A FRIGHTFUL AND SHAMEFUL STORY:
THE CINCINNATI RIOT OF 1884 AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER

A Thesis

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by

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INTRODUCTION
Unceasing War

In Philadelphia on April 6, 1884, the Reverend Leonard W. Bacon delivered a sermon on "the frightful and shameful story of the Cincinnati Riot." Bacon told his congregation that they had two important duties as good citizens and good Christians. One was the duty to obey. He deplored those who took the law into their own hands to redress grievances, and exhorted his audience "to yield honor and obedience to the institutions of human government as being God's ordinance for punishment and reward." Another duty was to enforce obedience to the state. Citizens had to be willing "to wield not only the policeman's club, but the musket and bayonet, to handle the battalion, to train the Gatling gun." There was only one solution to the growing problem of disorder in American society. According to Bacon, "the only right, the only prudent, the only tranquil relation of society toward persistent law-breakers, is a relation of unceasing war."¹

The "Gilded Age" was a turbulent period when the nation's basic economic unit shifted from the family farm to the business corporation, corrupt "machines" dominated party politics, and millions of immigrants from Europe and rural America flooded cities in search of work. As Robert Wiebe has suggested, America transformed from a land

of "island communities" to a nation where organized, cosmopolitan interests held sway. The so-called "respectable" elements feared the working underclass and felt obliged to protect themselves from the perpetrators of crime against person and property. The U.S. Army, the National Guard, and municipal police could provide the security necessary in these troubled times. Since Americans traditionally opposed a large standing army and police forces were frequently insufficient to deal with large-scale urban unrest, the "respectable classes" embraced the National Guard as an instrument to maintain civil order. Whether or not the National Guard would be an effective wartime reserve force would remain a matter of debate.

Ohio experienced these upheavals, too, and fielded a respectable National Guard. The Ohio National Guard (ONG) faced its greatest challenge in March 1884, when Democratic Governor George Hoadly deployed it to Cincinnati to put down a massive riot. The riot had its genesis in a search for order, but the goals and the methods of the search changed as the "dangerous classes" took control and made the riot their own. It was the "respectable" element who set the unrest in motion. Upset over a lenient sentence given to a murderer, leading citizens called for judicial and political reform at a public meeting, which adjourned peacefully. As the crowd went home, though, rowdier citizens called for lynching the criminal, and the situation deteriorated. By the end of the riot, the ONG had been deployed in full force, scores were killed and hundreds were wounded, and much property was destroyed. The search for order had been co-opted and

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seemingly became a senseless outburst of violence that was only stopped by an overwhelming display of the state's force.

An examination of the Ohio National Guard in the 1880s provides insight into a society under siege. This thesis will consider the ONG's role during the Gilded Age, and examine the origins of the violence and the performance of the ONG during the Riot. I intend to demonstrate that the Ohio National Guard, the protector of the "respectable classes," fulfilled its role as defender of order in the state. In the words of a Guardsman, it was "the concrete expression of the fact that our government rests at last upon its ability to enforce its laws, if resisted."³

³Address of Chaplain Moore, in Adjutant General's Department, *Annual Report of the Adjutant General, to the Governor of the State of Ohio, for the Year 1884* (Columbus: The Westbote Co., 1885), 17, cited hereafter as *ARAG 1884.*
CHAPTER I
Preserving Order in the Gilded Age

Robert Wiebe has shown that after the Civil War there was a fundamental shift in American values from those of the small town to those of a new, bureaucratic-minded middle class by 1920. Many people found it difficult to face the challenges of urbanization, industrialization, and immigration. Prior to industrialization, America had been a society of "island communities" where most civil affairs were still informally arranged. Institutions centered around small-town communal life, where everyone and everything seemed to fit into its prescribed place. The regulations of the urban-industrial world replaced personal, informal relationships in the community. Swiftly-changing America appeared to be a "society without a core," lacking national institutions to bring order to change.4

Corrupt government and justice were equally offensive in the Gilded Age, the heyday of machine politics. According to Wiebe, late nineteenth-century America was a nation of intense partisanship. Party ties gave a common identity and a sense of community attachment that was normally absent. Ward bosses gained strong loyalty from both old residents and newcomers. The bosses protected their adherents from a confusing world. In exchange for votes, they provided legal assistance, jobs, and

4Wiebe, The Search for Order, vii-12.
sustenance. Successful bosses distributed favors, managed utilities, and supported friendly candidates. There was a growing sense, though, that unscrupulous men had taken the reins of government and used it for personal enrichment.⁵

Many contemporary critics believed that society tolerated an atmosphere of vice, lawlessness, and brutality, which threatened order and good government. One of them, John A. Jameson, condemned society's attitude toward wrong-doing. Writing in 1884, he criticized society's "indifference, toleration, or connivance" in the face of crime, and felt that the attitude toward criminals was pity, if not admiration. He facetiously described the criminal as "an unfortunate man, to save whom from punishment seems to be the chief end of the law." In Jameson's view, the judicial system at the time served to protect the guilty from punishment. He went so far as to suggest that society's attitude should be that it would be better for ten innocent men to suffer than for one guilty man to escape.⁶

Another threat was alcohol which, as Jed Dannenbaum has shown, represented the disorder and loss of control experienced by people in a rapidly transforming society. In an agrarian society most drinking took place at home, and taverns were usually respectable and integrated into the community. When drunkenness occurred, it was confined usually to seasonal festivals and controlled by society's expectations about


appropriate behavior. The drinking environment became less controlled as society became more urban and commercial. The young men who flocked to the cities found themselves free of domestic and communal restraints, and the public saloon offered them and married men entertainment and companionship. Saloons were a haven for working-class customers in increasingly class-divided communities. The wage-earning economy made payday binges possible, and drunkenness created a law and order problem for the community. Alcohol and the saloon environment with its gambling and prostitution were corrupting influences which the Women's Christian Temperance Union sought to eliminate. The respectable classes feared a drunken electorate and the damage that alcohol did to spiritual welfare, to job performance, and to family life.\(^7\)

A popular metaphor of the time was that of "the volcano under the city," referring to the potentially explosive working underclass whose passions allegedly simmered in the slums. Alarmed by the Paris Commune in 1871, the New York Times editorialized that "the crust is but a thin one between our gay and hurried life of pleasure and business and a volcano of the most explosive social forces beneath us." Immigration to the cities brought a flood of inexperienced newcomers in need of jobs, housing, and a place in the community. Farm folk, European immigrants, and blacks co-existed uneasily, suspicious of each other and in competition for jobs and housing. The city was not a melting pot but a Balkanized collection of ghettos. Contemporary observers such as Edward Self feared an influx of unskilled immigrants, which would be a source of "moral and

\(^7\)Jed Dannenbaum, Drink and Disorder: Temperance Reform in Cincinnati from the Washingtonian Revival to the WCTU (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 1-12. The situation was better than in the early days of the Republic. For a discussion of alcoholism in the early nineteenth-century, see W.J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
physical evil" and "a constant addition to our criminal class." As long as they could keep them at a distance, the more "respectable" citizens paid little attention to the poor, and city governments did their best to contain the lower classes. As Janette Greenwood has shown in her study of post-Civil War Charlotte, both white and black members of the "better classes" shared values that transcended the barriers of race. Class was the crucial factor.8

The violence of the Paris Commune, which seemed to threaten family, religion, private property, and government, greatly influenced contemporary thought on the danger in the cities. The very mention of the word "commune" evoked images of the destruction of property, bodies in the streets, and the lower classes seizing power and overthrowing civilization. In the United States, the socialist movement went largely unnoticed until the late 1870s, when German socialists came out of their ethnic isolation. Optimists such as the Reverend A. Schwenninger feared the ruin socialism could bring if unchecked, but took comfort in the belief that "conditions in this country of the brave and the free" were not conducive to Socialism's growth. Many Americans did not share such a rosy view, however. As T.J. Jackson Lears has demonstrated, the masses crowding into the "polyglot cities" frightened the middle and upper classes. The restless, wandering proletariat, in search of work and apparently close to exploding, had to be

controlled. The "respectable" citizens demanded protection from the unruly masses, so officials had to show they were willing and able to use force if necessary.⁹

The railroad strike of 1877 seemed to make the fears of the "respectable class" a reality. The strike showed the propriety classes the need for an efficient internal police force to deal with disorder. In 1879 John L. Hart described the fears of the "better" classes. They saw the underclass as poorly educated, immoral, and engaged in drunken revelry. They passed through a "brute-like existence," eating, drinking, breeding, working, and dying. Hart believed that "the rich and more intelligent classes" had to guard against the threatening underclass with policemen and standing armies, and "to cover the land with prisons, cages, and all kinds of receptacles for the perpetrators of crime." The "better" classes were willing to pay for such protection and persuaded state legislatures to increase appropriations for state militia units. Such action served the interests of both businessmen and militia officers, who generally came from the same class.¹⁰

There were several means for restoring order, not all of which were legal. One time-honored expedient was the formation of vigilante groups, which were rarely led by thugs but by men from the better classes of society. According to Richard Hofstadter,


they were formed to create and enforce laws in the supposed absence of adequate law enforcement. They were primarily a frontier phenomenon, but they did spring up in some urban areas, especially those with a frontier tradition. In the 1880s, affluent citizens determined to fight against moral decay formed "Law and Order Leagues" throughout the United States. Vigilante groups provided an extra-legal and violent, if not high-minded, way to defend property and maintain order. Some critics attacked the vigilante movement, believing that those who took the law into their own hands condemned law and insulted government. By usurping the state's function, they inflicted a blow on its authority. Of course, the state would have to be prepared to defend its citizens promptly and effectively for vigilantes to have no excuse for their actions.\footnote{Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, ed., \textit{American Violence: A Documentary History} (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 21-22; Bacon, \textit{Lessons from the Riot}, 2. For a discussion of violence, vigilantism, and social control, see Edward L. Ayers, \textit{Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th-Century American South} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).}

Municipal police also served as a potential force for order, but they had many drawbacks. In some cases, municipal police forces were corrupt. Entry into police ranks depended on political influence and money, and some cities had complete turnovers in their police forces when party control changed. Whoever controlled the police had an important source of patronage and thus a major advantage in elections. Furthermore, they could control both illegal businesses, such as brothels, and legitimate businesses subject to regulation, such as saloons. Controlling the police allowed one either to acquire money and power or to protect good government and morality.\footnote{James F. Richardson, \textit{Urban Police in the United States} (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1974), 46-48. See also Bruce Smith, \textit{Police Systems in the United States}, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1960), for the administrative control of police and the effects of politics on American police forces.}
Municipal police, then, had to preserve order, fight vice and crime, help citizens in trouble, and tread warily in politics. Unfortunately, they usually were not up to their daunting task. Many cities' forces were too small, and many policemen lacked the necessary skill and weapons; furthermore, the police could be unreliable if they sympathized with the actions of lawbreakers. Contemporary critics such as Mortimer Leggett felt that the police were inadequate in dealing with mobs, since their training and organization did not suit them for riot duty. Only those trained "to deal out death and destruction" were suited for the task. Concerned citizens saw the need for a larger, more reliable, and more effective military force, whose "moral presence" could save the police from impotence in the face of overwhelming criminal threats.\(^{13}\)

Military force was the only alternative for those who advocated a stern response to disorder. To many observers, the Army was the most effective instrument of social control. Jerry Cooper has shown that it was not subject to local influences, loyalties, or conflicts, and it could objectively restore law and order. The public impression was that regulars were more efficient and disciplined than local militia, and were less likely to use unnecessary force. In addition, the regulars were backed by the moral authority of the United States government. Sometimes the mere presence of federal troops could restore order.\(^{14}\)


Some people seized on the law and order mission as a way to justify continued support for the military. Not everyone was willing to accept a huge professional standing army, so service during civil disturbances justified the Army's continued existence. Some officers felt that an army outnumbered by civilians but large enough to deal with disorder was no threat to society. The Report of the Secretary of War, issued on November 19, 1877, rejected the militia as the best defender of order. It said that "the army is to the United States what a well-disciplined and trained police force is to a city." The report described the militia as unreliable in emergencies when local troops might sympathize with the uprising. It said that the railway strike showed the value of "discipline, steadiness, and coolness," which trained soldiers, not militia, possess. Furthermore, strike duty demonstrated that the officer corps shared a common set of values with the "better classes," even if it did see itself as distinct from the rest of society. Officers in the Army were predominantly middle class in background and values; they sided with capital and stood for law and order.\footnote{Report, quoted in Riker, Soldiers of the States, 49; Cooper, The Army and Civil Disorder, 31, 253-57.}

In the end, the militia prevailed over the Army and became the defender of order in Gilded Age America. Some officers opposed using the army as policemen in the first place. William T. Sherman opposed using the army as a national police force, and thought such duty was "beneath a soldier's vocation." Furthermore, the army was scattered in small garrisons across the frontier. Given the mood in Washington, there
was no realistic hope that the army could be enlarged sufficiently to handle both a military and a domestic law enforcement mission.\textsuperscript{16}

CHAPTER II
The Rise of the National Guard

On March 26 and 27, 1884, the National Guard Association of the United States held its annual meeting in Cincinnati. Captain John Desmond of Cincinnati's 1st Regiment gave the closing speech, stating his reasons for "being a citizen-soldier in time of supposed peace." He felt that he lived in troubled times, when "the spirit of Communism" threatened individual and property rights; it was his duty to prepare himself and his men for the lawful defense of the guaranteed rights of every citizen. He supported law-abiding people, and if necessary was willing to give his life in defense of the Constitution and laws of the country. He urged his comrades to be true to the colors, to uphold the dignity of the law, and to preserve good order in society. He would fear "neither danger nor death" in the performance of his duty. Little did Captain Desmond know that just a few days later he would lose his life in defense of law and order.17

The militia in the United States did have problems, but its advantages outweighed its drawbacks. During the strike in 1877, militia forces were inefficient, undisciplined, and sometimes identified with the strikers. Federal troops were well-disciplined and intimidated the rioters without resort to bloodshed. By contrast, local militia units shot hundreds of people. Nevertheless, state troops were preferable for riot duty. Militia

17Moonlight to Finley, in ARAG 1884, 59.
supporters understood that there was prejudice against federal involvement in local matters, and the presence of Army troops could irritate mobs more. Also, militia troops could drill in, and presumably be more familiar with, the areas they had to defend. The militia was a low-cost alternative to a large standing army. Municipal police and the Army could not or would not do the job. Federal troops may have been more effective, but the militia was more economical and politically acceptable. Thus the state militias developed as the final arbiter of urban and labor unrest. In both English and American history, a myth had developed that the militia had been the best defense against unbridled governmental power. Now, the militia was the government's best defense against a turbulent populace.\(^{18}\)

Militia advocates stressed the need for a well-drilled force to combat disorder, and feared that civil authorities were not keeping pace with the socialists, communists, and nihilists who were gaining in skill and experience. Public indifference to the militia was understandable; taxpayers saw no need for large appropriations in the absence of a foreign threat, the regulars could cope with the Indians, and Civil War veterans could form a reserve in case of emergency. Nevertheless, militia advocates stressed that only state forces could adequately uphold the dignity of state government. In his sermon on the Cincinnati Riot, Leonard Bacon stated that citizens had the duty to obey authority and to enforce that obedience with military force if necessary. The duty to bear arms in defense of the state was a personal duty, to be performed by all regardless of how high

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one's position in society. Indeed, the wealthier one was, the more reason he had to join
the militia. Preparedness was the main issue. Bacon said that society needed "steady,
trained and disciplined support... It wants you now, so well equipped, so drilled to
soldierly duties, so conscious of the touch of your comrade's elbow, that no riot shall
ever dare to begin to be." 19

At the same time, service in the militia increased in popularity. Gerald
Linderman has shown how veterans told civilians what they wanted to hear. The Civil
War was heroic, not a tragedy. By the 1880s memories of the war were dim, and most
people only remembered war's benefits. There was a military revival in the United
States, and supporters saw militia units as a source of manly values such as physical
fitness, a sense of duty, and discipline. The courage and self-sacrifice that war demanded
contrasted sharply with the softness of post-war society. The war taught courage,
strength, endurance, duty, and principled sacrifice, virtues that were equated with
manhood. Furthermore, men admired fighting values and often endorsed violence, and
physical strength was seen as the foundation of male character. In fact, physical strength
and strength of character were considered the same thing. Service in the militia was one
way to develop the qualities deemed necessary in Victorian men. 20

19 E.L. Molineux, Riots in Cities and Their Suppression (Boston: Headquarters First Brigade, M.V.M.,
1884), 3-4; Riker, Soldiers of the States, 46; Bacon, Lessons from the Riot, 6-9.

