Leading the Pack: Union Decertification Petitioners as Key Agents in the Union Decertification Process

Dissertation

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By

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* * * * *

The Ohio State University
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To My Parents
Robert and Beppy Borgers
I wish to thank Dr. Marcus Hart Sandver for his guidance throughout the research. Thanks go to the other committee members, Drs. Stephen M. Hills and William D. Todor, for their insights, suggestions and comments. Thanks also go to Susan Josephs, and Dr. Arnon Reichers for their insights, comments and encouragement. I have had the great fortune to pursue my Ph.D. in parallel with Milan Lint who has provided great inspiration, collaboration, assistance and support. Gratitude is expressed for the financial support of the William Green Fellowship, for the extremely generous contributions of time and expertise by the staff of the National Labor Relations Board, and for the time and effort of all those individuals willing to respond to my extensive interviews and questionnaires. Conducting this research was made immeasurably easier by the unconditional support and love of my parents, Robert and Beppie Borgers, and my brothers, Peter and Robert. What could have been a rather lonely and one-dimensional period of my life was instead filled with warmth, comfort, and comic relief by the members of the Cisco and Lyons families: Alice, Paul, Binky, Mike, Megan and Sara. Finally, I express my deepest gratitude to Angela Cain, who stood by me, and who, with great effort, managed to somehow hold our lives and household together.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION .......................................................................................... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................. iii

VITA .................................................................................................... iv

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................ xi

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................... xiii

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1

1) The Question in Context .............................................................. 1
2) The Specific Question ................................................................. 2
3) The Value of the Question ........................................................... 3
CHAPTER I. LEGISLATIVE, PROCEDURAL, AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DECERTIFICATION ELECTION

I.1) Legislative History ........................................ 6
I.2) Procedural Background of Employee Initiated Decertification Elections . 9
   I.2.a) Filing the "RD" Petition .............................. 9
   I.2.b) Withdrawing the "RD" Petition ....................... 11
   I.2.c) Union Disclaimer of Interest ...................... 13
   I.2.d) Restrictions on Employer Interference with the "RD" Petition 13
   I.2.e) The "RD" Election Campaign ...................... 14
I.3) "RD" Petition and Election Rates Over Time ............... 16

CHAPTER II. REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LITERATURE ON DECERTIFICATION .... 28

II.1) The Utility Maximization or Cost-Benefit Model of Union Elections 29
   II.1.a) Univariate vs Multivariate Models ............... 31
II.2) Critique of the UM/CB Model .......................... 34
II.3) Decertification Variables, relationships, and Hypotheses ........ 39
   II.3.a) Dependent Variables .............................. 39
   II.3.b) Independent Variables ............................ 42
      II.3.b.i) Economic Variables ......................... 42
      II.3.b.ii) Sociopolitical Variables .................. 53
II.4) Summary .................................................. 76
II.4.a) The Theoretical Model ............................... 76
II.4.b) Decertification Variables, Relationships, and Hypotheses .... 78
CHAPTER III. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF DECERTIFICATION  

III.1) Individual-Environment Relationships .......................... 84
III.2) Individual-Organization Relationships ......................... 84
   III.2.a) Union Satisfaction ........................................ 86
   III.2.b) Commitment .............................................. 87
III.3) Group Processes ................................................. 90
   III.3.a) Group Participation ....................................... 91
      III.3.a.i) Goals ............................................... 92
      III.3.a.ii) Instrumentality (likelihood of success) ............ 93
      III.3.a.iii) Costs and Benefits ................................ 95
   III.3.b) Decertification Coalition Leadership ..................... 96
III.4) Organizational Structures and Processes ....................... 100
   III.4.a) "Formal" Decertification as an Organizational Process ... 100
   III.4.b) The Organizational Structure and Practice of Collective 
             Bargaining ............................................... 101
   III.4.c) Union Democracy - Organizational Insights to 
             decertification ........................................ 103
      III.4.c.i) Democracy at the Local Union Level ............... 103
      III.4.c.ii) Democracy at the National Union Level .......... 108
III.5) Organizational-Environment Relations .......................... 108
III.6) Summary ................................................................ 110

CHAPTER IV. RESEARCH GOALS AND HYPOTHESES ........................ 114

IV.1) Research Goals and Designs ........................................ 114
IV.2) Explanatory Hypotheses and Exploratory Areas .................. 116
   IV.2.a) Petitioners as Leaders .................................... 116
   IV.2.b) Petitioners’ Commitment to the Union .................... 118
   IV.2.c) Petitioners’ Relationship to the Union .................... 119
   IV.2.d) Petitioners’ Relationship to the Employer ............... 121
   IV.2.e) Management’s Degree of Involvement in the Decertification 
           Process ..................................................... 122
   IV.2.f) Decertification Coalition ................................... 124
   IV.2.g) Union Campaign Practices .................................. 125
   IV.2.h) NLRB Election Records ...................................... 127
   IV.2.i) Petitioners’ Reasons for Decertification .................. 129
   IV.2.j) Petitioners’ Demographics .................................. 130
IV.3) Summary ................................................................ 130
CHAPTER V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................... 132

V.1) Overview of the Research Design ........................................ 132
V.2) Data Analysis Methods ...................................................... 136
V.3) Variable Operationalizations .............................................. 137
   V.3.a) Dependent Variable .................................................... 137
   V.3.b) Independent Variables - Conventions for Selecting Measures . 137
   V.3.c) Independent Variables ................................................ 139
      V.3.c.i) Petitioners as Leaders ........................................... 139
      V.3.c.ii) Petitioners’ Commitment to the Union ..................... 140
      V.3.c.iii) Petitioners’ Relationship to the Union ................... 141
      V.3.c.iv) Petitioners’ Relationship to the Employer ............... 141
      V.3.c.v) Management’s Degree of Involvement in the
              Decertification Process .......................................... 142
      V.3.c.vi) Decertification Coalition .................................... 143
      V.3.c.vii) Union Campaign Practices ................................. 143
      V.3.c.viii) NLRB Election Records .................................... 144
      V.3.c.ix) Petitioners’ Reasons for Decertification ............... 145
      V.3.c.x) Petitioners’ Demographics .................................. 145
V.4) Limitations in the Research Methodology ............................. 146
CHAPTER VI. RESULTS ......................................................... 151

VI.1) Response Rates .......................................................... 151
VI.2) Exploratory Results ....................................................... 153
   VI.2.a) NLRB Election data .................................................. 153
   VI.2.b) Questionnaire data ................................................... 157
      VI.2.b.i) Petitioners as Leaders ......................................... 157
      VI.2.b.ii) Petitioners' Commitment to the Union .................... 161
      VI.2.b.iii) Petitioners' Relationship to the Union ................. 162
      VI.2.b.iv) Petitioners' Relationship to the Employer ............. 165
      VI.2.b.v) Management's Degree of Involvement in the
      Decertification Process .................................................. 166
      VI.2.b.vi) Decertification Coalition .................................. 169
      VI.2.b.vii) Union Campaign Practices .................................. 171
      VI.2.b.viii) Petitioners' Reasons for Decertification ............. 174
      VI.2.b.ix) Petitioners' Demographics .................................. 177
   VI.2.c) Summary of Exploratory Results ................................ 178

VI.3) Explanatory Results ..................................................... 180
   VI.3.a) Results for Selecting Measures of Independent Variables .. 181
   VI.3.b) Stepwise Regression Results ..................................... 188
   VI.3.c) Hierarchical Regression Results ................................ 192
   VI.3.d) Summary of the Explanatory Results ............................ 197

VI.4) Summary of Combined Exploratory and Explanatory Results .... 201
CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY ........................................... 210

VII.1) Overview of the Study .................................... 210
VII.2) Summary of the Findings ................................. 211
    VII.2.a) Summary of the Exploratory Results ............. 211
        VII.2.a.i) Background and Characteristics of Petitioners ........ 211
        VII.2.a.ii) The Reasons Petitioners Engage in Decertification Campaigns ........................................... 212
        VII.2.a.iii) Union and Management Involvement in the Decertification Process ........................................... 212
    VII.2.b) Summary of the Explanatory Results ............. 213
    VII.2.c) Summary of the Combined Exploratory and Explanatory Results ........................................... 216
        VII.2.c.i) The Nature of the Decertification Process ........ 216
        VII.2.c.ii) The Nature and Role of the Decertification Petitioner ........................................... 220
        VII.2.c.iii) An Alternative Model of the Decertification Process ........................................... 223

VII.3) Limitations in the Findings ............................ 224
    VII.3.a) Methodological Limitations ......................... 225
    VII.3.b) Theoretical Limitations .............................. 227

VII.4) Implications for Future Research ....................... 234
    VII.4.a) Demand for Decertification versus Decertification Election Outcomes ........................................... 235
    VII.4.b) Focus on the Agents and Institutions of the Industrial Relations System ........................................... 237

APPENDICES:

APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF ELECTION RESULTS FROM 1948-1963 241

APPENDIX B. OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL AND RESULTS 245

    B.1) Copy of Protocol for Open-Ended Practitioner Interviews .......... 245
    B.2) Copy of Cards Used During Open-Ended Practitioner Interviews .... 251
    B.3) Summary of Results of Open-Ended Practitioner Interviews ........ 257

APPENDIX C. SOLICITATION LETTER, CONSENT FORM, AND QUESTIONNAIRE ........................................... 275

APPENDIX D. CORRELATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE ........................................... 289

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 291
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1: Decertification Petitions, Elections, and Outcomes 1948-1990</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2: Representation and Certification Data 1948-1990</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1: Election Delay in Months</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2: Number of Eligible Employees</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3: Distribution of Mean Self Esteem Scores</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4: Petitioners’ Initiation of the Decertification</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5: Petitioners’ Behavioral Activism</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6: Petitioner Was Approached by Other Employees</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7: Petitioners Signed Petition because Other Employees Suggested it</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8: Petitioner-Employee Relationship</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9: Petitioners’ Holding of a Union Position</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10: Distribution of Mean Union Commitment</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.11: Petitioners’ Degree of Union Involvement</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.12: Distribution of Mean Organizational Commitment</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.13: Management’s Behavioral Activism</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.14: Management’s Verbal Activism ..................................... 168
6.15: Management Initiation of the Decertification .................. 168
6.16: Number of Petitioners ............................................... 169
6.17: Other Employees Initiation of Structure During the Decertification ... 170
6.18: Other Employees Behavioral Activism ............................ 171
6.19: Union Behavioral Activism ...................................... 172
6.20: Union Verbal Activism .......................................... 173
6.21: Petitioners’ General Reasons for Decertification .................... 174
6.22: Petitioners’ Most Important General Reasons for Decertification .... 175
6.23: Petitioners’ Most Common Specific Reasons for Decertification .... 176
6.24: Scale Reliabilities (calculated as Cronbach’s $\alpha$) .............. 182
6.25: Correlation Matrices for the Measures of Independent Variables .... 184-5
6.26: Correlation Percentage of Anti-Union Votes and: Other Employees Helped the Petitioner; and, Number of Other Employees who Helped the Petitioner ........................................ 188
6.27: Potential Regression Model Variables ............................ 189
6.28: Summary Statistics of Full Model ................................ 190-1
6.29: Summary Statistics of Hierarchical Regression Models: including only variables found to be significant in the full model at stage 1; including combinations of leadership variables at stage 2 ...................... 195
A.1: RC and RM Data 1948-1963 .................................... 243
A.2: Transformations of NLRB Data for Estimates of % Union Wins, and Number of Union Wins in RC Elections 1948-1963 .................. 243
A.3: Transformations of NLRB Data for Estimates of Number of Eligible Voters in Units Voting for a Union in RC Elections 1948-1963 .... 244
# List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURES</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1: Individual-Group-Organization-Environment Relationships</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2: Flow Diagram of the Decertification Process</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

1) The Question in Context

Labor union decertification is the process whereby rank-and-file union members vote to reject (decertify) the union presently representing them. The decertification vote is conducted as an official decertification election, administered (in the private sector) by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). This research will examine decertification in the private sector in order to increase academic and labor relations practitioners' understanding of this process.

Decertification petitioners are the individual employees who sign the decertification petition requesting that the NLRB hold a decertification election in their bargaining unit. This research focuses on the decertification petitioner both as a source of data and as a critical organizational actor in the decertification process. This focus has been driven by theoretical reflection and writing on the decertification process, and the development of an explanatory model of decertification, as presented in Chapter III.
While union decertification accounts for only a relatively small proportion of the overall decline in union density in the U.S.\(^1\), studying decertification can significantly increase understanding of fundamental causes of union decline because, union decertification constitutes rank-and-file union members rejecting the union that represents them, and signals union leadership that the members believe the union no longer effectively represents them\(^2\). In this sense, the study of decertification provides a unique perspective on union members' perceptions of union instrumentality and unions' organizational effectiveness as employee representatives. Since these are two factors that are consistently cited as being central to explanations of overall union decline in the US\(^3\), greater understanding of decertification is of critical concern to both Industrial Relations (IR) academics and union practitioners.

2) **The Specific Question:**

A questionnaire survey of decertification petitioners will be combined with NLRB election records to provide a large sample of richly detailed data on various aspects of decertification petitioners and the decertification process. The research has two goals: i) exploratory analysis of the decertification petitioner and the decertification process; and, ii) explanatory analysis of the role of the decertification petitioner in the decertification process.
Three exploratory questions are of particular interest: i) the background and characteristics of petitioners; ii) the reasons petitioners engage in decertification campaigns; and, iii) the degree of union and managerial involvement in the decertification process.

The explanatory analysis will examine the decertification petitioner's role as a leader of other employees in the bargaining unit. It is presupposed that decertification petitioners act as leaders of decertification coalitions in their bargaining unit. The decertification coalition is that group of employees who come together to decertify their union. It is further believed that decertification petitioners' leadership abilities and behaviors significantly affect the success of the coalition in attaining a decertification outcome. The research will examine the proposition that the leadership traits and behaviors of the decertification petitioner, as leader of the decertification coalition, significantly affects the coalition's ability to attain a decertification outcome.

3) **The Value of the Question:**

The research will generate three significant contributions to academic and labor relations practitioner knowledge.

First, the research will shed light on a rarely studied, poorly understood, yet controversial area of the US industrial relations system. Management actors argue that the
decertification process, in theory, gives US employees the democratic rights to opt out of unwanted collective representation. Many also allege severe union intimidation of those who choose to exercise this right, especially the leaders of this process, the decertification petitioners. Union actors, on the other hand argue that the decertification process has been subverted by management to become a legally sanctioned means, within the National Labor Relations Act, through which unions can be attacked and undermined. They allege that the majority of decertification petitioners are tools of management, used as a legal front for management initiated and led deunionization. Given these conflicting claims, an in-depth exploration of the decertification process, from the participants perspective, will shed considerable objective light on this debate. To date, no survey of decertification petitioners has ever been conducted, and, in this regard, this research represents a unique effort.

Second, the research will generate findings of considerable interest to union actors. Examination of the role of the decertification petitioner in the decertification process will uncover characteristics and behaviors of unions' most strident opposition. Such information will be of value to union leadership in formulating organizing strategies for both decertification and certification campaigns and for internal organizing. If decertification petitioners are indeed genuine leaders among the employees then these are the very employees who unions should be targeting as potential union activists. It should further be noted that such information is difficult for unions to furnish independently, given that they are likely to have poor, or weak relationships with strident anti-union employees.
Third, the research will operationalize and evaluate a conceptualization of decertification as an organizational process. This conceptualization represents a significant departure from, and improvement over, the traditional paradigm adopted in studies of union certification and decertification.

Notes:

1. Dickens and Leonard (1985), Troy (1986), and Kirkland (1986). Dickens and Leonard (1985) argue that even though there has been a 300% increase in the decertification rate between 1950 and 1979, taking the decertification rate at its highest, and assuming that every decertification election resulted in a union loss, "it would take over 15 years for decertification to cause a one percent drop in the percentage of the labor force organized - all other factors held constant" (p. 327).

2. Troy (1986), and Lipset (1986).

CHAPTER I
Legislative, Procedural, and Historical Background
of the Decertification Election

1.1) Legislative History

The demand for the decertification election emerged in the tumultuous legislative environment following passage of the 1935 Wagner Act. The Wagner Act did not contain provisions for either employees or employers to decertify their bargaining representative. However by 1939 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) modified its policy to allow employers to petition the board for an election in cases where two or more unions claimed recognition of the unit. This power was extended to employees in 1942, with the board arguing:

"...effectuation of the basic policies of the Act requires, as the life of the collective contract comes to a close, that the employees be able to advocate change in their affiliation, without fear of discharge by an employer for doing so."
However, it was not until 1943 that the board faced a request from employees for decertification to non-union status. The board turned down the request on the basis that such an outcome would have gone against the national policy of encouraging collective bargaining. "Thus employees could alter the form but not the fact of the collective representation under the Wagner Act" (Pulmer, 1981). The board also rejected three claims in 1945 by employers that their employees no longer wanted to be represented by their unions.

Hence the only recourse for employees who wanted to rid themselves of their bargaining representative was to convince their employer to risk an unfair labor practice charge by refusing to bargain in the hope of provoking the union to either petition for an election or file an unfair labor practice charge so as to bring the representation issue before the board. Alternatively, employees could encourage another union to request recognition of their unit.

In 1947 Congress re-examined the Wagner Act under the debate initiated by the proposed Taft-Hartley amendment to the National Labor Relations Act. Decertification was one of the more vehemently debated issues. The proponents of decertification argued that a procedure was needed to provide greater "individual freedom" vis-a-vis union representation. Senator Robert Taft described the intent of the proposed decertification section:
"Today if a union is once certified it is certified forever; there is no machinery by which there can be any decertification of that particular union. An election under this bill may be sought to decertify a union and go back to a non-union status, if the men so desire." (Daily Congressional Record, 1947)

Opposition to the decertification section was widespread and at high administrative levels.

Paul Herzog, Chairman of the NLRB was strongly opposed and forecast that the provision would seriously erode the stability of collective bargaining:

"To give them (dissident groups in any bargaining unit) complete freedom to challenge the status of their bargaining representative at any time means that the employers will constantly be harassed by elections, that the certified union will never attain a secure position and will tend to make unreasonable demands to hold their adherents and also that some employers will be given inducements to stimulate anti-union activity among their employees. While there are arguments both ways, our conclusion is that the encouragement of collective bargaining and the maintenance of stable relationships already established, weigh in favor of advising against the proposal." (U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 1948)

One aspect of the decertification section was particularly objectionable to its opponents - the provision to allow employer initiated decertification efforts ("RM" elections). This was one of the specific provisions mentioned by President Truman in presenting his veto of Taft-Hartley to Congress in 1947 (Sandver and Miller, 1984). Despite President Truman's veto, three days later, on June 23, 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley amendments, including the amended Section 9(c)1 which gave employees the power to decertify an incumbent union."
1.2) Procedural Background of Employee Initiated "RD* Decertification Elections"

1.2.a) Filing the "RD* Petition":

An RD petition may be filed only by an employee, group of employees, or an individual or labor organization acting on their behalf. An employer is not permitted to file an RD petition and its involvement in helping to prepare, circulate or file the petition may be a basis for the dismissal of the petition and an unfair labor practice charge.

A petition for a decertification election must contain an allegation that the currently certified or recognized bargaining agent is no longer the designated or selected agent of a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. For example, a statement signed by the majority of the employees in a unit expressing the opinion that they no longer desire to be represented by the existing union is sufficient under Section 9(c)(1)(A) to support an RD petition. Employees who seek to decertify their representative need not withdraw from the union as a condition for filing the decertification petition. A hearing in a decertification case is conducted by the Regional Director in the same manner as hearings for other representation proceedings.

The RD petition may be filed and entertained by the Board only within certain time periods. The general temporal limitations are as follows:
**The Election Year Rule:** The election year rule prohibits the Board from conducting an election in a unit or subdivision of a unit in which a valid election has been held during the preceding twelve months\textsuperscript{13}.

**The Certification Year Rule:** A union certified as the exclusive collective bargaining representative is given a minimum of one year from the date of certification to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the employer. This rule reflects a congressional intent to allow a union that wins a representation election to create and maintain a stable bargaining relationship for at least one year\textsuperscript{14}. Thus an RD petition will be dismissed if it is filed within one year from the date of certification of representative\textsuperscript{15}.

**Insulated and Open Period:** Subject to the election and certification rules, a petition may be filed at any time provided that there is no collective agreement in effect. Where such an agreement is in effect, a petition may be filed only from sixty to ninety days prior to the expiration of the contract - the "open period." In the health care industry the open period is between ninety and 120 days prior to the termination of the contract. No election petitions may be filed within the "insulated period" (90 days prior to the expiration of a contract executed in the health care industry and the 60 days prior to the expiration date of all other contracts) immediately preceding and including the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement\textsuperscript{16}.
**Contract Bar Rules:** The existence of a valid collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a union also may act as a bar to the filing of a petition for an election.

The petition should be filed with the regional office of the Board in the area where the bargaining unit is located. The petition form is supplied by the regional Board office. The petition must be in writing and signed. It must be either notarized or contain a declaration by the person signing it that its contents are true and correct to the best of the signatory's knowledge and belief. The petition may be signed by the petitioner, its representative or attorney. The regional office may lend assistance in the preparation of the petition. The petition is usually filed in person or by mail at the appropriate regional office.

The petition provides a description of the contemplated or existing appropriate bargaining unit, the approximate number of employees involved, and the names of all labor organizations claiming to represent the employees.

1.2.b) **Withdrawing the "RD Petition":**

As will become clear below, and in Chapter III, the withdrawal of the RD petition is a fairly critical issue in modelling the decertification campaign. Consequently, a brief overview of the regulations regarding withdrawal of an RD petition is provided.
A party seeking withdrawal of their petition must file a request with the Regional Director. The "party" in most decertification cases is the employee who signed the NLRB petition form. "Generally, the Regional Director should favor the effectuation of a petitioner's genuine voluntary desire to drop a representation proceeding." The conditions under which a petition may be withdrawn vary according to what stage of the campaign the withdrawal request is made.

Prior to Board approval of an election agreement or close of a hearing: a Board agent investigating a petition may request a party to withdraw its petition if, for example, a contract bar exists, unresolved unfair labor practices exist, or the petitioner has failed to submit an adequate showing of interest. If a petitioner’s withdrawal request is based upon a legitimate reason and is received prior to the close of any hearing or the approval of an election agreement, normally it will be granted without prejudice to the subsequent filing of a new petition.

After Close of Hearing or Approval of Election But Prior to Election: a timely withdrawal request should be approved without prejudice. If, however, an intervenor, other than a certified incumbent union, desires an election and produces a sufficient showing of interest, an election will be held as scheduled.

Withdrawal of Petition After Election: will generally not be approved if it appears that the intent of the withdrawal is to circumvent the Board’s certification procedure.
1.2.c) *Union Disclaimer of Interest:*

Unions faced with a decertification petition may file a "disclaimer of interest" with the Board. If valid, the disclaimer results in dismissal of the petition and cancellation of the election. Unions file disclaimers in order to conserve the union resources lost and avoid the adverse publicity that often accompany decertification campaigns\(^{22}\).

1.2.d) *Restrictions on Employer Interference with the "RD" Petition:*

A critical concern surrounding RD campaigns is controlling undue employer influence (Sandver and Miller, 1984). Under NLRB regulations, an employer may not initiate discussions with employees on the procedure to follow in preparing or filing a decertification petition, nor may employers promote or participate in inducing employees to sign any type of union repudiating document (Peirce, 1982). However, employers may provide "ministerial assistance" to employees. This includes providing, on request, the source of decertification petitions (i.e. the NLRB), the address and phone number of the regional Board office, and an Excelsior list (a list of eligible bargaining unit voters). This information may be distributed by the employer at an employee requested meeting where there is an anticipation such questions may be asked\(^{23}\). Employers are only responsible for the actions of their supervisors when they are not bargaining unit members. NLRB decisions in the 1980s gave "quite broad latitude" to the participation of supervisors and leadmen (Sandver and Miller, 1984)\(^{24}\).
1.2.e) The "RD" Election Campaign:

The NLRB regulations regarding decertification elections are the same as for certification elections and employer and union conduct is generally similar (Fulmer, 1978; Anderson et al, 1982; and, Lawler, 1990). The Board has generated extensive case based rulings on regulation of speech, conduct, third part conduct, and the effect of unlawful conduct. It would require considerable space to fully review this material. Therefore, only a brief overview is provided, with emphasis on those areas that assume particular importance during decertification campaigns. The issue of legal and illegal campaign conduct is addressed again in Chapters III and IV where the decertification model and hypotheses attempt to integrate this issue.

Once an election date has been scheduled the parties are in a position to begin their campaign to persuade the voters. Speeches, campaign literature, and other propaganda may be used to explain a party's position, to disseminate a party's lawful predictions as to the consequences of unionization and to compare a party's wage rates and benefit plans with those of the opponent. The parties may not engage in campaign conduct which creates "an atmosphere calculated to prevent a free and untrammelled choice by the employees." In cases where such "laboratory conditions" are undermined by union or employer conduct and where the free choice of representatives is rendered improbable, an election may be set aside.
Both academics (Pearce and Peterson, 1987), practitioners, and petitioners maintain that it is unions who most often undermine laboratory conditions during the decertification campaign. The main conflict during decertification campaigns tend to be between the anti-union employees and the union. In particular, the petitioner, who is the sole party able to withdraw the petition, can come under considerable pressure from the union. Thus, where the union is interested in retaining a given unit, there is potential for inappropriate union conduct to emerge.

Interestingly, the bulk of NLRB election conduct regulations focus on employer conduct. For example, there is no mention of unions in discussions of surveillance and interrogation. This is not surprising, given that the bulk of NLRB regulated elections are certification elections where the employer takes the more hostile and aggressive role.

Nevertheless, there are NLRB regulations concerning union threats of reprisals. Even though threats may be directly attributable to a union, they will constitute a basis for setting aside an election only when they destroy laboratory conditions. The Board has found that certain union threats of physical harm, job loss or loss of benefits to employees who do not favor unionization create an atmosphere which destroys these conditions. In 1983 the Board reversed previous policy, deciding to set aside elections on the basis of certain union threats relating to past or possible future reprisals by the union.
1.3) "RD" Petition and Election Rates Over Time

Table 1.1 provides an overview of RD (decertification) petition, election, and election outcome rates over time. Table 1.2 provides data on all representation cases, RC (certification) election, and election outcome rates over time.

After years of slow, fluctuating growth, the number of RD petitions filed increased fairly dramatically in the 1970s (Table 1.1.C1). Between 1948 and 1970 the number of decertification petitions filed each year grew from 458 to 766, an average of 3.1 percent per year. By 1979, however, the number of petitions had grown to 1,793, an average growth rate of 13.4 percent over the ten year period. This pattern of growth was replicated by the number of RD petitions as a proportion of all representation cases processed by the NLRB (comparing Table 1.1.C1 and Table 1.2.C1). In 1948 RD petitions represented only 7.2 percent of all cases, and this figure did not rise above 6.6 percent for the remaining 22 years. However, by 1979, the percentage had increased to 13.9 percent. This pattern of growth continued for a few more years, peaking in the early 1980s. After 1982 there was actually a decline in the number of RD petitions, with an average rate of decline of 5.1 percent from 1982 to 1990. The number of RD petitions as a proportion of all representation cases also peaked in 1982 (23.7 percent) and then declined to a low in 1989 (15.4 percent).
The number of RD elections experienced a similar pattern of growth (Table 1.1.C2). The number of elections increased from 97 in 1948, to 301 in 1970, to 777 in 1979, peaking in 1983 at 922 elections. Further, the proportion of RD petitions resulting in RD elections increased over this period. In 1948 only 21.2 percent of petitions resulted in elections and in the following five years the proportion regularly fell below 30 percent. However, by 1979 43.3 percent of RD petitions resulted in elections. In the following decade the proportion increased to where in 6 out of 11 years the percentage of RD petitions resulting in elections exceeded 50 percent (peaking in 1986 at 52.3 percent). However the aggregate number of RD elections saw a decline in the 1980s from a peak of 922 in 1983 to a low of 587 in 1990.

The percentage of union victories in RD elections, in contrast, has seen a slow decline over time (Table 1.1.C3). While unions never exceeded a 38.6 percent victory rate (1958), the average annual victory rate declined from 32.3 percent in the 1950s to 28.1 percent in the 1970s, ending at 25.6 percent in the 1980s. The darkest period for unions appears to have been from 1977 to 1987 when the victory rate was at or below the 25 percent mark for nine out of eleven of these years.

The number of employees lost by unions through lost decertification elections has followed an identical pattern (Table 1.1.C5). While from 1948 to 1958 unions typically only lost some 5,000 to 6,000 employees a year through lost decertification elections, this figure increased to 19,884 in 1978, peaking at 27,527 in 1981.
Table 1.1: Decertification Petitions, Elections, and Outcomes 1948-1990:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>C1 Number of Petitions Filed</th>
<th>C2 Number of Elections Held</th>
<th>C3 Percentage of Union Victories</th>
<th>C4 Number of Union Victories</th>
<th>C5 Number of employees Lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>458</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>402</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>484</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>44</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5,935</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5,598</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6,888</td>
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<td>489</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
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<td>541</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
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<td>607</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
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<td>593</td>
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<td>33.2</td>
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<td>698</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>6,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>679</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
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<tr>
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<td>593</td>
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<td>36.0</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
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<td>651</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>99</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>91</td>
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<tr>
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<td>942</td>
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<td>30.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,080</td>
<td>451</td>
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<td>134</td>
<td>10,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>10,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>11,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>13,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,457</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>15,303</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>22,398</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,754</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>19,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>777</td>
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<td>194</td>
<td>22,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>246</td>
<td>21,249</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>856</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>215</td>
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<tr>
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<td>869</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>22,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>922</td>
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<td>232</td>
<td>23,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>24,128</td>
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<td>1,675</td>
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<td>23,801</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,640</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>20,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,416</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>22,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>20,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>14,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>16,341</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
From 1980 to 1988 unions were losing an average of 22,923 employees a year through lost decertification elections. These changes represented only 2.3 percent growth in the number of employees lost from 1948 to 1970, followed by rapid 17.6 percent growth through the 1970s, peaking in the early 1980s, followed by gradual decline through the mid 1980s, and bottoming out at 14,809 in 1989.

The impact of RD decertification on collective bargaining has been debated since its legislative introduction (see above). The majority of academics who have examined aggregate decertification figures have concluded that decertification has never represented a serious threat to collective bargaining (Krislov, 1956 and 1979; Fulmer, 1981; Dickens and Leonard, 1985). This conclusion is often based on comparisons between losses to membership incurred through decertification and gains made through certification.

The certification figures contained in Table 1.2, C2-C5 appear to support the conclusion that decertification losses do not pose a serious threat when compared with certification gains. However, the figures should raise concerns about the state of organizing and the health of organized labor.

The number of RC elections held experienced gradual growth through the 1970s, peaking at 8,526 RC elections in 1973 (Table 1.2.C2). The average number of RC elections held was 5,078 in the 1950s, 6,930 in the 1960s, 7,752 in the 1970s, and 4,130 in the 1980s. These averages reflect the growth rate of RC elections over this period.
Table 1.2: Representation and Certification Data 1948-1990:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>C1 All Representation Cases Filed</th>
<th>C2 Number of Certification Elections</th>
<th>C3 Percentage of Union Victories</th>
<th>C4 Number of Union Victories</th>
<th>C5 Number of employees Gained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>2,243</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>135,580</td>
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<td>8,370</td>
<td>5,282</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>3,132</td>
<td>320,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9,279</td>
<td>5,251</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>3,114</td>
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<td>6,271</td>
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<td>3,719</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6,612</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>59.4</td>
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<td>58.0</td>
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<td>240,651</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>61.8</td>
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<td>4,214</td>
<td>300,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>55.1</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>259,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13,711</td>
<td>8,066</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>4,483</td>
<td>280,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14,032</td>
<td>8,526</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>4,501</td>
<td>216,842</td>
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<td>7,736</td>
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<td>3,906</td>
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<td>48.8</td>
<td>4,056</td>
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<td>3,536</td>
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</table>
From 1948 to 1970 the number of RC elections grew at an average annual rate of 10.5 percent, stabilized in the 1970s (fluctuating between 8,526 to 7,026 elections a year), and then declined at an annual average rate of 5.0 percent.

The percentage of union victories in RC elections has followed a slightly different pattern (Table 1.2.C3). Union success peaked in the mid to early 1950s with success rates between 63.0 and 66.5 percent. Over the following decades there was a gradual, fluctuating decline in the success rate until, in the 1980s the success rate in each year had dropped to 50 percent or less.

The number of employees gained through union won RC elections followed a pattern which combines both of the above patterns. While the number of employees gained through RC elections grew at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent between 1948 and 1970, the greatest gains occurred in the 1950s. The average annual number of employees gained was 316,933 in the 1950s, it was only 287,146 in the 1960s. After 1967 the number of employees gained went into a persistent decline that has continued through the present. The 1970s saw a 4.3 percent and the 1980s saw a 5.4 percent decline in the annual number of employees gained through RC elections. The average annual number of employees gained was 214,877 in the 1970s, and only 97,454 in the 1980s. If the relatively high 1980 and 1981 employee gain figures are removed, the annual average number of employees gained for the early to end 1980s is an even lower 81,876 employees.
Clearly the peak losses through decertification (27,527 in 1981) are considerably lower than the troughs in union gains through RC certification (74,389 in 1983). Consequently the figures appear to support the conclusion that decertification losses do not pose a serious threat to collective bargaining. Indeed, as Dickens and Leonard (1985) demonstrated, even though there was a 300 percent increase in the decertification rate between 1950 and 1979, taking the decertification rate at its highest, and assuming that every decertification election resulted in a union loss, "it would take over 15 years for decertification to cause a one percent drop in the percentage of the labor force organized - all other factors held constant" (p. 327).

Various authors have, however, identified the trends in RC certification data, as presented above, as a major determinant of the decline in aggregate union density (Dickens and Leonard, 1985; Weiler, 1985; Freeman, 1989b). These authors interpret the correlations between RC activity and victory rates and union density declines as reflecting "waning union influence and renewed employer assertiveness" (Chaison and Rose, 1991, p. 26). *It is the contention of this study that the increases in RD petitions, elections, and employees lost through RD elections, and the decline of union success rates all reflect the same dynamics underlying the RC data.*

Union decertification constitutes employees rejecting the union that represents them, and signals union leadership that the rank-and-file believe the union no longer effectively represents them (Troy, 1986; Lipset, 1986). It seems highly probable that the two central
reasons for employees feeling this way are "waning union influence and renewed employer assertiveness." In this sense, the study of decertification provides a unique perspective on union members' perceptions of union instrumentality and unions' organizational effectiveness as employee representatives. Since these are two factors that are consistently cited as central to explanations of overall union decline in the US, studying decertification can potentially provide significant insights into fundamental causes of union decline.

Notes:

1. Officially known as the National Labor Relations Act.


6. The amended Section 9(c)1 stated:

Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board (A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees...assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or being currently recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in Section 9(a).... The Board shall investigate such a petition and if it has a reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct
an election by secret ballot and certify the results thereof.

7. Neither this section nor subsequent chapters discuss employer initiated RM elections in any depth as the focus of this research is employee initiated decertification.

8. This section is based exclusively on Feerick et al (1985).

9. NLRB, Rules and Regulations § 102.60 (a).


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. § 9 (c) (3), 29 USC § 159 (c) (3) (1976).


15. See Midstate Tel. Co., 179 NLRB 185, 72 LRRM 1363 (1969); and, Centr-O-Cost & Eng'r Co., 100 NLRB 1507, 30 LRRM 1478 (1952).


17. For up to three years.

18. This section is based exclusively on Feerick et al (1985).

19. Sometimes multiple employees, or an attorney will sign the NLRB petition form. However, based on the sample of petitions processed in this study, such cases are relatively rare.


21. NLRB, Casehandling Manual (Part Two) ¶ 11, 112.

22. Pearce and Peterson (1987) found that unions filed disclaimers of interest in 135 of the 703 decertification cases they studied. Disclaimers represented about a third of all bargaining relationships broken in the wake of filing a decertification petition (the other two thirds represented lost decertification elections).

23. See Holly Manor Nursing Home, 235 NLRB 426 (1978) with regard to NLRB information, and Consolidated Rebuilders, Inc., 171 NLRB 1415 (1968) with regard to
the Excelsior list.


25. Although Sandver and Miller (1984) claim that the NLRB has regulated the contents of managerial campaigns more closely in decertification elections than in certification elections.


27. General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124, 126, 21 LRRM 1337, 1340 (1948).

28. As revealed in preliminary and questionnaire pre-test interviews.

29. Both Pearce and Peterson (1987), and practitioner and petitioner interviews point to this dynamic.


34. Number of RD cases received in given fiscal year.

35. Total number of RD elections closed in given fiscal year.

36. Percentage of RD elections won by union in given fiscal year.

37. Total number of RD elections won by union in given fiscal year.

38. Unless otherwise indicated, this figure represents the number of employees eligible to vote who were in elections resulting in decertification. Thus, this figure represents the number of employees who were previously represented by a union who were "lost" through RD decertification.

39. There was not a breakdown of the number of employees eligible to vote whose unions decertified. Consequently a figure was estimated by multiplying the percentage of union losses (100-column 5/100) with the number of eligible voters in all decertification elections.
40. ibid.

41. This figure was generated by subtracting the number of employees in units choosing representation from the number of employees eligible to vote in decertification elections.

42. ibid.

43. Source: NLRB Annual Reports: Annual Report Tables.

44. Prior to 1964 NLRB reporting protocols make direct reporting of election outcome figures (columns 4-6) impossible. Consequently all election outcome figures, prior to 1964 represent estimates. The derivation of these estimates is contained in Appendix A.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Total number of all representation cases (RC, RM, and RD) received in given fiscal year.

61. Total number of RC elections closed in given fiscal year.
62. Percentage of RC elections won by union in given fiscal year.

63. Total number of RC elections won by union in given fiscal year.

CHAPTER II
Review and Critique of the Industrial Relations Literature on Decertification

This chapter summarizes the Industrial Relations (IR) literature on decertification. The vast majority of decertification research dates from 1978, with the sole exception of Krislov’s (1956) study "Union Decertification". Broadly speaking, empirical research has either:

i) charted trends in decertification elections (Krislov, 1956; and, 1979; Elliot and Hawkins, 1980; Fulmer, 1981; and Lawler, 1990).

ii) produced multiple case studies in which common elements have been sought (Chafetz and Frazer, 1979).

iii) surveyed decertification cases, attempting to establish a relationship between characteristics of the election campaign, or the labor-management relations, and the decertification vote (Anderson, Busman, and O’Reilly, 1982; Fulmer, 1978; Fulmer, and Gilman, 1981; and, Bigoness, and Tosi, 1984).

iv) produced NLRB based studies relating characteristics of the election unit to the decertification election outcome (Dworkin and Extej, 1979a; and, 1979b; Anderson, Busman, and O’Reilly, 1979; Pearce and Peterson, 1987; Lawler, 1990).
v) produced NLRB based studies relating micro and macro economic forces to decertification election outcomes (Anderson, Busman, and O'Reilly, 1980; Elliot, and Hawkins, 1982; Lawler, and Hundley, 1983; and, Ahlburg, and Dworkin, 1984).

The following review draws on all the studies listed above apart from those under in "i". The aim of the review is to provide an in-depth and critical discussion of the theoretical models and dependent and independent variables used in the above studies. The conclusions that emerge from the review will be used to inform the discussion of an alternate decertification model (Chapter III), and the generation of specific hypotheses (Chapter IV).

First, the general models underlying study of decertification are examined and critiqued. Then, the various relationships and hypotheses posited by previous decertification studies are outlined. Lastly, a summary will highlight the ways in which the research presented in the subsequent chapters will address the various theoretical and methodological issues raised in the review.

II.1) *The Utility Maximization or Cost-Benefit Model of Union Elections*

The IR literature on decertification elections is dominated by a single type of explanatory and predictive model: the utility maximization or cost-benefit paradigm (The UM/CB model). This model is usually specified in terms of employees'/ union members' maximizing their utility in terms of individual cost vs benefit estimates of
certifying/decertifying a union. This model derives directly from the ground-breaking work on union growth by Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969). Block and Premack (1983) argue that the major contribution of this work was to replace prior "macro" explanations of union growth/decline (e.g. those looking at such things as - organizational strength of union organizations, labor market competition among workers, degree of class consciousness among working class) with a "micro" explanation:

"Ashenfelter and Pencavel interpreted the business cycle variables in a framework of utility-maximizing behavior...They asked how overall economic conditions affected workers' evaluations of the benefits and costs (risks) of joining a union...Ashenfelter and Pencavel recognized that it is the individual worker who decides whether or not to join a union." (p.44)

The following examples will demonstrate the various twists that authors have given this central model in analyzing union certification/ decertification. In Ahlburg and Dworkin's (1984) decertification model:

"(I)t was hypothesized that a union will be decertified when workers decide that the expected utility from their jobs becoming non-union exceeds the expected utility from their jobs remaining union. These relative utilities are assumed to be a function of the union-nonunion wage differential and of the nonwage aspects of unionization." (p.26)

Lawler and Hundley (1983) cite Pencavel's direct influence on the development of their certification and decertification models:
"Following Pencavel (1971), we assume that the certification and
decertification rates depend upon the difference between some equilibrium
level of unionization and the current level of unionization within the
industry…

The partial equilibrium levels of unionization depend on actions taken, or
potentially taken, by workers, employers, and unions. At a conceptual
level, we would expect the parties to consider several factors in regard to
certification or decertification activity: a) the financial costs and benefits
associated with certification/decertification; b) the intrinsic costs and
benefits associated with certification/ decertification; c) the risks associated
with certification/ decertification; and, d) the availability of resources to
support or oppose certification/decertification activities." (p. 337)

The authors then identify contextual variables which are argued to be causally linked to
raising and lowering costs, benefits, risks etc.

Elliot and Hawkins (1982) provide an interesting approach to the general UM/CB model.
They argue that utility-maximization is used by both employees/union-members and by
union leaders. According to the authors, union leaders attempt to balance costs and
benefits in terms of the competing needs of servicing existent units vs organizing new
units.

II.1.a) Unidimensional vs Multidimensional Models:

Within the UM/CB paradigm one can further differentiate between unidimensional, or
economically oriented models, and multidimensional models, which include political and
organizational variables. There exists a debate, sometimes explicit sometimes muted,
regarding the appropriateness and predictive powers of unidimensional economic models to explain and predict decertification elections. This debate has its roots in Ashenfelter and Pencavel’s (1969) work and the empirical debates that it generated.

The obvious attraction of the unidimensional approach to modelling union processes is that it attains the economist’s goal of parsimonious explanation. Ashenfelter and Pencavel’s (1969) approach generated so much interest because it moved union growth models away from the multidimensional historical explanations established by Bernstein (1954) and toward a more parsimonious unidimensional business cycle explanation.

