A BOMBSIGHT FOR A FREIGHT TRAIN: THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD, AIR DEFENSE, AND FEDERALIZATION, 1946-1950

A Thesis

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"An air arm is about as useful to the governor of a sovereign state as a bombsight to a freight train."

For L.L.H.

A Scholar and A Gentleman,
Salutamus Te
Acknowledgement

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FRANK L. HOWE
INTRODUCTION

The real and imagined successes of airpower during World War II assured the existence of a postwar Air National Guard. By 1945 it was only a matter of time before the Army Air Forces would become the United States Air Force. When that happened the twenty-nine observation squadrons that constituted the prewar Guard air arm would, along with newer units, become part of the new service.

The National Guard had been the first line reserve force since the passage of the Dick Act in 1903. The Air National Guard in fulfilling its initial mission of continental air defense had to be more than that. As Air Guardsmen were fond of saying, the ANG was "part of the first team." It had to be. Lieutenant General George Stratemeyer, first commander of the modern Air Defense Command (ADC), had virtually nothing else with which to work. Stratemeyer curbed his aversion to "the militia" because he knew that the accomplishment of the most vital part of ADC's vast and amorphous mission depended on the Air National Guard.

Attempts by both Headquarters Air Defense Command and Continental Air Command to gain operational control (or "command jurisdiction") of the Air Guard ended with very limited success. While the Air Guard received generally obsolescent aircraft and support equipment (and the Air Force Reserve foundered with even more meagre funds and few combat
aircraft), Stratemeyer attempted to make the ANG into a credible air defense force. After ADC was absorbed by Continental Air Command (CONAC), Lieutenant General Ennis Whitehead, Stratemeyer's successor, refought the battles of his predecessor for command of the Air Guard units with which he was supposed to defend the continental United States.

The status of the Air National Guard was paradoxical to both generals. It was a reserve component and part of the "regular establishment," but could be commanded only occasion ally. It was axiomatic to each that he must command in peace the forces he would lead into war. The generals' position was seen by most Guardsmen as a calculated, thinly- veiled attempt to supplant the Guard with a federally-con- trolled reserve force, anathema to the leaders of the National Guard.

The men who ran the National Guard Association of the United States (and thus the National Guard) feared abolition of the Guard. Guard Association President Ellard A. Walsh, of Minnesota, and his close friend and colleague, Milton A. Reckord of Maryland, saw the Air Guard as a vehicle through which a single, federally-controlled reserve component would begin. They chose to view the ANG in a rather narrow and secular 'old Army' frame of reference. This required them to insist that Air Guard units perform state missions, which were non-existent, in order to preserve the right of states to maintain their own forces, specifically the Army National Guard.
The marriage of necessity continued rather shakily throughout the late 1940's. First ADC, and later CONAC, needed the Air Guard (even with predominantly propeller-driven fighters and outmoded radar equipment) to produce any kind of in-being air defense force. The states needed the Air Force to fund their respective "little air forces," which had little state usefulness other than gubernatorial patronage and state prestige.

The end of this first phase in ANG-USAF relations came with the beginning of the Korean War in June, 1950. Individual Air Guardsmen, much to the Guard's consternation, were called up as replacements; after hostilities ended, a number of Guard pilots accepted regular commissions and remained on active duty. By 1952, a more modern and more accepted Air Guard stood runway alert with their active duty ADC counterparts. The skill displayed by Air Guard pilots in Korea and the emphasis on strategic offensive and defensive aviation during the Eisenhower-Dulles years were the primary reasons for greater Air Guard acceptance.

The situation today with respect to ANG-USAF relations and the Air Guard mission is similar to that of 1945-46. The war we hope is in its final stages in Southeast Asia is decidedly less popular than was World War II, but the same war-end symptoms are present in the American people (e.g. the desire to pull the troops out, cut the size of the regular establishment, and decrease all areas of defense spending). Already the Air Force is placing greater dependence on those
Air National Guard units with an air defense mission. Currently the ANG provides 59% of all Air Force interceptors. By 1973 the figure may be as high as 70%. This, coupled with growing neo-isolationist sentiment, could easily mean a return to prominence for strategic offensive and defensive forces after a decade of Tactical Air Command primacy. Should ADC be discontinued as a major command, the entire air defense mission could once again fall to the Guard. Then Strategic Air Command or Tactical Air Command would very likely be charged with supervision of the Air Guard in performing the air defense mission. It would then be forced to grapple with the same problems that Generals Stratemeyer and Whitehead had to contend with from 1946 to 1950.

Mobilization of the ANG for Korea, the Berlin and Pueblo Crises, and the Indo-Chinese War has clouded the issue of a state mission for the Guard. The ability of the Air Guard to perform its federal mission has quite clearly improved; the fact that state Air Guard units have no unique and viable state mission to perform is equally clear to the disinterested observer. Since there is no mission performed at the state level, what justification, other than tradition, can be offered for state air forces? There is none. The fact that the Guard has performed its federal mission with greater efficiency than the Air Force Reserve is disingenuous; it begs the question.

The dual component air reserve system is duplicative. There is no justification for the Air Force Reserve's "split
personality," i.e. serving both as a source of operationally-ready flying units and as a pool of individual replacements, while the ANG provides operationally-ready squadrons as well. Nor is there justification for forces whose sole mission is a federal one to be commanded by a state governor.

The Air Force and the Air National Guard have, nonetheless, developed a modus vivendi. Each seems willing to make the necessary tradeoff; the regulars take the combat-ready units of the Guard and wink at the peculiar and illogical status of the non-federalized Air Guard. The Air Guardsmen train for a federal mission with Air Force assistance, approval, and guidance while technically under command of a governor who has no use for his squadrons at the state level.

Perhaps the character of the Air Guard would be different had it not been for the Korean War and subsequent mobilizations that lent a distinctly national aspect to the forces. Certainly the intransigence of Reckord and Walsh precluded drastic change; but then the National Guard is not an institution generally amenable to change. And unless its air arm once again assumes almost total responsibility for a distinctly federal mission, such as continental air defense, it probably will not have to.

I was prompted to undertake this study because of the parallels between 1945-46 and 1971-72. In each case national war-weariness and the consequent cutbacks in military spending necessitated a re-evaluation of military policies and doctrine. The "citizen-soldier idea," a vital and enduring one in
American military history, was translated into the "citizen-fighter pilot idea" when the modern Air National Guard was created and assigned the air defense mission in 1946. The outbreak of the Korean War shifted attention from the problems of the unique Air Force - Air National Guard relationship and the air defense mission. The "New Look's" emphasis on strategic offensive and defensive aviation after 1953 guaranteed an important role for regular air defense forces, an emphasis which ended with the election of John Kennedy and the introduction of "Flexible Response." Decreased military spending and a neo-isolationist foreign policy may mean an increased air defense role for the Air National Guard, perhaps the total mission. Should that be the case, the unresolved issues of 1946-1950 will have to be resolved in the mid-1970's.
CHAPTER I

PLANNING AND ORGANIZING THE POST-WAR AIR RESERVE FORCES

Major General William F. Tompkins and his staff in the War Department's Special Planning Division (SPD) were largely responsible for the basic structure of the post-war American military establishment. It was to consist of the regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve Corps. These components would "provide the divisions, air groups, and other military units which would form the organizational basis for initial mobilization for national defense in time of an emergency."¹ Detailed planning was not undertaken by SPD personnel during 1944 because precise information on the size and deployment of the post-war regular forces was not available to them.²

The real and imagined successes of Army Air Forces strategic bombing clearly colored the thinking of SPD planners, as it was to shape American military thinking until the early 1960's. Tompkins and his staff were convinced that no nation would dare attack the United States after having seen the awesome power of the B-17's over Europe and the B-29's over Japan. If any country should be foolhardy enough to do so "all that would be necessary to defeat the aggressor would be a few squadrons of planes with atom
bombs..."\(^3\) In the final stages of World War II, then, those charged with basic responsibility for formulating plans for the peacetime military were obviously thinking in terms of an air arm based on the power of strategic bombardment. The less vital missions of air defense and tactical support could be assigned to the reserve elements of the air arm.

By the summer of 1945 General George C. Marshall was eager to see definitive plans and policies established for the organization and mission of the post-war National Guard and reserve. The results of the War Department planners' efforts was Approved War Department Policies Relating to the Postwar National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps, 13 October 1945, commonly referred to as Approved Policies, '45. This document established clearly how the War Department viewed the role and mission of the National Guard and the Reserve Corps; it insured a dual component reserve structure.

Aside from providing a reserve component of the army able to furnish combat-ready units, assisting in mobilization of the other reserve forces as necessary, and being prepared for world-wide deployment, the National Guard mission had a fourth part: "to defend critical areas of the United States from land, sea, or airborne invasion."\(^4\) This is the first written basis for the use of Air National Guard (ANG) units in continental air defense.

The Organized Reserve was divided into Active and Inactive sections. The Active Reserve mission partially duplicated
the Guard mission from the outset. It was to provide "units effectively organized and trained in time of peace for rapid mobilization... and additional trained commissioned and enlisted personnel for necessary replacement."\(^5\) The Inactive section was to constitute an officer replacement pool. Officers would be assigned on an individual basis to positions for which past military training and experience suited them.\(^6\)

Only the National Guard had responsibility for providing trained units, to be mobilized as units. The Reserves were called on to provide both units suitable for call-up and individuals; the Active Reserves would provide both officers and enlisted men in addition to units; the Inactive section would be a source of officer replacements. Not only was there a Reserve-National Guard mission overlap, there was a duplication of effort between the two sections of the Organized Reserve Corps. This ANG-Reserve mission duplication was to become a central issue several years later in the heated debate over conversion to a single component air reserve.

First priority in the post-war reorganization went to "divisions and air units."\(^7\) The National Guard was assured that "the pride and traditions"\(^8\) of its organizations would be upheld. The local character of National Guard units was virtually assured. This would continue to be as important to Guardsmen, in both ground and air units, after the war as it has been previously. National Guard Bureau Chief Major General Butler B. Miltonburger wrote in his FY1946
report that "the National Guard is not a catalogued pool of individuals. It is a collection of local volunteer units with strong traditions of their own."\(^9\)

The basis for troop distribution and allocation was established with the Army primarily in mind. The strengths of the state units were to be determined by the ratio of their male population between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five to the country's population in that age bracket.\(^{10}\) It was also noted that "organizations requiring technically-trained personnel will be allocated to states where such personnel is available."\(^{11}\) Although it makes very little difference whether an Army Guard chemical warfare or engineering unit is from Maine, Nebraska, or New Mexico, such was not the case with air defense radar units, Aircraft Control and Warning (A.C.&W.) squadrons. Obviously their location is crucial and must depend on the optimum location for detecting an enemy airborne invasion, not primarily on the area in which there are enough trained operators and technicians.

The duties and responsibilities of the National Guard Bureau, the War Department's executive agent in dealing with the National Guard, were clearly delineated in Approved Policies, \(^{145}\). The Bureau was charged with administration of Approved Policies, \(^{145}\) for Guard units in state status, promulgation of War Department directives applicable to Guard units, and "general administrative control of all...activities incident to the relations established by law and regulation between the Federal Government and the National Guard...."\(^{12}\)
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau was given a series of difficult tasks to perform. He was the War Department's chief expert on all National Guard matters and was charged with the responsibility for maintaining cooperation and coordination with all War Department agencies. He was to organize properly and administer the Guard and initiate or rule on all proposals for changes in the Guard. Perhaps most difficult of all was his task of maintenance of mutual understanding between the War Department and the National Guard.13

Federal and state responsibilities were defined. The federal government's responsibilities included providing instructors, outdoor training facilities, pay, uniforms and equipment, and ammunition. The states' tasks were to provide personnel, armories, and storage facilities. The federal government, however, agreed to pay for a portion of the storage wherever federal supplies and equipment were kept.14

The first-line reserve status of the Guard was re-emphasized in closing, along with a plea for cooperation and understanding:

The National Guard will be considered an integral part of the Army of the United States. Its success will depend on the development of mutual confidence between the Federal Government and the States and Territories. Such confidence can only be inspired by the wholehearted efforts of both parties to maintain an effective National Guard.
The Air Guard, by extension, was to become an integral part of the U.S. Air Force. The "citizen-soldier" tradition would have to be translated into the "citizen-fighter pilot" idea. The difficulty in making that transition would too often preclude "wholehearted support."

As Perry Smith has pointed out, the primary interest of Army Air Forces planners from 1943 to 1945 was assuring an autonomous, co-equal air arm. The role that some members of the air staff hoped the Air National Guard would play is clear from a 13 August 1945 memo prepared by Colonel L.W. Sweetser, Jr., Chief of the Reserve and National Guard Division for the Assistant Chief of Air Staff/Al. Sweetser admitted that generally air staff attitude toward establishment of a post-war Air National Guard was negative. He noted, however, that any plan that would increase public support for the AAF demanded serious consideration, even "with...state support and admitted political implications attendant."

