ROBERT LANSING:
AN INTERPRETIVE BIOGRAPHY

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

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The major source of information concerning Robert Lansing's personal beliefs and career rests in the subject's private papers at the Library of Congress and Princeton University Library. The Private Memcranda Books of the first collection are a well known source, but much substantive material may be acquired by patient reading of the bound correspondence. The Princeton collection is a small but important source especially in terms of Lansing's correspondence for the period after 1918. While at the Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, I received invaluable assistance from Ruth S. Nicholson, Charles P. Cooney, and especially Marilyn K. Farr. My research at Princeton was encouraged by Alexander P. Clark, Curator of Manuscripts, and by Mrs. Lynn A. B. Fremuth.

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INTRODUCTION

Nature never intended Mr. Lansing to be a leader of men, to fight for a great cause, or to engage in physical or intellectual combat. His life has been too soft for that, and his is naturally indolent. . . . He is, to use a word so often misapplied, a gentleman, and his motto is Noblesse oblige.

--Anonymous [Clinton W. Gilbert], The Mirrors of Washington (1921)

Mr. Lansing's mediocrity happily does not matter, since for all practical purposes the President is his own very admirable Secretary of State.

--The Outlook (1918)

The country has never quite appreciated Lansing. No other Secretary of State had so difficult a task. . . . The country owes Lansing much and some day I hope appreciation may be shown for his service during the perilous days of the Great War.

--Colonel Edward Mandell House (1928)

My critics do not place themselves in the position that I was at the time. . . .; I wish I could make my countrymen see my position. . . .

--Robert Lansing (1921)

No reputable historian would deny that Robert Lansing deserves consideration in any narrative or analysis of the United States' foreign relations during the Great War. As one of the nation's recognized authorities on the subject of international law he was designated in March of 1914 to replace retiring John Bassett Moore as Counselor for the Department of State in order to counterbalance the dubious
credentials of his immediate superior, the "Great Commoner" from Nebraska, Secretary of State William Jannings Bryan. In the early summer of the following year Bryan resigned the portfolio in protest over the administration's policy in the renewed Lusitania crisis. Lansing, in turn, was chosen to fill the republic's oldest cabinet post because President Woodrow Wilson believed he required only a "clerk" skilled in the technicalities of international law and protocol to expedite the policies which the President would formulate himself upon the suggestions rendered by his intimate friend and unofficial adviser, Colonel Edward Mandell House. Lansing played his assigned role well, particularly because he quickly discovered that Wilson would be receptive to more policy suggestions from him than most contemporaries expected. Time and events, however, mellowed Wilson's developing fondness for his Secretary, and by early 1919 if not before, the President had come to regard Lansing as offering the administration only limited strength. In February of 1920, he finally forced Lansing's resignation and publicly charged him with a crime only technically short of treason—the "assumption of Presidential authority" during Wilson's be-lindered illness.

This capsulated presentation of Robert Lansing's public history would be accepted without reservation by scholars of the period. Nevertheless, it is indeed ironic that a man's career—any man's career, but especially that
of a war time Secretary of State—can be recorded in the limited space occupied by some two hundred words. Upon reading the paragraph, however, two questions are brought to mind as having been ignored. First, to what extent was Woodrow Wilson "receptive" to Lansing's suggestions on American foreign policy; and, second, what was the nature and scope of those suggestions themselves?

To answer this first foil is by no means an easy task. In fact the historiography on the subject "Robert Lansing" has concentrated primarily upon this problem for the last half century without yet reaching any form of consensus. The first generation of historians to analyze the Secretary's role found him to be precisely as Wilson originally had intended, a mere legal clerk whose function it became to expedite policies formulated by the President and Colonel House. Writing even before Lansing's death in 1928, Professor Julius W. Pratt became the first to present the individual as "but one of the instruments through which Wilson directed his foreign policy."¹ This interpretation nevertheless is associated most often with the official biographer of Colonel House, Professor Charles Seymour. In his now famous caustic attacks of 1935, he proclaimed that despite "whatever Lansing himself might feel . . ., the President himself controlled foreign affairs and made up his own mind;" the Secretary's "positive . . . influence upon Wilson . . . cannot be regarded as a factor. . . ." requiring serious attention by students of American foreign policy.²
This school of thought, despite serious attacks by a growing percentage of historians, has lingered into the present day. Refined and perpetuated through the most highly esteemed diplomatic textbook of the 1930's and 1940's, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* by the late Samuel Flagg Bemis, the interpretation still is defended by no less a scholar than President Wilson's definitive biographer. "The evidence," writes Professor Arthur Stanley Link, "shows clearly that Wilson played the dominant role in the conduct of foreign policies, . . . and made all vital decisions, often contrary to the advice of Bryan, Lansing, and House."  

Although no scholar denies that Wilson made "all vital decisions" on policy himself, as a President is constitutionally required to do, many would question the degree of independent thought the chief executive utilized in determining the course foreign relations would follow. A second grouping of historians credit Lansing with having an important function in the give-and-take intellectual process which Wilson used to formulate his ideas; whereas a third school of historiography supports the belief that, at least in select geographic areas or on particular diplomatic problems, the Secretary of State either held a degree of autonomy or possessed a determinative influence over the precise direction the American diplomatic course would pursue. There yet remains a considerable difference of opinion even within these latter two interpretations, primarily in terms of
whether the influence Lansing held was or was not in the best national interest. Professor Charles Callan Tansill and, most recently, British journalist Colin Simpson have censured Lansing for, as they incorrectly claim, having "numerous personal and financial connections with Wall Street," while co-authors Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage have unconvincingly argued that the Secretary "seems to have fumbled nearly every legal issue" before the Department of State.  

Starting in the mid-1950's, a whole new generation of research on Robert Lansing began to appear which sought to place the Secretary in what the participants considered to be a more judicious perspective. Lansing, they argued, had been ignored both by his contemporaries and by historians not because he contributed little to the administration, but because his quiet and reserved personality had "evaporated" when contrasted to the commanding presence of Wilson and House. After political scientist Edward H. Buehrig had suggested in 1955 that Wilson had modified his views concerning the European war upon considering Lansing's effectual arguments in support of the necessity of preserving the European balance of power, 7 Professor Daniel M. Smith expanded the hypothesis into the first monograph devoted entirely to the Secretary. In Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914-1917, Smith outlined how Lansing helped shape United States neutrality policies in the early months of the European war
and, thereafter, how he remained a strong advocate of a firm approach to the German submarine issue. On the basis of his private memoranda books, Lansing was depicted by Smith as combining ideological considerations with a "realistic" concern for the nation's economic and security interests in the European war, and to have concluded in July of 1915 that on both grounds a German victory should be prevented, even by American intervention if necessary. Often working through House, Lansing influenced Wilson by recommending measures which were supported by concrete economic considerations and by couching other policy suggestions in idealistic terminology which he knew appealed to the President's psychology.  

Ambassador George F. Kennan agrees with Smith's presentation of Lansing as a realist, and in his own noted study of Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, Kennan credits the statesman with a major role in formulating the policy of nonrecognition of the Bolshevik regime and an important influence in the decision to intervene in Siberia to rescue the Czechoslovak legion. Likewise, the Wilsonian policies toward the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and the creation of independent Central European states more or less along national lines has now been firmly accredited to Lansing's influence by the scholarship of Victor S. Mamatey and George Bárány. The study of Lansing's contributions to the East Asian policy of the United States, however, has resulted in at least one interestingly new conclusion.
Professor Burton F. Beers has reevaluated the Lansing-Ishii Agreement from the perspective of the Secretary's--and not Wilson's--long range objectives and has concluded that because the President would not accept Lansing's advice any more than he did, "the United States missed at least two opportunities to reach understandings with Japan" which "might well have opened the way for substantial American accomplishments in East Asia."¹¹

The historiography on the subject of Robert Lansing is quite desolate when contrasted to other aspects and questions tangent to the Great War.¹² It must be strongly emphasized, however, that the "discovery" of Lansing occurred only two decades ago. Any answer therefore to the question concerning the extent to which President Wilson was receptive to Lansing's suggestions on American foreign policy must be weighed on imbalanced scales. With fifty active years spent in analyzing the actions of Wilson and House some historians still too often regard Lansing's claimants as upstart "revisionists" who are endeavoring somehow to diminish the stature of the President himself. This, of course, is not the case. The new generation of historians seek only to understand better the decision-making process which occurred within the Wilson Administration. They are not presenting Lansing as a reincarnated Friedrich von Holstein, the quiet but seemingly all powerful sage of the post-Bismarckian Wilhelmstrasse, but as an individual whose rational and
perspective analysis of foreign affairs was frequently utilized by his President. The future, at least for a time, belongs to the students of the third school of thought on Lansing's influence; Professors Smith, Kennan, Mamatey, Bárány, Beers, and others have raised questions which cannot be ignored any longer by those who have traditionally preferred to perceive the President as the omnipotent giver of policy.

It is not as much the intent of this study to actively engage in this historiographical debate per se, as it is to attempt to answer the second question previously asked with the hope that through such limited considerations a new perspective may be acquired from which others may endeavor to better determine the degree of President Wilson's receptiveness to Lansing's suggestions. As with the first question, the second foil, as to the nature and scope of the foreign policy suggestions which Secretary Lansing made to his President, is not easily answered. As with most men studied by the historian, Lansing's recommendations were usually the product of thought and deliberation and reflected the Secretary's own background, education, professional experience, and personal philosophies and prejudices. In essence, to understand Robert Lansing's policy suggestions the student must first understand the subject Robert Lansing himself.

As an amateur historian, Lansing realized the necessity of placing the investigation of any historical problem
within this personal context. Reflecting in later life upon his own career, he wrote a friend of some forty years that above all else, "historical events are essentially the acts of public men," and

to comprehend them and to place them in their true relation to the surrounding political and social conditions we should know the actors, their attainments, experience and motives, in a word, their characters. Biography thus becomes a vital factor of history. Without it history is nothing more than a lifeless and dull chronological record.13

It is to Robert Lansing's own "character" that this biography must consequently turn.
CHAPTER I

LAN Sing OF WATERTOWN

Robert Lansing's thirty year association with the Department of State maintained a family tradition for public service that extended back across some six generations.¹ Around the year 1640, Gerrit Frederickes Lansingham reestablished his prominent Dutch family in the region of Albany, New York. Through the efforts of the next four generations of attorneys, land speculators, andburgers, the family had acquired, by the 1770's, considerable tracts of land along the banks of the Hudson River; this resource enabled Lansing's ancestors to secure positions of trust and responsibility within the community well before the American Revolution. When the war did occur, the Lansings pledged themselves openly to the rebels' cause. Robert Lansing's great-great-grandfather, Jacob J. Lansing, served as a member of the famous New York Committee of Public Safety in 1775, and as a colonel in the Continental Army. The third of Jacob's four sons, John, is perhaps the best known ancestor. As one of the most prominent State politicians at the war's end, he served in the new legislature before becoming Chancellor of New York; previously, however, John had been a delegate to the Federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia where

¹
he resigned after six weeks service rather than support the proposed strong central government.

John's brother, Jacob's oldest son, Sanders Lansing, had been a distinguished Albany lawyer before his marriage into one of Eastern New York's most respected families, the Ten Eycks. His father-in-law, Jacob C. Ten Eyck, had been an officer in the war before being named to the Court of Common Pleas, while his new brother-in-law, also named Jacob, would become a member of the State Assembly and a county judge. By his wife Catherine, Sanders had but one son, whom they named Robert in 1799. It would be this latter Lansing who at age eighteen would move to Watertown, then a small settlement on the shore of Lake Ontario. Robert served the community as district attorney from 1826 to 1833, and as State Senator after 1831 until he resigned in 1847 to accept an appointment as County Judge which he received through the influence of his wife's brother, State Supreme Court Justice Frederick W. Hubbard.

In 1832, a year after Senator Lansing married his first wife, Maria Hubbard, the first Lansing was born in Watertown. Named John but called "Bertie" by his mother, the boy would mature in time to become the city's leading attorney and a leader in civic affairs. He might well have become mayor had it not been for his political affiliation; then as with today a Democrat in upstate New York can be viewed as the most singular of oddities. In early 1864,
John married Miss Maria Lay Dodge and thus united the Lansings with another family of "quality." John's father-in-law, Edwin Dodge, had settled near Watertown around 1800 and had gained wealth and prestige for himself as one of Gouverneur Morris' land agents. Dodge later served in the State Assembly and as a judge for the State Circuit Court. Before his death in 1877 at age 76, Judge Dodge would have ample opportunity to see his four grandchildren by John and Maria Lansing, the first of whom was born in the year 1864.²

To this heritage of public service and law Robert Lansing was born on Monday, the seventeenth day of October, 1864. As with the young Henry Adams he never questioned in his youth the duty for which destiny and lineage seemed to have called him, and in contrast to Adams, Lansing's own "education" only confirmed this boyhood resolve. He formally prepared for a legal career by taking advantage of the educational opportunities which were open to him in Watertown. After attending a private grammar school operated by Master Hannibal Smith, he concluded his preparatory studies at Watertown High School where he seemed to have developed strong interests in History, Mathematics, Composition, and Ancient Languages. Young "Bert" Lansing was remembered as a bright student who possessed above average intellectual abilities, but equally an individual who would never distinguish himself by reason of his mind. If Bert
were not brilliant, he did have the ability and inclination to expend the time and effort that might be needed to accomplish his goals. A hard worker, often meticulous about detail, he might have become a plodder had it not been for active non-academic interests which inspired him not to prolong his studies any longer than needed.³

In the summer of 1882, Lansing graduated from high school and entered Amherst College the following fall. For the next four years he undertook a curriculum which emphasized both the traditional classical approach to education and the most modern developments in the natural sciences.⁴ Throughout his freshman and sophomore years, he was required to take courses in Mathematics,⁵ Rhetoric and Declamation, and Ancient Languages. Although his grades were only average he must have sincerely enjoyed Greek and Latin literature since they left a favorable impression upon him that would last for the rest of his life.⁶ In his sophomore and junior years he completed his requirements for Modern Languages by taking a year each of French and German while, at the same time, he began the study of Natural Sciences. Surprisingly, it was in these two latter fields that Bert Lansing received his highest marks while at Amherst.⁷ His studies generally improved, however, throughout his junior and senior years when he received the opportunity to elect Debate, English Literature courses in Shakespeare and the Brownings, several Philosophy classes, and, of special
interest for him, four courses in religion: Catechism, Theism, Christian Evidences, and Religions of the World. In the fall term of his senior year the future Secretary of State failed to receive a passing grade in Political Economy.

Several useful observations may be made about Lansing's academic undertakings at Amherst College. The first of which is the most striking: he was by no means a scholar. When he received his degree on June 30, 1886, it read Bachelor of Arts, 

*rite*; his cumulative grade point average was only 2.327 on a scale of five points. Second, Bert had a love for history, particularly State and local history, which had sufficiently prepared him through his own readings so that he was excused from taking the courses which Amherst required of all Freshmen. Finally, a word must be said about his study of Psychology. It is not tenable to claim, as some historians have tried, that Lansing's introduction to psychology at college "undoubtedly assisted him" in later years "to analyze the President's mental processes. ..." since in reality the subject as he studied it in his Senior year was fundamentally different from the subject as studied by later generations. The course which Lansing attended, and the psychology which he understood, was departmentalized as a Philosophy and not as a Science and was described by the author of the textbook which Lansing used as "a psy[c]hography rather than a psychology; and [the subject] should not assume for itself the prerogatives of an exact science."
Upon his graduation from college Lansing had not yet completed his formal education. He returned to Watertown in the summer of 1886 and entered his father's law firm as a clerk. For the next two and one-half years he read law. As he prepared to follow his family's traditional profession he also began to consider his public service heritage as well. He joined the Jefferson County Democratic Party and secured an appointment to its executive committee that same year. In 1887, Lansing was elected the committee's Secretary, and from 1888 to 1891 he served as its Chairman.10

Meanwhile, in February of 1889, the New York State Bar Association admitted Robert Lansing to its membership upon the successful completion of his examinations. Only one more requirement stood in the way before he could claim the title of a properly educated "gentleman." For the remainder of that year Lansing took the Grand Tour by traveling through Great Britain, the Netherlands, and then south through Belgium, Germany, France, Switzerland, and finally on to the Mediterranean countries. With his return to Watertown his father made him the junior partner of his firm, now renamed Lansing and Lansing.11

Nevertheless, Bert Lansing's education had not been confined either to the classroom, to his father's law office, or to his travel. The experiences he encountered during his formative years in Watertown remained as important events in the future Secretary of State's maturation. Yet of all
the experiences which influenced his development, perhaps none were more effectual than those which centered at 143 Clinton Street. It is here, upon a single acre of land that John Lansing had constructed his simply ornamented, twenty-one room Victorian house, and it is within this same house that Robert Lansing's personality and character first began developing.12

The Lansings of Clinton Street were well known within their community as one of the original Watertownian families of quality, position, and property. It does not seem as if the Lansings themselves made any real attempts to down play this image. John Lansing dominated his household and must have instilled within its members a vivid awareness of status and the nineteenth-century tradition which declared that it is the social responsibility of any community's aristocracy to participate actively, if not dominate, in public affairs. Both of his daughters, for example, are remembered to have been pleasant young ladies with the normal amount of potential suitors, yet John Lansing never believed any of the gentlemen were socially "good enough" for his girls. Although this was a normal paternalistic feeling, he perhaps carried it to an extreme. With his death in 1907, both Emma Sterling and Katharin Ten Eyck were already in their thirties; they would never marry. This did not mean, however, that their lives were without accomplishment. On the contrary, working as a team, Emma and Katharin Lansing were instrumental
in founding a local visiting nurse society and played a significant role in the creation of the American Red Cross. Further, both women were later decorated by the French Government for their heroism and service as part of the nursing unit which followed the first American Expeditionary Force onto the battlefields in 1917. Despite a genuine sense of humanitarian compassion the sisters never lost their aloofness which perhaps can be best described by the phrase "social arrogance."\(^{13}\)

As for the sons of John Lansing, the youngest was a frail child who died before the girls were even born,\(^{14}\) while the oldest was fortunate enough to share in the warmth of this strong, closely knit family. Bert, according to the remembrances of his sister Emma, inherited his father's talent and temperament. Neither seemed ever to become agitated or angry, at least not in public. Although he possessed a good sense of humor when with his family and friends, Bert is mostly remembered as a shy individual who would often read far into the night.\(^{15}\) He enjoyed his father's library of some two thousand volumes, where he spent many evenings with his famous pot of cold coffee and a book on government, state or local history, or even a detective story or a dictionary. He once listed his favorite authors as historians Francis Parkman, Thomas Babington Macaulay, Edward Gibbon, and Thomas Carlyle, and English authors William Thackeray and William Shakespeare; "but I can't say that I get more
genuine enjoyment anywhere than I do in the Colonial Documents of New York, especially when they deal with the Iroquois Indians," a subject in which Lansing possessed a degree of expertise.16 Indeed, to satisfy his desire to read he resorted to inventing a bracket which would hold an oil lamp at the head of his bed and a bookrack for the bathtub.17

The studious Lansing also acquired an artistic side to his personality. Since his days at Amherst, he had developed a fondness for poetry as a means for relaxation, and, in time, he began to write his own verse as "an intellectual exercise," especially during periods of worry and frustration.18 Yet Lansing the artist is best known for his skilled caricatures, a hobby which annoyed many friends and associates. Although he never had any formal training, he would sit in meetings with a pad of paper before him and a pencil in his left hand and sketch the faces of real or imaginary people as he continued to participate in the business going on about him. The ambidextrous Lansing seemed to carry on this exercise with precision yet as a subconscious release occurring automatically "as if he were thinking of something else while his pencil moved over the paper."19 It is not surprising therefore that Lansing also turned to oils as a medium, particularly the painting of landscapes. Using bright colors, he expressed himself as a decided realist: almost photographic clarity with an eye for minute detail.20
Mild in temperament, contemplative, studious, artistic, Bert Lansing equally possessed the ability to experience intense love. Twice every Sunday he would travel into town to attend the First Presbyterian Church of Watertown, an institution founded by his ancestors. There, in the late 1880's, he met Miss Eleanor Foster, a tall, striking lady who came frequently to Watertown visiting her elder sister, the wife of the Reverend Allen Macy Dulles. Her family home was in Evansville, Indiana, but she had lived in Mexico City, St. Petersburg, and Madrid while her father served as United State Minister. For Lansing, Eleanor represented culture, refinement, and the world outside of Watertown, and the contest for her hand is reported to have been intense. She was the current belle of Washington society, and the upstate New York lawyer had more than one rival; when victory did come, on January 15, 1890, the wedding became one of the social events of the season. With bridesmaids in attendance from the official families of the day, the service was held in the substantial Foster home on Eighteenth Street, in the northwestern quarter of the District of Columbia.21

After the wedding, Lansing and his bride returned to Watertown where they probably anticipated spending the rest of their lives. Bert had acquired a deep sense of loyalty to his father and to the community, and John Lansing had let it be known that he expected his son to remember his heritage.22 Bert seems to have agreed with his father at first; yet over the course of the next
seventeen years, powerful forces would pull upon Lansing which became harder to resist as time advanced.

II

After having accepted the responsibilities of a wife, Lansing began to expand his activities in the realm of public service. It is probably at this juncture in his life that he successfully stood for election as a Ruling Elder of the Session at the First Presbyterian Church. In the case of his religious activities, however, it is totally incorrect to assume that he was motivated by the pressures of heritance. Robert Lansing was an exceedingly religious individual throughout his adult life. He regularly attended church services twice a week, on Sunday and Thursday evenings, and he taught two Sunday School classes each week during his years in Watertown, one for young ladies at his own church and the second at a mission serving an area around the pulp mills. Even in later years, during his tenure in Washington, ambassadors and cabinet members alike knew that the Lansings rarely accepted invitations to dine on Thursdays. The activities which he conducted in the name of his God had originally developed from his deep interest in Biblical literature. As a young man he had a special Bible bound with blank sheets of India paper between each of the printed pages; in this way he was able to extensively annotate the
Scriptures in a critical yet doctrinaire fashion. Indeed, as a conservative Protestant, Lansing's exegesis could never be interpreted as advancing even the slightest heresy. "I consider myself of the orthodox school," he wrote in 1915, which look[s] upon the Bible as containing the history of the true religion," and as containing the literal source of God's will which demands complete reliance upon the doctrine of the Christ's death and resurrection and upon individual repentance as "the only means of salvation." Lansing's religious beliefs remained a significant aspect of his psychological make-up, and in later years, as it will be shown, they became factors which helped shape his conception of American foreign policy.

Elder Lansing used his own financial resources to help establish a philanthropic society for the Watertown underprivileged and to send several local scholars on to college, but his public service activities likewise followed the more traditional political patterns. He received appointments to both the city's Library Board and its Board of Education, but his membership on the Board of Public Safety allowed him to make one of his most valuable contributions to the community. It was in this latter capacity that Lansing's dedication to minute detail enabled him to ponder over a maze of regulations governing the police and fire departments' operations. When he had finished his modernization attempts, local leaders credited him with giving Watertown one of the finest fire
companies in the country for a community of its population.  

Concurrent with his religious and municipal labors, Lansing continued to expand his participation in the Democratic Party organization as well. He had long believed that by its very nature Democracy could not survive in the United States unless each citizen took a responsible part in the affairs of his party, yet his own temperament prevented him from ever being an active or effective campaigner. As Secretary to the Jefferson County Democratic Committee, he did enjoy working with the many bureaucratic problems during the campaign of 1888, since this service entailed minimal activity before the public. Democrat Lansing was always a man of principle, however, more than a man of party. In that 1888 election he willingly cast his vote for the reelections of President Grover Cleveland and Governor David Bennett Hill, yet four years later he found it necessary to play the role of insurgent.

Politically, Lansing was a Bourbon Democrat par excellence. The Bourbons were the dominant element within the Democratic Party of the East and Mid-West for the period from 1877 to 1898. The leadership was Bourbon in the sense of being wealthy, self-esteeming, self-appointed guardians of an already fixed pattern of social and economic relationships. That is to say they embraced the existing course of the industrial revolution and they jealously guarded the machinery of material and political progress against all threats from
the increasingly restless farmers and wage laborers. As characterized by the recognized authority on Bourbon Democracy, Professor Horace Samuel Merill of the University of Maryland, these men were the conservative spokesmen of business in their party. Their aim became to prevent control of the government not only by farmers and wage earners, but by the inefficient, irresponsible, and corrupt officeholder as well. The Bourbons believed government interference in the Natural Laws of the marketplace imposed a check upon progress and, consequently, governmental regulation of the economy should be limited to the barest necessity. Likewise, because taxation was a drag on the economy, it too was to be kept to a minimum as were protective tariffs since this latter form of taxation equally interfered with Natural Law by providing a subsidy to special interests. The managers of public revenues must therefore be efficient, honest, and parsimonious and opposed to the spending of public moneys for reasons of paternalism, partisan advantage, or special interest.29

Robert Lansing embraced these conservative and reforming tenets of Bourbon Democracy in 1888, and, with little modification, he was still espousing this philosophy at his death in 1928. Such continuity of thought, however, cannot be ascribed to Governor Hill. He had gained a reputation as a reformer during the early 1870's when he participated in Samuel Jones Tilden's famous attacks upon Tammany Hall during the reign of Boss William Marcy Tweed, but since
becoming the State's chief executive, in 1885, the brilliant and ambitious Hill seemed to develop principles and methods that were highly questionable. Hill wanted his party's presidential nomination in 1892, and his strong-arm maneuvers to dominate the State party, his concessions to popular opinion and pressure groups even when they violated sound economic, social, and governmental principles, and his attempt to obtain his own election to the United States Senate while yet retaining the governorship, all combined to offend the sensibilities of reform-oriented Robert Lansing. The event which must have infuriated Lansing the most was when the New York State Democratic Committee, controlled by Chairman Edward Murphy, Jr. and other Hill supporters, set February 22, 1892, as the date for the State convention which would elect the delegates to the national convention at Chicago. Normally held in late April, this early gathering was chosen with the expectation that snowbound roads might prevent upstate rural regions such as Watertown from attending the local caucuses which selected delegates to the Albany meeting as this area's more conservative Democrats would tend to support Cleveland as opposed to aspirant Hill.

Hill's strategy produced only a technical victory. Although he did receive the endorsement of the New York convention, and the existence of the unit rule insured that the delegates would back him in Chicago, the Governor had also split the State party. Both Robert Lansing and his father
were among those who traveled to Albany, in May, to convene their own insurgent Democratic convocation and elect a second slate of delegates in protest to Hill's political methods. This meeting is not without historical significance since its occurrence gave comfort to the national supporters of Cleveland and dramatized the claim made by the former president himself, in February, that if Hill were nominated, it would be antithetical to everything the Democratic National Party claimed to exemplify, and it would "discredit and debase politics." 31

Hill's campaign ebbed after the February "snap convention" no doubt due in part to the split in his own State organization. The two Lancings were among four men elected at Albany to travel to Chicago and demand that the Committee on Credentials seat them as suitably elected Democratic delegates-at-large from New York. It must not have surprised John and Bert Lansing, however, when the doors to the National Convention refused to open at their request. In fact, William Collins Whitney, Cleveland's former Secretary of the Navy and his current floor manager, asked the rump delegation not to contest the seating of Hill's men since he was convinced of Cleveland's first-ballot renomination, a prediction that soon proved to be correct. 32

When Robert Lansing exercised his franchise, on November 8, 1892, by casting his ballot for Grover Cleveland as President of the United States, he no doubt expected that his career as a Democratic insurgent had terminated. Cleveland's
unswerving position in support of the gold standard and civil service reforms, as well as his personal desire to revise the national tariff schedules downwards, were policies which the Watertown attorney equally supported. Yet despite victory at the nation's polls, the four years of this second Cleveland Administration were trying ones for Bourbonism. Almost concurrent with his taking of the oath of office, the Republic's economic structure seemed to collapse about him. A forty-eight month depression followed. It soon became apparent to both Lansing and Cleveland, however, that the economy was not the only hostile force combating the presidency. Faced with a Congress that objected to his approach to the economic crisis, and having exhausted his patronage strength in bribing the Senate to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in the autumn of 1893, the President—never noted for his abilities as a compromiser—quickly discovered that it would be impossible to serve as an effective national leader. Even before he left the White House, in March of 1897, Cleveland had already begun to slip into political oblivion.

The events which were occurring at the nation's capital did not escape Lansing's attention. His own observations about the nature of American politics during the years following the election of 1892 began to fill him with disgust and disdain. He perceived a crisis in American government that had been caused by a Congress which would not
permit the President to expedite policies which were predicted upon a philosophy of government which the American people themselves had accepted willingly when they twice elected that same President to office. Lansing could understand the resistance offered by the Fifth-Fourth Congress during Cleveland's last two years in the White House; after all, he reasoned, this was a Republican Congress and the Republican Party was composed of men who could not be expected to appreciate the inherent virtues of Bourbonism. What he could not understand, however, was the opposition which his President encountered from members of his own political party.

For Robert Lansing, the Republican Party represented the party of centralization, a complete antithesis to Bourbon Democracy. Centralization, in turn, must be recognized for what it really was: "a virus that" "has been injected in the veins of our great body politic." This virus was extremely infectious and, if the Democratic Party did not take proper safeguards, the patient would either suffer permanent disfigurement or death. As he privately reflected upon this metaphor, he observed that the virus of Republican centralization courses through the arteries of commerce, impregnates every fibre of the nation and has been swept back to the great beating heart of the Republic only to be again sent forth to carry its influence to furthest limits of our land. Centralization means Nationalism, it means Imperialism, it means Expansion of territory, it means colonies ruled by the federal government
with the iron hand of armies, it means
Paternalism to favored classes, it means
Protection for favored industries, it means
Trusts and Combines of capital, it means
the Power of wealth gained through
governmental favoritism, and above all it
means the death of Individualism, which
made America a land of freedom and of
energy unsurpassed in the annals of the
world. This is the Progress of which the
Republican party makes its boasts. Progress,
yea, but Progress whither?

If the Republican Party were to continue its current direction, Lansing perceived only one possible answer to his rhetorical question—Socialism.

When our industries are thoroughly centralized into various Trusts and our government listens first to their wishes, it is but a short step, an easy step, to supplant the millionaire stockholders and directors with the Government; to have the Government instead of the Trust buy and make and sell and fix prices. And when that time comes individual enterprise, energy and effort will be useless.

At that future time, he predicted that the Federal Government would assume responsibility for allotting everyone's knowledge and skills, and soon it would come to pass that "Individualism will be a forgotten principle."^{33}

The role of the Democratic Party in the United States is thus "to save the Republic . . . from the mad rush of the party of Progress to Socialism. . . ."^{34} It is a vitally important role that only the Democrats can play since the only other national party in opposition at this juncture in history is the People's Party of the United States of America under the leadership of Ohio's James Baird Weaver, Georgia's
Thomas Edward Watson, and others. Yet in Lansing's mind, no alliances should be sought with this sector of the electorate since "Republicans and Populists, however they may claim to be different, are really foxes out of the same hole."  

In their often lauded collective wisdom the American people had elected, in November of 1892, a Democratic President of the United States and a Democratic Congress for the purpose of obstructing this creeping socialism. Yet Robert Lansing could not comprehend why the President's own partymen in this Fifty-Third Congress did not appear to accept the doctrine of Bourbonism anymore than did the Republicans or Populists. On issue after issue and on program after program, Cleveland's brand of Bourbonism encountered the ever increasing attacks of Senators and Representatives who called themselves loyal sons of Andrew Jackson. Then, on the fifth of March, 1895, an event occurred which prompted Lansing once again to choose the path of insurgent, only this time the path would lead him toward a reevaluation of his party allegiance as well. On that day in March, Democrats—not Populists or even Republicans—in the House of Representatives signed an appeal calling for the immediate restoration of the free and unlimited coinage of silver by the Federal Government at a ratio of sixteen ounces of silver being equal to one ounce of gold.  

As he reflected upon the bossism of David Hill, the political confrontation between the White House and Capital
Hill, and the fiscal radicalism of men such as the Nebraskan William Jennings Bryan, and as he lamented the ever undaunted propaganda for socialism, Robert Lansing slowly began to conclude that the time perhaps had come for the creation of a new political party. For Lansing, the primal idea behind the existence of any party was to unite those citizens who hold similar views in relation to the major questions of their era. He turned to history in his quandary and in so doing discovered that "all the great parties of the world have been founded through the advocates of some single principle of government uniting in their efforts to establish it and by organizing their followers for that purpose. But," he observed, "among many nations, especially Great Britain and the United States, the principle political parties have lost this fundamental idea, and have become merely a division of the electors, who are antagonistic through custom and usage." On questions such as the tariff, bimetallism, and the annexation of Hawaii, "there will be found adherents of the same idea [or position] in both parties." The American people have thus "lost the idea of party founded on principle and have, in the majority of cases, become partisans because of birth and early training." In the politics of the day, the party's "name is everything to the great majority of citizens."

Placing these reflections on paper in April of 1895, Lansing observed that "the cart is before the horse. Party
is before principle instead of principle before party," and although few men will admit it, the only thing that all the leaders of any single party ever agree upon is Senator William Learned Marcy's famous dictum of 1832, that "to the victor belong the spoils." Because of this, he felt that the United States needed a new party "composed of conscientious and patriotic American citizens" who are united by their adherence to a single political goal.

A party with one aim is the party of power and will at last [sic] succeed. If such a party could be organized with . . . its one object, laying aside all other questions until this has been won, what a grand achievement it would be for American institutions, American citizenship and American liberty.37

Robert Lansing, however, was enough of a political realist to know that neither he nor probably any other citizen could be successful in creating a political party dedicated to a single governmental principle. Even though the social and economic upheaval that existed during the tumultuous decade of the 1890's could not be denied nor minimized in terms of its impact upon the United States' political history, and even though the decade was noteworthy for the unusually large proliferation of third party movements that did occur, Lansing realized that the traditions of ideologically broad based, mass appeal parties had been too firmly established within the American political experience to be abandoned in favor of a return to the "First American Party System" with its emphasis upon conflicting ideologies.38
Lansing would mentally play with this idea of a new party for several years to come, but even then it cannot be said that his goal as expressed in 1895 ever would be forsaken. On the contrary, the apprehensions he held which produced the third party idea in the first instance would periodically reappear throughout the rest of his life. From the 1890's until his death, Robert Lansing would be studying the history of American political parties with the intent of effecting their reform.

If Lansing realized the futility of any attempt at creating a new party based upon ideological principles per se, he nevertheless cannot be chastised for surrendering himself to intellectual hypocrisy. When the Democratic Party reassembled in Chicago during July of 1896, and nominated for President of the United States the exemplar of free silver himself, William Jennings Bryan, Lansing—joined by his father and thousands of other Bourbon Democrats throughout the Republic—found himself once again in the role of insurgent. Once again he sacrificed party to the demands of principle.

No question existed in Lansing's mind as to Bryan's true identity—regardless of party labels, he was a Populist. Such men, according to the Watertown attorney, "believed in all sorts of government ownership" and they wanted to "see the government act as a great Father to the people—in other words they believe in more Paternalism than the Republicans
but less than the Socialists. However," he added, "they are all of one piece." If it ever came to a choice between these parties to the political left of Bourbonism, Lansing "would anytime prefer the paternalism of the Republican Party to that of the Populist" since "a Populist is the very worst of a Republican, so bad that the Republicans can't stand him, and they can stand a good deal too, when it comes to government control."40

Despite these strong convictions, it must have been hard for the Bourbon Democrat not to support his party's presidential nominee. It is not known if Lansing voted in the election of 1896 or not, but the fact that he did not cast his voice for Bryan seems to have troubled him for several years. Insurgent or not, Robert Lansing was a Democrat. This defection of 1896, as well as his activities four years before, continued to grate upon his conscience to the extent that he finally found it necessary to clarify his own thoughts by writing a personal justification for his actions. He began at the heart of his dilemma by asking himself "what is a Democrat?" "A man," he continued, "who follows his party standard no matter what is emblazoned upon it? Is that to be a Democrat? If it is, God help the Democratic Party." He attacked those members of his party "who think a bad Democrat is better than a good Republican" by quoting Thomas Jefferson's conviction that when a party abandons what an individual believes to be correct, then he likewise should
abandon the party. Men who always cast their ballots according to the dictates of their party are not the type of "men who make party great, for they lack force of character."41

After the historic election of 1896, Lansing would never again feel compelled to bolt his party. Such a statement, however, does not mean to infer that the dilemma he had faced in the campaign of that year—and indeed throughout the decade—would never reoccur. On the contrary, the ideological course upon which the Democratic Party soon would embark for at least the remainder of Lansing's lifetime did not in any way harmonize well with the attorney's own conservative political philosophy. There is at least one ideological tenet, however, which both Bourbon and Progressive agree upon: governmental reform. Whether it be reform of the civil service, the appointive executive bureaucracy, or the political parties themselves, this issue allowed Bourbon Lansing to remain loyal to his personal political doctrines while, at the same time, continuing to function within the national party organization. He had by the turn of the century discovered a formula for accommodating principle with party loyalty, the nature of which is nowhere better revealed than by his activities during the national campaign of 1912.42

Before the Democratic National Convention convened in Baltimore in early June of 1912, Lansing was one of several individuals who actively objected to the political methodology employed by the current leader of the New York
State Democratic Party and Grand Sachem of Tammany Hall, Charles Francis Murphy. Using tactics and strategy reminiscent of those pioneered by Governor David Hill two decades before, Murphy sought to hand-pick all of the State's ninety delegates to the Baltimore convention in order that he might retain sufficient control over the delegation so as to play the role of king maker in a contest for the presidential nomination which by no means had been predetermined. When Lansing arrived at the State convention, where he served as a member of the finance committee, he quickly joined a minority faction of upstate Democrats that included his Watertown friends John N. Carlisle and Jacob L. Ten Eyck. In Lansing's own words, this group engaged in an admittedly futile attempt to return the convention to the delegates' control and "rid our party of its 'Old Man of the Sea.'"\(^{43}\) The regular organization emerged as the victor in the ensuing contest and Murphy did indeed play a significant role at Baltimore even if he were unable to act as the determining power in the party's selection of its nominee. Yet of greater importance for the issue currently under examination, despite his objections to the Murphy organization—the same objections he voiced in the campaign of 1892—Robert Lansing was sufficiently satisfied with his attempt at reforming the convention's procedures, an attempt undertaken in the name of principle, that he was able—unlike in 1892—to write a friend of his father's that since he had been
defeated he now believed it "to be my duty to support the regular organization." The era of the young Bourbon insurgent apparently had terminated. 44

III

Robert Lansing of Watertown was more or less active in political affairs for over two score years. As previously noted, this participation was almost exclusively confined to an organizational bureaucratic nature. As a public speaker, his carefully written manuscripts tended to be convincingly read in an academic manner which prevented him from ever displaying any of the fine arts of oratory. 45 Lansing was conscious of this fact, and his speaking limitations combined with his basic shyness to convince him that his duty to the party did not include being a candidate for office. On at least two occasions in his later life, Bert Lansing was approached by influential members of the State's Democratic Party who were willing to organize a draft in order to place him in the United States Senate. Lansing always refused. 46 This ardent position was unwaveringly maintained because of a calamitous event that occurred during his years in Watertown; it seems that Lansing had always refused to be a candidate save for once.

In the latter months of 1901, a group of Democratic leaders in Watertown approached Bert Lansing and urged him to accept the partisan nomination for mayor. The Democratic
candidates were traditionally routed at the polls in this seemingly antediluvian Republican stronghold; however, with Lansing in the race things promised to be different. The well-known and popular attorney had received universal praise for his work in modernizing the police and fire departments and it appeared as if the opposition did not have any viable potential candidates of their own. Duty to party and his ancestral creed of duty to community were too much to resist. Lansing succumbed to their pleas.

The Republicans likewise felt that this was to be the Democrats' year. Upon Lansing's nomination, they countered with what most Watertownians considered to be a sacrifice candidate, James F. Pappa, the circulation manager for the Watertown Daily Times. Pappa nevertheless undertook an aggressive canvass, especially among the numerous employees of the city's paper mills. Talking informally with voters on the street and making appearances before community organizations, where he referred to Lansing as a member of the "Finger Bowl Set," Pappa was able to overturn his original disadvantage by early 1902. Lansing, meanwhile, proved to be the most reluctant of campaigners. The only formal speech that he is known to have made was an address at the Boon Street Mission, the same mission previously mentioned that Lansing himself had helped found and where he taught a weekly Sunday School class. In the spring election of 1902, Pappa defeated the Democrat by some one hundred fifty votes. Although this
was the strongest showing any Democrat had made in the mayoral race in recent history, Bery Lansing and his reluctance to campaign had engineered his own political debacle.\(^{49}\)

The address which Lansing delivered at the Boon Street Mission during January of the 1902 campaign is an interesting document that deserves at least passing consideration. Entitled "How Our City Is Governed," the speech included "a Discussion of Municipal Ownership" in which Lansing took the position that cities should not themselves own public service enterprises such as electric power plants and street car lines. The primary reason for this stand seems to be that such municipal ownership would produce a "great increase in the number of employes [sic] that would be added to the [public] pay-rolls," and "the bigger the pay-roll grows so much the more is the danger of . . . government getting into the wrong hands." Lansing unquestionably believed that

political corruption in a city . . . comes chiefly from employing a large number of men, so large that when they band together with their friends they can control elections and hold their jobs. . . . . The class of men who engage in political jobs take very little interest in politics unless they see ahead a dollar for themselves.

He did believe that "civil service examinations might help this" dilemma, but, he warned, "remember the civil service commissioners might be dishonest too."\(^{50}\)

In this campaign address, as well as in a series of private essays that he composed later that same year,\(^{51}\) Robert Lansing outlined a personal conception of public and
private finance that clearly places the Watertown attorney well within the mainstream of Bourbon economic thought. As with the Classical Liberal economists such as Adam Smith and Amasa Walter, Lansing told his audience on Boon Street that municipal ownership of public service enterprises should be opposed for the crucial reason that it would tend to restrict "the freedom of the individual in the capitalistic system." There is danger, he warned, in the whole concept of municipal ownership since the doctrine's proponents will never be content until they finally achieve the goal of socialism. If public ownership "is right in one case it should be right in the other" cases as well; if a city can own a street car line, through the rationale that it is for "the whole people," then what could prevent the city from running a hack line, a meat market, a grocery, and so on ad infinitum. To concede to this theory in part is to accept it in all of its ramifications; in time, it "will deprive some of your fellow citizens of their occupations, it will create a powerful political machine which may grind you up next, and it will make possible all sorts of jobs and steals by unscrupulous politicians."  

The only truly "great principle of government" is Individualism, a principle, according to Lansing, which leaves with "the individual every right and power that does not destroy social order." Individualism, however, has become locked in mortal combat with the antithetical force
of Nationalism, a philosophy of centralization which proposes "to give to the government every right and power that it can successfully execute." It is this conflict within the political arena that differentiates the previously examined Republican and Democratic Parties, and it is this same conflict, only transported by Lansing into the economic arena, that differentiates a strong, progressive, and free economy from one which is in decline. On the one hand "the spirit of Individualism finds expression in Competition and that arouses the energies and taxes the ingenuity of men; it is the soul of progress, the inducement to undertake new and untried fields of thought and action." On the other hand trusts, mergers, and combines "are but the offspring of the centralizing principle [of Nationalism] applied to business" and finance and are thus inherently "distructive alike of competition, individualism and progress." If allowed to develop unencumbered a trust will naturally use its great power--"its millions ..., its army of lobbyists and attorneys"--to invade "the legislative halls of State and Nation and by its very magnitude adds new laws to the statute books, which will increase its wealth at the expense of the people," thus becoming "a peril to free institutions. ..." A trust's "effect upon government is to make everything subservient to the means of facilitating business and protecting trade from interference." If trust have as their immediate consequence the corruption of government, their extended significance is
Socialism. In opposition to the view advanced by economist Thornstein Veblen in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*, Lansing's own beliefs were similar to those possessed by such individuals as the Reverend Josiah Strong, author Edward Bellamy, and economist Richard Theodore Ely, and, to a lesser extent, economist Henry George and muckraker Henry Demarest Lloyd. Despite their profoundly divergent emphases, in one way or another each of these well known authors shared Robert Lansing's conviction that the excesses of the modern industrial society might well persuade the working "classes" to accept Socialism as a panacea for the better life. Whereas men such as Josiah Strong feared a violent social revolution, Lansing did not. If Socialism were to develop in the United States Lansing predicted that it would be a peaceful evolutionary process such as the one described by that strange young man from Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts, Edward Bellamy, in his exceedingly popular utopian novel entitled *Looking Backward, 2000-1887*.

By "regulating the price of raw materials, by a system of blacklist, [by] controlling the cost to consumers by increasing or reducing the supply in accordance with the demand," by forcing retailers "to sell at prices fixed by the Trust," and by many other questionable methods, Big Business within the United States had become a "Frankenstein" monster.

In an essay written in May of 1902, in which he exemplified Bourbon economic thought and contemporary fears about
the American Republic's future existence to such an extent that it deserves to be quoted in extenso, Robert Lansing conceded that it is really not at all surprising that the people believe in government control, or, if not believing, are become convinced that the only remedy is that the government should own and manage these vast industries. Day by day the Trusts are making converts to Socialism. Is it not reasonable for a man, who sells to or buy[s] from a Trust, and who knows from actual experience that whether seller or consumer he must sell or purchase at the Trust's own prices, to think that it would be better for the people to become the one stockholder and manager of the industry? Then the seller and consumer would be given a share of the profits, by fixing a more equitable seal of prices, and the balance would be applied to government expenses. Taxes would disappear, an individual could obtain more for his raw product, the people would pay less for the manufactured article, the intermediate profits of the Trust would be eliminated. That is [the] rosy dream of Socialism. That is what Trusts are, by their example, teaching.

Once the government has taken control of the Trusts it will naturally find it necessary to expand into other areas, such as the procuring of raw materials, to prevent this sector of the economy from forming combines. Once Nationalization begins there is no convenient half-way station; that would be equally unjust. And having reached the end, where the great paternal government has monopolized every field of industry and every man is merely an employe, a slave of majorities, you have blotted out Individualism, you have destroyed Progress, you have made a man but a cog in one wheel of the great governmental machine, without power to raise himself by his own efforts. You have inaugurated an age, in which the incentive to study, to industry, to effort is absent. Society is everything, man is nothing. [Society would be nothing bu]
immense [?] anthill, in which superior knowledge and unusual toil go unrewarded. . . . Life would be but monotonous, colorless existence. Such is Socialism and to such a goal Trusts point the way.62

"Any influence" such as the trust "which is working to destroy the individual right of our citizens is an evil, a public evil, which justifies radical measures to counteract its effects."63 From Lansing's perspective there were three methods radical enough to "overcome the great enemy of Individualism." First, the United States could end the trust by a "general repeal of corporation laws." This solution, however, he quickly dismissed because it would obviously precipitate "financial panic and distress such as the world has never seen." Second, the government could assume ownership of the great trusts themselves. This, as it has been shown, Lansing equally rejected on the grounds that Socialism only perpetuates monopolies and is therefore just as antagonistic to Individualism as are the trusts. Furthermore, as in the case of municipal ownership of public service enterprises, the expansion of governmental controls produces an expansion of public pay-rolls which, in turn, results in a geometrical increase of governmental dishonesty and corruption. Obviously, for Lansing, in these first two methods the "disadvantages outweigh the advantages."64

The third "radical measure" which Robert Lansing perceived for safeguarding Individualism was a limitation of capitalistic combinations themselves. First, he suggested that federal laws be enacted prohibiting all agreements
between two or more corporations in relationship to trade, markets, and prices—-an end to Gentlemen's Agreements. Realizing that businessmen could avoid this statute by consolidating into one corporation—-by creating additional trusts— he "suggested without advocating" a variety of restrictive legislation: limitations upon the amount of capital stock a corporation may issue; prohibitions against buying or selling the stock or property of one corporation by a second; limitations upon the profits a company may pay stockholders, the surplus profit being subject to large taxation and then distribution among employees; restrictions upon the nature and type of investments a corporation may make; and, of course, strict statutes relating to any violation of this legislation and severe penalties for bribery or otherwise undermining its enforcement provisions. "By some such means" as this, Robert Lansing eagerly hoped that trusts could be prevented from "destroying the cherished principles of Individualism, . . . and [from] ruling this Republic . . . by the power of wealth instead of by the force of right principles."65

Unquestionably, Robert Lansing by 1902 had become a Bourbon Democrat in opposition to the dominant contemporary political and economic forces about him in a valiant attempt to prevent his personal Weltanschauung from becoming an anachronism in the world of the twentieth century. As a Bourbon he could not forsake the principle that Individualism is much more than just an ephemeral and abstract goal which
modern man must strive someday to obtain; on the contrary, it is a necessity of life itself, it is man's very raison d'être. Further, it is this same Individualism, expressed in terms of competition, that insures economic and social progress. As a Bourbon he equally believed that any interference with a man who is properly exercising his Individualism remains both a moral evil and a restraint upon progress. For these reasons alone Lansing could not help but condemn in principle the expansion of governmental control over the economy and society; and it is for these same reasons that Lansing justified the expansion of governmental control over one sector of the Republic--the Trusts. Their success at expressing their economic Individualism had reached a point in which their existence threatened free marketplace competition and, consequently, the Individualism of others. Ironically, in order to preserve democracy in the United States as he conceived it--in order to preserve Bourbon Democracy--Lansing came to embrace the un-Bourbon program of limited governmental regulation of the trusts. Obviously, this man of principle and of party also must be regarded as a political realist.66

IV

The more than two score years which constitute Robert Lansing's residence in Watertown were not solely confined to religious, municipal, and partisan labors. Time existed for a social life as well, and yet all of these undertakings were
subordinate to his pursuance of a legal career. When Bert and Eleanor Lansing returned to establish their home in Watertown, after their marriage in 1890, the city had much to interest the young couple. The social group to which they belonged consisted mainly of Bert's boyhood friends who were themselves members of locally prominent families and who, in turn, would eventually achieve a measure of success in law, business, journalism, and education. The Lansings frequently exchanged dinner parties with the members of this group, occasions which were dominated by involved discussions of books, politics, and cultural events.67 Somewhere around the year 1890, the men decided to formalize their relationship by organizing themselves into an association named the "Phortnightly Klub," which, at first, appears to have been a literary and debating society. The president of the club would serve for one year and he assumed the responsibility of assigning topics to each member for research. Once every two weeks, the men would assemble and listen to a formal paper ready by that member "whose time had come." Discussion would follow. In this way, each member delivered a paper once or twice a year. Besides these papers, the "P.K.," as it was referred to by the men, engaged in the production of an original play or operetta each year, such as "Breeches and Blankets," a musical comedy performed in 1901 on New York Indian life.68

The Phortnightly Klub, however, did not remain a purely intellectual organization. Starting in 1898, the
group expanded its program to include recreational activities, and, around 1904, it dropped the presentation of papers altogether. Every summer the dozen members would travel to the small Galloup Island located in the northeastern section of Lake Ontario. Here they constructed a large cottage to house themselves and their entourage, including a full-time cook and several fishing guides. For two weeks each year the men dropped all social affectations and played hard, completely isolated from all civilization since the island had neither telephone nor regular ferry service until after Lansing's death. On Galloup, the P.K. divided itself into two factions, the Dutch and the Indians, with the future Secretary of State being the leader of the former and having the august title of the Duke of Orange. His counterpart was Big Ching, a role played by the President of the Jefferson County National Bank, Robert J. Buck. The club's pennant would be raised each dawn and below it flew the pennants of the two factions, the relative position of which had been determined by the preceding day's game of quoits. Besides this traditional game they hiked, played baseball, swam, and generally ate and drank well. In later years, age forced the two factions to abandon such rigorous activities, but the island still did not lose its attraction for Lansing as a means of escape; in time, he would become a compulsive angler, and Galloup Island was located in the best black-bass fishing region in Lake Ontario.
The Phortnightly Klub remains an exceedingly important factor in any attempt to study the personality and character of the historical subject Robert Lansing. For over twenty-five years, long after he had left the city of his birth, Lansing made it a special point to return every summer to Galloup Island and spend two weeks alone with the P.K., isolated from the cares of law and diplomacy. The good that I have received from this intimate relationship," he wrote to Big Ching during an hour of reflection before sailing for the Paris Peace Conference, "where men spoke their true thoughts, I cannot estimate, but I know it has been a real factor in my life." The reason for this is that to Lansing the P.K. represented substantially more than just two weeks fishing with the "boys." Instead, it should be seen as reflecting a conflict which existed within the character and personality of Robert Lansing himself. It is a conflict that is fundamentally interrelated with his selection of a profession and of a wife.

When the New York State Bar Association, in February of 1889, admitted Robert Lansing to its membership, it was without question one of the most memorable days in the life of his fifty-seven year old father. By that date John Lansing had become one of the most respected men of the community which he served, and now he was assured that the family's historic tradition of local pre-eminence would not pass away with his death. He had served as a member of countless
municipal boards and commissions, as the founder and first
president of the Jefferson County Bar Association, and briefly as a member of the State Assembly. Now it would be his son's turn. Completely convinced that Bert would continue the ancestral heritage, John Lansing dissolved the successful partnership of Lansing and Sherman, and caused a new brass placard to be struck that ideally expresses the hope of his lifetime—"Lansing and Lansing." Evidence has already been presented to indicate that Robert Lansing accepted the pre-determined destiny in terms of community service, and the same generalization is valid as well in relationship to the traditional family profession.

Bert Lansing walked into a successful partnership, in 1889, without the slightest degree of effort on his own behalf. His family's name and his father's skills were enough to insure monetary rewards without his contribution, and, consequently, he never seemed to take an active interest in his work. One family friend who had been employed by "Captain Johnny" and son as a law clerk, described his friend as being inclined to "fool around all day at the office, reading, drawing pictures, and cracking jokes ... and then probably spend[ing] his entire evening at home." Although this is no doubt an exaggeration, it is correct to state that his lack of financial concerns meant that no necessity existed for him personally to fight out legal battles before the bench. He permitted his natural reserve
to become master of his profession. His associates called him a "Book Lawyer" since he would prepare a case given him and then turn it over to his father for presentation. Even in his office he would seldom take the initiative and when a potential client appeared he would invariably send the stranger in to consult with his father.77

A close relative of the family vividly recalled in later years how the senior partner often was puzzled and sometimes irritated by his son's diffident manner and his refusal to circulate among the Watertownians in order to solicit new clients.78 Bert Lansing apparently recognized his handicap, and he did try harder as the years passed to overcome his reserve. Perhaps one of the most important forces which gave him the fortitude to take a more dominate role in the affairs of the partnership was his sense of duty to his father and his ancestral heritage. Sometime after the turn of the century, John Lansing began to lose his sight, and although his mind remained active, it was not long before he had gone blind. Lansing conducted his father to and from the office each day, but the burden of managing the firm ever increasingly fell upon the dutiful son's shoulders.79

He had been born to serve his community and he sincerely wished to perform his task well; but aside from his religious, municipal, and partisan labors, the profession of law as practiced in a small upstate city such as
Watertown was just not as interesting as he had originally expected. It was interesting enough, and there existed sufficient opportunities to engage in the legal research that he enjoyed so much. Yet ordinary legal practice required a breadth of knowledge and he always had been an individual who favored studying a single issue or principle in depth, and, of course, there remained the theatrics of the courtroom which he approached with more than mild reluctance. There was at least one aspect of law, however, that did capture his fascination, and yet how could he continue to adhere to the requirements of lineage and still pursue his newly discovered specialization? Indeed, how could any man practice the Law of Nations in Watertown, New York? This was part of Lansing's personal conflict, a conflict that began to develop the year after he passed his Bar Examinations. In 1890, he not only married Eleanor, but he equally established a close friendship with his bride's father, John Watson Foster, perhaps the greatest authority living in the United States on the subject of International Law, and especially on the conduct of international arbitrations. 80

Former United States Minister to Mexico, Russia, and Spain, engaged in an extensive private practice as consultant for several foreign legations in the District of Columbia, Republican John Foster had been appointed, in 1891, by President Benjamin Harrison as the chief Agent for the United States before the Tribunal of the historic Bering Sea Fur
Seal Arbitration. Mindful of his own family responsibilities, he requested his son-in-law to join him in Washington, D.C. as one of his assistants. Robert Lansing agreed; in March of 1892, Foster's close friend, Secretary of State James Gillespie Blaine, officially appointed the then twenty-eight year old attorney as Associate Counsel for the United States.

Lansing was intrigued with his work on the commission and he enjoyed the opportunities that existed for travel under the guise of evidence-gathering missions. For the next fifteen years, the Watertown attorney would intermittently leave his small community and undertake to represent his nation at some of the most important gatherings in the history of international arbitration. After serving as Associate Counsel in the Bering Sea Fur Seal Arbitration between 1892 and 1893, he was appointed Counsel for the United States on the Bering Sea Claims Commission which sat from 1896 to 1897, and, later, he was both Counsel and Solicitor before the historic Alaskan Boundary Tribunal which met in 1903. In the course of his research he was able to journey more than once to Victoria in British Columbia, Montreal, Halifax, the Pacific Coast States, and Alaska, and there were extended stays in Paris and London while attending sessions of the tribunals. Between these offices, he also served as counsel for the Mexican and Chinese Legations at Washington, D.C., and he represented private parties before Canadian-American
and Venezuelan arbitral commissions. Under the careful
guidance of Foster--an individual who himself would be hon-
ored by an interim appointment as Secretary of State--Robert
Lansing developed into a bona fide expert on the Law of
Nations.

This work with Foster was the hardest task Lansing
had undertaken. Being a counsel and preparing an arbitration
case, as he once remarked, "is constant and anxious work, in
which the mental and physical faculties are under a severe
strain; yet the interest and importance of the struggle com-
penstate for all the hard work done." Regardless of his
rewarding specialization, between each arbitral session and
at the end of every commission, Lansing returned to the city
of his birth and continued to be the dutiful son who would
carry out the family heritage. For fifteen years this would
be the pattern of his profession. Then, in the year 1907,
all of this changed when the senior partner of Lansing and
Lansing died at the age of seventy-five years. Before that
eventful year had terminated, Bert and Eleanor Lansing had
established their permanent residence at 1323 Eighteenth
Street, Northwest, in the federal district of Washington.

Paternal loyalty prevented Lansing from pursuing
his chosen career full time until he had reached the age of
forty-three years. The death of his father eased a major
dilemma of the attorney's life; however, it must be
emphasized that this death did not in any way solve the
quandary. The problem did not exist because of John Lansing, but because the son was himself a Lansing, a Lansing of Watertown. From his youth he had ideologically embraced the ancestral creed of public service to this community, and as a result he would never feel completely secure in his decision to move from his "home." Although he did move to Washington in 1907, he never left Watertown in spirit and at no time during his life did he allow a year to pass without returning to its quiet even if only for a few days. "I love it," he told a group of personal friends in the later years of his life. "It is a place to arouse affection if present, and longing if absent. Once a Watertownian, always a Watertownian—that every man knows if he has been compelled, as I have, to live away from this city." As there is symbolism in the fact that he would never change his voting registration, equally there is foundation beneath a contemporary rumor spread by the townspeople "that had not Lansing been defeated by James F. Pappa for Mayor, he might have remained in Watertown and devoted himself to local politics."

Unsuited by temperament for a profession as either a candidate or as a local attorney, Lansing chose a third. Yet when removed from the comfort afforded by the friendships and social standing that were his to possess in upstate New York, he would often feel somewhat lost, bare, uneasy, and perhaps insecure. This is the second half of Lansing's basic conflict, and it alone can begin to explain
the unusual intensity and longevity of his formalized friendships through the medium of the Phortnightly Klub. He turned to the P. K. in times of crisis and tension, and he occasionally seemed to be more concerned with their approval of his actions than he was with securing that of the President whom he served. He wrote his friends, in 1915, that so many people "get very exalted ideas of a man's ability, which he knows and his intimates know are magnified beyond reason. P. K. knows me better than anyone else can know me, and I like to hear what they think." Three years later, he added that

even in the most critical times . . . my thoughts have reverted to P. K. and I have wondered what you fellows would think of my decisions and course of action, because I really care as much for your good opinion as I did for that of the world. That has been and will continue to be my attitude towards P. K. 86

Indubitably, for Robert Lansing it remained a truism that "once a Watertownian, always a Watertownian."
CHAPTER II

APPRENTICESHIP AND APPOINTMENT

"The nineteenth century," Professor Robert H. Ferrell has observed, "was the most renowned legal century of modern history, a moment when it seemed as if world order might be brought into reality, when rules for peaceful intercourse among nations appeared not as dreams but possibilities."¹ With the optimism of a Candide, men from the world's more "civilized nations" were convinced that international harmony could be achieved forever through the Rule of Law. The idea was not in itself recent—indeed, the scholarship of the period enjoyed using the seventeenth century treatises of Hugo Grotius as if they were proof-texts recently unearthed from the sands of a Geneva Holy Land.² Yet the dedication they swore to the principle of the Rule of Law among nations equalled the faith that a John Locke or a Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu had possessed in the same concept as being a provider or intranational political tranquility and socioeconomic order.