Perhaps the most extreme statement regarding the appropriateness and power of using unidimensional economic models on decertification elections was made by Lawler and Hundley (1983) who concluded that they are “exclusively a product of market conditions” (p.336). Ahlburg and Dworkin’s (1984) rationale for their unidimensional macroeconomic model of decertification is that:

"Anderson et al. (1982, p.187) have noted out of the 146 reasons cited by labor and management respondents as possible explanations for decertification activity, some 35 % "involved factors outside of the control of the bargaining agent. This suggests that at least some of the reasons for decertification activity may be unaffected by union actions." Other authors such as Elliot and Hawkins (1982) have reached the same conclusion." (p.15)
Ahlburg and Dworkin's argument is unconvincing because: i) a full 65% of the reasons for decertification cited by Anderson et al are within the control of the bargaining agent; and, ii) the "strategic" approach of Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1987) would posit that many of the macro factors outside of union control are filtered through labor and management's perceptions, actions and institutions. Further, contradictory empirical evidence exists. Koeller's (1991) multidimensional study found that:

"...organizational, political, and demographic effects are as important as market effects in determining union decertification activity. Organizational, political, and demographic factors also appear to influence employee interest in decertification, although the extent of these effects is more variable over time." (p.137)

Elliot and Hawkins (1982) also point to the significance of non-economic factors, specifically a union's rate of organizing, in determining decertification activity. Anderson et al (1982) discover a range of organizational level variables (such as changes in union leadership, and the existence of informal leadership within the unit) that are significantly related to decertification outcomes and they urge researchers to "cast widely" in developing their decertification models.

Given the limited, and contradictory time-series research on union decertification it is not clear whether unidimensional or multidimensional models would better predict variation in decertification outcomes. However, there are broader critiques of the overall UM/CB model that are particularly damaging to the unidimensional economic model.
II.2) Critique of the UM/CB Model

While decertification, like most union activities, is inherently social - involving processes that occur at an extra-individual, group or institutional level - the bulk of IR literature constructs models around the individual utility maximizer. Many IR outcomes are in reality the result of extra-individual, group or organizational level structures, relations, and processes. For example, Cooke (1983) provides an insightful discussion of the group and organizational processes that significantly help determine union *certification* election outcomes. The relationships and processes described below are clearly applicable to decertification elections:

"It is important to bear in mind that most representation elections are held only after at least 30% of the workers in a work unit have, in effect, requested the NLRB to do so. This implies that there are common dissatisfactions among the workers and that union representation is being pursued by a substantial proportion of the work unit. In determining the subjectively expected utility (SEU) associated with representation and the SEU associated with remaining nonunion, workers face a substantial task in sorting out the expected costs and benefits associated with either option.

Social-psychological research of group behavior strongly supports the belief that individual perceptions and opinions are shaped (or reshaped) substantially by the perceptions and opinions of others within a group. It is through the exchange of perceptions and opinions about (1) general worker dissatisfactions within the unit and (2) the likely gains and costs associated with union representation that the group shapes individual decisions to vote for or against union representation. Individuals having leadership or advocacy abilities are often especially influential in shaping the opinions of others in the group. Research also indicates that as group motives and goals form there is strong peer pressure for conformity and consensus." (p.403)
Similarly, Anderson, et al's (1982) qualitative case studies of *decertification* reveal the significance of informal leadership among the employees in generating action toward a decertification campaign.

Such processes are poorly explained as individual utility-maximizing processes. Nevertheless, UM/CB models continue to rely on a one dimensional conceptualization that focuses solely on the relationship between individual and environment. A full model of decertification should critically examine, conceptualize, and include the group and organizational relations and processes believed to be central to the determination of decertification outcomes.

IR scholars operationalize their utility-maximizing models of decertification by means of correlational analysis. Lawler (1990) calls this the "contextual approach." This approach treats decertification as an outcome of a host of contextual influences (markets, politics, social support, technology, employee demographics, and union/employer structures). The assumption is that changes in contextual conditions will alter individual's utility-maximizing or cost-benefit decisions with regard to retaining or rejecting their union. For example, Elliot and Hawkins (1982) argue:

"One major benefit often provided by unions is an increase in the level of job security under a collective bargaining contract...Changes in economic conditions which jeopardize the job security of employees will tend to lower employees' perceived benefits of union representation." (p.156)
The contextual approach has revealed some persistent associations between contextual variables and decertification outcomes, and has extended established union certification findings into the decertification realm. Nevertheless, the substantive conclusions generated by this approach have produced limited understanding of the causes of union decertification. I believe this lack of insight is due to three limitations of the contextual approach.

First, there are significant problems with the data used in contextual studies of union growth and decline. A particular weakness is that the aggregate data used in these studies do not fully capture underlying growth and decline processes, thus they "obscure the direction and magnitude of changes among the components of union growth" (Chaisson and Rose, 1991; p.12). Such data limitations have produced significant gaps in our understanding of union growth/decline. Future decertification models should therefore move away from their reliance on aggregate economic/political data toward greater use of data bases capable of capturing the individual, group and organizational level processes posited to underlie decertification.

Second, the contextual approach does not directly examine the actual nature of real-world individual, social and organizational responses to the environment. While the contextual variables used in union growth/decline models may be statistically associated with growth/decline outcomes, these models do not explain how or why these associations exist. Consequently, little is known about the causal relationships between the macro
political, economic, and social environment, the organizational actions, inactions, and strategies of unions and management, and the decertification decisions and actions of rank-and-file union members (Feuille, 1991). This limitation of the contextual approach has become increasingly apparent to IR scholars'. Future models of decertification should therefore take as their starting point an in-depth exploration of the real-world relationships that exist between the macro political, economic, and social environment, the organizational actions, inactions, and strategies of unions and management, and the decertification decisions and actions of rank-and-file union members. This will allow for a more realistic and complex understanding of any statistical associations that are subsequently uncovered.

The third limitation of contextual models is that they ignore that portion of the explanation for decertification which lies with the agents and organizations of the IR system. There is considerable consensus among IR scholars that agents' actions (and inactions), and organizational processes are primary determinants of union decline in the US'. Nevertheless, as Lawler (1990) points out, the majority of contextual models of union growth and decline, including contextual decertification models, have ignored the impact of IR agents and organizations.

Furthermore, ignoring IR agents and organizations limits the potential applied relevance and impact of IR research. IR was developed, in large part, as an applied field, seeking to describe and explain the realm of union-management relations for the purpose of
promoting, or (at minimum) of sustaining collective bargaining. This is an orientation that has all but disappeared in contemporary IR (Strauss, 1989). *IR should refocus research at a level which is insightful and relevant for labor relations practitioners.* With regard to decertification, this means refocusing research on the agents involved at the various organizational levels at which union practitioners actually operate. Future models of decertification should therefore examine the role of, and the relationship between, those actors and institutions believed to be central to decertification outcomes.

In sum, the above critique of the traditional UM/CB model points towards the need for development of a decertification model that:

i) critically examines, conceptualizes, and includes the group and organizational relations and processes believed to be central to the determination of decertification outcomes.

ii) is based on a data base carefully conceptualized so as to be capable of capturing the individual, group and organizational level processes posited to underlie decertification.

iii) takes as its starting point an in-depth exploration of the real-world relationships that exist between the macro political, economic, and social environment, the organizational actions, inactions, and strategies of unions and management, and the decertification decisions and actions of rank-and-file union members.

iv) refocuses research on the agents involved at the various organizational levels at which union practitioners actually operate. Such a model should examine the role of, and the relationship between, those actors and institutions believed to be central to decertification outcomes.
II.3) **Decertification Variables, Relationships, and Hypotheses**

The following describes and summarizes the variables, relationships, and hypotheses generated by the IR decertification literature. One goal of this section is to generate a set of quantifiable variables, and, where possible, produce a priori hypotheses regarding their relationship to decertification outcomes.

II.3.a) **Dependent Variables:**

The correlational models generated by IR scholars use a variety of decertification outcomes as dependent variables. For example: Anderson et al (1982) use union win/loss of the decertification election; Dickens et al (1987) use the proportion of the pro-union vote in the decertification election; and, Elliot and Hawkins (1982) use the aggregate annual decertification elections lost per million union members.

These operationalizations all measure the end point of the election process. Therefore they capture situations where at least 30% of the bargaining unit have expressed an overt interest in decertification, where the proper procedural steps have been followed by the bargaining unit members to establish the holding of a decertification election, and where the bargaining unit members have experienced a variety of union and management actions to encourage/discourage the decertification. As such, these measures do not represent a "clean" aggregate measure of pro-decertification sentiment among the unionized
workforce. They represent, rather, the pro-decertification sentiment of a *sample* of the unionized workforce that has emerged through a series of institutional filters.

This does not represent a methodological problem, as long as appropriate control and independent variables are used to build predictive models. However, as will become clear from the discussion of the independent variables (below), most of the independent and control variables are poor macro-level proxies for the hypothesized micro-level processes of interest.

Further, economic and political contextual variables are typically hypothesized to effect the general pro vs anti decertification sentiment among the workforce. As such, they predict aggregate *demand* for decertification. These variables do not, however, have a clear and non-problematic relationship with the filtered sample of decertification election outcomes used as dependent variables in these studies.

This point emerges clearly from discussions with practitioners who concede that broad contextual factors may affect the overall interest in decertification but argue that it is the on-going organizational dynamics that will determine whether this interest is ever translated into a decertification campaign, and eventually a union win/loss in the decertification election. This argument is supported by Anderson et al’s (1982) conclusion that the reasons for members petitioning for a decertification election may be different than the factors which determine the outcome of the actual election (see p.146). Pearce
and Peterson (1987) found that regionality effects for decertification campaigns do exist for the filing of decertification petitions and the cases getting to an election but not for the actual election outcomes. While these differences are unexplained, these results would appear to lend support to practitioners, and Anderson et al’s belief that there are structural differences between the filing of decertification petitions (reflecting a general pro-decertification sentiment), and decertification election outcomes (reflecting a narrower organizational level outcome).

In sum, given the nature of the independent variables used and their hypothesized effects, macro contextual models of decertification need to utilize dependent variables that capture the aggregate demand for decertification among the unionized workforce. Decertification election outcomes, due to group, organizational, and procedural filtering do not measure demand very accurately.

An alternative measure of decertification demand is the number of decertification petitions filed. This measure indicates the aggregate demand for decertification among the unionized workforce more accurately because it reveals the number of units interested in decertification prior to exposure to NLRB procedures and the organizational dynamics of decertification campaigns. Further, this measure only captures demand expressed by units where at least 30% of the unit has expressed interest and the initial procedural steps haven been taken. The filing of the petition therefore expresses both a real and serious demand for decertification and actual behavior to pursue that demand.
However, for those studies that are genuinely interested in the organizational dynamics of the decertification campaign itself, decertification election outcomes are a legitimate dependent variable. This is because they are examining and measuring the processes and relationships that determine whether the demand for decertification is translated into a majority vote for decertification.

II.3.b) Independent Variables:

Some order can be placed on these different models by grouping the independent variables within two general categories: i) economic; and, ii) sociopolitical. The sociopolitical category can be further subdivided into macro contextual factors, and, micro institutional-procedural factors.

II.3.b.i) Economic Variables:

Wages: The effect of wages on union growth/decline is somewhat in dispute. Macro-level studies of the business cycle have found that economic upswings are associated with union growth (Fiorito and Greer, 1982). This positive correlation has been found specifically with regard to wages (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976). It is argued that this correlation is due to the "credit effect" - "the tendency of workers to credit wage rises to unions and to support them in the hope of doing as well or even better in the future" (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976).
In contrast, the union certification literature holds that wage increases among non-union employees tends to dampen their interest in unionization. Cooke (1983) argues "that the larger wage increases are in one period, the less is worker dissatisfaction with employment conditions in the succeeding period" (p.404). This dynamic would lead one to expect an increase in certification elections as wage increases decline.

Clearly, it does not necessarily hold that this relationship would work in reverse with regard to decertification. It seems unlikely that wage increases in unionized units would diminish employees interest in retaining their union. Indeed, as was noted above, employees in unionized settings may understand wage increases in terms of a "credit effect."

A question therefore remains as to whether wage decreases will produce decertification increases. It is not clear that wage decreases will automatically lead to decertification for several reasons.

First, wage decreases for unionized employees will result in interest in decertification only if union wages decrease vis-a-vis non-union wages in the relevant labor markets. Unionized employees are likely to attribute such specific wage decreases to the ineffectiveness of their union representation (a reverse "credit effect"). This effect may be strengthened by unionized employers actively pointing out such discrepancies, with the promise that they could be rectified if the union was removed.
However, it is not clear that the credit effect (in either direction) is captured by macro contextual models. It is highly implausible that *general* wage increases/decreases (the variable used in these models) will be attributed to *specific* unions by employees. Consequently, general wage increases/decreases are unlikely to be used as the basis for employees' unionization/deunionization decisions (the dynamic supposedly captured by these models).

To truly capture the dynamics of the credit effect one would need wage data indicating wage bargain performance of specific unions within the context of the relevant labor market for the employees making the unionization/deunionization decisions. Clearly, macro-contextual unionization/deunionization models do not measure wages at these levels.

Second, wage decreases will not necessarily lead to decertification because unions provide a buffer against hostile labor markets. During periods of general wage decreases, unionized employees would only choose decertification if they felt that they could maintain/improve their wage bargain without union representation. It seems unlikely that such a conjectural and high-risk decision would be made more often during times of economic hardship.

On the other hand, it should be noted that general wage decreases indicate economic down-turns which, in turn, give employers greater bargaining power and are thus
associated with increased deunionization efforts. Consequently, general wage decreases may be associated with employer deunionization efforts and thus increased decertification.

Assuming one could control for employer deunionization efforts, a general decrease in real wages across the relevant labor market is unlikely to produce an increased interest in decertification. This is because the unionized employees are unlikely to attribute a general wage decrease to their union representation. Furthermore, in the face of declining real wages they may see the union as the only protection they have from even more rapid declines.

The empirical evidence for the above relationships is mixed and fairly weak, often accompanied by little theoretical justification. Lawler and Hundley (1983) hypothesize: "a negative relationship between the level of real wages and the decertification rate" (p.338). The authors rationale for the hypothesis is generated by simply inverting their hypothesized positive relationship between wages and certification. The regression coefficient was found to be significant, however the coefficient’s sign was opposite to the hypothesized direction. Lawler and Hundley also hypothesize that: "the rate of change in real wages will be...negatively related to decertification activity" (pp. 338-9). The authors rationale for this hypothesis is that: i) unionized employees will attribute declines in real wages to union ineffectiveness" (p. 338); and, ii) decreasing real earnings will decrease the flow of dues revenues to unions, thus weakening unions’ "organizing capacity" (p. 338). The regression coefficient was found to be significant and the sign
was in the hypothesized direction. The findings are surprising given the noted stickiness of union wages vis-a-vis non-union wages during inflationary periods (Elliot and Hawkins, 1982). Neither of these operationalizations appear well conceived, and neither seem to pay much attention to the likely organizational realities surrounding decertification dynamics.

Ahlburg and Dworkin (1984) provide a more appropriate operationalization of the wage variable - the union-nonunion wage differential. However, their model for decertifications in the 1960-80 period generates only weak support for the hypothesis that "the union-nonunion wage differential significantly influences the probability of decertification" (p. 26). Of course, given the above reservations about researchers' abilities to meaningfully measure such differentials, the lack of support may simply reflect the insensitivity of the authors' measure[1]. This is very likely given that Ahlburg and Dworkin do not actually survey wage differentials for their sample cases. Rather, they use a macro economic estimate, applied to the economy as a whole for entire fiscal years. It seems highly improbable that this measure would be able to capture the necessary level of detail.

In sum, while there might be reasonable a priori hypotheses relating the effect of wages on decertification outcomes, the empirical evidence for such relationships is mixed and fairly weak, often accompanied by little theoretical justification. It is an area that could benefit from further exploratory and correlative analysis. However, persistent measurement problems are likely to accompany attempts to operationalize this variable.
Unemployment: Macro-level studies of the business cycle have found that growing employment during economic upswings is associated with union growth. Chaisson and Rose (1991) claim that the converse can also be assumed to hold true: "when the unemployment rate is high and increasing, the incentive to ... remain (a union member) will be diminished" (p. 18).

Cooke (1983) argues that there is an ambiguous, or as he puts it, "curvilinear" relationship between unemployment, and trends in unemployment and certification outcomes. This, he argues is due to the fact that tight labor markets lower the utility of union representation for employees while simultaneously decreasing employers’ resistance to unionization. The opposite holds true under loose labor market conditions. The important part of this logic vis-a-vis decertification is the link between unemployment and employees perceptions of the utility of union representation. By Cooke’s logic, increases in unemployment increase the utility of union representation.

However, specifically with regard to decertification, Elliot and Hawkins (1982) argue the reverse:

"One major benefit often provided by unions is an increase in the level of job security under a collective bargaining contract...Changes in economic conditions which jeopardize the job security of employees will tend to lower employees’ perceived benefits of union representation." (p.156)
Elliot and Hawkins point seems well taken however only if one applies it to unemployment generated within the relevant labor market. It would seem that the relevant labor market with respect to employees' perceptions of union utility would be their own bargaining unit. Of course, large quantitative representation election studies do not study unemployment rates at this micro-level. Indeed, Elliot and Hawkins use the annual average unemployment rate as their unemployment variable. It is not at all clear how this macro-level variable will capture the micro-level dynamic explained above.

Elliot and Hawkins provide a further justification for their decertification-unemployment relationship:

"During high unemployment periods, the employer may also influence the employees' perception of the expected benefits from continued unionization, by implying that removal of the union might permit changes which could reduce layoffs or provide additional job opportunities in the organization. This would increase even further the likelihood that employees would turn to the decertification process." (p.156)

Again, this is a fair point, however it is too simplistic to capture the full complexity of a decertification situation. One could argue quite the reverse: Generally high unemployment may prompt employees to hang onto the only protection they have against an unfettered, and unregulated labor market - their union. It seems more probable that the only situation in which employees are likely to follow Elliot and Hawkins logic would be where they have truly lost all faith in their union. However such a perception may be dependent upon a wide variety of union actions and inactions. Therefore Elliot and
Hawkins' scenario is contingent upon employees' perceptions of union non-instrumentality (which may be generated by factors other than/in addition to the union's ability to stem lay-offs).

Elliot and Hawkins further complicate their model by arguing that their decertification-unemployment relationship applies especially for "workers who would rank low in the seniority queue" (p.156). If this is so then one must further account for the organizational demographics of the specific bargaining units included in one's study (in particular turnover and the numerical distribution of seniority). Again, Elliot and Hawkins point is well taken but generates a micro-level model far too complex for the typical macro measures used in election studies.

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the serious breach between micro-level theory and macro-level measures used, Elliot and Hawkins actually find a negative, although insignificant, relationship between unemployment and decertification. This is in direct contradiction of the hypothesized positive relationship.

Ahlburg and Dworkin's (1984) decertification study uses a more complex although still macro-level unemployment variable - "the age adjusted inverse of the unemployment rate" (p.26). They find this variable to be negatively related to the "conditional probability of decertification" (p.26). This author's interpretation of this finding is that one would expect decertification to rise as unemployment rises. Therefore, assuming one ignores the
discrepancy between micro-theory and macro-measure, their results would appear to support Elliot and Hawkins' claims.

Lawler and Hundley (1983) hypothesize, without theoretical justification, that: i) "the industry layoff rate will be positively related to the decertification rate" (p.339); and, ii) "a positive relationship between the industry quit rate and the decertification rate" (p.340). The authors find the first relationship to hold at a statistically significant level. They do not find the second relationship to be significant.

In sum, there are conflicting assertions regarding unemployment's effect on decertification. Nevertheless, there is some empirical evidence that unemployment is positively associated with decertification outcomes. However, given the breach between the complexity of micro-level theory and reality and the rather blunt macro-level measures used, it is not clear what the evidence means. The causal link between the micro-level behavior of decertification and macro-level measure of unemployment needs to be explored in order to determine the nature of the association.

**Inflation:** Business cycle theory has found a significant and robust relationship between price inflation and union growth/decline\(^{13}\). Price and Bain (1983) argue that workers are more likely to become and remain union members when inflation is a threat to living standards.
However, Ahlburg and Dworkin (1984) found that decertification is "a positive function of the inflation rate" (p. 24) for the 1950-80 period. Elliot and Hawkins (1982), who produce a similar finding for the 1948 to 1979 period, provide a theoretical rationale to explain this relationship.

"During periods of rapid inflation, increases in union wage levels tend to lag behind those in non-union organizations. Since the union-negotiated wage usually covers a number of years into the future, while the non-union wage in general tends to rise during inflationary periods, the union’s relative wage position will decline. Union members find the wage benefits from unionization lower than they had expected. During inflationary periods the benefits from unionization will diminish and the level of decertification should rise." (p.156)

This argument is reinforced by Ahlburg and Dworkin’s finding that "(T)here is also some evidence that if union bargainers underpredict the rate of inflation, decertification is more likely" (p.26).

These arguments, backed by their empirical findings are somewhat persuasive. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons to be suspicious of the causal link posited between inflation and decertification outcomes. Firstly, one would need to measure inflationary movement against the negotiated base wage plus cost of living adjustments in order to determine the extent of wage lag for union contracts. Nevertheless it is true that economists have observed the delayed response of union wage rises during inflationary periods (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). However, there is nothing automatic about non-union wage increases during inflationary periods either - these also depend on
a variety of other political-economic factors. Lastly, it is not at all apparent that temporary wage lags over the life of the contract would lead employees to decertify. It seems at least as likely that it would lead to the membership taking an aggressive position during the next round of contract negotiations. Only the most remarkably inept union leadership would be unable to convince its membership that the relative erosion of wages were due to inflationary pressures, and that this situation would be addressed in the next round of bargaining.

Again, while there appears to be a fairly well demonstrated, long-term association between inflation and decertification outcomes, it is not clear if these associations support the above hypothesized relationships. While it might be wise to hypothesize a positive association between inflation and decertification outcomes, given past empirical evidence, it is not clear what the micro-level theoretical justification for the association should be.

**Industry Concentration:** Two articles have examined the industrial classification provided for each decertification case by the NLRB as a potential predictor of decertification outcomes (Anderson et al., 1979; Fulmer and Gilman, 1981). While no theoretical justification for the inclusion of this variable was provided, the articles describe some variations in decertification outcomes across industries. However, neither study used this variable within a multivariate framework and consequently no strong hypotheses emerged. Given the lack of theoretical justification and explanation, and the lack of multivariate results it is impossible to generate any a priori hypotheses.
II.3.b.ii) *Sociopolitical Variables:*

These are factors that operate in the political and social realm. Macro factors are those that largely operate outside the direct relationship between employer and union. Micro factors are those that involve the direct relationship between employer and union.

*Macro Contextual Factors:*

**Union Density:** Macro models of union growth/decline have found union density to produce contradictory effects. On the one hand, the "saturation effect" causes unions' past organizing successes to slow further growth, because the "relatively easy organizable units are organized first, leading to a diminishing return to given levels of organizing efforts" (Fiorito, Gallagher, and Greer, 1986, p.291). On the other hand, the "enforcement effect" causes unions' past organizing successes to further increase membership growth "partly because employers find it more difficult to retaliate against individual union members and partly because unions find it easier to apply social coercion and union security provisions" (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976, p. 85).

While it is not possible to statistically isolate these countervailing effects, it has been found that union density has a negative overall effect on changes in union membership (Stepina and Fiorito, 1986). One might conclude from this evidence that the saturation effect tends to dominate the enforcement effect.
Cooke (1983) has added a further twist to the above argument. Cooke, following Bell’s (1953) saturation thesis, examines the effect of the percentage of an industry that is unionized on certification outcomes. He argues that:

"...as an industry becomes more highly organized, workers in non-union firms in that industry determine that there is less utility associated with union representation, because union organizing efforts are insufficient to persuade them otherwise and perhaps, in part, because such workers benefit from increasing union threat effects that drive up nonunion wages. (p.408)"

Cooke finds this variable to be consistently and significantly related to his certification measures. Further, Cooke finds evidence for a cut-off point:

"...up to industry penetration rates of about 35 percent, workers are more likely to vote for union representation as the penetration rate rises. Beyond a 35 percent penetration rate, however, greater penetration does not appreciably influence the likelihood that workers will vote for union representation or that unions will win elections." (p. 413)

This cut-off point might be explained by the varying strengths of the saturation vs enforcement effects at different density levels. At lower, but increasing densities the enforcement effect might dominate the saturation effect. However, once the 35% density level is reached the situation reverses.
Applying the above arguments to the decertification situation one would predict that
decertification levels are higher at higher union densities. Of particular importance would
be the belief among the employees that their union wage bargain would not be
undermined by decertification. In a densely unionized environment this is less likely to
occur.

A further extension of the saturation effect logic to the decertification situation is that as
density levels increase, only the less attractive units remain to be organized. In particular
the very small, isolated units (less than 20 employees) may be all that remain. As unions
organize these remaining "problem" units they are increasingly likely to face
decertifications. These units will yield only a small amount of dues revenue, will be
costly and difficult to service, and will likely be hard to bargain for (Dworkin and Extejt,
1979; 1980; and, Chafetz and Frazer, 1979). Consequently, higher densities are likely
to increase the potential for decertification.

Ahlburg and Dworkin (1984) actually argue the reverse of the above:

"Block (1980) has proposed that at high levels of union penetration, the
need for the membership for union organizing services declines relative to
their need for representation services. Thus, if as union density increases
unions shift funds from organizing to representation, the probability of
decertification may fall... Union density also has an impact on wages. Holt
(1970) and Addison and Siebert (1979) have argued that greater union
density enhances a union’s ability to increase wages and the union-
nonunion differential through increased power of the strike effect." (pp.
18-19)
Ahlburg and Dworkin in fact find that "declines in union density...result in an increase in the probability of decertification" (p.26). However, it is not clear whether their results support their hypotheses. The authors use the inverse of the ratio of total union membership to total nonagricultural employment as their measure of union density. It would seem that such a rough measure is considerably removed from the organizational level at which their hypotheses are constructed. The aggregate national decline of union density could well be related to decertification outcomes in a variety of manners which have nothing to do with their union density hypotheses (not least of which is the significant shift in attitude towards union instrumentality (Farber, 1988)).

Thus, while there are reasonable arguments for predicting opposite effects of union density on decertification outcomes, there is little solid evidence linking density to decertification outcomes.

Regional Concentration: The issue of regionality, usually centered around the right-to-work/non-right-to-work and/or north/south dichotomies, has been debated extensively in the certification election literature (Sandver, 1982, 1983; and Becker and Delaney, 1983). The rationale behind this dichotomy is typically that southern/right-to-work states have employers and legislatures that are more anti-union than northern/non-right-to-work states (Cooke, 1983). The hypothesis is therefore that southern/right-to-work states will exhibit lower certification rates than their northern/non-right-to-work counterparts. The regionality debate has moved in to the decertification literature. A "southern effect" for
decertification elections has been observed (Hunt and White, 1983; and, Krislov, 1956). Others, have failed to confirm such effects (Anderson et al, 1979; and, Fuimer and Gilman, 1981).

Most recently Pearce and Peterson (1987) have questioned the veracity of the whole north/south dichotomy, arguing that researchers need to considerably refine their regional definitions. Examining decertification cases and case to election transitions, as well as election outcomes, they find some evidence that these vary regionally (although not along a simple north/south divide). While the authors were unable to isolate a regional effect with regard to election outcomes (once multivariate controls were used) they did find some regional differences. Specifically:

"In some instances the Deep South appeared to be distinctly different. We note some unions, notably in the Building Trades family of unions, are much more frequently involved in decertification activity in the Deep South than they are elsewhere. Bargaining units in this region appeared less likely than those elsewhere to challenge unions in their respective bailiwick or in the service sector. And as Sandver (1982) noted in his study of certification cases, bargaining units in decertification episodes in the Deep South tended to be significantly larger than those in the other regions examined in this study." (p. 267)

While it is not clear whether these results allow for the development of a uni-dimensional regional hypothesis it is clear that researchers should be sensitive to the potential of regional variations in decertification case filings and possibly (if Hunt and White (1983) Krislov (1956) are correct) election outcomes.
Union Concentration: The degree to which decertification outcomes are concentrated among certain unions is a question of considerable applied interest. If distinctive patterns are identified and these are then matched to union specific organizational structures and practices, it would be possible to generate findings of great interest to unionists. Such data could potentially provide definitive insights into what types of structures and practices do or do not improve union performance prior to and during decertification campaigns.

Anderson et al (1979), Fulmer and Gilman (1981), and Krislov (1979) have all examined variations in decertification outcomes across unions. The persistent finding from these studies is that seven to eight of the largest national unions account for 45 to 63.6 percent of all decertification elections. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters has over the years become an increasingly large target for decertification activity (increasing its proportion of all decertification elections from some 15 percent in the late forties and early fifties to about a third in the mid seventies). However, once these union variations are entered into a multivariate model all effects wash out (Anderson et al, 1979).

Further, the potential insight from this focus is weakened by the studies' lack of theoretical discussion as to what may account for the observed variations. Further, there is no attempt to break the results down into regional or smaller organizational units. Consequently, the limited empirical findings cannot be used to generate the applied insights and hypotheses discussed above.
Micro Institutional-Procedural Factors:

Unit Size: The size of the bargaining unit that is being organized and represented by a union appears to have an important effect on union growth/decline outcomes. This is of considerable potential importance given that the majority of decertification cases occur in smaller bargaining units\textsuperscript{31}.

The AFL-CIO's survey of 1986-1987 organizing and first contract drives (AFL-CIO, 1989) revealed that unions consistently were less successful in larger bargaining units\textsuperscript{32}. These results have been replicated in multivariate studies controlling for other factors (Rose, 1972; Sandver, 1982; Cooke, 1983; and, Heneman and Sandver, 1983). These authors argue that the higher levels of success in smaller units are due to: i) less intense and less sophisticated employer resistance; and, ii) greater group cohesion among workers.

Cooke (1983) argues that "pro-union factions within small groups are better able to communicate, build conformity, and remain cohesive during election campaigns than are pro-union factions in larger units" (p.410). Cooke's size variable (SIZE) is consistently, positively and significantly related to certification outcomes. This effect of size "drops fairly sharply as \textit{SIZE} increases up to units of about 65 workers. Beyond units of 65 workers, \textit{SIZE} no longer appreciably influences election outcomes" (sic p.410).
While the social cohesion dynamic is consistently, and uni-directionally significant in the certification findings, it is not necessarily clear how it would effect decertification outcomes. Clearly, smallness in a unit where the majority of employees are anti-union would enhance the potential for pro-decertification group formation. However, where there are mixed sentiments among the employees, smallness would simultaneously enhance the potential for anti-decertification group formation.

Ahlburg and Dworkin (1984) argue that smaller units are more likely to decertify than larger units. Firstly, smaller units are more costly to service (Dworkin and Extej, 1979; 1980; and, Chafetz and Frazer, 1979), and consequently scarce resources may not be allocated to their representation (Anderson et al, 1979). It should be pointed out that this would actually increase the demand for decertification, rather than the direct likelihood of decertification. There appears to be some evidence for this dynamic in Pearce and Peterson’s (1987) finding that there are significant regional differences in the size of decertification cases which correspond to significant regional differences in the filing of cases. Although this does not provide definitive multivariate evidence, it suggests that unit size may be affecting the demand for decertification.

Secondly, there is greater "physical and psychological closeness of management to employees in small units" (Fulmer and Gilman, 1981, p.29). It should be recognized that this dynamic would increase both the demand for decertification (in that management will be more able to influence employees anti-union sentiments) and the likelihood of the
demand being translated into a successful decertification (in that management will be able to lend emotional and material assistance to the employees decertification campaign).

Thirdly, smaller units may be more unstable than larger units: "(V)oting majorities in decertification elections are so small that modest turnover would reverse the sentiment in a unit" (p. 19). Further, as Chafetz and Fraser (1979) point out, union support is usually spearheaded by a small group of pro-union activists. In smaller units voluntary or "involuntary" (i.e. management induced) turnover of the union activists will of course quickly push the balance of power among the remaining employees toward the pro-decertification faction and/or management. Ahlburg's (1982) study of decertification elections found that, on average, a reversal of 9 percent of votes would turn union wins into losses, whereas a 34 percent reversal would be needed to turn management wins into losses. Thus, the authors conclude that "turnover may lead to more union than management losses" (p. 19).

One further factor that may reinforce the hypothesis that smaller units are more likely to face decertification outcomes is the union’s option of filing a formal disclaimer of interest once faced with a decertification petition. Unions do opt for this response because:

"(B)y forfeiting the contest the union conserves scarce resources that would otherwise be consumed in a decertification campaign. The union also eliminates the adverse publicity and public relations fallout that might attend a formal repudiation at the ballot box." (Pearce and Peterson, 1987, p. 256)
Pearce and Peterson found that unions filed disclaimers in 135 of the 703 decertification cases they surveyed. This represented about a third of all bargaining relationships that were broken in the wake of filing a decertification petition. Given that smaller units are worth considerably less to unions in terms of dues revenues, and that, as noted above, they are considerably more expensive to service, it seems highly probable that disclaimers are more likely to be issued for smaller rather than for larger units.

Although the match between hypotheses and variables used is not very tight in decertification studies, authors consistently find unit size to be a consistent multivariate predictor of decertification election outcomes (Ahlburg and Dworkin, 1984; Anderson et al, 1979, Dworkin and Extejt, 1979). Invariably, these studies find that the larger the unit, the less likely the election resulted in the decertification of the union.

It would seem that both the theoretical and empirical evidence weigh in heavily on the side of the hypotheses that smaller units are more likely to experience: a) greater demand for decertification; and, b) greater campaign success rates for those decertification cases that are filed.

Unit Type: Various authors have examined whether the type of bargaining unit (the type of employees who make up the unit\(^2\)) affects decertification outcomes. Anderson et al (1979) observe that a substantial proportion of both single-union (46.3\%) and multi-union (63.7\%) of their decertification election population occurred in production and
maintenance worker units. Single-union election losses were spread evenly across unit types. However, multi-union election results were more varied across types of unit. Once unit type was inserted into their multivariate model, Anderson et al found that unit type did not affect election outcomes in single-union cases, but did significantly affect election outcomes in multi-union cases. Specifically:

"The results...reveal that craft, professional, and office units were significantly less likely to change unions. Thus, units which had a more homogeneous membership were less likely to decertify." (p. 35)

Fulmer and Gilman (1981) observed that anti-union votes occurred more frequently in more homogeneous units, regardless of the specific type of worker (including skill distinctions) in the unit. While this conclusion appears to contradict Anderson et al, Fulmer and Gilman did not disaggregate single vs multi union units, nor was their analysis multivariate.

Chafetz and Frazer (1979) found that the majority (67.5%) of their 43 decertification cases involved low-skilled employees. The authors, correlate this result with others, and conclude that:

"...small units of unskilled labor organized in large locals produced the large majority of decertifications....This finding leads to at least one disturbing conclusion. Those who could perhaps benefit the most from collective action are, in fact, the ones who have the most difficulty in retaining the legal right to it." (p. 6)
Again, such a conclusion should be viewed conservatively given the lack of multivariate controls and the limited number of cases studied.

In sum, there does not appear to be particularly compelling evidence to suggest that unit type is either an important theoretical or empirical factor in explaining decertification outcomes.

Unit Age: Various authors have noted the tendency for decertification elections to occur early on in the collective bargaining relationship (Krislov, 1956; Eischen24; Fulmer and Gilman, 1981). Several authors have proposed explanations for this pattern. The two more developed hypotheses are strongly utility-maximization in orientation. Elliot and Hawkins (1982) propose that:

"Employees in recently organized units may have been oversold by the promises of the union to improve their situation. They may become disappointed with the actual benefits delivered which in turn could substantially reduce their benefit/cost evaluation of unionization. On the other hand, where the union is well established, employees have developed more realistic expectations and support the continuance of the union/employer relationship to protect their own vested interest." (p.158)

Dworkin and Extejt (1979) argue that unionism is an "experience good", i.e. a good that grows in value with increased experience:
"...the longer a group of workers has experienced unionism (union shop arrangements), the less likely they will be to desire to revert back to nonunion (free choice) status. This argument is based on the supposition that workers become more and more comfortable or used to unionism (compulsory unionism) over time and that people are less likely to make drastic changes in their lifestyles as this "comfort factor" increases in magnitude. If unions do have a positive impact on wages and working conditions, we would expect that the longer a group has been represented by a union, the less likely they will be to decertify." (p. 230)

The age of the bargaining unit may also decrease the demand for decertification in that employer resistance to the union may be higher at the early stages of unionization. This would be so because management has just had its unilateral control of the work-place partially usurped and it has just experienced what is more than likely to have been a highly confrontational recognition battle. Further, older units will have had a chance to let labor-management relations stabilize and let all sides develop more realistic and more pragmatic attitudes toward one another.

Using "the number of eligible voters in previously unorganized units where union certification was won," Elliot and Hawkins find that this variable is associated in the opposite direction than that hypothesized but at a non-significant level. However, it is not clear how Elliot and Hawkins variable captures the stated hypothesis because it does not contain any temporal specification of bargaining unit age. Therefore the significance of the lack of support for their hypothesis is somewhat in question.
However, neither Dworkin and Extejt (using a multivariate approach), nor Fulmer and Gilman (using univariate cross-tabulation) found unit age (measured as time from original certification) to have significant effect on decertification outcomes.

Clearly, there are reasonable theoretical reasons to believe that the younger a unit is, the more likely it is to experience decertification. However, extant empirical evidence has not borne out this hypothesis at a significant level.

**Organizational Change:** It should be noted that the effects of unit age on decertification may be diluted by organizational changes which have similar effects on the actors attitudes and beliefs. Anderson et al (1982) found that: i) a change in union leadership; ii) a change in top company management; and, iii) annual turnover in the bargaining unit, all increase the likelihood of a union losing its bargaining unit status. These factors were seen by the authors as "critical" in determining the final vote. Such organizational changes probably increase the likelihood of decertification outcomes because of the attitudinal changes likely to be occurring within and between the employees, the union, and management.

**Union-Management Conflict:** Despite being a well recognized aspect of the US IR system most academic studies of union growth/decline have placed little emphasis on union-management conflict as a predictor of growth/decline outcomes (Feuille, 1991).
However, there has been growing recognition of the centrality of one aspect of labor-management conflict - employer opposition - to union density declines in the 1980s (Freeman, 1989a). As Feuille (1991) puts it (none too delicately) "There is ample evidence that most American private nonunion employers view the prospect of being unionized as the corporate equivalent of catching AIDS." Given such prevailing managerial attitudes, Feuille argues that "the unionization process in practice is a game of hardball, often played with lots of brushback and even beanball pitches" (Feuille, 1991, pp. 86-87). Chaison and Rose (1991) give a more institutional perspective on the issue:

"Employer resistance can go beyond the legal opportunities to deny voluntary union recognition and oppose new organizing activity and can entail discriminatory discharges of union supporters and refusals to bargain with certified unions." (p. 22)

As the evidence on the effect of unit age on decertifications makes clear, many decertifications occur shortly after initial certification when the degree of conflict and employer resistance is likely to be at peak intensity. Indeed, most union practitioners maintain that the decertification process is little more than a management initiated and run deunionization effort, often begun through a management provoked conflict early in the new relationship (Gagala, 1983; Lawler, 1990). Explicit, measurable inter-organizational conflict is manifest in two forms: a) strike data; and, b) NLRB records of bargaining unit conflicts.
Fulmer and Giiman (1981) found that 36.4 percent of those units in which the union was eventually decertified had experienced a strike, and that about two-thirds of these strikes had occurred within the three years prior to the decertification election.

Ahlburg and Dworkin (1984) argue that in many cases very strong unions need not strike to achieve their goals. Rather, it is the weaker unions who are forced into striking in an attempt to achieve their goals. The result is that such strikes may produce an income loss that outweighs any benefit gains they may have achieved through further bargaining.

"If this is true and if strikes do not increase relative wages for union members, increased strike activity should be associated with an increased probability of union decertification." (p. 19)

Elliot and Hawkins (1982) concur, arguing that "among some employees, dissatisfaction with the union will increase as strike activity increases, and thus the level of decertification may also increase" (p.157). Further they believe that this effect will be more pronounced for low-seniority and/or highly-skilled employees as strike gains tend, on average, to be less for them. Ahlburg and Dworkin’s results lead them to conclude that:

"The experience of a strike, rather than its duration or frequency …increase the probability of decertification". This could be a result of income lost in a strike, increased elasticity of substitution between union and nonunion labor, or the belief that strikes are consumption "bads."" (pp.27)
Elliot and Hawkins found that the "the number of private sector strikes per million private sector union members" to be positively related to decertification, although the association was not at a significant level.

Fulmer and Gilman (1981) point out that strikes do not necessarily indicate a poor relationship. Consequently they asked managers in their survey of employers who had experienced decertification to rate the quality of the union-management relationship. The authors found that "the vote to decertify is much stronger at the extremes good or bad relationships" (p. 32). Fulmer and Gilman believe a possible explanation for this result is that:

"...when there is an excellent relationship, the union is seen by some employees as unnecessary - and when the relationship is poor, the union, not management, is blamed." (p. 32)

Fulmer and Gilman's evidence relies solely on managers self-reports, and the analysis is not multivariate. Nevertheless, the authors feel strongly about their results, concluding that "the quality of the (labor-management) relationship is one of the more influential variables affecting election results" (p. 32).

Pearce and Peterson (1987) focused on the effect that a bargaining unit's labor-management relations had on the filing of and outcomes of decertifications. The authors analyzed NLRB archival records of prior Unfair Labor Practices charges (ULPs), and
prior decertification cases (both employer initiated "RM" cases and employee initiated "RD" cases) and deauthorization ("UD")². Pearce and Peterson argue that such records provide "objective data on the history of the bargaining relationship" (p. 257).

Pearce and Peterson’s interest is primarily in examining regional variations in these variables and they do not examine the effect of the NLRB records within a multivariate model of decertification outcomes. Consequently it is unclear what, if any effect prior ULPs and prior RD, RM and UD cases have on subsequent decertification attempts.

It seems highly probable that labor-management conflict lies behind many decertification elections. Unfortunately the measurement of inter-organization conflict is extremely difficult. Every objective measure contains "noise" generated by various organizational realities. A strike may reflect open labor-management warfare or simply a routine part of contract negotiations. ULPs may reflect genuine complaints or they may reflect conscious union and management strategies to push the other party through the extended bureaucratic dispute resolution process.

Further, it is not necessarily clear if these variables can realistically be linked directly to decertification outcomes. Firstly, calling strikes and filing ULPs are a necessary part of a union’s job and may be required if faced with a hostile management. In such instances these actions may actually garner strong member support if the union is seen as doing its unfortunate but necessary work to represent its members. In such instances strike and
ULP levels could be conceived as measures of union servicing activity. Further, Strike-decertification associations might be capturing more than abstract levels of union-management conflict. Such associations might just as well reflect the hiring of permanent strike replacements who are consequently encouraged by management to pursue decertification.

Consequently, while labor-management conflict should be included as a predictor variable in a decertification model, any resulting associations should be viewed with some reserve. Ideally cases would be disaggregated and the nature of each be defined precisely.

The Decertification Campaign: Most decertification studies focus at the macro level and do not examine the impact of campaign practices on decertification outcomes. As was argued earlier, most of the macro variables should actually have more to do with the aggregate demand for decertification petitions than with the final outcome of those decertification elections that are held. Theoretically, one would expect the decertification outcomes themselves to be primarily determined at the organizational level during the campaign.