Although the National Guard Bureau recommended state insignia and markings on ANG aircraft, the air staff insisted that AAF markings be used to demonstrate the fact that Air Guard aircraft and pilots were an integral part of the U.S. Air Force. A compromise eventually resulted; all Guard aircraft carried AAF (and later USAF) markings, along with the state's name and "ANG" on the fuselage. Still later the "Minuteman disc" decal was added to the vertical stabilizer of Air Guard planes.
The AAF Plans for the Two Components

Approved Policies, '45 was implemented by the Army Air Forces through separate plans for the two air reserve components: The Army Air Forces Plan for the Air Reserve and the Army Air Forces Plan for the Air National Guard. Both documents were prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff/Reserve and National Guard Division and his staff.

The Air Reserve Plan was begun in fall, 1945, but decisions pending on the strength and composition of the post-war forces held up final approval until July, 1946. One of the basic assumptions listed at the beginning of the plan confirmed the dual nature of the reserves: "Air Reserve training will be unit and individual proficiency training" under jurisdiction of the Air Defense Command's Commanding General. The force would be a "federally-controlled" one, capable, at least in theory, "of producing a balanced force along with the...Air National Guard and the Regular Army." The part of the Active Reserve Section that would provide units was subdivided into four categories based on manning and mobilization potential. Units designated "A-1" and "A-2" were support and combat units respectively. They were to be fully-manned and ready to go on M-Day. The "B" units were those fully-manned with officers, but with only a portion of their enlisted quota; they would be given the necessary additional manpower and training to make them ready at from M+90 to M+180. The "C" units were fully-manned with officers only; each would get its entire complement of
enlisted men, as well as training for them, and be ready to function at from M+180 to M+360.23

Whether or not the authors of the plan felt the "B" and "C" category units would ever actually be ready is conjectural; there is no indication as to the nature of these units. If they were envisioned as combat support organizations, the timetable could be considered realistic; if they were to be flying units, the whole scheme was impossible from the start. Class A units would receive all training equipment, as well as 100% of actual Table of Organization and Equipment (T.O. & E.) supplies and equipment (i.e. combat aircraft and the necessary support equipment). Class B and C units were scheduled to get only their training equipment. Even if M-Day and D-Day were not the same, there was clearly little chance that either Class B or C outfits could perform as effective combat units.

The Army Air Forces Plan for the Air National Guard gained War Department approval in November, 1946. This document outlined Headquarters AAF's reasons for making aircraft assignments to the Air Guard: "composition of the Air National Guard units was determined on the basis of suitability and feasibility of the types of flying units in existence for incorporation in the Air National Guard." The mission of the Air National Guard was largely shaped on the basis of the Army Air Forces' concept of which aircraft were suitable and why.

Very Heavy Bombardment (VHB) aircraft, the B-24 or B-29, for example, were deemed unsuitable because of their size and
maintenance costs; the cost per pilot would have been prohibitive. The final notation in the "Reasons and Remarks" section is "Arbitrarily limited to regular Air Force." 26 The limitation was not arbitrary and the reasons given were valid. Another reason - difficulty in recruiting and retaining the large crews necessary to man these aircraft - was not mentioned. Neither was the most basic and important reason. These aircraft, which were, in the eyes of most AAF planners, responsible for Allied victory, should be held for the regulars.

Fighters were eminently suitable for Air Guard use; their size and low maintenance cost were both in their favor. Moreover, the fighter unit "represents the most flexible form of air power (i.e. it can perform air defense, ground attack, or strategic bombardment escort missions)." 27

This analysis of the fighter in terms of a general purpose weapons system, rather than as several distinct types is misleading and illusory. Although it was the ostensible rationale for the merger of Tactical Air Command, Air Defense Command, and the fighter forces originally assigned to Strategic Air Command into Continental Air Command (CONAC) in 1948, the experiment was discontinued after three years. The two fighter commands with clearly separate and distinct missions re-emerged as major air commands. The fighter pilot engaged in interdiction or close air support of troops in contact with the enemy has a vastly different mission than the fighter pilot responsible for seeking out and destroying
enemy long-range fighters and bombers. The former is actually an "attack" pilot; the latter is an interceptor pilot.

The P-51 and P-47 were both used extensively during World War II as long range escorts for heavy bombers. That mission translates more easily into air defense than to tactical support. And, as an officer who worked closely with the Air Guard at both Headquarters ADC and CONAC has remarked: "It was usually difficult to convince a state to accept a tactical fighter outfit, but not an interceptor unit. The air defense mission was easy to sell as an extension of the citizen-soldier idea. That's one reason the Guard got the air defense mission."²⁸

Light bombardment aircraft (which invariably meant the B-26) were found suitable because of size, flexibility, and economy of operation.²⁹ Some Guardsmen clearly doubted the ability of the B-26 to serve any useful air defense task and recommended its replacement by an aircraft better-suited to the ANG mission.³⁰

Transport aircraft for the Guard are given short shrift. They are considered unsuitable; the terse and rather cryptic entry in the "Reasons and Remarks" Section is "not considered satisfactory in time of peace in T./O. & E. organizations"³¹ (i.e. organized, operational units).

A number of students of reserve and National Guard affairs within the Air Force would find this analysis puzzling. A contemporary Air Force historian has called airlift "the single best mission for the non-regular components; they can
do it just as well as the regulars and more cheaply, too."\(^{32}\) Another observer concluded that as long as the dual component reserve system remained the Air Force Reserve "should consist solely of transport wings with the mission of continental logistical support."\(^{33}\) The relative ease of the mission, lack of tactical demands on aircrews, and ability to perform the same basic mission in training status as in active status all contribute to cargo/transport as an ideal reserve mission. Since the majority of aircraft going to the Air Reserve at that time were either the C-47 "Skytrain" (the military version of the DC-3) or the C-46 "Commando," the Air Reserve could have had a viable and useful mission for its organized operational units.

Reconnaissance and other miscellaneous, specialized units were suitable in terms of cost, but seen as unsuitable overall because, due to the small numbers required, they "tend to become orphans in wartime."\(^{34}\) Assignment of T./O. & E. units in these specialized fields "would result in an unbalanced force by unduly diminishing the striking force."\(^{35}\)

**Summary**

The initial planning for the structure of the postwar military establishment was done by Major General William F. Tompkins and his staff in the Special Planning Division of the War Department in 1943-1944. General Tompkins and his staff planned for a dual component reserve structure for the peacetime American military. *Approved Policies, '45* opened
the door for the Air Guard's air defense mission by stipulating that the protection of vital parts of the U.S. from land, sea, or airborne invasion was part of the Guard's mission. The AAF Plan for the ANG which made only fighters and some light bombers available to the Air Guard further solidified the first mission of the Air National Guard - continental air defense.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 13.


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 4.

8. Ibid.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 22.

13. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

15 Ibid., p. 28.


17 Col. L.W. Sweetser, Jr., Army Air Forces, Daily Diary Memo prepared for the Assistant Chief of Air Staff/Al, 14 August 1945.

18 Col. Monro McCloskey, Army Air Forces, Daily Diary Memo prepared for the Assistant Chief of Air Staff/Al, 3 October 1946.


20 Ibid., p. 2.

21 Ibid.

22 "M-Day" is the day on which mobilization of the reserve forces will be initiated. "D-Day" is the day hostilities involving U.S. forces begin. Original planning, based on WWII experience, saw D-Day followed by M-Day. However, after the U.S.S.R. developed its atomic capability, the "atomic Pearl Harbor" idea gained wide acceptance, and it was assumed by most planners that M-Day and D-Day would be the same.

23 AAF Plan for the Air Reserve, pp. 5-6.

24 Ibid., p. 23.


26 Ibid.
Ibid.

Interview with Col. George S. Weart, 21 March 1972.

AAF Plan for the ANG, p. 8.

Brig. Gen. E.H. Zistle, Commander of the 55th FW, recommended replacement of the B-26 with the F-82 "Twin Mustang," a modified, two-pilot version of the F-51 developed during WWII, for use as a night fighter (Air National Guard Second Unit Commanders School, Speeches Delivered at the Orlando Conference _Orlando, Florida, 4-6 April 1949_), p. 38.

AAF Plan for the ANG, p. 8.


Lt. Col. J.E. Walker, USAF, "How Can We Best Utilize Our Reserve Forces?" (Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1957), pp. 13-14. A 1961 Air Command and Staff School Research Report written by an Air Guardsman whose Military Airlift Command (MAC)-committed ANG unit was mobilized for the Berlin Crisis makes a very interesting point on the efficacy of reserve cargo/transport units. MAC was able to allow the units it would gain to do exactly in training what they would do when federalized (i.e. fly nationwide and overseas transport missions). Thus, there was virtually no adjustment to make from training status to operational status (see Lt. Col. Clifford J. Lawrence, ANG, "The Air National Guard in the Berlin Crisis, 1961," Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1961).

AAF Plan for the ANG, p. 8.

Ibid.
CHAPTER II
THE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU,
AND THE CIVILIAN COMPONENTS

The first Air Defense Command existed from 26 February 1940 to 2 June 1941. It served only as a planning element under the Commanding General of First Army and did not have an air defense mission.¹

The modern Air Defense Command (ADC) was created by Headquarters, Army Air Forces on 27 March 1946. Its first commander was Lieutenant General George Stratemeyer, Commander of Army Air Forces, China Theatre, during World War II.² The initial ADC mission gave the new command full responsibility for the air defense of the continental United States. Additionally ADC was given responsibility for maintenance of the Air National Guard and Air Reserve "in a highly-trained, operational condition of readiness" and "to perform such special missions as the Commanding General, Army Air Forces may direct."³ Some two months later the mission was revised slightly to require ADC to "discharge the responsibilities of the Commanding General, AAF, with respect to the organization, administration, training, and maintenance of the Air National Guard and Air Reserve...."⁴ Perhaps cynicism about the ability of Air Guardsmen led to deletion of "...highly-trained, operational
condition of readiness." In any event, ADC's far-reaching responsibility as parent command for both the air reserve components was unmistakable.

Air Defense Command was burdened with a number of miscellaneous secondary missions by Headquarters AAF. These "cat and dog" missions included Air ROTC, Air Scouts, and the Civil Air Patrol, Army Overseas Replacement Depots, file maintenance of addresses for all WWII AAF personnel, air support for Red Cross disaster relief, and the administration of the AAF correspondence course program. As an ADC historian has remarked, "with the expansion of the mission to include such a miscellany of unrelated functions, the title gradually became less descriptive of the duties of the Air Defense Command...." The only common element among the numerous secondary missions is that they all dealt generally with forces and programs in the continental United States.

By mid-July, 1946, ADC consisted of six numbered air forces established to correspond to the numbered armies in the U.S. Whenever possible headquarters were co-located. Almost as soon as the Air Defense Command was a functioning organization, General Stratemeyer attempted to gain from General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, AAF, the necessary freedom of action to perform a mission as broad and heterogeneous as any ever assigned to an Air Force major command:

The missions are necessarily so broad and the resources of the Air Defense Command are so limited, that it is apparent that my entire means might
easily be dissipated without satisfactorily achieving any one portion of your directive.

The Air Defense Command Air Reserve Plan of 5 September 1946 was drawn up by Headquarters ADC planners to implement the Army Air Forces plan, approved seven weeks earlier.\(^9\)

In keeping with the parent plan, the ADC version was based on a total military establishment of 4.5 million men, almost 1.5 million of whom would be in the regular AAF and its two civilian components. The regular AAF was to have a total strength of 419,000; the Air National Guard would consist of just under 48,000, while the Air Reserve would be made up of slightly over 1 million men. Fewer than 150,000 of these Air Reservists (about 35,000 of them rated officers) were assigned to T./O. & E. units, however. The remaining 885,000, for whose training ADC was responsible, were non-assigned, individual replacements.\(^10\)

It was assumed by the authors of the plan that "a balanced, mobilized force of 1.5 million" could be ready "within twelve months from the declaration of a national emergency."\(^11\)

It is difficult to judge the realism of this estimate because of the lack of detailed information on the types of reserve squadrons to be mobilized. Had the Air Reserve been able to function on a par with the Air National Guard, the target was not an unreasonable one. However, it was soon evident that rapid mobilization of Air Reserve units for combat flying duties was simply impossible. Reserve units whose only flying had been in cargo aircraft and trainers could not possibly make the transition to combat
aircraft rapidly enough to be of immediate use.

General Stratemeyer was apprehensive from the outset about the ability of the ANG units to handle the air defense mission. However, he realized that he had no choice; the initial allocation of forces to ADC consisted of two night fighter squadrons, which existed only on paper, and three personnel - one officer and two enlisted men.\textsuperscript{12}

Stratemeyer first had to subdue his own "anti-militia" bias. He wrote to General Spaatz that no matter how well-trained and efficiently-organized the ANG might be, it was by definition a backup force for the regulars. He doubted the Guard's ability to function as an integral part of the regular forces.\textsuperscript{13}

Easily the most complex, demanding, and emotionally-charged issue Stratemeyer and his staff had to deal with was the problem of command and control. The Air National Guard had the unique distinction of being state militia and part of the regular establishment simultaneously. In its former capacity it was commanded by the state governors through their adjutants general; in its latter one it was part of the Air Defense Command and, seemingly, subject to the command of General Stratemeyer.