The Rule of Law was a goal yet to be achieved, but the means to its eventual fulfillment were agreed upon by all: the further codification of international law and the creation and acceptance of an international judiciary.³

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The former was a continuing phenomenon being accomplished through such diverse methods as individual states formally accepting established customs, the promulgation of treaties and of conventions from multinational conferences such as those held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, and even through the labor of private associations such as the International Law Association, l'Union Interparlementaire, l'Institut de Droit International, and the American Society of International Law. These procedures logically included the decisions and awards reached by an international judiciary, and, particularly, its most common nineteenth century manifestation, the arbitration tribunal.

Although in retrospect arbitration may appear only as being of minor and episodic importance in the history of United States diplomatic relations, and although it proved in practice to be an awkward way of conducting affairs between nations, the idea itself became exceedingly attractive to international lawyers and to theoretical students of foreign relations during the two score years which surround the turn of the century. For these individuals it became a panacea, an elixir vitæ for any and all binational disputes. Most adherents in the United States were proud of their own nation's record in such undertakings, since, as they were quick to notice, it had been among the first states in the modern world to utilize arbitral commissions when it endeavored to settle certain outstanding questions with Great
Britain. This had been accomplished through provisions of the Jay Treaty in 1794, the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, and the Treaty of Washington in 1871. Regardless of these early attempts, the belief in the Rule of Law and the spirit of Anglo-American *rapprochement* would engender the most important series of arbitral deliberations during this later period from 1880 to 1920: the Bering Sea Fur Seal Arbitration, the United States-British Canadian Joint High Commission, the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, and the American and British Claims Arbitration Under Special Agreement of 1910.

Indeed, it was the Golden Age of International arbitration, and equally it was an era in which a small clique of lawyers moved from one case to the next taking with them technical skills of the highest quality and earning for themselves the quiet acclamation and esteem of members from their profession while, for the most part, remaining unnoticed by the sensation-orientated national press and American public. These lawyers were such men as Elihu Root, John Watson Foster, James Brown Scott, Chandler Parsons Anderson, and Robert Lansing. Of these experts, Root and Foster received some limited national attention, while publicist Scott pondered the historical significance of their undertakings. Anderson and Lansing, on the other hand, with the assistance of countless others, did the detailed legal research that is an intrical part of their profession. Of these experts,
only the name Lansing remains constant throughout each of these arbitrations, a consistency that enabled Dr. Scott to remark, in the spring of 1914, that "Mr. Lansing has represented the United States ... in more international arbitrations than any living American, and he has had a longer and broader experience in international arbitration and has appeared more frequently before arbitral tribunals than any living lawyer."\(^5\)

Considering Lansing's extensive activities it remains exceedingly ironic, although certainly understandable, that a thorough investigation into the private and public documents will yield only limited information as to his precise role as an arbitrator and expert on international law. It is understandable because Lansing was a technician far more than he was a politician. Lansing and his comrades such as Scott and Anderson undertook the research, prepared their nation's arbitration case and counter-case, and then proceeded to turn their labor over to others--usually men with political futures or with past histories of loyal partisan service, but always men with a high public visibility--for presentation before the judges. This, of course, never seemed to concern Lansing since these "politicians" were usually qualified international lawyers; he preferred by temperament to remain isolated from public observation, receiving instead his personal reward from the satisfaction of serving his nation and from the words of praise that came
from the superiors whom he assisted. It does, however, concern the historian who wishes to differentiate Lansing's personal contribution from those made by others.

The extended controversy between Great Britain and the United States over fur-sealing in the region around the Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea affords an ideal example of the problem confronting those historians who endeavor to research Lansing's early contributions to American history.6 The dispute logically may be subdivided into three phases. First, as previously indicated, Secretary of State James G. Blaine appointed Lansing, in March of 1892, as Associate Counsel for the United States to assist Agent John Foster and Associate Counsel William Williams in preparing the American case for delivery before the Tribunal which would meet at Paris the following year. This, needless to say, became a formidable task which Foster later detailed in some thirty pages of his published memoirs. In those same thirty pages of text, however, Foster found it necessary to refer to his son-in-law's labor a total of one time.7 Besides the fact that he had served as Counsel for his government, and that he had traveled to Alaska, Victoria, Montreal, and Halifax, even less is known about Lansing's work as a member of the Bering Sea Claims Commission which had been created in 1896 to implement the award of the Paris Tribunal.8 Likewise, during the third phase, when he served as Technical Delegate to the International Conference for the
Protection and Preservation of Fur Seals, which met in Washington in May of 1911, the official reports remain silent as to his contribution. 9

Considering the dearth of documentary materials available, and the resulting impossibility of differentiating Lansing's role from those of others in arbitration diplomacy, a select number of fragmentary sources nevertheless have emerged that deserve at least passing consideration. For example, it is interesting to note that Lansing appeared before a hearing of the United States-British-Canadian Joint High Commission, on August 23, 1898, as counsel for the appeal of certain private American lumber interests which had claims against the Canadian government. He seems to have won his settlement, but this decision was rendered by a commission that included on its panel of judges his father-in-law and a family friend, Foster and John A. Kasson. 10 Further, it is also known that, in his capacity as both Solicitor and Counsel before the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal that sat at London in the early autumn of 1903, 11 Lansing was principally responsible for preparing the United States' countercase. It was a long, arduous task that required him to have "checked and rechecked for validity and objectivity" some eight hundred affidavits and countless documents from the British Foreign Office. 12 The result was worth the effort; many experts, including Lansing himself, believed that the countercase was "in many ways stronger than the original statement of our
claim."13 Naturally, from his perspective, the favorable award that the Tribunal reached resulted from the legal soundness of his nation's arguments, and not, as others claim, from President Theodore Roosevelt's threats of war and indirect intimidation of Tribunal President Richard Everard Webster, the first Viscount Alverstone.14

The experience he received during the diplomacy of the Alaskan Boundary Dispute was not in vain, since five years later, in March of 1908, Robert Lansing again had occasion to represent the United States in another boundary orientated arbitration, the seventy year long North Atlantic Fisheries Question.15 First as Associate Counsel and then as Counsel and Solicitor, he devoted his labor to the preparation of the case and counter-case in connection with developing the documentary appendices that supported the formal brief.16 In contrast to the Alaskan arbitration, the award delivered by this Tribunal, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, was not based on the legal evidence submitted by the United States and Great Britain as much as it was a political compromise, a fact that the Tribunal's President, Austrian jurist Dr. Heinrich Lammesch, publically admitted.17

Robert Lansing was a man of peace and above all else he was a man of law. He loved the law, and through its further application he believed the goal of world peace could be achieved. Foreign policy, statesmanship, and diplomacy remained important in international relations, but the future
of the world depended upon absolute legal justice and not upon politics. "A little familiarity with the work," he once wrote his close friend John William Davis upon the latter's appointment as United States Ambassador Extraordinary at the Court of Saint James', "will show you that diplomacy is nothing more nor less than tactfully applied commonsense,"18 while the law, on the other hand, when implemented properly, is truth. "Law and diplomacy, truth and commonsense, should be always harmonious but never synonymous." This apocryphal quotation unquestionably crystallizes at least a portion of Lansing's personal philosophy concerning international relations for the period before the outbreak of the Great War in Europe.

In an address delivered to the American Geographical Society, in January of 1904, Lansing admitted that "compromise and concession . . . [are] legitimate instruments of diplomacy but," he added, "never of judicial tribunals." He knew that such practices "have been the foundation of many an international award . . . [yet] if these two modes of reaching an agreement could be eradicated, much of the remaining opposition to the arbitration of disputes between nations would disappear. They are the chief stumbling-blocks to its progress." It is for this reason that he felt reassured by the award of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal because it "has done much to remove these objections . . . .; it has proved that the deep sense of justice inherent in the
Anglo-Saxon race can rise above national prejudice and the influence of national interest."\textsuperscript{19} Lansing seems to have been sincere in this attack upon chauvinism. Six years before the 1904 address, he had privately chastised Alabama's Senator John Tyler Morgan for his conduct as one of the arbitrators in the first phase of the Bering Sea Fur Seal Dispute; anyone who reads the proceedings of the Tribunal, Lansing charged, will discover "that though he sat on the bench he was unquestionably of the United States council."\textsuperscript{20}

In a similar manner, Lansing believed that the award of the Hague Tribunal in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration should have been determined "through the peaceful agency of impartial justice,"\textsuperscript{21} the "impartial application of principles of justice to proven facts."\textsuperscript{22} A Tribunal, he remarked in 1912, must be "considered to be a court of justice, whose duty is to decide a question in accordance with principles of law and equality and without regard to political expediency."\textsuperscript{23} It is obvious, therefore, why Lansing reacted as violently as he did to Dr. Heinrich Lammasch's announcement that the Fisheries award had been a political compromise. Compromise, Lansing publicly reminded the eminent professor of international law from the University of Vienna, "may be an admirable method of adjusting political differences. . . . but controversies of a strictly legal nature, such as the Fisheries Question,
should be adjusted by a court of justice in the technical sense of the word."  

The surviving documents from the Fisheries Arbitration provide a second insight into the historiographical problem of Robert Lansing that equally deserves passing consideration. The insight, however, is less related to any intellectual beliefs which Lansing himself might have possessed as it is capable of casting new light on the puzzling personal relationship he had with fellow attorney Chandler Parsons Anderson. In many ways, the two men shared the same interests, both enjoyed the study of international law, and both served their government to the best of their ability. They probably met first in the 1890's when Anderson began to serve on the several arbitral commissions with Lansing. Perhaps through skill, perhaps through a degree from Harvard Law School, or perhaps through patrons such as Richard Olney and Elihu Root who possessed more political clout than Lansing's patron and father-in-law, Anderson constantly received higher appointed positions on the same commissions than did the slightly older attorney from Watertown. When Lansing was Associate Counsel, Anderson was Counsel; when he became Counsel, Anderson was Agent. Finally, in December of 1910, Republican Anderson was rewarded by President William Howard Taft with the office of Counselor for the Department of State, a commission he held until the Democrats returned to power in 1913.
Lansing and Anderson's friendship, it appears, was quite close at first. Anderson had helped to secure Lansing's appointment to the Fisheries Arbitration in 1908, and the latter wrote in March of that year how "nothing could gratify me more than . . . the prospect of being again associated with you in so congenial an employment. . . ." 25 By the summer of the following year, however, the "prospect" of intimate cooperation among the commission's members had been decidedly compromised. During June of 1909, Lansing had returned to Watertown and Foster's country house at Henderson Harbor for a holiday before resuming his work on the United States counter-case. Anderson meanwhile returned to his home in New York City to draft the first pages of the American case before the Tribunal. On June 4, he sent Lansing the first sixty pages of his work and explicitly requested him to criticize it as much as he wanted. Lansing did just as he had been asked in a masterful and professional manner. 26 Anderson's reaction must have been totally unexpected. In a letter dated the twenty-fifth of June, he responded to the criticism in a tone that reflected not intellectual defense but, on the contrary, childish anger and bruised ego. It seems that Anderson had sent the draft to both Root and Dr. Scott asking them for some general comments on the direction he had taken and emphasizing that they were reading solely an early draft of the case. They responded—as indeed had Lansing—that he was doing a
commendable task and that they agreed with the nature of his approach. Anderson, however, had never requested them to criticize the case. Lansing's technical but friendly attack came in the wake of this praise and Anderson proved unable to accept it in the spirit in which it had been offered. "You see . . .," he blustered to the upstater, "you are in the minority . . .," and reminding Lansing of his subordinate position on the commission, announced that "I shall not attempt to make any of the changes which you have suggested." With a keen sarcasm that is quite rare in Lansing's personal letters, Anderson received a reply to his attack the following day. "In view of the unanimity of the opposition to my criticisms," he began, "I must of course be in error, and they cannot be well founded. I could have said much in praise of the draft which you sent me, but praise, unless given face to face, is of little value. I attempted to find fault, which I presumed was what you wished. . . ."

After this exchange of communiqués, the two men would remain friends but the development of any sense of intimate comradeship would never occur. From the perspective of either Lansing or Anderson this particular incident probably would not be considered of major importance; however, in retrospect, it does suggest a different aspect of Anderson's personality that may explain why the two men's subsequent correspondence began to assume a more formal tone and style. The outgoing, intelligent, personally ambitious
New Yorker enjoyed his relationship with the small town, shy upstater so long as he remained in a commanding position over the friendship. Convinced of his superiority as an intellectual, an attorney, and a politician, he may not have regarded Lansing as his equal.

The immaturity he exhibited over the criticism of the Fisheries Case most probably was unique, but in the same context it does help to explain why Anderson appeared so eager to resign from the Department of State some six years later. When the Great War erupted in Europe in the late summer of 1914, the then Counselor for the Department of State used his influence with the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, to have Anderson appointed as Special Legal Adviser to the Department. Bryan agreed and Anderson began his labor on the problems of American neutrality, reporting directly to the Secretary and the Counselor while yet retaining a large measure of autonomous action. By the summer of the following year, however, Bryan had resigned his post and rumors began circulating that Lansing might be the replacement. At this juncture, Anderson asked to be relieved of his duties citing as his reason the economic need to return to private practice. Lansing urged him to remain for a few more months "as a favor to himself and for patriotic reasons as well." Anderson agreed, and his "personal sacrifice" continued until October of 1915. His economic need was undoubtfully real, but the timing of
his actions suggest that the Anderson, whom historians generally acclaim with the highest praise,\textsuperscript{31} was an insecure individual who would relinquish the patronage that Lansing would now be in a position to convey rather than serve as his subordinate.

This study of the Anderson-Lansing relationship is also useful for the insight it provides into the Watertown attorney's approach to his work. Lansing was a professional, a skeptic, and a man who understood the value of teamwork and honesty among the members of any association. Perhaps he misjudged Anderson's request for criticism in 1909, yet Lansing considered the Fisheries Commission to be a team of lawyers each assigned an individual task but willing and able to criticize the contributions of other members for the general benefit of their collective assignment. The nation's case had priority over social amenities. As Secretary of State \textit{ad interim} in 1915, Lansing realized that the President might appoint him to fill the vacant Cabinet post, and he wanted Anderson to remain in the Department because he believed their friendship, their past working relationship, and Anderson's professional skill would be useful during his tenure as Secretary. Lansing wanted men under him that were the best he could secure and who could work harmoniously with him regardless of their party affiliation.
With the successful conclusion of the Fur Seal and Fisheries controversies, both the British and United States Governments desired to resolve the many private pecuniary claims outstanding against each of the two nations that had originated during these and other diplomatic and legal quarrels. Consequently, on August 18, 1910, a special agreement was signed that reopened negotiations on the hundreds of specific claims for the purpose of eventually submitting them to an Arbitration Tribunal which, in turn, would determine liability and award compensation. From January of 1911 until his resignation in March of 1914 Robert Lansing served as Counsel and Agent for the United States on the commission established by this Special Arbitration Agreement. Working jointly with American Counsel Charles F. Wilson and in cooperation with his British counterpart, Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst, Lansing engaged in the laborious task of preparing the two schedules of claims that were finally presented to the Tribunal in May of 1913. As always, Lansing excelled in the detailed nature of his work and applied his energy with such dedication that, at the Tribunal's opening session, President Henri Fromageot felt compelled to complement him on his "great ability, learning and experience. . . ." 

This was a fitting tribute to Robert Lansing. Unknown to either Fromageot or Lansing this would be the last time in his life that he would stand before the bench of an
international arbitral tribunal. Indeed, the past twenty-two years, during which he periodically represented his Republic upon multiple arbitral commissions, had been an educational experience of the first magnitude.

As it has been previously suggested, these same years had not been devoted solely to public law; under the careful tutelage of General Foster his education diversified. Between the years 1894 and 1895, and again between 1900 and 1901, Lansing had the opportunity to be the legal counsel for both the Mexican and the Chinese Legations in Washington, D.C. He continued in this capacity for the Mexican diplomats during the presidency of Francisco Indalecio Madero, from late 1911 until his assassination in February of 1913. In that same spring the Mexican Legation closed its door and Lansing's contract automatically terminated, since the United States Government refused to grant formal recognition to Madero's successor, Caudillo Victoriano Huerta. It would be consequently illogical to charge, as have some of Lansing's critics, that, through his association with the Legation, "Lansing had been Huerta's personal adviser."

His private legal experience before the spring of 1914, also included representing hundreds of personal claims against various foreign governments, such as the previously discussed representation of certain American lumber interests before the United States-British Canadian Joint High Commission in 1898 and the infamous case associated with the
estate of General Frederick Townsend Ward, an American mercenary who died in China during the Taiping Rebellion of the 1860's. Perhaps the most renowned suit he undertook was when he served as counsel for private American asphalt companies in legal action against the Venezuelan Government in 1905 before the Hague Tribunal. This was one of the many claims that Caudillo Cipriano Castro, whom President Theodore Roosevelt described as an "unspeakable villainous little monkey," had been forced to submit to arbitration under intimidation from a possible visit of the United States Marine Corps and from the actual visit of the monarchical fleets of Germany, Great Britain, and Italy during what has since become known as the Second Venezuelan Crisis.

Besides his legal career, the period before 1915 equally included his participation in a variety of clubs, societies, and associations that may be interpreted as but further illustration of a man who by heritage had been conditioned to play an active role in his community. Of course there always would be private and service affiliations: his church, the Gamma chapter of the Phi Upsilon social fraternity, the Jefferson County Historical Society where he served as Secretary, the Congressional County Historical Society, the Black River Valley Club of Watertown and the Jefferson County Golf Club, the directorships of the City National Bank in Washington and the Eager Electric Company in Watertown, the Holland Society of New York, the National
Geographic Society, the American Political Science Association, and the American Red Cross of which he would later serve as president. His major attention, however, centered around his professional organizations. He had been elected to the professional law fraternity, Delta Theta Phi, as a charter member in 1913, and there were usually meetings to attend in connection with his affiliation with the Jefferson County, the New York State, and the American Bar Associations. Yet despite this multifarious collection of interests, there remains one association that captured his attention and his devoted labor from its original conception until his death some twenty years later: the American Society of International Law.

At the 1905 session of the annual Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, Lansing and his close friend James Brown Scott discussed with a select group of associates the idea which had been current for the past several years of forming a professional society dedicated to the study and codification of international law, especially as it might pertain to the conduct of the United States' foreign policy. Sensing that the climate of opinion was in their favor, they persuaded the noted criminologist and dean of the school of law at Columbia University, Professor George Washington Kirchwey, to present a motion before the Conference to the effect that this assembly "regards with favor the movement to establish a society of international law in the
United States and of an American Journal of International Law, and pledges its earnest sympathy with the aims and purposes of such [a] movement." The resolution was introduced and then sent to a special committee of seven men for consideration. Chaired by Oscar Solomon Straus, the former minister to Turkey and a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and including both Lansing and Kirchwey, the committee reported back to the final session of the Conference the recommendations that the motion should be approved and that "a committee of representative gentlemen be selected in order to organize the Society upon a permanent basis." These recommendations were formally and warmly adopted by the assembled Conference before it adjourned.

As the delegates departed, Straus managed to secure the creation of the second and expanded committee for the purpose of drawing up a charter for the proposed Society and for outlining, in general terms, the scope of its journal. This resulting group of twenty-one men represented a cross section of the most outstanding minds and practitioners in the United States on the subject of the Law of Nations: besides Chairman Straus and Professor Kirchwey, the committee included Lansing, Dr. Scott, John Foster, Chandler Anderson, John William Griggs who had been Attorney General in the McKinley Administration and who now served on the Hague Court, the eminent Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University, and many other individuals of note. After some months
of thought and fund raising the committee gathered on January 12, 1906, in the rooms of the Bar Association of the City of New York and formally adopted the Society's constitution. It was here that Lansing was elected both to the Executive Committee of the Society and to the Executive Council which, at the next Lake Mohonk Conference in 1906, reconstituted itself into the Board of Editors of The American Journal of International Law. Dr. Scott was selected as its managing editor. As Scott would later recall, it fell upon Lansing and himself the responsibility for determining

the content of the Journal and all the details of its publication, and Mr. Lansing contributed to the first number an article modestly entitled, "Notes on Sovereignty in a State." He has been from the first number . . . an editor of the Journal, to which he has contributed signed articles, editorial comments, and book reviews. He has attended the annual meetings of the Society, at which he has read papers, and has taken part in the discussions on the floor.

"Mr. Lansing," Scott concluded, "was in a very special sense both a founder of the Society and of its Journal of International Law." 41

Remaining a member of both the Society's Executive Committee and the Journal's Board of Editors until his death in 1928, Robert Lansing traditionally considered his association with this undertaking as one of the major contributions of his lifetime. 42 Yet when examined in the context provided by his other accomplishments—his credentials as a public
and private arbitrator and expert on international law, and his experience and intellectual diversification received through participation in multiple private and service orientated affiliations—the American Society of International Law existed as but one additional educational encounter that prepared him for the duties of Counselor for the Department of State and, in turn, for the responsibilities of maintaining the portfolio of the Secretary of State. For these two positions of public trust, remarked the editors of *The Nation*, "Mr. Lansing's competence is unquestioned." 43

II

It appears that the idea of securing a political appointment as one of the under-secretaries of state in the Department of State first appealed to Robert Lansing shortly after moving to Washington in 1907. On more than one occasion such an offer had been tendered to him, however, he felt compelled to refuse in each instance since, as he later wrote a friend, he was too loyal a Democrat to serve under a Republican Administration. 44 These Republican requests only served to increase his interest in the idea of such an appointment to the extent that when his own party captured the White House after the November elections of 1912, he decided to seek the office of Assistant Secretary of State.
The office he sought was responsible for administrative and protocol functions within the Department, and, he believed, his twenty years of experience with the Department of State made him especially qualified to meet these demands. Further, the reorganization of the Department which was currently being contemplated would naturally fall under the Assistant Secretary's jurisdiction and this was a project which had long been of special interest to him. Lansing's hopes for a policy-making position were increased by the knowledge that the Democrats had been removed from presidential power for so long that there literally existed a dearth of experienced and politically acceptable candidates. 45

During the months of December, 1912 and January, 1913, Robert Lansing consequently began to solicit support from his Democratic friends. James Brown Scott of New York City and Frederic R. Coudert, a noted international lawyer whom he had become acquainted with during the Bering Sea Arbitration, were among the first to promise their assistance. Then over the Christmas holiday Lansing wrote to John N. Carlisle, a Watertown attorney, and asked him to intercede on his behalf with the Secretary of State-designate, William Jennings Bryan. Lansing frankly admitted that he "would not like to be a candidate and be turned down." Carlisle promised his unqualified support for Lansing, and told him that he would write his personal friend from Nebraska as soon as the selection of Bryan became official. He also advised that Lansing
should contact New York's Democratic Senator James A. O'Gorman since he would undoubtedly be consulted with regard to patronage in the State. 46

Coudert seems to have been the first to directly recommend Lansing to the President-elect, Woodrow Wilson, and was also in a position to supply a letter of introduction to Senator O'Gorman. 47 Lansing realized, however, that a letter from Coudert would not guarantee the Senator's support. O'Gorman was a close friend of former Governor Charles Murphy, the "Old Man" of the State party whom Lansing, it will be remembered, worked against in the past election. Consequently in early February, 1913, Lansing wrote to one of the Senator's personal friends, Henry Purcell, and asked that he talk to O'Gorman on his behalf. A municipal judge from Watertown, Purcell was influential in the State's Democratic Party; but despite many years of friendship, Lansing found it difficult to solicit his help. He did not enjoy asking for support as he had been forced to do, since such a practice "is very distasteful to me, unless it is to a close friend." Purcell did recommend him to O'Gorman, yet he frankly told Lansing that because of his past insurgent activities, especially against Murphy, he would not be getting the Senator's support unless he agreed to let local Democratic leaders such as Purcell control all New York patronage which might be in Lansing's power to distribute as Assistant Secretary. 48 The candidate answered Purcell's letter without attempting to justify his
past political actions. Although he claimed to have opposed only the party's leadership and never the State organization itself, he now would support Murphy for the sake of Democratic unity. "I do not believe in perpetuating factional differences," he told his friend, and, he added, he could reassure him that he could accept equally the principle of "home rule" in matters of patronage.49

On February 17, 1913, Lansing had an interview with O'Gorman in the latter's Washington office. The Senator was friendly but Lansing left the meeting with the feeling that the "outcome is doubtful." After listening to his friend's account of the interview, James Scott sent a letter that same day to Judge George Gray of the United States Court of Appeals. Gray had known both Lansing and Scott for fifteen years and considered Wilson to be a personal friend.50 While Scott and Lansing waited upon Judge Gray's reply to their request for assistance, the nation's capital prepared for the March 4, inauguration of President Woodrow Wilson.

During the first week of March, Lansing and his friends undertook one final round of attempts to capture the Assistant Secretariat. Fred Coudert contacted the eminent Professor of International Law at Columbia University, John Bassett Moore, and asked him for support. Moore, however, was currently under consideration for a Department of State office himself, and he did not feel he could "with propriety" recommend Lansing in a formal manner. He would, on the
other hand, state his good opinion of Lansing if he were ever asked. 51

Meanwhile, Dr. Scott had gone to see Bryan personally in order to candidly ascertain where his candidate and friend stood. Bryan informed him that the current Assistant Secretary of State, Francis Mairs Huntington-Wilson, who had been appointed in 1909 by President William Howard Taft, had been invited to remain at his post since both Bryan and the President recognized the need for trained, experienced personnel who were already familiar with Departmental routine. This no doubt came as a shock and disappointment to both Scott and Lansing. Yet before they had opportunity to decide upon a new course of action, Secretary Bryan telegraphed Dr. Scott from Baltimore a most peculiar message. Dated the seventh of March, the wire read in toto:

I WIRE YOU ADVISING DO ALL POSSIBLE THROUGH SENATOR GORMAN URGE MATTER OUR FRIEND THE CHIEF IS NON COMMITTAL BUT APPARENTLY IMPRESSED. HW STILL HANGS ON. 52

What Bryan was trying to communicate was that although Huntington-Wilson still held the office of Assistant Secretary, he was in the process of making strong pleas against one of Wilson's first foreign policy discussions. Bryan, personally, did not feel that Huntington-Wilson would have any other recourse but to resign within the next few weeks. What Scott and Lansing could not have known was that Wilson had been considering a major reversal in American relations with
China and that he would soon conclude that the United States must withdraw its support from the Six Power Consortium currently being organized in China. Huntington-Wilson, on the other hand, strongly backed the international loan and, in fact, would resign his office on May 19, the day after the President publicly announced the American intent. 53

When Secretary Bryan's telegram arrived on March 7, however, Scott and Lansing could only guess at its meaning. Taking its advice literally, Lansing went to Capital Hill early the next morning and spoke to Senator O'Gorman in a second interview. O'Gorman, in turn, dismissed the candidate telling him that at this late date the individual whom he should be talking with was the Secretary himself. Lansing thanked the Senator for his time and proceeded back towards the northwestern quadrant of the city. Bryan received Lansing in the early afternoon but was again quickly dismissed because Senator O'Gorman had not as of yet sent over Lansing's résumé. The respectful protest that several different vitas had been filed by the Department produced no results, and Lansing returned home to write O'Gorman requesting him to send on the document. 54

Two days later, on Monday, March 10, Judge George Gray finally came to Lansing's assistance exactly three weeks after Scott had originally written him. Gray sent a short letter to the President from his home in Wilmington endorsing the candidate and enclosed Scott's letter of February 17.
When the White House received the communiqués, Wilson sent them on to Bryan.\(^55\) It is at this juncture that both O'Gorman and Professor Moore spoke to the Secretary on Lansing's behalf in private conversations.\(^56\) Perhaps the reason why O'Gorman was finally persuaded into acting was the increased pressure applied by local New York Democratic leaders from the upstate region, a movement which had been organized by A. Raymond Cornwell, a Watertown attorney and close personal friend of Mr. Manton M. Wyvell, Bryan's personal secretary. By promising to use his influence in Washington for the benefit of the Jefferson County Democratic Club, Lansing also secured the support of the State Democratic Committee, but this Albany based organization did not take their vote until the twenty-second of March.\(^57\)

The lateness of the support which came from Judge Gray, Senator O'Gorman, and the New York State party, combined with an apparent disorganization of the campaign itself, hurt Robert Lansing's candidacy. These were not the reasons, however, behind Lansing's failure to secure the appointment as Assistant Secretary of State. The determining factor was that William Jennings Bryan wanted to reward his old friend John E. Osborne. After Huntington-Wilson left the post on March 19, 1913, the Secretary requested President Wilson to consider Osborne for the appointment. Osborne had been Governor of Wyoming a few years before and had served on the Democratic National Committee during the
election of 1912. Wilson believed this appointment to the Department of State would be a mistake since Osborne had no experience either in diplomacy or in foreign policy formulation. Bryan, however, had already approached Osborne before Wilson's objections were made known to him through the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. Having a high opinion of Osborne by reason of his past service to the party, Wilson decided not to make an issue of the matter. On April 21, 1913, John Osborne received the oath of office as Assistant Secretary of State and entered upon his duties that same day. When he finally submitted his letter of resignation, in December of 1916, it would be officially accepted by Secretary of State Robert Lansing.58

Lateness, disorganization, and Bryan's effort to reward the politically deserving were too many factors working against Lansing's appointment. Those who knew of his work with the Democratic Party, such as Senator O'Gorman, also knew of his history of insurgency, and those who knew of his diplomatic experience thought that he was a Republican. After Osborne's nomination Robert Lansing therefore returned to his duties as Counselor and Agent for the United States in the Anglo-American Arbitration Under Special Agreement of 1910. In the months that followed, however, he continued to observe foreign policy developments under the new Democratic Administration, developments which for the most part con- curred with his own beliefs. He seemed especially impressed
with the personality and political firmness employed by the former Governor of New Jersey. To one associate, he favorably compared Wilson with Theodore Roosevelt, remarking that the former possessed Roosevelt's energy and resolve without his impulsiveness and brutality. 59

If Robert Lansing developed favorable impressions of Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy decisions, another, more distinguished authority on the subject of International Law did not—the Counselor for the Department of State, Dr. John Bassett Moore. The office of Counselor had been created in the general Departmental reorganization of 1909, and had as its function the investigation of, and reporting on, such important questions as those which require expert legal and technical skill and uninterrupted consideration. It had been originally created because the then Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, wished to bring into the Department at an adequate salary his friend Henry M. Hoyt of Pennsylvania. When Hoyt died in November of 1910, Knox appointed Chandler P. Anderson. Upon the resignation of both Anderson and Assistant Secretary Huntington-Wilson in the Spring of 1913, however, the duties of the two posts were really combined into one, the Counselor, while the function of the office now held by Osborne soon became quite vague. In the opinion of the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of State became the "Social Secretary of the government" who saw to it that all protocol was observed. 60
The down grading of the office of Assistant Secretary was not a reflection upon Osborne in any way. Instead, it was one of several demands placed upon the administration by Moore in exchange for his service. The most respected authority in the United States on the subject of International Law, a member of the Hague Tribunal, author of the highly regarded *History and Digest of International Arbitration*, Moore was wanted by Wilson's foreign policy adviser, Colonel Edward M. House, to assume a State Department position in order to bring prestige to the administration and to act as a counter-balance to the diplomatically inept Bryan. In contact with Moore during February and March of 1913, Bryan learned that he would come to Washington only if a series of demands were first met: First, that he would be appointed Counselor at seventy-five hundred dollars per year instead of Assistant Secretary at the fixed salary of five thousand dollars per year. Second, he, and not the Assistant Secretary as had been traditional, would be Acting Secretary of State during Bryan's absences. Third, the Counselor would report directly to the Secretary himself. Fourth, he would come to the Department for only one year. Finally, Wilson and Bryan would pick the Solicitor and one of three Assistant Solicitors for the Department of State, while Moore would have a free hand in selecting the remaining two men, one of whom would be Lester Hood Woolsey. Wilson and Bryan agreed. Moore entered upon his duties on April 23, 1913, after having
converted the Counselorship from the status of near legal adviser to that of second in importance only to the Secretary of State himself. 61

During his year of service, Moore developed several opinions that were in serious disharmony with the policies pursued by Wilson and Bryan. The most important of these opinions was that Moore advocated de facto recognition of the Mexican Government under General Huerta, a view that contrasted sharply with the President's policy of "watchful waiting." Further, Moore had expressed his discontent, on more than one occasion, over the unorganized and unprofessional nature of the work being done at the Department under the inexperienced and inept leadership of Secretary Bryan. As a consequence of this unsatisfactory relationship with the State Department and his superiors Moore resigned his commission on February 2, 1914, to become effective on March 4, a full one and one-half months less than he had originally promised to serve. 62

As Professor Moore journeyed northward to return to the quiet of the campus of Columbia University, President Wilson was besieged by endorsements of various individuals for the vacant Counselor post. Robert Lansing and his supporters had learned the importance of early action through the experience of 1913, and this time they thought they were far better prepared to secure the commission. Soon after the first of the year, for example, Lansing had typed several
copies of an expanded résumé and sent it on to the Department of State for the Secretary's files in case an opening should develop in any of the under-secretariats. After Moore's departure, Judge George Gray took time to write Bryan on his stationary from the United States Court of Appeals. He described Lansing in terms that would especially appeal to the Nebraskan. He has always been "a 'doctrinaire democrat,'" he told the Secretary, who "... knows nothing of my writing this letter. ... For one of his age, his experience is quite exceptional." Bryan personally read Gray's letter and then forwarded it to the White House.63

Two days later, on March 12, 1914, President Wilson returned Judge Gray's letter to his Secretary of State with a brief note of thanks and the additional comment that "from a great many quarters I am learning things of Mr. Robert Lansing which make me think we ought to consider him very seriously indeed."64 The support of the prominent men and organizations which had been secured over a year before had been mobilized during the week of Moore's retirement with the effect that Lansing's candidacy could not be ignored a second time. Other men had an interest in the office as well, such as George Grafton, a minor Democratic politician whose sole claim upon the Counselorship was the energetic support of the Secretary of the Treasury and the President's future son-in-law, William Gibbs McAdoo. Whether from McAdoo or from within the Department of State itself, it is not known; but charges suddenly began to be raised that Lansing might have
engaged in "unethical and improper conduct" during his em-
ployment in General John Foster's law firm. 65

The issue that hindered Lansing's appointment in early March of 1914, was one that dated back over half a cen-
tury, the Ward Estate Claims. The case involved the heirs of Frederick Townsend Ward, the mercenary General of China's "Ever-Victorious Army," who had died in 1862 during the Tai-
ping Rebellion. For two score years after his death, the family had employed various attorneys to press the Chinese Government to honor their claim for Ward's unpaid salary and bonuses, officially set at $388,236 by Secretary of State William Maxwell Evarts in March of 1881. After persistent requests by the heirs, Foster agreed to accept the case on a contingency basis, in January, 1902, and asked Lansing to be his associate counsel. Foster and Lansing, who had served as Counsels for the Chinese Legation in Washington as recently as the month before taking the Ward commission, used their influence over high governmental officials at Peking, including members of the royal family, to obtain consent to settle the debt from the Boxer Indemnity Fund established to pay outstanding American claims growing out of the recent Chinese Civil War. The United States Government concurred in this arrangement through a diplomatic note signed by Sec-
retary of State John Hay in 1903.

Five years after the claim had been settled, the var-
ious attorneys who had represented the Wards before 1902
raised the charge that Foster and Lansing had abused their "official connections" and that the fee they had received for their service was exorbitant. Neither man, however, was employed by either government at the time of the settlement, and Foster defended the payment of one-half of the award as not unusual considering the age of the original claim. At the request of the unpaid former attorneys for the Ward family, Secretary of State Elihu Root reexamined the entire case in 1908 and ruled that neither violations of public trust nor excessive fees were sustainable charges. Three years later, however, the issue was again raised by the House of Representatives when the House Committee on Expenditures in the Department of State undertook a not-too-routine investigation. Foster and Lansing appeared before the committee on October 31, 1911, to answer the same questions, and again they were cleared of any wrongdoing.66

Nearly a dozen years after the closing of the case, the issue was dragged out again to frustrate Lansing's candidacy for the Counselorship. Secretary Bryan, of course, felt compelled to investigate. On the morning of March 11, 1914, a Wednesday, Bryan received Lansing at his office to discuss the Ward issue, requesting at the end of the meeting that Lansing prepare a memorandum of their conversation including a statement on the prosecution and payment of the claim. As Lansing was complying with the request later that same morning, his father-in-law wrote a personal letter to
Elihu Root, then a Senator from New York, asking him to send Wilson a note or to have an interview with the President in which Root would again state that the payment of the claim from the Boxer Indemnity Fund was legal and reasonable. Foster requested that the fellow former Secretary of State "might also give your personal estimate of Lansing." 67

From his Washington sick bed, Root complied with Foster's request that same afternoon. He told the President that while he was Secretary of State he had investigated the matter with thoroughness and that "I found no cause whatever for criticism." Further, Root wrote of his association with Robert Lansing on the

various international arbitrations particularly in the Fisheries case at the Hague four years ago, & in the Am. Society of International Law & I have formed a very high opinion of his ability & industry. He is earnest single minded & faithful to his work & has rather unusual experience in international law. 68

The issue of the Ward claims was, for the most part, kept quiet and out of the nation's newspapers. It was viewed from the White House as a possible source of embarrassment but never as a possible scandal. With the letter from Senator Root, the President expressed the belief that the question had been settled. On March 21, Wilson nominated Lansing as Counselor. 69 Even when the Ward case did hit the press, in the late editions of March 25, it remained relegated to the inside pages of the New York and Washington based publications. In fact, several prominent national newspapers, such
as the Chicago Tribune and the Atlanta Constitution, never even carried the story. Secretary Bryan appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on March 25, and explained the Ward case and praised Lansing's abilities. The Committee, in turn, approved the nomination unanimously the same day. On the following day, Friday, March 27, 1914, Robert Lansing of Watertown received confirmation by the United States Senate in his commission as the nation's fourth Counselor for the Department of State. 70

This extended survey of the events leading up to Lansing's appointment as Counselor presents factual and interpretive information available in no other history. Further, this same survey also permits clarification of certain generalizations which are traditionally repeated by historians about William Jennings Bryan's management of the Department of State. From the perspective of both contemporaries and historians, the greatest criticism of Bryan as Secretary of State has been directed against his unabashed devotion to the tenets of the spoils system. Countless histories have recounted the lugubrious details of how Bryan replaced experienced diplomats and administrators with political war horses or their sons, and there is no justification in repeating those stories here. But as Professor Richard Challener has emphasized, there was nothing malicious in his practice. "Bryan, with his Jacksonian faith in the common man, honestly believed that, just as he himself was qualified
to conduct the affairs of state, any average American could carry on the relatively simple task of representing his country abroad." Likewise, any lawyer could carry on the administrative and legal responsibilities of the posts in the offices at Washington. For this reason Bryan therefore selected John Osborne as Assistant Secretary of State in 1913.

The task Bryan undertook as Secretary remained essentially the same as that of most every other American politician who held that same office—finding suitable rewards for those who have served their party well. Although it has been shown that both President Wilson and Colonel House wanted Lansing to replace John Bassett Moore as Counselor in order that the Department might retain a counterbalance to the diplomatically unsophisticated Bryan, this survey has also illustrated that the Secretary deserves more credit for his appointments than he is usually assigned. By 1914 Lansing has established his credentials with Bryan as a Democrat in good standing with his State party, something he had not been able to do in 1913 due to the belated action of the New York State Democratic Committee. Yet Lansing was not the only Democrat seeking a public office in 1914, and most of those who were, such as George Grafton, had worked for the party longer and harder than had Lansing. Even the great spoilsman himself, however, realized that in every case the best qualified man for a government office was not always the most deserving Democrat; Bryan had come to champion
Lansing's candidacy before Wilson's own choice had been made known to the Secretary of State.

Lansing was content with his appointment. The Counsellorship existed as the one governmental post that fulfilled his every personal and professional desire. No longer could he be properly referred to as General Foster's son-in-law, nor as a mere legal clerk. Instead, the forty-nine year old Lansing held in his own right a position of public trust, a position of community service, in which he could utilize his skills as an international lawyer while at the same time contribute to the intellectual process which formulated the United States' foreign policies. President Wilson, Colonel House, and Secretary Bryan would now request and consider his suggestions.

In March of 1914, Lansing could not have foreseen the events which were developing upon the European continent and which were destined to quickly change the existing patterns of international relationships within the next five months. Nor could he have foreseen how these same events, within the course of the next fifteen months, would combine to catapult him into one of the hard, leather chairs which gathered about the long mahogany table in the Cabinet Room of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, a chair which Lansing did not particularly covet. When this second appointment occurred, he would then be directly charged with the additional responsibility of executing the Republic's foreign policies. Some of these
policies he would personally champion, others he would try to alter, while still others he would consciously ignore. The particular alternative that he would choose may best be understood within the light cast by an examination of certain of his personal beliefs and prejudices as they existed prior to his appointment as Counselor. To such an examination the next two chapters are dedicated.
CHAPTER III

SOVEREIGNTY: VENTURES INTO POLITICAL THEORY

Robert Lansing enjoyed the practice of international law more than the general cases he encountered as a partner in the firm of Lansing and Lansing. Specifically, application of the Law of Nations to questions of national and international Sovereignty fascinated him and by the time he retired from public service in 1920 he had become one of the United States' most distinguished theoreticians on the subject. Most historians have overlooked the fact that the first definition of the term "Territorial Sovereignty" ever to be officially codified as a part of the Law of Nations is the result of Lansing's expertise.

Although his interest in problems of sovereignty stemmed from his work on various arbitration commissions, one of his earliest statements on the subject, written in the winter of 1900, reflected the constitutional issues of imperialism and colonialism following the United States' formal annexation of Puerto Rico, Guam, Wake, and the Philippine Islands in February of 1899. By 1900, Congress could not agree on the kind of government these islands should accept. During this debate Alabama's Senator John
Tyler Morgan, whom Lansing had met in 1892 during the Bering Sea Arbitration, asked the attorney to prepare a formal legal brief answering two questions: would the United States Constitution extend automatically to these territories ceded by Spain without additional congressional legislation, and second, was the authority of the Federal Government at Washington limited in these same territories by the Constitution?

In his reply of February 14, 1900, Lansing answered a resounding "yes" to both questions, and his defense reflected a strict constructionist interpretation of the Constitution. Since the Constitution limited the authority of the United States Government, an occupied territory whether formally annexed or not was ipso facto subject to existing federal law. This position would conflict with the interpretation of the United States Supreme Court the following year. In the case of Downes v. Bidwell, Associate Justices Henry Billings Brown and Edward Douglass White rendered the decision that Congress must not only extend federal laws to the new territories by specific legislation, but also may extend only those provisions of the Constitution that the legislators specifically desired.

Lansing approached the former Spanish colonies from a literal and historical interpretation of the third section of the Constitution's Fourth Article. His defense of the equality of the civil rights possessed by the inhabitants
of a territory and by United States citizens echoed a legal principle dating back to 1784. Lansing's strict constructionist philosophy did not avoid the logical result of this position. The possible admission of these islands into the Union as incorporated territories equal in status with Alaska and Oklahoma remained contrary to his own perspective of the best national interest. He shared a popular belief that these islands were "inhabited by a race of different characters from those native to America," and they should "have their own government with only a mild restraining hand, quietly almost secretly, directing its course. Call it a protectorate, if you will . . . ," but nothing would "be gained by forcing these people to accept a government against their will" and against their own cultural and historical traditions. This same philosophy served as the basis for the Downes decision; yet unlike the Supreme Court, Lansing felt the Constitution could not be compromised for either political expediency or personal conviction. All people—whether residing in Manila, Philippines or Manila, Utah—shared equally in its provisions.

For Robert Lansing, sovereignty in the United States resided in the people, not because of some metaphysical Rousseauian "Social Contract," but because of their superior physical authority. Collectively the people possessed more power than the combined military forces of the Federal Government. Yet this sovereignty of the American people did
not imply the citizens of every other society held such authority. In a military dictatorship, the physical force and hence the sovereignty resided in the army, and the people were only wards of the state. "In a modern political state . . . [that] which can control all human conduct within the state . . . , the supreme coercive power, I would define as sovereignty." ⁶

This neo-machiavellian definition of sovereignty developed slowly, only after a period of about fifteen years. In 1898, Gary M. Jones, a close boyhood friend and a teacher of Civil Government at Watertown High School, discovered the dearth of "realistic" textbooks on his subject. Accepting his own educational limitations, Jones approached Lansing with the suggestion they write such a monograph and Lansing agreed. During the following two years, the friends produced a small volume entitled Government: Its Origin, Growth, and Form in the United States which became a classic Civics textbook for American high school students from its initial publication in 1902 until its final printing twenty-two years later. ⁷

The definition of sovereignty which Lansing used in Government was understandably not profound. He limited his description to the statement "every state or nation" which is independent is therefore automatically sovereign, "and the equal in that respect to every other state in the world, without regard to the extent, power or character of its
government." Lansing did, however, introduce the students to his concept of sovereignty based upon force. This "realistic" approach to Civics contrasted sharply with the students' understanding of the subject as traditionally presented through the writings of the French philosophers.8

As time progressed, Lansing became more convinced that sovereignty was nothing more than this decisive physical power behind a government's ability to govern. This thought appeared in his 1902 definition of sovereignty, but only in a rough form. For example, the term "Territorial Sovereignty in Government meant simply "the land over which a state has exclusive political control."9 Eight years later, however, Lansing significantly modified this statement. During a session of the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, the Tribunal realized no definition for territorial sovereignty currently existed in codified international law. The judges requested an opinion from the United States Agent, Chandler P. Anderson; Anderson, in turn, deferred to Lansing. In an undated memorandum Lansing delivered a three page definition of territorial sovereignty that consisted of two parts. The first section paraphrased his general interpretation of 1902 while the second part described territorial sovereignty as "the power of the State in relation to territory... to repel every act of sovereignty of a foreign state within such territory."10 In contrast to the ideas in Government, before a government was sovereign over a
particular geographic area, it must have the physical power to control the region and its inhabitants, and to prevent any other power from doing the same.

Darwinian or not, Lansing's view typified the aggressive qualities of international relations at the turn of the century and the logical corollary of his a priori was a justification of international aggression. If the aggressor was victorious in his war of conquest, then he ceased to be an "aggressor," since the defeated state had not exercised true sovereignty over this land. Accepted by the Tribunal in 1910 and placed upon the official arbitration records, the definition became the only interpretation of the term "Territorial Sovereignty" formally incorporated into the Law of Nations. By this juncture, Realpolitiker, not "realist" more accurately described Robert Lansing.

After the publication of Government, Lansing temporarily abandoned his developing theories of sovereignty and, instead, began writing a similar textbook for use in American colleges.11 In 1906 he would again find the time and inclination to clarify his thoughts on sovereignty. The resulting manuscript, completed in 1913, was Robert Lansing's only attempt to develop and express a systematic philosophy.

II

In the writings of Jean Bodin, Baruch Spinoza, Thomas Hobbes, Sir William Blackstone, and John Austin, sovereignty
meant absolute power of final decision exercised either by some person or group of persons. This person or body, the sovereign, decided all economic, social, and political problems brought to its attention and possessed the force to execute those decisions. Most theories of sovereignty also agreed upon the one essential condition for political order and the primary function of all governments—the survival of the sovereign. Notes on Sovereignty did not vary from these patterns in any perceptible fashion.

Although Lansing's treatise should be considered as a single philosophical entity, historically the study may be divided into three sections. The first part consists of two articles published during 1907, in The American Journal of International Law, entitled "Notes on Sovereignty in a State." Lansing wrote the second section, "Notes on World Sovereignty," at the same time as the first articles, in 1906, with the intention of publishing it in the Journal the following year. Both Lansing and managing-editor James Brown Scott, however, concluded this logical application of Lansing's theory to the subject of world sovereignty might appear too speculative and lacking the practical value of his two previous articles. Yet by the end of the Great War, Lansing's discussion seemed more in tune with current philosophic thought, especially in light of the renewed interest in world government resulting from the League of Nations. Consequently, in January of 1921, the
author agreed to publish the second installment after his retirement from public office. Between the appearance of these two series, Lansing summarized his views before the 1913 meeting of the American Political Science Association in an article entitled "A Definition of Sovereignty." Finally in April of 1921 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reprinted the entire series of four articles in a single volume under the appropriate banner of Notes on Sovereignty. As a single manuscript, the treatise demonstrated a cohesiveness of thought even though Lansing wrote the work in two distinct sittings separated by seven years of experience and reflection.

As in his studies of Government in 1902, and "Territorial Sovereignty" in 1910, Lansing's "Notes on Sovereignty in a State" began by equating his subject with "power"—human sovereignty was the power of "the possessor to do all things in a state without accountability," and it did not involve in any way questions of justice or morality. This possessor was the Real Sovereign; he could not divest himself of his sovereignty by grant or division of powers. Since sovereignty meant power, then real sovereignty overtly expressed itself only during periods of civil turmoil. Under conditions of peace, the real sovereign delegated to a government certain powers to be exercised for him; yet the government was only an Artificial Sovereign based upon the presumption of superior power and the passive acquiescence of the ruler. In Great Britain and the United
States, for example, the real sovereigns were the people themselves; the monarch or the president, parliament or congress, could not, by their own might, compel obedience to their laws, but the majority of people possessing collectively a preponderance of the power, desired to follow the laws of the state.13

In his second article, published in 1907, Lansing explored the location of sovereignty in a modern political state and especially in a federal state such as the United States. Judging by the exercise of authority, he discovered a state's sovereign possessed two distinct sovereignties: external and internal. External Sovereignty was understood from the perspective of a foreign government and appeared to be located solely within the institution of government itself. "The exact location in a state of the [real] sovereignty is not a matter of concern or inquiry" on the part of a foreign government; "that is exclusively a domestic question to be decided by the individuals composing the state." Even revolutions were not a proper concern for foreign countries: "the revolution from the external point of view is not a change in sovereigns but a change in agents of the sovereign" and the foreign government should remain "non-committal, neutral. . . ."14 Internal Sovereignty was the location of the real sovereignty from the vantage point of a citizen within the particular state. "The character of political institutions and the guaranty of the public and private right of individuals," depended upon its placement.15
One of the contributions Lansing made to political theory was this precise definition of internal and external sovereignty. Although originally conceived by the noted American jurist and diplomat Henry Wheaton in his classic study on international law of 1836, Lansing emphasized the concept's usefulness by his brief analysis of United States federalism. While the Federal Government possessed no internal sovereignty, except as to territories and colonies, the states held no external sovereignty. Through the Constitution, the States "confided to the federal state all of the external sovereignty of which they were respectively possessed"; the federal state "became thereby the treaty-making power of all, both between the states of the union and between them and foreign states. . . ." Since the enactment, application, and enforcement of all federal laws was an exercise of external sovereignty, the States could not subject a federal statute to ratification nor secede from the federation.

Unlike his first two articles, Lansing's "Notes on World Sovereignty" was the work of a speculative philosopher. His discussion of the concept of a World Sovereignty seemed premature and irrelevant in his own age of acute nationalism. In recent years few scholars have treated the subject in any depth; the most prominent of these was the nineteenth century Swiss legal scholar Johann Kaspar Bluntschli. Lansing himself waited fifteen years before publishing the
study. "Notes on Sovereignty," however did not reveal Lansing to be a "One-Worlder," universalist, or utopian; in reality, the article is the logical continuation of "Notes on Sovereignty in a State," and demonstrated Lansing's personal hope for world peace rested upon the universal de-emphasis of national sovereignty.

In this first series of "Notes," Lansing stated sovereignty existed even before the political unit. It was held by the individuals within a defined community who commanded a superior physical force and the "state" was only a manifestation of the will expressed by this community of sovereigns. Consequently, it logically followed the World Community, composed of the Earth's entire population, was a similar, only larger, grouping of sovereigns who had not as yet created a World State. These individuals possessed the physical might to compel absolute obedience from all other individuals in the world considered separately, and this all-powerful body was in fact the entire human race, considered as a single, world community. By previous definition, this universal community must have title to World Sovereignty. The sovereignty now possessed by every political state was artificial since no state in 1906 could defend itself against the collective power of the World Community. The very operation and exercise of any individual state's sovereignty depended upon the will of this World Sovereign. Lansing realized that, throughout history, only the sovereignty
within a state had ever been directly exercised; World Sovereignty, in turn, had not "up to the present time" been positively expressed. "It remains passive through lack of harmony of purpose and unity of action by its possessors, and through the absence of proper channels of expression."¹⁹

Of more than mere philosophical interest, Lansing predicted when the World Community would organize and assert its dormant collective sovereignty. Scholars such as Hugo Grotius, Jean Bodin, Henry Wheaton, William Beach Lawrence were all wrong in assuming "every nation is the equal of every other nation in the world." Such an assumption was legal in nature; it was not a real assumption founded upon the equality of every state's force. Lansing explained, in periods of domestic peace, the members of a small, hypothetical community presumably held an equal share of the sovereignty in their state. When civil war developed, however, individuals exercised their physical force, "the ultimate appeal of the real sovereign," and soon there existed victors and slaves. The victors had always been sovereign; the slaves had never possessed an equal share of sovereignty but had only assumed they had during the period of peace.

Lansing believed this social analogy extended to the political arena as well. "Since a war between two, three or four nations is no more destructive of the general peace of the world community than a conflict between a few individuals in a state is destructive of its domestic peace, the
persistent international condition is that of peace," and "the artificial assumption of state equality continues unaf-
fected." No conflict of modern times has been of sufficient magnitude to constitute a World War, thereby imposing upon
the Community of Nations a general condition of belligerency." If this situation changed however, the artificial equality
among states would prompt the organization of the Earth's
only real sovereignty--World Sovereignty.20

Lansing's "Notes" diverged at this juncture and pro-
vided a rationale for the authority of international law.
Since international law codes were "not enforced by a govern-
mental agent directly delegated by the World Sovereign,
[this] does not deprive them of their legal character or ef-
f ect. They remain laws, and constitute a code . . . by which
the external conduct of states should be judged," and for-
eign policies should be molded. This was possible, accord-
ing to Lansing, because through the process of codification,
the Law of Nations was formed and shaped to reflect the
standards of morality, equality, reason, and natural justice
accepted by the World Community. By their adoption, these
laws became a "manifestation of the existence of a sovereign
will in the world, which is supernational and supreme." In
areas dealt with by international law, states felt compelled
"to recognize the superiority of World Sovereignty" over
their own domestic sovereignty "rather than to incur the
condemnation, if not the hostility, of the great civilized
states, the most powerful and most influential members of the Community of Nations." The Rule of Law, therefore, depended upon public opinion "until the time is ripe for the establishment of a central government to announce, interpret, and enforce World Law, the express will of the World Sovereign. . . ." 21

In the last section of Notes on Sovereignty entitled "A Definition of Sovereignty" Robert Lansing restated the argument advanced in his 1906 writings. As had been the case in his textbook on Government, and in the 1910 definition of Territorial Sovereignty as well as in the earlier "Notes," the 1913 "Definition promoted a strong, schematic case for sovereignty based only upon physical force. This article was intended as a refutation of the school of thought embraced by the majority of scholars which accepted the Hobbian view that sovereignty was a "legal" principle interrelated with the existence of the state itself. For Thomas Hobbes, the state was sovereign. Its function was to prevent men from destroying each other by creating and enforcing laws. As developed in his magnum opus of 1651 entitled Leviathan, Hobbes envisioned the state as a politically, legally, and morally absolute sovereign.

Although Lansing agreed laws were both created and enforced by the sovereign, he could not accept the supposition that sovereignty was a legal concept residing in an "institution" called the state. In refutation Lansing pointed to
examples of civil war: his adversaries' alleged "sovereign" state had the same rights which all other "legally" sovereign states possessed in that it might enact as many laws as it wished; but, Lansing asked, who or what would enforce these edicts of the "legal" sovereign when the shopkeepers had already begun constructing barricades in the royal park? It was paradoxical to speak of a superiority which was not superior or of a supremacy which was not supreme or of a sovereignty which was not sovereign. Yet, this was precisely the argument that Lansing considered the majority of scholars in the "legalist" school to be making.

After delivering "A Definition of Sovereignty" before the American Political Science Association, Lansing submitted a draft of the address to the president of the organization for publication in the Proceedings of that year. President Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and author of several monographs dealing with sovereignty, was internationally recognized as a major proponent of the "legalist" school of thought which Lansing challenged. In a letter thanking him for the draft, Willoughby wrote, although he agreed with many of Lansing's conclusions, and although he respected the logic behind the argument, he could not accept the writer's basic supposition that sovereignty was equatable with paramount power in a state. Sovereignty, he reminded the attorney, may also be seen as "legal," or that which was interrelated with the
existence of the state itself. 23

Robert Lansing's reply to the august professor summarized his original position and placed Notes on Sovereignty within the intellectual climate of his time. "Perhaps," he began,

my view is too materialistic, and that my conception . . . is more sociological than legal. You may be right, but in dealing with the bases of human society I find it difficult to think of a law as a command of a sovereign when the concept of sovereignty is dependent upon the existence of law . . . . Unavoidably the sociological and legal become intermingled. . . .

I admit that what we term politically "the right of sovereignty" is a legal right, and is, therefore, a concept of law, . . . of constitutional law; but, believing as I do, that all human rights (excepting . . . those which are purely ethical . . . ) depend on sovereignty, I see in the legal right of sovereignty the right to exercise political authority which pertains to what I have termed "artificial sovereignty," while the source of the right is the "real sovereignty." While peace prevails, the law, resting on the superior might of the real sovereign, confers the legal right upon the artificial sovereign and insures its exercise; but, when war comes and enacted law loses its force, the rights of artificial sovereignty is dependent directly upon the will of the real sovereignty as manifested not by law, but by the exercise of physical superiority. It does not seem to me, therefore, that the concept of actual [or real] sovereignty should be limited by the term "legal," or that a legal right should be made to do duty for the collective power which is natural to a human society. 24

What Robert Lansing attempted to achieve in Notes was a "practical working theory" of sovereignty. He had never intended the undertaking to be a "novel definition . . . but rather to restate an old one and apply it to modern
political conditions." For this objective alone, the author must be viewed as a decided realist, one who would not ignore the existence of force and coercion within a state's domestic and foreign relations simply because they might contradict his personal conception of good and evil. In general terms, Notes demonstrated Lansing was not "a mere legalist, that he could clearly see the difference between domestic law, capable of enforcement, and international law which could not be enforced and which therefore represented little more than custom and expediency." Within the world community, each state pursued a policy of self-preservation and national self-interest; consequently, it was force, not international law or morality which existed as the "ultimate determinant of behavior." For this reason Lansing's definition of Territorial Sovereignty, in 1910, reflected the doctrine of the Realpolitik, and for this same reason, both Notes and his 1902 discussion of Government accepted the principle of intervention to maintain a balance of power among European states.

Despite his acceptance of the use of force in international relations, despite his realism, Lansing did not surrender to pessimism. Although not a universalist, he did believe a single democratic world government someday would be formed which would allow the peaceful expression of the people's sovereign will. Yet, for now, men must turn to the Law of Nations in order to settle their claims and grievances without resorting to force.
CHAPTER IV

ANTI-IMPERIAL EXPANSIONIST:
LANSING'S CONCEPTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

"Old traditions," writes historian Selig Adler, "like old soldiers, do not die--they merely fade away. The stronger the tradition, the longer it lingers, even after its raison d'être has disappeared."¹ One such tradition is Isolationism. Of continuing significance in twentieth-century American society, isolationism is a concept deeply embedded in the geography and history of the New World. Because of its association with the early years of the republic, the concept developed a patriotic meaning for the American citizen particularly during the period before the Great War of 1914. Isolation was somehow responsible for "his own peace, convenience, prosperity, and even the safety of his household,"² and as new values emerged upon the national scene, many men were reluctant to part with such a proud heritage.

No other series of events in the history of the United States gave greater impetus to anti-isolation ideas than the Spanish-American War of 1898. In particular, annexation of the Philippine Islands was a sharp departure
from previous American patterns of territorial expansion. For the first time the United States stepped beyond its continental limits to seize lands lying closer to the mainland of Asia than to its own shores. Strategically, the republic committed itself to defend remote outposts in East Asia; politically, it assumed responsibility for millions of peoples who would probably never be accepted as equal citizens; and economically, foreign trade received the assistance of military forces located at various "coaling station" throughout the globe.

Samuel Flagg Bemis once described the annexations as a "great national aberration" reflecting the "adolescent irresponsibility" of the United States. Albert K. Weinberg considered it a sudden and decisive breaking away of the Ship of State from its "traditional moorings," and the course now set, according to Ambassador George F. Kennan, lacked "solemn and careful deliberation." Richard Hofstadter understood "the taking of the Philippine Islands" as "a major historical departure for the American people," not only as "a breach in their traditions," but also as "a shock to their established values."³ Many individuals in the United States still believed isolationism was a policy that "best served the longrun interests of national security, business opportunities, and the universal triumph of liberty and democracy."⁴

As a result of the moral issues raised both by the United States' Senate's debate over the Treaty of Paris of
1898, and by the Filipino insurrection against American rule, isolationism or anti-imperialism appealed to a large number of writers and intellectuals of the post-war period. Revolutionary, United States Senator, and journalist Carl Schurz feared the shattering domestic effects of a colonial empire. Writing in The Century Magazine before the war's end, he warned Americans "no candid observer of current events in this Republic will deny that the exercise of more or less arbitrary rule over distant countries will be apt to produce most pernicious effects upon our public morals." 5 Yet if Schurz experienced apprehension, others, such as the popular poet William Vaughn Moody, American institution Samuel Langhorne Clemens, and public conscience Finley Peter Dunne expressed only anger.