20 Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War
(New York: The Free Press, 1987). For a discussion of late nineteenth century conceptions of manhood,
Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era (New York: Basic
Fraternal organizations flourished as men fled the female-dominated world of the home and sought refuge in the many organizations that catered to masculine needs in the late nineteenth century. Veterans' organizations, insurance societies, the Knights of Labor, saloons, and the National Guard provided the necessary male companionship. Mark Carnes has suggested that the fraternal movement was predominately an urban, Protestant, middle-class phenomenon, where ritual provided solace and psychological guidance during a young man's passage to manhood.\footnote{Mark C. Carnes, *Secret Ritual and Manhood in Victorian America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 3-14.}

Militia units appealed to those who wanted a taste of the military life. They were probably quite attractive to lower-middle class men, since many fraternal organizations had prohibitively expensive fees. "Contributing members" paid only a small annual fee to support their militia company. Units served as fraternal organizations, social clubs where members drilled, dined, and gave parties. Militia members visited units in other cities where they took part in parades and gala dinners. Their activities set them apart from other Americans and gave them a sense of community in a changing society.\footnote{Fogelson, *America's Armories*, 6-7; Riker, *Soldiers of the States*, 57.}

Finally, the militia, now known as the National Guard in most states, had powerful support. The National Guard Association of the United States, founded in 1879, sought to lobby effectively for an increase in Federal appropriations for the Guard. Most importantly, many Guard leaders came from the middle and upper classes, and shared their fellows' fears of class war. They feared the activities of socialists, communists, and anarchists, and thought little better of the poor immigrants who flocked
to the big cities. Guard officers such as Adjutant General Ebenezer Finley of Ohio believed that the National Guard should be composed of "our better class of citizens," and a Colonel Hamilton of Massachusetts criticized those who felt themselves above military duty. He felt that the wealthy "should be our best-organized and best disciplined soldiery," since safety for property was best assured in the hands of the owners. He condemned those who would instead hire others to defend themselves and their property. Most wealthy businessmen did not share Hamilton's enthusiasm for military service and poured funds into the Guard instead. Thus, the Guard benefited from the confluence of interests of both its leaders and supporters, who were enthusiastic about the "law and order" mission.23

National Guard officers who embraced the law and order mission gave great thought to riot control measures. Typical of contemporary attitudes were those of Thomas Moonlight, Adjutant General of Kansas in 1884. He considered the National Guard's first duty to be "to command obedience to the laws, and then enforce that command with bullet and bayonet, if necessary." Of course, many Guard units were badly organized and poorly trained, and part-time soldiers were not as proficient as regulars. Nevertheless, some thoughtful officers saw the need for more than parade-ground drill.24

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24Quoted in ARAG 1884, 61.
One such officer was General E.L. Molineux, who presented his ideas on riot control to the Military Service Institution of the United States in October 1883. He considered riots to be caused by "ignorant or misguided" men who thought that wrongs could only be corrected by violence. Their ranks were swelled by scoundrels looking for the chance "to glut their passions," and by curious bystanders inexorably drawn into the mayhem. The key to stopping a riot, Molineux thought, was to suppress it quickly. If police were backed by state troops, the crowd's ardor could be cooled. Delay was dangerous, since mobs grew in power and momentum, and their numbers increased their confidence. The authorities had to resist at the outset "with energy and determination," force the crowd back, and give the "idle and curious" a chance to disentangle themselves and go home.25

Molineux realized, of course, that harsher measures could be necessary. If so, "promptness, rapidity of movement, iron decision, crushing power exercised relentlessly and without hesitation" would be the most merciful method, since every wasted minute could result in more death or damage. Leadership was crucial, since officers' example would instill courage in the troops. If officers were resolute, confident, and knew their business, the soldiers would obey. The officers furthermore had to control their nerves and not communicate fear to the troops. Those troops suspected of sympathy for the rioters had to be carefully placed in the ranks near "reliable men" and under the watch

of their officers. If determination failed to affect the mob, artillery could be relied on to exert a powerful influence.\(^{26}\)

Thus, the National Guard had two main missions. The first was to supplement regular forces in time of national emergency. Summer camps and drill gave Guard units military ambitions, but effective combat training was virtually non-existent. Jim Dan Hill indicates that until the later 1880s the Guard was poorly funded, armories were inadequate, and manpower strength did not keep up with increasing populations. John Mahon has gone so far as to show that the National Guard's revival was not possible without the occurrence of industrial warfare. The second mission, to protect lives and property when civil unrest or disaster overwhelmed local civil authorities, represented the National Guard's most realistic function. Army and National Guard officers and their civilian counterparts agreed that the highest duty of government was the protection of the lives and property of its citizens. There was no realistic foreign threat, so the Guard served in the battle between anarchy and order.\(^{27}\)

The officers of the Ohio National Guard also saw the maintenance of civil order as their primary mission. The Adjutant General in 1884, Ebenezer Finley, felt that a well-disciplined militia was important not only to enforce and to preserve peace, but also to aid the civil authorities. He was concerned that too much reliance had been placed on federal troops, and that the people had become accustomed to looking to the federal

\(^{26}\)Ibid., 15-17, 24-26.

government for protection. He saw the trend as a threat to liberty and state sovereignty. Thus, a military force of Ohio citizens was preferable to the Army. Governor George Hoadly agreed, viewing the Ohio National Guard as "a bulwark of safety" against mob rule and violence. He felt that the Guard saved Ohio from the "humiliation" of having to call for federal assistance to deal with insurrections.\(^{28}\)

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<td>5,828</td>
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<tr>
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<td>90</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>5,870</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>1887</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>1889</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,110</td>
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**Table 1** Ohio Militia/National Guard Strength, 1865-1890

SOURCE: *Annual Reports of the Adjutant General to the Governor of the State of Ohio, 1865-1890.*

\(^{28}\) *ARAG 1884*, 24-25.
Nevertheless, the Ohio National Guard had not always been an effective instrument of state policy. In the years following the Civil War, the Ohio militia reached a low point in terms of strength and effectiveness. The federal government had left responsibility for administering the militia to the states, which failed to maintain their organizations. The main function of the Ohio Adjutant General's Department seems to have been the settlement of war claims. In 1868 the state disbanded most of its units, and Adjutant General E.F. Schneider reported that the state was practically without a militia. Thus, by 1869 the Ohio militia had declined to an organization of two infantry companies and two 2-gun artillery batteries. The militia units were almost totally self-supporting and had their own regulations. There was little incentive to maintain a unit, as the state's annual allowance was only fifty dollars for each infantry company and twenty-five dollars for each battery. Furthermore, the state legislature never made the necessary appropriations.\textsuperscript{29}

Some men recognized the need for an organization that could mobilize quickly and deal with an invasion or insurrection since Ohio would need more support than the scattered Army units could provide. The passage of the Ohio Independent Militia Law of 1870 was the initial step in the creation of the ONG, but it had a major flaw. The state was to incur no expense whatever for the maintenance of militia units. The law did have an important enlistment incentive, since contributing members would be exempt from jury duty and work on public highways. Critics considered the law worthless, since

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{ARAG} 1868, 22; E. Warren Pratt, \textit{History of the Ohio National Guard and Ohio Volunteers} (Cleveland: Plain Dealer Publishing, 1901), 6.
it did not require the state to provide extra funds for militia units. Indeed, in 1871 Adjutant General W.A. Knapp complained that "the State has no militia organization worthy of the name," since the laws were defective, and the state would bear no expense. In 1872 he warned that the militia laws were useless. They simply tolerated militia organizations and offered no encouragement. Thus, in the absence of a threat, there was little support or enthusiasm for a military force in Ohio.30

In spite of the obstacles, military enthusiasm in Ohio slowly revived. Volunteer units of both veterans and younger recruits sprang up across the state. By 1875, enthusiasts formed seventy-three companies and eleven batteries, and Adjutant General James Amos reported an increase in military spirit in Ohio. Some units were proficient in drill and well organized, but most still functioned as little more than local social clubs. Furthermore, the state provided no assistance to the militia, and the only funds came from contributing members and "outside friends." The militia still did not represent a unified, effective body of troops ready to take the field at a moment's notice.31

Labor unrest made the state government take the militia more seriously. Railroad disturbances in 1873 and a miners' strike in the Hocking Valley in 1874 led to the passage of a bill on March 29, 1875 designating the organized militia as the "Ohio National Guard." Again, the legislation made little provision for state payment of expenses, but the response was so enthusiastic that more companies organized than the state could equip. On April 17, 1876, the Ohio general assembly amended previous

30 ARAG 1871, 8; ARAG 1872, 8; Pratt, History of the Ohio National Guard, 6-7, 9.

31 ARAG 1875, 5, 7.
statutes and organized the scattered units, outfitting and training militia units as close as possible to Army standards. The general revenue fund would cover expenses, which were limited to $10,000 per year. Annual allowances were one hundred dollars per company and fifty dollars per battery. Further amendments in 1877 made local municipalities responsible for providing their militia with a drill room or armory. Breech-loading .45-.70 caliber Model 1873 Springfield rifles replaced the aging weapons that had been in service. The governor also appointed a board of officers to develop a code of regulations governing the ONG, replacing all previous company constitutions.32

The railway strike in 1877 and other public disturbances convinced many observers of the Guard's importance. Adjutant General Charles Karr believed that the ONG performed very efficiently, and the authorities gave some thought to planning for riot control. The "Code of Regulations for the Ohio National Guard" directed units on riot control duty to avoid using force, or at least to use no unnecessary violence. If officers decided to use force, they were to make the initial fire effective and not to use blanks. Furthermore, the troops were supposed to fire at the center of mass of the rioters' bodies and not to fire over the mob. Presumably, firing in such a manner would prevent rounds from injuring bystanders. Most importantly, the Code directed officers not to weaken their force by breaking it up into detachments.33

The Ohio National Guard drew its enlisted men from the lower classes, and the units were remarkably homogeneous. The typical Ohio Guardsman of the early 1880s

32Pratt, History of the Ohio National Guard, 10.

33ARAG 1877, 6; ARAG 1879, 406-09.
was single, in his late teens or early twenties, and working in a trade occupation. There were extremes. Company I, 1st Regiment enlisted a sixteen year old boy, and Company I, 6th Regiment enlisted a forty-seven year old man. Very few men with professional occupations enlisted in the Guard, although Company F, 4th Regiment of Lebanon had three lawyers, a very rare exception. For the most part, the soldiers worked as masons, butchers, clerks, undertakers, even actors. Most of the men were too young to have served in the Civil War. Finally, the troops tended to be native born. One especially homogeneous company was Company I, 4th Regiment of Miamisburg. Of the sixty-eight men who enlisted before April 1884, sixty were born in Miamisburg, five in Pennsylvania, two in Prussia, and one in Bavaria.

Table 2  Enlisted Composition of Ohio National Guard Units, c.1880-1884

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Co. I, 1st Rgt</th>
<th>Co. I, 4th Rgt</th>
<th>Co. I, 6th Rgt</th>
<th>Co. E, 16th Rgt</th>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>Marital Status</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Trade†</td>
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<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†clock maker, banker, artist, actor, butcher, blacksmith, stonemason, machinist, undertaker, miner, riverboat pilot, riverman, farmer, jailor, cheese maker, etc.

SOURCE: Adjutant General, *Regimental Rosters*, Ohio State Historical Archives, Columbus, Series 162. The men sampled enlisted prior to April 1884. In some cases, the men enlisted had left the service several years before the Cincinnati Riot.
Information on officers is harder to come by, but they seem to have been professional men. Fred J. Picard, colonel of the 13th Regiment, was a civil and consulting engineer and John Desmond, commander of Company B, 1st Regiment was a lawyer. Contemporary sources indicate that many officers were respected men in the community. The younger officers had no war experience, but many of the older ones, such as Lieutenant Colonel Morton Hawkins of the 1st Regiment, did. Regimental commanders William Williamson (3rd), Fred Flick (5th), John Entrekin (6th), Arthur Conger (8th), and Edgar Pocock (17th) also had Civil War experience. Officers at the company level were elected, which could result in incompetent men with little or no experience being chosen for leadership positions over more efficient officers with seniority. General Ebenezer Finley criticized the system and wanted the Constitution amended.

Starting in 1879, many units were disbanded or consolidated, but actual strength decreased little. By 1884 the ONG was a vigorous organization of about 6,000 men, with eighty-two infantry companies, two cavalry troops, and seven batteries of light artillery. General Finley complained that states such as New York and Pennsylvania provided far more liberal appropriations for their Guard units, but the Ohio National Guard was generally prepared for most missions. On several occasions in 1884, the governor of Ohio called upon the ONG to fulfill its duty. In February, the militia

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34 Adjutant General's Department, *Disability Payments for Cincinnati Riot, 1884* (Ohio State Historical Society Archives, Columbus, Series 2998).