Less than a month after the creation of ADC, Stratemeyer wrote Major General Butler B. Miltonburger, the National Guard Bureau Chief, to impress upon him the gravity of the air defense mission and the central role that the Air National Guard must play. Stratemeyer clearly hoped to gain some
concessions on the chain of command as early as possible, although he was unsure of what the Air Guard might be willing to concede:

This responsibility must be accompanied by greater authority in dealing with Air National Guard matters. In general, I feel I must be responsible for organizing and administering the Air National Guard in its federally-recognized status...I fully realize that under existing directives there cannot be a single channel of communication in dealing with the Air National Guard at this time....

Problems other than a lack of confidence in the Air Guard's ability and flexibility plagued the early days of ADC. A number of airfields Stratemeyer had hoped would be available to him had been declared excess to government needs by the War Assets Administration. Thus, he noted bitterly, he was "placed in the position of competing through the War Assets Administration with civilians for the future use of facilities, which are essential to the mission of this command."15

In a comprehensive and fascinating letter to his numbered air force commanders in mid-summer, the ADC commander enumerated eight points which he considered absolutely vital in accomplishing the air defense mission.16 The last three were obviously written with the Air National Guard in mind:

6. Defense against air attack can be achieved only by defense forces... actually in existence at the moment of attack.
7. All defense forces...engaged in defense against an air attack must be under a single commander (my emphasis).
8. Unity of command...is imperative.

14

15

16
He was by now absolutely sure of what he wanted from the Guard, but quickly despaired of getting it. By September he recommended to General Spaatz that if the Air National Guard continued its reluctance to turn operational control over to him, "the War Department should recommend another system for providing national defense in the air."\(^{18}\) That system or its source of aircraft and radar were not revealed; both the ADC commander and the AAF commander realized there was no workable alternative to the Air National Guard.

Although outspoken with his staff and superiors, Stratemeyer was almost invariably tactful and circumspect in his dealings with the Guard. General Spaatz, who was quite familiar with his subordinate's frank and candid manner, was dubious at first about Stratemeyer's ability to cope with the unique status and political intricacies of the National Guard. The AAF commander was pleasantly surprised by his performance in dealing with such hard-line Guardsmen as Walsh, Reckord, and C.D. O'Sullivan, California's adjutant general.\(^{19}\)

Stratemeyer realized that the necessity for tact and diplomacy extended throughout his command, and was especially vital for his officer and enlisted instructors. The Manual for Air National Guard Instructors was published by Headquarters ADC in August, 1946. In the foreword the commander reminded the instructors that the Air Guard was vital to ADC's accomplishment of the air defense mission. "Your task," he cautioned, "is a difficult one and calls for a combination of enthusiasm and thorough study, of action and deliberation,
of firmness and tact."20

In a closing section, "Tact and Diplomacy," he succinctly put the instructor's role (and his problem) into two sentences: "Throughout the material presented in this manual the words advise, recommend, and suggest have been used. They explain the instructor's position more clearly than a thousand words on many pages."21 They also explained the frustration and exasperation felt by General Stratemeyer.

The National Guard Bureau

The responsibility for organizing the units of the Air National Guard belonged to the National Guard Bureau's Aviation Division, established in December, 1945. The initial state allocations, based on Approved Policies, '45, were announced by the Guard Bureau two months later. After minor readjustments had been agreed upon by Generals Spaatz and Miltonburger, the final plan, calling for a total of 514 ANG units, was publicized in May. Miltonburger was able to announce, in his FY1946 report, that the Air National Guard had begun to take shape.22

Miltonburger emphasized in that report that the most modern aircraft and equipment available were absolutely necessary to the Air Guard. Financial problems, however, precluded rapid acquisition of large numbers of modern aircraft and the radar necessary to make them fully effective as an air defense weapon. In FY1947, the original Congressional appropriation for National Guard reorganization was
$110 million, of which $62 million was earmarked for air units. However, slightly more than $48 million was subsequently redirected elsewhere in the War Department by Congress. The final amount actually available to the ANG that year was $31 million - roughly one-half of the originally-intended sum.  

While the 1946 report insisted on the necessity of modern equipment for the Air Guard, and the corollary requirement for budgetary support, the 1947 analysis stressed the fiscal reality:

"Due to requirements of Headquarters, Army Air Forces, for first-line radar equipment, it was not possible during this fiscal year to obtain first-line radar equipment for the use of aircraft control and warning units of the Air National Guard. It was possible, however, to obtain a sufficient quantity of SCR270DA and SCR527DA obsolete radar sets to issue several of these to each aircraft control and warning squadron."

The importance of the most modern and sophisticated radar to any air defense effort had been common knowledge to military airmen since the Battle of Britain.

The Air National Guard vs. the Air Reserve

The Air Guard's problems were serious. However, if the Air Guard had no shoes, the Air Reserve had no feet. A chronic lack of money and a consequent shortage of even the most basic training equipment was evident from the very beginning. Although, Headquarters AAF estimated in 1946 that an annual expenditure of $156 million would be necessary to implement the initial Air Reserve training program, only $18 million was allocated for that purpose in 1946.
The backbone of the ANG was the P-51 "Mustang" and the P-47 "Thunderbolt." While these aircraft were at best on the verge of obsolescence in 1946 and 1947, the Air Reserve fighter squadrons were equipped with the AT-6 "Texan," which had been the advanced trainer used in the final phase of undergraduate pilot training during World War II. Bomb squadrons that had combat aircraft used the B-26 (a light attack bomber), irrespective of the type aircraft they would supposedly fly in the event of mobilization. Other squadrons, regardless of type, that were fortunate enough to have aircraft were equipped with the C-46 "Commando" or C-47 "Skytrain." All too often, Reserve squadrons that had been able to organize and secure aircraft were displaced at suitable airport facilities by ANG units which had priority.

Not only was the Air Reserve forced to compete with a better-organized, more prestigious, and generally more attractive reserve component within its own service, but with an aggressively administered, realistic Naval Air Reserve program as well. One student of Air Reserve/Air National Guard matters contends that the Naval Air Reserve was more effective in recruitment and retention than either of the Air Force components.

There was an almost total lack of participation in the Air Reserve by enlisted men and non-rated officers. Those who wanted to join were often frustrated by needless bureaucratic delay. A number of WWII ASWAADF (Arms and Services with AAP) personnel, principally non-flying officers, had a difficult
time becoming Air Reservists. At the end of the war these men had reverted to their basic Army branches, whose approval was required before the necessary transfer could take place. As is often the case with military organizations, the branches were extremely reluctant to give up any manpower at all.\textsuperscript{29}

The non-flyers who joined the reserves found that there was very little training available for them; the entire Air Reserve training program was predicated on maintaining the proficiency of aircrew members. A 7 August 1946 letter from Stratemeyer to Major General Willis Hale, Fourth Air Force Commander, spelled out the priorities of the training program: "First, flying training for reserve pilots...Second, expansion of flying activities to include all rated officers...Third, the inclusion in the training program of all other categories of personnel."\textsuperscript{30} Hale had anticipated his superior's wishes, and had told all his Air Reserve Base Unit Commanders almost two months before that until further notice they would pursue only the goal of pilot proficiency.\textsuperscript{31}

After a year of experience with the Air Reserve, Stratemeyer fully understood that little of value could be done for the mass of reservists. He recommended concentrating training efforts on the organized, operational Air Reserve squadrons for "a more efficient and useful Air Reserve."\textsuperscript{32} Stratemeyer's statement graphically illustrates the inherent weaknesses of both the Air Reserve and the dual component system. The operational units over which Stratemeyer exercised command were undermanned, ill-equipped, and far less combat-ready than
those operational units he did not command. Moreover, the training program for individual reservists was virtually non-existent. The Air Reserve was trying to accomplish a twofold mission, and doing very poorly, while the ANG was succeeding in maintenance of operational units. Strattemeyer, vexed and frustrated, felt he had to look first to the units he could command - and they were incapable of providing what was required. The arrangement Strattemeyer needed most was impossible: all T./O. & E. units in the same component, with that component fully under his command.

As long as the Air Reserve was denied combat aircraft, its pilot recruiting problems would continue. And it would continue to be denied; both publicly and privately the War Department line was the same - the Air National Guard was to enjoy first priority. Combat veterans of WWII were not interested in flying AT-6's or C-46's, if high performance fighter aircraft were available, as they were in the Air Guard. The lack of combat aircraft "and the general shortage of training facilities and equipment had serious effects on the morale and interest of the Air Force Reserve personnel, who were not receptive to a program so lacking in realism." The result was that many veterans who wanted to fly gave up their reserve commissions to join the Air Guard.

Friction between those who remained in the Air Reserve and the ANG was inevitable. The attitude of many reservists was aired by Colonel John Cerny, Commander of the 445th Bomb Group (AFRes) in Washington state. For two years Colonel Cerny's
unit, like many other bomber outfits in the Air Reserve, had flown cargo aircraft and trainers. Their first training in B-29's was to have been at their 1948 summer training. However, the training aircraft were diverted to take part in the air show that was part of the opening ceremonies for Idlewild Airport in New York. The big bombers never reached McChord AFB, Washington. When questioned by a reporter from the newspaper in nearby Spokane, Cerny denounced the encampment as a waste of tax money. He added that his group should be assigned to a SAC base for realistic training or re-equipped with fighters or B-26's.36

As soon as the story was published, Major General John Upston, Fourth Air Force Commanding General, ordered Cerny to make a full written explanation of his remarks, which Upston saw as damaging to the Air Reserve training program within Fourth Air Force. Cerny did so, saying in part:

The National Guard, which numbers in the thousands, are (sic) the fair-haired boys with equipment, pay, and an M-Day assignment. The Air Reserve, which numbers in the millions and is actually the backbone of experience for the Air Force to draw from, is left by the wayside with no pay, no equipment, and an M+6 to 8 assignment. At Air University, I was taught that the next war will be reliant on speed of operations. An M+6 to 8 force will have either nothing to defend or nothing to attack.

37

Summary

The Air Defense Command, under Lieutenant General Stratemeyer, was assigned a myriad of additional missions
aside from its primary one, continental air defense. Among them was responsibility for the Air Reserve and Air National Guard. Stratemeyer realized that he must depend on the Air Guard, which was organizing into operational units, for the bulk of his air defense fighter strength. At the outset, he had no AAF forces; although he was authorized two night fighter squadrons, they existed only on paper.

Stratemeyer adjusted to the alien idea of militia as first-line units, but he could not adjust to the Guard's command and control of forces with which he was to defend the United States. It was clear to him that he must have command in peace of the forces he would lead in war. This issue would not reach even a tentative and uneasy settlement for some two years.

The Air Reserve and Air National Guard each faced financial and organizational problems from the beginning. However, the Guard's problems were minor compared to those faced by the Air Reserve.

As the first line of defense, the Air Guard received without cost a great deal of aircraft and support equipment from the federal government's post-war surplus. Although the aircraft (P-47's and P-51's) were obsolescent and the radar equipment was obsolete, they were made available and served as the backbone of a real air defense force. The National Guard Bureau could make available to the Air Guard only about half ($31 million) of what it wanted in FY1946.

The Air Reserve got off to a much less auspicious start.
It was given the job of producing both organized, operational units and an individual replacement pool. It was impossible for it to do either very well. With a total of slightly over 1 million men the Air Reserve budget from Headquarters AAF for FY1946 was $18 million; the ANG's budget was almost twice that for fewer than 48,000 Air Guardsmen.

The aircraft the Air Reserve received were almost invariably cargo types or trainers, which made it impossible to institute realistic and worthwhile training programs. Many reservists switched to the ANG after WWII in order to fly in combat aircraft or to have the necessary training equipment available to keep up their skills.

While Air Reservists realized they were the poor relation (both literally and figuratively), few were as outspoken about the lack of training and unrealistic mission as Colonel Cerny. The Air Reserve was not only engaged in losing competition with the Air Guard, but was forced to vie for pilots with a well-run, aggressive Naval Air Reserve program, as well. The Air Reserve soon developed an inferiority complex, but was born with its "split personality." It was supposed to develop T./O. & E. units and individual replacements. It couldn't accomplish the first part of this task as well as the Guard, which was doing the same thing; it couldn't accomplish the second part at all. As Lieutenant General Elwood Quesada noted upon taking over the Air Reserve Program in 1948, it had been "poorly-conceived and poorly executed."
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., p. 2.


4 Ibid.


6 Ibid., p. 16.

7 Ibid., p. 1. The six numbered air forces and their locations were:
   First AF - Ft. Slocum, New York
   Second AF - Ft. Crook, Nebraska
   Fourth AF - Hamilton Field, California
   Tenth AF - Brooks Field, Texas
   Eleventh AF - Olmsted Field, Pennsylvania
   Fourteenth AF - Orlando Army Air Base, Florida


10 Ibid., pp. 71-72.

11 Ibid.


Letter, Lt. Gen. Stratemeyer to Numbered Air Force Commanders, 18 July 1946. Miscellaneous ADC Correspondence, 1946-1948, Historical Division, Air Force Archives, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Stratemeyer advised his field commanders of technological advancements being made and their possible effects on ADC. He saw an over-the-pole route as the most likely avenue for airborne invasion. He mentioned the B-36 and experiments that were under way with the P-85, a parasite fighter to be launched from the big bomber's bomb bay. Most interestingly, he warned the other generals that the day was not far off when enemy submarines could stand off our coast and, while submerged, fire missiles with high explosive, or even atomic, warheads.

