THE HISTORY OF THE
ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

NORMAN HARDING DOHN, B.A., A.M.

The Ohio State University
1959

Approved by

Foster
Adviser
Department of History
My first knowledge of the Anti-Saloon League came more than twenty years ago when I arrived in Westerville, Ohio, from western New York to attend Otterbein College. Although the League's heyday had long since passed, the residents of Westerville still boasted of the fact—as they do today—that the town was once the capital of a movement that proposed to change the living habits of the nation. There were still some reminders of the League's activities. A skeleton staff was still on duty at League headquarters and the American Issue publishing plant was still operating on a limited scale. The most important link with the League's past, however, was Howard Hyde Russell, the founder of the movement, who lived across the street from the main college campus and who frequently stopped to chat with students.

Once each year, Dr. Russell addressed the student body at a chapel service. Although nearly ninety years old at the time, and a pathetic figure in many respects as he reveled in the glory he had once experienced, he exhibited flashes of his one-time oratorical greatness and his zeal as a temperance reformer. There were also other League personalities, including Dr. Ernest H. Cherrington, who continued their residence in Westerville.

I became fascinated with the League and the impact it had on the social history of the nation while still a student at Otterbein. I was
surprised to learn, however, that few attempts had been made to examine the history of the Anti-Saloon League and its personalities. With the exception of the League's own publications, scattered magazine articles, and brief references to the League in standard social histories of the United States, I found that the League had been largely neglected. The only major effort to chronicle the story of the League was made by Peter H. Odegard in 1928 when he published the monograph: Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League. This, however, is less a history than it is a study of the League as a pressure agency in government.

Why the League has been generally ignored is difficult to understand, especially in light of the influence it exerted on the history and politics of the nation over so long a period of time. It developed into one of the most influential and powerful extra-governmental agencies the country has known.

In developing the story of the League I have attempted to do so without bias. This has been difficult since I have had to rely heavily for my information on League sources and on individuals who at one time or another were employed by the League. Responsibility for what follows, however, is entirely mine except where otherwise indicated. For access to primary source material on the League I am indebted to the late Ila Grindell, long-time employee of its Westerville
headquarters, and to the Temperance Foundation which now has charge of the League library and records.

Many persons have offered me encouragement and have shared their knowledge of the League with me. Above all, though, I am sure whatever merit this study has is due, in no small degree, to the inspiration, friendly counsel, and patient persistence of my wife.

Westerville, Ohio

N.H.D.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>PHILOSOPHY OF ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>NATIONAL GROWTH</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>A CHANGE IN COMMAND</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>THE LEAGUE'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>FUND-RAISING AND EXPENDITURES</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>THE MOVEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROHIBITION</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>ENACTMENT OF THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>AFTER VICTORY, WHAT?</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autobiography</td>
<td></td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE

At the stroke of midnight on January 16, 1920, a new experiment was begun in the United States—an experiment which its advocates believed would be permanent but which actually lasted little more than thirteen years. For on that date national prohibition by constitutional amendment, the dream of thousands of devoted men and women, officially became effective. Although a world-wide depression, a global war, and subsequent international political unrest have intervened, the struggle for national prohibition and its ultimate results still rank as one of the noteworthy chapters of America's history in the twentieth century.

The American people, more than one hundred million strong, greeted the "dry era" with mixed emotions. Millions had been won over to the cause of prohibition by a new type of moral crusader, who had substituted the fanaticism of his nineteenth century predecessor for hard-headed business sense and political acumen. These millions, thoroughly indoctrinated with the alleged virtues of prohibition, joyously hailed the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act.

There were millions of others, however, although many of them were in sympathy with a moderate approach to the use of alcohol and had supported earlier temperance movements, who felt that prohibition was much too drastic. They believed that to write such a provision
into the Constitution was to deprive the citizen of his personal
liberties. The wets, or at any rate the drinking segment of the
population, also supported this contention, yet they appeared to have
no doubt whatever that prohibition would prohibit. For weeks and even
months before prohibition became a law, they stashed away stocks of
their favorite brands of liquor in anticipation of the great drought.
Others sought advice from brewers and distillers as to how they could
manufacture their own refreshments.

As for members of the liquor and brewery industry, they
accepted their fate with little comment, seeming to realize they had
been defeated, at least temporarily, by a superior force. Many changed
over to other types of business, while a few of the more daring ones
took their operations underground and continued to produce and dis-
pense their product illegally. The size of this group increased as
enforcement of the prohibition law broke down.

Everybody expected that on the night of January 16, 1920,
saloons, cafes, cabarets, restaurants, and hotels all over the country
would be crowded with persons having a last fling before prohibition
settled over the nation. Newspaper reports, however, describe the
last fling as "very tame." Even in such notoriously wet cities as
New York, Chicago, Detroit, Louisville, Baltimore, New Orleans,
Philadelphia, and San Francisco, little excitement was reported.

A few hotels in New York draped their tables in black table
cloths in deference to the drooping spirits of Broadway, but no
special ceremony marked the passing of the old order. Entranced by
the shining vision of an America forever free from the liquor traffic,
the Anti-Saloon League of New York enthusiastically announced that
"a new nation will be born," and wished every man, woman, and child a
"Happy New Year."¹ William H. Anderson, superintendent of the New York
league and an important figure in the councils of the drys, sternly
admonished the wets to be good sports and take their medicine. "Shake
hands with Uncle Sam," he said, "and board his water wagon."²

In Washington, D.C., temperance reformers from all parts of the
United States, in the capital to attend the meetings of the National
Temperance Council and the National Legislative Conference, attended a
watch-night service and cheered a rousing oration by William Jennings
Bryan. His audience included such notables as Wayne B. Wheeler,
legislative superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League, Bishop James
Cannon, Jr., Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; Clarence True
Wilson, of the Methodist Board of Temperance, Prohibition, and Public
Morals; Representative Andrew J. Volstead of Minnesota, author of the
Volstead Act; and Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas, author of the
Eighteenth Amendment.³

In Norfolk, Virginia, Evangelist Billy Sunday preached the
funeral service of John Barleycorn. The deceased arrived in a coffin
twenty feet in length, brought to the doors of the tabernacle by a
span of horses and trailed by a dejected Devil. "Good-bye, John,"

²Ibid.
cried Mr. Sunday, "you were God's worst enemy. You were Hell's best friend. I hate you with a perfect hatred." In thousands of Protestant churches throughout the country, and in every town which had a chapter of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the drys greeted the coming of the great day with thanksgiving and watch-night services, at which the Lord was publicly praised for His share in the victory.

* * * *

The story of prohibition in this country is lengthy and detailed, dating back to colonial times when the "good creature of God," as liquor was called in some of the early laws, was considered by many a prime necessity, almost an indispensable part of everyday living. Liquor was a common article of diet, in many places almost as much so as bread, while even physicians looked upon it as a preventive of nearly all diseases and a specific for many. Nearly everyone drank, including both sexes and nearly all ages. Nor was the drinking habit restricted to any one section of the country or to any particular group of individuals. Whisky flavored with mint proved the most popular beverage of the South's landed gentry, while gin was the favorite drink of slaves and servants when they were able to get it. In New England, rum, which had become the principal medium of exchange in the slave trade during the last half of the

---


eighteenth century, was consumed in large quantities. The Puritans, who passed laws forbidding nearly everything that gave the people pleasure, let liquor alone, except for the usual regulatory statutes and the ordinances against drunkenness. And despite their pious virtues, they were hard drinkers, as well as being the first distillers of rum in this country. 6

Workingmen commonly received part of their wages in rum or other ardent spirits. The carpenters, for example, who helped to establish the first legal settlement of the Northwest Territory at Marietta, Ohio, were paid half a dollar a day, and one ration—the ration comprising "1 Gill of Whiskey." 7 Spirits of some sort also were included in the ration of the country's military personnel, and farm hands and slaves generally were provided with alcoholic stimulation. Nearly all business conferences and town and village meetings began and ended with a drink.

Although perhaps a bit shocking to the present generation, autobiographies and other writings of ministers reveal that few drank harder during this era of intemperance than the clergy. 8 They drank freely at the homes of their parishioners, at ordinations, funerals, and other religious exercises in which they participated. The


7 Norris F. Schneider, Campus Martius State Memorial Museum (booklet) (Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, Columbus, 1938), p. 9.

8 Asbury, op. cit., p. 13.
authorities of many towns encouraged the establishment of drinking places conveniently near the churches, so that the preachers and their flocks might be able to refresh themselves before and after service.\textsuperscript{9}

The notion that the manufacture and sale of all liquor containing alcohol should be prohibited was so preposterous that no one seems to have advanced it for more than one hundred and fifty years after the introduction of rum into the colonies. The only phase of the question which aroused any opposition was overindulgence. Consequently, all that could be designated as temperance reform work in the one hundred and sixty-eight years between the founding of Jamestown in 1607 and the outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1775 was activity which contented itself in legislation against drunkenness.\textsuperscript{10} There was an effort, of course, to prevent excessive consumption of liquor by the Indians, since the Red Man, under the influence of alcohol, was a menace to the safety of the colonists, and a limitation was placed on the alcoholic consumption of servants and apprentices to cut down on idleness and inefficiency. These efforts, however, were prompted not by an attitude of hostility toward intoxicants but rather by selfish and economic motives. The few temperance laws that were enacted were for the most part drawn to regulate the conduct of the individual consumer rather than to curb the activities of the seller.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{10} Cherrington, op. cit., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.
This attitude toward intoxicants, save for a few minor exceptions, existed throughout the colonial period. The first serious and effective efforts against the use of distilled liquors as beverages began with the movement for American Independence, and was prompted by the outbreak of the Revolution. Since all the man power of the Colonies was needed at its best, colonial legislatures and the Continental Congress began to give serious consideration to the scientific phases of the use of alcohol. Dr. Benjamin Rush, a noted physician, and one of the figures in the drafting and the signing of the Declaration of Independence, is generally recognized as the pioneer in the movement against the use of distilled liquors. In 1777, he prepared a strong document against the use of alcohol; the document was approved and adopted by the War Board of the Continental Congress and was printed and circulated among all the troops in the army. The object of the document was to urge all soldiers to abstain from the use of distilled liquors while in the service of their country. This is believed to be the first appeal against the use of distilled liquors to be recognized in any official way by the government.\textsuperscript{12}

The recommendations of Dr. Rush and resolutions passed by the various colonial legislatures regarding the use of distilled liquors, generally speaking, were not taken seriously and the few prohibitory laws enacted proved ineffective. The Christian Church, early in the

\textsuperscript{12}Cherrington, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 40.
nineteenth century, took steps to curb the production and consumption of ardent spirits. This movement within the church first began with certain outstanding ministers. The Rev. Increase Mather of New England was one of the first of the early temperance prophets. In 1673 he preached and published two sermons against the sin of drunkenness. In 1726 the Rev. Cotton Mather, with the cooperation and indorsement of twenty-two other ministers, published a "Serious Address to Those who Unnecessarily Frequent the Tavern." John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, following a visit to America, made his first pronouncement in England in 1743 against the liquor traffic and the liquor habit, and in 1826 Dr. Lyman Beecher of the Congregational Church preached a famous series of six sermons against intemperance. These and other ministers of the different church denominations repeatedly preached against the liquor traffic and strongly urged upon their respective churches the necessity of combatting intemperance. This, in turn, led numerous church bodies to offer declarations, urging upon their members the importance of divorcing themselves from any connection with the traffic in distilled liquors.

At first these declarations or resolutions were aimed solely at the drinking habits of individuals, but by about 1810 official bodies of the Presbyterian, Methodist, Congregational, and United Brethren Churches began to condemn drinking places as public nuisances and urged action against them.\(^\text{13}\) One of the most significant facts in

\(^{13}\text{Cherrington, op. cit., p. 65.}\)
connection with the movement of the church along temperance lines was that it marked the dawn of a new age in church activity since it suggested the importance of cooperative effort on the part of the churches of different denominations. Furthermore, the early years of the nineteenth century saw the church reaching outside of its own close-knit community into the realm of the social life of the nation and the world, and in doing so running head-on into the temperance question. This period also was marked by a great religious fervor which seemed to prevail throughout the nation and undoubtedly did much to hasten the progress of temperance reform.

In 1826 the American Temperance Society, later known as the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance, was born at Boston, Massachusetts, marking the beginning of the organized temperance effort of a general character in this country. Actually, the Society was nothing more than the voice of the church expressing itself in militant, organized form, for the leaders of the organization and those who followed in the movement for a quarter of a century were almost entirely of the church. In fact, every successful temperance movement since then, including the Anti-Saloon League, as we shall see, has been merely the instrument—the machinery and equipment—through which the Christian church has expressed itself.

The movement inaugurated in 1826 touched off a great wave of temperance reform, resulting in the formation of temperance groups in

---

virtually every town and community in the nation. And before long, the efforts of these bodies were showing tangible results, particularly on the local and state level. "Between 1851 and 1856," says Dr. Ernest H. Cherrington, "the legislatures of practically all the states were compelled to wrestle with the prohibition question." The first state or territorial prohibition law on record was enacted in 1843 by the Territorial Legislature of Oregon, but it was repealed five years later.  

Maine, however, is considered the real pioneer in the state prohibition movement. The Maine Law of 1851 is the law from which the history of prohibition legislation really dates. It was obtained only after the advocates of prohibition had made efforts in nine legislative sessions covering a period of fourteen years. To bring about its passage required a tremendous amount of both educational and political work. Spearheading the effort was Neal Dow who first championed the temperance cause in 1829, at the age of twenty-five, and who was mayor of Portland at the time the law was enacted. The Maine Law prohibited the manufacture, sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors. It provided for confiscation of liquor illegally held, search and seizure upon complaint of three inhabitants, and imprisonment for the third offense. At the fourth National Temperance Convention at Saratoga Springs, New York, August 20, 1851,

15 Cherrington, op. cit., p. 136.
16 Ibid., p. 135.
the three hundred delegates gathered there from seventeen states spent much of their time discussing the merits of the Maine Law and adopted a resolution favoring it. Many of the delegates returned to their homes determined to obtain if possible the enactment of the Maine Law in their respective states.

During the next four years, 1851 to 1855, the progress of prohibition was an almost continuous triumph. Thirteen states passed prohibitory laws and several more came near doing so. Soon, however, temperance reformers began to run into obstacles. In some of the states, the legislature enacted a prohibitory law but the governor vetoed it. In other, state supreme courts ruled the law unconstitutional or so emasculated it that it was deprived of all effectiveness.¹⁷

The failure of state-wide prohibition in most of these states and the lack of stability and permanency in the prohibition movement were due to a combination of circumstances. Just at the time when prohibition activity and prohibition legislation were at their peak, the attention of the moral reform forces was turned to the slavery question, which culminated in the Civil War. The general demoralizing effect of the war itself upon most aspects of public morality was significant in turning the tide which had been running so strongly in the direction of temperance reform. And the internal revenue plan which was adopted as a war measure, placing a heavy tax on alcoholic

beverages, proved so lucrative that it was continued after the war and unquestionably was a strong factor in defense of the liquor traffic.

Also responsible for interrupting the prohibition movement and causing the prompt repeal of prohibitory laws that had been enacted in the several states, was the partisan political turn which the movement took in the 1850's. In most of the states, prohibition became a party issue, being championed by one political party and opposed by another. This divided the sympathies of those in favor of prohibition. They regarded their allegiance to party ties as a virtue of more importance than their temperance proclivities.\(^{18}\)

Even more important, however, than these factors was the general attitude of the temperance workers who lost interest in the fight once prohibition laws had been placed on the statute books. Widespread apathy set in, which, in turn, brought about a falling off of financial support and active cooperation between the organized temperance groups.\(^{19}\)

Despite this temporary recession in the tide of temperance reform, a strong foundation had been laid for the crystallizing of public opinion toward the alcohol question. This sentiment was to burst forth a short time later with the demand for the enforcement and permanency of prohibitory laws. But the prohibition movement had suffered a very decided reaction, and temperance leaders were beside themselves to know what to do and how to turn the tide. One suggestion


\(^{19}\) *Cherrington, op. cit.*, p. 140.
was to form political leagues for the purpose of supporting party candidates who were out-and-out prohibitionists and nominate and support candidates of the temperance groups' own choosing who were not presented by any party. In the years immediately following the Civil War, however, the rank and file of temperance workers and organizations were not prepared to accept such a "radical" departure from their methods of operation. Realizing the importance and absolute necessity of political action, but finding neither of the two leading existing political parties willing to adopt formally the principle of prohibition, they chose instead to form their own political party whose platform and principles called for the prohibition of the manufacture, importation, and sale of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage.

 Appropriately, the new party, organized in 1869, called itself the Prohibition Party and placed its first party ticket in the field in the presidential campaign of 1872. The party participated in every subsequent presidential election but never even remotely came close to winning a national victory. In fact, the largest vote cast for its presidential candidate was in 1892 when John Bidwell received a total of 254,133 votes.20 Although the Prohibition party caused only a minor ripple on the mill pond of national partisan politics, it pioneered the path of political activity for the prohibition movement. Failing to accomplish its original purpose, it certainly

---

helped to clear the way for the non-partisan political activity which in later years was to carry the temperance movement down the trail to national prohibition. Furthermore, the Prohibition party, in sounding the clarion call for aggressive political action, was largely responsible for breaking down the ancient doctrine that the temperance movement and political activity should be kept separate.

On the negative side, the Prohibition party demonstrated the fact that even friends of prohibition and Christian voters who were favorable to prohibition refused to leave the political party with which they were affiliated to vote for a new party, even though that party advocated the principle in which they believed. This fact undoubtedly had its effect upon the men who later saw the possibilities and opportunities for a great non-partisan political movement which would enable the voter to remain in his own political party and yet give political expression to his prohibition sentiments.

Five years following the advent of the Prohibition party, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union came into being, marking the entrance into the active movement for temperance reform of the women of America. This movement generally is recognized as having been started in Hillsboro, Ohio, on December 21, 1873, with its first convention being held in Cleveland the following year.\textsuperscript{21} The movement or moral crusade spread rapidly to other towns and cities of Ohio and later into the cities and towns of other states. During the first

---

\textsuperscript{21}Cherrington, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 171.
year of its existence, the NCTU was a non-partisan organization with no connection whatsoever between it and the Prohibition party. Shortly after the presidential election of 1880, however, the women began to swing over to the camp of the Prohibitionists.

A minority faction of the NCTU, led by Mrs. J. Ellen Foster, president of the Iowa State Woman's Christian Temperance Union, vigorously opposed committing the Union to partisan politics, and in 1890 organized the Non-Partisan Woman's Christian Temperance Union, which for many years was conducted as a separate society, but which after the death of Mrs. Foster was reunited with the mother organization.22 The NCTU continued to engage in partisan politics and to support the Prohibition party until after the turn of the twentieth century when it shifted its loyalty to the non-partisan Anti-Saloon League. Besides the primary objective of temperance reform, the NCTU helped to promote the movement for women's suffrage.

During the 1880's, in addition to the minority segment of the NCTU, there also sprang up several other organizations whose membership recognized the potentiality of the non-partisan approach to the liquor question. They had their genesis in such states as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Michigan. In each case, however, it soon was discovered that it was an almost insurmountable task to modify the voter's political tendency to vote for the party rather than for

22 Cherrington, op. cit., p. 174.
individuals. None of these agencies developed beyond the organizational stage and they disintegrated for want of financial and public support.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite the mushrooming of these numerous partisan and non-partisan political groups within the prohibition movement, and not overlooking the fact that agitation of the liquor question had reached one of its highest peaks, the movement actually was losing ground. By 1893, of the eighteen states that had enacted prohibition laws during the preceding fifty years, only six were under nominal prohibition, and in these states the law was not well enforced. Only in Maine was there an honest effort being made to enforce the law.\textsuperscript{24}

However, one phase of the temperance work that continued without interruption, especially by the NCTU, was that of teaching temperance to children and training them for Christian citizenship and moral leadership. This was carried on in the public schools, Sunday school classes, and among Boy Scout and Girl Scout groups. Due to the efforts of the NCTU, Congress passed laws requiring temperance instruction in all public schools in Federal territory, including those of the District of Columbia, the West Point Military Academy, and the Naval Academy at Annapolis. In the ensuing years every state enacted similar legislation. This activity unquestionably helped to build temperance sentiment.

\* \* \* \*

\textsuperscript{23}Colvin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 385.

\textsuperscript{24}Cherrington, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 249.
The remnants of earlier temperance movements now found the situation discouraging and hopeless. The partisan plan for prohibition had failed; the earlier wave of prohibition reform that had swept across the nation had receded. Reaction had set in and even the religious and temperance forces of the country had come to the realization that the success of the prohibition movement depended upon the devising of some new plan which would promise more in the way of uniting the temperance forces.

It was under such circumstances that the dispensary system was introduced in South Carolina. The system, which had been used in several European countries, established a monopoly of the sale of liquor in the hands of the state in order to eliminate the element of private profit. It was fathered by Governor Benjamin Tillman and at first appealed to the political and moral forces in other states. It clothed the liquor traffic with a garment of respectability, vouched for by the state itself. The system was short lived, however, for two specific reasons. First, it had been in operation in South Carolina only a short time when a series of political scandals developed in connection with it, causing other states to give up the idea of adopting the system for fear of similar developments. Second, a few of the more farward looking prohibition advocates realized that by giving the liquor industry an air of respectability under state supervision, the system would fasten itself so tightly on the nation,

the chance of prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicants in the United States would be forever lost.26

From the welter of numerous plans and efforts to control strong drink, there was one, however, which appeared to stand apart from the others. It was the non-partisan political plan for cooperation in local prohibition work. Briefly, it proposed to bring all temperance forces into a cooperative effort, regardless of other alliances, affiliations, and adhesions. Why the idea had not been exploited to any degree prior to the closing years of the nineteenth century is difficult to explain. The most plausible explanation seems to rest in the fact that until that time partisan political ties had been so strong; it was unthinkable for a loyal party man to shed his political label to vote for a candidate on the opposite ticket regardless of his moral convictions.

By 1890, however, a nationwide liberal uprising coupled with a moral awakening began to sweep the country. Its roots may be found in Populism. This aroused liberal and humanitarian sentiment of the American people had as its objectives the recovery of political power usurped by big business and the enactment of a broad program of social and political reform. Consequently, with such a spirit manifest, the time was ripe to launch a non-partisan prohibition movement that would appeal to members of all political parties and religions, to laboring men, professional men, farmers, public servants, and the humblest citizens.

26Cherrington, op. cit., p. 251.
Furthermore, the plan appealed to the common sense of many in that it proposed to attack the liquor traffic first at the points of least resistance, namely, the country cross-roads, the townships, the villages, and rural counties. The plan proposed to use sentiment already in existence, crystallizing it for immediate use while at the same time, by that very process, creating more support for the larger battles ahead. The non-partisan idea also appealed to the American sense of fair play, for it operated on the policy of popular sovereignty on the liquor question, permitting the people of each community the right to exclude the liquor traffic when the majority of the population of that community so desired.

Then, too, the scheme was designed to deal with one question only, running counter to no deep prejudices except that engendered by the liquor traffic itself. Political, but not partisan, it proposed to work through men instead of parties. It made it possible for the temperance forces to fight on the offensive, choosing the place and weapons for each conflict, compelling the liquor traffic to defend itself on that ground and with those weapons. Its object was threefold; first, marshalling and organizing temperance sentiment into active public opinion; second, the crystallizing of public opinion into law; third, the following up of the enactment of law with enforcement and educational work of such character as to make for permanency. Such was the plan, which at this crucial period in the history of temperance reform, made its appeal to the temperance public.

***
The Anti-Saloon League, which forms the basis for this study, was the embodiment of the above plan. Its founders were a few men whose interest in prohibition had brought them together in an effort to obtain the adoption of a local option law. In this venture they had the support of the local churches, and the Anti-Saloon League was closely identified with the church from the day of its formation. The League was not a spontaneous movement by any means. It had a ready-made sentiment to draw from in the moral teaching of the schools, temperance work of the churches, popular disapproval of the drunkard, and in the increasingly persuasive proof that intemperance was a heavy handicap to modern industry.

As already indicated, the League found fertile ground in which to plant its idea since America at the close of the nineteenth century was experiencing a moral awakening. And, ironically, the liquor industry played into the hands of the League by standing pat in the face of this growing opposition. The industry scorned all talk of compromise. There was never a moment in the history of these years when the brewers and distillers could not have reformed the institution which was the chief point of attack in the campaign against their vested interests made by the prohibition movement. This institution was the saloon. The power of the brewers over the saloon was absolute; they controlled it under mortgage bonds and under their power to shut off its supply. They could have changed the saloon, or even have destroyed it, if they had wished to act. There is ample
evidence to support the thesis that reformation by the brewers and
distillers of their own trade might have averted national prohibi-
tion. 27

The Anti-Saloon League, which was to evolve into a national
organization, began first as a state movement with the formal organi-
zation in the Ohio League in 1893. Actually, it was an offspring of
the Oberlin Temperance Alliance, which had been formed twenty years
earlier for the purpose of meeting a crisis in the temperance move-
ment in that college town. James H. Fairchild, head of Oberlin
College, became its president. The Alliance had as its objective the
complete suppression of the "traffic in and the use of intoxicating
liquors." 28 Differing from most of the pledge-signing temperance
bodies of the day, it sought from the outset the elimination of the
saloon. Other college towns in Ohio were enlisted and agitation
began for a college-town local option law. Such legislation was
enacted by the Ohio General Assembly in 1882. Five years later, the
Alliance urged a statewide local option law for all townships, and
hired a young minister, Howard Hyde Russell, to lead the fight for
such a measure.

Russell was the son of an Episcopal minister and missionary.
His childhood was spent in Stillwater, Minnesota; Bloomsburg,
Pennsylvania, and Glens Falls, New York. Before he was eighteen he

27 Charles Merz, The Dry Decade (Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc.,

28 Ernest H. Cherrington, History of the Anti-Saloon League (The
had crossed the plains with cattle, taught school in Colorado, and worked on a newspaper. Later he studied law in the office of his father-in-law, a leader in the bar and politics of Iowa. At an early age he became obsessed with an intense hatred for the saloon, which, he confessed, came close to catching him "in its jaws of destruction."\(^{29}\)

Forsaking a promising legal career, Russell enrolled at Oberlin College Seminary to prepare for the ministry. During his five years there, he joined the temperance forces of the community. The college itself had lived steadfastly according to the ideals of its founders who envisioned an institution dedicated to "the diffussion of useful science, sound morality and pure religion."\(^{30}\) From its beginning it had been a reformist crusading center of learning. The college became the first coeducational institution in America, and, in 1835, its trustees admitted Negroes as students. For several years prior to the Civil War the campus took pride in being a station on the "underground railroad." Ideals championed by the faculty and students of Oberlin also were taken up and promoted by the townspeople.

When Russell was called by the Oberlin Alliance to wage its fight for a township local option law, he was doing his seminary ministry at Berea, Ohio. At Berea, he had been responsible for the closing of six saloons. During one campaign a saloon keeper sneaked

\(^{29}\)Howard Hyde Russell, unpublished memoirs.

up behind Russell and knocked him to the street. "This changed at least fifty votes," Russell recalled, "and we carried the election by six majority." 31

The Alliance soon realized it had picked the right man in Russell. Endowed with a bent for organization, he soon gained the confidence of the public, based on his previous record of success in temperance leadership. Of strong and wiry physical strength, he was a persuasive speaker. Although firm for reform, Russell was tactful and diplomatic; skillful in the raising of funds, and absolutely fearless and staunch in character. He was willing to accept the unpleasant features of his new job—absence from home and the hardships of early inadequate financial support—and able to hold on with tenacity when, again and again, everything seemed to indicate defeat had come.

Russell opened headquarters in Columbus and with the cooperation of the pastors and churches a Local Option League was formed. Petitions were circulated throughout the state demanding the passage of the Township Option Bill. The campaign was successful, and the Beatty law—"Ohio's first stick of local option dynamite"—was enacted in 1886 by a majority of one. 32

The victory was convincing evidence to Russell that a state-wide organization of churches and temperance societies was the most effective

31 Russell, unpublished memoirs.

means of fighting the liquor traffic. In his final report to the Oberlin Alliance in 1888 he urged such a plan. Shortly afterwards, Russell went to the Southwest Tabernacle of Kansas City, Missouri, and his suggestion was dropped. In 1890, he organized and became president of the Missouri Anti-Liquor League. A year later he was called to the Armour Mission in Chicago and the Missouri experiment collapsed. Twice in 1892 Russell spoke in Oberlin, each time urging the formation of a state-wide organization for Ohio. Nothing happened, however, because there was no one willing to take charge. In the spring of 1893 Russell heard that a state convention had been held in Indiana to form a state-wide, non-partisan temperance society. He hastened to Indianapolis, but the churches were unwilling to accept his plan and the whole matter was dropped.

Meanwhile, the Ohio State Liquor League was formed on March 30, 1893, at Dayton. It was the successor of the Liquor Dealers' Protective Association, and proposed to band together all liquor selling persons and societies in common defense of their trade. At the time there were one hundred and forty branch organizations in one hundred and twenty-five cities and towns. A salaried state organizer was employed to increase the number of local leagues. Proclaiming it intended to wage "war to the knife," the Liquor League sought the repeal of the habitual drunkard law, the Sunday closing statute, and a modification of the minor law.33

33 Anti-Saloon (November, 1893), p. 3.
This concerted threat from the liquor interests prodded the Oberlin Alliance into action. On May 21, 1893, the executive committee of the group, meeting in the Oberlin College Library, agreed to Russell's plan for a state-wide organization. Russell, carrying on his campaign against the saloon in Chicago, consented to become superintendent, and the Alliance agreed to finance the movement until it was able to stand on its own feet. Russell's salary was to be "at the rate of $2000 a year until such time as that salary is fixed by the State Executive Committee." 34

On the evening of June 4, a little band of men gathered together in the old First Congregational Church in Oberlin to discuss a movement that was to accomplish far greater things than they ever dreamed. In prayer and honest discussion, they began laying the foundation for the Anti-Saloon League of Ohio, which was to become the genesis of a great national agent of the church, interdenominational and non-partisan in scope. A temporary constitution, imperfect in detail, but based on the fundamental principles which were to make the movement what it became, was adopted. Recognizing that the foundation upon which victory had to be built was public sentiment, they devised a plan acceptable to the churches as a part of the church work. 35

34 Cherrington, History, p. 17.
It was agreed that Russell should devote his entire time to the development and prosecution of the work of the new organization, and that $500 should be raised immediately to set the league in operation. Besides crystallizing public opinion on the evils of the saloon and drink traffic, the group sought the strict enforcement of liquor laws already on the statute books, and the enactment of further legislation as public sentiment warranted. 36

Russell brought his activities to a speedy close in Chicago and took up the work of his new organization in Ohio. By September he was able to report subscriptions to the amount of about $3000, and to say that other temperance organizations and the press had given him "God Speed." State headquarters for the League were opened in Columbus with Russell in charge. The organization developed rapidly. By May of the following year, three hundred local committees had been formed, a state paper, Anti-Saloon, was being published, $8000 had been raised, and the Anti-Saloon League was a going concern. 37

There are no clear reasons why Ohio, particularly Oberlin, became the hotbed of temperance reform and the birthplace of the most powerful and influential prohibition organizations of all times. The explanation seems to rest rather in a series of overlapping circumstances. Ohio, from its very founding, had been receptive to new ideas which had as their purpose the improvement of human welfare.

36 Ibid., p. 23.

37 Peter Odegard, Pressure Politics (Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 5.
Notable among these were the championing of justice for women and the struggle for freedom and the equal rights for the Negro. Added to this was a strong religious influence that permeated virtually every section of the state. The map of Ohio was pinpointed with numerous colleges, like Oberlin, founded and operated by various religious denominations. The prime purpose of the founding fathers in establishing these institutions was to train young men and women for the ministry or related careers.

The use of strong drink was absolutely forbidden on the campus of these denominational institutions, and in many cases this influence became so pronounced that the communities in which the college was located also enacted legislation against the sale of intoxicants. In fact, long before the Anti-Saloon League came into being, Ohio was recognized for its prolonged and militant fight against the saloon.

Still another explanation for the reasons why Ohio became the very place of all places to cradle and nourish the anti-saloon movement was the fact that its population, particularly in the section of the state known as the Western Reserve, was largely inhabited by persons of New England ancestry. It was in New England that the first serious effort was made to curb the use of strong drink. Admittedly, the effort was nothing more or less than the voice and conscience of the church expressing itself in militant form through a small group of powerfully influential ministers. And despite the devotion of these individuals to the temperance cause, the liquor traffic was too
deepseated in New England to be uprooted by the preachings of a handful of reformists.

The influence of these individuals cannot be discounted, however, for their spirit and motives followed the thousands who left New England to establish new homes in the West. In many instances whole congregations migrated, taking their ministers with them. Congregationalists early gained a foothold in the New England settlements at Marietta and in the Western Reserve. It was the Congregational Church of New England which had been stirred to aggressive action by the Rev. Lyman Beecher, resulting in the first organized movement of a general or national character in the interest of temperance reform.

Life in the western wilderness also tended to produce a homogeneous population which proved to be especially susceptible to moral reform. The inhabitants responded eagerly to every opportunity to hear religious teaching from ministers and itinerant preachers. Early legislative bodies passed laws to prevent "profane swearing and Sabbath breaking" and enacted legislation to protect and encourage religious observance. The evils resulting from an overindulgence in intoxicants soon created a considerable sentiment in favor of more

---


39 Cherrington, Evolution, p. 67.

40 Clark, op. cit., p. 387.
temperate manner of life, and temperance societies were formed in large numbers.\textsuperscript{11}

One-quarter of the temperance societies in the state were located in that second New England which had been planted in the Western Reserve lands of Connecticut. Portage County alone, peopled largely by families from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and western New York, contained ten organizations active in reform work. Two other sections of New England settlement were important strongholds of the temperance forces, the Marietta district along the Ohio River and the villages of Granville and Worthington in the center of the state.\textsuperscript{12}

These societies kept the liquor question almost constantly before the public throughout most of the nineteenth century. Temperance reform early became involved in politics and many a campaign, both state and local, was fought over the issue. The sivery controversy and the Civil War, as we have seen, temporarily forced temperance to the background, but the movement returned to the Ohio scene stronger than ever with the worsening of the saloon situation and the exploitation of this condition by the CTU.

The rebirth of reform was at its zenith in Ohio when, as we have pointed out, there emerged a leader, "providentially called," who had devised both a plan and an organization to combat the liquor interests. This person, Howard Hyde Russell, was successful in welding the

\textsuperscript{11}E. H. Roseboom, F. P. Weisenburger, \emph{A History of Ohio} (The Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society), Columbus, 1953, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{12}Krout, \emph{op. cit.}, pp. 129-30.
numerous and divergent temperance groups into a unified and aggressive body. Russell's admirers perhaps overemphasize his genius in this respect. The time appears to have been ripe for such an organization and a person of even lesser ability might well have launched the movement on its way. It appears to have been the hour even more than the man that gave impetus to the Anti-Saloon League.

* * *

At the very time that the Ohio League was taking shape, similar organizations were being formed elsewhere. In the early spring of 1893 there was formed in Washington, D.C., an organization known as the "No Compromise Publishing Company." This concern issued a paper entitled No Compromise, the main purpose of which was to give publicity to the names of signers of indorsements of applications for retail liquor licenses.

The first issue of the periodical carried a significant first-page editorial entitled "A Union of Forces." It also announced that a call would soon be issued for a mass meeting to consider the question of a union of temperance efforts. This meeting was held on May 12, 1893, and it was then decided to call a larger meeting, a committee being appointed to make the necessary arrangements. This meeting took place on the afternoon of Sunday, June 4, 1893, in the First Congregational Church, Washington, and arrangements were made for a meeting of affiliated organizations, each organization being allowed to send two delegates. At this later meeting, which was held June 23, 1893, in Fletcher Chapel, Methodist Episcopal Church,
Washington, the Anti-Saloon League of the District of Columbia was formed. At a subsequent meeting, July 7, 1893, a constitution was adopted and an executive committee appointed.\(^3\)

In addition to the foregoing movements, many attempts were made in various places to obtain cooperation among temperance forces, but none of them attained organization. Only the Ohio Anti-Saloon League and the District of Columbia League proved successful.

At this time it was also the conviction of many temperance reformers that a national Anti-Saloon League was needed to meet successfully the exigencies of the liquor problem. In 1894, the Rev. A. J. Kynett, of Philadelphia, chairman of the Permanent Committee on Temperance and Prohibition of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and Archbishop John Ireland of the Roman Catholic Church, meeting upon a railway train, discussed a plan for uniting all the anti-saloon forces. The following spring, Dr. Kynett and the Rev. Luther Barton Wilson (afterward Bishop Wilson) of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, Washington, talked over the question of forming a national anti-saloon organization. The result was that the Anti-Saloon League of the District of Columbia, since Rev. Wilson was active in its work, took the initiative in calling a convention for the purpose of inaugurating such a body.\(^4\) This convention was held in the Sunday school house

\(^3\) Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem (The American Issue Publishing Company), Westerville, Ohio, 1925, p. 177.

\(^4\) Odegaard, op. cit., p. 6.
of Calvary Baptist Church, Washington, December 17, 1895. On the following day, delegates from the Ohio and Washington Anti-Saloon Leagues, together with representatives from forty-nine different state temperance groups, announced the birth of the American Anti-Saloon League (later changed to the Anti-Saloon League of America).

The first slate of officers, representing various temperance groups, was selected from different sections of the country. Hiram Price, who attended the convention as a representative of the Methodist Episcopal Church and the Sons of Temperance, was named president. Born in Washington County, Pennsylvania, January 10, 1814, he began his anti-saloon career before leaving that state by joining a division of the Sons of Temperance which was organized in a room over his store at Hollidaysburg, Hunting County, in 1844. Moving to Davenport, Iowa, Price was elected president of the State Bank of Iowa, continuing in that position until 1866. When the Civil War broke out and Iowa found itself without funds, he quartered and subsisted about 5000 soldiers for several months at his own expense. He served five terms as a Republican member of Congress, headed the Davenport and St. Paul Railroad Company for a time, and served four years as U. S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs as an appointee of President Garfield. Price was living in retirement when he was named president of the League. He held office until his death May 30, 1901, at the age of 87.

