THE GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE PAVLOVICH
AND THE KINGDOM OF POLAND

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INTRODUCTION

In the middle of the eighteenth century, Poland was a huge nation with a population of 10,500,000. Unfortunately, her frontiers were vulnerable, her constitution ineffective, and her leaders divided along the lines of family and group interest. Poland had three strong neighboring countries who wanted to expand: Russia, Austria, and Prussia. These nations effected three brutal partitions which resulted in the complete reduction of the Polish state. In 1807, Napoleon established, within a small area of Polish territory, the Duchy of Warsaw. This quasi-independent state contained only 1,800 square miles of land, and the King of Saxony was appointed duke. His family had been the eighteenth century rulers of Poland.

Alexander I of Russia was constantly interested in the Polish state, and as early as 1796, when he was Grand Duke Alexander, and heir apparent, he indicated in a private conversation with the Polish patriot, Prince Adam Czartoryski, that his intentions toward the Polish state were vastly different than those of his grandmother and chief executioner of Poland, Catherine II:

He told me that he did not share the ideas and doctrines of the cabinet and the court; that
he was far from approving the politics and the
court of his grandmother; that he condemned
her principles; that he had expressed wishes
for Poland and her glorious struggle; that he
had deplored her fall; that Kosciuszko in his eyes
was a great man because of the cause he had defend-
ed, which was the cause of humanity and justice.
He acknowledged to me that he detested despotism
wherever it was found and in whatever manner
it was exercised; that he loved liberty; that he
was for equality to all men; that he had taken a
great interest in the French revolution.¹

Alexander felt that it was his duty to ameliorate the con-
dition of the Poles in accordance with the liberal prin-
ciples he had gained from his teacher, Frederick Cesar
de LaHarpe.² Upon his accession to the throne of Russia
in 1801, Alexander I freed Polish prisoners in Siberia,
allowed the political exiles to return home, and when pos-
sible, he permitted them to reclaim their properties which

¹Adam Czartoryski, Mémoires du Prince Adam Czartoryski
et Correspondance avec l'Empereur Alexandre ler (2 vols.;
Paris: E. Plan and Nourit, 1857), II, 96. Also see Charles
Morley, "Alexander I and Czartoryski," Slavonic and East
European Review, XXV, No. 65 (April, 1947), 405-406.

²Frederick Cesar de LaHarpe (1754-1838) came to St.
Petersburg in 1782 to secure an education and became the
teacher of the Grand Dukes Alexander and Constantine. He
was later expelled from Russia for being implicated in a
political intrigue, 1795. He was involved in the Swiss
revolt of 1798 and became a Swiss Senator and director
of the republic. In 1800 he left Switzerland due to the
completion of a coup d'état. In 1815 he was appointed a
General in the Russian army by Alexander I and because of
his relationship with the Tsar of Russia, Switzerland
received more favorable consideration than the other
countries. After the Congress of Vienna LaHarpe re-es-
tablished himself in Switzerland.
had been taken by the state. Alexander I was not in an immediate position to restore the Polish state but he gave assurances to Prince Adam Czartoryski that "the destinies of Poland were as dear as ever to him."\(^3\)

It was not until 1805 that the proper circumstances prevailed for a restoration of the Polish Kingdom. This opportunity was presented by a reluctant Prussian King, Frederick William III, who did not want to enter the third coalition against Napoleon. A plan was formulated to invade Prussia, as its neutrality prevented the passage of Russian troops, and to proclaim the Polish Kingdom with Alexander I as king. The Russian Tsar changed his course at the final moment and did not travel to Warsaw to complete the plan, but went to Berlin where an agreement was reached with the Prussian king. Thus a brilliant opportunity for the restoration of the Polish Kingdom was lost due to imperial irresolution and the fear of encountering the Prussian army. Therefore, although the idea of the restoration of the Polish Kingdom remained an "idée fixe" throughout the years 1801-1815, diplomatic entanglements and the Napoleonic wars hampered its fruition until the Congress of Vienna. At Vienna, Alexander I was successful in building a Polish Kingdom in personal union with the

\(^3\)Morley, loc. cit., p. 406.
Russian empire. This momentous decision for the Polish state was delivered on June 9, 1815. Prussia retained the Grand Duchy of Posen, Austria kept Galicia, Cracow became a free city, and the remaining area of Napoleon's Grand Duchy of Warsaw was united with the Russian empire and was called the "Congress Kingdom." The Russian Tsar assumed the title of King of Poland. Following the confirmation of the principles of the Polish constitution, Alexander wrote to Count Jean Ostrowski, President of the Senate at Warsaw:

In assuming the title of King of Poland, I hope to satisfy the wishes of the nation. The Kingdom of Poland shall be united to the empire of Russia while retaining the privileges of its own constitution on which I desire to found the happiness of the country ... Though the crucial consideration of general peace has made it impossible for all Pole to be united under the same sceptre, it shall be my endeavor to alleviate to the best of my power the hardships of separation and obtain for them everywhere the enjoyment of their nationality.

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4 Ibid., p. 422.
5 For complete text of the treaty relative to Poland, see arts. 1-14, Fedor de Martens, Recueil des Traites et Conventions Conclus Par la Russie avec les Puissances étrangères (15 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1874-1909), IX, 237-243.
6 Maurice Paleologue, The Enigmatic Czar: The Life of Alexander I of Russia, trans. Edwin and Willa Muir (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1938), p. 233. Count Jean Ostrowski, to whom the above address was delivered, was a Polish general and statesman. In 1817 he became a Senator and was in opposition to Constantine's government. In 1830 he was appointed commandant general of the Polish national guard and was instrumental in planning Poland's defense system.
On June 20, 1815, the Polish kingdom was proclaimed at Warsaw by Alexander I. The constitution was completed by the Tsar and Prince Adam Czartoryski. This document granted Poland nominal independence and a separate political structure. The preamble voiced the caution that the constitution did not represent a natural or inherent right but rather an extension of the Tsar's good will and liberal designs. The Polish constitution provided for a Diet composed of a Senate and a House; a Council of State together with the Viceroy representing the sovereign in the Warsaw government. The executive authority in the Polish kingdom was vested in the Administrative Council. The direction of foreign policy was the responsibility of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg.\(^7\)

The Grand Duke Constantine was appointed commander-in-chief of the Polish army. Inasmuch as Alexander shared certain reservations about the capabilities of Constantine, he thought it necessary to add one more extra constitutional member to the Polish government. His choice was Nicholas Novosiltsev (1770-1838).

\(^7\) In August, 1822, the Grand Duke Constantine was given his own diplomatic chancery. Thereafter, all matters affecting the interior of the Polish kingdom were to pass through his hands. Marceli Handelsman, "The Polish Kingdom, 1815-1830," The Cambridge History of Poland, 1697-1935, ed. W. F. Reddaway et al. (2 vols.; Cambridge: at the University Press, 1951), II, 288.
If the government of the Polish kingdom developed into an unbearable tyranny, it deteriorated even further with the appointment of Nicholas Novosiltsev as Commissioner to the government of the Polish kingdom. He quickly earned the title of "the inquisitor" for his merciless conduct of investigations.

The future overseer of Poland had to be at the same time a trustworthy watchman over the Grand Duke, and he knew how to make himself irreplaceable both in Warsaw and in St. Petersburg. Lazy, riotous, always in quest of funds, deep in debt in spite of his high pay, and dependent on his creditors, on Warsaw Jews, and on the Prussian Consul, he had immense energy, initiative, ability to speak the jargon of the day and to win authority for himself.

Novosiltsev proved himself useful in the cause of reaction; he was indirectly involved in the downfall of Prince Adam Czartoryski. He made the Tsar suspicious of Poland and liberalism and was instrumental in ferreting out the secret societies at Wilno. The fierce attitude which Novosiltsev developed toward the Poles is all the more astonishing when one considers that he was at one time in sympathy with the Polish cause. Czartoryski substantiates this assertion during one of his many critical


9Handelsman, loc. cit., p. 277.

10See below, pp. 10-12.
reports to Alexander I on the subject of Constantine's conduct:

Up to now, Novosiltsev is the only one [Russian] who does not lead astray or defeat the public spirit. To my great pleasure Novosiltsev has been invited to be present at all the sittings of the Administrative Council at any time that he shall wish.\textsuperscript{11}

The change in Novosiltsev's sentiments towards the Poles is even more amazing when one observes that the commissioner needed the official assistance of Nicholas I to gain admittance to the sessions of the Administrative Council thirteen years later.\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, Constantine was instructed to submit when Novosiltsev's opinion was considered correct.\textsuperscript{13} Novosiltsev became both a useful and vital part of reactionary rule in the Polish kingdom.

The Polish Constitution did not deprive Alexander I of the authority to make vital governmental appointments. Outstanding Poles, henceforth, were driven away in favor of weak, reactionary, or incapable individuals such as Prince Joseph Zajonczek, "an old radical, a doughty warrior and Napoleonic general, but a man without character, whose head was turned by the power which was unexpectedly

\textsuperscript{11}Czartoryski, II, 366.
\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Sbornik: Russkoe Istoricheskoe Obshchestvo} (148 vols.; St. Petersburg: Academy of Sciences, 1867-1916), CXXXI, 310. (Hereafter cited as \textit{Sbornik}.)
\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}
conferred upon him (29 April 1818)."14 Zajonczek was appointed Viceroy and presided over the Administrative Council, which held him in contempt. The members of the Administrative Council, as well as most other Poles, had anticipated the appointment of their great leader, Prince Adam George Czartoryski (1770-1861), to the position of Viceroy. Prince Adam had been a close collaborator with Alexander in the management of Russian affairs since the Tsar's rise to power in 1801. Czartoryski was born in Warsaw on January 14, 1770, and died at Montfermeil, near Paris, on July 16, 1861. He was educated by his father and a number of Polish and foreign teachers which included the physiocrat Dupont de Nemours. In 1794, he and his brother Constantine were sent to the Russian Court, as ordered by Catherine II, where they were to remain as hostages and assurances of the family's good conduct in Poland. When his friend and confidant, Alexander I, ascended the throne of Russia he became an important member of the Russian government. The most vital post that he held relative to the Polish kingdom was that of Curator of the University of Wilno and supervisor of the educational district comprising the eight formerly Polish provinces of western Russia. Thus, the most famous and able of the Polish patriots was forced to step aside for General

14 Handelsman, loc. cit., p. 278.
Zajonczek, an individual who helped make the Polish government and constitution ineffective.

By November, 1815, Alexander I had transferred a great measure of his confidence from Prince Adam by appointing more agreeable Poles to the Warsaw government who were willing to overlook the Tsar's promises relative to the restoration of the lost provinces and the constitution of the Polish state. Prince Adam became a Senator of the kingdom and a member of the Administrative Council, but he was not able to conciliate his differences with the Grand Duke Constantine and refused to attend the Administrative Council's meetings. He attempted to remain aloof from the political arena and devote himself to his job of curator of the University of Wilno, and the supervision of the educational system of the eight formerly Polish provinces of western Russia. But Czartoryski was unable, immediately, to remove himself completely from the events taking place; because he found the governmental conditions rapidly growing worse. He felt that he was morally obligated to intercede on behalf of Poland and her institutions. In 1820, at the second session of the Polish Diet, Czartoryski exerted great influence in both houses. He wished to present the Emperor with an honest picture of the prevailing conditions and needs of the country. He was perturbed at the unconstitutional behavior of the Viceroy.
General Zajonczek, with Constantine's approval, in May, 1819, introduced censorship of the press; by a decree of July, 1819, he extended this censorship to include books published in the Polish kingdom. Unfortunately, the labor of the Committee of the Senate, which attempted to counter these acts, was rejected by the Tsar. He suspected correctly that its findings reflected the desires and intentions of Czartoryski. This was the final signal for Czartoryski to disengage himself from further presence in the Diet for the remainder of the reign of Alexander I.

After this last indication of his fall from favor, Prince Adam Czartoryski retired to his curatorship. He became interested in the student body which he found to be a "high spirited and broad-minded set." The spirit of nationality and patriotism had run high at Wilno since the powers had rendered their decision concerning Poland's future at Vienna, in 1815. The students were dissatisfied with that settlement, as it did not grant Poland complete national unity and freedom. The society of Philomates took the lead. Thomas Zan was its leader. The great poet, Adam Mickiewicz, (1798-1855), became one of its first associates. Also, there was the society of Radiants which had a large membership. The Radiants was disbanded in its

16 Ibid., p. 138.
infancy due to official opposition; it was replaced quickly by the Philarets. The schoolboys of the secondary system also founded societies and clubs of their own, but they were largely inconsequential.

The Grand Duke Constantine's secret police discovered the existence of the above mentioned secret societies and an investigation was initiated under the auspices of Commissioner Nicholas Novosiltsev. The Commissioner wanted to destroy the independent Polish educational system and thus eradicate the "spirit of unwise Polish nationality." He perpetrated mass arrests and effected a purge of the educational ranks. Prince Adam Czartoryski pleaded with Alexander I for tolerance and moderation.

The manner in which M. Novosiltsev conducted himself during his recent stay at Wilno makes me apprehensive that in his report pertaining to the schools, he has had occasion to make grave accusations and enter most unfavorable conclusions against public instruction in the Polish provinces. I do not intend to justify the reprehensible facts or to defend the guilty; nevertheless, since these institutions have been under my direction for twenty years, I beg you not to make a critical decision before I answer the accusations that must be contained in the report of M. Novosiltsev. 18

18 Ibid., p. 139.
At the time of Novosiltsey's investigation, the case of 'Major Valerian Łukasinski,' Grandmaster of National Freemasonry, was scheduled to come before the courts. The police thus suspected that branches of his organization were operating in Wilno with the approval and cooperation of Prince Adam. Ibid., p. 138.
This noble plea was tendered in vain, as shortly there-
after Prince Adam submitted his resignation, which was
accepted after being first rejected.¹⁹ Prince Adam's
resignation "ended the drama of partnership of those two
men, the Emperor of Russia and the Polish patriot, who
tried to bring to an end the contest between Russia and
Poland by reconciling Poland's rights with Russia's
greatness."²⁰

¹⁹Czartoryski, II, 389.
²⁰Kukiel, p. 139.
CHAPTER I

THE GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE AND HIS EARLY YEARS IN POLAND

The Controversial Grand Duke

Following the Peace of Paris, 11 April 1814, Alexander returned the Polish Corps to Warsaw and placed them under the command of his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine (May 8, 1779-June 27, 1831).\(^1\) Constantine was the second son of Emperor Paul and Empress Maria Feodorvna. He was named Constantine by his grandmother, Catherine II, as he was destined to become the Russian ruler at Constantinople in Catherine's ill fated program for Russian expansion. From his infancy, Constantine was an unmanageable child.\(^2\) Although he received the same type education as Alexander I, under the tutorship of the Swiss Colonel Frederick LaHarpe, Constantine held much of his instruction in contempt. On one occasion when a teacher ordered him to read a textual passage, Constantine replied impetuously: "I will not read; you read; and are in consequence only the

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\(^1\) For text of this treaty, see Martens, XIV, 211. It is surprising that, in spite of the military support the Polish forces extended to Napoleon during the Russian invasion, Alexander maintained his sympathetic designs for the Polish state. Leonid Strakhovsky, Alexander I of Russia: The Man Who Defeated Napoleon (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934), p. 34.

greater fool." The Grand Duke avoided all teaching except military instruction. He enjoyed the disciplining of soldiers. He developed considerable skill as a military tactician. He learned the methods of warfare under a master, General Suvorov, during the Italian campaign of 1799. It was during this action that Paul I awarded Constantine the title of Tsarevich of which the Grand Duke was eternally proud. At Austerlitz Constantine commanded a reserve force of ten battalions and eighteen squadrons; he earned considerable praise in that struggle for successfully defending his position against the ruthless attacks of Bernadotte. Constantine commanded a cavalry force in the Prussian campaign of 1806.

