make no difference. But if a hundred or several hundreds of them flee the battle, what will happen? The position of those who remain faithful becomes more and more perilous; the whole weight of the battle falls on them alone ... (36-7. Cf. Jhering 67).

In Liang’s version, we see this example playing a key role in this part of the argument. Again, Liang had missed Jhering’s point. This argument was nonetheless fundamental for Jhering. Even in this second part of the argument, the argument for the "common cause," Jhering still stressed individual rights. "The battler for constitutional law and the law of nations is none other than the battler for private law ... What is sowed in private law is reaped in public law and the law of nations.... Private law, not public law, is the real school of the political education of the people ...." (93). That is why
Jhering used the shillings example again (94). For Jhering, the real winners were the individual rights, not the community rights. It was the individual rights that Jhering fundamentally celebrated. This point, however, was totally ignored by Liang.

Jhering's arguments are not limited to the use of those analogies (e.g., "moral pain") and examples we have discussed. But the arguments Liang introduced from Jhering's text are primarily these arguments by analogies and examples. After the above analysis, it is not difficult for us to understand why Liang loved these analogies and examples.

On Liberty

"No freedom, better to die! These words truly expressed the spirit on which the eighteenth and nineteenth century European and American nations had been founded," Liang said in the opening sentence of his chapter nine on liberty (40). The Chinese term ziyu, "freedom," literally means "self-direction." It evinces little self-evident truth to the Chinese mind due to its strong egocentric and atomic connotations. However, China at the turn of this century did need the virtue of freedom to replace the so-called "slave mentality," if China wanted to survive and to be strong.11 Liang

11 Liang wrote to his master Kang Youwei in 1900: "Today we see the catastrophic culmination of the corruption and degeneration that have afflicted China in the past few thousand years. The prime source of this corruption and decay must be traced to the slavish character [of the Chinese people]. And this so-called liberty is what is needed to make people conscious of their own character and thus to enable them to shake free from control by others. This illness [of slavishness] cannot possibly be cured without taking the medicine of liberty" (Ding, 1:125. Quoted in Chang 1971, 192).
cited a variety of cases from modern Western history including the religious reform of Martin Luther, the political revolutions in England, America, and France, ..., the national struggles in Holland, Italy, Hungary, ..., and even the united strikes of working people in the past few decades. Whether these movements fought for religious, political, national, or economic liberty, Liang asserted, they all fought to achieve the liberal ideal--"No freedom, better to die" (40-44).

But what did this ideal of freedom exactly mean? In answering this question, Liang tried to justify three notions of freedom, i.e., the notions of collective freedom, freedom according to the laws, and freedom of the mind. For Liang, these three notions were crucial to the understanding of freedom as a moral ideal and a public virtue. According to a collective notion of freedom, Liang stated explicitly that the concept of freedom could not be applied to individuals.

Man cannot survive without [living in] groups. If a group fails to protect itself from other groups’ invasion, oppression, and robbery, then where is individual freedom? Let’s use the analogy of the body. If the mouth abuses its freedom and does not choose food with care, it will sooner or later lose its freedom when serious diseases arise. If the hand abuses its freedom and holds a spear to kill people, it will lose its freedom when punishments finally come. Therefore, to be moderate in eating and drinking and cautious in acting and moving is just the way to keep all parts of our body in freedom (46).

In this argument about the exclusive notion of collective freedom, did Liang present some aspects of Western liberalism? Yes. But I am afraid that he did not touch on the core of modern Western liberalism, whose "most appropriate and original name," as Guido de Ruggiero remarks, "is the liberties of the individual" (1959, 51). In the case of the thought of Rousseau (1712-1778), "the most eloquent exponent of Western
liberalism in Liang's mind" (Chang 1971, 192), Liang did express Rousseau's idea that "each person gives himself whole and entire" to his association (Rousseau 1987c, 148). Even the above analogy might have been created under the inspiration of Rousseau's well-known notion of the "body politic."  

