SELECTED STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT FROM WILSON TO WALDO: A SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE PERSPECTIVE
VOLUME I

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *
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1980

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1980
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Antecedent influences are so obvious a feature of academic life that it is not easy to avoid triteness in their acknowledgement. Nor in the task can one avoid the uneasy feeling of oversight. This is particularly apparent if one ponders the subtleties of intellectual endeavors. In this connection we especially wish to recognize the incalculable stimulation received from inquisitive students and imaginative colleagues. It would be a presumption to suppose they do not appreciate my indebtedness.

This writer has had the unique advantage of studying under two faculties of unparalleled scholarly acumen. In the study of economics at the University of Texas, Professors C. A. Wiley, C. E. Ayres, Robert Montgomery, and E. E. Hale turned the "dismal science" into an exciting quest for the "reasonable society." The impact of my major mentor, C. E. Ayres, will be evident to those familiar with his philosophy. Mention should also be made of Professor J. Gilbert McAllister under whose tutelage was probed the science of anthropology. More recently, studies in the art of public administration at The Ohio State University have been enriched by Professors Paul G. Craig, Clinton V. Oster, Arthur D. Lynn and Sven B. Lundstedt.
To the extent that the reader may find merit in the approach and analysis of this investigation, credit must be extended to those who provided the support necessary to see it through to completion: to Professor Arthur D. Lynn who first suggested the topic and shepherded the early research phases; to Professor Clinton V. Oster who provided unflagging interest and trenchant insights; to Professor Virgil G. Hinshaw whose technical advice and cosmopolitan scholarship found its way into the very fabric of the manuscript; and to Professor Sven B. Lundstedt who proposed the sociology of knowledge perspective employed in organizing and evaluating the data field and who with consummate skill steered the investigation away from pitfalls unanticipated by the author. Indeed, only the intellectual caliber and generous character of Professor Lundstedt could have transformed an otherwise arduous undertaking into the rewarding experience it came to be. The manuscript was typed with enviable competence by Mrs. Eleanor Schwab. Needless to say, errors of commission and omission are the author's own.

Finally, an expression of gratitude must be accorded my family for the brand of patience and empathy only those close at hand can provide one in the throes of composition.

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Studies in Organizational Analysis. Professor H. Randolph Bobbitt
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INTRODUCTION

There is nothing in the early literature of administration to portend its rise to prominence, perhaps dominance, in contemporary society. It has silently stolen industrial governance out of the hands of market forces and out of the halls of democratic deliberations. Nor is there anything in the current literature on the subject that charts a steady course for its future path. In the most fundamental and intimate sense, then, we pass our lives amid and through administrative institutions the future of which is as obscure as their ascendancy was unappreciated. In consequence, a lacuna in understanding requires explanation and correction.

One major problem seems to be that among serious students of the administrative phenomenon there is little agreement on the proper boundaries of the field or on proximate issues therein and too much unexamined agreement on the ultimate perspectives by which the field itself may be examined. Another no less significant problem is an apparent inability to wring out of the existing ideological climate generally acceptable justifications for administrative
devices. The upshot is that in the absence of a deeper legitimacy and intellectual insight, modern administration is surrounded by vulgar political posturing and by shrill and eccentric denouncements.

But modern administration is not a transient intruder on an otherwise stable, simple, and harmonious community; nor are its coordinates confined to the traditional borders of ownership or national polity. If we are to escape the merely pejorative and come to grips with the pervasive and expanding fact of administrative modes of action, ideological interpretations must be decisively abandoned for more disciplined and dependable theoretical perspectives.

The central objective of this study is to make some contribution toward more reliable theoretical conceptions of administration as a factor in the release of human energies and ingenuities requisite to the pressing problems of our time. The event to be studied is the historical data field of American public administration thought. The method employed is problem oriented.
PART I

ANALYTICAL ORIENTATIONS
CHAPTER I
FOCUSBING THE PROBLEM CONTEXT

The Place of Administration in Modern Society

Administration is the persistent institutional fact of our time. Its practice is pervasive in social affairs and its character pivotal in social analysis. But no event provides an index to its own significance and no gauge of the importance of an event that has yet to run its course is beyond question. Unfortunately, as so often is the case, what needs documentation is often scarcely documented. Nevertheless, even crude measures substantiate the asseverations of at least the conventional aficionados of the subject that no assessment of modern society not contending with its administrative dimensions could be taken seriously.

The data in Table 1, for example, establish administrators as a significant proportion of the economic population. In fact, specific field studies indicate that these data probably underestimate the extent of the phenomenon.
One study\(^1\) found that in a sample of 82 business firms, 13.3 per cent of all employees had administrative duties and the percentage is even higher in a survey of California school districts.\(^2\) Buttressed by cross-cultural comparisons, another admittedly allusive indicator (Table 2) suggests an even greater proportion. One authority makes a useful interpretation:

There may well be an indirect connection between the number of administrators and the general transformations that are taking place in the labor force of every country: the shifts from manual to mental labor, from less to more specialization and from less to more professionalism. The growing specialization requires more administrative work to keep things together. This probably disperses administrative responsibilities among ever growing numbers of technical and professional employees. Paradoxically, it is this very subdivision and dispersion which themselves compound the difficulty of collecting reliable general statistics on the number of administrators.\(^3\)

It seems reasonable to suppose that the data on Federal (Table 3) and State and Local government employment (Table 4) are susceptible to more straightforward interpretation. Clearly, the plethora of administrative

---

\(^1\)Robert D. Loken and C. J. Thake Winfield, "How Many Managers Are There?" *Current Economic Comment*, 14 (1952), pp. 18-27.


Table 1

U.S. Economic Population in Management, 1900-1974
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>A. Economic Population* (in millions)</th>
<th>B. Managers, excluding farm (in millions)</th>
<th>C. B as percent of A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Up to 1950 defined as economically active; from 1950 defined as total employed.


Table 2

Rise of Nonsalaried Industrial Employment in Selected Industrial Countries, 1895-1950
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rise of Ratio of Salaried to Nonsalaried Industrial Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7.7% to 21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11.8% to 14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>8.6% to 20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.8% to 14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.6% to 21.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

Paid Civilian Employment of the Federal Government: 1901 to 1973
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Legislative</th>
<th>Judicial</th>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Civil Service</th>
<th>Civil Service as percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>231.0</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>380.4</td>
<td>222.3</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>645.4</td>
<td>497.6</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>589.0</td>
<td>462.1</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1,022.9</td>
<td>726.9</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1,934.0</td>
<td>1,638.8</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2,370.9</td>
<td>2,041.0</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2,884.3</td>
<td>2,393.0</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2,722.1</td>
<td>2,605.6*</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adjusted to include, as with other data items under Civil Service, U.S. Postal employees.


Table 4

State and Local Government Employment:
1929 to 1973
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State and Local Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>2,532.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>3,206.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4,098.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5,570.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8,528.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>9,578.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

agencies at all levels of government overwhelmingly account for public service employment. By 1974 there were eleven major executive and forty-two major independent agencies in the Federal Government; the latest edition of the Code of Federal Regulations (1976) lists 306 agencies, and the number of State agencies is no less extensive. The State of Ohio, for instance, has 170 agencies\textsuperscript{4} while even the less industrial State of Mississippi has no less than 117 agencies.\textsuperscript{5} On the lower levels it has been observed that "No one knows how many administrative agencies have been created by municipalities and other units of local government. The number may be in the tens of thousands."\textsuperscript{6} It should be recognized also that the larger slice of both the legislative and the judicial branches of government represent indigenous administration. No doubt one learns something also from those approaches to the subject that show on comparison that the volume of "rule-making" and litigation by administrative organs engulfs legislation by legislatures and adjudication by courts.\textsuperscript{7}


\textsuperscript{5}Provided by letter (without counting criteria) from the Office of the Governor.


\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., p. 14. But within this judgmental framework of conventional categories, could not one argue, rather, for the growth of legislation and adjudication? Such an argument resolves itself into the questions of why
A further review of the data in the preceding tables indicates the substantial development of administration through the course of this century. But growth alone cannot measure the portent of administration for the contemporary human condition. It is surely well attested that administration touches our lives in an endless variety of ways. The extensive economic influence of corporate administration is evidenced by the facts, for example, that 65 per cent of the sales of U.S. industrial corporations, 76 per cent of employment, and 79 per cent of business profits are accounted for by the top 500 U.S. industrial corporations. From government we have utility and other economic regulation, communications and transportation regulation, financial management, education, scientific research and development, and defense, to mention only the beginning.

the summation of these two traditional patterns or their simultaneous expression has come to be lodged in a single institutional practice?; and how under such circumstances is administration distinct? In other words, which is more significant and why: the administrative aspect of law and legislation or the adjudicatory and legislative aspects of administration?--an issue left unclarified on the rim of this conventional analysis. At least one task of administrative theory would be to address this issue.

Care should be given to interpreting the data in Table 1 since the change in the definition of the total (Col. A) beginning in 1950 depresses the percentages (Col. C) from that date relative to those before that date.

There is also the emergence of what has been called the service economy, of claims on welfare, health, and the quality of life concerns so much with us these days. No great amount of insight is required, then, to understand the status of administration as a political issue and as a subject of theoretical inquiry. And two additional points, when juxtaposed, serve to augment the development. On the one hand, an alarming proportion of the potential and even active economic population is either excluded or on the edge of exclusion from the dynamics of the emerging "neo-industrial" system. Poverty, technological unemployment, underemployment, etc., are only surface indicators of this phenomenon. On the other hand, if administration be taken or specified as a type of behavior, rather than as an activity particular only to those designated as administrators, then within the emerging dynamics virtually all participants engage in some, and an increasing degree of, administering. That is, in a shrinking dynamically significant economic population there is an expanding administrative behavioral mode. It might even be argued that, institutionally, it makes more sense to say that ours is an administrative society than to recognize administration as an increasing factor in a commercial or democratic society.

To bring this truly revolutionary development into focus, it is necessary to recognize the administrative mode of behavior as not just pervasive but dominant in modern
so successfully transgressed and blurred the public-private distinction.11

Now while this is not a lonely view, the weight of scholarly opinion does not go so far. For one thing, the literature of import stems largely from, on one side, an alarmist dissent, and from, on the other side, euphoric apologists. Certainly, epithets such as "road to serfdom," neo-mercantilism, and "power elites" are not calculated to admit, although they may serve to suggest, the triumph of administration. Nor are those disposed to soliloquize of "freedom under planning," "big democracy," cooperative federalism or professional service likely to convince the critically minded. In similar vein, the middle ground is held by those who minimize administration out of a myopic

concern with the minutiae of efficiency, merit, and function. Nevertheless, it is worth observing that the most elucidating identifications of our social problems issue from expertise housed administratively; and that inability to grapple with social problems devoid of administrative mechanisms is particularly frustrating to those who harbor in both popular sentiment and sophisticated inquiry an enduring preoccupation, not to say bias, for the legendary deeds of traditional institutions. No social pathologist, at least none comes readily to mind, denies seemingly necessary administrative practice in the identification and resolution of significant social problems. Responsible commentators, therefore, all place administration somewhere in the upper reaches of significance. So much establishes a place for administration in modern society.

Assessments of contemporary administration, what one believes about its nature, also necessarily imply notions of beginnings and endings--its history and prospects. On the former there is now general agreement that the modern "species of the beast," notably the corporation and the regulatory agency, had its birth in the post Civil War era. Although specialists toiled in the field virtually from its inception, they did so largely in the shadow of the conventional business studies and political theory. In fact, the most influential manifestations of its existence were to be
located indirectly in imperfect competition\textsuperscript{12} and anti-trust, both formulated in the terms of market institutions. The rise of administration to the level of essential social significance, and of the discipline to intellectual parity in the post World War II decades, can be traced from the benchmark publications of Lord Hewart's \textit{The New Despotism} and Berle and Means' \textit{The Modern Corporation and Private Property} in 1929 and 1932 respectively.\textsuperscript{13} The recognition and concern evidenced in these works of the unfolding implications of fundamental institutional change follow, true to form, the already accomplished fact. Perhaps Karl Polanyi's pronouncement of market death by 1870 was a premature obituary.\textsuperscript{14} But it is not unreasonable, although certainly unacceptable to the fraternity of "main-stream" economists, to hypostatize the dominance of the corporate organizational form before the turn of the century. And with the advantage of hindsight it seems plausible to suggest what went unnoticed by historical observers: the early passage of public administration from incipiency to authority within


\textsuperscript{13}Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, \textit{The Modern Corporation and Private Property} (New York: Macmillan, 1932); Lord Hewart, \textit{The Despotic Society} (London: Ernest Benn, 1929).

\textsuperscript{14}Karl Polanyi, \textit{The Great Transformation} (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1944).
the realms of government. Thus recently, Holtan P. Odegard has trenchantly submitted that:

Progressive technological complexity finally mounted high enough to give rise to a new dimension in government at a date that may conveniently, though roughly, be set in 1911. That was the year Cannonism was overthrown. . . Since then the weight of administrative activity has tipped the scales, apparently irrevocably, to the glory of the Executive.15

To which one might only add "but not necessarily to the power of the Executive." Hostility to Odegard's assertion might routinely be expected from political theorists. But even administrative theorists are prone either to depict administration as an instrument subject to "higher" direction and control or to formulate administration as a problem in social control. Surely administration cannot be both master and servant. It is possibly neither. In any event, this hiatus does not negate the critical issues generated by administrative forces either dominant or merely ubiquitous.

On the latter--on the prospects of administration--many men believe and fear many things. Views vary from seeing administration as but a prelude to "1984" to a discernment of emerging strains of decay, with perhaps the majority

resting judgment on the loci of decision and control. In any event, in this period of presumed rapidly approaching social crisis, nowhere is confusion and controversy more apparent than over the future role and potential of administration. Even so, brief comments on two factors conditioning these prognostications may focus if not eliminate the imponderables.

One might think that "success" might be the prime element in forecasting the future of an institution, but such is not the case. For one thing, success may be "in spite of" rather than "because of" an institution; and for another thing, a success may be so great as to reduce its origin to a sinecure. It is also the case that "failure" is of equal importance with success in an evaluation, for the more critical element in an institutional projection is located in its demonstrated and emerging incapacities. Three are conspicuous in administration. First, administration has shown itself to be profoundly limited in its ability to forecast the advent, course, and scope of technological change. Second, administration seems particularly unresponsive to social anomie. Third, administration has demonstrated an acute insensitivity to the aesthetic.

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16Cf., for example, Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970), ch. 7; and Reich, The Greening, ch. V. Of course, virtually all students of public administration have had something to say about its future. A standard but thoughtful example would be: Emmette S. Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
Consideration of alternatives is the second constituent element in administrative—and indeed, all social—projections. What are they? Perhaps the most popular alternative calls for the reinvigoration of traditional institutions—implying they are spent. But why did they atrophy in the first place? And by what mechanism might they be energized? Not only does this path reek of antiquarianism, efforts to move down it have thus far conspicuously resulted in walking backward into countervailing bureaucracy—surely, a self-defeating journey. Then there is confronting "the system." But is there a reasonable calculus of justification for confrontation? It has been well said that "There is nothing in the American system that says that those who lose have an obligation to escalate. It's the nature of the system that those who lose accept their loss, and go back and try again."\(^{17}\) The difficulty is that if every other avenue of redress has been explored without success and then confrontation fails also, it is well nigh impossible to try again. This brings us to disengagement—for example, into pastoral life-styles. But there is every indication that in an industrial society the administrative system could endure the parasitism, might even thrive on it. And if it did not, there is cold comfort in the destruction of the host. Then there is that inscrutable bit of whimsy

known as "consciousness III" which will destroy the corporate state "without violence, without seizure of political power, without overthrow of any existing group of people."¹³ This raises mysticism and "pure contemplation" to new heights of omnipotence and is upon analysis, by the way, a sublimely conservative license to believe anything on any basis.

Some tentative conclusions can be drawn: Although it might be nice (albeit infernally dull) if man "got it right to start with," what man actually always faces are the untoward consequences of his previous acts. Administration is one of these. Further, nowhere in contemporary industrial society can there be located any commensurate, actual or potential, institutional alternative to administration. No non-administrative approach to administrative pathology is immediately apparent. Finally, administrative prognosis is indeterminate.

The Unsettled Case of the Administrative State

The aims of the opening section of this chapter were modestly: one, to evidence the advent of administration to prominence in modern society; two, to indicate a diversity of reactions to its presence; and three, to illustrate an infirm grasp of administration—its character and

¹³Reich, The Greening, p. 327.
prospects--by contemporaries. In executing these aims no preference among "types" of administration was intended; in particular, equal concern was distributed between those known commonly as public and private. In the remainder of this study, however, there exists an investigative bias for public, and more particularly, Federal administration. Apart from whatever might influence the interests of the author, two quick justifications for this focalization may be offered. First, because of its long intellectual history the raw materials of investigation have been drawn and coagulated into fields clustering about the contrasting poles of the public-private distinction. When administrative perplexities become conspicuous in the public arena, that lode, it stands to reason, should be mined before prospecting elsewhere. Second, if there be sound grounds for exploring the history of administrative thought, heed must be taken of the primitive and uneven development of the field. The history of public administration thought, for example, does not possess even a single treatise devoted exclusively to the topic. This would seem to suggest reliance on the more explored history of business administration thought. But, especially if the public-private distinction be suspect, an inadequacy in either area reflects derogatively upon the other and thus threatens the entire corpus of the subject. In other words, a relatively comprehensive field development is one requisite for confidence in
sectors. This gives the history of public administration thought some priority. Partiality to the Federal level follows from the application of criteria--exposed in chapter II--negative to localizing interests. It is imperative to recognize, however, that nothing in the (initial) particularization of subject matter requires provincialism in the analysis or parochialism in the conclusions.

In the year 1977 the administrative state is not new. It has not gone unnoticed. Nor can it be said that it lacks theoretical attention; academics from Waldo to Blau testify to that. But while many have wrestled with this feature of government, little visible agreement as to its significance or value has emerged. Hostile critics condemn it as an authoritarian system of privilege and serfdom. Friendly partisans minimize it as subject to the command of the public interest. In any event, friends and foes alike are uneasy, if not negative, over the bearing of public administration in the scheme of things, calling for accountability, countervailing checks, and a revitalization of democratic processes and competitive forces. But these conventional predilections relegate public administration to the fringe of integrity where, thus shorn, it escapes deliberately full and persistently self-correcting examination. In short, the ineluctable fact of the administrative state is as yet an unfocused theoretical issue. This is nowhere more apparent than in the cognate domains of
political economy, administrative issues, and the state of administrative theory itself. 19

The Role of Government in the Economy 20

The struggle to define the economic role of the state has acquired in recent times a certain urgency. The prospects for understanding, never in the 200 year dialogue on the subject utterly dark, remain, nevertheless, unquestionably dim. In his presidential remarks before the American Economic Association, Dr. George Stigler submits the subject, never properly researched, could not be otherwise than indeterminate. 21 Although Professor Stigler does not in so many words say so—doubtless restrained to neutrality by the decorum of the office—those who know his intellectual stance on these matters could confidently predict his conviction that had they been researched the bulk of the

19 Discussion of these fields is limited to indicate theoretical deficiency. Definitiveness is in no way presumed.


functions assumed by governments in the past two centuries would be exposed as fraudulently misplaced and better left to private responsibility; the remainder, of course, could be handled by your friendly local water district. However, it seems fair to observe that the discrepancy between the "pure theory" of the government role and the actual economic practice is reminiscent of the cleavage between such theory and its research operationality.  

22 Even more important—to move to conclusion before rehearsing arguments—is the absence in these ruminations of any suggestion that the deeper problem is lodged in the question asked. Attention has so unswervingly been fixed on elaborating answers that the question has just faded into what Carl Becker called the "climate of opinion" where it "slip[s] off the tongue or pen without fear and without research."  

23 Only impudent insight might guess what assiduous examination would establish: the problem is the framework of analysis that presumes the economic-political distinction. If we are to detribalize this presumption we need to discover the social "age" into which it fits. Such a notion is preeminently a product of the "Age of Reason" which, by splitting knowledge into

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nature and faith, spawned so many plaguy dualisms. We begin, as is customary in Western culture, with Adam.

Adam Smith, it is fair to charge, forged the political-economic vice in which current argumentation on the role of the state in the economy writhe. But the signal accomplishment of Smith rests on the tempering of that vice to the advantage of economics over politics. Curiously, the struggles of the political liberals paved the way for this accomplishment in two important ways. First, they destroyed the myth of divine right. Until this strategic link between the king and divine sovereignty was displaced, the sovereignty of the people--that is, the middle class--could not be effectively expressed. Second, they couched the interests of the entrepreneurial class in the terminology of natural rights. This reversed the assumptions of the doctrine of divine right by subjecting politics to non-political standards. Henceforth, and until the present time, politics holds a contingent position to and becomes the instrument of the sovereign citizen. Further, government is limited not only in its authority to the terms of the "social contract," it is limited in scope as well.24

But it remained for Adam Smith to put "teeth" into the concept of limited government. The hallmark of Smith's genius was the construction--he would say discovery--of a

natural economic system with all the esthetic beauty of the Newtonian natural physical system. This natural order economy is a mechanical system galvanized by self-interest and operating for the general good. Of self-interest, Smith, in a famous passage, says:

*It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantage.*

In a passage of equal renown, Smith speaks on the beneficent results with virginal certitude.

*The natural effort of every man to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often incumbers its operations.*

From this beginning Smith constructs the elements of his view of the role of government in the economy. First, the economy is a natural social system; the government is an artificial social system. The political liberals had cast government in the role of the servant; Smith casts economics as the master. Second, the evaluation of government must be measured against economic laws. From this it


26 *Ibid., II, p. 43.*
follows, third, that unnatural government is economically nonproductive and to its extent reduces the productive potential of the nation. Fourth, Smith, in addition to government, opposes bigness (franchises, monopolies, corporations, and such) as malicious to the natural economy. Fifth, and in spite of the foregoing, Smith allows that government should perform some functions. Chief among these are the protection of private property from which follows national defense, peace and order, and justice and such public works as might be useful but not forthcoming privately.  

Moreover:

Where the individual does not know, or does not have the power to advance, his own interests, Smith feels remarkably free to have the state intervene. . . .

Natural liberty seems to have been little more than a working rule, and Smith proposes numerous departures from natural liberty because the participants are incompetent or fail to consider external effects of their behavior.  

Smith supports his position by historical reference and "reasoning." In a partisan appraisal, Dr. Stigler opines

. . . that Smith displayed superb craftsmanship in supporting his first argument—that free individuals would use resources efficiently—but was excessively dogmatic in asserting his second argument, which accepted the competence but rejected the disinterest of the government machine. He gives no persuasive evidence that the state achieves the goals of its policies, and in particular he asserts rather than proves that the

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27 Ibid., II, p. 185.

mercantile system had a large effect upon the allocation of British resources. Nor does he demonstrate that the state is normally the captive of "partial interests." 29

Frankly, the one or the other--his line of reasoning or his supporting evidence--both seem bootless from the vantage of time. But the interesting question is what explains the immediate and wide acceptance of Smith's beguiling exposition at the time. It is hard to imagine a more ingenious system contrived in a more agreeable climate. On this score, three points seem instructive.

In the first place, Smith's message was in its immediacy profoundly conservative. 30 It denied no one their interests. Indeed, "private vices give public benefits." Further, what should be done about current difficulties? Quesnay had earlier given the classic answer:

As Kings and governors you will find how easy it is to exercise your sacred functions, which simply consist in not interfering with the good that is already being done, and in punishing those few persons who occasionally attack private property. 31

In the second place, Adam Smith legitimized what a large and growing commercial segment of the economic population was already habitually doing. In this he was, retrospectively,

29 Ibid., p. 3.

30 I use the word "conservative" here in a non-political sense.

something of a propagandist or commentator. Be that as it may, the salience of such an achievement has never been apprehended with such style as by J. K. Galbraith.

Man cannot live without an economic theology—without some rationalization of the abstract and seemingly inchoate arrangements which provide him with his livelihood. For this purpose the competitive and classical model had many advantages. It was comprehensive and internally consistent. By asserting that it was a description of reality the conservative could use it as the justification of the existing order. For the reformer it could be a goal, a beacon to mark the path of needed change. Both could be united in the central faith at least as long as nothing happened to strain unduly their capacity for belief.³²

And in response to Smith's infectious self-interest, this antidotal comment by Thurmond Arnold:

Selfish interests cannot form powerful organizations if they frankly recognize that they are selfish and fail to tie themselves up with some respectable myth.³³

It only remains to be said that to suppose Smith a witting spokesman for the bourgeoisie may be to give credit where it is not due; and to imagine guile in the exercise of mythology would be tantamount to rendering it ineffectual. And finally in the third place, Smith couched his system in terms guaranteed to carry conviction. It was the "Age of Newton"; a time when men confidently felt they were grasping the scheme of things. John Randall has said of it:


Newton's great . . . system of the world struck the imagination of the educated class of his time and spread with amazing swiftness. . . . Newton's name became a symbol which called up the picture of the scientific machine-universe, the last word in science, one of those uncriticized preconceptions which largely determined the social and political and religious as well as the strictly scientific thinking of the age. Newton was science; science was the eighteenth century ideal.\textsuperscript{34}

And Smith's system is patently Newtonian.

At no time in economic theory is the influence of the Newtonian concept . . . more clearly shown than in the usual analysis of competitive price. Prices are seen as "gravitating" about a norm or natural point, always being repelled from this point, but also always being forced back toward it by the "pull" of self-interest. The price system . . . moves resources in accordance with natural forces. And price when explained in this fashion is a Newtonian mechanism.\textsuperscript{35}

In consequence, Smith successfully sundered economics from politics and in the process rendered the latter subservient to the former. (Observe likewise the unobtrusive association of economics with the private and politics with the public.)

In Stigler's words--from the superb statement already cited--"Smith's intellectual heirs did little to strengthen his case for \textit{laissez faire}.\textsuperscript{36} Employing with sanguine credulity the legacy of a disjoined economics and


\textsuperscript{35}David Hamilton, \textit{Newtonian Classicism and Darwinian Institutionalism} (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1953), p. 34.

\textsuperscript{36}Stigler, "The Economist," pp. 3-4.
politics, from the younger Mill to the later Marshall a heavy bias for limited government persists, stressing now governmental inefficiency or then noting the susceptibility of governments to self-interest maneuver, but always granting vexacious exceptions to jolt the logic of the case. 37 It does seem mildly contradictory to entrust a market exception to inefficient government. But more clearly to the point, if the competitive market is assumed as the standard, then any intervention distorts. Of course economic laws may be elevated to preeminence but at a less elevated level troublesome exceptions to any unregulated market challenge the presumption. Certainly, political considerations often seem to dictate courses of action antithetical to economic principles. In fact, however, the offenses of governments seem less often to consist of political expediency than of following slavishly the maxims of some defunct economic philosopher with less than providential results. 38 It remains that thus relaxed, the economic-political cleavage takes on a queasy indeterminateness.


Keynesian economics,\textsuperscript{39} it is said, bridges the gap between economics and politics. Unquestionably the Keynesian stance throws a subversive silhouette. Lord Keynes, for one thing, debunks a range of interconnected economic precepts—Say's Law, for one—long held with unhesitating faith by respectable economists. In doing so he finds spurious the received wisdom of market equilibrium at maximum resource utilization—or, for that matter, even reasonable performance. He, therefore, abandons the hazardous compensations of impersonal pecuniary functions to embrace money management as an instrument of public policy. Keynes attempts to demonstrate how swapping the "unseen hand" of the unfettered market for deliberate adjustments of aggregate money flows can solve a limited number of specific problems of the "nation state" economy—most notably full employment.

In the long view, Keynes preserves the prestige of pecuniary analysis. The jerry-built, patch-work plumbing of macroeconomics, relying as it does on the pecuniary folkways, is essentially in the orthodox tradition. In his preoccupation with money flows appropriate to the needs of

the aggregate system, Keynes is silent concerning the non-pecuniary side of public policy. He says nothing--as conversely had Marx and Veblen before him--about social issues or the "real wealth" processes of industrial dynamics. But money management cannot be executed in a vacuum. It will necessarily have social import and create unremitting social reverberations. Surely it can be seen that politically directed or professionally determined purely pecuniary (economic) manipulation will either one or both embroil administration in a context of social legitimacy, tolerance, and reaction. One cannot be had without the other. The influence can be appreciated in neo-Keynesians whose flow of thought always moves from pecuniary considerations to, secondarily and sometimes reluctantly, social issues. It is also significant that by the mid-1930's no one saw fit to doubt the administrative practicality of the new economics. One might even wonder if it was more response to than inducement for administrative mechanisms.

In any event, it is difficult to see how Keynesian theory sorts out and clears up the ambiguities of political economy regarding the role of the state. There is no violation of the recurrent refusal of economics to submit its axioms to admittedly contingent political experience. The substitution of political decisions for the pecuniary logic commands very little receptivity. No guidelines--theoretical or experiential--exist either for reconciling conflict
between or determining the combination of the two. This is why the practice of government, Gunner Myrdal once suggested,

... is an art which is circumscribed by the Actual and the Possible, [his capitalizations] and precisely for this reason can it look to economic science for assistance. 40

And into this already indeterminate economics and politics circularity must be included the administrative factor. In what can only be described as palpable non-sense, political scientists and economists have alike often succumbed to the simplifying assumption that administration is only an instrumentality. But no institution is neutral. The role of the state in the economy is more vexatious and confusing after than before Keynes.

One persevering difficulty in this hubris has been the striking discrepancy between ideals or models and the realities of the economic acts of governments. Peter F. Drucker, as a matter of fact, believes that in modern times governments have always been sufficiently involved with economies to invalidate altogether the so-called laissez faire model. 41 He proposes instead two quite different analytical models: the mercantilist and the constitutionalist. Both of these premise an active relationship between

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the economy and government. The mercantilist, as the name suggests, is the older of the two, going back to the seventeenth and, especially, the eighteenth centuries, and is Drucker's interpretation of the popularly used term in economic history. In this model politics and economics are co-extensive and symbiotic but with the civil authority definitely the senior partner. The economy is administered by government with economic associations of various types functioning quasi-governmenteally. But the overwhelming characteristic is the priority of national sovereignty. "Within the nation-state there may be friction, conflict, competition, dispute . . ." but the national economy is a unified foundation "organized against an outside world."42 In the constitutionalist model an adversary relationship exists between the economy and government with the latter definitely in a residual role. The economy may be limited, regulated, adjudicated, and subjected to moral suasion but, and most importantly, only with authority derived initially from the private domain.

After tracing the historical vagaries, imbrications, and amalgams of these "ecopolitical" styles, Drucker concludes that at most

... these two models have, for well over a century, been the guides and set the norms. They told governments and politicians what should be. They established the criteria for right and wrong in the public mind. They did not perhaps

42 Ibid., p. 354.
determine the business-government relationship, but they set the limits within which specific relationship problems could be worked out on a case-by-case, issue-by-issue, "scandal-by-scandal" basis.\(^{43}\)

But, he goes on to say, at present "both models are obsolescent."\(^{44}\)

The relationship between business and government in every major country is in disrepair. . . . there are no clear rules, little common understanding, and at best a confused patchwork of laws and prejudices, regulations, traditions, and ad hoc improvisation, ranging from guerrilla warfare to the closest partnership. At the same time, there are new major problems which cannot be fitted into the existing relationships.\(^{45}\)

Drucker identifies four major problems. First, there is the mixed economy "in which government activities and business activities intertwine and compete at the same time" and where "what is 'public' and what is 'private,' what is 'government' and what is 'business' can no longer be separated."\(^{46}\) He cites defense procurement and joint tasks (such as NASA) as examples that strain the mercantilist and contradict the constitutionalist models. This view of the mixed economy still relies, however, on the traditional economic-political (government-business, private-public) dualism.\(^{47}\) Second, Drucker notes the rise of the

\(^{43}\)Ibid., p. 357. \(^{44}\)Ibid.

\(^{45}\)Ibid., p. 352. \(^{46}\)Ibid., p. 358.

\(^{47}\)A more insightful conception of the mixed economy might contrast institutions (those "phasing in" and those "phasing out") with a broadly conceived technological process.
multinational corporation and concomitantly "a supernational currency and credit mechanism."\(^{48}\) The resulting "estrangement... of economy and sovereignty"\(^{49}\) undermines the very basis of mercantilism; and the implied moral relativity challenges the moral imperatives of constitutionalism.

Third, the general transition to professional managerialism that has taken place in both the public and private spheres has smeared "old demarcation lines... thereby [invalidating]... the distinction on which both the mercantilist model and the constitutionalist model have been built."\(^{50}\) The crumbling of hierarchically functional distinctions between governmental and market institutions, fourth, means that "other [non-governmental] institutions can no longer be seen, as they were in the mercantilist model, as 'handmaidens' of the Grand Design of national policy."\(^{51}\) And, Drucker goes on to note:

The constitutionalist too has difficulty with a society in which business is expected to assume social responsibility. His position all along, and the basis for his insistence on the adversary relationship to business, has been that business has to be restrained, policed, regulated, limited--and if need be, punished--lest it behave irresponsibly and antisocially. Hence the ambivalence approaching schizophrenia, of the traditional American liberal who demands in the same breath that GM or IBM be split up and that they mobilize their resources to solve major social problems.\(^{52}\)

\(^{48}\)Ibid., p. 360. \(^{49}\)Ibid., p. 359.  
\(^{50}\)Ibid., p. 361. \(^{51}\)Ibid., p. 360.  
\(^{52}\)Ibid., p. 361.
Nor, although Drucker does not say so, will the "denaturalization" of the economy and the "demythologization" of the liberal state elevate the spirits of the adherents of laissez faire.

"Solutions," Drucker admits, "are not within sight." Nevertheless, he does advance two curious guidelines for reformulation of the role of the state in the economy. The first—and by far the more vacuous—of these echos Adam Smith's hasty ecumenism against "bigness," but from an unpersuasive distance: "The fatter government becomes, the flabbier and weaker it actually is." It is all very well to call for the limitation of governmental functions and magnitudes to what is "necessary." But defining what is necessary is precisely the crux of the problem, and it is not very enlightening to declare only that "what is unnecessary is unnecessary." The second of Drucker's guidelines—and by far the more revealing—calls for autonomy in private enterprise as a prerequisite for the granting of authority, and authority is deemed necessary for the imposition of accountability. On the former it is perhaps unkind to question the logic in the absence of definitions but at best it would seem the two bear the relationship to each other of mutuality rather than sequentiality; the latter is clearly a non sequitur. Even more

53Ibid.  
54Ibid., p. 364.  
55Ibid., pp. 362-363.
important, however, than Mr. Drucker's reasoning, if that is possible, is his "test of performance." It is a market test; a self-determining market, yet one in need of regulation. This seems to deny or ignore the developments already clearly enumerated. It surely reintroduces the indeterminateness of a partially "free" and a partially regulated economy. The approach reeks of self-serving ceremony: market enchantments masking administratively directed verdicts. 56

Of course, any summary characterization of the "role of the state" debate not recognizing theoretical heterogeneity would be suspect; but with due respect to the varied and the contentious, it is astonishing how regularly the "market test" provides a convenient base line against which other forces are judged. Indeed, there has emerged a technical branch of economics (welfare economics) 57 tenaciously devoted to the pursuit of this logic. Welfare economics is, substantially, the business of applying correctively the pecuniary logic to imperfect expressions of


57. The literature is ponderous. The following citation is as good a starting place as another: Tibor Scitovsky, Papers on Welfare and Growth (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964).
the market and to some (but not all) of those social areas where pecuniary habits have not otherwise obtained—for example, corrections due to market force distortions by non-market factors, or reckoning market force impingements on non-market factors. However, "The larger fact is the ultimate accommodation of the economic [market] system to an individual choice that is original and innate."\textsuperscript{58} From this tradition has grown an extensive body of thought on market failures and omissions presumably justifying (government) intervention.

One might schematically envision these various grounds for intervention as lying between two poles. At one pole would be a family of market models, in order of market relaxation from purely competitive, monopolistically competitive, oligopolistic, to monopolistic.\textsuperscript{59} At the other pole would be a family of government mechanisms, in order of intervention severity from legislative prescription, regulatory direction, pecuniary management (monetary and fiscal policy), to provision by government (and joint) enterprise. In between are the multifarious conditions that draw economic activity into the orbit of extra-market concern: appropriability, externality, transaction and

\textsuperscript{58} Galbraith, Economics, Peace and Laughter, p. 67.

information costs, defective time horizons, option demand, natural monopoly, etc. The technicalities of this catalogue need not detain us here; to the point however, is the fact that the exercise of these conditions to induce intervention is violated by comparable examples that do not. Moreover, no relationships between the market models and government responses can be stabilized. The proclivities of this formulation are further manifest in such language as market exception, government intervention and in the primacy accorded the application of pecuniary canons. But despite this conservative list to the paradigm—or perhaps because of it—neoliberitarian remonstrances, the polemical aside, are not without force.

To the argument that scientific advances have made governmental growth and control feasible, libertarians answer that feasibility cannot explain the actuality; nor does it follow that increased governmental activity can be credited for the good things that may occur—there is such a thing as spurious correlation. In the absence of other than market criteria by which to judge the economic acts of governments, libertarians can always argue things would have been even better had government not acted—a fairly safe argument since it is not easy to test. A second reason advanced for the expansion of the state is that wealthy societies have income elasticity of demand for government services. But, it might be rejoined, this does not explain
why the activity is governmental in the first place or why the new or increased activity could not be provided by private means. A third argument has it that consumers are increasingly incapable of judging the merits of complex goods, again an argument difficult to refute. But, what is the evidence that governmental agencies can or, at least, do perform this function? It is also true that quite simple affairs are often regulated. Another point often made is that the increasing interdependence of contemporary social life requires governmental assistance. While self-sufficiency has certainly diminished, by what logic does that call for the intervention of government, especially since such intervention is likely to further reduce self-sufficiency. To the argument that the use of political power by the underprivileged and minority groups through increased suffrage and other pressures has increased the scope of the state, the libertarian cries "foul" and points to the abrogation of sound economics as counter-productive to the burdened.

However, preoccupation with market tests may be more peevish ritual than pertinent. Only too often "accepted economic models . . . have not necessarily been the ones that illuminated reality."60 If the process, as there is good reason to suppose, has not been the movement of activities from the market to government but from

60Galbraith, Economics, Peace and Laughter, p. 64.
property and politics to both private and public administrative governance, if the market and political modalities have been supplanted by administrative practices, the problem then becomes one of explaining not only market failures but political failures as well and, even more so, of explaining the sliding of activities along a private-public bureaucratic axis.\footnote{For an interesting and surprising treatment of the varying characteristics between the public and private poles of the administrative axis, read carefully Robin Marris, "Is the Corporate Economy a Corporate State?" American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 62 (May, 1972), pp. 103-115.} In the absence of such enlarged considerations, the economic role of the state is irrelevant to profound realities and remains theoretically inconclusive.\footnote{It must be acknowledged that this subject has not been definitively covered. In particular, the exclusion of Marx will be met with dismay by some and outrage by many. Certainly also, the Cameralist tradition is a notable historical omission; and on the contemporary scene the work of Schumpeter and Galbraith and perhaps some examples of the "critical sociology" movement. But the stated purpose of the exposition attempted was to display theoretical divergency; so much was accomplished. Any further examples would be "beating a dead horse."}

**Vital Issues in Public Administration**

The field of public administration--and administration generally--is littered, like the economic role of the state just discussed, with emotionally charged issues. This state of affairs is due in part no doubt to the recurring tendency to approach the subject with a priori sympathy
or malice. The substitution of morality for demonstrable significance finds its roots ultimately however in the fact that administrative patterns of activity have overrun our traditionally derived categories of practical description. The purpose of the discussion at hand is to explore issues as cultural manifestations of deeper theoretical incapacities. It proceeds in two steps: first, several representative issues are presented; second, the significance and character of issues, per se, are explored.

The scheme of classification employed here clusters issues along four lines: one, the relation of public administration to other social features or factors; two, the role and nature of public administration; three, administrative conduct; and four, professionalism and educational preparation. Since issues are variously contingent, the content of particular issues is a function, to some degree, of how one "grids" the field. Alternative co-ordinates would enumerate different or realigned issues.63 Those exposed here are merely conveniently representative. While the elemental raison d'etre of this study turns on whether modern science may have imposed a revolutionary flux on our cherished "folk wisdom," the immediate discussion confines

itself to the more superficial turbulence found in fashion-
able discourse.

Historically, the justification of public adminis-
tration has been drawn from the steady logic that it is a
neutral instrument forged to realize imported goals. An
early contribution to this view, noted in the previous dis-
cussion, that government is inferior to inexorable economic
principles, has been seriously weakened--first by the loss
of intellectual respectability in "natural order" and,
second, by the practical difficulties of resting the eco-


demic case on the vestigial remnants of market fragments in
a corporate system. Coterminal grounds, however, have
proved more viable. "The epic myth" of public administra-
tion, as Earl Latham has put it,

. . . postulates a first cause in the person of
a creator . . . . It is the creator who fashions
his particular bureaucratic world out of the void.
As this godchief breathes the gift of life into
his creation, there springs into being a structure
of serried ranks, held in the confines of their
accustomed bounds by his will and command. The
mind of this secular divinity is the mind of the
universe he begats, and his will is its will, his
law its law.64

Nominees for this exalted role have been variously postu-
lated: a legislated "will of the people," rule of law, and
the "public interest."65 If the first principle of the

64 Earl Latham, "Hierarchy and Hieratics," in Ideas
and Issues in Public Administration, ed. by Dwight Waldo

65 No attempt seems necessary to cite examples of
the voluminous literature existing on each of these subjects.
liberal state is the subservience of legislation to the will of the electorate, surely its counterpart in the administrative state is the acquiescence of administration to the legislative will. But the latter proves as hollow as the former dissembling. The incapacity of legislation to enunciate sufficient technical detail appropriate to the rationalization of industries and the provision of social services is a notorious commonplace. At the same time, every delegation of legislative (or adjudicative) authority is an embarrassment to constitutional ideals. Caught on the horns of this dilemma, unable to control or withdraw, the congressional role is reduced to *ex post facto* comment or coercive harassment. And although more colorful, the guerrilla tactics and reorganizational peccadilloes of the executive (the Presidential Office) have been more a testament to administrative resiliency than susceptibility. Moreover, the courts have shown a conspicuous reluctance to invade administrative prerogatives.66 And where the courts have assumed jurisdiction, the consequences have been anything but definitive. In brief, it is difficult to resist concluding that social values have gravitated into the

66 The relation of the courts to administration is perhaps more fluid than that of the legislatures; and it may well be that the courts are more significant as a ceremonial legitimizer of public policy than legislatures.
custodial care of administration and that traditional economic and governmental mechanisms have been converted from decisional initiation to ceremonial policy ratification.

The public interest, of course, may be automatically presumed as long as belief in the functional viability of traditional institutions remains undisturbed. But with credulity "pressed to the wall," it rises to the level of anxious concern—and along with it a whole range of correlative issues: the public purpose, social responsibility, and public accountability. In the post World War II decades, the newly raised issue of social control curiously shifted suspicion that public administration was politically vulnerable—that is, that political contamination might circumvent or subvert democratically received directives—to fear that it might be immune to the gusty winds of interest group pressures across its terrain, for if traditional governmental institutions are short-circuited in the policy process, then political orthodoxy makes it imperative that interest groups possess not only administrative access but influence as well. While, it must be admitted, no wide

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68 The classic statement marking this bend in interest is: Paul Appleby, Policy and Administration (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1949).
agreement currently obtains on what overtly constitutes the public interest, by implication it lies in the attainment of interest group consensus or power group equilibrium. 69

Attention therefore centers on the capacity of public administration to absorb and equilibrate environmental values.

The conception of specific institutions as neutral brokers of the value conflicts of other institutions is not new. We have, for example, the traditional view of legislative government 70 and, more recently, Mills's ardent depiction of the "power elite" as unburdened by ideological commitment. 71 Cultural conditioning directs us to value some social arrangements—property, enterprise, law, localism, democracy—as right and proper in and of themselves, while other social arrangements—conspicuously public administration—are invidiously minimized as lacking self-contained integrity. Of course, administered public policy need not, and presumably should not, resist substantial unanimity

69 Although implied in most works, it is perhaps easier to recognize in Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936).

70 See, for example, Benjamin Fletcher Wright (ed.), The Federalist (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), No. 10.

among pertinent interest groups, although its ability to supersede constituency consensus remains a threatening question. The more troublesome eventuality, however, involves the aseptic administrative synthesis of public policy out of adversary circumstances—especially since public administrative organizations are likely to have infectious values and interests of their own to promulgate. Administrative ideology has not been neglected because administrators have none, but because it escapes the perspective employed. Early characterizations of public administration as controlled by multiple values\textsuperscript{72} and directed by "the free reconciliation of group interests"\textsuperscript{73} are now generally accepted as naive. Nevertheless, an older generation of "politically oriented" theorists continue, in their preoccupation with the necessary servility of public administration to democracy, to treat actualities as lapses from the ideal.\textsuperscript{74} A later crew of theorists more cautiously—and more realistically—stress the commingling and mutual adjustment of institutions


\textsuperscript{73}Herring, \textit{Public Administration}, pp. 9-25, 259 and \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{74}A thoughtful statement of this neo-conservatism can be found in Redford, \textit{Democracy in the Administrative State}. 
(including public administration) to each other. The critical question is, then, can public policy resist and unbalance consensus when extant or dictate consensus or balance when absent?

The question, in this context, depends upon the efficacy of interest group analysis. A recital of arguments are beyond the confines of these preliminary remarks, but a survey of the approach lays bare a severe weakness. The difficulty is that group conflict or consensus (balance or imbalance) exists until it doesn't. In either case, the passing of one into the other can be seen only in retrospect. There is no escaping the idle cataloguing of episodic group configurations. This basic indeterminancy in the analysis is of strategic importance; for in bypassing social dynamics for mechanical stability, the public interest comes to rest on ideals not derived from the evidence of performance. Without objective standards, the social control of public administrative processes is without a steady rudder. This is all the more deplorable since the strategic significance


76 From the extensive literature, the best representative work would be David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).
of public administration may turn in part on its leverage in group status relations.\textsuperscript{77}

Sooner or later the inconclusiveness of interest group analysis was bound to invite the final logical ploy to sustain the ideal of democratic control in the administrative state. In his engrossing work \textit{The Politics of Truth},\textsuperscript{78} Holtan P. Odegard proposes the democratization of public administration itself. At least tacitly this proposal accepts public administration as currently both non-democratic and dominant. Since virtually all students of administration are in agreement that it is essentially, and necessarily so, non-democratic and since it is widely held in popular belief that democracy is imperiled by a proliferating bureaucracy, it seems prudent, whatever else might be said about such an effort, to raise the question of the compatibility of administrative and democratic mores. One also wonders, if democratic processes are so ultimately desirable, what occasioned and sustained the development of public administration to dominance in the first place; and, if public administration now prevails, what tactics might

\textsuperscript{77}It might be suggested that inability to account for phasing into and out of consensus or conflict among institutionalized groups points up the need for the expansion of group types—especially technically based groups—sufficient to specify those unfolding behaviors that constitute a "constant" allowing for the derivation of predictable functions. It also suggests that group intensity is less significant than group style.

\textsuperscript{78}Op. cit.
successfully allow democratic processes to reassert themselves. Perhaps these concerns can be effectively addressed but not without abandoning democracy as a first principle beyond doubt and analysis and not without a reassessment of the meaning of modern administration.

It is fair to conclude that the issue of the social control of public administration remains problematical.

The classic case for the necessity— and success— of the public administration organizational form stresses certain characteristic advantages not, at least not easily, inducible in the more traditional institutions. Two of these characteristics are particularly propitious in highlighting issues involving the nature of public administration. First, in the interest of desirable policy continuity, it is maintained that the administrative device is proficient in organizing and bringing to bear requisite content familiarity and expertise in persistent problem areas of technical complexity. This contention, however, is not beyond suspicion. For example, it is with some justification commonly charged that in practice the pursuit

of this advantage tends to establish an interest group domi-
nated or biased administrative leadership. In practice how-
ever, "There can be no doubt that the main source of expert-
ness must be in its staff"$^{80}$ and, for many reasons, more
often than not administrative leadership finds itself at
the mercy of its professional technicians. One might, of
course, advance the charge of "expertise parochialism." But
a more telling reservation calls attention to the information
fragmentation resulting from the hierarchal and compartmental
proclivities in the administrative form. Subjected to these
enduring and arbitrary structural features, administrative
decision-making tends to operate on the simple concept of
mechanical rather than the more sophisticated concept of
integrated deliberation. In other words, the value of
information is debilitated by organizational rigidities
frustrating integration during its generation. To the dis-
tortions of "organizational orthodoxy" must also be added
those of "intellectual orthodoxy." Take, for example, the
prevailing view that factual information is strictly posi-
tivist—that is, in and of itself devoid of normative con-
tent. Such considerations throw into bold relief the issue,
among others, of the role administrative values may play in
the direction and interpretation of its expertise.

Certainly, if public administration is called upon
to provide policy in situations where policy fluctuates

$^{80}$Commission on Organization, Regulatory Commis-
sions, p. 22.
capriciously or is nonexistent, it would seem mildly contradictory to deny its imprint in doing so. To do otherwise, to limit the administrative role to policy execution or enforcement, reduces it to a flatulent appendage. Nevertheless, although administrative imperatives cannot be ignored in the decision to administer an area, the serious intrusion of public administration into the affairs of man does not yet form part of the acceptable ethos of modern society.

That such is the case may be substantiated by the second of the presumed advantages of the public administrative device. In persistent problem areas involving interest group conflict of significant social scope, it is maintained that the public administrative device is independently and impartially receptive to (internal and external) group participation in policy deliberation. But the characterization of public administration as a neutral conduit and repository of clientele values seems as suspect as the previous advantage. For one thing, clientele participation without value influence would seem contradictory and certainly pointless, not to mention unrealistic in practice. Furthermore, the ideological absence, although not the reality, of a political base for public administration weakens it to the indirect influence of clientele interests through executive, legislative, and court intercessions. There is also the difficulty that clientele demands may bias administrative
attention towards episodic contingencies at the expense of longer-term interest necessities which promise some hope of stability and continuity in policy. One wonders then, what is gained if an unsettled interest group conflict is simply imposed upon public administration. Nor can it be reasonably contravened that administrative values mediate the deliberative process. There is in administration, not surprisingly, an inherent bias in favor of administration as opposed to the more traditional, especially market and political, institutional modes of behavior. The more pertinent issue, then, turns on the value contribution by administration to an unsettled problem area.

The problem might be stated thusly. Our expectations of the public administrative role are twofold: First, it is expected that policy analogous to constitutional principles will be developed. However, public administration is not a constituent assembly with legislative capability. Nor is it obvious that dynamic problem situations requiring administrative action are amenable to principles evolved along constitutional lines. Second, it is expected that specific interest group conflicts will be adjusted on a case-by-case approach similar to court procedures. Again, however, while there are superficial similarities to courts—procedures like a court sitting en banc—administrative bodies are fundamentally a "far cry" from the traditional
legal system. And it is readily obvious that public administration is invariably involved in problem areas whose social and technical dynamics preclude the use of precedents, such as used by courts in areas like the common law. Strictly aside from the facts of performance, these expectations arise under the rubric of respectable doctrine simply because administration is governmental.

It appears, therefore, that the advantages advanced for public administration are uncertain. Indeed, little credence can be given to the assertion that it is independent, nonpartisan, and neutral; and there are several indications—especially in its organizational dicta—that public administration runs contrary if not antithetical to the use of requisite expertise.

Beyond mere questions of headless efficiency, it is pointless to dispute an active role to public administration in policy development. Surely, the lack of consensus in social situations obliging administrative remedies is likewise fertile ground for administrative discretion. But the degree to which a "promotional objective" should be cultivated is a matter of dispute. Two models have received particular, perhaps excessive, attention in the literature.

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81 Of course, the administrative aspect of the legal system has swollen to the point that comparisons seem to uncover similarities that are, in fact, spurious.

82 The seeming paradox of administrative support for and interference with expertise will be addressed in the succeeding chapter.
One—apparently based on what the decision process is
(assumed to be)—advocates an evolutionary nudging along of
affairs by a series of incremental steps. The other—
resting more on what the decision process ought to be—pro-
poses establishing administrative policy more aggressively.
Since neither statics nor quantum jumps are argued, what
remains of the contention turns on the practical quality of
policy guidance provided by administrative action. Propo-
nents of incrementalism fear that "needed" administrative
contributions would be retarded by political resistance to
a boldly presented and promoted policy. The view presumes
at least a possible conflict between administratively as
opposed to politically derived policy values; and the degree
of administrative discretion is determined by the threshold
of political awareness. Opponents of incrementalism fear,
on the other hand, that political expediency obscures policy
and deprives programs of responsible administrative review.
However, no framework is provided for the conciliation of

83 The classic statement is: Charles E. Lindblom,
"The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" Public Administration
Review, XIX (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-88.

84 For example, Charles L. Schultze, The Politics
and Economics of Public Spending (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1968), esp. ch. 3.

85 Indeed, one might wonder if the two views are
really all that different. The first may simply be looking
at the working-out of the ramifications of a previous (taken
as given) qualitative change; and the second view may simply
be looking at a long series of changes in terms of its cumu-
labative consequences, i.e., a qualitative change.
interest conflicts with policy objectives and therefore the locus of policy formation remains indefinite.

There is also vagueness in the meaning of policy. Carrying over a long tradition, some believe that within administration policy determination may be separated from policy execution. Herbert Simon, for example, has criticized theorists for concentrating upon "processes and methods for insuring incisive action," leaving aside analysis of "the choice which prefaces all action." Others find this impractical. Paul Appleby, for one, states that:

Executives do not sit at two different desks, treating policy at one and administration at another. Even intellectually, they more often deal with whole problems than they deal with them as exclusively problems of policy or problems of administration.

If policy may be said to be the articulation of effective practice, then it may not be conceived as residing exclusively in some activity anterior to other conduct. But if policy embraces the processes and products of action as well as efforts to predetermine the courses of action—not to mention inadvertent factors—then it may be so all-inclusive as to escape useful meaning. Some have attempted to localize policy by restricting it to abstracted formalism:

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87 Policy, p. 19.
88 Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968).
others by restricting it to specific goal content.\textsuperscript{89} Up until this time, then, the theory of policy, while not chaotic, is certainly adrift.

In summary, the nature and role of public administration is as yet an unsettled issue.

Virtually every aspect of administrative conduct itself—that is, conduct as administrative—suffers from portentous identification or contentious interpretation. A few examples should be indicative. To begin with, it cannot be gainsaid that the hierarchal characteristic of administrative organization is, overtly or covertly, a central element, and rightly so, in all administrative theories. Its function, however, is seldom questioned. Of course modern culturology informs us that rank is, or seems to be, a constituent property of all social institutions.\textsuperscript{90} However, the ideological symbols articulating institutional behavior patterns, especially in more recent times and in the more "modernized" societies, in many cases either pass off as aberrations from the ideal, deny, or do not recognize status relations. But where institutions are conceived as secondary, as mere means to realize the imposed values of primary institutions, where institutions lack self-contained integrity—as noted earlier is conspicuously the case with


public administration--then hierarchy tends to be overtly advanced and emphasized as a functional necessity to their tasks.\textsuperscript{91} Turning again to Latham, he has thus lightly but penetratively observed that:

The principle that maintains this [administrative] form is the concept of hierarchy. Hierarchy is an ordered structure of inferior and superior beings in an ascending scale. The god-chiefs dwell at the apex, from which, with his terrible eye, he can search out the hearts of his lowest subordinates and mold their deed to his command. The graphic picture of this mythic form is the triangular shape associated with pyramids and pup tents. Hierarchy is the linchpin that locks the form. With the mythic creation to bring the bureau into being and the principle of hierarchy to fix its structure, the principal elements of the bureaucratic theology are complete. A vertical godchief fathers an orderly universe, and by his will, fixes the orbits of every star in his administrative galaxy.\textsuperscript{92}

The function of hierarchy, whatever it may prove to be, is, then, an intimate factor in a wide variety of qualitative issues pertaining to administrative conduct.

Sloth and venality aside, anomie has been perhaps the most familiar but also often unacknowledged behavioral issue on public administrative conduct. In the more standard approaches, heavy reliance on the "service objective" deflects serious interest in behavioral health from public administrative to beneficiary organizations. The argument runs to the conclusion that as an instrumentality public

\textsuperscript{91}A good example is: Redford, \textit{Administrative State}, pp. 188-195.

\textsuperscript{92}Latham, "Hierarchy," pp. 105-106.
administration should be judged by the realization of assigned policy objectives. On the one hand then, there emerges an obsession with the clarity and lean efficiency of public administration as a means and, on the other hand, a preoccupation with the evaluation of enriching achievements in target areas. The judgment of means by consequences seems, as far as it goes, logical enough. But it is no less logical, not to mention sensible, to recognize that the quality of ends are determined by the quality of the means employed to attain them. It must unfortunately be recorded, nevertheless, that in each of the two conspicuous exemplifications of sustained interest in the issue of the quality of administrative conduct, the basal significance of the means-ends mutuality is either forfeit, as in the ethical absolutism emanating from religious prescriptions, or blurred, as in the ethical relativism espoused in the "human relations" movement. Moreover, additional limitations in these approaches must be conceded.

93 It would be interesting to study the extent to which enriched target areas are administrative.

94 In this connection, there is the fascinating question of the priority of administrative convenience and administrative feasibility.

For example, there is the eternal question of the consonance of mores thrown together from institutions of divergent cultural sources and histories. Certainly, the "track record" on the adaptability to administrative conduct of fairly stringent behavioral guidelines in the Judeo-Christian tradition is not encouraging. And while thoughtful and formidable in application, "human relations" suffers from a montage of behavioral science principles neither sufficiently conclusive or consistent to advance it beyond a prolegomenon in the development of a theory of administrative conduct.

But by far the more serious limitation is to be found in the persistent failure in theories to bring into focus the strategic significance of the structural imperatives of organizational orthodoxy--power, authority, consensus, balance, order, security, reduction, and all the rest--in coming to grips with the human, or should one say humane, quality of administrative conduct. This may be appreciated in such ambiguities as legitimate and illegitimate authority and "power is necessary but in excess corrupts." If, however, one rises above the simple conception of public administration as a delivery system and entertains it as a receiving and on-going system in its own right as well, then the way is open to seek pertinent answers to some impertinent questions. Are the hierarchal habits of conduct desensitizing to those values that give expansiveness, color, and fulfillment to work and life? Is the
submission to hierarchy a grim adjustment that homogenizes behavior into inertial patterns? Is conduct inconsistent with the codes, rules, and taboos of hierarchy rejected and penalized? Does mastering the structure demean and create a capacity for self-delusion? Is public administration too spare and arid an ecology to sustain, renew, and self-correct itself?\textsuperscript{96} Answers to these and similar questions, when asked, are without a consensus among authorities.

It should also be recorded that the exigencies of organizational orthodoxy bear critically on a farrago of increasingly important matters. Although popular mythology would have the nerve endings of public administration embedded in its social matrix with accountability, responsibility, and disclosure marching to the cadence of the democratic will, a plethora of recent evidence seems to indicate rather that public administration responds more often, if not exclusively, to internal compulsions than to a propitiatory environment. Indeed, even veracity has become an uncomfortable issue.

Finally, something in the nature of a crisis has emerged concerning the redress of grievance within (as well as upon) the administrative process. While the procedures of courts and legislatures have been subjected for many

\textsuperscript{96} The only serious inquiry along this line that we are aware of is one made by Professor Sven Lundstr?dt (unpublished seminar lectures, The Ohio State University, 1974).
decades to the process of protecting persons from discrimination and arbitrary treatment, to the extent that administration falls outside these traditions, it also falls outside the protection of customary rights. Surely the increasing criticism of administrative agencies on procedural grounds highlights the point that if our myth system is inadequate for the inclusion of administrative practices, then administration, through oversight or incompatibility, will be inadequate to provide even the traditional protections within its practice. Although the traditional protections of our historical institutions are often unsatisfactory even in their own context, at least they may be specified. But more significantly, where we do now know what the protections ought to be, then we are confronted with the task of creating, out of the void as it were, protections appropriate to administrative processes. Here is a theoretical issue, it may reasonably be argued, that is of paramount importance for a culture steeped in administrative practice. Yet it remains inchoate in the current literature.

The professionalization of public administration, and less obviously of administration generally, has an uneven history. Frederick C. Mosher has lately cited several negative factors at play in this history.97 He

suggests, for one thing, that antagonism to government as ultimately coercive albeit necessary and, within government, fear of administration as centralizing--that is, as anti-local--have each been extenuating to the prestige of public administration. Perhaps also this point should be amended to include for public administration a somewhat precarious legitimacy. Mosher further makes much of "the emphasis in public-administration literature and education on generalism" and goes on to note:

Most of American public administrators are products of specialized education and experience in a specialty deemed appropriate to the functions of the agencies they are administering; thus, in terms both of temporal sequence and of perceived importance, public administration is, for most of them, a second profession, if a profession at all. [Emphasis added.]

If professionalism is to specialization as pressure groups are to concerted action, then public administration would seem to be professional in some sense for public administrators undeniably constitute interest groups. However, if specialization is a requirement for professionalization and if administration is a generalized rather than a specialized endeavor, with the latter always and necessarily attaching to the former, then the vicissitudes of professionalism in public administration might be expected but not the impetus for it in the first place. Of course, the thesis linking professionalism with specialization may be a limited

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98 Ibid., p. 7.
conception or perhaps generalism is a type of specialization, but the deeper problem would seem to rest in the nature and meaning of administration itself. Certainly, the literature does exhibit a relentless but controversial and illusive search for specificity in the mantling web of public administration.

Further, a lately aroused nervous concern with the purposes and performance of the Higher Learning in the educational preparation for public service careers is generously leavened with the professionalism issue. Leaving a multitude of other contentions aside--virtually every aspect of the educational endeavor is subject to dispute--two polar philosophies are outstanding: the functional and analytical.

In general, the functional view--the dominate view of all professional faculties--takes the cultural context for granted and attempts to provide technical competence in a role. The key concept is "efficiency" and the shibboleth

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is "high standards." This approach has the undeniable advantage of clarity and concreteness; but despite its easy familiarity, this is a simple-minded view unhappily imperiled by a complex and dynamic culture. The functional approach is therefore suffused with the ideas of "response" and "adjustment." An awareness of complexity and change, however, is not a substitute for critical analysis. Without discriminate principles for the selection and organization of materials, breadth is dispersed and dissipated, often into trivia. Clearly, to assume that useful, even necessary, educational activity is therefore desirable educational activity in the formal college program is a non sequitur.

The alternate view stresses critical analysis of the cultural context. The vision here is responsible "reconstruction" and "transformation." The key concept is "criticism" and the shibboleth is "effectiveness." Ordinarily, the practical necessities of role access and survival dilute this approach with some degree of functional incongruity. Also, despite a laudable stress on transcendence and value, an unfortunate tendency towards aestheticism, elitism, and flighty withdrawal often weakens the analytic product.

100 Guidelines and Standards for Professional Masters Degree Programs in Public Affairs/Public Administration (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, 1974).
Of course, most educational efforts are a confused accommodation between these divergent philosophies where, for the most part, the functional view prevails and the analytical view inclines to be more rhetoric than substance. It is predictable that the reconciliation of educational philosophies in the administrative sciences is without prospect for the immediate future.

A final word on the nature of issues. In Western culture it hardly occurs to us to do otherwise than specify a situation by asking "What are the issues?" Although this may have its uses, we must be on guard. It is common to think of this disposition as a logical clarification, that all people necessarily do this; but some cultures do not and we do not always in our own culture. In trying to make issues of our affairs, we may be doing what is familiar, but this is no reason to suppose, as the history of mankind shows, that it follows that the basis for resolution has been established. The tendency to determine issues is neither a trait of human nature or a scientific procedure. Examination reveals that traditional issue formation takes initial values as given and obvious. The drawing of issues, then, tends to reinforce and perpetuate the original perspectives employed, and problems are "mini-maxed" or "solved" by combat. In science, on the other hand, initial frames of reference are provisional and the process of problem solving
tests and revises employed perspectives in a self-correcting procedure.