Despite these somewhat favorable commentaries on the Grand Duke Constantine, it is interesting to note the disparaging reports of various historians and visitors at the Russian court. Paleologue, for instance, has made the following comment relative to the character of the Grand Duke:

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3 Ibid.

4 Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov (1729-1800) was descended from a Swede named Suvor who immigrated to Russia in 1622. Suvorov entered the Russian army as a boy. He earned great fame for his military strategy during the Polish War of 1794. Following the war of 1794, Suvorov confiscated the Polish library of the Zaluski's and removed it to St. Petersburg. This library contained more than 150,000 volumes and 5,000 manuscripts. In 1799 Suvorov conducted a partially successful campaign against the French army in Italy.

5 Schnitzler, I, 147.
Devoid of all courage, physical and moral, incapable of the slightest elevation of soul, he always takes flight at the first sign of danger. In 1812 he publicly proclaimed his terror at Napoleon's approach telling everyone who cared to listen to him that peace must be obtained at all costs. He completely lacked the prime virtue of a soldier: Courage. 6

It is strange that Alexander would give an incompetent field commander the exacting task and responsibility of rebuilding the Polish army.

Residents at the Russian court have castigated the Grand Duke for an alleged bad temper and evil disposition. The characteristic attack accused the Grand Duke Constantine of being extremely violent, tyrannical, overbearing and lazy. But in spite of this virulent indictment, his critics often recognized a large measure of intelligence in the Grand Duke's general bearing. 7

In fairness to Constantine, it is necessary to consider a more favorable commentary on his character and mentality:

Not a bad man on the whole, this prince of stocky build, with a snub and angry glance, who had deliberately refused the finest crown in the


world in order to stop in Warsaw with his Polish wife, with a people whose hearts he believed he had conquered, with a national army organized entirely through his efforts. Constantine was neither the bloodthirsty tyrant of Polish legend nor the innocent dupe the Russian story wished to make him. He was quite simply a well intentioned man with a certain intelligence, but completely devoid of the qualities needed in a leader or a statesman. His character, inherited from his father Paul I, was unstable, blundering, violent, and meddlesome and exasperated the Poles particularly, whilst he thought of himself as their master and benefactor.8

Constantine was endowed with a great measure of compassion for others. An example of his kindness is shown by his conduct during the disastrous retreat of Napoleon's army from Russia in 1813. Constantine treated the sick and wounded with kindness. He extended equal treatment to officers and privates; he visited them in hospitals and even gave official appointments to several of his former enemies in his palace at Theina, on the Gulf of Finland.9

Such was the man who appeared in Warsaw to assume command of the Polish army. In two months he was the most unpopular man in the Polish kingdom.10

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9 Schnitzler, IL, 152.
10 Paleologue, pp. 256-257.
Constantine and the Polish Reaction to his Appointment

There was one person in the Polish kingdom who was more powerful than the immediate political alignments or the Constitution; he was the Grand Duke Constantine. The prospects for an enlightened government in Poland were dimmed considerably by the arbitrary conduct of the Grand Duke.\textsuperscript{11} Czartoryski complained continually to Alexander I of his brother's assault upon the Polish nation and constitution:

No amount of zeal or attention to duty seems to move Constantine. He impresses all that he has taken a hatred for Poland, and this hatred progresses at an alarming pace. The army, nation, nothing finds grace in his eyes. The constitution especially is a matter of continual sarcasms. He ridicules all laws and regulations and, unfortunately, abusive acts often follow his words.\textsuperscript{12}

The primary source of discord was the Grand Duke's refusal to respect a division of power between the civilian government and his military administration. Czartoryski realized from the outset that a system providing for a separation of power would be difficult to establish with a


\textsuperscript{12} Adam Czartoryski, Mémoires du Prince Adam Czartoryski et Correspondance avec L'Empereur Alexandre ler (2 vols.; Paris: E. FIon and Nourit, 1887), II, 337.
Grand Duke of Russia; accordingly, he had opposed Constantine's appointment to the post. Constantine ignored the Polish constitution. In 1816, the Grand Duke decided to organize a commission of war, and forcibly gained the Council of State's assent without discussion as prescribed by the constitution. Czartoryski pleaded vainly with Alexander to disallow this flagrant disregard of the Polish charter: "Please order submission of this proposal to the Council of State as is right and lawful according to the constitution."¹³ No evidence has been discovered by the writer which indicates that Czartoryski made a proper attempt to discuss and effect a solution to this pressing governmental problem with the Grand Duke Constantine. Czartoryski expressed his complaints and opposition directly to Alexander I. This course of action reflects a flagrant disregard of protocol and channels. Also, it made cooperation with the Grand Duke almost impossible. It is reasonable to conclude that a situation of this nature would create an obstacle to effective government, as achievement of the Emperor's orders largely depended upon the Grand Duke's disposition to act. Czartoryski's criticisms of the Grand Duke were straightforward and frank: "When your [Alexander's] orders are severe they are executed promptly and with vigor, but when they

¹³Czartoryski, II, 351.
are favorable to constitutional order, he finds many pretexts for retarding their execution or development. Therefore, although the Constitution promised success in its written principles, it was not strictly obeyed or properly executed.

Each day a new scene was brought to the attention of the Poles which caused increasing deterioration of public confidence in the Grand Duke Constantine. He appeared to be a tyrant. The general Polish population received only bad reports on the Grand Duke's conduct and character. The Polish leaders resented Constantine's authority, opposed his presence as military commander, and blamed him for failures of the civilian administration.

The Polish leaders failed to consider in their fury that Alexander I was obliged to maintain a member of the imperial family at Warsaw in order to make the existence of a constitutional state within the empire more acceptable to the Russian people. In addition, by assigning Constantine to this extra constitutional position in Poland, Alexander I was able to obtain the services of an ambitious brother and gain his unflinching loyalty during an

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14 Ibid., p. 373.
experiment with a liberal charter, which he certainly
could not have realized with an honest Polish patriot.16

The Grand Duke Constantine's Polish Army

The most treasured possession of the Russian Grand
Duke was the reconstructed Polish army. The army was
also of vital importance to the country, perhaps even
symbolic of Poland's existence as a political entity.17
One may conclude that this may have been Alexander I's
motive in maintaining the army's existence at the end of
the Napoleonic war when he could have fostered its destruc-
tion. The carefully worded provision pertaining to the
Polish troops in the Treaty of Paris, which was com-
pleted on April 11, 1814, seems to have been designed to
obtain the loyalty of the Polish troops:

The Polish troops which are in the French
service shall be given liberty to return home,
keeping their arms and baggage, as if they were
receiving honorable discharges. The officers, and
privates, may keep all decorations which have been
awarded to them, along with the accompanying bene-
fits.18

16 Handelsman, loc. cit., p. 277.
17 Charles Morley, "Alexander I and Czartoryski,"
Slavonic and East European Review, XXV, No. 65 (April,
1947), 414.
18 For complete text of this treaty provision, see
art. 19, Fedor de Martens, Recueil des Traités et Con-
ventions Conclus Par la Russie avec les Puissances
étrangères (15 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1874-1909), XIV,
211.
It is clear that such imperial magnanimity should have caused the Poles, Czartoryski especially, to become confident that the military commander-in-chief would be Polish.\textsuperscript{19} The Poles were grossly disappointed, as discussed above, when Alexander I appointed his brother and heir apparent to this powerful post. Prince Adam displayed his antagonism by courageously submitting a draft of the Grand Duke's recall to St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{20} This bold and eloquent petition failed to gain the desired response, for in spite of his Polish opponents, the Grand Duke retained supreme command of the Army, and his authority in Poland began to overshadow all others.

The Grank Duke Constantine was responsible to the Tsar alone. Constantine's authority was expanded in 1822 when an Imperial Ukaz was published which extended to him the powers of viceroy following the death of the venerable veteran Joseph Zajonczyk. Constantine used his new authority strictly in the interest of creating a new and efficient Polish military force.\textsuperscript{21}

In spite of the disgruntled Poles, the Grand Duke submerged himself in the task of completing a reorganization

\textsuperscript{19}The Poles had hoped for the appointment of their national hero Thaddeus Kosciuszko (1746-1817) to this important post.

\textsuperscript{20}Czartoryski, II, 340.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 351.
of the Polish Army. He dispensed with the "Post Napoleonic Cadres" in favor of an infantry corps equipped with artillery, a cavalry corps, and various technical groups. The army was to be composed of 40,000 men, and it was to maintain its distinctive Polish uniform and insignia.\textsuperscript{22}

Constantine's position in the kingdom was strengthened further by imperial decrees of 1817 and 1819. The former decree enlarged the army considerably as it added the Lithuanian corps and a Division of Uhlans to the Grand Duke's military forces.\textsuperscript{23} The latter decree made the Grand Duke Constantine commander-in-chief of all the formerly Polish provinces of western Russia. The above measures appear to indicate that, in spite of his occasional arbitrary conduct, Constantine was devoted to the

\textsuperscript{22}Due to the principle of substitution established in 1816, the more fortunate peasants and wealthy townsfolk could levy a substitute to perform their military service. The ranks were thus filled with members of the lower agricultural classes. Szymon Askenazy, "Poland and the Polish Revolution," The Cambridge Modern History, ed. A. W. Ward et al. (13 vols.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1934), X, 412.

\textsuperscript{23}Throughout the early period of the Polish kingdom, Alexander voiced his intention to restore greater Poland. At the closing of the Diet of 1818 he gave the Poles further cause to be hopeful for the national restoration. "You have proved yourself equal to your task. The results of your labor will teach me whether, true to my undertakings, I shall be able to extend what I have already done for you." Confidence in the eventual annexation of Lithuania to the Polish kingdom was greatly increased with this extension of the Grand Duke's authority. Ibid., p. 453.
Polish Army; otherwise, he could not have been entrusted with such a vast numerical and geographical responsibility.\textsuperscript{24}

Constantine was an admirer of military coordination. His excessive interest in small details was reflected in a letter written during a visit to Prussia, in which he devotes an unusually large section to a careful observation of the Prussian Army. He was excited by the Prussian Army's awkward military formations, lack of adequate guards, and generally poor military bearing.\textsuperscript{25}

The Grand Duke was also a severe disciplinarian, but he made no attempt to understand the Polish character. He failed to understand that it was not customary to berate, to insult, or to flog Polish soldiers; these were characteristic Russian measures, but they were intolerable to Poles. He was the victim, therefore, of many indirect attacks from Czartoryski, who relayed news of numerous incidents and tragedies to Alexander I. These reports, submitted by Prince Adam, were evidently designed to affect the Grand Duke's removal from his Polish post:

\textsuperscript{24}By 1830, the Polish Army had increased its numbers to such an extent that Nicholas specified the deployment of 60,000 Polish soldiers in the projected western offensive. Morley, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 410.

Constantine caught some Polish soldiers stealing apples, arrested them and ordered Russian soldiers to punish them by administering blows with the cudgel. On the same day at a parade the General Korwatorski and his regimental commander were the objects of a scathing and most humiliating reproof. The army waits anxiously for the recall of the Grand Duke.\textsuperscript{26}

Czartoryski reported that the number of desertions and resignations was increasing, but the most tragic development was the upsurge in suicides among military personnel. Czartoryski reported that suicides were growing more and more numerous because the soldiers were deciding to take their own lives rather than accept the shameful penalties and inhuman treatment which they were suffering.\textsuperscript{27}

In spite of Prince Adam's virulent attacks, it is important to consider that Constantine was assigned to command an army which considered the Grand Duke a foreign intruder and resented Constantine's presence in Poland. It is probable that the Polish army failed to give the Russian Grand Duke the cooperation which he needed to accomplish his mission. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that harsh standards of discipline were necessary to achieve the military stature which Constantine desired and attained, in some measure, despite civilian and military opposition.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{26}Czartoryski, II, 358-359.

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., pp. 361-362.

\textsuperscript{28}It was an enormous credit to Constantine that a large section of his Polish army remained loyal after the outbreak of the Polish revolution until he released them from further service obligations. Nesselrode, VII, 162.
Constantine was almost fanatical in his appreciation of perfect maneuvers and execution of tactical field problems. Subjects of this nature formed a prominent part of his early reports to the new Emperor, Nicholas I.

"Our military affairs go well; we had three exercises at the beginning of the week which were remarkable in precision drill, assembly and execution of orders.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, it was astonishing to note Czartoryski's complaint that the army lacked instruction in military science and tactics. This is a surprising statement since the Polish troops were constantly performing field maneuvers; these exercises are not likely to be conducted without the application of military science and tactics. Also, Constantine felt fully confident to state in May, 1826, that the Polish forces "had never been so highly trained and ready."\textsuperscript{30} It is unlikely that the Grand Duke would have made a false statement in this respect; he knew that Nicholas I was anxiously considering the use of Polish troops in immediate Russian wars.\textsuperscript{31} The Grand Duke Constantine achieved a large measure of success in communicating

\textsuperscript{29} Sbornik Rossii Istoricheskoe Obshchestvo (148 vols.); St. Petersburg: Academy of Science, 1867-1916), CXXXI, 24. (Hereafter cited as Sbornik.)

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 77.