Price was ideally suited to head the League during its early years. In his thoroughly catholic spirit he exemplified the
interdenominational idea; and in practically the whole of his political career he had demonstrated the feasibility and desirability of uniting men of all parties on such issues as the one to which the League confined its efforts—the suppression of the saloon. At the time of his death, the League said of him:

No other one name than his has given strength to the National League movement throughout the country at large during the period when it needed recommendation, and no one can more fully illustrate its principles in a blameless, uncompromising and strenuous life of opposition to the liquor traffic than did our leader and friend.\(^1\)

Bishop Wilson was elected first vice-president and Archbishop Ireland second vice-president. The Rev. John J. Keane, president of Catholic University of America, was the League's first choice for second vice-president, but he declined on the grounds that he "could not possibly do justice to what the position demands."\(^2\) In naming a Catholic to one of its top offices, the League made known it was not strictly a Protestant movement but was open to any and all who were interested in stamping out the liquor traffic. Others elected were the Rev. John J. Beacom, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, third vice-president; James L. Ewin, a Washington patent attorney, recording secretary, and F. W. Walsh, Jr., of Boston, treasurer.

The most important position, that of national superintendent, went to Dr. Russell. This was in recognition of his outstanding

\(^1\)Proceedings of the Sixth Anti-Saloon League Convention, 1901.

\(^2\)Proceedings of the First Anti-Saloon League Convention, 1895.
success with the anti-saloon group in Ohio. The dramatic tactics and the amazing results of the Ohio League had attracted immediate attention in other states. Russell received numerous requests for information at the national gathering, and the "Ohio Idea" began to spread. It became the model for the national organization, as well as for other state groups that began to mushroom throughout the country. Records show that nine out of every ten of the state superintendents of the several states, as well as district superintendents and field secretaries, either received their training or experience in the Ohio League or in a state league organized on the "Ohio model."

In less than a decade following the formation of the national body, the Anti-Saloon League was organized in thirty-eight states and had two hundred full-time employees on duty. It was publishing twenty-two state newspapers and had an annual revenue of $250,000. No other movement had so thoroughly united the forces of the church and enlisted them in a common effort. Being free from party affiliations, the League developed principles instead of patronage, and constructed a platform broad enough to unite all shades of political belief.

It was diplomatic in its approach, believing in a policy of prosecution rather than persecution. The League said to the saloon proprietor:

Your saloon must go, but we want to make a useful member of society out of you if we can. We will proceed in an orderly way, giving you ample warning and abundant

47 The American Issue, Dec. 9, 1902.
opportunity to get out of this business into one in which you will command the respect and patronage of all law-abiding citizens, but your saloon must go.

This approach proved much more effective than the hatchet-wielding Carrie Nation or the prayers of the I.C.T.U. The League created such pronounced anti-saloon sentiment in various communities of the state and nation that it effectually prevented the establishment of a saloon in many places where there was none, and often forced the abandonment of those in operation.

"If we can keep a saloon five hundred feet from a school-house," one League leader remarked, "we will do that. If we can extend the exclusion to a thousand feet, we will do that; if to a ward, or a county, or a city, or a state, we will do that. We will take what territory we can from every saloon-cursed district everywhere, until the open bar is exterminated." ¹⁸

CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE

The question often is asked: "Why did the earlier temperance movements fail and the League succeed?" The answer, aside from the favorable reform climate that we have noted, is found in the League's organization, its basic underlying philosophy, and its mode of action. The League believed that the solution to the liquor problem was not dependent so much upon the formation of a new organization as upon the recognition by the several independent, organized bodies, especially churches, of some vital proposition as common ground.¹

For its "common ground" the League selected opposition to the saloon. For years it had been the target of various reform elements and had been branded by the courts as one of the main causes of lawlessness and crime. It was held in disrepute even by those who saw no wrong in the individual's right to drink. Hence the name "Anti-Saloon League" was a popular choice. It attracted to its membership not only organizations and temperance workers of varying degrees but public-minded citizens who were interested in ridding their communities of the saloon and the corruption, distress, and poverty commonly associated with it.

To the League, the saloon meant not only any place devoted to the retailing and drinking of intoxicating liquors, but, employed as a generic or typical term, it included all the multiplicity of agencies which singly and together made up the liquor traffic.\(^2\)

The League did not ask state legislatures to abolish a single saloon. It asked instead that legislatures allow the people the right to do so if they wished. This it advocated through local option elections, a principle based on the majority rule theory, and the use of local police power and home rule. Personal temperance, wise legislation, and a healthful patriotic respect for law were the foundations on which the League's structure was built. League leaders argued that temperance reform had been a field for the fadist and the fanatic, the crook and the cure-all, and that it was high time to be wholly emancipated and placed upon a plane that would appeal to morally earnest men and women who could give to it their best thought and effort without feeling the sacrifices of self respect. They warned against those of the League who sought moral reform other than temperance. They explained that the temperance problem was large enough in itself, and that all effort should be pointed in that direction.

One of the League's early supporters in Ohio explained that the League's purpose was to capture as much territory from the saloon as possible, narrowing the area of the saloon's occupancy more and more, and aiming at nothing whatever but repression of the open bar. "It is

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 9-10.
to strike unitedly at the saloon, first and last and all the time, and let every other purpose go but this. . . ." He added that it would demand of the prohibitionist that he give up his insistence on legislation suppressive of all manufacture of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes and that the prohibitionist. . . not urge any legislation looking to the universal suppression of the use of such liquor as beverage. . . . Such is regarded as. . . an unwarranted interference with personal liberty. 3

Although League leaders advocated, and as far as can be determined practiced, total abstinence, they did not refuse the cooperation of men who were not total abstainers, nor did they make abstinence the sole test of a political candidate's acceptability. They realized that too much of the propaganda in prohibition reform had been denunciation of those who did not at once agree with the movement. And they recognized that one of the most unpopular features of most prohibition groups was their insistence on total abstinence. The drinking of alcoholic beverages in moderation was generally accepted. This was particularly true among immigrants of this period who were pouring into the United States in large numbers from Ireland and central and southern Europe where the drinking of intoxicants was as commonplace as the consuming of tea and coffee in America.

Explaining the effect of immigration on the liquor problem in the United States, E. R. L. Gould, writing in The Forum, pointed out that in 1850 the consumption of all kinds of liquor in this country averaged 4.08 gallons per inhabitant. In 1892 the consumption was

17.0h gallons—more than a four-fold increase. Although consumption of spirits diminished during this forty-two-year period from 2.25 to 1.50 gallons per capita, beer drinking advanced from 1.58 to 15.1 gallons per person. This tremendous increase in the consumption of beer the writer attributed to the great influx of foreigners.¹

The fact that the drinking of intoxicants had become such a part of American life led another writer to observe that it was as absurd for temperance crusaders to try to root out the use of alcohol as it would be to seek the elimination of beef and fish from an American’s diet. He charged that the prohibitionist, in his fanatical hatred for intoxicants, refused to draw any distinction between the moderate and intemperate drinker, and as a result he himself constituted the most formidable barrier to true reform.²

Consequently, in forming a great universal organization of Christian churches, including a number that did not preach total abstinence, such as the Catholic and Lutheran Churches, League officers felt it necessary to federate on some basis upon which all could agree. As pointed out, that basis was opposition to the open saloon.

An early edition of the American Issue, official organ of the League, declared that the League “views the open saloon as the great source of all intemperance. We feel, as an organization, that we can well turn over to the churches, the schools, the temperance


organizations, the consciences and common sense of men, the final removal of the drink habit by means of instruction and moral suasion, if we can only eradicate the open saloon. It is the saloon that is the chief source of crime. . . . The Anti-Saloon League believes, as an organization, that if we got rid of the saloons, we could trust time, and education, and the spread of morality and religion to discourage and remove whatever private us. of liquor as a beverage there may be."

Most Leaguers also felt that if a man were foolish enough to drink liquor, he had the right to do so as an American citizen, provided he did not make himself a nuisance and a charge to the community in which he lived. They would try by all moral and religious means to convert him. If they failed, they realized they could not prevent him from drinking because no existing law enabled them to do so. But he had God and society to be accountable to for the abuse of his liberty.

Dr. Purley A. Baker, superintendent of the national body, from 1903 until his death in 1923, liked to illustrate the League's tolerance toward personal use of liquor by telling the story of his visit to a prominent Ohio bank to interview its wealthy president. As Baker began to unfold the League's plan, the man stopped him and told Baker he was talking to the wrong person since he was not a total abstainer and kept liquor in his home.

---

6. April 11, 1902.
"The League advises against the personal use of liquor," Baker told the bank executive, "but its chief concern is with the traffic itself. As an institution, it is bad, commercially, socially, politically and morally. . . . We are seeking to abolish the saloon wherever possible."

Baker recalled the man tossed him two fifty dollar bills, and in a few years was contributing annually $10,000 toward the cause, had given up liquor himself, and was heading the movement to abolish liquor traffic in his own city. Commenting on his achievement, Baker said he might have criticized the man's personal habits and lost his cooperation.\(^7\)

There did originate within the League, however, the "Lincoln Legion," a total abstinence movement that confined its activities largely among youth organizations of several Protestant churches. Its aim was to get young people to pledge themselves to total abstinence, and gave to the world new information concerning the Great Emancipator as a temperance advocate. There also were a few League men who preached total abstinence. One was William C. Milley, of Pittsburgh, an early vice president of the national body. A prominent industrialist, he prided himself in being a "representative of that comparatively small body of men known as total abstainers." On one occasion he facetiously suggested buying up all the liquor in

\(^{7}\) Purley A. Baker, unpublished autobiography. Although never published, the autobiography is preserved in galley proofs at the League's former national headquarters, Westerville, Ohio.
Pennsylvania and "pouring the stuff into the Atlantic Ocean. I would not like to see it poured into our rivers and smaller streams, because that would mean death to the fish, but the Atlantic Ocean could stand it."  

Because of the League's stand on total abstinence, it was subjected to severe criticism from its opponents both within and without the temperance movement. Its critics called it hypocritical, asserting it made little difference to the League what a man's personal habits were providing he supported the League financially, and if a holder of public office, voted the right way. If his vote were dry, he himself might be wet. The League countered with the claim that it was better to have a drunkard who would "vote right, than to have a saint who will vote wrong."  

It asserted that it was an anti-saloon organization interested in ridding society of the saloon, and not a prohibition league.

In discussing the philosophy of the League and the reasons for its success, one must not overlook its remarkable achievement in bringing about harmony among the different temperance and church organizations of the country. Realizing that other temperance movements had failed because they were unable to see eye to eye, League leaders, from the outset, sought the amalgamation of all workers

---

8 Proceedings of Third Convention of Anti-Saloon League, 1898.

against the saloon. As a result, the League, perhaps more than any other single force, managed to bring about a greater esprit de corps in the field of temperance.

The need for forging a united striking force against the saloon was clearly expressed by President Price in the following keynote address delivered at the League's third national convention:

Before we can expect complete victory to perch upon our banners we must consent and agree that with reference to modes of procedure or names of organizations, and upon all other collateral questions, there must be allowed the largest liberty, and we must rally under one banner whose shibboleth watchword and battle cry shall be "Death to the liquor traffic."

If an attempt is made to dictate or prescribe forms of faith or practice upon all moral and political questions, we are liable to fail for lack of harmony. But if we only require concurrence upon the question of life or death of the liquor traffic, we ought to and I think we can count upon the cooperation of all good people.10

To emphasize the need for harmony among temperance groups, and to illustrate the lack of unity that existed prior to the advent of the League, Dr. Price related the story of a newspaper editor who printed a glaring advertisement of a new saloon that had opened in the community in which the newspaper was published, and refused to put in his columns an article that reflected on the saloon business. When asked if he did not think church members would boycott him if he favored the saloon, the editor replied, "No, they are all divided on

10 Proceedings of the Third Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1890.
the subject, and I do not fear them. I would rather oppose one thousand church members than fifty saloon men, for the latter mean business."

* * * *

Next in importance to the League's underlying philosophy was its method of organization. It was not another temperance society. It was not a rival of any organization, but, as its name implied, a league or organizations with the Christian Church as its focal point. League leaders were to repeat time and again that the saloon problem was the church's problem and that the world expected the church to solve it. They believed that if the church failed in this obligation, it was in danger of forfeiting leadership in moral reforms. Beginning as a self-perpetuating, voluntary organization, viewed with doubt, if not distrust, the League developed into an actual church federation of assured standing. Eventually, it was to be recognized by every leading denominational body of the nation as the official representative of the federated churches in the promotion of temperance work and legislation.

To symbolize itself as a federation of anti-saloon forces, the League at its second national convention in 1896 adopted the fasces as its emblem of identification. The bundle of rods was to symbolize federation with friends and the battle ax aggression against the enemy.
At the same time, the League adopted the motto: "Let us emphasize points on which we agree and avoid subjects as to which we differ." ¹¹

The League generally approached the churches in this manner:
"You are opposed to the saloon, and since the League is an agency through which you can work and consolidate your efforts, will you support it?"

The response of the churches was amazing; the few that did not cooperate at once were not criticized or scolded. Instead, the League systematically went to work to win them. Acting as a clearing house for churches and temperance societies, it stimulated agitation against the liquor traffic and welded public opinion. It believed local pastors should be the bulwark of this agitation, and was willing to help ministers and their congregations by offering advice and inspiration, and furnishing them with speakers and literature. Simply put, the League's philosophy was that of helping those who were willing to help themselves.

Representatives of all sects and creeds were urged to cooperate with the League in its work by offering their buildings in which to hold public meetings and making annual financial contributions to the League. League officials reasoned it was much less costly to work through an organization already committed against the saloon, such as the church, than to form a separate agency. Under League agencies and auspices, the church became a center for teaching civic patriotism and

good citizenship, and rapidly increasing numbers of citizens were induced to become active in their own party organization.

The perfection of the League idea was not to make the League, as an organization, a great political power continually active as a kind of party, or an end in itself. It preferred to allow the organization to stay in the background while the citizens as individuals became so influential for righteousness that political parties would stand for moral principles as a matter of course and divide only upon questions of administration.

Individual supporters of the League could engage in other movements for good government, because the League maintained that good government meant government that was not controlled by the saloon. They could also participate in special phases of temperance work through various temperance societies and organizations.

The League promoted citizenship and good government through a very simple organization, placing the bulk of the responsibility upon the churches and individual members of their congregations. Through its speakers and by direct mail, the League kept the voter informed of the voting record of his representatives in the state and federal legislatures. With League cooperation, hundreds and thousands of meetings were conducted by local pastors.

One Sunday, for example, by concerted arrangement, the pastors of more than two thousand Illinois churches discussed a pending temperance measure and urged their hearers to request their representatives to support it. A special pamphlet issued by the League furnished
the material for preparation. The effect of that one service, early in the League's history, made the proposed bill a recognized issue in the politics of the state.\textsuperscript{12}

Still another example of the League's effectiveness was demonstrated in Ohio. A League local option bill was defeated in 1900 by one vote in the Ohio Senate after it had passed the lower house. Of the sixty-seven members of both houses who voted against the bill, only fifteen were returned to the next legislature, which passed the bill by a vote of 82 to 18 in the lower house, and unanimously in the Senate.\textsuperscript{13}

The League did not form local anti-saloon leagues as distinct societies to be joined. This, it believed, would tend to preclude success by dividing its natural constituency into two classes, those who "belonged" and those who did not, with an artificial barrier between them. Another reason was that the possible inactivity of the local organization, or the ill-advised, independent action of inexperienced officers, in the name of the League, might bring discredit upon the whole movement.

The League discovered that all necessary organization could be obtained by making the individual church the working unit, and obtaining the appointment in each church of a small committee of voters (one

\textsuperscript{12} Anderson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 24-25.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 24-25.
of them to be the chairman of the "citizenship" or similar committee of the young people's society). The pastors and these committees were associated together in towns, counties, and legislative districts—organized, not as temperance reformers, but as citizens insisting upon their rights and due recognition in government of the principles which controlled their private lives. With this as a permanent nucleus, additional organization was built for campaign or other special purposes.

Through these committees the state league obtained lists of the church voters of the state and respective political divisions, and informed the voters concerning the attitude and record of candidates for office upon any pending anti-saloon issue.

The League adopted a streamlined, efficient administrative organization that included the idea of an active executive officer, the "executive human shoulder," as it was termed by Dr. Kynett, with assistant superintendents and agents giving their entire thought and undivided attention to the direction of League work. It included a financial system founded on the per-month subscription card, which, perhaps, more than any other single factor, aside from the active state superintendent idea, was mainly responsible for the success achieved by the League movement throughout the nation. It not only solved the problem of financial support, so essential, but more especially it obtained the active cooperation and the close affiliation of hundreds and thousands of small monthly contributors. Everyone of them had a personal and direct interest in seeing that all phases of
the League work received the largest measure of cooperation and active support in his local community, as well as in the larger political units.

The subscription or pledge card was originated by Dr. Russell. League representatives insisted that "God put the idea of that little subscription card in the mind of Dr. Russell at the same time He put the thought of the League on his conscience and in his heart." But realizing it could not achieve success through small gifts alone, the League also placed emphasis on the obtaining of larger gifts by personal and private request.

From the outset, its leaders realized the need of strong financial backing. "The sword and the purse constitute the military power of the nation," Dr. Price observed. "In our warfare against King Alcohol we can do without the sword, but the purse is an absolute necessity, and the lack of financial aid is the main cause of this prolonged struggle of truth and right against error and wrong."

Local chairmen of the League financial drives resorted to various techniques to stimulate the generosity of their constituency. One resorted to this little poem which he recited just before he made the collection:

Kind ladies and gentlemen I've been selected
To make the last speech of the night;
My words may be pointed, and subject disjointed,
Yet I think the committee did right.
They appointed me, not for my beauty or talent,

---

11Proceedings of the Fifth Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1900.
Or the eloquent words I could speak, 
Not at all for my learning or power of discerning, 
But simply because of my 'cheek'.
'Tis pleasant to serve you with wit or with 'taffy', 
And have you respond with a cheer, 
But not pleasant or funny to ask you for money, 
But a duty, and that's why I'm here. 
Please do not get angry or think me officious, 
Till I whisper a secret to you, 
Yes, to you I'll entrust it; our treasury's 'busted', 
And what are we going to do? 
We have workers who give both their time and their talent, 
And we want to do good and to please, 
But of cash we're deficient, and you have sufficient 
To put us at once at our ease. 
I think a collection would make us all happy, 
I know it will us, if not you; 
So I think I will ask it, and send around the basket, 
And see what you are willing to do. 
Put in silver, if only a dime or a quarter, 
They're so pretty and easy to count; 
Don't drop in a penny, it takes, oh, so many 
To make up a decent amount.15

With this administrative and financial arrangement, the League 
divided itself into three major departments, agitation, legislation, 
and enforcement. Agitation was considered the most important of these 
and was feared most by the liquor interests. This department utilized 
extensively the printed page, public speech, and song. The League's 
tagitation program was concerned largely with the building of public 
sentiment against the saloon. This was one of the first lines of 
action implemented by Dr. Russell. From the pulpit on Sunday morning 
he gave the "rum facts" for the preceding week, telling the congrega-
tion what he had found in their saloons, outlining the crime, horror 
and shame the saloon was bringing to the community. 

15League workers manual.
Dr. Russell was not alone in his agitation work. Other workers illustrated the alleged evils of the saloon by means of stereoptican lectures. One of these lectures, accompanied by Christmas scenes, showed the brewer's fine home and his children about a large Christmas tree. Other pictures showed the Salvation Army wagon giving out presents in a slum area reputedly desolated by the brewer's saloons. Many of the children were pictured standing barefooted in the snow "because the brewer had their stocking money."

At the same time, workers in the legislative department gathered information concerning corruption in government and the close association of liquor men with political office holders. If the League's program was to be successful, its leaders realized one of their first major tasks was to destroy this combination that existed between the "political boss" and the liquor traffic. It was generally recognized that the saloon, compact and thoroughly organized, was a powerful ally of political parties. Experience had proven that it would throw its whole influence behind any man of any party that showed it the most favor, and it could be depended upon to punish any man of any party who opposed its business.

Saloon men make no alliance for party success unless their business is to be cared for [Mr. Price asserted], and they will throw their influence for any man of any party who will best subserve their purposes. They are as wise as serpents and just as harmless. Everyone knows that the success in saloon men defeating legislation hostile to their business is owing to the fact that they are united, and that those who oppose them are not. They fight with closed ranks in solid column. We fight
In squads and independent detachments, hence our lack of speed and complete success. In this respect we ought to learn wisdom from our enemies. 16

And that is exactly what the League did. Although striving for different ends, the League adopted several of the tried and proved methods of organization utilized so successfully by the liquor interests. It sought the nomination and selection of the "proper" candidates on local and state levels, and the maintaining of careful records of how office holders voted on temperance issues. If the members of the legislature were unfriendly to the temperance cause, the League bound itself to defeat such men when they came before the people again as candidates for office.

Dr. Russell early in the life of the League expressed the necessity of hastening the organization of the various states to the point where the League would be "as forceful in securing congressional legislation as the liquor organizations have heretofore been in preventing it." He explained that that kind of effectiveness would be possible when the League became so organized that it could dictate the nomination and election of the members of Congress. 17

While the League left every man free to decide where he would work against the saloon, and did not ask him to abandon his party permanently, it proposed as a test of independent manhood that he should vote for a reputable, qualified candidate upon another ticket,

16 Proceedings of the Second Anti-Saloon League Convention, 1896.

17 Proceedings Second Anti-Saloon League Convention, 1896.
who stood against the saloon in preference to a disreputable and unfit
candidate of his own party who was controlled by the saloon. It in-
sisted that when the anti-saloon issue was involved he should be first
an American citizen—after that a Republican, Democrat, Prohibitionist,
Socialist, or something else. It maintained that the only really
"straight" ticket was one from which "crooked" candidates had been
scratched.18

The League asked no man to leave his political party, and in-
sisted it made no attempt to coerce its constituency. It gave the
facts about candidates where an anti-saloon issue was involved, but
disarmed criticism, and avoided dissension by assuming that the sincer-
ity and intelligence of the voter would dictate such action as would
best advance the League's cause. The League first sought to obtain
in the several parties the nomination of acceptable candidates for
office, and then waged an intensive campaign for their election.

In fact, the League even favored the election of candidates who
were not wholly in faith and practice, acceptable friends of temperance
reform. While it was desirable, the League admitted, that candidates
for office should be in all respects acceptable, "it may be necessary,
at times, in order to secure some desired end, to vote for candidates
committed to that object, though not wholly committed to the plans and
purposes of the League."19 The League denied that this practice


19 Declaration of Principles and Methods, Adopted by the League
in 1903.
expressed its approval of the undesirable characteristics of the partially acceptable candidates for whom it voted, pointing out that League adherents cast their ballots with reference to the one paramount issue of saloon suppression, and ignored other matters not connected with it. This was not compromising with evil, nor approving of wrong, the League declared, but was another means of striking an effective blow at the saloon.20

The League made it clear it was not a political party, explaining that it was broader than a party and without a party’s limitations. Its leaders declared that if they tied themselves to a party, the anti-saloon movement could make no progress unless that party by election of its candidates obtained control of governmental affairs. They reasoned that a party once victorious faced every administrative question growing out of complex governmental activity, and ran the risk of dividing its anti-saloon constituency upon any or all of them. If defeated, such a party would carry down with it the temperance movement dependent upon it. By using the non-partisan method, the permanence of anti-saloon victories did not hinge upon the outcome of an ordinary election.

The League found it difficult at first to get persons to vote for a temperance candidate on the opposite ticket rather than a liquor candidate on their own ticket. Party lines had been so tightly drawn, especially following the Civil War, that many Republicans thought no

20Ibid.
Democrat could possibly get to Heaven, and the Democrats felt that no Republican should be permitted to enter the Pearly Gates. Any voter known to have soiled his hands and sold his political birthright by voting for a candidate on the opposite ticket, was promptly read out of his party, and therefore, could never hope for the honor and emolument of public office. Under the incessant pounding of the League, however, men became bolder and more independent in their voting, until political parties of their own accord and for their own preservation began moving toward the prohibition issue.

The non-partisan method of electing candidates was used successfully for the first time in Ohio when the state League introduced its first legislative measure, the Haskell Bill, in January, 1894, and managed to bring it out of committee. At the committee hearing, Dr. Russell declared that during the next two years the League solemnly promised to do its utmost to save "harmless from defeat in the next election every member of the present legislature, regardless of party, who votes for the Haskell Bill."21 When the roll was taken, thirty-six members voted for the measure, considerably less than the number required to enact the legislation.

Before the legislature had adjourned, the League started its next campaign. Its most important task was the defeat of John Locke, Madison County Republican, for the Ohio Senate. Locke, a prominent party leader, had been a member of the House in 1891, where he

---
21 Russell, unpublished memoirs.
vigorously opposed the Haskell measure. In one speech he denounced local option, declaring it would destroy the rights and liberties of the people. "Let me warn every Republican member of the House," he exclaimed, "if you vote for this infamous bill you will surely achieve but one result—you will dig your own political grave."22

Not long after the legislature closed, Locke announced he would be a candidate for the state senate the following year. The counties comprising the senatorial district were Madison, Clark, and Champaign. According to regular rotation, it was Madison's County's "turn" to have the senatorship.

Early in the fall of 1894, Russell visited Springfield, Clark County seat, where he called upon Colonel David King, a leading businessman and an elder in the Presbyterian Church. He also was a good friend of the League. Russell disclosed to him the legislative plan and method by which the League hoped to elect and defeat candidates upon the saloon issue. If King would help, it would first be tried out in the coming campaign for state senator. King was willing to lend his assistance. He gave a dinner in his home and invited Russell to meet a group of individuals which included a reliable church temperance man from each ward in Springfield.

The dinner proved historic. It initiated the League's method of enacting and enforcing the abolition of the liquor traffic by the nomination and election of the "right" public officers. The plan

22 Ibid.
required the building of sentiment by agitation. Those attending the
dinner agreed to help. A second list was made of similar men in each
township in the county. Their names were divided among those
present, who promised to invite those named to call at their offices or
to "drive out and see them." The next meeting was held in the back
room of a bank, and there every ward and township was represented.
New lists were made and assigned in the same manner. These key men,
thus mobilized, spread the anti-saloon committee to almost every
election district.

By this time two legislative organizers, Wayne B. Wheeler and
Edwin C. Pinwiddle, about whom the public was to hear a great deal in
later years, were actively at work. They created a similar organiza-
tion in Champaign County. They also assisted local committeeemen in
extending the enrollment of voters who promised to vote at the
primaries for anti-saloon delegates to county conventions. The last
of the counties, Madison, was organized in the same manner.

A bone-dry Methodist grain dealer by the name of Jones allowed
his name to be used as a candidate against Locke, though he hardly
expected the League's plan would work.

Wheeler and Pinwiddle were everywhere diligently working day
and night, Pinwiddle by rail and buggy, Wheeler on his bicycle, with
the result that the conventions in Clark and Champaign counties
elected a majority of dry delegates to the senatorial convention. So
quietly had the organization been built, Locke did not learn he was in
danger of defeat until just after the county conventions had elected
their delegates to the senatorial convention. Upon the first ballot,
Locke was defeated. Jones was nominated by a substantial majority, and was elected to the senate in November. Locke never was able to rebuild his county ring; by his opposition to the dry forces, he had "dug his own political grave."\(^\text{23}\)

During the same year, 1895, the same organizational work was done to support the thirty-six members who had voted for the Haskell bill and sought renomination. Similar county committees were built and when the legislature met in Columbus in January, 1896, the League was able to show the party chairmen and leaders of both major political parties that every member of both parties who had voted for the Haskell Bill and sought renomination and re-election was in his seat. Three or four opponents of the bill were defeated.

An illustration of the state league acting in a similar manner over the whole state, as it was likely to do often, was the concerted effort to defeat the Republican candidate for lieutenant governor of Ohio in the fall of 1899. John A. Caldwell, attorney for the Ohio brewers, allegedly was nominated by the liquor interests of the state. The opposing candidate, Judge A. H. Patrick, was in no way committed to the liquor interests. Described by the League as a man of "excellent character and sterling integrity," Patrick was a staunch supporter of the local option principle in temperance legislation.

Although Caldwell was not defeated, the result of the election offered encouragement to the League and surprised the liquor interests

\(^{23}\)Foregoing account from Russell's unpublished memoirs.
and old-line politicians. Republican Governor Nash was elected by nearly 50,000 plurality, while his running-mate fell behind by more than 34,000 votes. The Cleveland Leader, summing up the results of the election asserted:

Caldwell was fortunate enough to be favored by the liquor dealers. It was not that they cared especially for him, but that they disliked and feared his rival, Patrick, on the contrary, had the good luck to be opposed by the saloons and to receive the support of the Anti-Saloon League. The net result is very flattering to Mr. Patrick. It must also be humiliating to the liquor interests of Ohio. The Anti-Saloon League is well pleased. 24

The editorial ended with a solemn warning to the state's brewers and saloon keepers that if they were wise they would take this lesson seriously to heart.

They have everything to lose and nothing to gain by stirring up the question of further regulation and restriction of their business [the Leader declared]. The more quiet they keep, the better off they will be. The more they meddle with politics the greater their danger must become. The time has passed, never to return, when they could bully the people of Ohio by threatening disaster to any party or public that excited their displeasure.

* * * *

The League's third department, that of enforcing existing temperance laws, did not match the importance of the agitation and legislative branches in the beginning, but gained in strength and importance with the growth of the national body. The League did not

---

24 November 7, 1899.
set itself up as a law enforcement agent per se. It thought of itself simply as an auxiliary force in assisting the legally established law enforcement officers to do their work. It believed, however, in having its own attorneys. Its leaders felt that not to have legal minds associated with the organization would be as ridiculous as trying to run a great business without legal counsel.

No phase of the League's work, however, was more misunderstood than its relation to the enforcement of law. Although aiming to tell the people their rights and give to each community the benefit of the experience of all others, the League had no patent process for closing saloons or compelling them to obey the law. As soon as support permitted, state leagues employed attorneys whose counsel and services consistent with League principles, such as protesting against the issuance of licenses, were furnished at no cost beyond traveling expenses. Such an attorney prepared an annotated pamphlet of the liquor laws of his state, that the people might know their rights, drafted proposed state legislation and framed enforcible ordinances for adoption by various municipalities. As a specialist he was helpful to local prosecuting attorneys in the preparation of the papers for trial, and carrying test cases upon important mooted points to the courts of last resort.

The League felt there could be no healthful, permanent enforcement of law except through the regularly constituted officials. Anything which absolved officials from their obligations, it maintained, or relieved the people of responsibility for the election of faithful
officials, intensified the disorder. Furthermore, League officials were convinced that law enforcement work was peculiarly local in its character because the officers for that purpose were local officers. When the people of any community had succeeded in improving conditions, the League had done it only through moral support and encouragement.

Moreover, the League did not furnish detectives to any community or local organization for the obtaining of evidence, though it helped them to obtain suitable men for this purpose. In such matters a state league acted as the agent of the local parties and assumed no obligation beyond good faith. The detectives so engaged were employees of the local parties and not of the state league. The testimony of reputable local citizens carried more weight with the average jury than the statements of paid, professional outside witnesses. Evidence of open, persistent violation of the law was, in the last analysis, evidence of official incompetence or corruption, which could only be cured at an election.

No cases were allowed to be commenced, or prosecutions instituted, in the name of the League. Any one of more of three things might be responsible for liquor lawlessness: faulty law, lax or corrupt officials, and dead or unorganized public sentiment. Of these, faulty law was paramount for it shielded the officials and disheartened the public. The League declared itself an agency for solving the saloon problem. As such, it maintained its business was with the
lawmaker, the law enforcement official, and the public conscience; but not, at first hand, with the law breaker, who was a mere symptom whom the League felt would disappear when conditions were made right.

This did not mean that the League abandoned law enforcement, but simply that it had put it into its proper place as part of an intelligent plan for permanent correction of fundamental conditions. The League refused to fritter away time and energy, and squander the people's money on trifles. Mere arrest and conviction of an individual saloon keeper, said the League, was not enough. It sought instead to eliminate faulty laws, and remove incompetent and corrupt officials. This coincided with the League's underlying philosophy that the only hope for a saloon-ridden community was the organization of a state and nation-wide movement, which, by continual agitation, would furnish a momentum that would carry the work over the sag in local sentiment. The voting out of saloons in different parts of the state, the constant effort for better legislation and the election of officials who would enforce the improved laws, said League officials, would eventually create a sentiment that would give even the worst community a chance to redeem itself. 25

CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION

The Anti-Saloon League in its early years was not, strictly speaking, an organization. It was the federated church in action against the saloon. Its agents were of the church and under all circumstances loyal to the church. It moved just as fast and just as far as the public sentiment of the church would permit. It had not come into existence simply to build a little local sentiment, obtain the passage of a few laws, and vote saloons from a few hundred towns. These were mere incidents in its progress. It had come, its adherents firmly believed, to solve the liquor problem in the nation once and for all.

To be most effective, however, it was recognized early in the life of the League that it had to be a closely knit body. No disagreement existed as to basic principles and with reference to the League's logical lines of activity there was the utmost unanimity. But League leaders had come to feel the necessity for a marshalling of their affiliated organizations into a symmetrical and harmonious unity for the transaction of the business for which the League stood. They realized there was the same need for a community of interest and action in the League that there was in a church organization. Difficulties and differences of view had arisen in some cases between the
officers of the state league and local league officials. In other cases disagreements had occurred between state and district officers. In still another instance, the management of the state league had been clearly inefficient. In another case the state league officers had carried on their work in a way that contravened the generally accepted methods of the League. From the beginning there was no constitutional authority with right or power to interfere, or to which appeal could be made to remedy a difficulty. There also was no adequate means whereby finances could be raised to support and carry on the work of the national league.

When the League first appointed its officers there was no endowment and no financial constituency or basis of any kind. The national superintendent and his associates were simply thrust out to devise ways and means as best they could to carry on their work. They were expected both to make their work go forward, and also to find the means to sustain their departments while doing so. It was a serious problem. In addition, League workers in the beginning were called upon not only to plan for the support of themselves and their assistants, but also to obtain additional sums of money to help support the state work in the new states where organizations were being formed. Consequently, had these early leaders not been able to appeal to personal friends for financial assistance, and if they had not had the good fortune to have a little credit at the bank, they would have been compelled to abandon their efforts. An examination of the League's early financial records shows that the League was constantly in debt
to its national superintendent for salary and traveling expenses. And the superintendent's salary never exceeded $2000 annually during the first decade of the League's existence.\(^1\)

Some of these weaknesses were solved with action taken at the Seventh National Convention in Washington in 1902. In case of incompetency or matter of discipline of any state officer, the general superintendent was authorized, upon written request of not fewer than three members of the board of state trustees, to call a meeting of the trustees to study the complaint. If the complaint was judged legitimate, the trustees were empowered to suspend such officer and even remove him from office. An appeals system also was provided to give the aggrieved party an opportunity to air his side of the matter. In the case of complaints against any national officer, such complaint could be made in writing by not less than three members of the national executive committee and filed with the national president. If the national president should be involved, the complaint was to be filed with the general superintendent. Upon receiving such a complaint, the president or superintendent was empowered to call together five state superintendents to examine and pass upon the merits of the complaint and suspend the officer during the pendency of the proceedings, and if they deemed best, discharge such officer.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Baker, unpublished "Autobiography."

As for finances, a board of trustees was formed, composed of two representatives from each state league, one of whom was the state superintendent, and the other elected by the board of trustees. The board was instructed to meet at the time and place of each national convention. Beginning with the 1903 meeting, a headquarters committee of three persons was appointed and empowered to make apportionment of money among the various state leagues to meet the expenses of the national league, hear the status of the financial condition of the various state leagues, and be prepared to act intelligently and just in the matter of apportionment.3

The League operated under this arrangement, making occasional changes and additions to its governing machinery, until 1913 when it adopted a precise and detailed constitution. An examination of the constitution discloses that the real ruling power centered in the board of directors and executive committee. The former comprised at least two representatives from each state league, chosen by whatever method the state might decide, with every state having more than a million population entitled to an additional member for each million of population thereof. To prevent the populous urban states from gaining control, however, no state could have more than five representatives. The board had power to make all bylaws and appointed national officers, including a president, twelve vice presidents, secretary, treasurer, and general superintendent; selected an

3Ibid.
executive committee, and chose, upon nomination by the executive committee, an associate general superintendent, a general manager of the League's publishing interests, a legislative superintendent, an assistant general superintendent, and an attorney. Amendments to the constitution were made by a two-thirds vote of the board upon recommendation by two-thirds of the executive committee; in the absence of such recommendation, a three-fourths vote by the board was necessary.

Nineteen members, usually representatives of the board, were chosen every two years and comprised the national executive committee which became the real governing body. There was one member for each of the sixteen districts into which the country was divided, and three chosen at large, of whom not more than one might come from any one of the districts. These districts were determined roughly on the basis of population. New York, for example, comprised a single district and the New England states taken together constituted another. Not more than one-third of the members could be salaried. The executive committee acted in all matters for the board of directors when the latter was not in session. Its duties included direction and control of the movements and expenditures of the active officers of the League; the provision of assistance whenever necessary; preparation of a budget; the fixing of salaries for all active officers. It had power to fill all vacancies occurring in the interim between meetings of the board of directors; determined all questions of policy and procedure, investigated the financial condition of the League, and made assessments upon the state leagues for the support of the national
League. Still another important function of the executive committee was that of fixing the time and place of League conventions, generally held every two years unless it by a two-thirds vote called a special convention in the interim. At these conventions all persons were recognized as delegates who were appointed by local churches and other affiliated organizations. Records of the League disclose, however, that what delegates decided was of little or no consequence. The real control in the convention, as outside, resided in the board of directors, the central executive committee and voting officials. Chief purpose of the two-year gatherings was to furnish a central outlet for League propaganda, for its proceedings usually received nation-wide publicity. League officials often complained that it was only at conventions that the League received its just recognition from the press. Consequently, they went all out to put on a real show every two years, featuring nationally-prominent speakers, especially members of Congress in sympathy with the dry cause, and interspersed the business sessions and speeches with a generous amount of music. At the close of one of the 1916 sessions at Atlantic City, for example, delegates marched to the beach where photographers took views of the vast assemblage. They all turned toward the boardwalk, and holding their hands or hats in the air, while motion picture operators took pictures of the gathering, recited the League's slogan, "I will see this thing through."

The most powerful and influential officer of the League was its national superintendent who had the authority to nominate state superintendents, and under provisions of the constitution, this
amounted to virtual selection. State superintendents were required to report to him each month. This, of course, gave him enormous power over state branches. Next in importance was the financial secretary who supervised the work of obtaining funds. Upon authorization from the executive committee and the local organization, he conducted subscription campaigns within the states and saw that the percentage due the national league was forthcoming. Two other extremely important positions were those of legislative superintendent and the manager of the American Issue Publishing Company. Although under the direction of the executive committee and the board of directors, the editorial and business management of the publishing company was largely entrusted to the manager. The company was owned by the League with the property being held by five trustees elected biennially by the board of directors. These trustees held the property in trust but could not themselves dispose of the property except by the authorization of the national board. While the company was a stock operation, incorporated under the laws of Ohio, only ten shares of stock of one hundred dollars each were issued. Two of these shares were held by each of the five trustees.\textsuperscript{4} As for the legislative superintendent, he nominally was under the direction of the executive committee and the general superintendent, but in his headquarters in Washington he was pretty much the

master of his own dominion. This was particularly true during the
tenure of Wayne H. Wheeler, beginning in 1919, under whose efficient
management the office assumed an importance in the public mind com-
parable to that of a national political boss.