So it is that the products of inquiry are a function of the process of inquiry and a field of endeavor characterized by stable and proliferating issues may be legitimately suspect as lacking an adequate scientific standing. The field of public administration certainly arouses that suspicion.

The State of Contemporary Public Administration Theory

The immediate objective before us is not an exploration in detail of this complex topic but, rather, a general characterization highlighting weaknesses in the formulation of public administration theories.

Theoretical controversy often seems to evoke faintly contradictory responses from students of public administration: one, that controversy is healthy, an opportunity to develop knowledge, draw conclusions, and make decisions; the other, that the discipline, at least the modern inter-disciplinary version, is young and will eventually resolve outstanding issues. Apparently, both the existence and the elimination of controversy are healthy. Of course, if particular issues can be laid to rest or resolved in the generation of new and more significant issues--through controversy alone, a doubtful thesis--then
the contradiction fades. The second assertion is beyond 
testability since the absence of settlement does not consti-
tute falsification.

Despite visible reservations—the "New Utopians," 
obsolescence in economic theory, and parochialism in behav-
ioral inquiry—academic Boswells credit quantitative meth-
ods, economic analysis, and behavioral science, with some 
justification and roughly in that order, with providing the 
basis for question settlement and discipline development. 
Surely one would agree with those who maintain that the 
understanding of public administration would be impoverished 
if it did not use, in essentials, materials from other 
disciplines. Unfortunately, an enduring feature of such 
efforts has been the successive resting of one theoretical 
system upon a congenial bias from another theoretical sys-
tem. That the mutual contribution and reinforcement of 
assumptions within this popular "troika" stem from common 
roots in the folklore of a parent culture is altogether too 
plausible to ignore.

But it is the nature of "deeper roots" that they 
are hidden by the appearances in broad daylight of the phe-
nomena to which they are presumably subjacent. Theory is 
even more severely limited by the implied demands of the 
audience to which it is addressed. It must be plausible. 
It must contain statements that most "reasonable" men at the 
particular time can accept; it cannot, in other words,
require an acceptance of the unaccustomed. The impediment is obvious when one realizes that strategic theoretical "break-throughs" that wash away stultifying issues entail, virtually without exception, not organized common sense but organized uncommon sense.

If--and it is the propositional "if"--the current plethora of theoretical issues in public administration are based not on operational criteria of evaluation but on melancholy speculations grown into convictions, some insight is garnered on the state of an art where controversy runs unbridled in the presence of a sanguinity of commonly held reputable presuppositions. The tiresome reiteration of issues amply illustrates the presumptive propensities of issue oriented predilections: infatuation with the "social control" of public administration; devotion to administrative functionality; preoccupation with narrow technical virtuosity; a passion for internal standards, etc. The point being that not only is the enumeration of controversy too parsimonious an exercise to comprehensively delineate and definitively evaluate a domain of thought, it serves, further, to mask the possibility that areas of accord may not reflect the cumulation of warranted assertions. At this juncture in the evolution of public administration thought, therefore, an examination of the extent and character of presuppositions and premises seems both wise and critical. However, the provisional conclusion of exigency emanating
from our reconnaissance on the state of contemporary public administration theory is that, irrespective of consensus on "ultimate" or general philosophical principles, working agreement on the semantic and pragmatic dimensions of scientific canons (by which to judge mutual accordance and to bring issues into focus) does not exist.

The always appalling obduracy of respectable doctrine will, of course, "fly in the face" of such a conclusion. But the fertility of a theoretical field to generate self-correction is a legitimate and unavoidable subject.
The primary task of this study is to examine the reasonableness of the conclusion in some selected historical paradigms of public administration with a view toward deriving the (or at least some) criteria a general theory of public administration must embrace if it hopes to achieve appropriateness and operationality to the problems and issues of its evolving practice.

Turning to the History of Thought: Reasons and Goals

One can anticipate, not altogether without grimmness, an uneven reception to the selection of the history of thought as the "data field" in which to prosecute goals. Historical perspectives are unlikely, for example, to have more than a flimsy appeal among practitioners or practitioner-oriented educators. Arid acknowledgment of prevailing theoretical incapacities further places justification for
turning to the history of public administration thought on those grounds in the vanguard of a movement hardly begun. Of course, no one suggests, or should they, that there is no accrual of knowledge in public administration; but neither can it be reasonably held that there are no serious theoretical inadequacies. Controversy does unbalance and unexamined assumptions do menace both inquiry and practice. In any event, an aura of pristine and comfortable indifference to the historical dimensions of current doctrine is a gratuitous imprudence.

While interest in the history of public administration thought is as yet sporadic, one can nonetheless also anticipate a quickening of that interest in the immediate future. Beyond "idle curiosity," such a turn will undoubtedly reflect to some extent, especially for public administration, a drive for status and legitimacy for a subject that has heretofore all too often felt itself a stepchild in academia. But the study of a stream of ideas, if it is to have any genuine intellectual significance, must make some contribution to present understanding. Therefore, while the more remote from our concerns the interest to which historical investigation is made subservient the more openly received may be the findings, only heuristic rather than antiquarian or honorific intentions will suffice to grant substance to the enterprise.
Let us observe, then, that as long as current doctrine is generally accepted as gospel or controversial questions are settled as the corpus of a subject is developed, the history of that doctrine is unlikely to elicit sedulous and critical interest. But, when recalcitrant and proliferating controversy stultifies theoretical development, when doctrine appears impotent to the issues of its presumed pertinency and "higher criticism" occurs, then attention is drawn toward what led to its original formulation and persistent plausability. One thing that makes the development of a set of ideas significant is the light it throws on how those ideas came to acceptance and what they "mean." Too little is known of the Methuselan ability of ideas to inveigle themselves so deep into the genetics of logic that they pass, without arrest, from generation to generation. A turn to the history of thought may also instruct us on how theory might be more artfully constructed. These are our goals.

Within the context of these goals, two reservations to the history of thought as a domain of inquiry--one a question of sufficiency, the other a question of necessity--merit comment. It might be argued by many that the disabilities of a modern theoretical conglomerate are not apt to be sufficiently exposed in the examination of a unilinear "idea-path." It might also be argued by some that a sufficiency of analysis is compromised because current
theory is less a conglomeration than a compound with markedly discriminate characteristics. Granting the foreclosure of complete and final understanding, it would surely go unchallenged that the more comprehensively analyzed are the ideational antecedents of a thought system, the greater the prospects for understanding its strengths and weaknesses as well as discerning its generic discontinuities and continuities. But it puts a strain on credulity to imagine that the intellectual regalia of public administration has been accoutered even primarily by styles of thought extraneous to its own historical fashions or that vexacious controversy may not rest upon an unhesitating faith in received wisdoms. The crux of the matter is that the drowsy attention hitherto accorded the history of public administration thought leaves us with an astonishing paucity of reliable knowledge as to either its actual influence on or, and perhaps even more importantly, its logical apposition to current theoretical paradigms. Moreover, since the history of thought of correlative theoretical systems (economics, the behavioral disciplines, etc., but with the glaring exception of quantification) are either in the process of development or have been assiduously scrutinized, priority as well as tactical considerations point to the exigency of turning to the history of public administration thought. However, it is not maintained here that the history of public administration thought is necessarily "sufficient" but rather
claimed only that it is significantly contributory to the aims set forth for this study.

There are a few who might argue that the history of public administration thought is not a necessary data field for the derivation of general evaluative criteria. Accepting what passes for the ordinary understanding of "history"—an extravagant concession—we are prone to agree. Nevertheless, the reader is reminded that the provisional conclusion of our survey casts grave doubts as to the efficacy of existing theory to self-correct itself. Certainly, appraisal canons are not nakedly self-evident; nor are instabilities reliable indicators of reconstructive resources. There is also the quite mundane consideration that the scope and complexity of a "contemporary" analysis is beyond the reach of a reasonable dissertation topic. The history of public administration thought provides an avenue through which we may reduce to manageable proportions a germane data field. However it is by no means suggested here that the history of public administration thought is the only approach but averred rather that it is a manifestly appropriate approach to announced objectives.

One seldom finds among statements concerning the substantive premises of a study reference to what might be characterized as "sweeping" philosophical predispositions. Such omissions are doubtless to a considerable extent defensive. But it is naive, if not disastrous, to ignore or
deny the influentiality of this larger context on the specifics of an investigation. Thus while it might be deflec-
tive to dwell on broader philosophical orientations, a modest effort to reveal them seems worthwhile. Although, admittedly, what follows is loosely conjectural, it is not enumerated as totally unfounded.

We believe, along with an increasing number of thoughtful scholars, that modern Western society is approaching a crisis point, that it is mid-passage, so to speak, between the endings of one era and the beginnings of another. Certainly, the scale of current problems and the scope of current controversy lends credence to the belief. And yet, in the scramble to grapple with pressing difficulties it is easy to presuppose a previous harmony more apparent than real. If, indeed, the human enterprise is marked by critical turning points, points that usher in characteristic ways of assertion purporting to seize the essential nature of enterprise, then perhaps what makes our time a period of turbulence lies in the fact that many persons believe many, often seemingly contradictory, things to be true.

But even a lack of consensus is an unsteady yardstick for it is not altogether clear that events generating the most controversy have the greatest impact over time. As examples, witness need only be given to the Platonic and Aristotelian variants of Greek science, the tedious
scholastic debate carried on between the "realists" and "nominalists" during the Middle Ages, and, of course, our own distinct traditions of rationalism and empiricism. Even more to the point may be the unexpressed and common assumptions that perch on the rim of otherwise controversial disputation. Thus despite differences, of rationalism and empiricism Karl Popper writes, adherents of both were of a mind

... that there was no need for any man to appeal to authority in matters of truth because each man carried the sources of knowledge in himself; either in his power of sense perception which he may use for the careful observation of nature, or in his power of intellectual intuition which he may use to distinguish truth from falsehood by refusing to accept any idea which is not clearly and distinctly perceived by the intellect.101

Perhaps what must be looked for in any age are not conflicting ideas so much as the pithy "common sense" notions so typically recurrent as to escape notice for, clearly, basic habits of thought do not preclude diversity of view and, in fact, may actually support it.

Of course, one should not minimize contemporary problems, which are urgent enough, or gloss over conflicting views, which are desperate enough, or underestimate the familiar homilies, which are critical enough, but if one seeks the source of that which leaves a period without a firm foundation, he must go beyond surface discourse to the

fundamental modes of thought; it is in the "form" that we cast decline and progress and mold understanding and ignorance.

As the institutional cynosure in the panorama of change which Western civilization is experiencing, our understanding of public administration consequently both shares in and induces the larger obscurities of that process. We forthrightly repudiate primordial quests for the more tangible benefits of a more specific assessment of our understanding of the public administrative phenomenon. Within the previous context of general remarks, the essential question, then, centers on the adequacy of public administration theory, on whether it possesses sufficient ideological malleability to attenuate imponderables.

The general feeling among scholars seems to be that in its modern course public administration has broken away and left adrift in its wake the ideologies of the past. This is always an untrustworthy assumption; and it is precisely this assumption we find too dubious to accept with passivity. In fact, we believe there is good reason to predicate that the ideological cloak in which the understandings of public administration came first to be adorned has not been discarded but only restyled to be worn still with a new rhetoric and fancy jargon. If such be the case, at least one critical element absent from the present social scene is a sufficiently "permissive" ideological discontinuity.
to liberate perhaps essential knowledge concerning, among other things of course, public administration. More specifically, the concern here is with the "social mechanics" of ideology.

In putting the case in the above manner, the word "permissive" was used advisedly--permissive in the sense of acting as an anteriorly facilitative ceremony permitting but not directing knowledge. In other words, ideologies are either more or less a restrictive (or an irrelevant) factor in the process of knowledge itself. There is also a bias of concern for the allowance or restriction of knowledge use rather than the dynamic process of knowledge generation. Of course, both elements are reciprocally necessary for a balanced account, but there are reasons for the emphasis. For instance, it does seem to us that already existing knowledge is improperly interpreted and indifferently employed. To what extent might ideological interference be involved? Then too, ideology is surely one, although not necessarily the only, impediment to the generation of new knowledge. In all of this also, we take the view that the viability of a community is most in jeopardy when inquiry into the character and authenticity of its most cherished beliefs languishes. To stress such an inquiry may serve to nudge us from one era into another without the social dislocations so conspicuously evident in past transformations.
From these "ulterior coordinates" we move in the succeeding chapter to the proximate "directive conceptions" of the study.
CHAPTER II
FASHIONING A FRAME OF REFERENCE

The introductory chapter was essentially contrived to establish that, although still unfocused, administration is linked to institutional transformations and ideological commitments of social scope and significance; that although issues selected for discussion are in a sense arbitrary slices of the prevailing discourse on public administration, they lend credence to grave doubts as to the efficacy of existing theory; and that although public administration is intimately involved in the dynamics of social action, it is not perceived as possessing fundamental values and its functions remain an open question. Such remarks were not designed to induce agreement but to provoke a critical audience; the remarks of the present chapter are not formulated to convince but to procure a familiar and efficacious context for the study and analysis to follow. The opening section explicates the perspective utilized in the inquiry; the middle section specifies key orienting terms; and the closing section elaborates the scheme of the inquiry.
The Social Matrix of Ideational Systems

In theories of the social, ideas (thought, etc.) are overwhelmingly assumed to be extra-social. Virtually all authorities also posit some relationship between social experience and a non-social realm of ideas. Social affairs, for example, may be portrayed as the fulfillment of ideas or ideas may perhaps be envisioned as entirely determined by social conditions. Is public administration the creature of anterior ideas? Or, are ideas about public administration merely reflected rationalizations after the fact? Or if both are supposed possible, when are ideas the one and when the other? Certainly, while ideas may seem to legislate social events, social developments seem as often to legislate ideas; and the difficulty then becomes detecting those exogenous ideas that are the unmoved prime movers of the social scene and segregating them from those exogenous ideas that are the impotent residues of that scene. But such a procedure opens a Pandora's box of indeterminancy; by making of ideas a category in which all social events are subsumed, nothing is explained by explaining everything. Thought so conceived is consigned to a murky region where one finds his way only by proxy through existential action patterns. Such an exercise is stripped of utility since in the one case artificing ideas can only be presumed after their efficacious expression and in the other case whatever is thought it was inevitably predetermined. The traditional theory of ideas
is therefore without implication for social action and thereby essentially untestable.

While the devil himself knoweth not the mind of man, even more to the point is that neither can the scientist. By removing ideas from the social matrix, theories about ideas—sometimes referred to as metatheory—are presumed to require distinctly different methodological and analytical approaches from those employable in behavioral subject matters. But domains of discourse derived by radically divergent methodologies are not susceptible to sensible relationality. It's rather like Mary Parker Follett's friend

Silas Wegg who, when he wanted to know something about Chinese metaphysics, first looked up China in the encyclopedia and then metaphysics and put them together.¹

Of course, it is nowhere "written in concrete" that any specific domain of discourse must or must not be at issue with any other. However, sciencing places data, regardless of other bases for classification, in a common methodological field where, should problematic circumstances dictate it, appropriate relationalities can be exhibited and pursued. In other words, the integration of factual data is precluded by disparate methodologies, fostered by the scientific methodology.

Moreover, any particular fact, say idea fact, only takes on meaning in terms of the relationships it possesses with other facts in a frame of reference. Keeping this in mind, attempts to specify the "when," "how," and "why" of idea facts turn out, in fact, to be the distributional facts of a frame of reference. Unequivocally therefore, if one wishes to investigate ideas as facts, the only reliable method is scientific; and if one wishes to relate idea facts to social facts, all relevant facts, including idea facts, must be unremittingly generated in a social frame of reference. Before turning to the task of formulating a social frame of reference, an additional comment is in order.

The typical exposition of scientific method is: first, realize an unsettled situation; second, research and construct the elements of the problem; third, postulate an hypothesis; fourth, operationally test the hypothesis; and fifth, draw conclusions. This five step exposition, however, overlooks something that is not so obvious or seems important until one comes to the social sciences; namely, a scientific frame of reference is always initially tentative and terminally (not ultimately) settled by its direct and positive role in solution sufficiency. Of course, in many

\[2\] Of course, differences exist on the nature of science; but it is one thing to engage in important but fruitless disputes on the applicability of science, quite another to carry on resolvable dialogue on its nature.
(perhaps most) cases an initial frame of reference may survive virtually intact the process of inquiry; in others it may undergo revisions or suffer abrupt alterations. An excellent example of the latter is found in the historical development of chemistry. A long process of work and research culminating in the concept of elemental substances within the framework of the Periodic Table was so clear and decisive that it marked a clear break with all previous theorizing. This example also illustrates why it is wrong to say that problems are settled in a final sense for they are always settled only within and by a perspective, and perspectives change. Mendeleev's "Table," for instance, proved subsequently inadequate. The point is, scientific perspectives are testable and valid perspectives must await problematic solutions. \(^3\)

Specify the Sociology of Knowledge Perspective

Although it is increasingly clear that knowledge is preeminently social, an uncompromisingly social level of ideas is not apparent in the "mainstream" of social science. To be sure, the social process of knowledge is incredibly complex and no perspective can manage to avoid all

\(^3\)This position varies from that made popular by Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Second ed., Enlarged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). What Kuhn calls a "paradigm," we identify as an ideological framework as opposed to a scientific theory. We argue the existence of both types of ideational modes.
difficulties or answer all questions. But the primary difficulty lies elsewhere. It lies in the doggedly provincial conception of the nature of ideas commonly held in social theory. Even in, for example, the "sociology of knowledge"--which from beginning to end has attempted to come to grips with the social basis of knowledge--there is ordinarily the implication that ideas, although known only through social expression, are themselves non-social. In spite of this and other lapses, we believe that the sociology of knowledge tradition offers advantages as the "raw material" from which an adequate perspective may be honed.

Chief among these is that, flaws notwithstanding, in the sociology of knowledge we have a program consistent in aims to those projected for the study at hand. In fact and in the main, the bearing of (supposed) non-social elements on ideas has either been ignored (by far the usual case) or denied (by far the more desirable case). There has also been the recognition that ideas are something more than the products of mere "thinking individuals," that it is the involvement in social behavior patterns that holds the key to the (social) formation, functions, and effects of ideational processes. And, of course, it is precisely this recognition that has nurtured the hope and the quest for a "science of ideas." It is further the case that from Marx and Mannheim to Merton, Bendix, Stark and the rest, the sociology of knowledge extends a rich theoretical background
which should foster and discipline the development of an improved and adequate perspective. Important contributions --for instance, the notion of ideology--should and can be incorporated in analysis. Moreover, nowhere is "relativism" more clearly exposed as the riddle to be overcome if a perspective is to achieve even a modicum of success in evaluating ideational systems. Finally, but not the least important, the sociology of knowledge provides a familiar context that should accommodate comprehension of the arguments employed in unfolding the perspective to be applied in the course of our study.

No context of inquiry should be regarded as autonomously privileged; the perspective here contemplated is qualified by evaluative objectives. Nor should ecumenism be anticipated in utilizing the sociology of knowledge as the vehicle for forging a perspective; the use of the sociology of knowledge will be highly selective. In matters such as those under discussion, there is always the strong temptation to retreat into unnecessary theoretical sinuosity. Succumbing to this occupational disease can only hazard making alternatives as clear as possible. We will consider the broad sweep, general tendencies, and pervasive dispositions along with specific problems and contributions, but the reader must be as mindful of exclusions as of inclusions. Ours is a, not the, sociology of knowledge perspective. The format is developmental--a logical, and
incidently temporal, sequence of specification-diagnosis-respecification to achieve some measure of adequate dependibility. We lay no claim to final authority; we seek progress in analysis, not a panacea.

Interest in social influences on knowledge can be traced, as with nearly anything else, to classical antiquity. But intellectual geriatrics aside, although the "sociology of knowledge" is a twentieth century phrase, the modern development--a recognized and persistently "scientific" endeavor--finds its origin in the nineteenth century reaction against eighteenth century radical individualism. Supremely theretofore, the ontological reference for ideas resided in some "extra-social" absolute operating a priori through the individual to society and the latter was accorded only a corrupting influence on ideas. "A pre-social, asocial, or antisocial type of man was thought possible and even superior to social man." Dominately thereafter, social factors became the locus--the only considered locus--for dealing with ideas and with "man . . . conceived of as essentially a social creature," society becomes the only source of knowledge.


6Ibid.
Under the impetus of this reorientation of outlook, two themes emerge for a program in the sociology of knowledge. The first involves the social determination of knowledge—that is, the social origins and basis of ideational systems. The second entails the identification of delusory ideas and, therefore concomitantly, the determination of the validity of ideas—that is, the social functions and effects of ideational systems. The typical predilection to sever these two aspects of a program in the sociology of knowledge has been clearly expressed by Karl Mannheim.

The sociology of knowledge is on the one hand a . . . purely empirical investigation through description and structural analysis of the ways in which social relationships, in fact, influence thought. This may pass, in the second place, into an epistemological inquiry concerned with the bearing of this interrelationship upon the problem of validity. It is important to notice that these two types of inquiry are not necessarily connected and one can accept the empirical results without drawing the epistemological conclusions.7

In consequence, while empirical occupations have nowhere, as far as we are aware, been in dispute, reservations have been expressed on evaluative concerns as properly included in the sociology of knowledge.8

In general, a "scientific" sociology of knowledge, it is maintained, should limit itself to matters of fact--


8 By far the most interesting statement of this position is Virgil Hinshaw, "Levels of Analysis," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XI (December, 1950), pp. 213-220.
establishing the ideational systems actually held along with their social origin and basis. Establishing a factual data field, to be sure, must be primary for scientific progress in the sociology of knowledge. But surely few would disagree with Carl Hempel that hypothetico-deductive elements are a procedural sine qua non in establishing facts.\(^9\) Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the significance of factual description except as a prerequisite to determining the value-status of those facts. But dependable understanding and evaluation "cannot be obtained by merely summarizing and inductively generalizing observational findings."\(^{10}\) Again, hypothetico-deductive elements are procedurally required. Plainly, then, a failure to recognize and evaluate theoretical perspective(s) endangers the quality of factual findings; and deprived of evaluative considerations, bare facts are without serious import. Indeed, fact-finding conceived in a non-epistemological context would be senseless and nugatory. It is not surprising then that despite positivist orientations most, if not all, students of the sociology of knowledge have contended eventually, and we believe properly, with normative questions.


\(^{10}\) Ibid.
While among sociologists of knowledge considerable diversity exists on what shall be considered primary and conditioning and secondary and conditioned, primarily, in confining the origin of ideas to the social sphere the traditional specifications posit that they are "the expression of some special social standpoint, or . . . reflect the interests and values dominant in some sector of the human scene at a certain state of its history."\(^{11}\) Or more specifically, "conceptions held . . . are the products of . . . place in society, and are affected by . . . and associated with this social position."\(^{12}\) Marx is habitually cited as perhaps the first prominent exemplar of this position. Here is his mid-nineteenth century statement.

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensible and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.\(^{13}\)


\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 495.

Thus consciousness (or thought) is directly determined by specific social "relations of production" (or institutions) --and through those indirectly by the social "forces of production" (or, more generally, technology) which obtain at a particular time and place.\footnote{Later Marxians tended to posit an interdetermination of ideas and institutions.} The relationship between ideas and institutions is equally typical of non-Marxian scholars. Consider, for example, this interpretation of the pioneer social theorist W. G. Sumner by W. Stark.

In his \textit{[Sumner's]} classic \textit{Folkways}, he suggested that wherever men try to live together, they develop mutual adjustments which harden into a set of customs, supported and secured by social sanctions, which permanently coordinate and control their conduct. These habits of action have as their concomitants habits of the mind, a generalized ethos that permeates the mental life of the society concerned. . . . A society is a society because, and insofar as, it is attuned to certain selected and hierarchically ordered values.\footnote{W. Stark, "The Sociology," p. 476.}

In a later intellectual vintage, the eminent German social philosopher Max Scheler virtually defines a social group in ideational terms.

The knowledge of the members of any group about each other, and the possibility of their mutual 'understanding,' is . . . not something which is added to a social group but something which co-constitutes the object, 'human society.'\footnote{Max Scheler, "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens," in \textit{Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft} (Leipzig: Neue-Geist Verlag, 1926), p. 47. All the translations of Scheler are the author's.}
Necessarily then, "All knowledge . . . is . . . determined by society and its structure."\textsuperscript{17} Or, to elaborate,

Knowledge is always and necessarily co-constituted sociologically, i.e., by the structure of society according to the prevalent perspective of social interests, and further the 'forms' of the mental acts by means of which knowledge is gained.\textsuperscript{18}

From this conception Scheler endeavors to match the rise and elaboration of specific forms of thought with specific types of groups. Sociological-historical relativism is evidenced by Scheler's contention that the sociology of knowledge predicates a "relatively natural Weltanschauung"--that is, all that which is generally viewed, in . . . [a] group, as 'given' without question, and any . . . opinion . . . which generally is held and felt not to require nor to be capable of, any justification.\textsuperscript{19}

Knowledge varies profoundly with different groups.

Karl Mannheim, by far the most celebrated figure in the sociology of knowledge tradition, advances essentially the orthodox view.\textsuperscript{20} As with his predecessors, "actual attitudes . . . are by no means merely of an individual nature."\textsuperscript{21} Ideas,

\ldots do not have their origin in the first place in the individual's becoming aware of his interests in the course of his thinking.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 48. \quad \textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 55.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 59.
\textsuperscript{20}But with one exception to be noted in our respecification.
\textsuperscript{21}Mannheim, Ideology, p. 268.
Rather, they arise out of the collective purposes of a group which underlie the thought of the individual, and in the prescribed outlook of which he merely participates.\textsuperscript{22}

Collective purposes "reveal themselves as the intellectual expressions of conflicting groups struggling for power,"\textsuperscript{23} and "social backgrounds emerge and become recognizable as the invisible forces underlying knowledge."\textsuperscript{24} Mannheim therefore identifies "the sociology of knowledge as a theory of the social or existential determination of actual thinking."\textsuperscript{25} The sociology of knowledge indicates

\textldots a research interest which leads to the raising of the question when and where social structures come to express themselves in the structure of assertions, and in what sense the former concretely determine the latter.\textsuperscript{26}

"The historical and social genesis of an idea,"

Mannheim observes,

\ldots would only be irrelevant to its ultimate validity if the temporal and social conditions of its emergence had no effect on its content and form. If this were the case, any two periods in the history of human knowledge would only be distinguished from one another by the fact that in the earlier period certain things were still unknown and certain errors still existed which, through later knowledge were completely corrected.\textsuperscript{27}

Although such a relationship might be appropriate for the exact sciences over extended periods of time,

\begin{align*}
\textsuperscript{22} & \text{Ibid.} \\
\textsuperscript{23} & \text{Ibid.} \\
\textsuperscript{24} & \text{Ibid., p. 269.} \\
\textsuperscript{25} & \text{Ibid., p. 267.} \\
\textsuperscript{26} & \text{Ibid., p. 266.} \\
\textsuperscript{27} & \text{Ibid., p. 271.}
\end{align*}
For the history of the cultural sciences, however, the earlier stages are not quite so simply superseded by the later stages, and it is not so easily demonstrable that early errors have subsequently been corrected. Every epoch has its fundamentally new approach and its characteristic point of view, and consequently sees the 'same' object from a new perspective.\textsuperscript{28}

Therefore,

If one were to trace in detail, in each individual case, the origin and the radius of diffusion of a certain thought-model, one would discover the peculiar affinity it has to the social position of given groups.\textsuperscript{29}

In brief, perspective--the "whole mode of conceiving"\textsuperscript{30}--is "inevitably differently formed in different social and historical settings."\textsuperscript{31}

Perhaps because, as Robert K. Merton once observed, "the sociology of knowledge remains largely a subject for meditation rather than a field of sustained and methodical investigation,"\textsuperscript{32} more recent approaches, although more eclectic, are nevertheless essentially in the tradition of earlier specifications. For example, in order to "introduce a basis of comparability among the welter of studies which have appeared"\textsuperscript{33} in the sociology of knowledge, Merton

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{28}Ibid.  \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 276.
\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 266.  \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p. 266.
\end{flushleft}
proposes an expansive paradigm. In addition to the customary social functions, purposes, and effects of ideas, the existential (social) basis of mental productions is extended beyond social position, class, and role to include a rather vague potpourri of factors designated as cultural values, mentality, ethos, and Weltanschauungen.  

But the inclusion of general analytic and logical theories only makes explicit what is implicit in the historicist proposition that "the sociology of knowledge came into being with the signal hypothesis that even 'truths' were to be socially accountable, were to be related to the historical society in which they emerged."  

More recently, in an intellectual tour de force on the subject, W. Stark holds:

The true basis of social determination, so far as human thought is concerned, is the process of social interaction, that all important process which consists in the meeting and collaboration of man and man. . . . On the one hand, institutions form themselves and achieve comparative fixity, on the other hand modal ideas; and both poles thus produced--ideas and institutions--are determined by, and characteristic of, the parent reality which has brought them forth.  

The particular usefulness of the sociology of knowledge, Stark believes, is:

It is easier to understand the superstructure through the substructure than the other way about; that strategically it is much wiser to

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34 Ibid., p. 372.  
35 Ibid., p. 371  
go on from a study of a society's institutions to that of its ideas than vice versa.\textsuperscript{37}

These abbreviated selections doubtless neglect much that for others will seem important. But they should be sufficient to obtain in a synthesized interpretation the essential thrust of the sociology of knowledge tradition.

Running throughout this tradition is the notion of structure. "The general concept of structure appears to have been borrowed and adapted from physics (especially classical mechanics) . . . and . . . from biology [especially morphology and physiology]," but "although the comparison of social structures to machines . . . or to organisms was generally intended to be merely analogous,"\textsuperscript{38} a "mechanistic-functional" relationship between stratified parts predominates.\textsuperscript{39} In the case at hand, thought, ideas, or theories are thought of, in general, as a "superstructure" in some manner or other "determined" by a "substructure." Most commonly, the latter is referred to by our authorities as institutional. Of course, the meaning ascribed to institutions varies but the weight of such characterizations as "harden into a set of customs," "comparative fixity," "social (group) interests," and "struggle for power" suggest

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 255.


\textsuperscript{39}Nagel, \textit{Structure}, p. 244.
the word "institution" as denoting those habitual patterns of behavior whose content is myth-sustained, and which are principally identified with ceremonies and status adjustments legitimized by myth systems. This view of institutions is strengthened by the relativism so conspicuous in the sociology of knowledge. It is because the legendary-ceremonial value systems of institutions are by their very nature limited and parochial that they are specific in time and place. And since different institutional practices are indeed significantly different, contact gives rise whenever and wherever it occurs to conflict.

(It would be irresponsible to pass over the references made more than occasionally--Scheler being a notable exception--to the relationship between ideas and technology, modes of production, and the like. But conceptions of that relationship eliminate it in the traditional specifications as a serious alternative to our contention that the operative element is institutional. For many, Sumner is an example, technology is simply translated as another habit or custom which effectively makes it indistinguishable from any "other" institutional practice. For others, Merton and Stark come to mind, technology degenerates into bare artifactual apparatus animated only by institutional practices like occupational roles and property mores which vis a vis

40 C. E. Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), especially chapters VIII and IX.
institutions renders it either an indeterminate factor or, like Marx where it is fundamental, only an indirect determinate of ideas through institutions. In any case, the sine qua non of traditional specifications resides in the compatibility of ideas with the institutional circumstances in which they find their genesis and association.)

Turning to the ideational superstructure, a twofold reductionism is common. In one, extra-social ideas are derived from the social substructure; in the other, "ideas are derived from some extra-ideational source," again a social substructure. In our specimens, and for most students of the sociology of knowledge, this distinction of reductions merges in a rather obvious mentalism. However, the matter is not entirely unequivocal. Merton at one point observes that the sociology of knowledge is "primarily concerned with the relations between knowledge and other existential factors in the society or culture." This statement certainly appears at odds with the notion of the existential basis of mental productions. Both Merton and Stark can be interpreted to see "social ideas" as the existential evidence of "mental processes." But, the methodology establishing existential social institutions and ideas and that


"establishing" extrasocial mental processes exhibit, for a unified approach to knowledge, an embarrassing incongruity. And the question must be raised, what prevents social ideas, as existential, from effecting social institutions and, for that matter, in a "feed-back" fashion mental processes? Indeed, since it signifies little, if anything, to study and know ideas that are residual and without further efficacy, most sociologists of knowledge admit or imply a reciprocal relationship between social ideas and affairs. Aside from the indeterminateness of this methodological muddle, our interpretation of the traditional specifications drives toward certain conclusions.

In light of the commonly employed reduction, ideas appear to have no other sanction than and no other function apart from discrete institutional loci. "Spelled out," ideas express and sanctify, rationalize, legitimate, and justify, perpetuate, defend, and sometimes proselytize the prevailing mores and folkways that uniquely characterize a group in social place and time. Such ideas are best, and usually, classified as ideological. Provisionally, an ideology is a

... set of ideas characteristic of a group, class, or nation that relates certain of their supposed attributes to some more commonly esteemed values in such a way as to bestow honorific status upon them and their institutions and provide the basis for invidious comparisons against their competitors.43

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In spite of the synonymy of behavior patterns and institutions, for reasons that should be apparent and presently shall be considered, many sociologists of knowledge—rightly but unsuccessfully—have striven mightily to avoid equating ideas and ideology. Mannheim writes:

The sociology of knowledge is concerned not so much with distortions due to a deliberate effort to deceive as with the varying ways in which objects present themselves to the subject according to the differences in social settings.44

Therefore,

... we will leave to the theory of ideology only the first forms of the "incorrect" and the untrue, while one-sidedness of observation, which is not due to more or less conscious intent, will be separated from the theory of ideology and treated as the proper subject-matter of the sociology of knowledge.45

And "we shall then, as far as possible, avoid the use of the term 'ideology,' because of its moral connotation, and shall instead speak of the 'perspective' of a thinker."46 But, rejoins Hinshaw:

If sociology of knowledge, as he claims, traces its heritage directly and immediately to the general theory of total ideology, then it is bound to be inextricably tinged with non-scientific, emotive elements.47

More radically, we hold that Mannheim's (partial) assertions based on social structure limited in place and time are in

44Mannheim, Ideology, p. 265.
45Ibid.
46Ibid., p. 266.
toto ideological. Stark also "wiggles on the hook." An ideology, he declares, is:

An idea or system of ideas in the psychological origin of which some selfish or sectional interest or desire has played a part and which would have been different if that interest or desire had not entered in. . . .48

"The doctrine of ideology," he goes on, "thus deals with a cause of intellectual error, rather than with the social element in the pursuit and perception of the truth."49 We might pause to point out that sources of error are certainly social and that the pursuit of truth surely should include an understanding of those sources. In the following excerpts, however, Stark believes a significant distinction can be made.

The sociology of knowledge deals with the formation of a specific world-view, the doctrine of ideology with its deformation; . . . only the former is a truly social science, whereas the latter belongs much rather to the sphere of psychology.50

.............

The . . . [doctrine of ideology] deals with a mode of thinking which is thrown off its proper course, the . . . [sociology of knowledge] with all modes of thinking, and especially with those which form the intellectual framework of our whole world-view and which exist long before any falsifying interest-begotten tendency can assert itself.51

Stark concludes:

49Ibid., p. 53.  
50Ibid., p. 51.
51Ibid., pp. 48-49.
The sociology of knowledge . . . is concerned with one of the conditions of true knowing, namely the social element in the complex of conditions on which all knowledge is dependent.\textsuperscript{52}

But when Stark identifies the "social element"—"Once we have penetrated to the essence of a society's institutional structure, the conquest of its culture and mentality will be relatively easy [Emphasis added]\textsuperscript{53}—ideas turn out to be, under our understanding, once more ideological. Moreover, the introduction by Stark of a neo-Kantian "social a priori,"\textsuperscript{54} results in a paradigm that reinforces our assertion: the "social a priori" (really a sort of presocial mentalism) provides a framework within which social institutions operate to determine the content of extra-social ideas. This social a priori, as noted above, exists "before any falsifying interest-begotten tendency can assert itself," and would leave social institutions an adulterating function—certainly a logical conclusion albeit inconsistent with Stark's overall position.

We have thus far concluded that in the traditional specifications: one, at least the direct determination of ideas is institutional; two, ideas do not attain an unequivocal social status; and three, ideas are ideological. To these must be added a final conclusion. As expressions of institutional egotism, ideologies are without evidential

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p. 97.
\item \textsuperscript{53}Ibid., p. 255.
\item \textsuperscript{54}Ibid., p. 107.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
warrant. What is missing in the popular understandings of ideology is that their presumed causal efficacy is untestable. Let us be clear: Of course the existence of ideologies can be factually ascertained; but the ideological mode precludes the empirical verification of what its content declares. As systems of values ideologies may be believed authoritative; as sets of imperatives they may be blindly prosecuted. But without scientific verification for projected courses of action the (ideological) goals of men have an indeterminate relevance to what actually ensues. An ideological perspective is essentially relativistic since it provides no criteria for (or even for considering) a reformulation and it provides no guidelines for the adjudication of conflict with alternative ideologies. That is, an ideological perspective is static since the dynamics of ideological change are absent in it and, au reste, non-instrumental since it typically reflexively follows the practices it symbolically articulates.

As we begin a diagnosis of traditional specifications, the reader should recall the selective character of what has gone before and of what is to come. There are many facets of the sociology of knowledge passed over in our account.\footnote{55} It is our judgment that these are relatively extraneous to the requirements of our purpose.

\footnote{55}{For example, the question of "imputation" is not considered.}
The initial step in our critique recognizes that in a sociology of knowledge dedicated to an uncompromised explication of thought in social terms, to posit an extra-social mentalism introduces an egregious "category error." The problem of separating an extra-social realm of ideas from a social realm of behavior can be located in the necessity to employ disparate and irreconcilable modes of knowing for the different realms. This introduces incongruity in the perspective and indeterminateness in its application. Moreover, this error obliges taking observable social "materials" (writings, language, communications, and such) as evidence of nonobservable mental structures. The ludicrousness of the exercise can perhaps be most vividly appreciated through a modified analogy used by Hinshaw in another context: It's rather like "trying to determine which, if any, of a number of pictures of a non-existent person are good likenesses."56 However unpalatable, the solution to this error is simple: drop the assumption of extra-social ideas—requiescat in pace—and unremittingly confine analysis to social categories.

Another error, however, is more thorny. Traditional formulations of the sociology of knowledge—victimized, on the one hand, by a myopic homogenization of social groups into a single behavioral type and succumbing, on the

other hand, to a concomitant unilinear determination of ideas—-are guilty of "insufficient enumeration." They fail to elaborate a delimited but sufficiently varied taxonomy to capture the efficacy of an operational theory. It is, for example, more than a theoretical misdemeanor that different types of effects of different types of ideas on extra-ideational features and between ideational elements cannot be conceived and considered. Indeed, the singularity of the postulated ideational-institutional nexus degenerates analysis into tautological and fatalistic (not merely deterministic) description without further implication. The insufficiency of "partial enumeration" condemns the approach as suspiciously ad hoc, tainted with social statics, and essentially itself untestable.

Following "hard at heel" of the foregoing, not only does the ordinary approach isolate a narrow segment of social life and ignore or hallucinate the richly varied remainder into the image of the selected segment, but by characterizing the postulated ideational-institutional nexus as solely customary, ideational implication is quarantined to the fixed and limited social place and time in which the appropriate customs obtain. And so we find in our midst the fallacy of contrariety and the problem of relativism. Hinshaw unfolds the predicament with his customary preciseness:
The very thesis of Wissenssoziologie . . . implies the dilemma of relativism. If every attempt at knowing is a function of one's place in society and history, then relativism is inescapable. Questions the logician: If one claims that relativism is true, then either this very claim is relative and, hence, relativism--if true at all--is not absolutely true; or, perhaps, relativism itself is the only position which can be upheld. But, in that case, if it is true, we can never know it to be so, since all our "knowledge" would be relative.57

Simply put, the dilemma is that the traditional perspective posits a conception of ideas and their social determination which, if applied to itself, renders itself dubiously applicable outside the social conditions of its own genesis and, indeed, it is not without doubt even within those conditions. In "radical relativism,"

. . . not only do different societies entertain different convictions as to what is true and what not, they differ even as to the meaning of the word 'truth' itself.58

"The mortal weakness," Stark declares, "is surely obvious."

Ideas . . . must mean more than 'convention', [sic] 'wide currency' or 'general acceptance'. [sic] . . . [a] test, according to which a belief is valid if it enables its holder to operate smoothly within, and to co-operate smoothly with, his society, is in reality no test at all. In a society of fools, any chosen form of folly would have the highest pragmatic value so far as social co-operation is concerned--but that would not make such folly wisdom, or madness sanity, or error truth.59

58 Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 337.
59 Ibid., p. 335.
Relativism is, then, the "Gordian knot" in the sociology of knowledge program.

And sociologists of knowledge have labored with determination and ingenuity to untie that knot. While in our judgment these efforts have proved unsuccessful, their review should be instructive as a preliminary to attempting a corrective respecification.

Marx tries to overcome the problem of relativism through

... a distinction between delusionary (or 'ideological') and realistic forms of thought, of which the first is said to be characteristic of declining, the last of ascending social classes.60

Among the many reasons why this will not do the job we note: One, there are invariably many, some conflicting, views contending for dominate acceptance. Minority status is, therefore, an insufficient basis for determining "realistic" ideas. Two, it is impossible to disprove and illogical to presume ex post that a dominant system of ideas, and thus delusionary, was previously "realistic" in a minority status. Three, and finally, no logical or experiential basis exists for assuming a final and classless system of "realistic" ideas. Hence, all institutionally based ideas reasonably may, and should, be considered relativistic. Another early, and equally hopeless, attempt to handle relativism is that

advanced by Scheler. What Scheler proposes is an

... absolute-sphere of ideas and values, which
 corresponds to the essential idea of man, very
 much higher above all factual past value-systems
 ... conserving nothing but the idea of the
 eternal, objective logos. To enter the over-
 whelming mysteries of this logos in the form of
 a ... history of the spirit is not possible
 for one nation, one culture ... , one or all
 past cultural periods, but only for all together,
 including the future ones, in solidary, temporal
 as well as spatial cooperation of irreplaceable,
 because individual, unique culture subjects.61

Or, "What Scheler suggests ... is the elaboration of a
 supra-temporal and supra-local synthesis of essential
 insights."62 The operationality of this solution awaits
 the millennium.

Regarding Mannheim's struggles with relativism,
Hinshaw calls attention to "Two ... attempts that are not
so well known."63 In the first, Mannheim writes:

To say that the absolute itself is unfolding in
a genetic process, and that it can be grasped
only from definite positions within the same proc-
ess, in categories which are moulded by the unfold-
ing of the material contact of the genetic flux
itself—to say this is not tantamount to professing
relativism.64

Of this Hinshaw comments (and nothing need be added):


63 V. G. Hinshaw, "The Objectivity of History,"

64 Karl Mannheim, Essays in the Sociology of Knowl-
edge, ed. by Paul Kecskemeti (London: Routledge & Kegan
If . . . Mannheim has correctly postulated or posited . . ., then historical truth and knowledge will only be "dynamic" approximations to the absolute. But here we have a posit or guess promoted to the status of true philosophic worldview which, on the very account of knowing what such a view offers, it would be impossible to validate.\(^65\)

In the second, Mannheim observes:

What if it can be shown that the accusation of relativism derives from a philosophy which professes an inadequate conception of 'absolute' and 'relative'; a philosophy which confronts 'truth' and 'falsehood' in a way which makes sense in the sphere of so-called exact science, but not in history, since in the latter there are aspects of the same subject-matter which can be regarded, not as either true or false, but as essentially dependent on a given perspective or standpoint which can co-exist with others?\(^66\)

This typically German expression depends upon the questionable--we would insist discredited--distinction of the nomothetic and idiographic disciplines--a separation Stark also makes and employs. It is not so much that objectivity and value contamination fall on either side of the equation; but rather a question of how objectivity and value are themselves conceived. In any event, it is patently ridiculous to deny the operation of bias upon science and the existence of warranted imperatives in social affairs. Absolutes and relatives remain!

In the struggle to break loose from relativism, Mannheim eventually embraces what has come to be called

\(^{65}\) Hinshaw, "The Objectivity," pp. 53-54.

\(^{66}\) Mannheim, Essays, p. 93.
"a synthesis of perspectives." Such a synthesis, it is believed, induces "a more detached perspective"—an escape from social locality and provincialism. For all practical purposes, Stark echoes Mannheim in advocating "the sympathetic reception... of the experiences of other, alien societies, divided... in space and time." There is little to recommend this path to paradise. First, we are not provided with even the slightest hint of what might constitute the dynamics of social detachment. Enlarged exposure to or participation in institutional variety might encourage, even require, synthesis. But what explains in the first place the increased exposure and participation? Second, there is something faintly contradictory in declaring all values relative and then recommending a non-relative tolerance. Moreover, criteria for sympathetic reception are lacking. Third, there is again the "real-appearance" problem. How is the "best" composite perspective to be known without access to (the absolute) reality? With access, of course, there would be no problem of relativism. Fourth, the advocacy of composite perspectives presumes a pre-existent harmony amenable to synthesis. But, and especially in light of conflicting and alien perspectives, would the presumption of a pre-existent discordancy be less reasonable? If not, an entire new range of questions and problems would have to be


entertained. Fifth, as previously noted, even Stark recognizes that harmony and agreement alone cannot establish validity. After all, a synthesis may flower, on comparison with alternatives, because of its vacuous irrelevancy or permissiveness. In conclusion, surely these remarks make it clear that not everyone who cries "Lord! Lord!" is destined to enter the gates of Heaven.

There is another effort to defuse relativism that in particular deserves our attention. In a series of articles, 69 Virgil Hinshaw proposes an unusually sophisticated solution based on Charles Morris' linguistic analysis called semiosis. 70, 71 He believes "that once subjected to this... analysis the dilemmas, confusions, and difficulties of Mannheim's 'epistemological sociology of knowledge' 


70 We would anticipate wails of anguish from certain sociologists at the exclusion of Talcott Parsons and the inclusion of a philosopher. But Hinshaw's exposition is far and away the more fruitful and suggestive in comparison with Parsons', whose approach is, in our judgment, rather trivial. In the end, Parsons applies a criterion best described as "survival sufficiency," which is ad hoc and applicable only ex post. Consult Nagel, Structure, pp. 530-531, for confirmation.

immediately disappear."72 The "main thesis" is:

Not only is there no epistemological branch of sociology of knowledge but also . . . if there are epistemological consequences of Wissenssoziologie their investigation belongs to the epistemologist, . . . not to the sociologist of knowledge, who is properly a scientist.73

Accordingly, there is only a "substantive sociology of knowledge" entailing "the analysis of the functional interrelations of social processes and structures on the one hand and the patterns of intellectual life, including the modes of knowing, on the other."74

Applying semiosis--concerning "the processes in which something functions as a sign"75--uncovers three levels of analysis. The first, wherein "sign-interpreter" relations are the desiderata, is pragmatical, a perceptual level where science operates to establish pragmatic truth. The latter must be understood as "verification" and "falsification" and concern centers on "workability" and "effectiveness."

Not only are terms which have no direct or indirect exemplification within experience ruled out, but the statement of theories must be such that they are amenable to scientific test and confirmation or refutation.76

73 Ibid., p. 59.  
74 Ibid., p. 58.
75 Ibid., p. 62
...in actual practice one must be content with no more than successful prediction and control [which] does not give license for the epistemological [sic] identification of effectiveness in inquiry with truth.77

Indeed, "At this level," Hinshaw maintains, "we are most often philosophically dogmatic. We assume, albeit implicitly, a naive realism."78 And when we come to consider the underlying presuppositions of sciencing we necessarily shift to another level and a different kind of truth.

The impossibility of empirical verification is what separates the first level from the remaining two. The second level, wherein "sign-denumatatum" relations are the subject-matter, is semantical, an epistemological level where

...we... distinguish the term 'factually true,' which with its correlative, 'factually false,' can be defined only within a semantical system, that is, within a symbolism that contains (say) the "name relation." Loosely speaking, 'factually true' reflects a correspondence between descriptive sentences and the facts to which they refer.79

It is important "that semantical truth... not be identified with pragmatical truth, or, as one should rather say, with verifiability"80 for "strictly speaking the semantical notion of truth never occurs in any empirically applied

language.  "81 This is no mere assertion on Hinshaw’s part; he gives, among others, these five reasons: First, "there is no a priori rule nor methodological prescription to insure the scientist that he has taken into consideration all the factors relevant to the situation at hand." 82 Second, there are "cases where different operations produce (approximately) the same results." 83 Third, there is "the provisional status of theories" since they "... are subject to drastic alteration and discard." 84 Fourth, in pragmatics, when properly interpreted, there are instances of "indirect, linguistic reductions" of complex statements to their "verification basis." 85 Also, hypothetical statements may occur at all, not just pragmatic, levels. 86 And fifth, "science can no longer be applied because the presuppositions of science itself are under investigation." 87 Since the theory of logical deduction presumably would exist at this level, it would apparently be consistent to hold additionally, although Hinshaw makes no mention of it, that "logic can no longer be applied because the presuppositions of logic itself are under investigation." If so, an already

81 Ibid., p. 87.  
82 Ibid., pp. 83-84.  
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid., pp. 84-85.  
85 Ibid., p. 89.  
86 Ibid., p. 90.  
infirm semantic truth, stripped of both science and logic, slides into limbo.

The third level, wherein "sign-sign" (or "assertion-assertion") relations are the substance, is syntactical, a speculative level itself divisible into two parts. One is analytically formal where through deduction "logical truth" is derived. At least a semblance of the coherence theory of truth would seem to be necessarily involved in "logical truth" although the correspondence theory of truth, held exclusively in the other two levels, is reputedly primary. The other part of this level is, somewhat more vaguely, metaphysics. 88

"Of the three branches of language analysis, it is pragmatics," Hinshaw insists, "which comprises the legitimate scope of the sociology of knowledge." 89 Therefore, "the sociologist of knowledge can, as regards truth, be properly concerned only with what is believed in, what is held or thought to be true," 90 and "in the social conditions under which doctrines and systems of doctrine are current." 91

It might be argued, we believe unwarrantedly, that relativism has simply been shifted out of the sociology of knowledge to remain at another level. It must be

88Ibid., pp. 215-216.
90Ibid.
91Ibid.
admitted that semiosis does seem to lend itself to the sus-
picion of mechanical realignment. But the position advanced
claims to resolve relativism, not manipulate it, and that
claim should not go unfaced. In the end, critical questions
must be directed to the conceptions entertained in and
through semiosis—questions we propose presently to take up.
For the moment, however, we ask instead: "Has relativism
been resolved?" We think not. We make two points. One, as
a perspective, semiosis is itself socially derived and pecu-
liar to a social place and time. Two, semiosis itself
advances a view which can only be interpreted as relativis-
tic. Let us take up point two first.

Suppose we accept the pragmatic establishment of
ideas socially held. The issue of relativism turns on
whether such ideas are "genuine" or, to restate the issue
implied, whether the ideational method of derivation of
those ideas is "genuine." In other words, the issue of
relativism is whether any ideational system can be sanc-
tioned beyond mere acceptance or "belief." Further accept-
ing that this issue falls to the epistemologist rather than
to the sociologist of knowledge, the issue now turns, within
the system under consideration, on the nature of "semantic
truth." Frankly, we are unable, with one exception, to
locate any understandable instance of "semantic truth."
The exception involves assuming that "facts" exist apart
from statements about them, and "semantic truth" is the matching of the two. What this really boils down to is that to say "it is" is tantamount to "'saying it is' is 'true'" and vice versa. Of course, a priori facts (genuine truth) are not in this system, and we would agree in any system, susceptible to verification procedures. Therefore, one either under some social conditions "believes" or under other social conditions "does not believe." This is relativism pure and simple. Nor should we be surprised.

Semiosis is a method for establishing categories (levels) based on the assumption that their content is a priori factually existent. It is not just that interest centers more on defining truth than on the question of how it comes about; it is that truth is presumed a priori rather than established through competent inquiry. And with regard to our second point (above), the fact that semiosis exemplifies what it "preaches" supports our contention that it is peculiar to social place and time. If it is not, it is self-contradictory. Whatever merits this approach may possess, and we find aplenty, resolving relativism is not one of them.

In view of the endemic character of relativism in the traditional specifications, it might seem unwise to

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employ the sociology of knowledge as a vehicle for a study in which ideational evaluation is paramount. If, however, a respecification can overcome this deficiency, and incidently the other defects disclosed in our diagnosis, then the sociology of knowledge perspective should prove both appropriate and adequate to the analysis of thought systems herein contemplated.

With all the aforesaid as background, a respecification must incorporate three attributes. First, all aspects of the analysis must be rendered exclusively in social terms. Second, the analysis must achieve sufficient taxonomic diversity to be determinate—in other words, avoiding indeterminancy and opening the way for warranted judgments. Third, the analysis must account for the dynamics of ideational systems and processes—not only, that is, their extant formulation but their reformulation as well. These requirements for respecification, of course, find their impetus, and should, in the traditional formulations reviewed. That impetus is to some extent—through "interpreted" acceptance or in anticipatory resources—positively fortuitous; to some extent—through problems posed and theoretical failures—negatively ordained, but not thereby less important. The job of respecification will be undertaken in the order of presentation requirements.

Since the social level of analysis has been previously mentioned and will again be considered in the
following section, on this point we shall be brief. Holding strictly to the social expressly means that all categories of analysis shall be treated as observably behavioral and thereby subject to competent (scientific) inquiry and the existence of extra-social factors are expressly denied as without evidential warrant and mischievous when assumed. In particular this means that all aspects of social symboling are not to be considered as expressions of nonobservable referents; and that "science-technology"—and similarly for all so-called "material" elements—shall not be "socially disembodied" to operate remotely as nonbehavioral artifact.

In one sense, this is not a difficult theoretical requirement. It is in another sense quite difficult—not so much as heresy but because it runs cross-grained to our habits. For example, even our language makes it difficult to evade implying or sliding into extra-social voids. Nevertheless, failure to procure an unexceptional social enumeration, however inadvertent, entangles analysis in methodological incongruity and inconclusiveness—both open invitations for all manner of invidious corrective strategems.

"Taxonomic sufficiency" follows as a perspective requirement, in this instance, from the error of "partial enumeration" found in traditional specifications—in fact, an enumeration of only one type of (group) behavior. But while a single style of group behavior is inadequate, neither can a viable taxonomy rely on chaotic pluralism.
"Sufficiency" requires a standard. Mannheim supplies, when developed, an answer. The social determination of knowledge operates problematically.

... (a) every formulation of a problem is made possible only by a previous actual human experience which involves such a problem; (b) in selection from the multiplicity of data there is involved an act of will on the part of the knower; and (c) forces arising out of living experience are significant in the direction which the treatment of the problem follows.\(^9\)

In other words, social knowledge arises in the social selection, formulation, and solution of social problems. But a social problem is a social pathology--something in need of corrective action--and this creates imperatives, two of which are dependable (not certain or final) knowledge and warranted judgments. However, these qualities are frustrated in the traditional specifications.

Although at the critical point conventional specifications stumble into indecisiveness, the institutional-ideological nexus, at least the interpretation given here, is an invaluable and acceptable category of analysis. Power (status or interest) groups undeniably influence social affairs; certainly institutional patterns of behavior significantly influence the course of social development. But clearly also, as a factor in the explosive sweep of recent social history, institutions are altogether too transitory, too latent, and too unpredictable when compared to the

nature and scope of the industrial arts, to provide a reliable explanatory potential. Nor can industrial processes simply be incorporated or absorbed into interest groups—instances of institutional retardation and sabotage of the former and of technological impact on the latter are too well documented. To resolve relativism we must lift analysis from its monolithic attachment to the institutional-ideological nexus without excluding the indispensable contributions it makes.

The necessary amendment surfaces spasmodically throughout the sociology of knowledge tradition. Marx identifies it as the "forces of production" and both Mannheim and Stark recognize an "exact" science devoid of relativism.

Scientific-technological thought differs from philosophical thought in that the former type of thought completes just one and the same system during successive periods, whereas the latter starts from new centres of systematization in every epoch in trying to master the increasing multiplicity of the historical world. Because it is the same system that is being built up in science in the course of the centuries, the phenomenon of change of meaning does not occur in this sphere, and we can picture the process of thought as direct progress towards ultimately "correct" knowledge which can be formulated only in one fashion.

social life raises certain questions both for the scientist and the man of culture. But whereas the answers which the former gives are in content and validity independent of social life, the answers given by the latter are essentially dependent on it, and therein consists the central problem of the sociology of knowledge.

Hinshaw correctly rejects distinctions between "hard" and "soft" sciences and offers a vastly more sophisticated understanding of scientific methodology. He falters, nevertheless, by rejecting the applicability of scientific procedures to formal and epistemological areas of discourse. We venture the opinion that semiosis, in its non-historical and non-developmental conception of language, is too static. It contains only symbols and referents of symbols with people left out. The result is some insights into syntactics, a questionable semantics, and because of its metaphysical epistemological basis (a "spectator theory of the mind" as pure disembodied activity), a fatally flawed pragmatics. But the point is that a science-technology nexus, whatever the defects, has not gone undetected. Since the parochial nature of orthodox social inquiry artificially excludes science-technology as a socially exogenous deus ex machina, it only remains to expose that nexus as a constituent category in the social orbit.

First of all, although obscured by our common predisposition to couch technology in such terms as isolated

inventions, market forces, sundry motives, and similar absurdities, it is nevertheless astounding that the patently distinctive organizational requisites of technological action-patterns have so easily escaped a full and persistent notice. For it is essential to grasp that the reverberatory reticulations inherent in coordinative prerequisites satisfy for technological behavior, no less than status byplay satisfies for power behavior, all the qualities of a social group. The scientific-technological nexus takes on thereby a consistency of approach with the group character of the ideological-institutional nexus.

Second, technological configurations of activity provide a cross-sectional reference by constantly encroaching upon and cutting across various institutional arrangements. A set of diverse institutions such as, for example, "legislative," political," "adjudicative," and "administrative" would all have a common (but not static) technological aspect. In other words, technology is an omnipresent factor in (but not of) institutional affairs.

Third, one need only emphasize the penetrative and expansional dimensions of scientific-technological behavioral modes to realize that ideational "break-throughs" and "take-offs" as well as ideational reformulations involve a non-symmetrical mutuality of different types of ideational modes.

Fourth and passing to the last of our perspective requirements, in our interpretation of standard approaches,
not only is behavioral designation squeezed into behavioral singularity but the "habitual" nature of that designation additionally wrings out behavioral dynamics. This is evidenced in a petulant concern with associating ideas only with specific social fixtures and an incapacity to rise above ideational relativism along with a striking neglect of ideational transformation. Analysis is consequently mired in an institutional setting of unpredictable and inconclusive status machinations. In contrast, the scientific-technological axis generates in the use of empirical verification trans-associational criteria by which possibilities of action may be operationally ascertained and by which the consequences of action undertaken may be measured. This provides the opportunity for amending analysis to include the specification of an alternate style of behavior --social groups whose characteristics are cumulatively self-sustained and self-corrective. In a word, the scientific-technological behavioral mode is dynamic.

Social dynamics has been explored and elaborated extensively by John Dewey on the ideational aspect and by C. E. Ayres on the technological aspect, both of whose works are well known.99 In particular, reference to the latter is recommended inasmuch as our concerns here are understandably centered on ideational processes. Briefly on the former,

99 These works are cited in the next section of this chapter.
the ideas articulating technological processes are instrumental. They serve to direct inquiry and are grounded in social experience. They operate positively as warranted imperatives in the construction and reconstruction of problematic situations by experimental investigation in order to project possible courses of action appropriate to solution sufficiency; the actual consequences of actions undertaken serve to confirm or revise self-correctively the predicted consequences of those actions. Two points need stressing. Possible lines of action grow out of problematic transformations and instrumental ideas are themselves testable as efficacious in their application. Or to put it the other way, ends or goals pressed on problematic situations from "external" sources are inappropriate and warranted ideas are not merely apparently effective but demonstrably efficacious. As we use it here then, the sociology of knowledge is a tool for evaluating social thought systems and processes. And social theories are most effective and dependable when they articulate (create viable symbols for) emerging social reconstruction in problematic contexts.

The theoretical transmutation of technology into group terms, when combined with the already well developed interest group theory, may well be the avenue through which the modern administrative phenomenon can be rendered analytically tractable. Whatever the merits of such an hypothesis, we may pause for only the conspectus of a theory of
group processes. In the first place, a social group is not a collection of individuals but a distinctive style or pattern of activity. Moreover, group space-time is a derivative of its characteristic behavior. Along with other attributes, the essentially repetitive character of interest group behavior associates with it all that might be called "social statics." Along with other attributes, the essentially cumulative character of technological group behavior associates it with all that might be labeled "social dynamics." Relations between interest groups may be supportive, neutral, or combative; if the latter, interest groups do not possess internal criteria for transformation into the alternative states. In particular, ideological distortions of technology prevent determinate predictions of general social change. Relations between technological groups may be integrative, neutral, or "conflictive"; if the latter, technological groups do possess internal criteria for their transformation into the alternative states. In particular, it is possible to bring institutional matters into dependable focus and to extrapolate and institute reasonable courses of social transformation. However, actual transformations in either type

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101 The word "conflict" is perhaps an unfortunate choice. Certainly the same word in an institutional context carries a different connotation.
of group necessarily involve the other. Relative to technological groups, power groups are either neutral or permissive; if the latter, *vis a vis* any particular technological group, germane interest groups are comparatively more or less restrictive. Characteristically, interest groups engage in facilitative ceremonies of justification and legitimization of technological practices. Relative to interest groups, technological groups are either neutral or impactive; if the latter, *vis a vis* any particular interest group, germane technological groups are comparatively more or less disruptive according to their degree of internal dynamism. Characteristically, technological group practices undermine interest group myths. From these bare bones, we believe relativism can be laid to rest.

When we find the relentless extension of technological ways and scientific standards into institutional areas governed by ceremonial values, industrial logic challenges empirically rootless ideologies. The expanded group distinctions in our perspective liberate analysis from the indeterminancy of relativism by locating institutional resistances and interest group conflicts within the framework of an industrial dynamics at the social level. Such a context is an opportunity to specify and bring about in an orderly fashion the institutional transformations requisite to a sufficiently permissive interest group consonance or consensus for the desired technological expression and to
avoid ephemeral vaticinations and institutional flux. It is at this point that administrative arrangements prove critical. Administrative folkways are conspicuously permissive (comparatively less resistant) to expertise—not only experts in guiding and forecasting technological activity but also, although to a lesser extent, experts in monitoring and adjusting interest group relationships.

To recapitulate, our respecification entails:
one, acceptance of the "interpreted" institutional behavioral mode and the (ideological) symboling behaviors articulating that mode; two, expansion to additionally include a technological behavioral mode and the (instrumental) symboling behaviors articulating that mode; and three, introduction of sufficient relationships between these, in the name of a group process theory, to rid analysis of relativism—specifically, a social dynamics based primarily on cognitive value judgments. Since the latter is so controversial, further comments on that subject seem proper. However, our interest is exclusively limited to presenting a position, not developing a "full-blown" theory of valuation or convincing through argumentation.\textsuperscript{102}

Again we rely on Hinshaw as a point of departure. If facts do generate obligatory values, then perceptual level analysis is sufficient for ethics, and that is the end of the matter. For those who believe otherwise, however, the method of levels suggests

that the problem lies on the speculative level. Thus, . . . the method allows at least the statement of nonnaturalistic ethical theories . . . .