\textsuperscript{31} Nicholas began to complain of manpower shortages within the Russian military units as early as February, 1826.
the Russian Military pride to the Polish Army. He was able to "reinforce the conception which the Poles derived from Napoleon I that an Army constituted a state within a state."\textsuperscript{32}

CHAPTER II

THE GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE'S RENUNCIATION
OF THE RUSSIAN CROWN

Alexander Chooses a Successor

In 1815 Alexander I was thirty-eight years of age. He did not have a male heir. The Grand Duke Constantine was thus next in the line of imperial succession. Constantine did not have any children as he and his first wife separated shortly after their marriage in 1796.\(^1\) Following Constantine in the line of succession was the Grand Duke Nicholas (1796-1855).

Nicholas was engaged to the Prussian Princess Charlotte in the autumn of 1815; they were married at St. Petersburg in July, 1817. The marriage of Nicholas and Charlotte resulted in the birth of a son, Alexander, who was to become Alexander II. The Tsar had encouraged the marriage of Nicholas and Charlotte, and after the birth of the male heir, Alexander began to indicate openly his preference for Nicholas as his successor to the Russian

\(^1\) Constantine's first wife was Anna Feodorovna of Coburg. At the time of their marriage she was only fifteen years of age, while Constantine was sixteen.
throne. Alexander made a comment at a dinner gathering in July, 1819, in the presence of Nicholas and Charlotte which clearly revealed his intentions concerning the succession to the Russian throne:

The favorite dream of my youth is realized when I see Nicholas fulfill all my hopes so well. I am old enough to be his father, and as heaven has not yet given me children, I regard him as my substitute.  

During the autumn of 1819, Alexander visited Warsaw and during the course of a conversation with Constantine the Tsar expressed his desire to vacate the throne. He did not feel physically capable to perform the arduous tasks that his position required. This may have been a probing measure to discover the intentions of Constantine relative to the throne of Russia:

I must tell you, brother, that I want to abdicate; I am tired and I have no more strength to carry the burden of government. I tell you in advance that you may decide what to do under the circumstances.  

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2It is interesting to note Schnitzler’s comment that the King of Prussia would not agree to the marriage of Charlotte to any Russian Grand Duke other than the heir to the throne. This indicates that the succession may have been transferred as early as 1815. J. H. Schnitzler, Secret History of the Court and Government of Russia Under the Emperors Alexander and Nicholas (London; Richard Bentley, 1847), II, 148.


Constantine replied that he would also retire from active governmental service if the Tsar chose to surrender the throne of the empire.5

It is clear that as early as 1819 the Grand Duke Nicholas was the most likely candidate to succeed Alexander I. He possessed the primary qualifications Alexander sought in his successor. He had a son; he was just twenty-three years of age at this time. Alexander's motives are indicated during a conversation with Nicholas in the latter part of 1819:

I have on more than one occasion discussed the subject of abdication with Constantine; but he being of nearly the same age as myself, and possessing an aversion to the idea of reigning has decidedly refused to succeed me. We are both the more convinced in our respective determinations by seeing in you a proof of the particular blessing of providence which has given you a son. You are therefore informed that you are destined at a future period to be invested with the Imperial dignity.6

The Divorce of Constantine

Shortly after the birth of the son of Nicholas and Charlotte, Constantine requested the Tsar's permission to

5 Constantine had already indicated his abhorrence of the throne. At the time of the murder of his father, Paul I, he said "After what has happened my brother may reign if he likes, but if the throne ever comes to me I shall certainly not accept it." Grunwald, p. 34.

divorce his wife, Anna Feodorovna, so that he could marry
the Polish countess, Jeanne Grudzinska.7 Alexander re-
acted favorably, but he encountered stern opposition from
the clergy. The churchmen felt that the entire affair
was a scandal. To annul a legal marriage was itself a
disgrace, but to remarry was an evil compounded.8 Also,
the Holy Synod protested that a divorced man or woman was
spiritually obligated to remain unmarried until one of
the former partners in matrimony became a member of a
Holy Order or died. An abrupt imperial decision of ap-
proval silenced the theological argument. The divorce
and consent to remarry was officially approved by a de-
cree of April 14, 1820, and the Grand Duke Constantine
remarried shortly thereafter.

7Jeanne Grudzinska was the daughter of the Polish
Count Grudzinska. Following her marriage to Constantine
she became Princess of Lowicz. Constantine made her
acquaintance in 1815 and soon came to be quite fond of
her. She died in November, 1831, five months after the
death of Constantine. Charles Nesselrode, Lettres et
Papiers du Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760-1800,
trans. A. Nesselrode (11 vols.; Paris: A. Lahure, Imprim-
eur-Editeur, 1908), VII, 233.

8Maurice Paleologue, The Enigmatic Czar: The Life of
Alexander I of Russia, trans. Edwin and Willa Muir (New
Constantine Renounces His Rights to the Throne

The decision to proceed with a divorce and remarriage proved to be a crucial error for the Grand Duke Constantine. He had to renounce his rights to the Russian throne in favor of his brother Nicholas in order to gain imperial approval for his petition of divorce. He had remarried morganatically.

Between 1820 and 1823 Alexander I harassed Constantine for a formal written renunciation of the throne. He was not satisfied with the verbal resolution which had been delivered in 1820. In the month of January, 1822, following a long discussion marked by a lack of mutual confidence, Alexander I succeeded in gaining a written declaration of abdication from the unfortunate Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich:

Encouraged by all the proofs of the infinitely sympathetic disposition of your Imperial Majesty toward me, I dare once more to lay at your feet, sire, a most humble prayer. Not finding in myself the genius, the talents, nor the force necessary to be elevated to the sovereign dignity to which I


10. The dynastic statute of April 5, 1797, "formulated the principle that the right of succession to the throne could not be imparted to the children of any member of the imperial family who married out of a royal house." Alfred Rambaud, History of Russia from Earliest Times to 1882 (3 vols.; Boston: Estes and Lauriat, 1882), III, 13-14.
would have the right by birth, I beg your Imperial Majesty to transfer this right to whom it would come after me, and thus to assure forever, the security of the new empire. As to me, I will add by this renunciation, a new guarantee and a new force to the engagement which I have voluntarily and solemnly contracted on the occasion of my divorce from my first wife. All the circumstances of my own situation, bearing more and more upon this measure, prove to the Empire and to the entire world the sincerity of my sentiments.

Deign, Sire, to accept with good will my prayer; help me secure the consent of our Imperial mother to this plan and sanction it with your Imperial assent. In the sphere of private life, I shall pledge myself always to serve as an example to your faithful subjects, and to all those who are animated by a love for our dear country.

I am with a profound respect for your majesty. Your most faithful subject and brother, Constantine Tsarevich, St. Petersburg, January 14, 1822.

Constantine's renunciation was quickly accepted. Archbishop Philaret was directed to prepare a manifesto which sanctioned the resolution made by Constantine and acknowledged the Grand Duke Nicholas as the successor of Alexander I. The manifesto was signed at Tsarkoe-Selo on August 28, 1823. The Tsar did not make a public announcement of the change in the order of the succession. He ordered the reproduction of three additional copies of the Grand Duke's

11Walsh, p. 257.
renunciation, without informing Constantine. One copy was to be deposited in a sealed envelope at the following locations: (1) the Cathedral of the Assumption at Moscow, (2) the Council of the Empire, (3) the Senate, (4) the Holy Synod. Alexander inscribed each of the historic documents with the following inscription:

This document to be preserved in the Uspenski Sabor [Cathedral of the Assumption] along with other state papers, until further orders from me. If I should die without giving further instructions, the envelope is to be opened at once by the Metropolitan Bishop and the Governor-General of Moscow.13

Why did Constantine wilfully renounce one of the most powerful thrones in Europe? He voluntarily gave up his right to the throne. He signed the renunciatory statement without the application of force in order to solemnize his earlier declaration. Askenazy offers the explanation that Constantine completed the renunciation on the condition that it would be withheld from the public notice, and thus he would be enabled to ascend the throne

12 Nicholas was informed of the envelope's contents. Also, an almanac published in September, 1825, in the town of Frankfurt on the Oder, under the control of Prussian censorship, referred to Nicholas as the heir. People visiting Nicholas's wife, the former Princess Charlotte of Prussia, reported her "assumption of haughtiness" which appears to indicate that she was aware of the events taking place in 1823. Schnitzler, II, 161.

13 Paleologue, p. 287.
in spite of the Tsar's wishes. Askenazy offers further, if Alexander considered the letter of renunciation conclusive, it is strange that he neglected to notify the public or the new heir of the orderly and lawful revision of the succession.

In spite of the above stated motives for the Grand Duke's action, the writer has discovered another interpretation which appears to be the Grand Duke Constantine's real reason for deliberately renouncing his right to the Russian throne. In 1823, Constantine had secured, after having experienced a marital disaster, a happy marriage. He had developed an appreciation of his domestic tranquility. He was quite willing to reject the throne in response to Alexander's incessant demands. To have done otherwise would have obliged Constantine to desert his post at Warsaw and to return to St. Petersburg and the cumbersome demands of political and administrative affairs. The Grand Duke Constantine chose, therefore, to renounce his right to the throne and remain in Warsaw.

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15 This is an astonishing remark inasmuch as Nicholas was obviously informed of the transaction between his two elder brothers. See above, pp. 31-33.

16 Schnitzler, II, 163.
Irrespective of the motives of Alexander or Constantine, if the army and the public had been notified of the revision of the succession, it would have precluded the chaos and confusion of December 14, 1825.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17}This is the only date that the writer shall, knowingly, cite according to the nineteenth century Russian calendar, which was twelve days behind the European system of dating.
CHAPTER III
CONSTANTINE AND THE SUCCESSION CRISIS OF 1825

The Death of Alexander and the Resulting Confusion

On the 14th of December, 1825 - a date forever memorable in Russian History - the inhabitants of St. Petersburg awoke under a cheerless leaden sky. . . . Few had slept well during the preceding night; in every home there was a presentiment of something extraordinary about to happen on this 14th December, a Monday - that luckless day in Russian minds. Grunwald

On December 1, 1825, Alexander I died at Taganrog. His failure to make public the developments of 1822 placed the Grand Duke Constantine in a terrible dilemma.

Following the death of Alexander I, General Diebitsch forwarded a letter to Warsaw to inform the Grand Duke Constantine, who was the official heir to the Russian throne, of Emperor Alexander's death.¹ Upon receiving the news,

¹Nikolai K. Shilder, Imperator Aleksandr Pervyi (4 vols.; St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1904-1905), IV, 577. Field Marshal Zabalkansky Diebitsch (1785-1831) was trained at the Corps of Cadets in Berlin. He entered the Russian service in 1801 at St. Petersburg as a 2nd Lieutenant. He earned fame at Austerlitz while serving on the staff of Wittgenstein. He was famous for military strategy and also for his diplomatic acumen which resulted in the detachment of the forces of the Prussian General York from Napoleon in 1813. Diebitsch became the Russian Chief of Staff after the battle of Leipzig. After the war he traveled extensively with Alexander, to Vienna and Leybach and other vital conferences. He gained Nicholas's confidence by submitting an excellent report on Decembrist activities. He was instrumental in the conviction of Pestuzhev. Diebitsch was given the title of count in 1829. He died during the Polish campaign after being afflicted by cholera.
December 7, 1825, Constantine ordered the immediate preparation of a dispatch to St. Petersburg which announced his earlier renunciation of the throne in favor of the Grand Duke Nicholas. Further, he protested his loyalty and devotion to the new Tsar, Nicholas I, and begged that in consideration of his thirty years' service he be allowed to retain his title and immediate military command in Poland. For three weeks, couriers traveled the wind-swept road between St. Petersburg and Warsaw to encourage Constantine to take the throne or travel to St. Petersburg and make a public reiteration of his abdication. The Grand Duke refused; he had decided against becoming the sovereign in 1822 with the approval of the late Emperor. He would not agree to make a public declaration at St. Petersburg because it would compromise the position of the new Emperor:

I cannot abdicate for I never was Emperor and never will be. Were I to come to St. Petersburg now, I would seem to be coming to enthrone my brother and I have no right to do that. Your invitation to arrive as soon as possible cannot be accepted.

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Couriers arrived in Warsaw daily with reports from Russian officialdom. Constantine would not accept their dispatches; he simply instructed the couriers that the messages were not for him and returned them to the Russian capital. Constantine resented the attempts by the Council of the Empire and the Russian Senate to place him on the throne. In his correspondence with his mother, he indicated his displeasure with the efforts of Russian officials in St. Petersburg:

I do not want to hear anything about the deeds of the council of the Empire or Senate. It is not from them that I received my right to the throne, but from my ancestors, and it was before them, and not too late, I renounced it. These gentlemen must not imagine they have the right to dispose of the Imperial crown at their pleasure. 4

Throughout the month of December, 1825, Constantine's letters to Nicholas bore heavily upon the theme of loyalty and devotion and a firm intention of refusing to accept the crown of Russia. 5 Furthermore, as late as January 7, 1826, in response to a request that he come to St. Petersburg, Constantine replied that there was no real assurance that the Decembrist uprising (December 14, 1825) was completed. He felt that his arrival in St. Petersburg could

5Sbornik, CXXXI, 21.
cause an additional outbreak of violence since his name had been compromised previously by the revolutionaries. 6

When the Grand Duke Nicholas received the news of the Emperor's death he immediately took an oath of allegiance to Constantine. His example was followed by the high officials of the Russian government. Nicholas did not receive Constantine's letter which contained his reiteration of the renunciation of the throne until December 8, 1825. Nicholas was displeased with Constantine's declaration because he felt that the nation would reject an illegal succession; therefore, he asked Constantine to reverse his decision as the Capital had already extended an oath of allegiance to him. Constantine refused, and Russia remained without a sovereign for twenty-five days. The Grand Duke Constantine assured Nicholas of the honesty of his statement and his intention to respect his earlier renunciation. The Grand Duke Nicholas finally accepted the throne on the night of December 13/25, 1825, following a long consultation with the President of the Russian Senate, Lapuchin. The Senate President convincingly argued that the late Emperor Alexander I had bequeathed Nicholas the role of Emperor of the Russian Empire; thus, in order to satisfy Imperial wishes and to

6Ibid., p. 20. For further details relative to the Decembrist uprising of December 14, 1825, see below, pp. 40–41.
halt the current confusion, he was obligated to accept the throne of the Russian Empire.

The First Russian Revolution

Throughout December, 1825, the Russian Empire was in a state of confusion. The throne stood empty for nearly three weeks. Constantine and Nicholas had “played with the crown of Russia, throwing it back and forth to each other as if it were an Indian rubber ball.”