Ibid.


Sturm and McMullen interviews.


Ibid., p. 47.


24 "Radar Equipment," Ibid., p. 106.


26 Ibid., p. 148.


33 Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, AAF, "The Future of the Army Air Forces," Military Review, XXVI (July, 1946), pp. 3-5; War Department Memo, Subject "Policies Relating to the Air National Guard and Air Reserve," "ADC History, March '46-June '47," pp. 51-52. Spaatz noted in the article that ADC would "be responsible for the co-ordination of continental air units, including the Air National Guard and Air Reserve into an effective fighting force" (p. 4). The implication that only "co-ordination would be needed to put the reserve components in combat-readiness was fatuous, at best.

35 Every rated WWII-veteran Air Guard officer to whom a questionnaire was sent said he had chosen the ANG over the Air Reserve in order to fly combat aircraft. Several took a reduction in rank to do so. Lt. Col. William Haines, a non-rated communications and electronics officer wrote, "I switched to the ANG after almost two years in the ORC during which time I never saw one item of signal equipment."


37 Ibid., pp. 48-49.

CHAPTER III

CONFERENCE AT SAN ANTONIO, BOARD AT WASHINGTON,
REACTION AT ST. LOUIS

The year 1948 was a crucial and climactic one for the Air National Guard in terms of its air defense mission and its relationship to the Air Force. Lines of communication were not clear. Some squadrons, favorites of the governors, were not eager to accept ADC guidance on operations and training matters. The training that was accomplished was neither uniform nor coordinated.¹ The Unit Commanders' Conference at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, in February of that year attempted to solve the problems that existed, especially the emotionally-charged issue of the proper relationship between the Air Force and the state Air Guard units.

The 25-27 February conferees included Lieutenant General Stratemeyer, ADC Commander; Major General Kenneth Cramer, Chief of the National Guard Bureau; Major General Raymond H. Fleming of Louisiana, President of the Adjutants General Association of the United States; Brigadier General John P. McConnell, Headquarters USAF's Chief of the National Guard and Reserve Division/Directorate of Training and Requirements; Brigadier General Adlai Gilkeson, Headquarters USAF's Inspector General; and other Air Force instructors, Air Guard unit
commanders, and the adjutants general.\textsuperscript{2}

A proposal advanced by General Stratemeyer to strengthen his operational control was approved by the adjutants general present, but, as National Guardsman magazine noted with considerable understatement in its report on the proceedings, "...some details remain to be settled."\textsuperscript{3} The Stratemeyer proposal, "Channels for Control of Operations for Training of Air National Guard Units in Preparation for Readiness for their Federal Mission," was an attempt to insure instant response and clear-cut command jurisdiction in all training activities and, of course, in case of an air attack on the continental United States. General Stratemeyer wanted to establish a purely military chain of command that would enable his numbered Air Force commanders to deal directly with their subordinate ANG wing commanders, and the wing commanders with their subordinate group commanders. This chain of command, to be unbroken by governors or adjutants general, would allow General Stratemeyer immediate access to the flying units through their wing commanders.\textsuperscript{4}

Guardsmen present at San Antonio saw the proposal as a means to increase their effectiveness in performance of their federal mission. In many cases, wings were split among several states and wing, group, and squadron headquarters were not co-located. The 55th Fighter Wing, for example, included units in Ohio, Kentucky, and West Virginia. Wing headquarters were in Columbus, Ohio, while one of the groups was head-quartered at Louisville, Kentucky, with one of its two fighter
squadrons. The other squadron was based in Charleston, West Virginia.\textsuperscript{5} Since a number of the adjutants general present already had informal agreements to facilitate command and control during summer training and times of state emergency, they saw the proposal only as a codification and formalization of what already existed.\textsuperscript{6} By July, 1948, the final version had been sent to all states and the District of Columbia, with thirty-five of forty-nine adjutants general agreeing to its contents.\textsuperscript{7}

However, two of the most influential and doctrinaire adjutants general were not at San Antonio and were deeply disturbed and angered by the final form of the proposal: Major General Ellard A. Walsh of Minnesota, President of the National Guard Association of the United States, and Major General Milton A. Reckord, Life of Member of its Executive Committee and Chairman of the Association's Standing Committee on Legislation.\textsuperscript{8} Walsh and Reckord both saw the proposed directive as a threat to the very character and existence of the National Guard. Indeed, General Walsh inferred nothing less than another in a long series of attempts to destroy the National Guard and replace it with a federally-controlled reserve:

The step taken...in the opinion of the Commanding General, Air Defense Command, is most constructive. In my opinion, it is destructive and illegal, for there is no authority vested in the Chief-of-Staff of the Air Force or the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to determine policy. This can only be done as provided by... the National Defense Act. This, and other
laws, were enacted by Congress for the protection of the National Guard. The continued attempts of the Department of Defense and the Regular Army to destroy the National Guard as it exists today, is eloquent testimony as to the needs of...protective measures.

The target of Generals Reckord and Walsh's criticism and the primary target for the 1948 National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) Conference later that year, was the report issued by the Secretary of Defense's Committee on Civilian Components or the Gray Board. The board, which included Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Cornelius V. Whitney and Brigadier General John P. McConnell, as well as Chairman Gordon B. Gray, called for an end to the dual component reserve system. It was the board's conclusion that "national security requires that all services have one federal reserve force."10 The federal reserve forces would be created under the Army Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 12) of the Constitution, rather than the militia clauses. The members may have had the Air Guard foremost in mind when they reasoned:

Having concluded that the National Guard must retain its accepted national role, the committee could come to no other conclusion than that the National Guard must be directly under Federal control. Such control would combine authority with responsibility. It would emphasize the Federal Government's obligation in the organization, training, and supply of the National Guard. 11

James Forrestal, first Secretary of Defense, also urged an ANG-AFRes merger under the aegis of the latter. In his
initial report to the President, he was quite candid on the subject:

National preparedness is a national rather than a state responsibility. Retention by the states of control over military forces with a solely national mission violates the sound principle of delegation of authority with responsibility.  

Forrestal, as well as the members of the Gray Board, saw air defense as a mission basically unsuitable for ANG forces because of its scope.

While it is fair to say that neither the Gray Board nor the Secretary of Defense gave serious consideration to viable state missions, it was obvious that the Air Guard was ill-suited for traditional National Guard functions. The Gray Board Report noted that use of the National Guard "with its present powerful armament is not generally suitable in the execution of state missions in case of riots or other civil uprisings." Once again the Secretary of Defense saw the problem in even sharper perspective:

The role of the Air National Guard is almost exclusively confined to national preparedness. The Air National Guard as now constituted is unsuitable for the normal peacetime state mission of the National Guard to protect life and property and preserve domestic peace, order and safety....It is inconceivable that these fighter and bombardment units would ever be used to maintain domestic law and order. In short, for all practical purposes, the Air National Guard has no state mission." (my emphasis)
One of the questions asked the governors by the Gray Board in a mailed questionnaire was whether or not they felt any pressing need for a state combat air force. While "many answered in the negative..., a majority stressed their desire for continuance of the Air National Guard."\textsuperscript{15} As one prominent Air Force historian put it, "governors just like to have their own airplanes to fly around in."\textsuperscript{16} Another student of Air National Guard matters contends that any type of National Guard unit provides a governor with added patronage power at virtually no cost. Additional Air Guard units mean additional political clout.\textsuperscript{17}

While the Gray and Forrestal arguments concerning the necessity for placing authority and responsibility in the same hands and the lack of any real state mission were certainly valid, the "forty-eight CINCs" argument is less tenable. Forrestal claimed that Air Guard organizational problems were exacerbated by the existence of "forty-eight different commanders-in-chief."\textsuperscript{18} The problem, although it certainly existed, was not insurmountable. In fact, the type agreement among the adjutants general of the states comprising the 57th (New England states) and 55th Fighter Wings is clear evidence that the more far-sighted Air Guardsmen were solving this problem, even if informally, as the Secretary of Defense was writing about it.

The Gray Board Report, which was for public consumption, was more circumspect and more cautious than the report Secretary Forrestal wrote for President Truman. Gray and his...
colleagues praised the National Guard for its exemplary past service, but emphasized that an all-encompassing federalization (ground and air units) would produce greater efficiency. The board was confident that in producing greater efficiency and responsiveness to national missions, the local character and traditions of the various Guard units would be retained. The report recommended the new reserve force be named "The National Guard of the United States." 19

The contention that a federally-controlled reserve force could maintain its traditional, local character and the recommendation that this same force should be given the National Guard name caused Guard leaders to bristle. General Walsh's reaction to those assertions was a storm of indignation:

To the Board, we say, with all the grimness at our command, that it was never more mistaken. There is no Federal reserve or militia that can ever achieve the historical background, the roots, the esprit, or the prestige of the Guard, nor will it ever command the local support which is the peculiar heritage of the Guard. 20

In two important particulars, Secretary Forrestal's message to the President was more flexible and realistic. First, he stated that, while there could be little doubt as to the desirability of an ANG-AFRes merger, "further study is still required of the arguments advanced for, and against, a similar treatment of the Army elements." 21 Second, Forrestal was fully aware of the political ramifications of any alteration in the Guard's status. Although he was convinced that there
was no military reason to wait, he knew that "other consider-
rations must be weighed in the balance in determining whether
from all standpoints, and not merely from the point of view
of military effectiveness, such a step is or is not desire-
able."\textsuperscript{22} President Truman, a former captain in the Missouri
National Guard, was well aware of the political dangers in-
volved in federalization and was unwilling to expose himself
to them. In a 12 August 1948 memo to Forrestal, the Chief
Executive remarked that the proposal for a federally-controlled
reserve was "interesting," but "filled with political dyna-
mite."\textsuperscript{23} The explosion, triggered by Reckord and Walsh, would
not be long in coming.

The Seventieth Annual Conference of the National Guard
Association of the U.S. was scheduled for St. Louis in Sep-
tember. At the St. Louis meeting the Stratemeyer version of
"Channels for Control of Operations for Training of Air Na-
tional Guard Units in Preparation for their Federal Mission"
and the modified version prepared by Generals Walsh and Reckord
were presented to the delegates. The difference between the
Stratemeyer and Reckord/Walsh versions was principally one of
semantics rather than substance. The result of each would be
the same: to increase effectiveness and minimize confusion
for the Air Guard in performing its federal mission, air de-
fense. General Stratemeyer realized by 1948 that USAF control
of the Air Guard was virtually unattainable; he was willing
to settle for what he felt was the next best solution to his
problem. However, as late as 23 January, General Stratemeyer,
in a rare burst of angry candor told the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force that most of his air defense units were commanded by state governors, not by him. He complained of time-consuming "tactful and circuitous approaches" and concluded by stating "I must be given command of the units of the National Guard with which I am expected to defend the United States."\textsuperscript{24}

The central point of the controversy over the proposed directive was paragraph 3. The Stratemeyer version of paragraph 3a read:

> On all matters pertaining to control of operations for training purposes in the preparation of Air National Guard units for the discharge of their federal mission, the Chief of Staff, USAF, through his designated commanders may exercise tactical, as differentiated from administrative command, jurisdiction over ANG units by means of normal military tactical command channels.

In defense of his version, the ADC commander spoke imploringly to the Conference. Although he clearly understood both the legal and traditional problems involved, his address emphasized the absolute necessity of responsiveness and responsibility:

> The legality of this policy with respect to basic laws guarding states' prerogatives has been questioned and recent interpretations by the legal staff of the National Guard Bureau have been incorporated...the most significant revision being the elimination of the phrase operational control and substituting...the more nebulous phrase supervision of training....I hope the states approve this policy. I cannot overemphasize the point that legal or illegal this policy must be made to work, and I am sure that every gentleman here wants it to work.
The counterproposal was originally drafted by General Reckord. After some rewriting by General Walsh it was presented to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in late July, 1948. Walsh introduced to the delegates the modified version of "Channels for Control of Operations for Training of Air National Guard Units in Preparation for Readiness for their Federal Mission" in a blistering speech to the Conference. The Guard Association President bitterly denounced the San Antonio meeting as a set-up with no purpose other than the introduction of the Stratemeyer proposal. He further insisted that the Guard had been under-represented, and that many of those present failed to see the underlying danger of the proposal.

The Reckord/Walsh version made explicit the state's control of its Air Guard units. The somewhat nebulous wording of the Stratemeyer proposal, which gave him "tactical" as opposed to "administrative command jurisdiction" over ANG units, was unacceptable because any "command jurisdiction" over Air Guard units by federal authorities in peacetime was unacceptable.

Reckord and Walsh's modification of the central paragraph allowed for "training supervision as differentiated from command jurisdiction." The purpose was not to clarify the relationship that would exist between the ANG and the USAF while the Guard trained for its air defense mission. Rather it was an opportunity for the National Guard to flex its muscles at a time when some influential Guard leaders
felt the National Guard in general, and the Air National Guard in particular, were seriously threatened with federal takeover. As President Walsh cautioned those present:

When the report of the Gray Board was released...with its recommendations for the complete incorporation of the National Guard, into a Federal Reserve organized under the Army Clause of the Constitution, rather than the Militia Clauses, the sinister implications of the proposed policy for a transfer of tactical command of the Air National Guard from the States to the Federal Government can be better appreciated.... No power was ever given to the Federal Government to organize and support a Federal Militia, and none exists.

