INDIA, RUSSIA, AND CHINA, 1947-1955: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIAN CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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National interest, as a pivot of diplomacy, is now almost universally employed in international relations. Indeed, it may be said that national interest—its maintenance, advancement, and defense by the various means and instrumentalities of political power—is the prime consideration of diplomacy.¹

CHAPTER I

A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

When India emerged as an independent nation after 1947, her leaders were immediately faced with many serious problems, and one of these problems was the formulation of a suitable foreign policy for the new country. It was a difficult task because India was not only an infant nation compared to the other powers of the world, but it was a country which lacked the many essential ingredients that enable a nation to wield a positive and forceful foreign policy. While her armed forces were modernized as compared to the armed forces of most Asian or African countries, India was, militarily speaking, a very weak nation. Moreover, in so far as her economy was concerned, India was mainly dependent upon outside sources to sustain her living standard, poor as that was. India's partition into two separate

nations on the eve of independence had also created a turmoil within the country which made national cohesion completely absent from the scene; in fact to create national unity became the most pressing immediate task.

While these factors could hardly be ignored by the Indian foreign-policy makers, the world outside was in the grip of the cold war. The Western nations sought to encourage all non-Communist countries to join in an anti-Communist alliance to escape Soviet domination. Soviet Russia made it known that any country having close ties with the West would be considered an unfriendly country.

Here was India, weak and hungry, dependent upon the West for her economic life, yet antagonistic toward the West due to the past colonial relationship; democratic and anti-Communist in her outlook, yet warm toward the anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic past of Soviet Russia, and she had no record of conflict with Russia in the past. How was India to act—especially when she took into account the fact that Soviet Russia and China were countries on her borders, countries with far more powerful military machines than India’s?

India’s leaders were also faced with other questions. Were they to pursue policies with India’s immediate needs in mind, or were they to give priority to the future setting and create a strong foundation so that India could find her rightful place in the family of nations? While solving the immediate economic crisis, could they ignore the fact that for a lasting solution of India’s economic ailments it was necessary to build a strong industrial base at home?
While dealing with the cold war dilemma, could they fail to see that India’s future was far more closely tied with Asian countries surrounding India than any other part of the world? And if that was true, did they not have to allow for the fact that China with her vast population and vast resources would always remain a part of the Asian picture?

It was in this context that the leaders of India faced the problem of dealing with Russia and China over the crucial years of 1947–1955. What were the guiding principles of India’s policies toward these countries? Indeed, where shall we look to find these principles?

Some Indian scholars have maintained that the motivations and concepts which lie behind Indian foreign policy can be found only in India’s heritage from her past, in the moralist outlook which can only be understood against this background. One author puts it thus:

In consonance with the traditions of this ancient people, who never coveted the possessions of their neighbours nor cherished feelings save of friendship and goodwill for all, Nehru announced that India would embark on her foreign relations with goodwill for every country and malice towards none.2

Many Western students of India have apparently decided that in the complex network of factors determining Indian foreign policy, the most important are to be found in the unpredictable whims and

fancies of India's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. An American writer has stated it as follows:

To conclude; the principal source of Indian thinking on the subject of foreign affairs is neither Hinduism, Buddhism, Gandhianism, the Western European tradition, nor a rational analysis of reality in terms of India's long-range national interest, but the complex biography of the Prime Minister. 3

Nehru himself, speaking at Columbia University in October 1949, said about India that "inevitably she had to consider her foreign policy in terms of enlightened self-interest." 4 Unfortunately, however, he has not gone beyond the familiar phrase, either to explain his interpretation or to apply it to the great problems and choices which exist before the Indian Government.

One interpretation of the phrase has been given by Hans Morgenthau, who believes that "the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, and national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions." 5 According to another interpretation: "Tooaring above all other interests is that of national


defense. By general consent this is the supreme consideration of every government.°6

In this study, we shall seek to understand how the Indian leaders have conceived "enlightened self-interest" for their new nation, especially as this concept is revealed in India's relationships with Soviet Russia and Communist China from 1947 to 1955. If they take Morgenthaler's or Beard's approach, it still remains to be seen how the Indian foreign-policy makers, especially Nehru, visualize the process of protecting India's security, protecting her national territory and her institutions, providing for national defense, and obtaining for India her rightful place in the world.

We shall search for the Indian meaning and interpretation in many places, especially in the national policy-makers' discussion of India's aims and objectives. We shall also seek to find the principles which are revealed in their policies and actions at crucial points such as the Korean conflict or the Tibetan episode. We shall also examine significant information which may reveal the Indian leaders' attitudes toward Communism—its general ideology, its usefulness for India, the role assumed by the Indian Communist Party—particularly for the insights which may be gained therein about the "national interest" of India.

°6 Beard, op. cit., p. 331.
CHAPTER II

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AIDS AND "NATIONAL INTEREST"

Although the policy-makers of the Indian Government have not
discussed specifically and publicly in any depth their concepts of
national policy, they have tried to explain at various times the
broad aims which they hold for their country in the field of foreign
policy. These explanations are often cloaked in generalized and
moralistic statements which seem to reveal little except noble sen-
timents, but they are based in large measure upon fundamental
concepts and attitudes well worth examination. Typical of one of
these explanations was Nehru's statement to the American Congress
in 1949: "The objectives of our foreign policy are the preservation
of world peace and enlargement of human freedom.. . ." ¹ On another
occasion he maintained that the main objectives of Indian foreign
policy were:

... the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with
any major power or group of powers but through an inde-
pendent approach to each controversial or disputed issue,
the liberation of subject peoples, the maintenance of
freedom, both national and individual, the elimination of
racial discrimination and the elimination of want, disease
and ignorance, which afflict the greater part of the
world's population. ²

¹Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 125.
²Ibid., p. 398.
Indian explanations of foreign policy aims mostly touch upon three general areas, specifically:

1. Peace and non-involvement in a major war.
2. Opposition to colonialism and racialism.

In an attempt to seek the underlying concepts in the explanations offered by India's foreign-policy makers, we shall examine each of the above areas specifically for any light which might be shed on basic concepts of national interest.

**Peace and Non-Involvement in a Major War**

In one of the many statements made by Nehru on foreign policy, he said:

> If the House considers other, different but, nevertheless, comparable countries and situations, it will realize that since India has to guard her newly won independence and solve many problems that have accumulated in the past, it becomes inevitable that she should follow a policy that will help as best it can to maintain world peace and also avoid, as far as possible, entanglements in world conflicts.¹

Here, briefly, Nehru indicated that it was important for India to have peace on the international scene because she wanted to attend to problems which she had acquired along with her independence. That these problems were pressing and called for immediate and undivided attention can be gauged by a look at some of the problems India's Prime Minister had in mind.

¹Ibid., p. 144.
Much was made of the fact that the transfer of power took place peacefully in India. It was a peaceful transfer where Britain and India were concerned. But as India was partitioned on the eve of independence into two separate nations, India and Pakistan, in the wake of this partition took place a mutual massacre of Hindus and Muslims the like of which India had never known before. Hindus from Pakistan and Muslims from India migrated from their homes by millions in what has been called by some the largest migration in the history of mankind. These homeless and displaced persons were not only a big problem in terms of rehabilitation, but wherever they went they carried with them tales of hate and horror; this in turn led to renewed violence and greater dislocation of life. To bring stability to the land torn by fratricidal warfare became the immediate concern of the government of free India. And yet the government was hampered further by the fact that partition had also meant division of the administrative and the military branches of the government. It had resulted in a complete rearrangement of the financial and economic structure of the country. To hold India together appeared to be the major task of the day.

To add to the woes of the Indian Government, in 1948 the Communist Party of India apparently decided to embark on a new policy which emphasized violence. In the Telengana district of Hyderabad, Communists succeeded for a short while in gaining complete power over a number of villages and no emissaries of the Indian Government could enter the area without risking their lives. In such cases the
Indian army had to go into action to overpower the resistance offered by strongholds created by the Communists. Although the Communist Party's challenge was met with strong measures, it did appear to the Indian leaders at times that India might go to pieces in the shadow of such internal crises.\(^4\)

It was under the impact of this situation that Prime Minister Nehru, speaking before the Constituent Assembly in March 1948, said that even though he was Minister for External Affairs, he was at that moment not interested in external affairs—it was internal affairs that occupied his mind.\(^5\)

Another element which was responsible for furthering the feeling of internal instability was the problem of integration of former "Princely States." When independence came to India the country was partitioned into two parts, India and Pakistan. But it was only "British India" which was partitioned. There was yet that part which has been termed "Princely India," which was not only left intact with the lapse of paramountcy exercised by the British, but the Princes were free to join either the Indian Union or Pakistan or to declare themselves independent if they so chose. This "India of the Princes" consisted of some 562 states, small and large, spread all over the country in a quilt-like patchwork. Under the protection of the

\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 30-31.

British the autocratic rule of the Maharajas had long prevailed in these semi-autonomous units, undisturbed and in many ways isolated from the rest of India. These "Princely States" were sheltered by the British from any external attack and in turn they were a reservoir of military manpower for the British to fight a war on foreign soil or to suppress a revolt within the country. The integration of these States, with small individual armies left virtually free by the British, into the Indian Union was a thorny task which the leaders of India inherited on the eve of independence.

The general tendency among the rulers was to make the best of the bargaining position in which the lapse of paramountcy placed them. The fact that during the second World War many of the major states had strengthened their armed forces could not be ignored. The decision, therefore, that with the withdrawal of the British, the Indian states comprising two-fifths of the land must return to a state of complete political isolation was fraught with the gravest danger to the integrity of the country. And so the prophets of gloom predicted that the ship of Indian freedom would founder on the rock of the states.6

The integration of the States into the Indian Union was for the most part accomplished with a finesse which baffled many a pessimist. But at the time of independence the Indian leaders were apprehensive that the question of the States might explode and create an uncontrollable situation.

There was one more important element on the domestic scene which was cause for concern on the part of the Indian leaders immediately after independence. The economic situation in India became

alarming as soon as the country had achieved independence. Partition of the country into two sections contributed to this in a large measure. Having been one economic unit previously, vivisection created problems which disrupted the economic life of both India and Pakistan. Certain industries were paralyzed because the owners had to flee for their lives in the wake of riots. Crops were left unattended because the land owners abandoned their farms. The problem of rehabilitating millions of refugees put further strain on the economy of the country. To make matters worse, the Communists in 1948 organized country-wide strikes and further immobilized the economic machinery of the nation. Just about that time India was also involved in a costly military campaign in Kashmir. Economic problems have been the bane of India for a long time, but the events awaiting India after independence made matters worse in this regard.

Nehru was making reference to these problems when he mentioned that peace on the international scene was necessary for India to solve the problems which the country was beset with at home. He maintained:

For our part, our main job today is to build our own country. We would be very happy indeed to be freed from all complications and implications, and just have leisure and time to work in our own country ... We do not want anything to happen that interferes with our own progress and development or with our own work.  

While Nehru made it known that the compelling need for internal stability and economic welfare made international peace a prime

necessity for the policy-makers of India, he did not answer the question whether that meant peace at any cost.

When India's leaders talk of peace, do they mean peace at any cost? India was involved in a small war with Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir very soon after India and Pakistan were declared independent countries. In 1950 India voted in favor of the United Nations resolution which called for opposing the North Korean aggression. Also, in the midst of the Tibetan crisis, while talking to the Indian Parliament about it, Nehru declared that "the principal barrier to India lies on the other side of Nepal and we are not going to tolerate any person coming over that barrier."^8

India's leaders, then, did not really believe in peace at any cost. It would appear that they meant to convey the view that a militarily and economically weak India could not afford to engage in a war with more powerful countries without courting disaster. They also feared that any war between the giant nations of America and Russia would result in a world war and inevitably involve India. As such India hoped that the Communist and anti-Communist camps would not run headlong into each other. It would appear that there was no doubt in the minds of the Indian leaders that India would not hesitate to fight if she felt that her immediate security was threatened. From all indications, India's objective of peace and non-involvement in a war meant just this.

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How did India seek to accomplish this objective of hers? India's leaders seem to have been of the opinion that policies of non-alignment, mediation, and efforts to create an "area of peace" were some of the means by which India could seek to further her ends in this direction.

When Nehru took over the reins of India's foreign affairs, he let it be known from the start that India would follow an independent course in international affairs and not align herself with any group of nations. Later on, he explained in many of his speeches that the advisability of pursuing such a course was based on his belief that India's objective of avoiding a war could best be secured by not lining up with any group of powers. Furthermore, he said that by adhering to a policy of non-alignment India could play an effective part in helping to preserve peace in the world.9

The Indian Prime Minister could also have been sustained, however, by other reasons in his belief that a non-alignment policy was most suited to serve the Indian interests. One of these reasons could have been that as a militarily weak nation India would have very little voice in policy-making in any group of nations presided over by strong nations. Nehru did not feel that India's interests could be advanced by placing the country in a subordinate position to more powerful nations.

9Nehru, Independence and After, p. 243.
At the time of independence, if India were to join a group of nations in an alliance, the natural thing would have been to join the Western democratic nations. Because India adopted a democratic system of government; she was also a dominion of the British Commonwealth until 1950. Moreover, India's army, navy, air force and many administrative services were manned by British personnel for many years after independence. India's economy was closely tied to the British economy. However, having tasted freedom after a long struggle with a powerful Western nation, India could not have been in any mood to return to a status which had the slightest resemblance to a state of subservience to some Western country. It had become a matter of prestige with the Indian leadership to follow an independent line of action. India was unwilling to play a secondary role all over again. Thus, non-alignment was the only answer to the increasing pressure from the two powerful camps which were interested in lining up the nations of the world on one side or the other. As India's Prime Minister explained:

By aligning ourselves with any one Power, you surrender your opinion, give up the policy you would normally pursue because somebody else wants you to pursue another policy. I do not think that it would be a right policy for us to adopt. If we did align ourselves we would only fall between two stools. We will neither be following the policy based on our ideals inherited from our past or the ones indicated by our present nor will we be able easily to adapt ourselves to the new policy consequent on such alignment.\[10\]

\[10\] Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, pp. 192-93.
Another very important reason for India's non-alignment could have been the fact that Nehru viewed the struggle between the Soviet bloc and the anti-Communist nations in a very different light than was seen by most of the nations in the West. Contrary to the thinking of the West, Nehru did not see the cold war as a battle of ideologies in the strict sense of the phrase. Even as early as 1945, he wrote that the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter were fading in the background. He felt the struggle was becoming purely military in nature, of physical force against force with philosophy playing no part. "In England, America and Russia we revert to the old game of power politics on a gigantic scale."11 Speaking before the Parliament in December 1950, India's Prime Minister said:

The most relevant fact at the moment is that there are some great nations in this world with concentrated power in their hands that influence all the other nations. That being so, there is a conflict between these powerful nations—an ideological conflict as well as a political conflict. Either these nations will have a war and try to suppress or defeat one another or one group will triumph over the other. There seems to be no other way. Although there is a great deal of talk about ideologies, I doubt if they come into the picture at all except as weapons.12


12Nehru's *Speeches 1949-1953*, p. 184. (Nehru observed in the Indian Parliament once: "How many countries of the free world have democracy!")
Interpreting the struggle between the Communist and the anti-Communist groups of nations as being mostly a phenomenon of power politics, India did not feel called upon to join a crusade for preserving democracy in the world since in her eyes that was not the issue at stake. The Indian leaders saw the cold war as primarily stemming from causes confined to the European theatre, the product of past rivalries between the nations of Europe. Therefore, they felt it was best for an Asian country like India to avoid getting entangled in this conflict.\(^{13}\)

Moreover, in this power struggle between the mighty nations, Prime Minister Nehru did not see India threatened with external aggression from the Communist side or any other side. In a television interview in London in June 1953, when asked if he saw any threat to India externally from Communist pressure, he replied, "Well, whatever the internal position might or might not be, I see absolutely no danger—external danger to India from Communist or any other source."\(^{14}\)

Why was India so certain that the Soviets would not endeavor to expand in the Asian direction when plenty of evidence was available that Russia sought to extend her boundaries after the Second World War? For one thing India interpreted Russia's advance in the European theatre as being a result of past European rivalries, as

\(^{13}\)See Nehru's speech before the Indian Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1949. Independence and After, pp. 231-32.

\(^{14}\)Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), June 27, 1953.
already indicated above. India seems to have been confident of this on another account also—there was no past record of Soviet expansion in Asia. Krishna Menon, India's present Defense Minister, stated on one occasion that India did not react to the Russian expansionist tendencies in the same manner as she reacted in the case of the Western countries because "... the Russians had not so far attempted to impose their will on India, while others had."\(^{15}\)

While this was true vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, did the picture change when Communist China became India's powerful neighbor? In terms of the past record, India and China had no history of conflict behind them either. In terms of the current period Nehru stated at a press conference:

I don't think China ever since its—this changeover there (referring to the Communist control of the China mainland)—has any desire to expand. They've got enough problems of their own, and as far as India is concerned, we have the most friendly relations with them.\(^{16}\)

Would India then have made any substantial gain in the direction of guarding her security by joining one of the major blocs in a military alliance? On the contrary, would it not have resulted in greater tensions where comparatively speaking none existed between India and one or the other bloc?

India could not make common cause with Soviet Russia and Communist China due to India's democratic leanings and also her

\(^{15}\)The Statesman (Calcutta), August 9, 1956.

\(^{16}\)Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), June 27, 1953.
economic dependence upon the West. On the other hand in terms of her security considerations, could India afford to risk increasing tensions with China and Russia by joining in an alliance with the West, especially when India and China had a common border running over 2000 miles or so? Looking at the world picture from this angle, one can see that Nehru felt assured in his mind that non-alignment was the most suitable policy for India.

There seems to be one more significant reason which probably caused India to pursue the neutral path. As already noted, the economic condition of India after independence was far from satisfactory, and was in fact bad. It is worth enquiring whether India could not have solved this problem more easily by associating herself with the Western nations, thus enabling her to draw upon the vast resources of the United States more freely. While no direct answer comes from the Indian leaders in this respect, there are indications that a two-fold consideration could have led the Indian leaders to prefer the non-alignment policy even where the economic problem was concerned.

It could not have taken much to see that India's economic problem was a chronic one, and that no proper solution of the problem could be provided unless some significant changes were wrought in India's economic base. To make these changes, programs running over a period of many years had to be formulated. If this approach had to be followed, it would have been difficult to keep on this course by alignment with a powerful bloc of nations when it was
obvious that these nations stressed the military preparedness more than anything else. Whereas in terms of India's interests, there was at no time any problem which called for greater attention than the economic problem. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, India's then representative, Mrs. Pandit, expressed this sentiment rather forcefully when she said:

It has now become almost a platitude to say that a clash of ideologies underlies the rift that is so noticeable in the world today. We, who come from the East, who are intimately familiar with the dire want, the poverty and suffering and starvation that prevail there, may be forgiven for thinking that ideology is less important than practice. We cannot eat an ideology, we cannot brandish an ideology, and feel that we are clothed and housed. Food, clothing, shelter, education, medical services—these are the things we need . . . . The conflict of ideology, or whatever it may be, that is plunging the world into gloom and tension, seems so sadly irrelevant to these great human problems: problems that vitally affect a half, and perhaps more than a half, of the world's population.17

Moreover, even though India was not aligned with the Western bloc, her economic ties with the West were close and there seemed no danger that the West would cut off its economic channels to India if she failed to join with the West in an alliance. Compared to the dangers that lay in an alignment policy, would India have gained anything by it even in the economic sphere?

Clearly, then, it seems that a combination of multiple elements might have motivated India to adhere to a policy of non-alignment, even though India maintained that she selected the path of

non-alignment primarily to achieve the end of peace and non-involvement in a major war.

India's leaders also claimed that India's efforts at mediation between the two major camps involved in the cold war were motivated by the objective of peace and non-involvement in a major war. As Nehru stated it:

The peace of one country cannot be assured unless there is peace elsewhere also. In this narrow and contracting world, war and peace and freedom are becoming indivisible. Therefore, it is not enough for one country to secure peace within its own borders but it is also necessary that it should endeavor, to its utmost capacity, to help in the maintenance of peace all over the world.\(^{16}\)

The Korean conflict was the first occasion where India had the opportunity to exercise mediation, and by virtue of that fact was the first occasion which gave prominence to India's role in the international arena. On this occasion India also discovered that her policy of non-alignment was proving to be an asset.

India's policy will be examined in some detail in a later chapter below. There are certain points to be noted here. The Indian delegate voted for the first two Security Council resolutions in regard to the Korean conflict. But even though India accepted the second resolution, she did not comply with its call to provide armed forces to assist South Korea against the invaders. This attitude on India's part was explained by Nehru in the Parliament. He indicated that while India had gone along with the principle

\(^{16}\)Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 129.
that aggression must be resisted, India could not help thinking of the possibility that the area of conflict might spread beyond Korea. This was certainly undesirable from India's point of view and from then on India turned her attention toward establishing her bona fides as an uncommitted nation primarily interested in bringing the conflict to an end. "The India government was determined before all else to prevent a general war and was prepared to suffer or ignore much for this purpose."\(^{19}\)

Thus urged by the desire to prevent the conflict from spreading, India directed her efforts toward bringing about rapprochement between two rival groups. Besides helping to sponsor resolutions in the Security Council to put an end to the fighting, India's efforts included personal appeals to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. It is worthy of note, however, that all of India's endeavors came to naught until such time as the two major parties were convinced that decisive victory was out of question for either side under the circumstances. Then and then alone India's bona fides were accepted and her attempts at mediation bore fruit.

The second time India is considered to have played such a role was in the case of Indo-China. India did not interest herself actively in the Indo-China struggle until it became evident that the United States and Soviet Russia were on the verge of intervening in

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the affair directly. As the fighting between the French and the Viet Minh forces intensified, it appeared certain that any overt intervention on the part of the two great Powers would set off a larger conflagration. It was at this stage that India came forward with proposals to halt the fighting and approached the two sides to settle the issue peacefully.

The problem of Formosa was the third instance where India's efforts to prevent an outbreak of war took the form of attempted mediation. On this occasion, too, only when the United States and Communist China seemed on the brink of conflict did India take steps to see if she could help in bringing the parties to a round table to discuss the matter and thus prevent an incident which could touch off World War III.

India's leaders made it known that in all three cases the chief motive behind India's policies of mediation was her desire to help prevent the outbreak of a major war, which could have brought India's involvement in it and might have spelled disaster for India.

In an attempt to keep a major conflict away from her shores, India also directed her energies toward creating an "area of peace." Since Nehru has recognized that in the world today peace and war have become indivisible, it would seem hardly possible to create an area which could remain isolated from the main current of events. However, in counseling the countries of Asia and Africa to stay out of any military alliance with the major powers, India felt an area could be developed which would not automatically become entangled in a
war if it were to take place between the Communist camp and the anti-Communist camp. 20

This move on India's part was interpreted by some as an attempt to create a "third force." But Nehru explained that if by "third force" the implication was that India intended to create a third military power, that was a misreading of India's intended aims; moreover, in view of the fact that even the biggest country was small in comparison with the military might of the United States and the Soviet Union, it was practically not feasible to create a third force of any consequence. 21

India attempted to win as many nations as possible to her way of thinking that one of the best ways to preserve peace and keep out of war was to shun military alliances. By creating a belt of such like-minded nations India appears to have hoped to keep hostilities away from her shore and further hoped that these nations could become a powerful pressure group in favor of peace.

In this connection it is interesting to note that one big reason for India's opposition to such treaties as the South East Asia Treaty and the Baghdad Pact was that they demolished the no-war area which India was trying to build. While discussing the Manila Pact

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21 Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 231.
before the Indian Parliament Nehru said:

Again, we have ventured to talk about an area of peace and we have thought that, perhaps, one of the major areas of peace might be South East Asia. Now, the Manila Treaty rather comes in the way of that area of peace. It takes up that very area which might be an area of peace and almost converts it into an area of potential war . . . .

When the North Atlantic Treaty came into existence, India did not express any opposition to it at the time of its inception. It was India's view that countries were free to organize regional defensive arrangements within the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, since the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty was in no way of interest to India, she did not feel affected by it in any manner. But later, when in the name of NATO certain countries approached India in regard to the issue of Goa, India maintained that NATO had extended its scope far beyond the originally intended limits of that treaty. It was then that India objected to the North Atlantic Treaty on the basis that the original purpose of this defense treaty had been surpassed and it had become a protector of the colonial interests of certain countries associated with the treaty.

However, in the case of other military alliances, such as the South East Asia Treaty and the Baghdad Pact, which covered parts of Asia, India objected strenuously from the very beginning because

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23 Ibid., col. 3682.
not only did these treaties cover an area which affected India intimately but also because in India's eyes these alliances brought the theatre of a possible future war much nearer to India's door. It was with this in mind that in referring to the United States-Pakistan military aid pact Nehru said that by virtue of this pact Pakistan dropped out of the non-war area in Asia; furthermore, military aid to Pakistan brought the cold war to Pakistan and, therefore, the cold war came to India's borders, meaning that if a shooting war developed it would come to India's door.\(^{24}\) India did not relish this prospect when she was eager to stay away from the theatre of a possible future conflict as far as she could.

**Opposition to Colonialism and Racialism**

Indian history goes as far back as 3000 B.C., but once the British succeeded in consolidating the whole of India under their control, in many ways there came about a complete break with India's past. As the British control continued through the last two centuries or so, a new entity called "British India" was born, which was not only administratively and politically one unit for the first time, but which was under a single authority at the top throughout the length and breadth of the country. The forces which ultimately led to the independence of India from the British were a product of this

\(^{24}\text{The Hindu (Madras), January 1, 1954.}\)
"British India," and the concepts of nationalism and independent India took root in a cultural atmosphere produced by the education system and the economic system introduced by the British. Thus it is hard to ignore the fact that in the case of India the period of British rule had a great impact on Indian foreign policy formulation after independence.

India became independent on August 15, 1947, after being under the heel of the foreigner for about two centuries. Indian independence, though a result of multiple factors, was for the Indians the culmination of a long and hard-fought struggle which at times had very bitter overtones. During this struggle the Indian people, and especially the Indian leaders, encountered certain mental and physical experiences which left an indelible mark on their memory. As a consequence certain attitudes took root in the minds of those who once formed the bulwark of the Indian independence struggle and who since independence have been responsible for moulding India's policies at home and abroad. As early as 1936, Nehru wrote in his autobiography:

The reaction of the Spanish War on me indicates how, in my mind, the problem of India was tied up with other world problems. More and more I came to think that these separate problems, political or economic, in China, Abyssinia, Spain, Central Europe, India, or elsewhere, were facets of one and the same world problem . . . . As peace was said to be indivisible in the present day world, so also freedom was indivisible, and the world could not continue for long part free, part unfree. The challenge of Fascism and Nazism was in essence the challenge of imperialism . . . . If freedom was to be established in the world not only
Fascism and Nazism had to go but imperialism had also to be completely liquidated.\textsuperscript{25}

Thus aversion to colonialism and imperialism remained uppermost in the thoughts of the Indian leaders. As one writer puts it: "The antipathy to imperialism is deep-rooted in the minds of everyone in India, and that has been acquired not from books, but from national experience."\textsuperscript{26} On September 7, 1946, six days after joining the Interim Government, which was the stepping stone to the full independence of India, Nehru, who was the Vice-President and Member for External Affairs in this government, went before the nation on the radio and announced that India's independent foreign policy would work for the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples.\textsuperscript{27} The keen and active interest India took in the cause of Indonesia, Tunisia and Morocco fully demonstrated that opposition to colonialism was to be an active part of the Indian foreign policy.

But opposition to foreign rule was only one of the several important attitudes which were fostered by the British control of India. There was another attitude which was fixed in the Indian mind as a result of this experience, and that was anti-racialism. For the Indian mind racialism was the direct consequence of colonialism and imperialism, practiced by the European against the Asian.


\textsuperscript{26}A. Appadorai, "India's Foreign Policy," \textit{International Affairs} (January 1949), p. 38.

\textsuperscript{27}Nehru, \textit{Independence and After}, p. 340.
Under the British rule in India every European, whether he was German, French, or Belgian, was entitled to certain privileges which marked him as a member of the ruling group. Railway carriages, station retiring rooms, benches in parks, social clubs, etc., were marked "For Europeans Only." The Indian intelligentsia were highly resentful of these restrictions, especially when they had to suffer this discrimination in their own country.

Many people resent racial discrimination, but for the educated Indians, who as a result of national awakening had become conscious of the ancient civilization and greatness of India, this experience was horrifying. It cut deep into their soul and made them extremely sensitive about racial inequality. Nehru once wrote:

... Imperialism and the domination of one people over another is bad, and so is racialism. But imperialism plus racialism can only lead to horror and ultimately to the degradation of all concerned with them ... .

... Biologists tell us that racialism is a myth and there is no such thing as a master race. But we in India have known racialism in all its forms ever since the commencement of British rule ... . The English were an Imperial Race, we were told, with the God-given right to govern us and keep us in subjection; if we protested we were reminded of the "tiger qualities of an imperial race." As an Indian, I am ashamed to write all this for the memory of it hurts, and what hurts still more is the fact that we submitted for so long to this degradation ... . And yet it is better that both Indians and Englishmen should know it for that is the psychological background of England's connection with India, and psychology counts and racial memories are long.28

Having been a victim of the phenomenon at home, after freedom the Indian leaders felt it their duty to oppose any such

28 Nehru, The Discovery of India, pp. 386-87.
nition that a people could be deprived of their liberties and rights for reasons of race. Moreover, within the country there was a demand that now that India was independent the government had to do something to alleviate the condition of persons of Indian descent in the Union of South Africa, who were suffering discriminatory treatment due to their Indian origin. This situation made the racialism issue a live one for India, and it found an important place in the foreign policy formulation of the country. One of the first complaints India placed before the United Nations General Assembly was in connection with the discriminatory treatment that was being meted out to persons of Indian descent in the Union of South Africa.

The feeling of resentment against the policies of colonialism and racialism as practiced by some Western countries also appears to have had another important association in the minds of the Indian intelligentsia. They felt that colonialism and racialism had led the Western countries to adopt an attitude of superiority toward Asians, an attitude which they appear to have felt was absent on the part of Russia.

Now, Europe and America, because they have been dominant countries, with a dominant culture, have tended to think that ways of living other than theirs are necessarily inferior. Whether they are inferior or not I do not know. If they are inferior, probably their own people will change them. But this method of approach of one country to another is a very limited approach and does not indicate much wisdom, because this world is a very varied place.²⁹

²⁹Nehru, Independence and After, p. 260.
Thus when India's foreign-policy makers talked of opposition to colonialism and racialism, they had several things in mind: the removal of Western control over parts of Asia which were still colonies of some Western nation, securing equal treatment for Indian residents in the Union of South Africa, and in general putting the West on guard that countries like India were now fully independent nations and a new approach toward these countries was necessary on the part of the West.

Securing India's Interests in Kashmir and Goa

The issues of Kashmir and Goa became a part of the international picture as soon as Kashmir went on the Security Council agenda, and the Portuguese authorities refused to negotiate an agreement for the peaceful transfer of Goa to India. The Kashmir problem was a product of the process of integration of the "Princely States" which, as mentioned earlier, India faced at the dawn of independence. Most of the States joined either the Indian Union or Pakistan, after partition, and at one time it appeared that the whole problem might resolve itself without any conflict.

However, in three instances the otherwise smooth operation encountered trouble. The States of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir stood aloof and did not follow the example of the other States who had all by August 15, 1947, accepted the Instrument of Accession as a result of which the States surrendered to the
Dominion of India on the three subjects of defense, external affairs, and communications. Before too long, the States of Junagadh and Hyderabad also fell into the fold. But in the case of Kashmir an ugly situation developed which until today continues to harass the Indian government.

Situated in the North-West of India, Kashmir State covered an area of about 84,000 square miles. One of the largest "Princely States" of India, at the time of partition, it also enjoyed a unique geographic position. The state boundaries touched Tibet, Sinkiang territory of China, Afghanistan, and were within a few miles of the Russian Turkestan border. At the same time the state had a frontier with both India and Pakistan.

The population of the state at the last census was about 4,000,000. Muslims formed 77 per cent of the population while Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists accounted for the rest of it. The state was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja.

Up to the time of transfer of power, the Maharaja did not accede to either of the Dominions and toyed with the idea of continuing as an independent state. However, shortly before the transfer of power the Kashmir Government announced that it wanted to enter into a Standstill Agreement with India and Pakistan. Pakistan signed a Standstill Agreement while India made it known that such a proposition had to be examined carefully before the Agreement could be concluded.  

Not long after, the Maharaja of Kashmir complained that Pakistan authorities were applying pressure to coerce the state into acceding to Pakistan. There were reports that armed tribal bands were carrying out raids on Kashmir State territory from the Pakistani side. Since these raiders could not reach the Kashmir border without crossing Pakistani territory it was alleged that Pakistan approved of their actions. On October 15, the Prime Minister of Kashmir State wrote to the British Prime Minister that the Government of Pakistan had broken the Standstill Agreement by stopping the supplies of food, petrol, and other essential articles and by discontinuing the railway service between Pakistan and Kashmir State which was at that time the only regular means for the State to procure supplies from outside. 31

Around this time Kashmir State also asked the Indian Government to supply it with arms. India did not act on this request since the whole situation was being studied by the Indian Government. In the meantime matters grew from bad to worse in Kashmir. 32

On the evening of October 24, the Government of India received the news that about five thousand tribesmen had attacked the state in a well planned fashion, had succeeded in capturing many towns, and were only about thirty-five miles from Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir State. The Maharaja of Kashmir sent desperate

31 Menon, op. cit., p. 396.
32 Nehru, Independence and After, p. 56.
appeals for armed help to India. On the advice of the then Governor General Lord Mountbatten, India did not send any armed aid until the Maharaja of Kashmir acceded his state to India and the popular political party of Kashmir, All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, concurred in the decision of the Maharaja.\(^{33}\)

On October 27, Indian troops were flown to Srinagar. After a hard battle with the help of reinforcements, the Indian army succeeded in saving the valley of Kashmir and the city of Srinagar from the wrath of the raiders, and drove back the attackers a considerable distance.

Pakistan was incensed on learning that the Maharaja of Kashmir had signed the Instrument of Accession with India. The Pakistan government issued a statement refusing to recognize the accession. The immediate reaction of the then Governor General of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was to order the Pakistan army to move into Kashmir. However, he was dissuaded from taking this step by the British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army who pointed out that the consequences of such an action would be disastrous.\(^{34}\)

As fighting between the Indian troops and raiding tribesmen continued all along the border of Kashmir State and Pakistan, attempts were made by Lord Mountbatten to bring about a reconciliation between India and Pakistan on the matter of Kashmir. No


\(^{34}\) Ibid., p. 226.
solution acceptable to both sides could be found. India is said to have made repeated requests to the Pakistan Government to prevent the use of its territory by the invaders. Pakistan ignored these pleas, according to India. There was mounting evidence that Pakistan not only acquiesced in the tribal attack, but some Pakistani nationals joined the aggressors and received support from their government in this action of theirs.35

On December 22, 1947, in a communication to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, India formally requested that the Government of Pakistan call upon the Pakistani nationals to stop participating in the attack on Kashmir State and also deny the invaders all access to and use of Pakistani territory for operations against Kashmir State.36


Once the Kashmir problem had found its way before the bar of world opinion, it became important for India to defend her case before the nations of the world and above all to win their support in her cause.

