Women Representing Women?: Pathways to Substantive Representation

Dissertation

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Abstract

My dissertation uses the case of women in the Bundestag (Germany’s lower legislative house) to foreground the tension between liberal democratic conceptions of political representation and identity-based representation. Unlike previous research, which has focused on establishing that female legislators advocate for women at greater rates than their male colleagues, I focus on variation among women. I show that party affiliation’s contribution to the variation among female legislators’ attention to women’s interests is not as strong as previous research has found, once we account for parties’ varying conceptions of what these interests are. Instead, several social markers in the German context (motherhood and marriage) as well as generational differences (in the form of cohort effects) distinguish among female legislators and contribute to understanding who will be more likely to advocate for women.

In establishing this argument, I use material from interviews with 54 female and male members of the Bundestag and biographical information about the 340 women in the Bundestag between 1998-2009, as well as original content analyses of party platforms and parliamentary debate transcripts from three legislative terms (composed of 360 speeches across 40 debates, addressing 21 laws, spanning 1998-2008).
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmothers and great aunt,

Vasiliki Xydia, Vera Gorman, and Ingrid Hanson.
Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the love and indefatigable support of Brian Hauser. Ola kala! Thanks also to my parents for their love, high expectations, and multilingualism.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The research problem

What explains which female legislators actively work to advance the interests of women as a group and which do not? In other words, under what conditions does descriptive representation (the presence of female legislators) facilitate substantive representation (advocacy on behalf of women’s interests)? In response to these questions I advance the argument that two social markers – specifically, motherhood and marriage – contribute to predictions of which female legislators will act upon their membership in the group of women. This effect is further influenced by age, as the experiences of motherhood and marriage vary by generation. Women who are mothers, and women who are married, experience specific social and legal pressures and obligations that make them more likely to be actively engaged in acting on behalf of women as a group. I show that this effect is more pronounced among older cohorts, whose experiences of these social and legal pressures were in periods of greater traditionalism.

I chose these two specific social markers, because they reflect differences among women (some of whom are mothers and/or married, and some are not), and they also reflect legal and social patterns that have shaped our very understandings of women’s rights and interests. Motherhood and marriage are not just markers of differences among women at any given moment; they also reflect social roles that have developed and changed over time. Thus, while much previous research on women’s substantive
representation (WSR) has focused on demonstrating that female legislators are more actively engaged in advocating for women than their male counterparts, I focus on variation among female legislators, and I do so recognizing that gendered experiences vary over time.

This project is significant for a number of reasons. Women, like numerous groups (primarily racial and ethnic), were often excluded from full citizenship when modern democracies were established. It is clear that gendered inequalities – in such domains, among others, as work opportunities and salary, and political participation – persist despite the emergence of formal equality. I argue that it is important to examine the ways in which individual legislators’ identities influence their preferences and activities alongside the standard panoply of predictors of legislative behavior (party affiliation, constituency effects, links to citizen organizations, inter alia). In a general sense, women represent women, but there is a great deal of variation among women, both regarding the extent to which they believe that women share interests and regarding what they believe those interests to be. Further, there is much variation among female legislators’ activities (speaking, committee-work, etc) on behalf of women as a group, including whether they do so at all.

My interventions in research on women in politics are also important. They respond simultaneously to contemporary political theory (including calls for greater attention to variation among women) and to gaps in existing empirical literature (including lack of precise measures of women’s shared identity as a motivator for action on behalf of other women). More broadly, I offer a framework for parsing what it means for identity to contribute to political representation in liberal democracies where the focus
typically lies on interests, instead. In policy terms, investigation into variation among women and gendered identity contributes policy recommendations regarding the electoral innovation of gender quotas, as I will discuss in the conclusion to this dissertation.

I study this variation among female members of Germany’s lower legislative house, the Bundestag. Germany’s multi-party system offers leverage on these research questions, because a wide variety of ideological positions is represented. Moreover, each party has a fairly tight, coherent platform, making it possible to more clearly identify intra- and inter-party variation. Germany’s legal-historical context is of further help in examining debates over women’s roles and rights. For example, it is only since the late 1980s and early 1990s that debates in the Bundestag have explicitly addressed gendered roles in parenting and child-care. These debates persist in the legislative periods that I examine (the 14th, 15th, and 16th legislative periods, 1998-2009).

In order to parse female legislators’ varying degrees of women’s substantive representation, it is necessary to understand the ways in which women share an identity and interests as a group. It is further necessary to examine the connections between individual legislators’ group memberships and their legislative activities; any individual legislator’s identity does not automatically trump the other forces acting upon her or him. I argue that both interest and identity groups matter in democratic settings, and that women constitute one of these groups that deserves and requires representation.

The argument that identity shapes individual legislators’ behavior receives serious attention in political theory accounts of political representation, but empirical studies of legislative behavior tend to focus on party affiliation, re-election incentives, constituency characteristics, majority (or government) party status, and other factors. These
approaches to studying legislative behavior often emphasize the role of interest groups: people “organized around a shared instrumental interest of the individuals who constitute the group without any necessary mutual identification among its members” (Gutmann 2003:13, emphasis in original). They do not address identity groups, which do rely upon “mutual identification.” Moreover, as I will discuss, principles of democratic liberalism tend to focus on individuals, embracing the idea that interest groups might aggregate individuals’ interests but resisting the idea that identity groups might play a legitimate role in shaping policy outcomes. Studies of WSR pay more attention to identity than the larger body of work on legislative behavior, as the mechanisms that scholars of women and politics propose for female legislators’ higher level of engagement with women’s issues often derive from arguments about women’s shared perspectives and experiences. (See chapter 2 for an extensive discussion about these connections and mechanisms.)

I will argue that interest and identity groups are closely related to one another, but several important distinctions require considering them separately. Gutmann (2003) distinguishes between identity and interest groups in the following way: “In paradigmatic form, identity group politics is bound up with a sense of who people are, while interest group politics is bound up with a sense of what people want” (15). Gutmann nonetheless emphasizes that there is likely to be a close connection between these two kinds of groups: “Since mutual identification [shared membership in identity group] informs people’s sense of their own political interests, group identity and collective interests are often mutually reinforcing in democratic politics” (2003:15). In terms of collective action based upon identity (i.e., identity politics), other theorists point out that this action will only happen when group members recognize their common membership (de Beauvoir
The politics of identity thus involves recognition of and advocacy for identity groups, by group members. This is importantly different from actions surrounding interest groups, where the person or agent who advocates for specific interests is irrelevant.

Although empirical studies of legislative behavior studies have clearly demonstrated that institutions and electoral incentives matter, conventional wisdom and women’s movements, alike, expect female legislators to pay particular attention to the concerns of women, African American legislators to pay particular attention to the concerns of African Americans, etc. This expectation is sometimes framed as a problem for democracy; Gutmann (2003) notes that “popular political commentators often subject them [identity groups] to hypercriticism,” decrying identity groups as “antithetical to …one indivisible nation” (3-4). Although interest groups are perceived as serving a useful function in aggregating or presenting concerns, identity groups are commonly understood to denote primordial and insurmountable differences among people.

Sonia Sotomayor’s recent Senate confirmation hearings for her appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court (July-August 2009) serve as an example of this negative assessment of identity politics. Based upon comments that she had made to other audiences about how being Latina has shaped her understanding of the world, Sotomayor was a lightning rod for concerns about whether she would make legal decisions based upon identity instead of the law. Sotomayor had delivered a speech entitled “A Latina Judge’s Voice” in 2001 at the University of California, Berkeley, which she concluded by making the identity-based claim that plagued her during her Senate confirmation hearings eight years later: “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.” Sotomayor was appealing to the idea that her identity made her a better legal mind, better able to appreciate the details and context necessary for adjudicating cases appropriately. Her detractors, however, took her words to mean that she would be a biased judge. These detractors, incidentally, seemed not to be of the mind that every person “has” an identity, and that all of these identities equally legitimately shape their understanding of the world; Sotomayor was accused of being racist.

On the one hand, Sotomayor publicly appealed to her identity and her background to describe influences, which she deemed positive, on her as a judge. On the other hand, identifying someone (even oneself) as a member of a group, e.g., a female legislator as a member of the group of women, does not automatically trump expectations of that individual based upon other forces acting upon her or him. In this sense, Sotomayor being Hispanic American does not require that she adjudicate the law based entirely upon this identity and heritage. A female representative from a conservative district, for example, would not have been elected and certainly would not be re-elected if she ignored her constituents’ desires by voting with a bloc of other female legislators against the wishes of her district and/or her political party.

I have argued that both interest and identity groups exist in democratic settings and deserve recognition and representation. However, the relationship between identity-based features of political representation and party- and constituency-driven

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1 For the full text of Sotomayor’s speech, see the Spring 2002 symposium issue of Berkeley’s La Raza Law Journal, entitled “Raising the Bar: Latino and Latina Presence in the Judiciary and the Struggle for Representation.”

representation is not entirely clear. The question of how identity functions in the process of political representation alongside other influences persists. Many previous studies of the representation of women’s interests (women’s substantive representation) have focused on demonstrating that female legislators (the presence of whom constitutes women’s descriptive representation) are better advocates of women’s interests than male legislators, with the implication that it is group membership and shared interests and perspectives – in short, identity – that facilitates this outcome. However, it is clear that not all female legislators view themselves as representatives of women, nor are all female legislators actively engaged in advocacy for women. Studies that show aggregate differences between female and male legislators’ substantive representation leave open the thorny question of when it is that identity “trumps” the other well-established factors influencing legislative behavior, and how it happens when it does. Previous empirical work suggests but does not test propositions such as the idea that issues of particular importance to women will provoke female legislators’ behavior (e.g., voting for or against specific legislation) separate from the motivations of their party affiliation or other influences. It is difficult, however, to delineate what these issues of particular importance to women are; moreover, it is clear that women will not all come to the same conclusions about how best to address even those problems that they agree are problems.

I argue throughout this dissertation that women are one of these groups of people who coalesce as an identity and interest group, but this does not automatically mean that every woman will actively engage in promoting the interests of women as a group. Some purchase on this question of which female legislators will actively engage in this

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3 As I will discuss in this dissertation, this previous work has not clearly operationalized or tested the mechanism by which this takes place.
advocacy of women may be found in theories of identity and identity groups. In order to establish some parameters for the role of identity in legislative behavior, I present several more perspectives on what identity politics is, in the first place, beginning with Gutmann’s (2003) definition of identity groups. As Gutmann writes, “identity groups…are of such great political significance yet neglected by political scientists and treated in a highly polemical way by popular commentators on politics” (2003:8). The emphasis on interests groups over identity groups makes it all the more important that studies of them explicitly justify their choices of definition and operationalization. Gutmann defines identity groups as “politically significant associations of people who are identified by or identify with one or more shared social markers,” such as “gender, race, class, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, and sexual orientation” (2003:9). These social markers serve both to unite people with one another and potentially galvanize them into action; they are politically significant, because they shape people’s needs, interests, and interactions with the state (inter alia: taxation rates; employment patterns; access to opportunities relating to their political and civil rights, such as education, employment, and voting). Gutmann continues: “What distinguishes social markers of group identity is that they carry social expectations about how a person of that particular group is expected to think, act, and even appear” (2003:9). When these people work together “in an organized fashion in politics on the basis of their group identities…they are part of identity group politics” (2003:10). In other words, we know identity politics by the explicit invocation of that identity and that group. However, as Gutmann notes, there is likely to be substantial overlap between identity groups and what we conceive of as
interest groups. Although it is important to consider them separately, they are not mutually exclusive.

Further blurring the distinction between identity and interest groups, Charles Taylor (1989) introduces identity as the source of defining one’s orientation towards values and priorities. We don’t have a framework for understanding the world – nor for defining our own interests – without our identity. Taylor writes:

“People may see their identity as defined partly by some moral or spiritual commitment, say as a Catholic, or an anarchist. Or they may define it in part by the nation or tradition they belong to, as an Armenian, say, or a Quebeccois. What they are saying is not just they are strongly attached to this spiritual view or background; rather, it is that this provides the frame within which they can determine where they stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, or of value” (1989:27).

Like Gutmann (2003), Taylor (1989) is emphasizing the role that identities play in shaping what our priorities are, in the first place. It is harder to “see” identity in Taylor’s formulation, because he argues that it implicitly informs all of our preferences and actions, i.e., it may even resemble the basis for interest groups. Regardless of where we place identity politics on the spectrum between Gutmann’s explicit “organized activities … on the basis of their group identity” (2003:10) and Taylor’s implicit “frame within which they [people] can determine where they stand on questions what is … of value” (1989:27), we need a better understanding of how identity and other predictors of legislative behavior interact, because there are strong reasons to believe that identities may shape priorities in ways separate from other institutions and incentives.

In more empirical terms, there is some basis in social psychology for explaining variation among group members’ active engagement in talking about and acting upon their membership in the group. This variation in engagement is based upon, in the case of
gender, women’s varying perceptions of their own identity relative to the group of women (do they feel that they are similar to other women?) and relative to other groups (are distinctions between themselves and others highlighted in terms of gender?). Gurin and Townsend (1986), for example, divide the concept of gender identity into three categories. Using a telephone survey to gather data about gender identity among American women, they inquire into the respondents’ perceived similarity to other women, respondents’ sense of common fate with other women, and how centrally gender figures in respondents’ sense of self. They measure each category as separate predictors of what they term “gender consciousness” (actions on behalf of the group of women) (1986:139-140).

Gurin and Townsend find that the dimension of identity most closely related to gender consciousness was sense of common fate, i.e., the extent to which respondents felt that their own personal experiences as women related to the experiences of women as a group. It is possible that Gurin and Townsend’s (1986) conclusions are highly specific to the time (early 1980s) and place (United States) of their survey. As a template for examining the parameters of identity politics for women, however, their research

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4 To capture “perceived similarity,” Gurin and Townsend offered respondents a list of 16 category labels, including socioeconomic, age, and sex categories, among others, and asked which group the respondent felt closest to. To capture “centrality,” the researchers asked respondents how “often in their everyday lives they thought about being a woman and what they have in common with women and men” (1986:142). To capture a sense of common fate, respondents were asked several questions about whether the state/status of women nationally related to them personally. “Gender consciousness” was measured with a composite index composed of questions “assessing attitudes towards the women’s movement and collective efforts to accomplish legislative and constitution change” (1986:143).
suggests the value of 1) disaggregating measures of identity and 2) employing a measure of identity that has a range of values rather than a dichotomy.\textsuperscript{5}

A 2006 *Perspectives on Politics* article by Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott sums up current empirical concerns related to these theories of identity and identity politics. They note that, in political science and related disciplines, “a wide variety of conceptualizations and definitions of identity have led some to conclude that identity is so elusive, slippery, and amorphous that it will never prove to be a useful variable for the social sciences” (2006:695). In order to draw studies of identity out of what they term “definitional anarchy,” the authors suggest a series of best practices centering on dividing inquiry into the categories of content (what meanings do “members” ascribe their identities?) and contestation (the process by which “individuals are continuously proposing and shaping the meanings of the groups to which they belong”). They argue that “understanding the interaction among constituent individuals and their groups – or agents and social identity structures – is a crucial part of the analysis of social identities,” emphasizing that the identity of an individual is a different matter from collective identity (1006:700-1).

The upshot of these recommendations for this specific study of women’s substantive representation is that I address the content of, and contestation over, women’s identity in the context of the Bundestag. Personal interviews and indirect measures inform this discussion of content and contestation; this discussion comprises chapter 3 of the dissertation. As I will show, motherhood and marriage in the contemporary German

\textsuperscript{5} Work that integrates the study of psychology, social psychology, and identity into the study of politics is varied and extensive. An early example of this work is Greenstein (1967); more recent work on integrating the study of narrative and identity into the social sciences includes Patterson and Monroe (1998) and Somers (1994).
context are cues to specific women’s identities. Contestation over social expectations and legal norms evolve over time via contestation; thus, these markers cue different experiences across generations. In chapter 5, I show how these social markers, mediated by age, contribute to explaining variation in women’s substantive representation.

As this discussion has highlighted, the difficulty in testing propositions about the parameters of identity politics is that categorizing people into groups does not automatically require that identity will matter. While there may be compelling evidence for thinking of people as belonging to identity groups that mediate their access to rights, goods, and services (i.e., that may also function as interest groups), that does not automatically translate into people acting based upon these group memberships: sometimes it does, and sometimes it doesn’t. Additionally, there is a fuzzy overlap between interest groups and identity groups.

Thus, my research focuses on explaining variation among female legislators in order to gain some purchase on the tensions between identity politics and liberal democratic frames of representation. I will argue that people (in this case, women) who experience certain social pressures specific to their group membership are more likely to act on behalf of that group. This is the primary argument that this project advances: all other factors being equal, female legislators who have experienced specific social and legal pressures as women are more likely to be actively engaged in advancing women as a group. The social markers of motherhood and marriage, mediated by age, are cues to these social pressures.

This claim is significant, because it proposes simultaneously to explain variation among female legislators as well as to parse what it means for identity to play a role in
political representation in liberal democracies. It also suggests how legitimate political representation might happen outside the usual chains of accountability in liberal democratic systems (principally electoral pressures, party affiliation, and party discipline).^6

In the remainder of this chapter, I develop two additional ideas that are core to this project. First, I discuss tensions between group and individual rights. Thinking about women as a group with a shared, coherent set of interests is a necessary precursor to expectations that there exist group members (female legislators) who would act to represent them. Moreover, no group is completely homogeneous with respect to how members perceive their identity and their interests. Second, I discuss the conception of women’s interests that I have chosen to employ, drawing upon extant research to justify these choices. I recognize the close connection between identity and interest groups and suggest issue areas where we might expect this connection to be especially close (namely, where social markers suggest it).

After discussing these concepts and choices, I introduce the context where I explore variation among female legislators: the Bundestag, Germany’s lower legislative house (1998-2009). I argue that public debates over the last decade among German legislators regarding the state’s involvement in and responsibility for shaping gender roles are excellent sites for observing the mechanics behind women’s substantive representation.

I conclude by outlining the sections of the dissertation, introducing how each chapter addresses the question of what factors contribute to female legislators actively working to advance the interests of women as a group.

**Women have rights as individuals and as a group of women**

Liberal democracies emphasize the rights and interests of the individual. As Max Weber defined it, a modern government is characterized by its universal application of the law to all individuals. This process of *rationalization* reflects the importance placed in modern systems on individual people as actors and as holders of rights and privileges. By way of another example of the emphasis placed on individual people in foundational texts on modern political life, consider T. H. Marshall’s (1965) discussion of the emergence of full and equal citizenship in liberal democracies. His notion of citizenship is framed in terms of successively attained rights acquired by *individuals*: civil, political, and social rights.

Despite all of this attention to rights as held by individual people, inescapably we also conceive of rights and interests in terms of groups. Access to full citizenship is mediated by social structures (including but not limited to class, ethnicity, race, level of education, sex, and intersections of these structures); these social structures group people together who share similar experiences in trying to access full citizenship. Theories of deliberative democracy, which underscore the value of reason giving in public decision making (Gutmann and Thompson 2004:3), especially emphasize the relevance of groups and group membership to democratic political life. Will Kymlicka notes:

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7 Weber develops this definition in the essay *Bureaucracy* (1920) and in other work.
“Deliberative democracy’…offers particular benefits to minority or marginalized groups. If such groups are to have any real influence in a majoritarian electoral system, and any reason to accept the legitimacy of the system, it will be through participating in the formation of public opinion, rather than through winning a majority vote…Their empowerment has largely come through participating in a public debate that has transformed the pre-existing assumptions held by members of the larger society about what is right and fair for these groups” (2002:292).

In the case of women, access to the public sphere has “transformed” conventional understandings of women’s particular responsibilities in the private sphere.

Thus, as attention to deliberative processes has increased, so too has concern about people in the polity who will potentially benefit from inclusion. Feminist political theory, especially, has paid a lot of attention to these potential benefits for women as a group, often suggesting “revised” versions of democratic deliberation to make absolutely sure that women will be able to take part in a fair and just way (Benhabib 1996, Fraser 1992, Mansbridge 1980, Sanders 1997, Young 2000). Their concerns often surround the power relations that persist in structuring deliberative processes: democratic deliberation is supposed, under ideal circumstances, to happen between free and equal interlocutors (where everyone’s speaking style and argumentation is equally valid and equally respected), but these circumstances rarely obtain in reality. Nonetheless, the opportunity to transform understandings of women’s role in the public sphere is tremendously powerful, and feminist theorists tend to endorse a version of deliberative democracy on this basis. As Young (2000) notes, the deliberative democratic “model conceptualizes the process of democratic discussion as not merely expressing and registering, but as transforming [emphasis in original] the preferences, interests, beliefs, and judgments of the participants” (26).

There are certainly challenges to talking about women as a group as opposed to as an aggregation of female individuals, each of whom has rights and interests. On the one hand, despite the emergence of formal equality, being female (as opposed to male) is in all polities correlated with disadvantages ranging from lower pay and slower professional advancement to disproportionate responsibility for childcare regardless of employment status outside the home. The theories of deliberative democracy that I have noted suggest that women as a group substantively benefit from being included in public debate: their participation has the potential to “[transform] the pre-existing assumptions held by members of the larger society about what is right and fair for” women (Kymlicka 2002:292). If we conceive of women as a group with shared identity and, by extension, shared interests, then women’s direct participation in public decision making is crucial to a positive transformation of sex-based inequalities.

However, women are not all of one mind about what comprise their interests, nor is there one singular “woman’s experience.” In all societies, women are divided among religious and ethnic communities and among socioeconomic strata, and they do not all support the same political party. Women are not the only group divided by what are often termed cross-cutting interests: Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) work on party-system formation argues that social cleavages, e.g., religious versus anti-clerical populations or rural versus urban populations, may translate into political cleavages, usually in the form of political parties. Voting populations may then be further sub-divided, e.g., rural populations may be divided along a dimension of religious differences. Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) seminal work has led to extensive research programs on social cleavages and political behavior. Research on ethnic politics, for example, has advanced
the argument that cross-cutting cleavages in the form of divided allegiances may actually inhibit ethnic balkanization, when ethnic groups do not mobilize due to other cleavages within their population.9

Unlike many of other groups whose unity is challenged by cross-cutting interests, women do not live together in communities or work together in the same workplace. Simone de Beauvoir writes “They [women] live dispersed among the males, attached through residence, housework, economic condition, and social standing to certain men—fathers or husbands—more firmly than they are to other women. If they belong to the bourgeoisie, they feel solidarity with men of that class, not with proletarian women; if they are white, their allegiance is to white men, not to Negro women” (1996 (1949): 606). These divisions among women suggest that the other groups to which they belong (class, race, ethnicity, etc) may be more salient in shaping their political attitudes and preferences.

S. Laurel Weldon (2008) offers a “solution” to the problem that these cross-cutting interests pose to group identities and collection action. In her discussion of intersectionality – i.e., the idea that all people fit into multiple categories of identity, and these multiple identities interact to affect how they live their lives – Weldon first notes that the problem with acknowledging that any individual person “belongs” to multiple groups is that it makes collective action almost impossible. If each individual person’s identity is composed of a unique collection of structural positions, then it becomes very difficult to talk about groups and shared identity, at all. In response to this problem, Weldon suggests that we should think about intersectionality differently: it is not the

9 Just one example of research on how various cleavages may become politically salient based upon broader political context is Posner (2004).
case, she argues, that all of our identities are equally salient at all times. In some contexts, class may be more salient, and in other contexts, gender. Weldon calls this “intersectionality-plus.”

In this conception of intersectionality, there will be some women-only (gender-only) experiences and concerns, just as there will also be experiences and concerns that are shaped by gender and class simultaneously (see Figure 1.1). “We might think,” writes Weldon, “of gender, race, and class as having some independent effects and some intersectional effects” (2008:203). These structural positions, or pieces of our identity, are “separable but mutually reinforcing” (2008:204).

**Figure 1.1. Intersectionality-plus (modified from Weldon 2008)**

Despite the reality of cross-cutting interests, there is much intuition behind conceiving of women as a group with shared interests and shared identity, in the aggregate. The political project of advancing women’s inclusion, for example, relies upon being able to talk about women as a group. At the very least, women were excluded, *as a group*, meaning that access to public decision making must be ensured for women, *as a
group. As Weldon’s model of intersectionality-plus argues (see Figure 1.1), there is a category of experiences, issues, and interests that should be exclusive to women as a group.

The next section turns to the content of women’s interests.

**Women’s interests**

I will argue that there is a coherent category of women’s interests, reflecting a coherent notion of women’s identity. These interests and identity are based upon a shared history of political marginalization as well as based upon experiences that women continue to share as a group. Moreover, as I have noted, I will argue that some gendered social pressures, cued by *social markers*, serve to reinforce women’s sense of identity as women. In this section, I develop the idea that there are interests that women may share as a group, and the odds that female legislators will actively engage in advancing those interests increases when these social markers obtain. This formulation addresses what is often described as conceptual blurring between women as an interest group and women as an identity group: the social markers of *motherhood* and *marriage* signal both experiences and perspectives shared among many women as well as shared interests. These effects are intensified for older cohorts of women, whose experiences as mothers and marriage women were shaped in more traditional eras that highlight gendered inequalities.

In order to assess the content of women’s interests, studies can seek external indicators (observing situations or experiences that women share and inferring interests based upon them) or they can ask the people themselves (via surveys or similarly direct
means). Either way, there is significant variation among women, such that it is difficult to define women’s interests accurately in a narrow way.\textsuperscript{10} In spite of this significant variation among women, many studies of women’s interests have dramatically simplified the range and diversity of women’s interests, often conflating women’s interests with feminism, broadly understood.\textsuperscript{11} On the one hand, this conflation is understandable. Feminist goals (e.g., to expand women’s reproductive rights) motivate many women’s movements lobbying in the public sphere. However, not all women, including women legislators, share the same stance towards feminism. Progressive and conservative women, alike, may self-identify as advocates of women’s interests, and it is important to acknowledge these perspectives.

Although there is observable diversity among women, strong rationale remains for expecting women to share some broad set of concerns, even if they do not all agree on how best to address those concerns (see previous discussion of Weldon 2008). Therefore, given the diversity of women’s interests, I make a case for inclusion of a wide diversity of interests; my operative concern is to avoid excluding meaningful indicators of women’s substantive representation. An extremely broad notion of women’s interests runs the risk of being meaningless, but there is a way to incorporate breadth without losing purchase on whether or not they are represented. Instead of measuring the representation of women’s interests (e.g., a list of specific interests) dichotomously as present or absent, I choose to identify several categories of interests, any portion of which a legislator might call attention to. Like Celis (2006), this scheme identifies legislators as

\textsuperscript{10} See Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007) for a similar discussion.

\textsuperscript{11} I define feminism very broadly to mean the advocacy of women having rights equal to men’s rights, \textit{with the goal of undoing traditional gender hierarchies} (see Squires 1999).
representing one or more categories of women’s interests. Importantly, however, I focus on a range of interests related to rights in a number of different spheres of activity (political, economic, and domestic [family, private sphere]). This notion of women’s interests draws from several strands of research, some of which focus on interests and some of which note the tight connections between identity and interests.

Sapiro’s 1981 article “When Are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women” is among the first scholarly works to address the question of women’s interests directly. Sapiro argues that definitions of political interests are largely rooted in historical context, observing that “in the beginning there was no problem of political representation of women.” There was no problem, because it was assumed that “women were represented,” by their husbands, whose interests they were definitionally (as wives) assumed to share (1981:701).

Although the time has passed in most contexts where women’s rights would be formally conflated with their husbands’ or fathers’, sexual division of labor and gendered experiences persist. Sapiro focuses on this sexual division labor as the justification for arguing that women do have distinctive interests worthy of political attention, e.g., she focuses on the political consequences of women’s traditional relegation to (and their distinctive work in) the private sphere. In the aggregate, women also occupy distinctive roles in the labor force and Sapiro argues that this fact alone justifies a notion of women’s interests. If these types of differences among men, or among people, translate into distinct political interests, why would they not do so among women? “Why is an individual’s relationship to the production of children not commonly accepted as a matter of political interest while one’s relationship to other forms of production is?” (1981:713)
Similarly, Phillips (1995) writes that the socio-structural differences between women and men “will generate significantly different experiences” (1995:53). However, Phillips also addresses more general factors distinguishing between women and men’s political interests. Phillips points out that by the 1990s most feminists focus on the differences among women rather than the similarities, in an effort to avoid essentialism, but the social fact is that there are broad patterns of similar experience among women. Despite not every woman sharing in these events, women disproportionately experience domestic violence, poverty, single-parenting, etc. No other established constituency would be subject to the expectation that every single member share identical experiences or agree on everything. If we can talk about interests and interest groups, at all, then we can talk about women’s interests. And if we can talk about women’s interests, Phillips suggests that we can also talk about women’s identity.

Other scholars pointedly emphasize identity over interests in talking about women as a group. They argue that members of an identity group (such as women) share more than just a list of preferences in common. Especially for a group that has historically been marginalized from political participation, there is also a need for respect and recognition, not merely for the space to make demands. Squires (2000) describes Fraser (1997) and Young (1990, 2007), for example, as advocating a representative process that includes as many voices and perspectives as possible. This process has the goal not of aggregating interests in an agonistic way, but rather of actively recognizing and respecting different perspectives. According to this argument, women’s interests are still rooted in their experiences, but these interests are nonetheless more diffuse than a discrete list of

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12 Here, arguments about women as an identity group join with arguments on behalf of deliberative democracy.
demands could accommodate.\textsuperscript{13} An identity group has interests, as well as claims on respect and recognition; an interest group does not necessarily share a sense of identity (see Fraser 1995 for discussion of balancing recognition with redistribution).

The theoretical debate over whether women constitute a coherent interest (or identity) group is not fully resolved by examining empirical studies of what women, themselves, consider their own interests. Many direct measures of interests (surveys, voting patterns, etc) show much diversity among women. For example, a 2007 Pew survey (http://pewresearch.org/pubs/536/working-women) of American mothers showed that stay-at-home mothers and working mothers have divergent attitudes about working outside the home; both categories of women dislike the idea of full-time work, but working mothers are much more positive about part-time work. In terms of gendered interests, i.e., interests that are distinctive to women, other surveys show how attitudinal differences between women and men are not the same in all societies: gendered attitudinal distinctions may be much smaller in some societies than in others.\textsuperscript{14}

What remains constant is the situation that women grapple with questions of balancing work and family in a way that men, overall, do not. Women share numerous experiences as a unique group, including but not limited to childbirth, disproportionate attention to child-care and family care, disproportionate experience of single-parenting,

\textsuperscript{13} Hartsock and Diamond (1998) also argue for distinguishing women from traditional interest groups. From their radical perspective, all political institutions were founded as patriarchies, meaning that they do not want merely to “include” women and women’s experiences in the business-as-usual of political decision making. Instead, they advocate re-creating political institutions from the bottom up.

\textsuperscript{14} See, for example, Inglehart and Norris (2003) for a comprehensive look at how attitudinal differences between women and men vary across societies.
and disproportionate experience of poverty. I choose to operationalize a broad range of indicators for women’s interests, reflecting this diversity.

A number of studies, both in the American context and elsewhere, offer precedent for this choice: they do not restrict indicators of women’s substantive representation to a narrow set of policies (Bratton 2005; Celis 2006; Saint-Germain 1989; Swers 2002; Tremblay 2006). In the same vein, Bratton (2005), Saint-Germain (1989), and Swers (2002) include both feminist women’s issues and traditional women’s issues in their analyses. Swers, for example, consults both liberal and conservative women’s groups’ legislative reports to identify bills that warrant closer inspection (2002:34-5). In including traditional (domestic) concerns of women, Saint-Germain (1989) argues that addressing only feminist issues (e.g., goals of social change) neglects important issues that are clearly related to women’s experiences, e.g., children, child care, and education (958).

Gendered social markers – e.g., being married, having children – are not limited to feminist concerns.

These broad notions of women’s interests inspire the research design that I will discuss in subsequent chapters, but I do more than expand the concept to include a greater range of interests. Specifically, I divide women’s interests into three spheres in which women have rights, related to different roles: the political sphere (in which we think of women having actionable rights as citizens; among other rights, this includes suffrage and, a more contemporary concern, women’s access to opportunities to run for office), the economic sphere (in which we think of women having actionable rights as employees, in the labor force, etc; this includes the right to financial independence), and the domestic sphere (this corresponds to what is often called the private sphere and includes women’s
roles as mothers and family-members). A common concern among women, especially salient in the German debates I examine, is how to balance a career with family responsibilities. Depending upon how this concern was framed, I coded this as either economic or domestic. Emphasis on women wanting to return to work after giving birth in order to be or remain financially independent was considered economic sphere. Emphasis on women having adequate time to spend with their children or to raise their children properly was considered domestic sphere.

Measuring the representation of all three spheres of interests is important for several reasons. First, conflating them would elide over persisting distinctions between the public and private roles of women. Writing about the U.S. context, the historian Glenna Matthews (1992) has argued that the story of the advancement of women’s rights is revealed by studying women’s movement into the public sphere. She provides an extensive discussion of how the relationship between women’s private and public lives in the United States has changed over the course of almost four centuries, showing that expectations of women in the home have persisted in shaping women’s activities in the public sphere, more so than the other way around. The idea that women’s domestic responsibilities constrain their freedom to become actively engaged in public life is immediately applicable to the German context, where debates about how to balance family and career are central to the state’s concern with gender roles.

Second, there are reasons to expect that members of specific political parties will be more active in advocating for women in some spheres than in others. For example, left-leaning parties have often incorporated a notion of women’s interests explicitly into their platforms. Right-leaning parties either incorporate a narrow notion of these interests
or do not address these issues explicitly, at all. As I will discuss in more detail near the end of this chapter, Germany’s Free Democratic Party (FDP), the European liberal party in the German system, is ideologically opposed to the state interfering with family dynamics but not opposed to the enforcement of anti-discrimination policies.

Third, disaggregating women’s interests into three categories makes it possible to maintain some agnosticism regarding which interests, exactly, should be represented. The diversity among women’s assessments of what their interests comprise justifies this agnosticism. Although this accumulated “list” of categories of women’s interests is broad, it does not extend to lesbian issues. This is because the intention of the project is to call attention to historical inequalities experienced by women as a larger group. This is a heteronormative construction of women’s rights, highlighting the idea that patriarchy is a heteronormative context.

Taken together, these three spheres encompass the primary issue areas in which women struggle for equality with men. In this way, women’s interests (writ large, including all three spheres) may include protecting equal access to educational opportunities and also tax policies that permit women to stay at home as primary caregivers if they wish, i.e., policies that do not prevent women from pursuing their job of choice, whatever that choice might be. For the purposes of this project, advocacy for these interests must explicitly call attention to women as a group. Policies and advocacy that may incidentally objectively benefit women as a group do not count, because attention is not called to these issues as women’s interests.¹¹

¹¹Recall Gutmann’s definition of identity, which emphasizes people working together “in an organized fashion on the basis of their identities” (2003:10).
More generally, women’s substantive representation “by happenstance” is not what this project is trying to explain. Instead, I seek to explain variation in female legislators’ explicit attention to women as a group and to women’s interests. I have argued that there is such a category of women’s interests; throughout the dissertation, I will advance the argument that the experience of specific, gendered social and legal pressures reinforce women’s sense of identity as women. In the case of female legislators, these social markers signal a greater propensity to work actively to call attention to women as a group and to advance women’s interests.

Case study: the Bundestag

In order to discern factors that contribute to women’s substantive representation and to examine variation among female legislators, I study Germany’s lower legislative house, the Bundestag. Germany’s multi-party system offers leverage on my research questions, and the German cultural context provides an informative backdrop for debates over women’s interests. It is in the last 15-20 years that the state has consciously and explicitly addressed gendered roles in parenting and child-care, arguably in response to the combination of a declining birth rate and simultaneously diminishing welfare state apparatus.

A wide variety of ideological positions is present in the Bundestag. The center-right is represented by the sister parties of Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU); their platform consists of social conservatism alongside a commitment to reconciling social justice with a market economy. European liberalism, invoking a commitment to the market economy more than to any specific social model, is
represented by the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The center-left is represented by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which emphasizes a mixed economy with extensive social security provisions and protection of workers’ rights. The Green Party/Alliance 90 is the post-materialist party in the Germany system, emphasizing human rights and environmentalism. Finally, there is a Communist-successor party, the Left. This party was known from the German reunification to 2007 as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Unlike in the American context, where much of the research on women’s substantive representation has been done, legislators need not choose exclusively between two (Democrat and Republican) sets of policy options and broad ideological perspectives.

This diversity corresponds to a range of stances towards women and women’s issues. The Left, for example, places tremendous emphasis on equality of outcome with respect to women, endorsing gender quotas in all areas. As we would expect from the party’s democratic socialist ideology, their platform also discusses the feminization of poverty at length. The Green party, although also left-oriented, does not simply do left “less”; instead, it does left differently from the Left party, focusing on environmentalism and long-time ties to German women’s movements, especially pacifist movements.

Thus, the ideological diversity in the German system makes it possible to make more complex evaluations of how and when legislators represent women substantively. For example, findings from the American context show Republican female legislators defecting from their party to vote for Democratically-sponsored legislation, but this only

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16 The feminization of poverty – which is empirically contested – would be the trend whereby women and female-headed households are disproportionately (relatively to men and male-headed households) poverty-stricken.
shows female legislators to be “more liberal” than male legislators (see, for example: Swers 1998; Swers 2002; Thomas 1994). In a system with greater formalized ideological diversity, legislators have many different stances towards women and women’s issues to adopt.

The debates over women’s issues and women’s rights in Germany are an additional reason to focus on this particular case. These debates have risen in response to rapid changes in the social, economic, and political status of women in Germany, most of which has transpired in the last 20 years. Indeed, [West] Germany has only relatively recently begun to catch up with its Northern European peers in terms of the rates at which women work outside the home and the rates at which they participate directly in politics as candidates and office-holders. Women in the German Democratic Republic participated in the work force in high numbers, though many observers have argued that this participation belied women’s relatively low degree of social and political power in the Communist context (Harsch 2007, Rueschemeyer 1994).

Women’s increasing political power is reflected in their increasing presence in the Bundestag (see Table 1). In the 8th, 9th, and 10th legislative terms (1976-1980, 1980-1983, and 1983-1987), women numbered 38, 44, and 51, respectively, i.e., always under 10% of the total membership. In the 11th term, elected in 1987, women jumped to 15.4%, largely thanks to the Green party’s gain in seats.¹⁷ Gains of approximately 5% per election continued in the 12th, 13th, and 14th terms, after which women’s presence in the Bundestag has hovered at just over 30%. This level of women’s presence in the lower

¹⁷ For the 8th-14th legislative periods, see Ismayr (2001) p.77-79. For the 15th–17th periods, see the Interparliamentary Union for the Women in National Parliaments datasets (the number of women is drawn from the data available immediately following the election).
legislative house places Germany at #18 in the September 2009 Interparliamentary Union table of women in national parliaments.¹⁸

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative term</th>
<th>Women’s presence in the Bundestag (#)</th>
<th>Women’s presence in the Bundestag (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th (1976-1980)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th (1980-1983)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th (1983-1987)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th (1987-1990)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th (1990-1994)</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th (1994-1998)</td>
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<td>14th (1998-2002)</td>
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<td>15th (2002-2005)</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
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<td>16th (2005-2009)</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th (2009-)</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1. Women’s presence in the Bundestag (1976-2009)

*The size of the Bundestag is not fixed and shifts at each election based upon parties’ acquisition of what are called “overhang seats” (see Shugert and Wattenberg 2001).