12 However, Liang did not present, at the same time, Rousseau's more fundamental idea that human associations must be founded on the basis of individual freedom.  

13 Nor did he appeal to Rousseau's rousing assertion that "man is born free," which indeed laid the ultimate rationale for the French Revolution (1987c, 141). It is wrong to say that Liang completely misunderstood the essence of modern Western liberalism. Liang understood Rousseau well enough to say, in his "A Study of Rousseau's Thought" written in the same year he wrote this chapter, that there were two parts of Rousseau: one emphasized individual freedom and the other emphasized collective freedom. Liang even realized

12 Rousseau said: "The body politic, taken individually, can be considered to be like a body that is organized, living and similar to that of a man. The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs are the brain, source of the nerves and seat of the understanding, the will and the senses, of which the judges and magistrates are the organs; the commerce, industry and agriculture are the mouth and stomach which prepare the common subsistence; the public finances are the blood that is discharged by a wise economy, performing the functions of the heart, in order to distribute nourishment and life throughout the body; the citizens are the body and members that make the machine move, live and work, and that cannot be harmed in any part without a painful impression immediately being transmitted to the brain, if the animal is in a state of good health" (1987b, 114). Liang quoted this analogy of "body politic" in his "A Study of Rousseau’s Thought" (102-03).

13 Cf. Rousseau: "'Find a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before?' This is the fundamental problem for which the social contract provides the solution" (1987c, 148).
that the former part bore more on "Rousseau's real intention" (1902, 103). But for Liang, what was more significant for Rousseau's "real intention" was not important compared with what was more significant for his own concern for the survival of China at the turn of this century. As far as the national crisis of China was concerned, individual freedom must be sacrificed for the sake of national freedom.

Liang also argued that "civilized freedom is freedom under the law." Under such freedom, "every one acts like the rhythmical operation of machinery. Every one moves like the military drilling of soldiers" (45). In this respect, Liang appeared to argue for the ideas of Montesquieu (1689-1755), another favorite Western master of his. In his introductory article, "The Thought of the Great Jurist Montesquieu" (1902), Liang quoted from Montesquieu that "Liberty is the right to do everything the laws permit" (23. Cf. Montesquieu 1989, bk.11). Interestingly, at the time when Liang quoted it, he was quite critical of it. He said that Montesquieu had created a paradox between the notion of freedom and the notion of law in this statement (23-4).14 This time, however, Liang tried to reconcile this conflict, even though his use of the two analogies, "the rhythmical operation of machinery" and "the military drilling of soldiers," tended to create a keener sense of the conflict. To reconcile them, Liang argued from a social Darwinian perspective instead of a Montesquieuian perspective.

There is no group in the world that can compete effectively with others while failing to put itself in order. Since outside competition never stops, the

14 The basic point Liang tried to make in his critique is that laws were also man-made. To him, it seemed that there was no way to guarantee that a law would be made by law-makers only for public interests (ibid).
cooperation within a group for the purpose of outside competition can never come to an end. If we abuse our freedom, and intrude into the freedom of others within the group, and, as a result, infringe upon the freedom of the group, the group will no longer fend for itself. It can even be reduced to a slave of other groups. Then, what freedom can we have? So a truly free man must be able to submit himself. Submit to what? To the laws (45).

So the Chinese must have laws for their freedom, but the freedom of their nation, not the freedom of individuals. While, for Montesquieu, the spirit of law was primarily to protect individual freedom and equality from being violated by other people, for Liang, it was to secure, in a final sense, the liberty and independence of a group.\(^\text{15}\)

In the second half of the chapter, Liang appeared to take an individualistic approach to freedom. But what he in fact argued was freedom of the mind. This was also Kant’s idea. In his "The Thought of Foremost Modern Philosopher Kant" (1902), Liang spoke highly of Kant’s distinction between internal and external freedom.\(^\text{16}\) In this chapter, when arguing the primacy of internal freedom over external freedom, however, Liang relied very little upon Kant’s terms. "Every man has a dual self," Liang claimed (46). He quoted the Daoist Zhuangzi’s maxim: "Of all causes for sorrow there is none so great as the death of the mind; --the death of man’s [body] comes next" (ch.21). Following this logic, Liang said: "Of all causes for humiliation there is none so great as our minds’ being enslaved, while our bodies’ being enslaved

\(^\text{15}\) Like Rousseau, Montesquieu also believed that in the state of nature man was born equal. "As soon as men are in society ... the equality that was among them ceases." Only laws can bring equality to human society (cf. 1989, 7-9).