35 Nehru, Independence and After, p. 67.
36 Ibid., p. 67.
But did India seek to win her case in Kashmir because she did not want to be proven morally wrong in holding on to Kashmir? Or was it that once India had set her foot legally in Kashmir she knew that she could not abandon this ancient gateway to India, used for repeated invasions in the past, in the face of open hostility proclaimed by Pakistan? As one writer puts it:

On Kashmir, it must be confessed, Nehru's mind is virtually a closed book . . . . He sees Kashmir . . . realistically in terms of India's security, abutting as that land does on China, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.37

At the same time Goa acquired international significance for India when she found that the Government of Portugal was not prepared to relinquish its hold on that colony.

The day Britain transferred power to Indian hands, there still remained pockets of Indian territory under French and Portuguese control. About three centuries before when the European powers appeared on the South and West coast of India, they occupied these territories as their trading posts. When the British had eliminated the rival European nations from the Indian trade and finally gained complete political control of India by the middle of the nineteenth century, they still left these trading posts in the hands of those powers who had originally occupied them. While India was herself under alien rule, she had no voice in regard to the existence of these foreign posts. However, the leaders of India

had hoped that once Britain moved out of India, other nations holding small portions of her territory would follow suit and transfer these posts to India by peaceful negotiation. The towns of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Karaikal, Yanam and Mahe were under French rule while Goa, Diu and Daman were under Portuguese control.

France and Portugal made no gestures to indicate that they were contemplating handing over their possessions on Indian soil to the government of India at the time of Indian independence. There were widespread disturbances in French India as well as Portugal India, with people demanding the right to determine their own future and calling for integration with India. The independent government of India asked both France and Portugal to come to an agreement in regard to the enclaves in question. After prolonged negotiations, France agreed to hold a plebiscite in her colonies and as a result ceded Chandernagore to India in early 1951, while Pondicherry, Karaikal, Yanam and Mahe became incorporated into the Indian territory in 1954.

Portugal from the very beginning displayed a rather stubborn attitude in this connection. Captain Durate, Portuguese Minister of Colonies, declared on June 10, 1947 that the Portuguese would fight to the last soldier to keep control of Goa and other possessions even after the British left India.39

38 Murti, op. cit., pp. 49-52.
39 Ibid., p. 51.
The Portuguese Government refused to discuss the future of Goa when the Indian Minister at Lisbon presented an aide memoire in February 1950 seeking to start talks in this direction. Finding it difficult to continue her efforts to persuade Portugal to cooperate in the matter, India turned to the nations of the world to support her cause and exert moral pressure on Portugal to settle the issue by mutual agreement.

Speaking on the occasion of India's seventh independence anniversary, Nehru said:

Goa has become a test for all nations. In this test, every nation is on trial because it has to state clearly its stand on the question whether any country can rule over another or not. This is the question of colonialism or whatever you wish to call it.

Goa is the oldest symbol of this colonial idea in India. It is an ugly pimple and if anybody says that we should continue to tolerate this pimple, then he has not understood our mind and heart nor of Asia...

We have now to watch and see towards which side the nations of the world lean in the matter of Goa and what advice they give to Portugal. If the right kind of advice is given, then the problem of Goa will be solved peacefully. If wrong advice is given, then tension and conflict is bound to increase.\textsuperscript{40}

Small in size, Goa did not have any economic or other significance in itself. Aside from the fact that to India the presence of Portugal in Goa was a reminder of her colonial past and as such an affront, speaking security-wise could India be expected to bear the presence of an outpost of a foreign power on her soil?

\textsuperscript{40} The Hindu, August 16, 1954.
In conclusion, therefore, behind the generalized statements concerning India's intention to work for "peace" and "non-involvement," etc., there lie the views of India's foreign-policy makers concerning that country's national interest. We might summarize these as follows:

1. India's national interest required immediately after independence, and continues to require, heavy concentration upon the solution of her pressing internal problems, and therefore a relatively low level of international commitment and involvement for the next few years.

2. India is militarily and economically weak in this early period of her nationhood. National interest, therefore, requires that the country attempt its utmost not to be drawn into a world war or even a large regional war against a formidable enemy—or even that it be forced to prepare against the eventuality of such wars—during the period of such weakness.

3. A new nation, striving to build a sense of patriotic pride among its citizens, can profit from a sense of world prestige and national equality with all the countries. India's national self-interest, therefore, led her away from accepting a position of subordination in either of the world camps.

4. National interest requires vigorous military preparation and political alignment with a major camp if the country is threatened by foreign aggression or if significant matters of principle
divide the world and India must choose between those supporting or attacking such principles important to India. Upon due consideration, however, India has decided that neither contingency actually exists. Her national interest, therefore, does not require involvement in either of the world camps for these reasons.

5. Economically backward and in desperate need of large-scale economic aid, India finds that her national interest is served by securing such aid from both sides, especially when the amount of the contribution being made is raised by competition between East and West. For this reason, the Indian leaders apparently find that their country's national interest requires good relations with, and accepting of economic aid from, both sides simultaneously.

6. A nation may be strong in terms of its citizens' sense of high moral purpose and its service to humanity. If it is militarily weak, its interests are greatly served if it can halt a trend toward world war or secure arbitration of a dangerous quarrel between militarily powerful opponents. For both reasons, therefore, India's self-interest requires that she maintain a neutral position between the two great blocs so that she can mediate in times of crisis and act as peace-maker when small wars break out or the danger of a big war becomes imminent.

7. India has little capacity to maintain a large military force, and would benefit directly from the establishment of an "area of peace" in Southern and Eastern Asia, for this would mean less need for border guards, military forces to prepare against possible
aggression from a neighbor, or competitive armaments. It is, therefore, to her national interest to work against military alliances or armament races in Asia.

8. As long as foreign domination exists in Asia, chances of foreign interference in Asia, and parts of Asia becoming involved in big powers' conflicts, remain great. India's national interest requires, therefore, that she oppose colonialism and make every effort to remove foreign domination from Asia. Besides, her opposition to colonialism and racialism makes India the rallying point for all nations which have suffered from colonialism and racialism in the past or continue to suffer currently, thus giving India added prestige and added weight in the councils of the world.

9. People of Indian origin form a large minority in the Union of South Africa. The Union government by its highly discriminatory practices hopes to drive this minority back to India. A highly populated country like India cannot afford to let these people migrate to India in large numbers, especially when these people were born in the Union of South Africa and have their economic and social roots in that country. India's national interest, therefore, calls for active opposition to racial discrimination of minorities, and removal of such handicaps in the Union of South Africa so as to permit people of Indian origin living there to enjoy a normal life.

10. India gained access to Kashmir State legally, in so far as India's leaders are concerned. They now feel that the strategic position of this state makes it important to India to retain control
of this territory in the name of her security. India's national interest thus compels her to gain the support of as many nations in the United Nations as possible to make certain that the United Nations would not pass any resolutions contrary to the interests of India. In view of the fact that Pakistan is militarily aligned with major powers of the West, India's national interest requires that she seek the aid of the only major power left in the Security Council outside the Western powers, namely, Soviet Russia, to guard India's interests in the Security Council where the Kashmir question remains at this time.

11. Goa is a part of the Indian territory. India's national interest cannot permit this territory to remain in foreign hands, who could use it as a base of operations against India's interests. India's present strength and concentration upon domestic affairs do not permit India to attempt to take this territory from Portugal by force. India's national interest thus calls for gaining as much support as possible so that world pressure might compel Portugal to hand this territory over to India.
CHAPTER III

INDIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST AND HER ROLE IN ASIA

As soon as India became independent, she sought to weave a closer bond between herself and the countries of Asia. India's leaders claimed that efforts in this direction were spurred by a feeling that by virtue of her geographical position India was destined to play a leading role in Asia. Speaking before the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi on March 23, 1947, Nehru said:

All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavor. It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that India herself is emerging into freedom and independence, she is the natural center and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia. Geography is a compelling factor, and geographically she is so situated as to be the meeting point of Western and Northern and Eastern and South-East Asia.¹

One cannot help wondering what the Indian Prime Minister had in mind when he said that India "is the natural center and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia." Was he asking that Asian unity be woven around India? Was this an attempt to build the prestige of India?

A well qualified Indian author on the subject of foreign policy has thrown interesting light on this matter in his statement:

¹Nehru, Independence and After, p. 297.
... But India becomes an air island only if, for purpose of defense, on the one side Burma and Malaya are included within the scheme, and if Thailand and Indo-China are included in her air boundaries, and Afghanistan and Persia and Iraq are brought into the system on the other side. That is, the Indian "air area of defense" should extend from Aden to Singapore and Bangkok, in order to protect the Indian ocean air routes and to keep the area secure against encroachment.2

This author appears to be suggesting that for her future security it was best for India to build an area of defense around her which would include most of the Asian countries. Is it possible that in stressing India's central role in Asia, India's Prime Minister was also thinking of India's future security which could be best guaranteed in an Asia free from the influence of European nations but subject to India's influence?

The idea of India's leadership in Asia was not new in itself. As early as 1918, there was talk of an Asian federation with India as the pivot. Mahatma Gandhi maintained that India was the key to the exploitation of Asiatic peoples and when India became independent Western powers would be unable to keep their hold on other Asian countries.3 Once India became independent, however, this concept of considering India as the hub of political and economic activity in Asia found a different and a more virile form. Even


3Werner Levi, Free India in Asia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952), pp. 31-33.
before India had formally achieved independence, it was made manifest that she intended to carry out her resolve to play a prominent part on the Asian scene. What was the pattern of India's policy in this direction?

On Nehru's initiative, India sponsored the Asian Relations Conference which was held in New Delhi during March 1947. Representatives of twenty-eight Asian countries gathered together on this occasion which was the first of its kind. It was a meeting on an unofficial footing; no resolutions were passed, no political questions were discussed, and the agenda was free from any controversial matters. Nehru's address to the Conference showed that while he was trying to speak to the rest of the world as the "Voice of Asia," he was at the same time urging his fellow Asians to stick together and follow a common policy which was primarily in their interest, independent, and Asian in origin. He talked of the vital role that was Asia's in a world of crisis and he observed that the countries of Asia would play this role on the basis of their own judgment free from dictates of others.⁴

As events showed later, this was the beginning of India's efforts to make her weight felt in Asian affairs. When Nehru visited the United Nations in Paris in November 1948, the Indian delegation organized a meeting of the Asian delegates in the United Nations. The express purpose of this meeting was to encourage prior consultation among the Asian delegates on the various issues before the United Nations.

⁴Nehru, Independence and After. p. 298.
A very important move was made when India called a conference of the Asian nations to consider the case of Dutch aggression in Indonesia. On January 20, 1949, delegates from nineteen nations met in New Delhi to frame and submit proposals to the Security Council to restore peace and freedom to Indonesia and to devise machinery and procedure by which the represented governments could keep in touch with one another for consultation and concerted action.

If the Conference accomplished nothing else, it certainly succeeded in drawing the attention of the world to the Indonesian case and the urgent nature of the situation. It also brought about united action in the United Nations on the part of the nations who had gathered at New Delhi. Ultimately, this action helped to accelerate the course of events to bring a quick settlement between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

More significantly, it provided the limelight for India who was quick to seize upon an opportunity which once again displayed her keen interest in Asian affairs. The occasion exhibited the importance of India where she could successfully muster Asian opinion toward a cause of common concern. It was one more chance for India's spokesman to speak on behalf of Asia and give warning that interference in Asian affairs could no longer go unchallenged. As Nehru put it at the Conference: "... If this gathering is significant today, it is still more significant in the perspective of tomorrow. Asia, too long submissive and dependent and a plaything
of other countries, will no longer brook any interference with her freedom."5

India took a bold step when she called an informal conference in New Delhi on February 20, 1949, to discover ways and means by which Commonwealth governments could help the Burma Government, which was at this time under heavy strain due to bad economic situation and internal disorder caused by the Karen rebels and the Communists. The Indian Government even showed signs that it was willing to explore possibilities of mediation between the Karen rebels and the Government of Burma. However, the thought of mediation was dropped in fear that an attempt of this kind might be misconstrued as interference in the domestic affairs of Burma.6

But the problem of arms aid and material aid was again discussed at another Commonwealth meeting and with Burmese approval arrangements were made to assist the country.7

Surprisingly enough in the case of Indo-China, India took no positive stand until 1954. But the situation in Indo-China was a complex one. At the time of Indian independence fighting was still

5 Ibid., p. 333.
going on in Indo-China between the French and the Indo-Chinese Communists and Nationalists led by the Viet Minh. While India stood for the independence of Indo-China and the end of French colonial rule there, she was in a dilemma whether or not to support the Viet Minh group which was led by the "Moscow-trained" Communist, Ho Chi Minh. "The fact cannot be ignored that the (Indian) government was not certain of the allegiance of the people of Indo-China to Ho Chi Minh although it is generally admitted that the Viet Minh is supported by most of the nationalist elements." The picture was further complicated when the French installed Bao Dai as the head of the Viet Nam State which was given a free status within the French Union in 1949. However, as Bao Dai was considered a French puppet, the Indian government refused to recognize either the Ho Chi Minh regime or the Bao Dai regime and continued its policy of keeping out of the fray.

Toward the end of 1953, the fighting in Viet Nam became intensified. By early 1954 it became obvious that the fate of Indo-China was going to be decided by the big powers, namely, the United States, Britain, France, and Russia. It was announced in the communique issued at the end of the Four Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin in February 1954, that it had been agreed upon to call a Five Power Conference at Geneva to discuss Korea and Indo-China. The fifth power was to be China. At this point India felt that she

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8Dutt, op. cit., p. 13.

9Nehru's Press Conferences, 1950, p. 36.
could no longer hold aloof from the Indo-China struggle. Not only was the thought of outside intervention a disturbing one, but worse still, India felt that she was being left out when she was far closer to the arena of conflict than countries like Britain and America. Moreover, even though India did not claim to be a big power, and recognized she was not one in the conventional sense, her leaders had on many occasions left no doubt in the minds of the world's statesmen that where the Asian scene was concerned India considered it her right to be consulted. And so on February 22, 1954, speaking before the House of the People, Nehru made an appeal for a cease-fire in the Indo-China war to be followed by talks for a settlement.

Again on April 24, two days before the opening of the Geneva Conference, speaking in the Indian Parliament, Nehru put forward certain proposals for a settlement in Indo-China.

The Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China opened on April 26. Coincidentally, on April 28, the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia met in Colombo, Ceylon, to discuss matters of common concern. On April 29, the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon received a telegram from Anthony Eden, who was at the Geneva Conference, asking for their views regarding the proposals on Indo-China being discussed at Geneva. It was understood that Nehru in his reply to Eden's telegram let it be known that the Indian government "would be willing to be associated with,
or participate in, a guarantee to assure the future of Indo-China, should the Geneva Conference arrive at a settlement, and should India be invited by both sides.\textsuperscript{10}

The Colombo Conference of the five Asian Prime Ministers ended on May 2. The final communique, besides condemning colonialism, racialism, and any interference in the affairs of South-East Asian countries, dealt at some length with the Indo-China situation. In part, it stated that the situation in Indo-China was explosive and hoped the Geneva Conference would bring a speedy termination of the conflict and restore peace in the area. The communique called for a cease-fire without delay and suggested direct negotiations among France, the three Associated States of Indo-China, and Viet Minh as well as the parties invited by agreement to settle the question. It was proposed that France declare that she is irrevocably committed to the complete independence of Indo-China; it was also proposed that the Geneva Conference should keep the United Nations informed of the progress of its deliberations on Indo-China.\textsuperscript{11}

But India’s efforts to have a say in the matter did not end with these attempts to give advice from a distance. On May 15, during a foreign affairs debate in the House of the People, the


\textsuperscript{11}Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 5, Part II, No. 70, cols. 7499–7502.
Indian Prime Minister said that India would accept an invitation to take part in the settlement of the Indo-China problem. Even though this invitation never did come, India’s chief delegate to the United Nations, Krishna Menon, arrived in Geneva on May 22 and started talks with the leading delegates to the Geneva Conference.

On June 2, 1954, Nehru, while addressing a public meeting in the then Bhopal State, is reported to have said:

... it was strange that the venue of the conference (Geneva Conference) discussing problems vitally affecting Asian countries should be in Europe and their fate decided by other nations ... The main problems before the conference were of Korea and Indo-China. Although India had no direct connection with the conference yet it appeared strange that problems vitally affecting the Asian countries should be discussed not by Asian but by other nations living so far apart ... As India was not invited to the conference she preferred to abstain from interfering in its affairs. She was, however, silently trying to exercise all her influence in bringing about a peaceful solution of these problems.12

It is debatable as to how silent were the attempts of India to exercise her influence. Nevertheless, India did end up playing an important role in the Indo-China issue and was also nominated as a member of the three international commissions appointed on Indo-China. Nehru proudly pointed out before the Indian Parliament that force of reality had foiled the attempts of those who were trying to ignore Asian opinion. He also maintained that the final solution was based on certain suggestions that had been advocated by India.13

12 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), June 2, 1954.
The Bandung Conference was the next important occasion which highlighted India's role in Asia. The original idea for this Asian-African Conference was supplied by the then Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo at the time of the Colombo Conference. Final arrangements for the conference were agreed upon at Bogor in December 1954. The Bandung Conference, sponsored by the "Colombo Powers," opened at Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18, 1955, with twenty-nine Asian-African nations attending. The significant feature of this conference was that it was the first inter-continental conference of the non-European peoples in the history of mankind. Moreover, this conference can be said to have ushered in a new era as was pointed out by President Sukarno in his opening address.14

The Bandung Conference was at best an attempt to bring together countries united by a common detestation of colonialism, racialism, and a desire for a higher standard of living. The final communiqué of the conference revealed that those were the only subjects on which there was unanimous opinion. For the nations gathered together on this occasion not only represented almost every religion under the sun, but they also represented almost every political faith and economic doctrine. Present in the assembly were countries like Communist China, democratic India, Burma, and Ceylon, theocratic Pakistan, and monarchist Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

14 Asian-African Conference, issued by the Information Service, Indonesian Embassy, New Delhi, p. 16.
Then again some of them were neutral in so far as the cold war is concerned: others were very closely tied with one "power bloc" or the other. To expect a common approach to world problems on the part of this motley assembly would have been too much. But the meeting provided a rare opportunity for mutual consultation and discussion among these nations who had all felt the Western iron at one time or another. It focused the attention of the world on a group of nations which contained about half of the world's population, but nations which had almost no voice in the affairs of the world for a century or more. Above all the efforts of the conference were concentrated on knitting a closer cooperation among Asian and African countries and cementing a bond of friendship which would elicit mutual assistance on problems of mutual interest.

In the opinion of this writer, where India was concerned the Bandung Conference was not one of those conferences in which India was successful in pushing her cause or wielding a powerful overall influence. Compared to her strict adherence to a policy of non-alignment, there were nations present there who were equally convinced about the advisability of having a military alliance with one of the blocs. If India was conscious of her important status in Asia, the presence of Communist China certainly prevented her from exhibiting any signs of such an assertion on her part. In fact Prime Minister Chou En-lai well utilized the occasion of the Bandung Conference to popularize his regime among nations who were not openly committed to opposition to Communist China.
However, there were factors which placed India in a good position to propagate her views. As a country with a politically and economically stable government, an independent foreign policy and a crusading spirit, India stood much better chance of being heard than any of the other nations. And it could be said that the role India played at the Bandung Conference was that of a counsellor. Perhaps that is what she sought, for in a conference that did not meet to solve any specific issues, the most a nation could expect was to propagate its ideas.

Nehru did just that in his speeches. While he urged the countries present not to be "yes men" of any power, he gave warning to the rest of the world that Asian and African nations would offer cooperation in the future only on equal footing. He called upon those attending the Bandung Conference to pursue a policy of non-alignment saying: "If we are camp followers of Russia or America or any other country of Europe, it is, if I may say so, not very creditable to our dignity, our new independence, our new freedom, our new spirit, and our new self-reliance."

If Bandung was a reminder to India of the disunited nature of Asia, if it was a warning to India that her position in Asia was by no means unchallenged, if this meeting brought home the fact that India could expect limited success in her endeavors to

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seek a privileged position, the occasion also demonstrated that India had not abandoned her belief that Asia's problems were of immediate concern to her.

The direction of India's policies in Asia suggests that she had a twofold purpose in mind. Firstly, India attempted to clear Asia of Western domination. Secondly, India tried to establish herself not only as the voice of Asia but also as the conscience of Asia. On the one hand, she tried to win the Asian countries to adhere to her policy of non-alignment, and on the other hand she strongly defended the rights of the Asian countries whenever an occasion arose. In this way India hoped she could command the position of influence in Asia.

India's policies of anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, and efforts to build a no-war area, worked hand in hand with her attempts to secure the withdrawal of Western nations from Asia and establish India's bona fides as the central power in Asia. Where else did these goals have their roots except in the belief that the future security of India could be best guaranteed in this manner?

India, as Nehru has often declared, was vitally interested in Korea because the peace of Asia was involved. This is a facet of his foreign policy which the West has still to understand and appreciate fully, for it is one of the basic influences which motivates India's international dealings.16

In terms of land, population, and natural resources, India occupies a position in Asia only second to that of China. Militarily, too, India would rank high behind China and Japan. Similarly, in industrial capacity India's position is matched only by Japan and China.

As circumstances would have it, Japan by her aggressive actions prior to 1945 not only betrayed the cry of "Asia for Asians," but she also removed herself from the position of being Asia's spokesman after the war. New China's potential and power give her the commanding position in Asia. However, combined with her adherence to Communist ideology, her strength became more a source of suspicion and fear than an inspiration for the newly independent countries in that region. This factor was clearly in evidence at the Bandung Conference. In fact, it can be said that this resulted in boosting India's prestige and position in Asia where she became the lone champion of democracy, independence, and Asianism. This also strengthened India's hand in pursuing her objectives in Asia.

Obviously, India's success in this direction was limited. Western nations continue to enjoy a privileged position in many parts of Asia even today, and from all appearances will continue

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18 The Hindu (Madras), April 22, 1955.
to enjoy this position for some time to come. Similarly, non-alignment could hardly suit countries like Pakistan, South Korea, and others. It would not, however, be wrong to say that India's voice has been given special attention in almost all Asian capitals.

It is easy to see that ultimately India stands to gain significantly by clearing Asia of foreign influence and establishing herself as an important Asian power. First of all, a person of Nehru's mind desires very strongly to lay a sturdy foundation for the future security of India. Foremost in the minds of men like the Indian Prime Minister stands the thought that never again should India fall a prey to foreign rule. If Asia is kept free from Western influence or Soviet influence, this would guarantee long-range security of India better than anything else.

It should be remembered that India is not in favor of any interference in the affairs of Asia from outside, be it Western or Eastern European in origin. The communiqué issued at the end of the Colombo Conference in 1954 made this very clear. With parts of Soviet Russia lying in Asia, sometimes the Soviet Union comes to be treated as an Asian power in the eyes of some Indians. But when it comes to Asian interests, Soviet interference is as much resented as interference from any other quarter. The visible stress on Western interference is mainly a result of the West's colonial domination of most of Asia in the past, whereas Asia has so far never experienced Soviet invasion of the colonial type.
Besides providing a measure of security, Asia free from outside influence would permit India to play a dominant role in Asian affairs. The prestige and position gained in this fashion would give India better bargaining power vis a vis the two power blocs on the international horizon.

There is no attempt to suggest here that during the ten years after independence India tried to carve for herself a sphere of influence in Asia. A militarily weak nation like India could never accomplish this task and she did not attempt to do so either. Moreover, the newly freed nations of Asia would never permit India to acquire such a status. Nevertheless, all evidence points to the view that India's foreign policy was aimed at winning the confidence of Asian nations through cooperation and persuasion. India wants to have a friendly Asia surrounding her, an Asia which would lend an ear to Indian counsel as against the counsel of any country whose primary interests lie elsewhere.

In summation it can be said then that when India's leaders talk of her central role in Asia, in terms of India's national interest they have apparently visualized the picture somewhat as follows:

1. Situated as India is in the heart of Asia, her future political and economic security require that the air-lines and sea-lines to India remain in friendly hands. This means that Asian countries surrounding her should remain free from foreign
interference in India's national interest, and this is what she has sought to secure in Asia.

2. Militarily and economically not too powerful, India can wield influence in Asian capitals primarily on a moral basis. Thus in pursuit of her national interest, India has sought to gain the support of newly born Asian nations by associating herself with their national aspirations in every way. India's policy of non-alignment, in this respect, is a great asset. India can not only claim that she is not guided by the interests of the major blocs but by those of Asian nations alone, but India can also in this way argue for the course of non-alignment as a way of keeping the Asian countries free from interference of major powers. By virtue of her greater strength compared to most of the other Asian countries, this makes India the rallying point of neutral forces.

3. Any political and economic changes taking place in the Asian countries surrounding India would affect India. India's national interest commands that she have a hand in the changes that take place to guard against any repercussions on India which may be of an adverse nature. It should be noted that India's right to participate in any discussions on the future of this area is better guaranteed when she speaks as the spokesman of neutral countries, whether it be in the face of Western interference in Asia or whether it be in the face of Communist interference in Asia at present or in the future.
CHAPTER IV

INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST AND COMMUNISM

The Indian National Congress Party has been the dominant political party in India through the entire period of the twentieth century to date. Both as the vanguard of the national movement and as the ruling party since independence, it has dominated the Indian political scene. In its capacity as the ruling party, the Indian National Congress has not only been the major source from where the leadership of the country has been drawn, but commanding the majority representation in the country's Parliament, it has been responsible for outlining the path which India has been following, be it at home or abroad. Thus it is considered sufficient for this study to examine what has been the attitude of Prime Minister Nehru and the Indian National Congress toward Communism and to see what this might reveal in terms of India's national interest. A brief discussion of the role of the local Communist Party in this area is also included.

Nehru and Communism

Nehru's writings and speeches reveal that, at one time, he was of the opinion that free India would have to adopt an economic
and social order more or less based on Marxian thought to solve the country's problems of backwardness. Nehru's speech before the Lucknow Congress in April 1936 is certainly indicative of this attitude. He said then that in socialism alone lay the solution of India's and the world's problems. He said further that in referring to socialism he was not only talking about an economic doctrine, but he was speaking of it as a philosophy of life also.\(^1\)

Nehru's earlier writings also reveal that he was thinking in terms of a socialist order which was somehow different from the Communist order of the Soviets.\(^2\) Moreover, he says in his autobiography, published in 1936, that he was no Communist and despised the authoritarian and violent ways of the Soviet Communists.\(^3\)

What type of a society did Nehru have in mind then? Views expressed by Nehru prior to the independence of India provide no definite answer to this question. At best they display an ambivalence showing that on the one hand Nehru abhorred subjugation of weaker nations by Britain, France, and other powers, which he felt was a result of capitalist economy, but he admired the democratic way of solving social problems. On the other hand, Communist philosophy with its scientific interpretation of history and its economic

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theory of self-sufficiency with no imperialistic overtones appealed to him, but he could not approve of the denial of fundamental liberties in Russia and the violent methods employed by that country. 4

It is significant to note, however, that on the eve of Indian independence, speaking before the Constituent Assembly in December 1946, as the head of the Interim Government, Nehru declared that India will adopt the democratic system of government as a free nation:

Well I told them that it is conceivable, of course, that a Republic may not be democratic, but the whole of our past is a witness to the fact that we stand for democratic institutions. Obviously, we are aiming at a democracy and nothing less than a democracy. 5

A few years later, in January 1950, the world witnessed the adoption of a secular democratic constitution for India under the guidance of Prime Minister Nehru. An important part of the Constitution dealt with individual rights which the Indian citizens were to enjoy in a free India. But when in 1951 the Indian government started the country on the path of the First Five Year Plan, the question was asked in many quarters whether democracy and planning went together. In explaining his approach to the problem Nehru said:

Broadly speaking, we aim at democracy with the essential features of socialism . . . .

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... it is patent that these basic human needs (food, clothing, etc.) are not satisfied in India and many other countries for a vast number of people today. The existing economic structure has failed to that extent and to seek to maintain it unchanged is, therefore, to ignore reality and invite defeat. We must find some way out. Communism's appeal to the many has been based on its promise to satisfy certain essential human needs and to provide security. But we have seen that it brings in its train conflict and violence and authoritarianism and the suppression of the individual. Can we provide economic security and progress without sacrificing democratic liberties? There is no reason why this should not be possible though the path may be difficult. . . .

This will mean our deliberately aiming at a new type of society whose chief purpose is the welfare of the people, not only in material living standards, but also in the things of the spirit . . . . If we have to avoid authoritarianism, as we must, we have also to avoid unregulated private enterprise. We have to try to replace the acquisitive instinct with the spirit of co-operative effort in a cause.6

It seems, therefore, that Nehru has sought a structure of society for India which would provide democratic institutions and a measure of economic planning. Furthermore, Nehru has opposed attempts of the Indian Communists to seize power in India.

Nehru has charged that the Indian Communist Party betrayed the cause of the Indian people in the 1942 civil disobedience campaign and the people of India will never forget this or forgive the Communists for this traitorous act. He has accused the Communist Party of following a policy which holds Russian policy as its guide.7

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6Jawaharlal Nehru, Report to the All India Congress Committee (New Delhi: A.I.C.C., 1951), pp. 7-8.

7Jawaharlal Nehru, Before and After Independence (New Delhi: The Indian Printing Works), p. 86.
Nehru has warned the Indian people that the activities of
the Indian Communist Party "are based on entirely extraneous con-
siderations," and these activities are aimed at creating chaos and
disorder in India. He has also said that India will combat in every
way such disruptive tactics. 8

Nehru has lashed out at the Indian Communists in public and
private. He has condemned their bigoted approach, their violent
methods, and their divorce from the Indian tradition. Calling the
Indian Communists reactionaries who were obsessed with the slogans
of the Soviet revolution, Nehru has left no doubt that he is against
the Communist elements of India in their efforts to take over the
reins of government. As he puts it before the Indian Constituent
Assembly:

We stand in this country for democracy, we stand for
an independent Sovereign India. Now, obviously, anything
that is opposed to the democratic concept—the real essen-
tially democratic concept, which includes not only poli-
tical but economic democracy—we ought to be opposed to.
We will resist the imposition of any other concept here
or any other practice. 9

It appears then that on the domestic front Nehru has stood
for some form of democratic socialism, and has strongly opposed the
attempts of the local Communist groups to seize power. What reflec-
tion has this had on Indian foreign policy?

8Nehru, Independence and After, pp. 193-94.

9Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 8 (March 1948), col.
1768.
While India's neutrality in the ideological struggle being waged between the Communist and the anti-Communist camps is an indication that Nehru's domestic position on Communism has no visible effect on India's foreign policy, it is also clear that Nehru would not put up with the prospect of outside help to the local Communists since he opposes the Communists in their attempts to gain power in India.

The Indian National Congress and Communism

The Indian National Congress Party has been in existence as a party since 1885, when it was formally established. But it could be said that it became a political party in the true sense only at the time of Indian independence, when political control of the country was transferred into its hands. Prior to independence it was more of a national front. As the organization which spearheaded the national movement, the Congress Party harbored all shades of political opinion in the name of nationalism and patriotism.

It is common knowledge that groups with absolutely divergent political and economic views found a common platform within the Congress. The present day Socialists who claim to differ fundamentally from the Congress were until the other day part and parcel of that organization wherein they were functioning as a sort of ginger group. With characteristic broadmindedness the Congress sheltered even the Moscow smitten Communists until they were expelled in 1945 for their own mistakes.10

10N. V. Rajkumar, Indian Political Parties (New Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1948), pp. 35-36.
It is true that even before independence the Congress Party did, at various times, adopt resolutions dealing with the problems of land, labor, and fundamental rights. After becoming the party in power, however, it put forward a comprehensive program which more than ever before indicated where the Party stood in terms of political and economic policies. In this connection two resolutions, among others, adopted by the Party after Indian independence stand out as most significant, and sketch the economic and social order the Indian National Congress considers suitable for the Indian people.

One of these resolutions was adopted by the Working Committee of the Party on June 18, 1954. It seems this resolution was prompted by a desire to allay certain doubts which had arisen in the public mind due to the contemplated party program of land reform and industrialization. The resolution stated that the Congress Party has always been opposed to the concept of class warfare, or confiscation of private property without just cause or compensation. The resolution maintained that these things are contrary to the Party's basic creed of non-violence and its belief in the fundamental rights of the individual. These rights include the right of free expression and association, the right to practice the religion of one's choice, the right to move freely throughout the country, acquire property, and follow any trade or calling. The resolution also stated that the Congress believes in a healthy relationship between capital and
labor. It said further that the contemplated program of land reform is meant to prevent the exploitation of the landless poor.\textsuperscript{11}

The other resolution, which is of historic significance, was adopted by the Indian National Congress at its annual session held at Avadi, Madras, in January 1955. This resolution, moved under the title of "The Socialistic Pattern of Society,"\textsuperscript{12} may be considered the culmination of the many economic and social programs which the Congress Party has formulated throughout its history. This resolution, more than any other resolution, outlines comprehensively the economic and social features of the types of society the Congress Party has regarded as suitable for the Indian people.

The main resolution adopted at Avadi reads as follows:

In order to realize the object of the Congress as laid down in Article 1 of the Congress Constitution and to further the objectives stated in the Preamble and Directive Principles of State Policy of the Constitution of India, planning should take place with a view to the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society, where the principal means of production are under social ownership or control, production is progressively speeded up and there is equitable distribution of the national wealth.\textsuperscript{13}

Elaborating upon this resolution the General Secretary of the Indian National Congress has remarked that a study of the Avadi


\textsuperscript{12}The Party has since changed the word "Socialistic" to "Socialist."

\textsuperscript{13}Resolutions: Indian National Congress Sixth Session (Madras: Indian National Congress, 1955), p. 3.
resolutions, the objectives of the Congress Constitution, and the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Indian Constitution, reveals that the basic objectives of the socialistic pattern of society would be to bring about a social and economic order based on equality of opportunity, and on social, economic, and political justice. In this social order all discrimination based on caste, creed, sex, or social and economic status will be eliminated. The right to work and earn a living wage will be ensured to all able-bodied citizens.