In his moving "Ode in Time of Hesitation," Professor Moody asked the McKinley Administration to

Tempt not our weakness, our cupidity!
For save we let the island men go free,
Those baffled and dislaureled ghosts
Will cure us from the lamentable coasts
Where walk the frustrate dead . . .
O ye who lead,
Take heed!
Blindness we may forgive, but baseness we will smite. 6

Mark Twain, on the other hand, advised in 1901 the time has come to explain to the public, "To the Person Sitting in Darkness," precisely what the new direction in foreign policy meant. He should be told

. . . there have been lies, yes, but they were told in a good cause. We have been treacherous,
but that was only in order that real good
might come out of apparent evil. True, we
have crushed a deceived and confiding people;
we have turned against the weak and the friend-
less who trusted us; we have stamped out a just
and intelligent and well-ordered republic;
we have stabbed an ally in the back and slapped
the face of a guest ... but each detail was
for the best. We know this. The Head of every
State and Sovereignty in Christendom ... in-
cluding our Congress ..., are members not
only of the church but also of the Blessings-
of-Civilization Trust. This world-girdling ac-
cumulation of trained morals, high principles,
and justice cannot do an unright thing, an un-
fair thing, an ungenerous thing, an unclean
thing. It knows what it is about. Give your-
self no uneasiness; it is all right.7

The optimistic Mr. Dooley satirically added " ... if th'
American people can govern themselvse, they can govern any-
thing that walks."8

Other individuals besides these four writers exper-
rienced the "shock" to established values referred to by Pro-
fessor Hofstadter. Politicians such as the senior Senator
from Massachusetts, Republican George Frisbie Hoar, regarded
the annexation of any foreign territory without consent of
its population contrary to the principles of the Declaration
of Independence.9 No literary or political figure, however,
presented his arguments with greater clarity and emotion than
Bourbon Democrat Robert Lansing. The national controversy
which raged over the question of imperialism "constituted
one of the great debates of American history";10 Lansing
not only argued the anti-imperialist position among his
contemporaries, but his essays provided insight into his
pre-war thinking about the precise direction which the foreign policy of the United States ought to take.

II

In 1902, Robert Lansing believed the "wisest" United States secretaries of state were Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Quincy Adams, Daniel Webster, William Learned Marcy, Lewis Cass, and Hamilton Fish. Each of these men were "profound thinkers and sound leaders," not "dreamers of dreams in which destiny and sentiment overshadowed wisdom and prudence." They all pursued "the conservative and safe course of the wisest American Statesmen" such as George Washington. Their reputations were best understood when contrasted to those three men who sullied the luster of that high public office: James Gillespie Blaine, Richard Olney, and the chief offender William Henry Seward. Seward, Lansing believed, first abandoned the prudent "advice of Washington in his 'Farewell Address,'" and began a program in which the United States acted "jointly with the European powers... Furthermore our policy of firmness tempered with conciliation and patience, was changed to one of compulsion by force." As for Blaine and Olney, "again the vision of Seward rose before those who directed the nation's policy and we acted jointly, for were we not a world-power with a manifest destiny?" This rejection of the conservative, traditional ideas on non-alliance and non-intervention did not end with Olney's
retirement in 1897; on the contrary,

we are today again chasing the phantoms of Lincoln's Secretary of State, the creation of his vivid and lurid imagination, drawn forward like the mariner by the syrens' [sic] song. The rocks lie just behind the manifest destiny of world power. There is still time to turn back. 12

Secretary Seward's phantoms were empire and world leadership, while the rocks upon which the seductive sirens lay were moral, political, and intellectual hypocrisy, international war, and domestic socialism.

In an essay of May, 1902 entitled "Our New Foreign Policy," Lansing discussed the reasons behind the revival of Seward's brand of imperialism as well as its possible consequences. During the past century--while the nation generally followed the almost "negative" policy of President Washington--the people of the United States "watched without envy the gradual division of Asia and Africa among the colonizing powers of Europe." These events did not disturb those who governed the Republic "as long as the markets were open to their goods and the ports to their ships." The wisdom of such a course was obvious, Lansing believed, since the United States "exhibited a growth in wealth and power unparalleled in the world's history. . . . The problems of government were internal rather than external." 13

When "Spanish misrule" disappeared from the Western Hemisphere, however, the Republican Party, the party in power, "flustered with the success of our army and navy[, instead, began] to venture upon a new and untried way." Under the
commanding officer of the Asiatic Naval Squadron, George Dewey, the United States acquired the Philippine Islands in the August, 1898 battle which captured the Spanish colonial capital at Manila. From the initial idea of giving up the port, the desire grew to retain the city as a coaling station, and then it dawned upon Republicans to keep the entire archipelago. "There was a glitter and fascination about having foreign possessions...; it suddenly became rapacious for territory and the extension of American dominion beyond the Western Hemisphere."

Lansing decided this sudden imperialistic spirit complemented the political philosophy of the Republican Party. There was "but one incentive to the Republican politicians for taking so radical a step"—partisan advantage. Carried away by the martial spirit of the wartime victories, a few Republican enthusiasts, Lansing charged,

thought it would add luster to the administration, if hereafter they could point to the Philippines and say, "these rich islands of the Orient were the reward we received for victory over Spain; never would the Democrats have gained such a prize; it is Republican diplomacy and a Republican administration America must thank for this splendid acquisition. The glory all belongs to the Republican Party."

Lansing was sure that sometime before April of 1898 Republican leaders realized the tenuous state of their political coalition. Middle-class America was tired of its victimization by the trusts, and even some of the "infant
industries, ingrates that they are," now grumbled at the high tariff protection interfering with the expansion of their foreign trade. Fearing the defection of business and the middle class, the "Party of Progress," unwilling to face and explain the advantages of protection, trusts, and high prices, decided "to divert popular attention and gather laurels for itself by securing the Philippine Archipelago [sic]."

Thus for partisan reasons Republicans purchased the Philippines for twenty million dollars. By spending this "tidy little sum," however, the United States acquired more than just one hundred fifteen thousand square miles of geography; it also "bought eight millions of human beings without asking them whether they liked it or not; and then we proceed to govern them, that is, make them pay taxes out of the money they earn, and this too without asking them for the right." For Lansing, this process was undemocratic and hypocritical; "it seems a good deal like buying an immense plantation with serfs attached to the land" at a price of two and one-half dollars per head.

If the Filipinos had not revolted against their new masters, this Republican ploy might have succeeded. The public reacted negatively to the human and monetary cost of suppressing the insurrection and "the beautiful dream of our Republican friends, changed suddenly into a nightmare. . . . There was but one thing to do--to shift the responsibility
from the Republican Party, to find a plausible excuse." Now
the party managers declared that they really never wanted to
take the islands in the first place, "but Humanity compelled
it." With sarcasm the essayist retorted: "Whenever a nation
wants to avoid responsibility it falls back on Humanity."15

Lansing rejected the whole concept of a war in the
name of humanity as "a convenient excuse" and the antithesis
of what should properly motivate a nation's foreign policy--
self-interest. It is "an apology of recent origin, chiefly
for consumption abroad and among a certain class of our
fellow citizens . . . who like to deal in abstract ideas of
an ideal sort"; those who spoke "a great deal about 'Anglo-
Saxon union', 'manifest destiny', 'the era of universal
peace', and other things of that sort, which sound well but
never materialize, nor are likely too [sic] until human nature
changes considerably."16 There was no "single instance" when
men fought a war in the name of humanity, although one should
not confuse humanity "with some great principle of govern-
ment, such as the right of a people to govern themselves, the
freedom of the seas or the restraint of growing despotism."
War for these principles was indeed in the national self-
interest. But if the United States adopted "Only for . . .
Humanity as its motto, where would it begin and where would
it end?" "The Armenians," he asked, "for hundreds of years
have been the prey to Turkish cruelty; ought we not help them?"
This, of course, was ridiculous. A war for humanity's sake
was paradoxical; national advantage determined foreign policy. The Republicans must remember "one inexorable rule": "No nation is to attempt to deprive another of its sovereignty on the plea of Humanity unless the suffering nation is the weaker. It is a good rule," he concluded sarcastically, "for it prevents many unpleasant experiences [sic] for the humane nations."17

As Republicans talked of humanity, they remained "rapturous over the glowing reports of the riches of our new possessions and what a splendid commercial investment the administration had made for the nation." Yet, even if the islands proved economically valuable, Lansing decided this profit would "go into the pockets of only a few manufactures or the vaults of the Trusts and not into the Treasury . . ." of the United States which purchased the archipelago in the first place. More importantly "who can ever pay us for the good American blood which has been shed in the marshes and jungles of Luzon?" Who can ever pay for the toils and hardships which the American soldiers have endured "at the hands of a treacherous and relentless foe?"

Concluding the essay, Lansing affixed shame upon the Republican Party. It is the greatest political mistake in our history, a mistake that is a crime against our people and against our institutions. In the hope of its own glory, the Republican Party has destroyed the tried foreign policy of a century, has sacrificed hundreds of American lives, has purchased a colony in rebellion, has spent the
public moneys like water, has granted the President despotic powers, and has incurred the condemnation of every conservative citizen of the Republic. 18

III

"Our New Foreign Policy" reflected Robert Lansing's opinions on American foreign policy at the turn of the century. The essay, however, appears to reveal contradictions between its contents and Lansing's previously expressed views on the interrelationship of sovereignty and national self-interest. A more thorough inquiry into these ambiguities, however, reveals a unity in the subject's philosophy to the extent that Lansing's foreign policy views may be presented as a systematic whole.

By heritage and choice, Robert Lansing was a conservative—religiously, economically, and politically. He believed the United States should not abandon traditional patterns in foreign policy "laid down by George Washington in his Farewell Address: . . . to avoid all alliances with foreign powers, to treat all with equal justice and consideration and to abstain, so far as consistent with national . . . dignity, from political, not economical, relations with distant states." Washington differentiated two separate spheres of global influence in which "we would attend to the affairs of the Western Hemisphere and did not desire and
would not permit European interference. On the other hand, we would not meddle with the politics of the Eastern Hemisphere." The unparallelled growth in national wealth and power during the nation's first century demonstrated the wisdom of such a policy.\(^19\)

Utilizing such a guideline, foreign policy ought to be "national," not "Republican" or "Democratic" in scope and character. The nation's international objectives must reflect its citizens' needs and concerns and not the partisan wranglings or economic goals of a particular interest. For these reasons, Lansing opposed annexation of the Philippines, an action favoring the expanding market requirements of the Republican "Trusts." In later years as well, Lansing exhibited a continuous reluctance to engage in any of his party's campaigns; he steadfastly maintained "there ought not to be any question of domestic politics in our international relations." In this way the United States could "present to foreign nations a solid front and declare the action is American and not the action of this or that Administration."\(^20\)

A bi-partisan foreign policy, however, was useless unless based upon the principles of national self-preservation and self-interest. This was how Lansing understood Washington's Farewell Address, and this was the hypothesis he championed in *Notes on Sovereignty*. Any state may resort to force to protect its interests and to preserve the existing international balance of power. Force made the
Philippines part of the United States, and as he wrote in the spring of 1922, force "is the great underlying actuality in all history." "The rule of the strong, the rule of force, rather than the rule of right, will continue to be supreme in the world." 21

The use of force in the Philippines, however, was not in the nation's best self-interest. The "artificial" sovereign of the United States, the Republican-controlled government, annexed these islands without regard for certain moral principles the American people, the real sovereign, considered to be of the highest importance. This partisan use of American military power made the Declaration of Independence a "sham," unjustified by the economic, political, or military benefits the islands returned. Writing in 1902 Lansing argued

any government, which acts for any other reason than national good, is betraying its trust and ignoring the purpose for which it was created. Furthermore, a government, when it assumes a line of action, which is detrimental to the interests of the nation, whatever the motive may be, is responsible to the people and forfeits their confidence, especially so if the policy, which they have adopted, is persisted in though clearly injurious to the nation. 22

Lansing disliked the dishonest rationale of the Republicans in 1898 for their actions. When confronted with developing domestic disillusionment over the American military action in the Philippines, party managers tried to justify annexation in the name of Humanity. This "convenient excuse"
for war was both illogical and hypocritical. Just as the North fought the American Civil War for the cause of union, not slavery, the Spanish-American War, "in which we heard so much about Humanity, would probably never have taken place except for the destruction of our cruiser in the harbor of Havana. . . . It was a war of vengeance," despite what Lansing had written in the textbook on Government. 23

The concept of war in the name of humanity, as developed in his essay on "Our New Foreign Policy," expressed Lansing's emotional and political reaction to the Republican governmental leadership. On December 21, 1912, however, he developed a more legalistic defense of his position in an address before the Society for the Settlement of International Disputes. Beginning with his a priori from "Notes on World Sovereignty," he stated that from an external perspective sovereignty was located solely within the institution of government. In wars for humanity, the "humane" or aggressor state interfered with the domestic affairs of the "inhuman" state since one sovereign state declared war against a second sovereign government for the protection of the sovereignless inhabitants. "The consequence would be that international law would apply directly to the fundamental rights of persons [instead of states], which would necessitate a revision of the present concept of sovereignty." Furthermore, instead of aiding surpressed peoples of the world, legalization of this rationale provides "a just
ground for coercion" in the relationship among states since "nations today have shown little evidence of being inspired by so lofty an altruism as entitles them to be the judges of the acts of other nations in their dealings with individuals." 24

Lansing did not believe a war for the betterment of humanity had ever or could ever exist. From the point of view of international law, such a war was illegal since it involved interference within the domestic affairs of the attacked state. The governmental leaders of a democratic state received a trust from the nation's citizens, from the real sovereign, to conduct the country's foreign and military policies in a responsible manner or else to relinquish control to more capable men. To insure the faithful execution of this trust, the people in a democracy had a right to demand true and honest reports from governmental spokesmen.

Just as a partisan use of military force was a betrayal of trust, so was the concealment by political parties of the real reasons for a war. This second point is best illustrated in Lansing's opposition to the "Secret Diplomacy" he observed during his participation on the American Commission to Negotiate the Peace in 1919. Surprised by the "muttered confidences" and "secret intrigues" occurring about him, Lansing was particularly disillusioned by the involvement of the President of the United States in "back-room diplomacy," especially considering Woodrow Wilson's
strong stand of January, 1918, favoring "open covents ... openly arrived at." "Secrecy and its natural consequences," Lansing believed, "have given to diplomacy a popular reputation for trickery, for double-dealings, and ... for unscrupulous and dishonest methods ... ."25 This alienated the people whom the diplomat represented. "Everywhere," he observed in 1919, "there are developing bitterness and resentment against secretiveness ... . The patience of the people is worn threadbare. Their temper has grown ragged. They are sick of whispering diplomats."26

Besides governmental responsibility, Lansing's reflections also embraced the problem of world peace. Since a state's foreign policy should be based upon self-interest and self-preservation, and since force may be used to promote national advantage and independence, it would appear Lansing's philosophy justified international aggression. What would prevent a country with an exaggerated sense of national honor or vital interest from constantly threatening war upon its neighbors? Lansing had a definite answer to this question.

The existence of world peace in part depended upon the phenomenon of public opinion as discussed in "Notes on World Sovereignty." A potential aggressor state usually curtailed its desires for conquest rather than "incur the condemnation, if not the hostility, of the great civilized states."27 Since "condemnation" implied more than verbal
protests, the term was somewhat of a misnomer. An aggressor also needed to consider if his actions threatened the existing regional or world balance of power and thus invited the "condemnation" of other states as expressed in terms of declarations of war. Did not the French Government withdraw its military support of Mexico's Emperor Maximilian at the same time the United States was ending its Civil War and thus became capable of diverting its men of arms southwards?

A second factor contributing to international peace was the world's division into aggressive and peaceful states. The factor of public opinion operated primarily because of the existence of these naturally peaceful states. Perhaps the most non-realistic aspect of Lansing's philosophy remained in his differentiation of these "peaceful states." They were democracies. "I believe," he wrote an acquaintance in 1917,

that it is a fact of history that real democracies are faithful to their treaty obligations, benevolent towards other nations striving for self-development, and just in their international relations, and that, whether their governmental systems are monarchical or republican, they long to maintain friendship with their neighbors and with all mankind. Self-governing nations, like the individuals who compose them, are naturally peace-loving and peace-seeking. If every people possessed the power to give full expression to their collective will, this earth would be substantially free from wars of aggression, and, if wars of that nature ceased, peace would reign throughout the world. The will of a people can only be controlled when democratic institutions are honestly and intelligently
maintained. Make the world safe for democracy by eliminating forever autocracy, despotism and tyranny, and enduring peace will surely come.²⁸

The third factor necessary to insure the continuation of world peace was to "regulate the exercise of sovereignty."²⁹ Although the nations of the world had unequal military powers at their command, they remained equal under codified international law.³⁰ "Every rule governing international intercourse, whether applicable in time of peace or in times of war, is intended to protect some fundamental right of a state" against its violations by another state.³¹ In other words, expanding the use and codification of international law prevented a state from acting in its own self-interest at all times; however, such restrictions ultimately served its best interests by fostering a climate of intra-world peace. By forsaking a small measure of its sovereignty to establish a world court, for example, a state could better utilize its resources by allocating them towards domestic needs.

At the close of a 1912 address on "How an International Arbitration is Conducted" Lansing elaborated upon this third point. He told his audience "National Honor" was nothing more than a "standing excuse," a "vague elastic term, which should have no place in the relations of governments who endeavor to act righteously." National Honor cannot relate to national self-interest. The community of nations
fortunately has begun to realize this. International law has begun to replace binational war. "The world is getting better," he concluded.

The desire to do right is becoming stronger. The power of justice is supplanting the power of physical force. The whole tendency of international thought is toward the peaceful adjustment of controversies, however grave they may be. I believe that many of us will live to see the time when there will be a world court with a defined jurisdiction administering justice according to a code of laws which have received the sanction of all civilized nations. When that time comes the abolition of war will be an accomplished fact, and the earth will enter upon an era of universal peace and of industrial development and prosperity unequaled in the annals of history.32

Despite the approaching era of peace under the Rule of Law, the most important principle of any nation's foreign policy would always remain self-interest and self-preservation. During a visit of the Phortnightly Klub to Washington in 1916, Lansing told them "there might be conditions under which a nation might do things which were in violation of settled principles of international law, provided the doing of those things were essential to self-preservation; in other words, that the right of self-preservation might be deemed to set aside or override international law."33 Again, during a meeting with his staff in October of 1917, Secretary of State Lansing admitted he had tried to prevent any government from filing claims against the United States based upon violations of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, since he did not feel these conventions bound the
United States "in this war." This was a war for self-preservation. Yet he retained faith in a new era still to come for the Rule of Law. "I believe in the future," he wrote in 1915; "when this great war is over, . . . we will return with even greater vigor to the maintenance of law and its declaration by judicial tribunals."  

IV

Robert Lansing's conception of the proper role for the United States in world affairs was not philosophically complex. Steeped deeply in the Washingtonian heritage, he believed the separate New and Old Worlds should not interfere with each other's destiny. This fixed characteristic of his personal philosophy covered all aspects of international relations except trade or defense against a genuine threat to self-preservation or self-interest. A genuine threat did not further the domestic partisan or economic advantage of a minority group within the United States, but did challenge established principles such as the freedom of the seas. When a threat of this nature existed, the United States had a moral obligation to use force to protect its interest.

Self-interest, self-preservation, a willingness to use force when necessary--these were Lansing's watchwords. Any government unwilling to base its foreign policy upon these principles should be replaced. Likewise, any government
purporting to be democratic and yet hiding the reasons for its actions from its citizens also should be replaced. Relations among states must be honest and as free from secrets as those between government and citizen.

Finally, emphasizing peace through law and the balance of power, and a realistic foreign policy based upon self-interest and force of arms, Lansing wanted the United States to take an active role in world affairs while at the same time preserving its sovereignty and freedom of diplomatic action. With but minor exceptions, this philosophy remained uncompromised throughout the remainder of Robert Lansing's career.

If Lansing's philosophy in relationship to the United States' role in world affairs were not complex, neither was it unique. As with Carl Schurz, William Vaughn Moody, Samuel Langhorne Clemens, Finley Peter Dunne, George Frisbie Hoar, and many members of the Anti-Imperialist League, Robert Lansing was an "isolationist." Yet this term through its use and misuse in the American historical experience, currently conjures up impressions unlike those possessed by previous "isolationists." At the turn of the century its meaning is best described by Walter F. LaFeber's phrase "Anti-Imperial Expansionists."37

"Anti-imperial expansionists" is a more accurate term than either isolationists or even anti-imperialists since the members of this discernible block took second place to
none in affirming the need for overseas markets. Upper-class easterners, literary rebels, Mugwumps, and Democratic politicos in membership, much of their opposition to overseas expansion remained idiosyncratic and individualized. Nevertheless a sense of group cohesion did exist.

First, they all identified with an earlier America—one not yet fully industrialized and corporatized. All these individuals, "in varying ways and degrees, were alienated from the new industrial urban order," and instinctively distrusted the seemingly radical departures from old and established values of American foreign policy. Traditional values were sacred to them.

Partisanship also characterized this diverse lot of anti-imperial expansionists: many were Democrats who although motivated by principle also acted out of a pragmatic desire to label the Republicans as imperialists and thus to profit at the polls from popular opposition to these new aggressive policies. Lansing himself reflected these anti-imperial expansionist characteristics, when he tried to equate business trusts, imperialism, and the Republican Party during his campaign for mayor in 1902 in his Boon Street Mission address. Further, many officers of the famous Anti-Imperialist League, like Lansing, were from the "conservative wing of the Democratic Party. . . . They were all sound-money men, viewed free silver as economic heresy. . . . , and largely opposed the other demands of the Populists in
1896." Lansing and the officers of the League accepted the *laissez faire* doctrines of Adam Smith, and as Bourbons also supported civil service and municipal reforms.⁴³

At the turn of the century leaders of American public opinion broadly divided themselves into one of three groups on this key foreign policy issue. These blocks differed in their answer to one question: Did commercial expansion necessitate as an accoutrement a formal colonial empire? One group, the imperial expansionists such as Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Henry Cabot Lodge responded to this question in the affirmative. Accepting social Darwinism literally and concerned for a "proper" role for the United States in world affairs, these men were among the first to perceive the era of international free trade had passed. The second group, a middle block, accepted the imperialists' position on free trade and agreed the government needed to play a more active role in the economic sphere. On the other hand, they desired to minimize the economic and social burdens of expansionism. The Federal Government should take an active part in the world, but one involving the least possible expenditure of public monies.⁴⁴

At the other end of the spectrum was the third block, the anti-imperial expansionists, who did not believe commercial expansion necessitated a formal colonial empire.⁴⁵ Robert Lansing sympathized with this ideological position
for a variety of reasons. Anti-imperial expansionists primarily expressed the general undesirability of a colonial empire simply because imperialism and the political principles of democracy were not compatible; the United States, as with ancient Rome, could not be both empire and republic. Empire was a hypocrisy since it permitted free men to rule the unfree and since it required the creation of a standing military force which might threaten the civilian domination of the Federal Government. Lansing echoed this fear for the future of civil liberties at home in his essays of 1902. He took a slightly different position in that he feared less a government dominated by the military than he did its eventual control by the business trusts, an event making "individualism ... a forgotten principle." 46

In contrast to this first rationale, the second appeared more hypocritical. Most anti-imperialist expansionists including Lansing argued empire meant the absorption of inferior, non-white-Anglo-Saxon races into the American political and social system—a racist argument hardly compatible with the true spirit of democracy. Lansing's similar position in the Spanish Cession Cases of 1898 has been noted; 47 throughout his entire adult life he sincerely believed

the African races are devoid of any capacity for political organization and lack genius for government. Unquestionably there is in them an inherent tendency to revert to savagery. ... The natural progressiveness and increasing culture of the white race is met at every hand by this irresistible tendency [on
the part of Blacks] to revert to the ances-
tral state of barbarism.\textsuperscript{48}

Since one of the basic reasons behind the decline of Rome
was the "flood of savage peoples" into its society, colonial
imperialism might produce the same effect upon the United
States.\textsuperscript{49}

The third explanation of this group was imperialism
per se simply did not work. Imperialism remained undesir-
able, they insisted, because it created certain antithetical
social forces within the subject lands which would even-
tually undermine colonial administrative control and profit-
able economic ventures. In support of their argument, anti-
imperialists pointed to British difficulties in India and to
the abortive "colonization" of the former Confederate States
of America during the period of Southern Reconstruction. In
May, 1902, Lansing supported this same rationale through
references to the British dependencies of East Africa and
Egypt, the island of Java under the Dutch, and Indo-China
and Madagascar under the French Republic. Lansing's study
of the European colonial attempts convinced him whenever a
power attempted to control a colony, without first working
through a native government, the endeavor "has caused wide-
spread dissatisfaction among the dependent people and has
ended disastrously to the governing nation."\textsuperscript{50}

There can be no question that during the years im-
mediately following the turn of the century Robert Lansing
held beliefs and prejudices about the proper role for the United States in world affairs that may be described by the phrase "anti-imperial expansionism." As a Bourbon Democrat he desired American expansion abroad not by annexations, not by a closed empire, but by a "free world" of downward tariff revisions allowing relatively unrestricted trade to flow among the states. He felt colonies were not in the United States' best interest since his nation could produce more and better goods and sell them for less on any market than any other nation in the world. Indeed, given his conservative political and economic philosophy, Robert Lansing's views on American foreign policy reflected the principle of national self-interest as he perceived it: given the era in which he lived, colonial imperialism just was not necessary.
CHAPTER V

LANSing OF STATE

It was only a short drive by electric automobile from the home at 1323 Eighteenth Street, northwest, which he and his wife shared with his father-in-law, to the general offices of the Department of State, located in the South Wing of the State, War and Navy Building. Situated across West Executive Avenue from the White House, at Seventeenth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, the huge solid granite building was one of the finest office buildings in the world when dedicated in 1875. Now, however, its four stories with some ten acres of floor space, divided by nearly two miles of corridors, was totally inadequate for its occupants.

Robert Lansing's office would be a suite of three rooms located in the Law Division, just down the main-floor hallway from the Secretary's offices. But before he started to work on that first Saturday in April, 1914, he recited the oath of office in one of the large diplomatic reception rooms. He stood before William Jennings Bryan with his right hand raised; his wife, Eleanor, and Dr. James Brown Scott were both present.1

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The press was there as well to meet "General Foster's son-in-law." The man they saw resembled the popular image of a diplomatist. A young forty-nine years old, five feet nine inches tall, weighing about one hundred sixty pounds, he preferred gray tweeds. In the summer months he usually donned a gray cutaway coat, striped trousers, and a soft gray hat. In all seasons, however, his good build and general fastidiousness marked him as one of the best dressed men in governmental circles.

His shoulders were broad, and his head was long, coming to an abrupt curve on top. Thick, closely cropped iron gray hair complemented his soft face. It was a thin face, with deep, gentle, gray eyes, and a narrow sculptured nose. Deep but fine lines beneath his eyes, and a double-chin hinted at his age. Then, of course, there was the mustache: small but full, meticulously trimmed; always present, it never seemed to attract the viewer's attention.²

No one watching the installation of Robert Lansing as the new Counselor for the Department of State, no one except his wife, knew that for at least the last fifteen years, he had suffered from the metabolic disease diabetes mellitus. He apparently told no one except his family until the last years of his life, perhaps because of the socio-religious stigma popularly attached to the disease. Although not severe, his illness was historically important since in this era before the discovery of hormone insulin, the only
treatment was dietary. At various times during his service to the Wilson Administration he suffered mild attacks that not only impeded the performance of his duties but temporarily altered his normally reserved demeanor. (See Appendix B.)

Nevertheless on the morning of April 1, 1914, he appeared healthy to the gentlemen of the press; but Lansing's appearance alone would not fill their day's copy. Lansing lacked the credentials, scholarship, enthusiasm, energy and charisma of his predecessor. Neither did he have the political influence of his immediate superior, the Chautauqua Lecturer, William J. Bryan. Despite his ability and willingness to spend time and care on even the most routine problems, Lansing to the American press was not "good copy." "Mr. Lansing," an editor of The Nation once remarked," ... would give you no reason to guess that he is an authority on anything."4

His manner of speaking was dry and modulated, implying he had all the time in the world. The press characterized him as "one who is naturally fond of his kind," and one who took "an interest in questions laid before him ... not for the sake of winning anyone's favor, but because the subjects are, of their own merit, worth thinking about."

Newspapermen in general believed "it would take a tremendous provocation to stir him to anger of the explosive sort," while at least one member of the press felt he lacked "the traits commonly associated with the idea of efficiency. ..."5
Yet Lansing, for the most part, had good rapport with the press. In fact, as late as June of 1918, the monthly magazine *Current Opinion* described him as "The 'Most Likable' Secretary of State America Ever Had." Yet newspapermen were generally milder in their criticism of him than were his colleagues. The Secretary of the Navy thought Lansing was "mousy," the Secretary of Agriculture believed he lacked imagination, the Postmaster General felt he was "without an outstanding personality," the President's wife conceived of him as "only a clerk," while the director of the wartime Committee of Public Information, George Creek, was convinced Lansing "worked at being dull and carried conservatism to the point of medievalism."\(^6\)

There is no question Robert Lansing remained "a quiet, undemonstrative, even phlegmatic sort of man," to quote William Gibbs McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury\(^7\); nevertheless, he approached his duties with a practical, skeptical, and keenly analytical mind.\(^8\) He did not associate closely with the members of the Cabinet or other "politics," preferring the company instead of his wife, the Fosters, his associates in the law profession, and his dinner friends from the diplomatic corps. Of course, no one except his wife knew him as well as his Watertown friends in the Phortnightly Klub.\(^9\) Even after he became Secretary of State, he rarely revealed his true feelings at Cabinet meetings and instead preferred communicating directly with the President via
memoranda. He sat at Cabinet and rarely said "anything unless an international question came up. . . . He sat in silence at the Cabinet table, with a pad of paper before him, and made small pencil sketches with his left hand."\textsuperscript{10}

If diffident in personality, silent at Cabinet meetings, and poor copy to the press, Lansing nevertheless competently performed his duties as Counselor for the Department of State. The relationship he established with his immediate superior remained official, friendly, but never intimate. Secretary Bryan had obtained his office primarily because of his large popular following with the Democratic Party and his influential position at the Democratic National Convention of 1912. When he assumed office in March of 1913, replacing Republican Philander C. Knox, he brought the best of intentions with him, including a sincere dedication to peace and the new Democratic administration; and "no background or experience in foreign affairs, or even in government administration." "Bryan," in the opinion of historian Alexander DeConde, ". . . not only lacked understanding of international relations but also had never shown more than a casual interest in foreign affairs except as a political issue at the end of the Spanish-American War."\textsuperscript{11}

In this era of the Great War, Bryan was a particularly unsuitable Secretary of State because of his Weltanschauung; his friend the Secretary of the Treasury, William McAdoo, felt Bryan "turned every . . . question into a moral issue. He
was by naute a crusader, a reformer. . . . He thought in terms of people bearing burdens, of the wicked in high places, of the altars of sacrifice." Yet at all times and in all places he exhibited the gallantry of a Knight of the Roundtable. 12

As Secretary, Bryan wanted to reward political faithfulness who had remained loyal to the Democratic Party during sixteen lean years since it last controlled the White House, and he wanted to negotiate with as many nations as possible his Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, or "cooling off treaties." 13 President Woodrow Wilson and his personal foreign policy advisor, Colonel Edward M. House, thought the appointment of a Counselor experienced both in international law and Departmental procedures would compensate for Bryan's weaknesses. Since the first Counselor, John Basset Moore, proved too inflexible to meet their expectations, Robert Lansing, consequently, now had the opportunity of a lifetime. He "succeeded admirably in all respects, especially at the task of compensating for Bryan's paucity of experience." 14 Wilson and House, as well as the British Ambassador at Washington, Sir Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, agreed in November, 1914 Lansing was "being more satisfactory than Moore." 15

With the eruption of the Great War in Europe in August of 1914, Robert Lansing became the actual head of the Department of State in all respects save for the title of Secretary itself. The total operation of the departmental
machinery depended upon his office for direction, and Lansing increasingly received personal calls and notes from the President requesting his expert legal knowledge. The main issue was American neutrality, and as a legal issue it needed to be handled by experienced lawyers, not politicians.\(^{16}\) As a result of this abnormal situation, tension developed between Bryan and Lansing. Despite the niceties of protocol those within the Department of State and the nation's press knew Bryan was Secretary in name only. As the second highest officer Lansing served as Acting Secretary of State during Bryan's frequent political and personal departures from the capital, and during such absences their contrasting methodologies were most noticeable. On one such occasion, the Director of the Consular Service, Wilbur John Carr, recorded in his personal diary that "Lansing seems to be more methodical. Black leather covered loose leaf books with paper labels on them classify and hold his various memoranda. He works slowly and deliberately, keeping a clear desk most of the time." As for the effect on personnel, the Department "shows [an] absence of feverishness and more deliberation than when Bryan is here. Probably every man enjoys his work more than when the Premier is here."\(^{17}\)

The press also recognized the tension in the Bryan-Lansing relationship. After serving as Counselor for almost eight months, the newspapermen "discovered" Lansing late in 1915. By early summer of the following year, the
Counselor was relatively well known to the American reading public. This sudden increase in interest in Lansing was, in part, motivated by a desire to discredit his superior. During October and November of 1914, Bryan continued to take many personal trips even though the Department was embroiled in complex negotiations with the belligerent powers over the acceptance of the unmodified Declaration of London of 1909, regulating warfare at sea, and over relaxing the United States' credit embargo. It was the "extremely able" Lansing, and not Bryan, the press learned, who was responsible for these aspects of American international relations.

During February, March, and April of 1915, the press paid even closer attention to the Counselor. Considerable excitement, for example, developed over Lansing's relatively minor part in the Congressional debate on the Ship Purchasing bill. Upon the initiative of Secretary William McAdoo, the Wilson Administration introduced in Congress a bill establishing a federal corporation authorized to purchase ships in American ports of foreign registry and to use these ships as merchant vessels carrying cargo to belligerent nations. It is most interesting, recorded the editors of Current Opinion, that

neither the President nor the Secretary of State, but Robert Lansing, sent the communication to the House requesting its passage. It excited still more comment that when the resolution struck a snag in the Senate and had to be remodeled, a hasty conference at the White House ensued, and it was Lansing not Bryan that
took part therein. The explanation made in the press reports was to the effect that Mr. Bryan was found to be in bed and "it was not thought necessary to wake him." A Secretary of State whom it is not thought necessary to waken in a critical matter of that kind is surely to be congratulated on the able assistance he is fortunate enough to command. 21

A similar sarcasm permeated the analysis of The Outlook over the United States diplomatic communiqué to the European belligerents protesting violations of American neutral rights on the high seas. In a particular reference to Lansing's famous phrase "strict accountability," 22 the editors discovered that "the recent notes from the Department of State ... reveal a practiced hand" that must belong to the Counselor. It would be beyond the expertise of Bryan or even the President to produce such "a direct, individual, expert expression of opinion." 23

The lavish praise from the press embarrassed Lansing, primarily because of its partisan foundation. 24 The timing and anti-Bryan nature of these laudations, he wrote several friends, compromised his efficacy at the Department. "No man has been more faithful to his duties or more in touch with the general situation than ..." has Bryan, Lansing wrote William Dulles. "I regret very much that he does not receive justice at the hands of the newspapers and that consideration, to which he is entitled." 25

The Secretary of State was conscious of the newspapers' criticisms. The President's reliance upon Colonel
House in matters of policy formation as well as his dependence upon Lansing for legalistic and bureaucratic matters pertaining to the Department of State further aggravated the situation. When Bryan finally resigned, in early June of 1915, his inflated sense of neglect bordered on a persecution-complex. In the meeting with the President in which Bryan announced his desire to leave the Cabinet, Wilson tried to dissuade him. Yet the more the two men talked, the more distraught the Secretary became. He could not even take a drink of water without spilling most of the liquid from the glass in his trembling hand. With a quiver in his voice he told the President his decision was final, blurtling out at the interview's end that "Colonel House has been Secretary of State, not I, and I have never had your full confidence."26

Despite the tensions that existed before Bryan's resignation within both the Administration and the Department of State, the Secretary and his Counselor's working relationship remained surprisingly amicable. Lansing carefully observed the proprieties of his subordinate position. In turn, Bryan always recognized, and seemed to appreciate, Lansing's advice and expertise. In fact, Bryan never failed to forward the Counselor's suggestions and memoranda to the President, even when the two men were in total disagreement. Nor does it appear that Bryan ever assumed credit for any of Lansing's contributions.27 It seems certain that Bryan relied on Lansing as a "special pleader," or as some form of
personal ombudsman to reduce frictions that arose between the Department and the White House;\textsuperscript{28} both men consciously endeavored "to avoid a repetition of the Huntington-Wilson situation."\textsuperscript{29}

When William Jennings Bryan surrendered the portfolio of the Secretariat of State, on June 9, 1915,\textsuperscript{30} he and his Counselor parted as friends. Lansing sympathized with Bryan's emotional trial during his last weeks in office, and on more than one occasion tried to dissuade him from resigning; "but nothing that I could say," Lansing later recalled, "affected his views or weakened his determination."\textsuperscript{31} In fact, Bryan made a special point, before his departure for Nebraska, personally to commend Lansing on his service, to which Lansing responded with an expression of "deep and lasting affection."\textsuperscript{32} After Bryan's departure, the two men remained in close contact for at least six months. Bryan expressed pleasure in the selection of his successor, and the new Secretary, in turn, agreed to make arrangements for Bryan's former personal office staff.\textsuperscript{33} As was then customary, Bryan, in September of that same year, presented to the new Secretary the leather and mahogany armchair which Lansing would use during meetings of the President's Cabinet.\textsuperscript{34}

\section*{II}

As with Francis Maire Huntington-Wilson and John Bassett Moore, William Jennings Bryan found it expedient to
resign his post within the Department of State. In each instance the circumstances were approximately the same: their consciences would not allow them to administer a policy formulated by their constitutional superior, President Woodrow Wilson. Huntington-Wilson resigned when Wilson publicly announced the United States would not participate in the Six Power Consortium of 1913. Moore's reasons for returning to Columbia University centered upon President's Mexican policy of "watchful waiting" as well as his own general antipathy to Bryan's managerial abilities. Bryan submitted his letter of resignation some sixteen months later because, to use his own words, Wilson had "prepared for transmission to the German Government a note in which I cannot join without violating what I deem to be an obligation to my country."\textsuperscript{35} Allowing his pacifist sentiments to influence his judgment, Bryan regarded the proposed second note to Germany protesting the illegal sinking of the British liner \textit{Lusitania} as a United States ultimatum answerable only by an imperial declaration of war.

Either directly or indirectly the public career of Robert Lansing benefited from their departures. Huntington-Wilson's departure as Assistant Secretariat of State allowed Lansing to prepare an organization behind his own candidacy. By the time Counselor Moore resigned, less than one year later, Lansing's credentials were too prominent to be ignored. As Moore's retirement opened the Counselorship to
him, in March of 1914, then, likewise, Bryan's departure, in June of 1915, gave him the premier position within the Executive Departments.

These three resignations alone, however, did not guarantee Lansing's promotions. President Wilson wanted a non-ambitious replacement for Bryan, a man who would not resign over a disagreement on some future policy decision, "a man," to quote Colonel Edward M. House, "with not too many ideas of his own..." 36 Robert Lansing's diffident personality combined with his legal expertises, made him appear as the most suitable candidate in the United States. "He who believes in luck," one anonymous writer observed in 1921, "should study the career of Robert Lansing." 37

III

At the hour of twelve o'clock noon, the ninth day of June, 1915, Robert Lansing of Watertown and Washington, D.C. became the Secretary of State ad interim. 38 Although President Woodrow Wilson already had several men under consideration to permanently fill the post, he quickly realized there existed a dearth of diplomatically and politically qualified candidates. Soon after learning of Bryan's intended resignation, Wilson canvassed the Cabinet for their suggestions for a replacement. Almost every member of the Cabinet, particularly the ambitious Secretaries of the Treasury and of the Navy, William McAdoo and Josephus Daniels, coveted this
prestigious chair with its weight of tradition. For this reason the President conferred with his Secretaries individually, and not at a formal Cabinet meeting and thereby avoided any possible infighting. 39

On Sunday, June 6, Wilson invited McAdoo and David Houston, the Secretary of Agriculture, to the White House. According to Houston's memoirs, the President remarked

Colonel House would be a good man, but that his health probably would not permit him to take the place. . . . He remarked that Lansing would not do, that he was not a big enough man, did not have enough imagination, and would not sufficiently vigorously combat or question his views, and that he was lacking in initiative. I agreed with him and said I thought that Lansing was useful where he was but that he would be of no real assistance to him in the position of Secretary of State. 40

McAdoo concurred with Wilson and Houston, adding it would be a political error to put another New Yorker in the Cabinet; we had two already--[Secretary of Commerce William Cox] Redfield and myself--and Lansing would make three. . . .

The President reflected awhile, and then . . . remarked that he could not think of any man in the Middle West who had Lansing's excellent qualifications for the place. He let me understand that he intended to be, in effect, his own Secretary of State, and that he needed Lansing to put diplomatic notes in proper form and to act as an adviser on points of international law. 41

Perhaps because of McAdoo's suggestion, Wilson's thoughts temporarily turned to his old friend from Princeton University, Thomas D. Jones, a Chicago businessman and a
loyal Democrat who had helped finance Wilson's previous campaigns. Jones was a trustee of Princeton University who remained faithful to the President during the battles for control of the graduate school. Yet such thoughts did not go very far. Wilson had not forgotten the bitter fight in the summer of 1914 when the Senate refused to confirm Jones' appointment to the Federal Reserve Board. Furthermore, Jones like Secretary Houston, another candidate he greatly admired, possessed no experience in foreign affairs.

Time and again, the President's thoughts reverted back toward Robert Lansing. He was competent, intelligent, experienced and eminently qualified. More importantly, Lansing was basically a-political, unpretentious, and, so it seemed to Wilson, unlikely to oppose the President on policy matters or be unfavorable publicity to the Administration. Wilson also felt Lansing's relatively youthful age might allow him to be more flexible than some candidates in a world which, diplomatically, "is changing so rapidly that we have got to change with it, or be left far behind," and "old Mr. John W. Foster, . . . for whom I have great respect, . . . would steer Lansing, and the combination would be of great help to me."

Although public opinion never significantly affected Wilson's actions, he obviously knew of the rash of articles and editorials supporting Lansing's appointment beyond the current ad interim status. The New York Sun and the New York
World, for example, were pleased with Lansing's firm convictions during the dispute with Bryan over the wording of the second Lusitania note to Germany; the New York Herald compared his quiet and subtle statescraft to the personality of Abraham Lincoln. The editors of the prestigious and influential New York Times emphatically endorsed the former Counselor. "If Robert Lansing is appointed Secretary of State," an editorial observed on June 16, it will be a break in the State Department tradition, but it will be satisfactory to the country. . . . The Secretaryship has gone, as a rule, to men not only of admitted presidential stature, but to men who had actually been unsuccessful candidates for the Presidency. . . . But there is no recent parallel to the promotion of Lansing from a subordinate place in the department, except that of John W. Foster in 1892. . . .

The editors urged Wilson to disregard this tradition.

Mr. Lansing has discharged the duties of Secretary of State for about a year and has won the public confidence. He has been virtually a member of the Administration, has attended Cabinet meetings, and participated in their discussions. The President has had opportunities to study him and is in no danger this time of getting a subordinate who sets his theories above his duty. He is able, experienced, and wise.

However unresponsive to public opinion, Wilson did consider suggestions from his personal friend and advisor Colonel House. When Bryan announced his resignation, House was at sea aboard the passenger ship St. Paul returning from his first European peace mission. Although already aware of
the news by a wireless message sent by his recent Irish host
Sir Horace Curzon Plunkett, he did not learn of the de-
tails until June 13, 1915, when Dudley Field Malone, the
Collector of Customs at the Port of New York, intercepted
the St. Paul with a revenue cutter and joined the Texan
until the ship reached its berth. The next morning,
Monday, June 14, House left his Long Island home early and
traveled into New York for an eight o'clock briefing from
Secretary McAdoo to learn what the President "had in mind
concerning Mr. Bryan's successor." McAdoo told House the President wished opinions of
either Jones or Houston for the position, assuming, of
course, House himself did not desire the appointment. House
had no aspiration whatsoever to be tied down "to departmental
details . . . for I could be far more useful to him and to
the country by carrying on as I had been doing." He
maintained a very special relationship with Wilson on mat-
ters of foreign policy, and did not want it compromised by
Departmental bureaucracy. Neither did House desire a new
Secretary of State who might destroy this arrangement to
increase his own authority and prestige. This was the threat
House faced from Jones and Houston. Emphasizing the candi-
dates' lack of experience, he told McAdoo neither they nor
any current member of the Cabinet would be acceptable to
him.
At this juncture House asked McAdoo why the President had not considered Lansing. McAdoo replied Wilson did not think Lansing was "big enough" for the post. This, however, was precisely what the Colonel wanted in a Secretary of State; such a man would allow him to continue the "real" business of foreign policy through personal diplomacy.

Written later that Monday, Colonel House's diary presented the Texan's "reasons for suggesting the promotion of Lansing from Counsellor to Secretary of State . . .: He has been in the Department long enough to know how the President is conducting the foreign policies of this Government, therefore, if he accepts the position . . . he will do so with the facts before him," and without "complaining at the President's method of using me in the way he does." Lansing understood the office routine as well as international law, "and his duties in these directions will keep him busy and happy."

Justifying his own extra-constitutional role in the Wilson Administration House believed "Objections may be made to the manner in which the President has chosen to conduct his affairs of Government through an unofficial adviser, but let it be remembered that conditions are unusual and the times abnormal." 52

The following Wednesday, June 16, House again met with McAdoo. Although personally disposed in Lansing's favor, he still had to contend with McAdoo's ego since "the idea of being Secretary of State is exceedingly tasteful to him."
The Colonel reiterated he "had something better to suggest to the President for him [McAdoo], which was, in the event of war, to name him chairman of a commission to accelerate the manufacture of munitions of war . . . ." At the same time he handed McAdoo a memorandum in the form of a personal letter to Wilson so the President might consider his views about Bryan's successor "second hand before I have an opportunity of seeing him in person." In this communiqué House frankly told the President Lansing "could be used to better advantage than a stronger man . . . without half the annoyance and anxiety that you have been under" during the Bryan tenure. "I think," he continued,

the most important thing is to get a man with not too many ideas of his own and one that will be entirely guided by you without unnecessary argument, and this, it seems to me, you would find in Lansing. I only met him once and then for a few minutes only, and while his mentality did not impress me unduly, at the same time, I hope you have found him able enough to answer the purpose indicated.

This advice apparently ended any presidential thoughts about appointing a politically strong individual.

Robert Lansing, it appears, wanted the office once held by his father-in-law. Yet, as a realist, when he received the offer it came as a surprise. On Wednesday, June 23, Lansing arrived at his office at 9:05 A.M. The morning mail was heavier than usual because of his absence since the previous Monday. On Tuesday he had received a Doctor of Laws degree from Colgate University, his first honorarium and he had only
just returned from Hamilton, New York. After the mail two subordinates briefed him on the latest developments in the strained American relations with Mexico and Japan. The President's private secretary, Joseph Patrick Tumulty, then telephoned him from the White House and told him Wilson had reached a decision and the post of Secretary of State was Lansing's if he wished to accept it. Lansing thanked Tumulty and returned to his work, most notably a review of recent developments in Santo Domingo. Later that morning, Tumulty called again saying the appointment would probably come that day since Wilson wanted to see Lansing in the early afternoon. Lansing returned to work. Finally, at 12:50 P.M. he lunched, as usual, with Chandler Anderson at the Metropolitan Club after which he proceeded on to the White House.

Writing his memoirs some years later, Lansing remembered the two o'clock interview quite well. "The President," Lansing wrote,

... summoned me to the White House and without any preliminaries told me that he had decided to appoint me Secretary of State if I would first say that I would accept the appointment ...

I personally had never shared the hope of some of my acquaintances that I would be appointed, because my selection would in no way add to Mr. Wilson's strength in dealing with Congress as to domestic legislation, for, though I had always been a Democrat, I had not been active in a political way for many years and never in Washington; therefore I had no especial influence with the Democratic leaders at the Capitol. Such influence was and is an
important qualification for a Cabinet officer in carrying through a general legislative program. . . . The President's offer came to me, therefore as something which I had not really expected. I told him frankly that I had grave doubts as to the wisdom of his selection, as I thought that his Administration ought to be strengthened by appointing a man with more influence in the councils of the Democratic Party, but that I was greatly honored by his offer and would of course accept if he desired me to do so.

He replied that he would not have asked me unless he had considered the matter from every point of view and satisfied himself that it was the thing to do. He added: "By experience and training you are especially equipped to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States. This, under present conditions, is far more important than political influence." He went on to say that he was gratified to have me accept the appointment, since he was convinced that we were of the same mind concerning international policies. Of this he had been able to judge on account of our intercourse during my year's service as Counselor for the Department of State.57

After the interview Lansing returned to his office and to his work, not departing until his usual hour at which time his wife and General and Mrs. William Crozier joined him for an early dinner at the Lock Tavern Club.58

One important point of his discussion with the President never appeared in Lansing's memoirs. Wilson reminded Lansing Colonel House would still be a leading figure in formulating policy, and Lansing, in turn, stated he understood the unusual situation.59 House personally discussed his position in the administration with the new Secretary a month later, and Lansing, it appears, never outwardly objected.
In fact, he often secured Wilson's approval for some of his programs in the years to come by channeling them through House. "I feel," House recorded after his July meeting with Lansing, "that I have a working partner in the State Department who will carry his full share."60

On the following morning, Thursday, June 24, Lansing arrived at the State, War and Navy Building at nine o'clock and opened some of his congratulatory mail. Thirty-five minutes later he went down the hall to the same reception room where he had taken the Counselor's oath only a year before. This time he took a different oath, and this time the press did not need to search elsewhere for their day's copy.61 Afterwards Lansing transferred his files and papers from the Counselor's office to the rooms of the Secretary of State and immediately began his new duties as the executive head for the Department of State. Four years, seven months, and twenty days of difficult and frustrating work followed.62

IV

When Robert Lansing assumed direction of the United States' oldest bureaucracy he did not make many changes in its personnel or organization. Anxious to select a new Counselor, Lansing suggested his good friend John William Davis. Woodrow Wilson, however, refused on the grounds that Davis was the Department of Justice's best Solicitor-
General in twenty years. Lansing, Colonel House and Wilson all suggested other candidates but none satisfied all three men. Lansing, and not House as historians traditionally assert, finally suggested one of House's friends, Frank Lyon Polk, corporation counsel for the City of New York; Wilson and House quickly agreed. House and Lansing interviewed the forty-four year old graduate of Yale and Columbia Universities in mid-August, 1915, and by the end of the month Polk accepted the commission.

Polk proved to be an ideal Counselor, and his relationship with the Secretary was one of close friendship. At their first meeting in 1915, Lansing discovered

Mr. Polk was exactly my conception of what a counselor or under secretary of the Department of State ought to be. I knew that I could trust him implicitly, and his personality was enough assurance that he would be an agreeable colleague. Our future intercourse confirmed my first impression of him.

One Departmental associate later remarked "Lansing and Polk were an excellent combination, for the former's legal approach to problems [,] which often made him appear cold and uncommunicative, was offset by the latter's wit and quickness of decision."

Material assistance also came from Assistant Secretary of State John E. Osborne, who took general charge of the administration of the Department and, to a lesser extent, of Latin American affairs. Originally appointed in 1886, "the revered Sage of the Department," Second Assistant Secretary Alvery Augustus Adee was in charge of all
Departmental correspondence and generally influenced all bureaucratic matters. The Third Assistant Secretary supervised the administrative direction of the diplomatic service, incoming and outgoing official dispatches, international conferences, and the expenditures of public monies by the Department. William Phillips of Massachusetts held this post from 1914 to January, 1917, when he replaced retiring Assistant Secretary Osborne; Breckinridge Long of Missouri assumed Phillips' duties. Phillips, who worked well with Polk, was a career diplomat who had previously served as Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and as Third Secretary in 1909 under Secretaries of State Robert Bacon and Philander Knox. Colonel House, on the other hand, appointed the inexperienced Long. A hard worker, a loyal Democrat, conceited, and devoted to House, Long acted as the Colonel's personal channel of information, keeping him informed of news Lansing or Polk might not wish to share. Lansing, aware of House's intent, consequently avoided taking Long into his confidence.

Besides the Assistant Secretaries of State, Lansing depended upon the services of several other men. The most important of these was Lester Hood Woolsey. Lansing first met Woolsey at the International Fur Seal Conference at Washington, in 1911, before the latter became one of John B. Moore's hand-picked Assistant Solicitors for the Department in 1913. When Lansing replaced Moore, he discovered he could work amicably with Woolsey on the many questions
relating to rights of belligerents and neutrals in a world at war. "In order to continue this confidential relationship," Lansing recalled, "which had been exceptionally agreeable and useful to me as Counselor, I named Mr. Woolsey . . . 'Confidential Law Adviser to the Secretary,'" a post he held until June, 1917 when he replaced Cone Johnson as Solicitor. Woolsey usually prepared the original drafts of diplomatic communiqués and then conferred with Lansing on the final form submitted to the President. Lansing respected his aide's abilities to the extent that, upon his retirement in 1920, he asked the Solicitor to join him as junior partner in his law firm. For several years after Lansing's death, the firm of Lansing and Woolsey continued to receive the most prestigious clients.

The man whom Woolsey replaced as Solicitor, Cone Johnson, was a Texas friend of Colonel House and a man of little experience and poor health. Although a hard worker Johnson never secured the Secretary's complete trust since he "was so much under the influence of the cotton interests that an experienced eye would have to be kept on the work he was doing to prevent him from committing the Department to something objectionable." The two men in the Secretary's own office who did gain Lansing's confidence were Richard Crane and Richard C. Sweet. Crane served as Lansing's private secretary from July of 1915 until he became the United States' first minister to Czechoslovakia in
1919; while Sweet, who had no formal education beyond high school, became the Secretary's Confidential Clerk. Sweet had served Secretary Bryan in the same capacity; a position, according to Lansing, "where personal loyalty and absolute trustworthiness are essential, for the man filling that position knows more state secrets than any other person in the Department except the Secretary. He decodes the messages sent in private ciphers, which even the regular cipher clerks do not know." Since "no secret was ever divulged by him," Lansing suggested he become the law clerk for the firm of Lansing and Woolsey in 1920. Sweet agreed.

Beyond the assistant secretaries and his personal staff, the Secretary received assistance from the Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board, a body established by Lansing when he was Counselor. Traditionally the Department of Justice refused to render an opinion on the legality of a particular governmental policy or position before an actual case developed, an established pattern to avoid being overwhelmed with hypothetical cases. Yet the legal division of the Department of State remained totally inadequate to handle the complex legal questions developing from the European war. The Department of the Navy faced a similar problem. James Brown Scott wrote Counselor Lansing, in August of 1914, emphasizing the immediate necessity of a joint board to render legal opinions for both the State and Navy Departments as well as to prepare methods of "procedure
and coöperation between the . . . Departments which . . . will keep them in close and constant touch. 76 Lansing sent the Scott memorandum to Secretary Bryan, who, after consulting with the President, approved the idea. On the recommendation of Lansing, and an independent appeal from former Secretary of State Richard Olney, Scott received the presidential appointment as Chairman of the new Neutrality Board; Captain Harry S. Knapp and James H. Oliver represented the Department of the Navy. 77

Acting as a central clearing office for problems of neutrality, the three member board reported directly to the State Department Counselor. The Counselor, in turn, sent a copy of the board's report to the Navy Department for its information provided he approved of the findings. In this way the Department of State acted as a sort of board of review over the joint commission, a system which limited the Navy's influence upon the making of American foreign policy. 78 Later, at Lansing's request, the State, Navy, and Treasury Departments collaborated to enforce the interpretations of the neutrality statutes rendered by the Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board. 79

During Robert Lansing's tenure as Secretary the major individuals in authority, the men to whom he turned freely for advice, all came from the same mental and professional mold as Lansing himself. "Lawyers" dominated Lansing's Department of State. Gone were the "politicians" such as
Bryan, Root, and Olney; the few who remained never successfully penetrated the inner-circle that revolved around the Secretary. "I have done my duties," reflected Long after his first year of service, "and have only to regret that they were not greater. . . ." 80

The few career officers who entered this circle were usually men such as Phillips who, during his diplomatic service, had expanded upon his early studies at Harvard law school to become an expert in the legal aspects of international trade and finance. For technical information Lansing relied upon the career diplomats and bureaucrats; yet even many of these individuals received their early training in the field of law: Wilbur J. Carr, the expert on consular affairs, held a Master of Laws degree from George Washington University; Albert H. Putney of the Near Eastern Division was once a professor and dean of several law schools, and Leland Harrison, director of the wartime Secret Intelligence Bureau, formerly served the Department as an advisor on legation and embassy legal problems.

To this kind of mind--the minds of Polk, Phillips, Woolsey, Scott, Anderson--Lansing would first turn for advice and assistance. Even when the Secretary needed to escape Departmental problems for a brief hour or two, he sought out his old personal friends Charles Warren and John Davis and lunched with them at the Metropolitan Club, and thus eased his burdens by sharing a table with the Assistant Attorney
General and the Solicitor-General of the Department of Justice. Such an atmosphere profoundly influenced Robert Lansing's thoughts on the problems he encountered and the policies he advanced to the President, the politician.
CHAPTER VI
THE GERMAN CONSPIRACY:
INHUMANE WARFARE AND SECRET INTRIGUES

An open sports car, a Graef und Stift, stopped momentarily at the corner of the Appel Quay and Franz Josef Street while the Governor, General Oskar Potiorek, gave the driver new directions. Their passengers no longer desired to turn right and follow the planned route which would have taken them to the Governor’s residence, the Konak. He asked the driver instead to continue down the Appel Quay toward the military hospital where they would visit Lieutenant Colonel Erich von Merizzi, the victim of a hand grenade thrown earlier that morning by some would-be assassin at that same automobile.

At that brief instance when the military vehicle hesitated, as the General shouted at the driver, a short young man with long hair and deep-set blue eyes took out his revolver and thrust his arm through the crowd along the Appel Quay. As he aimed his revolver, a weapon provided by the secret terrorist organization Ujedinjenje ili Smrt through his own Mlada Bosna society, a policeman saw the impending danger, and started to grab the lethal hand. A friend of
the assassin standing nearby struck the officer. Pistol shots rang out. Gavrilo Princip stood only a few steps from his two targets in the backseat of the Graef und Stift. The sports car raced off at high speed to the Konak.

It only took a few minutes for the driver to reach the Governor's residence, and by 11:30 a.m. a message was reluctantly wired to Vienna proclaiming on that day, Wednesday, June 28, 1914, St. Vitus's Day, in the Imperial city of Sarajevo, Bosnia, a native killed Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este, Archduke and heir apparent of the House of Habsburg-Lorraine, and his beloved wife, Sophie Chotek von Chotkowa und Wognia, Duchess of Hohenberg.¹ Unknowingly Gavrilo Princip set in motion that morning the various centripetal and centrifugal forces pulling upon Europe in the summer of 1914. His action ended an era, an empire, and a century of relative peace.²

During the month which followed June 28, ultimatums led to mobilizations as the leaders of Europe, not realizing they now lived in a new century, allowed archaic diplomacy to pull them into a war for which they were neither politically, militarily, economically, nor psychologically prepared. By July 28, the post-Bismarckian alliance systems began functioning in a way which the great German strategist himself never intended; on that date, the Empire and Kingdom of Austria-Hungary declared war on the small nation called
Serbia.\(^3\) By August 28, nine nations were at war—Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Germany, Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, and Japan; and before the catastrophe ended twenty eight nations from almost every continent on the globe would follow suit.\(^4\)

During the critical month between the assassinations at Sarajevo and the first of the multiple declarations of war, Robert Lansing, then Counselor for the Department of State, was on holiday in upstate New York with his wife, the Fosters, and members of the Phortnightly Klub. He returned to Washington on July 27, the day before the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia.\(^5\) Shocked by the sudden outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Lansing nevertheless was pleased his own nation remained geographically removed from the continental "slaughter fields."\(^6\) This initial emotional reaction, however, did not last. By the summer of the following year, the then Secretary of State Lansing had reversed his original stand and had decided "the actual participation of this country in the war . . ." is a possibility "we ought in look forward to . . . and make ready" for, since "a triumph for German imperialism must not be."\(^7\)

Although historians do not deny that after July of 1915 Robert Lansing used his position and personal influence to push the American public and his President into war against Germany, the reasons behind this decision remain unclear. In fact, no historical study has ever speculated
on Why Lansing "gradually came to view" American participation in the war as "vitally significant" to its self-interest. Admittedly his reactions to the war during the early months are not easily read. This is not because the written records are scanty, but because he succeeded so well in concealing his private thoughts about the merits of the conflict. "Even so," reminds Arthur S. Link,

the historian can see clearly enough the image of a man who was predisposed to favor the Allies but who struggled to keep an open mind and to follow policies so well grounded in the law of nations that they would be safely beyond the reproach of any partisan, and who in fact believed at this time that neutrality was the wise course for the United States. Although discerning the reasons behind Lansing's conversion to a militant position is a problem recognized—but never answered—by some historians, most others deny such a volte-face ever occurred. Because Lansing was pro-Ally and favored a German-American war in July of 1915, they assume he held these same beliefs in July of 1914. The existing historical evidence is overwhelmingly contrary to this position.

