HOW DECISION TIME AND DEGREE OF ANTICIPATION AFFECT THE
DECISIONMAKING PROCESS AS U.S. DECISIONMAKERS
CONFRONT VARIOUS FOREIGN-POLICY CHALLENGES
VOLUME I

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

M. Kent Bolton, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University

1992

Dissertation Committee:

Charles F. Hermann
Margaret G. Hermann
Brian M. Pollins

Approved by

Adviser

Department of Political Science
[We often] . . . assume that people sat around the table in a seminar-type discussion, having all the facts, . . . But that is rarely the case. Usually decisions are made in a very brief time with enormous pressure and uncertain knowledge.

Henry Kissinger.

The ancientest evil, if it be known to us, bears always lighter on us than a new one of which we know but little.

Montaigne.

[Leaders] are locked in endless battle in which the urgent constantly gains on the important. [Their is] a continual struggle to rescue an element of choice from the pressure of circumstance.

Henry Kissinger.

The process was the author of the policy.

George Ball.
Copyright by
M. Kent Bolton
1992
To My Parents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my indebtedness and deep appreciation to Dr. Charles F. Hermann whose guidance and encouragement have been an integral part of my graduate career at The Ohio State University. His mentorship precipitated this particular study and my interest in comparative foreign-policy studies generally. Additionally, part of the work herein accomplished was made possible through my association with the Mershon Center, whose director is Charles Hermann. I further would like to express my appreciation to both Dr. Margaret G. Hermann and Dr. Brian M. Pollins. Each has read this study and has provided valuable critiques at various stages of its completion. My association with each of these individuals, moreover, has contributed to the overall pleasure that I experienced while completing my doctoral work at The Ohio State University. Having said this, of course, should in no way be construed as imputing responsibility for any errors that may be herein contained to any of these individuals. Any such errors are mine alone. Finally, to my family I wish to express gratitude for their patience and forbearance.
VITA

1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.A., Brigham Young University

1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M.A., Brigham Young University

1988- Present . . . . . . . . . . . Faculty Associate, Arizona State University, Tempe Arizona

Publications

"Sino-Khmer Relations: An Appraisal of China's Foreign Policy Imperatives." In Journal of International and Area Studies 1 (Fall): 65--89.

Field of Study

Political Science

Major Area: International Politics; Comparative Foreign Policy Studies; Decisionmaking

Minor Area: Comparative Politics of Developing Nations
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION .................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................... iii
VITA ........................................................... iv
LIST OF TABLES ............................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................. viii

CHAPTER:                                                                 PAGE:

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................... 7

III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY ............ 17
    INTRODUCTION .......................................... 17
    CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ................................ 19
    Situational Typology of Independent Variables .......... 19
    Requisite Phases of Decisionmaking ...................... 21
    Schematic Representation of Conceptual Framework .... 26
    Central Assumptions and Hypotheses ..................... 30

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK .............................. 48
    Structured or Focused, Case-Study Comparison .......... 48
    Operationalizing the Independent Variables ............. 50

IV. U.S. PRESIDENTS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE FOREIGN-POLICY ESTABLISHMENTS ..................... 59
    INTRODUCTION .......................................... 59
    DECISIONMAKING UNIT APEX AND ROUTINE
    DECISIONMAKING ........................................ 64
    President Harry S. Truman ................................ 65
    President Dwight D. Eisenhower ......................... 74
    President John F. Kennedy ................................ 81
    President Lyndon B. Johnson ............................ 88
    President Richard M. Nixon ............................. 93
    President Gerald R. Ford .............................. 100
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V. SHORT TIME, SURPRISE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUEZ-SINAI, EC-121, MAYAGUEZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SUEZ-SINAI, 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE EC-121 INCIDENT, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VI. SHORT TIME, ANTICIPATION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAY OF PIGS, TONKIN GULF, THE SIX DAY WAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAY OF PIGS, 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TONKIN GULF, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIX-DAY WAR, 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

1. Case Studies for Analysis ........................................ 56
2. Summary Table of Hypotheses for Short Time, Surprise. ..................................................... 180
3. Summary Table of Hypotheses for Short time, Anticipation .................................................. 270
LIST OF FIGURES

1. Situational Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking Typology . 20
2. Typical Stimulus-Response Decision Making . . . . . . . . . 26
3. Stimulus-Response Model of Situational Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4. Stimulus-Response Model of Situational Decision Making in Organizational Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5. Truman Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6. Eisenhower Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7. Kennedy Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8. Johnson Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
9. Nixon Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10. Ford Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

How is the decisionmaking process affected by time and degree of anticipation? Is the process invariant or do certain factors produce observable change? And if change is observable, what sort of change is it and how? Questions such as these are what, in general, we shall be examining in the following study. It is such questions that comprise our particular area of interest. We shall undertake to examine these and other questions concerning U.S. foreign-policy decisionmaking. It is our desire and the objective of this study to investigate the decisionmaking process under differing conditions.

Decision time and degree of anticipation have elsewhere been noted as important factors in explaining decisionmaking behavior generally. In fact, on a very general level most of us who have taken a class on human physiology have learned of the human body's "fight-or-flight" mechanism by which it reacts to, among other things, extreme surprise and time constraint. Many have heard stories of seemingly super-human responses to events in which an immediate reaction was necessary to save a life or to avoid further
catastrophe. Simply put, under the extreme conditions of surprise and in which time is of the essence, people appear to react differently than under the opposite extremes.

Studies of important leaders, as well, responding to events characterized by surprise and short decision time abound. Such examples might range from the national level such as when the mayors of San Francisco and Oakland responded to 1989's unanticipated earthquake or the international level as when President Roosevelt responded to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In either case the leader was presumably caught off guard by the event; in either case an immediate or nearly immediate response was needed to avert the loss of additional lives.

The focus of this study is the impact that decision time and degree of anticipation (awareness) have on U.S. foreign-policy decisionmakers as they confront various foreign-policy challenges. Other studies have followed similar paths of inquiry vis-a-vis the examination of the effect of important variables on U.S. decisionmakers.¹ Some years ago Charles Hermann specifically defined international

¹This has particularly been the case with studies of international and national crises. To cite just a few examples, each with a different methodological approach: See Charles F. Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); Glen Snyder, and Paul Diesing, Conflicts Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); John R. Oneal, Foreign Policy Making in Times of Crisis (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1982); Thomas C. Wiegele, et al., Leaders under Stress (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985).
crises situationally as a function of time, surprise, and threat (Hermann, 1969B). In this oft-cited study Hermann suggests several hypotheses regarding decision making and decisionmakers under various combinations of these situational variables. It will be seen that this study owes a considerable debt to Hermann's scholarship.

In this study we propose to set forth a functional typology of decisionmaking, submit specific hypotheses about how time and surprise impact that decisionmaking, and subject the hypotheses to examination using specific foreign-policy events in which these variables appear in different combinations. We will enumerate hypotheses based on the typology. We then will subject those hypotheses to examination using case studies. Both the typology and the methodology are discussed in Chapter III.

It should be noted that our particular interest in this study concerns the impact the aforementioned variables have on decisionmakers and the decisionmaking process. The study is predicated on decision time and degree of anticipation having important, identifiable, and potentially predictable effects on decisionmaking. We assume that decisions are made by individuals and groups of individuals and not the state as a unitary, reified entity. We further assume that individual decision makers are subject to the organizational context or setting that surrounds them. We will therefore
be interested in analyzing both the decisionmaking unit (DMU) and process.\(^2\)

We postulate decisionmaking as a process with more or less identifiable phases. Indeed, it is the observation that U.S. foreign-policy decisionmaking demonstrates remarkable continuity temporally and spatially that, in part, prompted this study. We wondered, for example, why similar foreign policy outcomes in such seemingly diverse administrations as Kennedy's and Nixon's seemed to occur. If such vastly different types of presidents produced the same sort of foreign-policy outputs, there must be something significantly similar in the process of arriving at decisions. And if that were so, what important variables might be expected to have an observable impact on the process and how?

We have already stated several assumptions. These will be restated in Chapter III. It is, however, important to note here that they are assumptions we choose to make for methodological and substantive reasons. We wish to be explicit as to our choices and biases since they remain implicit throughout this study.

What follows then is our attempt to investigate the impact of decision time and degree of anticipation upon the

\(^2\)The decisionmaking unit (DMU) shall be defined as the nexus of decisionmakers, advisors, and bureaucratic actors involved in making and implementing decisions. We anticipate variance in its composition depending on length of time to respond to a given challenge and its degree of anticipation of that challenge.
process of decisionmaking. We of course hope to observe trends that might be generalizable. We realize, of course, that by examining U.S. foreign policy we may appear to some as being ethnocentric. This is neither our objective nor our desire. We believe that evidence abounds that the world is becoming increasingly interdependent. Nonetheless, having been socialized in the U.S. system it is that system and its foreign-policy decisionmaking process with which we are most familiar. Thus examining case studies in which the U.S. is challenged by an external actor, and examining the response to that challenge from the U.S. perspective seems only logical.

If the process of U.S. foreign-policy decisionmaking is affected in observable and predictable ways, it is reasonable for us to expect that it can be better understood. By better understanding U.S. foreign-policy decisionmaking, we hope that cumulation in the sub-discipline of decisionmaking is achieved. It is through understanding the process, what affects it and how, what perturbs it and causes it to respond in particular ways, that a better understanding of U.S. decisionmaking and presumably overall world decisionmaking is obtained. And this, we feel certain, in the long run enhances peaceful transition toward the interdependence that is so apparent and so much part of today's world on so many levels.
Finally we must discuss the outline and progression of the study that will follow. We have intentionally arranged this study in a way that we hope to be easy to follow and orderly in its progression. Following this Introduction is Chapter II which permits us to review some of the literature in which this work is grounded. Following the literature review, we move to the conceptual typology and analytic framework (Chapter III): its phases and indicators. We pose the typology as having the decisionmaking process affected in specific ways by different combinations of our independent variables. We derive and state from this certain hypotheses. And we explain the ways in which we collected data and operationalized variables. In Chapter IV we examine the presidential administrations that are studied in the case studies that form the core of our work--there are six administrations under our investigation. We attempt to establish a baseline for each administration around its influential decisionmakers and the way it typically sets about making foreign-policy decisions. This is for later comparison. Finally in Chapters V through VIII we look at case studies. In each chapter we shall consider three case studies identifiable by its combination of our independent variables. Chapter IX provides our conclusions and final observations.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The growing corpus of literature associated with international politics is vast. It includes the classics: Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War; the writings of Aristotle on political leadership and behavior while teaching at Plato’s Academy and those of other early political philosophers; also Machiavelli’s Discourses and The Prince would doubtless need inclusion. A proliferation of tracts and treatise arising out of the milieu of 18th Century Enlightenment and 19th Century Liberalism increased the volume as well as the richness of this literature. In the present century we have witnessed a similar proliferation of writings, explorations, and analyses of the political phenomena that are part and parcel of world politics. In most instances today’s scholarship can be traced back to having its origins in either the classics or the literature of Enlightenment and Liberalism. We shall see that this study too can be seen to have arisen out of one of these traditions. Specifically, it comes out of the latter tradition and its associated disciplines wherein the co-evolution of
classical economics and modern political thinking has occurred.

As the evolution of international politics progressed this century, sub-fields or disciplines developed as well. One such discipline, out of which this study flows, is that of foreign-policy studies. Initially, foreign-policy studies were ethnocentric: the analyst or practitioner undertook to understand his or her state's array of policies that were directed externally. Or the analyst would attempt to study the converse: another state's array of policies directed at the analyst's own state. Either way, the state appeared to be the central unit of analysis.

In the 1960s, new approaches, frameworks, and indeed units of analysis were explored. A rich body of scholarship developed around the "event" as a promising analytic unit. Not only did the event, as the unit of analysis, free scholarship from previous reliance strictly on the state as some reified object, but it lent itself to the methodological techniques that were also emerging in the social sciences. These techniques, collectively, were known by the appellation behavioralism.

A few of the notable studies and data sets that were spawned during this period include: Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB); McClelland's World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS); Rummel's Dimensionality of Nations (DON); and Hermann's Comparative Research on the Events of
Nations (CREON). Typologies were constructed in which the actions, or events, of nations could be classified so as to better understand why, when, and how events take place.

These scholars, and many others, shared a common interest in the comparative research of foreign policy. That is to say, they did not simply wish to understand their own country's actions or reactions with respect to an external actor. Instead they wished to glean common patterns, generalizations, and increased understanding by a broad comparative approach. This comparative approach, perforce, mitigated against the state-centric orientation of earlier studies. The discipline flourished for a time. Rosenau's well-known "Fad, Fantasy, or Field?" article in International Studies Quarterly (1968) captured the flavor of the era and extolled the potential usefulness of its practice.

Recently many of these same scholars re-examined their previous endeavors given the passage of time and the changes which had begun to take place in world politics. They issued a call for new frameworks, models, and conceptual orientations which shared a devotion to comparative research and whose purpose was to meet contemporary needs of foreign-policy research. The fruits of their effort can be seen in a collection of essays whose purpose is to critically examine and chart new directions for the discipline (Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau, 1987). It is an important contribution to scholarship for a number of reasons. The
reason that is most relevant to our purpose here, however, has to do with the way the essays consider past and future theoretical orientations that grapple with the state as a unit of analysis versus the individual decisionmaker and the wide range of analytic units in between. For it is this same issue with which many, perhaps most, students of world politics have grappled over time.

We began by mentioning the evolution of international politics from the classics to modern scholarship growing out of the Enlightenment period. We then briefly discussed the progression of foreign-policy studies and recent developments in the discipline. This leads us to the consideration of two theoretical traditions: Balance of Power, and Decisionmaking.

BALANCE OF POWER AND THE STATE

The classics revolved around balance of power—power equilibria, power vacuums, as well as numerous other similar concepts. These metaphors, some theorists reasoned, were useful in explaining the stability-instability dynamic that they saw as leading to wars. It may be war between ethnic clans, principalities, city states, or by extension it may be wars between states in the contemporary world system. But the analytic unit, at least implicitly, is the state.

These explanations and the theories that resulted from them served rather well. Many wars, to be sure, were easily explained by disequilibria caused by the growth of one state
and the sense of alarm it created in a competitor or neighboring state. Thucydides, for instance, noticed that the Greek confederacy of Athens and Sparta, and other smaller members, which defeated Persia began as an allied effort to defeat a foreign aggressor. But with victory Athens assumed titular leadership of the confederacy and continued to grow. Athens enclosed itself in nearly impermeable walls that permitted it a pivotal position so long as it continued to rule its contiguous access to the sea. This in turn created, at least as perceived by Sparta, an imbalance—a disequilibrium in power. As a result new alliances were formed and wars followed putatively to correct the imbalance. This example and others seemed to fit the construct; balance of power became more than a metaphor over time evolving into a theoretical concept. Much of what we call Realism and realpolitik owes its existence to such early insightful observation.

DECISIONMAKING

In this century some scholars increasingly came to view realpolitik as problematic. When imbalances of power arose, Realism implied that a sort of rational, cost-benefit analysis was conducted by the state's leader(s) to respond. But leaders may well perceive things differently. This led to a closer examination of the actual decisions made by leaders. That decisionmaking in the classics was based on a
rational-choice schema, new scholarship viewed not as an assumption but as an hypothesis demanding testing.

One pioneering study by Snyder and associates suggested a decisionmaking framework that placed a decisionmaker in his organizational context and attempted to distinguish the impact of his internal and external environments (Hermann and Peacock: 22-23). This opened the way for political science to follow various and sometimes diverse foci of decisionmaking theories--many of which are actively studied today. In a later study Snyder noted that the preferences of decisionmakers, though possibly individual in their inception, "derive from the rules of the organizational system, shared organizational experience over a period of time, and the information available to the decisional unit as particular decisions are made" (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapins, 1965: 172). That decisions were made over time meant that a process existed during which decisionmaking was affected by various influences over the course of the decisionmaking. This required examination of the process itself.

Other social sciences had been looking at decision-making processes as well. Herbert Simon's Administrative Behavior (1957) challenged "rationality" and instead posited "bounded rationality" and the decisionmaker who responds by selecting, from his choices, the first satisfactory one available. This Simon called "satisficing" behavior. Cyert
and March also challenged the validity of "rationality" in business decisions in their *Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (1963). Each sought to explain the decisionmaking process and in so doing described characteristics such as "incrementalism," "standard operating procedures," and "bureaucratic inertia" among others. Each of these characteristics implied time and process.

Political science studies also began to consider the process. The evolution of said studies roughly paralleled other social sciences. Two such studies which we briefly consider here are Allison and Steinbruner. In Allison's (1971) comparison of three theoretical perspectives of the decisionmaking process in the Cuban Missile Crisis he considered the Classical or Rational Choice model in which decisions, as already stated, are collectively taken by the state; which are purposive; and which are arrived at in a more or less risk-benefit calculation. Against this ideal type he compared his Organizational Process Model and Bureaucratic Politics Model. In his Organizational Model he agreed with Cyert and March: the process of decisionmaking is connected to the "machinery" that carries out that process. His third model, Bureaucratic Politics has been criticized for contributing little to our understanding and of being useful only in connection with his Organizational Model, not apart from it (Smith, 1987: 26; also Snyder and Diesing, 1977: 355).
Steinbruner's (1974) Cybernetic Theory of decisionmaking is equally important and concerned with process. He begins by discussing the classical rational-choice model which he calls the "analytic paradigm." Its failure to explain, for instance, why governments seemingly make decisions that are patently against their national interest leads him to his cybernetic model. Cybernetic decisionmaking posits decisionmaking processes that are flexible and adaptable to the environment. (His analogy of the tennis player adjusting to the movement of the ball is illustrative.) The decisionmaker(s) collectively reduce the task at hand into singularly simple increments. This effectively allows the decisionmaker to avoid the strict rigor of analytic thinking in perpetuity. Steinbruner was unwilling, however, to supplant the analytic paradigm with the cybernetic as the best explanation of the decisionmaking process. Rather, he argued, it is probably a combination of both types depending upon circumstances. And it is these circumstances or occasions therefore which become important.

The examination of the occasion or setting in which decisions are made was considered by Snyder, and associates, in their framework that we mentioned above. Snyder noted that some decision settings are more structured than others. The urgency of a particular setting, for example, may have a significant impact on the decisionmaking. Later new situational variables were introduced. The situational context,
wherein lack of prior consideration of the event's possibility and decision time were determined to be significant. Robinson and Snyder said that such decisionmaking occasions are ones that "arise without prior planning, allow short time for response, and have high value consequences" (Robinson and Snyder, 1965: 442). This was an interesting proposition. Charles Hermann empirically studied crisis decisionmaking in his works (Hermann, 1969A; Hermann, 1969B). As a result he determined that crises are "defined in terms of three situational attributes: Crisis is a situation that (1) threatens the high-priority goals of the decisionmaking unit; (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the situation is transformed; and (3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit when it occurs" (Hermann, 1969A: 29).

Hermann's simulation study assessed these three situational variables as well as tested hypotheses concerning the behavior to be expected given the variables. In his work (1969B) he also identified types of behavior. It is, in fact, these behaviors and the process surrounding them that we wish to examine in this study. It is thus in line with these decisionmaking studies, particularly those emphasizing process, that this study owes a debt. We are specifically interested in testing some of Hermann's explicit as well as implicit hypotheses in terms of the process that surrounds them. Thus we have stayed cognizant of the situational
context but have sought to look at the process associated with that context.

Hermann develops (1969B) a three-dimensional cube—"Crisis Cube"—whose corners represent configurations of the three variables or attributes noted above. Each of these eight corners then is distinguishable by its three dichotomized variables which yield eight \(2^3=8\) types of decisionmaking situations. He gives each situation a descriptive name (e.g., crisis, reflexive, routinized, etc.) which he then discusses. In his discussion he makes particular observations about the decisionmaking and he suggests that accordingly expected behaviors ought to be testable. It is testing said observations that we are going to attempt in the following pages. Not all of Hermann's eight configurations shall be examined. In particular we shall be interested in holding threat at a constant yet relatively high level. In this way we avoid a re-examination of crisis decisionmaking, per se, which has been done extensively elsewhere.

We shall presently turn our attention to testing Hermann's observations as well as ones we shall hypothesize (below). It is hoped that by positing the relationship, deductively, and by then testing the hypotheses that derive from that typology, we may add to the body of literature on decisionmaking just described.
CHAPTER III

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we shall seek to accomplish two tasks. The first is to introduce the conceptual or what we will call the situational framework. The framework, as we shall see, conceptualizes the decisionmaking process in a particular way which permits us to investigate that process. It permits us to observe change in our dependent variable: the foreign-policy decisionmaking process. In particular we seek to examine the impact that our independent variables, decision time and degree of anticipation, have on that process. To examine that impact we shall posit a typology of foreign-policy decisionmaking that varies under different configurations of the two independent variables. We then develop hypotheses which we attempt to test.

The second task is to examine the methodology which we shall employ to accomplish the first task. That methodology is a comparative approach known as a focused comparison. Though we employ a methodology that has been widely used, we augment it in ways that we feel buttresses the methodology and which allows for more robust generalizations. We shall
first introduce the methodology and discuss the way in which our variables are therein operationalized. This will, in later chapters, provide us with a means by which our variables may be tested using historical, case studies of U.S. foreign-policy decisionmaking.

Before progressing we should like to restate the problem area as we briefly introduced it in Chapter I. The problem area in which we are interested is the process of foreign-policy decisionmaking. In particular we shall examine U.S. foreign policy. However, we wish to state plainly that our long-term objective is to generalize our findings insofar as that proves possible. The immediate concern, nonetheless, is to examine the process using case studies of U.S. decisionmaking. But we do not wish to appear overly ethnocentric; we simply use cases with which we are most familiar.

From our problem area we wish to explore a research question. Our research question is aimed at determining how the process of foreign-policy decisionmaking is affected by the occasion or setting in which decisionmaking takes place. This is the process-oriented literature to which we referred in the previous chapter. Specifically, we are interested in the independent variables which we believe to be indicative of particular types of decisionmaking processes.

First, we are interested in time as an independent variable. How does the length of decision time (viz., short
or long) influence the process of decisionmaking? Our second independent variable of interest is degree of anticipation. How does anticipating a foreign-policy threat or challenge affect the decisionmaking process?

Thus we pose our research question this way. *What is the impact of decision time (the time in which decisionmakers have to respond) and degree of anticipation (whether the challenge was anticipated or, rather, surprised decisionmakers) on the foreign-policy decisionmaking process?*

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

**Situational Typology of Independent Variables**

As we noted in the previous chapter international politics and the study of foreign policy have taken various paths. No single path is necessarily better than another. We specifically place this study under the rubric of decisionmaking theory; further we noted our interest with process. Finally we clearly acknowledged our indebtedness to previous scholarship and briefly noted the Hermann study of situational variables which forms the basis of this work. We are interested in examining specific U.S. foreign-policy events characterized by four different configurations of situational or independent variables.

The situational variables are seen as exogenous with foreign-policy decisionmaking seen as endogenous. We shall undertake to test specific hypotheses based on a conceptual
typology of decisionmaking. These hypotheses, as we shall shortly see, derive from the conceptual framework and its basis in previous scholarship. The hypotheses that we shall examine are based on the following typology, the requisite phases of decisionmaking that we assume to exist, and the conceptual linkage that follows therefrom.

The first step of constructing our conceptual framework involves specifying the configurations of our dichotomized independent variables. Our independent variables—decision time, degree of anticipation—may be combined in four \(2^2=4\) different combinations. Those combinations are short time with surprise; and short time with anticipation; as well as long time with surprise; and long time with anticipation. These are the four combinations that form our situational typology:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEGREE of ANTICIPATION</th>
<th>Surprise</th>
<th>Anticipation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Configuration1</td>
<td>Configuration2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Configuration3</td>
<td>Configuration4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1

Situational Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking Typology

Now this typology of independent or situational variables forms a methodological construct from which we may
pose questions and examine our research question in a systematic way. It is, quite simply, a hierarchy for investigating the impact of our independent variables. It gives us an order to pursue as we examine our dependent variable. It is not intended to be anything other than a methodological device.

Requisite Phases of Decisionmaking

Now that we have a hierarchy of investigation or a procedural order for our examination we may continue. The next component of the framework must deal with the endogenous or dependent variable. We have specified our dependent variable as the foreign-policy decisionmaking process. The question becomes how do we examine that process.

We begin by specifying what we view as requisite phases of decisionmaking generally. The notion that decisionmaking has certain requisite processes is neither novel nor unique. It is a methodological assumption that we make in order to specify variables and indicators. As an assumption it is not something that we necessarily set out to test. Nonetheless, we do analyze said processes in our concluding chapter.

We believe that decisionmaking, of all kinds, has certain phases or processes that are recurrent. We acknowledge that the decisionmaking associated with, for instance, grocery shopping is qualitatively different than
decisionmaking associated with deciding to initiate the air
war over Iraq (1991). Nonetheless, each instance of
decisionmaking requires the decisionmaker(s) to go through a
process. The following phases, we assume, are minimally
required steps of that process. In other words, there may
well be other processes involved depending upon the
decision’s requirements but these ones are common to all
decisionmaking.

If one accepts that there are certain processes or
phases that are undertaken during decisionmaking, one may
begin to form a functional basis of examining that process.
For us this means that we may form a methodological
framework for examining our dependent variable. Let us
posit the following phases as requisites of any decision-
making process:

1) Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit: the individu-
al(s) who must be brought together in order to respond to a
situation which demands a decision.

We assume during the decisionmaking process that sur-
rounds foreign-policy decisionmaking the president and his
most trusted advisers typically form the apex of decision-
making. Nonetheless, other groups and bureaus will be
activated depending upon the situation: viz., the degree to
which the challenge was anticipated and the time given the
decisionmakers to respond. Thus we may expect to see vary-
ing recruitment of expertise, levels of bureaucracy, and
associated department personnel according to the configuration of independent variables that obtains. Questions such as the following may help to determine the actual locus of decisionmaking.

a) Is the decision group restrictive or open?

b) What is the size of the decisionmaking unit? Does decisionmaking remain in the hands of the small group at the apex or, are other larger bureaucracies activated?

c) Similarly, at what level does decisionmaking reside during the event? Does it remain at the apex or, does it pervade other decisionmaking bureaucracies?

It is our expectation that questions such as these will allow us to more easily follow the decisionmaking process. It will provide a heuristic of sorts that will direct our attention. The heuristic guides us to the level of convocation for decisionmaking. By determining the level at which the decisionmaking process is initiated and the flow or direction thereof we may better understand the process overall.

2) Selection of Option(s): the individual(s) who are convened to respond must now consider possibilities; this includes articulation and aggregation of various responses to the challenge.

The key questions here ought to center on: in whose hands does the process reside? How innovative is the
option-selection process. Are options selected by the top
decisionmakers based on their assessment of the particular
challenge? Or is the process relegated to lower levels of
the bureaucracy—are pre-existing contingencies from various
agencies the basis of options? Do decisionmakers improvise
or rely? Are they flexible or rigid? Further do we find
evidence of groupthink in the selection process? Is there
coercive concurrence—the *sine qua non* of groupthink—or are
alternative options welcomed.

3) **Implementation of Option(s):** this often, though not
always, actuates a larger decisionmaking bureaucracy; the
options chosen are put into effect.

Among other things we are looking for evidence that
suggests decisions made above by the president and his
advisers are being foiled or that implementors are sticking
to standard-operating procedures when they are not appro-
perate. Is there evidence of bureaucratic inertia? Thus we
are necessarily going to be sensitive to the locus of imple-
mentation: is it at a relatively high or low level? Did
standard-operating procedures characterize the process or
were there signs of improvisation to meet the particular
need? Was it instantaneous with the process in which
options were selected or temporally distinct from it?

4) **Evaluation of Option(s) Selected:** this includes
some form of monitoring or feedback; also this can range
from a very perfunctory function to a complex evaluation in which adjustments are undertaken.

At what level is feedback and subsequent evaluation conducted? What sources of intelligence and information are consulted? Was the information gained in the process comprehensive or incomplete? Was there evidence of withholding any information due to parochial interests?

Shortly we will put these questions about the decisionmaking process, based on requisite phases, in the form of hypotheses concerning how our independent variables are expected to affect the decisionmaking process. These hypotheses will then form the basis of our comparison.

We have now the two essential parts of our conceptual framework based on the foreign-policy setting. We have, first, established an order by which to introduce our exogenous variables. That order is the situational typology above. And we have established potential indicators for our endogenous variable. Those potential indicators are the requisite phases around which questions may be posed that will, in effect, allow us to observe or "measure" change in the dependent variable--the foreign-policy decisionmaking process.

By proposing these requisite phases as indicators of our dependent variable, and by establishing an order of examination of the combination of independent variables we have established an analytic framework for our
investigation. This framework permits us to generate hypotheses. We shall then employ this framework for the purposes of organizing our structured, focused case-study format.

Furthermore, we are theoretically able to select case studies for our examination that fit into one part of the typology versus another. We shall examine twelve U.S. foreign-policy events—three for each configuration of our independent variables—using this analytical and methodological framework. However, in order to re-emphasize what we will undertake in the following pages, it may first be useful to view our conceptualization of decisionmaking schematically.

**Schematic Representation of Conceptual Framework**

It is common in world politics literature (and in the social sciences generally) to view certain political processes as a stimulus-response dynamic. The international-foreign-policy decisionmaking literature has been conceptualized this way.

Typically the model is represented as follows:

```
Black Box
Stimulus------> [ ] -------> Response
```

*Figure 2*

Typical Stimulus-Response Decision Making
Where the stimulus is some received behavior and the response is some behavior sent in response to that received. That which occurs between the stimulus and response is of course the decisionmaking process. It is not uncommon for analysts to choose not to examine that which occurs inside the so-called black box. Rather, in those studies, what is examined is the output of the model as a function of its inputs. We, in contrast, are quite interested in trying to view an aspect of the process that is contained in the box—i.e., what happens in between the stimulus and the response.

For purposes of illustration, a modified version of this model in which processes inside the black box are relevant is necessary. Recall that we have posited certain decisionmaking processes as common to all decisionmaking events. Namely:

1) Convocation of Decision Unit
2) Selection of Options
3) Implementation of Options
4) Evaluation of Response (feedback mechanism)

Thus we may represent a modified version of the above stimulus-response model as:
Stimulus-Response Model of Situational Decision Making

Each cell in the above figure corresponds to the typology, we have specified above, of our independent variables. We have in effect modified the stimulus-response model in two ways. First, we have—for illustrative purposes—represented our typology of independent variables as being contained within the black box in their various configurations. This is simply a schematic representation of the direction our inquiry into process will take. Thus while the same requisite decisionmaking phases may theoretically be observed, this representation implies that the phases vary in specific ways according to specific combination of time and anticipation. Second, we have represented a feedback mechanism schematically. Simply put, it suggests that feedback occurs after a decision or decisions have been made and put in motion—that is implemented. Inserting the typology in the black box does not preclude the myriad of other processes that may occur within. Rather it is simply intended as an illustrative device. Also, while we have represented feedback as going back to the source of
decisionmaking--those involved in the four phases--we are cognizant that feedback may go to the source of the stimulus as well.

Finally, it will be noticed that the above figure does not account for organizational milieu--i.e., the organizational-bureaucratic context in which decisionmaking maladies and pathologies take place. It is this context, in fact, that scholarship has told us sometimes leads to anomalies in the decisionmaking process. Illustratively we may view it this way.

```
Organizational Context

Stimulus ------> [Blank] -----> Response

< Feedback <
```

Figure 4

Stimulus Response Model of Situational Decision Making in Organizational Context

Thus we have schematically depicted the decisionmaking process associated with each of our four combinations of independent variables embedded in the context of the decisionmaking milieu.

The following hypotheses derive from the aforementioned conceptualization of decisionmaking as well as from
scholarly research (previous chapter) already undertaken. It is our contention that the situation represented by each configuration sets in train specific foreign-policy decisionmaking processes and therefore has predictable impact on decisionmaking. Thus what follow are our hypotheses and their underlying conceptual assumptions.

Central Assumptions and Hypotheses

Assumptions

Assumption 1: Each of the four requisite phases of decisionmaking—convocation of decision unit, as well as selection, implementation and evaluation of options—are distinguishable, therefore at least potentially predictable, depending upon which configuration of situational variables obtains. In other words, the particular combinations of variables has specific consequences for the decisionmaking process of a given foreign-policy event. We further assume that the four phases or processes are temporally ordered.

Assumption 2: By correctly identifying into which configuration a particular U.S. foreign-policy event fits, specific decisionmaking dynamics may be expected to be observed. For example, the phenomenon known as "bureaucratic inertia" may be expected to occur more frequently under one configuration than another. Specifically, we would hypothesize that bureaucratic inertia is more likely under circumstances wherein the foreign-policy bureaucracy is directly brought into the decisionmaking process—e.g.,
configuration 4--than when it is excluded--e.g., configurations 1. Similar hypotheses could be imagined with respect to "groupthink," "incrementalism," and any number of other phenomena observed in the scholarly literature as associated with decisionmaking.

As we have already seen, one may render hypotheses given the typology as specified. We have briefly illustrated this with a couple of examples as we discussed underlying assumptions of the framework. The task to which we must now turn is that of formally specifying hypotheses.

Categorization of Hypotheses

What follows is an attempt to specify hypotheses with respect to our situational typology. Names are not attributed to each of the four configurations. Instead, the order suggested by the typology--configurations one through four--is followed. And we simply retain the heading of each configuration. Namely: Configuration 1 (Short time and surprise); Configuration 2 (Short time and anticipation); Configuration 3 (Long time and surprise); Configuration 4 (Long time and anticipation). Under each one we shall specify hypothesized processes based on our dependent variable's indicators: our requisite decisionmaking phases.

We accept earlier findings (Hermann, 1969A; 1969B; 1972) that unique decisionmaking processes transpire when decisionmakers are faced with situations in which high threat, short decision time, and surprise obtain. Indeed,
it would appear that threat alone is a sufficient condition --a stimulus--to actuate the decisionmaking process (Brady, 1978: 180). Threat accordingly creates a condition which initiates decisionmaking. In this study we have sought to hold threat constant so that we may evaluate the relative impact of decision time and degree of anticipation. Importantly, however, threat causes a high commitment from the decisionmaking unit. (Hermann, 1978.) Thus threat actuates a high-level decisionmaking process generally.

What follows is what we postulate to be the general effect of decision time and degree of anticipation on the decisionmaking process. We begin with very broad relationships. We then move to specific hypotheses from which we ultimately generate questions of comparison. It is critical at this point to stress the importance of the questions of comparison. They are cast such that, when answered systematically for each case study, our hypotheses are either confirmed or disconfirmed. Put differently, these comparative questions are indicators of hypothesized change in our dependent variable. As will be seen, our comparative questions ultimately will differentiate ordinally along various continuua.

In general we postulate that perception by decisionmakers of short time compels hasty convocation; causes the DMU to be restrictive in its composition (Hermann, 1978:94); causes the DMU to narrow the range of
options considered; and leads to a more simplified conceptualization of the challenge. Conversely, extended time permits a more inclusive DMU to be convened; allows the DMU to broaden the range of options considered; allows a more complex conceptualization of the challenge; and allows a more standardized or routine approach to decisionmaking.

We similarly postulate that lack of anticipation (i.e., surprise) precludes routine decisionmaking generally. More specifically, if surprise obtains then increased uncertainty will lead to improvised convocation, implementation, and feedback-evaluation; surprise also leads to a more simplified conceptualization of the challenge. Conversely, anticipation allows pre-established routines to influence all phases of the decisionmaking process. This leads to routine convocation, implementation, and feedback-evaluation; and it permits a more complex conceptualization of the challenge which allows the DMU to be more inclusive through each phase of decisionmaking.

From these general effects we may move to specific hypotheses. We shall pose our hypotheses in terms of the four configurations of our two independent variables: 1) short time and surprise; 2) short time and anticipation; 3) long time and surprise; 4) long time and anticipation.

1. Short Time, Surprise

The logic behind the following hypotheses is based on decisionmakers perceiving short decision time and their
being surprised by the challenge. In this extreme combination the DMU is faced with high-stakes decisionmaking. The challenge is highly salient to the decisionmakers. This invokes a high commitment from the decisionmaking unit. (Hermann, 1978.) That commitment, we expect, will cause the decisionmaking to be retained at the highest levels of the DMU. By definition this constitutes a restrictive DMU. Simultaneously, time pressures do not allow the luxury of lengthy deliberations in which outside expertise might otherwise be sought. In order to accomplish the task at hand under these circumstances, the DMU must simplify the challenge into achievable segments or responses. (Steinbrunner, 1974.) Consequently, we expect to see a decisionmaking process characterized by a restrictive, highly situated, DMU that perforce accomplishes its tasks quickly. In many ways this presents the opposite of what has been called "vigilant" decisionmaking. (Janis, 1982.) And the outcome of such processes might well be expected to be less satisfactory than the outcomes from a vigilant process. We however are more interested in the process than the outcome.
Hypothesis 1.1. If short time and surprise obtain the DMU will be convened: a) restrictively (apex); b) at a high locus; c) with high frequency until the issue is resolved; and d) extemporaneously (improvised convocation).

The following criteria or rules will be used for confirmation or disconfirmation of the hypothesis. A restrictive DMU will be one in which only the apex of the DMU is convened. (In Chapter IV we identify, using previous scholarly studies, the apex of each of our administrations.) The locus refers to the actual physical location of the convocation. Therefore, if the DMU is convened at the White House or the president's residence (i.e., an analogue of the White House), this is considered a high locus of convocation. Conversely, the DMU might convene at State or Defense, etc., both of which would be considered a low locus. With respect to high frequency we will accept either multiple meetings occurring each day of the event or continuous (i.e., around-the-clock) convocation during the event. And lastly, by extemporaneous we mean convocation in

---

The following numbering scheme will be used throughout this study. The number preceding the left-most decimal point refers to the specific configuration of time and degree of anticipation--i.e., configuration 1 (short time, surprise), configuration 2 (short time, anticipation), configuration 3 (long time, surprise), and configuration 4 (long time, anticipation). The number following said decimal point refers to the requisite decisionmaking process: 1) convocation; 2) selection; 3) implementation; and 4) evaluation. Thus 1.1 stands for the hypothesis concerning convocation under configuration 1 (short time and surprise). Similarly, 4.1 represents the hypothesis concerning convocation under configuration 4 (long time and anticipation).
an impromptu fashion—i.e., a meeting called just to address
this challenge. Thus if the DMU were simply to wait for the
next scheduled NSC or Cabinet meeting and address the issue
there, this would be routine rather than extemporaneous.

Hypothesis 1.2. If short time and surprise obtain
options will be selected: a) by the apex of the DMU; b)
from relatively few in number (due to a simplistic
conceptualization of the challenge); c) that reflect
individual leader(s') personality; d) that are reflective of
groupthink.

We have already discussed the definition of restrictive
with respect to the "apex" of the decisionmaking unit. By
few options we mean, at most, one or two from each member of
the apex of the DMU; we expect rather simplistic
conceptualization of any given challenge (e.g., use force or
not use force). Next we must address the issue of dominant
personalities. When identifying the apex of the DMU
(Chapter IV) we will identify its dominant personality (if
any); indicators of this being reflected in options is
selective biases of that personality. And finally,
indicators of groupthink are concurrence seeking,
stereotyped enemies, forced conformity, and absence of
consideration of alternative options.

Hypothesis 1.3. If short time and surprise obtain the
DMU will implement selected options: a) by retaining
control at the apex; b) extemporaneously (improvised means);
c) without noticeable bureaucratic interference; d)
instantaneously.

We expect the apex to directly follow through the
implementation process rather than delegate its prerogative.
Extemporaneous implementation is when routines are circumvented; and the DMU improvises the implementation process as it goes along. Indicators of bureaucratic inertia or momentum are indicative of bureaucratic interference; if none are present we will conclude no bureaucratic interference. And finally if implementation begins concomitant with (i.e., within hours as opposed to days, weeks, etc.) the selection of option(s), we will consider this instantaneous.

Hypothesis 1.4. If short time and surprise obtain the DMU will undertake to monitor (feedback) and evaluate its decision(s): a) retaining control at the apex; b) extemporaneously; c) without noticeable bureaucratic interference; d) instantaneous with the implementation process.

Again, if the apex directly monitors implementation from its locus (White House or analogue) this is retaining control of the Evaluative-feedback process. If the DMU improvises as it goes along, this will constitute extemporaneous feedback. If no indication of selectively fed, or controlled intelligence is present we will conclude no bureaucratic interference. And finally, if feedback is concomitant with the beginning of implementation, this constitutes instantaneous feedback.

2. Short Time, Anticipation

Under this configuration the most significant procedural departure from short time and surprise is the inclusion of expertise and routines from the larger
decisionmaking bureaucracy. Though the group will still be relatively restrictive, the DMU begins to broaden its base. Contingency plans—typically that have been generated by the foreign-policy bureaucracy tasked with some given issue area—begin to be incorporated into the process. At this point the apex of the DMU should still dominate the process in all its phases; nonetheless we see the presence of the larger bureaucracy—its benefits and its impediments. That the event was anticipated allows the decisionmaking unit to consider the stimulus as a function of its component parts. It allows a more elaborate conceptualization of the problem than before. (Brady, 1978: 181.) Thus we expect to see involvement of the bureaucracy at an early stage.

Hypothesis 2.1. If short time and anticipation obtain the DMU will be convened: a) more inclusively (apex and few outside experts); b) high locus of convocation; c) frequently; and d) extemporaneously.

The only aspect which we have yet to address is what constitutes more inclusive convocation. By more inclusive we mean that, in contrast to configuration one, the apex of the DMU will begin to include a few persons from outside the apex.

Hypothesis 2.2. If short time and anticipation obtain options will be selected: a) by a more inclusive DMU; b) from broader range of options; c) that reflect individual leader(s') personality; d) reflect presence of groupthink.

The only aspect we have yet to discuss is what is meant by a broader range of options. If several options are proffered by the members of the apex as well as some options
from the outside persons included, this will constitute a broader range of options. If options were to be proffered by the apex only, this would not constitute broader options.

Hypothesis 2.3. If short time and anticipation obtain the DMU will implement selected options: a) retaining control (from the apex of the DMU); b) with a combination of extemporaneous and routine means; c) with some bureaucratic presence evident; d) instantaneously (without long deliberation).

We have already mentioned that by bureaucratic presence we mean indications of bureaucratic infighting. We simply note that this issue will be addressed specifically for each case study in the respective chapters.

Hypothesis 2.4. If short time and anticipation obtain the DMU will undertake to monitor (feedback) and evaluate its decision(s): a) retaining control of the process at the apex); b) with a combination of improvised and routine channels of information; c) without noticeable bureaucratic interference; d) instantaneously with the implementation process.

3. Long time, Surprise

When decision time is not compelling immediate action, the decisionmakers are allowed to conceptualize the challenge and possible responses to it in more complex ways. More bureaucratic involvement may result. (Brady, 1978: 181.) More bureaucratic involvement invites competition over control of the decisionmaking process. (Hermann, 1978: 97.) Since the DMU is surprised by the event, however, we expect no basis for contingency plans. Initially we expect such foreign-policy events to approximate short time, surprise. As it becomes apparent, however, that time is not
compelling the DMU to make a hasty decision we expect to see a shift downward in locus of decisionmaking. Surprise has an initial impact that is marginalized or diminished over the event's extended time frame.

_Hypothesis 3.1._ If long time and surprise obtain the DMU will be convened: _a)_ inclusively (defined by apex and parts of bureaucracy); _b)_ at a low locus; _c)_ the apex will only convene periodically over the course of the event and not as a separate entity; _d)_ and said convocation will take place along standard operating routines.

To reiterate the issue of locus, by a low locus we mean not at the White House or its analogue. That is, if convocation to address the challenge first occurred at some other agency (Defense, State, etc.) and only after that was the apex convened to be informed, we would consider this a low locus of convocation. By periodically, we simply mean a few times over the course of the event. And we have already addressed the issue of routines versus improvisation.

_Hypothesis 3.2._ If long time and surprise obtain options will be selected: _a)_ by the larger bureaucracy rather than the apex; _b)_ from multiple sources (apex & bureaucratic) allowing a larger number of possibilities; _c)_ that reflect no individual personalities; _d)_ without any evidence of groupthink being present.

We have addressed each of these aspects above. And though we have not specifically hypothesized under what conditions complex versus simplistic conceptualization of a challenge might be expected, we note here implicitly that we expect several sources of options to allow for a more complex conceptualization of the challenge. Thus we expect
to see multiple variations on the same theme, as we encounter the cases, indicative of a complex conceptualization of the challenge. If we detect options being proffered by both the apex and the larger bureaucracy, we will accept this as evidence of multiple sources.

**Hypothesis 3.3.** If long time and surprise obtain the DMU will implement selected options: a) by relinquishing implementation to specific bureaucracy; b) along standard bureaucratic protocol or routines; c) with bureaucratic interference becoming noticeable; d) temporally distinct from selection phase.

When we speak of standard protocols we mean that previous contingency plans are selected by the agency normally tasked with such issues rather than some improvised option. We previously noted how we will handle the issued of bureaucratic interference (we look for evidence or accusations of bureaucratic infighting). By temporally distinct we mean that a matter of days transpires before the first option is selected.

**Hypothesis 3.4.** If long time and surprise obtain the DMU will undertake to monitor (feedback) and evaluate its decision(s): a) apex relinquishes control of the process to the larger bureaucracy; b) through routine channels of information; c) with presence bureaucratic interference; d) temporally distinct from the implementation process.

4. Long Time, Anticipation

Without either short decision time, or surprise present to compel high commitment, low commitment at the highest locus (e.g., president and immediate advisers) is expected. The most extreme manifestations of bureaucratic dynamics may
consequently be expected. Those are reflected in the hypotheses below.

Hypothesis 4.1. If long time and anticipation obtain the DMU will be convened: a) expansive DMU; b) low locus; c) the apex will only convene periodically over the course of the event and not as a separate entity; d) and said convocation will take place along standard operating routines.

By expansive DMU we mean that there is no discernible control exerted from the apex; it in effect relinquishes its prerogative. Rather, the larger bureaucracy becomes the DMU. The other aspects have been addressed.

Hypothesis 4.2. If long time and anticipation obtain options will be selected: a) by the larger bureaucracy rather than the apex; b) from multiple sources making for more options considered; c) that reflect no individual personalities; d) without any evidence of groupthink being present.

We note simply that with respect to feedback, we shall be looking for evidence of input from bureaucratic agencies reflecting parochial concerns of particular agencies.

Hypothesis 4.3. If long time and anticipation obtain the DMU will implement selected options: a) by relinquishing implementation to specific bureaucracy; b) along standard bureaucratic protocol or routines; c) with bureaucratic interference prevalent; d) temporally distinct from option selection.

With respect to temporal distinction between process, time permits if not encourages procrastination. Sometimes this may bode well for the process for it permits more vigilant planning. Other times it may appear to lead to incrementalism or piecemeal implementation. We will refrain from attempting to determine which way it plays out.
Instead we will simply look for distinguishable phases or processes.

_Hypothesis 4.4. If long time and anticipation obtain the DMU will undertake to monitor (feedback) and evaluate its decision(s): a) by allowing control of the process to be initiated and retained in the larger bureaucracy; b) that process will be conducted via bureaucratic routines for collecting information; c) with bureaucratic agencies dominating the process; d) temporally distinct from the implementation process._

There are the sixteen hypotheses we shall be considering in our study. We must now move toward finding a method by which these hypotheses may be tested for each of the twelve case studies.

To do this we have developed comparative questions that may be used to either confirm or disconfirm, when applied systematically to each of the case studies, the hypothesized processes. What follows then are those questions broadly written so as to be able to capture change in our dependent variable across all twelve cases under our investigation. These hypotheses are based on literature and common sense. While no single hypothesis is particularly provocative, combined they postulate a decisionmaking process that is unique in comparison to the process resulting from other configurations of these same variables. Thus if the case studies support these hypotheses specific implications result.
Questions of Comparison

1. Convocation of Decision Making Unit (DMU):
   a) Was convocation of DMU restricted to apex or larger bureaucracy?
   b) at what locus (high or low) was convocation?
   c) With what frequency was DMU convened over event’s course?
   d) Was DMU convened vis-a-vis standard operating routines or improvised (extemporaneous)?

2. Selection of Option(s):
   a) Were options selected by restrictive DMU (apex) or larger bureaucracy?
   b) Were options few or many in number?
   c) Did options reflect a dominant personality?
   d) Did options selection indicate groupthink?

3. Implementation of Option(s):
   a) Was implementation controlled by the apex or by more inclusive DMU (larger bureaucracy)?
   b) Was implementation extemporaneous (improvised) or did it follow routines?
   c) Was there evidence of bureaucratic politics?
   d) Was implementation instantaneous with selection?

4. Evaluation of Selected Action(s):
   a) Was process controlled at the apex or through larger decisionmaking bureaucracy?
   b) Was process extemporaneous or routine?
   c) Did signs of bureaucratic interference exist?
   d) Was process instantaneous with implementation?

It should be clear that there exits a certain amount of unavoidable interpretation with respect to answering these questions. Some are quite straightforward. For example, we earlier explained that what constituted the apex and what constituted extemporaneous versus routine would be operationalized for each administration in Chapter IV. Others, however, are not so clear cut. Interpretation will come into play when answering, for example, "was

---

The reader will notice that the numbering scheme used for the following comparative questions reflects the one used (supra) for the sixteen hypotheses.
bureaucratic interference evident?" This will be handled the same way for each case study. In the case study chapters there is a "Narrative" and an "Analysis." In the analysis section of each case study we will fully cover matters of interpretation.

Each question is posed under the requisite process of our dependent variable. In effect, each question is an indicator of the of the hypothesized process for each set of case studies representing each configuration of independent variables. We of course recognize these are not quantifiable indicators. Nonetheless, when integrated into our conceptual framework these questions provide a way to "measure" change in our dependent variable. What is more, by applying these comparative questions--each specifically referring back to a hypothesis--in a systematic way we can make some meaningful generalizations.

To systemize the methodology we will provide a tabular presentation of the questions as they reflect specific hypotheses. If the hypothesis was confirmed we shall place a "+" in the table for that hypothesis under each case study. If we disconfirmed the hypothesis, we shall place a "-" instead. If we were unable to unequivocally confirm or disconfirm, we shall place a "*" in the column.

At the end of each case-study chapter (Chapters V through VIII) we will address the "goodness of fit" issue for that group of case studies--each group representing one
of the four configurations of our independent variables. We propose to accept the following criteria. If at least 75 percent of the comparative questions (a-d) relating to a particular part of decisionmaking from which the hypothesis comes are confirmed, we will consider this a good fit. If at least 50 percent are confirmed, we will consider this an adequate fit. If less than 50 percent are confirmed, or put differently if more than 50 percent are disconfirmed, we will consider this a poor fit of our hypothesis. If no unequivocal answer is possible we shall not factor this into the calculation of our fit. It will rather be considered insufficient information.

To demonstrate what we intend to do at the end of each case-study chapter, we offer the following hypothetical case. Let us say that we had completed our investigation of a particular case study and that we were then attempting to determine goodness of fit for the hypothesized process under convocation of the decisionmaking unit. Let us further suppose that we had been investigating a case characterized by short time and surprise. Hypotheses for each of the four requisite phases of decisionmaking (our dependent variable) under this configuration have been numbered as described above. And the specific answer to each question had been addressed in the analysis section of the case study. We could then establish goodness of fit according to the criteria we just mentioned. Thus, in the analysis we had
confirmed the following: the DMU was convened restrictively; that it was convened at a high locus; that it had been convened frequently; and finally we were unable to determine precisely if it had been routine or extemporaneous in its convocation—not enough information was available to make that determination. We would present it as:

Case study 1/ 2/ 3/

1.1. Convocation of the DMU
   a. Restrictively +
   b. High Locus +
   c. Frequently +
   d. Extemporaneously *

And from this we could state Hypothesis 1.1 to be a good fit. That is to say, we have confirmed 75 percent of the comparative questions for that hypothesis.

One could do this for each of the three case studies that represent the hypotheses under short time and surprise and one might see something like this.

Case study 1/ 2/ 3/

1.1. Convocation of the DMU
   a. Restrictively + - +
   b. High Locus + + +
   c. Frequently + + +
   d. Extemporaneously * + +

Now provided we had systematically accomplished this for each hypothesis indicative of each set of case studies we could make some generalizations about the effect of our independent variables on our dependent variable. (This will be addressed in the Chapter IX.)

These hypotheses, as is clear, are not precisely measurable phenomena. They are simply trends that we may
expect to see. Based on decisionmaking literature, we would expect certain phenomena to be precluded by our situation variables--e.g., under time constraints we do not anticipate seeing much evidence of bureaucratic inertia. It is simply less likely to flourish under such conditions. Groupthink, in contrast, may well flourish under the extreme pressure of time constraints provided other necessary factors are present. Thus these hypotheses are primarily based on what we feel to be rather sensible observations.

Now that the basic questions for comparison are presented, we have established a way to observe variance in the dependent variable: the decisionmaking process. We must now turn our attention to several other important operational issues. First, we must discuss the focused-comparison of case studies as a methodology. Then we must operationalize our independent variables. Finally, we must select cases for investigation to which we ultimately wish to apply our comparative methodology.

**METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK**

**Structured or Focused, Case-Study Comparison**

The methodology which we use is not unfamiliar in the study of U.S. foreign policy. It was employed by two well-known scholars, Alexander George and Richard Smoke, wherein they called it a controlled, structured comparative case study. (George and Smoke, 1974: 88-103). For our purposes it is controlled in that we select case studies that are
similar along our independent variables. It is structured in that we will test the same hypotheses for each case study. And we seek to compare the findings in order to assess our hypotheses.

In addition to employing the methodology used by George and Smoke, we wish to address the ways in which we feel we have significantly buttressed said methodology for our purposes. As noted we will systematically apply each question—in order—to each of our twelve case studies. By so doing we have, we believe, significantly strengthened the methodology of structured, focused case studies. We systematically apply the same questions to each case study. These further refer to specific hypotheses which can then be assessed for goodness of fit. While a number of studies have recently sought to employ the focused comparison, we have noted a lack of rigor in specifically using the approach for "measuring" change in what is being observed. Rather, it has increasingly become common simply to use the methodology as an organizational construct. The methodology works well as an organizational construct; yet we feel its potential for more robust efforts at cumulation in theory building is too-often being ignored.

---

5 This phenomenon is amply demonstrated in a new book that considers the impact of the Vietnam War on foreign-policy consensus in America. See Richard A. Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).
Presently, we shall use a multiple, case-study approach to which we shall apply the above comparative questions. In effect, the questions are indicators of our dependent variable. Our framework posits that foreign-policy decisionmaking will vary in specific ways given different combinations of our independent variables. Our task then will be to confirm or disconfirm our hypotheses. Put simply, we will be examining how the decisionmaking process responds to movement or changes in decision time and degree of anticipation.

Operationalizing the Independent Variables

In Wilkenfeld and Brecher (Wilkenfeld and Brecher, 1988, Volume II) a data set consisting of various (N=627) foreign policy events is delineated according to the authors' definition of decisionmaking crisis. While their "Crisisbank" data set does not entirely meet our present needs it is nonetheless useful. For example, the authors list the dates for all 627 events in addition to information on decision group, level of threat, systemic variables, and various control variables. We shall use the Crisisbank data set as a starting point for our data-collection and case-selection techniques.
Threat

For this study we undertook an examination of the Wilkenfeld data looking for U.S. foreign policy events which would potentially fit the typology's parameters. Namely, we looked for U.S. foreign-policy events which were comprised of varying lengths of time yet which uniformly were coded for relatively high threat. Threat was established as follows. Crisisbank breaks threat into ordinal categories from the lowest (limited) to the highest (existence). Specifically Wilkenfeld enumerates the following levels of threat: 1) low or limited threat; 2) threat to political system; 3) threat to territorial integrity; 4) Threat to Influence in International System or Regional Subsystem; 5) threat of grave damage; 6) threat to existence. (Wilkenfeld and Brecher, 1988, Vol. II: 24.)

Notwithstanding possible arguments with the categories, they provide us with a useful way to operationalize events of a particular level of threat. We determined to look at any event involving the United states as one of the principals which also had a threat level of four—viz., threat to influence in international or regional subsystem. Further, since we looked only at said threats with the U.S. as a experiencing this threat, the threat can be imputed to be threat to the United States' influence in the international system. Our reasoning for this selection of threat is as follows. We wished a sufficiently high level so as to pose
a challenge to U.S decisionmakers. Such a challenge, we reasoned, would necessarily set in train the existing machinery of U.S. foreign-policy decisionmaking. However, we wished to avoid too high a level of threat which—together with short time and surprise—constitutes a crisis. Those instances have been carefully studied elsewhere (Hermann, 1969A). We therefore determined to stay above level three but below levels five and six.

Of the total number of cases under investigation in CrisisBank, some thirty-eight cases involve the United States as a principal (see Appendix A). From those thirty-eight we isolated only those cases which met our criterion of threat level. These cases numbered thirty-four (see Appendix B). Having done this, we were able to begin to select out cases that met some criterion of time—one of our two independent variables.

Time

After eliminating events in Crisisbank which either had too high or too low a level of threat, we were left with thirty-four (N=34) potential cases. Beginning with this subset we began to consider the duration of each event. The duration of these remaining cases varied widely. Hence we began to consider how to select events on a time criterion. We operationalized decision time in the following way. The first step was to simply dichotomize the variable: short time and long time.
Not unlike surprise and threat, time can be an ambiguous concept. It is intuitive to most of us. One usually knows the difference between a short time and a long time. Yet to transform the concept of time into a variable one must move beyond intuition.

One way that we might have operationalized decision time was to separate the total population of cases along some standard statistical criterion. For example, using Wilkenfeld's end points (Appendix A) of event commencement and termination, we calculated in days the total length of the event, taking into account events which occurred during leap years. In so doing we came up with an event length for each of the remaining thirty-four cases. We further calculated an arithmetic average (80.06 days) and median (57 day). (See Appendices B and C.) While this meets operational criteria, we have yet to demonstrate any theoretical relevance or connection to our own short-long time dichotomy.

Decision time has been examined with respect to several disciplines. Results have been mixed depending upon the way in which short time was defined. For example, one study demonstrated that "groups under high time-pressure [short time] did not make significantly less accurate decisions than groups under low time-pressure [long time]" (Toshiaki Sonoda, 1985: 19). That conclusion, however, was based on an experimental design which tested decisionmaking accuracy
between groups at intervals of fifteen and thirty minutes respectively. It would seem reasonable to infer that with respect to foreign-policy decisionmaking, both intervals are short.

Other literature that has specifically tested time as an independent variable has focused on similarly short time intervals. Isenberg (1985) assessed time on decision accuracy. The three time categories were low degree of time pressure (15 minutes), moderate degree (5 minutes), and high degree (3 minutes). As time pressure increased from low to moderate, accuracy increased. Accuracy decreased, however, when time pressure increased from moderate to high. A curvilinear relationship between time pressure and decision accuracy was thus demonstrated. (Isenberg, 1985:119-134). A study on business decisions found similar results: namely, that initially time pressure seems to provide a positive impact on the decisionmaker’s vigilance and overall effectiveness. (Rolfer, 1982.) This has been suggested elsewhere with respect to stress and decision performance. M. Hørmann (1978) has reported that the performance level of decision makers is improved by some stress after which it begins to negatively affect said performances.

Exact time intervals are not specified in the literature beyond the very discrete ones—e.g. minutes and seconds—already mentioned. It seems reasonable, however, to postulate that short time, during international events
demanding decisions at the highest levels, falls somewhere within a matter of days. The question is: three days, seven days, fourteen days? Short decision time has elsewhere been specified in cases of military combat to be a period ten days or less. (Hermann and Mason, 1980.) We chose to accept this demarcation and to apply it to our data with two provisos. First, we would not be held to Crisisbank's endpoints on time once we began analysis; if we found reason to differ with the beginning or termination of the event we would feel free to do so. Second, we decided to allow foreign-policy events, absent war's presence, to be considered short if they lasted twelve days or less. Our operational criterion became: short if it lasted less than thirteen days.

Degree of Anticipation

We were left simply to consider whether the cases under consideration presented U.S. decisionmakers with surprise or whether they were anticipated. Since Crisisbank had no coding scheme that allowed us to easily do this, we decided to rely upon face validity. Namely, we simply began reading the biographies of principal decisionmakers as well as case histories of the events to see if the decisionmakers claim surprise. This actually turned out to be somewhat easier than we expected. The reason was that there was virtually no disagreement. Historians and decisionmakers alike seemed in agreement as to whether any given case came as a surprise
or not. We were therefore able select cases on this variable as well. We determined that as we undertook more focused study of cases, if evidence counter to our original acceptance of anticipated—not anticipated became available we would simply drop that case. As it turned out we found no need to do so. (The issue of surprise is addressed separately in each of our case studies in the "Narrative.")

Thus we present the following. For each of the four combinations we wished to consider three case studies. The following list constitutes those twelve cases.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Time, Surprise:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Suez-Sinai (3 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. EC-121 Incident (10 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Mayaguez (2 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Time, Anticipations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Bay of Pigs (9 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Gulf of Tonkin (5 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Six-Day War (5 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Time, Surprise:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Greece (95 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Pueblo (336 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Korea II (252 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Time, Anticipation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Berlin Wall (80 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Guatemala (139 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Dominican Republic (129 days)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Case Studies for Analysis**

Note: The numbers left of each case correspond to the ordering in Appendix A.

Finally we must address what we expect to be able to say about our variables once the focused comparisons are completed. We are of course interested to compare and to test our decisionmaking hypotheses using each of the above
test our decisionmaking hypotheses using each of the above notated cases. We are, however, clearly cautious as to what may be implied or generalized from three cases for each configuration. These comprise twelve cases only. It is nonetheless true that we have a population equal to twelve (N=12) comprising nearly thirty-two percent (12/38=31.6%) of the total U.S.-foreign policy events coded in the Wilkenfeld data set. Thus we feel relatively confident that trends should be possible to ascertain.

Before launching into the case studies we have one issue to take up. From the above list it becomes obvious that six different presidential administrations are under our consideration. The first is the Truman Administration; the last is the Ford Administration. In between these two, we consider at least one case for each. Thus we shall be considering cases involving Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford. In order to make conclusions and comparisons across the cases, we must establish a baseline from which to compare each president’s "typical" decisionmaking to that which we encounter in our study. Thus we shall, in the following chapter, attempt to develop a baseline or norm for each administration.
CHAPTER IV

U.S. PRESIDENTS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE FOREIGN-POLICY ESTABLISHMENTS

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we shall be attempting to complete a brief overview of each of the presidents under consideration in this study. The case studies run from the Greek Civil War (1947) until the Mayaguez incident (1975). This rather lengthy expanse of time includes six U.S. presidents: Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford. As the reader will readily notice, in terms of political parties we are fortunate to have, for our consideration, three Republican administrations (Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford) and three Democratic administrations (Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson).

We shall not provide comprehensive coverage of each administration. Rather, we shall be attempting to provide a twofold look at each. We wish first to identify the top decisionmakers in each administration--what we shall identify as the apex. In each case the apex consists of the president, his secretary of state, secretary of defense, and national security adviser. And we will code each of these
individuals in terms of their relative influence in their administration's decisionmaking scheme. Additionally, we shall identify those persons whom each president trusted and respected and whose advice he sought regarding foreign-policy events. This may include specific cabinet members as well as personal advisers, et cetera.

After identifying these key persons we shall undertake to discuss respective presidential "styles" of decisionmaking. This is simply an attempt to provide an example of the routine decisionmaking of each administration. This allows us to compare decisionmaking under different configurations of our independent variables with said standard. This is not intended to be an in-depth coverage of each administration. Instead it is merely a glimpse, based on other scholarly work, into the approach each administration used in its routine decisionmaking tasks.

Though we do not intend to provide comprehensive description of each administration, even this cursory view becomes problematic at times. For example, the number of secretaries of state under consideration is not simply the same as the number of administrations. Truman alone had four; Nixon had two; Ford kept Nixon's. And the so-called national security adviser is equally ubiquitous. Truman never had one—he instead had an executive secretary of the NSC who simply coordinated the efforts of the NSC's advisory
role. Nixon had one, Henry Kissinger, whose responsibilities at one point in Nixon's second term included national security advisor and secretary of state. Ford retained Kissinger as secretary of state but chose Scowcroft (currently President Bush's national security adviser) to replace Kissinger's role as national security adviser.

Thus in this chapter we wish simply to establish each administration's decisionmaking standard and to identify the principal players. As this is accomplished we hope to establish a baseline for each administration. In other words, we hope to be able to establish a "norm" for each president: on whom did he typically rely for advice? How were decisions made typically? How did his administration utilize the NSC under typical sorts of circumstances? As we noted, the reason is simple: for comparative purposes. Once a baseline is established a comparison between an administration's particular baseline or "norm" with specific instances of the decisionmaking process which we observe in our case studies (i.e., under specific configurations of our independent variables) may be made.

An analogy from the medical world is illustrative. For example, if we wished to examine the impact that the administration of a certain drug has on one's blood pressure, how might we accomplish this? In its most simplistic format we might randomly select a number of individuals. We might then establish what each person's normal blood pressure is.
Following that we would introduce the treatment or drug (the independent variables in this case). We would then measure the bloodpressure again and compare the bloodpressure after treatment to before treatment. And we would do this for each of the individuals in the study.\textsuperscript{6} By analogy then we are simply attempting to compare a presidential administration's decisionmaking processes before and after treatment: introduction of the independent variables. We must therefore establish the "before" for each of the six administrations under our purview.

Each president will be considered using previous theoretical examinations as well as auto-biographical and biographical materials which are available. George (1980),\textsuperscript{7} for instance, has examined presidential decisionmaking and has postulated specific "types" of post-World War Two presidents. Accordingly George identifies competitive, formalistic, and collegial types. Two of the presidents under our consideration are noticeably absent from George's attempt to fit administrations into types, however. Neither

\textsuperscript{6}In praxis, this sort of test would be done as a double-blind study. Something like half the group would receive the drug under study while the other half would be given an inert drug known as a placebo. Further, neither the person administering the drug nor the person receiving the drug would know whether the drug or the placebo were being administered.

\textsuperscript{7}Though we use George's work as a reference here it should be noted that George was not the first to use such a classification scheme. See Richard Johnson, Managing the White House (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).
Lyndon Johnson nor Gerald Ford is assessed independently; neither is specifically characterized as one type. Nonetheless George mentions that Johnson changed from one form to another and gives some useful insights on him. It is also mentioned by George as well as in another theoretical work by Crabb and Mulcahy (1986) that Ford followed Nixon's style and that Kissinger was the key player. Combining these scholarly works we are able to flesh out each presidential administration, its important foreign-policy decisionmakers, and its typical patterns of approaching foreign-policy decisions. While not intended to be comprehensive, it will suffice for present purposes.

After establishing the composition of each administration's apex and relevant matters of presidential decisionmaking style, we shall look at the biographical materials in order to attempt to see how each president uniquely tended to use his State and Defense Departments as well as his National Security Council--i.e., the apex of each presidential Decisionmaking Unit (DMU). We again will be attempting to establish norms or patterns. This will be undertaken for each of our six presidents.

Thus what follows is an attempt to establish the six presidents' respective baseline. We will approach them chronologically. In the case studies that follow (Chapters V through VIII) we shall have occasion to refer back to this chapter for comparison. We shall first discuss the
identification of an apex for each administration followed
by an examination of its methods.

DECISIONMAKING UNIT APEX AND ROUTINE DECISIONMAKING

In the following pages we will use simple descriptive
figures to summarize foreign-policy characteristics of each
administration under our consideration. This has been done
is a somewhat similar fashion elsewhere. In addition to
the Crabb and Mulcahy (1986) study we additionally
incorporate the George (1980) presidential styles insofar as
they prove relevant. Further, we have used biographical
materials to augment those works. The typology is as
follows. Each of the six administrations in this study will
be ascribed an apex of its decisionmaking unit. The apex
consists of a relationship between the four key foreign-
policy principals for each administration—viz., the
president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense,
and the national security adviser. Each person is ranked,
using the sources already mentioned, as being very weak to
very strong in terms of relative influence for foreign
policy. The following symbols will be used:

---

See in particular the Crabb and Mulcahy (1986)
typology of American Foreign Policy Making. In that work
the authors use a threefold diagram to assess relative
influence of the president, his secretary of state, and his
national security adviser. We differ in that we also assess
each administration's secretary of defense. Nonetheless, our
debt to their typology is notable.
-- very weak
- weak
* average
+ strong
++ very strong

By typologizing each administration this way, we may identify an apex of the decisionmaking unit and more carefully pinpoint those whom we might reasonably expect to be influential in given decisionmaking circumstances. This allows us to systematize the application of our comparative questions. Thus, for example, if we have hypothesized that under given conditions we expect to see a decisionmaking unit restricted only to the apex, we may clearly confirm or disconfirm said hypothesis. It should be noted that in addition to these four roles, we shall identify other persons of documented influence and importance vis-a-vis foreign policy decisionmaking in each administration. When applicable these persons will be identified as part of the apex.

President Harry S. Truman

President Truman represents arguably the most illustrious of accomplished foreign-policy presidents under our consideration. Under his auspices World War Two was concluded. He made the fateful decision to use atomic weapons to cause Japan to capitulate. He was the executive who oversaw the rebuilding of both Europe and Japan; the Marshall Plan was administered during his tenure. The 1947
National Security Act with its resultant creation of an NSC and CIA was passed early in his relatively long tenure. NATO, and other treaty organizations as well, were established as fundamental parts of U.S. foreign policy. And the onset of the Cold War—until very recently the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy—began during his years in office. Truman came to office during war and he left office during one of the more controversial wars in U.S. history, namely, the Korean War.

President Truman also was accomplished at going through secretaries of state. His first was a carry-over from Roosevelt's administration—Edward R. Stettinius who served only until the end of June 1945. Stettinius was then replaced by James F. Byrnes who served until his pressured retirement in early January 1947. Following Byrnes was the well-respected and admired General George C. Marshall. Marshall served President Truman loyally from late January 1947 until his retirement on 7 January 1949. Finally, came Dean G. Acheson who served the president until Eisenhower came to office in January 1953. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 122-155.)