The lack of focus on the campaign in the decertification literature stands in contrast to the extensive body of work in this area within the certification election literature. Unfortunately, quantitative modelling of the campaign process faces three persistent and serious measurement problems: i) early and extended access to a large enough number
of election cases to allow multivariate statistical analysis is extremely difficult; ii) consequently, measurement usually involves retrospective self-reports; and, iii) quantifiable measurement of election campaigns is problematic given their highly non-routine, diffuse and soft-skill nature (Anderson et al, 1982). Consequently, any evidence on the effect of campaign practices should be interpreted cautiously.

Anderson et al (1982) develop an extensive discussion of the micro-institutional factors affecting the actual decertification campaign. Combining their case analysis with their multivariate analysis, the authors found that most decertification campaigns have the following in common:

- they are usually focussed on a galvanizing issue salient to the membership. However, for the issue to mobilize the membership normally requires:

  - informal leadership able to capitalize on the issue, pushing either for or against decertification:

    "an active, credible individual is vital to the process of convincing the members of the bargaining unit to support the union or to vote for no union representation" (p. 193).

- the nature of the campaign, both in terms of the level of the activity and the type of tactics used, are important:

  i) an active union campaign (in units with high levels of member involvement) is related to the union maintaining bargaining unit status. However despite this finding, the authors conclude that:

    "the amount of campaign activity may be much less important than either the content of the message being communicated or the quality of the strategies and tactics used by the parties....One-to-one contact allows the
development of trust and the commitment of employees to work in the campaign or vote in the desired way. It also allows problems and issues to be dealt with directly rather than avoided." (p. 194)

ii) For the union, verbal threats and explanations of potential costs of getting rid of the union significantly reduced the probability of decertification.

iii) For management, identifying the potential losses due to remaining unionized or benefits to ousting the union appears to backfire; it is related to the union maintaining its representative role. Where the expected consequences of decertification were perceived as beneficial to management, decertification was more likely to result.

Anderson et al's observation of a potential management "backfire" effect is corroborated by Lawler (1990) who believes this occurs when management adopts "aggressive decertification efforts" (p. 198). Management appear to be somewhat aware of this potential danger and Fulmer and Gilman's (1981) survey of managers who had experienced decertifications revealed that "most managers feel the company displays a very low profile in a decertification campaign" (p. 32). Indeed, the advice of management consultants tends to be "be involved, but cautiously" (DeMaria, 1982; Kilgour, 1987).²⁸

Both Lawler (1990) and Fulmer and Gilman (1981) corroborate Anderson et al's observations regarding the importance of union influence tactics, although Lawler concludes that those "tactics that have been studied do not appear to influence decertification election outcomes" (p. 197).
Lastly, Fulmer and Gilman (1981) found, not surprisingly, that the percentage of the unit who had signed the petition had a strong positive correlation with the election result of decertifying the union.

Clearly, it makes sense that union and management tactics will have an impact on decertification outcomes. Firstly, union-management relations and actions prior to the campaign will influence the demand for decertification (see "Reasons for Decertification" below). Secondly, union-management relations and actions during the campaign should be the main determinant of election outcomes, controlling for decertification demand. However, as was pointed out above there are very serious difficulties to overcome in accurately measuring variables that capture campaign activities. Consequently, it is only reasonable to expect fairly tentative conclusions to emerge from this line of research.

One further point should be made. The extant decertification literature makes no reference to the effect of a third actor in the decertification campaign - the decertification petitioner. As should be clear from the nature of this research, it is believed that the decertification petitioner plays a critical role in determining the outcome of the decertification election (this issue is of course addressed at length in Chapter III).

**Reasons for Decertification:** Very few decertification studies have attempted to examine the nature and formation of the attitudes of the actual election participants. As was pointed out, detailed studies of election campaigns are extremely difficult and costly.
Only one direct examination of employees attitudes toward a decertification exists - Bigoness and Tosi’s (1984) case study survey of a university based decertification. Ironically, the study highlights the constraints on research in this area in that the authors are themselves faculty at the university and were thus aware of the impending decertification campaign. This inside knowledge allowed them to produce and distribute a questionnaire immediately after the election was held.

Bigoness and Tosi were interested in examining the correlates of the pro and anti union votes. The principle, significant findings were that an individual’s score on a union instrumentality and positive attitude toward unions scale were both positively related to pro union voting behavior. These findings do not appear to be very surprising.

Anderson et al (1982) carried out a survey of union and management representatives involved in 57 elections in Southern California in the late seventies. The respondents were asked to choose from among ten potential reasons for the decertification. The authors grouped the responses into three broad categories and found that of the total number of reasons given for the decertifications:

- 45 percent were: "violation of members’ expectations."
- 20 percent were: "inability of the union to deal with management."
- 35 percent were: "contextual factors outside the union’s control."
Anderson et al also correlated the reasons given with various situational characteristics. They conclude:

"...the results suggest that violation of members’ expectations is most likely to be identified as the reason for decertification activity when the union has been unsuccessful or the members are uninvolved or have changed. However, the other two categories of reasons (inability of union to deal with management, and contextual factors) are present more often when management is willing to challenge the union, especially in larger bargaining units." (p. 188)

While these results are self-reports from management and union representatives, rather than reports from the employees themselves, they present fascinating avenues for further research. Specifically, the above would allow generation of various hypotheses that tie together organizational and situational correlates with specific attitudinal responses.

II.4) Summary

This summary indicates how the research presented in the remaining chapters draws on the foregoing review and critique of the literature.

II.4.a) The Theoretical Model:

The critique of the traditional UM/CB model pointed towards the development of an alternative decertification model that:
i) critically examines, conceptualizes, and includes the group and organizational relations and processes believed to be central to the determination of decertification outcomes. The research will conceptualize decertification as a process in which group and organizational relations and processes play a central role in determining decertification outcomes.

ii) is based on a data base carefully conceptualized so as to be capable of capturing the individual, group and organizational level processes posited to underlie decertification. The questionnaire survey used in this research was designed to generate a data set that captures the individual-group level processes that the alternative decertification model (Chapter III) posits underlie decertification. The questionnaire design combined theoretical insights drawn from the literature review and the alternative decertification model with insights drawn from labor and management practitioners in open-ended interviews.

iii) takes as its starting point an in-depth exploration of the real-world relationships that exist between the macro political, economic, and social environment, the organizational actions, inactions, and strategies of unions and management, and the decertification decisions and actions of rank-and-file union members. This research will adopt a process approach to the study of decertification. Again, theoretical insights were combined with open-ended interviews with practitioners to focus on the causal relations within the decertification process.

iv) refocuses research on the agents involved at the various organizational levels at which union practitioners actually operate. Such a model should examine the role of, and the relationship between, those actors and institutions believed to be central to decertification outcomes. This research will examine the role of decertification petitioners in the decertification process. Decertification petitioners are agents, operating at the organizational level, who are central to explaining and, from the union’s vantage point, controlling union decertification.
II.4.b) Decertification Variables, Relationships, and Hypotheses

A central critique of extant decertification models was that they wrongly specify their dependent variables. It was argued that most models utilize independent variables that would be expected to be related to the overall demand for decertification among the unionized work-force. It was pointed out that the dependent variable that would most accurately capture this would be some measure of the number of decertification petitions filed. Instead, most studies use decertification election outcomes as their dependent variable. It was argued that this dependent variable is more likely to be related to the organizational dynamics at the level of the bargaining unit, in particular the decertification campaign itself. *This research focuses on the actual decertification campaign. There is no interest in attempting to construct models predicting the demand for decertification. Consequently, it is legitimate to use various decertification election outcomes as dependent variables.*

The literature review revealed serious theoretical and methodological problems with the use and operationalization of the macro economic and socio-political independent variables. *Little attention will be paid to these variables as they are assumed to be related to overall demand for decertification among the unionized work-force. Given the present interest in the decertification campaign these variables are by and large irrelevant.*
Given the focus on the decertification campaign, micro institutional and procedural factors are seen as central to the alternative decertification model developed in Chapter III. Thus, the theoretical and empirical insights of prior research and the critiques of that research, presented above, will be used to generate hypotheses and to operationalize appropriate independent variables.

Notes:

1. See for example Anderson, Busman and O’Reilly (1982).

2. See Block and Premack (1983).

3. The authors argue that there is a trade off in allocating resources to servicing existing units versus organizing new units. Thus as the organizing rate goes up, all else equal, the decertification rate should increase.

4. However, it should be noted that Cook integrates the social dynamics he discusses into a utility-maximizing model via individual level “subjectively expected utility”.


10. Cooke (1979) did not find this variable to be statistically significant.

11. This is very probable given the widely held belief among practitioners interviewed that union non-union wage differentials are a very significant reason for the initiation of decertification campaigns (See Chapter VI).

13. Although Chaisson and Rose (1991) point out that this relationship may not hold for all time periods.


15. i.e. the enforcement effect.

16. At a significant level (own comment).

17. This measure, like the economic measures, also suffers in that, by the authors’ logic it should be related to aggregate interest in decertification. It is less likely, following the authors logic to be directly related to decertification election outcomes.

18. This includes the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, International Association of Machinists, Retail Clerks International Union, Hotel and Restaurant Employees, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Carpenters, United Automobile Workers, and Service Workers.

19. One would conclude that, given the lack of effect under multivariate control, variations in decertification activity levels and outcomes merely reflect variations in union organizing and representation efforts.

20. Such disaggregation would better reflect real differences in organizational structure and practice.

21. Anderson et al (1979) found that, of all decertification elections during 1975-77, 36 percent occurred in units of nine members or less, and 80 percent involved units of less than 49 members. Fulmer (1981) notes that the historical trend has actually been toward a concentration in smaller units (he reports that while in the 1950s 32.6 percent of all elections were in units of less than twenty people, in the 1970s the proportion had increased to 50.7 percent.

22. Specifically, unions won 51% of the elections for units of 75 or fewer workers, 47% for units of 76 to 150 workers, 32% for units of 151-250 workers, and 21% for units of more than 250 workers. The first contract success rate for units of more than 150 employees was only 40%, in comparison to the average of 73% for all units.

23. These studies use the NLRB unit type classifications as provided in their various reports: production and maintenance; craft; departmental; guards; professional; truck drivers; office, clerical, and other white collar; all others.


25. At a significant level (own comment).
26. Deauthorization aims to remove the authority of the incumbent union to maintain a union shop security arrangement. UD cases involve the use of a NLRB controlled election process substantively similar to certification and decertification elections.


28. Clearly this conclusion stands in contrast to the certification literature finding that intense management opposition is a highly effective weapon against unionization (Hunt and White, 1985; Lawler and West, 1985).

29. Included in this category were: membership needs not met; lack of servicing by union staff; high cost of dues; general discontent.

30. Included in this category were: failure to get a collective agreement; poor union-management relations; a strike.

31. Included in this category were: management tactics; outside unions; change in the composition of the unit.
CHAPTER III
An Alternative Model of Decertification

This chapter presents an alternative model of decertification that draws on the insights and critiques of the extant decertification literature (chapter II) and builds on the basis of a number of additional IR literatures. Chapter IV will narrow the focus to the specific areas addressed by the research, and present detailed hypotheses relating to these.

The discussion broadens the traditional dialogue in two directions. First, the traditional focus on the formal decertification election (from petition through election win/loss) will be broadened to include analysis of the antecedent conditions and processes that lead to the formation of a group of employees willing to pursue decertification. Second, the traditional focus on the individual-environment relationship will be expanded to include analysis of a variety of individual, group, organizational, and environmental relations, processes and structures not examined by traditional decertification models. Specifically, five levels of relationships are analyzed: i) individual-environment; ii) individual-organization; iii) group; iv) organizational; and v) organization-environment. These five levels of relationships are graphically represented in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Individual-Group-Organization-Environment Relationships
To broaden the analysis of the decertification process to include analysis of the antecedent conditions and processes underlying the emergence of a demand for decertification it is useful to present a flow diagram of the decertification process (figure 3.2). The ensuing discussion will refer to the various stages in this model. The flow model outlines the progressive stages in the process whereby individual employees emerge to form a "decertification coalition" and then pursue decertification as members of this informal group. Each stage in the model involves various individual-group-organizational-environment relations as outlined in figure 3.1.

III.1) Individual-Environment Relationships

Chapter II discussed the various macro economic and socio-political factors that may shape individual employees beliefs that the union is no longer an effective representative of their interests (stage 1 of figure 3.2). As was indicated in the summary little further attention will be paid to these variables as they are assumed to be related to overall demand for decertification among the unionized work-force. Given the present interest in the decertification campaign these variables are by and large irrelevant.

III.2) Individual-Organization Relationships

A defining premise of the present approach is that the relationship between individual and/or groups of employees and their union is central to the decertification process.
STAGE 1: individual employees perceive environmental and organizational changes that lead them to believe that the union is no longer an effective representative of their interests.

STAGE 2: employee groups coalesce around alternate views of these changes and alternate ways of dealing with them. Four alternate positions can be adopted:

a) No coalition forms - attitudinal and behavioral reactions are restricted to low employee satisfaction, commitment, and participation toward the union.

b) Decertification coalition forms to change the bargaining agent.

c) Decertification coalition forms to rid unit of collective bargaining.

d) Militant employee coalition seeks to change union structure and practices.

STAGE 3: individual, group, organizational and environmental "switching conditions" determine which of the four outcomes the majority of the employees decide to pursue.

STAGE 4: individual, group, organizational and environmental dynamics determine whether the employees' sought decertification outcome is achieved.

Figure 3.2: Flow Diagram of the Decertification Process
As was argued in the introduction and at the end of chapter 1, decertification signifies a major loss of faith of the employees in their union's ability to effectively represent them. While the causes of this loss of faith may lie outside the immediate control of the union leadership, employee loss of faith remains central to the decertification process (stage 1 of figure 3.2). Consequently, it is important to investigate those employee attitudes and behaviors toward their union that help explain the nature of their loss of faith in the union. The literature on employee attitudes and behaviors toward their union reveals two areas that are potentially insightful for the study of decertification: i) union satisfaction; and, ii) union commitment.

III.2.a) Union Satisfaction:

While the majority of rank-and-file union members are generally satisfied with their unions, and express a strong desire to remain unionized (Fiorito, Gallagher, and Fukami, 1988; Hills, 1985; Kochan, 1979; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986; Kochan, Katz, and Mower, 1984), it is also known that they are dissatisfied with certain aspects of their representation. Typically, members are least satisfied with what Kochan (1979) calls "union administration," i.e., internal member-union relations (Fiorito, Gallagher, and Fukami, 1988; Glick, Mirvis, and Harder, 1977; Jarley, Kuruvilla, and Casteel, 1990).

According to Gallagher and Strauss (1991), the relationship between employees' union dissatisfaction and employees' actions or behaviors (i.e. coalition formation in stage 2
of figure 3.2) is somewhat ambivalent, and union dissatisfaction is not expected to be directly related to decertification outcomes. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction is considered a relevant construct in that it may have indirect effects on decertification outcomes. Union dissatisfaction is likely to underlie decertification drives whose purpose is merely to signal union leadership that the membership is unhappy (i.e. the employees use decertification as a threat or voice mechanism as opposed to an exit mechanism) (stage 2 of figure 3.2). Further, widespread union dissatisfaction among the employees may offer management a lever with which to encourage decertification (stages 1-4 of figure 3.2).

III.2.b) Commitment:

It is believed that a lack of union commitment will be more central than union dissatisfaction in explaining the drive to a full decertification. Commitment represents a deep-seated, long-term affective response to the organization as a whole. Satisfaction, in comparison represents a more narrowly construed and transitory state (Mowday, Porter, and Steers, 1982). In terms of the behaviors required of employees interested in pursuing decertification (see section III.3) it seems likely that low union commitment will be a better predictor of decertification behavior among employees than low union satisfaction. Indeed, Klandermans (1986) has found that low union commitment was a stronger predictor of union turnover (quitting the union) than low union satisfaction.
Gordon et al. (1980), factor analyzed their union commitment scale to generate four differentiable factors of union commitment:

i) *Belief in Unions*: "moral" commitment to the union, which may be suggestive of Tagliacozzo and Seidman's (1956) "ideological" and "good union" man.

ii) *Union Loyalty*: relates pride and loyalty in the union with a recognition of the benefits derived from membership. This ties into the notion of "calculative" commitment.

iii) *Willingness to Work for the Union*: represents behavioral intentions or the propensity to act on behalf of the union.

iv) *Responsibility to the Union*: also represents behavioral intentions or the propensity to act on behalf of the union. The major distinction between factor iii and iv is that the level of personal cost of behavior associated with factor iii is greater than associated with factor iv.

Given that employee perceptions of low union instrumentality appear to underlie most decertifications, the factors *Belief in Unions*, and *Union Loyalty* would seem most relevant in the present context. Low levels of these forms of commitment among the employees, and in particular among their informal leaders, can be expected to be critical in enabling an employee decertification coalition to initiate and carry through a decertification drive (stages 1-4 of figure 3.2).

In evaluating the multiple, and comparative replications of Gordon et al.'s commitment factors Gallagher and Strauss (1991) conclude that the instrument has considerable internal and external validity. Further, the dimensions fit well within theories of "reasoned action" (Klandermans, 1986), most significantly because they suggest a
potential sequential linkage between beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions. Consequently, the dimensions of union commitment carry the legitimacy of being nested within extant socio-psychological literature. Further, the linkage between beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions is important in that this research relates employees union commitment attitudes to the behavioral outcome of them engaging in concerted decertification activities. An insightful avenue of commitment research is examination of the conditions under which union commitment is high (stage 1 of figure 3.2). The particular significance of such research is that it relates attitudes and beliefs to identifiable organizational processes and structures. It has been found that:

i) union commitment appears to be to be tied to union instrumentality - i.e. commitment to the union occurs when an individual feels the union can be used to achieve desired ends (Thacker and Fields, 1986; Martin and Peterson, 1987; Sherer and Morishima, 1989; Fullager and Barling, 1989). This finding is of significance in that there is widespread consensus that contemporary union instrumentality has become seriously blunted (Chaison and Rose, 1991; Dickens and Leonard, 1985; Goldfield, 1987; Freeman 1989a, and b; Voos, 1983). Farber (1987; 1988; 1989) has found that the contemporary decline in demand for union representation among non-union workers can, in large part, be explained by a decrease in perceptions of union instrumentality. One would expect that the decline in demand for union representation would be positively related to increased demand for decertification (stage 1 figure 3.2)
ii) social influences affect commitment - commitment appears to be shaped, in part by the attitudes of one's family and friends. Further, commitment appears to be shaped by the feelings one develops toward the union during one's first year of membership (Gordon et al, 1980). This finding points to the importance of effective first-year servicing by the union. This in turn raises several organizational issues. First, widespread managerial opposition in bargaining a first contract will seriously debilitate effective first-year servicing (Gagala, 1983; Reed, 1990b). Second, unions may need to examine the effectiveness of first-year servicing. In particular, there is some evidence that the transition from organizing to servicing is often poorly managed (Muehlenkamp, 1991).

iii) commitment, like satisfaction with the union, may be tied to members' views of the fairness of the grievance procedure, and their knowledge of how it works (Clark and Gallagher, 1989). Extending this finding, union commitment may therefore, be related to employees perceptions of their union's level of procedural justice. Consequently, the issue of union democracy becomes involved. This organizational level issue is addressed below.

III.3) Group Processes

In contrast to the traditional decertification research reviewed in chapter II, the present model places great emphasis on the group processes among the employees in a given bargaining unit. As Cooke has pointed out:
"It is important to bear in mind that most representation elections are held only after at least 30 % of the workers in a work unit have, in effect, requested the NLRB to do so. This implies that there are common dissatisfactions among the workers and that union representation is being pursued by a substantial proportion of the work unit." (p.403)

Examination of group processes among the employees helps explain why they participate in decertification coalitions (stages 1-2 of figure 3.2), and how they participate in such coalitions (stages 1-4 of figure 3.2).

III.3.a) Group Participation:

In order to generate some general explanations for why employees participate in decertification coalitions it is useful to draw on union participation literature.

This literature attempts (among other things) to answer the question: why do union members participate in union activities? In answering this question, some general processes have been uncovered that could usefully be applied to analyzing RAF decertification coalition participation.

Researchers have explained individual participation in union activities by using a "rational choice" model of decision-making (Klandermans, 1986). The rational-choice framework attempts to disaggregate complex social phenomena into the inter-connected set of goals, instrumentality, and cost and benefit perceptions of employees making union related
decisions. For example, within this framework an employees' active participation in the grievance procedure would be explained as follows:

"(a) member may attend a meeting to protest how her grievance is being processed if: she thinks there is a substantial chance of being heard; that being heard will help her win the grievance; and that the discounted value of attending the meeting (chance of being heard x the chance of being heard making a difference x the value of winning the grievance) exceeds such attendance costs as arranging for a baby sitter, missing a good TV program, or perhaps antagonizing the leadership by speaking out." (Gallagher and Strauss, 1991, pp. 155-6)

While there is probably little utility or interest among IR scholars and practitioners in attempting to measure the precise psychometric values of expectancies, valences etc., such a model can provide a useful heuristic tool for analyzing decertification coalition participation (and potentially leadership)⁴. The rational-choice framework is particularly insightful because it allows disaggregation of the complex social phenomenon of decertification coalition participation, and the making of causal connections between the goals, instrumentality, and perceived costs and benefits of such participation.

III.3.a.i) Goals:

Gallagher and Strauss (1991) argue that for union activists "the union delivers moral as well as economic goods" (p. 156). Given the relative difficulty of forming decertification coalitions, leaders and participants of such groups are likely to define and be united by a common moral/ideological dimension toward their union.
This does not imply that a high level moral issue has to exist in order for a decertification to become possible. Rather, the participants' broader ideologies and beliefs regarding the union's role in the workplace and society will be drawn on as important elements in defining the purpose and scope of a decertification coalition.

This dynamic may be particularly important in explaining the role of former union activists in leading decertification coalitions. As is discussed under section III.4.c.i, union stewards may play a central leadership role in many decertification coalitions. It seems highly probable that, in those cases where former union activists take a leadership role, a serious violation of the activists' moral/ideological belief in unions has been produced by some union action/inaction.

III.3.a.ii) Instrumentality (likelihood of success):

Union participation, as a means of achieving instrumental goals, has often appeared as a problematic theoretical proposition because scholars have traditionally relied heavily on neoclassical economic assumptions in analyzing this form of collective action. Consequently, more recent explanations of union participation have relied on alternate theoretical models. A particularly insightful approach draws on the political science theory of "resource mobilization".
"Klandermans' (1984) version of this theory suggests that members participate in union activities when they are convinced that the goal is important, that their own participation will make a difference, that other will participate, and that together they will be successful. As Klandermans (1984, p. 591) concludes, "...the willingness to participate in collective action appears to be strengthened by the belief that others will participate." (Gallagher and Strauss, 1991, p. 157)

In the concrete terms of decertification coalitions the following observations follow: i) individual instrumentality evaluations of leading and participating in a decertification are made with reference to other employees; and, ii) the perception that there is widespread willingness to participate in the decertification may be critical to initiating individual employees' participation. This insight is corroborated by the conclusion drawn from "interactionist" theories of participation. This approach argues that:

"participation is inextricably bound up with the group culture, and the individual decision to participate is influenced by the group to which the individual belongs." (Klandermans, 1986, p. 190)

This notion is further supported in the area of certification election activity where Cooke (1983) has concluded that:

"Social-psychological research of group behavior strongly supports the belief that individual perceptions and opinions are shaped (or reshaped) substantially by the perceptions and opinions of others within a group... Research also indicates that as group motives and goals form there is strong peer pressure for conformity and consensus." (p.403)
In conclusion, the existence of an informal anti-union employee coalition is likely to be an important determinant for the emergence of a decertification coalition willing to actively pursue decertification.

Focusing on instrumentality in this manner generates some potential strategic insights for union leadership in avoiding the formation and effective functioning of decertification coalitions. From a control orientation and somewhat anti-democratic perspective, union leadership strategies that isolate anti-union activists and break down anti-union coalitions are likely to help avoid the formation of decertification coalitions. From a more "human relations", and more democratic perspective leadership strategies that stress pro-union "group spirit, expressions of solidarity, symbols and ceremonies and appeals to values on a non-rational level" (Gallagher and Strauss, 1991 p. 157), are likely to weaken anti-union attitudes and help generate a pro-union coalition that can compete, against the decertification coalition, for the hearts and minds of the employees.

III.3.a.iii) Costs and Benefits:

The perceived costs and benefits of participating in a decertification coalition are central to individual employees' willingness to participate in decertification. Given unions' traditional wage and benefit raising effects (Freeman and Medoff, 1984), the benefits of voting a union out would not appear that great. If this is the case in potential decertification situations, then the costs of participation would not have to be raised very
high in order to discourage widespread employee participation in a decertification coalition. From a control perspective, this means that union leadership would not have to work very hard at discouraging participation. This would imply that union leadership does not have to rely on sending in the goons to avoid decertification. Further it means that some simple and limited human relations internal to the union may considerably enhance the perception of the benefit of staying union.

III.3.b) Decertification Coalition Leadership:

A second question is: how do employees participate in decertification coalitions. Cooke (1983) has identified a number of general group processes that affect individual union-voting behavior. One group process of particular significance is informal leadership among the employees.

The centrality of leadership to coalition formation has been noted in studies of certification (Cooke, 1983), and union member militancy (Nyden, 1978). With regard to the above cited group shaping of employees' certification decisions, Cooke (1983) argues that "Individuals having leadership or advocacy abilities are often especially influential in shaping the opinions of others in the group" (p. 403). Anderson et al (1982) have observed the operation of a leader-coalition dynamic in their case studies of decertification elections. Anderson et al concluded that, "an active, credible individual is vital to the process of convincing the members of the bargaining unit to support the
union or to vote for no union representation."
(p.193) Informal employee leadership will be critical to the decertification process at two stages in the causal flow model.

First, at stage 3 of the model, decertification coalition leaders will help determine the outcome sought by the employees by shaping their dissent to focus on a particular outcome. For example, the same coalition of dissatisfied employees, when led by a leader whose goal is changing union governance, may end up as union militants, or, when led by a leader whose goal is to change the union representing the unit, may end up as a decertification coalition pursuing a multi-union election.

Decertification coalition leader's own goals are therefore critical switching mechanisms - steering the employees toward one or another of the four potential outcomes outlined at stage 2 of the flow model.

Second, at stage 4 of the model, the leadership abilities and behaviors of decertification coalition leaders are central to determining whether the decertification coalition attains decertification. The organizational structure of the decertification process causes these abilities to be of such importance.

First, in contrast to certification coalitions, which are guided by professional union organizers, a decertification coalition has to rely on employees for leadership and organization. Further, as was discussed in 1.2.c, employers are not legally permitted to
initiate decertification campaigns and may provide only "ministerial assistance" to employees requesting help with decertification procedures. Thus while employees pursuing certification can rely on the skills of experienced professionals in guiding them towards their goal, employees seeking decertification are (at least legally) on their own.

Decertification coalition leaders must initiate and carry through a variety of tasks throughout the decertification process. At the earliest stage coalition leaders will be involved in, and initiate discussions about getting rid of the union and must persuade others of their standpoint. If it is decided that action is to be taken, coalition leaders must figure out the required procedural steps. The NLRB must be identified and contacted and the leader must establish the procedural steps to be taken. While this may seem a relatively simple task, the various legal-procedural constraints (especially with regard to timeliness) outlined in Chapter I must be correctly understood and followed. As Pearce and Peterson (1987) argue: "bargaining unit members who undertake an attempt to decertify their union representative quickly encounter...a perplexing maze of complex agency requirements" (p. 255). Once the leader has ascertained the decertification procedure he/she must report the findings back to the other employees, possibly arranging a meeting in order to communicate the information. Next a correctly specified decertification petition must be written and then circulated among interested employees. Once 30 percent of the unit is signed up the petition must be taken to the Board and an official petition form filled in. As was explained in chapter I, a single employee normally signs the formal decertification form. This form is then sent to both union and
management parties. At this stage the decertification drive is procedurally driven by the various NLRB steps, election scheduling hearings, election, ballot count etc. However, coalition leaders may still play an instrumental role in further organizing of employees into a pro-decertification voting bloc.

In sum, coalition leaders, to be effective, must take an unstructured situation - employees dissatisfied with their union representation - and turn this into a structured series of actions which follow narrowly constrained guidelines. Such "initiation of structure" is considered to be a defining element of leadership behavior (Bass, 1981).

The importance of decertification coalition leaders' leadership abilities and behaviors is heightened as they are potentially exposed to substantial pressure to call off the decertification (Pearce and Peterson, 1987). Under Taft-Hartley\textsuperscript{11}, an employee led decertification requires one individual to sign the decertification petition submitted to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Signing the decertification petition produces a number of consequences for the petition signer: i) the petition is sent to both management and union representatives and thus puts the signer in a highly public position, immediately identifiable by both union leadership and pro-union employee coalitions; and, ii) under Taft-Hartley\textsuperscript{12} the petitioner bears the sole responsibility for withdrawing the petition. Consequently, decertification petitioners may experience considerable pressure from both the union leadership and pro-union employees.
The presence of an informal leader among the employees in a unit appears to be central to the emergence of a decertification coalition and its successful pursuit of decertification. This factor's importance derives from both general group dynamics and the organizational nature of the decertification process. It is therefore posited that successful decertification attempts are led by individuals who exhibit leadership characteristics and behaviors.

III.4) Organizational Structures and Processes

There are three areas in which organizational processes, relations and structures are critical to decertification outcomes: a) "Formal" decertification as an organizational process; b) The Organizational Structure and Practice of Collective Bargaining; and, c) Union democracy and rank-and-file militancy as keys to understanding union decertification.

III.4.a) "Formal" Decertification as an Organizational Process:

Chapter II discussed the nature of union and management actions during the decertification campaign once the election has been scheduled. Section III.3 addressed the role of the decertification coalition leader in this process. In addition, the coalition leader may also participate in the influence tactics normally employed by unions and management during certification campaigns. Coalition leaders' influence tactics may include distribution of pro-decertification literature, organizing pro-decertification
meetings, talking to employees one-on-one, observing and questioning employees as to their pro/anti union stance, and the use of verbal and/or physical threats against opponents. The extant research has never addressed this issue. This research will explore the extent to which these tactics are used by decertification coalition leaders (stage 4 of figure 3.2).

III.4.b) The Organizational Structure and Practice of Collective Bargaining:

The organizational structure and practice of collective bargaining affects decertification in two ways: i) it mediates the individual-environment relationship stressed by traditional IR models; and, ii) it generates independent organizational outcomes that affect employee perceptions of union instrumentality and effectiveness (stage 1 of figure 3.2).

Under the traditional decertification model, individual employees are posited to cast pros vs anti-union votes on the basis of their individual perceptions and interpretations of a host of (economic, political, and institutional) variables within a utility-maximizing framework. Individuals appear to make such decisions in an unmediated manner, uninfluenced by group dynamics or by organizational constraints. Such a conceptualization seems highly unrealistic. While, some environmental factors, such as general unemployment and inflation, may be perceived and interpreted directly by individual employees, others, such as wage movements and union density, are likely to be perceived and interpreted as information "filtered" by management and union practices
and structures (for example during collective bargaining). This organizational filtering process is critical during certification campaigns when both the union and management attempt to structure employees perceptions of an uncertain external environment (in particular the labor market) to fit their own goals (unionization vs deunionization).

Focusing on the organizational level appears important from the participants' perspective. Anderson et al.'s (1982) survey of decertification campaigns found that there were three broad categories of responses regarding why a unit decertified: i) violation of members' expectations (45% of responses); ii) inability of the union to deal with management (20%); and, iii) contextual factors outside the union's control (35%). In short, 65% of the reasons given for decertification outcomes were union organizational outcomes where the employees perceived the union as ineffective or non-instrumental in meeting their demands.

It should be noted that the perception of low union instrumentality may be generated as much by managerial aggression as by union ineffectiveness. Labor practitioners point to avoidance of first contract settlements, hard-ball collective bargaining, pressuring the union into an unpopular strike, and the cultivation of anti-union factions within the unit as common, private-sector managerial practices designed to encourage decertification (Gagala, 1983).
Nevertheless, decertifications still require the existence of a sizable body of employees who have come to perceive the union as ineffective. Consequently, it should be fruitful to explore the contribution of union organizational ineffectiveness to employees perceptions of low union instrumentality. One way of addressing this issue is through the union democracy literature.

III.4.c) Union Democracy - Organizational Insights to Decertification:

George Strauss's (1991) discussion of union democracy, concludes that, "(i)t is service that the average member really wants. Democracy is primarily a means of insuring that it is available" (p.234) Hence, if union democracy is absent, service is diminished and employees disaffection is likely to increase. Consequently, examination of the organizational structures and practices underlying union democracy highlight potentially significant organizational causes of decertification.

III.4.c.i) Democracy at the Local Union Level:

The analysis of local union democracy has uncovered the following areas that are of interest to exploring determinants of decertification:
Stewards: Strauss (1991) believes that contemporary local democracy in the US may, in large part depend on the existence of a central group of activists who serve as stewards, dominate local meetings and check union leadership. Strauss argues that the union steward is often the key organizational activist in maintaining local democracy. This raises a number of interesting questions with regard to decertification.

Steward effectiveness on a day-to-day basis would appear to be an important element to explore as a determinant of decertification. A particularly interesting aspect of this question is the notion of the steward as a member of conflicting social systems (the union, departmental work group, and the company), and in terms of orientation (toward members vs toward union). Interviews of labor and management practitioners and perusal of the decertification petitions used in this study reveal that stewards often emerge as decertification coalition leaders. One proposition that emerges is that stewards may be key "switching agents", at stage 3 of figure 3.2, in defining which outcome a dissatisfied coalition of employees pursues. For instance it would seem that a disaffected workgroup oriented steward is more likely than a disaffected union-oriented steward to press for decertification (either to switch unions or to go non-union).

Union Leadership: Strauss (1991) points out that one measure of union democracy is leadership's responsiveness to membership demands. Although Strauss does not elaborate this theme, Nyden (1978) has identified such a dynamic in his examination of rank-and-file militancy:
"If workers feel that the union and its leadership provide protection from what they believe is capricious company action, grassroots militancy may be channeled through institutionalized procedures. On the other hand, if in the eyes of the membership the union does not defend workers' rights on the job, rank-and-file militancy is often directed as much against union officialdom as against management." (p.17)

Rank-and-file attributions of leadership instrumentality appear to be a critical "switching" condition that channel militancy toward an anti-management as opposed to an anti-management and anti-union stance. Rank-and-file attributions of leadership instrumentality would, therefore, appear to be critical to channelling rank-and-file disaffection toward decertification (stages 1-3 of figure 3.2).

**Occupational Community:** According to Strauss (1991), occupational community "facilitates the development of an activist core and so democracy." (p. 226) This argument is corroborated by Nyden's (1978) work on rank-and-file militancy. Further, occupational community is posited by both IR scholars and union practitioners to be a key element facilitating the organizing of new units (Anderson et al, 1982; Cooke, 1983; Gagala, 1983; Reed 1989) (stage 4 of figure 3.2). In all such discussions occupational community is equated with pro-union attitudes and pro-union oriented behaviors.

This raises the question: is decertification a more likely outcome in a unit with a weak occupational community than in one with a strong occupational community? It seems probable that units with a weak occupational community would be more likely to decertify. This prediction is based on two further propositions: First, decertification
moves a unit from an organized state, where, in theory, individual employees were united by common interests and pursued common goals, to a disorganized state, where, in theory, individuals revert to individual employee status, pursuing individualized interests. Second, a weak occupational community provides an environment in which management may find it easier to co-opt and coerce individuals into adopting anti-union views (stages 1-4 of figure 3.2). It may be that units with a strong occupational community are more likely to pursue decertification in order to change their representative union.

A number of factors contribute to the presence or absence of occupational community. These factors are briefly explored as they generate further propositions relating organizational level processes to decertification outcomes.

**Optimal Diversity:** Strauss (1991) argues that the demographic diversity of a local affects the level of democracy. Low demographic diversity has the effect of increasing democracy as officers are better attuned to membership needs, and the union is more able to reach consensus. However, if there is extremely low diversity there will be little to disagree over and democracy may wither. At the other extreme, if diversity becomes too great, disagreements may become extreme, sub-groups lose interest in each other’s issues, and the ability to form broad opposition groups may be undermined. Consequently, Strauss (1991) posits a curvilinear relationship with regard to democracy.
A similar relationship may be expected to hold between demographic diversity and the demand for decertification (stage 1 of figure 3.2). Low diversity may decrease employee disaffection. However, if such homogeneity becomes extreme to the point where democracy withers and union effectiveness declines, one could potentially foresee an increase in employees interest in decertification. Extreme diversity, on the other hand, would be expected to undermine occupational community and increase the likelihood of decertification. Interestingly, union practitioners point out that (formally stated), increasing a bargaining unit's diversity beyond its optimal point is management's goal during NLRB certification negotiation over "appropriate" bargaining unit boundaries.

**Status:** Both Strauss (1991) and Nyden (1978) argue that significant differences in status and pay undermine the bargaining unit's solidarity. Such differences tend to get translated into organizational structures whereby high pay, high status members assume leadership roles and form powerful cliques, with the consequence that low pay and low status workers are poorly represented by the unit. Clearly where such divisions exist one would anticipate a higher demand for decertification (stage 1 of figure 3.2) as status/pay groups split away either to non-union or other union status (Davis, 1986).

**Structural Alignment:** Strauss (1991) argues that "(D)emocracy is more feasible when"...a bargaining unit's..."social structure (occupational community); bargaining structure (with whom and for whom various forms of bargaining occur); and, union structure (especially the local's jurisdiction)"..." coincide." (p. 230). Strauss argues that
the US trend appears to be toward amalgamated locals, i.e. units in which this overlap does not occur and in which one would expect less occupational community. Extending this argument, such locals might be expected to express greater demand for decertification (stage 1 of figure 3.2).

III.4.c.ii) *Democracy at the National Union Level:*

While the local level generates concrete and material outcomes that shape employees' evaluations of their union, the national level generates important symbolic outcomes believed to shape employees' broader, affective attitude toward their union. Studies such as Sayles and Strauss (1953) and Halle (1984) reveal union members' suspicion and distrust of their national leadership. While, national union leadership may not control all the factors accounting for such perceptions, and such perceptions undoubtedly vary across unions, it is clear that such beliefs will do little to enhance union commitment. Consequently, employees' perceptions of the national union may be expected to affect demand for decertification (stage 1 of figure 3.2).

III.5) *Organizational-Environment Relations:*

Examination of organizational-environment relations is critical to evaluating decertification as an organizational outcome. As open-systems theories make explicit, the interaction of organization and environment is highly influential in shaping the internal
structure and practices of an organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus, in
evaluating the significance of organizational causes of decertification one must consider
the degree to which, and the manner in which such organizational structures and practices
have been dictated by the broader environment.

With regard to decertification, radical commentators such as Aronowitz (1983) and Davis
(1986) see connections between union leadership, broad environmental factors and
decertification outcomes. For example, Davis (1986) argues that contemporary union
leadership has adopted a strategy of protecting the privileges of its senior core of primary-
sector members, to the exclusion of the secondary sector's younger, unemployed and
working poor. Davis argues that this alleged strategy "risks the creation of a reactive anti-
solidarity, as the unemployed become strike-breakers, or the second-class citizens of the
lower wage tiers decertify unions that have failed to represent them" (pp. 152-3)

In contrast, Taplin (1990), who draws similar conclusions regarding union leadership
failure, locates such failure within the "contradictions" of an inherited business unionism.
Taplin traces the institutionalization of business unionism back to its origins in the New
Deal, and post World War II political-economy. Of particular significance, Taplin stresses
the shaping force of employer dominance over union interests during the latter part of this
period. Consequently, Taplin's account appears to place less blame on current union
leadership than does Davis's.
The point of drawing on these examples is to illustrate the importance of locating the organizational structures and processes, which affect demand for decertification (stage 1 of figure 3.2), within their broader environmental context. Such setting in context forces IR scholars and practitioners to debate the broader causes, and hence the broader limitations to solutions of IR issues.

III.6) **Summary:**

This chapter has developed a conceptualization of decertification that presents an alternative to more traditional models of the unionization and deunionization processes. The discussion broadened the traditional utility-maximization or cost-benefit model of decertification in two directions. First, the traditional focus on the formal decertification election (from petition through election win/loss) was broadened to include analysis of the antecedent conditions and processes that lead to the formation of a group of employees willing to pursue decertification. Second, the traditional focus on the individual-environment relationship was expanded to include analysis of a variety of individual, group, organizational, and environmental relations, processes and structures not examined by traditional decertification models. Specifically, five levels of relationships were analyzed: i) individual-environment; ii) individual-organization; iii) group; iv) organizational; and v) organization-environment.
Much of the chapter focussed on the individual, group, and organizational levels. This focus stands in contrast to the traditional emphasis of broad environmental, particularly economic factors. As was argued in chapter II, the individual, group and organizational levels are stressed for three reasons: i) they are rarely discussed in the traditional IR literature; ii) it is these levels that determine whether the demand for decertification among employees is actually translated into a successful decertification campaign; and, iii) research of relationships and processes that occur at these levels is of greater applied relevance because these are relationships and processes directly affected and controllable by IR practitioners.

The subsequent chapters further refine the focus. While various aspects of the alternative model are examined and evaluated, the central proposition of interest is that decertification petitioners act as leaders of other employees within the decertification coalition (see section III.3.b). Based on this proposition, it will be hypothesized that decertification petitioners exhibit a variety of leadership behaviors and characteristics, and that these behaviors and characteristics have a significant impact on decertification election outcomes.

Notes:

1. It could be argued, on the basis of the literature review presented in chapter II, that traditional models of decertification focus exclusively on the correlates of the antecedent conditions and processes that lead to pro-decertification attitudes among employees. As was argued in chapter II the variables used to model decertification should be expected to predict aggregate demand for decertification. As such these models do not actually
focus on the formal decertification election. However, as was pointed out, these models use the election process outcomes as their dependent variable. It is in this sense that they focus on the formal election.

2. However, Gallagher and Strauss (1991) point out that:

"Although such findings suggest a calculative attachment to the union, the relative scarcity of longitudinal studies makes it difficult to determine the direction of the causal relationship. Do positive instrumentality perceptions lead to higher commitment? Or do members with high commitment to the union tend to perceive the union as instrumental?" (p.149)

3. Suggestive in this regard is Folger and Konovsky's (1989) finding that employees level of organizational commitment is related to their perceptions of procedural justice.

4. For example, one can simply insert coalition participation in the place of grievance participation in the above quote. The result is as follows:

A RAF member may participate in a decertification coalition if: she thinks there is a substantial chance that her participation will strengthen the coalition; that strengthening the coalition will help decertify the union; and that the discounted value of participating in the coalition (chance of strengthening coalition * the chance of strengthened coalition decertifying the union * the value of decertifying the union) exceeds such attendance costs as arranging for a baby sitter, missing a good TV program, or perhaps antagonizing the leadership by speaking out.

5. See especially Olson's classic (1965) treatise. Specifically, collective action is problematic for neoclassical thinking because of the "free-rider" problem inherent in all group or social action.


7. Indeed sending in the goons may have a stronger, damaging "backlash" effect by generating outrage among the employees.