Although the actual government of the League was always centered
in the hands of a few men, theoretically its machinery was based on a
check and balance arrangement between the national body and the state
leagues. Within each state there was a board of trustees (called a
board of directors in a few of the states where the League was incor-
porated) made up of representatives from the various churches cooper-
ating with the League. It operated through a headquarters committee
of at least five members chosen biennially. The board had power to
determine questions of policy for the state league in harmony with the
policies of the national body. It also chose the state’s represent-
tatives on the national board of directors. State superintendents were
elected by the state leagues, annually, upon nomination of the general
superintendent. Salary was fixed by the state board, subject to the
approval of the national executive committee.

State superintendents supervised the work in their respective
areas subject to the direction of the state headquarters committee, the
general superintendent and the national executive committee. Actually,
however, the state superintendent had considerable freedom. Familiarity
with the local situation made his opinion especially valuable and
usually decisive. Successful superintendents were rewarded by transfer
to a larger and more important state or promotion to national office.
William H. Anderson successively filled the positions of state superintendent in Illinois, Maryland, and New York, and acted as national legislative superintendent for a time. E. H. Cherrington had demonstrated his abilities as superintendent in the state of Washington and was called to Westerville to take charge of the American Issue Publishing Company when it was organized. Wayne Wheeler served in the ranks as a speaker while he was studying law, later as attorney for the Ohio League, then as its superintendent, from which office he was sent to Washington as national attorney. Upon the resignation of E. C. Bimwiddle, he became general counsel and national legislative superintendent. Numerous other instances could be cited to illustrate the skillful manner in which the Anti-Saloon League made the most of the services of its able men.

As the work developed, effort was specialized and the responsibilities divided. State superintendents appointed district superintendents who were responsible to them for the promotion of the general work within their particular sections of the state, and named assistants, attorneys, and editors to help handle the business and administer the general policies which had to be directed from the headquarters offices. Organization below the state level was purely voluntary. The state and district superintendents were the divisional and regimental commanders. The captains, lieutenants and privates were found among the hundreds of thousands of pastors and laymen who gave liberally of their time in preparing meetings, distributing
literature, bringing proper pressure to bear upon public officials, and getting out the vote. Essentially, the League was organized to give church people an effective political organization to fight the liquor traffic. It had been found impractical for churches to enter the field of politics directly, and the League appeared to be an ideal vehicle through which they could wage their battle against the saloon.

* * * *

From its beginning the League was an organization primarily of Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, and Congregational churches, but it was not by any means limited to these denominations. In New Jersey at one time fifteen distinct denominations were represented on the board of trustees, while in most states there were several more than the four denominations named. Statistics are lacking as to the total number of churches which cooperated with the League, but estimates from scanty League records during the period 1911-1925 indicate the movement was receiving active support from approximately 15,000. This is perhaps a conservative estimate since Wayne B. Wheeler, addressing delegates to the League's fifteenth national convention in Columbus in 1913, welcomed them "in the names of more than 5000 loyal churches in this state who have opened their doors and their pocketbooks each year for

---


two decades in larger proportion. Since the national league dealt only with the larger churches, it is probable that the average number of affiliated churches throughout the United States during this period was not far short of 30,000. Frank R. Kent estimated that the League had the support of 60,000 agencies at the height of its success.

In 1908 Superintendent S. E. Nicholson in Pennsylvania, through the cooperation of some 4500 churches, had on file the names, addresses and party affiliations of 50,000 to 75,000. The fact that a voter was willing to give his name indicated a certain degree of sympathy.

Philadelphia is really mobilized said a Pennsylvania spokesman. The forces are ready for action.... It is no idle boast or empty dream. I can dictate twenty letters to twenty parts of the city and thereby set 50,000 men in action... especially for temperance propaganda.... I can name 100 churches that can marshal 20,000 men in Bible classes alone.... Governor Drumbaugh, a few months ago, said that no politician or political party... could afford to turn a deaf ear to the demands of such an organized body of men. They must surely hold the balance of power on any great moral issue.

On a single Sunday the pastors in more than 2,000 churches in Illinois discussed a pending temperance measure. In 1917, the Reverend C. F. Jones, superintendent in Nevada, reported that he had

8 "The Anti-Saloon League as Seen by Frank R. Kent of The Baltimore Sun." Anti-Saloon League reprint, no date (about 1915).
access to all the Protestant churches; that more than 600 people had been personally interviewed and that they had agreed to cooperate in the organization of 125 precincts. At the same convention, William H. Anderson reported that the New York League had access to 3,000 churches; that its staff numbered twenty-seven, exclusive of a clerical force of thirty; and that on the last Sunday in January, 1917, more than 3,000 pastors had engaged in concerted discussion "of the issues pending before the legislature." He boasted that some Jews and Catholics had participated.\footnote{Proceedings of the Eighteenth Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1917, pp. 220, 225.} Hundreds of League-sponsored meetings were held each year in every state for the purpose of raising money and discussing political contests and candidates. In the eight years from 1914 to 1923, the subscription department of the national league held 19,799 meetings in forty-one states and the District of Columbia, exclusive of special campaign meetings.\footnote{Cherrington, E. H., Report to the Executive Committee and National Board of Directors, 1923.} The total does not include meetings held by state leagues.

Supplementing the churches and temperance organizations, local committees of voters were formed after the most approved fashion of machine politics. States were divided into districts, districts were organized by counties, counties by wards, precincts and townships. There was a paid superintendent for each district, a paid manager for each county, while volunteer captains and lieutenants served in the
smaller units. If possible, there was a key man for every ten voters. An active man might be able to look after as many as thirty; but where the number was smaller, the results were more satisfactory. 13

* * * *

One of the most interesting features of the League, although it was primarily a Protestant church movement, was its relationship to the Roman Catholic Church. From its inception, the League encouraged support from Catholics. As early as 1894, Dr. Russell asserted he was "glad to report the earnest cooperation which many of our Catholic brethren are according the League." 14 And the following year he remarked

the federation of our Catholic fellow citizens with the Protestants in our League work...is one of our most hopeful indications in our great movement...Two of the bishops and many of the priests in Ohio now stand related as indorsers of many workers in our League. It should be understood by our League officers everywhere that joint meetings of Catholics and Protestants are always to be held in public halls as citizen meetings. No religious exercises are to be conducted in such meetings and the parish courtesies are to be respected by obtaining the invitation of the local priest when an outside speaker of the Catholic Church is to be asked to take part in the meeting. 15

This spirit of cooperation with the Catholic Church was manifest by the League in other ways. It pointed with pride to Father J. J. Curran, who for twenty-five years served as a vice president of the

13 Proceedings of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Conventions of the Anti-Saloon League, especially in state reports.

14 Anti-Saloon, April, 1894, p. 2.

15 Anti-Saloon, March, 1895, p. 2.
national body. When in 1913 Father Patrick J. Murphy of Texas addressed the Anti-Saloon League convention on "Why Should We Do Away with the Saloon Business," copies of his speech were widely distributed. The South Dakota League, about 1915, issued a pamphlet, Catholic Clergy and the Saloon, with quotations from Pope Leo VIII, Archbishop Keane, Bishop Conaty, Bishop Canevin, Bishop Monaghan, Father P. J. McKenna, and Father J. M. Clear, advocating prohibition. Thousands of reprints of an article by United States Senator Ransdell of Louisiana, a Catholic prohibitionist, on Catholics and Prohibition, were circulated. The Catholic Clergy Prohibition League was also cited. Mayor Dever of Chicago, a Catholic, was praised for his ardent advocacy of strict enforcement.  

To get the complete picture of the relationship between the League and the Roman Catholic Church, it is necessary to examine the attitude of the Church of Rome and its adherents toward the League and prohibition in general. Although one of the Church's basic tenets was temperance, it did not urge the practice of total abstinence in general but only to those who already had become addicted to intoxication. In this respect its philosophy coincided with that of the League. Within the League, however, there were certain extremists who advocated total abstinence. It was these individuals who were largely responsible for creating friction between Catholics and the League. They apparently failed or refused to understand that the Catholic Church could not possibly advocate total abstinence, for to do so would be to

---

16 Odegard, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
aim a death blow at one of the Church's most sacred liturgies which requires the use of sacramental wine. Writers of the Eighteenth Amendment were to take this into consideration when they inserted a clause giving the privilege of transportation to sacramental wines, liquors, or alcohol for medicinal, mechanical, and scientific purposes.

Maintaining its traditional policy of seldom approving any social, civic, economic, or other movement formed outside of its jurisdiction, the Church never officially endorsed the Anti-Saloon League. Instead, it permitted its members to exercise their own judgment in whether they wanted to take part in the movement. Failure of the Church to offer official sanction caused a majority of the Catholics in the United States to remain aloof from League activities. On the other hand, however, tens of thousands of laity and hundreds of priests throughout the country were in silent sympathy with the League, while more aggressive Catholics took an active part in its work. 17

Despite its failure to officially endorse the principles of the League, the Catholic Church, through its spokesmen, believed the saloon was the "physical and moral plague" of the times. It believed the saloon traded and batted upon intemperance, and that all the evils which accompanied or followed from intemperance could be laid at

17 From address to the Fifteenth National Convention of the Anti-Saloon League by the Reverend Father Patrick J. Murphy of Texas, 1913.
the saloon door. One of these spokesmen, Archbishop Ireland, was steadfast in his contention that the only thing the Catholic Church could do, if it were to remain loyal to its professed principles, was to "raise her hand in opposition to the American saloon and put herself on clear record as its antagonist." He asserted that the saloon was the personification of the "vilest elements in our modern civilization" and between it and the Catholic Church there could never be any truce. 18

In 1884, the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, Maryland, adopted decrees which were approved by Pope Leo XIII, bidding Catholics engaged in saloon keeping to leave the business and "choose if they at all can, some other more decent method of making a livelihood." 19 This was the forerunner of a much more far-reaching edict issued by the Reverend John A. Patterson, bishop of Columbus, Ohio, a decade later. The edit, published by the Columbus Diocese, declared that

no existing society, or branch or division thereof of the Catholic Church shall be allowed to have a liquor dealer or a saloon keeper at its head or among its officers, and no new Catholic society or new branch of an old organization, shall be formed which would admit membership to any person engaged, whether as principal or as agent in the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. 20

20 Ibid.
A supplementary clause excluded from sacraments of the Church, saloon
keepers who persisted in selling liquor on Sundays, or otherwise con-
ducted their business in an unlawful manner. This provision was not
new. It merely rehearsed the ordinary prescriptions of Catholic moral
theology. Bishop Patterson's ecclesiastical law was substantiated by
the Appellate Court of the Apostolic Delegate, Monsignor Francis
Satolli of New York.

Archbishop Ireland, discussing this action, expressed belief that
if other bishops issued similar decrees, they too would be substan-
tiated.

Henceforth [he wrote] Catholic public opinion frowns upon
the saloon and the saloon keeper; saloon keeping is a dis-
reputable business, and the saloon keeper, however cor-
rectly he conducts his particular saloon still, because of
the general malodorousness of the business in which he is
engaged, must not and will not be permitted to appear in any
capacity as a representative of the Church. 21

The Very Reverend P. J. Garrigan, a member of the Catholic
Total Abstinence Union of America and acting rector of The Catholic
University of America, in a letter to delegates attending the League's
second national convention declared that the
American saloon, as we know it, is against knowledge,
science, religion, truth, noble manhood, and against
every development in true education. The friends of
humanity should therefore range themselves against the
saloon, determined to reform or destroy it... 22

21 Ibid.

22 Proceedings of the Second National Convention of the Anti-
Saloon League, 1876, p. 69.
The Reverend Father James M. Cleary of Minneapolis, a temperance worker from 1873, told League delegates in 1905:

I have always been willing to work with any kind of an organization that can give a black eye to the saloon business... so that no man can truthfully say, when an American Catholic clergyman addresses an American audience upon the question of anti-saloon antagonism, that he is a peculiar kind of an individual or a fanatic or an irresponsible crank... he is simply quoting what the Catholic Church as an organized body, having a voice of its own and an authority of its own, has expressed in plainest tones to the American people. So no matter what may be said by anyone or by any class of men, you can rest assured that the Catholic Church in the United States as an organized body is determinedly hostile to the saloon and especially sets its face strongly against the Sunday saloon. And an American Catholic, whether he is priest or layman, who is not in sympathy with every earnest effort to curb the evil influences of the saloon is not in sympathy with the sentiments of his own church. ... Surely one of the great works of the Anti-Saloon League—one of the greatest it has at hand—is this work of creating a more intelligent respect for the law, a more intelligent reverence for the sovereign rule of the people.23

In an effort to explain his Church's stand on prohibition, the Reverend Father Patrick J. Murphy of Texas told a League gathering in 1913 he wanted to make one assertion that would help to place the Catholic Church in her true light before the minds of those who have wasted many a hard effort in fighting an imaginary menace, when by a little manifestation of a fairer spirit, they might have secured the aid of her tremendous strength in fighting down the meanest enemy of the white man's civilization. ... In the campaign that now is being inaugurated, and in the voting when that good time comes, every Catholic in the United States, whether priest or layman, is absolutely free to work for and to vote for National Prohibition ... The man who tells you that the Catholic Church is for the saloon is doing a grave

23 Proceedings of the Tenth National Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1905.
injustice to the religion of 15,000,000 of the American people. The man who tells you that the Catholic priesthood and the Catholic bishops of America are the allies of the saloon business—the man who tells you that is guilty of a gross and serious misrepresentation. . . .

To the same gathering, the Reverend J. J. Curran of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, pointed out that the Catholic Church leaves her children free to exercise their own judgment on all public questions which aim at the betterment of society and the elimination of wrong doing. . . . It is on this account that Catholics are permitted to join hands with Protestants in such great and promising questions as those involved in the Anti-Saloon League movement. . . . We have hundreds of priests and many bishops already enrolled in the cause of total abstinence, and I feel that it is only a question of time when they shall be equally zealous and aggressive in the cause of the Anti-Saloon League. We are all striving for the same end: Sobriety of life; our difference lies in the methods employed. Catholic temperance societies aim at total abstinizing the people by moral suasion, while the Anti-Saloon League aims at making people abstinent by closing the saloons by law altogether. . . .

Four years later, in 1917, Father Curran told delegates to the League's national convention that

the sentiment of prohibition is fast growing among our people in America. Hundreds of thousands of Catholics, both men and women, have already espoused the cause and have joined hands with you Protestant brothers for the ultimate success of the prohibition movement. Many of our priests have enlisted in the foremost ranks of prohibition, also the bishops of our country. . . .

\[\text{Proceedings of the Fifteenth National Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1913.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
was a suspicion among many Catholics that there was a sinister motive in the prohibition resolution to the effect that all wines were to be excluded from the right of transportation and consequently we could not celebrate the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, which is absolutely essential in our religion. But the amendment gives the privilege of transportation of sacramental wines... and this should be proof enough that the Anti-Saloon League and the people of America are broad enough, and sufficiently good citizens of America not to intrude, obstruct or injure the religion of their neighbors and fellow citizens.26

There were other Catholic leaders who saw the need for a unity of effort if the temperance crusaders were to realize their goal.

One of them was the Reverend A. P. Boyle of the Roman Catholic Church of St. Paul the Apostle in New York City who reasoned along virtually the same line as Dr. Russell.

After all else has been said [he declared] I would plead for a union of all uplifting agencies on a common platform. The saloon evil is malignant enough to make us sink that little indifferences of policies we have and unite on the broad platform of antagonism to the saloon, so that the public sentiment may be strengthened enough to place it under ban.27

Espite this evidence of cooperation between the League and representatives of the Catholic Church, there were some in the League who viewed the Church as a menace to the prohibition movement. Some extremists even charged that the Catholic priesthood and the Catholic bishops of America were allies of the saloon business.28 Most outspoken and best known of these persons were William H. Anderson, who carried

---

28 Odegard, op. cit., p. 25.
on a running battle with Tammany Hall for nearly two decades, and
Bishop James Cannon, Jr., long-time vice president of the League.

The foreign influence within the Catholic Church, perhaps more
than anything else, made the constituency to which the League appealed
suspicious of it. A large proportion of the liquor dealers and
saloon keepers were Catholics. Many were foreigners who arrived in the
United States during the closing decades of the nineteenth century,
often penniless and without a job. They were subjected to strong
temptation and intemperance. The sole clubroom open to them was the
saloon where they drowned their sorrows in drink. And when the poor
immigrant wanted to go into business the saloon usually was within
closest reach. Little capital was necessary; what money was needed
usually could be obtained easily from the brewer, distiller, or ward
politician. They were willing to loan in return for votes and busi-
ness. Also, most of the immigrants during this period came from
Ireland and central and southern Europe where the drinking of alcoholic
beverages was as commonplace as the drinking of tea or coffee in
America.29

All this was most disturbing to many League leaders as well
as great numbers of its rank and file membership who represented the
Protestant church in America which was overwhelmingly rural and anti-
foreign. Even today to the rural Protestant the city is a place of
vice and corruption; it is the home of the "foreign element" which he

(October, 1894), pp. 339-51.
abhors. This is true even though the Protestant Church in American cities is largely the property and product of rural immigrants. In the larger cities it has survived from the earlier rural period of the nation's development. Counts made of those attending city churches indicate they are largely made up of rural immigrants; 75 per cent of those present are frequently found to have been born in the country.  

The rural church, particularly the Protestant Church, is ideally adapted to crusading. It is more than a place of worship; it is a meetinghouse, a forum. In the city, on the other hand, strange persons, strange ideas, and strange customs meet and mingle. There is less demand for conformity. The village dweller, his own life hard and uneventful, is an ideal soldier for a moral crusade.  

Reformist movements in cities emphasize the social and economic rather than the moral; prohibition has been essentially a moral movement. Its leaders used economic and political arguments, but to the rank and file it was at bottom a moral problem. Drink was not only the cause of disease, destitution and depravity, it was above all "the Great Destroyer of the Temple of the Soul," the inciter of base passions and the arch enemy of Christian virtue.  

Where Protestants were in the majority, as in the rural South, prohibition was strong. There were nine Southern states which adopted prohibition prior to 1916.  

They were overwhelmingly

---


31 J. B. Thompson, Urbanization, particularly Chapters III, XX, X; Brunner, Hughes and Fattten, American Agricultural Villages, New York, 192, pp. 190-225.

32 Odegard, op. cit., p. 31.
Protestant, rural, and native. By contrast, Connecticut and Rhode Island, the two states which failed to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment, the Catholic percentage of the total church population was 67 and 76 per cent, respectively.\textsuperscript{33} The League, being an organization of Protestant churches, could look for small influence in cities where the Catholics generally predominated.

Whatever anti-Catholic or anti-foreign sentiments the Anti-Saloon League might have had, however, should not be attributed to a dislike for Catholics or aliens as such. If these groups had mounted the water wagon, chances are League leaders would have been the first to sing their praises.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid.
CHAPTER IV
NATIONAL GROWTH

The history of the first decade of the League movement, following the organization of the national agency in 1895, was largely that of installing the organization in the several states and the creation of machinery for the crystallization of public sentiment into the enactment of temperance legislation. And as has been the experience of many reform movements, the early years of the League's existence were difficult. Temperance men and women prominent in various reform organizations stood aloof, awaiting developments. This was particularly true of those affiliated with the much older and firmly established Prohibition party. Financial support was extremely meager, and the public was inclined to wait for the new movement to demonstrate its fitness to survive before it was willing to go all out in its behalf.

There were many times during these early years when, but for timely financial assistance, the Anti-Saloon League as a real, militant organization might have found an early grave. One of the most remarkable of these instances occurred in Ohio at a time when prospects of continuing to do business and maintain a League office from day to day were most discouraging. Dr. Russell had borrowed to the limit of the credit of both the League and himself—even to the extent of pawning his watch in order to meet certain small expenses.¹ It was

¹Cherrington, History of the Anti-Saloon League, p. 50.
under such stress that he went to E. N. Metcalf, of Cuyahoga, Ohio, and appealed for immediate help. Not only did Metcalf contribute $500 to the League, but he also prevailed upon A. I. Root, president of the Root Bee Company, of Medina, Ohio, to give a similar amount. Both Metcalf and Root, from that time on, were consistent and generous contributors, the Root Company's contributions up to 1913 totaling more than thirty thousand dollars.  

So important were finances that the ability to obtain contributions was considered one of the principal requisites of the League worker. "If he [the worker] does not know how, or cannot learn how to present the work in such a way as to secure a hearty response financially, he may as well hang in his resignation."  

The new man, however, was told not to beg, but to present his facts and put his claims for support on the ground of duty and opportunity.

To accept a position with the League meant a life of sacrifices for both the worker and his family. Aside from the ability to raise money, he was required to be

a thoroughly consecrated Christian... fighter with his fighting instincts under control. He must know how to reserve his fire until he can see the whites of his enemies' eyes... He must... know how to be knocked down, kicked about, thoroughly beaten, yet come back to the battle with a smile on his face and a spirit as sweet as Heaven.

\[2\]Ibid.


\[4\]Ibid.
League literature is sprinkled with accounts of personal assault on its employees, ranging from workers being egged and stoned to their being stabbed and shot by enemies of the movement. "Seldom was I without a gun tucked securely in my pocket," said William H. Anderson, recalling his early years in the movement as superintendent of the Illinois League. "Those were the days when wets were killing and maiming aggressive drys. The dry leader had to face the probability of being hit in the head with a stone or shot."\textsuperscript{5}

At first the League was compelled to take only those who offered themselves for service, but as it grew in strength and public favor, it became more selective. It sought men who were vigorous, versatile speakers able to adjust to every type of audience. And before long it was assembling an organization of full-time, paid workers in each state to supplement the army of volunteers. By the national constitution and general practice of the League, the superintendent was the executive officer of each state organization. Upon his shoulders was laid the primary responsibility for the development of a workable machine and its successful operation. If the work failed in whole or in part, the superintendent was held responsible. By the same token, if it succeeded, he was entitled to the credit just as is the manager of a business concern or a general of an army.

The League warned its superintendents that "to prevail against and to overcome the organized liquor traffic... is not a pastime

\textsuperscript{5}Interview with author, September, 1951.
for boys to play at, nor is it a before-breakfast job to be completed with the mind engrossed in other matters." Quickly weeded out were those who accepted or retained a state superintendency for the purpose of using the position as a stepping stone to other avocations or until something better came along. The League required that its superintendents center all their mental and physical energy toward the overthrow of the saloon, and insisted that the superintendent live the League movement until it possesses his whole being; live it, until whether he wakes or sleeps, whether he fasts or eats, his whole nature will be striving to make his league a formidable, unconquerable agency in the destruction of the drink traffic. It may be said that no man is called to do all that. But this is a movement of sacrifice, as truly as any crusade which has ever blessed the world of sacrificial devotion. . . .

Dr. Russell himself was an example of this almost fanatical devotion to duty. A brilliant lawyer and minister, capable of earning a comfortable income in either profession, he chose instead to devote his energies to the movement he had founded and nurtured. His salary, barely enough to keep his family and home together, often went unpaid for weeks and months at a time. In establishing the Ohio League's headquarters in Columbus, he and Mrs. Russell rented a low-priced house in the northern section of the city. Mrs. Russell, the daughter of a prominent Iowa attorney, exchanged a life of ease for one of


7 Ibid.
sacrificial service. Their two children, poorly clothed and meagerly fed, suffered jeers from their schoolmates.

The League, however, was confronted with another difficulty just as serious as finances, that of getting hearings in the churches. Many church bodies refused to accept League speakers because certain influential members of the congregations either owned brewery stock or owned buildings rented for saloons. This was particularly true in the larger cities where brewery owners threatened legal action if the League did not refrain from holding them up to the public as destroyers of morality.8

In Cleveland, Dr. Baker who had succeeded Dr. Russell as superintendent of the Ohio League, began photographing the slums and brewery districts as well as the brewers' fashionable homes. These photographs were made into slides and shown on screens in several of the city's prominent churches. A League representative serving as commentator pointed to the beautiful homes of the brewers as having been erected from money obtained from the sale of drinks to the working man. By contrast, he showed the slum homes of the working man who passed his paycheck across the bar of a neighborhood saloon.

The aroused brewers sent their attorney to Dr. Baker's office, threatening to enjoin the League.

They were able to bring pressure to bear which was sufficient to close the doors of

---

some of these fashionable clubs, misnamed churches, against us, but enough churches were open, together with public halls, to enable us to make a real impression upon the public sentiment of the city. 9

In fact, the system became a source of such effective agitation that it was extended into many states.

The early records of the League, however, relate incident after incident of pastors refusing the League admission to their pulpits. And often when a League speaker was admitted he was greeted by an unfriendly minister and congregation. On one occasion a pastor introduced Dr. Baker in this manner:

Mr. Baker, the superintendent of the Ohio Anti-Saloon League, is present to present the claims of that organization to us tonight. I do not believe in his organization or in the work he is doing, but we will try to hear him patiently. 10

A pastor who did open the doors of his church to the League was

Dr. Washington Gladden, noted minister of the First Congregational Church in Columbus. Shortly after becoming state superintendent, Baker arranged a League field day in Columbus and called upon Gladden to obtain use of his pulpit for one of the League's speakers. Gladden surprised Baker by drawing from his pocket a little notebook, turning to the date named, and remarking: "All right, you can have my church on the morning of that date." Baker said that his surprise was so great he replied, "Well, Doctor, you will probably want to consult your church officials about it."

9 Autobiography.
10 Ibid.
No [\text{fladden answered}], I do not want to consult them. Most of them are not very friendly to the cause you represent and would probably refuse. If I have not sense enough to know what cause I should introduce into my pulpit, I have not sense to be pastor of the church.\textsuperscript{11}

Although a temperance man rather than a prohibitionist, Fladden became an enthusiastic supporter of the League and eventually became a vice president of the national movement.

\* \* \* \*

As the League became better organized and began to demonstrate strength at the ballot-box in the election and defeat of candidates for state and federal legislatures, leading politicians began to take cognizance of its activities.

If we were in a Democratic county or district fighting a Democratic candidate we were branded as a "Republican side show"; if in a Republican county or district fighting a Republican candidate, we were dubbed "an adjunct to the Democratic Party" and whichever way we were fighting, our prohibition party friends scorned and denounced us as aiders and abettors of the liquor traffic [\text{Baker declared}]. It became a serious question in my mind... whether or not we could survive the terrific hammering we were receiving at the hands of the party press and politicians. We were defeating the candidates but were not securing much advance temperance legislation because the big politicians came to the rescue of the liquor traffic at every crucial test in the legislature. We were therefore angering the politician and not getting sufficient results to encourage our friends and supporters.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1900, Baker attracted national attention when he engaged in a heated controversy with Ohio's two Republican Senators, Joseph B.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}
Foraker and Mark Hanna. Baker charged that the two lawmakers influ-
enced the Ohio General Assembly, particularly the Senate, to vote
against League-sponsored temperance measures. One was the Clark
Local Option Bill, championed by Rep. Thomas H. Clark of Columbus,
which had passed the House and was pending in the Senate "with assur-
ance of one majority for its passage." But the measure was defeated
by a single vote cast by Senator Middleton of Urbana, who Baker
asserted had declared earlier that he could support the bill. Baker
said he had been told by Warren G. Harding, at this time a state
senator, that Foraker had called both him and Middleton from Washing-
ton, asking them to vote against the bill. According to Baker,
Harding refused to comply with Foraker's request, but Middleton did.¹³

Baker also declared publicly that members of the Legislature
had informed him that Senator Hanna had urged them, in view of Presi-
dent McKinley's candidacy for re-election, not to enact any temperance
legislation. Baker said it was common knowledge that Hanna

had bargained with the saloon and brewery interests that,
in consideration of a large contribution to the state
campaign fund, there should be no temperance legislation.

Baker made known these facts in a circular letter, widely distributed
throughout the state, which touched off a political explosion and led
to public exchange of letters between Baker and the two Ohio senators.
The tone of the letters was sharp and vitriolic, with Hanna declaring
in one that Baker had "lied" in saying he had made a bargain with

¹³Ibid.
saloon interests. Baker struck back just as sharply in a letter to Hanna declaring that

when I first addressed you, I believed you personally to be a gentleman. Your initial letter indicates that you believed me to be a scoundrel. We evidently were both mistaken.14

It is difficult to evaluate whether Baker or the Senators came out the better in the exchange on the specific issue involved. From a broader point of view, however, Baker definitely was the winner. His fearless stand against two prominent members of the Senate of the United States brought unusual recognition to both him and the League. It was a demonstration to the public that the League was much more than a group of country ministers obsessed with a fanatical idea of ridding the country of the saloon.

* * * *

Although the Ohio League established the pattern and set the pace during these years, the national agency was gaining respect and making its influence felt elsewhere. By 1906, it was in operation in forty-three states and territories; 250 field workers were devoting all their time to its activities, and an estimated 150 stenographers and clerks were working behind the scenes maintaining records and handling a myriad of miscellaneous details. In addition there were thousands of ministers, speakers, organizers, temperance women, canvassers, and others who helped. Approximately 15,000 regular agitation

14 Autobiography.
meetings, chiefly on Sunday in the churches with official speakers present, were being held annually. This did not take into account the almost numberless meetings in prohibition, local option, political, good citizenship, and law enforcement campaigns in which the League had a hand, either directly or indirectly, nor meetings held by its regular or volunteer workers. 15

The League by 1908 had issued more than 350 million pages of propaganda from its various state headquarters. The American Issue, the national organ, was being sent to approximately 300,000 paying subscribers each month, while a number of states also maintained state organs, with a paying subscription list ranging as high as 20,000 copies per week with vastly increased circulation in campaign times. In addition, enormous quantities of temperance literature was being published by individual members or friends of the League. It was the belief of the League that temperance laws and public sentiment should sustain each other. Fully nine-tenths of all its efforts and revenues were devoted to the creation of temperance opinion. 16

An idea of the League's successful operation and scope is gained by examining the results of its activities in the various states. Early in 1900, Minnesota, largely through League influence, passed a search and seizure law, which was the first temperance legislation enacted in that state in several years. The League's


16 Ibid.
fight on the governor of Arkansas, who had displayed sympathy toward the liquor interests, was successful to the extent of reducing his majority for re-election by 20,000 votes. This same kind of fight against the re-election of the Governor of Nebraska reduced his majority so greatly that he was re-elected by the narrow margin of 800 votes, while the rest of his ticket won by approximately 8000 majority. During the same year, twelve additional Iowa counties abolished the saloon; seventy-five Nebraska villages voted dry; Queen Anne's County, Maryland, joined the no-license ranks, and the District of Columbia, largely through the efforts of A. E. Shoemaker, attorney for the District League, succeeded in reducing the number of licenses for the sale of liquor to 641. This was 359 less than the number in operation in the District in 1892, one year before the League was born.17

In California, where the League was organized in 1897, six counties were under county-wide prohibition by 1908; six other counties were approximately two-thirds dry, and the saloon had been banished from 100 municipalities. Twenty-eight local option elections had been held in Colorado municipalities with the League taking an important part in all, and winning twenty-two of them. Under League direction, a law was passed in 1907, providing ward, precinct and municipal local option. In Illinois, where William H. Anderson became League superintendent in 1900, the League succeeded in getting a law passed in 1907

providing for local option by townships and municipalities and for precincts in counties not under township organization. In the spring election of 1908, out of 1,250 townships voting, 900 abolished the saloon; of the 11,000 townships in the state, 1053 voted dry; and twenty-five entire counties and twenty-two of the state's forty largest cities followed suit. Between 1900 and 1908 major victories also were recorded by the League in Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Vermont, and practically every Southern state. 18

In two-thirds of all the territory of the United States the saloon had been abolished by law by 1908. Forty years earlier there had been 3,500,000 living in dry territory; there were now 36 million. During that period the nation's population had scarcely doubled, but population in prohibition territory had increased tenfold. Of the 20 million persons living in the fourteen Southern states, 17 million were under prohibition law of some kind. In an eight-month period in 1908, state-wide prohibition had cleared the saloon from an area as great as that of France. In that area there was a solid block of territory 320 miles north and south by 720 miles east and west, a contemporary wrote, in which on the first of January, 1909, a bird could fly from the Mississippi to the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico, without looking down on a single legalized saloon. 19

18 Jackson, loc. cit.

Although, as we have seen, all but three of the eighteen states that had adopted prohibition during the last half of the nineteenth century had discarded their prohibition laws by the turn of the new century, there were actually more elements of permanency in the earlier movement than had appeared on the surface. During the years that the states were falling out of the prohibition column, the people were steadily removing the saloon by local option until at the time there were only three prohibition states left, the liquor traffic had nevertheless been abolished from two-thirds of the territory occupied by one-half of the population of the United States. Of the 36 million who had expelled the saloon, only 10 million had done so by state prohibitory laws; 26 million effected the removal by local option.20

The principal reason why the South took the lead in the temperance revolution was because of the belief that it was necessary to remove the saloon from the Negro to save Southern industry and civilization. Booker T. Washington, discussing the issue, said "the abolition of the barroom is a blessing to the Negro second only to the abolition of slavery. Two-thirds of the mobs, lynchings, and burnings at the stake are the result of bad whisky drunk by bad black men and bad white men."21

But there were reasons much deeper than this for prohibition's success not only in the South, but elsewhere. The Negro question had

20 Ibid.

21 "Prohibition and the Negro," Outlook, LXXXVII (March 14, 1908), pp. 587-89.
nothing to do with prohibition in Maine, Kansas, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, nor Iowa. The saloon was being ousted in many manufacturing cities of New England and in the residential sections of such cities as Cleveland and Chicago.

The new temperance upheaval was the revolt of the American conscience against what it considered wrong. The American saloon could blame itself largely for the opposition to it. It was an obvious center of corruption, and yet its owners and operators refused to do anything about correcting its evils. Another factor that stirred the public against the liquor traffic was the relationship between the politician and the saloon, particularly in the large cities like Chicago and New York where the political complexion often was determined by saloon rule.

It was not just the evil of the saloon that caused this revolution, however. The public was being awakened against all kinds of wrong, especially as represented by the city, and hence the saloon came in for its share of rebuke and opposition. For the great majority of the new century's reformers, the city contained almost the sum of their dislikes. It was a "devilsburg of crime" sucking into its corrupt vortex the "young, genuine, strong and simple men of the farm." There, if successful, they became "financial wreckers" who made their money strangling legitimate enterprises and other human beings. If they were failures—that is, if they remained factory workers—they gradually became like the machine they tended, "huge, hard, brutal, strung with a crude, blind strength, stupid, unreasoning." At the worst such unfortunates became the flotsam of the
slums, making the saloon their church and the dive their home. The native American lost not only his morals in the city, but also his talent for creative work and his sense of beauty. "Sometimes, I think, they're poison in th' life in a big city," Mr. Dooley remarked, "the flowers won't grow there. . . ." If a man stayed in the city long enough, one of David Graham Phillips' characters remarked, he would almost inevitably lose those qualities that made him an American: one had to go West to see a "real American, a man or a woman who looks as if he or she would do something honest or valuable. . . ." 22

Professor Richard Hofstadter explains that prohibition was linked to an aversion not merely to drunkenness and to the evils that accompanied it, but to the immigrant drinking masses, to the pleasures and amenities of city life, and to well-to-do classes and cultivated men. The saloon, as an institution pivotal in the life of vice on one side and of American urban politics on the other, fell under particular reprobation. 23

Temperance reformers and organizations of the past and present had been exceedingly active, and each without an exception had been an important factor in the great moral upheaval. The CTU, the Good Templars, the National Temperance Publication Society, the Prohibition


party, and the National Reform Bureau had all done their share, but the one organization which had done more than all the others in giving wise direction and successful results to the new temperance revolution was the Anti-Saloon League.

The League had conducted itself so wisely and honorably that it had commanded the universal respect of the churches of all denominations, many of the Catholic as well as Protestant. There were few towns or cities in the United States in which there was not a representative of the League in some one or more of the churches on Sunday presenting the cause and securing help for its promotion. For more than a decade this quiet work had been going on Sundays, besides that done on weekdays, and it was not necessary to go very far away from this unified sympathy and action of the Christian churches of America to find the chief cause of this tremendous moral upheaval. There was scarcely a legislature in session at which the Anti-Saloon League did not have some measure or measures unfriendly to the liquor traffic, and the restrictive temperance legislation of most of the states for many years had been handled by the official representatives of the League. Many rich men generously supported the organization; but there were thousands of annual contributors to its campaign fund, which spoke loudly of the popular sympathy and power which it possessed. Many who were not members of any church, or even
total abstainers, commended and united in the work of the League in the interest of law and order and of civic righteousness. 24

* * * *

As the League's success continued on the state level, its attention turned to federal legislation as well. Its traditional method of operation had been for the League president to petition the president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, outlining the League's attitude on pending legislation, supplemented by League attendance at hearings before congressional committees and letters to and interviews with individual senators and congressmen. Realizing the ineffectiveness of this system, it was recommended at a conference of the superintendents of the various states at Lake Bluff, Illinois, in the summer of 1899, that the League's national executive committee be requested to open a legislative headquarters in Washington to do the same work with reference to Congress which the state leagues, through the legislative department, were doing in each state legislature. Later that same year, the Rev. E. C. Dinwiddie, who had helped to spearhead the legislative work of the Ohio League, was appointed to head the legislative headquarters in Washington. Dinwiddie opened offices in a rather disreputable old red brick building just across the street from the national capitol. From this vantage point Dinwiddie, and later Wheeler watched, and at times directed, the evolution of temperance legislation by Congress.

24Iglehart, loc. cit.
Dinwiddie's first request was for state leagues to keep him advised

as to who are supposed to be friends and who enemies of
those you send to Congress, and your committee in
turn will keep you advised who are faithful and who are
unfaithful in Congress; and between the "upper and nether
millstones" something will happen.25

The first fight made by the newly-organized legislative
department was to secure the passage of what was commonly known as
the Canteen Law, prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors on army
posts. During the Fifty-Sixth Congress, Dinwiddie prevailed upon
Rep. J. T. Bowersock of Kansas to introduce a bill prohibiting the
sale of beer, wine or any intoxicating drinks in any army post
exchange. The bill became law, February 2, 1901.26 The success of
the venture in the face of the open hostility of the War Department,
and the combined strength of the liquor interests adding its weight,
was hailed by the League as an example of what the power of the church
and temperance forces when fully aroused and thoroughly united,
could accomplish. With diplomatic aplomb, the League did not take
full credit for the victory, but paid tribute to the work of the
Women's Christian Temperance Union, the Non-Partisan Women's Christian
Temperance Union, and other temperance groups.