The jumps in women’s presence in the Bundestag were largely facilitated by the adoption of gender quotas (sex quotas) by most parties in the German system.¹⁹,²⁰ As there is no constitutional or legislative mandate for inclusion of female candidates, these quotas are entirely voluntary and vary across party. The Green party officially adopted a “zipper policy” (alternating female and male candidates on their party list) at their 1986

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¹⁸ Prior to the 2002 15th legislative elections (with the Bundestag at 30.9% female), Germany placed at #11 in this list, showing how globally the presence of women in legislatures has increased in the last decade.

¹⁹ These quotas are most accurately termed “sex quotas,” because they are quotas based in biological distinctions. However, they are more commonly termed “gender quotas.”

²⁰ Drude Dahlerup refers to the “fast track” to women’s presence in legislatures that quotas may provide (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005 “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to Equal Political Representation for Woman” International Feminist Journal of Politics 7:1 26-48).
party convention in Hannover.\textsuperscript{21} Shortly, thereafter, the SPD adopted a gender quota at its 1988 party convention in Muenster that set increasingly ambitious benchmarks for the party to meet (by the late 1990s, 40% of SPD candidates must be female). The national CDU/CSU convention in 1996, under the leadership of Helmut Kohl, decided after contentious debate to instantiate a 30% “target” for including female candidates. The post-communist party in the German system has undergone several transformations since German reunification – it was first the PDS (the Party of Democratic Socialism) and then, in 2007, it became the Left party – but it has always included a 50% quota for candidate lists in its party rules. The FDP does not have a gender quota.

Women’s participation in the labor force has also followed an upward trajectory, though not as starkly upward. The German Statistical Agency (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland) notes that the percentage of women of working age (15 years and older) engaged in the labor force increased 3.3% between 1994 and 2004. In 2004, 55.5% of women were participants in the labor force, as compared to 66.3% of men. Looking at this age range (15-64) and distinguishing between the “new” states (the former GDR, East Germany) and the “old” states (West Germany), it is clear that women in the East are employed at substantially higher rates: 72% in the East versus 64% in the West (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, 2004). Although women in the West still participate in the labor force at lower rates than women in the East, data compiled by the Federal Ministry for Children, Families, Women, and Health (Bundesministerium fuer Jugend, Familie, Frauen und Gesundheit) in 1989 show a sizeable increase in just the five

\textsuperscript{21} A 50/50 policy has reportedly applied since the party’s inception.
years between 1989 and 1994: 47% of women between 15 and 65 in the West were employed (as compared to 52.2% in 1994).

Contrary to these signs of improvement, the reunited German state is actually in the process of cutting back the social welfare apparatus that is argued to have raised women’s political and economic status to begin with (see Sainsbury 1999). Simultaneously, the last three Bundestag terms have included unprecedented debates over women’s social roles and the state’s responsibility to support a wider array of work and family choices, e.g., by supporting a greater availability of child care, as well as debates surrounding the gendered effects of tax laws. This paring back of the welfare state may have forced the debate over women’s roles, in the first place, and it seems unlikely that women’s role in the workplace would have become such a salient issue in the 16th Bundestag if single mothers (an increasing demographic trend) were not particularly adversely affected by Hartz IV reforms. The Hartz IV reforms were implemented by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in the 15th Bundestag, in 2003, and they amounted to “the first major pruning of benefits since the welfare state was set up after the war” (The Guardian January 5, 2005).

In short, Germany’s recent trajectory as a social welfare state contrasts with social transformation in favor of women’s economic independence. Although many of these changes (e.g., greater availability of child care) represent feminist successes, substantial tension persists between more and less traditional conceptions of women’s roles in society. Moreover, not all parties – nor all women – share an understanding of the role that the state might take in mediating these contested values. Debates in the Bundestag over this simultaneous transformation of state structures and gender roles are
tremendously valuable material for assessing determinants of the substantive representation of women’s interests, because a wide variety of stances is present (permitting me to examine what factors contribute to this variety), and because the plenary sessions serve as the public’s window onto legislative activities. The reasons political parties and individual legislators give for supporting their conception of women’s rights and gender roles are publicly shared and explained in these fora.

**Road map**

I have introduced several concepts that are core to this project: first, the idea that we should pay attention to both identity and interests groups in democratic settings; second, the argument that women comprise one of these groups requiring attention; and third, a discussion of interests that women as a group might share. Subsequent chapters of the dissertation address pieces of the argument that female legislators are more likely to engage actively in advancing the rights and interests of women when they exhibit specific social markers that highlight their identity as women.

In some senses, the reversal of exclusive policies such that group members (e.g., women) can take part in public decision making, by running or and holding office, accomplishes the goal of advancing group rights, in and of itself. In other senses, group members’ (women’s) participation in public debate as legislators and as public decision makers may benefit these groups by, as Kymlicka describes it, “[transforming] the pre-existing assumptions held by members of the larger society about what is right and fair for these groups” (2002:292). In other words, simply including women in public decision making is a step forward in advancing women’s rights because it is, in and of itself,
progress when women hold office; but women’s direct involvement may impart other positives to decision making, as well. However, as I have emphasized, the extent to which their group membership influences female legislators’ preferences and behavior has not heretofore been clearly demonstrated.

I will argue that the experience of specific, gendered social and legal pressures (signaled by social markers) makes female legislators’ engagement in explicitly promoting women’s rights and interests more likely. I also identify three cohorts that reflect distinct periods of socialization, “eras” of women’s rights, where older cohorts were socialized in contexts of more intense debate over gendered norms. This cohort effect also shapes legislators’ engagement in women’s issues, such that socialization in more intense periods of debate makes WSR more likely. I show evidence to support this claim from contemporary Germany (1998-2009): I provide analyses of German party platforms’ and of contemporary German conceptions of what women’s interests are, and I examine evidence of the positions that legislators advocate in public debates. The chapters of the dissertation proceed as follows:

In chapter 2, I examine previous studies’ proposed mechanisms for women’s substantive representation. Much previous literature has shown differences between male and female legislators’ attention to women’s interests, generally showing a slightly higher rate of activity on behalf of women by female legislators. However, the mechanisms that this work proposes to explain female legislators’ engagement on these issues are not entirely clear, and they are not explicitly tested. I review this previous literature, emphasizing why I choose to focus on variation among women, and I discuss how I choose to operationalize women’s substantive representation. In discussing mechanisms
that produce women’s substantive representation, I further develop the usefulness of social markers, which promote attention to women as a group among the female legislators who manifest those social markers.

Chapters 3-5 are empirical chapters exploring the role of identity alongside other known predictors of individual legislators’ behavior. In chapter 3 I follow Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott’s (2006) advice and explore the content of, and contestation over, women’s identity in the German context. I show that the social markers of motherhood and marriage denote specific social and legal constraints, which evolve over time. In all periods, though to varying extent, they distinguish between 1) women who are mothers and women who are not and between 2) women who are married/widowed and women who are not. I suggest that these distinctions among women translate into variation in their engagement in addressing women’s issues. This chapter includes a combination of primary source material (in the forms of interviews with members of the Bundestag and demographic data) and secondary source material (in the form of scholarship addressing the role of women in German society).

Chapter 4 examines party affiliation as a predictor of who will represent women. Party affiliation is consistently shown in other studies to be a strong predictor of individual legislators’ behavior and preferences, and clearly some parties pay more attention to women as a group and to women’s interests than other parties. However, the sex of a legislator, separate from her or his party affiliation, has also been argued to explain propensity to act on behalf of women. My aim in this chapter is ask whether apparent distinctions among female legislators’ attitudes towards women’s interests amount simply to differences in party affiliation. I first compare female and male
legislators within the same party to assess whether gendered differences persist in spite of relatively high levels of party disciplines. Second, I compare women across parties. These two stages of analysis highlight the shortcomings of both party affiliation and sex as predictors of attitudes towards women and women’s interests.

Chapter 5 uses a large data-set of indicators of women’s substantive representation from transcripts of plenary session debates and of speaker characteristics and backgrounds (including the social markers of motherhood and marriage), with the goal of understanding the various factors underpinning variation among female legislators’ advocacy for women as a group. I show that several crucial distinctions among female legislators (specifically social markers, including motherhood and their marital status, and age) contribute to explaining variation in whether and how they pursue agendas related to women as a group.

In chapter 6, the final chapter, I discuss the implications of my findings for theoretical and empirical studies of women’s substantive representation.
Chapter 2: Women’s Substantive Representation

Introduction

What explains variation among female legislators’ active engagement in advancing the interests of women as a group? Chapter 1 defined women’s interests – a range of interests related to rights in a number of different spheres of activity (political, economic, and family) – acknowledging that grouping all women together is a fraught conceptual move. As I discussed in chapter 1, women are divided into sub-groups of experience, relationships, oppression, and interests, just as is any other supposed collection of people. However, I argued that women ultimately share enough fundamental social roles and a long history of subjugation in common, even when the specific context of these roles and this subjugation may vary, that we can talk about women requiring legislative attention as a group. Conventional wisdom and good sense suggest that female legislators would be best positioned to pay this attention. In this chapter I address in what ways these expectations may be justified.

Despite strong evidence that female legislators pay more attention to women’s interests than male legislators, it remains the case that not all women represent women, and some men do. Moreover, most studies of the representation of women’s interests indicate that these differences between female and male legislators are slight. Given this previous literature addressing women’s substantive representation, which I discuss here, attention must be paid to explaining the variation among women. In this chapter I
develop a theoretical framework for distinguishing among female legislators, i.e., identifying distinctions among female legislators that translate into varying degrees of attention to the group to which they, by dint of both history and persistently gendered social distinctions, belong. Alongside other explanatory variables that clearly play a role in distinguishing among female legislators, I will argue that two specific social markers motivate a greater level of activity in advancing women’s interests: motherhood and marriage. These social markers signal a particular appreciation for highly gender-specific roles that represent a history of legal and social inequalities. Following from the observation that legal and social norms evolve over time, I further argue that the age of a legislator shapes her propensity to engage in advocating for women. Older female legislators, especially older women who are mothers and/or married, will be more inclined to advocate for women than their younger counterparts, because they will have had direct experience with more traditionalist social and legal norms. These traditionalist norms frequently reinforce gendered inequalities.

Social markers are social cues (clothing, gender, race, ethnicity, class, among others) to specific social expectations about behavior and preferences. Women who exhibit specific social markers share both the experiences of filling that role (e.g., motherhood) as well as the pressures exerted on them by others’ expectations. In the case of female legislators, these expectations surrounding social markers are mitigated by other factors that have also been clearly shown in previous research to shape their preferences and activities, including: party affiliation, connections to extra-parliamentary organizations, and constituency. I will suggest that social markers may help us
understand how women sort into various political parties, introducing greater complexity into theories of women’s substantive representation.

The previous chapter addressed the fraught question of eliding over the many differences among women in order to group them together and proposed a theory of women’s interests. This chapter picks up this thread and proceeds to operationalize attention to and advocacy for these interests. I first review previous studies’ indicators of women’s substantive representation, summarizing the findings of these previous studies. Based upon this previous work, I justify my choice of operationalizing women’s substantive representation (WSR) primarily as *speech* that calls attention to women as a group. Next, I discuss the mechanisms that previous research has suggested to explain marginally greater WSR by female legislators than their male counterparts. This work often posits a connection between women’s descriptive (women’s presence) and substantive (acting on behalf of women) representation; while the evidence these studies present support gendered patterns in legislators’ engagement in WSR, i.e., differences between female and male legislators, it does not explain which female legislators do this versus which do not. In response to this checkered theorizing by empirical studies on connections between WDR and WSR, I propose a theory of social markers, which draws heavily upon political theory of identity and upon social psychology.

Social markers distinguish between female and male legislators, but they also distinguish among female legislators. As I will argue in this chapter and develop further in chapter 3 for the specific context of Germany, the social markers of *motherhood* and *marriage* denote pressures and experiences that some women have and some do not: women who are mothers and women who are married have different experiences as
women from those who are not mothers and not married, respectively. This effect is further mediated by age. A theory of social markers moves beyond experiences, however. For example, it is not only the act of raising a child that constitutes the content of the social marker of motherhood. This social marker also includes the kinds of legal and social expectations imposed upon women who are mothers, as distinct from women who are not mothers. I will suggest that these distinctions among women, based upon whether they are mothers and whether they are married, help predict who will actively engage with legislation with direct implications for women.

After discussing a theory of social markers as a tool for distinguishing among female legislators, I present the panoply of alternative explanations supported by previous research on individual legislators’ behavior. Subsequent chapters interrogate these alternative explanations using qualitative data, and a final empirical chapter offers some statistical analyses of social markers’ influence on WSR controlling for these other variables.

**What is to be explained: women’s substantive representation**

The dependent variable in this dissertation is women’s substantive representation (WSR): the active engagement by legislators (or, in a more general definition, any person or entity making public decisions) on issues on behalf of women as a group. If legislators never mentioned women; never acknowledged the ways in which gendered social roles are relevant for decisions by the state, e.g., by recognizing that gendered occupational
patterns may translate into gender-biased taxation patterns;\textsuperscript{22} and never examined the particular concerns facing women as primary caregivers, then women would be poorly or simply not substantively represented, whether or not female legislators had taken part in the policymaking process.

I restrict measures of women’s substantive representation to advocacy explicitly for women, i.e., indicators do not include WSR by happenstance or WSR disguised as something else. I was once asked by a political conservative why we cannot think of advocating for lower taxes as women’s substantive representation. It’s good for everyone, the audience member reasoned, including women, so why not count it as WSR? Must advocacy and legislation explicitly address women to be women’s substantive representation? Yes, it must. This dissertation develops theoretical expectations of variation among female legislators’ explicit attention to the concerns of women as a group. Although some feminists argue that female legislators make positive, innovative contributions to policy-making in all issue areas, the social markers I suggest emerge from theoretical literature that specifically addresses connections between gendered experiences and legislating on specific gendered issues. We might think of explicit references to women as a hard case: it takes a certain level of attention and commitment. My research models the predictors of this certain level of attention and commitment.

One might argue that restricting my definition of women’s substantive representation to explicit references to women and women’s interests biases my measures

\textsuperscript{22} For example, in Germany there is a taxation policy for married couples (called Ehegattensplitting) that places both spouses’ earnings under the higher tax bracket, which due to gendered income patterns is typically the husband’s. This means that in a given year more money is removed from the lower-paid spouse (more frequently the wife)’s income than would be otherwise.
towards feminist notions of women’s interests. This is because calling attention to the experiences of women, to gendered inequalities, etc, is central to feminism. However, as Ronnee Schreiber points out in her 2008 study of conservative women’s organizations in the United States, it is not just feminist organizations that are gender-conscious. Schreiber describes conservative women’s organizations as equally prone to “act to legitimate themselves as representatives of women’s interests” (2008:8). Research on conservative women’s organizations is rare, making Schreiber’s findings all the more significant. However anathema she may be to feminist organizations, Phyllis Schlafly lays claims to being a legitimate spokeswomen for American women. Given that both conservative and progressive women’s organizations undertake gender-conscious strategies, which reflect the ways in which ideologically varied female legislators may also act, I argue that restricting my indicators to explicit references to women does not unduly bias my findings.

A third concern about my choice to restrict WSR to explicit attention to women is that some legislators may judge it strategically smarter to advocate for women by not mentioning women. Absence of explicit references to women would not, therefore, reflect absence of attention to women. For example, a trend in women’s advocacy since the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 has been to make arguments in terms of human rights. We see this trend reflected in other campaigns, including LGBT rights campaigns. This is tactically smart, because it forces interlocutors into a rhetorical corner: it is much more difficult to argue against the importance of human rights than to argue against the importance of women’s rights, per se.
It is without doubt the case that important work on behalf of women – explicitly on behalf of women – is being undertaken with an emphasis on broader terminology. These activities should still fit within the universe of WSR to which my theory of social markers applies, because they reflect strategic choices rather than variation in ultimate goals, i.e., agitating for human rights in order to benefit women differs from agitating directly for women’s rights strictly in terms of means and not ends. However, I choose to focus on explicit references to women, with two justifications: first, the social markers that I present should substantively match the kind of issues on which some female legislators will be more active. Second, restricting indicators to explicit references to women as a group is a reasonable way both to identify data and to keep it to a more manageable size.

The notion of WSR that I have introduced here builds from Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) seminal work on political representation, with which most literature reviews on the subject begin. Pitkin discusses four ways to conceive of political representation: *formalistic*, which emphasizes the institutions that facilitate representation (namely, the rules that govern how representatives make decisions on behalf of others); *symbolic*, which regards how representatives symbolically affect the represented (e.g., as a role model); *descriptive*, which is when the representative resembles the represented (e.g., female legislators descriptively represent female constituents); and *substantive*, which is all of the ways in which representatives “act for” or on behalf of the represented.

Pitkin argues that formalistic and substantive representation are the most significant types, averring that a representative’s identity is only relevant when it is related to his or her actions: “A representative must first of all be capable of effective
action,” otherwise s/he is no representative, at all (65). She notes that descriptive and symbolic representation emphasize the identity (read: statal presence) of a representative more so than her actions; “what he is [or she] or is like” is the focus of these kinds of representation (1967:65). Ultimately, political representatives best serve their constituents by pursuing the interests of those constituents, not by looking like their constituents.

Legislative studies that focus on roll call votes satisfy Pitkin’s concern with effective action, and previous studies of WSR often follow suit. These studies of WSR have conceptualized their dependent variable in several different ways. Celis (2008) provides an excellent overview of this previous work, which has tended to focus on the representation of women’s interests in terms of differences between female and male legislators’ levels of engagement in WSR. Extant empirical studies of women’s political representation have tended to begin with an enumerated list of women’s interests and then sought the extent to which female legislators advocate for these interests. A first category examines what is often called “impact” (female legislators’ impact on policy making). Measures of “impact” include rates of legislators’ co-sponsorship of bills oriented towards women’s interests (Swers 2005; Saint-Germain 1989), the rates of enactment of women’s proposals into law (Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1991, 1994), and the success of women legislators in achieving leadership positions (Bratton 2005). In

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23 Here, Pitkin’s emphasis on action derives from her discussion of Hobbesian notions of representation. Hobbes argues that representatives are, definitionally, people who have authority to act on others’ behalf.

24 This measure is more appropriate in the American context, where individual legislators have relatively great freedom in initiating legislation.

25 In this vein, Pitkin (1967) argues that “a representative must first of all be capable of action,” otherwise he or she is no representative, at all (p.65). This argument underlies Pitkin’s ultimate rejection of descriptive – statal, identity-based – representation as inadequate as a stand-alone dimension of political representation.
a brilliant study of the policy effects of randomly reserved seats for women in village councils in India, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show that women’s presence on these councils increases investments in infrastructure of greater concern to women in those specific communities (e.g., greater investment in water in communities where women are particularly concerned about water).

A second category of WSR studies diverges somewhat from Pitkin’s notion of effective action. These studies operationalize substantive representation in terms of female legislators’ contributions to earlier stages of the legislative process. For example, Celis (2006) studies the number of “interventions” that female legislators make on behalf of women during budgetary debates, and Childs and Withey (Childs 2001 and 2002; Childs and Withey 2004) examine the content of Early Day Motions in the British Parliament. Celis notes that her research does not measure whether these interventions reallocated funds in a way that benefited women, but she stresses that these ideas cannot be incorporated into policy if they are never voiced at all (2006:91).

Impact studies have yielded contradictory results, and here I will focus on a number of examples. First, studies of women in American politics are divided on the question of women’s impact on policy. For example, Saint-Germain’s (1989) study of bills in the Arizona state legislature 1969-1986 concludes that women legislators distinctively influence policy. Saint-Germain analyzes 1) the initiation of public policy proposals and 2) the enactment of those proposals, and she identifies a gendered difference in both content of proposals as well as rates of those proposals’ enactment. Women, according to Saint-Germain, tend to initiate policy proposals that address women’s interests more often than men. By contrast, Reingold’s (2000) study of Arizona
and California state legislatures de-emphasizes gendered differences. Reingold (2000) even notes that, while she observes gendered attitudes in legislative behavior, the differences among women and among men may ultimately be more significant than the differences between women and men.

Unlike studies of the U.S., studies of impact outside the American context usually argue that women do have legislative agendas that are distinct from men. Dahlerup (1988), for example, has done compelling studies of women’s distinctive contributions to legislation in Scandinavia. Celis (2006) finds that women members of the Belgian parliament do appear to intervene in budgetary debates on women’s behalf at a higher rate than men do. Lovenduski and Norris (2003) analyze survey responses from approximately 1000 national politicians in Britain (both candidates and members of Parliament), testing specifically for – and claiming to find – gendered differences in values and attitudes that would underpin women representatives’ distinctiveness (e.g., the surveys ask questions about policy priorities). Like Reingold (1992, 2000), Lovenduski and Norris argue that these attitudes are necessary, though not sufficient, for women to champion women’s interests in the legislature. Similarly, Broughton and Zetlin (1996) conclude, based upon interviews with Australian Labor Party women parliamentarians from Queensland, that women do perceive their public office as a means to pursue women’s interests.

One of the most compelling corroborations of the hypothesis that women contribute ideas that would not otherwise find voice is found in a study done in the U.K. Childs (2002) cleverly seeks evidence of gendered policy-making in the highly structured British House of Commons by studying Early Day Motions, and she finds that women
take advantage of this more flexible environment to express preferences that distinctly address women’s interests. Notably, Early Day Motions by women MPs brought attention to the Value Added Tax that had been levied on women’s sanitary products; it had heretofore not occurred to male MPs that such products were in fact necessary (and therefore deserving of non-VAT status). This act of substantive representation is an example of representation that might derive exclusively from the experience of women.

Studies of women’s impact that address critical mass and tokenism have yielded a patchwork of conclusions, as well. Critical mass and tokenism arguments derive from Rosabeth Kanter’s (1977) finding that women employees in industry suppress their gendered differences when they are in the minority in their workplace. Looking at tokenism in the political context, Thomas (1991, 1994) and Saint-Germain (1989) study various American state legislatures in the 1970s and 1980s and conclude that a critical mass is necessary before women will fulfill their potential to represent women’s interests.

Bratton (2005), who studies state legislatures in California, Illinois and Maryland, also finds evidence of women’s impact, but her conclusions regarding tokenism are very different from Thomas and Saint-Germain’s. Bratton argues, contrary to Kanter’s (1977) finding, that women politicians are actually more extroverted about their gender in contexts of minority status. Although Kanter may have been correct about women in a private company setting, Bratton notes that “standing out” amongst other politicians is actually an asset. Unlike women employees of private companies, whose audience and critics are their colleagues (primarily men), women politicians’ job is public: extra visibility, and more exposure to voters, could potentially be a career boost (2005:100).
Related studies look at what they call critical women, i.e., female policymakers who as individuals are critical actors in advancing WSR (Celis 2006; Childs and Krook 2006; Celis, Childs, and Krook 2008; Childs and Krook 2009). This follows from the argument that female legislators contribute specific ideas to debate and to policymaking that would otherwise be absent.

I have noted that Pitkin describes substantive representation as “effective action” on behalf of the represented (1967:65). Studies that focus on impact follow from this definition. However, I argue for a definition that is not restricted to effectiveness (or outcome). A definition that privileges outcome, e.g., the passage of a law, discounts failed efforts, which are just as legitimate representation of interests. According to Pitkin’s logic, the actions of small parties with few seats would only count as substantive representation if they were fortunate enough to round out a coalition, as they would be largely “ineffectual” in terms of proposing legislation on their own. Even in a coalition, it might be argued that the small party holds little sway, and, therefore, does not substantively represent. Pitkin, therefore, predicts that the mere presence of women, much like the mere presence of small parties, does not constitute effective representation. However, as many opposition party legislators (whom I interviewed as part of my fieldwork) noted, the opposition plays a powerful role injecting new ideas into debate, which may later become viable when suggested by coalition members.

My approach most resembles the latter set of indicators that emphasize earlier stages of the legislative process, with an emphasis on speech acts that draw attention to, frame, and advocate for women as a group with distinct, politically relevant interests.

Note that many studies also measure the initiation or sponsorship of laws as impact.
Indicators that emphasize speech include legislators’ references to women as a group with distinct interests, legislators’ identification of issues as gendered, and the various kinds of justifications that legislators might give to bolster these references/identification. Although impact-based studies clearly have a place in this research, I argue that it is crucial to examine discourse as the initial stage of substantive representation. This choice follows from previous work like Karin Tamerius’s (1995) study of women’s substantive representation in the U.S. Congress. Tamerius argues that agenda setting and earlier stages of policy making are much more important to “women and other legislative minorities” (1995:95-6). Consequently, Tamerius codes speeches in Congress as one of her indicators of WSR.

Many scholars have studied legislators’ voting behavior, not parliamentary speech, in order to assess women’s substantive representation, with the premise that support or rejection of a bill ultimately defines each representative’s “effectiveness” (Pitkin 1967). However, party discipline often does not permit the freedom in voting that it permits in speech, and roll call votes are selective and (in contexts like Germany) rare (see Carey 2009). Although legislative voting patterns clearly matter in formalist models of representation, they do not fully capture substantive representation, because they miss the stage where new ideas are introduced to debate. Moreover, as proponents of deliberative democracy argued, much of the “action” in democracy happens prior to the vote (Mansbridge 1980; Saward 2000).

**Connections between descriptive and substantive representation: political theory**
Here I discuss theoretical approaches to women’s political representation with the goal of showing how my research framework builds upon these concepts. Drawing from the research that I describe here, I propose the argument that it is not just experiences as mothers and wives but also the perspectives resulting from these experiences that motivate some female legislators more than others. The idea that perspectives contribute to shared identity is drawn from a broader literature, not all of which directly addresses women (see discussion in chapter 1). I begin with the proposition that there is tremendous variation among women and then seek to identify the limited common ground among women; this approach is unlike much of the theoretical work that I describe here, which imply as their starting point that all women have an innate inclination to speak for other women.

Current theory on political representation diverges markedly from Pitkin’s claims even while it uses her terminology, in that it focuses on the links between descriptive/symbolic and substantive representation. Based upon J.S. Mill’s idea that representatives provide crucial information about constituents who are not actually present in the legislative body, Pitkin argues that descriptive representation may be most “appropriate and relevant” in situations where it is suspected that information about constituents’ preferences is missing. However, Pitkin dismisses this observation as rare and not nearly as important as effective action. Nonetheless, this concern about missing information underlies a fundamental theoretical reason for expecting descriptive representation to facilitate substantive representation: members of groups are expected to have the best knowledge of those groups’ respective interests. This expectation underpins the mechanism that is most often invoked by research on women’s substantive
representation (which focuses on distinguishing women’s contributions as distinct from men’s, not on explaining variation among female legislators): women will represent women, because female representatives can provide information (point of view) that would otherwise be absent. The emphasis in these mechanisms is on all women’s innate capacity to speak for other women.

Phillips’s *Politics of Presence* (1995) picks up Pitkin’s terminology but argues that descriptive and substantive representation may not be so easily separated, i.e., she does not depart from the premise that women have groupness. Phillips contrasts two distinct modes of politics: a politics of ideas and a politics of presence. Although these two modes are juxtaposed against one another, both are necessary, and Phillips argues that they overlap. The first mode corresponds to more formalistic models of representation, where what legislators do is aggregate and transmit constituents’ interests. By contrast, the second mode emphasizes identity. It is not just interests that are transmitted by a representative; instead, there is also a broader symbolism of the group that has those interests, because the presence of a group member encourages recognition and respect for that group. Phillips ultimately endorses a mix of her two modes of politics, noting that “it is in the relationship between ideas and presence that we can best hope to find a fairer system of representation, not in a false opposition between one or the other” (1995:25). She emphasizes that ideas (interests) cannot be fully separated from the people who share those interests.

Related to Phillips’s work, another school of thought on women’s political representation eschews the formalist models that Pitkin advocates, in which interest groups are of paramount importance, and advocates various versions of qualified
deliberative democratic models, instead (Fraser 1997, Mansbridge 1999, Young 1990 & 1997, Squires 1999, 2000). This theoretical work tends to emphasize female legislators’ ability to speak for other women as a matter of shared, gendered identity, even when they concede that that are differences among women. In other words, these theorists envision a shared overarching identity among women, with sub-groups (e.g., racial groups among women) that also require presence and voice in legislatures.

In this framework, individuals (here, individual women) from varied backgrounds can contribute different ideas and perspectives to debate and to decision making. Writing specifically about women, these theorists (see Phillips 1995, 1998; Young 1997) often emphasize that women’s interests are not merely a matter of objective circumstances or material conditions, i.e., it is not as simple as saying that women have grievances related to childcare because they are more frequently primary care-givers than men. These scholars refer to the “diversified life experience of different groups of women,” which yield a rich variety of perspectives that deserve to be articulated in public political fora (Celis 2008:78-9). This argument acknowledges that women are a diverse group, and that the absence of some representation of this diversity translates into less innovative policy making. More voices, it is argued, contribute more possible solutions to public problems and better address women’s concerns. This argument much more tightly underpins the expectation that personal experience, and not “merely” interests that may clearly be transmitted to political representatives whose identity is irrelevant, are what matters.

Further connecting an emphasis on identity with an emphasis on deliberation, Young (1997) argues for “public discussion and decision making” that “includes and affirms all particular social group perspectives” – including women – “in the society and
draws upon their situated knowledge as a resource for enlarging the understanding of everyone and moving them beyond their own parochial interests” (1997:399). Thus, inclusion is a vehicle for better decision making for everyone. Young (2000) further notes that the deliberative democratic “model conceptualizes the process of democratic discussion as not merely expressing and registering, but as transforming [emphasis in original] the preferences, interests, beliefs, and judgments of the participants” (26). Thus, it is not merely the transmission of women’s interests that is important but the ways in which including more perspectives shapes how people understand problems and the state, more generally.

Mansbridge (1999) and Williams (1998) similarly argue for a link between women’s descriptive and substantive representation on the basis of two broad categories of argument: first, they suggest that women (or other minorities) can be expected to legislate and behave in ways different from non-minority legislators, either by approaching problems differently or by invoking their personal experiences to motivate distinct kinds of legislation that would otherwise be absent or ignored; and second, they argue that historically marginalized groups must be descriptively included in political representative bodies in order to build trust and communication between those groups and their governments. Dovi (2002) refines Mansbridge and Williams’s claims to focus on the requirement that descriptive representatives have “strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups” (emphasis in original), e.g., by using their membership in historically disadvantaged groups to promote empowering social networks and greater communication.
Mansbridge (1999) contends that the process of deliberation is essential to the quality of the policies ultimately produced, and that descriptive representation can be crucial during deliberation. Legislating, she argues, is improved through descriptive representation when the described group’s “perspectives are relevant to a decision”: she gives the example of left-handers being a reasonable group to be descriptively represented in deliberations over surgical instruments (1999:635). Deliberation is improved by diversifying the perspectives voiced, and by ensuring that no voice is in such a minority as to be effectively silenced (1999:636). Thus, in terms of explicitly substantive representation, feminist proponents of modified deliberative democratic models would likely argue that the most meaningful measures of representation are found in deliberation, not in voting patterns. This is because it is in the stage of discussion that new ideas must be introduced; without women’s substantive representation at this stage, policy making will never include women’s concerns.

Although these theorists provide different frames for how to imagine connections between women’s presence in legislatures and justice and democracy, ultimately they begin with a claim about women’s groupness that is grounded in and justified by their shared experiences: we can talk about women as a group, because they share experiences. We can then expect female legislators to advocate for women as a group, because of these same shared experienced, i.e., it is this groupness (grounded in shared experiences) that is also expected to promote the representation of women’s interests. As Diamond and Hartsock argue, “Only women can act for women in identifying invisible [emphasis in original] problems” relevant to women, i.e., these problems are visible to people who experience them directly (1981:720). Although these various scholars frame the necessity
of women’s presence in legislatures differently, their arguments tend to originate with and return to the importance of women’s shared experiences as a group.

Most of the theory literature that I have discussed here simultaneously distinguishes between descriptive and substantive representation and makes arguments suggesting that they are imbricated with one another. Extant empirical work on women’s substantive representation often gestures towards these kinds of arguments but then, as I have noted, takes differences between female and male legislators as evidence of female legislators’ capacity to speak on behalf of women. In the next section, I discuss the mechanisms to which extant empirical studies allude.

Connections between descriptive and substantive representation: mechanisms proposed by empirical studies

Much research on WSR points to the importance of the presence of female legislators for women. These studies focus on establishing greater rates of WSR by female legislators than by their male counterparts, and even those scholars who argue that variation among women may be just as great as differences between women and men emphasize that women’s presence is likely to have substantive effects (Celis 2006, Reingold 2000). Although my project examines variation among female legislators rather than differences between female and male legislators, a review of these mechanisms proposed by previous studies is important 1) to establish the place of my project in this research program and 2) to develop hypotheses regarding variation among women.

Table 2.1 shows the findings of four exemplary studies of female legislators’ impact in the U.S. and Europe, where empirical research has concentrated. Despite these
similarities in findings, even a quick overview illustrates some variety in the mechanisms and arguments provided to interpret this pattern. Researchers often suggest a process by which women’s substantive representation obtains, but women’s presence in legislatures is typically taken as a proxy for these variously proposed, complicated mechanisms, while the steps in this process are rarely operationalized and tested. In other words, researchers show differences between female and male legislators as proof of their claims about women’s experiences or perspectives underlying good WSR; however, we do not know which experiences or preferences, as these are not measured directly.

Although it is a readily defensible practical decision due to data limitations, using a legislator’s sex as a proxy introduces two problems: 1) an apparent relationship between a legislator’s sex and her representation of women’s interests could be an indicator of numerous different processes, and 2) we lose sight of the variation among women as well as among men. Use of this proxy conflates sex with gender but does not in turn parse what about gender contributes to women’s substantive representation. As Kathleen Jones notes: “Gender is never an exhaustive descriptor of the actual lives or identities of all women or all men’” (Jones 1993:222).

The common underlying dimension of the mechanisms that these studies propose is an emphasis on the critical elements of personal experience and shared knowledge among women, which corresponds to scholars’ emphasis on descriptive representation. The implied mechanism in much of this research is that women share substantial experiences as a group, based upon both their biological sex and their social position, and

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27 See also Reingold (2000), especially Chapter 1, for a discussion of how this elision over differences among women is problematic. Reingold notes that differences among women are, according to many measures (public opinion surveys as well as surveys of elites), great, and the differences between women and men are not so great.
these experiences uniquely inform their substantive representation of women. It is personal experience that informs and promotes women’s substantive representation, hence the importance of women’s presence in legislatures and decision making bodies.

However, very little research explicitly tests this mechanism, and it is not clear how they model the connection between women’s experiences and their actions as legislators. Instead, these studies use legislators’ sex as a proxy for assumed differences between female and male legislators. While this might yield gendered patterns of difference, e.g., female legislators tend to serve on “soft” committees more than male legislators do, these patterns are not self-explanatory, and much of this research does not seek to explain evidence of differences in behavior between female and male legislators.
Table 2.1. Studies of female legislators’ distinctiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects included in the study</th>
<th>Conclusions: do female legislators legislate/prioritize differently?</th>
<th>Female legislators’ representation of women is mitigated by…*</th>
<th>Explanation for this difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swers (2002)</td>
<td>Legislators in U.S. Congress (103rd and 104th)</td>
<td>Yes (looking at sponsorship and voting patterns)</td>
<td>Partisan, ideological, constituency influences; majority party status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celi (2006)</td>
<td>Legislators in Belgian lower house (1900-1979)</td>
<td>Yes (looking at debates)</td>
<td>Number of women in the legislature (critical women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reingold (2000)</td>
<td>Legislators in Arizona and California (1990)</td>
<td>Yes, but only in that they join different committees and stay in closer touch with women’s groups</td>
<td>Institutional norms and requirements (e.g., majority coalitions, partisanship) (p.244)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1. Studies of female legislators’ distinctiveness

* “Mitigated by” refers to factors that the author discusses but does not necessarily control for statistically.

Birgit Meyer’s (2003) article is an example of research on linking descriptive and substantive representation that succeeds at establishing correlation but not causation. Meyer (2003) claims that women were instrumental in the passage of a series of landmark women’s rights legislation in Germany, but she does not describe how it is that
women made this impact. She states that powerful women members of the Bundestag “used their positions to build bridges between parliamentary caucuses and women’s groups,” but she does not explain what “bridge-building” is (is it holding breakfast meetings? strategically placing offices adjacent to one another? making space on the caucus agenda for the concerns of women’s groups?), nor does she demonstrate that other factors were not in fact responsible for these legislative outcomes (2003:416). Meyer’s evidence may suggest the correlation between apparent women’s efforts and the passage of women’s interest legislation, but her theory and data do not support causal claims.

The final column of Table 2.1 summarizes several examples of the various mechanisms proposed to explain how individual women may be especially good spokespersons for what Weldon calls women’s “group perspectives” (2002). This table illustrates empirical studies in political science, but the emphasis on personal experience and shared knowledge is originally based in feminist political theory, as I have shown. I provide a relatively cursory discussion of this previous work, as my goal is to demonstrate just two commonalities: first, this previous work often provides several (albeit related) mechanisms simultaneously, and second, these various mechanisms usually point to the importance of women’s shared experiences (as the basis for their groupness).

When studies find that female legislators represent women’s interests to a greater degree than their male counterparts, they often provide a mixture of these two arguments. In her research on budgetary debates in the Belgian lower house 1900-1979 (both before and after women gained suffrage in Belgium), Celis (2006) finds that both male and

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28 See Celis 2008 for an effort at disentangling these various mechanisms proposed to connect WDR and WSR.
female legislators intervene on behalf of women’s interests, but female legislators intervene on behalf of a broader range of interests. In explaining this pattern, Celis discusses the “specific life experience and social position of women and the potential sensitivity, knowledge, expertise, and willingness that women MPs generate for the representation of women” (2006:89). Celis argues that critical women – individual MPs in the Belgian lower house – were responsible for raising issues that would not otherwise have found voice (on critical actors/women see also Childs and Krook 2006; Childs and Krook 2009; Celis, Childs, and Krook 2008).

