Putnam's Two-Level Game:  
Case Studies of Serbian and Russian Reactions to the  
Kosovar and Chechen Independence Movements  

THESIS  

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Abstract

This paper uses Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory of International Relations to explain the differing outcomes of the secessionist movements in Serbia and Russia. The paper begins by exploring the theoretical approaches, advantages, and disadvantages of the two-level game in international relations literature. The paper then addresses two case studies-- Russia and Serbia-- and their reactions to the secessionist movements within their individual territories. Following the case studies, a further explanation of the two-level game played in the case studies is explored. Through the lens of the two-level game, it is argued that international relative balance of power played the major role in determining the ultimate result-- Russia retained Chechnya while Serbia essentially lost Kosovo.
Dedication

This document is dedicated to my family.
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Introduction

Domestic politics can have a direct effect on international politics and vice versa. It is important for policy makers to achieve domestic policy goals while maintaining international bargaining power. On the other hand, international negotiations must also keep in line with domestic constraints. These premises are integral to Putnam's Two-Level Game theory of international relations. The secessionist movements in Kosovo and Chechnya are great examples of why it is necessary for states to play the political game at two different boards.

The independence movements in Kosovo and Chechnya had very different outcomes. In this paper, I will argue that Serbia was unsuccessful at the two-level game because Kosovo was able to use international support to negate Serbia's bargaining power. On the other hand, Russia was able to maintain its political goals both on the domestic and international levels due to its political influence.
Two-Level Game Theory:

Putnam's Two-Level Game theory is an argument against international relations literature which mainly focuses on purely domestic or international analyses. He argues that theories based on domestic causes and international effects (“Second Image”) or international causes and domestic effects (“Second Image Reversed”) are inadequate in fully representing international relations (Putnam, 427-460). To better illustrate the constraints and goals of policy makers at both domestic and international levels, Putnam develops the Two-Level Game approach. He asserts that, “at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam 434).

Two Levels

Putnam's theory involves two levels of interaction among players. It is important to note that the two-level game is incredibly complex; moves that are rational for a player at one stage may be injudicious for that same player at the other stage (Putnam 434). To simplify the game, it is broken down into two levels—international and domestic. At Level I, the international level, bargaining between negotiators leads to a tentative
agreement. At this level of negotiations, the 'chief negotiator' is the main negotiating force. The 'chief negotiator' can be an individual, multiple persons, or single/multiple organizations depending on the situation.

Level II, the domestic audience, is the separate discussions by supporters of the 'chief negotiator' about whether to ratify the agreement. Level II can be characterized as a parliament, ratification vote, or any number of other instances requiring acceptance of the Level I agreement.

The agreement constructed at Level I must be voted up or down by the constituents at Level II. Crucially, the important interrelationship between the two levels is that any Level I agreement must be ratified by Level II (Putnam 436). Any modification of the agreement at Level II counts as a rejection at Level I and will require a re-opening of negotiations at Level I; final ratification must be 'voted' either up or down by Level II (Putnam 437).

**Win Set**

Given these circumstances, Putnam defines a 'win-set' for a particular Level II constituency as the set of all possible Level I agreements that would “win”-- effectively, the agreements that would gain the necessary majority among the constituents-- when voted up or down.
Win-sets are important because they can determine relative negotiating power. All things being equal, larger win-sets make Level I agreements more likely, because constituents will accept a broader range of options for action (Putnam 437). Level I negotiators do not have discrete win-sets of their own. Level I negotiators only bargain for outcomes which they know will be acceptable to the constituents at Level II. Knowing that successful agreement must fall within the Level II win-sets of the constituents involved at Level II, agreement is only possible if those win-sets overlap. Since win-sets are the range of outcomes individuals/groups will accept on a particular issue, the larger each win-set of the component constituents the more likely they are to overlap. Therefore, it can be understood that negotiations at Level I are more likely to be successful when larger win-sets are present at Level II, because more outcomes are passable, thereby increasing the likelihood of finding an outcome palatable to all parties. On the other hand, the smaller the win-set, the greater the risk of negotiations faltering (Putnam 438).

Large win-sets also have disadvantages. The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be 'pushed around' by other Level I negotiators. If other actors at the international level know that the leader has a broad win-set, they know that the leader can get a variety of policies passed, which means the leader may be weak at the bargaining table. Conversely, a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage (Putnam 440). If a leader has a small domestic win-set, the leader can use that to bargain more
effectively at the international level by saying to other leaders: "I can only get domestic support for a very narrow range of policies, so you have to make concessions, since neither of us will get anything unless I can get ratified whatever we agree on."

Mutual understanding of win-sets between negotiators is largely due to uncertainty or the lack thereof. If a country has a small win-set, that is only a bargaining advantage if the other negotiator is aware that domestic constraints exist. Therefore, the negotiator who is less constrained makes greater concessions than they otherwise would because an agreement is better than no agreement (Iida 410). Knowing what the leader can get accepted domestically allows that leader to bargain more effectively internationally-- to get concessions/policies that are more in tune with what the domestic coalitions will accept.

Leaders could have asymmetric information concerning the win-set of their 'opponents' domestic audience. Imperfect information will not yield quicker and more conciliatory results because the negotiators are unaware of the extent to which domestic constraints limit the opposition's bargaining power (Iida 411-413). Politicizing an issue often activates groups who are less worried about the cost of no-agreement, thus reducing the effective win-set (Putnam 445). This argument works at both international and domestic levels. A small international win-set allows a leader to appeal to the domestic audience and say that they need to take what they can get, since they cannot get any more
internationally; and conversely, a large international win-set means that domestic constituents can drive a harder bargain at home.

**Implications**

Relative negotiating power is also dependent on perceived and actual state-strength. “All-purpose support for international agreements is probably greater in smaller, more dependent countries . . . as compared to more self-sufficient countries . . . for most of whose citizens the costs of no-agreement are generally lower. More self-sufficient states with smaller win-sets should make fewer international agreements and drive harder bargains in those that they do make” (Putnam 443).

As hypothesized in “Second Image Reversed” theories, the two-level game accounts for the influence of international forces on domestic politics; the new domestic conditions prompted by these international influences will, in turn, affect international politics. “International pressures 'reverberate' within domestic politics, tipping the domestic balance and thus influencing the international negotiations” (Putnam 454). These 'reverberations' can alter both domestic and international policy in two ways. Firstly, states may adopt a 'to get along, go along' attitude in order to maintain amiable relations with other states. This is more likely to occur in more dependent (or interdependent) states. Secondly, suasive reverberation occurs when domestic constituents and
undecideds are moved by uncertainty surrounding the issues, messages from abroad, or other such international circumstances to alter domestic politics. This type of reverberation is more likely to occur in economic rather than political-military negotiations (Putnam 455).
Two-Level Game in IR Literature:

The debate between domestic level international relations theory and systemic level theory continues to rage on long after Waltz's groundbreaking work detailing his levels of analysis in *Man, the State, and War*. Although both domestic and systemic theorists agree that domestic politics play a crucial role in foreign policy behavior, the extent to which domestic actors respond to systemic factors or domestic ones determines which *theory* is best employed (Evans 7). Systemic theories of international relations hold states as rational unitary actors with stable preferences over time and a monopoly over domestic bargaining resources. Often times, approaches employing domestic politics as a variable are used only to solidify systemic theories. Some scholars believe that systemic theory provides the required analytical groundwork for analyzing domestic influences. However, the opposite may be more likely--- *domestic* politics provide the analytical basis for analyzing *international* factors (Evans 14). As James Caporaso points out, “domestic political theory should not simply fill in the detail left unexplained by systemic approaches, the “residual variance” approach. Instead, domestic politics approaches may specialize theoretically in a number of ways, for example, in the activities of different interest groups and in the representational logic of domestic institutions” (Caporaso 63). Both systemic and domestic politics approaches have provided increased understanding of international relations and foreign policy behavior in their own right; however, by
combining the two vantage points, theorists have the possibility of unlocking the complex game played by negotiators on both boards.