When Nicholas ascended the throne the guards had already sworn allegiance to the Grand Duke Constantine. The guards remembered Constantine’s good qualities and kindness and conveniently forgot his less attractive characteristics. He had been their commander prior to his assumption of command in Poland. The Grand Duke Nicholas was, however, a present and immediate malicious spirit, and the guards appeared to dislike him intensely.

To add to this confusion, several rumors were being circulated among the general population. The Austrian Ambassador, Lebzeltern, wrote the following note to Metternich concerning the instability and restlessness in the Russian capital:

7Grunwald, p. 1. Also see Nesselrode, VI, 225-229.
8Grunwald, p. 38.
It is said that Constantine is held by the Poles; that he refuses the Imperial crown but demands the throne of Poland, annexing with it Lithuania, Volhynia and Podolia; that he expresses his contempt for the Russians by refusing their oaths of allegiance; by not coming to St. Petersburg and making no reply to any entreaty . . . .

On the other hand, a rumor is gaining ground that Constantine’s arrival in St. Petersburg is delayed by a conspiracy plotted in the palace. 9

Therefore, in spite of the Grand Duke Constantine’s reiteration of his renunciation of the throne and the subsequent ascension of Nicholas I, the guard regiments, led by the Moscow regiment, invaded the Senate Square at about 11:00 A.M., December 14, 1825, amidst cheers for the Grand Duke Constantine. The guards hoped to prevent the execution of oaths of allegiance to Nicholas by the high officials of the Empire. Thus, the standard of the rebellion bore the name of Constantine and his Polish bride. 10

The leaders of the Decembrist uprising really cared little for Constantine or his spouse; they had planned an armed uprising for several years. The circumstances involving the succession of an illegal monarch seemed to present them with an excellent issue to utilize in arousing the revolutionary ardour of the guards. A noted Decembrist leader, Bestuzhev, shows how efficiently the confusion

9 Ibid., p. 2.

10 The cry of the guards is reputed to have been "long live Constantine and long live his wife Constitutsia." This is a highly popular historical legend, but not supported by any documentary evidence. Ibid., p. 10.
surrounding the succession was utilized in inciting a
guard unit to join the uprising:

We have been deceived; Constantine himself
sends me to you. If you believe in God, you will
refuse to swear allegiance to any other sovereign
than the one you swore fidelity to twenty days
ago.\textsuperscript{11}

The Decembrists were interested, largely, in establishing
a new political system. Their intention was to reorganize
the Russian Empire, but their principles were hastily
prepared, and they failed to consider the political and
economic problems of nineteenth-century Russia. Paul
Pestel had completed plans for a constitution which was
to be called \textit{Rousskaia Pravda} (Russian Truth), even though
the Northern and Southern Societies had failed to agree
upon the type of government that would follow the completed
revolution.\textsuperscript{12} The Decembrist uprising was a tragic fail-
ure. It was without firm leadership; it was poorly

\textsuperscript{11}Grunwald, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{12}Paul Pestel (1793-1826) was the son of Ivan Pestel,
governor-general of Irkutsk, Siberia. Paul was born the
year of the downfall of Robespierre. He has been called
a Robespierre and a Jacobin. In the spring of 1810 he
entered the Pages corps at Dresden and established him-
self as a brilliant student. He served in the Russian-
French campaigns of 1813-1814 as an aide-de-camp to the
Russian commander-in-chief Wittgenstein. After the war,
he lived in Nijniy where he gained the acquaintance of
Alexander and Nikita Muraviev, his future comrades in re-
bellion. Pestel was strongly influenced by the works of
Rousseau, Voltaire and Diderot. He felt that mankind's
problems could be solved if only subjected to reason. He
wrote \textit{Rousskaia Pravda}, which was a code of law, and a con-
stitution. It provided for liberty for all, the
planned, and it suffered from a horrible lack of initiative. The insurgents were easily, yet brutally suppressed.

The Grand Duke Constantine first learned of the Decembrist revolt on December 20, 1825, when he received a pathetic letter from Nicholas I. The Grand Duke indicated shock and indignation at the uprising and its accompanying threat of effecting a political upheaval. Upon receiving news of the revolutionaries' plan to murder Nicholas, he hastily dispatched a letter in which he expressed both anger and amazement:

Good God! What a terrible thing to happen! This rabble was not content with an angel as their sovereign, they plotted against him! What do they want? It is horrible, frightful, dishonoring to them all. . . . Your conduct, dear brother, is sublime, but for Heaven's sake, think well, don't let your clemency carry you too far.  

Nicholas was grateful for such loyalty and fidelity from the one that he had displaced. Accordingly, in his counter-revolutionary mood, he extended to the Grand Duke Constantine the authority to effect all measures that he considered necessary to prevent the progress of the

emancipation of the peasants, land distribution, freedom of the press and communal properties. This brilliant figure of immense ability was the first to be hung on July 26, 1826. Grunwald, p. 55. Leonid Strakhovsky, L'empeureur Nicholas ler et l'esprit National Russe (Louvain: Librairie Universitaire, 1928), pp. 52-53.

13 For text of this letter see Sbornik, CXXXI, 4-5.

14 Ibid., 3-9. Also see Grunwald, p. 55.
revolutionary germ in Poland. The Polish kingdom was being implicated in the design to remove the Emperor.\textsuperscript{15} Constantine was quick to extend assurances that Warsaw was politically stable and free from any threat of revolutionary disturbance:

Here [Warsaw] everything is quiet and in indignation at the horrors of St. Petersburg; in order to combat all the gossip and prattling about the deplorable events, I have taken the measure to have translated into Polish an article from the St. Petersburg newspaper, pertaining to the affair, and have it inserted in the public papers here.\textsuperscript{16}

In anticipation of the accusations that were to follow, Constantine steadfastly defended the Poles and imploringly stated that there had been no physical Polish participation in the Russian uprising.\textsuperscript{17} Also, in spite of the subtle demands of Nicholas I, Constantine refused to impose any radical measures, or effect widespread arrests although he had received several anonymous letters which spoke of the existence of a Polish conspiracy with the Russian Decembrist.\textsuperscript{18} Had the Grand Duke Constantine chosen to conduct himself in a like manner during Novosiltsev's inquisition during 1823, he certainly would have gained

\textsuperscript{15}Sbornik, CXXXI, 26.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 29.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., pp. 22-23.
a greater measure of respect and loyalty from the Polish nation.

The Investigation at Warsaw

The unraveling of the Decembrist uprising exposed to Nicholas I the existence in Poland of the Patriotic Society. It was the Polish kingdom's leading underground movement. Evidence existed which indicated that it had communicated with the Russian societies in 1823. The Patriotic Society had established a liaison with the Polish societies at Wilno. It had branches in Courland, the southwestern districts of Poland, and in Volhynia. It was from Volhynia that the Patriotic Society established

19 The Poles began to form secret societies simultaneously with the formation of the "Congress Kingdom." They had developed from Polish freemasonry. Their earliest and most significant leader was Major Walerian Lukasinski. He tried to reorganize an older organization, True Poles, and in 1819 renamed it National Freemasons. Lukasinski wanted to unify all Polish soldiers in the Polish army. He was arrested in 1822 and stood trial before a military court-martial in January, 1824. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. He was in prison at the outbreak of the insurrection of 1830-1831 and was thus "immured in the underground cells of the Schlusselburg fortress," where he died in 1868. Szymon Askenazy, "Poland and the Polish Revolution," The Cambridge Modern History, ed. A. W. Ward et al. (13 vols.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1934), X, 454. Lieutenant General Severin Krzyzanowski succeeded Lukasinski as the head of the Patriotic Society of Poland. He inherited an efficient, well organized organization.

20 Ibid.

21 The Wilno societies have been discussed above, pp. 10-12.
contact with the Russian southern group. A meeting was held between Muraviev-Apostol, Bestuzhev, and the Polish patriot Lieutenant General Krzyzanowski to determine if the two groups could agree upon a common conspiracy. It is interesting to observe that the Polish representative at the gathering, Krzyzanowski, defended monarchical government, in spite of the Russian's insistence upon the formation of a republican form of government following the completion of the revolution. Also, when the Russians voiced the intention to murder the Tsar and requested that the Polish Society dispose of the Grand Duke Constantine, it was flatly rejected by Krzyzanowski: "Never had Poles stained their hands with the blood of their monarchs."22 Krzyzanowski subsequently withheld his signature from a document which was designed to signify unity between the two National Societies. Probably the most persistent obstacle to an agreement between the two groups was that circumstances prevented the Russian representatives from extending a guarantee relative to the restoration of the formerly Polish provinces of western Russia.23 Krzyzanowski's supporters were both youthful students and men of the thirty to forty year age group who had fought

22 Askenazy, loc. cit., p. 454.
23 Ibid., p. 457.
in the Napoleonic wars. They were uncompromising supporters of national unity and freedom. Vienna was to them the highest symbol of Polish degradation.

The trial of the Russian Decembrist and the resulting confessions established conclusively that a liaison had been established between the Russians and their Polish counterparts. Constantine stubbornly refused to initiate the inquisitorial measures desired by the Tsar. He informed Nicholas that all the Polish secret societies had been suppressed, their leadership stifled, and their organizational vigor ended in 1822. Further, he defended the Poles that were accused of complicity, and refused to place them under arrest because of the absence of conclusive evidence to establish their guilt. Constantine urged the Tsar to accept his conviction that Poland was politically stable. The Grand Duke attempted in vain to dissuade Nicholas I from attaching any faith in reports that were, in his opinion, "written under the mask of zeal, but intended solely to be malicious towards the Polish nation." An interesting problem is a consideration of whether the Grand Duke Constantine was honestly sympathetic with the Poles, or was he struggling to

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24 Sbornik, CXXI, 27.
25 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
preserve his position from the vengeful and reactionary onslaught of Nicholas I? Did he suspect that Nicholas might conveniently choose to use the evidence of a Polish conspiratorial link with the Russian Decembrist as a pretext for the destruction of the constitutional state of Poland? A measure of this nature would have destroyed the command and responsibility of the Grand Duke Constantine.  

Therefore, although it is reasonable to speculate that Constantine felt a measure of compassion for Poland, a nation which he had ruled for twelve years, it is the opinion of the writer that Constantine's primary consideration was, at this time, to protect his position of authority within the empire.

The Investigation at Warsaw

In the latter part of January, 1826, Nicholas I informed Constantine that the investigation of the Decembrist conspiracy and the depositions of Bestuzhev and Muraviev-Apostol had provided additional evidence of Polish participation in the December 14, 1825, uprising. Constantine persisted with his dogmatic defense of the Poles and insisted that they had not established an agreeable contact or cooperated with the Russian societies. The Grand Duke

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felt that the Russian conspirators simply wanted the Poles to share their culpability. 27 In spite of Constantine’s entreaty, Nicholas I was convinced of the complicity of the Patriotic Society of Poland. Therefore, he insisted upon an inquest at Warsaw to expose and punish the guilty Poles. The demand for an inquest encountered difficulty from its start. It subsequently aroused the wrath of the Polish people against their Russian ruler.

Nicholas I demanded the appointment of a secret inquiry which would render a speedy condemnation of all Poles implicated in the Russian uprising. Constantine opposed this unconstitutional proposal. He demanded respect for the Polish constitution. 28 He insisted upon the formation of a public commission of inquiry; he suggested that it should be composed of honest and esteemed Poles. 29 True to his prevailing disposition, he would not sanction immediate and arbitrary arrests. Furthermore, Constantine urged Nicholas to accept this proposal of instituting a public commission as a means of precluding Polish accusations of arbitrary and unconstitutional

27 Kukiel, p. 145.

28 This conduct of the Grand Duke is to be contrasted with his behavior during the earlier period of his reign when he showed little inclination to respect or observe the Polish constitution.

29 Sbornik, CXXXI, 49.
conduct by their Russian ruler. To buttress this position, the Grand Duke assured the Tsar that a Polish commission would be even more severe and rigid than the Russians or himself.\textsuperscript{30}

The proposal of the Grand Duke Constantine was accepted by Tsar Nicholas I. He informed Constantine that, in his opinion, the Grand Duke had suggested an excellent method of conducting the investigation, and expressed his confidence that the commission would exonerate the innocent and expose the guilty.\textsuperscript{31} In this instance, it appears that Nicholas was quite agreeable to constitutional procedures. He was confident that his desire for revenge would be satisfied. The Tsar misconstrued the degree of influence that Constantine enjoyed in Polish politics and public opinion; he failed to appreciate the magnitude of the courage of the Polish people.\textsuperscript{32} His hopes for a quick and complete redress were to be shattered.

The proceedings of the Polish commission of inquiry were tedious and slow. In February, 1826, Constantine reported that the investigating commission was realizing much success, and that Poles in general were pained to find

\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 55, 66.
\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}
fellow countrymen in union with Russian revolutionaries. 33 But, by the end of July, 1826, Nicholas was becoming impatient with the inability of the Polish commission to complete the inquest. Constantine assured Nicholas that the commission was completing its task as rapidly as possible. 34

The Polish commission of inquiry completed its task the first week of November, 1825, and submitted its findings on January 3, 1827. Only eight Poles were indicted. Constantine explained, in alarm, to Nicholas I that he had created the commission of inquiry without interviewing the appointees; therefore, in his opinion, he could not be held responsible for the political dispositions of the commission's members. 35 Further, he offered to transport the Poles that were indicted to St. Petersburg for a trial; a Russian court under the influence of Nicholas would have delivered a speedy condemnation.

The President of the High National Court extricated both the Tsar and Grand Duke from an untenable position, as he balked at the proposal of sending Poles to the Russian city for a trial. An act of this nature would have

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33 Ibid., p. 53.

34 At the same time, the progress of the commission of inquiry was seriously impeded by the inability to locate informants and prime suspects. Ibid., p. 87.

35 Ibid., p. 113.
constituted a direct and blatant disregard of the Polish kingdom's constitution and its judicial laws.\textsuperscript{36} Constantine quickly agreed that the president of the Senate had made a valid criticism. The Grand Duke felt that both constitutional law and tradition made it imperative to conduct the trial of the accused in Polish courts. Nicholas I concurred; he indicated, also, that he wanted a sentence similar to that rendered by the Russian court at the trial of the Decembrist.\textsuperscript{37}

The Trial at Warsaw and the Beginning of Active Discontent

On August 18, 1827, a court of the Polish Diet was appointed to hear the case of the Poles who had been indicted by the commission of inquiry for participation and association in the Russian uprising of December 14, 1825. The officers of the court made an auspicious start by conducting a pre-trial investigation. They reviewed

\textsuperscript{36}Constantine emphasized to Nicholas that the entire country realized that Russian courts did not permit public hearings or defense of the accused. Poland's laws required lawyers for the defendants as well as the prosecutor.