Explaining further the General Secretary has stated that under this order the State will own or effectively control the principal means of production and material resources of the community. The economic system will be so organized that there will be no concentration of wealth and means of production to the detriment of the people as a whole. Attempts will be made to speed up and increase the total production of national wealth. There will be more equitable distribution of wealth, and existing economic disparities will be reduced to the minimum. There will be decentralization of economic and political power through the establishment of village panchayats (assemblies) and industrial co-operatives. This transformation of the social and economic order will essentially be brought about through peaceful and democratic methods.\[14\]

The President of the Indian National Congress has also thrown some light on the Avadi resolution. In clarification of the viewpoint expressed in this resolution, he has stated that when talking of redistribution of wealth the Congress Party did not have in mind redistribution of the existing wealth. The Party meant production of additional quantity of goods and creation of a purchasing power on the part of the people as a whole. He has said that there is no desire to take away the status of those who are gifted with intelligence and knowledge. On the contrary, the Congress wishes to create an active acceptance of the same status for the workers in the fields, factories, or work shops. The President of the Party has explained that the Congress will not achieve its aim of socialism through nationalization of land or industries in existence at present, nor will it employ any means of coercion to further its objective. He has stated:

The Socialistic Pattern of Society is distinguishable from the Communist Pattern of Society in that the latter believes in economic activity governing the social, economic, and cultural progress of man, whereas the former has still retained the hope and faith in him (man). It (The Socialistic Pattern) believes that there are social urges of a nobler character which govern the progress on the social, economic, and cultural side in the human world.\textsuperscript{15}

The resolutions cited above and the statements of the Congress leaders in support of these resolutions appear to indicate

that the Indian National Congress has concluded that India is to enjoy democratic political institutions and have an economic system in which the State will play a dominant role. It also appears that the leaders of the Congress Party have been eager to make a distinction between the pattern of political society they have set forth as their goal and the pattern of society which followers of Communism have chosen. As the then Indian Minister for Commerce and Industry said while speaking before a conference of the Provincial Congress Committee Presidents and Secretaries in April 1955:

So far as I am concerned, I do not mind it (state interference) so long as collectivism does not mean Communism, so far as individual initiative is not killed. That is where even in our Constitution, we emphasize individual liberty, and to that extent we also want the individual to have some property . . . . So, the thing we should recognize is that we are trying not to go the Communist way.16

The Indian National Congress has at the same time stood in constant opposition to the Communist Party of India. Strangely enough, the Communists of India were sheltered by the Congress Party until 1945. That year a subcommittee was appointed by the All India Congress Committee to investigate the charges of indiscipline against Communist members. The subcommittee report observed that the Congress was always aware of the fact that the general policy of Communists had been to ridicule and condemn Congress policy. The report said the Congress had, however, refrained from

taking any action against the Communists earlier because they were being harassed and suppressed by the British authorities in India and in such cases the sympathy of the Congress Party always went to those who suffered from government repression. But then the subcommittee recommended expulsion of Communists from central as well as provincial committees of the Congress Party for their hostile activities during the "Civil disobedience" campaign of 1942.17

Shortly afterwards the Secretary of the Communist Party of India called upon all Communists to leave the Congress Party as a protest against the subcommittee recommendations. This was the occasion when a complete break occurred between the Indian Communists and the Congress Party. Ever since there has been continued hostility between the Communist Party of India and the Indian National Congress party.

Campaign material issued by the Congress Party in the 1951-52 elections warned the people of India that the Communist Party was abiding by the parliamentary method to gain political control only as a screen. The Congress charged that in reality the Communist Party was wedded to violence and sought to capture power in India by violent methods in order to impose on the people its own views and an authoritarian rule under which free thought and expression would be suppressed completely. The Congress Party further accused

the Communists of spreading hatred, enmity, and subversion.\textsuperscript{18}

The publicity pamphlet of the Congress Party also stated that, whereas the Congress Party advocates a co-operative commonwealth in terms of the Constitution, the Communist Party desires a Communist state "and all that it may connote in the way of liquidating by force all other classes."\textsuperscript{19}

The Congress Party has publicly censured the Indian Communist Party for initiating policies which receive their inspiration from Moscow, not India. The Congress leaders have told the Indian masses on many an occasion that, contradictory as it may seem, the Indian Communist Party considers Soviet Russia as the Mecca of its dreams, not India.\textsuperscript{20}

The Indian National Congress Party has, thus, left no room for doubt as to its attitude toward Communism at home. But where international relations are concerned, the Congress Party has advocated a policy of non-alignment and non-discrimination in regard to the ideological backgrounds of various nations. One of the resolutions passed by the Jaipur Session of the Indian National Congress in 1948 stated in part:


\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Rajkumar, op. cit.}, p. 72.
It should be the constant aim of the foreign policy of India to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with all nations and to avoid entanglement in military or similar alliances which tend to divide up the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace.21

The Communist Party of India

Any discussion of India's relations with Communist countries calls for a survey of the Communist Party of India, particularly its policies and its influence in the formulation of the country's foreign policy. True, Indian politics have been completely dominated by the Indian National Congress during the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the Communist Party of India has made a bold bid for power on various occasions. That it has succeeded to a certain extent can not be denied. Its emergence as the party holding the largest number of seats in the lower house of the Indian Parliament after the popular Indian National Congress is a reminder of its potentials. But whether this has enabled the Communist Party to have a voice in Indian Affairs, especially on the international level, is seriously questionable. A brief examination of the life of the Party until 1955 provides some answers.

The Communist Party of India was established sometime in 1924 as a branch of the Communist International. From this time

21N. V. Rajkumar, Background of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: A.I.C.C., 1953), p. 97.
onward various emissaries were sent from abroad to help organize and develop the Party. During the early life of the Communist Party, the Party itself lay neglected while Communists continued to grow in strength under the flag of the Workers and Peasants Party. In 1928, in response to a directive from the Comintern, the Communist Party of India reorganized itself. The Party was now to lend itself to the task of becoming active in the name of the Communist Party of India, rather than any other front. It adopted the colonial thesis of the Comintern as the basis for work, which was to struggle against British imperialism for the independence of the country, to unite all Communist groups throughout the country, and to expose the "national reformist" organizations like the Indian National Congress and their leaders. The CPI followed this line until about the year 1935. However, in March 1929, after the Party's meeting in Bombay, the majority of the members of the Party were arrested, thus bringing to an end the first period in the history of the Communist Party of India.  

With its leaders behind bars, the CPI was in a state of confusion from 1929 to 1935. It was during this period that the Indian National Congress under Mahatma Gandhi's leadership launched the mass civil disobedience campaign for the first time. People from all walks of life responded to Mahatma Gandhi's call and joined in the campaign to oppose the British regime in India. But while the

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masses were courting arrest and facing police repression, the CPI stuck to its line of exposing the "national reformism" of the Indian National Congress. Thus the Communist Party of India stayed out of the greatest mass campaign for national freedom on the Indian scene and in this way earned the ire of the people. At the same time the British Government in India declared the Communist Party an unlawful organization in 1934, compelling it to abandon its operations in the open.

When the year 1935 dawned the Communist Party of India could see difficult times ahead. That year the Party line changed after the meeting of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in Moscow. The major factor in the background was the sudden and swift rise of Hitler on the European scene. Those were the days of the "popular front."

In pursuance of the "United Front" tactics the Communists infiltrated the Indian National Congress Party, trade unions, student organizations, etc., hoping to make these organizations adopt the Communist program. On the surface virulent criticism of the Congress and its leaders was stopped, and attempts were made to win the favor of the national leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Jay Prakash Narain.

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With the beginning of war in 1939, we come to a crucial chapter in the history of the CPI. The Russo-German pact of August 1939 resulted in a complete reversal of "United Front" tactics. The "popular front" had been aimed at opposing Fascism, but Stalin's non-aggression pact with Hitler made Hitler a friend of the socialist fatherland. The war, with England and France on the one side and Germany on the other, was branded as an "imperialist war."

This state of affairs obliged the Indian Communists to obstruct the war effort. Strangely enough, on the Indian scene, in the beginning circumstances worked in favor of the local Communist Party. The British Viceroy declared war on the Fascist Powers in the name of India without consulting the Indian leaders, or the Indian Legislative Assembly, or the Congress cabinets in the provinces. As a sequel to the Viceroy's action, the All-India Congress Committee met and adopted a resolution condemning the Viceroy's attitude. The resolution further asked that an assurance of Indian independence be provided so that the Indian people could participate wholeheartedly in the war effort against Nazi Germany. The British Government paid no heed.

The Congress cabinets in the provinces resigned from office in November 1939. The Congress then started individual Satyagrah (passive resistance) against the war effort. This favored the Communists who, in order to oppose the "imperialist war," could also pose as patriots opposing the British Government for not giving any assurance
of Indian independence. Eager to display its anti-Fascist character and its sympathy with the British cause in the fight against Fascism, the Congress started with a rather mild policy of opposition to the government. The Communist Party utilized this occasion to condemn the Congress Party for compromising with imperialist Britain. The Communists posed as true revolutionaries by advocating and sponsoring strikes, and by creating other impediments to the war effort.

Gandhi and Nehru were denounced as saboteurs of Indian independence and agents of imperialism. The Congress Socialists were described as henchmen of Gandhi for not sabotaging the Congress policy of "compromise." A virulent attack of calumny against the leaders of the Congress and the Socialist Party was started, not with a view to induce them to accept a more dynamic policy but to isolate them and to kill their influence with the masses. 24

The British administration in India met these disruptionist tactics of the CPI by arresting the Communists everywhere under the Defense of India Ordinance which came into force in September 1939.

However, the picture changed suddenly when Hitler invaded Russia on June 22, 1941. This called for a complete reversal of earlier policy. It was now the urgent duty of every Communist to come to the rescue of the "Fatherland of Socialism." Imperialist war turned into "People's War." Instead of hindering the war effort, every attempt had to be made to support it with vigor. The British on their part released the Communists from jail and a truce was negotiated between the two. After a decade of ban the Communist Party

24Masani, op. cit., p. 78.
was declared legal in July 1942. The Party was also encouraged and
given facilities to start a number of newspapers and associations which
carried out propaganda both for the war effort and for the Communist
Party. 25

The Party was in this manner pursuing a very unpopular course.
Because the CPI for about two years had been feeding the masses
strong anti-British and anti-imperialist propaganda, it had at the
same time posed as being more patriotic than the Congress Party and
had criticized the Congress in vehement language for not opposing
the British war effort more vigorously. Now suddenly the people were
asked to support the same war effort and assist the British in every
way.

While the Communists turned pro-war from anti-war, circum-
stances were compelling the Congress Party to take up a more stern
attitude toward the British in India. When the Congress Party felt
that all its appeals to the British Government for some assurance of
Indian independence had been ignored, and when the Cripps' Mission
also proved unsuccessful, the Working Committee of the Congress
Party passed a resolution on July 14, at Wardha, stating that if
India's minimum demands for independence were not entertained the
Congress would "be reluctantly compelled" to start a campaign of
mass civil disobedience. The All-India Congress Committee met in

25 Ibid., p. 81.
Bombay on August 8, 1942, and approved this resolution. The British administration had in the meantime prepared its own plans to deal with the situation. Even before the Congress Party could act on its resolution, early in the morning on August 9, 1942, Congress leaders were put under arrest. The whole nation rebelled in protest. The slogan of the day was that the British should "Quit India." In spite of the repression that the government carried out in return, there were violent demonstrations against the British throughout India.

The Communists responded to this national upsurge in a most callous and indifferent manner. They were on the side of the rulers and battled against the national movement. They went even as far as to act as spies on behalf of the British regime in India. National leaders of India and their politically conscious followers never forgave the Communist Party and its adherents for this traitorous act on the Indian scene.

From 1942 to 1945, almost every political and non-political worker connected with the Indian independence movement was either in jail or underground. The field was open for the Communist Party of India. During this period, on one hand the Communists tried to help the British in India to popularize the war effort and on the other hand they tried to discredit the Indian National Congress, its leaders, and the national movement. But mostly they failed in these efforts:

The Communists were by 1944, both internationally and nationally, isolated and discredited. Their efforts
to destroy the influence of Gandhi and of the Congress leaders since August, 1942, had completely failed. . . . They had lost support both among the peasants and the industrial workers. Their only influence was among the upper class "intellectuals" with whom it was fashionable to be communists because of Russian military successes.26

In 1945, the Indian National Congress expelled the Communists from its ranks. With the end of the war and beginning of the Indian independence, the next stage opens in the history of the Communist Party of India.

The Communist Party was conscious of the fact that in opposing the people's struggle from 1942-45, it had brought upon itself the anger of the people, and the party lay discredited with most of the sections of the population. Even industrial labor had turned against the Party. Under these circumstances the Party realized that the only way to save itself from complete ruination was to flow with the tide and rebuild its lost prestige.27 Thus on the eve of Indian independence the Communist Party, under the leadership of P. C. Joshi, supported the "partition plan" as a step toward the right direction, gave support to the Nehru government, and advised the Party followers to "rally to the defense of secularism and democracy as symbolized by Prime Minister Nehru."

26Ibid., p. 85.

27Ibid., op. cit., p. 63.
This compromising attitude lasted only for a short while. Soon there was widespread resentment in Party ranks. Rumblings from overseas gave the rising opposition added strength. While the cold war was beginning to warm up on the European horizon, it appears the Communist parties on the South and South East Asian scene were asked to make a drastic shift in their policy.\footnote{28}

The Second Congress of the Communist Party of India, held in Calcutta in February 1946, issued a Political Thesis which started the Party on a new course. This Political Thesis, in explaining the transfer of power in India, said that seeing the advancing and menacing tide of revolution the British imperialists decided to strike a bargain with the national bourgeoisie and handed over the country's rule to them; in this way the British were able to retain the actual control of the country with help from the bourgeois Indian leaders, who were themselves frightened and did not want the masses of India to capture power. The Thesis maintained that the freedom struggle had been betrayed by national leaders like Nehru and Patel.\footnote{29}

The Political Thesis, later known as the "Calcutta Line," also stated that there was general unrest among the people in India.

\footnote{28}Masani, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

\footnote{29}Political Thesis of the CPI (Passed by the 2nd Congress at Calcutta, February 28-March 6, 1946), pp. 12-13, 31.
Did this mean a counter-revolution was in the making? It seems the Communist Party did appraise the situation as being ripe for another revolution, because in response to the "Calcutta Line," the Communists in India started a campaign of violence and terror all over the country under the guidance of their new leader, B. T. Ranadive.

The central and state governments of India were, however, not caught completely off guard. The West Bengal Government declared the Communist Party illegal and arrested the local leaders of the Party. Soon after the Bombay Government also rounded up the local Party leaders. By 1949 there were 2500 Communists in jail all over India. The Government of Madras had to take even stronger measures. Parts of Madras, Hyderabad, and West Bengal were seething with Communist trouble, since Communists had concentrated their attacks in these areas. The Government of Madras had to send troops to the disturbed areas in Andhra and Malabar. Similarly, the situation in Telengana district of Hyderabad was rather dangerous. There were spots in Telengana where a Congressman or a government servant could not enter without grave danger to his life.

In these parts the Communists reigned supreme for quite some time before vigorous action was taken by the Indian Government to wipe out the disruptive elements from these pockets. Prime Minister Nehru, speaking in the Constituent Assembly, said:

The Communist Party of India has, during the past year, adopted an attitude not only of open hostility to the government but one which can be described as bordering on
open revolt . . . . Fortunately, these attempts failed because of the strength of popular opinion against them and the action taken by the government. Nevertheless, a great deal of misery and damage was caused by them in certain parts of India.\(^{30}\)

The policy of murder, arson, and looting on the part of the Communists continued for about a year and a half. But as the year 1950 dawned it appeared that the "Ranadive Line" had failed miserably. The Communists had only succeeded in alienating the public at large and the Party itself was going to shambles under continued attacks from the government.

In February 1950, the provisional Indian Parliament passed the "Preventive Detention Act" permitting the government to arrest people on suspicion in certain cases and detain them without trial. It was clear from the debate in Parliament that this Act was aimed at the Communists. By now it was obvious that the Communists had once more lost ground and suffered badly. It may be said that the damage suffered by the Communist Party at this juncture, in terms of public sympathy, was second only to the loss of prestige the Party underwent during the 1942–45 period, when it consciously pursued a policy totally opposed to public sentiment.

There was a strong feeling within the Communist Party of India at this time that Ranadive, having failed in his job, should

\(^{30}\) Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, *Communist Violence in India*, p. 3.
be replaced. The Andhra group under the leadership of Rajeshwar Rao took over power in July 1950. The Andhra group maintained that success could be achieved on the Indian scene only by following the pattern of the Chinese revolution. Rao pointed to the Chinese experiment as a model and suggested that the CPI concentrate on training the Indian peasants to revolt and seize power.

The leadership of Rajeshwar Rao and the Andhra group was, however, short lived. A commission made up of four top Indian Communist leaders went "underground" to Moscow and returned sometime early in 1951 with a document called the "Tactical Line." Since the document claimed the authority of the Kremlin, it met with the approval of various leaders of the different groups within the Party. The Party laid down its future course on the basis of this document. On the return of the group from Moscow, the Indian Communist leaders prepared a policy statement which was adopted as the new program by the All-India Party Conference in October 1951. Also, Rao was replaced by Ajoy Ghosh as General Secretary of the Party.

The new Party program analyzing the Indian situation maintained that India was still a dependent semi-colonial country. Since independence, it declared, the Nehru government had failed the masses in every respect. The program said that the people had begun to realize that the Congress government meant to protect and preserve

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31Madhu Limaye, Indian Communism Today (Bombay: The Book Centre Ltd.), p. 4.
British capital, landlords, and the princes.

The Communist Party's new program stated further that due to the backwardness of the economic development of India, and the weakness of the workers and peasants organizations, it was not possible to establish socialism in India immediately. Therefore, the program said, the Communists should support those aspects of the Indian government's foreign policy which opposed the American plans while furthering the Communist cause. The new program advocated the abandonment of armed revolution on the domestic scene for the time being and suggested constitutional forms of opposition to the ruling elements. Party members were asked to take part in the coming general elections. The new plan called for alignment with all leftist parties to form a coalition to replace the government. 32

The pressure of the government on the Communist Party was relieved as a result of the change in Communist Party policy. Toward the end of 1951, i.e., on the eve of general elections the Government of India had released most of the Communist prisoners and warrants were withdrawn against those who had gone underground, thus enabling the Party to participate in the elections fully.

In the general elections, held for the first time in independent India between November 1951 and February 1952, the CPI made a surprisingly impressive showing. Compared to the highly popular

Congress Party which received 44.9 per cent of the popular vote, the CPI received 5.44 per cent of the popular vote. However, in the Lok Sabha or the lower house, the Communist Party emerged as the largest organized opposition in the national Parliament, winning 23 seats out of 489.

In elections to the State Legislative Assemblies, the Communist vote was 6 per cent of the total vote. In areas like Madras, Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, West Bengal, and Tripura, the Communists achieved a great measure of success, winning a near majority of the Assembly seats in Travancore-Cochin and establishing themselves as a large minority in the other State Legislatures.

The Party was greatly elated by the success in election results. The Central Committee of the Party, at its meeting in March 1952, asked the Party organization to intensify its campaign to secure collaboration with other opposition parties, and form Communist dominated coalitions to replace the Congress Party wherever possible.

Ever since the elections the general strategy of the CPI has continued to be the same. The third Congress of the CPI met at Madurai from December 1953 to January 1954. The program presented at this conference was not much different from the policy statement of 1951.33

33Ibid., p. 24.
Pursuant to the Communist Party's latest program, the tactics of the Party have boiled down to attempts to unite all leftist groups, in and out of Parliament, to oppose the Indian National Congress Party. In these attempts the Communist Party had not been very successful but its efforts in this direction continue. 34

Also, pursuant to its new line the Party has approved major portions of Nehru's foreign policy and domestic policy, with some exceptions in the case of a few specific issues. All in all, for the time being the Communist Party of India appears to have settled down to a mild role compared to its tactics in 1949-1950.

Due to certain weaknesses inherent in its own character the Communist Party of India had been unable to carry the masses along with it, and it had also failed in its attempts to come close to the seat of the ruling group at the center.

In concluding this chapter, it can be said that India's leaders see Communism in its relation to India's national interest in the following terms:

1. India's national interest would be threatened if the control of government in India fell in the hands of those elements who would compromise India's independence as a free nation.

Therefore, in the interests of the country India's rulers oppose the Communist elements in India and seek to prevent them from gaining power in India.

2. India's national interest demands that, while maintaining democratic institutions and individual liberties, India adopt necessary economic measures without rigid ideological considerations to strengthen the country economically. Thus India's leaders are following the course of state planning without state coercion.

3. After due consideration India's leaders have decided that ideological considerations play little or no part in the struggle between the two major camps of the world. As such they believe that India's national interest requires that they deal with all other nations on the basis of economic and territorial security considerations, regardless of India's attitude toward Communism at home.

4. India's national interest requires that the local Communist Party be prevented from coming to power; thus India's leaders oppose the Communist Party of India. But since the Communist Party has failed to gain mass following, India's national interest is believed to be better served by permitting the Communist Party to operate in the open. In the view of the Indian leaders this not only strengthens the democratic position of the Indian rulers, but it also keeps the Communists from going
underground where as martyrs they might be a greater threat to the rulers of India than they would be in the open.
CHAPTER V

INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND INDIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST

General Relations Prior to Indian Independence

Although India's relations with Russia, in the strict international and official sense, did not begin until 1947, India did have contact with Russia prior to 1947, even though these contacts were minor in nature and superficial in character. One Russian writer claims that mutual acquaintance between India and Russia goes as far back as 400 B.C.\(^1\) Another Russian scholar maintains that the second European to set foot on the Indian soil was a Russian by the name of Afansi Nikitin, who appeared in India around 1466 and stayed there for several years.\(^2\)

Citing the Russian chronicles as the source, Nehru mentions in one of his books that during the Mogul rule (approximately 16th to 18th century) there existed exchange of diplomatic and trade missions between India and Russia.\(^3\) It is also known that

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\(^1\) Ulysses Young, "From the Ganges to the Volga," *Hindustan Standard* (Calcutta), December 11, 1955.


\(^3\) Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, pp. 308-309.

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the Russian Indologist Heraсим Lebedeff, who is credited with having set up a Sanskrit press at St. Petersburg with state aid, traveled widely in India during 1790-1796.\(^4\)

It might be said, however, that with the British occupation of India, all contact between India and the outside world came to an abrupt end. India was virtually shut out from the rest of the world. To a large extent India re-awakened to a realization of the world around her only after the First World War. Still held in bondage by a foreign country, however, she was unable to fraternize freely with the other nations. It was under these conditions that India and her people made their acquaintance with the Soviet revolution and modern Russia. Prevented from having any first-hand contact, the Indians were from time to time provided with the type of information which suited the British ruling group. This in itself was strong enough reason for most of the Indian intelligentsia to hold views about Russia which were contrastingly different from that of the British rulers. A statement made by Nehru in the nineteen twenties displays this attitude rather well. He said then:

> Ordinarily Russia and India should live as the best of neighbors with the fewest points of friction. The continual friction that we see today is between England and Russia, not between India and Russia. Is there any

reason why we in India should inherit the age-long rivalry of England against Russia? That is based on the greed and covetousness of British imperialism, and our interests surely lie in ending this imperialism and not in supporting and strengthening it.

Indians have for generations been told to fear Russia, and it is perhaps a little difficult to exercise this fear today. But if we face the facts, we can only come to one conclusion, and that is that India has nothing to fear from Russia.5

The impressions formed by the Indian leaders and the Indian intelligentsia regarding the Soviet revolution and the Soviet society between the two world wars are important to mark. Despite the changes that occurred during the Second World War and the post-war period in India and in Russia, most of these earlier impressions continued to linger in the minds of the Indian people. How far, if at all, these impressions influenced the thinking of the foreign-policy makers of India at the time of independence, it is hard to judge. But one could not go wrong in saying that as a result of these earlier impressions, there has existed on the part of the Indian intelligentsia an underlying attitude of sympathy toward the Soviet Union.

The impact of the Soviet revolution on the Indian mind was electrifying. The revolution occurred at a time when the Indian National Congress Party was changing in character from a moderate reformist group to a militant organization. To the leaders of the

Congress Party the Soviet revolution was a source of hope and inspiration. The Indians compared their struggle against the British with that which the Soviets had successfully led against the Czar's regime. That the Bolshevik revolution had been able to destroy a powerful autocracy was a matter of encouragement for those struggling for Indian independence. It served as an assurance for them that they too could accomplish their aim.

There was also the satisfaction for the Indian intelligentsia that the Soviet revolution had defied the Western countries just as much as the Czar in its fulfillment. It had held its ground against all attempts by the countries of the West to prevent it from succeeding. "There is no doubt that the nationalist movements in all Asian countries gained moral strength by the mere existence of a Revolutionary Russia."6

When the Soviet Government in a formal declaration on July 15, 1919, renounced all secret treaties concluded by the Czar's government in the Asian sphere, qualifying these treaties as having been unfair to the people of the Orient, it certainly won the admiration of the people of Asia. Chester Bowles observes that the impact of the Russian Revolution on the Indian public opinion was amazing; one famous Indian trade union leader walked and

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rode by camel all the way across Central Asia to Moscow to sit at the feet of Lenin, when he heard of the "ten days that shook the world." 7

Such was the reception accorded to the news of the October Revolution when it reached the ears of the Indian people. As the Soviet Union consolidated itself, and progressed toward economic self-sufficiency and internal stability, she created an ever deeper impression in the minds of the Indian educated class.

Two eminent personalities from the Indian scene, Tagore and Nehru, visited the Soviet Union a decade or so after the revolution. What they said about that country provides us with an example of how Russia was pictured by the Indian intelligentsia and the Indian leaders.

Rabindranath Tagore, famous man of letters and Nobel prize-winner, was in Russia in 1930. As individualistic and anti-regimentarian as poet Tagore was, he became an admirer of the Soviet society. In an interview with the Izvestia correspondent on September 25, 1930, Tagore said:

Before leaving your country let me once again assure you that I am struck with admiration for all that you are doing to free those who were in slavery, to raise up those who were lowly and oppressed, and to bring

help to those who were utterly helpless . . . .

In some of the remarks made by Nehru on his return from his first visit to Russia, we find a good deal of similarity between his views and the ones expressed above. Nehru was invited to Moscow with his father to attend the tenth anniversary celebration early in November 1927. On his return from this four-day visit, he wrote a few sketches giving his views of what he had seen of the Soviet Union. In one of the sketches he wrote:

No one can deny the fascination of this strange Eur-Asian country of the hammer and sickle, where workers and peasants sit on the thrones of the mighty and upset the best laid schemes of mice and men.

For us in India the fascination is even greater, and even our self-interest compels us to understand the vast forces which have upset the old order of things and brought a new world into existence, where values have changed utterly and old standards have given place to new.

Here, one can say, is a glimpse of the then prevailing thought in India in regard to Soviet Russia during the period between the two world wars. The attitudes of the Indian intelligentsia were influenced by Western authors like the Webbs and the opinions of the Indian leaders. And the Indian leadership was deeply impressed by the equalitarian philosophy of the Soviet Union, its rapid economic advancement, its ability to wipe out illiteracy, poverty, and misery, and its success at assimilating the various racial minorities.

9Nehru, Soviet Russia, p. 2.
It should be noted that at this time two factors were uppermost in the thoughts of the Indian leaders: the struggle against the British, and the social and economic difficulties that faced the Indian people. Only those features of the Soviet Union held significance for the Indian mind which had a bearing on these two factors. These features by themselves symbolized the entire structure of the Soviet society. Features like the authoritarian nature of the Soviet society, its dependence upon violence, its atheistic character, if not completely overlooked, were largely ignored at that time.

When Hitler turned around and attacked Soviet Russia in 1941, the Indian sympathies were all for the Soviet cause. That attitude of disgust which was widespread when Soviet Russia and Hitler's Germany had signed a non-aggression pact earlier, disappeared completely. Nehru helped draft a manifesto which proclaimed to the world that the "Soviet civilization was a progressive force in the world," and that its destruction at the hands of Hitler would be a "loss to humanity."\(^{10}\)

The famous "Quit India" resolution passed by the All India Congress Committee in 1942 stated:

\[\ldots\] the obvious demand for India's independence is resisted, though this has been made essentially to meet the present peril and to enable India to defend herself

\[^{10}\text{National Herald (Lucknow), March 14, 1949.}\]
and help China and Russia in their hour of need. The Committee is anxious not to embarrass in any way the defense of China or Russia, whose freedom is precious and must be preserved.\textsuperscript{11}

The Soviet Union did not render any direct or indirect assistance to the Indian independence struggle, nor did she make any specific pronouncements or moves calculated to help the Indian cause. This was also the case with most of the other countries. However, Soviet Russia by her very existence was considered an additional force in the opposition which was being offered to the colonial rule in India. Moreover, the anti-imperialist slogans of that country were interpreted as policy statements in support of those nations that were suffering under alien rule.

It is evident that the general tone of the Indian attitude toward Soviet Russia at the end of the Second World War was a sympathetic one. This should not be misconstrued to mean that India was in a mood to accept communism or was prepared to come under the Soviet heel. On the contrary India was eagerly looking forward to asserting her independence in every way, something which had been denied to her for over a hundred years. It is simply indicated here that at a time when suspicions against the Soviet Union were on the rise in the Western world and other quarters, there existed in India a fund of good will for Russia with no backlog of bitterness or rivalry. Thus formal relations between the two countries

could not have started with a more auspicious background, at least where India was concerned.

**General Relations 1947-1953**

India became an international entity in August 1947, but India began to function as an independent nation even before that. As a step toward ultimate transfer of power the Interim Government was formed in September 1946. Nehru was the Vice-President, and Member for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in this government. It could be said that in effect India began to function independently in the field of foreign relations from this time onward, for Nehru made it known on joining the Interim Government:

"We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation."12

In his first press conference in New Delhi, after joining the Interim Government, Nehru observed that India was desirous of establishing the same type of relations with the Soviet Union as with the United States and China. Nehru pointed out that since at that moment no formal relations existed between India and Russia, steps were being taken to examine the situation. He went on to say: "We

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Certainly want to develop those relations from every point of view because apart from Russia's intrinsic importance in world affairs today, the Soviet Union is our neighbour and it is always desirable to have neighbourly relations with neighbours.  

On November 30, 1946, a press communique declared that the Government of India had appointed K. P. S. Menon, Agent General for India in China, as their special representative to visit Moscow and discuss with the Russian Government arrangements preliminary to the exchange of diplomatic representatives between Russia and India.  

On April 13, 1947, another press communique from New Delhi announced that the two governments had decided to exchange diplomatic missions at embassy level.  

On the following June 25, Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit was appointed the first Indian ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Everything seemed to indicate that India and Russia were headed for an era of close cooperation and friendly relations. The past contained no record of conflict or rivalry between them. There were no outstanding issues that called for a clash. In fact, as shown earlier there was an abundance of goodwill toward the Soviet Union in the hearts of India's Minister for Foreign Affairs

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13 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), September 27, 1946.
14 The Hindu (Madras), December 2, 1946.
15 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), April 14, 1947.
and the people of India in general. When a delegation of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union took part for the first time in a session of the Indian Science Congress in New Delhi on January 3, 1947, speaking at a reception given in honor of the Soviet delegation, Nehru said:

For many years past we have looked with very great interest towards the Soviet Union for many reasons, but more especially because of the tremendous achievements of the Soviet Union during the last quarter of a century or so. You are neighbours and as neighbours we must take interest in each other. We must know each other and develop closer contacts with each other.

But apart from being neighbours you have been pioneers in many fields and you have transformed the vast tracts of your country before our eyes with a speed that has astonished humanity. Inevitably, when we want to produce great changes in India, we want to learn from your example.  

In those last few months of 1946 and in the early months of 1947, it seemed that India and Soviet Russia were full of warmth for each other, and they even appeared to see eye to eye on many an important issue on the international scene.

The Soviet delegation to the United Nations gave a luncheon in honor of the Indian delegation on December 6, 1946. Speaking on this occasion the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, said:

When at San Francisco I expressed the hope that the authentic voice of India would be heard soon in the

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16 The Hindu (Madras), January 9, 1947.
Assembly, I knew that voice would be raised on behalf of progressive causes. I am glad my anticipation has been so completely fulfilled.17

Representatives of India and Russia worked closely together against the Union of South Africa's move to annex South-West Africa. Mrs. Pandit gained strong support from the Soviet side in her case against South Africa's alleged discrimination against the people of Indian origin. As a result of this, in March 1947, Nehru sent a letter to Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov thanking him for the support rendered to the Indian delegation at the General Assembly session, during the discussion about the persecution of the Indian population in South Africa. Similar notes of thanks were also dispatched to the governments of Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

India and Russia also pushed hard in the Trusteeship Committee to liberalize the trusteeship agreements submitted by the administering powers. Noticing the similarity of the Indian and the Soviet stand on some major issues, comments came from various quarters that India was throwing her weight on the side of the Soviet bloc, and that India was drawing close to the Soviet orbit.

The Indian delegation took special notice of these reports. Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit, head of the Indian delegation, let it be known in a press interview that India's actions were being misinterpreted. She said that India had simply voted with the side

17The Hindu (Madras), December 8, 1946.
which saw eye to eye with India on such issues as colonialism, and even mentioned that the Soviet approach in this respect appeared more liberal than that of Britain or the United States. She went on to say: "India has no intention of becoming the satellite of any power no matter how powerful. We desire the friendship of all nations of the world."\(^1^8\)

However, statements clarifying the Indian position were no assurance for certain circles who could see before them a close collaboration developing between India and Soviet Russia. The pattern of things irritated John Foster Dulles, then a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations, to the extent that he remarked in New York: "In India, Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the interim Hindu Government."\(^1^9\)

Subsequent events showed that this contention was far from true. The cordiality which prevailed between India and the Soviet Union was short-lived. As the year 1947 advanced, the pace of the cold war quickened and the Soviet Union began to reflect the policy that the countries which were non-Communist were to be considered as anti-Communist. Before the year 1947 ended a pointed criticism of the Indian Government and the Indian leaders

\(^1^8\) *The Hindu*, December 11, 1946.

\(^1^9\) *The Hindu*, January 21, 1947.
began to appear in the Soviet press and the Soviet writings which was to continue, in spite of the open displeasure of India, for more than five years or so.

The Soviet magazine *New Times* of April 18, 1947, while commenting on the establishment of Indo-Soviet diplomatic relations, said:

The great cause of the liberation of India is far from completed and India is still entangled in colonial ties... Circles of Anglo-Indian reaction are trying—especially lately—to build up an anti-Soviet campaign against the sympathies and interests felt by the Indian people toward our country. By means of crude slander against the Soviet Union and inventive misinformation concerning its policy they are trying to interfere with the consolidation of friendly ties between the two huge countries.  