Walsh and Reckord now took a harder line than they had earlier. Some two months before the NGAUS Conference both Reckord and Walsh, in replying to a 22 July letter from General Stratemeyer to all adjutants general, spoke of cooperation and support for their modified version. By September, the ill-advised Stratemeyer version had assumed "sinister implications."

The Reckord/Walsh revision and its eventual acceptance illustrate several important characteristics of the pre-Korean War National Guard. First, the leadership of the National Guard Association (by definition the leadership of the National Guard) was thinking in terms of ground forces and the traditional citizen-soldier idea. These men were not unaware of the nature of airpower; rather they saw it only within their own very secular and limited frame of reference. Second, the National Guard frame of reference was not readily
transferable to such an obviously national mission as air defense of the continental United States. Third, their limited view required pressing for states' rights, which clearly existed, by arguing that their respective Air Guards performed state missions, which clearly did not - and do not now - exist.

As an Air Force officer assigned to Headquarters ADC during the initial stages of its development has noted, "Reckord...just didn't understand what we were trying to do. Both he and Walsh identified with the 'old Army' and they felt threatened."33

Making the Air Guard Go - Men, Airplanes, and Radar

Problems other than its relationship to the Air Force continued to plague the Air Guard in 1948. One of the most pressing was pilot recruitment and retention. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau noted in his FY1948 Report that "...the future procurement of rated pilots for the Air National Guard is a matter of great concern to the Bureau."34 A projected shortage of over 600 pilots in the lieutenant grades was foreseen by 1950. Major General Kenneth F. Cramer, who had replaced Major General Miltonburger, indicated a special board might be necessary to solve the problem. Commissioning warrant officers and enlisted men with at least one year of service "during wartime or in the National Guard"35 was seen as a possible solution. Apparently, the idea of sergeant pilots was not considered; the creation of "flight officers"
(flying warrant officers) had been ruled out by the 1946 Approved AAF Plan for the Air Reserve. It would have been galling for the Guard to accept pilots of lesser rank and credentials than the "regular establishment" anyway. Air Guardsmen have always been proud of their flying skill and eager for recognition as equals with their Air Force counterparts. Any reduction of standards would have been seen as strategically unwise if tactically expedient.

Cramer was sharply critical of the Navy and Marine Corps for their uncooperative attitude. Naval and Marine Reserve pilots who wanted ANG commissions were being hindered from switching services. Numerous obstacles prohibited rapid transfers, including a Navy Department ruling that no information on Naval Reservists interested in the Air Guard would be provided until the officers in question had resigned their Naval Reserve Commissions. The Air Guard had only recently cut down on the long wait for federal recognition for these officers. Complaints the previous year had focused attention on administrative lethargy in the National Guard Bureau. Wing Commanders had complained that the Guard Bureau was often slow in granting federal recognition to those former Naval and Marine Reserve fliers who had resigned commissions to join the Air Guard.

Cramer implied that the Navy had been guilty of dragging its feet in approving resignations of commission. This was especially exasperating since "...most of these officers would be in locations where there are no active flying units of the
Naval or Marine Corps Reserve. " Up to that time 163 former Naval and Marine Reserve pilots had applied for ANG commissions.

Along with the scarcity of qualified pilots to fly ANG aircraft, there was, as might be suspected, a scarcity of first-line aircraft available to the Air Guard. During FY1948 only five squadrons converted from World War II propeller-driven fighters to the Air Force’s first jet, the F-80 "Shooting Star." The overwhelming majority of the Guard fighter-interceptor squadrons were still equipped with late World War II-vintage aircraft, the F-47 "Thunderbolt" and the F-51 "Mustang." The 1948 Report on the Air National Guard, prepared by the Aviation Group of the National Guard Bureau, hoped that "by 1952...all National Guard squadrons - including light bombardment squadrons - will be equipped with jet-propelled planes." Like many National Guard estimates on receipt of first-line weapons and support equipment, it was wishful thinking.

Modern radar equipment and the personnel to operate it were in very short supply. The same model radar sets that had been temporary two years before were still in use. The Aviation Group’s report noted that the equipment the ANG Aircraft Control and Warning (A.C.&W.) squadrons needed was also critical to the Air Force or the Army. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau emphasized the necessity of even obsolescent radar for training purposes, while the Aviation group called the late World War II-vintage sets "stop-gap
equipment.\textsuperscript{44} Obviously it was not what was needed to accomplish the air defense mission.

Recruiting the essential non-flying officers and airmen for A.C.&W. squadrons was another headache for the Air Guard. This meant that a number of states "experienced continuing difficulties in obtaining the highly-skilled specialists... needed to man radar and communications equipment and to serve as instructors for unskilled recruits."\textsuperscript{45}

As in the previous fiscal year, budgetary limitations precluded fully-equipping Guard units. For FY1948 the Air Guard received slightly over $46 million, while its Army counterpart received well over $104 million.\textsuperscript{46}

Air defense operations demand close coordination and cooperation between ground and air elements of the team. Highly-skilled aircrews in sophisticated interceptors and highly-skilled radar and communications personnel operating the most modern equipment on the ground are prerequisites for success. The Air National Guard was simply neither manned nor equipped for successful accomplishment of that mission. Nonetheless, Air Guardsmen were convinced that they could get the job done with the proper weapons and support equipment. Major General Cramer cited several outstanding examples in his address to the St. Louis NGAUS Conference\textsuperscript{47} and the Aviation Group's report praised the combined wing maneuvers involving the 52nd and 67th Fighter Wings in New York and New England in which Guard A.C.&W. squadrons controlled day and night intercepts "very successfully"\textsuperscript{48} against First Air Force aircraft.
Headquarters ADC was less sanguine. Air defense planners were attempting "to refine current planning factors with regard to the utilization of Air National Guard fighter units in the air defense of the continental United States." Numbered Air Force Commanders were asked to furnish information as to how much time would be required for their squadrons to fight (and move if necessary), how many aircraft each squadron could launch initially, and how long it would take to develop maximum operational capability.

The responses ranged from acceptable times and numbers to very mediocre ones. Colonel T.K. McGehee insisted that his estimates for 14th Air Force were "...not to be considered a commitment by this headquarters. An operational readiness test should be conducted on each squadron concerned."

Nonetheless, the first five ANG fighter squadrons converted to the F-80 in 1948. The criteria included operational effectiveness of the units concerned, facilities available at their bases (especially runway length), and geographical dispersal.

Summary

The February, 1948, Conference at Brooks Field was an attempt to resolve the many problems that had plagued the ADC-ANG relationship for almost two years. General Strattemeyer's proposal for ADC control of ANG units was introduced at Brooks only to be stopped short by the Guard's "Old Guard," Generals Reckord and Walsh, who had missed the conference while testifying before the Gray Board.
The Reckord/Walsh alternate proposal was introduced at the annual convention of the National Guard Association in St. Louis in September. Their modification, partially a product of their fear that the National Guard was to be absorbed by the Reserves, as recommended by the Gray Board, allowed ADC only "training supervision." General Stratemeyer had hoped for "command jurisdiction."

The Air Guard was still vitally short of radar equipment, and had not found a way to replace the World War II pilots it was beginning to lose. The Guardsmen were not happy with obsolescent aircraft and radar, but they were convinced that with modern aircraft and support equipment they could perform the continental air defense mission.

Headquarters ADC was not convinced, but General Stratemeyer realized his only hope to create in-being air defense strength was through the Air Guard. The first five Air Guard squadrons converted to the F-80 jet in 1948.
FOOTNOTES


4 Ibid.

5 Air National Guard Second Unit Commanders School, Speeches Delivered at the Orlando Conference (Orlando, Florida, 4-6 April 1949), compiled by Air Plans Group, Air Force Division, National Guard Bureau, pp. 34-35. (Hereafter cited as Orlando Conference Speeches.)


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 41.

11    Ibid., p. 10.


16    Smith Interview. Lt. Col. Frank D. Sharp suggested in a 1949 Air Command and Staff School Research Report that a study of state requirements for non-combat aircraft be made. Should the states need them, such aircraft could be given to the states and assigned to the existing Army organic aviation organization.


19    Gray Board, p. 16.


22    Ibid., p. 160.


NGAUS Proceedings, 1948, p. 41.

Ibid., p. 213.


NGAUS Proceedings, 1948, p. 39. This contention is highly unlikely for a number of reasons. A preliminary conference was held 20-21 November 1947 at the Pentagon to discuss Air Guard problems in general and the agenda for the Brooks meeting in particular. A number of issues were discussed, including; supply, maintenance, A.C.&W. Manning and equipment, increased permanent party personnel for the units, and the appointment of air instructors as temporary unit commanders. Command and control was mentioned in passing; but not at length (see "History of ADC, July '47-May '48," document #207). Those present, including Col. W.A.R. Robertson, Aviation Group Chief, and Brig. Gen. J.P. McConnell, likely felt the proposal would not stir up much controversy at the meeting, and they were right. Aside from the fact that there were numerous other items on the agenda, since this was the first meeting after Air Force autonomy, there is the question of tactics. Had the Air Force wanted to "pull a fast one" on the Guard it would have been much easier to do so by mailing the proposal to each adjutant general without the fanfare of a national meeting. It is true that the weather was miserable and many conferees were late because of long periods of heavy fog (Weart interview and Ground Weather Observations, Brooks
Field, San Antonio, Texas, 23-29 February 1948/USAF ETAC OL-A, Military Airlift Command, Asheville, North Carolina. However, there is no evidence that those present were "packed," or even generally pro-federalization. The representative from 2nd Air Force sent a message to Headquarters ADC on 13 February 1948 recommending the control be accomplished through an amendment of the National Defense Act; he also wanted "the Adjutants-General made cognizant of this plan at the...Conference at Brooks..." (See "History of ADC, July '47-May '48," document #220.)

29
Ibid.

30
Ibid., p. 44.

31
Ibid., p. 45.

32

33
Weart interview.

34

35
Ibid.

36

37

38

39
Ibid.


Ibid., p. 16.


Aviation Group ANG Report, 1948, p. 16.

Ibid., p. 1.


Maj. Gen. Cramer found "the Aircraft Control and Warning set-up of the 67th Fighter Wing at the Commonwealth Armory in Boston" especially praiseworthy, as well as the work of the 57th Fighter Wing and its radar system at Idlewild Airport. These units pointed up "the tremendous potentialities of the Air National Guard" (see pp. 154-55, NGAUS Proceedings, 1948).


Ibid.

Letter, 14th Air Force Director of Operations (Col. T.K. McGehee) to Headquarters ADC, 21 September 1948, Subject: "Operational Effectiveness of Air National Guard Units." Ibid.
Weart interview. "I had probably been to more ANG squadrons than any other officer in the Air Force. General Hanley at 11th Air Force kept me on the road all the time, and it wasn't much different at ADC....The decision as to which outfits went jet was basically mine. We thought long runways were very important then; we didn't know so much about jets in those days. Geographical dispersal was important strategically and in terms of avoiding charges of favoritism." The five squadrons were: 132nd FS, Bangor, Maine; 158th FS, Savannah, Georgia; 159th FS, Jacksonville, Florida; 173rd FS, Lincoln, Nebraska; and 196th FS, San Bernardino, California.
CHAPTER IV

CONFERENCE AT ORLANDO, THE FEDERALIZATION ISSUE, GROWTH AND DIFFICULTIES

The Second Annual Air National Guard Unit Commanders Conference was held at Orlando (now McCoy) AFB, Florida, 4-6 April 1949. It had been more than thirteen months since the initial meeting at Brooks AFB; the Walsh/Reckord modification of "Channels..." had gained full and final approval on 28 December 1948, and command and control "was virtually a dead issue...at Orlando."¹ Brigadier General Louis F. Boutwell of Massachusetts, Commander of the 67th Fighter Wing urged the conferees to "forget the command question; it is unimportant. Exploit the possibilities which the Air National Guard offers you."³ He insisted that interstate cooperation could and would work, and praised adoption of the Walsh/Reckord version of "Channels..." although he admitted that he didn't understand all its particulars.⁴ General Boutwell's immediate superior, Major General William H. Harrison, Jr., Adjutant General of Massachusetts, was conciliatory. He insisted that the problems faced over the past thirteen months had not actually been so complex and "shouldn't have resulted in such bitter disputes and differences."⁵

The Air Guardsmen could afford to be magnanimous. They
had won the first major battle on the issue of command and control; the Air Guard was indisputably a state air force. Although General Stratemeyer had gained a modicum of authority in terms of "training supervision," it was far short of the "command jurisdiction" he hoped for.

Although command and control had ceased to be an issue, federalization certainly had not. Some Air Guardsmen saw the victory over General Stratemeyer as only the first of a series that had to be won in order to avoid federal absorption of the National Guard. No Air Guard officer who spoke failed to lambast the Gray Board either pointedly or indirectly. General Boutwell turned from his call for rapprochement with the Air Force to a blistering denunciation of those who would destroy the Guard through "centralization of power" which could lead only to evils such as "communism, nazism (sic), or fascism."