In addition to Lansing's 1914 letter in which he expressed pleasure in the United States' remoteness from the "slaughter fields," he referred to his "conversion" in his published memoirs while hinting at the reasons behind this change of mind. "The effect upon me personally," he began, "of the inhumanity of the Germans . . . had been such as to remove any doubt that I had previously held that sooner
or later the United States would be forced to enter the war on the side of the Allies."\textsuperscript{12} The most convincing evidence, however, is a private memorandum written on July 11, 1915, in which Lansing stated "only recently has the conviction come to me that democracy throughout the world is threatened" by German aggression. "We will have to cast aside our neutrality and become one of the champions of democracy."\textsuperscript{13}

In an attempt to fill the void left by previous studies of the Great War era, this dissertation will differentiate three factors which combined to persuade Robert Lansing to wage war with the Central Powers was in the United States' best interest: firstly, the apparent inhumane character of the war as waged by the Imperial German Government; secondly, the perceived consequences of German secret activities in Latin America and the United States; and thirdly, the impact of the European military situation upon American economic and military security. These three factors were interrelated in Lansing's own mind and were the product of an evolutionary series of events.

II

As a devout Presbyterian who believed in the Christ's teachings of brotherhood and humanity,\textsuperscript{14} Robert Lansing was aghast to learn of the alleged atrocities committed by the conquering German soldiers. As the Central-European army
marched across the Belgian plain in the summer of 1914, "a vast fog of atrocity stories rolled and spread before it, drifting rapidly through the Allied countries and over the Allied cables into every quarter of the world."\textsuperscript{15} From the first the United States Legation in Brussels, commanded by Minister Brand Whitlock of Ohio, heard rumors of old men, women, and children brutally shot, nuns violated, and bodies of fallen Allied soldiers desecrated. Whitlock was skeptical of these stories until the end of August when two events occurred to verify the allegations to his personal satisfaction: on the night of August 24, a German military balloon bombarded the civilian population of Antwerp in violation of The Hague Convention of 1907, and a few days later the Minister's personal secretary, Hugh Gibson, had opportunity to confirm first-hand horror stories of German atrocities at Louvain.\textsuperscript{16}

Lansing as a realist understood war was hell; nevertheless as a Christian gentleman he could not conceive of the reasoning which motivated the Germans' actions. In a letter to Secretary of State William J. Bryan a few days after the bombardment of Antwerp he wrote this action "appears to have been wanton and without military purpose, in fact an outrage against humanity."\textsuperscript{17} Yet despite the similar outcry of world public opinion, reports of "Belgian Horrors" continued to flow into the Department of State throughout the late summer and autumn of 1914.\textsuperscript{18} These reports served to
confirm Lansing preexisting prejudices about the barbarous nature of the "Teutonic Race" and influenced his thoughts more than historians have previously recognized.\textsuperscript{19}

A previously unpublished and overlooked private memorandum of December, 1914, casts new light on Robert Lansing's reaction to the alleged atrocities. The document deserves to be quoted in toto:

Balked of its prey by the interposition of little Belgium, the Prussian autocracy became a beast which knew no mercy and recognized no right. The lust for conquest gave place to the lust for revenge, a revenge which for utter heartlessness and barbarity can find no parallel among civilized peoples. Nothing can ever wipe away this stain. The pages of history, which record the deeds of the German armies in Belgium, are blacker than those which tell the Tales of Attila \textit{[sic, Attila, King of the Huns]} or of Tamerlane \textit{[sic, Tamerlane, Lord of Turkestan]}. Those leaders were uncouth savages without moral sense, while the military leaders of Germany were bred in universities and know the ethical standards of today. The civilized world stands aghast and horror stricken to think that such degeneracy of spirit, such ferocious wickedness, such unrestrained brutality can exist in the hearts of the rulers of an enlightened people. The shame of their crimes can never be blotted out.\textsuperscript{20}

Historians have traditionally portrayed Robert Lansing as a realist who did not allow himself to become emotionally involved with the moral questions raised by the Belgian Horrors.\textsuperscript{21} This December document, however, when combined with Lansing's August letter to Secretary Bryan, suggests a reinterpretation may be in order. Lansing became "emotionally involved" with the plight of the suffering
Belgians; nevertheless he did not allow these sentiments to affect his judgments on American foreign policy.

As observed earlier, Robert Lansing believed morality and moral laws did and should govern domestic relationships, but materialistic and selfish motives characterized relations among two or more states. The resulting conflicts were usually resolved by violence. In essence nations dealt with other nations in a savage manner regardless of how enlightened the conduct of their domestic affairs might be. To believe foreign policy stemmed from altruistic motives, such as engaging in war for the sake of a suffering humanity, was a fallacious and grave political error. In American foreign policy realistic principles of national self-interest and self-preservation must always temper idealism. Even the Belgian Horrors did not supersede this "theoretical" philosophy of international relations; the policy he advanced remained predicated upon the United States' self-interest as he understood it during the first year of the Great War.

As a gentleman and as a Christian Lansing considered German actions in Belgium to be inhuman and amoral. As a lawyer and expert on international law he described violation of Belgian neutrality as illegal. As a student of political theory he regarded the bombing of unfortified towns as infringements of mankind's natural rights. Yet as Counselor for the Department of State the question itself remained
totally irrelevant since "it does not affect American rights or interests, but those of the Belgians": "the United States," consequently, "would have no right and would even less be charged with the duty to make protest or demand explanation as to an alleged violation unless the rights or interests of the United States or its citizens are affected."24 Lansing's mind could differentiate among the various roles he played and the several types of German wrongdoings. As Counselor, he suggested a policy of neutrality since he did not believe German barbarism as of yet threatened the self-interest of the United States.

The initial Blitzkrieg on the Western Front during August, 1914, had brought German troops to a point inside France where they could see the Eiffel Tower in the distance. But after a two week long battle at the River Marne in September, the Central-European armies retreated. Lansing believed, as did most Americans, the Anglo-French counter-attack would soon cripple the German ability to continue the war and in time the war would end in an Allied triumph. Consequently, he concentrated upon the perfection of American neutrality, not its war preparedness.

In a letter to Secretary Bryan of January, 1915, Lansing reaffirmed his support for the neutrality of the United States and explained his own feelings about German warfare. "In the case of violations of the rules of human warfare," he began,
such as the dropping of bombs from aircraft on unfortified towns, the indiscriminate sowing of contact mines in the open sea, and the bombardment of unprotected seaports without even giving notice of the proposed attack, natural rights as well as legal rights are invaded. The practices may well be classed as inhumane and, therefore, immoral.

The proximity of these acts justified Great Britain's entry into the war if they destroyed the existing "compromise of conflicting national interests" which previously "preserved the balance of power" among European states. The war was, therefore, in Great Britain's national self-interest.²⁵

Robert Lansing also understood Germany's motives. In his January letter to Bryan Lansing reaffirmed a long-standing belief that at times "national safety may justify a nation in violating its solemn pledges" as when Germany attacked Belgium. Yet who "is to judge whether the breach of a treaty is justifiable or unjustifiable? Who is to decide whether a government's motives are good or bad?" Lansing did "not think that international ethics impose . . . a responsibility upon a nation . . . for it to sit in judgment on the motives and necessities of other nations."²⁶

True to the theory of international relations advanced in Notes on Sovereignty nine years before, Lansing rejected moral and ethical considerations as bases for foreign policy decisions. This same realistic approach dominated his writings of the early war period. For example, in April Lansing observed "the civilized world has through centuries of
effort constructed an elaborate system of ethics in which altruism has become more and more pronounced." Yet because of the European war, "this splendid structure of morality is crumbling." "Every nation engaged in this war," he explained,

. . . believes that its existence as an independent state is at stake. It makes no difference whether the facts justify the belief, that it is general is what counts. Convinced that defeat means national annihilation and that the result depends upon physical might, every principle of justice and morality is submerged in the supreme effort to succeed. Public and private rights are swept from the path by military necessity. The determination to advance at any sacrifice, to overwhelm the enemy by brute force, to be victorious, is the one dominant purpose.27

Lansing elaborated his point in a May memorandum. Considering the "new means of communication, new methods of locomotion, new engines of destruction untested in actual war, and the consequent changes in military and naval operations created new conditions, to which the long-established rules of war did not and could not apply," Lansing did not blame the European states for their panic and disregard for international ethics and law. From the belligerents' viewpoint he asked: "Would you do differently, if you were convinced that the future independence of your country were in peril? Would you . . . relinquish a single method of attack for the sole reason that the laws of war directed you to do so?" Humanity and neutral nations, usually protected by international law, were the chief victims of this modern warfare.28
An analysis of previous unexplored materials reveals Lansing emotionally reacted to reports of "Belgian Horrors." He considered the Germans' actions inhumane and amoral, illegal, and a violation of mankind's natural rights. Despite this antipathy towards German methods of warfare, he did not allow his personal feelings to influence his policy recommendations. Wrongs committed upon humanity were not a justification for war; the only determinant should be a nation's self-interest. This was not the situation existing during the first year of the Great War. Believing the conflict would eventually end in an Allied victory, Lansing directed his energies toward perfecting American neutrality.

Even though his personal ethical standards rejected the harsh nature of the conflict, Lansing the realist blamed neither the Central Powers nor the Allied Powers for their use of any and all methods of warfare. A war for self-preservation required a total effort since a state's first consideration was the perpetuation of national independence. A few months later Lansing again advanced this same line of reasoning, based upon the same a priori; however, when this occurred his conclusions were dramatically reversed.

III

The implications which Robert Lansing credited to reports he received about suspected German secret activities in Latin America and the United States is a second factor
contributing to the Counselor's decision that entry into the Great War was in the national self-interest. When Lansing first came to the Department of State he started receiving reports of German intrigues in Haiti, Santo Domingo, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. Although the exact nature of these intrigues differed, their apparent goal was the reduction of American economic and political influence in the southern republics and the limitation of its military hegemony over the strategic Panama Canal area. In late 1913 and early 1914 the Department learned of German negotiations with the Haitian Government to gain control, or partial control, of the republic's customs administration. According to unpublished and previously ignored chapters from Lansing's memoirs, if successful, the German actions "would give them a strong political influence in Haiti and doubtless result in their obtaining the [port at] Môle St. Nicholas as a German coaling station and potential naval base near the Panama Canal."  

Other reports during 1914 and early 1915 indicated Germany's intent to place several cruisers in the Atlantic Ocean, operating in the Caribbean Sea, to destroy ships and cargoes sailing from American ports and destined for Britain and France, and to intercept enemy merchantmen on their way to and from the Panama Canal. Additional information suggested if Germany acquired a naval base in the
Americas, such as at Môle St. Nicholas, a fleet of submarines would be assigned to the area's waters. Regardless of the impact upon United States military security, Lansing believed the Allied Powers "would in all probability have landed an armed force and occupied the station in spite of the Monroe Doctrine and the nationality of the owner, and the United States would have had to face a serious situation . . ." of a second sort.\textsuperscript{31}

Despite similar rumors of proposed German bases in the Dominican Republic, the Galapagos Islands, and the Danish West Indies,\textsuperscript{32} Lansing primarily expressed concern about the stories originating from Mexico. As early as December 1914, sources revealed a four-sided German operation in Mexico to insure the nation's future cooperation in the event of a German-American war. Well before the raid on Columbus, New Mexico in March of 1916, German agents had talked with bandit Francisco (Pancho) Villa about the value of a second Mexican-American war; at the same time other Germans offered one of the exiled generals from the regime of José de la Cruz Porfirio Díaz several million marks to start a counter-revolution. Meanwhile, a United States consul in Veracruz reported a German offer to President Venustiano Carranza of thirty-two German officers in return for a grant of a submarine base on the San Antonio Lizardo peninsula.\textsuperscript{33} Yet in the event the Mexican political winds should suddenly reverse direction, the Germans even extended
offers of friendship to former dictator Victoriano Huerta.34

Robert Lansing also became aware of German intrigues within the borders of the United States during the first year of the European war. Taking many different forms, these actions ranged from minor infractions of the American neutrality statutes to sabotage. Evidence collected by several different federal agencies indicated the Imperial German Embassy at Washington directed all these intrigues. Captain Franz von Papen, Captain Carl Boy-Ed, and Doctor Heinrich F. Albert, respectively the Imperial Military, Naval, and Commercial Attachés, as well as the Ambassador himself—Johann Heinrich Andreas Hermann Albrecht Count von Bernstorff-Dreilutzow-Stintenburg—in one way or another actively took part.35

The first series of operations which these men undertook began immediately after the war erupted and concerned the supplying of German cruisers at sea with coal and provisions, and with furnishing bogus United States passports to German reservists returning to the Vaterland by way of neutral European ports.36 These events did not unduly disturb Robert Lansing and the other advisers to President Woodrow Wilson even when evidence directly implicated Count von Bernstorff and Captain von Papen. Although annoyed, the authorities understood the natural desire of German soldiers to return home; they also did not blame the German envoys
for trying to make this possible. Lansing and the President apparently settled for the conviction of a few underlings and an implied promise from the Ambassador to end the forging of passports. 37

This quiescent state of affairs, however, did not last. In January or February, 1915, the German General Staff and Admiralty, alarmed by increases in United States exports of munitions to Great Britain and France, decided to impede that flow. Their scheme was to send to the United States a secret agent, a one Captain Franz Rintelen von Kleist, who would have considerable initiative and enormous sums of money to execute whatever measures seemed feasible. Traveling on a forged Swiss passport, Rintelen arrived in the United States on April 3, 1915, and immediately began working from a headquarters he established in New York City. On August 13, he was arrested by British security officers aboard a Dutch ship off the coast of Dover; yet during the brief four month interval his accomplishments were prodigious. 38

Although Rintelen embellished his activities when he later wrote his memoirs, much of his own summary of the intrigues can be authenticated through reports from agents of the Department of Justice which were leaked to the New York Times in later 1915. 39 The German super-spy unsuccessfully organized a conspiracy to destroy the Canadian Welland
Canal and thus close the vital Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway. Rintelen also approached General Huerta in April offering some twelve million dollars to finance a counter-revolution against President Carranza. Thirdly, he gathered employees from German insurance and steamship companies with branches in the United States—such as the Norddeutsche Versicherungsgesellschaft and the Hamburg-American Steamship Line—as well as members of the underworld, and gave them facilities to manufacture various types of time bombs for the destruction of munitions plants and ships in New York Harbor. Finally, with the help of American citizens he formed a labor union—the Labor's National Peace Council—representing longshoremen in the major port cities and then called a short-lived but effective strike against the loading of munitions ships.

Captain von Rintelen's sudden arrest in August resulted from a cryptic message wired to him by British agents in secret German code with an order to return immediately to Berlin. If the British had not captured him off of Dover, if he had not left the United States when he did, he would no doubt have become a permanent guest at one of several federal prisons. It seems a young lady named Anne L. Seward had exposed Rintelen's cover to federal authorities in early July. While taking a holiday at a resort hotel in Kennebunkport, Maine, during June of 1915, Rintelen met and apparently fell in love with Miss Seward, and during an
intimate moment he confided in her his real identity and assignment, including how he planned the destruction of the Lusitania. Anne Seward at once wrote her personal friend at Washington, Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Without hesitating, Lansing sent Chandler P. Anderson to Kennebunkport to receive the fantastic story's details. 40

When Anderson returned to Washington on July 9, Lansing turned the case over to his friend Charles Warren, Assistant Attorney General, who, in turn, ordered a surveillance placed on the German. On July 22, Warren reported Rintelen was none other than the infamous "Mr. X"--alias Frederick Hansen, alias Emil V. Gibbons, alias Emil V. Gaché--of whom they had heard so much in recent months; he was "the real head of a powerful and wide-spread German organ in this country engaged in innumerable schemes..." 41 Mr. X himself told one of Warren's agents "he gave the order for the sinking of the Lusitania," and, as the investigation continued, details about Rintelen's negotiations with Huerta also emerged. 42

The disclosure of Captain von Rintelen's activities stunned most of official Washington including the new Secretary of State. Lansing possibly informed President Wilson as early as July 7; the White House received the news with anger and alarm. 43 "I am sure," Wilson wrote Colonel House in early August, "that the country is honeycombed with German intrigue and infested with German spies. The evidence of these things are [sic] multiplying every day." 44
Periodical reports from his staff and from investigators of the Justice and Treasury Departments about similar matters for the past several months, however, had tempered Lansing's surprise.

From the first, Lansing suspected Ambassador Bernstorff's involvement in the intrigues and continued to view him as an "affable though dangerous antagonist," a man who did not hesitate to capitalize on every small diplomatic indiscretion. "With him" Secretary Lansing behaved as if it were "... always a duel of wits." Taking advantage of some leisure time in May of 1916, Lansing recorded impressions he had developed nine months before when he first learned of the scope of German activities in the United States. "Count Bernstorff," the Secretary began, was exceptionally skillful in handling the various propaganda and activities launched by German agents in this country. Although I was firmly convinced that he was aware of and in all probability directed these enterprises, some of which were flagrantly criminal, he was too clever to leave any proof of his share in them. It was always so arranged that the blame fell upon others, like Von Paper or Boy-Ed or [Bernhard] Dernburg... From numberless circumstances, which came to my knowledge, I have not the slightest doubt but that Bernstorff, during the early part of the war, not only was cognizant of all that was going on but probably directed the activities of his country's agents....

I felt that he was sly and unscrupulous, that he would go [to] any lengths to gain his end, and that he was [therefore,] untrustworthy in every way. ... Take it all together Count Bernstorff was a dangerous man and required constant watching.
On his own behalf, Bernstorff resolutely denied personal complicity in any unneutral activities during his ambassadorship.\(^{47}\)

Despite Lansing's charges, neither he nor President Wilson ever panicked over the disclosures. Their concern, however, should not be minimized. The administration launched a thorough investigation into every aspect of the intrigues and subtly warned the German Embassy through the press the discovery of additional intrigues might further strain official relations with Germany during the current negotiations over the sinking of the *Lusitania*. It appears Lansing and Wilson agreed among themselves not to inform the Cabinet about Captain von Rintelen or his activities.\(^{48}\)

During his initial weeks as Counselor of the Department of State Lansing did not attach particular significance to the rumors of German interest in Haiti, yet after August of 1914, he could no longer ignore the numerical and geographical proliferation of these reports. He wondered about the intent and scope of these German offensives against the Monroe Doctrine and whether they were individual spontaneous actions taken as an opportunity occurred or whether instead they all were part of a comprehensive master strategy formulated by the Imperial German General Staff. He at first attributed his fears to his own Germanophobe sentiments.

Suddenly, this all changed on Friday, July 9, 1915, when he received Chandler Anderson's oral report on his
conversation with Miss Seward. After talking with Anderson that morning, the Secretary invited him back later that afternoon to answer some additional questions; the next morning, he subjected his advisor to a third debriefing. Robert Lansing had found the answers he sought. He was not, however, pleased with the conclusions those answers seemed to be forcing him to make—Conspiracy.

On the following day, Sunday, July 11, 1915, he carefully placed his conclusions in his private memoranda books. Written at home and entitled "Considerations and Outline of Policies," this reflection remains the single most important document which Lansing left to posterity. Nevertheless, his conclusion did not come solely from his analysis of German intrigues, but in writing his memorandum the Secretary of State included the apparent impact of the European war situation upon United States military and economic security.
CHAPTER VII

THE GERMAN CONSPIRACY:
THE SUBMARINE CRISIS OF 1915

Following the outbreak of the European war, President Woodrow Wilson issued, on August 4, 1914, the first official Proclamation of Neutrality for the United States.¹ Then and for months afterwards American public opinion remained overwhelmingly neutral. The "certainty" of an Allied victory pacified even those who believed the United States had some interest in the Great War's eventual outcome. This certainty, accepted by both civilian and military spokesmen alike, conditioned American attitudes toward questions of neutrality, foreign policy, and domestic preparedness.² No single military catastrophe such as the fall of France in 1940 occurred before the spring of 1917 to shock the American public from its complacency. Most Americans never seriously considered the possibility or the consequences of a federalized Europe ruled by one man--Friedrich Wilhelm Viktor Albert von Hohenzollern, the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia.³

A few observers, however, such as Charles William Eliot and Walter Hines Page, the former president of Harvard University and the United States Ambassador to the Court of
St. James', realized from the first the conflict could seriously affect the United States. Ambassador Page frankly declared in 1914 the destruction of British naval power and the triumph of a militaristic Germany constituted a grave threat to the future security of the United States. More vociferous and more representative spokesmen, however, dismissed this pessimism. They instead demanded total separation of American from European interests—the ideological base of past American neutrality.

Even though a majority of Americans opposed intervention, their feelings were still mildly pro-Ally. After the initial shock of the war wore off, impartially in thought seemed impossible to maintain. "It was inevitable," observed one historian, "that as German methods and ambitions unfolded, these observers should begin to calculate the value of neutrality." Sensitive Americans could not forget stories of Belgian horrors or of German intrigues; such events caused a significant turn in American sentiment.

Yet for others this reorientation toward intervention occurred during the great submarine crisis of 1915. Support for intervention now spread to a minor but influential segment of the population. Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt, Henry L. Stimson, editor Ogden Reid of the New York Tribune, George Harvey of The North American
Review, and Lawrence Abbott of The Outlook, as well as many others, all began publicly to promote intervention under a variety of different rationales. The majority of Americans, unconvinced of the necessity of war in 1915, finally accepted this new position; referring to the Allies' final victory in the Great War, Secretary of State Robert Lansing once remarked "submarine warfare may have been a blessing in disguise."  

Although he never publicly endorsed intervention, Lansing favored this minority point of view as early as July of 1915. Pro-Ally from the war's beginning and advocating a policy of benevolent neutrality toward the Triple Entente, Lansing eventually accepted American military and economic intervention as necessary to protect and promote America's self-interest. Emotionally he saw in the Belgian horrors the barbaric consequences of Germany's inferior autocratic civilization; politically he detected the beginnings of a German conspiracy in Latin America and the United States.

This idea of conspiracy—a conspiracy against all western democracies—crystallized in his mind as an additional result of the war's impact upon American military and economic security. In particular, the introduction of German submarine warfare in February of 1915 stimulated Lansing's conversion to a position in favor of intervention.
The Great War in Europe had its military setbacks for the Allied cause. Although the September battle of the Marne halted the initial German Blitzkrieg against Paris, it also revealed the inability of the combined Franco-British forces to push the invader back more than a few miles. In the west, the war of movement became a war of position. By late spring the second battles of Ypres and Artois indicated an Allied victory would require a total commitment of their national resources. Meanwhile, the success of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, during the late summer of 1914, subdued the optimism of the most dedicated Allied supporter.9

The war at sea followed a similar pattern. During the first months of the war, the British Grand Fleet under the command of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, contained the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea. With thirteen dreadnoughts frustratingly inactive in its home waters, Germany, almost by accident, discovered a secret weapon. In September the German submarine U-9 sunk three British cruisers in a single day; three weeks later a submarine raid on Admiral Jellicoe's home base at Scapa Flow forced the British to withdraw and concentrate their fleet off the western coast of Scotland. The German public responded
enthusiastically to the new undersea weapon, and German naval leaders, such as the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Hugo von Pohl, and the State Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, used this favorable reaction to their advantage. Pohl and Tirpitz, forced to play a secondary role in the nation's war councils to the more prestigious Generals of the Army, decided the submarine could demonstrate the value of Germany's navy. Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the Imperial German Chancellor since 1909, conceded to Admiralty pressures in early 1915.  

Ostensibly in retaliation for Allied mining of the North Sea the previous November, the Berlin government proclaimed on February 4, 1915, a war zone surrounding the entire British Isles. Within this area, all belligerent vessels faced submarine attack without warning and without granting the provisions for the safe disembarkation of crews and passengers as stipulated by international law. Likewise, the proclamation warned neutral vessels to avoid these northern waters since the alleged misuse of neutral flags by the Allied Powers and the illegal ramming techniques against submarines precluded the traditional niceties of visit and search before torpedoing. Germany admitted the percentage of accidental attacks upon neutral ships would probably be high.  

Since Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan was on a speaking tour and Colonel Edward M. House was in
Europe on a special mission for the President, the American response to the German challenge fell exclusively upon President Wilson and Counselor Lansing. Lansing forwarded the German war zone proclamation to the White House on February 5, 1915, along with a short note indicating this "delicate situation" required careful treatment. After a brief conference with Wilson, Lansing prepared a draft note the following day expressing "grave concern" over the war zone and, in a phrase destined to make Wilson famous, declared the administration would hold the Imperial German government to "strict accountability" for the loss of American vessels or citizens to submarine attacks. The United States, the draft continued, demanded adherence to established patterns of international law, including those of visit and search; no neutral ship should be destroyed on suspicion alone.

After making some minor changes in phraseology, Wilson approved the Counselor's draft. The note was ready for dispatch on the following Monday, February 8, when suddenly newspapers published a memorandum from the Wilhelmstrasse explaining the February 4 proclamation creating the war zone. Having only read the proclamation itself, this German memorandum came as a surprise to the Counselor. He was so impressed by Germany's defense of its actions, Lansing momentarily questioned whether or not the American protest should be sent at all. As he wrote the President,
the memorandum impressed me as a strong presentation of the German case and removed some of the objectionable features of the declaration, if it is used without explanatory [sic] statements. In my opinion it makes the advisability of a strong protest, or any protest at all, open to question.16

The German Government had listed numerous British violations of international law—such as the declaration of a military zone in neutral waters, the illegal food blockade imposed upon the Central Powers, and the seizure of neutral ships on the high seas—and had observed how the United States had acquiesced in these Allied actions by its lack of either protest or retaliation. Germany now requested similar consideration for its proclamation of retaliation against the Entente Powers.

A few minutes before six o'clock that same day, Sunday, February 7, Lansing arrived at the White House to discuss the memorandum with President Wilson.17 The President recognized the changed situation and both he and Lansing understood why the Germans believed they needed such extreme reprisals. By now Lansing had resolved his earlier indecision and he told Wilson a note nevertheless should be sent to Berlin; the submarine zone was still contrary to American rights and self-interest. In a gesture of impartiality, the Counselor, with Wilson's approval, coupled the German note with a second note to Great Britain protesting its illegal use of the neutral American flag. Wilson in turn took it upon himself to recast in a somewhat more cordial tone the
draft note to Germany. 18 The two American protests were finally sent to the governments at London and Berlin on the following Wednesday, February 10. 19

Published in the American press on February 12, the two notes secured the approval of the nation's more thoughtful spokesmen. 20 Yet the protests were unequal both in tone and portent. The London communiqué included no threat of American retaliation in the event of British noncompliance. The formal note only declared Washington "trusts that His Majesty's Government will do all in their power to restrain vessels . . . from the deceptive use of the flag of the United States." In contrast, the warning telegraphed to Berlin held the Emperor's government to strict accountability for any violation of international law affecting American ships or citizens. This latter document expressed "such grave concern" over the proclamation of February 4, that the "German Government can readily appreciate that the . . . United States would be constrained . . . to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

Although the Wilson Administration had not yet decided precisely what type of steps "might be necessary" against Germany if this warning did not suffice, clearly the note implied a serious threat of retaliation. In any
event, this was the way the German Government interpreted the February 10 note, especially after the Wilhelmstrasse received several urgent messages from Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff warning "a mistake could have the most serious consequences";\textsuperscript{21} a submarine sinking an American vessel without warning would produce "an extraordinarily serious commotion."\textsuperscript{22} Bernstorff's advice and the American note aggravated the on-going struggle between the German civilian leaders who wanted peace with the United States and the military who advocated a vigorous undersea warfare regardless of the cost. After appealing to the Emperor, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and his party temporarily prevailed over the group led by the new Chief of the Admiralty Staff, Admiral Gustav Bachmann; orders were dispatched to the Imperial Fleet, on February 14, prohibiting submarine attacks against merchantmen flying neutral flags without first definitely ascertaining their authenticity.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite the unequalness of the two protests, Great Britain completely rejected the American request. The Foreign Office defended the use of neutral flags as a ruse de guerre. If the British Government stopped this time-accepted practice—which also protected neutral passengers—then it would be upon American shoulders "that the sole responsibility for injury to neutrals ought to rest."\textsuperscript{24}

Meanwhile, neither the White House nor the Department of State knew anything about the power struggle being
waged within the German Government. Between the date of the American protest to Germany and the latter's formal reply a week later, all knowledge about events in the central European empire came from the United States Ambassador at Berlin, James Watson Gerard. Forty-eight years old, a native of New York City, and a graduate of the law school at Columbia University, Gerard was "so highly excitable and gullible that he could not (and made no effort to) distinguish between gossip and truth." He did not recognize the impact the American protest had upon the men formulating German policy. Instead of reporting the vital information needed by his superiors, he bombarded the Department of State with questionable reports about a governmental directed "hate campaign" in the press against the United States.

Possessing no background of the German domestic situation, the Wilson Administration tried to evaluate the note sent in reply to the American protest by the Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Gottlieb E. G. von Jagow. The Department of State received this German dispatch on February 19; nevertheless Counselor Lansing had prepared a criticism of the note by the late afternoon of the eighteenth, based upon an accurate rendition which appeared in the Washington Star. Lansing and Secretary Bryan felt the German reply was unsatisfactory, but they were mildly optimistic over the apparent hint that Berlin might end its submarine war zone if the United States could persuade the Allies to permit the shipment of food and
industrial materials to Central Europe. Bryan had suggested such a compromise arrangement concerning foodstuffs to Great Britain earlier that same month and an encouraging reply had arrived only the day before. 28

Despite his optimism, Robert Lansing suspected a ruse. He did not completely trust the German offer to compromise since Great Britain was far more dependent upon food imports than was Germany. Yet the exact nature of his suspicions remains a problem of historical interpretation. On February 18, while preparing his marginal comments to the German note, Lansing concluded with the following analysis:

G. B. is more dependent on U.S. for food than Germany. If Germany could effectively carry out the Admiralty plan so as to interrupt trade with G.B., she would be far more benefited than G.B. would in stopping supplies to Germany. Germany is, however, willing to relax policy if G.B. will do so. The conclusion is that Germany does not expect that plan will succeed as she would never consent to forego such an advantage. 29

The historiographical problem seems to center around Lansing's meaning of the phrase "that plan" in the last sentence. Grammatically, of course, the antecedent is "policy" in the preceding sentence. This is a logical conclusion which Professor Daniel M. Smith accepted in 1958 when he wrote Lansing "concluded that Germany would not offer to forego the advantages of submarine warfare unless she confidently expected a British rejection of the proposed compromise." 30

Lansing's comments, however, quickly written for his own information, were not intended as a formal memorandum.
In this context a grammatically pure interpretation is questionable. What the Counselor more probably referred to by the term "that plan" was the phrase "Admiralty plan" in the second sentence. The whole meaning of the paragraph thus changes and provides a different insight into Lansing's suspicions about the Germans. The conclusion he reached was Berlin did not expect submarine warfare to succeed against Great Britain or else the Germans would never had consented to forego the advantages of a war zone. Lansing's friend and adviser, Chandler P. Anderson reached this same conclusion when he wrote Lansing the following day. "It occurs to me," Anderson began, "that Germany's announced willingness to recede from its proposed war zone blockade ... is suggestive that Germany is very uncertain about being able to make the proposed programme effective."\(^{31}\)

The nature of Lansing's suspicions concerning the German compromise offer is an important historical question in light of subsequent American actions. In conversation during the afternoon of February 18, Lansing and Bryan decided to propose a modus vivendi by which the Allied Powers would not use neutral flags on merchant vessels and would allow the Central Powers to import foodstuffs for civilian consumption. For its part Germany would abandon mine laying in the open seas and apply the existing rules for cruiser warfare to their submarines.\(^{32}\) President Wilson approved the proposal the following day, and identical dispatches
were telegraphed to London and Berlin on that Saturday, February 20.\textsuperscript{33}

The attempted compromise failed. Neither belligerent really desired the \textit{modus vivendi}. Germany insisted upon the importation of raw materials as well as foodstuffs and refused to give up the use of offensive mines. Similarly, Great Britain rejected the proposal, preferring instead to continue unabated the economic blockade of Germany.\textsuperscript{34} Yet the actual rejection of the American compromise is irrelevant in this discussion. Of more importance is why Counselor Lansing supported the \textit{modus vivendi}. On the one hand, Professor Smith asserts Lansing knew the compromise would not succeed; he backed it merely as "another impartial gesture" to propagate the myth of American neutrality.\textsuperscript{35} This hypothesis implies the Counselor wanted American-German agitation over neutral rights to continue since he had already decided American entry into the war was necessary and obtainable through the issue of freedom of the seas.

On the other hand, if Lansing felt the Germans were themselves questioning the effectiveness of the submarine as a weapon of war, then a different set of conclusions emerges. In the winter of 1915 the submarine's potential was still an unknown military quantity. As Lansing later recalled, "no one really knew in 1915 what submarines were able to do. Submarine warfare was to an extent in an experimental stage."\textsuperscript{36} Believing as he did Great Britain might accept the compromise on foodstuffs, and having concluded Germany
questioned the value of undersea warfare, Lansing's support for the modus vivendi consequently was a valid attempt at preserving American neutrality through eliminating the most singular source of American-German conflict—the sinking of neutral ships and unarmed merchant vessels in route through the war zone.

This second interpretation carries great weight. Why would Lansing support a compromise attempt unless he felt it might be acceptable to the belligerent governments? If it failed, nothing would have been lost. If it succeeded the United States would improve its relations with Germany, reduce the danger to American ships, passengers, and cargoes at sea, and increase its trade to both the Allied and the Central Powers. In other words, the United States would further its own self-interest. Furthermore, this same compromise would in the long run be more beneficial to Great Britain than to Germany. This second interpretation lends support to the hypothesis that as late as February and March of 1915, Lansing remained content with a foreign policy possibly characterized as a benevolent neutrality toward the Allied cause but nonetheless, a bona fide neutrality. Robert Lansing had not yet concluded American entry into the Great War would be mandatory.
The Counselor for the Department of State was one of the nation's most respected authorities on international law, yet ironically the approach he took in dealing with the problems of American neutrality during the Great War can be described as more realistic than legalistic. Although the latter characteristic was not absent from his approach to diplomacy, Robert Lansing weighed the actions of Great Britain and Imperial Germany not on the scales of abstract international law but rather on those of belligerent necessity and American self-interest. It was not difficult, for example, for Lansing to rationalize Britain's departure from the narrow path prescribed by the existing rules of warfare even though the same claim cannot be made as strongly for his understanding of Germany's similar transgressions.

Under the leadership of such individuals as Sir Winston Spencer Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty until May of 1915, the British with their command of the seas continually ignored existing rules of international law whenever they ceased to be expedient. Adjoining neutral states and the geographical features of the Baltic Sea prevented His Majesty's Navy from effectively blockading Imperial Germany. This problem was solved, however, by instituting long-range "blockades" on the high seas enforced by naval squadrons stationed off the coast of important neutral states, and by forcing embargoes and nonexportation agreements upon Germany's neutral neighbors. These "blockades" controlled
world commerce more efficiently than the more formal, traditional methods of actual blockade as sanctioned by international law. Only neutral retaliation could have ended the British manipulation of ocean commerce, but the nonbelligerent states—including the United States—refused to act. Instead the neutrals acquiesced in these practices while, for the sake of principle, they filed caveats and waited until the end of the war for legal settlements.  

Counselor Lansing could accept these British violations of international law. His theory of belligerent necessity recognized a nation must always be expected to act in its own self-interest. Britain entered the war to protect the European balance of power; now it intended to leave that same war victorious. The Great War of 1914 differed from all previous wars and these differences necessitated unusual policies and methods. Lansing realized as a powerful sovereign state, Britain could recognize no authority higher than its own and, in this fight for survival, it must refuse to be bound by outmoded rules that ran contrary to its own self-
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As reflected in his views about the Belgian horrors and in his reaction to the memorandum explaining the February 4 war zone proclamation, Lansing also realized this doctrine of belligerent necessity rationalized the conduct of the Imperial German Government. In fact, after reviewing the advantages and disadvantages to Germany of the continued use of the submarine, Lansing concluded as early as February
15, 1915, it would be in Germany's best interest to declare war upon the United States as soon as possible. The United States, he reasoned, traded war materials freely with the Allied Powers, but, due to the British Navy, exported only minimal supplies to the Central Powers. War with the United States consequently would produce no adverse effect upon German commerce, although it might, through the resultant civil discord from German-Americans, disrupt the flow of goods to the Allies. An American-German war might even create "a state of ... civil strife, in the United States, which would cause this Government to retain for its own use the munitions and supplies now being sent in great quantities to the Allies." In military terms, the American Navy would contribute little to the British mastery of the seas and, as Lansing falsely believed, "the United States could not send an army to Europe" to fight Germans on land. Beyond the loss of a hundred million dollars of "capital tied up in interned ships," and the "cessation of influence ... upon Great Britain to allow Germany to receive food from the United States," war with the American people would cost the Germans little and it would assure the maximum use of the submarine. "The Advantages" of such a war, Lansing concluded, thus "appear to outweigh the Disadvantages."³⁸

Yet if Germany and Britain acted in their own self-interest, then so must the United States. Fighting in an era when a nation needed to mobilize its total resources in order
to survive, the European Powers destroyed the traditional idea of a war limited to combatants. Neutrality ceased to have the same meaning as in the past. Ironically, Lansing found himself forced to rely upon codified international law to protect American interest at the precise hour in history when such formalities were undergoing radical changes.

As the Department of State's first legal adviser, Lansing understood the transitional nature of his era. In an address delivered before the Amherst Alumni Association of New York City on February 24, 1915, he discussed the war, the new weapons and techniques of warfare, and the problems thus created for neutral states in general and the United States in particular. "These are critical days for our country," he began;

how critical only those who are in intimate touch with affairs can fully realize. . . . The greatest war of all history is being waged with a disregard for human life and a ferocity unparalleled in the annals of war. Nations seem to have returned to primitive barbarism. . . . This great conflict has introduced the submarine, the aeroplane, the wireless telegraph, and new forms of explosives. . . .

The result is that neutral nations have had to meet a series of problems which have never been solved. The liability of error, the danger of unintentional partiality, and the constant complaint of one or another of the belligerents makes the path of neutrality rough and uncertain.

Lansing also spoke of the unusual wartime burdens placed upon the Department of State and how "things have to
be done, not studied, these days. ... A question which is a week old is ancient history." "It is my duty...," he continued,

to deal with questions of international law and usage. ... These questions are of absorbing interest and many of them are extremely complex because this war in its magnitude and methods is different from all the wars which have gone before. One can look in vain for precedents in many cases. In fact, we have to abandon that time-honored refuge of jurists and diplomats, precedents, and lay hold of the bed-rock of principle. Diplomacy to-day is wrestling with novel problems, to which it must apply natural justice and practical common sense.39

This was the task which Lansing willingly undertook during the first year of the European war. As a realist he understood why Great Britain and Germany disregarded the United States' legal neutrality, and yet he protected America's interests by protesting every violation. As observed, these protests were not always equitable. Certainly ties of blood, language, culture, and association influenced this imbalance; so did the economic boom that resulted from the Allies' purchases in the United States and which ended a twenty-month business depression. Considerations of American self-interest motivated Lansing's diplomacy, and prior to the summer of 1915 this self-interest meant neutrality for the United States.

Literally hundreds of historians have chastised Lansing for his "unneutrality" during October of 1914 when he led the drive to relax the administration's ban on extending
credit to belligerent governments. In fact, Professor Charles Tansill cited this change in policy as proof the Counselor was the "mouthpiece" for "numerous personal and financial connections . . . [on] Wall Street." A British journalist has recently suggested if Lansing "had favored the Germans" as strongly as he had favored the British, as revealed by the extension of credit, "he would undoubtedly have . . . been convicted of high treason." Robert Lansing, however, possessed no personal financial connections on Wall Street and he owned no stock in any corporation listed on the nation's several exchanges. Rather than assuming he supported "credit arrangements" to help nonexistent Wall Street friends and the British wartime cause, assumptions never supported by factual documentation, it would be more correct to state he intended to protect the American economy from returning to its formerly depressed condition and from losing a possible opportunity for further commercial expansion. As Lansing wrote President Wilson in October, 1914, unless the United States allowed private banks to extend credit to belligerents,

the buying power of these foreign purchasers will dry up and the business will go . . . elsewhere. . . . The critical time for American finance in our International relations is during the next three or four months and, if we allow these purchases to go elsewhere, we will have neglected our foreign trade at the time of our greatest need and greatest opportunity.
This concern for the United States' economic situation is also reflected in the memorandum of February 15, 1915, in which Lansing concluded an American-German war was to the best interest of the Central Powers. As a realist, Lansing recognize munitions and contraband trade strained relations with Germany; nevertheless he believed such exports were a legal and neutral commerce benefiting the American economy. Lansing never seriously considered a governmental embargo upon arms to the Allies, even though improved American-German relations would result. In essence, Lansing remained conscious that American neutrality was nearly valueless to Germany and in time the Germans came to this same realization themselves. 43

For the sake of American interests Robert Lansing protested belligerent transgressions of international law even though he personally sympathized with the reasons behind these violations. His appreciation of Anglo-American cultural ties and of a growing American economic dependency upon the Allies explain why his diplomacy toward Britain and Germany appeared inequitable. Yet if Britain would have ever assumed a policy which seriously effected the United States self-interest, Lansing would not have hesitated to demand stricter British compliance to codified international law. In fact, on two separate occasions prior to July of 1915, Lansing supported sending strong protests to London over violations of neutral rights, and in both
instances President Wilson preferred more moderate communiqués. 44

A third factor also helps to explain the inequity of the diplomatic notes sent from Washington; this reason originated from Lansing's conception of national interest as well and is one which became the ideological foundation behind the American response to the great submarine crisis of 1915. Robert Lansing impressed upon the Wilson Administration a conception of neutral rights distinguishing sharply between the loss of property for which damages could be claimed and paid and the loss of life for which there existed no adequate compensation. "If the diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain has been conducted in less vigorous terms than with Germany," wrote the editors of one law review in July of 1915 as they explained the Counselor's position,

it is because of the difference in the methods employed by the two belligerents in asserting their alleged belligerent rights. On the one hand, not a single American ship or cargo has been destroyed, not a single American life endangered or taken . . . ; while, on the other hand, attempts have been made to destroy American vessels with their cargoes, and in one case at least the attempt was successful, and hundreds of American lives have been ruthlessly jeopardized and in some instances sacrificed. 45

IV

Precisely one month after the Imperial German Government rejected the United States' suggestion of an Anglo-German modus vivendi, the Department of State received a
telegram from Ambassador Walter Hines Page at London with the news an American engineer, Leon Chester Thrasher, had drowned on March 28, 1915, when the German submarine U-28 sunk the British vessel *Falaba* in the Irish Sea. The *Falaba* sinking shocked the American people and stimulated a debate within the Wilson Administration as to how the United States should respond to this bold German challenge.  

Within the Department of State two different alternative courses of action emerged. First, the United States Government could warn its citizens not to travel belligerent vessels and thus, in effect, abandon much of the Allied war trade to the German submarine. This policy meant the administration would be abdicating the historic right of neutrals to protect their citizens in times of international war. Second, the government could continue asserting the right to travel freely the world's high seas, subject only to the limitations of visit and search, and thereby in effect safeguard Entente vessels from submarine attack. This alternative would increase the probability of an American-German war given the existing benevolent nature of Wilsonian neutrality. Whereas Secretary Bryan and Chandler P. Anderson championed the first policy, Counselor Robert Lansing became the leading proponent of the contrary view.  

For Lansing the national interest and an aroused public opinion precluded compromise. He championed a flat
challenge to the German Government on the question of submarine warfare since, as he wrote Anderson, "debating the legality to destroy life and the legality to destroy property are very different things." Lansing upheld the legal right of neutral citizens to travel on any belligerent ship in complete safety. If the Germans attacked British vessels, then they must first remove the crew and passengers to a place of safety. "But the sinking of the Falaba, when no attempt is made to resist or escape, without giving the crew and passengers adequate time to leave the vessel is a different matter. It is a practice unwarranted by international usage." As Lansing wrote the Secretary of State during the first week of April, 1915, "the great importance of the Thrasher case, to my mind, lies in the fact that a course of action must be adopted, which can be consistently applied to similar cases, if they should arise." This policy had the effect of extending "the February strict accountability clause beyond American ships so that the mere presence of Americans on board sufficed to protect Allied merchant vessels from submarine attack without warning." 

During this debate over American policy, Counselor Lansing encountered Secretary Bryan's opposition and President Wilson's indecision. When Bryan received Lansing's April 2 memorandum, calling the sinking "a flagrant violation of international law" and advocating "a denunciation of the German 'war zone'" he found himself in complete disagreement with his subordinate. Bryan feared Lansing's
strong approach would produce immediate American-German hostilities, and, instead, he believed "the American who takes passage upon a British vessel knowing that this method of warfare will be employed," was guilty of "contributory negligence," of contributing to his own destruction. Despite this disagreement with the Counselor, the Secretary sent both Lansing's memorandum and a statement of his own views to the White House. Bryan strengthened his own position on the following day, Saturday, April 3, by forwarding to the President a copy of the Counselor's February 15 memorandum indicating the advantages to Germany of a war between the two countries. Bryan realized Wilson did not want such a war, and perhaps he hoped to frighten the President into backing his own position.

If this had been Bryan's intention, Wilson did not respond. He apparently shared the Secretary's misgivings, but nonetheless concluded with Lansing the submarine commander had violated the Rule of Law; it is "our duty to make it clear to the German Government that we will insist that the lives of our citizens shall not be put in danger by acts which have no sanction whatever in the accepted law of nations." Wilson told Bryan "I do not like this case. It is full of disturbing possibilities." Nevertheless, "it would be wise for Mr. Lansing," and not Bryan or Anderson, "to draw a brief and succinct note" of protest to Germany "so that we may formulate our position in precise terms."
As for Lansing's February memorandum on an American-German war, Wilson appreciated "its force to the full[est]. But it ought not to alter our course so long as we think ourselves on the firm ground of right." 55

In matters of international law, a subject in which the President remained quite ignorant, Wilson depended heavily upon Lansing for advice, and when this advice was couched in abstract, moralistic terms, it tended to be readily accepted. 56 Convinced the Falaba case dealt with an issue beyond compromise, Lansing's draft note of instructions to Ambassador Gerard was "not conciliatory, and the language is plain almost to harshness." 57 In this draft of April 5, Lansing denounced the sinking of the Falaba as a "flagrant . . . violation of international law and . . . morality," asserted the right of Americans to travel the high seas, and demanded "just reparation for the death of Leon C. Thrasher." 58 In the letter to Bryan which covered the draft, Lansing admitted the severity of the proposal but claimed a more conciliatory note would be worse than no note at all and "had better not be sent." Only a sharp protest could modify Germany's actions and satisfy American public opinion. Interestingly, the Counselor did not believe his stand would result in war; "it by no means means war, but it means intense hostility and the charge of open support of the enemies of Germany." 59

The Lansing draft note initiated a heated debate within the Department of State. After reading the note
Chandler Anderson wrote his own memorandum on the Falaba case, and sent copies to Lansing, Bryan, and Wilson. Anderson argued the sinking of the Falaba per se was not a deliberate affront to the United States; consequently, the German Government should only pay a mere pecuniary indemnity for Thrasher's life, provided the United States could first prove the German action was illegal. Bryan was happy to receive Anderson's formal views since Lansing's opinion increasingly agitated the Secretary. Bryan wrote President Wilson on the following day questioning "whether an American citizen can, by putting his business above his regard for his country, assume for his own advantage unnecessary risk and thus involve his country in international complications."

Was the United States Government prepared to champion the neutral rights of its nationals traveling on belligerent vessels regardless of the circumstances?

Wilson received Lansing's draft note, Anderson's memorandum, and Bryan's letter on Tuesday, April 6. Deluged with this cross-current of opinion, he became hesitant to fix the direction of American foreign policy. Wilson asked the Department whether or not the British arming of merchantmen justified the Falaba's sinking. This hesitation caused Bryan to press harder for a less vigorous note than the one Lansing had prepared.

At this juncture Lansing hastened to quash these waverings. He countered with a direct reply to Anderson and
with an additional memorandum for the Secretary. He reminded the former of the legal difference between destroying life and destroying property, and he wrote Bryan stressing the importance of the case lay in the adoption of a course of action applicable in all future cases. The United States either must warn all Americans to keep off belligerent ships or else it must hold Germany to strict accountability for the loss of every American life. Whereas the first course was more expedient, "the dignity of the Government and its duty toward its citizens appears to demand a policy in harmony with the second course."  

On Thursday Lansing received substantial backing for his position from an opinion rendered by the Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board. In a formal paper prepared by Dr. James Brown Scott, the Board maintained submarine attacks without warning against merchant vessels were, by definition, "necessarily illegal" and, given the circumstances surrounding the Falaba's destruction, the death of national Thrasher had been "not only illegal but revoltingly inhuman." Shortly thereafter, Lansing sent three dispatches to the White House from Consul General Robert P. Skinner in London answering the President's questions of April 6 about the armament of British merchant ships. Skinner reported the German submarine commander, Baron von Forstner, torpedoed the Falaba after giving the passengers and crew ten minutes to abandon ship, and after ascertaining for himself the vessel
was unarmed. The question of the status of armed ships consequently dropped from the discussion, yet Skinner's reports gave Lansing the opportunity to strengthen his own position within the departmental debate: since the submarine commander gave ten minutes to abandon ship, "since he gave some time," why did he not give "sufficient" time for all to escape?\textsuperscript{66}

With the Department of State divided into two opposite groups, the final decision lay with Wilson. Yet the President hesitated. He did not send back Lansing's draft note nor did he submit a substitute. Days passed as both Bryan and Lansing waited. It would be two weeks before this indecision cleared, but in the meantime Robert Lansing and the Department of State had to deal with events which further complicated American-German relations without knowing the broader diplomatic policy goals of the President. This must have been frustrating to a man of the Counselor's mental disposition.

In an ill-timed diplomatic blunder, the German Ambassador at Washington presented a memorandum to the Secretary of State during the first week of April which complained bitterly of the United States' acquiescence to the Allied blockade and, further, criticized the "unneutral" American munitions trade with the Allies. Since the United States' arms industry supplied only the Allied Powers, the note claimed the true spirit of neutrality dictated either an end
to trade with the Allies or the supplying of American-made arms to the Central Powers. Lansing was incensed. He believed the German memorandum to be "unpardonable in the insinuations which it contains as to the motives of this Government" and felt Count von Bernstorff should be severely rebuked. "Any treatment more moderate than this would," Lansing believed, "... displease the American people who are jealous of our national dignity and expect our Government to maintain it."  

The more Lansing studied the memorandum the more unpardonable its language seemed. A second blunder by Bernstorff, however, soon followed the note. Having received no reply from the Department of State, the Ambassador gave a copy of the memorandum to the American press on April 11. He timed this release to coincide with the appearance in newspapers throughout the country of "An Appeal to the American People" for an arms embargo made by the publishers of over a hundred non-German foreign language newspapers. Lansing demanded to know whether or not the German note originated with Bernstorff or with the Wilhelmstrasse. If it had been the former he would suggest the Secretary declare the Prussian persona non grata to the Government at Washington. Interestingly, both through the press and through private sources Bernstorff assured Lansing the protest came from Berlin. The Wilson Administration accepted this response; documents made available to historians in recent years, however, raise doubts about the
Ambassador's truthfulness. Considering the strained relations with the Central Powers, the Counselor dropped his suggestion of Bernstorff's recall, and instead he concentrated upon reworking a note drafted by the President which rejected the German allegations and reaffirmed the legality of the munitions trade.

Two days after the Department answered Bernstorff's memorandum, on Thursday, April 22, President Wilson finally wrote Secretary Bryan about the sinking of the Falaba. "Although I have been silent for a long time about the case," he began, "I have had it much in my mind . . . to work out some practicable course of action with regard to the death of Thrasher." Wilson had decided to strike a compromise between the two positions advocated by the departmental factions. There would be "a very moderately worded but none the less solemn and emphatic protest against the whole thing," but no mention made of Thrasher. "My idea . . . is to put the whole note on very high grounds,--not on the loss of this single man's life, but on the interests of mankind which are involved. . . ." When Wilson's letter reached the Department later that same day, Advisor Anderson considered resigning and the Secretary openly expressed his disagreement. Bryan, of course, instructed Lansing to prepare a draft note to Germany along the lines suggested by the President.
Nevertheless, the Secretary felt compelled to restate his objections to the White House in a long and passionate communiqué. Bryan declared "the note which you propose will, I fear, very much inflame the already hostile feeling against us in Germany" and provoke a crisis that might lead to war. Considering the lack of American protest against British violations, would it not be better for the President to urge belligerents to end their war than to take a stand which might extend the conflict? "You have such an opportunity as has not come to any man before." Bryan renewed his appeal for a presidential peace move four days later when he sent Wilson Lansing's finished second draft note.

As a result of this eloquent and almost frantic appeal, the President lapsed back into a state of indecision. Woodrow Wilson was severely shaken. When he finally answered the Secretary, on Wednesday, April 28, he appears to have sided with the Bryan-Anderson faction rather than with Lansing and the Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board. He rejected the suggestion of a peace appeal as futile and as possibly offensive to the European Powers; yet regarding the Falaba case itself, the President confessed

I am not at all confident that we are on the right track in considering such a note as I outlined for Mr. Lansing to work on. I am not sure that my outline really expressed what I would myself say in the note, for, after all, the character of a note is chiefly in the way the thing is said and the points developed.
Then, to the delight of Secretary Bryan, the President added that

perhaps it is not necessary to make formal representations in the matter at all.\(^7\)

Did Woodrow Wilson mean to imply the United States should make no formal protest about the death of Leon C. Thrasher? Most probably he did. In this same letter to Bryan the President revealed "God knows I have searched my mind and conscience both to get the best, the nearest approach to wisdom, there is in them." American public opinion did not pressure him to take a strong stand against the German action, and he himself remained un convinced the death of Thrasher originated from bad-faith on the part of the Imperial German Government. In any event, this is the conclusion reached in 1960 by Arthur S. Link when he wrote the President

probably assumed that the sinking of the Falaba had been an isolated incident, and that the German government had no intention of making ruthless war against passenger ships. And . . . he probably shared the Secretary of State's conviction that fair play and the national interest demanded that the American government respond in the same way to the challenge of the submarine as it had to the challenge of the [British] cruiser [blockade].\(^8\)

What may be said with certainty is that no American protest was ever sent to the German Government at this time. Whether a result of indecision or of sympathy with Bryan's arguments, Wilson consciously reversed his position of the previous week and ignored Lansing's advice. Technically,
the Wilson Administration never formulated a positive policy in the Falaba case; on the contrary, the failure to lodge an American protest must be recognized for what it really was—a negative policy, a policy that resulted from no real policy at all.

No formal policy decision was made on the Falaba question, and no protest was wired to the German government which reflected either Secretary Bryan's pacifism, or Counselor Lansing's strict accountability doctrine, or President Wilson's April 22 compromise. It consequently becomes difficult to ignore Daniel Smith's hypothesis that "the Falaba case . . . completed the last major step in the delineation of America's neutral policy." The implication is the administration accepted Lansing's position and in subsequent crises with Germany continued to follow it as established policy. "The Falaba case," Smith declared, "had already determined American policy toward the submarine, and it was now only necessary to apply that policy to the Lusitania" case.81

The United States did adopt Lansing's Falaba policy of strict accountability after the sinking of the British passenger liner Lusitania; the sinking of the first vessel, however, did not result in a concrete American position as much as it contributed to a growing feeling of crisis within the Wilson Administration which, in turn, cannot be separated from a series of events occurring between the Falaba disaster and the Lusitania sinking. One such event was the memorandum
on the American munitions trade sent by Ambassador von Bernstorff in early April; several others came to the attention of President Wilson only a few days after he decided to forego a protest over the death of national Thrasher.

Considering the already troubled nature of American-German diplomatic relations, the first week of May in 1915 was a particularly eventful and historic seven days. On the first day of the month, Saturday, Department officials received a curious omen of forthcoming events even before they reached their offices. It came in the form of Count von Bernstorff's unusual paid advertisement which appeared in a number of leading American newspapers for that morning. Believing the Wilson Administration "underestimated the dangers" of submarine warfare, the Ambassador published the following warning to the American people:

NOTICE

TRAVELERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY
Washington, D.C., April 22, 1915
On that Saturday officials also received a telegraphed report describing events of the previous Thursday. During the afternoon of April 29 a German airplane over the North Sea dropped three bombs damaging an American steamship, flying the American flag, en route with petroleum from New York to Rotterdam. Fortunately the S.S. Cushing sustained no loss of life and virtually no damage. 84 Two other event occurring on that Saturday, however, were of even greater seriousness. The Department would not be notified until the following Monday, but on May 1 a German submarine off the coast of the Scilly Islands torpedoed the American oil tanker S. S. Gulflight without warning; two American seamen drowned and the Captain died from heart failure. 85 Second, at precisely 12:30 p.m., the queen of the Cunard Steamship Line and the largest ship in the North Atlantic service, the 30,396 ton Lusitania, put to sea from the Port of New York with nineteen hundred fifty-nine passengers on board. 86

From the perspective of the first of May, Robert Lansing considered the attack upon the Cushing and the German Embassy's warning to American passengers disturbing events. Whereas the former "indicated that the German naval policy is one of wanton and indiscriminate destruction of vessels regardless of nationality," the latter occurrence was "a formal threat" upon American citizens. In a letter to the Secretary of State Lansing reasoned the Falaba case had in fact been reopened; "everything seems to point to a
determined effort to affront this Government and force it to [an] open rupture of diplomatic relations. I hope that I am wrong, but I have that feeling. 87 While the Counselor contemplated the possibility of an American-German war, the Secretary of State used the occasion to lecture to the unusually large number of newspapermen gathered at the Department on the benefits of temperance. 88

When Lansing learned on May 3 of the submarine attack upon the Gulflight he became even more convinced of the correctness of his Saturday analysis. He consequently recommended to Bryan the United States either immediately dispatch the draft protest in the Falaba case, followed by a preemptory note on the two American vessels, or draft a new protest incorporating all three violations of American neutral rights. In any event, the United States must protest the German actions soon, and in "stronger and less conciliatory language" than in the latter two Falaba draft notes, since Germany was "wilfully" forcing the administration to return Ambassador von Bernstorff's credentials. 89

Wilson, it appears, rejected Lansing's advice of strict accountability. Bryan, however, did not immediately inform Lansing of this decision; instead, the Counselor received the information through a conversation with the Secretary of War, Lindley Miller Garrison. 91 On the following day, Wednesday, Lansing again took the initiative and, in a relatively brief memorandum to Bryan, analyzed the February strict
accountability note as it related to the recent violations of international law. "'Strict accountability,'" the Counselor declared, "can only mean that the German Government must make full reparations for the act of their naval force and must also repudiate the act, apologize for it and give ample assurance that it will not be repeated." The attacks upon the two American vessels were contrary to this doctrine. Consequently, the United States either must make rigid representations to the Wilhelmstrasse, threatening the use of force for repeated actions, or it must "recede from our former statements" altogether and be prepared to face the resulting global humiliation.\footnote{92}

While matters lingered in this tenuous state, a young German naval officer quietly interposed himself within the drama. His name was Kapitanleutnant Walter Schwieger, the commander of the U-20. His historic role took only eighteen short minutes; 761 persons escaped, but the single torpedo from his Uboot ended 1,198 lives--785 passengers and 413 members of the crew--and among these were 128 citizens of the United States.\footnote{93} At 3:15 p.m. on May 7, 1915, Captain Schwieger recorded in the U-20's log the following entry:
"Nothing more is to be seen of the 'Lusitania.'"\footnote{94}

The sinking of this great passenger liner had a most profound effect upon American public opinion. The Belgian Horrors were geographically remote and emotionally alien to anything within the American national experience; the German
secret activities within the United States and Latin America were unknown to the general public and just then being revealed to the highest ranking governmental officials. The Lusitania disaster, however, was "real." It was felt. It was an American tragedy. As the editors of the New York Tribune prophetically declared, "the nation which remembered the sailors of the Maine will not forget the civilians of the Lusitania!"95 "It is a deed," announced The Nation, for which a Hun would blush, a Turk be ashamed, and a Barbary pirate apologize. To speak of technicalities and the rules of war, in the face of such wholesale murder on the high seas, is a waste of time. The law of nations and the law of God have been alike trampled upon.96

The Lusitania sinking converted many Americans to active interventionists. Woodrow Wilson, however, did not yet share this militant view. Yet even he reacted emotionally to the historic events of that first week of May, 1915. He told a Philadelphia audience three days after the sinking of the Lusitania "there is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."97 Nevertheless Wilson now shifted his support from the Bryan faction within the Department of State to the one led by Counselor Lansing. No longer did the President reject Lansing's doctrine of strict accountability.