Soon thereafter it became clear that the Soviets considered the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru as being a part of the so-called "circles of Anglo-Indian reaction." A joint session of the sections for history and philosophy, literature and language, and economics and law, of the Academy of Sciences was held in Moscow from June 14 to June 18 on the subject of Indian studies. Reports were delivered at this session by Soviet scholars and spokesmen considered specialists on India. The general picture of the Indian scene drawn by these experts at this time portrayed the leadership of the Indian National Congress as having fallen "in the hands of the wealthy classes."

i.e., the "big bourgeoisie." It was stated that Nehru, a "rich
man," supported this group in the plan to retain links with
Great Britain. Nehru was said to have moved to the right as a
result of his association with reactionary leaders like Patel.
It was further analyzed that the "big bourgeoisie" was ready to
compromise Indian independence due to the fear of labor and of
the mass national-liberation movement, and the capitalist clique
"was prepared to 'capitulate' to the British, offering con-
tinued economic and military ties in return for formal polit-
ical independence."21

Other Soviet writings also reflected that the tide was
turning. The Soviets were shifting their position from one of
warmth toward India to one of caution and suspicion. The Asian
Relations Conference held in New Delhi in March 1947, was also
attended by a Soviet delegation. Professor E. Zhukov, a member
of this delegation, on his return submitted a report about the
conference to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in May.
In this report he observed that the conference had been financed
by some Indian capitalists and the secret motive behind the con-
ference was to revive the idea of "pan-Asiatism" with India as the

21E. Zhukov, "K pologheniiv v Indii," Mirovoekhoziaistvoi
mirovaia (July 1947), pp. 4-5. As quoted by Gene D. Overstreet
University, 1953.
center of the movement. Professor Zhukov observed in his report that India was dreaming of following in the footsteps of Japan.\textsuperscript{22}

There were many signs that the Soviets believed that the time had come when the Communist theory of class warfare was to be applied to the Indian scene also. Up to that point the Indian national movement had been supported as a part of the belief that in colonial countries independence in itself was a step toward the final Communist goal. But now that India was on the threshold of independence and it appeared certain that a Western type of democratic government would prevail in that country, a violent clash had become inevitable. Even that close cooperation which had been witnessed in the international conferences between the Indian and the Soviet delegations during the early months after India's assumption of power began to wane as the year 1947 drew to a close. Recalling a meeting in September 1947 with the head of the Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly session then in progress, Pannikar has written: "It was clear that Russia had become uncertain of India's attitude and was generally suspicious of our approach to questions of vital interest to her."\textsuperscript{23}

When Poland vacated a seat on the Security Council in October 1947, there was a tussle between India and the Ukraine to

\textsuperscript{22}Karunakaran, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 91.

procure that seat. India's reasons for wanting to gain that seat, as presented by Mrs. Pandit, were turned down and called irrelevant to the existing situation by Vishinsky.\textsuperscript{24} Also, a few days later India supported the United States move for the adoption of the United States proposal for a "Little Assembly." Soviet Russia denounced the proposal as endangering world peace.

In the following years India and Soviet Russia found each other on the opposite sides on many issues. Notable among these were the question of Ceylon's membership, Dutch-Indonesian conflict, Korea, Libyan independence, etc.

When the Security Council recommended that Ceylon be admitted to the United Nations, Soviet Russia objected to it and opposed the measure, saying that Ceylon was not an independent country with a democratic structure. India, of course, was wholeheartedly in favor of the United Nations membership for Ceylon and was very unhappy with the Soviet stand. Similarly, in the case of Indonesia, India and the Soviet Union failed to see eye to eye on the final solution of the problem. In December 1949, the fifteen powers that had attended the New Delhi conference on Indonesia, sponsored by Nehru, put forward a resolution welcoming the agreement that had been reached at the Round Table

\textsuperscript{24}The Leader (Allahabad), October 2, 1947.
Conference in The Hague toward solving the Indonesian problem. The General Assembly accepted the resolution, which also landed the parties concerned and the United Nations Commission for their efforts in securing a solution. Every one except the Soviet bloc voted in favor of the resolution. Opposing the measure the Soviet delegate said that the people of Indonesia "have been sacrificed on the block of the interests of colonial powers." India's delegate Sir B. N. Ruu defended Dr. Hatta, the then Indonesian Prime Minister, against the Soviet attacks.

The Indian representative observed that the Dutch-Indonesian agreement was one of special gratification to India since the Prime Minister of India had earlier in the year taken a leading part in a conference which had influenced a great deal the subsequent course of events. Earlier the Soviet Union had even voted against the United Nations Commission's participation in the Hague Conference.25

Reference will be made to the Korean problem and the question of Libyan independence later. With the passage of time it was clear that India did not wish to antagonize either of the two major powers if she could help it. To this end she continued her policy of staying away from any entangling alliances. But then

she also continued to follow a path which in her eyes was in consonance with her interests, regardless of what either of the blocs thought about it.

As matters stood, at the time of independence India adopted a democratic system of government. Since in August 1947, India's status was still that of a dominion, the Indian leaders of their own accord requested the previous British Viceroy of India, Earl Mountbatten, to be the first Governor General of India. India's armed forces continued to be headed by British officers for many years after independence. Moreover, India's economic ties with Britain and other Western countries were close in 1947, and remained so for years to come. Possibly, these factors crystallized Soviet antagonism toward India by the end of 1947. Yet it cannot be overlooked that the general trend of the international Communist forces took a sharp turn at this juncture, and Soviet relations with every non-Communist country followed a somewhat similar pattern. The Manifesto issued simultaneously in Moscow and Warsaw on October 5, 1947, as a result of the conference of eighteen leading European Communist delegates in Poland signaled the start of a new policy hostile to the West. The repercussions of the change were felt in almost every country, especially those dealing with the Soviet Union.

Relations between India and Russia during 1948 and for some years to come were marked by heavy criticism of the Indian
government in the Soviet papers, publications, and on Moscow Radio. Nehru was accused of linking the fate of India with imperialist warmonger nations and Nehru's foreign policy was repeatedly branded as being pro-imperialist.26

The frequency and the stinging tone of the Soviet press attacks caused Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit, then India's ambassador to Moscow, to remark to representatives of the United Press of America that "the Indian government was disturbed over the strong Soviet press attacks on India's internal and external policies."27 A few days after Mrs. Pandit's statement to the American press agency, replying to a question in the Indian Constituent Assembly in this connection, Prime Minister Nehru said that the Indian government had stated differently on several occasions that some comments in the Soviet press were unfortunate and did not help matters much.28

The year 1949 saw intensification of the cold war on the international horizon. The Berlin blockade and the coming into force of the North Atlantic Treaty were some obvious manifestations of it. At home in India the violent activities of the

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27 The Hindu, August 31, 1948.

28 Pioneer, September 5, 1948.
Communists reached a new peak. On the other hand India took a few steps during that year which were interpreted as showing that India was warming up to the Western world. At the end of a conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, in April 1949, it was revealed that even as a republic India would remain within the Commonwealth. The Government of India issued a communiqué on April 28, 1949, which stated that under the new constitution India shall become a sovereign independent republic but would continue to be a full member of the Commonwealth of Nations.29

Also, a press release by the American Government on May 12, 1949 stated that the Indian Prime Minister had accepted an invitation to visit the United States. Surprisingly enough, about two months earlier in March Nehru had told a press conference that he had turned down an invitation to go to the United States because of pressure of work. However, this visit now came off in October 1949.

About the time it was revealed that Nehru had received an invitation from President Truman, an Indian political analyst by the pen name of Sanjaya wrote an article entitled "Why Does Stalin Not Invite Nehru?" He asked whether Nehru would go to Moscow, and went on to answer by saying that "one does not go anywhere uninvited." He further observed that there was complete lack of contact

between India and Russia. He also felt that the situation could not be remedied unless the initiative came from the Soviet side because the New Delhi circles were of firm opinion that the Soviet government was not eager to develop closer contacts. He went on to say: "With all their mastery over dialectics, the Bolsheviks have not really acquired a deep insight into the Indian character."30

Possibly, the Indian Prime Minister was echoing the same sentiment when in August 1949, speaking at a reception in honor of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Ambassador designate to Moscow, he said:

> We consider our relations with the Soviet Union very important not only because the Soviet Union is a very great country in extent, power, prestige, capacity and in so many other ways is playing a very great part in the world today, but also because the Soviet Union is our near neighbour... Neighbours cannot afford to be indifferent to each other.31

On another occasion, while answering a question before the Indian Parliament in March 1950, Nehru observed that his government did not plan to sign non-aggression pacts with any country but they "would welcome" negotiations for treaties of friendship with all governments including that of Russia.32 However, Russia made no move in this direction and general indifference toward

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30 National Herald (Lucknow), March 14, 1949.

31 The Hindu (Madras), August 25, 1949. (Italics mine.)

32 Royal Institute of International Affairs; Chronology of International Events, Vol. 6 (December 19, 1949 to December 17, 1950), p. 178.
India on the part of Soviet Russia continued for some years to come. India on her part refrained from any action that might have been interpreted as being hostile and specifically aimed at the Soviet Union, but otherwise it appeared that India's friendship with the United States was gaining ground. The period between 1950 and 1952 saw no marked change in Indo-Soviet relations, even though during this time the international scene witnessed the rise of Communist China, the conflict in Korea, and the clash in Tibet.

While Moscow cold-shouldered India, the developments within India were watched by the Russians rather closely. Moscow Radio in repeated broadcasts in February and March of 1952 took special note of two developments: American economic aid to India and India's general elections.

In criticizing American aid to India the Moscow Radio mostly blamed the United States for trying to close in its tentacles on India, but the broadcasts implied that either the rulers of India were dupes not to know the real significance of the aid or they were willing to tie India with the imperialist camp in its plans to launch a third world war.33

In commenting on India's general elections, Moscow Radio accused the Indian government of having been unfair. The broadcaster said that the Congress Party had suffered a political defeat, but

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33 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), March 22, 1952.
the anti-democratic electoral system set up by the Indian government turned this defeat into a majority victory for the ruling party.\textsuperscript{34}

Moscow Radio also took notice of the one hundred and ninety million dollar loan that the United States gave to India in 1951 to purchase wheat in order to ward off an impending famine. The broadcast on this matter first pointed out that the American government was compensated for the loan with concessions to tap all valuable raw materials. Then the broadcast chided that the American grains when delivered to the starving population of India were found to be unfit for human consumption.

On March 29, 1952, it was revealed that India had protested to the Soviet Union against the sustained anti-Indian propaganda by Moscow Radio. The English daily \textit{Statesman}'s expert on international affairs wrote that the official Indian opinion had not reacted kindly to Moscow Radio's barrage of criticism in regard to India's policies and general elections. The writer himself explained that this attitude of Moscow resulted from its conviction that India's Commonwealth membership and economic ties with the West put India in the Western camp.\textsuperscript{35}

It is worthy of note here that toward the end of 1950, India had requested the American Government for a wheat loan to overcome

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} The \textit{Statesman} (New Delhi), March 29, 1952.
the threat of famine. However, India made no such request to the Soviet Union, although the Soviet Union did offer 500,000 tons of wheat which India accepted after much deliberation. In 1952, when some food shortage occurred in South India, Soviet Russia offered a relief donation with the proviso that the donation should be administered and distributed through a particular organization which was a local Communist front organization. In refusing to abide by such conditions, a press note issued by the Government of India explained that some private organizations in Madras had sent direct appeals to certain organizations in China and Russia to come to the aid of distress stricken districts of Madras and Travancore-Cochin without any knowledge of the Government of India. The press note further stated that the governments of Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China had been informed that in all such cases distribution of gifts took place through the Indian Red Cross, that private organizations were not permitted to indulge in this function because this could become a source of rivalry between various private organizations, and would interfere with the government's plans. Moreover, the press note added, the Indian Government wanted to keep the question of relief above party politics. The press note also mentioned that even though conditions in certain areas might have been difficult the situation in general was under satisfactory control. 36 Russia

and China finally agreed to the distribution of gifts by the Indian Red Cross.

Another note of discord was added to Indo-Soviet relations when, speaking at the Communist Party Congress on October 15, 1952, Marshal Stalin said:

Our party and our country have always needed and will go on needing the confidence, sympathy, and support of the fraternal peoples abroad.

It is plain that our party cannot remain in arrears to the fraternal parties and must itself, in its turn, extend support to them and also to their peoples in their struggles for liberation, in their struggle for maintenance of peace.37

In reply to a question by a member of the Indian Parliament, Mrs. Laxmi Menon, Parliamentary Secretary to the External Affairs Ministry, said in the Council of States that India had taken note of the above speech by Marshal Stalin and the Government of India felt that the speech did constitute a case of interference in the internal affairs of India. However, Mrs. Menon stated, the Government of India also felt that no useful purpose would be served by making any formal representation to the Soviet Union in this matter since no specific reference had been made in the speech to India or the Indian Communist Party.

Nehru, in answering some supplementary questions in this connection, let it be known that the Indian ambassador in Moscow

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(K. P. S. Menon) had carefully read the whole speech and advised that on the basis of published material no action on the diplomatic level was called for in this case. It is significant, however, that the Indian Government not only took notice of Marshal Stalin's reference to "fraternal parties," but considered it as amounting to interference in the domestic affairs of the country.

**General Relations 1953-1955**

In the year 1953 the rigid attitude which had marked the Soviet approach to India until that year showed signs of relaxing. The Soviet press and statesmen suddenly stopped their pointed attacks on the Indian Government and even the Communist Party of India saw fit to praise certain policies of Nehru. It is hard to avoid asking the question, "What made the Soviet Union turn on the faucet of sweetness?" Did India in any way alter her policies to atone for all that the Russians had been charging her with during the previous five years?

First of all, it has to be noted that it was during the general period of 1952-1953 that Soviet Russia began its peace offensive on the world scene. An article written by Marshal Stalin in February 1952, and published in *Bolshevik* on September 15, under the title of "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," is

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38 *National Herald* (Lucknow), December 19, 1952.
believed by some to have provided the initial inspiration for the Soviet peace offensive. In this article Stalin put forward the thesis that the struggle for markets between the capitalist countries of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan had started all over again. He felt that due to this situation the dissension between the capitalists was fiercer than the capitalists' quarrel with socialism. Therefore, it was Marshal Stalin's view that the Soviet Union should stand apart from the fray and try to exploit the differences within the capitalist camp.\(^{39}\) This might have accounted for the shift in Soviet policy. But there was another development which could have resulted in the general softening of the Soviet policy. By the year 1952 it was clear to Moscow that the strength of the Western alliance had grown and was continuing to grow.

The Western Powers were devoting a considerable proportion of their national incomes to military requirements and were no longer entirely dependent on American willingness to use the atom bomb. If Western Germany were not yet armed, it probably soon would be, and the absorption of Yugoslavia into the Western strategic map and the adherence of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty extended the western lines uninterruptedly from the Atlantic to the eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus.\(^{40}\)

This military preparedness of the opposition could possibly have convinced the Kremlin leaders that they could not any more exploit certain situations in Asia, the Middle East, or elsewhere


\(^{40}\)Ibid., p. 173.
with impunity. The Berlin blockade and the Korean adventures were grim reminders of this reality. Moreover, as Malenkov admitted before the Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953, after Stalin's death, Russia was beset with economic problems at home,\textsuperscript{41} which necessitated a lesser stress on armament production and greater stress on consumer goods. Also, the struggle for power within Russia on Stalin's death made lessening of tensions on the international scene desirable. In the face of these developments the Soviets, it appears, decided to launch a peace offensive. In so far as Asia was concerned the peace offensive meant utilizing the anti-Western sentiments of countries like India, Indonesia and Burma, etc., in a propaganda war against\textsuperscript{42} the so-called "imperialists." As Malenkov in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on August 18 appeared to indicate, the two principal objects of Soviet Russia at that time were: "to reduce the tension between the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and European and Asian countries on the other, and to vilify and isolate the U.S.A."\textsuperscript{43}

From the Soviet point of view, it seems, no time could have been more opportune for a shift in policy than the occasion of


\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Survey of International Affairs 1953}, op. cit., p. 29.
Stalin's death, when change could be made without any accompanying embarrassment. Thus it could be said that the era of Indo-Soviet friendship began with the death of Marshal Stalin in 1953. On March 6, 1953, the day Stalin's death was announced, Prime Minister Nehru eulogized him in the Indian Parliament in language which not only surprised many Western circles but also a large section of the Indian intelligentsia.\footnote{Council of States Debates, Vol. 3, No. 10, p. 55.}

Nehru added another note of encouragement when he said in a B.B.C. television interview on June 12, 1953, that India saw absolutely no external danger from Communist sources. In answer to a question whether in his opinion the Russian attitude to the rest of the world had really changed, Prime Minister Nehru went on to say that in his view there had been a marked change in the Russian attitude and Russia was sincerely desirous of peace at least for the foreseeable future. When asked if he felt the Soviet Union had abandoned the ideal of a world revolution under its guidance, Nehru replied: "I can't say. But I will put it this way, that their ideal of a world revolution they might think will be furthered much more by their showing internal results in Russia than by indulging in an adventure which may lead to war and upset everything."\footnote{Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), June 27, 1953.}
In these remarks and especially in paying tribute to the Soviet dictator, the Indian Prime Minister displayed signs of having forgotten that under Stalin’s direction and rule the policies of the Indian government were denounced as reactionary and subservient to the interests of Anglo-American imperialists.

It seems, however, that the Indian Prime Minister was prepared to overlook the criticism which had been aimed at India all these years because he sought to increase trade and other contacts with Russia at this time, and he wanted to take advantage of the favorable conditions which appeared to prevail on the Soviet horizon at this juncture.

It is noteworthy that trade relations between India and Russia were negligible until 1953. This was so because prior to independence India’s trade was overwhelmingly with the Western world. Moreover, even after independence India had close economic ties with England. There was no encouragement from the Soviet side to increase the flow of trade between the two countries.

However, in March 1953 India approached Russia with a proposal to exchange Indian commodities for Russian wheat. In August of that year India’s Food Minister announced that Russia had accepted the Indian proposal. Finally, on December 2, 1953, India and Soviet Russia signed a five year trade agreement. According to this agreement India was to export jute, tea, coffee, tobacco, shellac, hides, skins, black pepper, spices, mica,
vegetable oils, etc. In return India was to receive from the Soviet Union wheat, barley, crude oil, petroleum products, iron and steel products, optical instruments, agricultural machinery, industrial and electrical equipment.\footnote{46}{The Eastern Economist Annual Number 1955, New Delhi, p. 1041.}

Not only was this the first trade pact of its kind between free India and Russia, but this agreement paved the way for more significant commercial treaties in later years.

In February 1955 India and Russia signed a commercial agreement according to which Russia agreed to assist India in the setting up of a steel plant with an initial capacity of one million tons of ingots. The Soviet Union was to supply the equipment and technicians to build the plant and also provide for training the Indian personnel to eventually take over the operations of the plant. India agreed to pay for the project in Indian currency.\footnote{47}{Ibid., p. 1041.}

Also, in December 1955 another trade agreement came into being between these two countries which stipulated that Russia would supply one million tons of steel to India over the coming three years. Russia also agreed to supply oil production and mining equipment.\footnote{48}{Joint Indo-Soviet Communique, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, December 13, 1955.}
The year 1953, then, appears to have been singularly suspicious for Indo-Soviet relations. As already pointed out there were certain forces which compelled Russia to turn around and woo the Asian countries, while India, in the interests of her trade and policy of non-alignment, sought Russian cooperation. Something else happened as the year 1953 was closing which gave a significant impetus to the pace of growing contact between India and Russia. There was repeated reference in the American newspapers in November about the possibility of a United States-Pakistan military aid pact. Indian circles were shocked to hear about it. Worse still, there were denials from both sides about the intended pact up to the last minute. As Nehru disclosed in his speech before the Council of States on December 24, he could not definitely say what steps had been taken up to that time or what Pakistan and the United States proposed to do in regard to the matter of military aid. He said that they were given the information that some informal talks had been held regarding the issue. However, Nehru observed, from the way the press in America had been full of reports on the matter the previous two months, he was almost sure that things had gone "pretty far." Nehru also mentioned that he had been told by the Pakistani Prime Minister that there was no talk of bases or military alliance.49

49 The Hindu, December 26, 1953.
The worst Indian fears were proven well-founded, however, in a matter of about two months when things came into the open. The general feeling on the Indian scene was that India had been betrayed by the United States. Everyone admitted that both the United States and Pakistan were within their rights to sign any pact they desired, but the Indians had expected that the United States would pay a little more heed to their sentiments and give a little more consideration to the resulting effects on India of a United States-Pakistan military aid pact. India was apparently not even sounded out in advance in respect to this matter. The matter had been forced into the open by certain press references, and India was able to learn that some conversations to this effect had been held between the United States and Pakistan. With the type of situation that existed between India and Pakistan over the question of Kashmir, over the canal water dispute, and other issues, some Indian circles interpreted the American move as a "a stab in the back." The American decision to give military aid to Pakistan had a greater impact on Indian foreign policy than was envisioned by anyone.

The military aid pact between the United States and Pakistan had the dual effect of alienating India against the Western powers while it further spurred the Soviet Union to seek India's friendship. In order to prevent countries like India, Burma, and Indonesia from falling in line with Pakistan, Soviet Russia not only
sought to establish more friendly relations with these countries but she also encouraged them in their independent and neutral policy. Russia was compromising her original position in this respect but here was another compelling reason which caused her to make a major shift in her attitude toward India.

It was speculated in some circles that in retort to the American move India would enter into negotiations with Russia for supply of arms. A news agency reported at the time that Russia had made an offer of arms to India. Not only was this report quickly denied officially by India but her leaders made every effort to avoid any move which might imply that as a reaction to the United States-Pakistan pact India might move closer to the Soviet orbit.

The influence which the United States-Pakistan military aid pact exerted on the Indo-Soviet relations is discussed in detail in a later chapter. Here it is sufficient to stress that the United States-Pakistan move apparently helped to quicken the pace with which contacts between India and Soviet Russia increased. More than anything else it spurred Russian efforts to convince India that she was considered a friendly power by the Soviet Union. Russia concentrated her efforts in this direction in the following years as if in penance for the treatment accorded to India until the very end of 1952, when the Korean resolution submitted by India was sabotaged by Russia. Nevertheless, in
defense of her interests India did not let her guard down on any side.

In September 1954, a Communist member of the Indian Parliament asked the government benches whether it was a fact that books and periodicals printed and published in Russia were still not allowed to be sold on the railway platforms, implying thereby that there was no reason to continue the ban placed in 1952, as relations between India and Russia had improved immeasurably since then. Moreover, the trade pact which had been signed between the two countries a few months earlier included books as an item of import.50

The Deputy Minister of Indian Railways replied that the ban on the sale of Soviet literature was continuing. The Minister of Home Affairs added that two years earlier the Railway Board issued specific instructions that the bookstalls on railway platforms should be forbidden to sell unhealthy literature no matter where it came from or where it was printed. He said:

The word which was used, and deliberately used, in the answer was tendentious literature. Tendentious literature is something which purports or aims at saying—directly or indirectly by insinuations—your system of government is wrong, it is not sound, and you should not follow this system of government—though in a persuasive way it may be. But it is harmful.51

51Ibid., col. 2038.
He also added:

When a man offers to me a million books at the rate of nine annas (about 10 cents) which will cost anywhere about rupees five (1 dollar) I become, naturally, a little suspicious. I ask a question for which I do not expect an answer. Where do the proceeds go? Tell me. My hon. friends over there (pointing at Communist members) know much better than I do as to where the proceeds go.52

Obviously, in spite of the best of relations that existed between the two countries at that time, the Indian Government still held the view that Soviet literature was of a subversive character and that it was being sold so cheaply because of its propaganda value. Moreover, as the Minister implied, they knew that the funds collected from the sale of this literature were given to subsidize the Communist Party of India, a procedure which was certainly not relished by the government.

Aside from the above developments, the year 1954 as a whole appeared to indicate that Indo-Soviet relations were headed toward some type of mutual understanding and closer cooperation. The major events of 1954 fell into two categories as far as India was concerned. The coming into existence of the SEATO defense treaty and the American military aid to Pakistan were developments most unwelcome to India. If anything, they soured India against the Western world, and when she failed to receive an invitation

52Ibid., col. 2039.
to the Geneva Conference where the fate of Indo-China was decided, India was further aggrieved. On the other hand, a visit by Premier Chou En-lai to India in June, and a reciprocal visit by Nehru to China in October, were developments which made for closer contact between India and the Communist world.

That was the note on which the year 1955 dawned. The year opened with India and Russia signing an agreement in February for the construction of a steel plant in India with the help of Russia. Also during that month the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Vorshilov, and Foreign Minister Molotov, while addressing the Supreme Soviet, paid unique tribute to India by saying that the "international authority" of India was an important factor in the maintenance of peace and security in the world. In that same month Moscow Radio announced that the Soviet Union had proposed that Russia, Britain, and India should convene a conference to discuss the question of Formosa.53 Aside from the tributes and proclamations of goodwill, the year saw a marked growth of cultural and economic ties between India and the Soviet Union. The outstanding event took place when Russia invited the Indian Prime Minister to visit that country in June. Prime Minister Nehru arrived in Moscow on June 7, 1955 for a fortnight's visit to that country.

The stage had been well set for his coming to Russia.

53 This was turned down by the United States of America.
Earlier that year cultural delegations had been exchanged between India and Russia on an unprecedented scale. Indian dancers appeared on the stage of the famous Bolshoi Theatre and were well received. The Soviet movie houses were showing Indian films as a regular event. On the fifth anniversary of India's Republic Day that year, January 26, all the leading Soviet newspapers had published messages of greetings to India on the front pages, signed by the then Prime Minister Malenkov and the ceremonial chief of the Soviet Union, Voroshilov. Never before had this honor been showered on any non-Communist country.

There were other features of welcome, such as an exhibition of Indian books in the Soviet State Library, and appearance of Nehru's *The Discovery of India* in Russian translation with a foreword by the Indian Prime Minister himself, about three days before his arrival. Moreover, before Nehru had left Russia, a direct radio-telephone link had been established between India and Russia.

Aside from this the Soviet press had been full of kind references for Nehru and India. They called him "Prophet of Peace." India's efforts to solve international problems by peaceful means were lauded. The atmosphere was certainly full of cordiality when India's Prime Minister landed in Moscow.

But the significance of Nehru's visit lay in the political overtones of the event. The Soviets were in the midst of their new peace offensive. They had concluded a state treaty with Austria; the Soviet Union had put forward new proposals for reduction of
armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons; relations between Russia and Yugoslavia had been revived; and in July of that year the Geneva Conference of the Big Four Powers was to be held in the hope that world tensions could be reduced. Nehru had established himself as the "eyes and ears" of many countries in Asia and even outside. Thus if the Indian Premier could be impressed with the sincerity of Soviet intentions, he could prove to be a valuable asset in conveying to other countries that the peace desire of the Soviets was genuine. This was possibly one motive that the Soviets had, but then in another way a visit from India's leader was long overdue. Ever since Nehru had visited the United States it had been mentioned in Indian circles that Nehru should appear in Moscow to really demonstrate that India was neutral. Moreover, there could not have been a more fitting climax to the shift in Soviet policy toward India than an invitation to the Indian Prime Minister to visit Moscow.

From the Indian point of view the visit was a welcome gesture. India was prepared to demonstrate to the Soviet leadership that the Indian Government was sincerely neutral and completely independent in its appraisal of international events. India's Prime Minister was also eager to see at first hand the conditions in Russia and the progress of Russia, for about a quarter of a century had gone by since his brief visit to that country in 1927.

The occasion selected for an exchange of views was also
suspicious from another angle. India's representatives had just returned from Bandung where they had acquired a first-hand report on the pulse of Afro-Asian nations. They could supply Soviet Russia with a reasonably authentic account of what was going on in the minds of some of these nations and how they stood where the East-West struggle was concerned. On the other hand Soviet Russia was about to participate in a summit conference of the Big Four and India could possibly get an inkling of what Russia's policy was to be at this parley; this could place India in a privileged position among the non-Communist countries. Thus there were reasons for both parties to look forward to the Moscow visit of the Indian Prime Minister.

One thing the Indian leader wanted to make sure was that his visit would not be interpreted as abandoning the policy of non-alignment. Speaking at a banquet in the Kremlin he said:

I have no doubt that today Russia is playing a vital part in the cause of peaceful co-existence. World tensions have been lessened in the recent past though suspicion lingers still. But it is definitely true that the lessening of the tension is, in a large degree, the result of the several steps which your country had taken during the last few months . . .

. . . So far as we in India are concerned, we stretch out our hand of friendship to your people and country as it is stretched out to other countries.

We have no enemies in this world; we want to be friends with all, even though, sometimes, they may not be good to us. We think that the right approach will sometime or other bring the right results in response.54

54The Hindu, June 11, 1955.
The final communique followed the familiar pattern of citing common aims and objectives and professed that India and Russia were close friends. It also declared that relations between the two countries are guided by the five principles of Panch Shila, principles which are very near and dear to the heart of the Indian Prime Minister. These five principles calling for mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, peaceful co-existence, are by now well known to the world. But strangely enough at the Bandung Conference Nehru had expressed the opinion that the activities of the Cominform and Panch Shila do conflict with each other; in this light it is questionable how far the adherence of Russia to these principles was sincere.

On his return Nehru mentioned that the Cominform was not discussed during his visit. He declined to elaborate upon the contradiction between Panch Shila and the Cominform activities.

On returning to the capital of his country, the Indian Prime Minister gave his impressions of the Soviet tour during a press conference. Besides being impressed by the hearty welcome he received, he pointed out that even though the industrial advance made by Russia was remarkable, he felt that the people of Russia had paid a very heavy price for the country's progress. If anything, Nehru was implying that denial of individual liberties was too much of a price to pay for economic salvation. He also observed that there was no question of India imitating the ways of Russia. Under the
Indian approach, he said, there will be state ownership of major industries but in the sphere of land ownership India believed in individual peasant proprietorship.\textsuperscript{55} Thus once again Nehru let it be known that while he admired Soviet achievements he still questioned their methods and wanted India to tread the democratic path.

In November–December of 1955, Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India, thus returning Nehru’s visit to Russia.

Undoubtedly, the Indian people were gratified that the leaders of a mighty power had thought fit to return the visit of India’s Prime Minister. For the Indian mind this displayed the respect and the feeling of equality Russia held for India; the Indian official circles also felt satisfied at this show of good will.\textsuperscript{56}

For the Soviet leaders the Indian tour was one of a series of tours they undertook that year as a new weapon in the peace offensive. Through this gesture they were also able to cash in on the pro-Soviet opinion which seemed to be building up in India.

Whatever the motives, the Bulganin–Khrushchev visit certainly resulted in two things: firstly, it created a fear in the Western world that India had been drawn into the Soviet bloc and those who had suspected this all along were confirmed in their doubts.

\textsuperscript{55}The Hindu, July 20, 1955.

\textsuperscript{56}A. K. Chanda, Deputy Minister of External Affairs, revealed in Parliament on May 26, 1956, that Nehru invited President Eisenhower in July 1955, to visit India. President Eisenhower did not accept the invitation, saying that pressure of work did not permit him to leave the United States at the time.
Secondly, in spite of the general feeling of elation, it convinced the Indians that the Soviets would not miss a chance of utilizing India for the sake of gaining the initiative in the cold war, regardless of the Indian concern to keep itself out of the cold war as far as possible.

While Nehru tried to dispel the fears of the West by declaring in almost every speech when the Soviet leaders were in India that India remained friendly to all the nations, and that this show of affection between India and Russia did not in any form turn India away from the path of non-alignment, the Indian press objected when the Soviet leaders took the liberty of making anti-West statements from Indian soil which were purely Soviet propaganda. Nehru had to be content with saying in the Parliament that one does not tell one’s guests what to say and what not to say, thus implying that he was unhappy at some statements of the Soviet leaders. But the Indian press could afford to be more frank in its opinion; said the Hindustan Times, which more often than not reflects the official government opinion:

We have expressed the view more than once that the visit of the Russian leaders to India will have failed if it does not lead to an appreciable lessening of world tensions . . . . But what is happening just at the moment is something that must give cause for anxiety to well-wishers of peace. A little cold war within the cold war is in progress, and India (and Burma) would seem to have become the immediate venue . . . . The Soviet leaders must also realize that they are being strongly criticized, even in friendly circles, for their misuse of the occasion of their triumphal tour for blatant attacks upon
their opponents of the West. We are proud of the phenomenal welcome the Indian people have accorded to the guests . . . But the result of it all has got to be an improvement in international relations in general and not a line-up of forces for an intensification of the ideological conflict. Russian trends for sometime have encouraged such a hope. If that is a misreading of the position, the tour should never have been planned.57

Similarly, The Hindu also took the Soviet leaders to task for some of their anti-West pronouncements from Indian soil. Among other things the paper said:

It would be a great misfortune if the visit of the Soviet leaders, which was welcomed by the Indian people as presenting an opportunity to the representatives of the Russian people to understand free India's achievements and the way of life of an ancient people who have always valued friendly relations with all countries, is sought to be turned into an incident in the cold war.

. . . Any attempt, therefore, from the Soviet side to exploit our present friendly feelings towards the Soviet Union for the purpose of causing a rift between India and the United States should be severely deprecated.58

Evidently, the Soviet leaders out-reached their mark when they thought that having appealed to the Indian opinion by making statements on Kashmir and Goa, which were pro-Indian, they could then expect to be supported in any statements they made, however critical they might be of the West. This was not only a misreading of the Indian temper; this was also a miscalculation of the mood of the Indian foreign-policy makers, who were very keen to improve

57 The Hindustan Times, December 6, 1955.

contacts with Soviet Russia but certainly cool to any overtures of a "bear-hug."

The final communique issued at the end of the Soviet leader's visit did not differ very much from the one that had been issued at the end of Nehru's visit to Moscow. As its main features it contained a reaffirmation of Panch Shila principles; the common approach toward the problems of the Far East was expressed again; and of course, the mutual desire for peace was proclaimed once more.59

These visits brought India and Russia closer and possibly resulted in a better mutual understanding of the policies the two countries were pursuing on the international scene. Certainly the barriers which had prevented the two countries from cooperating prior to the year 1953 were further lowered and it seemed the way had been cleared for all types of economic and cultural cooperation. But India did not budge from her resolve to stay independent in every sphere of political activity, and let it be known in no uncertain terms that she was far from accepting communism as a way of life.

What does the above information reveal in regard to India's national interest? In the light of the above facts, it can be said that in India's relations with Russia from 1947-1955 the foreign-policy makers of India saw India's national interest served in the following manner:

(a) India was entering the international arena for the first time as an independent nation. It was a new experience for her. She was militarily weak, very unstable on the domestic front, and while she was conscious of the cold war forces on the international horizon India was uncertain whether she could or should play any role in that arena. India had no experience of conflict of interest with the Soviet Union in the past; on the other hand she had suffered humiliation and defeat at the hands of the Western powers. India's leaders had drawn inspiration from the Soviet revolution and had admired rapid Soviet advancement on the social and economic front. Soviet Union was also a neighboring power, and a mighty one at that. Under these influences India's leaders saw that India's national interest would be served by establishing normal diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and by pursuing a policy of non-align-ment in the cold war.

(b) When toward the end of 1946 and during 1947 Soviet representatives at the United Nations supported India's stand against the Union of South Africa and stood by India's side in opposing colonial forces, India willingly accepted Soviet cooperation because it helped to advance India's national interest.

(c) By 1948-49 India's leaders had made it manifest, and it had become clear by then, that India would continue to maintain democratic political institutions and remain within the British Commonwealth of nations. This resulted in severe criticism of the
Indian regime by the Soviet Union, and representatives of Russia at the United Nations openly stood against the Indian proposals and Indian position in general at the United Nations. As long as Soviet hostility toward India at this time remained within these limits, India's leaders felt that the Indian national interest would best be served by reciprocating Russia's cool attitude and not going any further than protesting against the criticism leveled by the Soviet publications and press. It is true that the Communist Party in India led a violent revolt against the Indian regime during this period. However, the Indian Government was able to suppress this outburst, and in the absence of any overt military assistance from outside India did not find it necessary to make this a point of friction between India and the Soviet Union. At the same time India continued and increased her economic ties with the Western countries during this period in order to build her economic resources. Not only did India find her national interest served this way, but she could not depend on any other source for her economic survival, but India refused to consider this as being indicative of her subservience to the West. 60

(d) Around 1953 cold war considerations compelled Soviet Russia to change her policy toward India and to encourage India in her neutrality. While India, being eager to develop trade with

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60 See Prime Minister Nehru's statement in this connection in Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 217.
Russia at this stage, reciprocated the new cooperative attitude of the Soviet Union, other forces intervened to draw India and Russia even closer. At a time when relations between India and Pakistan had reached a low point where talk of war between these two countries was not uncommon, the United States signed a military aid pact with Pakistan. Not seeing any immediate Communist threat to Pakistan, Indian leaders were convinced that Pakistan was arming herself not in order to defend her borders from Communist aggression but in order to deal with India from a position of strength. India also appears to have interpreted the American move as an unnecessary interference in the affairs of two Asian countries with common borders. In India's eyes the military aid pact was an indication that the United States had thrown her lot in with Pakistan in any future conflict between India and Pakistan. India's national interest dictated that India oppose not only the United States–Pakistan military aid pact but oppose all military pacts of this order. The Soviet Union was also opposed to these military pacts inasmuch as they resulted in American military bases surrounding Russia. The national interests of India and Russia coincided. While India did not sign any military pact with Russia to counteract the United States–Pakistan move, the bonds of similar interests between India and Russia grew, resulting in increasing growth of mutual contact between India and Russia.