35 *ARAG 1886*, 104-33; Pratt, *History of the Ohio National Guard*, 150-52; *ARAG 1884*, 44.
provided assistance when devastating floods struck the Ohio Valley. During the summer, ONG units controlled crowds at several public executions. In the fall, state troops helped keep the peace during the Hocking Valley coal strikes. The Cincinnati Riot of March 28-31, 1884 provided the Ohio National Guard's greatest challenge.36

36 ARAG 1884, 19-21.
CHAPTER III
The Quest for Reform in Cincinnati

Cincinnati was a turbulent city in the Gilded Age, beset by many of the problems that plagued the nation as a whole. It was a large industrial city packed with immigrants, and since the 1870s, Cincinnati politics had become the most corrupt in the state. In the words of a contemporary, "Party power ruled without proper check on the part of the public authorities; and thus our society, and its political institutions, were constantly degraded." The police were renowned for graft and corruption, and the courts were notoriously lenient. A typical American city of the period, Cincinnati was known for moral laxity and indifference to law, peace, or property rights.\(^{37}\)

By the 1880s Cincinnati was a city in crisis.\(^{38}\) Prior to the advent of rapid mass transit, Cincinnati had been a "walking city," one in which the citizens did not have to go beyond their immediate neighborhood to meet their daily needs. The streetcar made Cincinnati a "mobilized city," where the underclass shared the core of the city with the commercial, industrial, and entertainment districts, and those who could fled to the


suburbs on the periphery. By 1880 Cincinnati had over 225,000 people living in three different districts, the Circle, the Zone, and the Hilltops. The Circle was the heart of the old town, filled with factories, railway terminals, and flophouses. Its residents were primarily disadvantaged newcomers to the city, of all races and ethnic groups, packed into crowded ghettos. With a few exceptions, the area was noted for its dirt and decay, and death and contagious disease were commonplace. Violence, prostitution, gambling, and drinking flourished, and the Circle was notorious for its instability and disorder.

The Zone was the belt just beyond the appalling conditions of the Circle. It was overwhelmingly Catholic, and its inhabitants were primarily members of ethnic groups. Newly-arrived Germans assimilated rapidly, and they were the most economically and socially mobile immigrant group in Cincinnati. Some blacks lived in the Zone, but segregation was a fact of life. Most residents worked beyond walking distance of their homes, and they were mainly skilled or semi-skilled workers with little formal education who commuted by train or streetcar. Home ownership was more common, living conditions were less congested, and death and disease were less prevalent. The Zone was not totally free of criminal activity and was filled with tensions that could erupt into violence, but it was nevertheless a bastion of an increasingly-assertive middle class.

Finally, the Hilltops were the wealthier suburbs beyond the Zone, above the city both physically and socially. A contemporary described the suburbs as a paradise of gardens and tree-shaded roads. It was the least densely-populated area of the city.

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Residents lived in single-family homes, were far healthier than the other citizens of Cincinnati, and gave their children a good education, a private one if possible. The Hilltops were ethnically, racially, and religiously diverse, although Anglo-Saxon Protestants predominated. There was some crime, but the inhabitants considered criminal activity to be the hallmark of the city below. The Hilltops were a sanctuary for the economic elite, who saw the chaos of the industrializing city, with its criminality, labor militancy, culture clash, and corrupt politics, as a threat to order.

Cincinnati was bedeviled by corrupt Democratic party government in the period leading up to the riot. Indeed, many contemporaries blamed political corruption for fueling the riot in the first place. Political bosses were high-handed and notorious for bribery and poor administration. Elections made a mockery of the democratic process. There was no law requiring voter registration, and there was no attempt to stop people from voting several times during an election. Ward committees printed and distributed the ballots, and election judges were notorious for cheating. If such corrupt methods failed, groups of partisan thugs at the polling places would ensure votes went the bosses' way.  

The Cincinnati police force, the first line of defense against disorder, was part of the problem. The police were inextricably bound up in partisan politics, since most posts, especially high positions in administration, were filled by patronage. Furthermore, the police were renowned for graft and corruption. Joseph B. Foraker, later to be

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Republican governor of Ohio, accused the force of including gamblers, pickpockets, thieves, and other members of the criminal classes. Charles H. Wust, the prominent head of a woolen and hosiery firm, felt that the police were not vigilant or determined, they were discouraged that "as fast as they make arrests the cases are dismissed through the influence of the legal ring," a corrupt group of Cincinnati lawyers and judges.41

Many policemen were as upset about lax justice as most Cincinnati residents were, but they were inadequate to the task. Police officials constantly criticized the small size of the force. For example, one official complained in 1882 that Cincinnati, with a population of 255,708 and a police force of 315, compared unfavorably with similarly-sized cities such as San Francisco, with a population of 233,000 and a force of 400. The police were organized to serve the needs of the "walking city," not the "mobilized city," so one policeman for every 800 citizens was insufficient. The Cincinnati police force, then, could hardly have been more poorly prepared for the violence to come.42

Cincinnati had a long tradition of urban violence. Its first riot took place in February 1792 when a lieutenant from Fort Washington beat a local merchant. When the merchant pressed charges, the officer sent thirty soldiers to rough up the lawyer and the merchant's supporters. Citizens drove the troops away after a severe fight, and the officer got off with a three dollar fine. During a race riot in April 1836 after a black boy beat a white boy, a mob shot blacks and burned their houses. The police were


supposedly powerless to stop violence, and the mob leaders appeared to be respectable members of the community. The violence stopped only after the governor declared martial law. In January 1842, a mob attacked the Bank of Cincinnati, wounded a few policemen, and took control of the city before tiring from the violence. In 1848, a vigilante mob tried to lynch two men falsely accused of molesting a young girl. The sheriff called out the local militia to help preserve law and order, killing and wounding several and quelling the riot. Finally, in December 1853 a crowd of German socialists threatened the papal nuncio and warned him to leave the city. The entire police force attacked the mob, and one policeman and one rioter died. Cincinnati residents, then, had a long history of resorting to violence to solve their problems.  

The root cause of the riot was discontent with the city's justice system. In March 1884, twenty-three persons accused of murder or homicide, many of whom had been tried several times, occupied the city jail. The public, encouraged by local newspapers, condemned such delays in justice and became increasingly enraged as crimes piled up. A celebrated murder case brought matters to a head. On December 24, 1883, William Berner, a white youth aged eighteen, and Joseph Palmer, a mulatto youth aged nineteen, beat to death their employer, William Kirk. The murderers suspected Kirk of carrying large amounts of cash. As Palmer engaged Kirk in conversation, Berner hit the victim in the back of the head with a welding hammer. Palmer joined in with a club, and the two smashed their employer's skull. The murderers took $245 off the body, dumped the

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corpse in a clump of trees, and promptly squandered the money on Christmas night. Berner later gave himself up and implicated Palmer as well. Kirk left behind a widow and a baby, and since the murder was premeditated and particularly brutal, the public watched the case with interest to see how the police and the courts would handle the situation.44

Berner quickly emerged as the more sympathetic of the two criminals. He was described as "humiliated and tearful," and many citizens expressed pity for him. Berner was remorseful and claimed that he thought the plan was only to rob Kirk. Berner's family was apparently very respectable and shocked by his deed. About the worst that could be said about him was that he did not attend church regularly. Palmer, however, bore the brunt of the public's disgust. Newspapers described him as a "grinning, blaspheming mulatto brute" and an uncaring, remorseless animal. He did not know his father, avoided church, and claimed that he would not have killed Kirk if he had known Kirk only had $245 on him. Newspapers further inflamed public opinion when they reported that Palmer said that he and Berner ought to be lynched. Race played an important role in shaping the public's perception of the case, but law and order was the real concern.45

The circumstances surrounding the trial confirmed the public's doubts about the administration of justice in Cincinnati. Berner's lawyer, Tom Campbell, boasted that he would never allow a client to be sent to jail, no matter what the crime. Fearing that


45Ibid., December 29 and 30, 1883.
prejudice of Palmer might hurt Berner's chances of acquittal, Campbell arranged for Berner to be tried first. Charles Wust believed that Campbell contributed as much as anyone to the public's "righteous indignation" over corrupt justice.\footnote{The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 45; Tunison, The Cincinnati Riot, 9-12.}

The trial seemed to be a mockery of justice since the day it began on March 12, 1884. The prosecution bungled its peremptory challenges and allowed many biased jurors to sit on the case. Some of the jurors were awed by the status of the respected Berner family; others sympathized with Berner's father, since they had boys themselves and did not want to hurt the old man. The trial was expensive and Mr. Berner paid $4,500 to his son's defense team, which consisted of Campbell and two assistants, a Major Blackburn and a Judge Wilson.\footnote{Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 25, 1884.}

On March 24, 1884 after thirty-six hours of deliberation, the jury found Berner guilty of manslaughter. Given the circumstances of Kirk's death, most observers expected a charge of first-degree murder and the death penalty. Judge Matthews muttered "It is a d--d outrage," and excused the jury without the customary thanks. Trembling, the jurors collected their fee and left as observers hissed at them. The verdict encouraged the occupants of the county jail, who considered their own futures brighter. One criminal was not so optimistic. Wife-murderer Red McHugh feared lynching and asked to be secured in "the dungeon" where he would be safe from a mob.\footnote{Ibid., March 25, 1884.}
The press and citizens reacted angrily to the verdict. Anger swept the beer gardens and taverns of the city, where patrons could view caricatures of the jury and attorneys engaged in Bemer's trial. The jurors were an obvious target. The Cincinnati News Journal published the names and addresses of the twelve jurors so that their names could "be handed down to posterity." Once exposed, the jurors suffered greatly. Henry Bohne was beaten by a mob and only saved by police intervention; Louis Harmeyer was fired from his factory job; Charles Daliah was hounded by crowds everywhere he was recognized; Shaw, the foreman, was expelled from his Grand Army of the Republic post. Across the city, there was a "Loud Demand For Judge Lynch."  

The Cincinnati newspapers led the chorus of dissent against the verdict. The News Journal wanted to know if it was time for "Justice To Remove Her Blinds," and called the manslaughter verdict "another judicial comedy." It editorialized that murderers lived a charmed life in Cincinnati. The Commercial Gazette also condemned the "fool verdict" and said that there was no evidence that justified a verdict of manslaughter. There was no rancor between the murderer and his victim, and the paper considered the killing "cool murder, from the basest of motives." Besides, the accused had confessed to the crime, and guilt could not be more clear. The jury consisted of "nincompoops" who were incapable of applying the law to the facts. The Commercial Gazette warned the people of Cincinnati that the law no longer provided protection to life and property, and declared that government reform was necessary to improve conditions. The only way the people could "shake off the grip of the criminal classes" was by forcing city

officials, "vermin who have fattened on the corruption of the trusts of the people," to administer the law properly.  

Cincinnati residents reacted in a similar fashion. A Captain Hudson and other policemen considered the verdict an outrage, and John Simpkinson wondered, "In the name of God, what are we coming to?". Captain J. Milton Blair felt the verdict was "perfectly fearful," but predicted that Palmer would hang, since he did not have the money for a crack defense team. Many people saw "Judge Lynch" as the only remedy. C.H. Billings suggested that there should be a little judicious hanging, starting with the lawyers; August Schaeffer wanted citizens to form a vigilance committee and deal out justice; George Glamser thought that the murderers in the jail should be hanged in high places as a warning to others. Frank Rohan feared that if criminal indifference to the law were allowed to continue, people would start shooting each other in the streets and a "reign of terror" would arise.  

In a sermon on March 25, Archbishop William H. Elder warned against people taking the law into their own hands. He knew that the people wanted to lynch Berner, but said that it was sinful to agitate for violence or to encourage it. He believed that it was the duty of every good citizen to respect the law and to preserve the peace. Violence would solve nothing, and the people could not expect to stop crime by committing new crimes. The archbishop urged his congregation not to resort to violence to right a wrong, since God would provide the remedy. Nevertheless, Archbishop Elder

Cincinnati News Journal and the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 25, 1884.

See quotes reported in the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 25, 1884.
was one of the few who counseled moderation. The enraged citizens of Cincinnati wanted more immediate and drastic solutions to their problems.  

On Friday evening, March 28, more than 6,000 concerned citizens gathered at the Music Hall to discuss reform. Earlier that day the judge had sentenced Berner to twenty years in the state penitentiary at Columbus, the maximum penalty. From all accounts, the gathering's intent was orderly and responsible. General Finley described those attending the meeting as mainly "solid men of the city," and he characterized the crowd as "remarkable for its respectability." Charles Wust said that the goal of the meeting was to reform corrupt legal administration in an orderly and lawful way. He thought that the crowd was composed almost entirely of reputable citizens who merely wanted to express their indignation at the recent criminal trials in Cincinnati. One of the speakers, General A.J. Hickenlooper, agreed. In his speech he declared that he had come not only to protest, but also to suggest that whatever the meeting did would be done within the law.  

The leaders at the Music Hall, then, sought to reform the corrupt legal system and to prevent further miscarriages of justice. The crowd passed four resolutions. First, that the law-abiding people of Cincinnati looked with alarm and indignation at both the frequency of homicide and the immunity afforded to "red-handed murderers." Second, that the jurors in the Berner case were unfit to live in civilized society, that they should receive scorn and contempt, and that they should be glad to leave the county and live elsewhere for the rest of their "unworthy lives." Third, that the Music Hall crowd was 

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52Ibid., March 29, 1884. 

53The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 45; A R A G 1884, 62; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 29, 1884.
opposed to illegal methods of punishing crime, and would "secure a more vigorous and speedy administration of the criminal laws," making extra-judicial means unnecessary. Finally, that the assembly demanded changes to allow swifter and more effective administration of the criminal law. Thus did the "respectable" elements of Cincinnati society attempt to reform the legal system.\textsuperscript{54}

Nevertheless, there were signs of trouble during the meeting. Some members in the crowd wanted to attack the jurors, calling out "Kill them like dogs" and "Shoot them down on sight!". Of course, Berner was a favorite target. A few men cried "Hang him!", and others displayed nooses. One man exclaimed, "I thought we came here to organize a vigilance committee." With every speech, the crowd got more agitated. As the meeting adjourned around 9:45 p.m., a young man cried out "To the jail! Come on! Follow me, and hang Berner!". Charles Wust felt that the crowd would have dispersed to their homes or nearby saloons if the "rabble" outside had not advocated lynching Berner. Those outside mistook the movement for an advance on the jail, and many people followed the mob out of curiosity. Soon a crowd of about 10,000 gathered at the jail. Some of the people were determined, others thought that the events were a joke, but most were simply curious. Only about 200 of those involved seemed bent on violence.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{54}Cincinnati News Journal, March 29, 1884.