League members took courage and became inspired with the
possibility of still further victories over the organized liquor
traffic. The passage of the anti-canteen law helped to refute the

26 Ibid., p. 60.
old criticism of temperance forces that they were inconoclasts with no practical notions about putting anything better in place of the saloon. Those who led the fight for the law began the advocacy of a better ration for the army and for saloon substitutes for the benefit of the enlisted man. As a result, they were successful in obtaining numerous congressional appropriations for recreational facilities on army posts.

Having won the bout with the canteen, the League in succeeding years was largely responsible for legislation prohibiting liquor selling in immigration stations of the United States and also in the National Capital buildings; forcing the liquor canteen out of state and territorial soldiers' homes, and drying up large sections of the District of Columbia. In 1906, the League persuaded Congress to pass a law which required collectors of internal revenue to furnish certified copies of lists of those who paid the federal tax as retail liquor dealers. These lists could then be used as evidence against illegally operated saloons and other violators who sold liquor in defiance of state law, but who paid the federal tax in order to escape punishment by the federal government.

Recognizing the public demand for advanced legislation along temperance lines, Congress enacted a law appropriating an additional $350,000 for substitutes of liquor establishments in army canteens. A provision in the Oklahoma Statehood Bill also was obtained by the League which required the prohibition of the liquor traffic in Indian
territory and on all Indian reservations for a period of twenty-one years and thereafter until the people themselves should change the organic law.

It should by no means be understood that the Anti-Saloon League was alone responsible for all of these foregoing results. It had largely entered into the labors of preceding and contemporary temperance organizations. The League had but supplemented the vast previous preparation with its own multitudinous meetings and literature. It came in the providential fullness of time to be in a large part the executive arm of the temperance sentiment of the nation which had been building and gaining momentum for more than a century. The League was not a separate society. It was simply a federation of existing temperance agencies to the extent that they were willing to cooperate with each other.27

So absorbed had the country been for several years in the attempt to regulate corporations, check monopolies, and deal with the unprincipled rich, the veritable revolution in the sentiment of the people upon the great social issue of prohibition took place practically unnoticed, but the general public began to learn that there was a great anti-saloon movement under way. Prohibition had become the popular cause of many thousands of voters who were still Republicans and Democrats. This was because the Anti-Saloon League was nonpartisan. It appealed to reason rather than emotion, and it made use

27 Jackson, loc. cit.
of modern advertising methods to bring home salient facts. That's more, it was getting greater and greater support from business men of means and standing.28

* * * *

The League's victories in these early years, while they were not of large proportions compared with later years, were nevertheless most significant in their bearing on the general movement, and especially in their demonstration of the possibilities of the League when backed by the united support of the church forces in the local communities and in the states themselves. More and more temperance people came to realize the League offered the most effective machinery up to that time for securing tangible results in the fight against the liquor traffic, through the unification of the temperance forces represented in the different church denominations. By the same token, it was also evident that League machinery, unique and potentially powerful as it was, would be worthless without the cooperation of the church forces, regardless of denomination. The endeavor to win the church, therefore, was by all odds the most important and vital of all efforts on the part of the League management.

The movement was dependent upon the church, first of all, for financial support. It was also dependent upon the church for the necessary influence and power to turn the tide along non-partisan lines in the election of members of the legislatures favorable to

28 "War on the Saloons," Nation, LXXXV (Nov. 21, 1907), pp. 460-61.
temperance legislation and in the election, as well, of public
officials who would enforce the existing temperance laws. The church
voters' lists, therefore, constituted the real key to the situation.
With the endorsement and cooperation of the churches, the information
as to men and measures sent to the voters was almost certain to
receive attention, and usually results favorable to the League. The
church bodies, consequently, held in their hands the destiny of the
League; and while many years of difficult and persistent endeavor
were necessary to line up the church on the side of this new movement,
the effort from year to year was increasingly successful.
CHAPTER V
A CHANGE IN COMMAND

When Dr. Russell accepted the position of national superintendent of the League in 1895 his first objective was that of establishing branches in all the states of the Union, and placing the movement on its feet as an active, fighting force representing the Christian people of all churches. By 1903 this work had been accomplished to his satisfaction, and, on account of personal and home demands which seemed to make it imperative that he give his attention and time to the work in the New York State League, he presented his resignation as the active leader of the American League to the national convention in Washington, D.C. in December, 1903.\(^1\) In resigning his post, Russell told convention delegates:

"It is very plain that in the superintendent of this League we now require a man who has the essential qualities of leadership and who can devote his entire time to the field work through the whole land, initiating the League in states not yet organized, and fostering the work at its weakest points. I am clear in my mind that I ought not attempt to do the work, which I am certain now needs to be done, and I am loyal enough to the cause to which I am devoted to stand aside...\(^2\)

\(^1\)Cherrington, History of the Anti-Saloon League, p. 74.

To fill the position, Russell nominated Purley H. Baker, who was to serve the League as General Superintendent for nearly a quarter century.

It was in 1893, a short time after the Ohio League was founded, that Baker first came to see Russell in his dark, dingy, three-dollars-a-week office. He had read the first printing of the League's plans while serving as a Methodist minister in Gallipolis, Ohio, and was the first pastor to hunt up Russell's obscure headquarters. According to Russell, Baker asked a few relevant questions about the movement, nodded his head and said, "I'll help you." A short time later the strong, square-jawed, serious young pastor was appointed to the Third Avenue Methodist Church in Columbus where he became the League's most active volunteer leader in the capital city. As a pastor, he fought the Columbus liquor and brewery interests, as well as gambling and vice, virtually single-handed. When early local option bills were voted down by the Ohio Legislature, he denounced the lawmakers as abiding by the will of the saloon operators and brewers of the state.

From his pulpit, he shouted:

Legislators of Ohio, begone; God has no further use for you. That good day shall come when Ohio lawmakers shall do the bidding of Almighty God and shall permit the voters to speak their sovereign will at the ballot box. Then the people shall rise up to rebuke this wrong and they will destroy root and branch of this satanic infamy of the rum traffic.

---

3 Contained in unpublished eulogy by Russell at time of Baker's death, March 30, 1924.

4 Ibid.
He soon became one of the most hated, yet most feared individuals in the city by the brewers and distillers, who derisively referred to him as "Purley A. Faker."

Baker, who gave up his ministry in 1896 to devote full time to the League movement, was endowed with an unusual measure of common sense and practical business know-how, assets greatly needed by the League. In fact, there were many supporters of the League who, although they admired Dr. Russell's dedication and tremendous enthusiasm, realized that if the organization were to continue successfully on a national level, it required a leader with greater executive ability. Baker proved to be such a person; like Russell he believed that God had called him to the anti-saloon work, but he was practical in that he realized victory could not be won by prayers alone.

Some good people have so long fought the saloon with prayers only [he remarked] that they have lost sight of the fact that God Almighty does not vote, although He is the issue in every local option and prohibition election. The temperance people must learn that the battle before us is not a rose-water conflict. It is war—continual, relentless war.⁵

Baker's philosophy coincided with that of the League's first president, Hiram Price, who had observed more than a decade before that "long prayers in the synagogue and chief seats at feasts or in the sanctuary ought not to be the highest ambition of a people who profess to be governed by the principles of Christianity, because according

to the Divine record it is absolutely necessary to do some actual work, make some individual effort, and possibly some personal sacrifice of time and money to aid the right and oppose the wrong. 6

Russell was a dreamer and an evangelist who often prayed for a half hour at a public meeting before beginning his talk. By contrast, Baker was a hard-headed business man with firm convictions and the ability to get things done. He battled it out with the best of the liquor and brewery fraternity, and more often than not came out on the long end of the argument. A story is told by associates which helps to illustrate the differences in the two men. A major issue confronted the League and Russell is reported to have remarked: "We must pray earnestly for its success. We must pray for the League workers and League superintendents." To this, Baker replied: "They need watching over more than they need praying for." 7

Baker was born in poverty, his father having died before his birth. He was proud of his humble origin, however, and remarked in later life that he had the good fortune to be born poor, of an obscure family, in a country of sufficient fertility to grow men and women of clean blood, intellects susceptible of training and ambitions that panted for larger fields of activity as the hart for the water brook. 8

---

6 Proceedings of the Fifth Convention of Anti-Saloon League, Chicago, 1900, p. 4.
7 Told to author by Miss Ila Grindell, long-time League employee, 1951.
8 Autobiography.
His barefoot boyhood on a farm in Jackson County, Ohio, was strenuous. Once he pointed out to Russell the pasture where on frosty mornings he roused up the cows to warm his bare feet where they had been lying; he pointed to the steep hills where he followed the jerky plow with bleeding, stone-bruised feet.\(^9\) The spring he was thirteen, having had only limited education at a district school, he was off to begin life for himself. For two years he remained near his boyhood home, driving a four-mule team for a neighbor, hauling lumber to the county seat. Later, he mined ore for thirteen dollars a month and board. After another year's work for a relative who failed to pay for his services, he went to Fayette County, Ohio. There Baker worked for the next seven years as a farm hand with not one day in school. This did not prevent him from improving his mind, however, for he became an inveterate reader, and what he read, he retained, so keen was his mind.

His self-improvement program earned him a school teaching job, and while teaching he registered with a Circleville, Ohio, judge to read law. Soon after he started to teach he was appointed a local minister by the quarterly conference of the Methodist Church. Although he had deep convictions that he ought to prepare for the ministry, he still wanted to study law. The ministry finally won out, and Baker accepted the post of circuit preacher in the Portsmouth, Ohio, conference. From the very beginning of his ministry he was

\(^9\)Russell's Eulogy.
known as a strong, forceful preacher. Apt in quotation, well read in literature which he vividly remembered, he heaped a wealth of thought and human experience upon his listeners. He rose frequently to the very heights of oratory, mingled pathos with wit and humor, drew smiles or tears at will, and became famous in the country round about. With growing influence and marked leadership, he soon moved on to Racine, Ohio, then to Gallipolis for five years, and finally was appointed to the pastorate in Columbus.

From the beginning of his ministry, Baker was an implacable foe of the liquor traffic and scarcely preached a sermon without some form of attack upon it.

I judge I gained some notoriety, He commented, for when my name was being considered for the pastorate of a prominent and desirable church, the retiring pastor, who was one of those timid men who always moves in the direction of least resistance, arose and said, "Brethren, I do not think Brother Baker would be a suitable man as pastor of this church. He would not be here six months until he would have the city all stirred up on the liquor question and there would be no peace while he stayed here." I was not chosen as pastor and I have no reason to complain of the advice of the retiring minister, as he probably told the truth.10

The story already has been told of the war he waged on the brewers of Cleveland, Ohio, shortly after assuming his first position with the Ohio League. Elevated to Ohio superintendent, he waged the battle throughout the state, becoming feared and hated by virtually the entire brewery and distillery industry. In fact, this hatred

---

10 Autobiography.
culminated in a plot or conspiracy to undermine Baker's reputation and that of the League.

In 1896, a young lady, Miss Maude Dunbar by name, came to Baker's office in Columbus in search of employment. She presented a letter of recommendation purportedly written by her uncle, a former member of the Ohio Senate, whom Baker knew to be a reputable individual and a supporter of temperance legislation. Impressed with her credentials and general appearance and personality, Baker hired her as a stenographer in his office, and she proved to be a competent and satisfactory employee.

A day or two after Christmas, after she had been working for the League for several weeks, she inquired of Baker whether he had had a pleasant Christmas and whether he had received some nice gifts. Told that he had, Miss Dunbar informed Baker she had a gift for him but that it was too large for her to bring to the office, and asked if he could come to her apartment to pick it up. Already suspicious of her actions, Baker had done some checking on her original story. He discovered she was not the niece of a former Ohio legislator and was living with a man to whom she was not married. Consequently, when she asked Baker to accompany her to her apartment, he knew a trap was being laid for him.

Calling in League Attorney Wayne B. Wheeler and two other persons to serve as witnesses, Baker threatened to turn her over to the police for immoral conduct unless she told him who was behind the conspiracy to damage his reputation. Miss Dunbar confessed she had
been employed by Joe Miller of Cincinnati, state secretary of the Ohio Brewers' Association. Baker lost no time in turning over details of the incident to the press, and what, in Baker's words, "would have destroyed the League" had the plot been successful, boomeranged against the Brewers' Association and won for Baker a host of converts to the League movement. 11

To Furley A. Baker must go much of the credit for making the League a real national power. Prior to becoming its national superintendent, the organization was largely a name—a group of independent state leagues which refused to yield authority to the national body. It was under Baker that the League became a federation. 12

Two years after assuming League leadership he won for the organization a notable victory in Ohio that reverberated throughout the nation. Never before, perhaps, in any state were the issues so clearly defined between the saloons on the one hand and the churches on the other as in the campaign of 1905 in the state of Ohio. Actually it was more than a test of strength between the saloon and the church, for it settled the question as to whether the omnipartisan principles, preached by the League for a dozen years, could stand the test of application to a state-wide campaign where the patronage of a great party was involved.

The Ohio Legislature had passed a residential district local option bill, the Frannock bill by name, that was satisfactory to the

11 Autobiography.

12 Told to writer by William H. Anderson, September, 1951.
temperance people of the state, by an unprecedented majority of 72 to 33 in the House and 27 to 6 in the Senate. Some slight amendments were added to it in the Senate and it was sent back to the House for concurrence. Republican Governor Myron T. Herrick, who had been elected by a majority of approximately 113,000 in the Roosevelt landslide of 1904, intercepted the bill and threatened the members of the House that unless it was amended in accordance with his wishes, he would veto it. The Governor's recommended amendments corresponded to those which lobbyists for the saloon interests unsuccessfully had tried to force into the bill on the floor of the House and Senate. In order to get some temperance legislation passed, the Legislature yielded in a large degree to the Governor's demands. 

League leaders realized that the testing time had come and the long-expected battle must be fought. And battle it was. With Baker directing the over-all strategy, the contest raged for twelve months. Working closely with Baker was Ohio Superintendent Wayne R. Wheeler and J. C. Jackson, editor of The American Issue. After about six months the Methodist Church joined the fight on the side of the League, and was steadily and strongly supported by the Western Christian Advocate and the Pittsburgh Advocate. Then came the United Brethren Church backed by the Religious Telescope; the Disciples by the Standard; the Evangelicals backed by the Messenger. Also adding support were 

\[13\] Cherrington, The Evolution of Prohibition, p. 274.

\[14\] Cherrington, History, p. 81.
the United Presbyterians, Baptists, Presbyterians, Lutheran and Congregational people, the CTU and young peoples' societies. Aligned against these forces were an estimated twelve thousand saloons, one hundred and sixty breweries, seventy-five distilleries and a host of wholesalers. The American Issue estimated that during the course of the campaign three thousand public meetings were held and seventy-five million book pages of literature were distributed in presenting facts to the voters and countering false statements that were made by liquor dealers. 15

The League lined up its support behind J. H. Pattison of Cincinnati, for governor. Pattison was president of the Union Central Life Insurance Company and a substantial supporter of the League. He had been selected by the rural representatives at the state Democratic convention. A fifty-seven-year-old attorney and a graduate of Ohio Wesleyan University, Pattison was not a newcomer to politics. He had served in the House as a representative of Clermont County, later served in the Ohio Senate, and then was elected to Congress.

Herrick had been renominated by the George P. Cox political machine of Cincinnati, representing the wet element of the state. The fact that Herrick was associated with the Cox machine put two strikes against him from the outset, for Cox was characterized as one of the most vicious political bosses in the nation. League propagandists pounced on this fact, pointing out that

our [the League's] struggle... is not so much against Herrick as against Coxism. The issue is one that involves

15 Proceedings of the Tenth Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1903.
not only the temperance question, but the whole question of government of the people, for the people, by the people of Ohio. . . . The rejection of Herrick at the ballot box is the most powerful blow that can be struck at Coxsism in Ohio. . . . 16

The League declared churches and temperance people had discovered that their chief obstacle was the boss.

It is the boss whom we fear, whom we have to reckon with, and who generally defeats our bills, if they are defeated. And everywhere the reason of the defeat is the same. The boss has made terms with the liquor gang for its votes and its money. 17

Although the campaign against Herrick continued without letup for a full year, it was during the last month before election that the battle reached its peak with the League issuing the following directive to its workers:

Organize a temperance meeting at your church. Set one up at the crossroads schoolhouse. Turn your pulpit into a battery of Krupp guns, from which to hurl the bursting shells and solid shot against the saloon and its defenders. . . . Write articles for your local paper and urge it to print them. Buttonhole your doubtful neighbor and argue the case with him. Hunt for votes as when a boy or girl on the old farm you hunted for eggs. . . . This is the best fight Ohio was ever engaged in. . . . 18

Campaign literature even took its form in songs, such as this entitled "The Battle Hymn of Ohio" and sung to the tune of "The Battle Hymn of the Republic":

My faith has caught the vision of the dawning of the day When the manhood of our Buckeye State shall stop Boss Cox's sway,

---

18 Ibid., October 13, 1905, p. 9.
And the members of our churches shall all vote just as they pray.
Our God is marching on.

Chorus:

Be a Buckeye State defender!
Smite the bosses next November,
Smite them so they will remember
That God is marching on! 19

Another of the songs went like this:

Oh, what is the matter with Governor Herrick,
The man whom the people elected last fall
To watch legislation and not grow barbaric,
But to see that just laws were enacted for all?
Then why do his friends, all amazed and choleric,
Cry, "What is the matter with Governor Herrick?"

Oh, what is the matter with Governor Herrick,
Whom we so loved and trusted and thought on with pride?
No wonder the people are almost hysterical.
No wonder his friends strive their feelings to hide.
They find that the man whom our ballots elected
To stand like a rock in defense of the home,
Has done what his friends would never have expected,
And championed the cause of the grog-shop and rum.

'Tis plain that the grog-shop had power mesmeric;
Alas, who'd have thought it of Governor Herrick.
In the halls of our party's Political Temple
A fearful handwriting appears on the wall,
The time is at hand and the message is simple--
You'll hear from the people a year from next fall. 20

The League carried its appeal to labor to oust Herrick and Cox:

Workingmen of Ohio... help the thousands of liberty-loving freemen of Ohio to smash bossism... Help Ohio to fall into that steady march of all the states of the

20 Ibid., June 10, 1904, p. 9.
Union toward the abolition of the whole boss and machine system, by the substitution of direct primary nomination and referendum. 21

A large portion of each edition of the American Issue, distributed to some sixty thousand Ohio homes, was devoted to campaign material. Editorials, letters to the editor, reprints from editorials of leading newspapers in the state filled its columns. To meet this editorial onslaught, Herrick, late in 1904, organized what the American Issue termed the "Herrick-Reynolds Literary Bureau." T. C. Reynolds, who served as press bureau chief for the governor, opened offices in Columbus from which he issued "alleged" information for Republican editors who were willing to champion Herrick. In substance, Reynolds releases charged the League was fighting the Republican Party and that its opposition to the Governor was for personal revenge. They asserted that the League was attempting to usurp power over the Republican Party in Ohio and that it was out to "teach the Republican Party a lesson" that it must obey "the League or suffer defeat." "It is Herrick this time," one release declared, "but were he wholly out of the way the next man, and the rest, must still obey these autocrats or get out." 22 The Republican press in turn, lead by The Ohio State Journal in Columbus, printed these releases and added its own appraisal of the League.

21 Ibid., September 1, 1905, p. 2.

22 The Ohio State Journal, Columbus, December 17, 1904.
A few weeks before the campaign closed, the Fleischmann Distilling Company sent out a document lauding Governor Herrick and bitterly attacking Pattison. The League got hold of the pamphlet, verified its source, and distributed 75,000 copies of it to the voters. Following this, the Ohio Brewers' Association sent out a letter urging the brewers to organize their workers into campaign committees to work for the re-election of Herrick. Although it was designed as a secret communication, the League obtained a copy of the message on Thursday before election, photographed it, and sent out thousands of them to churches on Sunday.  

While the League was carrying on its share of the battle, Pattison waged an effective campaign. From the beginning he emphasized two dominant issues: The Governor's stand on temperance and bossism. It was a new kind of campaign for the Democratic party in Ohio. It was not unusual to hear an "Amen" in the audience, and at one point during a Pattison address, he said he would rather go down to defeat with the Christian people and the law-abiding citizens of Ohio than win with the liquor crowd. The scene which followed made some think they were attending a Methodist camp meeting.

In the largest total vote ever cast in Ohio up to that time, Pattison won over Herrick by 42,000 votes as the Democratic party swept fifty-seven of the state's eighty-eight counties.  

---

23 Proceedings of the Tenth Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1905.

24 Cherrington, History, p. 83.
Enquirer called the election "an everlasting monument to the independent voter." Furthermore, the outcome of the gubernatorial race was a prime example of what could happen when the League concentrated its activity on a single candidate, for the entire Republican ticket was elected with the exception of Herrick. It marked the first time in the history of the League movement that it had gone squarely against the chief executive of a great state who was backed by a highly organized machine in a party overwhelmingly in the majority. As a result, the League securely established itself as the agency of the church and the independent voter. The Ohio victory gave fresh courage to League forces in practically every state. As Leslie's Weekly put it, the League's defeat of Governor Herrick gave a "new impetus to the undenominational movement of religious bodies all over the land to secure reform legislation."  

The leaders of political parties in practically every state where the League was organized and functioning had come to know by experience that to nominate men favorable to the liquor interests in communities where the majority of the people were favorable to the no-license policy was suicidal from the party standpoint. In many sections of the nation, party leaders had come to understand that before they could launch the candidacy of any man for a legislative office with any assurance of success, they had to be sure his candidacy

---

25 November 21, 1905.

26 Leslie's Weekly, April 14, 1906.
would not arouse the enmity of the Anti-Saloon League. The thousands
of political graves that dotted nearly every state of the Union were
constant reminders to political leaders everywhere that this new
movement had come to hold the balance of power wherever temperance
issues were involved in political campaigns.

* * *

"If you turn the light into a rat hole," said Abraham Lincoln,
"it will soon cease to be a suitable rat hole." The Anti-Saloon
League turned the light of publicity into the rat hole of the American
saloon. The League was primarily concerned with the voters. Its
propaganda was not so much an educational as a political weapon. Its
purpose was to spur into action those voters who believed the liquor
traffic to be an evil. To accomplish this, it was necessary to
produce enough literature to reach a substantial portion of the voting
population. At first the literature was printed and circulated by
the local organizations with some small financial and ideational
assistance from the national League. But this was soon found to be
ineffective.

The idea of a national organ and a publishing department from
which the state organizations might be supplied had long been in the
minds of the national officers. But it fell to Superintendent Baker
to put the plan into operation. It had been Baker's experience that
under the existing arrangement the League could not count on prompt
delivery of printed material since few shops were in sufficient
sympathy with the League to exert themselves to see that work was
gotten out promptly, especially on hurry-up campaign matter. Much
of the literature was of a nature that to be effective it should not be
known to the public, especially to the opposition, until the League
was ready to send it out. Frequently the opposition got hold of it
in advance. And, Baker explained, "wet printers had no scruples about
furnishing the liquor people advanced information concerning the
League's plans and programs."^{27}

The first step taken to bring about greater unity and effective-
ness through a centralized editorial control came in 1907 when the
American Issue, which had been published by the Ohio League, was taken
over as the official national organ and moved from Columbus to Chicago.
Under the editorship of Dr. J. C. Jackson an effort was made to obtain
closer cooperation between the national and state leagues in the
matter of publications. The project included state editions of the
American Issue. In 1908, Dr. E. H. Cherrington, state superintendent
in Washington, was called to act as associate editor with Jackson and
as a general manager of the League's publishing interests. Within
two years, fifteen states adopted the new arrangement. The national
officers were now convinced of the feasibility of a League-owned
publishing plant, and in 1909 the American Issue Publishing Company
was established.

Selected as the site for the new venture was Westerville, Ohio,
a small town twelve miles north of Columbus. Baker owned a farm

^{27}Baker, unpublished Autobiography, p. 5.
about three and a half miles northeast of Westerville. He visited the
farm frequently, going as far as Westerville by trolley, and then
hiring a horse and buggy to go to the farm. During his many visits to
Westerville he fell in love with the community and its friendly people.
In selecting Westerville as the site for the League's publishing estab-
lishment, he reasoned it was near to Columbus, yet far enough away
from the city to avoid difficulties since the literature that was to
be published was to be of a fighting character and would probably
prove the lawless advocates of the liquor traffic to violence. 28

Consequently, Baker laid the League's plans before Clarence
Matters, editor of the Public Opinion, Westerville's weekly newspaper,
who took up the matter with the Westerville Board of Trade. Board
members were most receptive and they immediately started a public-
subscription campaign to buy a site. In all, Westerville citizens
contributed more than $9000. The printing plant was begun on Lincoln's
birthday in 1909 with Dr. Russell lifting the first shovelful of dirt
with a spade whose handle was of wood taken from a vanquished Columbus
saloon. 29

Aside from Baker's personal liking for Westerville, there were
other factors why the small central Ohio community was a natural site
for the League's printing enterprise. In several respects it was
similar to Oberlin where the League was born. Westerville was a
socially-minded college town. Its people, especially faculty members

28 Baker, op. cit.

29 Westerville in the American Tradition (The Ohio State
Archaeological and Historical Society, Columbus, 1940), p. 90.
of Otterbein College, had been noted abolitionists. Otterbein's president, the Reverend Henry Adams Thompson, was the Prohibition party's 1878 Ohio gubernatorial candidate, and in 1880 he was nominated for vice president on the party's national ticket.

Almost from its founding, Westerville had been a strong temperance town. The numerous early liquor-pledge societies found plenty of signatories among its citizens. A month after the founding of the CTU, Westerville women established a local chapter, and less than a year after the Ohio Anti-Saloon League was formed in Oberlin, an Anti-Saloon League committee was organized and Dr. Russell was invited to speak in Westerville. On two different occasions when an effort was made to establish a saloon in the community the establishments were destroyed by "mysterious" explosions. Westerville had been proud of its reputation as a saloonless college town for more than thirty years when the League decided to locate its printing plant there. 30

The League-owned publishing plant was completed in late 1909 and no time was lost in transferring the publishing interests to Westerville. Dr. Jackson, who had died a few months earlier, was succeeded by Ernest Cherrington who became editor-in-chief of all League publications, a position he held until his death. Cherrington, a graduate of Ohio Wesleyan University, had joined the League in 1902. He was the motivating force behind the League's publications. He

30 Ibid., p. 65.
believed that the appeal of the League publications should, for the most part, be directed to the mind and the heart of the "man on the fence" and not simply to make a few dyed-in-the-wool reformers shout for joy at the way the editor was giving the other fellow "what the general said."

Cherrington took great delight in quoting the volume of material turned out by the League presses. In 1909, at the superintendents and workers conference in Chicago, he cited the following statistics:

When in 1898 Superintendent Baker took charge of the League work in Ohio the bona fide subscription list of the American Issue had reached almost 15,000 which was evidence of the splendid advancement up to that time. The first thirty days the printing plant at Westerville was in operation, it turned out over 300,000 copies of the American Issue. In 1894 the Anti-Saloon League distributed 20,000 tracts, and in 1895, through special subscription made for the purpose, a ton and a half of literature was printed and circulated by the League. The paper stock alone, which at the present rate we will use in our printing plant at Westerville, during the first twelve months, will weigh more than 225 tons. The capacity at the Westerville plant is 1,500,000 copies of the American Issue per month, and if measured in book pages of literature the capacity of the plant reaches 600,000,000 per year.

With the establishment of the American Issue Publishing Company the literary output of the League assumed Gargantuan proportions. By 1912, its eight presses were printing more than forty tons of temperance literature each month, including thirty-one state editions of the American Issue, with an aggregate monthly circulation of more than 500,000. A new monthly publication, The American Patriot, began a

31 Interview with author, 1949.
feebie career in 1913. The next year, a second and more successful monthly was started, the New Republic, under the editorship of W. F. (Pussyfoot) Johnson. This became the most important of the League monthlys. It attained an average monthly circulation during the four years of its existence, 1913–1916, of about 300,000. The Scientific Temperance Journal, edited by Cora Stoddard, was added the next year. In 1915, two papers, The Worker and The National Daily, were started. Thus by 1916, the Westerville plant was printing six different temperance journals, including four monthlys with an aggregate circulation of about 420,000 each week, and a daily with a circulation of approximately 15,000. Between October 1, 1909, and January 1, 1923, circulation of periodicals published by the American Issue Publishing Company totaled 157,311,642. In addition, during the same period, the job department turned out 2,731,782,976 copies of books, pamphlets, leaflets, subscription cards, etc., realizing a return of $666,000.90. The company showed a steady increase in its profits, increasing assets from $64,382.33 to $360,677.70 at the close of 1922. In fact, when other departments of the League lagged behind financially, the publishing company came to their rescue.32

The problem of distribution was an important one. To send the literature through the mails required a regular subscription list, and the postage bill was considerable. The American Issue Publishing Company had special clerks at the postal department at its Westerville

plant, for the purpose of stamping, weighing and sending out its publications. They were mailed, for the most part, from Westerville directly to the individual. So great was the volume of mail that the Westerville post office was given a second-class rank. The League had in 1920 upwards of half a million addresses upon its lists. Distribution through churches was also effective. Here the literature reached the child as well as the adult. With League literature in his hands and with the imprecations hurled from the pulpit resounding in his ears, the churchman was not likely to be unaffected. The League also furnished corporations and labor unions with leaflets and posters. These were posted in conspicuous places in the plant and put into the pay envelopes of the employees.

One might almost say that the liquor business was drowned in a deluge of temperance literature. That's exactly what Superintendent Baker intended to have happen.

Books, paper, pamphlets, tracts and songs must issue in myriad millions [he declared] until all the people have learned that "wine is a mocker and strong drink is raging, and whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise."33

The public could be reached, Baker believed, by the printed page. Too much of the earlier literature, he felt, had been of a campaign character. He emphasized the need for a broad, fundamental, educational policy to be formulated and disseminated through League media.

We must print our way into the knowledge and power of the people before we win the war [he declared]. We must

33Address to 1911 National Convention, Washington, D.C., December 11, 1911.
put modern advertising business sense into our propaganda. We need well prepared circulars for the different classes to be mailed into the homes, attractive posters hung everywhere. . . . You cannot successfully combat page color advertisements, flashy posters and great electric beer signs with a few tracts printed on paper so cheap that when printed on one side you can read them on both. . . .

That such a gigantic outpouring of literature should have profoundly modified the behavior of the American people toward the liquor traffic is not surprising. Never before, perhaps, has a moral suasion organization, maintained by voluntary contributions and directed to a non-profit-making end, been able to conduct a campaign of education and agitation on such a scale.

And so it was, under the leadership of Superintendent Baker, that the League grew in strength and prestige. The League was now firmly established throughout the nation as a potent agency, set to wage battle with the liquor forces at every turn.
CHAPTER VI

THE LEAGUE'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

From the outset the League sought the most friendly relations with every organization dedicated to the overthrow of the liquor traffic. One of the principal objectives of its founders was to amalgamate scattered forces, mobilize the already created sentiment, and focus it at a given point for immediate results. The League's unwritten creed was, "We refuse to quarrel with our natural friends." It seldom answered attacks made upon it by other prohibition organizations. In harmony with the established policy of the state leagues, the national organization through its convention committee, sent the most kindly invitation to each local society of every temperance and prohibition organization to send delegates to its annual and biennial conventions. By the same token, the League never failed to acknowledge contributions made to the cause of prohibition by its predecessors and contemporaries. It recognized that its own success was dependent to a large degree upon the earlier accomplishments of these other agencies. This attitude is clearly reflected in the following editorial in The American Issue:

The Anti-Saloon League movement... has never been disposed to ignore or deny its indebtedness to the previous agitation and education in temperance matters by the churches, by the Prohibition party, the CTU, and the various smaller temperance organizations. With the Anti-Saloon League, it is largely a case of other men having
labored and of our having entered into their labors. The League has never claimed to be anything but a practical utilization of the temperance sentiment already in existence and generated by many sources.¹

Despite the League's efforts to cooperate and maintain harmony among the various temperance groups, internecine strife developed within the prohibition movement which for a time was as serious a threat to the League's progress as the opposition being waged against it by the wet forces. Referring to this internal upheaval, especially opposition from the Prohibition party, Superintendent Baker declared:

There was one source from which pronounced and virulent opposition came, that was not expected or anticipated which added much in the beginning to our difficulties and seriously handicapped for a time, the real work of saloon suppression. It was a class more noisy than numerous, who had filled the Heavens with their declarations of opposition to the liquor traffic but who, on the rise of the League movement, transferred much of that opposition to the Anti-Saloon League.²

Baker noted that some individuals had gone so far "in their blind hatred and rage as to contribute money to the support of the men who are paid to carry on the liquor propaganda against the League." This, he explained, "has not only been a serious and inexpressible grief, but it has made more difficult the unification of the forces against the common enemy."³

¹August 19, 1904.
³Ibid.
The most serious rupture within prohibition ranks was the clash between the Prohibition party and the League. It was largely a one-sided fracas, however, with the Prohibitionists taking the offensive while Leaguers, for the most part, refused to be drawn into a scrap. From virtually the very moment the League emerged on the horizon of prohibition reform, it became the target of a large element of the Prohibition party. Many ardent Prohibitionists regarded it as a greater enemy than the liquor traffic itself. Eugene Chafin, the Prohibition party candidate for President in 1908, declared:

There is nothing so damnable and wrong in the United States as the proposition of local option. We have got to kill the Anti-Saloon League and then lick the Republican and Democratic parties. [The League] is nothing but an annex to the Republican party and is only kept alive by them that Republican candidates may avoid the real issue and poll both the Sunday School and the whisky vote.  

This charge has been frequently repeated\(^5\) and much has been made of the fact that the original founders of the organization were Republicans.\(^6\) To one familiar with the history of the Anti-Saloon League, however, such charges are both amusing and without foundation. Oberlin, its birthplace, was a Republican stronghold, and it was natural and practical to take on the political complexion of the environment. But, even in Ohio, the League did not become a tail to


\(^5\)Odegard, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

the Republican kite. We have noted that in 1904 it was largely instru-
mental in defeating Myron T. Herrick, Republican candidate for
governor, and electing J. M. Pattison, a Democrat. William Jennings
Bryan could scarcely have been seduced by an organization that was but
a shadow of the Republican party, and the success of the League in the
Democratic South certainly cannot be attributed to Republican leanings.
The fact is, the tactics of the League required it to work through
both dominant parties on both the state and national scenes.

While some Prohibitionists accused the League of being wedded
to the Republican party, others denounced the League as actually
impeding the cause of prohibition because of its omni-partisan method.
The Prohibition party through the years had been preaching the neces-
sity of the union of the good citizenship of the nation in a great
national political party to obtain control of the government,
national, state and local, and legislative, executive and judicial.
Its purpose was to administer the government that the liquor traffic
might be suppressed and that the great social, economic, moral and
political benefits which would accompany such an administration might
be achieved. By the late eighties and early nineties the Prohibition
party was making some headway in convincing some voters of the sound-
ness of its position. Nearly every prominent leader in any branch of
temperance work was a Prohibitionist. Several attempts to organize
counter-movements against the Prohibition party had but little support
and met with early failure.7

7Ibid., pp. 380-81.
At one time it had looked as if prohibition might become the dominant issue in the presidential campaign of 1888. Several factors, however, headed it off, among which were the organization of the wets to defeat proposed state constitutional amendments and also the determination of the politicians to sidetrack prohibition by a compromise on high license and local option. The amendment defeats of the later eighties temporarily weakened the morale of the Prohibitionists. Then came the hard times and the financial stringency accompanied by the Populist wave and the free silver conflict. This split every party, the Prohibition party being hurt the worst. These hindrances, however, apparently did not affect the philosophy of the party. By 1892 most of the leading religious bodies were taking a very strong position in support, not only of national prohibition but also in support of the party for prohibition and they were emphasizing the responsibility of the Christian citizen for the use of the ballot. The substance of a number of the church declarations was that a Christian citizen should not vote for a party which did not place itself on record in an attitude of open hostility to the saloon.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 264-75.}

Then came the Anti-Saloon League. It taught that voting for a party was not necessary. Voters might stay in their old parties and vote for "good men in those parties. Here was a fundamental and inherent point of conflict between the League and the Prohibition party because it involved how the adherents of the respective organizations should vote. It involved the use of the ballot, the supreme instrument
of citizenship. The teaching of the one organization was to vote one way—for the old party; the teaching of the other was to vote for the Prohibition party. Upon the crucial question of the use of the ballot the teachings of the two organizations were diametrically opposed. Prohibitionists felt that the conflict brought on by League propaganda, emphasizing the omni-partisan philosophy, could not be brushed aside by any solemn homilies about cooperation, neither could it be glossed over by avoiding subjects over which the two agencies differed.

Prohibitionists also were convinced that most of the organizations with which the Anti-Saloon League was related in its origins were distinctly hostile to the Prohibition party plan. They pointed to the fact that the convention which organized the League into a national body in 1895 was attended by only one or two Prohibitionists of national prominence. And they made much over the fact that Hiram Price, the League's first national president, had been conspicuously persistent in his endeavors to head off the Prohibition party. They charged he had been present at the special convention of 1892 and had vigorously opposed the advanced party action taken there. Likewise in 1894, they explained, although then holding office as a Republican federal Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he went to the Prohibition convention and did his best to prevent the nomination of a national ticket.  

---

9 Ibid., pp. 386-87.
The issue over which the League and the Prohibition party clashed most bitterly, however, was that of local option. It had swept over the country, or sections of it, at intervals from 1833 on. It never truly became an effective instrument, however, until the League used the device as its principal means with which to fight the liquor trade. Prior to 1893 there had been widespread propaganda or general agitation in favor of local option by temperance people with the constant objective of state and national prohibition always in the foreground. The League, by contrast, although it favored this objective ultimately, was content to work persistently but more slowly in drying up small segments of the state and nation.

The Prohibition party maintained the League's method was too local to cope with the national problem. The liquor traffic, it pointed out, was organized in state and national bodies, and was protected by state and national laws. Because of this, said the Prohibitionists, the liquor traffic being legally entrenched in adjacent territory, conveniently "slopped over" into dry areas. Furthermore, the Prohibitionists taught that from the differentiation of functions between state and local government, the question of perpetuation of the liquor traffic was not a proper one to be referred to local subdivisions such as residence districts, wards, towns, townships, and counties. They held there were but two units of sovereignty in the United States, maintaining that the federal government was sovereign with respect to the subjects within its jurisdiction and the state governments were sovereign with respect to those matters reserved to the
states. Since this principle long had been held by political theorists, the Prohibitionists emphasized that the question of licensing or prohibiting the liquor traffic was by no means merely of local interest. It was a matter that supremely affected the health, wealth, order, safety, and welfare of the nation as a whole.  