On Monday, May 10, 1915, Woodrow Wilson personally drafted instructions to Ambassador Gerard at Berlin.98 In contrast to his position of only a week before, the
President now wrote the United States "must hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of ... [American neutral] rights." The note covered the Palaba, Cushing, and Gulflight cases as well as the sinking of the Lusitania. It requested Germany to repudiate these aggressive actions, grant reparations, and give assurances against their recurrence; Lansing had advanced all of these points in his May 5 definition of strict accountability. 99

When the Department of State received the President's draft, Bryan turned it over to Lansing and Anderson for revision. 100 Their only objection was to the President's term "unarmed merchantman"; instead they suggested substituting the term "unresisting merchantman," hoping to preclude a possible German counter-claim that if the Lusitania had been armed, then it was legitimately subject to attack without warning. 101 Unfortunately, upon the request of Secretary Bryan, Wilson did not accept this technical change; the German reply of May 28 raised this very point. 102 In its re-revised form, the American protest, dispatched to Ambassador Gerard on May 13, reached the Wilhelmstrasse on Saturday, May 15, 1915. 103

In relationship to the intradepartmental debate over the direction of American foreign policy, the formal presentation of the American note of May 13 may be seen symbolically as the final triumph for Lansing's legalistic, hard-line
position. It established the basic pattern of all future American responses to Germany's use of submarine warfare. This pattern limited—and would continue to limit still further—any future policy decisions until finally, in the spring of 1917, the Wilson Administration faced no alternative other than to recall Ambassador Gerard and terminate diplomatic intercourse. Bryan, of course, continued his search for peace and to dissuade the President from this "war-provoking" foreign policy. When his labors failed for the second time, in July of 1915, he resigned. Wilson accepted the Great Commoner's decision and, in his place, appointed Robert Lansing of New York to the Cabinet's premier position.

From the Neutrality Proclamation of August 4 down to the May protest over the sinking of the Lusitania, the United States had adopted a series of policies which, although technically within the legal definition of neutrality, increasingly orientated the republic toward the Entente Powers.\textsuperscript{104} Although such policies always reflected the nation's self-interest as perceived by Woodrow Wilson and Robert Lansing, they nevertheless compromised the integrity of neutrality. The extensive trade with the Allied Powers, the extension of credit to belligerent shoppers, and the failure to protest effectively the British blockade of Central Europe, all led to Count von Bernstorff's charge the United States had rejected the spirit—if not the form—of
true impartiality. The Wilson Administration left the German Empire no alternative but unrestricted Ubootkrieg. Lansing recognized this inevitability as early as February of 1915, and when this German decision did come he personally had no regrets. By then Secretary of State Lansing had come to believe "Germany must not be permitted to win this war ..., though to prevent it this country is forced to take an active part." The great submarine crisis of 1915, together with Germany's military actions in Belgium and its secret intrigues in the Americas, had convinced Robert Lansing of the desirability of an American-German war.
CHAPTER VIII

VOLTE-FACE: THE INEVITABLE DECISION AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS

During the late spring and early summer of 1915, Robert Lansing gradually concluded American entry into the Great War was in the national self-interest. Yet the roots of this change of mind reach back to the first months of the European war.¹

Pro-Ally from the war's beginning and anxious to create a foreign policy of benevolent neutrality toward the Triple Entente, Lansing reacted emotionally to the stories of German atrocities in neutral Belgium. He reflected upon these amoral and illegal acts, and considered them the barbaric consequences of Germany's inferior, autocratic, militaristic civilization. As a realist, he did not allow this emotion to influence his policy recommendations.

As early as 1902, Lansing had believed wars should not be waged to avenge wrongs committed upon humanity, but only to protect a nation's self-interest. Lansing would not condemn the Central European Empire if its methods of warfare were legitimately needed for national survival, but he did believe as a result of the war the moral structure of
western civilization might crumble. The Belgian horrors accentuated Lansing's latent Germanophobia and helped to pre-condition his subsequent reanalysis of American neutrality.

A more decisive factor—the submarine—helped persuade the Counselor of the necessity of an American-German war. Lansing thought submarine warfare threatened United States' economic and military security because it challenged Great Britain's mastery of the Atlantic Ocean; he was keenly aware of its possible impact upon American lives and property, and, consequently, upon American economic prosperity and legal neutrality. As submarine warfare was perfected, a series of incidents tempered German-American relations: the War Zone proclamation, the sinking of the Falaba and the death of Leon C. Thrasher, the German Embassy's notice to American travelers, the attacks upon the American vessels Cushing and Gulflight, and, finally, the death of one hundred twenty-eight Americans aboard the ill-fated passenger liner Lusitania.

Lansing decided the German proclamation of a War Zone and the sinking of the Falaba were injurious to American interests, but nevertheless he could sympathize with these German actions because of his theory of belligerent necessity. This same doctrine also required a policy of strict accountability to protect and advance America's self-interest. The events of the first three days of May, 1915, however, were an entirely different matter. The attacks upon American
vessels, and the "coincidental" German warning to American travelers, started the Counselor thinking. Perhaps these circumstances were not accidental or unintended.

In his letters to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, Lansing presented an additional argument for strict accountability which did not appear in his writings about the Falaba case. Recent events seemed "to point to a determined effort to affront this Government and force it on [an] open rupture of diplomatic relations." Germany had finally adopted the "attitude towards the United States" which Lansing had predicted "in my memorandum of February 15th." In that document, now almost three months old, Lansing reasoned Germany would eventually force hostilities to acquire the freedom of action prevented by American neutrality.

Lansing had concluded by May 3 the German government desired war with the United States. He might have believed by this date American entry into the war would be partially advantageous for economic and political reasons, but he was not yet convinced American involvement was desirous. Then came the May 7 sinking of the Lusitania; it severely strained Lansing's doctrine of belligerent necessity. Ein totaler Krieg or not, was not the extermination of over a thousand lives without prior warning indicative of something perversely wrong with Germanic civilization? As the Counselor strongly reacted to the submarine commander's lack of
warning, the British government issued a document to the American press which further intensified his feelings.

This Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages in Belgium confirmed most of the earlier accusations about German brutality. The Report had a profound and shocking impact in the United States; for many Americans its essential authenticity was beyond question for James Bryce, the first Viscount Bryce, had signed it. Former British Ambassador at Washington and a member of the Hague Tribunal, Bryce was well known and highly respected in the United States, and the Commission he headed immediately acquired this same credibility. "Proof that the German soldiers were guilty of cruel and dreadful atrocities," explained the New York Times, "now comes to hand in the report of the Bryce Commission. . . ." Coming only a week after the Lusitania disaster, these findings greatly strengthened the conviction Germany was a menace to the civilized international community.

The evidence to establish Robert Lansing's thoughts immediately after the Lusitania disaster and the publication of the Bryce Report is almost nonexistent. By considering the reaction of other like-minded men, however, and by reading his private reflections written two months later, it seems plausible the Counselor first questioned the motives behind Germany's original entry into the Great War during the first two weeks of May, 1915. During this period Lansing advised Bryan "in case the German Government refuses
to comply with the . . . demands" of the United States in its first protest over the sinking of the Lusitania, "diplomatic relations could be severed." This was a harsher step than he had previously taken, and he chose to qualify the statement by retorting "the severance of diplomatic relations does not necessarily mean war." Lansing thought of recalling Ambassador James Gerard before this date, but each time he hesitated. Now, if the German reply was unsatisfactory, he favored recalling Gerard.

Concurrent with the Belgian horrors and the great submarine crisis of 1915, a third and final factor motivated Lansing's initial reconsideration of American neutrality. This was the growing number of reports concerning German secret agents and their clandestined activities in the United States and Latin America. The most serious rumors included reported attempts to secure submarine bases in the waters around the Panama Canal; efforts to buy cooperation from Mexican officials and would-be officials in the event of an American-German war; and confirmed espionage and sabotage activities of agents within the United States. The extent and scope of these German undertakings surfaced in late June and early July of 1915, with the final disclosure of the infamous Mr. X's true identity--Captain Franz Rintelen von Kleist. Rintelen's affairs crystallized Lansing's reconsideration of American neutrality and United States' entry into war.
Robert Lansing first learned of the scope of Rintelen's activities from Chandler Anderson on Friday, July 9, 1915. In subsequent conversations, Lansing, now Wilson's Secretary of State ad interim, found a most logical explanation for Rintelen's actions—Conspiracy.

On the following day, Sunday, June 11, 1915, he carefully placed in his private memoranda books an entry entitled "Consideration and Outline of Policies." This reflection articulated the fears and exacerbations, as well as the hopes and confidences, playing upon Robert Lansing's mind. The memorandum began by enumerating factors which had convinced him of the conspiracy's existence.

I have come to the conclusion that the German Government is utterly hostile to all nations with democratic institutions because those who compose it see in democracy a menace to absolutism and the defeat of the German ambition for world domination. Everywhere German agents are plotting and intriguing to accomplish the supreme purpose of their government.

Only recently has the conviction come to me that democracy throughout the world is threatened. Suspicions of the vaguest sort only a few months ago have been more and more confirmed. From many sources evidence has been coming until it would be folly to close one's eyes to it.

German agents have undoubtedly been at work in Mexico arousing anti-American feeling and holding out false hopes of support. The proof is not conclusive but is sufficient to compel belief. Germans also appear to be operating in Haiti and San Domingo and are probably doing so in other Latin American Republics.
I think that this is being done so that this nation will have troubles in America and be unable to take part in the European War if a repetition of such outrages as the Lusitania sinking should require us to act. It may even go further and have in mind the possibility of a future war with this Republic in case the Allies should be defeated.

In these circumstances the policies we adopt are vital to the future of the United States and, I firmly believe to the welfare of mankind, for I see in the perpetuation of democracy the only hope of universal peace and progress for the world. Today German absolutism is the great menace to democracy.

Lansing's conclusions synthesized legal, national security, and ideological factors. His primary concerns, American self-interest and national security, depended upon a favorable European balance of power. In his thoughts on the latter he had not succumbed to British propaganda, which for months had warned of an immediate German assault upon North America,9 but instead he predicted a second world war between autocratic empires and democracies if Germany won the current conflict.10 No longer confident of an Allied victory, Lansing feared "the war may end in a draw or with the German Empire dominant over its enemies."

If Germany were not defeated in this war, it would still cherish the same ambition of world power which it now possesses, and, after establishing alliances with other totalitarian states, would "renew its attack on democracy." In a previously unpublished portion of this memorandum, Lansing predicted the nature of this second world war. "The
two powers," he elaborated,

which would probably be approached by Ger-
man, would be Russia and Japan, which are
almost as hostile to democracy as Germany
and which have similar ambitions of terri-
torial expansion.

These three great empires would constitute
an almost irresistible coalition against the
nations with republican and liberal monarchi-
cal institutions. It would be the old strug-
gle of absolutism against democracy, an even
greater struggle than the one now in progress.
The outcome would be doubtful, with, as it
seems to me, the chances in favor of the auto-
cratic allies.

The success of these three empires would
mean a division for the time being at least of
the world among them. I imagine that Germany
would be master of Western Europe, or Africa
and probably of the Americas; that Russia would
dominate Scandinavia, and Western and Southern
Asia; and Japan would control the Far East, the
Pacific and possibly the West Coast of North
America.

Their success would mean the overthrow of
democracy in the world, the suppression of
individual liberty, the setting up of evil am-
bitions, the subordination of the principles of
right and justice to physical might directed by
arbitrary will, and the turning back of the
hands of human progress two centuries.

These, I believe, would be the consequences
of the triumph of this triple alliance of auto-
cratic empires, a triumph which even the most
optimistic cannot deny to be a reasonable expec-
tation.

Lansing knew his position was unacceptable to most Americans,
and he felt he must do everything possible to educate them
about the potential danger.
The remedy seems to me to be plain. It is that Germany must not be permitted to win this war or to break even, though to prevent it this country is forced to take an active part. This ultimate necessity must be constantly in our minds in all our controversies with the belligerents. American public opinion will have to cast aside our neutrality and become one of the champions of democracy.  

The thesis Robert Lansing presented in his "Consideration and Outline of Policies" in July of 1915 was not an impulsive reaction to Anderson's reports on German secret activities nor to the recent Cabinet crisis over the second Lusitania note. His perception of the Great War as a struggle between autocracy and democracy crystallized only after extended personal reflection. He was sincere in his conviction.  

Lansing firmly believed autocracy sought to destroy the existing world order, and, in its place, to erect a new despotic system of international relationships controlled from Berlin. The autocratic states were willing to use any means to achieve global domination, including conspiring to undermine the political, economic, and military security of the potential champion of the Democratic principle--the United States.  

Beginning with the summer of 1915, Lansing's personal writings reflected this same thesis again and again. The new Secretary of State based his policy recommendations to Wilson upon this premise, since he understood the President to be more receptive to advice couched in moralistic and idealistic terms. Yet, to Robert Lansing, the July
memorandum was neither an ideological nor an unrealistic premise. It was a sincere belief based upon a rational and an analytical consideration of factual and conjectural evidence. The German autocratic conspiracy was a real phenomenon, not some abstract political theory or a creation of a British propagandist.13

Lansing firmly believed all democracies, all "self-governing nations, like the individuals who composed them, are naturally peace-loving and peace-seeking."14 Consequently, world peace could only come with the total destruction of German absolutism and militarism: world peace could only be continued by the constant vigil of all democracies. Lansing, because of this conviction, reacted coolly to Wilson's cherished idea of a post-war peace governed by some form of a universal league of nations. "The only hope," Lansing wrote in a memorandum of December 3, 1916, for an effective

League for Peace is in imposing as a qualification of membership that a nation shall possess democratic institutions which are real and not merely nominal. A League of Democracies would, in my opinion[, ] insure unity of action and the faithful performance of obligations. Democracies are not treaty breakers; they possess sensitive national consciences; they are guided by principles of justice and morality in their intercourse with one another; and they are not aggressive or improperly ambitious. All people abhor war and desire peace. Through democratic institutions the popular will finds expression.15

The Secretary of State and the President differed on the nature of the post-war association of nations and on the
immediacy of American entry into the conflict; furthermore, Lansing had no concrete indication Wilson even understood the thoughts Lansing tried to convey. In September of 1916, after months of conversation with the President about the reality of the German conspiracy, Lansing expressed his frustration when he recorded Wilson's blindness was an "amazing thing." "In fact," the Secretary continued, he does not seem to grasp the full significance of this war or the principles at issue. I have talked it over with him, but the violations of American rights by both sides seem to interest him more than the vital interests as I see them. That German imperialistic ambitions threaten free institutions everywhere apparently has not sunk very deeply into his mind. For six months I have talked about the struggle between Autocracy and Democracy, but do not see that I have made any great impression.16

Despite his frustration, Secretary Lansing did not relent. He kept preaching his message to the President and to any other member of the administration who would listen to him. As late as March 20, 1917, during the debate over renewed German use of unrestricted submarine warfare, Lansing vehemently asserted during a Cabinet meeting "the duty of this and every other democratic nation [was] to suppress an autocratic government like the German because of its atrocious character and because it was a menace to the national safety of this country and of all other countries with liberal systems of government."17
When the United States declared war upon the German government eighteen days later, Robert Lansing was delighted. On that day he wrote a childhood friend in Watertown "we have opened a new and I believe glorious chapter in our history. There will from now on be no need for the conservative and cautious course which it has been so necessary and so difficult to follow while we remained neutral." More than any other document written after his July, 1915 outline of policies, however, Lansing's private writings of April 7, emphasized the need to protect the United States' security by preserving the traditional European balance of power. "The decision is made," he began.

It is war. It was the only possible decision consistent with honor and reason. Even if Germany had not so flagrantly violated our rights we were bound to go to the aid of the Allies. I have trembled lest the supreme necessity of [war] would not be manifest to Congress. Some of our Senators and Representatives seem to be blind to the danger to civilization even now. They only see the infringement of our rights, and compared with the great issue they seem so little. Why can they not see that we must never allow the German Emperor to become master of Europe since he would then dominate the world and this country would be the next victim of his rapacity. Some day they will see it however.

Now to make ready our millions and send them overseas to bring victory to the cause of Liberty. It will be a long struggle but in the end we will win.

Indeed, from Robert Lansing's perspective the conflict between autocracy and democracy was much more than a battle between ideologies. It was now a physical conflict, the
outcome of which determined whether the United States continued as a free and independent political entity.

With the United States' entry into the Great War, Lansing might have rested from the two year long personal crusade; yet he did not. The Secretary of State now felt compelled to take his message to the American people—to educate them about the real reasons behind the war and about the dangers that could result from their incomplete support of the war effort. In a series of articles published in popular journals as *The Literary Digest* and *The Forum* as well as in publications of the wartime Committee on Public Information, Lansing warned the nation's citizens they were engaged in "a war in which the future of the United States is at stake. . . . Imagine Germany victor in Europe. . . . Who, then, would be the next victim of those who are seeking to be masters of the whole earth?" At Princeton University and before the Reserve Officers Training Corps at Madison Barracks, New York in 1917, and at Columbia University and at Union College in 1918, the "education of the American people" continued. It would not be until October of 1918, when it appeared certain the Central Powers would be defeated, before the Secretary abandoned his theme and replaced it with a call for rational, judicial minds to create a sound and enduring peace.

When he wrote his memorandum of July 11, 1915, Lansing realized neither the President nor American public
opinion were convinced of the necessity of an American-German war. He was willing to wait until they came to share his convictions, but, in the meantime, Lansing did not plan to be idle. During the period from July of 1915 to April of 1917, besides continuing to impress Wilson with the possibility of German conspiracy, Lansing formulated eight specific policies designed, in part, to undermine the German master goal of world domination. All eight policies revealed a deep awareness of national interest—prestige, economic advantage, and military security. "I think," the Secretary of State began, "that we should . . . adopt the following for the present and pursue these policies until conditions materially change." First, until the American people appreciate the German threat, the United States should settle "the present submarine controversy." Second, a vigilant and continuing watch should be maintained on German activities in the United States. Next, secret investigations of German activities in Latin America should be undertaken. Fourth, Lansing wanted to cultivate "a Pan-American doctrine" to alienate the "American republics from European influence, especially German influence." Fifth, to improve relations with Mexico the United States should recognize Venustiano Carranza's Government. Further, the United States should purchase the Danish West Indies as soon as possible "because Germany may conquer Denmark and come in that way into legal title." Seventh, the "prevention
by all means in our power of German influence becoming dominant in any nation bordering the Caribbean or near the Panama Canal." Finally, Lansing's policies included "the actual participation of this country in the war in case it becomes evident that Germany will be the victor, [since] a triumph for German imperialism must not be." 29

These eight policies outlined Robert Lansing's foreign strategem chronologically for the next two years and geographically for the entire planet. Domestically he vigilantly watched German secret activities. In terms of Europe, he sought a settlement of the Lusitania case and supported the Allied cause whenever possible through all means available, not excluding American entry into the war. Interestingly, five of his eight policies concerned Latin America; obviously, German activities in the southern republics and the need for greater United States-Latin American cooperation and friendship were issues which concerned the Secretary.

The document's omission on American relations with East Asia reveals much about Lansing's thoughts on the subject: the Secretary of State did not wish to be concerned—or to be forced to concern himself—with Eastern Asia. Yet Lansing feared the creation of a German-Japanese alliance; his policy consequently became one of compromise. He attempted to settle all outstanding issues with the Japanese Government in hopes the Wilson Administration could then
concentrate its attentions upon the problems raised by the German autocratic conspiracy in Europe and the Americas.

II

In recent years historians have reassessed Robert Lansing's role in the conduct of United States relations with East Asia. Traditionally, historians have characterized him as an executor for policies formulated by the President together with the assistance of Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and of Colonel Edward M. House. Recent studies have indicated, however, Lansing's role in shaping Wilsonian attitudes towards East Asia was more significant than historians suspected.

The historian most responsible for this reevaluation, Professor Burton F. Beers, has presented substantial documentation demonstrating Robert Lansing possessed definite ideas of his own about East Asian affairs, and, these ideas "were often quite distinct" from Wilson's. Lansing sought the President's approval for his ideas, "but when approval was not forthcoming," he instead "sought to implement his ideas through independent action." American relations with East Asia reflected these disagreements.

Although he had served as counsel for the Chinese Legation in Washington for five years at the turn of the century, Lansing only seriously began to concern himself with
East Asian problems after his appointment as Counselor. In August of 1914 the Wilson Administration embarked upon a sustained effort to prevent the Imperial Japanese government from taking advantage of the Great War in Europe to extend its control over China.\(^{32}\) Lansing was responsible for planning America's diplomatic response to Japan's invasion of Shantung Province and its Twenty-One Demands upon China. After studying these events, Professor Beers concluded Lansing "out of his work with these problems, . . . developed a proposal for striking a bargain on all outstanding questions between the United States and Japan."\(^{33}\)

What Lansing endeavored during the period from August, 1914 to November, 1917 was to secure a Japanese-American détente, or at least a modus vivendi, on three outstanding problems. From the Japanese point of view, the greatest tension stemmed from America's refusal to recognize Japanese spheres of influence in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. In fact, the United States had exerted economic and diplomatic pressures to drive Japan from these regions. Convinced these spheres were necessary to its national development, the Japanese government regarded the American position as indicative of an unfriendly attitude toward its national aspirations.\(^{34}\) Second, for some time, Americans were concerned over Japan's apparently deliberate attempts to exclude American merchants from South Manchuria. A recent example was a revision in freight rates on the
Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway which discriminated against American entrepreneurs. Washington protested these Japanese actions as violations of the pledges Tokyo made in 1899 in response to Secretary of State John Hay's Open Door Note. The final source of friction involved the discriminatory treatment accorded Japanese immigrants living in the United States. In 1913 the California legislature enacted a law prohibiting sale of agriculture lands to any alien of Japanese nationality. Japan, of course, officially protested the passage of the California Act and anti-American demonstrations erupted on the home islands. The Wilson Administration, concerned by this offense to Japanese sensibilities, nevertheless was unable to resolve the matter primarily because it could not compel the repeal of a State law.

In his desire to secure détente Lansing proposed solutions for these three different difficulties. On the one hand, Lansing was prepared to recognize publicly Japan's "special interests" in Eastern Inner Mongolia, South Manchuria, and Shantung Province. On the other hand, Japan would specifically pledge to prohibit discriminatory acts against foreign commerce in areas which the United States had recognized, and, second, to agree to make no further protests "in regard to legislation affecting land tenures in the United States unless such legislation is confiscatory in character, or materially affects vested rights."
Although he would later drop Shantung from his list of "recognized" spheres of influence, Lansing's proposal for compromise was both realistic and workable. On two separate occasions Lansing tried to reach an understanding with Japan along these lines; on both occasions the Japanese government indicated its willingness to negotiate such a bargain. Yet no agreement based upon the Lansing model was ever signed. The first attempt to negotiate, in March of 1915, failed, while the second attempt, in November of 1917, resulted in the totally unsatisfactory and exceedingly ambiguous Lansing-Ishii Agreement.

President Woodrow Wilson's determination to defend China's administrative and territorial integrity frustrated Robert Lansing's vain endeavors at détente. Japan's attempts to press Chinese acceptance of the full list of the Twenty-One Demands persuaded Wilson Tokyo eventually intended to seize all of China. Ever solicitous for China's welfare, the President would not allow the United States to be associated with this infringement of the Open Door Doctrine. From the middle of April, 1915 onward, Wilson's policy was to champion as actively as circumstances permitted Chinese sovereign rights, "now and always," while not "seeking any special advantage" in China for itself. Since Wilson was unwilling to consider any bargain which involved American recognition of Japan's "special interests" in China, Lansing found himself with nothing to exchange for Japanese concessions on
the alien land laws and on granting freedom of commercial opportunity in its spheres of influence. Lansing's two attempts at securing some form of Japanese-American bargain were thus doomed.

The history of Lansing's attempts to bargain with the Japanese reveals much about the Sinophile character of the President's prejudices and his basic mistrust of Japanese intentions. A study such as this also places the famous agreement between Secretary Lansing and Japan's Special Envoy to the United States Viscount Kikujiro Ishii in its broader historical perspective; that is, as a means of ending temporarily the bickering over China so the governments at Tokyo and Washington could focus their mutual attention upon Siberian problems. These insights, then, comprise the contribution which Professor Burton Beers has made to the historiography of the Wilson Administration.

Yet what Beers intended to show in his studies were Lansing's attempts, and the various degrees of success he achieved, to influence Wilsonian East Asian foreign policy. What he did not concern himself with--at least not in any detail--was why Robert Lansing remained eager to create a Japanese-American détente. Why was the Secretary of State so intent upon compromise that he would have recognized Japan's "special interests" in China and, in so doing, abandoned the American policy of demanding strict adherence to the Open Door principles?
The answer has two parts. First, the idea of a bargain with Japan originated in Lansing's assumptions about American economic interests in East Asia. As with others of his era, Lansing believed the American economy was maturing; prosperity would soon become dependent upon the continued exportation of vast quantities of agricultural commodities, manufactured goods, and surplus capital. Both Japan and China, he reasoned, existed as potential markets of enormous value.

Lansing realized, however, Japan too was expanding its industries which required the island nation to increase greatly its raw materials imports. Further, China's recent modernization effort demanded increased importation of foreign products, capital, and technical assistance. The traditional good relations between China and the United States suggested to Lansing China would ultimately turn to America, not to Japan, to fulfill its needs. Likewise, France, Russia, and Great Britain, engrossed in the European war, would soon be forced to admit other nations to their spheres of influence to meet the Chinese need for manufactured products and capital. Again, these markets would probably be opened to Americans rather than to the Japanese since the United States traditionally had few political aspirations in China while Japan's interests were large and well-publicized. The western powers could trust the
United States to limit its activities in their spheres to economic involvement alone.

For Robert Lansing, safeguarding the existing Sino-American commercial relationship was important for the United States. American-Japanese tensions, however, coupled with Japan's geographic position and its growing economic and military strength posed the danger of Japanese interference with American trade in China. The second reason why the Secretary of State desired a Japanese-American détente was identical to the reason why he changed his mind about American participation in the war—the German autocratic conspiracy against all western democracies and the Prussian hope for world domination. As Lansing revealed in his memorandum of July 11, 1915, he feared a possible future alliance between Berlin and Tokyo based upon the principles of absolutism and their common desire for territorial expansion. German overtures to Japan reinforced such fears. Lansing apparently believed an aggressive American foreign policy could undermine such an alliance. By settling all outstanding disputes between the United States and Japan, Japanese leaders would be less likely to accept the German proposals; however, if the Allies could destroy Germany, then the whole question of a German-Japanese alliance would be academic and conjectural.

Robert Lansing's attempted détente, his attempts at settling the three issues which produced the current
Japanese-American tensions, would have permitted his nation to concentrate its attention exclusively upon the problems raised by the German autocratic conspiracy in Europe, Latin America, and the United States. The Secretary of State did not wish to be concerned with East Asia during the Great War. Indeed, Robert Lansing's Asian policy was no "policy" at all, but should be viewed as only one segment of a more immediately important global policy.
CHAPTER IX

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Five of the eight policies outlined by Robert Lansing in his memorandum of July 11, 1915, concerned Latin America and the Caribbean. This obviously indicates German secret activities in the southern republics and the need to foster a greater sense of United States-Latin American cooperation and friendship were issues which concerned the Secretary of State. Security against German intrigues and multilateral cooperation became Lansing's objectives for the Western Hemisphere--goals which involved both the "Monroe Doctrine" and "Pan Americanism," and which were occasionally contradictory.¹

First, Lansing pursued "secret investigations of German activities in Latin America . . . and the adoption of means to frustrate them." He organized the Secret Service of the Department of State during the neutrality period to conduct "investigations of a highly confidential character." Prior to December of 1915 the Department had no such organization and Lansing needed to borrow experienced spies from the Department of the Treasury. Despite the support of the President and the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments,
Lansing could not consolidate the investigatory operatives from the different executive departments into a single body primarily because the Secretary of the Treasury, William G. McAdoo, wanted the famous Secret Service kept under Treasury's control.² Fearing security might be compromised by issuing instructions to agents through regular channels used for diplomatic correspondence, Lansing reorganized his Secret Service, in April of 1916, as the Secret Intelligence Bureau of the Division of Foreign Intelligence. Leland Harrison, an experienced foreign-service officer, became the bureau's chief and reported directly to the Counselor, Frank Polk.

Under Harrison the Bureau of Secret Intelligence became a valuable adjunct to the Department of State in conducting foreign affairs. As an independent bureau organized without sanction of law, this extra-legal body remained relatively small. It relied on information from its own agents, diplomatic and consular personnel, and the intelligence officers of the Allied governments.³ Secretary Lansing also sent, at various times, private citizens to Latin America to gather information, disguised as tourists or businessmen representing the interests of their firm. Perhaps the most interesting of these special missions was the one undertaken in March of 1917 by Lansing's eldest nephew. Osten-sibly visiting Central America on behalf of the Panamanian government for the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell,
future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gathered facts for his uncle on German activities in Panama, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. He was also instrumental in securing Panama's agreement to follow the United States in its declaration of war upon Germany. 4

Robert Lansing's four objectives toward Latin America and the Caribbean were closely interrelated. These goals reflected his concern for American military security and for his nation's continued predominance in the Western Hemisphere. Lansing's *a priori* was to prevent "by all means in our power" German influence from "becoming dominant in any nation bordering the Caribbean or near the Panama Canal." For this reason he wanted to "purchase . . . the Danish West Indies as soon and as secretly as possible," and he hoped to frustrate German intrigues in Mexico by recognizing the Venustiano Carranza government. Finally, Lansing sought "the cultivation of a Pan-American doctrine" with the object not only of "alienating the American republics from . . . German influence" but from "European influence" as well.

II

The United States government had exhibited an interest in acquiring the Danish West India Islands as a strategic naval base ever since the 1860's. Five Secretaries of State—William H. Seward, John W. Foster, Richard Olney,
John Hay, and Elihu Root—had approached Denmark with requests to sell. Secretary Lansing, aware of their failures, nevertheless was determined to acquire them either through purchase or conquest. Although Woodrow Wilson and Secretary Bryan had already indicated an interest in the islands as a naval base, the new Secretary of State had an additional motivation. Lansing feared the German army might eventually occupy Denmark and then secure legal title to the West Indies through Danish reparations. His negotiations for purchase consequently emphasized "if Denmark believes that Germany covets the islands she will sell to us and prevent their possession being a menace to Danish independence."  

After obtaining President Wilson's approval to "take the matter up very seriously," Lansing, in June of 1915, prepared the way for discreet overtures by the American Minister in Copenhagen, Maurice Francis Egan. Although the Danish Foreign Minister, Erik de Scavenius, indicated the sale of the islands might be possible, such a transaction would be unpopular to a large segment of the Danish population. The negotiations drifted for several months as Scavenius determined the reaction of his government and of the opposition in the Rigsdag. Robert Lansing finally transferred the negotiations to the western side of the Atlantic in October of 1915.

In a conversation with Danish Minister to Washington Constantin Brun, on Monday, November 15, 1915, Lansing
revealed his determination to acquire the islands. Acting solely on his own initiative, Lansing informed Brun if Denmark refused to sell its American islands, he "could conceive of circumstances which would compel" the United States to seize them by military force. As Lansing recalled the interview, Brun then asked the Secretary what those circumstances were, and I replied that the possible consequence of absorption of Denmark by a great power would create a situation which it would be difficult to meet other than by occupation of the Islands, and such action would undoubtedly cause serious consequences.

The other circumstance was that if Denmark voluntarily, or under coercion, transferred title to the Danish West Indies to another European power, which would seek to convert them into a naval base. 8

The threat, subsequently approved by the President, prodded the Danish government into serious negotiations. Between January and July, 1916, the terms and conditions of sale were determined. 9 Finally, on Friday, August 4, 1916, Secretary Lansing and Minister Brun signed a formal treaty of purchase at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. In exchange for the three major islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix, together with the adjacent islands and rocks—a total of one hundred thirty-two square miles—Denmark received twenty-five million dollars in gold. Further, over Lansing's objections, President Wilson agreed to acquiesce in the Danish demand for an appended declaration to the treaty stating the United States "will not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland." 10
Four days later President Wilson submitted the treaty to the United States Senate. Only minor opposition developed. On August 18, 1916, Secretary Lansing appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Missouri's William Joel Stone, to argue it was desirable "to get these islands out of the market to prevent foreign complications." This statement did not impress some committee members who, in turn, inquired "if the Monroe Doctrine would not be a bar to any foreign nation obtaining the Danish West Indies by colonization or purchase?" Lansing acquiesced in this viewpoint, but insisted it was "necessary for the United States to have the islands, and [Lansing] created the impression among some committee members that he had undivulged reasons for thinking so."

Not until several years later did Lansing reveal his "undivulged reasons." In an open letter to Senator Medill McCormick, who in May of 1922 was investigating the circumstances of the occupation of Haiti, Lansing stated the purchase of the Danish West Indies was on the basis of "official and unofficial sources" indicating Germany planned to build a submarine base on the islands.

Lansing's argument persuaded a majority of Senators, and on September 7, 1916 the Senate approved the treaty. Problems of formal ratification, however, were not yet over. When the Royal Danish government presented the treaty to the Rigsdag, opposition quickly developed among the conservative factions of the population; criticism of the treaty
became especially acute after the Minister of Finance, Edward Brandes, during a debate in the Folketing, inadvertently revealed the United States had exerted "friendly pressures" on Minister Brun. This was an obvious reference to Lansing's threat. A favorable popular referendum, however, combined with the financial burden of the islands, encouraged the Rigsdag to approve the treaty in late December of 1916.  

When the House of Representatives conducted its February hearings on the appropriation bill authorizing payment for the Virgin Islands of the United States, Secretary Lansing made several misleading statements before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Representative Clarence B. Miller of Minnesota referred to the Secretary's testimony before the Senate committee the previous summer and asked Lansing "is not the paramount purpose in acquiring these Danish West India Islands a military purpose?" Secretary Lansing's one word answer was a qualification: "Largely." A few minutes later the committee's chairman, Henry D. Flood of Virginia, asked him to clarify his meaning and "state the advantages . . . of acquiring these islands, from a military and commercial standpoint."  

Feeling he could say nothing beyond what appeared in his report to Wilson of January 22, 1917, Lansing limited his answer to a reading of that document. He told the committee "there can be no question as to the value of St. Thomas Harbor as a naval port . . ." and "the advantages of the
possession of a naval base off the entrance of the Panama Canal and near the island of Porto Rico are self-evident."

He then presented the questionable hypothesis that "the commercial value of the islands can not be doubted." The Secretary ended his prepared testimony by declaring

the political importance of extending American jurisdiction over the islands is not to be overlooked. The Caribbean is within the peculiar sphere of influence of the United States, especially since the completion of the Panama Canal, and the possibility of a change of sovereignty . . . is of grave concern to the United States. Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine, a settled national policy of the United States, would have caused this country to look with disfavor upon the transfer of sovereignty of the Danish West Indies to any other European nation.17

Although more candid than in his testimony before Senator Stone's committee, a result of the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany nine days before, the Secretary nevertheless knowingly made misleading statements. Robert Lansing conveyed his fear to Congress of German secret activities in the Caribbean; yet he himself did not believe the solution lay in the purchase of the Danish islands as a strategically important naval base. Neither did he feel the islands would be a commercial asset to the United States. In a personal letter of February 11, 1918, Lansing wrote the Governor of the Virgin Islands, James H. Oliver, the territory

would be a burden rather than a source of profit I always felt and I never believed that they had any special naval value, although in the possession of a hostile power
willing to expend sufficient sums they might have become a serious annoyance if not a menace. Their possession is but an assurance that no rival can hereafter threaten our present strong naval position, because even if taken from us they would be of little strategic value without years of work in making them a naval base. From that possibility we are saved and I think we can well afford to pay insurance in appropriations for protection from that danger.\(^\text{18}\)

Personally Lansing wanted the islands under United States' control so they could not be of military value to some other country, especially Imperial Germany. In fact, he did not even want St. Thomas Harbor converted into a naval base, since such a base would be a liability to the United States if Germany seized it during the war.

III

As his conception of the German autocratic conspiracy against American security motivated the Secretary of State to authorize investigations in Latin America and to acquire the Virgin Islands, likewise it influenced his handling of United States relations with the Republic of Mexico. Information he received about the extent and scope of German activities in Mexico convinced him Germany intended to use the already strained Mexican-American relations as a means of diverting the former's attention from events in Europe; if the two American states were at war, the United States would be unable to supply materials to the Allied powers.\(^\text{19}\)
Robert Lansing outlined, in the autumn of 1915, a three-part policy which guided his actions toward Mexico until at least November of 1918. The outline reflected how his fear of a German conspiracy influenced his Mexican policy. "Looking at the general situation" in American-Mexican relations, the Secretary began,

I have come to the following conclusions:

Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene.

Germany does not wish to have any one faction dominant in Mexico; therefore, we must recognize one faction as dominant in Mexico.

When we recognize a faction as the government, Germany will undoubtedly seek to cause a quarrel between that government and ours; therefore, we must avoid a quarrel regardless of criticism and complaint in Congress and the press.

It comes down to this: Our possible relations with Germany [i.e., the threat of war] must be our first consideration; and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly. It is the only rational and safe policy under present conditions. . . . The future may and, I have no doubt, will justify the wisdom of this course. . . .

Woodrow Wilson had established the current Mexican policy in March of 1913. The President had refused recognition to the régime of General Victoriano Huerta, the successor to assassinated President Francisco Madero, on the grounds the Huerta coup d'état was unconstitutional. Wilson hoped by refusing de facto recognition he could force Huerta to restore a constitutional régime. Lansing, in his memoranda
for both July and October of 1915, did not accept the Wilsonian policy. He did not think it wise since nonrecognition could establish "a dangerous precedent which, if generally followed, is liable to cause serious international troubles"; all "revolutions are always extra-constitutional and cannot be judged by legal standards of right" or wrong. Following the principles developed in his 1907 treaties on sovereignty, Lansing believed "recognition ought to depend on certain physical conditions rather than on the political beliefs . . . or on the moral character of the persons . . . seeking to be recognized." Those physical conditions were "the actual possession of sovereignty, as evidenced by the power to exercise it. . . ."21

To frustrate German influence and to avoid dangerous legal precedents, Lansing worked for diplomatic recognition of the strongest Mexican faction. Under no conditions, however, would progress and stability be achieved by dealing with the conservative and reactionary parties of the "old aristocratic" leaders such as Victoriano Huerta or José de la Cruz Porfirio Díaz; appreciating the underlying social and economic causes of La Revolución, he understood the United States must associate itself with one of the groups to the left of center. But which liberal faction?

Throughout June and early July of 1915 Lansing developed the opinion the only feasible way to restore peace to Mexico was to insist the three principal revolutionary
factions relinquish their military powers and eliminate themselves from consideration. "In view of the personal animosities, jealousies, and ambitions... nothing can be accomplished" through working with Venustiano Carranza, Emiliano Zapata, and Pancho Villa. If this step were successful, then a meeting of lesser chiefs would be called to create a provisional government representing the true principles of the Revolution. The United States and other major American states could recognize, aid, and support this government. This original plan, as well as most of Lansing's Latin American policies during the Great War, sought to associate United States' actions with those of other Western Hemisphere nations. The Secretary believed this would preclude charges of unilateral intervention in another state's domestic affairs and would foster a Pan-American spirit of cooperation.22

When Lansing first proposed his policy to President Wilson, on July 5, 1915, Zapata's forces controlled the Mexican capital. Only five days later, however, Zapata withdrew under pressure from the advancing Constitutionalist Army under General Pablo Gonzalez. These events caused the Secretary to question his original plan. As he later wrote in his unpublished memoirs, when Gonzalez "entered the city with little resistance... the Constitutionalist Party appeared to be unquestionably the strongest faction among revolutionists, while the commands issued in the capital
looking to the preservation of order and the preventing of looting indicated a better control by Carranza over his troops than that of other factional leaders." Because of this change in the military situation,

I changed my mind as to the best policy to adopt and [I] decided that the expedient thing to do was to secure the recognition of the Carranzista Government as the de facto government of Mexico and this I set forth in my "Outline of Foreign Policies" written on July 11th. . . . 23

The main objective of Lansing's revised policy was the "recognition of some government which given moral support would be able to tranquilize the distracted country and make possible a renewal of diplomatic intercourse . . ." with the United States. Although the Secretary had only contempt for Carranza personally, he respected his ability as a leader. As in Notes on Sovereignty in 1907, the issue in 1915 "was one of expediency rather than of principle." Recognition was a problem "to be determined on the facts, not on theory." 24

Although it has escaped the attention of previous historians, Robert Lansing typed an interesting personal letter, in December of 1919, to an intimate friend and fellow member of the Phortnightly Klub, Edward N. Smith. 25 In this letter Lansing reviewed the development of Mexican-American relations from his original appointment in 1915 to the 1919 kidnapping of Consular Agent William O. Jenkins. No other document presents a clearer capsulation of the Secretary's motives, goals, fears, and frustrations in his handling of
American diplomatic relations with Mexico. For these reasons, therefore, Lansing's December letter deserves to be quoted extensively. 26

"When I came in as Secretary of State, in June, 1915,
Lansing began,

Mexico was torn by factional strife, the principal factions being Carranzistas, Villistas and Zapatistas. . . . The whole country was seething with violence, a prey to bandits who operated in the name of partisan chiefs. I had found that all factions were being encouraged by German agents and supported in a measure at least by German money. I felt that this was done so as to compel the United States to take forcible means of abating the nuisance in order that we would become so occupied that we would be diverted from aiding the Allies. It was further my conviction that we would have to get into the European war sooner or later, a conviction which I do not think the President shared.

Holding these views the only wise course seemed to be to maintain friendly relations with Mexico at all hazards, and I was further confirmed in this when on inquiring of the General Staff I found that they estimated it would require 450,000 men to intervene in Mexico and that the available force was less than 35,000. With this knowledge of the facts and this conviction as to the future part that we were to take in Europe, what other course was there but to give de facto recognition to the strongest faction and try to stabilize that government? That was done through the conference of seven republics which recognized Carranza in [October,] 1915.

This Pan-American Conference on Mexico included representatives from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, as well as Bolivia, Guatemala, Uruguay, and the United States. Astutely appealing to Latin American sensitivity, Lansing opened the Conference with a long argument about sovereignty which
reconciled the four conferees originally critical of Carranza. Lansing achieved his goal through careful timing and pressure applied during the several sessions which met between August and October. One historian described his statesmanship at the Conference as "a classic example of the art of diplomacy." On October 19, 1915, the United States and the six Latin American nations simultaneously extended de facto recognition to the Carranza Government. Lansing's realistic policy of dealing with a de facto régime replaced the Wilsonian policy of moral pressure through nonrecognition.

Lansing's problems with Mexico, however, were not over. As the Secretary of State later informed his Watertown friend, he believed matters would grow better when we renewed diplomatic relations. It was a natural supposition that Carranza would be grateful and try to protect American lives and property, and that with American financial support and public sympathy he would be able to establish a government which could preserve peace and perform its international obligations. . . . But I had not reckoned with the character of Carranza. It was an error which, however, justifiable, seriously affected the future of our relations.

Whether German influence continued to be as strong as it had been with Carranza—and the fact that [German Foreign Minister Alfred F.M.] Zimmermann dared to send this foolish telegram in January, 1917, would seem to indicate it--; whether his hatred of Americans was so intense that nothing we could do would change him; whether he was so vain as to think we had to recognize him; or whether he considered it good politics to abuse and insult
the Yankees—I do not know. It may have been one or several or all of these reasons. Whatever the cause he acted like the stubborn, insolent old ass that he is.

Matters mended but little. The turmoil in Mexico continued. We tried in every way to get nearer to the Mexican Government, but it was of no use. We were rebuffed at every turn. It was no easy matter to swallow one's pride and to keep ladling out soothing syrup to those Greasers while they smiled sarcastically and kept on with their insults. I do not believe any man was more tempted than I to speak and act harshly. The great restraint was that more and more evidence kept coming in that Germans were industriously at work encouraging the Mexicans to mistreat our people and to flout our Government. For us to give Mexico an ultimatum and for Mexico to defy us was what the German Government through its agents sought. If we had lost our tempers, as we came near doing, we would have done exactly what the Germans wanted. . . . Furthermore (and this is of course very secret) we had reports, though not conclusive, that Japan was not disposed to come to an understanding with our disorderly neighbors.

Things went on from bad to worse, Germany's agents became more and more aggressive, and the Mexicans bolder and more impudent. It was humiliating and exasperating but we contained our policy and refused to be drawn into a war with Mexico. Then in the spring of 1916 came the Columbus raid.

During the night of March 9, 1916, four hundred raiders loyal to Pancho Villa entered the small town of Columbus, New Mexico. They killed nineteen Americans and burned the town. Wilson could not resist the demands for military intervention since Carranza's Government seemed incapable of controlling Villa. Military commanders in Texas were ordered to prepare an expedition to pursue Villa into Mexico. Two days after Lansing had negotiated a protocol with Mexico's representative
in Washington on March 13, 1916, Brigadier General John J. Pershing crossed the border with six thousand men in pursuit of the elusive La Cucaracha.²⁹

The following month an incident occurred which almost touched off war with the Carranza Government itself. His airplanes grounded Pershing sent a scouting column one hundred eighty miles into Mexico. At the southern Chihuahuan town of Parral a detachment of the column stopped to buy supplies. A civilian mob of patriotic and Villista Mexicans suddenly fired upon the unit. After unsuccessfully trying to restrain the civilians, the local Carranza military garrison joined the rioting, driving the Americans back to their reinforcements some eight miles away. Forty Mexicans were killed along with two American troopers. Nationalistic outcries followed from each nation.³⁰ As Lansing reminded Smith, the Columbus raid followed by the Parral skirmish "almost did the business."

The popular indignation could hardly be restrained and many of our officials, who did not realize what Germany was after and really did not care because they did not believe we would enter the European war, demanded intervention. It was pretty hard to sit on the lid those days and keep the war-kettle from boiling over.

Yet in the face of such provocations we kept to the adopted policy and after a diplomatic correspondence I proposed the Mexican Conference of 1916 which sat and sat and came to no conclusion.

This United States-Mexican Joint Commission first met in New London, Connecticut, on September 6, 1916. Luis Cabrera,
the Minister of Finance, headed the Mexican delegation; Secretary of the Interior Franklin Knight Lane chaired the American representation. Cabrera was a master of obstructionist tactics. The only question he would discuss was unconditional withdrawal of the American troops. Lane, however, had orders to make recall of troops conditional on signing a broader arrangement to end the troubled border conditions. The Commission finally broke up in an atmosphere of acrimony on January 15, 1917.31

Although historian Howard F. Cline believed the Commission's major goal was to carry "Wilson through the last stages of his political campaign" for reelection in November 1916, Professor Clarence C. Clendenen called the meetings a success since they accomplished what they set out to do--avert war.32 As reflected in his December letter to Smith, Secretary Lansing would agree with the latter interpretation. The Commission bridged over a critical period and that is all I ever expected of it. American temper had time to cool and finally the whole matter was lost sight of in the presidential campaign, and from that public attention became riveted on the peace suggestions of December, 1916, [made by President Wilson,] the German declaration to renew submarine warfare, the dismissal of Bernstorff, the Zimmerman[n] telegram, and finally the declaration of war.

Our entrance into the war was a complete vindication of the policy we had pursued. A score of times I was tempted by the sorry figure we cut to abandon it and show the Mexicans that we would stand no more of their villainies, but, when I considered that the sinister hand of Germany was pulling the strings, I saw the folly of being
drawn into a conflict with Mexico. It was a trial of patience, which was hard to bear, but it was, as events here proved, the wisest course.

Even though Robert Lansing thought American entry into the Great War vindicated both his Mexican policy and his trial of patience—statements not confined to his December letter—American entry also produced a diplomatic victory for Venustiano Carranza. From the first days of the Constitutionalist movement, Carranza never wavered in his determination to preserve the integrity and independence of La Revolución. He did not compromise Mexican sovereignty at New London, yet the Punitive Expedition withdrew in February of 1917, as he demanded. Pershing returned home for possible transport to France. One month later Secretary Lansing sent special envoy Henry P. Fletcher to Mexico City, and in exchange for an agreement respecting American property holdings in Mexico, Carranza, on August 31, 1917, secured de jure recognition from the United States. Finally, American entry into the European war gave the southern republic time to build and consolidate. When the war ended in 1918, and Lansing again turned his attentions upon Mexico, he faced a very different Carranza. If Carranza felt more "secure," Lansing no longer felt obliged "to keep ladling out soothing syrup to those Greasers." The resulting crisis nearly produced a second Mexican-American war, and it did produce the resignation of Secretary of State Robert Lansing.
IV

Of the eight policies outlined in the memorandum of July 11, 1915, the fourth and seventh were occasionally contradictory. The latter called for preventing "by all means in our power," German influence from "becoming dominant in any nation bordering the Caribbean or near the Panama Canal"; the fourth policy urged "the cultivation of a Pan-American doctrine with the object of alienating the American republics from European influence. . . ." The seventh objective explained Robert Lansing's secret investigations of German activities in Latin America, the purchase of the Virgin Islands, and his successful attempt to reverse the existing Wilsonian policy towards Mexico. These events in themselves did not conflict with the spirit of Pan-Americanism. In fact through the 1915 Pan American Conference on Mexico, Lansing expanded the existing precedents of hemispheric political cooperation.

While Lansing served as Secretary of State two other events resulted from this seventh policy which did conflict with the spirit of Pan-Americanism: the United States Marine Corps' occupations of the two countries sharing the island of Hispaniola. Since the first days of the Wilson Administration, events had foreshadowed intervention in disorderly Haiti. Then, in July of 1915, a fresh wave of revolutionary violence occurred, resulting in the overthrow of President
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam by General Rosalvo Bobo. The General reportedly was receiving money and supplies from Germany. Lansing warned President Wilson the situation required forceful measures. Three hundred thirty United States marines landed at Port-au-Prince on July 28, 1915; troops dispatched from Guantánamo Bay, Cuba quickly reinforced them. This military action did not end until nineteen years later.34

The United States occupied the Dominican Republic only ten months after the establishment of the Haitian protectorate. Under the United States' financial tutelage since 1907 when President Theodore Roosevelt assumed customs receivership, the island's régime had successfully resisted American demands for further control over domestic affairs until the spring of 1916. Lansing then took advantage of continued political unrest and a coup d'état in May, to secure Wilson's approval to land marines and restore domestic order. Unlike its neighbor to the west, the Dominican Republic remained a United States protectorate for a mere eight years.35

On both occasions Secretary Lansing justified his recommendations in the name of national security; political unrest and fiscal irresponsibility accentuated the possibility of European intervention and suggested the existence of German intrigues. On both occasions he justified his actions with the Monroe Doctrine. If he had been responsible for
United States Caribbean policy, he would have used the Monroe Doctrine as the tool, and national security as the rationale, to transform this southern sea into an undisputed American lake.

As early as June 11, 1914, Counselor Lansing prepared a memorandum on the "Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine, and Its Need of Restatement." If adopted, it would have been a major extension of the existing doctrine. The memorandum presented the contemporary opinion of the 1823 message. In realistic terms he differentiated "two essential elements of the Monroe Doctrine." First, "the doctrine is exclusively a national policy of the United States and relates to its national safety and vital interests"; second, it is directed against the extension of European control over American territory, but only when that control possesses "the element of permanency, or a reasonable possibility of permanency." If an American republic ceded territory to a European Power, the doctrine would be invoked against the American state. In this case, Lansing admitted the doctrine would be "out of harmony with the principle of equality of nations which underlies Pan-Americanism." Reflecting the view of "Actual Sovereignty" presented in his 1907 monograph, Lansing held that in cases where the "Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism . . . come into conflict, the Monroe Doctrine will . . . prevail so long as the United States . . . is the dominant power among the American nations. The equality of
American republics and, in a measure, their independence are legal rather than actual." Since the United States must consider its own interests first, the actual "integrity of other American nations is an incident, not an end" of American policy.

Counselor Lansing then analyzed what he considered to be a fundamental weakness in the original doctrine of 1823, a weakness never remedied by its various corollaries. The original doctrine "relates to European acquisition of political power in America by means of occupation, conquest or cession of territory. There is, nevertheless, another method by which such power may be acquired." The European nation, whose subjects supply the capital to install and operate the principal industries of a small American republic and furnish the funds upon which its government is dependent, may, if it so wishes, dominate the political action of the American government. To state it in another way, a European power whose subjects own the public debt of an American state and have invested there large amounts of capital, may control the government of the state as completely as if it had acquired sovereign rights over the territory through occupation, conquest or cession.

Since through such economic control as this the two elements of the original doctrine are called into play—the extension of permanent political control possibly affecting the national safety of the United States—Robert Lansing consequently asked the Wilson Administration a singularly fundamental question: "Has the time arrived, as a result of modern economic conditions in Central and South America, when the
Monroe Doctrine, if it is to continue effective, should be restated so as to include European acquisition of political control through the agency of financial supremacy over an American republic?" This question, Lansing concluded, "in my judgment should receive prompt and careful consideration." 36

The Counselor's suggestion, carried to its implied extent, would have appended the Monroe Doctrine so as to mark out for American capitalism the whole vast area of the New World as its private domain. American investment would replace European economic control. 37

Although Lansing forwarded his memorandum to Secretary Bryan a few days later, no records reveal Bryan's reaction. 38 Despite Secretary Bryan and President Wilson's prejudices against European concessionaires, perhaps Lansing had expanded the doctrine further than they were currently willing to accept. Whatever the administration's reasoning, the Lansing memorandum did not receive official sanction at this time but, instead, reappeared seventeen months later in a somewhat attenuated form.

On November 24, 1915, Secretary of State Lansing submitted a memorandum to the President on the "Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine." The first fifteen paragraphs were substantially the same as the document prepared in 1914. He geographically reduced the economic corollary to encompass solely the territory in and about the Caribbean Sea. As he explained to Wilson in a cover letter:
The possession of the Panama Canal and its defense have in a measure given to the territories in and about the Carribean [sic] Sea a new importance from the standpoint of our national safety. It is vital to the interests of this country that European political domination should in no way be extended over these regions. As it happens within this area lie the small republics of America which have been and to an extent still are the prey of revolutionists, of corrupt governments, and of predatory foreigners.

Because of this state of affairs our national safety, in my opinion, requires that the United States should intervene and aid in the establishment and maintenance of a stable and honest government, if no other way seems possible to attain that end.

Reminiscent of his 1902 reflections on the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, Lansing emphasized his argument rested solely upon considerations of United States self-interest and not upon humanitarian grounds. The latter argument "does not appeal to me, even though it might be justly urged, because too many international crimes have been committed in the name of Humanity." 39

Robert Lansing's second memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine developed the same economic corollary presented in June of 1914. He then described a danger to United States military interests. In the Caribbean revolutionary chiefs financed their ventures by turning to foreign speculators for large sums of money in exchange for concessions or other privileges in the event of a successful revolt. As a result the people of these countries were victims of constant strife between rival leaders; their condition had little chance for
improvement since the short-term governments existed only for the enrichment of the rulers and the speculators.

"Since the construction of the Panama Canal," Lansing argued,

it is essential for its safety that the neighboring nations should not come under the political domination of any European power either directly by force or by cession or indirectly through the agency of financial control by its subjects. While force and cession are not impossible means if the government of a republic is corrupt or weak, the greater danger lies in the subtlety of financial control.

To meet this danger the surest if not the only means, is the establishment of a stable and honest government which will devote the revenues of the state to defraying its just obligations, to developing its resources, and to educating its people. . . .

In order to accomplish this the first thing to be done is to remove the prize of revolution, namely, the control of the public revenues. If this can be done there will be few revolutions about the Carribean. In the second place the government must not be dependent on foreign financiers for its continuance in power. In the third place it must possess a reliable and efficient military force sufficient to suppress insurrection against the established authority.

The Secretary of State believed there were few men of suitable character and honesty to perform these monumental tasks. Consequently, "the United States is of necessity forced to . . . undertake the task of aiding in the establishment of a stable and honest government, upon the principles which will . . . prevent any possibility of European control."

Lansing concluded his 1915 memorandum by urging that in the case of the republics about the Carribean Sea the United States should expand the application of the Monroe Doctrine, and declare as a
definite Carribean policy that, while it does not seek dominion over the territory of any of these republics, it is necessary for the national safety of the United States, and particularly in view of its interests on the Isthmus of Panama, that it aid the people of those republics in establishing and maintain- ing responsible and honest governments to such extent as may be necessary in each particular case, and that it will not tolerate control over or interference with the political or financial affairs of these republics by any European power or its nationals or permit the occupation, even temporarily, by a European power, of any territory of such republics.40

President Wilson replied to these observations five days later. The memorandum, he decided, was "only for the guidance and clarification of our thought, and for informal discussion with our Latin American friends, . . . and for the sake of a frank understanding." The document would not serve as the basis of any immediate public declaration, but Wilson admitted he personally considered "the argument of this paper . . . to be unanswerable. . . ."41 According to Professor Dexter Perkins, "thus did Woodrow Wilson, prophet of democracy and friend of self-determination, commit himself to the principles of the Roosevelt corollary, and to a doctrine of intervention in the affairs of independent states." The Monroe Doctrine, "aimed to prevent the intervention of European powers, had become a justification for the intervention of the United States."42

The record of the Wilson Administration in Caribbean affairs would tend to support Professor Perkins' contention;
given the date of Lansing's second memorandum, however, is
doubtful the document had any impact upon the creation of
Wilson's policy towards Latin America. Coming after the
occupation of Haiti, the memorandum did not outline a new
Caribbean policy but, instead, reflected the Secretary of
State's personal views--views for the most part shared by
the President prior to his reading of the memorandum. Fur-
ther, the analysis presented by Perkins appears moderately
contradictory. Referring to the 1914 statement, Perkins
interpreted Lansing's position to be "the ultimate exten-
sion" of the Monroe Doctrine; on the other hand, the second
memorandum was described as being synonymous with the 1904
Roosevelt Corollary. Perkins perhaps was most correct in his
first evaluation. Robert Lansing's economic corollary ex-
panded the 1823 doctrine beyond the scope ever publicly en-
visioned by the bellicose former Republican President.
Theodore Roosevelt's policy announced to European Powers the
United States would intervene in an American republic in lieu
of and on behalf of the European states in order to collect
defaulted debts. Lansing's policy suggestion, however, was
that the traditional right of European capitalists to invest
freely anywhere they wished in the world might now be cur-
tailed, or at least limited, in the nations located within
the United States' strategic imperative--the Caribbean Sea.

Despite his desire to reinterpret the Monroe Doctrine,
Robert Lansing wished to foster a greater sense of inter-
American cooperation. Personally he did not believe the two policies of Monroism and Pan Americanism needed to be mutually exclusive. As he later explained in his unpublished memoirs, "the non-recognition of Huerta and the occupation of Vera Cruz . . . and American intervention in the Dominican Republic and Haiti seemed to be out of harmony with the spirit" of Pan Americanism. "It was necessary," he believed, "to overcome the impression created by those acts. . . ." Since "the popular understanding of the Monroe Doctrine and of . . . Pan-Americanism was so uncertain and confused . . . it seemed advisable to define the two policies in explicit terms and to show their relation to each other."

To clarify this discrepancy, the Secretary of State prepared an address for the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress. 43

The Congress met in Washington, D.C. during the last week of 1915 and the first week of 1916 and representatives of twenty-one American states attended. 44 It was natural for Lansing to be the principal speaker since he was the current president of the Pan American Union. In the address, delivered on December 27, he described the development of Pan Americanism as a product of a common American heritage of revolution for independence from European domination. Realizing a sense of nationality following the wars for independence, the American states became fully "conscious of the responsibilities and privileges which are theirs as sovereign
... states." "A feeling [developed] that the Republics of this hemisphere constitute a group separate and apart from other nations of the world, a group which is united by common ideals and common aspirations." Although initially vague, this feeling of uniqueness has become to-day a definite and certain force. We term it the "Pan-American spirit," from which springs the international policy of Pan-Americanism. ...

When we attempt to analyze Pan-Americanism we find that the essential qualities are those of the family—sympathy, helpfulness and a sincere desire to see another grow in prosperity. ... [It] extends beyond the sphere of politics and finds its application in the varied fields of human enterprise. ... The essential idea manifests itself in cooperation. ... We must not only be neighbors, but friends; not only friends, but intimates. We must understand one another. ...

Commerce and industry, science and art, public and private law, government and education, all of these great fields which invite the intellectual thoughts of man, fall within ... [its] province. ... Pan-Americanism is an expression of the idea of internationalism. America has become the guardian of that idea, which will in the end rule the world. Pan-Americanism is the most advanced as well as the most practical form of that idea. It has been made possible because of our geographical isolation, of our similar political institutions, and of our common conception of human rights.

In characterizing Pan Americanism in this way Lansing could declare to the Congress that it did not conflict with the basic ideas inherent in Monroeism. "If I have correctly interpreted Pan-Americanism ...," he explained,
it is in entire harmony with the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is a national policy of the Americas. The motives are to an extent different; the ends sought are the same. Both can exist without impairing the force of either. And both do exist and, I trust, will ever exist in all their vigor.