\(^\text{16}\) Kant made this distinction in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and many other of his writings in moral philosophy (e.g. Kant 1949, sec.3).
is the least" (47). The reason was that, when our mind was enslaved, it was enslaved by us. "It is not imposed upon by outside forces; nor can it be saved by them." "Real freedom must be first of all the freedom of the mind" (47). So, in a fundamental sense, the problem was not that the West and Japan invaded China. It was even not that the Chinese government oppressed the people. The problem lay in the mind of the Chinese people themselves. That was why China needed a moral revolution.

Liang further argued that there were four specific kinds of self-enslavements. They were enslavement by the ancient sages, enslavement by fashions and conventions, enslavement by the environment, and enslavement by passions and desires. But, for Liang, there was no enslavement by human knowledge, no enslavement by cultural values, no enslavement by moral norms, and, particularly, no enslavement by senses of social duties. So-called spiritual freedom was, in Liang’s mind, in fact, freedom that must contribute to the progressive evolution of a nation or a group. There was nothing wrong with the ancient sages in this regard. It was our fault to disregard the progression of society and to worship their words which were given only for the solution of the problems of their time. The exact following of fashions and conventions was wrong because it discouraged creation and evolution. By enslavement by the environment Liang meant a kind of blind faith in fate, which negated any efforts at making China strong. Finally, enslavement by passions and desires had to be stopped because it gave little place to lofty ideals and exalted ambitions (47-50). In short, in arguing for spiritual liberation from all these enslavements, Liang was not
arguing for it as a private virtue, which emphasized only the moral perfection of an individual personality. He was arguing for it as a public virtue.

Whether or not Liang truly understood modern Western liberalism is not the question of this chapter. However, he did show a great degree of consistency and coherency in approaching those Western liberal ideas which were taken from so different sources. This consistency and coherency could be explained by his preoccupation with chun [group] and by his concern for the situation of China.

**Conclusion**

There are several factors on Liang's part that contributed to the success of *A New People*. Liang skillfully and effectively preached on modern Western virtues by exploiting the traditional modes of argumentation, which emphasized the use of argument by examples, argument by analogies, argument from consequences, and argument from authority. He presented and argued for these virtues as the solution to one of the most fundamental moral conflicts of the time, that between the increasingly recognized modern values and the long-held Confucian ethical goals. In doing so, however, Liang did not try to reject traditional ethics in essence. He merely tried to correct a "deviation." Although many of his critiques appeared radical, he criticized traditional ethics from the perspective of the tradition itself. He did not condemn traditional ethics for not being "private" enough, but blamed it for not being "selfless" enough. His reasoning accorded well with the trend of traditional Chinese modes of thinking and of value judgments. He did not attempt to turn his readers around, but
simply pointed out that within their ideal line of sight there was an unknown happy land, a true paradigm of moral cultivation. He was, therefore, making his proposal of moral revolution or reform appear acceptable, both intellectually or emotionally, to the Chinese of that time.
CONCLUSION

Four Rhetorical/Interpretative Strategies

Of the rhetorical and interpretative tactics these three Chinese writers applied, four proved to be extremely significant in making Western ideas comprehensible in the Chinese context.