The Prohibitionists argued that the theory of local option was wrong. It was wrong, they said, for the state to surrender its sovereignty, evade its duty, and divest itself of responsibility on a matter vitally affecting the welfare of the state by shifting the decision to localities. On no similar subject, they said, was local option customary. Gambling, lotteries, stealing, prostitution, and all similar offenses against society, they explained, were dealt with by the state. In addition to backing up their arguments with legal interpretation, they insisted local option was too temporary and an "armed truce." The liquor men, they asserted, needed only to marshal their forces at the next election, when, by misleading propaganda, by a little more bribery, a little more purchasing and colonizing of voters, they could return to power.

Another defect of local option, they charged, was that it failed to provide a remedy for evils of the liquor traffic where the remedy was most needed. It surrendered to the liquor traffic the centers of population and power, concentrating the temperance energy where it was least needed and diverting it from centers of liquor influence where

\[^{10}\text{Tbid.}, \text{pp. 355-79.}\]
it was most needed. This, they explained, concentrated the rum power in its strongholds, allowing it to entrench itself. And despite the League's effort put forth in local option campaigns and its numerous political victories, they pointed out, the per capita consumption of liquor in the country as a whole increased. Then, too, Prohibitionists said local option made people believe that the liquor question was merely a local one and kept the dry voters of a state disunited, voting merely by local districts, whereas, if they had voted as a state unit, their aggregate vote would have supplied more than the majority needed to carry a state for prohibition. It was snatching a limited and transient advantage, they said, to postpone a wider and permanent one.

For twenty years ▓, Leigh Colvin, official historian of the Prohibition party, declared, many people were wandering in the wilderness of local option. The nation suffered from the success of the designs of the politicians of the late eighties and early nineties in their scheme to divert temperance reform away from prohibition into the channels of high license and local option, a scheme into which the Anti-Saloon League unwittingly played by diverting the emphasis of the church from high standard of national prohibition to mere localism, and by apparently offering a means to escape from the commanding ideal of a prohibition party to omni-partisanship—to the low standard of the old parties with their policies of duplicity and non-settlement.\(^{11}\)

As we have already noted, the League remained relatively silent, refusing to answer the charges made against its philosophy and its leaders by the Prohibitionists. Reflecting this attitude is the following editorial in the American Issue:

We do not believe there is a single proposition regarding the beverage liquor traffic which is advanced

\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 379.
by the Prohibition party to which the League does not subscribe. We gladly and fully recognize that the Prohibition party and the churches, by their right indoctrination of the people, have made our operations possible. The American Issue editor would no more club the Prohibition party than he would club his mother. Any man among us, who fights that party just as any man who fights the Republican or Democratic parties, as parties, will be silenced. 12

Occasionally, however, when his patience apparently had been tried to the utmost by remarks about the League in the party's official organ, the New Voice, the editor of the American Issue would speak his mind editorially. A representative retort referred to the prohibitionists as "high falluting temperance orators who habitually seek to make vehemence replace verity." 13 Another time he called Voice writers, "sensation mongers."

Actually it was not necessary for the League to answer the charges made against it by prohibitionists. The successful record of the League as compared with the feeble achievements of the Prohibition party, which had been engaged in the field of liquor reform for a much longer period of time, pretty much spoke for itself. For the most part, leaders of the Prohibition party were men of high motives and genuine devotion to the cause that they represented. The wisdom of the party policy in dealing with the liquor question could only be ascertained by a practical demonstration. The prohibitionists made the sacrifice of that demonstration which revealed the fact that multitudes of men who hated the liquor traffic, and were willing to

12 June 23, 1905.

13 June 3, 1902.
do all they could to abolish it, along what they regarded as reasonable lines, nevertheless would not break their party fealty and enter the ranks of what they regarded as a one-idea party. Others firmly believed the party method of dealing with the liquor traffic was not a wise one and therefore refused allegiance, but the fact that the party method was not a winning method did not detract from the great service rendered to the cause of temperance by the party. It sounded the gong in the ears of sleeping saints until under other auspices they were enlisted in a relentless war for the overthrow of the liquor traffic.

The charge that the League was the chief factor obstructing the growth of the Prohibition party, especially after the early years of the twentieth century, would seem to be without foundation.\(^{11}\) It is doubtful whether the party would have enjoyed the limited success it did had it not been for the presence of the League, particularly after 1913 when the League officially came out for national prohibition. In taking this stand for a constitutional amendment, the League destroyed arguments of the party that the League was dedicated solely to the local option method. In reality, however, the League had always had national prohibition as its ultimate objective. Superintendent Baker made this point clear to the delegates attending the League's Fifteenth National Convention:

> I have of late received many letters in which the writers expressed thankfulness that the Anti-Saloon League has at last seen the folly of its course and come out for Prohibition.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 383.
From the day of its inception, to the present, state and national prohibition has been the League's objective, and every move has been made with that in view, but it has never lost sight of the fact that prohibition must be gotten through the people and not through convention resolutions and platform declarations. It recognizes nothing more clearly than the necessity of reaching the ear of the public, and steadily building it up to a standard of sentiment that will sustain the larger declarations.  

Although the League and the Prohibition party often did not see eye-to-eye, they were known to cooperate from time to time in various political campaigns, particularly on the local and state level. While serving as superintendent of the Illinois League, William H. Anderson told the writer, he often worked closely with the Prohibition party and on occasion threw the League's full support behind party candidates. What is more, several individuals, including John G. Woolley, Edward C. Dinwiddie, James T. Bashford, and the Reverend Ervin Chapman, all of whom rose to prominence in the League movement, began their temperance careers with the Prohibition party.

During the first nine years of the League's existence, Woolley related, he thought the League a compromise and a mistake.

Its thesis, he noted, was too thoroughly and openly businesslike to be inspiring to me. Its work cut off somewhat the meager revenues of the Prohibition party and in a measure blocked the exodus from the old parties into the new one which I was trying with all my might to build up, without, as it seemed to me, doing any great, permanent injury to the saloon.

But after two years as editor of The New Voice, in which he had striven to cooperate with all enemies of the saloon, Woolley said he discovered

the League and the party were friends and not enemies. "And I... take my hat off to the Anti-Saloon League as the most sane, safe and successful application of prohibition doctrine the world has ever seen."\textsuperscript{16}

In many respects, Nooley's early life, his philosophy and his call to temperance work paralleled the career and experiences of Howard Hyde Russell. Both confessed they had been narrowly snatched "from the jaws of destruction" of the saloon and both attributed their being "saved" to divine guidance.

Eighteen years ago [Nooley recalled] I went to bed, if not a friend, a patron and servant of the saloon. . . . That night there came to me from somewhere a spurt of power to pray, and then to resolve confidently, and on the morning of the thirty-first of January, 1888, I got out of bed a freed man, by the Grace of God, a total abstainer, a Christian citizen, and a third party Prohibitionist. . . .\textsuperscript{17}

Working independently at first, Nooley led the way to uniting the many foes of the liquor traffic, believing the union should be founded on the power and the honor of the church. Although helping in local option fights, he believed that sometime, and the sooner the better, the Christian voters of the United States one and indivisible must try the beverage liquor traffic for its life on the bare issue of national decency.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16}American Issue, November 25, 1904.

\textsuperscript{17}Proceedings of the Eleventh National Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1906.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid.
Russell tried to enlist Woolley at the outset of the League
movement, but the latter declined on the ground that the League
"seemed merely a proposition to light back-fires for the protection
of favored localities while the great central, federal holocaust was
left to blaze right on." But, said Woolley,

my great-brained, great-hearted friend [Russell] was
building better than I knew. . . . Today. . . It [the
League] stands pledged, nationally and locally, to
the cardinal plank of the seven national Prohibition
party platforms, and leads us, in the roster of vic-
torious skirmishes, both in the state legislatures and
in Congress, we have elected no candidates without
its assistance. We get little hearing before Congres-
sional committees save through its representatives. . . .
All of this does not show me that I ought to give it my
labor or my money, but it does show to me that I should
be a bigot and a traitor to my own cause, if I were to
doubt its faith, disparage it, or hinder it. . . . The
work of our party is not done, but it is changed. It
cannot hereafter, without belittling itself, admit there
is any rivalry between itself and other open enemies
of the saloon.19

Although the Prohibitionists were and still are at very best
an extremely weak party in the field of national politics, their in-
fluence on the temperance question cannot be completely ignored. If
nothing else, the Prohibition party helped to build a road for
political liberty or conscience, from the bi-partisan quagmire that
followed the Civil War, to effectual democratic action manifest in
the numerous social and political reforms that followed in the wake
of the muckraking movement. It was the bridge builder of the great
temperance reform movement that enabled the Anti-Saloon League to
make prohibition a part of the Constitution. It fixed the word

19From an address before the state convention of the Prohibition
party, Portland Oregon, 1905.
"prohibition" in our political language and forced its enemies, members of the distilling and brewing industries, to come out in the open and fight the issue of prohibition before the public.

The Prohibition party saw the great temperance reform that had been gathering for three-quarters of a century and threw the whole subject into the realm of party politics, only to discover that a party was not the answer to the question. It massed the arguments, wrote the songs, and exposed corruption. But it still was party politics. Instead of achieving a working union of all the enemies of the saloon, in a new party, it aggravated division in the church, and the saloon lived on and prospered. The Prohibition party remained aloof, refused to make friends with other temperance agencies, and ignored the independent voter. Woolley pointed up the party's attitude this way:

It [the Prohibition party] would go to a clean, dyed-in-the-wool Republican and say, "You ought to be a Prohibitionist, and if you would be, the first step is absolutely to quit being a Republican." Now, however, true that might have been, it was a stiff proposition to put to a man who had voted for Fremont in '56 and straight down the line, and likely as not wore a bronze button on the lapel of his coat.

And similarly, we would go to a Bourbon Democrat and say, "You ought to be a Prohibitionist, and no Democrat can be Prohibitionist. That, too, may have been true enough at the time, but it was a bitter dose for a Democrat... Men are sensitive to their parties.

By contrast, said Woolley, the League said to a Republican:

All right, be a Republican, but first of all be a man.
And it said to a Progressive or a Socialist:

Be what you will, but whatever else you are, be a man. 20

Through this approach, in multiplying districts, the League had Republicans and Democrats competing for the dry support. Party lines drew increasingly dimmer and church divisions disappeared into larger advances, local gains began to affect larger units, and eventually state legislatures took action and national prohibition came into being. The Prohibition party may have put prohibition into national politics, but the Anti-Saloon League set it into action.

* * * *

The difficulties the League experienced with the Prohibition party were more than offset by the harmonious relations it enjoyed with the Women's Christian Temperance Union. In many respects the objectives and methods of operation of the League and the WCTU were greatly similar. In fact, long before the League came into existence, the WCTU, under the leadership of Frances E. Willard, who became its president in 1879, grasped the vital importance of the political phases of the alcohol problem. Prior to Miss Willard's ascendancy to leadership, the WCTU was largely a moral suasion movement, paying little attention to the political aspects of the liquor question, and unlike the Prohibition party, which seemingly resented the invasion of the League into the prohibition reform movement, the WCTU, with

20Call of An Epoch, pp. 130-31.
few exceptions, welcomed the new agency with open arms, continuing its propaganda barrage against the liquor traffic while teaming up with the League in its political activities. The women prayed, distributed documents, talked and spread millions of printed instructions on how to mark ballots.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century the most uniformly successful and far-reaching of any branch of temperance work was that of the Department of Scientific Temperance Instruction of the WCTU, which, under the leadership of Mrs. Mary H. Hunt, secured laws in every state in the Union, between 1882 and 1902, providing for the teaching of the effects of alcohol upon the human system in the public schools of the land.21 It was this agency that furnished a basis for the Scientific Temperance Federation, heavily endowed by the League, that presented the physiological side of the liquor question. But whereas the WCTU had devoted its efforts largely to convincing the public that alcohol as a beverage was not merely injurious when used in excess, but was bad physically, mentally and socially, in any quantity, the League went further, turning the floodlight of publicity upon the saloon and the liquor traffic. Its objects was not so much to form opinion as to mobilize for political action the already existing opinion built up by the WCTU and other temperance societies.

League leaders were quick to recognize the importance of women in carrying on their program. One of its main arguments in bringing

---

about the saloon's demise was the ill effect it had on women and children. League propaganda was saturated with stories and detailed accounts of broken homes, starving children, and mistreated wives—all the result of the saloon, it said, which took the workingman's paycheck and made a drunkard of him. The following is a typical comment:

The saloon is the storm center of crime; the devil's headquarters on earth; the schoolmaster of a broken decalogue; the deceiver of nations; the beast of sensuality; the past master of intrigue; the vagabond of poverty; the social vulture; the rendezvous of demagogues; the enlisting office of sin; the serpent of Eden; a ponderous second edition of hell, revised, enlarged and illuminated.  

The Home Against the Saloon, a pamphlet of the South Dakota League, asserted:

The liquor traffic is the crisis of a death struggle for supremacy over the American home. God is silently but surely sifting the American people into two classes—home defenders... and saloon defenders. Protect the home from the saloon or the saloon will destroy the home.

Poetic appeals to the chivalry of drinkers were made:

Women and children first, 'tis the law of the sea, But why not make it the rule wherever a may may be? Let it become the law where roisterers quench their thirst, Embazon it over the bar—"women and children first."  

Much was made, by the defenders of the saloon, of its services to the workingman. They called it the poor man's club. A widely circulated poem expressed the league's attitude:


THE POOR MAN'S CLUB
What It Does

The poor man's club, the poor man's club!
The man who says that deserves a rub,
The club that takes the Saturday pay,
The club that chases all hope away,
The club that empties the workman's bag
And leaves the wife a bone and a rag;
That takes the schoolbook from the boy,
And leaves him naught that he might enjoy;
Takes the price of toil from the laboring man,
That empties the stomach and fills the can.
That makes the home where peace might dwell,
Instead of a heaven a raging hell.
With the wife out washing, her rub, rub, rub,
Beats time for the songs of the poor man's club.
If you don't need clothes and can live without grub,
Why, just go and join the Poor Man's Club.

Such propaganda made a martyr of the American housewife, but
merely to enlist public sympathy toward American womanhood was not
enough. Women had to be given the means whereby they themselves
could improve their situation in society. The ACTU was among the first
organized agencies to recognize this need and aside from its major
emphasis on prohibition, sought the enfranchisement of women. Miss
Willard recognized that women could not deliver the full strength of
their blow at the liquor traffic until they were able to vote. This
led her to throw the weight of the ACTU in support of the suffrage
movement.21 And the League, despite its insistence on singleness of
purpose, made an exception in this instance, and also actively supported
woman suffrage. As early as 1898, President Price declared that

If it is admitted that women are a part of the people, and
as such are compelled to pay a part of the expenses of the

21Mary Earhart, Frances Willard (University of Chicago Press,
government, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that even-handed justice demands that she have some voice in deciding as to the character and enforcement of... such laws as materially and immediately affect the peace and happiness of the family... especially in reference to the liquor traffic... 25

The League even resorted to song in promoting women's suffrage:

Mary had a little vote, that roamed the state about,
And everywhere that the vote got in, John Barleycorn got out.
'Now, what makes John hate Mary so?'
Miss Anti, wondering, asks.
Oh, Mary is his greatest foe,
She empties all his casks.
How shocking! Here is Anti-dry,
One point agreed upon,
For everywhere that Mary votes,
She gives a shock to John.
Now, what makes Mary hate John so,
Why does she treat him thus?
Oh, Mary loves the boys, you know,
The reason's obvious.
Yes, Mary had a little vote,
Well used, without a doubt,
For when returns come rolling in,
John Barleycorn rolled out. 26

When the Ohio legislature turned down woman's local option suffrage, the editor of The American Issue expressed the regret of League officers "who did what they could to promote it," and explained that

a woman ought to have the right to protect her family as far as possible in its dearest interests. Seeing that she is the chief sufferer in the liquor fight, she

26 This song was sung particularly at League gatherings in Illinois.
should be granted the ballot in this particular as her right for national defense.27

At the League's seventeenth National Convention in Indianapolis in 1916, it was resolved that

the Anti-Saloon League of America unqualifiedly endorses the principle of woman suffrage and urges upon the temperance forces the justice, wisdom and desirability of securing the immediate franchise for women throughout the nation.28

In other respects, especially in local option elections, the ICTU and the League worked together harmoniously. Although the ICTU made its stand known much earlier, both had as their ultimate objective national prohibition. The Union had in 1881 presented to the Republican, Democratic, and Prohibition parties a "memorial of the American home for protection from the American saloon," which read:

We do hereby respectfully and earnestly petition you to advocate and to adopt such measures as are required, to the end that prohibition of the importation, exportation, manufacture, and sale of alcoholic beverages may become an integral part of the national constitution.29

Through the years the ICTU continued its agitation for national prohibition. Its delegates regularly accepted invitation to the League's national conventions and took an active part in the gatherings. A large delegation was on hand at the League's 1913 convention when final plans were made to seek an amendment to the Constitution, and

during the next five years while the amendment was being pushed, the
I.C.T.U was in the forefront of this activity.

***

Aside from its close bond with the I.C.T.U, the League also
extended the warm hand of fellowship to the various Protestant Church
groups in America and with few exceptions, as already noted, received
their full cooperation in the struggle against the saloon. Practically
every recognized Protestant Church group had taken a vigorous stand
against the liquor traffic even before the League came into existence.
Many of the churches had created separate organizations to deal
specifically with the liquor question and it was with these units that
the League closely worked.

The League's greatest support and cooperation came from the
Methodist Episcopal Church, the largest Protestant denomination and
long one of the most aggressive churches on the question of drink.
One of its most famous declarations was in 1892:

The liquor traffic is so pernicious in all its bearings,
so inimical to the interests of honest trade, so repugnant
to the moral sense, so injurious to the peace and order of
society, so hurtful to the home, to the church and to the
body politic and so utterly antagonistic to all that is
precious in life, that the only proper attitude toward it,
for Christians, is that of relentless hostility. It can
never be legalized without sin. 30

That the League and the Methodist Church became close allies
was to a large degree due to the fact that a large number of the

League's principal leaders were Methodists. Superintendent Baker began his career as a Methodist minister and remained active in the church throughout his life. Luther B. Wilson, one of the organizers of the national League and its president from 1901 to 1921, was a bishop of the church. Elevated to the episcopacy in 1904, he brought to the League not only the prestige of his ecclesiastical position, but a far-reaching vision and sound judgment that won innumerable friends for the cause to which he dedicated himself. Another Methodist bishop who played a prominent role in League affairs was James Cannon, Jr., for many years a vice president of the national body. Wayne B. Wheeler, general counsel and legislative superintendent of the League, was a prominent lay leader of the Methodist Church as were dozens of state superintendents and other officials of the state and national bodies. It was no surprise, therefore, that the Methodist Quadrennial Conference, meeting in Baltimore, June 1, 1908, after much heated discussion, put itself on record in favor of the League and its methods.31

While working with the Methodist Church as a whole, the League quite naturally developed its greatest cooperation with its Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals. The Board's purpose was and still is to assist in the enforcement of prohibition laws and to conduct in behalf of the church scientific investigation, research, and a campaign of education, pledge-signing, circulation of literature, 

street speaking, press and publicity work, and all the varied activities tending to create an intelligent public sentiment. The Reverend Clarence True Wilson, one-time president of the Oregon Anti-Saloon League and a staunch advocate of local option, served as general secretary of the Board of Temperance from 1910 to 1930. During this period the Board and the League gave each other their fullest cooperation, carrying on their activities in many instances as a single unit. The same position was later held by Ernest H. Cherrington, for many years head of the League's publishing and educational activities. Just prior to his death in 1950, Dr. Cherrington told the writer that the League and the Methodist Church "enjoyed the fullest cooperation and understanding in the battle against the saloon and the liquor traffic."

While the League enjoyed the support of most Protestant Church bodies, as far as can be determined, only the Methodist Church offered its official cooperation. The Presbyterian Church, for example, was precluded by reason of a provision in its fundamental law preventing official connection with non-ecclesiastical bodies and its General Assembly repeatedly refused to take steps toward authorizing official connection.\(^3^2\) It did, however, commend the League "as a safe, sane and effective agency in the advancement of the great cause of temperance," and pledged "the fullest cooperation consistent with the constitution of the church."

\(^{32}\)Colvin, op. cit., pp. 392-93.
The General Synod of the Lutheran Church, in session in Akron, Ohio, June 7, 1915, declared "its position as in heartiest sympathy with the principle and practice of total abstinence from alcoholic beverages and as unalterably opposed to the traffic in the same." At the same time it commended "the good work" of the Anti-Saloon League and other non-ecclesiastical organizations and bade them God-speed in their work for temperance reform. 33 Best known Lutheran among League leaders was Dr. E. C. Tinwiddle, minister, chairman of the church's temperance committee, and first national legislative superintendent of the League.

Next to the Methodist Church, the League unquestionably received its greatest support from the Baptist Church, especially through the American Baptist Home Mission Society, and with Southern Baptists through the Southern Baptist Convention. The Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), the United Brethren Church, the Congregational Church, and the Friends' Church all officially commended the League for its temperance activities. Following 1913, when the League officially announced its stand for national prohibition, the church bodies spoke with renewed zeal and almost with one voice for the same objective.

The evidence is preponderant that the League did more than any other agency before or since to amalgamate the scattered forces of

33 National Daily, June 8, 1915.
temperance reform and mobilize the sentiment against the saloon.
The fact that it was able, in some measure, to bring together
Protestants and Catholics and the warring factions in the field of
temperance reform is what made the League one of the greatest mani-
manifestations of militant democracy applied to a vital issue with a moral
implication that the world has ever seen.
CHAPTER VII
FUND-RAISING AND EXPENDITURES

The Anti-Saloon League, even though its leaders maintained it was God-inspired and devoted to the Lord's work, could not survive on prayers alone. It had to have money to put its plan into operation and keep it functioning as an agitation, legislative and enforcement agency. In fact, among the strong points of the League's methods that accounted for its success was its financial system, consisting of subscriptions made for so much a month, payable every three months, for a period of one year, three years, or five years, and the private canvass for funds among well-to-do persons. By these means more than $40,000,000, the League itself acknowledged, was raised nationally and expended. ¹ Others, especially enemies of the League, maintained the figure was much greater. On the basis of actual pre-prohibition expenditures and the expenditures made during the first six years of prohibition, one source maintained it was able to trace disbursements of more than $67,500,000. ²

It is difficult to obtain an accurate accounting of the League's financial status. In the first place, it steadfastly refused

¹ Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem, p. 184.
² James A. Reed, The Rape of Temperance (Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, 1931), New York, p. 87.
to divulge the names and amounts of its principal contributors. This attitude was adopted for a variety of reasons. Large contributors frequently requested or required that their names be kept secret. Business men and manufacturers who made contributions did not want to risk the danger of political and economic reprisals from the enemies of the League. There is considerable evidence that the brewers systematically made war on business men who supported the cause of prohibition.\(^3\) Many contributors wished their names to be kept secret because of the annoyance that besets persons known to have made large contributions to any cause.\(^4\)

Another reason why the researcher finds it difficult to unearth financial details of the League's operation lies in the fact that the Senate Committee, created in 1926 to investigate campaign expenses, dispatched accountants to the League's headquarters in Westerville, Ohio, with instructions to bring back to Washington records and accounts from which an actual picture of the League could be obtained. Following the investigation, the records were never returned to the League and are listed as missing. Consequently, one must rely on secondary source material, much of which is inadequate, to reconstruct a picture of the League's financial activities.

As the writer already has noted in Chapter II, the League began very modestly. There were no millionaires to sign checks in six

\(^3\)Odegard, op. cit., p. 186.

\(^4\)United States Daily, June 28, 1926.
figures to put the organization on its feet. The early founders of
the League, with one or two exceptions, were ministers. They were
men of small means. Money had to come, if at all, from small sub-
scribers. The League's early years were marked by great personal
sacrifice on the part of its workers. The organization was constantly
in debt to them, even though they performed their services for modest
salaries. Had it not been for a few "guardian angels" the movement
might well have collapsed before it even got off the ground. From
such humble beginnings the League prospered until at the height of
the campaign for national prohibition, Wayne B. Wheeler noted, it
was spending about $2,500,000 a year.\footnote{Wayne B. Wheeler, "The Inside Story of Prohibition," \textit{New York Times}, March 29, 1926.} This figure represented that
spent by both the state and national organizations.

As its prosperity increased, the League was charged with being
a corrupt, corporation-controlled political lobby. Colonel Gilmore
of the Model License League declared that he had seen a list of six
corporation heads, each of whom contributed a hundred thousand dollars
to the Anti-Saloon League.\footnote{Odegard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 182.} He furnished no evidence, and the League
denied it. Captain William Backus, a veteran Ohio brewer, charged
the League was maintained with Rockefeller money:

\begin{quote}
Invariably, the Anti-Saloon League members of the assembly can be counted on to do the right thing for the Standard Oil Company in this state. . . . Rockefeller, through his daughter, Mrs. McCormick of Chicago, is
\end{quote}
backing the Anti-Saloon League of America to the extent of $350,000. If it were not for Rockefeller, the Anti-Saloon League would go out of business."

He offered no proof. The entire yearly income of the League at the time was scarcely $500,000. Stories of Rockefeller's gifts are legion.

"It is reported that John D. Rockefeller has secretly given $5,000,000 to fight the saloons." 

"John D. Rockefeller has given $500,000 to the Anti-Saloon League... to start newspapers in several states... to attack the liquor traffic..." Eastern brewers alleged that these contributions were for the purpose of keeping the saloon question "before the public to detract attention from the methods of the Standard Oil Company." Later it was charged that Rockefeller contributed $15,000,000 to the ratification fight in New York.

Many of these charges were unfounded, but there is evidence that the Rockefellers contributed substantially to the Anti-Saloon League. In 1910 a list of all Rockefeller donations up to and including that year showed that the League had received a total of $100,000. In 1919 John D. Rockefeller, Jr., declared that "within a period covering twenty years these contributions have amounted to only $350,323.67. What prompted Mr. Rockefeller to contribute? Was

7 Ibid., p. 182.


9 New York American, March 26, 1923, quoted by Odegard, p. 182.

10 Chicago Record Herald, October 18, 1910, quoted by Odegard, p. 183.

11 Odegard, op. cit., p. 183.
it because of his Baptist reformist background? Was it because he believed prohibition to be good business? Was it to secure political power? Perhaps it was a combination of these reasons. There is an early statement of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., that "the cause of temperance is in keeping with the belief of both my father and myself." He explained his contributions after the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment thus:

To fail in the observance and enforcement of such a law strikes at the very foundation of orderly government and is in that way an attack upon civil liberty, for in a republic there can be no freedom for the individual if there is no respect for an enforcement of the laws which have been enacted in a manner prescribed by the people themselves in the constitution which they have adopted.

The League never became a one-man organization. Rockefeller contributions, as important as they were, do not explain how the League could spend $2,500,000 a year. By 1910 it was frankly appealing to manufacturers and business men. In December, 1911, Superintendent Baker said: "The League must have more money; it cannot continue to rely entirely on contributions from servant girls, and neighborhood janitors." Appealing to the rich to donate as they give to schools and colleges,

some of them of doubtful moral standards, he said, the one supreme need is more literature, more postage, more stenographers... We have about 350 men now in the field. In the next five years we should have a thousand,

---

12Ibid.

13New York Evening Post, April 1, 1921, quoted by Odegard, p. 183.
and men of the finest type stand ready to offer themselves as fast as they can be assured that the reward of their consecration is not starvation.¹¹

Similar sentiments were expressed in Anderson's Bluebook of the League. It noted that

large gifts are especially valuable in the early stages of the work because they make it possible to seize strategic opportunities and reap the full fruits of years of preparatory work, to start new lines of work and enlarge the "plant."¹⁵

But large contributions were few and far between. Wayne B. Wheeler declared:

Ninety per cent of the money came from persons who had pledged themselves to send us from 25 cents to $2 a month. In only one case... did the national organization receive so much as $25,000 a year from a single source and only five persons contributed $10,000 a year or more. I am sure that none of the state organizations fared better. The money came from little people of the country, just as the prohibition sentiment came from them.¹⁶

In discussing the League's finances the fact must be kept in mind that money was being raised by the individual state leagues as well as the national body. Although they derived their incomes in essentially the same manner and from the same source, the finances of the national and state leagues were kept quite distinct. Since it is virtually impossible to present a complete picture of the financial activities in the various states, the information presented here applies largely to the national body. It is known, however, that the

¹⁵ The Church in Action Against the Saloon, p. 50.
state leagues, too, relied on the small contributor to underwrite the cost of their work. In New York, for example, Superintendent Anderson reported that last year 1918 the total receipts in cash for the year were $260,000 in round figures. Fifty thousand of that the people contributed in sums ranging from one to a hundred dollars. Most of the amounts were $1, $6, $12, they for the year being the most popular sums.17

It is only natural that considerable interest should be attached to the names of the large contributors such as Rockefeller, S. S. Kresge, five and ten-cent store tycoon and chairman of the League's manufacture and business committee, and others of national prominence, but the record clearly shows that the great bulk of the League's operating expenses came in the form of small contributions of rank and file church members scattered throughout the country. Copies of the American Issue and other League publications are sprinkled with touching stories of drunkard's wives, of newsboys and children who contributed to the League out of gratitude for its work in executing old John Barleycorn. The number of actual contributors is difficult to estimate. Frank Kent of the Baltimore Sun, after a study of the League in 1922, placed the number of its contributors at seven hundred thousand.18 Another source noted that in 1919, at the zenith of its power and influence, the League was being supported financially by twenty thousand churches.19

17 H. Anderson, Literary Digest, August 16, 1918, p. 50.
18 Odegard, op. cit., p. 189.
19 Reed, The Rape of Temperance, p. 94.
The backbone of the League's financial structure was the contributions solicited through the churches. Every church opposed to the saloon was expected to give at least one regular public service a year and a contribution to the cause of temperance. The plan had the double advantage of enabling the League to obtain revenue and at the same time carry on its propaganda. The primary purpose, however, of such meetings, or "field days" as they were called, was the raising of funds. This is emphasized by the fact that the League declined invitations to speak where the subscription privilege did not accompany the invitation. "Let no church open its doors merely for the sake of having a League speaker come in and preach a temperance sermon. That is the least and most insignificant element involved." At the conclusion of the service, pledge envelopes were distributed. The pledge or subscription card was considered the ideal method of gaining temporal support for the organization. League speakers insisted that "God put the idea of that little subscription card in the mind of Dr. Russell at the same time He put the thought of the League on his conscience and in his heart." They said that the one was as necessary as the other and that without that card the thought of the League would likely never have been incarnated into the stupendous success which it had.


21 Ibid., p. 56.

Discussing the subscription card, the Reverend C. L. Collins, superintendent of the Florida League, pointed out it should be printed on good, heavy stock, that the presswork should be as good as that used upon any bond, that the form should be the simplest possible to cover the ground, and that every card should be entirely unsoiled and unmarred in any way. "Every pencil should be good," he added. "I see to it that every pencil is sharp . . . ." He also explained that the arrangement of the cards in the package should be such that the moment the ushers come forward to get them, the speaker could get both hands full of cards quickly and so hold them as to be sure that they did not slip out of his hands. "A very awkward thing," he said, "is to grasp the cards so loosely that by reason of the bulky ends, caused by the pencils, they get away from one, cause a break at the most critical moment, and likely lose good dollars." When it came to explaining just what a pledge meant, the Florida superintendent said he undertook to get both the eye and the ear of his hearers. At two or three points in the explanation he said he would ask the congregation to look at him while he explained the card.

I then carefully illustrate the marking of the card [he continued]. As an illustration I choose some amount which seems to be a notch or two above what I may reasonably expect the biggest man in the audience to give. I never yet have taken the lowest amount upon the card, but have sometimes taken as low as fifty cents a month as a suggestion.23

No wealthy givers were singled out, but the humblest listener was made to feel he should have a part, even if it were a small part, and such a one was led to realize his help was the one wanted. Every giver was made to feel he was a part of a vast army dedicated to the destruction of the saloon. League Leaders, early in the movement, appreciated that one hundred small givers were of inestimably more worth than five giving the same amount, for in the first case one hundred adherents had been obtained; whereas in the other only five.

Once the pledges were made and submitted to League headquarters, the subscription department of the state or national League, as the case might be, saw that they were actually paid. Loose offerings were also taken, but yielded small results compared to the pledge plan. "All other plans for financing and carrying on the League work have failed, and success everywhere has been in exact proportion to the willingness of the churches to profit by experience and cooperate fully upon this tested basis."  

The only serious obstacle to the League's pledge plan was the custom followed by some churches, "mainly a few wealthy conservative city churches," which combined all expenses and benevolences in a single annual collection and refused to permit any special appeal of any sort. The League took a dim view of this.

The general application of this "budget rule" would inevitably kill the League by instantly paralyzing its efficiency. In the first place the officials of the

---

budget class of churches will seldom appropriate from the treasury more than a small fraction of the amount that would be contributed by the members themselves if they were given the opportunity. In the second place, even if the lump contribution were larger, it would not accomplish as much in the promotion of the cause as a smaller sum made up of subscriptions which establish a vital contact and develop a sense of personal responsibility on the part of the individual members. It gets some money but enlists no men.25

Unless the churches were open regularly once a year, the League maintained, its work would be crippled financially. If eighteen months lapsed instead of twelve the League lost at least one-third of the available support and its force of workers would remain correspondingly inadequate. Experience had shown, the League said, not only that the great majority of subscriptions would not be renewed without the inspiration and freshened interest of a new presentation, but also that a break in the subscription decreased the number who would renew them.26

It is estimated that during the years 1911 to 1919, the years of the League's greatest prosperity, between 80 and 90 per cent of the national League's income came from pledges obtained at its own field days in the churches. The balance came from state contributions and individual subscriptions solicited or volunteered apart from church meetings. Prior to 1912, the national League had no systematic method of soliciting and collecting funds. In that year a subscription

25 Ibid., p. 53.
26 Ibid., p. 55.
department was organized. Total subscriptions from 1912 to January 1, 1923, totaled $16,151,422. Of this, cash collected amounted to $3,921,624, while $5,002,138 of the pledges was cancelled. These are strictly national figures. Thousands were were raised in the various states. During this period, 19,779 mass meetings and field days were held in the principal cities and towns of the nation.

* * * *

Although the League came in for some criticism for the manner in which it collected its money, "prying open the churches" as it was referred to by some, the method was accepted by and large as a legitimate arrangement, not much different from the fund-raising activity of any benevolent society. How the money was spent, however, was a far different story. It is in this respect that we find all sorts of charges and innuendos made against the League and its officials. In a great number of these instances the charges were completely unfounded while others made use of the half-truth technique. To maintain an objective point of view, one must constantly remind one's self that the prohibition movement was charged with emotionalism. The struggle between wets and drys was one of the most bitterly fought moral and social issues ever to take place in America. Consequently, each charge of corruption made against the League must be evaluated against this backdrop.

---

27 Odegard, op. cit., p. 195.

28 These figures are from the Report of the Subscription Department of the Anti-Saloon League of America as of January 1, 1923,
The best estimate is that the national League, apart from the state leagues, at its zenith, roughly from 1912 to 1920, spent approximately a half million dollars annually. Outlays went largely for salaries of speakers, expenses of speakers, literature for meetings, rentals for meetings, and office overhead.29 And despite charges to the contrary, the League recognized the need of being above suspicion. It availed itself of the assistance of business experts in putting its entire system into harmony with the best commercial usage in matters of bookkeeping, vouchers, records, and the handling of cash. All receipts from every source were sent to the central office, and all bills, including salaries and traveling expenses, were paid by voucher check requiring at least two signatures. Salaries were fixed at definite amounts, rather than upon a percentage basis, to avoid savor of graft. Every year the books were audited by certified public accountants. The books were open to inspection by any contributor for any proper purpose. An itemized annual financial statement was each year given to the press, and furnished directly to the contributors through the American Issue in the respective states. But under no circumstances were the names of the individual contributors given out or disclosed.30

It is true that special speakers were employed at various times, and received substantial fees. It was in this connection that "William

made to the Executive Committee and Board of Directors of the Anti-Saloon League. Presented at regular meeting of the Board of Directors, Washington, D.C., January 12, 1921.


30Anderson, The Church in Action, p. 49.
Jennings Bryan worked for humanity for $250 a day and expenses, "spot cash," as the New York World expressed it.\textsuperscript{31} Bryan received $11,000 from the League in 1919.\textsuperscript{32} Former Congressman Richmond P. Hobson was another platform favorite. Between 1914 and 1922 he received $171,250. W. E. (Pussyfoot) Johnson in the same period received $18,807. John F. Kramer, former Federal prohibition director, lectured for $7500 a year. Malcolm Patterson, former governor of Tennessee, was paid $12,211.\textsuperscript{33}

Most of the speakers received considerably less. Salaries varied according to their ability to get subscriptions. Hobson and Bryan, for example, with their stirring eloquence and color, apart from the merits of the campaign, succeeded in drawing crowds for a financial ballyhoo. H. B. Sowers, long-time treasurer and business manager of the American Issue Publishing Company, told the writer he often accompanied Bryan on his speaking engagements.

Bryan tried to make at least five speeches a day \textsuperscript{[Sowers recalled]} and three mass rallies on Sunday. He could really pack them in. In some towns people would wait until nine or ten o'clock at night to hear him speak. These speeches were much like political rallies. He held them in churches, town halls, Grange halls... any place that would hold a large group of people. Bryan would receive as much as $2000 in pledges at many of these rallies.

Another League speaker was Billy Sunday. Sowers recalled that Sunday was a difficult person to handle.

\textsuperscript{31}March 1, 1920, quoted by Odegard, p. 203.

\textsuperscript{32}United States Daily, July 3, 1926.

\textsuperscript{33}Odegard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 204.
One of my most embarrassing experiences with him [said Sowers] was in Cincinnati. Billy was speaking in a church and during the course of his talk he jumped up on a communion table. He marred the table so badly it cost me $15 to have it refinished.

Considerable criticism was directed at public officials, such as Congressman Upshaw of Georgia, Hobson and others, who received compensation from the League while in the public service. No intimation was made that their services to the League seriously interfered with their public duties. The sole danger, therefore, involved in such activity lay in the possibility of corruption. But there was no suggestion that the men mentioned would have voted differently or used their influence against temperance legislation but for the pay thus received. Upshaw, when asked if he accepted money from the League while he was a member of Congress, replied: "Of course I get paid for my time, but I never allow my engagements to interfere with my work in Congress. . . . I justify being paid on the same ground that a preacher accepts pay for Sunday service." 34 Other members of Congress for example, Ohio's Senators Willis and Fess, were very careful to accept nothing beyond expenses for speaking while holding office. 35

One of the most repeated charges made by enemies of the League was that it took nickels and dimes from thousands of widows, children

34 New York World, April 21, 1926, quoted by Odegard.

and small wage earners so as to pay its officials fancy salaries, enabling them to live in luxury. The writer has carefully investigated this charge and has been unable to substantiate it. The permanent officials of the League, while earning fairly substantial incomes when one considers that the income tax bite was far less significant than it is now, did not earn salaries out of line with their responsibilities. For one must not lose sight of the fact that the League was a big business operation, requiring the services of men of known executive ability.