Hinshaw has indeed located the major contention bifurcating approaches to the value question—namely, whether values are cognitive or noncognitive. The latter view has been variously defined and defended but, in general, it is held that value judgments are incapable of justification by the procedures, findings, and criteria of science. In other words, valuations are not descriptive statements and, since untestable, cannot be said to be true or false. There is much to recommend the view. No one denies, nor should they, that nontestable value statements are made—that much is verifiable, although when approaching the value field the use of verification procedures are curiously ignored or misused by noncognitivist proponents. Consequently, the usual assertion that values are noncognitive is itself untestable! But what of the former view?

Suppose a verified fact, "the streets are icy," is made and, further, it is asserted that "one ought to drive carefully." It certainly should be clear that in the context of chauffeuring an automobile, to select "icy streets" from a multitude of available facts is to employ --we would argue reasonably albeit tentatively--a valuation that the selected fact is important and, moreover, we would

contend that the valuation is contextually testable. The usual "fact-value" dichotomy is misleading. In this instance and in this context, while there is a difference between the "is" and "ought" statements, that difference is not that one is a fact and the other non-testable, or that one is a value and the other "value-free." The difference is, rather, of a tested and verified statement and a testable but not yet verified statement. In specific contexts then, testable normative statements direct the selection and organization of verified statements as means for projected courses of action; the execution of those courses of action tests the normative statements instrumentality in that function as warranted or unwarranted. If the former, then those statements become materials available to be employed and directed as factual means.

Granting the view just expressed, the more significant question is not whether all values are cognitive or non-cognitive but rather, what are the relationships between two types of value systems. Taking up this question, certainly non-testable (ideological) values are doubtless inevitably and disruptively involved in instrumental affairs. It is well known that many persons, perhaps to some extent all persons, stop reasoning when they come to sensitive belief and moral questions. But this does not establish that it is in principle impossible to use logical and inductive criteria of knowing in ethical and value matters. The
problem is not the existence of institutionally based values but the possibility of their appropriate diminishment.

Granting the involvement of ideological values as a sort of "climate of opinion" within which instrumental activity is on-going, three cases are appropriate to our purposes. First, if institutionally based values are sufficiently permissive to allow the exercise of instrumental values to direct inquiry to successful problematic solutions, then those ideological values are not at issue. Second, if solutions are not forthcoming, then it becomes necessary to inquire as to whether non-testable elements prevent the use or development of knowledge appropriate to the progress of problems at hand. Instrumental inquiry, in this sense, judges ideological values. Third, if the situation is one in which ideological values are in mutual conflict, a situation may be instrumentally constructed in which shared ideological values are located or instituted to serve as a basis for conducting allowable instrumental inquiry into those ideological values in question. As to "practicability," there are the enumerable instances of interfering biases located and excluded from scientific endeavors.

Of course, all values are relational and, in that sense, relative. But when used in social life, value relationships are causal relationships; that is, the invocation of values always has reference to favorable or adverse effects on the context in which they operate. Causal
relationships, however, are of two distinct orders. Those, then, who look to society for lessons should see both sides of it. On one side, value sets are related to some fixity—for example, a circumscribed social position—and each "value set-fixity" relationship, thus encapsulated and whether conceived as one stage in a series of stages or one unit in a conglomerate of units, is incapable of meeting the criteria for verification. Under a presumption of disparity, values necessarily are presumed causally efficacious; that is, they are tribal beliefs, group mores, or ideologies and, relative to like value sets, essentially devisive. These are the value conflicts most commonly recognized and this is the source of value relativism.

On the other side, value sets are contingently related to empirically constructed contexts and are verifiable in those contexts. Each such value set is related to like value sets and thus relative in two senses: one, it is relative to those value sets out of which it demonstrably developed and the existence of which made it possible; and two, since its value is not self-evident but lies in the demonstrable contribution made to other valid values, it is necessarily relative to those values. This is empirical value relationality. The more significant value conflict, then, is that between the two different orders of values or causal systems—the distinction is one of evidentiality.
The former presumes causal efficacy; the latter is demonstrably efficacious in an empirical context.

With this respecification of the sociology of knowledge perspective as a background, we turn next to specify the themes of analysis undertaken in this study.

Specifying the Themes of Analysis

Conventionally, the sociology of knowledge is held to be concerned with the social determination of ideational systems. This turns out, however, to be a misnomer. In fact, it is not the determination of knowledge that is undertaken but the description of ideational systems and the social conditions with which they are associated. Additionally, abstracted generalizations concerning the parameters of social system types that may be associated with a particular type of ideational system and vice versa, are sometimes made. But, as indicated in our diagnosis, these are essentially static concerns; that is, the social origin and development of ideational systems—or for that matter, the decay and demise of ideational systems—is, in the absence of dynamic determinants, limited to primitive ruminations concerning "circulating elites," "utopian strivings," and "social detachment" or ponderous prognostications of "class revolution." It was also noted that the evaluation of ideational systems is generally proclaimed unseasonable in a sociology of knowledge. Notwithstanding, most authorities
consider that matter overtly--since the validity of the con-
ceptions employed in the sociology of knowledge itself is
hard to ignore--or covertly--since the question of validity
is implied in descriptive efforts. Curiously, the descrip-
tion of ideational functionality is a labor generally
accepted when evaluation is not; but, at best, this strikes
us as a weedy distinction.

Our respecification of the sociology of knowledge
alternatively emphasizes what the orthodox specifications
exclude but cannot disregard, the evaluation of thought, in
particular, the functions of thought systems in the context
of social pathology. As we understand it, the sociology of
knowledge might be said to be concerned with: one, the
derivation, formulation, decline, and decomposition and
reformulation--in a word, the evolution--of ideational sys-
tems and processes; two, the functions of ideational systems
and processes; and three, the effects of ideational systems
and processes. More succinctly, the sociology of knowledge
is concerned with ideational "life-cycles."

Of course, the intimacy of such aspects as origin,
function, and effect is only obvious; but distinctions do
suggest loci of emphasis. In that sense, a major and two
minor themes of analysis are operative in this study. Pri-
marily and dominantly, analysis concentrates on ideational
functionality with a view to extract canons of theoretical
adequacy. Next in emphasis is an interest in discriminating
types of effects associated with different ideational styles. Finally, and only incidently, some attention is given to the general contextual determinants of ideational formulation.

While these themes of analysis are all disciplined by the theoretical perspective utilized, a second dimension of emphasis exercised and important to make explicit is that although the major theme is disciplined, we trust rigorously, by a developed data field, such is not the case with the two minor themes of analysis. More in "determinants" than in "effects," but in both, theorizing is speculative and illustrative rather than contingently conclusive.

Within the respecified perspective and keeping in mind these themes of analysis, we now turn to a specification of key orienting terms.

**Specification of Orienting Terms**

There is no need to dwell here on the notorious problems of communication that exist in the social and behavioral sciences. They have been well attested elsewhere. However, to merely acknowledge and, intimidated by sheer magnitude, to ignore altogether the inadequacies of language—inconsistency, incoherence, etc.—will not suffice; nor is it necessary. For one thing, reference can

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be made to the extensive, although hardly conclusive, literature on the subject. But more directly, specification of at least key terms is a minimum requirement. That is the mission now before us.

An immediate problem concerns the selection of terms to be specified. The multiplicity of significant terms in a study of the breadth to be undertaken here precludes exhaustive or even comprehensive selection. However, the character and objectives of our study likewise indicate positive selection criteria: (1) contribution to the parameters and co-ordinates of the data field, (2) consistency with and support for the perspective to be applied, (3) relevance to objectives, and (4) strategic centrality of use. To these we add: (5) minimization of theoretical repetition, and (6) meaning enhancement for terms not selected.  


106 For terms not attended to—such as, for example, social, political, democracy, etc.—two indices of reference are suggested to the reader. First, care should be given to the context in which the term is used. Second, the reader is directed to the use found in the pragmatist tradition in philosophy (especially the works of John Dewey) and the institutionalist tradition in economics (especially the writings of C. E. Ayres).
Utilizing these criteria, the "orienting terms" selected for specification are: idea, history, administration, and public.

Another problem involves the manner of specification. For instance, close to the heart of the difficulties in which this study finds its fons et origio is a startling chaos in the meaning of key terms. And to this must be added the repressive magnitude of inherited meanings. At the outset then, we find ourselves in an atmosphere polluted by flights of vagueness, bewildering diversity, and radical oppositions. Of course, these very corruptions and effusions point to the necessity for terminological specification as a frame of reference for correctional respecification. With this in mind, the modus operandi for specification is navigational rather than stationary; selective-rejective rather than definitional; coordinative rather than particularized; and provisional rather than conclusory. It is our aim, in other words, to generally locate by inclusion-exclusion provisional meanings and to bring more reliable and steady meanings out of inquiry instead of unnecessarily structuring inquiry through a priori fixed and ultimate definitions. Specifically (and leaving the nature of verification aside), we eschew analytics for a pragmatic synthetics.

A final caveat. Although intuition, faith, and revelation have not proven adequate to establish warranted
agreement, neither can a few bare paragraphs allotted to terminological specification lay all or even most questions to rest. It is even likely, indeed desirable, that some new questions will ensue. But it is well to remember that whereas language is the soil in which ambiguity flourishes, it is also the soil nourishing reasonable and reliable growth in understanding. We do entertain, therefore, the hope that our specifications will transpose discordant debate into compositional dialogue by removing questions from the cosmological penumbra in which they are all too often subsumed and placing them in an earthy arena of shared experience.

Idea or Thought

Wide differences of employment suggest the possibility that "idea" may be a word beyond salvage. Moreover, its use is particularly jeopardized by the implications of "mentalism" found in most of the meanings. Except perhaps for finalizing phases of inquiry, however, it is absurd to suppose that discarding it would be anything other than unilateral. As used, however, we unequivocally reject inscrutably private mental operations embedded in mind to adopt as a specification for idea a strictly behavioral account. For it seems to us that even if one believed in a private and mentalistic mind, the significance, the total
significance, of ideas would be their escape by behavioral communication into the common and public arena.

By behavioral we mean organism and environment held in the closest possible conjunction. And by behavioral we mean factual action-patterns. But fact does not just "take place"; the factual must be taken as that which has taken place, does take place, and will take place. Facts are not just "things" or just ultimate "here" and "now" givens; the factual includes the "there," the "later," and the "other." Therefore, ideas as behavioral action-patterns are events with consequent, not a priori imposed, spacial-temporal dimensions.107 And finally, behavioral idea facts should be selectively constructed in terms of their efficacy for emergent possibilities. Summarily then, by specifying ideas as behavioral we mean to place them in an existential and observable context; to declare them amenable to scientific investigation; and to render them susceptible to objective evaluation.108

In particular, this specification is a bold antithesis to the "idea and event" juxtaposition that has bemused

107 The reader is cautioned to realize that in the reports of specimens selected for study, the word "idea" will often, most often, occur as a name for presumed mental existences. We trust these occurrences will be obvious in context.

108 This specification is, of course, in the tradition of C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, whose works are well known. For a closely related view see: Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949).
so many scholars in their writing and perplexed so many readers in their apprehension. If ideas are to be taken as themselves events, then the idea and event formulation must be what Wittgenstein frankly labels a "category error." At bottom, this taxonomic dualism emanates from the "spectator theory of mind." Epistemologically, mental operations --disembodied and without objective content--are passively limited to confronting, possessing, or matching facts (events). Our specification of ideas as objective events introduces an alternative pragmatic epistemology, where ideas have the utility of active intervention in reconstructing human affairs.

We example, but without argumentation, three important exclusions occasioned by our specification. First, rationalism (classical rationalistic mentalism)--in brief, holding that knowledge about nonmental reality is, without observation or experience, independently attainable through the direct inspection of the mind by the mind--is clearly incompatible with the view set forth here. Second, subjectivism and the pragmatic outlook also clearly pass on opposite tracks. Regardless of whatever personal solace it may yield, appeals to some inner source of feelings, intuition, or what have you--so popular these days in existentialist, phenomenological, and humanistic circles--simply has not,

109 This is not to say, of course, that discussions of the relationship mechanics between ideas and events, if properly reinterpreted, may not be insightful.
nor cannot, do the job of clarifying discourse and forward-
ing warranted agreement. And third, formalism must be
equally rejected. By formalism we mean the conversion of
experience (or some segment of experience) into an "inde-
pendent structure" by: one, taking as sound and assured
some set of axioms (truisms); two, subjecting them to speci-
fied transformation rules; and three, utilizing the results
("conclusions") as a guide to explain, describe, or predict
existential events. The purely formal model (mathematical
or otherwise) is the usual expression of formalism in the
social sciences. This is a deductive exercise in which the
results are inherent in and determined by the initial axioms
and rules. As an abstraction "of" some concrete reality,
the model tends to become a mentalistic appearance of a
reality behind all knowing and itself incapable of being
known as fact. Our specification excludes the notion that
ideas are abstractions of reality (or facts).

History

Sweating over the arcane arguments about "covering
laws," maneuvering among dualisms, beset by querulous points
of technique and jarring philosophies, the end of the harrow-
ing journey leaves one with an irrepressible craving for a
clear and scenic route through historiography. Perhaps it
is folly to anticipate that specification within this muddled
field will not leave clarity still on the knees of the gods.
But under the cosmic assumption that what may be laid up in Heaven might be found on earth—at least eventually—we proceed first with rejected conceptions and some brief clarifications.

Conceptions of history, most of them anyway, fall into one of two categories—either idealistic or materialistic. The first of these attempts to explain social evolution as a result of the ideas (purposes, wills, etc.) of human (or supernatural) beings; the latter attempts to explain social evolution in terms of some accessible feature of man's environment. The idealist interpretation therefore implies that ideas make history and can influence the course of social development. The materialist, on the other hand, would say that whether or not any given idea gets accepted depends on something that is not an idea—ordinarily the state of industrial arts. Thus it is history which makes ideas and not vice versa.\(^{110}\)

We have already mentioned the mentalistic implications of idealism; but if ideas are nonmaterial, they are necessarily also extra-social. The kernel of historical dynamics is therefore left without an objective context. One influential critical idealist has thus maintained, for instance, that only in empathy with the intentions in the minds of historical actors can understanding of historical

\(^{110}\)The Marxian tradition is the most obvious example.
events be obtained. \textsuperscript{111} "Put yourself in the other person's shoes" may be excellent advice but how is one to know when the feat has been achieved? Resurrectionist subjectivism, along with all other forms of idealism, are without credentials in our specification of history.

If idealism be rejected, so also must materialism be rejected; for if materials are nonideational, they are necessarily also extra-social. Therefore from both sides of the idealism-materialism dualism we have posited prime movers exogenous to social behavior. But surely it is obvious that material artifacts cannot be at once merely a utilitarian trapping of the social scene and the unmoved mover of that scene--and thus indirectly the determining force in ideational processes.

Perhaps the most popular conception of history is that it is an approximation of a factually real but irrecoverable past. Here history is, as approximational to an unknown and unknowable past reality, a variant of naive realism, where theory is but an appearance of an unknown and unknowable deeper reality. The problem with either is that there is simply no way to know among diverse views which is the better in terms of correspondence, coherence, or completeness with a non-existent realm.

If in an analysis of approaches to history the basic problem is determining the adequacy of the explanation, it would seem, at first blush, a simple matter of subjecting the theory to the facts. But this is highly misleading. This requires, for one thing, contemporaneous data. Moreover, in the face of the same brute facts, different interpretations may seemingly be given. It has often been held, then, that the only remaining test is that of logic. However, no matter how grandiose, a syllogistic style of reasoning cannot resolve this dilemma. Only empirical verification, not analytic inspection, has in the course of human affairs served as a reliable judgmental device.

We turn next to some preliminary clarifications—hopefully expeditious to specification. One major controversy in historiography concerns whether the subject is idiographic or nomothetic; that is, are historical materials atomistically particularized or are they repeatable phenomena from which general covering laws may be derived and to which they may be applied. We take the unqualified position that neither particularizing nor generalizing may take place in the absence of the other.\(^{112}\) In other words, there is nothing in the nature of history, qua subject, that distinguishes it from any other subject. Hard on the heels of this first controversy, and emanating from it, is a second

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concerning the appropriate methodology, to wit: are scientific approaches to history possible? Acknowledging variation in instrumentalities, techniques, and materials, proponents of the covering law approach and the unity of science, as do we, answer this question affirmatively. A third difficulty involves the question of value contamination in historical (and social) studies. Granting the difficulty, we do not see that it is peculiar to historical study and we do call attention to the progress that has been made toward the development of rational justifications for value judgments. Finally, there is in our view a deplorable neglect in historical studies of the culturological perspective. We would resolutely confine the social history of any topic, and certainly of ideas, to whatever rigor the concept of culture might bring to our efforts.

Several conceptions of history anticipate or contribute to the specification of history we would advance--


historical "creation,"\textsuperscript{116} historical "reconstruction,"\textsuperscript{117} historical "transformation,"\textsuperscript{118} are examples--but the approaches of G. H. Mead\textsuperscript{119} and John Dewey\textsuperscript{120} suffer, from our point of view, the fewer deficiencies.\textsuperscript{121}

"Realities," including "historical realities," exist in, and only in, on-going social experience. There is no such thing as a real past as an entity behind us or, for that matter, a real future as an entity ahead of us; both the past and the future are aspects of an unfolding "present." The present is not, then, an episodic and transitory moment but an event in progress.

"As the new present arises, the past is the past of a different present."\textsuperscript{122} Dewey's comment calls attention to the fact that recognition of change in social states and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} M. Oakeshott, \textit{Experience and Its Modes} (Cambridge: The University Press, 1933).
\item \textsuperscript{117} E. Cassirer, \textit{The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science and History Since Hegel} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).
\item \textsuperscript{118} F. J. E. Woodbridge, \textit{The Purpose of History} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916).
\item \textsuperscript{119} G. H. Mead, \textit{The Philosophy of the Present}, ed. by A. E. Murphy (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1932).
\item \textsuperscript{120} John Dewey, \textit{Logic: The Theory of Inquiry} (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), ch. XII.
\item \textsuperscript{121} For a trenchant alternative view see: Virgil Hinshaw, "The Objectivity of History," \textit{Philosophy of Science}, 25 (January, 1958), pp. 51-58.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Dewey, \textit{Logic}, p. 239.
\end{itemize}
institutions, the emergence of novelty, makes the past a past and occasions history. The blossoming of emergent novelty has the double-barreled effect of respecifying social problems and reordering historical perspectives. The necessity for constant reselection and reorganization of historical materials means, therefore, that the past is not reclaimed but recreated. As Dewey observes, "The notion that historical inquiry simply reinstates the events that once happened 'as they actually happened' is incredibly naive."123 History is the never ending process of recreating the past of an emerging present.

Surely few, if any would argue with Dewey's admonition that "it is valuable . . . to avoid prejudice, to struggle for . . . objectivity and impartiality, and . . . to exercise caution in determining the authenticity of material proposed as potential data."124 But Dewey goes on to make clear that a changing past is not only inevitable, it is also instrumental. "All history is necessarily written from the standpoint of the present, and . . . is the history not only of the present but of that which is contemporaneously judged to be important [Emphasis added] in the present."125 Most scholars would condescend Dewey's point, nevertheless asserting that while interpretations may vary, the past does not. But, if history is necessarily interpretational, what

123 Ibid., p. 236.  
124 Ibid.  
125 Ibid., p. 235.
shall prevent self-serving constructions? Perhaps this ques-
tion explains, on the one hand, the widespread insistence
that history is a humanistic and not a (social) scientific
discipline; and, on the other hand, the quest for certainty
so apparent in realist conceptions of the past. But the
central issue turns on the nature of value judgments. Dewey,
as do we, denies that all judgmental propositions must be
non-cognitive. For it is only through grounded judgment
that history might be used to unravel the present to expose
and to articulate the means for effectuating futures free of
the difficulties and deficiencies that presently burden our
lives.

We conclude by calling attention to the compati-
bility, even mutual support, between the specifications of
idea and history herein given.

Administration

It is a measure of the paucity of solid accomplish-
ment in the theory of public administration that in the
entire lexicon of that field no term is more vague and arbi-
trary than administration itself. In the broadest sense,
this deficiency is profoundly historical. When in the twi-
light of the nineteenth century recognition and attention
came to the administrative phenomenon, Western society had
already formed its impression of itself as market directed
and democratically governed. In the context of that
commitment, administration was conceived as ancillary to more fundamental institutions and administrative functions were invidiously minimized as secondary and derivative. The effect was to withhold of administrative theory at the outset an unbounded critical analysis. To be sure, administration looms larger as from the present we see the past more clearly, and surely also, we are less naive about the character of administrative processes. Nevertheless, earlier conceptions linger to corrupt those held currently.

Thus, one authority flatly asserts that administration, at least primarily, is

\[\ldots\text{ concerned }\ldots\text{ with the implementing of policy received from outside and above itself, and as having to act within limits set by rules prescribed and interpreted outside itself.}\]

And another postulates that "administration is \ldots\text{ concerned with facts, execution, means, accountability, methods, laws, and structures.}"\(^{126}\) Such typical statements clearly posit a generic difference between administration and the derivation of policy. Further, language like "concerned with" and "facilitating" contrives to imply some distinction between administration and the execution of policy. Moreover, it happens that goals and means as ordinarily defined leave a gap in which administration, supposedly directed by


\(^{127}\text{Gerald E. Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1971), p. 100.}\)
the former and facilitating the latter, is not adequately explained in the theory of either. Taken together, these disjunctions and definitions deliver understanding into the pit.

Beyond historical bias, errors in specificational procedure must share the blame for the chimerical state of understanding that persists concerning the nature of administration. One of these, based on the presumption that the subject-predicate structure of our language mirrors "reality," is the habit of first defining something, in this case administration, and then additionally and separately its properties. But we do not have administration and its attributes; administration is (stands for) the attributes which objectively form a meaningful configuration. The eventualities of this error are grievous. So conceived, definitions must be "stable" in order to distinguish them from attributes. Definitions drive, therefore, for essentiality, for permanence. This explains why definitions tend to be formally tautological or abstractly general. The former introduces, as we have previously pointed out, difficulties for objective verification; the latter introduces a rather capricious movement from the thing defined to its (presumably variable) attributes. That is, the (extensional) denotative power is weak—sometimes arbitrarily restrictive; sometimes virtually without direction.
It might correctly be pointed out that efforts to bring administration into focus have concentrated, irrespective of definitional limitations, on enumerating attributes. However, a further error has clouded this work. In addition to the restraining influence of explicit and implicit a priori assumptions—for example the servile status of public administration that has stained the integrity of analysis—there is an understanding proclivity to interpret newly emerged habits of conduct in terms of more traditional social arrangements. Public administration is often characterized as "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial," which has the effect of preserving the focus of inquiry inside traditional categories, leaving distinctive administrative factors on the fringe, neither completely ignored nor fully explained.

The high pace of administrative penetration into social affairs makes intolerable a low order of understanding. Therefore, strenuous attempts to replace an earlier "take it for granted" tolerance of administration with an expanded determination have taken place. Three are especially noteworthy. First, there are those who have located administration in the higher echelons of hierarchically structured formal organizations as a functional intermediary bridging values and means.128 However, mounting evidence that hierarchy is often indifferent or even hostile to some ends and means—

128 Most scholars of administration fall into this category to some extent but we have in mind especially the "organizational analysis" movement and the Human Relations School.
in particular the logic of technical usage and evidential imperatives\textsuperscript{129}—has reduced aloofness to the distinction between the protestation and the performance of functionality and raised the question of the reference for administrative functions. Second, there are those who overlap or enfold administration and policy,\textsuperscript{130} which, in the absence of agreement on the nature of policy, merely transfers the locus of the problem. Third, there are those who confine administration to the execution of means \textit{per se},\textsuperscript{131} a reductionism that compels the question "how do administrative means differ from other types of means?" Are we left thrice confounded?

Although reliable specifications of administration have not emerged, we do not suggest that nothing of interest or significance has been said. The use of inherited perspectives and analogical techniques, of course, tells us something. But these stratagems do not lift analysis from a basic indeterminacy. Quintessentially, the problem is

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{129} Recognition of this hierarchal characteristic is scattered. For a typical "flirt" with this conception see: Victor Thompson, \textit{Modern Organization} (New York: Knopf, 1961); the classic statement is by Thorstein Veblen, \textit{The Theory of Business Enterprise} (New York: Viking, 1904), Ch. 1.

\item \textsuperscript{130} This approach was probably first effectively expressed in: Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (editors), \textit{The Policy Sciences} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951).

\item \textsuperscript{131} We have in mind the early "scientific management" school and the later "management science" development.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
taxonomic. Overwhelmingly, authorities postulate only one type of social behavior: institutional (or interest group) activity. In so doing, analysis is confined to relationships between institutions: the functional contribution of "secondary" institutions to the purposes of "primary" institutions and the clash of institutions with cross-purposes. This monolithic attachment when juxtaposed with the common assumption that institutional purposes (values) are non-objective, poses a number of vexacious questions.

At the top we must ask by what criteria or social circumstance are "service" institutions held to that station? The peculiar assumption is that a balance of values inheres in a related complex of "primary" institutions; but it is contradictory to propose that such an equilibrium of power could be discovered and expressed without involving the values of intermediary instruments and altering the values of subjects. It is seemly to recognize that such a strategic process is likely to vault "secondary" institutions into a sibling status. Further, on what grounds, apart from suasion or combat, are conflicting values to be accommodated? And what shall explain the "why" and "when" of institutional realignment in the social hierarchy of power? What we have is a theoretical syndrome steeped in "force," "pressure," and "conflict." 132 The recording of institutional struggles

is without predictive power and reduces analysis to a fallow ex post tabulation of transitory institutional dispositions. Moreover, when institutional values are assumed in a reflex fashion as mere group preference or prejudice, it follows that policy tends to be envisioned solely in terms of power and influence rather than in terms of the consequences for community well-being. In the face of the belief that policy ends are always relatively good for some and necessarily bad for others, and only arbitrarily so, what grounds exist for sorting through the relative significance of existing institutions? While interest group analysis is necessary and important, without an alternative type(s) of behavior, inquiry is at an impasse.

This is not the place to develop such alternative styles of behavior as might bring inquiry to sufficiency. That and a frame of reference conducive to that was covered in the previous section. All we have sought to accomplish here is to indicate some deficiencies in the ordinary specifications of administration.

When speaking of administration, we mean to refer to that trend of events variously called managerialism, the organizational revolution, bureaucratization, etc.133 This

133 While this "blanket" designation may cover something that in the end should be excluded, miss something that in the end should be included, or pass over some discriminations that in the end should be made between these terms, we believe these are considerations best reserved until the terminous of inquiry.
social transformation is pre-eminently institutional; but it is emphatically asserted that institutions are only one—not the—type of social behavior pattern. Institutions are those behavioral systems where ceremonies re-inact the legends; legends rationalize the mores; mores prescribe the behavior appropriate to rank; rank is the outward manifestation of presumed inner mystical potency; all inculcated by emotional conditioning. Anthropoligically, administration is a system of privilege and authority, sanctions and rewards, injunctions and taboos—with, like other institutions, circumscribed authority in some domain(s) of social affairs. Just as we agree, with interpretational modifications, that administration is institutional, we also accept along with most authorities that institutional values are non-objective; but it is emphasized that these values are only one—not the—type of value proposition. As non-objective, institutional values serve as the focal point of promotion and defense of what is deemed a priori as right and proper. Institutional behavior articulates value advocacy, not inquiry into what values are serviceable; institutions are issue defining practices, not problem solving procedures. Unfortunately, our society has not yet articulated the value content it subconsciously accepts in administrative practices. But clues to the ideology of administration surely abound: the slide from liberalism to welfare; the shift from contract to consensus; the erosion of property for membership; the
displacement of representation with a governance based on active planning; the evaporation of the "general will" and the reliance on expertise; the withering away of self-reliance for stewardship; and the acceptance of empiricism as the desideratum of decision and the use of rationalistic scenarios in the process of decision. These and other value strands have yet to be drawn into a central and cohesive ideological stalk.

But administration, as any institution, is a two-faced phenomenon. In what has been said, only the face of hierarchy has been exposed. Institutions must also be seen as allowing and interpreting, rejecting, and ignoring or failing to recognize various kinds of information. In this sense, institutions are distinctive and each is peculiar in the manner of defining issues. For example, economic issues are dominated by pecuniary information, legal issues by witness evidence, legislation by hearsay evidence, etc. It is common to say that there is more witness evidence (or information) in law than in legislation-making. However, it is better to say that hearsay evidence is at the center of legislation and witness evidence is at the center of adjudication; this assists us to talk coherently of the legal aspect of legislation, the legislative aspect of administration, etc. In other words, administration is not a middle road, but a new way. What is this "way"?
When Redford suggests that the "work of administration is different from that which we find taking place in legislatures and courts," perhaps what he intends can be found in Paul Appleby's comment that:

With the growth of scientific knowledge and its dependent technology, the public will come to rely more and more on expert contributions ... 135

Others have tangentially approached this conclusion. Carl J. Friederich has distinguished functional or technical responsibility and political responsibility. 136 Chester I. Barnard postulates a "functional status system" in opposition to a "scalar status system." 137 Paula Brown has studied the impact of "scientific folkways" on administrative procedures and organization. 138 And Don K. Price entertains the belief that:

The development of public policy and the methods of its administration owed less in the long run to the processes of conflict among political


parties and social or economic pressure groups than to the more objective processes of research and discussion among professional groups.\textsuperscript{139}

The other face of administration is conspicuously its congeniality with the use and manipulation of expert evidence in concerted programs.

Perhaps it now can be seen that if social institutions are examined as traditional information defining and filtering social practices in the context of emerging social problems, then the test of their adequacy is whether or not they sufficiently allow--insufficiently mutilate or prevent--information appropriate for the problems of their jurisdiction. An institutional failure in this regard eventually results in the emergence of new practices sufficiently permissive to the informational requisites of the persistent problem. The new practice is recognized, rationalized, legitimized, and justified only at some point subsequent to its emergence and development. It is the interference of these \textit{ex post} defective gropings that occasions lapses in theoretical understanding.

The dilemma of administration has never been better put (although perhaps unintentionally) than by Reinhard Bendix when he suggests that while in modern society administration possesses a near monopoly of skills,

professional beliefs keep it a subservient tool. In our terms, this translates into hierarchal and ideological restrictiveness on one side and on the other side a remarkable permissiveness to expertise when compared to alternative institutional practices. The functionality of administration, then, resides in greater permissiveness to modern science and technology despite its disruptive concerns with status machinations and ideological commitments.

Ours is not a study designed to develop and present, much less defend, a general theory of administration--and certainly not a general theory of institutional lifecycles. Recognizing that disagreements will not be settled by anything written here, we have desired only to give an initial orienting specification of administration that will serve to bring our own discussion of the topic into focus.

Public

Although the notion of the "public" is thoroughly familiar to everyone, just precisely what it means is illusive; and until recent times, the precise meaning has not been a matter of even mild concern. A century of administrative development, however, has reversed indifference to the point that, according to some, public administration is

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now suffering a "crisis of identity."\textsuperscript{141} But nothing so far said on the subject relieves us of the feeling that attempts to make something of significance out of the "public" distinction is other than indulging in a puerile and nugatory mental somersault.

Like so many ideas somehow absorbed from our intellectual past, the "public" (and its surrogates) takes its significance from occasionally unspoken and certainly unquestioned contrasts. One of these was of doubtful service even historically. The individual-social contrast has always suffered from the almost one hundred per cent vagueness of the word "individualism." John Stuart Mill attempted to delineate these two realms—with the purpose of holding the social (or public) to its absolute minimum—but was unable to discover individual behavior without social import and left the question, as with so many philosophical questions, in an ambiguous state.\textsuperscript{142} The typical government-business comparison may have had some utility when government was primarily legislative-judicial and business was primarily guided by market circumstances. But with the rise to prominence of corporations in business and agencies in


government, the problem becomes one of differences between "private" and "public" administration. Surely, neither of these are non-social or non-governance styles of conduct. In its historical context, "private" meant the protective acquisition of power from the feudal system by commercial interests. It is doubtful that "power" applies in present circumstances more to private than public administration. Nor is clarity promoted by linking productivity and enterprise more to a private than a public sector. Even "profit" is not an unquestioned factor in the distinction since it is difficult in the modern economic system to decipher it apart from governmental agency activity.\textsuperscript{143} And to overlapping administrative functions must be added the increasing number of quasi-public (or quasi-private) organizations that defy private-public categorization. And recent revelations of public administrative misconduct cannot but suggest that corporate administrative structures are at least as socially visible and service oriented in their social responsibility as public administrative agencies.

The fact that revelations of public administrative misconduct have been met with such shock and outrage indicates a priori expectations that governmental agencies are different from private organizations simply because they are

\textsuperscript{143}Not only is "profit" largely a matter of public administrative intercession, an increasing number of economists have suggested that profits are at best a minimum goal of the modern corporation; \textit{vide}, n. 10, Chapter I.
governmental. This is supported by a subtle bias that pervades inquiry into the public-private question. Even among those who see the distinction as a residue of receding social reality, it is presumed that the two areas may nevertheless be investigated separately. In other words, it is not considered that to study the one will not give meaningful research results apart from the research integration of the other. Take as an example that in contemplating economic regulation governmental agencies constantly use as a yardstick market forces which have been drastically altered by its own previous actions. The point is that the same social bias that may force significant characteristic differences in public administrative conduct, may also negate findings through faulty research design.

Despite, as recently pointed out, only scanty research on the distribution of attributes across the private-public spectrum and, furthermore, despite the seemingly successful parade of administrators back and forth across the two "sectors," practitioners and practitioner oriented scholars alike proclaim that while at "higher" levels of abstraction the distinction between private and public administration fades, at the mundane level of administrative practice techniques and procedures are divergent.

Aside from the fact that this is tantamount to admitting, in traditional terms, theoretical collapse, this brand of particularism would admit of as much variation (or more) of practices within the public area as between the public and private areas.

In view of both unsatisfactory theory for and meager research on a "public" domain, with heavy skepticism we shall provisionally specify as public prevailing social and legal usage. This would include quasi-public organizations. But it is stressed that we presume no a priori distinctions between public (administration) and non-public (administration); that we accept "common sense" understandings as only initial and tentative; that we specifically deny any non-social contrast; and that we reserve the right to expand initially designated (public) areas to include whatever will enhance theoretical development. In short, we shall take public administration as it comes and leave the ultimate question of its meaning or maintenance to the rigours of inquiry.

Scope and Method

In this, the final section of the chapter, we shall discuss, first, the establishment of the study's "data field" and, second, the logic and organization of the study.
Criteria and Procedures for Selecting and Establishing the Data Field

The short span and tardy recognition of modern administration coupled with the minority status accorded the subject throughout most of its duration have been depressing factors in the production of appertaining works. While this enormously simplifies formulating a data field, operative criteria are nonetheless necessary and should be made explicit.

The first criterion bears upon securing a manageable and contiguous research area. This exigency imposes two notable circumscriptions. First, only American writers are to be considered. While "pioneers" were greatly influenced by, especially, the "German tradition" and other "foreign" influences have been commonplace, the logic of "influence," if followed, suggestively expands attention to the contributions of at least economics and politics and perhaps law and sociology--inclusions altogether too cumbersome to handle and essentially unnecessary to make for the mission herein stated. Second, D. Waldo's The Administrative State marks the "cutoff point" for writings to be considered. This reflects a judgment that Waldo's seminal effort represents in public administration a pivotal juncture much the same as J. S. Mill's The Principles of Political Economy serves as a hinge between classical and neoclassical economics. Certainly it is similarly synthesizing and anticipatory.
As with "influence," the question of relative continuity and discontinuity after this "cutoff" is interesting and important but nonetheless an extraneous consideration to this study. In any event, it is impracticable to include the proliferation of works subsequent to The Administrative State.

A second and more substantial criterion relates the data field to subject and purpose. Inasmuch as "theoretical systems" are patently the subject of this investigation, only "general theories" of administration meet the necessary requirements. Excluded, therefore, are those examples in the historical literature, by far the majority, obsessed with cataloguing administrative procedures and practices. Of course, theory is implied in such works, but concreta alone are insufficient to avoid unstable theoretical interpretations. Excluded also, those episodic, isolated, and narrow investigations of administrative fragments where required theoretical power and theoretical implications are of insufficient scope to serve the objective of this inquiry--namely, to maximize the derivation of the requisites of theoretical adequacy. Similar reasoning additionally directs selection away from "local" to "national" orientations.

A third and final criterion considers what might be loosely called "significance." For a good many historians of thought, contemporaneous popularity and influence are
often grounds enough for selecting, or at least stressing, a particular theory. For Marxians, reflection of significant class interest provides the necessary index. It is just as well that neither popularity or influence are variables of note in the history of public administration thought, for they seem to us a bit fragile. Certainly the high pace of popularity or controversy is a poor yardstick for the assessment of long-term significance. While the informed regard enjoyed by a theory in its time is one factor in selection, relevance to the present and to investigatory objectives are the more weighty factors.

The method and procedures for presenting the data field are straightforward and relatively uncomplicated. Although essentially a "library" research project, the methodology is rigorously empirical. Much as an archeologist approaches his subject matter, selected specimens from the history of thought are approached as artifactually before us for verifiable enumeration. Of course these materials, as with any, are colored in organization and in recapitulation by perspective and purpose. Care has been taken, however, to make the latter explicit and the former is reviewable through reference to original writings. Indeed, although the theories have been sufficiently elaborated herein to maintain the comprehensive integrity of their original statement, these are not intended to be a substitute for them. That is, just as this study is not—although defendably representative—
an unabridged account of American public administration 
thought, so also selected enumerations are not intended to 
be exhaustively definitive.

In the same vein, it should be clarifying to 
stress that although casual reference may be made to 
instances of the subject, this is not a study of "adminis-
trative history"; and whatever theory may "bleed through" 
discourse otherwise occupied, it is not the purpose of this 
inquiry to synthesize or advance a "general theory" of 
public administration.

This investigation, then, relies on reference to 
selected general theories of recognized authorities in the 
historical literature of public administration thought and, 
only where deemed essential, to secondary sources.

Logic and Organization of the Study

The logic of this study is instrumentally proble-
matic. Although the scope and strategic character of modern 
public administration has come to be appreciated, primarily 
the phenomenon remains theoretically inconclusive. Evidence 
for this is abundant in the persistence of many critical 
issues and in the proliferation of other seemingly no less 
significant issues. The tentative hypothesis from which 
this investigation springs is that current theory is defi-
ciently formulated to serve as an effective and dependable 
instrumentality to sufficiently resolve issues, state
administration in resource terms, and thereby contribute to progress in the transformation of social problems in which administration is, or should be, a factor. Evidence for this hypothesis rests not only on the existence of widespread controversy over the nature and role of theory but also, and even more so, on the existence of a vital—usually covert—unexamined concordancy on theoretical fundamentals. The aim of this study is to examine the hypothesis with a view to derive a more effective basis for evaluating theoretical adequacy. If the hypothesis be sustained, then clearly our aim is fundamental to constructing and applying theory more artfully.

The organization of this study exemplifies this problematic logic. That is, the organization is an instrument designed to construct a context in which the hypothesis can be tested and the aim addressed. Part I is analytically orienting. Chapter I develops the initial elements evidencing both the problem and the tentative hypothesis to be applied to it. Chapter II constructs the perspective to be employed in the analysis. Part II—Chapters III through VIII—presents, primarily, the specimens of the data field and, secondarily, addresses critical questions to and discussions of each specimen separately as a diagnostic preparation for extensional treatment in the final part of the work. Part III states and evaluates the findings of the study. Chapter IX applies the perspective of analysis to the data field as a
whole. Chapter X draws conclusions from the analysis in the form of executing the aim of the inquiry and additionally considers some of the further implications of the analysis.

A second organizational dimension reflects the three themes of analysis: one, the social function of ideational modes; two, the social effects of ideational modes; and three, the social determinates of ideational modes. The first of these themes is the heart of the analysis undertaken in Chapter IX. The second, and minor, theme, is also a constituent element in the analysis of the same chapter. The third, and incidental, theme is speculatively exampled in Section 4 of each of the chapters from III through VIII and deserves an explanatory comment on its organization.

Any effort to grasp the formulation phase of a stream of ideas enmeshes one immediately in a sort of "two-faced" complexity. On one face, an ideational pattern is a composite in which not every idea is of the same type or formed in the same manner. On the other face, the factors by which an ideational pattern is affected are complicated. For one thing, ideas effect each other but in diverse and nonsymetrical ways. Moreover, the case is not simply one of "ideas from ideas"; other diverse factors and circumstances also enter in. To some extent, ideas reflect the strains and changes in institutional practice. Every intellectual pattern to some degree, then, represents an attack upon and defense of institutional structures. But this is not the
whole of the matter. The history of public administration thought cannot be altogether explained, Marxians and others notwithstanding, as a simple matter of rationalization, justification, attack, and defense. Ideas additionally reflect and are involved in the use of "tools"—what has been called the "machine process"—the dynamics of which is essential to understanding.

How then might such a complicated affair be schematized? Consider this analogy: The formation of a particular pattern of ideas might be seen as a stream with one bank representing institutional practices, and the other bank representing intellectual events; and underlying both and determining the general path and character of the formation a "bedrock" representing scientific-technological processes. Within such a conception, the "two-faced" complexity can be integrated into a single profile and determinate factors in the formation of an ideational pattern can be organized and speculatively exemplified under the following headings: one, intellectual events; two, the tensions and modifications of institutional practices; and three, technological developments.
PART II

THE DATA FIELD
CHAPTER III
WILSON

Brief Intellectual Biography

Although frugality of comment, within even the "brief" allotment reserved for this section, is surely indicated for one so well-known as this chapter's subject,¹ it is nonetheless the case that Wilson's scholarly contribution to public administration theory is scarcely known, even by practitioners of the art, beyond academics who have interested themselves in such matters. But if Goodnow is the "Father" of modern American public administration theory,² assuredly Wilson must be its "Midwife."

Raised in the crucible of Southern Presbyterianism, Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) graduated an indifferent student from Princeton in 1879. After studying law at the University of Virginia and following an unsuccessful attempt at the practice of that acrobatic art, he entered Johns Hopkins University in pursuance of interests in

²A widely used characterization.
government and history and received the degree of Ph.D. in 1886. His doctoral thesis, *Congressional Government*,\(^3\) was published in 1885 and has persevered as his most notable scholarly work. He held teaching positions in history and political economy at Bryn Mawr and Wesleyan before being called to the faculty of Princeton in 1890 as professor of jurisprudence and political economy.

Wilson's interests and writings on political questions won him a national reputation and his reform interests in educational policy elevated him to the presidency of Princeton in 1902. After a stint as governor of New Jersey he was elected the 28th President of the United States in 1913.

While Wilson had held in *Congressional Government* that the executive "is plainly bound in duty to render unquestioning obedience to Congress,"\(^4\) he came to hold the, not necessarily inconsistent, view that a chief executive officer has both the prerogative and responsibility to take an active role in legislative affairs. Henry A. Turner has summarized Wilson's opinion.

As the sole representative of the entire nation, the chief executive has the responsibility for translating the will of the people into law; as


\(^4\)Ibid., p. 181.
the chief of the administration, he must see that the needs of the administrative departments and establishments are provided, and that workable laws are enacted. ... 5

Moreover, in 1908 Wilson wrote that Congress should make no attempt to "originate its own bills except in minor matters which seem to spring out of public opinion or out of the special circumstances of particular interests." 6 "For six years," Turner observes, "he led and controlled Congress in a manner without precedent." 7

In addition to "Wilson's obsession for commanding was a desire for logical and orderly arrangements which gave him a compulsion for reorganizing." 8

At the time he [Wilson] took office, the Civil Service Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission were the only two independent commissions, and the Panama Railroad was the only government corporation in existence. During Wilson's Presidency numerous commissions, boards, "administrations," and government corporations were created. Of these, the Federal Trade Commission, the Tariff Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the United States Shipping Board became permanent parts of our federal administrative structure. 9

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7 Turner, "Executive Leadership," p. 98.


9 Ibid., p. 253.
There is no doubting the proliferation of public agencies and the quickening of administrative functions but personal idiosyncrasy seems altogether too "thin a thread" upon which to hang the developments. Nevertheless, Wilson's name is surely symbolic of the rise to dominance of administration in the public sector.\textsuperscript{10}

Wilson's direct interest in public administration began in his graduate days.

\begin{quote}
Johns Hopkins . . . by 1881 . . . had appointed its first two full time graduate social science professors, Herbert B. Adams and Richard T. Ely. . . . In Dr. Ely's classroom the young Wilson heard his first lecture on the subject of administration.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

And when in 1886 Wilson was invited to give a lecture on a topic of his own choice, it was hardly surprising that he chose public administration. Among other reasons undoubtedly covert in his selection, "In 1886 Professor Adams invited Wilson to give a three-year sequence course in administration at Johns Hopkins."\textsuperscript{12} The title of Wilson's lecture, destined to be the first—and incidently Wilson's only—published exegesis on the theory of "modern" public


\textsuperscript{12}Turner, "Administrator," p. 251.
administration in the United States,\textsuperscript{13} was "The Study of Administration."

Wilson continued for a decade his lectures on administration at Johns Hopkins and

During the first three years that Wilson taught at Princeton, he gave a course in administration in which he used the lectures that he gave in the first year of his three-year course at Johns Hopkins.\textsuperscript{14}

"And," as Turner points out,

\ldots at the time the first American textbook in administration had been written, Woodrow Wilson had been giving lectures in the field for six years.\textsuperscript{15}

Although the comment in the opening sentences of his essay "that the eminently practical science of administration is finding its way into college courses in this country"\textsuperscript{16} may indicate the immediate stimulus for Wilson's interest, the larger question is the circumstances of which specific interests in public administration are only a reflection. We shall come to that question in the next-to-last section of the chapter.

Even the cautious reader will find Wilson's essay on administration a frustrating experience. It cannot be

\textsuperscript{13} Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly, 2 (June, 1887), pp. 197-222. We shall cite from the more accessible reprint from the same journal, 55 (December, 1941), pp. 481-506.

\textsuperscript{14} Turner, "Administrator," p. 251.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Wilson, "Study," p. 481.
gainsaid that Wilson wrote the piece with singular looseness of style and organization, not to mention adroitness in side-stepping unequivocal conclusions and carelessness in promulgating contrary characterizations. All this has led one commentator to lament that "Few modern readers . . . seem to draw the same conclusions about the essential point of Wilson's writing," and to even speculate that "a clear definition was not Wilson's major intention" but rather to cast about for "a . . . rationale for . . . moral reforms in government [by appealing] . . . to the higher law of administration." Be that as it may, "The Study of Administration" became the harbinger, if not the exemplar, for more than a fair share of the subsequent theorizing on the subject. It is not surprising, then, the

. . . number of students and scholars of public administration in recent years have returned to the pages of Woodrow Wilson's essay, . . . presumably for a deeper understanding of the historic antecedents of American administrative thought . . .

Presentation of the General Theory

Most authorities "lay hold" of Wilson's theory of public administration by placing it in the context of his political theory--primarily as exhibited in Congressional Government. This is not an idle proclivity. For those

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 582.
many\textsuperscript{20} who see in the distinction between politics and administration the very quintessence of the Wilsonian approach, it appears compelling to move from the former to the latter; for the few\textsuperscript{21} who vociferously propound an intimacy between politics and administration, it seems necessary to include in the latter a discussion of the former. But our reason for following the usual gambit is that, in our judgment, it best mirrors Wilson's own "logic."

According to Wilson, political understanding can be obtained only by laying bare the essential locus of sovereign prerogative. The task of the political analyst, then, is to discern through the welter of political (or perhaps better, governmental) forms the center of power and the instruments through which power is exercised. In the case of America, the facade of form that must be penetrated is symbolically articulated as the "literary theory" of checks and balances found in the Constitution.\textsuperscript{22} Of this "theory" and its "reality," Wilson observes: "those checks and balances have proved mischievous just to the extent to which

\textsuperscript{20}An example is Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1973).


\textsuperscript{22}Wilson, Congressional, p. 31.
they have succeeded in establishing themselves as realities." 23 This view reflects a basic axiom that "the more power is divided the more irresponsible it becomes." 24 Or, to state the axiom positively, "Power and strict accountability for its use are essential constituents of good government." 25

Wilson argues that in the last half of the 19th century a previously scattered power had gravitated from localities to the federal government and within the national government "Congress had emerged as the center of national power, eclipsing the judiciary and executive branches." 26 The net result, as Wilson saw it, was that

For all practical purposes the national government is supreme over the state governments and Congress predominant over its so-called coordinate branches. 27

In other words, "Congress is establishing itself as the one sovereign authority in that government." 28

There is no doubting Wilson's unswerving allegiance to self-government--that is, representative democracy. It is a self-evident article of faith: It may seem curious, then, that the bulk of Congressional Government is turned

23Ibid., p. 187. 24Ibid., p. 77.
25Ibid., p. 284.
27Wilson, Congressional, p. 52.
28Ibid., p. 316.
over to indictments of Congressional shortcomings. But it is explainable. Representative democracy for Wilson can be translated to mean: One, a representative body, to be really representative, should be, as it were, a replica of the relevant body politic in the sense that the policies promulgated are synonymous with the (presumed) "popular will" inherent in that larger society. In other words, the "give and take" outcomes of a representative body in its legislative function should match the latent equilibrium points of diverse interests in the represented body. Two, in order to insure the first condition, those who serve to fix policies should be strictly accountable to those represented. Supposably, popular elections fulfill the first condition and through the second condition correct for changes or mistakes in regarding the "will" of the public. And three, in order to secure the first condition, those who serve the legislative body should be strictly accountable to it. Wilson's preoccupation with Congressional criticisms relates to defects in the first and second of these three conditions; and he anticipates concern for the third by holding that "the conditions of self-government requires [sic] that a sharp line of distinction" need be drawn "between those offices which are political and those which are non-political."²⁹ And he further clarifies the distinction by announcing that "The strictest rules of business

²⁹Ibid., p. 190.
discipline, of merit tenure and earned promotion, must rule
every office whose incumbent has not to do with choosing
between policies." 30

In "The Study of Administration" Wilson's anticipa-
pations flower and his preconceptions bear fruit. 31

It is Vincent Ostrom's studied conclusion, and
one supportable by the prevailing evidence, that in the
Wilsonian theory of politics there exists a prophetic point
of departure for his theory of administration. Ostrom states
flatly that "Wilson's theory of administration is based upon
... [a] 'sharp line of distinction' between 'politics' and
'administration.'" 32 Politics refers to the processes by
which public policies are derived and formulated. Public
administration refers to the processes by which public

30 Ibid.

31 There are two conspicuous problems in presenting
Wilson's thoughts on administration. First, Wilson often
lapses into sometimes seemingly irreconcilable multiple char-
acterizations. To some extent this rambling may be unraveled
by reference to the "thrust" of his approach, but residual
imponderables are unavoidable. Second, Wilson's organization
is scattered. Part I of the essay is a miscellany of topics:
defining the subject; the timeliness of its study; placing
administration in historical development and in diverse set-
tings; fixing administrative purpose; and considering some of
the difficulties in its institution and study. Part II
includes: more on the nature and province of administration;
the relationships of administration and the objects of its
study; and the attributes of "good" administration. Part III
centers on those methods of study most advantageous to the
subject. We shall reschedule this "loose-leaf" organization
into, we trust, a somewhat more orderly presentation
sequence.

policies are effectuated. Therefore, "administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions,"\textsuperscript{33} but rather involve the execution of political ends. As Wilson develops this distinction, however, it turns out to be multidimensional.

"The \textbf{broad plans of governmental action are not administrative.}\textsuperscript{34} "Every \textbf{particular application of general law is an act of administration.}\textsuperscript{35} To this "general-particular" distinction he adds a "superordinate-subordinate" distinction. "The general laws which direct things to be done are \ldots outside and \textbf{above} administration."\textsuperscript{36} Finally, Wilson restates the initial distinction by contrasting constitutional questions and administrative functions. The former "properly concern themselves with those instrumentalities of government which are to control \ldots [the establishment of] general law."\textsuperscript{37} The latter properly include those instrumentalities of government which control the "detailed and systematic execution of public law."\textsuperscript{38}

To summarize then, politics refers to the governmental mechanisms involved in developing and formulating general policies or plans of action; administration refers to the governmental mechanisms involved in executing or

\textsuperscript{33}Wilson, "The Study," p. 494.
\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. 496. [Emphasis added]
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid. [Emphasis added]
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38}Ibid.
applying methodically the particularized details of policy. The latter is deemed prior to and superior—that is, directive—to the former. Generally, administration develops the specialized means appropriate to the politically generated general ends.

Although for example Frederick Mosher agrees that Wilson "made the most vigourous statement on this dichotomy," Fred Riggs reverses the emphasis.

For Wilson not only were politics and administration intertwined, but administrative action was scarcely conceivable except as the implementation of general policies formulated by political means. Wilson does dwell on the importance of relationships between politics and administration. Clearly for Wilson, as Riggs so characteristically puts it, "administration action [is] . . . scarcely conceivable except as the implementation of general policies formulated by political means." But while politics "sets the tasks for administration," Wilson, with less obvious consistency or clarity, also writes "administration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to public opinion." That is, "the problem is to

41 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 500.
make public opinion efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome.\footnote{Ibid., p. 499.} Wilson says "efficiency" in this context means "authoritative criticism."\footnote{Ibid., p. 498.} Inasmuch as administrative means should not suffer political manipulation,\footnote{Ibid., p. 494.} the role of public opinion seems equivocal. In any event, Wilson was under no illusion that administrative development could take place in a vacuum. The separation of politics and administration did not mean the disappearance of politics, but the conduct of administration in a political context.\footnote{Riggs, "Relearning," p. 71.}

Because Wilson has so little to say on the "executive function," that topic might blur the administrative-politics distinction. In his essay on administration, Wilson unreservedly equates administration with the executive.\footnote{Wilson, "The Study," p. 482.} The executive function of the Presidency includes providing for administrative mechanisms and responsibility for the effective execution of laws. Wilson additionally recognizes a representative function and, therefore, a legislative function. Of course, these two aspects of the Presidency—one administrative and one political—hardly violate the distinction that runs through his theories. Moreover, his statements that administration "ought not to be a passive instrument,"\footnote{Ibid., pp. 496-497.} and that the administrator "should have . . .
the choice of means for accomplishing his work,"\(^{50}\) prescribe a degree of independence from politics. (Wilson also likens public administration to the field of business,\(^{51}\) but this breaches the public-private not the administration-politics distinction.)

Therefore, we see nothing in Wilson's, or for that matter Riggs', statements that detracts from the fundamental place of the politics-administration dichotomy in Wilson's theories.

At the outset of "The Study of Administration" Wilson raises two questions: Why in the United States has the study of administration been so long neglected? And why has its study turned critical at this juncture of the American experience? Wilson addresses these questions in the context of an historical theory of governmental development.

Wilson backs into the answer to the first question: "no practical science is ever studied where there is no need to know it."\(^{52}\) The clear implication is that the time for studying administration has come because "need" has emerged. "Need" is the mother of "necessity." Of course, administration has always been a constituent part of all governmental forms; but, with exceptions, it has received scant previous

\(^{50}\)Ibid., p. 496.  \(^{51}\)Ibid., p. 493.

\(^{52}\)Ibid., p. 481. [Emphasis added]
attention because there was no or little need for its study.

The question was always: who shall make law, and what shall the law be? The other question, how law should be administered . . . was put aside as "practical detail."

. . . The trouble in early times was almost altogether about the constitution of government. . . . There was little or no trouble about administration. . . . The functions of government were simple, because life itself was simple.53

However, "One does not have to look back of the last century for the beginnings of . . . present complexities . . . culminating in our own."54 "There is scarcely a single duty of government which was once simple which is not now complex."55 In fact, "majority rule is itself a new complexity."56 Moreover, "at the same time that the functions of government are . . . becoming more complex and difficult, they are also vastly multiplying in number."57 Wilson gives what he contends to be a salient example: "in some way it [government] must make itself master of masterful corporations."58

To Wilson, this transformation means:

The idea of the state [is] . . . undergoing noteworthy change; and the idea of the state is the conscience of administration. Seeing . . . new things which the state ought to do [politics], the next thing is to see clearly how it ought to do them [administration].59

53 Ibid., pp. 482-483.  
54 Ibid., p. 483.  
55 Ibid., p. 484.  
56 Ibid., pp. 484-485.  
57 Ibid., p. 485.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid.
And so Wilson concludes that "administrative tasks have nowadays to be . . . equipped for carrying those enormous burdens of administration which the needs of this industrial and trading age are so fast accumulating."\(^{60}\)

This is why there should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness.\(^{61}\)

Whereas the times may call for urgent study of administration in order that necessary policy may be discharged effectively,

The poisonous atmosphere of city government, the crooked secrets of state administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and again discovered in the bureaux at Washington forbid us to believe that any clear conceptions of what constitutes good administration are as yet very widely current in the United States.\(^{62}\)

Wilson also testifies that "American political history has been a history, not of administrative development, but of legislative oversight."\(^{63}\) In effect, Wilson considers the job of constitution-making to be closed--at least in so far as establishing essential principles is concerned.\(^{64}\) This does not mean, considering the corruption, that attention to political practice should be abandoned; he is annoyed rather at the continued preoccupation with political theory.

\(^{60}\)Ibid., p. 484. [Emphasis added]

\(^{61}\)Ibid., p. 485.

\(^{62}\)Ibid., pp. 485-486.

\(^{63}\)Ibid., p. 490.

\(^{64}\)Ibid.
How, then, do we establish the study of administration on a sound scientific basis? We commandeer it from "foreign" sources—notably from Europe.

In some cases of absolute rule, the study of administration, to a considerable degree, has taken place. Autocratically despotic governments, although independent of popular assent, have nevertheless not been indifferent to those methods best calculated to realize goals with the least agitation. Benevolently paternalistic governments—such as Frederick the Great's Prussia—have studies to serve, albeit without popular consent, the governed. There are also cases of dictatorial governments, popular or unpopular, that have undertaken a systematic "rationalization" of administration—Napoleon's France is an example. These are Wilson's sources for a scientific theory of public administration.65

Wilson's historical theory of governmental development takes place in three stages—stages were popular conceptions in his day. The first stage is one of absolute rule with a corresponding administrative system; the second stage is one of transitional substitution of popular political control by constitution-framing, typically accompanied by a corresponding administrative withering and disarray out of neglect; and the third stage is one of administrative

65 Ibid., pp. 488-489.
development under democratic control. Under this Wilsonian conceptualization, the administrative problem of the United States occurs in the context of phasing into stage three.

"The object of administrative study," in this context, "is to rescue executive methods . . . and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle." For Wilson, this objective need not endanger democratic values; for whereas the democratic politics "of ultimately determining by debate all essential questions affecting the public weal, of basing all structures of policy upon the major will" must be the conditioning factor, there is nevertheless "but one rule of good administration for all governments alike." In other words, regardless of political variation, fundamental administrative principles remain unaltered. This is a clear and irrefragable fission of politics and administration--in the absence of which Wilson's comparative method is untrustworthy.

Of these transcendental administrative principles Wilson has precious little to say. Presumably they await articulation. The extensive function is a unilateral efficient execution of public policy. Efficiency is a minimization of cost and effort. Beyond that a flexibility of

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66 Ibid., p. 488.  
67 Ibid., p. 494.  
68 Ibid., p. 502.  
69 Ibid., p. 496.  
70 Ibid., p. 481.
response to appropriate political direction is mentioned casually.\textsuperscript{71} Intentionally, nonpartisan and technically trained staffing is much on Wilson's mind.\textsuperscript{72} He calls for more businesslike methods\textsuperscript{73} and prescribes an appropriate organizational hierarchy with characteristic discipline in order to fix responsibility.\textsuperscript{74} Responsibility requires "large powers and unhampered discretion."\textsuperscript{75} These generally fall into the "scientific management" classification.

Wilson agonizes not altogether conclusively over several additional topics. The bearing of public opinion on the actualization and functioning of an effective administration occupies Wilson. A gloomy evaluation of the public's capacity for resolute agreement calls for gradual modifications and compromise on the former;\textsuperscript{76} conversely, he sees in the public matrix of contentious beliefs a necessary environment of vigilance and criticism for the latter.\textsuperscript{77} The problem of "operationalizing" the politics-administration discrimination is acknowledged but hardly resolved.\textsuperscript{78} Throughout the essay Wilson indicates a concern with the imperfections of both administrative and political practices. He is consequently "reform minded." The application of

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 504. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 494
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 500.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 497. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 491.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 499. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 495.
"foreign" experience to "indigenous" American affairs is another difficult topic for Wilson. On the one hand, he holds that there are universal (and therefore cross-cultural) principles of administrative means but the opposite is the case for political principles; on the other hand, there are universal administrative methods and practices but the opposite is the case for political practices. He nevertheless equates "modernity" with a coupled democratic politics and "scientific" administration.  

Paradigm Essentials: A Summary

The purpose of this section, and the corresponding sections in the remaining chapters of Part II, is to state in a "logical" sequence the essential elements of the theory under consideration. "Essential elements" refers primarily to basic propositions or features explicitly inherent in the theory. Implicit elements of the theory are primarily exposed in the last section of this chapter--and similarly for the remaining chapters in Part II.

The essentials of the Wilsonian paradigm are:

1. Power tends in every society to coagulate about a "dominant center." The degree of power dispersal

79 This is also Ostrom's opinion: The Intellectual, p. 27.

80 The reader is encouraged to compare this summary with that devised by Ostrom, Ibid., pp. 28-29.
is inversely related to the degree of the ability to fix the responsibility for its exercise.

(2) Politics is the exercise of power in the derivation and formulation of general policies pertaining to the polity. Although different political principles may be judged more or less desirable, none are privileged, all are limited, and to each other are relativistic.

(3) Administration is the exercise of power in the elaborated and detailed execution of general policy. The scientific principles of administration are universal and invariantly associable with all political principles.

(4) The proper spheres of politics and administration are separate. Politics provides the only legitimate tasks and goals for administration and in this sense administration should be subservient to politics. In the selection and employment of "means," however, administration should be independent of politics.

(5) The "executive function" is twofold: to provide for administrative instrumentalities and to stand responsible for the execution of policies.

(6) Efficiency and hierarchical organization are the requisites of "good" administrative instrumentalities.

(7) In the progress of social change, political stages tend to move from absolutistic to democratic forms. Responding to various "needs of convenience," administrative forms have always, in greater or lesser degree, existed in
every political stage. In a modern period of sufficient industrial, commercial, and institutional complexity, "needs of necessity" require a high degree of scientific administra-
tion. The coupling of democratic politics and scientific administration is an inexorable condition for this "modern-
ity."

The Social Matrix: Speculations on Determinates

Wilson's ideas on administration were formulated in a period, we believe, of exceptional significance in Western cultural development. It was an era of intellec-
tual ferment; a time when many men believed many quite dif-
ferent things to be true. The plain fact is that the stable foundations of traditional thought had been all but obliterated by the rising industrial factors in the economy, by the general expansion of knowledge, and by the steady advancement of science. Under such circumstances, ex post exercises in ferreting out the roots of an ideational system run the risk of emphasizing trivial rather than significant influences in the development phase; or falling into the trap of deeming the ideational outcome inevitable--like the outcome of elections--only by retrospect. However, our interests lean more towards logical juxtaposition and con-
temporary pertinency. In what is to follow, this slanted interest, along with the emplificative and speculative char-
acteristics previously mentioned, should be kept in mind.
For those who chafe at the abbreviation, it should also be remembered that each example suggested is a research project in itself.

Technological Factors

It is an astounding anomaly that, as obvious and as recognized as are the technological contrivances of man in shaping and altering his institutional habits, their role in the "life-cycle" of ideational systems should be so little studied. Nevertheless, technological imperatives are the critical determinants of thought systems. The brief examples segregated out below should be suggestive enough.