First, all of the three rhetors argued that they were not just presenting Western ideas, but also presenting significant solutions to the exigency of their time. By referring to the failures of the previous self-strengthening and reform programs and to the long-standing Chinese Way, they convinced the Chinese that only a spiritual and moral reform/revolution could finally bring China out of its critical situation. It was precisely in this particular historical, social, and rhetorical context that they introduced those Western ideas, which, they believed, were the keys to the success of the modern West. Liang proposed that moral renovation of the people by introducing Western public virtues was "a task of top priority in the present situation of China," given that "we wish the nation to be secure, rich, and honored" (ch. 1). Yan had Huxley "reiterate matters such as self-strengthening and the preservation of the race," though self-strengthening and the preservation of the race were not the original issues of
Huxley's text at all. Tan Sitong, on the other hand, argued that not only his four-billion countrymen but also the whole world could be saved by an egalitarian view of humanity (sec. 44).

Second, none of the three rhetors tried to suggest that the ideas they introduced from the West and elsewhere were so entirely new and revolutionary that the adoption of them demanded a total break with the Chinese tradition. Yan tried to demonstrate that many of Huxley's ideas "are in accord with what our ancient sages have said" (his preface to *Heavenly Evolution*). The idea of *xinmin* [renovation of the people], for Liang, "does not mean that our people must give up entirely what is old in order to follow others." It simply meant to "improve what is original in the people" while adopting what is originally lacking in the people (*A New People*, ch. 3). Tan had a similar attitude toward Western learning. It is not surprising that he "became more and more determined to promote new learning" after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, but ended up writing on *ren*, one of the time-honored subjects in the Chinese tradition (Liang 1899, 37).

In fact, the three rhetors gained more by explicitly identifying themselves with the spirit of tradition than by going against it. In the case of Tan, in attacking the traditional conception of human relations, Tan claimed that he was not attacking Confucius, but rather those of his followers who had distorted the Master's words. Thus, by identifying himself with the humanistic tradition of Confucianism, Tan granted himself the authority to reinterpret this tradition. Liang declared that public morality and private morality were not mutually exclusive but mutually inclusive terms
(A New People, 118). He then could deduce his new moral system from the "unalterable principles" of Confucian ethics. As for Yan, he not only claimed in his preface to Heavenly Evolution that there were similarities between Huxley’s ideas and those of the Chinese tradition, he also substantiated this claim by adopting words and ideas from the Chinese classics to render the crucial points of Heavenly Evolution. Largely in this way he was able to shorten the distance between his paraphasic translation and the Chinese readers.

Third, the three writers defined the terms for understanding these Western self-assertive ideas by approaching them from a strictly collectivist standpoint, a standpoint that had been taken for granted in the Chinese tradition. Liang’s notions of rights, liberty, an enterprising and adventurous spirit, and the like were collective, not individual concepts. The ideal of equality advocated by Tan was one which had no place for the individual personality. For Yan, it was groups, not individuals, that struggled for existence. The idea of chun [group], therefore, became the secure medium between these Western ideas and the Chinese tradition. While this collectivistic approach did make a lot of sense to the Chinese at that time, it unavoidably distorted the original ideas.

Fourth, all of the three discourses exploited the powerful Chinese modes of argumentation as they presented Western ideas. Their tendency to use argument from consequences is evident in their highlighting the significance of those Western ideas in dealing with the national crisis of China. However, it would be mistaken to say that the three rhetors were offering their countrymen nothing more than a makeshift
measure for getting China out of its crisis of survival. In his "translation," Yan successfully suggested that heavenly evolution or natural evolution would eventually lead to improvement of morality and that the ethically best would sooner or later become the fittest in a cosmic process. Liang also argued that his new system of public morality could remedy the bias of the traditional "private morality" and therefore could serve as a more perfect program for producing a morally sound person. For Tan, how much could one gain from his theory of humanity, a theory that aimed to "sweep away all obstacles and break free of all toils"?