For the purposes of this study we shall be interested in Truman's last two secretaries of state. During the Greek civil war, George Marshall was secretary of state. And during the Korean War Acheson was filling the post. It should be noted that Acheson was influential and served in
the State Department during the Greek affair. Both secretaries worked well with Truman and both showed tremendous loyalty to him. And Truman reciprocated this loyalty. During the McCarthy years Acheson came under fire for "losing" China and Truman remained loyal to his secretary of state. Truman relied heavily upon his State Department and its leaders. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 122-155.)

Truman relied much less on the War Department—only later to become the Department of Defense. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 144.) However he evidently trusted and held in high regard James Forrestal who was secretary of the navy and the first person selected to become secretary of the unified structure known as the Defense Department. And Forrestal was involved, as we shall see later, in the Greek case study. Unfortunately, Forrestal committed suicide in 1949 and was not part of the Truman Administration's decisionmaking in the Korean case study. Another key person was Rear Admiral Sidney Williams Souers whom Truman appointed to be the executive secretary for the nascent National Security Council. While Truman trusted Souers, and in him found a "kindred spirit" (Prados, 1991: 30) the NSC played only a nominal role as essentially an organization that generated policy papers, often after the fact. (Crabb and Mulcahy: 139; Prados, 1991, 29-32.)
Truman similarly allowed his cabinet to play only a diminutive role in foreign-policy decisionmaking. Truman saw himself as the ultimate arbiter of foreign-policy decisionmaking and did not shy from it. When it came to foreign policy, Truman "used his cabinet primarily as a forum for informing department heads of important diplomatic developments." The less dramatic and important a foreign-policy matter the more discussion he would invite among cabinet members.

Truman did have a person in whom he reposed tremendous trust and who needs to be mentioned here. That person was William Averell Harriman, the man who administered, and in Truman's view did so brilliantly, the Marshall Plan. Truman considered Harriman "a man you could depend on" and allowed him to function between State, the NSC, and Defense as a liaison of some importance. As a result of the Korean War, Truman brought Harriman back to the U.S. so as to avail himself of Harriman's capabilities. (Prados, 1991: 40-49.)

Thus Truman was clearly the apex of the foreign-policy decisionmaking process in his administration but he relied heavily on his secretaries of state. For our purposes this includes Marshall and Acheson. Truman typically relied on his NSC as a policy-paper generator and think tank only. During the decisionmaking process, particularly in matters

---

9Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 139; emphasis in original.
of some import, Truman typically involved the NSC *ex post facto*. This too was the case with his cabinet. Both were respected but told after decisions were made. Thus we represent the Truman Administration's DMU apex as follows.

![Figure 5](image)

**President**: Harry Truman  
**Secretary of State**: George Marshall; Dean Acheson  
**Secretary of Defense**: (James Forrestal); Louis Johnson  
**National Security Adviser**: Sidney Souers  
**Additional Members**: Averell Harriman.

Each of the four foreign-policy principals is coded which we shall now explain in terms of the administration's decisionmaking style and routines. The apex of the Truman administration is defined as the president (Truman), his secretary of state (Acheson or Marshall), and the antecedent to secretary of defense (Navy Secretary, Forrestal). As the secretary of defense, the director of the CIA, and the National Security Council were all created in 1947, these were minor players in the Greek Civil War and only marginally more important in 1950 when China entered the Korean conflict.

In this particular type of administration, the president is thought to be somewhat ill-prepared for diplomatic leadership. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 324.)
More specifically, he is seen as lacking breadth in terms of foreign policy. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 131.) Consequently, Truman turned often to his principal advisers, notably Secretary of State, Acheson. The relationship between them was a good one. The president reposed tremendous respect and confidence in Acheson, and Acheson kept his president fully informed of all diplomatic initiatives. The constitutional authority of the president is explicitly recognized; thus while State typically forwards initiatives to the president, only the president makes the final decision. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 132-134.)

In Truman's administrations, as seen above, the president is therefore coded as strong. The secretary of state similarly is coded as strong. The national security adviser is overall weak. Though the National Security Act (1947) was implemented in Truman's time, the office was under-used. Truman "was dubious about the value of the NSC. Acheson wanted no other executive agency to come between the president and his chief foreign policy adviser, and Truman did little to encourage that practice" (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 138-139).

Finally, Truman's secretary of defense must also be considered a weak position. There are a number of reasons. First, initially Truman had no secretary of defense. Prior to the 1947 National Security Act there were secretaries of
the services. Thus the National Security Act supplanted the secretaries of the navy and army with a secretary of defense. This eventually was strengthened though State clearly had the institutional initiative. Second, is the personal relationship already mentioned between Truman and Acheson; this allowed little room for competition from a defense secretary. Lastly, Acheson saw the military as "an adjunct" or instrument of diplomacy, not as its substitute. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 145.) The military was clearly a subordinate player to state. Nor did it help that some enmity developed between Louis Johnson and Truman.

We have mentioned already, that the National Security Act (1947) was passed during Truman's tenure. It was of course this act that, among other things, established the National Security Council (NSC). From this came the various offices of executive secretary, later under Eisenhower the office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (a.k.a. national security adviser) and a number of other managerial jobs. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established by this act with a director of Central Intelligence (DCI) whose statutory duties included coordinating intelligence for the president.

Though Truman is credited with creating the NSC, he did not use it as many of his successors did. Rather, his foreign-policy decisionmaking machinery remained centered around his Cabinet officers and departments.
Between the passage of the National Security Act in 1947 and the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950, President Truman did not attend council meetings regularly, and the executive secretary [Sidney Souers] and the NSC staff remained at the periphery of his relationship with his Cabinet officers and departments. (Prados, 1991: 46-47.)

This changed by the end of his administration and largely as a result of Truman's experience in the imbroglio known as the Korean War. The NSC was dramatically expanded and staffed under the succeeding Eisenhower Administration. Under Truman, nonetheless, the role of the NSC was advisory. President Truman, as mentioned, used his top cabinet and department officers for policy making for matters of diminished importance. It was his intention to weaken bureaucratic politics by strengthening his department heads' control over their particular domains. Truman functioned, in many ways, as a chairman of the board: he would listen to all of his experts' opinion, synthesize what he found to be the best parts, and then make a decision. It was a variation of the "formalistic" model. (George, 1980: 150.)

In Truman's version of the formalistic model, several identifying characteristics emerge. First, all specialized information and advise (e.g., foreign policy matters) moved to the president from his cabinet heads and advisers. Second, Truman defined a role for each cabinet head as a functional expert on some aspect of foreign policy or national security. Each functional expert then would be authorized and responsible for briefing the president on his
particular jurisdiction. Third, each adviser or cabinet head received information and advice from his subordinates; the president seldom reached down to that level of the bureaucracy himself for he had a designated expert whose job it was to do this. Fourth, there was little or no presidential encouragement for joint efforts at problem solving and analysis—one expert did not get together with another to synthesize for that was the president's task. Finally, the president took full responsibility for the decision made. It was he who listened, synthesized, and then decided. It was therefore he who should be the object of either approbation or opprobrium. (George, 1980: 150.)

We have already mentioned some of the president's key advisers. The secretary of state during the Greek affair and the Korean War were Marshall and Acheson respectively. And Sidney Souers was the executive secretary of the NSC—though we have noted that he was not an integral part of decisionmaking during Truman's tenure. The same is true of the then nascent CIA. During the Truman presidency, the CIA's "role in the foreign policy process remained limited, and its influence was nearly always eclipsed by that of the State Department . . ." (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 145). And though Truman collaborated with the Defense Department and saw its role as a necessary part of U.S. foreign policy, diplomacy was the key and State was responsible for diplomacy. The requisite military strength to accomplish
foreign-policy objectives when diplomacy failed was important but always subordinate to State. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 147-148.)

Thus under routine conditions we would expect to see a president who held the ultimate responsibility for decisions. He would canvass his most senior advisers and come to a decision himself. Said decisions would typically be announced to his administration through NSC or Cabinet meetings. But a rather small group of individuals would be responsible primarily for decisionmaking. And the president would be expected to rely on and involve his apex members for day-to-day decisions of foreign affairs.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower

Eisenhower's philosophy was to get the most competent men, the best for the job. Accordingly, anyone who made himself available was not worth having; those who had to sacrifice most to take the job were probably the best for it in Eisenhower's view.

The president employed friends and advisers whom he trusted or regarded as wise to be tenders of the information flow on foreign-policy matters. Thus his top appointments were more or less gate-keepers for their respective domains. Between the president and these information-tenders was his Special Assistant to the President: what has become in common parlance a chief of staff. The person who filled this position was Sherman Adams (George, 1980: 153; Ambrose,
1984: Chapter I.). Adams was typically involved in important meetings and decisions. Adams was one of the more important advisers in the Eisenhower Administration, though primarily for domestic matters.

Eisenhower personally selected his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles—Eisenhower's first appointment. While many found the secretary a pompous bore (according to one popular aphorism, "Dull, Duller, Dulles") Eisenhower truly respected and liked Foster. The president then instructed Herbert Brownell, Sherman Adams, and Lucius Clay to form a team to make Cabinet-appointment suggestions. Brownell later headed the Justice Department as Attorney General. Of all those who were eventually selected to fill his Cabinet, his Secretary of Treasury, George M. Humphrey, was a person with whom Eisenhower established a "warm and close personal relationship" (Ambrose, 1984: 23). Eisenhower came to rely on Humphrey for advice and counsel.

Thus in the Eisenhower administration, Adams, Foster Dulles, and Humphrey were key individuals in the decision-making process. To a lesser extent we might include Allen Dulles whom the president selected to be his DCI. Though not officially a policy maker, Allen Dulles enjoyed the virtue of being Foster Dulles's brother and therefore may have exerted an added influence that is hard to measure or even observe. We should mention also that General Goodpaster has been cited as playing an important advisory
role in Eisenhower's handling of foreign-policy matters, at least when they dealt with covert matters.

![Eisenhower Administration](image)

**Figure 6**

**President:** Dwight Eisenhower  
**Secretary of State:** John Foster Dulles  
**Secretary of Defense:** Charles Wilson  
**National Security Adviser:** Robert Cutler  
**Additional Members:** Allen Dulles, G. Humphrey, General Goodpaster, Sherman Adams.

As we did with Truman we may now relate the four foreign-policy principals and their relative coding to the decisionmaking routines of the administration.

In the Eisenhower Administration there existed a close personal relationship between the president and his secretary of state. And both individuals had impressive foreign-affairs resumes. Eisenhower was perhaps unmatched in among modern presidents in his own credentials in foreign affairs. (Ambrose, 1984: 18.) Similarly, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, had a laudable resume in terms of foreign affairs. In light of this, Eisenhower saw himself as his own secretary of defense. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 156-158, 170.)

This differs from the Truman-Acheson relationship in the following way. In the former case, Acheson's influence
was institutional; and he sought to maintain or even elevate State's prestige and role. In the latter case, Dulles was largely devoid of loyalty to State; his influence was personal not institutional. Dulles was Eisenhower's chief spokesman and his close personal friend. They formed a decisionmaking team with close cooperation. And Eisenhower, though himself active in input, saw Dulles as the chief architect of the foreign-policy process. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 157.)

Other important individuals in the Eisenhower Administration should be elaborated as apex members. First, as noted, Sherman Adams was Eisenhower's chief of staff. He was an influential person in that administration and his role should not be overlooked. Nonetheless, his primary responsibilities were not in terms of foreign affairs and we therefore expect his involvement in foreign affairs only under atypical conditions. Three others should again be stressed as important vis-a-vis foreign policy. They are Allen Dulles (DCI), General Goodpaster, and George Humphrey (Treasury). Dulles of course was brother to Foster Dulles and derived influence from his role as DCI as well as familial association. Goodpaster was well respected and considered an aide to Eisenhower. And Humphrey was seen as crucial to the administration's fiscal responsibilities; if the United States could not afford to do it Eisenhower wished to know. Each of these individual could reasonably
be regarded as members of the Eisenhower Administrations DMU apex.

According to George, Eisenhower's administration was a variation of the "formalistic model." (George, 1980: 154.) Accordingly, Eisenhower attempted to stay above the fray; he "avoided personal involvement as much as possible in the bureaucratic politics aspects of policy making within the executive branch and in less savory aspects of politics generally" (George, 1980: 152).

While this may generally be true—at least concerning bureaucratic politics—Eisenhower was very much in control of important decisions. Subsequently, biographers have demonstrated that he was quite willing to allow Foster Dulles, for example, to take credit for foreign-policy initiatives. Yet the impression one might get from reading selections out of recent declassified documents and one with which recent biographers agree is one in which Eisenhower was not loath to state his objectives in a foreign-policy crunch clearly and articulately. It becomes apparent that he in fact shouldered much more of the decisionmaking load than previously thought.

According to George's model of Eisenhower, the president preceded formal meetings of the NSC with "warm-up" sessions consisting of smaller groups of advisers. These allowed policy debate. George says the "conventional depiction of Eisenhower's NSC system as an unimaginative,
bureaucratic body laden with the preparation and presentation of cautiously formulated positions, therefore, is not justified" (George, 1980: 153). And the evidence that we were able to discover tends to support this assertion. During routine decisionmaking ventures virtually all of Eisenhower's staff would meet. These were his typical Cabinet meetings and various domestic issue-oriented meetings. Eisenhower's attempted to meet with his cabinet, subject to his schedule constraints, on a weekly basis. (Ambrose, 1984: 45.)

With respect to issues that were of little significance in his mind or seemed rather prosaic, Eisenhower apparently did little to hide his disinterest. Thus his own aides offered that Eisenhower often refused to "set a course and hold it" in such matters. (Ambrose, 1984: 79.) In somewhat more interesting matters he was known to be relatively more involved. He was known, for example, to read drafts of his State of the Union address to his complete and assembled Cabinet. He would then request comments, field questions, and tolerate discussion of the merits. (Ambrose, 1984: 46-47.)

However, as policy substance tended toward foreign-policy matters, the president would take charge more directly. Still, however, his style can be seen as reflecting the immediacy of the issue. Thus shortly after his election Eisenhower secretly flew off to Korea--he had
campaigned against the extant stalemate—to see for himself what he was up against. (Brendon, 1986: 236; Ambrose, 1984: 14-14, 30-32.) General Clark--Commander of U.S. Forces--reported to Eisenhower that he felt a Communist attack imminent from the Kaesong sanctuary. Clark wanted permission to launch a preemptive attack. Eisenhower allowed him to bomb hitherto untouchable areas but held him back on any invasion.

After returning, he met with his NSC (11 February 1953) to discuss Korea and options to end the "intolerable" situation. There was a full airing of ideas. During the NSC meeting Foster Dulles agreed with General Clark's assessment. Eisenhower suggested the consideration of atomic weapons. Bradley disapproved. What should the allies be told about Korea contingencies; how and if to utilize the UN in connection with Korea; these and other ideas were discussed. He encouraged open discussion and varied ideas. Under such conditions, namely, when a decision was not demanded forthwith, the president used his NSC as a clearing house for ideas (Ambrose, 1984: 51; George, 1980: 153; Brendon, 1986: 235). It was during such times that Eisenhower used his full compliment of decisionmaking bureaucrats. He used both his cabinet and his NSC staff to consider various courses of action.

In foreign-policy matters typically then, Eisenhower would use his decisionmaking bureaucracy, in a relatively
expansive format, to come to a decision. He would then turn over the implementation of specific tasks to those able individuals whom he had put in charge of their respective departments. He fully assumed that the headed agencies capable of carrying out such matters.

President John F. Kennedy

The history of John F. Kennedy's Administration and Cabinet is one of excitement and euphoria. A vibrant, young administration was replacing what many thought to be an old, cautious one. And the appointments made during the early days of the administration are in many ways legendary.

In Schlesinger's (1965) excellent history of the Kennedy Administration he devotes a chapter ("Gathering the Forces") to the way the administration came together. And in many ways it does seem rather remarkable. The administration was replete with Harvard and Oxford scholars, as well as scholars such as Neustadt, then at Columbia.

Committees were established to husband the best and brightest resources across the country. Kennedy instructed Neustadt and Clark Clifford, separately at first, to canvass recruitees and form lists of agenda items with respect to foreign policy. Sargent Shriver was established by the president as the coordinator of the recruitment operations. And Schlesinger and J.K. Galbraith appear to have functioned as the "liberal" recruitment specialists. In all, an
impressive array of talent was brought to bear on Washington D.C.

Specifically, Robert McNamara was snatched from his new position at the head of Ford Motor Company. McNamara was a management specialist who had served at the Pentagon with a team of specialists from the Harvard business school during World War II. For secretary of state, Kennedy finally decided upon Dean Rusk who had tremendously impressed earlier Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Rusk had been both a professor of government and a Rhodes scholar as well as had served under Acheson earlier as a specialist for East Asia affairs. Another cabinet position which became, by many accounts, influential in Kennedy's decisionmaking bureaucracy was Secretary of Treasury, Douglas Dillon. Dillon, a Republican, was a hold over from the Eisenhower Administration. As has often been mentioned, Robert Kennedy was one of the president's most trusted and influential advisers and he filled the post of Attorney General.

Other positions of importance in Kennedy's decision-making machinery were his director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who initially was Allen Dulles. Dulles remained until the Bay of Pigs fiasco caused Kennedy to reassess the efficacy of his entire intelligence and policy structure which led to some reorganization by the president. Kennedy's special assistant for national security affairs was McGeorge Bundy. Bundy, a Dean at Harvard, was so influential in
foreign policy as to give the White House "an infusion of energy on foreign affairs with which the State Department would never . . . quite catch up" (Schlesinger, 1965: 150). Walt W. Rostow, another academic, served as Bundy's assistant and eventually would replace Bundy later in the Johnson administration. Then there was Chester Bowles, who served as under secretary of state, the next position down from Rusk's. There were many others as well who influenced the process at least on the margins: the Paul Nitzes, Roger Hilsmans, professor Neustadts and others. But those mentioned above were part of the established machinery and enjoyed both de facto and de jure influence.

In summary, Kennedy assembled a brain-trust of advisers whom he would use to come to decisions. Seemingly atypical advisers, such as Schlesinger, were also involved during the process. Kennedy relied on and trusted McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy as his key foreign-policy advisers. Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, too was influential and of course explicitly trusted by the president. He was reported to informally advise the president on all matters, including foreign policy, and after the Bay of Pigs became more formally involved with foreign-policy. Other important individuals were consulted by Kennedy. The Rostow brothers too were considered important sources of information and expertise on foreign-policy matters.
The apex of the DMU for the Kennedy Administration then is as follows.

![Diagram of Kennedy Administration](image)

**Figure 7**

**President:** John Kennedy  
**Secretary of State:** Dean Rusk  
**Secretary of Defense:** Robert McNamara  
**National Security Adviser:** McGeorge Bundy  
**Additional Members:** Robert Kennedy, Ted Sorensen, Arthur Schlesinger.

The president himself was an accomplished congressmen who had experience in foreign affairs. In addition to being a war hero he had consciously associated himself with foreign-policy issues during his tenure on Capitol Hill.

As for Secretary of State Rusk, though he was thought of highly by Acheson whom Kennedy respected, he was not the president's first choice. And he never did elevate himself to the level Kennedy thought worthy of a top-notch State secretary. Instead, Kennedy saw himself in many ways, and acted as his own secretary of state. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 260.) In contrast Secretary McNamara became very influential in the Kennedy Administration. He was sought out early by the administration for his reputation as having a first-class mind. And over the course of the administration McNamara gained in prominence. McGeorge
Bundy is coded as a strong adviser for national security affairs. That he set up shop in the White House was not only unusual but indicative of his relative influence with the president; propinquity counts. It was not the NSC per se that was integral to the Kennedy decisionmaking machinery. Rather it was the staff principals; and Bundy was clearly the primary one. Others have mentioned Walt Rostow as important but he moved to State late in 1961 and was really much less important than Bundy. (Prados, 1991: 99–109.)

Two other adviser need to be justified as influential players and members of the apex. Though Kennedy effectively acted as his own chief of staff, Sorensen was the closes thing to one. (Prados, 1991: 113.) And Kennedy's office was one open to White House advisers and NSC principals at all times. Even more important among apex members is Arthur Schlesinger. He has been described as "the best know of Kennedy's political-cum-national-security advisers" [Prados, 1991: 113] and this is borne out in virtually all the accounts of the administration's decisionmaking.

Together with the president the above courtier of advisers formed the New Frontier's foreign-policy decisionmaking apex. Next we must look at what normal procedure and process was for this young group.

Schlesinger describes a machine that was split between domestic and foreign-policy matters. With respect to the
former, Ted Sorensen, led the way. Domestic policy was ushered through Sorensen to the president. It should also be noted that Sorensen headed the speech writing establishment and through that enjoyed some influence in the area of foreign policy as well. The notable exception to Sorensen's position was Bobby Kennedy; for obvious reasons he had direct access to his brother on both domestic and foreign issues. McGeorge Bundy acted equally as the president's principal adviser on foreign-policy issues. While State and Defense were never cut out of the loop, Bundy by his very proximity in the White House, was the natural person through whom the president would channel the day-to-day tasks of national security and foreign policy.

According to Schlesinger's account, Kennedy was fond of recommendations issued by Senator Jackson's Committee regarding the role and structure of the NSC. One of Jackson's suggestions was that the NSC be an intimate forum in which Kennedy could squarely confront the real policy choices. Under Kennedy's direction the NSC, with Bundy and Rostow, became "a supple instrument to meet the new President's distinctive needs" (Schlesinger, 1965: 210).

George notes that Kennedy's "distinctive needs," as it were, included his nature of handling conflict within his staff. Kennedy "felt much more at ease with the conflictual aspects of politics and policymaking than his predecessor; his sense of efficacy included confidence in his ability to
manage and shape the interpersonal relations of those around him in a constructive fashion, and his cognitive style led him to participate much more actively and directly in the policymaking process. . . ." This led to what George describes as a "collegial style of policymaking based on teamwork and shared responsibility among talented advisers."

Though George stresses collegial and teamwork, competition is not obviated: "Kennedy recognized the value of diversity and give-and-take among advisers, and he encouraged it" (George, 1980: 157).

Generally speaking, the collegial model seems to lie somewhere between the formalistic model of Eisenhower and the competitive model of Roosevelt. In the former, the president is thought to be too far removed from the fray; in the latter, the president is thought to be to deeply imbedded in the actual muck of internecine squabbling.

According to George, characteristics of Kennedy's collegial style included: 1) the president at the center of a wheel with spokes to individual advisers and/or cabinet heads; 2) group approach to solving problems; 3) broad-based information flow from lower bureaucracy to collegial team, viz., the DMU; 4) advisers function as debate team rather than filters; 5) all advisers encouraged to be generalists, not specialists; 6) informal decision procedures and frank debates; and 7) the president occasionally gives overlapping
assignments and may reach down himself to lower bureaucracy for extra information. (George, 1980: 157-159.)

Others have described a similarly open atmosphere of the Kennedy Administration. (Prados, 1991: 114.) Kennedy's personal and organizational style showed a penchant for advisers. Contrary, however, to what some have described as Kennedy's need to work with small groups, what eventually became the ExCom was not a small group at all. Indeed, over seventy persons were cleared to attend ExCom meetings. (Prados, 1991: 110.) It was simply the case that Kennedy enjoyed the intellectual exchange that surrounding himself with a floating discussion group provided. And said group was distinguished: "the best and the brightest."

Under routine conditions, therefore, we would expect to see an open style of foreign-policy decisionmaking in which the aforementioned apex members were integrally involved. We would further expect to see deliberations and debates among said individuals with the president ultimately taking the lead in determining policy. It is worth interest to note that as a result of the Bay of Pigs fiasco (below) the Kennedy Administration determined that it had been too lax in controlling implementation of policy and decided to rectify that situation. (Prados, 1991: 104.)

President Lyndon B. Johnson

President Johnson's decisionmaking bureaucracy consisted, like most presidents, of his cabinet and NSC machinery
in some combination. First we shall consider Johnson's cabinet. When Johnson came to office it was clearly under atypical circumstances. Perhaps because of the extraordinary circumstances and perhaps because Johnson actually valued Kennedy's extant machinery, he kept the lion's share of his predecessor's cabinet. For secretary of defense, Robert McNamara remained almost until the end of Johnson's administration. So too did Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. George Ball remained as under secretary of state where he continued to be a relatively influential player in foreign-policy decisionmaking. And of course Hubert Humphrey became Johnson's vice president and was involved to some degree, though a diminutive one, in the administration's decisionmaking.

The Harvard Dean, McGeorge Bundy, whose intellect had so intrigued President Kennedy remained for some time as Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs. Bundy apparently made the transition from Kennedy to Johnson relatively effortlessly. "Bundy quickly accustomed himself to the LBJ style . . . " and he "persisted in giving the president the full flavor and exactness of his thoughts, always flintily expressed, unplumed, and dry-boned." That Bundy's "thinking paralleled the president's in no way was due to flattery or the desire to please. They simply saw the world through the same prism." (Valenti, 1975: 68.)
These were the main players in the Johnson administration's foreign-policy decisionmaking bureaucracy. Now we must identify the apex members specifically.

![Diagram of the Johnson Administration](image)

**Figure 8**

President: Lyndon Johnson  
Secretary of State: Dean Rusk  
Secretary of Defense: Robert McNamara  
National Security Adviser: McGeorge Bundy; Walt Rostow  
Additional Members: Clark Clifford, Abe Fortas, Bill Moyers, George Ball.

Notice that the only difference between Kennedy's and Johnson's is the diminution of the National Security Role. While Bundy remained in that role, until 1966 when Rostow assumed the title, his relationship with Johnson was not as personal as it had been with Kennedy—with due respect to Valenti's characterization. Bundy seemed comfortable enough but Johnson had doubts about the "Harvard Dean." And though we have not changed the relative influence of Secretary of State Rusk, it should be noted that his prominence did increase somewhat in the Johnson Administration. His skills at bureaucratic maneuvering eventually allowed him to equal Defense Secretary McNamara. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 326.)

Johnson had evidently become somewhat distrustful of the CIA, as well, as a result of the Bay of Pigs. (Crabb
and Mulcahy, 1986: 204.) It should be noted, however, that eventually Johnson came to trust DCI Helms for his prescient predictions of the events surrounding the Six Day War and thereafter included Helms in the apex. Nonetheless, his reluctance to rely too heavily on formal advisers led to his relying a bit more on personal advisers such as Clark Clifford—who had distinguished himself serving other Democratic presidents. Also Johnson was known to rely on Abe Fortas and Bill Moyers for advise and counsel. Together these individuals form the apex of the Johnson decisionmaking unit.

In George's (1980) study of presidential decisionmaking, the author does not set Johnson apart as displaying a distinct decisionmaking type. He mentions in general terms that Johnson's advisers thrashed out options in the president's absence and would thereupon present the president with a seeming united bureaucracy. This was, according to George, an example of how Johnson's decisionmaking machinery malfunctioned. (George, 1980: 126.)

The only specific attempt to fit Johnson into one of the decisionmaking types is as follows:

As for Lyndon B. Johnson, he began by trying to emulate Franklin Roosevelt's style [viz., competitive] and gradually moved toward a formalistic approach but one that exhibited idiosyncratic features. (George, 1980: 149.)
Thus we must look to flesh out Johnson's idiosyncratic features and apply them to what we know of the formalistic approach.

First, we must remember that Eisenhower decisionmaking is an example of the formalistic approach. This is an approach in which orderly decisionmaking is a premium; it is reasoned that said orderly process will lead to more thorough analysis. A formalistic approach is also thought to conserve the president's time and energy for "big decisions." Conversely, such an approach may allow the "hierarchy" which screens information by design to distort information in practice. (George, 1980: 165.)

In the Crabb and Mulcahy (1986) study of presidential decisionmaking the authors describe Johnson's national security machinery as "decisionmaking by consensus." Further, they describe a strong president, and average-strength Secretary of State, and an average-strength NSC advisor. They go on to explain that, among other things, this presents ripe conditions for groupthink. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 326).

More importantly, the same study describes a two-level system of decisionmaking. On the one hand there existed "an intricate formal system." On the other hand there was "a highly personal and fluid informal system" (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 212). Johnson preferred to consult his most trusted individuals and small groups of advisers--i.e., the
informal system. When he convened a Cabinet of NSC meeting (i.e., the formal system) it was primarily to inform the remainder of the administration. Employing the informal system in which he surrounded himself with his trusted circle of advisers, Johnson would "stalk" a problem, involving himself "personally in minutiae" of any given issue. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 217.)

With respect to the Johnson Administration, then, we would expect a decisionmaking routine in which the president and his apex members would informally address policy issues; the advent of the Tuesday Lunch best illustrates this. Once decisions had agonizingly been made, the president would use the formal NSC structure or Cabinet meetings to inform the remainder of his bureaucracy and to give the impression that they were all involved.

President Richard M. Nixon

Nixon of course held office for two consecutive terms during which some of his key people changed. The most important of these persons, to be sure, is Henry Kissinger. Kissinger began as Nixon's national security adviser, at one point was both national security adviser and secretary of state, and outlasted Nixon in the White House by staying on as Gerald Ford's secretary of state upon Nixon's resignation. Other key cabinet officials, though unquestionably less important players in terms of actual decisionmaking, were Secretary of State William Rogers.
Rogers was a personal friend of Nixon's and many initially thought that he would therefore be a strong secretary of state using that relationship. This proved incorrect. Eventually Rogers was the person whom Kissinger ultimately replaced. And there was Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird who never gained ascendancy in the administration.

Figure 9

President: Richard Nixon
Secretary of State: William Rogers
Secretary of Defense: Melvin Laird
National Security Adviser: Henry Kissinger
Additional Members: John Mitchell, possibly Haldeman.

Nixon saw himself as a statesman of some import and certainly a person with foreign-policy credentials. He therefore "effectively displac[ed] the secretary of state from any meaningful role and substitut[ed] the national security adviser in his place" (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 237.) Despite the campaign talk of a cabinet government, Nixon was determined to direct foreign policy from the White House. And in his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, he found a like-minded cohort.

For domestic issues Haldeman was perhaps the most influential of advisers, though John Mitchell too was quite influential. Sometime near the beginning of 1970 (below)
Nixon claims that he began including Mitchell in foreign-policy issues with increasing frequency.

But since Nixon considered himself to be somewhat of an expert on foreign affairs and felt that his expertise and brawn, coupled with Kissinger's intellect and background provided ample resources the duo circumvented several traditional channels. For example, in March of 1969 (i.e., just two months after Nixon's inauguration) Nixon and Kissinger circumvented both Secretaries Laird and Rogers and, instead, worked through the ambassador in Phnom Penh to secretly bomb that country. Indeed they developed a rather complex fake-accounting process so as no to alert anyone in the Pentagon.

Nixon's decisionmaking apex may have been the most restrictive of any of the administration under our consideration. It began that way and became even more restrictive and, some would say conspiratorial, over the president's tenure.

A great deal has been written about the Nixon-Kissinger foreign-policy machinery. One study notes that whenever else one might wish to say about the Nixon administration, he in "collaboration with his national security adviser (de facto secretary of state), Henry Kissinger, Nixon promulgated far-reaching revisions in post World War II foreign policy" (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 237). George cites "Nixon's preference for a highly formalistic system"
as well as Nixon's own peculiar personal traits as resulting in "Nixon's need for a few staff aides immediately around him who were to serve as buffers. . . from the wear and tear of policymaking" (George, 1980: 155). Others notes that "Nixon demonstrated a need for tightly controlled decision-making procedures and disliked the face-to-face confrontations that are often required in the formulation and execution of any policy" (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 251). But this simply insulated Nixon from the tete-a-tete confrontations that often accompany strong-willed decisionmakers. It did not, as we shall see, obviate Nixon's own strong influence on his administration's foreign policy.

Indeed, in Nixon's variant of George's "formalistic model" the president headed "by far the most centralized and highly structured" foreign-policy decisionmaking structure of any president before him. And its very purpose and goal, beyond preventing personal confrontation and bureaucratic inertia, was "to enhance and protect [Nixon's] personal control over high policy" (George, 1980: 155).

Further, Nixon took to new extremes the chief-of-staff concept. In terms of foreign policy, Nixon's effective chief of staff was Henry Kissinger. Kissinger was, of course, Nixon's special assistant for national security affairs—-the de jure chief of foreign-policy matters under the Nixon design. But he was also the de facto foreign-
policy chief of staff inasmuch as he chaired all six special committees, set up in the Nixon foreign-policy system, through which foreign-policy matters perforce traveled. And it should be noted that said functions were hitherto State's prerogatives.

The six special committees--operating under NSC auspices--were: 1) Vietnam Special Studies Group; 2) Special Actions Group (international crises); 3) Defense Programs and Review Committee; 4) Verification Panel (SALT); 5) 40 Committee (covert operations); and 6) the Senior Review Group (an umbrella for all other policy issues). (George, 1980: 155; Hersh, 1983: 29.) All relevant information dealing with foreign policy was thus channeled through a specific group, which Kissinger chaired, up through the NSC, which Kissinger headed.

In addition to the six special committees, Kissinger had the prerogative to set up various ad hoc working groups. These were set up by Kissinger as needed (composed of specialists from various agencies) to report directly to Kissinger, thus, the president. These groups too were, therefore, controlled by Kissinger. (Hersh, 1983: 29.)

Sometime the first year of the administration, the NSC emerged as the uncontested foreign-policy mechanism for the "imperial presidency." Laird and Rogers quickly found out that they were but attendants not principals. (Although as we shall see their influence was surprisingly important the
first few months.) Soon they could not match Kissinger's impressive arrangement, however.

The National Security Council Staff, under the direction of Henry Kissinger, emerged as not simply the claimant for presidential attention in foreign policy machinery but as the principal vehicle for the articulation and implementation of the administration's objectives. (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 260-261.)

It has been extensively documented, if somewhat polemically, by Hersh how the Nixon-Kissinger team circumvented State and Defense in foreign policy. Hersh cites Morton Halperin as writing the broad memorandum that became the basis for the Nixon-Kissinger machinery: "Halperin, seiz[ed] the opportunity, . . . to draft a broad memorandum that placed nearly all power in the hands of the national security adviser" (Hersh, 1983: 29). This memo took power previously residing in State and gave it to Kissinger's "direct authority." Lawrence Eagleburger, who worked on a draft of the memorandum, described it to another foreign policy officer, Roger Morris, in the following way: 'what ever happened to the Secretary of State?' (Hersh, 1983: 30). Others, less polemically, have concluded the administration' reorganization had the result of "effectively displacing the secretary of state from any meaningful role and substituting the national security adviser [Kissinger] in his place" (Crabb and Mulcahy, 1986: 237).
On 27 December 1968, just over a month after his election, Nixon summoned his principal foreign-policy advisers to his vacation home in Key Biscane, Florida. In attendance were Kissinger, Melvin Laird, William Rogers, Bryce Harlow, Andrew Goodpaster, and Vice President-elect Spiro Agnew. Nixon presented the memorandum outlining the newly redesigned foreign-policy machine, using a ten-page working paper written by Kissinger. Foreign policy would originate from the White House. It was presented as a *fait accompli*. And his advisers accepted it as such, pro forma (Hersh, 1983: 31).

It would be wrong to conclude, as Hersh sometimes does, that this was all Kissinger surreptitiously working his own will. Nixon was known to be rather suspect of the traditional U.S. government foreign-policy bureaucracy. He did not, for example, trust the State Department whose "personnel had no loyalty to [Nixon]"; he accused the Foreign Service of having "disdained him as Vice President"; he felt the CIA "was staffed by Ivy League liberals who . . . had always opposed him" (Kissinger, 1979: 11,15). Indeed, Nixon implies in his memoirs that there would be a State Department in the nominal sense only. "I planned to direct foreign policy from the White House. Therefore, I regarded my choice of National Security Adviser as crucial" (Nixon, 1978: 341). He goes on to justify choosing Kissinger, among other reasons, because Kissinger had funneled information to
his campaign about Johnson's plans for bombing halts prior to the election.

And so the Nixon-Kissinger foreign-policy bureaucracy was born. A combination that Nixon characterized as "unlikely—the grocer's son from Whittier [California] and the refugee from Hitler's Germany, the politician and the academic" (Nixon, 1978: 341). The same combination that presidential historian, Stephen Ambrose, has described as "born conspirators" (Ambrose, 1989: 233). It should be noted, the Nixon-Kissinger cabal notwithstanding, that Nixon concedes that by the end of 1969, he began to include a new member of the team: John Mitchell. (Nixon, 1978: 433).

With the Nixon style and foreign-policy structure, we would therefore expect to see an administration whose foreign-policy decisionmaking is typically accomplished via a restrictive group of decisionmakers. We would further expect to see the process controlled rather tightly by Nixon and Kissinger themselves, carefully picking and choosing those whom they permit to be included in the process.

President Gerald R. Ford

President Gerald Ford, of course, came to office under circumstances that can scarcely be called normal. Most presidents have from election to inauguration (about 75 days) to put together their cabinets as well as the decisionmaking bureaucracy. Additionally, they typically enjoy a grace period or "honeymoon" for some time
thereafter; during this time presidents are scrutinized somewhat less than during the remainder of their term. This, clearly, was not the case for President Ford.

After eight months as vice president, Ford replaced le ancien régime that was characterized by scandal and disgrace. In so doing, President Ford was acutely aware that he had "no mandate from the people, and [that] the Congress understood that" (Ford, 1979: 126).

It was in this atmosphere that Ford assembled his decisionmaking bureaucracy. He kept in place his predecessor's cabinet which Ford saw as one "of fine quality" (Ford, 1979: 132). In Ford's memoirs he enumerates said cabinet beginning with Secretary of State Kissinger whom Ford calls "superb." He then mentions several other cabinet positions he inherited: Treasury (Bill Simon), HUD (Jim Lynn), Agriculture (Earl Butz), and Attorney General (William Saxbe). He then finally mentions his Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger whose intellect Ford respected but whose effectiveness vis-à-vis Congress he found suspect because of Schlesinger's perceived arrogance and patronizing attitude. (Ford, 1979: 132.)

In Head's, et. al., (1978) study of presidential decisionmaking during crises, the authors state that Ford typically would air various viewpoints and positions in cabinet meetings prior to any major initiative in order to facilitate diverse opinions. (Head, 1978: 72.) Ford's
memoirs confirm his approach as one encouraging an open door. (Ford, 1979: 126; ad passim). And it was this approach that he would use for both foreign policy and domestic matters. Yet as we shall see, during the Mayaguez affair President Ford's group of advisers consisted of a far-less formal group; rather, it consisted of four key individuals with some advice and general policy guidelines from the formal NSC structure.

Ford's structural apex differs little from that of Nixon's just described above.

![Figure 10]

Ford Administration

President: Gerald Ford
Secretary of State: Henry Kissinger
Secretary of Defense: James Schlesinger
National Security Adviser: Brent Scowcroft
Additional Members: William Colby (CIA)

What distinguishes it most from Nixon's is Kissinger as secretary of state and Scowcroft--Kissinger's alter ego--as national security adviser. Further, there is a lack of additional members. Ford was not an expert on foreign policy and was quite willing to defer to those whom he supposed to be so. Ford of course had not the foreign-policy savvy and acumen of his predecessor Nixon. And Kissinger became secretary of state in 1973--greatly
strengthening that role. Brent Scowcroft was a solid influence as national security adviser and had been Kissinger's deputy earlier. And though Schlesinger had his own power base independent of either Ford or Kissinger, and had held other cabinet portfolios, he eventually became superseded by Kissinger in the Ford Administration.

The CIA was of course undergoing intense scrutiny during the Ford years. The excesses of the past were being publicized with a vengeance. And though the agency was under assault, DCI Colby was a trusted individual by President Ford. (He eventually had to be cut for political reasons as the 1976 election campaign got underway. He was replaced by George Bush.) But in the interim he was well respected and liked by the president.

A typical day a decisionmaking for President Ford would begin with his arrival at the office whereupon he would be briefed on intelligence matters. This daily routine consisted of Brent Scowcroft alone or with CIA's David Peterson and would commence around 7:30 A.M. (Ford, 1978: 149.) Ford would then address domestic issues with advisers for a short while until Kissinger would meet with him somewhere between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. This meeting in which Ford and Kissinger would discuss pressing foreign-policy matters followed by general policy direction would last an hour or more. (Ford, 1978: 150.)
Even though Ford respected Secretary Schlesinger's intellect, it should be noted that only on a formal basis and with respect to general policy matters did Ford act on the secretary's advise. For example, upon coming to office Ford quickly learned of Schlesinger's desire to pardon those who had evaded the Vietnam war and who were forced to live in third countries. Schlesinger thought that in order to heal the country this needed to be addressed. (Ford, 1978: 141.) Ford did take his advise on this matter and later issued a qualified pardon. Yet if and when it came to siding with either his secretary of state or his secretary of defense, Ford rarely came down in the latter's camp. (As we shall see, Ford sided with Kissinger during the Mayaguez affair even though the military dimension of the affair was significant.) Indeed, Ford frequently turned to Kissinger, and Scowcroft for the most part as we shall discuss below.

In any case Ford immediately faced several challenges upon his swearing in as commander in chief for the U.S. armed forces. The recovery of a Soviet submarine that had sunk some six years earlier was in progress. The operation consisted of an putative research vessel, the Glomar Explorer using new technology to reach 16,000 feet below the ocean surface to retrieve said submarine. On Ford's second morning as president he was informed via his morning intelligence briefing that the Soviets were following the Glomar with apparent interest. Ford additionally faced the
Congressional debate on the Greek-Turkish squabble over Cyprus and the ramifications for NATO as Congress came back into session. The pattern he established for dealing with these matters is consistent with that outlined above: general discussion at both.

Ford used the NSC more than had Nixon. He attended meetings and listened to a full airing of opinions. Still, once the meetings had adjourned, he turned for advice to those whom he considered to be peerless in foreign-policy matters. And with increasing frequency that became Henry Kissinger. In the Ford Administration, then, we would expect to see routine decisions handled openly in NSC or Cabinet forums. He would allow input from all appropriate principals. Although he clearly valued the opinion of some over others. Nonetheless, in contrast to Nixon, we would expect to see a somewhat more expansive DMU apex.

We have now considered six administrations. We have, among other things, identified their principal decisionmakers in terms of foreign policy. We have, specifically, set forth those whom we have identified as each administration's DMU apex members. We have finally discussed the way each administration went about routine foreign-policy decisionmaking matters. We may now move directly to the case studies using these established baselines for comparison.
CHAPTER V

SHORT TIME, SURPRISE:
SUEZ-SINAI, EC-121, MAYAGUEZ

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we shall be considering three cases, all of which are characterized by short time in which to formulate foreign-policy decisions and surprise to the decisionmaking unit. Apart from the similarities along these two variables, the cases represent a broad cross section both temporally and spatially.

As for the temporal domain of these cases, the Suez-Sinai affair occurred in the fall of 1956. Events earlier in the year led up to the crucial period of 5 November through 8 November 1956. Next, chronologically, comes the EC-121 incident: the shooting down of a U.S. reconnaissance plane as it flew a standard mission over Korea. This event took place during the spring of 1969, from mid to late April. Nixon had scarcely been inaugurated when his administration was confronted with this event. It appears to be a rather isolated event with little leading up to it. Finally, we shall consider the Mayaguez capture. The reader
will recall that shortly after America ignominiously and finally extricated itself from Indochina, a U.S. vessel was captured and held for about a week by the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia. This took place in May of 1975.

There are contrasts spatially as well. For example, with each of the three events we have a different U.S. president to consider: Eisenhower for Suez, Nixon for the EC 121 spy plane, and Ford during the capture of the Mayaguez. The major antagonist in each case differs as well. For the Suez the antagonist of the crucial period was the Soviets. Of course the reader will immediately wonder why the British, French, and Israelis have been excluded. The reason, as will be seen, is that the Suez Canal incident changed qualitatively on 5 November when Eisenhower faced the specter of the Soviets intervening. As for the EC 121 spy plane case, the U.S. antagonist was the North Koreans and their infamous Kim Il-sung. Finally, with the Mayaguez we have the U.S. going against the newly empowered Khmer Rouge government of Democratic Kampuchea.

Other comparisons and contrasts could easily be made. Each event being characterized by a different session of Congress; Republican versus Democratic controlled; relative intensity of Cold War; etc. However, these are beyond the parameters of this study. We should note, however, that each of the presidents in these three cases was elected as a Republican president.
In any case we have a fairly wide basis on which to compare. It is hoped that this will allow generalizations to ultimately be made. Without further deliberation, then, we shall consider the three cases in chronological order. We shall use the following format. First, we introduce the case and events leading up to it by way of a narrative. A chronology of relevant events is included in the narrative. We then proceed to an analysis section in which the comparative questions based on the typology's hypotheses are answered. Then once all three cases are introduced and the comparative questions are answered, we shall briefly summarize are findings in narrative and tabular form.

THE SUEZ-SINAI, 1956

Narrative

The history of Arab-Israeli relations is long and fraught with hostility and historical animosity. The problems separating the belligerents include border disputes, religious differences, and seemingly insurmountable hatred of each other as ethnic groups. These and others

---

difficulties between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbors have been amply studied elsewhere and need not be introduced here. Suffice it to say that after Israel's creation by the UN in 1947 and, more precisely, after the British pulled out of former Palestine in 1948 hostilities continued and new conflagrations commenced.

An Armistice was sponsored by the UN to end the fighting. And it was successful for a time. Following the 1949 Armistice, however, generally poor relations continued to plague the region's countries. The Armistice did little to ameliorate the actual enmity felt by the region's antagonists. Instead it simply froze temporarily in place the hostilities.

It was during these years and while the Truman administration was in office that a "special relation" between Israel and the United States emerged. And this special relation was, to be sure, viewed askance by many of the region's Arabs. Upon Eisenhower's election to office the so-called special relation fell into decline. Eisenhower's administration intentionally took a decidedly impartial view. Eisenhower hoped both to take care of old friends while making new Arab friends.

But while the complexion of the American-Israeli relationship was changing, so too were things rapidly changing in the Arab world--particularly in Egypt. Indeed, U.S. policy in the region turned on three major considerations,
which were at times at odds with each other. First and foremost was to prevent the Soviet Union from extending its sphere of influence any deeper into the region in the wake of the power vacuum created by the Anglo-French retreat from the region. Second was to preserve U.S.-Arab relations so as to protect U.S. oil interests. And third was to maintain the state of Israel.

In Egypt, in particular, U.S. attempts at balancing the three priorities were problematic. Nasser was becoming an increasingly popular as well as bellicosely nationalist leader. One of Nasser's pet projects was the Aswan Dam. And he sought U.S. assistance for the project. Successfully as it turns out for the U.S. did commit to helping Nasser's Aswan-Dam project. But for various reasons in July 1956, President Eisenhower reneged on the offer to fund the project. Nasser was incensed. He retaliated immediately by nationalizing the Suez Canal.

The canal was owned primarily by the British and the French. The Anglo-French consortium was, to be sure, a very lucrative business venture. The Europeans paid Egypt only three percent of the canal's annual revenue--some $30 million. This of course precipitated what in the fall would become the Suez-Sinai campaign. Eventually, the British, the French, and the Israelis conspired to retake the canal and to depose of the upstart Arab leader once and for all.
Throughout the summer and early fall of 1956 relatively hostile and unfruitful negotiations over the nationalization took place. The result of Nasser's move to nationalize the canal had elevated him to the pantheon of Arab heros. Consequently, U.S. and other efforts to convince Nasser of his folly were less than successful. He remained distinctly unconvinced.

As peaceful negotiations continued to languish the Israelis, the British, and the French began to plot. The Israelis feared Nasser's increased belligerence and his apparent accumulation of power on their flank. They worried that an increasingly emboldened Nasser did not bode well for Israel as a state. The French and British too looked inhospitably upon Nasser's increasing popularity; they looked equally inhospitably upon the loss of their former source of revenue windfall. The answer to the problem for each of the conspirators seemed to be Nasser's demise.

The Israelis eventually invaded Egypt with British and French encouragement, albeit secretly. It was intended to look simply as though it was a indigenous move by Israelis to prevent Nasser from becoming more powerful. Then the Europeans conveniently issued a proclamation that both the Israelis and Egyptians must cease hostilities, withdraw from the canal zone, and allow an Anglo-French peacekeeping force to interpose itself between the two belligerents. During this time the Europeans effected a communications blackout
to keep the Americans unaware of their complicity in the scheme.

If the Americans were in the dark, the Soviets evidently were not. As a result of events in the region the Soviets eventually issued an "ultimatum" to the Anglo-French-Israeli cabal. They also informed the U.S. that with or without its blessing, they were going to help Egypt. And it is this ultimatum of 5 November 1956, that in turn led to the three-day period of critical U.S. foreign-policy decisionmaking.

Amid the early phases, however, American politics moved ahead inexorably, undaunted by the vagaries of Middle East politics. It was during this same fall (1956) that Eisenhower was running a campaign for reelection. Apparently neither the Israelis, nor the British, nor the French thought that the former Commander of Europe's liberation would take a risky political decision with elections imminent. What they did not know, however, was the degree of Eisenhower's determination not to allow foreign policy to be determined by domestic policy. As Eisenhower noted to a boyhood friend, "Swede" Hazlett:

The Administration had realized that Ben Gurion might try to take advantage of the pre-campaign period to launch a war because of the importance that so many politicians in the past have attached to our Jewish vote. I gave strict orders to the State Department that they should inform Israel that we'd handle our affairs exactly as though we didn't have a Jew in America. The welfare and best interests of our country were to be the sole criteria [sic] on which we
operated. (Eisenhower, 1965: 56.)

On 1 November 1956 a "Top Secret" NSC meeting took place. In it the "Blackout" between the U.S. and its putative allies France and Britain over the previous couple of weeks was discussed. The allies, apparently surprised by the initially harsh U.S. reaction to their conspiracy had determined that it would be best to keep the U.S. in the dark henceforth. Ambrose states that when the invasion finally occurred:

Eisenhower was badly surprised ... . The proper response was to remain cool, gather all the information he could, consider the options, and use them to take control of events ... . It was what he ... did ... in one of his greatest moments as President. (Ambrose, 1984: 354.)

Meanwhile rapid change in Eastern Europe appeared imminent in Poland and especially Hungary. Recall that Khrushchev had made his famous speech in the Twentieth Party Congress. This set in train events in Europe. The Eisenhower administration "had long expected" such changes: "it was an article of faith that sooner or later the satellites would rise up against Russia" (Ambrose, 1983: 355). Apparently State and CIA had encouraged European revolt tacitly implying U.S. support. According to Ambrose, however, Eisenhower never would have favored such support; he had maintained the same position for some four years.

---

11Declassified Document Quarterly, 1980: 384A. This was discussed in a Memorandum [S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC 302nd Meeting].
What is more, he viewed Republican rhetoric—even within his administration—as essentially hypocritical. (Ambrose, 1983: 355.)

Therefore in the fall of 1956 the Eisenhower Administration was faced with three challenges. A Christian Science Monitor editorial cartoon of the time showed Eisenhower in the middle of a three-ring circus. The rings, of course, were Suez-Sinai, events in Eastern Europe, and the upcoming election for Eisenhower's second term as president. But it was the Suez-Sinai campaign that Eisenhower thought most worthy of his attention. And we shall now turn to his handling of that affair.

Analysis

In the previous chapter we established a baseline for each presidential administration under consideration in this study. The purpose of course was to provide a basis of comparison for decisionmaking activities. With Eisenhower's decisionmaking structure in mind, we may begin to approach the focused analysis of the Suez-Sinai event. We shall proceed by answering, in order, each of the comparative questions which refer to a specific hypothesis.

1. Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

1.1.A. Was the DMU that was convened restrictive? Clearly the answer is yes. We earlier identified the apex of the Eisenhower Administration. We noted that Eisenhower had an impressive foreign-affairs resume and considered
himself his own Defense Secretary. Further we noted that in the Eisenhower scheme, the executive secretary of the National Security Council played a minimal role. We contrasted this role to the "maximalist" role played by John Foster Dulles (State). And finally we included a couple of other individuals whom Eisenhower was known to trust and to confer with: Allen Dulles, and Goodpaster, Sherman Adams, and perhaps George Humphrey. According to our hypothesis in Chapter III, we would expect Eisenhower to restrict the DMU to these individuals; that would constitute a restrictive DMU. And that is precisely what we found.

To the extent that a DMU was convened it was even more restrictive than the apex we hypothesized. What is clear is that Eisenhower was meeting with various groups and individuals about Suez prior to the Soviet "ultimatum" which precipitated the three-day event characterized by surprise and short decision time. (Brendon, 1987: 328.) He was being briefed as to what was happening insofar as it was determinable given the European blackout on information. We further know that sometime on Monday, 5 November 1956, the Anglo-French joint expedition arrived at the Suez and Port Said. Sometime after, apparently in the early afternoon, the Soviets became more directly involved. Bulganin is reported to have sent messages to Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion alerting them that the Soviets were prepared to use "force to crush the aggressors and [to] restore the peace."
Further, Bulganin issued a "thinly veiled threat to use nuclear missiles against London and Paris if the Franco-British force was not withdrawn from Suez" (Ambrose, 1984: 367-368).

About the same time that afternoon Eisenhower was sent a message from Bulganin that summarized the Soviet position with respect to the aggression and which proposed a joint Soviet-American action to march into Egypt with the purpose of stopping the attack. Bulganin warned Ike that 'If this war is not stopped, it is fraught with danger and can grow into a Third World War.' At about 5:00 P.M. the President summoned Hoover (sitting in for the ailing Foster Dulles), Adams, and Hughes—the apex of the administration—to discuss a reply to Bulganin's proposal. (Ambrose, 1984: 368.)

Though Foster Dulles was excluded by virtue of the fact he had entered the hospital, this clearly constitutes the first convocation of the DMU to respond to the threat of Soviet intervention. This threat changed the stakes as far as Eisenhower was concerned. Eisenhower responded quickly and the group convened was restrictive—precisely what we hypothesized.

1.1.B. At what locus was the DMU convened? We hypothesized under these conditions that a high locus of convocation would occur. Rather than meetings convened at State, Defense, and elsewhere to report back to the
president, the DMU would be convened at the White House or an analogue. This is of course what happened. The meetings over the next two days all took place at the White House with Eisenhower in direct control—clear confirmation of a high locus of convocation.

1.1.C. **Was the DMU convened frequently?** When compared to the period preceding the ultimatum, the frequency clearly increased dramatically. Virtually all of 5 November was devoted to various meetings, conversations, phone calls, and general discussions on the Suez debacle and the fact that the Soviets were now changing the complexion of it. This of course was in spite of the impending elections. In one discussion with Hoover, Adams, and Hughes, the president demonstrated his concern that the Soviets might do something provocative.

Those boys [Soviets] are both furious and scared. Just as with Hitler, that makes for the most dangerous possible state of mind. . . . be damn sure that . . . every outpost of our armed forces is absolutely right on their [sic] toes. (Ambrose, 1984: 368.)

He goes on to remark that "if those fellows start something, we may have to hit 'em--and, if necessary, with everything in the bucket" (Ambrose, 1984: 368).

Where one meeting ends and another begins is not always clear from the record; rather they occur around the clock. What is clear, however, is that the time devoted to the issue generally, as well as specifically the frequency of meetings increased dramatically over this three-day period.
And is must be remembered that this was the day prior to the Presidential Election. This distinctly constitutes a high frequency of convocation according to our criteria.

1.1.D. *Was the DMU convened along standard foreign-policy routines or in some improvised fashion?* Several points must be made. Earlier, we developed a norm or baseline for the decisionmaking structure in the Eisenhower Administration. And during the Suez-Sinai affair, after Soviet intentions to intervene became known (from 5 November until 9 November), there was a rather impressive departure from said norm. Not only did the president break his DMU into a smaller group of his closest advisers, he seems to have reconstituted it with even smaller sub-groups of this already smaller structure. Sometimes Hoover, Goodpaster, and Allen Dulles met with the president; other times Eisenhower met with just Hughes, and Hoover, and Adams; still other times Eisenhower met with just Goodpaster. Clearly meetings were constituted along rather ad hoc, informal procedures according to the president's perception of what was needed. And it is clear that it was not according to some standardized routines but, rather, was done on an ad hoc basis.

2. Selection of Options

1.2.A. *Were the options proffered by a restrictive DMU (i.e., the apex) or the larger bureaucracy?* All evidence indicates that it was Eisenhower alone who proffered and
ultimately selected options. Thus it is the case that an even more restrictive DMU than we anticipated selected options. Eisenhower presumably conferred with those other individuals comprising the apex but there was no evidence that any were able to put forth options. We therefore have clear confirmation of our expectations.

1.2.B. **Were options few or many in number DMU?**

According to one scholar, by 3 November Eisenhower was "directing his own foreign policy" (Brendon, 1987: 328). Another cites Eisenhower taking direct charge even earlier as he determined U.S. policy could not be acquiescent given the reprehensible British and French behavior. Eisenhower made the decision, "from which he never retreated one inch, that the cabal could not be allowed to succeed" (Ambrose, 1984: 357). Which ever day marked Eisenhower's taking direct control of the decisionmaking process, his policy during the three-day period under consideration, consisted of three basic tracts. First, was the military consideration: the U.S. was to be prepared to counter, should the Soviets actually intercede, by preparing to use "everything in the bucket" if necessary. The second tract was bilateral diplomacy. In that regard the president first made known on 5 November that the Soviet proposal of joint action with the U.S. was out of the question. Eisenhower also attempted to use U.S. influence--albeit unsuccessfully --to get the British and French to stand down. The third
tract was conducted through the United Nations. There the President had Ambassador Lodge take the offensive on votes and amendments to preclude the Soviets from gaining the initiative. It should be noted that this latter tract was evidently the least of the president's priorities. This may be seen in that Eisenhower conveyed policy through Hoover, to Lodge.

It appears from the record that these policies were in effect the only options considered. That Eisenhower took direct charge and directed policy from the White House made input from others problematic. He was briefed and he listened. But he apparently controlled the process himself. This was Eisenhower's instinctual response. It was only over succeeding hours that he brought others into the process. We earlier determined that no more than one or two options from each member of the apex would constitute few options. In this case, though evidently from only the president, few options were considered as a result of Suez-Sinai incident.

It is worth comparing this to the days leading up to the Soviet ultimatum for contrast. Prior to the 5 November entry of direct Soviet mischief, participation by several persons and agencies in formal NSC meetings, as mentioned above, is discernable. In these larger meetings both Ambrose, Brendon, and Eisenhower's diaries show various persons espousing their respective views on what U.S.
response to the European allies and Israel ought to be. There was give and take between contesting views and the policies that followed therefrom.

But following the ultimatum, Eisenhower effectively supplanted these would-be decisionmakers with himself. He took direct control and it was his view that was ultimately processed into U.S. policy. Indeed, that he failed to meet initially with those officially tasked with such matters—notably the Secretaries of State and Defense—effectively allowed him to uniformly dictate policy without having to confront opposition. Whether this was his intent or not is unclear. What is clear is that he effectively cut out the standard foreign-policy decisionmaking bureaucracy—those who would normally consider such issues from institutions whose stewardship was to generate such options.

Few persons were part of the decisionmaking process in response to the ultimatum. It was Eisenhower who proffered options. As others became involved, especially the next day, new discussions developed; but Eisenhower had already instructed that his policies be carried out. Thus these discussions developed after the fact.

1.2.C. Did options reflect a dominant individual personality? It would appear that for all intents and purposes, one personality, that of the president's dominated the initial process. Eisenhower's record as a military leader was one of directness and decisiveness. This was
apparent in the early period following the Soviet ultimatum. The only other big contender for having a dominating personality in the Eisenhower Administration was of course John Foster Dulles. But we have seen that, due to his hospital stay, he was not even part of the process. The contrast between the pre-ultimatum and post-ultimatum decisionmaking process is worth considering.

For example on 30 October Eisenhower, angry over the apparent lack of thought going into the Anglo-French collusion, announced at an NSC meeting that "those who began this operation should be left to . . . boil in their own oil, so to speak." Foster Dulles interjected that official U.S. policy ought not to be changed in one breath. Anglo-French thoughtlessness, notwithstanding, the U.S. could not sit idly by "and let them [the allies] go under" (Declassified Documents, 1978: 450C). Eisenhower's actions, during the three-day period in which surprise is present, provide clear contrast.

In an NSC meeting on 1 November, the tone of the meeting was one in which many opinions were tendered, and a good deal of give and take was apparent. (Ambrose, 1984: 363-364.) In an earlier NSC meeting, the agenda was not devoted solely to the Suez even though Allen Dulles briefed the participants that the CIA expected an Israeli military move forthwith. During this meeting Suez as well as Hungary were
discussed with various opinions on each matter evident in the record. (Ambrose, 1984: 355-356.)

In these early meetings concerning Suez (as well as other items) many personalities and opinions were reflected. In fact, at one such NSC meeting Allen Dulles attempted to direct the discussion always returning it to Hungary. Following 5 November only the president's views seems evident. By restricting participation the president effectively precluded extraneous debate. Though it was Eisenhower who clearly and controlled the selection of options we found insufficient evidence to conclude that his personality was reflected in them.

1.2.D. Was evidence of groupthink present? The circumstances would appear to have been rather ripe for it. Namely, the president discussing foreign-policy matters with Adams, his chief of staff, and determining U.S. policy on the spot put Adams in the unusual position of the in-group on foreign policy. Unfortunately, the record did not detail what occurred in this initial period when Eisenhower was singularly selecting and directing U.S. policy. We cannot therefore justifiably conclude that groupthink was present. We were unable to detect any of the tell-tale signs.

3. Implementation of Options

In the Suez-Sinai case it will be seen that implementation and evaluation once implementation began were very similar. As has already been noted (Chapter III)
Eisenhower's general style was to let others implement policies once a decision had been made.

1.3.A. Was implementation controlled by the apex or by a more inclusive DMU composed of the larger bureaucracy? We have seen that during the crucial days of Suez, the president took charge both in formulating and at least in directing the implementation of that policy. He directed actions, and was in turn briefed on their implementation directly.

There seems to be one exception; the exception is with regard to the international-diplomatic tract in the UN. Recall, that administration's threefold approach to the problem featured diplomacy as the final piece. And evidently, Eisenhower never spent much time regarding it. The decision was made (possibly 30 October) prior to Foster Dulles entering the hospital that the United States would confront its allies in the United Nations. Also the U.S. would do everything in its power to prevent the Soviets from seizing the initiative in the UN thereby precluding any overly-ambitious Soviet action under UN auspices. In a speech on the evening of 1 November, Eisenhower made known the U.S. position for friend and foe to hear:

We cannot subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us. There can be only one law--or there shall be no peace. (Ambrose, 1984: 364.)
After this speech, there is little evidence of Eisenhower being particularly interested in condemning the British and French. Eisenhower simply wished to forestall the Soviets seizing the initiative. Of the threefold approach decided upon by Eisenhower, and largely directed by him, the international-diplomatic approach in the United Nations was not something he followed through in terms of implementation. (Recall he instructed others to direct the ambassador rather than doing so himself.) Implementation was nonetheless directed by Eisenhower overall. Thus implementation was controlled by the apex—in fact it was controlled by an even more restrictive apex than we anticipated.

1.3.B. Was implementation extemporaneous or were pre-existing contingencies and routines employed? State's diplomatic contingencies did include countering possible Soviet actions in the UN under various situations. This was not exclusive to the Eisenhower Administration but was, rather, a contingency of containment that was widely practiced. It is clear, however, that State's contingencies did not include countering U.S. European allies. This was not a pre-existing procedure. Instead, Eisenhower improvised on the spot in what was a fairly dramatic departure for U.S. foreign policy. Finally, Eisenhower's directions to the military ("our outposts") to be prepared and his suggestion that the U.S. might have to go all the
way with "everything we got" seems also to have been an example of improvisation. Contingencies and standard-operating procedures developed earlier were largely supplanted by on-the-spot decisionmaking.

1.3.C. Was there evidence of bureaucratic politics in the implementation of policy? For the most part there was no evidence of bureaucratic inertia or interference with the president's direct control. There is an exception worth noting however. One source cites some back channel policy-implementation activity. While Eisenhower had made clear the attempted fait accompli presented him by the British and French would not be tolerated, the CIA apparently had other exigencies in mind. The Deputy Director of the CIA phoned his London man sometime on 3 November. According to one account, the CIA gave the following instructions to its London station to be passed on to the British:

comply with the goddam cease-fire [being discussed in the UN] or go ahead with the goddam invasion. Either way, we'll back 'em up if they do it fast. What we can't stand is their goddam hesitation waltz . . . .
(Brendon, 1987: 329.)

This occurred, however, prior to the 5 November through 8 November period, and therefore prior to the actual period of decisionmaking under consideration--albeit only slightly before. Nonetheless it is evidence that not all parts of the bureaucracy were in step with the president. Eisenhower had, after all, already publicly announced on 1 November that the U.S. would not tolerate the conspiracy. We must
therefore conclude that no evidence of bureaucratic politics during the event in question was evident.

1.3.D. Was implementation instantaneous with the selection process or temporally distinct? Because of the way in which Eisenhower took charge of implementation the foreign-policy bureaucracy was largely held at bay. The president directed it from the White House which constitutes an ad hoc departure for Eisenhower of the implementation process by its very nature. Given what we know of Eisenhower's administration and the way it typically made decisions, this becomes all the more dramatic.

And all of this was accomplished in real time. That is to say, there were no feasibility studies conducted; there was no exhaustive discussion of implications. Rather, the president issued commands and they were carried out immediately. The process of implementing options was begun simultaneous with their selection not apart from them.

4. Evaluation of Selected Options

The feedback and evaluation process very much reflect what took place in terms of implementation. The president directed it initially. He allowed more participation over time. His early decisiveness however precluded the normal foreign-policy machinery.

1.4.A. Was feedback-evaluation controlled by the apex of the DNU or by the larger foreign-policy bureaucracy? It clearly was the former. Indeed, events during the crucial
period (5-8 November), demonstrate that feedback was channeled directly to Eisenhower by Goodpaster and Allen Dulles. Furthermore, it was communicated in "real time" relatively speaking. This can be seen in that Goodpaster and Dulles were in several of the meetings with Eisenhower during these crucial days. Rarely was Goodpaster, in particular, out of the president's sight for long. (Ambrose, 1984: 368-370.) Because of the need for real-time evaluation of policy the channels were perforce of an ad hoc nature. Thus we see Goodpaster even eclipsing CIA's Dulles in briefing the president. On 7 November, for example, the president met with Adams, Goodpaster, and Hoover concerning latest Soviet activities. At one point Hoover relayed a message to the President from Allen Dulles, who was not in attendance. Thus we have Foster Dulles's replacement, Hoover, reporting to the president Allen Dulles's latest intelligence. Hoover reported that CIA had some intelligence on "The USSR reportedly . . . offer[ing] Egypt 250,000 volunteers and is attempting to place itself in the position of liberator" (Declassified Document Quarterly, 1981: 257A). The President directed Goodpaster to follow up, whereupon, Goodpaster returned shortly thereafter with "nothing solid" to indicate that Soviet troops were in fact on the move anywhere. (Ambrose, 1984: 370.)

1.4.B. Was the process extemporaneous or routine? We have really answered this question already in the previous
discussion. The very manner in which monitoring and evaluating decisions occurred effectively precluded routines of any sort. The entire process was largely improvised as deemed necessary by the president himself.

1.4.C. Were signs of bureaucratic interference present? Given the available evidence, we must conclude that little interference, hinderance or obfuscation from the foreign-policy bureaucracy occurred. It was done such that little bureaucratic influence could be exerted had there been a desire to exert it. It would be interesting to speculate as to possible information that might have changed hands between the Dulles brothers while Foster was in the hospital recuperating. But it would be speculative at best for we found nothing to indicate that Allen was anything but faithful to the president's desires during this period.

1.4.D. Was the evaluation-feedback process instantaneous with or temporally distinct from the implementation process? It is clear that there existed no temporal distinction between implementation and evaluation in the Suez-Sinai case. Rather, the president controlling all phases of the decisionmaking process moved nimbly between phases as if they were one. The example already cited of Goodpaster entering the room to correct information just given the president moments earlier comes to mind. In this case the president was both directing implementation and evaluation-feedback simultaneously. Thus, as was our
expectation, the phases of decisionmaking were concomitant with one another.

Summary

While operationally we chose to accept Crisisbank's end points of the event, it should be noted that there were at least three distinct periods of the Suez-Sinai campaign with respect to U.S. foreign policy. The first is the period between Nasser's nationalization of the Canal (July) through late October 1956. The second phase lasted from late October until 5 November. And finally there is the phase that runs 5 November through 8 November. It is the last phase that is of special interest for present purposes. And it is during this last phase that the decisionmaking process—selection, implementation, and evaluation of options—fits what is hypothesized in the model. The other phases are described for historical clarity, to be viewed for comparative purposes with the three days under consideration. The Soviet ultimatum clearly surprised Eisenhower. And he knew the time to respond was short. It is clear, furthermore, that Eisenhower did precisely that. In so doing he coopted the decisionmaking process.
THE EC-121 INCIDENT, 1969

Narrative

On 14 April 1969 (5:00 P.M. EST) a U.S. Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane lifted off from Atsugi Air Base in Japan. The mission was a routine one; Nixon records that such "flights had been made for almost twenty years under standing orders that the aircraft not approach closer than forty nautical miles to the coast of North Korea, well outside the international territorial limit" (Nixon, 1978: 382). Another study reports that some 190 of these same flights had been conducted during the first three months of 1969. (Kaplan, 1981: 390.) Routine or not, at 11:50 P.M., nearly seven hours after its departure, the EC-121 disappeared from radar screens. Thus began what both Nixon and Kissinger termed their first crisis.

The occasion was momentous, by all accounts, for the nascent administration. Nixon had been inaugurated less than three months prior. The Pueblo had been released from Korean captivity, thus ending nearly a year of American

---

humiliation, just some four months earlier. The administra-
tion had begun its then secret bombings of Cambodia the
previous month (March 1969). So momentous was it that
Kissinger describes it this way: "Thus was the Nixon admin-
istration propelled into its first major crisis" (Kissinger,
1979: 313). Nor did the new administration expect the
incident's geographic location, for Nixon's memoirs describe
being confronted "with a major crisis from a completely
unexpected quarter of the Communist World" (Nixon, 1978:
382). It was a bellwether for the administration: "Early
in 1969 we were tested in our first major crisis, . . . . and
received praise that we did not deserve." It was a
pedagogical experience as well. Kissinger notes that the
administration's learning began "with the EC-121, where we
learned so many lessons for even grimmer crises that lay
ahead" (Kissinger, 1979: 312).