(e) While India made common cause with Russia in matters of mutual advantage, India's leaders continued to consider any
interference by Russia in India's domestic affairs a threat to India's independence and Indian national interest. Thus India's leaders did not permit the sale of Soviet literature in places like railway platforms because of the belief that the funds from much sales were used to help the Communist Party. India's leaders also took offense to Stalin's reference in one of his speeches that Soviet Russia would help the Communist parties of other countries, or grounds that this amounted to interference by Russia in the internal affairs of other countries.
CHAPTER VI

KOREA IN INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

It may be said that in so far as Indo-Soviet relations are concerned, the Korean conflict was a crucial issue that could have resulted in India finding herself in the Western camp poised against Soviet Russia. Inasmuch as the Korean issue is being dealt with at length in a later chapter, here the discussion is confined to the earlier stages of the conflict with the object of determining how India and Russia approached the problem in terms of their interests.

Most of the facts in the Korean conflict are now well known. On June 25, 1950, the United States informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that North Korean forces had invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea that morning, and requested him to call an immediate meeting of the Security Council to tackle the situation. The Security Council met later that day and passed a resolution sponsored by the United States which branded the North Korean action as a breach of the peace, and called upon the authorities in North Korea to cease hostilities and withdraw their armed forces to the border along the 38th parallel. The resolution also requested the United Nations Commission on Korea to observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces and to keep the Security
Council informed on the execution of the resolution.\textsuperscript{1}

India's representative on the Security Council voted in favor of this resolution. The Soviet delegate was absent on this occasion, having walked out of the Council meeting on January 13. He had maintained that the Soviet Union would not participate in the work of the Security Council until the representative of Nationalist China had been removed from that body.

On June 27, the United Nations Commission on Korea reported that the North Korean authorities were carrying out a well-planned invasion of South Korea, and that it did not seem that North Korean authorities would heed the earlier Security Council resolution. The Security Council then adopted another resolution sponsored by the United States which recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore peace.

The Indian delegate did not participate in the voting on this resolution, observing that he had not received the proper instructions from his government. However, on June 29, the Secretary General received a communication from the Prime Minister of India drawing the Secretary General's attention to the following points.

1. All the information that India had received from various sources made it clear that North Korea had invaded South Korea.

\textsuperscript{1}Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, p. 222.
Most authoritative information came to India from the UN Commission on Korea since India was represented (by K. P. S. Menon) on that body and the Commission was in Seoul at the time of invasion.

2. After careful deliberation, India had decided that since she was opposed to any attempt to settle international disputes by force, she favored the Security Council resolution of June 25. The Government of India realized that for a satisfactory settlement of the issue it was essential to halt aggression and restore peace. Therefore, India also accepted the second resolution of the Security Council passed on June 27.

3. The Government of India wanted it known that this decision did not mean any change in India's basic foreign policy which was rooted in non-alignment and promotion of world peace.2

However, while India supported the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, India did not contribute any forces to the United Nations command, her representative at the United Nations explaining that India's army was trained for domestic defense only. India later contributed an ambulance unit.

The Soviet delegate was again absent when the Security Council resolution of June 27 was adopted. On June 29 the Secretary General transmitted the Security Council resolution of June 27 to all member states of the United Nations. On the same day the

Secretary General received a cable from the Soviet Union stating that the June 27 resolution had no legal force for two reasons, one being the illegal participation of the "Kuomintang representative" as representative of China, and the other reason being the absence of two permanent members of the Security Council from the voting, i.e., Russia and China, while the United Nations Charter made it compulsory that for any decision on an important matter all the five permanent members had to give their concurring votes. Thus the Government of Soviet Russia did not feel bound by either the June 25 resolution or June 27 resolution.

On July 4, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia made a speech in Moscow in which he declared that the developments in Korea were the result of a pre-planned attack by the South Korean forces on North Korea. He maintained that the United States had indulged in open armed intervention in Korea and the successive moves of America made very clear her aggressive intentions in Korea. At the same time he repeated the charges that the Security Council resolutions had no legal force. Later the permanent representative of Russia to the United Nations requested the Secretary General to circulate the text of the above speech among member states of the United Nations as an official document.3

Thus the Soviet position in the matter was that North Korea

was the aggrieved party, and their stand appeared to indicate that at the time the Soviets were not interested in bringing the hostilities to an end. Trygve Lie, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, has written that a few days after the Korean attack Washington requested Russia to use her good offices to bring about a cease-fire. The Soviet Union turned down this request and made it manifest that Russia was solidly behind North Korea.\(^4\)

Obviously, then, at this stage India and Soviet Russia were on the opposite sides of the Korean issue. Subsequent statements of the Indian Prime Minister and future moves on the part of India seem to indicate that India took full note of this, and it appears that she did not feel comfortable with the situation as it existed. "India was careful not to give room for any suggestion that as a result of her position on the North Korean aggression, she was ready to condemn the whole Communist world as 'aggressors' and that she was finally aligned with the Western bloc."\(^5\) To leave no room for doubt Nehru elaborated upon India's approach to the question in a press conference on July 7. Among other things he said: "In accepting the resolution of the Security Council, India did not accept any enlargement of those resolutions. Those resolutions


refer to aggression in Korea alone and to no other situation.\footnote{India Record, Vol. 2, No. 27 (July 13, 1950), p. 2.}

In the same press conference Nehru observed that one of the main reasons for the deteriorating international situation was the withdrawal of Russia from the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations. He also expressed the opinion that admission of Communist China to the Security Council and return of the Soviet Union to that body would enable the Security Council to function effectively and put an end to the Korean conflict. On the same day the Security Council adopted a resolution, sponsored by Britain and France, setting up a unified command in Korea under an American commander. India abstained from voting on this resolution.

India apparently felt that she had gone along with the Western powers as far as she could and now the point had been reached when India wanted to disassociate herself from any further involvement on one side. India sought to lend her efforts toward preventing the conflagration from spreading. This she attempted to do by placating both sides involved in the Korean issue. While neither the West nor the Communists appreciated this shift in the Indian tactics, India justified her actions in the name of peace.

On July 13, 1950, Nehru dispatched personal messages to Marshal Stalin and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In these identical notes Nehru pointed out that India's purpose was to localize
the conflict and help in bringing about an early peaceful settlement of the Korean issue. To accomplish this he suggested that the impasse in the Security Council be ended by admitting Communist China to the Security Council, which would result in bringing Russia back to the Council. He further suggested that through informal contacts within or outside the Security Council, the United States, Russia, and Communist China, with the help of other "peace-loving nations," find a basis for settling the Korean problem.7

Secretary Acheson turned down India's suggestion about seating Communist China in the United Nations. Marshal Stalin's reply of July 16 was of much help either. Stalin welcomed Nehru's initiative and agreed that seating of Communist China in the Seucuring Council would expedite matters for the peaceful solution of the Korean question, but gave no room to imply that Soviet Russia was prepared to compromise her earlier stand to halt the fighting.

However, undeterred by this unbending attitude of the major powers India continued to press for some peaceful solution. India's delegate, Sir B. N. Rau, appealed to the North Korean authorities on July 28, during Security Council debate, to withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel. He said:

If the North Koreans, even at this stage, would comply with this Council's resolution of 25 June—now that they know the world's verdict—they would spare Korea much needless suffering, they would allay fears of a world conflagration and strengthen the hands of those who are working for peace.  

India's efforts were in vain. India's concern was growing that this small war might become much larger, which India wanted to prevent if she could. But Soviet Russia seemed in no hurry to settle the issue. Moreover, from the Soviet point of view Korea was not an isolated issue which stood by itself; it was simply one center of the cold war being waged on so many fronts. To India, of course, the Korean problem meant an ever-present threat to peace and she wanted it solved without regard for anything else. Thus the interests of India and Russia lay in entirely different directions. Speaking before the Indian Parliament on August 3, 1950, Nehru expressed regret that the approaches made by him to the big powers had failed to achieve the results he had hoped for.  

With the return of the Soviet delegate to the Security Council on August 1, 1950, that body for all practical purposes was paralyzed due to the continuous disagreement between the two major permanent members. When on August 1, in the capacity of President, the Soviet representative ruled that the Nationalist
China representative could not participate in the proceedings since he did not represent the real China, India voted in favor of the President's ruling. However, on being challenged, the President's ruling was overruled.

When, however, the Russian representative moved that North Korea should be invited to attend the Council's meetings, India's delegate opposed the motion, saying that the Security Council was considering the issue of an attack by North Korea and thus until the hostilities ended there could be no question of seating North Korea.

Similarly, when the Soviet delegate submitted a resolution which asked the Security Council to call upon the United States to stop the bombing of civilian population in Korea, India opposed the resolution on the basis that the Soviet delegation had not presented any proof in support of the allegations.

Aside from these ramblings, India's main concern remained the same, namely, to find ways and means to bring the two major parties involved in the Korean conflict together and settle the question so as to bring the fighting to an end. Thus on August 14, the representative of India suggested at the meeting of the Security Council that the Council should appoint a committee of its non-permanent members "to study all resolutions or proposals that have been or may be proposed for a peaceful and just settlement in Korea, and to submit recommendations to the Council by a specified date." Many countries encouraged the suggestion but no formal resolution to this effect was made and no action taken.
September saw the Korean fighting assume new proportions. The tide of battle turned in favor of the United Nations troops with the successful Inchon landings of September 15. As the Communist troops fled northward the question arose, how far should the United Nations forces pursue them? Should they stop at the 38th parallel or should they penetrate North Korea? India suggested that the United Nations troops halt at the 38th parallel and armistice be offered on that line. Nehru said in a press conference in New Delhi on September 30 that since North Korea had been defeated adequately, efforts should be made to solve the Korean problem peacefully. He maintained that in his opinion the United Nations forces should not go beyond the 38th parallel before other means of solving the problem had been explored. ¹⁰

On the same day Chou En-lai, speaking in Peking on the first anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, warned that China would not stand aside if the territory of China's neighbors was invaded. ¹¹

About this time it was rumored that the North Koreans, possibly instigated by Moscow, approached India to put forward certain proposals in the United Nations to solve the issue, but India refused because of the unagreeable nature of the proposals. India

¹⁰Nehru's Press Conferences 1950 pp. 178-79.

¹¹New China News Agency, October 1, 1950.
denied these reports. Against all appeals from India and to India's deep regret, the United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel on October 9 and headed toward the Yalu River.

India was embittered by this action. Nehru exclaimed that the military mind had taken over. In terms of the Korean problem, from this point on, India moved further and further away from the Western position. Even though India's sympathies fell more in line with the stand taken by Communist China, where Soviet Russia was concerned, India and Russia continued to follow different paths if not completely opposite ones.

On November 5, the United Nations Command in Korea reported to the Security Council that the United Nations forces had come in contact with Chinese Communist military units in certain areas of Korea. Peking Radio called these units Chinese volunteers. But before the month ended it became quite clear that Communist China had launched a massive counter-attack in Korea against the United Nations forces as they approached the border between Korea and China.

The course of Korean events after the entry of China is dealt with in one of the succeeding chapters. However, in regard to India's national interest the following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the facts related above.

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(a) When the Korean question was brought before the Security Council, India's leaders apparently believed they had no other alternative except to vote with the Security Council resolution condemning the North Korean aggression. Firstly, the United Nations Commission in Korea was headed by an Indian, and this commission had reported that without doubt North Korea was the aggressor. With her representative as the head of the commission, India could neither doubt the veracity of the commission's report, nor fail to take note of it. Secondly, by displaying her readiness to condemn aggression whenever it took place and wherever it took place, India could feel justified in her stand in Kashmir and also claim that non-alignment in India's case did not mean appeasement of an aggressor. Thus India's foreign-policy makers considered it to be in India's national interest to vote in favor of the Security Council resolution of June 25.

(b) Having favored the resolution of June 25, it became binding upon India to vote for the second Security Council resolution which called upon the United Nations to aid South Korea to repel the North Korean attack. Very soon it was evident that Soviet Russia opposed the United Nations position and stood solidly behind North Korea. It also became clear thereafter that the end of Korean conflict was by no means in sight. In view of these factors India's leaders, it appears, decided upon a twofold course. Firstly, India did not dispatch any troops to Korea because she could not afford to engage any part of her army away from India.
for any length of time when she was still involved in Kashmir's defense. Secondly, India proclaimed that by associating herself with two Security Council resolutions she had by no means committed herself to everything that might flow from these resolutions. Thus India let it be known that voting in favor of resolutions sponsored by the Western powers did not mean that India had cast her lot with the West in the cold war, since Korea had become very much a part of the cold war. Not sending any troops to Korea helped India in this direction, for any enlargement of the Korean war would have otherwise found Indian troops fighting against the Communist forces on the side of the Western armies.

(c) As the Korean conflict progressed it began to look as if this small war would spread into a major war between the two super powers. India's leaders saw that it was in India's interest to seek ways to stop the conflict from spreading any further because otherwise not only would India become involved in the war being very close to the theatre of the conflict but it would spell disaster for a weak and new nation like India. Thus India's leaders rushed to make every effort to placate both sides, even though none of the major parties paid too much heed to India's efforts at this time.
CHAPTER VII

COLONIALISM AND RACIALISM IN INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Nehru's repeated references to anti-colonialism have made some Western writers remark that he is obsessed with this idea. Nevertheless, his attitude demonstrates that opposition to colonialism is one of the cardinal features of Indian foreign policy. As such, India has found in Russia an ally who has, if nothing else, established the claim in the hearts of most of the Asians that she believes in rooting out colonialism from this world.

Although the factors that motivate India are very different from the ones that motivate Russia, it seems true that India has felt gratified to have Soviet Russia on her side whenever the issue of colonialism has come to the fore. Whether outside or inside the United Nations, Soviet spokesmen have utilized every opportunity to condemn the colonial powers for subjugating millions of people against their wishes. In doing this the Soviets have touched a soft spot in the hearts of those who were once victims of colonialism and those who still suffer from it.

India lost no time in exhibiting to the world her fervent desire to eliminate colonies. She took a leading part in the discussion on the International Trusteeship system in the first session of the General Assembly in 1946. In an attempt to
liberalize all Trusteeship Agreements in favor of the trust territories, India found Soviet Russia constantly on her side.

Some of the Trusteeship Agreements permitted the Administering Authority to administer a Trust Territory as "an integral part" of the territories of the power concerned. The Soviet Union proposed that those words be removed from the Agreement and India favored the move. Similarly, when the Indian delegation proposed to add a new clause to all the agreements, which in essence would state that at the end of the Trusteeship period all the powers of authority would return to the people of the Trust Territory, the Soviet Union backed the Indian proposal. Again and again Soviet Russia and India acted together on various occasions in matters relating to the freedom of dependent peoples. But due to the continuous opposition of the Mandatory powers, which included most of the Western powers, the amendments sponsored by Russia and India failed to find a place in the final agreements for the most part.¹

The cooperation witnessed between India and Russia at this stage, however, did not go unnoticed by the other powers and many remarks showing disapproval of the same were made. The Indian people and the Indian leaders on the other hand found it heartening that a major power supported them in an area where they held very strong and definite views.

In July 1947, the Dutch suddenly imprisoned the Indonesian Republican leaders who had come to Batavia for negotiations, and started a full-scale military action against the Republic of Indonesia. India's aversion to colonialism immediately came to the surface. One writer has put it thus:

Perhaps no other question in the outside world interested India more than the question of the freedom of Indonesia. To the people of India and the rest of Asia Indonesia was a symbol—a symbol of the aspirations of many millions of the people of Asia for freedom and of their determination to obtain recognition of the freedom already attained.\(^2\)

India and Australia placed the matter before the Security Council and called for immediate action on its part. While Britain, France, and the United States were doubtful whether the Security Council had proper jurisdiction in the matter or not, the Soviet delegate condemned the Dutch action as a breach of peace and asked the Council to call upon the two parties to withdraw their armed forces.\(^3\)

Similarly, when the second Dutch military action took place in December 1948, the Soviet delegate wanted the Security Council to denounce the Dutch Government as an aggressor and asked that the two sides be required to withdraw their forces to the positions they had occupied before hostilities started.\(^4\)


\(^3\) *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48*, pp. 363-64.

Even though, when the final fifteen power resolution on Indonesia came before the General Assembly, India and Russia found each other on the opposite side with India favoring the resolution, the fact that Soviet Russia did not hesitate to condemn the Dutch colonial policy immediately when the matter was brought to world attention demonstrated that here was one more area where interests of India and Russia coincided.

In this connection the Western countries are often at a loss to understand why, when India pours out such vehemence against the Western colonial powers, she fails to take cognizance of the twentieth century colonialism practiced by Soviet Russia in her iron control of the Eastern European countries. It should be mentioned here that there is a great difference between the interpretation of India and the West in regard to the Soviet control of the countries of Eastern Europe.

While the Western democracies consider the Soviet grip over the iron curtain countries many times worse than the nineteenth century colonialism, and term it twentieth century colonialism, India maintains that the term colonialism does not even apply in this case. As Nehru stated in one of the closed sessions of the Bandung Conference:

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There has been a talk of new colonialism. Well, speaking technically, however much we may oppose what has happened to countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, it is not colonialism. It may be an objectionable thing, but the use of the word is incorrect.

In the Asian mind the main characteristics of colonialism appear in a situation where a highly industrialized nation seeks sources of cheap raw material, cheap and plentiful manpower, and a large market for the finished product with almost no competition; to obtain these things the nation pursues a policy of military conquest over the under-developed countries. Since racial discrimination against the Asians has been a direct result of colonial rule over most of Asia, the factor of color has also become an additional characteristic of colonialism in the Asian mind. Thus, only under the above circumstances does the term colonialism apply according to the Asian opinion.

In Asian eyes no one of these tests applies to Soviet imperialism or colonialism. The countries behind the Iron Curtain are European and white with the exception of the Soviet Asian republics which claim to be equal and autonomous units of the U.S.S.R. Colour does not enter into this form of imperialism which most Asians equate with the old wars and struggles of European countries for political or economic domination. Nor are the Iron Curtain nations reservoirs of cheap manpower or sources of cheap raw materials, countries such as Czechoslovakia enjoying proportionately a higher industrial level than Soviet Russia.7

Nehru also makes another distinction: he points out that the

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6Speeches of the Prime Minister of India in the Closed Sessions (Bandung, April 1955), p. 2.
7Morses, op. cit., p. 466.
East European countries have an international entity whereas in the case of colonies there is no such thing. As he observed at Bandung:

It seems to me rather extraordinary that we should discuss nations as such whose people we have recognized in the capacity of sovereign nations and then say that they are colonial territories. It may be—I do not know—that there are minorities and groups; but the fact is that the United Nations recognizes these countries as sovereign, independent countries and gives them a place within their framework . . . .

We have criticized, not directly but indirectly, the French colonial powers because of their colonies and we have every right to do that in the moderate, plain language of statesmanship. But there is a distinct and great difference in criticizing the very basis of independent nations that are represented in the United Nations and with whom we have diplomatic relations. There is a great difference between that and our talking about Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia. They are not admittedly from any point of view independent nations.8

Thus, it can be seen why the Indian Prime Minister when condemning colonialism includes only certain Western powers in the scope of that term and always aims his guns in that direction. It can also be easily seen why he almost always finds Soviet Russia making common cause with him, particularly in this matter. Whereas Nehru is interested in helping those Asian countries gain independence who are still under foreign rule because foreign interference in Asia is contrary to Indian national interest, Soviet Russia sees in every step toward independence on the part of colonies a certain weakening of

8Speeches of the Prime Minister of India in the Closed Sessions, p. 3.
the Western powers and as such a source of strength and hope to the Communist world.

Aside from the fact that Nehru does not consider countries of Eastern Europe victims of a colonial policy, it is significant to note his views on the question of Soviet satellites. Speculating about the shape of things to come at the end of the Second World War, Nehru wrote:

In physical and economic power there will be none to challenge it (Soviet Russia) on the Eurasian continent. Already it is showing an expansionist tendency and is expanding its territories more or less on the basis of the Tsar's Empire. How far this process will go it is difficult to say. Her Socialist economy does not necessarily lead to expansion for it can be made self-sufficient. But other forces and old suspicions are at play and again we notice the fear of so-called encirclement.9

This could be considered the essence of Nehru's views on the Eastern European question. He seems to hold the opinion that after the Second World War the Soviet Union attempted to have as many "friendly and dependent or semi-dependent countries near its border as possible" so that she could build her strength on an unassailable basis.10 This was due to the revival of her old fears that the "capitalist world" would try to strangle her once the common enemy had been eliminated. The feeling of insecurity on the part of Russia, therefore, pushed her into the policy of domination over the countries bordering her.

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9 Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 478.

India's ex-ambassador to Soviet Russia and now the Vice-President, Dr. Radhakrishnan, expressed the same belief in Paris in 1951. He said: "The trouble is the Russians still have fear of intervention which was born in them after World War I. They will not be convinced that other nations are not plotting against them."

This pattern of thought is confirmed by a statement Nehru made in an interview with Norman Cousins. Asked about the Russian imposition in Czechoslovakia, Nehru replied:

... I am greatly distressed at many things that have happened in Eastern Europe since the last war, most specially in Czechoslovakia ... .

One has to go deeper down and find root causes. It is patent today that some of the great countries of the world are so full of fear of what might happen, of aggression, etc., that they prepare for it with the result that others prepare for it, and so the preparation for war mounts up. Possibly even some of the aggression itself is caused rather by that fear that the other party might become dominant in that area.  

Starting with the conviction that the Soviet "aggression" in Eastern Europe is a result of fear on the part of that country of being encircled by hostile elements, it follows that in the eyes of the Indian Prime Minister the solution lies in removing these fears and producing an air of trust and confidence, and not in military

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11Hindustan Times, June 23, 1951.

12Nehru, Talks with Nehru, p. 56.
measures which would further heighten the tension. It is in the light of this belief that Nehru stresses peaceful co-existence which in his opinion would do far more to loosen the Soviet grip on countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, etc., than military pacts which only strengthen the suspicions and cause Russia to tighten her noose around these countries, and might finally lead to an unwanted Third World War.

Therefore, while the Eastern European question has caused some concern in Indian circles, it has not acquired the significance to have an adverse effect on Indo-Soviet relations. On the other hand the Soviet stand on colonialism has resulted in identical interests between India and Russia on many an occasion.

Similarly, racialism has been another issue which has united India and Russia in a common approach to one more problem.

Racial discrimination was the basis of the very first dispute in which India found herself involved when she first stepped into the international arena. The treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa had been a matter of concern to the Indians for a long time before the issue appeared in the United Nations. But things came to a head when in 1946 the Union of South Africa enacted strict discriminatory laws against the Indian minority, and refused to negotiate with the Indian Government in regard to the problem. India placed the issue before the United Nations General Assembly on June 22, 1946.
She brought the complaint to the United Nations under Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter, charging that the treatment of Indians in South Africa amounted to a violation of fundamental human rights and the principles of the Charter, and was a barrier in the maintenance of friendly relations, between the two member states of the United Nations. South Africa held that the matter was one of domestic jurisdiction and the General Assembly had no competence to deal with it.¹³

From the very beginning, when the question arose in the General Committee whether the item should be included in the agenda or not, India found that the Soviet Union was supporting her case vigorously. South Africa was alone in asking that the item should not be included in the agenda, and on the suggestion of the Soviet delegate the Assembly sent the matter to a joint meeting of the Political and Security Committee and Legal Committee for recommendations.

In the joint session of the two Committees while the Indian delegate moved, inter alia, that the General Assembly ask the Union government to revise their general policy and laws affecting the Asians in South Africa, the Union delegate moved that the General Assembly seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of

¹³Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly (General Committee; October 22–December 13, 1946), pp. 70–73.
of justice whether the issue was one of domestic jurisdiction or not.

In the debate that followed, from among the major powers, the United States and Britain supported the South African stand while Soviet Russia with the entire Soviet bloc, France, and China, supported the Indian position. The Soviet delegate in a forceful defense of the Indian case said that it was the duty of the United Nations, in view of the purposes and principles of the Charter, to remove the social evil of racial discrimination. He observed that if the question were referred to the International Court, it would not only minimize the political importance of the question but would also weaken the prestige of the United Nations.\(^\text{14}\)

The resolution accepted finally by the General Assembly, sponsored jointly by France and Mexico, rejected the South African demand and was very close to the Indian position. Though the dispute did not end with that resolution, during the time that the dispute was before the United Nations (1946–48), the approach of the various countries toward the issue remained the same throughout. The United States and Britain favored the South African stand while Soviet Russia continued to support India.

India's interest in removing racial discrimination is just as strong as her aversion to colonial rule. Where India was concerned

\(^{\text{14}}\text{Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly (Joint Committee of the First and Sixth Committees; November 21-30, 1946), pp. 28-29.}\)
the issue of racialism had hit home in the South African problem. Removal of racial discrimination against people of Indian descent in the Union of South Africa was a matter of upholding what was in the Indian national interest. Here once again India found Soviet Russia on her side.

In so far as the issues of foreign domination in Asian countries and racial discrimination against people of Indian descent in the Union of South Africa are concerned, the approach of the Indian leaders toward these problems is clear. India's leaders seek to remove foreign intervention in Asia, and they want the full rights of citizenship restored to the Indian population in the Union of South Africa. India cannot accomplish these objectives on the basis of her own military and economic strength. Pressure of world opinion alone can aid India in gaining these objectives. Thus, for whatever reasons of her own, when Soviet Russia makes common cause with India on these issues helping India to advance her interests in this direction, India willingly accepts this help.
CHAPTER VIII

KASHMIR AND GOA IN INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

It has been shown in an earlier chapter how the Kashmir problem came into being. Since Kashmir State did not accede to either India or Pakistan at the time of transfer of power, a conflict developed between India and Pakistan when in the face of tribal raids from across the Pakistan border, Kashmir acceded to India and called for her assistance to repel the raids.

On January 1, 1948, India brought the Kashmir case before the Security Council. Her basic complaint was that Pakistan was aiding the tribal elements who had invaded Kashmir territory earlier on October 20, 1947. India requested the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to desist from assisting in the invasion of Kashmir State and deny the invaders the use of Pakistan's territory for carrying out their operations. Pakistan flatly denied the allegation and counter-charged India with carrying on a policy of genocide against the Muslims.¹

In the debate that followed India was unhappy to find that, instead of trying to bring the hostilities to a speedy end, the Security Council allowed itself to hear Pakistan accuse India of

persecuting Muslim minorities and perpetrating other crimes. India was enraged, for in her eyes the issue could not have been more clear cut. The territory of Kashmir State had been invaded, and since this invasion by the tribes could not have been possible without crossing Pakistani territory, all India was asking was that Pakistan should be prevailed upon to stop providing the tribal raiders with facilities for their hostile operations. India's delegate questioned the Security Council as to why that body could not compel Pakistan to stop helping the invaders, when the Security Council had without delay condemned Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria for giving aid to the rebels fighting the government forces in Greece.

If India was unhappy with the Security Council attitude, she was more than unhappy to find that the United States and Britain were not supporting her position, which to her appeared the only just position. It seemed to India that Britain and the United States were pursuing a course entirely unsympathetic to her. The Soviets, however, were maintaining a somewhat neutral attitude in the Kashmir issue at this stage. Russia abstained from voting on almost all the resolutions connected with the Indo-Pakistan dispute. Russia's was a hands-off policy, not motivated by any feelings of friendship toward India and Pakistan, but instead by feelings of indifference and semi-hostility. The Soviet press at this time was busy accusing the leaders of India as well as Pakistan for being tools of Britain and America. So the Russians did not see their interests served by taking sides with either India or Pakistan.
In an article "The War in Kashmir" a Soviet writer observed:

Now that power in India is concentrated in the hands of the reactionaries, who persecute democratic leanings and toady to Britain and the United States, these latter powers are trying to put through their plan for the division of Kashmir, under which the strategic northern regions would remain in Pakistan.²

If this was the Soviet reading of the Kashmir situation it was certainly in striking contrast to the Indian view. India was not only playing for her interests but what she thought was a just cause. India was firmly opposed to the stand taken by the United States and Britain. How then could India be accused of toady to the American and British interests as the New Times article suggested?

But the Soviets continued to follow the policy of condemning all moves made by the United States and Britain toward solving the Kashmir issue, branding all such moves as being motivated by selfish considerations. The Soviets followed this approach right up to the year 1952. That year in the Security Council the Soviet delegate charged³ that the United States and Britain were exerting direct pressure on India and Pakistan to accept their proposal for submission of the Kashmir question to the arbitration of a third party, the purpose of the United States and Britain being to bring Kashmir under their own authority. All through this period the Soviets ignored the Indian interests and refrained from making any positive suggestions to solve the issue.

Thus when the Security Council set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on January 20, 1948, India selected Czechoslovakia as her nominee on that body, indicating in this way that India did not feel that her interests would be secure in the hands of any of the major powers where the Kashmir issue was concerned.

The Kashmir issue assumed new proportions when it was revealed in December 1953 that the United States and Pakistan were contemplating a military aid pact. Nehru let it be known in repeated utterances that the whole context of the situation had changed in view of the decision by the United States to strengthen Pakistan militarily. The Indian Prime Minister did not reject earlier commitments about a plebiscite in Kashmir, but since the question of plebiscite was attached to certain other important conditions from the very beginning, the Prime Minister felt that these conditions had become all the more difficult to be fulfilled in the light of the new development.5

There were other repercussions of the United States military aid to Pakistan which, in the Indian view, were also serious. It was observed that through this action the cold war had been brought to India's door, that the "no-war" area India was attempting to

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5Kundra, op. cit., p. 105.
build in Asia had been punctured. Also, this move, followed by the
Baghdad Pact and the South East Asian Treaty, meant continuing and
increased intervention by the Western European countries in the
Asian affairs, something which is anathema to Nehru. But above all
it seemed to India that the West had openly thrown its lot with
Pakistan against India, possibly as a pressure or spite due to the
professed and practiced neutrality of India. India had been wary
of the Western moves in the Kashmir issue from the very beginning.

... it is clear that the first doubts in Nehru's
mind over Western policy and motivations in international
affairs were implanted by what seemed to him and India
the wholly inexplicable attitude of the Security Council
on Kashmir.6

With the coming into force of the United States–Pakistan mili-
tary pact, India was convinced that whatever the West's reasons
India could not expect the United States and Britain to have an
impartial stand on the Kashmir issue. In fact India was convinced
that Pakistan had signed the pact with the United States mainly to
get American support in the Kashmir problem. Fearing that India's
interests in Kashmir were now positively threatened, India was ready
to accept support from any quarter to counteract this threat. While
India did not go out of her way to seek this support, it was obvious
that India would welcome such support from wherever it might come.

The Soviets could not have better timed their change of

6Moraes, op. cit., p. 397.
heart about the Kashmir issue. Moreover, the West had made it
easier for the Soviets to choose which side to back up by joining
with Pakistan in a pact that invalidated Pakistan's earlier claims
of neutrality in the cold war.

When the Soviet leaders visited India in November 1955, they
let it be known that they were solidly behind India on the Kashmir
issue. Arriving at the Srinagar airport, at the capital of Kashmir,
Bulganin said:

We have visited in India many cities . . . and we are
now full of the impressions of all that we have seen in
this great country . . . . But without visiting the northern
part of India, we could not have formed a complete
picture of the country.7

On his return to Moscow, the Soviet Prime Minister confirmed
this view when, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet, while re-
porting on his Asian tour, he said: "The problem (of Kashmir) has
been successfully solved by the people of Kashmir and the Soviet
Union fully supports India's position."8

The change in the Soviet attitude toward the Kashmir problem
was most welcome in India. Even if this statement of Marshal
Bulganin brought Kashmir directly into the cold war, which India
felt had already been done to an extent by the United States.

7The Hindustan Times, December 10, 1955.
8The Hindu, December 30, 1955.
military aid to Pakistan, India did not seem to mind it. She appeared to appreciate the fact that the Soviet Union had come to India's rescue to counterbalance the American support for Pakistan in the Security Council, which India felt was implicitly manifest in the military tie between the United States and Pakistan. India was even more satisfied at the thought that the Russian support had come without any string attached.

While the Soviet leaders were in India they also made certain statements in regard to Goa, which had a bearing on Indo-Soviet relations. Speaking before the Parliament in March 1957, Nehru referred to Goa in the following terms:

We have declared our policy quite clearly and firmly, it is unthinkable for us, for any foreign pocket to continue in India, for a variety of reasons. It is manifestly absurd that when the Great British Empire of India should cease to be, a little bit of some other empire should remain in bits of India. This is manifestly wrong and absurd.9

The Indian Prime Minister was referring to the French and Portuguese possessions on Indian soil which remained in their control even after the British left. With the passage of time the French bowed out gracefully, leaving their colonies to join the Indian Union. But the Portuguese refused to budge and continued to hold pockets of Indian territory under their control.

The main Portuguese colony of Goa thus became a source of

major irritation to India and in time gathered international sig-
nificance far beyond its size and strategic importance.

At the end of British rule, India was expecting Portugal to
start negotiations toward a settlement of the colonies. Instead,
Portugal suppressed ruthlessly the political movement which started
in Goa in 1947 in favor of Goa's liberation and merger with India.
Portugal took no steps to bring about a change in the status of Goa.

India initiated the move to settle the issue when in Febru-
ary 1950 the Indian Minister at Lisbon presented the Portuguese
Government with an aide mémoire on behalf of the Indian Government.
Later on the Government of India sent another note to the Portuguese
Government requesting that negotiations be started for the transfer
of Goa, Daman and Diu, to India. The Government of India also sent
several representations to the Salazar Government in regard to the
many legislative measures which were being promulgated by Portugal,
and which were openly anti-Indian in character. The Portuguese
Government refused to discuss the question of Portugal's sovereignty
over Goa, claiming it to be a part of metropolitan Portugal. They
also failed to withdraw any of the discriminatory measures. In
protest India closed her legation in Lisbon on June 11, 1953.10

Indian opinion was greatly agitated over the matter. To

10 The Ministry of External Affairs--Report 1952-53 and
1953-54, Government of India.
India, Goa was not merely a foreign pocket on her soil; it was a reminder to her of her colonial past, a constant affront to her dignity, and a humiliating spectacle. That a tiny nation sitting thousands of miles away could hold on defiantly to a piece of territory which belonged to India in her own right was an unbearable thought for the Indians. The situation greatly disturbed the Indian intelligentsia and the Indian leaders.