\textit{Ibid.}, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{37}Of the Russian Decembrist, 121 were found guilty and placed on trial. The soldiers, approximately 700, were reassigned to remote and isolated duty stations. Five of the Decembrists were executed: Pestel, Ryliev, Bestuzhev, Kokhorski, and Muraviev-Apostol. Twenty were sentenced to life imprisonment and the remainder received sentences ranging from twenty years' imprisonment to degradation. Grunwald, p. 67.
the findings of the commission of inquiry. Constantine displayed anger at their proceedings as he related to Nicholas that "a rebellious senatorial delegation arranged for a new construction of statements and trial declarations."³⁸ The Grand Duke complained that a member of the above delegation, Michael Radziwill, was sending dispatches relative to their activities to Polish officials at Grodno.³⁹ His concern over Radziwill’s activities grew from the fact that Grodno was infested with secret societies.

In spite of the Grand Duke’s irritation, the Polish court conducted its trial deliberately and in strict compliance with the Polish kingdom’s constitution. It was not until May, 1828, that the Grand Duke announced that the trial was near completion. The castellan Bienkowski

³⁸ The court of the Diet did not recognize the commission of inquiry’s findings, as they were not satisfied that the commission was a constitutionally instituted body. Sbornik, CXXXI, 174.

³⁹ Two years earlier, the Grand Duke had rejected the claim that secret societies existed in Poland. Michael-Geron Radziwill (1773-1850) served in the army of independence under Kosciuszko. In 1812, he marched against the Russians at the head of a Polish regiment and conducted himself brilliantly at Smolensk, Vitebsk, and Polotsk and was made a Brigadier General by Napoleon. In 1815 he was promoted to Lieutenant General of the Polish army. During the revolution of 1830-1831, he became Generalissimo of the Polish army. He followed the dictator General Joseph Chlopiński in that office, but did not enjoy the supreme power of the latter. After the fall of Warsaw, Radziwill was transported into the interior of Russia, where he remained a prisoner until 1836.
had just delivered a long summation in which he attempted
to prove the innocence of the accused. Bienkowski con-
sumed eight hours in delivering his arguments. He was
successful. The decision rendered by the court of the
Polish Diet stated that the members of the Polish Patriotic
Society were not guilty of high treason in the meaning of
the Polish constitution. Mild sentences were given for
participation in an illegal society and not informing the
government of the existence of the Russian movement. The
most prominent Polish defendant was Lieutenant General
Severin Krzyzanowski. He was sentenced to three years'
imprisonment. The others were given less severe penal-
ties. 40 The decision of the court was rendered by a vote
of thirty-nine to one. General Krasinski was the lone
dissenting voice. 41 The ruling made a spectacular impact
upon the Polish political scene. Constantine went into a
rage and immediately proposed to Nicholas the transfer of
the accused Poles to St. Petersburg for a new trial. The
Grand Duke felt that the court had violated imperial

40 Kukiel, p. 147. See also Askenazy, loc. cit., p.
457.

41 Vincent Krasinski (1782-1858) was a commander of
Polish cavalry under Napoleon. Afterwards, he entered the
service of Russia where he became a General of the Cavalry
and later a member of the Polish Council of State. He
remained faithful to the Tsar during the insurrection of
1830-1831.
confidence, neglected its constitutional duty, absolved criminals, and overruled the findings of the commission of inquiry.\footnote{Sbornik, CXXXI, 257. Marcelli Handelsman, "The Polish Kingdom, 1815-1830," The Cambridge History of Poland, 1697-1935, ed. W. F. Reddaway et al. (2 vols.; Cambridge: at the University Press, 1951), II, 293.}

The reaction of Constantine must be considered mild when compared to the cold anger of Tsar Nicholas I. He asked "Is it possible to push impudence and blindness much further?"\footnote{Ibid.} He authorized Constantine to send the accused Poles to St. Petersburg for a retrial.\footnote{Ibid.} He felt that the President of the court deserved condemnation for treason.\footnote{Ibid.} He ordered the Administrative Council and the Council of State to review the Polish Court's ruling and declare whether the court of the Diet had not committed a crime against the state. Furthermore, he addressed the Senate directly by letter. He informed it that it had lost the confidence of the Grand Duke Constantine, and that those individuals that had been judged by the Polish Court of the Diet were to be brought before

\footnote{Voyvode Peter Bielinski was the president of the court. He was well liked by his associates, but he was old and constantly sick. Thus, he depended upon Czartoryski for his decisions and argumentative presentations. Kukiel, p. 146.}
the Russian courts for a proper judgment. Constantine concurred with the Tsar's views and expressed his opinion that the Senate and the court deserved punishment. However, Constantine concluded, the President of the court could not be tried by the same court which had subscribed to his opinion. He reasoned that if the court placed the President of the court of the Diet on trial and failed to deliver a condemnation, it would become necessary to try his judges. The Grand Duke thus felt that the most expedient course of action was to reprimand the Senate severely, suspend the Polish court's verdict, and conduct a new trial of the defendants in a special Russian court.

The course of action outlined by the Grand Duke was not accepted completely. As a result, Nicholas I was once more exposed to measures of veiled insubordination and embarrassment from his Polish subjects. The Administrative Council and Council of State refused to condemn the verdict of the Court of the Diet or its president, in spite of the Tsar's instructions. The Minister of Finance, Prince Xavier Lubecki, forwarded a defense of the court and its officials to Nicholas I. Lubecki was firmly supported by Count Ignatius Sobolewski, who was the chairman

46 Sbornik, CXXXI, 257.
47 Kukiel, p. 148.
of the Council of State. Following the refusal of the
Administrative Council and Council of State to effect the
desired condemnations, Nicholas I ordered Lubecki and
Sobolewski to appear before the Grand Duke Constantine.
The Grand Duke reprimanded them severely for their con-
duct. Count Sobolewski was informed by the Grand Duke
that the Sovereign was extremely displeased with his weak-
hearted efforts in his official capacity. Lubecki was the
victim of a similar rebuke, but he craftily defended his
support of the court as expounded in his report to Nich-
olás. 48 The Grand Duke decided to retain these two Polish
officials in the government, in spite of his nominal free-
dom to make removals.

On January 6, 1829, Nicholas I proceeded to organize
a Russian court of the Senate to review the Polish court’s
proceedings. The Russian court consisted of Kochubey,
Tolstoy, Golitzyn, Vasilshchikov, Speransky, Nesselrode
and General Diebitsch. 49 The Tsar instructed the Russian
court to pronounce against the accused and the Polish
court of the Diet, which held original jurisdiction, in
the severest manner possible. The Russian court reported
to the Tsar on February 20, 1829, with the following find-
ings:

48 Constantine was obviously displeased about the re-
port which Lubecki had forwarded to Nicholas concerning the
affair, for in this document Lubecki accused the Grand Duke
of “seeing revolt in every Pole.” Shornik, CXXXI, 294.
49 Ibid., p. 291.
The Court of the Senate, without a dissenting vote, has condemned all the conspirators; some of the senators have accused the defendants of things which did not appear in the original charges. 50

The court of the Russian Senate agreed that the accused Polish defendants were guilty of high treason. They increased the number of charges against the defendants, but also sponsored a request for a pardon on behalf of one of the accused, Prince Jablonski. Following the rendition of the Russian court's review, which constituted a reversal of the Polish court's verdict, the Tsar delivered his final decision relative to the Polish trial. He confirmed the Polish court's decision, but he ordered two defendants, Lieutenant General Severin Krzyzanowski and Andrew Plichota, transferred to St. Petersburg to stand trial in a Russian court. 51 The remaining defendants were released in compliance with the Polish court's ruling.

Significantly, Nicholas was responsive to Polish public opinion. The very lenient court decision was allowed to stand. The Tsar realized that he had antagonized the Polish nation by his arbitrary conduct relative to the proceedings in the Polish court. In fairness to Nicholas I, the

50 Ibid., p. 318.

51 Krzyzanowski was deported to Siberia, where he died in 1832. With his arrest and departure, the Patriotic Society ceased to exist.
it must be said that he was overly sensitive to the possibility of uprisings. Had not his reign begun with an insurrection and bloody violence? He was thereafter constantly concerned about rebellion and civil disturbances.

Throughout the months of February and March, 1829, Nicholas I indicated anxiety relative to the sentiments of the Polish public. He questioned the Grand Duke Constantine constantly about the state of public opinion and its reaction to the Russian judicial decision. Constantine's characteristic reply was that "the most disturbing reaction has occurred among the youth, insignificant civilian employees, and students." Constantine's reply predicted in part the future ingredients of Polish insurrectionism. It was a group partially fitting the above description that attacked the Grand Duke's palace residence on the night of November 29, 1830.

It is interesting to note that Constantine defended steadfastly the Polish constitutional procedures throughout most of the crisis. It is tragic that the Poles did not recognize and accept the obvious change and sincerity of the unfortunate Russian Grand Duke. Their wisest course of action would have been to have formed an alliance with Constantine, who was at least respected and accepted as

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52 Sbornik, CXXXI, 323.
an equal in the Russian Empire by the Tsar. The Poles were blinded, unfortunately, by the Grand Duke's meaningless and superficial demand for a more severe penalty for the alleged conspirators. The Polish leaders overlooked or ignored the possibility that Constantine was motivated simply by a desire to placate the wrath of Nicholas with a view to protecting what remained of Polish constitutional freedom and government. The Poles were unable to overcome the force of their nationalistic fervor. The entire incident was a giant step in the direction of the tragic insurrection of 1830-1831. It was obvious in March, 1829, that a wide chasm had developed between the Polish nation and their Russian ruler, which defied bridging.

53 Kukiel, p. 150.

54 Paradoxically, in a letter written seven months prior to the rendition of the Polish court's decision, Constantine predicted the actual outcome of the conspirator's case. Furthermore, he signified agreement with this anticipated verdict. This substantiates the suspicion that the Grand Duke agreed with the decision, but felt duty bound to bring pressure to bear for a sentence less in the interest of his position and Polish constitutional freedom. Sbornik, CXXXI, 205. Kukiel, p. 150.

55 Askenazy, loc. cit., p. 458.
CHAPTER IV
CONSTANTINE'S ATTEMPTS TO REALIZE THE
GOALS ESTABLISHED BY ALEXANDER I

The Change in Constantine's Character

In the early years of his reign Nicholas's attitude toward Poland was largely determined by his deference to his elder brother Constantine. The Grand Duke urged the Tsar to continue the policies and intentions of Alexander I in the "Congress Kingdom."¹

Constantine was one of the few subordinates in the Russian government who was granted a large measure of political independence. The Grand Duke was extended such enormous respect, as during the trial of the Polish Decembrist, that he appeared at times to be the superior of the Tsar.²

The Grand Duke Constantine's elevation in stature permitted him to question imperial policy measures and to criticize the Tsar.³ In addition to his favorable position

³Sbornik, CXXXI, 205, 328-329.
within the government of the Russian empire, Constantine was becoming increasingly loyal to the Polish nation. Constantine's marriage to the Polish Countess Grudzinska seemed to cause a pleasant change in the Grand Duke's character and disposition. By 1825, his eleven years' residence in Warsaw appeared to have drawn him closer to the Polish people; it impressed upon him his responsibility to the "Congress Kingdom" which he had been appointed to rule. Constantine became sensitive about Polish rights and his duty to protect the Polish constitution. The following commentary describes the sentiments of the Grand Duke Constantine and emphasizes his changing national and political posture:

The Czarvitch [Tsarevich] evaded engaging himself in questions which touched upon the Government but in turn he opposed Nicholas's interference in the interior administration of Poland. The Emperor maintained a delicate appreciation of the ideas of Constantine and approved nearly all of his governmental proposals.

Nevertheless, the Grand Duke Constantine could not make any significant advancement towards the realization of the objectives and goals of Alexander I. Constantine could not change the reactionary trend of Nicholas's attitude towards Poland, even though he may have desired more liberal policies. Constantine managed Poland's

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*Riasanovsky, pp. 37-38.*
political and administrative affairs, but he discharged his duties in consistency with the conservative governmental ideals which guided Nicholas I.

Nicholas was not accessible to liberal ideas. He had not enjoyed the same type education that was given to his two elder brothers, Alexander and Constantine. Thus he received little training in politics and social theory. Nicholas was given a military uniform, and commissioned an officer of the guards at the age of three. A very significant part of his education was entrusted to an inept teacher, General von Lamzdorf, who contributed little towards Nicholas's moral and intellectual development.

Nicholas I has become quite famous for his conviction relative to the divine mission of the absolute monarch. Poland was simply, in his opinion, a country which the Russians had subjugated. He did not have the immediate courage in 1825 or again in 1829 to destroy the Polish constitution entirely, but he revealed his sentiments towards the Polish kingdom: The Polish constitution represented the liberalism of the Russian Tsar. It was not a

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natural right of the Polish people and it could be withdrawn. This creed was a dagger pointed at the heart of the "Congress Kingdom." It becomes less difficult to comprehend the fears experienced by the Grand Duke Constantine from 1825 to 1831.

The relationship of the imperial brothers in Poland is highlighted by the disputed coronation ceremony at Warsaw, the attempted settlement of the Lithuanian problem, and the expressed designs of Nicholas upon the Grand Duke Constantine's Polish army. One will discern in the following pages a measure of victory for the conservatism of Nicholas I over the increasingly liberal and Polish inclinations of the Grand Duke Constantine.

The Coronation at Warsaw

The Grand Duke Constantine requested an immediate coronation ceremony early in the reign of Nicholas I. This request was consistent with the provisions of the Polish constitution. At the time of the Grand Duke's entreaty, the trial of the Polish conspirators was still in progress. Therefore, the Tsar was not inclined to have the coronation ceremony until the court had completed its task. Furthermore, the Tsar did not feel that a ceremony in Warsaw was necessary. In his opinion, such a

7Sbornik, CXXXI, 78-79.
ceremony would simply represent the repetition of an act previously completed in Russia. Following an enormous disputation between Constantine and Nicholas, a tentative agreement was reached to crown the Polish king at Warsaw as required by the Polish charter. However, following the completion of the preliminary arrangements, another impasse developed. It was a problem involving both national tradition and religion. Nicholas did not wish to participate in a Catholic coronation ceremony. The Grand Duke Constantine courageously insisted upon a religious service and the singing of the Te Deum. He felt that an act of this nature would prove to the Polish people that the Tsar was without prejudice against Catholics of the Polish kingdom. The Catholic ceremony would be an expression of the Emperor's tolerant and protective spirit. Constantine made, in a very eloquent fashion, the following comment to the Tsar relative to his religious obligations to his Polish subjects: "God has called you to reign over a people of another rite; it is your responsibility to protect and respect their faith." Also, he reminded Nicholas of the precedents established by Alexander I, and warned the Tsar that it was imperative that the ceremony be conducted in the manner he had suggested. Nicholas I finally

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8 Ibid., p. 336.
9 Ibid., pp. 328-329.
signified agreement with Constantine and the ceremony was conducted at Warsaw in March, 1829.