The potential of mobilized resources during the Civil War when combined with the relaxed restraints at its conclusion vaulted the United States in the last half of the nineteenth century into an industrialized society. For example, the value of products went from two billion dollars in 1860 to eleven billion dollars by the turn of the century. One of the more familiar features of this momentous change was the "transportation revolution." There were significant developments in shipping, mechanical road-vehicles, bridge building, etc., but the epitomy of this revolution was the railroad.81 Railroad mileage increased from 30,000

in 1860 to 200,000 in 1900. In the same period population doubled to 70,000,000; there were mass immigrations and migrations and by 1900 half the population lived in cities. The railroad symbolized the intrusion of industrialism into pastoral life-ways, the supremacy of technology over nature, and the ingenuity of invention to overcome obstacles. It generated the syndrome of achievement, efficiency, and progress; changed the tempo of life and the conception of time; impacted on political and religious beliefs; and spawned a sense of "manifest destiny." 82

Other features of this industrialization are hardly less well known—the dramatic development of mass-production in the chemical, steel, textile, machine tool, and oil industries; the beginning mechanization of agriculture; the engineering achievements associated with urbanism—all had far-reaching and disciplining effects on "thinking man."

Of course, technology fits awkwardly into traditional conceptions of the industrialization of a previously agrarian culture. Theories of "stationary states" with technology defined as a constant will not suffice. What we have is a contagious and pervasive "break-through." But through what? The answer leaps from the question: institutional rigidity!

Institutional Factors

The paths of technologies are littered with institutional waste. Technological development is nevertheless a struggle. Some institutions may allow particular technologies to filter through like a sieve, but others may successfully resist imperviously over extended periods of time; still others may be pushed aside into a relatively isolated existence, vestigial remnants to wither and die a lingering death. No technology prevails unscathed but eventually all institutions either undergo evolutionary modifications into new forms or they bend and break, shattered to reassemble into new patterns. The ordinary conception of institutional affairs is based on constant relationships, which is well enough as long as institutional systems are static. But "it is exactly at the time of crisis, when . . . institutionalized and rigid behavior patterns are undergoing modification, . . . that the assumption that . . . elasticities and propensities are constants is most dubious."\(^{83}\) What is needed is an understanding of the timing of institutional crumbling and "of the direction in which various components of the crumbling structure will jump."\(^{84}\) But we do not possess even the bare rudiments of a theory of institutional


\(^{84}\)Ibid., p. 58.
thresholds of resistance and collapse. We do possess, however, the late nineteenth century evidences of fractured institutional structures.

Surely preeminent among these is the rise of the corporation. An early nineteenth century movement toward general incorporation accelerated space in the last half of the century. Of course, contractual organizations can be traced to early Roman law\(^\text{85}\) and the roots of corporations lie deep in European history--there were English joint stock companies as early as the thirteenth century.\(^\text{86}\) But the significance of the nineteenth century phenomenon is more than expansion.

For one thing, the nineteenth century corporation, in particular the railroad corporation, was instrumental, even crucial, in the creation of modern management.\(^\text{87}\) For another thing, corporate status became a general property right; and, in fact, the corporation, through a series of court decisions, was legitimized as a legal individual. "In a transition as gradual as the course of events which gave it protective coloring, the rights of man were being


\(^{86}\) Ibid., pp. 16-17.

converted into the immunities of corporations." But even more profoundly, the institution of property itself was modified by a fragmentation into ownership and control. Moreover, pecuniary institutions began to shift from a matrix of traditional habits to one of administered arrangements. Just how fast and far this shifting process has gone may be a matter of debate, but that it did take place, and still is taking place, is an incontrovertible fact.

Of course, these institutional changes were bound to reverberate throughout the society. Education is a case in point. As the century sailed to a close, so also did the classical tradition in "The Higher Learning." The conventional education had theretofore been primarily concerned with polishing the student to become a well-rounded "gentleman," with preparing him to assume his station in society. But with the advent of technological complexities, education began to respond with an increased emphasis on "professional" training. We have noted both Wilson's involvement in educational reform and his call for a technically trained civil servant.

Government was also affected by institutional changes. In particular regulatory interests quickened and...
moved from local areas to the federal level. In 1887, the
date of Wilson's essay on public administration, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission was established and three years
later the Sherman Antitrust Act came upon the scene. These,
however, were delayed and hampered by the ascendancy of the
"Captains of Finance" and the tradition of laissez faire.

**Ideational Factors**

Despite the central significance of the emerging
corporation, unlike the Economy, the State, or the Church
there existed no underlying rationale to justify it and for
the seeker of truth there was no philosophy by which to
understand it. There was an understanding proclivity to
fill this ideational vacuum with those ideas that had seem-
ingly proved serviceable in the past or some variation on
those themes. The trouble was that such tutelary deities
as competitive forces and the "Gospel of Wealth" did not
attain the necessary generality of social acceptance and
were opposed by such alternatives as the ethos of rural
provincialism and the "brotherhood" of labor.

To this clash of dogmas there was added a second
unsettling realization. The growing body of ethnographic
information indicated a striking variability of institutional
arrangements in diverse cultures. Theories that derived
their basic postulates from unitary cultures in thin slices
of historical time were condemned as simply ethnocentric
and without import beyond their own sphere of derivation. One response was the "relativism" discussed in Chapter 2. But another was to find a higher, universal truth.

One example of this latter is the development of neoclassical economics. Smarting from the charge that classical economics was ethnocentric, the Austrian School concocted the "economic man," a lightning hedonic calculator providing an ultimate decision calculus operable irrespective of the institutional milieu. The date is 1871 and remade political economy into, like mathematics and physics, the "science" of economics. Neoclassicism fast became a quantitative and formal endeavor. Taylorism is another example. Scientific management held that there exists regardless of social arrangements an ultimate set of principles for the "best" execution of a task. These principles may be discovered by mechanical manipulation and observation. There are important differences between these two examples but both were responsive attempts to locate absolute theoretical authority.

From among the many idea events associable with the differences between the two examples we select only one. Prior to 1866 two closely related views regarding mathematics were entertained: the Pythagorean view that all correct knowledge of the world must be mathematical knowledge (Kepler and Leibniz are in this tradition); and the epistemological Platonian view that mathematical methods are essential for
knowing the world—that is, matter participates in mathematical ideas only in their pure content or form (Descartes and Spinoza are examples). In other words, mathematics provides an accurate description of factual existence; it mirrors the inherent mathematical character of the factual world. Kant's presentation of mathematics as derivable from pure reason (a priori intuition) was the culminating synthesis of these views. However, there was a weakness in Euclid's mathematical (geometric) statement. It need not be explored in depth here but, briefly, the fifth postulate—through a given point one and only one parallel line can be drawn to a given straight line—became a matter of controversy. Saccheri (1667-1733) tried to show that the denial of the postulate leads to a contradiction—but it does not. Lobachevsky (1793-1856) held that many parallel lines may be drawn through a point; and Gauss (1777-1855) maintained that no parallel lines can be drawn through a point, etc. Out of these developments grew several non-Euclidian geometries. In 1866 E. Betrami reconciled all these geometries into a single logical system. This became a turning point for mathematics. After 1866 a "two world" thesis emerges. One holds that mathematics resides in a formally analytic domain where mathematical truth may be demonstrated logically (neoclassical economics is an example). The other holds that mathematics lies inherent in an empirically
synthetic domain where mathematical laws can be discovered by induction from brute fact (Taylorism is an example). 90

Clearly, one need only recall Wilson's claim that no matter how variable the politics, there exists an ultimate, absolute, and universal set of administrative principles, to see the connection.

More directly, the "Darwinian Revolution" exercised a considerable influence on Wilson's ideas. Social Darwinism refers simply to the application of evolutionary theory to social subjects--first in the sense of accepting the proposition that all existential affairs are processes of general development; and second, in the sense of employing specific mechanisms of development such as variation, selection, mutation, etc. 91 Another, and the more profound, meaning of evolution, namely the social significance of man's descent from anthropoid stock, is only vaguely appreciated. Wilson's "evolutionary organic theory" is evidenced in his notion of change through slow accumulation. This theory "enabled him to reason that since governmental forms had evolved to their present state it was logical that further changes should be


91 Two excellent accounts of the subject are Harry Elmer Barnes, Historical Sociology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948); and Richard Hofstader, Social Darwinism in American Thought, rev. ed. (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1944).
adopted. Despite the slow and compromising change envisioned by Wilson, his interest in reform drew him uneasily into an identification with the progressives. One might even class Wilson's theory as an early progressive statement.

The Progressive movement, the force of which covered roughly the two decades straddling the turn of the century, was gathered from a wide spectrum of sources. C. H. Cooley from sociology; Richard T. Ely and Simon Patten from economics; F. H. Johnson and Walter Rauschenbusch from religion; Herbert Croly from political science; James Mark Baldwin from social psychology; and H. D. Lloyd from journalism were all intellectual mentors of the movement. In one way or another, all saw nineteenth century industrialism as having brought on an institutional crisis. But notwithstanding that crisis, industrialism also afforded an opportunity to divert its benefits from the few to the social betterment of the masses. There was an inordinate amount of theoretical agonizing over the tactics and justification for a program; but, in general, reform, planning, and administration figured prominently in most statements.

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Even more directly, it has been observed that the early Wilson

... was a Federalist by nature and by training. Moreover, Wilson gathered most of his political, administrative, and economic ideas from reading the works of the eighteenth and nineteenth century British publicists and statesmen rather than from personal observation and analysis. ... Throughout his life Wilson's administrative philosophy continued to be basically Hamiltonian. But in the first decade of the twentieth century his political and economic convictions underwent a transformation, and he emerged a twentieth century liberal and a militant advocate of the political principles of Thomas Jefferson. 94

More indirectly and lastly, the influence through Adams and Ely of German historicism 95 and the German tradition in administration from Cameralism to Stein must be considered critical in any assessment of Wilson's intellectual antecedents.

From these examples it should be seen that Wilson's time, then, was one of considerable technological development, institutional metamorphosis, and ideational ferment. It was a period of clashing dogmas, of scrambling to formulate new rationalizations, and of coping with new ideas incongruent with older preconceptions. Deciphering his thought is bound to reflect these diverse currents.


Some Critical Questions and Discussions

In the previous sections of this chapter we have attempted to display the general theory in question, to highlight its essentials, and to explore the roots of the more visible ideational foliage. The aims of this section, and of the corresponding sections in the remaining chapters of Part II, are twofold: first, to appraise the theory's adequacy and operational integrity; and second, to prepare the ground for a broader appraisal of our specimen theories taken as a whole. Of the two aims, the latter receives, on balance, a bit more weight than the former. Two further comments may elucidate the character of these sections. Although assessments may necessitate some repetitiveness, they are not intended to be plenary. For example, a relevant point in one theory may, on occasion, be passed over for discussion in another theory where it seems more centrally pertinent; or the same point may be approached differently in different theories. In any event, every attempt is made to evade destructive trivialities. We appreciate that criticisms from the eminence of the present involve much that was unavailable or obscure in the original context of a theoretical development. But progress toward more firmly grounded theoretical construction should not be diverted into condescending by-paths. There is homage enough in the selection of a theory as a worthy contributor
to the journey. With these caveats "under the belt," what about the quality of Wilson's theory of administration?

To begin with, Wilson's theory fulfills the characterization "general" in several senses. For one thing, it is reasonably "intensional"—that is, the theory covers, albeit with uneven thoroughness, a wide variety of administrative categories as opposed to only limited segments of the subject. The theory is also reasonably "extensional"—that is, various "interfaces" of administration are included in the theory. For another thing, administration is placed in a historical and comparative perspective. Finally, administration is general in the sense that it is a universal feature of governmental forms.

Wilson's objectives tend to fade into a single plane of importance rather than to order themselves into some sequential significancies. Apparently, the apex objective is a clarion call for the study of administration. If so, hard at heel are secondary objectives: to explain why it must be studied; to propose what the study would entail; to suggest how to go about the study; and to identify some of the problems of an application of the theory. More specifically, Wilson has the objective of developing a scientific theory of administration. Our concern is whether or to what extent his "ground-breaking" effort achieves that status.
Is Wilson's a scientific theory? For those who would apply the test of quantification, the theory appears lacking. But so-called quantitative theories have as their basis, have as necessary interpretations, "literary statements." Moreover, there is nothing in the theory precluding measurement and quantification—to the contrary for example, consider minimization criteria and "time and motion" studies. For those who would apply the test of "empiricism," it must be admitted that the quality of Wilson's evidence is vague and unsubstantiated. But his is a "trail-blazing" excursion and the press of the theory is synthetic rather than analytic. Nevertheless, the conception of empiricism is unsound.

Wilson believes that there lurks amongst, but not in, bare facts principles which may be induced and collapsed into enduring finality. In this sense, even principles become "facts." Of course, premises are covertly involved in the selection and organization of facts and the "back door" intrusion of Wilson's ideals and high moral sense is only obvious—for example, the assumed primacy of "self-rule." The upshot is that what Wilson sought to explain was wholly preconceived.

There is another difficulty. Wilson tries to impute a thoroughly scientific character to something which

96"Logical simples" and "undefined primitives" notwithstanding.
is not at all scientific. Clearly, administration is, however differentiated, an institutional phenomenon—indeed, Wilson confines his analysis to institutions—and under our specification, institutions may be scientifically studied but they are not themselves scientific. In the absence of a dynamic social category, use of the historical-comparative method—otherwise an enhancement of testing "power"—puts Wilson in the relativism bind. Wilson's cross-cultural fixity—namely administration—cannot relieve the onus for it is subservient to an entirely relative politics.

Are the terms of the theory well defined and are the distinctions sustainable? One key term in the theory, power, goes undefined. It seems to function as a code word employed when Wilson "runs into the sand" on a quest for the source of social dynamics. But the major difficulty is that the terms Wilson does define are questionably operational. When a theory, such as Wilson's, involves limited interactions among a few gross variables, the tendency is to regress into "things and attributes." Wilson presumes that the "things" under examination preexist, that the disparity between politics and administration, ends and means, and historical stages are discoverable. Existence is the outcome, in other words, of simplistic observation rather than disciplined inquiry. As a result, the terms do not hold up. This is best seen in the distinctions proposed by Wilson.
Just what is, for example, the distinction between executive and administrative? Or, to take another, what is the distinction between business (private) administration and public administration? On these, Wilson is either confusing or silent. A third distinction is that, if any, between modern and premodern administration. There are two weaknesses in Wilson's notion of administrative universality. First, Wilson cannot conceive of government without politics but could he conceive of government without administration? Or, to put it another way, Wilson cannot conceive of administration without politics but could he conceive of politics without administration? Wilson seems not to have confronted this possibility "head-on." It seems that administration, at least in rudimentary form, is always present in government. Certainly, politics without administration seems pointless. One vague differentiation between premodern and modern stages is that the "needs" of the former are simple and of the latter complex. Apart from the question of need itself, presently to be taken up, does Wilson mean to imply that premodern administration is understandably convenient, especially for autocratic political regimes, but not absolutely necessary? If so, administration loses its universality.

Second, Wilson can conceive of a scientific administration, but could he conceive of a nonscientific administration? At one point Wilson slips and writes: "we are having now what we never had before, a science of
administration."97 Does Wilson mean to say that the study of administration is becoming scientific or that administration is becoming scientific? Perhaps the weight of Wilson's theory inclines to the former. And yet Wilson also did observe "administrative tasks have nowadays to be ... studiously and systematically adjusted to carefully tested standards of policy."98 Does Wilson mean to suggest that this was not the case in earlier times? If so, administration again loses its universality.

Since, in Wilson's theory, the nature of administration cannot be altered by an external politics, Wilson's "stages" are necessarily political, not administrative. Some stages may call for a great deal of scientific administration, others practically none at all; in some stages the ends of politics may be undemocratically deplorable or benevolent, but administration is not thereby in either case the less scientific. Wilson can conceive of a scientific administration but not of a scientific politics.

Of the politics-administration distinction, Wilson is quite definite: politics is "ends"; administration is "means." And he is no less certain that while administration is among diverse political systems independent, in any particular instance of government, administration is separate

97 Wilson, "The Study," p. 484. [Emphasis added]
98 Ibid. [Emphasis added]
but subservient to politics. Therefore, Wilson can conceive of moving from politics to administration but not from administration to politics. And yet surely, although not perhaps so obviously in Wilson's day, administration is an intimate factor in the effective derivation of political ends. And surely also in some measure, political ends "materialize" out of administrative circumstances. At least it is clear that policy is redefined and changed in the process of its administration. But of all this Wilson is oblivious. The number of covert assumptions packed into the separation of means and ends as "things" sui generis beggar the recounting. The topic will necessarily surface time and again throughout the study.

The problem is not that distinctions are made. The problem is "how" they are made. Given Wilson's presumption of disparate "things," he is unable to conceive of changing contexts wherein what functions as "ends" in one functions as "means" in another. In theoretical terms, the conclusions that flow from premises become premises for further inquiry. Further, Wilson is unable to shift attributes to defining properties and vice versa. That is, in one context some factors may be held stable while in another context those same factors function as variable. Wilson's theory is problem oriented but his "problem" has an independent and discoverable existence. The consequence of this
conception is that the influence of his theory on the problem—or better, its function in the problem—is lost.

Administrative function and purpose is perhaps the clearest exposition in the theory. Beyond what has already been said, it is of the utmost importance to realize that Wilson differentiates between "end-producing" institutions and "end-executing" institutions. The former, of which politics is an example, are primary and dominant; the latter, of which administration is an example, are secondary and subordinate. Political institutions must and do respond to internal compulsions but administrative institutions must be value-neutral and passively receptive to political direction. Administrative institutions, then, function as the means to service politically produced social values and they are exclusively judged in this function by the degree to which those values are realized in primary institutions. This is a totally preconceived characterization and, if true, should attract ethnographers everywhere as the only incidence of amoral organized behavior in the entire history of mankind. But no theoretical justification or experiential evidence for this bizarre assertion is advanced by Wilson.

Wilson does place administration in a context of governmental change. However, no cosmogony (or eschatology) of administration is developed. Wilson simply does not explicate a nonadministrative stage in social history; he just accepts its existence. And, in fact, his theory of
administrative change is exclusively one of degree. Stages one and two are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of administration. Moreover, Wilson is patently silent on the dynamics of governmental (really political) transition from stage one to stage two. Again, he merely asserts that the change has occurred or is occurring. It is a curious omission inasmuch as the power dispersal involved in the passage from stages of absolute rule to stages of constitution-making seems to contravert Wilson's "law" of power centralization. On the passage from stage two to stage three—or for that matter, conceivably from stage one to stage three—Wilson invokes the element of "need." The major differentiation between the first two stages and the third, or "modern," stage is the (unexplained) emergence of social complexity. This complexity "needs" and requires a high degree of scientific administration. There are not many explanations of the rise of modern administration and the "need" theory is so prominent among them that it deserves some attention on the score of its adequacy.

At the outset it should be recognized that implicit in the "need" theory is a "failure" or "void" theory. That is, if the needs of complexity, for example, are unmet, it must be assumed that extant institutions are unable to handle those needs. In this sense, there is an institutional void. Wilson would probably say rather that, in this case, administration is underdeveloped to the task. In any event,
some kind of institutional insufficiency is a precondition for the "need" theory. It should also be recognized that needs are a given; there is nothing in the theory to explain their arrival on the scene.

Since the prevailing view is that institutions bring about and mold human social (and material) life, and since already extant dominant institutions enjoy the advantage of working their "will," why, it might be asked, do not these institutions simply mold the situation of needs to their own abilities and dissolve the necessity for any institutional innovation? In other words, why would not already extant and powerful institutions either prevent or destroy rival institutions? Wilson would probably argue that the development of administration is supplementary, not threatening, to existing (primary) institutions. Within Wilson's theory this is an understandable position; from a critical viewpoint, administrative development cannot be neutral. In any event, the fact of institutional failure or inappropriateness is not an explanation of that fact. Suppose a law, the Sherman Antitrust Act, is passed making it a crime to conspire to enter into agreement to restrain trade or to monopolize an industry. Further suppose, as was the case, that enforcement fell to the Justice Department and the courts. This was so much a failure that by 1914 it was superseded by the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, the latter creating a new administrative
agency for enforcement. But not only do these facts not explain the failure, nothing in the situation suggests the necessity for establishing administrative machinery. The question that needs answering is why, at such a juncture, would managerial techniques be so compelling?

The "failure" theory leads to the "response" theory. Administration is said to be the response to a need stimulus. In the face of a "felt need" an appropriate mechanism is brought about. But this is a hopeless theory for it is always "true" ex post facto and never disproved a priori. If a need exists and the response has not yet occurred, it can always be said that it will eventually come about—and this holds no matter how long the need may have existed. And if the response occurs, it is taken as a mark of the "success" of the theory. The trouble is, if necessity is the mother of response, it has an unpredictable gestation period—one can never know when the child will be born. Therefore, success, the offspring of need, can only be seen in retrospect. Straight to the point, this is not a testable theory.

Of course, we do often have legitimate needs—say a cure for cancer—but that is not a necessary, much less a sufficient, condition for an appropriate response. It might be argued that when need is expressed it is a useful stimulus to appropriate action. There is no doubt that this is so. But there is also no doubt that there are needs to
prevent appropriate action. Moreover, many innovations seem to eventuate in the absence of any "felt need." A "needs" theory is, on analysis, wholly ambiguous.

Our final comments are reserved for Wilson's conception of the place and nature of public administration in a modern society.

Solely in the context of legislative democracy, Wilson steadfastly calls for an autonomously independent public administration animated only by politically ordained and executively enforced policies. His aims are to insure administrative compliance to political authority and to secure political goals with minimal administrative exertions. In the former of these aims, Wilson relies on the twin elements of "informed public criticism" and "clear cut" delineations of administrative responsibility. In effect, administration must be independent of politics in order to organizationally (hierarchically) distribute visible responsibilities. But Wilson seems to violate this administrative necessity by advocating the principle that "administration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to public opinion." 99 Moreover, within Wilson's theory the principle seems unnecessary. If the effects of administrative policy execution are politically undesirable, the proper political recourse is through the legislative process and to administration through the (chief) executive conduit. It is

99 Ibid., p. 500.
interesting to note that Wilson can conceive of administra-
tion existing in a political "environment" but it does not
occur to him, perhaps understandably in his time, to conceive
of politics existing in an administrative "environment." The
fact that in today's society the latter has come to be the
more realistic conception is indication enough that Wilson
has missed the central significance or meaning of managerial
habits of behavior.

In the latter of Wilson's aims—the minimization
of administrative exertion—reliance is placed on hierarchal
organization and all that it implies in the way of order,
authority, responsibility, etc. It is surprising that Wil-
son does so, for there is nothing in his conception of the
administrative instrumentality that would insure securing
any goal, much less efficiency standards. His radical sep-
oration of means and ends is vividly expressed in this ques-
tionable analogy:

If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife
cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the
knife without borrowing his probable intention
to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a
monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public
bureau well, I can learn his business methods
without changing one of my republican spots. 100

In other words, administrative means (hierarchal organiza-
tion) can be exercised to the ends of profligacy just as
well as to the ends of economy. Only an intimate connection

100 Ibid., p. 504.
between means and ends, one in which each may confront and illuminate the other, can overcome this difficulty.

Let it be said in conclusion that wherever the defects of Wilson's theory—and there are many not approached in our critique—it provides a stimulating potential for theoretical orientation.
CHAPTER IV
GOODNOW

In this chapter, and in each of the succeeding chapters in Part II, the reader is cautioned to understand that discussions will take account of those that have come before in previous chapters. For example, since the social context of both Wilson and Goodnow are in large measure similar, the section in this chapter on social determinates will reflect that fact.

Brief Intellectual Biography

After undergraduate work at Amherst, Frank Johnson Goodnow (1859-1939) was awarded the LL.B degree from Columbia University in 1879.\(^1\) He studied abroad at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques and the University of Berlin where he specialized in administrative law. He began a long teaching career at Columbia University in 1883 where he specialized in administrative law. In 1914 Goodnow

assumed the presidency of Johns Hopkins University where, until he retired in 1929, he continued active academic work in public administration in collaboration with W. W. and W. F. Willoughby. Among Goodnow's many students were, for example, Marshall Dimock and G. W. Spicer.

Goodnow was also professionally active. He was a founder and the first President of the American Political Science Association and, among other things, a member of the board of the Brookings Institution and a member of President Taft's Commission on Efficiency and Economy.

It was while at Columbia University that Goodnow published the three books which constitute his principal contributions to public administration theory. Of the first of these, Dwight Waldo has with undisguised irony remarked:

Most subsequent students of administration, even when they have not read it and even when they arrive at quite opposite conclusions with respect to the application of "politics" and "administration," have regarded Politics and Administration much as the eighteenth-century literati regarded Newton's Principia.

Even discounting Waldo's flair for overstatement, there is no denying that the "politics-administration" distinction has enjoyed wide currency in the market place of public administration theory. This element in Goodnow's theory has also induced a predisposition to lump him into the

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2 Frank J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900).

Wilsonian tradition. Whether Goodnow was seriously influenced by Wilson or whether both simply reacted to similar cultural stimuli is less important than the not so recognized dissimilarities, as we shall attempt to establish, in the theories of the two. Goodnow's manual on "politics" and "administration" was followed by two ponderous tomes that extended the previous theme and blocked out the dimensions of the field: **Comparative Administrative Law** and **Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States**. These writings unquestionably influenced a generation of public administration comment. In our presentation of Goodnow's theory, all three books will be considered as a single statement. This procedure is upholdable due to the repetitively consistent projection of ideas throughout the three works.

**Presentation of the General Theory**

To understand Goodnow's theory of public administration, it is necessary to commence with his conception of governmental functions. He claims that it is futile to seek the nature of such functions through the mere perusal of the formal law. The existence, for example, of extra-

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legal political parties illustrates that "actual systems of
government may be changed before the formal government is
changed." It is imperative therefore "to get back of the
formal governmental organization and examine the real
political life." Infatuation with formal law, moreover,
tends to introduce a bias against administrative affairs in
favor of constitutional questions; but "the Constitution
cannot be understood without a knowledge of the administra-
tive system." Understanding has been further confused by
the so-called "three function" aberration passed to the
Founding Fathers by way of Montesquieu--based on the pecu-
liar circumstances, of little moment here, that persuaded
the English that governmental organs dispensing justice
should be separate from those administering policy. Execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial functions are, Goodnow
avers, neither capable of precise formal statement or dis-
cernable in actual practice. Organs of government must not
be confused with functions of government. Whatever the
forms of government, they are all reducible to only two
functions.

All the actions of the state . . . are
undertaken with the object, either of facilitating
the expression of . . . will or of aiding in its
execution . . . whatever may be the formal charac-
ter of the governmental system.9

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6 Goodnow, Politics, p. 3.
7 Ibid., p. 1. 8 Ibid., p. 6.
9 Ibid., p. 9.
Goodnow then makes, as had Wilson before him, the so familiar and seemingly so innocent transposition: "These functions are, respectively, Politics and Administration."\(^{10}\)

Goodnow supports the assumption that these two functions represent a "natural" and "logical" division of labor by a lame analogy:

Political \([\text{governmental}]\) functions group themselves naturally under two heads, which are equally applicable to the mental operations and the actions of self-conscious personalities. That is, the action of the state as a political entity consists either in operations necessary to the expression of its will, or in operations necessary to the execution of that will.\(^{11}\)

Of course this is a "psychological" basis for the distinction, but the analogy is also associable with Goodnow's "organismic" conception of the state.\(^ {12}\) Thus, an element of a social system (e.g., a governmental organ) has a characteristic (e.g., determination of will) which makes a functional contribution to a characteristic (e.g., execution of will) of another part of the system (e.g., another governmental organ) or to a characteristic (e.g., maintenance or survival) of the system as a whole (e.g., the governmental system).\(^ {13}\)

But:

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 22 \(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 9.
\(^{12}\)Ibid., pp. 8-9.
\(^{13}\)For an excellent example see Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science, and Religion (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), pp. 52-57.
Functionalism would not be so functional after all, unless it could define the concept of function not merely by such glib expressions as "the contribution which a partial activity makes to the total activity of which it is a part."\textsuperscript{14}

In sympathy with Malinowski's admonition, Goodnow holds that social institutions are grounded in the psychological "needs" of the human participants.\textsuperscript{15}

Although the two functions or powers of government are analytically distinguishable, they are not assignable to separate governmental organs. This is so not only

\ldots because the exercise of governmental power cannot be clearly apportioned, but also because, as political systems develop, these two primary functions of government tend to be differentiated into minor and secondary functions. The discharge of each of these minor functions is entrusted to somewhat separate and independent governmental organs.\textsuperscript{16}

And as a matter of fact,

\ldots no political organization, based on the general theory of a differentiation of governmental functions, has ever been established which assigns the function of expressing the will of the state exclusively to any one of the organs for which it makes provision.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{15}A variant on Malinowski's use in that capacity of biological needs.

\textsuperscript{16}Goodnow, \textit{Politics}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 15.
Nevertheless, while no governmental organ is exclusively confined to a single function, the tendency is for one function to dominate.

The problem that bemuses Goodnow, then, is the proper relationship that should obtain between governmental organs in the exercising of the two functions. His immediate intention is to develop political ideas or theory more closely in tune to actual practice than is the case with the formal legal system. It is Goodnow's contention that in thus redressing theory, the essential functional similarity of all governments, whatever their organizational distinctiveness, will be revealed. The universality of functions in conjunction with the scientific treatment accorded the subject of administration by foreign writers justify the comparative method of moving from Continental to American circumstances. The ultimate purpose is to suggest remedies in actual practice to better meet the necessities and effectiveness of governmental, especially administrative, functions. The stress is occasioned by the emergence--Goodnow offhandedly gives "complexity" as the reason--of a Period of Administrative Reform out of an "Age of Constitutional Reform." 

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18 Goodnow, Comparative, p. v.
19 Goodnow, Politics, pp. v, vi.
20 Goodnow, Comparative, p. iv.
"The function of politics" has to do primarily with the expression of public will, secondarily with the execution of that will. In regard to the former, there is involved the matters of sovereignty and representation: the provision for constituting the body politic and the formation of a representational body.\(^{21}\) It is apparent that Goodnow takes political values as primary "givens" and that he presumes the latent existence in the body politic of a "saddle-point" balance of value contentions. He nevertheless laments the lack of formal provision for deliberative processes leading to reflexive policies.\(^{22}\) (Surely he must mean "leading to the formation of representational bodies.")

On the question of what shall constitute a legitimate public (governmental) activity, only a vague position can be gleaned from scattered comments. Beyond the securing of individual rights, when through gain in the market place the private provision for the social welfare is deficient, precluded, or not forthcoming, then there exists a sufficient but not necessary condition for provision through governmental service without gain. The necessary condition is a political matter. The warrant to act and the extent of

\(^{21}\)Goodnow, *Principles*, pp. 64ff., 118ff.

\(^{22}\)Goodnow, *Politics*, pp. 149-150.
the action is—although Goodnow does not explicitly so list it—a political function.  

Within the sphere of government, there exists a spectrum of will expression types. At one extreme are unconditional and complete expressions—usually rules, protections, or restraints—wherein details are either not needed or are easily enumerated and administration, in such cases, is confined to the detection of violations. In a sense, this is administrative law in absolute form and is applicable in (undefined) simple societies or in instances of simplicity in otherwise complex societies. At the other extreme—and logically derived from Goodnow’s scheme—are totally conditional and incomplete will expressions. That is, there is only a legislative warrant to administratively address a public problem area without the provision of details or specific goal content. Although such cases require political license, they are tantamount to administrative expression of will—which is no doubt why Goodnow failed to explicate such a possibility. In between these two extremes are cases of degrees of conditionality and completeness in will expression requiring administrative attention. In these instances the political expression is general and directive but, in the face of unforeseen contingencies, nondetailed. Such expressions instruct

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23 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 8.

administration to act and, in some measure, how to act. The degree of incompleteness is inversely related to the degree of administrative participation in will expression.

The obvious mingling of political and administrative functions occasions the secondary political function. That function is a response to the necessity of a state of harmony between expression of will and execution of will.\textsuperscript{25} The logical necessity of expression prior to purposive execution and the ideal of democratic direction require that execution be subservient to expression.\textsuperscript{26} The latter is empty without the former;\textsuperscript{27} administrative expression of will is functional usurpation tantamount to democratic subversion; and administrative execution contrary to the democratic will is an improper assertion of the right to express will.\textsuperscript{28} All of these are avoidances of popular will and the substitution of administrative will.\textsuperscript{29} Political necessity requires, therefore, harmony between means and ends; without that coordinating harmony political paralysis and administrative confusion inevitably ensue.\textsuperscript{30}

In summary, the ends of politics are to express popular will and to direct and control the execution of

\textsuperscript{25}Goodnow, Politics, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., pp. 11, 24. \textsuperscript{27}Ibid., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{29}Goodnow, Principles, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 31.
that will.\textsuperscript{31} Popular government requires subordination of means to ends.\textsuperscript{32} The problem of popular government is the proper control—the methods of "social control"—over administration.

In the widest sense, in the sense of government as an organ of society, administration is the activity of government\textsuperscript{33}—that is, "the governmental system in active operation."\textsuperscript{34} As a functional aspect of government, administration is the residual after subtracting the legislative and judicial functions.\textsuperscript{35} Positively, administration is the function of executing the will of the state;\textsuperscript{36} it is found in all the manifestations of the executive officers.\textsuperscript{37} But the administrative organs of government are more than just the administrative function, since governmental organs always embody more than one function.\textsuperscript{38} The directions of administrative action are varied: foreign relations, defense, financial affairs, internal domestic affairs,

\textsuperscript{31}Goodnow, Politics, pp. 255-263.
\textsuperscript{32}Goodnow, Principles, pp. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{33}Goodnow, Comparative, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{34}Goodnow, Principles, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{35}Goodnow, Politics, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 72.
\textsuperscript{37}Goodnow, Comparative, pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., p. 6.
etc. 39 The administration of government consists of: one, detailed execution of the express will of the state; two, a border-line (quasi) judicial activity involving disputes in detailed and concrete cases of execution and involving (some) instances of redress of infringement of individual rights; three, "investigatory" and information gathering activities; and four, the institution of organizational devices appropriate to its function. 40

All cases of conditional and incomplete expressions of political will decree administrative discretion; the degree of the latter is inversely related to the degree of the former and this relationship is a factor in administrative forms. Goodnow provides two illustrative models. 41 The model of "great discrimination" is organizationally characterized by centralized power, clear responsibility, and internal allegiance to a tight hierarchy of authority. Under such conditions the distinction between the political function of will expression and the administrative function of will execution is obscured with, therefore, little impetus to discern the popular will. The model of "negligible discrimination" is organizationally characterized by decentralized power, diffused responsibility, and wide

39 Goodnow, Comparative, pp. 2-4; Principles, pp. 117-118.

40 Goodnow, Politics, pp. 73-77; Comparative, p. 37.

41 Goodnow, Politics, pp. 94-95.
discretion within a vague hierarchy of weak authority. Under such conditions extensive political control is felt even in the details of execution. Popular will in the former case is endangered by irrelevancy; and in what amounts to almost the same thing, in the latter case the popular will is thwarted through a frustrated impartial and efficient execution.

These models introduce, in addition to the necessary dominance of "general political goals" over a necessarily subservient "detailed administrative execution," three further dimensions to the problem of popular political control of administrative actions. First, there must be no interference in the derivation of popular political policies; they must be unpolluted primary expressions. In a word, the expression of will must be independent of extraneous influences. However, a considerable measure of administrative independence is also necessary not only due to the discretion inherent in detailed execution but because efficiency in execution is diluted by political meddling. The problem is one of insuring conformity to political goal intentions without "undue" interference. Some administrative independence must be sacrificed. Second, efficiency is effectuated by a centralized and concentrated hierarchically structured administrative organization of power, authority, and responsibility. Such an administrative device is

42 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 43 Ibid., p. 117.
impossible if there is political intervention in the use of appropriate means. Administration must be efficient in securing the political will;\footnote{Ibid., p. 77.} nevertheless, administrative insularity endangers political control. It is interesting to note that the formation and operation of a representative political body is also a centralizing and concentrating social process. Third, the matter of administrative concurrence is implied in the models— that is, administration must be in agreement, perhaps to some extent voluntary agreement, with political directives. Goodnow refers only casually to the subject and then only to indicate that there should be concurrence of authority independent of will expression before it becomes a rule of conduct.\footnote{Goodnow, \textit{Politics}, p. 39; \textit{Principles}, p. 12.} His reasoning is vague. If he means concurrence as a "check" on power, then his reason seems counter to the thrust of his exposition. A good reason can be supplied; namely, a political goal requiring administrative action must be administratively feasible.

Although the separation of powers is related to the matter of administrative independence, Goodnow holds that it goes too far by way of preventing the coordination of political and administrative functions. This might be overlooked as long as society was "simple"; as society moved into complexity, the consequences of relative administrative
independence came to be appreciated. In the absence of formal control, informal political control came to manifest itself in the form of the political party. But that response was insufficiently democratic and excessively intrusive in administrative affairs. Harmony between the two functions, then, is what Goodnow sees as the governmental problem of his day. Or, to put it another way, the political problem is democratic control; the administrative problem is adequate independence.

The formal answer to reconciling uncoordinated governmental functions is simplified, Goodnow finds, by a rather fortuitous eventuality. Clearly, although political control must be sufficient, it must also be limited. It so happens, however, that as the necessity for the political control of administration increases--or as Goodnow puts it, means increase and political elaboration decreases ---the needed extent of that control lessens.

The fact is ..., that there is a large part of administration which is unconnected with politics, which should be relieved very largely, if not altogether, from control of political bodies. It is unconnected with politics because it embraces fields of semi-scientific, quasi-judicial and quasi-business or commercial activity--work which has little if any influence on the expression of the true state will.\footnote{Goodnow, \textit{Politics}, pp. 92-93.}

Indeed, as has been pointed out, the extension of politics into these administrative matters would, by twisting will

\footnote{Ibid., pp. 85-86.}
through inefficient administration, be counterproductive. What is called for is direct political control over the ends to be executed and indirect control enough to limit administration to only those means appropriate to the aforesaid ends; beyond that, administrative control is necessary. Simply, general administrative conduct must be subjected to political control but not the detailed routine, technical, and objective administrative work. 48 The way is found in the "executive."

Goodnow recognizes a minor judicial aspect to the executive, but his attention is riveted on the two major aspects: one political and one administrative. 49 These are manifested in that executives are not, or should not be, selected for expertise only; they must be equally selected for the ability to exercise judgment. 50 These two aspects are confused with the result that the executive organ fluctuates between political leadership with administration residing elsewhere and administrative executor with politics residing elsewhere. In the United States, often both have fled the office. Significantly included in the content of the political aspect is the supervision of the law; that is, it is an executive function to see that the laws are faithfully executed. The administrative aspect

48 Ibid., p. 81.
49 Goodnow, Principles, pp. 64-82.
50 Goodnow, Politics, p. 81.
involves responsibility for the provision of what is necessary to execute legislative fiat; that is, it is an executive function to choose from among those means that are proper. Goodnow proposes a rule: Political control should extend just so far as to insure harmony between popular will expression and popular will execution. When applied, this rule would extend political control to cover the political but not the administrative aspect of the executive. Curiously, this partial coverage of the executive secures its unity. If, Goodnow argues, the political aspect of the executive is independent (i.e., free of external political control), then the administrative aspect of the executive tends within the executive to be independent. This is an infectious violation of the organizational requisites for administrative efficiency.

Goodnow reviews the various formal methods of administrative control: legislative, judicial, and, of course, internal administrative control. Exactly how these are to be made effective is not so clear. He mentions the cultivation of public opinion in the recognition of the proper coordination of governmental functions.51 Again, however, on just how such public opinion is to be brought about Goodnow is without counsel. Some reforms within the context of realities are suggested. Principally these amount to formalizing and democratizing the political parties and

51 Goodnow, Principles, p. 56.
centralizing administrative organization. Goodnow is redundantly uninformative on how to institute these reforms.

There is one important conclusion that should be drawn from Goodnow's analysis of functional coordination. It is that administration is the function of the executive, the totality of the executive and administrative authorities. Within administration, an executive function is distinguishable.

Goodnow's conception of administrative law is correlative with his conception of administration. The major distinction is that between political law and administrative law. In the former instance, there is politically originated and sovereignty based law on and about administration. This law is further distinguished. On one side this law is concerned with the form or anatomy of administration: fixing general organizational forms and relationships between forms. On the other side this law is concerned with expressing and regulating the discharge of the state will: designating general administrative responsibilities and defining general administrative jurisdictions. In the United States, insofar as constitutional law is the basis for these, it deals more with the former than the

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52 Goodnow, Politics, pp. 255-263.

53 Goodnow, Comparative, p. 5.

54 Goodnow, Comparative, pp. 6-18; Principles, pp. 3, 16-23.
latter, legislative law is, overwhelmingly in the latter, the primary basis for both. In the latter instance, administrative law originating from within administrative functions is similarly of the same two types. On one side are the laws pertaining to the elaboration of administrative organization, methods, and internal relationships. On the other side are the laws elaborating and detailing the received and directive general expressions of public will. Most significantly, Goodnow recognizes informal power and therefore informal law (e.g., political parties).

Two final points should be noted. First, Goodnow is peculiarly ahistorical. The comments made on the subject are scattered and fragmentary. He expresses a primitive stage theory and cites, but does not develop, the (administrative) needs evolving from complexity as the transitional factor. As to what constitutes complexity, he only mentions the rise of cities, technological factors, and the corporation. In the last we have our second point. The advent of corporations are significant for two reasons. One of these is that they represent new tax subjects. The other is that since corporations are engaged in business promotable through favorable governmental action or burdened by the contrary, the temptation and opportunity favor improper political relationships. This eventuality is intensified

55 Goodnow, Politics, p. 7.
56 Ibid., p. 112. 57 Ibid., p. 251.
by the "closed" nature of corporate affairs. However, rather than disclosure, Goodnow relies again on publicity and public opinion as a restraint. 58

Paradigm Essentials: A Summary

The essentials of Goodnow's theory are:

(1) Formal law is not a reliable indicator of the realities or character of governmental behaviors.

(2) "In all governmental systems . . ." and regardless of the variety of their forms, there are only two primary and ultimate ". . . functions of government, viz, the expression of the will of the state and the execution of that will. . . . These two functions are, respectively, Politics and Administration." 59 No governmental organ is confined to a single function but the tendency is for one of the two functions to dominate.

(3) The political function is normative; the administrative function is both normative and, but primarily, quasi-scientific. These functions, since universal --that is, essentially of the same character--in all governments, may be studied by the comparative scientific method.

(4) Political expression of will is generalized. The integrity of popular will requires independence in its derivation, concurrence by an alternate independent

58 Ibid., p. 253. 59 Ibid., p. 22.
authority, and sufficient political control over the administra-
tive function to prevent the execution of nonpolitically
prescribed goals and to insure the execution of those that
are prescribed.

(5) Administrative execution of will is particularizing. The legitimacy of administrative action depends
upon a subservience to and efficient execution of the popu-
lar will.

(6) Administrative efficiency requires independence in the selection of (appropriate) means and a central-
ized and hierarchally structured organization of authority
and responsibility.

(7) There is within administration a distinguish-
able executive authority with a dual function: to insure
within administration a fealty to popular will and to pro-
vide for the necessary administrative means and organiza-
tion.

(8) The nature of the political and administrative functions requires that the former be dominant over
the latter without violating the necessary degree of admin-
istrative independence pursuant to efficient execution of
policy. The governmental problem is to secure that necessary
but limited control of the popular will over administration.
The popular extent of that control should be sufficient to
secure the necessary harmonious coordination between polit-
ical expression of will and administrative execution of will
without impairing means efficiency.
(9) If the necessary political control of administration is not formally provided, it will assert itself informally. The political party is an example of an undemocratic informal response to the absence of formal coordinative principles and the existence of excessive formal stress on the principle of separation of powers.

(10) The formal answer to the problem of political control is that it should extend to cover the normative aspect but not the positive (i.e., administrative) aspect of executive authority. The proposed reforms to bring about this condition are to legalize and democratize the political party and to institute an informed public opinion.

The Social Matrix: Speculations on Determinates

The social milieu of Goodnow was essentially the same as that of Wilson. The difference was one of cadence as the emerging technological, institutional, and ideational factors rushed to a ruthless maturity. The brief remarks in this section should be understood, therefore, as in large measure supplemental to those made on the social context of Wilson's thought.

Technological Factors

"Topping-off," as it were, the manufacturing explosion already mentioned, notice should be given the
impetus provided by the remarkable development of precision in the machine-tool industry.

The spread of the so-called "American system" --that is, the improvement of the economy of manufacture by producing fully interchangeable parts --is one of the most striking technological developments of the second half of the nineteenth century. 60

This "system" set the stage for assembly-line production. In a similar vein, to the transportation developments already mentioned should be added equally revolutionary communications developments. These included electric lighting (and electro-technology generally); 61 telegraphy and telephony; 62 and such technology of journalism as the typewriter, type casting and setting, the modern printing press, photography, etc. 63 In all their manifestations, these occurrences propelled American society out of a relatively sedentary rural localism into a relatively mobile urban cosmopolitanism.

Three characteristics of this many dimensioned transformation may serve to illustrate its ideational influences. A vast percentage of the technology employed in American Industrialization, or at least the knowledge on which it was based, was borrowed from familiar European

61 Ibid., pp. 608-621. 62 Ibid., pp. 621-629.
63 Ibid., pp. 631-667.
"parent cultures." One reason for this is obvious. The United States was, compared to Europe, an underdeveloped area without an extensive base of science or of skilled labor.\textsuperscript{64} There was, in other words, an ease of technological entry and, jointly, conditions of technological opportunity. One characteristic of the nineteenth century industrial leap forward was, then, an emphasis on the "practicality" of application, adaptation, and improvement. Unlike Europe where basic scientific effort enjoyed a measure of ideological independence from innovation, in the United States science and technology were problem centered; "know-how," not knowing why, is the usual American synonym for science and technology. This simple pragmatism was undoubtedly a conditioning element in the emergence of philosophical pragmatism and scientific management.

A second characteristic of American industrialization stems from its scale and interrelatedness. The social entrance of technology had been hitherto accepted as isolated bits and pieces. This fragmented conception may well have been the chief protector of technological innovation. It is not altogether unreasonable to speculate that if in the early phases of industrialization a society might be able to grasp the full eventual impact of its total technology on cherished folkways, reputable orthodoxy might

\textsuperscript{64}John B. Rae, "The 'know-how' Tradition: Technology in American History," Technology and Culture, I (Spring, 1960), pp. 141-142.
successfully resist its implementation. In any event, by the time technology came to be recognized as a system, resistance would surely have been unavailing. But speculations aside, the ripening conception of technology as a system, when conjoined with the "application, adaptation, and improvement" syndrome, is certainly consonant with the "efficient response to complexity" element in both Wilson's and Goodnow's theories.

The growing awareness of the scope and interconnectedness of technology (i.e., a large-scale system), had one further ideational repercussion that bears on our subject. We have in mind Lewis Mumford's "tension between small-scale association and large scale organization, between personal autonomy and institutional regulation, between remote control and diffused local intervention."65 In speaking of an earlier "Agricultural Revolution," in the Middle Ages from the beginning of the sixth century to the end of the ninth century, Lynn White, Jr. records a fundamental change wrought in man's conception of his place in the scheme of things: "once man had been a part of nature; now he became her exploiter."66 The modern "Industrial Revolution" may have wrought a no less profound change


of man's conception of his place in the scheme of things; man as a manipulated factor in a technological system. It is mildly curious that industrialism, which in its early phase ushered in the democratic state, should be conceived in its mature stage as a danger to democracy; but, as Mumford succinctly puts it, the difference is one of a "democratic technics" and of an "authoritarian technics." 67 A contemporary statement of the former can be seen in E. F. Schumacher's Small is Beautiful; 68 a contemporary statement of the latter has been made by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society. 69 We do not propose to argue the worthiness of the position here, but the point is abundantly clear in both Wilson's and Goodnow's discussions. Goodnow, for example, clearly sees public administration as a democratically controlled regulator of complex social colossi potentially threatening to the popular will.

One of the many interesting instances of ideational influence on technology is to be found in architecture. By 1890 the technical means for a new building art were available. One of the first to make use of these means was Louis Sullivan, commonly hailed the first great


modern architect, who tried to express in his "skyscrapers" an organic theory of the building art. 70 Sullivan's interest in structural engineering was only one aspect of a wide-ranging interest in science generally. His concept of "form follows function," as an example, is an obvious reflection of social Darwinism. Sullivan believed that architecture should be organically elicited out of the social and technical elements in which man lives. 71 Carl Condit has observed:

If his work seems limited beside the vastly richer symbolism of medieval and baroque architecture, we may at least say that he was responding to the one coherent order that was discernible in the contradictory currents of nineteenth- and twentieth-century culture. In the absence of a cosmos in which man was conceived to be the central figure, the scientific technology on which building increasingly depended became the one sure basis of architectural and civic art. It is Sullivan's achievement to have understood how this basis could be transmuted into an effective and valid artistic statement. 72

Institutional Factors

If by the turn of the century the plexus of technology had become unmistakenly apparent, the institutional


picture must be described as, in its time, deceptive. In retrospect, of course, we may see the afflictions steadily infused by a persistent technology into revered institutions. But even in Goodnow's day there were, albeit unattended, warning signals of institutional impotency—as distinct from the much lamented visibly venal corruption—lurking below the surface.

Take, for example, the post Civil War ascendency of the Congress to a dominance within government that persisted until the eve of World War I. And yet, this was not a period of unqualified legislative hegemony. After a rash of legislation in the 1860's, proliferating economic problems in the last three decades of the nineteenth century were handled by Congress in at best a desultory fashion. Moreover, despite considerable legislative hostility to scaldent corporations, the Congress was unable to halt or undo judicial intercessions favorable to the corporate form. Between 1860 and 1875 most of the legal restraints on corporations were stripped away and in the remainder of the century the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment became the vehicle for the judicial legitimization and

73 Congressional dominance was particularly emphasized, as noted in the previous chapter, by Wilson.

justification of corporations. Even more prophetically, direct Congressional efforts to curb and control corporations through antitrust legislation was an abject failure.

Goodnow's preoccupation with political control was itself, it might have been recognized at the time, an indicator that all was not fundamentally well in that sector. However reasonable the case for "reform," more basic in the decline of "commonwealth" were the irrepressible forces at play in the transportation and communication revolutions. The plain fact is that traditional communities were increasingly difficult to define and locate and that stable polities were beginning to melt away. Such developments compel, or they should have, an examination of the emerging meaning and function of electoral and political institutions as well as, it would seem to follow, legislative institutions. Such developments also begin to explain the increasing interest in "public opinion."

It is of critical importance to mention one final institutional factor. We refer to the relationship between governmental institutions and technics. Assuredly this relationship has a long historical foreground. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that governmental interest in technical

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75 There are any number of competent accounts of this development. See, for example, Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1956); and Don Votaw, Modern Corporations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965).
information quickened throughout the nineteenth century to obsessive proportions in the post World War II decades. Just why this relationship initially expanded is obscure. Perhaps it was accidentally habitual; perhaps it had something to do with the growing scope and magnitude of technical data; or perhaps the matter turns on social versus private costs and benefits. As indicated in Chapter I, there is little agreement on the question. Suffice it to say, the relationship did become incontrovertibly extensive by 1900. Given that, two important points can be made. The first is that the nineteenth century government involvement was "gathering" oriented rather than "research" based. Technical information, indeed virtually all information, was therefore overwhelmingly conceived as positively factual—that is, without normative content or portent. Goodnow, for example, clearly so understands such information. The second is that factual information so conceived finds in administration a remarkably receptive social ecology. Put another way, information so conceived is not congenially received by legislative, political, and judicial mores. Again, although not stated in the above manner, Goodnow limits technical information to administrative means unfettered by political control.


Ideational Factors

Invariably, ideological interpretations of scientific events are cast in the image of preconceived interests; meaning lies, in other words, in the eye of the self-interested beholder. Such was the case with the event "Evolution." One interpretation of social Darwinism stressed organic holism and growth, functionality, and cooperative harmony. This is the tradition of Durkheim and a host of followers; and this is the interpretation manifest in Goodnow's theory of administration. Another interpretation, however, stressed the rivalry of social struggle and the survival of the fittest. This interpretation became the new gospel of free-enterprise and laissez-faire; and this is the influence that weakened "commonwealth" and provided the ideological reference for the legal support so important to an ever more sprawling corporate manner of conducting affairs.

In providing this support, it cannot be supposed that the court enjoyed a unique dispensation from the prevailing social climate; for that matter, neither is it necessary to suppose the court captured or bought by greedy "Captains of Finance." What can be supposed is that in the waning decades of the nineteenth century there occurred a shift in the weight of contrary ideologies. In economics, market freedom, long defended as a means to an end, became an end in itself identified with moral liberty. In
politics, from the corpus of equal democratic values, "private" property was extirpated and made preponderant; also, an embryonic anti-state doctrine began to fulminate. Of course, the economic equation assumes small and transitory firms dictated by the vagaries of the market; and there is considerable opinion that actual state interference was more often than not industry initiated and beneficial. However, ideologies are deft at avoiding realities. And, as pointed out, when these realities were recognized, such remedies as antitrust and regulation were all but futile. In any event, the shift in ideology indicates that Goodnow was sailing his theory against increasingly adverse winds.

Shifts in scientific theory were no less significant. The replacement of the will of God by the vision of an independently and lawfully functioning mechanistic universe marks the beginning of the Modern Age. Charles Singer has referred to the last half of the nineteenth century as the "culmination of the mechanical view of the world." Of "classical science" Singer observes: "Despite its triumphs there yet remained in the narrative


inconsistencies so evident and breaks so definite that they could be ignored only by the most optimistic or the least philosophical. 81 Of both, unfortunately, there is an abundance. But in the late nineteenth century it became increasingly clear that assumptionless theory was illusory and that observations themselves disturb observed mechanisms. In theory and in evidence, then, the mechanical conception was defective. But the philosophic tradition of "grounding" theoretical systems on incorrigible and non-inferential principles or premises lived on beyond the failure of mechanism.

The emergence of modern positivism was by far the most significant example of that proclivity. All that need be observed at the moment is that the effort was remarkably embracing: in the empiricist tradition, it relied on sense-data as immaculate phenomena from which may be derived the minimum premises for knowledge of factual matters; in the rationalist tradition it strove to construct fully self-warranting systems of thought; and in the best of tradition, it steadfastly dichotomized fact and value. Goodnow's approach to administration bears the traces of each of these traditions.

Finally, notice should be given to the influence of "legal realism"--in both its positivist and sociological senses--on Goodnow's sense of the law.

81 Ibid., p. 515.
Some Critical Questions and Discussions

Goodnow's theory of public administration is general in virtually all senses of the term. In particular, he charts and details the field with a definitiveness to last for nearly three decades. Goodnow's objectives are, primarily, to specify the proper place of administration in the governmental process—that is, the proper relationship between politics and administration—and, secondarily, to propose reforms requisite to that relationship.

On developing a science of administration, Goodnow is affirmative but not substantive; one can only take his example for analysis. Unfortunately, Goodnow's methodology is itself, to use the current vernacular, a "mixed bag." The formal law is dismissed as dangerously misleading, but the model advanced in its place seems indistinguishably formal and subject, it would appear, to the identical charge. "Actual" behavior is the touchstone for theoretical formulation, but behavior is undefined and presumed, evidently, to be self-announcing primary sense-data. As was the case with Wilson, what is claimed inherent in the data has been covertly infused. Even on a positivist interpretation, Goodnow's use of a priori value judgments—for example, the primacy of popular will—render the theory scientifically defective on those grounds. Vagueness and a loose

82Although, as we shall see in subsequent discussion, it is weak in some dimensions.
eclecticism make any characterization of Goodnow's methodology, as with Wilson, largely judgmental. We would tilt the scales on the formal rather than the empirical side.

In some areas, term distinctions have little clarity or are nonexistent. There is virtually no distinction between the modern form of administration and those forms that occur historically. It might be argued that no differences exist, but the implication is otherwise. In other areas, distinctions are more positive. The place of the executive, vis a vis both politics and administration, is more carefully defined. The province of governmental as opposed to nongovernmental affairs is made on the grounds, respectively, of social and individual welfare. The distinction between private and public administration is made with the key being the absence of acquisitiveness in the latter.

As with Wilson, Goodnow's central distinction, upon which depends so many other distinctions, is between politics and administration. These are privileged analytic categories beyond the caprice of experience; but in practice, politics and administration overlap and blend. Goodnow therefore worries about the proper practice of politics and administration but he does not worry about whether he ought to worry about the matter in that way or, that is, to worry about it at all.

Goodnow's distinction between governmental organs and governmental functions reflects both a substance-
attribute preoccupation and a cleavage between context-free analytics and contingent experience. Among the many illustrations of theoretical incapacity ensuing from this methodological dualism, we turn to give three.

Goodnow treats social organs as a sort of super-person substance. Bertrand Russell has written:

A person is a complex whole having a single life . . . can there be a super-person, composed of persons as the body is composed of organs, and having a single life which is not the sum of the lives of the component persons? If there can be such a super person . . . then the State may be such a being, and it may be as superior to ourselves as the whole body is to the eye. But if we think this super-person a mere metaphysical monstrosity, then we shall say that the intrinsic value of a community is derived from that of its members, and that the State is a means, not an end.83

That is, if it is a monstrosity for societies to behave and have intentions like persons, then social organs are the institutional means for collective individual ends. But for Goodnow, the governmental organ is not a means for individual ends, it is a means for collective individual ends, and collective will is social. Goodnow conceives the governmental organ to be individual-like, but with both (collective) expressions and (collective) expression executions included. Both Goodnow and Russell are in error.

It makes no sense to pose, as does Russell, a conceptual whole part individual and part social, with ends

in one and means in the other. It is tantamount to specifying an oak table as sixty percent cells and forty percent atoms, neither of which displaces the other. And granting Goodnow's characterization of the individual, altogether a questionable characterization, there is no reason to expect social organs to resemble a person anymore than a person should resemble the cells or organs of which he is composed. The question is begged by inappropriately associating two quite different realms of discourse in which neither is a part of the other as a whole.

The inappropriate mixing of units of analysis and the conception of units as autonomous both undermine functionality as used by Goodnow. Even if the former be corrected, the latter assumes a fixity not justified by experience or competent inquiry. The politics-administration dualism, which so occupies Goodnow, reflected the growing oppositions of rising secular forces and institutions rooted in the past. Whatever the institutional shock, established belief systems tend to persist. But practical accommodation is no less pressing. Although, then, Goodnow's emphasis on harmony is understandable, it was made precisely because of changing social circumstances, circumstances of rift and conflict. A bias for harmony is, moreover theoretically unsound. "A" may be to "B" functional in one context and in other contexts dysfunctional or non-functional. Thus, as contexts change, so do functions. Moreover, "function" is
too narrow a relation type on which to hang theoretical sophistication. The criticisms of functionalism are legend and there is little point in pursuing the subject further here. 84

Goodnow's theory is problem centered, but the nature of the "problem" is, like Wilson, improperly conceived. Problems are, again, presumed separate from the methods that address them. One consequence is that while "what is wrong" is discoverable in experience, "what to do" is derived formally. Consider, for example, Goodnow's reform "solutions": informed public opinion, administrative centralization, and legalization of political parties. Careful inspection reveals a gap between the social state which is defective and the social states which are proposed as solutions. Absolutely no operational proposal is advanced by Goodnow on how to move out of the former state and into the latter states. The problem is not that a solution path cannot be proposed; the problem is that the theory is negative to such proposals. It seems obvious that problem states can be discovered in experience but equally obvious that solution states do not so exist. The answer is that the function of theory is to construct social contexts as potentially

84 For those who desire to pursue the matter, a good beginning would be Don Martindale, ed., Functionalism in the Social Sciences, Monograph 5 (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965).
realizable solution paths. "Problem" and "solution" are two sides of the same experiential coin.

We conclude with two final points. First, Goodnow continues the assumption that efficiency is a function of hierarchy. By efficiency he means not only "least cost and effort" means to a given end but also the limitation of means to those leading only to popular political ends imposed on administration by legislative control over and through executive authority. The selection and use of proper means is strictly a technical matter which should be insulated from political interference. Only a partial list of the more obviously implied assumptions should show how questionable is this view: unique value-free administrative organization, ends of means are predictable before use, goals filtered only from superordinate to subordinate hierarchical rungs, and technical information is without normative content.

Second, the primitive historical and comparative dimensions of Goodnow's theory weaken its penetrative credibility. Moreover, the impression given is of a static picture, detailed and thorough, but exhibiting a disturbing Western ethnocentrism and lacking the social motion of its time. Perhaps it is only what should be expected. In the early throes of emerging social forces, deviations are often restrained in the guise of familiar stabilities.
Whatever the disabilities, in the backdrop of its time, Goodnow's impressive enterprise deserves an honored niche in the field of public administration scholarship.
SELECTED STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT FROM WILSON TO
WALDO: A SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE PERSPECTIVE
VOLUME II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
John Carroll Chitwood, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1980

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CHAPTER V
WILLOUGHBY

Brief Intellectual Biography

William Franklin Willoughby (1867-1960)\(^1\) graduated from Johns Hopkins University in 1888. For the period 1890-1901 he served in the United States Department of Labor and then lectured in economics at his Alma Mater and Harvard. During 1912-1917 he was Professor of Jurisprudence and Politics at Princeton after which he joined the faculty of Johns Hopkins where, in conjunction with his brother (W. W. Willoughby) and Frank J. Goodnow, he specialized in public administration.

Willoughby's extensive and varied professional career included: Assistant Director of the United States Census, member of President Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency, Director of the Bureau of Public Personnel Administration, Director of the Institute for Governmental Research of the Brookings Institution, and drafter of the Budgetary and Accounting Act of 1921.

Among Willoughby's major publications are: The Government of Modern States, Principles of Public Administration, and Principles of Judicial Administration. The presentation of Willoughby's general theory of public administration will rely on the first two of these books and, more essentially, a later article: "The Science of Public Administration."  

Presentation of the General Theory

Willoughby's path to public administration, with minor but interesting exceptions, is in the tradition of his forebears. The shaping of the American system of government was essentially political: protecting individual rights and liberties, securing the legitimate expression of the popular will, and preventing governmental abuse of powers. Such was not a time for administrative concerns. But the rise of administrative activities to a majority


6 Willoughby, Principles of Public, p. vii.
status in the ebbing decades of the nineteenth century 
entirely changed the governmental picture. In this new time, 
"No longer is there an a priori assumption that a widening 
of the sphere of public action is an evil." 7 Indeed, 
The province of government is now held to embrace 
all forms of activities which contribute in any 
way to the promotion of the public welfare. There 
is hardly a field of activity into which our gov-
ernments have not entered. 8 
However manifest a pervading administration, Willoughby may 
overstate popular acceptance. But Dwight Waldo has put his 
finger on the deeper significance of Willoughby's statement. 
The validity of the ideal of a man-made harmony, 
created for the most part through the instrument-
tality of governmental bureaucracies, has almost 
universally been assumed by writers of public 
administration—else why should they write of 
public administration except to damn it? 9 
To this substitution of administrative action for "natural 
(market?) forces," the staple conditions of scale, complex-
ity, and technicality are evoked to maintain that "the 
great political problem now confronting us is that of 
securing economy and efficiency in the actual administra-
tion of governmental affairs." 10 This represents, when 
compared to Wilson and Goodnow, a shift of emphasis from

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. viii.
10 Willoughby, Principles of Public, p. viii.
the "political control" of administration to its "functional perfection."

This is a curious shift of interest when one contemplates the following observation by Willoughby:

Gone . . . is the early simple faith that there were intrinsic merits in democratic government which could be depended upon by their own inherent force, as it were, to provide a satisfactory formulation and exertion of the public will. Upon the contrary, it is now recognized that, if anything, a popularly controlled government is . . . peculiarly prone to financial extravagances and administrative inefficiency.\textsuperscript{11}

In the absence of autocracy or some other alternative suggestion such as the administrative determination of policy, calling into question the potency of democratic processes to derive adequate policy requiring administrative action surely leaves the proper locus of policy formulation up in the air. We have here reflected, it would appear, a tenaciously unsatisfactory resolution of the "political control" of administration. Nevertheless, this is not the rabbit the fox chases for Willoughby flatly states that

\textit{... the whole problem of government has largely shifted from that of the organization and operation of the electoral and legislative branches of government through which the popular will is formulated and expressed to that of the organization and operation of the administrative branch through which this will as thus determined is actually put into execution.}\textsuperscript{12}

Willoughby is not essentially concerned with political power or even with the actual dispersion of administrative power;

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
he is concerned with what the scientific principles of administration would prescribe within the framework of the constitution.  