Throughout 1954 there were protracted negotiations between India and Portugal, but nothing came of them. In 1955 the matter came to an impasse and diplomatic relations between India and Portugal were broken. All this time India was hoping the Western democracies, especially America and Great Britain, would pressure Portugal to come to a settlement with India. However, with the passage of time, the feeling grew in India that an identical pattern was setting in as in the case of Kashmir; the more determined India became about her case, the farther away moved the objective. And in India’s eyes, the Western powers appeared to be helping her foe to hold on to something that belonged to India. The result was frustration and bitterness and every statement the Indian Prime Minister made on the subject revealed that this feeling was multiplying with time. Discussing the subject in the Indian Parliament in September 1955, he said:

We have watched with interest the reactions of foreign countries to what is happening in Goa. Goa is not only a symbol, small as it is; it was and it has become even
more so a symbol of decadent colonialism trying to hold on. It is something more. It has become an acid test by which we can judge the policies of other countries. Does any country actively support or encourage Portuguese intransigence in Goa? If so, we know, broadly speaking, where that country stands in world affairs. Or are there any countries that, without positively and actively encouraging, passively support or acquiesce in this position? We know how those countries stand.

Or, lastly, do those other countries realize that Portuguese domination in Goa cannot and must not continue, not only for normal reasons and causes, but because it has become an affront to civilized humanity, more especially after the brutal behavior, the brutal and uncivilized behavior of the Portuguese authorities there?11

This is how matters stood in regard to Goa when the Soviet leaders made their official appearance in India. Until that time no formal comment had been made specifically about Goa by the Russian Government. It was generally known that she favored India where the issue of colonialism was concerned. But it took no deep analysis for the Communist leaders to realize that Indian feelings were running high at this time on the question of Goa. Thus at a public rally in Calcutta on November 30, 1955, the Soviet Communist Party chief Khrushchev stated:

There are countries which fasten themselves like ticks to a healthy body. I mean Portugal, which refuses to leave Goa, to relinquish its hold in that territory which legitimately belongs to India.

But this will happen sooner or later and Goa will be free of foreign domination and become a component part of the

11Lok Sabha Debates (September 17, 1955), cols. 13793-13794.
Republic of India. 12

The result was magical. The Soviet Union had confirmed herself as the real friend of India so far as the people were concerned. The official Indian circles were pleased with the statement. To top it off right about that time, even while the Soviet leaders were in India, the United States Secretary of State in a joint statement with Foreign Minister Cunha of Portugal referred to Goa as "a province of Portugal," unthoughtfully implying that the United States subscribed to the official Portuguese view in regard to Goa. This certainly left no doubt in the minds of the Indians as to who was their friend and who opposed them. This may not have created an everlasting effect on Indo-Soviet relations, but it established once again that in pursuing her interests India could rely on Russia and not on the Western powers.

It is not difficult to see that in Kashmir, India would be satisfied with maintaining the status quo, if nothing else. India feels fully justified in having entered Kashmir territory legally. India would now like to retain control of this territory for strategic purposes as well as another reason. If Kashmir, predominantly populated by Muslims, is now made to unite with Pakistan because of religious considerations alone, then the lives of about 35 million Muslims, who have voluntarily chosen to reside in India, will

be under the constant threat of communal violence. The old sores of communal hatred will open up again with the danger that India might once again be thrown into a turmoil.

Since the Security Council continues to concern itself with the Kashmir question, India's interest is served in two ways: (a) India wants to make certain that the Security Council will not pass a resolution which will pressure India into pursuing a course that might result in her losing control of Kashmir territory now in hand. From among the major powers in the Security Council, Soviet Russia alone has supported India's case. It is in India's interest to retain this support to counteract any move by the other major powers of the Security Council, who in India's eyes favor Pakistan because they are aligned with Pakistan in military alliances. (b) India wants to make certain that Pakistan will not be able to execute a military decision in Kashmir. To prevent this India opposes military aid to Pakistan. In this also Soviet Russia supports India, because in Soviet eyes all military pacts between any country and the United States are aimed against the Soviet Union.

Similarly in the case of Goa, India's interest lies in uniting that territory with India. While India does not find it possible to accomplish this on her own, she can only look to world opinion to act as a pressure upon Portugal to relinquish her control over Goa. To this date Soviet Russia alone among the major powers has supported India's stand on Goa. Once again India
cannot brush aside this support and the interests of India and
Russia appear to coincide here also.
CHAPTER IX

INDO-CHINESE RELATIONS AND INDIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST

Contacts Prior to 1949

References in Chinese records show that contact between India and China existed as far back as 1000 B.C. But in spite of this evidence available it is generally accepted that formal contact between these two ancient lands came into being when in 67 A.D. Emperor Ming-ti of the Han Dynasty welcomed to his capital Lo-yang two Buddhist missionaries from India.\(^1\) Even if this occasion did not mark the beginning of intercourse between India and China, it certainly marked the start of an active Buddhist movement in China which was mainly responsible for the cultural relationship which developed between the two countries for many centuries to come.

As Buddhism began to fade in India, the contacts between India and China also weakened. Professor Bagchi notes that the Chinese chronicles have no mention of any Indian visitors after 1036.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\) Tan Yun Shan, "Sino-Indian Relationship: Recent Political Changes," *Amrit Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), October 22, 1950.

Occasional diplomatic intercourse between India and China still persisted during the Indo-Afghan and Mogul periods in India, as Nehru records in his book.\(^3\) It appears, however, that for all practical purposes India and China were cut off from each other from the twelfth century onward. The ancient relationship between the two countries did not come to be renewed until the dawn of the twentieth century.

In 1924 the poet Rabindranath Tagore paid a visit to China. His visit in a way marked the resumption of the old contact between India and China. It was a resumption of the old contact in more than one way. Not only was the renewed relationship necessarily on unofficial basis with India under alien rule and China in the throes of internal struggle, but it was also non-political and mainly cultural in nature. However, it is noteworthy that before long the political leadership in China and India developed an attitude of sympathy for each other's case. As India and China marched toward their respective goals, while neither was in a position to help the other, the nationalist leadership in both the countries watched with interest the political developments taking place in the other's country. Thus when Japan attacked China the Indian National Congress Party associated itself with the Chinese cause and even sent a medical unit, consisting of a number of doctors

\(^3\)Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 225.
with required equipment and material, to China on behalf of the Party in 1938.4

The then existing circumstances did not permit any closer or more intimate relations. There was a short visit to China by Nehru in August 1939, when he was a guest of President and Madame Chiang Kai-shek for a few days. Similarly, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek visited India for a few days in 1942. The Generalissimo expressed himself in favor of India's desire for freedom while the "Quit India" resolution passed by the Indian Congress Party in 1942, calculated to oppose British rule in India, made specific mention that there was no intent to weaken the defense effort of China; on the contrary the Congress Party felt that an independent India could aid the war effort of countries like China much better. Aside from manifesting these feelings of sympathy, the two countries had no opportunity to develop any real relations. If the Himalayas had prevented the growth of close contact before, India's colonial status and China's instability proved formidable barriers to the growth of any meaningful ties once the two countries had discovered each other anew.

When India acquired the ability of acting in the international field as an independent country at the creation of the Interim Government in September 1946, the Indian leadership looked

4Ibid., p. 508.
forward to the establishment of normal relations with other countries, and specially close contacts with neighboring countries since the barrier of foreign rule had been lifted. To this end, as India's Foreign Minister, Nehru directed one of his first acts and it was announced on October 22, 1946, that India and China had decided to establish diplomatic relations at the embassy level.

Even prior to that, under the British regime India was represented at Nanking by an Agent General and China was represented by a High Commission in New Delhi. In essence, however, this was British representation. Thus it should be said that for the first time formal relations between India and China as independent nations came into being in October 1946.

However, if there was hope in certain quarters in both these countries that India's independence had opened the way to the development of increased political, economic and cultural ties between the two largest nations of Asia, who were neighbors and held sympathy and goodwill for each other's cause, then this hope was doomed very soon. India's partition in 1947 shook the very foundations of that nation, and the Indian leadership was completely absorbed during the next few years in efforts to bring about internal stability. At about the same time China became submerged in the civil war once again. Thus the prospect of India and China developing intimate contact was once more pushed into the background.
India and the Question of Recognizing New China

When the year 1949 dawned the situation in China was beginning to take a decisive turn. The fortunes of Chiang's Nationalist Government were fast dwindling. When in February 1949 the Kuomintang leaders dispatched a delegation to Peking to initiate talks for peace with the Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, there appeared general acceptance of the fact that unless there was wholesale intervention by an outside power the Chinese Communists were on their way to complete victory in the not too distant future. The Reds must have been confident of the same when they refused to negotiate on any other basis except unconditional surrender by the Nationalist regime.

With this in the background, in April 1949 it was rumored that the Indian Government had started negotiations with the Chinese Communists toward eventual recognition of their government. This report was denied by the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi, but at the same time the statement was also made that the matter would be taken into consideration in due course.\(^5\)

In June of that year Mao Tse-tung announced in Peking that the Chinese Communists were willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign country that was prepared to break off relations with the Chiang Government.\(^6\) Even if this occasion was considered

\(^5\)National Herald (Lucknow), April 27, 1949.

\(^6\)The Statesman (New Delhi), June 12, 1949.
too early to take any positive steps toward recognition of the Communist regime, it became clear that India’s decision could not be postponed for too long once the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed on the first of October 1949. In this connection Pannikar writes that there was general agreement among the government leaders in India that the new China regime would have to be recognized, but there was difference of opinion among the foreign-policy makers as to its timing. The conservative wing in the Indian Congress Party and some senior officials of the Indian Foreign Office suggested that India should move slowly in the matter. Nehru, however, decided that India would convey her recognition as soon as the Kuomintang Government moved to the island of Formosa.  

After the People’s Republic of China had been proclaimed, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai summoned the foreign representatives in Peking and handed to them a communication which invited their governments to establish diplomatic relations with the new regime in China. India did not respond to this move immediately, but Prime Minister Nehru informed the Peking Government that India intended to recognize the new government in China very soon.  

It was finally on December 30 that the Indian Government announced its recognition of the Mao regime, at the same time

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breaking its relations with the Nationalist Government which had now moved to the island of Formosa. India thus became the second non-Communist country of the world, Burma being the first, to recognize the Mao Government. Even then it was not until May 1950 that India was able to exchange ambassadors with new China.

Explaining India's action Nehru said before the Parliament in March 1950 that, regardless of whether India approved or disapproved of the course of events which had taken place in China, India could not afford to ignore a historical fact that a new government had arisen on the China mainland. He maintained that when it became quite clear that the new Chinese Government was in possession of practically the entire mainland and the stability of that government seemed certain, India offered to recognize the new government so that the two countries could deal with each other properly through ambassadors.9

However, India's move in this direction did not stop with her formal recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. Once India herself had taken the step she showed interest in trying to influence other countries to follow suit and accord recognition to the People's Republic of China.

As early as January 1950, when formal exchange of missions between India and China had still not taken place, press reports from the Colombo Conference of the Commonwealth Ministers in session

at that time indicated that Nehru had urged all the members of the Conference to accord early recognition to Communist China. Nehru's plea was reported to have been based on the argument that "the Chinese people must not be given a sense of isolation from the rest of the world, particularly from the non-Communist world, but that they should be encouraged to resume normal relations with other parts of the world."

At the time that Nehru was pleading before the Commonwealth Minister's Conference for speedy recognition of the New China regime by those who had not done so until then, India's representative in the Security Council was supporting a move by Russia to oust the Nationalist Chinese delegate from the Security Council to make room for the representative of the Mao Government. A draft resolution put forward by Soviet Russia calling for such an action on the part of the Security Council was voted upon on January 13. It was lost but India voted with the Soviet Union on that resolution.

Having failed in their efforts to exclude Chiang Kai-shek's representatives from the councils of the United Nations, the Russians walked out of the various organs of the United Nations. This caused a great deal of anxiety in Indian circles. In a period when the cold war was at its height India felt very uneasy about the absence of the Russians from the United Nations. In India's eyes such

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\(^{10}\) Dutt, op. cit., p. 115.
a situation only added to the tense atmosphere which was gripping the world and further increased the danger to the peace of the world. It also threatened to cripple the usefulness of the United Nations as an organization for preserving peace. Since any signs of the international situation turning worse caused grave concern in Indian quarters, after the departure of the Soviet bloc countries from the United Nations, India felt compelled to take the initiative to bring about the United Nations recognition of Communist China so that Soviet Russia could return to that world body.

Even before India could take any positive steps to bring about the United Nations recognition of China, India's worst fears were realized when in June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea. In the absence of the Soviet delegation the Security Council was able to adopt the first two resolutions on Korea which resulted in the direct participation of the United Nations in the Korean war. In her own mind India felt that her fears had come true and that probably the Korean crisis would not have occurred if the Soviets had not left the United Nations. ¹¹ But now that the situation had passed beyond that stage, India was anxious that the Korean conflict be localized and prevented from spreading any further. The chances of localizing the Korean war, in India's eyes, were much better if

the Soviets were back in the United Nations and they could be probed about their intentions in Korea. India felt that now it had become all the more important that Communist China be seated in the United Nations so that Soviet Russia would end her boycott of the world organization. India, therefore, lent herself to this task with a sense of urgency.

While Nehru tried to move British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin in this matter, the Indian ambassador in Peking was asked to approach the Mao Government and ascertain their attitude to the problem. On July 1, 1950, Ambassador Pannikar approached the Peking Foreign Office with the suggestion that possibly the Korean problem could be settled in the Security Council if China were given her legitimate place there and if consequently Soviet Russia returned to the United Nations. On July 10, the Peking Government conveyed to Indian ambassador its general agreement with India's approach.12

On hearing from the Indian Embassy in China, Prime Minister Nehru sent personal appeals to Marshal Stalin and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In his letters Nehru suggested that the Korean conflict be brought to an end by negotiations in the Security Council or outside it upon the recognition of Communist China by the United Nations and the subsequent return of the Soviet Union to that world organization.

12Pannikar, In Two Chinaas, pp. 103-104.
Marshal Stalin in his reply expressed appreciation of India's stand, while Secretary Acheson in his answer maintained that the question of seating Red China in the United Nations was in no way connected with the North Korean aggression and should, therefore, be kept separate from the main issue. Seeing that the personal approach had failed, India carried its appeal to the United Nations General Assembly when it met on September 19, 1950 for its fifth session.

A draft resolution placed before the General Assembly in the name of India sought to have the Chinese Communists represented in the United Nations, in place of the Nationalist delegates. The basis for this claim was that the Communist regime was the only government which had complete control over the territory and people of the China mainland, and thus that government alone could carry out the obligations of a member under the United Nations charter.13

The General Assembly rejected the Indian resolution. This does not seem to have discouraged India, however. From then on India continued to utilize every occasion in the United Nations to push for the admission of the Mao Government.

In defending the Indian resolution before the General Assembly on September 19, 1950, India's chief delegate Sir B. N. Ran had

maintained that India's advocacy of the claims of new China was a natural consequence of India's own recognition of the new Central People's Government of China in December 1949.14

Various other arguments were advanced by India's spokesmen at different intervals to justify India's persistent drive in this direction. Nehru, in an interview with Norman Cousins, observed that in his opinion it would be dangerous to isolate and cut off China as had been done in the case of Russia when the Soviet Union was born. Nehru remarked that the attempt by the Western countries to put a cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union at that time not only failed but had ultimately resulted in making the Soviet Union a bitter opponent of the Western world. To avoid repetition of the same mistake Nehru advocated the acceptance of the Communist regime in the councils of the world as the legitimate government of China.15

On another occasion, speaking before the Indian Parliament Nehru maintained:

I have long been convinced of the fact that a great part of our present day difficulties—certainly in the Far East, but I would like to go farther and say in the world—-are due to this extraordinary shutting of one's eyes to the fact of China . . . . The result is that all kinds of conflicts arise. I am convinced in my mind that there would have been no Korean War if the People's Government of China had been in the United Nations—it is only guess work—-because people

14 Ibid., p. 9.

15 Nehru, Talks with Nehru, pp. 54-55.
could have dealt with China across the table.\textsuperscript{16}

India's chief delegate to the United Nations, Sir B. N. Rau, said in Toronto in April 1951 that there was a 50-50 chance of luring Communist China away from the Soviet Union if the representatives of Mao Government were permitted to replace the Nationalist delegates in the United Nations. He added that there was little likelihood of the people's republic being overthrown by opposition from within.\textsuperscript{17}

While commenting on the General Assembly's decision to postpone indefinitely the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, India's ambassador to China was reported as saying in Paris:

\begin{quote}
... the General Assembly's decision would reinforce the conviction of the Chinese People's Government that they could not expect even elementary justice at the hands of the majority of the United Nations. And such convictions would only add to the already existing tension and make the prospects of a peaceful settlement even more remote.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Undoubtedly, these were forceful arguments on the basis of which India sought United Nations recognition of the Communist Chinese regime. But India's determined and relentless efforts in this direction, in the face of such unfriendly acts by the People's


\textsuperscript{17}The Indian Express (Bombay), April 26, 1951.

\textsuperscript{18}Indian Record (London: India House, November 29, 1951), Vol. 3, No. 35, p. 5.
Republic of China as the invasion of Tibet and the abuse of India's attempts to end the fighting in Korea, can be understood only in the light of certain fundamental interests, dealt with at the end of this chapter, which motivated India in her endeavors.

**India and China 1949-1955**

With India's recognition of the Communist regime in China, a new chapter began in the history of Indo-Chinese relationship.

By the end of 1949 India had acquired the internal stability she desperately sought at the dawn of independence. On the other hand it seemed that a new era had opened up for China. China was a well consolidated unit for the first time and the new leadership boasted of having the whole country behind it. Thus on the surface that long awaited opportunity had arrived when India and China could develop the close friendship which had been often talked about in the past but had never materialized. Yet underneath it all another disturbing element had entered the picture. While India had chosen the democratic path, China was to follow the Communist road. While India had adopted a neutral attitude toward the ideological struggle afoot, China made it manifest from the very beginning that in her eyes the world was divided into two camps and she belonged to the Communist camp. This new element caused both sides to move with caution toward each other. India showed no hesitation in recognizing the new China regime, but India's feelings toward new China were
somewhat mingled. The first Indian ambassador to the People's Republic of China, relating the thoughts in his mind on his way to take over his assignment, has written:

All my training has been in the liberal radicalism of the West and consequently, though I was in some measure familiar with the economic doctrines of Marx, I had no sympathy for a political system in which individual liberty did not find a prominent place. But as against all this, I had a deep feeling of sympathy for the Chinese people, a desire to see them united, strong and powerful, able to stand up against the nations which had oppressed them for a hundred years, a psychological appreciation of their desire to wipe out the humiliations which followed the Western domination of their country and to proclaim the message of Asia resurgent. In these matters the attitudes of India and China were similar. Where they differed was in their political structure, in their conception of social life, and perhaps more than even that, in their attitude to the world. 19

Pannikar has also mentioned at another place that he knew, like everyone else, that there was no possibility of intimate relations with a Communist China but he hoped that an area of cooperation could be established. 20

Obviously, in 1949, India had no high hopes that she could develop close and friendly relations with the New China in the years immediately ahead. As we look back we find that the 1949-1953 period of India's relations with the People's Republic of China was marked by mutual suspicion and fear of each other's intentions. During this period the conflict in Tibet took place. The situation

19Pannikar, In Two Chinas, p. 72.

20Ibid., p. 102.
in Korea took a turn where China became a principal party in the affair. In both these cases India took a keen interest, but China and India failed to see eye to eye on many an occasion. The two incidents will be dealt with separately, but suffice it to say that they added to the atmosphere of suspicion which covered the relations between the two countries from the very beginning.

It needs to be mentioned here that during this period Indo-Soviet relations were also strained. Yet there is in a way a noticeable difference between the coldness which marked Indo-Soviet relations in this period and the attitude of caution on both sides which characterized Indo-Chinese relations in the same period. While the Soviet press and publications carried out a sustained and stinging criticism of the Indian leadership during this interval, there was no continuous anti-Indian propaganda on the Chinese scene.

Similarly, while no cultural exchanges took place between India and Russia during this period, the first Chinese Cultural Mission from the People's Republic of China visited India in October 1951, and in 1952 India sent an official cultural mission to China, headed by Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit, to promote understanding and friendship between the two countries. Moreover, the Peking Government invited Nehru to visit China on two occasions, once in the fall of 1951 and again in February 1952. Nehru turned down these
invitations on various pretexts.\textsuperscript{21} All the same Soviet Russia made no gestures of a similar nature toward India at this time.

It is also noteworthy that when India was threatened with a famine in early 1951, China offered one million tons of food grains in exchange for various commodities to relieve the food shortage in India, and at India's request dispatched half of this amount with an urgency that created a very favorable impression in India. It was revealed in June 1951 that India was importing 80,000 tons of rice and 450,000 tons of milk from China, and in May 1952 it was announced in New Delhi that a contract had been signed with Peking which would enable India to import 100,000 metric tons of rice at "reasonable price."

With the above exceptions, however, relations between India and China during the 1949-1953 period followed a somewhat similar pattern to that of relations between India and Soviet Russia.

In an article which appeared sometime in November 1949, Mao Tse-tung denounced the Indian Government and Nehru as "feudal

\textsuperscript{21}Mark C. Feer, in his Ph.D. thesis entitled \textit{India's China Policy} (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy), remarks that Nehru turned down these invitations because he felt his position as a potential peacemaker with the West on Far Eastern problems would be compromised. While this argument has merit, it also appears that the Indian Prime Minister might not have accepted an invitation from China because the relations between India and China were far from cordial at this time. The bitterness caused by the Tibetan episode had not subsided completely; the Korean war was still on and India was by no means certain about the future intentions of China.
reactionaries” and the “running dogs of British Imperialism.”

Also in October 1949 when the Communist Party of India was engaged in terroristic activities of the worst order, Mao Tse-tung sent a message to Ranadive, the Secretary of the Party, wishing the Indian Communists speed in their attempts to liberate India and expressing the hope that India would one day go the Chinese way. Similarly, prior to the Chinese attack on Tibet the New China News Agency reported that the “Anglo-American imperialists and their running dog, Pandit Nehru, were plotting a coup in Lhasa for the annexation of Tibet.”

It is also well known by now that the proposals advanced by India for a Korean truce in December 1952 were denounced by Peking in rather strong language.

Moreover, while speaking in the Indian Parliament in March 1950 Nehru expressed a desire to sign a treaty of friendship with Communist China among other countries, there was no response of any sort from Peking.

These are instances which reflect that relations between India and China were more or less on the strained side during the


23 The Communist (Bombay: January 1950), as quoted in India in World Affairs, p. 101.

first three years or so after the People's Republic of China had been established. But India's efforts were directed toward minimizing the friction as far as possible. While China launched her attack on Tibet, ignoring the Indian sentiments completely and even condemning the Indian attitude, India continued to fight for a seat in the United Nations for China. And when India's efforts to halt the fighting in Korea were denounced by China, India only expressed shock but swallowed the bitter pill without complaint. India's attitude toward China at this time is appropriately expressed in the words of Nehru who said in an interview in 1951:

So far as China is concerned, China is developing along entirely different lines from us. We have no desire to interfere with China and don't want China to interfere with us. I believe China's people and India's people, quite apart from recent developments, have had for a long period of time very friendly feelings toward each other. I think, despite changes, we want that to continue and we do not want to take any steps to raise hostilities between these two countries, which have a tremendous frontier and which have had at least two thousand years or more of relations with each other.  

As in the case of Soviet Russia, so also in the case of China this picture suddenly changed in 1953. The Peking regime agreed to a settlement in Korea in March 1953: the draft of the armistice agreement finally accepted by the Chinese Government was largely based on the proposals which had been placed before the

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United Nations by India in 1952, and denounced by China at that time. Also, in October 1953 the Chinese Government accepted a suggestion by the Indian Government to settle certain matters concerning the Indian trade interests in Tibet, and in January 1954 talks began in Peking between the representatives of the two countries in this direction. This was the first time India had approached China concerning Tibet since the Tibetan episode in 1950-51 without incurring the wrath of China.

This initial change in attitude on the part of China in 1953 resulted in the growth of intimate ties between India and China during the next two years.

In his opening speech before the Geneva Conference in April 1954, Chou En-lai expressed regret that an important Asian country like India, which was concerned about peace, could not be present at the Conference. Also, in April 1954, China and India signed an eight-year agreement to provide trade and cultural intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India. This agreement contained the famous clauses of Panch Shila which became the hallmark of India's foreign relations after 1954. And in October 1954, India and Communist China signed their first trade agreement.

But the biggest surprise of 1954 was the announcement from Geneva on June 22 that the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai would pay a visit to New Delhi on his way back to China from Geneva. The Indian newspapers commented that the matter had been kept as a
secret by the Indian authorities and that a few weeks earlier Krishna Menon had carried the invitation to the Chinese leader.26

Naturally, India felt honored that the Prime Minister of Communist China had agreed to visit India. But the fact that this visit occurred at a moment in history when India was feeling disillusioned with the Western Powers, not only because of the United States military aid to Pakistan but also because the West had barred India from the Geneva Conference, heightened its importance in the eyes of the Indian intelligentsia and its significance in so far as Indo-Chinese relations were concerned.

Chou En-lai arrived in New Delhi on June 25, and spent three days in the Indian capital. During this brief period the Prime Ministers of India and China carried on intensive talks. As one Indian newspaper put it, there was much the two wanted to learn about each other: primarily Premier Chou was interested in learning how independent was India's foreign policy while Prime Minister Nehru wanted to know how far China was dependent upon Soviet Russia and what were Chinese intentions in South East Asia.27

To what extent the two statesmen succeeded in probing each other's heart is difficult to say. But some of the statements


27 The Hindu (Madras), June 30, 1954.
made by the Chinese leader in New Delhi certainly created a very favorable impression in India and apparently established the belief that China had no ambitions of extending her territory in the foreseeable future.

At a press conference in New Delhi on June 27, while answering a question concerning peaceful co-existence, Chou En-lai said:

The rights of the people of each nation to national independence and self-determination must be respected. The people of each nation should have the right to choose their own system and way of life, without interference from other nations. Revolution cannot be exported; at the same time, outside interference with the common will expressed by the people of any nation would not be permitted.\(^{28}\)

A statement of this type was interpreted as showing that China was ready to accept peaceful co-existence with a neighbor whose government was based on a political philosophy very different from that of the People's Republic of China.

Nehru's view of this visit from the Prime Minister of the new China was revealed in a letter he wrote to the Presidents of the Congress Party Committees on the state level. Nehru called the meeting between him and Chou En-lai of historic importance where the future of Asia was concerned. He expressed the belief that the joint statement issued at the end of the talks gave expression to

\(^{28}\)Fisher and Bondurant, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
a sentiment which had been gathering strength among the nations of Asia for some time, mainly that in future the problems of Asia will be mostly decided on the basis of how the countries of Asia want to solve them. Nehru went on to say that there was no need to doubt the sincerity of the statements which had been made by Chou En-lai in regard to the future intentions of China, for the practical approach to such things was to keep one's guard but accept the hand of friendship if extended.29

In view of the fact that Premier Chou's visit had no specific purpose its importance cannot be measured on the basis of any solid accomplishments, for there were none to mention. But it would be hard to ignore its significance in terms of Indo-Chinese relations and the future of Asia. That this first meeting between Nehru and Chou did lay some foundations for a modus vivendi in the years to come, is borne out by certain events which followed the brief stop-over of the Chinese Prime Minister.

Only a few months later Nehru returned the courtesy of the Chinese Premier by journeying to the People's Republic of China for a visit in October which lasted for twelve days. On his return Nehru made statements which indicated that, barring any unforeseen development, India and China were on the way to an era of understanding and mutual cooperation.

29The Hindu (Madras), July 7, 1954.
In a press conference in New Delhi on November 13, 1954, India's Prime Minister said:

I am convinced that China entirely for its own sake, wants peace, wants time to develop the country and is thinking in terms of at least three or four five-year plans for the next fifteen or twenty years . . . . So the question of aggression, internal or external, has to be seen in that context and their desire not to get into trouble. But if trouble is there and other things happen, then one does not know how things may develop.30

In answer to another question at this press conference Nehru stated that there were some countries in Asia which feared the intentions and power of China and that he had expressed the view in Peking that to allay the fears of such countries it would be advisable for China to refrain from making any moves which might be misconstrued as being of a threatening nature. Thus the Indian Prime Minister hoped that China would not take any steps which might aggravate the explosive situation in the Far East.

The year 1955 saw India and China closer to each other than ever before. Exchanges between the two countries on the cultural level surpassed all previous records. Missions of goodwill traveled back and forth in a steady stream. And at the Bandung Conference India took great pains to make China acceptable to the Asian-African world while keeping out of the limelight herself.

China on the other hand responded by showing that her trust

30 The Hindu (Madras), November 14, 1954.
in India's non-alignment policy had reached a stage where she could consult India on certain crucial problems. At the Bandung Conference Chou En-lai invited Krishna Menon to visit Peking to discuss matters concerning the Far East. India was pleased when, on returning from his talks with the Chinese leader, Krishna Menon announced in New Delhi on May 30 that Communist China would release on that day four United States airmen held in the Chinese jail, as a move toward relaxation of tensions in the Far East. India felt honored that China had entrusted India's representative with the task of releasing such an important information to the world.

By the end of 1955, it appears, India and China had succeeded in establishing between them a completely unexpected measure of cooperation and understanding.

The story of Indo-Chinese relations points to one thing above all. India's foreign policy makers have been of one mind in their feeling that it is in India's national interest to establish relations with China on the most cooperative basis possible. The main reason for this can easily be seen in a statement Prime Minister Nehru made before the Indian Parliament in 1953. He said then:

... if we have to think of any policy that we may have to pursue in regard to the Chinese State, we have to remember that we have a frontier of roughly 2,000 miles with them, and we are neighbors today, tomorrow, and in the future. Therefore, whatever other countries do, whatever policies they may have--and I am not going into that question--we have to consider our policy in regard to China remembering not only whatever past we may have had, but the present and the future, that we have to live
together in peace and friendship, and I hope, cooperation.31

The presence of an undefined and extensive border with China, especially when she has a comparatively powerful military machine, makes it incumbent upon Indian leadership to take note of China's intentions in the interests of India's security. Thus India's interest is served by preventing the growth of any hostility between the two countries. India, therefore, wanted to establish relations with China from the very day India became independent. Events in China did not permit the growth of close contacts between India and Nationalist China. When the Nationalist regime was overthrown, there was no doubt in the minds of India's foreign-policy makers that India's interest lay in recognizing the new regime in China. In doing this the only factor that could have come in the way was the Communist nature of the new government in China. Having declared herself neutral in the ideological struggle, however, India did not find this to be a block in her way. In fact, swift recognition of Communist China could be held by India as evidence of her neutrality. Therefore, India recognized Communist China without delay. The question arises, however, as to how India's interest is served in continuing to push for the United Nations recognition of the Communist regime. The following points supply somewhat of

an answer to this question:

1. When the Korean war started in the absence of the Soviet delegation from the Security Council, India very soon realized that probably one way to prevent this conflict from turning into a worldwide conflagration was to secure the return of Russia to the United Nations. Hoping that this could be accomplished the quickest by sending representatives from the People's Republic of China, India took it upon herself to espouse new China's cause.

2. When President Truman announced that the United States Seventh Fleet would protect Formosa, Communist China was agitated by this move. Ambassador Pannikar has written that the United States intervention in Taiwan was interpreted by the People's Republic of China as a direct threat to Communist China. 32

Noting that the American interest in Formosa can explode at any time into a conflict between the United States and Communist China, India has put on a sustained drive for the United Nations recognition of New China, knowing that such a step will force a decision on the future of Formosa. This will not only eliminate a potential source of war in the Far East, a war which is apt to draw India into the conflict also, but it will at the same time eliminate another source which is responsible for European interference in Asian affairs.

32 Pannikar, In Two Chinas, p. 103.
3. The United Nations recognition of Communist China will automatically result in that country occupying one of the permanent seats on the Security Council. India's interests lie in gaining this Asian representation on that key body. During the time that Nationalist China has occupied the permanent seat on the Security Council, India's leaders have felt that neither the Formosa Government represents China as such, nor does that government reflect the interests of the Asian countries as seen by India. In fact when the Chiang regime crumbled, it was considered a good omen in terms of Indian interests because Chiang was seen as a puppet of Western powers who could neither provide stability in China nor the leadership for Asianism. The new China has proved itself to be stable and strong. In this regard India considers China as an asset in keeping non-Asian powers out of Asia. A seat for the new regime in the Security Council would guard the interests of Asia more effectively in so far as India is concerned. True, a strong China is also a potential threat to India. But for the present India is convinced that China will not start any adventures of expansion in the near future. Thus it is in India's interest to strike a modus vivendi with China which will help to produce conditions in Asia ensuring India's future security.
CHAPTER X

KOREA IN INDO-CHINESE RELATIONS

Korea was one of those issues that could have brought the relations between India and the People’s Republic of China to a breaking point very soon after the two countries had exchanged diplomatic missions for the first time. It was in May 1950 that the first Indian ambassador to Communist China presented his credentials to the Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Chairman Mao is reported to have told the Indian ambassador on this occasion that his China had no aggressive designs against anyone and that any state based on war would eventually perish.¹ It is interesting to note that in December 1950, India’s delegate B. N. Rau was asking the Chinese representative General Wu Asiu-chaun, who was at the time in New York, whether the Chinese really wanted peace in Korea.²

It has already been shown in an earlier chapter how India found herself in a situation where she voted for the first two resolutions of the Security Council, condemning the North Korean aggression and asking the members of the United Nations to assist

¹Hindu (Madras), May 23, 1950.
in ending this aggression.

With this action on the part of India, India and China were lined up on the opposite sides of the Korean issue in the first stages of that conflict. In a cablegram on July 6, 1950, Prime Minister Chou En-lai informed the United Nations Secretary General that in the eyes of the People's Republic of China the June 27 Security Council resolution simply supported the American armed aggression in Korea, and constituted an intervention in the internal affairs of Korea. Prime Minister Chou also labeled the Security Council resolution illegal because it had been adopted in the absence of two permanent members, i.e., the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Premier Chou went on to say that President Truman's statement in regard to Formosa was an act of open aggression and in spite of the obstructive steps taken by the United States, the Chinese people were determined to liberate Taiwan.3

As India stood lined up against the Communist side at the beginning of the Korean conflict, it appears she was fully aware of the fact that any further support of the Western stand on the problem would involve her deeper in the cold war and a possible hot war. India was, therefore, quick to affirm her neutrality and seek ways of ending the fighting at the very first opportunity. In his communication to the Secretary-General on June 29, Nehru made it

manifest that India's support of the first two resolutions did not imply that India had abandoned her policy of non-alignment. At the same time on July 1, the Indian ambassador called at the Foreign Office in Peking and sought to find out if a seat for new China in the United Nations and subsequent return of the Soviet Union to that body could result in negotiations to end the conflict in Korea. Prime Minister Nehru is also supposed to have moved British Foreign Minister Bevin in this connection at this time.⁴

Available evidence does not indicate that China was very disturbed with India's stand on the Korean question at this stage. Two possible reasons can account for that. In the first place China was not directly involved in the Korean war until later. In the second place the first round in that conflict appeared to be going completely in favor of the Communists. In fact, Ambassador Pannikar has remarked in his book that during "the first three months of the Korean war there was hardly any noticeable military activity in China."⁵ It was the American statement on Taiwan which agitated the Chinese.