Although she emphasizes the experiential underpinnings of these female MPs’ behavior, Celis also notes an electoral accountability argument: “From the time of women’s suffrage on, of course, representatives also depend on women for their re-election, and the mechanism to encourage women to vote for them by trying to better represent female citizens starts working” (2006:89). Celis speculates upon a relationship between women’s enfranchisement and the representation of women’s interests in budgetary debates, but it is empirically unclear which of these factors (or to what extent both identity and electoral factors) are responsible for the patterns she observes. In any case, electoral pressures on legislators should affect both female and male legislators equally.29

Also focusing on establishing differences between female and male legislators, Swers (2002) similarly invokes a cluster of related mechanisms. She cites Mansbridge’s

29 Celis (2006)’s data bridge periods both before and after Belgian women gained the right to vote in national legislative elections (in 1948), meaning that the electoral pressures hypothesis could probably be tested statistically, Celis (2006) does emphasize in her article that her findings are not intended to “generate conclusions about what could have caused a possible distinctive activity of the women MPs (their life experiences, political expectations, external pressure from lobby groups)” (91).
argument that experiences shared by group members “improve the deliberative quality of the legislature by allowing for the expression of different perspectives on and solutions to policy problems” (Mansbridge quoted in Swers 2002:3). Later Swers refers to the “unique experiences and viewpoints” that women may contribute (2002:3), and she discusses the idea that gender-role socialization, producing specific psychological orientations (e.g., a tendency to be more nurturing), translates into other spheres of women’s lives (4). Ultimately, Swers implies that these experiences shared among women are what inspire their specific, unique-to-women sense of urgency regarding issues relevant to women.

Studies that look directly at legislators’ attitudes get closer to learning something about identity politics as opposed to about legislators’ responses to constituent pressures. Lovenduski and Norris (2003), for example, study both sitting legislators’ and candidates’ responses to a British 2001 election-time survey of political values and policy priorities. They aim to identify attitudes and beliefs that would underlie women’s substantive representation (see also Broughton and Zetlin 1996; Childs 2001; Kathlene 1989, 1995). These authors frame their studies as an effort to distinguish between female and male legislators’ attitudes as a precursor to expectations of their different legislative behavior.

By looking at attitudes and not only a legislator’s sex as an indicator of policy priorities, Lovenduski and Norris (2003) suggest that gendered attitudes and beliefs are a better predictor of women’s substantive representation than simply the legislator’s sex. However, their goal remains to demonstrate differences between female and male legislators’ attitudes. They write: “Due to their particular life experiences in the home,
workplace, and public sphere, women politicians prioritise and express different types of values, attitudes, and policy priorities, such as greater concern about childcare, health, or education, or a less conflictual and more collaborative political style” (2003:87).

Lovenduski and Norris (2003) control statistically for what I would argue are proxies for personal experiences (they control for respondents’ sex as well as various social background characteristics), but they nonetheless claim that these controls (only sex is statistically significant) do not capture “deep-seated attitudinal differences between women and men leaders” (95). For example, the age effects that they determine are statistically significant (they find that younger politicians are more likely to favor gender equality) are not further tested to ascertain whether specific life experiences that younger generations share reduce apparent gender differences. For example, are younger male and female politicians more similar than their older counterparts? Having controlled for these various background factors, Lovenduski and Norris claim that “deep-seated attitudinal differences between women and men leaders…cannot simply be explained away as due to their social background” (2003:95). They go on to argue that particular life experiences distinguish women from men. However, the examples the authors give for “particular life experiences in the home, workplace, and public sphere” seem to overlap with social background factors that they argue they have controlled for and found not statistically significant.

The explicit expectation that female legislators will represent women’s interests – in various ways, along various pathways – is intuitive. However, we do not progress much beyond conventional wisdom when we allow legislators’ sex to serve as a proxy for gender, which is clearly more complicated. (See Squires 2000 for a review of various
competing theories of gender.) Although she does not provide alternative measures, Swers concedes the problematic nature of using legislators’ sex as a way to measure what is a complicated social process, lamenting, “We must utilize observed differences based upon biology to make inferences about the impact of a social construct, gender” (2002:9).

Reingold (2000) supports my concerns about the use of this proxy. She discusses at length the conventional argument that women’s shared experiences will contribute to shared knowledge, which is part of a specific perspective that would be lacking in politics in women’s absence (2000:20-21), but she also reminds the reader at length of “the empirical, conceptual, and normative dangers of equating sex and gender, and forgetting that gender is a social construction and thus highly dependent upon social context” (2000:49). Aware of these caveats, Reingold crafts her research design after Deaux and Mayor’s (1990) social-psychological model of gender, which underscores variation among people. She writes: “‘Null’ findings, those in which the attitudes and behavior of men and women are not consistently or significantly different” should not be “necessarily viewed as disappointing or as theoretical dead ends” (2000:50). This is because the impulse to represent women substantively may lie with some other factors besides sex and gender; overturning conventional expectations is an important step towards establishing the determinants of women’s substantive representation.

In short, we must remain mindful of the distinction between sex and gender. It is not sufficient to observe a legislator’s sex and assume that her or his identity automatically facilitates greater or less attention to women as a group. Identity is complicated and involves both self-recognition (“I am a woman”) as well as recognition by others (“She is a woman”). In order to explain some of the variation among female
legislators’ attention to women as a group, we need to develop expectations of how identity translates into action among legislators.

**Social markers**

My goal is to explain variation among female legislators’ attention to women as a group, specifically in the German context. This is different from aiming to explain variation in the positions that female legislators take on issues relating to women, e.g., more versus less conservative, although this second question is clearly related to the first, as many previous studies show that party affiliation explains both kinds of variation. For example, the finding that women in left-leaning parties are better representatives of women’s interests is no surprise when women’s interests are defined as feminist.

In place of the often muddy and difficult to operationalize claims to a “sense of urgency” among female legislators, I propose a set of indicators of identity that I hypothesize make activity on behalf of women as a group more likely. These are social markers: social cues (clothing, gender, race, ethnicity, class, among others) to specific social expectations about behavior and preferences. These are expectations held by others, and they exert pressure on people manifesting these social markers. As I discuss at greater length in chapters 3 and 5, I expect that age mitigates the effects of social markers, because age signals different periods of socialization and different experiences.

I will argue that female legislators who exhibit specific markers – motherhood and marriage – are more likely to act on behalf women than those who do not. In chapter 3, I will show that mothers and married women, respectively, are subject to specific

30 Note that the “sense of urgency” is argued to differentiate between male and female legislators, not among female legislators.
social pressures in contemporary Germany; for example, different social expectations apply to mothers as opposed to women who are not mothers. This effect is greater among older cohorts of female legislators, as they experienced more traditional social and legal pressures than their younger counterparts. Although I do not explicitly test the mechanism behind this, I suggest that these social pressures make them more aware of the challenges facing them as women, which in turn makes them more likely to identify themselves and act as advocates for women. This represents progress in the study of WSR, because I am testing the usefulness of specific sets of pressures and experiences in explaining differences among women rather than describing all women as sharing experiences as a group.

A theory of social markers recognizes that not all women self-identify as advocates of women as a group. Further, the precise manifestations of social markers, and the kinds of social pressures that they inspire from others, are defined by cultural and historical context, making this a theory that is portable and applicable to different contexts. Social markers, like gender, are “highly dependent upon social context” (Reingold 2000:49; see also Gutmann 2003, Young 2000). For this reason, chapter 3 expands upon the specific social markers of motherhood and marriage in the contemporary Germany context, in order to show the social pressures that these markers provoke.

As I discussed in the introductory chapter, Gutmann (2003) incorporates the idea of social markers into her very definition of identity groups: these groups are “politically significant associations of people who are identified by or identify with one or more shared social markers,” such as “gender, race, class, ethnicity, nationality, religion,
disability, and sexual orientation” (2003:9). Gutmann’s notion of social markers tends
towards macro-level external signs of identity. However, a finer-grained notion of social
markers helps explain why some women feel a greater propensity to identify with women
than others. Thus a theory of social markers connects objective claims about women’s
shared experiences and interests (á la Sapiro) with subjective claims to groupness
(women must recognize their groupness to identify themselves as together and as a group,
and social markers help aid in that recognitions and identification).

In this section I discuss the theoretical basis for expecting there to exist social
markers that can help us differentiate among female legislators for the purpose of
explaining who engages in WSR and who does not. I begin with literature that addresses
questions surrounding how one measures identity. Then I turn to empirical studies that
follow from this literature.

Several recent pieces on studying identity in political science highlight the
problems with measurement (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott 2006; Fearon 1999;
Smith 2004): the concept of identity is fuzzy and varies according to different scholars,
and researchers employing it are prone to give “I know it when I see it” kinds of
definitions. Connolly (1991), for example, states that “an identity is established in
relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized” (64), while
Taylor (1989) states that it “provides the frame within which they [people] can determine
where they stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, or of value”
(1989:27). Fearon (1999) calls it a scandal that political science still lacks a coherent
definition based upon which data and findings can accumulate.
What is agreed upon among scholars of identity is that identity is contested among and within groups. For example, Connolly (1991) talks about power relationships (and struggle) among identity groups (à la whose identity is legitimate, morally right, superior?). Young (2000) endorses talking about identity in relational terms, i.e., conceiving of people in groups that fluctuate based upon context. Gutmann (2003), writing specifically about social markers, argues that the “social expectations” cued by social markers “change over time and social context (11) and “are open to widely varying interpretation” (12). Identity and social markers are explained at length to be very important, but it is not clear how they translate into action, especially given the contested content of social markers. How can we predict behavior and actions based upon identity?

Several recent empirical studies of the relationship between family arrangements and legislators’ behavior offer some strategies for identifying these relationships (Warner and Steel 1999, Washington 2008). In a 2008 American Economic Review article, Ebonya Washington finds that having a daughter has a measurable, positive impact on individual legislators’ voting on feminist bills: parenting a female makes U.S. representatives vote more liberally on bills regarding women’s issues. She does not lay claim to the mechanism by which this happens, but she speculates that experiencing the concerns of women as one’s own makes it more likely one will vote on behalf of women. Washington’s findings apply to both female and male members of Congress.

The applicability of Washington’s (2008) findings to a theory of social markers as predictors of variation among female legislators is as follows. First, Washington’s findings show that legislators’ family arrangements impact legislative behavior. These family arrangements are central to legislators’ home life, which in turn is integral to their
identities. Consider, as an example, how many legislators do not including information even on very short professional biographies about their family composition (answer: very few; 66 of 431, just 15%, of women in the Bundestag between 1998 and 2009 do not mention whether or not they have children; see also Kunovich and Wall 2009). Second and relatedly, Washington shows that changes in legislators’ family arrangements impact voting patterns.

These empirical studies show a robust connection between home lives and legislators’ voting records, but this is not yet the same as showing that identity, per se, motivates action. Fearon (1999) suggests that connecting identity to action relies upon specifying what kinds of social obligations specific social markers confer. For example, consider the increasing burden on American mothers to be hyper-attentive, compared to a much more laissez-faire approach to parenting as recently as two decades ago. People like myself born in the late 1970s and early 1980s were not subject to hand-holding at the bus stop or baby monitors, and the pressure that popular culture places on mothers in the United States to take responsibility for paying attention at all times is extreme. Being a mother in the United States involves powerful social expectations, which in turn shape behavior. These kinds of expectations are central to criticisms of female politicians with young children, for example, who may be criticized for ignoring their children.

As I will discuss in detail in chapter 3, German women – and German female legislators – are also subject to pressures related to the social markers they exhibit. These pressures are both legal and social: there is a persistent history of laws constraining the

rights of married women and mothers. As both legal and social norms evolve over time, these pressures vary. In recognition of this, most theorists emphasize that contestation over how social markers manifest and are interpreted is an ongoing process. Fearon (1999) calls it the “content of a social category” (14), and Gutmann (2003) calls it a social marker; these fluctuate over time, meaning that social markers must be evaluated in their context, e.g., contemporary Germany. Once we understand what social norms are associated with a given social marker in its context, Fearon argues that we should be able to explain people’s actions in “reference to [their] social categories.” In other words, we can seek “an explanation [of action] in terms of social norms” or standards of conduct (Fearon 1999:27).

In chapter 3 I discuss the content of (and contestation over) social markers relating to gender in the contemporary German context in order to show that having children and being married carry with them strong social and legal expectations that should impel female legislators to act on behalf of women. This relationship between social markers and action does not require any specific ideological persuasion. I then show this relationship between social markers and WSR in chapter 5 using content analyses of Bundestag parliamentary debates.

**Additional crucial variables**

Social markers are clearly not sufficient in and of themselves as predictors of WSR, just as a legislator’s sex is not. Legislators are subject to many constraints and pressures, and it is to these additional factors to which I turn now. Controlling for these
factors that previous research has shown to shape individual legislators’ preferences and behaviors should reveal a distinct role for social markers.

**Age and cohort**

As I have noted, I expect a female legislator’s age to modify her experience of the social and legal norms surrounding motherhood and marriage. This is not an age effect in terms of the life-cycle, however, i.e., it is not that that *becoming older* causes women’s perceptions of gendered inequalities to shift in systematic and predictable ways. Instead, I posit that the period of history in which female legislators were first married and had children contributes to their level of engagement in advocating for women. I argue that this takes place through a process of socialization; I demonstrate the forces acting upon German women over the course of the 20th century in chapter 3. Specifically, older female legislators were exposed to greater and more overt gendered inequalities than their younger counterparts. Moreover, older female legislators themselves were often directly engaged in debates over women’s rights earlier in the twentieth century, while younger female legislators have benefited from the legal advances that these debates precipitated. This cohort-related distinction provides greater nuance to my framework for explaining variation among female legislators’ attention to women’s interests as a group.

The distinction between a cohort effect and a life-cycle effect is covered extensively in the sociology and political sociology literature. Russell Dalton, for example, writes about value change and generational differences. In a 1977 piece, he lays out an approach that is fundamental to studying attitudinal change over time, which is cohort analysis: “We propose to trace the development of value priorities by using age
cohortas as the units of analysis. Central to this approach is the concept of a generational
unit – that is, an aggregation of individuals who, during their formative years,
experienced a common economic environment which had significant effects for all of
most members of the unit” (1977:461). Thus, Dalton identifies periods of time
characterized by varying measures of an independent variable of particular interest (in his
case, economic development), and he expects cohorts of people’s attitudes to vary with
those measures. This is distinct from an approach where age should matter in terms of the
life-cycle. A life-cycle hypothesis suggests that, regardless of context, being at a certain
stage in one’s life explains one’s attitudes and values.

Ronald Inglehart has also addressed what he terms generational value change in
an extensive body of work. He argues that socioeconomic progress contributes to a
change in people’s existential security, which in turn shapes their values and attitudes
(1971, 1997, 2003). Existential security refers to the certainty one has of surviving; it
increases as famine becomes less likely, as people increasingly work at desk jobs, etc.
The vehicle of this change is socioeconomic development, and Inglehart posits a
generational time-lag, i.e., it takes people time to grow accustomed to new existential
circumstances.

In another sociological treatment of studying generations, David Kertzer (1983)
points to definitional fuzziness in many of these previous studies. Kertzer identifies four
different definitions of generation that social scientists use: “generation as a principle of
kinship descent; generation as cohort; generation as life stage; and generation as
historical period” (1983:126). In addition to highlighting the challenges to demarcating
generational groups, Kertzer points out that cross-sectional studies do not have the
evidence to distinguish between age effects and cohort effects. This is because cross-sectional studies do not show whether and how individuals’ attitudes change over time.

My theoretical expectations are for a cohort effect. The advancement of women’s rights in Germany is a historical process that has proceeded sequentially throughout the course of the 20th century, and I identify three particularly significant junctures in this progression. These junctures define cohorts of female legislators who, in their earlier years of marriage and parenting, experienced social and legal pressures and obligations associated with these specific “eras” of women’s rights:

I. 1949: the formal instantiation of equal rights for women and men in the Basic Law (the German constitution)
II. 1956/7: the (very limited) Equal Rights Act, which revised highly restrictive laws about the rights of married women
III. 1976/7: Marriage and Family Law Reform

In the analyses that follow in chapters 3 and 5, I examine the effects of belonging to these cohorts on rates of WSR. Although I cannot distinguish between age effects and cohort effects definitively using my cross-sectional data-set, interview material that I will share bolsters the notion of a cohort effect rather than an age effect. The three junctures that I have identified in 1949, 1956, and 1976 are important landmarks in the advancement of women’s rights in Germany, but they are merely proxies for women’s experiences of these landmarks. In additional to a possible lag in women’s experiences (it takes time for women to be socialized to new legal and social norms), changes in the social norms that surround these legal landmarks will vary regionally: some regions were surely slower to implement changes in divorce law rulings, for example, as Kolinsky has suggested. All of this makes it more difficult to demarcate “clean breaks” between cohorts. However, I will argue that cohort effects persist, and they should be visible using
the cut-points I suggest above. I elaborate further upon the legal changes that define these cohort categories in chapter 3, and I then test the role of cohorts in shaping legislators’ attention to women’s interests in chapter 5.

The cohort effect intersects with social markers, because both cohort and social markers reflect gendered experiences and socialization. I have argued that motherhood and marriage distinguish among women, and these distinctions are modified by the legal and social context which women are socialized as mothers and wives. The three cohorts that I have defined reflect gendered experiences that vary among women based upon age, and in chapter 3 I discuss the eras of women’s rights that shape these experiences.

**Party affiliation**

Previous research on women’s substantive representation that uses individual-level data typically controls for party affiliation. This is because, according to much previous research, members of progressive parties tend to represent women substantively more so than members of conservative parties (Swers 1998, 2002; Thomas 1991, 1994). These parties’ manifestos pay a lot of attention to women as a group, and the parties are likely to have ties to various women’s organizations.

More generally, it has been shown that party affiliation structures individual legislators’ behavior, by sorting legislators according to ideological preferences (Levitt 1996) and by exerting party pressure (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001). Other recent work (Aldrich 1995) suggests that parties are tools used by individual legislators to achieve their ends (chiefly maintaining their careers). The three studies I have cited are from the United States context, where party cohesion is often argued to be relatively
weak. By contrast, party affiliation structures individual legislators’ behavior very strongly in contexts outside the United States, especially in parliamentary systems (Loewenberg 2002). Even still, a recent study of speeches delivered in Bundestag plenary sessions offers strong evidence of within-party factions even in Germany (Bernauer and Braeuninger 2009). The authors call this “intra-party preference heterogeneity,” and they argue that such factions contribute to explaining the early end to the 15th legislative period in 2005. Thus, even in “weak party” contexts (like the U.S.) there is support for the notion that parties structure individual legislators’ behavior, and even in “strong party” contexts (like Germany) there is evidence that some heterogeneity within parties exists. As principal-agent literature on parliamentary systems has suggested, individual legislators may be pulled in various directions at once (Mitchell 2000; Mueller 2000; Strom, Mueller, and Bergman 2003). Nonetheless, none of this research suggests that parties do not matter. On the contrary, parties are argued to maintain substantial influence over individual legislators, especially on specific issue areas and at specific times in the electoral cycle.

In her research on women’s substantive representation in the 103rd and 104th U.S. Congresses, Swers concludes that ideology is the strongest overall predictor of legislators’ support of bills relevant to women’s interests (1998, 2002).\textsuperscript{32} Conservative ideology predicts supporting these bills less, while liberal (U.S. liberal) ideology predicts supporting these bills more. However, Swers also observes that sex differentiates among members of the same political party. Her findings indicate that women in the Republican party are more progressive than men in the Republican party, and women in the

\textsuperscript{32} Swers measures women’s substantive representation in terms of legislators’ voting records on bills recognized to support women’s interests.
Democratic party are more progressive than men in the Democratic party. Swers’s research further highlights that a given legislator’s individual – as opposed to party-defined – choice to represent women’s interests is only visible when she or he markedly diverges from the conservative party platform in order to do so. This is because party discipline in a more progressive party frequently produces women’s substantive representation in a way largely indistinguishable from an individual legislator’s other motivations to do so.

The implication of Swers’s observation is that female and male legislators in more conservative parties are likely to diverge in their representation of women’s interests, while female and male legislators in more progressive parties will both represent women’s interests. Swers then further observes, comparing the 103rd and 104th U.S. Congresses, that Republican women are more likely to diverge from their party position on issues of particular interest or urgency to women when Republicans are in the majority (in the 104th Congress; Swers 2002). Other researchers also typically control for party affiliation in statistical models for explaining women’s substantive representation, but Swers’s (1998, 2002) work is unique in focusing on individual-level data, and her findings emphasize the importance of divergences as observable implications of women’s substantive representation.

By controlling for party affiliation as well as other factors, we should be able to observe whether social markers remain meaningful indicators of variation in WSR.

**District characteristics**
Studies of women’s substantive representation that use individual level data typically control for some measure of district characteristics. For example, Swers (1998) controls for percentage urban, percentage African American, and median household income. These controls are crucial for addressing the possibility that it is simply the normal electoral process that promotes women’s substantive representation. In other words, is it that particular constituencies demand the representation of interests that are like women’s interests, or is a legislator prone to represent these interests no matter what? Controlling for these factors is also important, because it recognizes that not all districts will “demand” attention to women’s interests, despite the fact that half of any given district’s population is female.

Surveying the literature, O’Brien and MacDonald (2008) argue that “methodological strategies” used by other scholars to deal with constituency effects “seriously underestimate the effect of a legislator’s constituency on her or his legislative behavior and priorities” (2008:2). Simply controlling for a variety of district characteristics, they point out, cannot account for districts that are prone to elect women, i.e., the question remains whether a female legislator represents certain interests because of her constituency or because of her gender. O’Brien and MacDonald address this methodological issue with a quasi-experiment in the U.S. context, where the treatment is a change in the gender of a given district’s House representative: in other words, they compare a female and male legislator’s representation of the same district.

Using longitudinal data (1973 – 2002) of “sex switches” (pair of subsequent terms, in which the elected representative was of a different sex from her or his predecessor), O’Brien and MacDonald compare levels of feminist and social welfare -
related bill sponsorship before and after the change in the sex of the legislator representing the same district. This permits them to parse the independent effects of the legislator’s sex on support for this legislation. O’Brien and MacDonald conclude that, even controlling for constituency, women’s substantive interests (sponsorship and co-sponsorship of feminist bills) are more frequently promoted by female legislators. Female legislators also sponsor or co-sponsor more bills relating to social welfare, but only when there is a relatively high number of women in the House. (See also Gerrity et al 2007.)

In order to address constituency effects from a different angle, Carroll (2002) researches U.S. Congresswomen’s attitudes towards representing women who are not residents in their districts, i.e., are not technically even constituents. Carroll finds that women do feel responsible, but it is unclear whether this translates into sex differences in terms of actual policy making.

Ultimately, the question of constituency effects will be less significant in contexts of party lists or otherwise high levels of party discipline, i.e., anywhere in Western Europe (among other regions). However, based upon the concerns of O’Brien and MacDonald, I attempt several different ways of addressing constituency effects in my analyses. First, in quantitative analyses I can control for ballot type, because Germany has a mixed electoral system, such that some legislators may be more beholden and responsive to constituents (and, conversely, more or less beholden to their parties) than others.\textsuperscript{33} The premise behind this first effort at addressing O’Brien and MacDonald’s and Gerrity et al’s concerns is that constituency will matter less for some legislators than for others. Second, I include two dummy region variables in some of my statistical models: I

control for whether the legislator represents Bavaria and whether s/he represents a former-GDR state. Bavaria is the region of Germany that is markedly more conservative than the rest of the country, and states in the former GDR differ markedly (in terms of economic development, job opportunities, social concerns, etc) from those in western Germany.

Unfortunately, as O’Brien and MacDonald (2008) and Gerrity et al (2007) point out, these tactics cannot fully account for constituency characteristics that correlate with the sex of the representative; the electoral context of Germany, however, makes this concern less significant than it would be in the United States.

**Women’s groups and movements**

There is strong empirical evidence for the idea that legislators’ contact with extra-parliamentary groups – social movements, social groups, interest groups, etc – shapes their attention to issues. In fact, the connection between interest groups and legislators’ activities is fundamental to aggregative and pluralist models of democracy.

S. Laurel Weldon (2002) has contended that these extra-parliamentary factors must be considered when studying women’s substantive representation, because group representation cannot be provided by individuals drawing only upon their own personal experience. Indeed, Weldon purposely does not address individual-level representatives, arguing that it is difficult, if not impossible, for an individual person to represent group interests. Instead, Weldon asserts that the presence of “strong autonomous women’s movements” (2002:1162), with access to “public agencies whose responsibility it is to provide an intra-governmental voice for particular marginalized groups” (2002:1158)
may be the surest way to improve women’s substantive representation. She demonstrates this using a cross-national data set and measuring women’s substantive representation in terms of the enactment of policies to address violence against women.

Carroll (2006) addresses a different mechanism relating to the presence of women’s movements and organizations. She calls this “gendered social capital.” Unlike Weldon, Carroll focuses on the effects of networking with women’s movements on individual legislators. This theory of gendered social capital suggests that female legislators might feel “internally accountable” to female constituents. Carroll (2006) suggests that women’s organizations and networks may “[foster] a representational relationship between women public officials and women in the electorate” (357). This relationship should obtain whether or not the organization or network is directly in that legislator’s district.

Theories of gendered social capital concede Weldon’s (2002) point that individuals will struggle to represent group interests based solely upon her or his personal experiences. However, Carroll (2006) and others point to networks and connections with women’s groups as one way of overcoming this limitation. Because my focus is on factors that contribute to individual legislators’ speech acts and substantive representation of women, I propose a hypothesis based more upon Carroll’s theory of gendered social capital: any legislator who has ties to women’s groups will be more likely to represent women substantively. That said, female legislators are more likely to belong to or have

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34 A women’s organization is autonomous, according to Weldon’s rules, if it is based outside a political party, union, or other political institution.
36 See also Katzenstein (1998), who writes about gendered social capital in the church and military.
close ties with women’s organizations. The logic behind this hypothesis is that any connection or networking with women’s organizations will heighten a legislator’s attention to that group’s demands or interests. This process could also go in the reverse direction, with the same effect on WSR: legislators who are going to pay more attention to women as a group will join women’s organizations.

**Summary of hypotheses**

*Social markers and age:* Female legislators who exhibit specific social markers—namely, motherhood and marriage—will be subject to social and legal expectations that motivate them to address women as a group and women’s interests. These experiences are modified by age, where age/cohort reflect different periods of socialization and hence different experiences.

One implication of this hypothesis is that social markers will distinguish among members of the same party. An additional implication is that the effects of these social markers will vary by the legislator’s age/cohort. The legal and social expectations of married women and mothers in the German context have grown less restrictive and less traditionalist over the course of the 20th century.

*Party affiliation:* Female legislators will adhere to their party’s platform in addressing women as a group and women’s interests, all other factors being equal. This hypothesis is based upon the observation that, especially in systems
with high levels of party discipline, a legislator cannot do whatever she wants to. One implication of this hypothesis is that a member of the CDU/CSU and a member of the Left party should be readily distinguishable from one another.

**District characteristics:** Female legislators will reflect their district characteristics in the extent to which they represent women.

One implication of this hypothesis is that the representative of a constituency in Bavaria will be more conservative than a representative from outside Bavaria. This is because Bavaria is markedly the most socially conservative region of Germany. This district effect should apply even to Bavarian legislators from parties that are not themselves socially conservative.

**Women’s organizations:** Female legislators with stated connections to women’s organizations will be more likely to “do” WSR than female legislators without, all other factors being equal.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have conceptualized WSR for my project, and I have proposed a series of possible explanations explaining variation among female legislators’ WSR-related activities. The main independent variables include social markers, party affiliation, constituency characteristics, and links to extra-parliamentary women’s organizations.
In the three empirical chapters that follow, I address these hypotheses using a series of different data. In chapter 3, I expand upon and justify my choice of social markers in the German context. This chapter assesses the content of the social markers of motherhood and marriage in contemporary Germany, noting axes of conflict over these markers. I use a combination of primary sources (personal interviews with members of the Bundestag) and secondary sources (scholarship on women’s roles in German society and culture).

In chapter 4, I address the role of party affiliation in distinguishing among female legislators. I do this through an examination of party platforms and transcripts of interviews with female and male members of the Bundestag.

In chapter 5, I assess the role of social markers in MdB’s speeches in Bundestag plenary sessions, accounting for the other important factors that I have identified. This chapter also includes a dataset of personal background characteristics of the 341 women who served in the Bundestag during the period of study (1998-2009).
Chapter 3: Content and Contestation: Selected Social Markers in Germany

Introduction

In this chapter I explore two specific gendered identities in contemporary Germany: motherhood and being married. My aim is to show how the social and legal expectations, obligations, and pressures surrounding motherhood and marriage distinguish between women who are mothers and/or wives and women who are not, i.e., I explore motherhood and marriage as two key social markers in contemporary Germany. Social markers include clothing, gender, and race, among other examples, which are all outward cues to social expectations about behavior and preferences. When someone encounters a given social marker, he or she has specific expectations about how people exhibiting it will act. These expectations comprise the content of these social markers. Moreover, the law frequently distinguishes between mothers and non-mothers, and between married and unmarried women; these legal pressures further differentiate women from one another. Social markers clearly distinguish between women and men, but, more importantly for my research on women’s substantive representation, they also distinguish among women. In the case of female legislators, women exhibiting these social markers are more likely to represent women substantively. This is because there is an intrinsic connection between the content of these social markers and the prominent issues areas in which legislators may advocate for women in contemporary Germany.

37 This is not a joint hypothesis, meaning that I am not examining the social expectations associated with women who are mothers and married. Instead, I am examining motherhood and being married as distinct social markers, though of course empirically the two are often linked.
I have hypothesized that these markers cue social and legal pressure relating to specific issue areas: the political, economic, and family-related rights of women. The content of these social markers make it more likely that women exhibiting these markers will take action on behalf of women, all other factors being equal. This contribution to the body of research on women’s substantive representation and political representation, more broadly, is therefore twofold: I examine variation among women (as opposed to distinguishing between female and male legislators), and I offer a more precise mechanism for how identity politics may fit alongside conventional, institutional explanations of individual legislators’ behavior. Previous studies of women’s substantive representation have hypothesized that women share experiences as a group that compel female legislators to advocate for women more than their male counterparts do, but they have not identified specified specific shared experiences, nor have they tested these effects.

Drawing upon a combination of primary and secondary sources consisting of interviews with members of the Bundestag, demographic data, and scholarly literature on women in Germany, I focus on specific social expectations that motherhood and marriage impose upon women in contemporary Germany. I do this with two goals: 1) to identify the social and legal pressures exerted on women who have children and are married in late 20th and early 21st century Germany and 2) to show the connection between these social markers and concerns regarding the advancement of women’s interests.
First I will consider the legal history of contestation over these expectations of women. This legal history reflects public disagreement about the extent to which the state should enact policies that encourage specific gendered roles relating to these social markers. As I showed in chapter 2, although progression towards greater gender equality in German has been positive over the course of the 20th century, three landmark legal decisions are particularly significant evidence of positive change: 1949 (formal instantiation of equal rights for women and men in the Basic Law), 1956/7 (a limited Equal Rights Act), and 1976/7 (Marriage and Family Law Reform). The debates surrounding each of these legal shifts are evidence of disagreement over gendered norms, with more intense debates earlier in the century over basic questions of equal rights for women. The upshot of these legal landmarks is that younger women in the Bundestag, regardless of whether they are mothers or wives, were socialized in the context of much less intense debate over women’s rights than their older counterparts.

I discuss this history with respect to both motherhood (laws relating to mothers, e.g., child custody and child care) and marriage (laws relating to the rights of married women, e.g., property ownership and divorce rights). There is not one single notion of how best to be a mother, for example, in Germany, or indeed anywhere. For this reason I address the evolution of dominant norms as well as the debates over these norms. Some of this contestation happens within the Bundestag, especially in the form of debates over legislation designed to address such issues as childcare (related to concerns about low birthrates). Debates over this legislation amounts to contestation over what kinds of

38 See Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott (2006) for the recommendation that studies using identity as a variable examine both the content of dimensions of identity as well as contestation over this content.
gendered social roles it is appropriate or best for the state to support. For example, legislation that effectively encourages women to stay home with their children is in favor of retaining traditional family roles.

Second, I proceed to address change over time in behavior relating to motherhood and marriage among women. I begin by showing demographic patterns, including birth and marriage rates. These patterns reflect the kinds of choices that women make to have children and get married, as well as the implications these choices have for an additional, crucial element in modern life: participation in the labor force. I then discuss the social expectations and pressures surrounding motherhood and marriage for women, e.g., what is generally meant by the ideals of a “good mother” or a “good wife.” These pressures on women to honor their family obligations remain highly traditional even in contemporary Germany, and they have come into conflict with women’s desire and financial need to pursue a paying career. As I will discuss, women’s perception of a conflict between having a family and having a career persists into the 21st century. Indeed, this issue has taken center stage in ongoing public debates about women’s role in the family and in public.

Based upon these patterns of change over time, I argue that traditional expectations are diminishing as time passes, though the links to history are strong. The effect of this gradual evolution is that we should expect some generational differences among women. Specifically, we should see distinct cohort effects based upon the periods of German history in which women were socialized. In addition to the expectation that older mothers and older married women would be more likely to address women’s issues than younger mothers and younger married women (due to direct experience with
traditional pressures and legal restrictions), older women (regardless of their status as mothers or wives) were socialized in periods of more intense debate over women’s rights. These cohorts differentiate among women’s experiences with eras of women’s rights and gendered social norms, such that older cohorts should be more likely to engage actively in WSR.

The conclusions that I draw in this chapter are limited to the social and legal expectations that mothers and married women experience in contemporary Germany. Chapter 5 shows statistically that these social markers help explain some of the variation among female legislators’ actions in issues of particular importance to women. I also suggest that legislators’ age further shapes this effect. However, I do not make any claims to establish the valence of these actions on behalf of women in this chapter. For example, I do not claim to explain whether being married makes a woman more likely to be politically conservative, per se.

Social markers: content and contestation

Social markers are cues to certain social and legal expectations and obligations. However, these expectations and obligations are not entirely uniform across any given country, nor even within much smaller communities. In this section I briefly review how the content of social markers, and contestation over this content, can help us understand the pressures differentiating among female legislators. I will argue in chapter 5 that these differences in turn translate into variable propensity to represent women substantively.

A number of recent essays address the problem of “measuring identity,” but most of these offer concepts similar to “content” and “contestation” as I have discussed them.
Abdelal et al (2006) define the content of identity as the “meaning of a collective identity,” and they discuss this in four dimensions: constitutive norms (the rules defining group membership), social purposes (the goals of the group), relational comparisons (the ways in which an identity is defined by what it is not), and cognitive models (the ways in which one’s understanding of the world, values, etc, are defined by one’s identity) (2006:696). Contestation, according to these authors, is the degree to which this content is agreed upon by people who share a given identity. Although Abdelal et al (2006) make strong suggestions about how research on identity might become more precise, these suggestions are not immediately applicable to social markers. This is because social markers are a narrower notion of identity: they are outward signs that cue to identity, i.e., they exist relative to popular understandings of what those cues mean. Abdelal et al’s (2006) essay, by contrast, focuses more on within-group perspectives on what it means to be group members.

In my research, I focus on content as defined by what others see in the four dimensions that Abdelal et al (2006) discuss, and I understand contestation to denote public debate over what is seen. Social markers are clearly part of and a measure of identity: Gutmann (2003) includes social markers in her definition of identity groups: these groups are “politically significant associations of people who are identified by or identify with one or more shared social markers,” such as “gender, race, class, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, and sexual orientation” (2003:9). Thus I follow Gutmann in focusing on social markers as outward signs of identity, which are then interpreted by people who interact with one another.
Fearon (1999) discusses these social expectations in terms of social norms: “the content of a social category is frequently made up of norms attached to or associated with membership in the category” (27). These norms are composed in part of expectations that people have of individuals exhibiting these markers, e.g., different social expectations apply to mothers as opposed to women who are not mothers. However, social norms are not automatically the same as prevailing behavior, because not all people conform to these norms. There is clearly a connection between prevailing norms and prevailing behavior, but they should not be conflated. Neither prevailing norms (e.g., cultural accounts) nor prevailing behavior (measurable behavior, or even demographics) automatically denotes the forces that compel individuals to comply with norms. Recognizing this, Fearon goes on to write: “A full explanation of an action [e.g., a legislator speaking on behalf of women] in terms of a norm associated with an identity needs to do at least two things. First, we would like to know what is the person’s motivation or reason for acting in accordance with that norm, and thus, with the dictates of the social identity. Second, we may want an account of why this particular action is a norm, rather than other possibilities” (1999:28).

In other words, a satisfying explanation of someone’s actions in terms of their identity requires understanding both 1) what the norms associated with that identity are and 2) why an individual feels she should conform or act according to them. This chapter addresses the former more fully than the latter: I examine these social expectations in detail, but I assume that they are considered forceful because of the threat of surprise or disapproval. This effect is further intensified by legal expectations that reinforce social
norms. These social markers of motherhood and marriage exact some distinctions among women, and I argue that these markers signal greater likelihood of attention to women as a group and to women’s interests.

The connection between these social markers and engagement in advocacy for women is that the social markers signal experiences that highlight gender identity as well as spark recognition of the kinds of challenges facing women in more traditional roles. Single women and non-mothers have, as I will show, historically enjoyed less restrictive social obligations, and this corresponds with broader rights and legal privileges than married women and mothers. In subsequent chapters, I use these social markers to explain variation among female legislators’ actions on behalf of women in the Bundestag. In Fearon’s terminology, the actions being explained by social markers constitute women’s substantive representation.

As I discussed in chapter 2, much previous literature on women’s substantive representation has focused on differentiating female and male legislators from one another. This work has suggested that women have knowledge, perspectives, and experiences that make them better representatives of women’s interests, but these claims are rarely operationalized. Moreover, knowledge, perspectives, and experience are likely to vary to some extent among women. A theory of social markers suggests a way to operationalize these experiences, acknowledging that there will be variation among women. Moreover, a theory of social markers recognizes that the underlying factors behind some female legislators’ greater propensity to represent women substantively will vary over time. For the macro-social marker of “being female,” for example, there are

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39 At the conclusion of this chapter, I address the alternative argument that legal restrictions on women impose incentives for different behavior.
clearly gendered norms qua social expectations, but these norms vary according to time and place. In other words, the content (the meaning and interpretation) of social markers varies across time and place, such that motherhood denotes different expectations of behavior in rural Greece versus urban Japan, and 1900 versus 2000. Marriage, too, is a different experience for women in Germany now than even 15 years ago; for example, it was not until 1991 that both husband and wife could keep their last name upon getting married. For this reason, the next section of this chapter provides some historical context, focusing on legal developments in the 20th century. Many of the issues that define motherhood and marriage as social markers in contemporary Germany are strongly shaped by traditionally gendered roles, some of which were legally enforced and reinforced.

Legal-historical context

Eva Kolinsky, one of the foremost scholars of women in Germany, argues that it is necessary to consider women’s history in order to talk about contemporary gendered issues: “Forces that shaped the history of women in Germany and the history of women’s equality continue to affect women” (1995:7). Observing the links between past and present, she writes that “conventional role patterns exist side-by-side with a new focus on partnership and equality” (1993:94), making it important to understand what these conventional role patterns are. This sentiment is expressed in the popular press of both Germany and the United States, as well; for example, the New York Times recently ran an

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40 Until that time, spouses had to take the same last name, although this could be the woman’s last name.
41 I translated from the German.
article entitled “In Germany, a Tradition Falls, and Women Rise” (January 17, 2010).
Focusing on mothers, the article notes, “…In Germany, despite its vaunted modernity, a
traditional perception of motherhood lingers.” This amounts to more than just a
perception; for example, much social infrastructure, including public schools, makes
assumptions about the presence of a stay-at-home parent.