The two-level game approach provides three different approaches from that of strict systemic or domestic theories. Firstly, it is a theory of international bargaining (Evans 16). Similar to the Realist school with its concern for power, international bargaining within the two-level game involves the power one state has over another due to political constraints within the domestic political sphere. Secondly, the statesman is the central strategic actor (Evans 16). Rather than focusing solely on the state as a rational unitary actor and domestic politics being held within a 'black box', the two-level game attempts to approach international relations and foreign policy with the 'chief negotiator' as the main actor. By focusing on the 'chief negotiator', two-level game theorists may employ various methods in order to determine the driving force behind the negotiating decision-making. As explained by Andrew Moravcsik in the introduction of *Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*:

The two-level-games approach invites us to explore within a single framework the implications of different specifications of the principal-agent relation between the polity and the statesman, and different specifications of the statesman's interests. These include the Classical Realist view of a statesman faced with domestic constraints on mobilization; the view, more consistent with a Liberal approach, that the statesman is a pure "agent" of society, seeking to maximize domestic political support; and finally, the notion of statesmen seeking to realize personal goals. One unexpected byproduct of the latter concept may be renewed interest in
explanations that stress the individual psychology and political skill of statesmen—"first-image" explanations, according to Waltz's typology (16).

Finally, the two-level game approach allows one to use a dual-sided attack on foreign policy decision-making behavior. The two-level game admits that domestic political factors can influence the results of international bargaining in terms of constraints and/or preferences. At the same time, it recognizes that moves on the international playing board may have purely domestic political goals. For example, a state's aggressive rhetoric internationally may be intended to secure domestic support. The two-level game provides the lens in order to understand the exploitation of both sides of the game (Evans 17). The two-level game allows theorists a unique opportunity to utilize both international and domestic level factors to explain moves on both sides of the board. The importance of one playing surface on another often influences foreign policy behavior and negotiating strategy. It is important to focus on both levels in order to gain a holistic understanding of the situation at hand.

Many authors have taken Putnam's metaphor and expanded it and its application. Articles concerning US foreign policy as a two-level game (Boyer 185-212), Israel-Palestine and its two-level game (Shamir 311-328), and the Brazilian debt crisis of 1988 (Lehman 601-644) are just a few examples of Putnam's theory being applied across international relations literature. Other authors have attempted to expand Putnam's argument through extensive empirical research designs and statistical approaches. Iida, in
the *Journal of Conflict Studies*, attempts to empirically test Putnam's hypotheses when adding the variable of uncertainty (Iida 611-644). Jongryn Mo, in the *American Political Science Review*, delves into the extent to which states will maneuver in order to garner domestic support to increase international bargaining power (Mo 914). Ahmer Tarar uses game-theoretic modeling to showcase how the importance of constituencies and their preferences can affect bargaining power of the 'chief negotiator'. In his work “Constituencies and Their Preferences in International Bargaining,” he shows that “an executive with a national constituency such as a nationally elected president benefits by being constrained. An executive with a constituency distinct from that of the ratifying legislators, however, is worse off under greater constraints, when the constraints come from constituencies other than his or her own” (Tarar 383-407). Through these works, the application of Putnam's metaphor continues to gain strength. The important contribution of his original work-- the effect domestic constraints play on international bargaining and vice versa-- continues to intrigue political scientists to this day. As more in-depth analyses are produced, the more theorists understand the complexity of bargaining and negotiation.

Though Putnam's metaphor has been widely used and acclaimed within the international relation's literature, critiques of his work also exist. A main critique of Putnam's theory is that it assumes that negotiations are bilateral; however, many negotiations on the
international stage involve externalities and third-party observers which can ally, balance against, or otherwise alter the negotiations (Mitchell 29). The adherence of states to act within the constraints of international organizations also influences state behavior.

Another set of critiques, cited by Knopf in his work “Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiation”, involves the limitations of Putnam's original approach. Firstly, Knopf argues that distinctions should be made between negotiations involving transnational, transgovernmental, and cross-over issues since these differences could affect the bargaining outcome (Knopf 599). Although Putnam did employ these variations within his metaphor, he inadequately explained the differentiation. Secondly, Knopf argues that alliances, such as military alliances, can confound negotiations and affect the outcome of the bargaining process (Knopf 599).

Additional critiques of Putnam's metaphor are that it does not go far enough toward explaining the outcomes and relationships involved in international bargaining. Schoppa argues that aspects of Putnam's theory remain “underdeveloped” especially concerning which strategies should be employed in particular instances to gain the highest positive outcome (Schoppa 354).
Lee Ann Patterson argues that Putnam's two-level game may be too simplistic in some circumstances. Her research into agricultural policy in Europe highlights one instance where there are actually three-levels to the game. Rather than rejecting Putnam's argument, Patterson expands it to include the domestic audience, the European Community, and the international community (Patterson 99-134).

Some scholars argue that Putnam's two-level game approach is most useful in negotiations involving trade, investment, and other similar economic matters. Critics cite mixed explanations for security issues. “When negotiations on territorial disputes are set within an enduring rivalry, international factors can occasionally account for a given outcome; in other security situations purely domestic political factors provide an adequate explanation; but sometimes the outcome is incomprehensible unless one understands the simultaneous interaction of the two levels” (Raymond 346-348). Putnam's theory may be better suited for certain negotiations and less appropriate for others.

Similarly, other critics cite the domestic level of politics as the causal element for international bargaining thereby reducing the need for a 'two-level game'. If interest groups inform domestic elites of policy decisions, then domestic political elites shape the policy at the international level even though a 'chief negotiator' may be involved. The 'chief negotiator' is nothing more than the product of domestic politics. These critics
argue that the 'two-level game' gives too much credence to the international level of bargaining. Instead, some proponents argue that it is much more likely a 'one-level game' with domestic politics driving policy domestically and internationally (Jacobson 99-100).

Although critiques of Putnam's article abound, it still remains a foundational work of international relations theory. New avenues of exploring Putnam's theory continue to present themselves. Recent political science literature uses Putnam's two-level game to examine and analyze economic and trade agreements (Rosendorff 389-400 and Duch 437-452). Additionally, recent literature continues to use Putnam's two-level game paradigm for bargaining approaches to conflict resolution (Yasuaki 843-864 and Shamir 311-328). The next negotiation avenue to be explored through the two-level game is open for debate.
Assumptions:

Within the two-level game paradigm, assumptions are integral to the understanding of the theory. The assumptions are both at the individual and systemic level. At the individual level, it is assumed that all actors are rational. Rationality implies that actors are usually risk averse and make rational choices with the information available to them.