Why the administration was caught off guard by mischief
in Korea is unclear since hostilities were high along the
DMZ and there was a pattern of trouble there. (See Kaplan,
1981: 386-87.) Nor is it necessary to agree with either
Nixon's or Kissinger's characterization as "crisis." What
is clear is that an important foreign-policy challenge
occurred that is distinguishable by a short decision time in
which to respond and surprise. Though the administration
could not save the crew, it felt a quick response was
absolutely imperative. Otherwise, the North Koreans and
others would undertake additional acts of irresponsibility. To use Kissinger's own, if somewhat self-serving words, it was an occasion of "high-risk decisions quickly and under pressure" (Kissinger, 1979: 312).

One hour after the plane disappeared from radar, the Situation Room in the White House was notified (12:50 A.M., 15 April). The notification simply said that an EC-121 had been attacked by two Korean MIGs; whether or not the plane had been shot down was as yet still unconfirmed. At 1:07 A.M., Kissinger's assistant Alexander Haig was notified about the episode. At 1:10 A.M. Haig relayed the message to Kissinger stressing that it was unconfirmed. Kissinger instructed Haig to get all possible information on the matter as quickly as possible with a view toward either confirming or disconfirming. He further instructed Haig to call him as soon as his task was accomplished. (Kissinger, 1979: 316.)

At 1:45 A.M. Haig telephoned Secretary of Defense Laird's assistant, Colonel Robert Pursley. According to Kissinger this was to inform Defense. Yet it is equally plausible that Haig was attempting to ascertain what Defense knew of the matter since the White House had received the information directly through the Situation Room perhaps bypassing other channels. In any case, it would appear that the White House had the information before Defense since the latter was unaware of the incident at 1:45 A.M. (nearly
three hours after the fact). At 2:17 A.M. Radio Pyongyang announced that its forces had downed an American plane that had strayed into Korean airspace. (Kissinger, 1979: 316; Kaplan, 1981: 382.) For whatever reason, this was not taken as confirmation—much to Kissinger's dismay and ire. (Kissinger, 1979: 316.)

Little else noteworthy happened that night, at least that is in the public record. It was at 7:20 A.M. (five hours after loss of radar contact) that Kissinger briefed President Nixon. Apparently little came from that briefing. The president felt no particular need to call an NSC meeting because one was already scheduled for the following morning at 10:00 A.M. Instead, Kissinger convened an NSC Review Group meeting later that afternoon "to prepare options for an NSC meeting that was scheduled for the following day 16 April. . . ." (Kissinger, 1979: 316).

On the next day (16 April), as already scheduled, the NSC meeting took place at around 10:00 A.M. Apparently there was an open discussion of varied opinions on how the matter ought to be handled. Secretary Rogers remembers the president saying "We're going to show them," to which Rogers reminded Nixon that that was precisely what Johnson had said about Vietnam and look what it got us. (Hersh, 1983: 72; Ambrose, 1989: 269.) In addition to Rogers's cautious stance Laird, Helms (CIA), and the NSC specialist for East Asia, Richard Sneider also argued for restraint.
Additionally, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea William Porter—who had evidently received word of the NSC meeting and possible bombing options—sent a special cable that urged the NSC not to act hastily for South Korea might take it as a green light. (Hersh, 1983: 73; Ambrose, 1989: 270.)

Nixon reports that he argued for a firm show of force. (Nixon, 1978: 383.) Kissinger remembers offering no recommendations that day [Kissinger, 1979: 318], although several interviews conducted by Hersh of participants remember it rather differently. (Hersh, 1983: 69-73.) Nixon also remembers Kissinger arguing forcefully for a firm response. (Nixon, 1978: 382-85.) And Vice President Spiro Agnew argued bellicosely for revenge. (Ambrose, 1989: 270.) Heated discussion notwithstanding, "Nothing was decided that morning" (Nixon, 1978: 383).

The following day (17 April) Nixon reconsidered two options that had emerged from the NSC the previous day. The first option was a firm response: retaliate by sending a military strike against the airfield that had launched the attack. The second option was to continue EC-121 flights with military escort. The first option had been rejected by Laird, and others who had cited the negative effect such an act would have on America's Vietnam effort. Moreover, should the U.S. decide upon such a retaliatory approach it must be ready to fight a war on a second front since no one could predict how North Korea would respond. Finally,
college campuses were already in turmoil; an attack on Korea might cause them to explode. (Ambrose, 1989: 270.) As for the second response, the president worried that it would be perceived as too weak a response to communist aggression. (Nixon, 1989: 383.)

Finally Nixon ended up choosing the second approach, despite his fear that it might be perceived as weakness. And though the administration had decided that it would not retaliate with military force, it also ordered two aircraft carriers into the region. This became known as Task Force 71—containing 40 vessels and 256 warplanes. (Kaplan, 1981: 391.) Task Force 71 would provide the dual role of providing escort for the reconstituted reconnaissance flights as well as demonstrating resolve. (Kissinger, 1979: 318.) Both moves were announced by the administration at a press conference on 18 April, which the president had scheduled well in advance of the incident.

Kissinger learned from the NSC Meeting, among other things, that the existing foreign-policy machinery was not up to the task. He therefore assembled, on 17 April, a "special crisis management group composed of middle-level representatives of State, Defense, the CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" with Kissinger as its chair. (Kissinger, 1979: 319.) This later (May 1969) became known as the Special Actions Group—one of the six groups chaired by Kissinger. (See The Nixon Administration, Chapter IV).
Despite the apparent decision, Nixon and Kissinger continued to meet following the news conference of 18 April. Kissinger reports that he and Nixon reviewed the situation and specific options that morning, almost immediately after the conference. Though U.S. action with regard to the incident had been announced at the news conference, the two were still looking for ways to appear more like a superpower. To Kissinger, all previous deliberations in which the NSC was involved had been "theoretical" with "no concrete operational plans" (Kissinger, 1979: 319). Accordingly, the two discussed upping the ante somewhat; however, Nixon did not wish to act in a way which would publicly be seen as contravening his advisers' (Laird and Rogers) publicly-announced positions not to use force. Thus as Nixon and Kissinger debated possibilities, Kissinger acted as a go-between testing the various choices out on Rogers, Laird, and Helms individually. (Kissinger, 1979: 319.) Kissinger reported back to Nixon that the others were still unanimously against force. He agreed with Nixon that so new an administration could not risk a publicly divided foreign-policy bureaucracy. (Kissinger, 1979: 319.) Hersh reports that there was one more top-level meeting--Hersh claims it was an NSC meeting--held the afternoon of 18 April. The meeting was essentially a replay of the earlier one on 16 April. Nixon and Kissinger "listened to the formal objections to retaliation from Laird, Rogers, and Helms"
(Hersh, 1983: 74). And having determined it unwise to alienate Cabinet members of such a new administration Nixon and Kissinger grudgingly resigned themselves to the options already announced.

The next morning Kissinger met with his interdepartmental group to inform them that all actions which the administration would take had been made. No new options would be considered or implemented. Thus ended, practically speaking, what Nixon later called "the most serious misjudgment of my Presidency, including Watergate" (Ambrose, 1989: 271). Kissinger too came away from the EC-121 episode with disdain for how the administration had handled it: "the President never really made up his mind"; overall Kissinger judged their performance "as weak, indecisive and disorganized. . ." (Kissinger, 1979: 321).

Though Crisisbank cites 26 April as the conclusion of the affair, it can plausibly be argued that it ended several days earlier, perhaps by 20 April. After that both Nixon and Kissinger turned to other matters. Public pronouncements had been issued; and the decision not to alienate members of the administration had been made. The flotilla continued to show a presence in the region until the end of April. Yet the Soviets had worked with ships in the flotilla to find the remains of the EC-121 and had done nothing but to proffer a "mild protest" when Task Force 71 arrived. (Kaplan, 1981: 390-391.)
Soon new foreign-policy challenges would beckon. At month's end President de Gaulle of France resigned. New problems and difficulties with Japan were also in progress. Thus ended the administration's first foreign-policy "crisis."

Analysis

We now turn to a comparative analysis of the EC-121 episode asking the same sixteen questions we will ask of all other cases under consideration.

1. Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

As was stated above, the White House Situation Room was notified of the "unconfirmed" event at 12:50 A.M. on 15 April. This was approximately one hour after the event. At 1:07 Haig was notified. At 1:10 Haig told Kissinger. Later that morning (7:20 A.M.) Kissinger informed Nixon. Though notification of Kissinger really set in train various parts of the decisionmaking machinery, it would be difficult to conclude that the DMU had fully been informed prior to Kissinger's briefing with Nixon. Thus it was about five and one-half hours that elapsed between the event and the full DMU's awareness of it. This is probably the first convocation of at least a truncated DMU. Later that day, though we found no record of the exact time, Kissinger convened an NSC Review group whose purpose was to generate options for the already-scheduled NSC meeting of the following day.
1.1.A. Was the apex of the DMU convened or was some larger DMU initially convened? We have already discussed the chain of events leading to the first NSC Meeting. Prior to that meeting we have stated that Kissinger's gathering of his NSC staff was noteworthy--this is the meeting in which options were generated and considered, as was its statutory obligation, by Kissinger's NSC staff for the president. Neither Kissinger, nor any of the secondary accounts that we found, made reference to exactly whom Kissinger included in this meeting. However, in his memoirs Kissinger enumerates his staff's "core members" as Winston Lord, Lawrence Eagleburger, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, William Hyland, Harold Saunders, Peter Rodman, and Alexander Haig. (Kissinger, 1979: 24.) This is a total of seven individuals. Noticeably absent from this list of core members is Morton Halperin who fell into disrepute much later and was eventually wire-tapped because of suspected disloyalty. This could conceivably account for Kissinger's failure to list him as a "core" member of the NSC. We know, however, from other accounts that Halperin was involved in this particular affair. (Hersh, 1983: 69-77.) We also have seen that Richard Sneider was the ranking NSC official for East Asia and was involved. Finally, Alexis Johnson comes up in several accounts as being involved in several of the meetings surrounding the EC-121, as well as a Colonel Sitton from the Pentagon who was "called back to the White House"
to discuss the possibility of a B-52 raid. (Hersh, 1983: 75.)

To be sure, no exact count is determinable. But we can estimate that probably between seven and eleven individuals were included in this group convened by Kissinger to present the president with options. The president was not even included in this initial group; and it is clearly broader than the apex we earlier defined. Additionally, the NSC meeting and its attendants must be included. Though we have not provided a precise number we have seen that the DMU was rather large and clearly inclusive of several individuals who are not part of the apex. This contrasts with what we hypothesized.

1.1.B. Was the DMU convened at a high locus? By high locus we have agreed to accept at the White House or an analogue. Thus if the meetings were convened at State or the Pentagon, this would not be a high locus. In this particular case the meetings were convened at the White House. Kissinger's office and his staff met regularly at the White House and this was no exception.

1.1.C. With what frequency was the DMU convened over the event's course? Technically there were two NSC meetings over the course of the affair. The first was the already-scheduled meeting of 16 April at 10:00 A.M. The second is reported in Hersh's account. He cites a second NSC meeting 18 April, after the president's news conference.
Additionally, we know that Kissinger convened working groups to discuss the matter—any options generated from these meetings, however, had to eventually pass under the president's purview. We are informed by all accounts that the upcoming news conference (18 April) occupied a good deal of the president's time and energy, presumably leaving less of either for the EC-121 affair. It may be reasonable to count, therefore, the meetings Kissinger held with his own NSC staff members, minus the Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI (Helms), and the president and vice president.

As for these, the meeting of 15 April during which Kissinger and his staff generated options for the 16 April NSC Meeting has already been mentioned. Additionally Kissinger met with his staff on 19 April to inform them that decisions had been made and implemented—no further consideration was therefore needed. (Kissinger, 1979: 320.) Yet this could scarcely be considered anything other than informing and perhaps justifying what decisions had been taken. Indeed, Alexander Haig and Lawrence Eagleburger apparently expressed their tremendous disgust with the final decisions at this meeting.  

---

13Hersh quotes Haig as threatening 'to resign if we don't get a President with balls.' Eagleburger, displaying a little more decorum, lamented that he was 'disgusted with pusillanimous politicians such as Nixon who talk tough but back down under pressure' (Hersh, 77).
however, this meeting was clearly ex post facto. There is additionally evidence of one-on-one meetings with Kissinger and selected aides; these are arguably meetings that could be counted. Thus besides the two NSC Meetings, there is one additional meeting of Kissinger's NSC staff that is probably feasible to count. And though it is not clear how many or who was involved, Kissinger's NSC staff meetings might also be included.

It also seems reasonable to include the "informal" meetings Kissinger and Nixon had on the matter. We know that on 17 April Nixon reconsidered the options resulting from the previous day's NSC Meeting. Kissinger discusses it in his own memoirs so it appears clear that he was present. (Kissinger, 1979: 318.) Also, Kissinger met with the president on 18 April, almost immediately after the news conference, to review the situation and consider ways of taking a firmer stance. (Kissinger, 1979: 319.) Thus we may add two more meetings to the total.

All told, a frequently convened DMU is clearly what emerges. The only troubling aspect is that much of the meetings were convened in absence of the president. And while this technically meets what we hypothesized we should note that it is not what we expected to see. As for Nixon, there appears to be only a few which he attended. The two formal NSC Meetings were attended by the president. And we have noted the two meetings that Kissinger and Nixon held
away from the scrutiny of other cabinet or NSC staff members.

1.1.D. *Was the DMU convened along standard-operating routines or in some improvised fashion?* The two NSC Meetings were convened along standardized procedures per the Nixon-Kissinger conception of how the NSC ought to function. Additionally, Kissinger's meeting with his staff would appear to be along rather typical, institutional lines. However, the two meetings between Kissinger and the president seem to run counter to standard procedures. It appears that they specifically excluded those who were advocating a restrained, diplomatic response. One unflattering characterization of this process is as follows:

Kissinger's and Nixon's newly revised National Security Council system worked during the EC-121 crisis in a way that the two men made sure it never would again: to produce frank debate at the highest levels. When the Secretaries of Defense and State and the director of the CIA urged diplomatic action only, Kissinger and Nixon were confronted with Cabinet-level officials who were on record against retaliation before the two men had a firm plan on how to retaliate. (Hersh, 1983: 69.)

The meetings between the president and his national security adviser seem to be ad hoc meetings in which ways to discuss a tougher stance were considered apart from the others. Thus there is a mixture of formal and informal--some meetings conducted along statutory and standard procedure, others in a much more ad hoc, fashion regarding the consideration of options and the formulation of decisions. That is, we have evidence of improvised means of convening
the DMU but we additionally have evidence of standard-operating procedures. Thus while indications of routines being followed is present among NSC members, the principal decisionmakers, Nixon and Kissinger, provide us with ample evidence of improvisation to conclude extemporaneous convocation.

2. Selection of Options

1.2.A. Were the options proffered by the members of the apex of the DMU or the larger bureaucracy? While we cannot unequivocally determine the origin of each suggested option we are able to say that said process was not confined solely to the apex. That is to say, we have evidence that this particular aspect of the hypothesis is disconfirmed. Recall that Kissinger met with his staff to put together options for the president. Thus those members of his staff, whom we enumerated above, were involved and they are clearly outside the apex. Additionally, we know that Richard Sneider, Ambassador Porter, and a least a few others--notably Spiro Agnew--were involved in proffering options. And it was these persons, many of whom were excluded from the apex, who suggested the moderate options that were ultimately chosen. We may clearly count this as disconfirming this hypothesis in the EC-121 case.

1.2.B. How many options were entertained? We have already seen that a range of options was considered. There were options that might be classified as restrained and
diplomatic in nature. And there were those that were
decidedly military and retaliatory in nature. While the
decision finally came down to the two options listed above—
resumption of reconnaissance, and a large Naval presence—
various types of bombing raids were considered.

For example, Colonel Sitton was specifically tasked by
Kissinger with preparing B-52 bombing options for the af-
fair. Sitton, who was known as Mr. B-52, spent the next few
days shuttling back and forth between the Pentagon and the
White House with various plans.\textsuperscript{14} Sitton had earlier been
involved in contingency planning for the \textit{Pueblo} incident.
His options, in this particular affair, ranged from "hitting
one airfield" from which the MIGs had been launched, to
"taking out everything" (Hersh, 1983: 69). Kissinger
describes "his staff's advice" that first day of the inci-
dent as "amazingly hawkish." He lists the options generated
at this meeting as "ranging from stiff diplomatic protests .
. . to seizure of North Korean ships at sea"; from "the
mining of Wonsan harbor to shore bombardment or attacking an
airfield." But alas, given the lack of direction from the
president, all these options were simply "academic exercis-
es"; and much of 15 April was "therefore, spent in inconclu-
sive planning exercises" (Kissinger, 1979: 317).

\textsuperscript{14} Colonel Sitton had won Henry Kissinger's approbation
the previous month by coming up with the operational plan by
which the Nixon administration would secretly bomb Cambodia.
(Hersh, 1983: 69.)
Laird's military adviser Robert Pursley remembers 'an endless stream of options' originating from the JCS and being shuttled over to the White House. (Hersh, 1983: 71.) Alexis Johnson and Richard Sneider remember Kissinger advocating a "sterile strike" in which U.S. bombers would fly over a Korean airfield to "clobber" the perpetrators. Johnson convinced Kissinger that such an option was not feasible: how would the Koreans know that U.S. bombers heading for their country would not be a massive attack; it was all predicated on convincing Kim Il-sung that this was a retaliation only. The problem was the U.S. had no way to communicate with Kim Il-sung. (Hersh, 1981: 70.) Perhaps most stunning is what Hersh reports—with some corroboration by Haldeman—with respect to massive attacks.

... in those first days after the EC-121 incident, Kissinger ordered updated studies made of all options, including the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons. Six or seven were produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ranging from retaliatory strikes on North Korean airfields to the mass destruction of hydroelectric plants. (Hersh, 1983: 72; c.f., Ambrose, 1989: 270.)

Clearly a number of persons and options were involved during the EC-121 affair. Thus once again we have ample evidence of disconfirmation.

1.2.C. Finally we ask if the options were reflective of individual personalities? Here we run into strong personalities being reflected in the options but not the ones we anticipated. That is, we identified Nixon and Kissinger as those whom we considered the dominant
personalities in the Nixon Administration. We described Nixon's State and Defense Secretaries as relatively weak. And yet was the restraint and caution suggested by these two rather than the more aggressive stance advocated by Nixon and Kissinger that prevailed. Despite Nixon's own preferences and possible predilections ("meet force with force" [Nixon, 1978: 383]), despite Kissinger's desire to retaliate with even more vigor than Nixon envisaged [Nixon, 1978: 384; Ambrose, 1989: 270], neither of these rather strong personalities prevailed. Rather, they accepted, even if somewhat grudgingly, the advice of their colleagues and chose "the safe, sane, sensible response to provocation" (Ambrose, 1989: 271). We must therefore consider this as clear disconfirmation.

1.2.D. Was groupthink indicated in the EC-121 case?
There is a variety of anecdotal support for the supposition of groupthink generally in the Nixon Administration. Janis (1982) devotes a chapter to its discussion with respect to the Watergate fiasco. We however found neither evidence to support of disprove it in the EC-121 case. We must conclude that insufficient evidence was present to make such a determination.

3. Implementation of Options
We have thus far discussed little of the implementation of the options. Contrary to what we hypothesized in Chapter III, there appears to have been bureaucratic inertia in the
implementation process. Nixon notes that "making his decision . . . turned out to be easier than getting it carried out." It was some three weeks, according to the former president, before his order was finally implemented in its entirety. He was "surprised and angered" by this delay. (Nixon, 1978: 385.)

It appears that upon first hearing of the shoot-down, Secretary Laird ordered the cessation of the reconnaissance flights over Korea as well as other potentially hostile areas. He evidently did this without presidential approval. (Kissinger, 1979: 320.) And as noted in Nixon's own words Laird's reputation suffered as a result.

Additionally, there were reported leaks from the decisionmaking bureaucracy over the details of the planned response during the implementation stage. Kissinger recalls that "once we had notified our bureaucracy [of the decision], word leaked out rapidly that there would be no retaliation" (Kissinger, 1979: 320). This had the effect of rendering the massive flotilla impotent which caused Kissinger a good deal of disquiet. Ambrose reports that Nixon "was frustrated by the bureaucracy" in his attempt to have his ultimate decision implemented. (Ambrose, 1989: 271.) One can only speculate as to why the problems occurred. But Kissinger characterizes the debacle as a "blessing in disguise" for it caused Nixon and Kissinger to "dramatically tighten our procedures" (Kissinger, 1979:
321). And since many future foreign-policy dramas were distinguishable from the EC-121 by the way the administration cut out State and Defense, we can infer that reducing the number of decisionmakers who were en courant was part of this tightening process.

1.3.A. Hence we may now answer directly the question Was control of implementation retained by the apex of the DMU or did the existing decisionmaking bureaucracy control implementation? The answer, if we can believe the president and his principal foreign-policy adviser, is clearly that it was from the latter. Were Nixon and Kissinger to have directly conducted the implementation process, they would not have suffered the frustration about which they both write. We have evidence of disconfirmation here as well.

1.3.B. Was Implementation improvised (extemporaneous) or according to standard routines? There is ample anecdotal evidence that little improvisation occurred. One illustration suffices. Kissinger notes that the full extent of Laird's decision to implement a "stand-down" of reconnaissance flights was not even detailed to the White House until 22 April. (Kissinger, 1979: 320.) It seems incomprehensible--as Kissinger himself says--but it is true. The slow and deliberate processes of the bureaucracy, in the case of the Defense Department, supplanted any flexible, adaptive ideas that Nixon and Kissinger might have had. Laird's implementation of policy was based on standard
protocols much to the chagrin of Nixon and Kissinger. Implementation occurred strictly, as far as can be discerned from the available accounts, within standard channels and routines. Once more we find evidence that runs counter to our expectation.

1.3.C. Were signs of bureaucratic politics present? We have already suggested a clear affirmative answer to this question. Kissinger explicitly says that bureaucratic politics were present: "each agency developed its own options geared to its more or less parochial concerns" (Kissinger, 1979: 317). And Secretary of State Rogers announced on 16 April, as if to preclude the NSC machinery, "The weak can be rash; the powerful must be more restrained" (New York Times, 17 April, 1969). This announcement predated the president's own announcement of U.S. policy with respect to the incident by two days. Though it may not have had a significant impact on policy, we must conclude that evidence to indicate bureaucratic politics exits--this of course is counter to what we anticipated finding.

1.3.D. Was implementation conducted instantaneously with the selection of options? To the contrary of what we hypothesized, in the EC-121 case implementation was temporally distinct from the selection process. Days past before the administration officially sought to act at all. That Laird moved on his own more quickly was more a function of State's standard-operating procedures; it was not an
official administration move as evidenced by Nixon's displeasure upon discovering the news.

It is especially under this heading of implementation that the EC-121 case runs counter to what we hypothesized using the model above. The reader will note that of the four parts of hypothesis 1.3., each was disconfirmed clearly rendering the hypothesis disconfirmed. Why this is so, we cannot say with certainty. We can speculate that it was due to how quickly it occurred in the course of the new administration. Hersh attempts to make the case that the EC-121 incident was an aberration in Kissinger's foreign-policy tenure. Hersh, who is clearly hostile to Kissinger, claims that at this early date Kissinger was "unable to control the bureaucracy" (Hersh, 1983: 69). But that within a relatively short period of time, Kissinger figured out how to dominate it through ingratiating himself with Nixon and using tremendous skills at duplicity. Whether this is true or not must be left to others to decide.

4. Evaluation of Options

Before directly answering questions on the feedback mechanism, a general observation is in order. Namely, there appears to have been relatively little feedback so as to allow the decisionmakers to evaluate and re-evaluate their options.

1.4.A. Did the apex of the DMU retain control of the feedback-evaluation process? The little feedback that
appears to have occurred was largely through standard channels controlled and conducted by the bureaucracy, thereby disconfirming our hypothesized expectation. Recall that there were problems "confirming" that the EC-121 spy plane had been downed. Nixon comments that when Kissinger first told him of the report it was "reliable" but not confirmed. (Nixon, 1978: 382.) Kissinger seems to lament that fact. He mentions that at 2:17 A.M. Radio Pyongyang announced that they had shot down the U.S. plane but still nobody would consider the report confirmed. "But for reasons unfathomable to me at this remove, everybody decided to ignore the broadcast" (Kissinger, 1979: 316). He does not explain why he chose not to confirm the shoot-down at that remove based on the same broadcast.

1.4.B. Was feedback-evaluation characterized by improvisation or standard means? It appears that it was NSA intercepts that were providing much of the information. Nixon simply cites "intelligence reports" that indicated that the event might have been isolated--some commander in the field trying to give Kim Il-sung a nice birthday present. (Nixon, 1978: 383). But Hersh develops the theme somewhat more. In an interview with an "official" who worked at the NSA, Hersh discusses the fact that the administration was able to monitor and recreate the events surrounding the EC-121 affair utilizing both Soviet and North Korean radar signals. Hersh, in fact, identifies
Nixon as causing "near-pandemonium" when he disclosed to the press that the administration knew exactly what the respective radars said at the time. After the disclosure, Alexis Johnson reportedly quipped that the president's security clearance might have to be revoked. (Hersh, 1983: 73-74.) We have therefore clear evidence of impromptu feedback-evaluation with the president directing it. That it reflects negatively on Nixon does nothing to change the fact that it confirms our expected behavior.

1.4.C. **Was there noticeable bureaucratic interference in this phase of decisionmaking?** We know that the information that eventually worked its way upward to the apex was generally reliable. And we know that some very sophisticated NSA intercepts were quite comprehensive and that Nixon eventually became aware of them. Despite this there was hesitancy to confirm the shoot-down. Also, as mentioned earlier, Kissinger was rather upset to find out that Laird **immediately** halted reconnaissance flights over East Asia, as well as the Middle East, upon finding out about the shoot-down. Thus the information was out there and available, and at least the NSA data were reliable. That Nixon and Kissinger feel that they were not kept well informed appears to be more a function of their own colluding behind the scenes thereby excluding themselves from the NSC. Both Secretaries Laird and Rogers--apex members--accessed information in a timely manner.
NSA apparently kept the DMU, notwithstanding Kissinger and Nixon, well abreast of events as they transpired in Far East Asia. And yet parts of the DMU were in the dark about what the bureaucracy at large was doing in the nation's capital. This does not appear to be intentionally done however. Rather, it appears that the lack of direction from the president or his national security adviser a lack of urgency to pervade and therefore information was not pushed quickly to the top. This does not, however, constitute bureaucratic inertia or malfeasance of any sort. Bureaucratic interference was not evidenced in this case.

1.4.D. *Was evaluation and feedback instantaneous with implementation?* In the EC-121 case we have already noted that little monitoring of the selected and implemented options occurred at the apex. To the extent that it did take place it appears to have been in conjunction with implementation. Nixon himself seemed uninterested in the event from start to finish and did nothing to pursue or obtain information for the most part. But we have seen clear evidence that both State and Defense working in tandem did evaluate information concomitant with the implementation of options. The EC-121 case often presents problems in terms of clear cut answers. But since at least part of the apex evaluated and monitored information instantaneous with implementation we will conclude evidence of confirmation of our hypothesized expectations. We should clearly note,
however, that though it confirms our hypothesized expectation, many things that we clearly did not anticipate were also evident.

THE MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR, 1975

Narrative

Unlike either the Suez-Sinai affair or the EC-121 incident, the Mayaguez seizure occurred in an area of the world in which the U.S. had only recently extricated itself from war. And at first blush it would appear that the affair caught policy makers off guard with good reason. As we shall show, however, there was every reason to expect a Mayaguez-type event to occur. At the lower levels of foreign-policy bureaucracy, similar events in the Gulf of Thailand had been quite recently monitored. Further, CIA was watching relations rapidly deteriorating between former "fraternal brothers," Cambodia and Vietnam in their fight against American "imperialism." Said deterioration of relations was showing up in island skirmishes between the belligerent in the very vicinity in which the Mayaguez was seized. And while someone finally did suggest that the

---

seizure might be a result of the factional fighting occurring in earnest, it was not one of the principals involved in U.S. decisionmaking. It was, rather, the White House photographer.

Early on the morning of 12 May 1975 (3:18 A.M. Washington time) a U.S. merchant ship the Mayaguez was seized by Khmer Rouge soldiers. The ship's SOS signal was monitored in Jakarta (Indonesia) and was relayed to the National Military Command Center at about 5:12 A.M. This same information was passed along to President Ford's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Brent Scowcroft, upon Scowcroft's arrival at the White House at 7:00 A.M. Scowcroft apparently prepared his morning intelligence briefing, along with colleague, David Peterson (CIA) featuring the affair prominently. The two briefed the president at 7:40 A.M.

While Ford states in his memoirs that he felt the incident involving the seizure of a U.S. vessel by foes who had so recently "humiliated" the United States constituted "a very serious matter," he simply instructed Scowcroft to keep him informed. (Head, 1978: 107.)

Meanwhile, Henry Kissinger, who was performing the dual role of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser to the President, learned of the incident at his own morning State Department briefing (about 8:00 A.M.). Staff member William Hyland informed the Secretary whereupon Kissinger
became "extremely concerned and called the president at once" (Head, 1978: 107). A short while later Kissinger met with Brent Scowcroft for twenty-five minutes about the Mayaguez. After their meeting, both went to meet with Ford at 9:23 A.M. in the Oval Office. As a result of this meeting, President Ford called for a meeting of the National Security Council at noon to formally address the matter. (Head, 1978: 107.) One analyst notes that it was Kissinger who advised Ford to call such a meeting. (Lamb, 1989: 80.)

At 12:05 the first, of what would be four, NSC meetings convened. It was convened according to standard format. The participants were the ones who normally were involved. They were: President Ford; VP Nelson Rockefeller; Secretary Kissinger (State); Secretary James R. Schlesinger (Defense); Director William E. Colby (CIA); Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State; William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense; acting chairman of JCS, General David C. Jones (USAF); Assistant to the President, Donald H. Rumsfeld; Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Lieut. Gen. Brent Scowcroft; and senior NSC staff officer for East Asia, Richard Smyser—eleven persons in all. (Head, 1979: 109.)

In the meeting Kissinger took the lead; he "argued strongly" that what was at stake far outweighed a simple act of piracy. Rather, the issue was one of international perceptions of power and national will. (Head, 1979: 109.)
Many of the participants felt that Korea was ripe for trouble and that, moreover, the infamous Pueblo seizure which resulted in U.S. disgrace and domestic recriminations was an appropriate allegory. (Head, 1979: 108; Lamb, 1989: 81, 98-99 passim.)

Ford asked several questions regarding the exact location and disposition of both the ship and its crew. But nobody questioned the validity of Kissinger's supposition—namely, that this was somehow a test of wills; that the U.S. would be perceived as a helpless giant unwilling to do what was necessary for its own interests. Two key objectives emerged from this initial meeting: 1) to recover the ship and its crew; 2) to do so in such a way "as to demonstrate firmly to the international community that the United States could and would act with firmness to protect its interests, . . . " (Head, 1979: 110).

Thus the die was cast. America's prestige was hanging in the balance. The United States had scarcely concluded its ignominious withdrawal from Indochina—thereby sacrificing its reputation—and it was being tested again. There evidently was no limit to Asian communists' willingness to attempt to further humiliate the U.S. in terms of world perception. And this would in turn encourage the communist regime in Korea to further brazen moves. Only a firm response would retrieve America's former prestige while forestalling any possible aggression in Korea.
It is important to note that the assumptions just stated were not even questioned, let alone challenged by anyone until the fourth NSC meeting on the afternoon of Wednesday--less than twelve hours before the conclusion of the Mayaguez affair. And it was the White House photographer, David Hume Kennerly, not one of the principal decisionmakers who finally spoke. During the fourth NSC meeting, Kennerly was snapping photos of the key decision-makers at work. In Ford's memoirs he discusses the event with surprising candor. He notes that Kennerly, who was allowed to attend other important meetings to shoot photos, had never before spoken up. But in this meeting Kennerly who had recently returned from Indochina where he had seen some of the chaos in Cambodia said:

Has anyone considered that this might be the act of a local Cambodian commander who has just taken it into his own hands to halt any ship that comes by? Has anyone stopped to think that he might not have gotten his orders from Phnom Penh? If that's what happened, you know, you can blow the whole place away and it's not gonna make any difference. Everyone here has been talking about Cambodia as if it were a traditional government. Like France. . . . But I was in Cambodia just two weeks ago, and it's not that kind of government at all. We don't even know who the leadership is. Has anyone considered that? (Ford, 1979: 279-280.)

Though Kissinger's response is not noted, it is clear from all accounts that neither Kissinger nor Scowcroft, nor the president had considered that. Nor had they availed themselves of the spate of intelligence coming out of the region or they would have known that other ships had been seized
just days prior; that the Cambodians and Vietnamese were already fighting among themselves over previously drawn colonial land and maritime borders.

The CIA, among others, monitors the region's radio broadcast and print media which it then translates through the Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS). FBIS had already translated some details of the ominous war brewing between former "fraternal brothers" Vietnam and Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge.

For example, we found several descriptions of what was happening at the time. On 4 May 1975, Khmer Rouge forces occupied the Vietnamese island of Phu Quoc, and a week later on 10 May attacked Tho Chu island, taking some 515 civilian prisoners. Both islands were a point of contention remaining from French colonial days (the French-drawn Brevie line). The Vietnamese recaptured the islands later in May and took some 500 Khmer prisoners. By May 25, Vietnamese local units repelled the attackers and pushed them back to their own island of Hon Troc from where they had launched the attacks. After receiving assurances that no more attacks would be forthcoming, Vietnamese Peoples Army (VPA) troops withdrew from Hon Troc, returning the 500 Khmer Rouge they had secured as prisoners during the May skirmishes. However, the 515 Vietnamese civilians taken prisoner by the Khmer Rouge were never heard or seen from again. In addition to the maritime provocations, coordinated Khmer Rouge
forays along the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier had occurred. It was this period beginning in spring 1975 and escalating throughout 1977 and 1978 that eventually led to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. And lastly, it was known by at least some of the participants in the administration that a Korean vessel had been boarded on 4 May, just one week earlier. Despite warnings, then, the administration was caught off guard.

As mentioned, there were a total of four NSC meetings throughout the course of the Mayaguez affair. At the second meeting (Tuesday, 10:30 A.M.) the participants were the same as the first with the exception of Kissinger. Kissinger had a previously scheduled appointment in Kansas City. At this meeting there were briefings on the latest intelligence regarding the whereabouts of the ship and crew and operational matters of concern to the military in particular. (Head, 1979: 114-115.) Concerning military options that were entertained, Ford did not wish to make any firm commitment apparently concerned with the validity of the intelligence he was getting. (Head, 1979: 115). With Kissinger missing, however, it is at least feasible to speculate that Ford wished to discuss it with his principal adviser prior to any commitment. In any case Ford called Kissinger shortly after the meeting. In a twelve-minute conversation the president apparently broached the idea of issuing an "ultimatum" with a deadline. In Kissinger's
absence the president had drafted the text of the ultimatum. The two concluded the call with "Kissinger having convinced Ford that the ultimatum was a bad idea" (Lamb, 1989: 82).

That night (Tuesday, 10:40 P.M.) with Kissinger back from Kansas City, the third NSC Meeting was convened. Director of Central Intelligence Colby opened the meeting with an intelligence briefing—as he had done before. Several operational details were discussed, including an unfortunate incident in which 23 U.S. servicemen had lost their lives in an operation related to the Mayaguez rescue effort. Following Colby, General Jones (Acting Chair JCS) discussed five military options that the Pentagon had come up with.

There was a reportedly "lively" discussion between Kissinger and Defense Secretary Schlesinger. Kissinger's position was: he was "emphatic" on the use of force; the U.S. had to impress Korea's Kim Il-sung with America's resolve; and that the U.S. could not afford another Pueblo-type debacle. Schlesinger, in contrast, felt that while it was true that the United States had to retrieve its ship and crew and that some punishment to the Cambodians was to be meted out, he was not eager to use the incident to teach the Koreans a lesson, much less the world. (Head, 1979: 117). Ford concluded the meeting by ordering some initial phases of the rescue operation to begin. In apparent deference to Schlesinger he ordered B-52s on Guam to be on alert but not
to begin bombing—Kissinger had requested strategic bombing.

We found very little documentation of the hours between this third NSC meeting and the fourth NSC Meeting the following afternoon. What is known is that the JCS met at the Pentagon between the third and fourth meetings in a series of meetings concerning operational details of the rescue. And on Wednesday there was a flurry of activity at the lower reaches of the bureaucracy. (Head, 1979: 122.)

The fourth NSC Meeting was convened on Wednesday afternoon (3:52 P.M.). It lasted until about 5:40 P.M. "The purpose of this fourth meeting was to review the diplomatic state of play, and [to] consider the details of the landing plan" which had been determined by the JCS in the interim. (Head, 1979: 122.) All the decisions had been made, however, with the exception of operational matters. Colby gave the latest intelligence in a briefing. Then General Jones presented in detail the JCS plan to achieve the president's objectives. Between 4:45 and 5:10 P.M., Ford ordered the entire military operation to commence.

While the president did not meet again with his NSC staff per se, he met with Kissinger, and Scowcroft over the next several hours. At 6:45 P.M. Ford briefeded congressmen in the Cabinet Room. This lasted about one hour ending at 7:47 P.M. Shortly after, the president had dinner with the Dutch Ambassador whom Ford describes as put off because the
president's staff had rescheduled the dinner for later than originally planned.

Meanwhile the Cambodians broadcast that they would relinquish the ship provided all offensive operations against them halted. This was broadcast shortly after 7:00 P.M. Washington time. At 7:28 the crew of the Mayaguez was released though no one was yet aware in Washington. Thus while the president was briefing Congress, the crew was being released. Kissinger and Scowcroft learned of the broadcast at 8:15 P.M. Scowcroft interrupted the president's dinner to tell him of the news. Ford authorized Scowcroft to call Schlesinger "to hold up the air strikes." Kissinger, however, determined that such an abrupt cessation of force would not be prudent; he too interrupted Ford's dinner to make this clear. Kissinger later joined the foreign dignitary and Ford at the dinner which lasted until nearly 11:00 P.M.

After Ford finally said goodnight to his guests, he and Kissinger made their way to the Oval Office to listen to the latest news on the event. At 11:08 P.M. Schlesinger called the president to inform him that thirty members of the crew of over forty had been released. At 11:15 P.M. Schlesinger called back with the corrected information that all crew members had been recovered. After some discussion between Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft at the Oval Office, and Schlesinger on the phone, it was determined to allow a final
strike against the mainland of Cambodia to "look ferocious" (Lamb, 1989: 96).

The Mayaguez affair was over. The Cambodians had presumably been taught that there was a limit to U.S. patience; the Koreans and the world that the U.S. would respond firmly with respect to its national interest. And while the 40-member crew had been recovered 41 U.S. servicemen lost their lives in the effort.

Analysis

Keeping in mind the basic structure of President Ford's foreign-policy decisionmaking structure, we shall now proceed with the focused comparison. As with the other case studies, we shall answer the questions in the order of the four decisionmaking requisite functions.

1. Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

Between the event's occurrence and the DMU beginning the process, a matter of a few hours transpired. Namely, Brent Scowcroft and David Peterson informed the president of the situation in his morning intelligence briefing, about 7:40 A.M. This was rather routine--the president typically held such briefing daily with either Scowcroft alone or with CIA's Peterson about 7:30 A.M. The National Military Command Center had learned of the seizure some two hours earlier (5:12 A.M.) and had handled the matter according to standard operating procedures--Scowcroft had finally been alerted to the situation at about 7:00 A.M. The first NSC
meeting began shortly after noon (12:05). Thus technically the elapsed time was about four and one-half hours later. This of course is a rather hastily called meeting, especially considering that it was of the entire NSC.

1.1.A. Was the convened DMU restricted to the apex? At first blush, the answer appears to be no. The apex was what initiated the initial convocation. However, as we described in our narrative and detail more below, the decisionmaking unit convened—though orchestrating its actions through the NSC—was the foursome of Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Schlesinger. Thus in reality the DMU was restrictive in its composition.

1.1.B. Was the convocation at a high locus? We may clearly confirm a high locus of convocation. It began at the White House, and remained throughout the few days of the affair, a high locus of convocation.

1.1.C. With what frequency did DMU meet? Again it is quite easy to determine. During the three-day affair, there were a total of four formal NSC meetings—a relatively large number. They were as follows: 1st NSC (12:05 P.M. Monday, 12 May); 2nd NSC (10:30 A.M. Tuesday, 13 May); 3rd NSC (10:40 P.M. Tuesday, 13 May); 4th NSC (3:52 P.M. Wednesday, 14 May). And for all intents and purposes, the affair was concluded late the same night as the fourth and last NSC meeting. Additionally, we have seen a multiplicity of other meetings being convened with the more restrictive group of
decisionmaking principals. Clearly this constitutes frequent convocation of the DMU.

1.1.D. Was the DMU's convened according to improvised or routine means? We are told that the format followed the standard NSC format of the Ford administration—indeed "over the previous six years" (Head, 1979: 109). On its face then it appears that it was simply standardized and routine; this of course runs counter to our expectations.

However, it is important to point out that while the NSC format was standard, convening it so frequently in so few days was anything but. Moreover, by most accounts the real decisionmaking was not done in the NSC. Recall above that Ford deferred to Kissinger on matters of foreign policy. According to virtually all accounts, much of the decisionmaking occurred outside the formal NSC meetings. Thus we shall describe briefly that process.

As mentioned, President Ford was informed of the Mayaguez seizure Monday, 12 May 1975 at about 7:40 A.M. According to the scholars in Crisis Resolution, Ford's response was 'My feeling was that the seizure of a U.S. vessel and crew, especially by a country which had so recently humiliated us, was a very serious matter' (Head, 1979: 107). Yet according to that same account Ford simply told them to keep him informed--he said nothing about calling an NSC meeting nor did his actions depict any seriousness. In another account we learn a possible
explanation. Lamb corroborates that Scowcroft and Peterson informed Ford. "The session lasted only twenty minutes. Preferring to postpone any decision until he had spoken with Kissinger, the president told Scowcroft to keep him informed" (Lamb, 1989: 79). In Ford's memoirs he notes that he typically met with Kissinger daily at between 9:00 and 10:00 A.M. And so it was on this day.

Kissinger had learned through his own channels--his State Department morning briefing--about the Mayaguez incident at around 8:00 A.M. William Hyland of Kissinger's staff informed his boss.

Dr. Kissinger reportedly became extremely concerned and called the president at once. At 9:23, Kissinger arrived in the Oval Office to discuss the matter with the President and General Scowcroft. After the discussion, the President called for a meeting of the National Security Council at noon. (Head, 1979: 107.)

Lamb reports that prior to meeting with Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft met for twenty-five minutes, after they both went to see the president. Further, he tells us that it was Kissinger who advised Ford to convene the NSC meeting. (Lamb, 1989: 80.)

Irrespective of who advised whom, it is nonetheless the case that in addition to the four, formal NSC meetings there were several informal, ad hoc meetings over the next couple of days involving Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft. Additionally, there were several phone calls between the three principals--the informal DMU. In fact, Kissinger had
previous commitments which prevented his attendance at the second NSC meeting. He was to speak that day in Kansas City. Yet he was in contact with Ford by phone while in Kansas City. Moreover, these informal meeting were by their very nature rather ad hoc in character; there was no routine for such meetings. One may reasonably conclude that the convocation was extemporaneous in nature.

2. Selection of Options

1.2.A. Did the apex of the DMU proffer and select options? Before answering we must explain. As is easily documented above, there were on average eleven persons at each NSC Meeting. The actual persons varied some: for example, when Kissinger missed the second meeting to be in Kansas City, Ford had included—for the first time—his counselor for Congressional matters. But the number attending remained around eleven. Yet the evidence indicates that those who actually counted in terms of proffering various decisions were the gang of four: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, and to a lesser extent, Schlesinger. One scholars identifies these four as the "key decision-makers" (Lamb, 1989: 57). And the evidence supports such an assertion. Thus we may confirm that it was the apex that selected the options.

1.2.B. Were the considered options relatively few in number? We need to distinguish between decisionmaking options and military operational options. Of the latter
there were apparently several. Recall that between the third and fourth NSC Meetings the JCS met to consider manifold operational possibilities. Also recall that at both the third and fourth NSC meetings General Jones outlined various military "options" to accomplish the two key objectives with which the president had tasked the armed forces. These, however, are not options considered by the DMU vis-a-vis a resolution of the Mayaguez affair.

There were two key objectives that resulted either from the first NSC meeting or from the flurry of exclusive meetings involving only Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft. The authors of Crisis Resolution cite a five-part procedural plan to implement the two key objectives. This included 1) a strong diplomatic note protesting the incident delivered to the Cambodian government via the PRC; 2) the U.S.S. Coral Sea being sent to the area; 3) assembling an amphibious task force in the Philippines; 4) continuous photo reconnaissance over the area; and 5) a public statement to be issued reporting the affair as well as U.S. demands for resolution. (Head, 1979: 111.) With the exception of point one, however, none of these can truly be considered options. They were simply procedural matters to implement the twofold objective of the ship's return and a firm response. Point one, on the other hand, shows that diplomacy was at least considered even if only in a pro forma matter.
Thus we see that the consideration of options falls under two different rubrics: diplomacy, which was summarily dismissed; and show of force, which was the course chosen. This constitutes few options.

1.2.C. Did the options reflect the apex's dominant personality? Clearly Kissinger's personality tended to dominate the decisionmaking process. We know that Ford deferred in general to Kissinger on foreign-policy matters. We have further seen that Scowcroft was Kissinger's "other self" on such issues. Of the four key decisionmakers, that leaves only Schlesinger. We have found only one time where the Secretary of Defense personally counseled the president on the Mayaguez. On the early morning of the second day of the incident, prior to the second NSC Meeting, Schlesinger called Ford to discuss the event. (Lamb, 1989: 83-84.) And on one other occasion, a "lively discussion" between Kissinger and Schlesinger took place--during the third NSC Meeting. And this argument centered around military responses to the ship's seizure, clearly the domain of Schlesinger rather than Kissinger. Kissinger argued for B-52 bombers flying from Guam to strategically bomb the mainland as a symbolic gesture. Schlesinger argued that the mainland was not the target; that the seizure had taken place around islands off the mainland; and that B-52 bombing might incense the American people because of previous administration's penchant for over-using said bombers.
(Doubtless this last point was not lost on Kissinger since it was he and Nixon who had secretly bombed Cambodia for years with B-52s.) Ford compromised by having the B-52 bombers put on alert but not initiating bombing sorties with them. (Head, 1979: 117-118.)

This compromise notwithstanding, Kissinger's personality clearly held sway over Schlesinger's and Ford accepted the former's "grasps of the nuance" of foreign policy as preeminent. One article, rather unflattering to Kissinger, summarized Kissinger's personality. Whether accurate or not it is worth mentioning since Kissinger's personality dominated the affair. Lloyd Shearer's article, "Decline and Future of Henry Kissinger" in Parade Magazine (22 June 1975) characterizes Kissinger as having a "Strangelove streak" that pervaded his thinking and actions.

1.2.D. Finally, Was there evidence of groupthink present in the Mayaguez incident's decisionmaking. It is tempting to state an unqualified yes. After all, we have seen how there were at most four key decisionmakers. And we have seen that Kissinger likely was the dominant of the four. Further, we have seen that Kissinger's view of the Mayaguez seizure presumed that any action near Cambodia must perforce be a unified action from a unified government. It did not allow for factional infighting, or a local commander simply acting on his own. And there is no evidence that the presumption was ever challenged by the principals--only
3. Implementation of Options

1.3.A. Was implementation controlled by the apex of the DMU or the larger bureaucracy? We may conclude that the apex remained in control of the implementation process. Throughout the event the apex of the DMU controlled each aspect of decisionmaking. We have already seen that the apex—in this case Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft—kept a firm handle on implementation. Indeed we have examples of the president ordering implementation while informing the other members of the DMU what was taking place.

1.3.B. Was implementation extemporaneous or routine? Military implementation was conducted according to standard operating procedures from the bureaucracy below the NSC. The military met in the Pentagon to hammer out ways to implement the two key options. As with any foreign-policy event this is going to be the case in large part. The question really concerns whether any improvised techniques of implementing—and monitoring—the array of options were present?

Once the operation got under way, there were a couple of occurrences of the president actually making military decisions. For example, during the third NSC Meeting a U.S. pilot who was conducting reconnaissance over the area spotted a small boat leaving the island suspected to be harboring the crew. The pilot radioed in to his superiors who immediately got the message relayed to the military in
the NSC meeting. The pilot described what he thought to be caucasians on the boat. Ford ordered the pilot to stop the boat using every necessary action short of sinking it. The message was immediately relayed back to the pilot who commenced strafing and bombing to deter the boat's movement. (Lamb, 1989: 86-87.)

Thus while generally military operations follow standard routines, there is clear evidence of extemporaneous implementation. It was probably no small feat to have nearly instantaneous communication from a pilot to the NSC meeting and back again.

1.3.C. Was there evidence of bureaucratic politics during implementation? There is, counter to our expectations, at least partial evidence. Both the authors of Crisis Resolution and Lamb's study describe varying degrees of the bureaucracy going it alone, or putting parochial interests before general ones. Both studies point out that there were communication problems between the marines and the air force in terms of coordinating the rescue. There were instances where information was apparently withheld—although it may have been for lack of a request rather than intentionally withholding pertinent information. (Lamb, 1989: 130-131.) On the other hand, both studies dismiss the bureaucratic factors as minimal. Indeed, both studies justify their respective investigations in terms of rejecting other explanations—in particular they
both reject a bureaucratic-politics model. Lamb concludes definitively: "In the Mayaguez crisis, behavior motivated by bureaucratic interests did not account for the major decisions nor did it critically affect the outcome of the crisis" (Lamb, 1989: 220). We may conclude, therefore, that while bureaucratic politics was arguably indicated, its role was insignificant. We therefore confirm this aspect of our hypothesis: bureaucratic politics did not interfere.

1.3.D. Finally, was implementation instantaneous with selection of options? The answer is clearly yes. We have already noted that Ford improvised implementation from the actual meetings as decisions were being made. There was no temporal distinction between selection and implementation.

Thus each of the four parts of this hypothesis are confirmed in the case of the Mayaguez.

4. Evaluation of Selected Actions

1.4.A. Was the feedback and evaluation process retained at the apex of the DMU? Feedback on the actions selected, once set in motion, was channeled directly to the DMU. We have already seen an example where the president was informed in "real time" during an NSC meeting. What is more, there were multiple feedback loops, all of which seemed to make their way back to the top four decisionmakers, the informal DMU. Kissinger had his own intelligence collection mechanism through State. Scowcroft was privy to that but had his own through his standing as
the Deputy Adviser for National Security Affairs--his would have included CIA and DIA. And of course Schlesinger, as Secretary of Defense, was the DIA's boss. That the feedback worked as well as it apparently did is a rather impressive accomplishment. So while the feedback came from standard mechanisms, it was clearly channeled to the top in a relatively expedient fashion. And we have seen at least one example of ad hoc communications. The apex controlled this process.

1.4.B. Was feedback and evaluation extemporaneous or routine? We have largely answered this question as well. The monitoring of information and its evaluation was done at the highest levels of the administration; and it was done in innovative ways that permitted real-time evaluation of options that were being implemented. The apex avoided being constrained by routines and instead improvised.

1.4.C. Were there signs of bureaucratic interference in the feedback and evaluation process? The only indication, and it is tenuous, of bureaucratic interference is that the information was spotty. The authors of Crisis Resolution attribute Ford's unwillingness to make a firm commitment during the second NSC Meeting to his suspicion of the intelligence he was getting. (Head, 1979: 113.) But this is pre-implementation and is thus excluded. Also Secretary Schlesinger initially called the president to tell him that thirty crew members, not the entire crew of forty
were released. But the vital information flow appears to have been rather exhaustive. And Schlesinger called back with corrected information within minutes of his first call. Overall, the feedback was reliable, comprehensive, and was expediently relayed to the key decisionmakers of the DMU. No bureaucracy or agency interfered with the process notwithstanding Ford's suspicions.

1.4.D. Was feedback-evaluation instantaneous with implementation? We discussed this in our attempt to depict the improvised nature of the feedback mechanism during the Mayaguez affair. We noted that Ford actually monitored, for example, precise parts of implementation while he had the NSC principals in attendance. It was clearly instantaneous with implementation. We again have a good fit with the hypothesis regarding feedback and evaluation under the conditions of short time and surprise.

SUMMARY

Before moving on to the next set of case studies we should like to briefly summarize what trends we have seen under the conditions of short time and surprise. The three cases we examined under this combination of independent variables were the Suez-Sinai affair, the downing of the EC-121 spy plane, and the seizure of the Mayaguez. Of those cases, two fit our hypothesized processes of decisionmaking quite well. One case, however, only marginally matched our expectations. Let us now consider our results in tabular
format.
TABLE 2

SUMMARY TABLE OF HYPOTHESES FOR
SHORT TIME, SURPRISE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Studies #:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1 Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Restrictively</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. High Locus</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. High Frequency</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Extemporaneously</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.2 Selection of Options</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Proffered by Apex</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Few in Number</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Reflect Dominant Personality</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Groupthink Indicated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.3 Implementation of Options</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Controlled at Apex</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Extemporaneous</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. No Bureaucratic Interference</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Instantaneous with Selection</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.4 Evaluation (Feedback) of Options</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Controlled by Apex</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Extemporaneous</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. No Bureaucratic Interference</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Instantaneous with Implementation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:

"+": Confirmed
"-": Disconfirmed
"*": Insufficient Information

Case Study 1: Suez-Sinai, 1956
Case Study 2: EC-121, 1969
Case Study 3: Mayaguez, 1975
Without question the most striking observation is the second case study: the EC-121 spy plane. It represents a poor fit with our hypotheses overall. Strikingly, its lack of fit seems confined to hypothesis 1.2 and hypothesis 1.3. However, one views it, our observations of the EC-121 case provide a glaring divergence with our expectations. Though the fit was poor, as defined in Chapter III, with respect to hypothesis (1.2) regarding convocation and (1.3) implementation, we nonetheless observed two of our hypotheses being supported well: 1.1 and 1.4.

Looking at the other two case studies in this chapter, however, we see that the all four hypotheses represented a relatively good fit. We see that there was very little overall departure of observations with what we hypothesized. In the Suez-Sinai case we found insufficient evidence to either confirm or disconfirm the comparative question on dominant personality under hypothesis 1.2. We still see at least 50 percent of the questions confirmed.

With respect to the Mayaguez case, we too found an overwhelmingly good fit. That is, at least 75% of the comparative questions were confirmed for each of the four hypotheses. Indeed, in only one process (hypothesis 1.2, under option selection) was there less than 100% confirmation of the four comparative questions.

In summary, of our three cases two fit well. The EC-121 case presents us with interesting questions that we will
address in the concluding chapter of this work. Before moving to those conclusions, we must address our next set of three case studies.
CHAPTER VI

SHORT TIME, ANTICIPATION:

BAY OF PIGS, TONKIN GULF, AND THE SIX-DAY WAR

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we shall be looking at three cases in which short decision time is still an identifiable characteristic. The difference between these cases and the ones in the previous chapter turns on surprise. In each of the three cases in the last chapter the decisionmakers were surprised by the foreign-policy event which confronted them; they did not anticipate the event's occurrence. In each of the following three cases, decisionmakers did anticipate the foreign-policy event that followed. This is not to say that they anticipated every conceivable aspect of the event; nor did they necessarily anticipate the exact time when the event would unfold. Instead, they knew that the event was virtually inevitable. Thus various degrees and levels of a priori contingency planning were carried out.

As with the last chapter we have a rather broad selection of cases. Geographically, the Bay of Pigs took place in America's back yard: the Caribbean basin. The Tonkin Gulf affair occurred in the Far East, along the coastline of
northern Vietnam. And the Six Day War erupted in a familiar place to U.S. decisionmakers for armed conflict: the Middle East.

In terms of presidential administrations, we will be looking at two: President John F. Kennedy's and his successor Lyndon Baines Johnson's. Both were of course Democrats, though they were arguably from different factions of the Democratic Party. As for the temporal domain, all three cases occurred during the 1960s.

The chapter will follow the pattern of the previous case studies. Namely, we shall introduce the cases in chronological order. A narrative will be given for each case followed by an analysis section in which we apply the questions of the focused comparison. After we have done this for each of the three cases, we shall conclude with a brief summary.

BAY OF PIGS, 1961

Narrative

Early in 1960, as the fall campaign for the presidency was heating up, the Eisenhower Administration was becoming increasingly focused internationally on Laos and Cuba. With

respect to Cuba, the administration had authorized the CIA to initiate the planning phases of what amounted to a guerilla infiltration of the island at some future date. In the spring of 1960 (March), President Eisenhower combined the hitherto disparate threads of the CIA plan into a two-part approach.

The two-part approach consisted of a political and a military component. During 1960 there was a relatively steady flow of emigres leaving Cuba for the United States. Thus, the president determined to unite them into a broad range of Cuban exiles with the commonality of opposing Castro; this was the political component. The second component was a military one: Eisenhower directed the CIA to recruit and to train a Cuban force capable of guerilla action for eventual infiltration. (Schlesinger, 1965: 226; Wyden, 1979: 25.)

The military component was directed by CIA operatives and some quasi-military personnel in Central America. And by fall of 1960 it had taken on a momentum and life of its own. With a "need-to-know" criterion firmly in place, and the geographic distance of the operation from Washington, far too much information was being compartmentalized and, wittingly or not, kept from policy makers in Washington.

The agents in the field were shaping it to meet their own needs. In favoring the "reliable" exiles--those who would take orders--they were conceivably endangering the whole project; for the men most capable of rallying popular support within Cuba against the Castro regime were bound to be more independent, more
principled and more radical than the manageable types whom the intelligence agency preferred for operational reasons. (Schlesinger, 1965: 231.)

With little in the way of supervision, CIA operatives in the field (notably Guatemala where the brigade trained) began to change the very nature of the operation to fit the exigencies that they determined to be salient. It was at this time, in early November, that the operation somehow underwent a change, evidently quite unbeknownst to Eisenhower. The operation changed from a guerilla infiltration to an amphibious assault which would require U.S. air cover.

Shortly after the election the new president, John F. Kennedy, was briefed for the first time as to the existence of the operation. Eisenhower personally briefed his successor. (Schlesinger, 1965: 252.) Since Eisenhower was unaware that the guerilla-infiltration plan had been transformed to an amphibious assault, he could scarcely inform the new president of it. Thus two presidents, the ostensible directors of U.S. foreign policy, were quite ignorant of the foreign-policy path on which the United States was furtively embarked. Institutional momentum had overtaken the decisionmaking process.

The new president's second briefing on what would become known as the Bay of Pigs was conducted on 29 November 1960. Director of CIA, Allen Dulles, gave the president a detailed briefing during which Kennedy was alerted to the CIA's amphibious plan. Schlesinger notes that "Kennedy
listened with attention, then told Dulles to carry the work forward" (Schlesinger, 1965: 233; c.f., Wyden, 1979: 68-69). What is not noted is why the president failed to ask who had authorized a change in the plan; or what was Eisenhower's view of the new plan, if he had even been made aware of it; or why was an amphibious assault being contemplated as a replacement for the original infiltration plan—what had made the plan obsolete? Nonetheless the work did in fact go forward.

During the next several weeks, Kennedy's new administration turned to filling important posts, preparing for the inauguration, and readying itself to assume control of the government. Sometime in early December, the new CIA plan was presented "in a routine way before the Special Group, the secret interdepartmental committee charged with the supervision of special operations" (Schlesinger, 1965: 233). The Special Group was comprised of Eisenhower's people but it was functioning in the vacuum of uncertainty. Whom did the group now work for? How much leeway did the group have in planning? Who had to sign off on any changes? In this vacuum the Special Group performed in a tentative way. It neither approved nor disapproved the new scheme. Instead it encouraged, not unlike the new president, the CIA to press ahead with the new operation putting off any difficult decisions.
As both Kennedy and the Special Group failed to pose questions critical to the new CIA plan, momentum continued to build. The very real complications, dilemmas, and contradictions this posed for U.S. policy were blithely ignored.

For example, both Kennedy and Eisenhower had allowed the plan to move forward with the proviso that the United States not be noticeably linked to it—"plausible deniability." And when the operation was a guerilla infiltration this was theoretically possible. But the new amphibious plan called for an expeditionary force both in size and scope. It would necessarily be equipped by the U.S. The plan called for the expedition to have artillery to secure its landing. It also called for air support from World War Two vintage B-26s which were to use Nicaragua as base. How the United States might disavow itself from such an operation was apparently ignored.

The dilemma was this:

if the [U.S.] kept its role small enough to conceal its responsibility, the operation might not have a fair chance of success; while if it made its role large enough to give the operation a fair chance of success, the responsibility could not be plausibly disclaimed in case of failure. (Schlesinger, 1965: 235.)

The logical conclusion of this dilemma was that if the plan were left to proceed, Kennedy might eventually face the choice between international-political humiliation of a force which the U.S. had created or intervention with U.S.
troops to forestall that eventuality.

Moreover, there was the theoretical constraint of "need-to-know" secrecy of this covert operation. The operatives who were actually running the operation from Guatemala were vested with keeping it secret. Accordingly, only those with a need to know were to be privy to the plan's details. In practice, however, this obviated some of those experts in State, Defense, and elsewhere from ever studying the plan which might have pointed out some of its weaknesses. In fact, the JCS only got involved for the first time in January 1961. (Schlesinger, 1965: 235; Wyden, 1979: 86-92.) Yet virtually anybody who had an interest outside of the government could read about the operation in the print media. One of the daily papers in Guatemala City for instance had broken the story back in October 1960. And articles in American journals (e.g., The Nation) were circulating in November 1960. Time published a description in January. (Wyden, 1979: 45-47.) Hence the contradiction was that only those inside the government who might have found problems in the plan were those who were kept from seeing it. Thus stood the seriously flawed plan as Kennedy's inauguration drew near.

Few in the new administration besides John Kennedy had first-hand knowledge of the plan. Only on 22 January--two days after inauguration--did Allen Dulles (CIA) and General Lemnitzer (JCS) brief the foreign-policy principals of the
New Frontier. Among those briefed were Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and Robert Kennedy. And though the JCS had only been briefed earlier that same month, during this meeting Lemnitzer tried to discuss military options ranging from minimum to maximum U.S. involvement. But the meeting was simply a briefing and not a policy debate.

On 28 January, only six days after the briefing, President Kennedy convened his first White House meeting on the matter. From this meeting evolved a core group of presidential advisers who, with Kennedy, met over the course of the next eighty days to reshape the plan bequeathed to them from the former administration. Janis identifies this core group as Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, and CIA's Dulles and Bissell with the JCS holdovers from the previous administration. And it is during the eighty days between this first White House meeting and the actual invasion that Janis uses to support his thesis of groupthink. (Janis, 1982: 15-17.) It should be noted, however, that Schlesinger cites Bobby Kennedy's participation in the group only at the initial meeting and then after the invasion was portending dramatic failure. (Schlesinger, 238, 259, 292.) And Parmet explicitly states that Bobby "was not in on the decision" but that both brothers thought alike anyway. (Parmet, 1983: 159.) Wyden too disputes Janis as he notes that "The Attorney General. . . had not attended any of the preinvasion planning meetings. . ." (Wyden, 1979: 289).
This is important for, as we shall see, Janis makes some significance of Bobby Kennedy's remarks to Arthur Schlesinger at a birthday party in mid April—just days before the invasion commenced. It was at this party that the younger Kennedy remarked to Schlesinger that the president had noted Schlesinger's discomfort with the plan. Schlesinger confirmed that he was uncomfortable with it whereupon Robert Kennedy told him that he may be correct in his assessment but that now the was time to back the president. Janis cites this as an example of mind guards precluding thoughtful analysis. (Janis, 1982: 40.) While this may be true, Robert Kennedy was seldom in the meetings during which the Bay of Pigs plan was discussed. Thus for our purposes we must be careful not to make too much of this one incident, however true it might be.

More important than the "mindguard" incident, for present purposes, is the actual group. By looking at several accounts it appears that the principals were Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Schlesinger, JCS, Dulles and Bissell, and of course the president. We have noted already that Robert Kennedy was seldom involved, though it is possible that his involvement is unrecorded given that two brothers may well have informally discussed matters of significance. Also, the vice president was present at some of these planning sessions.
Over the course of the next eighty days, then, these persons met several times to discuss options concerning the Bay of Pigs operation. And while this study is concerned with the meetings following 15 April 1961 (CrisisBank delineates endpoints of 15 April and 24 April) it is worth considering a couple of the meetings during this earlier period for comparative purposes. (For a good day-to-day historical account of the meetings read Schlesinger [1965]: Chapters IX, X, and XI; for an analysis see Janis [1982]: Chapter II.)

On 15 March, just one month before the invasion commenced, once again a newly revised CIA plan was presented to the JCS. (Parmet, 1983: 164; Schlesinger, 1965: 250.) Its revisions were marginal. Indeed throughout the eighty-day period marginal changes had been put in place but no substantive changes had been considered. At this meeting the CIA presented a plan in response to some questions and issues raised at an earlier meeting. Schlesinger reports that the CIA (presumably Dulles and Bissell) dominated this meeting. (Schlesinger, 1965: 250.) Then on 4 April the White House group heard from an outsider for the first time. Kennedy had decided to allow Senator Fulbright (a widely respected figure in foreign affairs and reportedly Kennedy's first choice for Secretary of State) to hear the plan to see if an outsider might offer some advise. Fulbright did in fact find several things about the operation troubling; yet
the plan continued in his absence. (Schlesinger, 1965: 251; Wyden, 1979: 146-150.) In both of these meetings the participants were the core group identified above.

And it is during these meetings that Janis (1982) finds evidence of groupthink. In the 4 April meeting Janis argues that Kennedy controlled the meeting, dominated and essentially coerced the in-group. Even the way he controlled how and when Fulbright spoke and the questions posed are demonstrative of the groupthink thesis according to Janis.

Throughout this period the president never vacillated on his position that direct U.S. involvement would not be allowed. And yet it would appear that the practitioners of the plan in Guatemala were convinced that once begun, the administration would lend direct support. On 12 April 1961, Kennedy publicly responded to the proliferation of stories about imminent invasion of Cuba. He publicly stated that no U.S. intervention in Cuba would take place.

Even at this late date there is some evidence that Kennedy was not fully committed to allowing the plan to be implemented. It was scheduled to have begun 5 April, then 10 April and the president had canceled it. It was now scheduled for 17 April. Parmet notes that on 12 April Kennedy "had yet to grant his final approval for the invasion plan" (Parmet, 1983: 165). And Schlesinger implies that since the president had postponed it before, he might
well do it again, and that not until 14 April did he commit past the first "no-go" point from a military standpoint. (Schlesinger, 1965: 267.) It was Friday (14 April) when the president received a message from the field. Schlesinger cites a marine colonel--Parmet identifies him as Colonel Jack Hawkins--sending the president a message that indicated that morale could not be higher, that the brigade could not be better prepared, and in other ways simply lied. Both Schlesinger and Parmet describe it a cheer leading. If the president had been considering another postponement, this report dissuaded him. (Parmet, 1983: 165; Schlesinger, 1965: 267.) The president gave the go-ahead signal.

Upon receiving the president's signal, the CIA revealed the plan in its entirety to the 1400-man strong brigade. They had kept it secret for obvious security reasons as well as for purposes of controlling the brigade. Thus began the debacle known as the Bay of Pigs (Bahía de Cochinos). The plan at this late stage of its evolution included three sets of air strikes by B-26s that were to look as though they were Cuban pilots defecting. The first set was to fly from Nicaragua and to bomb airstrips in Cuba. This was to take place Saturday morning (15 April). After that first air strike, the second set--air reconnaissance--was to assess the damage. Finally, a third set was to occur in conjunction with the amphibious assault. The assault itself was
not scheduled to take place until Monday morning, 17 April. The first bombing runs began as scheduled.

On Saturday the president maintained his usually busy schedule. He was briefed by Bundy in the early morning. He then attended a business-as-usual physician's meeting in the White House Conference Room. After the physician's meeting the president was briefed by his assigned military aide, General Clifton as well as Secretary Rusk. At noon Kennedy met with Clifton and Rusk again but with Bissell, Schlesinger, and Berle also in attendance. Then at 12:40 P.M. the president helicoptered away for the weekend in Glen Ora Virginia. The trip to Virginia was part of the plan to camouflage U.S. participation. (Parmet, 1983: 166.) While all this activity was taking place at the White House, the bombing had begun in Cuba.

The next morning (16 April) the president attended Mass in the morning after which he played golf. Another go-ahead signal was needed for the amphibious group to disembark—they were waiting off the coast of Guatemala and scheduled to set sail for arrival at station off Cuba the following morning. Parmet notes that on "Sunday the president was obviously in no hurry to reach Bissell with the go-ahead signal for the landings" (Parmet, 1983: 166). But he gave it at noon: "At Sunday noon, the last no-go point, he authorized the expedition to proceed to the beaches" (Schlesinger, 1965: 272). The president spent the rest of
the day with his family at Glen Ora. (Wyden, 1979: 194-195.)

The president and his family returned by helicopter to Washington early Monday. Except for an occasional briefing or call on Monday the president followed his normally heavy Monday schedule. Later that evening the gravity of the situation became clear as the invasion foundered on the beaches of Cuba.

By Tuesday morning it was generally conceded that the invasion had failed badly and that impending disaster faced all involved. And by Thursday (20 April) the Bay of Pigs was widely recognized domestically and internationally as the administration's first foreign-policy failure.

In fact Schlesinger takes several pages to discuss the events of Thursday. The invasion was over for all intents and purposes. Schlesinger notes that the administration turned to domestic issues primarily. Reaction to the debacle was coming in swiftly. Thus the president's "first problem on Thursday was to contain the political consequences of the debacle." While domestic politics came first, some thought was given to foreign policy in conjunction with the former. Kennedy's concern,

was to head off any outcry within the United States for violent retaliation against Castro, to reassure the democratic world about the prudence of Washington and at the same time dissuade the communist regarding restraint. (Schlesinger, 1965: 278.)
In addition: "The next step was to secure the administration against partisan attack. . ." (Schlesinger, 1965: 288). Hence the main focus was back to domestic issues; nothing now could be done. The invasion had failed; the United States had been humiliated but at least it was over. Now to contain the bleeding. Thus ended what Janis ranks among the "worst fiascoes ever perpetrated by a responsible government" (Janis, 1983: 14).