This national policy of the United States was a tool to protect the separate identity of the Western Hemisphere, an identity basic to the Pan American spirit. It should not be a source of anguish for the American states but a source of comfort. Although Lansing spoke only for the United States, he felt he expressed sentiments echoed in every American state when

I say that the might of this country will never be exercised in a spirit of greed to wrest from a neighboring state its territory or possessions. The ambitions of this Republic do not lie in the path of conquest but in the paths of peace and justice. Whenever and wherever we can we will stretch forth a hand to those who need help. If the sovereignty of a sister Republic is menaced from overseas, the power of the United States and, I hope and believe, the united power of the American Republics will constitute a bulwark which will protect the independence and integrity of their neighbor from unjust invasion or aggression. The American Family of Nations might well take for its motto that of [Alexandre] Dumas' famous musketeers, "One for all; all for one."45

Lansing's address, accepted generally as a declaration of the Wilson Administration's policy towards Latin America, may have resolved any contradictions between Pan Americanism and Monroeism in the Secretary's own mind, but it is doubtful it pacified the Congressional delegates.
What Lansing had said they had heard before and would hear again, and the examples of Mexico and Hispaniola were all too recent. As the editors of The Nation quickly pointed out, it was an "altogether admirable address of Welcome," but Mexico and Haiti "must have been in the minds of all who heard him." Even the idea of collective security against non-American aggressors was not new; the idea had existed within the administration since 1913 and would linger on until the end of the European war when it would then be expanded to a global concept and embodied in Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Considerations of national security influenced Lansing more than his desire for cooperation. These considerations required unilateral action by the United States in the Caribbean—not multilateral actions by the American republics. As long as the Secretary of State's unwillingness to renounce the United States' self-proclaimed "right of intervention" influenced his policy recommendations to Woodrow Wilson, a genuine Pan American spirit of unity remained a phantom.
CHAPTER X

POST-WAR DECADE

"Friday, the 13th! This is my lucky day for I am free from the intolerable situation in which I have been so long. Yesterday I resigned my commission as Secretary of State, and this afternoon came the President's acceptance 'to take effect at once.'"¹ With these words Robert Lansing began the entry in his private memoranda books for February 13, 1920. On the following morning the nation's press headlined the news--President Woodrow Wilson had abruptly demanded the resignation of his Secretary of State because Lansing had called unauthorized and unconstitutional cabinet meetings during Wilson's winter illness of 1919 and 1920. By this curt dismissal Wilson gave public notice the four month interregnum was clearly over and he intended once more to take and active part in the affairs of state. "President Wilson Becomes Normal," heralded Harvey's Weekly, "Lansing Gets His."²

Obviously the calling of unauthorized Cabinet sessions existed solely as a causa formalis for resignation. The actual reasons rest in the nature of the Wilson-Lansing relationship itself and in the foreign policies Lansing
suggested and pursued both before and during the President's illness. When the resignation finally came, Robert Lansing retired from public service and devoted the remaining years of his life to his writing and to the law—international law.\(^3\)

II

"The amazing feature of the Wilson-Lansing relationship is that it lasted so long."\(^4\) The two individuals were dissimilar in both temperament and mental processes. The President tended to be more idealistic, moralistic, and mentally intuitive—possessing what Lansing once characterized as a "feminine mind,"\(^5\) his Secretary of State remained more skeptical, practical, and analytical. Many contemporaries within the diplomatic and political professions recognized and appreciated Lansing's merits and abilities to one degree or another; President Wilson, it appears, did not.\(^6\)

Robert Lansing received his appointments as Counselor and as Secretary of State because he had the technical skills Wilson needed to implement his own policy decisions. Wilson considered the New Yorker only a highly placed legal clerk, and the historian—president apparently did not understand the form, manner, and timing in which a question is presented to the White House will frequently shape the policy's direction. Given a more intimate personal relationship with the President, such as the one possessed by Colonel Edward M.
House before 1919, Lansing's influence would undoubtedly have been greater; this, however, remained impossible. His legal, realistic, critical, conservative mind prevented him from giving any man the unqualified loyalty and personal admiration which Woodrow Wilson demanded. Their relationship ever increasingly became one of tension and, finally, conflict; the contemporary Washington correspondent for the New York Evening Post described it as a conflict between a legal and a political-professorial mind.  

According to the Imperial German Ambassador at Washington, Johann-Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, "Mr. Lansing was a lawyer, not a politician, and [he] looked at everything from the point of view of a lawyer and [from] his position as the President's sole legal adviser. He was, so to speak, Mr. Wilson's legal conscience." Woodrow Wilson, however, had a deep antipathy for lawyers and legal minds, no doubt dating back to his experiences as a law student at the University of Virginia. Whereas Lansing enjoyed the technicalities of the discipline, Wilson regarded law as preparation for a political career. If Lansing preached world peace through the universal application of the Rule of Law, then Wilson sought to make the world safe for democracy through a political agreement among states, an agreement not drafted by "lawyers."

One of the assistant secretaries with the Department of State perhaps capsulized the President's attitude towards the Secretary most succinctly by writing
he did not "think Wilson ever really cared for him, although he respected him."  

Apparently President Wilson never recognized the extent of his dependence upon Lansing, especially during the period before the United States entered the Great War, when Wilson's ignorance of international law was most manifest. The President as well as Colonel House believed Lansing would be a "yes man" who would follow their suggestions unquestioningly. Both men, however, underestimated Robert Lansing. At the outset of his association with the President, Lansing admired his personal qualities and his leadership abilities; this original impression, however, waned with constant exposure. After an initial brief period of amazement over his appointment as Secretary, Lansing accustomed himself to the office and its publicity and began to reevaluate the individual assumptions and programs currently operative within the area of American foreign relations. In most cases he discovered Wilson to be a receptive listener to his suggestions. "It had always been my practice," Lansing later wrote, "... to speak to him with candor and to disagree with him whenever I thought he was reaching a wrong decision in regard to any matter pertaining to foreign affairs." Yet the Secretary soon realized Wilson really did not accept anyone's advice without personal deliberation. When a decision did come, he rarely entertained any further discussion or argument. He became irritated if not irate if someone urged a decision's reversal.  

11

12
Realizing this, Lansing consequently developed a subtle, indirect method of pressing his opinions forward. Whenever Wilson would request an interpretation of a point of international law or a survey of historical precedents, Lansing provided memoranda intertwining fact with the Secretary's own suggestions and restrained yet persuasive arguments. Lansing understood the President's preference for written communiqués, which could be reflected upon in quiet and without external pressure, and for suggestions couched in "idealistic and moralistic concepts of honor, duty, and righteousness."\textsuperscript{13} Lansing's patience, reserve, and tenacity enabled him to undertake this slower path. He became so skilled in this method that even his associates on the Cabinet were surprised to learn from the posthumous publication of his memoirs in 1935, of his support for an American-German war as early as the spring of 1915.\textsuperscript{14}

Initially, Woodrow Wilson expressed pleasure in his appointment of Lansing as Secretary of State. In August of 1915 he wrote Colonel House "Lansing is proving most satisfactory" and is "a great comfort in these troubled times."\textsuperscript{15} Lansing's relationship with members of the press and the diplomatic corps, his management of the Department machinery and personnel, and his initial deference to the President and House, produced this content. His realism and conservatism, however, eventually caused presidential disillusionment.
In the winter of 1916, the Secretary proposed a modus vivendi to the European belligerent powers, approved by the President, ending the armament of merchant vessels in exchange for a German promise to order its submarines to comply with established rules of international warfare. When the German Government attempted to use this scheme to its own advantage, the resulting torrent of criticism and protest on the part of Colonel House, the Allied Powers, and the United States Congress obliged Wilson to withdraw the compromise. In this presidential election year Wilson personally blamed his Secretary for this embarrassing blunder. Upon the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Wilson restated the American position in a letter addressed to its chairman, Senator William Joel Stone; Lansing was not consulted. When Lansing learned of the letter through the press, he expressed his bitterness over the slight to House, who, in turn, informed the President. Wilson told House Lansing must realize it is constitutionally the President's function to conduct foreign affairs. Two days later, while talking to the President's wife, House learned both she and her husband blamed Lansing for exercising "bad judgment" in his handling of the affair.16

Although the modus vivendi was withdrawn in March of 1916, Lansing angered the President even more the following December. Convinced Wilson's attempts to mediate the European war were futile, he sought to undermine the efforts by
intimating at a press conference war was imminent with Germany.\textsuperscript{17} Enraged over his Secretary's actions, Wilson told House of his decision to replace Lansing with Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker. House, content with his working relationship with Lansing, apparently interceded on his behalf. Wilson recanted. The President, however, did not immediately take Lansing into his confidence; in fact, three months later, Wilson described Lansing as the single most unsatisfactory member of his Cabinet, destined for a second place in the history textbooks, since he has "no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind."\textsuperscript{18}

After the United States entered the war in 1917, and the legalistic aspects of American foreign relations became less critical, Wilson's dependence upon Lansing decreased and the intensity of their disagreements increased.\textsuperscript{19} Although Robert Lansing significantly influenced Wilsonian policies toward Russia\textsuperscript{20} and Austria-Hungary,\textsuperscript{21} his hope of détente with Imperial Japan, even at the expense of the Open Door principles, remained a point of contention.\textsuperscript{22} Lansing also opposed the President's stands on collective security and on international disarmament. Yet more importantly Lansing objected to the President's conduct during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and to the Wilsonian concept of a League of Nations. It was this opposition while at Paris, combined with the President's later illness and Lansing's
handling of a renewed Mexican crisis, which ultimately forced the Secretary's resignation of February, 1920.

III

In April of 1917, when the United States entered the Great War, Robert Lansing's only policy was the defeat of the enemy. Intensely working for the past two years to prepare the United States diplomatically for war, he had not thought about structuring the post-war world around any particular set of principles or policies.

Lansing's war time speeches vigorously condemned "Prussianism" and "German autocracy." He rejected compromise with the current rules of Germany, and worked diligently during August of 1917 to persuade Woodrow Wilson to reject the personal appeal for a negotiated peace made by Giacomo della Chiesa, His Holiness Pope Benedict XV.23 The war was a war of self-defense, Lansing told the American people, fought not to save the Allied Powers but to protect their own nation's security. By October of 1918, however, he had completely reversed this position. Lansing deliberately mellowed his public addresses in order to temper the American people's war time Germanophobic spirit, their "unreasoning demand to 'treat 'em rough,' without any regard as to what the result will be." He realized "it is sometimes hard to preserve a judicial mind in dealing with a pack of wolves such as the Germans are, but this must be done if the future
is to be what we seek to have it." 24

This change of emphasis within his public speeches reflected, by the autumn of 1918, Lansing's developing personal conception of international relations in the post-war world. The consolidation of the Bolsheviks' power in Russia, after the October Revolution of 1917, prompted this long-range consideration. 25 As the Bolshevik revolution under Vladimir Lenin gained momentum and as the war against Germany entered its final stages, Lansing saw in communism the same or even greater threat to western democracies as German autocracy. He reasoned if the Allied and Associate Powers imposed a harsh peace upon the defeated Central Powers, Bolshevism would exploit the European peoples' fears and hunger and achieve further political triumphs. Whereas he once wrote of the struggle between democracy and absolutism, by October, 1918 he concluded there were now "two great evils at work in the world today, Absolutism, the power of which is waning, and Bolshevism, the power of which is increaasing." 26 By November the war against the "Despotism of Autocracy" had "been brought to a successful conclusion," but "in its place has arisen a new and more sinister form of Despotism in the Bolsheviks. Bolshevism like Autocracy seeks to make a class the master of all society." 27 "The sacrifice which was made to overthrow autocracy," he wrote one friend, "would be useless, if it results in the triumph of proletariate despotism which menaces liberty and human
rights more than the most powerful autocrats"; he told a second friend "the great cure for Bolshevism is food." Calling for a "just" and quick peace, Lansing realized "men with full bellies are not Bolsheviks. We must, as soon as we can, feed the people of the Central Empires. In no spirit of vengeance must we refuse to supply those famished peoples with food." 

A second factor motivating Secretary Lansing to consider the structure of post-war international relations was the American interest in a permanent, relatively inclusive, multinational collective-security organization aimed at policing the new peace. Personally Lansing believed any world confederation or league to be inherently impractical. Such an organization, he reasoned, depended upon the good faith and peaceful intentions of its member states; all nations, however, except democracies were basically untrustworthy.

In a series of private memoranda dating from the autumn of 1918 to the spring of 1919, Lansing refined his argument against the Wilsonian conception of a league of nations; in essence four fundamental differences characterize the extent of disagreement between the Secretary and President Wilson. First, Lansing believed the best guarantee of peace was the universal triumph of democracy in the present war and in a league of democratic states. Second, Wilson's Covenant of the League of Nations denied the legal equality
of member nations; the President's support of the Executive Council of the League resulted in the legal supremacy of the five Great Powers. The Secretary considered it "politically inexpedient" to bind the United States to a collective security provision which invited attacks on its basic constitutionality. Fourth, Lansing and James Brown Scott both believed the President's original draft of the Covenant subordinated international arbitration and other judicial settlements to an unnecessary emphasis upon the Realpolitik; international disputes would be solved upon the basis of political compromise and diplomatic adjustments and not upon the merits of the states' respective legal cases. Lansing, however, had insisted since the turn of the century the best solution to world tensions remained the strengthening of existing arbitration and judicial machinery and the depoliticalization of conflicting claims.\(^{32}\)

True to his philosophy in *Notes on Sovereignty*, Robert Lansing considered nations too selfish to make the Wilsonian League of Nations function. The world needed a practical, legal peace, not utopianism. It needed food more than a Covenant.

By Armistice Day 1918, Lansing had dropped in President Wilson's esteem. He recognized their divergent views on the organization of the post-war world and dismissed Lansing's caution as obstructionism. Increasingly disillusioned with Wilson, Lansing often appeared blunt and tactless.
When Lansing opposed Wilson's attending the Paris Peace Conference in person, saying it might impair his diplomatic strength, the President considered the Secretary guilty of effrontery and disloyalty and inspired by personal ambitions to lead the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Lansing was accurate in predicting the Republicans in Congress would use Wilson's Paris journey in a political assault. To help prevent this, the Secretary recommended the American delegation include Republican Elihu Root, but Wilson rejected him as too conservative. Instead the President chose Lansing, Colonel Edward M. House, General Tasker Howard Bliss, and Henry White as fellow commissioners.  

Lansing's personal frustration and humiliation on the American Commission is a familiar story. Always an indefatigable doodler and a caricaturist of ability, he seems to have spent most of his time in Paris sketching and writing caustic comments in his private memoranda books. At one point he even returned to writing poetry, and in a bitterly sarcastic selection characterized the Big Four of the Conference as Olympian gods "Pondering o'er the fate of nations, / Pondering how the world of mortals / Should be made a place of virtue."  

The President made all important decisions himself and generally ignored the other commissioners with the noted exception of Colonel House. Lansing, Bliss, and White became disillusioned observers. The Secretary, embittered by
Wilson's repeated slights and his publicly displayed preference for House's counsel, found the Paris situation almost unendurable. When he tried to remedy the lack of preparation for the Conference, by having experts in his Department prepare a detailed treaty plan, Wilson angrily ordered a halt. He would not have "lawyers drafting the treaty of peace." Yet at Paris, the British, French, and Italian delegations had lawyers, and elaborate treaty plans, and were consequently ready to take the initiative. The American delegation, isolated from Wilson, floundered inefficiently and without direction. 36

At the beginning of the Conference Lansing and Wilson sat on the Council of Ten, the directing body of the Congress; the Secretary's frankness and logical arguments apparently angered Wilson. For efficiency, this organization became the Council of Four, where Wilson sat with the Allied premiers--David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando--and the Council of Foreign Ministers, or the "Little Five," which functioned as a clearing house on questions for the Council of Four. Completely removed from the important decision-making aspects of the Conference, Lansing contemplated resignation. Only a strong sense of duty and his desire to do nothing to endanger the work of the American delegation kept him from returning home. 37

Wilson and House monopolized the United States' contribution to the League of Nations. The Secretary, never
informed of the content of the Covenant as it as being draft-
ed, recorded exaggerated fears of a diminution of American
sovereignty and a loss of diplomatic freedom of action.
Later he willingly risked Wilson's anger by suggesting a
modification of the League's collective security principle.
He proposed member nations simply renounce aggressive inten-
tions against other members. The League's assembly and Coun-
cil would then be confined largely to codifying international
law and to peacefully adjusting disputes. In the case of ag-
gression, Lansing's League would confer on measures to restore
peace. It would, furthermore, be based unequivocally upon
the legal equality of states—no big-power vetoes or balance-
of-power politics—and thus no Great Power oligarchy could
dominate the world.38 For all his appreciation of power
realities, Lansing retained the judicial approach to inter-
national relations. House, it appears, was impressed with
Lansing's "negative guarantee of peace," but President Wilson
completely ignored the suggestion.39 Although the United
States Senate might have approved Lansing's plan it might have
equally proved as meaningless as the 1926 Pack of Paris. In
any event, the plan suggested an attainable level of inter-
national cooperation and its emphasis on judicial machinery
was practical and valuable.

Lansing became increasingly more critical of Wilson's
League. The Secretary feared the expanding Bolshevik menace
in a hungry and war-wrecked Central Europe, and as the con-
ference dragged on, Lansing wanted an immediate restoration
of peace. Lansing blamed the delay on Wilson's obsession with the League, and in vain he urged the President to settle for a preliminary treaty of peace with general provisions of some type of League of Nations; at a later time a second international congress could discuss the details. He attempted to force his plan through the Council of Ten but Wilson quickly rebuked him.40 With a preliminary treaty Europe could begin restoration at once but Wilson correctly believed any postponement of the compromises over the League might give its opponents the opportunity to permanently kill the measure by abstaining from participation in the second congress.

Troubled by the success of Bolshevism in Russia and moved by a sense of fairness, Lansing opposed excessively harsh treatment of Germany. He predicted unreasonable reparations would never be collected, and he supported the struggle of the American counsel on the Reparations Commission, his nephew John Foster Dulles, against violation of the pre-Armistic agreement to include war costs with allowable civilian damages. He denounced as preposterous the extreme Allied plans of squeezing Germany dry, especially those seeking to deprive Germany of colonies, a merchant marine, and valuable ore-bearing lands. He unsuccessfully opposed both Wilson's decision to include war pensions in civilian reparations and House's concession to base reparations on claims rather than on an estimate of Germany's ability to pay. Lansing scored
a minor success, however, when he persuaded Wilson to block
French schemes to obtain German trade secrets and patents,
possibly prohibiting the development of German commercial
aviation. 41

Secretary Lansing vigorously supported Wilson's oppo-
position to the dismemberment of Germany by challenging
several moves in the Council of Foreign Ministers to treat
Bavaria and other German states as independent entities.
Wilson successfully defended the principle of German terri-
torial integrity, but at the price of a defensive military
alliance with the French Republic. Although opposed to this
"Secret Treaty" since it was inconsistent with the League's
Covenant and ran counter to America's Washingtonian non-
entanglement policy, Lansing nevertheless did understand the
French demand for security; after all American power had
checked German expansion. Although Lansing warned the Presi-
dent the Senate would never approve the alliance, Wilson
ordered the Secretary to sign the pact in the name of the
United States. 42

Lansing also served as Chairman of the Commission on
Responsibility for the War, and in this capacity helped to
attach the infamous and historically questionable war-guilt
clause to the final treaty signed at Versailles. He did
not question German responsibility for the Great War, yet
he openly disagreed with most of the allied leaders on the
matter of a public trial for the former German Emperor.
Lansing thought this would establish a dangerous precedent since the former monarch was not guilty of violating any recognized international law. If the Kaiser had to be tried for something, Lansing felt it should be a "political" trial for his moral offenses in the beginning of the war. 43

On other major decisions of the conference Lansing had little influence. He opposed concessions to Italy at Yugoslavia's expense along the Dalmatian coast and, strangely for a traditionalist, approved Wilson's unsuccessful appeal to the Italian people over the head of Orlando for support on the disposition of Fiume to Yugoslavia. 44 As for Japan's claims to Germany's Pacific holdings, Lansing and the American commissioners, with House wavering, supported Wilson in opposing transfer of the Shantung leasehold to Japan. Although earlier willing to bargain with Japan, the German threat had ended and he now believed Japan's possession of Shantung compromised China's independence and territorial integrity. He freely advised the Chinese delegates at Paris in their fight to regain Shantung and ably challenged the Japanese arguments in the Council of Ten. Finally, when Japan appeared ready to bolt the conference and not join the League, Wilson rejected the advice of Lansing and the other commissioners and acquiesced in the cession to Japan of Germany's rights in Shantung. In exchange, Wilson secured a verbal Japanese promise to restore eventual sovereignty to China. Lansing, however, opposed Wilson's move contending Japan was
bluffing in its threat not to sign the treaty. It is unclear why Lansing, as a realist, took such a stand, for Japan occupied the areas it demanded and would be ousted only by force. Humiliating a powerful state and the nearest power to the American Philippine Islands did not appear to be in America's best interest.45

With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, the greatest assemblage of statesmen since the Congress of Vienna dispersed. Surveying the work of the conference, Lansing was convinced wars would still be fought and France and Italy had wisely insisted on strategic rather than ethnic frontiers. He suspected the particulars of the peace were faulty, harsh, and unjust, yet he signed the treaty. He believed the world needed peace, even a decidedly imperfect one, in order to check the spread of Bolshevism and to allow the European nations to resume their former economic and social progress.46

IV

A month after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles Secretary of State Robert Lansing returned to the United States. He had remained in Europe in order to organize the post-conference duties of the American delegation while President Woodrow Wilson hurried back to Washington to present the treaty to the Senate of the United States. Lansing predicted a difficult time for the President and his treaty, and
felt the animosity Wilson would encounter would be more personal than ideological or political. "My view," he wrote Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk, is that the Senate "... will find the President rather indigestible. ... I have never seen him more pugnacious or bellicose." *47 Nevertheless he still believed the Senate would ratify the treaty. First, he was sure the Senators shared in the "universal desire for peace," a long overdue peace, and, second, press reports revealed a "manifest disagreement" among the treaty's opponents as to whether it should be amended or voted down *in toto.* *48

When Robert Lansing finally returned to his office toward the end of July, 1919, he was "a saddened and disheartened man." *49* The American public knew of the slights he had endured at Paris and of the debate between himself and the President over the Shantung question. Conservatives and liberals alike criticized him for not resigning. The former attacked him for opposing the President of the United States; the latter believed he should have remained firm to his own principles. Only one anti-administration and liberal periodical understood why Lansing did not resign in Paris. "We do not criticise Mr. Lansing for not resigning," declared the editors of *The Nation*; "we believe that he accepted the humiliating position in which he was placed and worked on it because he felt that that was the highest and most patriotic duty that he could perform. He has, we believe, seen the
real situation far more clearly than his chief. . . ."50

Lansing himself later wrote he

was fully convinced that my withdrawal from
the American Commission would seriously de-
lay the restoration of peace, possibly in the
signature of the Treaty at Paris and certain-
ly in its ratification at Washington. Con-
sidering that the time had passed to make an
attempt to change Mr. Wilson's views on any
fundamental principle, and believing it a duty
to place no obstacle in the way of the signature
and ratification of the Treaty of Paris with
Germany, I felt that there was no course for me
as a representative of the United States other
than to obey the President's orders however strong
my personal inclination might be to refuse to
follow a line of action which seemed to me wrong
in principle and unwise in policy.51

Back in Washington for the first time in six months,
one of the first programs he undertook was to try and win
congressional support for a "complete repair and reorganiza-
tion" of the Department of State. The war had dramatized the
widespread weaknesses in the current structure and he found
both parties in Congress willing to discuss his reforms des-
pite the ongoing partisan debate over the Treaty of Versailles.
The reforms he felt the Department required took four
years to enact, but more immediately he faced a different type
of problem with the gentlemen of The Hill.52 On Wednesday,
August 6, 1919, the Secretary of State appeared before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to answer questions
about the treaty negotiated in Paris.53

In testimony before the Committee chaired by Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, Lansing presented an ef-
fective case for approval of the treaty and for the immediate
restoration of peace. The opponents of ratification, however, seized upon two startling statements from his testimony. First, he expressed the personal opinion that President Wilson could have secured justice for China without surrendering Shantung to the Japanese, and, second, that he personally knew nothing of the secret Anglo-Japanese pact over the division of Germany's Pacific islands until he had arrived in Paris. Yet for the most part Lansing "presented a rather pathetic figure." He revealed his ignorance of the actions of the Big Four and the various compromises surrounding the final structure of the League of Nations. "I do not know," was his most frequent answer," charged the New York Sun. "We trust," commented the editors of the Detroit News, "Mr. Lansing enjoyed the scenery around Versailles, ... while waiting the arrival of the American newspapers to read what the peace conference was doing." 

His appearance before the Committee was "a disagreeable experience" from the start. Lansing thought the Senators less interested in securing relevant information than in uncovering political capital for use against the President. Obviously disturbed by the criticism in the press of August 7, Lansing recorded his explanation in his private memoranda books. "I felt that I could not disclose the truth" to the Senators, he began,

`... in regard to the proceedings of the Commission on the League of Nations or of the various drafts of the Covenant ... because it would have played directly into the hands of these politicians and rejoiced their very`
souls. I would have saved myself from much adverse criticism in the press by a statement of the facts, but in doing so I would have opened the flood gates of invective against the President and have put myself in open hostility to the Covenant as finally drafted. My loyalty to the President—though some may think that he has forfeited it—and still more my patriotic duty to put no obstacle in the way of the ratification of the Treaty prevented my adopting such a course before the Committee. I preferred the mortification of being considered to have been ignored rather than to interfere in any way with a restoration of peace at the earliest possible moment. . . .

I am sure that my course was the right one.\textsuperscript{56}

Although the Secretary of State returned to the Capital for a rematch the following Monday, August 11—an appearance he described as "satisfactory"\textsuperscript{57}—the rest of the month he spent on a host of minor Departmental problems. Tired physically and mentally, Robert Lansing and his wife left Washington by the evening train on September 4 for their holiday. They spent the night in Boston and proceeded the next day to their summer home at Henderson Harbor. On Friday of the following week, September 12, Lansing intended to leave his wife at the cottage and join his fellow members of the Phortnightly Klub for a week of fishing at their camp on isolated Galloos Island. High winds prevented his departure. Perhaps this proved to be for the best; if he had left as scheduled he would not have read the story that broke in the next morning's newspapers.\textsuperscript{58} Known as the Bullitt Affair, Lansing believed the event persuaded President Wilson he "had
been working against the League of Nations with the intention of bringing about the rejection of the Covenant by the Senate."\^59

The twenty-eight-year-old William Christian Bullitt was a personable man, deeply idealistic and markedly impulsive. Attached to the American Peace Commission in a minor capacity, he had made a special trip to Russia to clarify American relations with the Bolsheviks. He had returned with proposals which were not ideal but which neverthelss offered the most favorable opportunity yet extended to the Western Powers for honorably extracting themselves from the military intervention in Russia. When he returned Wilson and Lloyd George publicly denied all responsibility for his journey. Angered by this reception and disillusioned by the treaty itself, he wrote a scorching letter of criticism to Wilson and a letter of resignation to Secretary Lansing.

Bullitt visited Lansing at the Hôtel de Crillon on May 19, 1919, the day after his resignation had been accepted. Bullitt elaborated on the reasons for his resignation, saying he could not accept a treaty based upon injustice. Lansing explained he would not comment on the resignation since it was a matter of Bullitt's own conscience. Bullitt then answered he knew Lansing must feel strongly about the treaty, but understood the Secretary's position forbade any further comment.\^60
Later that year Bullitt received a subpoena from the Lodge Committee. Eager to testify, he took the stand on Friday, September 12, 1919 and offered to read from contemporary notes apparently taken after confidential conversations in Paris. William Bullitt's testimony was sensational. He told the Senate Committee during their May 19 conversation Secretary Lansing had admitted "many parts of the Treaty [were] thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the League of Nations"; the League as constituted was entirely "useless"; the "powers had simply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves"; and the American people would "unquestionably" defeat the treaty if they "ever understand what it lets them in for." 61 He placed the vacationing Secretary of State on the defensive. The domestic and foreign press headlined the testimony, and the New York Sun reported at least one "Democratic leader, who would not permit his name to be used," questioned the wisdom of continuing Lansing's tenure as Secretary. The witty Georges Clemenceau, wounded by an assassin during the Peace Conference, reportedly remarked: "I got my bullet at the Conference, but Lansing got his afterward." 62

The press apparently contacted Lansing at Henderson Harbor the evening after Bullitt's presentation. The Secretary had no public comment but privately recorded in his desk diary Bullitt "outrageously repeated confidential interview with me in garbled form." 62 Perhaps to cool his temper,
Lansing left the following morning for the Galoos to fish with the P.K. That same day, Saturday, Acting Secretary of State William Phillips wired Lansing everyone in Washington, including the press corps, thought Bullitt's conduct reprehensible. Phillips suggested some kind of public statement be issued denouncing the testimony. On Monday Lansing returned to Henderson Harbor and, after reading Phillips' telegram, telephoned the Acting Secretary for further information. He was told President Wilson's personal representative in the Senate, Nebraska's Gilbert Monell Hitchcock, believed Silence was Lansing's best course unless he issued an absolute denial of Bullitt's entire statement. Mindful of the impact the affair might have upon the treaty's ratification and unable to make such a denial, Lansing later wired Phillips he would make no public statement, at least not until he received advice from the President. 63

The following Tuesday Lansing presented his case to President Wilson, who by then was somewhere west of the Mississippi River on his famous tour to gain public support for the Treaty of Versailles. 64 Through the Department of State Lansing telegraphed Wilson his version of the May 19 interview saying he told Bullitt "I recognized that certain features of the treaty were bad as I presumed most every one did, but that was probably unavoidable in view of conflicting claims and that nothing ought to be done to prevent the speedy restoration of peace by signing the treaty." 65 Lansing
offered to make a public explanation along these lines, but could not make an absolute denial. As later recorded in his memoir on the Peace Negotiations, Lansing believed

> it is very easy to see how by making a record of one side of this conversation without reference to the other side and by omitting the context, entirely changed the meaning of what was said. My attitude was, and I intended to show it at the time, that the Treaty should be signed and ratified at the earliest possible moment because the restoration of peace was paramount and that any provision in the Treaty which might delay the peace, by making uncertain senatorial consent to ratification, was to be deplored.66

Meanwhile newspapermen aboard the presidential train had called Bullitt's testimony to Wilson's attention, but the President made no immediate comment. Then, probably on September 17, came Secretary Lansing's telegram. The President was profoundly distressed. "My God!," he cried out to Joseph P. Tumulty his personal secretary, "I did not think it was possible for Lansing to act this way." According to the biased memoir of Tumulty, Wilson is reported as declaring:

> Were I in Washington I would at once demand his resignation! That kind of disloyalty must not be permitted to go unchallenged for a single minute. The testimony of Bullitt is a confirmation of the suspicions I have had with reference to this individual. I found the same attitude of mine on the part of Lansing on the other side [of the Atlantic]. . . . But they were only suspicions. . . . But here in his own statement is a verification . . . of everything I suspected.67

As nothing but a flat denial would help correct the impression left by Bullitt, and as Lansing had to admit the testimony contained some degree of truth, a labored public explanation
would only made matters worse. The President did not give Lansing the authorization to issue a statement; hence none could be issued. In fact Wilson did not even reply to the Secretary's telegram. As the press waited upon Lansing, likewise Lansing waited upon the President. Silence was the only reward for the patient. "Conversational temptations mean nothing to Secretary Lansing," jested the exasperated editors of the Washington Star. "When the Secretary fishes, he fishes."67

The Bullitt Affair reverberated across the country and even throughout Europe. At home foes of the League of Nations were jubilant. Whatever ground Wilson may have laboriously won thus far on his western tour was not partially lost, perhaps wholly lost. "I am convinced," Tumulty recalled, "that only the President's illness a few days later prevented an immediate demand on his part for the resignation of Mr. Lansing."69 It is irrelevant whether or not Tumulty exaggerated Wilson's irritation, since on September 26, 1919, the President of the United States did indeed take ill. It would be over four months before he was again capable of demanding anyone's resignation.

V

Back in Washington after the sudden cancellation of his western tour, President Woodrow Wilson suffered a possible cerebral thrombosis. The illness paralyzed the left side of
his body but his mind was not permanently damaged; he remained prostrate for at least the month of October, unable to perform most of his official duties for several months thereafter. The President's wife, Edith Bolling Gate Wilson, and his physician, Admiral Cary Travers Grayson, did not reveal the full extent of this illness to the public nor to the Cabinet since they apparently feared such knowledge would result in attempts to declare Wilson incapable of continuing in office. In this decision they placed personal loyalties above the national interest in the belief Wilson's will to live depended upon awaiting executive duties.  

In this unprecedented situation Robert Lansing assumed the responsibility for taking emergency action. Upon Lansing's return from upstate New York on September 29, Joseph Tumulty informed him Wilson was near a nervous collapse and could not conduct any official business. The following Thursday evening, October 2, the day of the President's massive attack, the Secretary telephoned Grayson to determine if Wilson could receive the visiting King and Queen of Belgium. Grayson replied the illness was "bad" and the state visit was impossible. The next morning Lansing decided to seek first-hand information at the White House.

In response to the Secretary's questions, the "nervously excited" and very much depressed Tumulty replied Wilson was much worse; he "pointed to [his] left side significantly." Understanding from this gesture that the President had suffered a stroke paralyzing his left side, Lansing
decided to speak to Doctor Grayson personally. The three men entered the cabinet room on the State Floor and conferred for about an hour on the medical and political crisis now facing the administration. 71

A degree of controversy surrounds this conference. According to Tumulty, Lansing stated Wilson was incapacitated within the meaning of the Constitution and suggested the Vice President, Thomas Riley Marshall, assume the executive powers. Responding to Tumulty's question, Lansing intimated either Grayson or Tumulty should accept the responsibility for certifying Wilson disabled. In his memoirs, the President's personal secretary asserted he then angrily refused to have any part in such actions "while Woodrow Wilson is lying . . . on the broad of his back" and both he and Grayson flatly stated they "would stand together and repudiate" any attempts to oust their leader on medical grounds. Lansing on several occasions denied Tumulty's account of the conference. He claimed he had no thought of anyone superceding the President, but merely raised the question for consideration. 72

Lansing's questions about the vice-presidential assumption of powers should not have surprised Tumulty or Grayson. With his legalistic mind it was natural for the Secretary to think of maintaining executive leadership during the current emergency. The press carried exaggerated rumors about the President's condition--some charging syphilis,
contracted in Paris, had produced insanity—and some con-
gressmen demanded an investigation. Tumulty and Grayson's
opposition, however, persuaded Lansing to postpone the ques-
tion of inability. The three men agreed instead the Cab-
inet should be consulted on the general political situation.
Tumulty wanted an immediate session, but Lansing feared a
hasty summons would unduly excite the press and Capital Hill.
Perhaps he also believed time would reveal the extent of Wil-
son's incapacity to function.

The actual calling of the Cabinet by Robert Lansing
was an unprecedented step. Sent from the White House, the
summons remains the only one in American history issued in
the name of the Secretary of State. Understanding the unique-
ness of the situation, Lansing explained the notice to Sec-
retary of War Newton Diehl Baker that same day and to Secre-
tary of the Interior Franklin Knight Lane the following Sat-
urday. Both department chiefs agreed with Lansing's deci-
sion.

The first extra-legal Cabinet sat on Monday, October
6, 1919, in its usual chamber one floor below the desperately
ill President. Wilson's chair was empty when Lansing
opened the session. According to the memoirs of Secretary
of Agriculture David Franklin Houston, Lansing posed two
questions. First, who should decide if the President were
able to perform his duties and, second, should the Cabinet
carry on the executive functions. Although Thomas Marshall
was not officially discussed, the Vice President might have
been the subject of conversation before or after the two hour gathering. Both Tumulty and Grayson appeared before the group to report on Wilson's physical condition, and the Admiral assured the department chiefs the President had improved over the weekend. He would not, however, predict when the crisis—described as indigestion followed by a nervous breakdown—would be over.  

Although he did not question the doctor, the Secretary of State was dissatisfied with Grayson's report. He decided the doctor was "carefully avoiding giving any definite information," and wondered if the illness were now being minimized or if Tumulty had originally exaggerated the medical crisis. Houston conjectured later Lansing probably had planned to discuss temporary duties for Marshall, but the doctor's optimistic words made such a proposal inopportune.

During the following months the Cabinet sat at regular intervals, weekly at first, and then, at the suggestion of Postmaster General Albert Sidney Burleson, twice a week. After each session the Secretary of State prepared a summary of the discussions and sent it to the President's office. According to Grayson's statement at the first meeting, Wilson knew the Cabinet was meeting without his authorization and most likely he knew of subsequent conferences. Edith Wilson had not protested, thus tacitly accepting the meetings as necessary. Lansing later defended the sessions as vital to reassure public opinion the executive branch of government still functioned and to forestall congressional investigations.
Tumulty equally used the sitting of Cabinet as proof of near-normal conditions at the White House.77

During Wilson's illness Edith Wilson determined the nature and timing of the official business which reached her husband. This was also a time of cabinet government and departmental autonomy. As a group the departmental chiefs discussed policy for dealing with such problems as Attorney General Alexander Michell Palmer's fear of a worldwide Bolshevik menace and the demands of the United Mine Workers under John Llwellyn Lewis for a sixty per cent wage boost. Nevertheless, in terms of most executive functions, each of the several secretaries ran their own departments by either following already established policies or by initiating new courses under their own authority. In terms of the United States relations with the Republic of Mexico, Robert Lansing exercised such autonomy of action; as a result he nearly involved the nation in a second war with Mexico and, in turn, made his own dismissal a certainty.

Robert Lansing never saw the President during the entire period of illness, not even after Wilson recovered sufficiently to receive briefly a few official guests. In fact Mrs. Wilson indicated the Secretary was not a welcomed guest on the Executive Mansion's second floor. These factors encouraged Lansing to operate his Department on his own judgments. He kept written communications with the President to a minimum since the responses he received either came from
Tumulty or Mrs. Wilson, and naturally he wondered if they had even consulted the President. 78

The best illustration of Lansing's autonomy was his conduct of the Jenkins Affair with Mexico. Property and oil disputes since 1917 had intensified the already strained relations with Venustiano Carranza's government in Mexico. This smoldering fire finally flared in late October of 1919 when an American Consular Agent, William Oscar Jenkins, was kidnapped at Pueblo and held for ransom by rebels attempting to discredit the Carranza régime. Three days later, on October 26, the rebels released Agent Jenkins because of his poor health. That same day, however, local Mexican officials arrested him on the charge of collusion with the outlaws. Lansing considered the charge unsubstantiated but Jenkins, a part-time consular employee, could not claim diplomatic immunity. The outcry in the American press and in Congress forced Lansing to issue a number of increasingly sharp notes to the Carranza Government urging Jenkins' release. Mexican nationalism, dislike for the United States, and Mexican federalism, however, made it difficult for Carranza to comply with Lansing's demands. 79

Aware of the rising tide of resentment in the United States and of demands for armed intervention, Robert Lansing pursued a firm policy in the Jenkins Affair. He considered the case as merely another in a series of difficulties with Mexico and while he hoped to avoid a premature ultimatum,
the Secretary thought military force might be necessary. The Cabinet discussed the crisis on November 18; Lane and Burleson approved drastic measures while Baker, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, and Secretary of Labor William Bau'chop Wilson were opposed. Nevertheless, the Department of State prepared for any eventuality and alerted the War and Navy Departments.80

At this juncture, Lansing freed himself from the Cabinet's restraining influence and adopted stronger measures to force a speedy resolution of the Jenkins matter. He cancelled the Cabinet Meeting scheduled for November 28, saying he was not ready to discuss the situation. This action disturbed Daniels and he urged Lansing to wait until the case could be thoroughly investigated. Secretary Baker apparently had told Daniels Lansing admitted before one Cabinet meeting "if we go into Mexico it will settle our difficulties [of domestic radicalism and labor unrest] here" at home. Lansing may have believed a foreign crisis would intensify American patriotism, but no conclusive evidence indicates he deliberately sought an American-Mexican war for this end.81 Lansing's personal records and letters for this period instead reveal him attempting to prevent war with Mexico. His threats would hopefully impress on Carranza the seriousness of the situation in the eyes of the American people; the prolonged series of Mexican irritants had to be brought to an end soon. Lansing wanted to make the Jenkins Affair the turning point in the two nations' relations, either by a
reversal of Carranza's policy toward the United States or, if need be, by war. 82

On November 28, Secretary Lansing called the Mexican Ambassador, Ygnacio Bonillas, to the Department for an interview. Lansing threatened war if the Jenkins Affair and other diplomatic disputes were not satisfactorily settled. If war came, Lansing remarked, "it would be carried through to the end with all the power of this nation." The Ambassador left the Secretary's office "white with rage." Lansing later recorded he considered the episode merely a diplomatic ploy intended to settle the crisis, rather than a threat to provoke war. "If my interview with Bonillas," he wrote,

does not bring Carranza and his advisers to their senses, nothing will. It seemed to me a last resort to get the Mexicans to change their policy and prevent an explosion in Congress and the adoption of drastic demands for action. Bellicose as was my manner and language during the interview, it was really intended to prevent war. 83

Congressional opinion generally supported Lansing's firm policy. The Secretary conferred with Senator Albert Bacon Fall, a leader of the group favoring drastic measures toward Mexico, on December 1, and the Senator approved the actions taken thus far. No one, however, had consulted the White House on the Jenkins Affair, and Lansing recorded in his desk diary during December that he was "in some doubt whether Pres[iden]t [Wilson] will like it when he learns of it. I am right, so I don't care." 84
With this determined attitude, Lansing appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee later that week to give testimony on a resolution introduced by Senator Fall. This intended joint resolution supported the Secretary's Mexican policy and, second, called for the severance of diplomatic relations with the Carranza Government. On December 4, Lansing thanked the committee for its support but indicated the second part of the resolution was unnecessary and premature. Responding to a question from Chairman Henry Cabot Lodge, Lansing admitted his autonomous action and said he had not consulted Wilson on Mexico since the previous September. The Jenkins case now became a domestic political issue. 85

Most Republicans on the committee used Lansing's testimony in attacking Wilson's ability to conduct his presidential duties. Senators Fall and Lodge, responding to pressures for a congressional investigation into Wilson's health, appointed a special subcommittee of two to call upon Wilson personally and question him on American-Mexican relations. The White House staff, of course, became embittered over the primary motive behind this request for an interview and, especially, over Lansing's role in precipitating it. Joe Tumulty telephoned Lansing and expressed his and Mrs. Wilson's annoyance over the forthcoming visit. Tumulty's words revealed doubts as to the President's state of recovery; Lansing began wondering if Wilson were still capable of
comprehending even the most basic problems presented for his consideration. If Wilson were as well as Grayson kept stating in his press releases, Lansing replied, "it would be difficult to excuse a refusal" to see the subcommittee.86

Protocol forced the Secretary of State to prepare a memorandum on the Mexican crisis for Wilson's information; thus the White House had an opportunity to reject and repudiate Lansing's past actions in the name of the President of the United States. The memorandum sent to Wilson on December 5 deemphasized the crisis. Lansing explained he had tried to divert the attention of Fall and others from more serious Mexican events to the Jenkins Affair because the latter "could not possibly" result in diplomatic rupture or war.87 Fortunately for Lansing, the crisis ended when Wilson successfully received the visiting Republican Senator Albert Fall and Democratic Senator Gilbert Hitchcock on December 6, and when during the conference news dramatically arrived of Agent Jenkins' release on bail.88

Woodrow Wilson's apparent recovery gave rise to press rumors the President would soon demand the Secretary's resignation for his independent action. Although Lansing denied these rumors as "absurd," his handling of the crisis and his failure to consult with Wilson undoubtedly strained their relationship beyond reconciliation.89 Lansing's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about his autonomous actions was politically unwise. He believed,
however, Wilson was unable to perform the constitutionally required duties of the presidency, and, in his bitterness over past White House slights, perhaps he consciously tried to precipitate a congressional investigation. He felt Grayson was protecting Wilson from all mental exertion and concealing the truth about his condition from the public. Such secrecy must be ended, it was undemocratic; the American people have a right to know the truth about their President. If the White House did not choose to inform the public voluntarily, then a thorough investigation by Congress was both understandable and reasonable.

VI

Opposing the 1916 peace attempts, different views on the nature of American post-war foreign policy, personality and ideological clashes at Paris, the testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August of 1919, the Bullitt Affair, the American-Mexican crisis over the Jenkins Affair, as well as a general deterioration of the mutual respect the two men originally held for each other, combined to convince President Woodrow Wilson he no longer needed Robert Lansing's assistance in managing the Department of State. The Jenkins Affair undoubtedly served as the catalyst behind resignation even though the actual event did not occur until two months after the White House conference on Mexican
affairs. During these two months Lansing knew the end of his public service career was near; he waited quietly. He decided not to resign immediately since such an action, if accepted "with the profoundest of regrets," would prohibit him from presenting to the American public his explanation for his past actions.90 Yet as Lansing waited for Wilson to act, the President also waited upon his Secretary. Finally, in early February, Wilson tried to insult Lansing into resignation.

In January of 1920 Wilson compiled a list of diplomatic appointments which even the devoted Tumulty called "terrible." Third Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, for example, appeared as a nominee for a Switzerland post in which he had no interest. Then, on February 3, Mrs. Wilson stunned Lansing by announcing the President was nominating Arthur Hugh Frazier for the Swiss post. Frazier, while in the diplomatic service at Paris, had aroused Lansing's dislike with his arrogant behavior and his association with the Colonel House "clique." Frazier subsequently resigned from the foreign service for personal reasons, and when he applied for readmission Lansing personally refused his request. The nomination of Frazier thus became a personal affront to Lansing and threatened to damage the morale of the professional foreign service personnel. Lansing sent protests to Grayson and the President, but no letter of resignation.91

Finally, on February 7, 1920, President Wilson conceded the waiting game to Robert Lansing. In a startling and
unheralded letter to the Secretary of State, Wilson chose the weakest of all possible rationales. "My dear Mr. Secretary," he began,

is it true, as I have been told, that during my illness you have frequently called the heads of the executive departments of the Government into conference? If it is, I feel it my duty to call to your attention . . . [that] under our constitutional laws . . . no one but the President has the right to summon the heads of the executive departments into conference. . . ."

Lansing could not believe what he read. Of all the justifications available to the President Lansing's calling of the Cabinet obviously would delight Wilson's critics; it supported their charges of Wilson's emotional inability to conduct the duties of his office. The American people knew Wilson was aware of the Cabinet meetings.

On the following Monday, Lansing's reply admitted the charge was true, and explained the "mutual benefit" Cabinet officials gained from the practice. The Secretary concluded his letter by stating if Wilson believed he had "failed in my loyalty to you, . . . I am of course ready, Mr. President, to relieve you of any embarrassment by placing my resignation in your hands."93 Wilson replied on Wednesday he was "very much disappointed" with the explanation, finding nothing in it "which justifies your assumption of Presidential authority. . . ." "The affair," he explained,

. . . only deepens a feeling that was growing upon me. While we were still in Paris, I felt, and have felt increasingly ever since, that you
accepted my guidance and direction on questions with regard to which I had to instruct you only with increasing reluctance, and since my return to Washington I have been struck by the number of matters in which you have apparently tried to fore-stall my judgement by formulating action and merely asking my approval when it was impossible for me to form an independent judgment because I had not had an opportunity to examine the circumstances with any degree of independence.

"With the kindiest feeling," Wilson accepted the Secretary's offer of resignation. The next day Lansing had "the honor ... to tender you my resignation as Secretary of State, the same to take effect at your convenience." The President accepted the offer on Friday, February 13, 1920, an acceptance which took "effect at once."

Robert Lansing had contemplated resignation many times since January of 1919. For the last several months he had only waited for the proper opportunity. He remained at this post primarily because of a sense of duty to country, party, and the office of the presidency. He sincerely tried to secure approval of the peace treaty and to continue the functions of the Department of State during the President's illness despite personal insults from the White House and growing criticisms from the press. When he finally left the State, War and Navy Building that Friday afternoon, he felt he had remained loyal to his high trust—he believed he had served well the American people, his office, the presidency, and his family heritage of public service. This self-pride was all that mattered. By now Robert Lansing cared little about the opinions of Woodrow Wilson.
CONCLUSION

The forced resignation of Secretary of State Robert Lansing produced sensational headlines throughout the United States. The editorial consensus denounced the President's actions and generally supported Lansing's calling of extra-constitutional Cabinet meetings and praised his patriotic motives for not resigning during the critical yet personally humiliating months at Paris. "The President's action," declared the New York Evening Globe, "... can only be described as an amazing error... there can be no question of the injustice of the President's attack. ..." While the Syracuse Journal called the resignation Woodrow Wilson's "biggest blunder," the Los Angeles Times predicted it would be "Wilson's last mad act" before Congress investigated his mental competency. The Kansas City Star regarded "the President's position as indicative of an autocracy such as was never before enthroned in the White House," and a Connecticut editor maintained Wilson's correspondence with Lansing prior to the dismissal revealed "an hysteria ... which does not speak well for the future of the administration."¹

Public opinion attacked the method used to force the resignation more than it lamented the loss of the Secretary
of State. "The surprise and indignation of the country," explained The Outlook, "have not been aroused by the request for resignation, but by the manner in which the request was made and the temperamental condition of the President which the request reveals."² Although personally satisfied with the general editorial reaction to the event, Robert Lansing faced some severe critics. Most liberals held a poor opinion of the former Secretary; they believed he had been a conventional and imperialistic diplomat whose policies reacted to events rather than acted positively to create better international harmony. Liberals admitted he probably could have negotiated a better and more consistent peace than the Treaty of Versailles; nevertheless they accused him of hypocrisy for not resigning in January of 1919 when he realized irreconcilable differences separated his principles from the President's. The conservatives felt Lansing was not strong enough; he should have pressed for a more vigorous policy against Germany and Mexico.³

Lansing himself did not seem to mind the dismissal. "I am a very contented and happy man these days," he wrote one friend in late February, 1920, "for I am freed from an impossible situation and from a load of responsibilities which had become almost unbearable."⁴ "It was my good fortune," he told a second friend, "that the matter was raised in the way that it was, as it gave me a remarkable opportunity to lay the true facts before my countrymen."⁵
This was what Lansing did when he released to the press his correspondence with the President leading to the resignation, and this is what he did the following year when he published a brief memoir justifying his actions and programs at the Paris Peace Conference. *The Peace Negotiations*, supplemented by a study of *The Big Four of the Peace Conference*, created a sensation. These monographs "certainly . . . 'stirred the menagerie up'. It is a good deal like feeding time in the circus." They achieved what Lansing intended; from the caustic comments of reviewers, they "apparently . . . got under the skin of some of the most ardent admirers of Mr. Wilson." 6

Robert Lansing undertook other writing projects following his resignation, including an extended memoir of his tenure as Secretary of State. When he died eight years later, however, the manuscript remained largely uncompleted. He never had time to give it the effort it deserved since his law firm required as much attention as his failing health permitted. As his family heritage demanded, he also managed to continue his community service activities within his busy schedule. 7

At Lansing's request, Solicitor Lester Hood Woolsey left the Department of State in April of 1920 and became the junior member in the partnership of Lansing and Woolsey. Their office at Eight Jackson Place, Washington, D.C., had from the first more potential clients than it could accept.
Announcements of the firm's organization were sent to every citizen who had filed a claim against the German Government for losses in the war and to every attorney in the city. They received over seven thousand inquiries in response. Soon the firm received more prestigious clients. Lansing, between 1920 and 1925, served as counsel for the legations of Chile, Persia, Finland, Poland, and China; he advised Chile in the famous Tacna-Arica arbitration as well as the Chinese delegation to the League of Nations; and he acted as legal adviser for China at the Washington Naval Conference. His personal and corporate clients included both Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, foreign minister and acting prime minister of China, and the United Fruit Company. His services for China prompted President Hsu Shih Chang to confer upon Lansing the "Insignia of the First Class of the Order of Chia-Ho with the Grand Cordon," as the highest award China could bestow upon a foreigner, it had never before been given to an American.

By 1925 Lansing withdrew from an active role in the partnership and entered retirement. His health had been poor since 1919 and now his physician, Sterling Ruffin, demanded he take a complete rest. The new insulin treatment seemed to ease his diabetes for a time (see Appendix B); nevertheless the patient grew steadily weaker. He spent the summer of 1928 in Henderson Harbor as usual, but this year he did not go fishing with the Phortnightly Klub. In early October
he returned to Washington only to undergo an attack of myocarditis. He had suffered from this diabetic-caused heart condition for several years, but only now was the illness pronounced serious. His wife requested his two sisters to come to the capital, and the three women were present in the old house on Eighteenth Street on Tuesday, October 30, 1928, when Robert Lansing suffered a final attack.

Secretary of State Frank Kellogg led governmental officials and the diplomatic corps to Thursday services at the Lansing home, and on Friday a special funeral train carried the New Yorker back to Watertown. Five hundred residents crowded the First Presbyterian Church for a final farewell, and the stores closed as the deceased was interred in the family's Brookside Cemetery. Although the nation's press reported these events, and although hundreds of obituaries were written, Robert Lansing's death prompted few if any eulogies. This was fitting for a man of Lansing's modest personality. The myth of Robert Lansing as President Wilson's highly-placed "law clerk" had already been accepted by the American public.

As Counselor and as Secretary of State Lansing's policies were founded upon his conception of American national interest. Yet considerations of national security and economic expansion clearly involved ideological factors as well. As a product of the American democratic experience, he believed democracy and its institutions were unalterably
in conflict with aggressive and amoral autocracies. If the latter—whether in the form of a German conspiracy or Bolshevism—were not checked, the United States would be compelled to abandon its traditional way of life and adopt heavy peace-time armaments. If this occurred individual liberties would be curtailed and the very foundations of American democratic institutions undermined. During his first weeks as Secretary, Lansing established eight policies he felt were necessary to meet the challenge to national security afforded by the European war. These policies were successfully translated into concrete actions and results.

In evaluating his role and achievements, this history concludes the United States profited by having as Secretary of State a statesman capable of surveying the broader scene and acting on a reasoned course designed to promote the national interest—never his personal interest. American entry into the Great War must be seen as Lansing's most successful policy: Imperial Germany was defeated, a structure of power favorable to the United States was established, and democracy appeared to be universally triumphant. That the post-war leaders in Europe and in the United States wasted the fruits of victory and allowed, if not abetted, the rise of new ideological and military menaces, was in no way the fault of Lansing or his eight objectives. Perfection and omniscience are not required of statesmen; rather they should possess a measure of realistic vision and the courage to act. Lansing met these requirements. Of
the policies he considered prime objectives during his tenure in office, all were fulfilled. In the evaluation of posterity Robert Lansing deserves better than he has received.
APPENDIX A

GENELOGICAL TABLES

TABLE I: DESCENDANTS OF GERRIT FREDERICKSE LANSINGH

TABLE II: DESCENDANTS OF JOHN WATSON FOSTER
TABLE I
DISCENDANTS OF GERRIT FREDERICKE LANSING

Jacob J. Lansing

Jacob C. Ten Eyck

Jacob Catherine Sanders Abraham John Gerrett


Edwin Dodge Jerusha Sterling

John Maria Ley Dodge

Eleanor Foster—Robert Edwin Dodge Emma Sterling Katharin Ten Eyck
(1864-1928) (1867-1870) (1872-1956) (1875-1933)
TABLE II
DESCENDANTS OF JOHN WATSON FOSTER

John Watson Foster — Mary Parke

Robert Lansing — Eleanor          Edith — Allen Macy Dulles

John Foster  Allen Watson  Eleanor Lansing
APPENDIX B

ROBERT LANSING'S HEALTH

Since the early 1890's Robert Lansing suffered from the metabolic disease diabetes mellitus. He apparently never told anyone outside of his family until the last years of his life, perhaps because of the socio-religious stigma popularly attached with the disease. Many Americans before the Great War still considered the illness as penance for original sin, for "mortification of the flesh," since most diabetics were males who were sexually impotent. Perhaps for this reason, Bert and Eleanor Lansing never had children.¹

The disease appears to have developed several years before being diagnosed. As a young man in Watertown, Lansing developed an unusual physical dependency upon strong, black coffee, and he reportedly consumed over three pots per day of this insulin stimulating drink. He never drank liquor, except for an occasional beer, with the Phortnightly Klub on their trips to Galloo Island. It was not until the 1890's, however, before Lansing experienced his first attack.² In this era before the discovery of the hormone insulin by Sir Frederick Grant Banting and associates in
1922, the only treatment was dietary. Lansing must have been on a diet similar to the one developed by the Italian physician Arnoldo Cantani in the second half of the nineteenth century. Under such a treatment the patient ate only lean meat and various fats. In milder cases, such as Lansing's, eggs, liver, and shellfish were allowed. The total food intake was strictly limited; Cantani, for example, allowed his patients about one pound of cooked meat per day, and for twenty-four hours each week the patient would be expected to fast.³

The demands of Washington social life, however, would not allow strict compliance to the Cantani diet. Lansing once remarked that

my own experience was that dining out was one of the pleasantest forms of relaxation. After a day of strain and anxiety at the Department of State where a multitude of perplexing questions compelled intensive mental labor, nothing was more diverting to the mind than to sit at a table with an entertaining company of friends. Cares and troubles were forgotten under the stimulus of lively conversation.⁴

Although these occasions were often business-oriented, Lansing's metabolism could not take the strain. Beginning with December 1, 1915, and ending with March 10, 1916, a period of about one hundred days, Lansing's personal Desk Diary revealed he and his wife attended fifty-five dinners and gave eight. Considering they never accepted invitations on Sundays, the possible evenings spent dining at home when they might have gone out was only twenty-two out of eighty-
five nights. Well over half of their non-Sundays were thus spent away from a controlled diet.\textsuperscript{5}

The result of such a schedule brought on a mild attack of ill health. March 14, 1916 Lansing left Washington to spend ten days at the central North Carolina golfing resort of Pinehurst. With his return on March 23, the Secretary of State heard of the unannounced sinking of the unarmed, French, cross-channel passenger ship Sussex by Central Power torpedos. This violation of the September, 1915, "Arabic Pledge" precipitated a German-American crisis that prevented Lansing from taking proper care of his health. When the Sussex crisis quieted, in May of 1916, Lansing was deathly ill.

Upon the "demands" of his personal physician, Dr. Sterling Ruffin of Washington, the Secretary agreed to undergo an extensive treatment provided it would be administered at his home and not in a hospital. On Thursday, May 18, 1916, Lansing started the dietary program developed in 1914 by Dr. Frederick Madison Allen of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. Its principle remained systematic undernutrition. Under the Allen method, a patient first fasted for several days. He then was placed on a diet sharply limited in carbohydrates, fats, and proteins. For the next nine days, the patient was allowed to eat sixty-four calories on the first day and increasing to five hundred four on the last. The tenth day became a fast day, as did
one in each seven days thereafter until the treatment ended. The patient would have one hundred fifty-one calories on the eleventh day, with this number increasing every twenty-four hours until he had reached one thousand thirty calories. After thirty-four days of treatment, the patient was discharged sugar-free. For a more filling effect, much of the food would be prepared in bran flower and talcum powder. In a few cases, patients had actually died from starvation under the Allen diet.⁶

Lansing's disease and therefore his treatment, fortunately, was not that severe. For three days he received no food at all. On the fourth day, May 21, he consumed five ounces of green vegetables; on the next day, he had eight ounces of vegetables and one egg. By the seventh day, he had increased his intake to fifteen ounces of vegetables, three eggs, and two ounces of meat. During the period between May 18 and June 6, a period of twenty days, this diet continued. His doctor denied him work and exercise of any form for the first two weeks. During the third week, however, he went to the Department three times, but for less than two hours on each occasion. On the sixteenth day, Lansing was allowed to travel to Watertown to make an important address, but Dr. Ruffin attended him during the sojourn. When he returned to work, on June 6, 1916, he felt better but he had lost some seventeen pounds. In the classic symptomatology of his illness, at this juncture Lansing
now received his first pair of eyeglasses.\textsuperscript{7}

His health would soon return to him, especially after a four week holiday in upstate New York beginning the following month.\textsuperscript{8} But throughout his service as Counselor and as Secretary of State Lansing was not a well man. By 1918, he had developed neuritis, an inflammation of the nerves which caused him cramp-like pains, loss of reflexes, and muscular atrophy in the lower extremities;\textsuperscript{9} by 1924, rheumatism in his arms and shoulders and a decaying of his teeth could also be traced to his diabetes.\textsuperscript{10} After 1922, however, he began to have a few carbohydrates in his diet since he became one of the first in the United States to receive insulin treatments. Nevertheless when Robert Lansing died, in October of 1928, this too was associated with the disease which had been "the veritable millstone about my neck" for over a quarter of a century.\textsuperscript{11}
APPENDIX C

PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS OF ROBERT LANSING'S INCUMBENCY

In 1924 Robert Lansing answered a seventeen part questionnaire pertaining to his tenure as Secretary of State. His five page, typed response, entitled "Biographical Data of Robert Lansing," is preserved in the Lansing Papers at the Library of Congress. Part fifteen is here reproduced for the first time. Lansing had been asked to indicate the principal concerns he had dealt with while Secretary of State, and his answer remains a subject of historical interest since the particular items which he included—as well as those which he excluded—offer insight into Lansing's own conception of what the Department of State's priorities were during the period from June, 1915 to February, 1920.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF ROBERT LANSING

....