In 1920, the salary of Wayne B. Wheeler was raised from $6000 to $7500. A similar raise was recommended for Superintendent Baker but he asked that it be placed at $6500 from $5000. The salary of the assistant superintendent, Doctor E. J. Moore, was increased from $4,800 to $5,000.\(^\text{36}\) In 1928, Dr. Russell's salary was increased to $7,000. At no time did the salary of a national League official exceed $8,000. That was the amount eventually paid to Wheeler and Ernest Cherrington. The aggregate salaries of the twelve active officers at the national headquarters in 1924 amounted to $52,161, an average of $4,350. These officers gave all their time to League work and as far as can be determined "made nothing on the side." Aside from the general manager, the four most important employees of the American Issue Company received salaries between $3,000 and $4,000.\(^\text{37}\)


The salaries of state superintendents varied widely, depending largely on the size of the state organization. Highest recorded salary was that of Arthur J. Davis, listed as superintendent of New York but who served in a regional capacity over Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, as well as New York. In 1924 and 1925 he was listed as receiving $10,000 annually.\textsuperscript{38}

None of the League's expenditures was labeled "political" although League officials time and again admitted that they were in politics. It was the avowed purpose of the organization from its beginning to elect drys and defeat wets. It was consequently puzzling to many to find that the League, when asked to give an account of its political expenditures, insisted it was not a political organization but an educational and scientific one. According to Odegard:

Broadly viewed, the entire outlay of the League may be regarded as political. The League spends money to educate men and women to vote dry, as the regular parties spend money to educate people to vote the Republican or Democratic ticket. It is true, the Anti-Saloon League rarely puts forward a candidate of its own. Its policy is to support those candidates of other parties who are "satisfactory." If a political organization be viewed narrowly as one which selects its own candidates for public office, the Anti-Saloon League may properly escape being so designated.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite numerous demands by the wets that the League file returns under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, it failed to do so.

\textsuperscript{38}Minutes of Board of Directors of Anti-Saloon League of New York, January 26, 1925. Also in personal letter from Davis to Cherrington, February 19, 1924.

\textsuperscript{39}Odegard, op. cit., p. 208.
Try as they might, enemies of the League for the most part failed to uncover any major corruption or scandal among its officers or any serious discrepancies or dishonesty in its overall operation. This is a remarkable record, especially when one considers the organization handled large sums of money, and employed over the course of forty years thousands of different individuals. And one can be assured that the wets were ever alert to detect any corruption among the drys. There were a few isolated instances, but none serious enough to warrant a detailed discussion here. The most famous of these instances, the one involving William H. Anderson of New York, will be taken up in a subsequent chapter.

With all the smoke that has been raised concerning corruption within the League, it is surprising to learn there is so little fire.

I recognize [said Frank Kent of the Baltimore Sun] that to concede that the Anti-Saloon League is anything but a "bunch of crooks" will cause a good many wets around here severe pain. . . . What I have said about the character of these men is a fundamental fact which it seems to me ought to be understood. They are not only honest but the real leaders are amazingly astute, incredibly efficient, practical to a point and with an ability to see ahead about eight times as far as the average political leader.40

40Quoted by Odegard, pp. 242-43.
CHAPTER VIII

THE MOVEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROHIBITION

The activities of the Anti-Saloon League in Washington did not begin with the drive for national prohibition. Its legislative functions had been long expanding in the nation's capital. A national legislative office, as we have noted, was opened in 1899 under the direction of E. C. Dinwiddie. According to the United States Brewers' Association:

A national legislative agent with a force of subordinates was appointed to infest the lobbies of the capitol in Washington. Senators and Representatives who refused to do the League's bidding found they had to face bitter fights and personal abuse in party primaries and general elections.

When an Anti-Saloon League measure was pending on the calendar, the desks of the lawmakers would be deluged with "form" letters or telegrams from the "folks back home."

The League lobbyists applied to Congress the methods that were in familiar use in the state legislatures. S. E. Nicholson, the League's veteran strategist, described these methods:

The choosing of issues, the determination of policies, the introduction of bills, are not half the battle. Watching bills after introduction, lobbying before committees and among Congressmen, arranging for hearings in behalf of measures presented, are all a vital part of a

---

1 Year Book of United States Brewers' Association, 1919, p. 19.

175
national legislative program. Yet, even these... are mere incidents in the campaign. Back of all such endeavor there must be a nationwide movement of public opinion, voicing itself in a way that will be heard by every Congressman. Petitions are important if presented in sufficient volume; personal communications to members are still more effective, personal interviews are best of all, where the citizen can come face to face with his member and out of the fullness of his heart, make known his wishes for legislation as a true American sovereign. ... The surest way to secure needed temperance legislation is for the sovereign voters, through well-planned organization, to elect men as their representatives... who will write the laws upon the statute books.2

The effectiveness of the League's methods was demonstrated by the passage in 1913 during the closing days of the Sixty-Second Congress of the Webb-Kenyon Act, prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of intoxicating liquors into any state where the sale of such liquor was illegal. It marked the most outstanding victory during the first twenty years of the League's existence and was overshadowed only by national prohibition itself. The victory was all the more emphatic by virtue of the fact that the measure was passed in both Houses of Congress over the veto of President Taft. This action marked an epoch in the history of the temperance movement, not only because of the direct results that were bound to follow the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Law, but also in showing the general trend of public sentiment against the liquor traffic throughout the country, voiced as it was by more than two-thirds of the representatives of the people in the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. Furthermore, the passage of the interstate liquor shipment bill was the result of

twelve years of persistent effort on the part of the Anti-Saloon 
League and the temperance forces throughout the nation to obtain 
remedial Federal legislation.³

While the legislation was the result of the combined effort of 
the temperance forces, if any agency was to be singled out for being 
primarily responsible, credit would have to be given to the League. 
For it was in response to a call issued by the League in December, 
1911, that a meeting was held in Washington, D.C., to take up the 
whole general subject of legislation to forbid interstate shipments 
of intoxicating liquors.⁴

While the call for this conference was made by the Anti-Saloon 
League of America, the action of the national league was largely at 
the suggestion of S. E. Nicholson, secretary of the national organiza-
tion and at that time national legislative superintendent of the 
League. The success of the conference and the results which followed 
the getting together of the temperance forces on this important ques-
tion of national legislation were very largely due to Nicholson's 
efforts.

Nicholson had been closely connected with the League from its 
birth. As a member of the legislature in Indiana he had taken the 
lead in promoting certain temperance legislation in that state. He 
served as superintendent in Maryland and Pennsylvania, and later

³ Cherrington, History, p. 141.
⁴ Ibid., p. 151.
directed League work in his native state as superintendent. Following
that, he held the office of national legislative superintendent in
Washington for two years. His long and wide experience in dealing
with legislative bodies, both as a member and as the representative
of the League, had convinced him of the necessity for united action
upon the part of the reform organizations in order to secure results;
and the calling of the Washington conference, which was participated
in by representatives of most of the temperance organizations of the
nation, and the comparatively quick results which came from this
united action, fully demonstrated the wisdom of Nicholson's judgment
in inducing the League to inaugurate such a movement.⁵

In a peculiar way, another League representative—the Reverend
E. C. Dinwiddie—must also be given special credit for this victory.
Dinwiddie, functioning as legislative superintendent of the League,
was one of the pioneers of the League movement, having been the second
man called into service by Dr. Russell after the birth of the Ohio
League at Oberlin. He began as a League man in December, 1893. In
the Ohio legislative session of 1894, he assisted Superintendent
Russell in the legislative work in behalf of the Haskell Local Option
bill, after which he was made legislative superintendent in Ohio.
After the Pennsylvania branch of the League was organized, he became
the superintendent of the League in that state; and when national
legislative offices were opened in Washington, D.C., in 1899, he was
elected national legislative superintendent.

⁵Cherrington, History, pp. 151-52.
So important is the Webb-Kenyon law to the over-all prohibition story that it is essential to examine the details of its passage. The fourteenth convention of the League assembled in Washington in December, 1911, soon after the second session of the Democratic-controlled Sixty-Second Congress opened. Nicholson, acting legislative superintendent, announced the intention of fighting every Congressman hostile to the League program. General Superintendent Baker urged that state temperance legislation be momentarily neglected and all efforts concentrated on Congress:

The states are helpless to enforce their own laws because the federal government persists in backing the speakeasy keeper and the blind tiger. If this present Congress, like its predecessors, refuses to hear the appeal of the people and give adequate relief, it is time to stop state legislation while we devote ourselves to the specific task of creating a Congress that will give relief. It is time our League attorneys and others... agree upon a bill that will be effective, and in their judgment constitutional... and let everybody get behind that bill and never stop... until it is a law upon the statute books.

The people have fought too long to tolerate a makeshift measure; they will forgive us if the measure should prove unconstitutional, but they will hold to strict account any man or set of men, in or out of Congress, who make themselves responsible for an inefficient measure.6

Sitting the action to the word, a special conference was called to draft such a measure. Yearly two hundred delegates, representing thirty-nine states and twenty-six organizations, attended this conference. The committee appointed to draw up a bill included, among others, the Reverend A. J. Barton, League superintendent of Texas;

---

F. W. Caldwell, an Oklahoma attorney; former Governor Hanly of Indiana; Congressman Webb of North Carolina, and Margaret Bye of the UCTU. The bill agreed upon was introduced by Senator Kenyon of Iowa. Several other bills were introduced, including one by Congressman Webb. The Senate committee, after extensive hearings, reported the Kenyon bill favorably. Congress was bombarded with appeals from the drys, protests from the wets, and threats from both sides. Armfuls of arguments, legal and moral, petitions galore and sacks of mail poured in. The legislatures of five states memorialized Congress to pass the legislation.

The debate in the Senate began on December 16, 1912, and it is significant, says Professor Richard Hofstadter, that the bill tended to be supported by the Progressives while most of its opponents were conservatives. Among those speaking in behalf of the measure were McCumber, Borah, Kenyon and Shepard. Senator Root, an administration adviser in many matters and the member of the Senate most likely to be 

---

7Ibid.

8Sen. Doc. 146, 62d Congress, 2d Session; Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 3d Session, pp. 2796-2805. The bill was reached April 15, 1912, and after several unsuccessful attempts, on August 16, Senator Kenyon succeeded in securing a unanimous consent agreement to consider the bill upon the opening of the third session.—Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 2d Session, pp. 10924, 11053.

9Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 3d Session, pp. 3272, 3305, 2760, 2871, 2889, 2428, 2525, 2870, 1761, 2253.

the purveyor of administration sentiments, expressed his sympathy with the efforts to curb the illicit liquor traffic, but doubted its constitutionality. He further expressed the hope that "the time may come, and I shall be glad to see it, when the people of the United States will be ready to act as a whole in the suppression of this traffic."\(^\text{11}\) Senator Sutherland, a constitutional lawyer of repute, made a devastating analysis of the bill, and found it unconstitutional.

The purpose of including the commerce clause in the Constitution, he argued, had been to secure commerce among the states against conflicting and discriminating regulations of the states, such as would be authorized by this statute, which was made specifically dependent on the laws of the several states. The constitutional powers of the states were defined, not by Congress, but by the Constitution. Apparently, in his mind interstate commerce was still interstate commerce, even though power over it was surrendered by Congress, and a congressional surrender of power was not sufficient to give the states control over it. Whatever the action of Congress, the Constitution had put the control of interstate commerce in the hands of the federal government and had thereby taken it away from the states. He believed, furthermore, that Congress could not prevent the shipment of liquor in interstate commerce because of its alleged harmful effects unless the prohibition was made general and not rested upon the

\(^{11}\text{Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 3d Session, p. 2915.}\)
separate actions of particular states or parts of states. Meanwhile, in the House the Webb bill was reported on February 7, 1913, with a recommendation that it pass. Webb cited a long list of religious and reform organizations that had petitioned for the bill, claiming that they represented more than thirty-five million constituents. Sabbath of Illinois replied that the legislation was being forced upon the country by "narrow-minded and prejudiced persons... who are seeking to force their views and belief upon the country as a whole." The pressure, however, was by no means one-sided. Bartholdt of Missouri, chafed by the tyranny of the League, read a protest from the German-American Alliance which he claimed represented two million citizens. And the criticism that was made in the Senate was repeated in the House—that it was an unconstitutional delegation of power to the states.

Nevertheless, when on February 8, 1913, the Webb bill came to a vote, it passed easily, 239 yeas to 64 nays. The measure was not quite identical with the Kenyon bill and there was some fear that the

12 Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 3d Session, pp. 2901 ff.
13 H. R. 17593; House Report 1161; Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 3d Session, pp. 2762, 2788-2865.
14 Ibid., pp. 2835-36.
15 Ibid., p. 2816.
16 Ibid., p. 2866.
House having passed the Webb bill, the Senate would not enact the Kenyon bill, and both would be smothered in conference.

To prevent this, the Senate accepted the Webb bill as a substitute for the Kenyon bill, 64 to 18, and it was submitted for executive approval.\textsuperscript{17}

There was some surprise when a few days later President Taft, on the advice of Attorney General Wickersham, vetoed the bill as unconstitutional. Vigorously condemning the theory that Congress should pass laws and let the Supreme Court decide as to their constitutionality, he reasserted the doctrine, which goes back to at least Andrew Jackson, that the President and Congress as well as the Court are bound to interpret and obey the Constitution.\textsuperscript{18} The Senate, however, promptly passed the measure over the President’s veto by a vote of 63 to 21.\textsuperscript{19} The House, with equal readiness and even more decisively, repassed the bill, 246 to 95. The Anti-Saloon League had won a major victory. The wets were fully aware of its significance:

The passage of the Webb-Kenyon bill, its veto by President Taft and its victory over the veto by more than two-thirds majority apparently mark the climax of a movement that has been active for half a century. If the Supreme Court declares the act unconstitutional, it does not change the impressive fact that in the face of the united effort of all branches of the alcoholic liquor trade, the National Congress voted for the bill.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 292k.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4293.

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 4297-99.

\textsuperscript{20}George Muller, statistician, United States Brewers Association, in \textit{National Liquor Dealers’ Journal}, April 2, 1913.
The lamentations of the vets were equalled only by the hosannas of the drys:

The victory of the Webb-Kenyon-Sheppard bill withdrawing the Federal protection from the liquor trade in its nullifications of state laws prohibiting the sale of liquors within its territory was undoubtedly due, pre-eminently, to the Anti-Saloon League. That is a fact. The Anti-Saloon League organized the movement, saw its development, watched its struggle and danger points, used the telegraph freely and with effect, brought to bear the necessary pressure of men and argument, and won one of the greatest victories in the history of temperance reform.21

Four years elapsed before the law came directly before the Supreme Court. At length, on January 8, 1917, it was completely sustained by a vote of seven to two.22 Disagreeing with Taft, who had appointed him Chief Justice and was later to succeed him in that office, and with Sutherland who was later to be Taft's colleague on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice White argued that the act did not delegate power to the states, but was an exercise of federal power. The act was uniform, he said. The lack of uniformity was in the conditions amid which it was to be applied. Furthermore, the Constitution did not require that federal commercial regulations be uniform throughout the United States. As a regulation of commerce, the Webb-Kenyon Act was but an extension of the Wilson Act of 1890, of which the purpose had been to regulate by divesting shipments of their interstate character and stripping them of the right to be sold

21 Central Christian Advocate, April 2, 1913.

22 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad, 242 U. S. 311, 1917.
in the original package, which otherwise would have obtained. The Wilson Act had been held constitutional, and this decision must follow precedent.

An interesting fact in connection with the case was that the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, relying upon the opinion of former Attorney General Wickersham as to the invalidity of the Webb-Kenyon Act, declined to defend it before the court. The government's case, therefore, was presented by Wayne B. Wheeler, the League's general counsel. Wheeler's defense of the constitutionality of the act, in two arguments before the Supreme Court of the United States, gave him a national reputation. This was the most important case in which he ever appeared. He was successful in defending the act even though he himself believed the law unconstitutional. He had opposed it in gatherings of the dry forces and had striven to replace it with another measure, which he believed would stand the test before the Supreme Court. 23

Many opponents of the legislation were deeply grieved over the court's decision. One writer pronounced it tyranny, "whether it comes from the hands of a monarch, the voice of a mob, or the vote of the majority." 24 The Anti-Saloon League, of course, rejoiced. Congressman Webb, speaking to the League's convention in 1917, said:

They called me a cornfield lawyer because I said it was constitutional, but I tell you... I felt absolutely safe for the destiny of that great measure in the hands of the great Supreme Court of this country and, thank God, my faith has not been disturbed... It/the decision and the law is the first and greatest blow that the liquor interests of the country ever received right between the eyes.

I believe the year 1917... so far as prohibition activities and victories are concerned, is the greatest year in the history of the world.25

* * *

No sooner had the Webb-Kenyon bill been put into operation than the Anti-Saloon League began to make preparations for the next step in national legislation. The American Issue came out editorially in favor of a movement for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of beverage intoxicants. The Headquarters Committee of the League, upon recommendation of the general superintendent, favorably passed upon the proposition for national prohibition as the next and final step. This action of the Headquarters Committee was submitted to the trustees of the national organization, who, by an overwhelming majority, endorsed the plan. Twenty years of League activity, therefore, from the time of the birth of the organization in 1893, closed with the Anti-Saloon League putting into operation the machinery for launching the campaign in behalf of a Constitutional Amendment providing for national prohibition. This campaign was formally launched

at the Twenty-Year Jubilee Convention of the League at Columbus, Ohio, November 10-13, 1913.

Nine states having an aggregate population of 11,600,000 had statewide prohibition this year. In the thirty-one other states with local option laws, 26,000,000 people were living under the no-license system. Three with a population of 3,700,000 had prohibition except in those sections where a majority vote had set it aside; two had prohibition for all territory outside cities and villages. Congress had abolished the saloon in military forts and on reservations, in the navy and soldiers' homes, and the national capitol building, and had shown its dry leanings to overcome the President's veto of the Webb-Kenyon act. A survey of Congress showed that a substantial majority came from dry constituencies. The League claimed that more than 50 per cent of the people and 71 per cent of the area of the United States were under prohibitory laws. It was felt that the time had come to drive the traffic to its last stand.26

The League had accomplished more in twenty years than the Prohibition party had in fifty. It had become probably the most active and effective political agency in the country and passing the Webb-Kenyon Act over President Taft's veto gave the final fillip to its long cherished plan for a nationwide campaign for national prohibition. The church in the form of the League was far abler in

---

26 Year Book of the Anti-Saloon League, 1913; E. P. Cherrington, Evolution of Prohibition, pp. 319-20.
politics than the saloon. The reason is relatively clear. It was the old story of a conflict between money and a moral principle. And whenever the issue between dollars and principles has been raised in this country, principles generally have won out in the long run.

The Jubilee Convention opened at Columbus' Memorial Hall during a pre-season blizzard. Winter may have been raging outside, but there was spring in the souls of the delegates to this historic gathering. Wheeler, at that time superintendent of the Ohio League, greeted the delegates:

We welcome you... to the launching of the most beneficient and far-reaching movement since the Civil War. As Moses said to the children of Israel that they should go forward, just so the time has come for the moral forces of this great nation to march on against the last bulwarks of the enemy. A great national evil has been localized and quarantined. Over two-thirds of the saloons of America are now in ten states. They are localized more today than slavery was when the last stage of the conflict was reached. The people are growing restless. Like the muttering of a great storm you can hear the determined demand from every quarter to attack the enemy all along the line for national constitutional prohibition. I do not know how you may feel about this, but I would die rather than run from such a conflict.27

It was a formidable gathering, with representatives from every state in the Union. Ministers, judges, social workers, scientists, senators, congressmen, governors, and the League's own leaders trained in pulpit and politics, all dedicating themselves to the final assault upon the bulwark of evil. They were conscious of the difficulties they had to face.

Victory demands idealism, plus an army declared League President Wilson. As Moses approached with

unsandaled feet that brush of flame and caught the word of
God, so come we to this hour and in its solemn hush we read
and recognize the divine hour for a new advance—prohibition
for all our land. . . . Members of the convention, we turn
our faces toward the future. The host slyly represent has
wrought well. Today the cry is forward.28

John C. Woolley reached the peak of eloquence in addressing the
convention on "The Call of an Epoch":

The meeting is the Constitutional Convention of the
Churches of America in national action against the crime
of crimes. . . . That business must go. Day and night
we will pursue it, locally and at large. We will crowd
it to the ropes. We will not break away in the clinches.
And when it lies dying among its bags of bloody gold and
looks up into our faces with its last gasp and whimpers
"Another million of revenue for just one breath of life,"
we will put the heel of open-eyed national honor on its
throat and say "NO." Down to Hell and say we sent three
thither!"29

In addition to the speakers mentioned, the gathering was
addressed by a galaxy of notables, including Governor Ben V. Hooper
of Tennessee, Judge Charles A. Pollock of North Dakota, W. V. Bennett,
mayor of Rockford, Illinois, largest dry city in wet territory in the
United States, Governor William T. Haines of Maine, Governor George H.
Hodges of Kansas, Senator D. C. McNally of Florida, Representative
Richmond P. Hobson of Alabama, William H. (Alfalfa Bill) Murray,
congressman-at-large of Oklahoma, and numerous Protestant and Catholic
Church leaders, in addition to officers of the UCTU.

Highlight of the convention was the resolution for a constitu-
tional amendment for prohibition which was introduced by former

28 Ibid., p. 18.

29 Proceedings of the Fifteenth Convention of the Anti-Saloon
League, 1913.
Governor J. Frank Hanly of Indiana on behalf of the board of trustees.

The resolution said:

We declare our settled conviction that license and
regulation are inadequate to exterminate the liquor
traffic. The license system, instead of eliminating
the evils of the traffic, has become its last and strong-
est fortress. . . . We therefore declare for its national
annihilation by an amendment to the Federal Constitution
which shall forever prohibit throughout the territory
of the United States the manufacture and sale, and the
importation, exportation and transportation of intoxi-
cating liquors to be used as a beverage. 30

Wayne B. Wheeler, recalling the drama that took place as the
resolution was placed before the convention, said "for a moment there
was silence, tense and deep. Then the convention cut loose. With a
roar as wild as the raging storm outside it jumped to its feet and
yelled approval. The first shot in the battle for the Eighteenth
Amendment had been fired." 31 After the demonstration had proceeded
for some minutes the convention sang "America." A prayer of thank-
giving and dedication was offered by the chairman, Bishop W. T.
Anderson of Cincinnati, following which the convention sang "Praise
God From Whom All Blessings Flow." 32

In contrast to the wild enthusiasm that swept through the dry
ranks with the approval of the prohibition resolution was the gloom

30 Ibid.

31 "The Inside Story of Prohibition's Adoption," New York Times,
March 29, 1926.

32 Proceedings of the Fifteenth National Convention of the
Anti-Saloon League, 1913.
and despair that settled over the liquor trade as it apparently realized its jig was up:

To us. . . the handwriting is on the wall and its interpretation spells doom. The liquor business is to blame. It seems incapable of learning any lesson of advancement or any motive but profit. To perpetuate itself it has formed alliances with slums. . . . It deliberately aids the most corrupt political powers. . . . There are billions of property involved. . . . but when the people decide that the truth is being told about the alcoholic liquor traffic the money value will not count. . . .33

A council of One Hundred, the name of which was afterwards changed to the National Temperance Council, representing the leading men and women in all the national temperance reform organizations of the United States, was organized in Columbus simultaneously with the holding of the epoch-making convention of the League. From that time forward, all the leading temperance bodies of the nation centered their efforts on the movement for national prohibition. The National Temperance Council began to play a very important part in the national prohibition fight by bringing the reform leaders into frequent conferences, by eliminating in some degree the old prejudices which had existed between the organizations, especially that between the League and the Prohibition party, and by emphasizing the important matters on which all the organizations represented in the body were practically agreed.34

33 National Liquor Dealers' Journal, September 10, 1913.

At the Columbus convention of the League, delegates had authorized the selection of a Committee of One Thousand Men to meet in Washington, march to the Capitol of the United States, and present to the members of both Houses of Congress the League's proposed resolution. The NCTU also organized a Committee of One Thousand Women for a similar purpose. When these committees met on Pennsylvania Avenue in the Nation's capitol, the Committee of One Thousand Men had been increased to a committee of more than two thousand, while the Committee of Women had increased beyond the thousand mark, so that as the two committees joined forces they comprised a human petition of more than three thousand American citizens, representing virtually every state in the Union, appealing to Congress to submit national prohibition to the legislatures of the several states. Wearing the white ribbon of temperance, the committee members, many grown gray and infirm in the long campaign, marched down Pennsylvania Avenue to the strains of "Onward, Christian Soldiers," jeered at by their enemies and cheered by their friends. At the steps of the Capitol they were met by Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas and Congressman Richard Pearson Hobson of Alabama to whom they entrusted their petition. Spokesmen for the League were Malcolm R. Patterson, former governor of Tennessee, and Ernest N. Cherrington.35

Later that same day, December 10, 1913, the resolution was introduced by Sheppard in the Senate. The Judiciary Committee, to

35Cherrington, Evolution, pp. 322-23; Degard, Pressure Politics, p. 151.
which it was referred, never reported it. In the House it fared better. Hoping for immediate consideration the drys thronged the Capitol on the day following the parade. Hobson, presenting the resolution to the House, warned his party that an accounting was at hand. "If the Democratic party can only live by joining the liquor interests to debauch the American People, then in God's name let it die." Congressman Bartholdt of St. Louis rose to suggest that the House move out of Washington to avoid pressure from the drys. Turning to the crowded galleries he shouted, "Never mind! You may intimidate village councils and members of state legislatures and even some congressmen, but you cannot cow or intimidate me." And, turning to his colleagues, "I predict that not one of you who vote for it will ever come back to tell the tale."36

The next day, December 12, in the League's offices, just across from the Capitol, the drys agreed on the following method of attack: (1) an intensive drive back in the states for new dry territory; (2) a fight for a dry congressman in every district where a reasonable chance of winning presented itself, and (3) a fight for more dry United States senators. To accomplish these ends a special headquarters committee had been created by the convention. The fight began at once.37 Congress was all but buried in an avalanche of communications from the people back home. The wires were hot with

---

36 Congressional Record, 63d Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 736-45.

messages. The local leagues spurred on the church folks, and it seemed that the flood of public opinion had broken an unsuspecting Congress. A partial list of endorsed petitions contained the names of 9,296 organizations with a total membership of 3,358,586.\(^{38}\)

The Judiciary Committee of the House reported Hobson's resolution without comment, May 9, 1911, and on December 22 it came up for debate. At 9:30 a.m. the doors of the gallery of the House were thrown open and in a few minutes every available seat was occupied and the corridors were filled with anxious adherents of either side. Promptly at 10 a.m. the gavel fell, calling the House to order for two hours' debate as to whether or not the rule granted by the committee would be accepted by the House. The two hours' debate was utilized more for the discussion of prohibition and anti-prohibition than as to whether the rule would prevail. It was adopted, however, almost unanimously by a voice vote. Then came eight hours' debate on the main issue—four hours allotted to each side. Congressman Hobson led for the prohibition forces and Congressman Mann (R., Chicago), and Congressman Underwood (R., Alabama), for the opposition. It was a spirited debate; at times persuasive, earnest, and eloquent, and again, rising to the fury of a tornado it swept the hall like a hurricane.

At noon when the vote had been taken up the rule and main debate was to begin, Congressman Bartholdt, who the League charged was a

\(^{38}\)Congressional Record, 63d Congress, 2nd Session, p. 8626.
mouthpiece for the Anheuser-Busch Brewery, with two or three of his colleagues, attempted to start a stampede by getting up and starting out of the hall, motioning and calling to others to follow. Some twelve or fifteen of his sympathizers did so.

But it was left to Mr. Vollmer of Davenport, Iowa [said Superintendent Baker] to descend to the lowest level of sacrilege that perhaps was ever heard or witnessed on the floor of Congress. In the midst of his speech against the resolution he lifted his hand and declared that he invoked against this resolution "the spirit of George Washington, the brewer; of Thomas Jefferson, the distiller; of Abraham Lincoln, the bartender, and of Jesus Christ, the wine maker." 39

On hand at the debate sat an old man in the rear seat of the hall with his crutch leaning against his shoulder, cane in hand, his long, white beard dropping to his waistline. He was former United States Senator Henry V. Blair of New Hampshire, who thirty-eight years before had presented in the Senate the first resolution for national prohibition, but which did not advance beyond the committee.

When the vote was about to be taken, Munn of Illinois proposed that ratification be by conventions in the states. The League spokesmen objected that this additional obstacle served no good purpose, offering the reason that the same people who chose the legislatures would choose the delegates. The amendment was defeated, as was a substitute offered by Morrison, which would have completely prohibited the interstate transportation of liquor. He commented on

39Proceedings of the Sixteenth National Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, 1915, pp. 33-34. See also Congressional Record, 63d Session, 1914, pp. 495-616 for complete details of debate.
an objection Pinwiddie had made that Congress already had power to
do this, saying that if this were so, "the duty rests upon the Anti-
Saloon League to write such a statute into the body of our Federal
laws." He added: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the Anti-
Saloon League controls the vote of a majority of the members of
Congress." Hobson proposed an amendment giving Congress or the states
power of enforcement "independently or concurrently," which was agreed
to, and the resolution thus amended came to a vote. The roll call
stood 197 in the affirmative and 189 in the negative. Lacking the
necessary two-thirds, the resolution failed.\footnote{\textsuperscript{10}}

An analysis of the vote in the House of Representatives showed
that the representatives from fifteen states voted solidly for the
resolution, that more than three-fourths of the members from each of
twenty-one states and a majority of the representatives from each of
twenty-seven states voted for submission, only seven states giving a
solid vote and only eighteen a majority vote against the resolution.\footnote{\textsuperscript{11}}

Having fired its first shot in the battle for the Eighteenth
Amendment, the League wasn't disappointed with the result. It didn't
expect the amendment would be submitted to the states when it was
first introduced in Congress and it was more than satisfied with the
majority vote. Leaders realized that a stiff fight still lay ahead
but they were confident of ultimate victory. As for the national

\footnote{\textsuperscript{10}}\textit{Ibid.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{11}}Cherrington, \textit{Evolution}, p. 325.
political complexion, conditions were ideal for the League. Woodrow Wilson had been swept into office by a huge electoral vote the preceding year and was well along with his legislative program. The Democrats were in power; the solid South was in the saddle and the solid South was dry. Elsewhere the nation was being dried up piece-meal—a city here, a county there, and over yonder an entire state. Except for the dripping sections of the East and the great industrial cities, wet citadels were falling almost daily.

League leaders were well aware that they could not afford to stand still. They had to step up their campaign with even greater vigor, especially that of fund-raising:

We must lay more money upon the altar of sacrifice. We must send forth more literature from our presses. We must put more men in the field. The enemy is fighting for its life. Its resistance, its opposition, shall be according to the full measure of its resources. It is possible to lose all the advantages we have gained in all the years through perversity or indifference. It is possible to see the golden gate of opportunity swing shut if there be hesitancy in answering the call of the hour.42

Through the churches of the country, which funnelled information into the state Leagues, the national League was kept in intimate contact with every section of the United States and with the battles being waged on all fronts. The first step in the renewed campaign was to have the people appeal to Congress.

We started out to let Congress hear from the people back home [Wheeler explained]. Word went out from Washington and state headquarters to send letters, telegrams and petitions to congressmen and senators in

42Luther B. Wilson, president, in 1914 Anti-Saloon League Yearbook, p. 45.
Washington. They rolled in by tens of thousands burying Congress like an avalanche. . . . From that December day in 1913 when Washington wired back to every state—"open fire on the enemy"—until the final vote of submission, the country kept up a drumfire on Washington. It was not manufactured sentiment. It was there. What we did was simply direct it where and in the manner in which it would do the most good.43

The League started off the year 1914 with about 20,000 speakers, mostly volunteers, all over the United States. They spoke at every opportunity and at every sort of gathering. As the intensity of the campaign increased, so did the number of speakers. During the final stages of the battle, there were approximately 50,000 trained speakers, volunteers and regulars, directing their fire upon the wets in every village, town, city, county and state—a vocal army storming the enemy trenches. Literature, too, played a big role. It was distributed to speakers and through them to the rank and file of the voters. The American Issue Printing Company in Westerville became the biggest prohibition printing establishment in the world. It was not uncommon for carloads of printed material to roll out of Westerville in one day for the front. Speakers, with their literature, went into every congressional district where there was a chance to elect a dry and waged as strong a fight as candidates had ever seen. In Washington, the bombardment continued on representatives and senators. Scores of members of Congress took their political lives in their hands during the struggle, as up to the time of submission

---

of the amendment there was strong feelings both ways and members did not know, in a great many of cases, what the folks back home really did want.

The League's Washington headquarters opened correspondence with every possible friend in Congress. Representatives of the League also went to see them personally. At the same time the Washington office got frequent information from the various states as to the way the fight was going there, and when such information was received, it would be placed before members of Congress who were wavering or who the League wanted to convert. Information obtained in correspondence and interviews was sent back to the states and field workers were kept advised of attitudes of every member of Congress and ways were suggested for local workers to win converts. While this was going on the League kept itself informed daily on what the wets were doing. It knew what their arguments would be every time they changed them. In fact, the League often knew in advance of their plans and strategy. Whenever the wets opened up against a dry congressman, the League in Washington would wire back to that member's state or district and tell the local drys to start a counterattack. Within twenty-four hours a storm of telegrams would break over that member's head and he would realize that a revolution had broken loose back home. Every member of Congress received scores of petitions asking the submission of the prohibition amendment. Local workers attended to that, too. Politically wise, the League didn't bother going into hopelessly wet districts or working on wet members of Congress. To
have done so, said Wheeler, would have enraged the Congressmen. "We always distinguished between a good chance for a fight and a fight for a good chance," he explained.\textsuperscript{14}

The 1914 election passed and the League counted heads. Many seats were gained for the drys, but League leaders still feared they lacked the necessary two-thirds in each House. Yet, the League triumphed even beyond its fondest hopes, for it did not expect to have the prohibition amendment submitted by the Congress elected in 1914. When that Congress—the Sixty-Fourth—convened in Washington in December, 1915, a joint resolution calling for the submission of a prohibitory amendment was introduced in both Houses. Public sentiment and the strategy of the day, however, dictated holding off so far as rushing Congress was concerned. On December 14, 1916, the House Judiciary Committee by a vote of twelve to seven favorably reported the resolution which was placed on the House calendar. On December 21, 1916, the Judiciary Committee of the Senate by a vote of thirteen to three favorably reported the resolution which put on the calendar. But neither resolution came to a vote and both died with the adjournment of the Sixty-Fourth Congress.\textsuperscript{15} The League reasoned that had it pressed in 1915 or 1916 for submission of the amendment and had failed, it might have delayed its passage for many years.

\textsuperscript{14}New York Times, March 29, 1926.

\textsuperscript{15}Cherrington, Evolution, p. 328.
Back in the field League workers got busy again. All of the energy put into the 1914 campaign boiled and bubbled with hotter fire in the campaign of 1916.

We laid down such a barrage as the candidates had never seen before [heeler recalled]. We didn't try to convert the presidential candidates [both of whom sidestepped the prohibition issue] but we concentrated on Congress... On election night the lights burned late in our Washington office. Elsewhere our state workers were getting the returns... We knew late election night that we had won. Many hours before the country knew whether Hughes or Wilson had triumphed, the dry workers throughout the nation were celebrating our victory. We knew that the Prohibition Amendment would be submitted to the states by the Congress just elected.6

---

CHAPTER IX

ENACTMENT OF THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT

The League had staked its hopes on the election of 1916. All that remained now was for the dry forces to help the lawmakers shape the necessary legislation and supervise its enactment. In accomplishing this objective, the Anti-Saloon League demonstrated itself as being one of the most effective pressure groups that had ever exerted its influence on Congress.

National Superintendent Purley A. Baker had charge of the fight for the Anti-Saloon League in putting over the Eighteenth Amendment. Bishop James Cannon, Dr. A. J. Barton, and E. H. Cherrington, with the help of some of the ablest men in American political life, planned the campaign. Edwin C. Hinwiddle, serving as legislative superintendent during much of the period, dealt directly with members of Congress. The state superintendents had charge of the ratification campaigns in their respective states. A very important role, however, in the over-all operation fell to a wiry little man with tremendous capacity and terrific zeal. This human dynamo, as he was often called, was Wayne Bidwell Wheeler.

Born at Brookfield, Trumbull County, Ohio, November 10, 1869, Wheeler was educated in the public schools, Oberlin College, and the Law School of Western Reserve University. While at Oberlin he became
Interested in the temperance movement, to which he thereafter devoted his life. He entered organized temperance work as the result of an offer made by Dr. Russell who was seeking an assistant for pioneer organization work in the Ohio League. The League founder had asked several Oberlin professors to recommend a suitable candidate for the position; and, as Russell later wrote, "Every teacher consulted replied 'Wayne D. Wheeler.'" Russell found Wheeler in the janitor's quarters of one of the student halls, for, as a poor boy, he had partly earned his way for nearly six years of college by taking care of the building. He also sold books and other articles, and taught in rural schools, with the result that, although he entered college almost penniless, he left it with a bank account.

Wheeler decided to accept Dr. Russell's offer, and he entered the service of the Ohio Anti-Saloon League as field secretary in May, 1891. From that day until his death, September 5, 1927, he remained on the staff of the League, rising gradually to leadership in the state organization and subsequently to general counsel and legislative superintendent of the national body. In 1896 he was appointed district superintendent of the Ohio League, and two years later he was made attorney, remaining in that position until 1903, when he became state superintendent. His ability in local option fights and in the successful management of the Ohio League soon attracted the attention of the national League, and in 1916 he was appointed general

---

1Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem, pp. 2832-35.
counsel for the Anti-Saloon League of America. In 1919 he also became legislative superintendent of the League, holding these two positions until his death.

In his work in Ohio Wheeler learned the game of politics. We already have noted, for example, how he managed the League's fight against the reelection of Governor Myron T. Herrick in Ohio. While muckraking in Ohio, Lincoln Steffens recalled that in every little community there was a solid little anti-saloon vote for local option, which the politicians, especially the "bad actors" among them, respected. When I asked why, the answer was that there was a fellow in Columbus, named Wayne or Wheeler, or was it Wayne Something Something Wheeler, who ran the politics of this movement, and--"say, he knows the game."