From the nineteenth century onward in Germany, the middle-class model of the
wife not working outside the home was seen as a sign of success. This gave rise to the
Kinder, Kueche, Kirche (children, kitchens, and church) adage, which denoted the areas
in which women were expected to be occupied (Kolinsky 1995:12, 14). This traditional
conception combines the roles of wife and mother in a way that did not begin to
disintegrate until the 1980s in Germany.

Much of the resistance to changes in this traditional conception is literally
instantiated in law. Germany’s Civil Code, which went into effect in 1900, included two
articles specifically pertaining to women as wives and mothers that were not revised
(incrementally) until 1957/8, 1976/7, and 1988 respectively. As many feminist scholars
have noted, the two sections of the Civil Code, taken together, both prevented and
required women to seek work outside the home: §1356 stipulated that the wife look after
her family, requiring that she obtain her husband’s permission in order to seek
employment outside the home, while §1360 stipulated that the wife had to seek paid
employment “in addition to her regular housework duties” if her husband’s income was
not adequate.42

42 See Kolinsky (1993:43-50).
These kinds of strictures on married women were only strengthened during the Nazi era in Germany through unabashed pro-natalist policies. For example, marriage loans amounting to several months’ pay were disbursed to couples who met a series of economic and racial criteria, on the added condition that the women leave the workforce. These loans were forgiven at the rate of 1/4 per child, such that a family owed nothing back to the state after having four children.43

Political, social, and economic reconstruction after the Second World War forced framers of the new (West) German constitution to decide whether to include similar pro-natalist policies. Post-war politicians had hoped to reject Nazi-era policies, but most political factions very much wished to retain the 1900 Civil Code.44 In 1946, there were twice as many women of child-bearing age as men (not counting men still in prisoner of war camps). By 1950, the ratio of women to men between 25 and 40 remained 130:100. These demographic imbalances caused state-builders some anxiety, because they hoped to maintain a birthrate sufficient to keep post-war Germany growing in upcoming decades. Thus, despite the desire to reject all vestiges of Nazi-era policies, the Basic Law (the new [provisional] constitution, adopted in 1949) retained legal frameworks transparently designed to uphold traditional family structures.45 Moeller writes: “Returning to normalcy [after WWII] included forging the social order that would allow normal families to thrive and identifying ‘incomplete families’ and ‘mother families’ as

44 These constitution framers met between 1948 and 1949 and were called the Parliamentary Council. They were delegated at the state level to gather in Bonn to design a provisional constitutional framework; its provisional nature was emphasized to keep open the possibility of a reunification of the two halves of Germany.
products of abnormal times, peculiar legacies of a past that would soon be left behind” (1993:78). For this reason, Article 6 of the Basic Law placed “marriage, motherhood, and the family under the ‘particular protection’ of the state” (Moeller 1993:41).

On the upside for the rights of women as individuals, Article 3 in West Germany’s Basic Law explicitly stated that women and men had the same rights.\(^\text{46}\) However, this was not accomplished without intense debate between more and less conservative political factions of the Parliamentary Council. One of the arguments against including this statement of equal rights was that it invalidated the abovementioned sections of the Civil Code. Ultimately, under public pressure, the Parliamentary Council compromised: they included the statement of equal rights but allowed that portions of the Civil Code that were contradicted by the Basic Law could remain in effect until March 1953. This gave the West German state some time to reconcile these legal frameworks. The combined effect of these pieces of the Basic Law was a marked difference between the freedoms of married and unmarried women. As Erna Scheffler, a feminist lawyer, pointed out in 1950: “Only the married woman is still in many decisive ways disadvantaged by the law” (Scheffler quoted in Moeller 1993:86). Married women were entangled in legislation designed to protect the traditional family in ways that did not honor women’s rights as equal to men’s, while unmarried women avoided this entanglement.

The stark contrast between married and unmarried women’s rights in West Germany persisted for decades, all in the name of protecting traditional gender roles that tended to conflate wife, mother, and housewife. Changes to the Civil Code in 1957/8

\(^{46}\) I am distinguishing between to the rights of women as individuals as opposed to women as wives and mothers (defined by their relationships to others).
made incremental progress: these changes established that spouses owned property jointly, and women were no longer required to garner their husband’s permission in order to work outside the home.\(^{47}\) However, Kolinsky maintains that the 1958 Civil Code nonetheless continued to reify the “housewife marriage,” i.e., a family arrangement in which the woman did not work outside the home. As of these revisions to the Code in 1958, §1356 still read: “The woman runs the household in her own responsibility. She is entitled to take on paid employment, \textit{as far as this can be combined with her duties in marriage and family}” (cited in Kolinsky 1993:49, emphasis added).

Greater progress was not made until 1976/7, at which time divorce laws were amended. For the first time, both spouses (i.e., both parents) were explicitly recognized as equals, such that custody of the children could not automatically be given to fathers. In this set of changes to the Civil Code, §1356 and §1360 were also amended to be non-sex specific, e.g., “The spouses agree on the running of the household” (cited in Kolinsky 1993:50). Despite these ostensible signs of progress, Kolinsky argues that in fact the implementation of the Civil Code took some time, as judges ruling on divorce cases continued to punish women who left their husbands, citing that these women had reneged on household duties (1993:53). In fact, the Bundestag did not act aggressively on legislating women’s rights and equality – e.g., in terms of equal pay for equal work, or with an anti-discrimination policy – until forced to do so by the European Community: European policy changes in 1980 forced member-states to conform with the law on “Equal Treatment of Men and Women at Work” (Kolinsky 1993:55).

Legal distinctions between married and unmarried women in West Germany persisted into the 1980s. For example, programs designed to assist women’s entry and re-entry into the workplace, especially after time taken to raise children, were incrementally pared back in ways that imposed specific expectations of married women. Kolinsky writes: “After 1981, women were only admitted to [retraining] courses if they could convince the authorities that their domestic duties would not impair their ability to work at least 20 hours per week,” while there was no commensurate stricture on men seeking retraining (1993:58).

This concern over married women maintaining their obligations to the home has remained active to the present day, though (and perhaps as a result of these tenacious norms) both birth and marriage rates have declined substantially since the 1970s. In contrasting the 1950s and 1980s, Kolinsky claims that mothers’ life cycles – career, followed by marriage, followed by time to raise their children, followed by a renewed interest in career – are largely unchanged in these two periods, though the “family phase” in the 1980s was shorter (1993:84-5). In other words, women remained primarily responsible for household tasks and childcare, but the breaks they took from paid employment were shorter than they were several decades ago. However, in persisting signs that women are still not as free to pursue a paying job alongside their “household duties” as their male counterparts, women currently comprise the bulk of the part-time labor force. A publication by the Germany Federal Statistics Office from 2009 presents a combination of labor force demographics and survey data to show that women comprise more than 80% of the part-time labor force. Moreover, 52% of their survey respondents indicated that they worked part-time (as opposed to full-time) due to child and other care-
taking duties. The extent to which women choose this balance of time, as opposed to feeling forced by the lack of other options, is not discernible from these data.

Some of the institutionalization of household duties as women’s work relates to concerns over the low birthrate in Germany. State subsidy for the costs of raising children in Germany actually dates to the Nazi era (see discussion of marriage loans above), but these were retained in the post-war period as a way to encourage the birthrate. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the last several decades have heralded legislation termed *Erziehungsgeld* (money to support child-rearing) designed to address the low birthrate, and these policy efforts clearly stem from earlier legal-historical trends that attempted to reinforce women’s role in the home. Kolinsky writes, “The moves in the 1986/7 legislation to bridge the gap between motherhood and employment were inspired by a Conservative desire to make the home and child-rearing more attractive to women, to increase the birth rate, to take positive action in support of a traditional mother’s role” (1993:71). Thus, by the 1980s legislation designed to encourage the birthrate had to, by necessity, address women’s increasing interest in and need for paid employment.

According to the original legislation in 1986, the German state provides families (defined by the presence of a child) with a certain amount of money per child. The duration of the support was originally 10 months, increased to 12 months in 1988. From the original legislation in 1986 onward, the money is paid to the parent (non sex-specific) who cares for the child and is not employed full-time, i.e., including housewives. As of 2007 legislation, this sum of money is paid monthly for 14 months, and either the mother

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48 Katharina Puch “Frauendomaene Teilzeitarbeit” (“The Women’s Domain of Part-time Work”), *STATmagazin*, April 2009, available at destatis.de. This study defines part-time work as less than 21 hours/week, and the survey includes respondents between 15 and 64 years of age.
49 See Kolinsky 1993:71.
or the father may act as primary caregiver at this time. Until 2007, this child-rearing period was termed *Erziehungsurlaub* (child-rearing vacation); debates in the Bundestag in 2000 officially changed the term to *Erziehungszeit* in recognition of the fact that raising a child does not in fact constitute a vacation. This legislation is different from previous child subsidies in that it is much more explicitly designed to address time that the parent takes off work to be with her or his child.

Most recent debates regarding Kindergeld and Erziehungsgeld have been over whether the money would more appropriately be spent in efforts to expand child-care facilities. Instead of giving money directly to parents, argue some politicians, money should be invested in infrastructure that helps families. The tenacity of these policies giving money directly to families, as evidenced by the positions taken by legislators and parties in these debates, ties directly to the belief that children should be cared for in the home, and that this is best done by their mothers.

The post-war legal history of women in the German Democratic Republic is of course substantially different from women in West Germany. Although both the West German and GDR’s post-war constitutions included explicit statements of women and men’s equality, the GDR proceeded to instantiate much more extensive equal rights for women in the workplace; employment was guaranteed to every citizen regardless of sex. The GDR’s 1965 Family Code Law states that husbands and wives have the same rights and obligations at home and with children.\(^5\) Despite these legal advancements in the GDR, however, women were rarely employed in higher-paying jobs, i.e., gendered

occupational patterns persisted. Moreover, legal changes in the GDR did not manage to make household work more equally distributed between wife and husband.\textsuperscript{51}

This history suggests that German law has consistently reinforced traditionally gendered roles, especially those relating to motherhood. However, it is important to note that, as of the early 1990s, women have comprised more than 10% of the Bundestag putting many of these policies in place. Thus, in recent history female legislators are helping to create and re-create policies that reflect traditional expectations of women, especially relating to motherhood.

**Motherhood**

This section addresses several related questions. First, building from the legal-historical context that I have discussed, what is the content of the social marker of being a mother, i.e., what are the traditional social expectations associated with motherhood in Germany, and how does motherhood thereby distinguish among women in Germany? Second, what does contestation over the content of motherhood as a social marker look like? Answering the former question establishes that mothers in Germany experience specific social pressures that are different from the pressures on non-mothers. In terms of observable implications, the result of this distinction is that we should expect different actions from mothers and non-mothers in the German context. Aside from the obvious distinction that mothers raise children and non-mothers do not, there is a connection between these shared pressures and experiences and actions that relate to women’s pressures and experiences. This effect should be emphasized further by the age of the

\textsuperscript{51} See also Einhorn (1993), Harsch (2007), Rueschemeyer 1998.
legislator, as the legal and social context for any individual female legislator’s motherhood will change over time. Contestation over this definition of motherhood mirrors the debates over women’s interests that I address in other chapters.

As I will illustrate in this section, the social pressure exerted on mothers in late 20th-early 21st century Germany is aptly illustrated by the well-publicized conflict between work and family obligations. Die Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf (the balancing of family and work) is an oft-cited goal of contemporary German women, with many mothers perceiving it necessary to choose one or the other. Political parties have taken up this issue, giving it a prominent place in the sections of their party platforms addressing women and family and in their policy. I will show that this high level of attention to this specific gendered issue makes sense in the context of persistent traditional expectations of women as mothers and wives.

Demographic data offer important insight into how the typical Frauenbild (image and expectations of women) has changed over time in post-WWII West and unified Germany, as well as how the former West and East Germany differ from one another. Facts such as the rates at which women have children are necessary for understanding the frequency of this social marker and the degree to which it represents “normal” Germany. However, it is important to note that a description of these facts does not immediately denote the content of the social marker of motherhood. I follow a presentation of demographic data with a discussion of primary and secondary sources, which attest to various social pressures and expectations attendant upon motherhood in contemporary Germany.
The demographics of motherhood are often given in terms of the average number of children per woman (total fertility rate). The Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany (2009) indicates that this average in Germany has declined even since the mid-1980s, from 1.43 children per woman (1985-1990) to 1.32 children per woman (2005-2010). As part of this trend, the birthrate in Germany has been declining fairly steadily for the last three decades. The early 1960s was the peak in number of births for both West and East Germany, and 1972 marked a crucial turning point in West Germany: this was the first time deaths exceeded live births since 1946. As the German Federal Statistical Office notes in its publication “Germany’s Population By 2050,” lower birth rates in turn reduce the number of potential mothers, furthering the decrease in birthrate.

From the 1970s, trends in birthrates in West and East Germany diverged. Total fertility in the West would hover around 1.4 for the next three decades. In the former German Democratic Republic, state policies explicitly designed to increase birthrate by providing extensive benefits were successful, such that total fertility rate was 1.94 (children per woman) in 1980. However, these trends flipped after the two parts of Germany reunited in 1990: total fertility in the former GDR dropped from 1.52 to 0.77 between 1990 and 1994. Since that time, total fertility rates in the former East and West German have begun to converge.

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52 Statistisches Jahrbuch 2009, Wiesbaden, International Table A2.2 (p.693). These data compare the average for West Germany with the average for unified Germany (former West and East regions combined).
53 The Federal Statistical Office, available online; see also “Germany’s Population By 2050” (Federal Statistics Office).
54 Immigration to Germany contributes to the overall population separate from births and deaths.
55 For more detail on these natalist policies, see Donna Harsch’s Revenge of the Domestic: Women, the Family, and Communism in the German Democratic Republic (2006).
An additional trend in motherhood is that women in Germany are waiting until they are older to have children. The “Germany’s Population By 2050” report indicates fairly dramatic increases in the ages at which birthrates peak: comparing 2004 and 1991, birth rates among women in the former West Germany now peak at around age 31 (up from 29), and birth rates among women in the former GDR peak at around age 29 (up from 22). The latter is readily attributable to the decline in the economy in former Eastern regions.

Finally, more women in Germany are having children outside marriage. In 1950, 10.6% of live births were to unmarried women. This increased to 15.3% in 1990, to 23.4% in 2000, and to 30.8% in 2007. Cultural guidebooks to Germany note that single motherhood is much more acceptable, although this openly upsets the Catholic establishment (Bernstein 2004:72).

These demographic patterns reflect changes in what is commonly done as well as what is acceptable. However, the causality of these kinds of changes is hard to figure out: is it the greater number of births out of marriage that change people’s attitudes, or the other way around?

What is beyond dispute is that structural constraints make changes slower, and one of the most telling facts about raising children in contemporary Germany is that most schools and kindergartens are in session only until noon or one o’clock. This means that parents (typically mothers) can work only half days at most. This, too, contributes to the phenomenon that women, especially mothers, take on part-time rather than full-time work. As “substitute teaching” is not an institution in Germany as it is in the United

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56 See the Federal Yearbook 2009, Table 2.23, p.54.
States, it is further the case that schools or classes must be cancelled in the (unpredictable) event that the teacher is ill. In order to help working parents, some German states have established a number of elementary schools that are guaranteed not to close early, but these are limited and a fairly new phenomenon (Bernstein 2004:68-9).

Kolinsky notes that while “very few women give up their jobs when they get married, i.e., women’s careers and marriage are no longer in conflict,” kids and career remain in conflict (1995:81).

Regardless of its origins (i.e., whether it stems from structural constraints or from cultural forces), the pressure to choose between their children and pursuing their careers is central to the question of what it means to be a good mother. Neither fathers nor non-mothers feel this pressure over how to use their time. This conflict is deepened, or even exacerbated, with Elterngeld (money given directly to families), by which women are effectively encouraged to pick motherhood over career, at least temporarily.

Western German mothers who choose to work when their children are young are often documented as feeling guilt over this choice. There is a specific term in German to describe the terrible mother who abandons her children, and usage of the term is prevalent: Rabenmutter, which translates directly to “raven mother,” i.e., a terrible mother who leaves her children [behind in the nest]. For example, a recent book co-authored by Ursula von der Leyen (the Minister of Family Affairs in the 16th legislative period, 2005-2009, from the CDU) includes a chapter composed of the transcript of a roundtable of seven women discussing “what women between 30 and 60 years want.” Although the book could be interpreted as a public relations stunt by von der Leyen to promote her Elterngeld policies, the introduction to this women’s roundtable
acknowledges, “These women find that they are only equal to men [gleichberechtigt] when they do not have children” (2007:25, my translation). Throughout the transcripts, the women use the term Rabenmutter, especially women accused of being “raven mothers” when they returned to work soon after giving birth.

In the almost two decades since Germany’s reunification, the axis of contestation is clearly East versus West: women in the former GDR were expected and encouraged to continue working, and it was made possible for them to place their children in childcare from a young age. In the former East, where mothers feel little hesitation about placing their children in Krippen (crèches) from a young age, there are many childcare facilities that make this possible. In the West, especially in regions like Bavaria where the norm of stay-at-home mothers is especially strong, childcare spots are few and far between.

Overall in Germany, only the former-GDR states and Berlin have childcare coverage for 40 percent of young children. Kolinsky writes: “The East German solution, that kids were left in childcare all day, did not obtain in the West. First, there were not enough daycare and kindergarten spots…But it also reflected that far fewer women wanted this kind of childcare” in the West (1995:82).

Here again causality is hard to determine; these regionalized attitudes are based in norms, which shape and are shaped by existing institutions. These attitudes do not stem merely from the fact that child care facilities are available in the East, making it possible for women to seek paid employment, because that could hypothetically force mothers to make difficult choices. With the availability of childcare facilities, it actually is a choice, giving mothers a chance to agonize, when in the absence of childcare facilities the

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“choice” is clear. Instead, it seems more likely that several generations of women in the former GDR were encouraged to work outside the home, and this became widely accepted and unproblematic.

These claims about gender and motherhood in previous scholarly work are reflected in the interviews that I conducted with members of the Bundestag (MdB) between 2007 and 2008. Although not a statistically representative sample, the 54 interviews were with a variety of female and male MdB from all of the political parties that are active at the national level in Germany, and my selection of MdB to contact for interviews was randomly systematic (a random selection of equal numbers of female and male MdB from each party.) \(^{58}\) (See Table 3.1.)

These political parties include: the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Unions (CDU/CSU: these are center-right sister parties that work together effectively as a single party at the national level; they are committed to a market economy and are socially relatively conservative), the Social Democratic Party (SPD: a center-left party with traditionally strong ties to trade unions), the Free Democratic Party (FDP: a European liberal party that has governed with the CDU/CSU numerous times at the national level), the Alliance90/Green Party (Greens: they are a left-oriented, post-materialist, pro-environment, anti-nuclear power party), and the Left Party (Left: they are the post-Communist successor party to the PDS, which in turn was the successor to the East German Socialist Unity Party). \(^{59}\)

\(^{58}\) In chapter 4 I discuss in detail the political parties currently active at the national level in Germany.

\(^{59}\) Please see Appendix A and chapter 4 for more details about these interviews.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th># Seats in the 16th Bundestag</th>
<th>Women’s presence in the 16th Bundestag: # (% of party)</th>
<th># Interviews: women</th>
<th># Interviews: men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left (communist successor)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26 (49.1%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green (post materialist)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30 (58.8%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD (center left)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>79 (36.0%)</td>
<td>7 (6 unique) •</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU (center right)</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>47 (21.1%)</td>
<td>6 *</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP (European liberal)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>15 (24.6%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total # interviews</strong></td>
<td><strong>54 total</strong> (w/ 52 unique MdB)</td>
<td><strong>28 (27 unique)</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.1. Interviews with MdB**

The total # of MdB in the 16th Bundestag at the end of the legislative period was 612, including 197 women (Source: Inter-parliamentary Union Archive of Statistical Data for August, 2009, available at [http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif310809.htm](http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif310809.htm), last accessed January 6, 2010).

* One interview was with the (female) head of a CSU female MdB’s Berlin office, and one interview was with a female CDU MdB who served in the 13th legislative period (1994-1998)

* I interviewed one female SPD MdB twice.

Although it could be that MdB attitudes are not representative of German society as a whole, I argue that their accounts can be especially informative. This is because MdB are tasked with devising legislation that addresses the concerns of Germans, forcing MdB to be informed about what these concerns consist of.
In response to questions about a) whether women have politically relevant interests that are distinct from men and b) the extent to which women’s interests are differentiable from family interests, multiple interviewees referred to what they called a Frauenbild (image and expectations of women). Interviewees’ attention to Frauenbildern focused on, first, women’s place in the family, and second, on the ways in which these expectations hampered women’s economic rights.

For example, at the far-left of the mainstream political spectrum, a woman from the Left party used the term “value” to describe family models, underscoring that mothers are subject to specific (and traditional) expectations. “Women are still part of the traditional family model that is still valued,” she said (112707B – female Left).

Other interviewees referred to how these conventional Frauenbilder are not good for women. Two other women from the Left party expressed their distaste for persistent traditional norms in no uncertain terms:

“Germany, compared to France, is backwards,” stated one woman, referring to German policies relating to supporting mothers (021108A – female Left).

Another female interviewee from the Left party, in her seventies, described the resurgence of debate over whether it should be acceptable for young children not to be looked after by their mothers at home: “We’re experiencing this again – I’m thinking, at [septegenarian], is this really an issue once again in German politics? That women should not only be looked after by their mothers – that it’s the highest good for kids to spend time with other kids?” With disbelief in her voice, she continued: “This is a particularly German question. It’s not an issue in the UK or in France, it’s long been understood. But here in Germany in 2008 yet again we’re experiencing this. And it leads to the policy that
we should give money directly to families to look after their kids at home!” (061808 – female Left).

Speaking more generally about persistent traditional norms, one man from the Left party observed, “Overall there’s this image of women – the true, accommodating woman, versus the hard, money-earning man” (062308B – male Left). Another man from the Left, talking about women’s interests and particular concern with social questions, stated: “Part of it has to do with the traditional women-image and – role…There is a German, conservative understanding of relationships among the sexes” (021108C – male Left).

These more pointed observations of persistent cultural norms are from the Left party. This is not surprising. The Left, an opposition party, would wish to portray the conservative party currently in Government as out-moded, while members of the CDU/CSU have less to gain by labeling themselves “traditional.” Further in this vein, one interviewee, again from the Left party, griped about the changes they were forced to make to recent anti-discrimination legislation: the legislation had to be “compromised to accommodate the FDP and CDU/CSU with their more traditional notion of women and gender” (112807C – male Left).

In the SPD, the center-left party with ties to trade unions and some historical connections to early 20th century feminist-socialist movements, both female and male interviewees referred to these family-oriented expectations as a liability for women:

Women have a “very specific situation,” said a woman from the SPD, “Women don’t have the same choices about their living situation, they are still tied to the family” (061907—female SPD). Similarly, a man from the SPD referred to women’s place in the
home as a sociostructural pattern: “It’s a sociostructural thing that men go out for their career and women, the German convention, they stay to look after the kids” (21408C – male SPD).

In talking about women’s conventional place in the home, one male legislator in the CDU, a center-right party that is socially conservative, stated: “Family issues are perhaps more important for women – but I think we’re moving away from this Bild” (112907B – male CDU). He may have been trying to distance himself from the indictment that his party was somehow backward.

Despite various similar indictments of the FDP (the European liberal party in the German system), two women from this party made it clear that they understood perfectly well how little norms had changed:

“Much has changed in the last 20 years,” stated one woman from the FDP, “but it hasn’t progressed so far that men would stay at home while their wives go out and have careers” (112707D—female FDP).

Another woman in the FDP described the hypothetical (but certainly common) situation of a child become ill, noting that the mother takes care of this sort of problem, while the father comes home from work much later. “For most female voters in Germany, it is still traditional, like this,” she said (112807A – female FDP).

In other parts of their interviews, it is clear that MdBs often placed an emphasis on the conflict between motherhood and career. Of my interviewees, 21 explicitly mentioned the tension experienced by mothers over how to balance a career with their parenting obligations, and 9 interviewees noted that fathers do not experience the same pressures. As national debates over childcare, Kindergeld, and Erziehungsgeld illustrate,
not everyone agrees on how best to encourage the birthrate: should money be given directly to families, or should it be directed towards building infrastructure (namely, childcare facilities) that help families? In expressing an opinion about this question, members of the FDP and CDU/CSU (the two more conservative parties) tended to talk about the goal of promoting *Wahlfreiheit* (freedom of choice), frequently modifying this to describe it as *real* freedom of choice. With few exceptions, they argued that giving money directly to families facilitated this real freedom of choice.

However, other interviewees pointed out that it was not really a choice if there were not any childcare facilities available, as is often the case in western German states. Given that birthrates have dropped while women are increasingly active in the workplace, it seems that women and families perceive career and family as zero-sum. Although most denounced the idea that women should choose between family and career, numerous interviewees acknowledged that this was often the reality. As one woman from the Left party expressed it: “Women should not have to choose between staying at home and having a career, but it seems like they must these days” (*021108A – female Left*).

Another woman, from the Green (post-materialist) party, observed that typical men’s careers “are very hard to balance with family” (*112807B – female Green*) in order to explain women’s disproportionate presence in certain occupations.

Further emphasizing the pressures imposed on women in Germany, another woman from the Green party stated, “The entire issue of having both children and career [that it is difficult to have both] is a specific women’s issue” (*021108D – female Green*).

Two women and two men from the CDU directly addressed the need for greater support of balancing these parts of a woman’s life (though they ultimately endorse...
Erziehungsgeld, or direct payments to families, alongside increase in child care facilities):

“We must help women with balancing childcare and their careers” (060607 – female CDU).

Women want “freedom of choice regarding family and career” (112707A – male CDU), and “For younger women, the balancing of family and work is something that the Union needs to support yet more strongly, for childcare under three years of age” (061708B – male CDU).

One woman from the FDP, recognizing that she diverges somewhat from her party, indicated a preference for increasing childcare facilities. “Women in the 21st century are still trying very hard to balance successful careers and family. Although things are becoming better,” she explained, “although men are a bit more partner-like, they still spend more time out of the house” (112707D – female FDP).

These interviews represent a limited sample of elites’ attitudes. However, it is important that I track legislators’ attitudes, as it is their social markers (i.e., how they perceive pressures on them) that I use in chapter 5 to help explain their propensity to represent women substantively. Moreover, a number of very personal anecdotes that female interviewees shared are clear evidence that even MdB struggle with these questions.

One woman in the SPD, talking about herself as a public figure, remarked, “We need young women in here [in the Bundestag] who have kids – not just young women who have rejected kids for their careers.” She emphasized that if women in the Bundestag
also appeared to have to choose between families and their political careers, this would “send the wrong signal” (021408B – female SPD).

**Being married**

On the one hand, being married in the German context is closely related to having children: the pressures on women as mothers, i.e., with respect to having children, originate with traditional models of family life, and these models also apply to marriage. In this way, much of the evidence I have provided – especially the interviewees’ comments regarding the persistence of conventional family and gender roles – applies to distinctions between married and unmarried women. Moreover, motherhood and marriage have historically been closely linked in legal terms, as I have discussed.

On the other hand, over the course of the 20th century the legal restrictions on women demarcated more strongly between married and unmarried women than between mothers and non-mothers. Married women were legally restricted to a “housewife marriage” until 1977, which meant that wives were legally bound to take responsibility for domestic and household tasks. These tasks included childcare, i.e., this restriction on married women’s employment related to the expectation that they would have children. The crucial distinction here is that unmarried mothers were not similarly restricted; without a husband, regardless of their status as mothers, women did not need someone else’s permission to seek employment outside the home. Thus, these traditionalist marriage and divorce codes, dismantled only incrementally over the latter half of the 20th century, disproportionately affected women who were married.
Moreover, the two social markers of motherhood and marriage may be separable in specific contexts, such as when there is anxiety over population decline. When the emphasis shifts to having children to replenish the population, the expectation that this co-exist with traditional marriage is lessened. There is currently such concern about the German birthrate, which has been below replacement since the 1970s (see also the demographic discussion above). In late 20th and early 21st century Germany, the pressure on women to marry is substantially less than it used to be. I will show that, as pressure to marry has lessened, so have the social pressures on women who marry. Ultimately, although I have shown that the legal restrictions associated with marriage were historically more onerous for women, the social norms associated with motherhood are the most persistent.

As with the previous section, I consider first what the content of the social marker of being married is, and how marriage distinguishes among women in Germany.

As with the demographics of motherhood, facts about rates of marriage and divorce reveal the frequency of this social marker among women. A society in which only 25% of women chose to marry at some point in their lives, for example, is clearly different from one in which 75% do. As in other advanced industrial societies, women in Germany are delaying marriage until later, and increasing numbers eschew it altogether. Between 1985 and 2007, the average age at which a woman marries for the first time has increased from 24.1 to 29.8 years. Moreover, in a sign that marriage is increasingly separable from motherhood, the ratio of births to unmarried women to births to married women has increased (see demographic discussion in previous section). Despite the clear

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60 For men in this period, average age at first marriage has increased from 26.6 to 32.7 years. For these data, see the *Statistical Yearbook of Germany* 2009.
signal that contemporary Germans find marriage less compelling than Germans in past decades, however, it remains the case that over half of German residents over 20 years of age are married.\footnote{Bernstein (2004) cites the figure of 61\% as the percentage of German residents over 20 who were married in the mid 1990s. He does not specify, but the phrase “German residents” suggests that he means to include people living in Germany with an immigrant background, as well. This is noteworthy, because rates of marriage tend to be higher among Germans with an immigrant background.}

The social marker of “married woman” carries with it far fewer obligations than “mother” in contemporary Germany, but I argue that it nonetheless signals a different set of pressures from the ones single women experience, which may in part explain lower rates of marriage. Although the development of laws regarding married women has been slow (see the discussion above regarding glacially-paced amendments to the German Civil Code), contemporary German women experience few of the strictures enforced until the 1970s and 1980s.

It is not only legal strides that matter. I noted extensive evidence in the previous section regarding social norms imposed on mothers in Germany; in addition to legal changes, social norms have evolved, placing less emphasis on the Hausfrau expectation. This cultural change is reflected in some devaluation of marriage as a necessary institution. For example, Ostner (2001), writing about attitudes towards cohabitation (living together outside marriage) in Germany, notes: “Moral panics exist in Germany, but they do not pertain to … divorce, or serial divorcing and remarrying … Germans just do not care” (2001:88). Ostner describes German sociologists by the late 1990s as talking about “living arrangements” in place of “families” in order to accommodate a plurality of choices. These trends reflect the demographic data I shared regarding later marriage and
lower rates of marriage among Germans. Most Germans do marry at some point in their lives, but it is no longer the defining, all-encompassing institution that it once was.

One of the exceptions to late 20th and early 21st century gains for married women regards a tax policy called *Ehegattensplitting* (taxing both spouses at the rate of the higher-earning spouse). As wives are often the lower-paid spouse in two-career marriages, women’s income in a given year is lower than it would be otherwise. There is some debate within the Bundestag about whether this tax policy actually discriminates against women. One of my interviewees, a man from the FDP, exasperatedly told me that many people think that it does discriminate against women, but that this reflects their ignorance about finance (112607 – male FDP). When I asked one of my female interviewees about Ehegattensplitting, her response was: “We women are against it!” (021308A – female SPD).

Simply the question of last names can be revealing. The Civil Code dating to 1900 required that women take their husband’s last name (see Shaffer 1981:40). This changed in West Germany in the postwar period to permit women to hyphenate their last names alongside their husbands’ names. Married women in West Germany were not allowed to keep their last name until 1981, and then only if their husbands adopted it. Spouses were required to have the same last name but could pick either the husband’s or wife’s. As of 1991, married women can keep their last name regardless of their husband’s choice, but the standard remains either adopting the husband’s name or hyphenating.

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In further reflection of the persistence of conventional understandings of the role of married women, Kolinsky (1993) cites a survey question asked of women between 15 and 30 years of age regarding marriage and partnership. Respondents were asked to place themselves in one of three categories: conventional, uncertain (i.e., poised between the two extremes), or the “new” woman (i.e., not tethered to traditional Frauenbildern). In 1985, when the survey was administered, 39% of women described themselves as conventional, 31% as uncertain, and 30% as “new.” Kolinsky claims that “this simultaneous existence and similar frequency of three types of women – the conventional, the uncertain, and the ‘new’ woman – suggest the traditional role for women as mothers and homemakers have not been replaced by clear-cut new ones based upon partnership (1993:95).

Kolinsky further cites a time-use study that is telling: although contemporary marriages evidence greater egalitarianism in household tasks before children, “once children are born, the husbands’ commitment [to household tasks] decreased, and that of their wives increased.” Ultimately, married couples without children, where both spouses were employed, were the closest to the ideal of equal partnership (1993:95). This idea that men are not quite ready to be the ones who stay at home while their wives go out to work is expressed in a number of different ways by my MdB interviewees in the 2007-8 period. By contrast, unmarried women in Germany manage to avoid any Hausfrau expectations.

I have presented marriage in contemporary Germany as an institution that has undergone substantial changes in the last 50 years, both in terms of the law and in terms

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63 See Kolinsky 1993:94-5.
of social expectations. For all this, marriage has not disappeared, and more than half of Germans will marry at some point in their lives; instead, the norms surrounding marriage have changed, and it has different implications for women in the 21st century from its historical implications. This evolution away from strong pressures on married women in the German context introduces the likelihood of cohorts with different experiences and perspectives. As I discussed in chapter 2, age is an important distinction among German women. The legal strides and evolution of social norms regarding marriage suggest that women just getting married in 2008 have a much different marriage to look ahead to than women who got married in 1968. I have hypothesized that (older) female legislators who experienced marriage as an institution promoting gendered inequality, more so than it does today, are more likely to speak on behalf of women.

A number of the MdB – both female and male – I interviewed made exactly this observation: “It’s hard to convince young women that it’s important to work further,” observes one woman from the SPD, “because there have been improvements” (021208A – female SPD). Another woman in the SPD made a similar comment: “Younger women don’t need to fight for this in the way that my generation did” (021308A – female SPD). Although this second interviewee seemed to be arguing that her days as an activist on behalf of women were over, she suggests that she nonetheless has a lingering awareness of a “need to fight” that a younger female legislator lacks.

Conclusion

I have shown, using a combination of primary and secondary sources, that women in contemporary Germany are subject to varying expectations based upon their status as
mothers or married women. Some of these expectations clearly stem from a history of instantiating traditional family models into law, which continues into the present. While such legal frameworks as the Civil Code have been incrementally revised throughout the postwar period to reflect gender-neutral language and equality between women and men, current legislation (specifically Eltern geld) is largely designed around the belief that young children should be cared for by their mothers at home.

These expectations have not evolved uncontested, and the legal history I have presented suggests that steps away from traditional gender-role models have been incremental. Thus, it stands to reason that there will be generational differences among women. Specifically for this study, there will be generational differences among female legislators, in two senses: 1) As older female legislators were subject to more traditional versions of these expectations, it is expected that the positive influence of social markers on substantively representing women will be greater among older women. 2) Female legislators (regardless of their status as mothers and wives) from older cohorts were exposed to and often themselves actively engaged in intense debates over fundamental women’s rights; this makes them more likely to engage in WSR in their contemporary work in the Bundestag.

Throughout this chapter, I have generally treated the legal restrictions placed on women as a reflection of social norms, not as exogenous forces on people’s behavior. However, there are clearly counter-arguments stating that institutions (including laws) shape behavior. A substantial literature in political economy, for example, has suggested that divorce laws, specifically the decision rules they institute for dividing assets upon divorce, alter women’s behavior and even their political preferences (see Iversen,
Rosenbluth, and Soskice 2005). This prompts the question of whether motherhood and marriage are social markers as opposed to signals pointing to economic self-interest.

The argument that I have developed here and in previous chapters suggests that these are indicators of both identity as well as interests. Women’s expectations of themselves and the expectations held by others stem from ideas about “good mothers” and “good wives,” and the freedom with which women make choices stems from legal regimes including child custody, marriage, and divorce laws. Moreover, the incremental legal changes that I have described do not spring ex nihilo. I am not developing a theory for institutional change in this project, but I argue that the evolution of social and legal norms is more likely to be recursive than unidirectional.

Having shown that the social markers of motherhood and marriage distinguish among women, and that their content evolved over the course of the 20th century, I turn in the subsequent chapter to party affiliation as a factor explaining women’s substantive representation.
Chapter 4: Members of the Bundestag ‘Reading the Party Script’

Introduction

Although Thomas (1994) notes that in the mid-nineties scholars had not reached conclusions about the “impact” of female legislators, by 2009 the question of whether female legislators legislate differently from their male counterparts in contexts of low levels of party discipline (however slight this difference, and whatever the prior origins of this difference, might be; see Reingold 2000) is no longer under serious debate. The uncertainties that linger involve factors mitigating this observation. First, it has not yet been firmly established empirically whether a “critical mass” exists. Second, neither is it entirely clear to what extent party affiliation and party discipline eclipse gendered patterns. Swers (1998, 2002) shows that party distinguishes among women, but this could be an artifact of her definition of women’s interests. Moreover, previous research has tended to focus on differences between male and female legislators’ attention to women’s interests, leaving us without a clear account of political parties as signaling distinctions among women. These mitigating factors are especially salient in legislative settings where party discipline is high, because party discipline obscures the preferences of individual legislators. Thus, parsing the effects of party versus identity in such sites as Germany is especially problematic.

In previous chapters I have advanced the claim that social markers, specifically motherhood and marriage, differentiate among women in ways that may translate into
different propensity to work on behalf of women’s interests. This effect is further mediated by individual legislators’ age, as the social and legal norms associated with motherhood and marriage evolved over the course of the 20th century. As I was not attempting to explain the valence of this advocacy for women, i.e., not attempting to explain the predictors of more versus less conservative understandings of what is “best for women,” I did not discuss at length the ways in which ideology (often measured with party affiliation) also differentiates among women. However, party differences among female legislators clearly shape their activities in ways relating to women.

My aim in this chapter is ask whether apparent distinctions among female legislators’ attitudes towards women’s interests amount simply to differences in party affiliation. As I have discussed in previous chapters, both conservative and feminist women may claim to be legitimate representatives of women. Once we include more conservative notions of women’s interests as women’s substantive representation, e.g., focusing on women’s role in their families as a good unto itself, does party persist in distinguishing among female legislators? In this chapter I first compare female and male legislators within the same party to assess whether gendered differences persist in spite of relatively high levels of party disciplines. Second, I compare women across parties. The first stage of this analysis (comparing women and men) establishes the extent to which party “matters.”

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64 At this juncture, I am not trying to establish the direction of causality, i.e., I am not addressing whether women sort into political parties in part based upon their proclivity to work on behalf of women.
The second stage of this analysis – comparing female legislators across parties – highlights two observations. On the one hand, we should not automatically lump conservative women with conservative men when it comes to WSR.