The manner in which the coronation ceremony was actually carried out reflected the sentiments of Nicholas toward the Polish people. The coronation was not held in the Cathedral of St. Alexander, as planned, but in the ceremonial hall of the Senate. The Catholic Archbishop was not permitted to serve in his traditional capacity; his role was subordinated to that of the Tsar. Nicholas crowned himself, took the sceptre and diadem from the cleric and knelt and read the oath of allegiance in French.\(^{10}\) The crown was not the old crown of Poland, but a new one which had been sent from St. Petersburg for the coronation of a Polish king! The Archbishop's ceremonial prayers were by-passed, and the singing of the *Te Deum* was completely ignored.\(^{11}\)

Thus, Nicholas made it obvious to Constantine and the Polish nation that he was not only suspicious, but also disrespectful of their nationality and its institutions. In spite of his protestations, he was not really willing

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to accept the separate existence of the "Congress Kingdom." Nicholas had refused deliberately to accept the crown and its authority from the Polish people in accordance with established laws and traditions.

The precedents established by Emperor Alexander I were due for constant reversal by this most absolute of monarchs, Tsar Nicholas I.

**Lithuania: A Forgotten Pledge**

The promises of Alexander I to the Polish people relative to the reunion of Lithuania to the Polish kingdom received even less respect from Nicholas I than the constitutional obligation for the crowning of the Polish king at Warsaw. Constantine lost little time in reminding the new Tsar of the assurances delivered by the deceased Emperor, Alexander I, concerning the projected restoration of Greater Poland. The Grand Duke emphasized the illegal and disgraceful nature of the eighteenth century reduction of the Polish state:

There is not a Pole, regardless of his opinions, who does not firmly believe that his country was plundered and not conquered by the Empress Catherine during the three partitions. This shameful larceny will eventually backfire on the nation that sponsored the crime.  

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12 See below, p. 68.

13 *Sbornik*, CXXXI, 205. Also see Kukiel, p. 147.
Nicholas I replied emphatically to the Grand Duke Constantine that a reunification of the "Congress Kingdom" and Lithuania was beyond the realm of possibility:

I will never agree to the reunion of Lithuania to Poland because it would be dangerous to the Empire's stability. I will be a good Pole and a good Russian, but I cannot suffer anything that would prove detrimental to the royal domain. I cannot nourish or even less encourage the idea of their ever being rejoined.14

Nicholas was attempting to impress upon Constantine the realization that although he was a Russian Tsar as well as a Polish King, he felt that if he supported the annexation of Lithuania to Poland the Russian people would be dangerously aroused at the loss of their western provinces.15

Constantine's despondency and sense of defeat is painfully expressed in a letter of November 5, 1827. He appears to accept this last disclosure of the Emperor's views on the lost provinces as the death stroke to Polish hopes for the long desired restoration of their former kingdom: "As to the political opinions of the late Emperor and yourself relating to the Polish problem, my part is not to be the judge, but to comply with your orders."16 It is evident that although Constantine weakly defended

14 Sbornik, CXXXI, 184.
15 Kukiel, p. 146.
16 Sbornik, CXXXI, 187.
the Polish cause in this instance, the policies and objectives of Alexander were undergoing further revision. The reality must not be lost that even Alexander I had not been willing to risk the restoration of these territories to their rightful owner. He was fearful, also, of a dangerous reaction within Russia. Many Russians were already resentful that the Polish people had been given a liberal constitution, and the animosity which grew from the destructive Polish collaboration with Napoleon in the Russian campaign had not subsided.

Constantine's Struggle to Retain Control of the Polish Army

The Polish army was the most treasured possession of the Grand Duke Constantine. The Tsar admired its military efficiency and felt that it was the most important institution in the "Congress Kingdom." Nicholas made several attempts to usurp Constantine's control of the Polish army. It was a highly trained body of men; it would have been an excellent instrument of repression for the "Policeman of Europe," as Nicholas came to be known.

One of Nicholas's earliest causes of discomfort was the presence of Polish troops on Russian soil in the provincial regions of Volhynia, Podolia, Bialystok and Minsk.  

17Kukiel, p. 143.
He feigned the fear that the end result would be the Polinization of the borderland regions of western Russia.\textsuperscript{19} Nicholas proposed that certain changes be made in the five provinces in which Alexander had granted the Grand Duke military jurisdiction. Constantine was to surrender the recruits from Wilno and Podolia in exchange for those of Pskov and Tver (present-day Kalinin). The recruits from Wilno and Podolia would thereafter be assigned to the Russian military units east of Moscow. The Grand Duke revolted at this proposal. He wanted to maintain control and recruiting privileges in all areas previously assigned to him by Emperor Alexander I. Constantine argued that the men of Pskov and Tver were poor soldiers and lacked military spirit. He did not wish to sacrifice outstanding men for an inferior caliber of soldier who was extremely unfit for military service. But, in spite of the efforts of Constantine to prevent the institution of Nicholas's proposal, the changes were made.\textsuperscript{20} Consequently, Constantine's efforts toward securing recruits for his Lithuanian corps were limited to the provinces of Grodno, Minsk, and Volhynia. The Grand Duke received the provinces of Pskov and Tver, which were completely Russian areas, for the Tsar's levy of recruits from Wilno and Podelia.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20}Askenazy, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 460.
The primary cause for the avid interest of the Tsar in the Polish army was its brilliant military record and its history of outstanding combat effectiveness. The Russian army seemed to suffer from chronic unpreparedness and insufficient training. Nicholas I complained constantly of unit shortages within his army, recruiting problems and lack of adequate finances to maintain an effective military force on a war footing. Therefore, Nicholas subtly tried to seize control of a portion of the Polish army by proposing that the numerical compliment of Polish squadrons be reduced from twenty-eight to twenty. The intention of the Tsar was to gain the surplus of eight officers and soldiers from each squadron for reassignment to purely Russian units.

Constantine was constantly apprehensive about the seizure of his troops or their commitment to military action. He opposed, outright, the use of Polish troops in foreign countries. He felt that deployment in this manner would certainly result in his army's decimation by a ferocious enemy, probably a reference to the Turkish soldiers. This expression was consistent with

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21Sbornik, CXXXI, 62.

22The Tsar was conducting a costly campaign against the Turks in support of the Greek revolution "one of the exciting legacies of the French revolution." Russian interest in the revolt stemmed from her activities in
Constantine's sentiments about war: "I do not like war; it spoils soldiers, it soils their uniforms and destroys discipline."\(^{23}\)

A letter from Nicholas during the Turkish campaign of 1828 substantiated Constantine's forboding. The Tsar announced that the Russian army had recently suffered the loss of 5,000 men at the battle of Brailow. He requested that the Grand Duke reinforce his forces with one division of infantry and one division of cavalry from the Polish army. The Grand Duke had placed himself unwittingly in a compromising position; he had proclaimed a short while earlier that his army was highly trained, well equipped and adequately prepared to defend the borders of the "Congress Kingdom" against any invading force. Nevertheless, when the Tsar requested Polish reinforcements for the Turkish front, Constantine balked. He was dismayed at the terrible losses that had been suffered by the Russian troops in battle against the Turks. He criticized the Tsar's blundering battle tactics. Nicholas had an


\(^{23}\)Riasanovsky, p. 37.
excessive tendency to order frontal assaults by Russian soldiers. Constantine felt that attacks of this nature were too costly. Furthermore, he indicated that it would be impossible to dispatch the Polish troops in less than four to five months.\textsuperscript{24} It was difficult to buy horses for transporting the army. Also, Constantine was hampered by the fact that he was training several new divisions and they were not prepared for combat. Constantine voiced concern that an immediate departure of Polish troops to reinforce the Russian forces opposing the Turks would cause Europe to feel that Russian losses were so heavy that the Tsar was reduced to desperation in his quest for additional troops to stem the tide of a Turkish victory.\textsuperscript{25} Constantine felt that an impression of this nature would make the Russian Empire appear unsteady and vulnerable to attack. Equally significant, the Grand Duke made it clear that he had no intention of traveling with the army to fight in a Russian war. He was responsible for the conduct of affairs at Warsaw; he would not run the risk of losing the respect of his military personnel

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{The Tsar had advised the Grand Duke that it was imperative that the Polish troops embark at once as he needed them within one month, which was the approximate travel time required by a military unit to reach the theater of combat. Shornik, CXXXI, 238.}

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Tbid., p. 246.}
by remaining in Poland while his soldiers embarked to
fight in a Russian war:

I have been with the Polish army for thirteen
years; what would they think of me if they were to
depart in peacetime for danger and war and I re-
main behind.26

The implication of this statement was that if the
Grand Duke Constantine could not participate in the Turk-
ish war, then neither could his army.

The expressed refusal of Constantine to quit his Wars-
saw post proved to be the concluding argument against the
commitment of Polish troops in Nicholas's war. Silence
enveloped the affair. Nicholas did not make any further
demands for the embarkation of Polish troops for the
Turkish front.27

The Grand Duke's reluctance to commit his Polish
forces to a Russian war precluded the possibility of ef-
fecting a more harmonious union of the Polish and Rus-
sian people; it represented the loss of an excellent op-
portunity to remove a measure of the stigma attached to
the participation of Poles in Napoleon's invasion of Rus-
sia. The Polish forces had fought fiercely and with valor

26 Ibid., p. 240.

27 Constantine did send a group of four officers to
observe the action and serve in various capacities. One
of the Polish officers, Colonel Hauke, continued as the
side-de-camp of Nicholas I throughout the Polish insur-
rection of 1830-1831. Ibid., p. 261.
in that action, especially at Smolensk where they were long-remembered by the populace. Constantine recognized the favorable effect a joint military operation would have had upon Polish-Russian relations, but he could not risk the loss of his army. He understood that the Tsar did not accept the existence of a constitutional state within his autocratic empire. Constantine's fears were justified by the events of the period following the end of the insurrection. When the Polish army was neutralized and their commander-in-chief removed by an untimely death, the regressive nature of Nicholas ran its course and the constitutional Polish kingdom crumbled into ruin.

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CHAPTER V

NATIONAL INSURRECTION

Prelude to Revolution

It appears that from the birth of the "Congress Kingdom" its constitutional guarantees which were proclaimed at Warsaw in November, 1815, by Alexander I were consistently violated, deliberately or inadvertently, by the kingdom's Russian rulers. The era had arrived in the early months of 1830 for the preparation of the destruction of this artificial kingdom, which had been created by the world powers at Vienna on June 9, 1815. The kingdom was destroyed indeed, but history rendered a decision against the Polish people and their Polanized ruler, the Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich.

The drift towards an outright break with Russia and insurrectionary violence had become apparent as early as 1828-1829 with the final disposition of the Polish Patriotic Society. Following the completion of the Polish conspiracy trial, the Patriotic Society and its official organization were destroyed. Its destruction was consequential, for a new underground movement was established among the students at the Officers' Training school in
Warsaw.\(^1\) Constantine was aware of this development, as he related to the Tsar on June 25, 1829, that "the revolutionary germs in Poland had not been snuffed out. They were simply quiescent and awaiting an opportune moment to explode."\(^2\)

The French Revolution of 1830 and Its Repercussions in Poland

In 1829, the general atmosphere of western Europe was rife with discontent and revolutionary notions. During a western tour in September, 1829, the Grand Duke Constantine was appalled by the public unrest in France. He observed revolutionary ferment in the army and the press. The newspapers appeared scandalous to a Russian because of their expressed hostility towards the King of France, Charles X.

Nicholas I was aware of the rapidly deteriorating conditions in France. He was apprehensive about the conduct of Charles X. He told Diebitsch "the measures of the government [French] make me tremble for the consequences. . . . it is cruel to have to say it; but it is the folly of the King who is the cause of this." Russia was bound


by treaty obligations to support Charles X and the French institutions. Nicholas expressed his forboding as he told the Austrian Ambassador "I assure you I am very grieved and very anxious. For after all, our treaties pledge us to support the institutions given to France, and what support can we give the King if he is the first to violate them."³

Therefore, it is clear that Nicholas was not surprised when he first learned of the July Revolution at Paris in 1830. He felt that the overthrow of Charles X was justified by the French king's foolish immoderation and disregard of his oath to preserve French institutions. He did not feel, however, that the monarchy would not be saved.

Nicholas I's realistic approach to the French problem and the subsequent revolution was cast aside when Louis Philippe mounted the throne of France. In spite of his understanding that Charles X had sponsored his own destruction, Nicholas was not prepared to condone a usurper. He recognized the weaknesses of Charles X, but he could not approve of the unauthorized action of the revolutionaries. He cast aside a realistic policy in favor of "an abstract principle and the rights of a child defrauded of his inheritance."⁴

⁴Ibid.
The Russian Tsar began to fear that once again the French nation was planning to proclaim her mission of liberating the enslaved nations of Europe. A French policy of this nature could affect the Russian Empire. France had helped Poland previously and perhaps she would do so again. Nicholas began to consider crushing the French Revolution; the Polish army, supplemented by Prussian arms, could lead the counter-revolution.

When the news of the French uprising reached the Grand Duke Constantine he reminded Nicholas of the disturbing conditions which he had observed a year earlier, during his sojourn in the West. In spite of Constantine's alarm in 1829, nothing had been done by Nicholas or the powers to halt the drift toward a rebellion. Constantine related sorrowfully that "after twenty-five years of insurrection [1789-1815] France has set the world back forty-one years with bloodshed. They failed to recognize the generosity of Russia even when they were at their knees at the end of the Napoleonic wars." The Grand Duke showed grave concern as he submitted a request for copies of daily reports concurrently with St. Petersburg in order to eliminate the twelve to fourteen day delay in his receipt of dispatches. He would thus be able to remain

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6Sbornik, CXXXII, 34-35.
constantly on guard and in a state of preparedness for emergency situations.