**Analysis**

If Janis's characterization of the Bay of Pigs as "one of the worst fiascoes ever perpetrated by a responsible government" is correct, there is clear merit in the examination of the event. But what makes it especially interesting for our purposes is that it was a foreign-policy event distinguishable by a short decision time and lack of surprise. As to the short time, from the beginning of the event, 15 April, until its conclusion, 24 April, only nine days transpired. (In fact, we shall argue below that the Bay of Pigs was essentially over on Thursday 20 April—i.e., only five days.) As for the awareness, the Kennedy administration had known and discussed the plan's eventuality for months; it was well anticipated. Janis focuses on the period of time leading up to the event's commencement. We, conversely, are interested in decisionmaking during the event. Hence while we are not entirely concerned with the same phase of the event from which Janis makes his group-
think argument, it will be worth examining some of this period as well for comparative context.

In cases where there is no surprise due to the decisionmakers initiating the event we need to address the issue of when was the initial convocation of the DMU. This is because there are invariably planning meetings prior to the event's commencement that are convened to discuss the matter. We however are interested in convocation of the decision unit after commencement of a given event.

Specifically for the Bay of Pigs case, recall that the B-26s began bombing Cuban airstrips on early Saturday, 15 April. And we have seen already that the president kept his usually crowded Saturday schedule including meeting with physicians and others. Prior to his attending this physician's meeting, there was an early-morning briefing by Bundy for Kennedy—though this appears to have been simply informative, not a meeting of the DMU. Nonetheless, it is at this morning briefing that the president was informed that the operation was actually underway. After the physician's conference, the president met with Secretary Rusk, General Clifton (a military aide), Bissell (CIA), Berle, and Schlesinger. This session was at noon and the president flew off for the weekend at 12:40. Once again the nature of this meeting was simply to brief the president: in effect, the operation had begun and had proceeded thus and so. No particular decisions were demanded.
The briefings that took place following Kennedy's departure were few and were simply for the purpose of updating the operation's progress. Most of the business surrounding the Bay of Pigs had been decided well in advance and the principals simply monitored the situation. Indeed it was not until well after President Kennedy's return Monday that a meeting of the decisionmaking unit took place. This consisted of the so-called White House Group which met to consider the status of the operation. It should be noted that while Saturday morning began the Bay of Pigs' operation, it was not until Monday morning that the amphibious assault actually took place. Nonetheless, there was not a meeting of the DMU until the president convened a 7:00 A.M. Cabinet-Room session Tuesday. (Schlesinger, 1965: 275-276; Wyden, 1979: 266.) Until that time all the business surrounding the operation was simply conducted via phone calls and very short, informal briefings.

1. Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

2.1.A. Was the convened DMU restricted to the apex or was a larger DMU involved? This really gets to the issue of who was initially convened. We know that the DMU changed somewhat but largely remained the core of the White House Group identified by Janis in the early-planning stages. This consisted of the President, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Dulles and/or Bissell, usually at least one representative of the JCS, and Schlesinger. In attendance at the first
meeting at 7:00 A.M. Tuesday were Kennedy, Johnson, Dulles, Bissell, Admiral Burke, Harlan Cleavland, Rostow, Bundy, Schlesinger, General Lyman Lemnitzer (Chair JCS), and Robert Kennedy—a total of eleven persons. Clearly this group is more inclusive than simply the apex of the DMU. The apex (as identified in Chapter IV) forms the core of the DMU but others were included as well. We hypothesized that under these situational conditions, the apex would begin to include other sources of expertise, not normally part of the apex. And this is what Kennedy and his principal advisers did.

2.1.B. At what locus was the DMU convened, high or low? The locus was of course the White House. Eventually a special group was set up to monitor the situation so the president could be kept appraised in timely fashion. And Kennedy instructed that the group remain housed at the White House where he could periodically check in on events. Thus we have confirmed a high locus of convocation.

2.1.C. With what frequency was the DMU was convened? There was the meeting just mentioned—7:00 A.M. Cabinet-Room meeting Tuesday. Following that meeting, the president and Schlesinger had lunch with journalist James Reston. Then in the early afternoon was another Cabinet Room meeting with essentially the same attendees. They were considering how to respond to Khrushchev's message which pledged "all necessary assistance" to Cuba. Because the Soviets were
getting involved the president had Charles Bohlen, Foy Kohler, and Harlan Cleavland to the meeting--two Soviet specialists and an international organization's specialist respectively. (Schlesinger, 1965: 275-76.)

Throughout the day, though they did not actually meet over it, the president, Schlesinger, and Bundy listened to reports of the worsening situation on the beaches of Cuba. Wyden notes that Kennedy was in and out of the Cabinet room--now effectively "an emergency command post"--all day long. The impression is that he was simply checking on the latest information. (Wyden, 1979: 267.) Schlesinger describes the day: "It was a long and grim day--the longest and grimmest the New Frontier had known" (Schlesinger, 1965: 277). The president kept his scheduled attendance at the annual Congressional Reception that evening. And Schlesinger returned to his Georgetown house.

Late that same night--actually now Wednesday 19 April--Bundy called Schlesinger at home. Evidently following the Congressional Reception, the president decided to convene another meeting to assess the damage. (Wyden, 1979: 270-271.) Schlesinger records that at 1:00 A.M. Bundy called and said that the president wanted him back at the White House immediately. Upon returning Schlesinger found the president, Bundy, VP Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Burke and Lemnitzer (JCS), Bissell, and Bundy's assistant W. W. Rostow. At this meeting the participants responded to the
now obvious failure. They discussed how to recover, what to
do about the Cubans now being captured, what to do with the
Revolutionary Council--the CIA's invention--and various
other matters. (Schlesinger, 1965: 277-78; Wyden, 1979:
270-271.) This meeting appears to be the first time
Kennedy's administration came to grips with the reality that
the operation had turned into disaster of epic proportions;
that their contingency planning was flawed and had failed
them; and that new tough decisions beckoned.

On Wednesday and then on Thursday there were more
meetings but the composition of the group changed reflecting
the changing nature of the event. On Thursday the adminis-
tration began to consider the consequences of the fiasco--
viz., potential domestic and partisan recriminations.
Kennedy's primary domestic adviser, Ted Sorensen, became
directly involved. Also, Salinger, the press secretary to
Kennedy began attending meetings Thursday. Robert Kennedy
too became much more involved. These 19 and 20 April meet-
ings then we do not include because, as Schlesinger clearly
points out, the focus of said meetings was domestic poli-
tics. "His first problem on Thursday was to contain the
political consequences of the debacle" according to
Schlesinger. And with a view toward doing that the presi-
dent moved nimbly:

The next step was to secure the administration against
partisan attack. . . . Later that day he [JFK] called
Richard Nixon . . . and by weekend he talked to
Eisenhower, Nelson Rockefeller and Barry Goldwater. (Schlesinger, 1965: 287.)

Thus there were only three full meetings of the original DMU. There were also several informal, impromptu discussions with one or two advisers and the president as well as a number of phone calls during the Bay of Pigs event. Beginning on Thursday the DMU changed somewhat and the substance of the meetings changed considerably. Considering each of these groups of meetings we clearly have a frequently convened DMU. The composition and substance may have changed from meeting to meeting but that they were frequent is clear.

2.1.D. The answer to whether the DMU was convened extemporaneously or along standard routines as we have already seen, is somewhat problematic. The meetings prior to the event's commencement—the planning meetings—of course were largely along standard routines. Once the event began however they became much more ad hoc in nature. Over the weekend, while Kennedy was out of town, there was a number of terse updates, and two formal White House meetings. These were conducted along standard-operating procedures because the planning for the operation had been conducted well in advance. Yet as we know, the president's top advisers were in almost constant contact in the Cabinet room on Tuesday—this was clearly ad hoc in nature. Hence it was a mixture with Kennedy attending formally convened
meetings and his advisers holding impromptu meetings frequently. We can neither confirm nor disconfirm this part of the hypothesis unequivocally and thus will consider it insufficient information.

2. Selection of Options

2.2.A. **Were the options proffered by the apex of the DMU or by a larger DMU?** As we have seen in the narrative, a variety of sources was involved in generating options. Indeed there was some competition over said process. In any event, possible options were suggested by the apex of the DMU; additionally, those other individuals who had been asked to join the group all contributed in suggesting ways to end the misery of the failed operation. All accounts make clear that generally speaking anyone could speak at any time. At the late-Tuesday-early-Wednesday meeting Admiral Burke argued with Bissell over what would make military sense, and Schlesinger records that while he did not speak up, it was because he felt he was with experts out of his league—self-imposed censorship as Janis calls it. Parmet describes a good deal of rather healthy conversation at this meeting without actually identifying each person speaking. (Parmet, 1983: 171.) Thus we must conclude that all were allowed, if they so chose, to speak up and offer suggestions and options. Wyden, in fact, describes a scene during which
Admiral Burke nearly yelled at the president in his frustration. (Wyden, 1979: 270.)

That some chose not to avail themselves of the opportunity is a separate issue. And it is worth noting that while Schlesinger chose not to voice his opinions vigorously at this particular meeting, he did write his thoughts down in memo and made sure the president saw it.\textsuperscript{17} What is more, on 20 April as the meetings began to change from foreign policy to domestic recriminations, Schlesinger did offer his advise to the participants--evidently he considered his own expertise to be in the domestic sphere. When others seemed to ignore Schlesinger, Bundy spoke up to remind them that schlesinger was one of the few who had been against the operation and therefore merited some attention. Kennedy sarcastically responded: 'Arthur wrote me a memorandum that will look pretty good when he gets around to writing his book on my administration, . . . Only he better not publish that memorandum while I'm still alive . . . .' (Schlesinger, 1965: 289). Options being proferred from the apex with some additional input from other advisers confirms our expectation.

2.2.B. How many options were considered? Under present conditions we expect to see a larger number of options entertained. This is primarily due to a larger DMU

\textsuperscript{17}To read Schlesinger's memoranda, see Declassified Document Quarterly Catalogue, 1978: 302c.
and what we expect to be a more complex conceptualization of the challenge.

Upon commencement of the operation virtually *no* options were discussed until the Tuesday-morning meeting. Recall that the participants discussed how best to respond to the Soviets' threat at this meeting. Then late Tuesday night/early Wednesday morning, the DMU considered—for the first time—options regarding how to best stop the bleeding as it were. The operation had founndered; the DMU sought ways to cut loses. These included flying air cover from nearby U.S. aircraft carriers. The idea was not that they could change the fate of the operation itself. Instead they were trying to save the lives of as many in the brigade as possible. They discussed direct U.S. involvement with no attendant subterfuge at this meeting. And this occurred at around 1:00 A.M. Wednesday morning. Until that point no other options had been considered. The Bay of Pigs' planning had been concluded in advance of the actual event and the decisionmakers clung to that planning until well into the operation's demise. Thus a number of options was considered over the course of the event; and there were various sources of input into the generation of options.

2.2.C. *Did options reflect a dominant personality?*

Once again we must consider pre-15 April versus post-15 April. Prior to 15 April it would appear that Bissell dominated the process. He convinced two administrations
that the plan was sound—and perhaps it was in its early incarnations. Bissell was well respected in the Eisenhower administration. He had implemented the very successful U-2 program which had won him kudos in the government. He was also a respected intellect; he held a doctorate in economics from Yale and he had taught at MIT. (In fact Walt Rostow had been one of his students.) He had helped administer the Marshall Plan. And he had run a similar operation to the Bay of Pigs in Guatemala in 1954; that operation was deemed quite successful. Both Parmet and Schlesinger note that he was convincing, articulate, and bright. And they both note that Kennedy was quite taken with his abilities. Further, during some of the pre-invasion meetings he is recorded to have dominated the Joint Chiefs. Yet after the operation began this was no longer the case. He continued to attend meetings but as we have already discussed, others began to confront him with alternative options. Doubtless they were somewhat emboldened by seeing Bissell's plan as it failed. The president began to assert himself after the operation failed. Schlesinger reports that Kennedy began taking charge and directing the meetings much more. Further, for the first time Kennedy overruled Bissell. As mentioned above, while the president was still at Glen Ora a controversy arose over airstrikes. Rusk was concerned that they could too easily be attributed to the U.S. He called the president to discuss it whereupon Kennedy canceled one
strike. When Bissell (CIA) learned of it he was annoyed but chose not to push the issue. (Schlesinger, 1965: 272-274.) Wyden describes others at CIA headquarters on the verge of nervous breakdown over the affair, however. (Wyden, 1979: 204-206.)

Thus we may conclude that while a personality, namely Bissell's, seems to have dominated the early planning phases, once the operation was underway this was no longer the case. The president seemed to take charge of the situation but Rusk, the JCS, and others also began to exert themselves much more. We must therefore conclude that no dominant personality controlled the selection of options during the period of interest for our purposes. This contrasts to our expectations.

2.2.D. Were signs of groupthink present? We must again emphasize the difference between the planning period and the period following commencement of the operation. As will be recalled Janis, in his seminal work, cites the Bay of Pigs as the example par excellence of the groupthink phenomenon. If one looks at his argument, however, it is focused on the period leading up to 15 April. He illustrates that, in meeting after meeting, the White House Group failed to ask the tough questions; failed to consider the implications of their undertaking; failed to challenge faulty assumptions. And Janis illustrates his thesis persuasively.
The focus of this case study though is the period of the invasion. And Janis scarcely mentions meetings during this period. And there is good reason for that. The initial three days of the operation were ones during which the administration adhered to established procedures—ones established in the early phases of planning. As the operation soured, however, new considerations arose; and there is precious-little evidence of groupthink during this period. Nonetheless, we must not ignore the potential influence exerted by the presence of groupthink for it characterized the pre-invasion period and, as we have seen, there was precious-little deviation from said procedures in the initial three days of the operation. (See Wyden, 1979: 313-327.) That influence, notwithstanding, we are unable to confirm our expectations in this particular case.

3. Implementation of Options

2.3.A. Was implementation controlled by the apex of the broader foreign-policy machinery? Perhaps not surprisingly, it follows the same pattern established in the selection-of-options section above. The pre-invasion planning was dominated by the decisionmaking bureaucracy—at least the CIA portion of it. And during the initial three days of the operation (15-17 April) the implementation of the operation was also conducted by the CIA. Only after disaster was evident did the more restrictive DMU actually depart from the CIA's established operation at which time
improvisation was evident. Only then did the DMU implement any options. And these were relatively few. The options clung to and implemented remained, for most of the operation, those of the CIA's. Thus we have ambiguous evidence concerning this aspect of the hypothesis. The more restrictive DMU did eventually take charge and did control implementation; however, there was a period initially wherein the bureaucracy controlled this process. Thus we are unable to either confirm or disconfirm this particular function of the hypothesis: the evidence is mixed.

2.3.B. Was implementation extemporaneous or was it conducted according to routines? The reasoning follows very closely the previous question. That is, contingencies and routines worked out in advance, primarily by Bissell and his cohorts at CIA, were followed. Not until some time Tuesday did the DMU fully seize control of the implementation process at which time a good deal more improvisation was detectable.

We therefore witness a combination of implementation following routines. As the routines were seen as inadequate, improvised implementation followed. This is what we hypothesized under these conditions.

2.3.C. Was there evidence of bureaucratic politics? We found only marginal indication of bureaucratic politics once the operation was underway. There is evidence that CIA and the Pentagon tussled over how the plan ought to be
staffed and managed. (Wyden, 1979: 87.) This was in the pre-planning stage however. There was an instance when the JCS and Bissell argued over how best to proceed as the operation seemed to be failing—in the Tuesday-morning Cabinet Room meeting. Bissell clung to his operation; he looked for ways to salvage it even if it meant direct U.S. involvement which had been established by both Eisenhower and Kennedy as off limits. The Joint Chiefs began asserting themselves for the first time during this meeting. Whether their concerns were parochial or not is unclear. But Bissell's very likely were. In any case we have confirmed at least some indication of this phenomenon. We have enough evidence to confirm our expectations.

By way of contrast, the pre-invasion period was dominated by CIA's parochial concerns. The selection of refugees, for operational reasons, who were most pliable is one example. These were probably the least likely Cubans to be able to generate a popular uprising upon landing in Cuba, let alone run the government should the operation succeed. We have not included this period in our analysis, however, since it was prior to the event's commencement.

2.3.D. Finally, was implementation instantaneous with the selection process or temporally distinct? As with short time and surprise we hypothesize an implementation process that is virtually instantaneous with selection of options. Despite the lag period between the commencement of
the operation and the DMU's convocation to address events, once the DMU was controlling implementation it was done as options were selected. Recall that the options revolved around salvaging lives and the administration's reputation. In either case, as options were decided upon they were immediately implemented. The instance of the air cover, a departure from stated plans, is illustrative of this. (Schlesinger, 1965: 278.) So too was the administration's overtures to the media (Kennedy and Schlesinger having lunch with the press) accomplished with alacrity.

4. Evaluation of Selected Action

2.4.A. Was the evaluation-feedback process controlled by the apex or the larger bureaucracy? We have already seen that feedback was directed through the DMU. As the president prepared to leave to Glen Ora Saturday morning, he was briefed by Bundy, then later by General Clifton and Secretary Rusk. (Parmet, 1983: 166.) There were several phone calls to the president while in Glen Ora simply to keep him abreast of the situation. While feedback on the operation's progress may have been compartmentalized in the CIA as well, we found no explicit reference to this nor did it appear to prevent the president and the DMU generally from receiving rather constant feedback. At one point, as noted above, Schlesinger remarks that the president, Bundy, and he listened all day Tuesday to the grim reports as they continued to pour in. That a "command center" was
established in the Cabinet room by the president's top
advisers further demonstrates the point. Thus we may
conclude that the apex did retain control; we have confirmed
this part of the hypothesis.

2.4.B. *Was the process extemporaneous or routine in
nature?* It would appear that this was conducted according
to pre-determined channels rather than some innovative, ad
hoc mechanism. Even after the operation was recognized as a
foreign-policy disaster, the DMU continued to be kept
abreast, as far as we could determine, by those channels
that had informed them throughout. Wyden describes a White
House, that despite its best efforts, was always seven hours
behind the information curve and hence confused. (Wyden,
1979: 264.) This is clearly in contrast to what we
hypothesized and we therefore conclude disconfirmation.

2.4.C. *Were there any signs of bureaucratic
interference?* We found no evidence that any information was
kept from the president or the DMU generally once the
operation was underway. What information was available,
even though its message was glib, was channeled to the DMU.
And though the CIA in particular may have had reason to put
a particular spin on information, we found no evidence of
any such thing. This jibes with what we hypothesized under
these conditions.

2.4.D. *Was the process instantaneous with
implementation?* We again find confirmation of what we
expected to find. As we described when discussing implementation, after the initial lag period in which no action—not even a convocation of the DMU—took place, things moved rapidly. The administration monitored the event as it unfolded, and the options it had decided to implement as a result of the looming disaster. We have confirmation.

TONKIN GULF, 1964\(^{18}\)

Narrative

The summer of 1964 was a busy one for President Johnson. Having assumed office as a result of Kennedy's assassination, the upcoming fall election offered Johnson a chance to be elected president in his own right. And the election largely occupied his time and efforts. Presidential politics, notwithstanding, Johnson had inherited his predecessor's Vietnam legacy and intended to honor the slain president's commitment to preserve the independence of South Vietnam. (Johnson, 1971: 118; Crabb, 1986: 199).

In August of 1964 the exercise of honoring Kennedy's commitment to Vietnam took a very different path. Until that point, however, Johnson remained relatively status quo. For instance, just prior to Kennedy's death the president of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, had been assassinated and a new government had come to power. The Kennedy administration began to reassess the situation given the new realities. And just after Johnson assumed the presidency a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) on the situation in Vietnam was released. NSAM 273 was quite upbeat in its evaluation of the prospects in Vietnam and called for a "don't-rock-the-boat" continuation of U.S. policy. That is, it called for the U.S. to continue to assist and to provide money but to keep it a Vietnamese affair. (Defense Department, [1971] Bk 3, VI: 1.)

This document is what Johnson initially used as his blueprint for U.S. policy in Vietnam. And for the next several months this remained the course of U.S. policy with little change. Yet things in Vietnam were rapidly deteriorating from an American viewpoint. The programs of the United States were not working; what was worse, the programs and policies of the government of South Vietnam were failing dramatically.

On 12 February 1964 a new document was promulgated. An Intelligence Estimate, produced by CIA, was sent back to Washington where the president, State, Defense, and the JCS
were able to review it. The document was far less sanguine than NSAM 273. In a section entitled the "Short-term Prospects in Southeast Asia," its leading conclusion was:

That the situation in South Vietnam is very serious and prospects uncertain. Even with U.S. assistance . . . South Vietnam has, at best, an even chance of withstanding the insurgency menace during the next few weeks. (Defense Department, [1971] Bk 3, IV: 34.)

The editor's of the Defense Department's collection comment that by the February-March 1964 period, all concerned "fully recognized" that "the situation in Vietnam was deteriorating so rapidly that the dimensions and kinds of effort so far invested could not hope to reverse the trend" (Defense Department, [1971] Bk 3, IV: 35).

Even though all recognized the gravity of the situation, throughout the spring and into the summer, U.S. policy remained constant. The U.S. continued to assist the Vietnamese through overt and covert means. That the fall election loomed large at this time doubtless added to the administration's caution.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon was determining that election or not, a much more visible U.S. presence was necessary. On 18 February the JCS recommended "Intensified operations . . . to include air bombings" of North Vietnam and the introduction of U.S. Air Commando units and jet aircraft. (Defense Department [1971] Bk 3, IV: 39-40.) Though the Joint Chiefs do not make U.S. policy per se, it was shortly after this assessment that Defense Secretary McNamara became
convinced that they were correct. And McNamara was very influential in the Johnson administration. The result was NSAM 288 which called for a "considerable enlargement of U.S. effort" in Vietnam. (Defense Department [1971] Bk 3, IV: 46.)

At this point U.S. policy began to take on a dramatically different flavor than previously. Though McNamara had essentially been convinced by the JCS, his response in NSAM 288 was deemed inadequate by them. After reviewing a draft memo of NSAM 288 that McNamara sent to the president, the chairman of the JCS responded. The JCS felt that the recommendations of NSAM 288 would not alone "be sufficient to turn the tide against the Viet Cong in" South Vietnam. Rather, "positive action being taken against the Hanoi government at an early date" was the minimum that was necessary. In other words, the JCS were recommending that the U.S. effectively take control of the military aspects of the effort and, moreover, that the U.S. take the war North to Hanoi. (Defense Department [1971] Bk 3, IV: 46.) Almost simultaneously, the president of South Vietnam, General Khanh was agreeing with the U.S. military. And he too began to speak of taking the war North and having the U.S. directly assist. It was not until May and June that the recommendations and ruminations began to take the form of an animate proposal.
On 30 May 1964 Johnson sent his top advisers to meet in Honolulu with those who were implementing policy for the U.S. in Vietnam. Concomitantly in Washington a meeting was held that specifically discussed "means of broadening the U.S. role in Vietnam" (Defense Department [1971] Bk 3, IV: 78). By now the wheels of change were actively turning. Sometime in late May William Bundy had written an internal memo at State suggesting the desirability of a congressional resolution for the president so as to make possible the expected increased U.S. role. On 15 June McGeorge Bundy drafted a memorandum, with William's apparently attached, and sent both to the Secretaries of State and Defense. In it he announced a meeting for that day at 6:00 P.M. And he stated the issue directly:

The principal question for discussion will be to assess the desirability of recommending to the President that a Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia should be sought promptly. (Defense Department, [1971] Bk 3, VI: 82.)

Karnow points out that this meeting and others like it were conducted by what was then the "ultrasecret 303 Committee" (Karnow, 1983: 364).

The result of the meeting was threefold. First, the so-called De Soto patrol missions, whose purpose was to collect intelligence, were revamped and resumed along the coast of North Vietnam. Second, new coordination between the De Soto missions and the covert raids—these had been funded and supported by the U.S. for some time under the
acronym OPLAN 34—being conducted by South Vietnamese commandos was undertaken. Third, the William Bundy memo (above) that discussed how to get a congressional resolution as well as actually producing a draft thereof was reconsidered. 19

The editors of the Defense Department papers comment on this new turn in U.S. policy—a move from previous assistance to direct assumption of many aspects of the war during 1964.

We moved gradually in this direction, impelled almost inevitably to ultimate actions of this sort, but always reluctantly and always hesitant to commit ourselves to more than very minor moves, until suddenly and dramatically the Tonkin Gulf affair of early August provided an occasion to make a move of the sort we had long been anticipating but until then had always deferred. (Defense Department, [1971] Bk 3, VI: 58; my emphasis.)

As of August 1964, therefore, this is where U.S. policy stood. Though elections were approaching, the situation in Vietnam was deteriorating rapidly. The president could ill-afford standing idly by to lose Vietnam with Barry Goldwater running as his opponent. Yet he could scarcely risk dramatically upping the ante in Vietnam without something tantamount to unanimous Congressional support. Thus in early August the event that fortuitously allowed Johnson to solve his problem came along. An event that:

19 The actual draft resolution, dated 25 May 1964, is photo copied in the Defense Department (1971) papers. See Bk 4, IV, b., pp. 43-48. Section 2 specifically gives the president, if he determines it necessary, the "use [of] all measures, including the commitment of armed forces . . . ."
Subsequent research by both official and unofficial investigators has indicated with almost total certainty... never happened. It had not been deliberately faked, but Johnson and his staff, desperately seeking a pretext to act vigorously, had seized upon a fuzzy set of circumstances to fulfill a contingency plan. (Karnow, 1983: 373.)

While Karnow's characterization of the administration's seeking a pretext in desperation may be overstated, the Tonkin Gulf affair unquestionably provided the administration with a great deal of latitude. Furthermore, the administration was able to pull the Bundy contingency plan off the shelf to its advantage.

In his memoirs president Johnson's describes the events surrounding the Tonkin Gulf affair this way.

In August 1964 an unexpected crisis developed, one that threatened for a time to change the nature of the war in Vietnam. (Johnson, 1971: 112.)

The so-called unexpected development was a "high-priority" message that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked a U.S. destroyer in the Gulf of Tonkin. The message came in directly to the Situation Room where a Duty Officer summarized the event and sent it to the president's bedroom.

Though the exact series of events is still somewhat unclear, the following is known. Prior to the first attack U.S.-funded OPLAN 34 raids were running in the area; and U.S. ships (De Soto missions) were monitoring the operations with electronic equipment. The typical operation involved a covert raid of specific installations with monitoring by U.S. ships so as to collect intelligence information. On 30
July one such operation had taken place. There had been several others since spring of 1964.

Then around mid morning Sunday 2 August 1964, U.S. ships were still steaming off the coastline of North Vietnam in close proximity to where the 30 July operation had taken place. Around this time a number of small North Vietnamese craft began tracking and closing on the U.S. destroyer. Soon thereafter a skirmish took place in which two or three Vietnamese craft were sunk, and the Maddox sustained one bullet hole. These altercations occurred late Saturday night, early Sunday morning in the Washington. (Washington is twelve hours behind Vietnamese time.) Thus several hours later, though as we have seen while the president was still in bed, first word of the events came to the president's attention.

The president "called a meeting of key advisers later that morning in the White House" (Johnson, 1971: 113). The president's memoirs do not record the precise time of the meeting. In attendance were Rusk and his assistant George Ball, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, General Wheeler (JCS) "and several experts in technical intelligence" (Johnson, 1971: 113).

The result of the meeting was a decision not to retaliate. There was apparently general consensus that it might have been an isolated incident by some local commander who was acting like a rogue. Instead the decision was made to
issue a warning to Hanoi that "grave consequences" could be expected were Hanoi to attack U.S. ships on the high seas again. The president also immediately cabled the Soviets. Johnson told them that the U.S. did not wish to broaden the conflict and he requested Soviet efforts to get the message to Hanoi.

Perhaps the president was uninformed as to the activity in his own government; or perhaps he was being disingenuous. For at the same time there was renewed activity at the State Department. William Bundy, the one who had drafted a Congressional resolution back in June was out of town on vacation. In Bundy's absence Rusk gathered his remaining staff together and instructed them to get "Bundy's draft resolution, just in case the president's authority to deal with Southeast Asia had to be broadened" (Karnow, 1983: 369).

The Pentagon too was gearing up for action. The JCS and their adjunct commanders began to put plans together. They used earlier intelligence from De Soto missions and other sources to pinpoint harbor installations and oil depots that provided ripe targets. They dispatched additional U.S. fighter-bombers to both South Vietnam and Thailand. They also ordered the U.S. Constellation to steam to the area and they instructed a second destroyer, the C. Turner Joy to join the Maddox in a new mission that was to 'assert the right of freedom of the seas' (Karnow, 1983:
369). The commander of the task force, Rear Admiral Robert Moore, instructed Captain Herrick of the Maddox that the North Vietnamese had 'thrown down the gauntlet' and therefore must be treated as belligerent. Karkow infers that "the Maddox and Turner Joy were effectively being used to bait the Communists" (Karkow, 1983: 370). Whether true or not, what is indisputable is that on 3 August both ships began a zig-zag course that approached eight miles off the Vietnamese coastline and four miles off the islands where the OPLAN 34 missions had been conducted. What is also true is that new OPLAN missions were conducted on 3 August at the same group of islands. It is unclear whether this was done in collaboration with the U.S. or not. President Johnson's memoirs state that the ships' commanders did not know of either when or where such attacks would take place. He does not comment on whether he knew. Karkow implies that there was some connection.

It was not until 4 August that the infamous second Tonkin Gulf incident took place. That night just after 9:00 P.M. in Vietnam (9:00 A.M. Washington), a second attack allegedly occurred. At around 9:00 A.M. Secretary McNamara called Johnson to tell him that intelligence intercepts suggested a second attack was imminent. "Soon we received messages from the destroyer Maddox that its radar . . . had spotted vessels believed to be hostile" and that an ambush appeared likely. Johnson then notes simply that "within an
hour" he received word that the ships were in fact under attack. (Johnson, 1971: 114.) The route the said messages traveled was from the ships to Pacific Command Headquarters to McNamara to Johnson.

There was a noon-NSC meeting already scheduled to discuss other matters (viz., Cyprus). It was at the White House and the participants included Douglas Dillon (Treasury), Robert Kennedy (Justice), George Ball, DCI McConne, USIA Director Carl Rowan, and Edward McDermott of Emergency Planning. Johnson notes that he was detained by phone calls and was unable to attend the meeting initially. He further notes that McGeorge Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, and General LeMay were at their own meetings at the Pentagon. They arrived at the White House around 12:30 where the president and they joined the NSC meeting late.

It was shortly after their late arrival that the president closed the meeting and asked Rusk, McNamara, McConne, and Bundy to join him for a working lunch. He reports that "the unanimous view of these advisers was that we could not ignore this second provocation and that the attack required retaliation." And that as a result, "air strikes against North Vietnamese PT boats and their bases plus a strike on one oil depot" was decided upon. (Johnson, 1971: 114.)

The remainder of the day the president went about his normal business occasionally listening to reports as they flowed in. Johnson notes that they listened to one report
from a North Vietnamese skipper bragging of firing on a U.S. boat. It is worth mentioning that these intercepts still have not been declassified (Levantrosser, 1988: 302; Gelb and Betts, 1979: 104). Some have asserted that the still-classified intercepts, which were implied by the administration to validate the second incident, are actually from the first incident on 2 August and that is why they have not been declassified. Though Johnson makes a great deal of the intercepts he makes rather short shrift of the action reports from the ships' commanders. His only comment being that a "few were ambiguous" (Johnson, 1971: 114).

Again there are some who question this. Karnow cites Captain Herrick (Maddox) as skeptical of the entire second affair. The atmospherics in the gulf on a dark night may have been to blame for what radar showed. And the sonar operator was new and questionable: he reported twenty-two torpedoes yet there was never a hit. (Karnow, 1983: 370–372.) According to the Defense Department's own study, "There is no question, however, that the second incident was promptly exploited by the Administration." And referring to apparent alacrity with which the reprisal was accomplished the study notes:

The most reasonable explanation for the actions which accompanied the reprisals, and for the rapidity of their implementation, is the fact that each of them had been proposed and staffed in detail months before. (Defense Department, [1971] Bk 4, IV, b: 12.)
Irrespective of whether the administration orchestrated the events or simply exploited them as they happened it is clear that it used contingency plans that had been prepared in advance.

The president instructed McNamara to confirm the second incident which he did post haste. Though Herrick, the Captain of the ship, was still trying to confirm the incident the Pentagon announced publicly that the second provocation was confirmed. President Johnson convened another NSC meeting at 6:15 P.M. 4 August. The participants discussed the "confirmation" and the president met with congressional leadership at 7:00 P.M.

Additionally, upon receiving confirmation the president initiated the JCS's contingency plans from earlier that year and within a couple of days initiated the Bundy draft Congressional resolution as well. The night of 4 August, the president appeared on television to inform the American people of their government's actions:

Repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. (Karnow, 1983: 372.)

Though Johnson spends little time discussing the retaliation in his memoirs he notes approvingly that some 25 "enemy boats and 90 percent of the oil storage tanks at Vinh" were destroyed; he also notes that the U.S. lost two planes. (Johnson, 1971: 117.) He does however go on in great detail
to discuss how the Congress nearly unanimously passed a resolution of support. He fails to mention in his memoirs that it was the same resolution that William Bundy had drafted some two months earlier.

Crisisbank list the Tonkin Gulf affair as lasting from 2 August until 7 August. As we have seen, however, from a decisionmaking viewpoint little happened after 4 August; the president publicly announced the administration's decisions late that night on national television. On 5 August Johnson requested passage of the joint resolution in a formal message to both houses of Congress. On 6 August administration officials, including Secretary McNamara, testified before both houses regarding the pending resolution. And on 7 August, the resolution was passed.

The president notes in his memoirs that another meeting was convened with "some of my advisers." The subject was simply long-term actions for Vietnam and there is nothing to indicate that the Tonkin Gulf affair was an issue.

Johnson was elected in his own right in November. Thus ended the Tonkin Gulf affair and began a new phase in America's involvement in Vietnam. Just a few months later another incident occurred at the Bien Hoa airbase in which U.S. planes were destroyed. It occurred in February 1965. Several days later a new bombing campaign--the first sustained bombing of North Vietnam--called Rolling Thunder
began. And in March 1965 the president introduced American ground troops into Vietnam at Danang.

Analysis

1. Convocation of the DMU

First we must identify the initial convocation of the DMU. In all the reports that we read the exact time of the event is not specified. Karkow has it happening around midnight of 1 August into the morning of 2 August. We know from Johnson's memoirs that he had the messages from the Duty Officer in the Situation Room brought to him in his bedroom the morning of 2 August. We also know from his memoirs that the president "called a meeting of key advisers later that morning in the White House" (Johnson, 1971: 113). This took place prior to the scheduled NSC meeting (i.e., prior to noon) but we do not know exactly when.

2.1.A. Was the convened DMU restricted to the apex or a larger decisionmaking group? We know that the DMU convened consisted of the president, Rusk, George Ball, McNamara's assistant Cyrus Vance, General Wheeler, and some technical intelligence experts. We know from other accounts that Bundy too was there. Including the president we can infer that there were probably some eight to ten persons initially involved. This group activated a much larger part of the foreign-policy bureaucracy. Thus we see confirmation that the DMU was more inclusive than simply the apex. The
apex formed the heart of the DMU but other expertise was brought in.

2.1.B. At what locus (high or low) was the DMU convened? Though meetings took place at a number of locations (e.g., the Pentagon, and the State Department) other than the White House, the DMU was clearly convened at the White House. This is where Johnson assembled his decisionmakers and from where most of the action emanated. Thus we confirm a high locus of convocation.

2.1.C. With what frequency was the DMU convened? There was the meeting that occurred before noon on 2 August. Additionally, the president's memoirs describe a prescheduled NSC meeting of 2 August, that he and his top advisers Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy attended though they arrived late. We know also that the reason Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy arrived late is that they were meeting at the Pentagon on the matter. Thus we know of three meetings on Sunday 2 August. The president's account notes that the NSC meeting was scheduled to deal with Cyprus and other items. When Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy arrived Johnson's memoirs note that the Tonkin Gulf was discussed. Shortly thereafter the meeting was dismissed whereupon those who had arrived late, in addition to DCI McConne, joined the president for what appears to have been a working lunch.

There were meetings of individual departments dealing with the Tonkin Gulf on 3 August but not in conjunction with
the president or his primary advisers. Then on 4 August, after the "second incident," the president convened an NSC meeting at 6:15 P.M. There would appear to have been then a total of four meetings at which the DMU met to respond to the events in Tonkin. Additionally there were countless other meetings at lower levels of the bureaucracy. The JCS, in particular, met a number of times to discuss implementation of the earlier established contingency plans. This clearly constitutes a frequently convened DMU.

2.1.D. Was the DMU convened extemporaneously or along standard routines? The pre-scheduled NSC meeting, the one instance of a routine convocation, was quickly dismissed by the president so that he could meet with a more exclusive group. The initial meeting, the one following the NSC, and virtually all the others indicated improvisation on the part of the DMU. This too appears to be the case with the second NSC meeting on 4 August. We therefore see ample evidence of an extemporaneously convened DMU; our expectations are confirmed.

2. Selection of Options

2.2.A. Was the selection of options accomplished by the apex or a more inclusive DMU? We hypothesized that options would be proffered by other individuals not normally part of the apex. And this is clearly the case in the Tonkin Gulf case. The congressional track was generated well in advance of events--Bundy and others at State making
contingencies in case they might later be used. Once under way this continued to be the case. Johnson and his immediate advisers (the apex) each contributed. So too did members from the Pentagon and State. While the process was clearly controlled by the apex, other sources of input are evident.

2.2.B. How many options were considered? We have already seen that the options considered by the DMU were not options in the sense that we have seen in the previous chapter--i.e., simply reacting to events. Instead, contingency plans, laid out well in advance, were taken off the shelf as it were and used for the Tonkin Gulf. We of course expect to see as much as we earlier hypothesized under conditions wherein surprise is not a factor.

Of course back in the planning phases during spring 1964, there were doubtless numerous options considered on how to handle events in Vietnam. We have already discussed NSAMs 273 and 288 and other Intelligence Estimates. Countless options circulate during such a process--Defense, State, CIA, and others all weigh in with their respective interests. These memoranda and action plans do not apply to the Tonkin Gulf per se but rather to policy direction in Vietnam.

Once the Tonkin Gulf affair began, there was essentially a two-track approach to options. First, there existed the congressional-resolution track. The purpose of this, of
course, was to implement the administration's desire to have sweeping prerogatives and support with respect to Vietnam policy. This track involved top officials in the administration (McNamara, Rusk, both Bundy brothers) but its focus was Capitol Hill.

The second track was a retaliation track. After the first attack the DMU considered retaliation or no retaliation. They chose not to retaliate at that time. After the so-called second attack they chose retaliation along pre-established contingency plans. Several sources, both civilian and military, at the Defense Department were involved.

Though these two tracks can be identified, there were any number of options under the congressional-resolution and retaliation rubrics respectively. Thus numerous options were considered very early in 1964 to deal with either track. Recall that the military had identified specific bombing targets; indeed, collecting such intelligence was the actual purpose of the De Soto missions. And we have seen that Bundy, State, and Defense were generating options on getting Congressional support. Johnson's own view of the congressional-resolution option is illustrative of its comprehensive and exhaustive nature. At one point the president jovially quipped that the resolution was "like grandma's nightshirt--it covered everything" (Karnow, 1983: 374).
Vast parts of the decisionmaking bureaucracy were involved at various times. With respect to the congressional-resolution plan parts of the White House Staff (Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, etc.), Defense (McNamara, Vance, etc.), State (Rusk, Ball, William Bundy), CIA (McConne, Colby, etc.) and all their immediate assistants were involved throughout the spring of 1964. Additionally the JCS was occasionally involved—recall that they rebuked McNamara's NSAM plan as inadequate—as well as Lodge and other embassy personnel in Vietnam. Input into the process was given by all and probably many others; and it is well documented in the Defense Department\(^20\) collection.

With respect to the military-retaliation approach there was an equally impressive array of persons involved. It may have been somewhat smaller in breadth: i.e., much of the group was physically located in the Pentagon or in Vietnam. But the number of persons that the Pentagon enlists on a given matter tends to be rather large.

Thus during the initial planning stages the number of persons involved is incalculable. The JCS have a huge staff at the Pentagon which works on various contingency plans. State had experts on Asia, international affairs, China and the Soviet Union, European experts, as well as insurgency and pacification experts (like Roger Hillsman) working on

parts of what came to be the plan at various times. Similarly, CIA had an array of experts contributing. Johnson and his top advisers too constantly considered potential options on Vietnam. That the Defense Department collection on U.S. policy in Vietnam is twelve volumes attests to no dearth of persons involved in considering options regarding Vietnam. While most of these individuals were not part of the process during the crucial few days they were nonetheless involved in the options that were used for Tonkin. Put simply, they generated the contingency planning that the administration relied upon in toto. We therefore conclude that a number of options was considered and that their origins were broadly based. This confirms what we expected to see.

2.2.C. Did the options reflect a dominant personality or dominant personalities? We identified Johnson as the dominant personality in his administration. Many books and articles have been written detailing the extend to which the president involved himself in policy; this is only more the case when it came to Vietnam. Thus as we hypothesized, we would expect to see evidence of this in the options that the administration selected. This was not the case during Tonkin however. Though much has been made of Johnson dominating U.S. policy with respect to Vietnam--actually selecting targets, etc.--in this case his personality played a minor role.
2.2.D. Was there is evidence of Groupthink? Recall that in the Bay of Pigs case study (supra) we discussed Janis's argument of groupthink being present in the initial planning stages. As the Kennedy administration inherited the operation and began discussing it, Janis contends that no one ever asked the tough questions or considered the implications of what was being undertaken. Rather, there was a need to be part of the New Frontier and its glamour; exceptional people performed in an exceptionally stupid way.

With respect to the early planning of what became Tonkin Gulf, we found little support of groupthink. There was no "inner circle" or "in-group" that was dominating the process and generating policy. The group was broad and included experts from various departments and levels of our government. If the Tonkin Gulf resolution was bad policy, it was not because the ramifications of said policy went unconsidered. They were considered and exploited to their fullest. The editors of the Defense Department study note the following:

In many ways the attacks on U.S. ships in the Tonkin Gulf provided the Administration with an opportunity to do a number of things that had been urged on it. Certainly it offered a politically acceptable way of exerting direct punitive pressure on North Vietnam. In South Vietnam, the U.S. response served to satisfy for a time the growing desire for some action to carry the war to the North. Relative to the election campaign, it provided a means of eliminating any doubts about President Johnson's decisiveness. . . . The obvious convenience and the ways in which it was exploited have been at the root of much of the suspicion with which critics of Administration policy have viewed
the incident. (Defense Department, [1971] Bk 4, C.2: 10.)

To be sure, the administration appears to have displayed considerable dexterity with respect to its consideration of the implications of policy and how best to use said implications to its advantage. We conclude therefore that our expectations are disconfirmed.

3. Implementation of Options

2.3.A. Was implementation controlled by the apex of the DMU or a broader decisionmaking group? Recall that there were two tracks to the policy options: military-retaliatory and congressional-resolution tracks. The evidence supports the conclusion that in either case it was conducted at relatively high levels, though clearly at lower levels than seen in the cases in the previous chapter.

With respect to the military approach, policy was not conducted by the president but it was clearly implemented at the highest locus in the Pentagon. First, most of the military machinery had been set in motion in advance of the event. The JCS had been moving the equipment necessary to project force early in the year. Second, during the actual altercation, the JCS moved additional U.S. fighter-bombers into position following the first incident--there is no record of the president ordering such moves. For example, although the meeting following the first incident decided against retaliation, the JCS moved military power forward.
Further, Admiral Sharp ordered other war ships—which had already been moved close to Vietnam—into forward positions. When Captain Herrick of the Maddox was trying to explain the actual incident to Rear Admiral Moore (Commander of the Task Force Ticonderoga that was in the region) the Admiral tersely summarized the situation for the apparently slow-to-comprehend Herrick. Moore told Herrick that he was to return to the scene and provoke them by playing "chicken" with the small North Vietnamese craft. The challenge was to be met: the North Vietnamese had "thrown down the gauntlet" (Karnow, 1983: 369-70).

As for the congressional approach, the president himself addressed a formal message to both houses, in effect, to soften up the target. This was followed by his sending of his congressional commandos (McNamara, Rusk, Bundy) to the Hill where they explained the necessity for a strong show of support for the president, lest other communist regimes become emboldened. This was accomplished in relatively short order, 5 and 6 August respectively. And there was a proselyting blitz of key members of Congress (Fulbright for example) in order to coopt their direct help in orchestrating the passing of the resolution. It was, to be sure, a rather impressive display of a team effort to get from Congress what the administration sought.
In both instances the implementation of selected options was controlled by the apex of the DMU. This confirms our hypothesis.

2.3.B. Was implementation accomplished extemporaneously or by routines? There must always be some flexibility in policy and that of course was the case during the Tonkin Gulf incident. Nonetheless, there is evidence of standard-operating procedures being followed. With respect to the military approach, a list of 94 targets (oil depots, radar sights, etc.) had been constructed well in advance. And the JCS simply pulled out the list and selected its reprisal targets from it.

With regard to the congressional-resolution approach it was somewhat more ad hoc in nature. Back on 15 June 1964 McGeorge Bundy had called a meeting at which McNamara, Rusk, and some assistants gathered to discuss "recommending to the President that a Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia should be sought promptly" (Defense Department, [1971] Bk 3, IV, C.1.: 82). As Bundy announced the meeting he sent a cover memo with six enclosures. William Bundy's draft resolution was enclosed as well as his argument for why it was necessary. In addition, McGeorge Bundy included "themes to be employed in presenting the resolution to Congress" and, just to be prepared, a long series "of questions and answers regarding the resolution" (Defense Department, [1971] Bk 3, IV, C.1.: 83). Potential questions that might
be raised were answered. Though a blueprint was in place the president perforce improvised with Congress. This is perhaps most reflected in the way he sent high-level officials to testify.

Thus what we see is a combination of routines and improvisation. This is in fact what we expect to see under these conditions.

2.3.C. Was there evidence of Bureaucratic Politics? There is actually only slight evidence of it. There were some differences according to department or service that are recorded in the Defense Department papers but the seem to be splitting hairs rather than substantive differences. (Defense Department [1971] Bk 4, IV, C.2.: 37-40.) We can only speculate as to why there was so much apparent unity in the government. It may be that Vietnam was unique; after all Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon followed relatively similar policies. Perhaps it was, as has been argued elsewhere, that most of those who were in decisionmaking positions simply shared a very similar view of the world. In any event, there was very little difference in views of State versus Defense versus CIA--unity characterized the various bureaus. In any case bureaucratic politics is only implied and the evidence is less than convincing. We must conclude that there is insufficient information to be certain.

2.3.D. Was implementation instantaneous with the selection of options or temporally distinct? In both the
congressional and military tracts it is clear that implementation occurred immediately. This may not be terribly surprising with respect to the military track. It is a bit more surprising with the congressional activity though. That such high-level officials were able to respond so quickly so as to be lobbying the president's policy literally within hours is rather impressive. We find evidence to confirm our expectation of instantaneous implementation.

4. Evaluation of Selected Options

Was feedback-evaluation controlled by the apex of the DMU or from the larger decisionmaking machinery? Recall that on the morning of 2 August the president had reports directly to him in his bedroom in the early hours. This would appear to be an example of feedback being directed to and from above. It was not until the second incident that the administration implemented its Tonkin Gulf policy. Further, we may recall that later that day McNamara was reporting to the president what was happening in the region. Thus from relatively early on the president directly involved in the evaluation of what was happening.

With respect to the congressional option the president stayed actively involved. He monitored the situation through McGeorge Bundy. This may have been due to the president's vast experience and expertise in congressional matters. He was after all a former congressional leader of
some magnitude; this being his domain may have caused him to
take a more personal interest.

This was perhaps less so with respect to the military tract. There is evidence that McNamara kept control of
monitoring said tract; and of course McNamara is part of the
DMU's apex.

In both instances our expectations are confirmed.

2.4.B. Was evaluation-feedback improvised or routine
in nature? Because all the plans had been done on a
contingency basis, the decisionmakers largely relied on
routines when accessing and assessing information surround-
ing Tonkin Gulf. And because most of the evaluation of
options was done prior to the actual event (recall the
prepared answers to questions) this was simply a normal
matter for standard operating procedures. Thus there is
little evidence of improvisation when monitoring and
evaluating the military tract.

With respect to the congressional tract, however, a
good-deal more improvisation occurred. Recall Johnson's
sending of a team to Capitol Hill. Also recall that the
president selected particular congressman whom he felt might
be useful in guiding the policy through. We do then find
evidence of improvisation in terms of monitoring and
evaluating options that had begun implementation.

2.4.C. Was evidence of Bureaucratic Politics evident
in the feedback-evaluation process? Because of the way the
options came up through the bureaucracy with various experts and pundits assessing them as they evolved, information was readily available. There was no evidence of any particular parochial need of husbanding information or keeping it from others. All the departments and agencies were weighing in on selecting the options as well as evaluating them.

We found nothing at all to indicate bureaucratic interference in this aspect of the decisionmaking process. We therefore are able to confirm no noticeable bureaucratic interference as we anticipated.

2.4.D. Was feedback-evaluation instantaneous with implementation? We have already addressed this issue above. All phases of the decisionmaking surrounding the Tonkin affair, once the so-called second incident was reported, move rapidly. There was no temporal distinction between selection and implementation. Nor was there one between implementation and evaluation. Evaluation was instantaneous with implementation and we have confirmation of our what we expected to observe.
SIX-DAY WAR

Narrative

On the morning of 5 June 1967 a new round of armed conflict began between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In President Johnson's memoirs he notes that he "had been fearing a Middle East conflict" for some time and had been "working as hard as [he] could to forestall it" (Johnson, 1971: 287). Hard work or not, the administration expected war; the precise timing was somewhat unexpected but that war was imminent was widely believed.

Of course there had been a long and violent history of animosities and conflicts between Arab and Jew. Hostilities between Arab states and the state of Israel had a shorter history though no less violent. Since Palestine's partition into two states by the UN in 1947--a state for Jews and one for Palestinian Arabs--and the withdrawal of British forces in 1948 there had been two wars. The first war followed Britain's departure in 1948. It ended with UN intervention and a set of agreements for a cease fire. The second military conflict was in 1956 when Israeli forces, in collusion with Britain and France, invaded Egypt after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Again the UN intervened and a cease

fire was established. In both instances the UN intervened and a cease fire was established; and in both instances the underlying causes of the conflicts were left unresolved. This provided the back drop for a third round which began in the summer of 1967.

Over a year earlier (February 1966) there occurred an internal coup in Syria in which a pro-Marxist faction of the Baath party came to power. Upon coming to power the new Syrian leaders announced their total commitment to Palestinian rights as well as to a revolutionary struggle of Arabs against Israel. Syria supported the increasingly active fedayeen faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in its raids from Syria and Jordan into Israel.

In early 1967 Israeli leaders felt compelled to warn Syria that should Syria continue to support said raids Israel would retaliate with impunity. Thus by spring an escalation of sorts had begun. Terrorist raids began to increase in number and degree. Each raid would result in Israeli retaliation. Terrorist raid begat retaliation which begat harsher terrorist raid which begat harsher retaliation an so on. Additionally, rumors began to circulate that the Israelis were mobilizing for an invasion of Damascus. And Syria and Egypt concluded a "mutual-defense treaty." By May of 1967 the atmosphere in the region was highly charged.

President Johnson notes in his memoirs that 14 May seems to be a significant turning point. After this day,
events had a tragic inevitability of their own. It was not clear in mid-May of 1967 that any government actually wanted war, but after May 14 the Arab states began to act in ways inconsistent with preserving peace. (Johnson, 1971: 290.)

What occurred on 14 May that caused Johnson to see the onset of war as a tragic inevitability was Nasser's action to mobilize his military. Then on 16 May Nasser requested the UN to withdraw its troops—the very troops that had been interposed between belligerent since the Suez-Sinai incident some ten years earlier. The UN complied and its forces withdrew on 18 May. Around this time Nasser struck the final blow: he closed the Gulf of Aqaba.

Meanwhile in Washington the Johnson Administration was working to forestall war. On 18 May Johnson instructed Secretary Rusk to assess both British and French positions on the region with respect to earlier agreements: Tripartite Declaration and the 1957 Agreement. The latter agreement in particular guaranteed Israelis the rights to innocent passage in Aqaba. Both the U.S. and Israel understood the 1957 Agreement to mean that Israel had the right to self-defense under the UN Charter if the either the Gulf of Aqaba or the Strait of Tiran were closed. Would the allies back the U.S. in insisting that said agreements be adhered to? Word came back that the British were on board but that the French had demurred.

On 23 May Johnson publicly declared Egypt's actions "illegal" and reaffirmed Israel's right to free and innocent
passage under previous agreements. At the same time the
president had Secretary Rusk brief the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. Again Johnson was seeking consensus. Rusk
reported back to the president that the Senate generally
agreed that the U.S. could not stand idly by while the
Israelis were pushed into the sea—but neither could the
U.S. take unilateral action. If the U.S. were to act it
would have to be with allied support.

On 24 May Rusk and other State Department officials met
with British Minister for Foreign Affairs, George Thomson,
in Washington to discuss a proposal based on the 1957 Agree-
ment. The British proposed a two-fold approach. First, a
public declaration would be made in which the right of
innocent and free passage would be reaffirmed generally; and
the Americans and British would enlist as many states as
they could to sign the declaration with a view toward re-
ceiving UN endorsement. Second, the Americans and British
would create a naval task force, again getting as many
nations as possible to join, whose purpose would be to steam
into the region to break Nasser's blockade. Both the Brit-
ish and the Americans worked on this plan: enlisting sup-
port from friendly nations as well as selling the plan to
their respective constituencies at home.

On 25 President Johnson was scheduled to go to Canada
for United States day at Expo '67. In his memoirs he notes
that he put off the decision until the last possible minute.
He mentions that on the morning of 25 May, "intelligence reports indicated that we could be reasonably sure the Middle East would not explode while I was gone" (Johnson, 1971: 292). The president went to Canada on 25 May and the only explosion heard was that of the press: they claimed that the president intentionally kept his plans from them until the last possible moment. He returned the following day.

On the evening of 26 May Johnson met with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban in Washington. It appears to have been the typical sort of meeting allies have when trying to assess what the other one is thinking. Johnson reports that Eban discussed Israeli intelligence reports. These reports, according to Eban, suggested that the Arabs were "preparing for an all-out attack" against Israel. Johnson said that U.S. intelligence did not necessarily agree that such an attack was inevitable but that should it occur U.S. intelligence assured the president that the Israelis would "whip hell out of them." The most significant point to come out of this meeting was a seemingly tacit agreement that the U.S. would support the Israelis provided the Israelis allow Anglo-American efforts in the UN to continue and provided the Israelis not be the first to attack. The president stressed that it was critical that Israel 'not be the one to bear responsibility for the outbreak of war' (Johnson, 1971: 293).
As mentioned both principals seem to have taken this meeting as a tacit agreement. Johnson reports that on 28 May the Israeli cabinet decided to postpone military action. And on 30 May Johnson received a message from Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. The message acknowledged the meeting with Eban and, further, asserted that the meeting had an important influence on Israel's decision to wait to see what happened. It included, however, one proviso: 'It is crucial that the international naval escort should move through the Strait within a week or two' (Johnson, 1971: 294).

Johnson seems to have put some merit in the agreement, at least after the fact when writing his memoirs. He notes that "As my advisers and I interpreted" Eshkol's message "we had about two weeks to make diplomacy succeed before Israel took independent military action" (Johnson, 1971: 294). Apparently Israel took a different meaning from it for the implied two weeks was not to be. Even in Johnson's memoirs, however, the former president suggests that within a matter of days following Eshkol's cable the U.S. administration foresaw the two week timeline shortening. The paragraph following the one in which Johnson discusses his advisers' and his "interpretation" he goes on to say that in "Early June we sensed that the Israelis might be moving toward a decision to reopen Aqaba on their own" (Johnson, 1971: 294). It would appear, then, that at best the administration
understood the implied two weeks to be a dynamic timeline that was sensitive to situational factors.

On 3 June the United States pushed for a respite in the United Nations. U.S. Ambassador Goldberg asked the Security Council to endorse a plea made by the UN Secretary General which called for all countries involved to avoid violence and provide time for further diplomacy. France abstained from the vote and the U.S. was unable to get Security Council endorsement. Concomitantly the U.S. continued its effort for the British proposal. This too was unsuccessful. By early June only two nations (Holland and Australia) besides America and Britain had committed to join the proposed naval task force. And by 4 June there was a total of merely eight countries, including the U.S. and the U.K., that had agreed to sign the declaration reaffirming innocent passage. (Johnson, 1971: 295-296.)

During this same weekend (3-4 June) Secretary Rusk cabled all Ambassadors in Arab capitals suggesting that any persons with ideas to prevent the impending war had better suggest them post haste. The efforts to utilize the decisionmaking machinery were for naught. Early on the morning of 5 June (Washington) war broke out as the Israelis launched a "preemptive" attack.

President Johnson was awakened by Walt Rostow (who had replaced McGeorge Bundy as National Security Adviser) at 4:35 A.M. who informed his boss that war had broken out.
Shortly thereafter (5:09 A.M.) Secretary Rusk called the president to get his approval of a message that was to be sent to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The president approved the message. The message followed previous administration's handling of war in the region; it suggested pursuing the matter in the United Nations.

We feel it is very important that the United Nations Security Council succeed in bringing this fighting to an end as quickly as possible and are ready to cooperate with all members of the Council to that end. (Johnson, 1971: 297.)

There followed several other calls by Rostow and the president had breakfast in his bedroom at 6:00 A.M. These were simply informative and the president writes that by 7:00 A.M. enough facts were coming in to put together that the Israelis had attacked Egypt's major airfields and various other targets and that they were having measurable success. (Johnson, 1971: 297.)

At 7:57 A.M. McNamara called to inform the president that the "hotline" was up. McNamara quickly proceeded to find a way to get the hotline directed to the Situation Room at the White House. By the time the president arrived in the Situation Room, McNamara, Rusk, and Rostow were waiting there. Johnson spoke with Kosygin and the thrust seems to have been that both superpowers should agree to stay cool and should find a way to end hostilities using their influence with their respective allies.
The U.S. immediately set about renewing its activities in the United Nations. Goldberg handled the matter in the UN with Rusk acting as liaison between the UN, the White House, and State. The president's memoirs mention a meeting later that day at the White House with Rusk where they appear to have discussed how matters were proceeding in the UN.

The following morning (Tuesday 6 June) around 6:30 A.M. the hotline was up once again. The president arrived at the Situation Room at 6:40 where he found a rather large contingency waiting. After again discussing the situation with the Soviets the president discussed the latest with all the participants. They included the vice president, Rusk, McNamara, Nicholas Katzenback, Rostow, McGeorge Bundy (Johnson asked him over), Clark Clifford (Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) and Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson who was in town for consultations. The participant were served breakfast by Lady Bird. There appears to have been a fairly felicitous demeanor to the meeting.

They also discussed Egypt's accusation that the U.S. had sent American planes from the Sixth Fleet to help the Israelis. This was untrue. Rusk left the meeting to go to West Lobby of White House where reporters were assembled—he publicly denied the charge. Johnson had already raised the issue in his conversation via the hotline with the Soviets.
He merely pointed out that since the Soviets were monitoring U.S. ships and knew the charge to be untrue they might wish to convey this knowledge to their Arab friend who were making the accusations.

During the day Israeli forces continued to move steadily into Jordan and the Sinai. As the alacrity with which they were moving became evident the Russian delegation in the UN accepted a simple cease fire resolution as first step toward peace. This move broke the deadlock and the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a cease fire forthwith. That evening the president appeared on television to make a brief announcement that the U.S. welcomed the resolution.

Kaplan notes that this agreement by the Soviets to go along in the Security Council was in "keeping with [their] posture" of pursuing their main effort on behalf of Arabs diplomatically in the United Nations. There the Soviets agreed, despite Arab opposition, to a UN resolution of cease fire which essentially preserved Israeli gains. (Kaplan, 1981: 433.)

On 7 June the Israelis announced their willingness to accept the Security Council Resolution provided the Arabs agree. Having little to lose—they had already taken land and were clearly winning the battle—the Israelis moved quickly to accept it. The Arabs, on the other hand, chose to ignore the resolution apparently feeling they could get a
better offer. Because the Arabs chose not to respond the Israelis continued to march. They reopened the Gulf of Aqaba and seized the Sinai. They also took Jerusalem in toto reportedly to suppress artillery fire coming from the Jordanian sector. (Johnson, 1971: 300.)

Later that day an NSC meeting was convened at which the participants discussed Nasser's "stunning loss." Though the president's earlier assurance given Abba Eban (that were war to break out U.S. intelligence had Israelis as odds on favorites) may have been hubris at the time, it was turning out to be quite accurate. The president asked McGeorge Bundy (who was working at the Ford Foundation) to serve as an executive secretary for a special group whose task would be to work on long-term solutions to the region's problems. (Johnson, 1971: 300.) By day's end word arrived that a cease fire was in effect between Jordan and Israel.

The next morning (Thursday 8 June) word came to the White House that the U.S. communication ship the Liberty had been torpedoed in international waters off the coast of the Sinai. At first it was not apparent who had fired. It was found out at around 11:00 A.M. that the Israelis had done so accidentally. But Johnson notes that for "seventy tense minutes we had no idea who was responsible" (Johnson, 1971: 300). As it became clear that the Israelis had torpedoed the ship the president sent a message to Kosygin to reassure the Soviets about the incident and reduce tensions. Kosygin
replied that the information had been received and had been relayed to the Egyptians.

That same afternoon the Secretary General of the UN announced that the Arabs had accepted the cease fire. It was at this time that the Soviets introduced a new resolution that included a condemnation of Israeli violations of the extant cease fire. Johnson describes this as a confusing episode in which the Soviets muddied the waters. Kaplan's analysis of Soviet actions during the war assesses it differently; he down-plays the event. (Kaplan, 1981: 435-438.) The Soviets submitted another draft that demonstrated existing differences between the superpowers but the draft was never voted on. Further, by that evening all but Syria had agreed to the original resolution and Syria agreed the following day.

Nonetheless the situation remained somewhat tense on Friday, 9 June. The U.S. knew neither Syria's nor Israel's intent. The administration knew that Syria was a special protege of the Soviets and that there were probably Soviet advisers in country. Fighting erupted between the antagonists in the Golan Heights. And rumors circulated that the Israelis intended to march all the way to Damascus. Again the U.S. worked through the UN.

Then a hotline call came again, in which "new word from Moscow brought a sudden chill to the situation" (Johnson, 1971: 301). Kosygin relayed a message that Johnson got
around 9:05 A.M. The Soviets implied that they might have to do something drastic unless Israel "unconditionally halted operations" (Johnson, 1971: 302). In attendance were McNamara, Rostow, Clifford, Bundy, Katzenback, Thompson, DCI Helms. The president had Thompson retranslate the text to make sure that they were being threatened. Johnson remembers the room being "deathly still" and he asked McNamara the location of the Sixth Fleet. They Fleet was circling in the Mediterranean per predetermined plans and it was currently 300 mile west of Syria's coast—10 to 12 hours away. Johnson ordered the fleet to head toward coast up to 50 miles; the previously set limit was 100 miles.

Kaplan cites sources saying that it was far less dramatic than the president describes it. (Kaplan, 1981: 436.) The Soviets, it was assumed, would get the message that the U.S. would do what was necessary to meet a threat. But at the same time Johnson told Kosygin over the hotline that the U.S. would press Israel to hasten its actions to accept the cease fire. (Johnson, 1971: 302-303.)

That same day the Soviets informed Israel that they had broken off diplomatic relations. Nonetheless Kaplan describes Soviet maneuvers as moderate; no show of force was committed. (Kaplan, 1981: 435-436.) And later that day the administration received word at 3:00 P.M. that Israel would implement the cease fire resolution. The Israelis then
informed the UN Security Council of its intentions and things began to look as if hostilities were over.

Just before noon the tension had subsided. Kosygin and Johnson had additional exchanges though they are not numbered. Finally they agreed over the hotline that the situation was apparently past its worst and both could work for lasting peace.

Analysis

Keeping the aforementioned narrative of the Six-Day War in mind, we may now proceed to apply the questions of the focused comparison. We should first recall that the actual event occurred when the Israelis preemptively attacked their Arab neighbors. This occurred the early morning hours of 5 June 1967 (Washington). Similar to the other two cases in this chapter, the actual planning of possible U.S. responses to the eventuality of war began well in advance. Indeed, in this particular case the Johnson Administration used plans whose origins may be found in the Eisenhower Administration's handling of a previous conflict in the area—the Suez-Sinai Campaign.

1. Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

We begin by determining when and where was the first convocation of the DMU. We know that Walt Rostow initially phoned the president at around 4:30 A.M. with the news that war and commenced. This is according to the White House phone log of the morning as it is reprinted in Johnson's
memoirs. We further know that the president remained in his bedroom, indeed apparently went back to sleeping, and was disturbed by several other phone calls that morning.

4:30 A.M. -- telephone call from Rostow
5:09 -- telephone call from Rusk
6:15 -- telephone call from Rostow
6:35 -- telephone call from George Christian
6:40 -- breakfast in bedroom (Christian in and out)
6:49 -- telephone call to Rostow
6:55 -- telephone call to Rostow

Then by around 7:00 A.M. the president notes that the facts were beginning to come into focus. The Israelis had attacked Egypt's major airfields, and had done so with measurable effect. (Johnson, 1971: 297.) Still no convocation of the president and his principal advisers had taken place.

It was not until McNamara called (7:57 A.M.) to inform the president that the Hotline awaited him in the Situation Room that Johnson left his bedroom. Upon going to the Situation Room the president took the call from the Soviets and then, we are informed, met with those advisers in attendance (viz., Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and Walt Rostow). Thus during this very impromptu initial meeting, only the apex of the DMU convened. We note that in subsequent meetings a slightly larger group always met.

2.1.A. Was the convocation of the DMU restricted to the apex or a larger group? We have just answered that question as we established the initial convocation of the DMU. The very first meeting was the apex exclusively. It
is important to note that this meeting was not actually convened. That is, the persons involved were monitoring events when the Soviets initiated contact via the Hotline. McNamara called Johnson to the Situation Room after which the first meeting took place. Subsequent to that, each meeting was attended by a somewhat broader DMU comprised of the apex and the vice president, Clark Clifford, McGeorge Bundy, Katzenback, and Thompson. Thus we conclude that the DMU was a slightly more inclusive group than the apex, confirming our expectations.

2.1.B. **At what locus was the DMU convened?** In each instance the DMU was convened at the White House. Most times those meetings took place in the Situation Room which became a de facto command center. There was, additionally, an NSC meeting held at the White House. Thus we may conclude that a high locus of convocation existed in the six-day War.

2.1.C. **Was the DMU convened frequently or infrequently during the event?** It was clearly the former. We may turn to Johnson's memoirs to support this. Several meeting took place during the six-day war. The first meeting, we have just mentioned, took place around 8:30 A.M. on Monday, 5 July. The second meeting was 6 June in the Situation Room as the more inclusive DMU began to function. The third meeting was an NSC meeting on 7 June--convened specifically to address the war in the Middle East. The following day (8
June) as a result of the U.S. Liberty being hit, another meeting occurred. The following day (9 June) another meeting followed another Hotline exchange. In his memoirs the president mentions that the participants discussed ways of implementing the UN strategy that they had come up with prior to the outbreak of war. Johnson also briefly mentions a meeting with Rusk later that day at the White House. No other persons are mentioned as being in attendance; and it appears to have simply been Rusk giving Johnson a progress report on the day's activities in the United Nations. Thus this meeting does not seem to constitute a meeting of the DMU.

In any event, at least one meeting per day of the event took place. In addition there were numerous briefings. We conclude that the DMU was convened frequently during the six-day war.

2.1.D. Was the convocation of the DMU extemporaneous or routine in nature? Of the four meetings, three were indisputably the result of improvisation: they convened around a call from Moscow via the hotline. And the president mentions in his memoirs that this was the first time the hotline had been used for its intended purpose. (Johnson, 1971: 287.) The remaining meeting was convened per the standard NSC format. Nonetheless, event this NSC meeting was less than routine for it was specifically called to address the Middle East. Thus we must conclude that a
relatively extemporaneous approach to convening the DMU's meetings was the rule of the Six Day War.

2. Selection of Options

2.2.A. Were options selected by a restrictive DMU (apex only) or a larger DMU? We have determined the DMU's composition as being the apex as well as a group of around six others. And it is this more inclusive group that controlled the decisionmaking surrounding the war. Interestingly, much of their policy took shape around precedents from previous administrations. We therefore are able to confirm our expectation that a more inclusive DMU would be proffering and selecting options under these conditions.

2.2.B. Were there few or many options considered by U.S. decisionmakers during the six-day war? As mentioned, much of the policy that developed during the six-day war was based on precedents set by Truman and Eisenhower. The primary response was to seek UN intervention to end the fighting quickly.

There were, over the years, variations on this theme. Eisenhower had directly sought to get the Anglo-Franco-Israeli cabal to stand down during the 1956 Suez-Sinai affair; this however was accompanied by activity in the UN to get a cease fire. And President Johnson implied in his memoirs that every possible influence was used to get the Israelis to accept the UN terms for a cease fire early on.
Still, the basis of U.S. policy was a cease fire in the United Nations. So dominant was this policy thrust that the military component was largely ignored until events compelled the DMU react. Recall that the Sixth Fleet continued to steam around the Mediterranean according to pre-determined schedules. Only on 10 June, the day before the war formally ended, did Johnson involve the Sixth Fleet and this was as a result of an explicit Soviet threat.

In addition to the option-by-analogy approach just described, the administration was working on unique approaches. Recall that there were numerous plans considered; recall the British twofold proposal to prevent the outbreak of war by breaking Nasser's blockade and getting UN endorsement. These approaches were eclipsed by the thrust to seek a cease fire through the UN however.