Too many military and civilian officials responsible for the administration of reserve programs were Uptonians, who favored centralization, and were pro-regular and anti-Guard; Guardsmen, on the other hand, were Washingtonians, who favored maintenance of the militia and opposed any centralization of power. The struggle between these two schools of thought, Boutwell said, was the struggle for the existence of the National Guard.

Lieutenant General Elwood Quesada, recently appointed Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, would certainly have been classified as an Uptonian by Boutwell. His address, which can best be described as impolitic,
clearly stung the Guardsmen. Quesada was by turns hostile and patronizing. He reminded the delegates that the federal government had contributed over $430 million in supplies and equipment to the Guard. The state character and traditions of the Guard were important, "but only...militarily to the degree that they contribute to a more effective national military organization." By insisting that the Air Force's authority was not commensurate with its responsibility where the ANG was concerned, he was, at least in the eyes of the Guardsmen, making a case for federalization. His praise of the Gray Board as dedicated, sincere and thorough men to the assembly was courageous, though ill-advised. It was like praising the sincerity and thoroughness of the Warren Court to the John Birch Society's Executive Council.

Major General R.M. Webster substituted for Lieutenant General Stratemeyer, who was in route to his next assignment as Commanding General, Far Eastern Air Forces. Webster was Commanding General, Eastern Air Defense Forces (EADF), which had replaced First and Fourteenth Air Forces when CONAC replaced ADC. Webster attempted to explain the reasoning behind the establishment of CONAC to the conference, but his explanation was clumsy and confusing. The whole CONAC concept (combination and cross-training of all Air Force fighter forces within one command) was so misbegotten from the start, however, that it would have taken an orator of greater eloquence than General Webster to make it even appear reasonable.

He made the expected reference to the ANG's "first-team"
status, which by 1949 had become almost a genuflective remark to any Air Guard gathering. Because of the addition of the Tactical Air Command mission to CONAC, he noted that Air Guard units might be asked to cross-train in order to master "missions peculiar...to Tactical Air Command" although first priority in training was still to go to gaining proficiency in "interception and air combat."

The aircraft statistics cited by Webster were certainly impressive and would obviously make an Air Guardsman feel like a member of the "first team."
The regular Air Force had a total of forty fighter squadrons, twenty-one of which were jet; the ANG had a total of sixty-nine fighter squadrons, eight of which were jet. The Air Guard, in 1949, comprised 63% of the total fighter force of the U.S., and 28% of its jet strength.

The Air Force was less successful in promoting harmony at Orlando than it had been the previous year at San Antonio. Although the command question had been settled to the Air Guard's satisfaction, some present undoubtedly felt the "regular establishment" had attempted to hoodwink them in 1948, and only Walsh and Reckord's alertness had saved the day. Five of the six scheduled Air Force speakers were substitutes; in several cases the alternate was of considerably less rank.

The Air Guard was being told of its importance, but not by the Air Force's most important people. General Quesada's speech was needlessly vindictive; it obviously was not going to change the minds of those present, and served only to anger them. Brigadier General McConnell, who had not intended to
speak, took the platform after Quesada's address in order to smooth things over. 14

Views on Federalization From the Ranks

Federalization was a vital issue among lower ranking Guard officers, too. Lieutenant Colonel Tom Lanphier, Jr., Idaho's Senior Air Officer, stirred tremendous controversy with his January, 1949, article, "AF Air Forces Too Many" in Air Force magazine. Air Force, under the guise of editorial neutrality, was generally pro-federalization. Lanphier's article was exceptionally "good copy" for three reasons. First, it was a case for federalization being made by an Air Guard officer, a genuine rarity. Second, he was a highly-decorated, AAF P-38 ace of World War II, and the man credited with shooting down Admiral Yamamoto. Third, his squadron had been selected for conversion to F-80's during 1949, an honor which reflected on his ability as commander.

Lanphier called the Air National Guard "a luxurious flying club for those lucky enough to get in," 15 and noted that while his squadron had thirty-five F-51's for twenty-seven assigned pilots, nearby Air Reservists had no aircraft. 16 He claimed, counter to the arguments of Walsh and Reckord, that local support would be easy to maintain since the personnel and location of the units would not change. 17 He could see no valid reason for state control when Idaho's contribution to its ANG unit was only 3% of its total FY1948 budget. 18 Moreover, the only mission was the federal one.
"An air arm is about as useful to the governor of a sovereign state as a bombsight to a freight train." Lanphier, who insisted full control by the Air Force was the only sensible method of combining authority and responsibility, ended his article on an especially heretical note, "the Gray Board was right."20

The flood of responses, both letters and articles, prompted Air Force to run a special forum section in the February, March, and April issues in order to accommodate Air Guardsmen and Air Reservists who commented. There were differences of opinion, but the majority of Air Guardsmen, as might be assumed, opposed federalization violently. Most arguments against federalization, like those of Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. DuBois of the Missouri ANG, were disingenuous. DuBois argued that even though the federal government paid 95% of the bill, a complete federalization would not add any operational strength and would mean only 100% federal underwriting.21 Additional operational strength, of course, was not an issue; federal control of a force with a solely federal mission was and is. Captain Barry Goldwater of the Arizona ANG agreed with Lanphier in principle, but noted that it was incumbent upon the Air Force to devise a reserve system superior to the Air Guard. "Until then," he wrote, "the ANG gets my vote."22 The most heated reply, totally intransigent on the issue of state command prerogatives, came from Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Gould, Maryland's Senior Air Officer and General Reckord's immediate
subordinate. As the title, "Air Guard—or a Promise?", implies
Gould stressed the fact that the ANG actually had the aircraft
and could perform the federal mission. He claimed there is no
mission duplication since the ANG had an M-Day mission while
the AFRs did not (a spurious argument) and warned of dire
consequences if all military forces were controlled "by a few
men in Washington."\(^{23}\)

One argument used by all federalization foes was irre-
futable: the Air Guard was getting the job done and the Air
Reserve was not. Why, then, should all air reserve forces
be placed under the control of those whose planning and ad-
ministration of the Air Reserve had been so poor?

The Reserve Components as the Air Force Saw Them

On 4 October 1949 the Office of the Special Assistant
to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs reported to the
Secretary of Defense's Civilian Components Policy Board.
This report clearly shows how the Air Force viewed each of
its two reserve components, and how it analyzed the events
of 1946-1949.

In examining the origin of the Air Reserve, by then the
Air Force Reserve, the report stated that "ambitious programs
were developed only to be discarded because budgetary cutbacks
precluded...effective...training."\(^{24}\) This lack of realistic
financial planning was seen as a basic error that caused
"stormy and unhappy"\(^{25}\) times for the Air Force Reserve. A
lack of experience in reserve affairs was seen as a serious
problem, and "higher priority tasks in the attainment of autonomy, and the rehabilitation of the demobilized United States Air Force...contributed to impede progress."\textsuperscript{26} Or, as Air Guardsmen were fond of pointing out, as long as the Air Force Reserve (or any reserve component) was totally dependent on the Air Force for money, it would be, both literally and figuratively, a poor relation.

The original idea of insuring each reservist of at least some training was also seen as a mistake. General Quesada and his staff realized, as General Stratemeyer had after experience with the Air Reserve, that the emphasis must be on the quality of training, rather than the quantity.\textsuperscript{27} This meant concentrating on personnel in organized, operational units, especially rated officers, who comprised roughly 3% of the total Air Force Reserve. The fallacy of both unit training and individual training in an organization as enormous and under-budgeted as the Air Force Reserve had become patent. But, while emphasis was placed on programs to develop T./O.&E. units,\textsuperscript{28} the Mobilization Assignment Program was continued, too.\textsuperscript{29}

Quesada's staff introduced the Air National Guard as "only an extension of our traditional policy of reliance on the citizen-soldier for national defense."\textsuperscript{30} The mission ("...to provide a reserve component of the United States Air Force...") was the mission of the federalized Guard, the ANGUS. This lapse in a presentation which obviously attempted to be as technically correct as possible is interesting. It shows
that General Quesada and his staff, like most other Air Force officers, saw the Air Guard only as a reserve component without any other mission.31

All 514 authorized units had been organized and federally-recognized by mid-June. A total of 13,245 officers and men were authorized for the A.C.&W. squadrons so vital to air defense; the units were far from fully-manned.32 Large scale construction with the federal government underwriting 75% of the cost was being undertaken to provide suitable facilities. The inadequate fields from which the pre-WWII observation squadrons operated often had only unpaved runways and rarely had fire or crash equipment, or storage facilities for high octane fuel.33 By 1 October 1949, the ANG had 82% of its authorized aircraft and 100% of its necessary spare parts and support equipment on hand. The contrast with the Air Force Reserve, many of whose units were authorized only 25% of their T./O.&E. aircraft and supplies, is striking.34

Quesada and his staff underlined three major problems facing the ANG in the fall of 1949. First, twelve additional radar squadrons (authorized, but not yet funded) and numerous additional trained personnel, both officer and enlisted, were seen as absolute necessities. The Air Guard was still fifty-four radar sets short of having minimum facilities for the A.C.&W. squadrons then operating. A second need was for modern facilities, especially longer runways to accommodate jets. Third, the necessity of recruiting and retaining younger pilots was re-emphasized.35
The authors of the report, in an attempt "to summarize briefly the somewhat confusing status of the Air National Guard,"36 show graphically why the issue of command and control was such an intricate one:

During time of peace the ANGUS is theoretically in dormant status. However, the Air National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guards of the several States and Territories are physically the same. Thus, while in time of peace the ANG is under direct control of state military authorities, its alter ego, the Air National Guard of the United States, is being trained under the supervision of federal agencies with the support of federal funds.

37

This "Alice in Wonderland" status frustrated both Stratemeyer and Whitehead, but as awkward as it was, it was the best arrangement either could obtain.

The most interesting aspect of the report is the difference in tone of the sections on the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. After citing a series of erroneous assumptions underlying the Air Force Reserve Program, a briefing on the status of current programs still based on those fallacies is presented in a most matter-of-fact way. The ANG section, on the other hand, presented a more detailed picture followed by a clear accounting of immediate problems to be solved in order for the Air Guard to perform successfully the air defense mission. The implication is clear: take care of the Guard and allow the Reserve to rock along as best it can until there is time to work on it. It is not difficult to understand that, by 1949, the Air Force Reserve had not met
its two main objectives: "1. The creation of a pool of qualified and quickly-available officers and airmen to augment the regular Air Force in an emergency. 2. The development of proficiency in individual participants."38

The Air National Guard as the Chief of the National Guard Bureau Saw It

Major General Kenneth Cramer, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, appeared to champion the cause of the ANG before the Department of Defense's Ad Hoc Committee on Civilian Components in the spring of 1949.39 In his opening remarks, General Cramer asserted that the states had realized from the start that there were no state missions for the ANG and "with full knowledge of the problems...to their great credit, the states...promptly undertook to carry out the Air National Guard program."40 It is impossible, of course, to determine whether or not the states really understood that there were no state missions for an ANG squadron. Certainly some must have, although many of the governors answering the Gray Board's questionnaire indicated their ANG units performed various state missions, including search and rescue and emergency airlift.

The nature of the problems encountered by a state upon acceptance of an Air Guard unit is unclear. Except for a very minimal outlay of funds and the effort involved in location of a suitable airfield, the states had very little to do; the aircraft were a gift from WWII surpluses; the Air Force provided uniforms and pay, as well as active duty officers
and non-commissioned officers to assist the units.

The thrust of Cramer's presentation was an attempt to convince the committee that if there were to be a single air reserve component, it should be the Air National Guard. The ANG, he asserted was getting the job done under considerable handicaps, such as having only about 60% of the authorized Air Force instructors. Training had advanced to the point where six of the Air Guard's twelve wings had held wing level exercises requiring extensive interstate cooperation and coordination; a number of Guard A.C.&W. units had participated as well.

The Guard Bureau chief stressed that the ANG was a fully-organized, functioning entity for which almost $155 billion had been appropriated since its inception. In closing, he recommended that the committee request an accounting of Air Force Reserve assets and a "blueprint" for its future programs as "a point of departure...toward conclusions of a definite and constructive character." The implication was that any merger should be accomplished by the Air National Guard's absorbing the Air Force Reserve. Cramer made no mention of two of the Air Guard's most pressing problems: the lack of first-line radar equipment and personnel to operate and service it, and the scarcity of pilots. At that time the Air Guard was authorized a total of 4,020 pilots, 3,400 of whom were actually on board. Many of these 3,400 would soon be promoted out of the cockpit or passed over for promotion and released as overage in grade.
CONAC: Combat-Readiness, Command and Control

The report on results of operational readiness tests (ORT's) conducted on Air National Guard units during the first nine months of 1949 confirmed Lieutenant Colonel Lanhier's skepticism rather than Major General Cramer's enthusiasm. It would require "an average of 86.6 days for Air National Guard units to attain one hundred percent combat effectiveness."\(^45\)

Nonetheless, CONAC was planning to equip as many Air Guard units as possible with jet fighters during FY1950 and FY1951. Thirteen more ANG squadrons were scheduled to receive jets in FY1950, while twenty-two more would go jet the following year. The aircraft programmed for the Guard were the F-80 "Shooting Star," F-84 "Thunderjet," F-86 "Sabrejet" (later to become the frontline fighter of the Korean War), and the F-94 "Starfire." Allocations which would make the Guard almost 50% jet-equipped (41 of 84 squadrons) were to be based on "air defense factors in conjunction with existing airfield facilities."\(^46\)

The Korean War would stop the flow of jet fighters to the Air Guard, as well as increasing its pilot procurement problems. Many of the Guard aircraft of federalized units remained with the regular Air Force afterwards as part of the beefed-up post-Korea military. Air Guard pilots were often offered regular commissions and chose to accept and remain on extended active duty, too.