Actors pursue preferences which inform their rationality. Their preferences are fixed and are informed by individual, domestic, and systemic environments. Actors are goal-directed because they attempt to achieve and promote their preferences.

Additionally, all actors are aware that a two-level game is being played. Both the 'chief negotiator' and his/her domestic decision-makers understand the necessity of the two-level game. At the same time, other 'chief negotiators' within the international system are aware that politics are a two-level game. Everyone involved in the negotiation understands the nature of their bargaining positions.

Capabilities differ between actors. Some actors may be better prepared to process information. For example, some governments may have access to intelligence information, past experience, or any number of other examples of additional information to inform their choices. Similarly, some actors may be better able to quickly move legislation through the domestic sphere in order to proceed quickly with negotiations.
while others may be limited by procedures and regulations. Differentiation of capabilities implies that some negotiators will be better prepared than others to enter the bargaining process. Also, it implies that some governments will be better prepared to address the bargaining criteria, process those criteria, and produce legislation.

Lastly, it is assumed that rounds of the two-level game are played sequentially. 'Chief negotiators' arrive at a prospective agreement, that agreement is brought before the domestic government, and it is voted up or down. If the agreement is ratified, the 'chief negotiator' relays that information to the international audience. If the agreement is denied, the negotiations begin again with new parameters. Although the 'chief negotiator' may play the game simultaneously because he/she has some idea of the win-set domestically, the domestic legislators necessitate simultaneous play of the game. Domestic governments may help inform the 'chief negotiator' of the win-set in order to improve the likelihood of ratification; however, the domestic government makes the game sequential because they can only vote up or down one bargaining position at a time.
**Logic:**

The structure of negotiations among Level I and Level II actors is dependent upon the nature and environment in which the negotiation is taking place. For example, Level I 'chief negotiators' may be countries' Presidents or Prime Ministers, members of countries of the United Nations, members of Non-Governmental Organizations or Governmental Organizations, or highly influential countries associated with the negotiations. These players have different capabilities depending on their individual states' or organizations' political, social, and military influences. Presidents of true democracies must return to their respective constituents (Level II) in order to pass the negotiations at Level I. In authoritarian regimes, the chief negotiator at Level I may have enough power to essentially by-pass Level II discussions at the legislative level; however, the Level I negotiator may be beholden to other Level II constituents such as the military or the public at large should the public be aggrieved enough to 'take it to the streets'. In nascent democracies, democracies which may have domestic institutions but those institutions are limited or ineffectual, the leader at Level I may or may not need to return for Level II acceptance of the bargaining position. For example, if the President/PM/’chief negotiator' has majority power domestically, the Level II vote may only be a formality. On the other hand, if the 'chief negotiator' is a part of an oligarchy or elite driven system, he/she may be required to have the elite groups vote up or down.
Leaders at Level I may negotiate bargains such as military, economic, political, or social interventions. Certain types of negotiations may be more concentrated in the decision-making power of the 'chief negotiator' and less in the Level II constituents thereby increasing or decreasing the importance of the Level II game. The matter of military intervention, in some instances, may be handled by the 'chief negotiator' and in other instances be concentrated at Level II. For example, the President of the United States (Level I) is not allowed to declare war-- Congress (Level II) declares war. On the other hand, the Prime Minister of Britain (Level I) may declare war without the approval of the British Parliament, only with the approval of the King or Queen. States which have power concentrated in their Level I negotiator are able to drive harder bargains because all states involved in the negotiation are aware that Level II is not going to be able to check and balance the bargain spear-headed by Level I. 'Chief negotiators' who are more constrained by their Level II constituents will be willing to accept a broader range of negotiation outcomes at Level I because all parties involved in the negotiation, including the 'chief negotiator', are aware that the 'chief negotiator' must return to his/her Level II constituents for approval.

A state and its leader have many options concerning the type of negotiations in which they could participate. In military matters, in a true democracy, chief negotiators are constrained by their need for Level II approval. In nascent democracies, military
intervention, internal and external, may be centered in Level I or may require discussion and approval within a limited group at Level II. Authoritarian states may require nominal acceptance at Level II for any military negotiation at Level I, but most likely only requires Level I approval.

Economic, social, and political negotiations follow along the same lines. The propensity for states at Level I to be successful at both Level I, and subsequently Level II, is the relative balance of power between the actors. For example, if state A is more powerful economically, militarily, politically, or socially than others in the Level I negotiation, A would presumably be able to drive a harder bargain for its own benefits in the negotiations. At the same time, the balance of power between actors also influences the domestic arena. For example, if the chief negotiator (here the President) has more power through a sympathetic population, a majority Parliament, or any number of situations, the President then, effectively, has more power than the collection of actors at Level II because he/she can speak for them at Level I without fear of the negotiation being voted down. On the other hand, if the President has an unsympathetic audience and/or a hostile Parliament, he/she may be highly constrained at Level II and therefore have less power than Level II. Therefore, the ability of the 'chief negotiator' to effectively bargain at Level I is contingent on his/her strength at Level II and vice versa. The more power a chief negotiator assumes at Level I, the more likely he/she is to drive a harder bargain to reach
an outcome which will be acceptable to Level II, and thereby increase the likelihood for ratification at Level II. On the other hand, the more power held by Level II, in respect to Level I, constrains the chief negotiator's range of acceptable bargaining outcomes at Level I. This increases the win-set at Level I for the chief negotiator by requiring other Level I negotiators to open the negotiating possibilities further in order to reach an agreement which would be acceptable to Level II-- the smaller the win-set at Level II, the larger the win potential at Level I.

Whether states are nascent democracies, true democracies, or authoritarian regimes, negotiation strategy rests on the relative balance of power between the actors at both Levels of the two-level game. Depending on the dynamics of the negotiation, relative power balances can impact the likelihood of compromise, the size of win-sets, and which 'chief negotiator' will dominate the bargaining table. If State A (a first-world democracy with high military, social, economic, and political prestige) is negotiating with State B (an authoritarian, third-world regime with low prestige in all areas), State A will have the advantage due to the relative power at Level I, even though State B may have more power at Level II in comparison. State B will be required to capitulate because of its dependence on State A for future gains, and because of its inability to drive a hard bargain at Level I due to its limited importance in global functions. If State A negotiates with State C (a nascent democracy, first world, high prestige in most areas), depending
on the topic of negotiation, States A and C may be on equal footing. If State A requires
State C's cooperation in economic, military, social, or political positions globally, State C
may have the upper hand because it can threaten to end participation/agreements.
Conversely, if State A can effectively threaten State C with economic, military, or
political actions detrimental to State C's survival, State A has more power. At the same
time, negotiations between State A and State C are also dependent on their individual
Level II constraints. State A may be more constrained at Level II than State C due to its
reliance on democratic values, while State C is openly able to negotiate agreements
without much fear of hostility at Level II. Thereby, State C is more powerful at Level II
than State A allowing State C to drive a harder bargain at Level I.