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.; The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 7; ARAG 1884, 63; Roe, Our Police, 63.
CHAPTER IV
The Cincinnati Riot

Upon arriving at the jail the mob broke in and roamed through the corridors. Sheriff Morton Hawkins and some of his deputies had been on duty at the jail, expecting trouble. They brought in cots so they could man the jail office round-the-clock. Hawkins's men had no firearms and carried only clubs, so they could do little. The riot alarm sounded at 9:55 p.m., further exciting the crowd, and more people hurried to the scene. The mob roamed the jail for half an hour looking for Berner, but the authorities had already secretly forwarded him to the Columbus Penitentiary. Rioters did encounter Berner's accomplice, Palmer, but did not recognize him as he was light skinned. The rioters asked him if he were Palmer, and he coolly responded "No, can't you see that I am a white man?". Looking for a black man, they were satisfied and left him alone.56

Police reinforcements soon arrived on patrol wagons and tried to control the crowd. As the police forced their way through the dense throng, several reckless members of the mob fired their pistols, killing a teenager in the mob. The police managed to slip into the jail by using the tunnel that connected the jail and court house. They confronted the rioters in the jail corridors, and Sheriff Hawkins tried to convince

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the mob to disperse, telling them Berner was long gone. Upon hearing the news many of the disappointed crowd started to leave, and it seemed as if the worst was over.\textsuperscript{57}

The riot might have ended at this point, but then what one observer called "a motley crowd of men and boys" ensured the violence would continue. They broke into the jail, but had to halt at a set of barred doors. The police stood ready to receive the attack, but were ordered not to use their pistols in the narrow confines of the jail. One especially muscular man started to batter at the doors with a sledgehammer without hindrance from the police. After ten minutes he broke the lock, and the mob poured through the doors. As the rioters broke through, the police clubbed each one and threw them into the tunnel. In the confusion, several policemen were hit by stones, and the gas lights went out several times.\textsuperscript{58}

As the situation deteriorated around 11:00 p.m., Sheriff Hawkins, who was also a lieutenant colonel in the 1st Regiment, decided to call out the local militia. He took seriously his duty to protect the county jail. In his opinion, the policemen were almost passive in their defense of law and order. According to the "Military Code of the State of Ohio," in case of riot or other civil disturbance the sheriff, mayor, or judge could call out the local militia "to act in aid of the civil authorities." Any Guardsman refusing such an order was subject to dismissal, fines, and imprisonment up to six months. By virtue of his authority as sheriff of Hamilton County, Hawkins ordered the commander of the 1st Regiment, Colonel Charles Hunt, to send as many men as possible. Two companies

\textsuperscript{57}Roe, \textit{Our Police}, 65.

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid., 66-67.
had been on duty at the regimental armory during the week to safeguard the unit's ammunition, so Hunt was able to muster about forty soldiers. He sent runners to track down more members of the regiment, but large numbers of the 1st Regiment failed to report for duty, as there was a "general disposition" not to interfere with the mob. Many of the local troops shared the mob's supposed concern about disorder in the city. Two of Hunt's officers were later dishonorably discharged for dereliction of duty, and some 1st Regiment troops actually took part in the riot. Hawkins later said that one 1st Regiment soldier was at the head of the mob.59

Around 11:30 p.m., Colonel Hunt led his small column into the court house and passed through the tunnel to the jail. As the troops entered the jail rotunda at about 12:15 a.m., they encountered the mob of about a hundred rioters who were fleeing from the police. Adding to the confusion, the gas lights went out. The rioters fired revolvers and threw pieces of masonry at the soldiers, wounding four men in the head and upper body. Their surgeon, A.E. Jones, believed that the location of the wounds showed that the rioters deliberately shot to kill. The most severely wounded man, Corporal Charles Cook, Company I, had wounds in the mouth, sternum, and left shoulder, and powder burns on his face that almost totally destroyed his right eye.60

Sheriff Hawkins immediately ordered, "Give it to 'em, boys, fire!". Captain John Foellger, who admitted later to have a "fellow feeling" for the rioters, added: "For Christ's sake, boys, fire high!". Police officer Von Seggern, who was caught in the


60 *Hunt*, in *ARAG* 1884, 224-5; *Jones*, in *ARAG* 1884, 226-7.
crowd, shouted, "For God's sake don't shoot in here, you will hit some of your friends!". A soldier reported later that the front rank had to jump out of the way to avoid being shot by their comrades. The soldiers fired over the heads of the rioters, but the arched roof and confined space of the tunnel deflected bullets into the crowd. Among the wounded were two policemen, Von Seggern and Phil Nunn. Many later condemned the decision to fire, but the confusion, the troops' fear, the confined and dark space, and the mob's belligerence made bloodshed likely.\(^6^1\)

The mob fell back and cleared the rotunda, but the disturbance was not over. As Colonel Hunt formed his men into line, the rioters attacked from all sides. After the rioters ignored several warnings to withdraw from the jail, Hunt's troops again fired and drove the mob outside. In an attempt to force the militia out of the building, some rioters started a coal oil fire at the Sycamore Street entrance. The fire department could do nothing about the blaze, since the mob threatened the firemen and destroyed some equipment. When the firemen were ordered home, the crowd cheered. When Hunt sent several men to clear the entrance approaches, they did so "under a heavy fire of pistols, brickbats and stones." Around 1:30 a.m., a militia volley killed policeman Joe Sturm as he waited by his patrol wagon. With the aid of a police company, Hunt's men finally cleared the area around the jail and secured it until the morning.\(^6^2\)

After being driven from the jail, the mob attacked other locations. Around 2:00 a.m., the rioters broke into the Veteran Guard Armory and stole about 150 rifles. They

\(^{61}\) The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 40; Roe, Our Police, 68; Tunison, The Cincinnati Riot, 83; Hunt, in ARAG 1884, 224-25.

\(^{62}\) Hunt, in ARAG 1884, 224-5; Roe, Our Police, 68; Tunison, The Cincinnati Riot, 85-86.
then broke into the B. Kittredge gun store and carried off all the weapons they wanted, including a small cannon and three kegs of powder, but no ammunition. The rioters also broke down the door to the 1st Regiment Armory, but Captain Desmond and a small guard were "ready to give them a warm reception," so the mob quickly withdrew. As the militia continued to fire volleys after warning the crowd to get back, the mob slowly melted away. Around 3:00 a.m. the mob began to disperse, and all was quiet by daybreak.63

From the troops' point of view, the bloodshed was understandable. Most of them had never been under fire before, and the darkness in the tunnel added to the chaos. Some of the troops undoubtedly lost their nerve as they confronted a violent mob in the murky confines under the jail. Critics did not accept such explanations, and the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that anger was growing against the troops, "upon whom the whole responsibility for the loss of life is placed." The Cincinnati Commercial Gazette blamed the militia for most of the casualties. It reported that the troops were wild with excitement, and did not know what to do. A reporter who went to visit some wounded troops was surrounded by twenty panic-stricken Guardsmen, who pointed their weapons at his head.64

Of course, the mob bore a large share of the blame for the violence. The crowd was a mixture of "respectable" men and the worst elements of society. The majority of the rioters were young, and there seems to have been no leadership. According to the

63Tunison, The Cincinnati Riot, 85-86; Hunt, in ARAG 1884, 225.
64Tunison, The Cincinnati Riot, 84; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 31, 1884; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 29, 1884.
New York Times, the violent members of the mob were working men and apprentices, and the Cincinnati News Journal claimed that the mob contained every tough citizen of the city. It said that the "howling mob" was not the voice of an outraged community, but "a Commune." The Cincinnati Commercial Gazette was more charitable and described the rioters as "young fellows" who were ordinarily quiet and respectable, but caught up in the excitement. Nevertheless, the crowd that ostensibly wanted to restore law and order to Cincinnati did anything but that. The rioters did not even take vengeance on the prisoners in the jail, but instead ransacked the jailer's apartment.65

On Saturday morning, Sheriff Hawkins took steps to reinforce the defenders at the jail. Around 9:00 a.m. he ordered Captain Frank Joyce's 2nd Battery of Cincinnati to report without the battery guns, since Hawkins needed infantry and the battery had no ammunition anyway. Forty-one of Joyce's men reported for duty but twenty-one did not. Six were either sick or out of town, nine offered various excuses, and six refused to report because they did not want to protect murderers and thieves. By 10:00 a.m., Colonel Hunt also found that many of his men were not reporting for duty as ordered, since they were terrorized by the press and citizens of Cincinnati. Payroll reports indicate that less than half of the regiment reported for duty. Fearing a resumption of the rioting on Saturday evening, Hunt and Sheriff Hawkins decided to ask Governor

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George Hoadly for reinforcements. Help would have to come from outside Cincinnati, due to the sympathies and fears of the local troops.66

Sheriff Hawkins and the other officers present agreed that help would have to come from outside the city. Mayor Thomas Stephens was sick and played little part in the initial planning or the subsequent riot control. Around 11:00 a.m., Hawkins sent a telegram to General Finley warning about great danger and asking for a regiment. Governor Hoadly, a former resident of Cincinnati, sent telegrams to trusted friends and Quartermaster General Michael Ryan, asking them if they thought sending more troops was advisable. Meanwhile, around noon, Governor Hoadly alerted the 4th Regiment, the 14th Regiment, and the 5th Battery for possible deployment. He alerted the 13th Regiment around 3:00 p.m.67

Hoadly's advisors in Cincinnati strongly advised him not to send more troops, thinking that the troubles were generally over. General Ryan reported that he was against bringing in more troops: "we can take of ourselves and preserve the peace." John E. Bell believed that bringing in more militia would "add fuel to the flames," and Henry Umer reported that sending troops might do more harm than good. Sheriff Hawkins, meanwhile, insisted that he needed 2,000 more men to control the situation. Hoadly ordered Ryan to consult with Hawkins, but felt he could wait longer to decide whether or not to send the troops. He did not want to send troops unless it was absolutely

66The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 13; Joyce, in ARAG 1884, 237-38; Hunt, in ARAG 1884, 225; Adjutant General's Department, Muster, Payroll, and Inspection Reports, Ohio State Historical Society Archives, Columbus, Series 2528, Box 31, 228, cited hereafter as Payroll Reports.

67Telegrams in ARAG 1884, 147-8; Picard, in ARAG 1884, 239. For hometowns of ONG units, see Appendix.
necessary, influenced no doubt by a telegram from Murat Halstead, who felt that deployment of more troops could cause more harm, as the "people are exasperated against them." 68

Hoadly's confusion was understandable. The officers in charge demanded reinforcements, but reliable sources warned him that more troops would aggravate the situation. Hoadly wanted Hawkins's request withdrawn if the danger was past, and the governor wanted to avoid unnecessary expense or excitement. He told General Ryan that he did not want "to stampede the State for nothing, nor to fail to have the men on hand if necessary." In the end, Hoadly would have to trust those who had the responsibility to maintain order. 69

Hoadly relied on Ryan, the man on the scene, to help make the final decision on the troop deployment. After viewing the damage at the jail and conferring with officers of the 1st Regiment, General Ryan and the civilians sent a telegram to Governor Hoadly around 4:40 p.m. They reported that the officers, "the responsible parties," insisted on reinforcements. Thus, Ryan and the others declined to "express any further contrary opinion," and said that if troops should be sent it should be done immediately. Sheriff Hawkins, taking seriously his duty to protect the county jail, prevailed. 70

Accordingly, Hoadly ordered troops to Cincinnati. In Columbus, Colonel George Freeman's 14th Regiment marched down High Street to the accompaniment of military

68 Telegrams in ARAG 1884, 149-51.

69 Hoadly to Ryan, in ARAG 1884, 151.

70 Urner and Ryan to Hoadly, in ARAG 1884, 151-2.
music and cheering crowds. The scene reminded many observers of the troop departures in 1861. The 14th Regiment left by train around 6:00 p.m., and Captain George Sintz's 5th Battery left Springfield around 6:30 p.m. In Dayton, where many citizens sympathized with the rioters, Colonel Frank Mott's 4th Regiment received a less enthusiastic sendoff and left for Cincinnati at about 6:30 p.m. Governor Hoadly informed Hawkins of the imminent arrival of the reinforcements, but ordered him not to parade them or to take them from the depot unless absolutely necessary. Hoadly directed Hawkins to send an officer to guide the arrivals from the depot if they were needed at the riot site.\textsuperscript{71}

Tensions in Cincinnati continued to rise, aggravated by alcohol and an inflammatory proclamation posted throughout the city by the "communist element." Saturday was pay day, and many workers were spending their wages freely on drinks. A handbill distributed across the city called for immediate action to "heal sores by purifying the body" and to rid Cincinnati of all criminal elements, be they criminal lawyers, gamblers, or prostitutes. It urged the organization of vigilance committees which could, "by earnest work, cleanse the moral atmosphere in three days." The handbill declared that as long as criminal lawyers were permitted "to corrupt juries, outrage justice and shield criminals," citizens would continue to be murdered, property continue to be destroyed, and protection by the law continue to be denied. It warned

\textsuperscript{71}Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 30, 1884; Sintz, in ARAG 1884, 257; Dayton Daily Democrat, March 31, 1884; Hoadly to Hawkins, in ARAG 1884, 152. For deployment times, see Table 3.
"disreputable" characters to leave and never return. Without a change, the handbill alleged, wickedness would reign supreme.\textsuperscript{72}

Despite such inflammatory rhetoric, Saturday night began innocently enough. There were still only about 120 troops on duty at the jail. Around 7:45 p.m., General Ryan reported to Governor Hoadly that everything was very quiet. Ryan saw no need to bring troops from the depot unless a crisis developed, and he considered the authorities in the city unnecessarily alarmed. Around 9:50 p.m., he assured the governor that there was "no probability of disturbance." Hoadly must have been surprised when he received a telegram from Colonel Harper at 10:36 p.m. that "they are having a fight at the courthouse."\textsuperscript{73}

As night fell, crowds had gathered around the barricades, eager to vent their anger with the militia. A few people started to throw rocks at the court house, and the crowd gained confidence when no one stopped the violence. Hawkins had left the court house weakly defended, opting instead to concentrate on the jail's defenses. The \textit{New York Times} criticized the military and police, accusing them of not having a "settled plan or competent leadership." Hawkins concentrated the defenses on Sycamore Street, and left Main Street exposed. Thus, a mob entered the poorly-defended court house. The \textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer} reported that the crowd was "full of a deep rage" against the

\textsuperscript{72}Quoted in \textit{The Great Cincinnati Riots!}, 17.