Steffens called on Wheeler in his small upstairs office in Columbus.

"How do you do it?" Steffens said he asked Wheeler.

He bent forward, fiery will in his keen eyes, and he hissed his shrewd, mad answer: I do it the way the bosses do it, with minorities. There are some anti-saloon voters in every community. I and other speakers increase the number and passion of them. I list and blend them to vote as I bid. I say, we'll all vote against the men in office who won't support our bills. We'll vote for candidates who promise to. They'll break their promise. Sure. Next time we'll break them. And we can. We did. Our swinging, solid minorities, no matter how small, counted. The politicians came to us, volunteered promises, which, by and by, were kept. We are teaching these crooks that breaking promises to us is sure of punishment than going back on their bosses, and some day they will learn that all over the United States—and we'll have national prohibition."

Wheeler made a thorough study of the legal aspects of prohibition legislation and of law enforcement, which became of great importance as dry victories increased. He led the fight to secure a county local option law in Ohio, and, after that law was passed (1908), took part in campaigns in all parts of the state, which resulted in fifty-eight of the eighty-eight counties going dry in the next two years. He also assisted in prohibition campaigns in many other states. Arguing many cases before the courts of Ohio, he had the unparalleled record of being concerned in more than two thousand cases regarding temperance in the state, besides having drafted hundreds of municipal ordinances. He was compelled to follow a large number of cases through all the courts of Ohio, from the lowest to the highest, and he argued several important cases before the United States Supreme Court. He came to be known in Ohio as the "Man whom the brewers fear." One of the "wettest papers in one of the wettest cities of Ohio" once wrote of him:

> Even Wayne B. Wheeler’s enemies admit his ability; indefatigable and shrewd, he works with the zeal of a Savonarola and the craft of a Machiavelli. Under his direction the temperance movement has received greater legislative recognition than ever before. There are certain enthusiastic opponents that liken Wheeler to his satanic majesty, but even they must give him his due, which is the tribute to a man who never loses his urbanity and his sense of direction as to his goal.  

Wheeler’s active opposition to any public official who said a kind word for the liquor traffic and his willingness to endorse a

---

3Quoted in Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem, p. 2833.
personal wet who was politically dry brought him into frequent collision with his own group throughout his career and lent force to the attacks made upon him by the foes of prohibition. Only Superintendent Baker's and Wheeler's mutual devotion to their work and respect for each other prevented a serious breach in the councils of the drys. Dr. Baker complained that, when he was fighting the Senator Foraker group or the George Cox crowd in Ohio, Wheeler was personally cultivating some of the men he himself assailed. Wheeler justified this by the plea that the time might come when they would need a friend in one of these hostile camps. This phase of the Wheeler temperament marked much of his national activity. He rarely indulged in a personal attack against an influential wet. By refraining from general attack, he won over to the dry camp, not by argument or by conversion to the theory of prohibition, but by demonstration of the expediency of political dryness, many upon whom the wet forces had counted.

Superintendent Baker was tempted to remove Wheeler from League councils when Wheeler was about to leave the Ohio superintendency to devote all of his time to the post of national attorney. He had been combining the two offices, according to Baker, to the disadvantage of both. After he had resigned the Ohio office, Wheeler and Baker

---

1 Steuart, Wayne Wheeler, Dry Boss, p. 63. In the absence of any Wheeler papers, Steuart, publicity secretary to Wheeler, provides the most extensive source material concerning Wheeler. Steuart wrote his account shortly after Wheeler’s death.

2 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
disagreed once more over political questions, and Baker threatened to have Wheeler's election in 1916 as national attorney cancelled, thus leaving Wheeler outside the League organization. Then, as so often later, Wheeler's value to the League was so great his recalcitrancy was overlooked and he and Baker buried the hatchet.  

Consequently, Wheeler moved into the national scene at an opportune time. He became a member of the League team directing the final push for prohibition. This drive was aided immensely by the Great War sweeping over Europe and threatening to draw much of the civilized world, including the United States, into the struggle. The war did three things for prohibition. It centralized authority in Washington; it stressed the importance of saving food; and it banned most things German. The first of these three changes was inevitable. The war brushed aside the restraints normally imposed on Congress. In rapid succession laws were adopted authorizing the government to do things which it had never done when the nation was at peace: seize railways, requisition factories, take over mines, fix prices, put an embargo on all exports, commandeer ships, standardize all loaves of bread, punish those careless in the use of fuel, draft men for the military service, and send the army to a war in France. With such drastic legislation as a pattern, the proposal for one more drastic law seemed commonplace. For any suddenness, any

---

6 Ibid., p. 66.

7 Charles Merz, The Dry Decade, p. 25.
boldness, and any severity involved in the adoption of a national prohibition law, a dozen persuasive precedents had been set before the war was three months old.

In the second place, it was clear from the start that food was an important factor in the war and that great quantities of food could be saved if an end were put to brewing and distilling. This point was promptly emphasized by the friends of prohibition. It was echoed by many men in public life who were not identified with the prohibition movement and never had been, but who recognized that prohibition could be made an effective means of saving grain. These persons included such prominent national figures as Herbert Hoover and Theodore Roosevelt.

Finally, as the third of the three chief contributions made by the war to the cause of prohibition, there was the obvious opportunity it afforded the drys in Congress and outside of Congress to point out the close association between the brewers' trade and many men with German sympathies. Time and again, throughout the whole controversy over the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, the brewers were denounced not only as enemies of temperance but as enemies of peace.

The liquor traffic aids those forces in our country whose loyalty is called into question at this hour. The liquor traffic is the strong financial supporter of the German-American Alliance. The purpose of this Alliance is to secure German solidarity for the promotion of German ideals and German Kultur and oppose any restriction or prohibition of the liquor traffic. Its
leaders urge its members to vote only for those who stand for Germanism and oppose prohibition.6

Wheeler had preached prohibition as the best form of preparedness before America entered the war. After our entry, he was actively engaged in supporting the various measures to conserve foodstuffs by limiting their use for the manufacture of intoxicants, by promoting wartime prohibition as well as the Eighteenth Amendment and the act to enforce it. His greatest interest, however, was the activities of the brewers which were made by subcommittees of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate, and in the investigation of the German-American Alliance.

One hundred and one indictments, of which one hundred were against seventy-two brewers or breweries in Pennsylvania, and one against the United States Brewers' Association, had been returned on March 4, 1916, by the federal grand jury at Pittsburgh, which had been investigating the political activity of the brewers. In the preceding January, seven Texas breweries had pleaded guilty to improper use of money in politics, and had paid $281,000 in fines plus the court costs and had accepted injunctions against any future political contributions. Some of the activities of the United States Brewers' Association were brought out in the hearing in the Texas cases. When the Pittsburgh cases came to trial, witnesses for the brewers asserted that their records were burned monthly. Through the cooperation of the Department of Justice, the New York offices of the

Association was searched, and the confidential files seized and turned over to the grand jury. To prevent these becoming public, pleas of guilty were entered by the defendants, who paid fines approximating $100,000. The files, however, were held in the custody of the United States District Attorney, on the ground that they might be needed as evidence. Wheeler had information concerning the contents of these files. He was unable, however, to find any method whereby he could have them made public.9

The war gave him the desired opportunity to reach the German-American Alliance, which had been opposing prohibition, and, he hoped, ultimately the United States Brewers' Association. A Gustave Ohlinger of Toledo gave him much material concerning the Alliance. The fact that this organization, which had always experienced difficulty financing itself, suddenly achieved a sound financial basis, made Ohlinger suspicious. He wrote Wheeler, with whom he had been in correspondence for some time:

It is a fair inference, in view of the fact that the source of these donations was officially declared to be confidential, and from the further fact that the Alliance devoted itself with rabid violence to attacking prohibition and to attacking policies of the government, and to supporting the German government, that these contributions came either from the representatives of the German government or from the liquor interests of this country.10

This looked like a key to the files of the United States Brewers' Association. Wheeler had already been instrumental in securing the

9Stewart, op. cit., p. 117.
10Ibid.
introduction, through Senator William H. King of Utah, of a bill to
repeal the charter of the Alliance. He passed Ohlinger's news on to
King, and a meeting of the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary to which the bill had been referred, was called on
February 23, 1918. Ohlinger appeared before the Committee and made
a lengthy statement, which was the opening of sensational revelations
concerning German activities in America. 11

Wheeler wrote Superintendent Baker, February 25, the following
letter:

The evidence against the German-American Alliance
started Saturday. Ohlinger is making good with a venge-
ance. The papers are giving the report front page space.
We could not have secured for $25,000 the publicity
against the German Alliance which we got through the
Sunday papers. The committee insists on Mr. Ohlinger
continuing his testimony. Will write more about it as
it proceeds. 12

He reported three days later on the success of his bombshell,
in a second letter to Baker, in which he said:

You have doubtless seen the way the newspapers have
taken up the German-American Alliance. They are giving
it almost as much attention as the Act of Congress
itself. We could not have bought for $50,000 what we
have gotten on this investigation thus far, and it will
continue.

We are not willing to be known at present that we
started the investigation. I think I told you that even
after I got Senator King to secure the appointment of a
subcommittee, they put the responsibility on me personally


12Steuart, op. cit., p. 118.
to get witnesses. I had Mr. Ohlinger come at my expense, and before he had testified twenty minutes the committee was on fire. They are now glad to accept the responsibility of the whole investigation.\textsuperscript{13}

He later wrote a report on this first investigation in which he declared:

It is a conservative statement to say that we have secured more than a million dollars' worth of free advertising against the liquor traffic, through the investigation and the material which we have secured and have used. There is not a week passes now but what some magazine or paper has in it a special article relating to the Alliance. It is astounding to find out how much corroborative evidence there is to prove that the Pan-German American Alliance has worked throughout the world for a world-wide domination, using State and National organizations like the German Alliance to accomplish its purpose.\textsuperscript{14}

Wheeler speeded up both popular and Congressional sentiment when he obtained the influence of Theodore Roosevelt in this fight against the German-American Alliance. He kept Roosevelt supplied with proofs of the testimony offered in the investigation. As a consequence of the investigation, the German-American Alliance, on April 11, voted to disband, its charter was revoked, and an active, organized opposition to prohibition was silenced. The files of the United States Brewers' Association, however, were still sealed. Wheeler wrote to A. Mitchell Palmer, custodian of Allen Property, in the hope of inspiring an investigation which would make this data available. Palmer did not take any official action, but on September 11, 1918, in

\textsuperscript{13}Steuart, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 119.
an address delivered at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, he made an attack on the United States Brewers’ Association in which he charged it with subsidizing the press, dominating politics, being unpatriotic, and preventing youth of German descent from becoming Americanized. The press generally carried sensational reports of the address.15

Wheeler saw his opportunity now and prepared a resolution for investigation of the Brewers’ Association, quoting the Palmer statement as authority, and had it introduced in Congress by Senator Wesley Jones of Washington. The resolution passed, and a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee was named to conduct the investigation. The revelations were startling. The wave of popular resentment against the corruption of officials, the purchase of votes, the subsidizing of newspapers, the boycott of dry business men, and the long list of lawless activities of the brewers shown by their statements in this investigation were utilized to speed up ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment. In virtually all his public addresses, as well as in such conferences as he held in the various states, Wheeler used this expose as a text. Bone-dry laws, stringent enforcement measures, and other prohibition legislation were obtained with ease.16

* * * *

When President Wilson called the new Congress in extra session, soon after his inauguration in March 1917, for the purpose of declaring

15 New York Times, September 15, 1918.

16 Steuart, op. cit., pp. 121-23. See League pamphlet, The National German-American Alliance and Its Allies, Pro-German Brewers and Liquor Dealers, A Disloyal Combination.
that a state of war with Germany existed, the prohibition leaders were equally prepared for the passage of a resolution presenting their declaration of war, the Eighteenth Amendment, to the states for ratification. Although the dry forces had in both branches of Congress the majority necessary for the submission of the amendment, President Wilson requested that they delay action until the war program had been adopted. The conference of dry leaders, of which Wheeler was a part, promptly agreed to this request of the President.

The real battle of the special session, so far as the League was concerned, came over the Lever food control bill. Without consulting the White House, dry members of the House—Wheeler said they were all Democrats—amended the bill to prohibit the use of grain and other foodstuffs in the manufacture of beverage alcohol. In this form the measure passed the House on June 23, 1917. Immediately there was great excitement, and the frightened brewers abandoned the distillers and set out to save themselves. A group of wet senators headed by Penrose of Pennsylvania announced that they would filibuster against the entire bill unless it was modified to permit the manufacture of beer and wines.

The legislative committee of the League, composed of Bishop James Cannon, Jr., Dr. A. J. Borton, Ernest H. Cherrington, Superintendent Baker, E. C. Dinwiddie, and Wheeler, was summoned to the


18 Herbert Asbury, The Great Illusion, p. 130.
office of Senator Thomas S. Martin of Virginia, the Democratic floor leader. Martin was dry. He owed his election directly to men prominent in the League. Especially was he indebted to Bishop Cannon and Dr. Cherrington. Cherrington had taken over a Virginia daily newspaper, which he edited for a long time in the interest of Martin's candidacy. Martin was a close friend of Woodrow Wilson. All these factors, his prohibition conviction, his friendship with League men and the President, and his position as floor leader of the Senate, made him the inevitable link between the White House and the Bliss Building, Washington headquarters of the League. 19

When members of the legislative committee reached Martin's office, they were informed by him that Wilson insisted that the prohibitory clauses should be stricken out of the food control bill, since their inclusion would make its passage impossible. He formally laid before the committee the situation as the President had outlined it to him, and in Wilson's name asked the League to permit the passage of the bill without the dry amendments. Members of the committee suggested that an appeal be made to the patriotism of Senator Penrose and his associates. Senator Martin replied that such an appeal, when liquor was at stake, would be hopeless. 20 Thereupon officials of the League said that perhaps they would consent to modification of the bill if President Wilson would make a formal

19 Steuwart, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

request in writing. The President at first shied from doing this. He finally consented, and wrote a letter to the League legislative committee. A carbon copy was sent to Senator Martin. This letter was not satisfactory to the League, and Martin requested the President to write a letter setting forth more specifically his request and reasons for it. The second letter follows, addressed to Bishop Cannon:

June 29, 1917

My dear Mr. Cannon:

I am very glad to respond to the request of Senator Martin, the Democratic floor leader in the Senate, and I give to your Legislative Committee an expression of my opinion with regard to the wisest and most patriotic policy to be pursued toward the food administration legislation now pending in Congress.

I regard the immediate passage of the bill as of vital consequence to the safety and defense of the nation. Time is of the essence, and yet it has become evident that heated and protracted debate will delay the passage of the bill indefinitely if the provisions affecting the manufacture of beer and wine are insisted upon.

In these circumstances I have not hesitated to say to members of the Senate who have been kind enough to consult me that it would undoubtedly be in the public interest in this very critical matter if the friends of these provisions should consent to their elimination from the present measure. Feeling that your committee is actuated by the same patriotic motives which inspire me, I am confident that these considerations will seem to you as they seem to me, to be imperative.

With much respect, sincerely yours,

Woodrow Wilson
To this letter the committee of the League replied:

June 30, 1917

To the President,
The White House, Washington, D.C.

Sir:

We have earnestly considered the statement in your letter of yesterday to the legislative committee of the Anti-Saloon League of America, that in the face of the present food crisis you are greatly concerned lest the passage of the food administration legislation now pending in Congress be jeopardized by a heated and protracted debate upon certain sections of the bill relating to the manufacture of foodstuffs into intoxicating liquors.

We are aware of the threats made by the friends of beer and wine in the Senate, of an indefinite and protracted filibuster against these provisions of the bill. We beg to advise you that as patriotic Americans, determined to uphold you as commander-in-chief of the army and navy in the present war, we will not, for our constituency, offer any obstruction to the prompt passage of the Food Control Bill.

Of course we cannot presume to indicate to members of Congress what action they should take in view of this request from the President of the United States. They will doubtless act in accordance with their convictions of duty.

We are glad that your request applies only to the pending food administration legislation. It will be our purpose to urge the passage of the legislation prohibiting the waste of foodstuffs in the manufacture of beer and wines at the earliest possible date, either in the form of a separate bill or in connection with other war legislation.

We assure you of our purpose as patriotic American citizens, to cooperate in every possible way in the winning of the great war in which our nation is engaged. 21

Sincerely and respectfully yours,

P. G. Baker,
General Superintendent
Ralph C. Pimlottie
Legislative Superintendent
James Cannon, Jr.
Arthur Barton,
Wayne B. Heeber,
Legislative Committee

---

While the League did not "presume to indicate what attitude members of Congress should take," its declaration was sufficient so that the food control bill, minus the beer and wine provision, was enacted August 10. In conference the bill was amended so that the manufacture of foodstuffs into distilled spirits was prohibited and the President was given authority to extend the restriction of beer and wine when he should deem it necessary. 22

The League, anxious for the President to exercise this discretionary authority, wrote to Mr. Wilson on April 1, 1918, reminding him of the exchange of letters between him and the League the previous June in which the League agreed not to hamper the passage of the food control bill. Members of the League's legislative committee expressed their concern over the waste of foodstuffs in the manufacture of beer and wine and explained that "the events of the past few months have, in our judgment, thoroughly convinced the vast majority of the citizens of our country that such tremendous waste of foodstuffs, fuel and manpower consequent upon the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, is so great an evil that both the manufacture and sale should be promptly prohibited." In view of these facts, the committee said it was convinced it was its duty to ask you to use the authority vested in you to prevent the further waste of food material by prohibiting the manufacture of such material into intoxicating liquors, and to ask Congress to pass speedily such legislation as will

---

absolutely prohibit the sale of all kinds of intoxicants for beverage purposes during the period of the war and demobilization thereafter. . . . 23

When no reply was received from the President, the committee called at the White House where they discussed these legislative questions with President Wilson—without arriving at any conclusion, however. Without awaiting presidential approval, wartime prohibition bills were thereupon drafted by Sheeler and, after their approval by the committee, were suggested to various members of Congress. Resolutions submitting to the states the national prohibition amendment to the Constitution were also introduced early in the first session of the Sixty-Fifth Congress. 24 Both distillers and brewers made overtures to the League during the period when the Eighteenth Amendment was pending before Congress, looking to the postponement of its enforcement until such time as the liquor interests could close up their business. The wets knew they could not hope to prevent the passage of the submission resolution; they hoped that the task of getting it through would absorb the attention of the dry leaders and take their minds off wartime prohibition, which was the immediate danger. They reasoned that even after the amendment had passed Congress, ratification would require majorities in both Houses of thirty-six state legislatures, while it could be


blocked by a majority in either house of only thirteen states. The wets were confident they could hold thirteen states till doomsday. They seemed to have ignored completely the plain fact that the Anti-Saloon League had been manipulating state legislatures for about ten years, and that the drys had brought most of them into the fold before they went after Congress. The lack of unanimity, too, on the part of the wets, and the divisions between the producers of spirits and the beer and wine people played into the hands of the prohibition workers. It was largely due to this division of wet ranks that the course of prohibition in the states and nation was so smooth.

When the submission resolutions were introduced in the Senate, the familiar objection was raised that it would keep the liquor question in politics for fifty years. Wheeler, who was in his customary place in the Senate gallery, was sent for by his friend, Senator Harding of Ohio. Harding suggested that some limitation should be put upon the time allowed for ratification by the states. Wheeler doubted the constitutionality of any proviso that would limit the rights of the state to act upon a constitutional amendment proposed by Congress. He was more sanguine concerning the possibilities of speedy ratification than Harding, who suggested that a five-year limit would be fair to both sides. Harding did not believe that the amendment would be ratified within any such period. Wheeler, himself, as later admitted, had his own doubts on the question.25

25 Steuart, op. cit., p. 111.
The only serious question in Wheeler's mind, aside from the constitutional problems involved, was a very practical one. It was important that as many states as possible be given the opportunity to consider the proposed amendment at two sessions of the legislature. A six-year limitation rather than a five, would afford a greater range of action. Wheeler agreed to the Harding proposal with the distinct understanding that some other member of the Senate would be secured to amend the Harding proposal so that the limit would be six years instead of five, an understanding to which Harding gave consent, with the promise that he would not oppose such an amendment. By this agreement, Wheeler obtained Harding's promise of support and also the assurance that Harding would bring with him a number of other senators who were willing to vote for the reference of the amendment with such a limitation. The Senate adopted the resolution with the six-year limit, which the House later extended to seven years. When the amendment was adopted within less than thirteen months from the time of its submission, Wheeler took great pleasure in teasing Harding in their frequent correspondence on his failure to properly estimate the popular reaction against the liquor traffic.26

Similar tactics were used by Wheeler to reach other senators who were either not very favorable to the principle of prohibition or else questioned its political expediency. Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin was won over by Wheeler through the argument that this was

26Ibid., p. 112.
In fullest harmony with the senator's own theories of popular government, since it merely gave to the people of the states, through their legislatures, the opportunity to express themselves either for or against the proposed constitutional amendment. The defeat of some of the outstanding wetts in the preceding election had given to many members of Congress their first realization of the national influence of the League and the related prohibition groups, so that when the amendment came before the Senate on August 1, it was adopted, with little debate, by a majority of 65 to 20.27

The task of passing the amendment through the lower branch of Congress was more difficult. Congress reassembled December 3. Within a week the prohibition amendment was reported and December 17 set for the debate. Meanwhile, the League's eighteenth convention met in Washington. Victory was close at hand; four states had adopted prohibition within the year, bringing the total to twenty-seven. This was no time to ground arms.

You have got to marshal, within the lower house of Congress within the next few days, 290 out of 435 votes if all are present and voting [warned a speaker who called himself a "lobbyist for Jesus Christ"]. My appeal to you is that you strengthen the hands of your committee in this city, that you fortify your Third House.

One League official boasted that he had seen to the sending of nine hundred telegrams in one day to Congressmen during the previous session. Wheeler insisted that the amendment must be passed in that

---

session of Congress. His reasoning is interesting:

We have got to win it now because when 1920 comes and reapportionment is here, forty new wet Congressmen will come from the great wet centers with their rapidly increasing population.

So much was the Anti-Saloon League concerned with the will of the majority.  

As the time for consideration of the resolution in the House approached, the wets lamented the fact that a secret ballot could not be taken.

Every Congressman knows [said the Washington Times] that if the ballot on the constitutional amendment were a secret ballot, making it impossible for the Anti-Saloon League bosses to punish disobedience, the amendment would not pass.  

When the resolution came up the dry leaders checked on their lists a sufficient number of votes to meet the constitutional requirement. There was a demand that some time be allowed the liquor interests to adjust their affairs, before the amendment took effect.

There was no good answer to this argument so we traded jackknives with them [said Wheeler]. We agreed that we would add a year's time after ratification before the amendment should become effective if, on the other hand, they would add a year's time to the six years voted by the Senate as the time for ratification. That gave seven years for ratification and one year for the amendment to take effect.  

---


29 December 14, 1917.

These changes were made and the enforcement section altered. Wheeler by personal call, by letter and by telephone, worked until the actual vote was cast, making sure that men pledged to the resolution should be present, and seeking to win over at the last moment, the wavering or the fearful. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 282 to 128—a majority well over the necessary two-thirds. The following day, December 18, the Senate concurred in the House amendment, 47 ayes to 8 nays.\(^{31}\) The proposed amendment was thereupon offered to the states in the following form:

Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission thereof to the States by the Congress.

It is one of the anomalies of the story of prohibition, says Charles Merz, that those sections of the country which were ultimately to show themselves most bitterly opposed to this action paid least attention to it at the time that it was made.\(^{32}\) It was a moment of triumph for the drys. The wets seemed scarcely to have observed their own defeat. It is difficult to find any trace of organized protest

\(^{31}\) *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 2d Session, 1917, pp. 422–70, 478.

\(^{32}\) *The Dry Decade*, p. 36.
against the Eighteenth Amendment either during 1917, when Congress
was debating it, or for some time thereafter. The obvious explanation
of this lack of interest during 1917 and 1918 lies in the fact that
during these two years a still larger story absorbed the interest of
the nation. The war not only shifted the attention of the American
public away from prohibition. The intensity of public interest in the
war permitted those Americans who were opposed to action on this
question to believe in some vague way that the whole agitation for
prohibition, like the war itself, was something transient, incidental
to an emergency, and in due time bound to disappear. It was the
mistaken notion of the opponents of prohibition that thirteen hostile
states could hold out comfortably for seven years.

In the first place, these individuals overlooked the fact that
the battle was now to be fought in the state capitals and that it was
precisely in the state capitals that the Anti-Saloon League and its
allied organizations had been functioning most effectively. The
League understood the methods of state legislatures. It knew how to
swing pivotal votes when they were needed. Wheeler described how this
was done in several cases during the fight over ratification. The
opponents of the law, meantime, had no such effective organization.
In fact, they were not organized at all. The only organized opposi-
tion to ratification came from the brewers and distillers. The
brewers were under fire as pro-German. The distillers had been

\[33\] New York Times, April 1, 1926.
outlawed for the duration of the war. Ordinary people who were neither brewers nor distillers, but who were opposed to prohibition on principle or as a matter of personal taste, had no organization to represent them at the state capitals, no lobby and no leaders. In the second place, it soon became apparent that the war would play a positive part and not merely a negative part in the ratification of the Amendment. For while the war overshadowed the Amendment and kept it from becoming the burning issue which it otherwise might have been, the war also served effectively to identify patriotism with the cause of prohibition.

Under the Food Control Law adopted in August, 1917, the distillers were already closed. Now, in September, 1918, the government decided to close the breweries as well as the distilleries, partly because of a drought which had damaged crops and partly because of a labor shortage and the necessity of drafting more men for the army.3

Finally, in this same month—September, 1918—Congress gave its approval to a plan for "war-time" prohibition on a national scale. Ironically enough, the bill carrying this provision did not become a law until fourteen days after the war was over and did not actually take effect until the seventh month of peace. Nevertheless, the approval of the proposal by Congress precisely at the time when the state legislatures were acting on the Eighteenth Amendment once more linked the cause of prohibition with the war.

It was on January 8, 1918, that Mississippi became the first state to ratify the Amendment. During the same month Virginia, Kentucky, South Carolina, and North Dakota added their vote to Mississippi's. Eight more states took favorable action before the end of spring. Two states voted favorably in the fall; and twenty states suddenly added their approval in the first fifteen days of January, 1919. This brought the total to thirty-five. At 10:32 on the following morning—January 16, 1919—the Nebraska legislature voted for ratification by the comfortable majority of 31 to 1, and three quarters of the states had fallen into line.

The result was never in doubt. Only in New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois was the vote at all close. In six states—Kansas, Utah, Wyoming, South Dakota, Idaho and Washington—it was unanimous in both houses. More than eighty per cent of the members of the forty-six state legislatures that eventually approved the Amendment were recorded in favor of it. And it is not unreasonable to assume that public opinion was pretty generally favorable, too. The process of ratification was complete. According to the provisions of the Amendment, on January 16, 1920, one year after ratification by the thirty-sixth state, national prohibition became a part of the fundamental law of the land.

For the friends of prohibition there remained only the task of consolidating their gains by the enactment of a law for the enforcement of the new Amendment so speedily written into the Constitution.
It was a task which found them well prepared. On the same day that Nebraska became the thirty-sixth state to ratify the Amendment, the Anti-Saloon League announced that it had already completed plans for an enforcement measure.\(^{35}\) This measure was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Volstead of Minnesota on May 27, 1919, carrying provisions for the enforcement of both war-time prohibition, which became operative on July 1, at the beginning of the seventh month of peace, and of constitutional prohibition, as established by the Eighteenth Amendment.

The Volstead Act might more accurately have been called the "Wheeler Act," for the general counsel of the League was largely responsible for it. Early in 1918 Wheeler began gathering material for the enforcement legislation. He had some time before compiled and published The Federal and State Laws Relating to the Liquor Traffic, which, incidentally, was the only book of which he was the author. This had gone into two editions at the time. From this wealth of material, he began to assemble what he termed "the majority experience of the states."\(^{36}\)

He outlined to the League's executive committee his ideas for the needed law, and at his suggestion a committee was appointed by the League to aid him in his task of preparing an enforcement code for use by whatever members of Congress might be selected eventually

\(^{35}\) New York Times, January 17, 1919.

\(^{36}\) Steuart, op. cit., p. 143.
to introduce the measure. The committee was composed of Wheeler; George W. Crabbe, superintendent of the Maryland League; Frank R. Ebbert, attorney for the Illinois League; R. C. Minton, attorney for the Indiana League; Superintendent James A. White of the Ohio League; Judge Charles A. Pollock of Fargo, North Dakota, and A. E. Blair of Ohio.37

At a later meeting of the executive committee in May, 1919, Wheeler explained that the committee charged with the preparation of the enforcement measure believed it was desirable to have the war prohibition and the permanent prohibition codes combined in one bill. He said it would make the drafting of it more difficult but would facilitate the passage of the measure. He went on to explain that it was amazing to find how many "of our friends in and out of Congress do not know what laws are needed or the precedents and reasons for them."38

When Legislative Superintendent Dinwiddie of the League appeared before the House Committee on the Judiciary to make a brief statement in behalf of the bill. Congressman Leonidas C. Dyer of Missouri inquired concerning the authorship of the measure. Dinwiddie's reply was:

I would not say that this was prepared by us. I think probably the basis of the bills—even the one introduced

37 Stewart, op. cit., p. 148.

38 Ibid., p. 149.
by the chairman—was prepared after much collaboration with our people all over the country. 39

Dyer pressed his point, saying:

I understood from the chairman, if I am not mistaken—and if I am I hope he will correct me—that you are the representative of the Anti-Saloon League who prepared and submitted to him for introduction in the House some bill. 40

Chairman Volstead promptly interjected: "No, this is not the one, but it practically carries out the same ideas. Most of it has been redrawn so as to be now somewhat different, although the general character of it is the same." 41

An amusing comment on the conflicting claims of authorship may be found in the discussion which followed, when Congressman Dyer inquired whether Mr. Volstead had submitted the bill to various departments of government, including the Internal Revenue Bureau. Volstead replied that this last bureau had not been heard from.

Dinwiddie, however, was able to testify that "we have had a number of conferences at the Internal Revenue Bureau" on various matters in the bill, and added: "we are to have further conferences with them with a view to perfecting such protection beyond what is already in the bill." 42

39 Ibid., p. 149.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
Wheeler frequently asserted that he took the suggestions offered by the League’s special committee, combined them with his own rough draft, and produced the bill which, when some minor changes were made, became the Volstead Act. When the measure was given to Volstead, chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, he altered the order of some sections, but did comparatively little else to the measure, according to Wheeler, except to introduce it. Wheeler’s pride in his work led him to indiscreet admissions, until it became generally accepted in official Washington that the bill was his composition. Later he circulated a summary of his career, prepared by Linfield Jones, in which this sentence appears, in discussing the Volstead Act: "He drafted the original bill and fought for it before the Congressional Committees, and it stands today practically unchanged except in details."13

So, not only had the League been largely responsible for the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment; it had provided the legislation by which the law was to be enforced. As we shall see, however, even the League’s well-oiled machinery was incapable of coping with the problem of enforcement that was to plague the nation as long as the Eighteenth Amendment was the law of the land.

---

CHAPTER X

AFTER THE VICTORY, WHAT?

Superintendent Baker, addressing delegates to the League's nineteenth national convention in Washington in 1919, confidently declared "that no candidate, Republican or Democrat, can ever again be elected President of the United States who does not positively and distinctly favor the Eighteenth Amendment and its rigid enforcement."¹ Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas exuded similar confidence two years later when he told those attending the League's twentieth national convention that the liquor forces had as much of a chance of repealing the Eighteenth Amendment as a humming bird has to fly away with the Washington Monument. "Repeal the Eighteenth Amendment? Why, the crowd doesn't know that Napoleon has got back from Elba. Repeal the Eighteenth Amendment? As well endeavor to bring back the woolly rhinoceros, the saber-tooth tiger, the hairy mammoth and the Heidelberg man."²

And Representative Andrew J. Volstead told the same gathering, "We will enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. There isn't any question in my mind about it. They never can repeal it."³

¹Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Convention of the Anti-Saloon League, Washington, 1919, p. 34.


³Ibid., p. 104.
This air of confidence permeated the ranks of the drays during the early years of prohibition, and soon had a deteriorating effect. Certain that the Eighteenth Amendment would remain forever a permanent part of the Constitution, many who had devoted a lifetime to militant temperance reform succumbed to complacency. Before long the League was to feel the effects of this attitude reflected in a dropping off both of personal and financial support. Whereas this had a gradual eroding effect on the League organization, there were other conditions, more dramatic in nature, which developed during the first decade of prohibition and greatly reduced the League's total effectiveness. One of these was the breaking into the open, despite the League's desperate attempt to prevent it, of discord within the internal workings of the organization.

This dissention centered for the most part on the activities of Wayne B. Wheeler whose dictatorship of prohibition, including a voice in the appointment of enforcement officials, federal judges, district attorneys, etc., in the opening year of the Harding administration, had become almost complete. Wheeler was in conflict with some of the ablest men in the League, who objected to his plan for "personally conducted enforcement" through Commissioner Roy Haynes, whose appointment Wheeler had engineered, and equally strenuously objected to his part in the distribution of federal patronage. This conflict was hidden but was perilous. Occasional hints at it crept into the public press, only to be strenuously denied.
Superintendent Baker had been the League's political oracle. A far-seeing man, he had guided the organization through the political battles that preceded the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. He had worked quietly. Wheeler now had practically seized upon Baker's own province in League affairs, although occupying offices that were, theoretically, inferior to Baker's post. Baker, too, was ill. Diabetes had seized upon him. He was to die of this in 1922. In 1922 he found it sapping his energies just when he needed them for his fight against Wheeler's encroachment upon his authority in the League. Wheeler was not seeking to invade Baker's territory. He liked and respected the old crusader who had taken Howard Russell's dream and made it a mighty army with banners. But Wheeler always felt that the task he himself was doing was the most important, if not the only one, to be done. In getting these things realized, however, he involved the League in many a political controversy, alienated many of its most influential supporters by his tactics, and exposed himself to attack from friends as well as foes.

This internal struggle for power within the League came to a head in 1921. The Thirty-Year Jubilee Convention of the League opened at Washington, January 12, with Superintendent Baker absent. He was dying; a few months at the longest were all that remained to him of life. He expressed his desire to lay down the office he had held for more than twenty years. His logical successor was Ernest H. Cherrington, manager of the League's publishing interests, who, with Baker and Bishop James Cannon, Jr., of Virginia, had been the
three men most directly responsible for the introduction and ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment.

Wheeler and Cherrington had been opposing forces in the League councils. Wheeler's idea was law enforcement, and his policy was opportunistic. Cherrington's idea was law observance, and his policy education. If Baker's withdrawal from the superintendency was announced at the annual meeting of the board of trustees of the League, Cherrington's election was inevitable. Consequently, Wheeler sought postponement. A member of his faction addressed the delegates, setting forth Dr. Baker's sudden rally and prospective full recovery. As he presented the story, it appeared as though a miracle had been wrought. His message fell on ears that were eager to believe it. They voted to reelect Dr. Baker for the coming two-year term of office. League men later wondered whether it was the notoriously unbalanced enthusiasm of the man that had dictated his statement of Baker's condition, or whether it had been inspired by Wheeler. Then the question was once directly put to Wheeler, he evaded replying. At all events, the election had been postponed temporarily.¹

Dr. Baker's illness had made necessary the appointment of an assistant, the Reverend E. J. Moore, who had been a district superintendent under Wheeler in Ohio. Moore "swung around the circle," presumably busy about national league concerns, but in reality organizing an anti-Cherrington vote in the special election which must

inevitably be called when Dr. Baker's rapidly approaching death occurred. He reported, personally or by letter, to Wheeler in Washington the results of his calls.  

Then Baker presented his resignation, March 12, 1924, a few weeks before his death, Wheeler realized Cherrington's election was imminent. When the trustees gathered at Indianapolis, he let it be known to a few that he would appreciate a complimentary vote for Baker's post, although he would not accept the office even though elected. The ballot was taken, Cherrington was within a few votes of election. F. Scott McBride, then superintendent of the Illinois League, was second, and Wheeler had received his complimentary votes---enough to have made an election impossible on the first ballot. At Wheeler's suggestion, word was passed to some of the Cherrington supporters that Wheeler would take the post if elected, with the hint that Cherrington was not anxious for the position himself. Other political methods, familiar to men who had played with caucuses, primaries, and conventions for years, were used. Enough votes were drawn from Cherrington to ensure his defeat, while enough of the original Wheeler votes went to McBride to give him the election. Wheeler's "balance of power" had enabled him to defeat the ablest man in the League," after Dr. Baker's withdrawal. Wheeler himself told, to intimates in the League, the story of his successful coup, justifying it by the assertion that McBride would not interfere with

---

5Ibid., p. 215.
Wheeler's Washington activities, while Cherrington might have done so if elected. 6 By McBride's election, Wheeler became the dominating power in the League, except when the Legislative Committee or the Executive Committee were meeting.

* * * *

The same year, 1924, another incident broke into the headlines that was to rock the League even more resoundingly than Wheeler's power grab. It involved Superintendent William H. Anderson of New York who was found guilty of third degree forgery and sentenced to two years in prison. Something of the history of this extraordinary man and the facts leading up to his denouement are necessary to a fair understanding of the case.

Anderson was graduated from the University of Michigan in 1892, and after teaching school for a few years, returned and took a law degree in 1896. He practiced law until 1900, when he became attorney for the Illinois League. He presently became state superintendent, serving until 1906, when he was transferred to New York for a year. Between 1907 and 1911 he headed League work in Maryland, and in the latter year he returned to New York as state superintendent. 7

He was recognized from the beginning as one of the ablest and most vigorous soldiers in the League's legions. He was honored in its national councils and served for a time as national legislative

---

6 Ibid., p. 216.
superintendent. His vigorous methods, which he characterized as "using the meat ax," earned him enmity but also no little respect from the wets. From the beginning he was accused of using the temperance organization solely as a "good thing" for himself. His financial integrity was attacked; he was called "a dirty, lying scoundrel"; it was said that "no wild beast could possibly be as great a menace as the person known as William H. Anderson." At other times he was pictured as a "pirate king," a "political black hand," "a squatter who was run out of Illinois," and a "chaser of moonbeams." 8

From the day that Anderson set foot in New York, on his return to the state, the liquor interests were on the defensive. As for the League, his coming was like a cold shower or a shot of "high life" and things began to happen. Publicity was the chief weapon in the arsenal of the League, and Anderson had a capacity for getting it comparable to that of a movie star or a transatlantic aviator. "In the few short months since his arrival," said the New York World, 9 "he has changed the whole political lineup in New York State. Six months ago prohibition was about as much of an issue... as Mormonism, pragmatism or the fourth dimension." Anderson was called the "White Hope of Temperance," the "Arch Foe of Demon Rum" the "Napoleonic Leader of the Anti-Saloon League."