The relative balance of power between actors affects the negotiating positions at both
Level I and Level II. Studying the dynamics between Level I and Level II negotiations
provides insight into the negotiating strategies and results which would not otherwise be
understood as completely. The balancing act between Level I bargaining and Level II
acceptance is highly dependent on the balance of power between all parties involved in
the negotiations.
Basic Arguments:

The basic argument of this paper is that relative balance of power between actors at the differing levels of interaction will influence the abilities of states to work at both Level I and Level II. The more power a state possesses at Level I (international prestige) the greater potential that state has to influence the negotiations internationally and thereby increase the win-set domestically because negotiations at Level I will be more palatable to Level II constituents. Similarly, relative balance of power between negotiators at Level II (domestic control) will force international negotiations to be more favorable to Level II parties in order to proceed with ratification of any agreement. Therefore, it is argued that more power at Level I produces a bigger win-set (acceptable range of bargaining outcomes) at Level II and vice versa. The relative power at Level I is the distinction between Serbia and Russia.

In both case studies being examined in this paper a second two-level game emerges. The domestic governments and the secessionist governments pursue a two-level game in the domestic arena. This paper does not attempt to address or pursue the domestic two-level games, although it could be an area of future research.
Hypothetical Moves Available:

In both the Russian and Serbian cases of independence movements within their borders, the 'chief negotiators' were their respective Presidents. The Russian and Serbian Presidents function as the head of domestic and foreign policy arms of government. Although both Presidents were the main actors in the bargaining process, each had to return to his domestic audience in order to ratify any agreements. In the Russian case, the President must return to the Duma (Russian Parliament) in order for the negotiation to be voted up or down. The Serbian President must allow the National Assembly of Serbia (Serbian Parliament) the opportunity to vote on the agreements.

The win-set for Russia domestically concerning the independence movement in Chechnya was extremely small. The Duma was staunchly opposed to any appearance of independence being granted to Chechnya. On the international level, the win-set for Russia was very large because of Russia's military, economic, and political power in the international system; other international actors were unable to drive hard bargains in terms of forcing Russia's hand.

In Serbia, the domestic win-set was very small. Members of the National Assembly of Serbia opposed Kosovar independence of any variation. The Serbian Parliament was not going to accept any form of negotiation concerning the issue of Kosovo. Internationally, Serbia faced a small win-set as well. Many states in the international community would
not accept Serbia's position of maintaining Kosovo for purposes of territorial integrity. Based on historical incidents such as the Balkan War and Serbian oppression and destruction of Kosovar villages and populations, the international community severely limited Serbia's bargaining position at the international stage. With such a small win-set at the international level and with so many major international actors pushing for Kosovar independence, Serbia was unable to win at the international level forcing the domestic government to bow to international pressure.

Hypothetically, both Russia and Serbia have a variety of moves at their disposal at the international and domestic levels. Although some moves are more viable than others, multiple strategies could have been employed by both parties. From the Russian perspective, military force in suppressing the movement in Chechnya is a legitimate option. Past experience has shown that military force is an effective mode of combating the resistance movement. Although Russia effectively lost the first Chechen War, it still maintained its territorial integrity. Military force would also create dis-incentives for other republics in the region to form resistance movements. Although military force is a viable option, it also comes with a social, political, and economic cost. The First Chechen War prompted a large outcry of disappointment and anger from the Russian population. Many young men fought and died. Force could backfire and hurt leaders and government officials in forthcoming elections. It is also costly economically to fund ammunitions,
salaries, and transportation. On the international level, the use of force within one's own territory comes with political costs. The international community frowns on the use of deadly force against populations. International aid, political standing, and possible international military interference could be very costly.

Another option Russia could use would be economic pressure to limit Chechen resistance. Although economic aid to Chechnya was minimal, Russian economic pressure internationally, could further discourage states from even considering the provision of economic assistance. Internally, Russia could chose to stop construction projects in Chechnya, limit goods and services flowing into the republic, and any other number of economic pressures in order to force policy change.

Legally, Russia could employ the argument for territorial integrity in order to both stop the Chechen resistance movement and hamper any other resistance movements in the Federation. Territorial integrity is a foundational block for international and domestic sovereignty. Most states in the international system support the concept of territorial integrity, because if one state sets precedence for a population to break away, other populations in other states may follow suit. There is the same fear domestically. If one republic breaks away, a domino-effect may occur where other republics break away, as well. Russia's bargaining position based on territorial integrity strengthens its domestic and international win-set.
From the Serbian perspective, military force could be a difficult sell both internationally and domestically. Based on past experience, Serbian military offensives in the region were met with international condemnation and eventually international military response. Due to both international pressure against the use of military force and the previous depletion of military strength, Serbia may be unable to use military force in the case of Kosovo.

Economically, Serbia could cut off goods, supplies, and resources to Kosovo; however, the international community may view that as another attempt to oppress the Kosovar population. Additionally, international aid, which Serbia depends on, could be cut off. Also, Kosovo enjoys international aid in its own right, so Serbian elimination of economic trade would do little to harm Kosovo economically.

Legally, Serbia could argue for territorial integrity. Though international law encourages territorial integrity, in Serbia's case, UN intervention during the Balkan War has severely limited Serbia's sovereignty and agency in the eyes of the international community. As a pariah of the international system, Serbia may be unable to make a strong enough case for territorial integrity as a legitimate basis for the retention of Kosovar lands.

Serbia and Russia play the two-level game sequentially. In each case, negotiations are not formalized; but, rather, are peripheral moves/negotiations to avoid international censure,
intervention, and sanctions. Internationally, Russia stands firm against Chechen
independence, returns to its domestic audience, maintains its stance against the Chechen
resistance movement, and advances back to the international level citing a small domestic
win-set as a detriment to further negotiations. Serbia attempts to bargain internationally
for territorial integrity, is met with much resistance by the international community,
returns to the domestic audience where international pressure decreases domestic
potential for remaining at the status quo, advances back to the international level to
attempt to bargain for concessions, and so forth. Each round of negotiations begins at one
level, proceeds to the next, returns, and another round begins.
Case Study: Serbia and Kosovo

Historical tensions which both simmer and boil between Serbia and its province of Kosovo vehemently reasserted themselves after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The disagreement over Kosovo's bid for independence culminated on 17 February 2008 with Kosovo declaring independence from Serbia and being supported by members of the international community. Prior to February 2008, Serbia and Kosovo maintained a stressed and complex relationship stemming from centuries of shared history.

For centuries Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs inhabited the region. Both sides claim first possession and close ethnic ties to the territory. As a region in the medieval kingdom of Serbia, Kosovo became a symbol of Serbian nationalism, religion, strength, and power. It is the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the home of its most sacred places (Clark xix). It is also the site of a legendary 1389 battlefield where an encounter between Serbs and Turks dissolved the medieval Serbian state. The 1389 battle of Kosovo Polje acquired symbolic significance. Oral legends were passed down extolling the deeds and legitimacy of the Serbian nation (Rogel 169). At the same time, Albanians considered the region home. Albanians had been inhabitants of Kosovo prior to Slavic immigration into the region in the 6th century A.D.