\textsuperscript{73}Ryan, in \textit{ARAG 1884}, 221; Telegrams in \textit{ARAG 1884}, 155.
troops for Friday night's bloodshed. Unable to cope with the militia's gunfire, the crowd expressed their feelings by destroying the county seat of law and justice.74

Rioters piled furniture in the County Treasurer's office and set it on fire. The fire department could do nothing to stop the blaze, since the mob kept back the fire engines and cut the hoses that the firemen did manage to hook up. The *Cincinnati News Journal* considered it ironic that the burning of the court house and its records opened "a new and rich field for the shyster lawyers," who would grow rich supplying lost records. Captain Desmond, a valued officer of the First Regiment, led his Company B in an attempt to drive back the mob so the firemen could attack the fire. As Desmond led his men forward, a rioter shot him in the head and killed him. In the court house rotunda, First Sergeant Michael Malone was severely wounded in the upper torso.75

Colonel Mott's 4th Regiment arrived from Dayton around 9:00 p.m., and things went badly from the start. Sheriff Hawkins thought it safer for the reinforcements to deploy rather than wait back at the depots, so he sent a deputy sheriff to guide the units forward. As the deputy led the command forward, a howling mob surrounded the troops. About halfway to the court house, the guide left to reconnoiter the route ahead but did not return, leaving the regiment in a sea of angry rioters. The halt was disastrous. The troops were demoralized and scared, standing "with their knees knocking together and their teeth chattering." One man fainted when a fellow soldier accidentally discharged his rifle, and officers and men started to panic. All thought of duty disappeared, and one

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74 New York Times, March 30, 1884; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 31, 1884.

75 Cincinnati News Journal, April 1, 1884; Ryan to Hoadly, in ARAG 1884, 155; The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 22; Roe, Our Police, 69.
soldier of the regiment later commented, "we could have killed every man before us had we fired in volleys, but very few of us had the heart to do it. We did not want to kill our own brothers." He felt that his officers acted like "old women" and "petered right out when the time came for decisive action." He believed that Mott's indecision led to a rout. The troops thought that Mott understood the danger better than they did, and when he hesitated they lost confidence. The soldier thought that if the officers had kept their heads the mob could have been easily dispersed.\textsuperscript{75}

Confronted in the darkness by the mob and unwilling to risk their lives in a cause they did not think worth dying for, the 4th Regiment fled. Colonel Mott tried to urge his men forward, but Company H broke and the other companies followed. Captain William Wooster, thinking of his wife and child, said he did not want to risk getting shot and preferred disgrace to death. Captain Edward Rott told Mott that he would not take his men forward to be killed, and others said they did not care what would happen to them for disobeying orders. The penalty for desertion was a fine of up to $1,000 and up to six months imprisonment, but many of the troops must have assumed that the law would not be enforced. Trying to maintain a semblance of order, Mott ordered a withdrawal to the depot. Although some troops tried to do their duty, a large portion of the command scattered, put on civilian clothes, and mixed in with the crowd at local hotels and bars. As few as six troops reported for duty back at the depot, and some troops started to make their way back to Dayton. Many citizens actually congratulated the "returning" militiamen for refusing to shoot the mob, telling them that they should

\textsuperscript{75}Dayton Daily Democrat, April 1 and 2, 1884; Dayton Daily Evening Herald, March 31, 1884.
have given guns to the rioters. Other citizens felt indignant that their militia had behaved so poorly and greeted the troops with taunts and abuse. Pressured by public opinion, some of the troops did return, so that by 2:00 p.m. on Sunday Mott was able to muster about 116 men of his command. 77

At 11:00 p.m., Colonel Freeman's reinforced 14th Regiment arrived in Cincinnati, adding over 350 men to Hawkins's force. General Ryan and a deputy met the arrivals, who had been issued twenty rounds of ball ammunition and were ordered to be cool and not to fire unless absolutely necessary. In what General Finley called a solemn sight, the 14th Regiment marched to the riot scene in good order, although jeering rioters threw stones and fired revolvers at the rear guard. The troops maintained good discipline and ignored the mob. Colonel Hunt credited the 14th with stabilizing the situation and exhibiting "coolness and bravery under the most trying difficulties known to a citizen soldier." At the court house, Sheriff Hawkins directed Freeman to clear the approaches to the building. Freeman's men drove the crowd back at bayonet point near South Court Street, but the rioters, maddened by the militia, continued to throw stones and shoot at the troops, wounding at least six. After repeated calls to withdraw the troops opened fire, killing and wounding several in the crowd. With grim determination, the 14th Regiment cleared the area around the court house, allowing the fire department to deal with the blaze 78

77 ARAG 1884, 66-67; Dayton Daily Evening Herald, March 31, 1884; Dayton Daily Democrat, March 31, 1884.

78 Hunt, in ARAG 1884, 226; Freeman, in ARAG 1884, 230-35.
Captain Sintz and his thirty-seven men of the 5th Battery had arrived at 11:30 p.m. on Saturday, but there was no one at the depot and Sintz could not contact Sheriff Hawkins. Having found "no guide, no message, no horses, no friction primers, no escort, no support, nothing at all," Sintz at first decided to remain at the depot and assume a defensive posture, but later made it to the court house and reinforced the short-handed 2nd Battery. Mobs shot at his men, but there was never a need to fire as "the grim muzzle of the gun, double-shotted with canister, undoubtedly had a subduing influence upon many boisterous ones."79

Throughout Saturday evening, mobs attacked private property, especially pawn shops and gun stores. Around 9:00 p.m. at Powell's gun store, looters tried to steal weapons and ammunition. Manager Guilford Stone warned the crowd to stand back, but the rioters jeered at him and stormed the store. Stone and several clerks opened fire, killing two or three, and drove the thieves off. Around midnight, another group of rioters stole two cannon from Power Hall and went in search of ammunition. A police squad captured some of the thieves, many of whom were from Kentucky. Yet another mob broke into the Music Hall and captured the 2nd Battery's three guns around 2:00 a.m. Hunt and Hawkins, with Companies H and K of the 1st Regiment, a Gatling gun, and a police company, went to deal with the mob. Since the soldiers had to drag the gun over the cobble stones, the police got there first and recaptured the guns. The rest of the night was quiet, save for an occasional shot exchanged with the rioters. During the lull,

79Sintz, in ARAG 1884, 257-8.
surgeons set up temporary hospitals in local shops, and officers tried to get overcoats for the troops, who were suffering from lack of cold weather gear.80

Again, there was disagreement about the character of the violence. The Cincinnati Commercial Gazette thought it was a mistake to call the mob a bunch of ruffians. It claimed that the rioters were not from "the vicious classes," but working-class men, "a good example of the plain people," and thought it shameful that "honest men" kept murdering each other when the real object of the unrest was the murderers in the jail. The Cincinnati News Journal took a less favorable view, and said that what was originally intended to be a movement to punish crime instead "degenerated into an aimless unmanageable mob." It saw the arrival of Guard reinforcements as assurance that law and order would be shortly restored.81

Throughout the night, Governor Hoadly alerted the rest of the units in the state to be prepared for deployment to Cincinnati. He set up his headquarters in the office of the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and St. Louis Railroad, where he had a telegraph line to coordinate troop movements. Hoadly also secured the cooperation of railroad owners, since the troops would be moving on a Sunday and would need special trains. The governor then decided to deploy the reinforcements, influenced by telegrams from his officers in Cincinnati. Colonel Church reported that the police were "powerless" and recommended that troops remain in Cincinnati through Sunday night. Church feared that Saturday's "disasters," when published, would infuriate the rioters even more. Hoadly


may also have been influenced by the attack on the gun stores, which raised the possibility that other property might be molested.\textsuperscript{82}

Mayor Stephens had thus far played a minor role in quelling the riot. He was apparently ill with pneumonia, but had spent Saturday night at his office. General J.D. Cox and a group of prominent citizens aided the mayor, and they favored massing a large body of troops to overawe the rioters and restore peace and order. Around noon, Mayor Stephens himself, on the advice of his "committee of safety," requested that Hoadly send all the available troops of the ONG to Cincinnati. He believed that the mere presence of a strong body of troops would eliminate the need to use them. In response to Stephens's request, Hoadly alerted the 5th, 16th, and 8th Regiments to deploy. The mayor started to assert his authority more and finally issued a proclamation on Sunday morning calling for all rioters to disperse, for all law-abiding citizens to volunteer as special police, for all members of the Grand Army of the Republic to assemble at their posts and prepare for duty, and for all youths to stay at home. Stephens then imposed a 7:00 p.m. curfew.\textsuperscript{83}

Alcohol had been playing a major role in fueling the riot. One of the most difficult tasks the police faced was keeping drunks from harassing the militia and getting killed. Cincinnati had 1,608 saloons, and near the jail there were four to five on each block. Stephens did not order the closing of every saloon in the area around the jail, and

\textsuperscript{82} The Cincinnati Riots!, 29-30; Church to Hoadly, ARAG 1884, 160, 164; ARAG 1884, 69; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 30, 1884.

\textsuperscript{83} ARAG 1884, 69; The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 24; Finley to Hoadly, ARAG 1884, 168; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 31, 1884.
the bars did "a flourishing business, feeding the flames of riot and recklessness into fury." The Cincinnati Commercial Gazette criticized the mayor's inaction, and said that he seemed "to have lost his grip entirely, if he ever had any." Stephens's illness may have explained his hesitation, but it was no excuse. Many condemned the mayor's failure to close the saloons, which he finally did at 12:30 a.m. on Tuesday, April 1. General Finley and Stephens also took steps to keep the so-called undesirable elements from Kentucky away from the riot by blocking the bridge and ferries to Newport and Covington.\(^{84}\)

Units continued to converge on Cincinnati from all over the state. Colonel Fred Picard and 176 men of the 13th Regiment arrived at 6:30 a.m. with 20,000 ball cartridges for the troops at the barricades. The 4th Regiment did not provide an escort for the 13th Regiment as ordered, so Picard and twenty-seven men had to run a gauntlet of rioters, who succeeded in taking the ammunition wagon twice. Using bayonets when necessary, Picard's men recovered the wagon each time and reached the 14th Regiment at the courthouse and jail. The troops suffered only a few bruises from stones.\(^{85}\)

Throughout Sunday morning, groups across the state volunteered their services to Governor Hoadly, who was under increasing pressure to send more troops. Civil War veteran officers, National Guard brass, and veteran companies all expressed their eagerness to serve. The Columbus Dispatch reported that the entire Columbus police force volunteered to go to Cincinnati to help the police there. Citizens anxious that the

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\(^{84}\) The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 49; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 30 and April 1, 1884; ARAG 1884, 181.

\(^{85}\) Picard, in ARAG 1884, 239-40.
city was under the mob's control telegraphed Governor Hoadly, demanding stronger
treatment of the rioters. In the morning, John Covington warned Hoadly that the "best
citizens" were "panic stricken."  

Table 3 Ohio National Guard Deployment Timetable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Time Alerted</th>
<th>Time Deployed</th>
<th>Arrival Time</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>% Deployed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Regiment</td>
<td>3-28, 2300</td>
<td>Stationed in Cincinnati</td>
<td>c.190</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Battery</td>
<td>3-29, 0900</td>
<td>Stationed in Cincinnati</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sheriff Hawkins's request for troops, 1101</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Regiment</td>
<td>3-29, 1200</td>
<td>3-29, 1730</td>
<td>3-29, 2230</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>4th Regiment</td>
<td>3-29, 1204</td>
<td>3-29, 1830</td>
<td>3-29, 2130</td>
<td>82 or 116</td>
<td>c.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Battery</td>
<td>3-29, 1240</td>
<td>3-29, 1830</td>
<td>3-29, 2300</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>3-29, 1248</td>
<td>3-30, 1335</td>
<td>3-30, 0600</td>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>3-29, 1500</td>
<td>3-30, 0300</td>
<td>3-30, 0630</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>6th Regiment</td>
<td>3-30, 0035</td>
<td>3-30, 1500</td>
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<td>281</td>
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<td>17th Regiment</td>
<td>3-30, 0055</td>
<td>3-30, 1900</td>
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<td>3-31, 0230</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Regiment</td>
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<td>3-31, 0330</td>
<td></td>
<td>245</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>Mayor Stephens's call for troops, 1208</td>
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<td>5th Regiment</td>
<td>3-30, 1303</td>
<td>3-31, 0500?</td>
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<td>8th Regiment</td>
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<td>Recalled, 3-31, 1210</td>
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</table>

SOURCE: ARAG 1884; Payroll Reports: Cincinnati News Journal, April 1, 1884; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 2, 1884.

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86Columbus Dispatch, March 31, 1884; ARAG 1884, 166.
Throughout the afternoon, Hoadly continued to receive discouraging reports. Murat Halstead asked him to get as many troops as possible to Cincinnati, since there was danger of "ruinous trouble." Richard Smith and B. Eggleston warned that the streets were filling with drunken people threatening "plunder and arson." They told Hoadly that the mayor was sick, the sheriff was exhausted, and the city was coming under control of "thieves and desperadoes." They recommended harsher measures and a declaration of martial law. No doubt exasperated by the requests, Hoadly replied to Smith and Eggleston, asking why the "law and order citizens" could not organize and aid the troops in defending lives and property.\(^7\)

The troops prepared for the violence everyone was expecting on Sunday night. According to the *New York Times*, the troops admitted they were scared, and some did not have the nerve to fire on the crowd. Nevertheless, most of the men resolved to do their duty, since by Sunday night people should have known the risk they ran by being near the mobs. Anyone shot would have themselves to blame. Troops continued to build barricades of lumber, barrels, and wagons, and snacked on crackers, cold ham, and coffee as they wrote letters home. Finley reminded his commanders that they were under the mayor's orders and ordered them to use forbearance as long as there was virtue in forbearance, and not be the aggressors; if force were required, to use it effectively in defense of life and property. The remaining troops of the 4th Regiment, though despised,

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\(^7\)Telegrams in *ARAG 1884*, 176-77, 180.
were expected to do their duty, and by the time 281 men of Colonel John Entrekin's 6th Regiment arrived at 3:00 p.m., Finley could count on a force of almost 2,000.\textsuperscript{88}

Crowds slowly gathered again throughout the day, and police made several arrests at the barricades in the afternoon. There were many boys in the crowds who taunted the police and militia. As E. Anthony Rotundo has shown, contemporary boys valued courage highly, and respected those who suppressed fear and pain. Their culture was governed by shame. Presumably, the boys in Cincinnati were involved in a deadly game of daring, and some of them paid for their displays of prowess with their lives. The policemen did their best to keep an open area of a hundred feet in front of the militia's barricades. The "roughs" protected themselves by keeping women and children to the front of the mob, but other than throwing a few stones and firing a revolver occasionally, the mob did little. They threatened to do worse at nightfall, however. At the canal bridge, one rioter armed with a revolver threw a stone at the guard, hitting the officer in charge. The troops shot him, and there were no further disturbances.\textsuperscript{89}

In response to Saturday night's disaster, Hoadly had sent several more units which arrived by Sunday evening. The fifty-five men of Captain Louis Smithnight's 1st Battery, after a rousing send-off from relatives and well-wishers in Cleveland, arrived in the early evening with four 3-inch rifles. The men loaded the guns before leaving Cleveland, so the battery was ready for action when it detrained. While the battery was

\textsuperscript{88}New York Times, March 31, 1884; Finley to Hoadly, in ARAG 1884, 165; General Orders No. 1, in ARAG 1884, 208; Dayton Daily Journal, March 31, 1884.