On the other hand, more data are required to settle whether what appear to be party-based differences among female legislators simply show that conservative parties treat masculinity as the universal. In other words, conservative parties’ platforms simply do not refer to women and women’s interests with great frequency, necessitating that female conservatives take an extra step (diverging from their parties’ neglect of women) in order to advocate for women. Even when the women’s interests for which female conservatives lobby clearly reflect conservative and traditional notions of gender roles, this advocacy constitutes a departure from conservative platforms, which typically do not refer to women or to gender, at all. Schreiber (2008) shows that both social conservative and economic conservative women’s organizations in the U.S. context must work to show how their advocacy for their conception of women’s interests fits within the more mainstream conservative agenda. This is because the association between women’s organizations and conservative politics is a relatively recent phenomenon, and women’s interests have no historical place in conservative politics. In summary, both the quantity of interests as well as the quality of interests (to what breadth of interests do they refer, and with what frequency?) differ between more and less conservative party platforms.

Although social markers and, relatedly, age are central to the broader argument that I make about variation among female legislators’ WSR in this dissertation, I do not address them here. This chapter focuses instead on the independent variable that has dominated previous research, party affiliation, in order to clarify several distinctions that
have gone unexamined. I aim to show that sex does not suffice to differentiate among members of the same party, nor does party affiliation suffice to differentiate among female legislators. Party affiliation requires closer attention, not only because it is known as a consistent predictor of individual legislators’ behavior and preferences. The definition of women’s interests used in previous work has often been tightly correlated with left-oriented party platforms, making it difficult to identify institutional party-effects as distinct from ideology.

In order to parse the effects of party affiliation and gender in this chapter, I use material from political party programs from the 2005 legislative elections and 54 personal interviews with members of the Bundestag (MdB), looking specifically at variation among parties’ and legislators’ conceptions of women’s interests. This is important for studying variation among female legislators’ WSR, because we must isolate party effects in order to see whether and how the identity of any individual legislator matters.

First, I assess political parties’ stances towards women’s interests: how political parties define women-specific issues, and what they state as their policies towards these issues. Second, I examine the variety among legislators within parties, specifically with respect to: 1) whether they believe that women’s interests are in fact distinct, and, if they do, what those interests are, and 2) their perceptions of gender quotas within their party and in the overall system. Measures of all of these attitudes are crucial to assessing the origins of women’s substantive representation (Broughton and Zetlin 1996, Lovenduski and Norris 2003), because they reveal prerequisites for engagement in advocating for women as a group. Finally, I compare female legislators across parties, assessing the extent to which party dominates variation in WSR among women.
The first category – believing in and identifying women’s interests as distinct – is a standard precursor to women’s substantive representation, i.e., women’s interests must exist in order to be represented. The second, legislators’ attitudes towards a gender quota and their explanations of these attitudes, gives important information about the extent to which legislators recognize challenges that women might disproportionately face in “making good” on formal equality. This attitude is also a standard prerequisite to women’s substantive representation, because a legislator would have to believe in challenges that women face in order to advocate policies that address those challenges. More practically speaking, quotas constitute a gendered issue on which each party in Germany has staked out a very clear position, making it relatively easy to identify when a legislator diverges from the party. I pay particular attention to the reasons that legislators give when they diverge.

Using the qualitative data I have described, I will show that party affiliation largely, but not completely, shapes the language used by both female and male legislators. This is not surprising. Not only do people join parties to match their preferences, but there are also disincentives for diverging too markedly. However, I also show the persistence of gendered patterns within parties. Having shown gendered patterns within parties in the context of largely party-dominated language, I then compare women across parties, showing that party affiliation cannot fully account for the similarities and differences among women. If sex neatly described legislators’ divergence from their parties (i.e., female legislators diverge in order to resemble one another across party lines), this might reflect a push-pull between party and sex effects, e.g., a conservative female legislator with a strong potential to advocate for women will diverge
from her party when she deems it necessary. However, as neither party nor sex suffices to explain variation among women, there may be some other process at work shaping the relationship between party affiliation and sex effects. I have suggested that an interplay of social markers and age (cohort) may be this process.

Although the interviewees I met with do not constitute a statistically representative sample of legislators in the Bundestag, they do illustrate the diversity of stances taken even by members of the same party. This diversity establishes the range of women’s substantive representation I would expect to find using other indicators. The interviews also provide insight into legislators’ perceptions of women and women’s interests. These insights are crucial to interpreting the quantitative indicators of women’s substantive representation that I analyze in chapter 5. As I will discuss in more detail in this chapter, the aggregate profile of my interviewees in terms of two key attributes (sex and party affiliation) mirrors the profile of the Bundestag at large, which suggests that my interview material may be roughly generalizable. Though the interviews do not necessarily reflect the distribution or frequency of attitudes within a given party, they should reflect the range of extant attitudes.

For the reason that the interviews are not a statistically representative sample, I refer to my findings in terms of my interviewees, not in terms of the entire Bundestag. I note descriptive statistics, but I emphasize meaning (interviewees’ choice of language) over frequency (how often interviewees chose one way of describing women’s interests over another).

**Theoretical expectations**
Here I briefly re-visit the argument I laid out in chapter 2 regarding the effects of party affiliation.

The first hypothesis I present is a baseline expectation that party affiliation provides the language that MdB use to talk about women and women’s interests. This expectation follows from studies that show party to be a strong indicator of individual party members’ actions and preferences (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Levitt 1996) as well as from studies specifically addressing party discipline in parliamentary systems (Loewenberg 1967, Mitchell 2000; Mueller 2000; Strom, Mueller, and Bergman 2003). Previous work on women in politics also tends to suggest that party and/or ideology are the dominant predictors of WSR (Swers 1998, Swers 2002, Thomas 1991, Thomas 1994). For some of this previous research on WSR, women’s interests are defined narrowly as feminist, making it no surprise that findings show conservative legislators as not representing women. An observable implication of this baseline hypothesis is that there will be little variation within any given party, i.e., there should not be much variation between women and men, and among women, of the same party. Thus, the strong version of this hypothesis refutes claims about differences between female and male legislators, though it does offer a purely party-based explanation for variation among female legislators.

The second, alternative hypothesis I present is that the sex of any individual legislator will determine the language that s/he uses to talk about women and women’s interests. Previous research on WSR never stakes out this “strong” version of the expectation that women represent women, readily conceding that there are numerous factors that play important roles in individual legislators’ attention to specific issue areas.
However, despite this admission of multiple factors, this previous work focuses on establishing distinctions between female and male legislators. This approach is framed as an exploration into what exogenous factors mitigate female legislators’ inherent propensity to represent women. Female legislators’ potential to advocate for women is taken as a given. An observable implication of this second hypothesis is that any WSR variation within party will be between women and men.

I offer two caveats to this discussion thus far. First, the degree of cohesion within any given party affects these observable implications. As Arend Lijphart terms it, a single party may be fractured to the point of functioning as multiple parties (a “factionalized party”; 1999:72), and multiple parties may work so closely as to function effectively as a single party (“closely allied parties”; 1999:69). The implications of this are that party affiliation might not be as appropriate as faction for this hypothesis. In this chapter, I treat the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union as a single party. Not only do the CDU/CSU fit Lijphart’s definition for closely allied parties, they officially share a platform at the national level, and I use the legislative platform as the party “script.” Recognizing that this simplifying assumption may be flawed, I disaggregate my findings in chapter 5.

Second, the strong hypothesis that female legislators will represent women clearly runs contrary to the premise of this dissertation, which seeks to explain the differences among female legislators. The variation that I explore in this dissertation can be

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65 See also Laver and Schofield (1990).
66 An additional challenge to distinguishing between the CDU and CSU in this chapter is the small N; as I will discuss, I did a handful of interviewees with each of these parties. Although chapter 5 looks at the CDU and CSU separately, in no part of the dissertation do I disaggregate the SPD into any alleged factions. This might be something to consider in future projects.
illuminated against the backdrop of this strong hypothesis. Throughout the project, I do not suggest that a legislator’s sex should determine her or his propensity to engage actively in advancing the interests of women. Nor do I suggest that all women inherently share a propensity for WSR that is simply revealed or hidden by other exogenous factors such as party affiliation. Instead, I argue that it may be a mistake to treat party affiliation and tendency to represent women as variables that are fully independent of one another. I aim to demonstrate this sticky connection in this chapter.

Neither of these simple hypotheses alone suffices to explain variation in WSR. However, their overlap tells us something about the extent to which party affiliation succeeds in distinguishing among female legislators.

**Party platforms: the language of women’s interests**

If MdB were to “stick to the script” in talking about women and women’s interests, what would they say? In this section I outline the positions – and the language used to describe those positions – of each of the five parties (six if we count the CDU and CSU separately) currently holding seats in the Bundestag, based upon their platforms as presented for the 2005 legislative elections. This is the platform most relevant to my interviewees, who are (with two exceptions) members of the 16th Bundestag (2005-2009). Although these interviewees are the very party members who are likely to have had some hand in crafting platforms, in the first place, I treat the platforms as an exogenous rubric. This is because a platform is an aggregation of attitudes via a fairly complicated process, including much negotiation over language, while my interviewees were individual
people. Moreover, the more an individual MdB’s position differs from the “average” party member’s position, the less likely it will have been integrated into the platform.

As I will illustrate, these five platforms’ approaches to talking about women’s interests distinguish themselves from one another along three dimensions: 1) an emphasis on equality of opportunity versus on equality of outcome, which correlates with the extent to which the party supports policies like affirmative action; 2) whether or not the party emphasizes socio-structural challenges that women disproportionately face, which is a prerequisite for endorsing policies that would address those challenges; and 3) the extent to which the party recognizes women’s interests as a distinct category of interests.

Two approaches contributed to my identification of these three dimensions as important. First, I consulted the Comparative Manifesto Project, based at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung, to see what coding categories are defined as relating to women. There are two: a code for a positive reference to social justice (Per 503), and a code for a positive reference to non-economic demographic groups (Per 706).

706 Non-economic Demographic Groups: Positive
Favourable mentions of, or need for, assistance to women, old people, young people, linguistic groups, etc; special interest groups of all kinds.

503 Social Justice: Positive
Concept of equality; need for fair treatment of all people; special protection for underprivileged; need for fair distribution of resources; removal of class barriers; end of discrimination such as racial or sexual discrimination, etc.

With these two coding categories in mind, I read through the German party platforms relevant to my project. I arrived at the three dimensions I described semi-inductively; they relate to both CMP categories.
A legislator’s recognition of women’s interests as distinct is a prerequisite for her or his substantive representation of women. The degree to which a party recognizes challenges that women face in fully realizing their rights as citizens is also a predictor of whether that party will advocate policies that address those challenges. Finally, questions of equality of opportunity versus equality of outcome commonly divide political parties. National-level parties in Germany do not align perfectly along a left to right spectrum, but I will discuss them roughly in that order.

I note the quantity of references to women in any given party platform as an additional axis of comparison. This is to highlight that conservative parties do identify a set of women’s interests, but these interests occupy a smaller space in their platform.

**Left**

The Left party (die Linke) is easily the left-most party in the 16th Bundestag. Its current incarnation is as a 2007 (mid-legislative period) re-constitution of the former Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS; it was called the “Linkspartei/PDS”), which in turn was the successor to the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the German Democratic Republic.67 The PDS, although programmatically left-wing, is not a Leninist party, which would make them anti-system (Lees 2005:153-4, Gunther and Diamond 2001:18). One of my interviewees from the Left party proudly displayed a large portrait of Karl Marx on his office wall, and another interviewee gleefully referred to how he enjoys that “the Communists” can make the other MdB nervous. Despite these signals, and despite the

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67 See Barker (1998) for a discussion of the transformation from the SED to the PDS; the SED was not dissolved but rather substantially altered in a series of decisions between 1989 and the mid 1990s.
tendency of scholars to view the PDS as a protest party, the party has a stable electorate, principally in the East, and it “now attempts to portray itself more as a broad church of leftward leaning opinion, having denied the importance of the leading role of the working class and chosen to accept…the rules of the political game like every other democratic party (Hough, Koss, and Olsen 2007:6).

Instead, the Linkspartei/PDS is an electoralist programmatic left party, focused on vote-gathering in the former East. The Linkspartei/PDS had seats in the Bundestag from East and West Germany’s reunification in 1990 up until 2002. In the 2002 legislative elections only two party members (Gesine Loetzsch and Petra Pau) were elected (single member district); the Left did not win sufficient votes as a party to gain any seats. The party returned to the Bundestag in 2005, and it gained an additional 3.2% in the most recent Bundestag elections to occupy 76 seats. This amounts to 11.9% of the legislative body overall as of September 2009.

The Left’s 2005 legislative election program (the Linkspartei/PDS at the time of the 2005 election) pays considerable attention to socioeconomic issues, as we would expect from the communist-successor party. For example, the introduction to the 2005 program bemoans tax breaks for big capitalists, expressing particular concern for the unemployed. However, this program also includes a separate section dedicated to “Gender Equality and Encouragement of Women,” which begins by stating that

“the equality of men and women is an integral part of a democratic society. This equality does not just include legal protection from discrimination, but also the active encouragement of the sexes, who are still hindered by traditional gender-roles from equal participation in careers and society” (p.25)

This statement captures the spirit of the Left’s attitude towards women and women’s interests, which incorporates explicit attention to gendered disadvantages as well as support of positive discrimination to implement equality of access and outcome. “Roles and self-understandings are shaped by patriarchy,” and the Left aim to get rid of this structural discrimination (p.25-6). In terms of gendered economic disadvantages, they note that women have experienced greater economic and social precarity as a result of the Hartz IV laws, which revised social welfare provision in 2003 (p.26).

The interests that the Left program identifies are: the desire not to be disproportionately burdened with the care of children and dependents (p.11); the possibility – for both women and men – of combining work and family, with the assistance of state-provided childcare (p.16-18); encouragement of careers in research and the sciences (p.19); women’s right to make decisions about their bodies (p.26); and women and children’s right to personal safety, independent of their partners and parents (p.26). These concerns reflect an emphasis on state involvement in attaining certain goals of social and economic justice.

**Alliance90/Green Party**\(^{68}\)

Of the five parties, it is the Alliance90/Greens’ platform for the 2005 legislative elections (www.gruene.de/cms/default/dokbin/141/141550.wahlprogramm_2005.pdf), last accessed December 15, 2009) that dedicates the most text and detail to identifying women as a group with a distinct set of interests. This is not a break with the party’s history: the Greens’ origins in Germany in the 1970s lie with activist social movements, \(^{68}\)“Alliance 90” refers to the coalition of smaller social activist organizations from the former East Germany. Alliance90 and the Greens formally combined in 1993.
including the women’s movement as well as peace, anti-nuclear, and civil rights movements. As Lees (2005) describes, it was in the early 1980s that the party became a national level party, coalescing around more grass-roots state-level political groups of varying levels of opposition to the capitalist state: “The Greens fought the March 1983 Bundestag elections for the first time as a unified party” (170-1). This process of coalescing into a viable national-level party involved lots of infighting over whether the party would remain opposed to a professionalized party (thereby remaining “left-libertarian”) or not (to become a programmatic electoralist party). Ultimately, they shed many of their anti-capitalist policies and became relatively mainstream.

However, the Greens’ emergence from social movements of the 1970s is still evident in party policies. Specifically in terms of women, the party has implemented a strict 50% candidate quota since its inception.69 Green parties in Europe are commonly referred to as post-materialist, an ideological orientation that corresponds with high levels of gender equity (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

The Greens’ 2005 program discusses at length the disadvantages that women face, all of which they argue require attention. These disadvantages include salary inequalities (unequal pay for equal work), the double burden of simultaneous income-work and domestic work (p.18), unequal access to credit (p.26), and disproportionate responsibility for caring for the elderly and for dependents (p.82). Simply the identification of these challenges distinguishes the Greens from other party platforms, which do not frame

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69 The Greens use a “zipper policy” to assemble the party list, whereby every other list position is filled by a female candidate. The first candidate (Spitzenkandidat) is always female, with the result that more than half of the Greens’ current MdB are female.
women’s interests as strongly in terms of overcoming barriers of this variety and magnitude. 

As the platform states, “A full modernization of society is impossible without gender equality and fairness” (p.82). In that spirit, they state that women must be equally represented in leadership positions, as well. Following from this, they explicitly support quotas in all occupational areas, not just politics (p.83-4). Although there is a separate section on supporting families (p.81), family interests remain distinct from women’s interests, i.e., women are included in the family, but women’s rights and interests are clearly demarcated. In defense of reproductive rights, they write, “Girls and women have the right to a self-determined life,” meaning that they must be able to make the decision for or against pregnancy on their own (p.86). This right to self-determination is framed in terms of the woman’s value as an individual person, not in terms of her relationships to other people.

Thus, according to the language of the German Green party in 2005, gender equality must be achieved by actively addressing a rather lengthy set of pre-existing socio-structural challenges. This language of women’s interests emphasizes equality of opportunity as well as some measure of quality of outcome, and it explicitly recognizes challenges and disadvantages as gendered.

**Social Democratic Party (SPD)**

The large left-center party in Germany is the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The party’s origins resemble the origins of social democracy across Europe in the 19th century: industrialization precipitated the rise of trade unions, which in turn organized
efforts to expand suffrage and lobbied for workers’ rights. In 1890, Bismarck’s ban on socialist parties was lifted, and the Social Democratic Party emerged, which blended Marxist principles (e.g., nationalization of capital) and reformism (e.g., equal rights for women). Although the tension between these two approaches to social change persisted, the balance favored reformism, resulting in the SPD as a center-left party.

There is some disagreement over exactly how to categorize the SPD as a party. Gunther and Diamond (2003) identify Germany’s SPD as a class-mass party: a party with socialist roots that has maintained many of its ties with secondary associations, e.g., trade unions. In the early 20th century, as with many socialist movements worldwide, these secondary associations included the socialist women’s movements. Lees (2005) disagrees, identifying the SPD as an electoralist party, for the reasons that by the late 1990s the party platform had moved closer to the center, with an increasing focus on activity during elections. Gunther and Diamond (2003) define the electoralist party as one that does not maintain extensive grass-roots activities but rather is most active during elections, “[utilizing] ‘modern’ campaign techniques (stressing television and mass-communications media over the mobilization of party members and affiliated organizations)” (Gunther and Diamond 2003:185). Either way, the party is oriented left of center and prone to shift its emphases in response to electoral pressures.

The SPD’s 2005 election platform (www.spd.de/040705_Wahlmanifest.pdf, last accessed August 20, 2008), like the Greens’, cites the necessity of institutional means for attaining women’s equality in society, politics, and the economy (p.43). However, there

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70 See Gerhard Braunthal (1994).
is substantially less attention to framing women’s interests in terms of socio-structural challenges that must be overcome.

The policies that the SPD supports in favor of women are: equal pay for equal work, equal opportunities in the workplace, making an effort to widen the spectrum of jobs available to women, improving the possibility of balancing work and family, the necessity of supporting continuing-education training for both women and men equally when they are unemployed (even if their partner is employed), combating violence against women, combating forced marriage, and a new gender-specific anti-discrimination law (p.44-5, p.49).

Although the SPD’s platform is less explicit than the Greens about the distinction between women’s interests and family interests, the distinction is nonetheless present. For example, a separate section of the platform, entitled, “We desire that women and men have equal rights in the workplace” (p.43), is dedicated to women strictly as employees, not as mothers trying to balance work and family. Overall, SPD language regarding women’s interests endorses institutional means of implementing equality of outcome, but the emphasis lies with equality of opportunity, e.g., they support widening the spectrum of jobs available to women.

**Christian Democratic and Christian Social Unions (CDU and CSU)**

The SPD’s coalition partner in the 16\textsuperscript{th} Bundestag, the joint Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU), is the large party clearly situated at the center-right: socially conservative but committed to reconciling social justice with a market economy. Lees (2005) writes, “The character of the CDU/CSU was forged in the
particular circumstances of occupied Germany in the period 1945-1949,” going on to argue that the post-war period evidenced “both political space and a political need for a right-of-centre, cross-class, cross-confessional party” (151). In its early years, the party varied across regions of Germany, with some regions focusing more on religious affiliation than others. It has since, in response to electoral exigencies (the need to mobilize supporters), evolved into its modern catch-all party form, a genus of the electorallist party (Gunther and Diamond 2003, Lees 2005:164).

The Union’s 2005 election platform (http://www.regierungsprogramm.cdu.de/, last accessed August 20, 2008) refers to three issues as pertaining specifically to women. First, the platform identifies the equality of women in the workplace, specifically that family and career be possible to balance together, as a woman’s interest. The program notes that “family-friendly employment structures are a central part of successful management” (p.15). As Ursula von der Leyen, the CDU/CSU/s Family Affairs Minister in the 16th legislative party, often says in speeches, Germany must reach the “European standard for childcare” in order to remain economically competitive.71

Second, the platform addresses human trafficking, proposing specific laws to punish sexual victimization and human trafficking (p.32). Third, the platform identifies the human rights of Muslim girls and women in Germany as a woman-specific concern, though it is framed as a matter of human rights. Specifically, the program mentions forced marriage as a “statutory offense” (p.34). The program includes a section on family politics entitled “The Future of Families: Education and Upbringing,” but this refers throughout to parents, not to either sex specifically.

Although the Union’s platform explicitly mentions its opposition to blatant law-breaking, e.g., violence against women, overall its language characterizes women’s interests largely in relation to the family, i.e., balancing work and family. An example of how this emphasis translates into policy is the work of the current (2005-present) federal minister for Family, Seniors, Women, and Youth, Ursula von der Leyen, a member of the CDU/CSU. Her efforts are clearly distinctive from the traditional Union attitude towards women and family, but the policies on which von der Leyen focuses nonetheless continue to frame women as part of a family, not as individual citizens. Moreover, in contrast with the Greens and even the SPD, no attention is paid to socio-structural challenges that women might face, aside from – implicitly – women’s disproportionate responsibility for childcare. However, this responsibility is not fully conceived of as a challenge in conservative conceptions of women’s interests. Motherhood is not perceived as a disadvantage, per se (see also Schreiber 2008).

Ultimately, this is language that gestures towards equality of opportunity, with the implicit assumption that the state regards women mostly in terms of their family relationships.

**Free Democratic Party (FDP)**

One final party, an opposition party in the 16th legislative party, remains: the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The FDP is the European liberal party in the German system, formed after the second world war as part of an effort to avoid party-system

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72 Previously, typical CDU/CSU attitudes have involved endorsing women staying at home with their children, while present policies aim to make it possible for women to work as well as have a family.
fragmentation of the kind that had taken place during the Weimar Republic. In its early stages of formation in 1946, leaders of the party focused on the FDP as a party for the middle-class (buergerlich),\textsuperscript{73} i.e., as an alternative to the worker-focused SPD and the middle-class-but-social-justice-oriented CDU. Lees (2005) describes the contemporary FDP as a programmatic party committed to the market economy far more than to any specific social model. Supporters of the FDP include primarily the middle class and owners of small businesses.

Although I refer to both the CDU/CSU and the FDP party groups as the conservative parties in Germany, it is important to distinguish between the two: the CDU/CSU is socially conservative, while the FDP is economically conservative. The FDP does not have much of a stake in traditional gender roles, but it is opposed to state intervention, meaning that in effect it protects the status quo, which is contrary to feminist notions of women’s interests.

Their 2005 platform (files.liberale.de/fdp-wahlprogramm.pdf, last accessed December 15, 2009) emphasizes the potential contribution of women to the economy and to societal development (p.22): “Liberal women’s politics builds upon women’s qualifications, strengths, and motivation” (p.35-6). Women’s interests according to the FDP are: support of the possibility of having children while simultaneously working, with an emphasis on this being the wish of both women and men (p.33-4); the abolition of tax bracket #5, which taxes the lower-paid partner in a marriage, typically the woman, differently over the course of a year (p.34); and equal opportunities in their careers.

\textsuperscript{73}See Heino Kaack (1976) \textit{Zur Geschichte und Programmatik der Freien Demokratischen Partei} (On the History and Aims of the FDP) Verlag Anton Hain.
Overall, the FDP, unlike the SPD and Greens, does not dwell on language recognizing challenges that women may face. Unsurprisingly, the program focuses on formal equality of opportunity, typically providing economic arguments for why everyone should support more women in the labor force. As the liberal party, they focus on individual persons’ rights and emphasize universalism. Positive discrimination is not part of their policy arsenal, i.e., they do not support affirmative action policies that would implement equality of outcome, per se. Although it is not stated implicitly in the program, the FDP is likely also supportive of balancing family and career due to Germany’s low birth-rate and the consequences that this demographic shift may have in the future.\textsuperscript{74}

In summary, these five party platforms offer a variety of approaches to talking about women’s interests. (See Table 4.1.) They vary primarily along three axes: equality of opportunity versus equality of outcome, recognition of challenges that women disproportionately face, and recognition of women’s interests as a distinct category. These axes of difference are not surprising, given each party’s ideological profile. The platforms also vary in terms of the extent to which they discuss women as a group: the more conservative parties (the CDU/CSU and the FDP) dedicate much less of their program to women and women’s interests than the parties on the left.

\textsuperscript{74} See, for a journalistic account, R. Shorto’s “No Babies?”\textit{ New York Times} (June 29, 2008).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Equality of opportunity/ outcome</th>
<th>Attention to gendered challenges</th>
<th>Women’s interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left (communist-successor)</td>
<td>Emphasis on both, more on equality of outcome</td>
<td>Discussion of “patriarchy-shaped self-understanding,” the feminization of poverty, the double burden, etc.</td>
<td>Attention to family and economic spheres, and more broadly to equal rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green (post-materialist)</td>
<td>Emphasis on both, more on equality of outcome</td>
<td>Discussion of salary inequalities, double burden, unequal access to credit, etc</td>
<td>Attention to family and economic spheres, and more broadly to equal rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD (center-left)</td>
<td>Emphasis on both, more on equality of opportunity</td>
<td>Discussion of needing anti-discrimination laws, of gendered unemployment patterns, etc</td>
<td>Attention to both family and economic spheres, with more attention of family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU (center-right)</td>
<td>Emphasis on equality of opportunity</td>
<td>Allusion to women’s double-burden</td>
<td>Interests mostly restricted to the family/domestic sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP (European liberal)</td>
<td>Emphasis on equality of opportunity</td>
<td>No mention</td>
<td>Interests mostly restricted to the economic sphere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1. Party platforms: content addressing women and women’s interests

The party affiliation hypothesis suggests that MdB will use the language of their party, e.g., both female and male legislators from the CDU/CSU will focus on women’s interests as family-related. The sex hypothesis suggests that attention to women as a
group is mediated by the legislator’s sex: women will 1) recognize women’s interests as distinct, while their male counterparts are less likely to do so, and 2) identify a broader range of interests than their male counterparts, e.g., women across parties will have more in common than women and men of the same party.

In the sections that follow, I discuss whether and how interviewees “stuck to the script,” starting with comparisons between women and men of the same party and proceeding to comparisons among women across parties.

**Methodology**

The material I use for comparing women and men in the same party and women across parties consists of 54 interviews with MdB, administered between June 2007 and June 2008. These interviews are best categorized as “attitude-mapping” interviews: the questionnaire was composed of open-ended questions intended to capture MdBs’ conceptions of women’s interests, their attitudes towards a variety of issues, etc. (See Appendix A for the full interview questionnaire.) Although a short survey administered to a larger number of MdB would have yielded more readily generalizable results, the interview process permitted me to ask follow-up questions and to receive extended responses, which yielded greater insight into legislators’ attitudes and examples of their reasons, i.e., more detail.

Two of the 54 interviews were with the same female member of the SPD, and one was with a female CSU legislator’s head-of-office. One female CDU member was a member of the 13th legislative period (1994-1998), not of the 16th (2005-2009). Although they are not statistically representative, these interviews include women and men from all
six political parties currently holding seats in the Bundestag. (See Table 4.2; this is identical to Table 3.1. It is repeated here for the convenience of readers.) Moreover, the social background characteristics of this interview sample are roughly representative of the Bundestag overall.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th># Seats in the 16th Bundestag</th>
<th>Women’s presence in the 16th Bundestag: # (% of party)</th>
<th># Interviews: women</th>
<th># Interviews: men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left (communist successor)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26 (49.1%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green (post materialist)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30 (58.8%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD (center left)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>79 (36.0%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU (center right)</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>47 (21.1%)</td>
<td>6 *</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP (European liberal)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>15 (24.6%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # interviews</td>
<td>54 total</td>
<td>28 (27 unique)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2. Interviews with MdB
The total # of MdB in the 16th Bundestag at the end of the legislative period was 612, including 197 women (Source: Inter-parliamentary Union Archive of Statistical Data for August, 2009, available at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif310809.htm, last accessed January 6, 2010).

* One interview was with the (female) head of a CSU female MdB’s Berlin office, and one interview was with a female CDU MdB who served in the 13th legislative period (1994-1998)

• I interviewed one female SPD MdB twice.
With the exception of the one former member of the Bundestag, my selection of contacts proceeded in the following manner. I disaggregated party group lists (available online at www.bundestag.de) by sex and then randomly selected equal numbers of women and men. Response rates for some groups, especially female members of the SPD, were particularly low, and in those cases I randomly selected additional MdB from that category to contact. Overall, I contacted approximately 400 MdB by email in preparation for multiple trips to Berlin, and about 13% of these contacts yielded interviews. Occasionally, a legislator was unavailable at a given time but encouraged me to contact her/him on a future occasion. In all of these cases, this repeat contact produced an interview. This constitutes a systematic random sample.

I designed my interview questionnaire to gather information about legislators’ perceptions of themselves, their jobs (including their independence from their party and party group), and their relationship to women as a constituency and their conception of women’s interests, as well as to assess the kinds of justifications that they provided for these attitudes. I explore whether they note a particular commitment to representing women based upon their party program, for example, or based upon identity. The sequencing of questions was important for the interview: questions about women and gender were unannounced and followed more general questions about representation and constituency.

My goal with these interviews was not to discern statistically significant patterns among interviewees, per se, but rather to garner a sense of the diversity of ways in which

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75 The former MdB was referred to me by someone I met at a conference.
76 The project title for my fieldwork was “Identifying and Conceptualizing Constituencies: Pathways to Representation.”
MdB expressed their attitudes. Specifically, I aimed with these interviews to learn the range of language that MdB used to express their positions on issues related to women and women’s interests. Thus, my emphasis throughout this chapter is on the meaning that interviewees ascribed to their work and responsibilities, with less attention paid to the frequency with which these attributions were made. That said, the diversity of interviewees, in quantitative terms, is of some initial interest. As Table 4.2 shows, I spoke with between three and eight women and men from each party group.

Yet more interesting than the fact that not all members of a given Fraktion stuck to their party scripts in answering to questions about women and women’s interests are the ways in which their responses differed. In terms of intra-party variation, sex appears to be a signal that a conservative female legislator is more likely to describe women’s interests in more expansive terms than a conservative male. However, in terms of intra-party variation, this did not make all female MdB identical to one another. Conservative female MdB, for example, still emphasized family-related interests more than their left-leaning female counterparts.

In the sections that follow, I analyze the extent to which interviewees used their parties’ language to talk about women and women’s interests, with an emphasis on the dimensions of inter-party difference: equality of opportunity versus equality of outcome, the degree of emphasis on socio-structural challenges that women might face, and the extent to which s/he recognizes women’s interests as a distinct category. First I compare women and men in the same party, and then I compare women across parties. I do this for women’s interests and then for attitudes towards quotas.
Within-party comparisons between female and male legislators

Attitudes towards the existence and content of women’s interests

As Table 4.3 shows, there was variation among my interviewees with respect to whether they believe that women constitute a group with distinct interests. The most striking impression that the interviews give is that intra-party variation in beliefs about the distinctiveness of women’s interests is not uniform across parties, i.e., gendered differences are not uniform across parties. I will discuss each party, in turn.
Table 4.3. MdB beliefs about the existence of women’s interests as distinct from other interests: number of interviewees offering each response type (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Yes, women have different interests</th>
<th>Yes, but I don’t know what they are</th>
<th>Not fundamentally different, no</th>
<th>TOTAL number of interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left (communist successor)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5 (83.3%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (16.7%)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5 (71.4%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green (post materialist)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD (center left)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6 (100%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU (center right)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3 (37.5%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (37.5%)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP (European liberal)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 (66.67)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23 (88.5%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (11.5%)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>15 (57.7%)</td>
<td>2 (7.7%)</td>
<td>9 (34.6%)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In some cases the question regarding women’s interests was not answered by the interviewee, or the answer was unclear and did not fit in any category.
° Two interviews were done with one female SPD interviewee. Her responses are not doubled here.

Interviewees in the two parties furthest to the left of the political spectrum in Germany, the Left and the Greens, exhibited little variation in terms of whether they believed that women as a group have interests that are distinct from men, and this amounted to close adherence to their party program. Indeed, in the Left party, all of the interviewees take a fairly activist feminist stance towards addressing gendered
inequalities and gendered issues. A number of interviewees, both women and men, referred to the need to fight to gain equality:

“Women continue to fight to be sure that their rights are implemented,” stated one woman from the Left (113007B – female Left).

In talking about whether women must decide between a career and caring for their children in the home, another woman from the Left stated, “On this question I’m pretty radical. I believe that women must, for themselves, take responsibility [for their livelihood]. … It’s not whether they may return to work, it is they must” (021308C – female Left).

A man from the Left made one claim paraphrased directly from his party program: “There is no freedom in society without women’s emancipation” (021208C – male Left).

Two men from the Left party indicated that they did not believe that women’s interests were distinct, but these were qualified claims rather an outright rejection of the idea that sex/gender might disadvantage someone. These interviewees were rejecting the role of gender, alone, arguing instead that gender interacts with socioeconomic status:

“Fundamentally it’s not being a woman but rather social position. A woman who works as a hairdresser in the East for 3.50 Euros [per hour] – or as a chamber maid in a Western hotel for 3.70 Euros [per hour] – it’s not that she’s a woman…it’s that she’s dependently employed, her wage is too low, and so we need a better minimum wage” (112807C – male Left). This same interviewee went on to say, “There are of course questions that have to do with women: equal pay for equal work, etc, the balancing of work and family. The mother needs childcare nurseries, day-mothers, etc. Those are
clearly gendered issues. But the woman dentist who earns 300,000 Euros per year – she is a woman, but she has very different problems.”

Another man from the Left also referred to minimum-wage laws as benefiting mothers more than women-specific legislation would: “Women don’t have particular, as though weird, interests – they’re half of the citizens! So they’re not abnormal.” Giving little discussion to the content of women’s interests, this interviewee went on to say that the Left’s minimum-wage plan would really help women. (112907C – male Left.)

Similar variation is found in the Green party. Female and male interviewees, alike, tended to adhere to their party platform, focusing on questions of social justice and equality and justice across generations. Typical statements included:

“Women think forward to the future,” said one woman from the Green party, in answer to my question about whether women have distinct interests. “And a large number of voters for the Greens are women. Even a seemingly conservative woman would support us, because they know that we take them seriously as women. Because we think ahead to the next generation” (112807B – female Greens).

Women’s interests include “social justice, environmental justice, long-term issues,” said one man from the Greens. “Equal rights, the balancing of career and family – a real problem in Germany, an issue that I worked on before I came to the Bundestag” (021508B – male Greens).

However, two male interviewees from the Green party indicated that they felt variation among women was probably as great as variation between women and men. They argued that more general questions of human rights and equality must be addressed:
“It is still the case that an area of women’s issues exists, though it is diminishing slowly…Young women don’t have the same classical feminist spirit, fighting against men…So it is not so strongly man versus woman” (061608B – male Greens).

Women and men’s issues “really aren’t so different…Women are as diverse as men…but some specific issues: equal rights, social-structural inequalities. But one finds the full spectrum of preferences among women, as among men” (061807 – male Greens).

One man from the Green party, upon being asked who best represents women’s interests, made observations about the need for women’s empowerment that stem from the Greens’ emphasis on quotas and support for women. He told me that he got a funny feeling when men claimed to represent women’s interests, that it seemed very paternalistic. “I get the feeling that men often use this to curry favor.” He added that behind men’s discrimination of women often “stands men’s fear of losing power” (021508B – male Greens).

Women and men from the SPD were more varied, though they, too, tended to stick to their party’s script in responding to questions about women and women’s interests. Similar to the Greens, SPD interviewees largely conformed to their party platform. As I noted in the previous section, the SPD platform script clearly identifies women’s interests as distinct, and it maintains a distinction (though a lesser one than the Greens) between women’s interests and family interests. It mentions but does not dwell upon socio-structural challenges that women face; it invokes equality of outcome as well as equality of opportunity, but it emphasizes opportunity. Interviewees emphasized family-related interests, though female interviewees were more likely to expand beyond
this range of interests. One female interviewee from the SPD, for example, declared that women’s interests could be divided into six categories, upon which she proceeded to elaborate (061708A – female SPD).

Another female interviewee stated, “Earlier, and still now, I think that women think more about family issues than men. It’s regrettable, but…it’s a big discrepancy” (021408A – female SPD).

Male interviewees from the SPD seemed to be more likely to talk about women’s issues as a distinction that has grown less important over time, i.e., with the SPD’s help much progress had been made. However, these men, too, generally recognized persistent gendered inequalities.

“In my experience, the differences [between women and men] are small. I am a man but was supported by women [female voters],” said one man from the SPD. However, he proceeded later in his interview to claim that women’s interests might include “equal treatment, professional advancement, money in the workplace…it’s a social-structural thing that…women move with their husbands” when husbands’ careers require re-location. “This is a systematic disadvantage,” he observed “021408C – male SPD).

Another man claimed that the era of talking about women’s interests was gone: “There are old-fashioned issues – calling the equality of men and women women’s interests. This is a social question women and men must pursue together. There are certainly fights over women’s interests, but this is mostly past. It’s not 50-50 representation in business and politics etc, but we’re making lots of progress, in the right direction” (021108B – male SPD).
This claim (021108B) contrasts with the claim made by one of his female colleagues in the SPD: Women must have “not just equal rights on paper – but also the possibility of living these rights” (021308A – female SPD).

Although there were some distinctions between female and male interviewees in the SPD, this was much less marked than the gendered distinctions manifested in my interviews with members of the CDU and the CSU. In the case of the CDU/CSU, the program limits its attention to women’s interests to family-specific issues and to blatant issues of human rights, e.g., human trafficking. There is no text in the platform addressing gendered challenges that might disproportionately affect women in their pursuit of economic and political equality with men, i.e., both women and men are noted as parents who will be concerned about the balancing of work and family.

Men who deny outright that inequalities exist, or deny that women have particular claims to grievances, are not to be found among my interviewees in the left-leaning parties of the Left, Greens, and the SPD. However, two male interviewees from the CDU/CSU expressed very conservative perspectives on these questions.

Dismissing responsibility for knowing what women’s interests might be, one male interviewee from the CDU stated, “Well, I think that the strong group of our women MdB – the Fraunenunion – they formulate their interests quite well.”