13 In effect, while there are "relative advantages and disadvantages" of various forms of government that "vitaly affect the problem of the efficient conduct of the affairs of the administrative branch," 14 Willoughby believes that, at least, the scientific principles of administration can be applied and realized within the constitutional form of government existing in the United States. Reservations duly noted, Willoughby unreservedly holds to the established line that

... in administration, there are certain principles of general application analogous to those characterizing any science which must be observed if the end of administration, efficiency of operation, is to be secured, and that these principles are to be determined and their significance made known only by the rigid application of the scientific method to their investigation.  

15

Straight to the point, Willoughby attempts to deliver a long cherished promise: (at least some of) the principles of public administration. In this deliverance is unraveled the incentive for refocusing the problem of administration. Whatever reason and coherence the political control of administration might obtain, an important--perhaps the most


15 Ibid., p. ix.
significant--contributor will for Willoughby be an efficient administration based on scientific principles.

In addition to a change of emphasis, Willoughby introduces a novel innovation in his conception of democratic government. He counts not two or three but five governmental powers: legislative, administrative, executive, judicial, and electoral. Although the problem of administration resolves itself--as with most of his contemporaries in these matters--into relationships between the first three of these, Willoughby abandons the conventional liberal state model to embrace a "corporate" or "holding company" image of the relationship structure.\footnote{Willoughby, Government, passim.} Of particular interest are the conceptions of Congress as, in part, a "board of directors" and the Executive as, in part, a "general manager." Undoubtedly this view is indicative of the pervasiveness attained by the corporate form but, unfortunately, the deeper significance and opportunity such a conception affords is not grasped by either Willoughby or his fellow students of public administration.\footnote{It is certainly a more "realistic" approach than later attempts by some political theorists to apply "market place" ideas to democracy.}

It has already been said that Willoughby's prime concern is the "efficient conduct" of administrative affairs. But he is well aware of predispositions to believe
that efficient public administration is a contradiction. He observes:

The impression is widespread that it is inherently impossible to secure the same efficiency and economy in the administration of public affairs that can be secured in the conduct of private undertakings.\textsuperscript{18}

Willoughby finds two arguments in support of this skepticism. One is that political interests tend to elbow technical competence aside; the other is the lack in public administration of that "incentive to efficiency and economy which the element of profit gives to private enterprises conducted for gain."\textsuperscript{19} While not denying the force of such contentions, Willoughby believes they are "much overestimated."\textsuperscript{20} His comment on the former of these arguments deserves a full quotation:

From the policy-determining and order-giving standpoint, the direction of governmental affairs is, and probably always will be, in the hands of a non-professional class. The fact that those exercising this authority have not been technically trained for their work does not, however, necessarily mean that they will perform their duties in an inefficient manner. The prime function of the legislator is to represent and translate into action the wishes of the people; that is, to determine policies and give the necessary orders for putting these policies into effect. This they can better do than can a permanent professional bureaucracy. While not themselves possessing technical competence as regards the framing of the measures through which their determinations are put into effect, they can, and to a large extent do, avail themselves of the technical assistance of those who do have professional training and experience. Most legislative measures directly affecting


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 2.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
administrative activities, either originate in the administrative branch where they are put into force by those having expert knowledge and technical competence, or are elaborated in conference with such officials.\[21\]

Positing as it does the administrative origin of, or at least the administrative influence on, legislative acts, this is, on its face and in the context of then extant standard theory, a remarkable statement. Even if Willoughby intends such administrative input to be confined to non-policy matters, it makes a divergence from the traditional theory that the choice of proper administrative means (or processes) should be left in the hands of administrators. Of course, if the process-content distinction\[22\] be untenable—that is, if the pursuance of policy is an intimate function of the means employed—then it would appear that administration is a serious factor in the formulation of generalized ends legislatively enacted as well as in the enumeration of detailed ends administratively achieved.\[23\]

This line of thought suggests that Willoughby's responses to the issue addressed may be an imperfect understanding of a significant administrative displacement of legislative policy determination; it additionally invites the speculation that perhaps Willoughby should have reversed the issue concerning the influence of politics on administration to,

\[21\]Ibid. [Emphasis added.]

\[22\]Willoughby does advocate this position.

\[23\]A now commonly accepted view.
instead, the influence of administration of legislation. Willoughby also considers the chief executive as an avenue of administrative contamination by politics. Again and with familiar argumentation, Willoughby discounts political interference.

Here, too, the same distinction between general and technical direction of affairs can be, and to a large extent is recognized. While responsibility and ultimate authority resides in the chief executive and the departmental heads, the actual direction of affairs is for the most part in the hands of a permanent, technically competent personnel. 24

The conclusion is, therefore, that political considerations do not "present any inherent obstacle to securing an efficiency in the conduct of governmental affairs." 25

On "the second reason urged whereby competence in public administration equal to that found in private administration cannot be secured," 26 Willoughby maintains that the proper comparison is "not with private enterprises conducted by individual owners, but with private enterprises conducted under a corporate form of organization." 27 Such a comparison shows that "managers of the large corporations have a status and interest . . . not dissimilar from those of officers of the government." 28 Three points are made in support of the conclusion that, as between corporate and

24 Willoughby, Principles of Public, p. 3.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 4.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
public administration, efficiency is equally realizable. First and foremost, while "governmental services are not conducted with a view to making profits in the ordinary sense of the term," they

. . . are run, however, . . . at the minimum of cost consistent with the maintenance of proper standards and the rendering of proper services to the public served. If proper operating and cost accounts are kept, there are available the same data by which to judge efficiency as are furnished by profits in the case of private corporations.29

Second, the incentives of public servants to win public approval is a no less significant spur to efficiency than the incentives of private corporate managers to maximize profits and thereby, presumably, win stockholder approval.30 And third, "all private corporations are by no means run efficiently and economically."31 Willoughby gives this reason:

The control that stockholders have been able to exert has been no greater, if as great, as that which the citizen stockholders of the public corporation have been able to exercise over the conduct of governmental operations, and in the absence of such control most, if not all, of the abuses, unfortunately too often present in governmental work, have arisen and flourished.32

An unreconstructed classical economist might apply consistently "market criteria" to give Willoughby "high marks" on point three while, on the same grounds, cite him for inconsistency between points three and one; and Willoughby might pause to consider the possibility that point two is

29 Ibid., p. 5.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid., p. 6.  
32 Ibid.
weakened by the reasoning utilized in point three. We get instead a somewhat restrained summary.

... the superior advantages of private undertakings, from the standpoint of efficient administration, are much less than are commonly supposed, and that there is no inherent reason why the administration of public affairs cannot be made closely to approximate, if not to equal in efficiency, that of private undertakings.\textsuperscript{33}

Aware of the variance found in the use of the term "administration," Willoughby typically tries to avoid misapprehension by first narrowing the meaning. He acknowledges the broad sense of the term as encompassing the conduct of all governmental affairs and proposes to restrict his use of the term to "the operations of the administrative branch only."\textsuperscript{34} In a later statement, however, administration is held to specify the totality of forging, operating, and maintaining the governmental mechanisms through which policy is executed.\textsuperscript{35} In other words, administration has as its reference the institutional processes involving policy execution but not the policy content itself. This later meaning seems to modify the earlier restricted definition inasmuch as what is implied may go beyond the administrative branch itself. The important point to be made, however, is that, although related, this process-content distinction is not quite the same thing as the means-ends distinction hitherto so endemic in the public administration literature.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.} \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Willoughby, "Science,"} pp. 34-35.
Certainly such a slicing up of governmental affairs and locating the administrative function conflicts, for example, with Goodnow's placing of the detailed elaboration of general political ends in the administrative domain.

To understand his definition of public administration, Willoughby writes, "it is necessary to point out the distinctions that are implied in it."\(^{36}\) These distinctions, numbering four, are of paramount importance. They serve to locate the subject matter the nature of which makes a science possible and to which fundamental principles must find general application (to ensure the end of operating efficiency).

Willoughby first occupies himself with the distinction (ostensibly) between administration and legislation--ostensibly because the distinction seems to be more realistically between administrative and legislative. The clarification rests on distinguishing the enactments of the legislature as comprising two distinct categories. One contains laws having as "their purpose to determine and regulate"\(^{37}\) (some of) the social conduct of citizens. Jurisdictcally, these laws enumerate the manner of enforcing "rights, duties and remedies."\(^{38}\) Legislatively, these laws enumerate exclusively "political" ends of a (conceived) permanent nature. Giving a somewhat interpretive summary

\(^{36}\)Ibid., p. 39.  
\(^{37}\)Ibid., p. 40.  
\(^{38}\)Ibid.
then, this category of enacted law by the legislature is exclusively legislative and necessarily of judicial import. Silence leaves dangling the question of whether such laws are sometimes, never, or always barren of administrative import!

The other category of "laws" have as their purpose "giving directions to officers of the government" and "are, for the most part, but administrative orders ... hav[ing] only a temporary end in view."39 Examples are: "appropriation acts," authorizing ... engaging in an activity," and "construction of ... public work."40 This is surely an untrustworthy list to rest all doubts as to when a law fits into this category or the other; notwithstanding, in the following assertion Willoughby makes unqualified use of the distinction.

When enacting statutes of the second character, our legislative bodies are acting precisely as a board of directors ... and their acts, as such, are purely of an administrative character.41

This characterization unsheathes the primary point: the legal seat and source of administrative authority resides in the legislature. In summary, the distinction made places an integral and dominant part of administration in the legislative branch.

Willoughby next succors additional understanding from the distinction, over which confusion reigns, between

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39Ibid. [Emphasis added.]
40Ibid.
41Ibid., p. 41.
executive and administrative powers. Although "popular opinion prevails that the framers [of the Constitution] . . . employed the term executive as including what are now known as administrative powers," Willoughby believes this to be an error. The "term 'executive power' was not deemed . . . to be synonymous with, or even to include, administrative power." Rather, "there can be no question but that they [the framers] used the term executive in its technical sense as covering only the political duties of the titular head of the nation." Of course, extensive administrative power has been both conferred on the executive by statute and arrogated by the executive through political power and the constitutional power to appoint, but these are matters made at issue by the distinction, not a contradiction of it. One should not exit this topic without "eyebrow lifting" notice that Willoughby discerns no administrative authority in the constitutional power accorded the executive to see that the laws are faithfully executed.

Willoughby's third and fourth distinctions get to the nitty-gritty of winnowing the subject matter of a science of public administration, the field from which fundamental

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42 Willoughby, Government, p. 252.
44 Willoughby, Government, p. 252. Willoughby may be right, although just how he divined this intelligence is not clear.
principles must somehow be derived and should be applied.

Plunging directly into Willoughby's own words, the

... third distinction is that between the work involved in directing, supervising and controlling operations and the actual performance of those operations. [Emphasis mine.] The former is usually described as the function of general direction, or of overhead administration; the latter, as the function of direct administration.46

Surely "of those operations" renders the distinction equivocal but one's eyes should not wander for "this distinction is of importance, since, strictly speaking, the science of administration has only to do with the former."47 Willoughby himself submits that understanding is advanced in a fourth distinction.

This is the one between what . . . may be termed the institutional and the functional activities of an enterprise. Functional activities consist of those having for their purpose the direct performance of the work for which an enterprise is maintained and operated. Institutional activities are those which have for their purpose the maintenance and operation of the institution itself; that is, the government, service, or industrial organization that is required in order that the functional activities may be performed.48

This is a clean-cut assertion of a "means-content" distinction. Institutional activity embraces all that is essential in the provision of the means appropriate to the execution of functional activity; functional activity denotes the substantive process of end achievement. The former, then, is a means to an end; the latter is an end in itself. Moreover,

46 Ibid., p. 43. There is on this point no substitute for reader reference to the original.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
institutional activities "differ radically from functional activities . . . in kind." 

The latter activity . . . is usually highly technical in character and varies with the nature of the tasks to be accomplished. The prime factors for securing efficiency with respect to it are, thus, technical skill on the part of the operatives and competent direction and oversight of an executive, rather than the application of operative or administrative principles. 

The former activity is . . . of the same general character no matter what the nature of the undertaking. It is this characteristic which makes it both possible and desirable that the problems involved in their performance should constitute a special subject of study with a view to determining the general principles underlying them.

It is essential to note that Willoughby recognizes variety in means practices; the "fact," however, that they are, regardless of the diverse nature of tasks serviced, of the "same general character" provides, for Willoughby, the wherefore to hold . . . that the problems [Emphasis mine.] having to do with the performance of purely institutional activities are of the same nature, and that the same general principles should be followed in meeting them.

This point bears recapitulation. When compared one to another, the differential technical content of policy processes--from articulation and general formulation to detailed execution and achievement--lacks the requisite

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49 Ibid., p. 44.
50 Ibid., p. 51.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 45.
problem generality for principle application. To the contrary when compared one to another, the characteristic activities of delivery systems—from development and employment to maintenance—exhibit problems of a common nature, whatever the policy content, and this makes possible and germane the application of fundamental administrative principles.

The ambiguity in Willoughby's third distinction, if the distinction be recomposed, can be "handled" in the context of his fourth distinction. To that end, consider the following five classes of administrative behavior:

Class One: Institutional acts (the institutional delivery system in its totality).

Class Two: Acts of overhead administration (exclusively a part of the institutional delivery system).

Class Three: Acts of direct administration (strictly an executive function by directing personnel of executing personnel).

Class Four: Acts of policy execution (exclusively a part of the functional policy process).

Class Five: Functional acts (the functional policy process in its totality).

Classes One, Three, and Five make up, for Willoughby, the administrative enterprise or process in its totality.

Clearly, the fourth distinction is between Classes One and

53Science is not precluded from general application within specific policy contents.

54Willoughby uses "overhead administration" and "general direction" synonymously. He typically relies on the first.
Five. Troubles in the interpretation of the third distinction stem from the easy tendency to confuse the Second Class of acts with the Third and the Third Class of acts with the Fourth. In peeling off and separating the delivery system as a means to an end in itself (Class One) from the policy process as an end in itself (Class Five), Willoughby's purpose is to localize the subject field—in this case Class One—for a science of public administration. Passing by other arguments, a distinction, in view of its stated purpose, between Classes Three and Four would be fruitless since both fall outside the designated scientific field. Willoughby's third distinction is, therefore, between Classes Two and Three.

Arm in arm with this rather obvious conclusion looms a companion line of inquiry ripe with promise. As we understand it here, the scheme of distinctions Willoughby employs leaves direct administration (direct supervision and control of policy execution) at loose ends between overhead administration and policy execution, not in either and without comment by Willoughby. If we heed his words that efficiency in policy execution rests not on "the application of operative or administrative principles" but on, rather, the skill of functional operatives and the "competent direction and oversight of an executive," then direct administration is an unscientific executive function. If this is the case, we are confronted with a striking subtlety: a strain of delegated authority (running through but not a part of
institutional activity and running abreast but not a part of functional activity) which is concerned solely with the fidelity of policy execution to properly expressed and authorized political ends. Of course, efficiency in policy execution is also a function of efficient institutional means; but to Willoughby, the latter is an independent constant irrespective of the ends sought and this "requires" a direction and control of ends not found in the means itself, a point unappreciated by Willoughby in anything he says.

It would seem trifling to explore further the myriad of criss-crossing implications endemic in Willoughby's distinctions, but one final observation should not be resisted. Consider the following step by step rendition of Willoughby's reasoning. One, in the institutional-functional distinction, the latter is varied in character and the former is independently constant in character and constitutes the scientific field of public administration. Two, in the relationship between overhead administration and the remaining institutional factors, the latter are constant in character whereas the former are independently constant in character and both sides of the relationship fall within the scientific field. Three, in the relationship between direct administration and policy execution, the latter is varied in character and the former is independently constant in character but excluded from the scientific field. Why? Since overhead administration and direct administration both stand in the same relationship (of direction, supervision and
control) with, respectively, (the remaining) institutional factors and policy operations, only a dependency relationship with its referent seems to deny scientific status to direct administration. Avoiding this inconsistency without committing equally grievous theoretical errors, calls for, as the "best" alternative, altogether excising a "lumped together" overhead administration and direct administration from institutional activity, an alternative that would, for Willoughby, surely engender an equally unacceptable theoretical compromise.

At the heart of Willoughby's scientific concern are the problems of overhead administration. The problems of organization are next in importance. The remainder can conveniently be respecified into problems of logistics (bringing men and material together at the "right" time and place) and informational systems, processes, and procedures (including pecuniary affairs). 55 These problems reduce, in the final analysis, to matters of authority. Willoughby's fundamental principles, then, have to do with the distribution, exercise, and control of authority between the legislature as a "board of directors," the executive as "general manager," and administrative organs. For the purpose of "typing" or demonstrating the character of Willoughby's general theory, it is only necessary in what follows to give

characteristic examples, not a full enumeration, of the
approach employed.

One problem illustrating the need for fundamental
principles is introduced when the legislature--as the legal
seat of the original power--exercises administrative author-
ity. The question is: shall the authority be exercised
directly or be delegated? Since, presumably, instances of
policy not requiring administrative delivery mechanisms are
both unlikely and not germane, this is really a question of
either directly delegating authority to (existing) adminis-
trative organs or delegating authority to the executive for
the same purpose indirectly. Running through a long list of
such factors as continuity, coordination, standardization,
and duplication, Willoughby finds them intractable in an
arrangement

\[\ldots\ \text{under which the legislature seeks to control}
\ldots\ \text{administrative} \ldots\ \text{action directly or}
\text{through agencies directly responsible to it}. \ldots\]

To render these factors manageable, Willoughby announces a
principle.

It can be stated without any hesitation that a
prime requisite of any proper administrative
system is that . . . the chief executive shall
be given all the duties and powers of a general
manager and be made in fact, as well as in
theory, the head of the administration.\[59\]

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57 Ibid., p. 39.
59 Willoughby, Principles of Public, p. 36.
In a word, administrative authority should be delegated to the executive. Out of this principle emerges another problem: how much (as well as what) authority should be delegated? Willoughby parades the familiar general-detail dilemma.

A too-detailed specification and control over what shall be done and the means and procedure that shall be employed in doing it, is productive of harm in three ways: it results in ill-advised action, since it involves the making of decisions which can be intelligently made only by those actually in charge of the work to be done and thus familiar with the conditions to be met; it weakens the sense of responsibility of administrative officers; and it makes it impossible for those officers to adjust their actions to varying needs and do those things which must be done if efficiency and economy are to be secured. On the other hand, a too-general specification of what shall be done and a too-large grant of discretionary powers, accompanied by an inadequate system of supervision and control, means that the legislature has failed properly to discharge its duty of determining the activities to be engaged in and the conditions under which they shall be performed and throws open the door to administrative abuses of a wide range.\(^60\)

Willoughby also notes elsewhere a political objection to detailed determinations by the legislature. It is that the legislative composition is subject to special interest influence while the executive in the status of general manager is more likely to hold steady on the general welfare.\(^61\)

At least a minor principle is provided. As between detailed a priori specification and full ex post accounting, "there

\(^{60}\)Willoughby, *Government*, p. 442.

can be little question that the latter is the superior." 62 If the essential element in delegation is control, this is surely a skimpy rule. By implication, if one struggles through the logic, a restatement might read as follows: The degree and character of the principal's delegation of administrative authority should extend to and be limited by the principal's ability to control the delegation (accountability) and the agent's ability to perform the delegation (responsibility). This explains why, as Willoughby bluntly puts it, "it is a canon of administration that all grants of authority should be accompanied by means for ensuring that such grants are properly exercised." 63 We are thus led by the hand straight to the problem of control means. Willoughby lists the usual techniques, among which are: (1) records and accounts, (2) reports, (3) investigations, (4) audits, and (5) legislative committee hearings. 64 While Willoughby admits to some weaknesses in these techniques, he is exercised to pessimism primarily by a failure to utilize them. In fact, sprinkled throughout his work are exasperated comments on the "failure to provide" and the "failure to utilize." One might even state, albeit directly unexpressed by Willoughby, the following principles: First an expansion of a previous canon to read instead that every grant of authority should include the means both for its

63 Ibid., p. 443.
64 Ibid., pp. 443-444.
proper exercise and for the proper control of its exercise. Second the addition of a (weak) rule to read that the existence of unutilized means of control is insufficient to the purpose of control.

In the area of organization, Willoughby is intent on "working out a systematic scheme" or "the fundamental character of the organization that it is desired to establish." From the couch Willoughby uncovers his desire.

Approaching the problem from this standpoint, it may be said that the administrative branch of a government should constitute a single integrated piece of administrative mechanism. By this is meant that the several administrative services, instead of being viewed as isolated or independent units, should be treated as working parts of a general organization to the end that each, while having its distinct sphere, will work in harmony with all the others towards the attainment of common objects.

This is a bald statement of mechanistic holism and structural functionalism. For the higher reaches of administrative organs, Willoughby considers two types of organization. One is the independent and uncorrelated "unit having little or no direct relation to other services" and "the line of authority runs direct from the operating service to the" authorizing principal. The other is the

66 Willoughby, Principles of Public, p. 81.
67 Ibid., p. 81.
69 Willoughby, Principles of Public, p. 82.
integrated system where

... the attempt is made to group all services whose operations fall in the same general field, and which consequently should maintain intimate working relations with each other, into departments presided over by officers having a general oversight of them all and entrusted with the duty of seeing that they work harmoniously towards the attainment of a common end.  

"Under this system," Willoughby continues, "the line of authority runs from the several services to the departments of which they are subordinate units, and from these to the authorizing principal." Willoughby issues the principle. "Of the relative advantages of these two systems, there can be no doubt. The second, or [integrated departmental, is ... superior.] The "obvious" advantages are: simplification; more comprehensive and coordinated programs; economy of effort and facilities; more efficient institutional (means) delivery systems. However, Willoughby qualifies the principle (and other principles) by limiting its applicability to units "of a strictly administrative character."

As Willoughby explains the qualification, if units possess

... a quasi-legislative character, they should be subject directly to Congress, on whose behalf they are acting; and, in so far as their action has a quasi-judicial character, superior control should be vested in the courts.

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70Ibid.  
71Ibid.  
72Willoughby, Government, p. 453. [Emphasis added.]  
73Ibid., p. 454.  
74Ibid., p. 455.
This qualification would seem to exempt most administrative organs and would seem to reduce the principle of delegation as well as the principle of organization to a miniscule reference. For the internal organization of administrative organs, Willoughby considers two types: the bureau and the board. Willoughby propounds two correlative principles. In those cases "where the work to be done is essentially of an administrative character, that is, one calling for the direct performance of work, the bureau type of organization should be adopted."\(^7^5\) The reason for this conclusion is that it fixes responsibility and accountability in a single executive. In those instances of exceptional administrative discretion and of exceptional conflicts of interest, and in those cases of the exercise of quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power, the board type of organization should be adopted.\(^7^6\) The reason for this option is that "the collective judgment of a number of persons is more likely to be of a superior character."\(^7^7\) Curiously, Willoughby also takes a glance at the organization of purely functional activities, but of the two types considered--the functional (of "Scientific Management" fame) and the departmental--a preference rule is not adopted.\(^7^8\)

\(^{75}\)Ibid., p. 456. [Emphasis added.]

\(^{76}\)Ibid.

\(^{77}\)Ibid.

These examples should adequately illustrate Willoughby's approach to the principles of public administration. He follows the same procedure for each of the areas of the delivery system; but the principles derived are strikingly, but not surprisingly, uniform in character. To give further examples would be, therefore, fruitlessly repetitious. One brief concluding comment is prompted, however, before going on to summarize the essentials of Willoughby's theory of public administration.

Before Willoughby, in the introductory years of public administration as a definitive subject matter in the United States, the "legal approach" to public administration -- Goodnow is the conspicuous exemplar -- was well established. With Willoughby and up to the present however, the legal avenue becomes a bypath; administrative law becomes a "topic within," not "the conception of," public administration. Its nature, nevertheless, has little changed. Thus, Willoughby distinguishes those administrative laws (or rules) "which affect the interest or rights of persons outside of the service" but promulgated from within the service; those administrative laws "which have to do with purely administrative operations within the service" but promulgated from outside the service; 79 and those procedural rules both promulgated and applied exclusively within the service. 80

79 Ibid.

first two of these, and sometimes the last, typically comprise the contemporary field of administrative law.

Paradigm Essentials: A Summary

The essentials of Willoughby's theory are:

1. The increasing complexity, magnitude, and variety of governmental tasks, all requiring extensive administrative attention, explain the modern rise of public administration and the shift of interest from political to administrative affairs.

2. The government is best conceived as a "holding company" with the legislature a "board of directors" and the executive a "general manager." There are five governmental functions: legislative, executive, administrative, judicial, and electoral. The theory of public administration involves only the first three of these.

3. The executive possesses no inherent administrative authority. The legislature is the sole legal seat of administrative authority and as such is an integral part of and dominant over the administrative function and process.

4. The administrative enterprise or process consists of three distinct kinds of closely associated activity: one, institutional administration (exclusively a delivery system activity); two, direct administration (exclusively an executive activity); and three, policy operations (exclusively a substantive policy process activity). These three strains of activity run through the legislative
branch and administrative organs and ordinarily, but not exclusively, through the executive branch.

(5) Science is the articulation of fundamental principles of general applicability. The character of institutional administration—constancy in the problems posed in its conduct irrespective of variability in policy content—makes a science of public administration possible; conversely, such a science, while applicable within each substantive policy content, is precluded by the character of policy processes as a class—that is, the lack of problem constancy across varied policy processes. The possibility of a science of direct administration is dismissed without cause (although a reason can be fitted into the theoretical scheme). The science of public administration is germane, therefore, exclusively to institutional administration and observing its fundamental principles is essential directly to the end of institutional administrative efficiency and indirectly to the end of policy operations efficiency.

(6) Efficiency in public administration is (realizably) consonant with the efficiency of (private) corporate administration.

(7) Institutional administration (or the delivery system) is made up of problem tasks which may be conveniently identified as overhead administration, organization, logistical operations, and informational and pecuniary operations; the science of public administration requires fundamental principles appropriate to each problem task.
(8) The fundamental principles are essentially concerned with authority: the source, delegation, and distribution of authority; the organizational means appropriate to its exercise; the organizational means and devices appropriate to its control; and the effective utilization of its exercising and controlling means.

The Social Matrix: Speculations on Determinates

In the evening (1937) of Willoughby's theory of public administration, one finds only the refinements of basically unaltered themes expressed in its dawning (1919). The relevant social context in which the theory was forged, then, is located in the first two decades of this century, in the years just before and after the "Great War." There are many prudent qualifications, but if the time of Wilson's landmark article on public administration was one of scrambling to bring emerging social forces into focus; and if the time of Goodnow's work was one of clashing social forces without a ready handle; then, it may be said, Willoughby's time was conspicuous in its failure to recognize and come to theoretical terms with a society fundamentally altered in its technological processes and institutional arrangements. It was a time of technological bemusement, of obliviousness to the implications of institutional change, and of ideological obstinacy.
Technological Factors

The technological forces unleashed in the last half of the nineteenth century formed in the early years of the twentieth century a lusty, pervasive, and crudely coordinated industrial complex. The amalgamation of fossil fuel energy, factory manufacturing techniques, knowledge and skills, and like factors had, by any standards, spawned a society profoundly divergent from the pre-Civil War society out of which it emerged. And this transformed society was contagious with potentially even more explosive change.

Such potentialities, all later to flourish spectacularly, included the slowly developing plastics field; the invention of the radio and the initiation of network broadcasting; and, not least, the invention and early use of the airplane. Finally, an event of immediate and obvious social impact, but whose eventual effects were startlingly widespread and are yet to run their course, was the


83 Ibid., pp. 302-303.

conveyor-band mass production of automobiles in 1908. \(^{85}\) The influence of automobile use came eventually to include virtually every facet of society: population distribution, class distinctions, sex and customs, vacation and entertainment patterns, health and environmental pollution, etc. \(^{86}\) Further examples would only be reiterative.

This scene, saturated with a matured but mutant regenerative technology, gave substance in popular culture to the eighteenth century idea of progress. But the idea of progress was thoughtlessly accepted with incurious optimism. Reasons are not hard to find. The "climate" of industrial technology had become by this time commonplace and any technology, everywhere and always, is so "obvious" a state of affairs that it does not easily invite the attention habitually accorded customary practices and mores, not to mention the occult and mysterious. And, after all, was it not the expected realization envisioned in the promise of democratic free enterprise? But even in the standard scholarly circles of the time, a no less inane understanding of the technological process must be protested. The prevailing belief ascribed invention to genius and innovation to entrepreneurship. The belief was, and is, sustained by its tautological nature. Ingenuity and enterprise are "known" by achievement


\(^{86}\) Ibid.
and achievement is "evidenced" by ingenuity and enterprise. The belief is supported by the credits and rewards bestowed by society. Inquiry is thus thwarted by "feedback" and "stop think" stratagems.

In the threshold years of this century, then, there is a troubling contrast between the innocent embrace of industrial technology and the "main stream" protestations of its dynamics.  

**Institutional Factors**

Concomitant with the course of industrialization ran a panorama of institutional change no less fundamental in scope and significance. Interestingly, this change is faintly mirrored in Willoughby's work: casting the governmental structure in the image of the corporate form, unlimited social relevance of public administration, and the shift of interest to the principles of administrative means from political control of and judicial approaches to administration.

A corporate conception of government reflects twin developments of truly revolutionary proportions. The first was association of the corporate form and large scale machine enterprise. The congenial appropriateness of the former to the exigencies of the latter in all its

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87 Alternatives must be sought in the intellectual "underworld" conceptions of, for example, Marxian "technological determinism" or Veblenian "technological dynamism."
ramifications led to the corporate domination of the market economy somewhere about, more or less, a quarter of a century before World War I; the appropriateness manifested itself—and still does since it is yet in progress—in a process of market factor modification, essentially different types of modification of property, money, contract, and capital.\(^{88}\) This was not a neat formula. It was an uneven, imperfect, and incomplete process; in Willoughby's time, the most advanced modification was in the institution of property. Briefly, in the nineteenth century the courts had cut away the commonwealth necessity for corporate ventures, "legitimized" the corporation, and severely restricted legislative interference with "corporate property." While these actions could be thought of as an extension of conventional private property, such is not the case. The very form of corporate organization modifies property. The stockholder owns rights: rights to a possible return on investment and to a share in the control of the total organization but no right to (a share of) any particular part of the "corporate property." To this "first degree" of separation of ownership and control there falls across the turn of the century a "second degree" of separation: the dispersion of

\(^{88}\) The literature on this subject, pro and con, is extensively cited in Chapter I.
ownership. There will be further modifications; the net result is the isolation of corporate property into a passive ritual and the unfolding of full managerial control. This is an institutional revolution of the first order. But Willoughby catches only a glimpse and fails to see where it leads.

The second institutional transformation, truly the twin of the first, lying behind Willoughby's corporate conception of government was the stealthy ascendancy within the configuration of governmental institutions of administration from incipient subservience to unapprehended dominance--unapprehended then by everyone and by virtually everyone now. Undoubtedly, this development was as uneven, imperfect, and incomplete as its counterpart process for the corporation in the private sphere. As we noted in Chapter I, H. P. Odegard selects 1911 as the "symbolic" date for this passover of power; surely the affair was consummated by the eve of World War I. There is suggestive evidence. Consider the rash of, so-called, progressive legislation prior to the war: conservation enactments, three acts between 1903 and 1910 increasing the scope and effectiveness of the ICC, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Federal Reserve System legislation, and the progressive income tax legislation. (Note the heavy administrative implications

even of an active legislature.) In the decade of the twenties, in contrast, we find legislative quiescence; the Supreme Court, with its "rule of reason," fights a rear guard action; the executive is laughably inept; and the administrative area grows apace. How could so critical an institutional change go undetected? Perhaps the paeans for private enterprise and the "palm waving" for representative government disallowed recognition of what would be anyway an embarrassment. In any event, this reconfiguration of governmental "power" compounds the revolutionary institutional changes associated with the corporation; and the former provides the impetus to apply the conspicuous corporate model. The point is not that the corporation is democratic; it isn't. Nor that the government is like a corporation; it isn't. The point is that administrative modes of practice have come, early in the century, to prevail throughout the society; it is a society of administered governance.

The picture we get must include the sliding into secondary status of political, legislative, judicial, and executive governmental institutions and the passing into oblivion of market institutions. With the passing of the market, public administration and corporate administration are, for Willoughby, equally efficient, equally relevant to substantive social areas of concern, or, in other words, equally substitutable. This leaves us with no explanation for corporate failure or, to put it the other way, no rule for choosing between public or corporate administration as
a course of action. Willoughby appears to exercise the conventional bias of holding public action to a residual role. With the passing of the legislature into a satellite status (Willoughby merely points to the administrative incapacities of the legislature), attention is shifted from political control to administrative means. Nevertheless, Willoughby accepts the final authority of political ends legislatively expressed and directed.

In the threshold years of this century, then, there is a disturbing contrast between the revolutionary changes taking place in revered institutions and the insouciance of the majority of those experiencing the change.

**Ideational Factors**

"Of politics," Henry Steele Commager has written,

... the nineteenth-century American was complacent, conservative, and orthodox, for to tamper with the institutions and principles of the Founding Fathers seemed almost like tampering with the Ten Commandments or the Laws of Nature. The analogy is not strained. The political theory to which the Fathers had subscribed, and which the nineteenth century inherited, was "Newtonian." ⁹⁰

But, Commager goes on to point out,

... with the profound change in society, economy, and technology that come in the latter half of the nineteenth century, ... the gap between the eighteenth-century constitutional pattern

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and the nineteenth-century political practice widened steadily.\(^1\)

The public administration movement was one response to this "gap"; it was an attempted escape; it was an "idea-conditioned" route.

Evolution, in its "broad" sense, must be assigned an initial influence. Taking government as a sweep through history elongated the data base thus highlighting the growing instances of administration in contrast to an earlier political (or legislative) hegemony. Darwinism disallowed condemning this shift as an aberration of Natural Law; it was a logical and legitimate addition to the governmental process, a transformation of government from symbol to instrument. From Wilson to Goodnow to Willoughby the sense of history recedes, but politics lingers on to bedevil the fledgling field of public administration. Students of the subject were neither intimidated away from the desirability, in the name of efficiency, of a politically independent administrative function nor reasoned out of a necessity, in the name of democracy, of a political primacy over administration. How to exercise political control "over" without inserting it "into" the administrative function is the central issue about which theory is drawn.

Crude pragmatism--tendency to diagnose specific causes of concrete events, emphasis on application, preoccupation with technique, etc.--was another influencing

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 314-315.
idea. This set of predilections, in conjunction with the notion of "system" suggested by the newly erupted machine technology, introduces through the back door the "mechanism" being shown the front door.

Of significance also were the covert and indirect ideas on the economic basis of an expanded public administration. Questions cannot be repressed: What occasions the "substitution" of public for private economic activity?; Are there inherent "deficiencies" in the corporate economy?; Is public administration an "appropriate" economic force?; Is there a "proper mix" of private and public administration of an industrial economy—if so, what is the rule?—or is a publicly or privately administered industrial economy an irrelevant or trivial issue?

One instance in the above connection, surely, was the progressive movement comprising a complex of ideas—progress, reform, and planning—held in varying crisis by different factions. Waldo notes one dichotomy in the movement:

At the very heart of Progressivism was a basic conflict . . . between those whose hope for the future was primarily that of a planned and administered society, and those who . . . remained firm in the old liberal faith in an underlying harmony, which . . . [will express itself] if the necessary institutional and social reforms are made.92

Willoughby can certainly be associated with the former.

92Waldo, The Administrative, p. 17.
Taken together, these ideas presage the typical reliance by the pioneers of public administration on monocratic organization as the solvent for the problem of the "value-control" of administrative means without jeopardizing efficiency. But in the midst of an awaking optimism and activism, there persists an indigestible lump of obstinate ideology, for the apparatus of monocratic organization--specificity, controllability, measurability, predictability, regularity, and hierarchy--is patently mechanistic.

In the threshold years of this century, therefore, there is a distressing contrast between emerging industrial and institutional realities and the essential ideas commonly employed in understanding and addressing these realities.

Some Critical Questions and Discussions

Characterizing Willoughby's theory of public administration as "general" requires some qualification. In the ordinary sense of the term the theory is general; it "maps" the field of administration itself and develops the relationships between administration and those social areas directly "interfacing" it. Further, insofar as science is appropriate to administration, the theory would apply to historical and comparative instances of the subject. However, the former receives only perfunctory notice and the latter is virtually ignored. Willoughby's objectives are reasonably clear: to establish the significance of modern public administration; to delineate the field of public
administration, its parts, the setting in which it exists, and the relationships between these; to articulate the sense and specific reference of a science of public administration; and to enumerate the fundamental principles of general applicability.

If anything, Willoughby is even more aggressive than his predecessors in affirming the possibility and necessity of a science of public administration. Science, any science avers Willoughby, is the general application of fundamental principles. The requisites for the "possibility" of which Willoughby speaks would seem to be: one, a stable subject generating problems of the same nature; and two, fixed and ultimate "laws." But in a fast-paced world, stable subject matters are rare and short-lived; even in the "hard" sciences, history records no instances of constant subject fields. Nor are there, it follows, immutable bodies of "laws." Science does not consist principally of even non-absolute principles; science is essentially a complex method for generating warranted and dependable assertions.

Willoughby does insist on the rigid use of the scientific method, but he nowhere describes the method. Of course, even naive notions of problematically couched research data provide some discipline to the process of inquiry; but it is a long step between that and establishing principles by such phrases as "it is obvious" and "there can be no doubt." The principles Willoughby advances are "ought"
statements--what administrative practice ought to be--and as such they are vacuous unless actual administrative practice is, on some basis, unsound and stands in need of correction. Of course, unsound practice indicates that it should be "something else," but how does one derive "what it should be" from "what it merely incorrectly is"? Gerald Caiden believes Willoughby's principles to be "ideal guiding norms, . . . measurement of the practice against the ideal, and ways of bringing the actual and the ideal together."\(^9\) The weight of Willoughby's total presentation overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that he idealizes the "best" of actual practice--"best" being what leads to "efficiency." The program would be one, then, of eliminating some practices and "improving" others. Apart from the elusiveness of efficiency as a disciplining value, there is the difficulty of measuring "improvement" against a never actualized ideal. Also, it must be understood that Willoughby's "ways of bringing the actual and the ideal together" are deceptive. He proposes "reforms and improvements" but does not take the important step of explaining why they do not already obtain --that is, what are the existing resistences to their institution--and how they are to be brought about--that is, what are the existing resources for their institution. Willoughby's conception of the function of the ideal in a

problematic context is less than satisfactory. Or, to put
the matter another way, Willoughby's notion of the proble-
matic is narrow and incomplete; a problem is discovered and
responded to rather than constructed. It is fair to conclude
that Willoughby's general conception of science is undefend-
able. At its best it is a sort of formalism conditioned by
a naive empiricism; at its worst the former prevails over
the latter.

For the purpose of elucidating the principles of
public administration, Willoughby must locate the subject
matter to which science is pertinent. The empirical back-
drop in which this effort takes place only crudely reveals,
to Willoughby, the essential social forces at play. It is a
"herding" rather than "highlighting" influence, an "infil-
trating" rather than "capturing" recognition. And the
direct empirical basis for the task frustrates essential
insight by a doting reliance on conventionally narrow
research data. From this crude and restricted empirical
foundation, Willoughby lifts out an idealized conception or
model of the categories of public administration and its
setting. It is of critical importance to grasp that, in
consequence, Willoughby's distinctions are those inherent
in his model of idealized practice, not those directly found
in actual experience. It is clear that Willoughby under-
stands his idealized model to be derived from (or a projec-
tion of) empirical practice; and further, the character of
practices in the model are identical to the character of
actual practices. In this sense, the idealized model is positive (rather than normative). It is even more critically important to understand that Willoughby develops within this general model a sub-model, one that is confined specifically to only that part of the public administrative category to which science applies. Two points need to be made about this sub-model. First, the principles of public administration elicited in the context of this sub-model are capable of (some kind of) realization in appropriate (corresponding) actual public administrative practice. In this sense, the positive model possesses a normative element. Second, Willoughby spells-out the character of ideal administrative practice (and, of course, the character of its corresponding actual administrative practice at the same time) as "functionally integrated mechanism." The ideal sub-model, then, could be thought of as "positive mechanistic-functionalism" (in contradistinction to Goodnow's "positive organismic-functionalism").

Given Willoughby's view of science, the stable categories of an ideal model would certainly seem, if not necessary, at least highly convenient; distinction-making, in the absence of changing associations and other vagaries of actual practice, surely would be simple and straightforward. It would be like a pre-Darwinian taxonomy without

94 For an elaborate and thoroughly absorbing treatment of this subject, vide: Werner Stark, The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 1963), passim.
the embarrassing instances that fall across classifications. But the "content" of Willoughby's distinctions create problems analogous to the "Ptolemaic dilemma" of cycles, epicycles, epi-epi-cycles, ad infinitum. Take, for example, the distinction between legislative and administrative, which leads to the distinction between administrative means and administrative policy content, which leads, on one side, to the distinction between direct supervision of content and substantive content activity and, on the other side, to the distinction between direct supervision of means and content of means, etc. ad nauseam, if not ad infinitum.

Turning to the adequacy of the specific distinctions made by Willoughby, it is worth noting at the outset that the absence of cross-cultural awareness and a greater sense of history leads to missed opportunities. Thus, for example, although Willoughby virtually dissolves the distinction between public administration and private corporate administration, it does not occur to him to consider either the distinction between entrepreneurship in a corporate economy and entrepreneurship in a market economy or the distinction between modern public administration and pre-modern (nonindustrial) public administration. A weak historical perspective also contributes to a dreadfully serious flaw in Willoughby's theory. Although the traditional administration-politics distinction is deemphasized, it surreptitiously reenters to play a commanding role in the theory.
As for the nonadministrative governmental functions, the purely legislative function is vague; it is difficult to summon instances of laws without administrative import. The nonadministrative executive function is shallow.

The administrative function taken as a whole—that is, the simple sum of all the administrative activities—is, in the context of the theory Willoughby presents, reasonably coherent. However, the internal workings and meanings of the administrative function are unreasonably incoherent. Our approach will be to address the more serious errors by repairing the administrative function with as much fidelity to Willoughby's theoretical paradigm as making some sense of it will allow. (The following discussion should be approached as an extension of the previous "presentation of theory" section, with the emphasis changing from description with a dash of analysis to critical reconstruction with a dash of redecoration.)

It is useful to see the development of Willoughby's theory in three steps. As a preliminary to taking these steps, Willoughby dismisses the political control of public administration as entirely unsatisfactory, perhaps uncorrectably so. In any event, in order to bring some coherence and rationality to the practice of public administration, he turns to the possibility of applying science to that subject. His first step is to establish the scope of science in the field of public administration, its specific extent and limits. The second step is to enumerate the fundamental
principles generally operative in the relevant area. The third step is the application of these principles to the end of efficiency—again in the relevant area of course. In brief, to the end of administrative efficiency, Willoughby replaces discredited and undependable political control with an administratively internal application of scientific principles.

If one approached Willoughby's first step—identification of an area of administration in which science can be established—within the framework of the adequacy of his conception of science, virtually nothing would be left intact. But even within his conception there is inconsistency in the application of criteria of category distinctions. The reader should review our discussion of this point and our revision of categories made in the second section of this chapter. Essentially, we draw together into one category all "supervision, direction and control" activity—that is, direct and overhead administration. This category would be exclusively an administrative executive function. The other two categories of the administrative field would be the policy process (functional activity) and the "delivery system" (institutional activity sans overhead administration). The latter category is identified by Willoughby as relevant for a science of public administration.

All of the fundamental principles enumerated by Willoughby in the second step are either directly concerned with or reduce to a concern for the delegation, dispersion,
control, etc. of authority. The original source and final arbiter of (legal) authority lies in the administrative legislation of the legislative function. Willoughby identifies the remainder of the authority system as an executive administrative function. But it is not inherently executive; it is entirely delegated. The usual, and preferred, lines of authority—authority in all of its manifestations—run from the legislative to the chief executive and then either to the delivery system (overhead administration) or to the policy process (direct administration). Ordinarily authority accountability runs along the same lines in the reverse direction back to the legislative. The conspicuous exceptions are in the case of quasi-legislative administrative actions in which cases the lines of accountability run directly to the legislative and in the cases of quasi-judicial actions in which cases the lines of authority run directly to the judiciary. We have here in essence described what Willoughby's fundamental principles, at rock bottom, amount to. Willoughby associates these principles exclusively with institutional activity. But in this he is mistaken. These principles articulate and have as their sole reference the activity of direction, supervision, and control; this activity is patently authority activity. This interpretation is supported by Willoughby's characterization of organization—which boils down to monocratic organization—and by his characterization of the administrative device as mechanistic.
Willoughby, in the third step, believes that the efficiency of the institutional delivery system depends on the successful application of his principles. But this merely translates to the successful application of the authority system; surely, in that case, he would want to add the technical competence of institutional activity. Willoughby would recognize, of course, the contribution of an efficient delivery system to policy execution—that is, how efficiently a policy, any policy, is carried out. Willoughby further believes that "the prime factors for securing efficiency with respect to" functional activity—substantive policy execution—are the quality of the technical work and competent direction, supervision, and control—that is, the authority system. In this he must mean "efficiency of what policy is executed." This is the case because he understands the institutional delivery system to be "neutral" as regards what policy is being carried out. It is like saying, to put an extreme case, that the same "efficient" institutional delivery system that implemented the Holocaust could be similarly employed, with only superficial changes, to implement a National Health Plan. There is no escape from the chilling realization that the presumption "greases" a reverse policy-shift case. But if the "policy-neutral means" presumption be true, and Willoughby believes so, it brings home why he is, without realizing it, consumed with the problem of controlling what policy is carried out. However, it is easy to compromise the "neutrality"
position; inefficient delivery systems, for example, clearly affect what policy turns out to be by blurring an authorized policy outcome and by inducing unauthorized (and unwanted) outcomes. So it turns out, that even those authority system activities pertaining to delivery system efficiency are ultimately, albeit indirectly, concerned with controlling substantive policy content—-that is, what policy is.

And so in the last analysis, when the outer skin of a presumptive science of public administration is stripped away, there remains only the inert bones of the classical tradition of hierarchial authority. The crux of Willoughby's theory lies in the administrative function of the executive. Nevertheless, while from the vantage point of the present he appears the apogee of administrative orthodoxy, in his own time he did choose to examine with scientific persistence an emerging social phenomenon of critical significance. For that he deserves more credit than posterity has seen fit to accord him.
CHAPTER VI

WHITE

Brief Intellectual Biography

Leonard Dupee White (1891-1958)\(^1\) received B.S. and M.A. degrees from Dartmouth College in 1914 and 1915 respectively and the Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago in 1921. After teaching stints from 1915 to 1920 at Clark University and Dartmouth College, he joined the faculty of the University of Chicago where he began an illustrious teaching career spanning the better part of four decades. The esteem of his colleagues was evidenced by elections to the presidency of both the American Political Science Association (1944) and the American Society for Public Administration (1947). White was the recipient of many formal distinctions and at the time of his death was emeritus professor.

White's writing reflects his public service and research endeavors in the lavish use of empirical material to enhance theoretical clarity and exhibits a measure of style beyond that ordinarily encountered in the field of

public administration. With the possible exception of White's last books on the history of American public administration, without question his most notable publication was *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*. This remarkable textbook, the first in the field, dominated its "market" through three revised editions into the post-war years. Other publications by White include: *The City Manager; "Administration, Public,"* in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*; and the chapter in a book edited by White, Gaus, and Dimock, "The Meaning of Principles in Public Administration."  

Herbert J. Strong has written:

Leonard D. White did not plant the seeds from which the field of public administration grew, but

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for four decades he tended that garden with unexcelled devotion. 5

Writer, teacher, researcher, professional servant, Leonard D. White became the most formidable force in the discipline's drive for a place in the academic sun.

**Presentation of the General Theory**

In contrast to the three preceding specimens, White's general theory of public administration is a study in restless movement. Unlike the posed subject of a portrait photographer, it is an unfolding action requiring a movie cameraman. What is called for then are themes which will serve as loci about which "ideas in process" may be organized. White, in the preface of the first edition of his textbook, supplies the bases for such themes by professing with trenchant theoretical awareness the four assumptions on which the work depends for development.

The book rests upon at least four assumptions. It assumes that administration is a single process, substantially uniform in its essential characteristics wherever observed. . . . It assumes that the study of administration should start from the base of management rather than the foundations of law. . . . It assumes that administration is still primarily an art but attaches importance to the significant tendency to transform it into a science. It assumes that administration has become, and will continue to be the heart of the problem of modern government. 6 [Emphasis added.]

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5 Herbert J. Strong, "Leonard D. White and the Study of Public Administration," Public Administration Review, Vol. 25 (March, 1965), pp. 38-51. This is an exceptionally lucid and penetrating consideration of White's general theory of public administration and we acknowledge its imprint on this chapter.

6 I, pp. vii-viii. The preface is repeated in all editions.
Every departure from these assumptions takes a course that incessantly returns White to their reconsideration. What is the essential nature of administration and the distinctive character of public administration? What is the proper subject of public administration and what is the opportune approach to its study? What is the prospect of a scientific administrative practice? And, what is the vital problem of administration in a modern government?

Prophetically, White's initial assumptions become the persevering questions of his life's work. This perseverance can be most conveniently traced through the four editions of his introductory text with only incidental reference to other works. Since this study encompasses an historical period ending roughly with the conclusion of World War II, emphasis is placed on the first two editions of White's text. Use made of the two post-war editions has a twofold justification. Reference to the later phase of White's theorizing is limited to bringing the earlier phase of his theorizing into reasonable perspective; in other words, we wish to avoid compromising the integrity and full flavor of White's theoretical thrust. Further, extended reference introduces no material not logically appertaining to the historical context of the pre-war years; indeed, it epitomizes the theoretical dilemmas of the "classical" formulations of public administration.

In his first assumption White attests to the essential unity of the administrative process everywhere
found and makes an application in the opening lines of his text.

There is an essential unity in the process of administration, whether it be observed in city, state or federal governments, that precludes a "stratified" classification of the subject.8

This invites the question of whether a distinct classification may be similarly precluded between public and private administrative practice. In the first edition White states: "The antecedents of American public administration are profoundly different from those of American business."9 Business has not had to contend with a "spoils system"; the profit motive is a disciplining force for business; business has greater flexibility--less rule prescribed consistency--of action; and government affairs are subject to greater accountability.10 But these are differences of circumstance not of "kind" and by the second edition White finds in public ownership of utilities, credit unions, semi-governmental profit-making corporations, etc., trends to further "fray" the public-private distinction.11 Theoretical consistency would seem to deny much of a meaningful distinction.

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7 Strong, "White," p. 39. Strong points out that all four of White's assumptions are unqualified by "public."

8 White, I, p. 1; II, p. 7; III, p. 3; IV, p. 1.

9 I, p. 17.

10 I, pp. 17-20.

11 II, pp. 7-8.
"Public administration," White states, "is the management of men and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes of the state."\textsuperscript{12} In the sense of management, the objective of public administration is the "efficient utilization of resources."\textsuperscript{13} On its face, this "definition" appears to "parrot" the familiar means-ends and means-content discriminations in "which good management is recognized as an element essential to success" and White goes on to recognize a deferment and a loophole.

It leaves open the question to what extent the administration itself participates in formulating the purposes of the state, and avoids any controversy as to the precise nature of administrative action.\textsuperscript{14}

In the second edition, White has this description:

\textbf{In its broadest sense public administration consists of all those operations having for their purpose the fulfillment or enforcement of public policy as declared by the competent authorities.}\textsuperscript{15}

And, he goes on immediately to observe, "it is a special case of the larger category, administration, a process which is common to all organized human effort"\textsuperscript{16} or, as he moves on to the post-war editions, "a process common to all group effort, public or private, civil or military, large scale or small scale."\textsuperscript{17} Finally, White arrives at this description:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12}I, p. 2; II, p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{14}I, p. 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{15}II, p. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{16}II, pp. 3-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{17}III, p. 3; IV, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
"The art of administration is the direction, coordination, and control of many persons to achieve some purpose or objective."\textsuperscript{18} The art of administration is "in all human activities except those capable of being executed by one person."\textsuperscript{19} Herbert Strong, after going over the same ground, draws the unavoidable conclusion:

\ldots administration consists of all those operations aiming at the achievement of some purpose or objective shared by two or more people. It excludes, then, only those "operations" that are non-purposive and those that concern only one person.\textsuperscript{20}

Thus, administration is driven by White to the point of frivolous generality; he is faced with the problem of particularizing public administration within a framework devoid of obvious refining indicators. He is more conventional in his answer than he realizes.

Whatever the cultural diversity, whatever the magnitude of the task, whatever the character of the technology, the process of management has been the indispensable factor in social enterprise achievement; moreover, management is universal in nature.\textsuperscript{21} White's second assumption is that management comprises the locus of the study of public administration. White scores infatuation with law for a lamentable delay in appreciating management in the public sphere.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18}III, p. 4; IV, p. 2
\item \textsuperscript{19}III, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{20}Strong, "White," p. 40.
\item \textsuperscript{21}White, III, p. 3; IV, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
In the first edition White finds himself in general agreement with Goodnow's conception of administrative law as setting policy, determining the administrative framework, providing authority, etc. But for White there is a decided difference between the boundaries set by constitutional and administrative law and the administrative process of conducting the public business; more succinctly, there is a decided difference between looking at the administrative process from the point of view of administrative law and looking at that process from the point of view of its own internal working patterns. In making a comparison, Strong notes that the organization of the subject indicated by the outline of both men's books, shows a clear similarity but from differing perspectives.

Thus, for example, while Goodnow treats "offices and officers," White deals with "the personnel problem"; for Goodnow the central problem is the law governing the official relation, for White it is morale.

But if the administrative process does not set its boundaries, does not set the course it takes, then the law sets the means and ends of public administration. Its a matter of stressing, as White puts it, "the managerial phase of administration and minimizing its legalistic and formal

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24 Ibid.
aspects. "25 But other than the fact that the legal symbols relating to private and public administration vary, there is nothing to differentiate the study of "public" management from its private "cousin."

In the second edition White rejects Wilson's distinction of administration as the "detailed execution of general policy" on the grounds that it is an unwarranted exaggeration of the field. 26 He proposes two additional limits. White not only admits the "feasibility" of approaching public administration from substantive policy functions, "it is artificial to describe public administration apart from these major functions." 27 Nevertheless, he rejects this route as too unwieldy and, moreover, unnecessary because sustaining substantive activities

. . . are certain common procedures and problems characteristic of modern administration under any political system and in any field of government activity. . . . These aspects of administration are broadly managerial in nature. 28

Although White admits that as an enforcement procedure judicial action is clearly an administrative activity, he imposes another limit by passing up its consideration. He gives as his reason a too specialized characteristic behavior. Strong explains this singular limitation as possibly a reflection of White's bias against the legalistic approach

27 II, pp. 5-6. 28 II, p. 6.
to public administration. But White expressly proposes to study "the central core of the total complex of administration" and the absence of such a core in the judicial system would be a more likely reason for slicing that field away from his subject matter.

At this point, White's position—in a logical, not temporal, sense—might be summarized as follows: Administration is purposive group behavior; it is "means-fulfilling" or "means-enforcing" (and perhaps to some undetermined extent "end-determining") group behavior. Administrative law provides for the end, means, and form of administration; it is a "policy-declaring," "means-setting," and "boundary-determining" function. The art of administration is management; management is the direction, coordination, and control of purposive group (administrative) processes. Management is the central core of the administrative complex and provides a set of common procedures underlying various specialized substantive activities within the administrative domain. White excludes from his consideration of public administration both substantive policy matters and judicial activities. The reasons lightly suggested for these eliminations are practical and tactical; nevertheless, the elimination of substantive matters makes the study of public administration somehow "artificial" and the elimination of judicial activity

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29 Strong, "White," p. 43.
30 White, I, pp. 15-16.
makes it incomplete. In any event, the managerial process is White's subject of study. More elegantly stated, more carefully qualified, less dogmatically supported, White's position bears, notwithstanding, a striking resemblance to Willoughby's paradigm.

From ancient practice to modern performance, "the natural history of administration" reveals an unaltered type of behavior.

What differentiates the modern public official from the scribe of antiquity is the marvelous material equipment with which he works, and the contribution which science has made, and continues to make, to his profession. 31

White's third assumption presumes a significant transformation of administration from art to science. The paramount feature of the modern scene is a process of development whose proliferating technology and persevering science imposes relentlessly upon administration a new order of professional discipline. This development manifests itself not only in the substantive policy areas of administration but in the managerial core of administration itself.

That is, science is not only furnishing the tools with which administration works, it is transforming the methods of administration (in the sense of management) from rule of thumb empiricism to ascertained principle. 32

When Willoughby speaks of this scientific expression, he seems to have in mind a displacement of inappropriate habits by principle directed behavior; but White speaks of the

31I, p. 4. 32I, p. 15.
"transformation" of management. To preserve the continuity of managerial action as a type, he must mean to distinguish between the purpose of management, which is constant, and the means and technique of management, which are in transformation. But although, on comparison, a bit more reserved than Willoughby, White echoes Willoughby's conviction that "we are wholly justified in asserting that a science of management appears to be immediately before us. In some respects indeed it is now fairly well established." 33 Moreover, White's principles similarly echo those advanced by Willoughby; they are almost exclusively concerned with the authority process. For example, in the first edition we find this:

Efficient government depends in a very fundamental manner upon the proper allocation of responsibility and power within the administrative machine. The principle to be observed here is simple enough; to define responsibility so precisely that each official will be specifically charged with definite duties . . . . The necessary corollary of this principle deals with the allocation of authority; the object again should be to vest in each official adequate authority . . . to enable him to discharge efficiently the duties pertaining to his office. 34

In the second edition he adds another rule: "Of cardinal importance is the rule of unity of command . . . . This rule emphasizes the desirability of a single source of final authority in any organization . . . ." 35

In the mid-thirties White reconsidered the question of "principles" and arrived at a modified view. Principles should not be thought of as formally derived and rigidly applied; instead, they are guides to action carefully secured from experience and adjustable in practice. In the post-war editions White steadily retreats from not just principles but from a general optimism earlier expressed on the imminence of managerial science. In its place he substitutes "continuous improvement" and "a science bounded by cultural differences." Strong correctly catches the significance of "these words"; they mark "a significant change in emphasis or, perhaps more exactly, in perspective." From principles to generalities of the authority system bounded by cultural differences, White has come full circle. At the outset he sought the meaning of American public administration in the universality of the administrative process; in the commencement de la fin he seeks the meaning of public administration in the specific circumstances of the American experience.

In the first edition White pays homage to tradition by addressing the subject of governmental functions. He insists that the locus of governance has shifted.

In an earlier and simpler age, legislative bodies had the time to deal with the major issues, the

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36 White, "Meaning," passim.
37 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 38 White, IV, p. 9.
character of which was suited to the deliberations of the lay mind. . . . The problems which crowd on legislative bodies today are often entangled with, or become exclusively technical questions which the layman can handle only by utilizing the services of the expert. . . . [Experts] are not merely useful to legislators . . .; they are simply indispensable. They are the government. One may indeed suggest that the traditional assignment of the legislature as the pivotal agency in the governmental triumvirate is destined at no distant date to be replaced by a more realistic analysis which will establish government as the task of administration, operating within such areas as may be circumscribed by legislatures and courts.40

White's fourth assumption is that the problem of modern government is administration. It is important to grasp here that the dynamics of governance have not shifted away from the legislature simply because of magnitude or complexity; nor is the "distance" between the legislature and the "rough and irregular outline of social habit"41 sufficient explanation. Neither is it sufficient to recognize in administration an intermingling of executive, legislative, and judicial functions. The point is that the work of government has changed; the problems are of an entirely different character. White is indirectly suggesting that the problem of modern government is not political; it is administrative. But what is the administrative problem?

In the first edition White provides the rudiments of an explanation for the shift of governance to administration. The industrial revolution with all its myriad social ramifications has made indispensable "a degree of social

40 White, I, p. 6.  41 I, p. 399.
cooperation in which laissez faire has become impossible."\(^{42}\)

In these new circumstances there has emerged

\[\ldots\text{the acceptance of the state as a great agency of social cooperation, as well as an agency of social regulation. The state becomes therefore an important means by which the program of social amelioration is effected.}\] \(^{43}\)

In other words, White eliminates politics as the locus of the administrative problem by simply asserting--surely an unconvincing superficiality--that the new role of the state is (politically) acceptable. (Presumably, although White passes over the question, the requisite degree of "social cooperation" necessitated by the advent of industrialism is beyond the capacities of the private corporate economy or, alternatively, is unobtainable with the passing of a "pure" market mechanism.) In the second edition White enlarges the explanation of the rise of administration within modern government. Against a background of enhanced political equality, growing economic inequalities attendant to industrialization led government to redress through administrative measures the grievances of unbridled competition and wealth concentration.\(^{44}\) Clearly, however, these are politically activated administrative measures to achieve economic goals and this seemingly reunites politics and administration.

In all of the editions there is an historical bent, but in the post-war editions White is increasingly

\(^{42}\)I, p. 8. \(^{43}\)Ibid.  
\(^{44}\)II, p. 22.
preoccupied with the "unique" elements at play in American administrative development. He identifies Federalist activism, Jacksonian democracy, and moral reformism as important factors influencing administration in the American experience. Out of the three, Federalist "energy and responsibility" has proven to be the most compatible with modern technology and management.

The catastrophic forces of depression and war, the international tensions since 1945, and the mere magnitude of the administrative machine, at home and overseas, tend toward the dominance of the ideas of Alexander Hamilton rather than those of Andrew Jackson. The first half of the present century may indeed be called the new Hamiltonianism. The democratic ideal, nevertheless, has not lost strength even though the rule of rotation is circumscribed; and the power of moral standards in the public service is magnified, not lessened, by occasional personal failures.

Are the values of democracy and reform the administrative problem? At least in the American case, White seems to respond affirmatively.

The initiation of public policy has escaped legislative halls and now rests principally with official agencies and with citizen groups. The latter necessarily represent special segments of opinion and interest. The former have the moral obligation to represent the interest of all, to seek the public good. Being somewhat less vulnerable to outside pressures, public servants may cultivate the general welfare with greater detachment, with a surer reliance on rational analysis, with a clearer appreciation of long-run consequences, than representative bodies. This is not to say that their opinions should supersede the preferences of elected, representative bodies; it is merely to indicate the special values that are involved in the role which administration has now achieved.

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45 III, p. 7.  
46 IV, pp. 22-23.
This point of view suggests that statesmen are needed in the higher ranks of administration rather than technicians.\textsuperscript{47}

More forcefully and reflecting the ebbing prospects for a science of management, White comes to the problem of the modern (American) administrative government:

The need, incessant and urgent, is for the administrative mind that can hold fast to the public interest and bind conflicting special interests to it by skillful contrivance, based on knowledge but exceeding mere expertise.\textsuperscript{48}

Strong points out that this

\ldots might be taken to imply that administration is the heart of modern government precisely to the extent that public administration in modern government is not mere administration, but the main field within which political and constitutional problems now move.\textsuperscript{49}

White clings to the idea that the rise of administration has altered, not simply shifted, the problem of modern government. "In the highest reaches the administrative art touches the political, but it grows out of different soil."\textsuperscript{50}

[Emphasis mine.] And this is where the question is left; or rather, it is assigned to the future results of studies representing a variety of perspectives: historical, legal, comparative, political, psychological, sociological, technical, etc.\textsuperscript{51}

In their early years, White's deliberations were severely moulded by his conception of administration as the

\textsuperscript{47}\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{III, pp. 7-8.}} \textsuperscript{48}\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{III, p. 8.}} \textsuperscript{49}\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{Strong, "White," p. 48.}} \textsuperscript{50}\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{White, III, p. 8.}} \textsuperscript{51}\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{IV, p. 11.}}}
locus of significance for modern government. He sought intellectual parity for the study of administration in a universalism that all but dissipated any meaningful specification of public—much less generic—administration. He rejected law as an approach to administration and further weakened the specification of public administration. Although it left his subject matter incomplete and artificial, he cuts out of his consideration both judicial administration and substantive policy. He tried to defuse politics as a factor in the administrative process. He left himself as a subject matter the management process.