\textsuperscript{89}Rotundo, American Manhood, 42, 52; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 31, 1884; Freeman, in ARAG 1884, 233.
on the way to Cincinnati, crowds at many stops tried to disable the guns, but the troops struck back with the flats of their sabers. Upon arrival, Smithnight established an artillery park on the City Hall grounds. Colonel Edgar Pocock and 249 men of the 17th Regiment arrived at 7:00 p.m. with 30,000 rounds of ammunition picked up in Columbus. At about the same time, Company A of Major Henry Harper's 9th Battalion (Colored) arrived as well, Company B having been attached to the 14th Regiment the day prior. By this time, Hoadly had learned the importance of entering the city in full regiments, not detachments. He directed Colonel Joel Hetrick to concentrate his 2nd Regiment at Dayton or another convenient location before arriving at Cincinnati. 90

The crowd threatened the barricades as night fell, but there was little violence until after 10:00 p.m. Again General Ryan misinformed Governor Hoadly, reporting around 10:41 p.m. that all was quiet and the worst was past. Instead, anger against the troops apparently still ran high. A mob that included many boys gathered at Court and Walnut and started to shoot at the troops along the barricade. When the troops could no longer endure the mob's fire, their officers decided to give the rioters "the benefit" of a volley from the battery gun around 11:00 p.m. The officers first warned the crowd, who responded with curses and more gunshots. The battery gun scattered the mob, and the streets were relatively calm until midnight. An experienced surgeon in one of the hospitals reported that the scene reminded him of a desperate battle, as there were about

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90 Smithnight, in ARAG 1884, 260; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 2, 1884; Hoadly to Hetrick, in ARAG 1884, 186.
150 wounded and dying men with gaping wounds lying around the place. Thereafter, the troops only fired if a soldier were shot or the mob charged the barricades.91

Wanton violence continued throughout the evening. Thieves attacked pawn shops on Central near Sixth, but police caught them; a crowd overturned streetcars at Elm and Twelfth, then went to Power Hall where they tried to assemble the parts of a cannon. Troops from the 6th Regiment dispersed them. At 1:00 a.m., the rioters made another attempt to charge the barricade, vowing to "clean out those blue coats." The soldiers did not respond to the mob's firing, which continued for about fifteen minutes, but on order fired two volleys in quick succession when the mob charged. At least five rioters were wounded, and "gradually all became quiet" by 3:00 a.m. At 2:55 a.m., Finley informed Hoadly that he had enough men for the moment, and asked the governor not to send more troops until requested. Hoadly continued the deployment, however, presumably influenced by his experiences with General Ryan's optimistic reports of the situation in Cincinnati.92

On Monday morning, the troops continued to improve their positions as more reinforcements arrived. The soldiers around the barricades spoke in low tones and acted, rightly, as if they had just participated in a battle. Though the troops did not know it, the Cincinnati Riot was over. Colonel William Williamson's 3rd Regiment had arrived around 2:30 a.m. with 353 men. Colonel Jonathan Norton and 369 men of the 16th

91Ryan to Hoadly, ARAG 1884, 188; Freeman, in ARAG 1884, 233-34; Tunison, The Cincinnati Riot, 91-92.

92Freeman, in ARAG 1884, 233-34; Tunison, The Cincinnati Riot, 91-92; Finley to Hoadly, in ARAG 1884, 190.
Regiment arrived at 10:30 a.m., detained with fixed bayonets, and received "tremendous applause" as they marched to their post at the jail. Many of Norton's troops sympathized with the rioters, but they were determined to obey orders at any cost. The usually-critical Cincinnati Commercial Gazette crowed that "the soldier boys are the masters of the situation." Governor Hoadly was confident enough that he decided to stop the 8th Regiment's deployment at 5:43 a.m., and at 11:00 a.m., he decided to let those units already south of Dayton proceed to their destination, while those north of Dayton were to return home.\footnote{Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 1, 1884; Toledo Evening Bee, March 31, 1994; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 31, 1884; Telegrams in ARAG 1884, 191, 193.}

Colonel Joel Hetrick and about 200 men of the 2nd Regiment arrived in Cincinnati at 11:30 a.m. in good spirits. They had heard rumors that the mob was disarming troops upon arrival, but they resolved to do their duty "and fight, if necessary, to the last ditch." Major Freeman Thorp's 5th Regiment arrived shortly after with about 200 men. General Finley reported that by 4:45 p.m. he had 2,499 troops in Cincinnati. About 150 U.S. Army troops from Newport Barracks, Kentucky deployed on Monday night to defend the Customs House and Post Office.\footnote{Hetrick, in ARAG 1884, 266; Schellenberger, in ARAG 1884, 255; Finley, in ARAG 1884, 196; Columbus Dispatch, April 1, 1884.}

After suppressing the riot, Guard units and patrols of concerned citizens made sure that hostilities did not resume. The duty was relatively uneventful, except for some members of the Governor's Guard who were sleeping on a sidewalk on Monday night. One of their muskets, which had been leaning against a wall, fell down. The bayonet
slightly wounded one soldier, and the weapon discharged and killed Private Israel Getz. Colonel Jonathan Norton kept his men occupied by rotating his companies through the scenes of destruction in Cincinnati. He wanted his men to "understand the kind of warfare we are expected to engage in while in the State service." He knew that the Ohio National Guard's primary role was to maintain law and order.95

The authorities remained cautious and did not relax their vigilance. Colonel Church telegraphed Hoadly that the troops performed well and restored public confidence, but he recommended that the troops should remain one more night to show that law and order had been established. The mayor and his committee of safety agreed that no troops should be sent home. There was still the possibility of violence, and the authorities decided to close all the saloons again at 12:30 a.m. on Tuesday, April 1.96

Nevertheless, the troops could not remain in Cincinnati indefinitely, so generally following the principle of "first in, first out," the regiments went home by train or steamboat. The 14th Regiment and the 1st Battery went home on Tuesday, April 1st. Hoadly was concerned that the local newspapers might rekindle the riot, so he warned Finley on Tuesday morning, April 2, to be careful about removing troops. Hoadly did not want to clear the city until the police were able to provide adequate protection for property. Thus, all but two regiments went home on April 2.97

95Columbus Daily Times, April 1, 1884; Norton, in ARAG 1884, 244.

96Church to Hoadly, in ARAG 1884, 192; Finley to Hoadly, in ARAG 1884, 197; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, April 1, 1884.

97Hoadly to Finley, in ARAG 1884, 204.
The 17th Regiment stayed, and Colonel Pocock took command of all military forces, under the direction of Sheriff Hawkins. Pocock’s men considered the order to stay in Cincinnati a heavy blow. They had left their homes and businesses without any preparation, so their personal interests were suffering. Furthermore, the regiment was inadequately equipped. The men resolved to do their duty though, and Colonel Pocock believed that the honor of the ONG rested upon his men. Governor Hoadly agreed that the regiment’s extended stay was unpleasant duty, but his officers had recommended that the unit stay until the April 7 elections. They finally returned on April 8. The 1st Regiment went home on April 2, but had to leave a detail of three officers and forty men posted at the Armory to respond to any call from Sheriff Hawkins. They went home on April 17, bringing the ONG’s involvement in Cincinnati to an end.\footnote{ARAG 1884, 206, 217; Pocock, in ARAG 1884, 262-3; Hunt, in ARAG 1884, 226; Dayton Daily Democrat, April 4, 1884.}

Most of the units received warm welcomes when they returned home. The 14th Regiment, “a magnificent lot of young fellows,” received a heroes’ welcome in Columbus from 10,000 well-wishers, complete with bands and fireworks. Springfield residents treated the 9th Battalion (Colored) to a banquet and reception after their return, and the 17th Regiment’s welcome flattered them and showed them they were appreciated.\footnote{Columbus Dispatch, April 2, 1884; ARAG 1884, 263, 265.}

Casualties during the riot were quite high. The ONG troops suffered relatively few casualties, considering the violence they encountered. Captain Desmond and Private Getz were the only fatalities, but about four dozen troops were wounded by various missiles, some seriously. The heaviest casualties came from Company F of the 14th
Regiment, which had twelve of the regiment's fifteen casualties. The wounds were caused by pistols, shotguns, bricks, stones, even fists. Many men got sick during the deployment. In the 17th Regiment, forty-seven of the 249 men who deployed suffered from sickness. Mob casualties numbered about forty-eight dead and over 139 wounded, many of which other rioters or shop owners inflicted. For example, one body appeared to be that of a man killed by a jealous husband, and employees killed or wounded several rioters when they tried to break into Powell's gun store on Saturday night.¹⁰⁰

The dead soldiers' funerals reflected the sense of community in the Ohio National Guard. In his instructions to General Finley, Governor Hoadly made sure that the dead were buried with full military honors. He felt that soldiers who died doing their duty were due as much respect as those who died fighting a foreign enemy. In a major ceremony that many of Cincinnati's citizens attended, Captain Desmond was buried on April 1. Each regiment provided a company of thirty men to attend the Mass at the cathedral, and Colonel Hunt led the escort. Finley considered it "a most imposing affair." Private Getz was buried in Columbus on April 3, after an impressive ceremony at the First Baptist Church attended by a band and Companies A, B, and F of the 14th Regiment. The "better class" expressed much sympathy for the fallen soldiers, and Governor Hoadly said the people of Cincinnati and of Ohio owed those wounded or

¹⁰⁰Surgeon's Report, in ARAG 1884, 236; Church, in ARAG 1884, 227-9; Disability Payments, The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 56; Tunison, The Cincinnati Riot, 90.
killed "a debt of gratitude, such as is ever awarded to brave men who risk their lives in defense of law and order."101

The state legislature also provided compensation for injuries the troops sustained in Cincinnati. Since previous statutes covered troops only wounded while on State service, the Ohio legislature passed "An Act Making an Appropriation to pay certain sums to a portion of the Ohio National Guard" on April 14. The Act recognized sickness as a service-related injury and considered those injured to be on duty from their mobilization date until they were again able to perform manual labor, not to exceed 120 days. The legislature appropriated $5,000 to settle claims. Several dozen troops, predominantly from the 1st and 14th Regiments, made claims against the state for injuries received during the riot. Some troops were incapacitated well into the summer. The disabilities ranged from "acute inflammation of the lungs," "acute dysentery," "articular rheumatism," "acute conjunctivitis," and "sickness" to severe gunshot wounds in the head. One soldier, Private Edward Gunckel of Company H, 4th Regiment, even received compensation for accidentally shooting himself in the foot. The legislature also appropriated $70,000 to pay expenses incurred during the riot. Governor Hoadly was concerned about the financial status of Captain Desmond's mother, as the young officer

101 Hoadly to Finley, in ARAG 1884, 195-96; Finley to Hoadly, in ARAG 1884, 202; General Orders No. 6, in ARAG 1884, 210; Columbus Daily Times, April 3, 1884; General Orders No. 8, in ARAG 1884, 210-11.
was his mother's sole support. Other than burial expenses, however, the state made no provision for the families of troops who were killed or disabled while on state service.\footnote{Disability Payments; Senate Bill No. 239 and House Bill No. 554, in The State of Ohio, General and Local Laws and Joint Resolutions (Columbus: G.J. Brand, 1884), 172-73 and 205; ARAG 1884, 72-73, 205.}
CHAPTER V
The Riot's Character and the Guard's Performance

The Cincinnati Riot was a search for order on two levels. First, it expressed the public's violent reaction to corrupt justice. Second, it expressed the "respectable" class's desire to maintain order and protect lives and property. The violence in March 1884 could be viewed, then, as two distinct riots. Friday night saw a failed attempt to execute vigilante justice. On subsequent nights, the violence was wanton and irrational, aggravated to a degree by the behavior of Ohio National Guard troops. The ONG found itself thrust into a violent, rancorous, and confusing situation, and managed to restore order despite the troops' inexperience and sympathies.

The riot was hardly a quest for judicial and political reform. Rather, it began when unrest shifted from the "respectable" class to the underclass, and violence replaced relatively civil political discourse. When a mob went to the jail from the Music Hall meeting, its motives may have been to execute vigilante justice on William Berner and Joseph Palmer, if not all the inmates. Lacking leadership, though, the crowd left the criminals alone and instead pillaged and tried to burn the jail. The Cincinnati News Journal expressed the views of the "law and order" citizens when it criticized the Friday night mob. It conceded that at times the people must take the law into their own hands in the interests of law and order, life, and property. It editorialized, however, that if the
mob had ever been motivated by the desire to administer justice "by the direct methods of Judge Lynch," it abandoned that goal and turned into a mob bent on plunder. The mob was not the voice of an outraged community. When the police let the violence get out of hand, and Sheriff Hawkins called out the local militia, Cincinnati was well on the way to more violence. 103

After Friday night, the rioters seem to have been motivated by the militia's presence and the chance to wreak havoc on the community. The New York Times and other newspapers reported that the militia was held responsible for the slaughter, and the mob was furious at the troops for their "reckless shooting." As discussed above, some of the men Governor Hoadly consulted about the troop deployment predicted such an outcome. Nevertheless, the reform movement had been superseded by Cincinnati's dangerous elements. Observers such as the Dayton Daily Democrat referred to the mob as a "Commune" and to Cincinnati as "The Paris of America." The object of the rioters seems to have been plunder in many cases, notably the attacks on gun stores and pawn shops. The Cincinnati News Journal described the situation best when it said that "the doctoring" should have been halted Friday night; after that, "the patient [was] in the hands of quacks." 104

Of course, many people disagreed with the assessments of conservative newspapers and the propertied classes. Men such as Colonel Church described the rioters as generally "thieves and reprobates," but others had a more sympathetic view.