The three authors also relied heavily upon argument from the authorities of their tradition, though the sources of authority they drew upon were somewhat different for each. Tan cited a variety of sources--from the teachings of Confucius, Mencius, Mozi, and Zhuangzi to the sacred words of Buddha and Jesus--to support his egalitarian interpretation. Liang appealed to the Confucian principles of filial piety and loyalty in his campaign for public morality (see particularly his chs. 5 and 6). Although the very act of translation prevented Yan from quoting the classics of his tradition directly, he made use of indirect citation from them in almost all the crucial parts of his translation. For example, he applied the well-known statement from the Book of Changes that "The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is production and reproduction" to substitute for the originally neutral description of the "mighty instinct" of multiplication.

Argument by analogies played a crucial role in the formulation of these three rhetors’ new systems. By resort to the modern notions of ether and electricity, two
variations on qi, Tan established a radical notion of universal body and the idea of immediate flow of sensation throughout this universal body, which further grounded his egalitarian interpretation of humanity. These analogies, for Tan, were nonetheless mechanistic types of analogies. Liang introduced a modern notion of nation from the analogy of the family. He also argued for an innate sense of rights by comparing this sense to the "physical pain" one felt when one's organism was being invaded by outside forces. Yan, too, added a wealth of analogic expressions to vivify and enforce his interpretation of Huxley.

These three writers were all inclined to use concrete examples drawn from daily life and from history to present abstract ideas. In addition, they also show a great tendency to apply parallelism and antithesis in their arguments. Although I did not highlight this tendency in Tan and Liang's texts, it is amply apparent in the passages I quoted.

These Chinese modes of argumentation provided the three rhetors with easy ways to build the Western ideas for which they argued into the structure of Chinese consciousness. However, while these Western ideas were thus made comprehensible in the Chinese context, they had been reconstructed partially or completely. Liang was bound to give more credit to Western ethics than to traditional Chinese ethics by identifying the former with gongde [public morality] and the latter with side [private morality], since the Chinese had traditionally believed that gong [public, collectivism, altruism] was inherently superior to si [private, individualism, selfishness]. However, by such identifications, Liang was also bound to ignore any individualistic motives and
concerns that lay behind the moral practice of the West. How Chinese Huxley sounded when he was made to proclaim that "[t]he great virtue of Heaven and Earth is production and reproduction"? And then, how far was he removed from the brutal reality of Darwinism? For the same reason, the modern analogies of ether, electricity, and nerve did not serve, for Tan, to illustrate the Newtonian notion of world-machine. Instead, they all came to demonstrate the all-embracing principle of ren [humanity]. "Ren alone exists in heaven and earth!"

Five general conclusions follow from my analysis of these rhetorical strategies whereby Western ideas were interpreted for the Chinese audiences. These conclusions may apply more generally to all cultural interpretations of foreign ideas, whether in China or in other parts of the world.

First, we might speculate that intellectual transaction between cultures is always initiated by the "taker" or "host culture" rather than by the "giver" or "quest culture." The transaction occurs only when the "taker" or "host culture" decides to respond intellectually to some aspects of the foreign ideas. This means that in this kind of intercultural communication the native interpreter, not the original author, is the real speaker to the native audience, though he/she may think of himself/herself as merely speaking for a foreign school of thought. The scholar studying this intercultural communication phenomenon should focus primarily on examining the indigenous culture to uncover the basic motives for the transaction.

Second, rhetoric is indeed culture-bound. This suggests that if an introduced foreign doctrine is made to sound persuasive in a cultural context, it is not necessarily
due to the rhetoric of the original speaker (e.g., Huxley) but to the rhetoric of the interpreter/introducer (e.g., Yan). The rhetorical critic should pay particular attention to the ways in which the interpreter adapts the original arguments to his/her cultural modes of argumentation.

Third, while some individuals may approach foreign ideas from purely scholarly interest, a cultural movement toward foreign learning such as the one we observe in this study is necessarily motivated by very pragmatic and practical social needs. The Chinese acceptance of a Darwinian world view at the turn of this century was by no means a purely intellectual choice. It was, as Yan suggested, fundamentally a moral choice.