Continental Air Command was unable to establish any more
definite control over the Air National Guard than had Air Defense Command. Although General Whitehead made one last effort to accomplish what General Stratemeyer had attempted two years earlier. He directed Major General Robert Webster, Commanding General of Eastern Air Defense Forces (EADF)^47 to request governors within his area to voluntarily relinquish operational control of ANG fighters so they could augment regular Air Force air defense units. Major General Karl Hausauer, Chief of Staff to New York's adjutant general, the indomitable Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, demurred. It was New York law, he wrote General Webster, that state military forces could be turned over to federal command only if an attack on the continental United States were imminent."

Whitehead had hoped to extend this agreement, once consummated, throughout the EADF area and eventually westward. However, Air Guardsmen saw it only as another power play from the top. In late December, 1949, General Webster, in an EADF position paper on the Air Guard echoed the frustration and exasperation of both Stratemeyer and Whitehead:

> The Air National Guard cannot be used to support active air defense at present because this headquarters does not exercise operational control over the ANG, and it is apparent that authority cannot be obtained upon any sound basis...without appropriate legislation by Congress.

By January, 1950, CONAC was ready to give up the fight for operational control of the Air Guard. General Whitehead and his staff were convinced that a credible air defense force
was impossible without federal control, which they saw as unattainable. They concluded that the ANG should be re-equipped with light transport and liaison aircraft in order to serve a more useful and compatible function upon being called up. Whitehead probably realized, however, that he could not have been able to accomplish a mission change of that type. The National Guard Association simply would never have let it happen. The Air National Guard, once assigned a combat mission, would not relinquish it. Air Guard fighter squadrons were on their way to summer camps to practice for their air defense mission on 25 June 1950.

Summary

The immediate command and control problem had been settled to the ANG's satisfaction for the time being, so Air Guardsmen could afford to be magnanimous at Orlando. Federalization, however, remained a most sensitive issue. Lieutenant Colonel Tom Lanphier, Jr., Senior Air Officer, Idaho Air National Guard, stirred great controversy by advocating it, while the Guard's leadership was denouncing it bitterly and unequivocally. Most Air Guardsmen saw their victory over ADC as only one battle in the war to avert total abolition of the Air National Guard.

The Air Guard attained its full growth in 1949 with all 514 units organized and federally-recognized. The same serious problems that plagued the Air Guard in 1946 were evident three years later. Only about 60% of the Air Force instructors
authorized were actually on the job. Modern radar and the personnel to operate and maintain it were not available to the Air Guard; neither was a method for maintaining a continuous flow of pilots.

Reserve problems were a great deal more serious than those of the Guard. Several basic planning errors still haunted the Air Force Reserve. Not only was there a lack of money, but a needless dual mission. The AFRes was supposed to provide both T./0.&E. units and an individual replacement pool. By 1949 it was obvious that neither task had been fulfilled. Only a few B-26 light bombers had been provided the AFRes; the majority of reserve wings with aircraft had only AT-6 trainers or C-46 and C-47 cargo aircraft. This lack of combat aircraft was a serious obstacle to pilot recruitment and retention; the AFRes had to compete with the Naval Air Reserve program as well as the ANG. Both could offer high performance fighters and a realistic training program. Enlisted and non-rated officer participation was almost non-existent; those non-flyers who did join were usually frustrated by the lack of training equipment and a training program. Perhaps the biggest problem was that an M-Day mission of the type assigned most reserve units was simply not taken seriously by most people in the Air Force. By 1949 the idea that M-Day and D-Day would be the same was generally taken for granted; if M-Day was D-Day, Air Force Reserve Mobilization would have been minimal.

Even with its obvious shortcomings, the ANG was clearly
the first line of defense in theory and in fact. Plans to bring the Air Guard to a 50% jet configuration, never realized because of the Korean War, were being made at Headquarters CONAC in late 1949.

General Whitehead found that he was unable to establish any tighter control over the Air Guard than had his predecessor. He and his staff decided that the only solution was to re-equip them with light transport and liaison aircraft for an M-Day support role, although they must have realized a mission change by then was impossible. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea some six months later would quickly shift the spotlight away from continental air defense.
FOOTNOTES

1
Weart interview.

2

3
Air National Guard Second Unit Commanders School, Speeches Delivered at the Orlando Conference (Orlando, Florida, 4-6 April 1949), p. 15. (Hereafter cited as Orlando Conference Speeches.)

4
Ibid.

5
Ibid., p. 74.

6
Ibid., p. 15.

7
Ibid., p. 13. George Washington's Sentiments on a Peace Establishment outlined a detailed plan for a militia to support a small regular army. Brevet Maj. Gen. Emory Upton's The Military Policy of America, written almost 100 years later, blasted the militia for incompetence and cowardice, and called for a large standing army as the only guarantor of victory in the next war.

8
Ibid., pp. 77-78.

9
Ibid., pp. 78-79.

10
Ibid., pp. 18-19.

11
Ibid., p. 13.

12
Spruance and Weart interviews.

Orlando Conference Speeches, p. 81.


Ibid., p. 15.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 12.

Ibid., p. 15.


Ibid.

Lt. Col. Robert L. Gould, Senior Air Officer, Maryland Air National Guard, "Air Guard-or a Promise?" Air Force, II (April, 1949), p. 43.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 5. The Corollary Unit Program would create organizations based on the same T./O.&E. as a parent regular Air Force unit, and be co-located with it. The Air Force Reserve Training Center Program would be established in large population centers where there were no regular Air Force facilities, or the existing facilities could not support a corollary unit. At the time of the report there were twenty-five operational wings in the AFRTC program: twenty troop carrier wings equipped with either C-46's or C-57's and 5 light bomb wings equipped with B-26's. Each wing, however, had only 25% of its authorized T./O.&E. aircraft and equipment.

Ibid., p. 9.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 12.


Ibid., pp. 15-16. As of 1 October the ANG had 2,263 of 2,753 authorized aircraft. Of these, 1,843 were combat aircraft and 104 were jets.

Ibid., pp. 17-18.

Ibid., p. 19.

Ibid.
38 Col. Leonard Dereszynski, USAFRRes., "An Analysis of
the Stability of the Air Force Reserve Program, 1948-1968"
(Air War College Thesis, Air University, 1969), pp. 28-29
(quoted from Stewart Symington, Annual Report of the Secre-
tary of the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal

39 The transcript is undated except for "1949." However
at one point in his presentation, Maj. Gen. Cramer referred
to the ANG as a "thirty-three month old organization." Counting from the time at which state allocations were made,
would place the presentation in March of that year.

40 Maj. Gen. Kenneth F. Cramer, Chief of the National
Guard Bureau, Presentation on the Air National Guard before
the Department of Defense Ad Hoc Committee on Civilian Com-
ponents (March ?), 1949, (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-

41 Ibid., p. 14.

42 Ibid., p. 16. The wings were: 67th (New England states),
52nd (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania), 54th (Tennessee,
Georgia, Florida, and the Carolinas), 71st (Missouri, Iowa,
and Wyoming), 86th (Nebraska, Colorado, and Kansas), 55th
(Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, and West Virginia).

43 Ibid., p. 19.

44 "Men and Units," Report of the Chief of the National

45 Letter, Lt. Gen. Whitehead to Gen. Spaatz, 10 September
1949, "Subject: Combat Effectiveness of Air National Guard
Units." Miscellaneous ADC Correspondence, 1948-1950. His-
torical Division, Air Force Archives, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
Laupheimer wrote (pp. 11-12 of Air Force article - see footnote
#15) that the Air Guard never got an adequate amount of time
for running intercepts or practicing air to air gunnery. Col.
George Weart noted that "combat readiness standards in those
days were not hard and fast as they are now. One big problem,
of course, was that the average ANG pilot got only about one-
half of the flying time of his active duty counterpart, and
many got less than that." (Weart interview)

When CONAC was formed the ADC numbered air forces in the Eastern U.S. (First and Fourteenth) were combined into "Eastern Air Defense Forces" (EADF). Those in the West (Fourth and Tenth) became Western Air Defense Forces (WADF). Maj. Gen. Webster, formerly Commanding General, First Air Force, assumed command of EADF.


CHAPTER V

FEDERALIZATION AND THE OTHER ALTERNATIVE: VIABLE MISSIONS FOR THE AIR GUARD AT STATE LEVEL

Continental Air Defense and the Viability of ADC

During the past two decades federalization of the Air National Guard has not been the vital issue it was prior to the Korean War. Korea ended the first phase of the Air Force - Air National Guard relationship. Involvement in actual hostilities in Korea made air defense of the U.S. a decidedly less pressing issue. The performance of Air Guardsmen mobilized for Korea was generally excellent; their professionalism and expertise were important in gaining increased acceptance from the regulars.¹ Mobilizations for the Berlin and Pueblo crises and the Indo-Chinese War helped minimize the issue of a state mission. The ability of Air Guard units to accomplish their federal mission rapidly in these tense international confrontations tended to make the state mission issue appear less relevant.

Great reliance on strategic offensive and defensive aviation was a corollary of the Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look." But a much larger share of the air defense mission was assumed by the regular Air Force; Air National Guard pilots, fresh from outstanding performances in Korea, stood runway alert to
augment the regular forces by the war's end.

The policy changes by the Kennedy administration resulting from the "Flexible Response" doctrine meant a large-scale conventional build-up, a decreased dependence on nuclear weapons, and a consequent loss in prestige for Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command. Additionally, ADC suffered from budget cutbacks. Strategic Air Command managed to claim a place for itself in the Indo-Chinese War, but it was not until after the North Vietnamese invasion of spring, 1972, that SAC's B-52's were given the job of bombing strategic rather than tactical targets.2

Air defense has not been a vital mission during the Indo-Chinese War. The Air Force has sent ADC's F-102 "Delta Daggers" and F-106 "Delta Darts" to provide for the air defense of Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon. However, no USAF interceptor has fired a shot in anger as part of an air defense force.

The threat of an attack on the continental U.S. by manned aircraft is no longer taken seriously, although most military and civilian leaders acknowledge the necessity for a long-range strategic bomber - especially after the B-52 has proven its "flexibility" for conventional bombing in Indo-China. Strategic Air Command will convert a number of wings from older models of the B-52 to the new B-1 when it enters the Air Force inventory in 1976 or 1977. Unlike SAC, Aerospace Defense Command (the name was officially changed in 1968) cannot point to the flexibility of its aircraft or an
important limited war role for them. The YF-12 "Blackbird," the interceptor ADC eagerly anticipated throughout the 1960's, was purchased only for SAC in its modified form as the SR (Strategic Reconnaissance) -71.

While the end of the Indo-Chinese War will probably restore strategic offensive aviation to its former position of prominence in the regular Air Force, strategic defensive aviation will not regain the primacy it enjoyed throughout the 1950's. In fact, ADC's need for the Air National Guard is greater now than at any time since 1946. A 31 March 1972 news release from the Secretary of the Air Force's Office of Information announced that "the realignment and reorganization of Aerospace Defense Command forces require increased reliance on the combat capabilities of the Air National Guard."3 Although the release refers only to augmentation of ADC forces in a perimeter (primarily coastal) defense,4 the Air Guard could easily find itself with the entire air defense mission.

Both Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command would like to have the entire Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). This network of airborne radar stations (modified Boeing 707's which will be redesignated EC-137's) will be capable of controlling both strategic and tactical aircraft. Either command is in a much stronger position to get it than ADC. Each played a major role in the Indo-Chinese war. Strategic Air Command is assured of viability because of the B-1; Tactical Air Command will be given both the A-X, an attack airplane designed specifically for limited warfare operations,
and the F-15, a highly-sophisticated air superiority fighter.

With military spending in all areas gaining increasingly intense scrutiny and the manned aircraft threat no longer menacing, ADC might be discontinued as a major command. In the event of its demise the remaining ADC aircraft, personnel, and equipment would almost surely be transferred virtually intact to become a numbered air force or sub-command under SAC or TAC, which would assume responsibility for the air defense mission. If that happens, and the possibility is very real, the second round in the single component air reserve battle could easily begin.