103 Cincinnati News Journal, March 29, 1884.

104 New York Times, April 1, 1884; Dayton Daily Democrat, April 1, 1884; Cincinnati News Journal, March 31, 1884.
"Cincinnati," an anonymous socialist, called the Friday night unrest a "good-natured demonstration," and considered the rioters to be an "amiable and curious crowd." He excoriated the authorities who considered "a few sporadic attempts at disorder" to be a communistic riot of the criminal classes. Other socialists saw in the Cincinnati Riot an attempt to overthrow oppressive government. "Citizen" Justus Schwab of New York City believed that the riot was the start of an "uprising of the common people, the workingmen of the United States against class government." Charles Miller, Secretary of New York City's Central Labor Union, hoped that the rioters would organize themselves and take on the real issue, namely "the whole social system" that caused the riot in the first place. The specter of class warfare, while it inspired some people, frightened the "respectable" classes and made the militia deployment justifiable in their view.\(^{105}\)

Steven Ross has claimed that the rioters were engaged in their own "search for order" and were more "respectable" than the newspapers and leading citizens were willing to admit. Ross argues that the rioters sought law and order, justice, republican government, and reform just as the concerned citizens at the Music Hall did. The evidence does not support such an assertion, particularly since the rioters left the criminals in the jail alone and concentrated their efforts on destroying public and private property. Furthermore, the violence was senseless, mainly the work of scattered groups of hoodlums and young boys. As the \textit{Ironton Register} reported, "the small boy made a

\(^{105}\)Church to Hoadly, in \textit{ARAG 1884}, 192; Tunison, \textit{The Cincinnati Riot}, 57, 60; \textit{Cincinnati News Journal}, March 31, 1884.
big figure in the mob." Ross takes the riot casualty lists, compares them with the city directory, and determines that the rioters represented a stable portion of the working class community. Unfortunately, there is no proof that the casualties were actually rioters or just victims of the violence. Contemporary accounts indicate that most of the rioters were not righteous laborers, but working men bent on plunder. What is important is not the mobs' composition but the fact that the rioters were behaving in a criminal manner. Socialists such as Justus Schwab could hope all they wanted for revolution, but the riot was mindless violence pure and simple. The people of Cincinnati were carrying on a proud tradition of civil unrest.106

In the view of National Guard and state officials, the troops performed very well in Cincinnati. Governor Hoadly felt that the Guard did its duty "fearlessly and faithfully in the face of almost insuperable difficulties," and General Finley thought that federal troops could not have done better. The regimental commanders were unanimous in their praise for their soldiers' conduct. Colonel Hunt reported that his 1st Regiment did not "get panicky and lose their heads," as the local newspapers claimed, but "were cool and steady and under perfect discipline;" Colonel Hetrick described his 2nd Regiment as eager to "fight bitterly every inch of ground in the defense of the laws of the great State of Ohio;" Colonel Williamson's 3rd Regiment exhibited "good behavior and soldierlike conduct;" Colonel Entrekin's 6th Regiment performed its duty cheerfully and with dispatch; Colonel Freeman's 14th Regiment displayed "coolness and soldierly bearing

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106 Ross, Workers on the Edge, 264-69; Ironton Register, April 3, 1884.
under the most trying circumstances," and Colonel Pocock's 17th Regiment behaved like veterans and "were soldiers worthy of the name.\textsuperscript{107}

Nevertheless, the deployment exposed many problems in the Ohio National Guard. Logistics were chaotic at best. As Surgeon Woods reported, the troops "had just left comfortable homes, warm beds, and well-spread tables, and had not been inured to the varied forms of exposure now before them." The troops did not have enough blankets and overcoats and suffered accordingly from exposure. In the 17th Regiment alone, forty-seven men suffered from diarrhea, chills, and fever. The regiments improvised sleeping quarters, using law offices, drugstores, even the basement of the cathedral. Quartermaster General Ryan provided 28,763 meals at 18\textcent each, but most officers criticized the rations as well. Quartermaster Terry considered them inadequate, complaining that there was no sugar, milk, butter, vegetables, plates, or cutlery, just coffee, bread, and poorly-cooked ham. Many of the men had to sit on the sidewalk as they ate. The 1st Battery ate at local restaurants at their own expense, since they did not like the commissary food. Of course, such complaints would confirm the worst prejudices of anti-militia regular officers such as Emory Upton. Nevertheless, Surgeon Woods criticized the poor logistical arrangements and found it strange that the state expected "the best of soldierly service," yet treated the troops with "marked indifference."

\textsuperscript{107}Dayton Daily Democrat, April 3, 1884; Finley, in ARAG 1884, 70; Commanders' reports in ARAG 1884, 226-67.
The legislature would have to support its National Guard better if it expected faithful service.\textsuperscript{108}

Of course, not all the troops served the state faithfully. The failure of many Cincinnati Guardsmen to report for duty was a great embarrassment. Payroll records for the 1st Regiment indicate that as many as half of its troops could have been absent without leave (AWOL). Company F's records are missing, but in the other six companies, 162 received payment for riot duty while 182 were listed as AWOL. A third of the 2nd Battery did not report for duty. Such poor attendance made the deployment of troops from outside Cincinnati inevitable if the riot were to be put down by state troops and not the police. Some units outside Cincinnati had problems as well. The 4th Regiment's disorderly retreat was the most extreme example, but the troops lived near Cincinnati in the Dayton area, and thus knew the initial cause of the riot. As far away as Cleveland, however, troops did not report for duty. Company A of the 5th Regiment had thirty men AWOL, while forty-three reported for duty.\textsuperscript{109}

Thus, the entire Ohio National Guard did not deploy to Cincinnati to quell the riot. As of 4:45 p.m. on Monday, March 31, after the deployment ended, there were 2,499 troops in the city. The ONG's official strength puts the number deployed in perspective. On November 15, 1883, 5,472 men were on the rolls. A year later, there were 5,828. Thus, less than half of the ONG actually deployed to Cincinnati. Troops who were AWOL or who deserted explain part of the shortfall, but there were other

\textsuperscript{108}Woods, in ARAG 1884, 246-47; Jones, in ARAG 1884, 229; Terry, in ARAG 1884, 248; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 2, 1884.

\textsuperscript{109}See Table 4.
mitigating factors. Many men were out of town when their units were called up and had a legitimate excuse not to deploy. Others were sick, although some could, of course, have been feigning illness. The fact that some units deployed on a Sunday was a factor as well. There was no telegraph service to some small towns on Sunday, so some companies could not be mustered. Other units could not get special railroad service on Sunday. In defense of the Ohio National Guard leadership, it did manage to deploy a large number of men on short notice.\footnote{110}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Sample of Ohio National Guard Units Paid for Cincinnati Riot Duty}
\begin{tabular}{llllll}
\hline
Unit & Paid & AWOL & Excused\(^\dagger\) & Out of Town & Sick \\
\hline
A-1 & 17 & 25 & 12 & 1 & 1 \\
B-1* & 36 & 4 & 2 & 2 & 2 \\
C-1 & 24 & 35 & 2 & 2 & 2 \\
D-1 & 20 & 50 & 2 & 1 & 1 \\
H-1 & 40 & 28 & 1 & 4 & 1 \\
I-1 & 25 & 40 & 2 & 4 & 1 \\
1st Rgt., less Co. F & 162 & 182 & 27 & 7 & \\
1-4 & 21 & 35 & & & \\
A-5 & 43 & 30 & & & \\
I-6 & 46 & 11 & & & \\
B-14 & 53 & 2 & 1 & 4 & \\
F-14 & 41 & 1 & 13 & & \\
E-16 & 39 & 1 & 10 & 1 & \\
A-9Bn & 39 & 3 & 18 & 1 & \\
B-9Bn & 26 & 30 & & & \\
1st Bty & 54 & 7 & & & \\
2nd Bty & 41 & 21 & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\(\dagger\)Company B, 1st Regiment had already been on duty for several days to safeguard the armory. Its troops had no choice whether or not to serve, unless they wanted to desert.

SOURCE: Adjutant General, \textit{Muster, Payroll, and Inspection Reports}, Ohio State Historical Society Archives, Columbus, Series 2528, Box 51, 228.

\footnote{110}{ARAG 1884, 196.}
The authorities dealt severely with those who refused to do their duty. Captain Joyce of the 2nd Battery planned to discharge the six men who deserted and to replace them "with new and better material." Some of the 1st Regiment soldiers actually participated in the riot, and others, such as Lieutenants Valentine Beiser of Company F and Frank Kline of Company A, disobeyed orders to suppress the riot. In July, a general court martial found Beiser guilty of disobeying orders and dishonorably discharged him from state service. The court found Kline guilty of deserting his command in the face of the enemy and sentenced him to a fine of $100, three months' imprisonment in the Hamilton County jail, and a dishonorable discharge from state service. In addition, the leadership of the Cincinnati ONG units resigned shortly after the riot. Colonel Hunt, Lieutenant Colonel John Johnston, and Major James Morgan of the 1st Regiment resigned on June 19, June 21, and May 20 respectively. In the 2nd Battery, Second Lieutenant Fuller resigned on May 28, and Captain Joyce resigned on September 18.\footnote{Joyce, in ARAG 1884, 238; General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, in ARAG 1884, 96-9; Adjutant General's Department, Regimental Officer Roster, Ohio State Historical Society Archives, Columbus, Series 73, vol. 55.}

The authorities reserved the harshest punishment for the 4th Regiment. On April 8, Governor Hoadly relieved Colonel Mott from command and arrested him and Lieutenant Colonel George Phillips for "disobedience of orders and other misconduct" during the riot. A court of inquiry headed by Colonel Pocock of the 17th Regiment investigated the charges against the 4th Regiment officers. The court found that if one of the governor's staff had met the regiment at the depot, as in the 14th Regiment's case, the 4th Regiment probably would have done its duty. The court considered the halt
halfway to the court house "disastrous." The court said that the regiment had as many
good men as any other unit in the State and was sympathetic to Colonel Mott, but it
could not condone his regiment's conduct. Mott and his officers had their orders, and
their duty was clear. They should have proceeded to the jail, done their duty "with
enthusiasm," and ensured that their men followed orders. Therefore, the court found the
following officers guilty of misconduct and suggested they be allowed to resign for the
good of the service:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel Frank Mott</th>
<th>Incompetency and disobedience of orders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel George Phillips</td>
<td>Leaving his command without orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant William Anderson</td>
<td>Absence without leave and disobedience of orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain William Wooster</td>
<td>Disobedience of orders and desertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant William Buckles</td>
<td>Absence without leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Charles Guenkel</td>
<td>Intoxication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant John Walters</td>
<td>Desertion</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The state authorities disbanded the regiment on May 31, as it had "become inefficient
as an organization," and its faithful troops became the nucleus of the newly-formed 7th
Regiment. Such was the penalty for failure in the state's service.\textsuperscript{112}

Although the officers thought that the troops behaved well and made a good
impression, some citizens condemned the Guard's conduct. The \textit{Cincinnati News Journal}
reported that some people boycotted members of the 1st Regiment for having done their
duty. One member of the 2nd Battery even lost his civilian job as a result of his doing
his duty. Many people believed that most of the Guard's victims were innocent and
indiscriminately killed by gunfire. Briggs Swift, seventy-year-old head of the meat-
packing firm, was shot in the thigh and thought that some of the soldiers were "nervous

\textsuperscript{112} Court of Inquiry---Fourth Regiment, in \textit{ARAG 1884}, 297-300.
and reckless." The *Volksblatt* questioned the wisdom of calling out the militia in the first place, believing that if the authorities had instead relied on the police, peace could have been restored without loss of life.¹¹³

Socialists likewise criticized the Ohio National Guard. "Cincinnati" considered the violence "a rage of militia terror" and thought that Sheriff Hawkins incited the troops, who were in "a ferocious panic." The typographers' union declared that membership in the Guard was "inconsistent with the duties and obligations of trade unionists," and urged working men to withdraw from the ONG as soon as possible. A meeting of the Trades Assembly of Cincinnati on April 4 expressed the harshest view of the militia's conduct. Claiming that "the militia are a detriment to society and should be abolished," the members passed a vote of thanks to the 4th Regiment for not staying and taking part in the bloodshed, which must have been little comfort to Colonel Mott.¹¹⁴

Nevertheless, many citizens realized that the troops restored order to a chaotic situation and praised their conduct. One policeman said that if any innocent people died they had only themselves to blame. He thought that innocent bystanders should have enough sense to stay at home and to keep away from the mob. Of course, there was more than one mob, and it was difficult to keep clear of the highly-mobile violence. The *Cincinnati Times Star* summed up the attitude of what it called the "respectable people" when it asked: "What do we maintain the militia for, if it is not to shoot when occasion

¹¹³*Cincinnati News Journal*, April 3, 1884; Joyce, in *ARAG 1884*, 238; *Cincinnati Commercial Gazette*, March 31, 1884; *The Great Cincinnati Riots!*, 45.

demands?" It admitted that the authorities handled some things poorly, but thought it was unjust to criticize the militia, who had done the best they could. Even the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette admitted the valuable service the troops performed, saying that they were due "the utmost kindness and the most respectful consideration."\(^{115}\)

What counted most was that the city of Cincinnati and the state government approved of the Ohio National Guard's conduct. On March 31, the city council passed a vote of thanks to the military for "the efficient aid rendered the civil authorities," and the state legislature endorsed the Guard's action. Governor Hoadly expressed the gratitude of the "law and order citizens" when he congratulated the ONG for its successful efforts "in sustaining the civil authorities." He praised the soldiers' courage and loyalty in carrying out a "difficult and dangerous" mission. The Ohio National Guard had met the expectations of its supporters.\(^{116}\)

Critics questioned the ability of the authorities, but for the most part officials discharged their duties well. There were undoubtedly problems, such as the confusion surrounding the 4th Regiment's arrival. Better coordination could have improved the situation. The New York Times accused Governor Hoadly of "conservatism almost bordering on cowardice," and accused the ONG and police of having no "settled plan or competent leadership." In fairness to Hoadly, he had advice from trusted residents recommending that no troops be sent. When he did decide to send reinforcements, he and his staff worked closely with railroad managers and deployed, without incident, most

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\(^{115}\) The Great Cincinnati Riots\(^1\), 55; Cincinnati Times Star, March 31, 1884; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, March 31, 1884.