8 Baltimore Sun, February 21, 1912, and July 19, 1908.
9 June 11, 1914.
Step by step he drove the saloon from a large section of New York state. When the Eighteenth Amendment was adopted he saw to it that New York ratified, and it was largely due to his skill and indefatigable efforts that the Mullan-Gage enforcement law was adopted. The ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment did not lessen his activities, and having by his own "meat-and-methods" and incautious language alienated a large section of the city and state, it was inevitable that there should be retaliation. Several efforts had been made to "get" Anderson and with him the League. This effort reached its climax in 1923. The Mullan-Gage Law was repealed; the League was compelled by the court to report its campaign expenditures and Anderson himself was indicted for larceny, extortion, and third degree forgery, found guilty, and subsequently sent to Sing Sing where he spent nine months. A complete history of the facts involved in his indictment and conviction cannot be given here. Space permits only a summary of the facts established.10

In 1917 it was arranged between Anderson and one C. B. Phillips, employed as a special financial agent for the League, that Phillips' commissions in excess of ten thousand dollars should be shared with Anderson. In 1918 the sum had been too small to divide, but the plan was carried out in 1919 and again in 1920.

It appeared that on July 7, 1920, Anderson had instructed the League's bookkeeper to draw a check for $2500 to Anderson's own order

and charge it to Phillips' salary and commissions account, explaining that he had loaned Phillips $2500 which was being repaid in this way. He deposited the check to his personal account. On March 2, 1921, another check for $1375 was likewise charged to Phillips' account. He explained this time that it was a repayment of money advanced to Phillips. Early in March, to aid him in making out his income tax returns, Phillips was informed that the League books showed his salary and commissions during the preceding year to be $18,893. Phillips claimed that he had received approximately $4000 less than this and objected to paying a tax on money he had not received. Anderson thereupon instructed the bookkeeper to transfer $4400 from Phillips' salary account to his expense account, which was done. But, since the vouchers in Phillips' expense account for that year had been only $57.40, it made it appear that the League still owed Phillips $4200 for expenses.

In explaining his dealings with Phillips and his use of the money thus obtained, Anderson said he did not turn the money over to the League but deposited it to his own account, crediting the League upon its indebtedness to him of some $21,700. The officials of the League admitted this indebtedness and approved this as one way of paying it. The Court summarized Anderson's story of the creation of this debt:

On March 26, 1918, defendant for the first time represented to the board of directors of the League that from March 1, 1913, to December 30, 1914, he upon his own initiative had conducted a publicity campaign for the League... costing $24,700; that he financed it out of his own funds
by mortgaging his home, hypothecating his life insurance policies and borrowing from friends on his personal notes.

Anderson claimed that he could not give names and vouchers to show how these expenditures were made because he had given his word of honor that he would not reveal their identity. The board of directors, believing him, authorized payments with interest at six per cent, as funds became available, and at the time of the trial approximately $11,000 had been paid. This narration the court characterized as "demonstrably" false in view of the fact that at the trial Anderson testified that the money advanced by him was paid out of funds aggregating approximately $25,000, given to Anderson in 1912 and 1913 by one John T. King. He admitted that he never knew King personally or where he lived or did business. The identity of another person, named Mann, whom Anderson claimed to have been his disbursing agent in his publicity campaign, was not revealed. Anderson said that he gave Mann large sums of money in the Pennsylvania terminal but that he had not seen him since 1911. In spite of vigorous objections of the defendant's counsel, ex-Governor Whitman, the trial court admitted this evidence. Of the King story the court said, bluntly, "It is not possible otherwise to characterize the narration except to say that it had every earmark of being a fictitious concoction and one which it was almost impossible for even the most gullible to credit."11 There is small doubt that the explanations Anderson offered had as much to do with his conviction as the technical forgery.

In fairness to Anderson, there is reason to believe that the preposterous King story had its elements of truth. The story runs that while Anderson was superintendent in Maryland, John T. King, prominent Connecticut Republican, approached him on behalf of Senator Penrose of Pennsylvania, requesting his cooperation in putting over a certain political deal. Anderson agreed to help, and King gave him some $20,000 as a personal gift. 12

His story to the board of directors that the carrying-on of his publicity campaign necessitated the mortgaging of his home was a shade less accurate. He had intended to use the King money to pay for his home in Yonkers. Because of the necessity for cash to put the Anti-Saloon League of New York on the map, he used the money for publicity. As a consequence, he was able to make but a small payment on his home and gave a mortgage for the remainder. There is, however, no explanation of the manner in which the money was spent beyond that which Anderson gave to the jury. The Mann incident certainly reads like fiction. 13

There are certain other misconceptions concerning this case that fairness requires be corrected. The impression has been that Anderson invented the story of the publicity campaign in order to shake down the League for $25,000. As a matter of fact, when he was invited to take charge of the New York League he was told by the

12 Peter Odegard, Pressure Politics, pp. 238-39.

directors that since the income of the organization was small (it was then barely $30,000 a year), he must assume responsibility in getting publicity. In 1918, having more than quadrupled the League's income, Anderson submitted a statement of his personal expenditures. After investigation the directors agreed to repay him. Realizing, however, that the payment of so large a sum at one time would cripple the League, it authorized any member of the staff, not engaged exclusively in collecting funds, to add to his salary by soliciting subscriptions outside the churches on a five per cent commission basis. No employee of the League ever took advantage of this ruling, but Anderson used it to justify his private agreement with Phillips.\(^1\)

Anderson himself declared that a combination of politics, the press, and disgruntled former League employees led to his indictment and conviction. He quoted District Attorney Santon as having said, "If I put Anderson out of business, it will make me governor." As for the wets, he said their efforts "to destroy me are perfectly legitimate." Before the trial he had asserted that Phillips and former employees of the League who had been dismissed for peculation had offered to sell "revelations" to the New York World. But it was decided to have the story first appear in the Evening Mail, a paper

friendly to prohibition, whose editor, T. L. Stoddard, had intimated that if Anderson would resign the story would not appear. 15

Anderson told the author in an interview in 1951 that the episode was part of a conspiracy to get Alfred E. Smith elected President in 1924. Raymond Fosdick, later to become president of the Rockefeller Foundation, had been placed in charge of benevolences for the Rockefeller enterprises. According to Anderson, Fosdick was a warm friend of Smith. Consequently, upon assuming his new post, Fosdick reduced the Rockefeller contributions to the League. For three years prior to this, Anderson explained, Rockefeller had contributed $75,000 annually to the New York League. Rockefeller himself had threatened to withdraw his support from the League, but when Anderson told him if he did so, the League would collapse, Rockefeller agreed to continue his support. But Anderson maintained that apparently unknown to Rockefeller, Fosdick reduced the annual contribution to $25,000 and began to conspire against Anderson.

Whatever the actual facts were, Anderson had reaped the harvest of the vituperative whirlwind he had sown. The wets in New York, and not a few of the local drys, were glad to get rid of him. The drys outside of the city, however, filled the columns of the American Issue for almost a year with letters expressing unshakable faith in him. Most of the directors and officers of the League stood by him.

as did most of the church press of the country.\textsuperscript{16} Yet there was no official action on the part of the National League during or after the trial to come to Anderson's assistance. He was allowed to fight the case through on his own. By not acting, the League added weight to the alleged guilt against Anderson, thus focusing the suspicious spotlight of public opinion on itself as well as on the accused.

Why the League did not act can best be explained by the fact that Superintendent Baker was on his death bed and Wheeler, who held no brief for Anderson, had usurped considerable authority and was dictating League policy from his office in Washington. Cherrington, who was in sympathy with Anderson, had his backing for national superintendent. Thus it was important for Wheeler to get Anderson out of the way, lest the latter foil his efforts to hand pick Doctor Baker's successor.

It was not entirely because of Wheeler, however, that the League did not come officially to Anderson's support. Anderson had been the "Peck's Bad Boy" in the eyes of many influential League leaders. He had been difficult to handle. He set his own course in New York and often turned deaf ears to advice from the national office. Some charged the New York League had not contributed enough proportionately to the national body. They also thought Anderson's salary of $10,000 was out of line with what other state superintendents were receiving. Anderson defended his salary on the grounds his job was the biggest.

He also pointed to the record he had achieved as state superintendent. \textsuperscript{17} Had Dr. Baker been well, there is little doubt but what he would have thrown the League behind Anderson's fight and probably would have saved him from conviction. But those in active leadership were afraid to publicly back him. As the result, the Anderson affair cast a black cloud over the League organization and plagued its activities for years to come.

* * * *

Repercussions from the Anderson trial and conviction had not completely subsided when a new incident of much greater scope engulfed the League. A special Senate committee which had been formed to investigate campaign expenses in various states in the 1926 primaries, suddenly focused its attention on the League. The resolution, under which the committee was appointed, made it possible to include any agency or organization that used money in these campaigns. In Pennsylvania, the candidacy of Governor Gifford Pinchot for the Senate was strongly supported by the WCTU, the League, and certain other societies identified with temperance and social reform. It so happened that Senator James A. Reed, of Missouri, chairman of the committee, was an aggressive opponent of prohibition, and particularly hostile to church-supported organizations that took the lead in the fight against the liquor traffic and gave the United States the Eighteenth Amendment. He apparently saw in the committee he headed an opportunity to expose to the public the operation of these groups.

\textsuperscript{17}Interview with author, 1951.
The fact that these dry organizations were strongly opposed to William J. Vare, Pennsylvania's wet candidate, and in accordance with their long-standing custom had raised and expended money for campaign purposes, gave Senator Reed a much coveted opportunity to switch the investigation from the Pennsylvania campaign to a general inquiry into the raising and spending of money by the League over a period of years. Wheeler virtually invited the committee to summon him when he gave the press some general statements suggesting the expenditures of funds by the wets to influence the Pennsylvania primaries. Reed seized upon the statement at once and Wheeler was subpoenaed to appear before the committee. According to Reed, Wheeler sought several private interviews before the committee and submitted "what he called his evidence against the wets in Pennsylvania. This evidence consisted of nothing more than rumors. Although I gave him every opportunity to produce his proof, he failed completely to do so." Reed said that the League had taken a prominent part in these primaries and when the committee sought to question Wheeler about that, "his attitude was quite different. His answers were vague and his information meager. He promised to supply some of the information but the committee had to wait so long that it finally determined to send its own agents, including accountants, to Westerville with instructions to bring back from its home office records and accounts from which an actual picture of the League could be obtained. From these records, I was astonished to find that the Anti-Saloon League

18James A. Reed, The Rape of Temperance, pp. 76-77.
whose only business was prohibition, politics, and propaganda, maintained a payroll of more than one thousand persons, and that it had paid sums of money to certain members of Congress, both Senators and Representatives, to make speeches at which money collections were made."

Virtually everything of moment in the files of the League was taken by Reed's agents. Whatever legal rights the League might have had—and Wheeler believed they had excellent ones—to resist this "search and seizure," they were not invoked. Wheeler declared: "If we offer any objection, we will be misrepresented as having something to conceal. Let them go ahead." Wheeler was promised that these documents would be returned when the committee had decided which among them should become part of the record. None, however, was ever returned. Certain newspapers published, the following year, extracts of the League's minutes. They also printed photographic facsimiles of letters that had been seized by Reed's orders. There was only one source from which they could be obtained—the Reed Committee.

At the time Wheeler was summoned before the committee, he looked like a corpse. He was only a shadow of his former self. There was a tremendous difference between the smiling, virile, and audacious champion of a few years before and the haggard, weary, and spent man before the committee. Over work had taken its toll. Whether by

---


deliberately cruel purpose or not, Reed for many days required
Wheeler's presence at the hearings, even when he was not testifying.
The intervals between such appearances Wheeler spent in bed.21

Wheeler's own summary of his evidence is interesting. He
dictated this account of it:

The resolution called for only the investigation of
expenditures in the 1926 primaries. We had to decide
whether to stand on our legal rights or to give to the
public all the facts even though we were not compelled
to do so under the law. We decided on the latter
course. Senator Reed started with my connection with
the League as early as 1893 and traced it year by year,
demanding the amount of salary, methods of organiza-
tion, and information about every other phase of the
League activity year by year. It was, of course, dif-
ficult to remember accurately all the details as to
salary, names of officers and so on, but we gave them as
best we could and later confirmation showed that they
were substantially correct. The questions gave us an
opportunity to show that the League was the most demo-
cratic organization doing inter-denominational temperance
work; that its state boards were controlled by boards of
trustees or directors chosen by the state boards. Bring-
ing this to the attention of the public anew was helpful
in many quarters.

The Senator's charge that fabulous sums were raised
and spent was met by filing with the committee the public
accountants' reports of both national and state League
expenditures. We filed with the committee the League's
policy with reference to publishing the names of its
subscribers... . . .

The committee finally decided that they would not ask
for the names of subscribers who gave less than $500 and
only back to 1920. At least, that was the last vote of
the committee. In a few instances, publication of the
names of these subscribers has been rather disturbing to
our friends, but in most instances it has had no detri-
mental effect.

21 Ibid., p. 269.
The charge that the League's political methods were unethical gave us an opportunity to bring to the attention of the committee that these were the methods used by the wets to control the politics of the nation for many years and that one branch of the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment, which included over thirty members of Congress, was practicing it now. We insisted that the right of a citizen to vote against a candidate who did not represent him on any question was an exercise of good citizenship rather than bad ethics. To vote a straight ticket under such circumstances is crooked politics. There is only one way to clean up bad political conditions in certain places, and that is to defeat the party candidate who is bad and sustain those who are good. We also differentiated in those states where by law the voters are compelled to support the candidates nominated if they participated in the primary. There are not many such states. In many of the states, if a citizen votes for the majority on any given ticket he is permitted to participate in the primaries of that party.

The charge that the League's activities were all political was met squarely and repeatedly. We insisted that the campaign of education for total abstinence and self-control, the general building of public sentiment for law enforcement and national sobriety, and for legislation to destroy the evils of the liquor traffic was not political in any sense intended in the law. I think I made clear to the committee and to the press that we had complied with the provisions of the Federal corrupt practices act as a national organization longer than any other association or combination of individuals. Also that the phrase, 'political activities,' is denied in the law and that we were following the legal definition in the filing of our reports.  

Reed conducted a cross-examination of Wheeler for several days, apparently intending to have it appear that a sharp and bear-baiting manner and a treat-them-rough method were necessary to disclose to the country the alleged nefarious and corrupting practices of the League. Tremendous headlines, followed by many columns of verbatim report in metropolitan newspapers, gave the public the

\[\text{22} \text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. } 270-72.\]
impression that Wheeler and his associates had been engaged in highly improper practices. The thing that seemed most startling and horrifying to the press, as it contemplated the iniquities of the League, was the aggregate figure of receipts and expenditures. By adding together the entire sums collected in six years by the National League and the twenty-three state branches, the grand total of eleven million dollars was reached.

The National League had been raising and spending a little more than a half million dollars a year on the work at large. The state leagues raised and spent their own money within their separate areas, the total of these sums averaging more than a million a year. Altogether, the national and state leagues had been raising and spending to the extent of $1,800,000 a year. This, according to Wheeler, was a mere pittance compared with the sums that the enemies of prohibition had spent in their own interest. Wheeler admitted that the total cost of the campaign putting prohibition in the Constitution was in the neighborhood of thirty-five million dollars, "for education and all progress during thirty years" prior to the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment, and that it was the amount spent by all different agencies fighting for prohibition. At the height of the campaign just before the adoption of the amendment, the state and national expenditures were about two and a half million dollars a year.²³

---

Although the Reed investigation gave a black eye to the League itself, Wheeler, practically dying, made a favorable impression on the press through his ready and courteous replies to the senatorial hectoring. He was rushed to the Battle Creek Sanitarium as soon as the hearings closed. There it was found that his heart muscles had weakened because of the hard strain of work for over thirty years, seven days a week and fifteen hours or so a day. He was warned that he must be careful hereafter if he hoped to regain his strength. He promised to relax some of his strenuous activities, but soon was back in the thick of the fight to hold the line for prohibition.

In a little more than a year he was dead. Full page headlines in the newspapers informed the nation of the passage of America's "dry boss." The death of few private citizens ever have been given as much newspaper space. Friend and foe alike joined in paying tribute to his sincerity, intensity, and success. Cartoonists who had been wont to portray him as Borgia or a political tyrant, now pictured him as a patriot, who had given his life for his fellow men. Some of the finest tributes were paid not by his comrades, but by the enemy.

It is noteworthy that the League orators at the funeral carefully phrased their eulogies. They commented on Wheeler's "devotion to his cause," but did not praise him as the champion of prohibition. Reading between the lines, one might see how carefully these men differentiated between the structure of personal power and influence which Wheeler had erected and the constructive work for prohibition in which he had a part.
Wheeler was hardly in his grave before statements began to appear in the press of various parts of the country, inspired by League men, to the effect that there would be "no successor to Wheeler." Equally frequent were the statements that policies of political intrigue were to be abandoned and that the League would return to its proper functions, which do not include "personally conducted prohibition." The action of the forthcoming convention of the League, to be held in December, was forecast quite accurately, as the event proved. The long ignored policy of education, by which the League had won its earlier victories and laid the foundation upon which the Eighteenth Amendment was built, began to receive new emphasis. The first snow had not fallen on Wheeler's grave before many of the plans and policies which were peculiarly his had been either repudiated or quietly abandoned.

Before turning to this new or revived policy of the League, however, it is appropriate to tabulate the good accomplished and the harm done to the prohibition cause by Wayne B. Wheeler. Unquestionably, through his genius as a politician, he became one of the most potent prohibition forces in the entire nation. It is equally unquestionable that he always meant to use this power for what he believed to be good. He cared nothing for the tinsel of office-holding, the temptations of money meant nothing to him, but power, unquestioned power, irresponsible power, seemed the most desirable good. More yet, in his thought, it was desirable for the effectiveness of prohibition enforcement that someone, himself naturally, should
possess such authority. Much of Wheeler's influence in elections was useful to prohibition. His endorsement was worth thousands of votes to a candidate. Frequently the mere threat that he intended to visit a state and speak in opposition of a doubtful candidate or an avowed wet was sufficient to cause the abandonment of such a candidate by his friends. On the other hand, some of his political intrigues alienated the support of very ardent friends of prohibition. He was careful in the choice of the enemies that he made. He knew, too, the advertising value of the injudicious attacks made upon him by such men as Senator Reed who were so intimately identified with the wet group that their assaults rebounded to Wheeler's credit.

Although the dry majority in both branches of Congress increased at each election from the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, Wheeler's success in obtaining helpful legislation was not marked. The Volstead Act, of which he was the principal author, was so weak that prosecutors usually preferred to avail themselves of the clearer phraseology and stronger penalties found in the old Internal Revenue Laws. The Prohibition Reorganization bill, the last consequential legislation which he supported, resulted in his elimination as unofficial councillor for the federal enforcement agencies and opened the exit door for his friend, the former Prohibition Commissioner Roy Haynes. Wheeler's greatest value, probably, was as a propagandist. The newspapers found him always ready with a timely
utterance on any question that even remotely affected prohibition.
Of the thousands of men and women who served the League, the name of
Wayne B. Wheeler is best remembered.

* * * *

As we have already noted, the League gradually shifted its
emphasis, with the death of Wheeler, from pressure politics to that of
education. Early in 1928 it announced it intended to fight Demon
Rum on two fronts—that of force and that of persuasion, each having
a general with full authority and ample financial resources, but in-
dependent of each other. The two commanders in the common cause were
Dr. F. Scott McBride, re-elected general superintendent by the narrow
margin of three or four votes, and Ernest H. Cherrington, rival
candidate for the same office, for whom defeat was tempered by the
creation of a new department of education and propaganda, of which
he was made the head. After the voting, spokesmen for the League
informed correspondents that all rivalries were forgotten and the
two factions agreed to get together behind the slogan: "A Dry
President in 1928."21

The double command and double policy represented a compromise,
and came about when the supporters of Cherrington failed in their
efforts to put him in the saddle and to scrap completely the old
policy of applying pressure to legislators and executives, which was
identified with the leadership of Wheeler, and to replace it with a

21 "New Policy of the Anti-Saloon League," Literary Digest,
LXXXVII (January 7, 1928), pp. 6-9.
new program of propaganda. Consequently, Cherrington's policy was to supplement rather than replace the League's established policy, of which McBride was the champion. In accepting leadership of the new department of Education, Publicity and Research, Cherrington declared:

We need today as we have never needed, a campaign of education. We need a baptism of the right kind of literature, periodicals, and truth-carrying messages that will convey the truth to the people of this nation and the rest of the world. We have reached the place where we no longer can take the defensive, we must once again assume the offensive. We must reach the daily press of this country as often as the liquor interests are able to reach that press. Through the movies and the radio we must get the truth across to the people. The colleges and universities, the high schools and the millions of young men and women who are to take their place in the life of the nation just a few years hence, are the laboratory where it is to be demonstrated whether or not the next generation will maintain prohibition.25

At the same time Cherrington told delegates to the convention at which the formation of the new department was announced that for "the next five years, not less than ten million dollars is needed to do the work that must be done." At this point, ... Kresge asked permission to say a few words. During the course of his remarks he pledged five-hundred-thousand dollars toward the work of the new department provided an equal amount could be raised, to complete the first million, the amount needed immediately to start the campaign. Kresge stimulated others in the audience to make pledges, but the

financial goal was never reached. In fact, before another year had rolled around the nation was in the throes of its worst financial crisis, and with the lack of operating funds the new department not only failed to get off the ground, but the entire League machinery came to a virtual halt. The depression virtually sounded the death knell for the League although its complete break-up was not to occur until many years later.

The last time the League actively engaged in politics was in the 1928 presidential election. That year the prohibition issue became the dominant one for the first time in a contest for President since the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. Both leading party conventions adopted enforcement planks in their platforms satisfactory to the League. Between the Republican convention at Kansas City, which nominated Herbert Hoover, and the convention at Houston, which nominated Alfred E. Smith, the League issued an official statement to the effect that it was satisfied with the platform and candidate at Kansas City and hoped that the Houston convention would give a similar platform and a candidate who would accept the platform. The League made it clear that in case this was done, it would not support one candidate as against the other, thereby following strictly its non-partisan policy.

In accepting the platform of his party, Hoover said he would stand for prohibition enforcement and throughout the campaign made it clear he wished prohibition success. Smith, however, on the last day of the Houston convention sent a telegram of acceptance stating
that on the prohibition question he, himself, would be the platform. In other words, he would be for repeal. Thus the issue, as far as the League was concerned, was clearly defined. The League, therefore, followed the same fundamental methods it had employed for thirty-five years of its successful history. It raised a special campaign fund of $100,000 which was used to carry the facts as to the attitudes of the candidates to the voters. Twenty thousand dollars of this was expended for the printing in the League's own plant at Westerville, and the rest was spent for postage, telephone and telegraph, other literature, meetings and expenses of travel by workers in an effort to inform the people of the issues involved and to carry the message of the records and attitudes of the candidates to the voters.

How much credit the League can be given for Hoover's overwhelming victory cannot be accurately gauged, but it was not as much as League leaders maintained. And certainly Arthur J. Barton, chairman of the League's national executive committee, was not a very good seer when he told delegates to the League's twenty-fourth convention in Detroit in 1930:

I predict that never again will any party allow itself to be so bullied and so led to certain political slaughter by a candidate and that hereafter both of the major parties will frankly espouse prohibition as a dearly bought and highly fruitful American achievement and that no candidate for the presidency will ever have serious consideration by either of the major parties who is known to be in favor

of the repeal or weakening of the Eighteenth Amendment or its supporting legislation. No political party can continue to live in America, much less win a national election, if it is either wet or manned and controlled by wets. Those who do not see this are blind and cannot see afar off.\(^{27}\)

Two years later the platform plank adopted by the Democratic party convention declared specifically for the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and demanded that Congress propose such repeal to ratification conventions in the states. The Democratic landslide of 1932 consequently spelled the doom of prohibition. The League, desperately short of financial resources and its ranks greatly depleted of virile leadership, watched helplessly as the dry era came to an end.

The League's demise undoubtedly was hastened by the depression, although a dwindling in contributions and pledges was noted shortly after the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment, resulting from the belief of a great majority of temperance advocates that the battle had been won once and for all. In five years, from 1920 to 1926, the receipts of the National League dropped nearly a half million dollars a year. Reports of its financial operations submitted to the Senate investigating committee showed that it was costing the League ninety-nine and a half-cents of every dollar collected to pay commissions, salaries, traveling expenses, hotel and food bills of collectors and employees. By 1930, its financial situation, after eleven years of prohibition, had become desperate.\(^{28}\) An indication

\(^{27}\)Ibid., pp. 50-51.

\(^{28}\)Reed, The Rape of Temperance, p. 100.
of this financial plight is noted in the following letter from Ernest Cherrington to Bishop Cannon, July 26, 1931:

I have been hoping for weeks that... finances would improve, but our financial situation seems to be rapidly getting worse instead of better. . . . I have never found conditions quite as bad as they are and many of our best friends are in such position they cannot even pay their old subscriptions past due, to say nothing about giving any special help. . . . As you probably know, the salaries of many of the men. . . . are back for several months. In some cases they are back for a year. . . . Frankly, I have never known a more difficult time from the financial point of view. . . . and the prospects for the future are not very bright.29

One of the "friends" who had fallen down on his payments was S. S. Kresge who three years before had pledged a half million dollars for educational purposes. In a letter to Kresge, August 24, 1931, Bishop Cannon wrote:

I remember how greatly delighted I was when you made the subscription, because, I calculated that it would be a 'sheet anchor' for our work during the presidential campaigns of 1928 and 1932. The lack of this money has greatly embarrassed all our operations, as they had been predicated upon this regular receipt. I do trust that you will arrange to continue yearly payment, as announced publicly at the banquet at the Mayflower Hotel.30

During the year 1932 total receipts from all departments totaled $216,848 and in 1933, $121,940. Besides that, the business of the American Issue Publishing Company fell off two-thirds between 1930 and 1933. Total loss for operating the plant in 1933 was $13,000. Other figures disclosed that only $23,000 was raised for the 1932

29Cherrington's personal correspondence file at Westerville headquarters.

30Ibid.
campaign fund; only $16,000 was received by the educational department in 1931, whereas $30,000 had been obtained in 1930; unpaid pledges on the books as of December 31, 1931, totaled $1,145,090.70, and back salaries totaled $57,000.31

Aside from its financial plight, the League's strength also had been depleted by the failure of young men to enter League work, replacing such stalwarts as Baker, Wheeler, and others who had died or who had retired from active leadership. Baker recognized this problem shortly before his death when he wired those attending the Superintendents' and Workers' Conference being held in conjunction with the twenty-first National convention:

A careful survey of our League men will reveal the average age to be about fifty. No church could long survive with a ministry that averaged fifty without constant influx of young men. We are not having these recruits. At least a hundred young men with elements of leadership should be coming to us from our Christian colleges in the next six months. They can be had for the asking. Failure to meet this condition means failure everywhere...32

It is doubtful, however, whether any amount of money or influx of fresh, new leadership would have preserved the League or even prohibition. During the decade following the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment great changes were taking place in America. For the first time in history the United States had emerged as a world power. American servicemen, having come into contact with other

31 Treasurer's Report submitted to the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees, January 1, 1931.

cultures and civilizations, helped America to shed its traditional provincialism. Following the 1918 Armistice there came a subtle change in the emotional weather. The torch of idealism that had kindled a revolt of the American conscience seemed to have pretty well burned itself out. People were tired. In particular, their public spirit, their consciences, and their hopes were tired. The returning soldiers were disillusioned about the crusade they had been sent off on. The war had proved to be a filthy business. People felt it was about time to relax after fighting for democracy and the League of Nations. They preferred to look after themselves for a change, rather than after other people and the world in general; and to have a good time. The prohibition law—the curious final product of the revolt of American conscience—had not long been on the books before people began to flout it right and left; pretty soon a great many men and women who had always considered themselves patterns of law-abiding respectability began to patronize bootleggers, or concoct bathtub gin, or wear hip-pocket flasks to parties. Even the reformers themselves were tired, and wondered why they now went limp at the thought of battling for great political causes. There was a very general desire in the 1920's to shake off the restraints of puritanism, to upset the long-standing conventions of decorum. This rebellion was spearheaded by girls who began drinking, smoking, changing the style of dress, openly discussing sex, and doing a host of other things young ladies of earlier generations would never have thought of doing. Along with this relaxation of the social code went a wave of
religious skepticism. Among young men and women who prided themselves on their modern-mindedness there was a disposition to regard church work or social service, or anything else to which the word "uplift" could be applied, as "poisonous" and an unwarranted intrusion upon other people's privacy; and besides, one had a right to enjoy oneself, and taking a ride in a sedan on Sunday morning was much more fun than going to church.

The 1929 stock market crash and the resulting depression, combined with the social revolt that was gaining momentum throughout the 1920's, made repeal inevitable. Proponents of repeal argued that the elimination of the Eighteenth Amendment would do much to improve unemployment, revive industry, promote the general welfare generally, and keep taxes from soaring. These arguments were appealing to a depression-wrecked nation.

The revolt against the Eighteenth Amendment, and the agitation for its repeal, became a national issue in the 1932 presidential campaign. Both party platforms favored the overthrow of prohibition. The second session of the 72nd Congress meeting within a month after the November elections lost no time in preparing a joint resolution which was adopted by two-thirds majority in both houses. It was deposited in the Department of State, February 20, 1933, and the following day was sent by the Secretary of State to the respective governors of the forty-eight states. In less than ten months thirty-six states had ratified the repeal amendment. On December 5, the Secretary of State certified the ratification and prohibition officially came to an end.
The League did not completely collapse following repeal. A nucleus of the organization remained intact with its principal endeavors being devoted to education. In 1934 the Temperance Education Foundation was established as a non-profit adjunct of the League. It was formed "exclusively for education on all phases of the alcohol problem, including research and collection of data and the dissemination of information on the nature and effect of the manufacture of, the use of, and the traffic in, beverage alcohol, together with the problems arising therefrom." In 1948, the Anti-Saloon League of America, at its convention in Pittsburgh, changed its name to the National Temperance League. It released ownership and control of the American Issue Publishing Company and turned over the establishment to Dr. E. H. Cherrington and associates to be held in trust by a board of seven trustees for the Temperance Education Foundation, Inc., with headquarters in Westerville. The Temperance Education Foundation, Inc., continued ownership and control of the American Issue Publishing Company. The Reverend E. H. Dalley succeeded Dr. Cherrington as president of the Foundation and the American Issue Publishing Company in 1950 upon Dr. Cherrington's death. The publishing company continued to print a variety of temperance materials for state and national organizations, including the American Issue, which had a circulation in excess of seven thousand.
The National Temperance League, which operated separately but cooperatively with the Education Foundation, maintained headquarters in Washington where it kept its eye on legislative matters dealing with the liquor traffic. Its principal strength in the 1950's lay in the states, with organizations functioning in forty states and the Territory of Hawaii. These state groups operated under different names and took the form of church and civic movements. Some had as many as fifteen paid employees while others operated entirely with volunteer help. While the state groups were concerned largely with education, especially with the instruction of young people regarding alcohol, they also helped to initiate and promote local option elections and kept watch over state legislatures to see that no legislation was enacted that was detrimental to the cause they represented.

The combined annual budget of the states and national body for 1958 was in excess of one million dollars. The majority of the revenue was raised within the states with each state required to allocate five per cent of its income to the national league. Principal source of income was from businessmen and industry, some of whom, such as S. S. Kresge, were heavy contributors to the Anti-Saloon League. The national body also developed fund-raising projects, such as the sale of highway safety stamps and Christmas seals. The pledge system was abandoned by the new organization.

The return of national prohibition, while it may be coveted by some of the more zealous modern day temperance reformers, was not an objective of the leaders of the National Temperance League. You
couldn't give me another eighteenth amendment for a million dollars," Edward B. Dunford told the author in an interview. Dunford, who serves the National Temperance League as its attorney and succeeded Wayne E. Wheeler as attorney of the Anti-Saloon League, maintained "the Twenty-First Amendment repealing prohibition is a good law and the one that should have been passed originally. It frees the police power of the states from the limitations formerly imposed upon them by the commerce clause of the Constitution, and affords the greatest possible autonomy in dealing with the liquor traffic within their borders." Prohibition, Dunford declared, should be legislated and enforced on the local and state levels. No amount of federal legislation, he was convinced, could keep the public from drinking. Laws governing the manufacture and consumption of alcoholic beverages must originate with the people themselves. This could be accomplished, said Dunford, through education and the enlightenment of the public.

Current leaders of the movement were optimistic about the future. They pointed to the fact that the temperance programs in most of the states were in a growth period. They further pointed with pride to the fact that considerably in excess of 50 per cent of the nation's area was free of the legalized liquor traffic. And, according to the best up-to-date information compiled in 1958 by the National...
Temperance League, of the 37,371 local option elections held since repeal, 21,628 had been won by the drays.\textsuperscript{34}

* * * *

It is unlikely that any present or future temperance organization will ever achieve the scope, power, and prestige enjoyed by the Anti-Saloon League at the height of its activity just prior to the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment. The League, which came into being at a propitious time in the nation's history, did more than any other agency before or since to amalgamate the scattered forces of temperance reform and mobilize sentiment against a most likely target—the old fashioned saloon. The fact that it was able, in some measure, to bring together Protestants, and even a good many Catholics, and the warring factions in the field of temperance reform is what made the League one of the outstanding manifestations of militant democracy applied to a vital issue with a moral implication that the world has ever seen.

Its influence overflowed the bounds of temperance reform and added a substantial boost to the overall reform movement that was sweeping the nation during the closing years of the last century and the first two decades of the twentieth century. As we have already noted, the League gave a strong helping hand to the woman suffrage movement. It also influenced legislation leading to the direct election of United States senators, and furthered the cause of such

\textsuperscript{34} Alcohol Statistics Letter, compiled by the National Temperance League, Inc., 1954.
principles of democratic government as the initiative, referendum, and recall. Although the Anti-Saloon League has passed into the limbo of history, its influence still lives on. Unquestionably it was one of the most potent and effective extra-governmental agencies the nation has known, setting a pattern for many present day groups, especially organized labor, which make use of the omni-partisan technique of pressure politics.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Most of the material relative to the American Anti-Saloon League is of a fugitive nature. It is to be found mainly in religious periodicals, in secular newspapers and magazines, and in the publications of the Anti-Saloon League itself. Very little of it is between book covers. The most valuable single source is the American Issue, both national and state issues. Other valuable material is found in the League's Year Book, Proceedings of the American Anti-Saloon League Conventions, the Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem, and Ernest H. Cherrington's History of the Anti-Saloon League.

I have likewise gained insight into the character and operation of the League and its principal personalities through conversations with scores, if not hundreds of persons who had contact with the League. Some were with its admirers, some with its detractors.

Personal correspondence and administrative records, especially those dealing with finances, are scarce. There are two reasons why this is so: The League did not make a practice of keeping detailed written minutes of meetings of its officers, and most of the records and reports, covering a period of nearly thirty years, which were housed at the League's headquarters in Westerville, Ohio, were appropriated by the Senate Committee on Campaign Expenditures in 1926. This material was never returned to the League, and apparently was lost or misplaced.
PRIMARY SOURCES

Anti-Saloon League Materials

The Anti-Saloon, 1893-1896. This was a monthly publication and a forerunner of the American Issue.


The Voice, quarterly publication of the Temperance Society of the Methodist Church, 1911-20.


Periodical Literature


Anderson, w. H., "Mr. Anderson Puts His Side of the Case." Outlook, CXXV, 84 (September 19, 1923).

"Anti-Saloon League and Civil Service." Outlook, CXXV, 319-21 (October 21, 1923).

"Anti-Saloon League Sees the Light." Christian Century, XXXVII, 297-98 (March 5, 1930).


Davenport, J., "Dry Eyes on Hoover: Interview with F. S. McBride. Colliers], LXXXI, 8-9 (February 2, 1929).


"Investigating the Anti-Saloon League." Review of Reviews, LXIV, 126-28 (August, 1926).

"Is Prohibition Worth $35,000,000?" Literary Digest, XC, 8-9 (July 10, 1926).


"Master Mind of Prohibition." Outlook, CXXXVII, 40 (September 14, 1927).


"Prohibition After Wheeler." *Outlook*, LXXXIV, 5-7 (September 17, 1927).

"Prohibition and the Negro!" *Outlook*, LXXVII, 587-89 (March 11, 1908).


"Reformers Meet Reform." *Nation*, CXVIII, 155 (February 13, 1924).


"The Saloon Problem." *Outlook*, LXI, 484-97 (February 18, 1898).

"War Breaking Down the Barriers to Prohibition and Woman Suffrage." *Current Opinion*, LXIV, 62-84 (February 1918).


Whaley, P. H., "Aspects of Prohibition in the South." Collier's, LI, 32 (May 31, 1913).

Government Publications

Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1913.
Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 3rd Session, 1914.
Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 1st Session, 1917.
Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, 1917.


Newspapers

Baltimore Sun.
Chicago Record-Herald.
Columbus Dispatch.
Cleveland Plain Dealer.
New York American.
New York Evening Post.
New York World.
Ohio State Journal.
Washington Post.

Miscellaneous


Baker, Urley A., Unpublished Autobiography. Although never published, the autobiography is preserved in galley proofs at the Anti-Saloon League's former headquarters, Westerville, Ohio.


General Catalogue of Oberlin College, 1893-1908.


Schneider, Morris F., Campus Martius State Memorial Museum (booklet). Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, Columbus, 1936.

The National German-American Alliance and Its Allies, Pro-German Brewers and Liquor Dealers, A Misloyal Combination (pamphlet). Published by Anti-Saloon League.

Westerville in the American Tradition (booklet). The Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, Columbus, 1940.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books


Brenner, E. S., Hughes, T. T., Patten, W., American Agricultural Villages. George H. Doran Company, New York, 1927.


---, The Underworld of American Politics. Fletcher Dobyns Publisher, New York, 1932.


Walters, Everett, Joseph Benson Foraker, The Ohio History Press, Columbus, 1948.


AUTobiography

I, Norman Harding Dohn, was born in Clarence, New York, November 5, 1920. I received my secondary education in the public schools of Clarence, New York, and my undergraduate training at Otterbein College, which granted me the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1943. From Ohio State University, I received the Master of Arts degree in 1947. For two years, from 1946 to 1948, I was employed as an instructor in English, Journalism, and radio-speech at Otterbein College. In 1948 I was employed as a reporter by the Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. During my employment at The Dispatch I have served as assistant city editor, Sunday editor, and television newscaster. Currently, I am an editorial writer.