8. See Cooke (1983), p. 403. Cooke provides a discussion of those group processes that frame individual employee decisions with regard to certification elections. These include loss of face, reciprocity between members, socio-psychological solidarity, and in-group vs. out-group activities.


10. My emphasis.


13. Gallagher and Strauss make the same argument, adding that "as yet there have been few formal studies as to how this occurs." (p. 144) However, it should be noted that the operation of such dynamics have been observed in case studies of union settings. See for example Nyden (1978) or Halle (1984).

14. This view was strongly corroborated by interviews with labor practitioners in Ohio (1992).

15. According to Strauss, union democracy provides the structural conditions under which the RAF can voice, and enforce, demands for satisfactory service from union leadership.


"Union oriented stewards are more ideologically concerned and keep in closer contact with local officers and other stewards, while workgroup-oriented stewards are more parochial in both their interests and their contacts; they are less inclined to overall union strategy." (p. 216)

17. Next to the area where the petitioner signs the petition form there is a space which asks for "position description." In many instances petitioners signed union steward in this area.

18. This should not be unexpected as: i) the steward is likely to be a natural leader or have taken on leadership properties, in the eyes of the RAF, by virtue of her/his position; ii) if decertifications are, as Lawler (1990) claims, about intra-union politics, stewards, by virtue of their access to both the union organization and RAF are in a good position to channel such politics.

19. See also Tannenbaum and Kahn (1958).

20. Thus there is an effect on demand for decertification (stage 1 of figure III.2).

21. Demographic diversity refers to the variation in the RAF’s occupation, age, ethnicity, and sex.

22. My emphasis.
CHAPTER IV
Research Goals and Hypotheses

This chapter outlines the research goals and design (discussed in full in chapter V) of this study. Secondly, the specific hypotheses that are to be tested and the areas that are to be explored are presented.

IV.1) Research Goals and Design

A questionnaire survey, mailed to some 500 decertification petitioners will be combined with NLRB election records to generate a data base covering a variety of aspects of the decertification process. The research has two goals: i) exploratory analysis of the decertification petitioner and the decertification process; and, ii) explanatory analysis of the role of the decertification petitioner in the decertification process.

Three exploratory questions are of particular interest: i) the background and characteristics of petitioners; ii) the reasons petitioners engage in decertification campaigns; and, iii) the degree of managerial involvement in the decertification process.
The explanatory analysis will examine the decertification petitioner's role as a leader of other employees in the bargaining unit. Given the costs and risks associated with signing a decertification petition (see III.3.b) it is presupposed that decertification petitioners act as leaders of decertification coalitions in their bargaining unit. The research will examine the proposition that the leadership traits and behaviors of the decertification petitioner, as leader of the decertification coalition, significantly affect the coalition's ability to secure decertification.

The discussion in previous chapters has gradually shifted away from the traditional emphasis on broad environmental, and particularly economic factors. For the reasons given in chapter III, the alternative decertification model focused largely on the individual, group and organizational levels. The research goals and design, in turn, shift emphasis further to the individual level.

Surveying decertification petitioners to examine the exploratory and explanatory questions outlined necessitates a focus on the perspective of the individual petitioner. While the survey addresses a number of organizational issues, and the archival NLRB records provide some objective organizational data, the decertification petitioners are naturally best able to answer questions that elicit individual level experiences and information.
IV.2) **Explanatory Hypotheses and Exploratory Areas**

The hypotheses and propositions presented below were generated by combining information from the decertification literature review (chapter II), the alternative decertification model (chapter III), and the results of open-ended interviews with labor and management practitioners (methodology - chapter V; interview protocol and results - appendix B).

IV.2.a) **Petitioner as Leader:**

*Rationale:* It was concluded in section III.3.b that the presence of an informal leader among the employees in a unit should be a central determinant to the emergence of a decertification coalition and its successful pursuit of decertification. This factor's importance derives from both general group dynamics and the organizational nature of the decertification process. Further, practitioners, in the open-ended interviews saw petitioner leadership behaviors and traits as their most important common attribute.

*Measures:* The degree to which the decertification petitioner exhibits leadership characteristics and behaviors can be evaluated using cognitive and behavioral measures. *Self-Esteem* of the petitioner provides an important cognitive measure of leadership. Self-esteem has consistently been related to leadership (Bass, 1981). Reed (1989) used Rosenberg's 1965 10-item Self-Esteem Scale as one of his more significant measures of
successful union organizer traits. Given these findings, it is believed that this aspect of leadership will also be significant in identifying successful decertification petitioners. Practitioners gave strong endorsements of this trait in the open-ended interviews. The petitioner’s degree of leadership can also be captured by whether he/she has held past elected and/or appointed union positions. Such activity indicates that the petitioner has experienced a leadership position among the rank-and-file. A variety of behavioral dimensions indicate leadership behavior during the decertification campaign. As was argued in section III.3.b, decertification coalition leaders, to be effective, must take an unstructured situation - employees dissatisfied with their union representation - and turn this into a structured series of actions which follow narrowly constrained guidelines. Such "initiation of structure" is considered to be a defining element of leadership behavior (Bass, 1981). When a petitioner claims responsibility for the steps that need to be taken to initiate and pursue decertification (section III.3.b) it indicates that they initiated decertification structure and so acted as leaders. The relationship between the other rank-and-file and the petitioner indicates the degree to which the petitioner is viewed as a leader. One way of capturing this dimension is to establish whether the petitioner was approached by others, or had to approach others, in initiating and leading the decertification. If the petitioner was consistently approached by others it suggests that the rank-and-file perceived the petitioner as a natural leader. Lastly, the petitioner may engage in a variety of influence tactics during the election campaign (section III.a.a). The more active a petitioner is during the campaign, the more initiation of structure, and hence leadership they engage in.
**Hypotheses:** It is posited that successful decertification attempts are led by petitioners who exhibit leadership characteristics and behaviors. Consequently:

\[ H_1: \text{Decertification petitioner's leadership behaviors and characteristics have a significant, positive effect on decertification election outcomes.} \]

**IV.2.b) Petitioner's Commitment to the Union:**

**Rationale:** It was concluded in section III.2.b that low levels of union commitment among the employees, and in particular among decertification petitioners, can be expected to be critical in enabling an employee decertification coalition to initiate and carry through a decertification drive. Further, given Anderson et al's (1982) findings (under section II.3.b.ii) regarding the reasons believed to cause employees to seek decertification, one would expect low union commitment to be pervasive. Anderson et al's findings are corroborated by practitioners' strongly supportive response to questions regarding low union commitment.

**Measures:** It was concluded in section III.2.b that low levels of two types of union commitment would be most relevant with regard to decertification: Belief in Unions (or "moral"/"ideological" commitment to the union); and, Union Loyalty (where pride and loyalty in the union are related to an instrumental recognition of the benefits derived from membership). There are 11 items in Gordon et al's (1980) 37-item union commitment scale that can elicit, or be modified to elicit: i) *specific pride* in having been a part of the
union the petitioner sought to decertify (7 items); and ii) the specific instrumental value of having been in the union vs not having been in the union (4 items).

**Hypotheses:** It is posited that successful decertification attempts are led by petitioners who exhibit extremely low commitment to their union. Consequently:

\[ H_2: \text{Decertification petitioner's degree of union commitment has a significant, negative effect on decertification election outcomes.} \]

Given that Anderson et al (1982) found internal correlations between the types of reasons given for decertification, and also with the organizational variable unit size, it will be of interest to explore correlations between union commitment and measures of these factors. Assuming that low union commitment is highly correlated with reasons classified as violation of members' expectations, correlations between commitment and: union failure (positive relationship); lack of membership involvement (positive relationship); management challenges to union (negative relationship); and, larger bargaining units (negative relationship) can be explored.

**IV.2.c) Petitioner's Relationship to the Union:**

**Rationale:** The degree and nature of petitioners' involvement with their union prior to the decertification attempt would be of interest for a variety of reasons. First, it would allow one to capture the behavioral corollaries of Gordon et al's (1980) union
commitment factors: *Willingness to Work for the Union*; and, *Responsibility to the Union*. Second, it would provide descriptive evidence with which to evaluate union practitioners' allegations that petitioners are anti-union pawns in management deunionization strategies. Third, if the results reveal many petitioners to be disgruntled former union activists, this could, in turn, generate some important lessons regarding union servicing and internal organizing. Fourth, section III.4.c.i argued that union stewards may be key "switching agents" among employees. Hence, identification of those who held steward positions is of interest.

**Measures:** The petitioner's degree and nature of involvement with the union prior to decertification can be captured using *a series of behavioral questions*, *including those that establish the holding of a steward position by the petitioner*. Responses can also be collapsed into a "union involvement" scale.

**Hypotheses:** It is posited (on the basis of union practitioner allegations) that successful decertification attempts are led by petitioners who had little positive involvement with the union prior to decertification. Consequently:

\[ H_5: \text{Decertification petitioner's degree of union involvement has a significant, negative effect on decertification election outcomes.} \]

The above, and additional areas of descriptive interest, such as the petitioner's holding of a steward position, are examined using descriptive statistics.
IV.2.d) Petitioner's Relationship to the Employer:

Rationale: Neither the literature review (chapter II) nor the alternative decertification model (chapter III) dwelt on the relationship between petitioner and employer, beyond the mention of union practitioner allegations. However, open-ended interviews with practitioners revealed that this was considered a central factor.

The practitioners argued that in most decertification cases a relatively close, and in some cases collusive, relationship exists between management and the petitioner. Even when the decertification coalition is a genuine employee initiated and led movement, management is often called upon to assist (in providing "ministerial assistance," section I.2.c). Further, a degree of trust between the petitioner and management is often critical because the initiation and maintenance of the decertification campaign is based on an evaluation of the dissatisfaction with the union versus the degree of trust in management to operate fairly and justly in a post-union environment (see appendix B).

Further, the instrumentality and benefits of participating in decertification efforts (sections III.3.a.ii, and III.3.a.iii) are likely increased by the closeness of petitioner and employer. Closeness to the employer will increase the instrumentality of participation in decertification if the employer uses the relationship to help persuade the petitioner of the importance of the decertification. Employer support of petitioners is likely to help convince them that their participation will make a difference, that others will participate,
and that together they will be successful. Closeness to the employer increases the benefits of participation in decertification if the petitioner believes future individual rewards from the employer may be generated by participation.

**Measures:** 9 items from Mowday et al’s 1979 Organizational Commitment Questionnaire can capture petitioner evaluations of their relationship with their employers. These match the characterization of the nature of the typically close petitioner-employer relationship.

**Hypotheses:** It is posited that successful decertification attempts are led by petitioners who had a high degree of commitment to their employer. Consequently:

\[ H_1: \text{Decertification Petitioners’ degree of commitment to their employer has a significant, positive effect on decertification election outcomes.} \]

**IV.2.e) Management’s Degree of Involvement in the Decertification Process:**

**Rationale:** While both academics (in section II.b.ii) and practitioners (in appendix B) argue that management usually takes a low profile during decertifications, union practitioners allegations of managerial involvement make this a very interesting (and controversial) area. Measures that are able to differentiate between legal and illegal managerial involvement provide both important explanatory and exploratory variables. Along the same lines, the effect and degree of use of management consultants in decertification campaigns is of great interest. Given the argument that management
usually takes a low profile during decertification, the use of a management consultant is considered aggressive managerial behavior. Both Anderson et al (1982) and Lawler (1990) observed the operation of a "backfire" effect when management adopts aggressive decertification efforts (section II.b.ii). This dynamic was corroborated by practitioners. In addition, the practitioners pointed out that obvious illegal managerial involvement typically results in the filing of Unfair Labor Practice charges by the union. This has the effect of: i) delaying the election (which gives the union extra time to organize); and, ii) undermining management's initial advantage over the union, in that some focus will shift from the union's defense of its record to management's defense of its actions. Consequently, it is probable that low levels of legal employer involvement enhance the likelihood of decertification, while high levels of aggressive and, in particular, illegal employer involvement, and the use of a management consultant, lead to a strong backlash effect and diminish the likelihood of decertification.

**Measures:** A variety of measures help evaluate management's degree of involvement. The different campaign activities and promises and threats generally used in certification and decertification elections can be established. It can also be examined to what degree management was involved in initiation of the decertification campaign and to what extent management suggested the various actions taken by employees (where both legal and illegal activities can be isolated). Lastly, the use of a management consultant can be established.
Hypotheses: It is posited that successful decertification attempts occur when low, legal levels of managerial involvement occur. However, when higher, more aggressive, and especially illegal levels of managerial involvement occur, and consultants are used there is a strong decline in the probability of a decertification resulting. Consequently:

$H_3$: There is a significant, positive relationship between moderate, and legal levels of managerial involvement and decertification election outcomes, and a significant, negative relationship between extreme, and illegal levels of managerial involvement, and the use of a management consultant and decertification election outcomes.

IV.2.f) Decertification Coalition:

Rationale: It was concluded in section III.3.a.ii that the existence of an informal anti-union employee coalition in the bargaining unit will be a critical condition enabling the formation of a decertification coalition.

Measures: The existence of an anti-union coalition can be measured somewhat objectively by noting whether multiple employees sign the decertification petition. In those cases where this occurs this indicates the active involvement of more than one employee. Further, petitioners can be asked to what degree other employees were involved in initiation of the decertification campaign. Lastly, petitioners can be asked whether other employees helped with the decertification campaign.
**Hypotheses:** It is posited that successful decertification attempts occur when an informal anti-union employee coalition exists in the bargaining unit. Consequently:

\[ H_0: \text{The existence of an informal decertification coalition in the bargaining unit has a significant, positive effect on decertification election outcomes.} \]

**IV.2.g) Union Campaign Practices:**

**Rationale:** It was concluded in II.3.b.ii that union campaign practices will have an impact on decertification outcomes. Specifically, Anderson et al (1982, p. 194) concluded that "an active union campaign (in units with high levels of member involvement) was related to the union maintaining bargaining unit status." Of particular importance was "the content of the message being communicated" and "the quality of the strategies and tactics used." "Verbal threats and explanations of potential costs of getting rid of the union" were found to significantly reduce the probability of decertification. "One-to-one contact" was seen as being the most effective union activity. These conclusions were corroborated by Lawler (1990), Fulmer and Gilman (1981) and by practitioners in the open-ended interviews.

Further, the fairly strong effect of union influence tactics on decertification campaigns support the conclusions drawn in section III.3.a.iii regarding the costs versus benefits of employee participation in the decertification coalition. Given that the benefits of voting a union out would not appear to be that great, the costs of participation would not have
to be raised very high by the union in order to discourage widespread employee participation in a decertification coalition. Consequently, some basic, quality internal organizing and servicing may considerably enhance the perception of the benefit of staying union.

It was also noted in section III.3.a.iii that unions may also be prone to "backlash effects" if their campaign tactics become too heavy-handed. Excessively aggressive behaviors and threats may generate outrage among the employees and turn formerly pro union employees against the union. However, it would probably take more extreme activities to provoke a union backlash effect than a management backlash effect because the union has to appear active to win back employee support, and management involvement is legally more restricted than union involvement.

Open ended interviews with practitioners also revealed that the amount of delay between submission of a decertification petition and the actual holding of the decertification election tended to improve the union's chance of turning the decertification around by giving them more time to mount an organizing campaign. Practitioners pointed out that unions, cognizant of this, are quick to file unfair labor practice charges when decertification petitions are submitted because this initiates often lengthy investigations by the NLRB. Consequently the delay between filing of the petition and holding of the election can capture the amount of time the union has to mount an organizing campaign.
**Measures:** The different campaign activities and promises and threats generally used by unions in certification and decertification elections can be established. The specific activities and messages identified by Anderson et al (1982) above as being particularly effective can be isolated. A measure of time elapsed between filing of the decertification petition and the holding of the election can be obtained from NLRB records.

**Hypotheses:** It is posited that the greater the union campaign activity and the longer the election delay the lower the probability of decertification. However, when extremely aggressive union tactics are used, the probability of decertification rises. Consequently:

\[ H_1: \text{The amount of time elapsed between the filing of a petition and the holding of the election has a significant, negative effect on decertification election outcomes.} \]

\[ H_2: \text{There is a significant, negative relationship between moderate levels of union involvement and decertification election outcomes, and a significant, positive relationship between extreme, and aggressive levels of union involvement and decertification election outcomes.} \]

**IV.2.h) NLRB Election Records:**

**Rationale:** It was concluded in section II.3.b.ii that theoretical and empirical evidence supports the contention that smaller bargaining units are more likely to experience decertification. Practitioners corroborated both the significance of this factor and many of the causal links between size and outcome discussed under section II.3.b.ii.
**Measures:** NLRB records contain data on the number of eligible employees in the bargaining unit. This data can be used to measure unit size.

**Hypotheses:**

H$_0$: The size of the bargaining unit has a significant, negative effect on decertification election outcomes.

**Rationale:** The unions involved in decertification campaigns is a purely descriptive factor. The question of interest is whether particular unions have particularly high decertification petition filing and election loss rates. Practitioners did point out that the Teamsters typically experience higher rates of petition filing, and lose more decertification elections than other unions. The practitioners argued that this was because: i) they organize more than other unions, therefore (in absolute terms) they are more likely to experience decertification activity; ii) they organize more low-wage employees and small units than other unions - such units are harder bargain for (the margin of bargaining gains is low) and service (small units are expensive and garner less interest from the union) while employees still pay dues; iii) they don't service many of the smaller units they have organized; and, iv) the Teamsters often file disclaimers (walk away from the unit) when facing a decertification petition.

**Measures:** NLRB records contain indicate the union involved in the decertification.
**Hypotheses:** It is posited that Teamster represented units are more likely to experience decertification losses than other unions. Consequently:

H₁₀: Teamsters representation has a significant, positive effect on decertification election outcomes.

IV.2.i) **Petitioner’s Reasons for Decertification:**

**Rationale:** Given union practitioners allegations regarding the causes of decertification it is extremely interesting to generate exploratory data on the reasons employees pursue decertification. Such a study has not, to date, been conducted. Of particular interest is the petitioner’s perception as to whether the union could have avoided the reasons given for decertification. Data on this issue addresses the degree to which decertification campaigns are being driven by environmental factors and management resistance and deunionization efforts as opposed to union ineffectiveness. Also, various of the reasons given cast some light on issues raised in chapters II and III. Cross-tabulation of reasons with various other variables will allow further analysis of these issues.

**Measures:** The measures are straight-forward questions asking for the reasons decertification was pursued.
IV.2.j) Petitioner Demographics:

**Rationale:** Demographic measures of the petitioners are included as descriptive background variables. Further, a number of them will serve as control variables.

IV.3) Summary

The hypotheses to be tested and the areas to be explored were presented in relation to the literature review (chapter II) and the alternative model (chapter III). Chapter V will specify the hypotheses and areas in further detail within the context of the research methodology.

Notes:

1. Leaders consistently rate themselves higher on self-esteem (Stogdill, 1974), attempted leadership is higher among those who feel self-esteem (Hemphill and Pepinsky, 1955), and self-confidence is related to leadership behaviors (Mowday, 1979; and Kipnis and Lane, 1962).

2. Reed (1989) argued that self-esteem was related to organizer success because:

   "The ability to persist in an organizing effort despite setbacks and failures depends partly on a strong sense of self-worth and self-acceptance. Individuals who have a high degree of self-esteem may more easily rebound from temporary failure and retain their commitment to the organizing project." (p. 105)

3. Interestingly, practitioners saw the link between self-esteem and petitioners adoption and leadership of decertification campaigns in similar terms to Reed’s link between self-esteem and organizers (see endnote 2).
4. It will be recalled that of the reasons given: 45 percent were classified as "violation of members' expectations" (by the union); and 20 percent were classified as "inability of the union to deal with management."

5. The first three factors are all measured in the "reasons for decertification" section of the questionnaire (see appendix C), the fourth factor is measured using NLRB records.

6. Both factors represent behavioral intentions, or the propensity to act on behalf of the union where the level of personal cost of behavior associated with the former factor is greater than that associated with the latter factor.

7. Practitioners characterized this relationship as: "faith in employer;" "emotional closeness;" and, "social relationship" (see appendix B).

8. In particular, given the finding that the use of management consultants has a powerful (negative) impact on union certification election wins (Cooke, 1983; Gagala, 1983; Lawler, 1990; and, Reed, 1989).
CHAPTER V
Research Methodology

V.1) Overview of the Research Design

The research followed an iterative four-stage design:

Stage I: Open-ended, pre-survey practitioner interviews. The goal of these interviews was to examine the validity of variables proposed at earlier stages of the research¹, and to generate additional variables to be measured at stages II and III.

The interviews followed a protocol (see appendix B) that was designed on the basis of previous research and the alternative model of decertification (chapters II and III). The interviews were conducted with two management lawyers, two union staff members, one union lawyer, and one NLRB staff member. The respondents all had considerable experience with decertification campaigns. The results of the interviews (summarized in appendix B) resulted in the addition of a number of areas of interest as discussed in chapter IV², and substantial modification of earlier drafts of the petitioner questionnaire.

132
Further, the interviews resulted in a substantial revision of the original research proposal (Borgers, 1992c). Following analysis of the interview results, and in consultation with the dissertation committee, it was decided to drop seven of the eight psychological scales included in early drafts of the questionnaire.

The psychological scales had been drawn from Reed's (1989) work on union organizers. It was originally believed that, during decertification elections, decertification petitioners fulfilled the role that union organizers play during certification elections. Consequently, the psychological traits that Reed (1989) had found to distinguish effective union organizers could also be expected to distinguish effective decertification petitioners. The scales were dropped because the practitioners argued that: i) decertification petitioners did not fulfill similar roles to union organizers; ii) the majority of the competencies and characteristics identified by Reed did not apply to petitioners; and, iii) there was a poor match between the characteristics, competencies, and traits posited by Reed to be synonymous.

However, practitioners did corroborate the argument presented in section III.3.b, that petitioners were typically leaders among the other employees. They felt that Reed's competency: "ability to persist in work despite failures and setbacks"; characteristic: "strong self-image", and trait: "self-esteem" captured the essence of such leadership and characterized well many petitioners. Consequently, the self-esteem scale was retained.
Stage II: Questionnaire survey of decertification petitioners. The questionnaire was designed by incorporating information from earlier research and the results of the open-ended interviews (appendix B). The questionnaire was designed to elicit the specific information discussed in chapter IV. The questionnaire was pre-tested on two local decertification petitioners.

The resulting questionnaire (appendix C) was mailed to 479 decertification petitioners (443 cases). The questionnaire was accompanied by a cover letter and two copies of a consent form (appendix C). The survey materials were mailed to petitioners' work addresses, as listed on the petition. This strategy was adopted because attempts to establish contact with petitioners for pre-tests revealed that many petitioners no longer resided at the listed home address. One month after mailing the surveys follow-up calls were made to those petitioners from who no survey had been received. Petitioners were contacted at the home and/or work numbers listed on the petition. The follow-up calls resulted in a second wave of survey mailings to 110 petitioners. Notes were kept on the nature of the responses and non-responses so as to be able to produce a precise picture of the response rate (see section VI.1). Follow-up calls were subsequently made to those receiving second wave questionnaires, and to those who had received the first wave questionnaire, had expressed interest in participating in the study, but had not yet mailed back their questionnaires.
The 479 petitioners receiving questionnaires represent a population that was generated by requesting decertification petitions for the 100 most recently closed RD cases (as of September 30, 1992) from five NLRB regions. This request produced cases closed between March 1987 and October 1992. The petitions were obtained from the NLRB by submitting a Freedom of Information Act request to the NLRB General Counsel in Washington, DC.

The 100 most recently closed RD cases for five regions were chosen as the population because: i) they provided a population sufficiently large to allow statistical analysis; and, ii) they generated a population of the most recently closed decertification elections. The latter consideration was important as: i) the cases had to be closed so that respondents could answer without fear of jeopardizing on-going decertification elections; and, ii) the questionnaires relied to a great extent on petitioners’ recall, therefore the more contemporary the case the higher the reliability of the recollections.

The five NLRB regions are: Region 6 (based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania); Region 7 (based in Detroit, Michigan); Region 8 (based in Cleveland, Ohio); Region 9 (based in Cincinnati, Ohio); and, Region 25 (based in Indianapolis, Indiana). The restriction to these five regions aimed to: i) reduce the costs of follow-up telephone solicitation of respondents; and, ii) provide a relatively homogenous sample of NLRB regions.
Stage III: Archival data. The necessary election data discussed in chapters I, IV and V, was obtained by using a combination of NLRB annual reports and monthly election reports, and primary data from the NLRB, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

Stage IV: Correlational Analysis. The correlational hypotheses and exploratory areas, as described in chapter IV, were operationalized in this chapter using the questionnaire and archival generated variables. The data was analyzed using the statistical techniques introduced in the following sections, and discussed further, with regard to the statistical results, in chapter VI.

V.2) Data Analysis Methods

All variables were analyzed using exploratory descriptive statistics so as to describe the frequencies, dispersion, and central tendencies of the data. The results are reported, in chapters VI and VII, in the context of the discussion presented in chapter IV.

Explanatory correlational models examined the correlational determinants of the result of the decertification election. The general model was specified as follows:

\[
\text{Decertification Outcome} = f\{(\text{Petitioner Characteristics}) + (\text{Petitioner, Employer, and Union Campaign Practices})\}
\]
The hypotheses presented in chapter IV were tested using a combination of one full, and multiple hierarchical least squares regression models. The general null hypothesis was tested using hierarchical least squares regression with the forced entry of petitioner leadership measures at step two. The general null hypothesis tested was:

\[ H_0: \text{Decertification petitioner's leadership behaviors and characteristics do not have a significant effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.} \]

V.3) Variable Operationalizations

V.3.a) Dependent Variable:

The decertification outcome, percentage of anti-union votes, served as the dependent variable. This variable was generated using NLRB election records which contain the number of employees eligible to vote and the number of employees who voted against the union.

V.3.b) Independent variables - Conventions for Selecting Measures:

Multiple measures were used to capture the independent variables introduced in chapter IV. In order to achieve a parsimonious model it was necessary to choose between these measures and to reject the "weaker" ones. The following conventions were used to determine which of the measures to use.
For all scales, scale reliability was determined using Cronbach’s $\alpha$ (Cronbach, 1951). The well established scales (self-esteem, and union and organizational commitment) have been applied in multiple settings, and this allowed comparison of the reliabilities found in this study relative to those found in previous studies. Such comparison was of interest given that selective items from these scales were used, and given that the commitment scales were reworded so as to provide a retroactive evaluation. The scales produced for this study (behavioral and verbal activism, initiation of structure, petitioner union involvement, and petitioner-other employees relationship) are unique. Cronbach’s $\alpha$ provided a reasonable measure of these scales’ reliability. Those scales with an $\alpha$ of less than .50 were rejected (Davis and Cosenza, 1988). Further, where multiple scales measured the same independent variable, if large differences between the scales’ reliabilities existed, the more reliable scale was used in the explanatory models.

A correlation matrix of all potential measures was used to identify extreme multicollinearity between measures of the same independent variables. Where extreme multicollinearity was identified, the following conventions were used for choosing between the measures:

- If the measures were all of particular interest, separate hierarchical regression models were run to see which are of most significance and produced the best fit (highest model $R^2$).

- If the measures were not of particular interest, they were rejected on the basis of: i) low, individual correlation with the dependent variable; and, ii) inferior performance within a full regression model that sorted through all potential measures.
V.3.c) Independent variables:

V.3.c.i) Petitioner as Leader:

Self-Esteem of the petitioner was measured using Rosenberg's 1965 10-item Self-Esteem Scale (question 33). A five point Likert type scale (ranging from strongly agree, through neither, to strongly disagree) was used to register the response. The actual measure used in the analysis was the mean item score for the scale items (which can range between 1 and 5). This measure provided a single, easily interpretable measure of self-esteem. The petitioner's initiation of decertification structure was indicated when a petitioner claimed responsibility for the steps that need to be taken to initiate and pursue decertification (question 7). The degree of initiation was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (none of the steps were taken by the petitioner) and 7 (all of the 7 steps were taken by the petitioner). The petitioner's use of influence tactics during the election campaign was measured by question 5, which asked who engaged in influence tactics during the campaign. The degree of behavioral activism was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (the petitioner engaged in no influence tactics) and 7 (the petitioner engaged in all 7 possible influence tactics). The relationship between the other employees and the petitioner was indicated by whether the petitioner was approached by others, or had to approach others, in initiating and leading the decertification (questions 8 and 9). The degree of leadership was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (the petitioner had to approach others (question 8), and someone other than the employees
suggested that he/she should sign the petition (question 9)) and 2 (the petitioner was approached by others (question 8), and the employees suggested he/she should sign the petition'') (question 9)). The petitioner’s holding of past elected and/or appointed union positions was asked as part of the "Union Activities Section" of the questionnaire (question 21). This variable took a value of 1 if the petitioner had previously held a union position.

V.3.c.ii) Petitioner’s Commitment to the Union:

11 items in Gordon et al’s (1980) 37-item union commitment scale elicit: i) specific pride in having been a part of the union the petitioner sought to decertify (7 items); and ii) the specific instrumental value of having been in the union vs not having been in the union (4 items) (question 13, items a-k). These items were modified, where necessary to refer to "the" union so as to elicit specific commitment to the union the petitioner attempted to decertify. The scale was preceded by a statement indicating that the items refer to the period of the decertification campaign. All items were modified to past tense statements. A five point Likert type scale (ranging from strongly agree, through neither, to strongly disagree) was used to register the response. The actual measure used in the analysis was the mean item score for the scale items (which can range between 1 and 11). This measure provided a single, easily interpretable measure of union commitment.
V.3.c.iii) Petitioner's Relationship to the Union:

A series of behavioral questions indicated the petitioners degree and nature of involvement with the union prior to decertification (questions 14-21). Questions 16-19 were used to generate a degree of union involvement scale. The scale can vary between 0 (the petitioner never engaged in any of the union activities) and 12 (the petitioner usually (questions 16-18)/many times (question 19) engaged in the union activities). Question 21 established whether the petitioner ever held a union steward position.

V.3.c.iv) Petitioner's Relationship to the Employer:

Measures: 9 items from Mowday et al's 1979 Organizational Commitment Questionnaire measured petitioner evaluations of their relationship with their employers (question 13, items l-t). The scale was preceded by a statement indicating that the items refer to the period of the decertification campaign. All items were modified to past tense statements. A five point Likert type scale (ranging from strongly agree, through neither, to strongly disagree) was used to register the response. The actual measure used in the analysis was the mean item score for the scale items (which can range between 1 and 9). This measure provided a single, easily interpretable measure of organizational commitment.
Management’s use of influence tactics during the election campaign was measured as part of a scale asking about all those engaged in influence tactics during the campaign (question 5). The degree of behavioral activism was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (management engaged in no influence tactics) and 7 (management engaged in all 7 possible influence tactics14). Highly aggressive managerial tactics were isolated by creating a dichotomous variable which took a value of 1 if management either: i) questioned employees; and/or, ii) threatened employees. Management’s use of campaign promises and statements/threats was measured by a series of multiple responses (question 6). The degree of verbal activism was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (management made no promises/statements) and 8 (management made at least 8 promises/statements15). Extreme managerial threats were isolated by creating a dichotomous variable which took a value of 1 if management threatened either: i) future work-place shut-downs; and/or, ii) replacing strikers in future strikes. Management’s initiation of decertification structure was indicated when a petitioner claims management was responsible for the steps that need to be taken to initiate and pursue decertification (question 7). The degree of initiation was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (none of the steps were taken by management) and 7 (all of the 7 steps were taken by management). Illegal managerial involvement in the initiation of the decertification was indicated if management either: i) started discussion as about decertification; and/or, ii) wrote the petition. Use of a management consultant is established by Question 12.
V.3.c.vi) Decertification Coalition:

Other employees' use of influence tactics during the election campaign was measured as part of a scale asking about all those engaged in influence tactics during the campaign (question 5). The degree of behavioral activism was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (other employee engaged in no influence tactics) and 7 (other employees engaged in all 7 possible influence tactics\textsuperscript{16}). Multiple employees signing the decertification petition indicated the active involvement of more than one employee and thus implied the existence of an anti-union coalition. The involvement of other employees in the initiation of decertification structure indicated active support of the petitioner by other employees (question 7). The degree of initiation was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (none of the steps were taken by another employee) and 7 (all of the 7 steps were taken by another employee). Question 10 directly established whether, and how many, other employees helped with the decertification campaign.

V.3.c.vii) Union Campaign Practices:

The union's use of influence tactics during the election campaign was measured as part of a scale asking about all those engaged in influence tactics during the campaign (question 5). The degree of behavioral activism was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (the union engaged in no influence tactics) and 7 (the union engaged in all 7 possible influence tactics\textsuperscript{17}). Highly aggressive union tactics were isolated by creating
a dichotomous variable which took a value of 1 if the union either: i) questioned employees; and/or, ii) threatened employees. The union’s use of *campaign promises and statements/threats* was measured by a series of multiple responses (*question 6*). The degree of *verbal activism* was measured as a scale that can vary between 0 (the union made no promises/statements) and 9 (the union made at least 9 promises/statements”). *Union threats* were isolated by creating a dichotomous variable which took a value of 1 if the union threatened that decertification would allow management to either: i) get rid of health benefits; and/or, ii) lower employees’ wages; and/or, iii) ignore employees’ complaints; and/or, iv) fire employees at will.

V.3.c.viii) *NLRB Election Records:*

*The time elapsed between filing of the decertification petition and the holding of the election* was generated from NLRB General Counsel election records. NLRB election reports indicated the *number of eligible employees in the bargaining unit.* This data was used to measure *unit size.* NLRB election reports also indicated the *union involved in the decertification election.* The *Teamsters* were distinguishable from other unions and their involvement in the decertification was used as a variable.
V.3.c.ix) Petitioner’s Reasons for Decertification:

*Question 1* elicited the multiple potential reasons a petitioner sought decertification. The *general reasons* listed were:

- Employees’ grievances were handled badly by the union.
- The union dues were too high.
- The union contract was unsatisfactory.
- There was too much conflict between the union and management.
- There were problems with the business agent/union representative.
- There were problems with the administration of the union.
- Other reasons.

*Question 2* indicated which of the general reasons was the most important. *Question 4* indicated whether the petitioner felt the union could have avoided the problems elicited in question 1, and indicated the petitioner’s perception of the union’s culpability with regard to the decertification.

V.3.c.x) Petitioner Demographics:

*Questions 22-32* established a variety of demographic factors. Included were questions on: start date at work-place; previous unionized work-place experience; family union experience; age; gender; marital status; ethnic background; education; personal income; political affiliation; and, electoral voting.
V.4) Limitations in the Research Methodology

The most obvious limitation of the presented methodology is the questionnaire survey's reliance on petitioners' self-reports. Although self-ratings have generally been found to provide robust measurement, and serve as useful predictors (Kidder and Judd, 1986; Shrauger and Osberg, 1981), the controversial nature of decertification raises concern about the validity of the responses (Cannell and Henson, 1974). Of particular concern are those questions regarding employer behaviors in cases where employers engaged in illegal activities and/or a collusive relationship existed between the petitioner and employer. In such instances the petitioners' self reports are likely to have been biased in the direction of under-reporting illegal and/or collusive behaviors (Athanassiades, 1973; March and Feldman, 1981).

The threat of poor response validity was addressed by: i) studying only closed decertification cases, thus minimizing petitioners fears of ramifications for the present state of collective bargaining in their units; ii) stressing the confidential and voluntary nature of the survey, thus increasing the likelihood of more accurate responses; and, iii) offering petitioners the opportunity to receive a copy of the research findings, thus heightening their self-interest in the study (Jones and Sigall, 1971).

A further limitation of the research methodology is the high probability that the survey response rates and patterns were influenced by the nature of the decertification campaigns
surveyed. Petitioners involved in campaigns relying on collusive and illegal managerial support are less likely to have responded to the questionnaire. Consequently, the response rates and patterns probably reflect a biased sample of decertification cases - those where the campaign was run in a relatively legitimate manner. Indeed, in a small number of telephone discussions with non-responding petitioners, petitioners alluded to a collusive relationship with management, and/or made explicit reference to managerial illegalities during the decertification.

The above limitation was addressed by: i) a vigorous and extensive effort to maximize the response rate through multiple calls and mailings to the petitioners; ii) repeated assurances during mail and telephone contact regarding the confidentiality and independent nature of the study; and, iii) the keeping of careful notes on the extent and nature of non-responses. While these practices cannot remove the threat of a selective sample of decertification cases, a reasonable response rate was achieved, and the nature of non-responses was fairly well established (see section VI.1).

Finally, the methodology is limited by its reliance on retrospective accounts. Respondents recollections of past events are inherently biased in a variety of manners. First, people simply have limited, imperfect recall (Ericsson and Simon, 1980), Second, respondents recollections will be inaccurate due to hindsight bias (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975; Fischhoff, 1982) and attributional bias (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). Hindsight bias leads respondents retrospectively to see events as inevitable and to
"consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight" (Fischhoff, 1982, p. 341). Attributional bias "leads people to attribute outcomes to appealing but often inappropriate causes (Huber and Power, 1982, p. 173). Attributional bias is of particular concern for the present methodology in that it leads respondents to describe decision processes as more systematic and rational than they actually were at the time (Schwenk, 1982). In particular, this form of attributional bias will distort respondents recollections of the reasons they sought decertification. Further, attributional bias leads respondents to attribute favorable outcomes to their own and associates, actions and unfavorable outcomes to uncontrollable forces (Bettman and Weitz, 1983). This form of attributional bias will distort respondents recollections regarding the initiation of structure, and the behavioral and verbal activism of the different actors involved in the decertification process.

These potential weaknesses were addressed by attempting to follow Huber and Power’s (1982, p. 174-8) guidelines for improving the accuracy of retrospective reports:

i) Petitioners were chosen as respondents as they were clearly the most knowledgeable individuals regarding the majority of questions addressed by the research. Ideally, triangulation would have been used to measure the degree of management and other employees initiation of structure and union, management, and other employees behavioral and verbal activism. However, resource constraints limited the extent of the survey. Further, full responses from four different actors for each case would have been extremely difficult to achieve and would have produced very low overall response rates.

ii) The closed ended questions sought, as far as possible to focus on factual data, and to steer clear of highly judgmental data. The intent was to minimize the emotional distortions associated with judgmental areas of interest.
iii) Repeated promises of confidentiality, the attempt to minimize length of the questionnaire, and the offer to mail survey results to the respondents, all aimed to motivate respondents to co-operate with the research.

iv) The decertification cases were the most recent available for study, thus minimizing the elapsed time between the decertification and the data collection.

v) The elaborate pre-survey interviews and pre-tests allowed tailoring of the questionnaire so as to maximize the richness and specificity of the questions while minimizing their complexity.

In sum, this study’s greatest potential weaknesses derive from its reliance on retrospective self-reports. Given the conflicting nature of union and management perceptions of the decertification process, and the conflict laden and controversial nature of the decertification process itself, there was great concern in minimizing the specific biases discussed. The procedures detailed above will insure that these biases are minimized and that where the biases are unavoidable, there is a sense of their extent.

Notes:

1. Derived from earlier versions of the literature review (Borgers 1992a) and alternative model (Borgers, 1992b), and the William Green Fellowship proposal (Borgers 1992c).

2. Principally the focus on the petitioner-employer relationship.

3. The characteristics, competencies, variables and scales used by Reed (1989) are listed on card 3, used in the open-ended interview protocol (appendix B).

4. Derived from earlier versions of the literature review and alternative model, and the William Green Fellowship proposal.

5. There are less cases than questionnaires because: i) questionnaires were sent to all petitioners when multiple petitioners signed one decertification petition; and, ii) the same individuals filed repeated petitions for the same bargaining unit.
6. Two copies of the consent form were sent so that the respondent could keep one and send the other back.

7. It was hoped that, of the possible 500 decertification cases, about 50 percent of the petitioners would respond, generating a data based on some 250 questionnaires.

8. Nationally, NLRB regions vary in their support of unionization (Heneman and Sandver, 1983).

9. This outcome is the traditional certification/decertification dependent variable (See Heneman and Sandver 1983; and, Sandver and Miller, 1984).

10. Extreme multicollinearity is considered to occur when the correlation between two measures exceeds .800 (Greenhaus, Parasuraman, and Wormley, 1990).

11. Where relevant, the referent question in the petitioner questionnaire (appendix C) is cited.

12. "Other" influence tactics are counted as one regardless of how many were actually listed.

13. It is not clear that question 9 unambiguously captures a leadership dynamic. Other employees suggesting an individual sign the petition could certainly indicate that individual holds leadership status. However the individual suggesting this action themselves might just as well indicate leadership in the sense of initiating structure.

14. "Other" influence tactics are counted as one regardless of how many were actually listed.

15. "Other" promises/statements are counted as one regardless of how many were actually listed.

16. "Other" influence tactics are counted as one regardless of how many were actually listed.

17. "Other" influence tactics are counted as one regardless of how many were actually listed.

18. "Other" promises/statements are counted as one regardless of how many were actually listed.
CHAPTER VI
Results

VI.1) Response Rates

Of the original 500 decertification cases, 31 had been signed by multiple petitioners. Where possible questionnaires were sent to all petitioners listed. The inclusion of multiple petitioners increased the number of cases to 518. However, 39 of these cases were petitions filed by the same petitioner for the same employer, union and unit. Only one questionnaire was sent to each petitioner. Consequently the number of petitioners surveyed dropped to 479.

After the initial mailing, follow up phone calls and (110) subsequent mailings, 193 petitioners out of 479 returned the survey materials (40.3 percent). Of these, two did not fill out the questionnaire but sent explanatory letters. The overall response rate for filled out questionnaires was therefore 191 out of 479 (39.9 percent).
Discussions with employers and/or the disconnection of employer telephone numbers revealed that 101 petitioners never received the survey materials because either: i) the employer had gone out of business; ii) the petitioner was no longer employed and no forwarding address was available (21.1 percent of the original 479). If these non-received questionnaires are subtracted from the total number of questionnaires mailed out (479) the response rate increases to 191 out of 378 (50.5 percent). This response rate more accurately reflects the percentage of petitioners who did not respond to the materials.

Follow up phone calls revealed that 66 petitioners expressed that they had no interest in filling out the questionnaire (13.8 percent of the original 479). Ninety petitioners, when contacted, expressed interest in filling out a questionnaire but then never mailed the survey materials back (18.8 percent of the original 479). In 29 cases the employer was contacted and it was established that the petitioner was still an employee. However no direct contact with the employee was ever established. It is not clear whether the survey materials ever reached the petitioner in these cases. These ambiguous cases represent 6.1 percent of the original 479.

Consequently, the results presented are based on a population survey where at least 50 percent of those receiving the questionnaire responded. Only about 14 percent of the population directly refused participation, although this percentage may have been higher if more petitioners had been directly contacted. Given these response rates, the results do represent the views of at least half of the decertification petitioners.
VI.2) Exploratory Results

VI.2.a) NLRB Election Data:

In order to provide an overview of the population of decertification petitions and elections surveyed, National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) petition and election data was analyzed. This data, available for all cases, also allowed comparison of the cases for which a questionnaire response was received versus those for which no response was received.