Another man from the CDU expressed frustration with the claim that woman had interests that could not be represented by, effectively, a male-dominated Bundestag. He became visibly frustrated in responding to my question about whether women had different interests from men’s:
“I am one of those people who believe that there are differences between women and men,” he said. He continued: “Women often have different interests, I assume, I don’t know, I’m not a woman.” In talking about the variety of women’s interests, he said, his frustration visibly increasing: “I always say…this new Frauenbild…the over-emancipated [ueber-emanzipierte] woman…women who want to do that, okay, but other women should be allowed to live in their own way if they don’t want that. “I look at the Left and the Greens, their idea of how a woman should behave” – all women want to live their lives, “but only the emancipated women, as though the others women are hiding under the table – for me that is not right. It’s only one type of woman who they [Left, Greens] support” (113007A – male CDU).

The other male interviewees from the CDU/CSU varied in their attitudes towards the existence of women’s interests. Several, for example, indicated the belief that the situation had improved a great deal over time. These men tended to refer to women’s interests exclusively in terms of family-related issues.

“There are interests that concern women more than men. But these differences are decreasing, because men are also becoming occupied with these things. But, classically, questions of childcare, the balancing of work and family…but it’s changing. We’re having a bit of a debate about this in politics, to make it necessary that men also be concerned with this. Twenty years ago this would have been an issue that only women would have been occupied with…A social transformation has taken place” (112707C – male CDU).

However, notably, the only interviewee from the CDU/CSU of either sex who used the term patriarchy was a man: “There are doubtlessly specific women’s
interests…Equal rights; that women can develop without a patriarchy; equal pay – men on average still earn more than women; many offices are occupied by men more than women; the upbringing and care of children…” (021308D – male CDU).

Another man referred fairly extensively to his female relatives, whom he clearly respected. Although he does refer to families, it is clear that his aim is to talk about women’s independence in society, more generally: “Women are definitely concerned about specific things” he said, “women, thank goodness, and I say this having a daughter and daughters-in-law, have their own education and are independent of men. They want a family, they want kids, they want a good future for their kids – but they want to be independent. Not that their husband isn’t alive, but that they don’t just do cooking and cleaning” (112707A – male CDU).

Women from the CDU/CSU did not use feminist terminology to describe women’s interests, but four of them (of six, total) made distinctions between family and women’s interests in ways that revealed a broader definition of women’s rights. For example, one woman stated: “As long as women care more for kids, we need to do a specific kind of politics for them. For example, we must help women with balancing childcare and careers. Of course, the best would be to persuade men to take part [in childcare], too!” (060607 – female CDU).

“Yes, women still require different solutions,” stated another woman from the CDU. “But mostly things have changed so completely. Women, understandably, want – and take! – the same educational opportunities [as men], and girls graduate with better grades, at better rates…And in the labor market, it’s an important task to change how
women relate to the labor market. Women should have equal opportunities…there are still deficits,” for example, “lower wages” (062007 – female CDU).

The woman I interviewed who was the head of a female MdB’s office was visibly pregnant at the time of our interview. “Family issues would probably classically be the first-place ‘women’s interest,’ but that really shouldn’t be just a women’s issue.” She continued to comment upon how family and career issues for women quickly become intertwined: “Encouragement of women in their jobs, for example…This isn’t actually a family issue, but one comes in just a few steps to family” (061808B – female CSU).

Only one man in the CDU/CSU mentioned gendered inequalities (including wage inequalities), while three women did so. These patterns within the interview material are not automatically generalizable for the entire CDU/CSU, but they do suggest that gendered differences are fairly visible within these parties, in ways that they are not in the left-leaning parties.

Similar gendered differences are found among FDP interviewees. As I have discussed, the FDP is the liberal/libertarian party in the German system, and as such concerns itself programmatically with neither equality of outcome nor socio-structural explanations of gendered inequalities. The FDP does not have a stake in traditional gender roles, but it also does not seek to unmake these roles. Despite this platform, two female FDP interviewees were explicit about these inequalities.

One woman from the FDP expanded upon inequalities within the household that have consequences for women. “Women in the 21st century are still trying to balance successful careers and family,” she said. “Although things are becoming better…although men are a bit more partner-like, they still spend more time out of the house.”
This same interviewee, departing somewhat from her party platform, expressed the need for wider availability of childcare: “Women want infrastructure [such as childcare centers]! This is still something much more important for women than for men. Men don’t worry about this…Much has changed in the last 20 years. … But it hasn’t progressed so far that men would stay at home while their wives go out and have careers” (112707D – female FDP).

One female FDP interviewee fully recognized sexism and gendered inequalities but still refused to endorse more interventionist state policies. “There is still this glass ceiling here,” she said, and then proceeded to describe men in airport lounges asking her if her husband will be sitting in the empty seat beside her. “Well,” she described herself as responding sarcastically: “I am allowed to fly by myself.” In an earlier part of her interview, she stated, “Every day I experience this [sexism]. Unequal pay for equal work. But this particular treatment doesn’t help!” (062008B – female FDP). By “particular treatment,” interviewee 062008B was referring to policies like affirmative-action, which specifically target women or other groups identified as disadvantaged.

Male FDP interviewees tended to agree with the latter position that the answer to any gendered inequalities does not lie with positive discrimination. One male FDP interviewee acknowledged that “women have a social disadvantage due to the double burden,” but he vehemently rejected direct state intervention (113007C – male FDP). He noted, further, “It’s always claimed that women have different, specific interests,” but he did not elaborate further, except to say that it is important that women be able to return to work after giving birth and looking after kids.
Another male FDP interviewee was careful to make a distinction between women as a different versus a particular constituency: “andere, nicht besondere” (112607 – male FDP). By this, he meant that women are simply one of many distinct interest groups (e.g., union workers); they are not some specific kind of interest group different from all others. 112607 proceeded to tell an anecdote about a female colleague who was constantly ignored by people joining committee meetings despite the fact that she was the head of the committee. This interviewee related the anecdote to prove to me that this kind of discrimination transpires, but he endorsed personal, voluntary tactics for overcoming this kind of prejudice.

Thus, although male FDP interviewees did acknowledge women’s interests as distinct, and even refer to gendered challenges (e.g., double burden), they appeared less inclined than their female counterparts to eschew the liberal language of their party to advocate for specific policies to benefit women. Both female and male interviewees in the FDP expressed a distaste for extensive state intervention to address gendered issues.

In sum, party does not appear to over-shadow differences between female and male MdB with respect to women and women’s interests. However, party clearly matters, nonetheless: the degree to which women and men of one party differ, and the ways in which they differ, does vary by party. Some of this is a factor of the extent to which any given platform addresses women’s interests. Women and men in left-leaning parties may both talk about women’s interests fairly extensively without differing from one another or diverging from their parties’ positions. By contrast, interviewees in more conservative
parties will vary in the extent to which they speak expansively about women’s interests

as they vary in the extent to which they diverge from their party platform.

Attitudes towards gender quotas

I do not give extensive examples of interviewees’ responses about their attitude towards gender quotas when they align with party programs. This is because interviewees’ arguments in support (or not) of gender quotas largely reflected arguments noted in the previous section regarding equality of outcome; gender quotas clearly implement this kind of equality. However, I do note the types of justifications given when interviewees depart from their party language. As I will highlight, there was variation present among both more and less conservative interviewees.

In terms of party-defined patterns, there is a clear demarcation between parties that have implemented gender quotas (Greens, SPD, Left) and those that have either not or have implemented a weak version of one (FDP, CDU/CSU). Although the CDU implements a 1/3 target (soft) quota for its party lists, this is generally accepted as a loose quota, and one interviewee even claimed that it was no longer in operation (061808C – male CDU). As Table 4.4 shows, and as the party programs and policies predict, interviewees in the FDP do not support a quota, with only one exception. Also conforming to expectations generated by the party platforms, SPD, Green, and Left interviewees generally do support the quota. The socially conservative party, the CDU/CSU, is more divided on the question of gender quotas, and I will discuss these interviewees’ claims at greater length later in this section.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Yes or qualified yes</th>
<th>No or qualified no</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left (communist successor)</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3 (60%)</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Green (post materialist)</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPD (center left)</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5 (83.3%)</td>
<td>1 (16.7%)</td>
<td>6°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CDU/CSU (center right)</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3 (60%)</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3 (37.5%)</td>
<td>5 (62.5%)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FDP (European liberal)</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>16 (61.5%)</td>
<td>10 (38.5%)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>13 (50%)</td>
<td>13 (50%)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4. MdB beliefs in instituting gender quotas for women in politics: number of interviewees offering each response type (%)

* In some cases the question regarding gender quotas was not answered by the interviewee, or the answer was unclear and did not fit in any category.
° Two interviews were done with one female SPD interviewee. Her responses are not doubled here.

Importantly, there is variation within parties, but it does not suggest the persistence of gendered differences. The noteworthy interviewees are those who clearly diverged from their parties’ positions, and they include both women and men: 2 from the SPD, 1 from the FDP, and 2 from the Left. In the case of the SPD and Left interviewees, they were departing from party-prescribed language in order to express dissatisfaction with a gender quota. In the case of the SPD, both interviewees arguing against the quota...
offered qualified statements, either to admit grudgingly that they may be useful or to claim that they were once useful but are no longer.

“‘I have always stood against quotas,’ said one woman from the SPD. ‘Nonetheless, my experience has shown me that it is important as a vehicle. But I hope they can be gotten rid of at some point. Fundamentally, I don’t care for them. They’re discrimination’ (021408 – female SDP).

Another member of the SPD, a man, agreed that the gender quotas amounted to discrimination, and he made the argument that this kind of positive discrimination was no longer necessary: “I think it’s discrimination,” he said. “It was once right, to put pressure on, but … a social transformation has taken place. There is other work to be done, no question, but … no quota” (021108 – male SPD).

The single FDP interviewee who championed quotas was a woman, and she was upfront about her divergence from her party: “I have an unusual position in my party. I support a quota. It’s not okay if a party group is less than 30% women. When women have less than 30% participation and influence, that doesn’t suffice to change relationships” (062308A – female FDP). This interviewee’s argument for quotas is not that the legislature ought to reflect the population descriptively, as some other interviewees claimed; instead, she argued, instrumentally, that the representation of women’s interests is only possible when female legislators take part.

Finally, the two Left interviewees who expressed lack of support for the gender quota were both, interestingly, female. Both, however, offered qualified responses that acknowledged that quotas might have some usefulness:
“I am not particularly in favor of them,” said one woman from the Left, “because one should be elected on the basis of one’s knowledge. But sometimes the quota is good. … So there are advantages and disadvantages. The big disadvantage is when women achieve positions for which they are not ready or appropriate. The advantage is that they get women into politics” (113008B – female Left).

“I don’t really support it,” said another woman from the Left. “Actually, I find it sad, that a quota is possible…But I’ve learned over the course of years that men, due to their education and their socialization, will insist upon their political positions of power. So men must be forced to make room for women” (021308C – female Left).

As I have noted, CDU/CSU interviewees gave more mixed responses. Table 4.4 shows that both female and male MdB spoke in favor of gender quotas, despite their party program’s general rejection of equality of outcome. It was unlikely that members of the CDU/CSU would speak on behalf of gender quotas, because these quotas tend to be predicated upon the idea that women are prevented from aspiring to office by unfair hindrances, and the CDU/CSU platform does not devote attention or language to identifying such hindrances. A closer look at the justifications that CDU/CSU interviewees provided in support of gender quotas helps to resolve this quandary. Female interviewees provided grudging admission that to have women present was by far preferable to not, even though they did not support the crutch that the quota provides:

“I wish they were avoidable, but as of now they are unavoidable,” said one woman from the CDU (021508A – female CDU).

Male CDU/CSU interviewees who supported the quota did so for a variety of reasons, but these statements of support were always qualified. The first and second
examples below are in the past tense, indicating that quotas are not necessary in today’s world. The second argued that, although quotas may be useful, women may simply be less interested in taking part in politics, i.e., women’s lower rates of participation could be due to lower interest, not discrimination:

“In the past, quotas were necessary,” said one man from the CDU, and they “certainly helped to increase the number of women in certain committees” (112707C – male CDU).

“I find it an instrument that was perhaps necessary…to make it possible to bring more women into politics and into committees,” said another man from the CDU (061808C – male CDU).

“Quotas do have something going for them,” acknowledged another. “There are some areas, where men have had primacy. But sometimes there isn’t a woman who is interested in the position. So you shouldn’t just go out and find a woman, come hell or high water, if she will be bored sitting there” (021308D – male CDU).

Finally, in language that no other male interviewee employed explicitly, one man from the CDU declared, “I shouldn’t be pushed out of my constituency to make space for a woman to run” (061708B – male CDU). This speaker, incidentally, was directly elected and therefore would not have been ousted to include women on the party list, anyway.

Overall, interviewees’ language regarding quotas reflected their parties’ programs, with a number of important distinctions. When female conservatives diverged from their party program in order to support gender quotas, they typically did so with the justification that it was necessary for implementing good policy for women, i.e., as part of acknowledging that women have interests that deserve to be represented. Male
conservatives diverged from their platforms more grudgingly, admitting that quotas serve as a vehicle to increase women’s participation but declining to embrace them fully. CDU/CSU interviewees may have done so because their platform countenances a very narrow notion of women’s interests; FDP interviewees may have done so because their platform does not endorse positive discrimination. The less conservative interviewees who diverged from their party in order not to support quotas typically admitted that quotas do have positive consequences alongside the negative ones they identified.

**Across-party comparisons among female legislators**

I address three categories of comparison among female legislators: 1) variation among female legislators that relates to their party affiliation, i.e., which corresponds to their respective party platforms, 2) variation among female legislators that does not relate to their party affiliation, e.g., when female legislators diverge from their party but still differ from one another, and 3) similarities among female legislators that clearly cannot stem from their party affiliation. I consider each of these categories in turn. My quotation of interviewees is minimal in order to reduce redundancy.

As the discussion in the previous section shows, there is across-party variation among female legislators. Women from the Left take a more radical activist stance, women from the Greens focus on women’s rights as social justice, women from the SPD show their feminist roots but tend to focus on the family, women from the CDU/CSU are more likely to focus on the family, and women from the FDP acknowledge gendered inequalities but are more likely to eschew state intervention. None of these distinctions is surprising given the positions each of these parties takes on women’s interests.
Indeed, these differences among female legislators roughly mirror their differences in party program. However, the variation is not entirely captured by their party programs. Women in the FDP acknowledge gendered inequalities, while their party platform does not dwell on this issue. Although women in the CDU/CSU focus more on the family than on other spheres of women’s interests, their discussion of these interests is broader than their party platform’s is. A number of female SPD interviewees went beyond their party program in discussing women’s rights.

Moreover, comparisons between female and male legislators of the same party showed variation in their characterizations of women’s interests. On the one hand, this suggests that party, alone, cannot explain variation among all female legislators’ attitudes, let alone among all legislators’ (regardless of sex) attitudes. I have described and shown both women and men in the SPD, for example, as championing a fairly broad selection of women’s rights, but sex nonetheless persists in making a difference: among my interviewees, more men than women in the SPD wished to characterize the struggle for equal rights as over. On the other hand, this gendered variation within any given party does not cement the importance of sex in shaping attitudes towards women’s interests. Although female and male legislators in the same party were not all alike, this did not in turn make all female legislators alike across parties.

Any similarities among women across party lines cannot (definitionally) be attributed to party affiliation. A common trend among female interviewees, regardless of their party affiliation, was an emphasis on the *de facto* rights of women. Female interviewees in all parties made an explicit distinction between women’s formal equality with men and women actually experiencing this equality in their daily lives. Female
interviewees in progressive and conservative parties, alike, frequently cited the importance of women making good on equal rights. The first two interviewee statements below, which explicitly refer to the inadequacy of formal equality, are from members of left-leaning parties:

“Women continue to fight to be sure that their rights are implemented,” said one woman from the Left party (113007B – female Left). I have described Left party interviewees as being fairly activist, overall.

A female interviewee from the SPD emphasized that women must have “not just equal rights on paper – but also the possibility of living these rights” (021308A – female SPD). This statement captures the distinction between de jure and de facto equality. It also reflects the SPD’s platform’s attention to equality of outcome.

More conservative female interviewees were less explicit about this distinction, and this, too, reflects their party platforms, which emphasize equality of opportunity (including formal equality) over equality of outcome. However, their attention to challenges that uniquely face women goes beyond their party platforms and makes their concerns resemble women in left-leaning parties.

For example, one female interviewee from the CDU noted: “As long as women care more for kids, we need to do a specific kind of politics for them” (060607 – female CDU).

Finally, one female interviewee from the FDP stated emphatically, with great annoyance, “Everyday I experience this [sexism]” (062008B – female FDP).

These quotations illustrate that female legislators across party lines are inclined to identify the ways in which formal equality has not yielded equality of the sexes in
practice. This finding resonates with previous work, particularly Swers (1998, 2002), which has argued that female legislators have a greater sense of urgency about women’s interests. This emphasis on de facto rights was not shared by many male interviewees, even in less conservative parties. As I noted in previous sections, male interviewees tended to refer to the “big” fights over gender equality as having already taken place: “There are certainly fights over women’s interests, but this is mostly past” (021108B – male SPD). “A social transformation has taken place” (112007C – male CDU).

Despite the commonality among women of emphasizing de facto equality, women were not of one mind of how to achieve it. As I noted in previous sections regarding intra-party variation, even female FDP and CDU/CSU who recognized impediments to women’s political participation were disinclined to support positive discrimination to fix the problem. This variation is immediately visible in interviewees’ comments about gender quotas. Female members of the CDU/CSU grudgingly admitted that these quotas served an important purpose, e.g., one interviewee said, “I wish they were avoidable, but as of now they are unavoidable” (021508A – female CDU).

In sum: although variation among female legislators was to some extent captured by party affiliation, some variation remained that was not explained by party. Furthermore, similarities among all female legislators seemed to be mitigated by party affiliation. Although it would be tempting to conclude that either party affiliation or sex trumps the other, it appears that a process more complicated than “party affiliation mediating sex” or “sex mediating party affiliation” is underway.

**Conclusion**
Using interview material from 54 in-depth interviews with MdB, I have shown simultaneously 1) the persistence of gendered differences within parties, 2) the persistence of variation among women across parties, where some of this variation is clearly shaped by differences in party platforms and some is not, and 3) similarities among women across party lines, i.e., female legislators’ shared concern about women’s de facto rights.

My inspection of intraparty variation shows that female interviewees were more inclined to diverge from their party platforms in order to talk about women’s interests than their male colleagues. These gendered patterns did not immediately translate into convergence among women across parties, however. Distinctions among female interviewees of different parties persisted, and some of these were related directly to party affiliation and platforms. For example, female members of the FDP were still generally unwilling to resort to positive discrimination policies to address gendered inequalities and issues.

Some of the differences that persisted among female interviewees were not clearly structured by party affiliation. This was in part because female legislators, especially in the CDU/CSU and the FDP, had often already diverged from their party platforms (i.e., these more conservative female interviewees had already gone “off script”). For example, numerous female interviewees from the CDU/CSU and FDP discussed women’s rights in more expansive terms than their party platforms do, but this do not make them ideologically identical to interviewees from the Left, Greens, and SPD. The attention of female interviewees in the CDU/CSU to spheres of rights outside the family sphere did not amount to agreeing with female SPD interviewees on how to
address or advance these rights. In other words, conservative female interviewees’
divergence from their party platforms did not automatically denote a convergence among
women upon the same notion of women’s interests.

These findings highlight the absence of an absolute destination of women’s rights
towards which female legislators converge. When more conservative female interviewees
diverged from their platforms to pay greater attention to women as a group than their
party platforms do, this did not amount to ideological convergence with their less
conservative counterparts. Thus, these findings further highlight that it was not merely
that party affiliation mediated some innate capacity of female interviewees to advocate
for one absolute definition of women’s interests. Ideological distinctions among female
legislators of different parties persisted, even when female legislators paid greater
attention to women’s interests than their male colleagues. The partial exception to this
generalization is the propensity of female legislators across parties to call attention to
gaps between formal equality of the sexes and equality as experienced by people in their
daily lives.

Ultimately, there remains variation among women that has not been explained in
this analysis of party scripts. In chapter 5, I examine alternative explanations for variation
among female legislators.
Chapter 5: Quantitative Measures of Women’s Substantive Representation

Introduction

This chapter presents quantitative measures of women’s substantive representation (WSR). It juxtaposes the standard panoply of predictors of WSR alongside the social markers of motherhood and marriage as well as legislators’ generational differences, providing statistical tests of relationships that have been discussed in previous chapters using qualitative data. Although social markers alone do not contribute directly to explaining variation in female legislators’ participation in plenary session debates addressing women’s interests, I show that they are part of a complicated set of pathways contributing to various indicators of WSR. Ultimately, a female legislator’s age is one of the most prominent factors in shaping her attention to women’s interests; this follows from my discussions of social markers and of the evolution of social/legal norms in chapter 3.

In this chapter I employ three indicators of women’s substantive representation: 1) membership in the legislative committee committed to addressing issues directly related to women (the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children), 2) participation in debates that address laws that explicitly relate to women, and 3) explicit

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77 Between 1998 and 2009, 23.2% of female MdB were members of this Committee at some point.
78 In the period 1998-2009, 22.0% of female MdB participated in one or more of these debates.

reference to one or more spheres of women’s interests in these speeches.\textsuperscript{79} The former indicator, committee membership, is argued by some scholars to be a poor measure of WSR, because it may reflect the ghettoization of female legislators, not their empowerment on behalf of women (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, Taylor-Robinson 2005). However, my interviewees in the German context argue against this interpretation. Furthermore, in this chapter I show that many of the same variables that contribute to explaining variation in speech acts as WSR also contribute to explaining committee membership. This suggests that committee membership should not be discounted as a potential vehicle for advancing women’s interests, even if it also reflected some measure of marginalization. For the latter two indicators of WSR, these debates precede a vote on the legislation under consideration. I will show that social markers and age qua distinctions among German female legislators account for some of the variation in their attention to women as a group.

Specifically, these distinctions among German women help explain variation in female legislators’ membership in the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children. In turn, membership in this committee makes speaking in debates about women and women’s interests more likely. A highly consistent predictor of variation among female legislators’ engagement in all forms of WSR is cohort, which I have argued in previous chapters derives from a process of socialization. Finally, I show that these same social markers do not similarly explain variation in women’s participation in a random selection of speeches. This indicates that social markers do not contribute to explaining

\textsuperscript{79} In the period 1998-2009, 72.1% of speeches delivered by female MdB referred to one or more of the spheres of women’s interests that I outlined in previous chapters: economic, political, and family-related.
just any legislative participation (regardless of the subject or policy matter). Instead, these social markers contribute to explaining engagement specifically with women’s issues, which corroborates a connection between a female speakers’ identity and the gendered content of issues under debate. It is not merely that some women speak more and some less regardless of the topic under discussion.

In two previous chapters, I cited material from personal interviews with members of the Bundestag, including interviewees’ responses to direct questions about their attitudes towards women as a group and towards women’s interests. The interview material in chapter 3 offered important insights into how German legislators (both women and men) conceive of women’s roles as mothers and wives, and these insights provided further justification for the social markers that I have identified as helping to explain variation among women. Interview material in chapter 4 illuminated the role of party affiliation in explaining this variation. However, personal interviews are not sites of substantive representation, in and of themselves. The usefulness of these interviews lies in pointing to possible explanations for observable patterns in other venues more relevant to public decision making. In this chapter, I present objective measures of legislators’ engagement in addressing women as a group: membership in the appropriate legislative committee and participation in and contribution to plenary session debates.

First, my goal in examining committee membership is to establish whether any of these membership patterns are explained by social markers. The significance of such a relationship derives from the fact that membership in the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children reflects a sizeable contribution to WSR. If social markers explain which MdB serve on the committee devoted to addressing issues related to families,
seniors, women, and children, then most likely either 1) political parties appoint people who share certain characteristics or 2) individuals with certain characteristics tend to step forward to take part at greater rates than others. MdB are assigned to committees in proportions roughly reflecting the percentages of seats held by parties in the Bundestag, meaning that party membership, in and of itself, is not an explanation of any individual legislator’s committee membership. Thus, the question becomes whether social markers influence who joins the committee from any given party (intra-party distinctions). Nor is the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children a powerful committee, unlike the finance or budget committee, meaning that people who join it are one or more of the following: junior legislators who are genuinely interested in the subject, or unambitious legislators.80 Contrary to the argument that committee members are there against their will, most of the MdB with whom I did personal interviews argued that political parties honored their requests regarding committee preferences. Thus, whether aiming “low” reflects low ambition or not, it still reflects purposeful attention to women as a group, even if this amounts to a legislators’ choice among low-ranking committees.

My goals in analyzing debates over laws specifically addressing women’s issues are twofold: first, and most briefly, to establish aggregate differences between female and male legislators’ participation in these debates (both in terms of rate of participation and in terms of the content of what they contribute). This preliminary step of showing gendered patterns serves to juxtapose my data alongside previous studies of women’s substantive representation, which have focused on sex as a variable of particular interest.

80 See work by Davidson-Schmich (2008, 2009) and Lawless and Fox (2005) for studies of gendered political ambition. Davidson-Schmich’s work is specifically on women in the German context.
By showing findings that speak directly to other studies’ results, I make claims that apply and add to the broader body of knowledge. I do find that female legislators contribute more frequently to women’s substantive representation than their male counterparts, but I also find that closer inspection is necessary for explaining why this is so.

Second and more importantly, these analyses establish determinants of female legislators’ varying participation in these debates. Transcripts for these debates are readily available on the Bundestag’s website, and the content of these speeches during these debates illustrates individual legislators’ priorities. Legislators on the speaker list have finite time, which forces them to make choices about which specific elements of legislation under consideration to address. When speakers do address women and women’s interests explicitly, these speeches offer evidence of which interests they prioritize, namely, whether they focus on political interests, economic interests, or social/family interests (or some combination of the three).

I coded two categories of debate transcripts: 1) the population of debates in the Bundestag between 1998 and 2008 that addressed laws indexed by the Bundestag’s library as relating to women or gender; and 2) a random selection drawn from all of the debates undertaken by the Bundestag in the same 11 year period, which serve as a baseline for comparison for women’s participation rates (the percentage of speeches uttered by women). These participation data point to women’s greater participation in thematic (about women) debates, but analyses of the content of these speeches is also necessary for further distinguishing among legislators. My second set of indicators from these debates consists of analyses of the speeches that legislators give.
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I address the use of parliamentary speech as a source of information about women’s substantive representation. Second, I discuss my data collection, including the criteria governing which debates I examined and a description of the coding scheme. Third, I discuss the results of these analyses: a) descriptive statistics of social markers in the Bundestag, b) rates of incidence of my chosen indicators of WSR, c) factors influencing: party affiliation, committee membership, and female legislators’ participation in debates specifically about women and women’s interests, and d) factors influencing whether female speakers refer to women’s interests (in one or more categories) in these debates. Although I do not account fully for alternative explanations at every one of these stages, c-d parallel the dimensions of WSR that I show in figure 5.1. Each of these dimensions contributes to WSR. Along the way, I note data about male legislators, as well, in order to keep my work in conversation with studies that focus on distinguishing between female and male legislators as representatives of women.

This section concludes with a discussion of the fact that findings from plenary session debates are limited, in that they do not include issue areas on which there is general agreement. In the final section, I summarize my findings, assessing these statistical patterns in light of the claims and evidence that I discussed in previous chapters.

**Parliamentary debates as data**

My emphasis on public speech as a site of representation where we will observe important evidence of individual legislators’ attention to women’s interests follows from
previous work on women’s substantive representation. Karin Tamerius (1995) claims that conventional measures of legislative influence (primarily voting records) miss areas where women are more likely to impact policy making. She argues, “From the perspective of women and other legislative minorities…critical stages of the legislative process are more properly identified as agenda setting and policy formulation” (1995:95-6). On this basis, Tamerius looks at women’s substantive representation as the advocacy of feminist principles in the U.S. context; among other kinds of data, she codes speeches in Congress: “the value of the speech variable for each legislator was the percentage of speeches she or he made within Congress that were feminist” (1995:107).

There is also no shortage of literature pointing to the important role that deliberation and public speech play in shaping people’s understandings of their own interests, others’ interests, and public interests. Theorists of democratic deliberation, many of whom are not writing specifically about women’s substantive representation, underscore the importance of public speech in the representative process. Maeve Cook (2002), for example, emphasizes the “educative…and community-generating power of the process of public deliberation” (2002:53, emphasis in original; see also Mansbridge 1980, Saward 2000). As I note in the introductory chapter to the dissertation, deliberative democracy is supposed to be especially useful in “[transforming] the pre-existing assumptions held by members of the larger society about what is right and fair for…groups” that have historically been excluded from public decision making (Kymlicka 2002:292). Often these theorists mean deliberation among people who comprise the public when they refer to public deliberation, i.e., they are not referring to deliberation in public among elected representatives. However, it is not only citizen
participation that has value; deliberation among legislators is also thought to yield better outcomes than non-deliberative decision making.

Mansbridge (1999) and various other theorists writing specifically about women emphasize that female legislators contribute perspectives to debates and knowledge that would otherwise be absent.81 In other words, it is important for women to take part in legislative deliberation, because otherwise women’s perspectives are absent from these conversations. This argument suggests that we can observe these perspectives in female legislators’ public speech. Other scholars argue that public political speech confers particular legitimacy on representation, making participation in these debates (and the content of these contributions) useful windows onto what constitutes legitimacy. Bernard Manin suggests that public speech acts, such as in plenary debates, have taken on even greater democratic importance as communication technologies have improved. Manin (1997) heralds the emergence of an “audience democracy” (1997:220), arguing that individual legislators (and their speech acts) have gained importance in contemporary parliamentary systems. He writes, “the link between the representative…and his electors has an essentially personal character” due to modern and ubiquitous forms of mass communication, which personalize the representative relationship (219-220). For example, citizens in many countries (including Germany) can view “parliament TV,” broadcasts that show everything taking place in the legislative chamber. Even prior to the emergence of sophisticated communication technology, however, plenary debates have offered what is often the most public view of legislative activities.

My use of content analyses of these debates has precedent both in the study of

81 See also Fraser (1997), Young (2000).
German politics as well as in the study of women’s substantive representation. Louise Davidson-Schmich (2005), for example, examines state-level parliamentary debates (1990-2002) for evidence of former-Eastern German legislators’ acquisition of democratic norms. Karen Celis (2006) addresses what she terms “interventions” on behalf of women in Belgian budgetary debates 1900-1979. She argues that critical women – individual MPs in the Belgian lower house – were responsible for raising issues that would not otherwise have found voice.

Many scholars have studied legislators’ voting behavior, not parliamentary speech, in order to assess women’s substantive representation, with the premise that support or rejection of a bill ultimately defines each representative’s “effectiveness” (Pitkin 1968). However, party discipline often does not permit much freedom in voting. In a context like Germany, this means that there is likely to be relatively little variation among legislators to study, and findings would be biased, because party groups often determine when MdB are free to vote independently. Even more problematic is the shortage of comprehensive voting data from which to generalize (see Carey 2009). Although legislative voting patterns clearly matter, because they ultimately describe how bills become laws, they do not fully capture substantive representation. In fact, what these voting patterns do not capture may include areas where more marginalized groups’ interests are addressed. As proponents of deliberative democracy have argued, much of the “action” in democracy happens prior to the vote (Mansbridge 1980; Saward 2000),

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82 See also Bernauer and Brauninger (2009) for a textual analysis of Bundestag speeches. Theirs is a study of intra-party variation in preferences in the Bundestag (2002-2005).
83 “Conscience votes” (Gewissensfrage) in the Bundestag are votes where MdB are explicitly allowed to vote independently. Votes on stem cells, for example, are considered conscience votes, as are votes regarding bioethics, more generally, abortion, the rights of resident (and illegal) aliens, and questions of military occupation, e.g., in Afghanistan).
and this is likely to be even more the case for groups whose interests have not historically received as much attention (Kymlicka 2000, Tamerius 1995).

Wodak and van Dijk (2000) note that parliamentary debates are a “form of political discursive interaction” that “has been studied relatively rarely, despite its fundamental role in policymaking and legislation” (19). Increased attention to parliamentary debates in the 10 years since the publication of their volume *Racism at the Top* has promoted inquiry into methodological concerns surrounding these data, with a focus on computer-aided coding. An extensive, multi-disciplinary NSF-funded project on computer-aided coding of parliamentary speech, for example, has yielded numerous publications on issues like clusters of word-use, how to weight word-usage, how to group word-usage into pre-existing ideological categories, etc. The organization of a panel at the 2009 Midwest Political Science Association meeting, entitled “Texts and Data,” reflecting growing interest in computer-analysis of text. Instead of focusing on computer-aided coding, Benoit, Laver, Mikhaylov (2009) focus on hand-coding. Specifically, they evaluate errors in the compilation of the Comparative Manifesto Project, and they offer a method for calculating levels of nonsystematic error for every category and scale included in the CMP.

For the purposes of my analyses, I hand-code, due to the difficulty of generalizing how references to different kinds of women’s interests might be expressed. It is important not to overlook varying ways of describing women’s interests, because this valence is

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84 This increased attention is probably not in direct response to Wodak and Dijk’s book, but its publication does correspond with the onset of attention to these data.
85 Burt Monroe, Steven Abney, Michael Colaresi, Kevin Quinn, and Dragomir Radev: “The Dynamics of Political Rhetoric and Political Representation,” funded by the National Science Foundation.
86 See Monroe, Colaresi, and Quinn (2008).
essential to identifying a speaker as *advancing* women’s interests. Simply counting references by speakers to women, for example, would not help us fully understand who works to advance women’s interests, because these references could be in the context of arguments against the necessity of being concerned with these interests. Simple counts are also problematic, because the German word for woman, “Frau,” is also a form of address. Although I may attempt to employ computer-aided coding in the future, the limitations for the current project are substantial.

Parliamentary speech is obviously useful because of the public face it offers political decision making and because of the ubiquity of verbatim transcripts. However, these same apparent advantages may make text-as-data problematic. In plenary debates, legislators are performing for particular audiences, meaning that their speech may present the arguments they believe will be persuasive rather than the actual motivations behind policy decisions and positions. Moreover, it may seem unlikely that a legislator will speak her or his individual mind in this public context. Indeed, in the German context speaker lists are arranged to give each party appropriate speaking time, not each individual. The way around these limitations lies with limiting the scope of my conclusions. Although these speeches cannot be interpreted directly as individual speakers’ personal convictions, they do support claims regarding how legislators choose consciously and explicitly to present themselves, i.e., whether a legislator consciously and explicitly identifies her or himself as a representative of women’s interests. Whether
or not references to women’s interests are “sincere,” they place these ideas and concerns in the legislative chamber.87

Data

To examine the various pathways to WSR, including the role of social markers and age, I draw upon three categories of data: 1) committee membership lists for the Bundestag, specifically for the Committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Children; 2) publicly available biographical information about members of the 14th, 15th, and 16th Bundestag terms (1998-2009), which includes relevant social markers; and 3) content analyses of Bundestag plenary session debates (1998-2008). Here I thumbnail how I collected these data.

Committee membership

The Committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Children is dedicated to working through legislation addressing the groups indicated in the committee’s name. Their activities include discussing, presenting amendments, and consulting experts regarding this legislation. The committee introduces itself on its website as follows: “One of our emphases is the support of children and families and the possibility of balancing family and career. We are committed to treating men and women equally, to make a self-

87 Empirical studies of deliberative democracy are in relatively early stages when it comes to examining the role of sincerity. Although the conditions that political theorists describe clearly require a rather high level of sincerity among participants, “sincerity” is very difficult to operationalize (see Neblo 2007, Neblo et al 2008).
sufficient life possible for the elderly, and to support young people”
(http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse/a13/index.jsp).\textsuperscript{88}

The average size of this committee over the last three legislative terms (14\textsuperscript{th}, 15\textsuperscript{th}, and 16\textsuperscript{th}) was approximately 30 regular members and 30 substitute members, totaling 60 members in each term. Membership is divided among parties in numbers reflecting their seat share in the Bundestag. For the numbers I present in this chapter, I count only regular members of the committee, as the substitute members take part a very limited role in committee activities.\textsuperscript{89}

It is important to note that not all of the speakers in debates addressing women’s issues are members of this committee, nor do all members of this committee speak in such debates. However, as I will discuss later in this chapter, many speakers are drawn from this committee.

**Individual legislators’ biographical information**

Biographical information about MdB provided data for several analytical strategies. First, I gathered biographical information for all of the speakers (female and male) in the debates I analyzed. These data (biographical data for all speakers in women-themed and randomly selected debates under analysis) serve as independent variables in the models of women’s substantive representation for which the unit of analysis is a speech, i.e., I evaluate which factors predict whether a speech will include certain attributes or references that I have coded as indicators of women’s substantive

\textsuperscript{88} This was the description given on the committee’s website at the end of the 16\textsuperscript{th} legislative term, and the language has not changed since the formation of the 17\textsuperscript{th} government (see also http://bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a13/index.jsp, last accessed November 27, 2009).

\textsuperscript{89} Interviewees told me that their “substitute” duties were generally unimportant.
representation. Most of these models are restricted to female speakers, such that I am analyzing predictors of variation among women.

I also gathered this biographical information for the remaining female MdB across the period of study, which yielded a set of biographical data for all women in the Bundestag 1998-2009. These data are for examining variation among female MdB, e.g., for answering questions about which social markers distinguish between female members of the Family, Seniors, Women, and Children committee and women not on the committee, and between female speakers in women-themed debates and women who do not speak.

I consulted the Bundestag’s website as my primary source (http://bundestag.de), gathering data on a host of variables that include those that I have defined as social markers: cohort, party affiliation, the ballot type by which they were elected (party list or single member district), marital status (single, married or in a longterm partnership, divorced or separated, widowed), number of children, religious affiliation (explicitly no affiliation, Lutheran, Catholic, or Muslim), level of education (only high school; high school plus additional vocational training or college; and high school followed by college and graduate education, including the law), whether they grew up in the GDR, and whether they currently represent constituents in Bavaria. A 0 for religious affiliation or for marital status applied only when a legislator specifically indicated no affiliation or unmarried status, i.e., there is a distinction between 0 and missing data. These datasets for individual MdB also included whether (and in which legislative terms) they were members of two committees: the Family, Seniors, Women, and Children Committee and the Finance Committee. This latter committee was pointedly selected as one that does not
explicitly address women as a group for the purpose of comparison, e.g., in terms of the percentage of female membership.

When pieces of information were missing, I proceeded to consult legislators’ personal websites (e.g., http://www.dorothee-baer.de/ for the MdB Dorothee Baer). Recent legislators tend to have more extensive personal websites in addition to their websites housed on bundestag.de, while some MdB serving only in earlier terms did not have personal websites, or their websites have been dismantled. Some personal information was more difficult to track down, e.g., only a little over half of all female MdB reported any information about their religious affiliation. As I have noted, when these data could still not be found after further investigation, this was coded as missing data, not as 0.

For speakers serving in multiple terms whose biographical data changed between terms, e.g., via divorce, I selected the value reported in the legislative term when her or his speech was given.\(^90\) In order to calculate aggregate descriptive statistics of female MdB’s biographical data, I pooled the data in the following way: if a female MdB was listed as divorced for two of three terms that she served, I noted her marital status in the pooled data-set as \textit{divorced}. If an MdB served only two terms, I selected the most recent information, e.g., if she served in two terms and was listed as married in second term, I noted her marital status as \textit{married}.