It is not clear that White understands that the management process, as he expresses it, is composed of two, quite differentiated, aspects. One of these aspects is the authority system on the verge of becoming a science; the other is substantive managerial practice already revolutionized in technique and technology by modern science. Indeed, the bulk of White's textbook is made up of just this material—less of the former and a refinement of the latter as the editions wear on—developed with unerring craftsmanship. It was a reliable reference and steady guide for managerial practitioners. It became the "new Gideon" of the public servant class. It has been said, justly no doubt, that White was essentially of an empirical rather than a theoretical temper; but he was too astute an observer and too wise a recorder not to theorize. Therefore, as his doubts concerning management science multiplied, he became
disquieted over a powerful managerialism in a value void.

Strong catches White's reaction with consummate insight.

He [White] observed a brash young science drive assumptions and principles . . . to extremes that were foreign and distasteful to him. He saw this science carry the pursuit of an underlying process to the point where it seemed to abandon a concern with public administration altogether . . . . As the rest of the discipline became more scientific and more concerned with process as process, White became less so. As the most vigorous movements within the discipline shunted the political environment and ends of public administration more and more to the periphery, White brought them back to a prominent place.52

Paradigm Essentials: A Summary

The essentials of and the significant changes in White's theory are:

(1) In modern governments the locus of decisive action occurs in the administrative sphere.

(2) Administration is purposive group behavior. Public administration is the purpose fulfilling process or aspect of government.

(3) The primary and most general study of public administration is its managerial core. Judicial administration and substantive policy actions are set aside from consideration as unnecessary to the study of management.

(4) Management is the direction, coordination, and control of substantive administrative means. Law (the legislative function) provides the form, boundaries, and

52 Strong, "White," p. 50.
direction of administration but is not a proper approach to the study of management. Management must be understood on its own terms and is in transformation from an art to a science. Scientific principles are difficult to apply in management. Principles refer to the authority system. (The executive function is not examined.)

(5) The rise of administration is a by-product of industrialism. In the circumstances of industrialism, the state is a politically acceptable means for achieving through administrative means a requisite degree of social cooperation and is politically conditioned to provide through administrative means a requisite degree of social regulation (or less economic inequality). Eventually White finds a panoply of American political values—reform, morality, (federal) activism—at play across the administrative scene.

(6) Increasing concern with political factors and declining confidence in the achievability of managerial science induce White to redefine the problem of management to be primarily one of practicing statesmanship by holding the public interest paramount in the face of adverse special interest pressures.

The Social Matrix: Speculations on Determinates

White's intellectual career spanned four decades rich in social contrast, turmoil, and development. He was too much the social activist not to be influenced but too much the discriminating historian to be swayed by the
vicissitudes of meandering and episodic events or fads in thought. As discriminately as he made his intellectual way, however, he was never able to unravel the modern public administration conundrum. For example, he realized that there is some portion of "truth" in the conventional explanation that the magnitude and complexity of modern social problems call into use the administrative means of governments but he also understood that the explanation slurs over the precise circumstances drawing governments to act--nor does it, it might be added, address how administrative means came to be employed to meet those circumstances. White addresses the question by introducing circumstances of his own: unsatisfactory degree of social cooperation, unacceptable economic inequality, and federal activism. But they are meager contributions to understanding with no more development than White gives them. In the discussions that follow we will try to bring these points more in focus.

Technological Factors

For all the early theorists, technological considerations have been omnipresent factors in the rise of public administration; but White dares to be more specific. In this connection, what occasions the provision by government of "social cooperation" beyond the canons of laissez faire? Clearly, the answer must be some manner of inconsonance between conventional entrepreneurial practices and accepted structuring arrangements, on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, the integrative and coordinative characteristics of
dynamic technological systems. Put another way, if the
imperatives of erupting technological systems are not incor-
porated into legal forms, or expressed in accepted practice,
then they are likely to slide into extra-legal arrangements.
Alternatively, such arrangements as cartels, industrial
unions, corporate mergers, trade associations, and govern-
ment actions from surveillance and investigation to regula-
tion and operation—with promotion and service functions in
between—are all part of the same process of adjustment and
alteration of conventional practices—that is, provision for
"social cooperation"—made necessary by the exigencies of
industrial practices.53

The exigencies of industrial practices express
themselves in other dimensions. It is well understood, for
example, that the machine revolutionized "work." The change
goes beyond the diminution of the burdensomeness of human
labor; it touches the character of work as well. Until the
industrial revolution work was carried on by the artisan or
craftsman, learned on the job through apprenticeship, and
based on "folk knowledge."54 In discussing Japanese sword-

53 See Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of Business
Enterprise (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904),
especially Chapters One and Two.

54 Kenneth Boulding, "The 'Two Cultures'," in Tech-
nology in Western Civilization, Vol. II, ed. by Melvin
Kransberg and Carroll W. Pursell, Jr. (New York: Oxford
making (AD 800), Jacob Bronowski gives an interesting example of "folk knowledge" in use.

The making of the sword, like all ancient metallurgy, is surrounded with ritual, and that is for a clear reason. When you have no written language [or inability to read], when you have nothing that can be called a chemical formula, then you must have a precise ceremonial which fixes the sequence of operations so that they are exact and memorable.55

With the industrial revolution, however, folk knowledge--acquired vicariously in ordinary experience and embalmed in ritual--fades into the background to be superseded by scientific knowledge--induced by the systematic organization of experience. In particular, two characteristics of science-based work, when combined, are fundamental to an understanding of the rise of administration. First, the accumulated masses of scientifically generated knowledge make necessary extended pre-work education and training experience. Peter Drucker, for example, notes the emergence of this necessity:

The 19th century was . . . the era of technical-university building. . . . The technically educated man with the college degree began to assume leadership about the time of World War I, and by the time of the second World War the change was essentially complete.56


Second, in the educational setting the masses of scientifically generated knowledge has necessarily been channelized—although it might be suggested too traditionally—into proliferating specializations. Thus there emerges the narrow specialist, the "expert." What has not been fully appreciated is the incompatibility of political, legislative and judicial mores to the receipt, assimilation, and exercise of expert evidence; whereas to the contrary in retrospect, expert information finds in administrative mores a hospitable environment. It is opportune to note that just as in olden times folk knowledge was embedded in ritual, so in modern times specialized scientific knowledge has become embedded in professionalism. Failure to distinguish in this regard is a problem of the first rank in contemporary social affairs.

In a sense, the Great Depression of the thirties was a technological event of the first magnitude. The specter of idle men, machines, and knowledge abundantly cluttering the economic landscape was profoundly sobering. Conventional diagnoses and prescriptions seemed puny in the face of the obvious end of simply putting all the available resources back together into productivity. Looking back, it is astonishing that belief systems persevered so stubbornly; but one alteration was of high significance. It was not possible to accept longer the view that such economic catastrophes were divinely ordained. It easily followed that whatever contributed to getting the machines running again
and to keeping the economy at "full employment" could scarcely be considered sacrilegious. This surely was the impetus for the federalism White scores. But the current scene shows that federal activism may be decried when practiced as well as invoked when passive; Hamiltonianism does not possess, therefore, the value White assigned it.

**Institutional Factors**

Sandwiched between war and depression, the decade of the twenties takes on a deceptive innocence. The roots of social crisis surely run through the period but despite intensive research and analysis agreement on their identity has not surfaced. There is no doubt, however, that the period does not present a uniform picture of institutional health and harmony. Both labor and agriculture, for example, were without political clout and the latter was economically depressed throughout the twenties. Financial institutions could only be characterized as erratic, if not bizarre. In the government the legislature was somnolent, the executive complacent, and the courts reactionary. And beneath a popular culture of relaxed conventionality there emerged a subculture of crime. But these strains of institutional flux and contrast were ignored, as the planning-wing of progressivism was eclipsed, in the euphoria of "economic prosperity." It is "a paradox," writes Joseph Dorfman of the period, that
. . . the war experience taught that rational planning, backed up by extensive empirical research, was feasible; but the high level of prosperity of the latter part of the decade seemed to indicate, contrariwise, that extensive planning was unnecessary and indeed likely to impede the economic progress of the nation. 57

In the early years of the New Deal there were two policy philosophies contending for supremacy. An early group of advisors—A. A. Berle, Walton Hamilton, Rexford Tugwell, Jerome Frank, etc.—emphasized, once more, national planning; a second group—mostly Brandeisian lawyers such as Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran—emphasized revitalization of competitive enterprise through reform. Arthur Schlesinger has characterized the contention thusly:

The two groups of New Dealers . . . disagreed on the diagnosis—whether bigness was inevitable or reversible; and they disagreed on the cure—whether there should be affirmative economic planning or merely an attempt to revitalize the market; whether government should try to do things itself or whether it should simply try and reform the rules of the game. 58

Of course, there was a good bit of trial and error mixed in to muddy the waters but the Brandeisians, along with doses of Keynesian fiscal policy, prevailed. The failed NRA was the only experiment in industrial planning and stabilization; but nothing like overall industrial planning saw the light.

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This is not the place to review the vast array of New Deal legislation and programs; suffice it to say that the government was vaulted into undisputed partnership in social and economic affairs. But the general policy of the time can be summarized. Policy was bounded primarily to institutional considerations and limited to minimal institutional adjustment and maximal institutional stability. This policy was expressed primarily through three themes: first, commitment to blind raw growth with a subtle shift in emphasis from concern over relative economic status between groups to concern over absolute gains by groups over time; second, regulation of noncompetitive areas rather than surgical reconstruction; and third, use of fiscal policy and income redistribution supplements to ameliorate failures in the system. In short, policy was remedial rather than anticipatory, piecemeal rather than comprehensive, and dominated by the pecuniary logic. Of more than merely passing interest is the fact that such a policy paradigm does not generate criteria for "how much" institutional adjustment is necessary or "to what" should institutional adjustment be made.

One cannot leave the institutional scene of White's time without taking note of one striking institutional rigidity. Henry Steele Commager's characterization cannot be improved upon.

The triumph of mechanical concepts in the juristic arena coincided with the triumph of dynamic progressivism in the political. The result was a conflict which increasingly exacerbated the relations between the political and
judicial branches of the government and between the various parts of the federal system and all but brought political evolution and experimentation to a standstill. . . .

That the courts exercised that privilege [of ultimate interpretation] cannot be doubted by anyone familiar with the judicial record from the mid-1880's to the 1930's. For four or five decades the political field was strewn with the corpses of social welfare laws struck down by judicial weapons. 59

In the early days of the New Deal, executively inspired, administratively formulated, and legislatively legitimized policy was more often than not delegitimized through judicial review. (Interestingly, in later post-war decades these institutional roles were somewhat reversed with a judicial inspiration and legitimization of policies unable to find expression in a politically recalcitrant executive or to find their way through a politically immobilized legislature.)

Ideational Factors

The persistence of ideology has not gone unchallenged in the modern American experience. In less than two centuries, the pace of technology and a degree of democracy so relentlessly redistributed and intermingled social arrangement as to break up an elitist monopoly on the interpretation of life. Varieties of social interpretations made apparent the role of deductive elements in the selection and organization of social "fact." Rapid change made apparent

the mutability of human experience and induced expectations of social novelty and a sense of the time scale of social events. Comparative social studies, spurred by extrapolations from Darwinian theory and the panorama of Paleolithic, Neolithic, and Iron Age societies which lay at the doorstep of explosive Western expansion, intruded upon ethnocentric perspectives.

Moreover, the rise of science asserted itself as the critical element in thought. Philip Wylie has observed:

The branches of science have emerged, I submit, in the order in which they have done least damage to man's prestigious illusions concerning himself. Mathematics came first because it hardly hurt human vanity. Physics came next because, although it diminished human illusions of terrestrial grandeur, it left miraculous man unimpaired. Biology was put off because it involved an examination of man as an animal--when he insisted on remaining a God. Psychology is . . . avoided . . . because, with its acceptance, a thousand pridelful institutions will vanish, myriad sacred tenets even of scientists will dissolve.60

No doubt this is an overly optimistic observation but the spread of science from astronomy, physics, and chemistry to biology and psychology introduced the issue of a science of human affairs. (The concept of culture became the basis for this effort.) For many, then, the formulation of science took place against a backdrop of dissolving ideas of the absolute, the qualification of entities and fixed states as derivative; for these, the basic terms of science became:

experience, context, relations, change and continuity, experimental, etc. Undoubtedly, the progressive and unstable character of American civilization was fertile soil for the conception of democracy as the process of socially co-operative intelligence, access to knowledge, rational discussion, public re-examination and modification of principles, and sharing of self-correcting experience. John Dewey was, of course, the major exemplar of this pragmatic view; but there were many variants on the pragmatic theme expressed across the intellectual spectrum—Beard in history, Veblen in economics, Pound and Holmes in law, Mead in philosophy, to name only a few.61

Of White, John Gaus has pointed out:

He entered upon his work at a time when the Department of Political Science of the University of Chicago, under the leadership of Charles Merriam, was becoming outstanding for the fresh and varied activities and thought of an unusual group of scholars . . . . Pioneering was encouraged; an atmosphere of cooperation across traditional lines of organization and thought within the university was achieved; and support was obtained for new lines of work.62

Here was a position and intellectual climate strategically tangential to the pragmatic temper. Gaus also points to "the character of public affairs" during White's intellectual tenure.

61 Two examples from among the many books surveying pragmatism are: Morton White, Social Thought in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); and Milton R. Konvitz and Gail Kennedy, eds., The American Pragmatists (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1960).

He began his work when the catastrophe of the First World War was challenging institutions and ideas, particularly in government . . . . He had prepared himself and had entered upon creative work when the catastrophe of depression forced a further appraisal of public policies and the construction of more adequate public instruments and processes. Then came the Second World War and the post-war years. Throughout his professional life, our country was in urgent need of transforming its means of public housekeeping . . . .63

A concern with the problematic is a critical element in the pragmatic theoretical profile.

Some Critical Questions and Discussions

White’s approach to his subject is prompted by a belief, a conviction, that a study of public administration subsumed to the conventions of political theory does not serve an understanding of the character of modern government. In the process of industrialization the “work” of government alters and the locus of significant government action shifts from the halls of the legislature to the administrative arena. White carves out for himself, then, a twofold task. First to achieve discipline parity, administration must be emancipated from the strictures of classical political theory by establishing for it a theoretical basis independent of politics. Second to determine the study of the discipline, the essential nature of administrative governance must be defined.

Addressing these objectives, White submits that all purposive group behavior is administrative. This

63 Ibid., p. 231.
extreme generalization, as we noted earlier, is devoid of any significant discriminatory power. Thus, for example, group behavior that has as its purpose the derivation of purpose--i.e., legislative behavior--is, by definitional fiat, administrative. This is a lamentable loss of opportunity, for White had available a store of ethnological materials and culturological perspectives which could have been applied to the question. As it turns out, the attempt to establish an independent theoretical basis for administration is a failure.

White takes another stab at separating politics and administration by removing from the latter "policy declaration" and confining the former to "policy fulfillment and enforcement." White leaves open the extent--but not the doubt--of administrative involvement in the process leading up to authoritative policy declarations and of administrative policy determination through its execution. In effect, politics is presumably taken out of administration but not the other way around. Unfortunately, White's attention is so absorbed by the first of these two points that he fails to appreciate the critical significance of the second point to his own theoretical goal. Suppose, for example, that most policy proposals find their origin in administrative realms; that the politics of policy formulation is in large measure characterized by the play of both private and public administrative interest groups; and that the nature of most legislative policy declarations place in the hands of the
administrative process such discretionary authority as to virtually determine the meaning and extent of policy through its execution. Suppose, in other words, that in modern government the role of the legislature is reduced to a ritual legitimization of administrative governance. Here is the direct route to the question of what circumstances in modern industrial society induce the shift from classical liberal democracy to administrative processes of governance.

Further, the remarks just made suggest the weakness of the conception of administrative law as the legislative imposition of direction, form, and bounds upon administrative practice; suggested instead is at least some participation by administration in the outcome of administrative law enacted by the legislature. This supports White's contention that it is a mistake to approach administration through the perspective of (legislatively enacted) administrative law. However, it does not follow that legal considerations may not be a significant factor in the study of administration. A weakness in White's line of argument is the absence of an effective distinction between private and public administration and a too hasty dismissal robs White of whatever differentiation the legal processes of justification and legitimization of the two species of administration might provide. 64 White quite correctly but on questionable grounds excludes

the judicial system from his study. The "highly specialized" character of "judicial administration"--White's explanation--is indeed so specialized that it makes no more sense to consider judicial mores as administrative--our explanation--than, for example, to consider legislative mores as administrative.

White is seemingly on sounder ground in the exclusion of substantive policy subjects from his study of public administration. After all White's study is not about substantive programs but their administration. Nevertheless, he feels the exclusion of substantive matters--although no explanation is given--somehow renders the study of public administration "artificial." White has good reason for uneasiness on the score of this exclusion as we shall suggest in three steps.

White explains the rise of public administration, the shift of governance from a legislative to administrative center of gravity, as the result of the emergence in industrializing society of fundamentally different problems compelling governmental action than the demands made of government in preindustrial circumstances. But, to explain "fundamentally different problems" after excluding the character--not the details, but the character--of substantive affairs would be like saying: "the existence of public administration explains the necessity of its development; the development of public administration explains the necessity of its existence." It is not unreasonable to contend that an adequate
explanation of the function of extant public administration would, if applied, satisfactorily explain its development; conversely, it is reasonable to contend that an adequate explanation of the historical rise of public administration should satisfactorily explain its extant function. Indeed, the latter is a more comprehensive test of the former.

White advances three reasons for the extended employment of public administration. He cites as his first reason the political acceptance of the state's breach of laissez faire dogma. But this is not an explanation of why the state finds it expedient to act administratively or even of why the polity finds such action acceptable; it is a statement of fact. "Social cooperation and regulation" are given as the goals of governmental action but these are surely matters of substance. Moreover, there is the nagging question of why private corporate administration is improvident of sufficient social cooperation and regulation. Once again, the differentiation between public and private ideological, including legal, symbols might be instructive but such a consideration does not appear in White's epagoge. A second reason invoked by White to explain the rise of public administration is executive activism. Undoubtedly from the outset and substantially, American economic development has been conditioned by remarkably contrived governmental subsidies, privileges, and protections often initiated or blessed by the executive. But American history also affords conspicuous instances of executive passivism both in the
face of social crisis—the Hoover administration—or in the face of apparent social stability—the Eisenhower encumbrance. Moreover, in troubled times there may be a cry for executive restraint—as currently—or a clamor for executive leadership—as in the Depression Years. These considerations, granted Federalism has generally prevailed, lead to the conclusion that an explanation of governmental activism must include the nature of substantive affairs.

White’s third reason for the extensive use of public administration is that it represents a political response to those disadvantaged in the process of industrialization. It is a point that must not be passed over hastily. Economic displacement and exploitation are unquestionable by-products of industrialization; but it is undeniable also that society is generally better off in consequence of industrialization. The problems of economic distress, then, are not inherent in industrial technology but have their locus in the relationship between the pace of technological development and the persistence of traditional institutional practices. Policies directed toward economic distress must, therefore, deal directly with the substantive matters of technological imperatives and institutional adjustment; policies must fall on or somewhere between maximizing technological imperatives under the restraint of maintaining sufficient institutional stability to prevent social chaos or minimizing institutional change under the restraint of allowing sufficient expression of technological imperatives to
prevent technological (and scientific) decay--beyond either margin the technological basis for a viable community collapses. The point is: the institutional means employed by government in carrying out policy must itself conform to the policy characterization. In other words, the characterization of substantive policy is indissociable from substantive means. Are electoral, judicial, and legislative mores insufficient to the minimal expression of technological requisites necessary for a viable industrial community? Are administrative mores insufficient to the maximal expression of technological requisites endurable by a viable industrial community? White's theory does not rise to pose the questions, much less to see the answers as affirmative. Without explanatory pretense, it may descriptively be said in the American case that under the aegis of private and public administrative arrangements a greater permissiveness to the expression of scientific and technological imperatives has been achieved than was possible under market dicta and laissez faire government. The conclusion of our first step in this line of argument is that the character of substantive policies is an indispensable element in the theoretical understanding of substantive means.

White makes what he calls the "management core" of administration the focal point of his study. The subject of management comprises the body of practices and procedures commonly found in effectively administered policy programs. But although "located in" and "synthesized from"
circumstances of substantive policy applications, management materials make up, for White, a universal subject sui generis. Such a contention is a contributing factor to White’s dismissal of “outside perspectives” in preference to getting at the essence of management, so to speak, “from within.” The meaning and understanding of management must be located internally from its own inherent patterns and its own indigenous logic; management is a “means-in-itself” with an ontological reference independent from that of “ends-in-themselves.” In a word, White dualizes means and ends. White’s interest is in the transformation of management from an art into a science and, initially, he adopts Taylorism as his model. Under this conception, the relevant empirically synthetic domain from which eternal managerial truths would be inductively discovered is limited to the brute facts of means alone—that is, ends would be excluded as relevant facts. Undoubtedly White becomes aware of the problems in this approach—the problem of deductive elements entering into the selection of facts; the problem of full formalization without contradiction; etc.—and abandons immutable principles for “warranted guides.” Under this altered conception, management and policy content are “connected” since it is only in the experience of end-consequences that the appropriateness and effectiveness of means may be judged as warranted. Moreover, the mutuality of the means-end

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65 White, I, pp. 15-16.
connection becomes apparent since it is fruitless to consider ends apart from the consideration of whether appropriate means are available for their realization. But even beyond this, White's study of management illustrates the contextuality of means and ends. His purpose, or end, is to improve managerial processes through study; the means that must be employed reside in considering the nature and degree of policy fulfillment. The conclusions of our second step are that means and ends are contextually determined and within any specific context means and ends are mutually related. There are no "means-in-themselves" or "ends-in-themselves."

The exclusion of substantive policy from White's study invites more than artificiality or incompleteness; it induces rank confusion in the discrimination and judgment of means. In a society of simple tools and folk-knowledge, the intimacy of means and ends, so important in any enterprise, is smothered in ritual—as in the Japanese sword-making example earlier cited. The "fixing" of technical operations by ritual in a static social situation offers no apparent difficulty, but with the advent of technological change the disparity between the demands of ritual and the requisites of technological competency intensifies. In a society undergoing progressive industrialization, the extension of scientific ways of behavior into social areas previously governed by ceremonial considerations brings to the urgency of maintaining a means-end continuum not only the necessity of assiduous attention to technical skill but the necessity, as
well, of emphasizing organizational and planning activities of dynamic scope. These dynamic imperatives, however, do not occur in a social vacuum free of business and governmental folkways; moreover, they do not occur evenly throughout society and do not therefore present a general challenge to ideological commitments. In industrialization we see a heightened contrast, then, between the organizational requisites generated by a cumulative and self-sustaining instrumental logic and the organizational prerogatives based on past-binding custom. When White gathers from publicly administered programs managerial procedures and practices, he indiscriminately catches both the persisting organizational structures of status and authority and the emerging organizational processes of instrumental operationality. The contrarieties inherent in this montage of organizational styles underlie White's unavailing struggle to rationalize the managerial process.

Consider, for example, that White's theoretical excursions into the managerial field are almost exclusively preoccupied with formulating principles or guides for the proper hierarchical distribution of authority and responsibility whereas, in contrast, the routine managerial practices and procedures of bringing appropriate personnel, information, and materials together at the right time and place are enumerated in a descriptive manner. This theoretical structuring of "logistical operations" in terms of the prerogatives of hierarchial organization, as it might be put,
results from a failure to perceive the organizational character of the instrumental requisites emanating from the spheres of science and technology. Hence, the frustration of organizational instability; hence, the embarrassment of managerial indeterminacy. Although he nourishes "rear guard" hope, White quickly retreats from an early and facile triumph of management science; but he never grasps the futility of transforming received status ideals into technological workability. White is justifiably wary of "mere expertise," suspicious of narrow technicality; there is no indication, however, that he comprehends how hierarchically distributed authority and responsibility "artificially" fragment instrumental knowledge or, reciprocally, how conveniently positivistically conceived information fits into the static categories of organizational orthodoxy. But the point of our third step is that even if one enjoys the perspective herein employed, the permissive liberation of technological potentialities into possibilities through adjusting ceremonial arrangements requires as a reference substantive policy matters.

White identifies with pragmatism but his practice falls short of its attainment. The failure to maintain a means-ends continuum in theoretical formulations--just analyzed in depth--is perhaps the most conspicuous violation of the pragmatist perspective. But there are other lapses no less serious. For example, White is careful to acknowledge premises but he does not distinguish between those that are
testable in the direction of inquiry and those that simply impose themselves on inquiry. Democracy and equality are samples of the latter in White's work. Contextual weakness is also evidenced in, for example, the relativism and ethnocentrism of administration placed in unique American circumstances. Finally, the universalizing of administration and management are unfortunate theoretical lapses White should and could have avoided. In summary, White's pragmatic proclivity degenerates in performance to a somewhat qualified empiricism. His paradigm moves from premises to facts to theory collapsed into conclusions. It is worthwhile noting that White never takes his conclusions as final; but instead of turning conclusions into premises, White invariably returns to original premises.

A final methodological point should also be mentioned. White calls for multiple perspectives and multidisciplinary approaches to the study of public administration. But in the absence of integrative criteria, he is loath to move in this direction himself and casts a jaundiced eye on the positivistic, eclectic, and relativistic efforts typified by others in this regard.

White never brings into clear focus what is meant by "the problem of modern government is administration." He recognizes that industrial forces have defused the traditional channels of political machination and he wisely abandons as moribund the issue of the legislative control of public administration. In other words more bold than White
can bring himself to utter, enfranchisement in and access to electoral mechanisms are no longer, if they ever were, meaningful routes to the effectuation of political values since legislatively derived political pronouncements are, per se, without a proper and necessary informational base. Realistically, White reintroduces politics as a significant factor in the administrative process and trenchantly identifies the "different soil" upon which political adjustments must rest.

The problems which crowd upon legislative bodies today are often entangled with, or become exclusively technical questions which the layman can handle only by utilizing the services of the expert. These [experts] are not merely useful to legislators overwhelmed by the increasing flood of bills, they are simply indispensable. They are the government. One may indeed suggest that the traditional assignment of the legislature as the pivotal agency in the governmental triumvirate is destined at no distant to be replaced by a more realistic analysis which will establish government as the task of administration, operating within such areas as may be circumscribed by legislatures and courts.

But while White grasps the significance of expert information and the structural incapacities of the legislature to harbor it, he fails to fully understand its incompatibility with legislative mores and the legislature remains as an unreconciled thorn in the side of his analysis.

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66 The financial realities of modern nomination and campaign processes further reduce the presumed efficacy of the electoral process and further contribute to the ineptitude and irrelevancy of a sitting legislature through special interest susceptibility.

67 White, I, p. 6.
White's call for administrative statesmanship in defining and attending the "public interest" reflects a laudable sense of community but he does not provide a reliable theoretical context for bringing the idea into understandable focus.

[Administrators] have the moral obligation to represent the interest of all, to seek the public good. Being somewhat less vulnerable to outside pressures, public servants may cultivate the general welfare with greater detachment, with a surer reliance on rational analysis, with a clearer appreciation of long-run consequences, than representative bodies. This is not to say their opinions should supersede the preferences of elected, representative bodies; it is merely to indicate the special values that are involved in the role which administration has now achieved.68

Surely this statement must be as controversial as confused; it bristles with formidable issues and intriguing questions. For example, the democracy-administration tension is obvious; and what constitutes the "general welfare"? This topic is too vast to be tackled here but we will introduce a few suggestive coordinates that might be helpful in guiding study.

In a society already privately and publicly bureaucratized, effective political pressure emanates primarily from administrative groups or organizations with a significant administrative aspect. Moreover, governmental assistance, although the ideological rhetoric of justification obscures recognition, invariably takes the form of an "administrative solution." This is partly due to the administrative bias of a society steeped in administrative habits;

68III, pp. 7-8.
but it is more fundamentally due to the lack of a viable institutional alternative. There is a third, equally overlooked, link in this chain of logic: the "success" of administrative solutions essentially depends on the character of recipient groups, on whether they possess indigenous administrative potential which may be developed with assistance or whether they are susceptible to administrative direction—that is, if they cannot acquire indigenous administrative capability, can public administration assume the role of its administrative aspect? Labor unions are a classic example of the former; welfare programs, public health, and OASI are reasonable examples of the latter; and illegal aliens are a classic example of a category outside the "administrative solution" altogether. Put another way, managerialism, professionalism, and unionism are symbols, the institutional aspects, of those participating in the dynamic mainstream of social life. When White speaks of the "public interest," does he have in mind the extension of public administration beyond these symbols? Does such an extension rest on a "moral obligation" or does it rest on the necessity of some minimal degree of "social cohesiveness"? Does White have in mind a policy of mere "maintenance" or of "relocation" into the dynamics of social life? And, in view of the "trinitarian administrative bias" characteristic of modern society, how do we evaluate the place of public administration vis-a-vis the problems of modern society?
History yields little confidence that societies effectively anticipate crisis or that, when anticipated, they achieve either consensus on appropriate policy or resolve to act. Ordinarily, groups suffering economic adversity do not possess political power but in times of general social distress—such as, for example, the economic deterioration of the Great Depression—some degree of expanded opportunity emerges for governmental assistance to disadvantaged groups outside the "administrative bias." However, in times of social stress—such as, for example, currently—there is also the opportunity and inclination to discontinue assistance previously accorded groups outside the "administrative bias." Moreover, as we have earlier suggested, the policies of government have hovered close to the margin of minimal institutional adjustment. Thus, policy interpretations of "economic equality" have stressed passive access rather than active attainment and, within the absolute gains of raw economic growth, little change in relative economic position, despite ideological protestations to the contrary, has been promoted or evidenced—organized labor, but not labor as a whole, is the possible single exception in White's time. Does the "public interest" suggest or require something beyond this conservative policy profile?

If so, a considerable strain is placed on "administrative statesmanship." Can the administrative mode of institutional behaviors accommodate a shift in policy posture from grudging institutional modifications in response
to querulous technological concessions to progressive social reconstruction? Can, in other words, administration accommodate a melding of experts on directing technological development and experts in facilitating institutional change?

The introduction of morale in the ranks as a subject in the administrative lexicon reflects, no doubt, White's broad humanistic interest; but it reflects also his recognition that the effectiveness of administered programs is a direct function of the quality of administrative behavior. This point opens up a dimension of unexpectedly significant matters of which we may pause here to give only a smattering. In our society it is a ready assumption that means to a given end should be minimized. Not surprisingly then, is it not the case that, in the received doctrine, the fostering of strictly administrative values is limited to their exclusive enhancement of the program values being administered? To be sure, for example, the purpose of educational administration is to enhance the educational environment of educators; but should the administrative work environment of administrators be secondary and inferior to the educational work environment of educators? Is the morale of administrators only significant if it becomes a factor in the morale of non-administrators? In view of the role of administration in modern society—as suggested, for example, in the previous paragraph—an enriched administrative ecology may be of critical importance. This is not to suggest, of
course, that administrative ease is the decisive criterion in evaluating program acceptability; administrative feasibility is that criterion.

One cannot leave a discussion of White's theory of public administration without noting the lack of a firm specification of "executive" and its relationship with "administrative."

White is a first-rate empiricist with admirable theoretical "instincts" but with less than adequate theoretical skill to exploit them. White's theory thrashes about inside an orthodox cocoon from which it fails to emerge and fly in all its potential beauty. Nevertheless, if one judges a theory by its ability to stimulate thought, it is a success.
CHAPTER VII
BARNARD

Hanging Chester I. Barnard in the gallery of public administration theorists may offend the tender sensibilities of the purist; but to exclude his portrait would leave for the period under our consideration an unwarranted theoretical gap of a serious nature. Among the more embarrassing deficiencies of the "classical decades" of public administration theory must be counted the repetitive superficiality of organizational pronouncements and the fumbling formulations of the executive function. These are the subjects to which Barnard turns his considerable experience and theoretical powers when, as Charles Perrow observes, "there was hardly anything around to qualify as an academic theory of organizations in the United States."¹ Barnard's contribution to administrative theory—organization theory and the executive function embedded in it—is entirely generic. Our concern, however, rests on what light Barnard's theory sheds on the public species of the administrative phenomenon.

Brief Intellectual Biography

We have presented and examined the work of four academicians who established reputations as activists in their professional field; we take up now the work of a highly successful practitioner turned theoretician. Charles Irving Barnard (1887-1961) gained his administrative experience climbing the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company's managerial hierarchy to its summit. This experience was impressively supplemented by directorships in several companies, as president of the United Service Organization, as president of the Rockefeller Foundation, and as chairman of the National Science Foundation; he was also a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Barnard's formal education ran from Harvard University eccentrically through various institutions of higher learning to a D.S. degree from Rutgers University in 1936. Barnard's obvious and admitted efforts at self-education uncover an unquenchable urge to bring some measure of rhyme and reason to his administrative experience—or perhaps more accurately, to formulate a theory adequately obedient to his untutored administrative practice. In any event, the product of his unsystematic forays into a wide diversity of disciplines was the now classic book entitled
The Functions of the Executive. This effort should be credited with providing the major basis for the later work in both the "decision making" and "human relations" schools of thought as well as affecting significantly subsequent work in organizational theory and administrative communications.

Reading The Functions of the Executive, so often the case with pioneering work, is a laborious chore; it is shot throughout with tedious elaborations of categories upon and within categories based for the most part on the repetitious application of such dualisms as material-nonmaterial culture, organization-environment, psychological-social, etc. Fidelity to the presentation of Barnard's general theory does not require us to include, nor will we, the vast majority of this convoluted material. For the dedicated specialist or for confirmation of our presentation, however, we repeat the injunction for the reader to consult original sources. Some assistance in understanding may be gleaned from Barnard's article, "Comments on the Job of the Executive," given in rebuttal to an article on his work by

Melvin T. Copeland. Less useful is a later book by Barnard entitled *Organization and Management*.

**Presentation of the General Theory**

Barnard is the epitome of the "organization man" at a time when the legitimacy of established organizations was being severely challenged and he responds with a spirited defense. His purpose is to define and explain the role of the executive in organizations but he finds little assistance from the established doctrines. "Always," he complains, "... the social scientists--from whatever side they approached--just reached the edge of organization as I experienced it, and retreated." He goes on to indicate the deficiencies and expose his orienting predilection.

Rarely did they seem to me to sense the processes of coordination and decision that underlie a large part at least of the phenomena they described. More important, there was lacking much recognition of formal organization as a most important characteristic of social life, and as being the principal structural aspect of society itself.

Barnard mentions two approaches particularly obstructive to the development of universal generalizations

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5 Barnard, *Functions*, pp. xxviii-xxix.
of organizations. One has been a legalism that interprets
the state (or church) as the source of authority when most
theories derive the state from and base it upon organizations
in the first place. This leaves the ultimate source of
authority ambiguous. Relying on Eugen Ehrlich, 6 Barnard con-
ceives substantive law promulgated by the state to have as
its source people as organized. 7 In the context of the times
and, as will become apparent, in the terms of Barnard's
theory of organizations, the primary source of the law would
rest in corporations. A second obstructive factor in bring-
ing to light the essentials of organizations has been the
exaggeration of economics and the relegation of social
processes, of which economics is only one aspect, to a
merely exogenous position of trivial concern. Again con-
sidered in the light of the times, Barnard's expansion of
non-economic factors to at least an equal status with eco-
nomic factors in organizations is, however justified, not
surprising.

Organizations, especially formal organizations,
are the most conspicuous feature of modern life. Without
a grasp of the nature and meaning of organizations, then,
Barnard believes we are in ignorance of the nature and
meaning of modern society itself. Organizational behavior

6 Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the
Sociology of Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1936).

7 Barnard, Functions, p. xxix.
is cooperative behavior; cooperation is the essence of organizations; cooperative behavior is necessarily purposive or goal directed. Barnard defines formal organization "as a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons." This definition seems rather all-inclusive and raises more questions that it presumably answers. For example, isn't such a definition simply synonymous with social behavior? And the concept of "formal" organization would surely be simplified if it carried with it "legal" or "rule" recognition. Also, are there any non-associated individual behaviors? These and other questions must be addressed in the final section of this chapter.

Barnard himself would judge his approach by whether it is "valid through a wide range of concrete situations with relatively few variables, which can be effectively investigated"; whether "the relations between this conceptual scheme and other systems can be effectively and usefully formulated"; and finally "whether its use will make possible a more effective conscious promotion and manipulation of cooperation among men . . . ."

Barnard's organizational emphasis prophetically suggests—as the spate of studies, research, and publications since bears testimony—that "organizationalism" bodes well to become in this century what "individualism" was to the previous century: its central ideological symbol.

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8Ibid., p. 73.  
9Ibid., p. 69.
Speculation aside, however, the point is that Barnard's approach introduces a shift of emphasis and confronts him with the bedeviling problem of so much of modern social analysis: the place of the individual relative to the place of the organization.

Interestingly, Barnard rejects in his concept of organization the commonly accepted necessary but not sufficient condition of a "group of persons." For one thing the notion implies "membership" and this is too restrictive for the extent of organizational participation Barnard has in mind; many significant cooperative activities do not require membership. For another thing the notion detracts from the significant hard core meaning of organization as a "system of interactions"; in other words, analysis should begin with the relevant cooperative actions as a system itself. However, Barnard does not reduce this system to a collection of individuals. Organization is "nonpersonal." The "relationships of cooperation" are given off by persons but they are not themselves, so to speak, a part of the organizational system; they form a part of the environment of the organization, a part of the larger cooperative system which includes the organization. Barnard states the position thusly:

The system, then, to which we give the name "organization" is a system composed of the activities of human beings. What makes these activities a system is that the efforts of different persons
are here coordinated. For this reason their significant aspects are not personal. They are determined by the system . . . 10

Put another way, the mutual actions of persons forming a series of cooperative interactions have as their reference the meaning of the system of coordinated actions themselves.

This is a "forced" and awkward position to adhere to and Barnard is driven to suggest

. . . that every participant in an organization may be regarded as having a dual personality--an organization personality and an individual personality. Strictly speaking, an organization purpose has directly no meaning for the individual. What has meaning for him is the organization's relation to him--what burdens it imposes, what benefits it confers. In referring to the aspects of purpose as cooperatively viewed, we are alluding to the organization personality of individuals.11

He is not identifying here a "sociological role"; the identification has the strength that for the person acting organizationally the "organization personality" is all-pervasive. Thus the individual is reduced to a flatulent residual of reified organization. The individual may be thought of as a point through which passes a multitude of behavioral interactions--i.e., cooperative acts--and from which radiates self-actions--i.e., acts nonconjunctive with other individual acts, if they exist, of like purpose. Focusing on the "point," the individual is a unique set of actions; historical and on-going acts are internalized into

10 Ibid., p. 77.
11 Ibid., p. 88.
psychological states referred to by Barnard as motives. 12 Free will is limited to this unique "region of activities" and choice depends on the limitation of possibilities within the region. 13 Belief in free will is necessary because

... persons who have no sense of ego, who are lacking in self-respect, who believe that what they do or think is unimportant, who have no initiative whatever, are problems, psychological cases, insane, not of this world, unfitted for cooperation. 14

Hence, the domination or continued expression by the individual of actions which are not or do not become organizational are condemned. Barnard here expresses the ultimate denigration of the individual. From the organizational point of view, the pertinent properties of persons are the motivational choice of purposive actions--i.e., cooperative actions. 15

Barnard writes:

Overlaying or embedded in the complex of informal organizations, which in the aggregate we call great national and local societies, is a network of formal organizations. If we examine this network it quickly appears that there are a few strands of formal organization that are clearly dominant and relatively comprehensive, all other formal organizations being directly or indirectly subordinate to them. 16

Barnard says that subordination involves only "comprehensiveness" but since the factors of subordination all reduce to limitations of organizational purpose, the effective meaning is "subservience." In this connection, a "complex

12 Ibid., pp. 11-12.  
13 Ibid., pp. 13-14.  
14 Ibid., p. 13.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., p. 96.
organization" is one with subservient organizational units. The "success" of a complex organization depends on the mutuality of subordinate and subservient organizational units.

Not only are the characteristics of subordinate systems of cooperation in large measure directly or indirectly determined by prescription of superior organizations, but these superior organizations themselves are composed of the complexes of subordinate organizations, so that what takes place within the latter, their existence, their success or failure, react upon the superior organization.\textsuperscript{17}

Inevitably, however, competition also exists between all organizational units. These conditions—subordination, mutuality, and competition—are all factors in the necessity of the existence in complex organizations of a non-subservient executive organizational unit.\textsuperscript{18}

The origin of organizations may be found "in the deliberate intention of a single person"\textsuperscript{19} inducing others to cooperate in a common purpose—the primitive executive function—or by an organization creating a new organizational unit or the "segmentation of existing organizations caused by schism, rebellion, or the interposition of an external force."\textsuperscript{20} Some organizations are simply formed by the "spontaneous" emergence of common purposive actions conjoined, again, by the primitive executive function.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 99.  \textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 111.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 103.  \textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 102.
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.
"It is impossible for formal organizations to grow," Barnard holds,

... except by the process of combining unit organizations already existing, or the creation of new units of organization to be added to those in an existing complex.\textsuperscript{22}

"The clue to the structural requirements of large complex organizations lies in" effective leadership.\textsuperscript{23} Barnard makes the striking observation that

... successful cooperation in or by formal organizations is the abnormal, not the normal condition. What are observed from day to day are the successful survivors among innumerable failures. The organizations commanding sustained attention, almost all of which are short-lived at best, are the exceptions, not the rule.\textsuperscript{24}

In the life and death struggle of organizations Barnard lays the basis for an extreme functionalism—survival is the test of functionality—and sets "the place of the executive functions in the survival of cooperation."\textsuperscript{25}

The necessary ingredients of a formal organization are: "communication," "willingness to serve," and "common purpose." Of these Barnard says that

... the initial existence of an organization depends upon a combination of these elements appropriate to the external conditions at the moment. Its survival depends upon the maintenance of an equilibrium of the system.\textsuperscript{26}

These elements are best understood in the processes of organization.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 104. \textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 105. \textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 5. \textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 7. \textsuperscript{26}Ibid., pp. 82-83.
A major problem facing formal organizations is the acquisition and preservation of cooperative behavior. This is faintly incongruous with the conception of organization as voluntarily cooperative. However, the conditions of subordination (limitation of purpose) and competition in the circumstances of a society dominated by proliferating formal organizations introduces the necessity of the inducement and maintenance of cooperative behavior. Barnard therefore shifts—without visible acknowledgment—the conception of organization as emergently and inherently voluntarily cooperative to organization as attracted and imposed cooperation. This shift defines the executive function as not so much the reflection of cooperation but as, instead, its primary source. From the point of view of the person standing outside organizations, the parceling out of cooperative behavior—i.e., organizational contributions—depends upon a "contribution-satisfaction equilibrium."

If each man gets back only what he puts in, there is no incentive, that is, no net satisfaction for him in cooperation. What he gets back must give him advantage in terms of satisfaction; which almost always means return in a different form from what he contributes.27

Organizational participation evidences a "contribution-satisfaction equilibrium"; "net satisfaction" implies a redistribution of satisfactions through organizational participation. Barnard accomplishes this "feat" by dividing satisfactions into material and subjective

27Ibid., p. 58.
classifications. Of the two, the latter is by far the more significant; in fact, "material rewards are ineffective beyond the subsistence level . . . ."\(^{28}\) Organizational participation depends, then, not so much on the satisfaction of material gain but on, rather, subjective rewards such as pride of workmanship, prestige, and the sense of belonging.

From the point of view of the organization, cooperative participation depends upon a "contribution-inducement balance." Barnard provides two methods for securing the cooperative efforts necessary for organizational existence and survival. One method involves inducement by "objective incentives,"\(^{29}\) Such incentives refer to the same material and subjective classifications enumerated above and with the same emphasis on the latter classification. The other method involves "persuasion." Three techniques are propounded. One is the technique of developing "coercive conditions"; examples would be ostracism and discharge.\(^{30}\) A second approach "rationalizes opportunity"; an example would be the identification of organizational interest with individual self-interest.\(^{31}\) The third approach resorts to the "inculcation of motives"; an example would be appeals to organizational loyalty.\(^{32}\)

\(^{28}\)Ibid., p. 144.  \(^{29}\)Ibid., pp. 142-149.  
\(^{30}\)Ibid., p. 149.  \(^{31}\)Ibid., p. 150.  
\(^{32}\)Ibid., pp. 152-153.
Five points must be made about the organizational process of acquiring and maintaining cooperative behavior. First, except in the case of organizational failure—and perhaps even in that case—"equilibrium" and "balance" are tautological. The inclusion of subjective factors in the equation makes it easy to assert equality of exchange, regardless of "objective" material inequalities, primarily because "arbitrary" values may be assigned or assumed for those factors without fear of "falsification"; the joker in this deal lies in the point that the equation is not testable. Second, if Barnard is correct regarding the weights assigned to material and subjective factors, it would appear that contributions made by participants and received by organizations—which is not really an exchange but an identity—is favorable to the organization for the costs of material inducement are minimal and the costs of subjective inducement are likely trivial. Certainly, organizational growth would be hampered without favorable contributions. (Of course, there are many ways organizations may externalize—i.e., avoid—costs.) Even if Barnard is correct on this matter, it is generally agreed that organizational participant dissatisfaction over subjective matters usually is expressed—labor union demands are often cited—in terms of material factors. At any event, a "good" Marxist confronting Barnard's position would have a field day crying "exploitation." Third, although Barnard dismisses the narrow concept of "economic man," it is interesting to note
that he applies virtually the same logical analysis to the larger social situation which includes non-economic as well as economic factors. Fourth, the conception of organizations as composed of "voluntary" cooperative actions is suspect, else why would potential or actual organizational participants "have to make elaborate calculations of inducements and contributions if the crux of the matter were cooperation in a common purpose?" Indeed, contributing cooperative behavior would seem to be based on reward rather than common purpose; moreover, the very use of reward as an inducement would tend to draw attention away from cooperation toward reward. Fifth, the use of indoctrination, propaganda, inducements, coercion and the like are all justified by the overriding supposition that organizations are the sole locus of social functionality for all and the executive function must be responsible for the viability of organizations to achieve their purpose.

Barnard must be credited with introducing into administrative theory the critical importance of communications. A communications network is both the medium and the adhesive of a system of coordinated activities. Lines of authority are necessarily channels of communication; executives are centers of communication; common purpose is meaningless unless communicated; organizational structure and size are a function of communication. However Barnard

33 Perrow, Complex, p. 82.
develops no comprehensive theory of communication and limits himself to formal principles—which should be required reading for every practicing administrator.\textsuperscript{34}

Barnard's discussion of "informal organization" is another renowned contribution to administrative theory. The distinction between formal and informal organization is, according to Barnard, that the latter is an unconsciously formed (surely Barnard means "formed without rule recognition") and indefinitely structured activity pattern; moreover, "common or joint purposes are excluded by definition \ldots\"\textsuperscript{35} However, Barnard goes on to say that "common or joint results of important character nevertheless come from such organization."\textsuperscript{36} These beneficent results include "a means of maintaining the personality of the individual against certain effects of formal organization which tend to disintegrate [it];\textsuperscript{37} and to perform

\ldots the communication of intangible facts, opinions, suggestions, decisions that cannot pass through formal channels without raising issues calling for decisions, without dissipating dignity and objective authority, and without overloading executive positions \ldots\textsuperscript{38}

Clearly, Barnard is indirectly admitting to formal organization incapacities, an astonishing incongruity in his general theory. But there is something else even more astonishing. We have previously taken cognizance of informal organization

\textsuperscript{34}Barnard, \textit{Functions}, pp. 82-95, 161-184.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 115. \quad 36Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 122. \quad 38Ibid., p. 225.
as one source of the rise of formal organization, to this must now be added formal organization as a source of informal organization with the latter positively conditioning the former. But Barnard of informal organizations says that they "correspond to the unconscious or nonintellectual actions and habits of individuals," whereas formal organizations correspond "to their reasoned and calculated actions and policies." In other words, formal organization is rational whereas informal organization is irrational. It thus turns out that irrational organization--i.e., informal organization--can give rise to and positively contribute to rational organization--i.e., formal organization. Of course Barnard recognizes negative relationships between formal and informal organizations as well as positive contributions but the ambiguity of organizational dynamics remains. The communication function of informal organization is, however, a lasting contribution to administrative theory.

To the "input-output" and communications systems, Barnard adds another innovative contribution, the decision making system. Barnard notes that the decision making system is difficult to study since decisions are complicated and the evidence of decision is indirect. Moreover, techniques for dealing with different areas of a problem exhibit a marked disparity in developed effectiveness and thus

39 Ibid., p. 116.
decisions tend to be of a speculative or hybrid character unable to "bear the weight of ponderous logic." Nevertheless, Barnard stresses "the superlative degree to which logical processes must and can characterize organization action as contrasted with individual action, and the degree to which decision is specialized in organization." Critical decisions fall in the domain of the executive function.

The fine art of executive decision consists in not deciding questions that are not now pertinent, in not deciding prematurely, in not making decision that cannot be made effective, and in not making decisions that others should make.

Perrow succinctly points out that Barnard was groping his way toward an essentially behavioral analysis of leadership by singling out the importance of rational analysis of alternatives and selection of the best one.

The direction and success of organizations depends, then, on key executive decisions and the "processes of decision . . . are largely techniques for narrowing choice."

Decision making must initially discriminate between those elements in the decision environment which are irrelevant and those which are "strategic factors" to organizational purpose. A strategic factor is "one whose control, in the right form, at the right place and time, will establish a new system or set of conditions which meets . . .

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40 Ibid., p. 310.  
41 Ibid., p. 186.  
42 Ibid., p. 194.  
43 Perrow, Complex, p. 82.  
[organizational] purpose."\(^{45}\) But, determining and acting on strategic factors alters the decisional situation and thereby redefines organizational purpose. In Barnard's words, "the determination of the strategic factor is itself the decision which at once reduces purpose to a new level, compelling search for a new strategic factor in the new situation."\(^{46}\)

In brief, organizational purpose is determined in and by the executive decision process. Since cooperative behaviors are ipso facto purposive, and since purpose is determined by executive decision, Barnard has placed "common purpose" in jeopardy. Since purpose is determined by executive decision, and since in complex organizations the executive function is nonsubservient, Barnard has placed "voluntary cooperation" in jeopardy. The issue of the "locus of authority" is thus joined.

In Barnard's time, the rather thoughtlessly accepted view found in the literature was that hierarchically imposed authority is necessary to secure cooperation in accomplishing purposive tasks. Barnard reverses this conception to hold that authority is "the character of an order in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted."\(^{47}\)

In other words, authority lies not in the delivery of an order but rather in its acceptance. It is obvious that the shift from an imposed to acceptance formulation of authority

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\(^{45}\)Ibid., p. 203. \(^{46}\)Ibid., p. 204.

\(^{47}\)Ibid., p. 161.
has as its reference compatibility with a "voluntary cooperation" conception of organization. The standards for order acceptability are: (a) intelligibility; (b) consistency with organizational purpose; (c) feasibility; and (d) conformity with the personal interests of order recipients.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 165-166.} It stands to reason that orders which fail to meet any one of the first three standards would undermine all of the orthodox conceptions of authority; in Barnard's organizational theory, however, the standard of personal interest conformity would be, in view of the assumption of common purpose, a superfluity. Barnard suggests that the acceptance of authority is facilitated by the existence in each person, in greater or lesser degree, of a "zone of indifference" within which orders will be accepted willingly.\footnote{Ibid., p. 169.} Such a suggestion serves the purpose of enhancing the "common purpose" conception of organization--although "indifference" is a strange characterization to apply to such a zone. Curiously, group pressure is also advanced as an inducement to accept orders but surely this is precisely the point of the alternative theory of imposition.\footnote{Ibid.} Barnard even cites "the fiction of superior authority"--i.e., "belief in superior authority" or "belief in the propriety of authority acquiescence"--as facilitating authority acceptance but, again, this is precisely the condition on
which the alternative theory of imposition relies.\textsuperscript{51} Barnard seems determined to lock himself in the cage of the beast from which he is attempting to escape. Nor can we escape a brief demur on the shoddy reasoning employed by Barnard in maintaining that the existence of an underlying veto establishes authority as resting in the hands of order recipients.

From among a number of telling criticisms we select the line of analysis that follows from the question: What is the meaning of order nonacceptance? That is, what is the consequence for a particular person of an order that meets the first three and violates the fourth of the standards listed above? It is axiomatic that in the example case to be considered, the order issuing organization must be for the order recipient of central social significance--i.e., a key organization for social participation or even social survival--otherwise the test of acceptance authority is trivialized. Initially, order defiance means, both by theoretical definition and practical action, organization severance. Barnard avers that "to fail in an obligation intentionally is an act of hostility. This no organization can permit; and it must respond with punitive action . . . ."\textsuperscript{52} The other side of organization severance is, necessarily, organization relocation--i.e., social life in modern society cannot escape involving and depending upon participation in complex organizations. Practically, then, 

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., p. 170. \textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p. 171.
order defiance is contingent upon the existence of an
instance of purpose compatibility within a variously limited
"zone of viable organizational alternatives." But even if
such a happy contingency were always the case, we have a
mere shift from one authority system to another.

Barnard confusing a shift of participation in
authority systems with a veto of authority; the former does
not imply the latter. Of course, one authority system may
be in competition with another but this in no way under-
mines authority as a system. Barnard confuses the order
giving and receiving content of an authority system with
the system itself. As we have seen, the rejection of a
specific order implies, for all practical purposes, the
acceptance of orders in a different authority system. The
acceptance and issuance of orders affirms for both the
recipient and the issuer a belief in the authority system,
a belief by both in the right of orders to be issued and
in the obligation or necessity for orders to be obeyed.
The source of authority is in the system; the issue of
authority is the social basis and consequences of authority
systems. Barnard's formulation is not such an understanding
but an ideological justification. Barnard's theory rests on
the "legitimacy" of organization purpose as promulgated by
executive decision.

To seize the quintessence of Barnard's theory, it
is necessary to understand that he does not hold that organi-
izations cannot fail to have a moral purpose; he holds that
organizations are necessarily morally purposive. It is not that organizations must always pursue a moral purpose; the purposive processes of organizations are moral. Organizations are voluntarily cooperative and exemplify common purpose. Morality does not emerge from cooperative endeavors; it is synonymous with cooperative endeavors. And organizations are the purist form and expression of cooperation. To question organizations, then, is to undermine the very moral basis of modern society, to weaken the cohesive structure of civilized life, to challenge the "fountains of social well-being." Although there is not one word in Barnard's exposition on the moral content of organizational purpose, it is nevertheless sanctified. But the "laying on of hands" is not necessarily followed by the miracle.

The executive function must induce cooperation through an incentive-reward system; must make and communicate critical and key decisions; must insure cooperation through an authority system; and must determine and inculcate organizational goals. Lumped together, these "intra-organizational oriented" executive functions are directed toward "the maintenance of the vitality of action --the will to effort." However,

... the concrete interaction and mutual adjustment of the executive functions [as an organic unit] are partly to be determined by the factors of the

53 Ibid., p. 217.
54 Ibid., p. 234.
environment of the organization—the specific cooperative system as a whole and its environment.\textsuperscript{55} (Emphasis mine.)

This "inter-organizational oriented" executive function is directed toward

\ldots the organization's relationships (that is, of exchanging utilities) with other organizations and with individuals not connected with the organization in a cooperative way, which relationships have utilities for the organization. It is the aggregate of the potentialities of cooperation with those outside the cooperative system.\textsuperscript{56}

Executive functions have as their purpose organizational efficiency—that is, "capacity to offer effective inducements in sufficient quantities to maintain the equilibrium of the system."\textsuperscript{57} In the executive process, then,

\ldots efficiency of organization results from two controls: the control of output and income in detail at the point of exchange, at the periphery of organization; and coordination, which is internal and the productive factor in organization. Exchange is the distributive factor; coordination is the creative factor.\textsuperscript{58}

Survival is the test of organizational effectiveness but "the organization can survive only as it secures by exchange, transformation, and creation a surplus of utilities in its own economy."\textsuperscript{59}

Cooperation may be an attribute of organizations but it is the executive responsibility to create it where

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 233.
\item \textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 241
\item \textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 93
\item \textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 254.
\item \textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 245.
\end{itemize}
it does not exist and to enforce it where it is in danger of
disintegration. Organizations, Barnard warns,

... do not remain in existence, they usually do
not come into being, the vitality is lacking, there
is no enduring cooperation, without the creation of
faith, the catalyst by which the living system of
human efforts is enabled to continue its incessant
interchanges of energies and satisfactions. Co-
operation, not leadership, is the creative process;
but leadership is the indispensable fulminator of
its forces.\textsuperscript{60}

It is the quality of executive leadership that breathes life
into otherwise only potential cooperation. "So among those
who cooperate," Barnard informs us, "the things that are
seen are moved by the things unseen. Out of the void comes
the spirit that shapes the ends of men."\textsuperscript{61} One should not be
surprised that Barnard did not apply to leadership the same
logic applied to authority and find that it rests in "follow-
ship."

In summary, it is difficult to shake off the
suspicion that the functions of the executive serve more the
exploitation of innocent participants caught up in an
organizational maze not altogether of their own choosing or
understanding rather than the impersonally rational assist-
ance of voluntary endeavors to realize common purposes; more
the ends of organizational tranquility through deception
rather than consensus through mutual evaluation of means and
ends; more the uncritical promotion of sovereign organiza-
tional purpose rather than a sensitive concern with the

\textsuperscript{60}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 259. \textsuperscript{61}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 284.
community value of imperatively coordinated systems of human effort.

Barnard embraces hierarchical organization with undisguised enthusiasm. Coordination is dictated in formal organization through ranked subordination (subservience) of organizational sub-units to central authority. "Freedom is lessened in order that friction, strife and disruption may be reduced, security and power thereby being attained and conserved."\textsuperscript{62} Lateral organization, on the other hand, inherently "lacks its own formal means of preventing friction, strife and disruptive action."\textsuperscript{63} A formal organization may be limited in purpose by superior environmental organizations. This limitation is irrational when imposed by informal society; limitations imposed by formal organizations, such as the state, are legal formulations having as their source the organizations comprising the relevant social community. While a complex formal organization has a certain conventional autonomy, Barnard would include in it all relevant cooperative activities. This introduces an interesting point. A formal organization is composed of subordinate organizational units and a nonsubordinate executive unit. The authority of this executive unit, then, would appear to apply to groups not ordinarily conceived to fall within that authority; the executive functions would,


\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.

apparently to Barnard, legitimately extend beyond ordinary expectations. For example, the customers of organizations (corporations) could be legitimately subjected to propaganda or coercion to obtain organizational purpose. This point deserves Barnard's full treatment. He says

... that in the fundamental sociology of business behavior the services of an employee and of a customer when making a purchase are equivalent elements, similar contributions to the same organization ... It is customary to use different names in connection with the two categories of contributors to organization--employees and customers--such as "morale" as to employees and "good will" as to customers, but this is merely a matter of customary terminology that tends to conceal similarities without being based upon differences essential from the point of view of the theory of cooperation.64

Barnard goes on to list an application to customers of executive functions ordinarily applied to employees as follows:

(1) The bringing of customers into cooperative relationship; (2) the subsequent eliciting of services; (3) the maintenance of customer morale; (4) the maintenance of the scheme of inducements; (5) the maintenance of the scheme of deterrents; (6) supervision and control; (7) inspection; (8) education and training.65

The extension of this conception to public administrative organizations is thought-provoking.

With two exceptions, Barnard treats the executive organization much as any organization. One exception, the nonsubordinate executive unit as the locus of executive function, has been covered. The second exception is Barnard's morality concept of executive responsibility.

64Barnard, "Comments," p. 300.

65Ibid.
Barnard locates the value aspects or implications of organizational actions in the executive unit; or, to put it another way, organizational values are the responsibility of the executive function; or, to give another possible interpretation, executive responsibility is organizational value activity. Within the executive unit there exists a hierarchy of codes of moral conduct increasing from bottom to top in magnitude, differentiation, and complexity. Organizational actions invariably bring codes of moral conduct into conflict. Often these conflicts are relatively simple to resolve through reference to commonly accepted value rankings of importance or significance. If, however, commensurate codes of conduct are in conflict, stress is placed on executive capacity to resolve the conflict. Barnard sets the stage in the following manner:

When . . . codes have substantially equal validity . . . , conflict of codes is a serious . . . issue. The results of such a conflict may be of three kinds: (1) either there is a paralysis of action, accompanied by emotional tension, and ending in a sense of frustration, blockage, uncertainty, or in a loss of decisiveness and lack of confidence; or (2) there is conformance to one code and violation of the other, resulting in a sense of guilt, discomfort, dissatisfaction, or a loss of self-respect . . . .

Barnard identifies the third result or course of action as

. . . the inventing of a moral basis for the solution of moral conflicts--variously called "handling the exceptional case," "the appellate function," "the judicial function." This function is exercised in the cases that seem "right" from one point of view, "wrong" from another. The solution of such cases lies either in substituting a new action which avoids the

66 Barnard, Functions, p. 264.
conflict, or in providing a moral justification for exception or compromise. We are accustomed to call the first solution "executive," the second "judicial." They are both executive functions in the broad sense . . . . Were it not for the separation of powers in American government, we should better recognize that the judicial process is a highly specialized executive process.67

(White identifies adjudication as administrative; Barnard identifies it as executive. Is there a difference?) Barnard summarizes:

Executive positions (a) imply a complex morality, and (b) require a high capacity of responsibility, (c) under conditions of activity, necessitating (d) commensurate general and specific technical abilities as a moral factor. . . . [I]n addition there is required (e) the faculty of creating morals for others.68

Of course, "creating morals (or values) for others" is precisely, as Barnard admits, what is primarily involved or implied in all the executive functions. Barnard's theory is, therefore, seriously crippled by the absence of reasonably objective methods for executive resolution of value conflicts. To be sure, Barnard's "value noncognitivism" does not support the application of objective methods in the value field.

Morals are personal forces or propensities of a general and stable character in individuals which tend to inhibit, control, or modify inconsistent immediate specific desires, impulses, or interests, and to intensify those which are consistent with such propensities.69

67Ibid., pp. 279-280.
68Ibid., p. 272.
69Ibid., p. 261.
The point is that responsibility is the property of an individual by which whatever morality exists in him becomes effective in conduct.\textsuperscript{70}

Nevertheless, "relativism" does not intimidate Barnard from mandating an "absolute" outcome of executive value conflict resolution. "The most important single contribution required of the executive . . . is [organizational] loyalty, [or] domination by the organization personality."\textsuperscript{71} Barnard hands down the first and foremost Commandment of the Executive Catechism: Thou shalt create and support only values in the interest of the Organization.

Paradigm Essentials: A Summary

The essentials of Barnard's theory are:

1. The existence, survival, progress, and moral basis of modern society finds their locus in complex formal organizations.

2. The legalistic approach provides "no more than the topography and cartography of organization."\textsuperscript{72} "[N]on-economic motives, interests, and processes, as well as the economic, are fundamental in [organizational] behavior."\textsuperscript{73}

3. An organization consists of cooperative actions voluntarily directed toward a common purpose. A formal organization is "a system of consciously coordinated personal

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., p. 267. \hfill \textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 220.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. xxviii. \hfill \textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. xxxi.
activities or forces. A complex organization is a system of superordinate-subordinate organizations. The executive function (or unit) is organizationally supreme.