Of the 518 petitions, 95.2 percent were filed after 1988 and 97.2 percent of all elections held occurred after 1988. Of all petitions that resulted in elections, the vast majority experienced little election delay. 85.8 percent of all elections held were held one to six months after the petition was filed (table 6.1). The mean election delay was about two months (with a standard deviation of 1.56 months). Of the 518 petitions filed, 168 (32.6 percent) were withdrawn prior to elections and 1 was withdrawn after an election was held. Of all elections held, 91.4 percent were stipulated by the NLRB. Of all 350 elections held, 247 (70.6 percent) were lost by the incumbent union.

As is indicated in table 6.1, the distribution of response versus non-response cases was fairly similar. Response cases experienced slightly disproportionately more delays of one to six months (90.3 percent) and fewer delays of less than one month (8.3 percent).
Table 6.1: Election Delay in Months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Non-Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Valid Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Valid Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESS THAN ONE MONTH</td>
<td>29 8.3</td>
<td>6 5.3</td>
<td>23 9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE TO SIX MONTHS</td>
<td>301 85.8</td>
<td>103 90.3</td>
<td>198 83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR</td>
<td>18 5.1</td>
<td>5 4.4</td>
<td>13 5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE TO TWO YEARS</td>
<td>3 .9</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>3 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO ELECTION HELD</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>518 100.0</td>
<td>173 100.0</td>
<td>345 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage of anti-union votes in the 350 elections held was:

- less than 30% in 11.7% of elections.
- 30% to less than 50% in 24.3% of elections.
- 50% to less than 70% in 36.3% of elections.
- 70% to 100% in 27.7% of elections.

The mean percentage of anti-union votes was 55.40 percent (with a standard deviation of 22.26 percent). The distribution of response versus non-response cases was very similar to the above figures. Response cases experienced slightly disproportionately higher percentages of anti-union votes (for example 30.7 percent of response case elections experienced 70 to 100 percent anti-union votes). In contrast, non-response cases experienced slightly disproportionately lower percentages of anti-union votes (for example 12.7 percent of response case elections experienced less than 30 percent anti-union votes).
The majority of units (62.5 percent) experiencing decertification petitions had less than 30 eligible employees in them. 27 percent of the units were extremely small (less than 10 eligible employees) (table 6.2). The mean unit size was 44 eligible employees (the median unit size was 22 eligible employees, with standard deviation of 60 employees). These figures closely match national decertification statistics (Fulmer, 1981), and the units surveyed appear highly representative of the national population.

Table 6.2: Number of Eligible Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Non-Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Valid Frequency</td>
<td>Valid Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-29</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-65</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66-99</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-199</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-499</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 AND OVER</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, as indicated in table 6.2, the distribution of response versus non-response cases was fairly similar. Response cases experienced slightly disproportionately smaller units, and non-response cases experienced slightly disproportionately larger units.
The vast majority of elections (98 percent) were single union elections. Where multi-union elections were held the incumbent union won in every single case. The unions most often experiencing decertification petitions were (in descending order):

i) International Brotherhood of Teamsters (26.7 percent of all cases).
ii) the United Steelworkers of America (9.7 percent of all cases).
iii) United Auto Workers (7.2 percent of all cases).
iv) International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
v) United Food and Commercial Workers.
vi) International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.
vii) Service Employees International Union.
viii) Local Independent Unions, Carpenters and Joiners of America, and Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union.
ix) Sheet Metal Workers Association, Graphic Communications, and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers.

The unions listed under iv through ix each represented less than 5 percent of all cases.

None of the remaining unions individually represented more than 2 percent of all cases.

Most decertification petitions (48.5 percent) originated in the manufacturing industry. Transportation, communication, electric, gas, and sanitary services, and services each accounted for 17 percent of all cases. Most union units (57.9 percent) were classified as covering production and maintenance occupations. 15.2 percent of all union units were classified as covering truck-drivers.

The data, as reported, does not reveal any major differences in the distribution of unit characteristics between response versus non-response cases.
VI.2.b) Questionnaire Data:

The following sections present the results of the exploratory analysis of the questionnaire data. For each of the areas and measures outlined in chapters IV and V, the frequencies, central tendencies, and dispersion of the data are reported. The order of the sections follows that used in chapters IV and V. The following sections (VI.2.b.i to VI.2.b.ix) report the results and indicate whether they support or contradict the predictions made in chapter IV. Section VI.2.c summarizes the results within the context of the discussion in previous chapters. Section VI.4 combines the exploratory results with the explanatory results to provide further depth to the discussion.

VI.2.b.i) Petitioners as Leaders:

The majority of petitioners tended to express high self esteem, with a mean mean self esteem score of 4.33\(^1\) (standard deviation .54). Table 6.3 indicates that 76.8 percent of the respondents having a mean self esteem score between 4 and 5, and 22 percent between 3 and less than 4.

Petitioners were moderately to highly involved in the initiation of the decertification. Table 6.4 indicates that 89.7 percent of the petitioners were the initiating party in at least three of the steps, 30.1 percent were the initiating party in all seven of the steps. On average, petitioners initiated 4.94 steps\(^1\) (with a standard deviation of 1.97 steps).
Table 6.3: Distribution of Mean Self Esteem Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Valid Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 TO LT 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 TO LT 3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 TO LT 4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 TO 5</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4: Petitioners’ Initiation of the Decertification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO INITIATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FULL INITIATION</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Petitioners were somewhat less actively involved in using influence tactics during the election campaign, as measured by the degree of behavioral activism scale. Table 6.5 indicates that 67.9 percent of the petitioners engaged in 1 to 4 types of tactics during the campaign. Less than 10 percent engaged in 6 to 7 types of tactics. On average, petitioners engaged in 2.89 types of tactics\(^{11}\) (with a standard deviation of 1.83).
Table 6.5: Petitioners' Behavioral Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO INFLUENCE TACTICS USED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL INFLUENCE TACTICS USED</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 6.6-6.8 show that the petitioner was most often either approached by others in starting to talk about the decertification or signed the petition because other employees suggested it (table 6.8 value = 1). About a quarter of all petitioners experienced both (table 6.8 value = 2).

Table 6.6: Petitioner Was Approached by Other Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Valid Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO NOT RECALL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.7: Petitioners Signed Petition because Other Employees Suggested it

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MULTIPLE RESPONSE</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER EMPLOYEES SUGGESTED</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETITIONER SUGGESTED</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANAGEMENT SUGGESTED</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8: Petitioner-Employee Relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent 17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEITHER</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPROACHED BY OTHERS/SED BECAUSE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER EMPLOYEES SUGGESTED</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOTH</td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.9 indicates that while the majority of petitioners did not previously hold a position in the union, almost 30 percent had held a position.

These results all strongly support the theory (section III.3.b) and predictions (section IV.2.a), that petitioners manifest a wide variety of leadership characteristics and behaviors.
Table 6.9: Petitioners’ Holding of a Union Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Valid Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI.2.b.ii) Petitioners’ Commitment to the Union:

Table 6.10 reveals that 88 percent of petitioners exhibited low to very low mean union commitment at the time of the decertification campaign. It is surprising however that this distribution is not more extreme. The mean mean union commitment is 2.23¹⁹ (with a standard deviation of .72). Further, table 6.10 indicates that the majority of petitioners (52 percent) expressed only low commitment, and 12 percent actually expressed moderate to very high mean union commitment.

Table 6.10: Distribution of Mean Union Commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Valid Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 TO LT 2 (VERY LOW)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 TO LT 3 (LOW)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 TO LT 4 (MODERATE TO HIGH)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 TO 5 (VERY HIGH)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These findings do support the theoretical (section III.2.b) and practitioner (section IV.2.b) predictions that petitioners would exhibit low union commitment. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that more than 12 percent of petitioners, individuals who had tried to remove the union, exhibited moderate to high union commitment. These petitioners may have filed decertification petitions simply to attract attention from the union in order to improve servicing.

The notion that there may be correlations between the level of union commitment and the types of reasons listed for seeking decertification, and the unit size (section IV.2.b) appeared unfounded. Mean union commitment was not significantly correlated with any of the reasons for decertification response categories nor with the number of eligible employees.

VI.2.b.iii) Petitioners’ Relationship to the Union:

About half the petitioners had been employees during the original union certification election. Of those who had voted (and who could recall their vote) about 36 percent had voted for the union. About 76 percent had been dues paying union members. Of those who paid dues (and who knew) about 92 percent were required to pay dues.
The majority of petitioners were actually fairly active union members prior to the decertification. *Table 6.11* indicates that 57.7 percent of the petitioners scored from 8 to 12 on the *union involvement* scale. This can be interpreted as indicating that, on average, petitioners with these scores were "sometimes" involved in all four of the activities listed in questions 16 through 19 (attending union meetings, participating in votes to accept/reject the contract and electing people to union positions and filing grievances).

**Table 6.11: Petitioners’ Degree of Union Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEVER INVOLVED IN ANY UNION ACTIVITIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USUALLY/MANY TIMES INVOLVED IN UNION ACTIVITIES</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A substantial proportion of petitioners had actually been union activists and leaders. About 22 percent of the petitioners had run for union position, with about 79 percent of those running winning their elections. Table 6.9 revealed that 30 percent of petitioners (55 petitioners) had previously held a position in the union. Of these individuals 5 had been union presidents (9.0 percent), 5 had been union vice presidents (9.0 percent), 4 had been union treasurers (7.3 percent), and 39 had been union stewards (70.9 percent). Of those who had been union stewards, 25 were elected and 14 were appointed. On average, petitioners scored 7.61\textsuperscript{2} on the union involvement scale (with a standard deviation of 3.23).

The above results are surprising and run strongly counter to union practitioners' allegations that petitioners are anti-union pawns in management deunionization strategies. More than half the respondents had been active union members, close to a quarter had run for union position, and 30 percent had actually held union office. Combining these results with the extensive low union commitment revealed in section VI.2.b.ii, it appears that the majority of petitioners are disgruntled formerly active union members and that a substantial proportion are disgruntled former union activists.

More than 20 percent of petitioners had held steward positions. This result lends tentative support to the notion that these individuals were key "switching agents" among the employees. Unfortunately, the survey does not allow further analysis of this proposition.
VI.2.b.iv) Petitioners' Relationship to the Employer:

Table 6.12 reveals that 84.4 percent of petitioners felt moderate to very high mean organizational commitment toward the employer at the time of the decertification campaign. Indeed, the mean mean organizational commitment was 3.82 (with standard deviation .81). It is surprising, however, that 15.7 percent felt low to very low organizational commitment.

Table 6.12: Distribution of Mean Organizational Commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 TO LT 2 (VERY LOW)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 TO LT 3 (LOW)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 TO LT 4 (MODERATE TO HIGH)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 TO 5 (VERY HIGH)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As predicted by the practitioners (section IV.2.d), the above results reveal that a large majority of the petitioners had a close relationship with their employers at the time of the decertification. Nevertheless a substantial minority of petitioners did not fit this picture and exhibited low to very low mean organizational commitment to the employer.
VI.2.b.v) Management's Degree of Involvement in the Decertification Process:

Management was not that intensely involved in using influence tactics during the election campaign, as measured by the degree of behavioral activism scale. However, there is some indication that management involvement varies considerable.

On average, management used only 1.88 tactics during the campaign (with standard deviation 1.82). However, while table 6.13 reveals that in almost 30 percent of the cases management used no tactics whatsoever, management used in 1 to 4 types of tactics in 59.1 percent of the cases. In less than 4 percent of the cases management engaged in 6 to 7 types of tactics.

Table 6.13: Management's Behavioral Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO INFLUENCE TACTICS USED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL INFLUENCE TACTICS USED</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Management used the two most aggressive tactics\textsuperscript{27} in about 20 percent of the cases. These results indicate that while management did not often get intensely involved in the election, in a substantial number of cases where influence tactics were used, these were extreme in nature. Management consultants/lawyers appear to have been used in about 45 percent of all cases.

Management’s use of campaign promises/statements/threats, as measured by the degree of verbal activism scale, was also not that intense. On average, management used only 1.75 promises/statements/threats\textsuperscript{28} (with standard deviation 1.91). Table 6.14 indicates that in about 43 percent of the cases management used no promises/statements/threats whatsoever. Management made in 1 to 4 promises/statements/threats during the campaign in 48.1 percent of the cases. In less than 1 percent of the cases management made 7 to 8 promises/statements/threats.

Management used what were considered the two most extreme threats\textsuperscript{29} in about 15 percent of the cases. Again, this seems to indicate that while management did not often make high numbers of promises and/or statements/threats, in a substantial number of cases where threats were used, these were extreme in nature.
Table 6.14: Management's Verbal Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO PROMISES/STATEMENTS/THREATS MADE</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL PROMISES/STATEMENTS/THREATS MADE</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Management was rarely involved in initiation of the decertification. Table 6.15 reveals that in 89.6 percent of the cases management took no steps to initiate decertification. On average, management was involved in .2 steps\(^1\) (with standard deviation .8 steps). Similarly, management was involved in obviously illegal steps\(^2\) in only about 5 percent of the cases.

Table 6.15: Management Initiation of the Decertification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO INITIATION</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FULL INITIATION</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above results strongly support those predicted (section IV.2.e) in that management appears to have taken a very low profile in the majority of these cases. Of course, as was pointed out (in section V.4) the methodology's bias is toward an under-reporting of managerial involvement and influence.

VI.2.b.vi) Decertification Coalition:

The vast majority (94 percent) of petitions were signed by single petitioners. In those cases where multiple petitioners signed, two petitioners usually signed. The largest number of petitioners was 4 (table 6.16). Nevertheless 68.4 percent of the petitioners were helped by other employees. The majority of these cases involved 3 or less other employees.

Table 6.16: Number of Petitioners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF PETITIONERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While other employees were considerably less involved than petitioners in initiating the decertification, they were almost as active during the actual election campaign. On average, other employees initiated only .41 steps\(^3\) of the decertification (with standard deviation 1.08). In 81.5 percent of the cases other employees initiated none of the decertification steps. However, in 16.8 percent of the cases other employees did initiate 1 to 4 of the steps (table 6.17). Other employees were more intensely involved during the election campaign, as measured by the degree of behavioral activism scale. On average, other employees used 1.81 tactics\(^4\) during the campaign (with standard deviation 1.72). Table 6.18 indicates that, while in 31.4 percent of the cases no tactics were used, other employees engaged in 1 to 4 types of tactics during the campaign in 59.1 percent of the cases. In less than 3 percent of the cases other employees engaged in 6 to 7 types of tactics.

Table 6.17: Other Employees Initiation of Structure During the Decertification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO INITIATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FULL INITIATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.18: Other Employees Behavioral Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO INFLUENCE TACTICS USED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL INFLUENCE TACTICS USED</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above results indicate that while the petitioner may often act alone in initiating the decertification campaign (especially in signing the petition), the large majority of decertification cases see the emergence of a fairly active decertification coalition during the actual election campaign.

VI.2.b.vii) Union Campaign Practices:

Unions were more intensely involved during the election campaign, as measured by the degree of behavioral activism scale than was management. On average, unions used 2.55 tactics (with standard deviation of 2.22). Table 6.19 indicates that, while in 22.6 percent of the cases no tactics were used, unions engaged in 1 to 4 types of tactics during the campaign in 53.4 percent of the cases. In more than 14 percent of the cases unions engaged in 6 to 7 types of tactics.
In particular, unions were more likely to engage in what were considered the two most aggressive tactics\(^\text{37}\). Unions used these tactics in about 34 percent of the cases. This seems to indicate that while unions did not get involved in a substantial number of cases (22.6 percent), when they did engage in the election process their involvement was fairly intense, and in a substantial number of cases they resorted to extreme tactics.

The union's use of campaign promises/threats, as measured by the degree of verbal activism scale, was also more intense than management's. On average, unions made 3.23 promises/threats\(^\text{38}\) (with standard deviation 2.38). Table 6.20 indicate that unions made no promises/threats in only about 21 percent of the cases. The union made in 1 to 4 promises/threats during the campaign in 48.2 percent of the cases. In almost 11 percent of the cases the union made 7 to 8 promises/threats.

Table 6.19: Union Behavioral Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent(^\text{39})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO INFLUENCE TACTICS USED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL INFLUENCE TACTICS USED</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.20: Union Verbal Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent^40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO PROMISES/THREATS MADE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL PROMISES/THREATS MADE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The union used one of four threats\(^41\) in about 71.6 percent of the cases. This seems to indicate that the union is not only more verbally active, but that it also relies fairly heavily on threats as part of its anti-decertification campaign.

The above results demonstrate that unions are more frequently and more intensely involved in decertification campaigns than management. The results also indicate that unions tend to resort to more extreme behaviors during decertification campaigns. These results make sense within the context of the discussion in chapter IV (and specifically section IV.2.g.). Given that the union’s position is under threat, and given that management is legally and normatively more restricted in its actions than the union, one would expect union behaviors to be more frequent and intense. These results also bear out management practitioner, and petitioner claims that unions often resort to very heavy-
handed tactics during decertification campaigns. It should be noted, however, that the petitioners' decertification experience, working in opposition to the union, would lead one to expect petitioners to exhibit some response bias toward an over-reporting and possible exaggeration of union behaviors.

VI.2.b.viii) Petitioners' Reasons for Decertification:

As table 6.21 makes clear, the most common reason given for pursuing decertification was dissatisfaction with the contract. Also mentioned by the majority of petitioners were: i) problems with the administration of the union; ii) problems with the business agent/union representative; and, other problems.

Table 6.21: Petitioners’ General Reasons for Decertification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency with which this reason was given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employees' grievances were handled badly by the union:</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union dues were too high:</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union contract was unsatisfactory</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was too much conflict between the union and management:</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There were problems with the business agent/union representative:</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There were problems with the administration of the union:</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons:</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This ordering of responses was fairly well matched by petitioners ranking of the *most important reason* for pursuing decertification (*table 6.22*). The picture is somewhat confused due to respondents multiple responses, and penchant for the "other" column. Nevertheless, ignoring these entries, dissatisfaction with the contract emerges as the most important issue, followed by too much conflict, and problems with the union administration. Interestingly, while problems with the business agent/representative were frequently given as a general reason for seeking decertification, they were rarely mentioned as the most important reason. This anomaly might be due to poor business agent behavior being a common, but not singly determinant reason for petitioners seeking decertification. While problems with the contract and labor-management conflict may be fairly intractable issues, resolvable only through decertification, problems with the business agent may be solved by the rank-and-file's demand for, and the union's assignment of a new business agent.

**Table 6.22: Petitioners' Most Important General Reasons for Decertification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Reasons</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievances</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dues</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Agent/Representative</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Administration</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Not Recall</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6.23: Petitioners’ Most Common Specific Reasons for Decertification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRIEVANCES:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union did not properly examine individual grievances</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union did not represent employees effectively during the grievance procedure</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTRACT:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The wages were too low</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The benefits were not adequate</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union was unable to get a first contract</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSINESS AGENT/REPRESENTATIVE:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He/she did not do his/her job</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNION ADMINISTRATION:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union ignored the interests of the employees</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union imposed its will on the employees</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The union was not democratic</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of specific reasons listed under grievances (table 6.23), business agent/representative, and union administration it appears that petitioners had a general perception of union negligence, in the sense of being insensitive toward employee interests. For example, with regard to grievances, more specific negligent behaviors, such as not filing paperwork, or missing deadlines, were less mentioned. Also the specific reasons listed under union administration are actually fairly general complaints. Nevertheless, it is also clear that while general perceptions of union negligence may have been important, the large numbers of "other" listings among these responses, indicate that it was often very specific issues that motivated petitioners to seek decertification.

Also of interest is the belief of 53.4 percent of the petitioners that the union could have avoided failing in the ways they indicated. However, 35.6 percent of the petitioners
believed that the union could not have avoided failing in the ways they indicated. This result is presently hard to evaluate in that this response may indicate that petitioners believed there were external factors leading to the union failure, or it may indicate that petitioners believed unions to be inherently flawed and therefore incapable of avoiding failure".

VI.2.b.ix) Petitioners' Demographics:

Petitioners' tenure with the employer at the time of the decertification ranged from less than six months to more than 20 years. The majority (65.1 percent) had been employees for ten years or less. The mean tenure was about eight and a half years (with standard deviation 6.88). About 47 percent of the petitioners had worked in unionized environments before. About 80 percent had immediate family who had previously worked in unionized environments.

Petitioners' ages ranged from 21 to 66. The majority of petitioners were 20 to 40 years old (66.3 percent). The mean age was about 38 years (with standard deviation 10.27). The majority of petitioners were male (73.4 percent), married (about 71 percent), caucasian, (94.5 percent), and high school graduates (about 91 percent). All of the high school graduates had several years post-high school education, with close to half attaining a technical or vocational diploma. The majority of petitioners (56.9 percent) had pre tax annual incomes of $15,001 to $30,000 (this was also the median income range, with
standard deviation .75). A large number (27.6 percent) had slightly higher pre tax annual incomes of $30,001 to $45,000. The political affiliations and voting patterns of many of the petitioners appeared to follow that of the so-called "Reagan Democrat". The largest number of petitioners (33.5 percent) listed their political affiliation as Democrat (25.3 percent listed their affiliation as Republican). However, in the 1984 and 1987 presidential election the largest number of petitioners voted Republican (32.7 and 38.0 percent respectively). In 1992 the largest number of petitioners moved over to the Democrats (34.5 percent) and the Independent ticket saw a massive increase in support, receiving 19.4 percent of the petitioners' vote (as compared to 3.1 percent in the two previous elections.

VI.2.c) Summary of Exploratory Results:

The decertification cases examined in this research appear to be very representative of the national pattern. This representativeness is not that surprising given that the survey examined the population of 500 most recently closed decertification cases across five eastern and mid-western NLRB regions. The majority of the cases involved small units (less than 30 eligible employees), and single union elections. About half the cases occurred in the manufacturing sector. The Teamsters were disproportionately represented in that over a quarter of all the decertification cases were brought against Teamster units while the Teamsters only represent about 8 percent of all private sector union members⁴⁷.
Demographically, the majority of petitioners appeared to emerge from the traditional ranks of union membership - white, middle-aged males, high-school graduates who presently find themselves in the lower to mid middle class. Contrary to union practitioners' beliefs, the majority of petitioners had been active union members and a sizable proportion (about a quarter) had been union activists and held union office.

Not surprisingly, at the time of decertification, the large majority of petitioners felt low commitment to the union. As predicted by practitioners, the large majority of practitioners were close to management, as evidenced by their high commitment to the employer. Given the petitioners' previous involvement and activism in the union, it is likely that, at an earlier stage of their union membership, they exhibited dual commitment (Angle and Perry, 1986).

As predicted, the majority of petitioners exhibited a wide range of leadership characteristics and behaviors. It appears that these leadership factors may be more important in the initiation of the decertification than in the actual election campaign. The vast majority of petitions were signed by a single petitioner, and the petitioners claimed responsibility for the majority of steps involved in initiating the decertification. In contrast, petitioners were less active, and they were actively assisted by other employees during the election campaign.
The union was considerably more extensively and intensively involved in the election campaign than management and, as alleged by management practitioners and petitioners, often resorted to aggressive behaviors and relied on threats during its campaign. In the vast majority of cases management had minimal involvement in initiating decertification. It should be noted that, given the respondents, these findings are likely to be biased toward over-reporting union abuses and under-reporting management abuses.

Finally, petitioners appeared to seek decertification for a combination of general reasons, many of which may have been merely irritants (such as the business agent not doing his/her job, and poor general administration of the union), and very specific problems, which may have served as the catalyst for initiating decertification. The most commonly specified problem lay with the terms of the contract. Interestingly, over half the petitioners believed the union could have avoided the problems that led them to seek decertification.

VI.3) **Explanatory Results**

Discussion of the explanatory results follows the progression of steps outlined in chapter V and the actual progression of steps followed in analyzing the data. Thus, the results regarding the conventions for selecting measures of independent variables are presented first, in section VI.3.a. The measures selected using the preceding conventions were entered in a stepwise regression procedure that was used to further eliminate extraneous
independent variables. Section VI.3.b details the stepwise regression model and presents the results generated by this procedure. The measures selected on the basis of the foregoing procedures were then used to construct various hierarchical least squares regression models. Section VI.3.c details the hierarchical regression models and presents the results generated by them. Section VI.3.d uses the results produced by the stepwise and hierarchical models to evaluate the various hypotheses presented in chapter IV.

VI.3.a) *Results for Selecting Measures of Independent Variables*:

The exploratory aspect of this study, generated a large number of measures that could potentially be used to capture the independent variables of interest in the explanatory regression models. However, some of these measures captured very similar aspects of the independent variables, and others were simply not robust enough to serve as reliable measures in a regression model.

The first convention for selecting out poor measures of independent variables was testing for the reliabilities of the various scales that were to be used as independent variable measures. Cronbach's $\alpha$ provided a reasonable measure of these scales reliability. Those scales with an $\alpha$ of less than .50 were selected out (Davis and Cosenza, 1988). Further, where multiple scales measured the same independent variable, if large differences between the scales' reliabilities existed, the more reliable scale was used in the regression models.
Table 6.24 contains the scale reliabilities for all scales that were considered for inclusion in the regression models. The table indicates Cronbach’s α for each scale and, for the established scales, comparative reliabilities of the scales as reported in previous studies. Clearly, the majority of the scales exhibited α scores well in excess of the .50 recommended cut-off (Davis and Cosenza, 1988), and the modified established scales had α scores that compared favorably to previous studies. Only Petitioner-Other Employees Relationship and the Petitioner’s Union Involvement scales had α scores below the .50 cut-off. These two scales were consequently dropped from the regression analysis.

Table 6.24: Scale Reliabilities (calculated as Cronbach’s α)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale:</th>
<th>Cronbach’s α:</th>
<th>Previous studies Cronbach’s α:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner’s Self-Esteem</td>
<td>.8679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner’s Initiation of Decertification</td>
<td>.7855</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner-Other Employees Relationship</td>
<td>.2961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner Behavioral Activism</td>
<td>.5632</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner’s Union Commitment</td>
<td>.8211</td>
<td>.82 – .8848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner’s Union Involvement</td>
<td>.4084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner’s Organizational Commitment</td>
<td>.9222</td>
<td>.54 – .9049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management’s Behavioral Activism</td>
<td>.6128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management’s Verbal Activism</td>
<td>.7457</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management’s Initiation of Decertification</td>
<td>.7855</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Employees Initiation of Decertification</td>
<td>.7855</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Employees Behavioral Activism</td>
<td>.5402</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union’s Behavioral Activism</td>
<td>.7291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union’s Verbal Activism</td>
<td>.7822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relatively large differences in α scores existed between Petitioner Initiation of Decertification and Petitioner Behavioral Activism, and between Another Employees Initiation of Structure and Another Employees Behavioral Activism. While both these scales capture petitioner and other employees behaviors they capture their occurrence at different stages of the decertification process. Further, the exploratory analysis revealed that there may be some differences in the degree of petitioner involvement across initiation of the decertification and the actual election campaign itself. Consequently, separate models, including either initiation of structure or behavioral activism were run.

The second convention for selecting out poor measures of independent variables was testing for extreme multicollinearity between measures of the same independent variables. Where correlations in excess of .800 existed between measures, extreme multicollinearity was considered to be present (Greenhaus, Parasuraman, and Wormley, 1990). In such cases, the following conventions for choosing between them were used:

- If the measures were all of particular interest, separate hierarchical regression models were run to see which are of most significance and produced the best fit (highest model $R^2$).

- If the measures were not of particular interest, they were rejected on the basis of: i) low, individual correlation with the dependent variable; and, ii) inferior performance within a full regression model that entered all potential measures.

Table 6.25 contains the correlation matrices for all the remaining potential measures of the various independent variables specified in chapter V.
Table 6.25: Correlation Matrices for the Measures of Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Petitioner mean self-esteem</th>
<th>Petitioner held union position</th>
<th>Petitioner initiation</th>
<th>Petitioner behavioral activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner's mean self-esteem</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>- .2258</td>
<td>.0359</td>
<td>- .1046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .029</td>
<td>P = .383</td>
<td>P = .193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner held union position</td>
<td>- .2258</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>- .1747</td>
<td>- .0619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P = .029</td>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .073</td>
<td>P = .304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner's initiation of decertification</td>
<td>.0359</td>
<td>- .1747</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>- .2569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>P = .015</td>
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</tr>
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<td>- .0619</td>
<td>- .2569</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P = .193</td>
<td>P = .304</td>
<td>P = .015</td>
<td>P = .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management behavioral activism</th>
<th>Management aggressive tactics</th>
<th>Management verbal activism</th>
<th>Management extreme threats</th>
<th>Management initiation</th>
<th>Management illegal initiation</th>
<th>Management Consultant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management behavioral activism</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.5334</td>
<td>.2242</td>
<td>.0644</td>
<td>.1682</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .000</td>
<td>P = .030</td>
<td>P = .279</td>
<td>P = .080</td>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management used highly aggressive tactics</td>
<td>.5334</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.1727</td>
<td>.0160</td>
<td>-.0695</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P = .000</td>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .075</td>
<td>P = .447</td>
<td>P = .282</td>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management verbal activism</td>
<td>.2242</td>
<td>.1727</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.4626</td>
<td>.3041</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P = .030</td>
<td>P = .075</td>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .4626</td>
<td>P = .3041</td>
<td>P = .0807</td>
<td>P = .087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management used extreme threats</td>
<td>.0644</td>
<td>.0160</td>
<td>.4626</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.1304</td>
<td>-.0406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P = .297</td>
<td>P = .447</td>
<td>P = .000</td>
<td>P = .1304</td>
<td>P = .139</td>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management initiation of decertification</td>
<td>.1682</td>
<td>-.0695</td>
<td>.3041</td>
<td>.1304</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.0222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P = .080</td>
<td>P = .282</td>
<td>P = .005</td>
<td>P = .139</td>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .</td>
<td>P = .308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal managerial initiation</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management used a consultant</td>
<td>.1693</td>
<td>.0974</td>
<td>.0807</td>
<td>-.0406</td>
<td>.0222</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P = 1-tailed Significance
"." is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed

continued...
Table 6.25: Correlation Matrices for the Measures of Independent Variables (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Multiple employees signed</th>
<th>Other employees initiated</th>
<th>Other ee's behavioral activism</th>
<th>Other employees helped</th>
<th>Number of employees helped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple employees signed</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>-.0162</td>
<td>.1926</td>
<td>.1454</td>
<td>-.0113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .</td>
<td>P= .447</td>
<td>P= .054</td>
<td>P= .113</td>
<td>P= .463</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employees initiation of decertification</td>
<td>-.0162</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>-.0018</td>
<td>.1360</td>
<td>-.1709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .447</td>
<td>P= .</td>
<td>P= .494</td>
<td>P= .129</td>
<td>P= .077</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employees behavioral activism</td>
<td>.1926</td>
<td>-.0018</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.1184</td>
<td>-.1598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .054</td>
<td>P= .494</td>
<td>P= .</td>
<td>P= .163</td>
<td>P= .092</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employees helped petitioner</td>
<td>.1454</td>
<td>.1360</td>
<td>.1184</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>-.8799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .113</td>
<td>P= .129</td>
<td>P= .163</td>
<td>P= .</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of other employees that helped</td>
<td>-.0113</td>
<td>-.1709</td>
<td>-.1598</td>
<td>-.8799</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .463</td>
<td>P= .077</td>
<td>P= .092</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union behavioral activism</th>
<th>Union aggressive tactics</th>
<th>Union verbal activism</th>
<th>Union use of election</th>
<th>Delay in election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union behavioral activism</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.7526</td>
<td>.4927</td>
<td>.3806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .001</td>
<td>P= .321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union used highly aggressive tactics</td>
<td>.7526</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.4105</td>
<td>.3131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .004</td>
<td>P= .208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union's verbal activism</td>
<td>.4927</td>
<td>.4105</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.7375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .398</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union used threats</td>
<td>.3806</td>
<td>.3131</td>
<td>.7375</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .001</td>
<td>P= .004</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .</td>
<td>P= .279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay in election</td>
<td>.0560</td>
<td>-.0930</td>
<td>.0312</td>
<td>.0707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .321</td>
<td>P= .208</td>
<td>P= .398</td>
<td>P= .279</td>
<td>P= .</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P= 1-tailed Significance
". " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed
Table 6.25 reveals statistically significant ($p < .05$) correlations between the following sets of measures:

- **Petitioner Initiation of Decertification** and **Petitioner Behavioral Activism**.

- **Management Behavioral Activism** and: **Highly Aggressive Managerial Tactics**; **Management Verbal Activism**; and, **Use of a Management Consultant**. **Management Verbal Activism** and: **Extreme Managerial Threats**; and, **Management Initiation of Decertification**.

- **Union Behavioral Activism** and: **Union Verbal Activism**; and, **Union use of Threats**. **Highly Aggressive Union Tactics** and **Union use of Threats**.

Although the correlations between the above sets of measures are significant, they are small to moderate. None of the correlations exceed [.8000], the level at which extreme multicollinearity is considered to be present. Table 6.25 also reveals statistically significant ($p < .05$) correlations at or above the [.8000] level between the following sets of measures. Consequently multicollinearity is considered to exist between these sets of measures.

- **Other Employees Helped the Petitioner** and the **Number of Other Employees who Helped the Petitioner**.

- **Union Behavioral Activism** and **Highly Aggressive Union Tactics**. **Union Verbal Activism** and **Union use of Threats**.

Unions' behavioral and verbal activism and their use of aggressive tactics and threats are all considered to be of interest. Therefore, separate models will be run which contain
either union behavioral and verbal activism or union use of aggressive tactics and threats. Given the rough symmetry between these variables and those measuring managerial campaign behaviors, and, given the relatively high correlations between management behavioral activism and management use of aggressive tactics, and between management verbal activism and management use of extreme threats, separate models will be run. One model will contain the more "moderate" measures of union and managerial activism\textsuperscript{2}. Another model will contain the more "extreme" measures of union and managerial activism\textsuperscript{3}.

The variables Other Employees Helped the Petitioner and the Number of Other Employees who Helped the Petitioner are not both of interest, therefore their relationship with the dependent variable, Percentage of Anti-Union Votes was examined. Table 6. 26 reveals that while Other Employees Helped the Petitioner was correlated with Percentage of Anti-Union Votes at a higher level of significance than the Number of Other Employees who Helped the Petitioner, the size of the correlations was about equal. Both variables were therefore entered in a full regression model of all potential measures. The Number of Other Employees who Helped the Petitioner was found to be significant (p < .10), while Other Employees Helped the Petitioner was not found to be significant (p > .10). Therefore, Other Employees Helped the Petitioner was dropped from subsequent regression models.
Table 6.26: Correlation Percentage of Anti-Union Votes and: Other Employees Helped the Petitioner; and, Number of Other Employees who Helped the Petitioner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Anti-Union Votes</th>
<th>Other Employees Helped the Petitioner</th>
<th>P = .008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Other Employees who Helped the Petitioner</td>
<td>P = .013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- .2834</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P = 1-tailed Significance

VI.3.b) Full Regression Results:

Given the large number of measures to be considered in the regression models (see table 6.27), a preliminary full regression was run to establish a broad view of the nature and strength of the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable.

Table 6.28 contains the summary statistics for the model. Only four of the independent variables were found to be significant: Union’s Behavioral Activism, Number of Other Employees that Helped the Petitioner, Petitioner has an immediate family member who has worked in a unionized setting, and Teamsters. The model’s overall fit had an adjusted R² of .14304.
Table 6.27: Potential Regression Model Variables

Dependent Variable:

'Percentage of anti-union votes in the decertification election'

Independent Variables:

Petitioner Leadership:

'Petitioner's mean self-esteem'
'Petitioner held union position'
'Petitioner's initiation of decertification'
'Petitioner's behavioral activism during the election campaign'

Petitioner Union/Employer Commitment:

'Petitioner's mean union commitment'
'Petitioner's mean organizational commitment to the employer'

Management Involvement in Decertification:

'Management's behavioral activism during the election campaign'
'Management's use of highly aggressive tactics during the election campaign'
'Management's verbal activism during the election campaign'
'Management's use of extreme threats during the election campaign'
'Management's initiation of decertification'
'Illegal managerial initiation of decertification'
'Management's use of a consultant/lawyer'

Decertification Coalition:

'Multiple employees signed the decertification petition'
'Other employees initiation of decertification'
'Other employees behavioral activism during the election campaign'
'Number of other employees that helped the petitioner'

Union Involvement in Decertification:

'Union's behavioral activism during the election campaign'
'Union's use of highly aggressive tactics during the election campaign'
'Union's verbal activism during the election campaign'
'Union's use of threats during the election campaign'
'Time elapsed between filing of decertification petition and holding of the election'

NLRB election data:

'Number of eligible employees in the bargaining unit'
'Teamsters are the incumbent union representative'

Petitioner Demographics:

'Petitioner's tenure (in months) with the employer at time of filing the petition'
'Petitioner has/had not worked in a unionized setting previously'
'Petitioner has/has not got an immediate family member who has worked in a unionized setting'
'Petitioner's age (in years) at time of filing the petition'
'Petitioner's gender'
'Petitioner's marital status'
'Petitioner's ethnic origin'
'Petitioner is/is not a high-school graduate'
'Petitioner's number of years of formal post-high-school education'
'Petitioner's highest level of education attained'
'Petitioner's pre-tax income'
'Petitioner's political affiliation'
Table 6.28: Summary Statistics of Full Model

R Square: .32240  Adjusted R Square: .14304

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the equation:</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Signif. of T</th>
<th>Hypothesized Beta sign (+/-/?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner Leadership:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner mean self-esteem</td>
<td>.10507</td>
<td>.1903</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner held union position</td>
<td>.12221</td>
<td>.3237</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner initiation</td>
<td>.05931</td>
<td>.5757</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner behavioral activism</td>
<td>-.06766</td>
<td>.4212</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner Union/Employer Commitment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner mean union commitment</td>
<td>.05068</td>
<td>.6071</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner mean organizational commitment</td>
<td>-4.259E-03</td>
<td>.9655</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Involvement in Decertification:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management behavioral activism</td>
<td>-.14053</td>
<td>.2980</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management used aggressive tactics</td>
<td>-.06124</td>
<td>.6117</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management verbal activism</td>
<td>-.01620</td>
<td>.8654</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management used extreme threats</td>
<td>-.08433</td>
<td>.3451</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management initiation</td>
<td>-.09070</td>
<td>.4998</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal managerial initiation</td>
<td>-.02350</td>
<td>.8519</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of management consultant</td>
<td>.08114</td>
<td>.3136</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decertification Coalition:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of employees helped petitioner</td>
<td>-.15260</td>
<td>.0810</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employees helped petitioner</td>
<td>-.08542</td>
<td>.5213</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple employees signed petition</td>
<td>-.07865</td>
<td>.4297</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employees initiation</td>
<td>7.783E-03</td>
<td>.9322</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employees behavioral activism</td>
<td>-.09690</td>
<td>.2871</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Involvement in Decertification:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union behavioral activism</td>
<td>-.17789</td>
<td>.0501</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union used aggressive tactics</td>
<td>-.09510</td>
<td>.4224</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union verbal activism</td>
<td>-.10761</td>
<td>.3919</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union used threats</td>
<td>-.05504</td>
<td>.6345</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MLB election data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Signif.</th>
<th>Hypothesized Beta sign (+/-/?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election Delay</td>
<td>-.09517</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site of unit</td>
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<td>.4682</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamsters</td>
<td>.19088</td>
<td>.0266</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.28: Summary Statistics of Full Model (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the equation:</th>
<th>Beta In</th>
<th>Signif. of T</th>
<th>Hypothesized Beta sign (+/-/?^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner Demographics:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Petitioner tenure</td>
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<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner unionised work experience</td>
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<td>.1645</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate family with union experience</td>
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<td>.0200</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner age</td>
<td>-.13941</td>
<td>.1556</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner gender</td>
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<td>.7764</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner marital status</td>
<td>.08244</td>
<td>.3137</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner ethnic origin</td>
<td>-.11176</td>
<td>.1678</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner is high-school graduate</td>
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<td>.9501</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner years of formal post high-school education</td>
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<td>.2192</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner highest level of education</td>
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<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner pre-tax income</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>Petitioner political affiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 6.28 reveals that of the four significant variables both *Union behavioral activism* and *Teamsters* were related to *percentage of anti-union votes* in the hypothesized directions. The *number of other employees that helped the petitioner* was significantly related to *percentage of anti-union votes*, however not in the hypothesized direction. *Immediate family member with union experience* was significantly related to *percentage of anti-union votes*, however the directionality of the relationship had not been specified a priori.

The remaining variables were not found to be significantly related to the *percentage of anti-union votes* (*p > .10*). Of the non-significant variables, and for whom hypothesized directionality had been established (chapter IV), 10 out of 21 (about 48 percent) had Beta coefficients in the hypothesized direction^6.
The above results were used to help structure selection of hierarchical regression models. However, as will become clear from the discussion below, these results are independently important with regard to interpretation of the data. Consequently, summary and interpretive analysis of these results is offered in sections VI.3.d.

**VI.3.c) Hierarchical Regression Results:**

On the basis of the foregoing variable selection criteria a wide variety of hierarchical regression models were constructed and run. The goals were to: i) establish which of the independent variable combinations produced the best overall model fit (adjusted $R^2$); ii) which combinations of the leadership variables produced the largest and most significant increase in overall model fit ($R^2$ change, and the $F$ significance of the change), when leadership variables were added to an existent regression model; and, iii) for the best fitting models, what was the strength and direction of the leadership variables' relationship to percentage of anti-union votes.

Six sets of models were selected. For each set of models two versions were run. One model entered leadership variables *Mean Self-Esteem, Holding of a Union Position*, and *Petitioner Initiation of Structure* after all the other variables had already been entered. A second model entered leadership variables *Mean Self-Esteem, Holding of a Union Position*, and *Petitioner Behavioral Activism* after all other variables had already been entered. Thus, 12 separate models were run. The six sets of models were as follows:
i) Full models, including all variables listed in table 6.27.

ii) Models including all variables listed in table 6.27, but excluding all demographic controls except Immediate family member with union experience^{58}.

iii) Models including all variables listed in table 6.27, but excluding all measures of extreme union and management activism^{59}.

iv) Models including all variables listed in table 6.27, but excluding all measures of moderate union and management activism^{60}.

v) Models including all variables listed in table 6.27, but excluding Other employees behavioral activism^{61}.

v) Models including all variables listed in table 6.27, but excluding Other employees initiation^{62}.

None of the models produced an overall model fit significantly higher than that of the full model. The hierarchical models' adjusted R^2, after addition of the combinations of leadership variables ranged from .143 to .156.

With two exceptions, none of the models uncovered significant relationships other than those uncovered by the stepwise procedure. Consequently, for the sake of clarity and parsimony, the interpretive discussion of the non-significant, non-leadership variables will be based on the results of the full regression (see section VI.3.d)^{63}. The two exceptions, with regard to significant new independent variables, occurred in the two models in which the measures of moderate union and management activism were excluded (models in set IV, above). In the model in which Petitioner Initiation of Decertification was included as one of the leadership measures, Highly Aggressive Union Tactics was found to be significantly related to Percentage of Anti union Votes with a Beta value of -.218
(significant at $p < .05$). Similarly, in the model in which *Petitioners' Behavioral Activism* was included as one of the leadership measures *Highly Aggressive Union Tactics* was again found to be significantly related to *Percentage of Anti union Votes* with a Beta value of -.227 (significant at $p < .01$).