The Serbian empire was occupied by the Hungarians, Austrians, and the Ottomans. In the waning days of Ottoman rule, the Principality of Serbia was formed in 1817; formal
independence was enacted in 1878. Serbia could not consider itself whole without Kosovo (Clark 9); so, in 1912 Kosovo was reacquired from the Ottoman Empire. At the end of World War I, Serbia, including Kosovo, became a part of the first Yugoslavia. In World War II, Kosovo was briefly reunited with Albania, but with the defeat of the Axis powers, Kosovo returned to Yugoslavia as a region of Serbia.

In 1974, Kosovo became an autonomous province of Serbia including equal representation compared to Serbia on the federal presidency. This 1974 Constitution defined Kosovo as a 'constituent element' of the Yugoslav federation with rights and responsibilities equal to those of a republic except the right to secession (Clark 39).

By amending the Serbian Constitution (Rogel 172), this autonomy was retracted by Milosevic in 1989 (Clark xix). By this time, Kosovar Albanians had little recourse to reattain autonomy. As such, Kosovar Albanians began creating psuedo-state institutions and structures within the region. For example, they organized schools and hospital care when Belgrade rejected these services for Albanians. Most importantly, they collected the taxes needed to pay for them. Additionally, they formed their own trade unions and established a new leadership, which directed the political affairs of the province. Kosovar Albanian political leaders stood on the steps of a parliament, whose doors were closed to them, and issued a proclamation of sovereignty for Kosovo soon after the revocation of autonomy. On 22 September 1991 (two years later) the Kosovars held a referendum on
establishing a republic, an effort that met with overwhelming voter support (Rogel 173). Of the 87.01% of the 1,051,357 voters who cast their ballots (Serbs did not vote) 99.87% of them voted for independence (Judah 65).

Though supported within Kosovo, independence was not supported by the international community (except Albania) (Clark 90). Kosovars never believed, however, that US or European policy was unchangeable when it declared that Kosovo did not have the right to independence because of its provincial status (Judah 76).

As the disintegration of Yugoslavia continued, the Dayton Accords brokered peace agreements and border arrangements for the newly independent states which formerly comprised Yugoslavia. Kosovo was not even mentioned as a part of the Accords because the international community deemed it an internal conflict. Kosovar Albanians understood the impact of the Dayton Accords to mean that only through violent struggle, such as occurred in Bosnia and Croatia, could statehood be achieved (Rogel 175). With this in mind, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began attacking Serbs in the province. As the international community condemned the violent acts of the KLA, Serbia began to 'crack down' on Kosovar 'disobedience' since it was considered an internal matter. As weeks wore on, Milosevic continued to increase assaults on Kosovo, though hoping to remain below the threshold of triggering outright international intervention (Solana 114-121).
The continued escalation of violence worried the West-- especially NATO. In late September 1998, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1199 calling for an end to the violence. Anticipating that both sides, especially Serbia, would ignore the UN resolution, NATO began discussing the legality of using force. Legally, NATO was only to use force if one of the member states was attacked. In this instance, Serbia was not a member state of NATO. Additionally, Serbia was a sovereign state with Kosovo considered to be an internal matter. “The matter was clinched on 8 October 1998, when Contact Group leaders’ meeting at London’s Heathrow airport got a backhanded go-ahead from Igor Ivanov, Russia’s foreign minister. He told the group, that should intervention in Serbia be proposed to the United Nations, Russia (China, too) would veto it; however, if NATO intervened, Russia would protest, but, naturally, would have no recourse” (Rogel 176).

The vital turning point of NATO’s decision to invade was the massacre of the Albanian village of Racak. This allowed NATO to intervene, first diplomatically, on grounds of a humanitarian crisis. The Rambouillet negotiations for a ceasefire were held 6-23 February 1999. One document on the agenda was non-negotiable. It guaranteed the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, meaning that Kosovo would not be allowed independence at that time; it also included human rights guarantees for both Serbs and Albanians; and finally, it stated that what was discussed and agreed to at Rambouillet
could be revised after three years. A second document, which was intended as an interim agreement, dealt with matters such as a ceasefire, a representative assembly for Kosovo, and elections to it. Though the Serbs mostly ignored the conference, the Kosovar Albanians actively participated in debates especially concerning an independence referendum. On 18 March 1999 the Albanians signed the agreement after consulting the populace; however, the Serbs refused. With Serbian refusal, war seemed imminent.

The war in Kosovo, which had no UN Security Council resolution to back it, began on 24 March 1999. NATO forces were made up of contingents from the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and Spain (Rezun 55). It lasted seventy-eight days and ended on 10 June 1999.

Several days before the war’s onset, Milosevic had purged his leadership, assuring that hard-liners would be in power in the government and in the army in the likelihood of a conflict (Rogel 178). The Serb public, rather than rising up to overthrow Milosevic, as some NATO statesmen expected or at least hoped for, rallied behind Serbia’s leadership (Rogel 180).

Things went badly for NATO. The military action, for one, required the approval of nineteen countries, which NATO’s head, Spain's Javier Solana, gained on 23 March 1999. The war was carried out exclusively by air, from heights of 15,000 feet or above. During the campaign, NATO allies began to fear that military intervention could
strengthen KLA demands for sovereignty more than it could weaken Milosevic's desire to act violently in Kosovo (Daalder 35).

On the international front, Milosevic expected aid from Russia; however, he did not receive it. In early June, the Russians agreed to the critical NATO demand that all Serb forces must leave Kosovo. Chernomyrdin and Ahtisarri took the message to Milosevic, who a few days earlier, along with four key Serb government officials, had been indicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal. On 3 June 1999, Milosevic, at last, capitulated having underestimated allied resolve (Solana 118). On 9 June, military heads from NATO and Yugoslavia signed a Military-Technical Agreement ending the fighting. The document stipulated the withdrawal of all Serbian forces (military, paramilitary, and police) from Kosovo, a task that was expeditiously completed by 20 June 1999. It also provided for the presence of an international security contingent to monitor the agreement and facilitate the return of refugees. The Kosovars seemed to be adapting to what they expected to be a temporary condition of autonomy; assembly elections and a referendum on independence were hoped for in the near future.

At the end of the war Serbia and Kosovo remained at a stalemate. Serbia desired to maintain Kosovo as a part of Serbian territorial integrity; on the other hand, “Nothing less than full de facto independence for Kosovo will satisfy the Albanian majority which is a precondition of success” (Brems Knudsen 150). With the onslaught of international
pressure, Belgrade now had a more realistic view of Serbia's limited possibilities involving Kosovo. In Serbia's favor was the fact that both China and Russia have been against solutions which limit Serbian sovereignty ruling out full independence (Brems Knudsen 160).

A 2000 report from the UN Security Council provides a range of possibilities for the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia: 1) the indefinite continuation of Kosovo as an international protectorate, 2) partition of the province, either by means of a canton agreement or by setting up a new border along the Ibar River which would de facto separate the Albanian and Serbian populations, 3) autonomy within Serbia and Montenegro, 4) conditional independence, 5) full independence (Brems Knudsen 162).