Fourth, a social campaign for foreign ideas and doctrines is always situated in certain historical, social, and rhetorical contexts. In other words, this campaign is part of the response to a particular situation. This situation-related feature can explain the native interpreter's decisions to take in those parts of foreign learning that can most potentially meet the social urgency, and to focus and elaborate on those aspects of the chosen foreign ideas that may guide his/her countrymen to deal with their unique situation.

Fifth, as a further conclusion from the above four, notions of "reception" and "assimilation" of foreign ideas and theories can be very misleading insofar as they assume that the native interpreters simply transmit the foreign ideas unchanged. I have shown that at least in these three cases there is a process of creative interpretation, a process which is guided by sensitivity to the rhetorical situation. This means that
when we talk about Chinese responses to, say, Huxley based on Yan Fu's translation, we really are not talking about Chinese responses to Huxley any more, but about Chinese responses to Yan Fu's re-creation of Huxley in this cultural context. The above general conclusions, of course, are by no means absolute. Rather, they are amenable to testing by further case studies.

It should be pointed out that there is a question about these three men's level of consciousness about what they were doing, a question which I did not discuss directly in this dissertation. This topic presents itself as an interesting subject for further study. In the case of Yan Fu, there is no question that he was consciously changing the words of Huxley, since the alterations are so obvious. The question is whether Yan, Tan, and Liang were consciously altering the Western ideas. This is a very complex question, for it can in turn be broken down into three further questions: whether were they consciously altering (1) the ideas presented in the given Western texts, (2) the ideas of the original authors, or (3) the essence of those ideas which, they believed, were generally held by Westerners? The last question is most relevant to these three cases because these men, especially Tan and Liang, believed that they were presenting Western ideas, i.e., ideas that associated with the Western cultures, not just attributable to particular authors.

The answer to the third question is probably "no," for all of the three interpreters truly believed that they were not just presenting Western ideas, but also preaching the gospel, true testimonies from the successful modern West. These men, who unavoidably understood those Western ideas from their own cultural context, were
so certain of their interpretations that they probably did not realize that they were simply presenting their own account of the modern success of the West.

Answering the first and the second questions definitively would require a lengthy study of these works from other perspectives. It is possible that the three writers did not realize at all that they were changing the ideas of the texts or the ideas of the authors while changing their words. No one is objective, everyone sees what he/she expects to see. These men were no exception. It is also possible that they were highly aware of what they were doing with these particular texts or authors. However, insofar as they believed that they were transmitting the essence of Western culture, their acts could still be justified. Yan, for example, was certain that the idea of the fittest and the idea of the ethically best were two sides of the same coin. He would surely have been shocked by the realization that Huxley saw them as in conflict. Yan had a perfect reason to believe that such a "confusion" was something that ought not to be present in the text.

These questions about the level of awareness raise another issue, that of the ethics of interpretation. It seems to me that the traditional criteria for judging the propriety of an interpretative act can no longer be applied in these cases. This is because we cannot really say that Yan, Tan, and Liang were simply lying when they were consciously or unconsciously making those changes, since for them their acts were morally justified in a broader context.

The point here is that there is an ethical dimension of this cultural reinterpretation or re-creation that can make distortion of foreign ideas even more
likely. We tend to attribute the problem of distortion to incompetence with the languages or to individual interpreters' deliberate misrepresentations, under the assumption that distortion is entirely avoidable if competent and ethical translators can be found. But in fact, there is a moral justification for such cultural reinterpretation or re-creation of foreign ideas. If the ethics of interpretation elicits not only a sense of responsibility to transmit the truth of the words, but also a sense of obligation to convey their ultimate truth, distortion of an foreign idea is, indeed, unavoidable. This is so because every culture has its own interpretation of the ultimate truth.

I should also point out that, whatever these three writers' level of awareness, I believe that the rhetorical strategies they used to guide the reader to understand and accept their intention would have remained more or less the same.