It is interesting to note that Nicholas did not dash recklessly into a crusading war against France. He showed a great deal of caution and discretion in the early part of August, 1830. He confided to the Grand Duke at Warsaw that "L'Orleans shall never be more than an infamous usurper, but all of these developments do not give us the right to intervene with force; our opposition shall be moral. But if revolutionary France thinks of recovering her ancient frontiers our duty will change completely from moral to violent physical opposition." But by mid-October, Nicholas was acting with the purpose of waging war. He had become alarmed by threatened revolutionary explosions in Italy, Spain and Belgium. The early measures of the Tsar were mild. He ordered the Governor General of the Port of Kronstadt to refuse entrance to all French vessels bearing the tricolor. He informed Baron Bourgoing that he would be issued a passport for departure from St. Petersburg as his plan was to break diplomatic relations with France. An interview between Nicholas

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7Ibid., p. 36.
8Sbornik, CXXXII, 36. Also see Morley, loc. cit., p. 410.
9Morley, loc. cit., p. 408.
and the Baron prevented a severance of diplomatic ties.\textsuperscript{10}

The most noteworthy actions of Tsar Nicholas I, however, pertain to Constantine's Poland. Nicholas ordered the acting Polish Secretary of State to contact the Polish Minister of Finance Lubecki so that he could be informed of the financial status of the Polish kingdom.\textsuperscript{11} This measure was completed to determine what contribution a Russian offensive effort could expect from Poland. Nicholas ordered Constantine to cancel all leaves of absence of his military personnel and also advise St. Petersburg on the operational status and location of the Lithuanian Corps. Further, he suggested that "certain troops be assigned to such strategic points as Warsaw and Zamosc."\textsuperscript{12}

Constantine became alarmed at the Emperor's revelation of his intention to march westward. The Grand Duke felt that inasmuch as the powers had not acted to prevent the development of the revolution, the following measures would be more prudent: (1) recall all Russian subjects abroad, (2) prevent the entry of all French citizens until you have discovered their political posture, (3) continue to receive all ships flying the tri-color, as to do otherwise meant to

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p. 408.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid. See also Sbornik, CXXXII, 37.

\textsuperscript{12}Morley, loc. cit., p. 408.
declare war, and war would be imprudent at that time, (4) wait and see what our allies are going to do; do not go headlong into war before determining what course of action they will choose. Constantine felt that any other course of action could cause Russia to become isolated from her friends. As to the military preparations which had been requested by the Tsar, Constantine was reluctant as ever to commit his army to foreign wars. The impediments to Polish mobilization were similar to those which prevented dispatching his army to the Turkish front in 1829. The Grand Duke complained that horses were not available and that he was in the process of recruiting 4,000 new soldiers and the new personnel would not be ready for combat until about January 10, 1831. Further, he refused to agree to cancel furloughs which had been scheduled previously, as he did not wish to cause a serious problem of morale. Ominously, the Grand Duke Constantine warned Nicholas on August 13, 1830, that in spite of the Tsar's overwhelming interest in western European problems, there was cause for concern with conditions within the Russian Empire. Constantine was aware of the existence of the underground movement in Poland

\footnote{Sbornik, CXXXII, 38-40.}

which was agitating for an uprising. He reminded Nicholas that many promises remained unexecuted relative to the restoration of Greater Poland, especially with regards to Lithuania. In the same dispatch, the Grand Duke tempered his expression of concern over Polish conditions as he ended by assuring the Tsar that the majority of the Polish population desired peace and civil order, and that it was only the lawyers, judges, students and youthful army officers that were attempting to upset the social order which existed in Poland. Constantine felt that the Tsar's primary consideration should be with the Russian Empire:

You are the ruler and master of an immense empire and your first duty is to conciliate the interests of your subjects. . . . Leave France to herself with all her germs of disorder and she will soon be embroiled in a Civil War. . . . that is unless they first become involved in a foreign war which would serve to unite them in defense of their country.

Nicholas I was not to be deterred. Revolutionary activity was on the upsurge as the discontented began to stir in Belgium. Also, the riots in France on October 18, 1830, and the withdrawal of the less radical members from the French Cabinet on November 2, 1830, were for Nicholas

\footnote{Sbornik, CXXXII, 42-43. This is the boldest reference I have observed Constantine make relative to the Lithuanian problem.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 51.}
conclusive proof that revolutionary ardor had not subsided. Therefore, the tempo of Nicholas’s determination to halt all revolutions experienced a decided resurgence. He made strong attempts to gain the cooperation of the other powers, but London, Vienna, and Berlin extended diplomatic recognition to the new French government. Nicholas was confounded by their acts of recognition. He decided that he had to assume complete responsibility to prevent a recurrence of the events of the Napoleonic era and thus moved to effect a general mobilization of the Empire’s military forces.

The Grand Duke Constantine tried to curtail imperial measures which would effect the administration of the "Congress Kingdom" of Poland. The Emperor's plans would effect, eventually, his position of authority at Warsaw which he guarded jealously as his own preserve in accordance with the power extended to him during the lifetime of Alexander I. The Grand Duke’s attitude toward war, especially foreign entanglements, has been amplified above. It appears that Constantine’s lack of a bellicose spirit

\[17\] Morley, *loc. cit.*, p. 408. At this time Cholera was at the gates of Moscow. Nicholas and Russian officials were in a state of confusion, as nearly 1,000 Russians had died by October 6, 1830, as a result of this disease which had been returned by the Russian armies which had participated in the Turkish campaign. *Sbornik*, CXXXII, 55.

was a crucial aspect, also, of his opposition to a western offensive. In an attempt to dissuade Nicholas from attacking the French, the Tsarevich assured the Emperor that France and Louis Philippe were anxious to preserve the general peace. Further, he warned Nicholas that if France became the victim of a Russian offensive action, the European community of nations would feel that Russia was the threat to international peace and stability.  

Thus, the major powers proscribed, in effect, the Russian Tsar's proposals for an offensive action against France. The Grand Duke Constantine and the Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode openly criticized the wisdom of becoming involved in a war; yet, Nicholas I remained firm in his determination to suppress revolution in the west. The catalytic agent was the Belgium uprising. The King of the Netherlands requested military aid from the Russian Tsar. The kingdom of the Netherlands, including Belgium,

19 _Ibid._, pp. 49, 57. Constantine was not the only open opponent to the projected war. Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, wrote Metternich that since England, Austria, and Prussia had extended diplomatic recognition to Louis Philippe, Russia should follow suit. The Russian Minister felt that inasmuch as Russia was beleagured by the Cholera epidemic and that there was no assurance that a Russian offensive would be supported by the English treasury, Russia could not wage war. Charles Nesselrode, _Lettres et Papiers du Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760-1850_, trans. A. Nesselrode (II vols., Paris: A. Lahure, Imprimeur-Editeur, 1904-1908), VI, 180-196. Also see Morley, _loc. cit._, p. 413.

20 _Shornik_, CXXXII, 55.
was created by Russia, England, Austria and Prussia in 1814 as a bulwark against the ambitions of France. Also, the King of the Netherlands was the brother-in-law of Nicholas I. The Dutch king was married to Anna Pavlona. Nicholas informed Constantine of the King of Holland's request and explained that he was obligated to honor it as he could not ignore his treaty obligations.  

There are indications, nevertheless, that Nicholas would have been willing to accept a moratorium on warfare if the revolutionary tempest had subsided. He related to the Russian Minister of War his hopes that Russian mobilization would prove to be a deterrent to war:

The dispatches I have just received, my dear friend . . . are of such a nature that we must, without delay, make preparations for our entry into the field . . . . It remains to be seen if the knowledge of our formidable preparations will prevent the war.  

Following his order for a general mobilization, which included a Polish contingent of 60,000 troops, Nicholas advised Constantine, October 6, 1830, that no troops would go beyond the border of the Empire if the French did not traverse their frontiers, and the prevailing turmoil in Belgium remained a localized insurrection. The revolt in Belgium did not lose its vigor and thus confirmed the

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21Ibid.

22Grunwald, pp. 111-112.
intentions of the supreme autocrat to take the offensive. He ordered Diebitsch to Berlin to gain an understanding with the King of Prussia and upon completion of that mission to return to Warsaw to assume command of the Tsar's counter-revolutionary offensive. In this same communication of October 13, 1830, Nicholas established December 22 as the date the military forces were to be prepared to assume the offensive, if necessary.  

The Polish army and the Lithuanian corps were to be deployed as the vanguard of this reactionary crusade, and the Tsar hoped to have Constantine accompany his army on the projected offensive. The plans were complete for the suppression of the revolutions in the West. Unfortunately, Nicholas failed to consider the effect his martial spirit and planned expenditure of Polish troops on foreign soil would have upon the dissident segments of the Polish population. If the Grand Duke Constantine and the Foreign Minister Nesselrode were unable to prevent the embarkation of the "Policeman of Europe" upon his counter-revolutionary crusade, the revolution of November 29, 1830, at Warsaw destroyed the expedition completely.

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The Polish Military Conspiracy

The fifteen-year period of the existence of the Polish kingdom had been marked by the Russian failure to fulfill the promises of the restoration of Greater Poland, willful withholding of constitutional guarantees, institutionalizing of a vigorous censorship of newspapers and books, the forcible recall of students studying abroad prior to the completion of their programs of study, the strict police surveillance, the abolitionment of the publication of debates of the Polish Diet and lastly the brutal suppression of the Patriotic Society and the unconstitutional judicial processes of 1826-1829.24

Following the destruction of the Patriotic Society, a new society came into existence. It began in 1828 at the Officers' Training Academy and was under the leadership of Lieutenant Peter Wysocki, who was displaced later by Lieutenant Joseph Zaliwski, a leading Polish carbonari. Certain segments of this society, known as the "Cade League," had agitated for a rebellion on two previous occasions, during the May, 1829, coronation ceremony, and in September, 1829, while the Russian army was busy on the Turkish front. On the former occasion, rebellion

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was vetoed by the less emotional members who realized that they were not adequately prepared to embark upon an insurrection, and on the latter occasion they were discouraged by the Russian victory and the subsequent treaty of Adrianople. But, despite their insurrectionary inactivity, the membership in the "Cadet League" increased considerably as the number of the Polish discontented mounted due to the steady aggravation of the above mentioned problems.

The victory of the French revolution seemed to raise the hopes of the Polish conspirators, and gave them the inspiration needed to make the courageous and bold step of initiating armed insurrection against the overwhelming odds presented by the Russian military establishment.  

The members of the "Cadet League" were well informed about Nicholas's mobilization orders and the plan to utilize the Polish army as the initial invasion force of his counter-revolutionary crusade. They also realized that if their army was decimated in battle, as Constantine feared, they would have lost a very vital element of their revolutionary machine. There was even one more important consideration which influenced their decision to embark

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26Morley, loc. cit., p. 413.
upon an armed uprising: The existence of the "Cadet League" had been brought to the attention of the Grand Duke Constantine and the Tsar.

On November 2, 1830, two members of the "Cadet League" were apprehended by Constantine's secret police. The conspirators revealed the secrets of their organization; its plans and information concerning its leadership were thus exposed. Constantine reported his findings to Nicholas. The Tsar ordered a complete investigation, necessary arrests and a trial by court-martial. Constantine appointed a committee to conduct the inquest. The committee was placed under the leadership of Count Stanislas Potocki, who was a Polish patriot. The investigation proceeded deliberately. Careful attention was paid to judicial legality. A voluminous amount of information was uncovered relative to a planned insurgency, but the Grand Duke Constantine pleaded with Nicholas for moderation. Nicholas demanded immediate seizure of the exposed members of the conspiracy. When these instructions reached the Polish capital, the pace of the drift toward open revolt quickened considerably. Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz forwarded an address to Prince Adam Czartoryski and informed him of the above developments which seemed to be precipitating the course of events: "Our sovereign would

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like waging war, but his more prudent brother tries to stop him."28

The coincidence of the crusading spirit of the Russian Tsar and the revolutionary propensity of the Polish "Cadet League" resulted in the Glorious Revolution of November 29, as by November, 1830, a compromise was out of the reach of the antagonists. The only solution that was available would have meant the complete capitulation of the Russian Tsar; he would have been required to restore the lost provinces and Polish independence which had been brutally snatched away during the eighteenth century partitions of that tragedy ridden nation.29

On about November 22, 1830, following the receipt of the Tsar's rigorous instructions for the treatment of the exposed members of the "Cadet League," final plans were executed to begin the Polish uprising on the evening

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28Ibid. Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz (1757-1841) was a Polish scholar, poet and statesman. He was an important figure in the development of Polish national spirit and literature through his historical songs and essays. In the early part of his career, he served as an adjudant to Kosciuszko. He was taken prisoner with Kosciuszko at the battle of Maciejowice. After his release from prison, he traveled in America, where he was married. After Vienna, he was a member of the Polish constitutio

November 29, 1830. Thus, the plans of the absolutist Nicholas I were altered; the French revolution was preserved; Prussia was extricated, once again, from an untenable position, as she did not want to participate in Nicholas's western offensive.

The Polish Uprising of 1830-1831

On November 29, 1830, Lieutenant Joseph Zaliwski led an attack upon the Belvedere palace, which marked the beginning of the Polish insurrection of 1830-1831. The revolutionary forces killed one general and wounded two other members of the Grand Duke's residential staff, but Constantine managed to escape with the aid of his servants.

The revolt exploded amidst confusion; yet, Constantine failed to make an attempt to suppress the Polish uprising at its inception, although he had 7,000 Lithuanian and Russian troops plus twenty-eight pieces of artillery at his disposal. If he had permitted the Lithuanian corps

30 Lieutenant Joseph Zaliwski sponsored the proposal to attack the Belvedere palace with the purpose of assassinating the Grand Duke Constantine. Zaliwski felt that the murder of Constantine would force Poland into a "life or death struggle" with Russia and stifle the efforts of Polish moderates to gain a compromise with the Russian Tsar.

31 Sbornik, XXXII, 78. Askenazy, loc. cit., p. 456. The uprising began on a Monday evening at 7:15 P.M. The force that attacked the Belvedere palace was composed of six youthful officers and twelve university students.
to occupy Fort Modlin, which occupied a strategic location above Warsaw, the revolt would have been suppressed within a few hours after it had begun.\textsuperscript{32} It is no surprise that on December 18, 1830, during an interview with Deputy Walicki from Pulsawy, the Grand Duke Constantine could honestly say that "had I wished, you would all have been annihilated at the very beginning. . . . Fundamentally, I am a better Pole than you. . . . I have spoken your language so long that now it is difficult for me to speak Russian: I have proven my sympathy with you by forbidding the Imperial troops to fire on you."\textsuperscript{33} The Grand Duke Constantine had a conviction that the Polish conservatives would overpower the radicals and restore the imperial government and civil order.