The political and physical fighting between Serbian and Kosovar factions continued long after the war. Boris Tadich, current President of Serbia (elected in 2004), continued to stand firm on Serbia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Tadich argued Kosovo should be afforded “less than independence, but more than autonomy.” He continued, “The independence of Kosovo is unacceptable for me, and for all of Serbia” (Kupchan 18). As of 2004, only one high-ranking Serbian official, former Prime Minister Goran Svilanovich, actively supported Kosovar independence (Kupchan 19). Kosovar Albanians continued to press for their own independent state and refused to accept an autonomous republic within greater Serbia (Sletzinger 35-41). Violence continued to
erupt as Kosovar Albanians attempted to exact revenge on the remaining Orthodox Serb population in the region. Major protests in Kosovo, during March 2004, created widespread violence against the Serbian minority (Kupchan 17). As Kupchan points out, even as late as 2004, Kosovo was not ready to become a full-fledged independent state:

By any measure, the political conditions in Kosovo fall well short of the standards that the international community has set as preconditions for moving to final status negotiations. Serbs do not enjoy freedom of movement, one of the main reasons that only a handful of those who fled since 1999 have returned. The process of decentralization meant to empower local communities has proved stillborn. Political and legal institutions have yet to mature, stymied by infighting among political parties, crime and corruption, and patronage systems deeply embedded in the clannish structure of Albanian society. Poverty is pervasive, with unemployment topping 50 percent even among ethnic Albanians. An inadequate power supply makes for daily blackouts, and Kosovo's uncertain political status leaves it unable to attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure (17-18).

However, he argues, there remain few alternatives to statehood which would rectify the growing issues in the region (Kupchan 18).

As the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo became increasingly intractable, Kosovo again declared independence on 17 February 2008 (Bilefsky 1). This time, many states within the international community (including the United States, Canada, France, Germany, and others) accepted Kosovo as an independent state.
Internal stability and legitimacy are not the only issues contingent upon the intractable division between Serbia and Kosovo. The issue of Kosovar autonomy versus independence continues to be a major roadblock for Serbia's future membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). EU and NATO membership could aid Serbia greatly through economic support, increased political legitimacy, and military security. Although Serbia attempted to placate the international community through toned-down rhetoric in 2004-2005 by campaigning for Kosovo to have “less than independence, but more than autonomy,” Kosovo continued to understand that negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo for independence were untenable (Sletzinger 35). Without a solid solution to the “Kosovo Problem,” Serbia will remain outside the ranks of the EU and NATO.
Two-Level Game Analysis: Serbia

In Serbia, the domestic win-set was very small. Members of the National Assembly of Serbia opposed Kosovar independence of any variation. The Serbian Parliament was not going to accept any form of negotiation concerning the issue of Kosovo. Internationally, Serbia faced a small win-set as well. Many states in the international community would not accept Serbia's position of maintaining Kosovo for purposes of territorial integrity. Based on historical incidents such as the Balkan War and Serbian oppression and destruction of Kosovar villages and populations, the international community severely limited Serbia's bargaining position at the international stage. With such a small win-set at the international level and with so many major international actors pushing for Kosovar independence, Serbia was unable to win at the international level forcing the domestic government to bow to international pressure.

According to Putnam's Two-Level Game theory, issues at Level I are constrained by win-sets optimal at Level II. In the case of Kosovo, Serbia's win-set was extremely small. Due to domestic political and social factors, only maintaining Kosovo as part of Serbia's territorial property was acceptable. Milosevic\(^1\) was backed into a corner both domestically and internationally. Domestically, he was unable to coordinate win-sets

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\(^1\) For purposes of this paper, Milosevic and Serbia are used interchangeably as part of Putnam's Two-Level Game theory since he is seen as the 'chief negotiator'.
between Serbian and Kosovar interests. At the international level, Serbia attempted to bargain with its small win-set; however, negotiations eventually broke down with the international community rejecting Serbia's bargaining position.

Serbia was able to gain domestic support for its actions in Kosovo due to an overwhelming surge of nationalism within the country. The old myth of struggle for Serbian independence was reasserted as a means of maintaining Serbian territorial integrity (Howard 7). In fact the myth's nationalistic “power waxes and wanes according to circumstances. It lies dormant-- as it did throughout the Tito years-- or it is re-activated when it suits somebody's political purposes” (Howard 20). The myth was most useful in legitimizing the rule of Milosevic and the brutal conduct of regular and paramilitary forces loyal to the Serbian cause (Kuhle 19). This nationalistic rhetoric also increased and entrenched governmental and popular support for Serbian actions in Kosovo. As stated earlier in the paper, Serbs backed Milosevic and his actions within Kosovo. Therefore, Milosevic was bound by his public and political supporters to live up to the nationalistic rhetoric. Any sign of weakening would be unacceptable. At Level II, only the retention of Kosovo, at any cost, was a viable option.

In addition to Serbian national identity being tied to Kosovo, Serbia stood firm on the issue of maintaining territorial integrity (Posen 42). It was believed by the Serbian populace and government that other sizable minority regions within Serbia, such as
Vojvodina, might also attempt independence movements (Posen 48). The crack down on Kosovo was meant as a warning signal to other regions of the state. This made the issue of keeping Kosovo even more intractable.

In terms of international negotiations, Serbia negotiated often. In the early 1990s, Serbia negotiated with the international community in terms of Serbian territorial sovereignty. Both Level I and Level II agreed that Serbia was an independent, sovereign state. As such, the international community was not allowed to interfere. At the time, the international community accepted Serbia's bargaining position. By the late 1990s, the international community wished to reassess Serbia's bargaining position concerning Kosovo. Level II constituents were still unable to see any foreseeable outcome that granted increased autonomy and especially not full independence to Kosovo. When Serbia participated in the Rambouillet agreement negotiations, Milosevic had to be firm in his position, because his nationalistic support base would never agree to Kosovar demands. Milosevic arrogantly believed that the international community would not involve itself in an internal Serbian matter (Rezun 50). Since Serbia was unable to find an alternative to the small win-set, negotiations stalemated.

With this stalemate, the international community rejected Serbia's position of territorial sovereignty and integrity when NATO forces intervened. Even though Milosevic had
Level II support for his position at Level I, the international community (NATO states) at the bargaining table rejected Serbia's position.

These new negotiations then prompted what Putnam refers to as 'reverberations' within society. Since the international community came to the aid of the Kosovar Albanians, domestic policy within Kosovo became increasingly intractable-- more so than before. Independence was the only viable option. Both Serbia and Kosovo's domestic win-sets became immutable. To alter the balance, diplomacy, particularly Russia’s pressure on Serbia, was a very important, if not decisive, factor. Serbia was unable to continue its pressure internationally for its Level II policies because Russia would not back up Serbian negotiating points. Additionally, the pressure exerted by NATO forces weakened Serbia's political ability to legitimately hold on to the Kosovo province.