(4) An organization in its origin, survival, and growth is conditioned by subordination, mutuality, and competition in the conglomerate of organizations in which the life-cycle occurs.

(5) The essential elements of organization are: communication, willing service, and purpose.

(6) The essential organizational processes are: the economy of incentives (an organizational input-output system); a system of communication; the decision making system; the authority system; and the system of purpose formulation and promulgation.

(7) The executive functions are to assume ultimate responsibility for the formation, maintenance, and effective operation of the essential organizational elements and processes. The executive function divides into responsibility for the relationships of the organization as a whole with its environment (inter-organizational relationships) and responsibility for the cooperative actions appropriate to organizational purpose which, given the environment, make for an effectively functioning coordinative system (intra-organizational relationships).

74 Ibid., p. 72.
(8) Executive responsibility is essentially a matter of creating and inculcating values and resolving value conflicts solely in the context of organizational interests.

The Social Matrix: Speculations on Determinates

Technological Factors

Under this heading in previous chapters, we have sketched the American industrial revolution, its explosive character, its multi-dimensional social effects on institutions, work and ideas. In the course of human history the industrial revolution has perhaps been relatively matched only by the evolution of Man himself and the neolithic revolution of plant cultivation that led to the early civilizations. Only in the thoughtlessness that often accompanies the overwhelmingly obvious or in lay ignorance or in the obsessive retention and application of inherited mythology could one fail to understand the dominant and central significance of modern technology in any subject of social scope. Barnard's study of organizations, however, exemplifies just such a failure. The best that can be said is that technological factors stand passively in the background of Barnard's organizational theory. Of course no respectable intellectual effort in our "enlightened" century can be obviously mythological; Barnard's theory of organization is a systematic rationalization dressed in the intellectual regalia of accepted wisdom. It exalts cooperation without
denying the individual or admitting regimentation; it safely justifies established organizations without the tests of exploitation or serviceability. But scarcely beneath the surface lies the presumption that established institutions are the bearers of industrial society, that the spirit of cooperation is nourished in a hierarchial climate of authority.

The tragedy of Barnard's theory is not only that it fails to articulate the emerging organizational patterns of dynamic technology but that it fails also to articulate an understanding that the reason modern administrative organizations appear and are designated as technically functional is their more congenial nature to scientific effort than alternative institutional systems.

Our point is that Barnard conceives technology as an extra-social product of social institutions and as a passive non-organizational environment of social organizations.

Institutional Factors

Under this heading in previous chapters, we have given attention to the institutional stress, flux, and adjustment attending the American industrial revolution. In particular we traced the expansion of administrative practices through government agencies and private corporations in the midst of increasingly less significant but traditionally more hallowed democratic and market
institutions. The prevalence of administrative practices and the flaring concern over the adequacy of established institutions in the depression ridden thirties stimulated Barnard's treatise. It was the first serious effort in the United States--Max Weber had not yet been translated into English--to provide a theoretical basis for organizational actions. However, the unilinear conception of human organization solely in terms of institutional habit patterns seriously incapacitates Barnard's theoretical perspective; and Barnard's transparent apologetics for the executive function in organizations seriously compromises the perspective.

Evidences of theoretical deficiency are numerous. The emergence and proliferation of modified institutional practices in the midst of relatively fixed institutions easily gives the impression of spontaneity and individual voluntaryism. But the former is a code word for "unexplained" and the latter is incorrect--habit patterns, in the sense implied, are invariably and necessarily recognized after some degree of establishment. In Barnard's theory individuals are nonorganizational and organizations are nonindividual. What, then, is the dynamic of transforming one "state" into the other? Barnard also allows that informal organization gives rise to formal organization and vice versa; but how does one explain the irrational giving rise to the rational and vice versa? Agonizing over dualistic dilemmas is a philosophic exercise of long standing but we
are not aware of any successful solution. Barnard's solution is executive dedication. The explanations of organizational demise—"failure to cooperate, failure of cooperation, failure of organization, disorganization, disintegration, destruction of organization"\(^{75}\)—reduce primarily to the elements and processes of organization for which the executive function is responsible. But to lay blame is to imply the source of success; the "fulminating executive" receives the credit for organizational survival and success. It is instructive to note that dysfunctional purpose does not appear in Barnard's list. To do so would be to introduce an unacceptable question to the extreme functionalist: are established and on-going organizations serviceable to community well-being?

Our point is that Barnard's theory is essentially an ideological rationalization and justification of modern administrative organizations. As such it is the captive victim of the message it preaches.

**Ideational Factors**

Under this heading in previous chapters, we have striven to accomplish the following:

First, we attempted to heighten awareness of the almost bewildering diversity of thought accompanying the American industrial and managerial revolution. We identified what seemed to us to be the major philosophic movements

\(^{75}\)Ibid., p. 5.
relevant to the period of classical public administration thought, especially positivism, realism, and pragmatism. We tried to make apparent the rich variety of expressions germinated or supported by these movements—formalism, idealism, rationalism, empiricism, and instrumentalism are only samples. We associated ideas with social movements (planning in Progressivism), social events (full production and the Great Depression), social processes (mechanism and industrialization) and academic disciplines (democracy in political science). And we suppose every reader will be dissatisfied because a major item of thought has been ignored.

Second, we have attempted to pull apart the ideological and scientific aspects of thought.

Third, we have attempted to suggest the major intellectual events appropriate to forming a science of social analysis. These were Darwinism, culturology, Freudianism, and Einsteinian relativity.

Fourth, we have emphasized ideas relating to the question of value.

Fifth, despite an almost overwhelming variability, we have attempted to identify those ideational factors of prevailing influence and those conspicuously ignored or avoided. In the former category must be placed positivism, formalism, empiricism, functionalism, and relativism; in the latter category goes culturology.

The influence of Barnard's voracious reading is a peculiar affair. For one thing, we know from his own pen
that he found little help from the standard material that came under his perusal. Nevertheless, the theory as finally compounded is a remarkably rationalized presentation of the "party line." For another thing, Barnard was frankly open in identifying influences and those he did not acknowledge are easily traced. However, a survey of these influences do not reveal any systematic criteria of selection. It would appear that the ideas utilized in the theory were not selected to explain his managerial experience; they were selected to match the frothy conglomerate of "common sense" notions acquired in the course of managerial practice.

It may be said, then, that empirical support for the theory is indirect and unreliable and that the theory is covertly based on unsupported presuppositions. Moreover, it is doubtful that the theory would hold up under purely analytic criteria. It is laced with dualisms and category errors beyond repair. It is blatantly functionalist, defines values as noncognitive, and the concept of culture is not visibly employed. In short, Barnard's theory of organizations is ideologically oriented.

**Some Critical Questions and Discussions**

The necessities of "understanding" have introduced into the presentation and social context discussions of Barnard's theory considerable critical analysis. We shall therefore limit this final section to brief comments on a few selected points.
In the earliest phases of the Western industrial revolution it is a curiosity that the emergence and proliferation of a multiplicity of more flexible—relative to new technology and commerce—institutions in the context of static Feudal institutions led to the modern concept of the individualism while in the later phases of the American industrial revolution the emergence of alternative organizational systems led to a resurgence of holistic concern. It is an anomaly, also, that earlier overtly individualistic theories were covertly dominated by social conceptions. Perhaps John Ward's trenchant observation that "the ideal of individualism . . . [was], in its very rejection of social forces, itself a social ideal," 76 goes far to explain both the curiosity and the anomaly. In any event, the persistence of philosophical dualisms and the rise to dominance of administrative organizations has conspired to make the individual-societal dilemma endemic in contemporary social theories and issues. It is fair to say that as an apologist for establishment organizations Barnard does not wish to offend the ideal of individualism; the result is that, although an organizational bias dominates, his theory is hardly unequivocal on the subject.

For example, Barnard's statement that

.. a theory is a comprehensive explanation of a situation, of a state of affairs, of a course of events or action, of what takes place... [A theory should] fit the facts in general... 77

tends to suggest a nominalistic theory of organization—that is, organization is a logical construct, abstracted from individual behavior, and, as such, exists in the mind of the investigator. However, "the incentive economy"—based on a crude psychological interpretation of the Hawthorne Plant Studies and Elton Mayo's work 78—and "the morality of responsibility" conceptions tend to suggest an idealistic theory of organization—that is, organization consists of norms or values in the minds of the participants. Most of the content of Barnard's formulations, exemplified for example in "the organization personality," tend to suggest a realistic theory of organization—that is, organization is a thing sui generis moving in accordance with its own laws and principles, possessing its own elements and processes, and having an ontological reference of its own. Such a theory is extra-individual or supra-individual with the individual reduced to a mere "carrier" of the organizational corpus. Granted that the realist conception dominates, the existence of all three conceptions illustrates

77 Barnard, "Comments," p. 305.

Barnard's failure to resolve the individual-societal problem. About the only elements of the theory that "stand still" are the functional and organismic features--the latter supported by the role of Barnard's theory in fathering the "human relations movement."

Another manifestation of the individual-societal dualism can be found in Barnard's mixing of "self-actional" and "inter-actional" perspectives. The individual is an entity with attributes. Individual actions are "powered" by self-contained internal attributes such as, for example, motives and morals. Society consists of inter-actions between individuals. There are literally hundreds of terms used to ascribe such relations in the social sciences; these include: "status relations," "power relations," "influence," and, of course, "cooperation." Sometimes these terms are presumed to be conceptual ways of viewing social relationships; but sometimes they are reified to become the source of dynamics which drive or power the system of inter-actions of which individuals are the basic units; and systems of inter-actions are variously "associated" and reported as group configurations and organizational structures. The association of these views with Aristotelian and Newtonian perspectives cannot be denied.\(^79\) The use of such terms as "entity," "attribute," "substance," etc., is indicative of a primitive analysis.

\(^79\) John Dewey and A. F. Bentley, The Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), passim.
Finally, Barnard's individual-organization distinction induces a specification proclivity of exceeding import. Actions, for Barnard, are organizational because of their cooperative nature and cooperative actions are inherently purposive. Consider these representative definitions from contemporary students of the field:

An organization is a system which, as the attainment of its goal, "produces" an identifiable something which can be utilized in some way by another system.\(^80\)

... formal organizations are characterized by explicit goals, an elaborate system of explicit rules and regulations, and a formal status structure with clearly marked lines of communication and authority.\(^81\)

Organizations are social units (or human groupings) deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals ... \(^82\)

In all these definitions goals are an essential characteristic of organizations. To these three theorists goals require organizational action; to Barnard organizational actions are purposive. But to all students of the phenomenon, purpose is essential. To put it the other way, non-purposive actions are nonorganizational; it is apparent that random, irregular, or capricious individual behaviors do not suffer meaningful consolidation and are, as a matter


of fact, either actually or potentially disruptive or preventive to meaningful associationality. It would seem to appear, then, that those individual behaviors which are repetitious, routinized or regular and thus causally determinate to ends as consequences are characteristically organizational. There is thus introduced into the theory of organizations a bias for action-patterns that are characteristically institutional in nature. It should not be overlooked in this connection that regular or regularizing action-patterns are those most easily susceptible to pedestrian empirical enumeration.

We have earlier taken note of the widespread impression that science is "organized common sense." It simply is not appreciated that science is "organized uncommon sense." Common sense is based on observation and experience; it generalizes from what happens in the ordinary course of events. But science is based upon the creation of new experience in the form of experiment to initiate and indicate the linkages of things by deliberate and determinate interference in ordinary happenings. This is a vastly different and more successful process than the usual mundane notion of science suggests, for "reality" turns out to be far richer in possibilities than would ever be dreamed of by recourse to the familiar and the obvious. The difference between the "experience of the ordinary" and the "experience of experiment" is critical in understanding the implications of the bias in organizational theory. Clearly, that bias not only
identifies organization with the former, it views the latter as positively malicious to organization.\textsuperscript{83} Barnard presumes cooperative behavior to be purposive; the opposite would be non-purposive behavior. But Barnard also conceives cooperative behavior to be the opposite of conflict behavior. It might be suggested that cooperative behavior is the weakest form of conflict behavior and the weakest form, seen from the opposite direction, of a whole range of unspecified or misinterpreted instrumental (non-conflict) behaviors. It is the fulcrum behavior, then, that gets specified as organizational; behaviors at the conflict and instrumental poles tend to be excluded.

We have repeatedly taken cognizance of the absence in the public administration literature of a clear and informative specification of the executive function. In particular the lack of clarity in the executive-administrative distinction is uncomfortable, but relationships between the executive and legislative or judicial functions may be of some significance for administration also. Of course, it may well be that the executive specification is trivial but until clarity emerges the theory of public administration must surely suffer some degree of obscurity. The probability that inattention to the executive by those coming to the field of public administration from a

\textsuperscript{83}Victor A. Thompson, \textit{Bureaucracy and Innovation} (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969), passim.
background of conventional political theory may rest on the presumption that its meaning is obvious only heightens suspicion that some unobvious but potentially revealing questions are not being asked.

Ostensibly Barnard focuses on executive functions but if one substitutes the term administrative in every instance in which the term executive is employed, it is disheartening how little change in sense or meaning surfaces. With but two exceptions the public administration theorist would find after such a substitution of terms a relatively comfortable and familiar theoretical climate. The administrator breathes purpose into the organization, husbands that purpose, elaborates the details of that purpose, and he reconciles the disharmonies and adjudicates the conflicts of that elaborated purpose; further the administrator is responsible for instituting and maintaining organizational processes. Undoubtedly, the public administrative theorist would find Barnard's unabashed advocacy of propaganda, deception, and devious indoctrination unsavory if not unethical—although it would certainly be a legitimate issue in current public administrative practice. The jarring exception, however, would be Barnard's designation of the executive, to resubstitute terms, as the originator and final arbiter of purpose. Wilson and Goodnow would have rejected the former out of hand; only the legislature may legitimately originate purpose. Willoughby and White acceded to the actuality, even the necessity, of
administratively derived purpose but always with the proviso of legislative ratification (which implies legislative veto). But none of these theorists relaxed administrative accountability (in some manner to the democratic process) and legislative review. In short, democratic control of the public administrative process has been held immaculate. Is origination of purpose an executive function? If so it is anathema to the democratic ideal.

In Barnard's formulation of the functions of the executive there is one clue of signal provocativeness. The clue suggests that the executive is the lineal descendant or residual of primitive chieftainship. The executive is, on the one hand, the symbol of the essential mystical unity of the organization; as such—and this is Barnard's clue—the executive is the symbolic representative of the organization as a whole with its external environment. On the other hand, the executive is also the symbol of the stratified distribution of mystical potency within the organization; as such the executive may be conceived to be the source—Barnard's conception—of essential "vitality of action" or "will to effort" or it may be conceived to be the conduit for the reception and hierarchical distribution or redistribution of power. In common language, the executive is the authoritative representative of the organization as a whole and the dispenser and enforcer of internal organizational authority. At best this conception is a halting step out of the dark into the twilight.
Barnard's theory is less original than eclectically complex and unfamiliar. From the perspective of critical analysis the theory is a "house of cards"; as a pioneering effort it has left a mark that cannot be erased.
CHAPTER VIII

WALDO

In a sense—in the sense of this study's purposive context—the theoretical presentations of the five foregoing chapters yield the basic thrust and the characteristic variability of the "classical tradition" in American public administration thought. It is not contended that nothing important remains to be said about the unutilized insights or the influential factors in the emerging discipline's environment—that would be absurd. Indeed, that interesting story is yet to be fully written. Nor is it asserted that nothing of value remains to be found or detailed on the subject of public administration thought itself—that would be arrogant. Exhaustiveness was never pretended or definitiveness claimed for this study. It is argued, however, that in the "present state of the knowledge" there exists no further data which if presented would alter the general complexion, direction, or extent of public administration thought as exemplified in the line of theories from Wilson, Goodnow, and Willoughby to White and Barnard.\(^1\) However, no

\(^1\)For example, examination of the following two reasonably representative books not selected for presentation in this study (but meeting our "selection criteria" except
serious study of the formative period of public administration thought in the United States can be considered "complete" without including a consideration of Dwight Waldo's *The Administrative State*.²

The quick-memoried reader may understandably pause over the inclusion of Waldo's premiere work in public administration as an apparent violation of our selection criteria; it is true that the work is primarily a survey and analysis of the pre-World War II literature rather than the development of a general theory. However, in the framework of presentation of materials, in the organization of topics, and in the conclusions drawn there are the implications of a general theoretical stance it would be unwise not to bring into visible focus. If one were to hazard a generalization on how from the vantage of the present the publication of *The Administrative State* is seen in the evolution of the discipline, it might be as a rite de passage from youthful naivete and indiscretions to developing maturity. But how much and what kind of a break with the past is Waldo's work? In answering this question we shall not be

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concerned with summarizing Waldo's survey; our concern is with, instead, the presentation and discussion of his own theory insofar as it may be ascertained.

**Brief Intellectual Biography**

Clifford Dwight Waldo (1913- ) is Albert Schweitzer Professor in the Humanities in the celebrated Maxwell School of Syracuse University. A former Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, Waldo has also served in the Office of Price Administration and at the United States Bureau of the Budget. For over three decades subsequent to The Administrative State Waldo has authored and edited a stream of books, monographs, and articles, noteworthy in particular

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3 Although it is a more exhaustive and wider survey than that presented in Part II of this study.

as a measure of his place in the profession was his selection—reminiscent of White's selection similarly in the thirties—to make the contribution on "public administration" to the new *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

Our analysis and discussion will be strictly limited, of course, to Waldo's initial publication. *The Administrative State* is divided into three parts. Part I is an elaboration of Waldo's understanding, or attempt to understand, the social background and forces at play in "the rise of public administration." We shall consider this material—that is, Waldo's "understanding"—in the fourth section of this chapter as to its indicativeness of the social matrix of Waldo's own thought. In Parts II and III Waldo approaches the subject of public administration thought in terms of "problems" and "concepts." These are the materials to which we now turn our attention.

*Presentation of the General Theory*

Waldo must be credited with exceptional methodological appropriateness in approaching the corpus of public administrative thought problematically—that is, to see his subject as a problem, or set of problems, to be addressed. It is, indeed, a methodological attribute too little appreciated and too seldom employed. Waldo's employment, however, suffers deficiencies. Waldo organizes the body of pre-World War II public administration theory topically around certain substantive theoretical "issues"—or as he puts it,
"problems." This not only makes it difficult to judge the quality of specific general theories as a whole, but it tends to suppress the apprehension of the developmental progress of theory. Since anyone acquainted with the "early literature" would doubtless grant its containment within the "hard shell" of orthodoxy, it is at least arguable whether "theoretical development" or the "quality of a general theory" is more or less significant than the "variability of positions taken on a specific topic." More serious is an emphasis by Waldo on the failure of theory within substantive problems rather than the adequacy of theory to generate the "proper" problem, the failure of theory to answer certain questions rather than the adequacy of theory to stimulate the "right" questions. This is not an unqualified criticism for Waldo does address the question of methodology—although, even so, the emphasis falls on the adequacy of science conceived in administrative theory rather than as exemplified by administrative theory. Nevertheless, that the "bias" suggested colors Waldo's presentation can be ascertained in the problems selected as significant, the context in which those problems are placed, and in the stating of those problems as "issues."\(^5\)

Waldo entitles Part II of his book as "Problems of Political Philosophy." Specifically, he identifies the subject matter as "that part of the literature of public

\(^5\)See our discussion of "issues," pp. 66-67ff.
administration that bears upon five problems in political philosophy. . . ."⁶ Put simply, this is like asking: "what is 'over there' in administrative thought that bears on what is significant 'over here' in political philosophy?" Now it makes a great deal of difference whether one considers the bearing of "administrative problems" on "political philosophy" or whether one considers the bearing of "political problems" on "administrative philosophy." Both the relevance and treatment of problems depend on perspective. At the time Waldo approached the subject, the perhaps common judgment was that the administrative literature barely rose to the level of "theory" much less "philosophy" and what existed of the former was the theoretical baggage innocently carried from political origins to administrative destinations. Although there is some restlessness in the literature culminating in something of a struggle by White to escape the "political straight jacket," one of Waldo's scathing points scores this "orthodoxy."⁷ Why, then, it may be asked, does Waldo adopt the same perspective he denounces as orthodox? Any agile thinker can, no doubt, suggest some reasons; for our purposes, the point is Waldo does employ the orthodox political perspective. In this connection, one might wonder what the title of Waldo's book signifies. One of the more depressing failures of the early theorists--perhaps White


⁷Ibid., pp. 74, 206.
is a mild exception—came in not recognizing either the potentiality or the actuality of administrative dominance. In view of the traditional political bent of Waldo's evaluative perspective, his use of the phrase "The Administrative State" does not necessarily announce the triumph of administrative governance. It may reasonably be surmised, in conclusion, that Waldo places public administration in roughly the same "political context"—but, to be sure, with considerably more self-awareness—as did the students of public administration before him.

This "surmise" receives support from the topics selected by Waldo as significantly bearing on political philosophy. They are: "the nature of the Good Life," "the criteria of action or the bases of decision," "the separation of powers," centralization and decentralization," and "Who should rule?" The prominence of these topics in the early public administration literature reflects, of course, the theoretical background available to cope with a suddenly persistent administrative growth. After all, these were all central topics in the early political literature when administration was so embryonic as to pass notice—alone enough to arouse suspicion as to administrative relevance. Of course, these topics perhaps possess such generality that they may very well be administratively significant. Nevertheless, the uncritical transference of these topics to form

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8 Ibid., p. 65.
the "core" of administrative concern cannot be calculated to
tally skepticism that the administrative phenomenon is in
proper theoretical focus. It may be said, to surmise again,
that insofar as this array of five problems can be taken as
indicative, Waldo's implied administrative theory shares
with the "Classical Fathers" a common catechism of issue
considerations--that is, the same values command their
attention.

Waldo correctly observes that "the outlines of the
Good Life can be discerned in any political philosophy." 9
And Waldo points out that "students of public administra-
tion" are not immune from that "vision." 10 However, visions
of the Good Life vary greatly on either side of that "Great
Divide" of Western history, the "Industrial Revolution." In
the "back watershed," conformity to "God's 'Social Design'"
was the typical static view; rewards awaited a "Heavenly
Paradise." In the "front watershed," however, there emerged
the view that "Heavenly Rewards"--and a few crass material
ones too--might be reaped in an "Earthly Paradise." The
industrial cornucopia spawned the ethos of a Life to be
achieved, to be wrestled by human ingenuity from a poten-
tially provident nature. In this transformation from social
passivism to social activism there emerged in the latter a
second distinction of considerable significance--namely,
that between "private productivity" and "governance

9Ibid.  
10Ibid., p. 66.
necessity." It is not easy, perhaps not reasonable, to separate eighteenth-century political and economic philosophers. Adam Smith no less than Hume or Locke had a conception of the Good Life--or, as he put it, the "Wealth of the Nation"--and all subjugate governance to private market productivity. Thus, the magnitude of government directly reduces productivity; therefore, however necessary, governance must be held to the minimum. Thus, governance interferes with productivity; therefore, however necessary, governance should be localized.

Of course, this ideology hardly comported with the actual role of government in industrialization but it did confront the early theorists with the difficult problem of rationalizing the growth of administration. Waldo observes:

It is very significant that administrative writers do not generally feel any inconsistency in holding both to the idea of an extended sphere of government influence and operation, and to the ideals of a business civilization. . . . They thought, as most of their successors have thought, that the "tuning up" of governmental machinery and its more vigorous operation will not be inconsistent with the maximum operation of all legitimate business enterprise.11

Ideologically speaking, this is, as Waldo recognizes, an uneasy rationalization. But Waldo does not stress, as he should, that however complimentary public administration may be it is always assigned by the earlier theorists a residual role and its necessity is never directly faced. Perhaps some semblance of an answer may be found in the

11 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
facts that none of the earlier writers, Waldo included, contemplate the possibility that the "private" corporation was an extension of governance—a suggestion not easily induced from the "political perspective"—and that none of the earlier writers, Waldo included, consider the relative ideological permissiveness as between public and private administration vis-à-vis industrial imperatives—a suggestion not inducible from an "institutionally bound" perspective.

These perspective limitations are evidenced in Waldo's enumeration of the value objectives of an expanded public administration: individualism, materialism, peace, and urbanization. The incongruities, superficiality, and incompleteness of this list are neither worthy nor indicative of Waldo's larger vision. In the last analysis, Waldo poses conventional issues around democracy as the ultimate value question: Can a non-democratic but neutral administration receive and serve democratic ends? Or, can non-democratic administration be democratically controlled?

These issues may be reduced to the question: Who should rule? Waldo accepts the centrality of the question.

Generally speaking, the literature dealing with the problem "Who should Rule?" is not satisfying; it stimulates rather than nourishes. All of the conflicts and inconsistencies in the public administration movement meet at this point; all the unresolved theoretical problems of the movement break the surface of the current. Practically all of these conflicts, inconsistencies, and unresolved problems, it should hurriedly be added, are not peculiar to the literature of public administration

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12 Ibid., pp. 71-73.
but are general problems posed by large-scale, technically advanced, democratic society at the present stage of human knowledge and international relations. The indictment against public administration can be only that, at the theoretical level, it has contributed little to the "solution" or even the systematic statement of these problems.\textsuperscript{13}

This is followed with a trenchant statement--required reading really--of the ideological crisis, at least a measurable extent of it, brought about by the rise of administration.

At root is the fact that democratic ideology and institutions grew up in association with a belief in an underlying harmony, a belief that things need not be "managed" but will run themselves. The democratic philosophy at present is in the travail of being "rethought" to accommodate the concept of management and democratic institutions in the throes of change to accommodate the fact of management.\textsuperscript{14}

And this is followed by a revealing statement on the nature of the question as Waldo conceives it.

Democratic liberalism has been associated historically with the fact and the ideal of a "plurality of values"--of which ideal, freedom of speech, association, and religion, and "limited government," are the characteristic institutional expressions.

The problems we now face are not only reason for their solution, they tax the very imagination even to grasp their extent. Is it possible to build a strong bureaucracy unless there is agreement upon the ends to be served (as against agreement to disagree, and plurality of values)? Bureaucracies have never grown up, so far as we are aware, to "mold the framework of our culture" or to "rebuild the pattern of our lives," but for much more immediate and mundane objectives upon which at least the ruling groups were agreed.\textsuperscript{15}

A general theory of institutions awaits articulation. However, it may generally be said that associated ideas of

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., pp. 100-101.  
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 101.  
\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.
"understanding" (rationalization), defense (justification and legitimization), attack (condemnation as illegitimate), etc., follow the emergence and early development of a "novel" institutional practice; in short, "recognition" is, or has historically been, ex post. It may also be said that at least some institutions are not recognized as threatening to those in rule until too late for containment or destruction—else Western Europe would still be subject, for example, to "divine rule." Certainly the rudimentary and mature phases of institutional development may exhibit quite differentiated social functions. In any event, the role of the rulers vis a vis institutional processes is a more complicated matter than suggested by Waldo. Indeed, the important question of "Who should rule?" may, nevertheless, be secondary to the question "How did the rulers come to rule?" Waldo drives to the heart of the matter:

Science has created a whole new realm of discourse. What is the relationship of the domain of science to administration? to politics? If administrators are to use [Emphasis mine.] "science," how far up the governmental pyramid should it extend, what conceptions of "scientific method" are we to accept, and what is the relationship of science to "purpose"? If there is a distinct "administrative" function, what precisely is the nature of its expertise? 16

Perhaps, then, the most important question is not "Who should rule?" but "What is the methodological process by which decisions should be derived and effectuated?" Under Waldo's theoretical constraints, this is not the question he would

16 Ibid.
pose, or if posed, this is not a question he would accept since he unqualifiedly asserts:

I am not overlooking the claim of the pragmatists to have bridged the gap between the realm of science and the realm of value; I would dispute the validity of that claim.17

This leaves Waldo in the lap of the pioneers of public administration thought and brings us to the problems of "the criteria of action" and "the separation of powers."

No doubt Waldo is culpable to the charge of "hasty generalization" and questionable interpretation, but this is a quibbling charge compared to the masterful treatment given the topic of "action rationalization." With a flair for theoretical integration and penetrating insight, Waldo attempts to focus in a common field the prevailing (or associable) evaluative rationalizations underlying the characteristic actions of the legislative, judicial, and administrative functions.

The problem might be formulated as follows: The discretionary and coordinative dimensions of administration necessarily require decisions; decisions necessarily involve values both in the explicit or covert basis for decision and in the consequences of decision. Waldo therefore asks:

Who decides, and upon what basis, what activities are "less worthy" or "more desirable"? Does the administrative superior decide, as a part of the coordinating process? Do the "people" decide? Does the "will of the people" or the "public interest" decide? And how is "effective citizen pressure" distinguished from these? Whoever makes

17Ibid., p. 101ff.
the decision, how does he know that the decision he makes is "right"? 18

This is a questionable set of questions--traditionally biased, alternatives missed, etc.--but they are in line with Waldo's theoretical perspective. In searching out a "point of view" to approach the problem, Waldo observes:

A comparison of public administration with Utilitarianism and with so-called "legal realism" reveals some significant parallels. . . . According to the vagaries of time and events, Utilitarians found themselves concerned chiefly with the legislative branch, legal realists with the judicial branch, [and positivism] . . . with the . . . administrative branch. 19

Both the Utilitarians and the Legal Realists, argues Waldo, reacted against "higher law" and intangible values as barricades against social well-being and progress.

Horrified at the habit of mind that accepted cruelties and confusion because they were traditional or sanctioned by a "natural" order, they [Utilitarians] hoped to revamp the laws and the law-making process, thus to make of Parliament a machine to grind out a New Order, and to create . . . well-being and social harmony. 20

They [Legal Realists] deny the a priori and the theoretical and put forward the empirical, the instrumentalist, and the experimental. Finding an "antiquated" judicial organ interposing itself in the American scheme between the creative legislature (Utilitarians) and the New Order, they sought to educate the members of the judicial organ to their utilitarian function . . . 21

Both schools of thought "pose as hardheaded. They have presented their arguments as practical and objective when compared to the 'constitutional metaphysics' and 'folklore' 

18 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 19 Ibid., p. 77.
20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., p. 78.
of their opponents."^22 But, of course, these systems of action rationalization are themselves value-laden and presume fixed principles.

Positivism stands in the same relationship to public administration, believes Waldo, as Utilitarianism and Legal Realism stand to the legislative and judicial functions respectively.

The same professions of utility, practicality, objectivity, and empiricism are made, the same boast of tough-mindedness. The legislative ways having been cleared of "nonsense on stilts" and the judicial procedure having been freed of "metaphysics," there remains only to use the instrument of administration in an unencumbered, expeditious, practical, and scientific way . . . ^23

In short, "The answer of positivism," contends Waldo,

. . . to the problem of the basis of decision is that "science," "facts," "measurement" answer questions of "What to do?" It asserts that what is objective can and should "determine," that the imperative of "the facts" should be substituted for chance and will.^24

But the idea that answers can be directly derived from facts is delusionary; the result is proclaimed "rigid scientific objectivity on the one hand" and unsubstantiated "humanitarian zeal on the other."^25 As with Utilitarianism and Legal Realism, then, Positivism is not a guide to action without value import. The same thing is true also, maintains Waldo, for those few devotees of Pragmatism as a basis for administrative decision.

^22^Ibid. ^23^Ibid., pp. 78-79.

^24^Ibid., p. 80. ^25^Ibid., pp. 80-81.
... pragmatism is a protest against rationalism, against a priori methods of thought, and habits of mind. Its test of truth is usually considered to be chiefly "workability" ..., if it has desirable effects when tried. It places emphasis upon experience, and is hence characterized by empiricism. Intelligent use of experience in testing for truth is an experiment; so "experimental" is a term frequently found in pragmatic writings. Since the truth of an idea is determined by (or is) what it does, it is in some sense an instrument. Impatience with the "abstract" or "theoretical," and use of such terms as scientific, experience, empirical, practicability, experiment--these characterize the pragmatic temper.26

In all of these attempts to establish a basis for decision, the fallacy is committed of

... supposing that any "ought" for human beings can be deduced from any status of affairs in the common sense world ..., The very significance of "ought" lies in the difference it implies from what "is."27

We have previously commented on the "difference" between normative and positive statements.28 Waldo makes his position unequivocally clear: "'Science,' it should be clear, has no purposes ..."29 "'Purpose,' then, from the scientific point of view, is only a datum--not a moral imperative."30 In no uncertain terms, the "expert" is ruled out as a basis of decision.

A brief comment must be made. Waldo, when he uses the term, must mean "vulgar" positivism. No informed person would ever accuse a competent positivist of committing the

26Ibid., p. 83.  
27Ibid., p. 82.  
28Chapter II, p. 130.  
29Waldo, State, p. 81.  
30Ibid.
"naturalistic fallacy." Waldo, when he uses the term, must mean "vulgar" pragmatism. No informed person should ever accuse a competent pragmatist of advocating mere "work-ability" — "demonstrable workability" would be an improvement. This is surprisingly loose and shallow exposition for one who can go on to observe:

It is well not to stretch the similarities too far, for it is beyond doubt that the outlines of pragmatist epistemology and metaphysics do not accord with the positivist tenents. In particular, pragmatism envisages a rather flexible, indeterminate, and relativist world; positivism regards the things and relations of the world as fixed, determinable, and determining. Since both claim the sanction of "science" it seems probable that one, at least, is swinging on the wrong gate.  

Waldo should have swung on these gates a little longer. It is the sophisticated, not the vulgar, positivist philosophy that provides the "umbrella" under which "classical" public administration thought found shelter; it is the sophisticated, not the vulgar, pragmatist philosophy that provides the only viable alternative to the value comonundrum at the heart of public administration thought's orthodoxy.

In essence, Waldo criticizes the early theorists for not making clear in the daylight the values presumed in the night. But what values in the light of day would Waldo advocate? Waldo yearns for those values which he feels the early theorists "do not include. There is no hint of Platonistic Realism, nor any variety of Idealism, nor anything as intangible as the 'will of the people.'"  

31 Ibid., p. 84  
32 Ibid., p. 77.
these are "up-front" absolutistic; what is the last of these but Merle Fainsod's "parallelogram of operative forces,\textsuperscript{33}" or David Easton's "authoritative allocation of values.\textsuperscript{34}"

In the midst of relativism there lurks the absolute equi-
librium of interest groups. Are such values distinct from
"humanitarian zeal"? It can only be surmised that Waldo
would include value as an integral element of his implied
administration theory but his conception of value is iden-
tical with that of the early theorists.

The lack of an in-depth cultural perspective frustrates Waldo in the possibility of refurbishing his insights on the criteria of decision into an enlightened exposition of governance modes of behavior. Out of a survey of government functions--separation of powers--we get these con-
clusions.

\ldots either as a description of the facts or a
scheme of reform, any simple division of govern-
ment into politics-and-administration is inade-
quate. As a description of fact it is inadequate
because the governing process is a "seamless web
of discretion and action." As a scheme of reform
it is inadequate because it bears the same defect
as the tripartite scheme it was designed to
replace; it carries with it the idea of division,
of dissimilarity, of antagonism.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33}Merle Fainsod, "Some Reflections on the Nature
Friedrich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940),
pp. 297-323.

\textsuperscript{34}David Easton, \textit{The Political System} (New York:

\textsuperscript{35}Waldo, \textit{State}, p. 128.
We have been moving in the interpretation of our federal system from "competitive federalism" to "cooperative federalism," and the same tendencies are observable with respect to the separation of powers.\textsuperscript{36}

Finally, Waldo concludes that emergent conceptions of governmental powers must take cognizance of the fact that in the writings both administration and planning "have clearly been elevated to the status of Powers or Functions."\textsuperscript{37} In the first place, notice should be taken that Waldo appears to side step the traditional issue of "separation of powers" by denying its applicability to an emerging "functional holism." In this Waldo may have been influenced not only by swollen and proliferating administrative organs, but by the significant emergence of administrative arms--theoretically, "aspects of"--to the executive, legislative and judicial organs; this development along with usual characterization of administration as "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-adjuticative" might lead to a conception of a "seamless web." However, the distinctions remain and a competent functionalist would raise the question of their relationships to each other and to the whole. A second point of interest, then, is that Waldo seems to embrace an "organismic-functionalist" conception of government. If so, we may surmise that his theory falls within the classical ambit.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid. \textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 129.
whether planning might not be raised to the status of a function or power. In a sense, all the traditional institutional modes of governance relate to planning; however, the planning filtering through the mores of judicial and legislative practices is so rudimentary as to be hardly recognized as such. Certainly the quantity and quality of information generated in an industrial setting are inconsonant with the mores of traditional institutional governance; certainly, also, the scope and character of social problems in an industrial setting require programs of action beyond the capacities of traditional institutional governance. Thus while planning is a constant in human affairs—a, but not the, defining characteristic of the cultural process—it is not to be confused with institutional governance. Waldo additionally raises the question of the distinction between, to paraphrase, planning carried on in "policy deciding" and planning involved in "policy execution."38 This "split" of planning reflects, of course, the creaky politics-administration distinction Waldo dismisses as less than useful. In any event, this splitting of planning is of receding significance since planning in the "deciding phase" has increasingly been absorbed by planning in the "executing phase" and the latter stands "protected" under the canopy of administrative governance. But Waldo is to be applauded for scoring the conspicuous emergence in modern industrial society of planning

38 Ibid., pp. 127-128.
as a factor of critical importance. The "problem" of planning is best seen in the context of Waldo's fifth and last "political problem."

Waldo characterizes the problem of "centralization-decentralization" as revolving around concerns "about the proper nature of governmental institutions." Waldo sets the political context of these concerns with this masterful statement:

The rationale of the eighteenth-century instruments of government was that good government is government limited in its objectives, balanced in its organs, and divided in its powers. These instruments were framed under the dominance of Newtonian conceptions of mechanical balance, in accordance with ancient precepts for preventing tyranny, and in deep-felt fear of government by a majority. But the original institutions, set up and managed by the commercial and plantation minority, had been considerably modified in spirit and in form by the passing of political power into the hands of the "the people" and by the ideology of the New Democracy. Governmental forms were adapted to the fact of rude frontier equalitarianism, and the "spirit of the laws" changed even when the forms remained the same. The Founding Fathers wanted government limited, divided, balanced; nineteenth-century democrats wanted it pulverized, dispersed, vulgarized. The former gave us functional separation and territorial division of powers, checks and balances, bicameralism, an independent judiciary, enumerated powers granted, and enumerated and unenumerated rights retained. The latter gave us general manhood suffrage, elected administrators, elected judges, thousands of tiny political units, a theory that in public life one is worth what he can get, and a practice of rotation in office.

Waldo gives us a journeyman survey of the arguments involved in the problem of centralization versus decentralization but he draws only apprentice conclusions on trends. One reason

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39 Ibid., p. 131.  
40 Ibid., pp. 131-132.
Waldo fails to capitalize conclusions out of this problem lies in the political context in which the problem is held. In the nature of the case, arguments citing advantages in either direction--toward or away from centralization or decentralization--carry with them disadvantages. Thus, for example, centralization "takes advantage of the principle of economy of citizen attention" but carries with it the disadvantage of a loss of citizen proximity; or, to take another example, decentralization may enhance "control" through citizen participation but carries the disadvantage of more likely duplication of effort. Moreover, no matter what advantage is cited it may be argued that it is in fact a disadvantage. Thus, for example, centralization may enhance opportunity for authority abuse or it may localize responsibility and reduce the opportunity for authority abuse. The difficulty is that encased in a purely political context, questions of centralization-decentralization are indeterminate; no stable criteria exist for decision.

Another reason Waldo seems unable to draw definitive conclusions is that the political perspective draws attention away from considerations that would provide a framework for determinate analysis. Laced throughout Waldo's survey are allusions and references to matters of a technological nature. These include: "large-scale enterprise,"

\[\text{\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.}, \text{ p. 138.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.}\]
"acquisition and exercise of expertise,"\(^{43}\) "advantages for planning,"\(^{44}\) etc. In fact, Waldo discusses, paraphrases, and quotes L. W. Lancaster as follows:

The state fabric . . . must be loosely knit, in order that knowledge and power shall coincide. Many doctrines of our law and many of the "canons of integration" Lancaster does not regard as simply wrong; they are irrelevant to the great problem before us, the problem of synthesizing our political heritage with contemporary scientific and economic facts.

The evolution of modern technology . . . has "short-circuited" the legislature, the institution that democracy evolved to secure the responsibility of its rulers; the qualities that bring political success are not all those necessary to form a competent opinion on administrative problems. However, "administration" does not face "the people" in the aspect of ruler to ruled, despite the fact that much of our legal language would suggest this. For the same forces that have altered the relationship between the legislature and the people, and between the legislature and administration, have created a new relationship between administration and the people. The fact is, that the knowledge and skills which give administrators their "claim to power" are not their prerogatives alone, but are diffused throughout society. . . . A close survey of actual administration reveals that the membrane of the legal concept of "public" is in fact so thin as to permit a very large amount of osmosis.

To the important and compelling facts of expertise and associations of experts, we have made some pragmatic adjustment. "Not only much of our public administration is conditioned by the attitude of so-called private associations but . . . in fact a substantial proportion of it is actually conducted by such organizations." But our political ideology lags far behind.\(^{45}\)

Waldo's political ideology is similarly in arrears. Lancaster suggests a direction for analysis the significance

\(^{43}\)Ibid., p. 143  \(^{44}\)Ibid., p. 138.

of which Waldo seems not to appreciate. The missing frame of reference for otherwise indeterminate questions of centralization-decentralization can be found in the emerging organizational requisites of the technological process. If one contemplates the restrictions inherent in ceremonially prescribed and (legally) sanctified social units of activities or organizations relative to the dynamics of operationally specified distributions of relatively integrated technological activities or organizations and some semblance of the nature of the centralization-decentralization problem emerges. In such contemplation lies, also, some understanding of the rise of corporations and the extension of public administration in an industrializing society. However, Waldo concludes merely by noting that one trend is abandon the problem or to assume it away as inherently resolved in "good" organizations.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 153-154.} One can only conclude that Waldo's implied theory of public administration does not lift this problem beyond classical strictures.

In the discussion just completed there exists a primitive basis for the development of a theory of planning. We shall limit ourselves to two points. Clearly the notion of planning is received ambivalently in our society. In particular, comprehensive over-all social planning is resisted. This is true primarily because the prevailing social theories in our culture have been cast in the
Dirkheimian mold of conceiving society as moving toward an inherent stable harmony, whereas such planning finds receptivity in underworld social theories cast in the Marxian mold of society conceived as moving in the grips of inherent dynamic contradiction. Then too, static executions—such as a fixed plan instead of flexible planning—and planning beyond technical capacities have understandably given planning a bad name. However, it is readily apparent that some type of planning consistent with the prevailing mores is allowable within the ceremonially prescribed domain of all institutions—although such planning is more or less deformed by those prevailing mores. But, planning across ceremonial borders has been resisted tooth and claw. My second point follows from the first. Planning is synonymous with tool-using; an industrial explosion, then, is a planning explosion. When technological organizational and planning requisites erupt across institutionally prescribed borders, the technological process is arbitrarily disrupted eventually to the point of crisis—a crisis in the continuance of the technological process itself and mounting stress on the continuance of institutional practices. These have traditionally been the social circumstances out of which institutional modifications have emerged. Modern administration is a unique case in institutional history; it not only allows planning, planning is a constituent symbol in administrative ideology. In short, planning is ceremonially extolled. Thus, at every point of crisis, given the
existence of administration, more administration and more extended administration, layers upon layers of administration, tends to be the institutional response. Planning in administration includes, or should include, not only attention to the extent of technological sprawl but also the degree and direction of its dynamic; moreover it includes, or should include, expertise in institutional adjustment. This last point introduces the "Achilles' heel" of modern administration: Can administration harbor and tolerate the means to its own modification? The role of planning in administration is, then, a critical theoretical problem; it awaits articulation.

Waldo addresses three concepts which he considers central in the classical literature of public administration. The tiresomely familiar subject of "principles" is first on his list. Waldo traces the idea of "higher law" from "divine law" through "natural law" to the early theorist faith in the "higher law of science."47 It is true that principles of public administration were invariably advanced as imperatives in the name of science; it is additionally true that these principles were embarrassingly vulnerable to formal analysis and difficult to apply consistently. However, Waldo finds the most obvious alternative approach--White's attempt to delevitate principles, ground them in experience, and reduce them from imperatives to guides--as

47 Ibid., pp. 159-161.
theoretically shallow. There is some justification for 
Waldo's criticism but his dismissal reflects more the desire 
to march in a different direction. He accepts, without 
using the designation, the positivist scheme. First, there 
are normative principles that "purport to tell us what ought 
to be true . . . ."\textsuperscript{48} Second, there are empirical principles 
(actually synthetic statements) that "purport to tell us 
what is actually the case . . . ."\textsuperscript{49} In this case, validity 
depends on whether the principles "describe or coincide with 
'reality.'"\textsuperscript{50} Finally, there are principles that "prescribe 
a relationship between formal concepts."\textsuperscript{51} Applying this 
scheme, Waldo concludes that the advocates of principles in 
public administration are under the delusion that they are 
operating within the realm of positive principles when, in 
fact, they are promulgating normative principles in the guise 
of science. However right Waldo's conclusion, there is room 
for doubt on the manner by which he reaches it; in the end, 
just how much distance Waldo places between himself and the 
classical school depends on the adequacy of his conception 
of science.

Waldo next takes up the concepts of organization 
exemplified in the early literature. In line with the pre-
vailing drift toward vulgar positivism (naive empiricism) 
and the heavy influence of rationalized values,

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 160. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{49} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p. 169. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{51} Ibid., pp. 170, 202.
organizational theory has ordinarily been conceived as universally imperative.

The sources of the "pure theory of organization" notion are several. It is, of course, an aspect of the general drift to "positivism," "objectivity," and "science" . . . . It doubtless has drawn support from the divorce of "administration" from "politics" . . . . It seems also to be related to the idea of "the one best way" of scientific management . . . .52

The "pure theory" has been attacked from two directions. Organization theorists are held to be too narrow in that they seek to consider organizations apart from the purposes which motivate and justify them . . . . On the other hand, organization theorists are held guilty of unjustifiable generality, of ignoring the specificity which is the very "stuff" of actual administration.53

The applicability of the former criticism to Willoughby and the latter to Barnard is obvious. Since the subject of principles in the early literature is virtually synonymous with organization--that is, principles almost exclusively articulate imperatives relating to the system of hierarchial authority--and since principles are to Waldo necessarily normative, he not surprisingly concludes: "The data of administrative study are organizations in relation to purpose."54

Waldo reserves his major attention for the concept of efficiency. He holds, rightly, that "economy and efficiency" "have often been held to be the ultimate administrative values, serving to unify and direct all inquiry."55

52 Ibid., p. 173. 53 Ibid., p. 175. 54 Ibid., pp. 185-186. 55 Ibid., p. 200.
After the usual admirable survey of the subject in the literature, he dismisses "economy as secondary and derived," leaving the analysis of "efficiency" as the key to unraveling understanding.

Those who are more "sophisticated" about economy explain that there are different types or degrees of economy, and that "true" economy may mean spending more rather than less money. If they attempt to explain "true" economy they do it in terms of efficiency. Efficiency is therefore the fundamental concept.56

Two meanings of efficiency are identified: "efficient cause" and "ratio or proportion." In the literature these two meanings are not distinguished, slipping back and forth with confusing consequences; but, preciseness invariably emphasizes efficiency as meaning "ratio."57 Waldo denies the common usage of efficiency as the ultimate administrative value and attempts to drive to the heart of the matter by asking some "ultimate questions": "Efficient for what? Is not efficiency for efficiency's sake meaningless? Is efficiency not necessarily measured in terms of other values?"58 Waldo believes he has the "ultimate answer."

We hold that efficiency cannot itself be a "value." Rather, it operates in the interstices of a value system; it prescribes relationships (ratios or proportions) among parts of the value system; it receives its "moral content" by syntax, by absorption. Things are not simply "efficient" or "inefficient." They are efficient or inefficient for given purposes, and efficiency for one purpose may mean inefficiency for another.59

56 Ibid., p. 201.  
57 Ibid., pp. 201-202.  
59 Ibid.
Waldo grants the meaningfulness of the rejoinder that asks ". . . cannot efficiency be used in a purely descriptive manner to designate ratio or proportion, potentiality or effectiveness?"  

How is one to mediate between the "normative" and the "objective" interpretations of efficiency?---for surely the truth must lie between them. We propose this formula: the descriptive or objective notion of efficiency is valid and useful, but only within a framework of consciously held values.  

In short, objective efficiency can be determined "only after the frame of reference for the calculations is fixed."  

Waldo criticizes the classical conception of efficiency because it presumed unqualified objectivity when, in fact and necessarily, it rested on implicit fixed values; Waldo proposes an alternative conception of efficiency as objectively determinate only within a fixed framework of explicit values. Since Waldo holds the same non-objective theory of value as the classicists, only value explicitness differentiates his notion of efficiency from the tradition he criticizes. (We know of no student of these matters that would not admit the inevitable play of implicit values. This narrows the distance between Waldo and the classicists even further and induces the question: Is all objectivity thereby qualified?) Of course, insofar as possible values

\[60\text{Ibid., p. 203.} \quad 61\text{Ibid.}\]
\[62\text{Ibid., pp. 203-204.}\]
should be made explicit; to do so assists correcting mistakes about what values have been at play and perhaps also reduces delusions. But this process of discovery—surely a scientific one?—does not, under the non-objective theory of value, provide a basis for resolving conflicts in value. In our opinion, the single most significant contribution made by Waldo in his book is the concept of "context" or "frame of reference." But Waldo can conceive only of a context of non-objective values. Consider that if a framework of objective facts which condition or contain non-objective values is entertained—no change in the theory of value would be implied in so doing—then Waldo would be committing the fallacy of vicious circularity since objective facts are only determinate in a framework of non-objective values. One can only draw the conclusion, then, that Waldo holds that objective facts rest entirely and exclusively on non-objective values! On this point the sophisticated positivist would ride Waldo out of camp on a rail. Moreover, as we shall directly see, this position contradicts Waldo's own conception of science.

Waldo suggests the interesting notion that "a hierarchy of purposes may be of value in mediating between the normative and the descriptive aspects of efficiency."63 The notion runs to the effect

63Ibid., p. 204.
"higher levels"; that the "efficiency" of various instruments and procedures at the lower levels of purpose is likely to be the same or nearly the same for various persons and groups, because the purposes are the same or nearly the same, i.e., the frame of reference is constant; but that in the higher levels of human purpose the "efficiency" of various instruments and procedures tends to differ because the purposes differ significantly—the frame of reference is not constant. \(^{64}\)

"In practice," Waldo goes on,

the proposed scheme means that the efficiency of various instruments and procedures of a mechanical and routine nature, those that serve "unimportant" purposes or that serve ends that are important only in terms of other or higher ends, will be approximately constant in all organizations; but that the less mechanical and routine the instruments and procedures, and the more important or more nearly ultimate the purposes they serve, the less likely is their efficiency to be constant. \(^{65}\)

Waldo concludes as follows:

Through the idea of a "pyramid of values," the rigid division between "politics" and "administration" is replaced by an organic interrelation. [Emphasis added.] This concept recognizes as valid what most students of administration have strongly felt: that there is a realm of "science" where "objectivity" is possible and "efficiency" can be measured. On the other hand, it takes cognizance of the fact that, increasingly, as one's frame of reference widens and disagreement about ends becomes important, "science" and "objectivity" are more difficult, judgments of "efficiency" less accurate, more controversial. \(^{66}\)

There are insights lurking about in this idea but to bring them into focus would require a more powerful theoretical perspective than Waldo provides. If one assumes Waldo's theoretical posture, conflicts either laterally or

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\(^{64}\) Ibid.  
\(^{65}\) Ibid., pp. 204-205.  
\(^{66}\) Ibid., p. 205.
horizontally in a "pyramid of values" are without an objective basis for resolution. What does this imply? Even more importantly, although it might not occur to Waldo, value constancy may be as significant a source of human travail as value conflict.

Waldo sprints ahead of his predecessors with a formidable statement of the theoretical perspective he believes best exemplifies modern science. We shall outline only the essentials. Waldo prefaces his offering with this discerning observation:

The material "gifts" of science all do violence to common sense . . . . And the picture of the world presented by theoretical science . . . not only violates common sense, it strains the educated imagination. 67

Waldo grants a place in science for empiricism and experimentalism but the mere accumulation of facts or their controlled manipulation does not suffice to appreciate "the place the ideas play in creating and defining 'facts.'" 68 After this promising beginning, however, Waldo slips in this comment:

Not only is there no such thing as communicable "fact" apart from idea or purpose, but modern science in its advanced aspects is independent of observed fact in a very important way. 69 [Emphasis added.]

Here Waldo associates idea with purpose and detaches "it" from "fact." He explains:

67Ibid., p. 177. 68Ibid., p. 179. 69Ibid.
Apparently, the "real" or "natural" sciences have a primary and a secondary stage of development. In the primary stage, the procedure is chiefly descriptive and inductive (though by no means free from theory . . .). In this stage the science moves in the realm of "concepts by inspection," i.e. concepts which acquire meaning through reference to directly apprehensible data. Eventually, it is found impossible to comprehend the empirical data, to "make sense of it," without recourse to a fundamentally different procedure. This procedure is the introduction of "concepts by postulation." The meaning of a concept by postulation is not given by the deliverances of sense-awareness. Instead, its meaning is "proposed" or "imagined"; and it is defined "syntactically" by its relationship to other concepts by postulation.70

Recalling an earlier comment by Waldo, 71 the primary stage is one of determining "what is actually the case" either by "describing" or "coinciding" with "reality." The former indicates a "coherence theory of truth" and the latter a "correspondence theory of truth"; Waldo does not differentiate or choose between these but the latter would likely be the better assumption. There is also vagueness in the "eventual confusion" leading to the necessity of the secondary stage. Since "verification" in the secondary stage necessarily contains the fallacy of "affirming the consequent,"

... scientists attempt to propose every conceivable theoretical possibility, to demonstrate that not only is a given theoretical system confirmed by natural or experimental phenomena, but that is the only theoretical system so confirmed.72

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70 Ibid., pp. 179-180.
71 See p. 429.
72 Waldo, State, p. 180.
In other words, analytic procedures are employed in the secondary stage to produce "formal coherence" with the "correspondent truth" of the primary stage. With this conception of science, Waldo attempts to crawl back into the positivist camp and contradicts his meaning of "fact" implied in his discussion of efficiency. Waldo attempts to avoid the contradiction with this dualism: "It is submitted that the established techniques of science are inapplicable to thinking and valuing human beings."\(^73\) In other words, "the nature of the subject matter must define the method."\(^74\) Thus, science is limited within administrative practice to subject matters amenable to its method; and the application of science to administration, however unsuccessfully realized the cherished and confident goal of the classical school of administrative theorists, is seriously questioned if not denied.

**Paradigm Essentials: A Summary**

The surmised essentials of Waldo's implied theory are:

1. The trend of governance is toward the cooperative blending of governmental functions. Governmental functions are simultaneously exercised in every phase or act of governance. Government should, therefore, be conceived as a

\(^{73}\) Ibid., p. 181.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., p. 191.
functioning organic whole. The elevation of "planning" to a
governmental function should be considered.

(2) Administration is a normative system. "The
data of administrative study are organizations in relation
to purpose." 75

(3) The problems of administration--locus of rule,
criteria of action, policy goals, etc.--are essentially
political problems.

(4) Principles of administration necessarily imply
and depend on values.

(5) Administrative efficiency is determinate only
within an overtly specified normative frame of reference.

(6) The applicability of positive science is
limited to non-normative subject matters; the applicability
of positive science to human affairs of normative import is
circumscribed by normative frames of reference.

The Social Matrix: Speculations on Determinates

Any attempt to define and enumerate the rise of
public administration and the thought directed at it over
three-quarters of a century is in its magnitude and complex-
ity an intellectual task fatiguing even to contemplate. On
the other hand, to approach a subject matter of scope with-
out attention to the social context of its occurrence would
leave an intolerable number of critical questions dangling.

75 Ibid., pp. 185-186.
Nevertheless, whatever the necessity, Waldo's efforts to explore the social context of his subject matter cannot but elicit admiration.

Waldo rightly emphasizes the early, turn-of-the-century decades since the later decades of administration and its thought saw the unfolding of a concatenation of events largely of a late nineteenth-century vintage. Waldo also organizes his material, again we believe rightly, from the general to the specific: social and ideational background to social movements and motifs to scientific managerialism. However, beyond and within these two considerations lies a conglomerate of incongruous categories. The problem that emerges is not so much that anything important has been missed in the "context" but that it appears as an incoherent melange rather than as an understandable picture. This may explain why Waldo stresses description rather than explanation, influence rather than dynamics. In short, no theoretical context is explicitly provided nor can a deeper "theoretical scheme" be deduced from Waldo's presentation. As a matter of interest, we shall rearrange some of Waldo's categories--admittedly somewhat arbitrarily--into our scheme.

Waldo's presentation, however, is not without clues as to how he views the world about him. The overt use in as well as covert infiltration of conventional dualisms into his material saddles him with the difficult, actually insoluble, problem of relationship between disparate categories. The result is the employment of the usual parallelisms,
reductionisms, and the conventional social science stratagems of ascribing such non-observables as "power," "influence," "force," etc., to bridge the gap.

**Technological Factors**

Waldo takes direct cognizance of the industrial revolution, especially the institutional stress and ideas associated with its startling productivity.

Toward the close of the nineteenth-century, when productive capacity began to exceed the capacity of available markets to absorb goods at productive prices, emphasis shifted from securing capital and enlarging facilities to raising profits by more effective use of productive equipment—machines and men.\(^{76}\)

Straight out of this stress come ideas of specialization and efficiency; social movements in personnel, progressivism, and scientific management; and secondary effects such as urbanism, closing the frontier, and wars. Nevertheless, Waldo is outrightly contemptuous of those who have made technology their theoretical centerpiece.\(^{77}\) There is something of an ambivalence in Waldo's bold recognition of technology and sharp reaction to technological proponents, an ambivalence that reflects a lack of reconciliation between technology seen as the product of institutional forces and, at the same time, as an influential social environment, both a social residual and social moulder. It

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\(^{76}\) Ibid., p. 3.

\(^{77}\) Ibid., p. 48.
might be said that Waldo epitomizes the ambivalent technological conception, when there was one, of his forebears.

**Institutional Factors**

With the foregoing discussion in mind, it may be said that Waldo compresses all social action-patterns--functions of government, corporations, social movements, formal education, etc.--into, in our sense of the term, an institutional interpretation. Since, however, human institutions are purposive systems and since, additionally, purposive systems are non-objective valuings, Waldo is confronted with the ageless problem of reconciling conflicting values that have no other sanction than culturally conditioned belief. Waldo faces the difficulties of value discord, then, within a holistic conception of society--an organismic conception in Waldo's case--as the ultimate reference for values. The issue becomes not one of the source of value conflict or the possibility of conflict between two different types of value systems; the issue becomes one of value conflicts harmonized *ex post*. Waldo reasserts the political process as the arbiter of value conflicts and the "public interest" becomes the equilibrium point of conflicting "special interests." Public administration is just another normative governmental function homogenized with other normative governmental functions to form a functional part of an organic whole. Positive science is applicable to the material environment--resources and technology--but
only within normative frames of reference. The difficulties with this conception are mind-boggling. But the afore-mentioned indeterminism of technology as both social product and artificer and the lack of objective criteria for adjusting value conflicts are critical.

Clearly under the influence of this view, Waldo would be susceptible to social processes of moderation, conciliation, and adjustment; skeptical of value-free assertions of science; astute in searching out implicit value premises; favorable to planning and efficiency in explicit value contexts of general acceptance; and contemptuous of scientific claims in the value field.

Ideational Factors

It must be remembered that every one of the pioneers of public administration thought—at least every one we have selected for analysis and most of those Waldo examines—were intellectual products of the late nineteenth or relatively early twentieth-century. Waldo, on the other hand, has the two-fold advantage of a "next-generation" education and the opportunity for detached hindsight. It cannot be said that these advantages went unutilized. Waldo lays bare the distorted picture of public administration placed within a framework of peculiar American political values; he uncovers the fundamentalist premises of the legal system; he brings into relief the issue of democracy and expertise; he scores the hypnotic spread of a "faith in
science"; and he identifies the strands of empiricism, realism, rationalism, etc. running through society and education. It can be said that all these ideational elements, negatively or positively, had a marked influence on the style of Waldo's own thought.

There are clues too on the ideational factors influencing Waldo's thought in his discussion of "tendencies in public administration thought." 78 One is the increasing emphasis on the empirical and descriptive rather than the theoretical and philosophical. While not denying the importance of the former, Waldo is apprehensive about the undeveloped state of the latter. Another is the stress on functional topics rather than institutional matters. Waldo wonders "whether there is a study of administration 'as such'; at least whether there is a 'function of administration,' as such, in which training or specialization is possible." 79 Finally, Waldo sees an increasing tension between the place of the expert and the place of democracy. Whether from the perspective of the present Waldo's "trends" were fatidic the reader may draw his own conclusions. We do conclude, however, that Waldo finds it difficult to conceive of a future in fact unburdened with the "orthodoxy" of the past.

78 Ibid., Chapter 11, passim.
79 Ibid., p. 207.
Some Critical Questions and Discussions

Either because it was propitious or facilitative, considerable critical analysis accompanied the presentation of Waldo's implied theory. We limit ourselves, therefore, to brief discussions of five points.

First, Waldo's implied theory is, with superficial modifications, apparently applicable to private as well as public administration. However, there is no reason to suppose, indeed Waldo is doubtful, that the theory possesses cross-cultural applicability. Waldo does not even hint at any distinction between modern and preindustrial administration; no explanation of the "origin" and rise of administration is suggested--although influences upon it are enumerated.

Second, put another way, we have just suggested that Waldo's theory is in the tradition of social statics. From the culturological point of view, the theory judges movement toward or deviating from an organic norm of stability or equilibrium; adjustment is judged in terms of fixity. Waldo himself denies the possibility of an administrative dynamics. Public administration constitutes a normative subject matter which makes impossible the derivation of an empirically verified deductive system the generic qualities of which could predict future states of the subject matter from a specific instance of the empirical state of that

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80 Ibid., pp. 188-189.  
81 Ibid., pp. 185-186.
subject matter. As Waldo puts it: "the basic requirement of a theoretical dynamics is concepts defining the state of a system at a given time with respect to its specific as well as its generic properties."\(^{82}\) But in administration there exists "no 'relation of necessary connection' joining the specific state of a system at a given time to a specific state at any other time."\(^{83}\) This presumes that prediction is the purpose of science; that for science to apply there must be an existential subject matter independent and unaffected by human valuations; and that the subject matter obeys Newtonian or Humian causation.

Third, the young Waldo has placed his bet on the wrong philosophy of science. The primary job of science is not prediction but the articulation of emergent solution possibilities in on-going problematic situations. The historical record alone is enough to dismiss the supposition that there is any subject matter immune to the penetration of scientific method. Science can hardly be excluded from a subject matter made known by science. Finally, there is no non-contingent causation. Every act of "knowing" is an alteration of the circumstances inquired into; otherwise, there would be no "knowing."

Fourth, one should take note that under Waldo's conception of science and value, the former is not applicable to the latter. How, then, does he "know" that science is

\(^{82}\text{Ibid., pp. 184-185.} \quad ^{83}\text{Ibid., p. 185.}\)
not applicable to value? It certainly cannot be through science. Waldo simply "believes" that to be the case. Does it follow that if someone else just "believes" that science is applicable to value, then that would be as "true" as Waldo's opposite "truth"? Moreover, if science be allowed to tell us that our values are merely the emotionally conditioned assertions of tribal superstition, why--or even "how"--would they continue to prevail? For someone like Waldo who insists that science is merely "descriptive" and "predictive," the question would be what would be "put in the place of" normative social traditions. What does, in that connection, "place" mean? Do we need to worry about what will replace astrology as scientific astronomy grows?