For dichotomous measures of marital status, an MdB who had ever been married (i.e., was married, divorced, or widowed) was coded as 1. This follows from chapter 3, where I developed the argument that it is direct experience with the social and legal

\(^90\) In other words, these speaker data are specific to the speech.
pressures of marriage that will encourage female legislators to pay attention to women as a group. Although MdB who are divorced are no longer married, they were once, denoting their experience with this institution.

Text as data: content analyses of debates

Prior to doing statistical analyses, I coded two categories of plenary session debates: first, I examined the population of debates 1998-2008 that were indexed by the Bundestag document library as addressing anything related to women-specific concerns. Second, I looked at a selection of debates randomly drawn from the population of all debates undertaken by the Bundestag in this period. I recorded participation rates (disaggregated by speakers’ sex and party affiliation) for both sets of debates, and for the women-themed debates I coded for the substance of speakers’ contributions. These latter substantive codes captured the types of women’s interests to which speakers were appealing (i.e., in what spheres or roles – political, economic, or family/domestic – speakers refer to women as having distinct interests or concerns), whether speakers explicitly recognized disproportionate challenges faced by women, and whether the speaker emphasized equality of opportunity or equality of outcome. These indicators of women’s substantive representation reflect my analyses of party platforms in chapter 4.

For example, one speaker in a debate about subsidies for families referred to needing to “eliminate patriarchal marriage and family norms.” I coded this as an explicit reference to women’s family-related interests. This reference implicates other spheres of women’s roles – e.g., women’s freedom to seek paid employment outside the home – but the explicit reference was to family roles. In a different debate, this one about punishment
for sexual violence, a speaker referred to a woman’s “right” to protection against sexual violence. I coded this as a political right, as this was an explicit reference to a woman’s right to protection by the state. In a third debate, this one about economic sustainability, a speaker referred to concern about women’s rates of participation in the labor force; I coded this as a reference to an economic right.

References to women as a group were expected to be, and anecdotally (since I did not code for it) were, highly rare in the randomly selected debates.

The participation counts sought a ratio of female to male speakers, disaggregated by party, in any given debate. In some cases the same speaker sought a second opportunity to speak within the same debate; I did not code this as a second speaker but rather as a continuation of that individual speaker’s participation in that debate. For example, in a given debate Volker Beck (a male legislator in the Green party) might speak twice: first he might give his prepared speech, and then later he might provide a rebuttal to another legislator’s speech. In terms of coding, I would treat his original speech and the continuation of it as one single speech. Beck might also speak in the second debate addressing the same law; I would count this as a separate speech. Thus for a speaker database that I use to analyze speaker attributes, Beck counts only once; for a speech database, Beck “counts” as many times as he gave separate speeches.

My reasoning for this choice is as follows. In each debate there is a limited number of roles for speakers. It would be a mistake to treat Beck’s original speech and his rebuttal as two separate speeches (uttered by two separate male speakers), because it would overplay his participation in the debate and distort the sex ratio of participation. Another way to think of this coding choice is that I was coding the number of unique
speakers in a given debate. I did not code interjections or questions, as they were very short and of lesser procedural importance than a regular-length speech (see Xydias 2007 for an analysis of interjections and questions in a sub-set of Bundestag debates). I show the sex ratio to keep my findings in conversation with previous work on women’s substantive representation.

**Coding Categories** (see Appendix B for the full coding scheme)

1) Participation rates: the sex ratio of speakers in any given debate

2) Substantive measures: the content of speeches in these debates
   - Types of women’s interests to which they appeal (i.e., in what spheres or roles do they refer to women as having distinct interests or concerns; see Chapters 2-3)
     - Political sphere
     - Economic sphere
     - Family/domestic sphere
   - Recognition of disproportionate challenges faced by women
   - Equality of opportunity / outcome
   - References to personal experiences
     - Just a reference, not part of an argument
     - A reference that justifies a policy position
     - A reference that justifies divergence from the party’s position

This substantive coding scheme treats each speech as one unit of analysis, i.e., a reference to women’s political right/interests within a given speech gives that speech a 1 for that coding category.

Neuendorf (2002) and Krippendorff (2004, 2nd ed.) assert that intercoder reliability is necessary for establishing the validity of any findings: “Without the establishment of reliability, content analysis measures are useless” (Neuendorf 2002: 141). Although I lacked the resources to employ a second coder for the entirety of the plenary session debates that I include in this project, a second coder, a native speaker of
German who is a graduate student in Ohio State’s Department of Political Science, assisted in a limited “reliability check” (Neuendorf 2002: 142).

I trained this second coder over a period of several weeks. We met first to discuss the coding scheme, in the abstract, and we identified three debates for both of us to code before our next meeting. Over the course of the next three weeks, we met on a weekly basis and compared coding notes. This iterative process resulted in some changes to the language of the coding scheme (refining the description of the coding categories) as well as the deletion of several coding categories, which the second coder and I established did not seem relevant to the debates at hand.

I do not provide a measure of intercoder reliability, because I did not have the resources to employ a second coder to assist in that effort. However, this partial reliability check is a practical compromise that suggests the coding scheme is robust.

**Selection of debates**

A number of considerations specific to Germany informed my selection of debates to analyze. Multiple entities may initiate national-level legislation in Germany, though most drafts of laws (Gesetzentwürfe) are initiated by the government. These include the federal government, any party holding seats in the Bundestag, and a group comprising at least 5% of the Bundestag’s membership (regardless of party affiliation). Procedurally, each Gesetzentwurf is then addressed three times in the Bundestag. The first occasion is often merely a reading of the law’s title, followed by a waiving of debate and the law’s immediate forwarding to one or more relevant committees. The third

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occasion often follows the second immediately and consists of the vote, if the Gesetzentwurf reaches the third occasion (not all Gesetzentwuerfe reach a vote). Occasionally the same law in virtually identical form will be initiated by more than one entity, and each Gesetzentwurf receives the three sessions to which it is entitled; however, the sessions may overlap for these Gesetzentwuerfe that are identical or very close in content, i.e., a single debate may simultaneously address the content of these two closely related or identical Gesetzentwuerfe.

Ultimately, any given law may yield up to 3 debates (3 sets of speeches). Two or more Gesetzentwuerfe that are identical or very close in content may yield more than 3 debates (i.e., the number of debates addressing the same content may exceed 3), but this is rare. The Bundestag’s library, specifically the Stand der Gesetzgebung des Bundes (GESTA: the Catalog of Federal Legislation), indexes and catalogs legislation by legislative term and by subject matter, and each entry includes the dates (and often the page numbers) where debates about each respective law may be found. Thus the speeches that I analyzed comprise debates, which in turn address specific laws that I have identified as important.

I selected a total of 38 laws to analyze from the 14-16th legislative periods (1998-2009). These laws fall into two categories: laws that are explicitly about women, and randomly selected laws that provide a baseline for comparison. The first set of laws (totaling 21 laws, 40 debates, and 345 speeches) was generated by a search of the Bundestag’s document and information database (http://dip.bundestag.de/), a database
that includes the GESTA. This GESTA search engine includes an index from which I could select search (index) terms, i.e., I selected from the list of index terms all those related to women or gender. The 16th (current) legislative period has not yet been indexed in this manner, but I truncated the search terms from the 14th and 15th legislative periods in order to replicate the search, i.e., I manually searched the content of parliamentary debates in the 16th legislative term for those terms. I truncated these search terms (searching just for root words) in order to be sure to capture various usages (declensions, forms) of the same words.

Search terms (Boolean “or”) for each legislative term:

14th term: Frau (woman), Frauenarbeit (women’s work), Frauenbeauftragter (women’s commission), Frauenfoerder* (promotion of women), Geschlecht* (gender), Diskrimin* (discrimination)

15th term: Frau (woman), Frauenerwerbsquote (women’s labor force participation), Frauenfoerderung (promotion of women), Frauenhandel (women trafficking), Frauenhaus (shelter for women), Frauenmilchsammelstelle (breast-feeding), Geschlecht* (gender), Diskriminier* (discrimination)

16th term: Frau* (woman/women), Geschlecht* (gender), and Diskriminier* (discrimination)

To arrive at the final set of laws to examine from the list indexed by the DIP as related to gender and women, I rejected laws that did not actually fit in the universe to which my coding scheme is supposed to apply. Specifically, I did not retain laws addressing single-sex partnership rights and laws prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons. These laws were indexed by the keywords Diskrimination and sometimes Gleichberechtigung (equal treatment under the law) but did not address the larger group of women directly.

As I have noted in previous chapters, this study focuses on heterosexual notions of

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women’s interests, which follows from the historical context of the specific social markers that I selected.

The DIP staff who index laws all have their own understandings of what it means for something to be relevant or related to women, and it is impossible for me to account for this bias directly. Other studies have confronted concerns about biased samples in various ways. Swers (2002), for example, faced a similar dilemma in her study of women’s substantive representation in the U.S. In order to avoid bias in her sample, she drew bills from the monthly legislative reports of significant women’s organizations (both conservative and progressive organizations), and then she supplemented this sample with other bills (not explicitly listed by these organizations) that also fall within these issue areas. She identified these additional bills by reviewing bill synopses (2002:34-5). In order to check whether any laws were likely to have slipped through the cracks in my selection of transcripts to analyze, I randomly selected 100 laws from GESTA for the 14th legislative period and came up with nothing that ought to fit that did not show up with the previous method of selecting laws.93

The second set of laws was systematically (by legislative period) randomly selected (they total 17 laws, 28 debates, and 204 speeches).94 The purpose of these randomly selected laws (and their corresponding debates and speeches) is twofold: to address concerns about whether apparent differences between female and male legislators have nothing to do with women’s interests or indeed with the subject at hand at all (e.g., do women just talk more/less, regardless of the topic under discussion), and to show that

93 These 100 laws randomly selected from the 14th legislative period constitute approximately 10% of the laws discussed in the Bundestag 1998-2002.
94 See random.org.
social markers do not in fact explain, or explain differently, variation among female legislators’ activities in areas unrelated to women.

**Discussion of results**

**Social markers**

341 women comprised the female membership of the Bundestag between 1998 and 2009 (the 14th, 15th, and 16th legislative periods). Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics of variation in social markers in the population of female MdB across this time period: rates of marriage and having kids, disaggregated by “generation” (the decade in which the legislator was born). Disaggregating by age is important, because I showed in chapter 3 that the content of social markers change over time.

When the N that I note in any of these tables is less than 341 or less than the total number of women in a given party, this is because of missing data. For much of this chapter I discuss dichotomized versions of these variables: married/divorced/widowed versus not, and mothers versus non-mothers. Although it is certainly the case that having five children is different from having one, dichotomizing these variables made for a more efficient discussion and does not change the substantive findings. How to dichotomize the marital status variable does make a difference, by contrast; based upon chapter 3, I group married, divorced, and widowed legislators together, because all of these legislators are or have been married at some point. Dichotomizing this variable differently does change results.
Overall, 68.8% of the female MdB serving in the Bundestag between 1998 and 2009 were married or in self-described longterm partnerships, 3.4% were widowed, 15.4% were single, and 12.1% were divorced. Disaggregating these data by “generation” for the full female membership of these three legislative terms gives us further information about the variation among female membership of the Bundestag. Table 5.1 shows that the demographic trends that I observed in chapter 3 are also evidenced among women in the Bundestag. It is important to note that the odds of being married as one ages are a product of more than just attitudes towards marriage: there are hypothetically more opportunities to decide to get married as time passes. In cross-sectional data like these, some of the differences in marriage and motherhood rates are due to age (time passing), not due to attitudinal differences that vary by generation.

Recruitment patterns are also visible in Table 5.1. The largest cohort of MdB was born 1945-1954, in the decade after the end of WWII. These legislators’ children are at

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade in which the legislator was born</th>
<th>Total # of women born in this period</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% Married, Divorced, or Widowed</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% with Kids</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-1990</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1974</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1964</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1954</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-1944</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>93.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1934</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1. Female legislators (1998-2009): rates of marriage and having children, disaggregated by the decade in which the legislator was born
least in their teens and twenties by 1998, when this project’s period of study begins. Numerous female MdB whom I interviewed referred explicitly to waiting until their children had grown to become actively involved in politics.

**Descriptive statistics: rates of incidence of these various indicators of WSR**

As Table 5.2 shows, the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children is consistently staffed by female legislators at greater rates than by male legislators. This disproportionality is further highlighted by the fact that there are fewer women than men in the Bundestag, to begin with. Indeed, between 1998 and 2009, 23.2% of all female MdB were members of this Committee at some point. Given the number of standing legislative committees (approximately 20; it varies slightly across legislative terms), this is quite high. Clearly, membership in this committee is gendered, but it remains the case that not all female legislators are equally likely to join it. I address factors that influence committee membership in a subsequent section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative period</th>
<th>Ratio of female to male members of the committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14th (1998-2002)</td>
<td>20 women : 11 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th (2002-2005)</td>
<td>23 women : 9 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th (2005-2009)</td>
<td>21 women : 10 men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.2. Membership in the Committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Children**
Table 5.3 shows the rates of incidence of my substantive measures of WSR in speeches delivered in debates specifically addressing women’s interests. In the period 1998-2009, The sub-population of speeches uttered by female legislators was consistently more likely to include references to women’s interests than the overall population of speeches. 72.1% of speeches delivered by female MdB referred to one or more of the spheres of women’s interests that I outlined in previous chapters: economic, political, and family-related. This is substantially higher than the percentage of speeches, overall, containing references to any of these interests (50.4% of all speeches). As previous studies of WSR have shown, sex distinctions among legislators matter for WSR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of women’s substantive representation</th>
<th>% of speeches that included each indicator</th>
<th>% of speeches uttered by female speakers that included each indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reference to women’s political interests</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>49.7%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...to economic interests</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>42.6%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...to family interests</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>34.4%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to any category of women’s interests</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>72.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...to challenges women disproportionately face</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>31.7%**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3. Overview of the relative frequency of women’s substantive representation in the Bundestag in speeches about women/issues, 1998-2008

*Total number of speeches: 345 (183 were uttered by women and 162 by men)*

T tests for independence, examining whether the sex of the speaker and the presence of WSR in her/his speech are related: * p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Factors influencing party affiliation

I noted in chapter 3 that factors contributing to individuals’ party affiliation, i.e., factors temporally preceding and correlating with legislators’ party affiliation, must be investigated. This is because it may be that party affiliation, which previous research has shown to be a powerful predictor of WSR, is actually shaped by some prior process that in turn also shapes WSR. Table 5.4 shows social markers disaggregated by party affiliation.
** Table 5.4. Social markers: all female MdB in the 14\textsuperscript{th}-16\textsuperscript{th} legislative terms (1998-2009), disaggregated by political party**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party**</th>
<th>Total # of Women ('98-'09)</th>
<th>N ◊</th>
<th>% Married, Divorced, or Widowed</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% with Kids</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Average Year of Birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>90.1%</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>86.7%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4. Social markers: all female MdB in the 14\textsuperscript{th}-16\textsuperscript{th} legislative terms (1998-2009), disaggregated by political party

** CDU (Christian Democratic Union), CSU (Christian Social Union), SPD (Social Democratic Party), Greens (post-materialist), and Left (post-Communist). If an MdB is elected from a constituency (SMD) but her/his party does not win any PR seats, s/he may hold office “unaffiliated” (without a party group). In the three legislative periods covered by this study, one female legislator held office only while unaffiliated. Several other female MdB held office while unaffiliated for one term, but their party won seats in the other two terms.

◊ When data missing from profiles on the Bundestag website could not be found elsewhere, the N is less than the total number of women serving in the Bundestag for each party.

As Table 5.4 shows, female MdB in the CDU are married/divorced/widowed at lower rates than the overall average for the Bundestag, and fewer of them have children. Female MdB in the SPD, the other large catch-all party in the German system, are married or widowed at higher rates than the overall average, just as more of them have children than the average. This is, on its face, an odd finding, given that the CDU/CSU is a socially conservative party. The explanation likely lies with the lower tendency for
socially conservative women with children to serve in the Bundestag. Those women with children who do serve in the Bundestag are often older, whose children are already in their teens and older. This corresponds with the importance among social conservatives of women’s role as mothers. It is harder for conservatives reconcile a career with caring for younger children, and this becomes even harder when the career involves spending weeks at a time away from home (in Berlin).

Next I look at the statistical relationships between social markers and party affiliation and age and party affiliation, respectively. I look at party affiliation in 5 categories: the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the FDP, the Greens, and the Left combined with no party affiliation.95

In examining whether the five categories of party affiliation co-vary with being married/divorced/widowed and having kids, respectively, I find that 1) overall, being married is not related to party affiliation to a statistically significant degree,96 but 2) having kids is. T-tests for each party individually (e.g., a dummy for being a member of the SPD) show a statistically significant relationship between being in the SPD and having children and being in the CDU/CSU and not having children. Although these social markers are not statistically significant in sorting female legislators into all parties, these findings show that there is more that differs among female legislators than “just” party affiliation. It is not merely that some women are in the CDU and some are not; women vary in their personal backgrounds, as well. I interpret this finding as related the

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95 “No party affiliation” refers to MdB who won constituencies in legislative elections but whose parties did not clear the 5% electoral threshold, i.e., the MdB who take seats as “Fraktionslos” legislators, or legislators without a party group. This one Fraktionslos female MdB was a member of the PDS/Linkspartei (Left).
96 Cross-tabulation of the marital status dummy variable with party affiliation yields a p value that is not quite within the bounds of statistical significance (chi2, pr=0.122).
observation I made above regarding the lower tendency of socially conservative mothers and married women to serve in the Bundestag. Female members of the SPD, by contrast, are not as hesitant about combining motherhood with service in the Bundestag. For example, one of my interviewees stated: “We need young women in here [in the Bundestag] who have kids – not just young women who have rejected kids for their careers. This is…the wrong signal” (021408B – female SPD).

The relationship between social markers and party affiliation is not consistent. However, Table 5.5 shows that age is important. This table shows the distribution of age across parties, using cohort as the age grouping. These cohorts correspond to the eras of women’s rights that I identified in previous chapters: women born 1900-1936, women born 1937-1956, and women born 1957-1985. A chi2 indicates that this distribution reflects a statistically significant relationship. Cross-tabulation of the year of a female legislator’s entry into the Bundestag and her party affiliation also shows a statistically significant correlation. One of the determinants of these patterns is the fact that female legislators in the Green and the Left parties are younger than their counterparts in the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP. Neither of these parties is a post-war party, unlike the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP. The Greens first gained seats in the Bundestag in 1983, and the Left (as the PDS/Linkspartei) originated in 1990 at the time of German reunification. On the one hand, this reflects the fact that the Green and Left parties are relatively new to the party system. On the other hand (see Table 5.4), these same parties with, on average, younger female MdB simultaneously exhibit as high or higher rates of having children than longer-established parties. Based upon the social and demographic trends I discussed
in chapter 3, I interpret this as a greater acceptance among younger MdB in these parties to combine work and family commitments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>1 (1.2%)</td>
<td>53 (64.6%)</td>
<td>28 (34.1%)</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>4 (2.8%)</td>
<td>104 (73.2%)</td>
<td>34 (23.9%)</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14 (70.0%)</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27 (51.9%)</td>
<td>25 (48.1%)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>1 (2.3%)</td>
<td>19 (43.2%)</td>
<td>24 (54.5%)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6 (1.8%)</td>
<td>217 (63.8%)</td>
<td>117 (34.4%)</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.5. The relationship between party affiliation and cohort: the number and percentage of female legislators born in each cohort who are affiliated with each party, respectively

The possibility that a process related to social markers sorts women into various parties, which in turn exerts influence on female legislators’ propensity to WSR, is an important insight. On the one hand, the finding from previous research that party affiliation helps predict WSR could be interpreted against the backdrop of the assumption that all female legislators – being women – share an equal potential to represent women’s issues. According to this interpretation, it is party affiliation, all else being equal, that mitigates female legislators’ potential to engage actively in advocating for women, i.e., conservative parties deactivate female legislators’ potential to represent women. On the other hand, female legislators in different parties may also differ from one another in
other crucial ways, namely in terms of the social markers and other personal characteristics (reflecting experiences and perspectives) they exhibit. According to this second, interpretation, factors contributing to female legislators’ propensity to engage actively in advocating for women actually precede their choice of party affiliation.

**Factors influencing committee membership**

For the numbers I present here, I count only regular members of the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children, as the substitute members rarely take part in committee activities. Table 5.6 begins the process of establishing whether social markers help us understand which women are members of this committee. In Table 5.6, I compare the percentage of committee members who are married/divorced/widowed with the percentage of non-committee members, showing that female committee members are married/divorced/widowed at greater rates than non-committee members. A t-test shows that the 9.7% difference between committee members and non-members is statistically significant. As I have hypothesized, having been married makes a female legislator more likely to actively engage in advocating for women, here in the form of membership in the committee specifically tasked with addressing women’s issues.

In Table 5.6 I also compare the percentage of committee members who have children with the percentage of non-committee members. I show that a higher percentage of committee members have children than non-committee members: 91.1% as compared to 82.4%. This distinction between committee and non-committee members is clearly statistically significant. These findings suggest that committee-membership-as-WSR is something that married female MdB and female MdB do at greater rates than their not
married / without kids counterparts. Female MdB who have been married or in a longterm partnership, and female MdB who have children, have a disproportionately high presence in this committee. As I discussed in chapter 3, women who are married and have children in Germany experience social and legal pressures that should make them more aware of and attuned to gendered inequalities. I argued that this effect lessens over the course of the 20th century, but the aggregate effect (not controlling for legislators’ age) still suggests the influence of these social markers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee members’ rates of marriage vs. non-members’ rates</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Marriage mean (std error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee member</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.918 (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-committee member</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>0.821 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ t = -1.983, \text{ df} = 295 \]

\[ Pr(T < t) = 0.024, \text{ Pr(|T| > |t|)} = 0.048, \text{ Pr}(T > t) = 0.976 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee members’ rates of having children vs. non-members’ rates</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Kids mean (std error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee member</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>.911 (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-committee member</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>.824 (.024)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ t = -2.181, \text{ df} = 169.416 \]

\[ Pr(T < t) = 0.015, \text{ Pr(|T| > |t|)} = 0.031, \text{ Pr}(T > t) = 0.985 \]

Table 5.6. Are female committee members different from female non-committee members in terms of key social markers?: t-tests for independence

If we look at rates of marriage and having children among female members of the finance committee, by contrast, we see a different story: there is no statistically significant difference between rates of being married and having children within the finance committee and without. Female legislators’ membership rates in the finance
committee in the 15th and 16th legislative terms are 11 (of 35) and 10 (of 36), respectively. Thus, part of this finding may be due to the small sample size (low number of women on the committee). However, it remains the case that social markers that distinguish among female MdBs with respect to membership in the women-related committee do not similarly distinguish among female MdB’s membership in the finance committee. This is significant, because it supports a connection between specific dimensions of women’s lives, which I have hypothesized have made them more familiar and aware of gendered inequalities, and engagement in advocating for women. Direct experience with gendered laws and expectations – specifically laws and expectations that distinguish among women – makes advocacy for women (in the form membership in the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children) more likely.

The significance of these patterns can be interpreted in various ways. It could be that committee membership has more to do with the party group leadership’s notions of who ought to serve than it has to do with individual legislators’ choices. In the case of the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children, this would mean that the party’s impression of who was best suited to advocate for women drives committee membership, i.e., it might be that party leadership’s expectations of who ought to represent women trump individual legislators’ intentions. However, most of my interviewees, especially members of smaller parties, felt they had some control over which committees they joined. I was told that, upon an election and formation of a government, MdB were polled for their committee preferences. They typically described submitting a list of three top committee choices to the Fraktion leadership. Interviewees in larger parties indicated that expressing interest in a highly coveted spot on a powerful committee, e.g., the finance
committee, was not likely to be successful until one had served in the Bundestag for some time. MdB could readily join a committee like the Family, Seniors, Women, and Children committee, however, if they wished.

**Factors influencing female legislators’ participation in debates about women’s interests**

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show that committee membership, which I have just shown is shaped by social markers, in turn shapes other opportunities to advocate for women. Committee membership increases a speaker’s odds of taking part in a women-themed debate. Looking at the population of female members of the Bundestag, 90% of committee members spoke at some point 1998-2008 in debates specifically about women, as compared to only 62.8% of non-members. This relationship is also clear in Table 5.8, where I disaggregate by the legislative term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean participation rate (std error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female committee member</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.900 (.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female non-committee member</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>.628 (.055)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ t = -2.848, df=106 \]

Pr(T < t) = 0.003, Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.005, Pr(T > t) = 0.997

Table 5.7. Comparing female committee members’ rates of speaking in women-themed debates with the rates of non-committee members

This is not surprising for several reasons. First, an MdB who is a member of this specific committee is interested in issues relating to women. There is also an institutional
reason: when a committee reviews legislation and makes amendments etc, it provides a speakers’ list drawn from committee membership. Others not on the committee may and do speak, as well, but the MdB on that specific committee are the most knowledgeable about the legislation that they have just discussed.

However, I have also suggested that social markers may distinguish between speakers and non-speakers in women-themed debates. Given that social markers distinguish between female MdB who are committee members and those who are not, and committee membership makes speaking in these debates more likely, some further investigation is necessary to ascertain whether there is an independent effect of social markers on speaker status (i.e., not indirectly through committee membership).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14th legislative term</th>
<th>Committee member</th>
<th>Not a committee member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-speaker</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson chi2(1) = 29.381, Pr = 0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15th legislative term</th>
<th>Committee member</th>
<th>Not a committee member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-speaker</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson chi2(1) = 13.581, Pr = 0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16th legislative term</th>
<th>Committee member</th>
<th>Not a committee member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-speaker</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson chi2(1) = 25.006, Pr = 0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8. The relationship between female MdBs’ committee membership and whether they speak in debates about women
As a preliminary check, Table 5.9 shows that participation in women-themed debates is skewed by sex. These participation “counts” show what percentage of speakers addressing a specific law are female. Table 5.9 shows that in the randomly selected debates, women comprised 32.4% of all speakers. Thus, even in a random sample of debates, speeches are given by female MdB more frequently than women’s presence in the Bundestag would predict (14th Bundestag: 30.9% female,97 15th Bundestag: 32.3% female,98 and 16th Bundestag: 31.8% female99). This finding is even more pronounced in debates that address laws specifically about women and gender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% speeches in randomly selected debates</th>
<th>% speeches in debates specifically about women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9. Percentage of speeches given by female MdB (1998-2008)

Neither cross-tabulations between legislators’ age and speaking rates nor t-tests for independence yielded a statistically significant relationship. Thus, for this indicator of WSR (participation in debates), age does not appear to distinguish among female legislators.

Table 5.10 shows social marker distinctions between female MdB who speak in debates about women and women’s issues and MdB who do not participate in these debates. In these tables I compare the rates at which speakers in women-themed debates

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97 See Ismayr (2001) p.78
98 See Inter-parliamentary Union
99 See www.bundestag.de
are married/divorced/widowed with the rates of non-speakers, and then I compare the rates at which speakers in women-themed debates have children with the rates of non-speakers. These results do not support my expectations. Rates of marriage are higher among non-speakers (85.5% as compared to 81.2%), but this is not statistically significant. Rates of having children are different between speakers and non-speakers to a statistically significant degree, but female speakers in these debates have children at lower rates than non-speakers. This does not meet my expectations, either, and it may seem at first to contradict my findings regarding the correlates of committee membership: I showed that committee membership correlates with higher levels of these social markers.

| comparing speakers’ marriage rates with non-speakers’ marriage rates |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| N                                               | Mean (std error) |
| Speaker                                         | 69               | 0.812 (0.047)    |
| Non-Speaker                                     | 228              | 0.855 (0.023)    |

\[ t = 0.877, df= 295 \]
\[ Pr(T < t) = 0.809, Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.381, Pr(T > t) = 0.191 \]

| comparing speakers’ rates of having children with non-speakers’ rates of having children |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| N                                               | Mean (std error) |
| Speaker                                         | 75               | .773 (.049)      |
| Non-Speaker                                     | 266              | .865 (.021)      |

\[ t = 1.723, df= 103.161 \]
\[ Pr(T < t) = 0.956, Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.088, Pr(T > t) = 0.044 \]

Table 5.10. Key social markers distinguish between female MdB who participate in debates about women/issues and female MdB who do not participate
Membership in the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women and Children clearly promotes female legislators’ participation in debates specifically about women’s issues. This is an example of one of my indicators of WSR facilitating other modes of WSR: MdB who are members of this committee have already signaled their commitment to addressing a broader category of interests that includes women’s interests, making them more likely to take part in these debates.

However, social markers do not then correlate with female legislators’ rates of participation in these debates. Indeed, motherhood is negatively correlated with participation, which is the reverse of the effect I have hypothesized. Although marriage, motherhood, and age contribute to explaining committee membership as I have hypothesized (where being married, being a mother, and being older contribute to membership), these social markers do not have a direct effect on participation in debates. I am at a loss for how to explain this fully, though I will suggest that it does not necessarily contradict my theoretical expectations. I will demonstrate in the next section that this is because merely participating in debates about women’s interests does not automatically denote advocacy for women. Indeed, many MdB who participate in debates that expressly address legislation about women do so without referring to women’s interests. (See Table 5.3 for an overview of the relative frequency of WSR in the content of speeches given in these debates about women.) This distinction between participation and contribution likely highlights different dimensions of WSR, i.e., participation in debates about women’s interests may have different determinants from contribution of WSR to these debates. Figure 5.1 showed pathways to WSR, but each of these “stages” is also a dimension of WSR in its own right.
Factors influencing references to women’s interests in these debates

Findings in the previous section were mixed. However, I have suggested that references to women’s interests in debates may be a more meaningful indicator of WSR than simply participating in these debates. Here I turn to analyses of the content of speeches.

The dependent variables that I use for women’s substantive representation in the subsequent analyses are dichotomous; they are dummies for references to women’s political interests, economic interests, and family-related interests, respectively. I restrict these models to speeches uttered by female legislators in order to focus on variation among women, and I pool together three legislative terms of content analyses of speeches addressing laws that are explicitly about women and women’s interests (14th, 15th, and 16th; 1998-2008100). In analyzing factors that contribute to explaining which female speakers refer to these categories of women’s interests, I performed a series of cross-tabulations followed by a series of logistic regressions. I do not show all of the results of these analyses here, only the ones that relate directly to claims that I have raised in previous chapters: 1) motherhood and having been married at any point will increase the odds of a speech including explicit references to women’s interests, 2) in my cross-sectional data-set, increasing age is correlated with increasing tendency to make explicit reference to women’s interests, and 3) membership in the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children will increase a speaker’s odds of referring explicitly to women’s interests.

100 Note that the 16th legislative term ended in 2009. However, my content analysis data collection ended in 2008.
Because each of these dependent variables that I have listed here is dichotomous, the statistical models are logistic regressions. Each model is clustered by debate, i.e., these models account for how the variance of the dependent variable may vary by debate. I chose to cluster by debate as opposed to by law, because occasionally a given debate actually addressed multiple (though related) laws, and an overall lack of references within a given debate could be more a reflection of the multiple laws under discussion than of individual speakers’ interest in representing women.

I ran models for all three categories of women’s interests (political, economic, and family-related). Although my focus is on distinguishing among speeches delivered by female speakers, I started by examining variation among all of the speeches (uttered by female and male legislators) that addressed laws indexed as relating to women and women’s interests. In all of these models, i.e., logit models of references to each category of women’s interests respectively, the sex of the speaker consistently had a statistically significant and positive coefficient. This supports previous research that has found female legislators to be more active advocates for women. The other variable that consistently had a positive, statistically significant coefficient was membership in the committee on Family, Seniors, Children, and Women. As I have shown, speaking opportunities in debates about these issues are closely linked to committee membership. In model 1 (Table 5.11), for the sake of illustration I show a regression of references to women’s interests (this is an aggregated measure of references to women’s interests, ranging from no references to any category of interests to references to all three categories within a single speech) on selected independent variables. I leave out social markers, because
theoretically they do not apply to male legislators. I include year of birth in lieu of cohort for the same reason; the cohorts that I have theorized do not apply to male legislators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Coefficient (standard error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.773 (0.119) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee member</td>
<td>0.378 (0.132) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>0.008 (0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>-0.135 (0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0.072 (0.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of birth</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.004) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>33.539 (8.667) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.11. OLS regression model of references to women’s political interests: all speeches given in debates about women’s issues 1998-2008 (including female and male speakers)

*** p < .01; ** p < 0.05; * p < .10
+ variable dropped due to collinearity

As model 1 shows, unlike much previous research on “women’s impact,” I find that party affiliation (a series of dummies for each party) does not have a consistent statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that, in models including both female and male legislators, party affiliation in and of itself is not such a useful predictor of attention to women’s interests. The sex of a given speaker seems to trump her or his party affiliation.
In the sections that follow, I analyze the relationships between my particular variables of interests and variation among female speakers’ references to women’s interests (political interests, economic interests, and family interests, respectively) in debates over laws specifically addressing women as a group. These models are clearly different from the models that included speeches uttered by both women and men, which suggests that the pathways explaining which female legislators engage in WSR are different from the pathways explaining men’s engagement with these issues. The variables for the speaker’s level of educational attainment, election/ballot type, membership in extra-parliamentary women’s organizations, and religious affiliation are omitted from the following analyses, because in preliminary analyses they failed to explain variation in any model.

Factors influencing references to women’s political interests

Here I look at the role of social markers, age, and committee membership in explaining speaker’s references to political interests in debates specifically about women’s interest legislation. I begin by looking at a series of correlations.

Table 5.12 shows three statistically significant relationships. Speakers who refer to women’s political interests in their speeches have children at higher rates, are older, and are members of the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children at higher rates than speakers who do not refer to these interests. Thus, one social marker (having children), age, and committee membership all relate positively to this measure of WSR, as I hypothesized.
Speakers who refer to women’s political interests in their speeches have also been married at higher rates than speakers who do not refer to these interests, but this difference is just outside the bounds of statistical significance. Overall, my theoretical expectations are met by these t-tests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spikers’ mean rate of marriage (std error)</th>
<th>Spikers’ mean rate of having kids (std error)</th>
<th>Spikers’ mean year of birth (std error)</th>
<th>Spikers’ mean rate of committee membership (std error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speech w/ reference to political interests</td>
<td>0.837 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.827 (0.044)</td>
<td>1954.7 (1.056)</td>
<td>0.516 (0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech w/ out reference to political interests</td>
<td>0.776 (0.045)</td>
<td>0.773 (0.049)</td>
<td>1949.5 (0.877)</td>
<td>0.359 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1952.1</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.12. Comparing female speakers who refer to women’s political interests with female speakers who do not◊

* T-test indicates a statistically significant difference in means between the groups of interest (speeches with references to women’s political interests versus speeches without these references)
◊ The N of these samples were, respectively: for marriage rates (86 speeches referring to interests, 85 not referring), for rates of having children (75 speeches referring to interests, 75 not referring), and for rates of committee membership (92 speeches referring to interests, 91 not referring).

Next I show a logit model of references to women’s political interests, in order to account for multiple explanations simultaneously. I ran two models of female speakers’ references to women’s political interests, both of them clustered around the debate during
which the speech was delivered: first, a more spare logistic regression model, which included dummies for membership in the family et al committee, having grown up in the former GDR, and currently representing the conservative state of Bavaria, and a variable for party affiliation. This spare model included no statistically significant coefficients, and the model’s overall fit was poor, as well (model not shown for these reasons).

A more expansive model of references to women’s political interests showed more promise. Model 2 is a logistic regression model, again clustered around the debate within which a given speech took place. Model 2 included all of the variables in the spare model, with the addition of: the speaker’s cohort, a dummy for being married/divorced/widowed, and a dummy for having children. (See model 2 Table 5.13.) Several things are striking about this model (model 2). First, party affiliation is not statistically significant.101 Second, membership in the committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children is not a statistically significant predictor of these references, either. I have shown that membership in this committee is clearly related to speaking, in the first place. Moreover, the t-tests in Table 5.12 showed that references to women’s political interests co-vary with membership in the committee. However, controlling for other influential factors, including social markers and age, renders committee membership no longer influential. I showed earlier in this chapter that marital status and having children correlate with committee membership; it is possible, then, that the effects of social markers and committee membership are obscuring one another in this model. I will discuss this at greater length when I show that membership in this committee does, by contrast, contribute to speakers’ references to family-related interests.

101 I also ran this model using a series of dummies, one for each political party. The results are not different.
Model 2 shows just one factor contributing to the likelihood of a speaker referring to women’s political interests in these debates: cohort. The coefficient for cohort is negative, meaning that women in earlier cohorts who speak in these debates are more likely to refer to women’s political interests than their younger counterparts. Table 5.13 suggests that the effects of cohort (which reflect different experiences with and socialization in social and legal norms) may be substantial. In Table 5.14, I show predicted probabilities to demonstrate the effect of cohort on references to women’s political interests.

I calculated these predicted probabilities holding the variables not under consideration at their modes (all but party affiliation were dummy variables). I set the value of party affiliation at 2 for the SPD, which is the mode for this variable; more female speakers are in the SPD in the period of study than in any other party. In separate calculations of these predicted probabilities, I set the value of party affiliation at zero, as no single party claims more than half of all female speakers. Both approaches to selecting a value for party affiliation yielded the same trend, i.e., for all party affiliations, the speaker with the greatest probability of referring to women’s political interests was in the oldest cohort, the second greatest was in the middle cohort, and the least likely was the youngest cohort.

Table 5.14 shows that a speech uttered by a female speaker in the oldest cohort (born 1926-1936) has a 77.2% probability of including a reference to women’s political interests. A speech uttered by a female speaker in the middle cohort (born 1937-1956) has only a 49.0% probability of including a reference to these interests. This probability

102 It is also the case that more female MdB (not just among speakers, but among all female legislators) are in the SPD in the period of study than in any other party.
decreases to 21.5% when the speaker was born 1957-1985 (the youngest cohort). For a debate in the year 2000, this means that a 65 year-old female speaker, who came of age prior to major legal changes on behalf of women’s rights, is substantially more likely to mention these interests than a 20 year-old female speaker (all other factors being equal).

This finding clearly supports my expectations that older women, having been socialized in more traditionalist eras when debates over women’s rights were fiercer, will be more aware of and attuned to gendered inequalities. This in turn makes them more likely to talk about women’s rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2 Coefficient (standard error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee member</td>
<td>.568 (.462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in GDR</td>
<td>-.161 (.551)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represent Bavaria</td>
<td>.445 (.516)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party affiliation</td>
<td>-.113 (.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort</td>
<td>-1.257 (.349)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>.765 (.544)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having kids</td>
<td>-.415 (.496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.351 (.769)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.13. Logit model references to women’s political interests: female speakers in debates specifically about women

*** p < .01; ** p < 0.05; * p < .10
Table 5.14. The impact of cohort on referring to women’s political interests in women themed debates (logit-generated probabilities, from model 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>% likelihood of referring to women’s political interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker was born 1900-1936</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker was born 1937-1956</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker was born 1957-1985</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although model 2 does not show social marker effects, the significance of a speaker’s cohort reflects a parallel process of socialization, where experiences with different eras of women’s rights translate into attitudinal differences. I discuss this in greater details in subsequent sections.