15. Indicate in captions the principal questions which came up under his incumbency.

1. The LUSITANIA case.
2. The rights of neutrals and belligerents with respect to neutral trade in time of war.
3. Submarine warfare.
4. Censorship of the mails.
5. Carrying on contraband.
7. Rights of the United States as a neutral to trade in munitions of war with belligerents.
8. The Pan American Conference on Mexico, 1915.
9. The Occupation of Haiti.
10. The British Blacklist.
11. Enforcement of Blockades.
13. Arming of Merchant Ships
14. The SUSSEX Case.
15. Peace Overtures of President Wilson

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16. The Severance of Diplomatic Relations with Germany.
17. The Zimmerman Telegram.
19. Negotiation of treaty for purchase of the Danish West Indies.
20. The Entrance of the United States into the War against Germany.
22. Russia and the Root Mission.
23. Latin America and the War.
24. Regulations of the distribution of supplies to neutral countries contiguous to Germany.
25. Crisis in relations with Mexico, due to Pershing's expedition.
29. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement.
30. The Bolsheviks and the Russian Revolution.
31. The publication of sensational messages between the German Government and its representatives, which had been intercepted by the Department of State.
32. War with Austria-Hungary.
33. Turkish and Bulgarian relations.
34. Recognition of Polish Nationality.
35. The Problem of submerged nationalities.
36. Siberia and the Trans-Siberian Railway.
37. The campaign of propaganda for Democracy in the Central Empires.
38. Negotiations leading up to the Armistice.
40. The American Commission to Negotiate Peace.
41. Member of the Council of Ten at the Peace Conference.
42. Chairman of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties.
43. The Senate's Hearings on the Treaty of Versailles and the testimony of William C. Bullitt.
44. The President's illness during the national strike of coal miners.
45. The visits to the United States of the King and Queen of the Belgians, of the Prince of Wales, and of the Prince of Udine.
46. The Meetings of the Cabinet in the absence of the President because of illness.
47. The difficulty of transacting the business of the Department of State without free access to the President.
48. Controversy with Mexico over the kidnapping for ransom of American Consul Jenkins.
49. The decision to resign during the President's illness when it became evident that the President was willing to assume the responsibility for the retirement.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AHR</td>
<td>The American Historical Review</td>
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<td>AJIL</td>
<td>The American Journal of International Law</td>
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Lansing Papers, Princeton
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Lansing-Wilson Letters, NA
"Personal and Confidential" Letters from Secretary of State Lansing to President Wilson, 1915-1918. Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memoranda of the Secretary of State. General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59. National Archives. (Preliminary Inventory 157. Entry 875.)

Memo, Lansing Papers, LC

Miscellaneous Letters, NA
Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Secretary of State. January 24, 1911-April 23, 1928. 11 volumes. Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memoranda of the Secretary of State. General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59. National Archives. (Preliminary Inventory 157. Entry 873.)

MVHR
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review

PHR
Pacific Historical Review

RL
Robert Lansing

RL, Memoir MS.

Wash.
Washington

WW
Woodrow Wilson
INTRODUCTION

1. J. W. Pratt, "Robert Lansing," The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York, 1929), X, 54. Pratt sent his manuscript to RL in 1928 for his comments. The reply is an interesting document which reflects RL's disdain for the memoirs being written by his fellow colleagues in the administration. If one "believes everything that they say is literally true, it would appear that President Wilson originated few, if any, of the policies known as 'Wilsonian';" RL to Pratt, Wash., June 24, 1928, The Papers of Robert Lansing, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Lansing Papers, LC). Also see Pratt's sketch of RL in the Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1933).


3. Samuel Flagg Bemis wrote that RL was "a political funambulator, walking the unsteady tightwire of neutrality to the end, leaving the decision to others"; a view Bemis did not think necessary to revise throughout five editions of his A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, 1965), 605.


5. Daniel M. Smith agrees with this division of historians; see his Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914-1917 (Berkeley, 1953), iii.

6. Colin Simpson, The Lusitania (Boston, 1972), 53; Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), ch. VII; and William Borchard with William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), 33. The "scholarship" of Simpson's work is correctly reviewed by Thomas A. Bailey as nonexistent; "much of the time one wonders if the book is history or hoax." See Bailey's review in AHR, LXXIX (1974), 114-15.


8. Besides his monograph, Smith has written a sketch of RL which appears in An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries

9. George Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1956-1958), I (Russia Leaves the War), 30-31: "It would be wrong to assume that Lansing's plodding meticulousness of method, his deficiency in showmanship, and his lack of personal color rendered unimportant the contribution he was capable of making to the formulation of America's response to Soviet power. Behind this façade of stuffy correctness and legal precision there lay powers of insight that might have been envied by the more boisterous natures which wartime Washington then abounded."


13 RL to James Brown Scott, Wash., April 14, 1924, Lansing Papers, LC.
CHAPTER I: LANSING OF WATERTOWN


2. The Lansing family is touched on in Beers, Vain Endeavor, 3-4; Lane, "As His Friend Know Him," Collier's, LVI (Nov. 13, 1915), 22; and J. W. Pratt, Dictionary of American Biography, ed. by D. Malone (New York, 1933), X, 609. Also see Alexander C. Flick, ed., History of the State of New York, 10 vols. (New York, 1934), V, 31-61, 112; and Claude G. Munsell, The Lansing Family: A Genealogy of the Descendants of Gerrit Frederickse Lansing... (New York, 1916), which can be obtained at the Newberry Library, Chicago. Of major value is the extensive obituary of RL in the Watertown Daily Times, Oct. 31, 1928. In the mid-1950's Professor B. F. Beers had the opportunity to conduct interviews (Vain Endeavor, ix, 190) in Watertown with the now late Miss Emma Sterling Lansing, RL's sister; Mrs. John Lansing Gill, a cousin of RL's who cared for the aged Miss Lansing; Miss Gertrude Holmer, long-standing friend of the Lansings, local Democratic leader, and teacher at Watertown High School; and Miss Nama Washburn, former secretary to Gary M. Jones, one of RL's friends. These interviews are full of useful information on the family and
Notes For Chapter I
on RL's Watertown days which can be found nowhere else. This
author is indebted to Professor Beers for the copies he so
graciously furnished. The citations are: "Interview with
Miss Emma Sterling Lansing, Watertown, New York, October 9,
1954," hereafter referred to as Beers' Interview, 1954;
"Interview with Miss Emma Sterling Lansing and Mrs. John L.
Gill, Watertown, New York, August 30, 1955," hereafter,
Beers' Interview, 1955; and "Memorandum of a Conversation with
Miss Gertrude Helmer and Miss Nana Washburn, Watertown, New

3. Beers' Interview, 1954; Lane, "As His Friends Know
Him," Collier's, LVI (Nov. 13, 1915), 22; "Diplomatic Counsellor

4. Information on Amherst is taken from the college catalog
of 1886, and from RL's previously unreleased official trans-
cript, as provided by Mr. Robert F. Grose, Registrar, Amherst
College.

5. They were Algebra, Geometry, and Trigonometry.

6. "The full worth of Latin and Greek in higher education"
is in "developing the mind"; classical study "cultivates a
taste for higher things than the sordid and practical of
daily life" (RL to Harold S. Sutton, Wash., March 8, 1915,
Lansing Papers, LC).

7. For Science, RL took Chemistry, Physics, Biology,
Botany, Physiology, and Zoology.

8. See Beers, Vain Endeavor, 5; "Diplomatic Counsellor
General," Current Opinion, LVIII (April, 1915), 240; and
Smith, Robert Lansing, 170.

9. Laurens P. Hicke, Empirical Psychology (New York, 1854),
vii; Amherst Catalog, 1886, 36.

10. RL to J. Pratt, Wash., June 24, 1928, Lansing Papers,
LC; RL, Memorandum to the Department of State, Watertown,
Jan. 1, 1914, Ibid.

11. Lane, "As His Friends Know Him," Collier's, LVI (Nov.
13, 1915), 22; but of greater value is RL, "Biographical
Data of Robert Lansing," n.d. (ca. 1924), Lansing Papers, LC.

12. The lot, No. 9 on the block of Clinton Street (s.),
Sherman Street (w.), and Mullin Street (n.), was originally
1.34 acres. The Rev. Isaac and Elisabeth Brayton built a
wood frame Georgian home on the land before 1845. On Dec. 3,
1863, John Lansing of Lansing and Sherman paid $7,000 for the
land. John added a number of rooms, raised its height by
adding a functional attic, and added a two story Bay window.
Notes For Chapter I
On the East side, and changed the architecture to Victorian. In 1897 he converted a large portion of the back lot on Mullin Street to Robert's name for building a residence. This land was later sold to Dr. Walter S. Atkinson for his own home which was built as 146 Mullin Street. At John's death, the land with a 16 foot frontage was left to his 3 children (1907), his wife having died before him. RL later deeded his rights to his two sisters who lived together until Katharine's death in 1933. Emma resided their as sole owner until she died in 1956. The estate was then purchased by Mrs. Nelle L. Poli of 137 Clinton Street in 1957, who converted it into a funeral parlor. See Watertown Daily Times, June 26, 1957; and also Beers' Interview, 1954.

13. Of the several stories told about the sisters' arrogance, one about Emma will serve as an example. It seems Emma was speaking at a meeting of the Visiting Nurse Society, held at a Mrs. Wilmot's house, a member of the nouveaux riches. While outlining the history of the local association, Emma remarked that she had given up the presidency when she went to France; then, she said, a "dreadful" thing had happened: Mrs. Wilmot had become president. Beers' Interview, 1957. Also see the Watertown Daily Times, Dec. 11, 1956.


16. Alleyne Ireland, "Lansing of the State Department," a newspaper interview of June 10, 1915, which may be found in volume III of RL's Scrapbooks, Lansing Papers, LC. In 1902 RL wrote "The Iroquois: An Essay" (address before the Phortnightly Klub, Jan., 1902, Lansing Papers, LC), which he later revised and published as "The Iroquois League of Nations," Independent, CXIII (Oct. 4, 11, 1924), 222-24, 257-59, 286-69.


18. "Ad-Interim Secretary," Literary Digest, L (June 26, 1915), 1546.

19. Ibid.; William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years (Boston, 1931), 339; William C. Redfield, With Congress and Cabinet (Garden City, 1924), 80. A number of these caricatures have survived from the period of 1919 done while RL was in Paris. They may be seen in The Papers of Robert Lansing, Manuscript Division, Princeton University Library, Princeton University (hereafter, cited as Lansing Papers, Princeton).

20. Beers' Interview, 1954. RL also made red cedar carvings during his Watertown years, see Lane, "As His Friends Know Him," Collier's, LVI (Nov. 13, 1915), 24.
Notes For Chapter I

22. It was at this juncture that John Lansing gave his son the back lot of the estate in order that he might build his own house, an example of the elder Lansing's wish for his son to remain in Watertown. See supra, n. 13.

23. Although RL's personal finances will be discussed in a different context, it should be noted that Eleanor had no source of income other than what she received from her husband.


25. Lane, "As His Friends Know Him," Collier's, LVI (Nov. 13, 1915), 23; Beers' Interview, 1955.


27. RL to Chandler P. Anderson, Watertown, March 17, 1898, The Papers of Chandler Parsons Anderson, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereafter, cited as Anderson Papers); and Lane, "As His Friends Know Him," Collier's, LVI (Nov. 13, 1915), 23.


31. Quoted in Faulkner, Politics, p. 122.

32. Ibid., 123-24; Watertown Daily Times, Oct. 31, 1928; and see the memorabilia in RL's Scrapbooks, Vol. I, Lansing Papers, LC. After the election Hill (1823-1910) served as
Notes For Chapter I
United States Senator from New York until 1897. In November of 1894, however, he did attempt to secure reelection to the governorship but was defeated by Levi Morton; The Nation commenting on this event reaffirmed its opinion that Hill was "the worst man in American politics" (LIX [Nov. 15, 1894], 351).

33. As a young man RL developed a fondness for writing. This in turn may have developed from his hobby of the etymological study of the English language. By 1915 he had read Goethe's Canterbury Tales at least four times since he found them to be helpful in mastering "clear, simple English with regard for the precise meaning of every word" (quoted in Ireland, "Lansing of State," Lansing Papers, LC). RL would periodically find it necessary to record his feelings to clarify his own mind as to the proper solution to a given problem. His "personal and Confidential Memoranda" written during the Great War are famous examples of this trait, but lesser know moments of reflection have also survived from his years in Watertown. Housed in Box 79 of the Lansing Papers, LC, are a series of short essays on "Political Questions" and "Economic Questions" from the period 1902 to 1903. The extended quotation on the Republican Party given above is from an essay in this series entitled "The Party of Obstruction," May 9, 1902.

34. Ibid. The title of this essay is thus referring to the Democrats in a positive way as "The Party of Obstruction."

35. RL, untitled and undated epigram, in his series "Political Questions," Lansing Papers, LC.

36. In the 53rd Congress, the division of party membership was as follows: Senate: Democrats, 44; Republicans, 38; Others, 3. House: Democrats, 218; Republicans, 127; Others, 11. The "Appeal of the Silver Democrats," framed by Richard P. Bland and William Jennings Bryan, was only signed by a minority of House Democrats. It should be noted in 1890 the price of silver had fallen to a ratio of 20:1 with gold. On this issue, see Richard P. Bland, "Present Status of the Silver Question," North American Review, CLXV (Oct., 1897), 475; James L. Laughlin, History of Bimetallism in the United States (New York, 1897); Gilbert C. Fite and Jim F. Reese, An Economic History of the United States (Boston, 1959), 473; Paul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss, Financial History of the United States (New York, 1952), 243-46; and William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan (Chicago, 1925), 101-02.

37. RL, "Should There Be a New Political Party?," unpublished address, April, 1895, Lansing Papers, LC. RL suggested civil service reform would be an appropriate principle to create the new political party upon.
Notes For Chapter I


40. RL, "Democracy and Republicanism in America," May 24, 1902, from his series on "Political Questions," Lansing Papers, LC.

41. Ibid.

42. Although RL's active participation in the Democratic Party did decline after 1896, this was principally a result of an expanding legal practice which required extensive traveling. In any event, little documentation exists on his activities in the national elections of 1900, 1904, and 1908.

43. RL to Jacob L. Ten Eyck, Henerson Harbor, Aug. 19, 1912, Lansing Papers, LC. Also see Ten Eyck to RL, Albany, Aug. 17, 1912, Ibid.; New York World, April 12, 1912; Watertown Daily Times, Aug. 12, 13, 1912; Watertown Standard, Aug. 10, 1912. As for RL's two friends, John N. Carlisle should not be confused with John G. Carlisle, the Kentuckian who served as Speaker of the House from 1883 to 1889; while Ten Eyck may have been a distant relation of the Lansings (see Appendix A, Table I). Scattered throughout the Lansing Papers LC are numerous letters between RL and Ten Eyck, the latter being prominent in the State party, which reveal that Ten Eyck relied heavily on RL's advice and support in matters of federal patronage.


46. There were several attempts to draft RL, but the two here referred to, in 1915 and 1920, represented members of the regular party organization. For 1915, see Jacob B. Gomez to RL, Schenectady, Nov. 8, 1915, and RL to Gomez, Wash., Nov. 10, 1915, Lansing Papers, LC. For 1920, see New York Times, Oct. 31, 1928.

47. RL, "How Our City is Governed, Containing a Discussion
Notes For Chapter I
of Municipal Ownership," unpublished address delivered at
the Boon Street Mission, Jan., 1902, Lansing Papers, LC.

48. The Democrat usually lost the race by 1000 to 1200
votes. See RL to Senator James A. O'Gorman, Wash., March 8,
1913, Ibid.

49. On the 1902 mayoral race, see the following: Beers' Interview, 1955; Watertown Daily Times, Oct. 31, 1928; Lane,
"As His Friends Know Him," Collier's, LVI (Nov. 13, 1915),
23; Beers, Vain Endeavor, 12-13.


51. The issue of trusts and combines had been a popular
topic for conversation since the capitalization of the United
States Steel Corporation in 1901, but special public interest
developed after President Theodore Roosevelt directed Attorney
General Philander C. Knox to file suit (March 10, 1902) for
dissolution of the Northern Securities Company. On this
issue see Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, A Biography
(New York, 1931), 177-85; John M. Blum, The Republican Ro-
oosevelt (New York, 1968), 119-20; and Northern Securities
Company vs. United States of America, 193 U. S. Reports
197 (1904). In reflecting upon these events, RL wrote a series
of essays in May, 1902, to clarify his own mind on such
"Economic Questions." Such reflections are based in part on
his reading of Professor Goldwin Smith's new monograph on
Commonwealth and Empire (New York: Macmillan and Company,
1902), which RL took four pages of notes from in support of
the Classical Liberal Economic view. RL's essays, found in
the Lansing Papers, LC, are: "Combination and Competition,"
of Commercialism," May 6, 1902; "Trusts and Socialism," May
7, 1902; and "Merger, Combine, Trust," May 9, 1902.

52. The course in Political Economy which RL studied at
Amherst, and in which he received such a poor grade, was
based upon The Science of Wealth (1866), a book by Amasa Walker
which accepted the Classical Liberal interpretation of econ-
omics. See Amherst College Catalog, 1886.


54. RL, "Democracy and Republicanism in America," May 24,
1902, Lansing Papers, LC. These views are similar to those
which RL expressed in an unfinished manuscript he worked on
from 1902 to 1903. Entitled "Principles of American Political
Parties" (uncompleted and unpublished MS., n.d., Lansing
Papers, LC), it was intended as a college textbook on the
history of American political parties. He abandoned the
project because by the time he had reached the era of the
Civil War, the undertaking had mushroomed into more than 400
pages divided into 12 chapters.
Notes for Chapter I

55. RL, "Combination and Competition," n.d.


57. RL, "Combination and Competition," n.d.


59. RL, "Effects of Commercialism," May 6, 1902. For the point of view of business, see the following contemporary articles: Chester M. Destler, "The Opposition of American Businessmen to Social Control During the 'Guil
ded Age,'" HVHR, XXXIX (1952-1953), 641-72; Andrew Carnegie, "The Bugaboo of
Trusts," North American Review, CXLVIII (Feb., 1889), 149; Idem.,
"Popular Illusions About Trusts," Century Magazine, LX (May,
1900), 143-49; Samuel C. T. Dodd, "The Present Legal Status

60. Whereas Veblen held the working class strove to become part of the leisure class and thus explained the nation's social stability (The Theory of the Leisure Class [New York:
Viking Press, 1899]), the others all predicted the working class might accept socialism as their governmental ideal. See the following: The Rev. Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Pos-
sible Future and Present Crisis (New York: Baker and Taylor
Company, 1885); Richard T. Ely, Monopolies and Trusts (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1900); Edward Bellamy, Looking
Backward, 2000-1887 (Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1888);
Henry D. Lloyd, Wealth Against Commonwealth (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1894).


62. Ibid.


64. RL, "Trusts," May 5, 1902.

65. Ibid.

66. RL was not alone in this conclusion. In his State of
the Union address before Congress in December of 1888, Grover
Cleveland felt that the time had come to limit the "unreason-
able economic inequality" existing between worker and privileged.
The speech is quoted in Merrill, Bourbon Leader, 136-37.


68. Much of this information cannot be documented since it is acquired through the reading of hundreds of letters between
RL and members of the Phrontishly Klub. Some useful com-
ments about the organization of the group may be discovered.
Notes For Chapter I

In the first few pages of RL's "Michelangelo, Architecture," unpublished address before the P.K., Autumn, 1893, Lansing Papers, LC. See Also Beers' Interview, 1957. Several of RL's papers have survived and may be found in the Library of Congress; these include: "Social Life under the Early Plantagenet Kings," n.d.; "Clubs of the French Revolution," Nov., 1891; "Should There be a New Political Party?" April, 1894; "Social Life During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth," April, 1900; "The Iroquois: An Essay," Jan., 1902; and "The Eastern Shore of Ontario Prior to 1797," Jan., 1903.

69. RL to Lester Woolsey, Henderson Harbor, July 15, 1923, The Papers of Lester Hood Woolsey, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereafter, cited as Woolsey Papers). Woolsey was RL's law partner from 1920 to 1928.

70. The spelling for "Galloup" has since been standardized as "Gallow"; however, this history will continue to use the former since it is the one preferred by the P.K. RL reported the history of the island in his Jefferson County Prior to 1797 (Watertown, 1905), 67-68.

71. Beers' Interview, 1957. RL had his own private guide.

72. Lane, "As His Friends Know Him," Collier's, LVI (Nov. 13, 1915), 22; Beers' Interview, 1957; Watertown Daily Times, Oct. 31, 1928.

73. From 1898 to 1923 RL is known to have joined the P.K. every year save for 1915, that being the summer of his appointment as Secretary of State, the Lusitania negotiations, the Arabic sinking, and concerns over German espionage. From 1924 to 1927, no records exist as to whether he went or not; illness prevented him from going in 1928.

74. RL to Robert J. Buck and all the members of the P.K., Wash., Nov. 19, 1918, Lansing Papers, LC.

75. The original partnership had been formed with George H. Sherman, but upon his death, the position was continued through the son, Charles A. Sherman. For an additional point of interest, see supra, n. 23.

76. Lane, "As His Friends Know Him," Collier's, LVI (Nov. 13, 1915), 24.


78. Beers' Interview, 1955. The relative was RL's cousin, Mrs. John Lansing Gill.

79. Ibid., 1954. Also see "Ad-Interim Secretary," Literary Digest, L (June 26, 1915), 1546.
Notes For Chapter II

80. On Foster, see William R. Castle, Jr., "John Watson Foster," The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York, 1928), VIII, 187-223; and James Brown Scott, "John Watson Foster—An Appreciation," AJIL, XII (1918), 127-34. The most interesting of Foster's several works are the following: Diplomatic Memoirs, 2 vols. (Boston, 1909); American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston, 1903); and A Century of American Diplomacy, 1776-1876 (Boston, 1900).


82. After Blaine retired in June of 1892, Harrison appointed Foster as Secretary of State. Foster resigned in February of 1893 after the election of Cleveland. Many authors have incorrectly claimed that RL's first appointment occurred while Foster was Secretary.

83. RL, "How an International Arbitration is Conducted," unpublished address, March, 1912, Lansing Papers, LC.

84. Quoted from an unpublished address by RL before the Jefferson County Bar Association, Watertown, June 24, 1920, Ibid.


86. RL to Gary M. Jones, Wash., Aug. 18, 1915, Lansing Papers, LC; RL to R. J. Buck et al., Wash., Nov. 29, 1918, Ibid.

CHAPTER II: APPRENTICESHIP AND APPOINTMENT


2. On Hugo Grotius (née Huig de Groot, 1583-1645), and as an example of the revival of his image, see two studies by
Notes For Chapter II


5. James Brown Scott, "The Appointment of Mr. Robert Lansing of New York as Counselor of the Department of State," Ibid., VIII (April, 1914), 337. In 1911 Scott has written that RL "has participated in more international arbitrations than any American publicist of the present generation" (Ibid., V [Jan., 1911], 1, n.1). C. P. Anderson had served in each of these arbitral commissions as well, but the demands of his private practice reduced his length of service after the turn of the century. Most historians have accepted Scott's claim for RL on its face-value; see D. M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality (Berkeley, 1958), 1.


Notes For Chapter II


10. The Joint Commission was established by protocol of May 30, 1898 (Malloy, Treaties, I, 145) and met in Quebec from Aug. 23 to Oct. 10, 1898, and in Washington from Nov. 9, 1898 to Feb. 20, 1899 (Foster, Memoirs, II, 186-90; Cal-


12. RL, "The Alaskan Boundary Tribunal," unpublished address before the Story Chapter of Phi Delta Phi, Columbia University, Jan. 22, 1904, p. 7, Lansing Papers, LC. The documents of the arbitration are found in Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, Proce-

edings Before the Tribunal Convened at London Under Provisions
Notes For Chapter II
of the Treaty Between the United States of America and Great
Britain Concluded January 24, 1903, 7 vols. (Washington,
1903), and which also was printed as Senate Document 162,
58th Congress, 2nd Session.

Also on the counter case, see RL to Anderson, Wash., June 18,
20, 23, 1903, Foster to Anderson, Henderson Harbor, June 25,
1903, Ibid. Further, several useful letters may be discovered
in Alaskan Boundary Convention—1903, Miscellaneous Corre-
respondence, June to November, 1903, Records of the Alaskan
Boundary Tribunal, Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions
and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, National Archives: Pos-
ter to RL, Henderson Harbor, June 20, 1903; RL to Anderson,
Wash., June 20, 1903; and other letters filed throughout.

14. See RL, "The Questions Settled by the Award of the A-
laskan Boundary Tribunal," address before the American Geo-
ographical Society, Jan., 1904, Lansing Papers, LC, a speech
which was published in the Bulletin of the American Geo-
 graphical Society, XXXVI (1904), 65-80. The less idealistic
view of the Tribunal's final award is in Bailey, "Roose-
velt," 123-30; and Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 265.
Finally, research on the Alaskan Question should include the
Report of John W. Foster, Agent of the United States before
the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, to the Secretary of State,
John Hay, October 24, 1903, in the Report of the Alaskan
Boundary Commission—1903, Records of the Alaskan Boundary
Tribunal; The Alaskan Boundary Tribunal... (Washington, 1903);
as well as the "Report of an Anglo-American Tribunal on ter-

15. For RL's appointment, see Anderson to RL, Wash., March
7, 1908 (two letters of this date), Anderson Papers; RL to
Anderson, Watertown, March 9, 1908 (two letters), Ibid.;
Daily Standard, March 5, 1909; New York Sun, Feb. 24, 1909;
and the Syracuse Post-Standard, May 16, 1910. For background,
see Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, chs. I-IV; Calla-
han, Canadian Relations, 521-24.

States," Nov. 14, 1910, in U.S., Congress, Senate, Proceedings
in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration Before the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, 12 vols., Senate
Document 870, 61st Congress, 3rd Session (hereafter, cited
as Senate Document 870), I, 11; and the draft of this above

17. Acting under the general treaty of arbitration of A-
pril 4, 1908 (35:2 U.S., Statutes at Large 1960), Secretary
Notes For Chapter II
of State Root signed a special agreement on Jan. 27, 1909, submitting the Fisheries Question to The Hague (36:2 Statutes at Large 2141; RL, "The Newfoundland Fisheries Question," AJIL, III[1909], 461-64; "Renewal of Modus Vivendi Concerning Newfoundland Fisheries," Ibid., 953-54). The Tribunal began its session on June 1, 1910 (H. Lammensch, "President's Address. . .," Ibid., IV[1910], 567-90; "The United States at The Hague Court of Arbitration," Ibid., 675-77), and rendered its award on Sept. 7, 1910 (Senate Document 870, vol. I, 64-101; Malloy, Treaties, III, 2627, 2628; New York Tribune, Sept. 10, 1910; New York Times, Sept. 8, 1910; C.P. Anderson, "The Final Outcome of the Fisheries Question," AJIL, VII[1913], 1-16). Lammensch's statement was published in the United States in July of 1911, and attacked in an article written by RL (RL, "Statement by the President of the Tribunal that the North Atlantic Fisheries Award was a Compromise," Ibid., V[1911], 725-26; and see a defense, H. Lammensch, "Was the Award in the North Atlantic Fisheries Case a Compromise?" Ibid., VI[1912], 178-80).


22. Ibid. RL has written much on the Fisheries Case; besides those already cited, see also his "The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries," Ibid., IV[1910], 903-08; the Political Relations Between the United States and Newfoundland, 1910-1929, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, for his "Memorandum on American Fishing Rights in Newfoundland," Feb. 17, 1912, DS 711.438/521; and his "The Fisheries Arbitration of 1910," an unpublished address before the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, May 24, 1911, Lansing Papers, LC. This address was one of the major papers given at the conference, see H.C. Phillips to E. Root, n.p., March 28, 1911, in The Papers of Elihu Root, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter, referred to as Root Papers).

23. RL, "How an International Arbitration is Conducted," unpublished address, March, 1912, Lansing Papers, LC. The quotation is taken from p. 4.

24. RL, "Statement by President of Tribunal," 726. Lammasch's remark first appeared in his article "Formation of
Notes For Chapter II
the Hague Court of Arbitration," as published in Das Recht for March 10, 1911.

25. RL to Anderson, Watertown, March 9, 1908, Anderson Papers.


29. See the entry for June 10, 1915, in The Diary of Chandler P. Anderson, part of the Anderson Papers (hereafter, cited as Anderson Diary). Root advised Anderson not to get involved in the politics of the Wilson Administration if he wanted to keep his identity as a Republican (Ibid., June 26, 1915).


31. For example, see C.C. Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), 167; and A.S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960), 48.


33. RL's appointment and general instructions may be found in RL to George Young, Wash., Feb. 14, 1911, Anderson Papers; P. C. Knox to RL, Wash., Jan. 15, 1912, Feb. 8, 1912, Ibid., a copy of the latter may also be found in Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Secretary of State, Jan. 24, 1911--April 23, 1928, 11 vols., Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memoranda of the Secretary of State, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (here-
34. Much technical information on the claims is in the file "Arbiter, American and British Claims, General Correspondence (May 1913-April 1914)," and "Negotiation of Treaties and Schedules," both in Box 22 of the Anderson Papers.


36. After RL relinquished his $7500 per annum appointment as Agent to become Counselor, he would never again appear before a tribunal; however, between 1923 and 1925, he did help prepare one more arbitration case when he served as Counsel for Chile in the Tacna-Arica Arbitration.

37. The attack was current in the national press for about a week starting on April 6, 1914. See the Washington Herald, April 6; and the New York Times, April 6, 1914, Oct. 31, 1928. The charges were primarily partisan in origin, and can be traced to the reelection attempts of Congressman Henry W. Elliot; see H. W. Elliot to W. J. Bryan, Wash., March 26, 1914, The Papers of William Jennings Bryan, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereafter, referred to as Bryan Papers).

38. The Ward Case will be discussed infra in another context.

39. The literature on the Second Venezuelan Crisis is vast; consequently, research should begin with the historiographical essay in Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (New York, 1956), 339-70; and then consult Henry Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1931), 198-203, from which the quotation by Roosevelt has been taken (p. 198).

40. [J. B. Scott,] "The Appointment of Mr. Robert Lansing as Secretary of State," AJIL, IX (1915), 696.

41. Ibid., 697. On the Society, also see O. S. Straus, Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft (Boston, 1922), 332-36; and the Editorial Comment in the AJIL, I (1907), 129-35. Scott would remain managing editor until 1924, and Straus would be Chairman of the Executive Committee until his death in 1926. From 1921 to 1922 RL was Straus's vice-chairman.

42. RL, "Biographical Data of Robert Lansing," n.d. (ca. 1924), Lansing Papers, LC: RL, Memo to State Department,
Notes for Chapter II
Watertown, Jan. 1, 1914, Ibid.

43. "A Non-Political Secretary of State," Nation, CI (June 1, 1915), 7.

44. RL to John N. Carlisle, Watertown, Dec. 20, 1912, Lansing Papers, LC.


46. RL to J. N. Carlisle, Watertown, Dec. 20, 1912, and Carlisle to RL, Watertown, Dec. 23, 1912, Lansing Papers, LC. Seeking O'Gorman's support was the logical political move, even though President-elect WW did not enjoy the Senator's counsel. Before his election, WW had promised to "greatly rely upon his judgment in matters concerning New York:" but by early 1915, WW wrote he did not have a high regard for O'Gorman, and that "I am not willing to consider Senator O'Gorman's suggestions [for appointments] at all." See WW to Bryan, Trenton, July 16, 1912, and WW to Bryan, Wash., Feb. 19, 1915, Bryan Papers.

47. Frederic R. Coudert to WW, New York, Jan. 7, 1913, J. B. Scott to Coudert, n.p., Jan. 21, 1913, Lansing Papers, LC. Carlisle also sent an introduction to O'Gorman, and tried to obtain Governor William Sulzer's support as well. Carlisle to RL, Albany, Jan. 25, 1913, and RL to Carlisle, Wash., Jan. 27, 1913, Ibid.

48. Purcell was also President of the Jefferson County Savings Bank and had sometimes participated in the activities of the Phortnightly Klub. See RL to Purcell, Wash., Feb. 4, 1913, Purcell to RL, Watertown, Feb. 7, 1913, and Purcell to O'Gorman, Watertown, Feb. 7, 1913, Lansing Papers, LC.

49. RL to Purcell, Wash., Feb. 10, 1913, Ibid.

50. RL to Coudert, Wash., Feb. 17, 1913, and Scott to George Gray, Wash., Feb. 17, 1913, Ibid. Gray had been attorney General of Delaware, 1879-1885; United States Senator, 1885-1899; member of the High Commission to adjust differences with Canada, 1898; and on the commission to negotiate peace with Spain, 1898. He now served on the Court of Appeals in the Third Circuit of Delaware. It is not known if he ever answered Scott's letter.

51. J. B. Moore to F. Coudert, New York, March 7, 1913, Lansing Papers, LC.
53. See F. M. Huntington-Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat (Boston, 1945), 246-47; Stuart, Dept. of State, 225-26; for Huntington-Wilson's letter of resignation, see Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, 8 vols. (New York, 1932), IV, 72; and for WW's press statement of March 18, 1913, see U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter, cited as Foreign Relations), 1913, p. 170.

54. RL to O'Gorman, Wash., March 8, 1913, Lansing Papers, LC. In the letter, RL sent a copy of his résumé in case the Senator had lost the earlier copies.


57. A. Raymond Cornwall to RL, Watertown, March 11, 1913, RL to Cornwall, Wash., March 13, 1913, and Cornwall to RL, Watertown, March 22, 1913, Lansing Papers, LC.

58. See WW to J. B. Moore, Wash., April 12, 1913, Moore to WW, New York, April 14, 1913, Bryan to WW, n.p., April 15, 1913, Wilson Papers. Also see Daniels, Years of Peace, 149-50; Stuart, Dept. of State, 226; and Coletta, Bryan, II, 110.

59. See New York Times, Oct. 31, 1928; RL to C. J. B. Hurst, Wash., March 31, 1914, Anderson Papers. On WW, see RL to A. Mitchell Innes, Wash., Jan. 14, 1914, Lansing Papers, LC, in which he remarked that having recently attended a diplomatic reception he can add credence to the rumor that WW does not know how to conduct such an affair; it was no more than a vast mob.

60. Gaillard Hunt, The Department of State of the United States: Its History and Functions (New Haven, 1914), 244; Stuart, Dept. of State, 213; Huntington-Wilson, Memoirs, 190-91; and Daniels, Years of Peace, 437.

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64. WW to Bryan, Wash., March 12, 1914, Bryan Papers and Wilson Papers.


68. Root to WW, Wash., March 11, 1914, Wilson Papers. Root was sick with "the grip." A search of the Root and Wilson Papers has not produced any letter of answer to Root's letter of the 11th on the part of the President. Secretary Daniels was of the opinion that it was WW who "suggested that Root... be consulted," and that Root "undoubtedly spoke truly, for, however one might differ with Lansing, [as Daniels often did,] all who were associated with him regarded him as upright and honorable" (Daniels, Years of Peace, 437). Also see Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 vols. (New York, 1938), II, 320.

69. See Washington Evening Star, March 20; Washington Post, March; New York Times, March 21; New York Tribune, March 21; and New York World, March 21, 1914. The Root letter of March 11, combined with the fact that RL had served under Root as legal counsel for the State Department, has led the late Professor Charles Callan Tansill to charge RL was one of three men whom WW allowed Root to appoint to the Department in exchange for his support in the repealing of the Panama Tolls Act. Both as Counselor and as Secretary, Tansill has held, RL continued to repay his debt to Root by accepting his advice on important issues and by reflecting "the Anglophile bias of his patron, Senator Root" (Tansill, America Goes to War [New York, 1938], 166-69). There is no question that RL owed his
Notes For Chapter II
appointment to Root, nor that RL ever failed to understand
the importance of the March letter. Upon Root's retirement
a year later, RL wrote: "As to your personal interest in
my behalf when the President had my name under consideration
for Counselor, you know how deeply I feel." (RL to Root,
Wash., March 4, 1915, Root Papers; and see Root to RL, Wash.,
March 5, 1915, Lansing Papers, LC; Anderson Diary, May 15,
1915; RL to Root, Wash., Dec. 10, 1913, Root Papers.) Yet
the idea that Root picked RL, or that RL was strongly influ-
enced by Root's suggestions while he served as Secretary of
State, cannot be supported by fact. The Root, Lansing, and
Wilson Papers have been searched to discover a documented ba-
sis for Tansill's charges by Philip Jessup, Daniel Smith and
this author; all three researchers have concluded independently
that Professor Tansill is in error. See Jessup, Root, II,
319-20, 330; Smith, Lansing, 176, n. 18.

70. For press coverage of the Ward Case, see Washington Post,
March 26, 1914; and New York Times, March 25, 1914. On Bryan
before the Senate Committee, see New York Times, March 26,
1914. On the confirmation, see New York Times, March 28,
1914; and U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 63rd
Congress, 2nd session (March 27, 1914), 5178. RL entered up-
on his duties on April 1, 1914.

71. Richard Challener, "William Jennings Bryan, 1913-
1915," in An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of
State in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Norman A. Graebner
(New York, 1961), 85. For other historians' views, see Co-
letta, Bryan, II, 110-19; and A. S. Link, Wilson: The New

CHAPTER III
SOVEREIGNTY: VENTURES INTO POLITICAL THEORY

1. To a degree, all of the arbitration commissions dealt
with questions of sovereignty; yet RL's work as Agent for
the American and British Claims Commission under Special A-
greement of 1910 was particularly concerned with the issue.
RL became involved in State Succession Cases between 1911
and 1914 which concerned claims for private losses resulting
Notes For Chapter III
from "a transfer from one Power to another [of] a territory where the claim arose." See C. J. B. Hurst to RL, Wash., April 1, 1914, Anderson Papers; and also RL to Hurst, n.p., March 28, & 31, 1914, Ibid. In the same context, RL had been asked by the State Department, in 1911, to take up the case of the archipelago of Spitzbergen, an island of 50,000 square miles lying about 400 miles north of Norway. No nation had ever claimed sovereignty over the area until 1900, when coal was discovered. At that juncture most of the European powers and the United States began to demand possession. The island, finally granted to Norway in 1925 by international commission, became the subject of many international conferences which were called to consider the legal principle of terra nullius as it related to territorial sovereignty (dominium). RL considered his work on this case "a most engrossing subject and one which challenged the knowledge of the student of abstract principles of government as well as his ingenuity in applying them in a practical way." See RL, "A Unique International Problem," address prepared in Jan., 1912, Lansing Papers, LC. This address was rewritten in May, 1916, and published under the same title in the AJIL, XI (1917), 763-71.

2. RL, "The Constitution and the Spanish Cessions of 1898," unpublished paper prepared at the request of Senator John T. Morgan, Feb. 14, 1900, Lansing Papers, LC. By the term "civil war" RL did not include the guerrilla warfare that was currently being waged by the Filipino resistance movement since, despite its ruthless nature, it remained limited in scope.

3. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 United States Reports 244 (1901). This case, as part of the "Insular Cases," is discussed in World's Work, II (July, 1901), 903; and also by RL's grand-nephew Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power, 1898-1954 (New York, 1954), 56-57.


5. The quotations are from an essay by RL entitled "The Philippines: Colonies or Dependencies?" May 22, 1902, Lansing Papers, LC. This essay is part of the series on "Political Questions" (see supra, Ch. I, n. 32).

6. RL, "A Definition of Sovereignty," The Proceedings of The American Political Science Association, 1913-1914 (Baltimore, 1914), 74. With the publication of this article,
Notes For Chapter III
Westel W. Willoughby, the noted professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and a leader in a "school" of thought that opposed the one adhered to by RL in his approach to the study of Sovereignty, admitted that RL had "made one of the best statements that I have seen of the conception of sovereignty based on force" (W. W. Willoughby to RL, Baltimore, Jan. 3, 1914, Lansing Papers, LC).

7. Entitled Government: Its Origin, Growth, and Form in the United States, by Robert Lansing and Gary M. Jones (New York: Silver, Burdett and Company, 1902), the work had, besides the central text, several separately bound supplements by various other authors concerning the State Governments of New York, Missouri, Ohio, Michigan, and Iowa. Although it is known that the popular central text remained in print until Sept. 18, 1924, the publisher's records do not indicate the total number of copies that were either sold or printed (Miss Myrtle E. Teffau, Librarian, General Learning Corporation, to this author, Morristown, New Jersey, July 26, 1973, author's files).

8. RL and Jones, Government, 190. Speaking of the philosophes as an undefined group, RL wrote in 1906 that "they dealt with what they conceived ought to be in human affairs, rather than what really is." Montesquieu, however, is an exception because he "never defines nor treats...sovereignty." See RL, Notes on Sovereignty, From the Standpoint of the State and the World, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Pamphlet Series, Division of International Law, Publication Number 38 (Washington, 1921), 1.

9. RL and Jones, Government, 191, italics added.

10. The undated and untitled memo may be found in the folder "Notes" (Box 17), Anderson Papers.

11. RL, "Principles of American Political Parties," uncompleted and unpublished manuscript, n.d.[1902-1903], Lansing Papers, LC. As the manuscript began to take form, it crystallized as more of a history of political parties in the United States. RL had divided all parties into one of two great classes, the conservative and the liberal, and the recurring motif that his analysis suggested exemplifies his political views as presented in supra, ch. I. By the time his labor had reached the era of the Civil War, the undertaking had mushroomed into 425 pages divided into 12 chapters. The project was abandoned. It is most probable that RL had every intention of returning someday to edit and complete his "Principles," but if this were the case it would remain an unobtained goal.

12. For the treatise as originally written in 1906, see:
Notes For Chapter III

"Notes on Sovereignty in a State," AJIL, I (1907), 105-28, & 297-320; and "Notes on World Sovereignty," Ibid., XV (1921), 13-27. In 1913, RL wrote "A Definition of Sovereignty," which appeared in The Proceedings of The American Political Science Association, 1913-1914 (Baltimore, 1914), 61-75. The three parts were then published as Notes on Sovereignty, From the Standpoint of the State and of the World, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Pamphlet Series, Division of International Law, Publication Number 38 (Washington, 1921), 94pp. Information on the facts of publication for RL's articles may be found in Ibid., 55, n.1. It appears that Scott had tried to publish the article on world sovereignty as early as 1917, but that RL had refused (Scott to RL, Wash., May 9, 1917, Lansing Papers, LC). It was Scott who took the initiative in 1921 to have the entire series republished by the Carnegie Endowment, an organization for which Scott served as Director of the Division of International Law.

13. For convenience, all references will be to the Carnegie edition and all italics may be considered to be RL's. See RL, Notes, 1-28. RL's basic definition was similar to those advanced by Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 6th edition (Boston, 1855), 29; and John William Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, 2 vols. (Boston, 1890), I, 53. As RL claimed (Notes, p. 15), the distinction between real and artificial sovereignty had not been developed by previous publicists.


15. Ibid., 29-32, quoting p. 30.


17. Viewed externally, however, a State possesses no sovereignty of any form and the federal state holds full sovereignty and complete nationality. "It is apparent," concluded Lansing, "that these independent spheres of power and responsibility...cause confusion and present grave difficulties in the administration of the foreign affairs of the United States." Ibid., 33, 34, & 37. From this point of the argument RL proceeded to treat the subjects of independence, civil and state liberty, constitutions, and law within the framework of internal sovereignty; see Ibid., 37-54.


19. RL, Notes, 55-68, quoting pp. 67-68.

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21. Quotations are taken from Ibid., 72, 74, & 76.

22. "Until a people become politically organized there is no Sovereignty" (W. W. Willoughby, An Examination of the Nature of the State [New York, 1896], 290).

23. W. W. Willoughby to RL, Baltimore, Feb. 4, 1913, Lansing Papers, LC.

24. RL to Willoughby, Wash., Feb. 12, 1913, Lansing Papers, LC.

25. RL, Notes, 93 & 94.


27. RL, Notes, 54, and see 41-45 for a discussion of constitutions.

CHAPTER IV
ANTI-IMPERIAL EXPANSIONIST


4. Adler, Isolationist Impulse, 32.

5. Carl Schurz, "Thoughts on American Imperialism," Çen-
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tury Magazine, LVI (1898), 787-88. Schurz, who had been a revolutionary in Germany in 1848, also predicted in this article that colonialism would promote the multiplication of trusts.


9. Senator Hoar's address may be found in U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3rd session, 493-50, and is quoted in part in Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), 347-48.


11. The sources on RL's thoughts for this section are as follows: "Our New Foreign Policy," May 15, 1902; "The Philippines: Colonies or Dependencies?" May 22, 1902; "Imperialism's Progress," May 23, 1902; and "Seward's Foreign Policy," June 2, 1902; all of which are essays in RL's own hand and which may be found in the Lansing Papers, LC as part of his series on "Political Questions" (see supra, ch. I, n. 32).


15. Ibid., 3-4.

16. Ibid., 4-5. This is the same group of people which RL once described as those "who sell their daughters, after providing them with a fortune, to bankrupt dukes and barons and viscounts, and when the bargain is made wear a monacle and forget their old friends; they are always telling you what the Earl of This or 'Mrs. Lord' That said to them, and how vul[g]ar Americans are and what a 'nawsty' place New York is" (RL, "Imperialism's Progress," May 23, 1902, Lansing Papers, LC).
Notes For Chapter IV

17. RL, "Our New Foreign Policy," 5-7. RL made no distinction between the phrases "for the sake of humanity" and "in the name of humanity."

18. Ibid., 8-9. As previously noted, in his essay entitled "The Philippines: Colonies or Dependencies?," 3, written one week later, RL stated that "the Filipinos should have their own government with only a mild restraining hand...[from the United States] directing its course."


22. RL, "Philippines: Colonies or Dependencies?," 1.

23. RL, "Our New Foreign Policy," 5.


27. RL, Notes on Sovereignty (Washington, 1921), 72.


30. RL, Notes on Sovereignty, 65-67, & 90; and also see RL and Gary M. Jones, Government (New York, 1902), 190.


32. RL, "How an International Arbitration is Conducted,"
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unpublished address, March, 1912, Lansing Papers, LC.


35. RL to Professor George Grafton Wilson, Wash., Oct. 15, 1915, Lansing Papers, LC. In the Lansing Papers, LC, there is an unaddressed reflection by RL dated July 18, 1920 which makes a similar point: "In the organization of the nations of the world there are two fundamental principles which will give it permanency, the equality of nations and legal justice. Robert Lansing."


40. E. B. Tompkins, "The Old Guard: A Study of the Anti-Imperialist Leadership," Historian, XXX (1967-1968), 373. In this article published five years before the LaFeber study, Tompkins reported the literature of the period revealed the importance contemporary anti-imperialists placed upon the "perversion" of traditional values. "One of the basic things that bothered them about the adoption of the policy of imperialism was that it represented a change from the policy which the United States had pursued since its inception as a nation."


42. See supra, ch. I, section III.

43. Tompkins, "Old Guard," Historian, XXX, 380, 375, & 383.

44. For the ideological debate at the turn of the century,
Notes For Chapter IV


46. RL, "The Party of Obstruction," May 9, 1902, Lansing Papers, LC. See supra, ch. I, section II. A professor of jurisprudence and political economy at Princeton University by the name of Woodrow Wilson had similar beliefs. Although he was not an anti-imperialist, he did oppose the annexation of the Philippines and regretted the increase in federal power that seemed to have resulted from the 1898 war. See A. S. Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House (Princeton, 1947), 27-28.

47. Supra, ch. III, section I.

48. RL to James H. Oliver, Governor of the Virgin Islands, Wash., Feb. 11, 1918, Lansing Papers, LC. Also see RL to J. W. Davis, Wash., July 29, 1919, Lansing Papers, Princeton. In both the letter to Oliver and the one to Davis, RL went on to imply that the expansion of commerce and trade to areas inhabited by "backward" races would not automatically bring the extension of civilization. In none of his writings did RL seem particularly concerned with the expansion of "American civilization" to backward peoples of the world.


50. RL, "The Philippines: Colonies or Dependencies?", May 22, 1902, Ibid. In his writings before 1914 RL never dealt with the question of preemptive annexation; that is, the right of the United States to annex territory in the name of free trade when another industrial country appears to be about to annex that same area and create a closed empire excluding American commerce. As it will be shown in Chs. VIII and IX, RL did support American annexation of lands if their location made them a danger to American military security in the event that they were conquered by a hostile world power.
CHAPTER V

LANISING OF STATE

1. Bryan's friend Cone Johnson was confirmed as Solicitor on the same day. See J. B. Scott to RL, Wash., April 1, 1915, Lansing Papers, LC.


6. See respectively the following: Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace (Chapel Hill, 1944), 441-42; David F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920, 2 vols. (Garden City, 1926), I, 141; for Secretary Burleson's comment see Daniels, Years of Peace, 346; Edith Bolling Wilson, My Memoir (Indianapolis, 1939), 64; and George Creel, Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years (New York, 1947), 160.

7. William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years (Boston, 1931), 339.


9. B. F. Beers, Interview with Miss Emma Sterling Lansing and Mrs. John L. Gill, Watertown, New York, August 30, 1955, copy of which is in this author's files.

10. McAdoo, Crowded Years, 339. On the cabinet meetings, see also Daniels, Years of Peace, 439; and William C. Redfield, With Congress and Cabinet (Garden City, 1924), 80.

11. Alexander DeConde, The American Secretary of State, An
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Interpretation (New York, 1962), 53. As a general interpretation, DeConde has prepared a useful volume for students of American Foreign Policy; however, as is the case with most such undertakings, the author was forced to depend too heavily upon traditional interpretations. For example, DeConde presents RL in the dull, clerk image that comes from taking the memoirs of the period at their face value. What is most unusual is that this traditional view is presented despite the fact that he gives credit to Professor B. F. Beers' research on RL, the conclusions of which refute those advanced by DeConde. See Ibid., 97-103, & viii.

12. McAdoo, Crowded Years, 338. WW collected newspaper comments on Bryan as Secretary, and these may be found in the Wilson Papers (Series IV, case file 40B). For the view of Secretary Daniels on Bryan, see his Years of Peace, 427-42; and also Katherine E. Brand, "Memorandum of an Interview with Josephus Daniels," American Embassy, Mexico City, August 8, 1936, in The Papers of Ray Stannard Baker, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. This interview will be hereafter cited as Brand, Daniels Interview, 1936, R. S. Baker Papers.


16. R. S. Baker noted WW wrote RL 8 times in one day regarding war and neutrality problems. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, 8 vols. (Garden City, 1938), V, 167, the date being Sept. 17, 1914; and also see "Diplomatic Counsellor General...in Anxious Times," Current Opinion, LVIII (April, 1915), 239-40.

17. Diary of W. J. Carr, Oct. 29, 1914, as quoted in Katherine Crane, Mr. Carr of State, Forty-Seven Years in the State Department (New York, 1960), 180. Also see for some reaction on the part of the press, Washington Times, March 22, 1915;
Notes For Chapter V
Watertown Daily Standard, Nov. 9, 1914.

18. The issues of the Declaration of London and loans to belligerents are discussed in Smith, Lansing, 22-30, 92-95.


22. This term will be discussed infra, ch. VII. The first formal diplomatic note in which it appeared was one sent by Bryan to Amb. James W. Gerard, Wash., Feb. 10, 1915, in U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The World War, 1915, Supplement (hereafter, cited as Foreign Relations, Sup., 1915), 98-100.


24. New York Sun, Nov. 9, 1914; this and several other articles were kept by Mrs. Lansing and placed in her scrapbook, see Scrapbook, vol. III, Lansing Papers, LC.

25. RL to William Dulles, Wash., Nov. 13, 1914, Lansing Papers, LC. Also see RL's two letters of Nov. 14, 1914, Wash., to George V. S. Camp and to Edward N. Smith, Ibid.

26. This in any event is the story as told later by WW to House; see House Diary, June 24, 1915. Also see Link, Neutrality, 421-22; R. S. Baker, Wilson: Life and Letters, V, 356: Smith, Lansing, 69; Coletta, Bryan, II, 340; and Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting Years, Memoirs of a Liberal Editor (New York, 1939), 273-75.
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27. On this point, see Smith, Lansing, 69-70.


29. See Anderson Diary, March 15, 1915.

30. For the letters of resignation, see Bryan to WW, Wash., June 8, 1915, Bryan Papers; WW to Bryan, Wash., June 8, 1915, Bryan Papers and Wilson Papers; both of which were printed in the New York Times, June 9, 1915. For one of the best treatments of the subject, see Coletta, Bryan, II, 329-61. Some interesting and sometimes conflicting contemporary views on the resignation are as follows: Daniels, Years of Peace, ch. XLV, 427-35; Brand, Daniels Interview, 1936, 4-5, R. S. Baker Papers; Houston, Eight Years, 1, 140-41, and 146: "The President wanted peace, but an honourable peace. Bryan apparently wanted peace at any price:" and Anderson Diary, June 9, 1915. For the views of the press, the story broke on June 9, 1915, and under that date see: Washington Times; Chicago Record Herald; New York Sun; and New York Tribune; most of which carry stories that reflect as much about the papers' ideologies as they communicate the news. Of special interest, see "Our Clash with Germany and Mr. Bryan's Mystifying Resignation," Current Opinion, LIX (July, 1915), 1, 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2: "Nothing like this has ever been seen before in the history even of shirt-sleeve diplomacy" (p. 1); and Arthur W. Page, "Mr. Bryan's Retirement and Its Significance," World's Work, XXX (July, 1915), 269-72; Bryan has "demonstrated his inability to fulfill the tasks which his office imposed upon him" (p. 270).


32. RL to Bryan, Wash., June 9, 1915, Lansing Papers, LC, and Bryan Papers. On the same day, Mrs. Lansing wrote Mrs. Bryan that "I don't know when I have seen my husband so unhappy and I assure you it is a sincere grief to us both--to have you go" (E. Lansing to Mary B. Bryan, Wash., June 9, 1915, Bryan Papers).

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34. RL's chair cost Bryan $65.75; see Colonel William W. Wart to Bryan, Wash., Sept. 8, 1915, Bryan Papers. Colin Simpson, in his recent book on The Lusitania (Boston, 1972), 53, holds the view that RL "had little love for Bryan;" whatever that is supposed to mean, Simpson leaves up to the reader.


37. [Clinton W. Gilbert,] The Mirrors of Washington, by Anonymous (New York, 1921), 213.

38. WW to RL, Wash., June 9, 1915, Wilson Papers; and WW to Bryan, Wash., June 9, 1915, Bryan Papers. For secondary studies on RL's appointment as Secretary (June 23), see Smith, Lansing, 70-72; Beers, Vain Endeavor, 52-56; and Link, Neutrality, 427-28. RL's own account is in his Memoirs, 15-17; which also appeared in a pre-publication article entitled "The Difficulties of Neutrality," Saturday Evening Post, CCIII, No. 42 (April 18, 1931), 6.


40. Houston, Eight Years, I, 141. Cf. "Memorandum by Ray Stannard Baker of an Interview with Secretary Houston," Dec. 1, 1928, R. S. Baker Papers, in which Houston remembered WW saying of RL on that same occasion that "He won't oppose me."

41. McAdoo, Crowded Years, 338. Secretary Daniels concurred with McAdoo as to RL's political weakness. Years later he recalled a conversation he had had with Postmaster General Albert Burleson in which he said that RL "has no backing. He has lived in Washington most of his life. If he ever voted, no-body knows it. He brings no strength into the Cabinet. I think it is a mistake" (Brand, Daniels Interview, 1936, 7-8, R. S. Baker Papers). Later Daniels commented in his memoirs that any fame which RL had achieved had been because he was "a beneficiary of Republican favors" (Years of Peace, 436).

42. Jones and his brother David had contributed $41,000 to WW's campaigns for the White House, see Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House (Princeton, 1947, 403, 485.

43. Jones' association with the "Harvester Trust" (he was a director of the International Harvester Company) had alienated the Senate. See Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, 1956), 451-57; and Idem., Neutrality, 427-28.

44. House Diary, June 14, 1915; and House to Eleanor Foster Lansing, n.p., April 13, 1931, The Papers of Edward M. House, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University (hereafter, cited as House Papers). Houston, in turn, would have preferred "a
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man like Ex-Secretary Olney" (Eight Years, I, 149); while
Daniels believed that "if Wilson had consulted the Cabinet,
he would have found that most of them would have favored
Newton Baker or Frank Polk" (Years of Peace, p. 437). Polk,
corporation counsel for New York City, would soon replace RL
as Counselor (Aug. 30, 1915); while Baker, Mayor of Cleve-
land, Ohio, would become Secretary of War in 1916. On Baker,
see Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker, America at War, 2
vols. (New York, ;931); and Daniel R. Beaver, Newton D. Ba-

45. Edith Bolling Wilson, My Memoir (Indianapolis, 1939),
64.

46. New York Sun, June 18, 1915; New York World, June 18,

47. New York Times, June 16, 1915, 10 (liberty has been
taken with the original paragraph development). For other
press comments, see Scrapbook, vol. IV, Lansing Papers, LC.

48. House Diary, June 13, 1915. Some information of limited
value on House's role in RL's appointment may be found in
Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 4 vols.
(Boston, 1926), II, 5.

49. House Diary, June 14, 1915.

50. Ibid., June 13, 1915.

51. Ibid., June 14, 1915. On the House-Wilson special re-
lationship, see George S. Viereck, The Strangest Friendship
in History, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York,
1932); Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow
Wilson and Colonel House, A Personality Study (New York,
1964); and Charles Seymour, "The Role of Colonel House in
Wilson's Diplomacy," Wilson's Foreign Policy in Perspective,
edited by Edward H. Buehrig (Bloomington, 1957), 11-33. Al-
so see the contemporary articles by Oswald Garrison Villard,
Prophets True and False (New York, 1928), 169-86: "By...his
own record there rests upon Colonel House's head a large
share of the blood guilt for those 70,000 American soldiers
who were done to death in France..." (p. 186); and Gilbert,
Mirrors of Washington, 89-104.

52. House Diary, June 14, 1915.

53. Ibid., June 16, 14, 1915.

54. House to WW, Roslyn, Wilson Papers and House Papers.
This letter is also quoted in Beers, Vain Endeavor, 54; and
Smith, Lansing, 71.
Notes For Chapter V


57. RL, Memoirs, 15-17; and Saturday Evening Post, April 28, 1931, 6. As indicated in his Memoirs, p. 15, RL believed that House "strongly urged" the appointment of Walter Hines Page, current Ambassador at London, as the new Secretary. It is true that on June 17, 1915, House wrote Page that "I suggested your name to McAdoo" (House Papers), but neither his Diary nor his correspondence with WW give credence to this statement. In fact, in 1931, House wrote RL's wife that Page had never been a real candidate (House to Eleanor Lansing, April 13, 1931, House Papers). Page's most recent biographer, however, accepts House's June, 1915, letter at its face value; see Ross Gregory, Walter Hines Page, Ambassador to the Court of St. James's (Lexington, 1970), 104.


59. House Diary, June 24, 1915.

60. Ibid., July 24, 1915.

61. For some of the better press accounts, see the following newspapers: "Lansing, A Non-Political Secretary of State," Providence Sunday Journal, June 13, 1915; Washington Post, June 23, 24, 1915; Syracuse Post-Standard, June 24, 1915, which has some photographs of RL at ages 10, 19, and 25 years; Veracruz El Pueblo, June 24, 1915; and the following New York papers under date of June 24, 1915: Times, World, Tribune, and American. Also see J. B. Scott, "The Secretaryship of State and Mr. Lansing," Atlantic Monthly, CLVI (Oct., 1915), 568-72; "A Non-Political Secretary of State," Nation, CI (July 1, 1915), 7-8.

62. Lansing Diaries, LC, July 24, 1915; RL, Memoirs, 17. Congress was not in session, therefore Senate confirmation did not occur until Dec. 13, 1915; see U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st session, 238. One of RL's first official acts was to send out a circular to all American Diplomatic and Consular Offices, June 24, 1915, which read: "Gentlemen: I have to inform you that the President has appointed me to be Secretary of State and that I have this day entered upon the duties of the office" (Administrative Records, United States Government, Department of
Notes For Chapter V
State, Office of the Secretary, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives: DS 111.11/412.


64. WW was in favor of A. Mitchell Palmer, but RL felt that he would not be happy in the role of a subordinate and House feared that Palmer would produce the same situation that had existed between Bryan and Moore. WW did not push the issue. (See WW to RL, Wash., July 28, Aug. 2, 1915, RL to WW, Wash., July 31, 1915, House to RL, Manchester, July 29, 1915, Lansing Papers, Princeton; and RL to House, Wash., July 30, 1915, House Papers). House then pushed for William M. Howard of Georgia, but WW felt the geography was wrong (House to RL, n.p., Aug. 10, 1915, RL to House, Wash., Aug. 12, 1915, Lansing Papers, Princeton).

65. RL to House, Wash., Aug. 12, 1915, Lansing Papers, Princeton; House to RL, Manchester, Aug. 14, 1915, Seymour, House, II, 11. For an example of the many historians who assume that Polk's name was first suggested by House because he was a friend of the Colonel's, see Seymour, House, II, 11; G. H. Stuart, Department of State (New York, 1949), 239; and also Smith, Lansing, 81.