Regrettably, very little is recorded about the consideration of options in any of the sources. The implication is that many were actively suggesting and examining a plethora of options. Yet said options are not detailed in the record. While we suspect that there was a relatively broad range of options put forth then, we are unable to sufficiently confirm this due to insufficient information.

2.2.C. Did the selection of options reflect dominant personalities? The answer is somewhat problematic. That is because the UN thrust was policy be precedent--i.e., the
Johnson Administration simply conforming to earlier administrations' action in similar circumstances. However, one thing emerges in Johnson's case: the president took great care to build consensus around his administration's actions.

Recall that Johnson sent high-level officials to speak to key congressional leaders. Those leaders effectively legitimated Johnson's predilections. Much has been written about Johnson's need to seek consensus and this seems to be clear indication of his leadership in the six-day war. Though we see indication of his leadership being exerted, the process of option selection was clearly one based on earlier precedent—i.e., what various administrations had done before Johnson. We cannot therefore conclude Johnson's personality was reflected in the process—this disconfirms our expectation.

2.2.D. Was there evidence indicating the presence of groupthink? Continuity with previous administrations, as we have already pointed out, certainly is indicative of the policy. But there was no indication of an in-group that was wittingly or unwittingly suppressing dissent; there were no signs of forced consensus. That nobody particularly challenged U.S. policy with respect to the war is probably a simple function of so many persons seeing it the same way. Even the Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed with the administration with no apparent dissent. Continuity,
however, is clearly not groupthink. We therefore conclude that no evidence of groupthink was present and thereby disconfirm our expectations in that regard.

3. Implementation of Options

Before answering this set of questions we must stress once again that much of the U.S. policy surrounding the six-day war was based on precedents from various administrations and agencies for handling armed conflict in the Middle East. Namely, if war should occur, bring it to the Security Council of the United Nations and secure an expeditious cease fire.

2.3.A. Was U.S. policy's implementation controlled by the apex or a larger foreign-policy group? This is relatively straightforward. The actual bringing of a resolution to the Security Council was done by U.S. Ambassador Goldberg. This is, of course, the job of an ambassador to the UN. And his actions were dictated by the president's direct orders, at least once, and by Secretary of State Rusk. Goldberg was not part of the president's principal advisers but his actions were clearly directed directly by members of the DMU's apex. As for the military component, recall that it was largely ignored until late in the event when the fighting in the Golan brought a terse Soviet response. Consequently, Johnson—detailed rather melodramatically in his memoirs—ordered McNamara to direct the Sixth Fleet to leave its station in the Mediterranean in
order to steam toward Israel. What is more, Johnson directly controlled policy vis-a-vis the Soviets as they spoke directly on several occasions. In all, we may reasonably conclude that control of implementation remained at the apex of the DMU.

2.3.B. **Was implementation accomplished through extemporaneously or in some routine way?** On the one hand, the thrust to seek a cease fire in the UN was largely conducted and accomplished the same way that other administrations had done. It was accomplished through the standard channels of the ambassador bringing it to the Security Council, working with friends and foes alike to garner support, and the normal parliamentary procedures of the United Nations. This exemplifies the bureaucracy's routines. The only exception might be the president's direct orders to Goldberg--somewhat indicative of improvisation. The standard-operating procedures evidently were quite adequate for the task and there was precious-little reason to go beyond them.

Militarily, the Sixth Fleet steamed around the Mediterranean according to the Pentagon's contingencies. Through the first several days of the war this was accomplished through wholly standard, day-to-day channels. However, Johnson's intervention through McNamara from the Situation Room in the White House is a far cry from routine.
Indeed, what is perhaps most interesting, if not startling, is that the JCS was largely circumvented in this matter.

We may justifiably conclude that there was a combination of routines and improvised implementation during the administration's handling of the six-day war. This confirms our expectations.

2.3.C. Was there any indication of bureaucratic politics during the event? We found only one reference that could even possibly be interpreted as demonstrative of an agency's or bureaucracy's parochial concerns. At the daily briefing conducted by the State Department the afternoon of 5 June, the briefing officer was pressed for a statement of U.S. policy on the war. The war had of course only begun early that morning. The officer, not being privy to any meetings, assumed quite naturally that the president's last statement on the matter (one Johnson made on 23 May when working to forestall the outbreak of war) should simply be restated. He did so adding that he was in no position to speak specifically beyond the president's former statement. Yet he addressed another question on anti-American riots that were occurring in some Arab capitals to which he responded: 'Our position is neutral in thought, word, and deed' (Johnson, 1971: 299). Johnson characterizes this as a remark that may have been intended to reassure Arabs that we were not going to get involved in the hostilities. In his memoirs the president calls the statement "an oversimplified
approach to a complicated situation" (Johnson, 1971: 299). And one might infer that those in the Department of State who were pro-Arab may have been trying to shape policy. But even Johnson dismisses it without much comment. And it seems much more likely that the briefing officer simply responded in a way he thought prudent given State Department protocol. It seems very unlikely that it was more than that.

Though something might be made of this event, it strikes us as rather inconsequential. Moreover, that the DMU directed and controlled implementation so closely seems to have precluded any bureaucratic interference, had there been a basis for it. Thus we conclude that no evidence of bureaucratic politics was indicated and we thereby disconfirm our expectation.

2.3.D. *Was implementation begun instantaneously with the selection of options?* The clear answer is yes. There was virtually no distinction between decisions made and their being put into motion. These decisions were always made at the White House and they were ordered effective immediately. In every instance we found very hasty implementation of the selected options. This confirms our expectations in this regard.

4. Evaluation of Selected Options

2.4.A. *Was the feedback-evaluation process controlled and directed by the apex or by a larger foreign-policy
group? The six-day war was clearly volatile enough to warrant close evaluation and monitoring by the DMU. And that was what we observed. Johnson's telephone log that first morning alone aptly illustrates that the president directed feedback from the earliest stages. We have already seen that Ambassador Goldberg reported directly to the president at least once. And at the meeting on 10 June (supra) at which Johnson received word directly from the Soviets that unless Israel immediately accept the UN's cease fire the Soviets might have to intervene on behalf of their client, Syria, we again see feedback going directly to the top of the decisionmaking unit. We confirm that the process was controlled and directed at the apex of the DMU.

2.4.B. Was the process accomplished via extemporaneous or routine channels? We see a combination of both. On the one hand the president monitored U.S. policies in the UN through the standard, prescribed channels. Goldberg, for the most part, reported back to Rusk who was the de facto liaison to the president. This was done in a rather routine way with little indication of improvisation. On the other hand we have the president directly monitoring U.S. actions and their impact as he spoke with the Soviets from the Situation Room. This typifies extemporaneous channels. That it was the first time such a thing was done serves to underline the ad hoc nature of it. We therefore conclude
that a combination of routine and extemporaneous channels to monitor (i.e., feedback) and to evaluate policy was used.

2.4.c. **Was the evidence of bureaucratic interference in the process?** If we expected to see bureaucratic interference it would likely be when routine procedures, involving a larger section of the bureaucracy, were employed. This might show up in terms of incomplete information or skewed information being relayed to the DMU. We found no evidence that information was in any way obstructed. That it was directed through the highest locus of the decisionmaking bureaucracy probably bodes against much bureaucratic inertia with respect to what information is given the president. The information that President Johnson and his principal advisers received appears to have been complete and comprehensive.

As we have seen with each aspect of the evaluation or feedback process, it was the improvised response that determined how that process would work. The president using the hotline, for example, left little room for interference or obfuscation of the feedback of information to the decisionmakers. And though surprise was not part of that situation, its seems to have been directed from and through a high locus of the decisionmaking unit. It would best be described, therefore, as a mix of routines and improvisation. We therefore conclude, as we hypothesized, that no bureaucratic interference was noticeable.
2.4.D. **Was feedback-evaluation conducted instantaneous with the implementation process?** We have confirmation in this instance of what we expected to find. Namely, the time factor makes indistinguishable the process of implementation and evaluation. Rather, they appear to flow together as one process. Again the use of the hotline by the president is quite illustrative of this phenomenon.

**SUMMARY**

We next consider our three cases characterized by short time but lack of surprise to discuss goodness of fit with the hypotheses. Per custom, we begin with a tabular summary of our findings then proceed to discuss them.
### TABLE 3

**SUMMARY TABLE OF HYPOTHESES FOR SHORT TIME, ANTICIPATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Studies #:</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.1 Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit</strong>&lt;br&gt;A. More Inclusively</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. High Locus</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. High Frequency</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Extemporaneously</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2 Selection of Options</strong>&lt;br&gt;A. Proffered by Apex</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Broader Range of Options</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Reflect Dominant Personality</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Groupthink Indicated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.3 Implementation of Options</strong>&lt;br&gt;A. Controlled at Apex</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Extemporaneous &amp; Routine Combined</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Bureaucratic Politics Present</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Instantaneous with Selection</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.4 Evaluation (Feedback) of Options</strong>&lt;br&gt;A. Controlled by Apex</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Extemporaneous &amp; Routine Combined</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. No Bureaucratic Interference</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Instantaneous with Implementation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:<br>"+": Confirmed<br>"-": Disconfirmed<br>"*": Insufficient Information

Case Study 4: Bay of Pigs<br>Case Study 5: Tonkin Gulf<br>Case Study 6: Six Day War
In each of the three case studies under our consideration in this chapter we have observed decisionmaking that matched our hypothesized process rather well. Specifically, the Bay of Pigs case fit our hypotheses concerning convocation of the decisionmaking unit (2.1), implementation of options (2.3), and evaluation-feedback (2.4) adequately. That is to say, at least 75% of the comparative questions were confirmed. With respect to our hypothesis concerning selection of options (2.2) we were not so prescient. To the contrary we see that we have only two of our four comparative question being confirmed; and we established in Chapter III that we would consider such a fit poor.

The trend is also seen as we look at the Tonkin Gulf and Six Day War cases. Namely, in each of those cases, our comparative questions were confirmed such that we could consider hypotheses 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 adequate or good fits. Yet when we look at hypothesis 2.2 (selection of options) we see that in one case only two comparative questions could be confirmed (Tonkin) and in the other case only one could be confirmed while there was insufficient evidence on the other. In both cases, at least two comparative questions were disconfirmed—thus establishing the hypothesis as a poor fit with observed decisionmaking.

We turn now to our next set of three cases before further analyzing this.
HOW DECISION TIME AND DEGREE OF ANTICIPATION AFFECT THE
DECISIONMAKING PROCESS AS U.S. DECISIONMAKERS
CONFRONT VARIOUS FOREIGN-POLICY CHALLENGES
VOLUME II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
M. Kent Bolton, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University

1992
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .............................................. xii

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................ xiv

VII. LONG TIME, SURPRISE:
GREECE, KOREA, AND THE PUEBLO ......................... 272
   INTRODUCTION ........................................... 272
   GREEK CIVIL WAR, 1947 .................................. 273
      Narrative ............................................ 273
      Analysis ............................................. 285
   CHINA'S ENTRY IN THE KOREAN WAR, 1950 ............. 302
      Narrative ............................................ 302
      Analysis ............................................. 318
   THE PUEBLO INCIDENT, 1968 ............................ 335
      Narrative ............................................ 335
      Analysis ............................................. 347
   SUMMARY ............................................... 368

VIII. LONG TIME, ANTICIPATION:
GUATEMALA, BERLIN, AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ........... 373
   INTRODUCTION ........................................... 373
   GUATEMALA, 1954 ....................................... 374
      Narrative ........................................... 374
      Analysis ............................................ 390
   BERLIN, AIDE-MEMOIRE, 1961 .......................... 411
      Narrative ........................................... 411
      Analysis ............................................ 426
   DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1965 ............................. 444
      Narrative ........................................... 444
      Analysis ............................................ 458
   SUMMARY ............................................... 478

IX. CONCLUSION: DECISION TIME AND DEGREE OF ANTICIPATION ....................................... 484
   INTRODUCTION ........................................... 484
   ANALYSIS ............................................... 485
      General Fit of Hypotheses .......................... 487
      Analysis by Process and Independent Variable 493
   SUMMARY ............................................... 521
      Final Thoughts ...................................... 525

APPENDICES .................................................. x
LIST OF TABLES

4. Summary Table of Hypotheses for Long Time, Surprise .................................. 370
5. Summary Table of Hypotheses for Long Time, Anticipation ............................... 482
6. Degree of Confirmation for All Hypotheses .................................................. 487
7. Degree of Confirmation by Decisionmaking Process ..................................... 491
8. Convocation of DMU A) Composition ..................................................... 497
9. Convocation of DMU B) Locus ............................................................... 497
10. Convocation of DMU C) Frequency ....................................................... 498
11. Convocation of DMU D) Procedural ......................................................... 498
12. Comparison of Convocation Process ...................................................... 500
13. Selection of Options A) Locus ................................................................. 505
14. Selection of Options B) Quantity/Sources ............................................... 505
15. Selection of Options C) Dominant Personality .......................................... 506
16. Selection of Options D) Groupthink ....................................................... 506
17. Comparison of Selection Process ........................................................... 507
18. Implementation of Options A) Locus ....................................................... 511
19. Implementation of Options B) Nature of Process ....................................... 511
20. Implementation of Options C) Bureaucratic Politics ..................................... 512
21. Implementation of Options D) Temporality ............................................... 512
22. Comparison of Implementation Process .................................................... 513
23. Evaluation-Feedback A) Locus ................................................................. 516
26. Evaluation-Feedback D) Temporality ............ 517
27. Comparison of Evaluation-Feedback ............ 519
LIST OF FIGURES

11. Comparison of All Hypotheses:
   Goodness of Fit ........................................... 489

12. Decisionmaking Process: Comparison by
    DM Process ............................................. 492

13. Convocation Hypotheses:
    Comparison by Function .............................. .501
    Comparison by X-Variable ............................ .501

14. Selection Hypotheses:
    Comparison by Function .............................. .509
    Comparison by X-Variable ............................ .509

15. Implementation Hypotheses:
    Comparison by Function .............................. .514
    Comparison by X-Variable ............................ .514

16. Evaluation-Feedback Hypotheses:
    Comparison by Function .............................. .518
    Comparison by X-Variable ............................ .518
CHAPTER VII

LONG TIME, SURPRISE:

GREECE, KOREA, AND THE PUEBLO

INTRODUCTION

In the following three cases we have examples of decisionmaking in which surprise is a factor but in which the decisionmaking unit is not forced to respond quickly. As with previous chapters we will proceed chronologically. We begin with the Truman Administration and its handling and response to the Greek Civil War whose origins had their genesis largely during World War Two. Following Greece, we move to the Korean War. It is not uncommon to find scholars dividing the Korean War into two or three phases. The phase with which we will concern ourselves is the entry of the People's Republic of China into the fighting. It presented the United States, and the UN troops under its command, with what MacArthur called a "new war." Finally we conclude this chapter with North Korea's seizure of the U.S. intelligence ship the Pueblo.
GREEK CIVIL WAR, 1947

Narrative

On 21 February 1947 the United States became directly involved in Greek politics dramatically and rapidly. Hitherto the U.S. had played an observer status at most. Thereafter it took a direct role. One result of America's entering Greek politics was the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Administration moved into Greece on the premise that subversion of struggling democracies from within or from without required a dramatic shift in U.S. policy from isolationism to activism. Before discussing that shift more fully, however, the historical context that led up to America's intervention in Greece is necessary.

For centuries Greece had straddled a geopolitical fault line between Russia, the Ottoman empire, and Great Britain. As the Ottoman empire declined during the nineteenth century two titans were left to struggle in the region, with Greece and other neighboring states to feel the brunt of the struggle. There was a pause in the struggle during World War Two

---

during which Greece was brutally occupied by the Axis powers. Yet this was but a brief respite and in October 1944 Churchill and Stalin met in Moscow to re-establish separate spheres of influence. The Soviets retained preeminence in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary while Great Britain's sphere included Greece and significant portions of Yugoslavia.

If Greece had expanded geographically into the Aegean Islands, Macedonia, and Thrace during the Ottoman period, it continued to expand politically under British control in the twentieth century. The factions that had evolved by World War Two were further exacerbated by Axis occupation. During this period essentially two rival groups emerged: the Monarchists loyal to King George II and a political coalition dominated by Greek communists known as ELAS. Though ELAS grew dramatically—both politically and in size—during the war the British and the U.S. reduced aid to that group in favor of those loyal to the monarchy. In October 1943 ELAS attacked forces loyal to the King and the Greek Civil War began.

As World War Two ended the British attempted to reclaim their colonial past in Greece. Upon returning they found a country decimated politically and economically from the Axis occupation. Throughout 1945 the British watched the various factions terrorize the Greek countryside. Despite a
tremendous amount of British money, Greece seemed to be unraveling.

At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, President Truman suggested that the allies provide an impartial observer status for Greece to help facilitate the healing process. But Stalin demurred. Thus the United Nations instead set up a relief mission for Greece to coordinate the distribution of aid that was coming from the allies, primarily Great Britain. Greece continued to flounder. In January the U.S. extended a loan of $25 million but warned the Greek government that any hope for further aid would be contingent upon a stable, democratic government that was economically sound.

Throughout 1946 matters in Greece went from bad to worse. In January the Soviets raised the issue of British troops' presence in Greece at the UN. In March there were elections held despite Greek communists' appeal to boycott them. Not only were the communists hurt by the elections, but liberals and leftist—the very groups that might help form a broad-based government—were also hurt. In September (on the heels of a plebiscite to restore the monarchy) the British announced that in keeping with a long-established policy, 4,000 of their 28,000 troops would be withdrawn immediately. Chaos continued to prevail and the U.S. sent an aircraft carrier with six escort ships to the region. Still chaos reigned supreme by year's end.
Throughout January and February of 1947 dispatches were arriving in Washington with increasing frequency from Greece painting a bleak picture at best. Economically the Greek government was spending five times what it generated in taxes. Mark Etheridge, an American representative in Greece, reported in February that Greece was a 'ripe plum' (Oneal, 1982: 156). Almost concomitantly a British "white paper" was issued enumerating the financial difficulties Great Britain was experiencing.

As we have already seen, the U.S. was watching Greece falter with some concern. On 21 February, Secretary of State General George Marshall received a memorandum from Loy Henderson forcefully outlining the potential for a sudden collapse of Greece, its implications, and the repercussions for U.S. policy elsewhere. In consequence Marshall approved, as recommended by Henderson, that a special bill be introduced in Congress granting an immediate loan to Greece. (Jones, 1955: 131-32; Oneal, 1982: 157.) Having done this Marshall left the State Department for a weekend away at Princeton New Jersey. Shortly after his departure, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson received an urgent message from the British Ambassador who told Acheson that his government had an important matter to discuss with Secretary Marshall concerning Greece. Acheson, as Acting Secretary in Marshall's absence, received the Ambassador who transmitted notes from the British government explaining that five weeks
hence (on 31 March) the British would cease their aid to Greece. (Jones, 1955: 129-130; Oneal, 1982: 157.) Thus began America's direct involvement in Greece. Ultimately this resulted in the Truman Doctrine.

As we shall see, over approximately the next three months U.S. foreign policy would undergo a significant change in direction. A precise time limit was given the U.S.--five weeks--though as we shall see the British kept troops and influence for somewhat longer. And surprise was present. The U.S. government knew that the situation in Greece was deteriorating and doing so rapidly. The administration suspected that the Soviets were stirring up trouble in the region and that under the existing conditions the Greek communist factions might well prosper. Indeed it even knew that the British would eventually recede from the area leaving potential vacuums. "What had not been anticipated, however, was the suddenness with which the British intended to discontinue their aid to Greece" (Oneal, 1982: 159).

By limiting their consultation with the State Department and in planning to terminate their assistance rather than reduce it, the British surprised the Truman administration and unequivocally precipitated a crisis for the United States. (Oneal, 1982: 159).

And as a consequence of the lack of anticipation, the administration had to scramble to forge a policy. The resulting policy was generalized well beyond the situation in Greece. It was a benchmark in the shift from America's isolationist past to its activist future. Previous standard-operating
procedures were abandoned; new policies were generated in their stead. (Jones, 1955: 132; Oneal, 1982: 159-160.)

Those new policies began to take shape immediately. Dean Acheson established a study committee within the State Department whose purpose was to comprehensively yet quickly analyze the situation. He instructed his subordinates to address: the funds and authority then existing that could be adapted and extended for Greece's immediate economic and military needs; the strategic importance of Greece to the U.S.; and what would be necessary to preserve Greece. This study was to be completed over the weekend so that it could be handed to Marshall early Monday prior to his scheduled meeting with Britain's Lord Inverchapel. (Acheson, 1969: 217-18; Jones, 1955: 132; Oneal, 1982: 162.)

Additionally, Acheson instructed Loy Henderson and Jack Hickerson to plan to meet the following day (22 February) with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)--an entity that was replaced later that year by the National Security Act--so as to brief those persons responsible for their respective agency's actions regarding the matter. Again this was done so as to have the SWNCC fully briefed and prepared to discuss the matter with Marshall on Monday. With the assigning of duties completed, Acheson telephoned President Truman and then Secretary Marshall to inform them of what had taken place and what he had done in response. (Jones, 1955: 155; Acheson, 218.)
That evening the first staff meeting took place per Acheson's instructions. George Kennan chaired that first meeting, though his duties later precluded his presence with respect to Greece. With this first staff meeting the policy began to take shape. Jones reports that all present agreed that extraordinary measures would be necessary from the U.S. Henderson made assignments and the first draft of the "factual paper" that Acheson had commissioned was completed that weekend. Thus, "eight hours after the transmission of the first spark from the British Embassy, ended the first day" of America's involvement in Greece and its new foreign-policy direction. Kennan "recalls driving home with a sense of great development impending" (Jones, 1955: 134).

Marshall returned, as scheduled, to a flurry of activity. A Cabinet meeting was already scheduled for that Monday morning (24 February). Before attending Marshall met with Acheson for a more comprehensive briefing of the weekend's activities. He then went to see the president, which was "customary" before the regular weekly Cabinet luncheon. (Jones, 1955: 134.) Then at noon Marshall and the president assembled with the Cabinet. Marshall stressed that the British notes were tantamount to a British abdication of power. (Jones, 1955: 129-130.) After this Cabinet meeting, however, Marshall's role diminished substantially. He was scheduled to leave for the Moscow Conference and therefore "deliberately left the Greece-Turkey ball with Acheson, who
first caught it and who would have to run with it when Marshall left" (Jones, 1955: 134).

That afternoon Acheson presided over a meeting with the SWNCC. "This was an important meeting" says Jones, "for the problem of aid to Greece and Turkey was considered on a high level in its wider world setting, and a broad government position began to flow" (Jones, 1955: 135). Apparently consensus began to develop at this meeting. The points around which consensus built were: agreement that Greece was vital to U.S. security and must be strengthened; the U.S. was the only one in a position to do it; and that therefore President Truman should ask Congress for funds and authority. Finally Acheson committed State to having a formal statement of position and recommendations completed and submitted for SWNCC's approval on Wednesday (26 February). Acheson met with Marshall later that day to report his activities.

On Tuesday (25 February) "subordinate staff of the State Department" met to contribute to process. (Jones, 1955: 135.) Acheson let all involved voice their opinions. He then summed up, "in the process allaying doubts, resolving conflicts, incorporating ideas presented to him, pointing up the logic of the discussion. . . . Chief and staff were as one" (Jones, 1955: 136). That night Acheson, Henderson and some staff worked late writing the final version of "Position and Recommendations of the Department
of State Regarding Immediate Aid to Greece and Turkey." (It should be noted that as the process evolved, Turkey's importance was diminished in an apparent effort to package the Truman Doctrine.)

On Wednesday (26 February) the JCS submitted their assessment of the strategic importance of Greece and Turkey. (Oneal, 1955: 164.) This had apparently resulted from the initial meeting between Henderson and Hickerson from State with other SWNCC members on Saturday. The JCS sounded alarms at the dangers of Greece falling under communist sway. They feared that such a government might combine with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union to pressure Turkey into granting naval rights inimical to the United States. Additionally the SWNCC met to discuss the "Position and Recommendation" paper generated by State. Interestingly State had generalized the Greek situation to the probable needs of "other" countries in similar situations. All of these assessments coming out of the various staff meetings were discussed that afternoon with President Truman, Secretary Marshall, and Dean Acheson. It was determined that there was precious-little time to spare and that authority from Congress would be needed to proceed. But how? Congress would have to be brought in immediately. Truman decided to telephone invitations to key Congressional leaders to a meeting for the following day. (Jones, 1955: 138.)
The meeting with Congressional leaders on Thursday (27 February) turned out to be the first of two such meetings (the second was on 10 March). Present during this first meeting at the White House, in addition to Truman, Marshall, and Acheson were: Senator Vandenberg; Speaker Martin; Sam Rayburn (House minority leader); Charles Eaton (Republican Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs); Senator Styles Bridges (Republican Chair of the Appropriations); Senator Tom Connally (ranking Democrat on Foreign Relation); and Sol Bloom (ranking Democrat on House Foreign Affairs). (Jones, 1955: 138.)

It was at this meeting that Marshall, at Truman's behest, explained the situation to the Congressional leaders. Evidently the assembled congressmen got the impression that it was not terribly critical and that the U.S. was effectively pulling British colonialism's chestnuts out of the fire. Acheson remembers that his "distinguished chief, most unusually and unhappily, flubbed his opening statement" (Acheson, 1969: 219). He became worried and leaned over to Marshall saying: 'Is this a private fight or can anyone get into it?' Marshall told Truman that Acheson had something to say and the president gave Acheson permission to speak. Acheson gave an impassioned history of events in the region, what State believed the Soviets were up to globally (a la Kennan) and what all those involved agreed was necessary to avoid the broader repercussions of communist success in
Greece. Acheson's speech saved the day. (Acheson, 1969: 219; Jones, 1955: 139, 139-142; Oneal, 1982: 164.)

Congress was on board with administration policy. However, Vandenberg requested that the president forthrightly approach American people about the matter. He wished the president to outline to Americans how serious the challenge was from America's former ally and that they be convinced that a new direction in U.S. foreign policy be taken. This became the Truman Doctrine. Later that evening Acheson held an off-the-record background conference with the press whereupon he pitched the broad implications and began the process of preparing America for a change.

Acheson concluded that the group would have the responsibility for implementation. Henderson would lead, with Hickerson his second, and Jack Jernegan would be the executive secretary of the coordinating committee. Russell met that afternoon with the SWNCC to begin all coordination.

Over the next several days the speech requested by Vandenberg was drafted, primarily by Jones, corrected and edited by the president, his special counsel Clark Clifford, and by Acheson. On 10 March the speech was approved by Truman. After the president approved it the speech was cleared for release to the press. On 11 March the SWNCC met to appoint an ad hoc committee whose purpose was to study other countries which fit the criteria of the Truman Doctrine. This committee was eventually merged into the process that would become known as the Marshall Plan.

On 12 March President Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress to deliver the speech that was a direct result of the notes delivered to Dean Acheson on 21 February. In consequence the U.S. became involved in Greece and the Truman Doctrine was born. Throughout March Congress held hearings on Greece--Acheson was the point man at these hearings. Marshall left for Moscow and did not return until 28 April. On 21 April, the ad hoc committee released its report stressing the nature of the threat to democratic regimes globally out of which the Marshall Plan largely evolved. (McLellan, 1976: 126.) And on 22 May President
Truman signed the bill passed by Congress which authorized and funded the Greek-Turkey aid program and provided for the assignment of U.S. advisers to those countries.

**Analysis**

Now that we have examined the historical context in which the Greek Civil War took place and the circumstances surrounding the putative collapse of Greece, we may apply the question of focused comparison to America's decision-making role in the affair. As has been the case previously, we begin with Crisisbank's endpoints for the event (21 February to 22 May). But, as we shall see and as has been seen elsewhere, the decisionmaking functions do not always match Crisisbank's time frame.

1. **Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit**

We begin by establishing the first convocation of the DMU and its composition. Recall that Secretary Marshall had left the State Department for the weekend in order to speak at Princeton University. It was shortly after his departure that the British Ambassador phoned to report that he had an urgent message for the Secretary. Acheson took the call whereupon he told the Ambassador that his boss could not be reached immediately and, further, that it was Acheson's duty to handle such matters in the Secretary's absence. (Acheson, 1969: 217.) Acheson notes in his memoirs that he and the Ambassador were, in any case, close friends. The latter told Acheson that he had two notes from his
government both of which regarded important information about a "crisis in British aid to Greece" (Acheson, 1969: 217). Apparently the Ambassador then briefed Acheson but in only a general way.

Meanwhile the "notes" were received by Loy Henderson at State. It was Henderson who had earlier alerted Marshall that problems lay ahead in Greece. It was at this point that Acheson realized the gravity of what his friend had only intimated. Acheson records that the notes "were shockers." British aid to Greece and Turkey would end in a few weeks and "His Majesty's Government devoutly hoped that we could assume the burden in both Greece and Turkey" (Acheson, 1969: 217).

At that time Acheson instructed his subordinates, Henderson and Hickerson, to call a meeting of State's European and Near East experts for that evening for a preliminary report. Jones reports that the three--Acheson, Henderson, and Hickerson--met only briefly that afternoon for they all realized that "The most important thing was to work out an orderly procedure and [to] get things moving fast" (Jones, 1955: 132). Acheson had tasked the two with preparing an analysis paper covering what would be needed in terms of funding and personnel were the U.S. to assume responsibility, and the strategic significance of Greece. With the immediate matters taken care of, Acheson called President Truman and Secretary Marshall to brief them.
That evening the group met and assignments were more or less made. Oneal reports that there was some discussion as to whether the British were simply bluffing but that after some time consensus developed that a new period was being heralded in. (Oneal, 1982: 163.) Though Acheson did not, evidently, attend he was fully briefed the next morning (Saturday, 22 February). And from this meeting all of Acheson's actions continued to flow. (Acheson, 1969: 218; Jones, 1982: 134.)

The initial convocation was a plenary session of what became State's study committee. Acheson, Henderson, and Hickerson briefly met whereupon they determined that a larger meeting was needed with a broad array of expertise. They scheduled it for that evening--Friday.

3.1.A. Was the convened DMU restricted to the apex or the larger bureaucracy? Put simply, the bureaucracy was involved from the earliest stages of the Greek affair. Indeed, the entire apex of the DMU only gradually involved itself. Acheson (a member of the apex) phoned both Truman and Marshall sometime that afternoon. It was not until Monday, however, that the entire apex met as a group and that was when they convened with other members of the broadly-based DMU. The DMU convened to deal with U.S. interest vis-a-vis Greece was a broadly comprised group. If it had a center of gravity it would be at the State
Department. This is of course what we would expect under these conditions.

3.1.B. At what locus was the DMU convened? This is straightforward. The initial convocation took place at the State Department. Furthermore, the locus of the DMU remained at State even as other entities—e.g., the SWNCC—were included. Thus a low locus, as we expected, is what we observed in the Greek affair.

3.1.C. With what frequency was the apex convened over the course of the event? As we already implied, the apex was scarcely ever convened. It did meet with the broader DMU the first Monday following the weekend. Recall there was a previously scheduled Cabinet meeting at which the apex of the Truman administration was informed of State's activities to date.

The broader DMU met repeatedly over the next several weeks. Acheson's memoirs simply note that it was frequent and that he attended a few of those meetings. Jones notes that the "staff worked furiously" and was able to redraft Friday evening's assessment in the form of an end product by Sunday afternoon. (Jones, 1955: 134.) Additionally we know from several accounts that meetings continued on Monday and throughout the week of 24 February. The SWNCC was briefed in a preliminary way Saturday, 22 February, and then involved more formally Monday 24 February. The number of
meetings proliferated as the number of experts were brought in to handle the matter.

Our hypothesis concerns the apex however. And though the DMU met frequently, the apex of the DMU only met infrequently over the event's entire three-month duration. This confirms what we hypothesized to be the case.

3.1.D. Was the DMU convened along standard operating procedures or extemporaneously? In the case of America entering Greek politics it was primarily the former. This is not to say that U.S. policy was not innovative; indeed, it was. Nonetheless, it was State that Truman believed to be the rightful originator of U.S. foreign policy. (See Chapter IV.) And in this case State in fact did originate policy and present it to the president for his approval.

Recall that Acheson almost immediately gathered a group of experts from state together. Assignments were made, including the calling of another meeting that evening to promulgate policy and recommendations, and the briefing of the SWNCC the next morning so as to be prepared for Marshall's return Monday, and experts were innovatively brought in from outside the formal State bureaucracy. George Kennan, for instance, who was working at the War College was immediately sought out because of his expertise on Soviet behavior--indeed he chaired the first meeting rather than Acheson, Henderson, or Hickerson.
Later (11 March), Acheson directed a committee formed whose purpose was to study other countries who met the criteria of the Truman Doctrine. Similarly, the initial State Department group that dealt with the British leaving Greece broke into numerous ad hoc working groups (per above assignments) whose purpose was to consider their specific areas of expertise as applying to the affair. In both Acheson's and Jones' memoirs the respective authors note how fond Marshall was of saying "Don't fight the problem gentlemen. Solve it!" And each of these groups set about to provide solutions to a wholly new sort of problem: America picking up the remnants of the British empire.

And finally, the Greek affair was fought on several fronts. Select members of Congress were brought in on two occasions—27 February and 10 March. In the first case Truman had invitations telephoned to hasten the process. In each case a select group of important leadership was targeted. And Truman explicitly states in his memoirs that this was done because the opposite party was in control; it was an expedient forged under the conditions. "The vital decision that I was about to make was complicated by the fact that Congress was no longer controlled by the Democratic Party." Under these conditions Truman felt it "desirable, therefore, to advise the congressional leadership as soon as possible of the gravity of the situation and of the nature of the decision I had to make" (Truman, 1955: 103).
While a good deal of innovation characterized this policy, it is nonetheless true that it was done according to standard-operating procedures in the Truman Administration. We may therefore impute a confirmation to this aspect of the hypothesis.

2. Selection of Options

3.2.A. The first question we pose concerns where control of selecting options was centered. Specifically, were options generated and selected by the apex of the DMU or some larger DMU? We have clearly showed a DMU, in the Greek affair, that was much more inclusive than the apex. It was convened this way initially and continued throughout the affair. Options were entertained, analyzed, and critiqued at State. They were then coordinated with other government agencies which had interests via the SWNCC. As the number of participants proliferated in the DMU, as the application of options was continually generalized to broader conditions, and as the decisionmaking continued over the approximately three-month period, any number of persons were allowed to state their views and to participate.

Jones's account is perhaps most remarkable in detailing this phenomenon. In his second chapter, "The Chief Actors," Jones explicitly mentions President Truman, Secretary Marshall, Undersecretary Acheson, Undersecretary Forrestal (Navy), Secretary Patterson (War), and Senator Vandenberg as chief actors. This is somewhat misleading, however. In
that same chapter, for example, Jones remarks that Acheson "rather than competing with members of his staff, knew how to draw wise counsel, harmony, and constructive effort" from them. (Jones, 1955: 101.) And later in that chapter he also mentions Averell Harriman and W. Clayton as important influences in the policy.

Clearly then the options were not selected simply by the apex but were generated from a broad base of expertise.

3.2.B. Were the options and their sources few or many in number? The sources were indisputably varied and manifold. And it would appear that the number of possibilities too was varied and large. We can mention a few specifics to illustrate the point.

Recall that Acheson instructed Henderson and Hickerson to assemble experts and to consider the following: 1) the facts as seen by U.S. representatives in Greece; 2) funds and personnel presently available; 3) funds and personnel likely to be needed; and 4) significance of an independent Greece (and Turkey) to Western Europe—and by extension to the U.S. (Acheson, 1969: 218.) Clearly he was not interested in limiting or restricting the number of options that the DMU might entertain. Instead he was allowing a surprisingly large degree of latitude.

We also know that the application of whatever options were decided upon was to be in very broad terms. It was a case of generalizing to a much broader set of circumstances
than simply Greece, or even Greece and Turkey. Notice, Western Europe's implications are considered initially. And we know that the end result of the decisionmaking surrounding the Greek Civil War and America's association therewith was a broad-ranging Truman Doctrine and eventually the Marshall Plan.

We have no way of enumerating and tracking each option that was considered over the event's duration. We do know that there were many. We know further that they were rather unique and innovative in approach. And finally we know that over time these options were generalized to a larger set of target nations than simply Greece and Turkey. What began as a response to British abdication of power metamorphosed into the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of the post-war world. Thus we may say that a great many possible options were considered.

3.2.C. Did the process reflect any dominant personalities? Acheson was identified in Chapter IV as a candidate, along with Truman himself, for a likely dominant personality. Yet during the decisionmaking process surrounding America's involvement in the Greek Civil War this was not the case. He allowed those under him to do their jobs without his interference. In fact Truman left town on a state visit to Mexico during early March. (Truman, 1955: 104.)
Marshall similarly played a somewhat subdued role in the decisionmaking. Instead he turned the whole matter over to Acheson. Recall Jones's statement that Marshall "deliberately left the Greece-Turkey ball with Acheson, who first caught it and who would have to run with it when Marshall left" for the Moscow Conference, not to return until nearly May. (Jones, 1955: 134.)

The only other likely candidate for dominating the process with his personality would be Acheson who was carrying the ball, to use Jones's metaphor. By reading Jones's account of several of the meetings where Acheson was a participant we see that Acheson worked to develop esprit d' corps rather than cajole the other participants. For example, on 25 February—very early on in the event—Acheson met with the so-called subordinate staff at State. Jones recounts how Acheson permitted all to voice their opinions. Then, "When all had spoken, Acheson made his summation, in the process allaying doubts, resolving conflicts, incorporating ideas presented to him" and thereby "fortified his staff for the creative work on the project ahead" (Jones, 1955: 136). This set the tone and was to be repeated on other occasions.

The reality, therefore, is that the policy making surrounding the Greek affair was truly a momentous occasion in which there was a large variety of inputs. It is not at all clear that Acheson could have dominated the process had
he wished to do so. In any event, he did not dominate.

We conclude therefore that neither single personalities nor small groups of personalities dominated the process. Rather a truly team effort at problem solving seems to have obtained. The decisionmaking bureaucracy was employed to its fullest. And this was reflected in the process of selecting options.

3.2.D. Was there evidence of groupthink? That there was a team effort with Acheson synthesizing "ideas" presented to him clearly belies groupthink's presence. Jones mentions a great deal of consensus, however. Throughout his chapter covering the week of 21 February through 28 February he repeatedly notes that the participants all realized the gravity of the situation, that a new era was being entered, that new policy for the U.S. lay ahead. But with each account he also notes that discussion took place and that various opinions were entertained--they simply had a common purpose in mind. Groupthink is not evidenced by the record as was our expectation.

3. Implementation of Options

3.3.A. Was implementation controlled by the apex of the DMU or from below by way of the existing foreign-policy bureaucracy? The implementation of policy really did not begin until after Congress passed the legislation requested
by the administration. Hitherto, stop-gap measures were taken and the U.S. government pressured Britain to hold the line until said legislation. Once it was passed and signed by the president on 22 May, implementation was conducted at a lower locus of the bureaucracy essentially from below.

Even if we were to divide the implementation of U.S. policy into two phases--pre legislation and post legislation--it remained centered at the State Department. On 28 February Acheson met in the Secretary's conference room at State with the group of some twenty individuals discussed above. Jones comments that the meeting took place at 10:30 A.M. as "Acheson met with those departmental officers who would have the chief responsibility for working out all aspects of the program" (Jones, 1955: 145). Acheson concluded that those persons and their respective staffs would have the main duties for implementing the threefold (economic, military, and technical) program.

Following the legislation, as previously mentioned, Dwight Griswold was appointed by Truman to "administer the program in Greece" (McCoy, 1984: 122; also see Oneal, 1982: 175). Parts of the group that was appointed by the SWNCC in mid March to assess other countries that might fit the Truman Doctrine criteria also merged with the Griswold group and handled the implementation. Griswold remained as such until September 1948.
In either case implementation was conducted from below. It was conducted so as to report back often but it was never actually a function of DMU's apex. The apex relinquished control of the implementation of U.S. policy from the earliest moments of the event.

3.3.B. Was implementation accomplished according to routines or was it extemporaneous? In implementing the Truman administration's policy toward Greece, it would appear to be largely the case that it was routines. The administration followed, with perhaps slight adaptations, previous precedents as it moved along toward implementing its policy. Legislation, of course, follows the same basic pattern irrespective of whether a president is pushing for it or not. Committees meet, debate takes place, and votes are made. (In this case, the House passed it 287 to 107 and the Senate by 67 to 23; and it was done quickly by Congressional standards [McCoy, 1984: 123].) And well into the affair, after some Congressional debate, the administration followed standard procedures in the United Nations, though this seems to have been done more as an after thought. (Jones, 1955: 180-185; Acheson, 1969: 223-225.)

3.3.C. Was there evidence of bureaucratic politics in the implementation of policy? There was reported to be some negotiating over particulars between the administration and Congress but this is quite typical in both domestic- and
foreign-policy decisionmaking. Otherwise there was no mention of either bureaucracy going it alone (bureaucratic momentum) or of an agency dragging its collective feet (bureaucratic inertia). This appears to be one of those points at which consensus in government and at large permitted teamwork.

Hence though we expected and predicted bureaucratic politics to be present under these situational conditions we found no evidence of it. We must conclude that the evidence disconfirms our expectations.

3.3.D. Was implementation instantaneous with selection of options or temporally distinct? It was clearly distinct and apart form the process of selecting options. As options evolved over time and the course of the event, so too did the means of implementing said options. And there was always a lag between the two processes. Indeed decisions were made the first week of the event but as is well know the portion that became the Marshall Plan took years to implement.

4. Evaluation of Actions

3.4.A. Was feedback-evaluation directed by and through the apex of the DMU or from the decisionmaking bureaucracy below? The day-to-day evaluation of the actions was probably done on the spot by those implementing it. This was particularly the case, as noted above, after
Griswold was sent to administer the program (June 1947). Prior to the legislation (22 May) there was very little to evaluate in terms of actions taken. While decisions had been made, virtually no action to implement those decisions had been taken. Thus the monitoring and evaluation of the policy was in motion was from below and on the scene; it was then forwarded to Griswold who, if he considered it important, would bring it to the attention of his peers in Washington. Clearly the apex of the DMU relinquished its prerogatives with respect to this phase of decisionmaking which is what we expected to see.

3.4.B. Was the feedback-evaluation process accomplished through routine channels or through extemporaneous sources? It would appear that little in the way of improvised or even innovative channels was accomplished. Prior to the 1947 National Security Act the Central Intelligence Group coordinated intelligence; it was set up through an executive order on 20 January 1946. (Truman, 1955: 57.) It was, however, under the auspices of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. As we have seen this group, the SWNCC, became part of the decisionmaking and implementation process early on. It too, we may infer from Truman's memoirs, was the central clearinghouse for the evaluation of intelligence. While there appears to be no explicit reference to it evaluating actions once implementation was underway, it was the statutory organization for
doing this. And we have seen that prior to implementation they clearly performed this function. (Jones, 1955: 129-153, 199-207.) Further, Oneal notes that the NSC reevaluated the selected options of the administration at year's end in 1948. (Oneal, 1982: 185-86.) The NSC, of course eventually supplanted the SWNCC.

We conclude that the feedback-evaluation process was routine in nature and that no evidence of improvisation, as was seen under other situational characteristics, was present in this case. This meets our expectation.

3.4.C. **Was there evidence of bureaucratic interference in the process?** If information that was incomplete or tainted with parochial concerns were forwarded to the DMU we would conclude that bureaucratic interference was indicated. Because there is little evaluation of the implementation process initially, and because it took place over a long period of time, it is difficult to say with certainty what information was moved from Greece to Washington. However, Oneal shows that in 1948 and 1949—though this is well after the period under present consideration—information was quite good. And Jones's account of the decisionmaking at State (probably the most comprehensive) makes absolutely no mention of a lack of information.

Prior to the decisionmaking process, one could at least argue, the intelligence surrounding events in Greece and Turkey, and with respect to what our allies were doing might
be somewhat suspect. The administration seems to have been caught off guard even though Britain had been in financial crisis for sometime. Yet once the notes arrived, and once the decisionmaking process began, this problem does not appear to have repeated itself. Information was evidently quite good and quite comprehensive. We must therefore conclude that bureaucratic interference, if it did exist, was not noticeable, thus disconfirming what we expected to find.

3.4.D. **Was the process instantaneous with implementation or temporally distinct?** As was the case when we discussed implementation (supra), there was a lag between processes. That sources of information in foreign lands is sometimes slow to develop is not terribly surprising. In this case it was even more the case since implementation evolved over a lengthy time period. As a result, the impetus for timely information to evaluate each aspect of some given policy is diminished. And so it was in Greece.
CHINA'S ENTRY IN THE KOREAN WAR

Narrative

It is not uncommon for scholars to divide the long imbroglio known as the Korean War into phases. In Allen Whiting's seminal study the author's entire research focuses on China's crossing the Yalu river which separated China from North Korea. Of George's and Smoke's nearly dozen case studies the authors include one study of the outbreak of the Korean War as well as one case study devoted to China's entry therein. Crisisbank too divides its coverage of the Korean conflict into three phases: the initial outbreak (Korean War I), the entry of China (Korean War II), and period of final negotiation and fighting that occurred in 1953 near that war's conclusion (Korean War III).

In our treatment of the Korean War we shall be looking at China's involvement. This phase of the Korean War began after MacArthur's daring Inchon landing began to presage North Korea's collapse. It is typically demarcated as beginning in late October 1950 and terminating in July 1951 when negotiations over ending said conflict began. These are the endpoints used by Crisisbank and the ones we use as

---

our preliminary endpoints. While we will not be covering
the initial outbreak of war in Korea, a brief overview of
the initiation of war is useful for purposes of context.

It will be recalled that at the conclusion of World War
Two the allies divided Korea. General MacArthur issued
General Order No. 1 on 2 September 1945 accomplishing that
division. From that document the 38th parallel was accepted
as a reasonable line from which to delineate north from
south for administrative purposes. In fact a young officer,
Colonel Dean Rusk (later to be intimately involved with U.S.
policy as a State Department Officer), actually selected the
38th parallel so as to provide deep water ports for the
allies that would administer each half of Korea. All of
this of course took place prior to the onset of the Cold
War.

From 1946 through 1949 the Cold War intensified and the
erstwhile allies, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union separated into camps. Relations between
the Anglo-American camp and the Soviet camp deteriorated in
earnest. On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China
(PRC) was established after a bloody civil war in which
America supported one side and the Soviets the other.

In that same year (1949) General MacArthur implicitly
excluded Korea from the American defense perimeter when he
said:

Now the Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon lake and our
line of defense runs through the chain of islands
fringing the coast of Asia. It starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu archipelago which includes its broad main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska. (Whiting, 1960: 39.)

The next year Secretary Acheson spoke before the National Press Club in Washington on 12 January. In his speech he further elaborated America's defense perimeter as including 'the Aleutians, Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines' concurring with General MacArthur. He went further however:

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack... Should such an attack occur... the initial reliance must be on the people of the attacked to resist it and then upon commitments of the entire world under the Charter of the United Nations. (Whiting, 1960: 39.)

Thus Korea, wittingly or not, was excluded from America's defense perimeter.

Within a little more than five month's time the North Korean regime of Kim Il-sung poured across the 38th parallel and marched toward Seoul. What prompted the aggression of North Korea is not entirely clear. It may simply be that the North Koreans were feeling the pressures of an intensifying Cold War in which Europe and Asia were being carved up by the superpowers leaving less powerful regimes to suffer such indignities as they must under the circumstances. (Kaplan, 1981: 317.) Whatever the reason, over a few weeks North Korean troops moved rapidly southward. In the process they nearly succeeded in occupying the entire peninsula. It was not until the middle of July that UN troops under
MacArthur as Supreme Commander could feel optimistic in turning back the aggression. "By July 20 General MacArthur, always optimistic, could cable the president that the enemy 'has had his great chance and failed to exploit it'" (Acheson, 1969: 424). Acheson concedes that within a week or two--i.e., by July's end--the situation had calmed down and stabilized.

Near the end of July Pentagon planners proposed a far-reaching plan. The plan was based on previous UN resolutions that condoned the unification of Korea. In keeping with this earlier resolution, the Pentagon proposed that the Supreme Commander (viz., MacArthur) be allowed to cross the 38th parallel to defeat the enemy's forces and to occupy Korea. The plan was not without some provisos though. The Pentagon reasoned that unless the United States was willing to mobilize with sufficient resources the plan would not work. It further reasoned that if the Soviets intervened, the plan ought to be scrapped. It is of some interest that Acheson describes the plan as typical of military planners whose "recommendations are usually premised upon the meticulous statement of assumptions that as often as not are quite contrary to the facts and yet control the conclusions" (Acheson, 1969: 451). In short, Acheson derides the plan. As George and Smoke point out, Acheson may well have done this for convenience sake while writing his memoirs. They point out that later research has shown that Acheson was
much more favorable toward the plan at its inception. (George and Smoke, 1974: 229.)

At a 1 September 1950 NSC meeting the Council provisionally approved the Pentagon plan and recommended it to the president for his approval. The document generated authorized MacArthur to conduct military operations beyond the 38th parallel as well as to make plans for Korea's eventual occupation. (Truman, 1956: 359.) George and Smoke see it as a significant meeting. Thus it was "the important first step toward making [new decisions] in stages" and illustrated how "the administration thereafter slid into the new war aim without ever making an explicit, well-formulated decision to do so" (George and Smoke, 1974: 196.) Truman approved the document on 11 September.

All of this was at a time when the North Koreans had been turned back and policy planners in Washington were feeling relatively heady. By month's end (28 September) approval had been given and the JCS promulgated orders for MacArthur to the effect described. (Acheson, 1969: 451.) Acheson notes that at State there were two conflicting opinions regarding the matter. First were those who rejected crossing the 38th parallel under virtually any circumstances. Conversely there were those who felt that the UN troops should be allowed to go wherever necessary. (Acheson, 1969: 445). The State Department eventually
acquiesced in face of the plan and turned toward NATO matters that were then beckoning.

It will be recalled that around this time (15 September) MacArthur made his daring landing at Inchon. Though neither his superiors at the Pentagon nor his peers in either Defense or State thought it would succeed, the commander in the field was given wide latitude— an American tradition. With his dramatic success his former doubters, including Acheson, apparently began to reassess their opinions as to whether MacArthur should be allowed to press northward. "Truman and Acheson allowed the favorable turn of military events . . . to lead them to commit the United States and the United Nations to a new war aim" (George and Smoke, 1974: 197). What is more, throughout the early fall MacArthur took increasing liberties with his orders while his superiors acquiesced. By mid-October MacArthur had reached a line beyond which the September orders allowed only "Korean" troops to pass. On 24 October MacArthur sent his troops northward to 'drive forward with all speed and full utilization of their forces' again demonstrating his penchant for interpreting the September order with wide latitude. Acheson suggests that even the JCS were upset but almost afraid to confront MacArthur who was practically deified in America. (Acheson, 1969: 462-463.) Military exigencies determined U.S. policy rather than the other way around. (George and Smoke, 1974: 202-203.) And in this
case military exigencies were based on flawed intelligence
or at least a bad misreading of said intelligence. (George
and Smoke, 1974: 208-209.)

If Washington would not oppose MacArthur the PRC appar-
ently concluded that the time had come for them to do so.
The 7th Regiment of South Korea's 6th Division, under
MacArthur's command, "blundered into a large concentration
of Chinese troops" on 26 October and was destroyed.
had covertly moved some 200,000 troops from Manchuria into
Korea. (Whiting, 1960: 116-118.) On 31 October the first
Russian MIG-15 was seen flying sorties in Korea. On 2
November PRC "volunteers" attacked American troops that
MacArthur had sent too far north. MacArthur was badly
surprised and his troops were badly outnumbered and
defeated. It was a "new war" according to one of the
General's dispatches back to Washington. (Whiting, 1960:
118; Acheson, 1969: 465.)

MacArthur behaved somewhat erratically. He sent con-
flicting reports back to Washington: one day urging that
Washington be more perspicacious in its view of events; the
next day sounding alarm. For example, on 4 November
MacArthur cabled the president to allay Truman's fears,
suggesting the reports Truman was reading were premature,
and urging patience as 'a more complete accumulation of
military facts' became available. Then on 5 November the
General reported to the UN that at least twelve incidents of PRC troops had been documented and that the UN must allow him to respond simply to preserve the remaining troops under his command. In conflict with the September order given MacArthur, which placed restrictions on what air missions could be flown, the General ordered General Stratemeyer to use full air power to knock out Chinese troops and their supplies in the rear. Stratemeyer, apparently reflecting perspicaciousness of his own, informed the Pentagon about his orders from MacArthur just three hours before his planes were scheduled to bomb bridges along the Korea-China frontier. (Acheson, 1969: 463.)

State got wind of the matter around 10:00 A.M. Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of Defense, delivered the message to Acheson. Lovett was concerned that the bombings would be ineffective militarily and potentially disastrous politically. Dean Rusk, who was present, noted that the U.S. had committed not to attack Manchuria without British consultation. Further, State had requested the UN Security Council to consider the reports of massive Chinese intervention. The assembled State and Defense officers decided to telephone Secretary Marshall (Defense) for his views. Together they determined that MacArthur's orders must be stayed until the president, who was in Missouri, could be reached.

Acheson was able to get Truman on the phone—they located him returning from voting in Kansas City. After
hearing an explanation of the situation from Acheson, Truman directed Acheson and Lovett to handle it as they thought best, agreeing that the bombing be postponed, provided the security of the troops not be placed in jeopardy. Lovett left Acheson to return to a meeting with the JCS at which he summarized the president's view. The JCS agreed and sent word to MacArthur requesting that he explain his reasons for ordering such a drastic mission. MacArthur sent back a cable that framed the mission as imperative to prevent 'a calamity of major proportions' (Acheson, 1969: 464). He was given the go-ahead.

Over this three-week period (end of October through middle of November) there is a good deal of cable traffic between MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo and Washington. Acheson's memoirs make clear that this was a period during which the president's advisers served their chief poorly. Acheson notes that neither he nor the JCS challenged MacArthur and that in effect it was MacArthur who made policy by default. (Acheson, 1969: 467-468.) "Within a few weeks the administration allowed a headstrong, self-confident MacArthur to implement his own military strategy" (George and Smoke, 1974: 224). The president's advisers evidently preferred to acquiesce in the face of so formidable a foe as MacArthur. Unfortunately MacArthur's policies were not commensurate with reality.
Around this same period (specifically, 9 November to 25 November) the Chinese invasion seemed to vanish. China's troops pulled back leaving the American commanded UN troops to successfully fight the North Koreans. MacArthur took this as a sign of tremendous success: the "Oriental mind" is one that understands only force and MacArthur had shown them just that. (George and Smoke, 1974: 210-211, and 228.)

What in reality was happening was that Chinese forces were regrouping in rear areas. They were preparing to launch a major new offensive which they began on 26 November. Truman notes in his memoirs that CIA produced a report on the eve of offensive that warned of what quickly came. (Truman, 1956: 381.)

Chinese forces launched a counteroffensive along the entire Korean front. They quickly smashed UN defenses and overran MacArthur's beleaguered forces. (It should be noted that Whiting reports that the Chinese were preparing for war in rear areas but hoping that the U.S. would seek a political way out; thus in abdicating policy to General MacArthur Washington missed an opportunity to end the conflict much sooner than was ultimately achieved [Whiting, 117-118].) MacArthur, badly surprised and shaken, began cabling Washington that the world faced "an entirely new war" (Acheson, 1969: 469). The opportunity to keep to the earlier "limited" goals was lost. (George and Smoke, 1974: 230-231.)
On both 8 November and 28 November the NSC convened to discuss Chinese intentions and the new situation respectively, and policy recommendations appropriate to face the challenge. General Bradley summarized the military situation. What just days earlier was a UN offensive was now a retreat. U.S. planes located on the peninsula were in jeopardy. General Marshall produced a report for the NSC which he and the three service Secretaries had generated. The thrust was that the U.S. as an agent of the UN must not be drawn into a separate war with the PRC. The war must be kept limited and just to survive the U.S. would have to commit far more resources to the area forthwith. For the time being MacArthur would have to hold on with what he had. Finally, Defense recommended that MacArthur be ordered to find a line to which he could pull back and which he could hold. The actual line would be determined by MacArthur but he would thereafter take instructions from Washington. More work was necessary for the group to generate complete recommendations for Truman's approval and the meeting ended with all setting about to accomplish that. (Acheson, 1969: 469-471.)

Over the next several days things remained somewhat confused. MacArthur sent messages back to Washington which Lovett simply considered to be "prosperity papers": memoranda which excused MacArthur from the impending disaster. Truman added to the confusion when at a press conference on
30 November he frankly answered press questions giving the idea that the atomic bomb might be used. This sent Attlee quickly to Washington to consult with the Americans. In the UN there was a near sense of panic. U.S. leadership had failed, was the feeling, and the UN had hitched its star to a losing cause.

A meeting was held at the Pentagon on 1 December. Key officials from State and Defense met to discuss the prevailing sense of gloom and what could be done to supplant it. Marshall decided that Washington was not getting enough accurate reporting from MacArthur's headquarters and therefore decided to send General Collins to the area to report back. On 2 December State and Defense held individual meetings at their respective offices. Prior to this day Truman had been noticeably absent from the decisionmaking process. He had been kept abreast through briefings but had missed most of the meetings. After 2 December, the participants were prepared with proposals and recommendations for Truman's consideration.

After each group had met respectively they convened another joint meeting. The result of this meeting was a briefing, arrived at jointly, for the president. It was during this process that Ambassador Warren Austin (UN) was instructed by Acheson to leave New York for Washington for consultation. The group was preparing to give comprehensive recommendations to the president. By day's end "a memoran-
dum for [Acheson] to discuss with the President" was completed. (Acheson, 1969: 473.) Acheson notes that many were involved in the effort so that in addition to the briefing memorandum for the president Acheson felt that he had "satisfactory briefing notes and intelligence material" so as to wrest control of decisionmaking back from MacArthur's headquarters to where it belonged in Washington. (Acheson, 1969: 473.)

Later that same day Acheson met with Marshall at around 8:00 P.M.; at that point both proceeded to the see the president. The thrust of the intelligence paper was that there was clearly Soviet connivance backing Chinese actions. The president directed Marshall and Acheson to put on the UN agenda raising Chinese intervention in Korea. Truman instructed the two to meet with JCS next morning to get latest update. Truman gave them their instructions whereupon Acheson returned to State for another round of meetings with his staff. (Acheson, 1969: 473-474.)

The next morning, Sunday 3 December, Acheson took Dean Rusk with him to meet with Secretary Marshall, Lovett, and the JCS at the Pentagon. This was the meeting that Truman had directed take place. MacArthur had been sending a stream of prosperity papers back to the Pentagon in which he threatened disaster unless he was given the authority to bomb base areas in Manchuria. The JCS said that the situation was indeed bad and that it would probably reach a
critical stage in three to four days. The group discussed contingency plans for evacuation should that be required. Acheson recommended that bombing China be done only as a last ditch effort to save lives and that in any case the authority to issue such an order be kept in Washington—not with MacArthur. General Ridgway spoke up at this meeting and said that the time was now to act. Enough debating had already taken place and something must be done immediately. Acheson comments that with Ridgway's frank assessment marked "the first time that someone had expressed what everyone thought—that the Emperor [i.e., MacArthur] had no clothes on" (Acheson, 1969: 475). All agreed that the president ought to issue a state of emergency so as to alert the American people as to the situation and what resources would be necessary for it.

Finally decisionmaking had been recognized as inadequate and incremental. New boldness and decisiveness was injected henceforth. Discussion of relieving MacArthur from command so he could direct his attention to his duties in Japan was actively on the agenda. Attlee arrived on 4 December whereupon State assuaged him. State and Defense met and hammered out plans for the president's approval. MacArthur continued to leak his view and Truman responded on 5 December with a moratorium on government officials talking to the press. On 13 December Truman invited leaders of both parties to the White House to brief them and to discuss the
possibility of a state-of-emergency proclamation. General Ridgway, who had recently voiced concern over the timidity of the decisionmaking, was sent to succeed General Walker as Commander of the 8th Army--Walker unexpectedly died in a jeep crash. Upon Ridgway's arrival MacArthur turned over the 8th to him telling him to do with then as he saw fit. Acheson cites this as a turning point in Korea. Within a month, Ridgway had transformed a retreat into a forward march. (Acheson, 1969: 512.)

The day after Christmas, 26 December, a meeting was convened by the president at Blair House. A new directive was hammered out for MacArthur. Truman worked with Acheson, Secretary Snyder (Treasury), and Generals Marshall and Bradley on this directive. The next day it was sent to the JCS whereupon they approved it. The following day it was sent to MacArthur. It was this directive that Ridgway used to turn the situation around. (Acheson, 1969: 514.)

On 11 January the UN proposed a compromise resolution. Acheson recommended that Truman authorize its acceptance. Truman did approve it and it was voted on (13 January) at which time the Chinese rejected it. This was what the U.S. had assumed would happen but it gave the U.S. the morale highroad. Thereafter the U.S. was seen as flexible and the Chinese were seen as the recalcitrant ones. (Acheson was later labeled an appeaser in the U.S. for supporting it.)
On 17 January another NSC meeting was convened. Truman attended this one. Generals Collins and Vandenberg had returned from Korea and they briefed the attendees. They were able to report, among other things, that Ridgway had turned the situation around. The meeting appears only to have served as a briefing. No decisions were made. Through the remainder of January success was becoming apparent. MacArthur began to publicly involve himself again. Acheson derogatorily comments that "While General MacArthur was fighting the Pentagon, General Ridgway was fighting the enemy" (Acheson, 1969: 517). This presaged the flap that was to occur between the president and MacArthur over which the latter was relieved. While interesting it is not crucial to our purposes.

On 1 February the U.S. was able to get a resolution through the UN condemning Chinese aggression. Acheson notes that both allies and enemies were suspicious of the United States but that since the U.S. had been perceived as flexible on the previous month's resolution, the U.S. got its way. In March MacArthur's final falling out with the president occurred as the General directly contravened Truman's December moratorium. In mid May the UN embargoed China and North Korea. By the end of May the Soviets were signalling their willingness to seek peaceful settlement of the Korean situation. Two meetings were held between Kennan of State and the Soviets' UN Ambassador Malik on 31 May and
5 June respectively. By 10 July General Ridgway began the direct negotiations that would eventually end the fighting. And though negotiations and some fighting would drag on until 1953, the second phase of the Korea war and China's entry therein ended as negotiations began.

Analysis

With the basic history in place we may begin to focus our attention on decisionmaking during the phase of the Korean War in which the PRC entered the fray. For it was this entry that surprised U.S. decisionmakers. The phase of the war lasted from the end of October 1950 until negotiations began on 10 July 1951; thus the case meets our criteria for surprise and long decision time.

1. Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

Our first four questions deal with the how the decisionmaking unit was convened, and who was involved. But first we must establish when the first convocation of the DMU took place. We know from Truman's own memoirs that rumors existed in September of Chinese intentions to intervene should the UN forces under MacArthur cross the 38th parallel. But the president dismisses them as common propaganda. He instructed the JCS to make contingency plans just in case, but none of the principals actually expected it to happen. (Truman, 1956: 362.) George and Smoke cite a CIA estimate that was released three days prior to China's entry as concluding that Beijing's entry was "not probable
in 1950" if ever. (George and Smoke, 1974: 209.) It was not until 31 October, according to Truman, that "we gained evidence that [the Chinese] were in the battle area and actually fighting against the United Nations forces" (Truman, 1956: 372). On this day headquarters of X Corps in Korea captured Chinese prisoners and reported it back to Washington. Acheson notes that "it took time for report of the events . . . to percolate from North Korea through Tokyo to Washington, if, indeed, it ever did percolate in recognizable form" (Acheson, 1969: 463). And he comments that just bits of the information were received during the first week of November. Thus during this period no specific convocation of the DMU took place: all involved were waiting to get a fuller accounting of what was happening.

It was not until 5-6 November that such detailed information began to be received from MacArthur. As reported above, the president was away voting in Missouri. MacArthur had reversed his earlier message of patience and was reporting that men and material from China were "pouring" into Korea. He therefore instructed the air force to bomb the bridges across the Yalu river. It was at this time that Acheson got an "urgent" message to Truman by phone. As a result, Acheson, Rusk, Lovett, and the JCS met and generated a message to MacArthur--instructing him to hold unless a demonstrable serious threat to our troops could be forwarded. (Truman, 1956: 374-375; Acheson, 1969:
Hence it was nearly one week between first awareness of Chinese troops entering the war and the initial convocation of the DMU.

3.1.A. Was the convened DMU restricted to the apex or a more inclusive DMU? The apex, as such, was largely absent as the DMU for the affair convened. Rather, Acheson (successor to Secretary Marshall) seems to have initiated the activity. And he met with Lovett (Defense) and the JCS. Thus besides Acheson, neither the president nor Secretary of Defense nor any representative from the NSC was involved initially--or for some time. Clearly the decisionmaking was not restricted to the apex of the DMU but was instead inclusive of lower-level officials.

3.1.B. At what Locus (high or low) was convocation accomplished? Most of the meetings were held at either State or Defense. The only early meeting held at the White House was a 8 November NSC meeting which President Truman did not even attend. There can be no doubt that the locus of decisionmaking was at a low level. Truman did not hold a meeting including the apex of the DMU until 26 December, and this was a full NSC meeting.

3.1.C. With what frequency was the apex of the DMU convened during the event? The trend of not convening the apex of the DMU with any sense of urgency seems to have held throughout. The president authorized an NSC meeting to be convened on 8 November in which several of the main partici-
pants were involved, though Truman did not attend. Over the
next few weeks the DMU broke into separate groups along
bureaucratic protocol: State enacted its own planning
groups; Defense its own, etc. There seems to be little
collaboration during this period. In fact this is the
period (26 October through 17 November) that Acheson cites,
in retrospect, as one during which the president was poorly
served by his advisers.

We were all deeply apprehensive. We were frank with
one another, but not quite frank enough. I was unwill-
ing to urge on the President a military course that his
military advisers would not propose. They would not
propose it because it ran counter to American military
tradition of the proper powers of the theater commander
since 1864. (Acheson, 1969: 468.)

Acheson also discusses the period from 10 November until 4
December in similarly unflattering terms. "All the
President's advisers in this matter, civilian and military,
knew that something was badly wrong [with decisionmaking],
though . . . what to do about it they muffed." That they
were concerned is reflected in the number of separate meet-
ings held: "the Secretaries of State and Defense and their
chief assistants met three times with the Chiefs of Staff in
their war room . . . the two secretaries met five times with
the President, and I consulted with him on five other occa-
sions." Still Acheson concludes that "none of us, myself
prominently included, served him as he was entitled to be
served" (Acheson, 1969: 466). So while there were numerous
meetings taking place at State, at Defense, at the Pentagon
in general, the apex of DMU was simply not functioning involved. Such fragmented meetings prevailed until the near collapse of MacArthur's forces at the end of November. In any event, the apex of the DMU was only convened formally one time, on 26 December.

3.1.D. Was the DMU convened along extemporaneous or routine means? When it was convened it was along routinized protocols. The NSC meeting of 9 November was according to routine; that Truman did not attend was even fairly typical. The president preferred the NSC to generate options for his approval at which time he would make the final decision (see Chapter IV). And in fact when convened during this event the DMU was essentially to make certain all the principals were fully briefed. Decisionmaking was not, at least throughout November, one of its functions. The 6 November meeting was a bit more ad hoc in character. Acheson began gathering key persons while communicating by phone with the president. Yet this seems to be the exception of the period rather than the rule. It is interesting to note by contrast that back in June when the North Koreans invaded the South, the meetings were attended by Truman and they were held at his residence (Blair House). During the initial phase of the entry of China, Truman missed several meetings and they were invariably held at State or Defense.

2. Selection of Options
3.2.A. Were options proffered by a restrictive DMU (i.e., the apex) or the larger decisionmaking bureaucracy? As we have already demonstrated, the apex of the DMU was scarcely involved in the decisionmaking at all. Rather a lower-level group (with the exception of Acheson) from various parts of the bureaucracy became the DMU. And it was this group, from the larger decisionmaking bureaucracy, that proffered options, determined what ones would go to the president for approval, and ultimately moved the selection process along.

3.2.B. Were the options many or few in number? As we have discussed above—and one of the main theses of the case study of deterrence by George and Smoke—decisionmaking was largely abandoned as an enterprise. That which was undertaken was incremental [George and Smoke, 1974: 196, 203] and determined by military exigencies and prior contingencies. (George and Smoke: 197, 202.) In fact there is little mention of options at all.

Nonetheless we know that several military options were considered. MacArthur was considering and selecting options in the field; and once decisionmakers got up to speed in Washington the same occurred. At the first convocation of the DMU (6 November) the only option that was considered was that of postponing MacArthur's order to bomb. Then at the following meeting (NSC meeting of 9 November) options that were discussed regarding how to engage the Chinese in some
sort of negotiation so as to achieve the status quo ante. (Acheson, 1969: 471; Truman, 1956: 380.) Truman writes that there were essentially three directions policy was following in November—though his thoughts are second hand inasmuch as he is reporting what Acheson represented to him as taking place at the meetings. The threefold approach was this: 1) to reassure U.S. allies that the U.S. was not attempting to widen the conflict; 2) to seek maximum support in the UN against further Chinese aggression; and 3) to ascertain the strength and intentions of the Chinese. (Truman, 1956: 381.) Of the three, the last one was policy as reported by MacArthur; he cabled Washington that he was probing in order to assess China's degree of commitment. He had not been instructed to do this but simply determined to do so because of military need.

In short we are able to discover only the broad outline of the options considered. We know that there were several directions and several sources of input into the process. Yet we are unable to say with certainty what options were considered and selected. We must therefore consider the evidence inconclusive and insufficient to make a determination.

3.2.C. **Were the options reflective of an individual personality or personalities?** We must consider MacArthur's influence. The General clearly dominated phases of U.S. (indeed UN) decisionmaking concerning China's entry into the
Korean War. And we have noted that of the options mentioned in the president's memoirs, the General was responsible for one third. Nor is it "too much to suggest . . . that tactical military requirements and the search for a military strategy to guide operations in North Korea intruded into and decisively shaped the more slowly developing war objectives and grand strategy in Washington" (George and Smoke, 1974: 203). Moreover, it was MacArthur who, as supreme commander and whose personality may have predisposed him to dominate, personally guided military requirements.