After NATO intervention, the question of Kosovar independence remained ambiguous. It took another ten years for formal Kosovar independence. Currently, 60 out of 192 UN Nations formally or informally support Kosovar independence (“Kosovo” 1). Even though key members of the international community do not support Kosovo's independence (including Russia, China, and India), Serbia is now a pawn in the international game. Without strength to bargain at Level I, Level II concerns are now muted. Serbia has very little effective bargaining power on the international scene. This is well-known by the other international negotiators. Therefore, Serbia loses the bargaining
position it had fought so hard for in the 1990s, because the reverberations within society, i.e. international support of Kosovar independence increasing domestic desires to maintain Kosovo, affected Serbia's ability to negotiate effectively at Level I.
Case Study: Russia and Chechnya

Russia and Chechnya have been at odds with one another for centuries. Even as early as 1819, Chechens fought the Russians over territory and independence (Dunlop 15). The Caucasian War (1817-1864) showcased the immutable difference between the two ethnic groups. During the Soviet era, the Chechens and other mountain peoples were promised the right to self-determination and secession; however, the Bolsheviks reneged on the promise and exacted revenge for Chechnya's disobedience (Dunlop 42-44). On 30 November 1922, the Chechen Autonomous Oblast' was created. Under the Soviet Union, Chechnya was considered a particularly virulent problem. Through numerous border rearrangements, mass deportations, and periodic weapons confiscations, the Soviet leadership attempted to limit the ethnic volatility of the region.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many ethnic groups in the former Soviet sphere began declaring independence. On 27 October 1991, Dzhochар Dudaev (elected President of Chechnya) declared the independence of Chechnya. Yeltsin required the support of Russia's Autonomous Republics (of which Chechnya was one) in order to maintain Russia's territorial integrity in the midst of secessionist crises. Since most of Russia's territory was not inhabited by ethnic Russians, Yeltsin feared the dissolution of Russia itself. It was feared that if Chechnya was allowed to secede, then other autonomous republics would follow, severely threatening Russia's territorial integrity.
“It was absolutely necessary for the survival of the Russian Federation to prevent the spread of national ethnic conflicts towards its borders. . . The Dudaev regime was a source of threat to Russian security and territorial integrity” (Chopra 229). Therefore, the Russian government was not in favor of allowing Chechnya to secede. Signing of the Federation Treaty in 1992 decreased the separatist dangers which had been brewing in 1991. The Federation Treaty was actually three treaties, one for the autonomous republics, one for the oblasts' and krais, and one for the autonomous districts, each of which sketched out the balance of authority between Moscow and the regions. Two republics refused to sign-- Tatarstan and Chechnya (Dunlop 169).

As tensions continued to increase, Moscow alternated between negotiations with Chechnya and military intervention. By the summer of 1993, the Russian government decided on a more aggressive approach to Chechnya (Dunlop 185). The best argument for Russia to use force in Chechnya was to prevent further bloodshed in the region; this seemed justifiable in both the eyes of the Russian citizens and the international community (Knezys 30). On 14 February 1994, Tatarstan signed a bilateral agreement with Russia affirming its status as a republic within the Russian state. This left Chechnya as the only hold-out among the 89 “subjects” of the Russian Federation (Dunlop 187).

On 15 November 1994 Deputy Premier Shakrai was removed by Yeltsin as chief Russian negotiator for the Russian-Chechen dispute. He was replaced by Nikolai Egorov.
Although Shakrai was considered a 'hawk' in his stance on Chechnya, Egorov was a 'super hawk' (Dunlop 200). During September-October 1994, a new influx of hardliner 'hawks' began to appear in the Yeltsin leadership. There were no influential advocates in the Russian government who wanted to grant Chechnya full independence; however, there was a minority who wanted to maintain Chechnya's status as a 'quasi-separated state' in order to benefit economically from its crime-ridden nature (Dunlop 186). In Russian politics, trends of strengthening statehood and nationalistic aims became increasingly apparent (Dunlop 203). On the Chechen side, Dudaev was “practically unbendable and continued to insist that all questions of relations with Russia had to be conditioned on the recognition of Chechnya's independence” (Knezys 26).

After failing to assassinate Dudaev, and increasing tensions between Moscow and Chechnya, Russia launched the First Chechen War in 1994. Although Moscow used overwhelming manpower, air-power, and weaponry, the conflict ended in a stalemate in 1996 with a peace treaty signed a year later. The Russian public had grown tired of the war and the violence; however, Chechnya as a separate independent state was still unthinkable. By the end of the conflict, Chechen tactics such as the Buddennovsk hospital hostage crisis had shocked the public and discredited the Chechen rebels. Any international or domestic support the Chechens could have hoped to gain for their independence movement evaporated.
During the inter-war period, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov continued to press for Chechen sovereignty. Following a Chechen incursion into neighboring Dagestan (which wanted to gain independence), a series of apartment bombings in Moscow blamed on the Chechens, and the threat of terrorism from the region, the Russian government interceded militarily in October 1999 marking the beginning of the Second Chechen Conflict. Better choreographed and planned than the first attempt, Moscow gained control of Grozny in 2000 and established a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya headed by Akhmad Kadyrov.

Prior to and during the Second Chechen Conflict there was much debate in Moscow as to how to handle the situation. Some groups in the Kremlin wished to use diplomatic means to solve the problem while others argued for the use of force—both solutions presupposed Chechnya being a part of the Russian Federation (Makinen 1162). During the period 1999-2001, the three main parties of power—Nash Dom-Rossiya, Edinstvo, and Otechestvo— and the leading opposition party Yabloko—discussed options regarding the Chechen problem. Nash Dom-Rossiya supported the military option citing the need to destroy terrorism, retain Russian territorial integrity, and to restore peace in the North Caucasus (Makinen 1163). Although the Otechestvo party advocated the political process, it still argued for the retention of Chechnya. This was justified by arguing that: “there are too many ethnic groups wanting independence, and if we (Moscow) were to
allow one such group to leave the 'mother country' then we could have to allow others to
do so, too, which is far too dangerous” (Makinen 1167). The political party Edinstvo also
advocated for the use of force. It argued that the integrity and sovereignty of Russia had
already been offended by Chechnya's bid for independence and that offense could not go
unpunished. Shoigu, leader of Edinstvo, believed that maintaining Russia's territorial
integrity was more important than the measures taken to reach the goal (Makinen 1173).
As the opposition party, Yabloko did not initially support the use of force. Yabloko
wanted to use diplomatic and political measures to mediate the conflict; however, the use
of force was not off the table if Chechnya did not comply with certain conditions.
Yabloko believed that state integrity was more important than self-determination. As a
solution to the conflict, the head of Yabloko offered the use of political negotiations on
all issues-- except on the full independence of Chechnya (Makinen 1179-1180). Even
though the leading political parties in the Russian government debated the process by
which to engage Chechnya, they all adamantly agreed that Chechnya was to remain in the
Russian Federation.

American and European leaders did not dispute Russian sovereignty or territorial
integrity. Rather, they objected to the methods used by the Russian government forces.
In response to Russia's use of force in the Second Chechen Conflict, US Secretary of
State Madeline Albright spoke to the United Nations in 2000 concerning Russia's blatant
disregard for human rights abuses in Chechnya (“Second” 1). Although most of the international community vocally condemned Russia's use of force in the conflict, it was well known that the community would have little power to influence Moscow (“Putin” 1). Threats of economic sanctions, moral and ethical ramifications, and treaty blockades were offered as 'sticks' by the international community (“Russia” 1). Some foreign politicians even referred to Kosovo when discussing their opposition to Moscow's actions: “We condemn vigorously what Milosevic did in Kosovo and we condemn vigorously what Russia is doing in Chechnya” (“UK” 1). Although the international community expressed great dismay and disapproval over Russia's actions in Chechnya, it has yet to be able to effectively punish or enforce its dissatisfaction.