The Federalization Arguments - Reason and Emotion

Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the members of the Gray Board argued for federalization on sound, clear-cut military and managerial bases. It was axiomatic to them that a force with a strictly federal mission should certainly be under federal control. They realized that, as one Air Force officer remarked, "there really isn't any state mission for the Air Guard; their job is to back up the regulars." 5

While the Air Guard performs a variety of state-oriented tasks (e.g., search and rescue, small-scale tactical airlift, and various forms of disaster relief), there is no evidence that the regulars would reject such missions. They could be performed as well by the Air Force, which would almost certainly be happy to undertake them. The publicity would be beneficial in improving the public's image of the Air Force.
It presents a tremendous opportunity for the Air Force to show its interest and involvement on a state and local level. It would present the Air Force not just as the service that drops thousands of tons of bombs, but the service that rescues lost children, saves starving cattle, and flies food, clothing and shelter to victims of natural disasters. This technician addition to the Air Force's mission would be popular and practical. It would not be a large-scale nor frequent duty, but it could obviously be beneficial in terms of public acceptance, a major consideration today.

The Air Guard's mission of backing up the regular Air Force is the mission for which it trains and prepares; it is the mission for which the ANG was organized. In the case of air defense or any of the national missions to which the ANG is now committed, this means frequently becoming part of the regular establishment; and that means that authority and responsibility should be co-located. Although the Army National Guard obviously has a mission to perform at the state level, a state air force is, without federal responsibility, an organization in search of a mission. The Air Force should exercise control ("command jurisdiction") over a force that is clearly nothing more than its primary reserve.

Most replies to these arguments by Air Guardsmen were not responsive to the basic issue involved. Most are still not today. Very few ANG officers were willing to publicly agree with Lieutenant Colonel Lanphier in 1949. Very few today will state unequivocally that there is no state mission
for the Air Guard.  

The arguments advanced by Air Guardsmen in favor of the dual component reserve system can be placed in four general categories; they were being used in the late 1940's, and they are still in use today: the Constitutional/Patriotic argument, the Pragmatic/Realistic argument, the Healthy Competition argument, and the Lack of Empathy argument.

Generals Reckord and Walsh exemplified the Constitutional/Patriotic argument. They saw themselves as protectors and defenders of the Constitution against a powerful and power-hungry federal bureaucracy, led by the Pentagon. To be with them was to be on the patriotic, constitutionally-sound side; to be against them was to be at best woefully misguided. Brigadier General Boutwell, in his speech at the 1949 Orlando Conference, characterized federalization of the Guard as the first step toward a military dictatorship. The line of argument advanced by Reckord and Walsh overlooked the fact that there would still be a militia. There simply would be no aerial militia.

Air Guardsmen of the Pragmatic/Realistic school (e.g. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Gould of Maryland) maintain that, irrespective of other arguments, the Air National Guard works better than the Air Force Reserve. The Air Guard, they argue, has the airplanes, the skilled and dedicated volunteers, the community support and the political clout, thanks to the individual efforts of the states' senators and representatives and the collective effort of a very powerful lobby, the Na-
tional Guard Association of the U.S. The Reserve has always been in a weaker position in every respect. Why should a successful program be turned over to those agencies that could not plan and administer the Air Reserve program from the beginning? Besides, the Air Force gets to have its cake and eat it, too, their argument runs. It has both combat-ready, operational units and a replacement pool, and enjoys the benefit of the states' underwriting a portion of the cost.

This argument is factual, but disingenuous. It admits the total lack of a state mission for the Guard. It does, however, present an interesting corollary advanced by some Guardsmen, the merger of the Air Force Reserve into the Air National Guard. This solution solves the duplication problem, but increases difficulties of command; the Air Force would have a single reserve component, but one that it couldn't command on a permanent basis.

While many, starting with Forrestal and the Gray Board, saw the ANG and AFRs engaged in a needless and enervating competition, some Guardsmen see it as a healthy rivalry that keeps both components more alert and effective than they would be otherwise. The histories of the two components show that this is not a tenable position; the ANG started far ahead and has remained there. This argument could be more than a rationalization only if their relative positions of power and influence had been roughly the same; they have not been, of course, and are not now.

The Lack of Empathy argument is at base emotional and
ideological, and centers around the uniqueness with which the Air Guardsman sees himself. The Air Guardsman, like his Army counterpart, is always conscious of the unique state-federal character of the ANG. He sees himself as more than just a reservist and only slightly less than a regular; he is the inheritor of a unique heritage and tradition, a special kind of patriot and defender of the Constitution. The regular, who is not a part of this special group, is incapable of understanding it. Therefore federalization is doomed to failure because only an Air Guardsman can make the system work for other Air Guardsmen.

The differences between Guardsmen and other reservists are more imagined than real. Admittedly, the National Guard is a unique institution, but it is not an esoteric order; the heritage and traditions that distinguish it do not render it incomprehensible to the outsider. This is the same spurious logic that is used to justify "Black Studies" programs on American campuses.

Some, both regulars and Air Guardsmen, see the air defense mission as ideal for the Air National Guard, both militarily and ideologically. Not only does it provide stability for the Air Guardsman and economy for the regulars, but it has the added advantage of being the logical extension of the militia tradition, putting the citizen-soldier in the cockpit, or perhaps even in the missile control center.

Those who favor the dual component system must identify a mission for the Air National Guard at the state level.
However, this mission must be compatible with the Air Guard's federal responsibilities. Under the current system whereby ANG units are committed to one of three major commands for both training and mobilization (Aerospace Defense Command, Tactical Air Command, and Military Airlift Command), identification of a uniform state mission is virtually impossible. It would be possible to identify several missions best-suited to non-regulars (e.g. reconnaissance, tactical airlift, and rescue and recovery) and assign them to the Guard, thus maintaining both the dual component reserve system and the gaining command arrangement. However, there is no real necessity for the Air Guard, rather than the regular Air Force, to perform these missions, and since both the Air Force and the Air Guardsmen see the Air National Guard as a reserve component, the identification of plausible state missions is really a time-consuming and pointless exercise.

Summary

The mobilization of the Air Guard for the Korean War foreclosed on the federalization debate that had continued throughout the previous four years. Subsequent federal call-ups for the Berlin and Pueblo Crises and the Indo-Chinese War cast the Air Guard in a national role and further blurred the issue of state missions and state-federal command and control.

Neo-isolationist sentiment and closer scrutiny of military spending could mean the end of ADC, even though strategic
offensive aviation should once again gain prominence. The Air National Guard might very well find itself with virtually the entire air defense mission as it did in 1946. Should that be the case, the federalization battles would probably be refought.

Gray and Forrestal called for federalization of the Air National Guard because they realized its only real mission was a federal one. They concluded that authority and responsibility should be permanently, rather than sporadically, collocated. Guardsmen responded with four basic arguments against federalization which were long on emotional appeal and short on substance.

The Constitutional-Patriotic argument, advanced by Reckord, Walsh, and Boutwell, saw the Guard as the last bastion of states' rights before the onslaught of the Pentagon generals, who wished to devour the Guard without regard for the Constitutional issues involved. The Pragmatic/Realistic arguments of Gould and others disingenuously point out that the ANG performs its federal mission more effectively than the AFRes. Additionally, the dual component system allows the Air Force to maintain both combat-ready, operational units and a reserve pool without paying the full price. The Healthy Competition argument would be valid only if the AFRes had been healthy enough to provide competition for the Air Guard, which it has not. Some Guardsmen see their institution as a unique one that can be understood only by another Guardsman. On that basis they claim federalization is impossible
because regulars can't command and administer what they don't understand. These Guardsmen fail to recognize the difference between a unique institution and an esoteric one.

Some see the Air Guard as a perfectly logical extension of the "citizen-soldier idea." Others who wish to preserve the dual component system (or at least the state character of the Guard) dwell on state-oriented tasks the Air Guard could perform or is performing. However, there is no evidence that the regular Air Force, which could certainly do as thorough and economical a job, would reject these tasks.

The central issues then are clear. Do the states need air units to perform missions that cannot be performed any other way? Are there viable and continuing state missions for ANG units? If not, is there any valid reason for a unit whose whole existence is predicated on performing as a component of the U.S. Air Force to be under the command of a state governor? The answers to all these questions was "no" in 1946; it has not changed. However, the Air Force and Air Guard have reached the necessary modus vivendi to make the traditional system function. Without a change in the Air Guard's mission and the National Guard structure, the system, illogical as it is, will continue to work.
1. Brig. Gen. Wenger, Ohio's Assistant Adjutant General for Air, feels that the Korean Mobilization was "very important" in raising ANG stock with the regulars. Lt. Col. Haines and Col. Kelly agree. However, Lt. Col. Weidinger and Col. Griffith rated the Korean War as of only marginal importance to the Air Guard because unit integrity was not maintained and Guard pilots were often used on an individual replacement basis (ANG questionnaires completed by Brig. Gen. Wenger, Cols. Kelly and Griffith, and Lt. Cols. Haines and Weidinger). National Guard Fact Sheet #12, "A Summary of Air National Guard Mobilizations in the 20th Century" points to the fact that twenty-two of the Air Guard's twenty-seven wings were called up before the termination of hostilities, but makes no mention of the fact that these wings were often broken down for squadron or individual reassignment.

2. The continuing debate on the use (or misuse) of air-power in Indo-China has often centered around the early decision to bomb strategic targets in North Vietnam with tactical fighter-bombers, while using strategic bombers (B-52's) to attack tactical targets in the south. This has been characterized as "killing gnats with sledgehammers in the south, while hunting elephants with slingshots in the north."


4. Ibid.

5. Weart interview.

6. Col. Richter states simply, "there is no valid reason for state ANG units." Both Lt. Cols. Haines and Frey admit there is no state mission, but add that the ANG performs its federal mission more effectively than the AFRBs (ANG questionnaires completed by Col. Richter and Lt. Cols. Haines and Frey).
7 Air National Guard Second Unit Commanders School, Speeches Delivered at the Orlando Conference (Orlando, Florida, 4-6 April 1949), p. 15.

8 Lt. Col. Robert L. Gould, Senior Air Officer, Maryland Air National Guard, "Air Guard-or a Promise?" Air Force, II (April, 1949), pp. 40-43.


11 Maj. Carl J. Chapman, USAF, "Should the Air National Guard be Federalized?" (Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, 1949); Col. G.L. Doolittle, Oregon ANG, "Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Potential in the Continuing Conflict" (Air War College Thesis, Air University, 1958); Col. James M. Trail, ANG, Chief of Staff for Air, Idaho Air National Guard, "Does the Air National Guard Have Too Many Aircraft Types?" Air Force, IX (June, 1956), p. 124. Col. Trail noted that he had no complaints about the ANG's receiving surplus Air Force aircraft, "...the pros should have the most modern equipment before the semi-pros get it - if there isn't enough for both." Note that he referred to Air Guardsmen as "semi-pros" rather than reserves, amateurs, non-professionals, or even citizen-soldiers.

12 Lt. Col. J.E. Walker, USAF, "How Can We Best Utilize Our Reserve Forces?" (Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, 1957); Lt. Col. Clifford J. Lawrence, ANG, "The Air National Guard in the Berlin Crisis" (Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, 1961); Maj. Lenton D. Roller, USAF, "Utilization of the ANG in the Air Defense Plan of the U.S." (Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, 1948); Maj. Thomas M. Fitzgerald, USAF, "The Air National Guard: Our Only Interceptor Force?" (Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, 1966). Brig. Gen. Spruance, who was instrumental in planning for Air Guard manning of BOMARC missile sites during the mid-1950's, sees it as a perfectly logical job for the ANG. The idea was not accepted "because the
regulars saw it as a threat to their funding, manning, etc. - not control, that was worked out." Lt. Col. Weidinger anticipates ANG missilemen in air defense as the next step "after the fighter phase." (ANG questionnaires completed by Brig. Gen. Spruance and Lt. Col. Weidinger.)

13 Maj. Malcolm Beaton, USAF, "A Mission for the Air National Guard - Aerospace Rescue and Recovery" (Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, 1969); Lt. Col. Albert P. Litwa, ANG, "Aerospace Rescue and Recovery - A Mission for the Air National Guard?" (Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, 1971); Maj. Lloyd A. Hutton, ANG, "The Non-Active Duty Role of the Air National Guard" (Air Command and Staff School Research Report, Air University, 1968). Beaton contends that the entire Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service mission could go to the Air Guard, which is unlikely. He sees it as an important recruiting device in a period of no draft because of the humanitarian nature of the mission, another questionable assumption. Hutton sees the rescue and recovery mission and tactical airlift as well-suited to Guard operations. Col. George Weart adds reconnaissance to the list of missions amenable to Guard performance (Weart interview). The limited requirement for both rescue and recovery and reconnaissance, however, precludes total mission assignment to the Guard.
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Maj. Gen. Ernest Briscoe, former Chief of Staff, Ohio ANG.

Col. Robert A. Kelly, former Administrative Staff Officer, Headquarters Ohio ANG.

Lt. Col. Royal Frey, Curator, Air Force Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, and former Staff Officer, 121st TFW.

Col. Harry Richter, Vice-President for Community Relations, Ohio National Bank, and former Comptroller and Information Officer, Headquarters Ohio ANG.

Lt. Col. William B. Haines, Chief Division of Soldiers' Claims and Veterans' Affairs, Office of the Adjutant General of Ohio, and former Staff Communications and Electronics Officer, Headquarters Ohio ANG.


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