On the other hand, we must consider that in due time "grand strategy" did catch up with MacArthur and indeed supplanted MacArthur's proconsul direction. Thus while his personality may have dominated some aspects, on balance this was not the case. Eventually the decisionmaking processes caught up with military requirements and Washington wrested back the policy making duties for which it was responsible. Thereafter decisionmaking was reflective of a larger bureaucracy and not of any individual or group of individuals. We therefore conclude that evidence to confirm this aspect of the hypothesis exists.

Finally we consider 3.2.D. Were there indications of groupthink present? It is somewhat tempting to say yes. After all, decisionmakers apparently slid along rather blithely and incrementally with little action. And as Acheson notes it was not until Ridgway spoke up with "his
frank assessment" that those involved realized together that "the Emperor had no clothes" (Acheson, 1969: 475). But it would appear that individual and departmental reasons for inaction rather than some collective in-group trying to avoid a challenge was what was behind this phenomenon. Acheson notes throughout his discussion that several individuals would criticize or challenge MacArthur's assessments. That they were concerned lest there be political fallout over too rigorous a public challenge is what allowed MacArthur to initially circumvent the group's views.

Thus while there is nothing very compelling to indicate the presence of groupthink, we must at least mention a potential caveat. George and Smoke argue that Acheson's account wherein he suggests that he often and openly disagreed with MacArthur's views is at least a little self serving. They point to evidence that suggests that Acheson too was either mesmerized or cajoled by MacArthur. (George and Smoke, 1974: 229). Nonetheless they do not conclude that it was a pathology like groupthink. That the president's "top advisers could agree on the need for new instructions to MacArthur and yet found narrow bureaucratic and political reasons for not informing" Truman was not groupthink but was still "a breakdown of the first magnitude in the advisory process" (George and Smoke, 1974: 224). Groupthink was not indicated in this instance.
3. Implementation of Options

As with the other questions we are hoping to establish if the implementation process was conducted from the highest locus of decisionmaking as well as whether it was in an ad hoc manner or alternatively according to standard procedures.

3.3.A. Was implementation controlled by the apex of the DMU or by a more inclusive DMU? We have discussed this to some extent previously. Recall that we have seen an essentially threefold approach in the options selected. With respect to the "handling" of our allies this was done through the prescribed State Department channels. Even though Attlee unexpectedly came calling on Washington, Acheson, rightly as the Secretary of State, met with the British dignitary. The resolutions at the UN (e.g., condemning Chinese aggression and embargoing China and North Korea) were implemented by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Austin Warren. This was clearly utilization of the foreign-policy bureaucracy. And the military campaign was unquestionably implemented and conducted by MacArthur. Later as General Ridgway was sent to Korea to supplant MacArthur, he began to conduct policy as suggested through Washington. But prior to that, it was MacArthur's show. His conduct in implementing policy, or rather failing to implement it as Washington continually requested, eventually cost him his job. In all three areas, however,
implementation of U.S. policy was conducted by the foreign-policy bureaucracy at large rather than through a restrictive DMU apex.

3.3.B. Was implementation of options conducted a la routines or extemporaneously? By discussing the locus of implementation we have touched upon the method as well. As just noted, if we accept Truman's own view that policy was threefold, in each of the three areas standard routines were applied. Though Attlee's hastily scheduled trip was unusual, State's protocol held sway. Attlee was reassured that U.S. policy was, as it had previously been, that of consulting with allies prior to major changes in policy. Specifically Acheson convinced Attlee that the U.S. would neither seek to expand the war by bombing China nor use nuclear weapons. Neither is there any evidence that anything but standard procedures were used at the UN. The U.S. Ambassador there influenced allies to introduce resolutions amenable to the U.S. and inimical to China—he simply implemented policy per instructions from his superiors. Allies were consulted and caucused; foes were explained the limits of U.S. patience and warned to apply pressure on China. As for the military campaign, contingency plans have always been a central part of war. Korea had its surprises in which, doubtless, adaptation of said contingencies took place. And from Acheson's and Truman's accounts we understand that MacArthur perfected the
art of adapting contingencies that had their genesis in Washington to fit his exigencies. Still, those same contingencies were the basis of his campaign and once Ridgway was sent there those contingencies were firmly reestablished. We conclude, as we would expect given our hypotheses, that routines formed the basis of implementation.

3.3.C. Was there evidence of bureaucratic politics in implementation? We have noted how the various departments worked in concert. It is not that they always met together to determine a joint policy but, rather, that they willingly worked out policy after consultation and some collaboration. Acheson's memoirs particularly stress this. The document generated from the 1 September NSC meeting formed the contingency plan (clearly centered on "containment") from which the administration only incrementally departed over the course of this phase of the war. That they moved in stages, incrementally, may provide some evidence of bureaucratic politics—-inertia to be precise. George and Smoke imply as much:

The fact that all the President's top advisers could agree on the need for new instructions to MacArthur [departing form the original ones contained in the NSC document] and yet found narrow bureaucratic and political reasons for not informing the President of this constitutes a breakdown of the first magnitude in the advisory process. (George and Smoke, 1974: 224.)

Yet no evidence of "bureaucratic" motivation or is provided. Instead the authors seem to be making the argument as a generalization of poor advise. As we have seen, Acheson
admits the same in his account. There is simply no evidence that any department or agency dragged its feet or pushed its parochial concerns. The combined and collective thrust of U.S. policy regarding China's involvement was standard containment. And each department contributed to that individually. Thus we conclude that bureaucratic politics was not evidenced.

3.3.D. **Was implementation instantaneous with selection of options or temporally distinct?** Implementation was, without question, distinct from the process of selection. We have already spent some time describing the slowness with which implementation occurred. We cited, for example, the thesis argued persuasively by George and Smoke (1974) of incremental policy making and implementation. Part of the reason may be, in contrast to our argument, the distance between where policy was to be implemented and its origins in Washington. Nonetheless, it was temporally distinct.

4. Evaluation of Selected Action

The final group of questions concerns the feedback process once policy had been determined and implemented. 3.4.A. **Was feedback controlled at the apex of the DMU or through a larger DMU comprised of the more inclusive parts of the foreign-policy bureaucracy?** Like the actual implementation, the evaluation of policy was split along departmental lines. State followed action in the UN as well as how U.S. policy was playing domestically and abroad. Of
course State was kept fully briefed with respect to the military campaign; this was primarily a function of the concerted effort rather than anything else. Similarly, Defense implemented and evaluated military policy. The JCS communicated with their commander (MacArthur) regularly and he with them. This is quite typical of the military: the euphemism is "chain of command." On a few occasions Secretary Marshall involved himself in communications with MacArthur; so too did President Truman. But these departures appear to be directed at MacArthur's insubordination rather than evaluating policy. (See Truman, 1956: 440-450 passim.) Thus the process of feedback followed the process of implementation: the department tasked with implementing specific policy similarly evaluated it once put in action. The apex of the DMU was only secondarily involved as it abdicated its prerogatives along bureaucratic lines. This confirms our expectations.

3.4.B. **Was the feedback-evaluation process accomplished through extemporaneous means or through standard channels from the foreign-policy bureaucracy?** The latter best characterizes feedback with respect to this phase of the Korean War. With 1947's National Security Act, the CIA was created and empowered with coordinating intelligence for the president. Truman mentions a few occasions where Bedell Smith was taken to meetings in order to brief those present. Yet the examples cited are
briefings of the DMU as to what the Soviets were likely to do, how they might behave under this or that circumstance. (Truman, 1956: 419.) On another occasion Smith was used to brief congressional leaders. But these are, at best, examples of marginal significance.

For the most part, intelligence and evaluation was conducted in the department responsible for the particular aspect policy. Defense clearly conducted its own. And it is with regard to Defense that the only example of ad hoc feedback is found. Recall that Marshall eventually sent General Collins to Korea to get a clearer picture of the facts, "so confused and confusing were the reports from [MacArthur]" (Acheson, 1969: 472; Truman, 1956: 415). Again this appears an exception rather than a rule during the event. And it must be remembered that this example of improvised evaluation of policy was related to difficulties the administration was having with MacArthur, and only secondarily related to U.S. policy with respect to the Chinese intervention. We therefore conclude that the feedback and evaluation process was routine.

3.4.C. Did signs of bureaucratic interference in the feedback-evaluation process exist? Again we look for indicators such as the accuracy of information the DMU was able to get or whether spin or outright misinformation was channeled back to the DMU. Recall that both Truman and Acheson stress that the first week or so after China's
involvement, information was inaccurate and confusing at best. (Truman, 1956: 372-373; Acheson, 1969: 463.) This is not entirely unexpected given the location and nature of technology then existing. Moreover, that MacArthur was fully in charge of the information flow very likely added to its confused nature. This, however, deals with the DMU discovering what had happened and not of its evaluation once policy had been implemented.

As policy was determined, as the NSC paper of 1 September was adapted to the situation, feedback was fairly steady. Regular NSC meetings were held in October, November, and December to coordinate the respective departments sharing their information with their peers. And while there were undoubtedly instances of incomplete information—e.g., what Acheson characterizes as MacArthur's "purple telegrams"—the information was relatively complete and factual. The DMU was not influenced by MacArthur's antics.

MacArthur provides the only example of selective information. He was busy "fighting the Pentagon" while others were fighting the war to use Acheson's words. And he has been characterized as more interested in how he would be viewed by history than fully keeping Washington abreast. Recall that Lovett (Defense) pejoratively labeled MacArthur's memoranda "prosperity papers." Notwithstanding any malfeasance MacArthur may have displayed, we have seen in other cases that information from the field in a military
conflict tends to be suspect in any case. Thus it is not uncommon for decisionmakers to wait for more information in order to obviate the phenomenon.

As State and Defense became more involved—i.e., after the first few days—they each became more adept at winnowing the kernels of accurate information from MacArthur's telegrams. And over time as decisionmakers relied on multiple sources of information, rather than simply MacArthur's memoranda and cables, a relatively accurate picture was developed. Nonetheless, MacArthur's reports clearly demonstrate examples of "selective" information being relayed to the DMU. We must stress that this was largely prior to implementation of policy as the DMU was attempting to discover the "facts."

Thus while there is evidence that MacArthur put spin on information, this is not bureaucratic politics. Rather, it is MacArthur acting in a self-serving way. Indeed, the bureaucracy in which he officially functioned—the military—worked in conjunction with State and others to minimize MacArthur. We therefore conclude, contrary to our expectations, that no evidence of bureaucratic interference is evident.

3.4.D. Was the process instantaneous with implementation or temporally distinct? Our reasoning here follows precisely that which we outlined above under implementation. Namely, time transpired between
decisionmaking processes. As selection and implementation were temporally distinct, so too were implementation and evaluation. It took time to get information back; and there appeared no urgency about evaluating and perhaps reformulating policy as information did arrive. Instead, time was allowed to transpire. The two processes were temporally distinct as we would predict.

THE PUEBLO INCIDENT, 1968

Narrative

On 6 January 1968 the U.S. Pueblo, a highly-sophisticated electronic-intelligence-gathering vessel made ready to set sail from Japan. Its mission was to gather data off the coast of North Korea in relief of its sister ship the Banner which was due for leave.

The Pueblo's mission had been determined the previous month, that is, during December 1967. The procedure was apparently routine. Pueblo was simply one among several other operations that was authorized. It was contained in a

---

"fat notebook--the 'Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule'" which was making its way through the "approval cycle." As of 26 December 1967, proposals for the following month, including the **Pueblo** mission, had only to be signed off by CIA, NSA, and State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (I&R). At 11:00 A.M. on 27 December, representatives of the various agencies met in the Pentagon to resolve any differences of opinion about the actual missions contained in the notebook as well as the risk evaluation of each. At this particular meeting there was no such difference of opinion. "Everything was strictly routine" (Armbrister, 1970: 192-193). **Pueblo**'s risk evaluation was termed "minimal."

The only remaining hurdle for the missions, including the **Pueblo's**, was to be cleared by the Senior Interdepartmental Group, known in the Johnson years as the 303 Committee. The 303 Committee was established to provide oversight and coordination with respect to covert operations. Late Friday afternoon, 29 December, said committee met; included were the president's National Security Adviser, Walt Rostow, as well as Paul Nitze (Defense) and Nicholas Katzenbach (State). The monthly schedule for January 1968 was approved whereupon the notebook was sent back to the Pentagon. (Armbrister, 1970: 194.)

There is no mention of whether recent warnings from North Korea were discussed by the Committee though Armbrister reports that there was no fault found in the
Pueblo proposal. (Armbriester, 1970: 194.) But it was clear that hostilities were increasing between North Korea and the Untied States. In November, and then again twice in December the North Koreans had warned the "U.S. imperialists" about their provocations in North Korean territorial waters. (Simmons, 1978: 2-3.) Indeed, just two days before the Pueblo sailed, Pyongyang radio announced:

The U.S. imperialist aggressor army, which has been incessantly committing provocative acts lately on the sea off of the eastern coast, from 0600 hours this morning again dispatched many armed boats, mingled with fishing boats, under the escort of armed warships into the coastal waters of our side. (Simmons, 1978: 3.)

It is doubtful whether the Pueblo was actually made aware of this announcement during its preparation to sail. Moreover, the threat of such announcements had diminished with their repeated issuance without any action to back them up. It is probable that the administration assumed this was simply another hollow threat.

As the Pueblo sailed to its area off the coast of North Korea on 8 December, it was heading into politically uncharted waters. The crew of 83 men collected intelligence for some two weeks until on the night of 22 January, the unexpected happened. The ship's crew and the administration were caught quite off guard by what followed.25

25With one exception, all the accounts agree that the administration was surprised because of various sorts of intelligence failures: the radio broadcasts had not been forwarded to appropriate persons, or the fact that North Korea threatened so often but did nothing, etc. The one exceptions is the 1988 book by Robert Liston (cited supra).
At about 11:30 P.M. (EDT) on 22 January 1968 the Pueblo was surrounded by two Soviet-style subchasers, three or four torpedo boats, and two North Korean MIGs. Over the next hour or so the Pueblo crew destroyed documents and maneuvered so as to prevent the ship's capture. Finally the Pueblo was boarded by North Koreans and towed to Wonsan harbor where it arrived at around 6:30 A.M. (EDT) on the morning of 23 January. During the ship's capture one crewman was killed and the captain and one other were wounded. The crew of the ship were imprisoned for some eleven months during which time they were poorly fed, denied medical care, and they were forced to sign "confessions."

In the early morning hours (2:24 A.M.) of 23 January, President Johnson's bedside telephone rang. It was the duty officer from the Situation Room, in the White House basement, who reported to Johnson what was then known of the Pueblo incident. "The first reports were sketchy. The U.S. Pueblo, . . . had been cruising off the coast of North

He agrees that the administration was surprised but for a significantly different reason. Namely, the National Security Agency (NSA) which commands such operations deliberately withheld information from the government. His is an elaborate conspiracy theory in which the U.S. government, its people, its press, and its intelligence operations have all been controlled and duped by the NSA. While his argument requires a sort of mental gymnastic with which we are not comfortable, his book is nonetheless a fascinating account of the Pueblo incident. More importantly, it occasionally provides useful insights. For this reason we use the book here as a reference but hasten to add that we remain wholly unconvinced of its thesis.
Korea, gathering intelligence from the mainland" when it was illegally seized. The ship was then boarded by North Koreans. (Johnson, 1971: 533.) Armbrister reports that after hearing about it Rostow went to the Situation Room where he and Art McCafferty (Chief of Situation Room) gathered information for the president's consideration the following morning. Rostow had called the president after 2:00 A.M. but was unable to give Johnson many details. (Armbrister, 1970: 237.) It was unclear, for example, if at any time the ship had violated Korean territorial waters. Pueblo had maintained radio silence for the previous ten days and had only reported its position just prior to seizure.

The morning of 23 January was characterized by a flurry of activity at the White House, State, and at the Pentagon. At the White House, the president received his next report at around 6:00 A.M. from Rostow. Rostow had summarized the night's information into a one-page report. Among other things, Rostow pointed out that they believed the ship to have not violated territorial waters. Also, important security codes may have been compromised. The ship carried sophisticated equipment that was under the NSA's control. Rostow had already sent out the order worldwide to change codes during the night. (Armbrister, 1970: 237.)

At the State Department, Rusk quickly instructed Llewellyn Thompson to request Soviet influence and help in the matter. (Armbrister, 1970: 247.) Johnson, in fact,
sights the Soviets' "chilly" response as one sign that the whole thing had been premeditated. (Johnson, 1971: 535.) Also, William Bundy (State) who would normally handle such an event assigned his deputy, Samuel Berger to set up watch on Pueblo. It seems that Bundy was so involved with the siege at Khe Sanh and the putative forthcoming Vietnamese offensive (Tet began one week later) that he had no time for Pueblo. Berger, in Bundy's stead, attempted to handle the matter from his desk for the next couple of days but by 26 January he found that he could not continue to follow events there; he therefore followed custom and set up watch in State's Operations Center. (Armbriester, 1970: 247-48.)

Activity at the Pentagon was equally harried. In the early hours of the seizure, the Pentagon looked at ways the ship might be rescued. Regional air and naval commanders had already initiated contingency plans and parts of the Seventh Fleet (notably the U.S. Enterprise) had set courses toward the area of trouble. Secretary McNamara was informed of the incident during the night after Rostow had been alerted by the White House Situation Room. Rostow called both Secretaries McNamara and Rusk. Both suggested Rostow not wake the president until details could be ascertained. (Armbriester, 1970: 222-223.) Having been alerted Secretary McNamara showed up for work at about 7:00 A.M. By this time the Pueblo had already arrived at Wonsan harbor; a rescue of the ship was therefore no longer a viable option. "He
[McNamara] called in his military and civilian advisors. "Armbrister quotes Richard Steadman (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) as saying that there was 'a sort of stunned silence.' "Nobody really knew what had happened or what to do about it." McNamara instructed them to gather information, and to compile a chronology of events. He then left the Pentagon for the White House. (Armbrister, 1970: 238.)

The first meeting had already begun in the White House basement. Rostow, Rusk, Katzenbach, and Bundy were listening to General Wheeler who was pointing at maps and explaining what had happened when McNamara and Nitze arrived. Around the same time General Maxwell Taylor and his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Robert McGowan appeared. At 10:00 A.M. the president joined the group to discuss what had happened and how to respond. Immediately the participants realized two important factors: a rescue of the Pueblo in international waters was no longer possible (the ship was now moored in a North Korean harbor); and U.S. naval vessels had been ordered to the area during the night and were still proceeding toward Korea. (Simmons, 1978: 8.)

By 10:25, the president instructed General Wheeler to contact Admiral Hyland in Hawaii to instruct that no show of force take place. The group had quickly decided that with Pueblo in Wonsan harbor, an attempted retrieval of the Pueblo would be most unlikely to succeed and would only get
the crew killed. (Armbrister, 1970: 238-239; Johnson, 1971: 532.) Still the administration wished to demonstrate resolve. It therefore ordered a large augmentation of what the Pentagon already had steaming to the region. Task Force 77 was quickly moved into the area. (Simmons, 1978: 8-11; Kaplan, 1981: 359.)

At around noon President Johnson met with his regular Tuesday Lunch group to discuss other matters. The Pueblo was featured prominently in discussions. The participants were the regulars: Secretaries Rusk, and McNamara, DCI Helms, JCS Chairman Wheeler, and White House aides Walt Rostow, and White House aides George Christian and Tom Johnson. Included too was Clark Clifford who was designated to replace McNamara. (Johnson, 1971: 532.) This is important because Clifford is cited by Armbrister as a most influential member of the decisionmaking unit. And this was the first time he apparently became involved. McNamara welcomed Clifford to his new job with the following comment: 'This is what it is like on a typical day. We had an inadvertent intrusion into Cambodia. We lost a B-52 with four H-bombs aboard. We had an intelligence ship captured by the North Koreans.' Clifford's response is recorded as, 'Mr. President, may I leave now?' (Johnson, 1971: 532). Finally, that evening at 6:00 P.M. President Johnson had about two-dozen members of Congress to the White House where they were briefed. (Armbrister, 1970: 249.)
Thereafter, discussions focused on what might be done to get the ship back and what sort of response should the United States offer to the challenge. President Johnson remarks that over "the next few days I held dozens of meetings with the National Security Council, with foreign affairs and military advisers, and with congressional leaders" in which said discussions took place. In terms of the response to the provocation, an array of options was considered. They included mining Wonsan harbor, mining other North Korean harbors, interdicting coastal shipping, a tit-for-tat seizure of a North Korean ship, and several permutations of strikes by air or naval gunfire. (Johnson, 1971: 536; Simmons, 1978: 8.) Each scenario was considered too risky and, what was worse, unlikely to achieve the administration's objective—viz., to get the ship and its crew back. Johnson's memoirs make this point clear. "I wanted the officers and crew of the Pueblo home alive, and I was prepared to take considerable political heat to achieve this goal. In taking this position I was fully supported by my advisers, military as well as civilian" (Johnson, 1971: 536). Rusk similarly notes several options being discussed but remarks that a "rescue operation was quickly ruled out" because it "was not operationally feasible" (Rusk, 1990: 391). Rusk notes that it would have taken the administration some three to four weeks to mobilize sufficient air power to do the job. (Rusk, 1990: 392.)
It was during this period, after the decision not to use force was made, that a Planning Committee was set up. Its purpose was to consider all options and responses and to follow through for the duration. Johnson apparently instructed the military to make a list of military options for the Committee's discussion. (Armbrister, 1970: 258-263.) The Planning Committee, at least "for the next several days" beginning with 24 January, held "informal" meetings. (Armbrister, 1970: 258; Declassified Documents Quarterly, 1986: 475.) It was during these meetings that Clifford exerted "by all accounts" the most influence. (Armbrister, 1970: 258.) The meetings were held at the White House and the participants--in addition to Clifford--included the following: Rostow, Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Katzenbach, Arthur Goldberg (UN Ambassador), DCI Helms, Paul Nitze (Defense), Sam Berger (State), Paul Warnke (Defense) and Richard Steadman (Defense). According to Armbrister, Clifford, Rusk, and McNamara all counseled "moderation" reminding the group that the objective was to get the crew back alive.

During one such meeting, after hearing repeated options on how to hit the North Koreans, Clifford directed the group back to the issue at hand. He demanded they stop asking 'What have we got to hit them with?' and instead focus on 'What are this country's objectives?' Though Clifford's influence was strong, it did not prevent others from contin-
ning to put forward more forceful options. Rusk recounts that "One senior presidential adviser wanted to lure a Soviet intelligence ship into South Korean waters and then have South Korean naval vessels seize it as counterhostage" (1990: Rusk, 392). Though Rusk does not identify the adviser, Armbrister does. Armbrister quotes another participant, Steadman, as describing Walt Rostow's suggestion to lure a Soviet ship into a South Korean trap as providing symmetry.

Over the past several years Rusk and Rostow had disagreed occasionally over the scope of their respective roles in determining foreign policy. Both men held essentially the same view about the war in Vietnam; still relations between them were "correct." Now the Secretary of State looked directly at Rostow. "The only symmetry," he said, "is its equal outrageousness." (Armbrister, 1970: 261.)

The group continued to consider other options.

One option that the president accepted was to mobilize reserves in the states. Johnson did so, calling up some 15,000 reservists on 25 January without prior consultation with Congress whose leaders merely acquiesced. The effect was that "the administration publicly underlined a prudent approach to the Pueblo crisis, combined with a demonstration of military strength" (Simmons, 1978: 10). On 26 January the president addressed the nation and simultaneously seemed to send a signal abroad. He said "I hope that North Korea will recognize the gravity of the situation they have created. . . . I am confident that the American people will
exhibit in this crisis, as they have in other crises, determination and sanity" (Simmons, 1978: 11; Armbuster, 1970: 265).

Prior to the president's call for sanity, Johnson instructed Ambassador Goldberg to request an "urgent session" of the United Nations Security Council. On Thursday, 25 January, Goldberg made a brief address before the Council. "It is imperative" Goldberg stressed "that the Security Council act with the greatest urgency" in condemning the aggression. He pointed out, referring to the rights of self defense that such a "course is far more preferable to the remedies which the Charter reserves to member states" (Armbuster, 1970: 265).

Slowly the Planning Committee seemed to shift back to its respective constituent locations. Defense considered military options from the Pentagon in which the White House invariably found flaws. State, under Berger's command, continued its frantic search for options. And Goldberg tried to keep the issue alive in the UN. Johnson's memoirs make it sound as though it was a perfectly rational decisionmaking process with the president at the helm. Others characterize it in somewhat less charitable terms. (Armbuster, 1970: 260-265.) In early February the North Koreans protested the "U.S. imperialists" efforts to "illegally" bring the Pueblo affair before the UN. But in so doing they offered the first glimpse of a method of
resolution. A precedent had been set in a 1964 incident when two U.S. helicopter pilots crossed the DMZ and were captured. Their eventual release was gained after the U.S. signed a paper admitting that the two had violated North Korean territory. This provided the eventual solution to the Pueblo.

Also in early February the process of getting the Pueblo crew back moved from decisionmakers in Washington to negotiators in Korea. The Armistice Committee held regular meetings at Panmunjom. Those meetings would begin to focus almost exclusively on the Pueblo and its crew. By 4 March the U.S. and North Korean representatives had met some ten times concerning the Pueblo. The Koreans had provided the names of the dead and wounded. And for the next several months, until December 1968, negotiations would continue on the crew's release. (Armbrister, 1970: 283-285.) During this time the Operation Center at State continued to follow events and make suggestions. Then on the morning of 23 December the crew members of Pueblo crossed the bridge into South Korean territory where they were sent back to San Diego for debriefing. Thus ended the eleven-month Pueblo affair.

Analysis

We begin the comparative analysis by asking of the Pueblo incident those same question which we have applied to previous case studies. Each is asked in order to get a feel
for the decisionmaking process that obtained during the particular event.

1. Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

We begin by establishing the first convocation of the DMU. Recall that Walt Rostow became aware of the Pueblo's seizure during the late hours of Tuesday night and early hours of Wednesday morning (22, 23 January respectively). The White House Situation Room had been monitoring events in Vietnam. The administration had anticipated some sort of large Vietnamese offensive (correctly as it turned out) for a some weeks. In particular, the siege at Khe Sanh was being watched closely. Sometime around 11:45 P.M. Tuesday night, Jim Brown from the Situation Room called Walt Rostow at his residence. The information was sketchy but an American intelligence ship was in trouble off the coast of North Korea. Rostow remained at home but phoned Secretaries McNamara and Rusk to inform each. By 12:45 A.M. (one hour later) Rostow was convinced that it was a serious situation and he therefore decided to return to the White House Situation Room himself to monitor events as they unfolded. (Armbrister, 1970: 222.) And we know from the president's own memoirs that he first received a call from the Situation Room at 2:24 A.M. (Johnson, 1971: 533; also Armbrister, 1970: 237.)

We are told that Rostow continued to monitor events the entire night and by morning had reduced the incident to a
one-page summary for the president. (Johnson, 1971: 533.) We know also that he had informed both Secretaries McNamara and Rusk during the night. Though alerted no meeting had thus far been scheduled.

That morning Rusk went to work at State where he instructed Llewellyn Thompson (Soviet expert) to seek Soviet assistance in the matter. He saw to other matters and then eventually went to the White House to be briefed by Rostow and others.

Similarly McNamara showed up for work at the Pentagon where he gathered together his civilian and military advisers. He instructed them to construct a chronology and to get as much information as possible. He then decided to go to the White House himself. And we know that when he arrived a group of foreign-policy decisionmakers was assembled discussing Pueblo. The group was comprised of Rostow, Rusk, Katzenbach, William Bundy, and General Wheeler. Around the same time that McNamara arrived, bringing Nitze with him, so too did General Maxwell Taylor and his military aide. And finally we know that the president showed up around 10:00 A.M. (Armbriester, 1970: 238-239.) It is not clear who, if anybody, actually instructed that such a meeting take place or if it simply convened in an informal way.

3.1.A. **Was the DMU convened restricted to the apex or a more inclusive group?** No matter which meeting we accept
as the initial convocation, the DMU was clearly more inclusive than simply the apex. The apex, to be sure, was involved. But several other individuals were involved as well. And the president did not get involved in meeting with the DMU until several hours after things had been moving along with respect to the affair. Thus a relatively expansive DMU was convened and remained atop the decisionmaking from an early time.

The DMU included: Rostow, Rusk, William Bundy (replaced after the first day by Samuel Berger), General Wheeler, McNamara and Nitze, Maxwell Taylor and an aide, and the president. The composition changed only slightly after that first day. Clark Clifford and Paul Warnke were added, and as already mentioned Berger replaced Bundy. Also to be included in this group is Arthur Goldberg, who attended several meetings even though he was officially stationed in New York. Similarly two others became regular members: DCI Helms and Richard Steadman (Defense). Finally, there is no mention of General Taylor after this first day; his duties concerned Vietnam primarily and it is reasonable to infer that he returned to those duties as did William Bundy. This rather expansive group became the basis for the Planning Committee which ultimately took charge of the decisionmaking. And in addition to the main persons of the Planning Committee, there were several others involved back at their respective agencies.
3.1.B. At what locus was the DMU convened? We would expect a low locus of convocation under this particular configuration of independent variables. And ultimately, after the first two-to-three days, this is what happened. But we must recognize that initially the locus was quite high. The first meeting occurred at the White House. And for at least two days the Planning Group that was established to follow events continued to meet there. This was partly due to the fact that Clark Clifford had no office at which he could conduct meetings. It was therefore natural to meet in the White House basement with Rostow and others. Nonetheless the evidence disconfirms this aspect of the hypothesis.

3.1.C. With what frequency was the apex of the DMU convened? At the very early stages of the event there was a flurry of meetings. There were independent meetings at the White House, State, and Defense all the first morning. We know that following those independent meetings a meeting took place in the White House basement at which the apex of the DMU and others attended--Johnson came late to it. We know, that after this meeting another one took place--albeit not exclusively to discuss Pueblo--at noon. That is when the president tells us he held his weekly Tuesday Luncheon meeting and when Clifford was really introduced to the Pueblo affair. (Johnson, 1971: 532.) And we know that several meetings of the Planning Committee took place
beginning the following day, 24 January, which continued fairly frequently for the next several days— at least until early February.

Further, the Pentagon held a flurry of meetings in which viable military options were considered. And finally, we know that once negotiations began in Panmunjom those meetings were held with some frequency. By early March ten such meetings had already been held; Armbriester later mentions an 8 May meeting as being the sixteenth one. (Armbriester, 1970: 298.) We conclude then that during the remainder of January and through February the DMU convened quite often. It separated into various agencies but it continued to get coordination through the Planning Committee which began on 24 January.

Yet there appears to have been only a on meeting at which the apex of the DMU was convened. The initial meeting in the White House basement was one. This meeting seems to have simply taken place without any one in particular convening it. Thereafter the president followed events from time to time. But he turned over the decisionmaking to others. And the apex of the DMU was never really involved, as a group, thereafter. We therefore conclude, as we expect to see under such conditions, that the apex of the DMU meets very infrequently.

3.1.D. Was the DMU convened along standard routines or was it extemporaneous? Again we must
differentiate between the earliest period of the DMU's awareness and the lengthy period over which the Pueblo affair continued. Initially, there seems to have been a rather ad hoc flavor to the way the DMU was established and convened. The first meeting, we will recall, seems to have just happened. Rostow went to the White House during the night as events began to unfold. Rusk, Katzenbach, and William Bundy from State and General Wheeler from the JCS sort of showed up that first morning. And McNamara first went to Defense where he instructed his staff on what he wished for them to accomplish. He then immediately went to the White House. We know that all of them—and they form the basis of the DMU—were at the White House, in the basement, discussing the Pueblo when President Johnson joined them around 10:00 A.M. that first morning. This was clearly an ad hoc meeting: it simply came together as a result of the night's events.

Yet just following that the president met with his Tuesday Lunch group which was established as an advisory group on foreign affairs and Vietnam in particular. Apparently it was determined at this meeting, or shortly thereafter, to establish a Planning Committee comprised of more or less the same persons as originally met in the White House basement. And it was this group that generated options, cleared them with the president, and eventually
coordinated the negotiations that freed the crew of the Pueblo.

Thus it was this Planning Committee comprised of those typically tasked with foreign affairs that handled the affair. It was clearly comprised of the same persons he typically used for making decisions about Vietnam. (For example see Declassified Documents Quarterly, 1986: 1041.) And over time it simply folded back in to the various agencies. It was therefore a rather routine group convened to handle the Pueblo matter.

2. Selection of Options

The following questions attempt to get at the sorts of options that were considered, who was allowed to participate, the locus and nature of the decisionmaking process, and whether groupthink was a factor.

3.2.A. Were options proffered and selected by a restrictive DMU (apex) or a more inclusive DMU? The options proffered over the course of the Pueblo affair had their origins in several agencies. The initial options were selected by the military as it attempted to respond to a ship in trouble. These were done without any elected official's, much less any member of the DMU's apex, input. It was simply a case of the military following its own chain of command and contingencies.

Beyond these first options, the Planning Committee was the body which proffered and selected options. In many
instances said options were discussed and planned and then sent to the president for his approval. In other instances, options were simply selected and put into motion. In either case the sources of input were relatively broad.

The apex of the DMU was not involved in the decisionmaking around the Pueblo per se. To be sure, persons from the apex were involved: notably Rusk, Rostow, and McNamara. But these persons were functioning largely under the coordinating efforts of Clark Clifford. Moreover, to the extent that these persons were involved at all it was within the context of their respective organizational affiliations.

3.2.B. Were few or many options considered? The first option that was considered was that of rescue. This was put into play on a contingency basis by the U.S. naval and air forces in that region of the world. Armbriester's account is the most comprehensive with respect to this. Elements of the Commander in Chief of Pacific Fleet, Commander of Naval Forces in Japan and Hawaii, and several parts of the U.S. intelligence community were involved in this effort. Because some rather unique factors and failures influenced events initially, however, this option was obsolete by the time the DMU really got underway in its consideration of the Pueblo affair.

By the time the DMU began meeting that first morning (23 January) the options all turned toward getting the crew
back alive. Recall that President Johnson mentions this in his memoirs. He says that "I wanted the officers and crew of the Pueblo home alive, and I was prepared to take considerable political heat to achieve this goal" (Johnson, 1971: 536). He notes that his advisers agreed, both civilian and military. Thus all the options that the DMU considered once convened dealt with that main goal. In generating options to achieve said goal, several ideas were considered. Some of them, as mentioned above, were to mine Korean waters, seize their ships, blockade their coast, and to attack them with naval and air fire. Of these, most were quickly discarded as too risky and likely to ensure the crew's death rather than hasten their return. The decisionmaking process was clearly not the orderly process that Johnson's memoirs describe. Instead, there was intense pressure in which some rather screwy ideas surfaced. (Recall, the Rostow idea to lure a Soviet ship into South Korean hands for the sake of symmetry.) Armbrister interviewed those involved in the process and provides some insight. He notes that the president,

wanted to do something pretty quick, another former White House aide says, but he was in the position of not knowing, not finding anything that looked like a very good thing to do. He talked to McNamara, Rusk, Rostow, Clifford. He telephoned Sam Berger, (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), in the middle of the night. His message: Give us more ideas, more alternatives; think them out. (Armbrister, 1970: 260-261.)
Though this was early on in the process, similarly intense sessions characterized the process even into early February. Armbrister describes Rostow on the phone often chiding Berger. Berger in turn "drove his men hard." One describes feeling the "pressure bouncing off the walls" and one State Department official was actually hospitalized with chest pain after one such session. (Armbrister, 1970: 273.) Clearly multiple options were considered. There was no lack of persons coming up with ideas and options though the DMU continually found flaws in them.

Predictably the number of options proliferated with the number of persons involved. We have seen that the initial DMU consisted of some twelve persons. Nonetheless, countless others were employed in the process of generating options. At Defense McNamara had both civilian and military chains of command working diligently. Similar efforts, as we just witnessed, occurred at State with Berger driving his people relentlessly. Johnson would get on the phone and call people in order to get new ideas. (See Armbrister, 1970: 284-285.) Options were being worked out at the UN. And of course negotiations began rather quickly in Korea with U.S. representatives meeting Korean representatives. The vast resources of the foreign-policy bureaucracy were employed including the countless number of specialists in various agencies.
Interestingly enough, after several months the negotiations stalled over technicalities. The Koreans were continually harping on what they called the three "A's": admit, apologize, and assure it would not be repeated. There was intense pressure on the American side to get the crew back; but many were loath to put the U.S. \textit{imprimatur} on a false document. This was simply an expedient that would set an inappropriate precedent. (It is what philosophers call an instrumental attitude about the truth and it might have been dangerous for future U.S. policy.) One State Department official, James Leonard, was worried about this very thing and one night mentioned it to his wife. Her reply was to the effect that perhaps the U.S. should do it but make it exceptionally clear beforehand that the U.S. was signing a false document. The point was if the U.S. removed the deception, such an act could be accomplished with a clear conscience. This became the "Leonard proposal" and in fact formed the eventual solution to the problem. (Armbrister, 1970: 333-335.) Rusk only briefly mentions it in his account saying simply that "this bizarre diplomatic maneuver ended the crisis" (Rusk, 1990: 395). Though anecdotal, it serves to demonstrate that many were truly involved in generating options.

We may fairly conclude that a large number of options was considered and that the sources of input into said options was varied.
3.2.C. Did individual personalities dominate the selection of options? We have already seen that Clark Clifford was the most influential person in the Planning Committee by "all accounts." Clifford was soon to replace McNamara as Secretary of Defense, but at this particular time held no portfolio—he was simply a person whom Johnson trusted. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that he dominated. He influenced the decisionmaking, to be sure, but there was clearly give and take characteristic of others exerting their own influence. We have seen, for instance, that Rusk and Rostow were not shy about putting forth their views.

And contrary to accounts of decisionmaking in the Johnson administration, the president's own dominant personality was not influential in this particular matter. Indeed, no personality could be identified as dominating the selection of options in terms of the Pueblo.

3.2.D. Was there evidence of groupthink present? On the face of it the ingredients for groupthink appear to be present. That is, there was an elite group of top decisionmakers to handle the Pueblo; most of these persons had worked in high government positions for years; and others were in the top of their respective fields in the private sector prior to their government service. One is tempted therefore to see ripe conditions for an in-group forming under the pressure. There is, however, no signs of
this. As consensus began to form around particular approaches someone invariably challenged it. These were individuals of some intellectual acumen who were no doubt proud and confident of their capabilities. Rather than demur in the face of each other they seemed to prefer continually challenging one another. Groupthink does not appear to be a factor during the Pueblo affair.

3. Implementation of Options

3.3.A. Was implementation controlled by the apex of the DMU or some larger group from the established foreign-policy bureaucracy? We have seen that the Planning Committee considered options and in fact coordinated implementation. Yet it turned over the day-to-day implementation to the foreign-policy bureaucracy at large. This was true on all fronts. The military was allowed to handle its areas of expertise without interference; State directed its various areas. In fact we have an account of State's approach on three fronts simultaneously. First, the UN Ambassador brought matters before the UN with great dispatch. Second, Ambassador Thompson was instructed to do all that he could to employ any Soviet influence in the matter. Initially the Soviets were "chilly" but they later seemed more helpful after dogged persistence by Thompson. And third, "we contacted almost every government in the world and asked them to use their good offices to secure the release of the Pueblo crew" (Johnson, 1971: 536). And
Rostow kept the president informed by taking part in the group's coordinating function. Though the Planning Group was the final clearing house of information and decisions, it granted great latitude to the bureaucracy below. This was apparently necessary because of the nature of the drawn-out negotiations and the nature of those with whom the U.S. negotiated. Rusk characterizes the latter this way: the North Koreans "behaved like a pluperfect bastard, even with other Communist states" (Rusk, 1990: 394).

The apex delegated its authority in terms of implementation. It appears that it was content to allow the bureaucracies and agencies tasked with such matters to go about their duties. This confirms what we would expect to see under such conditions.

3.3.B. Was implementation improvised or did it follow bureaucratic routines? The direct answer is that routines were followed with little improvisation. The foreign-policy bureaucracy was allowed to implement policy. In so doing it typically follows standard-operating procedures. This was clearly the case in the Pueblo affair. As already mentioned, military operating procedures were followed most assiduously--this is perhaps most often going to be the case with the military. It was the military that handled the negotiations on the spot in Korea. While this might appear to be an improvisation is really is not. The reason is that since the conclusion of the Korean War the military had been
tasked with negotiations; it had become a routine matter for military commanders in the area to handle such matters. We have already mentioned the threefold approach which State followed. This too was along standard lines of procedure following protocol worked out over time in the U.S. State Department. The only case of circumventing conventions is the one mentioned above, the "Leonard proposal." And this appears to have been an aberration, albeit a lucky one.

3.3.c. Were signs of bureaucratic politics present as policy was implemented? Because we have established that the foreign-policy bureaucracy was instrumental in implementation, we expect to see, more often than not, signs of bureaucratic interests and parochial concerns. For example, an area where we might expect to see this is where the military is put in the position of handling the negotiations in Korea. We might well expect its representatives to be seen emphasizing military concerns when and where possible. Though we paid special attention for this, we found no evidence to indicate that such a phenomenon occurred.

We earlier mentioned the Rusk (State) and Rostow (Executive) going at each other somewhat as options were put forth. And it could be that bureaucratic interests were behind that incident. Yet it should be noted that there was often healthy debate that accompanies considering several points of view under times of some stress. It should also be noted that this was not during the implementation phase
but, rather, was when options were being selected. Similarly, when we considered the formality with which the military chain of command operates one is sometimes tempted to see bureaucratic politics at play. Again, however, we must point out that this was not during implementation of policy chosen by the administration. What is more, the formality occurs within the respective services as well as between them. Thus we must conclude that there is little evidence of bureaucratic politics present during the implementation of policy to resolve the Pueblo affair.

3.3.D. **Was implementation instantaneous with or temporally distinct from the selection of options?** The trend of seeing a distinct difference between selection of options and implementation thereof has held throughout the case studies in this chapter. This is what we expected to see of course. In the case of the Pueblo, we must mention one slight caveat. Namely, when the military initially reacted to events in an attempt to effect a rescue, implementation was virtually instantaneous. The problem of logistics prevented success. This of course lasted only the first few hours of what became nearly a year-long affair. With this single exception, implementation of options was a slow, deliberate process that was temporally distinct from selecting options.
4. Evaluation of Selected Options

3.4.A. Was feedback-evaluation controlled by the apex of the DMU or by a more inclusive DMU? As we have demonstrated in the other processes of decisionmaking, the apex of the DMU was not formally involved. Rather the bureaucracies to which the members of the apex belonged were largely in control of the process.

The final coordinator of feedback and evaluation was the Planning Committee. And as we have seen it was a rather expansive group with various bureaucratic interests represented in its composition. It remained the final clearing house until the crew was returned at which time the Planning Committee ceased to exist. Thereafter internal investigations occurred but they were not handled by the Planning Committee. It may well be that they should have been. One of the criticisms that turned up was that the military was allowed to investigate the military. Eventually the Pike Committee in Congress produced a report that made this very point. In any event the apex did not control the feedback-evaluation process.

3.4.B. Did feedback-evaluation consist of standard channels or improvised ones to evaluate the options once selected? We find that feedback and evaluation were rather routine in nature. The DMU did not attempt to find independent or extemporaneous channels of information. The existing foreign-policy channels were, evidently, deemed
sufficient. In fact, at least with respect to those meetings that took place in Korea, the process was at times agonizingly slow. There was a protocol of sorts that determined who could call a meeting and when. There were rules regarding which side called the last and what that meant for the next and so on. At one point the American side wished to put through the basis of the Leonard proposal, but it was not the American side's turn to call a meeting. The U.S. was forced to wait weeks while the Korean side stalled. Armbrister, among others, describes it as a painful process. (Armbrister, 1970: 321-336; Liston, 1988: 244-246.)

Moreover, the way new proposals worked their way through the evaluation mechanism was laborious and slow on the American side. The Leonard proposal was typed by Leonard after his wife suggested it. He then took it to State where he conferred with Katzenbach and others. They in turn submitted it to Rusk and Rostow and the Planning Committee which in turn got the president's approval. Finally, it went back down the chain and was forwarded to Korea for General Woodward to submit. (Armbrister, 1970: 322-336.)

We should note, however, some rather ingenious examples of feedback from the actual crew of the Pueblo. Two examples illustrate. First, is what Rusk describes as the "men of the Pueblo" finding "ways of signaling hidden messages" (Rusk, 1990: 394). The message to which he refers is the famous picture taken of eight of the Pueblo crew
(officers) in which they all were extending their middle fingers so the folks back home could get their message. Another time, in October, the Koreans forced the officers of the Pueblo to sign another series of "confessions" and added the addendum that the crew would have to request leniency from the North Koreans. The ship's captain, Bucher, offered to serve as chair of the committee to handle the written message which he knew would find its way back to America. On 8 October, the letter was released which read:

> We were fully authorized to penetrate [Korean] waters . . . whenever there was a chance of adding goodies to our spy bag. . . . We, as conscientious human beings, who were cast upon the rocks and shoals of immorality by the tidal wave of Washington's naughty policies, know that neither the frequency nor the distance of the transgressions [into Korean waters] matter because, in the final analysis, penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the act . . . . (Armbrister, 1970: 324-325.)

In addition to the obviously absurd wording, the Captain had cleverly included the legal definition of rape in the first and last lines, which caused Clark Clifford, evidently the only one to catch it, to burst into laughter.

Notwithstanding improvisation on the part of the captured crew then we must conclude that feedback and evaluation was routine.

3.4.C. Was there evidence of bureaucratic interference in the process? For the most part information flow seemed comprehensive and no evidence of bureaucratic interference is evident. During the initial eight hours, however, there
was difficulty ascertaining what was happening. Yet after this initial period the bureaucracy caught up with events and was able to monitor them completely thereafter. This is not to say that decisionmakers knew everything that was occurring within the prison in which the crew was held. It is simply the case that there was an unobstructed information flow from all levels of the bureaucracy to the Planning Committee upon which they were able to evaluate various options as the process moved along.

The same is so when looking for signs of selective information being fed to the DMU. There is really no evidence to speak of. There was only one place that we even found a complaint of somebody being kept out of the loop so to speak. At one point in the fall (September) when it looked as though the crew's release was imminent, the military prepared a document on how the men ought to be handled and debriefed depending upon how and when they were released. The document was distributed and there were some words between State and the Pentagon over the matter. (Armbriester, 1970: 322-323.) This was clearly a minor matter of misunderstanding rather than information being kept from any part of the decisionmaking unit. And it was an isolated case. We found no indication of bureaucratic interference, contrary to our expectations.

3.4.D. **Was feedback-evaluation instantaneous with implementation or temporally distinct?** Little needs to be
elaborated here. There is no question that feedback and then evaluation took time. And since the DMU did not seek to circumvent the normal channels in favor of finding some more ad hoc ways of monitoring events, this remained the case. The process was clearly distinct from implementation.

SUMMARY

A few observations are worth noting. First, with respect to convoking the decisionmaking unit, surprise combined with ample time in which to act seems to have bedeviled and confused decisionmakers. Notice that in each case the DMU met fairly soon after an event's discovery but did not know quite what to do; also, the locus was lower inasmuch as each president turned over matters to others. Decisionmakers seemed almost paralyzed and unwilling to act boldly until more information could be ascertained. Thus they met frequently but simply studied the event at length. That there was ample time apparently allowed leaders the luxury of indecision while awaiting more information. In the Greece case study, action came relatively quickly but it was in the form of generalizing Greece to the entire world.

The comparison of the initial outbreak of war in Korea with the subsequent entry of China is instructive. In the former instance meetings were convened rapidly, decisions were quickly taken, and the location of activity was at Truman's residence (Blair House). He was directly involved from the earliest stages. In the latter case, he seems to
have withdrawn from the activity and instead allowed others to handle it. We may infer that this is explained to some extent by the difference in time afforded decisionmakers--both instances were characterized by surprise.

Similarly, in each case in this chapter implementation of policy--once finally decided upon by the DMU--is relegated to lower levels of the bureaucracy. This is the converse of what we found in the cases previously where decision time was at a premium.

Finally, the feedback process seems to be different in these cases in which time was not an immediate concern. Recall that in the cases such as the Mayaguez seizure, the EC-121 shootout, and to a lesser degree with the Suez-Sinai affair, evaluation of selected courses of action was monitored at the highest levels. In contrast, the cases in this chapter seem to have relegated feedback and evaluation to the existing foreign-policy bureaucracies.

Let us consider each of the case studies with respect to the four hypothesized processes of decisionmaking for goodness of fit.
### TABLE 4

**SUMMARY TABLE OF HYPOTHESES FOR LONG TIME, SURPRISE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Studies #</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### 3.1 Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

- A. More Inclusively
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +
- B. Low Locus
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: -
- C. Low Frequency
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +
- D. Routine vs Impromptu
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +

---

#### 3.2 Selection of Options

- A. Expansively Proffered
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +
- B. Many in Sources and Number
  - 7: *
  - 8: +
  - 9: +
- C. No Dominant Personality
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +
- D. No Groupthink Indicated
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +

---

#### 3.3 Implementation of Options

- A. Controlled by Bureaucracy
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +
- B. Routine
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +
- C. Bureaucratic Politics Present
  - 7: -
  - 8: -
  - 9: -
- D. Temporally Distinct from Selection
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +

---

#### 3.4 Evaluation (Feedback) of Options

- A. Controlled by Bureaucracy
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +
- B. Routine
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +
- C. Bureaucratic Interference Present
  - 7: -
  - 8: -
  - 9: -
- D. Distinct from Implementation
  - 7: +
  - 8: +
  - 9: +

---

**Legend:**

"+": Confirmed

"-": Disconfirmed

"*": Insufficient Information

Case Study 7: Greece Civil War
Case Study 8: China Enters Korean War
Case Study 9: **Pueblo** Capture
Perhaps the first thing we notice is the trend that seemed to be establishing itself in the previous two chapters did not continue here. That is, our observation concerning selecting options in these cases and our hypothesis for that process (3.2) were not disparate. Again we will defer further discussion until the concluding chapter.

Let us look at the goodness of fit on a case-by-case basis. The Greece Civil War case presents us with good fit (at least 75% of the comparative questions confirmed) on each of the four hypotheses--3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. Indeed on hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 (convocation and selection of options respectively) we see that all four comparative questions were confirmed. In terms of hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4 (implementation and evaluation respectively) we see that one comparative question was disconfirmed for each. Nonetheless the criterion of good fit is still met. Perhaps more interesting is that in both instances the comparative question that was disconfirmed dealt with bureaucratic politics.

To generalize this even further we notice that in each of the three case studies, under hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4, the comparative question for bureaucratic politics was disconfirmed. Clearly, we have a trend that cannot be ignored and which we shall take up in the final chapter.
Similar to the Greece case, the observed decisionmaking processes with respect to both the Chinese phase of the Korean War and the Pueblo seizure fit well with our hypothesized processes. And again we see that the earlier trend in terms of selection of options is no longer a problem.

We move now to our last set of three case studies after which we will undertake closer scrutiny of all twelve case studies in Chapter IX.
CHAPTER VIII

LONG TIME, ANTICIPATION:
GUATEMALA, BERLIN, AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

INTRODUCTION

In the following cases we have examples of U.S foreign-policy decisionmaking under the situational configuration of ample time in which to respond and in the absence of surprise. Put differently, prior to the event's occurrence the decisionmakers anticipated its eventuality. That they knew it was coming presumably allowed them to consider implications and to act proactively rather than reactively. They also had time in which to assess their policies and adapt contingencies if they so chose. We shall now consider the cases to see how the actual responses match our expectations.
GUATEMALA, 1954

Narrative

The seeds of what would become America's covert intervention in Guatemala were sown in Guatemala's 1944 revolution. In that year a ruthless dictator, General Jorge Ubico, was thrown out of office by a new breed of young military officers. Among those officers were two notable figures for they would later be important players in the 1954, U.S.-directed coup. Their names: Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and Carlos Castillo Armas. Though cohorts in 1944 they would be nemeses in 1954.

As early as Truman's last two years in office, events in Latin America, particularly Guatemala, were becoming increasingly salient to that administration. The administration therefore continued to monitor, with some concern, what it perceived to be an increasing communist influence. In November 1950, Jacobo Arbenz was elected as Presidente of Guatemala with over fifty percent of the vote. He was elected as a reformer who promised to improve life for Guatemala's poor peasant population. In 1950 he began to

---

implement that promise with various agrarian-reform programs. During this period he either threatened or in fact expropriated some land that was formerly held by U.S. companies. This greatly infuriated these companies and at least one, United Fruit Company (UFCO), began communicating with the Truman administration demanding action to forestall further reforms inimical to its business interests.

Truman's own analysis and those of officials in his administration tended to brand Arbenz as a communist. In Immerman's work on Guatemala, the author demonstrates that Arbenz was more closely aligned with a "green revolution" than a "red revolution." (Immerman, 1982: 183). Though objectively Immerman may be correct, during the early 1950s and with the onset of the McCarthy "Red" hunts, the subjective view clearly saw Arbenz as an agent of Moscow—wittingly or not. In retrospect, the indicators used to demonstrate Arbenz's communist tendencies are rather comical and perhaps worth a quick illustration. In the early 1950s Truman's Ambassador to the area was Ambassador Patterson. He one day explained to a Rotary Group how it was that the administration could conclude that Arbenz was a communist. It is worth quoting him:

Many times it is impossible to prove legally that a certain individual is a communist; but for cases of this sort I recommend a practical method of detection—the "duck test." The duck test works this way: suppose you see a bird walking around in a farm yard. This bird wears no label that says "duck." But the bird certainly looks like a duck. Also, he goes to pond and you notice that he swims like a duck. Then he
opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by this time you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he's wearing a label or not. (Immerman, 1982: 102.)

By the early 1950s, for all intents and purposes, Truman and his administration had indeed concluded that Arbenz was a "duck." They had further concluded that if not Arbenz himself, others within his top advisers worked for Moscow. (Immerman, 1982: 101-132 passim.)

These conclusions led to some rather dramatic activity. For example, Thomas Corcoran of UFCO met with Thomas Mann (State's Latin American Division) at which time the former informed the latter that UFCO and other U.S. companies were looking at ways to 'bring the moderate elements into power in Guatemala'; these companies had decided that it was up to them 'to bring a measure of political stability and social tranquility' to Guatemala. (Immerman, 1982: 118-119.) But they were not averse to the administration's assistance should it be forthcoming. And there is clear evidence that it was in fact forthcoming. An operation by the code name FORTUNE was initiated in which the CIA passed arms to UFCO which in turn was to pass them to anti-Arbenz rebels, more correctly those who favored U.S. interests. (Prados, 1986: 100; Immerman, 1982: 118-122.) Apparently the operation was aborted at some point shortly thereafter.

In brief, this was the nature of U.S. policy toward Guatemala in November 1952 when Eisenhower became president-
elect. Then in February 1953, just the month after Eisenhower's inauguration, the Arbenz government announced its intention to expropriate large tracts of land of which 225,000 acres belonged to UFCO. Arbenz offered compensation but this was deemed "wholly inadequate" by United Fruit (known locally as El Pulpo, "the Octopus"). In Eisenhower's memoirs the former president remembers thinking that Arbenz's moves were "discriminatory and unfair" (Eisenhower, 1963: 421).

The new administration began moving on Guatemala with some dispatch. The president sent his most trusted adviser, his brother Milton, to Central America to assess the threat. While the president was attempting to assess the situation, others were busy with their own means of assessing. In the summer UFCO's Thomas Corcoran met with the new administration. (Recall it was he who met earlier with State's Mann.) This time Corcoran met with Walter Bedell Smith (Under Secretary of State). Apparently Corcoran found a sympathetic listener. It was Smith who had been involved in covert operations in Truman's administration. Now as State's representative he listened to the UFCO advocate and returned with a message that something must be done. It was "that conversation [that] is recalled by CIA officers as the clear starting point of the plan" that would be PBSUCCESS (Prados, 1986: 99).
In other accounts it is alleged that in August 1953 the special planning group of the NSC approved the plan after which it went to the president. Prados disputes this. He sees it as something much more evolutionary in nature and that it "is probable that ad hoc procedures were used" (Prados, 1986: 99; c.f., Immerman, 1982: 134). In any case the exact genesis of the plan is evidently undeterminable given what has thus far been declassified. Immerman mentions that while the exact timing is arguable, it occurred in stages sometime in 1953. Eisenhower seems not to have taken a direct interest until late spring or early summer of 1953. But the initial planning, as we have seen, by various other decisionmaking agencies dates back to 1952 and early 1953. (Immerman, 1982: 126-132.)

What is certain is that within the initial months of 1953 the new administration received a stream of advice advocating the elimination of Arbenz's government, and this advice reached individuals who constructed the eventual policy. (Immerman, 1982: 132.)

For our purposes, suffice it to say that covert operations were ongoing in 1952 and into 1953 in Guatemala. In some instances these were being done without the president's direct knowledge of what was happening, though he apparently had some idea of their occurrence.

Toward the end of 1953 a new Ambassador was selected to go to Guatemala. John E. Peurifoy had served previously in Greece and had distinguished himself there. Now he was on his way to equally distinguishing himself in Guatemala.
Peurifoy was a can-do, damn-the-torpedoes American. He refused to wear the traditional black homburg but wore instead a green Borsalino; he drove a sports car; and he was known to pack a handgun in a shoulder holster. What he may have lacked in intellectual acuity, he made up in forceful flamboyance. Peurifoy arrived in Guatemala City in October 1953. (Immerman, 1982: 137.)

Peurifoy was known to be frank and to the point in his "diplomatic" intercourse. Upon arriving in Guatemala the new Ambassador held an audience with Arbenz so as to determine for himself the potential dangers the Presidente presented to U.S. interests. After meeting with Arbenz Peurifoy reported back to Eisenhower as to his impressions. Eisenhower reports in his memoirs that Peurifoy "aptly" characterized Arbenz simply: 'It seemed to me that the man thought like a Communist and talked like a Communist, and if not actually one, would do until one came along' (Eisenhower, 1963: 422). The similarities between Peurifoy's assessment and the "duck test" are obvious. Arbenz was, as far as the Eisenhower administration was concerned, inimical to United States' interests in Latin America.

As we have noted, various parts of Eisenhower's foreign-policy bureaucracy were already busy planning to do something to ameliorate this problem. Around the same time that Peurifoy was assessing Arbenz, either a new plan or simply an extension of Truman's aborted covert operations in
Guatemala, was gaining momentum. Howard Hunt (later of Bay of Pigs and Watergate infamy) contacted Castillo Armas who was now in exile in Honduras. (Immerman, 1982: 141-142; Ambrose, 1984: 193.) Recall that Armas had earlier collaborated with Arbenz in the 1944 Revolution. Within a month's time (December 1953), Armas issued a declaration from Honduras "stating his intention to liberate Guatemala from Arbenz" (Prados, 1986: 102). The broadcast facilities were those of another U.S. agency: the United States Information Agency (USIA).

In early 1954 USIA began broadcasting its own accounts of the Arbenz government. Those accounts, among other things, painted a picture of a corrupt communist dictator. USIA would send these, either as radio or print media, to Chile where said accounts would ultimately emanate as though indigenous Chilean sources. They were, of course, invariably passed without attribution. (Immerman, 1982: 144.)

Meanwhile back in Guatemala Peurifoy was active. The Ambassador began to function something akin to a proconsul making U.S. policy on the spot and reporting it back to Washington ex post facto. (It should be mentioned that Eisenhower speaks approvingly of Peurifoy's actions in his memoirs.) In one instance Peurifoy told a reporter from Time that:

Public opinion in the U.S. might force us to take some measures to prevent Guatemala from falling into the lap of international communism. We cannot permit a Soviet Republic to be established between Texas and the Panama
If Eisenhower ever needed any convincing that an operation—now called PBSUCCESS and which had been planned over the previous months—was necessary, he was now convinced. Sometime in January he gave the first go-ahead nod for pushing ahead with what was shaping up as a covert plan to topple Arbenz. Eisenhower would reserve his final approval a little longer.

During this period Arbenz continued to hold out hope that his country's differences with the United States might be resolved. On 9 February 1954, Arbenz evidently visited Peurifoy. During this meeting Arbenz mentioned his desire to resolve differences and suggested that some sort of arrangement might be achieved whereby UFCO's interests were not so adversely impacted. Apparently Arbenz was sufficiently naive to believe that this was still about the UFCO dispute only. Arbenz "implored" the United States to lift the boycott that had been imposed on Guatemala earlier. Peurifoy declined on the spot. After his audience with Arbenz, Peurifoy reported back to State that he simply thought Arbenz was stalling and that no easing of pressure would be appropriate. (Immerman, 1982: 161; Prados, 1986: 99-101.)

This may have pressured Arbenz into his next step. And as it turned out, it was a fateful step. On 10 February
1954 Arbenz asked for help from the East Block.

Unsuccessful and increasingly desperate, the Guatemalan president now risked infuriating both the United States and his own military officers (rumors circulated that he intended to form a peasant militia) by soliciting assistance from behind the Iron Curtain. The Soviets jumped at the opportunity to embarrass, at the very least, the United States. (Immerman, 1982: 155.)

This is the date Crisisbank cites as the beginning of the event. We have seen that the planning, however, was carried on at a lower level for several months prior to this. After 10 February, nonetheless, Eisenhower began to follow more closely the details of PBSUCCESS.

Evidence of the administration's more direct interest and role came the following month. From 1 through 28 March an Organization of American States Conference was held in Caracas. Its purpose was to discuss affairs that concerned all the American Republics. Secretary Dulles attended for the United States and quickly set the tone. The Secretary of State used Caracas as a bully pulpit from which he, among other things, secured a resolution condemning Guatemalan aggression as a danger to all the Americas. (Eisenhower, 1963: 423-424; Immerman, 1982: 143-151.) Though the administration had okayed the initial phases and it was clearly taking a more active role itself in following events, it had still not made its final decision on implementation. "At the time of Caracas this inner group [Eisenhower and his top advisers] had not yet decided to implement PBSUCCESS fully. . . . (Immerman, 1982: 150). Yet
implementation of some phases had been proceeding for some months as directed by the lower levels of the bureaucracy.

Final approval was soon to come. The administration had known of Arbenz's plea for help from the Soviets. Sometime in late March or early May U.S. intelligence had received evidence that a shipload of armaments was headed to Guatemala on a Swedish ship. The ship's cargo had actually been discovered by a CIA agent posing as a bird watcher in Europe. (Immerman, 1982: 155.) For some days the ship's circuitous route bedeviled U.S. intelligence which lost its location. When rediscovered it was clearly on its way to Guatemala. On 17 May 1954, the Swedish ship with two thousand tons of Czechoslovakian arms arrived at Puerto Barrios Guatemala. Waiting at the dock were Ambassador Peurifoy and his staff. (Immerman, 1982: 155; Ambrose, 1984: 193; Prados, 1986: 103; Eisenhower, 1963: 424.) To use Eisenhower's own words, upon the ship's arrival, "things came to a head" (Eisenhower, 1963: 424). The ship's cargo became known on Capitol Hill and Congress was in an uproar. The State Department issued a press release describing the shipment. DCI Allen Dulles prevailed on his brother Foster Dulles who made sure that the press release described the shipment--whose quantity and composition was as yet unknown--as "a very large shipment." Immerman suggests that the "Dulles brothers decided . . . to fan public fury" and that Allen Dulles took it upon himself to become "a legislative
liaison" (Immerman, 1982: 156). There is no record in any of the accounts, including Eisenhower's own, to suggest that the Dulles brothers consulted with the president as to their actions between 17 and 19 May.

But on 19 May there was an early-morning White House staff meeting. The president and Secretary Dulles decided that the seriousness of the situation had to be underscored to both domestic and foreign audiences. It was decided that Eisenhower would use that day's scheduled press conference to do so. (Immerman, 1982: 156.) Also, on 19 May Secretary Dulles, in an apparently coordinated attack, announced that 'a government in which Communist influence is very strong has come into a position to dominate militarily the Central American area' (Immerman, 1982: 157).

A relative increase in activity followed with Eisenhower involving himself in events somewhat more closely. For example on 24 May the president met with Congressional leaders to tell them personally of the circumstances surrounding Guatemala and that the administration would be obliged to do more than simply sit around and watch events unfold. (Eisenhower, 1963: 424; Immerman, 1982: 157.) In the previous day or so, however, State began orchestrating the show. Henry Holland (Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) had been instructed by Foster Dulles to order surveillance of all ships headed toward Guatemala. (Immerman, 1982: 159;
Prados, 1986: 103.) The Assistant Secretary worried about the propriety of such a move and the complications that might be encountered. Yet Foster and Allen Dulles prevailed on him and he carried out his orders. Eisenhower read a memorandum prepared by "his special assistant for security affairs" to legislators explaining State's actions.

Also on 24 May the NSC Planning Board met to officially draft a memorandum declaring the previous days' pronouncements and actions official U.S. policy. One of those pronouncements, made by the president himself, was that another convocation of the OAS be completed post haste to jointly consider the threat. It was the administration's view that another resolution condemning Guatemala might be useful. On 28 May the NSC formally accepted Eisenhower's proposal.

At the State Department where, perhaps because of the sibling factor, the covert plan was being coordinated the need for an OAS resolution was not evidently seen as quite so important. State did nothing to follow through on NSC's recommendations. Instead, State began to coordinate another publicity blitz. USIA, under State's direction, produced a memorandum that was circulated which was full of innuendo and unproven assertions. Quickly American media began to publish some of those same assertions as factual. Both Time and Harper's Magazine published prominent feature stories with the surreptitious USIA assertions. It was no small production. Several accounts describe the deception. One
author's biography of Eisenhower describes this episode of "deceit and corruption toward Guatemala . . . as one of the most sordid and inane foreign 'security' operations in American history" (Brendon, 1987: 283-284). Its magnitude is perhaps most remarkable. The USIA campaign "prepared two hundred articles and backgrounders, designed some twenty-seven thousand anti-Communist cartoons and posters, and developed both films and scripts for media outlets" (Immerman, 1982: 158; c.f., Prados, 1986: 104).

Over the next several weeks, while State, CIA, and their respective bureaus busied themselves with Guatemala, the president simply kept abreast.

On 1 June Arbenz desperately tried for the last time to reach an accommodation with the United States over what he still thought to be the obstacle: UFCO. Resorting to sending his Foreign Minister to see Peurifoy, he was again rebuked. Peurifoy dismissed the Foreign Minister telling him that conciliation over UFCO matters was not the issue. Communism was the issue. After dismissing Arbenz's representative, Peurifoy transmitted a message to State explaining the conversation and what Peurifoy's response had been. He further suggested that since Arbenz was clearly on the ropes, the time was ripe to ratchet up the pressure.

In mid-June Armas made another broadcast from Honduras, this time demanding Arbenz's resignation. This began the para-military portion of PBSUCCESS. The interesting part is
that Armas's "rag-taggle" army consisted of only some 150 men of whom some were paid mercenaries. It was the shadow of an army only. The psychological operations, including the media blitz, was at the basis of the operation, not Armas and his army. And CIA and USIA alone ran these efforts. Indeed it was neither Eisenhower, nor either Dulles, nor even any American official of import who had chosen Armas to lead the so-called army; it was Howard Hunt. (Ambrose, 1984: 193.) On 18 June Armas crossed from Honduras into Guatemalan territory. He and his men proceeded only six miles whereupon they found a secure place to hide while awaiting instructions. Their refuge was a Church. (Immerman, 1982: 162; Ambrose, 1984: 194; Prados, 1986: 104.)

On 20 June Eisenhower apparently requested a report on what was happening, why Armas had not advanced to the capital, where he and his army were, and so on. The CIA sent him a message explaining that the group was simply waiting at the Church just inside Guatemala. They explained that the operation 'is not in any sense a conventional military operation' but rather rested on the total program's 'psychological impact' (Immerman, 1982: 161). They assured Eisenhower that the precedent had been established in Iran and was successful. (Immerman, 1982: 164; Prados, 1986: 95-99.)
Armas simply needed to be ready when Arbenz was forced to resign. The plan was really quite ingenious. CIA had convinced, back in 1953, Nicaragua to participate by allowing its planes to be flown over the capital of Guatemala. In return, the Nicaraguan dictator would receive new U.S. planes which he felt to be a magnanimous quid pro quo. The planes were not actually going to bomb the city; rather they would simply drop noise-making devices (dynamite, coke bottles with gasoline, etc.). Simultaneously, USIA and CIA broadcasts would blast away in Guatemala. Though the broadcasts were actually transmitted from a dilapidated barn in Honduras, they would claim to be hidden close to the capital which would demonstrate that Arbenz was impotent against as easy a target as a rebel radio station. The broadcasts were tremendously successful: numerous stories of Armas's army advancing on the capital while Arbenz's troops either collapsed or defected began to have an impact on the population. The general nuisance of the incessant, though artificially, air raids lent validity to the stories.

In a stroke of good fortune one of Arbenz pilots actually was influenced by the broadcasts and did defect. (Declassified Documents Quarterly, 1976: 14H.) Upon finding out that it was all a hoax he refused to be part of the plan. It seems the CIA wished him to make personal announcements from its radio station in Honduras. It was only after plying the confused pilot with alcohol that the
CIA's wishes were achieved. Not surprisingly, a good bit of expert editing was necessary before the pilot's message was ready for broadcast. Once completed the message did go out over radio and convinced Arbenz that he had pilots who might defect en masse. He consequently grounded his air force which probably sealed his fate. (Immerman, 1982: 167.)

On 20 June Guatemalan representatives in the United Nations called for an emergency session of the Security Council. They claimed they were being attacked by a U.S.-sponsored army. This contingency had been foreseen by State and was quickly handled. As it turns out, Henry Cabot Lodge was then president of the Security Council and he simply stalled the convening of such a meeting on the grounds that it was an OAS matter first.