In contrast, Russia was able to gain the support of China. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman commented that China: “understands and supports the efforts made by Russia in safeguarding national unity and territorial integrity” (Hutzler 1).
Two- Level Game Analysis: Russia

The win-set for Russia domestically concerning the independence movement in Chechnya was extremely small. The Duma was staunchly opposed to any appearance of independence being granted to Chechnya. On the international level, the win-set for Russia was very large because of Russia's military, economic, and political power in the international system. Other international actors were unable to drive hard bargains in terms of forcing Russia's hand.

The 'chief negotiator' in the Russian case is the country's President; however, the President is supposed to be held accountable and constrained by the Duma (Russian Parliament) in order for the negotiation to be voted up or down according to Putnam's theory. However, both levels in Putnam's Two-Level Game, in the Russian case, are controlled by the President. With a quasi-democratic system in Russia, the President of the country holds extraordinary power in both the domestic and international arenas. Although typically the 'chief negotiator' is beholden to the domestic audience for final ratification of a negotiation, the Russian Presidency contains such power that the President's wishes and influence extend further than in true democratic governments.

Yeltsin and Putin were successful in negotiating the two-level game at both the domestic and international levels. Leading up to both wars, Yeltsin was required to meet the demands of both the Russian public and his political allies. Especially during the First
Chechen Conflict when Yeltsin appointed 'super-hawks' into his advisory group, he needed to maintain their support and confidence. Only keeping Chechnya at any cost was a viable option. During the Second Conflict, Yeltsin still had to appease his political power base by fighting for Russia's territorial integrity and domestic safety. As related earlier in the paper, all political parties in power including the main opposition party agreed that Chechnya needed to remain a part of the Russian Federation.

At the same time as Yeltsin needed to appease his domestic allies with a very narrow win-set, the Chechen government also faced an extremely small win-set. During both conflicts, the main Chechen government refused to pursue any negotiations which did not correspond directly with Chechnya being granted full independence. This pressure was applied by those serving in the Chechen government as well as the Chechen population.

Both domestic groups faced small win-sets resulting in a stalemate; however, Moscow rejected Chechnya's legitimacy to negotiate the matter and intervened militarily. Chechnya was unable to win the domestic bargaining game. Russia was powerful enough politically and militarily to dismiss Chechen negotiations. Chechnya was unable to rally enough domestic or international bargaining power to forestall Russian intervention.

Although the international community condemned Russia's severely aggressive actions in the region, it was unable to effectively punish or disrupt Russian goals. Initially, the
international community backed Russia in both instances: in the first, for maintenance of territorial integrity, and in the second for countering terrorism. Russia was able to influence the international level to not interfere in an 'internal' crisis.

As the international community attempted to reprimand Russia for its humanitarian crisis and disregard for human rights, it was unable to exert sufficient pressure on Russia. Threats of economic and political sanctions were ignored by Moscow. Although the international community attempted to bargain with Russia at Level I for a diplomatic rather than military solution, Russia's small win-set at Level II and its strong bargaining power at Level I allowed Moscow to ignore the international community's outcry.

At the international level, Chechnya was unable to foster support from other countries. No international countries voiced support for Chechnya's independence from Russia.

There are at least three reasons why no state or international organization was ready to support the Chechen secessionist movement(s). First and foremost, no state appeared ready to risk conflict with the host state, the Russian Federation, which, as a nuclear power, had destructive capabilities which very few other states could match. Second, the US and its allies, supported the Yeltsin government in Russia on the grounds that, unlike its opposition (Chechnya), his government appeared committed to a multi-party democracy and free market economy in Russia and, most importantly, to cooperation with the US and European powers. Third, the secessionist government of Dudaev was sometimes portrayed, in the US and European media, as an authoritarian, coercive and corrupt government (Pavkovic 117).
Even the Muslim countries, which Chechnya had counted on for support, refused to jeopardize their economic and political ties with Moscow (“Islamic” 1). Chechnya was unsuccessful at forcing Russia's hand at the international board because many states feared Moscow's response.
Conclusion:

Secessionist movements often involve negotiations within both the international and domestic spheres of power. Putnam's Two-Level Game theory provides a framework in which to understand the crucial dynamic between domestic and international negotiations. Both Serbia's involvement in Kosovo and Russia's intervention in Chechnya are example of states playing a two-level game. Theoretically, Serbia and Russia both must bargain with their domestic audiences in order to be held accountable to citizens' interests as well as maintain power. At the same time, each state must negotiate at the international level to legitimize its position-- and in these instances the use of force. In both the Serbian and Russian cases presented in this paper, the win-sets at Level II were extremely small, thereby decreasing the amount of bargaining available between Level I and Level II. Aware of the severely limited options acceptable at Level II, Level I negotiators did not attempt to produce outcomes other than those palatable to Level II effectively eliminating the need for bargaining between Level I and Level II.

Serbia was unable to push the ultimate international decision toward its favor. Instead, the international community intervened and caused reverberations within Serbian social and political spheres. These reverberations resulted in the eventual breaking away of Kosovo from Serbian authority. Serbia was too weak domestically and internationally to impede the international decision. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and citizens of the Serbian
state reached a stalemate in decision-making because each had a very narrow win-set to alter the negotiations. The international community was able to intervene because the repercussions of Serbian displeasure were limited. Kosovo was able to take advantage of its new negotiating position in the aftermath of NATO intervention. With the international community effectively advocating eventual Kosovar independence, Kosovo was able to reassert its bid for independence in 2008 and be recognized and legitimated by many states.

Conversely, Russia was successful at both the domestic and international game of influence. Domestically, Yeltsin was able to garner political and social support for his actions in Chechnya based on nationalistic rhetoric. Moscow's decision to maintain Chechnya at all costs was condoned by Yeltsin's political advisors, the political parties in power, and Russian citizens. The win-set in Russia was extremely small in negotiating a alternative option for the Chechen situation. Additionally, Russia's political, social, economic, and military strength acted as a deterrent to international interference. Russia successfully bargained at the international level because it was strong enough to deflect international pressure. Even though the international community strongly 'condemned' Russia for its human rights abuses in Chechnya, no state was willing to intervene directly.

The secessionist movements in Chechnya and Kosovo produced markedly different outcomes. Putnam's Two-Level Game theory highlights the importance of both
international and domestic factors for international relations. Through the framework envisioned by Putnam, the differing outcomes of the two secessionist movements studied in this paper are revealed and better understood. The constraints under which Russia and Serbia operated domestically and internationally played a major role in their abilities to effectively negotiate for their respective positions.

With the information presented in this paper in mind, further exploration of Putnam's theory and its application in international relations could be investigated. Although not developed fully in this paper, the deeper two-level game present in both case studies could provide exciting new research and applications for Putnam's theory. Analysis of the dynamic relationship between the national government and the secessionist movement could provide deeper insight into the progression of secessionist processes. Another avenue of exploration could be a case study in which more de-census occurs. In both the Serbian and Russian instances the acceptable outcome at both Level I and Level II are the same; however, other states with secessionist movements may see more incongruity between Level I options and Level II preferences.
Bibliography


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