The significance of *Highly Aggressive Union Tactics* once *Union Behavioral Activism* is removed from the model is not that surprising given that these two variables were found to be multicollinear (see section VI.3.a). It is interesting that: i) in the full model *Union Behavioral Activism* was a more significant predictor than *Highly Aggressive Union Tactics*; and, ii) when included in a hierarchical model by itself *Highly Aggressive Union Tactics* has a significant negative effect on *Percentage of Anti union Votes*.

The entry of the combinations of leadership variables after all other variables had been entered produced no significant increases in the models overall $R^2$ level of fit (adjusted $R^2$ actually decreased in 5 of the models). Therefore, these models do not provide evidence to support the hypothesis that petitioners' leadership behaviors and characteristics have a significant, positive effect on decertification outcomes.

In sum, none of the models, specified in terms of theoretical expectations, and following the variable selection criteria, produced significant results. Consequently, the goal of model parsimony was followed to establish whether any of the leadership variables were able to make a significant contribution to a regression model of decertification outcomes.
Table 6.29: Summary Statistics of Hierarchical Regression Models: including only variables found to be significant in the full model at stage 1; including combinations of leadership variables at stage 2

Model statistics after stage 2, entry of leadership variables: Petitioner mean self-esteem, Petitioner held union position, and Petitioner initiation of decertification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation:</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Signif.</th>
<th>Hypothesized Beta of T</th>
<th>Sign (+/-)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate family member with union experience</td>
<td>.20323</td>
<td>.0050</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of other employees helped petitioner</td>
<td>-.18239</td>
<td>.0108</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union behavioral activism</td>
<td>-.27859</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamsters</td>
<td>.18047</td>
<td>.0114</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner mean self-esteem</td>
<td>.09217</td>
<td>.1944</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner initiation</td>
<td>.11979</td>
<td>.0949</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner held union position</td>
<td>.10935</td>
<td>.1350</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0050</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model statistics after stage 2, entry of leadership variables: Petitioner mean self-esteem, Petitioner held union position, and Petitioner behavioral activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation:</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Signif.</th>
<th>Hypothesized Beta of T</th>
<th>Sign (+/-)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate family member with union experience</td>
<td>.20247</td>
<td>.0055</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of other employees helped petitioner</td>
<td>-.17948</td>
<td>.0128</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union behavioral activism</td>
<td>-.27338</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamsters</td>
<td>.16716</td>
<td>.0192</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner mean self-esteem</td>
<td>.09742</td>
<td>.1716</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner behavioral activism</td>
<td>-.07997</td>
<td>.2688</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner held union position</td>
<td>.08989</td>
<td>.2166</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two hierarchical regression models were constructed, each entering the four variables found to be significant in the full model (Union behavioral activism, the number of other employees that helped the petitioner, Immediate family member with union experience, and Teamsters) at the first stage, and the different combinations of leadership variables at the second stage (Petitioner mean self-esteem, Petitioner held union position, and Petitioner initiation of decertification) and (Petitioner mean self-esteem, Petitioner held union position, and Petitioner behavioral activism). Table 6.29 presents the summary results.

Table 6.29 reveals that the $R^2$ change when leadership variables are entered is higher than for the preceding hierarchical models. $R^2$ change for the previous models ranged from .012 to .021, while $R^2$ change for the models in table 6.29 are .030 and .022. However, neither of the $R^2$ changes are significant at the $p < .05$ level (although entry of Petitioner mean self-esteem, Petitioner held union position, and Petitioner initiation of decertification produced a $R^2$ change with .109 significance).

Therefore, these models also do not provide evidence to support the hypothesis that petitioners' leadership behaviors and characteristics have a significant, positive effect on decertification outcomes. Interestingly, all the petitioner leadership variables except for Petitioner Behavioral Activism did have positive Beta coefficients, as hypothesized. Further, the Beta value for Petitioner initiation of decertification had a T value significant at .0949.
Table 6.29 also indicates that once the leadership variables are entered, the overall model fit, as measured by adjusted $R^2$, is considerably higher than for the full model (section VI.3.b). The adjusted $R^2$ for the full model was .143 (table 6.28) whereas the adjusted $R^2$ for the above models is .174 and .166. Thus, the addition of the leadership variables does improve overall model fit.

VI.3.d) Summary of the Explanatory Results:

The foregoing discussions generate the following summary of the explanatory results:

$H_1$: Decertification petitioners' leadership behaviors and characteristics have a significant and positive effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.

Hypothesis 1 was not found to be significant. However, entry of leadership variables at stage two in hierarchical models including only variables found to be significant in the full model produced relatively large increases in adjusted $R^2$ and improved overall model fit (as measured by adjusted $R^2$). Further, Petitioners' Mean Self-Esteem, Petitioners' Degree of Initiation of Decertification, and Petitioners' Prior Holding of a Union Position, had positive Beta coefficients, as hypothesized. Further, the Beta value for Petitioner initiation of decertification had a $T$ value significant at .0949. Petitioners' Behavioral Activism had a negative Beta coefficient, contrary to the hypothesized direction (table 6.29).
H_2: Decertification petitioners' degree of union commitment has a significant and negative effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.

Hypothesis 2 was not found to be significant for any of the specified models. *Union Commitment* had a Beta coefficient opposite in direction to that hypothesized (*table 6.28*).

H_3: Decertification petitioners' degree of union involvement has a significant and negative effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.

Hypothesis 3 was not evaluated as the *Degree of Union Involvement* scale was found to be unreliable (see section VI.3.a).

H_4: Decertification Petitioners' degree of commitment to their employer has a significant and positive effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.

Hypothesis 4 was not found to be significant for any of the specified models. *Mean Organizational Commitment to the Employer* had a Beta coefficient opposite in direction to that hypothesized (*table 6.28*).

H_5: There is a significant, positive relationship between low, and legal levels of managerial involvement and decertification election outcomes, and a significant, negative relationship between high, and illegal levels of managerial involvement, and the use of a management consultant and decertification election outcomes.
Hypothesis 5 was not found to be significant for any of the specified models. Management's Degree of Behavioral Activism, Management's Degree of Verbal Activism, Management's Initiation of the Decertification, had negative Beta coefficients. The Use of a Management Consultant had a positive Beta coefficients. These coefficients were in the opposite directions to those hypothesized. Highly Aggressive Managerial Tactics, Extreme Managerial Threats, and Illegal Managerial Involvement in the Decertification had (negative) Beta coefficients in the hypothesized direction (table 6.28).

H₄: The existence of an informal decertification coalition in the bargaining unit has a significant and positive effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.

Hypothesis 6, as measured by the Number of Employees who Helped the Petitioner was found to be significant (p < .01, and p < .05), however its Beta coefficient was opposite in direction to that hypothesized (see table 6.29). For the other measures included, hypothesis 6 was not found to be significant for any of the specified models. Other Employees' Degree of Behavioral Activism had a Beta coefficient opposite in direction to that hypothesized. Involvement of Other Employees in the Initiation of the Decertification had a Beta coefficient in the hypothesized direction (table 6.28).

H₅: The amount of time elapsed between the filing of a petition and the holding of the election has a significant negative effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.
Hypothesis 7 was not found to be significant for any of the specified models. *The Time Elapsed Between Filing of the Decertification Petition and the Holding of the Election* had a Beta coefficient in the hypothesized direction (*table 6.28*).

**H₇:** There is a significant, negative relationship between low to moderate levels of union involvement and decertification election outcomes, and a significant, positive relationship between high, and aggressive levels of union involvement and decertification election outcomes.

Hypothesis 8, as measured by the *Union's Degree of Behavioral Activism* was found to be significant (p < .0001, and p < .0010). *Union Behavioral Activism* had a (negative) Beta coefficient in the direction hypothesized (see *table 6.29*). Hypothesis 8, as measured by *Highly Aggressive Union Tactics* was found to be significant (p < .05, and p < .01) when used in hierarchical models that excluded *Union Behavioral Activism*. *Highly Aggressive Union Tactics* had a (negative) Beta coefficient opposite in direction to that hypothesized (see section VI.3.c). For the other measures included, hypothesis 8 was not found to be significant for any of the specified models. *Unions' Use of Threats* had a (negative) Beta coefficient opposite in direction to that hypothesized. The *Union's Degree of Verbal Activism* had a (negative) Beta coefficient in the hypothesized direction (*table 6.28*).

**H₈:** The size of the bargaining unit has a significant and negative effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.
Hypothesis 9 was not found to be significant for any of the specified models. The Size of the Unit had a Beta coefficient in the hypothesized direction (table 6.28).

\[ H_{10}: \text{Teamsters representation has a significant and positive effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.} \]

Hypothesis 10, as measured by the Teamsters was found to be significant (p < .01, and p < .05), with a Beta coefficient in the direction hypothesized (table 6.29).

VI.4.) Summary of Combined Exploratory and Explanatory Results

It was found that entry of petitioner leadership variables at stage two in hierarchical models that included only variables found to be significant in the full model in step one, produced relatively large increases in adjusted R\(^2\) and considerably improved overall model fit (as measured by adjusted R\(^2\)). Second all the leadership variables, with the exception of the Petitioners' Behavioral Activism, had Beta coefficients in the hypothesized (positive) direction.

Of particular interest are the relative performances of the variables: Petitioners' Initiation of Decertification; and, Petitioners' Behavioral Activism. Exploratory analysis revealed that leadership factors may be more important during initiation of the decertification than during the actual election campaign. This conclusion appears to be supported by the explanatory performances of Petitioners' Initiation of Decertification and Petitioners'
Behavioral Activism. When entered in the restricted hierarchical model, Petitioners' Initiation of Decertification had the largest Beta coefficient and the highest probability of significance (p < .10) of all of the leadership variables. In contrast, Petitioners' Behavioral Activism had the smallest Beta coefficient, with the least probability of significance (p > .27) of all of the leadership variables, and the Beta coefficient's directionality was opposite to that hypothesized (table 6.29). While neither variable was significant (at p < .05), these results do appear to reinforce the conclusion that petitioner leadership may be more important in initiating the decertification and in submitting the decertification petition, than in leading an active decertification election campaign.

None of the measures of management involvement in the decertification ever approached significance, and the more moderate measures had Beta coefficients opposite in direction (positive) to that hypothesized (table 6.28). The lack of significant findings corroborate the exploratory conclusion that management adopted a very low profile in the majority of these cases. It makes sense that, given the lack of management involvement in the decertification efforts, their actions had no significant effect on election outcomes. Again, this result should be interpreted cautiously due to the methodology's bias toward under-reporting managerial involvement and influence (see section V.4).

The finding of a significant Beta coefficient opposite in direction to that hypothesized for the Number of Employees who Helped the Petitioner was surprising and is difficult to explain. The exploratory results revealed that the majority of petitioners had been helped
by other employees and that these employees had been active during the election campaign. It is possible that the unexpected explanatory result is due to measurement error.

The exploratory and explanatory results regarding union involvement in the decertification campaign are very interesting. Established research on certification elections has largely failed to uncover any significant impact of union election campaigns on certification election outcomes (Brotslaw, 1967; Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, 1976; Maranto and Fiorito, 1987; Heneman and Sandver, 1989). Clearly, this study reverses this finding with regard to decertification elections. The exploratory results revealed that unions were frequently and intensely involved in decertification campaigns. The explanatory results reveal a strong and consistent negative effect of Union Behavioral Activism on the percentage of anti-union votes. Further, the explanatory results reveal that there is no apparent "back-lash" effect when unions resort to highly aggressive campaign behaviors. It was shown that when Union Use of Aggressive Tactics was included in a hierarchical model without Union Behavioral Activism (which was extremely collinear with Union Use of Aggressive Tactics), Union Use of Aggressive Tactics had a significant negative effect on the Percentage of Anti-Union Votes (see section VI.3.c).

Although the Size of the Bargaining Unit had a coefficient in the hypothesized (negative) direction, the coefficient lacked significance. As sections II.3.b.ii and IV.2.h made clear, extant theoretical and empirical evidence, and practitioner claims, provide strong support
for the hypothesis that there is a significant negative relationship between the Size of the Bargaining Unit and Percentage of Anti-Union Votes in decertification elections. The lack of significance of Unit Size in this study is therefore surprising and stands in contrast to extant research.

As section VI.2.a indicated the Teamsters were involved in more than a quarter of all the decertification cases in this study. The explanatory results reveal that, as predicted, after controlling for other factors Teamster involvement in decertification elections significantly increases the percentage of anti-union votes. These findings corroborate practitioner claims that the Teamsters lose proportionally more decertification elections than other unions. As was indicated in section IV.2.h, practitioners put forward multiple explanations for this phenomenon. Unfortunately, the data generated by this study does not allow comparative evaluation of these multiple explanations.

Notes:

1. In most of these cases employees were not permitted to receive phone calls at work and messages left for them were not returned.

2. It is likely that in many cases the materials were not received because where contact with petitioners was established many never received the materials from their employers.

3. Unless otherwise noted the percentage figures presented are valid percentage i.e. the figures represent the percentage after missing values have been deleted from the calculations. The number and overall percentage size of the missing cases is noted for each table.

4. This figure closely matches the union loss rate for the late 1980s of about 71 percent (see table I.1).
5.167 cases (32.2%) never experienced an election, therefore produced no election results, and are thus not included in this column.

6. The two largest units contained 546 and 591 eligible employees.

7. Fulmer found that, for all bargaining units experiencing decertification elections, from 1970-1979, on average, 28.0 percent of the units contained less than 10 employees, and 63.4 percent of the units contained less than 30 employees.

8. Anderson et al (1981) argue that, given that unit size is the only characteristic consistently related to election outcomes, this criteria of representativeness is extremely important.

9. 4 cases (.8%) were missing.


12. 9 cases (5.2%) were missing.


14. 14 cases (8.1%) were missing.

15. 3 cases (1.6%) were missing.

16. 4 cases (2.1%) were missing.

17. 36 cases (20.8%) were missing.

18. 4 cases (2.1%) were missing.


20. 23 cases (13.3%) were missing.

21. 9 cases (5.2%) were missing.

22. Out of a possible 12.

23. Out of a possible 5.

24. 7 cases (4.0%) were missing.

26. 14 cases (8.1 %) were missing.
27. Questioning, and physically or verbally threatening employees.
29. Threats of plant closure, and of replacing strikers in future strikes.
30. 7 cases (4.0 %) were missing.
32. Starting discussions about decertification, and writing the petition.
33. Out of a possible 7.
34. Out of a possible 7.
35. 14 cases (8.1 %) were missing.
37. Questioning, and physically or verbally threatening employees.
39. 14 cases (8.1 %) were missing.
40. 9 cases (5.2 %) were missing.
41. Decertification would allow management to: i) get rid of health benefits; ii) lower wages; iii) ignore employees' complaints; and, iv) fire employees at will.
42. A response category is only included if more than 20 petitioners listed it. The "others" category is omitted.
43. In particular with regard to the contract, union-management conflict, and problems with the business agent, the listing of 112 other reasons for decertification, and the high frequency of "other reasons" given as the most important reason for pursuing decertification.
44. Content analysis of the explanations given may reveal the degree to which petitioners actually see the union as fully culpable for the problems leading to decertification.
45. In 1983, the Teamsters total membership represented 8.01 percent of total north american union membership (source: Troy and Sheflin, 1985).

47. This score is the score for the entire "initiation of structure scale" which includes initiation of structure by the petitioner, his/her attorney, another employee, and management.


50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. The more moderate measures of union and managerial activism are union and management *Behavioral and Verbal Activism*.

53. Extreme measures of union and managerial activism are considered to be union and management use of *Highly Aggressive Tactics and Threats*, and management’s *Illegal Initiation of the Decertification*, and *Use of a Management Consultant*.

54. A + indicates a hypothesized positive Beta (a positive relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable). A - indicates a hypothesized negative Beta (a negative relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable). A ? indicates that directionality was not specified a priori.

55. Ibid.

56. The following variables had Beta coefficients in the hypothesized direction: Petitioner mean self-esteem; Petitioner held union position; Petitioner initiation; Management used aggressive tactics; Management used extreme threats; Illegal managerial initiation; Other employees initiation; Union verbal activism; Election Delay; and, Size of unit.

57. Relatively large differences in $\alpha$ scores existed between petitioner initiation of structure and petitioner behavioral activism. While both these scales capture petitioner behaviors they capture their occurrence at different stages of the decertification process. Further, the exploratory analysis revealed that there may be some differences in the degree of petitioner involvement across initiation of the decertification and the actual election campaign itself. Consequently separate models, including only initiation of structure or behavioral activism were run.

58. This was the only demographic control selected in the stepwise regression (see section VI.3.b).
59. The Measures of extreme union activism are: *Union Used Aggressive Tactics*, and *Union Used Threats*. The measures of extreme management activism are: *Management Used Aggressive Tactics*, *Management Used Extreme Threats*, *Illegal Managerial Initiation*, and *Use of Management Consultant*.

60. Measures of moderate union activism are: *Union Behavioral Activism*, and *Union Verbal Activism*. Measures of moderate management activism are: *Management Behavioral Activism*, *Management Verbal Activism*, and *Management Initiation of Decertification*.

61. Relatively large differences in α scores existed between another employees initiation of structure and another employees behavioral activism. While both these scales capture other employees behaviors they capture their occurrence at different stages of the decertification process. Consequently separate models, including only initiation of structure or behavioral activism were run.

62. Relatively large differences in α scores existed between another employees initiation of structure and another employees behavioral activism. While both these scales capture other employees behaviors they capture their occurrence at different stages of the decertification process. Consequently separate models, including only initiation of structure or behavioral activism were run.

63. Specifically, the SPSSpc stepwise procedure generates Betas and their significance for variables not selected by the stepwise procedure. These measures capture the directionality and significance of the relationship with the dependent variable if these independent variables had been included. The measures provide a valid basis for comparison given that the model used to examine the leadership variables also contains only the variables selected by the stepwise procedure.

64. *Union behavioral activism, the number of other employees that helped the petitioner, Immediate family member with union experience, and Teamsters*.

65. A + indicates a hypothesized positive Beta (a positive relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable). A - indicates a hypothesized negative Beta (a negative relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable). A ? indicates that directionality was not specified a priori.

66. Ibid.

67. *Union behavioral activism, The number of other employees helped petitioner, Immediate family member with union experience, and Teamsters*.

68. *Aggressive tactics were classified as either: i) questioning employees; and/or, threatening employees (see section V.3.c.vii)*.
69. Specifically, practitioners gave the following reasons for higher Teamster loss of decertifications: i) they organize more than other unions, therefore (in absolute terms) they are more likely to experience decertification activity; ii) they organize more low-wage employees and small units than other unions - such units are harder bargain for (the margin of bargaining gains is low) and service (small units are expensive and garner less interest from the union) while employees still pay dues; iii) they don't service many of the smaller units they have organized; and, iv) the Teamsters often file disclaimers (walk away from the unit) when facing a decertification petition.
CHAPTER VII
Summary

VII.1) Overview of the Study

This research has examined decertification in the private sector in order to increase academic and labor relations practitioners’ understanding of the decertification process. The research focused on the decertification petitioner both as a source of data and as a critical organizational actor in the decertification process. This focus was driven by theoretical reflection and writing on the decertification process, and the development of an alternative explanatory model of decertification.

A questionnaire survey of 191 decertification petitioners was combined with National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election records to provide a large sample of richly detailed data on various aspects of decertification petitioners and the decertification process. The research simultaneously pursued two related goals: i) exploratory analysis of the decertification petitioner and the decertification process; and, ii) explanatory analysis of the role of the decertification petitioner in the decertification process.
VII.2) **Summary of the Findings**

VII.2.a) **Summary of the Exploratory Results:**

The research addressed three substantive areas that are of particular interest given this study's unique focus on the decertification petitioner and decertification process.

VII.2.a.i) **Background and Characteristics of Petitioners:**

Demographically, the majority of petitioners appeared to emerge from the traditional ranks of union membership - white, middle-aged males, high-school graduates who presently find themselves in the lower to mid middle class.

Contrary to union practitioners' beliefs, the majority of petitioners had been active union members and a sizable proportion (about a quarter) had been union activists and held union office. At the time of decertification, the large majority of petitioners felt low commitment to the union. As predicted by practitioners, the large majority of petitioners felt a kinship with their employer, as evidenced by their high commitment to the employer. Given the petitioners' previous involvement and activism in the union, it is likely that, at an earlier stage of their union membership, they may have exhibited dual commitment (Angle and Perry, 1986).
As predicted, the majority of petitioners exhibited a wide range of leadership characteristics and behaviors. It appears that these leadership factors may have been more important in the initiation of the decertification than in the actual election campaign. The vast majority of petitions were signed by a single petitioner, and the petitioners claimed responsibility for the majority of steps involved in initiating the decertification. In contrast, petitioners were less active, and they were actively assisted by other employees during the election campaign.

VII.2.a.ii) The Reasons Petitioners Engage in Decertification Campaigns:

Petitioners appeared to seek decertification for a combination of general reasons, many of which may have been perceived as mere irritants (such as the business agent not doing his/her job, and poor general administration of the union), and more specific problems, which may have served as the actual catalyst for initiating the decertification. The most commonly specified problem lay with the terms of the contract. Over half the petitioners believed the union could have avoided the problems that led them to seek decertification.

VII.2.a.iii) Union and Management Involvement in the Decertification Process:

Unions were found to be considerably more extensively and intensively involved in the election campaign than management and often resorted to aggressive behaviors and relied on threats during their campaigns. In the vast majority of cases management had minimal
involvement in initiating decertification. Again, it should be noted that these findings are likely to be biased toward over-reporting union abuses and under-reporting management abuses.

VII.2.b) **Summary of the Explanatory Results:**

The major focus of the explanatory analysis was an examination of the decertification petitioner’s role as a leader of other employees in the bargaining unit. Chapter III presented an alternative model of decertification. One of the propositions generated by the model was that decertification petitioners act as leaders of decertification coalitions in their bargaining unit. The decertification coalition was defined as that group of employees who come together to decertify their union. This proposition was qualitatively corroborated during intensive, open-ended interviews with labor relations practitioners. Consequently, the hypothesis was advanced that decertification petitioners’ leadership abilities and behaviors would significantly affect the success of the decertification coalition in defeating the union in a decertification election. The general null hypothesis that was evaluated by the explanatory research was:

\[ H_0: \text{Decertification petitioner's leadership behaviors and characteristics do not have a significant effect on the outcome of the decertification election.} \]

The general model used to evaluate the above hypothesis was specified as follows:
Decertification Outcome = f{(Petitioner Characteristics) + (Petitioner, Employer, and Union Campaign Practices)}

The dependent variable - decertification outcome - was measured as the percentage of anti-union votes in the decertification election. The petitioner leadership behaviors and characteristics were measured using a variety of indicators: i) the petitioner’s mean score on Rosenberg’s 1965 10-item self-esteem scale; ii) the petitioner’s initiation of the decertification campaign; iii) the petitioner’s use of influence tactics during the election campaign; and, iv) the petitioner’s holding of a past union position (see chapter V for detailed discussion of these and the other variables’ measures).

Unfortunately, the findings do not support rejection of the general null hypothesis at a significant level. Nevertheless, entry of leadership variables at stage two in hierarchical models including only control variables found to be significant in the full regression model produced relatively large increases in adjusted R² and improved overall model fit (as measured by adjusted R²). Further, petitioners’ mean self-esteem, petitioners’ degree of initiation of decertification structure, and petitioners’ prior holding of a union position, had positive Beta coefficients, as hypothesized. Petitioners’ behavioral activism had a negative Beta coefficient, contrary to the hypothesized direction.

An additional eight hypotheses were examined using the general model¹. These hypotheses were based on the alternative decertification model (chapter III), the extant decertification literature (chapter II), and the results of the open-ended interviews with
labor relations practitioners (appendix B). Only two of the remaining eight hypothesized relationships were found to be significant and to operate in the predicted direction.

The results of the two specific hypotheses found to be significant and to operate in the predicted direction were as follows.

$H_5$: There is a significant, negative relationship between low to moderate levels of union involvement and decertification election outcomes, and a significant, positive relationship between high, and aggressive levels of union involvement and decertification election outcomes (as described graphically in figure IV.2).

Hypothesis 8, as measured by the union's degree of "behavioral activism" was found to be significant ($p < .0001$, and $p < .0010$), with a (negative) Beta coefficient in the direction hypothesized. Hypothesis 8, as measured by highly aggressive union tactics was found to be significant ($p < .05$, and $p < .01$) when used in hierarchical models that excluded union behavioral activism. Union’s use of highly aggressive tactics had a (negative) Beta coefficient opposite in direction to that hypothesized.

$H_{10}$: Teamsters representation has a significant and positive effect on the percentage of anti-union votes.

Hypothesis 10, as measured by the union being the Teamsters was found to be significant ($p < .01$, and $p < .05$), with a Beta coefficient in the direction hypothesized.
VII.2.c) Summary of the Combined Exploratory and Explanatory Results:

Despite the limited verification of the explanatory hypotheses, the combined exploratory and explanatory results do generate three significant contributions to academics' and labor relations practitioners' knowledge of decertification.

VII.2.c.i) The Nature of the Decertification Process:

The research has shed light on a rarely studied, poorly understood, yet controversial area of the US industrial relations system. Management practitioners typically argue that the decertification process gives US employees the democratic means to opt out of unwanted union representation. Management practitioners argue that decertification normally occurs in smaller units where union representation has been lax and ineffectual. Some practitioners and petitioners also allege severe union intimidation of those who choose to exercise this right, especially the leaders of this process - the decertification petitioners. Union practitioners, on the other hand, argue that the democratic function of the decertification process has been subverted by management to become a legally sanctioned means through which unions can be attacked and undermined. They allege that the majority of decertification petitioners are used as tools of management, to present a legal front behind which management initiates and leads decertification efforts.
The results appear to support the former claims far more than the latter claims. *Combining the insights generated by the exploratory and explanatory findings produces convincing evidence that the majority of decertification elections and union losses are genuine expressions of employee dissatisfaction with, and rejection of, unions that are perceived as not providing effective servicing for employees in smaller union units.* The following results support this conclusion.

This study finds evidence of widespread anti-union sentiment among employees in units that have filed a petition for decertification. This evidence appears to support the argument that union decertifications, by and large, represent genuine employee majorities rejecting union representation.

First, the finding of an extremely high union decertification election loss rate, which mirrors national loss rates, indicates pervasive anti-union sentiment among employees in these units. Over 70 percent of the elections held were lost by unions. In over a third of the elections 50 to 70 percent of the eligible employees voted against the union, and in over a quarter of the elections 70 to 100 percent of the eligible employees voted against the union.

Second, the results undermine the notion that the decertification campaigns are orchestrated by a single, employee under the direction of management. Rather, there appears to have been quite widespread general anti-union sentiment among the employees,
and, in most cases there is evidence of the existence of some form of an informal coalition of anti-union employees prior to the election campaign. As a matter of NLRB procedure, at least 30 percent of the employees in each of the units would have had to sign a decertification petition in order to initiate a formal decertification campaign. Therefore, all cases automatically involved substantial numbers of anti-union employees. The results indicate that over 80 percent of the petitioners were approached by other employees in starting to talk about the decertification, about 68 percent of the petitioners were assisted by other employees, and other employees were involved both in initiating the decertification and in helping run the decertification election campaign. It appears that, in most cases, petitioners operated within an informal coalition of like-minded anti-union employees.

Lastly, high union election loss rates were observed despite extensive, intensive, and often highly aggressive union campaigns. The exploratory results appear to corroborate management practitioner and petitioner allegations that union decertification campaigns are typically very intensive and frequently border on, and lapse into, intimidation of those who choose to participate in decertifications, especially the leaders of this process - the decertification petitioners. As was shown, these campaigns did produce significant declines in the percentage of anti-union votes. The fact that the majority of employees rejected unions in over 70 percent of the decertification elections despite being subjected to intensive, aggressive, and effective union campaigns further corroborates the existence of widespread anti-union sentiment among the employees in these units.
The above evidence points to the existence of widespread anti-union sentiment among employees in units that have filed a petition for decertification. This evidence appears to support the argument that union decertifications, by and large, represent genuine employee majorities rejecting union representation. The results could only be explained as management manipulation by arguing that all those employees who approached the petitioner to talk about decertification, helped the petitioner during the campaign, signed the decertification petition, and voted against the union in the election, were either duplicitous and/or manipulated and intimidated by management into voting against the union. This seems, at the very least, an improbable explanation.

Union claims that the decertification process is typically initiated and led by management were not substantiated by the findings. Management was rarely involved in initiation of the decertification process. In 89.6 percent of the cases management took no steps to initiate the decertification. Similarly, management was involved in obviously illegal steps in only about 5 percent of the cases. In the majority of cases management was also not intensely involved in using either influence tactics nor in making verbal promises and threats. In almost 30 percent of the cases management used no influence tactics whatsoever. It is not surprising that management involvement was not found to have a significant impact on the decertification election outcome. It should be noted that in a minority of cases (15 to 20 percent) management did resort to aggressive tactics, and the use of extreme threats. Overall however, the results support the conclusion that, in the majority of decertification cases, management typically adopted a very low profile.
Union practitioners’ allegations that decertification petitioners are simply anti-union employees used by management as a legal front behind which they can further their deunionization efforts, are not supported by this study’s findings. It was found that the majority of petitioners had actually been fairly active union members, close to a quarter had run for union positions, and 30 percent had actually held union office. While the majority of petitioners were anti-union in the sense that they initiated and led the decertification campaign, and while 88 percent of the petitioners expressed low to very low union commitment, these results merely indicate that petitioners were extremely unhappy with the union at the time of the decertification. It was also shown that the majority of the petitioners were moderately to highly committed to their employer at the time of the decertification. However, as was argued, given the majority of petitioners’ previous involvement and activism in the union, it is probable that, at an earlier stage of their union membership, many of the petitioners had exhibited commitment to both the employer and union. As noted in the dual commitment literature such a phenomenon is not uncommon (Gordon, Beauvais, and Ladd, 1984; Angle and Perry, 1986). In sum, the majority of petitioners in fact appear to be disgruntled formerly active union members, and a substantial proportion of them are actually disgruntled former union activists and leaders.

The argument that decertification normally occurs in smaller units where union representation has been lax and ineffectual appears to be borne out by this study’s results. The majority of units experiencing decertification petitions had less than 30 eligible
employees in them, and 27 percent of the units were extremely small (less than 10 eligible employees). These figures closely match national decertification statistics.

Petitioners' reasons for seeking decertification were numerous but focused primarily on a lack of servicing by the national union (in particular, the business agent not doing his/her job, and poor general administration of the union), and the existence of unsatisfactory contract terms. These results are further corroborated by the findings that the Teamsters were disproportionately involved in decertification cases, and that their involvement produced a significant increase in the percentage of anti-union votes. This result points to the importance of union-specific practices in terms of explaining decertification election outcomes. Practitioners' numerous reasons for higher Teamster involvement in, and loss of decertifications centered primarily on the same small unit-poor servicing dynamic.

VII.2.c.ii) The Nature and Role of the Decertification Petitioner:

This study's examination of the decertification petitioner's role in the decertification process uncovered characteristics and behaviors of unions' most strident opposition. Such information could be of considerable potential value to union leadership in formulating organizing strategies for both decertification and certification campaigns and for internal organizing.
It is clear that the majority of decertification petitioners were not only genuine leaders among the union membership, they were also, at one time, active union members and in many cases union activists and leaders. It should be of great concern to union leadership that 55 out of 191 petitioners (30 percent) had held union positions. Even more disturbing is the finding that while the majority (70.9 percent) had been stewards, 18 percent had actually been union presidents and vice-presidents.

Clearly, given the results presented, petitioners are, in the majority of cases, the type of individuals that unions should be targeting as potential rank-and-file leaders and union activists during their organizing and servicing activities. Ignoring the needs of such individuals, or worse, severely disappointing their expectations about the benefits of union representation not only squanders potentially vital union members and activists, it also alienates the very individuals who have the wherewithal to take, and lead others to take action against the union.

Further, petitioners experiences with the decertification election are likely to increase their dislike and distrust of unions. It should be noted that petitioners will carry their anti-union sentiments and experiences with them in present and future work-places. Attempts to organize work-places where an ex-petitioner is an employee may be seriously hampered by the presence of someone who can tell fellow employees convincing stories about the dark side of unionism. Clearly, in an already hostile environment, such individuals will not help future organizing efforts.
VII.2.c.iii) An Alternative Model of the Decertification Process:

Chapter III developed a conceptualization of decertification that presents an alternative to more traditional models of the unionization and deunionization processes. The discussion broadened the traditional utility-maximization or cost-benefit model of decertification in two directions. First, the traditional focus on the formal decertification election (from petition through election win/loss) was broadened to include analysis of the antecedent conditions and processes that lead to the formation of a group of employees willing to pursue decertification. Second, the traditional focus on the individual-environment relationship was expanded to include analysis of a variety of individual, group, organizational, and environmental relations, processes and structures not examined by traditional decertification models. Specifically, five levels of relationships were analyzed: i) individual-environment; ii) individual-organization; iii) group; iv) organizational; and v) organization-environment.

The research operationalized, and generated findings that focused on the individual, group and organizational levels. These levels were stressed for three reasons: i) they are rarely discussed in the traditional IR literature; ii) it is these levels that determine whether the demand for decertification among employees is actually translated into a successful decertification campaign; and, iii) research of relationships and processes that occur at these levels is of greater applied relevance because these are relationships and processes directly affected and controllable by labor relations practitioners.
The exploratory results presented in section VI.2 provide substantial support for the propositions which were in large part generated by the alternative model. Most significantly, the central proposition, that decertification petitioners act as leaders of other employees within the decertification coalition, and will therefore exhibit a variety of leadership behaviors and characteristics was verified. However, as discussed in section VII.2.b, the major hypothesis of interest - the impact of petitioner leadership behaviors and characteristics on the percentage of anti-union votes in the decertification election - was not found to be supported at a significant level. Thus, it may be concluded that, within the parameters of this study, petitioner leadership was not found to significantly effect the outcome of the decertification election. The following section attempts to provide some explanations for both this (non) result and the lack of significance of some of the other hypotheses.

VII.3) Limitations in the Findings

The central hypothesis regarding petitioner leadership, plus six out of the remaining eight hypotheses were either found to be non-significant or to operate in the opposite direction to that predicted. The critical task at this juncture is to put forth possible explanations for the lack of significant results.
VII.3.a) **Methodological Limitations:**

The most immediately obvious causes for the limited confirmation of hypotheses are the methodological limitations discussed in section V.4. Despite the measures taken to minimize these limitations it is highly probable that they affected the study's results.

As was argued in section V.4, the potential poor response validity, and biased response patterns may have led to an under-reporting of illegal and/or collusive employer behaviors. These potential biases would help account for the lack of significance of employer behaviors in initiating the decertification, and employers degree of behavioral and verbal activism during the decertification campaigns.

The reliance on petitioners' retrospective accounts may have introduced further biases in the results. First, despite the use of the most recently closed decertification cases, petitioners were asked to recall events that took place quite some time ago. About 80 percent of the petitions were filed between 2 and 5 years ago. Clearly, the responses will have suffered to some degree from petitioners' imperfect recall (Ericsson and Simon, 1980). Hindsight bias (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975 and Fischhoff, 1982) will probably have led petitioners to over-report and under-report different aspects of the decertification process that do not fit their present understanding of the events. Attributional bias (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982) will have led petitioners to understand their experience of the decertification process within an artificially
systematic and rational framework. Consequently, attributional bias will have also led petitioners to over-report and under-report aspects of the decertification process that do not fit their present understanding of the events. As was argued in section V.4, attributional bias will probably have distorted petitioners recollections regarding the initiation of structure, and the behavioral and verbal activism of the different actors in the decertification process.

The only way to try and account for the above biases regarding under and over reporting of management and union activism in future research would be to triangulate the data. This could have been done in two ways.

First, parallel surveys could have been sent to the union and management representatives involved in the decertifications. This solution is problematic and was not adopted for three reasons. One, it would be extremely difficult to locate the union and management representatives actually involved in the decertifications. The benefit of surveying petitioners was the guarantee of directly contacting the individual who had been involved in the decertification. Second, for full triangulation to occur, the petitioner, and the management and union representatives for each case would have had to respond. Clearly, if all three parties had been required to respond, the response rate would have been considerably lower. Further, if this strategy had been adopted the union and management representatives would have had to have been informed that the petitioner had also been surveyed, thus destroying the petitioners' confidentiality. This would not only have
drastically decreased the petitioner response rate, it would also have put many petitioners, especially those still working in the same work-place and under the same union representative, in a compromised position.

Second, archival data such as NLRB unfair labor practice charges, and Department of Labor strike statistics, could be used to measure and thus triangulate the degree of union and management activism and conflict prior to and during the decertification campaign. This solution is problematic and was not adopted for the reasons detailed in section II.3.b.ii: i) these measures contain considerable "noise" generated by various organizational realities; and, ii) the measures’ relationship to decertification outcomes was considered to be ambiguous due to the multiple interpretations that can be made of raw ULP and strike statistics, and therefore would have been difficult to specify a priori.

VII.3.b) Theoretical Limitations:

The limited confirmation of hypotheses may also be related to theoretical limitations. First, the petitioner leadership factors hypothesized to effect the outcome of the decertification election may actually have a more significant affect on the emergence of a decertification coalition, and on the successful filing of a decertification petition. Second, the limited confirmation of hypotheses regarding the effect of management campaign practices on decertification election outcomes may actually provide an interesting corollary to findings in the certification election literature.
Petitioner leadership may have more impact on the emergence of a decertification coalition, and on the successful filing of a decertification petition than on the actual decertification election campaign. Both the exploratory and explanatory findings appear to point to a difference between petitioner involvement in initiation of the decertification and petitioner behavioral activism during the actual election campaign. It seems that the petitioner may be considerably less active during the election campaign.

These findings could be explained by arguing that initiation of the decertification requires greater petitioner involvement and leadership than the actual decertification election campaign itself.

As was detailed in chapter III, petitioners, as decertification coalition leaders, must initiate and carry through a variety of tasks throughout the decertification process. At the earliest stages, petitioners will be involved in, and initiate discussions about getting rid of the union and must persuade others of their standpoint. If it is decided that action is to be taken, petitioners must figure out the required procedural steps. The NLRB must be identified and contacted and the petitioner must establish the procedural steps to be taken. While this may seem a relatively simple task, the various legal-procedural constraints (especially with regard to timeliness) outlined in Chapter I must be correctly understood and followed. As Pearce and Peterson (1987) argue: "bargaining unit members who undertake an attempt to decertify their union representative quickly encounter...a perplexing maze of complex agency requirements" (p. 255). Once the
petitioner has ascertained the decertification procedure he/she must report the findings back to the other employees, possibly arranging a meeting in order to communicate the information. Next a correctly specified decertification petition must be written and then circulated among interested employees. Once 30 percent of the unit is signed up the petition must be taken to the Board and an official petition form filled in. As was explained in chapter I, and corroborated in section VI.1, a single petitioner normally signs the formal decertification petition. This form is then sent to both union and management parties, making the petitioner’s identity very public knowledge. It should be noted that it is during this initiation stage that petitioners first decide whether or not to lead the decertification coalition and to expose themselves by signing the decertification petition. Thus, it is during this earlier stage of the decertification that petitioners actually expose themselves to the risks involved in leading the decertification. Once the petition has been accepted by the NLRB the decertification drive becomes procedurally driven by the various NLRB steps, election scheduling hearings, election, ballot count etc, and the petitioner’s role becomes less central to the process. While the results indicate that the petitioner continues to play a role in the formal decertification election campaign, the degree of activism appears to diminish.

Consequently, the relative complexities and risks to the petitioner outlined above, may provide an explanation for the findings that petitioner leadership did not have a significant impact on decertification election outcomes, and appeared to be more central to the initiation stage than the election campaign stage of the decertification process.
The limited confirmation of hypotheses regarding the effect of management campaign practices on decertification election outcomes may actually provide an interesting corollary to findings in the certification literature.

Established research on certification elections has largely failed to uncover any significant impact of union election campaigns on certification election outcomes (Brotslaw, 1967; Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, 1976; Maranto and Fiorito, 1987; Heneman and Sandver, 1989). Even more recent work, focussing explicitly on the impact of union organizing on certification election outcomes, has also failed to uncover any significant impact' (Peterson, Lee, and Finnegan, 1990; Rosse and Fossum, 1990). Similarly, much of the earlier certification literature also failed to uncover any impact of management election campaigns on certification election outcomes (Brotslaw, 1967; Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, 1976). However, more recent work has questioned the veracity of the conclusions regarding management campaigns (Freeman, 1985). Indeed, Freeman (1985), after reviewing 12 contemporary certification studies concluded that:

"Despite considerable differences among studies, ..., virtually all (studies of managerial opposition) tell the same story: managerial opposition to unionism, particularly illegal campaign tactics, is a major, if not the major, determination of NLRB election results." (p. 54)

As noted in section II.3.b.ii the decertification election literature has focussed little on the effect of management and union campaigns on decertification election outcomes. Those multivariate studies that have focused on this dynamic (Fulmer and Gilman, 1981;
Anderson et al, 1982; Lawler, 1990) have found some, limited evidence that union tactics reduce the probability of decertification, while management tactics by and large tend to back-fire, and actually lead to a decreased probability of decertification. Nevertheless, Lawler (1990) has concluded that the "tactics that have been studied do not appear to influence decertification election outcomes" (p. 197).

Clearly, this study reverses the above findings with regard to cerification elections, and provides significant new evidence with regard to decertification elections. The exploratory results revealed that unions were frequently and intensely involved in decertification campaigns. The explanatory results revealed a strong and consistent negative effect of union behavioral activism on the percentage of anti-union votes. Further, the explanatory results reveal that there is no apparent "back-lash" effect when unions resort to highly aggressive campaign behaviors. In contrast, none of the measures of management involvement in the decertification ever approached significance, and the more moderate measures had Beta coefficients opposite in direction (positive) to that hypothesized. The lack of significant findings corroborate the exploratory conclusion that management adopted a very low profile in the majority of these cases. It makes sense that, given the lack of management involvement in the decertification efforts, their actions had no significant effect on election outcomes.

A possible explanation for this study's findings, which might also help explain those noted above regarding certification elections, can be extracted from the individual-group,
and organizational dynamics explored in chapter III. This explanation is also consistent with that developed above regarding the greater significance of petitioner involvement in initiation of the decertification than in the actual decertification election campaign.

Under NLRB procedures, union election campaigns (decertification or certification) cannot progress to the official election campaign until there has been a 30 percent showing of interest among the employees. Consequently, in the case of decertification, by the time a petition has been filed, informal leaders among the employees have gotten a sizable group of employees to express their interest in voting the union out. Further, the majority of other employees will in all likelihood be aware of the decertification attempt and many may already have formed an anti-union opinion on which they would vote if an election were held. Therefore, at the time a decertification petition is filed, the union is likely to be at a considerable disadvantage in terms of support among the employees in the unit.

As was pointed out in section IV.2.e, management will be both legally limited and normatively limited (in the sense that employees' will be sensitive to management involvement) during the initiation of the decertification and during the decertification election campaign itself. Results supporting this claim - the limited involvement, and the limited impact of management actions on the outcome of the decertification election - have been duly noted. Further, as was argued in section IV.2.c, and as was verified in section VI.2.b.iii, petitioners typically have a close relationship with their employer. This
relationship is important to the petitioner and others supporting the decertification in that they often seek assistance from the employer and must trust their employer to treat them fairly and justly in a post-union environment. This study, like previous decertification research, does not capture the development of this critical relationship because it will have formed long before decertification ever became an issue and, therefore, prior to researchers’ measurements.