One further element may shed some light on the question of their level of awareness of their rhetorical adaptations, that being the differing levels of their language skills. Yan had the most English. He spent two years studying in London and interacted directly with Westerners. However, how well he came to know the Western cultures and people in those two years is questionable. During Liang's exile in Japan (1898-1907) he learned Western ideas and theories largely from Japanese sources. As for Tan, he never went abroad nor did he know English. He had to rely on Chinese translations and the interpretations made by Western missionaries and their Chinese associates. This fact implies that the three men's knowledge about Western ideas was very limited. It is interesting that Tan, the person with the least direct exposure to foreign texts, was the most radical in his ideas. While this may be
coincidence, it does suggest that the degree of facility in English and the amount of
direct exposure to Western learning did not necessarily determine the degree of one’s
iconoclasm, and thus a greater need to adapt the discourse to the Chinese audience.

**Major Contributions of This Study**

Since this is an interdisciplinary study relating to both intercultural
communication and rhetoric, in this section I would like to focus on its potential
contributions to these two fields.

This study contributes to intercultural communication not only by its new inputs
to the literature, but also through its choice of subject matter. It explores particular
kinds of intercultural communication events which have rarely been considered by
scholars of intercultural communication. The interactions analyzed here differ from
those commonly considered in the intercultural communication literature insofar as (1)
they took place in the past rather than the present, (2) they involved public discourses,
with the speaker/writer being the interpreter or spokesman of a foreign doctrine or
idea, rather than, say, direct and private interpersonal exchange, and (3) the
transactions were intellectual rather than business meetings or social events. These
intellectual transactions involved dialogues between two complex cultural systems
rather than between individuals, and they were conducted with a high degree of
awareness of the differing intellectual traditions. Such a degree of awareness and
reflection is usually absent in the face-to-face mode of conversation with a foreigner
or in the viewing of foreign TV programs. This study suggests that intercultural
communication can and should be expanded to study these particular kinds of communicative interchanges between cultures. Further, the five general conclusions discussed above may be used as working hypotheses for further research into intercultural communication of this kind.

As for the contribution of this study to rhetoric, I have argued here that the great modern intellectual movement of China at the turn of this century was rhetorically engineered. This observation reaffirms the present-day drive to extend the traditional scope of rhetorical inquiry. It implies that rhetorical scholars can profitably examine not only large-scale intellectual movements and revolutions in scientific thought but intercultural materials as well.

This study reaffirms what has long been considered axiomatic for rhetoric and communication, i.e., the principle that the successful speaker/writer always adapts to the audience/reader. The Chinese rhetors who spoke for the West were no exception to this rule. But this does not mean that the rhetor can do no more than conform to his audience. These studies were intended to demonstrate as well how these three Chinese writers successfully opened up a new horizon for their audience in the very process of adapting to its basic cultural assumptions.

In addition, this study is an addition to the small but growing body of Western-language studies of Chinese rhetoric. In particular, it illustrates the enduring power of the Chinese rhetorical tradition even during the prolonged and challenging encounter with new and radical Western ideas.
I would like to close this section with some thoughts on the methodological significance of this analysis. In these three cases studies I have attempted to refine Bitzer’s notion of rhetorical situation and to expand its scope by applying it cross-culturally. I hope these analyses have shown that the notion of rhetorical situation can be an even more powerful tool of analysis if understood from a more dynamic and holistic viewpoint. First, I have proposed that the construal of a particular rhetorical situation may need to take account of the power of a culture’s discourse traditions. Further, I have viewed audience, a crucial element of the rhetorical situation, under two aspects; it may be considered as the potential audience for new discourses and as those who have been brought up in a particular discourse tradition. In addition, I have suggested that rhetorical exigency does not exist so much in the outside world as in the mind of the audience, in this case, those who felt that traditional frameworks no longer provided them with satisfactory answers about a changing world.