Nonetheless, India was conscious of the fact that China was probably even more interested in the Korean struggle than the Soviet Union. As Nehru put it at a press conference in New Delhi on October 16:

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⁴Pannikar, In Two Chinas, pp. 103-104.
⁵Ibid., p. 103.
It was patent to us that the U.S.S.R. and even more particularly China were largely concerned with the future of neighbouring territory like Korea and that no satisfactory solution in the Far East could be arrived at by ignoring those two powers.  

There was, however, no doubt left about the active Chinese interest in the Korean struggle once the Americans had landed at Inchon. This new development became a matter of grave concern for the People's Republic of China. While the United Nations debated whether their forces should go beyond the 38th parallel or not, Communist China prepared to intervene in the Korean war. The Military Governor of Peking at an informal meeting with the Indian ambassador on September 25 conveyed to him that People's China would not sit quietly while the American forces advanced toward the Korean-Chinese border.\footnote{India Record, Vol. 2, No. 37 (London: India House, October 25, 1950), p. 2.}

The then Indian ambassador to Peking has noted in his book that the above occasion was the first time that he learned about China's intention to step into the Korean war directly. It would not be wrong to conclude that he informed the Indian Government about this development without delay. Possibly, it was on the basis of this information that Nehru said in a press conference in New Delhi on September 30 that in his opinion the United Nations forces

\footnote{Pannikar, In Two Chinas, p. 108.}
should not cross the 38th parallel into North Korea.

If there was any doubt in India's mind as to the seriousness of China's intent, it must have been removed beyond question when Prime Minister Chou En-lai summoned Ambassador Pannikar at midnight on October 2 and informed him that China would intervene in case the 38th parallel was crossed by the United Nations forces. Recalling the conversation which took place on this occasion, the Indian ambassador has written:

He [Premier Chou] thanked Pandit Nehru for what he had been doing in the cause of peace, and said no country's need for peace was greater than that of China, but there were occasions when peace could only be defended by determination to resist aggression. If the Americans crossed the 38th parallel China would be forced to intervene in Korea. Otherwise he was most anxious for a peaceful settlement, and generally accepted Pandit Nehru's approach.⁸

The Indian Government was informed of this in haste and they in turn communicated this information to interested governments. But the intelligence reports of the United States Government were of an opposite opinion, and in spite of India's warnings the United Nations indirectly authorized General MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel.⁹

India was unhappy at the thought that the Western powers did not place much value on India's sources of information. But India

⁸Ibid., p. 109.

⁹Bowles, op. cit., p. 240.
was probably more pained by the thought that since the Communist Chinese would carry out their threat, even if only to show that they meant what they had said, the possibilities of the Korean war growing into a larger war had multiplied. It may be said that this event caused India to become cold where the West was concerned while she turned sympathetic to the Chinese stand, in spite of the origins of the conflict. Since China became an actual participant in the Korean war as a result of the United Nations' decision to permit its forces to cross the 38th parallel, India's outlook on the Korean problem encountered a change. On the one hand India became all the more anxious that everything should be done to prevent the conflict from spreading, and on the other hand she seems to have concluded that as far as the Communist side was concerned, from that point onward the fate of the Korean war was in the hands of Communist China and not Soviet Russia. This is a point worthy of note, for at a later stage India's peace efforts appear to have come to naught because she thought that Soviet Russia was to a great degree out of the picture.

It was not until November that the United Nations forces came into actual contact with the Chinese troops. The United Nations Command in Korea reported this to the Security Council on November 5. The Security Council decided to invite the People's Republic of China to send a representative to be present while the Security Council discussed the report received from the United Nations Command. On November 11, China declined this invitation, maintaining
that the Security Council had refused to discuss the question of American intervention in Korea as asked by the Peking Government and as such they could not participate in the proceedings of the Security Council.

The Korean events acquired a dangerous character at the beginning of December when it became clear that Communist China had in reality launched a counter-attack against the United Nations forces in Korea. As the United Nations forces retreated toward the 38th parallel India once again picked up the initiative to see if the fighting could be ended at the 38th parallel. Possibly India felt that the see-saw nature of the struggle had made the two sides realize that complete victory was out of question.

While in the United Nations, India with twelve other Asian countries appealed to North Korea and China to announce their intention of stopping at the 38th parallel, the Indian ambassador in Peking approached the Chinese Government on December 8 with the request that they make a declaration that their forces would not go south of the 38th parallel.10

The Chinese Premier informed the Indian ambassador that General MacArthur had demolished the 38th parallel. And on the floor of the United Nations General Assembly, Soviet Russia taunted India among others that they had earlier favored the crossing of the 38th parallel by the United Nations but now that the tables were turned

10Pannikar, In Two Chinas, p. 117.
they were appealing that the other side refrain from crossing that line. This made it clear that the Communist Chinese troops would cross the 38th parallel if they were successful in pushing the United Nations forces further south.

India should have by this time concluded that neither of the parties locked in the battle was prepared to yield ground, because of the fear that a gesture of this kind might be interpreted as a sign of weakness and exploited as such. But even if India did recognize this, there was no choice for her except to continue her efforts in an endeavor to find some basis for a settlement, because she knew that as long as the threat to peace in Asia prevailed a threat to Indian security also remained.

There were demands in the United Nations that the next logical step was to brand China as an aggressor. India introduced a thirteen-power resolution in the General Assembly on December 12, requesting the Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including the President of the Assembly, to determine the basis on which a cease-fire in Korea could be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible.

After introducing the joint thirteen-power draft resolution before the First Committee, the Indian representative informed that Committee that he had had discussions with the Chinese
representative General Wu Hsiu-chuan, then present in New York,\textsuperscript{11} in order to ascertain the views of the Peking Government regarding the Korean conflict. The Indian delegate went ahead to say that as a result of the conversations he had concluded that China wanted a spell of peace but the ordeals through which that country had passed made it generally suspicious and apprehensive.\textsuperscript{12}

Justifying further approaches to the Chinese Government on this basis, the Indian delegate asked that the thirteen-power resolution be adopted by the General Assembly. On December 14, the General Assembly accepted the proposal and the three-man cease-fire group was immediately created with India and Canada being the other two members besides the President of the General Assembly.

The cease-fire group went into action forthwith, but in its first report to the General Assembly on January 2, 1951, the group admitted that it had failed in its attempts to persuade the People's Republic of China to start negotiations toward a final settlement of the Korean conflict.

In its first communication to the Peking Government the group had requested that government to instruct their representative in

\textsuperscript{11} General Wu had come to New York as a result of the Security Council resolution of 29th September. This resolution invited the Peking Government to send their representative to attend the Security Council meetings after 15th November to discuss the complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan. The debate on this was inconclusive.

New York to stay there and discuss with the group the possibility of arranging a cease-fire. The Peking Government in their reply turned down this request, maintaining that they did not recognize the existence of the group since their representative had not participated in the adoption of the resolution which created the group.\textsuperscript{13}

In answer to a second communication from the group on December 19, Premier Chou En-lai sent a reply to the President of the General Assembly saying that if the Arab-Asian bloc was interested in genuine peace then they should free themselves from American pressure, abandon the cease-fire group as an instrument to search for a solution, and give up any hopes of achieving a cease-fire as a starting point for further negotiations.\textsuperscript{14}

Having been rebuffed by the Peking Government in this manner, the cease-fire group in its report to the General Assembly regretted that it was unable to make any recommendations toward a cease-fire for the time being.

No amount of rationalization could have justified the attitude of the Peking Government at this time. Moreover, by suggesting that the Arab-Asian bloc was acting under the influence of the American Government the Chinese were questioning the sincerity of the Indian effort. But India refused to give up in the face of

\textsuperscript{13}Year Book of the United Nations 1950, pp. 250-51.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 251.
this adamant attitude on the part of the Chinese Government, because at this moment there was a resolution before the General Assembly calling upon the United Nations to brand Communist China an aggressor in Korea. India was fearful that once the Peking Government was condemned all chances of finding a solution by negotiation would be lost.

In a supplementary report to the General Assembly on January 11, 1951, the cease-fire group presented a five-point program to end the conflict in Korea. This program called for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of all non-Korean forces by stages to establish a free and united Korea, and setting up of an appropriate body to achieve a settlement of the Far Eastern Problems.

Communist China's reply sent on January 17 said that, as always maintained by China, hostilities in Korea should be brought to an end through negotiations among the various countries concerned. The reply further stated that if cease-fire came into effect without negotiations, it was possible that talks might be prolonged without arriving at any specific solution. Then the reply went on to put forward certain counter-proposals which among other things suggested the United Nations recognition of Communist China at the very beginning of any negotiations.15

The Chinese reply was considered in the First Committee from January 18 to 30. The United States interpreted the Chinese reply as being a rejection of the United Nations proposals, and asked that the United Nations condemn the Chinese aggression in Korea. Sir Rau, the Indian delegate, maintained that the Peking reply was in part an acceptance and in part a non-acceptance of the United Nations principles. He said further that the Chinese reply in a way asked for elucidation of certain points and also put forth certain counter-proposals. Therefore, he felt that the counter-proposals needed careful examination. He also went on to say that branding the Central People's Government of China as an aggressor would serve no purpose.\textsuperscript{16}

At about the same time the Indian Government asked its ambassador in Peking to seek from the Chinese Government an elucidation of certain points included in the Chinese reply to the United Nations. The Indian ambassador, on receiving an answer from the Chinese Foreign Office, communicated it directly to Sir B. N. Rau at the United Nations.\textsuperscript{17} On January 22, Sir Rau told the First Committee about this new communication sent to him by the Indian Embassy in Peking. He suggested that the Committee adjourn for forty-eight hours to permit the delegations to consider the situation in the light of

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly Fifth Session} (First Committee: January 3-May 17, 1951), p. 524.

\textsuperscript{17} Pannikar, \textit{In Two Chinas}, pp. 123-24.
the latest information.

It is worthy of note here that the latest word from Peking which came through the Indian ambassador stationed there, contained certain items which in a sense amounted to new proposals on the part of Communist China. For example, whereas the Mao regime in its earlier reply to the United Nations had maintained that no cease-fire could be agreed upon prior to negotiations, the communication from the Indian ambassador included a clause which suggested that the Chinese Government would be prepared to agree to a cease-fire for a limited period of time at the first meeting of the proposed Seven-Nation Conference which was to deal with the whole problem of ending the war in Korea.

Whether this small concession was made by the Peking Government because the Indian Government had approached them to come forward with some gesture to avert condemnation by the United Nations, or whether the Peking Government felt compelled to make some gesture to prevent being branded an aggressor, is difficult to say. But on January 22, when the Indian delegate disclosed the new offer from Peking, and succeeded in getting the debate postponed for forty-eight hours, it seemed that this latest word might be instrumental in keeping the negotiations alive and might help to at least postpone any attempts to condemn People's China. However, when the debate resumed in the Political Committee on January 25, it became clear that the United States was opposed to any
further delay in condemning the Chinese intervention in Korea. Maintaining that the latest word from Peking should be ignored because it was not addressed to the United Nations but to a particular government, the United States succeeded in its efforts when on January 30 a majority of the members in the First Committee lined up behind the United States resolution and voted to brand Communist China as an aggressor in Korea.

Before the adoption of this resolution India made two more valiant attempts to thwart this move. The leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations told the Political Committee on January 29 that Prime Minister Chou En-lai had informed Ambassador Pannikar in Peking that People’s China would refuse to have any further negotiations with the United Nations if that organization pronounced China as being guilty of aggression in Korea.18 And on January 30 in a last minute stand, Sir B. N. Rau disclosed to the First Committee that the Government of India had learned from the highest sources in Peking that the Chinese authorities had looked with favor upon the resolution which had been sponsored by the twelve Asian–Arab countries in the First Committee on January 24. (This resolution had called for an early exploratory conference of the seven powers named by Peking in its reply to the United Nations on January 17, but the proposal was turned down by the First

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18 The Hindu (Madras), January 31, 1951.
The Indian delegate stated that his government was further given to understand that Peking was prepared to cooperate in negotiations for a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Asian draft resolution. He went on to say that the Chinese Government had also let it be known that they had agreed to arrange a cease-fire at the first meeting of the proposed conference because they desired peace and appreciated the efforts of those in the United Nations who really stood for peace.19

However, these last minute attempts by the Indian delegation to stop action on the United States resolution failed, and on February 1 the General Assembly adopted the resolution placed before it after it had been accepted by the First Committee, declaring People's China an aggressor in Korea.

As a sequel to this resolution, in May the United Nations adopted another resolution which imposed a boycott on the export of strategic materials to Communist China and North Korea.

With the passage of these two resolutions the Korean war reached a new stage. India, at least for the time being, gave up all efforts at mediation, probably concluding that the two parties at war were not willing to come to any agreement at this time.

The United Nations discussion of the Korean problem came to

a temporary halt after the resolution imposing an economic embargo against Communist China had been adopted. Not until the start of the Seventh Assembly session in October 1952 did the General Assembly again take up the task of trying to end hostilities in Korea.

In July 1951, the center of talks on the Korean issue had moved from the United Nations to Pan Mun Jom, Korea. There the truce negotiations lingered on for about a year and a half. Toward the end of that period it seemed that the two parties were able to come to some agreement on almost all aspects of the problem except the item of exchange of prisoners. That item alone became the unsurmountable obstacle bringing the truce negotiations to a deadlock.

When the General Assembly met in October 1952, all the delegations were eager that the Assembly take up the Korean problem once again and resolve the impasse. At a luncheon of the United Nations Correspondents' Association in New York on October 24, Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit, leader of the Indian delegation to that session of the Assembly, let it be known that the various United Nations delegations were searching for some formula that would end the Korean deadlock. She revealed that the Indian delegation was busy meeting with a great many other delegations to find out how a workable solution could be arrived at. She also mentioned that until then no suggestion had been made to India to approach the Chinese Government in regard to any proposal.20

20The Hindu (Madras), October 26, 1952.
As the Indian Prime Minister later disclosed before the Parliament, there were many resolutions in the air at this time, but the Indian delegation having felt that none of these resolutions offered any hope of a peaceful settlement attempted to evolve a formula which they hoped would appeal to the major parties concerned.\footnote{Parliamentary Debates Part 1 (December 15, 1952), col. 1533.}

To avoid the tragedy of having the final resolution rejected by one party, the Indian delegation to begin with laid down certain principles which were to be the foundation of the draft resolution if they were accepted by all. Thereupon, the Indian delegation proceeded to consult the interested parties to ascertain whether they would accept these principles as the basis for a settlement.

On November 2, India dispatched these principles to the Peking Government for comment while the Indian delegation at the United Nations started consulting other delegations there in regard to this matter.

As Nehru revealed before the Parliament on December 15, the Chinese Government did not commit itself to anything, but neither did they indicate any disapproval of the basic formula at this stage. On the other hand the Mao Government let it be understood that they were appreciative of India's efforts toward a peaceful settlement.\footnote{Ibid., col. 1534.}
Having received a general approval of the basic principles from most of the United Nations delegations, and in the absence of any objections from the Chinese or the Soviet side, the Indian delegation decided to frame a resolution embodying these principles. New Delhi received the text of the resolution from its United Nations delegation on November 16 and immediately forwarded it to the Chinese Government. On November 17 the Indian delegation presented the resolution to the Political Committee of the U. N. General Assembly.

There was immediate comment from the United States delegation that they would not accept the Indian plan as it stood. No other voices were heard at the time. On November 19, the Indian delegation formally moved the resolution in the Political Committee. The British delegation and a host of others gave their support to the plan. But there was neither any reply from the Chinese Government nor any indication from the Soviet side even until then.

The silence of the Communist side was broken for the first time by Moscow Radio on November 22, when it quoted certain comments by Tass on the Indian resolution. Moscow Radio quoted Tass as saying that if the "verbal veneer" was removed from the Indian proposal it would show that the plan basically contradicted the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war. Moscow Radio said further that according to Tass the authors and supporters of the Indian formula were trying to send the prisoners of war into slavery in the
United States. Also on November 22, the North Korean Radio denounced the Indian resolution and accused India of supporting "American aggression in Korea." Whether these broadcasts should have been taken as reflecting the official Communist views on the Indian resolution or not, it is idle to debate. There was at this time no choice for India except to await the official word from the Chinese and the Soviet side.

On November 23, continuing its silence on the Indian resolution, the Soviet delegation put forward a proposal before the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, revising its own earlier resolution placed before that Committee on October 29. But on November 24, Russia in a surprise move took Poland's place on the speaker's list in the debate on the Korean truce resolutions in the Political Committee and rejected the Indian resolution. Soviet delegate Vishinsky called the Indian proposal unsatisfactory and unacceptable. He charged that the Indian resolution was so designed that it could perpetuate the Korean war instead of ending it.25

23 The Hindu (Madras), November 24, 1952.
24 The Hindu (Madras), November 24, 1952.
Records indicate that about the time Vishinsky was denouncing the Indian resolution in the Political Committee, the Chinese Government handed to the Indian ambassador in Peking an aide memoire which informed the Indian Government that Communist China could not accept the Indian plan for settling the Korean issue. But this aide memoire dated November 24 did not reach the Indian Government until November 25. Thus it would appear that Soviet Russia rejected the Indian plan in the United Nations even before India had learned of the official Chinese reaction.

India was naturally shocked but probably more so because of the indirect manner in which the Chinese had dealt with the Indian Government. It appears that once the Chinese had entered the Korean war, India became convinced that the fate of the Korean war in future was in the hands of Communist China and not Soviet Russia. Subsequent events indicate that under this impression India concentrated on securing China's approval to any final solution believing that that would bring Russia in line by itself. But India was to learn the hard way that Soviet Russia's influence over China was of a stronger character than India had realized. Indeed, the Indian spokesmen were probably red-faced to learn that while they took pains to tell the world that China was to a considerable degree independent from Russian control, events appeared to prove the story to be quite to the contrary.

Thus when on November 26, the United Nations Political and
Security Committee voted to give priority to the Indian resolution over other resolutions on the same subject before the Committee, Soviet Russia in opposing this action of the Committee for the first time brought it to the attention of the other nations that Communist China had rejected the Indian plan as early as November 24. In fact Soviet delegate Vishinsky tauntingly asked the Indian delegation why they had not mentioned this fact before the Committee and went on to remark caustically:

... perhaps the Indian delegation was not acquainted with that fact, inasmuch as the Chinese answer was handed to the Indian ambassador in Peking on 24 November—although it would appear offhand that a 48-hour interval should have sufficed for the Indian government to inform its delegation here as to the Chinese reaction to the Indian draft resolution. 26

It is noteworthy that until this time neither China nor India, the two principal parties in this matter, had made any public announcement of the fact that the Indian resolution had been rejected by China. The Soviet delegate took it upon himself to reveal this to the world. Whatever else the Soviet delegate's statement might have implied, it certainly reflected one thing, that Soviet Russia's representatives felt that they could speak on behalf of Communist China with much better assurance than India had imagined.

It was on November 28 that Premier Chou En-lai announced that People's China fully endorsed the overall proposal of the Soviet

26 Ibid., p. 149.
delegation calling for an immediate cease-fire and turning over the question of the prisoners to a commission. But even at this time the Chinese Prime Minister made no reference to the Indian resolution; neither did he reveal as to why the Soviet resolution was preferable to the Indian resolution when there was overwhelming support for the Indian resolution and great opposition to the Soviet plan.

During the debate in the Political and Security Committee on the Indian resolution on November 28, the Indian delegate Krishna Menon requested the Committee to postpone the debate until December 1, but did not give any reasons why he was asking for more time. The extra time was granted by the Committee only after Menon had assured the other delegations that he was not planning to withdraw the resolution. On November 29, a spokesman for the Indian External Affairs Ministry made the statement that it was the Indian Government's view that possibly the Chinese had misunderstood certain provisions of the Indian plan. He said India was making efforts to clarify these points and hoped that the Chinese rejection of the plan was not final.

Obviously, India was still nourishing the hope that, if China could be somehow brought around to accept the Indian plan in spite of the Soviet denunciations, the Soviet Union would be

27 The Hindu, November 29, 1952.
28 The Hindu, November 30, 1952.
willing to go along with China. But once again India's hopes in this direction was destined to end in failure.

Krishna Menon presented the Indian resolution to the Political Committee on December 1. In his speech Menon declared that India was by no means dictating terms to the Chinese but was suggesting proposals for a peaceful settlement. He expressed regret that a representative of the People's Republic of China was not present to participate in the discussions. But he observed that India had been in constant touch with China and regardless of what happened to the Indian resolution this contact would be continued. The Indian delegate then explained the purport of his resolution and remarked that the Soviet objection about the absence of a cease-fire provision in that resolution was not valid, since cease-fire could result within twelve hours if armistice was agreed upon. He pointed out that the object of the Indian resolution was to remove the last hurdle in the path of an armistice agreement which would bring about a cease-fire, and negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the problem would follow.  

But all this had no effect on the Russian delegation and, taking the floor after Menon, Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky

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denounced the Indian plan in no uncertain terms.\textsuperscript{30}

When the final vote was taken, the Political Committee ap-
proved the Indian resolution and turned down the Soviet proposals.
On December 3, the General Assembly met in plenary session to con-
sider the Indian proposals. Just before the voting took place,
the Indian delegation introduced a last minute amendment intended
to make it clear that the aim of the Indian resolution was to bring
about an immediate cease-fire. This amendment to the resolution
was accepted by the General Assembly, and then the members went on
to adopt the Indian proposals by an overwhelming vote of 54 to 5
in favor of the resolution.

On December 5, Lester Pearson, the then President of the
General Assembly, cabled a copy of the Indian proposals directly
to the Peking Government, urging them to accept the recommendations
contained therein.

The next day on December 6, the Peking Radio declared that
the Indian proposals were not acceptable to China. The broadcast
charged that the Indian resolution supported the position of the
United States military leaders in Korea and accused the Indian
dlegation of being in the Anglo-American camp.\textsuperscript{31}

The same day, appearing before a public meeting in Bombay,

\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 177-79.

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{The Hindustan Times}, December 6, 1952.
Prime Minister Nehru expressed regret that Russia and China had seen it fit to distrust the intentions of India. Nehru said that he was pained to note that those two countries were imputing motives and doubting India's bond fides, thinking that India was attempting to trap them into accepting something which in their view originated in the opposition camp. The Indian Prime Minister went on to say that India would not give up her efforts to secure peace in Korea and India's policy would be to remain neutral.³²

If India's feelings had been hurt, China certainly took no note of it. The Peking Government replied officially to the communication from the President of the General Assembly on December 14. In this note Premier Chou En-lai accused the United Nations General Assembly of having adopted a resolution which supported the American position on the issue of prisoners of war and facilitated the continuation and expansion of the war in Korea. Chou En-lai in rejecting the Indian resolution called it unfair and unreasonable. He charged that the Indian plan had adopted the proposals forwarded by the United States at Pan Mun Jom in September, with the difference that India had couched them in more sly terms to fool the people of the world easily and permit America to carry out her nefarious schemes.³³

³² The Hindustan Times, December 7, 1952.

India was stunned by these insults and innuendoes, but before the world India tried to present a picture of calm and determination. Referring to the Chinese reply next day, Krishna Menon said rather stoically: "They [the Chinese] appear to be very angry with us, but we must not be angry with them and we must persevere as best we can for peace." 34

India's efforts in the direction of finding a solution to the Korean problem came to an end at this point. It was not until April 1953 that a satisfactory way was found to end the Korean conflict. The United Nations resolution which was accepted at this time by all sides, including the Russian and the Chinese, was sponsored by Brazil. This resolution was, however, very similar to the one that had been put forward by India earlier in 1952.

On the basis of public records no fully satisfactory answer can be provided to the question as to why the Chinese rejected the Indian proposals. Nevertheless, the record throws light on some very important factors which appear to have played a part in the final decision of the Peking Government. These factors may be summed up as follows:

(a) When in October 1952 India started to move in the direction of evolving a formula to end the deadlock reached at Pan Munjom, she concentrated on framing proposals which would be acceptable to China—not that the Soviets were not consulted by India,

34The Hindustan Times, December 17, 1952.
but as Nehru disclosed in the Council of States on February 16, 1953, "... the resolution that was proposed by us [the Indian Government] was framed by us, as we thought, to represent very largely the Chinese viewpoint. I do not say, hundred per cent, but it was an attempt to represent that viewpoint." Possibly this was due to India's feeling that she had a special responsibility toward China, as Nehru had once expressed in the Indian Parliament. In addition to this possible reason, India's direct approach to China seems to have been based on the assumption that Korea had become primarily a Chinese problem once China had intervened in the Korean war. India also appears to have assumed that in spite of Soviet Russia's interest in Korea, Russia had mostly left the matter in the hands of the Chinese, because Korea was an Asian problem in the sphere of the Chinese competence.

(b) Even before the Indian Government had received the note from Peking expressing the Chinese inability to accept the Indian resolution, Soviet Russia's delegate rejected the Indian resolution in the Political Committee of the United Nations to everyone's surprise. True, China and Soviet Russia had until then been silent as to their attitude toward the Indian proposals, but from the beginning China had encouraged India in her efforts and had even expressed appreciation for India's endeavors. India received the rejection

36 Indian Parliamentary Debates, December 6, 1950, col. 1265.
note from China after the Soviets had made manifest their unwillingness to accept the resolution. But even then, neither India nor China made the matter of the Chinese rejection public. In fact when Chou En-lai announced his government's endorsement of the Soviet plan on November 28, he refrained from making any comment on the Indian resolution. Once again the Soviet delegate had to be the one to disclose to the world that China had already informed India about not being able to accept the Indian plan. Interestingly enough, available evidence indicates that India continued to approach the Peking regime in the hope that they would even then accept the Indian proposals with some changes, thus indicating that India was not taking the Soviet rejection as being the final answer for China also. These actions of India show that, having been constantly in direct touch with the Peking regime through the Indian ambassador, India was not prepared to believe that Peking had misled India when India had come to recognize her ambassador as the surest guide in interpreting the intentions of Mao's Government.

(c) It is strongly indicated by the course of events that India's direct approach to China to solve the Korean tangle was influenced by the hope that in Asian affairs China could be persuaded to follow an independent line which was more Asian in content than communist, since it is in India's interest to see China
develop a policy completely independent of Soviet Russia, at least in Asia. If China had agreed to the Indian proposals, it would have confirmed India in her belief that no Soviet dictation of the Chinese policy had been attempted or appeared likely to be attempted, that China was no satellite of Moscow, that the Sino-Soviet alliance was vulnerable, and there was every chance that if given an opportunity China could be won away from her association with Soviet Russia. 37

(d) When the arguments given by China, at the end of the affair, for rejecting the Indian resolution are analyzed, they show that China's rejection had very little to do with the content matter of the resolution, thus indicating that disapproval must have been based on outside considerations. One point illustrated this rather well. In January 1951 China had insisted that negotiations must precede a cease-fire, whereas in December 1952 China complained that the Indian proposals lacked an immediate cease-fire provision. Moreover, the Soviet proposals endorsed by China did not include the cease-fire clause until the last minute. Only one day prior to the Russian rejection of the Indian formula did the Soviet delegate offer an amendment to his own resolution asking that a cease-fire clause be incorporated into the Russian proposals. But then on December 3, before the General Assembly adopted the Indian

37 B. N. Rau, India's chief delegate to the U. N., made these comments in Toronto on April 24, 1951, Indian Express, April 26, 1951.
resolution, to overcome the major objection from the Communist side the Indian delegate introduced an amendment to his proposals making it manifest that immediate cease-fire was the objective of the Indian resolution. Still, the Indian resolution was denounced. Interestingly enough, in 1953 when finally the Communists agreed to an armistice in Korea, the plan agreed upon was very similar to the Indian plan. Evidently then, the Chinese rejection was motivated by considerations beyond the realm of the resolution itself.

(e) The above factors tend to indicate that in all probability the Indian proposals were rejected on the initiative of Soviet Russia rather than China, that the Soviet rejection appears to have been more a matter of strategy than anything else. This strategy seems to have included a desire to disrupt any growth of intimate relations between India and China at that time. Soviet Russia wanted China to make it manifest to India as well as the world that China and Russia presented a solid front on all international affairs, that it was false to believe that their unity could be punctured. In so far as China was concerned, she turned down the Indian proposals in spite of having been sympathetic toward Indian attempts at peace-making, because China's immediate interests lay with Soviet Russia. Aside from the ideological ties China certainly could not risk disagreement with the Soviet position when China's economic and military future was dependent upon Moscow.
(f) India realized all along that no solution in Korea could be effective without China's active consent or at least acquiescence, since Korea was neighboring territory for China and her interests were inevitably involved there. Moreover, the American and Chinese statements on Formosa as a result of the Korean war made India feel that the Far Eastern problems as a whole had become intertwined with the Korean problem, and any one of them could result in an expansion of the Korean war into a world war. Thus stopping of hostilities in Korea became a primary necessity which could in turn lead the way to a peaceful solution of the rest of the problems. But China was the central figure in every one of these problems. Therefore, in Indian eyes, every attempt had to be made to bring the world to recognize Communist China as a fact which could not be ignored. Moreover, India certainly did not want to sow any seeds in Korea which might have become a source of future tensions between India and China. It must also be taken into account that possibly from India's point of view China had legitimate grounds to be intimately concerned with Asian affairs whereas the Western intervention in Asian affairs was certainly never welcome. It is on the basis of these interests that India did her best to approach China even when China publicly denounced India.
CHAPTER XI

TIBET IN INDO-CHINESE RELATIONS

Over the period of 1947-1955, the problem of Tibet was the thorniest issue encountered in Indo-Chinese relations. The Tibetan episode was one event which could have brought India and China into direct conflict, had it not been that India withdrew from the fray as fast as she entered it. In a way India's quick reaction to the Tibetan episode was similar, although not so quick, to her reaction in the case of Korea, but India's desire to retreat from her forward position was just as keen in the case of Tibet as it had been in the case of Korea.

Tibet is a state of about 460,000 square miles in area with a population of about five million people, situated on the highest plateau of the world. The average elevation is about 11,000 feet above sea level. The boundaries of Tibet touch China in the east, Mongolia in the north, Kashmir in the west, and Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and the rest of India in the south. Thus, wedged in between India and China, Tibet always remained a prey to the designs of both sides. The high altitude of Tibet and its geographical situation formed the best possible barrier to India on the north. Tibet was an effective buffer against any direct pressure from Russia or even China. On the other hand China always tried to turn Tibet into
a Chinese province, claiming that the Tibetans and the Chinese had
a common ethnic and cultural background, something denied by the
Tibetans themselves. It is within the framework of these forces
that the major portion of the past political history of Tibet was
written.¹

Existence of tensions between China and Tibet dates as far
back as the seventh century A.D. In spite of the success of the
erlier monarchs of Tibet in defeating the forces of China, by the
thirteenth century the tables had so turned that throughout later
history China wielded notable political influence in Tibet.

However, it was in the eighteenth century, during the reign
of the Manchu Dynasty in China, that Tibet was placed under Chinese
hegemony. From then on the Chinese control of Tibet was symbolized
by the presence of Chinese Ambans or Residents at Lhasa. These
Ambans exercised supervision over the administration of Tibet and
conducted the foreign affairs of Tibet so as to serve the interests
of China. The degree of Chinese influence and control over the af-
fairs of Tibet depended in large measure upon the strength of the
Government in Peking. Whenever the Chinese Government at Peking
was weak the Tibetans rebelled and slew the Chinese overlords in
Lhasa. The Chinese retaliated, and if they were strong enough their

¹ Sir Charles Bell, Tibet Past and Present (London: Oxford
military expeditions succeeded in reinstating the Chinese authority, but if they failed the Tibetans considered themselves completely independent till such time as the Chinese could make an effective recovery. Thus, in a situation of this order, a strange relationship existed between China and Tibet. The Tibetans in essence regarded the Chinese as unwelcome visitors. They regarded the Dalai Lama as the highest authority. But the Chinese considered Tibet as one of their possessions and treated her as such whenever their military strength permitted them to do so.²

Around the end of the nineteenth century this relationship took a significant turn with the entry of British India into the picture. India prior to the British rule showed little political interest in her neighbors, although India's cultural influence spread far and wide and it was through her emissaries that Buddhism reached Tibet. It is true that in 1841 Raja Gulab Singh of Kashmir dispatched a military expedition against Tibet under his famous General Zorawar Singh. However, it would not be proper to call this military adventure an Indian enterprise or an attempt on the part of India to establish political hegemony over Tibet.

But when the British had succeeded in gaining complete control over the whole of India, they proceeded to evince active interest in the countries surrounding India to make certain that

²Balkrishna Gokhale, "Red Shadow over Tibet," *Times of India* (New Delhi), March 5, 1950.
their prize possession was not threatened from any quarter. Even during the days of the British East India Company, attempts were made by Warren Hastings in 1774 and again in 1873 to establish commercial and cultural contacts between the Bengal province of India and Tibet. But not much came out of these half-hearted endeavors. Once India had been completely overpowered by the British, however, they pushed vigorously for the establishment of political relations between British India and Tibet. Even then it was not until 1904 that the British succeeded in executing a treaty between British India and Tibet.

The air was rife with rumors in 1902 that China and Russia were in the process of signing a secret agreement by virtue of which Russia would guarantee to protect the integrity of China and in return China would hand over her entire interest in Tibet to Russia.3 The prospect of Russian influence in Tibet was hardly palatable to the British in India. Thus in January 1903, Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India, planned to send a mission with an armed escort to Lhasa to make direct contact with the Dalai Lama and settle the question of political and commercial relations. Although the Russians on learning about the British intentions tried to assure them that Russia had no designs on Tibet, the British expedition, which had by now become a military expedition, under the leadership of Colonel Younghusband made its way toward Tibet in July 1903.

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3 Bell, op. cit., pp. 280-81.
The Dalai Lama and his advisers fled to Mongolia before the British army. But on reaching Lhasa Younghusband was able to effect a treaty between the British and the Tibetans which provided for greater trade between British India and Tibet, required Tibet to pay a heavy indemnity, and called on Tibet not to permit any concessions to any foreign power without the British consent. But this Lhasa Convention of 1904 was not put into force, because having accepted the Chinese authority over Tibet in principle in earlier periods, the British felt that Chinese adhesion to the treaty was essential before its becoming active.

The Chinese government, however, was not only alarmed at this show of force by the British but became convinced that China must do everything to restore her authority in Tibet. In April 1906, China and Britain signed a Convention at Peking which in effect modified the Lhasa Convention of 1904. On the whole, the Peking Convention placed Tibet solidly in the hands of China. No other power except China was to have the right of concessions in Tibet and the task of preserving Tibet's integrity was to rest with China. In signing the Peking Convention the British did two things of note. Firstly, they delivered Tibet into the hands of China against the wishes of the Tibetans, and at a time when China had failed to impose her control by force. Secondly, the British

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5Ibid., pp. 287–88.
repeated the practice of signing a treaty about Tibet without that country's presence or acquiescence.