In sum, the critical individual-group, and organizational dynamics, with regard to petitioner and management involvement in the decertification process, occur prior to measurement by the typical decertification election study.

In contrast, as was noted, the union enters the decertification campaign at a substantial disadvantage. A petitioner has already emerged as an informal leader, and organized a substantial group of employees who have expressed an active interest in decertification. The bond of trust between employees and employer is also already established. Consequently, union actions during the campaign probably cannot avoid having the effect of reducing the number of anti-union voters. Further, as was argued in section IV.2.g, one would anticipate even low levels of union campaign practices to have a strong, negative effect on anti-union votes in decertification elections. Clearly, the noted results regarding the impact of union campaign tactics appear to support this argument.
The logic of above arguments could be extended to certification elections. Briefly, in the certification scenario, the positions of union and management are reversed, with the union usually filing a request for an election with the NLRB only after extensive pre-campaign organizing and with over 50 percent of the employees in the prospective unit backing it (Gagala, 1983). In this case management enters the campaign stage at a disadvantage and on the defensive (while in decertification the union must defend its performance, in certification management must defend its performance). It seems clear that management is considerably less restrained both legally and normatively in its actions during the certification campaign and therefore has, or takes, far greater latitude in its actions (Freeman, 1985). In this scenario it is to be expected that the management certification election campaign will have greater impact than the union campaign.

In sum, with regard to the decertification process, the critical aspects of petitioner and management involvement take place prior to and during the filing of the decertification petition, while the critical aspects of union involvement take place after filing of the decertification petition. While the data collected by this study only verify certain aspects of this explanation, the results are certainly consistent with the explanation.

VII.4) Implications for Future Research

Based on the preceding discussion, and the critique of the traditional decertification model presented in chapter II, it seems clear that future academic research on the decertification
process, and deunionization and unionization processes in general, could benefit considerably from a reevaluation of, and reorientation toward, the contextual, utility maximization or cost benefit paradigm (the UM/CB model). The present research appears to contain two important implications regarding such a reorientation.

VII.4.a) Demand for Decertification versus Decertification Election Outcomes:

A central critique of extant decertification models in chapter II was that they wrongly specify their dependent variables. It was argued that most models utilize independent variables that would be expected to be related more to the overall demand for decertification than the outcome of decertification elections. However, measures of the latter remain the dependent variables of choice. The interpretation of the present research findings support the significance of this critique.

As was argued above, the critical petitioner, management and union dynamics affecting decertification elections occur at different stages of the decertification process. While union involvement during the decertification election campaign can influence the result of the election, petitioner and management involvement during the decertification election campaign exert only a limited, and non-significant impact. It appears that the critical aspects of petitioner and management involvement occur prior to the filing of the decertification petition and should therefore more strongly effect the demand for decertification.
Future research could examine the validity of this argument. This could be achieved by taking the predictors used in traditional UM/CB models of decertification and testing the degree to which they are able to predict the demand for certification and decertification versus the outcome of the decertification election.

As has been argued, demand for decertification could be measured as the number of decertification petitions filed. There are however some important constraints on using this dependent variable.

One constraint on using the number of decertification petitions filed as a dependent variable is that the raw number of submissions will provide a very inaccurate picture of the actual demand for decertification. Examination of this study’s petitions, and discussions with NLRB representatives reveal that many petitions are withdrawn by the petitioner for procedural reasons, most frequently due to untimely filing. Nevertheless, where this occurs the petitioner often refiles at a later date. While the NLRB does not maintain records of the reasons for petition withdrawals, those instances where petitions are withdrawn and later resubmitted by the same petitioner could be counted as single filings.

A far more problematic constraint on using the number of petitions filed as an indicator of demand for decertification is that this measure, by itself excludes all instances where an informal decertification process was started but never reached the stage of filing a
petition. One obvious and important scenario of how this could occur is where the union recognizes the emergent decertification campaign and takes early steps to intervene. Clearly, research that merely tracks established NLRB statistics such as petition filings will not capture such processes. Studying such processes would require researchers to be involved in on-going and intensive monitoring of bargaining units. While there are obvious resource constraints on carrying out such research there may be ways to conduct such research which are not overwhelmingly arduous. The most obviously apparent approach would be to use case research focusing on units in specific, carefully selected unions. One of the more obvious unions of interest would be the Teamsters, given their disproportionate experience of decertification cases.

VII.4.b) Focus on the Agents and Institutions of the Industrial Relations System:

As was argued in chapter II, a major limitation of UM/CB models is that they ignore that portion of the explanation for decertification which lies with the agents and organizations of the IR system. There is a growing consensus among IR scholars that agents' actions (and inactions), and organizational processes are primary determinants of union decline in the US'. Nevertheless, as Lawler (1990) points out, the majority of UM/CB models of union growth and decline, including decertification models, have ignored the impact of IR agents and organizations.
Furthermore, it was argued that ignoring IR agents and institutions limits the potential applied relevance and impact of IR research. IR was developed, in large part, as an applied field, seeking to describe and explain the realm of union-management relations for the purpose of promoting, or (at minimum) of sustaining collective bargaining. This is an orientation that has all but disappeared in contemporary IR (Strauss, 1989). A central normative goal of the present research has been to develop research, and to develop a practice of research, that explicitly focus on IR agents and institutions and which can provide relevant and usable results for labor relations, and especially union, practitioners.

*Given this study's findings, and the interpretation of these findings, I believe that the most fruitful avenue for future decertification research is to further focus attention on the individual, group, and organizational dynamics of the pre-petition stage of the decertification process.*

As was argued in the introduction, union decertification constitutes employees rejecting the union that represents them, and signals union leadership that the members believe the union no longer effectively represents them. In this sense, the study of decertification potentially provides a unique perspective on union members’ perceptions of union instrumentality and unions’ organizational effectiveness as worker representatives.
This study has revealed that the individual, group, and organizational dynamics producing these perceptions largely occur prior to the formal decertification election campaign. While the study has also revealed that union campaign activities are effective in reducing the percentage of anti-union votes in the decertification election, unions continue to lose over 70 percent of these elections. Further, this study has revealed that, contrary to union practitioners' beliefs, the majority of decertification petitioners were previously active union members and many of them actually held union positions. Clearly the union-member dynamics leading to this conversion of union activists to union opponents occurs over an extended period prior to the filing of the decertification petition. From the union's perspective, the critical issue is examination of these union-member dynamics, and the development of early and effective intervention in units where these dynamics are emerging.

In sum, the research findings appear to point toward the need for decertification research to move toward the study of the pre-petition filing conditions that lead employees to initiate a decertification election and file a decertification petition. Clearly this is the area of greatest potential utility to union practitioners and could generate insights of broad applicability to servicing and organizing beyond just units that are facing decertification.

Notes:

1. One of the hypotheses originally advanced was not evaluated due to its reliance on a scale which turned out to exhibit low scale reliability.
2. In fact Peterson, Lee, and Finnegan (1990) found that union organizing could lead to a lessening of union support during a certification election.

3. This is why unions don’t typically file for a certification election unless at least more than 50 percent of the prospective unit have signed showing of interest cards (Gagala, 1983).


5. Troy (1986), and Lipset (1986).
APPENDIX A
Derivation of Election Results from 1948-1963

The restrictions on pre-1964 election result data are as follows:

i) Prior to 1964 the NLRB grouped RM and RC election results as certification election results.

ii) Prior to 1952 the NLRB also included "R" election results in this figure. "R" elections are for "certification of representatives for purposes of collective bargaining with an employer, under section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, prior to the amendment" (US. NLRB, 1948, p. 123).

Restriction i was dealt with using the following estimations:

a) Mean RC and RM union win rates were calculated for the years 1964-1970. The mean RC win rate was 59.3%. The mean RM win rate was 45.0%.

b) The number of RC elections and the number of eligible RC voters were multiplied by the mean RC win rate (Tables A.2 and A.3, Column 1). This produced one end of an estimate of the number of RC elections and the number of RC eligible voters that could be expected to be included in the aggregate RC and RM election results.
c) The number of RM elections and the number of eligible RM voters were multiplied by the mean RM win rate (Tables A.2 and A.3, Column 2). These figures were then subtracted from the corresponding aggregate RC and RM election results (number of elections won and number of eligible voters in units voting for a union) (Tables A.2 an A.3, Column 3). This produced the other end of an estimate of the number of RC elections and the number of RC eligible voters that could be expected to be included in the aggregate RC and RM election results.

e) The estimate for number of union wins was converted into a percentage figure (Table A.2, Column 4).

d) The average of the percentage and number estimates was calculated (Tables A.2, Columns 5 and 6, and Table A.3, Column 4). These figures were used as the estimates reported in Table 1.2.

Restriction ii was dealt with using the following estimation:

a) Given that "R" elections were no longer held from 1952 on it was not possible to generate a mean "R" election union win rate. Consequently, the number of RC elections and the number of eligible RC voters were simply multiplied by the mean RC win rate (Table A.2, Columns 5 and 6, and Table A.3, Column 4). This produced a single estimate of the number of RC elections and the number of RC eligible voters that could be expected to be included in the aggregate R, RC, and RM election results. These figures were used as the estimates reported in Table 1.2.

Table A.1 contains the NLRB Annual Report Data. Tables A.2 and A.3 contain the various transformations on this data that result in the above described estimates.
Table A.1: RC and RM Data 1948-1963:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of RC Elections Held</th>
<th># of Eligible RC Voters</th>
<th># of RM Elections Held</th>
<th># of Eligible RM Voters</th>
<th># of Elections Won by Union</th>
<th>Eligible Voters in Union Won Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>228,634</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>10,425</td>
<td>2,337</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>5,282</td>
<td>541,283</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>36,774</td>
<td>3,889</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>5,251</td>
<td>604,006</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>28,281</td>
<td>4,186</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>6,271</td>
<td>651,651</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>14,760</td>
<td>4,758</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
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Table A.2: Transformations of NLRB Data for Estimates of % Union Wins, and Number of Union Wins in RC Elections 1948-1963:

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Table A.3: Transformations of NLRB Data for Estimates of Number of Eligible Voters in Units Voting for a Union in RC Elections 1948-1963:

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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

APPENDIX B
Open-Ended Interview Protocol and Results

B.1) Copy of Protocol for Open-Ended Practitioner Interviews

Greeting.

As I explained over the phone, I am conducting a study of union decertification. Right now I am trying to build up a general picture of the decertification process and what factors are important in determining the outcome of decertification elections. I am particularly interested in the role of individual, rank-and-file union members in this process. These are very important questions because researchers know next to nothing about why individuals decertify a union.

The interview should last about one hour. If you feel that any of the questions are too sensitive or personal you can simply disregard them. The answers that you provide will be used to design a questionnaire that is to be distributed to about 500 decertification petitioners. The answers that you provide me will remain absolutely confidential - only I will have access to this information.

Before we proceed do you have any questions about what I have said? Please take a minute to think about what I have said. Is there any further information that you would like at this point?

Decertification Experience:

In answering this question and the questions that follow I want you to think about your experiences in the decertification elections that you have been involved in. Please try to refer back to these experiences in answering the questions.

1) How many decertification elections have you been involved in?

2) What was(were) your position(s) in these elections?

Union and Employer Campaign Practices:

I want to know more about the kinds of tactics and practices both the union and management engage in during decertification elections.
As I said the purpose of this interview is to design a questionnaire that I will distribute to some 300 decertification petitioners. I want the petitioners to tell me about the practices and tactics that union and management used during their decertification campaign. The problem is that this is likely to be a sensitive and highly political question for them. I would like to explore with you how you think I could best ask this question. This card shows how I might ask it.

HAND RESPONDENT CARD 1.

3) Let’s look at section A first.

a. Do you think that decertification petitioners would respond to such a question?
b. Do you think that decertification petitioners would provide truthful and accurate answers?
c. Would you change the way I asked the question - how?
d. Do you think there are practices missing from this list - what are they?
e. Do you think there are practices on the list which are of no importance to decertification elections?
f. Which of these practices would be most important?
g. Which of these practices do you think would be most used?
h. Which of these practices would be least important?
i. Which of these practices would be least used?
j. Are any of the terms unclear?

4) Now let’s look at section B.

a. Do you think that decertification petitioners would respond to such a question?
b. Do you think that decertification petitioners would provide truthful and accurate answers?
c. Would you change the way I asked the question - how?
d. How would you ask the question?
e. Does the description of the stages of the decertification campaign make sense to you?

As I said the purpose of this interview is to design a questionnaire that I will distribute to some 300 decertification petitioners. I want the petitioners to tell me about the practices and tactics that union and management used during their decertification campaign. The problem is that this is likely to be a sensitive and highly political topic.

5) One approach to this problem is to look at the history of the bargaining unit in terms of the National Labor Relations Board records of the unit. For example you could use Unfair Labor Practice claims filed with the NLRB during the decertification election. This would indicate what types of practices and tactics the other side had engaged in during the decertification campaign. The problem with this approach is that, as practitioners from both sides know, Unfair Labor Practice charges are often filed for strategic purposes - for example so as to delay the election process. The question is:

a. Would records of Unfair Labor Practice charges give an accurate indication of what actually went on during the campaign?
b. Can you think of some way to strengthen this approach?
c. Are there certain Unfair Labor Practice charges that I should include/disregard?
6) Another way of using National Labor Relations Board records are as indicators of the past history of the bargaining unit in terms of conflict between management and labor. Researchers have used factors such as delay between certification petition and certification election; Board ordered (cf. consent) certification election; and the prior submission of deauthorization and decertification petitions, and the holding of deauthorization and decertification elections, as indicators of managerial opposition to the union. The question is:

   a. Would such records give an accurate indication of the labor-management climate prior to the decertification?
   b. Can you think of some way to strengthen this approach?
   c. Are there certain records that I should include/disregard?

Petitioner Intentions and Campaign Practices:

7) I want to know more about the intentions and reasons for petitioners to seek decertification and also the kinds of tactics and practices used by those workers who are organizing and leading the decertification election. Here is a card that lists questions about petitioners intentions and some possible tactics and practices that workers might use to organize and lead a decertification campaign.

Hand respondent CARD 2.

   a. Do you think that decertification petitioners would respond to such a question?
   b. Do you think that decertification petitioners would provide truthful and accurate answers?
   c. Would you change the way I asked the question - how?
   d. Do you think there are practices missing from this list - what are they?
   e. Do you think there are practices on the list which are of no importance to decertification elections?
   f. Which of these practices would be most important?
   g. Which of these practices do you think would be most used?
   h. Which of these practices would be least important?
   i. Which of these practices would be least used?
   j. Are any of the terms unclear?

Petitioner Characteristics:

8) As I told you over the phone, the central question in this research is the role of individual, union members in the decertification process.

Please think about the union members that you have seen initiate, organize, and lead decertification campaigns. Do you feel that these individuals possessed special abilities that made them good organizers and leaders of other rank-and-file union members during the decertification campaign?

GIVE EXAMPLES OF ABILITIES IF NECESSARY.

Please list specific abilities that you think you and/ these individuals possessed.
HAND RESPONDENT PAPER TO LIST ABILITIES: I would like to read your answers so that we can discuss them.
a. You listed...as an important ability - what exactly did you mean by ...?
b. Why is this ability so important?
c. At what stage of the decertification election is this ability particularly important?
d. Please rank the abilities in their order of importance.

COMPARE LISTED ABILITIES WITH REED'S ABILITIES (CARD 3) AND NOTE UNMENTIONED ABILITIES.

9) There are some other abilities that I think might be important in making someone a good organizer/leader of a decertification campaign. For example...ABILITY FROM CARD 3.

a. Do you think this ability is important?
b. Why is it important?
c. At what stage of the decertification election is this ability particularly important?

Union Commitment:

I want to spend some time talking about union members' commitment to the union. Commitment to the union has been studied quite a bit by academics. Here is a precise definition of commitment. I would like you to read it carefully so that we are talking about the same thing.

HAND RESPONDENT CARD 4.

10) Do you think low commitment to the union, as defined on the card, effects union members willingness to initiate, organize and lead a decertification campaign - how?

11) Are there specific aspects of the definition of commitment to the union, as listed on the card, or as forms of commitment you can think of, which would be particularly important in explaining a union members willingness to initiate, organize and lead a decertification campaign?

Petitioner's relationship to union:

I believe a decertification petitioner's previous relationship with the union may help explain their interest in decertification. Here is a card with questions trying to establish the nature of that relationship.

HAND RESPONDENT CARD 5.

Let's go through each of the aspects of the relationship listed on the card.

STATE ITEMS I-VI ONE BY ONE, FOLLOWED BY:

12) Do you think this aspect of the union member's relationship to his/her union would have any effect on their willingness to initiate, organize and lead a decertification campaign - how?
Environmental and Organizational Controls:

Decertification elections take place within a broader economic and political environment. For example, a recession might reduce the effectiveness of unions and so lead to more decertifications as union members become frustrated. I would like you to sit back and think about the broader environment in which decertification elections take place. Here is a list of three measures of the broader environment I was planning to use.

HAND RESPONDENT CARD 6 AND EXPLAIN EACH FACTOR:

13) I want to describe how I believe each measure listed on the card affects decertification. I would like you to respond to my description and tell me if it is wrong or right and if you think such an effect would be important in explaining decertifications:

a. Wage Change and Unemployment both capture the state of the economy. Do you think a declining or improving economy affects decertifications - how?
b. Right-to-work states tend to be more anti-union and employers and employees tend to be more resistant to unions in these states. Do you think the right-to-work status of a state affects decertifications - how?
c. Based on your experiences with decertifications do you think there are measures missing from this list - can you think of other ways the political and economic environment affect decertifications - what are they?

Why is/are these measure(s) so important - how do they affect decertifications?

Additional Macro and Micro Socio-Political Controls:

Apart from the economic and political measures we have just talked about there are likely to be factors within the industrial relations environment itself which affect the likelihood of decertifications occurring and being won. Here is a partial list of such factors. Each factor is defined on the card.

HAND RESPONDENT CARD 7.

14) I want to describe how I believe each factor listed on the card affects decertification. I would like you to respond to my description and tell me if it is wrong or right and if you think such an effect would be important in explaining decertifications.

GO THROUGH LIST OF FACTORS ON CARD AND GIVE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTIONS:

a) Union density: Union practitioners argue that many decertifications occur where a union has over-extended itself by attempting to organize and service small "remainder" unions after the larger bulk of the potential work-places have been organized. So, where union density is high decertification should increase. Do you think union density affects decertifications - how?
b) Teamsters: Some think that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters is a union that is very efficient at organizing but is not very effective in providing service once it has won the election. These critics argue that the Teamsters corruption and bureaucracy may make the union particularly susceptible to low member commitment. So, bargaining units represented by the Teamsters should have a higher rate of decertification. Do you think a bargaining unit being represented by the Teamsters will affect decertifications - how?

c) Certification Margin: would indicate the degree of union support during the original certification. If the margin of union victory was small, a decertification majority would be easier to attain as fewer Rank-and-file would have to convert to an anti-union vote. So, the smaller the certification margin the more likely the bargaining unit is to decertify. Do you think the margin of victory in the certification election will affect decertifications - how?

d) First Contract and Contract Delay: would indicate whether the unit ever got a first contract and if so how long it took. The inability to attain a first contract and the delay between certification and first contract is often cited by union practitioners as an important source of Rank-and-file discontent. So, bargaining units where a first contract was never attained or took a long time to attain are more likely to decertify. Do you think the difficulty in getting a first contract will affect decertifications - how?

e) Delay in Decertification Election: would indicate the amount of time the union has to initiate a counter organizing effort. So, the longer the delay the less likely the bargaining unit is to decertify. Do you think the delay in the certification election will affect decertifications - how?

f) Unit Size: small election units provide conditions under which "pro-union factions...are better able to communicate, build conformity, and remain cohesive during election campaigns." The same dynamic is believed to operate with regard to decertification coalitions (Cooke 1983) argues that the size effect (increased size leads to lower effectiveness of pro-union coalition) only operates in units of up to roughly 65 members. Once the unit is larger than this the size effect will no longer register. I don't know how this factor will effect decertifications. The size effect could provide advantages for both pro and anti union factions during the decertification. How do you think this factor would effect decertification?

g) Unit Age: the Rank-and-file's experience with collective bargaining may be an important influence on their attitudes toward the union. For example, all else equal, relatively young units will probably be less able to withstand hard-ball managerial tactics than relatively established units. So, the younger the unit the more likely it is to decertify. Do you think the age of the bargaining unit will affect decertifications - how?

h) Diversity of Occupations: academics argue that the existence of an occupational community is an important factor enabling the emergence of Rank-and-file coalitions. So, where there is less diversity of occupations within a bargaining unit you are more likely to see Rank-and-file coalitions. Again, I don't know how this factor will effect decertifications. The ability to form coalitions could provide advantages for both pro and anti union factions during the decertification. How do you think this factor would effect decertification?

15) Lastly, do you think there are factors missing from the list - what are they?

Why is/are these factor(s) so important - how do they affect decertifications?

Thank you for your time, your assistance is greatly appreciated and will be of enormous value to the research.
### B.2) Copy of Cards Used During Open-Ended Practitioner Interviews

**CARD 1:** A. The following lists a number of activities and tactics a union/employee association and management often rely on prior to and during decertification elections. Please indicate which of the activities/tactics were used during the decertification campaign:

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<th>used</th>
<th>not</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Produced paid advertisements</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built coalitions in opposition to the union among residents of the wider community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up an organizing committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kept union supporters names secret</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributed pro-union/ anti-decertification literature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held organizing meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-on-one organizing - personal contact by union representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steward training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributed questionnaires</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance of employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogation of employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened union opponents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise of improved servicing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Management tactics:

- Use of an outside management consultant/adviser/labor lawyer
- Supervisor training
- Distributed questionnaires
- Set up an organizing Committee
- Surveillance of employees
- Interrogation of employees
- Threatened union supporters
- Discharged union supporters
- Opposition to first contract
- Hard-ball negotiating in last round of collective bargaining
- Promise of improved compensation if union defeated
- Threatened to shut-down/move plant

Please list any other tactics/practices/strategies that were used by either side prior to and during the decertification election:
B. Please describe how the decertification campaign developed. There are typically 5 stages in a decertification campaign (listed below). Please think of what happened in each stage and how the union/employee association and management representatives acted in each stage. What kinds of activities did they engage in? What kinds of activities did you engage in? (Please provide as much detail as you can. If you need more space to describe the campaign please feel free to use the back of this sheet).

**Stage I:** Individual workers in a bargaining unit start to feel that they no longer wish to be represented by their union. The union/employee association and management representatives pick up on workers discontent and start an informal campaign to discourage/encourage decertification.

**Stage II:** Individual workers start to talk to one another about their feelings about the union/employee association and their wish to rid themselves of the union/employee association. Individual workers opposed to the union/employee association become a "group" of like-minded individuals.

**Stage III:** The group of workers opposed to the union/employee association decides it wants to decertify and petitions the National Labor Relations Board in order to hold a decertification election.

**Stage IV:** The National Labor Relations Board grants the decertification petition. A date is set for the election and the "formal" union/employee association and management campaigns to avoid/encourage decertification begin.

**Stage V:** The election is held and the union/employee association is either decertified or remains as the bargaining agent. The "aftermath" of the election is felt by the workers.
CARD 2:

Petitioner intentions:

i) Why did you want to decertify the union?

ii) Why did you, rather than some other employee sign the decertification petition?

iii) a. what did you hope to achieve by seeking decertification?

(If decertification went through):

b. Were your expectations met?

Petitioner decertification practices:

i) Built coalitions in opposition to the union among residents of the wider community.

ii) Set up an organizing committee.

iii) Kept union opponents names secret.

iv) Distributed anti-decertification literature

v) Held organizing meetings

vi) One-on-one organizing - personal contact with co-workers

vii) Surveillance of co-workers

viii) Interrogation of co-workers

ix) Threatened union supporters

x) Vocal on-going opposition to union representation.

xi) Distributed petitions among co-workers to demonstrate anti-union sentiment.
### Reed's Organizer Competencies, Characteristics, and Variable Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency</th>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to meaningfully involve the rank-and-file in important aspects of the campaign.</td>
<td>Willingness to delegate.</td>
<td>Faith in People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to persist in work despite failures and setbacks.</td>
<td>Strong self-image.</td>
<td>Self-Esteem</td>
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<td>Rigidity</td>
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<td>Ability to enact the organizing environment by manipulating symbols, events, and language.</td>
<td>Belief that people are manipulable in interpersonal situations.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
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<td>Ability to support and empower people.</td>
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<td>Internal Locus of Control</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Desire for control over life events.</td>
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<td>Ability to interact with a wide variety of groups.</td>
<td>Sensitivity to social cues and ability to adapt behavior to the requirements of the situation.</td>
<td>Self-Monitoring</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ease with different social classes</td>
<td>Social Mobility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CARD 4: Union Commitment: (Adapted from p. 480 Gordon et al 1980)

1) A strong desire to remain a member of the union.
2) A willingness to exert high levels of effort on behalf of the union.
3) A definite belief in and acceptance of the values and goals of the union.

CARD 5:

i) Were you an employee at the company during the original certification election? 

ii) Did you vote for the union in the original certification election? 

iii) Are/were you a member of the union/employees association before it was decertified? 

iv) Did you ever attend a union/employees association meeting? 

v) Did you ever vote in an internal union/employees association election? 

vi) Did you ever file a grievance through your union/employees association? 

vii) Were you ever elected to, nominated, or chosen for an office in the union/employees association? 

Please describe the office: ____________________________

viii) How long were you a member of the union/employees association? _________ Years

CARD 6:

Wage Change - Percent change in average industry wages at time of decertification election.
Unemployment - State unemployment rate at time of decertification election.
Right-to-Work - Right-to-Work vs non Right-to-Work States.

CARD 7:

Union Density - Proportion of the work-force organized for the three-digit SIC category.
Teamsters - Election unit was represented by International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Certification Margin - Percent margin of union victory in certification election.
1st Contract - First contract signed vs first contract never signed.
Contract Delay - Delay between certification and signing of first contract.
Delay in Decertification Election - Delay between decertification petition and decertification election.
Unit Size - Number of individuals in election unit + 100.
Unit Age - Age of bargaining unit.
Occupations - Presence of more than one occupation in election unit.
B.3) Summary of Results of Open-Ended Practitioner Interviews

Introduction:

This section summarizes the results of the open-ended interviews (OEI) with labor and management practitioners. The purpose of the OEI was to: i) evaluate the validity of my questionnaire survey (QS) in terms of usefulness of questions, appropriateness of language etc.; and, ii) improve the QS on the basis of the grounded practitioner knowledge. The results of the OEI were then combined with the pre-existent theoretical insights on the questionnaire to derive: i) a statistical model; and, ii) a QS that measures the relevant variables. The QS was then pre-tested on 3 local Decertification Petitioners (DPs). The OEI interviews were conducted with:

G: Management lawyer.

W: formerly NLRB staff and presently a management lawyer.

J&R: J: Director of Membership Services; and, R: District Organizer - for an industrial union.

K: Assistant Director - Regional NLRB office.

S: Union lawyer.
Structural Suggestions: The broad structural conclusions from the OEI are that:

i) Brief (30 minutes at most).
ii) Use very simple language.
iii) Use as much closed-ended, highly specific and accurate (grounded details) questions as possible.

Restructuring should be based on above conclusions, question modifications and subsequent restructuring. Both the solicitations and questionnaire must focus on diffusing DPs suspicion and hostility and garnering their interest.

W (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): AT FIRST W WAS VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT MY ABILITY TO GET HONEST RESPONSES (ALTHOUGH AFTER W HAD SEEN PARTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE SEEMED MORE POSITIVE). YOU WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK MANY YEARS BEFORE GETTING HONEST ANSWERS FROM DPs - ONCE POLITICAL STRESS DISSIPATED. DP PROBABLY WON'T REALLY UNDERSTAND PROCESS. IF DP DID FOLLOW THE BOOK HE WOULD PROBABLY STILL BE CONCERNED THAT HE HAD DONE SOMETHING ILLEGAL. IF DP KNOWS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OCCURRED - SUCH AS EMPLOYER WRITING UP THE PETITION (W SEEMED TO IMPLY THIS WAS A COMMON OCCURRENCE) THEN DP EITHER WON'T ANSWER OR WON'T KNOW WHAT TO ANSWER. DP'S ARE TYPICALLY GOING TO HAVE VERY LOW EDUCATION LEVELS - YOU WILL NEED TO SIMPLIFY YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE.

J (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): ON FIRST CONTACT WITH HIM, WHEN REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW ACTED VERY WARY OF ME AND MY STUDY, DESPITE GIVING HIM SUE J.'S NAME, HE SAID SOMETHING LIKE: "WE WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM MEMBERS, FROM AN ACADEMIC STANDPOINT THIS MAY NOT BE CORRECT, BUT FRANKLY, THEY CAN GO TO HELL." THEN J ATTENDED INTERVIEW WITH R, HARDLY SAID ANYTHING, HE ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED A DECERT., AND THEN HE LEFT HALF-WAY THROUGH THE INTERVIEW.

R (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): IN REALITY STUDY WILL NOT HELP PRACTITIONERS AS THEY ALREADY KNOW WHAT THEY ARE DOING. WHAT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO UNIONS WOULD BE A STUDY THAT HELPDEVISE AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM FOR DECERTS. BASICALLY, DEVELOP AN ONGOING TEST FOR IS THE UNION SERVICING EFFECTIVELY? DEVELOP A MEASURE OF UNION EFFECTIVENESS AND ADMINISTER IT TO SMALL UNION UNITS OVER TIME, WAY BEFORE A DECERT IS INITIATED. SOME UNITS WILL GO TO DECERTS OTHERS WON'T. CAN TEST WHETHER MEASURE HELPS PREDICT WHICH DO AND DON'T.

R (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): - TIME MAY BE A REAL CONCERN FOR DPs, ONE HOUR IS TOO LONG.
- GIVE THEM AS MUCH CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS AS POSSIBLE - WRITING CONSUMES TOO MUCH TIME AND/OR EFFORT.
- COULD DO OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS AS A "PART 2" OVER THE PHONE WITH THOSE WHO RESPOND TO CLOSED-ENDED "PART 1".
- NLRB IS LUCKY TO GET 50% RESPONSE RATES TO ITS QUESTIONNAIRES ON CERTIFICATION CAMPAIGNS.
- GIVE DPs A DEADLINE TO FOLLOW AND DO FOLLOW-UP CALLS.
- SUSPECTS THAT CASE ANALYSIS WILL BE VERY ENLIGHTENING.
3) Union and Employer Campaign Practices Closed-Ended List:

Section A: b. Do you think that decertification petitioners would provide truthful and accurate answers?

G: WILL ONLY PROVIDE TRUTHFUL ANSWERS TO THOSE CATEGORIES THAT THEY BELIEVE ARE LEGAL. WON’T PROVIDE TRUTHFUL RESPONSES FOR ILLEGAL PRACTICES.

W: YES - FOR A&B, IF INTELLIGENT ENOUGH.

R: IN DECEIT MANAGEMENT NOT SUPPOSED TO BE INVOLVED SO MANAGEMENT’S ROLE IS DISGUISED. DP’s ARE COACHED TO SAY MANAGEMENT DID NOTHING.

d. Do you think there are practices missing from this list - what are they?

G: YES. MANAGEMENT OFTEN WORKS WITH A SMALL GROUP OF EMPLOYEES.

K: MIGHT WANT TO INCLUDE: THREATENING TO CLOSE PLANT AND THREATENING TO REPLACE STRIKES DURING ECONOMIC STRIKES - MAYBE VERY IMPORTANT MANAGEMENT TACTICS OCCUR OFTEN IN CAMPAIGNS, AND ARE VERY IMPORTANT IN TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT OF JOB INSECURITY.

R: NEED ITEMS ON UNION COMMITMENT AND SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS. NEED DEMOGRAPHIC DATA (OCCUPATION, INCOME, RACE, AGE ETC.)

e. Do you think there are practices on the list which are of no importance to decertification elections?

G: YES: PAID ADVERTS BY UNIONS (RARELY USED); COALITIONS AMONG RESIDENTS BY UNIONS (NOT USED); UNION ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (RARELY USED); QUESTIONNAIRES BY EITHER SIDE (NOT USED); MANAGEMENT SETTING UP ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (NOT USED).

S: RARELY USED: QUESTIONNAIRES, ALTHOUGH WOULD EXPECT TO SEE THEM USED IN LARGER UNITS. STEWARD TRAINING.

NOT USED: PAID ADS (EITHER SIDE) COALITIONS AMONG COMMUNITY, KEEPING NAMES SECRET (CERTIFICATION TECHNIQUE).

f. Which of these practices would be most important?

G: ONE-ON-ONE UNION ORGANIZING - UNION, USING EXCELSIOR LIST GOES HOUSE TO HOUSE; CAMPAIGN LITERATURE; SURVEILLANCE AND THREATENING DOES OCCUR (BY BOTH PRO AND ANTI UNION EMPLOYEES). MANAGEMENT OFTEN USES SMALL MEETINGS WITH EMPLOYEES - HE USED THIS TACTIC OFTEN - PROVIDE INFO. AND DO Q&A.
S: ON ORGANIZING AND PROMISES OF IMPROVED SERVICING ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT UNION TACTICS. ALSO USED: LITERATURE DISTRIBUTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL MEETINGS. SURVEILLANCE, THREATS AND INTERROGATION ARE ALL DONE BY MANAGEMENT. ***But see "additional comment on interrogation, under "j".***

j. Are any of the terms unclear?

W: MANY TERMS SUCH AS SURVEILLANCE, INTERROGATION HAVE DIVERSE MEANINGS (VOLUMES OF NLRB DISCUSSION OF TERMS) - SO RESPONSES COULD MEAN MANY DIFFERENT THINGS.

K: NEED TO FRAME QUESTIONS VERY DIRECTLY AND STATE ISSUES IN PETITIONERS OWN TERMS. NEED TO REWORD TERMS - PETITIONERS WON'T UNDERSTAND MANY OF THESE TERMS: COALITIONS - REWORD; SURVEILLANCE - "WATCHING EMPLOYEES"; INTERROGATION - "QUESTIONING EMPLOYEES".

General Comments on Practices:

W: IN SMALL UNITS CAMPAIGN CANNOT BE TOO POLISHED AS RAF WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGNS NOT THEIR OWN.

R: DECERT TENDS TO PLAY OUT AS CAMPAIGN BETWEEN UNION AND DP S.

G: DEGREE OF HARDBALL USED IS NOT A DECERT TACTIC IT DEPENDS SIMPLY ON BARGAINING POWER.

G: MANAGEMENT HAS TO BE VERY CAREFUL DURING DECERT. BECAUSE IF UNION WINS THE NEXT ROUND OF CB WILL BE V. TOUGH. MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT IS VERY SUBTLE - "I ONLY BECAME INVOLVED WHEN THE CONDITIONS WERE RIGHT." EMPLOYER CAN SIMPLY ASK MEMBERS IF THEY ARE SATISFIED WITH THEIR UNION (AND THEN SUGGEST DECERT ROUTE, PROVIDE INFO. ETC.)

G: THERE IS A FINE LINE ON PROMISES OF BENEFITS. FOR EXAMPLE: "JOINT TRUSTEE FUNDS" ARE HEALTH BENEFIT FUNDS THAT ARE TYPICALLY PART OF A UNION CONTRACT. THUS UNION OFTEN ARGUES THAT A DECERT WILL DESTROY EE'S HEALTH BENEFIT FUND. MANAGEMENT MAY (IN RESPONSE?) PROMISE THAT SOME HEALTH PLAN WILL BE KEPT BUT CANNOT PROMISE A SPECIFIC PLAN. MANAGEMENT SOMETIMES WILL DISCUSS THE PLAN THAT COVERS THEIR NON-UNION EMPLOYEES TO ILLUSTRATE THE LIKELY PACKAGE. ONE MANAGEMENT TACTIC "BORDERING ON ILLEGAL" WAS HOLDING BENEFITS PRESENTATION TO SALARIED EMPLOYEES AND INVITING UNION MEMBERS TO ATTEND - THIS IS A SUBTLE WAY TO MAKE PROMISES.
Comments on Fine-Tuning:

G: COULD ADD: MANAGEMENT PROVIDES THE ADDRESS OF THE NLRB TO INTERESTED DPs; PROVIDES PETITION NLRB FORM; PROVIDES PETITION INFORMATION.

From discussion with G: SHOULD DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN IN-HOUSE AND OUTSIDE MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT/LAWYER - BOTH ARE OFTEN USED BUT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE MIGHT INDICATE STRONG EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO UNION AND ATTEMPT TO INITIATE AND PUSH DECERT, WHEREAS IN-HOUSE LIKE GOMPERT SIMPLY WAITS FOR "THE RIGHT CONDITIONS" TO EMERGE.

#4) Union and Employer Campaign Practices Open-Ended "Stages":

b. Do you think that decertification petitioners would provide truthful and accurate answers?
d. How would you ask the question?

G: TRUTHFUL YES, EXCEPT ON ILLEGAL PRACTICES.

W: MAYBE NOT ACCURATE: STAGES MAY BE CONSIDERABLY BLURRED - THINGS CAN HAPPEN VERY CASUALLY AND QUICKLY, ESPECIALLY IN SMALL UNITS. THUS, MAY NOT BE Able TO DIFFERENTIATE STAGES.

R: AS Q PRESENTLY SET UP DPs WILL FIT EXPERIENCES INTO CATEGORIES ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NOT REALLY REFLECT THEIR REALITY. SHOULD REPHRASE INTO:
- WHAT HAPPENED WHEN THE DECERTIFICATION WAS FIRST DISCUSSED?
- AT WHAT POINT DID A GROUP FORM...?
- AT WHAT POINT WAS DECISION MADE TO DECERTIFY?
- ONCE AN ELECTION DATE WAS SET WHAT DID YOU DO? WHAT DID THE UNION DO? WHAT DID THE EMPLOYER DO?
- WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THE DECERT. ELECTION WAS OVER?

c. Would you change the way I worded the question - how?

G: YES, MAYBE CHANGE WORDING: NLRB DOES NOT "GRANT" THE PETITION.

K: YES, WAY TOO THEORETICAL. JUST USE UNION NOT UNION/EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATION.

e. Does the description of the stages of the decertification campaign make sense to you?

R: STATES THAT MY STAGES ARE SIMILAR TO STAGES OF ORGANIZING AS HE HAS EXPERIENCED THEM.
S: STEPS OF PROCESS MAKE SENSE - S SEEMED TO LIKE THEM. TYPICALLY IN STEP 3 MANAGEMENT AIDS EMPLOYEES IN WRITING UP A PETITION: A PIECE OF PAPER WITH A STATEMENT THAT UNION NO LONGER WANTED IN UNIT BY EMPLOYEES. NEED 30% OF UNIT TO GO TO AN ELECTION. PETITIONER, OFTEN IN GROUP GOES TO REGIONAL NLRB/NLRB OFFICER VISITS AND OFFICIAL PETITION FILED. IF THERE IS ANY EVIDENCE OF A ULP'S AUTOMATICALLY FILES A ULP. THEN THERE IS A 30 DAY LIMIT ON AN NLRB CONDUCTED INVESTIGATION. IF NLRB FINDS EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ULP NLRB ISSUES A COMPLAINT AGAINST EMPLOYER. IF A COMPLAINT IS ISSUED ELECTION CAN BE HELD UP FOR MONTHS.

#5) NLRB ULP Records:

a. Would records of Unfair Labor Practice charges give an accurate indication of what actually went on during the campaign?

G: DON'T KNOW. HAS NEVER HAD A UNION FILE A ULP TO BUY TIME DURING DECERT.

ANY UNIT WHERE ULP'S ARE FILED AGAINST EMPLOYER BY UNION/EMPLOYEE ARE HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO BE FACING DECERT AS UNION IS ACTIVE. ANY UNIT WHERE ULP'S ARE FILED AGAINST UNION BY EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEES THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE OF A DECERT OCCURRING.

W: WILL GIVE YOU AN INDICATION THAT THERE HAS BEEN CONFLICT. MIGHT WANT BNA DATA ON STRIKES ALSO.

R: UNION FILED ULP'S NOT USEFUL STAT. IN LAST 10 YEARS, "SOME UNIONS ARE INTO LITIGATION, SOME ARE NOT. THIS REFLECTS A UNION'S TACTICAL BIAS."

K: ULP'S WILL INDICATE CLIMATE OF CAMPAIGN. UNION WILL OFTEN FILE ULP'S - THIS DELAYS DECERT AS NLRB MUST INVESTIGATE, ULP'S CAN "DRAG ON FOREVER".

b. Can you think of some way to strengthen this approach?

c. Are there certain Unfair Labor Practice charges that I should include/disregard?

R: MANAGEMENT FILED ULP'S MAY INDICATE SOMETHING BUT THEIR NUMBERS ARE VERY SMALL/TINY.

K: MANAGEMENT ULP'S VS UNION ARE VERY RARE. OFTEN 8 (A) 5 CHARGES ARE FILED. YOU COULD ASK ABOUT ULP'S DURING CASE INVESTIGATIONS. EMPLOYEE ULP'S AGAINST UNIONS MIGHT DISCLOSE DISSATISFACTION WITH UNION.

S: S ON ULP'S: S AND HIS UNION CLIENTS ONLY PURSUE ULP'S WHERE THERE IS A BELIEVE THAT THE EMPLOYER HAD INITIATED/LENT CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE IN STARTING, WRITING AND DISTRIBUTING THE PETITION. IF A SUPERVISOR IS FOUND TO HAVE HELPED WITH SIGNING UP OF PETITION THEN
THIS WILL TAINT ALL SIGNATURES AND WILL NEED TO SUBMIT A PETITION - THIS WILL GIVE THE UNION LOTS OF TIME TO GET ORGANIZED. THIS TYPE OF ULP IS AN 8(A) 1.2. (A \#2 ULP) WILL OFTEN ALSO INCLUDE A "5" (8(A) 1.5) FOR LACK OF BARGAINING IN GOOD FAITH.

UNION WILL NORMALLY FILE AN 8 (A) 1.5 BEFORE A DECERT PETITION IN FOLLOWING SCENARIO. NEW UNIT HAS TRIED TO GET A CONTRACT AND IS STILL WITHIN ITS FIRST YEAR FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. UNION WILL FILE A 5 TOWARDS END OF FIRST YEAR IF STILL NO CONTRACT (RD CANNOT BE FILED WITHIN FIRST YEAR AFTER CERTIFICATION). IN SOME (RARE) CASES A UNION MIGHT GO THROUGH YEAR WITHOUT CONTRACT, FACE A DECERT AND THEN FILE AND A 5 DURING DECERT.