Factors influencing references to women’s economic interests

Similar to the previous section, I first examine whether social markers, age, and committee membership correlate with female speakers’ references to women’s interests (here, economic interests). I discuss these findings against the backdrop of chapter 3, and then I show two logit models that account for multiple factors simultaneously.

T-tests for independence in Table 5.15 show only one factor as correlated with references to economic interests to a statistically significant degree: speakers’ mean year of birth. The rates of marriage and having kids are greater among speakers who refer to these interests than among speakers who do not, but these differences are not statistically significant. This suggests that references to women’s economic interests are a different
“kind” of WSR from references to political interests. Once again, older female legislators are more likely to mention these interests explicitly, but the other correlates do not contribute as hypothesized. It is possible that the dominant gendered economic concerns mentioned in these debates – equal pay for equal work and the importance of mothers being able to pursue paid employment in order to support themselves financially – are so widely shared that variation among speakers and speeches is not explained by the same factors as other dimensions of WSR. Indeed as I noted in chapter 4’s examination of party platforms, all five party manifestos for the 2005 legislative elections mentioned women’s rights in the workplace.
Table 5.15. Comparing speakers who refer to women’s economic interests with speakers who do not 🧢

* T-test indicates a statistically significant difference in means between the groups of interest (speeches with references to women’s economic interests versus speeches without these references)

◊ The N of these samples were, respectively: for marriage rates (70 speeches referring to interests, 101 not referring), for rates of having children (64 speeches referring to interests, 86 not referring), for age (78 speeches referring to interests, 105 not referring) and for rates of committee membership (78 speeches referring to interests, 105 not referring).

Despite the fact that all party manifestos refer to women’s economic rights, it remains the case that there is variation among female speaker in their tendency to refer to these rights and interests explicitly. According to these t-tests, the only correlate that positively relates to these references (to a statistically significant degree) is a legislator’s age. As I described in chapter 3, 1977 was a milestone year for women in Germany. After this year, married women no longer needed permission from their husbands to work
outside the home. It makes sense that older women, having experienced greater restrictions of their economic rights, would be more active in this issue area.

In order to test the roles these factors play simultaneously, I ran two logit models for references to women’s economic interests (see models 3 and 4 in Table 5.16). The first model included the following variables: membership in the family et al committee, growing up in the GDR, representing the conservative state of Bavaria, party affiliation, and cohort. I show the model that includes dummies for each political party, respectively, as there are individual parties that positively contribute to explaining references to economic interests.

This model (model 3 in Table 5.16) explained limited variation (Pseudo R2 = 0.055). As in the political interests models, membership in the family et al committee remains unhelpful for explaining references to economic interests. All told, however, the model included two statistically significant coefficients: for the speaker having been born in the GDR (a positive effect) and the speaker’s cohort (a negative effect for younger cohorts). The speaker being a member of the Green party had a positive effect but was just outside the bounds of statistical significance (p=.100).

These findings corroborate my discussion of eras – and contexts – of debates over women’s rights in chapter 3. Women who grew up in the GDR enjoyed more expansive rights in the workplace than their Western counterparts. Controlling for GDR background, cohort remains a negative predictor of a female speaker’s likelihood of referring to women’s economic rights. Like the models of references to political interests, older women are more likely to refer to women’s economic interests. Once again, this corroborates my expectation that direct experiences with more gender-unequal “regimes,”
as well as socialization in periods of more intense debate over women’s rights, will make female legislators more likely to be aware of and engage in these issues.

Model 4 in Table 5.16 is a more expansive model of references to women’s economic interests. This was also a logit, clustered around the debate within which the speech took place. Model 4 includes all of the above variables, with the addition of indicators of social markers: a dummy for being or having been married and a dummy for having children. GDR background and cohort remain statistically significant in this model. Although marital status and having children do not emerge as statistically significant covariates of this indicator of WSR, they do not appear to overlap with cohort effects. As I will discuss at greater length in the conclusion of this chapter, the independent effect of cohort in these models suggests that women’s experience with gendered inequalities need not necessarily be direct and personal to influence WSR. Instead, a cohort effect via socialization is more likely at work.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 3 Coefficient (standard error)</th>
<th>Model 4 Coefficient (standard error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee member</td>
<td>.107 (.385)</td>
<td>.041 (.373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in GDR</td>
<td>.757 (.412) *</td>
<td>1.050 (.637) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represent Bavaria</td>
<td>- .590 (.607)</td>
<td>-.336 (.693)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>.682 (.494)</td>
<td>.462 (.563)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>.466 (.245)</td>
<td>.357 (.427)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>.833 (.507)</td>
<td>.838 (.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>-.047 (.446)</td>
<td>-.296 (.713)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort</td>
<td>-.854 (.275) ***</td>
<td>-1.021 (.323) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.064 (.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having kids</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.322 (.505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.028 (.658)</td>
<td>1.170 (.722)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.16. Logit model predicting references to women’s economic interests
(speeches uttered by female legislators in debates specifically about women)

*** p < .01; ** p < 0.05; * p < .10
+ Variable dropped due to collinearity

None of these models of references to women’s economic interests suggests that
the social markers of marriage or motherhood contribute to this specific indicator of
WSR. However, as I noted in my discussion of the models of references to women’s
political interests, the significance of a speaker’s cohort may tap into a parallel process of
directly experiencing eras of greater gender inequality.
Factors influencing references to women’s family interests

I follow the same sequence of analyses for family-related interests as I do in the previous sections. Table 5.17, which presents t-tests for independence, shows only speakers’ mean rate of committee membership as correlated with references to family-related interests. This is noteworthy: family-related interests are the only category of interests whose representation is not correlated with a speaker’s age. These comparison-of-mean tests do not control for alternative explanations, and I will show in the subsequent logit analyses that disaggregating speakers further (i.e., controlling for other factors) is necessary to highlight the effect of age on attention to women’s family-related interests. Neither marital status nor having kids is correlated with this indicator of WSR to a statistically significant relationship degree. In Table 5.18, I show that it is necessary to control for other variables (including cohort) to show how these social markers matter for WSR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spkrs’ mean rate of marriage (std error)</th>
<th>Spkrs’ mean rate of having kids (std error)</th>
<th>Spkrs’ mean year of birth (std error)</th>
<th>Spkrs’ mean rate of committee mmbbrship (std error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speech w/ reference to family interests</td>
<td>0.759 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.774 (0.058)</td>
<td>1951.5 (1.289)</td>
<td>0.556 (0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech w/out reference to family interests</td>
<td>0.832 (0.035)</td>
<td>0.814 (0.040)</td>
<td>1952.467 (0.854)</td>
<td>0.375 (0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1952.1</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.17. Comparing speakers who refer to women’s family-related interests with speakers who do not

* T-test indicates a statistically significant difference in means between the groups of interest (speeches with references to women’s family-related interests versus speeches without these references)

◊ The N of these samples were, respectively: for marriage rates (58 speeches referring to interests, 113 not referring), for rates of having children (53 speeches referring to interests, 97 not referring), for age (63 speeches referring to interests, 120 not referring) and for rates of committee membership (63 speeches referring to interests, 120 not referring).

The models examining references to women’s family-related interests offer further insight into the effects of both party affiliation and membership on the family et al committee. Table 5.18 shows two models (5–6): the first includes membership in the family et al committee, growing up in the GDR, representing the conservative state of Bavaria, party affiliation, and cohort. The second (model 6) adds two indicators of social markers (having been married/divorced/widowed and having children) and their interactions with cohort. These interacted terms illustrate how a female speaker’s cohort
(reflecting her experience of different eras of women’s rights) modifies these social markers: married/divorced/widowed * cohort and having kids * cohort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 5 Coefficient (standard error)</th>
<th>Model 6 Coefficient (standard error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee member</td>
<td>.700 (.354) **</td>
<td>.733 (.420) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in GDR</td>
<td>.017 (.571)</td>
<td>-.163 (.520)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represent Bavaria</td>
<td>-.567 (.519)</td>
<td>-.118 (.483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>.884 (.603)</td>
<td>2.451 (1.208) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>.003 (.345)</td>
<td>1.546 (1.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1.734 (.881) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>-.330 (.498)</td>
<td>1.457 (1.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>-.849 (.737)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort</td>
<td>.113 (.473)</td>
<td>-2.519 (1.377) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-8.367 (3.234) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having kids</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.380 (2.618)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status*Cohort</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.499 (1.440) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kids*Cohort</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.694 (1.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.182 (1.021)</td>
<td>3.610 (3.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.18. Logit model predicting references to women’s family-related interests (speeches uttered by female legislators in debates specifically about women)

*** p < .01; ** p < .05, * p < .10
+ Variable dropped due to collinearity

In the first model of references to women’s family-related interests (model 5), being a committee member increases speakers’ references to these interests. This is highly noteworthy, because membership in this committee was not a statistically significant predictor of references to women’s political or economic interests. I interpret
this to reflect this committee’s emphasis on the family part of their agenda. Membership in this committee does not reflect a particular interest in women’s interests as distinct from the family. This means, further, that the inclusion of “women” in the title of the committee does not necessarily translate into advocacy for women as individuals (as opposed to as mothers and members of a family). Unlike previous models, cohort in model 5 is not statistically significant in model 5. This suggests that references to women’s family-related interests is a different “kind” of WSR from references to political and economic interests, respectively. We must look to model 6, with interaction terms, to explain why this is the case.

Model 6 introduces two indicators of social markers (having been married/divorced/widowed and having children) and their interactions with cohort: marital status * cohort and kids * cohort. This reflects change in social and legal norms over time, operationalizing my expectation that different cohorts of women will have different experiences as mothers and wives. The social pressures and obligations on married women in the 1960s in Germany, for example, were very different from those in Germany four decades later, and interaction terms allow me to test hypotheses of cohort effects and social markers jointly.

Model 6 shows six coefficients to be statistically significant: membership in the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children; membership in the CDU/CSU and the FDP, respectively; cohort; marital status; and the interaction term of marital status * cohort. This finding is a partial corroboration of my expectation that social markers; marital status and marital status modified by age will influence WSR. Alongside the effects of marital status, it is clear that a legislator’s cohort remains a negative influence
on likelihood of referring to women’s family-related interests (i.e., older cohorts have
greater tendency to WSR) even when controlling for social markers. In other words, a
legislator’s cohort exerts an independent effect on the DV. The consistency with which
cohort shapes tendency to engage in advocating for women is clear for most of the
measures of WSR that I include in this project, and this effect remains after controlling
for other personal characteristics that reflect legislators’ experiences and perspectives.
These findings also corroborate the expectations in chapter 3, where I suggested that the
effects of these specific social markers should be mediated by legislators’ cohorts. This is
because the experience of social and legal norms surrounding marriage and motherhood
vary across time. As I have described in previous sections, the cohorts that I have
designated reflect specific events that punctuate the advancement of women’s rights over
time (e.g., 1977 revisions to the Civil Code).

However, the directional on marital status (married/divorced/widowed) alone in
model 6 is not as I hypothesized. The coefficient for marital status in model 6 is actually
negative (not weak or statistically significant), suggesting that it is negatively associated
with references to women’s political interests. All other factors being equal, being or
having been married appears to reduce the odds of a speech containing a reference to
women’s family-related interests in this model. On the one hand, the effects of
component parts of interaction terms are sometimes distorted in interaction models (this
is because of collinearity between the component term, here marital status, and the
interacted term, here marital status * cohort). On the other hand, Table 5.17 (which
showed only comparison-of-mean tests) indicates the same relationship: it showed the
mean rate of being married/divorced/widowed as lower among speakers who referred to
women’s family-related interests (though this difference of means was not statistically significant). The interacted marital status term sheds some light on this: marital status does corroborate my expectations when it is interacted with cohort. In other words, “simply” being or having been married does not point to higher rates of WSR among female legislators, but having been married and socialized in an earlier era of more restrictive women’s rights does point to higher rates of WSR. Notably, although the direction on the coefficient is positive, as I would expect, having children (either alone or in interaction with cohort) is not statistically significant.

**Women substantive representation: what MdB don’t say**

On the one hand, these patterns of substantive contributions to debate are telling: social markers and cohort effects help explain whether female legislators actively engage in advocating for women (though they seem to differ in their effects on different measures of WSR). However, it is also necessary to consider crucial contributions to women’s substantive representation that do not engender debate, because the Bundestag has already collectively agreed upon their importance. In some cases, laws that hypothetically might have generated informative debate (informative about the origins of WSR) were not debated, at all. These were laws that were announced initially in a plenary session and then transferred directly to committee without discussion, sometimes on several occasions, i.e., the laws were announced and, “by inter-Fraktion agreement,” forwarded to one or more committees for continued review. These acts of WSR do not happen at the individual level, but they do represent important progress in advocacy for women.
One example of these laws of interest is a law about use of the term “Elternzeit,” i.e., “parent time” (GESTA Law #I008, introduced and passed by the Bundestag in 2000 in its 14th legislative period). This term was intended to replace the terms “Elternurlaub” and “Erziehungsurlaub,” which translate into English as “parent vacation” and “child-raising vacation,” respectively. This law was not debated publicly at any time, though it was announced in two separate plenary sessions and forwarded to committee for discussion, and ultimately it passed unanimously. Debates over terminology and how this reflects the value of child-raising as work (and more generally the value of traditional women’s work) are clearly reflective of generally held norms about gender roles: by 2000 in Germany, despite variation among parties, this terminology went literally without public debate.

Other laws of great significance to women’s political, economic, and social rights similarly evinced little debate and passed unanimously. For example, in the 14th Bundestag (in 2001), a law to amend the 1979 law banning all forms of discrimination against women (GESTA law #XI001) was discussed on only one occasion, and only by 7 speakers. It passed unanimously.

Although these examples provide little individual-level data to analyze, they are important indicators of the overall level of advocacy for women in the Bundestag. By 2001, the dimensions of debate about laws against sex-discrimination are quite limited.

One way to deal with the issue that system-wide norms develop over time would be to expand the sample of debates back to the early 1980s. There are strong reasons to believe that discourse about women as a political group and about women’s interests would present starker contrasts among female and male legislators and among parties at
that time. Female MdB comprised only 8% of the Bundestag in 1980, for example; this percentage had remained roughly the same since 1949.

Conclusion

Much previous research on women’s substantive representation has focused on showing that female legislators are better representatives of women than male legislators, where better is measured at turns as voting for feminist legislation, sponsoring or co-sponsoring legislation to advance women’s rights, etc. In this chapter, I showed that models of women’s substantive representation should not just control for the sex of individual legislators in order to explain their behavior. The pathways explaining which female legislators engage in WSR are different from the pathways explaining men’s engagement with these issues.

Focusing on variation among female legislators was very illuminating. First, social markers (specifically, being married/in a long term partnership and having kids) are positively and statistically significantly related to numerous measures of women’s substantive representation. Although these results are a bit mixed, the crux of these findings is that social markers clearly do sort female legislators in ways that shape their attention to women’s interests. Female legislators who are members of the Committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Children exhibit different patterns of social markers from non-members. In turn, being a member of this committee offers opportunities to speak in debates specifically addressing women and women’s interests. Moreover, patterns of social markers vary somewhat by party. This suggests that party effects found in other
research on women’s substantive representation may more accurately be attributed to social markers that shape party affiliation.

I have also shown that the speaker’s cohort mediates the effect of social markers. This further corroborates the claims I made in chapter 3 regarding social pressures and the obligations cued by social markers in Germany: these pressures and obligations evolve over time, such that the age of the speaker should indeed matter. The context for being the mother of a small child in the 1960s in Germany, for example, was different from the context for being the mother of a small child in the 1990s.

The independent effect of age in these models suggests that women’s experience with gendered inequalities need not necessarily be direct and personal to have an effect. In other words, although specific social markers may differentiate among women within any cross-section (social markers are determinants of references to women’s family-related interests, though not the other spheres of interests), female legislators’ socialization in varying contexts of gender inequality exerts an independent effect on their propensity to engage in WSR. Female MdB who grew up in earlier and more restrictive “eras” of women’s rights are more attuned to women’s issues whether or not they are married and/or mothers.

The particular salience of marital status and cohort (alone and interacted) as determinants of references to women’s family-related interests highlights the fact that this selected social marker denotes family-related experiences and perspectives. I did not have access to data about individual female legislators’ experience with sexual discrimination in the workplace; however, based upon my findings here, I would suggest that indicators of distinctly different experiences and perspectives would not relate to advocacy for
family-related issues. Instead, these other indicators would highlight advocacy for women in issue areas relating to those experiences and perspectives.

Finally, my findings suggest that the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children accentuates the family part of their agenda, such that membership in this committee does not appear to signal attention to women’s interests outside their role as mothers. In other words, the committee’s title may include the word “women,” but this does not translate into advocacy for women in all of the roles that they occupy.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Introduction

In this dissertation I have addressed connections between descriptive and substantive representation, exploring the conditions under which legislators who are members of specific identity groups can be expected to advocate for those groups. Specifically, I have examined variation among female legislators in the context of Germany, with the goal of discerning explanations for why some of them are actively engaged in advocacy for women and others are not.

As I address in chapter 1, conceiving of women as a coherent group – whether an identity or an interest group – is a fraught endeavor, because there are many important differences among women. Socioeconomics, level of education, race, ethnicity, and religious community, as well as intersections of all of these dimensions of identity, contribute to these differences. Indeed, many theorists of intersectionality (multiple dimensions of identity existing simultaneously) acknowledge that the logical extension of their argument stakes the claim that each individual person is completely unique with respect to her or his identity, i.e., no two people are sufficiently similar to group them together in a politically relevant way. Despite these challenges to talking about people as members of groups, specifically individual women as members of a group of women, Weldon (2008) argues that a set of issues, experiences, interests, and identity remains that
is specific to women as a group. These are issues, experiences, interests, and identity that are primarily shaped by sex and gender. (See Figure 1.1)

I have aimed to parse the determinants of attention to these concerns – women’s substantive representation – by examining variation among women. I have emphasized specific facets of gendered identity (namely, motherhood and marriage, as well as generational differences that mediate these dimensions of identity) as independent variables of particular interest, because these are social markers that reflect experiences with social and legal pressures unique to women as a group. However, gendered identity is not the only factor contributing to the potential for female legislators to engage in advocating for women. Women in legislatures, like men, are subject to other constraints and pressures, as well, including but not limited to their political party. For the reason that multiple pathways may lead to advocacy for women, my research design evaluates the role of identity and social markers alongside institutional and partisan factors. Furthermore, I evaluate multiple different indicators of WSR, suggesting how they may be inter-related, e.g., I show that membership in the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children promotes legislators’ participation in debates about women-related legislation. Thus, I examine several pathways to WSR sequentially. (See Figure 5.1.)

**Summary of findings**

My indicators for WSR vary across three empirical chapters, reflecting my inclusion of both qualitative and quantitative evidence. I draw upon 54 personal interviews with members of the Bundestag, original content analyses of party platforms,
original content analyses of a total of 549 speeches delivered in Bundestag plenary sessions, and substantial secondary material.

In chapters 1-2, I discuss the shortfalls of previous research. In terms of women’s substantive representation, previous studies rarely present direct evidence to support the links between descriptive and substantive representation. Instead, this research has focused on establishing differences between female and male legislators. This approach elides over differences among women and does not show precisely what it is about female legislators’ shared biology, or the direct consequences of this biology, that promotes greater levels of advocacy for women than advocacy undertaken by their male colleagues. In terms of work in political theory, I show that feminist conceptions of women’s interests are often too narrow to apply to studies that acknowledge variation among women.

In chapters 4 and 5 I discuss some of the limitations of party affiliation as an explanation of variation among female legislators’ attention to women as a group. These limitations become visible once we have controlled for individual parties’ definitions of women’s interests. If the dependent variable is “attention to women as a group,” then I should not define women’s interests narrowly and in terms that overlap with specific ideological orientations. It is no surprise that studies that define women’s interests as feminist find that affiliation with a left-leaning party predicts WSR. In chapters 4 and 5, I show that women across parties pay attention to women as a group; they just do not all emphasize the same sets of issues. Once a broader definition of WSR is employed (“attention to women as a group” rather than “advocacy for feminist principles”), party affiliation is not a strong predictor of variation among legislators.
In chapter 4, I examine variation among parties and variation among women using material from elite interviews and content analyses of party platforms. I find that, although interviewees’ responses to questions about women as a group generally clustered around the messages in their party platforms, female legislators diverged from these platforms more frequently than their male colleagues in order to talk about women’s interests more expansively than their party “script” dictated. This material did not permit simultaneous consideration of alternative explanations of these patterns, but the implication is that party is a less important determinant of legislators’ attention to women’s interests than other factors, including (when distinguishing among all legislators) sex. Statistical analyses in chapter 5 corroborate that party affiliation relates weakly to my various indicators of WSR, controlling for a host of other variables.

In chapters 3 and 5, I show that the content of two specific social markers in the German context, motherhood and marriage, relate intrinsically to women-specific concerns of the kind that Weldon (2008) predicted. By this I mean that women exhibiting these social markers are more likely to have experienced and had their perspectives shaped by specific legal and social pressures. A discussion of the legal-historical context of women’s interests and women’s rights in 20th and 21st century Germany illuminates what these legal and social pressures consist of. In Fearon’s (1999) terms, the “content” of the social categories of mother and married woman calls female legislators in these categories to action on behalf of other women. This effect is stronger for measures of WSR that are related to women’s familial roles. The social markers of motherhood and marriage are particularly salient determinants of explicit attention to women’s family-related interests.
The legal and social pressures that mothers and married women experience vary over time, which is a finding further supported by my data. I discuss how legal and social norms directly relating to motherhood and marriage change over the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in Germany in chapter 3. In chapter 5, I show that variation in female legislators’ age contributes substantially to explanations of their active engagement in advocacy for women. Older female legislators are much more likely than their younger female colleagues to advocate for women, controlling for other factors including party affiliation. Indeed, age also corresponds directly with increasing rates of having children among female legislators in the Bundestag. As I discuss in chapter 3, these generational differences correspond to different eras of women’s rights in Germany. For example, it was not until 1977 that the Civil Code’s divorce law was revised; until that time, it was legally assumed that any woman initiating divorce proceedings had left her husband and abandoned her children, relinquishing custody. Female legislators in my period of study who were in their 30s and 40s in 1977 – these women constitute the oldest two cohort of female MdB in the 2000s – have clearly different gendered experiences from the female legislators who were in their teens or not yet born at that time. Statistical analyses in chapter 5 also show that a legislator’s age mediates the effects of marital status and having children on my indicator of WSR that focuses on family roles (references in speeches to women’s family-related interests).

These findings about generational differences are further corroborated by my interviews with legislators, many of whom shared their impressions that younger female MdB are much less engaged in advocacy for women.
Implications for political theory

My dissertation project makes two contributions in political theory on women’s political representation: 1) I contribute to what Judith Squires calls diversity feminism, and 2) I respond to increasing demand for research that acknowledges variation among women. These contributions reflect how I have incorporated cutting edge feminist theory into an empirical project, which places my dissertation at the forefront of research on women’s political representation.

Judith Squires (1999), among other scholars (see, for example, Fraser 1995), presents diversity feminism as an alternative approach to two dominant strands of feminism: equality feminism and difference feminism. All three aim to advance the rights of women, but the two dominant approaches present starkly different, mutually exclusive standards for implementing gender equality. To treat all people equally is a contested undertaking: does it mean to “make gender invisible,” by not referring to gender in any legislation? Or does it mean to craft policy in such a way that it recognizes and acknowledges that laws may, due to pre-existing social structural inequalities or due to gendered social roles, impact women and men differently? Equality and difference feminisms, respectively, argue that it must be one of these approaches or the other. Diversity feminism, by contrast, proposes a middle road, which permits a more fluid definition of what counts as women’s interests and what counts as substantive representation.

Squires (1999) describes equality feminists as advocating “gender invisible” policies, i.e., policies that do not refer to gender and do not recognize (or reify) any differences between women and men. Equality feminists are sometimes also called liberal
feminists, in that they advocate liberal principles of individualism, universalism, and equality. For example, an equality feminist advocates parental leave, rather than maternal leave, upon the birth of a child.

By contrast, difference feminists “accept and even celebrate gender differences” (Squires 1999:117). They advocate what Squires (1999) calls “gender visibility.” For example, Carol Gilligan’s seminal work in difference feminism, *In a Different Voice* (1982), argues that women and men have fundamentally different attitudes and perspectives towards their roles in society. Women, she argues, are “relational,” defining themselves and their roles in relation to people and context around them. Men are individualist. The crux of this approach is that women are different from men, and this does not make them inferior to men. Gilligan, as a difference feminist, suggests that these gender differences should be recognized in law, and male/masculine attributes should not be treated as “universal.” For example, women should not have to work outside the home to be financially compensated; housework and childcare should earn income, too.

In place of staking a claim on women either being the “same” as men or women being “different” from men, diversity feminism advocates acknowledging intrinsic differences (often identified as biological differences) only when they are relevant to the policy under consideration. For example, medical issues relating specifically to female biology should be recognized as specifically female issues, not categorized alongside some analogous uniquely male malady. On the other hand, differences between women and men should not be acknowledged in contexts where these differences are irrelevant, e.g., in auditions for a symphony orchestra.
My project’s framework is diversity feminist, because I do not define women’s interests in exclusively equality or difference feminist terms. Instead, I measure WSR in three categories (political interests, economic interests, and family-related interests) that canvass a wide range of concerns. Importantly, these indicators do not restrict WSR to specific types of solutions relating to these concerns. Much previous research on WSR has a narrower framework for measuring women’s interests. As Squires (1999) asserts, diversity feminism is an important theoretical step forward, because it essentializes women as little as possible while still conceiving of women as a group.

Second, I respond to increasing demand for research that acknowledges variation among women. My contribution to this development in feminist theory is clear: rather than conflating female legislators together as all having equal potential to advocate for women’s interests in the same way, I explore the determinants of differences among female legislators’ attitudes and actions.

Implications for empirical studies of women in politics

My findings diverge from previous research in two important ways. First, paying closer attention to variation among female legislators while simultaneously broadening the definition of women’s interest (and corresponding broadening the definition of what counts as WSR) yields an analysis in which the effects of party affiliation are weaker than they have previously been shown to be. In previous studies, statistical models that take party affiliation into account have found it to have a statistically significant effect on numerous measures of women’s substantive representation. However, I have shown that party affiliation is less meaningful when it is not conflated with the definition for
women’s interests; it is no surprise that studies defining women’s interests as feminist that members of conservative parties are found not to advocate for women. ¹⁰³

Second, my research is the first study to look directly at the relationship between identity (using precise measures) and activities on behalf of women. I have shown that the sources of variation in female legislators’ engagement in WSR in Germany include dimensions of identity that directly relate to legal and social pressures that largely define gendered politics. For example, I showed that female legislators who are mothers and/or married are more likely to be members of the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children than their non-mother and/or unmarried colleagues. The content of these social markers – motherhood and marriage – are intrinsically related to the issues on which this committee focuses. Although these social markers do not contribute consistently to other dimensions and indicators of women’s substantive representation, they are part of a complicated set of pathways contributing to attention to women as a group and to women’s interests. These social markers do contribute directly to advocacy for women in their familial roles, however. The particular salience of these social markers and age in explaining variation in advocacy for women’s family-related interests reflects the fact that marital status and motherhood denote family-related experiences and perspectives.

In sum, I have shown that greater attention to variation among women, including the determinants of this variation, is a very valuable line of inquiry. It provides insight into the connections between descriptive and substantive representation, which is an important contribution to research on WSR. Previous studies have alluded to these

¹⁰³ See Scheiber (2008) for a discussion of conservative women’s organizations making claims to speak for women.
connections between dimensions of political representation without operationalizing and testing a mechanism.

**Implications for policy**

The most direct implication for policy that this dissertation presents regards the electoral innovation of gender quotas. By the mid 1990s, 84 parties in 36 nations had self-imposed quotas for women’s inclusion in legislatures, largely on the premise that the presence of women would facilitate new and different kinds of public policy. In addition to these party-voluntary quotas, constitutional and/or legislative reform in numerous states has imposed quotas on electoral systems in their entirety, with sanctions for parties’ non-compliance. At best, however, previous studies of WSR conclude only that female legislators promote women’s substantive interests more frequently than male legislators do. This is a relative gain, not an absolute one.

Moreover, there is no guarantee that women whose election to office is facilitated by a quota will be particularly inclined to advocate for women. My project’s focus on variation among women highlights that there are statistically significant differences among women’s proclivity to work on behalf of other women. This finding is corroborated by my qualitative evidence. As one of my interviewees scoffed, “The idea that I can represent women just because I am a woman – this is completely false! … It’s not enough just to be a woman” (021108D, female Green). This interviewee went on to discuss how legislators who represent women well do so because they have accumulated expertise and knowledge about issues and policies.
Scholars have expressed concerns about gender quotas essentializing women, noting that these quotas tend to make assumptions both about female legislators being the “same” as well as about women’s interests being uniform. Mansbridge (2005), for example, addresses “the tendency of quotas to promote cultural beliefs in ‘essentialism’ — the conviction that the individuals represented through quotas have some essential traits” that require descriptive representation (623). Mansbridge claims that “only constant, explicit stress on experiences rather than innateness can mitigate this tendency” (2005:632). However, clearly even experiences are not uniform across the population of women, and many factors besides identity shape any individual legislators’ actions.

The findings that I present suggest that the substantive benefits of gender quotas are limited by the extent to which identity, and specific facets of identity, promote descriptive representatives to act on behalf of the group to which they “belong.” In the German context, the social markers of motherhood and marriage among older cohorts of female legislators promote activities on behalf of other women. However, in other contexts these same markers may actually promote female legislators’ traditionalism.

The second policy implication regards the usefulness of a standing legislative committee dedicated to addressing issues that directly affect women. In the German context, I have shown that membership in the Committee on Family, Seniors, Women, and Children promotes predominantly family-related women’s issues. This is but one category of gendered issues. It may be that states pay lip service to advancing women’s rights and interests by establishing a standing committee for “women,” but in fact this standing committee addresses but a narrow category of issues.
Critiques

I address two larger-scale critiques of my project in this section: 1) that the social marker framework is unnecessary for interpreting my findings about variation among female legislators and 2) that my findings apply only to Germany.

This first critique suggests that female legislators who are more actively engaged in advocating for women are doing so on the basis of shared interests, not shared identity. It asks whether the social marker angle is necessary. Indeed, identity groups and interest groups overlap substantially. Gutmann (2003) and Taylor (1989) point out that our collective understandings and definitions of identity suggest that identity actually shapes how we perceive our interests, i.e., what we perceive to be best of us is shaped by our values: our identity “provides the frame within which they can determine where they stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, or of value” (Taylor 1989:27). Gutmann (2003) observes that conventional studies of interest groups tend to ignore the fuzziness of their definitions of “interests,” which are not as set-in-stone as scholars present them.

However, there is not merely fuzzy overlap between identity and interests. I have argued in previous chapters that the concept (and my definitions) of identity offer particular leverage on understanding female legislators’ advocacy for women. Hartsock and Diamond (1981, 1998) offer paradigmatic arguments on behalf of women as an identity group: from their radical perspective, all political institutions were founded as patriarchies, meaning that they do not want merely to “include” women and women’s experiences in the business-as-usual of political decision making. Instead, they advocate re-creating political institutions from the bottom up.
The second critique regards the portability of my findings to contexts outside Germany. Although the social and legal implications that I discuss in chapter 3 are specific to Germany, the idea that social categories have content that compel action is a framework that is immediately applicable to other cultural and political contexts. Furthermore, this framework is likely to be useful for cross-national research of women’s political representation. Instead of imposing a priori definitions of women’s interests and a priori indicators of WSR, the content of these measures may be determined inductively for each case within a framework of social markers.

**Avenues for future research**

I would like to develop the insights in this dissertation into a project on electoral quotas. I have argued that gender quotas make assumptions about the potential attitudes and actions of descriptive representatives. Beginning with the more general framework for understanding which group members will advocate for people whom they descriptively represent, which I have developed in this dissertation, I aim to assess the substantive success of such electoral quotas. I would like to assess empirically whether the institution of an electoral quota mediates these connections between descriptive and substantive representation.

The framework for this dissertation could also be applied to research on other areas of women’s interests by selecting a new set of social markers as indicators of different experiences and perspectives.
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Appendix A: Full interview questionnaire

Sie können immer verweigern, Fragen zu beantworten und Sie können auch jederzeit das Gespräch zu Ende bringen. Alle Informationen werden streng vertraulich behandelt und Ihr Name wird nie mit meiner Forschung verbunden.

Darf ich das Gespräch auf Band wegen meiner imperfekten Deutschkenntnis aufnehmen?

1. Wählerschaft – allgemein (7)
   - Wie definieren Sie Ihre Wählerschaft? Das heisst – wen vertreten Sie?
   - Sie sind über Landesliste gewählt worden. Würden Sie anders denken (vis à vis Ihre Wählerschaft) wenn Sie direkt gewählt worden waren?
   - Ist Ihr Verhältnis mit Ihrer Partei etwas anders, weil Sie über Landesliste worden sind? Wenn ja, wie?
   - Welche soziale oder wirtschaftliche Gruppierungen sind Ihre hauptsächliche Unterstützer?
   - Können Sie bitte beschreiben Ihren grössten Vorteil als Vertreter? Z.B., was ist Ihre beste Eigenschaft als Vertreter (nichts als Kandidat)? Das Wissen, Der Ehrgeiz, die Morale...?
   - Was ist die beste – wichtigste – Eigenschaft eines Politikers in Deutschland? … Ist das anders als in, z.B., den Vereinigten Staaten?
   - Würden Sie sagen, dass Ihre Partei Ihnen erlaubt, Ihre Wählerschaft zu vertreten?

2. Politik (1)
   - In welchen Politik haben Sie selbst den grössten Fortschritt gemacht?

3. Frauen(politik) (6)
   - Im Allgemein sind Frauen eine besondere Wählerschaft? Wenn ja, wie? warum?
   - Was sind “Fraueninteressen”? Gibt es diese Interesse?
Vertreten einige Parteien Frauen besser als andere Parteien? Wenn ja, wie? warum?

Vertreten einige Abgeordnete Frauen besser als andere Abgeordnete? Wenn ja, wie? warum?

Was halten Sie vom Krippenanspruch? Ist der Staat verantwortlich? Warum ja/nein?

Sollen Frauen sich entscheiden, entweder zu Hause zu bleiben oder eine Arbeitstelle zu finden? Gibt es einen Kompromiss? Soll es ein Kompromiss geben?

4. Quoten (2)

Was halten Sie von einer Quotenregelung für Frauen in der Politik (im allgemein)?

Was halten Sie von dem Begriff “Quotenfrau”?

5. Letzte Frage

Was ist Ihre Verantwortung als Vetreterin? ... Warum sind Sie im Bundestag?... d.H. Was ist Ihre Motivation?
Appendix B: Full coding scheme

I coded the Bundestag debates by speech. Each code applied to the entire speech given by a single speaker (not including any interjections voiced by other speakers). In cases where a speaker resumed her/his speech later in the same debate (e.g., providing a rebuttal), I did not count this as a separate speech. This was also my approach to assembling the participation counts data-set; the same person speaking twice in a debate was not counted twice when s/he was providing a rebuttal or asking a question.

Because the texts being coding are prepared speech, coding can be both substantive (categorizing the words/justifications that the speaker uses) and structural (it can be assumed that the speaker is lining up claims and evidence in a relatively linear fashion).

Categories of analysis: women’s substantive representation

The variables described below address a series of hypotheses about women’s political representation. They capture whether and in what ways MdBs\textsuperscript{104} substantively represent women.

Variables to code for each speech: A-D

Variable A: Speech ID
Variable B: ID for the debate that the speech is part of (e.g., XI003A, XI003B where X = the Bundestag Wahlperiode)
Variable C: Speaker ID
Variable D: Total number of lines of speech (rounded to the closest 5 lines – e.g., 245 instead of 243).

Variables to code: #1-4

Variable #1: Types of women’s interests
This variable captures the kinds of women’s interests to which MdBs may be appealing /referring. I have divided these interests into three spheres within which we might talk about women’s interests: the political sphere (explicit rights-related questions), economic sphere (interests relating to women in the workplace), and family/domestic sphere (interests relating to women’s roles as mothers and family-members).

\textsuperscript{104} MdB = Mitglied des Bundestags (member of the Bundestag).
Variable 1A
0  No reference: a neutral statement, containing no reference to women’s interests (this is the default)
1  Political sphere: e.g., the importance of women having every right to run for office, attain higher education, etc

Variable 1B
0  No reference: a neutral statement, containing no reference to women’s interests (this is the default)
1  Economic sphere: e.g., when women who want to return to work after giving birth in order to be/remain financially independent. Alternatively, questions that regard “equal pay for equal work.”

Variable 1C
0  No reference: a neutral statement, containing no reference to women’s interests (this is the default)
1  Family/domestic sphere: e.g., references to women’s interests in their roles as mothers/wives/family members.

Variable #2: Recognition of disproportionate challenges
This variable captures whether an MdB explicitly recognizes challenges that women disproportionately face, as a group. For example, reference to the “double burden” would count as a recognition of disproportionate challenges.

0  Neutral statement: There is no explicit reference to disproportionately gendered challenges
1  Disproportionate challenges: The MdB explicitly identifies a challenge as something that women disproportionately face

Variable #3: Equality of opportunity/outcome
This variable captures whether an MdB refers to women’s issues in terms of equality of opportunity (e.g., supporting a policy because it encourages more women to attain higher educational degrees) or in terms of equality of outcome (e.g., supporting an affirmative action policy such as a quota for women in business leadership roles).

Variable 3A
0  No reference/neutral statement: There is no explicit reference to women and equality of opportunity/outcome.
1  Equality of Opportunity: The legislator refers to women’s interests in terms of formal equality, e.g., nothing should prevent unduly women from pursuing higher education, or no law prevents women from running for office.
Variable 3B

0  *No reference/neutral statement:* There is no explicit reference to women and equality of opportunity/outcome.

1  *Equality of Outcome:* The legislator refers to women’s interests in terms of parity, e.g., the idea that we should or must see women’s equal participation in politics and in the workforce. A gender quota is an example of *equality of outcome.*

Variable #4: Personal experience

This variable captures when an MdB refers to a personal experience that s/he has had. This does *not* need to be part of an argument.

**Variable 4A**

0  *Default:* The MdB does not refer to any personal experiences.

1  *Reference:* The MdB refers to one or more personal experiences – but only a reference, not as part of an argument

**Variable 4B**

0  *Default:* The MdB does not refer to any personal experiences.

1  *Justification for position:* The MdB refers to personal experiences as part of a justification for her or his position on an issue.

**Variable 4C**

0  *Default:* The MdB does not refer to any personal experiences.

1  *Justification for divergence:* The MdB refers to personal experiences as part of a justification for her or his divergence from the party’s position.