Fifth, the scientific conception of valuation as a continuous process of social secularization is also a different "place" than Waldo's "Good Society" based on unfounded beliefs. The promise of an industrializing society is not the "Good Society" or the "Great Society" but an "Able Society"--capable, dependable, and reasonable.

The classical tradition was built on the firm conviction that a "science of public administration" was possible and necessary; Waldo closes the era with an infirm conviction that a "science of public administration" is a delusion.
PART III

FINDINGS AND VALUATION
CHAPTER IX
ANALYSIS

Part I of this enterprise was devoted to the formulation of the problematic context of its goals and the theoretical perspective to be utilized in prosecuting them. Part II was designed to present the data field of general theories of public administration appropriate to the goals of the study, to critically analyze each theory, and to introduce the social context of each theory. We turn now in Part III to an analysis of the data field as a whole, to examine the social effects of distinctive ideational modes, to propose requisites for theoretical adequacy, and to comment on suggested directions for further study.

More specifically, this chapter culminates the major theme of analysis and addresses one of the two minor themes of analysis manifest in the sociology of knowledge perspective specified in Chapter II.\(^1\) The major theme of

\(^1\)The reader will recall that a second minor theme of analysis, the social matrix in which social ideas arise and function, was addressed as a topic in each chapter of Part II. It is our belief that these discussions when taken as a whole provide the basis for the elevation of this theme to an equal status with the major evaluative theme of this study.
analysis involves the social function of ideational modes or styles; this theme is explicitly evaluative. The analysis undertaken here is a conclusive summary of the analyses, taken as a whole, provided in the presentation of the data field. The minor theme of analysis comments briefly on the characteristic social effects of the differentiated ideational modes made explicit in the major theme of analysis.

**Specification of Concluding Terms**

Before turning to analysis, the adequacy of concluding terms critical to analysis must be considered. With three exceptions, our judgment is that in explicit specifications, in the context of discussion, and in cited background sources we have provided a sufficiency of terminological clarity. The three exceptions are: public administration, culture, and positivism.

**Public Administration**

The necessity for a reexamination of public administration stems in part from the abject failures of specificity manifested in the general theories examined. In view of the cloudy designations found in the current literature, we should hardly be surprised. To some extent the answer lies in the fact that the rise and flowering of private administration—as exemplified in the private corporation—was a ceremonial subterfuge for the extension of public governance in an ideological climate of market mania and
paranoic abhorrence of government. To some extent, also, the answer lies in the ceremonial legitimization of public administration as "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-adjudicative" in nature—designations hardly calculated to catch the essential differentiation of administration from traditional governance functions. Thus none of the early theorists can successfully explain the necessity of public administration—that is, the failure in one way or another of private administration—or effectively relate differentiated governance functions. Implicit in these considerations, however, are clues to understanding that should be made explicit.

All of the early theorists unthinkingly, but understandably, accept public administration in cases of social necessity not filled by private administration. The question is, what occasions the "necessity" for this residual role? The answer is to be found in the ideological limitations imposed on private administration—that is, the ideological limitations of private administration. These limitations prevent, first, its ability to meet the technological requisites of expansive industrialism; the absence of this technologically appropriate administration directly imperils the social entity ceremonially designated as private. These limitations prevent, second, the appropriate extension of administration to meet the general social consequences of expansive industrialism; the absence of this latter extension of administration directly imperils the
community and indirectly the private entity. To put the matter in what may seem a peculiar manner, the ideological fetters of a private ideology imposed on administrative governance necessitates eventually, for the reasons given, the employment of administration not so ideologically constrained --in a word, public administration. It may be concluded, then, that the social scope ideologically permitted public administration significantly differentiates it from private administration. One of the more obvious expressions of this enhanced social scope--although perhaps not too much should be made of it--is in the pecuniary mores associated with public administration.

With qualifications and exceptions the reader can easily appreciate, the weight of the early theory subjugates administration to politics--i.e., democratic purpose--and reduces the former to a mere means. Of course, as the arm of democratic purpose, public administration acquires the necessary ideological license--i.e., ceremonial justification--for the social scope of its action but by the same token "over-all" social planning is withheld from public administration as an "obvious" threat to democracy as the supreme political value. In this context, three final comments are in order. First, the political bias has suppressed the recognition of administration as the dominant mode of governance. Second, the political bias has contributed to the "jumble" of modern public administration unable to organize itself successfully on the grounds of policy
purpose; coordination has typically swiveled on the insufficient point of effective "means." Third, both the political and economic ideological biases against national planning have contributed to all manner of "semi" and unofficial administrative arrangements within national borders and to the development of all manner of administrative arrangements across national borders.

The Concept of Culture

The advent of Darwinism created both a crisis and a breakthrough for social analysis. The crisis was that if obviously distinctive human behavior cannot be explained in terms of special creation, how is it to be explained? This question was the opportunity met by the development of the concept of culture.² The concept of culture effectively accomplishes three things. It squares with Darwinism by providing a naturalistic explanation of the group creation and transmission of characteristic human action patterns. It also provides an explanation of the great diversity of human societies, since each society's action patterns must be understood as a relatively distinct functional whole. Finally, a theory of culture explains the amazing stability of otherwise diverse societies, since each society imposes

upon itself the sanctions by which the continuance of that society is presumably insured.

Despite the critical necessity of placing social analysis in a cultural perspective, it must not be suggested that to do so will dissolve all difficulties; the concept of culture is not a panacea. New questions, problems, and controversies at a higher level must still be dealt with.\(^3\) If, however, social action patterns be understood as styles or modes of language-behaviors in all their manifold aspects, the way is open for startling insights, integrations, and developments in social analysis.

**Positivism**

Positivism has a long history but the modern expression of that way of thinking follows hard on the heels of the works of, among others, G. E. Moore\(^4\) and Ludwig Wittgenstein.\(^5\) For our purposes, it will be useful to identify two variants of modern positivism.

One variant can be loosely identified as "logical positivism" and is represented by, among others, A. J. Ayer\(^6\)


and Charles Stevenson. Of course there are differences, but, in general, there is a consensus in this wing of positivism that scientific language alone can describe and explain aspects of reality. There are two categories of scientific language. One is "synthetic" and is the kind of "truth" found in empirical science based on experience. The other is "analytic" and this kind of "logical truth" flows from definitions or meanings in various implicative relationships. At rock bottom, analytic truth is tautological but it is critically significant in that it reveals the structure of language. Again in general, it may be said that analytics provides the basis for making theories out of synthetics and meaningful scientific language is either one or the other and meaningful scientific theories are both. Value language, it is claimed, describes nothing; it merely indicates feelings or attitudes. Differences or controversy in science can be resolved by reference to an analytic-synthetic context; value differences can only be "resolved" by recourse to persuasion or force. To equate the positive and the normative commits the "naturalist fallacy." A sturdy example of this line of thought is Herbert Simon's Administrative Behavior.

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The other variant of positivism has been labelled the "ordinary language" school and is represented by, among others, R. M. Hare⁹ and P. H. Nowell-Smith.¹⁰ In this wing of positivism there is an insistence on the analysis of the language used in ordinary discourse. The conclusion is that it is necessary to separate descriptive language from value language. However, value language has a "logic" which is neither deductive or inductive but may be understood within the mores of the group expressing it. In other words, there is value "reasoning" relative to and confined to a specific cultural context. But to equate descriptive language and value language commits the "naturalist fallacy." A typical example of this line of thought is T. D. Weldon's The Vocabulary of Politics.¹¹

There is much to recommend logical positivism; it eschews metaphysics in a disciplined effort to formulate a philosophy of science. Its central concern with language is insightful. But despite its contributions and rigor, it is fatally flawed. Criticisms, directly and by implication, are sprinkled throughout this study and thoroughgoing critical analyses of the positivist movement are readily available

to the reader.\textsuperscript{12} We limit ourselves, therefore, to two, what seems to us to be, telling points. First, the positivist understanding of science is inadequate. This is principally a consequence of a defective epistemology. Whatever coherence can be achieved in analytics (formal logic) must come, despite positivist's assertions to the contrary, from their synthetics; and their synthetics is based on an untenable correspondence theory of presenting symbols with "reality"--i.e., "facts." The positivist view of language is static; their view of language is non-temporal and non-social; there is no social process between their two-termed world of symbols and symbol referents. This "spectator theory of mind" as pure disembodied activity--"pictures" of facts Wittgenstein disarmingely labels it--raises the nagging question of the sources of observational error; moreover, there is no room for emergent novelty or prescriptive implication. The failure to explore the social linkage between symbol and referent, however, is an open invitation for the culturologist to step into the breach. The second point of criticism follows from the first. The narrow, non-social view of science held by the positivists contributes to the withholding of its application to the field of value which leads to the unfortunate conclusion that values are inherently non-scientific. The prevalence of value

\textsuperscript{12}Julius R. Weinberg, \textit{An Examination of Logical Positivism} (London: International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method, 1950).
noncognitivism in modern society is indisputable—although there is more secularism under the surface than is ordinarily appreciated. Value noncognitivism is hardly surprising in vulgar culture or among the metaphysically inclined intelligentsia; but such a view is distressing among positivists devoted to science inasmuch as it is an assertion that cannot itself be established, at least within the positivist paradigm, by science! That we hold the contrary view has been discussed elsewhere in this study.  

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Reviewing the Historical Heritage

It is often not understood that a critical analysis is, after all, not very critical if in its exercise it does not itself undergo evaluation or, to put the matter less strongly, if in its exercise it does not lay itself open to evaluation. Effective analysis requires a careful specification of perspective and an explicit context. Many theorists often ignore or even deny "context"; but no theory or analysis is non-contextual, although the context may be only vague or covert. In Part II each general theory provided an explicit context for the analyses carried forth. In the analysis before us, however, we shall be concerned with the theories of Part II taken as a whole, as a data field. The analyses of Part II provide a basis for solidification—something beyond a mere summary—of "the data

13Chapter II, pp. 128-133.
field" into a context. In general, the analysis of each theory involved the following points: were premises and objectives clearly stated; were terms defined; identification of theoretical foundations, type and content problems; and were conclusions warranted. On the next to last point, we had a particular interest in the categories or units employed in and the locus of dynamics of each theory. From this material a "scale of theoretical types," including the theoretical "type" of the analysis itself, can be developed to provide a context for analyzing the data field of Part II as a whole. Three general types of theories can be identified; we present them as a "progression" of theoretical "power."

The first type of theory, and the most "primitive," has its roots in Aristotelian philosophy. Attention centers on atomistic and autonomous units of analysis and the locus of action is self-actional. Concern centers, therefore, on thing and attribute, substance and property. In this view, "units" are presumed to act under their own power; the unit contains or possesses as an "essence" the source of dynamics. Teleologically, the action is what the unit does. The second type and stage of theory is more familiarly mechanistic or organismic. In this type of theory, collections of units are formed into structures and systems and the locus of dynamics is found in the interactions which make up these forms of behaviors. Here the social scientist talks of interaction between individuals, or group interaction, or
social relations, or human relations—but always relations "between." When explanations cannot be stated as a simple matter of forces between "units," the gap is filled with hypostatized, artificial forces or substances between units; concepts are reified and made capable of acting as causes. Thus explanations use terms that cannot be operationally defined, words that stand for non-observables. Analysis is limited to interactions among a few grossly defined variables. The third type of theory is instrumental; it involves widened observation and situational description of problem events; it centers on emergent processes and a reconstructive concern with effecting solutions. Here concern is with the full treatment of contextual process and "relations" are among components of the context—that is, the categories of explanation are viewed as making up and participating in the total context. Thus the dynamics of the context are located in transactional specifications, relations across rather than between, of processes that are not unchanging or unalterable. The difference between the interactional and transactional perspectives lies between subject matters of inquiry: as between separate units, structures, or systems in interaction, in the one, and the view where events are processes as aspects or phases, in the other.\footnote{14} Of course, no theory can be neatly typed. The characteristic theory of

\footnote{14}Once again we call attention to the source of this line of thought. \textit{Vide,} John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, \textit{Knowing and the Known} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949).
the first type penetrates and survives along the second type of theory; the third type of theory always has only limited success in divesting itself of the stickier elements of the second type. There are always difficulties in drawing fine lines of classification when dealing with an evolving affair; there is always the blending of the categories. However this scheme should provide a reasonable context for the criticisms we now turn to make.

The taxonomic difficulties of the early tradition in public administration thought are enough to make any competent logician wince. Some category errors are so obvious as to be unforgivable. For example, the attempt to universalize administration or management, so conspicuous in White, results in vacuous triviality; the crude lumping together of incongruous categories such as "frontier," "business," and "urbanization" by Waldo produces confusion; the lack of consistency by Willoughby in distinguishing categories--for example, as between "direct" and "overhead" administration--requires reinterpretation to make his theory comprehensible; a similar inconsistency by Waldo in switching the categories of science and value as determinate leaves an unresolved contradiction; the failure to enumerate obvious categories in a particular spectrum--for example, in Goodnow's "will expression" types--leads to serious gaps in theoretical conclusions; and the proliferation of categories as the result of criss-crossing multiple dualistic assumptions by Barnard renders his theory unnecessarily duplicative, to mention
only one consequence. There are other examples—for instance Barnard's use of two categories, cooperation and purpose, as virtually synonymous—but by far the most serious errors occur in failures to attain and confine categories exclusively to a social domain of discourse. Ideas are generally held outside the social domain but they may through "concept reification" slip into the social domain as an operative force; technology is an additional example of "category slippage." Motives and the like are almost without exception held outside the social context. The best way to illustrate the failure to attain a consistent social domain of discourse is by examining the nature of the theories themselves.

All of our theorists, every one, employ what is popularly called "levels of analysis." While all concentrate, as would be expected, on organization, group, system, structure, and similar constructs, all posit, in greater or lesser degree of explicitness, individuals and individual behaviors as the primary and basic level of analysis. Upon examination this is really two levels fused into one; one is the "actual" raw individual behaviors and the other is the symbolic representation of the corresponding direct apprehension of that behavior. Any attempt, any successful attempt, to classify both of these levels as like the latter results in the assumption of yet another level like the former, below both of the original levels; both of the original levels would then be thought of as two different
symbolic apprehensions on the same level. In other words, we have a "naive realism" matched with "naive empiricism." This, then, is the level of "synthetics," of non-social self-action. Above this "fused level," there is posited a level consisting of collections of individual behaviors into analytically prescribed classifications of social behavior or interactions, usually known as groups, associations, organizations, etc. Sometimes there may be several levels of this nature; for example, there may be a level of organizations consisting of collections of groups from a lower level. But this "levels paradigm" always posits an ultimate level, usually known as the culture or a Nation, which consists of all the extant (or sometimes even all possible) social organizations in the social levels below it.

The first point to make about the "levels of analysis" approach is the striking differentiation of "methods of knowing" necessary at the three distinct levels. The "implied" level of "real" individual behaviors must rest on some Cartesian-like inner belief; the level of synthetics relies on the matching of symbols with raw sense experience; the remaining level (or levels) vaults methodology into the realm of pure analytics. The implications of such a conglomerate of methodologies is in direct conflict with an effective meaning of science. Sciencing places data—regardless of the more proximate basis for classification—in a common methodological field where the issue is precisely "what relationships might be exhibited or constructed."
A particular data area may be judged as of decreasing or even of trivial significance for the emerging affairs of man; or, problems may emerge and pass to solution within established data areas and therefore one domain of data simply is not at issue with another; or, sub-domains of data may become relatively distinct as was the case historically with philosophy and psychology. However, when problem dimensions fall across boundaries, by far the more usual case in modern society and by far the more likely case with public administration, different domains of data are at issue. Of course, it is nowhere "written in blood" that specific domain areas must or must not be at issue with each other or that if at issue science will immediately be able to put them coherently together; but the significance of scientific specification is that it makes possible through a common methodology the juxtaposition of otherwise differentiated domains of data should problematic circumstances dictate the necessity. The realization of possibilities is amply illustrated by, among many examples, biochemistry and social geography. The use of theoretical paradigms that require disparate methodologies seems to preclude the very possibility that gives scientific specification its significance.

All of the theorists examined in this study accept naive empiricism or synthetics or, as Waldo calls it, (vulgar) positivism; with Waldo as something of an exception, they all research or practice or theorize in that tradition.
But all of these theorists typify or emphasize analytical levels of methodology: Wilson with an Americanized bias; Goodnow with a rather classical formalism; Willoughby with a mechanical model; White with a somewhat vulgarized and vague pragmatism; Barnard with a crudely biased and preconceived set of analytical categories; and Waldo with a vulgar and scattered analytics in the standard political tradition. Moreover, all of these theorists unequivocally typify a non-scientific methodology in the field of value; values are localized in individual sentiments, feelings, and the like or are stated as "will of the people," political goals, etc. or, as with Barnard and Waldo, as organizational purpose or normative frames of reference.

Another way to characterize the "levels of analysis" paradigm is to note that at the level of "(naive) realism" we have a presumably non-abstract primary category of non-social and self-actional behaviors; at the synthetic level we have an abstract category of symbolic representations of the previous category; at the next level we have an abstract analytical category which is both social and inter-actional based or imposed on the previous category which is neither; and finally, at the higher levels we have abstract analytical categories based or imposed on previous categories of the same nature—except the highest category which is based or imposed on all previous categories of the same nature. Once again we are presented with the strikingly disparate methods required to handle each level. But the
point we wish to make now is the clear and serious implication of the "levels" exposition that "abstract" is oriented toward "mind." What we have is a "mental appearance of" or a "model of" or, that is, an "abstraction of" directly perceived or apprehended "reality." Social analysis is thus reduced to abstract formalism. Although Waldo would perhaps demur, it might be argued that analytics is circumscribed by synthetics (although not the other way around). The essential problem is not "what is to prevent analytical preconceptions from arbitrarily influencing the selection of synthetic facts--although that is a real problem--but the point that, however circumscribed by synthetics, analytical categories are not derived from synthetics in this paradigm and, therefore, are necessarily imposed upon synthetics."

The "critical realists" would classify all the "levels of analysis" as real; with the exception of "naive realism" we would agree. Every theory is equally abstract and equally real, but in different theories these two categories are differently perceived. As we conceive them, abstraction, in a problematic context, is derived from a critical survey of the relations between methods as means and conclusions as consequences; or more simply, abstraction is the relation between operational "might"s and a constructed "is" from which they are derived. In other words, ideas are tools functioning to instigate and direct inquiry through operational but provisional possibilities, not escapes from or evasions of reality. The standard view of
abstraction is a mistaken interpretation of this instrumental function of ideas with the consequence of distorting if not missing the operational possibilities of the "is" by imposing impossible or disconnected and incomplete solutions upon it—that is, there is no path leading out of the "problematic is" into the "proposed solution."

All of the pioneer theorists, in greater or lesser degree, approach the subject of public administration as problematic; not one of them, however, has a reliable theory of the problematic. From Wilson to White, the subject matter is described in a "straightforward empirical manner," then analytically derived explanations are imposed on the described problems as proposed solutions; but when these "solutions" are examined, they turn out to be disconnected from the context to which they apply: Wilson calls for an independent and scientific public administration, but he does not explain how this is to be achieved with policy being executed in an environment of powerful special interest groups; Goodnow proposes to resolve the problem of the political control over the ends of policy by reforming political parties and raising the level of informed public awareness, but each of these would seem to depend on the other and Goodnow is silent on just how either might be brought about out of the circumstances of political and private self-interest; Willoughby's clarion call for the institution of scientific principles to the practice of administration leaves unanswered why, if so obvious, are they not in place and functioning; not unlike
Wilson and Goodnow, White also poses the problem of the public interest versus narrow special interests, but although he suggests conditions favorable to "administrative statesmanship," it is not difficult to enumerate conditions unfavorable to that prospect; Barnard is alarmed over threatening discontent with established organizations, but the use of questionable means to perpetuate those organizations is surely the crux of a restless dissatisfaction with their nature and the absence of flexible organizational alternatives; and Waldo bemoans the inherited delusion of a science of administration (and then gives birth to the delusion that a science of public administration is impossible) or begs away administrative problems as after all only traditional political problems for which he denies determinate criteria for resolution. Both White and Waldo give hopeful attention to trends toward more administration, more planning, more professionalization, more specialization, etc., but neither can capitalize upon these tendencies beyond issues of threatened democracy and the general interest, or a crisis in understanding the administrative phenomenon in our midst.

There are several "presumptions" in the typical levels paradigm found in our data field. The first is the presumption of autonomy. Autonomy is at the same time one of the most innocuous and one of the most pernicious meanings held in theory. The former because, in and of itself, nothing much, if anything, can be made of it; the latter because of the easy fastening, once accepted, of other not so
innocuous meanings upon it. It is not easy to pin down precisely what autonomy means—first because there is nothing in experience comporting to it; second because it is difficult to hold meanings still in symbol shuffling without experiential reference. The meaning that seems most to come across is independence; that is, in a state of autonomy there is a presumption of disparity between the category in question and another or other categories. In a word, an "A" is presumed separate from a "B"; "A" is an entity sui generis. For our purposes it doesn't matter how "B" is specified—although in a general theory of taxonomy, the specification of "B" makes a very big difference—but what does matter is that there is no "A" in "B" and no "B" in "A." There is a sort of magic emptiness between the border of one and the other; "A's" border gives it, or should give it, inviolate integrity. Within the level of discourse of its formulation, "A" is an autonomy. But, as "A" is a "something," that something is—much better than "has"—a passive essence, an inactive intentionality that serves as its identity and when active as a basis for interaction with other appropriate categories—for example, "B."

In the presumptions of autonomy and disparity there is implied a presumption of initial non-relationality. The ready acceptance of "no relationship" between "A" and "B" is astonishing. Certainly, even on purely formal grounds it collapses. If one posits an autonomous "A," what goes unnoticed is that a contrasting "B" is necessarily implied,
else autonomy from what? It is not strange, then, that after positing an "A" standing alone, it cannot be left alone; the compulsion to pair it with a "B" follows from the fact that a "B" was a constituent, albeit silent, partner in the assertion of "A" in the first place. What we have here, of course, is the classic case of dualism. There is a veritable epidemic of dualism in our data field. From an interminable list we select the following as typically central in the theories of "the data field": politics-administration, ends-means, fact-value, science-custom, individual-social, public-private, motives-behavior, form-content, organization-environment, and abstract-real. These dualisms are clearly reminiscent of such venerable ancestors as mind-body, being-nonbeing, and soul-universe. To some extent, of course, the dualism of early public administration thought mirror the clashes and rents in a social fabric under the strains of rapid industrialization. The continuity of dualistic ways of thought out of the past and into early public administration theory reflects also the conception of modern society as not so much new as an enlargement or extension into "new territory." In any event, at every point of stress, issues were formulated as dualisms (or dualisms as issues).

The road surveyed and laid out by the foregoing "presumptions" relentlessly leads, then, to the necessity of relating initially presumed unrelated disparate and autonomous entities. This is accomplished either by summing into sociality common self-actional expressions of essences, or by
structuralizing an equilibrium of self-actional conflicts, or by systemizing self-actions blended into interactions, or by, of course, all or some combination of these. But in all of these cases, activity emerges from passive essence, the observable from the unobservable; the "dynamic" of sociality is, therefore based on a presumption of causal efficacy. Our data field is saturated with this presumption: Wilson's summed "public opinion," Goodnow's summed "will expressions," Willoughby's definition of a scientific subject matter, and Barnard's summations of cooperative behaviors; the "public interest" as an equilibrium of special interests in White (at least implied in the rest), the "input-output" balance of Barnard, and the attempt to equilibrate governmental functions by Wilson; and the hierarchic authority system accepted by all our theorists, the "organizational purpose" of Barnard, and the melded governmental functions of Waldo. Presumptions of causal efficacy abound on either side of descriptive synthetics. On the "down side" we have the "individual liberty" of Wilson, the "psychological needs" of Goodnow, the "individual equality" and "administrative morale" of White, the "organizational dedication" of the executive in Barnard, and the "individual leader" of social movements in Waldo. Self-actions are presumed caused by reified concepts of individual motives and sentiments and these patently normative dispositions are transferred to the emphasized "up side" to turn descriptive-explanatory categories covertly into prescriptive reifications. All of the following, for example, are
presumed causally necessary or valuable: the "democratic will" of Wilson, the "organismic and mechanistic functionalities" of Goodnow, Willoughby, White, Barnard and Waldo, the "organizational purpose" of Barnard, and the "public interest" and "hierarchical organization" of all the theorists.

Of course, no satisfactory resolution to dualism has surfaced because an unanswerable question is posed in its use. The proper question to ask is not how to relate initially unrelated categorical entities, but how do we relate "better" already related distinctions. The pertinency of the reformulated question should be apparent for not only are self-identities contradictory in the narrow formal sense, non-relational entities are unknown experientially. What we have to start with, what we always have to work with, are relationships. We do not suggest here a sort of Jamesian relational homogeneity. What is being called for is the recognition of relational variety. One of the reasons for the mistaken assumption of non-relational isolates should shed some light on this point. When an element is found to be of indifferent consequence in a particular context, the inevitable tendency—mistakenly but understandably—is to assume the element unrelated to that context. Properly, this is rather an instance of a relationship of non-relevancy, not non-relationship. Establishing relationships of both relevancy and non-relevancy is of great importance in delimiting a problem context by avoiding infinite regress
and heightening information pertinency. In the construction of the problem context the specification of relevant relational variety is critical. For example, consider the following: dynamic-static, functional-dysfunctional, cumulative-repetitive, habitual-reflective, emergent-retarding, participatory-exclusive, integrative-conflicting, dominance-subservience, etc. It might be instructive, further, to consider the social relationships between exclusion, dominance, and conflict; between participatory, integrative, and reconstruction; and between a divisive-conflict behavioral range, a cooperative-reshuffling behavioral range, and an integrative-reformulative behavioral range. It is equally crucial to distinguish "relations between" and "relations across." The former is interactional: relations between a priori and unchanging entities, "in-between" presumed disparate categories. Here categories are "discovered" disparate and then agonizingly brought into presumed causal conjunction. The latter is trans-actional: participation among components or phases or aspects of a broadly conceived situation which is mutual and reciprocal, and the task is one of reconstructive relational enrichment to affect contextual transformation toward solution.

One of the more restrictive features of the "data field paradigm" we have been discussing, is that in application it has a relentless affinity for stable styles of behavior and interprets change in terms of fixity; it is, in a word, a theory of social statics. Evidence in the
direction of this characterization should come readily to mind. There is, in the first place, the absence of reliable explanations of the rise and spread of public administration. Many, perhaps most, of the ingredients for a reasonably adequate explanation can be found scattered throughout the literature but not one of our theorists can formulate them into an adequate dynamic: Wilson's inconsistent stage theory and futile probe into a "need and necessity" explanation make a shambles of understanding; White's "political values" and "federal activism" are ad hoc and exceptions enhance their vulnerability; and Barnard's alternation of "rational" and "irrational" categories as a source of organization is surely as controversial as confused. To this paucity of solid accomplishment in bringing the rise of public administration into credible relief, there must be added the evidence of the previously mentioned "balance," "equilibrium," "function," and "stable harmony" proclivities rife in the data field. There must be mentioned, too, the unswerving faith from Wilson to Willoughby in "immutable principles of universal application" that will forge public administration into an efficient instrument capable of bringing into fruition unadulterated political values. Finally, a comparison should bring the point home. In overtly "individualist paradigms," dynamics is overtly trivialized by the "single-exit" logic of an equilibrating politics or market; in overtly "organizationalist paradigms," dynamics is covertly trivialized by the "single-exit" logic
of structural rigidity. Paradoxically, the former model relies on social forces while the latter model seems to find executive leadership, administrative dedication, and managerial charisma indispensable. In all of this there is a singularity of social enumeration insufficient for a theory of dynamics; from every direction, then, dynamics fails to get into the paradigm equation. For a more complete understanding, the "theory of categories" exercised in the classical theories of public administration must be explored.

Classical taxonomy was essentially the business of driving the imperfect world of diversity and change to an ideal world of static and ultimate types. This pre-Darwinian "science," as Veblen sardonically condemned it, has been carried into the modern scene on the back of an analytic theory of categories. In a few words, such categories are analytically derived through formal logic while the members of a category are derived synthetically by empirical procedures and the two are "matched" for the verification of a theoretical paradigm.

The typically fixed character of such categories introduces a quick and easy classification of the "unilinear" and "unidimensional" styles of behavior; a bias toward centralizing and regularizing behavioral movements; a bias for adhesive and accommodating behavioral responses; and both conflict and emergent behaviors tend to get lumped together as troublesomely and commonly divergent. These theoretical proclivities have been documented for all the theories in the
data field and are epitomized in the work of Barnard where behavioral conformity is so worshiped that every manner of deception, pressure, and elimination of alternatives may be practiced to bring it about. The notion of the category as a collection of common units contributes to the conception of members "alike" or at least "convergent." But, any collection of members taken as a distribution is both alike and different, both convergent and divergent. The one implies the other and there is no reason to stress relative commonality in a classification more than relative distinction; the stress placed on the one or the other should depend on operational considerations in a specific context, not the bias of a fixed category of commonalities. In this connection, it should also be recognized that there is a bias for seeing the members of different categories as "unlike" or at least "divergent." Once again and on the same grounds, this is unnecessary and corrupting to serviceable analysis. There is no reason to favor across different categories divergence more than convergence, unlike more than like, or even different more than overlapping, etc.; the selection of stress depends on the contextual serviceability of operational distinctions and unifications.

For the analysts—and the pioneer public administrations theorists are all "fellow-traveling" analysts—the only test for adequacy is the formal application of consistency, coherency, and completeness rules; there is no operational test for categories in the experiential world.
Even on formal grounds no paradigm has been able to meet the "rules," "logical simples" and "undefined primitives" not to the contrary. Categories are presumed to be, in the traditional sense of the term, abstract; categories are abstract frameworks for empirically enumerated common members. But this is surely a mistake. A category is a symbol standing for its members; it is the same as its members. Therefore, the testing for and of membership are tests of categories.

In summary, the data field of American public administration thought considered in this study exhibits a number of critical errors and weaknesses, the most conspicuous of which are: failure to achieve a consistent social domain of discourse; the weaknesses of singular and (therefore) insufficient social enumeration; the errors of the presumption of autonomy and the presumption of disparity which lead to the presumption of initial nonrelationship and thence to the presumption of causal efficacy; and the weakness of analysis mired in social statics. In essence, the failure of the historical heritage is one of perspective and contextual inadequacy.

Of course, it may be said that a subject of singular importance was defined, but it was not until the closing decade of the period that the larger significance of public administration came to be suspicioned. It may also be said that there was some recognition of public administration as a central factor in a period of critical social transition, yet only White and Waldo seriously introduce historical and
trends dimensions to their analyses and these are ethnocentricly and institutionally constrained. It may even be said that theoretical insights were approached, but White's pragmatics is halting and shallow, Barnard's concept of an "entity" as a point of crisscrossing aspects is marred by an inner-outer dualism, and Waldo's frames of reference are normatively static. It may be admitted that significant research data of a descriptive nature were generated during the classical period, but in the circumstances of rapid social change theorists and practitioners alike require theoretical criteria and understanding to assess the contingencies of data, their slide into obsolescence or emerging significance.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, even with a tolerance for the difficulties of the pioneer theorist in the midst of the emerging event studied, it must be said that the failure to utilize extant theoretical materials was a tragic lapse. Failures to employ social theories of technology in all its aspects and the concept of culture in all its aspects were the most unforgivable omissions.

The question emerges: What explains the persistent development and use of the typical theoretical paradigm of the data field? We do not propose to answer that question here; a reasonable answer is beyond the resources of this study. Certainly, the sheer fact of some undoubtedly progress

\textsuperscript{15}The relationship between the theoretical paradigm of the public administration classicists and the theory of research extant in their time would be a worthy topic of investigation.
in the study of administration must account for some of the answer, although how much of that progress is in spite of theory rather than because of it remains an open question. Certainly, the demonstrated incapacities of theory in spite of some successes remains the critical question. We do propose, however, to suggest a thesis, a thesis which serves also a possible beginning answer to another question: Does the data field constitute a body of thought?

Our thesis is this: Sophisticated positivism provided--and we think provides still--a convenient, protective, and supportive amalgamated theoretical umbrella under which the "social levels" theoretical paradigm could be promulgated and held with relative immunity from critical examination. Two facts, one following from the other, about positivism support and explain the thesis. The first fact is that from a single analytical theory of language, positivism amalgamated into a single theoretical paradigm the three major strands of thought theretofore socially significant--to wit, rationalism, empiricism, and religion (values). Thus the two types of positive science and normative discourse consolidated under the banner of positivism what had previously been relatively conflicting theories: idealism and rationalism folded into analytic formalism, manipulated and controlled empiricism evolved out of passive observation, and value noncognitivism became the lineal descendant of the previous hodgepodge of religious and ethical value theories. The second fact is that this happy
amalgamation elevated positivism to the prevailing, one might even say overwhelming, climate of opinion in Western society. The latter fact provided for social theorists a warm and comfortable background for a relatively unexamined common set of presuppositions; the former fact provided a ready reference for theoretical authority. All of the theorists in our data field espouse value noncognitivism. It may be that none of those theorists thought of themselves as positivist. Certainly, their formalism is relatively crude and their empiricism vulgar by sophisticated positivist standards. Also certainly, the theorists we have examined are uneven in their emphasis on formalism or empiricism. In general, most have an empirical bent but the general theories actually promulgated are decidedly cast in a model building mold. In any event, whatever the bias, positivism can be selectively referenced for theoretical support. The apposition between positivism and the data field of public administration thought presented in this study gives reasonable support to our thesis.

In the sociology of knowledge tradition, we take leave of this topic with an "off-hand" hypothesis: Late nineteenth-century conservative social philosophy provided some measure of sub rosa support to a developing positivism.
Ideational Modes of Thought: Types of Social Effects

The sociology of knowledge literature abounds with descriptions of ideational systems and associated social structures; little attention, if any, is given to the social effects of ideational systems. The sociology of knowledge literature is, further, replete with the descriptions of differentiated ideational system types; discussions of the relationships between ideational types, however, are sparse. Briefly, a descriptive bias and a tendency to interpret all ideational systems as relative ideological statements account for these omissions within the standard sociology of knowledge perspective. Under our respecification, the perspective is expanded to include evaluative and dynamic dimensions with the result that "social effects" is enhanced as a topic.

The respecification of the sociology of knowledge perspective employed in this study posits the ideational process to be made up of two differentiated but intimately associated aspects, styles, or modes of thought. One of these is the somewhat redefined ideological mode of thought

16 Vide., Chapter II, pp. 88-89, 104-105.

17 The modes of thought enumerated here are limited and only suggestive of more sophisticated categories. For example, an esthetic mode is an obvious candidate for inclusion and variant modes within and across the more obvious modes employed and suggested here should increase the power of the analysis. In any event, we believe the introductory analysis provided here is sufficient to lay the basis for the development of this theme of analysis to parity with the major theme of analysis within the sociology of knowledge perspective.
(commonly equated in the traditional specifications with all ideas) which articulates institutional patterns of behavior; the other is the instrumental mode of thought (an addition to the traditional specifications) which articulates scientific-technological patterns of behavior.\textsuperscript{18} Since each of these ideational modes articulating distinctive actions patterns are both manifestations of the ideational process, the key to the subject of "social effects" lies in the nature of the two ideational modes as they relate to each other. That is the topic we introduce in this section.

The associational nature of the two modes of thought to be discussed cannot be too strongly stressed. Even the provisional distinctions operationally instituted to assist an initial discussion of the two modes separately should result in highlighting the fact that each mode is the obverse of the other. In other words, we are studying a dichotomy, not a dualism. Let us consider an ideology--that is, ideas that form a system of belief--sliced out of a stream of ideologies. The first point to make is that such a system of belief is always culturally relative to a specific social structure, institution, or interest group. An ideology always legitimizes, justifies, promotes, protects, and perpetuates the (ceremonial) practices with which it is associated; it extols membership and denigrates the outsider; it articulates a hierarchy of dominance and subservience.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Vide}, Chapter II, pp. 119-124.
replete with sanctions and rewards to enforce the integrity of the group. Ideologies, in other words, carry the presumptions of autonomy and disparity. The cumulative knowledge from psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychology, and anthropology has revealed much of the process by which members are conditioned so as to respond emotionally to symbols which have little or no meaning to others not so conditioned to those symbols. So conditioned, the very vividness of emotion lends authenticity to the belief; the emotion itself becomes the evidence of the "rightness" of belief.

A second point is that ideological change is implied and objectively enumerable in an ideological stream but if analysis is strictly confined to that frame of reference only ex post description is possible. Thus, one can locate the social elements out of which was formed--that is, that went into the make-up of--a subsequent ideology, but no explanation for such a necessity is possible any more than a prediction as to the future course of ideological change is possible. In short, ideologically confined analysis cannot generate answers to the "when" or "why" or "how" of ideological change; or to put the matter another way, ideologically confined analysis is limited to ex post description. Analysis so constrained is known as social statics.

Passing to a third point, all ideologies purport to promulgate a "truth" concerning existential affairs; however, this "truth" makes reference to and depends upon non-existentials of one sort or another. Invariably, the
non-existential referent is presumed causally efficacious
with regard to the existential referent. Joan Robinson has
asked the question: "How can we distinguish ideology from
science?" 19 She provides the answer to her question and the
essential characteristic of ideology:

The hallmark of a metaphysical [ideological]
proposition is that it is not capable of being
tested. We cannot say in what respect the world
would be different if it were not true. The world
would be just the same except that we would be
making different noises about it. It can never be
proved wrong, for it will roll out of every argument
on its own circularity; it claims to be true by
definition of its own terms. It purports to say
something about real life, but we can learn nothing
from it. 20

Of course, non-testable belief systems acquire much of their
persistence from the fact that they have not been disproved;
but to a scientist, non-testable statements carry no more
warrant than disproved testable statements. One must also
be wary of so-called categorical propositions since they are
vacuously true by allowing for all possible outcomes. Ex
post, categorical and ideological propositions bear the sim-
ilarity of presuming to have told us something which upon
examination turns out to be the contrary. There is one
interesting continuity in the content of ideological state-
ments. Emerging ideologies invariably legitimize and justify
the social practices which they articulate in terms of pre-
viously held ideological belief: "a man's home is his

20 Ibid., p. 3.
castle"; "a private corporation is a legal individual"; and "public administration is 'quasi-legislative' and 'quasi-judicial.'" Relationships between differentiated ideologies may, in different contexts, be supportive, conflictive, or irrelevant.

Our conclusion is that the data field of public administration thought examined in this study is ideologically oriented.

Turning to the instrumental mode of thought, any meaningful slice from a stream of such thought is relative to the total social context in which it occurs. Three implications are paramount. First, instrumental thought articulates on-going social behavior. Inherent in that articulation, therefore, is a constant revisionary reference to the ideas of the same nature out of which it emerged and a continuous reformulation of the emergent possibilities demonstrated in its application to problematic affairs. This involves attention to evidential patterns, their cumulative and convergent directions. This means also that the elements of an instrumental theory can be found emergent in previous instrumental theories and possess the emergent elements of subsequent instrumental theories. Second, instrumental theories generate testable propositions. Thus instrumental ideas are under continuous self-examination and self-correction in specific contexts as to their warrantedness through demonstrated efficacy. This means that instrumental ideas are not contextually-bound and cumulative. Thus the process of an
instrumental mode of thought exhibits a cumulative continuity not found in ideological modes of thought. Third, the requisite logic of instrumental modes of thought brings them to bear on ideological modes of thought as proper subjects of study and analysis. If such were not the case, instrumental modes of thought would lack explanation as to rate and timing of development. Since such is the case, instrumental modes of thought may evaluate ideological modes of thought as to their contextual efficacy, as to their relative permissiveness to the expression and development of knowledge requisite to problematic situations, and as to their thresholds of tolerance and decay. Instrumental modes of thought, then, place "description-explanation-prediction" in a larger frame of reference, one of articulating emerging process of requisite social reconstruction.

Our conclusion is that the data field of public administration thought examined in this study is not instrumentally oriented.

If these two modes of thought are placed in a common context of analysis, it may be concluded that:

(1) The two modes of thought exhibit differentiated process characteristics. The ideological mode is static, change resistant, relative to its social sphere of belief, and without an internal logic of change; the instrumental mode is dynamic, change generating, relative only to constantly developing social frames of reference, and possesses a determinate logic of change.
(2) The two modes of thought are not symmetrically related. Relative to instrumental modes of thought, ideological modes are either irrelevant or more or less permissive and are, additionally, without encompassing evaluative frames of reference beyond its own symbols of belief. Relative to ideological modes of thought, instrumental modes are either irrelevant or impactive and are, additionally, in possession of encompassing evaluative frames of reference regarding ideological elements at issue.

(3) The persistence of an ideological mode of thought successfully retarding to a socially critical instrumental mode of thought results in cumulative disorder in the ideational process; conversely, the expression of instrumental modes of thought as here developed would not move beyond the threshold of intolerance of a socially critical ideological mode unless under the extreme condition of the immediate foregoing statement. In the instance of a condition of cumulative ideational disorder, the successful negotiation of ideological discontinuity results in a released expression of the instrumental mode and the reinstitution of cumulative order in the ideational process.

In our judgment, contemporary Western society is rapidly approaching the point of social crisis requiring a significant discontinuity in the prevailing ideological climate.

A dichotomy of ideational modes of thought is not without theoretical shortcomings. In any rate of ideational
progress, how much of that progress is due to "instrumental-push" and how much to "ideological-give"? In any rate of ideational disorder, how much of that disorder is due to "ideological resistance" and how much to "instrumental incapacity"? While most social problems primarily reflect obstruction to knowledge use and generation, excessive ideological flexibility will not remedy a problematic situation the instrumental mode is insufficiently developed to answer. Despite these indeterminate features, the theory provides some guidelines for inquiry in the case of ideational disturbance. Moreover, the nonsymmetrical nature of the ideational modes provides some measure of relief from indeterminateness. Nevertheless, the basic difficulty lies in category insufficiency; dyadic theories are too primitive for significant social problems. Virtually all contemporary social theories of any complexity, however, are reducible to multiple dualisms with all the attendant theoretical errors they entail. The methodological approach delivering a dichotomous theory has the promise of generating multiple categories not so encumbered. It is a promise, it must be admitted, yet to be demonstrated. But surely the possibility of category differentiation within and across the ideational modes utilized in our analysis is a warranted line of investigation considering the theoretical disabilities of dualistically based alternatives.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION

The general approach and the preceding analysis of this study ripen in this chapter into their major objective: the enumeration of coordinate criteria by which theoretical adequacy may be achieved and judged. The study is concluded with a brief prognosis and with suggestions for further study.

The Requisites of Theoretical Adequacy

There is no disputing the relative maturity of the modern practice of science. Concomitant with the rise over roughly the past century of positive science was a decline of scientific materialism and subjective metaphysics. Nevertheless, there is no denying the uneven quality of contemporary scientific practice across the spectrum of human affairs. This is strikingly apparent in the areas of economics and politics where richly fruitful and imaginative thought has been suppressed by the strictures of market and nation state mentalities. But the penetration of modern "mature science" by antique elements of an earlier "proto-science" is not the whole story. Science is incompatible
with the idea of an a priori terminus in its own theoretical framework. The reason is there is no ultimate and privileged view of science. Moreover, to presume so deteriorates extant knowledge; to do so, in other words, is self-defeating. As the prevailing view of science, the self-corrective capacity of positivism, as with the vulgar social theories associated with it, becomes a legitimate matter of critical concern.

The culminating objective of this study is to enumerate canons appropriate to theoretical formation and evaluation. Just as the analysis undertaken in the previous chapter was provided an annotated context derived from the analyses of Part II, we here provide the enumeration of "canons" with an annotated context similarly derived from the study taken as a whole with support from background sources.1 Such a context consists of "scientific perspective types," including the perspective "type" employed in this study itself. Three general types of perspectives can be identified; we present them as "phases" of enhanced perspective "power."

The "proto-scientific" perspective is the most primitive. Things are the subjects of knowledge and these are ultimately known as "essences" or "transcendental ideas." The mind possesses "faculties" endowing it with the

inscrutable powers to know by "rational intuition" or "higher reason." Common sense ideas may have public referents but the basic or "higher" concepts have no such direct referents and conceptualization tends to rely on metaphor and analogy. The deductive logic of the syllogism is one of proof by class inclusion or exclusion. Hypotheses are the road to absolutely certain knowledge disengaged from reality and free from contingency. There is, therefore, an emphasis on the intensional logic of qualities. Definitions are discovered and have the property of being true or false and are basic to inquiry. There is no sharp distinction between "having evidence" for a position and "having an argument" in support of a position. Since mind is capable of a dialectical exercise for truth, the logic of proof is completely autonomous and self-contained. Rebuttal is confined to its own rules and categories. Language is a reliable copy of reality. Inquiry is essentially linguistic and noncontextual. Nature is either a scene of essences realizing their forms or an animated locus of competing "wills." As such its potentialities are fixed and can be understood but not altered. Explanation is in terms of ultimate purpose. Recognition of the persistence of identical entities throughout a series of changes abstracts identities from all aspects of the causal occasion. The absence of a public arena for confirmation robs controversy of an operational method of settlement. The implication is that violence may be the ultimate recourse to resolve disagreement even with
claims of "good will" on all sides. Facts are learned by one method; values are acquired by a different method. Morals are intrinsically valuable and are, therefore, unaffected by the growth of knowledge, social circumstances, or any contingency whatsoever. Each man is deemed capable of choosing the moral course and punishment tends to be condemnatory and retributive.

The prevailing "mature science" is positivistic. Knowledge is of the relations between and the interactions of things. We may know things directly but theories are only about things. The mind is capable of directly perceiving reality and of analytical exercises. There is thus a domain of a priori analytic concepts and a domain of a posteriori synthetic concepts. Deductive analytics and inductive synthetics may be matched for theoretical development. Analytic definitions are tautological; synthetic definitions are contingent on experience. Evidence is nonlogical but enters into theoretical argumentation. Language is structural and occurs on different levels of linguistic usage; such as the positive levels of semantics and syntactics and the normative level of values. Inquiry is primarily synthetically descriptive; theoretical explanation and prediction require the addition of analytic procedures. Nature is basically a locus of potentialities to be discovered. Causality is a matter of controlled demonstration of sequences or correlation. Purpose is considered extraneous to positive science. Ethics and values are scientifically meaningless and relative to the
mores of the group expressing them. They are nevertheless highly significant as the basis for determining the ends of positive science. Controversy and value conflict may be settled on the basis of a relative "normative logic," moral suasion, or recourse to combat.

We propose to call our third perspective "frontier science." It consists of the scattered remnants of the relatively dissipated earlier pragmatist movement. Knowledge is garnered in the instigation of controlled change in and of specified problematic contexts. Knowledge functions, then, in the knowledge getting process. Knowledge is of relationships disciplined by operational distinctions and unifications. The knower and the known can not be sharply separated in the knowing process. All concepts operate in a public domain and are subject to change upon evidence. The logic is a logic of inquiry and there is no method of inquiry that frees knowledge from contingency. Definitions function in controlling inquiry. Overweening emphasis upon definition at the beginning of inquiry is sterile. The most useful definitions emerge within and from inquiry. Logic is not completely autonomous and self-contained but is continuous with determinate and successful inquiry. Language is dynamic and developmental, not a given datum apart from the phenomena of change in some intrinsic fashion. Reliable knowledge can not be obtained by the mere manipulation of language. It is necessary to distinguish the different modes of language-behaviors and to be on guard against the metaphysical
assumptions that may underlie the syntactical structure of particular languages—for example, the substance-attribute metaphysics which underlies the subject-predicate form of the Indo-Aryan languages. Special languages may be invented to achieve more effective operationality. Inquiry is primarily experimental. Nature is a locus of potentialities that not only "occur"—the statistically customary—but that may also "be contrived." The situation is the causal occasion. Hence, the concept "causality" is both logically and operationally prior to the concept of identity. "Destinies" are changed by the deliberate manipulation of the causal occasion. It is always at least possible to settle controversy by public evidence. Facts and values are both consequences of theories possessed by an inquirer and every effort should be made to make them apparent. Initial assumptions must be subject to modification as inquiry proceeds into both fact and value. Values are assessed in terms of consequences and every "end" is also a condition of further consequences. What is consequentially worthwhile is determinate from historical and experiential knowledge, from the cumulative wisdom of the culture, employing deliberative and critical skills. Hence the justification of value judgments is evidential, open to public inquiry and testing. Value acceptance does not relieve commitment to further reflection and warranted revision.

Of course, contemporary science is not easily typed. Elements of proto-science persist, usually in revised
and reinterpreted form, in current philosophies of science and elements of frontier science are intermittently emergent throughout the scene, often couched in language not obviously associable with historical pragmatism.

In the context of the critical analysis of the previous chapter and in the context of the foregoing perspectives of the methodology of knowledge, we are now prepared to enumerate the canons of theoretical adequacy elicited from the theoretical weaknesses, mistakes and failures as well as the partial successes demonstrated in those contexts. It is our contention that reliable and dependable theory should be formulated within and may be judged within the coordinative context of these canons. For those who fear self-fulfilling restrictiveness, it is further our contention that the perspectives generated within this canonical frame of reference when applied to specific problematic situations results in a reciprocal self-correctiveness which persistently enlarges the social meaningfulness and enhances the social acceptability of such a canonical frame of reference as an evolving set of coordinative guidelines for social action of a reconstructive nature. Discussions of "canonical meaning" is restrained for it is our contention that initially such an emphasis is less critical than that public administration theorists--or for that matter, all social theorists--should submit forthwith to a critical dialogue on the operational practicality, warrantability, and reasonable variation of canonical meanings.
(1) The Canon of Testability. All of the canons to be discussed here are about testability. This one, however, concerns the centrality and nature of testability while the remaining canons deal with matters such as the significance, sharpness, or power of testing. Put simply, a test is the symbolic articulation provisionally held of emergent possibilities in a specific context which when operationally instituted may be determined to have functioned in the outcomes such as to confirm, refute, or revise (i.e., partially confirm and refute) the original articulation. In other words, taking into account relevant and significant evidential patterns, a consequential hypothesis

. . . is developed in relation to other conceptual structures until it receives a form in which it can instigate and direct an experiment that will disclose precisely those conditions which have the maximum possible force in determining whether the hypothesis should be accepted or rejected. Or it may be that the experiment will indicate what modifications are required in the hypothesis so that it may be applicable, i.e., suited to interpret and organize the facts of the case.2

In this exposition, ideas have a determinate contextual function which makes possible judgments as to their warrantedness. Testing involves knowledge gained through the instigation and direction of change. That knowledge is never complete, certain, or final but is, rather, always contingent to the context in which it was generated.

The modern literature expresses a bias for refutation. It is so, of course, that the possibility of refutation

is a requirement of empirical testing but, in some quarters, it is held that refutation is the only possible test. Several contributions to these biases are worth mentioning. It is often pointed out that analytically derived alternative theories may "equally explain" an existential situation. The answer, of course, lies in the epistemological metaphysics of this positivist based approach to verification; pragmatist warrantability is, on the other hand, demonstrable. Those concerned with testability are set on edge by the widely held view that any theory may easily be confirmed through evidence selectivity. For those accepting the "matching principle" of verification, only sincere and diligent attempts at refutation, therefore, are genuine tests. Since such "false" confirmation requires considerable ad hoc and ex post maneuvering, one might wonder if arbitrary selectivity of facts might not also easily allow falsification of any theory. Those concerned with testability are also edgy by the fact that confirmation is so untidy in its contingency. But refutation is only seemingly complete and final; in the end, however, refutation is no less contingent than confirmation.

Among those who reject falsification as an end-in-itself and who accept both refutation and confirmation, a bias exists for the former because of an asymmetry between the two. The falsification (or confirmation) of a

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proposition entails the confirmation (or falsification) of its contradictory; but, the falsification of a proposition does not confirm its contrary. The contrary of a falsified proposition may itself be false. Of course, an analogous case does not exist on the confirmation side of the equation.

In empirical testing—as opposed to mere formal demonstration or synthetic correspondence—all propositions are contingent; either way, confirmation or refutation, evidence is cumulative; convergent, directional, corroborative, predominant, etc., in greater or lesser degree, never final and complete. Under these circumstances, something is always implied in both confirmation and refutation about the other and a wittingly devised theory of testability must allow equally for both. What we have is a confirmation-refutation process, not one or the other. It is the non-testable that does not find a place in science.

(2) The Canon of Simplicity. Unfortunately, this canon has been subject to superficial interpretations: easy or comfortable understanding, ontological relief of inquiry from incubi, simple-minded parsimony, etc. However, simplicity does not have an ontological residence in subject matters; it is methodologically directive. In general, simplicity directs that, insofar as reasonable and practicable, contextually unnecessary and irrelevant elements should be expunged from theory. Complete exclusion is not suggested since at some point such efforts would surely reduce more positive theoretical development without compensatory returns.
Moreover, contextually extraneous residues are inevitable in all theory.

It is often passed over in its obviousness that, regardless of difficulty or complexity, whatever is necessary for a sufficiency of solution development must be included in theoretical formulations. It is even more often overlooked that the eradication of irrelevant elements in those theoretical formulations is a methodological mission of no mean significance. Theoretical success tends to divert attention from those included elements only mildly diversionary or even neutral to that success. We must be on guard against not recognizing theoretical success "in spite of" unnecessary inclusion. Even more, we must be on guard, given theoretical success, of assuming efficacious significance to unnecessarily included elements simply because they are there. In short, whatever can be removed from a theory without significant diminution of solution adequacy, should be removed.

Cognizance should be taken of the fact that the beginnings of simplicity are found in the Canon of Testability through the exclusion of non-testable elements. However, empirically verified or potentially verifiable elements are subject to simplicity exclusion, the test here falling on the grounds of specific problematic relevancy. It might be argued that an element meeting the conditions of testability, although unnecessary in a particular context, might be highly relevant in another, perhaps subsequent, context; the
risk of projecting an unnecessary or disruptive element, however, is no less a possibility. Of course, simplicity is conditioned by the coordinative implications of other canons.

The point of the apparent success of "ideals" in such areas as physics should not go unaddressed. The fact that some "ideals" are acceptable—for example, instantaneous velocity and perfectly elastic impact—but not all—for example, perpetual motion—should alert one to consider carefully what is involved. The success of so-called idealizations can be attributed to three circumstances: first, often an unproved speculation derived from an extensive context of independent confirming evidence is labeled an ideal; second, often a variable for which there exists a wide range of confirmed values, may be given an extreme value—usually as a convenience in reference to other variables or instrumentation—again labeled an ideal; third, often a symbol that stands for, is a mere proxy for, a set of operations—for example, horsepower—is called an ideal or at least an unobservable. But these uses of "ideal" fall reasonably within acceptable theoretical inclusion. It is also not unreasonably usual for a theory to peripherally "flesh-out" with common sense terminology which can ease communication and serve to avoid distraction toward non-essentials.

However, simplicity is particularly significant in avoiding or spotting the obsessive proclivity in our society of providing "answers" and "explanations" for questions and problems unsupplied with evidential thrust. Simplicity
additionally contributes to the identification of implicit or explicit premises as either evidentially warranted or metaphysically rooted.

(3) The Canon of Consistency. When compared, two generally unassociated circumstances suggest a revision of the traditional interpretation of this canon as the subjection of the forms of inquiry to the logical rules derived from a formal system with complete and nonfallacious integrity. In the first of these circumstances, urgent inquiry into complex problems has compelled a considerable degree of harmony and working agreement regarding proximate existentials without recourse to agreement on ultimate principles. In the second circumstance, work over the past century on the foundations problems of mathematics now obliges us to conclude: complete and consistent formalized theories are confined to such narrow slices of relevancy as to be trivial and virtually untestable; axiom systems of any significance, strength, and complexity cannot generate all such operationally necessary statements as may be problematically required of them; and elaborated axiom systems seem not to be able to avoid going outside its own system for consistency testing. In other words, single self-warranting systems are beyond both completeness and consistency.

Now the full implications of these circumstances for social analysis are not yet clear. But they do bespeak the need for firm resistance to the temptation to drive
analysis to the wall of full formalization. We do not hesitate to suggest that the work of the symbolic model builders--idle symbolic manipulation under the guise of exactitude, completeness, and finality--has been contributory to intellectual errors and policy disasters. All attempts to carry theories to their "ultimate foundations"--and thus beyond the field of experiential reference--are highly questionable exercises.

Consistency, then, should be confined to the experiential context; consistency rules should be generalized from experiential contexts; and rule application is subject to modification or exception in specific contexts. However, in any of this we deny the relaxation of significant analytical rigor.

(4) The Canon of Comprehensiveness. When a theory achieves consistency across a spectrum of contiguously relevant but initially devisive materials--internal consistency to the point of contextual solution--we have the kernel of comprehensiveness. When a theory acquires consistency across a spectrum of relatively disparate contexts of only indirect relevancy--external consistency across varied realms of discourse--then the Canon of Comprehensiveness is directly exercised.

Concern with external consistency has been notoriously flighty in the social disciplines where inconveniences are lazily avoided as exogenous. Also, an enduring feature of theoretical systems in the social sciences has been their
mutual reliance on concepts uncritically borrowed and unconditionally used. What presents itself is a loose conglomerate of conventional wisdoms serving as the bedrock assumptions for assiduously compartmentalized professional disciplines and a sordid history of recurrent irrelevancy and irresponsibility in the partial, scattered, and incompatible analyses of our pressing and complex problems. The more varied the contexts--cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural, etc. --in which a theory may be shown directly warranted, the more forceful the test of the theory and the more confidence we may have in its ability to bring the incongruities of problematic situations into a common frame of reference for solution.

The importance of the Canon of Comprehensiveness in a time of social crisis cannot be overstressed. When a society moves from relative stability into large-scale but misunderstood change, gross social resistance and strain, closure and disorder become the emergent dangers. These social dangers cluster about the unquestioned commitment to ideological loci. It would seem unwise to confine the analysis of any devoutly held belief to the social milieu which spawned and nourishes it. One does not have to embrace cultural relativism to admit significant modal differences in human experiences. Awareness of behavioral differentiation may be a leavening agent in ideological transformation.

(5) The Canon of Fruitfulness. The brief comment to be made here hardly does justice to the importance of this
canon. But there is no line of discussion that may be opened up capable of being closed without extended discussion beyond the necessities of our purpose here. It should be observed that testability itself implies fertility since testing hypotheses always generates new testable hypotheses. To put the matter negatively, an hypothesis from which nothing can be deduced and which is without further consequence, is essentially untestable. Comprehensiveness implies expanded fertility. The Canon of Fruitfulness judges theoretical potentiality by the rate, volume, and pertinency of generated testable hypotheses.

(6) The Canon of Problematic Significance. The thrust of remarks so far has been to take theoretical evaluation out of formally closed systems and place it in problematic contexts. For those who dogmatically defend or incuriously accept that after contextual contingency has been addressed some self-justifying ultimate is additionally required, such a thrust will seem indeterminate. But only theory directly growing out of and referring to substantive problems has been able to sustain dynamic self-correction, and that is the injunction this canon places on theory. The Canon of Problematic Significance requires that a theory be disciplined by the exigencies of contextual transformation toward solution sufficiency. Note that total inclusion or solution perfectibility is not suggested. This canon disciplines the relative significance of the other flexible canons.
There may be some who will consider it at least an intellectual misdemeanour to abandon scholarly purity for mundane contingency in judgmental matters. But if by the term problematics we mean the general theory and study of the issues involved in selecting significant problems and methods and criteria for dealing with problems, then practicality is highly theoretical. Problematics is as yet an insufficiently developed field. It may be said, however, that in order for theory to achieve contextual adequacy, it must go beyond the mere ability to explain more and better what alternative theories explain; it must include the theories that purport to explain the context in question and the tactics by which those theories may be displaced in the process of moving toward solution sufficiency. In other words, adequate contextual theory must include a consideration of theories whose content is in various degrees untestable; testable elements are inherently included in proper testing.

(7) The Canon of Coherency. Traditionally, this canon refers to some form of stable harmony or stands as a synonym for formal logical consistency. As with the foregoing canon, this canon refers to the canons taken in concert. Ordinarily, canon relationships are visualized dialectically: more of one canon means less of another canon. This may often be the case; when so, the exigencies of "problematic significance" provide a determinate solution to the relative importance of the various canons. However, when in the methodological application of these canons the
give and take of mechanical accommodation gives way to mutually contributory canon expansion or the expansion of any canon does not diminish the degree of significance of any other canon, then we have the expansion of theoretical coherency.

(8) The Canon of Instrumental Valuation. We add this canon as a matter of emphasis that in their exercise the canons enumerated here are necessarily evaluative in nature. They bristle with values presupposed, necessary, and reaffirmed in the progress of intelligent inquiry: search for truth, originality, dissent, tolerance, etc.

Prognosis and Suggestions for Further Inquiry

Enlightened prognosis is primarily a matter of effective diagnosis of emerging opportunities. Within the confines of this study, we would note that the positivists have chosen to build a philosophy around the principle of verification based on the analysis of language. That circumstance is an opportunity of strategic significance, an opportunity to institute a dialogue on precisely the critical topic in modern social analysis. Moreover, the current intellectual landscape possesses a proliferating bank of knowledge specifically appropriate to the possibilities of a theoretical synthesis not so easily or obviously attainable through the first half of this century. Never has the importance of theoretical integration been more obvious than
in our present circumstances and more necessary than in the field of public administration.

But in the broader context of contemporary society, the prospects for undoing the gerrymandering of values out of the scientific precinct before our problems slide into difficult to reverse stages is dim. We do not doubt that at some indeterminate future date it will be understood that as an intellectual event our time was one pivoting on the question of the application of secular science to sacred values. In an even broader context, Western civilization is man's second great attempt to construct a viable community based on science. The ideological conflict posed by the invention of science in the new complexity of sixth century B.C. Iron Age Greek society is vividly portrayed in the great dramatic literature of the following century: *Prometheus Bound* is basically a drama emphasizing the clash between the old religion of blind submission and the new moral freedom associated with science; *Oedipus the King* poses the deep question of the relationship between causality and determinism; and *Alcestis* is a bitter indictment of sacrificial death. In the end the "Great Greek Experiment" expired.

It is entirely possible that an even more sophisticated philosophy of science than that promulgated would not have saved an effort based on such meager technology and abilities to diffuse education and achieve sufficient levels of public intelligence; it is no less possible that a failure of modern society to achieve a higher philosophic
synthesis will not be a critical factor in arresting a thunderous technology or in crippling community intelligence. Nevertheless, it is a gamble unwise to take for we do know that scientific inquiry rests on value judgments: conviction that evidence is superior to faith, conviction that doubt is useful, conviction that solutions however incomplete are better than salvation, and conviction that truth is better than error no matter how flattering or comforting the latter may be or however unpalatable the former may appear. It is the relationship between these value convictions and the practice of public administration that must command our attention. Fatidic exercises are less significant than the work at hand.

While this study has been given an operational terminus, in a very important sense it must be considered also a study "in progress." Put simply, the indicated expansions for the subsequent development of the effort undertaken here are twofold. First, the two minor themes of analysis—the social context and social effects of ideational processes—should be brought to theoretical parity with the major theme of analysis—the social function of ideational processes. The application of a "full blown" sociology of knowledge perspective should provide a more powerful analysis and test of the perspective than the more specific perspective designed for this study. While it was our judgment that the evaluative dimension of the sociology of knowledge perspective would be in any study the more critical, that
dimension is least accepted in the fraternity of students of the approach. The bringing to equal status especially of the social context theme would certainly enhance the familiarity of the perspective. In any event, we would hold that the three themes are so intimately associated that the indicated expansion is a first priority.

Second, the expansion of the data field is necessary to test the force of the perspective. The steps of expansion are obvious: expansion of the data field within the time period covered in this study; expansion of the data field to include foreign contemporary thought; expansion of the data field to include historical and comparative areas of thought; and finally, but not least important, expansion of the data field to include modern public administration theory. This last expansion, due to the multidisciplinary character of modern theory, would represent the most critical test of the perspective. In a very real sense, it is our judgment that such a test represents one of the applicability of the perspective to generic administration and social analysis in the broadest sense of the term.
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