The Chinese government soon took advantage of this new situation and appointed a high commissioner for Tibet. The Chinese high commissioner on arrival in Lhasa proceeded to take control of the Tibetan administration, as well as set about to reduce the influence of the British in Tibet, in the absence of the Dalai Lama who was still in exile. The Chinese also paid the indemnity levied against Tibet by the Lhasa Convention, thus showing that they accepted responsibility for the Tibetan actions.

To strengthen the status quo in Tibet further, Great Britain signed an agreement with Russia in 1907 calling for a hands-off policy in regard to Tibet. This agreement also recognized the Chinese authority over Tibet where foreign relations were concerned, thus becoming instrumental in perpetuating the Chinese hegemony over Tibet.6

In 1911 revolution broke out inside China, and the Tibetans utilized this occasion to throw off the Chinese yoke. They succeeded in recapturing most of their country and the Dalai Lama and his ministers returned to the capital city of Lhasa by the middle of 1912. When the internal affairs of China settled down she attempted to return to Tibet. By now, however, the British attitude toward Tibet had changed, and Britain informed President Yuan Shih-kai of

6 Ibid., p. 96.
China that interference in the internal affairs of Tibet could not be condoned, and that a new agreement should be signed among Britain, China and Tibet to put into writing an arrangement which would be more in accord with the prevailing situation.

It was to effect such an agreement that the Simla Conference began in October 1913 among the representatives of Britain, China, and Tibet. In April 1914 the provisions to the Simla Convention were agreed upon by all the parties. The chief provisions of the Convention stipulated that internally Tibet was to be an autonomous unit and China was to refrain from any interference with the administration of Tibet. Recognition was given to the over-all authority of China over Tibet, and China was permitted to restation an Amban at Lhasa with a very limited military escort. British rights to establish certain trade marts were recognized, and Britain was allowed to station a few hundred troops at these trade agencies. Also it was decided to recognize two main divisions of Tibet: Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. China was permitted to have a freer hand in Inner Tibet or the eastern parts of Tibet adjoining the Chinese territory, while it was agreed that Outer Tibet or the rest of the Tibetan territory would be completely under the control of Lhasa without any interference from China.

It is noteworthy that for the first time the British formally acknowledged the internal independence of Tibet and in a way sought it as a guarantee from China by incorporating it in the Simla Convention. Moreover, it was the first time that Tibet and China
participated in the treaty-making process on an equal footing. But two days after the Convention had been initialled, the Chinese government declared that they would not abide by the decisions of their representative at the Conference. The British Minister at Peking informed the Chinese government that Great Britain and Tibet considered the Convention concluded since it had been initialled by all the parties concerned, and if China refused to permit her representative to place his full signature on the treaty then Britain and Tibet would go ahead and sign it independently. However, the whole affair broke down when the First World War started at this time and the matter was pushed into the background.

At the end of War, China tried to push her way back into Tibet in 1917 and 1918. Her military action failed in both cases and the Tibetans remained their own masters. A Chinese Mission arrived in Lhasa in early 1920 to negotiate a final agreement with Tibet. After a few months stay in Lhasa this Mission returned to China without accomplishing anything. After the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1934 a Chinese envoy came to Lhasa, supposedly to convey China's condolences. He continued his stay, however, and from then on a Chinese mission was stationed at Lhasa. This mission was expelled by the Tibetans in July 1949. However, no new agreement was signed between China and Tibet during all this period and

the situation remained as it was at the end of the Simla Conference.

This, then, was the situation when India became independent in 1947. India was considered to have inherited the rights and obligations of the British, and Tibet did not object to it. Thus India acquired the right to station a political agent at Lhasa, establish trade centers at Gyantse, Gartok, and Yatung in Tibet, and maintain post and telegraph offices along the trade route up to Gyantse. To protect the trade route India also acquired the right to station a small military detachment at Gyantse. The Tibetan authorities expressed the desire to station their own representative in New Delhi, and although the Indian government agreed to it the Tibetans for some reason or another failed to take advantage of the opportunity.8

On the eve of the Communist victory in China, suddenly the whole picture took a different hue. When in 1948 the disintegration of the Kuomintang power became obvious, the Tibetan government at Lhasa declared that in face of the danger of a third World War they were closing Tibet to all foreigners. Following this declaration in July 1949, the Lhasa government expelled the Kuomintang Mission and the Chinese residents from Tibet. No such action was, however, taken against the Indians. The news of these happenings stirred up all types of comment. It was speculated that the Tibetan action had been motivated by two major objectives: Tibet's desire to prevent the possible spread of Chinese Communist influence through

8The Hindu (Madras), January 13, 1950.
Sino-Tibetan contact, Tibet’s wish to assert her full sovereign status—something which had for all practical purposes become a fact in the previous twenty years—by taking timely advantage of the downfall of the nationalist regime.9

Whatever the real Tibetan objectives were, the Communist Chinese soon made manifest their own plans for Tibet. The Communist People's Political Conference which met during July 1949 in Peking adopted a resolution saying that Tibet would be retained as a part of the People's Republic of China. The resolution explained that the new Communist regime of China would consider Tibet under its jurisdiction, but would recognize the internal autonomy of Tibet. At about the same time Chou En-lai speaking at a public meeting in Peking declared that "Lenin's self-determination principle" would be upheld in Tibet and no discrimination would be shown toward the Tibetans. The Communist Chinese also denounced the Tibetan action of expelling the Chinese mission that was then stationed in Lhasa, thus showing that possibly the Communists were counting on gaining control of Tibet by replacing the old representatives with their own.10 These statements on behalf of the Communist Chinese made it manifest that the new regime in China had no intentions of permitting Tibet to entertain hopes of complete independence from Chinese control. But the Communist Chinese did not make any moves in this direction at this time and even after

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the formal establishment of the People's Republic of China; for the most part of 1949 and 1950 they remained satisfied with making repeated statements to the effect that they were determined to "liberate" Tibet.

The Indians on their part were fully cognizant of the events taking place in Tibet and China, not only because Tibet stood on the northern frontier of India but because there was great suspense as to what new China had in mind for Tibet, and how far it would influence the future relations between India and China.

When news about the expulsion of the Kuomintang Mission at Lhasa reached India, Prime Minister Nehru tried to play the whole thing down by saying at a press conference in New Delhi that all reports about a revolt in Tibet were unfounded and that there was hardly any trouble in Tibet. It is true, he said, that for some reason the Tibetan government had decided to send away certain Chinese residing in Tibet and had requested the Indian government to give them passage through India to go to China, but beyond that there was nothing to all the fantastic stories which were being circulated in the Indian press.\footnote{The Hindu, August 6, 1949.}

In spite of this attempt to assume a calm appearance, some of India's actions revealed that the government of India was preparing for any eventuality in this area. In June 1949 the Indian government took over the administration of the Himalayan kingdom
of Sikkim, the gateway to Tibet from India, under an old treaty of 1861 which had been signed between the British and the state of Sikkim. A new treaty was later signed by Sikkim and India in December 1950, whereby India took over direct control of defense, external affairs and communications of that State. On August 8, 1949, the government of India entered into a new treaty with Bhutan, the other Himalayan kingdom, whereby Bhutan was promised internal autonomy while it was agreed that the State would be guided by India in its external affairs. Also, India proceeded to exhibit keen interest in the domestic affairs of Nepal, making it manifest that India would like to help bring about stability and a measure of popular control in that strife-ridden border State. On hearing about the expulsion of the Chinese, India dispatched her political officer in Sikkim to Lhasa to study conditions there and report back on the latest developments.

After India had accorded recognition to the new China regime on December 30, 1949, it was questioned in many quarters as to whether this also meant recognition of Communist China's full sovereignty over Tibet. To settle all speculation at rest, at least

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temporarily, official circles in New Delhi let it be known that
India's attitude toward the question of Tibet's political status was
governed by the Simla Convention of 1914, which implied that India
stood for Tibet's autonomy in internal affairs but recognized the
right of China to exercise control over Tibet's international
affairs. This did not reveal how India viewed Tibet's moves
toward complete independence or who was to guarantee Tibet's inter-
nal autonomy. Possibly India had no answers to these questions,
for everything depended upon Peking's actions. While Peking talked
about Tibet's "liberation," it did not reveal what that phrase
stood for or how it was to be brought about. Thus India strengthened
her northern frontiers and watched and waited for the next move to
come from the east.

Tibet on her part attempted to consolidate her independence
by seeking the help of other countries to back up her claim. Takdag
Pandit Hoithokthu, Regent of Tibet, revealed on January 14, 1950 that
the Tibetan National Assembly had unanimously agreed to send separate
goodwill missions to the United States, Britain, India, and Nepal to
prove Tibet's independence. He said that a mission was being dis-
patched to China as well to explain to the new regime there the
validity of Tibet's independence.17


17 The Hindu, January 16, 1950.
The Chinese response to the statement made by the Regent of Tibet showed that they did not look with favor upon such moves by Tibet. A Chinese Communist official warned on January 21 that Peking would consider any country entering into diplomatic relations with Tibet as being hostile to China. Also on January 31, Peking Radio said in a broadcast that everyone knows that Tibet is a part of China; thus Lhasa neither had the right to send any missions nor the right to display any independence. The broadcast said that under these circumstances Tibet would be well advised to cancel the plans for all the other missions but send representatives to Peking to negotiate the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet.18

As circumstances would have it, this is exactly what Tibet had to do when the Western powers refused to receive her missions.19 In an interview on April 19, Tsechang Thupden Gyalpo, one of the leaders of a Tibetan delegation, disclosed in Calcutta that he and his delegation were on their way to meet the Chinese Communists "somewhere on the Chinese border" to negotiate an amicable settlement between China and Tibet. He said that the Peking authorities were aware of their mission but there was no formal communication between the two parties.20 This meeting between the Tibetan delegation and the Chinese representatives, which was to take place in

18The Times of India (Bombay), February 2, 1950.
20The Statesman (New Delhi), April 20, 1950.
Hongkong, failed to materialize as the British government declined to give visas to the delegations, maintaining that the then existing situation in Hongkong was not conducive to a meeting between the representatives of China and Tibet at that place.\textsuperscript{21}

In the month of August it became clear that negotiations between China and Tibet would take place in New Delhi as soon as the Chinese ambassador to India arrived there.\textsuperscript{22} At the same time there were strong rumors afloat during that month, in the wake of certain statements made by the Chinese leaders, that the Chinese Communist armies were advancing toward the borders of Tibet.\textsuperscript{23} In the light of these developments India took the first step, although informally, to approach the Chinese government in connection with the Tibetan issue. The Indian ambassador in Peking in conversations with Premier Chou En-lai on August 22 expressed the hope that the Chinese government would settle the Tibetan question peacefully. Prime Minister Chou in his reply let it be known that liberation of Tibet was a "sacred duty" of the Peking government but they were anxious to avoid military action in accomplishing their aim.\textsuperscript{24}

Thus, in spite of India's approach to China, the exact nature of China's intentions in Tibet continued to be a mystery to India.

\textsuperscript{21}The Hindu, August 22, 1950.
\textsuperscript{22}The Times of India, August 25, 1950.
\textsuperscript{23}The Statesman, August 14, 1950.
\textsuperscript{24}Pannikar, In Two Chinas, p. 105.
as well as to the rest of the world. In the spring of 1950 an
unofficial Communist delegation arrived in Lhasa with the offer of
self-government if Tibet would agree to join with new China volun-
tarily. Also toward the end of September 1950, talks began between
the new Chinese ambassador in New Delhi and the Tibetan delegation
present there to find a solution to the whole problem. But these
half-hearted attempts to seek a peaceful solution were not permitted
to progress very far. On October 7, 1950, the Peking regime pro-
ceeded to apply direct military pressure to accomplish its aims in
Tibet. On that day the Communist Chinese forces attacked the Tibetan
border at six different points. The news of the Chinese invasion
was not released to the world for about two weeks. India's Ministry
of External Affairs issued a communique in New Delhi on October 15
that no confirmation of the rumors of Chinese invasion of Tibet had
been received by them from Lhasa or Peking. When India's am-
bassador at Peking made attempts to discover the truth of the matter
from the Chinese Foreign Office, he was turned away without any
definite word. Then on October 25 Peking Radio announced to the
world that the process of "liberating Tibet" had begun.

25 H. E. Richardson, "The State of Tibet," Journal of the

26 Heinrich Harrer, Seven Years In Tibet (New York: E. P.

27 Press Information Bureau Release, Government of India,
October 15, 1950.

28 Pannikar, In Two Chinas, P. 112.
Ironically enough, it was the same day that a Tibetan delegation started on its way to Peking for negotiations on India's advice and the Indian ambassador was supposed to have informed the Chinese government about it. 29

India was completely taken aback by the news of the Chinese invasion of Tibet. The Government of India immediately dispatched a strong note of protest to China. The note sent on October 26 maintained that China's decision to invade Tibet appeared "most surprising and regrettable" to the Government of India in view of the fact that China had given India to understand that the question of Tibet would be solved peacefully, and also in view of the fact that a Tibetan delegation had just then left for Peking on India's advice to settle the matter by negotiation. The Government of India also stated in this note that they recognized the fact that there had been some delay in the Tibetan delegation's departure for Peking, but the note explained that this delay was circumstantial and no foreign influences hostile to China were responsible for this. The note went on to say:

Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by the Chinese government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronized with it and there will naturally be the fear on the part of the Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable, and in the considered judgment of the Government of India not in the interest of China or of peace. The Government of India can only

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express their deep regret that in spite of friendly and
disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them, the
Chinese Government should have decided to seek solution
of the problems of their relation with Tibet by force
instead of by slower and more enduring methods of peace-
ful approach.30

China's reply dated October 30 was just as strongly worded
as the Indian note. The Foreign Minister of China declared that
People's China wanted to make it very clear that Tibet was an
integral part of Chinese territory, and the problem of Tibet was
entirely a domestic issue of China. The Foreign Minister of China
went on to say that the Chinese government had hoped that the matter
could be concluded by peaceful negotiations but the Tibetan delega-
tion under the instigation of foreign influences had delayed its
departure for Peking. He said that China had still not given up
the thought of peaceful negotiations, but whatever the future devel-
opments may be Tibet was a domestic problem of the People's Republic
of China and they would not tolerate any foreign interference in the
matter. The note also added:

Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government
of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China
cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign
influences hostile to China in Tibet and expresses its
deep regret.31

Irritated by the Chinese insinuations, the Government of India
wrote back another note to the Foreign Minister of China on October
31. In this note the Government of India protested that at no time
had India been under any foreign influence in regard to Tibet. The

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30Ibid., p. 2.
31Ibid., p. 2.
note said further that the Tibetan claim to autonomy was legitimate and the Indian government had been given to understand on authority that even China was willing to recognize this and foster it. Thus India had repeatedly suggested that China and Tibet peacefully work out a solution in which Tibetan autonomy could be reconciled within the framework of Chinese suzerainty. This second note went on to say that India had all along received assurances from the Peking Government that they were aiming at a peaceful settlement in Tibet, and since the Tibetans had in no way resorted to military methods the news of the Chinese invasion had come as a surprise and a shock. Thus the Indian government felt that the military attack was unjustified and in view of these developments it could not advise the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking unless the Chinese government saw fit to order its troops to halt their advance into Tibet.32

The second reply from the Chinese government was not made public but it was supposed to have reiterated the earlier stand of China.33 That is where the exchanges between the two governments rested. In this manner, India and China may be said to have succeeded for the first time in revealing their respective positions regarding Tibet, but the country that was the center of attention in this controversy certainly received no help nor much comfort from these statements.

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32Ibid., p. 3.
33Mehra, op. cit., p. 10.
The government of the Dalai Lama sought India's diplomatic help to settle the whole question but India was not asked to move the United Nations in this matter.\textsuperscript{34} Tsepon Shakalipa, the leader of the seven-man official Tibetan delegation to Peking, had stated in Calcutta on October 26 that his delegation would proceed to Peking to negotiate the matter regardless of the Chinese invasion.\textsuperscript{35} Obviously the government of India, in view of their stated policy in one of the notes to the Chinese government, advised the Tibetan delegation not to proceed to Peking as a protest against the unwarranted attack, and Tsepon Shekalipa and his delegation retired to Kalimpong in India to watch further developments in the matter.\textsuperscript{36}

In November Tibet herself took the initiative of carrying the issue to the United Nations. On November 7, the Tibetan Cabinet and National Assembly acting on behalf of the Dalai Lama addressed a complaint to the Secretary General of the United Nations which was received by the United Nations Secretariat on November 13. In this complaint the Lhasa government reviewed Tibet's relations with China all through the twentieth century. They contended that Tibet continued to maintain friendly relations with China but never agreed to the Chinese claim of suzerainty in 1919; while relations between Tibet and India were guided by the treaty of 1914, the

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{National Herald}, October 31, 1950.

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{National Herald}, October 27, 1950.

Chinese by refusing to sign that treaty had renounced the rights which would have accrued to them through that treaty. Thus the note from Lhasa said, "Tibet's independence thereby assumed de jure status."

The Tibetan complaint went on to maintain that the Communist Chinese had used all sorts of devious methods to pressure and undermine the government of Tibet, while the latter realizing that she was militarily weak had agreed to settle the matter in a peaceful and friendly manner through mutual negotiations. However, charged the Lhasa government, even while talks between the Chinese ambassador in India and the Tibetan delegation were proceeding the Chinese made a sneak attack on Tibet and did not reveal this fact to the world for some weeks. The Lhasa government's complaint further added:

The conquest of Tibet by China will only enlarge the area of conflict and increase the threat to the independence and stability of other Asian nations.

We, Ministers with the approval of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, entrust the problem of Tibet in this emergency to the ultimate decision of the United Nations, hoping that the conscience of the world would not allow the disruption of our State by methods reminiscent of the jungle.37

Tibetan efforts to secure the aid of the United Nations to stem the tide of Chinese invasion proved futile. Tibet had hoped that the conscience of the world would be aroused. On the contrary, no official action was taken by any government. The question was

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37 The Hindu, November 14, 1950.
not even brought before the Security Council, even though Ecuador, 38 then a member of the Security Council, is said to have threatened to bring the Tibetan issue before the United Nations. On November 19, the representative of the republic of El Salvador condemned the "unprovoked aggression" of the Chinese in the General Assembly and called for inclusion of the item of the Chinese invasion in the agenda. But on November 24, when the Steering Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met to consider whether the item should be put on the Assembly agenda, it was decided to shelve the Tibetan complaint indefi-
initely. The recommendation of the Indian delegate was, it appears, instrumental in convincing the members of the advisability of such a course. The Indian delegate said in part:

... in the latest note received by his government, the Peking Government had declared that the Chinese forces had ceased to advance after the fall of Chamdo, a town some 480 k. meters from Lhasa. The Indian Government was certain that the Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful means, and that such a settlement could safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while maintaining its historical association with China. 39

This was the last occasion on which the rest of the world had to concern itself with the Tibetan problem. The Chinese issued no orders to their troops to halt their advance. But the forces of Peking saw no need to continue their progress with the speed with

38 Pannikar, In Two Chinas, p. 113.
which the original attack had been made. The Dalai Lama and his
advisers had by now realized that it was impossible for Tibet to
attempt to resist the Chinese pressure on her own, and they had
seen that not even India was willing to stake anything in order to
save Tibet from the clutches of Communist China. Thereafter,
unofficially representatives of Tibet and China approached each
other to see how best the situation could be brought under control.\textsuperscript{40}

In a press conference on March 13, 1951, Nehru revealed that the
representatives of the Dalai Lama were proceeding to Peking for
talks with the Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan question.
He said that the Chinese had always claimed that Tibet was an inte-
gral but autonomous part of China, but what sort of autonomy was
implied would only become clear in the talks which were about to
take place.\textsuperscript{41}

Official talks between the Dalai Lama's representatives and
the Chinese Government began in Peking in the latter part of April.
On May 23, Peking Radio announced to the world that a 17-point
agreement had been signed between the Tibetan "Regional Government"
and the Central People's government of China. Although the agree-
ment promised to let the Tibetans be their own guide in local affairs
with external affairs and defense left in the hands of China, the
agreement provided for the setting up of a military and administra-
tive committee by China which in effect was to run the affairs

\textsuperscript{40} Purshom L. Mehra, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 11-12.
\textsuperscript{41} India Record, Vol. 3, No. 12 (March 28, 1951), p. 3.
of Tibet.\footnote{42}{The Statesman, May 29, 1951.}

In so far as India was concerned, the significant fact was that this was the first agreement signed by China and Tibet in the twentieth century to which India was neither a party, nor was she consulted in regard to the substance of the agreement. Evidently India had bowed before the changed conditions and silently given up her traditional position in Tibet. This was certainly confirmed in the press note issued by the government of India on September 15, 1952, relating to the new arrangement decided upon regarding India's Mission at Lhasa and the trading rights with Tibet. The government communique announced that the Indian Mission in Lhasa was to be designated as a Consulate-General in the future and the three Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Gartok, and Yatung were to be supervised by the Consulate-General. In return the Indian Government agreed to the opening of a Chinese Consulate-General in Bombay. The communique explained that the change in status of the Indian Mission followed the change in the political set-up in Lhasa itself, whereby for the first time in history Tibet's foreign relations were under the effective control of China.\footnote{43}{The Statesman, September 16, 1952.}

It was clear that under the new conditions India could no longer deal with Tibet directly. It was also clear that India had
resigned to it by demonstrating that her only interest lay in trading rights and that she was not concerned with the nature of Tibet's autonomy in internal affairs. Later it was felt by the Indian Government that there were still some unsettled points left, in spite of the new arrangement announced. In order to formulate a fuller and more elaborate agreement between India and China on the question of Tibet, negotiations began in Peking on December 31, 1953 between the representatives of the two countries.\(^4\)

On April 29, 1954, the government of India and China signed an "Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet region of China and India." In the preamble it was stated that the agreement was based on the principles of: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.\(^5\) These five principles formed the most notable feature of the agreement, as Nehru himself said before the Indian Parliament,\(^6\) and later became the landmark of India's foreign policy under the name of Panch Shila. The rest of the agreement set out in detail the trading facilities which


were to exist between India and Tibet. Significantly enough, India willingly agreed to the withdrawal of her military escort stationed at Gyantse since 1904 and handed over the communications installations and the rest houses to China. With this final note the matter of Tibet came to a close where Indo-Chinese relations were concerned, at least from all outward appearances to the satisfaction of both China and India.

Looking at the course of developments in the Tibetan affair, there seems to be a singular lack of consistency in India’s policy. How did India interpret the events, in so far as they affected her interests in her policy toward China and Tibet?

Certain statements of the first Indian ambassador to Communist China indicate that the government of India were fully alive to the fact that the problem of Tibet would crop up sooner or later, since they had recognized the regime of Mao Tse-tung. Not knowing the exact nature of Communist China’s intentions, however, they waited for the first move to come from the other side before making any declaration of policy in the matter. This attitude might have been considered safe in view of the fact that in the past no occasion had occurred when the exact relationship had been defined between Tibet and China.

The Simla Convention of 1914 provided that China’s suzerainty
would be recognized over the whole of Tibet but China was to promise not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. Moreover, as Tibet was divided into two zones, "Outer Tibet" and "Inner Tibet," the autonomy of "Outer Tibet" alone was provided for in the agreement.48 As related earlier China refused to sign this agreement in the end. Thus even though Tibet and Britain continued to maintain that they were bound by the Simla Convention, it would be debatable whether China could have been considered bound by it. Richardson notes49 that British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden informed the Chinese representative Soong in 1943 that Britain's recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was conditional on Chinese recognition of Tibet's autonomy; but since China under the Kuomintang never gained the strength to force the issue, an occasion did not arise where it might have been demonstrated as to what these statements meant in practical implementation. Moreover, since Britain was in a position militarily vis a vis Nationalistic China to guarantee Tibet's autonomy as envisioned by Tibet and Britain, Nationalist China was probably never tempted to challenge the opposition's stand.

Thus when India stepped into Britain's shoes the situation turned even more complex, for on the one hand Tibet's status stood

48 Bell, op. cit., p. 154.

49 Richardson, op. cit., p. 233.
as ill-defined as ever before while on the other hand India was hardly as powerful militarily as Britain had been. Furthermore, the new regime in China had exhibited its military prowess and had made it manifest that it would not hesitate to use force to accomplish its goals. No wonder then that India felt safer in letting Communist China take the initial step in Tibet.

India was first spurred into some action only when in August certain statements of the Chinese leaders indicated that the invasion of Tibet was imminent. Prior to that, as has already been noted above, India had taken precautionary measures to guard her northern frontiers, but no approaches appear to have been made to the Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan problem in the light of new developments. On August 22, the Indian ambassador expressed the hope before the Prime Minister of new China that the Tibetan issue would be settled peacefully. He received a somewhat vague reply that China was prepared for a peaceful solution but Tibet had to be liberated. Knowing fully well this did not clarify the issue very much, the Indian Government did not press for any further elucidation at this time. In the meantime, while Tibet was making attempts to have her independence recognized on some firmer basis, India apparently did not feel called upon to restrain Tibet in her actions, but India did advise that state to send a delegation to Peking. India was, therefore, pinning her hopes on direct negotiation between China and Tibet, hoping that this would not only
clarify certain points which were a mystery until then but also save the situation from acquiring a character which might involve a show of force and place India in a very awkward and embarrassing position.

India's worst fears came alive when, even while negotiations between the Tibetan delegation and the Chinese ambassador were proceeding in New Delhi, news was received that China had invaded Tibet. India fired away a strong protest to China. Nehru said in the Parliament on December 7, 1950, that "I see no difficulty in saying to the Chinese Government that whether they have suzerainty over Tibet or sovereignty over Tibet, . . . the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else." In view of the fact that later on India quietly accepted the Chinese verdict in Tibet, with Nehru even attempting to convince the Indian people and the world that India had never challenged the position of China in Tibet, It needs to be asked why India protested to China as she did when the news of Chinese invasion was received in New Delhi.

In terms of India's interests, it is not difficult to see that an autonomous Tibet could have become a buffer zone between India and China. Therefore, while India was hoping that peaceful negotiations between China and Tibet might bring into existence

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50Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 189.

a state of affairs where Tibet might have had some control over her affairs, India knew as soon as she learned of the Chinese invasion and its certain success that all hopes of autonomous Tibet were lost. India had almost no legal grounds for complaint. She lacked the military power to assist Tibet to any effective degree. India, therefore, pursued the only alternative course left to her, and protested sharply to China accusing her of committing aggression against a peaceful people. Then, too, India took it as an affront that China had betrayed her trust with India.

Aside from the protests, India did not take any other steps in the issue of Tibet. Unable to establish an autonomous Tibet, India's interests required her to avoid hostilities with China if at all possible. India feels that it is in the best interests of her security to avoid any unnecessary friction with a powerful neighbor whose common boundary with India runs the length of about 2,000 miles. By no means is it implied here that under these circumstances there are no limits to which China could push, and that India would not try under any circumstances to check China. There was no question in anyone's mind that above all else India had no right of interference in Tibet. At the same time the Indian Prime Minister made it known in no uncertain terms where India considered her northern boundaries to lie, making it implicit that if China crossed those boundaries India would fight to defend her borders. At the time of the Tibetan crisis, Prime Minister Nehru said in Parliament:
Where the question of India's security is concerned, we consider the Himalayan mountains as our border. Therefore the principal barrier to India lies on the other side of Nepal. We are not going to tolerate any person coming over that barrier. ⑤2

Moreover, when India strengthened her position in the border states by renewing her treaties with Bhutan and Sikkim and placing their external affairs in her own hands, India left no doubt as to her resolve to protect her boundaries in case of transgression.

At the same time India did not want the United Nations to step into the Tibetan case because she was afraid that Tibet would in this manner become the object of cold war pressures which would bring further Western interference in Asian affairs, something that India considers as being contrary to her interests. This would have also meant cutting off all prospects of finding a modus vivendi with China in Asian affairs in the future. Thus India withdrew herself from the Tibetan conflict to guard her national interest.

⑤2 The Hindu, December 7, 1950.
CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSIONS

It can now be said that in dealing with Russia and China from 1947-1955 India was guided by her national interest. On the basis of the material covered in the earlier chapters, it can also be said that in thinking of India's national interest, the leaders of India are primarily concerned with maintaining the territorial and economic security of India. The two are indeed intertwined to the extent that it is hard to think of maintaining territorial integrity in the modern world without a sound economic base. At the same time without economic independence a country's political independence becomes a sham, while it is difficult to conceive of economic independence without the existence of political independence. The Indian concept of national interest then revolves around the problem of devising policies which will protect India's political and economic security in the present and in the future.

It is true that India's relations with Soviet Russia and Communist China during 1947-1955 were marked throughout by a desire on the part of India to seek cooperation with these two countries. While Soviet Russia and Communist China did not reciprocate India's cooperative attitude until 1953, this did not prevent India, during the earlier period, from making all possible efforts to seek a
modus vivendi with these countries. India's leaders have admired Soviet Russia for the last three decades because of the accomplishments of that country in the economic field and the social field.

Yet it is clear that the moving forces in India's foreign policy are not to be found in any ideological attractions to Communism or the Soviet system. Whatever interest was felt by the Indian leaders in the Soviet experiments, it never led them to advocate a communist system of government or entertain any thought of being dominated by Soviet Russia in any way. In the case of China, India did not hesitate to recognize Communist China as soon as the Nationalist regime had been ousted from the China mainland. In this way, India's leaders let it be known that the communist nature of the new regime was no barrier in their eyes in order to establish friendly diplomatic ties between India and China. At the same time, however, India's foreign-policy makers made it manifest that they stood for democratic institutions in India and would not suffer any interference from outside in this regard. Moreover, India continued her close economic and Commonwealth ties with the Western world throughout the above-mentioned period.

On the other hand, the available data shows quite clearly that the course which India followed in her relations with Russia and China over the period of 1947 to 1955, was guided by considerations of economic and political security. Her leaders feel that in maintaining India's territorial security, they cannot ignore
the fact that Russia and China are powerful countries in the neighbor-
hood of India. There are about three ways in which a possible threat to Indian territorial integrity from these countries can be averted. Firstly, it can be done by making attempts to foster cooperation between these countries and India so as to remove any doubts on the part of these countries that India is hostile to them. The policy of non-alignment has helped in this regard. Simi-
larly, a timely retreat in the issue of Tibet proved to be the right step in this direction. Also, a return to the neutral corner after the first two moves in the Korean problem proved to be the right approach for this purpose.

Secondly, Indian security could be strengthened by adopting measures to strengthen India internally so as to discourage any thought of expansion toward India on the part of these coun-
tries in the future. The policy of seeking aid from any source to build India's industrial and military potential has brought desired success in this area. Thus in spite of Soviet criticism India has relied on heavy aid from the Western countries, especi-
ally the United States, finding it to be the best source of assist-
tance in this sphere. At the same time when the Soviets agreed to build a steel plant in India, the foreign-policy makers of India readily accepted the offer because a move of this type speeds up the process of building India internally.

Thirdly, Indian security could be furthered by strengthen-
ing the border outposts of India so as to warn the future
aggressors that any trespassing of Indian territory will not go unchallenged. To this end India has taken over the control of border states like Sikkim and Bhutan, and has intervened in the affairs of Nepal, to make certain that boundaries of India are well protected.

India's leaders are thinking of India's political security when they take cognizance of the fact that territorial integrity would have no meaning if within India communist elements took over power and subjugated the internal and external policies of India to the designs of a foreign power. It is with this in mind that the Indian leaders, while being cooperative with Russia and China on the international scene, make every effort to prevent the local Communists from coming to power in India. Thus Indian leaders oppose any aid from Communist China or Russia to the local Communists and make it manifest that such a move by any of these countries is considered interference in the internal affairs of India, which independent India resents. As Prime Minister Nehru put it once: "It is one thing to admire other countries, and seek to learn from them. Let us do so by all means. It is totally a different thing to think of that country as more one's own than one's own country."  

It is considerations of territorial integrity which motivate India's leaders to seek a place of influence in Asia and

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1Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 1, No. 7 (May 22, 1952), cc. 391.
Asian affairs. Stationed in the heart of Asia, India's leaders feel that India's security would be threatened if countries surrounding India fell a prey to foreign control. Thus India's leaders seek to eliminate Western control from Asian countries, since the West alone has been responsible for subjugating countries of Asia in the past. When Soviet Russia, for reasons of her own, supports India in this sphere, India welcomes the support. But when Soviet Russia attempts to extend her own influence in Asia, even though through China, India resents it. It is in view of this factor that India has attempted, and will probably continue to attempt, to free China from Soviet ties in matters of Asian interest. Toward this end India has pressed for the United Nations recognition of China, and in the Korean issue sought to encourage China to take a line independent of Moscow. India recognizes that China is a part of Asia, and will inevitably play an important role in the affairs of Asia in the future. With India's ever present interests in Asia, India sees a much better chance of striking a modus vivendi with China in Asian matters without Soviet influence than with the Soviet influence on China.

It is also a matter of territorial integrity in so far as the issues of Kashmir and Goa are concerned. Kashmir's strategic location makes it incumbent upon Indian leaders to retain this territory in the interests of India's security, there being no question in India's mind that the territory was acquired
legally in the first place. Similarly, India would always feel threatened if Goa, as a part of the Indian territory, remained in foreign hands. When Soviet Russia supports India's case in these two issues, she considers it in her interests to welcome this support.

India's leaders have India's economic security in mind when they insist on economic aid without strings, and when they seek to build the industrial base in India with help from every source rather than from one source alone. In the long run a measure of self-sufficiency alone will provide real economic independence. At the same time too much dependence upon one source might impose economic subjugation thus endangering political independence itself.

The sources of Indian foreign policy aims, then, lie in the Indian concept of national interest which emphasizes territorial and economic security above all.
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AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I, Sudershan Chawla, was born in Lahore, India before partition, on September 1, 1924. I matriculated from Government High School, Delhi, India, in May 1939. I entered the Delhi University in August 1939, and completed the requirements for the Bachelor of Arts degree in Physics and Mathematics in May, 1943. From 1943 to 1944, I travelled widely in India. From September 1944 to May 1946, I attended the St. Xavier's College in Bombay, India, to work toward a degree in advanced communications fields. But without completing this degree, I left India for the United States toward the end of 1946. I arrived in the United States in March, 1947. I attended Coyne Electric School in Chicago from March 1947 to March 1948, receiving a diploma in radio technology at the end of that period.

In September 1948, I entered the graduate school at the Ohio State University, where I received the degree of Master of Arts in English Literature in June 1949. I registered in September 1949 with the graduate school to work toward a Ph.D. degree in Political Science. In September 1950, I married an American girl from Columbus, Ohio.

In June 1951, I left my studies to work with the Voice of America in New York. I was with the Voice from June 1951 to October 1953.
In the fall quarter of 1953, I returned to the Ohio State University and completed my comprehensive examinations in December 1954.

In March 1955, I left the United States for a trip abroad. My wife and I reached India in September 1955 after a few months travel in various countries of Europe. In India I carried out research for my dissertation.

I returned to the United States in May 1957, and proceeded to write the dissertation. At the same time I taught as a graduate assistant at the Ohio State University. In September 1955, I accepted a full-time teaching position with Muskingham College.

I have declared my intention to settle in the United States.