IF AN EMPLOYER CAN GET A MAJORITY TO SIGN A PETITION AFTER 1 YR WITH NO CONTRACT THEN THE EMPLOYER CAN REFUSE TO BARGAIN. THE PETITION SIGNED BY AT LEAST 50+1 % OF THE UNIT PROVIDES "OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE" THAT THE UNION NO LONGER REPRESENTS A MAJORITY WITHIN THE UNIT. IF EMPLOYER FOLLOWS THIS STRATEGY UNION CAN EITHER FILE AN 8A5, OR 8A2 (IF BELIEVE EMPLOYER INITIATED ETC PETITION) OR UNION MIGHT JUST WALK (UNION HAS TO CAREFUL IN SUCH A SCENARIO TO ASCERTAIN THEIR VALIDITY OF THE PETITION, MAJORITY ETC. OR IT MIGHT FACE A DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION CHARGE FORM A UNION MEMBER.

#6) NLRB Election Records:

a. Would such records give an accurate indication of the labor-management climate prior to the decertification?

b. Can you think of some way to strengthen this approach?

c. Are there certain records that I should include/disregard?

R: DELAY IS A GOOD PREDICTOR OF MANAGEMENT OPPOSITION AS THE EMPLOYER IS THE ONE WHO DELAYS THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS.

K: DELAY DURING CERTIFICATION MAY OR MAY NOT PREDICT ANYTHING.

R: BOARD ORDERED VS CONSENT NOT IMPORTANT - ALL DECERTS ARE STIPS.***THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION***

R: PRIOR DEAUTH./DECERT PETITIONS MAY BE IMPORTANT BUT NOT SURE WHAT IT WOULD MEAN.

S: DEAUTHORIZATION IS ACTUALLY HARDER THAN DECERTIFICATION - NEED A MAJORITY OF THE UNIT (CF. THOSE WHO COME OUT TO VOTE, IN A DECERT), PLUS DEAUTH. ONLY LASTS ONE YEAR. DEAUTH. CAN ONLY OCCUR IN NON-RTW STATES.
#7) Petitioner Intentions and Campaigns:

a. Do you think that decertification petitioners would respond to such a question?
b. Do you think that decertification petitioners would provide truthful and accurate answers?

G: YES

i. Which of these practices would be least used?

G: THOUGHT EMPLOYEES MIGHT NOT SPY AND INTERROGATE BUT THEN CHANGED HIS MIND - EMPLOYEES MIGHT SPY, INTERROGATE AND DEFINITELY THREATEN OTHER EMPLOYEES.

#8) New/Additional Petitioner Characteristics:

Additional DP competencies/characteristics: none emerged. On basis of comments here and elsewhere, however, two additional areas should be looked at:

- Employer Commitment - VERY IMPORTANT (according to Gompert and Rosen) - could place in same section as union commitment.

- Leadership qualities - see Rosen question format suggestions.

This question elicited little useful response in terms of competencies and/or psychological characteristics.

- Instead got mixed bag of motivations. These responses will be reported in a section on DP motivations.

- Also R made some points about DPs typical backgrounds and employer relationship. These are reported in sections on DP-union/employer relationships, and DP background questions.

Only R made some directly useful points:

SUCCESS OF DECERTS: NATURAL LEADERS ON THE JOB - SHOULD ASK:

- HOW WOULD CO-WORKERS DESCRIBE YOU?
- WERE OTHERS APPROACHING YOU ABOUT THE DECERT, OR WERE YOU APPROACHING OTHERS. THESE CAPTURE LEADERSHIP QUALITIES
- WERE PEOPLE COMING TO YOU ANTI-UNION OR WERE THEY UNDECIDED?

K also made leadership point under #8) "manipulable".
#9) Evaluating Responses to Reed’s Organizer Competencies, and Characteristics:

<table>
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<th>Character Response</th>
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<td>Characteristic: Willingness to delegate.</td>
<td>W: YES</td>
<td>W: YES</td>
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<td></td>
<td>R: NO</td>
<td>R: NO</td>
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<td>K: YES</td>
<td>K: MAYBE NOT</td>
</tr>
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<td>G: YES</td>
<td>G: VERY, VERY IMPORTANT</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>R: NO</td>
<td>R: IF = LEADERSHIP, THEN IMPORTANT</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>K: YES</td>
<td>K: BAD MATCH</td>
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<td>Characteristic: Desire for control over events.</td>
<td>G: ?</td>
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<td>R: NO</td>
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<td>of the situation.</td>
<td>R: NO</td>
<td>R: NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>K: NOT REALLY</td>
<td>K: NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic: Ease with different social classes</td>
<td>G: ?</td>
<td>W: NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>R: NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>K: NO</td>
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Conclusions:

Significantly change this section - two issues:

i) practitioners belief that competencies and characteristics unlikely to predict much. Only leadership and strong self-image are considered important common attributes.

ii) match-up between competencies and characteristics was not found to be very convincing.

Global Statements:

G: EVERYTHING IN COMPETENCY COLUMN IS VALID*. THE MATCH UP BETWEEN CHARACTERISTICS AND COMPETENCIES IS NOT VERY ACCURATE.

R: ALL COMPETENCIES ARE IRRELEVANT AS THEY APPLY TO ORGANIZERS NOT DPS. DPS ROLE IS NOT // TO ORGANIZERS ROLE. DPS ROLE IS MORE // TO ORGANIZING COMMITTEE CHAIR AND MEMBERS ROLE IN ORGANIZING. CHARACTERISTICS ARE ALL MISMATCHES.

Specific Competencies and Characteristics:

Involvement:

W: BECAUSE DP IS SOMEONE WHO HAS TO BE LIKED AND RESPECTED BY OTHERS.

K: YES, NEED GROUP INVOLVEMENT. INVOLVE OTHER PEOPLE BEFORE THEY COME TO NLRB, OFTEN ARRIVE AS A GROUP. CHARACTERISTIC - MAYBE NOT, MAY BE MORE AN ISSUE OF SUPPORT.

Delegate:

G: NO, BECAUSE THE WILLINGNESS TO DELEGATE IS NOT RELEVANT IN SMALL GROUPS.
W: NO, BECAUSE DELEGATION IRRELEVANT IN MOST DECERTS AS ARE SMALL UNITS.

Persist:

W: AT MARGINAL LEVEL, YES - IN TERMS OF DP GETTING IN CONTACT WITH RIGHT AGENCIES, THIS CAN OFTEN BE DIFFICULT AND FRUSTRATING FOR DPS. DPS DON'T FACE TOO MANY SET-BACKS DURING THE ELECTION AS THEY ARE ALIGNED WITH THE EMPLOYER AND CAN'T LEGALLY BE TARGETED BY THE UNION, DECERT. IS FAIRLY SAFE FOR DP AND OFTEN FAIRLY QUICK. R corroborated this insight: IN DECERT YOU HAVE AN EMPLOYER/SUPERVISOR TO ASSIST YOU SO THE DECERT DOES NOT INVOLVE A LOT OF WORK FOR THE DP.
Self-Image:

G: STRONG SELF-IMAGE IS VERY IMPORTANT - He stressed this.

W: ABSOLUTELY, DP HAS TO THINK HE CAN DO BETTER ALONE THAN WITH THE UNION.

R: ONLY STRONG-SELF IMAGE (IF = LEADERSHIP) WOULD BE IMPORTANT. LEADERSHIP IS THE MOST IMPORTANT QUALITY A DP MUST POSSESS.

K: YES, NEED SOMEONE WHO HAS A STRONG SELF-IMAGE.

QUESTION: Does Rosenberg’s 10-item scale capture self-image?

Adapt & Abandon:

Enact:


Manipulable:

W: BECAUSE DP HAS TO BELIEVE HE CAN CONVINCE OTHERS.

R: THE ABILITY TO MANIPULATE OTHERS MAY BE RELEVANT.

K: DPs PROBABLY OUTSPOKEN TO OTHER PEOPLE AND MANIPULATE OTHERS TO SUPPORT THEM. “DPS ARE LEADERS IN THEIR OWN LITTLE WORLD.

Support and Empower:

W: DP HAS TO CONVINCE OTHER THAT “WE DON’T HAVE TO HAVE WHAT WE HAVE.” DP HAS TO GET OTHER RAF OFF THE STATUS QUO. DP HAS TO CONVINCE RAF THAT WE CAN EFFECT CHANGE.

K: YES TO COMPETENCY, BUT: CHARACTERISTIC - NOT A GOOD MATCH WITH COMPETENCY.

Control:

Interact & Social Cues/Classes:

W: NO, BECAUSE IT IS NOT NEEDED IN MOST DECERTS AS THEY ARE SMALL, HOMOGENOUS UNITS.

K: NOT REALLY, ONLY NEED TO INTERACT WITH OWN WORKERS, MAY HAVE TO INTERACT WITH SOME OTHER GROUPS TOO. MOST DECERTS ARE IN 50-100 MEMBER UNITS, SO THERE IS NOT A WIDE VARIETY OF PEOPLE.
#10 & #11) Union Commitment:

Practitioners responded strongly to these questions - all believed DPs would have low commitment to the union:

G: PREDICTS ALL THREE ASPECTS OF DEFINITION WOULD BE HIGHLY NEGATIVELY SCORED BY DPs. IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW THIS WOULD BE RELATED TO DECERTS, ALTHOUGH HE SEEMED TO AGREE IT WOULD CAPTURE PART OF THEIR MOTIVATION.

W: YES - FEELINGS OF LOW UNION COMMITMENT WILL BE UNIVERSAL ACROSS DPs.

R: THIS IS VERY USEFUL AND YOU SHOULD EXPAND IT: UNION EXPERIENCE IN PREVIOUS JOBS.

DPs MAY BE STRONG PRO-UNION LEADERS IN PAST WHO HAVE GOTTEN FRUSTRATED (NOT EVEN NECESSARILY WRONGED) DPs IN UNITS WHERE LITTLE UNION SUPPORT OR MANAGEMENT OPPOSITION WOULD BE OF THIS NATURE.

K: PEOPLE SUPPORTING DECERT WILL HAVE LOW COMMITMENT AS THEY DON'T THINK THE UNION IS EFFECTIVE.

#12) Petitioner’s Relationship to Union:

G: NOT SURE THAT ANY OF THESE WOULD HAVE A STRONG PREDICTABLE AFFECT ON DECERTS BECAUSE DPs BACKGROUNDS ARE VARIED - SOME HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ANTI-UNION OTHERS WERE ONCE PRO-UNION AND HAVE TURNED AGAINST IT.

W: YES, ABSOLUTELY. OFTEN DPs ARE PEOPLE WRONGED IN THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE. OFTEN DPs ARE PEOPLE WHO PREVIOUSLY HELD UNION POSITIONS.

R: THESE QUESTIONS ARE GOOD AND I WOULD BROADEN THEM TO UNION EXPERIENCE IN OTHER WORK-PLACES AND FAMILY-UNION BACKGROUND.

Also R argued that it would be very important to get data on DPs political background, religious affiliation etc.. Also think about comments on DPs motivations and how it relates to DP-union relationship.

#13 & #14) Macro and Micro Control Variables:

13a. Wage Change and Unemployment both capture the state of the economy. Do you think a declining or improving economy affects decertifications - how?

G: WAGES: YES - HOWEVER THE REASON THIS WOULD AFFECT DECERTS IS THAT DPs MAKE COMPARISONS TO COMPARABLE NON-UNION UNITS.
UNEMPLOYMENT: YES - HOWEVER THIS EFFECT (AS THE ABOVE EFFECT IS)
WOULD BE MEDIATED BY RAF FAITH IN/TRUST OF MANAGEMENT. HIGH
UNEMPLOYMENT MIGHT DETER DECERTS IF MANAGEMENT IS NOT TRUSTED AS
SCARED THAT THEY MIGHT ENACT CUTS THEY WOULD NOT INITIATE UNDER
UNION PROTECTION. IF RAF TRUST MANAGEMENT THEN IT WOULD NOT HAVE AN
EFFECT.

W: YES - IF UNION PROMISES SECURITY AND WAGES AND THERE ARE MASS-
LAYOFFS OR WAGE DECLINES THEN UNION LOSES ITS LEGITIMACY.

R: YES TO SOME DEGREE, R AGREED WITH MY PRESENTATION OF MANAGEMENT
LAWYER'S VIEW OF EFFECT (DPR: TRUST IN MANAGEMENT VS FRUSTRATION WITH
UNION). "CHOICE BETWEEN DEVIL THEY KNOW AND DON'T KNOW IS LESS TAKEN
DURING BAD TIMES."

K: HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT - PEOPLE ARE MORE INSECURE ABOUT THEIR JOBS AND
THEY MIGHT OPT TO "GO IT ALONE." PEOPLE ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE WAY
THEY ARE BEING REPRESENTED - GRIEVANCES, SHEER NEGLECT, OR POOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OUTCOMES. OR IT MAY NE EMPLOYER'S
ENCOURAGEMENT, PROMISE OF BENEFITS, SPONSORSHIP.

S: UNIT'S WAGE CHANGE VIZ AVERAGE INDUSTRY WAGE CHANGE WOULD BE
VERY IMPORTANT. UNEMPLOYMENT WOULD NOT REALLY HAVE AN EFFECT.

13b. Right-to-work states tend to be more anti-union and employers and employees tend
to be more resistant to unions in these states. Do you think the right-to-work status of a
state affects decertifications - how?

G: GAVE A TENTATIVE NO. BUT THEN SAID THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD AFFECT
DECERTS AS RIGHT-TO-WORK STATE EMPLOYEES TEND TO GENERATE A CULTURE
THAT IS LESS PRO-UNION; LESS WILLINGNESS TO JOIN, LOWER TRUST OF UNION
ETC.

W: DON'T KNOW HAS NEVER WORKED IN A RTW STATE.

R: MAYBE - THOSE WHO DON'T LIKE DUES CAN OPT OUT WITHOUT DECERTIFYING
IN RTW STATES. HOWEVER R DOES NOT HAVE DIRECT EXPERIENCE WITH RTW
STATES.

S: OHIO IS NON RTW STATE; INCENTIVE FOR PEOPLE WHO DON'T WANT TO PAY
DUES TO DECERTIFY. IN RTW STATES PEOPLE DON'T HAVE TO PAY DUES SO LESS
INCENTIVE TO DECERTIFY. ALSO, IN RTW STATES UNIONS HAVE TO WORK
HARDER TO KEEP THEIR DUES PAYING MEMBERS SO SERVICE MAY BE BETTER.
HOWEVER (I POINTED OUT) RTW STATES TEND TO BE LESS PRO-UNION - *** S
AGREED AND SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY INTERESTING QUESTION. ***

S (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): BECK CASE - IN NON-RTW STATES MEMBERS
ONLY HAVE TO PAY REPRESENTATIONAL PROPORTION OF DUES - THIS RULING
WAS VERY DISTURBING TO UNIONS.
14d. The difficulty in getting a first contract affects decertification - This was seen as central to initiation of decertification:

G: YES, IF NO FIRST CONTRACT HAS BEEN SIGNED CAN CIRCULATE A PETITION FOR A NO FAITH IN THE UNION (NEED 50% +1) THEN EMPLOYER CAN LEGITIMATELY CLAIM UNION DOES NOT REPRESENT EMPLOYEES. IN SUCH CASES THE UNION WILL OFTEN JUST WALK AWAY (I.E. PETITION FILED BUT NO ELECTION HELD BUT UNION DECERTIFIES). UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCE MANAGEMENT SHOWS UNION PETITION AND TELLS IT TO GO TO THE NLRB.

W: YES

R: THIS IS A MAJOR QUESTION - IF FIRST CONTRACT NEVER SIGNED THE ORGANIZING EFFORT IS A FAILURE, IF NO FIRST CONTRACT SIGNED THEN A DECERT WILL OCCUR.

S: DEFINITELY, IF NO CONTRACT AFTER FIRST YEAR EITHER A DECERT OR EMPLOYER WITHDRAWING RECOGNITION WILL OCCUR. THE DELAY IN GETTING A CONTRACT IS ALSO A FACTOR.

Additional Points:

DP Motivations/Intentions:

R (from #5): CERT./DECERT. PROCESS IS A LEGAL PROCESS BUT NOT THE SUBSTANTIVE PROCESS. R - DECERT. IS A SITUATION WHERE THE MAJORITY OF EMPLOYEES FEEL THERE ISN'T A UNION.

G (FROM RESPONSE TO #6): OF 20 DECERTS ONLY HAD 1 WHERE EMPLOYEE CHANGED THEIR MIND AND STICK WITH UNION.

W (FROM RESPONSE TO #8): USUALLY YOUR SMART GUYS - UPPER QUARTILE OF BARGAINING UNIT IN INTELLIGENCE.

TYPICALLY THEY ARE WORKING FROM A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS - DUES VS BENEFITS; OR ARE PISSED OFF AT THE BUSINESS AGENT.

K (FROM RESPONSE TO #8): DPs ARE "AVERAGE PEOPLE OFF THE STREET WHO EXPRESS SOME DISSATISFACTION ABOUT THEIR PRESENT SITUATION." VERY TYPICALLY FACTORY EMPLOYEES WITHOUT MUCH EDUCATION WHO NEED HELP IN DRAFTING A PETITION. NLRB OFTEN WRITES PETITION FOR THEM.

G (FROM RESPONSE TO #9): FUNDAMENTALLY DPs ARE BASICALLY DISSATISFIED WITH THE UNION. SPECIFICALLY EITHER/OR SERVICE (ROUGHLY MEANING POOR HANDLING OF GRIEVANCE(S), DUES MONEY, AND CONTRACT (WAGES AND BENEFITS NOT HIGH ENOUGH) - AT VARIOUS POINTS G TALKED ABOUT RAF MAKING COMPARISONS TO COMPARABLE NON-UNION RAF AND IN RELATION TO DUES, SO HIGHLY INSTRUMENTAL CALCULATIONS).
R (FROM RESPONSE TO #9): ALL OF REED'S COMPETENCIES ARE IRRELEVANT AS THEY APPLY TO ORGANIZERS NOT DPs. DPs ROLE IS NOT // TO ORGANIZERS ROLE. DPs ROLE IS MORE // TO ORGANIZING COMMITTEE CHAIR AND MEMBERS ROLE IN ORGANIZING. ALL OF REED'S CHARACTERISTICS ARE ALL MISMATCHES, PLUS IN DECERT. YOU HAVE AN EMPLOYER/SUPERVISOR TO ASSIST YOU SO THE DECERT DOES NOT INVOLVE A LOT OF WORK FOR THE DP.

R (FROM RESPONSE TO #10 & #11): DPs MAY BE STRONG PRO-UNION LEADERS IN PAST WHO HAVE GOTTEN FRUSTRATED (NOT EVEN NECESSARILY WRONGED) DPs IN UNITS WHERE LITTLE UNION SUPPORT OR MANAGEMENT OPPOSITION WOULD BE OF THIS NATURE.

K (FROM RESPONSE TO #10 & #11): PEOPLE SUPPORTING DECERT, WILL HAVE LOW UNION COMMITMENT AS THEY DON'T THINK THE UNION IS EFFECTIVE.

G (FROM RESPONSE TO #12): NOT SURE THAT ANY OF THESE (Dps RELATION TO UNION) WOULD HAVE A STRONG PREDICTABLE AFFECT ON DECERTS BECAUSE DPs BACKGROUNDS ARE VARIED - SOME HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ANTI-UNION OTHERS WERE ONCE PRO-UNION AND HAVE TURNED AGAINST IT.

W (FROM RESPONSE TO #12): OFTEN DPs ARE PEOPLE WRONGED IN THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE. OFTEN DPs ARE PEOPLE WHO PREVIOUSLY HELD UNION POSITIONS.

W (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): IN NLRB THE AUTOMATIC REACTION TO RD PETITIONS WAS THAT IT WAS ALWAYS EMPLOYER SPONSORED. ON FURTHER DISCUSSION W REVEALED THAT NLRB FOLKS SAW ANY EMPLOYER HELP AS SIGN OF EMPLOYER SPONSORSHIP.

HOWEVER W WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT IN MANY OF THESE CASES DP IS DISSATISFIED RAF WHO WANTS TO GET RID OF UNION BUT DOES NOT KNOW HOW. DP DOES NOT EVEN KNOW WHO TO CALL. SO GOES AND TALKS TO EMPLOYER. EMPLOYER IS THEN PUT IN THE LEGAL QUANDARY OF WHAT TO DO IN THIS SITUATION. W AND COLLEAGUE IN CHICAGO DEVELOPED A METHOD OF GIVING ASSISTANCE WITHOUT TRANSGRESSING (OR BEING FOUND TO TRANSGRESS) THE NLRB INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW: EMPLOYER CONTACTS MANAGEMENT LAWYER AND TELLS HIM THAT HE HAS EMPLOYEE INTERESTED IN DECERT. LAWYER SENDS LETTER WITH DETAILS TO EMPLOYER AND TELLS EMPLOYER TO GIVE TO EMPLOYEE. THE LETTER EXPLAINS THE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF DECERT AND SAYS IT IS UP TO EMPLOYEE TO PURSUE DECERT IF THAT IS HIS DESIRE.

DECERTS GENERALLY DON'T OCCUR IN LARGER UNITS (TYPICALLY IN UNITS OF 20 EE'S, UNLIKELY TO BE 200 OR ABOVE), OR IN UNITS WHERE EMPLOYER IS PART OF MULTI-EMPLOYER UNION HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND - EMPLOYER COULD NOT AFFORD TO PAY EQUIVALENT BENEFITS WITHOUT BEING A PART OF SUCH A FUND. SO EMPLOYER CANNOT HAVE HIMSELF DECERTIFIED.

SMALL UNITS ARE TYPICALLY TOO EXPENSIVE TO SERVICE - SMALL AND LOW-WAGE.
S (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): DPs ARE INDIVIDUALS WHO EITHER:

I) ARE STIMULATED BY MANAGEMENT.
II) ARE GENUINELY UNHAPPY WITH THE UNION.

DECEIT, IS OFTEN "PEOPLE CRYING FOR ATTENTION" WHO OFTEN DON'T REALLY WANT TO LOSE THE UNION. DP OFTEN THINKS HE/SHE IS NOT GETTING ANYTHING FOR DUES, OR, EMPLOYER IS GETTING RID OF UNION AND "PETITIONER IS THEIR TOOL" - SOMEONE WHO CAN BE TRUSTED. DECERTS CAN HAPPEN IN LARGE UNITS WHEN RAF DISSATISFIED WITH CONTRACT - DECERTIFICATION OF LARGER UNITS HAS MUCH TO DO WITH THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF REAGAN-BUSH YEARS.

Leadership: See also specific item responses from #9 contain indicators of importance of leadership.

R (FROM RESPONSE TO #8): SUCCESS OF DECERTS: NATURAL LEADERS ON THE JOB.

K (FROM RESPONSE TO #8): DPs "DON'T IMPRESS ME AS LEADERSHIP TYPES, THEY ARE GENERALLY TICKED OFF ABOUT THE UNION IN SOME WAY."

K (FROM RESPONSE TO #9): "DPS ARE LEADERS IN THEIR OWN LITTLE WORLD."

R (FROM RESPONSE TO #9): ONLY STRONG-SELF IMAGE (IF = LEADERSHIP) WOULD BE IMPORTANT. THE ABILITY TO MANIPULATE OTHERS MAY BE RELEVANT. LEADERSHIP IS THE MOST IMPORTANT QUALITY A DP MUST POSsess.

Need for Additional DP demographic data:

R (FROM #3): NEED ITEMS ON UNION COMMITMENT AND SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS. NEED DEMOGRAPHIC DATA (OCCUPATION, INCOME, RACE, AGE ETC.)

R (FROM #8): 'THREE THINGS DIFFERENTIATE DPs:

I) SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH BOSS - YOU JUST KNOW.
II) USED TO WORK IN SAME INDUSTRY/FIRM IN NON-UNION SETTING.
III) NON-UNION BACKGROUND.

R (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO GET DATA ON DPs BACKGROUND - POLITICAL BACKGROUND, RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION ETC.

Dependent variable of election vs not election may not be significant:

R (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): ON UNIONS WALKING VS GOING TO ELECTIONS - SOMETIMES THESE DECISIONS ARE CONSCIOUS STRATEGY, SOMETIMES THEY ARE SIMPLY NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF A SMALL LOCAL WHERE UNION LEADERS DON'T KNOW YOU CAN WALK. CONSEQUENTLY, NOT SURE YOU CAN DRAW
CONCLUSIONS FROM DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN A DRIVE GETTING TO AN ELECTION OR NOT - MAY HAVE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO DO WITH THE DP'S ACTIONS, MOTIVATIONS ETC. MORE USEFUL IS IMPLY SUCCESSFUL VS UNSUCCESSFUL ELECTION - THIS THE RELEVANT VARIABLE.

G (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): PETITION FORM ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED BY A LIST OF SIGNATURES BELOW A STATEMENT OF INTENT TO DECERTIFY (NOT SHOWN TO UNION). IF THERE IS A LARGE MAJORITY, AND THE UNION CALLS NLRB AND ASKS HOW THINGS STAND AND NLRB GIVES OUT ROUGH FIGURES, THEN UNION WILL TYPICALLY JUST WALK AWAY FROM A UNIT (SO PETITION, NO ELECTION, BUT DECERTIFICATION). ***COULD USE AS MEASURE IF NLRB GIVES OUT SUCH DATA***.

Employer Commitment

VERY IMPORTANT:

G (FROM #3): MANAGEMENT OFTEN WORKS WITH A SMALL GROUP OF EMPLOYEES.

R (FROM #3): IN DECERTS MANAGEMENT NOT SUPPOSED TO BE INVOLVED SO MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IS DISGUISED. DPs ARE COACHED TO SAY MANAGEMENT DID NOTHING.

R (FROM #8): "DP abilities":

I) SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH BOSS - YOU JUST KNOW.
II) SOMEONE WHO USED TO WORK IN SAME INDUSTRY/FIRM IN NON-UNION SETTING.
III) NON-UNION BACKGROUND.

S (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): EMOTIONAL CLOSENESS (of DP) TO EMPLOYER IS A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR.

G (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"): G stressed importance of "FAITH IN EMPLOYER", SPECIFICALLY IMMEDIATE/PLANT/"LOCAL" MANAGEMENT, SPECIFICALLY FAITH IN DAY-TO-DAY TREATMENT, AND IN BASIC WAGES AND BENEFITS.
Interpretation of G’s comments: Decision to pursue decertification is based on an evaluation of, and balancing of dissatisfaction with the union on the one hand, and the degree of trust of management in a post-union environment:

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Dissatisfaction with union service (roughly grievance and daily equity issues) and/or wage and benefit comparisons

Decertification Decision

Trust of immediate management with regard to post-union procedural equity and/or wage and benefit equity comparisons.

External Environment
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**Solicitation Script:**

K ON SOLICITATION SCRIPT (FROM "ADDITIONAL POINTS"):  
- SEEMED TO PREFER WRITTEN TO VERBAL SOLICITATION:  
- PLEASE REWORD VERBAL SOLICITATION: 
- SENSITIZE "WE GOT YOUR NAME FROM THE NLRB". (PARA. 3)  
- TAKE OUT "INTERVIEW THE VARIOUS NLRB..." AND "SPEAKING TO THE NLRB...". (PARA. 6)  
- HELPS SOMETIMES TO GIVE YOUR NAME AND A PHONE NUMBER AT OSU.  
- THANK DP S POLITELY AT END OF VERBAL SOLICITATION.
APPENDIX C
Solicitation Letter, Consent Form, and Questionnaire

Dear Petitioner Name,

I am a researcher at the Ohio State University. I am contacting you to ask you to participate in a study of union decertification. This study seeks to understand union decertification from the employee's point of view. You have been selected as part of a scientifically designed sample to participate in this study.

Please fill out the enclosed questionnaire which asks a number of questions related to the union decertification you experienced. The questionnaire takes 30-45 minutes to complete. There are no right or wrong answers, please just answer as completely and accurately as possible. If there are any questions you do not wish to answer simply skip them. Of course the more questions you answer the more helpful your response will be. I appreciate any information you are able to give.

*It is very important to understand that the information you give is completely confidential. No one, not the union, the employer, nor the National Labor Relations Board has any access to the information you provide. You may notice that there is a number on the return envelope. This number is required for mailing purposes only and does not affect the confidentiality of your response.*

*Once you have completed the questionnaire, please put it in the enclosed return envelope. Also, please sign both copies of the enclosed "consent form". This form, ensures that you understand the purpose of the study and that I keep your response confidential, as promised. You may keep one copy of the consent form for your own records. Please put the other copy in the return envelope with the questionnaire. The return envelope is pre-addressed and the postage is pre-paid.*

*Please respond within a week of receiving this letter. Your assistance is greatly appreciated as your response is the only way to get an understanding of decertification from the employee's point of view. If you have any questions about the questionnaire or the study please do not hesitate to write me at the above address, or call me at either of the following numbers: (614) 292-8669 (O) (614) 447-1373 (H).*

In thanks, sincerely,

Frank Borgers

P.S. If you wish to receive a summary of the research findings (which should be ready in about six months), please "X" the box on the last page of the questionnaire and indicate your mailing address.
The Ohio State University

Protocol No.:_______

CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH

I consent to participating in the research entitled:

"Union Decertification Petitioners and
the Union Decertification Process"

Frank Borgers has explained the purpose of the research, the procedures to be followed, and the expected duration of my participation.

I acknowledge that I have been given the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction. Further, I understand that I am free to withdraw consent at any time and to discontinue participation in the study without prejudice to me.

Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form. I sign it freely and voluntarily. A copy has been given to me.

Signed:______________________  Date:_______
(participant)

Signed:______________________
1) Reasons for Decertification: Here are reasons employees often give for trying to decertify a union. Please indicate with a "✓" which of these were reasons you tried to decertify your union. Also, for each one that was a reason for decertification please indicate what the more specific problems were.

Employees’ grievances were handled badly by the union:

Not a reason:  
Was a reason:  
Please indicate more specific problems with grievance handling:

The union did not properly examine individual grievances:  
The union sided with management in evaluating grievances:  
The union did not file the required paper-work:  
The union missed deadlines:  
The union did not represent employees effectively during grievance arbitration hearings:  
The union only pursued grievances filed by "favorite" union members:  
Other problems:  

The union dues were too high:

Not a reason:  
Was a reason:  

The union contract was unsatisfactory:

Not a reason:  
Was a reason:  
Please indicate more specific problems with the contract:

The wages were too low:  
The benefits were not adequate:  
The union was unable to get a first contract:  
The union was unable to get a contract:  
Other unsatisfactory contract terms:  

There was too much conflict between the union and management:

Not a reason:  
Was a reason:  
Please indicate more specific types of conflict:

The union filed too many grievances:  
The union called too many strikes:  
Other conflicts:  

There were problems with the business agent/union representative:

Not a reason:
Was a reason: Please indicate more specific problems with the business agent/union representative:

He/she was not liked:
He/she did not do his/her job:
Other problems:

There were problems with the administration of the union:

Not a reason:
Was a reason: Please indicate more specific problems with the administration of the union:

The union ignored the interests of the employees:
The union imposed its will on the employees:
The union was not democratic:
Other problems:

Please list any other reasons why you tried to decertify:

2) What was the most important general reason for trying to decertify your union?

Employees’ grievances were handled badly by the union:
The union dues were too high:
The union contract was unsatisfactory:
There was too much conflict between the union and management:
There were problems with the business agent/union representative:
There were problems with the administration of the union:
Other:
Don’t recall:

3) Did you withdraw your petition?

No:
Yes: Why did you withdraw your petition?

The union promised to correct the problems that led to the decertification:
The union corrected the problems that led to the decertification:
Union supporters threatened you:
Union representatives threatened you:
Other reasons:
4) The reasons for decertification imply the union failed. Do you feel that the union could have avoided failing in the ways you indicated:

No: ___  
Yes: ___

Please explain your answer: _____________________________

____________________________________________________

5) Here are activities that the union, management, and employees often do during a decertification campaign. Please circle all those people who did the following activities during the decertification campaign.

union did: U  management did: M  you did: Y  another employee did: E  
no one did: N  don’t recall: DR

a) Gave out pamphlets, leaflets, letters etc. to convince employees to either support or oppose the union:
   U M Y E N DR

b) Organized meetings of employees to discuss the decertification:  
   U M Y E N DR

c) Talked to employees one-on-one to convince them to either support or oppose the union:
   U M Y E N DR

d) Watched employees to see whether they did things to either support or oppose the union:
   U M Y E N DR

e) Questioned employees to find out whether they supported or opposed the union:
   U M Y E N DR

f) Physically or verbally threatened employees to convince them to support or oppose the union:
   U M Y E N DR

Please list any other activities that were done during the decertification campaign:

Union did: _____________________________

Management did: _____________________________

You did: _____________________________

Another employee did: _____________________________
6) Here are campaign promises and statements that the union and management often make during a decertification campaign. Please "V" those promises and statements that the union, and management made during the decertification campaign.

Union Promised:

a) To represent employees better during grievances:

b) To negotiate a better contract:

c) To replace the business agent:

d) Other: 

e) No promises were made:

Union Stated:

a) That decertification would allow management to get rid of employees' health benefits:

b) That decertification would allow management to lower employees' wages:

c) That decertification would allow management to ignore employees' complaints:

d) That decertification would allow management to fire employees at will:

e) Other: 

f) No statements were made:

Management Promised:

a) To maintain employees' health benefits if the union was decertified:

b) To maintain employees' wages if the union was decertified:

c) To deal fairly with employees' complaints if the union was decertified:

d) Other: 

e) No promises were made:

Management Stated:

a) That it might have to close the work-place if the union was not decertified:

b) That it might replace strikers in future strikes:

c) That employees would be better off if they decertified as they would no longer have to pay union dues:

d) Other: 

e) No statements were made:

7) Decertifications involve a number of steps. These steps can be taken by different people. Please circle who was most important in taking the following steps during the decertification campaign:

   you: Y your Attorney: A another employee: E management: M don't recall: DR

a) Starting discussions about decertification: 

b) Finding the address of the National Labor Relations Board:

c) Contacting the National Labor Relations Board:

d) Setting up a meeting to discuss the decertification with other employees:

e) Writing the petition:

f) Circulating the petition among the employees:

g) Mailing/bringing the petition to the National Labor Relations Board:
8a) When employees first started talking about decertification did you approach other employees to talk about decertification?

No: ___
Yes: ___
Don’t recall: ___

8b) When employees first started talking about decertification did other employees approach you to talk about decertification?

No: ___
Yes: ___
Don’t recall: ___

9) Why did you become the one who signed the decertification petition?

Because other employees suggested it: ___
Because you suggested it: ___
Because management suggested it: ___
Other: __________________________________________

10) Did other employees help you with the decertification campaign?

No: ___
Yes: ___ About how many employees helped you?: ___

11) Did management offer to help with the decertification campaign?

No: ___
Yes: ___ Generally, when management offered help, did you first have to ask them to help you?

No: ___
Yes: ___
Other: __________________________________________

12) Did management use a management consultant/lawyer during the decertification campaign?

No: ___
Yes: ___
Don’t know: ___
13) Attitudes: Below are a number of statements. The statements are about how you felt about the union and the company at the time of the decertification campaign. Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by circling the answer that comes closest to how you felt at the time of the decertification campaign.

strongly agree: SA  agree: A neither agree nor disagree: N disagree: D strongly disagree: SD

a) I felt a sense of pride being a part of the union: SA A N D SD
b) I felt little loyalty toward the union: SA A N D SD
c) I had little confidence and trust in most members of the local: SA A N D SD
d) Members of the local were not expected to have a strong personal commitment to the union: SA A N D SD
e) The record of the union was a good example of what dedicated people can get done: SA A N D SD
f) I talked up the union to my friends as a great organization to be a member of: SA A N D SD
g) I rarely told others that I was a member of the union: SA A N D SD

h) There was a lot to be gained by being a member of the union: SA A N D SD
i) As long as I was doing the kind of work I enjoyed, it did not matter if I belonged in the union: SA A N D SD
j) I could just as well have worked in a non-union company as long as the type of work was similar: SA A N D SD
k) My loyalty was to my work, not the union: SA A N D SD

l) I was willing to put in a good deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help the company be successful: SA A N D SD
m) I talked up the company to my friends as a great company to work for: SA A N D SD
n) I would have accepted almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for the company: SA A N D SD
o) I found that my values and the company’s values were very similar: SA A N D SD

p) I was proud to tell others that I was part of the company: SA A N D SD
q) The company really inspired the very best in me in the way of job performance: SA A N D SD
r) I am extremely glad that I chose the company to work for over others I was considering at the time I was hired: SA A N D SD
s) I really cared about the fate of the company: SA A N D SD

t) For me, this was the best of all possible companies for which to work: SA A N D SD
Union Activities:

14) Were you an employee at the workplace when the certification election was held (the original election to see if the union should represent the employees)?

   No:  
   Yes:  How did you vote in the certification election?
       For the union:
       Against the union:
       Did not vote:
       Don’t recall:

15) Were you ever a dues paying union member?

   No:  
   Yes:  Were you required by the contract to become a dues paying union member?
   No:  
   Yes:  
   Don’t know:

16) Did you attend union meetings?

   Never:  Rarely:  Sometimes:  Usually:  

17) Did you participate in votes to accept/reject the contract?

   Never:  Rarely:  Sometimes:  Usually:  
   No votes were ever held:

18) Did you participate in votes to elect people to union positions?

   Never:  Rarely:  Sometimes:  Usually:  
   No votes were ever held:

19) Did you file grievances through your union?

   Never:  Once:  A few times:  Many times:
20) Did you ever run for an elected position in the union?

No:____
Yes:____ Did you win the election?

No:____
Yes:____

21) Did you ever hold a position in the union?

No:____
Yes:____ Please indicate (by circling your answer) the position(s) you held, and whether they were won through an election, or appointed by the union:

- Union President: E A
- Union Vice President: E A
- Union Treasurer: E A
- Union steward: E A

Other:________________

Background Information: Many of the following questions are standard background questions. If there are any questions you do not wish to answer simply skip them.

22) When did you start working at the work-place where the decertification campaign occurred?

Month/Year:_________/_________
Don't recall:____

23) Had you ever worked in a unionized work-place before being hired at this work-place?

No:____
Yes:____

24) Has anyone in your immediate family (grandparents, parents, brothers, sisters) ever worked in a unionized work-place?

No:____
Yes:____
Don't know:____

25) In what year were you born?

Year:______
26) What is your gender?

Male: ___  Female: ___

27) What is your present marital status?

Single: ___  Married: ___
Other: ________________

28) What is your ethnic background?

Other: ____________________

29) Are you a high school graduate/G.E.D.?

No: ___
Yes: ___ a) How many years of formal education have you had beyond high school?

Years: ___

b) What was the highest level of education you attained?

Technical/vocational diploma: ___
Associates degree: ___
Bachelor's degree: ___
Other: ____________________

30) What is your personal income before taxes?

Less than $15,000: ___
$15,001 - $30,000: ___
$30,001 - $45,000: ___
$45,001 - $60,000: ___
$60,001 or more: ___

31) What is your political affiliation:

None: ___
Democrat: ___
Republican: ___
Independent: ___
Other: ________________
32) How did you vote in the last three presidential elections?:

Democrat: D  Republican: R  Independent: I  Other: O  Did not vote: DV  Don’t recall: DR

1984: D R I O DV DR
1988: D R I O DV DR
1992: D R I O DV DR

33) How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by circling the answer that comes closest to how you feel.

strongly agree: SA  agree: A  neither agree nor disagree: N  disagree: D  strongly disagree: SD

a) On the whole I am satisfied with myself:  

b) At times I think I am no good at all:

c) I feel that I have a number of good qualities:

d) I am able to do things as well as most other people:

e) I feel I do not have much to be proud of:

f) I certainly feel useless at times:

g) I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others:

h) I wish I could have more respect for myself:

i) All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure:

j) I take a positive attitude toward myself:

34) Would you like a summary of the research findings?

No:   

Yes:   Please mail the summary to:

Please add any comments you have about this questionnaire and/or study:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME
APPENDIX D
Correlation of Independent Variables with the Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations:</th>
<th>Petitioner Mean Self-Esteem</th>
<th>Petitioner Held Union Position</th>
<th>Petitioner Initiation of Structure</th>
<th>Petitioner Behavioral Activism</th>
<th>Petitioner Mean Union Commitment</th>
<th>Petitioner Organizational Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Anti-Union Votes</td>
<td>.0003</td>
<td>.0094</td>
<td>.3161</td>
<td>-.2552</td>
<td>.1174</td>
<td>-.2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .499</td>
<td>P= .469</td>
<td>P= .004</td>
<td>P= .016</td>
<td>P= .165</td>
<td>P= .045</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations:</th>
<th>Management Behavioral Activism</th>
<th>Management Highly Verbal Activism</th>
<th>Management Extreme Activism</th>
<th>Management Threats</th>
<th>Management Structure</th>
<th>Management Illegal Activism</th>
<th>Management Illegal Initiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Anti-Union Votes</td>
<td>-.1389</td>
<td>-.0418</td>
<td>-.1735</td>
<td>-.2372</td>
<td>.0129</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .124</td>
<td>P= .365</td>
<td>P= .074</td>
<td>P= .023</td>
<td>P= .458</td>
<td></td>
<td>P= .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations:</th>
<th>Multiple Signed Employees</th>
<th>Other Employees</th>
<th>Other Employees</th>
<th>How Many Employees</th>
<th>Other Behavioral Activism</th>
<th>How Many Employees</th>
<th>Other Behavioral Activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Anti-Union Votes</td>
<td>-.0952</td>
<td>-.0469</td>
<td>-.1976</td>
<td>-.2834</td>
<td>.2650</td>
<td>-.4154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .215</td>
<td>P= .349</td>
<td>P= .049</td>
<td>P= .008</td>
<td>P= .013</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations:</th>
<th>Union Highly Activism</th>
<th>Union Verbal Activism</th>
<th>Union Threats</th>
<th>Election Delay</th>
<th>Eligible Employees</th>
<th>Number of Teamsters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Anti-Union Votes</td>
<td>-.4053</td>
<td>-.3129</td>
<td>-.2226</td>
<td>-.1233</td>
<td>-.3096</td>
<td>.1459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P= .000</td>
<td>P= .004</td>
<td>P= .031</td>
<td>P= .153</td>
<td>P= .001</td>
<td>P= .122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P= 1-tailed significance of correlation.
"." is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed.
Correlations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Anti-</th>
<th>Petitioner Tenure</th>
<th>Petitioner Union Work Experience</th>
<th>Petitioner Family Union Experience</th>
<th>Petitioner Age</th>
<th>Petitioner Gender</th>
<th>Petitioner Marital Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Votes</td>
<td>P = .230</td>
<td>P = .151</td>
<td>P = .010</td>
<td>P = .092</td>
<td>P = .322</td>
<td>P = .126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.0892</td>
<td>.1240</td>
<td>.2758</td>
<td>-.1593</td>
<td>-.0557</td>
<td>.1375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Anti-</th>
<th>Petitioner Ethnic Origin</th>
<th>Petitioner High School Graduate</th>
<th>Petitioner Post School Education</th>
<th>Petitioner Highest Edn. Level</th>
<th>Petitioner Income</th>
<th>Petitioner Political Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Votes</td>
<td>P = .115</td>
<td>P = .088</td>
<td>P = .034</td>
<td>P = .011</td>
<td>P = .037</td>
<td>P = .470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.1443</td>
<td>-.1626</td>
<td>.2171</td>
<td>.2708</td>
<td>-.2139</td>
<td>.0091</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P = 1-tailed significance of correlation.
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed.
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