66. House Diary, Aug. 15, 1915; RL, Memoirs, 362. Also see RL to Polk, Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Secretary of State, NA, IV, 168; and RL to WW, Wash., Aug. 26, 1915, in "Personal and Confidential" Letters from Secretary of State Lansing to President Wilson, 1915-1918, Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memoranda of the Secretary of State, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (hereafter, cited as the Lansing-Wilson Letters, NA); New York Tribune, Aug. 29, 1915; and Anderson Diary, Sept. 8, 1915.

67. RL, Memoirs, 262-63.

68. Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 74. By an act of Congress of March 1, 1919, the title of Counselor was changed to Under Secretary of State; the Assistant Secretary became the First Assistant Secretary of State; see Stuart, Dept. of State, 254.

69. A. A. Adee(1842-1924): 47 years in the State Department: 3rd Assistant Secretary, 1882-1886; and 2nd Assistant Secretary, 1886-1924. See James W. Gerard, My Four Years in Ger-
Notes For Chapter V

70. Phillips would later be the U.S. minister to the Netherlands and Luxemburg, 1920-22; and to Canada, 1927-29; and Ambassador to Belgium, 1924-27; and Italy, 1936-41. He would become most noted as F. D. Roosevelt's personal representative to India, 1942-1945; and as political adviser to D. Eisenhower, 1943-1944.

71. See the many letters to House from B. Long that may be found in The Papers of Breckinridge Long, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereafter, cited as Long Papers), General Correspondence, 1917 (Box 27). Long also seemed to carry on a personal war to remove from the Department men who were "non-American." "I have caused about 15 officers to go...because of German nationality...." See The Diary of Breckinridge Long, in the Long Papers (hereafter, cited as Long Diary), March 16, 1917; and also see the entry for March 20, 1917.

72. RL, Memoirs, 361; and see Stuart, Dept. of State, 239, 242; and RL to Bert L. Hunt, Wash., Dec. 2, 1918, Lansing Papers, LC.

73. Anderson Diary, Sept. 8, 1915. Also see RL, Memoirs, 361-62; and Cohn Johnson to R. S. Baker, Tyler, Texas, Oct. 15, 1932, R. S. Baker Papers.

74. Crane owed his appointment to the fact that his father, Charles R. Crane, the famous Chicago plumbing fixture magnate, was the largest single contributor ($40,000) to WW's election campaign of 1912. See RL to House, Wash., July 30, 1915, Lansing Papers, Princeton; Charles R. Crane to RL, Woods Hole, Mass., Aug. 3, 1915, and RL to C. R. Crane, Wash., Aug. 7, 1915, Lansing Papers, LC; and on C. R. Crane's contributions, see Link, Road to the White House, 403,485.


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79. RL to WW, Wash., Nov. 5, 1915, Lansing Papers, LC; WW to J. Daniels, Wash., Nov. 6, 1914, The Papers of Josephus Daniels, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereafter, cited as Daniels Papers). The Reports of the Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board (August 14, 1914 to March 29, 1917) number 152, and they may be found in the Woolsey Papers (Box 62-64); and in the National Archives: Political Relations Between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, The Records of the Department of State Relating to World War I and Its Termination, 1914-1929, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (hereafter, cited as: DS 763.72): DS 763.72111/7321 (1-152).


CHAPTER VI
THE GERMAN CONSPIRACY
INHUMANE WARFARE AND SECRET INTRIGUES


4. For the declarations of war from Aug. 1, to Aug. 28, 1914, see DS 763.72/53, 77, 86, 115, 192, 263, 310, 375, 380, 709. Besides the nine nations listed in the text, the other nations to enter the Great War were as follows: in 1914, Turkey; in 1915, Italy, San Marino, and Bulgaria; in 1916, Portugal and Roumania; in 1917, the United States, Panama, Cuba, Greece, Siam, Liberia, China, and Brazil; and in 1918, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Haiti, and Honduras.
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Further, besides these twenty-eight states, four additional nations severed diplomatic relations with Germany in 1917: Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, and Ecuador.


8. Ibid.


10. Daniel M. Smith and Link are among the few who recognize the historical problem of RL's conversion to militancy. Yet neither man answers the problem. Smith dismisses the issue by declaring that RL finally "became convinced that American interests in the balance of power...gave the United States a stake in the war and justified intervention" (Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality [Berkeley, 1958], 19). Also see his article "Robert Lansing and the Formulation of American Neutral Policies, 1914-1915," NVHR, XLII (1956-1957), 81.

11. Typical of this position are the studies by Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 (Chicago, 1966), 39; Charles Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), 66; and Edwin Borchard and William Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), 75, which moralized about RL's actions during Oct., 1914, thusly: "Neutrals...must be prepared to be neutral and to maintain neutral rights. Mr. Lansing was not prepared for either." Borchard and Lage also are of the opinion that RL "seems to have fumbled nearly every legal issue" (Ibid., 33). RL's pro-Ally position and his early support for American entry into the war were not generally recognized by historians until after the publication of RL's own memoirs in 1935.

12. RL, Memoirs, 18. See supra, n. 6, for the 1914 letter.


15. Walter Millis, Road to War: America, 1914-1917 (Bos-
Notes for Chapter VI
	on, 1935), 66, and see 65-72 for a study of the atrocities as reported in the American press.

16. Ibid., 66; Tansill, America Goes to War, 24-25; Mark Sullivan, History of Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925, 6 vols. (New York, 1933), V, 21-29. For the official correspondence concerning illegal and inhuman warfare for the period from August to October, 1914, see: DS 763.72116/0-79.


19. Cf. Link, Neutrality, 47: RL was not "a sentimentalist whose reason had been deranged by fear or tales of horror."


22. Supra, chs. III-IV.


26. Ibid.

27. RL, "War General," April 15, 1915, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC.


29. Documents on suspected German agents in Latin America are hard to find in the General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives. Some limited in-
Notes For Chapter VI
formation may be seen in the Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Germany, 1910-1929 (cited as DS 862.00); in particular the records on Espionage, Propaganda, and Sabotage: DS 862.202/0 through DS 862.20212/750. On the other hand, almost nothing at all can be found in the Records of the Department of State Relating to the Political Relations Between Haiti and Germany, 1910-1929 (cited as DS 738.62); or in those relating to the Political Relations Between Mexico and Germany, 1910-1929 (cited as DS 712.62). The reason for this is that most reports and correspondence on activities in Latin America were filed along with the documents on activities of agents in the United States; these in turn were placed in a series of special records not part of the Central Files, the Records of the Office of the Counselor and of the Chief Special Agent for the Department of State. Still classified under the seventy-five year rule, they are described in U.S., General Service Administration, National Archives and Records Service, Preliminary Inventory of the General Records of the Department of State (Record Group 59), compiled by Daniel T. Goggin and H. Stephen Helton (Washington, 1963), entry numbers 538-543.

30. Subsequent to his retirement from the State Department, RL undertook the preparation of a personal narrative reviewing the foreign affairs of the United States during the period he served as Secretary of State. At the time of his death the work was still incomplete. Events dealt with terminated in the year 1917, and the massive manuscript itself was not in a polished form. In 1935, seven years after RL's death, the Bobbs-Merrill Company published in some 380 pages the chapters concerned with American neutrality and entry into the war, after they had been edited by RL's nephew Allen W. Dulles. Previously, a few pages had been published in The New York Times Magazine (July 19, 1931, 4-5) on the "Drama of the Virgin Island Purchase." Besides this, almost no use has been made of several long chapters, primarily concerned with relations with Latin America, that are in the original manuscript as housed at the Library of Congress or that are in the draft as revised by Dulles and located at Princeton University. The quotation in the text is taken from RL, "Memoirs," Uncompleted and Partly Unpublished Manuscript of a Personal Narrative, n.d. (ca. 1922-1928), Lansing Papers, LC (hereafter, cited as: RL, Memoir MS.), Chapter XIII: "The Haitian Affair," 96.

31. RL, Memoir MS, 96-97. Some of these reports were being sent by Paul Fuller, Jr., of New York who had been assigned as special envoy to Haiti in April, 1915. See also RL to A. Flockton, Wash., May 15, 1922, and RL to David Y. Thomas, Wash., Nov. 22, 1922, Lansing Papers, LC.

32. RL to Bryan, Wash., Nov. 13, 1914, and RL to James H.
Notes For Chapter VI


34. The offers were in terms of financing a counter-revolution against Carranza and were made in New York City by Captain Franz Rintelen von Kleist. See Captain von Rintelen, The Dark Invader, Wartime Reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence Officer (London, 1933), 60-74, 91-182; New York Times, Nov. 22, Dec. 5, 8, 18, 1915; Link, Neutrality, 561-63; and Tuchman, Zimmermann Telegram, 65-76.

35. On Count von Bernstorff, see his two reminiscences, Memoirs of Count Bernstorff, Translated from the German by Eric Sutton (New York, 1936); and the more important My Three Years in America (New York, 1920); as well as the contemporary article "Bernstorff: The Most Conspicuous Member of the Diplomatic Corps at Washington," Current Opinion, LXI (July, 1915), 19-21.

36. For excellent summaries of the German efforts to supply cruisers at sea and of the passport frauds, see Count von Bernstorff, My Three Years, 85-88; and RL, Memoirs, 67-75. On the passport cases, see further the New York Times, Feb. 26, 27, 1915; Bryan to American Diplomatic and Consular Offices, Wash., Dec. 21, 1914, Foreign Relations, Sup., 1914, 370; and Bryan to William J. Stone, Chairman Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Wash., Jan. 20, 1915, Ibid., xii.

37. This is the conclusion reached by Professor A. S. Link after his study of Bernstorff's dispatches to the Wilhelmstrasse, documents which are now located in the Archives of the German Foreign Office. See Link, Neutrality, 558-60.

38. Rintelen, Dark Invader, 60-74; New York World, Sept. 13, Dec. 8, 1915; and see Stenographic Minutes of the Public Hearings on the Responsibility for the War, Testimony of Count von Bernstorff, Oct. 22, 1919, in Germany, National Constituent Assembly, Official German Documents Relating to The World War, translated under the supervision of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Inter-
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41. Anderson Diary, July 22, 1915; and see his entry for July 12, 1915.

42. Ibid., July 22, 1915; Warren to RL, Wash., Sept. 15, 1915, Lansing Papers, LC; and Daniels Diary, Sept. 21, 1917, recording RL's disclosure of related facts to the Cabinet which "caused us to call him old Sherlock Holmes," Also of interest, the New York Times, Aug. 16, 17, 1915; and Lansing Diaries, LC, July 7, 9, 10, 22, 1915.

43. Professor Link does "not know precisely when Lansing informed the President," but he believes it to have been about the first of August (Neutrality, 563). Yet Lansing Diaries, LC, July 7, 1915, records RL talking with Joseph Tumulty on the phone about Miss Seward.


46. RL, "Count Johann von Bernstorff," May, 1916, Sketch Book, in Memo, Lansing Papers, LC. The words placed in brackets were added by RL in the 1920's when he prepared the sketch for publication. At that time he also replaced the word "unscrupulous" (3rd Paragraph, 1st Sentence) with the phrase "exceptionally clever."

47. See Bernstorff, My Three Years, 107.

48. See Link, Neutrality, 564.

49. Lansing Diaries, LC, July 9, 10, 1915.
CHAPTER VII
THE GERMAN CONSPIRACY:
THE SUBMARINE CRISIS OF 1915

1. For the Proclamation of Neutrality, Aug. 4, 1914, originally written by RL, see the following: DS 763.72111 N39/7; Foreign Relations, Sup., 1914, 547-51; and Carlton Savage, editor, Policy of the United States Towards Maritime Commerce in War, 2 vols. (Washington, 1934-1936), LL, 163-79. For a discussion of neutrality laws as they existed before the war, see Charles G. Fenwick, The Neutrality Laws of the United States (Washington, 1913); and Savage, ed., Maritime Commerce, I, in toto.


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12. Gerard to Bryan, Berlin, Feb. 4, 1915, Foreign Relations, Sup., 1915, 94; and German Memo of Feb. 4, in Bern-
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21. Bernstorff to Gottlieb von Jagow, Wash., Feb. 11, 1915, Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt, Wiltkrieg, Ubootkrieg, Archives of the Imperial German Foreign Office Received by the United States Department of State from the St. Antony's Collection, Microfilm, National Archives; hereafter, cited as AA, Ubootkrieg, German F. O. Archives.

22. Bernstorff to Foreign Office, Wash., Feb. 17, 1915, Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt, Wiltkrieg, Allgemein, Archives of the Imperial German Foreign Office, Microfilm, National Archives; hereafter, cited as AA, Allgemein, German F. O. Archives. Although extensive use has been made by historians of the famous
Notes For Chapter VII
published German documents on the origin of the World War (Germany, Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, edited by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht M. Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, 40 vols. [Berlin, 1922-1927]), the several series of microfilms at the National Archives of the Imperial German Foreign Office's records have received only limited attention. The American historian who perhaps has made the greatest use of these documents is Ernest R. May, World War and American Isolation (Cambridge, 1959).


25. Link, Neutrality, 331.


29. Lansing Papers, I, 361; RL's italics.

30. Smith, Lansing, 51.

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35. Smith, Lansing, 52.

36. RL, Memoir MS., LC, p. 97.


40. C. C. Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), 76-77; Colin Simpson, The Lusitania (Boston, 1972), 53-54.

41. For the years 1913-1917 RL's corporate stock holdings were in companies mostly located in Watertown, New York, and none of them were listed on any of the nation's exchanges. His total investment in stock was minimal since, as he told his secret partner and business manager F. M. Boyer, he did not wish to speculate: "I do not like to have an investment in an industry which requires attention when I am unable to give it that attention" (RL to F. M. Boyer, Wash., Dec. 16, 1915, Special Boyer Correspondence, Lansing Papers, LC). RL
Notes For Chapter VII
was not a wealthy man when he went to the Department of State in 1914, as revealed by his stock dividends and his income tax for 1913 (Boyer to RL, Watertown, Feb. 11, 1914, Ibid.); his Gross Income in 1913 was only $12,754.84; and this included the following dividends: Eagar Electric Co. --$67.50, Northern New York Coal Company--$135.00, Aldrich Paper Co. --$150.00, City National Bank (Watertown)--$245.00, Total: $597.50. This limited activity in the market had not changed fundamentally by 1917 (Boyer to RL, Watertown, Jan. 25, 1917, Ibid.), although he sold some shares of Warren Parchment Company in Dec., 1916 for $10,500, which he put in savings certificates at the Watertown City National Bank at 4 per cent interest (Boyer to RL, Watertown, Dec. 12, 26, 1916, Jan. 5, 1917, Ibid.; RL to Boyer, Wash., Dec. 29, 1916, Jan. 3, 1917, Ibid.). RL seems to have had most of his money in real estate and personal loans to friends. In Jan., 1915, he seems to have had only about $2800 to $3000 in cash at hand. After his retirement from public service, his wealth increased remarkably due to his private law practice and royalties from his several memoirs and articles. In 1921 the syndication rights alone paid Lansing $14,000.


44. The first occasion was over the draft note of the Dec. 26, 1914 protest of British interference with neutral trade; while the second protest concerned the British Orders in Council of March 11, 1915 which ended all trade with the Central Powers. For background, see Smith, Lansing, 46-47, 53-56; Morrissey, Defense of Neutral Rights, 43-45; and Link, Neutrality, 340-48.

45. "Controversy Over Use of Submarines," AJIL, IX (1915), 673; this editorial comment was probably written by Dr. James Brown Scott. See also Morrissey, Defense of Neutral Rights, 53-54.

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Relations, Sup., 1915, 358, 359-60. Also see Spindler, La Guerre Sous-Marine, II, 63-68.

47. For the reaction of the press, see Literary Digest, L (April 10, 1915), 789-91.


50. RL to Bryan, Wash., April 7, 1915, Ibid., I, 373-74.

51. Smith, Lansing, 56-57.


56. This is the thesis usually associated with Daniel Smith. See his Lansing, 57-58, 166-71; and his "Robert Lansing, 1915-1920," An Uncertain Tradition, ed. by N. A. Graebner (New York, 1961), 101-11.


63. RL, "Comments on Mr. Anderson's Memorandum of April 5,
Notes For Chapter VII

64. RL to Bryan, Wash., April 7, 1915, Lansing Papers, I, 373-74.

65. Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board, opinion of April 8, 1915, DS 763.72111/7321; the opinion may also be found in the Woolsey Papers and the Wilson Papers. Professor Tansill (America Goes to War, 255) has made an important error in chronology at this point, holding that RL's April 7, 1915 letter to Bryan took its "cue from the report of the Board." Of further interest, see Baker, Life and Letters, V, 266-67.


70. On the "Appeal," see Literary Digest, L (April 17, 1915), 861; and Link, Neutrality, 350-53.


72. Bernstorff held to this same position in his memoirs (My Three Years, 63-64), yet a search of the documents in the German Foreign Office Archives reveals the memorandum was the Ambassador's own idea, it was delivered on his own initiative, and the Foreign Office did not possess a copy of the protest until late April. See Bernstorff to Foreign Office, Wash., March 28, April 19, 1915, and Jagow to Bernstorff, Berlin, March 31, 1915, in AA, Allgemein, German F. O. Archives.


75. Lansing Diaries, LC, April 22, 1915.
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76. Ibid., April 23-27, 1915. RL left Washington at 11:30 a.m. on Friday, April 23, 1915, and returned by boat the following Monday night.


82. Bernstorff, My Three Years, 115.

83. New York Times, May 1, 1915; New York Sun, May 1, 1915; and also printed in Lansing Papers, I, 382-83; and located in Claims Against Germany by the United States, 1910-1929, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives: DS 462.11T41/22 I/2.


87. RL to Bryan, Wash., May 1, 1915, Lansing Papers, I, 381-82.

88. Lansing Diaries, LC, May 1, 1915.


90. New York Times, May 4, 5, 1915; and Bryan to WW, Wash.,
Notes For Chapter VII
May 5, 1915, Wilson Papers and in Correspondence of Secretary of State Bryan with President Wilson, 1913-1915, 4 vols., Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memoranda of the Secretary of State, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (referred to as Bryan-Wilson Correspondence, NA). Also see Link, Neutrality, 366-67; Baker, Life and Letters, V, 327; and P. E. Coletta, William Jennings Bryan, 3 vols. (Lincoln, 1969), II, 310-11.


93. Statistics are from Thomas A. Bailey, "The Sinking of the Lusitania," AHR, XLI (1935-1936), 57 n., and also see pp. 54-73.

94. Schwieger's log is quoted from Link, Neutrality, 372; but also see excerpts from his wartime diary as well as from the diary of the Commander of the High Seas Submarine Fleet, Fregattenkapitan Bauer, as printed in the German in T. A. Bailey, "German Documents Relating to the Lusitania," JMH, VIII (1936), 320-37.


96. Nation, C (May 13, 1915), 527. On the reaction of the press, see Literary Digest, L (May 15, 1915), 1133-34; and the Independent, LXXXII (May 17, 1915), 267-68.


99. From the draft printed in the Lansing Papers, I, 395-98.


101. See the draft in Ibid., I, 395-98; and RL to Bryan, Wash., May 12, 1915, Ibid., I, 394-94. It should be noted at
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this juncture that Chandler Anderson came to accept RL's point of view as his own after the sinking of the Lusitania. As he wrote in his diary: "My advice in this situation has been that the real and only answer to the German attitude is for this Government to take immediate steps to prepare itself to enforce whatever demands it may ultimately find it necessary to make. Germany is threatening us today, because she holds us in contempt, and knows that we are powerless to enforce our rights. If we are known to have the necessary power to insist upon the observance of our rights and to back up our demands, it would be unnecessary to make any demands. In other words, the moment Germany saw that we were prepared to enforce our rights, she would cease to interfere with those rights" (Anderson Diary, May 11, 1915). Also according to his diary, it appears as if it were Anderson who first suggested that the word "unarmed" be "changed to 'unresisting' in order to fully cover the ground" (Ibid., May 12, 1915).


CHAPTER VIII
VOLTE-FACE

1. The documentation for the following summary will be found in the notes for chs. VI-VII.
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3. RL, Memorandum on Relations with Germany, Feb. 15, 1915, Ibid., I, 367-68.


5. Great Britain, Parliament, Committee on Alleged German Outrages, Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages, 2 vols. (London, 1915), Command Papers 7894-7895; and the New York Times, May 13, 1915, 6-8. The Bryce Report was scheduled for publication on May 13 some two weeks before the sinking of the Lusitania. Careful scholarship has established the document was essentially correct in its major indictment that Germany used terror as a weapon of intimidation; see James M. Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1917 (New Haven 1941), 78-103.


12. Edward Buehrig (Wilson and the Balance of Power, 137) has written: "But did Lansing really fear for the future of democracy or was he using the ideological argument to cut through the inhibitions and controversies which beset American policy and thus bring the United States in on the right side of the war—that of the Allies? Perhaps...the motive was mixed."
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13. See RL to Joseph M. Steels, Wash., Nov. 27, 1918, RL to Walter I. Clark, Wash., Aug. 22, 1919, and RL to Frank Lane, Wash., May 16, 1921, Lansing Papers, LC., for indications RL considered Germany the Antichrist.


15. RL, "What will the President Do?" Dec. 3, 1916, Memo, Ibid.


17. RL added: "I must have spoken with vehemence because the President asked me to lower my voice so that none in the corridor could hear." From RL, "Memorandum of the Cabinet Meeting," March 20, 1917, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC. Also see RL to WW, Wash., March 19, 1917, Lansing Papers, LC, and in RL, Memoirs, 234-36.


19. RL to G. M. Jones, Wash., April 6, 1917, Lansing Papers, LC.

20. RL, "Memorandum on the Declaration of War Against Germany," April 7, 1917, Memo, Ibid.


22. RL, "A War of Self-Defense," Literary Digest, LV (December 29, 1917), 33, 100-102, quoting p. 33. This article was the same as the one which the Committee on Public Information published in Aug., 1917, as RL, "America's Future at Stake," A War of Self-Defense, by Robert Lansing and Louis F. Post, War Information Series, No. 5 (Washington, 1917). A year later, in "Our Partners for Liberty," Forum, LX (July,
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1918), 70-71, RL wrote: "To-day this Republic stands with the
democracies of the earth arrayed in battle against the most
relelentless enemy of human liberty which the ages have pro-
duced. To save this country of ours and to save the civilized
world from Prussianism has become the supreme duty of the A-
erican people...."

23. RL, "The great free peoples of the world...," unentit-
tled address delivered at Princeton University, June 16,
1917, handwritten manuscript, dated June, 1917, located in
the Lansing Papers, Princeton. In this address, RL stated
"No cost in lives and treasure is too much to pay. This gen-
eration may be forced to pay the cost but all future gener-
ations will reap the inestimable benefit of the ages."

24. RL's speech was delivered before 1600 candidates for
commissions as reserve officers, Madison Barracks, New York,
on Sunday, July 29, 1917. It was the single most popular
speech of his career, being printed in full in newspapers and
journals throughout the world. Yet a few hours before he
made the address, he wrote to Frank Polk "it was a great bore
to have to do this but I really saw no way of avoiding it"
(RL to Polk, Henderson Harbor, July 29, 1917, Lansing Pa-
pers, LC). Later that afternoon he told the candidates that
"Were ever people on earth able to express their will there
would be no wars of aggression, then there would be no wars,
and lasting peace would come to this earth. The only way
that a people can express their will is through democratic
institutions." This speech became the basis for the Literary
Digest article cited in the previous note (n. 22), and many
of the paragraphs are identical. For the Madison Barracks Ad-
dress, see the New York Times, July 30, 1917; "Mr. Lansing's
Address to American Officers," The Spectator [London], CXIX
(Sept. 15, 1917), 264-66; "Secretary Lansing on Our War Aims,"
Current History, VI, Pt. II (Sept., 1917), 455-59; and Dis-
curso del Hon. Robert Lansing...en al Cuartel de Madison..., traducido en la Unión Panamericana (Washington, 1917).

25. Five days before RL gave his famous speech on "Prus-
sianism" at Union College (see infra, n. 26), he gave a simi-
lar speech, only shorter in length, at Columbia University,
New York. Delivered on June 5, 1918, this has since become
known as his "(Little) Prussianism Speech." It may be found
in "Beware German Peace Snares, Lansing Warns," Chicago Tri-
bune, June 6, 1918.

26. RL, "Prussianism," an address delivered at Union Col-
lege, Schenectady, New York, on June 10, 1918, was picked up
by the wires of the Associated Press. It may be found in the
Washington Evening Star, June 10, 1918; the Christian Science
Monitor, June 10, 1918; the National Geographic Magazine,
XXXIII (June, 1918), 546-57; and as El Prusianismo (Washing-
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In defining "Prussianism," RL stated that "We now recognize that the policies of the Imperial Government of Germany and the boasted 'kultur' of the German people have been concentrated on the single purpose of expanding the territory and power of the Prussian Emperor of Germany until he, through the possession of superior force, becomes the primate of all the rulers of the earth. World domination was the supreme object. That was and is the central thought of Prussianism."

27. For further information on this same subject, see RL to Edward N. Smith, Wash., April 25, 1916, and April 7, 1917, Lansing Papers, LC. Also see the unentitled reflection by RL dated Oct. 10, 1917, Lansing Papers, Princeton: "The clouds which fell upon civilization when the waves of barbarians swept over Europe in the Dark Ages have again gathered in the north. The standards of morality and justice are swept by the tempest...."

28. In Sept., 1918, RL believed the United States should aid Siberians in establishing a government independent of the Bolsheviks. He told the President Americans would approve the move if they were informed of its necessity. He suggested that he deliver a speech, to alert the public, in which he would dwell on the need to continue the war until Bolshevik "Prussianism" was eliminated. Wilson disagreed after reading the draft of RL's speech. (RL to WW, Wash., Sept. 23, 1918, Wilson Papers and Lansing Papers, Princeton; also see Burton F. Beers, Vain Endeavor [Durham, 1962], 136). The theme of the speech which RL was soon to give at the Auburn Theological Seminary (Oct. 10, 1918) was therefore changed. As he later wrote a friend (RL to Gary M. Jones, Wash., Oct. 17, 1918, Lansing Papers, LC), the address was intended to quiet the wartime fanaticism and to prepare the public to accept a just and rational peace. Yet a question remains as to what he actually did say at Auburn. The speech given to the press that night and later published as The Spirit of the Coming Era (Washington, 1918), reflected this reconciliatory theme suggested in his letter to Jones. Yet his personal Diaries, LC (entry for Oct. 10, 1918), reveal he was ill that night and that he gave only a short speech which he was still forced to read in two different segments, resting between the parts. Further, in the Lansing Papers at Princeton there is a hand written address with the same title and date as the published speech, but shorter in length and different in content (RL, "Spirit of the Coming Era," Oct. 10, 1918, Lansing Papers, Princeton). If it is this latter document RL read that night--and it appears likely--then his new theme was never presented personally since its contents were only generalizations about the American people's noble sacrifices during the war.

29. RL, "Consideration and Outline of Policies," July 11,
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1915, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC; and also in RL, Memoirs, 20.


34. The Japanese suspicions were reported in John Van Antwerp MacMurray, United States Charge d'Affaires in China, to Bryan, Peking, Aug. 13, 1914, DS 763.72/354; and in MacMurray to Bryan, Peking, Aug. 18, 1914, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, DS 893.00/2184.


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Japanese Land Question in the United States," June 16, 1914, 47pp, Woolsey Papers. The positions taken by the two governments in the alien land question may be found in the relevant documents as printed in "American-Japanese Discussions Relating to Land Tenure Law of California" (printed June 29, 1914), and "Japanese Comment on the California Land Tenure Correspondence" (printed July 31, 1914), U.S., Department of State, Division of Information, Alphabetical Series of Confidential Publications, 1909-1928, Records of the Division of Current Information, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives: Information Series D (Far East), Nos. 73-74.

37. RL to Bryan, Wash., March 1, 1915, Lansing Papers, II (1940), 407-08.

38. Beers has correctly pointed out Lansing reversed his stand on the recognition of Japan's interest in Shantung because of investment interests acquired in a flood control project along the Huai River by an American company, the American International Corporation. See Beers, Vain Endeavor, 75-83; and Li, Wilson's China Policy, 184-90.

39. WW to Bryan, Wash., April 14, 1915, Lansing Papers, II, 416-17. For Beer's account of the President's motives, see Vain Endeavor, 45-46.

40. Ibid., 118-19, and also pp. 177-84. Although the source material on the Lansing-Ishii Agreement is vast, several important references should be cited at this juncture. There are three printed memoirs by the men who were involved in the negotiations: RL, Memoirs, 281-306; Edward T. Williams (Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs), "Japan's Interests in Manchuria," University of California Chronicle, XXXIV (January, 1932), 1-27; and Viscount Kikujirō Ishii, Diplomatic Commentaries, translated from the Japanese and edited by William R. Langdon (Baltimore, 1936), 109-35. Williams also wrote a six-page summary memorandum "The Lansing-Ishii Agreement," April 29, 1918, Long Papers. The classic study of the talks is Francis C. Prescott, "The Lansing-Ishii Agreement" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1949). Pierre Renouvin, La Question d'Extreme-Orient, 1840-1940 (Paris, 1946), sees the note as Japan's first timid attempt at establishing an Asian Monroe Doctrine. Also see the citations in supra, n. 30. For a sample of RL's own views, see his "Memoranda on the Lansing-Ishii Agreement," 1917, 70pp., Lansing Papers, Princeton; "Shantung, The Eastern Alsace-Lorraine: America's Policy in the Far East," Asia, XIX (Sept., 1919), 873, which is RL's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 11, 1919, on the phrase "special interests" in China; and RL's famous memorandum, "The Lansing-
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41. RL's assumptions about American economic interests in East Asia were influenced by his close association with his father-in-law, John W. Foster; for Foster's views, see his American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston, 1903). This history is not intending to imply that Beers overlooked RL's ideas about American trade and investment in Asia; see his "Lansing's Proposed Bargain," PHR, XXVI (1957), 391-92, and his Vain Endeavor, 20-22.

42. See RL to Smith, Wash., Dec. 20, 1917, RL to J. W. Davis, Nov. 3, 1922, Lansing Papers, LC; and supra, ch. I, section II.


44. By the time of his talks with Ishii in 1917, RL's fears of a German conspiracy were being tempered by a new fear—an international Bolshevik conspiracy. See for example RL, Memorandum on the Russian Situation," Dec. 7, 1917, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC.

45. For the rumors which the Department of State received about German overtures to Japan, see Bryan to WW, Wash., April 26, 1915, Bryan Papers; Frank L. Polk, Memorandum of the Counselor, Dec. 15, 1915, The Papers of Frank Lyon Polk, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University (hereafter, cited as Polk Papers); and RL, "Memorandum on Zimmermann Message to Mexico," March 4, 1917, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC.
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1918); Percy Alvin Martin, Latin America and the War (Baltimore, 1921); and Carlos Silva Vildósola and Nicolás F. López, South American Opinions on the War, translated from the Spanish by Peter H. Goldsmith (Washington, 1917). Finally, attention must be given to several important period-studies: P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917 (Cambridge, 1970); Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore, 1942), which has been superceded by Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964). Munro holds that interventions were primarily for political and strategic, rather than for economic, reasons. He should be read along with Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1963); and Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, 1954).

2. RL, Memoirs, 84; G. H. Stuart, The Department of State (New York, 1949), 243, 244-45; W. Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston, 1952), 76.


4. See RL, Memoirs, 314; RL to Newton D. Baker, Wash., Aug. 16, 1917, Lansing Papers, LC; the several letters of introduction written by RL for Dulles in vol. 25 of the bound correspondence, Lansing Papers, LC; and Dulles' important report of May 1, 1917, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Costa Rica, 1910-1929, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives: DS 818.00/142.

5. RL, "Consideration and Outline of Policies," July 11, 1915, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC. For details on the negotiations, see C. C. Tansill, The Purchase of the Danish West Indies (Baltimore, 1931), 548 pp.; and G. W. Baker, "Robert Lansing and the Purchase of the Danish West Indies," Social Studies, LVII (1966), 64-71. RL's memoir account is "Drama of the Virgin Island Purchase," New York Times Magazine, July 19, 1931, 4-5. The American Minister to Denmark has written a useful memoir as well, see Maurice Francis Egan, Ten Years Near the German Frontier, A Retrospect and a Warning (New York, 1919). Also of value, see Soren J. M. P. Fogdall, "Danish-American Diplomacy, 1776-1920," University of Iowa Studies in the Social Sciences, VII (1921-1927), No. 2, 171 pp.; and Luther K. Zabriskie, The Virgin Islands of the United States of America (New York, 1918), who was the American vice-
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consul at St. Thomas. Two useful contemporary articles are the Editorial Comment of "The Purchase of the Danish West Indies by the United States of America," AJIL, X (1916), 853-59; and George A. Finch, "The Danish West Indies," Ibid., XI (1917), 413-16. Although many of the public documents are printed in Foreign Relations, 1917, 457-706; and in the Lansing Papers, II, 501-11; it is still necessary to consult the dispatches in The Political Relations Between the United States and Denmark, 1910-1929, The Cession of the Danish West Indies, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (hereafter, cited as DS 711.59): DS 711.5914/0-300.


8. RL, Memorandum of a Conversation with Brun, Nov. 15, 1915, Lansing Papers, II, 501-02. Also see RL to WW, Wash., Dec. 4, 1915, in Ibid., II, 503-04, and in Lansing-Wilson Letters, NA. It was not until Secretary of the Navy Daniels read the published Lansing Papers, II (1940) that he learned for the first time that RL had used the threat of force. Daniels wrote in his memoirs that the Cabinet was never told this and "I am sure...Wilson was not informed of Lansing's imperialistic threat." This, of course, was not true. See J. Daniels, Years of Peace (Chapel Hill, 1944), 175-76.


10. Lansing Diaries, LC, Aug. 4, 1916; and for the treaty see Foreign Relations, 1917, 694-700. As for RL's objections, see RL to Woolsey, Henderson Harbor, July 24, 1916, and RL to Polk, Henderson Harbor, July 28, 1916, Woolsey Papers. The cost of the territory thus would be $189,393.93 per square mile, or less than one cent per square foot of land.


14. Egan, Ten Years, 268-88; Egan to RL, Copenhagen, Aug. 14,
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25. 1916, DS 711.5914/91, and -/123; for the plebiscite vote of 284,000 for and 158,000 against the sale, see Egan to RL, Copenhagen, Dec., 15, 1915, DS 711.5914/176. On the economy of the islands, see Luther R. Zabriskie to W. Carr, St. Thomas, March 20, 1916, DS 711.5914/51; and Fogdall, "Danish-American Diplomacy," 144. On the ratification, the lower house (Folketing) voted 90 to 16 with 5 absent on Dec. 20, and the upper house (Landsting) voted 40 to 19 the following day; on Dec. 22, 1916, the king ratified the treaty. See Egan to RL, Copenhagen, Dec. 20, 21, 22, 1916, DS 711.5914/177, -/178, -/180.


17.  Ibid., 10-11; the original letter to Wilson appears in Foreign Relations, 1917, 692-94.

18.  RL to J. H. Oliver, Wash., Feb. 11, 1918, Lansing Papers, LC.


23.  RL, Memoir MS., 122.

24.  Ibid., 128-29.

25.  Smith, a Republican and editor of the Watertown Standard is described in RL to WW, Wash., June 9, 1917, Lansing Papers, Princeton.


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28. On the Conference, see Ibid., 362ff.; Link, Neutrality, 487-94; P. H. Lowry, "Mexican Policy of Wilson" (Yale, 1949), 147-50. For RL's point of view, see his Memoir MS., ch. X; "The Conference in Regard to Mexico," Oct. 10, 1915, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC; and RL to WW, Wash., Aug. 6, 10, 30, Sept. 12, 1915, Lansing-Wilson Letters, NA. D. M. Smith ("Robert Lansing," Uncertain Tradition, p. 112) holds that RL was hoping to displace Carranza with recognition of "the more amenable General Alvaro Obregon;" there is no documentation seen by this author which can support the Smith statement. As for the opinion of the American Press, see the following: "The Reversal of Our Policy in Mexico, and Its Relation to the War in Europe," Current Opinion, LIX (July, 1915), 3-5; "Seven Republics Appeal to Mexico to Stop Her Infernal Racket," Ibid., LIX (Sept., 1915), 149-52; "Carranza Wins Recognition at Last as the Ruler of Mexico," Ibid., LIX (Nov., 1915), 300-01, which quotes an editorial from the Detroit Free Press as saying that "the likelihood [is] that ultimately this nation will be obliged to intervene below the Rio Grande;" The Nation, CI (Aug. 5, 12, Sept. 16, 1915), 162, 187, 343; and the Independent, LXXXIII (Sept. 20, 1915), 386-87. John Barette, Director-General of the Pan-American Union, wrote an article on the conference which highlights RL's role, see "Practical Pan-Americanism," North American Review, Sept., 1915, 1-11. C. P. Anderson held a less favorable view about the whole conference, see his Diary, LC, entry for Aug. 5, 1915.

29. On the Columbus raid and the Pershing expedition, see Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico, Revised Edition (New York, 1963), 176-80; Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 187-223; Clarence Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa (Ithaca, 1961), 225-81; and Brand, Daniels Interview, 1936, p. 8, R. S. Baker Papers. For RL's views, see his Memoir MS., 297-310, 319-21, in which he notes how he found it necessary to tell the Latin American ministers "again and again" that the United States would not intervene in Mexico; yet he admits that American troops on Mexican soil "might seem to them to contradict this assurance" (p. 316).


32. Cline, U. S. and Mexico, 183; Clendenen, U. S. and Villa,
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285. Also see L. H. Woolsey, "Robert Lansing's Record as Secretary of State," Current History, XXIX (Dec., 1928), 389-90. In his Memoir MS., 375, RL says of Secretary Lane that in view of the closeness of the 1916 election results WW owes a great debt to Lane for keeping the United States out of war with Mexico; but that Lane "never received a word of thanks for his voluntary service" from the President.

33. See for example, RL, War Memoirs, 308-09. In March, 1917, RL wrote Smith that the fear of German activities in Mexico made it necessary to "take every precaution in dealing with the Mexican Government. This was a decided factor in our Mexican policy, I might say, a controlling factor. Yet it could not be explained. We had to accept in silence the criticism of recognizing Carranza, of not acting vigorously, of withdrawing Pershing without accomplishment, of vacillation, &c., and this had to be done while a presidential campaign was in progress because the national welfare demanded that our lips should be sealed" (RL to E. N. Smith, Wash., March 3, 1917, Lansing Papers, LC).


36. RL, "Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine, and Its Need of Restatement," June 11, 1914, Lansing Papers, II, 460-65. It is most surprising that no historian has observed that two months prior RL wrote his now famous memo he had attended the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American
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Society of International Law where he heard his friend Elihu Root deliver his subsequently famous presidential address on "The Real Monroe Doctrine." Root traced the historical origins of the doctrine and concluded that its "scope...is strictly limited" to only the "occupation of territory in the New World" by a European Power. Although Root did not call for an expansion of the doctrine to encompass economic imperialism, it does seem likely that his address caused RL to start thinking about this limitation. See Root, "The Real Monroe Doctrine," AJIL, VIII (1914), 428-42.

37. Perkins described the memorandum as "the ultimate expansion of the principles of 1823" (History of the Monroe Doctrine, 267). Also see A. P. Whitaker, Western Hemisphere Idea, 122-23. RL's ideas were not so different from those advanced in 1902 by the Argentine Foreign Minister Luis M. Drago; see Whitaker's chapter on "Drago's Economic Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," Ibid., 86-107.

38. RL to Bryan, Wash., June 16, 1914, Lansing Papers, II, 459-60. Bryan seems to have made no written comments, see Political Relations Between the United States and Other American States, the Monroe Doctrine, 1910-1929, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (hereafter cited as DS 710.11): DS 710.11/186 1/2.


40. RL, "Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine," Nov. 24, 1915, Lansing Papers, II, 468-70, which is an edited copy of the memorandum; consequently, see the complete document in DS 710.11/188 1/2.


43. RL, Memoir MS., 173-74, 175.

44. Meeting from December 27, 1915 to January 8, 1916, the Congress aimed at continuing the work started at the first session held in 1908 at Santiago, Chile.

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Choate, Wash., Jan. 20, 1916, and RL to Prof. J. Madison
Gathany, Wash., April 10, 1918, Lansing Papers, LC. Of
related interest, see L. S. Rowe to RL, Philadelphia, Oct.
9, 1915, and RL to Rowe, Wash., Oct. 11, 1915, Ibid., for
the "unquestioned confidence" most Latin Americans had in
RL's leadership.

46. At a dinner on January 8, 1916, which concluded the
Congress, RL made the following remarks: "Each of us loves
his native land above all others. It would be mad indeed if
it were otherwise for the destiny of a nation resides in the
hearts of its people. True patriotism destroys individual
selfishness. The best that a man has must he give to his
country; be it talent, be it wealth, or be it life itself.
Self-sacrifice is the essence of patriotism. But in seeking
the welfare of our country we today render no better service
than by giving support to Pan Americanism. While the policy
...is international in scope and purpose, it gives to each
American republic the opportunity to build its future un-
hindered by those fears and suspicions which in the past
have so often darkened our relations. It is to me, there-
fore, a patriotic duty--and it may be yours also--to foster
and encourage the Pan American spirit" (RL, Memorandum of
Remarks at Pan American Dinner, Jan. 8, 1916, Lansing Papers,
LC).


48. RL, Memoir MS., ch. XII, 167-85; Bemis, "Wilson and
Latin America," Wilson's Foreign Policy in Perspective, 130-
36. For information on the transition from the general
policy of intervention to what has been called the "Good
Neighbor Policy," see Dana Gardner Munro, "Intervention and
Dollar Diplomacy in Retrospect," as printed in The United
States and Latin America, ed. by Earl T. Glauert and Lester
D. Langley (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Com-
pany, 1971), 62-76. For the "New Left" view, see Lloyd C.
Gardner, Walter F. LaFeber, and Thomas J. McCormick, Creation
of the American Empire: U. S. Diplomatic History (Chicago,
1973), 280-368 passim.
CHAPTER X: POST-WAR DECADE


4. D. M. Smith, "Robert Lansing, 1915-1920," An Uncertain Tradition, ed. by N. A. Graebner (New York, 1961), 103. Smith has written on the Wilson-Lansing relationship elsewhere, see previous note; his monograph on Robert Lansing (Berkeley, 1958), 77-82; and his Aftermath of War: Bainbridge Colby and Wilsonian Diplomacy, 1920-1921 (Philadelphia, 1970), 4-5, 156-59. RL wrote several profiles of WW and analyses of their relationship, among these see: The Peace Negotiations (Boston, 1921), passim; War Memoirs (Indianapolis, 1935), 24, 349-50; and The Big Four, And Others of the Peace Conference (Boston, 1921), 37-67. This latter sketch was written in April and May of 1920, and serialized in the Saturday Evening Post (XCIII, March 12, 1921, pp. 3-4, March 19, pp. 3-4, March 26, pp. 8-9, and April 2, 1921, pp. 6-7), and in a condensed form in The Review of Reviews (LXIII [April, 1921], 427-29). The most interesting view of WW which RL wrote is "The Mentality of Woodrow Wilson," Nov. 20, 1921, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC (see infra, n. 5).

5. RL, "The Mentality of Woodrow Wilson," Nov. 20, 1921, Ibid.: "When one comes to consider Mr. Wilson's mental processes, there is the feeling that intuition rather than reason played the chief part in the way in which he reached conclusions and judgments. In fact arguments, however soundly reasoned, did not appeal to him if they were opposed to his feeling of what was the right thing to do. Even established facts were ignored if they did not fit in with this intuitive sense, this semi-divine power to select the right. Such attitude of mind is essentially feminine. . . ." For a discussion of this Memorandum, see Beers, Vain Endeavor (Durham, 1962), 49-50; A. S. Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York, 1954), who sees this "description of Wilson's mental processes. . .[as] the most illuminating this writer has read" (p. 32, n. 18). Also see William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years

7. Lawrence, True Story of Wilson, 78.


10. RL, "President's Draft of a Covenant for a League of Nations," Jan. 11, 1919, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC. RL later wrote that WW "does not value the advice of lawyers except on strictly legal questions, and that he considers their objections and criticisms on other subjects to be too often based on mere technicalities and their judgments to be warped by an undue regard for precedent" (Peace Negotiations, 41).

11. "The Reminiscences of William Phillips," Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, quoted in Smith, Lansing, 195, n. 44. Phillips also takes a similar stand in his Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston, 1952), 73-74, yet of the 477 pages in this latter memoir, Phillips found it necessary to refer to his former friend and superior only twice. In the chapters concerned with the war years, the author is presented as being the major influence upon WW in the making of policy.

12. RL, Peace Negotiations, 24; and see Smith, Lansing, 77.

13. Ibid., 171; Beers, Vain Endeavor, 50.

14. On this point see RL, Memoirs, 18; and Josephus Daniels, Years of Peace (Chapel Hill, 1944), 440.


17. The interrelated questions of the "Leak" and "Blunder" of December, 1916, is a story which yet needs to be written satisfactorily. Investigation into the problem should begin with RL, Memoirs, 177-92; John M. Blum, "The Leak Investigation
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20. A brief overview of RL's opinions on Russia is in Smith, "Robert Lansing," Uncertain Tradition, 115-13; while George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1956-1958), emphasizes RL's role in shaping the Siberian intervention and the nonrecognition policies. Although in Notes on Sovereignty RL advanced the theory that a government which controls a territory should receive diplomatic recognition, as reflected in his policy toward Carranza's Mexico, he found the Bolshevik ideology and morally so impossible that in this case he compromised his principle. See RL, "Memorandum on the Siberian Situation," July 4, 1918, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC; and two untitled memoranda of Dec. 4, 1917 and Jan. 6, 1918, Lansing Papers, Princeton. For conflicting views, see Norman Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (London, 1968), 50-119; Betty Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920 (Durham, 1956).
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22. See supra, ch. VIII, section II.


25. RL was not surprised by the fall of the Kerensky government, since he had predicted it three months before; see
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his "Memorandum on the Russian Situation," Aug. 9, 1917, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC.


27. RL, "The war, which has been brought to a successful conclusion. . . ." untitled memorandum, Nov. 22, 1918, Ibid.


29. RL to Ed Smith, Wash., Nov. 14, 1918, Ibid.; and also see RL to Charles L. Parmelee, Wash., Nov. 13, 1918, Ibid.
William Hard, "Anti-Bolsheviks: Mr. Lansing," New Republic, XIX (July 2, 1919), 271-73, is an interesting criticism of RL's position.


31. See RL to House, Wash., April 8, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 118-20. Between September, 1918 and March, 1919, RL wrote eleven memoranda on the League of Nations, see Memo, Lansing Papers, LC.

32. RL's case is best presented in his Peace Negotiations, 162-77; yet this published account of his views is more guarded than in his War Memoires, perhaps due to its date of publication (1921), and thus cannot always be taken at its face value.


34. Of the many volumes relating to the Paris Conference, the following have been most useful: The two studies by RL previously noted—Peace Negotiations and The Big Four; T. A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (Chicago, 1944); E. M. House and Charles Seymour, eds., What Really Happened at Paris (New York, 1921); Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counter-revolution at Versailles (New York, 1967); Sir Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking,
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35. Many of RL's caricatures, including two of himself, survive in the Lansing Papers, Princeton, as does the following untitled and undated poem.

In a glorious marble palace
On the slopes of Mount Olympus
Near the blooming Fields Elysian
Great and mighty Jove was seated,
In his hand a bolt of thunder,
On his head a victor's garland,
Round his frame a spotless Toga,
By his side was Mars in armor,
Neptune with his fearsome trident,
And the gold-desiring Pluto.

There they sat in secret conclave
There they sat in whispering council
Mightiest gods of all in Heaven,
In the ancient heathen Heaven,
Where the sunlight is eternal,
Where the flowers are perennial,
Where no gnats or other insects,
Noxious reptiles, creeping vermin,
E'er pollute the breath of springtime
Or the glorious homes celestial.

There they sat, the four Olympians,
Pondering o'er the fate of nations,
Pondering how the world of mortals
Should be made a place of virtue
Should be freed from foul ambitious
From the bloody scenes of conflict,
From the woes of want and famine
From the cruel and heartless tyrants
Who oppressed the weak and helpless.

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42. RL, Peace Negotiations, 178-89. See Bailey, Lost Peace, ch. XV; and Yates, United States and French Security, passim, which presents RL as an isolationist because of his opposition.


44. RL, "Possible Crisis if Italians are Allowed to Hope They Will Get Fiume," March 29, 1919, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC.


46. As for the Covenant, "I am saying nothing. . . . I claim no share in authorship and want no responsibility for its operation. Possibly it can be worked out all right, but I cannot escape the feeling of doubt which I have had ever since the Covenant was originally drafted" (RL to L. H. Wooley, Paris, May 24, 1919, Lansing Papers, Princeton). For other reflections by RL, see his memoranda dated June 9, 20,
Notes For Chapter X
21, 29, 1919, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC. RL presented his own plan for the League to the American People in an address before the American Bar Association, September 5, 1919, and again in an article printed in 1921 ("Some Legal Problems of the Peace Conference," AJIL, XIII [Oct., 1919], 631-50; "A Suggestion as to a Possible Policy in Relation to the Treaties of Peace and the League of Nations," Outlook, CXXVIII [June 29, 1921], 366-68). Both articles reflected the need for the "negative guarantee" and for increased emphasis upon international law. Yet this did not mean he had forsaken his earlier belief in the sovereignty of force; see his "The Fallacy of 'Outlaw War,'" Independent, CXIII (Aug. 16, 1924), 95-96. William E. Borah disagreed, see "Public Opinion Outlaws War: A Reply to Mr. Lansing," Ibid., CXIII (Sept. 13, 1924), 147-49. During the debate over the Kellogg-Briand Pact some years later, one editor reprinted RL's article as "Can war Be Outlawed?" (Congressional Digest, VII [March, 1928], 87-89.

47. RL to Polk, Paris, June 4, 1919, Lansing Papers, Princeton.
48. RL to J. Davis, Paris, July 10, 1919, Ibid.
49. Nation, CIX (June 19, 1919, 68.
50. Ibid.
51. RL, Peace Negotiations, 187-88. After his resignation, RL would make this same point in several letters to friends and associates. To Nicolas Murray Butler he wrote "if I could have known in January, 1919, the intense opposition of the President to my views. . . . I would of course have resigned my office. But I did not know and could not foresee" (Wash., March 25, 1921, Lansing Papers, LC). Also see RL to Oswald G. Villard, Wash., March 23, 1921, and RL to Herbert A. Gibbons, Wash., April 2, 1921, Ibid.
52. RL had been interested in reorganization of the Department since at least 1914; yet he was unable to seriously pursue the matter until after the war had ended. When he left office in February of 1920, he continued to pressure congressmen for reform. RL must be given credit for being the ideological father of the 1924 Rogers Act. His case is presented in "Reasons Why Reorganization. . . is necessary," Dec. 4, 1919, RL to Stephen Porter, Wash., Dec. 6, 1919, Lansing Papers, LC. The quotation is from RL to John J. Rogers, Wash., Jan. 21, 1920, in U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on the Foreign Service of the United States, 68th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 30-31.
53. Lansing Diaries, LC, Aug. 6, 1919. He was before the Committee from 2:30 to 4:30 p.m.
54. Bailey, Great Betrayal, 82-83.
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55. RL's testimony is in Senate Document 106, pp. 139-252 (op. cit., n. 35). Quotations are from the New York Sun and Detroit News, Aug. 7, 1919. For the most interesting critical editorials, see the following papers under date of Aug. 7, 1919: Philadelphia Public Ledger; and the New York American, Tribune, and World; and the Philadelphia North American, stating "under Mr. Wilson the office of the secretary of state appears to be limited ordinarily to a state of mind."

56. RL, "Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," Aug. 7, 1919, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC.


58. Lansing Diaries, LC, Sept. 4-29, 1919. While in Boston RL spoke before the American Bar Association on "Some Questions of the Peace Conference"; see supra, n. 46; and Boston Herald, Sept. 6, 1919.

59. RL, Peace Negotiations, 270.


62. Lansing Diaries, LC, Sept. 12, 1919. RL later referred to Bullitt as "the little traitor" (RL to Polk, Wash., Oct., 1919, Lansing Papers, Princeton), and as a man whose "conduct is beyond words—that is, words fit to print" (RL to Davis, Henderson Harbor, Sept. 21, 1919, Ibid.).


64. On WW's trip, see Bailey, Great Betrayal, ch. VI; E. B. Wilson, My Memoir, 273; Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as
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I Know Him (Garden City, 1921), 434, 438; and David H. Jennings, "President Wilson's Tour in September, 1919: A Study of Forces Operating During the League of Nations Fight" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1959). RL opposed the trip because he felt WW was needed in Washington to help Hitchcock handle the Senate; see RL to Davis, Wash., Sept. 2, 1919, Lansing Papers, Princeton.


66. RL, Peace Negotiations, 271. Bullitt restated his case after reading RL's memoir, and it may be found in Bullitt to RL, New York, March 25, 1921, Lansing Papers, LC; and in Bullitt to The Editors, New York Times, March 26, 1921.

67. Tumulty, As I Know Him, 441-43.


72. Tumulty, As I Know Him, 216, 443-44; Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of War and After, 1917-1923 (Chapel Hill, 1946), 523-24; RL to J. Pratt, Wash., June 24, 1928, Lansing Papers, LC; RL, "Note on Interview with Tumulty," Lansing Papers, Princeton. Yet despite RL's denials, a month later he wrote a friend: "The truth is, I think, 'inability' to perform his duties, within the meaning of the Constitution, exists, and the President ought to turn over his office to the Vice President and devote himself to regaining his vigor" (RL to J. Davis, Wash., Nov. 18, 1918, Lansing Papers, Princeton).
Notes For Chapter X
73. Gene Smith, *When the Cheering Stopped*, ch. VII.


76. RL, "Cabinet Meetings during the President's Illness," Feb. 10, 1921, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC.


80. RL, "Method of Determining a Course of Action," Nov. 13, 1919, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC; Lansing Diaries, LC, Nov. 18, 24, 1919; Daniels Diary, Nov. 18, 1919. At the Cabinet Meeting, RL took the position that conditions did not justify intervention at this time.

81. Lansing Diaries, LC, Nov. 28, 1919; Daniels, *Years of War*, 522-23; Daniels Diary, Nov. 28, 1919.

82. See RL to Ed Smith, Wash., Dec. 5, 1919, Lansing Papers, Princeton.

83. RL, "Interview with Mexican Ambassador," Nov. 28, 1919, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC; Lansing Diaries, LC, Nov. 28, 1919; Long Diary, Nov. 28, 1919.
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84. Lansing Diaries, LC, Dec. 1, 2, 3, 1919; New York Times, Dec. 2, 4, 5, 1919; RL to Davis, Wash., Dec. 2, 1919, Lansing Papers, Princeton: "I am trying to see some way out without breaking off diplomatic relations. . . . It may be that we will have to spank him [Carranza] before we get through." RL to Robert Buck, Wash., Dec. 3, 1919, Ibid.: "When he [WW] is finally able to review the conduct of affairs he may complain of my course. This does not worry me because, as I have done what I think is right, I am sure that the country will not suffer."


86. RL, "President's Capacity to Perform His Duties," Dec. 4, 1919, Memo, Lansing Papers, LC.


88. E. B. Wilson, My Memoir, 298-99; Daniels, Years of War, 511-18; Houston, Eight Years, II, 190-91; New York Times, Dec. 6, 7, 1919.

89. Ibid., Dec. 11, 12, 1919.


93. RL to WW, Wash., Feb. 9, 1920, Ibid.

94. WW to RL, Wash., Feb. 11, 1920, Ibid.


96. See the sources listed supra, n. 90.
CONCLUSION


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7. These include President, Society of Washington; Vice President, Boy's Club Federation; Washington Opera Committee of the National Opera Association; Vice President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. But most of his time spent on public service was related to his religious activities: American Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities; Vice President, American Bible Society; Delegate to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.; Chairman, General Committee, Interchurch World Movement; the New Era Movement of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

8. Information of Lansing and Woolsey is from the letters in Box 6, Woolsey Papers.

9. In 1923 Poland bestowed upon RL the Diploma and Insignia of the Order of Poland Regenerated, First Class.


APPENDIX B: ROBERT LANSING'S HEALTH

1. "The couple's childless state was a source of regret, but Eleanor didn't grieve, saying that she could be with her husband more" (B. F. Beers, Interview with Emma Sterling Lansing, Oct. 9, 1954, in this author's possession). See also Henry Dolger and Bernard Seeman, How to Live with Diabetes (New York: Pyramid Books, 1966), 38, 41; and Nellis B. Foster, Diabetes Mellitus, Designed for the Use of Practitioners of Medicine (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1915), 129.
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2. "As for Lansing's troubles with sugar diabetes, the condition appeared ca. 1910. Insulin therapy was then experimental, and Bert had trouble getting adjusted. However, by the time he became associated with the Wilson administration he was having little trouble. Miss Emma thought that his reported illness in 1916-17 was due more to overwork than anything else." This is the view held by RL's sister when interviewed by Professor Beers in 1954. Miss Emma Lansing was in error on several points. Insulin was not discovered until 1922; in an article published in 1915, G. M. Jones speaks of RL's illness requiring "a diet for a long time" as having occurred before the couple moved to Washington in 1907 (D. F. Lane, "Robert Lansing as His Friends Know Him," Collier's LVI [Nov. 13, 1915], 24); and RL wrote E. M. House of his illness in 1916 as having been coming on for some time. The treatment he was undergoing was dietary and complete rest, during which he lost over 15 pounds. See RL to House, Wash., May 31, 1916, Lansing Papers, Princeton.


6. Doger and Seeman, Diabetes, 56-57.


9. In 1920, RL wrote friends "in strict confidence" that for the past several years he would suffer acute physical pain whenever he made a public address. See RL to E. E. Violette, Wash., April 20, 1920, RL to Pat Harrison, Henderson Harbor, Aug. 12, 1920, and RL to F. K. Lane, Wash., April 15, 1921, Lansing Papers, LC; and Foster, Diabetes Mellitus, 126, 128-29.

10. See a series of letters between RL and L. H. Woolsey during July and August, 1924, in Box 6 of the Woolsey Papers.

11. Sir Frederick Grant Banting (1891-1941), working under the direction of John James Rickard Macleod (1876-1935) of the University of Toronto, began research (1921) on internal secretions of the pancreas. Banting discovered (1922), with the aid of Charles Herbert Best (b. 1899) and, secondarily, James Bertram Collip (1892-1965), the hormone insulin, now used as a specific remedy for diabetes. Banting and Macleon
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were awarded jointly the 1923 Nobel Prize for Phisiology and Medicine, which they shared with Best and Collip. For in-
formation of RL's adjustment to insulin, see Richard C. Sweet
to Louis Sopkin, Wash., July 11, 1923, Lansing Papers, LC;
and on RL's death see the New York Times, Oct. 31, 1928, and
the sources in supra, Conclusion, nn. 10 and 11.
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7. "How Our City is Governed, Containing a Discussion of Municipal Ownership." Unpublished Address Delivered at Boon Street Mission, January, 1902. Lansing Papers, LC.


   This essay became the basis for the 1924 published article listed below as entry 51.


20. "Statement by the President of the Tribunal that the North Atlantic Fisheries Award was a Compromise." American Journal of International Law, V (1911), 725-26.


This address deals with the conference at Christiania, Norway, on the archipelago of Spitzbergen in 1912. Revised in 1916, it was finally published in 1917. See the entry 30 below.


See the annotation for entry 39.


This same article was republished under the title "A War of Self-Defense" by The Literary Digest (LV [December 29, 1917], 33, 100-02).


A Spanish translation of this Address was published by the Pan American Union in 1917.


See annotation at entry 23 above.


This is an Address of October 10, 1918, at a dinner in celebration of the 100th anniversary of Auburn Theological Seminary.


This is a reprint of Lansing's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 11, 1919.


An Address before the regents of the University of the State of New York, October 17, 1919.


See the annotation for entry 39.


This is a reprint of Lansing's "Notes" originally written in 1906 and as published in 1907 and 1921 as entries 15 and 38 above. The third part of the Carnegie edition is a reprint of Lansing's summary article written in 1914 (entry 24).


42. "Dante and His Century." Unpublished article, December 23, 1921. Lansing Papers, LC.

43. "Self-Determination." Saturday Evening Post, CXIII (April 9, 1921), 6-7, 101-02.


45. "A Suggestion as to a Possible Policy in Relation to the Treaty of Peace and the League of Nations." Outlook, CXXVIII (June 29, 1921), 366-68.


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50. "The Fallacy of 'Outlaw War.'" Independent, CXIII (August 16, 1924), 95-96.

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53. "When Wilson Failed as Peacemaker." Saturday Evening Post, CCIII, No. 51 (June 20, 1931), 10-11, 123-27.

See annotation for entry 56.

54. "War Days in the White House." Saturday Evening Post, CCIV, No. 6 (August 8, 1931), 21, 87-92.

See annotation for entry 56.
55. "Drama of the Virgin Island Purchase." *New York Times* 
    Magazine, July 19, 1931, 4-5.

    See annotation for entry 56.


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    three articles published in the Saturday Evening 
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    the same manuscript but is not included in the 

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