The psychological war continued for another week. Eisenhower was kept abreast but attended to other matters. Then on 27 June 1954 Jacobo Arbenz resigned his presidency to his Chief of Armed Forces, Colonel Diaz. Diaz accepted his resignation and assumed interim control. This is precisely what the U.S. had hoped would happen. Diaz had long been a friend of the U.S. and it was assumed that Armas could now simply be spirited into the capital to take over power. Diaz however unexpectedly vowed to fight on. (Declassified Documents Quarterly, 1977: 89E.) Evidently no one had briefed him and he was unaware of the plan, actually being convinced himself that the capital was under attack.
Unbeknown to Diaz, Armas was still awaiting instruction back near the Honduran-Guatemalan frontier.

This was an unexpected complication but it was quickly resolved. The "Dulles brothers made the decision" to handle it through Peurifoy. The Ambassador, who several times had been seen running about the city streets waving his sidearm immediately was dispatched to straighten out Diaz. Diaz provided some resistance but resigned himself to his fate. Peurifoy quickly contacted his Honduran contacts (the U.S. Ambassador there) and a team was dispatched to pick up Armas. The latter was soon brought ceremoniously into the city whereupon he assumed the duties of running the government. The appropriately named operation, as it turned out, thus ended with a whimper.

**Analysis**

We may now apply to operation PBSUCCESS those question which we have applied to the previous case studies. We must first raise the thorny issue of whom is the DMU comprised. We have typically been able to identify the DMU in other case studies. We noticed, however, in the Bay of Pigs's case that identification was somewhat more complex. That is, there was a group of decisionmakers, notably the CIA, who had made the contingency plans for that operation prior to Kennedy's presidency. Yet we associated what we eventually determined to be the DMU with that group which
accounted for decisionmaking once the operation actually began.

In the Guatemala case, we know that planning, implementa-
tion, and feedback were all going on prior to the 10
February initiation of arms from the East block that,
according to Crisisbank precipitated the event. We know, as
well then that such was the case prior to the ship's 17 May
arrival, which to use Eisenhower's words brought "things to
a head." For the purposes of continuity, we shall again
associate the DMU with decisionmaking following the event's
initiation. While this excludes all those whom we know to
have been involved with decisionmaking at earlier times, it
is reasonable to stay within endpoints for purposes of
comparative analysis. Finally, we should say that as a
general proposition, it appears that covert operations often
have initial planning and even some implementation well in
advance of a president and his top advisers actually
involving themselves.

1. Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

We must attempt to determine the initial convocation of
the DMU once PBSUCCESS was underway. We have already noted
that this is somewhat problematic—and in fact this has
tended to be the case where surprise is not involved. The
reason is that contingency planning—hence decisionmaker's
meeting—takes place in advance of the actual event.
Specifically, with respect to operations surrounding Guatemala we have seen that they date back to the Truman administration. And while no evidence is available that Truman briefed Eisenhower as to their existence, it is reasonable to infer that Eisenhower discovered at least the broad details shortly after taking office. We know for example that he dispatched his brother Milton, whom he considered to have "such exceptional capabilities" that he would have put him in the Cabinet had he not been related. (Eisenhower, 1963: 420). He further mentions that Milton, from 1953 on, was his eyes and ears on Latin America.

We know from others that 10 February is a point after which Eisenhower followed events in Guatemala with great interest. Crisisbank, for example, cites this as the beginning of the Guatemala affair. That Arbenz finally turned to the East block, as the argument goes, precipitated the events that followed. But the other accounts cite the ship's arrival in Puerto Barrios (17 May 1954) as the critical day. After that day Eisenhower followed events even more closely and Foster Dulles joined actively in coordinating his brother's covert operation with State and the White House.

Which ever date we accept as beginning the affair, we must realize that the planning for it dates back many months previously. Eisenhower's initial go-ahead signal given to Allen Dulles in either December 1953 or January 1954 was
clearly important. As a result, an Operations Center in Florida was set up; active programs by USIA and CIA, even though they could have later been rescinded, began. Though Eisenhower was yet to give his final approval—which did not occur until after the ship's arrival—he clearly was aware of the event that was an effort to supplant the "communist" Arbenz with another leader. For purposes of continuity, however, we will accept the date after which Eisenhower's approval became effectively irreversible. Namely, it was on 10 February when the administration learned that an arms shipment was headed toward Guatemala. Prior to this discovery, the administration was not irreversibly wed to the covert operation; after this date Eisenhower felt the operation was the responsible and necessary course of action.

Now we are left to determine the first convocation of the DMU to deal with the operation. We know that Eisenhower mentioned the matter in March 1954, at a Cabinet meeting. And that he told the CIA to go ahead with the planning and initial stages of implementation as early as December 1953. We know too that UFCO's Corcoran met with State's Bedell Smith in the summer of 1953 over the danger the former saw in Arbenz's reform programs. And Smith reported it back to State and eventually Eisenhower. (Prados, 1986: 99; Immerman, 1982: 126-133.) And we further know that Ambassador Peurifoy was appointed to Guatemala and shortly
began reporting back to Washington that Arbenz talked and acted like a communist.

Once Eisenhower gave approval for an operation to be undertaken he was not involved again until rather late into it. Yet a DMU was functioning. It consisted of several officials at the CIA and State. There is no record available to determine when, where, and how often they met. But we know that planning was underway.

Then upon the ship's arrival in Guatemala, carrying arms from the East block, Eisenhower met with the Dulles brothers to explicitly consider the progress of the murky covert program they had begun and how it was proceeding. Specifically it was at an early-morning White House meeting on 19 May. (Immerman, 1982: 156.)

4.1.A. Was convocation of the DMU a restrictive group (apex) or a more expansive group? The answer is very straightforward. The apex of the Eisenhower Administration was only partially involved throughout the activity in Guatemala. The president himself only attended a couple of meetings over the course of several months. He would occasionally request updates but he clearly had delegated decisionmaking responsibilities to others. Foster Dulles seems to have been the titular head of this DMU. Between Foster Dulles and his brother Allen, most of the decisionmaking surrounding Guatemala took place. Without question the DMU in this case was a more expansive group
than the apex of the DMU; indeed it was largely run by lower-level officials like Howard Hunt.

4.1.B. **At what locus was the DMU convened?** While we were unable to determine with certainty where each meeting took place, we were able to determine that it was not at the White House. Instead it seems to have alternated between State and CIA. The only meetings that took place at the White House were once when Eisenhower's NSC Planning Board ratified actions ex post facto, and once when the president requested some clarifications of what was taking place. The locus was clearly at a low level as we would expect.

4.1.C. **How often was the apex of the DMU convened?** The answer simply is very infrequently. We found no indication in any of the accounts that the apex of the DMU was ever convened on the matter. But a close approximation to it met a couple of times.

Once the ship arrived we have record only of Eisenhower meeting with the two Dulles brothers and other top officials infrequently. There was of course the 19 May meeting mentioned above. Later, after the actual operation was proceeding, Eisenhower was briefed and in turn briefed Congressional leaders; he held a couple of press conferences at which he read the "line" as prepared by others. And not until June do we explicitly find reference to another meeting.
On 22 June the planes that the U.S. had convinced Nicaragua to supply to strafe the capital were discussed. There were only three in the first place and on 22 June Allen Dulles informed Eisenhower that two had been downed. Without replacements, Dulles argued, the operation would fail. (Ambrose notes that in Dulles's less than passionate pleas he informed the president that without replacements, the Armas army, holed up at a church near Honduras, "might soon die of boredom" [Ambrose, 1982: 194].) Secretary Dulles and his assistant Holland were in attendance as well. Though Eisenhower had initially precluded any direct U.S. involvement, Allen Dulles convinced him that he must make the exception and send U.S. planes. Foster Dulles agreed with his brother. Eisenhower gave in. (Eisenhower, 1963: 425.)

At another meeting (24 June) the president and Foster Dulles discussed the fact that the British were not cooperating fully in the U.S. plan to drag its feet in the U.N. over Arbenz government's call for an emergency session. As a result the president--for the first time in history--authorized the U.S. representatives to the Security Council to exercise a veto against the British and the French. (Immerman, 1982: 171; Prados, 1986: 105.) And finally a meeting was held on 8 July, well after the termination of the event.
We are therefore on safe ground to conclude that the top decisionmakers (apex) met only infrequently. It is reasonable to infer that other meetings not recorded took place—particularly given Eisenhower's tendency to meet informally with one or two advisers or simply call them by phone. And we do know that the Dulles brothers met frequently over at State with a few of their respective staff people in tow. Still, we must conclude that over the length of the operation, the DMU met infrequently. This is what we would expect to find.

4.1.D. **Was the DMU convened along routine procedures or extemporaneously?** What appears to be the first convocation of the DMU to deal specifically with PBSUCCESS was the early-morning White House meeting on 19 May. Though we may be tempted to infer from the almost ominous "early-morning" appellation that the meeting was atypical, the contrary is true. As we noted above (Chapter IV), once policy had been kicked around a lower levels—NSC Planning Board, between appropriate Secretaries, etc.—Eisenhower would often meet with a group and make the ultimate decision. And we know too that he often held early morning staff meetings simply for briefings and such. There is no reason to conclude, therefore, that this meeting on 19 July was anything other than standard. Indeed that it did not take place until 19 June, two days after the ship's arrival supports the argument that neither any particular sense of
urgency nor any improvisation was associated with said meeting.

Furthermore, the meetings at which the real planning took place were very much along standard protocol. CIA did its part. State did its part. There would occasionally be meetings to coordinate the planning. And it followed in a very routine manner. That this planning was with respect to a cover operation makes it all the more interesting. That is, one might expect to see more improvisation under the circumstances but it simply was not the case. Routines and bureaucratic procedures best describe the DMU's meetings.

2. Selection of Options

4.2.A. Were the options selected by a restrictive DMU (apex) or a more inclusive DMU? We have already demonstrated that the apex of the DMU was not truly involved in the process. The key member, President Eisenhower, was scarcely involved in selecting options at any time. Indeed, he seems to have been ignorant of the details at various times of the operation. A more expansive group was the DMU and that is the group that selected options. It included Foster Dulles (an apex member) as well as his brother Allen. But it also included low-level individuals at USIA, CIA, and embassy personnel.

4.2.B. How many options were considered by the DMU? This is quite an interesting question indeed. The fact is that the apex of the DMU only considered a couple of options
and they were directed at augmenting the operation that had already been initiated. These options included sending arms to neighboring countries, Honduras and Nicaragua. Eisenhower addresses this in his memoirs. (Eisenhower, 1963: 424.) This is somewhat dubious however. The fact is that CIA had promised "replacements" to at least Nicaragua and therefore the president's suggestion that he decided to send them arms at their request to "help counter the danger created by the Czech shipment to Guatemala" is suspect.

We also know that Eisenhower claims in his memoirs to have ordered a quarantine of Guatemalan harbors. (Eisenhower, 1963: 424.) Again this is suspect for we find that it was actually ordered from the State Department, though admittedly this does not preclude it originating with Eisenhower. But Assistant Secretary Holland actually ordered the action and it caused some stir at State. State's legal division determined that there was no basis in international law for doing it. And a State Department veteran, Robert Murphy, wrote a memorandum to his boss Dulles in which he stated:

I believe the philosophy back of the action is wrong. . . to resort to this action confesses the bankruptcy of our political policy vis-a-vis that country [Guatemala]. . . . Our present action should give stir to the bones of Admiral von Tirpitz. (Immerman, 1982: 159.)

And finally we must consider one last option that the president claims to have considered and ordered. He states
that they discussed and requested a special meeting of the OAS. (Eisenhower, 1963: 424.) This is undoubtedly true. And while the OAS never did have occasion to meet as a result of this particular request, it has been demonstrated that this was a very successful subterfuge used by the administration to forestall the UN Security Council from considering activities in Guatemala while PBSUCCESS was underway. All other options, and they are quite incalculable, were considered by other agencies well in advance of PBSUCCESS's final activation.

Among those who proffered options we know that the Dulles brothers, Assistant Secretary Holland, and probably a handful of others were involved—Richard Bissell for example was in charge of the CIA's task force on it and he was at some of the meetings. (Ambrose, 1984: 193). But we have already established that the consideration of options was done, for the most part, elsewhere and prior to the ship's arrival in port. There is neither record of exactly how many options nor how many persons were involved, for much of it is still classified. But we clearly know from Immerman's work that it was fairly large, especially for a covert operation in which secrecy is suppose to be at a premium. It spanned two administrations, it involved various parts of the CIA, and the USIA (under State's auspices), and it even included direct influence from private interests—notably UFCO's Thomas Corcoran.
The sources of options was so vast that the president was unable to follow them. It is illustrative to recall a few examples. Well after PBSUCCESS was underway, on 20 June, Eisenhower seemed confused as to what the actual operation entailed. He therefore requested a briefing from the CIA. CIA apparently did not feel sufficiently impressed to go over to the White House to personally brief the president or even call him. Rather, they sent him a memorandum explaining the broad details. In it they reminded the president, lest he worry that Armas's army was simply sitting, that the operation was not 'in any sense a conventional military operation' but was a 'psychological' one that would unfold in due course.

Also recall how on at least two occasions we have seen documented that Ambassador Peurifoy made U.S. foreign-policy decisions on the spot, informing his masters in Washington only as a matter of courtesy. And he was seen running around the city on more than one occasion waving his handgun and to be shouting out orders to various persons—Americans and Guatemalans.

Contrary to an event in which high-level ad hoc groups might restrict the decisionmaking process from lower-level expertise, the story of PBSUCCESS seems to be one of the lower-level, foreign-policy bureaucracy dominating. It is in fact difficult to find lower-level bureaucrats who were not more involved than the president and his top advisers.
We conclude that there was a vast many options considered and that they came from all parts of the foreign-polic
cy bureaucracy. We have hypothesized that as the number of individuals involved proliferates so too will the number of options entertained. And this is precisely what we find in this instance.

4.2.C. Did individual personalities dominate the decisionmaking with respect to PBSUCCESS? This is a somewhat complicated issue for we have seen that the initial stages of the decisionmaking, those done prior to the operation's onset was accomplished with some degree of stealth. There simply is no record of it to speak of. But after January of 1954, which we have set as the beginning date, no particular personality seems to have dominated. Indeed many personalities seem to have flexed their muscles. Both Dulles brothers were influential. Presumably Eisenhower was influential. In at least one instance, very late in the operation, Eisenhower became furious at the British and French and threatened to teach them lessons. (Immerman, 1982: 171; Ambrose, 1984: 196.) Clearly Ambassador Peurifoy was the most influential person in Guatemala. And others, Holland, Bissell, and Hunt come to mind. We must conclude then that no single personality nor did any particular group dominate. Rather, many strong and influential persons were involved over the operation's life.
4.2.D. Is there evidence of groupthink in the selection of options? The answer is an unequivocal no. There were too many individuals and agencies involved for such a phenomenon. If groupthink occurred, for example, within the pinnacle of decisionmakers (Eisenhower, and the Dulles brothers) there is no evidence of it. Moreover, it may well be that those individuals failed to consider sufficient alternatives in a realistic way, but it seems to have been out of a sense of off-hands approach rather than some intra-group pathology. Finally, we have evidence of dissent at least in the State Department as to particular options under consideration. As we have seen, both Holland and Murphy at various times disputed orders that came down from Secretary Dulles.

3. Implementation of Policy

4.3.A. Was implementation of policy controlled by the apex of the DMU or by the larger foreign-policy bureaucracy? Put simply, implementation was conducted from below; the foreign-policy bureaucracy designated to handle covert affairs implemented policy. In fact this was to absurd extremes. Recall that in the earliest stages--prior to Eisenhower--UFCO representatives were working in concert with CIA to implement policies. Never do we see the top decisionmakers of the Eisenhower administration involving themselves in the actual implementation of policy.
4.3.B. Was implementation accomplished by standard-operating routines or improvised? Contingencies were
developed as far back as the Truman administration. Over
time they were, doubtless, adapted to fit the tide of change
that inevitably occurs over time. Nonetheless we have seen
a heavy reliance on the basic plans that were developed with
very little extemporaneous adaptation. Only one departure
from the original plan—at least as we know that plan—comes
to mind.

Recall that upon receiving Arbenz's resignation Colonel
Diaz accepted it according to script. For some strange
reason, though, he announced his attention to fight on.
That even he, an ally of the U.S., was so convinced that his
capital was under siege is arguably a tribute to the CIA's
psychological program. Nonetheless this presented a slight
complication to which those on the spot reacted rather
admirably. Peurifoy immediately went to Diaz and got him
under control; he explained what was happening and to as-
suage Diaz's feelings did some on-the-spot negotiating for
Diaz's future. The Ambassador then called the U.S. Ambassa-
dor in Honduras and requested that a team be sent out to
collect Armas and his army and to quickly get them to the
Guatemalan capital. This provides the only example of
adapting the original contingency that was operation
PBSUCCESS. Thus we conclude that standard-operating proce-
dures and the original plans were followed rather closely.
While covert programs unquestionably entail channels of implementation somewhat different than overt programs, this does not make them extraordinary. As covert programs go, PBSUCCESS was implemented along the channels set up in the initial contingency plan. Peurifoy, for example, was moved to Guatemala in the fall of 1953 for that very reason. He was determined to be the best one for the impending operation and the one who could best implement the program that had been developed. CIA and USIA set up well in advance their respective propaganda organs and implemented them, similarly, according to the chain of command that was envisioned in the original plan. The various parts of the bureaucracy that are tasked with such operations followed them through and implemented them within prescribed channels.

We conclude that little or no improvisation took place in terms of implementing PBSUCCESS. Rather, as we would expect to find, routines developed by the bureaucracy were followed.

4.3.C. Were signs of bureaucratic politics or interference present during implementation? According to our hypotheses, we would expect to see signs of bureaucratic politics under the conditions of extended decision time and lack of surprise. The contrary is true, however, with respect to PBSUCCESS. There is simply no evidence that one bureaucracy attempted to exert its influence at the expense
of another. Nor is there evidence of rivalries within subdivision of particular bureaucracies. By way of speculation, it may be that covert programs have a dynamic of their own that tends to mitigate against bureaucratic politics. We shall reserve that discussion until we have looked at all the case studies. The fact is that, in this particular case, no evidence of bureaucratic politics was found.

4.3.D. Was implementation conducted instantaneously with the selection process or temporarily distinct from it? The argument is a simple one. One need only recall that the process of selecting options began as early as 1952. This of course changed over time and adaptations and new options were considered. As a new administration came in the selection process continued to change. The notable point, however, is that options changed only marginally over this long period of time.

Implementation of final options only took place relatively late in the affair. And the implementation is best characterized by its piecemeal nature. It was slow, deliberate, and clearly distinct from the process of selecting options.

4. Evaluation of Selected Options

We begin by attempting to trace the path of feedback once implementation of chosen options was underway. 4.4.A. Was feedback-evaluation of policy directed by and through
the apex of the DMU or at lower levels via the foreign-policy bureaucracy? It is worth recalling that we have dated Eisenhower's increased involvement with the operation early in 1954. Though we have conceded that Crisisbank cites 10 February and still others cite 17 May. No matter which of these dates one accepts, the basic answer remains unchanged. Evaluation of policy once set in motion was accomplished at the lower level: viz., the respective divisions of CIA and State (USIA, and U.S. Embassy). If anything, the president and his top advisers, with the possible exception of Allen Dulles, seem almost aloof as to following the policy as it progressed. Recall that Eisenhower on 20 June—a week before the operation's successful conclusion—was confused as to the details of what was happening. And recall that implementation and evaluation often occurred on the spot as Peurifoy was apt to do. At best the top decisionmakers of the administration followed events when their manifold other duties permitted it.

The feedback mechanism and the evaluation of information therefrom, to the extent that it occurred, was clearly done through the embassy, CIA, and State. There is no reason to suspect that this was to deliberately keep the president in the dark. Yet we know that the effect was that very thing. We conclude that feedback and evaluation was not controlled by the apex.
4.4.B. **Was the process accomplished through standard bureaucratic routines or extemporaneously?** The administration's top decisionmakers, as we have pointed out, rarely paid attention to the day-to-day operations let alone employed innovative means of following said events. What degree of innovation existed in the field is another issue; it is probable that ad hoc means were employed though we find no evidence of it. The channels that the foreign-policy bureaucracy uses for monitoring its vast empire of activities were apparently quite sufficient for its purposes during operation PBSUCCESS. No evidence of any improvising was detected.

The process of feedback and evaluation in PBSUCCESS was routine. This is of course what we would expect to find. The only surprise is how routine it was given that the operation was suppose to be covert. Nonetheless, our expectation is confirmed.

4.4.C. **Were there any signs of bureaucratic interference in the process?** Again we look for evidence of information that was selectively fed to the administration's top decisionmakers, or unreliable channels of feedback. And we find little.

Indeed, as far as we have seen, information that was requested by top decisionmakers was generally reliable. The president and Foster Dulles, for example, were kept abreast of issues that might have a broader impact: that Armas's
army was initially housed in Honduras, and that it had only proceeded some six miles into Guatemala as late as 20 June. Further, though it has not been discussed here, information was sent over to Henry Cabot Lodge at the U.N. and to other State representatives handling OAS matters so as to completely coordinate the operation. And even thought the president initially okayed the operation with the proviso that no direct U.S. involvement accompany it, he was told of U.S. pilots actually strafing the city during the operation. In other words, though it went against his better judgement, those who had changed the plan did not attempt to hide it from the president. In sum, the information was there for the asking. That the president and his top advisers chose not to follow it on a day-to-day basis was not a function of information being withheld.

Similarly, the top of the DMU appears to have been kept fully abreast to the extent that it requested information. This really requires little elaboration beyond what was just discussed. Namely, insofar as the president and his top advisers requested information, it was quickly forthcoming. One exception is worth noting however. The president's NSC apparatus seems to have been kept in the dark to some extent. Its only association with the program seems to come after the fact. For example, after Eisenhower declared that the OAS must be brought in directly to condemn the threat, and after he branded communist aggression in
Guatemala as dangerous to all the Republics of the Americas, the NSC simply restated his words in the form of memoranda to be formally passed. This may indicate that they were not fully abreast. And again it may be that Eisenhower simply worried about leaks and did not insist that any one inform the NSC. We do know that his "special assistant for national security" (in common parlance his National Security Adviser) was more involved for we have the instance of him writing a speech describing the degree of threat surrounding East block arms which Eisenhower read to Congressional leaders. It would be stretching to conclude, therefore, that the top decisionmakers were given only selective information.

There simply is no evidence of bureaucratic interference in the case of Guatemala. We therefore must disconfirm this aspect of our hypothesis.

4.4.D. Was feedback-evaluation instantaneous with or temporally distinct from implementation? This requires little discussion. As we explained above, the time over which the operation was conducted virtually guaranteed temporal distinction. The best example perhaps is that of Eisenhower being in the dark as to what was happening once the operation was underway. It was not a matter of deliberate intention to keep the president ill informed. Rather, it simply took time for information to go through channels. And since the apex of the DMU did not keep firm control on the process, the turn-around time between
implementation and feedback simply increased. This is what we expect to witness.

BERLIN, AIDE-MEMOIRE, 1961

Narrative

The events surrounding World War Two's victory for the Allies and the animosities over Berlin are generally quite well known. It is therefore appropriate that we spend only the briefest of time discussing those events as they led in the 1961 Berlin aide-memoire incident.

As the war drew to an end in 1945, the Allies had collectively fought their way into Berlin. In consequence, a four-power administration of that war-torn city was arranged between the Allies. Further, Germany was divided into East and West blocks known respectively as the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. (Indeed until events beginning in 1989 and culminating in 1990, the two Germanies remained as such.) Importantly, Berlin which was to be administered under the four-power arrangement lay about 100 miles inside East Germany. Thus access to the Western sectors was problematic. Only through

---

arrangements concluded at the war's end was Western access to West Berlin provided via air corridors and the *autobahn*.

As is well known, the onset of the Cold War strained these arrangements increasingly. So strained did relations become there and elsewhere (e.g., Greece and Turkey) that on 24 June 1948 the Soviets, who administered East Berlin, set up blockades and checkpoints, obviating Western access along the *autobahn*. This led to the legendary Berlin air lift during which West Berlin's very existence was sustained via massive and ubiquitous U.S. planes flying into West Berlin. Eventually the hostilities were diminished but not resolved. Moreover, Berlin increasingly became a symbol of the intense Cold War rivalry.

During 1957, for example, the Soviets began to demonstrate new rocket and missile capabilities which were seen, among other things, as directly threatening to the European Allies. (In fact, this led to the belief and subsequent political exploitation of the so-called missile gap.) NATO responded. In December of 1957 NATO adopted a plan for stationing intermediate-range strategic missiles in Europe at various allied locations. The nuclear warheads would remain under U.S. control. That the missiles' range was intermediate clearly signaled to Moscow that it was the target and that its demonstration of capabilities had been met head on.
Throughout early 1958 little other than reciprocal propaganda was forthcoming from either side. There was some demonstration against the allied position within the European countries for it became clear that in the eventuality of war, the battle would be fought on European soil. The missiles were to be installed in the fall, 1958.

Later that fall the Soviets dramatically turned their attention toward the problem. Khrushchev (10 November) made a speech denouncing the "remilitarization" of Germany. For a time it looked as though another blockade would follow. However, the situation slowly diffused as other events came along. Eisenhower invited Khrushchev to America and was to meet Khrushchev in the Soviet Union. And a summit was to result at Paris. And for a time it looked as though some concessions and new agreements over the "German problem" might actually result. Then the U-2 incident came along in 1960 and intensified hostilities once more. By November 1960, of course, Presidential elections catapulted John F. Kennedy into office and consequently into the thicket of Berlin.

Even before the new president was inaugurated Khrushchev put him on notice regarding Berlin. On 6 January 1961 the Soviet leader made a speech in which he declared the Allied position in Berlin "especially vulnerable" (Schlesinger, 1965: 344; c.f., George and Smoke, 1974: 414). Later that month Kennedy was inaugurated and the following
month began to stake out his own position on Berlin: put crudely, that he would be no less resolute than had been Eisenhower. (George and Smoke, 1974: 414.) In March Kennedy commissioned a study by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Kennedy requested that Acheson consider, in particular, the problems of NATO and Germany. Though many saw Acheson as rather hawkish, Kennedy "considered Acheson one of the most intelligent and experienced men around and did not see why he should not avail himself of 'hard' views before making his own judgment" (Schlesinger, 1965: 380; George and Smoke, 1974: 415).

In April Acheson provided the new president with his "interim" report which "warned that a crisis was likely in 1961" (Sorensen, 1965: 583). It went on to explain that the Soviets must be met forcefully; that force was the currency in which they dealt; and that to set out on a track of negotiations would be seen by them as weak. Finally, it warned that the West was presently unprepared for what lay ahead: it might well be necessary to use all-out force. (Sorensen, 1965: 583-584.)

In late May President Kennedy visited Europe. He first stopped to meet his French counterpart De Gaulle. Earlier in the year Kennedy had suggested a face-to-face meeting with Khrushchev for May. But because of events (notably the Bay of Pigs) the meeting with the Soviet leader was rescheduled for June. Kennedy wished to assess the French position
on negotiating over Berlin prior to seeing Khrushchev. After a short stop-over in Paris, the Kennedy entourage proceeded to Vienna where Khrushchev awaited its arrival. The Soviet leader met with the new U.S. president on 3 and 4 June.

At the Vienna meeting both leaders apparently attempted to demonstrate their respective resolve. Three issues were discussed: the situation in Laos, a possible Test ban treaty, and Berlin. Of the three issues only Laos provided a basis for a formal agreement. Nonetheless, the Soviets and Americans came to a sort of tacit agreement or understanding on nuclear testing: Khrushchev agreed that the Soviets would not be the first to re-initiate testing of nuclear warheads. Thus if the U.S. chose not to test, neither would the Soviets. As will be seen the Soviets were in fact to break that understanding as the Berlin problem boiled over in the fall. (Schlesinger, 1965: 366-374; Sorensen, 1965: 543-550, 584.)

At the close of the two-day meeting Khrushchev gave Kennedy an aide-memoire on Germany. The position that the memorandum summarized was that which Khrushchev had made and argued forcefully in person. If the U.S. was unwilling to agree with the Soviets to a new peacetime position on Berlin, then the Soviets would simply sign a unilateral treaty with East Germany thereby turning over all rights to that sovereign state. Once done this would abrogate the
previous four-power agreement signed at the conclusion of
the war. The effect: it would preclude U.S. access to West
Berlin through East Germany without the latter's permission.
Additionally, Khrushchev set a time table. If no satisfac-
tory movement was seen the Soviets would conclude their
treaty with East Germany by year's end. And no power on
earth could prevent them from so doing. (Schlesinger, 1965:
370-374; Sorensen, 1965: 583-586; Blechman and Kaplan, 1978:
413; George and Smoke, 1974: 415.)

Though Kennedy had been forewarned by Acheson and
others that Berlin could be expected to be a hot spot in
1961, the aide-memoire represents the beginning of the 1961
Berlin episode. (Crisisbank cites 13 August, the day the
wall was begun.) After meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna,
and after receiving formally the Soviets' aide-memoire, the
U.S. foreign-policy establishment devoted a good deal of its
attention to the problem, from which it would not turn its
attention again until fall.

After Vienna Kennedy flew to London to meet Macmillan.
Macmillan had visited the U.S. a few months earlier where he
had discussed Germany with Kennedy, and at the president's
invitation, Dean Acheson. This early June meeting too was
pre-arranged. What had not been pre-arranged however was
the message that Kennedy delivered to the British leader:
Berlin could no longer be discussed as an academic issue; it
must be dealt with directly and immediately.
A couple of days later, after arriving back in Washington and resting a bit, the president assembled his foreign-policy machinery. Representatives from State, Defense, the NSC and the rest of the White House staff attended. The president immediately tasked State with an official response to the aide-memoire. And everyone there, including State, was to begin the process of generating new proposals and positions. Acheson's earlier position paper was discussed. At this early meeting there began to appear a division over the Acheson thesis. (Schlesinger, 1965: 381-383; Sorensen, 1965: 587.)

On 15 June the Soviet leader reiterated his position for those abroad as well as announced it domestically. Khrushchev told the Soviet people the government's position on a Test Ban as well as stating the deadline on Berlin as being year's end. (Schlesinger, 1965: 377; Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 416.) This day was important for another reason. At a press conference, East German leader Walter Ulbricht "almost openly predicted the construction of a wall to seal off West Berlin and dropped broad hints that this action would mean the end of unrestricted Western access to the city by air" (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 417). This was presumably done with the knowledge of the Soviet government. Whether it was done as a sort of trial balloon is not known.

Though the president had tasked his foreign-policy machinery in mid June with new proposals and specifically
State with a quick response to the Soviet aide-memoire, as the end of June drew near little had been done. About this same time, apparently, a final version of the Acheson study was given to the president. (Schlesinger, 1965: 381; Sorensen, 1965: 587.) Acheson's view represented what others have called the "hard line" (George and Smoke, 1974: 433). It insisted that the only reason the Soviets now dared to make such a belligerent demarche was that they had come to believe that the U.S. nuclear deterrent was inadequate. The U.S. must therefore help them to realize the folly of their view. It must be willing to call the Soviet bluff. If the Soviets did conclude a treaty so be it; that in itself was not worth worrying about. The U.S. would in turn continue to enforce its access rights. If necessary, it would send a division down the autobahn to emphasize its resolve. (Schlesinger, 1965: 381-383).

Earlier in the year (February) McNamara had reported to the president that the U.S. conventional posture was woefully inadequate thus leaving the U.S. in a Berlin-like situation with the choice of either backing down or escalating: humiliation or annihilation. Thus the administration had already begun strengthening conventional forces but this was still at an early stage. That being the case Acheson's view of calling the bluff left the Soviets with the opportunity to call the U.S. bluff in turn. Then what would the U.S. do? "Acheson's paper generated a fierce debate in the
administration" (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 419; Schlesinger, 1965: 383). Opposing battle factions began to congeal. The president was dismayed because the basis of discussion seemed to revolve around Acheson's paper only; nothing new had resulted out of the directions he had given various departments. Kennedy "complained" about "the pace at the Department of State" and elsewhere. (Sorensen, 1965: 587.) These arguments were rehashes. Acheson's position was simply the previous administration's position of 1958. This inertia continued throughout June as the president became increasingly exasperated.

Near the end of June he asked State for the latest draft; he had scheduled a working Fourth of July weekend at Hyannis Port at which some of his top advisers would discuss it. Still "He found, to his dismay . . . . a compilation of stale, tedious and negative phrases, none of them new" (Sorensen, 1965: 587). He requested Sorensen, one not known as an expert on international affairs, to draft a short memorandum so he could take it with him, which he would then use as a basis for discussion.

Meanwhile, Schlesinger too had come away from June's meetings with ill feelings. He called Carl Kaysen (then at Harvard) and Abram Chayes (legal adviser, State) and discussed what he felt to be an increasingly bankrupt policy. They got together and concluded that they were all uncomfortable with the way the discussion was shaping up.
Acheson's position by default had become the de facto basis of the new administration's policy and that was disquieting. It reminded Schlesinger of a few months earlier when a similar sort of planning had resulted in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. After their discussion Schlesinger put these thoughts on paper and wrote a memorandum to the president.

Schlesinger had an appointment with the president already scheduled prior to the latter's departure for Hyannis Port. Upon discussing that business, Schlesinger handed the president the memorandum and suggested he read it as he flew out of town. Kennedy instead read it immediately—he agreed and had been feeling himself trapped by the sway of the bureaucracy. Kennedy, as he had done with Sorensen, instructed Schlesinger to "prepare an unsigned memorandum about the unexplored issues in the Berlin problem which he might use at his talks at the Cape" (Schlesinger, 1965: 387). Schlesinger immediately got on with it. He got Chayes and Henry Kissinger (then a consultant for the NSC) together and they quickly produced a paper pointing out the inadequacies of the discussions on Berlin to date. They further suggested positions that offered more than simply humiliation or annihilation. (Schlesinger, 1965: 388).

At the Cape, over the Fourth of July weekend the president held his meeting with Rusk, McNamara, and General Maxwell Taylor (possibly others). Though it is not recorded, it is reasonable to infer that he used both the Sorensen
paper and the Schlesinger-Chayes-Kissinger memorandum to chide his top advisers. What is known is that he rebuked Rusk for State's poor performance thus far. He instructed him to compile an "negotiating prospectus." McNamara was to prepare a plan that would permit non-nuclear resistance, should the Soviets proceed, on a sufficient scale so as not to resort to nuclear weapons. (This was a rejection of the Acheson thesis.) All of them were to crack the whip and to get their respective bureaucracies doing what they were paid to do. They each had ten days to carry out their instructions.28

On 13 July an NSC meeting was convened--apparently the first one on Berlin. There was a rather lively discussion that is documented. Rusk was still rather circumspect and unsure. But Bundy and Kissinger were making forceful points. Sorensen too was arguing his position and what he described as the White House staff position. (Schlesinger, 1965: 390.) The discussion was apparently enough to motivate Rusk's department into action. On 18 July State finally sent Kennedy a draft of its official position. Rusk had evidently failed to be persuaded by the Bundy-Kissinger-Schlesinger line. For his official response is character-

28Blechman and Kaplan assert that this was an NSC meeting and that it took place on 9 July and, further, that Kennedy ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. military options and capabilities. (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 421.) We found no corroboration of their assertion however.
ized as "a tired and turgid rehash of documents left over from the Berlin crisis of 1958-59" (Schlesinger, 1965: 384). This jibes with what Sorensen earlier described as State's positions. It did call for negotiations—a bit of a departure from Acheson's position—but only within the four-power framework.

On 19 July the president—in what Sorensen earlier describes but ineptly supports as the president's decision "to take complete charge [Sorensen, 586]" of the situation—held an informal meeting in his living quarters. (Sorensen, 1965: 590). At this meeting the president noted to those in attendance that he had made his decisions. He would ask Congress to increase the military budget over what he had already requested as a result of McNamara's spring study. Further he would request Congress to provide him with stand-by authority for immediate mobilization in case that eventuality be required. Also he would triple the draft calls. And the U.S. would take the diplomatic initiative for negotiations with the Soviets.

On 25 July the president appeared on television where he argued his case to the American public. The speech was truly a collaborative effort with input from journalist Max Freedman, Ed Murrow (USIA), Sorensen, General Taylor and others. (Sorensen, 1965: 591). While the "White House group rejoiced at the speech" and its appropriate mix of threat and conciliation, the press characterized it as a
rather pugnacious response to the Soviets. (Schlesinger, 1965: 392.) On 7 August, Khrushchev replied with his own speech which Kennedy characterized approvingly as a mirror image of his own speech.

In early August the president set in motion the diplomatic course which he had chosen. Rusk went to Paris to consult with the allies. And all parts of the foreign-policy bureaucracy seemed to be working in unison. Then on 13 August, what Ulbricht had suggested back in mid June, began to take place. Just after midnight East German troops occupied most of the crossing points and began to tear up roads and to install blocks and barbed wire. Others had assumed something like this might happen. On a July television interview Senator Fulbright--in commenting on East Germany's brain drain--had said 'I don't' understand why the East Germans don't close their border because I think they have a right to close it' (Schlesinger, 1965: 394). Walt Rostow had also warned the president that such a thing might be done. "Despite the presidential and other anticipations, the action caught the State Department and the CIA by surprise" (Schlesinger, 1965: 394-395). A number of crossing points remained open until 17 August and movement between sectors continued for several days after that. (Schlesinger, 1965: 395; Sorensen, 1965: 593-594.) Still it was seen by many as an ominous sign. And for the West Berliner's it must have seemed particularly disheartening.
Kennedy responded at once. On 14 August the president "instantly mobilized the resources of government" The Berlin Task Force (earlier set up at State) went into continuous session. (Schlesinger, 1965: 395.) Though it seemed to exhaust the problem without addressing it. It was four days before it finally was able to present a protest. (Schlesinger, 1965: 395.) While State wrestled with the implications the president instructed Vice-President Johnson to make a personal trip to Berlin—a demonstration, of sorts, of U.S. empathy for the West Berliners' situation. This he carried out splendidly. The president, additionally, sent a 1500-man battle group from its station in West Germany to West Berlin. Clearly 1500 Americans were not going to alter the situation; it was simply symbolic of U.S. right of passage to Berlin.

The president met with his National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy. Bundy said that in his staff there existed "unanimity" regarding taking a clear initiative for direct negotiations. He also informed the president that State (Rusk, recall was in Paris) was clinging to the four-power negotiation framework. Further, Rusk had got word back that the U.S. might wish to await the upcoming General Assembly in New York at which time the they all might meet to discuss the matter. Bundy argued that such a course was too cautious at best and futile at worst: it was neither new nor was it likely to be productive. The only way "to galvanize
the lumbering machinery into action" was to set a public deadline by which time negotiations were to have begun. (Schlesinger, 1965: 398.)

Kennedy drafted and sent a letter to Rusk which reflected his agreement with Bundy. "We must make it plain to our allies that we plan to issue an invitation to negotiations before September 1" instructed Kennedy. As for the others, they would be welcome to join us or if they so choose they could watch from the sidelines. (Schlesinger, 1965: 398.) Finally, the president in this letter as well as other that followed "almost despairingly, threw out a wide variety of specific ideas" on what posture the U.S. might take. (Schlesinger, 1965: 399.)

Rusk apparently still only marginally got the message. A few days later he announced that the U.S. would negotiate with the Soviets after the mid-September General Assembly meeting at which the allies were scheduled to meet. Still the president moved the program along applying pressure where needed. Ultimately he ended up accepting the positive ideas of each faction and rejecting each faction's negative ideas. (Schlesinger, 1965: 398.)

On 30 August the president appointed General Lucius Clay as his special representative on Berlin. Clay was fondly remembered by many West Germans for his role in the war and in the 1948 air lift of the besieged city. On that same day the Soviets resumed nuclear testing thereby abro-
gating the tacit understanding arrived at in Vienna. Back from Paris Rusk pointed out to Kennedy in September that the Soviets were showing little sign of wishing to negotiate; perhaps the U.S. had embarked on the wrong approach. Kennedy confidently told Rusk that it was too early. The Soviets wished to bring the pot to a boil, frighten everyone a little more before they would negotiate; but they would negotiate. (Schlesinger, 1965: 398.)

As it happened the president had judged the Soviet position correctly. The following month Kennedy met with President Kekkonen of Finland and reassured him of the U.S. desire to negotiate and resolve the situation peacefully and amicably; but in no way would the U.S. avoid its responsibilities. On 17 October Khrushchev announced, at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, that the western powers were showing signs of seeking a solution. It was therefore reasonable that the Soviets 'not insist on signing a peace treaty absolutely before December 31, 1961' (Schlesinger, 1965: 400). With this announcement the deadline was lifted. And though the ugly reminder of the confrontation, the Berlin Wall, remained until 1989 the Berlin confrontation gradually drifted into the backwaters of the Cold War.

**Analysis**

1. Convocation of the Decisionmaking Unit
By custom, we begin with the convocation of the decisionmaking unit: how was it convoked, by whom, how soon, and how often? As we have seen, President Kennedy became aware of the likelihood of a Berlin problem early in 1961. In fact on 6 January Khrushchev, in effect, forewarned the new president to be ready. We know also that Acheson's interim report received by the president in April warned that a Berlin problem was likely in 1961. But it was not until the Vienna meetings between Khrushchev and Kennedy that it was confirmed. While the two fenced over various issues during the meetings, including Berlin, it was at the meetings' conclusions on 4 June that Kennedy was given the aide-memoire. This was an official announcement by the Soviet Union that it would no longer accept the status quo as a satisfactory policy. One way or the other, the sixteen-year stalemate was to be resolved. And the Soviets gave a time frame in which this was going to be accomplished: by year's end.

After Vienna President Kennedy flew on to London where he met with Macmillan. On 7 June he returned to the United States. Upon returning, he held a new conference and described the talks as a very sober two days. It was not, evidently, until 8 June that the president assembled representatives from his foreign-policy departments and assigned them specific tasks concerning Berlin. Doubtless, he had talked with individuals or small groups of individuals prior
to this meeting, but had not formally set the administration upon its course of resolving the problem presented by Moscow's aide-memoire. Thus it was some four days after becoming definitively aware of the Soviet demarche that the first convocation of the DMU occurred.

4.1.A. **Was the DMU convened restrictively (apex) or as a more expansive group?** While we do not have the exact list of who attended, we know that it was a rather expansive meetings. The apex members of the administration were involved. Additionally, we found accounts stating that other representatives from State, Defense, the NSC, and the White House Staff attended. Included in this latter category were such individuals as Sorensen and Schlesinger, both of whom give details of the meeting. Thus we may justifiably conclude that the convened DMU was not restrictive; the apex was augmented by several lower-level individuals.

4.1.B. **At what locus, high or low, was the DMU convened?** The locus was high. This of course is not what we would anticipate under these conditions; rather we would expect a low locus of convocation. For example we might expect to see State convene its own meetings, Defense its own, and so on. Instead the president had each of the agencies come to the White House where he activated the process. Thereafter meetings took place in respective agencies as we would expect. Nonetheless, the initial
convocation was at a high locus. We must therefore consider this particular aspect disconfirmed.

4.1.C. How frequently was the apex of the DMU convened? We know that various parts of the DMU were convened frequently over the event's course. We know, for instance, that the NSC met on a couple of occasions. We know that the president met with several working groups of top advisers. For example he had Acheson's position paper discussed by a group of top advisers; another time he took memoranda that Schlesinger and Kissinger had produced as well as one from Sorensen to Hyannis Port over the Fourth of July holiday where the president discussed them with Rusk, McNamara, and General Taylor. We know that prior to leaving to Hyannis Port he met independently with Schlesinger and Sorensen. But the process of decisionmaking seems to have been relegated to various advisory agencies and the apex of the DMU met rather infrequently over the matter, with the exception of the period surrounding the wall's erection. Instead, State's Berlin Task Force, Defense and its various groups, Bundy and his staff, and special assistants to the president (viz., Schlesinger and Sorensen) seemed to form the basis of decisionmaking.

Thus we may conclude that the apex of the DMU met infrequently and that decisionmaking was largely centered in various groups. This is what we would anticipate under these conditions.
4.1.D. Was the DMU convened along standard routines or was its convocation extemporaneous? Upon returning from Europe the president evidently rested up for about a day. He then assembled his major foreign-policy bureaucracy representatives and directed them with specific tasks. Recall, for example, that State was to work up a response to the aide-memoire. There was absolutely nothing unusual, atypical, or ad hoc about the way this was done. Kennedy directed each agency to handle its customary area of expertise--this was clearly routine. There is no record of who actually ordered the creation of the Berlin Task Force, but Schlesinger's remarks--disparaging as they are--indicate that it was probably undertaken in State. This was quite natural for State to do. It amounted to culling together experts from various desks--international political affairs desk, Soviet and East Europe desk, etc. This is a standard mechanism for State under virtually any administration. In fact it is somewhat surprising, perhaps, how little improvisation was associated with the Berlin problem given its overall implications. Nonetheless, Kennedy continued to allow standard procedures of various agencies to handle the situation. In fact it was this very problem, as we have seen, that caused Schlesinger and others to become concerned.

Standard routines, then, best describe the process of convening the DMU surrounding the Berlin affair. There was
little improvisation by the top decisionmakers who, instead, seemed largely content to allow the bureaucracy to grind away at a solution to the challenge. This confirms our hypothesized expectations.

2. Selection of Options

4.2.A. Were options selected by a restrictive DMU (i.e., the apex) or by the larger bureaucracy? We know that the sources of input into the selection of options were rather varied. The competing interests were vast and continued to grow over time. Initially the traditional agencies were involved: State, Defense, and the NSC. Over time we have documentation of outside consultants (e.g., Kaysen and Kissinger) domestic advisers and various White House Staff (e.g., Sorensen), allies (De Gaulle and Macmillan), the Council of Economic Advisers [see Schlesinger, 1965: 390], influential Senators (Fulbright, Humphrey, Pell) all of whom got involved with the issue and its impact on the UN [Schlesinger, 1965: 384], and even important journalists and former journalists got involved in the presidents presentation of options (Freedman and Murrow). This does not even begin to address the number of individuals involved at State (e.g., in the special Berlin Task Force), at Defense (civilian and military), at the UN and elsewhere. The number of persons involved is unquestionably huge and it continued to grow over the course of the Berlin problem until its conclusion. Finally it
should be pointed out that the former administration (Acheson) was brought in and presumably input from his sources too was involved.

We may conclude that the foreign-policy bureaucracy was completely involved. No ExCom, for instance, was established as was the case during the Missile Crisis. It was a joint effort with the president enlisting and employing all the foreign-policy resources at his disposal. This is, to be sure, what we would expect under the conditions of lengthy decision time and advance knowledge of a problem in Berlin. The foreign-policy bureaucracy, in all its expansive splendor, in effect becomes DMU.

4.2.B. Was the number of options proffered large or few? In the Berlin affair the machinery creaked along rather slowly initially--options were not even considered but instead simply an evaluation of previously developed contingencies moved cautiously forward.

In fact it was simply the early Acheson "interim" draft that was used because it happened to have been available. It literally took weeks before options began to be generated. Recall that Kennedy toward the end of June began to complain "about the pace" with which options and ideas were being generated--there seemed to be bureaucratic paralysis for the first couple of weeks following the Vienna meetings. Thus there was an initial period in which options were not
generated and this earlier-prepared contingency simply formed the basis of discussion.

Once proposals began to filter up, memoranda and ideas (though Schlesinger calls them "rehashes" of earlier ones and characterizes them as "stale and turgid") came from everywhere. The number is incalculable but it is large. It is important to note, though, that it literally took weeks before the process began. Nonetheless, the number was indisputably large.

4.2.C. Were the options reflective of individual personalities? By way of comparison, recall that during the planning of the Bay of Pigs Dulles and Bissell are alleged to have dominated the decisionmaking. Once Kennedy became involved this was no longer the case, of course, but initially it was. Contrast that situation with the present one where the DMU was so large that no single personality or group of personalities could possibly dominate the selection of options. It is conceivable, though there is no record of it, that individual or small groups of personalities dominated aspects of the option-generating process. It could be, for example, that the Berlin Task force was dominated by Rusk. Or that the Schlesinger-Kaysen-Kissinger group was dominated by Kissinger. Even were this the case, each one of these sub-groups was part of a much larger DMU and could scarcely exert operational hegemony on the process.
Even when the president finally announced to an informal group of his advisers that he had made his decision it was clearly a product of many inputs from the larger DMU. Recall that Sorensen attempts to make the case that Kennedy took charge of the Berlin situation: his "second basic decision was to take complete charge of the operation. For months he saturated himself in the problem" (Sorensen, 1965: 586). As much as Sorensen would like us to believe this to be so, it clearly is at best an exaggeration. When Kennedy assembled some close advisers and friends on 19 July at his living quarters, Sorensen notes that Kennedy "stated each decision in firm, precise tones" (Sorensen, 1965: 590). While we do not dispute that firm and precise tones were used, the substance was a compilation of several other options offered from his foreign-policy machinery. He would ask for a further increase in the military budget over what he had already requested--this was a McNamara suggestion from June as well as attributable to Acheson. He further accepted some suggestions--about the draft and mobilization contingencies--that Maxwell Taylor and presumably the JCS had suggested. As far as his major plan to negotiate directly with the Soviets, three different and independent sources had previously suggested that: Bundy stated his staff was behind it unanimously; Sorensen had earlier written a memorandum to that effect; and the unlikely Schlesinger-Kissinger team had essentially recommended the
same. This does not detract from the president's taking charge; however, it demonstrates that he relied on his vast foreign-policy machinery (which is after all its purpose) to generate the options for his final selection.

Thus with due respect to Sorensen, we must conclude that neither individual personalities nor small groups of personalities dominated the selection of options surrounding Berlin. The options were reflective of the bureaucracies involved and precedents in U.S. foreign policy as we would expect to see under these conditions.

4.2.D. Was there evidence of groupthink in the selection of options? The answer is an unequivocal no. There was no in-group but, rather, several groups. There was, in addition, an acute memory of the Bay of Pigs situation just a few months earlier that surely mitigated against a repeat of such folly. Recall that Schlesinger explicitly remarks that he felt the decisionmaking (near the end of June) was following such a pattern. If we scrutinize his remarks we note that he is referring to State: former Secretary Acheson's thesis was paralyzing thoughtful analysis there. This was not at all generalized to the other parts of the DMU like Defense and the NSC for example. Nor is it completely clear how Schlesinger, a White House aide, would know with certitude what was taking place at State. Moreover, even Schlesinger allows that by July and August the Berlin Task Force (State) was in continuous
session considering several options: "Rejecting some countermeasures, . . . as too drastic and others, . . . as too trivial" (Schlesinger, 1965: 395). It should be noted that he still considered their conclusions too slow in coming.

We must be at least somewhat suspect of Schlesinger's motives in any event. One of the threads throughout his chapters on Berlin is that of the president, frustrated with State, turning to others and eventually adroitly solving the problem. Among those others, we must remember, was the Schlesinger-Kissinger team.

Irrespective of whether Schlesinger is presenting a self-serving account or not, then, we must still conclude that groupthink was not a problem during the Berlin episode of 1961.

3. Implementation of Options

To cite trends, it has often been the case that when the more extreme situational variables obtain, a somewhat restrictive, ad hoc DMU is formed. Further, when this happens, it too is often the case that implementation is closely followed if not conducted by that DMU. Under these less-than-extreme conditions, our expectation are that this would not be the case.

4.3.A. Was implementation of options controlled by the apex of the DMU or from the larger foreign-policy bureaucracy? As we have determined, during the Berlin
problem of 1961, the DMU effectively was the foreign-policy bureaucracy at large. Hence, in answer to the question, it is clear that the full, foreign-policy machinery was employed in the implementation phase as in previous phases. Among the options selected which we have already considered were asking Congress for an increase in military appropriations; getting special sanction to increase the draft and special powers to mobilize if necessary; and a direct track of negotiations with the Soviets apart from the previous four-power approach. In each case appropriate parts of the vast bureaucracy were used to carry out these options. Congress, obviously, had to debate and to allow the president his requests. And though the State Department may have been slow in coming around, repeatedly the accounts demonstrate the president directly tasking them with their diplomatic responsibilities. Rusk went to Paris to consult with allies and, as it turned out, to prevail on them to follow the U.S. lead. Negotiations were eventually carried on with Ambassadors from both sides of the Atlantic and in fact the same is true of the negotiations in the UN.

Once again, we must conclude that the entire foreign-policy bureaucracy was involved in implementation. It was neither controlled nor accomplished at a particularly high level.

4.3.B. Was implementation accomplished via standard routines or extemporaneously? We must first consider the
Acheson proposal. That proposal and the Kennedy Administra-
tion's early response to Khrushchev were based on the
previous administration's handling of other Berlin problems.
(Schlesinger, 1965: 381-383; George and Smoke, 1974:
423, 433-434; Sorensen, 1965: 587; Blechman and Kaplan, 1978:
411-412.) And this typified the situation until about mid
July. During June, as we have seen, debate raged within the
various agencies of the administration. Each account used
in this case study cites the fierce debate. George and
Smoke as well as Blechman and Kaplan discuss the "hard line"
versus the "soft line" in said debate during late June.
(George and Smoke, 1974: 433-434; Blechman and Kaplan, 1978:
419-420.) But we know that by mid July the president had
made his decision on the way his administration would handle
the situation.

As we have discussed above, it turns out to be a syn-
thesis of views. Some previous contingencies were accepted:
the president did finally send a 1500-man force down the
autobahn as originally suggested by Acheson and which had
been developed in the Eisenhower administration. Further
the president implemented a negotiation stance that was an
adaptation of earlier contingencies: he rejected a rigid
adherence to the four-power formula and declared that he
would conduct bilateral ones if necessary but that consulta-
tions would be conducted with allies. And finally, he
completely eschewed other contingencies. For example, as he
discovered in the spring, the military contingency called for immediate escalation to nuclear if necessary; and indeed Acheson agreed that this was appropriate. (Schlesinger, 1965: 380-381 and 388.) Fortunately, the president directed other defense measures that were short of "humiliation or annihilation" which included a build up of conventional forces over time to demonstrate resolve. (George and Smoke, 1974: 433-434; Sorensen, 1965: 590, 594-595.)

Thus the answer to the question is that implementation was largely accomplished along bureaucratic routines. There exist examples of adjusting routines and contingencies to meet specific needs of this affair but this is itself routine. As we would expect to see, routines rather than improvisation best describes implementation.

4.3.C. Was there evidence of bureaucratic politics present in the implementation phase of Berlin? We have discussed at some length the bureaucratic inertia that characterized the earliest part of the Berlin episode, during June. We know that State seemed paralyzed for some time. We also know that some of the president's advisers became sufficiently worried about State's reticence to operate outside its narrowly prescribed world view that they raised the issue with the president. Recall that both Schlesinger and a small group as well as Sorensen at separate times approached the president in order to circumvent what they separately perceived as State's inertia
and lack of innovative thinking. And we know that Kennedy apparently thought likewise for he had both groups formulate their perspective thoughts in written form so he could confront Secretary Rusk in a 13 July meeting.

We further know that even after the president thought he had his State department functioning he found that Rusk and others were still behind the administration learning curve. As late as after the erection of the Berlin Wall (13-17 August) Kennedy met with Bundy to find ways to maneuver around State's inertia. Thus there is at least circumstantial evidence that State's prerogatives and European view diverged from the president's and his most attuned advisers. It would be difficult to argue that the result was in any way harmful to U.S. policy. But the evidence of problems with the State Department exist.

We conclude therefore that there is evidence of bureaucratic inertia and organizational imperatives that surfaced in the Berlin situation. Their overall impact is far less clear. Nonetheless, the evidence of bureaucratic interference is confirmed.

4.3.D. Was implementation conducted instantaneous with the selection of options or was it temporally distinct? We have described in some detail the temporal distinction between the various phases of decisionmaking. And has been the case previously in this chapter, implementation of options, once selected, has always been separated by time.
The temporal distinction has been clear and unmistakable. In this specific case, the same has been true. Indeed, at certain points options that had been selected were being put into motion as new options were undergoing consideration. The processes of selecting and implementing options was distinct.

4. Evaluation of Selected Options

4.4.A. Was the feedback-evaluation process controlled at the apex of the DMU or through the larger bureaucracy? For the most part feedback was channeled through its constituent parts of the foreign-policy bureaucracy. After July Rusk went back to the allies and reported through normal diplomatic channels--thus diplomacy was channeled through routines State channels. Defense matters were, appropriately, handled through the Pentagon. For example, in August when the East Germans began to erect the wall Kennedy instructed the military to send the 1500-man force from West Germany to West Berlin. The president directed it through McNamara who directed it through the appropriate chain of command. Though such had been done several times before, no one quite knew what to expect. And as it happened, the force was stopped and counted at an East German checkpoint. And during the activity the president stayed contact with events as was his convention: his military aide stayed in contact with the Pentagon and reported events throughout the day. (Sorensen, 1965: 594.)
The only departure that might be considered is that he appointed the well-known Lucius Clay as his special representative for Berlin during August. One might suspect the appointment as a way of getting independently verified feedback. While this seemed to be atypical, there was no further mention of Clay doing anything or performing any particular function in any of the accounts. He seems to have been a symbolic appointment to help the West Berliners to buck up under the strain. (Schlesinger, 1965: 397.)

4.4.B. *Was the process accomplished routinely or extemporaneously?* Again it seems to have been quite standard. There was simply nothing out of the ordinary with one possible exception. During the Berlin affair both Kennedy and Khrushchev seemed to have turned to selected journalists to sound out and to evaluate his opponent's position. Kennedy was known for doing this— in fact during the worst days of Bay of Pigs he and Schlesinger met with a reporter for lunch. Thus it is not that is was a particularly extraordinary event but, rather, that using the press to find out how his options were being received domestically and abroad was somewhat innovative. On one other occasion the president met with President Kekkonen of Finland. Kennedy explained the U.S. position carefully and emphasized that the U.S. did not wish a forced settlement but a peaceful one. This appears to have been intentionally done so that word would get back to the Soviets. These were
rare exceptions though and it would be easy to make too much of them. Thus on balance, standard channels, as has been discussed, were used for information.

4.4.C. Were there any signs of bureaucratic interference in the evaluation-feedback process? For example did various agencies withhold information, or put a particular spin on it? Or was the information that was available to decisionmakers complete and reliable? And was the DMU kept abreast of events as they unfolded? In each instance we find no indication of interference. There was no hint of obstructions of information. The military did not attempt, as far as the evidence indicates, to keep information to themselves. Nor did State, for example, despite the indication that it stalled on implementation, attempt to keep information from the military or any other agency. It was a joint effort once policy was defined. Furthermore, since the DMU was essentially the vast foreign-policy bureaucracy, and since we have determined that there existed a sharing of information between its parts, we may rightfully conclude that the DMU was kept abreast once policy was determined and implemented.

We conclude that there was no evidence of interference in the feedback-evaluation phase of decisionmaking in the Berlin case. And we again find this in contrast to what we expected to find.
4.4.D. Was the process instantaneous with implementation or temporally distinct? With little elaboration we may again conclude, as we have detailed above, that the processes of decisionmaking were temporally distinct. This was the case in terms of implementation and evaluation-feedback as well. And this is what we would expect to find.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1965\textsuperscript{29}

**Narrative**

By the time of President Johnson's intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, America had a long if less than distinguished history of involving itself in Dominican politics. The U.S. had intervened in 1905 and 1916 respectively. On the latter occasion, the U.S. occupied the Dominican Republic for some eight years which resulted in the Trujillo family's rule over that country—a heavy-handed rule that lasted into Kennedy's administration.

Sometime in 1959 Trujillo's power began to wane. As is often the case during military dictatorships, factions from

both the left and the right as well as moderates wait for
the final demise of such odious regimes. This too was the
case in Santo Domingo as Trujillo continued his decline
President Kennedy summarized the options facing America
succinctly:

There are three possibilities. . . in descending order
of preference: a decent democratic regime, a
continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime.
We ought to aim at the first but we really can't
renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the
third. (Schlesinger, 1965: 769.)

Consequently Kennedy began to establish contingency plans
for the Dominican Republic. He established a rapid deploy-
ment force and began establishing "routine training exercis-
es" that formed the basis of President Johnson's interven-
tion some four years later. (Schlesinger, 1965: 769-770;
Rusk, 1990: 371.)

Joaquin Balaguer, formerly associated with the
Trujillos though with somewhat more respectable credentials,
seemed to control the Dominican government through 1961.
Still, the Trujillos were never far away. The assassinated
leader's son, Ramfis and his two "wicked uncles" still
exerted influence in the island country. Then in November,
with unrest fomenting, the two wicked uncles were reported
to have returned to the island from exile. Secretary Rusk
called for an emergency meeting of the OAS on the political
front; militarily, Kennedy ordered the U.S. naval task force
to steam to the area on 19 November. The administration succeeded and the Trujillos once again fled. (Schlesinger, 1965: 771.)

Finally in December 1962 a remarkable event occurred in the Dominican Republic. Democratic elections were held for the first time in generations and Juan Bosch was elected. Bosch took office early in 1963. The Kennedy administration was generous with its recognition and aid. Kennedy reestablished diplomatic ties and sent Ambassador Martin to represent the U.S. And America backed his relatively mild social reforms. (Rusk, 1990: 369.) In fact rumors of the Dominican Republic becoming a "democratic showcase in the Caribbean" were not uncommon. (Schlesinger, 1965: 773; Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 303). By fall, however, the administration had become disappointed with Bosch's leadership. He was a writer and a dreamer and had little instinct for managing. Ambassador Martin even began to suspect that he was too easily influenced by communist factions in the Dominican. U.S aid began to diminish; whether intended or not it resulted in plotting among the military to supplant Bosch with one of their own.

Then in September 1963 Juan Bosch was deposed by a junta comprised of Colonel Wessin (Commander of the Air Force Base at San Isidro) and former Foreign Minister Reid Cabral. The administration, though admittedly unhappy with Bosch's performance, was upset that an elected official was
overthrown in such a fashion. Even Ambassador Martin cabled
State to request another show of naval force. "The State
Department sharply refused, however, and warned Martin not
to commit the United States to save Bosch" (Blechman and
Kaplan, 1978: 303). Thus while State was sending one
signal, Kennedy instructed that Martin be recalled, economic
aid cut off, and diplomatic recognition withheld. (Rusk,
1990: 369.) This pattern of difference between agencies
would be a recurring one in 1965.

Kennedy was assassinated shortly after the imbroglio.
And President Johnson took charge. A guerilla movement was
gaining ground, largely as a result of the coup. And the
domestic scene in the Dominican Republic was worsening. The
new administration became alarmed that a Castro-type debacle
might loose itself in Santo Domingo. Thomas Mann at State
led the anti-"Castroite" charge. (LaFeber, 1987: 69.) And
soon President Johnson reestablished ties. He sent W.
Tapley "Tap" Bennett, a conservative foreign service
officer, to be Ambassador. (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978:
304.) Bennett would later become allied with Thomas Mann
against less conservative voices within the administration.
Nonetheless, in the following months Bennett established
warm relations with the Wessin-Cabral junta.

Despite the administration's wishes, by early 1965 the
Cabral leadership "was in deep trouble" (Blechman and
Kaplan, 1978: 304). The junta had promised democratic
elections only to be canceled by Cabral. "By early spring it had become evident that a major blowup was imminent" (Bleichman and Kaplan, 1978: 305). The "CIA reported on April 11 and 12, just two weeks before" the revolution began that the administration better prepare itself. (Prados, 1991: 140.) It was common knowledge in the press as well; the New York Times reported trouble at least a week prior to its advent. (Szulc, 1965: 6.) Even in Johnson's memoirs we find explicit reference to his awareness of what was coming: "We had heard rumors of an impending coup... for some time" (Johnson, 1971: 188).

On the morning of Saturday, 24 April 1965, rebellion broke out in Santo Domingo--its focus was against the military junta and the canceled elections; much of it was pro-Bosch; some of it was inspired by communist factions. The U.S. embassy there reported the news immediately and followed it with frequent updates to the State Department. (Szulc, 1965: 3.) At the time the rebellion broke out Ambassador Bennett was in the States, having been recalled for consultations. (Johnson, 1971: 188; Prados, 1991: 140; Szulc, 1965: 8.) William Connett, Bennett's second in command, was thus left to deal with it from the U.S. embassy end. Bennett would not return until some three days later. (Szulc, 1965: 8.) Moreover, Johnson had gone to Camp David for the weekend. Upon arriving at Camp David Johnson learned that Thomas Mann (Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs) had been trying to reach him. The president returned Mann's calls whereupon he learned of the outbreak of rebellion.

The president evidently remained in contact with Bundy, Rusk, and McNamara all of whom Johnson says were holed up in the White House Situation Room. (Johnson, 1971: 190.) The Wessin-Cabral forces countered early Sunday (25 April) and full war broke out between the junta and the rebels. Sometime, probably mid-morning Sunday, the decision was made to send the task force earlier established by Kennedy to the general area. Johnson did not return to the White House until around 6:00 P.M. Sunday evening. Prados claims that only Bundy was at the Situation Room but that the president did keep in touch with all three decisionmakers. (Prados, 1991: 141.) Johnson met with his advisers Sunday evening where as Rusk puts it bluntly: "Facing this rapidly deteriorating situation, Lyndon Johnson dusted off a contingency evacuation plan prepared earlier under the instruction of President Kennedy and moved ships. . . in to Dominican waters" (Rusk, 1990: 371). Though Rusk gives the credit to Johnson, it seems clear that the implementation of some decisions was already in progress. Clearly decisions had already been set in train. (Johnson, 1971: 190; Szulc, 1965: 19-22.)

Sunday afternoon rebel leaders met with officials at the U.S. embassy in Santo Domingo. The Wessin forces were
apparently making progress for the rebels requested the embassy's good offices for negotiations. Though it is not clear who met with the rebels it was probably Connett who was second in command and, thus, in charge during Bennett's absence. The embassy refused to deal with the rebels—particularly given the early success of the Wessin forces. They "misperceived" them as communist inclined even though they were representing a return to the constitutionally elected Bosch. (LaFeber, 1987: 76). Thomas Mann set up in State's seventh floor Operations Center. Ambassador Bennett had yet to return to the Dominican Republic; in fact he had stopped to visit his mother in Georgia. Thus Connett was reporting directly to Thomas Mann at State's Operations Center. Initially Connett minimized the urgency and was not overly concerned with the rebels. Apparently after this meeting with them, however, he reversed his position. Eventually he began reporting back to Mann that the pro-Bosch forces were controlled by communists. (Szulc, 1965: 19.) War continued with Wessin's forces bombing and strafing the pro-Bosch-rebel positions. The situation remained confused in Santo Domingo, much more so in Washington as leaders attempted to follow events. Cabral was forced to resign, though, and Wessin "temporarily" assumed his position.

As fighting continued on Tuesday morning (27 April) Wessin's troops began to stall out. By this time Ambassador
Bennett had returned and had assumed control. He was faced with an increasingly beleaguered and stalled Wessin offensive. Embassy officials had already said no to negotiations when approached by rebel leaders days earlier. Fortuitously though he began to get information that the rebels might still be willing to deal. Evidently for the second time rebel representatives and former Bosch officials approached the U.S. embassy and requested negotiations. Surprisingly Bennett declined on the grounds that he had no authority. (Szulc, 1965: 36.) The Ambassador apparently felt that Wessin's forces would ultimately prevail. Bennett made his choice. He sent special "critic" messages back to Mann in the Operations Center; Mann in turn communicated with the White House Situation Room. (Prados, 1991: 142.) Then Bennett "made a series of fateful on-the-scene decision" which ultimately directed U.S. policy. He requested direct U.S intervention. Confusion reigned in Washington. Rusk cabled Bennett instructing him that he wanted no U.S. intervention unless there was conclusive evidence that the communists directed the pro-Bosch movement. (Bleichman and Kaplan, 1978: 309.) Besides, the embassy had earlier cabled that Wessin's troops were winning decisively and now he was sending messages of urgent need to forestall their defeat.

The final straw was the morning of Wednesday 28 April. The rebels, who were now thought to be finished for all intents and purposes, launched a massive counter offensive.
They began moving dramatically and quickly. Bennett's failure to accept their request seemed to inspire them to fight harder. This likely helped confuse the situation in Washington for even Bennett must have been confused. He had sent State seemingly contradictory messages. Another explanation: "there were a number of indications that [U.S.] government officials even at lower levels feared for their careers if they could be charged with 'losing the Dominican Republic'" (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 308).

Johnson met with advisers who were already discussing South East Asia and Vietnam. Rusk, McNamara, George Ball, and Bill Moyers were all involved. By now Johnson had learned of the most recent reports and was alarmed. The president "told his advisers that [he] was not going to sit by and see American lives lost in this situation" (Johnson, 1971: 195). Consequently on 28 April 1965 he ordered the landing of 500 marines to evacuate Americans. (Rusk, 1990: 371.)

Concomitant with his military move Johnson ordered Rusk to initiate an emergency session of the OAS. Additionally he arranged a meeting with Congressional leaders for that evening. And finally the president made a television announcement to inform the American people. His address has been charitably described as "hyperbole." Rusk notes that, on spotty reports of atrocities, Johnson mentioned that the rebellion had resulted in 'headless bodies lying in the
streets of Santo Domingo.' This apparently was unsubstantiated and caused a bit of a ruckus. Johnson consequently called Ambassador Bennett personally to instruct him: 'For God's sake, see if you can find some headless bodies' (Rusk, 1990: 374). In addition to finessing the facts with the American public there is evidence that he gave some inaccurate information to the convened Congressional leaders. (Szulc, 1965: 45.) Whether intentional or not information was not totally factual. Szulc says that the president's reaction is to be expected given "the exaggerated and inaccurate information" being "fed" him from the embassy. (Szulc, 1965: 45.)

Early Thursday (29 April) marines began to land in order to implement the evacuation of Americans. Szulc from the New York Times was one of those with the landing vessels. And he mentions that he and others on the ship were able to monitor military communications suggesting that there might be more than an evacuation soon. (Szulc, 1965: 59.) The information turned out to be accurate: the initial 500 troops Johnson had ordered to implement the evacuation had turned to 2,500 by Thursday night.

Ellsworth Bunker, as a result of the president's direction to Rusk, was dispatched to meet with the OAS. (Rusk, 1990: 372; Szulc, 1965: 74.) After some heated debate—primarily regarding the fact that the U.S. had acted prior to consultation—the OAS agreed that an International Safety
Zone should be created and that the status of U.S. troops would be that of "neutrals." On Friday, 30 April, the marines fanned out creating the zone. The idea was that of safe passage for evacuees as well as interposing a "neutral" between the belligerents.