Thus, this study suggests a larger perspective for understanding the nature of a rhetorical situation. Bitzer has emphasized that a social event invites and may even demand rhetorical responses. But he did not go further to point out that this invitation is often more than an invitation to explicate the event and to recommend an appropriate reaction. In crises, this invitation may also be for reassessment and reinterpretation of a traditional world view. In such situations people want to know not only what has happened and how they should respond, but also whether the customary assumptions remain effective for explaining the world and orienting one’s life. If not, how can they be readjusted or reinterpreted so as to be preserved in a
shifting situation? In this sense, every unexpected great social event is bound to raise a profound challenge for rhetors-- how to guarantee the continuity and integration of the culturally-given meaning of life. Without taking this serious question into consideration, we may fail to understand the nature of the situations in which those three discourses emerged, not only to respond to the national crisis of China, but also to the demand for reconstruction of meaningful frameworks for life orientation in critically novel circumstances.

I also propose that one sees a rhetorical situation as both determining and determined by discourses, rather than seeing discourse as an isolated element of a rhetorical act. A perceived rhetorical situation has the power to invite discourse. However, even the preliminary perception of a situation demands interpretation. The development of a nation-wide sense of urgency such as the one that dominated China at the turn of this century involves a complex course of rhetorical interactions. Before Yan, there was already much hue and cry about the danger of wangguo miezhong [national subjugation and genocide] among the coastal reformist and even the self-strengthening rhetors (e.g., Chang Zhitong). That is why Yan could immediately catch his countrymen's attention by claiming the special relevance of his translation of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics to "self-strengthening and the preservation of the race." From this perspective, Yan did not just respond to the objective historical events (e.g., the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95), but also to the urgent necessity of maintaining a discourse tradition that had developed to account for the changing situations of China.
Yan, of course, added something new to this tradition, i.e., a "Darwinian" justification of this concern about the modern fate of China.

Discourses not only respond to a situation but also define it in such a way as to maintain a meaningful course of life within a particular cultural tradition. The self-strengthening and reformist rhetors in the second half of the nineteenth century came to understand their situations within frameworks formulated by their predecessors. Their responsive and creative discourses in turn provided the next generation with frameworks within which new situations were assessed and interpreted.

Continuity of the Paradigms

Yan, Tan, and Liang’s interpretive frameworks have had an enormous impact on the minds of later generations. The evolution of Sun Yexian’s (Sun Yat-sen’s) attitude toward the Western ideas of freedom and equality suggests that he in fact did not exceed the perspective presented in Liang’s A New People, even though he became a political enemy of Liang’s by advocating a violent revolution against the Qing dynasty (cf. Wang 1986). During the May Fourth era (1915-25) a new generation of modern Chinese intelligentsia emerged. Disappointed by the tradition, they began to challenge the previous theories which had explicitly identified them with the legacy of the past in one way or another. They called for a totalistic break with the tradition and China’s "wholesale Westernization." However, upon careful examination, their conception of the ideal of the new youth did not go much beyond Liang’s conception of the ideal of the new people. A distinct feature of the May Fourth intellectual
movement lies in its recognition of the value of individualism. Chen Duxiu, a most influential figure of this movement, stated explicitly that "Western nations are oriented toward the individual" (1915). However, as Chang Hao has demonstrated, a basic concern for the group persisted even in the most iconoclastic minds at that time (1989, 45-50). The exalted ideas of group and society continued to serve for cultural iconoclasts like Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi as a significant conflict mediator between self-assertion and social commitment. For example, Chen Duxiu stated that "a real life is an immortal life one receives from society" (1920). Hu Shi also held a similar view. After the May Fourth era, the emergence of Mao Zedong's model of communism may be seen, in a way, as a triumph of traditional collectivism and of the ideal of datong [grand harmony]. For Mao and his followers, Marxism was by no means a Western model of individualism, but a perfect model of collectivism. The modern history of China indicates that the cultural iconoclasts in the 1910s-1920s and those after them did not fundamentally transcend the paradigms established by Yan, Tan, Liang, and other influential writers of the early modern Chinese intelligentsia in the transitional era. This may explain why the historical drama of 1919 in which the Peking students went out on strike and demonstrated for democracy was replayed again in Tiananmen Square after seventy years.
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