\(^{116}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 1, 1884; General Orders No. 9, in ARAG 1884, 211.
of the state's Guard units. Colonel Hunt thought the delay contributed to the unrest Saturday night. Rioting began around 8:00 p.m., and the 4th and 14th Regiments did not arrive until 9:30 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. respectively. A more timely arrival of reinforcements may have saved the court house from burning, but some people were already furious at the militia and would have rioted anyway. Sunday's rioting proves that troop presence earlier on Saturday would not necessarily have stopped the riot; to a certain extent, the riot had to burn itself out. If any of the authorities can be criticized, it is Mayor Stephens, who let matters get out of control and had to rely on state officials to clean up the mess.\textsuperscript{117}

The most important consideration concerning the Ohio National Guard's deployment is whether or not the movement was necessary in the first place. The \textit{Cincinnati News Journal} thought that Sheriff Hawkins was wrong to call out the troops on Friday night, since they were inexperienced and did more harm to themselves than to the mob. The fact that Corporal Charles Cook received severe powder burns on his face during the jail tunnel engagement suggests that troops in the rear ranks wounded him. Nevertheless, the police seemed to be unable to deal with the unrest. Charles Wust thought that a sufficient number of policemen could not be summoned, particularly since the jail was near one of the worst districts in town and there were many "turbulent and desperate" men available to fill the mobs' ranks. As sheriff of Hamilton County, Hawkins had the authority to call out the militia, and he apologized to no one for his actions. He took seriously his duty to safeguard the county jail, and can perhaps be

\textsuperscript{117}\textit{New York Times}, March 30 and 31, 1884.
faulted for being too quick to rely on massive military force to restore order. Hawkins's political career certainly did not suffer because of his performance during the Riot. By 1890, he was Adjutant General for Governor James E. Campbell. The Cincinnati police force was too small to deal with the massive uprising, and thus served primarily as a barrier between the crowds and the troops at the barricades. Once the violence got out of hand and the police proved powerless, military force was the logical next step. The "respectable" classes expected nothing less.\textsuperscript{118}

Finally, was the deployment of troops to Cincinnati justified? Given the inability of the police to deal with the rioters, Hawkins's decision to call out the local militia is understandable. His primary responsibility was to safeguard the jail. Hawkins's action, however, started the authorities down a slippery slope, which ended with every regiment in the state being called out. What had been a local conflict escalated into a statewide, even national, concern.\textsuperscript{119} If the reaction of the 1st Regiment to Hawkins's call would have been better, the riot might have been stopped on Friday night. However, the poor response did little but embolden the crowd, who saw that decision and courage were lacking on the part of city officials. When the militia fired on the crowd in the jail tunnel, it was understandable. The mob was throwing bricks and stones and firing pistols at the troops, wounding several. The tunnel was dark, the troops were confused, the mob

\textsuperscript{118}Cincinnati News Journal, March 29, 1884; The Great Cincinnati Riots!, 46; Dayton Daily Democrat, April 4, 1884.

\textsuperscript{119}The New York Times devoted four of six columns on page one to riot coverage on March 30, and six of seven columns on March 31.
was out of control. The gunfire did help disperse the mob, but the situation outside the jail got out of hand. Only a massive display of force could then deal with the unrest.

The performance of the 14th Regiment showed what a resolute unit could accomplish. Colonel Freeman seems to have been a decisive and clear-headed commander, and his troops responded to his example. The regiment's determined advance from the depot and resolute action at the court house awed bystanders and helped quell the violence on Saturday night. Governor Hoadly congratulated Freeman's men in particular for their judgment, gallantry, and job well done. Admittedly, the passions aroused by the riot needed time to burn themselves out, so a more determined performance by the 1st Regiment on Friday night might not have mattered. Nevertheless, the 14th Regiment showed the value of decisiveness and performed the mission that National Guard supporters expected. In Colonel Freeman's view, the regiment upheld the state's laws and dignity.\(^{120}\)

The Riot prompted the state government to give more support to the Ohio National Guard. On April 2, the legislature passed a bill providing for an annual brigade encampment of five to eight days between May 1 and November 1. The act further stipulated that the camps would be governed by United States Army regulations. Unfortunately for the commanders, the state still did not provide adequately for the ONG's maintenance. The summer encampments held in July and August, 1884 were a mixed success. Colonel Freeman reported that the ONG "must be better provided for," and Colonel Jonathan Norton had to charge an admission fee to camp visitors in order

\(^{120}\) *ARAG* 1884, 31.
to defray expenses. He wanted the state to show "proper appreciation" for her forces and not make them "go into the show-business." There was also little riot training at the camps. The brigades took part in sham battles along neat Napoleonic lines, and had to concentrate on close-order drill and other rudiments of soldiering. At the camp in 1885, Colonel James Shellenberger did train his 3rd Regiment in "Street Riot Movement" while marching them to the railroad station at the end of camp, but the ONG seems to have been in a state of denial about its mission. At the 1885 encampment, Army inspectors found ONG units deficient in guard duty. The War Department considered guard duty crucial, since the militia would most likely be called on to protect property. The Cincinnati Riot had demonstrated the most likely use of Guard force, but Guard leaders instead focused on training for the Civil War.¹²¹

The ONG did learn from the experience at Cincinnati and was well prepared for yet another riot in Cincinnati in 1886. In 1884, Quartermaster Terry had recommended that to suppress, or better yet, to prevent a riot, troops should deploy as regiments or brigades and assemble at a convenient place before reaching their destination. Thus, by sheer force of numbers and discipline, the troops could disperse mobs without loss of life. On May 7, 1886, the mayor of Cincinnati requested ONG presence during a riot. The local units were already on duty, and the governor sent twenty-nine infantry companies and two artillery batteries. The troops assembled at the Carthage fairgrounds about ten miles from Cincinnati, and they were never needed. The crisis passed, and the

¹²¹The State of Ohio, General and Local Laws, 98-99; Freeman, in ARAG 1884, 35; Norton, in ARAG 1884, 41; ARAG 1885, 22-23, 29.
troops, 1,828 in all, redeployed after May 13. Cooler heads prevailed on all sides, and the actual use of state force was not necessary. The troops did not have to use violent measures to be effective.\(^\text{122}\)

\(^{122}\)Terry, in \textit{ARAG} \textit{1884}, 249; \textit{ARAG} \textit{1886}, 58-73.
CONCLUSION

The events at Cincinnati illustrate the process by which late nineteenth-century American society attempted to maintain order. Citizens attempted, unsuccessfully, to reform society by peaceful means. The underclass took advantage of civil unrest and distorted it into an orgy of violence that, although not as deadly, reminded many frightened citizens of the Paris Commune. The rioters cared little for judicial reform. Looting did little to eliminate injustice or corrupt government and was a strange way to vent anger against the Ohio National Guard. While critics, particularly labor unions, vilified the ONG, the "respectable" classes applauded its performance. The riot was a search for order gone mad.

Cincinnati seems to have benefitted little from the experience of the riots. The Cincinnati News Journal said that if the rioters succeeded in forcing the authorities to apprehend criminals and to administer justice "with more swiftness and certainty, their mission will not have been in vain." There were some actions that encouraged the "law and order citizens." In June 1884, T.C. Campbell, William Berner's lawyer, was brought up on charges of packing juries, filing false affidavits, and perjury in many court cases. Joseph Palmer, who lacked the defense team from which Berner benefitted, was found guilty of first-degree murder and hanged on July 15, 1885. Little really changed in Cincinnati, however. Before Berner's sentence expired, many prominent citizens
petitioned the prison managers for his release; he was paroled, and left prison quietly. Most importantly, election violence in October 1884 led to another riot. The police handled the situation, but two policemen and one black man died, and a large number were wounded. Corrupt government and justice continued, and Cincinnati did not get its reform after all.\footnote{Cincinnati News Journal, March 31, 1884; Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, June 22, 1884 and July 16, 1885; Charles E. Creager, The Fourteenth Ohio National Guard (Columbus: Landon, 1899). 32; Miller, Boss Cox's Cincinnati, 61-62.}

The Cincinnati Riot tested convictions such as those Captain Desmond expressed in his speech to the National Guard Association. The troops at Cincinnati had two choices. They could refuse to serve in a cause in which they did not believe, or they could perform the duty that the state of Ohio required. The ONG had been called upon to protect life and property when the local authorities had failed. The violence was excessive, but in spite of many difficulties the troops restored peace. "Cincinnati's" claims notwithstanding, the rioters were hardly a crowd of good-natured fellows bent on fun. The troops, most of whom were young, inexperienced, came from the same class as the rioters, and did not want to be in Cincinnati in the first place, performed the best they could given the circumstances.

The Ohio National Guard, then, performed its mission effectively and fulfilled its role as defender of order in the state. It restored order, it deployed large numbers of troops on short notice, and it redeployed without incident. There were some problems, but the state possessed an instrument capable of enforcing the government's will. The Guard troops were in a difficult position in Cincinnati. If they had not put down the riot,
possibly more people would have been killed, and more property would have been damaged. The militia did quell the riot and was criticized for the way in which it did so. Because of the retirement of experienced officers and men and subsequent reorganization of units, many of the companies sent to the riot were poorly prepared. Most of the units proved their worth, however, and accomplished their mission in a manner which reflected great credit upon the ONG. The Ohio National Guard had come a long way since its low point in 1869.
APPENDIX

Units of the Ohio National Guard in 1884

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Hometown</th>
<th>Nickname</th>
<th>Organized on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unattached Infantry (112 men)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>Governor's Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 August 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>Toledo Cadets</td>
<td></td>
<td>17 March 1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Battalion of Infantry (182 men)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>Bushnell Guard</td>
<td>21 April 1874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>Duffy Light Guard</td>
<td>9 February 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Regiment of Infantry (502 men)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>Wayne Guard</td>
<td>13 August 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>Lytle Grays</td>
<td>23 April 1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>Hunt Rifles</td>
<td>13 April 1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>Garfield Rifles</td>
<td>25 September 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>Moore Light Guard</td>
<td>8 December 1874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>Robinson Light Infantry</td>
<td>7 July 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>Lincoln Guard</td>
<td>24 March 1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Regiment of Infantry (370 men)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Findlay</td>
<td>Findlay Guard</td>
<td>10 December 1874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Upper Sandusky</td>
<td>Kirby Light Guard</td>
<td>7 January 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>Melanchthon Guard</td>
<td>14 January 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Van Wert</td>
<td>Gilliland Veteran Guard</td>
<td>18 May 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Bellefontaine</td>
<td>Lawrence Cadets</td>
<td>10 April 1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Kenton</td>
<td>Robinson Guard</td>
<td>9 November 1877</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[1^{24} ARAG 1884, 102-27, 130; Adjutant General's Department, Regimental Rosters, Ohio State Historical Archives, Columbus, Series 162. Unit strengths are an average of November 15, 1883 and November 15, 1884 strengths. Total ONG strength in 1883 was 5,472; total strength in 1884 was 5,828.\]
<table>
<thead>
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<td>Urbana</td>
<td>Urbana Guard</td>
<td>4 February 1876</td>
</tr>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Greenville</td>
<td>Hall Guard</td>
<td>12 April 1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Sidney</td>
<td>Sidney Guard</td>
<td>25 August 1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Troy</td>
<td>Troy Guard</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Piqua</td>
<td>Wikoff Centennial Guard</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Gettysburg</td>
<td>Gettysburg Guard</td>
<td>8 May 1875</td>
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**Fourth Regiment of Infantry (456 men)**

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<thead>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>Dayton Light Guard</td>
<td>30 September 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>Champion City Guard</td>
<td>23 February 1874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Xenia</td>
<td>Fay Light Guard</td>
<td>26 July 1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lebanon Guard</td>
<td>18 September 1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>Hamilton Light Guard</td>
<td>14 October 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Germantown</td>
<td>Germantown Light Guard</td>
<td>14 August 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Miamisburg</td>
<td>Miami Light Guard</td>
<td>17 December 1878</td>
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**Fifth Regiment of Infantry (406 men)**

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<th>Nickname</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>Cleveland Cadets</td>
<td>13 March 1883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Berea</td>
<td>Berea Light Guard</td>
<td>26 September 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>Geneva Rifles</td>
<td>22 November 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>Cleveland Light Guard</td>
<td>30 July 1881</td>
</tr>
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**Sixth Regiment of Infantry (551 men)**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Chillicothe</td>
<td>Sill Guard</td>
<td>16 August 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Washington C.H.</td>
<td>Ely Light Guard</td>
<td>28 April 1875</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Lower Salem</td>
<td>Salem Rifles</td>
<td>24 July 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Ironton</td>
<td>Kirker Rifles</td>
<td>11 August 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>Mount Pleasant Guard</td>
<td>24 May 1881</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Circleville</td>
<td>Circleville Guard</td>
<td>15 October 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>McArthur</td>
<td>Fenton Guard</td>
<td>16 August 1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Waverly</td>
<td>Waverly Guard</td>
<td>22 September 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Middleport</td>
<td>Bishop Guard</td>
<td>17 August 1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Hometown</td>
<td>Nickname</td>
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<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>Akron City Guard</td>
<td>3 January 1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Youngstown</td>
<td>Iron City Guard</td>
<td>19 June 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Wooster</td>
<td>Wooster City Guard</td>
<td>26 February 1881</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>East Palestine</td>
<td>East Palestine Grays</td>
<td>4 September 1875</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Beach City</td>
<td>Beach City Blues</td>
<td>1 June 1876</td>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Wadsworth</td>
<td>Wadsworth Light Guard</td>
<td>3 June 1876</td>
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**Thirteenth Regiment of Infantry (348 men)**

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<td>31 July 1876</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>Loveland</td>
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<td>6 May 1882</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>Ellison Light Guard</td>
<td>9 August 1883</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Waynesville</td>
<td>Harris Guard</td>
<td>25 September 1878</td>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Georgetown</td>
<td>Georgetown Guard</td>
<td>3 September 1877</td>
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**Fourteenth Regiment of Infantry (543 men)**

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<th>Organized on</th>
</tr>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>Pugh Videttes</td>
<td>9 February 1877</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>Thurman Light Guard</td>
<td>19 June 1877</td>
</tr>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Westerville</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2 October 1877</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>Marysville</td>
<td>Curry Cadets</td>
<td>18 July 1877</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Mt. Gilead</td>
<td>Levering Guard</td>
<td>15 August 1878</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>Converse Guard</td>
<td>18 August 1877</td>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Richwood</td>
<td>Gibson Guard</td>
<td>19 July 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Canal Winchester</td>
<td>Potter Light Guard</td>
<td>2 March 1878</td>
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<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Joy Guard</td>
<td>13 February 1879</td>
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**Sixteenth Regiment of Infantry (479 men)**

<table>
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<th>Company</th>
<th>Hometown</th>
<th>Nickname</th>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Toledo</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Sandusky</td>
<td>Sandusky Light Guard</td>
<td>3 May 1875</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>Toledo Grays</td>
<td>15 March 1876</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>Fostoria</td>
<td>Fostoria Light Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Bryan</td>
<td>Bryan Light Guard</td>
<td>6 July 1877</td>
</tr>
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<td>F</td>
<td>Napoleon</td>
<td>Napoleon Light Guard</td>
<td>19 July 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Norwalk</td>
<td>Western Reserve Guard</td>
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<td>H</td>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>Milburn Guard</td>
<td>15 August 1877</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Clyde</td>
<td>McPherson Guard</td>
<td>15 August 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Hometown</td>
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<td>Organized on</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>New Lexington</td>
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<td>10 June 1876</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>Zanesville</td>
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<td>29 August 1881</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Mt. Vernon</td>
<td>Vance Cadets</td>
<td>20 April 1881</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>Ashland</td>
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<td>Coshocton</td>
<td>Coshocton Light Guard</td>
<td>30 September 1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>Newark Guard</td>
<td>21 August 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Hebron</td>
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*Seventeenth Regiment of Infantry (468 men)*

<table>
<thead>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third</td>
<td>Ashtabula</td>
<td>29 January 1876</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>23 November 1872</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>19 July 1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>26 November 1877</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>Marietta</td>
<td>8 January 1878</td>
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*Light Artillery Batteries (421 men)*
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