Also on Friday some in the administration began to question the objectivity of the embassy's reports generally and Ambassador Bennett specifically. (Bennett had earlier been connected with Milton Eisenhower's work in Guatemala and was now being suspected of reflexive sympathy for the conservative interests in the Dominican.) Bill Moyers, a special assistant to the president and speech writer, contacted Kennedy's former representative to the Dominican, Ambassador Martin, late Friday night. Arrangements were made for the Martin to go to Puerto Rico to speak with Juan Bosch, and then on to Santo Domingo. (Szulc, 1965: 80-83.) Martin's instructions were to see if there was room for negotiations. Martin was able almost immediately to arrange for a truce. General Imbert was asked to represent the Wessin forces as a more palatable figure and Martin arranged for Imbert to sign an agreement with Caamaño from the rebel side. (Szulc, 1965: 87; Johnson, 1971: 202.) Unfortunately though while political factors were progressing, military momentum was engendering its own progression. The 82nd Airborne landed Saturday (1 May) and in the resulting confusion fighting again erupted with American forces.
contravening their "neutral" status and siding with the Wessin-Imbert forces.

Over the next several days fighting continued. Dr. Mora from OAS arrived to begin the process of brokering a new agreement. Johnson announced on Sunday (2 May) that the rebels were now controlled by communists, echoing the embassy's earlier pleas. And some 9,200 American troops were now present on the Caribbean island. (Szulc, 1965: 90-106.) On 5 May Dr. Mora successfully concluded still another truce. Caamano was recognized as the titular representative of the rebels until Juan Bosch could return to assume constitutional authority. That same day U.S. marines began invading rebel-held territories in Santo Domingo. (Szulc, 1965: 129-136.) Soon the OAS voted to send its own peacekeeping forces to gradually replace the U.S. forces there. And while the OAS continued to negotiate with both sides, Bennett was once again conducting his own negotiations with Imbert for a "Government of National Reconstruction." The Ambassador, evidently unhappy with OAS's direction, hoped to be able to have something with which to bargain for U.S. interests as he perceived them. (Szulc, 1965: 152-153.)

This political maneuvering continued for days with sporadic fighting erupting from time to time.

Again parts of the administration, at least in Washington, were looking for ways to settle it politically. Johnson dispatched his close friend Abe Fortas to talk with
Bosch in Puerto Rico. As Johnson was dispatching Fortas, Imbert's troops were preparing and grouping for an offensive. The following day (13 May) war broke out with a vengeance. While Fortas was in Puerto Rico at Johnson's behest, Bennett was encouraging Imbert to continue to fight the rebels in the Dominican. Further, State announced that it would quickly get $750,000 in a badly needed financial package to Imbert. (Szulc, 1965: 189-203.) On 14 May Imbert announced Operation Cleanup; negotiations were no longer necessary.

As the local embassy machinery and the military seemed increasingly difficult to control, a White House meeting was held on 14 May. The result of the meeting was that McGeorge Bundy, representing the president, and Thomas Mann, representing State would go first to San Juan and then on to Santo Domingo. Their mission was to fix the mess. The mission was conducted with the utmost of stealth. By 16 May, Bundy was having success with Bosch in San Juan and the rebels in Santo Domingo. And then Imbert's forces launched another massive offensive. (Szulc, 1965: 213-229.) Despite the difficulties Bundy still had brokered a deal by 17 May. While Bundy continued to work, Mann returned (20 May) to Washington. On 21 May the rebels spokesman, Caamano publicly thanked the Johnson administration for playing a constructive and fair role. It looked as though a peaceful conclusion had finally been achieved. An interim leader,
Mr. Guzman, had been agreed upon by all. And though intermittent fighting continued, Bundy stayed on in Santo Domingo to ensure the transition.

Then on 23 May (Sunday) the entire agreement fell apart. Washington instructed Bundy that he would have to impose new conditions upon Guzman before finalizing agreements and securing signatures. A dejected Bundy attempted to carry out his duties but conditions—among them a guarantee to expel all communists from any government position—prevented the agreements' conclusion. Bundy would soon leave the Dominican where the OAS, and now representative of the UN, would continue on negotiating new truces, and new political arrangements while fighting would occasionally erupt. The U.S. thereafter attempted only to exert its influence through those international organizations and withdrew many of its troops. Only those under OAS control remained.

It was not until the end of August that a deal was finalized that ended the fighting in the Dominican Republic. And in fact it was the same agreement which Bundy had worked out back in May with the simple difference of yet another mutually agreed upon leader. Like Bundy's earlier Guzman agreement, the August provisional government was eventually headed by a former Bosch cabinet member, Mr. Hector Garcia. With Mr. Garcia's acceptance of the provisional leadership
in early September 1965, the Dominican problem, at least from the U.S. perspective ended.

Now we wish to analyze the decisionmaking surrounding the Dominican Republic to consider how it was impacted by the foreknowledge of the event in Washington and the event's long duration over which decisions were made.

**Analysis**

The following analysis of decisionmaking surrounding the Dominican Republic will demonstrate some of the more dramatic effects that this particular configuration of situation variables can have on the process. We begin by assessing the convocation of the decision unit.

1. Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit

We first wish to ascertain when and where the first convocation of the DMU occurred. As we know, rebellion broke out on 24 April 1965—early Saturday morning. The U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Tap Bennett, was in the United States. President Johnson was on his way to Camp David for a weekend of relaxation. Thomas Mann at the State Department received word from Bennett's assistant, Mr. Connett, that rebellion was underway. We have several accounts, provided above, that indicate that the action was anticipated for "some time" even if the exact date was unknown.

Upon arriving at Camp David Johnson informs us that a message awaited him from Thomas Mann. The president re-
turned the call whereupon he was informed of the rebellion. We known that the president asked, according to his own account, if there was anything that he needed to do about it. Mann said no; State was in control of the matter and would keep the president fully briefed. (Johnson, 1971: 187.) The president did not return to the White House until late Sunday afternoon whereupon he found his top advisers already meeting to discuss action on the Dominican Republic. Interestingly, however, Johnson acknowledges that actions directing the Atlantic Fleet to the area had already been taken. (Johnson, 1971: 190.) Thus the DMU, clearly absent the president, had at begun to function by sometime Saturday.

4.1.A. Was convocation of the DMU restrictive (apex only) or a larger group? The initiation of a DMU was through the State Department. There information first came in about trouble taking place. And at least for some time Thomas Mann handled the situation from State. At some point, evidently early Sunday, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy met at the Situation Room to discuss the matter and to determine whether the president needed to come back from Camp David.

The emerging DMU was comprised of apex members, with the exception of the president, and other individuals as well. Specifically, we know that Connett from the U.S. embassy and Thomas Mann from State were included. And
though they are not specifically enumerated, we know the Situation Room personnel (Duty Officer, etc.) as well as some representatives of the Pentagon were also involved. Recall that military actions—albeit based on pre-established contingencies—were implemented prior to Johnson's return to Washington. Hence we may fairly conclude that the DMU was not restricted solely to the apex members of the administration.

4.1.B. **At what locus was it convened?** The initial convocation of the partial DMU was clearly done somewhere at State. This was the tete-a-tete between the embassy's Connett and Mr. Mann. And some decisions were clearly undertaken as a result. Soon thereafter the apex members began to involve themselves and convocation moved to a higher locus: the White House Situation Room. Nonetheless, initially it was convened at a low locus. And over the course of the event the locus remained low for most of the decisionmaking matters.

4.1.C. **With what frequency was the apex of the DMU convened during the event?** Over the approximately five months that the situation continued, there were few meetings of the top decisionmakers. They informally met without the president that first Sunday; again they met with the president Sunday evening—apparently to simply inform him. Though Johnson goes to some lengths in his memoirs to suggest he followed events intently, it was not until the
afternoon of Wednesday, 28 April, that he again met with his decisionmakers regarding the situation. And in fact he notes that he and his advisers were meeting on Vietnam—not the Caribbean—when a message from Ambassador Bennett prompted them to discuss the Dominican Republic. (Johnson, 1971: 195). As a result he convened a meeting with Congressional leaders that night to explain the administration's actions. The following night, 29 April, the president and his advisers—though a broader group than the apex—met once more to discuss a full-fledged intervention versus their earlier evacuation contingency. (Johnson, 1971: 200.)

Following this meeting these top decisionmakers, as far as the record indicates, did not meet again with respect to the Dominican Republic. Together then we have them meeting four times, once without the president, over the event's entire course. Clearly several other discussions took place—advisers and meetings occurred at State and Defense and with Bundy's own staff. And there were almost constant meetings at the U.S. embassy. But this does not constitute a meeting of the top decisionmakers. Relatively few meetings were held by them. As with Berlin, for example, the larger foreign-policy bureaucracy effectively became the DMU.

Thus as we would anticipate the apex of the DMU met relatively infrequently. Instead a larger, more complex DMU
formed and met to handle the day-to-day decisionmaking
surrounding the Dominican Republic.

4.1.D. Was the DMU convened along ad hoc or standard
procedures? Recall on Sunday that the president returned to
his advisers already meeting. Though not a formal NSC
meeting, it was common procedure for Bundy to follow events
in the Situation Room and then to contact those who needed
to know. This is apparently what the president walked in
on. That he was then briefed was also rather standard and
clearly to be expected. The next meeting was called to
discuss Vietnam—a message from Bennett came through which
turned the discussion to Dominican affairs. And the next
evening, a meeting was called to formalize the decision to
escalate. In all, these meetings were rather more informal
and ad hoc than we would have expected. Following this
initial activity, however, decisionmaking on the Dominican
Republic moved in to pre-established routinized meeting
formats in which Johnson was only indirectly involved. The
larger foreign-policy machinery functioned along standard-
operating procedures.

Overall we must conclude that standard-operating
routines were the basis for the convocation of the DMU. And
this is of course what we would expect.

2. Selection of Options

4.2.A. Were the options selected by a restrictive
(apex) DMU or a larger DMU? We have detailed in the
narrative above that the options came from a combination of sources. Initially, the decisionmaking, including selecting provisional options, was undertaken by those at the embassy in Santo Domingo and at State back in Washington. Further, we saw that by Sunday McGeorge Bundy was involved in the selection of options. He remained an integral part of the decisionmaking throughout the affair. Additionally, Rusk and McNamara were involved at one point when they instructed that contingency plans generated in the previous administration be put into play. Finally, we know that unexpected sources of options such as Moyers, a former U.S. Ambassador to the area, and Johnson's personal friend Abe Fortas were each involved at various stages of the options selection process. In all there was a broad group of individuals involved in proffering options and ultimately selecting them.

4.2.B. Were the options considered few or many in number? Until 29 April (Thursday), it appears that all options revolved around the Kennedy Administration's contingency plans--a broad bundle of options. There is little indication that any of the top decisionmakers considered anything other than accepting, almost reflexively, what had previously worked in similar situations. Indeed, to use Rusk's own assessment: they "dusted off a contingency evacuation plan prepared earlier under the instruction of President Kennedy and moved ships."
.. in to Dominican waters" (Rusk, 1990: 371). Hence, despite, Johnson's reference to "we" in his memoirs, and Rusk's giving Johnson credit, there is evidence that even this option was chosen by others—probably Bundy and McNamara as it turns out. Johnson implies as much when he notes that he discussed the contingency plan with McNamara as the evacuation was in progress, Tuesday 27 April. He began to wonder, according to his account, if the 500 marines would be enough. McNamara assured him that he had already taken care of that concern and had made more men available. (Johnson, 1971: 192.) And Szulc informs us that troops simply continued to multiply from Tuesday through Friday, from 500 eventually reaching nearly 10,000. (Szulc, 1965: 59, 99.)

This was of course the military contingency plan. Additionally there was a diplomatic contingency. Unlike many of the cases we have considered in this work wherein the diplomatic action was typically taken in the UN Security Council, according to the contingency developed by Kennedy, affairs in the Caribbean would go directly to the OAS. (Schlesinger, 1965: 771; Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 294-299.) And during the 1965 rebellion in the Dominican, this contingency was accepted in toto. Johnson describes the scene during which he turns to Rusk and says 'Mr. Secretary. .. I want you to. .. get in touch with the OAS' (Johnson, 1971: 195). Unfortunately from the OAS's viewpoint, this
instruction was not given until Wednesday evening, some four
days after the rebellion began and more than a day after
U.S. evacuation began. Also, in Rusk's account of
contacting the OAS he notes that "We also called an urgent
meeting of the" OAS. (Rusk, 1990: 371.) What is interesting
is that Rusk earlier distinguishes when Johnson directed
action by referring to him directly (third person,
singular). Here he uses first person, plural which implies
that perhaps State simply contacted the OAS per established-
contingency plans. Irrespective of who actually directed
the action, it is clear that it was a contingency plan
originated in the previous administration.

Thus the answer to our question is that a number of
options were chosen though never was there a very in-depth
consideration of what was needed. Rather, contingencies
were set in motion and the DMU continued to react and adjust
to them over the course of the event. Nonetheless, a large
number of options was involved as we would expect.

4.2.C. *Were individual personalities reflected in the
process of selecting options?* We must distinguish here
between the phase of decisionmaking in which options are
selected versus when they are implemented. Though sometimes
fuzzy we shall attempt to do so. In the first few days of
the affair, contingencies were simply dusted off and put
into force. And at that time it was the top administration
people who were involved: Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, and
Bundy. At this time no personality dominated the process. Instead, the availability of contingency plans controlled U.S. decisionmaking.

But as the process continued--i.e., as the U.S. escalated its intervention--this clearly changed. Ambassador Bennett, for instance, clearly dominated implementation of contingencies and in effect caused the administration to have to select new options. This may well have been the case with Thomas Mann too. But for our purposes, this slips into the implementation phase. We must not confuse the initial decisionmaking with later implementation obstacles that caused reassessments. We shall discuss that below.

Thus we conclude that during the initial selection-of-option phase, no single personality dominated the process. We further conclude that no particular group dominated said process. Under these conditions we would no anticipate a single personality exerting itself. Thus we have confirmed our expectation.

4.2.D. Were signs of groupthink present in the option phase associated with the Dominican rebellion? By its very nature the phenomenon of groupthink is linked to the selection of options. And we may conclude relatively easily that no signs of groupthink presented themselves. As we have discussed, contingency plans were simply pulled off the shelf. While this implies that little thought went in
to the initial U.S. response to the Dominican rebellion, this does not constitute groupthink. Groupthink must include a tight group of decisionmakers who wish to protect their position and association with the group. They therefore impose thought constraints and discourage any critical analysis of the options being considered.

In contrast, during the initial option phase concerning the Dominican rebellion, there was no tight group of decisionmakers. Rather, Johnson was at Camp David and did not hasten his return home to deal with the problem. Rusk and McNamara seem to have remained associated with their respective agencies and would touch base with Bundy, as needed, to coordinate actions. This left Bundy, in the Situation Room, who probably assumed that the contingencies of his previous boss, President Kennedy, were more than ample to deal with the Dominican. After all, said plans had worked before.

That there was a lack of critical attention paid to selecting options seems clear in retrospect. However, there was clearly no in-group and, consequently, no need to protect its constituent members. Evidence of groupthink is not present in the option phase of U.S. decisionmaking on the Dominican rebellion. This is what we would expect because under the circumstances it is difficult for a small "conspiratorial" group to exert itself.
3. Implementation of Options

4.3.A. Was implementation conducted and controlled by the apex of the DMU or from a broader group comprised of foreign-policy bureaucracy? It is here perhaps that the Dominican Republic case study provides the most dramatic examples of what we would expect.

Initially, implementation appears to have been carried out in two areas: State and Defense. The evacuation contingency was implemented through McNamara's department and we have seen evidence that McNamara may have actually begun implementation prior to the first time the president met with his advisers. Similarly, State likely initiated the emergency meeting of the OAS per earlier contingency plans. It would appear that Johnson initially was lukewarm to bringing the OAS in; it was not done until well after the evacuation had begun. And Rusk mentions the president's hesitation while Rusk was suggesting it be done more quickly. (Rusk, 1990: 373.) What is more, we have pointed out above that it may well have been Rusk who made the decision and pulled the president along in effect. Thus, the implementation of policy surrounding the Dominican rebellion was not conducted out of the White House, controlled by the apex as a group, as has elsewhere been the case under opposite configuration of situational variables—e.g. EC-121, Mayaguez.
And over the course of U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic this trend became even more pronounced and established. Blechman reports that a number of U.S. "government officials even at lower levels" began to fear for their careers should the implementation of Dominican policy go sour. (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 308.) And we have seen that Ambassador Bennett in effect presented the U.S. with a fait accompli that required further escalation as a result of his "series of fateful... decisions" (Prados, 1991: 142). The Szulc book, in particular, is full of examples of policy being implemented at the lowest levels of the foreign-policy machinery. Staff people in the embassy (Connett and another "source"), by military personnel (General Palmer and even soldiers blundering into fighting), and a host of others including Dominicans who intentionally scuttled U.S. negotiations so as to get offers more to their liking.

Implementation was, from beginning to end, conducted at the lower levels. The U.S. foreign-policy bureaucracy, not the top decisionmakers, implemented U.S. policy with respect to the Dominican rebellion. If the apex of the DMU had wished to control the process if failed. Perhaps it had simply resigned itself to delegating the process the bureaucracy at large. In any event our expectation is confirmed.
4.3.B. Was implementation conducted a la standard implementation routines or was there improvised implementation by the apex? We have discussed this at some length. The contingency plans that were shaped into standard-operation procedures by an earlier administration formed the basis of U.S. decisions. During the first several days of the rebellion they were followed carefully and completely. Once Bennett returned to Santo Domingo, and once he assessed those with whom he was most comfortable—Cabral and Wessin—as being in difficulty, he took actions that effectively caused the administration to adapt those contingencies. Thus standard routines were followed and then over time adapted. We have seen this repeatedly. Once contingencies are put in place, the longer the event continues the more adaptation to them occurs.

We must re-emphasize that implementation took place through the foreign-policy community at large: State, Defense, Situation Room in Washington; and in military command centers and the embassy in the Dominican. In each of these cases it was quite standard. The only improvising that may have occurred was with Mr. Connett initially reporting events and getting his interim but immediate instructions from Bundy. That did not last long however. Thomas Mann soon set up in the Operations Center and supplanted Bundy. (Szulc, 1965: 21.) There is, we may fairly speculate, some degree of improvising that is always
associated with military actions. And therefore we might say that it was present in Santo Domingo. Yet that it is always associated with military action indicates that it is typical and not unusual. Thus it would likely be pushing too hard to classify this as evidence of some trend in the Dominican case. Implementation occurred within normal, standardized, and routinized channels of the larger foreign-policy machinery. This was our expectation and has been borne out repeatedly in these cases.

4.3.C. Were signs of bureaucratic politics present? It is the Dominican case that provides us with perhaps our most dramatic examples of bureaucratic politics. We have mentioned some early ones with Mann and Bennett. A few more examples may be illustrative.

As the rebellion stalled out on both sides negotiations followed. This was the lengthy period of U.S. involvement in the whole affair. Abe Fortas was sent to facilitate the process. We learned that those on the scene in Santo Domingo (notably Bennett) got wind of Fortas's mission and encouraged Wessin's forces on in a new offensive. (Szulc, 1965: 193-195.) This was latter repeated when Bundy and Mann undertook a secret mission to facilitate negotiations. (Szulc, 1965: 213-229). Despite the coincidental offensive that was launched as Bundy began negotiations he still was successful after long and painstaking meetings were conducted over days. Mann departed to return to Washington.
And shortly thereafter, Bundy was instructed that the negotiations he had concluded were off. New demands were issued from Washington. (Szulc, 1965: 264-266, 270-278; Rusk, 1990: 375.)

There were clear and dramatic cases of bureaucratic politics during the implementation of U.S. policy concerning the Dominican rebellion. Secretary Mann and Ambassador Bennett were the point men for it--both from State. But they doubtless had unnamed allies who helped. Rusk implies that he may have been one such important ally when he discusses the Bundy-Mann mission. He mentions that the "mission itself became divided" and he later notes that "I supported Mann" as opposed to Bundy. (Rusk, 1990: 375.) There is no doubt that the impact of bureaucratic politics was felt in Santo Domingo. It is perhaps our best example of bureaucratic interference and the difficulties caused by said interference.

4.3.D. Was implementation instantaneous with selecting options or temporally distinct from it? It is virtually impossible to trace each instance of a decision being chosen and then to follow when implementation of that decision occurred. What we have noticed generally, however, is that there is a lag period between the processes. With one exception this was the case with respect to the Dominican Republic as well.
The exception came very early on. Recall that while the president was still away at Camp David, others (McNamara and perhaps Bundy) determined to implement part of Kennedy's contingency plan for such a circumstance. That is, they ordered that a Task Force move near the Dominican Republic. This was done relatively instantaneous with the decision—perhaps surprisingly so. It should be noted, however, that according to the Szulc account ships were already in the area and this was not a case of implementation per se. Rather it was a case of characterizing an extant activity in charitable terms. Nonetheless it provides an exception.

Apart from this exception, there was invariably a lag between options being selected and their being implemented. Indeed sometimes such a lag that it caused confusion among parts of the bureaucracy which was attempting to follow events and accomplish its tasks. We therefore conclude that the processes were temporally distinct.

4. Evaluation of Selected Options

4.4.A. *Was feedback directed by and through the apex of the DMU or through the foreign-policy bureaucracy?* As is normally the case, the information eventually gets to the top layers of decisionmakers. In this case the top layer would be Johnson, Bundy, Rusk, and McNamara. And in fact information regarding the general events and the impact contingency plans was having on events was getting back to the president. The means by which it arrived were: it was
collected locally by the embassy, transmitted from the embassy to State's Operation Center, and from there transmitted to the Situation Room. Presumably it was simultaneously transmitted to Defense though there is a lack of mention of this in any of our accounts.

Rather than be directed by the DMU, then, it was directed by the embassy and its staff and eventually received by the top decisionmakers. Before it was received it was sent through State. Thus in the Dominican case, feedback and resulting evaluation was neither directed by nor through the highest levels of decisionmaking. It was done at distinctly lower levels.

4.4.B. Was the feedback-evaluation process extemporaneous or routine? For the most part, and in line with the previous conclusion, the top layer of decisionmakers remained content with the existing bureaucratic channels. That is, the apex evidently saw no need to improvise feedback-evaluation channels independent of the routine ones. This was the case over the entire course of the Dominican rebellion.

There is a notable exception however. Recall that nearly one week into the event the administration became frustrated if not suspicious of the information it was receiving. Interestingly, it was Bill Moyers (an assistant to the president for largely domestic matters) who did something about it. On Friday, 30 April, Moyers contacted
former Ambassador Martin--Kennedy's appointment to the Dominican. And Moyers enlisted Martin's help. Martin's mission was to go to both San Juan (where Bosch was in exile) and Santo Domingo in order to evaluate the situation and to report back. (Szulc, 1965: 80-83.)

It seems clear that the administration felt the need for independent confirmation of the mix of messages they were receiving from the U.S. embassy. Connett had originally down-played the communist element of the rebellion then he dramatized it. Similarly, Bennett initially reported that the Wessin-Cabral junta would have little trouble then he pleaded for immediate help. The administration, at least in this one instance, became annoyed enough to seek ad hoc confirmation of feedback so as to accurately evaluate the situation.

Still we should not over emphasize this occurrence for it was a short lived and evidently singular event. By and large the feedback-cum-evaluation mechanisms existing in the foreign-policy bureaucracy were used.

4.4.C. Was there evidence of bureaucratic interference in the process? Put differently, was the information that was relayed to the top decisionmakers complete and accurate or spotty and inaccurate? It would appear that the administration, in the instance just mentioned, worried that the information was possibly incomplete and subjective at best. Moyers therefore sought to rectify the situation.
Though there is no evidence that this recurred or that Moyers was successful in making this stick.

This may have been unfortunate for there is ample evidence that information was selective—very likely unwittingly. We have cited examples previously and will only briefly mention them again. Bennett, as we have seen, was comfortable with the conservative elements in the Dominican: the Wessin-Cabral junta. And he tended to take their view of the rebellion. Not surprisingly, the junta's view was that it was communist directed. Thus despite evidence to the contrary, as many on the scene attempted to point out to the ambassador, Bennett regularly reported back the Wessin-Cabral line. We have mentioned other examples and need not repeat them here. It is fairly clear that the top decisionmakers in Washington were neither able to get accurate information nor the "big picture" as they felt they needed it. The independent missions, from Martin, to Fortas, to Bundy simply confirm this.

On the other hand we found evidence that some information was, treated before sent to the administration in order to create a particular perception. This may have been an example intentionally misleading Washington with selective information. It is certainly arguable; Szulc believes it to have been intentional. He mentions that it is understandable that the president made his regrettable
decisions given the "exaggerated and inaccurate information" he was being "fed" (Szulc, 1965: 45).

But we have another example that is clearly alleged to be exactly such an instance. Namely, when Bundy and Mann traveled to the Dominican in May to assess negotiations, there was a clear split between them. We have already cited Rusk noting it and admitting that he agreed with his fellow, Thomas Mann. In Szulc's history he mentions "highly informed individuals in the U.S. Government" who were talking about the feuding very early on in Santo Domingo. Then Mr. Mann returned to Washington. As Mann was preparing to return to the U.S. he passed through San Isidro, the base commanded by Wessin. He told an embassy official, overheard by eavesdropping reporters: 'I'll have to do a lot of arguing about all this when I get home' (Szulc, 1965: 243). And as we know, within one day of his return, Bundy was told that the deal he had labored to broker was no longer acceptable; a day earlier it had been cause for rejoice. The clear implication, and the one inferred by Szulc, is that Bundy was had. (Szulc, 1965: 243, 250-251.)

We may therefore conclude that there is evidence of bureaucratic interference. We are not able to determine whether is was malicious or not, only that it occurred and that lower-level bureaucrats were willing to play fast and loose with information. That is various factions were going head to head. In particular "hard-liners" in State were
attempting to make sure their view of things prevailed. (See
Szulc, 1965: 251.)

4.4.D. And finally was feedback-evaluation
instantaneous with or temporally distinct from
implementation? We hardly need to detail the obvious. It
is clear that the processes were distinct. To cite but one
obvious example, implementation was taking place when
President Johnson became concerned that information was
returning to Washington obscured by bureaucratic exigencies.
For this reason, as we have discussed elsewhere, he went to
the rather extreme means of sending a trusted adviser out to
sort matters our for him. The distinction between these
processes is obvious. Evaluation and implementation were
temporally distinct.

SUMMARY

Once again we have considered three cases characterized
by a particular configuration of situational variables. In
the present chapter those variables were long time and
anticipation of the event before it occurred. We have, in
these three cases, three different presidents: Eisenhower
(Republican), Kennedy (Democrat), and Johnson, (Democrat).
Two of our cases were local in that they took place in Latin
America. One occurred in Europe. Temporally they are
separated by some eleven years. What have we seen?

In terms of the convocation of the DMU we have seen a
tendency for the top decisionmakers--the designated apex--to
meet rather infrequently. The cases ranged in the time it
took for the apex members to initially meet but once they
had met, in each case, there was no apparent urgency to meet
frequently thereafter. Rather, they delegated a good deal
of the responsibility to a lower level of the foreign-policy
bureaucracy. Further, in each case the initial convocation
of top decisionmakers seems to have been rather standard in
nature: nothing particularly out of the norm. Perhaps most
interesting, there appears to be a tendency for the apex and
particularly the president to effectively abdicate their
prerogatives to larger foreign-policy machinery, as it is
constituted, to become the DMU.

In the matter of how options were selected, again the
trend just describes seems to prevail. Namely, the apex is
relatively uninvolved. Rather its members consider or
direct others to consider the contingency-planning of
agencies appropriate to the matter at hand. At lower levels
there is often a good deal of option generation. But there
was a clear tendency, at least initially, to go with
previous contingencies rather than select a particular
response and strategy for the particular nature of the
foreign-policy event in which the administration is engaged.
Thus again the administration allows a large degree of
responsibility for generating options to reside in the
foreign-policy apparatus. Consequently we see no dominating
personalities during this phase, probably by virtue of the
shear size of the effective DMU. Neither do we see particularly provocative or innovative options generated--status quo prevails.

The agencies that are normally tasked with implementing areas of foreign policy are the ones that did so in these case studies: routines are maintained. The problem hits the president and his top advisers and then seems to spread out, like an ink blot, to the agencies that handle similar affairs on a daily basis. Implementation is largely routine, standard channels are observed, and little improvisation occurs.

Finally we consider the feedback-evaluation phase. We have seen a rather standard pattern wherein the locus of control of the information flow is well below the top decisionmaking apex. Thus information on which decisionmakers ultimately evaluate a policy's appropriateness and success is filtered through the larger bureaucracy. This is in contrast to the more extreme combination of variables wherein the top decisionmakers form the DMU and control virtually all phases, including feedback. Nonetheless, it must be said that decisionmakers at the top, for the most part, were able to get information that they needed--insofar as they requested it. There was no obvious pattern of attempting to withhold information. (The Dominican Republic, being the exception.) Generally
then, the foreign-policy process and its machinery is what tends to dominate the feedback process in these cases.

In each case the decisionmakers had ample time to assess the threat, what U.S. policy in similar instances had been, and what response might be appropriate. Furthermore, in each case the event's occurrence had been anticipated. In the Guatemala case they of course initiated the event and consequently knew with great accuracy its timing. In the Berlin event, many had considered such a move likely; indeed previous administrations had had to deal with similar events. But the administration did not know the exact timing. Similarly, the Dominican case was one that at least the Kennedy Administration had considered. It was the timing that was not entirely known. Nevertheless, none of the cases had surprised decisionmakers. We summarize our findings as follows.
# Table 5

## Summary Table of Hypotheses for Long Time, Anticipation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Studies #:</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 4.1 Convocation of Decisionmaking Unit
- A. Expansively: + + +
- B. Low Locus: + - +
- C. Low Frequency: + + +
- D. Routine vs Impromptu: + + +

---

### 4.2 Selection of Options
- A. Expansively Proffered: + + +
- B. Many in Sources and Number: + + +
- C. No Dominant Personality: + + +
- D. No Groupthink Indicated: + + +

---

### 4.3 Implementation of Options
- A. Controlled by Bureaucracy: + + +
- B. Routine: + + +
- C. Bureaucratic Politics Present: - + +
- D. Temporally Distinct from Selection: + + +

---

### 4.4 Evaluation (Feedback) of Options
- A. Controlled by Bureaucracy: + + +
- B. Routine: + + +
- C. Bureaucratic Interference Present: - - +
- D. Distinct from Implementation: + + +

---

**Legend:**

"+": Confirmed  
"-": Disconfirmed  
"*": Insufficient Information

Case Study 10: Guatemala, 1954  
Case Study 11: Berlin Aide-Memoire  
Case Study 12: Dominican Republic
The three case studies in this chapter present us with surprisingly similar findings to our previous chapter in terms of goodness of fit. That is, we again see that the earlier trend we feared developing with selection of options was not a trend at all. In these cases as in the previous three, our hypothesis (4.2) concerning selecting options was a very good fit indeed. In none of the these three cases was a comparative question under that hypothesis disconfirmed.

In two of our case studies (Guatemala and the Berlin) we found that one comparative question under two different decisionmaking hypotheses was disconfirmed. In the Guatemala case, the disconfirmed comparative questions were under the implementation and evaluation processes. In the Berlin case, the disconfirmed comparative questions were under the convocation and evaluation process.

Finally, in the Dominican Republic case study we see what we may reasonably characterize as an excellent fit. That is to say, our observed decisionmaking processes confirmed all four hypotheses without a single comparative question being disconfirmed.

We must now turn toward analyzing these results.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION: DECISION TIME AND DEGREE OF ANTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION

We began this study by asking how the decisionmaking process is affected by decision time and degree of anticipation. We have now looked at twelve case studies organized in sets of three cases for each of four combinations of independent variables. We now return to the original question in an effort to discern patterns and generalizations of our independent variables' effect on the decision-making process. We shall attempt to evaluate our findings in a general sense and then move to a more detailed analysis.

Recall that at the conclusion of each of the case-study chapters (viz., Chapters V - VIII) we summarized the respective hypotheses for each chapter. (The reader may wish to return to Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5.) In the following pages we shall similarly attempt to organize our analysis in terms of both tabular and graphical presentation of our results. We shall be interested in assessing overall goodness of fit with respect to our sixteen hypotheses. We shall then further dissect our findings along various
comparisons. Our reasoning is that we wish to be able to compare our findings by independent variable as well as across cases (from configuration to configuration), within cases (within a given configuration), and across component functions of our sixteen hypotheses.

ANALYSIS

We begin with an assessment of the overall goodness of fit. Recall that we postulated sixteen hypotheses. The hypotheses were organized in four groups—each group referred to one of the four configurations of our independent variables, decision time and degree of anticipation. Thus we had, under configuration 1 (short time, surprise), four hypotheses. (Specifically we posited hypothesis 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.) And we did this for all four configurations of our independent variables.

Recall further that we developed sixteen comparative questions such that each question would be answered for each of the twelve case studies under our investigation. The comparative questions served several purposes. First, they allowed us to employ the focused, structured case-study methodology which we determined as appropriate for our research design. Second, the questions cast as they were allowed us to further buttress the methodology in a way
which we hold allows us to generalize our findings.\textsuperscript{30}

Finally, the comparative questions were actually conceptualized and employed as indicators of movement in our dependent variable: the foreign-policy decisionmaking process. The comparative questions were crafted, in effect, as continua for each aspect of foreign-policy decisionmaking we were examining.

To illustrate, let us compare Hypothesis 1.1.A with 4.1.A. The initial number refers to the configuration of independent variables established in Chapter III—that is, configurations one through four. The second number refers to the process under consideration in foreign-policy decisionmaking. As will be recalled we posited four requisite processes: 1) convocation of a DMU; 2) selection of options; 3) implementation of options; and 4) evaluation-feedback. Specifically, hypothesis 1.1.A postulates that under short time and surprise the DMU will be convened exclusively; hypothesis 4.1.A postulates that under long time and anticipation the DMU will be convened expansively. The comparative question cast to either confirm or disconfirm this aspect of decisionmaking is question 1.a: "was convocation of DMU restricted to the apex of the DMU or

\textsuperscript{30}Refer back to Chapter 3 where we discuss the original methodology, how we intended to systemize it further, and where we compared it to recent uses which we held to be under-utilizing the methodology's strengths and possibilities.
a more expansive DMU?" (Apex and restrictive were operationalized versus expansive or larger bureaucracy in Chapter III.) What is important here, however, is to note that the question allows us to measure change in our dependent variable along a continuum. And this was done for each of the hypotheses.

**General Fit of Hypotheses**

As we just recalled we began with sixteen hypotheses and we applied sixteen comparative questions to each of the twelve case studies in this work. We begin by assessing how well the hypotheses matched observed foreign-policy decisionmaking in the case studies. The following is a table constructed from the summary tables at the end of each case-study chapter (Chapters V-VIII).

**Table 6**

**Degree of Confirmation for all Hypotheses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1.1</th>
<th>91.70%</th>
<th>Hypothesis 2.1</th>
<th>100.00%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1.2</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 2.2</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1.3</td>
<td>66.70%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 2.3</td>
<td>90.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1.4</td>
<td>91.67%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 2.4</td>
<td>91.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 3.1</th>
<th>91.67%</th>
<th>Hypothesis 4.1</th>
<th>91.67%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3.2</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 4.2</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3.3</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 4.3</td>
<td>91.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3.4</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 4.4</td>
<td>83.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As will readily be noticed, Table 6 simply represents our tabulating the ratio of confirmed (+) to disconfirmed (-) for each of the sixteen hypotheses. Further, it will be
noticed that of the four parts of each hypothesis (A–D) all have been collapsed for an overall assessment. And the results are simply displayed in terms of a percentage. We present these same results graphically as follows.
Comparison of All Hypotheses

Goodness of Fit

Degree of Confirmation

Figure 11
We immediately note two observations. First, the overall fit of our hypothesized processes to our observed processes in the case studies is fairly good. That is to say, if we were to take the arithmetic average of the percentages from each of the sixteen hypotheses we would see an overall 83.77 percent fit between hypothesized and observed. This may reasonably be characterized as a respectable fit.

Secondly, we immediately notice that two hypotheses stand out as representing a demonstrably poor fit. Hypothesis 1.2 (the hypothesis concerning selection of options under short time and surprise) and hypothesis 2.2 (hypothesis concerning selection of options under short time and anticipation) are both at 50 percent. We will discuss this as we analyze each hypothesis more carefully; but we will note in passing that it appears that our situational typology, used to generate our sixteen hypotheses, performed poorly for selection of options when associated with short time. Note in contrast that under long time, the fit for selection of options is excellent--100 percent in both cases.

In any event our overall observation allows us to feel confident in the way that we conceptualized the decisionmaking process and our typology of variables that allowed us to generate hypotheses for testing. Overall our
situational typology and conceptual framework held up rather well.

While our overall confidence is good we must begin to examine more specifically our results. Let us compare our decisionmaking processes in an effort to determine which of the four processes—around which we generated hypotheses—best fit what we observed in the case studies. The following table and graph represents this comparison.

Table 7

Degree of Confirmation by Decisionmaking Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convocation</th>
<th>Selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1.1 91.70%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 1.2 50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2.1 100.00%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 2.2 50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3.1 91.70%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 3.2 100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4.1 91.70%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 4.2 100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>===========</td>
<td>===========</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93.8%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Evaluation-Feedback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1.3 66.70%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 1.4 91.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2.3 90.00%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 2.4 91.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3.3 75.00%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 3.4 75.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4.3 91.70%</td>
<td>Hypothesis 4.4 83.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>===========</td>
<td>===========</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80.9%</td>
<td>85.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These data refer to a composite degree of confirmation for hypotheses for: 1) Convocation; 2) Selection; 3) Implementation; and 4) Evaluation-Feedback.
Decisionmaking Process
Comparison by DM Process

Figure 12
We notice that the process of decisionmaking which we called convocation of the DMU has the best overall average (93.8%). The least percentage overall is associated with the process we called selecting options (75.0%). Both the implementation and evaluation processes were slightly above 80 percent (80.9% and 85.5% respectively). This augments our confidence in our restating that the what we observed with respect to our conceptualized processes well matched our hypothesized expectations. Clearly, a good level of match between hypothesis and observation exists overall.

Analysis by Process and Independent Variable

Let us now scrutinize more carefully our findings in terms of our four configurations of independent variables and our four requisite phases of the decisionmaking process. Again we refer the reader back to the summary tables at the end of each case-study chapter (Chapters V through VIII). It is from these summary tables that the following tables and graphs are constructed.

We postulated four requisite processes (phases) as being part of any type of decisionmaking (i.e., minimal requirements). And we have seen that what we observed in case studies, for these processes, generally supports our hypotheses. Now we would like to analyze each process more specifically by its hypothesized function (A-D) and by its association with our two independent variables.
Recall the four requisite decisionmaking processes:

1) Convocation of the Decisionmaking Unit (DMU);
2) Selection of Options by the DMU;
3) Implementation of Options by the DMU;
4) Evaluation-Feedback of implemented options by DMU.

With respect to each of the four requisite decisionmaking processes, we may now further disaggregate each process into constituent functions: A, B, C, D. Let us look more closely at each of these functions under each process.

Under Convocation we enumerated the following. A) referred to the composition of the DMU—either restrictive (apex) or more expansive (inclusive). B) referred to the locus of convocation—either high or low. C) referred to the frequency with which the DMU convened during the foreign-policy event. And finally D) referred to the procedural nature of convocation—either being routine or extemporaneous in nature.

Similarly we disaggregated Selection of options accordingly. A) referred to the composition of the DMU proffering and selecting options—either the apex or a more expansive DMU. B) referred to the number of options proffered and selected—we operationalized few or many. The reasoning as indicated in Chapter III was simply that a larger DMU would generate a larger number of options. C) referred to the presence or absence of a dominant personality or personalities being reflected in the process
of selecting options. And D) referred to the presence or absence of the pathology groupthink.

As for Implementation we differentiated as follows. First, A) referred to the composition of the DMU controlling implementation—again either restricted to the operationalized apex or a more expansive decision unit. B) referred to the procedural nature of implementation—was it routine or extemporaneous in nature. C) referred to the hypothesized presence or absence of bureaucratic politics. And D) referred to whether the implementation process was distinct in time (temporally distinct) from the selection process or if they were effectively one process combined (instantaneous).

Finally we disaggregated the Evaluation-Feedback process precisely the same way as we did the Implementation process. That is, under Evaluation-Feedback A) referred to the locus of control—was the process controlled by DMU's apex or a more expansive DMU. B) referred to the nature being routine or non-routine (extemporaneous). C) referred to the presence or absence of bureaucratic interference. And D) referred to temporality: was evaluation-feedback temporally distinct from or instantaneous with implementation?

We present our findings in the following tables under the respective processes of Convocation, Selection, Implementation, and Evaluation-Feedback. There are sixteen
tables referring directly to the sixteen comparative questions which we conceptualized as indicators of our hypotheses regarding the foreign-policy decisionmaking process.

Convocation

The following data refer exclusively to the process of convocation and its constituent functions. That is, if we were to go back to the summary tables found at the end of each case-study chapter (i.e., Hypothesis 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1, A-D), and if we examined the hypothesis for convocation in each chapter, we could construct the following tables.
Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (1.1.A)</td>
<td>Hyp (2.1.A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOT</td>
<td>+ .83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (3.1.A)</td>
<td>Hyp (4.1.A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>+ 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Convocation of DMU A) Composition

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (1.1.B)</td>
<td>Hyp (2.1.B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOT</td>
<td>+ 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (3.1.B)</td>
<td>Hyp (4.1.B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>+ .67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Convocation of DMU B) Locus
Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.1.C)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.1.C)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Hyp (3.1.C)**   | **Hyp (4.1.C)**      |
| Greece, '47       | Guatemala, '54      |
| China/Korea, '50  | Berlin, '61         |
| Pueblo, 68        | Dominican, '65      |
|                   | + 1.0               |

1.0 1.0

Convocation of DMU C) Frequency

Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.1.D)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.1.D)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Hyp (3.1.D)**   | **Hyp (4.1.D)**      |
| Greece, '47       | Guatemala, '54      |
| China/Korea, '50  | Berlin, '61         |
| Pueblo, 68        | Dominican, '65      |
|                   | + 1.0               |

1.0 1.0

Convocation of DMU D) Procedural
By presenting the data this way we are able to compare and assess each constituent function (i.e., A-D) of a given decisionmaking process (in this case Convocation) in terms the goodness of fit. We are able to specifically compare by independent variable. That is, we may consider how well the function we hypothesized under each of the four decisionmaking processes matched what we observed in our case studies to assess short time versus long time--holding degree of anticipation constant. Or conversely, we may compare the same match across degree of anticipation--holding decision time constant.

Furthermore, we may recombine the above four tables from which we generate a data-summary table. From this summary table we are able to isolate any given function (A-D) of the decisionmaking process; what is more, we may single out one of our independent variables which, hitherto, have been assessed in combinations of the two variables.
Table 12
Comparison of Convocation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A Composition</th>
<th>B Locus</th>
<th>C Frequency</th>
<th>D Nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHORT TIME</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG TIME</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURPRISE</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTICIPATE</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From these data, as just mentioned, we may make some rather interesting comparisons. We may compare our component functions of the convocation process (i.e., composition, locus, frequency, and procedural nature) across all twelve case studies. We notice immediately that under our convocation hypothesis, the function which we have called locus represents the lowest percent of confirmation (83.3%). We may also break down convocation according to single independent variables. Though the percentages are all rather close, we notice both surprise (91.7%) and long time (91.7%) rank lower than short time (95.6%) or anticipate (95.8%). Graphically each of these may be represented as follows.
Convocation Hypotheses
Comparison by Function

Convocation Hypotheses
Comparison by X-Variable
As has been discussed above, convocation as an overall requisite process had the highest percentage of confirmation. As we look more closely (table 12), we see that of the four functions under the convocation process, B) locus ranks lowest. Our logic regarding the locus of convening the DMU was that the location at which the DMU would initially convene—and presumably thereafter direct—decisionmaking would be sensitive to the decisionmakers' contextual environment. Specifically, we reasoned that said decisionmakers facing a threat which surprised them and which they perceived as demanding quick action would perforce take complete control of decisionmaking and seek to protect their prerogatives by keeping decisionmaking sequestered at the top: that is the White House (or analogue). This was confirmed 83.3 percent of the time however.

On the other hand, the composition of the DMU—following the same reasoning of being sensitive to the situational context—was confirmed nearly 92 percent of the time. Our interpretation is that while the DMU is in fact restrictive (91.7%) and does seek to protect its prerogatives and control, the decisionmakers are not terribly concerned (at least initially) with where the DMU is actually located. We might reasonably imagine that other factors have a more significant bearing on the actual location of convening the DMU. It may be as simple an
Often this happens to be at the White House, but other times the White House is a less convenient place to convene due to proximity of principal players during any given event.

Though A) composition showed a higher percentage of confirmation (91.7%), than B) locus, the same argument holds for both. That is, all else being equal, the DMU will be restrictive and will seek to control its decisionmaking prerogatives. Nonetheless, foreign-policy challenges do not always fall at convenient times and the principal players may simply not be available at the right place during these chance occasions. That the hypothesized function of A) composition is confirmed 100 percent of the time when associated with the variable long time as well as when with anticipation (100%), appears to add circumstantial plausibility to the argument. Put differently, either knowing an event to be imminent or diminished time pressure mitigates against lack of proximity's inconvenience.

Otherwise, our hypothesized functions C) frequency and D) procedural nature seemed to be confirmed by actual observation remarkably well (100% respectively). Both the frequency of convocation during the event and the actual nature of the process--be it extemporaneous or routine--were observed to follow what we had hypothesized using the typology.

Selection of Options

We turn now to the selection process and its constituent functions by assessing the following data. Using the same
Selection of Options

We turn now to the selection process and its constituent functions by assessing the following data. Using the same organizational construct for analyzing the selection process by function (A-D) and by independent variable, we see the following.
### Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.2.A)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.2.A)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>+ .83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.2.B)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.2.B)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>+ .80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Selection of Options A) Locus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (3.2.A)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (4.2.A)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>+ 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>Dominican, '65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Selection of Options B) Quantity/Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (3.2.B)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (4.2.B)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>+ 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>Dominican, '65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Selection of Options B) Quantity/Sources

- .83
- 1.0

- Selection of Options A) Locus
- Selection of Options B) Quantity/Sources
Table 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (1.2.C)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>* Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>- Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>+ Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (3.2.C)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>+ Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>+ Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>+ Dominican, '65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selection of Options C) Dominant Personality

Table 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (1.2.D)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>- Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>* Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>- Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (3.2.D)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>+ Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>+ Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>+ Dominican, '65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selection of Options D) Groupthink
As we did when analyzing convocation we collapse these four tables into one representation of the data that allows comparison by independent variable and by process function.

Table 17

Comparison of Selection Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHORT TIME</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG TIME</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURPRISE</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTICIPATE</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking more closely at the selection-of-options process we notice some rather glaring differences between what we hypothesized and what we actually observed. As functions of selection, both C) dominant personality and D) groupthink and their potential impact fared quite poorly (62.5% and 52.5% respectively). Our logic had dominant personalities exerting themselves under specific situational contexts and this clearly was not confirmed by the case studies. Rather, under short time—when we would expect an association—scarce evidence of confirmation is the rule (20%). It is considerably better under surprise—again where we would expect to see it—with 80 percent confirmation. Yet as a function of the selection process C) dominant personality's degree of confirmation is a rather
low 62.5 percent. This may be presented graphically as follows.
Selection Hypotheses
Comparison by Function

Degree of Confirmation

A. Locus | B. Quantity | C. Personality | D. Groupthink
91.7 | 90 | 62.5 | 62.5

Selection Functions

Selection Hypotheses
Comparison by X-Variable

Degree of Confirmation

A. Short Time | B. Long Time | C. Surprise | D. Anticipate
45.8 | 76.8 | 75

Selection Functions

Figure 14
The logic behind dominant personality formed the pretext of our expectations regarding groupthink. Hence that D) groupthink fared so poorly as a hypothesized function of the selection process (52.5%) is not surprising. The apparent flaw in reasoning was common to both functions. Strikingly, however, we had no occasion to confirm (0%) the presence of groupthink associated with short time in any of our twelve cases. To the extent that D) groupthink presented itself under the configuration of short time and surprise, it was singularly associated with surprise (60.0%).

The obverse expectation--i.e., no dominant personality exerting influence and, further, no groupthink present under the configuration of long time and anticipation--was borne out with a higher degree of confirmation. It would appear that the oft-noted pathology of groupthink is perhaps far-less prevalent than is commonly thought. At the very least, it appears that other important variables, ones which we clearly did not examine, are associated with it.

Implementation of Options

We now turn toward examining implementation. The following data are presented. We employ the identical tabular presentation for examining implementation.
### Table 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.3.A)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.3.A)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64 + .80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67 +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Hyp (3.3.A)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Hyp (4.3.A)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61 + 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>Dominican, '65 +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ .83 \quad 1.0 \]

Implementation of Options A) Locus

### Table 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.3.B)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.3.B)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64 + .83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67 +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Hyp (3.3.B)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Hyp (4.3.B)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61 + 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>Dominican, '65 +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ .83 \quad 1.0 \]

Implementation of Options B) Nature of Process
Table 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (1.3.C)</td>
<td>Hyp (2.3.C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-171, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyp (3.3.C)</th>
<th>Hyp (4.3.C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>Dominican, '65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implementation of Options C) Bureaucratic Politics

Table 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyp (1.3.D)</td>
<td>Hyp (2.3.D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyp (3.3.D)</th>
<th>Hyp (4.3.D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>Dominican, '65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implementation of Options D) Temporality
From these four tables of data dealing with A) locus, B) process, C) bureaucratic politics, and D) temporal distinction under the process of Implementation, we generate the following table.

### Table 22

Comparison of Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A Locus</th>
<th>B Process</th>
<th>C B.Politics</th>
<th>D Temporality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHORT TIME</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG TIME</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURPRISE</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTICIPATE</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hypotheses concerning implementation performed somewhat better overall than those under selection. (We have already addressed the overall comparison by process above.) As we look more closely we note that of the four functions which we attempted to examine, C) bureaucratic politics shows the least degree of confirmation. Presenting these data graphically helps to see the comparisons. For bureaucratic politics across all twelve case we see a 46.7 percent rate of confirmation. In other words, one might as easily guess the presence or absence of bureaucratic interference in a given case and do somewhat better than we did using our typology.
Implementation Hypotheses
Comparison by Function

Degree of Confirmation

A. Locus  B. Process  C. B-Politics  D. Temporality

Implementation Function

76.7  83.3  70.8  90

Short Time  Long Time  Surprise  Anticipate

Independent Variable

Figure 15
We expect to see bureaucratic interference associated with the situational variables of long time and anticipation. The reasoning is quite straightforward. Under said conditions, bureaucracies and the individuals who comprise them are given the opportunity to interfere. Bureaucratic expediency would dictate that if the opportunity exists, it would be seized. As is well known, many scholars have written about the potentially adverse consequences of such interference. Yet in association with long time, only one-third of the time is there any indication of it. In association with anticipation we see it confirmed 60 percent of the time. Hence our expectations with respect to bureaucratic politics do not appear to be well borne out. Much less still did we note evidence of adverse consequences. (In fairness we should say that we were not particularly looking for adverse consequences.)

Otherwise, the hypotheses concerning implementation as a process and its constituent functions under varied situational conditions seem to present a relatively high degree of confirmation.

**Evaluation-Feedback**

We conclude this section by addressing the requisite decisionmaking process we called evaluation-feedback. The following data reflect our findings from the case studies. We present in tabular and graphical format.
Table 23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.4.A)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.4.A)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ .83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (3.4.A)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (4.4.A)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>Dominican, '65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ .83 \quad 1.0 \]

Evaluation-Feedback A) Locus

Table 24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.4.B)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.4.B)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ .83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (3.4.B)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (4.4.B)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, '47</td>
<td>Guatemala, '54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Korea, '50</td>
<td>Berlin, '61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo, 68</td>
<td>Dominican, '65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ 1.0 \quad .83 \]

Evaluation-Feedback B) Nature
Table 25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.4.C)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.4.C)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56 +</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69 +</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64 + 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75 +</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67 +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hyp (3.4.C)**

| Greece, '47 - | Guatemala, '54 - |
| China/Korea, '50 - | Berlin, '61 - .167 |
| Pueblo, 68 - | Dominican, '65 + |

.E50 .67

Evaluation-Feedback C) Bureaucratic Politics

Table 26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURPRISE</th>
<th>ANTICIPATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyp (1.4.D)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hyp (2.4.D)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez-Sinai, '56 +</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs, '61 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121, '69 +</td>
<td>Tonkin, '64 + 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez, '75 +</td>
<td>Six-Day War, '67 +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hyp (3.4.D)**

| Greece, '47 + | Guatemala, '54 + |
| China/Korea, '50 + | Berlin, '61 + 1.0 |
| Pueblo, 68 + | Dominican, '65 + |

1.0 1.0

Evaluation-Feedback D) Temporality
Evaluation Feedback Hypotheses
Comparison by Function

Degree of Confirmation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Degree of Confirmation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Locus</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Process</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. B-Politics</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Temporality</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluation Feedback Hypotheses
Comparison by X-Variable

Degree of Confirmation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Degree of Confirmation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short Time</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Time</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipate</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16
And we again are able to construct one table from the above four, collapsing the categories, to make comparisons across all cases for a particular function of the evaluation-feedback process and across independent variables.

**Table 27**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locus</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Politic</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As an overall process evaluation-feedback rated out rather close (in terms of percentages) to implementation (85.4% and 80.9% respectively). (Both were compared above.) Upon closer scrutiny we see other similarities. Namely, there is one function under evaluation-feedback that pulls down the overall percentage of confirmation. Interestingly, the function is the same one posited under implementation. That is, we note that C) bureaucratic interference again is confirmed a low 58.4 percent of the time.

Again the logic followed bureaucracies interfering when a foreign-policy challenge was anticipated and when time allowed bureaucratic mobilization. With respect to anticipation, we
see only 66.7 percent of the time is there evidence of said interference.

Recall that we saw a 60 percent confirmation rate with bureaucratic interference under the implementation process being associated with anticipation. It scarcely represents a high degree of confirmation in either process: implementation or evaluation-feedback. But even more interesting is the low percentage of confirmation—under the evaluation-feedback process—of our function C) bureaucratic interference being associated with long time. Under the process of evaluation-feedback, we find a confirmation percentage of a strikingly low 16.7 percent.

It is somewhat perplexing and strikes us as being a similar situation when we compare the so-called pathologies of groupthink and bureaucratic politics. It is at least plausible to argue that while perhaps decision time and degree of anticipation are in some way associated with the pathologies (perhaps necessary conditions) they are by no means sufficient conditions. Clearly, other important variables either singularly or in conjunction with our independent variables are more closely associated with bureaucratic politics and groupthink. Indeed this would appear to be an avenue for renewed and potentially fruitful research.
SUMMARY

We have seen that there has been an overall fit between observations made vis-a-vis specific case studies and hypotheses generated using the analytic framework. The overall fit is indeed quite impressive we would argue. Looking back at the case studies we see that with one exception, namely the EC-121 case, our cases' observed processes showed a high degree of fit with what we hypothesized. We have similarly seen weaknesses: that is, some of the sixteen hypotheses generated using the typology clearly were not supported by observation. We were, to be sure, surprised at times by our findings.

We are far from discouraged for it represents, in our estimation, progress vis-a-vis a research program. Our research question clearly finds its origins in earlier work: decisionmaking theory generally, and comparative foreign-policy studies specifically. We built upon findings of scholars who have posed multiple questions about the decisionmaking process and its contextual environment. By using earlier findings and previous scholarship we deductively postulated a typology which specified relationships between independent variables and the foreign-policy decisionmaking process. We combined our conceptual framework with our situational typology to yield an analytic framework. And we sought an appropriate methodology so that we could empirically subject our hypotheses to scrutiny. In this way we have
contributed to progress—the extent of knowledge about
decisionmaking and its context in a comparative foreign-policy
setting. Insofar as we have been successful, we feel the
investment to have been a worthwhile one.

Having said this we must begin to look toward future
progress. As noted, we found certain areas where observation
did not meet expectation. This suggests future avenues of
research. We recall, for example, that of our conceptualized
requisite processes of decisionmaking, the one we called
selection of options fit least well with observation. This
suggests potential ways of re-conceptualizing the process. We
recall more specifically that our hypotheses with respect to
the oft-cited decisionmaking pathologies—groupthink and
bureaucratic politics—fell far short of our expectations.
Why was this the case? What future research designs might
fruitfully differentiate between the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the presence of these pathologies?

We progressed further by identifying weaknesses in terms
of our present research design. Though we were not displeased
with its apparent efficacy, we discovered—well into the
research project—that the construct we employed for
collecting and differentiating case studies had an inherent
flaw. It had to do with decision time. We sought, among
other things, to analyze the impact of short time versus long
time on the decisionmaking process. And the cases which we
collected using our construct for short time were in fact all
short in duration. Yet this did not necessarily mean that the
decisionmakers in a given case perceived time as being short
in which to act. Put differently, that the case study met our
operationalized criterion of short time did not perforce
equate to the given decisionmakers feeling it imperative to
act quickly. (In particular, the EC-121 case raised doubts
about this potential flaw.)\(^3\) Nonetheless, we learn as we
identify weaknesses in our design just as we learn from
identifying its strengths.

Another potential weakness has to do with our data. It
will be recalled that we necessarily made subjective
determinations in the process of either confirming or
disconfirming a given aspect of a given hypothesis. Though we
would prefer less subjectivity, our research design simply did
not permit us the antiseptic conditions of a true experimental
design and laboratory conditions. We attempted to be quite
systematic and consistent in our approach at each such
juncture. What is more, we clearly and explicitly stated how
any given determination to confirm or disconfirm was reached.
From this basis we developed a system of bookkeeping, in
effect, that permitted us to later compare our findings along
various dimensions. The comparative questions were cast such

\(^3\)Though both Nixon and Kissinger claimed to have felt
pressure to act quickly, their claims are suspect. That is,
once the spy plane had been downed and lives lost, quick
action by the U.S. could do little. It may be that the
pressure the two leaders described was simply a self-imposed
response to what they felt to be a direct affront.
that each would "measure" movement along a continuum. Thus our bookkeeping was essentially based on ordinal data. We organized our comparisons and analyses bearing in mind that ordinal data is unlikely to provide the sophisticated degree of differentiation possible with interval data. We kept this in mind in our analysis. And we were careful not to attempt to infer causation from what was simple association.

And what we have discovered, in addition to the findings analyzed above, is that there exist ways to refine the typology, to refine the data collection technique, and to strengthen the overall design. This too, we feel certain, is progress.

We recall some of the earlier scholarship—indeed the formative years of comparative foreign-policy studies—and come back to the framework Rosenau (1966; 1980) suggested. All foreign policy and, therefore the decisionmaking process therewith associated, may be seen to originate from one of five major categories. He noted the external environment, societal sources, governmental sources, role sources, and individual sources. Rosenau's basic argument was as cogent as it was robust. Irrespective of what government, nation-state, or entity is creating output we call foreign policy, that output has its origins in one of these categories. And if we as students of comparative foreign-policy studies wish to build theory which compares and contrasts, indeed explains foreign policy, we must begin to craft research designs around
these categories. For it is these categories that provide a framework for progress in our research. We have a community of scholars seeking answers to various foreign-policy questions who have in common a blueprint and a construct that allows comparisons of results.

We have in this study attempted to add to the stock of knowledge common to this community of scholars. We have specifically posed research questions that cross the government, role, and to some extent individual sources. Moreover, as we illustrated in Chapter III, we took into account the stimulus from the external source. By doing this, by finding answers to some of our questions and by finding questions that need further examination, we have hopefully helped to build the bridges between theory that are so clearly needed. It is these bridges that will ultimately lead to cumulation.

**Final Thoughts**

Finally, we wish to discuss those whom we know will be skeptical of this work. There will be many, we are sure, who will find problems with disparate origins. We have already discussed the issue of data analysis above. And it is likely that our data analysis will not meet the stringent tests of some social scientists. We do not quarrel with such arguments. Our reply, in advance, is that we worked very hard to make the best of the data we had. There are surely different ways to approach this and different data that could
be collected which would provide a basis for a more quantitative approach and far more sophisticated analytical tools. We welcome any efforts along these lines.

There are others who, for differences in theoretical perspective or orientation, will find fault with this work. We are not unaware of such differences in orientation and, in fact, do not preclude them.

For example, the political realists may well argue that this is little more than an academic exercise. They would possibly argue that the whole basis of decisionmaking theory and process misses the point completely. Rather, the output not the process is what matters. Power vacuums and disequilibria matter far more than the decisionmaking unit—indeed the latter is superfluous. We see such stimulus-response arguments as plausible and in fact feel that they fit under the rubric of Rosenau's external source of foreign policy. That is to say, we do not necessarily disagree that disequilibria precipitate behavior. Nor do we disagree that, for instance, the global system of nation-states has a certain innate quality of anarchy that recurringly leads to the destabilizing spiral of a security dilemma. We simply say that the external source is one of at least five sources of foreign policy that deserves attention. We chose to focus more closely on others which we feel deserve no less attention.
There may additionally be those who disagree with the essence of our situational variables--decision time and degree of anticipation. They may argue for instance that situational context is, to be sure, crucial. But the overriding situational context that produces policies in the extant global system is rooted in the maladies associated with the international capitalist system itself. Behavior at the apex of U.S. foreign-policy decisionmaking, they might well argue, pales by comparison to the much larger issues of uneven development between north and south or the exploitation of the latter by the former. It may be that they are correct. Nonetheless we choose for substantive reasons to focus on different situational contexts and settings.

In any event we do not pretend to obviate alternative explanations of world events. It is not our intention to call into doubt other theoretical orientations. We feel that under any conditions, one might pose an alternative explanation and perhaps better explain any given phenomenon. Indeed we invite such scrutiny for we feel that progress, as noted above, comes from such an exchange of ideas and juxtaposing of alternative explanations.

Such arguments notwithstanding--and we could surely detail several more--we do feel that we have fulfilled certain requirements that permit us to include our work in the larger comparative foreign-policy studies community. First, we have proposed a priori a set of hypotheses based on a deductive
conceptual framework. Said framework has its origins in previous scholarship's devotion to theory building. And we have derived an analytic typology from this in order to test our hypotheses. Second, we have established temporal priority. That is, our research design, the analytic typology, and the collection of case studies based thereon allowed us to effectively establish the application of independent variables. Therefore, albeit through manipulation of case studies, we have exogenous variables preceding our examination of endogenous process. Third, we empirically established co-variation through our intra-category and inter-category comparisons. And finally, we have accomplished this within the general bounds delineated by the Rosenau framework for comparative, foreign-policy studies.

Plausible alternatives do nothing to change these requisites of cumulation. Having re-emphasized the study's findings—both anticipated and those which we did not anticipate—we conclude by claiming modest merit as a research project.
APPENDIX A

1. Truman Doctrine and Greece (77/0485); Threat to US influence; From 21 February 1947 to 22 May 1947: 95 days.
2. Berlin Blockade (87/0644); Threat to US influence; From 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949: 322 days.
3. China's Civil War (89/0660); Threat to US influence; From 23 September 1948 to 26 October 1948: 33 days.
4. Korean War I (96/0710); Threat to US influence; From 25 June 1950 to 29 June 1950: ??? 3 days
5. Korean War II (97/0715); Threat to US influence; From 31 October 1950 to 10 July 1951: 252 days.
6. Korean War III (104/0716); Threat to US influence; From 16 April 1953 to 27 July 1953: 102 days.
7. Guatemala (108/0820); Threat to US influence; From 10 February 1954 to 29 June 1954: 139 days.
8. Dien Bien Phu (109/0880); Threat to US influence; From 20 March 1954 to 8 May 1954: 56 days.
9. Taiwan Straits I (110/0830); Threat to US influence; From 10 January 1955 to 23 April 1955: 103 days.
10. Suez-Sinai Campaign (120/0970); Threat to US influence; From 5 November 1956 to 8 November 1956: 3 days.
11. Berlin Deadline (127/1135); Threat to US influence; From 27 November 1958 to 30 March 1959: 123 days.
12. Taiwan Straits II (133/1120); Threat to US influence; From 23 August 1958 to 14 September 1958: 22 days.
13. Pathet Lao Offensive I (146/1350); Threat to US influence; From 9 March 1961 to 16 May 1961: 73 days.
14. Bay of Pigs (147/1270); Threat to US influence; From 15 April 1961 to 24 April 1961: 9 days.
15. Berlin Wall (151/1320); Threat to US influence; From 13 August 1961 to 17 October 1961: 80 days.
16. Viet Cong Attack (152/1351); Threat to US influence; From 18 September 1961 to 15 November 1961: 58 days.
17. Pathet Lao Offensive II (159/1352); Threat to US influence; From 6 May 1962 to 12 June 1962: 37 days.
18. Cuban Missiles (162/1400); Threat of Grave Damage; From 16 October 1962 to 20 November 1962: 35 days.

\[1\] Those cases that are in boldface represent the twelve cases selected for this study. Criteria for their selections is discussed in Chapter III. The code numbers used by Wilkenfeld, et al., are in parentheses.
19. Panama Canal (173/1530); Threat to US influence; From 10 January 1964 to 12 January 1964: 2 days.
20. Gulf of Tonkin (177/1638); Threat to US influence; From 2 August 1964 to 7 August 1964: 5 days.
21. Congo (178/1570); Threat to US influence; From 26 September 1964 to 29 November 1964: 64 days.
22. Pleiku (180/1639); Threat to US influence; From 7 February 1965 to 2 March 1965: 23 days.
23. Dominican Republic (182/1580); Threat to US influence; 24 April 1965 to 31 August 1965: 129 days.
24. Six Day War (189/1580); Threat to US influence; From 6 June 1967 to 11 June 1967: 5 days.
25. Pueblo (191/1730); Threat to US influence; From 22 January 1968 to 23 December 1968: 336 days.
26. Tet Offensive (192/1730); Threat to US influence; From 27 February 1968 to 31 March 1968: 38 days.
27. Vietnam Spring Offensive (198/1829); Threat of Grave damage; From 22 February 1969 to 18 March 1969: 24 days.
28. EC-121 Spy Plane (201/1805); Threat to US influence; From 15 April 1969 to 26 April 1969: 11 days.
29. Invasion of Cambodia (206/1850); Threat to US influence; From 21 April 1970 to 30 June 1970: 70 days.
30. Black September (207/1860); Threat to US influence; From 15 September 1970 to 29 September 1970: 14 days.
31. Cienfuegos Base (208/1865); Threat of Grave damage; From 16 September 1970 to 23 October 1970: 37 days.
33. Christmas Bombings (218/1931); Threat to US influence; From 4 December 1972 to 27 January 1973: 54 days.
34. October–Yom Kippur War (224/2030); Threat to US influence; From 12 October 1973 to 31 May 1974: 231 days.
35. Mayaguez (228/2080); Threat to US influence; From 12 May 1975 to 14 May 1975: 2 days.
36. War in Angola (229/2070); Threat to US influence; From 1 September 1975 to 19 December 1975: 109 days.
37. Shaba II (263/2570); Threat to US influence; 14 May 1978 to 22 May 1978: 8 days.
38. US Hostages in Iran (278/2860); Threat Limited; From 4 November 1979 to 20 January 1981: 443 days.
## APPENDIX B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases Included (N=34)</th>
<th>Case Studies Under Consideration</th>
<th>Event's Duration in Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Greek Civil War, 1947</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Berlin Blockade, 1948</td>
<td>322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 China's Civil War, 1949</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Outbreak of Korean War, 1950</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 China's Enters Korea, 1950</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Korean War Stalemate, 1953</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Guatemala Covert Operation, 1954</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Dien Ben Phu, 1954</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Taiwan Straits, 1955</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Suez-Sinai, 1956</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Berlin Deadline, 1958-1959</td>
<td>123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Taiwan Straits, 1958</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Pathet Lao Offensive, 1961</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Bay of Pigs, 1961</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Berlin Aide-Memoir, 1961</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Viet Cong Attack, 1961</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Pathet Lao Offensive, 1962</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Panama Canal, 1964</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Tonkin Gulf, 1964</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Congo War, 1964</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Pleiku Attack, 1965</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Dominican Republic, 1965</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Six-Day War, 1967</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Pueblo Capture, 1968</td>
<td>336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Tet Offensive, 1968</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 EC-121 Spy Plane, 1969</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Cambodia Invasion, 1970</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Black September, 1970</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Mining Vietnam's Ports, 1972</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Christmas Bombing (Hanoi), 1972-1973</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Yom Kippur War, 1973</td>
<td>231</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Mayaguez Seizure, 1975</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 War in Angola, 1975</td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Shaba, 1978</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=34

Average = 77.76 Days

531
APPENDIX C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases Included (N=34)</th>
<th>Case Studies Under Consideration</th>
<th>Event's Ascending Order of Duration in Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 Panama Canal, 1964</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Mayaguez Seizure, 1975</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Suez-Sinai, 1956</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Outbreak of Korean War, 1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Tonkin Gulf, 1964</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Six-Day War, 1967</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Shaba, 1978</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Bay of Pigs, 1961</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 EC-121 Spy Plane, 1969</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Black September, 1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Taiwan Straits, 1958</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Pleiku Attack, 1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 China's Civil War, 1949</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Pathet Lao Offensive, 1962</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Tet Offensive, 1968</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Christmas Bombing (Hanoi), 1972-1973</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Dien Ben Phu, 1954</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Viet Cong Attack, 1961</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Congo War, 1964</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Cambodia Invasion, 1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Pathet Lao Offensive, 1961</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Berlin Aide-Memoir, 1961</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Greek Civil War, 1947</td>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Korean War Stalemate, 1953</td>
<td></td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Taiwan Straits, 1955</td>
<td></td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 War in Angola, 1975</td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Mining Vietnam's Ports, 1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Berlin Deadline, 1958-1959</td>
<td></td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Dominican Republic, 1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Guatemala Covert Operation, 1954</td>
<td></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Yom Kippur War, 1973</td>
<td></td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 China's Enters Korea, 1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Berlin Blockade, 1948</td>
<td></td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Pueblo Capture, 1968</td>
<td></td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

======
57 Days

532
Bibliography