The initial reaction of the Grand Duke Constantine to the insurrection was a mixture of humility, bitterness and hopefulness for the future. He appeared heartbroken in his earliest communication following the outbreak of the uprising. Constantine felt that his sixteen years of faithful service to Poland had been destroyed by a group of youthful army officers and students. His letter to Nicholas on December 8, 1830, indicates that he could

\textsuperscript{32}Grunwald, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid.
not believe that the Poles would betray him: "I confess that I cannot understand how honest and brave men can forget their oaths of military allegiance and join in an insurrection. But in spite of it all I feel that it is necessary for you to act with prudence. I feel that magnanimity will have a much more desirable effect than brutal force." Constantine pleaded with Nicholas to make a careful choice between the application of forcible or conciliatory measures. Constantine felt that the Polish conservatives, led by Czartoryski and Lubecki, would have been willing to make a peaceful settlement without demanding the restoration of all the western provinces of Russia to their rightful owner. He realized that the Poles were aware that the chances of their victory were remote, but at the same time he cautioned the Tsar that the Polish nation would fight to the bitter end if measures conducive to alleviating Polish grievances were not invoked. "You must make your own wise choice, but please do not initiate a precipitous action; I will do nothing while waiting your decision." The reply of Nicholas I was brutal and harsh when compared to the sympathetic and humane entreaty submitted by the Grand Duke Constantine:

\[^{34}\textit{Sbornik, CXXXII, 76.}\]

\[^{35}\textit{Ibid.}\]
I shall concede nothing to violence. Give my thanks to Lubecki and Iserski [sic] for preserving your life but their cause is hopeless. . . . steps have been taken to suppress this rebellion. . . . it is not your fault, it is the fault of ingratitude. . . . This is the second time Poland has followed the example of France and for the second time the Poles will be the victims of their devotion. 36

The Tsar made it clear that he was intent upon suppressing the insurrection by force and overturning the political system of Poland.

On the night of November 29, 1830, Czartoryski and Lubecki visited Constantine, who had set up an encampment outside the gates of Warsaw. The Grand Duke answered their inquiries relative to his plan for combatting the uprising in a manner which must be considered unusual for a ruler who had just been unseated by an insurrection:

The Grand Duke declared that he was maintaining a passive attitude and that he left the pacification of the capital to the Poles themselves. 37

Thus assured that the Grand Duke was not going to interfere or order the deployment of the Russian or Lithuanian army inside the city, Czartoryski drafted the following proclamation which was posted in the streets of

36Ibid., p. 77. The name of the Pole referred to in the above quotation should be rendered in the following manner: Jezierski.

Warsaw the morning following the Polish consultation with Constantine:

Poles,

The sad events which took place yesterday evening and during last night have determined the government to co-opt into its service some persons of outstanding merit, and to address to you the following proclamation: His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke and Tsarewicz has just prohibited the Russian soldiers from undertaking any action because Poles alone should be charged with the reconciliation of their countrymen. The Pole cannot cover his hand with the blood of his brother; and it cannot be your intention to give the world the spectacle of a civil war. Only your moderation can turn away calamities which threaten to come upon you. Thus return to order and to calm. Let the veil of night cover the passions which broke loose. Reflect upon the future and upon your country, threatened from all sides; remove all that could imperil its existence. We on our side shall fulfill our duty to maintain public order, the laws and the liberties assured to the country by its constitution.

(Signed) Czartoryski, Radziwill, Chłopicki.38

On December 2, 1830, another interview was held between Czartoryski, Lubecki and Constantine. The Grand Duke stated honestly that he had no intention of attacking the capital without orders from St. Petersburg and in any case he would warn the defenders forty-eight hours in advance; that he would approach the Emperor on behalf of

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38 Henryk Frankel, Poland: The Struggle for Power, 1772-1939 (London: Lindsay Drummond, Ltd., 1946), p. 19. Joseph Chłopicki (1772-1854) was a Polish general. He participated in Napoleonic wars. After the insurrection developed, he became military dictator. He never believed in the rebellion nor did he have confidence in Poland's chances for a victory. He quit as dictator on January 20, 1831, when negotiations with Nicholas failed.
the revolutionaries; that he would not issue orders for
the entry of the Lithuanian corps into the Polish kingdom
as a combatant. He refused to make any promises relative
to the restoration of the lost provinces.\textsuperscript{39} In spite of
the efforts of Constantine and the Polish conservatives
to bring an end to the uprising, Emperor Nicholas was
taking steps, at the same time, which placed a compromise
out of reach. The Tsar did not wish to effect a judicious
settlement of the circumstances that produced the insur-
rection. He wanted the Poles to submit unconditionally.
The Polish conservatives, led by Adam Czartoryski, could
no longer control the fiery emotions of the revolutionary
radicals. The radicals wanted a complete Russian capitua-
lation, or the development of the Warsaw uprising into
an open war for independence.

The Tsar issued two proclamations: One condemned
the rebellion and the other removed the most moderate
members from the Administrative Council, Czartoryski,
Niemcewicz and Chłopicki.\textsuperscript{40} This step caused a reaction
at Warsaw which took the control of the government and
the revolution out of the hands of the men who had no

\textsuperscript{39}Handelsman, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 296.

\textsuperscript{40}Czartoryski was elected president of the new Na-
tional government which developed as a result of this
imperial announcement and subsequent failures of attempts
at negotiating a settlement. Kukiel, p. 177.
intention of waging an armed insurrection against Russian military power. Thus, the attempts to reach an agreement by the Polish moderates and the Grand Duke Constantine were stifled completely by the imperial decree. Constantine's apprehension of the future is indicated in a pathetic address to the Tsar on December 17, 1830:

I have no ambition and realize that my public career is finished after sixteen years of mischance, treachery, and false friends. In spite of it all I feel mercy is more necessary and useful than force. Your proclamation to the Poles is well written but will not produce order for after its publication the revolt is more active than ever and after two meetings the Diet has presented General Chlopicki with unlimited dictatorial powers and declared the revolt to be the cause of the entire nation. God knows no one wanted an opposite effect more than I.⁴¹

It is evident that the Tsar's proclamation was a crushing blow to Constantine's hopes of effecting a compromise with the revolutionary forces. He had made a great effort to prevent the uprising from developing into a full-scale war. In a letter to Metternich, Ficquelmont, the Austrian Ambassador to Russia, stated that "in all the news from the Grand Duke there is a prevailing and very pronounced tone of praise for the Polish troops that remained faithful to him, and he has no bitterness against the others. . . . he loves Poland, he has spent his whole life there. . . . If he gains his ends, he will plead the

⁴¹Sbornik, CXXXII, 85-86.
cause of Poland; order will return if the leaders of the conspiracy . . . and the military corps that revolted are punished.\textsuperscript{42} If these were the hopes of Constantine, they were destroyed by the vengeful Tsar. Constantine could only release his faithful Polish troops and depart from Poland. He crossed the frontier of the Polish kingdom on December 12, 1830, under very miserable conditions; but even then he maintained a faint hope for an eventual restoration of imperial authority. In spite of Constantine's manifestation of acceptance of his complete and final removal from Poland, the writer does not feel that he resigned himself to a permanent separation from the Polish state. He defended Poland until the end of his career and seemed to maintain a lasting hope of returning to Warsaw.

\textbf{The Revolution Runs its Course at Warsaw}

Following the receipt of Nicholas's proclamation which demanded complete submission, the Poles organized an interim government. General Chlopicki was appointed the revolution's military commander-in-chief. He was an enemy of the revolution and did not have any faith in liberal government. Therefore, he assumed the role of dictator.\textsuperscript{43} He felt that negotiations would halt the

\textsuperscript{42}Grunwald, p. 116.
\textsuperscript{43}Kukiel, p. 173.
dangerous drift toward war with Russia. The negotiations with Nicholas failed miserably. On December 10, 1830, one last attempt to reach a compromise was initiated. Lubecki and Jezierski were sent on a mission to negotiate a settlement with the Tsar. When the two Polish representatives arrived in St. Petersburg, Nicholas notified them that he could not receive them if they represented a government which he did not recognize.44 Lubecki and Jezierski submitted as subjects of the Russian Tsar in order to gain an audience. Nicholas asked the Poles if they had received his address relative to the insurgency. Prince Lubecki replied in a bold manner "Sire, the proclamation is not consequent, a fixed idea dominates the nation; she fears that one wants to profit from this revolt by withdrawing the constitution. The proclamation has not destroyed this fear."45 Upon receiving this response, Nicholas turned to Diebitsch and said "consequently this is war; Marshal depart immediately."46 Thus, as a result of this failure, the trend toward a complete and final rupture quickened its pace. On December 18, 1830, in recognition of the failure of the Lubecki mission, the

44Nesselrode, VII, 164.
45Sbornik, CXXXII, 90.
46Nesselrode, VII, 164.
Diet met and confirmed the dictatorship of Chlopicki. On January 20, 1831, Chlopicki resigned in public. He was disappointed in the failure to reach an agreement with the Tsar. Also, he felt that it was madness for the Poles to attempt to wage a war with the nation which had defeated Napoleon.47 On January 25, the Diet appointed Michael Radziwill commander-in-chief to succeed Chlopicki, dethroned the Romanov’s and delivered an eulogy for the Decembrist uprising.48 The dethronement of the Romanovs was not a judicious decision, as it hastened the arrival of the attacking Russian army and made it increasingly difficult for the western powers to intervene on Poland’s behalf.49 When Nicholas received the news of his dethronement at Warsaw, he informed Constantine that he had done all that was possible to prevent an all-out war. “These leaders remind me of Pestel. . . . I do not want war or revenge but what can I do. They destroy themselves, not us . . .”50

On January 29, 1831, a New National government was installed in Poland. Czartoryski was the president,

47 Sbornik, CXXXII, 115.
48 Ibid., p. 116.
49 Ackenazy, loc. cit., p. 467.
50 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
Joachim Lelewel was the Minister of Education, Bonaventura Niemojowski became the Minister of Justice, and Michael Radziwill was elected commander-in-chief. The military commander was not to enjoy supreme power, as in the case of Chlopicki; he was to be responsible to the Diet. This government remained in power and nominal control until it was overthrown in August, 1831, due to the incompetency of Polish generals and ineffective military operations.

The Russian Army Enters Poland

The unwillingness of either side to compromise resulted in the breakdown of negotiations. There remained no alternative but war.

The ambitious hero of Adrianople, Field Marshal Diebitsch, crossed into Polish territory in February, 1831. He commanded a Russian army which totaled 120,000

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51 Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861) was a Polish historian and politician. In 1828 he became a member of the Polish Diet. He was a prolific revolutionary writer in 1830, and thus not extremely popular with the conservative Chlopicki. Following the resignation of General Chlopicki, Lelewel became a member of the new national government and president of the patriotic clubs of Poland. Following Poland's defeat, he retired to France, where he became the chairman of the Polish immigration committee. He was exiled by Louis Philippe and Lelewel retired to Belgium, where he taught modern history at the new university in Bruxelles.

Bonaventura Niemojowski was the last president of the Polish national government. He also retired to France following the Polish defeat. He became the chairman of the Polish Provisional Committee at Paris in December, 1831.
men. He was filled with optimism and predicted a victory within a few weeks.52 Military operations at the outset of the war indicated a quick Russian victory. On February 19, 1831, the Polish forces were badly beaten at Grochow and retreated towards Warsaw. Diebitsch could have taken advantage of the Poles' state of confusion, entered the capital, and ended the war, but suddenly his pursuit of the retreating Poles came to a halt. The cause of this strange maneuver is not known conclusively; the strongest and most reasonable explanation is that the Grand Duke Constantine intervened to prevent further slaughter and destruction.53 The Poles utilized the interlude to regroup and arouse other sections to join the revolutionary cause. It is interesting to note that following the Grochow action, Nicholas I denied the Grand Duke any authority over military operations and ordered him to leave Diebitsch's headquarters. In this order, Nicholas stated "you have told us that you would serve me with zeal and devotion. . . . Well, it is by virtue of this promise that I ask, that I insist."54 The dejected Grand Duke replied that "I am cut to the heart. . . . I

52Nesselrode, VII, 171.
53Grunwald, pp. 118-119.
54Ibid., p. 120.
did not think at the age of fifty-one, and after thirty years of service, I would finish my career in such a deplorable way."55 In the end, Constantine became a straggler in the rear of the Russian army. 56 This was indeed an unfortunate status for a Prince who had rejected the rule of the Russian Empire.

Following the Polish insurrection and during the early months of 1831, the Grand Duke Constantine did not travel toward St. Petersburg. He moved about visiting battle scenes. He irritated corps commanders who reported to Nicholas that Constantine's presence frustrated the soldiers. A severe admonition was delivered by General Rosen who was in command of the Lithuanian corps which had formerly been under Constantine's jurisdiction. 57 On March 16, 1831, Nicholas denied Constantine's request to return to the army. He felt that it would be degrading for a member of the royal family to be at the front without a command. 58 He offered Constantine the choice of returning to his old position as commander of the guards in

55Ibid.

56The army was often barefooted and hungry. Constantine's entourage was ambushed constantly, lost artillery to the insurgents, as his men grew too weak to drag the heavy field pieces. Yet he pleaded for mercy for the mislead Poles who did not know how to resist the revolutionary torrent. Sbornik, CXXXII, 112-114, 211.

57Ibid., p. 70.

58Ibid., pp. 143-144.
St. Petersburg. The Grand Duke refused to accept the guard command because he had not served with the guards since 1814 and felt that he would be received as a foreigner. Furthermore, he informed Nicholas that he wanted to rejoin the army simply to be near his ex-soldiers and officers who had been integrated into the Grand Army of the Empire. Constantine felt that it was his sacred duty to share the army's dangers and his desire to rejoin his former comrades was not motivated by an attraction for the glory of command.

The Reaction of Constantine to the Russian Offensive

The Grand Duke Constantine spent the months of March, April, and May, 1831, recounting the battle action to Nicholas I, deprecating the military tactics of the Russians, and caring for his wife who had been with him since the revolution had begun.59

Constantine was disappointed with the manner in which the former units of his army were utilized in the Russian offensive. The Lithuanian corps was integrated, along with its commander General Rosen, into the Grand Army and renamed the Sixth corps. The Lithuanian grenadiers met with the same fate. Even a detachment from his personal

59Constantine's spouse had been ill much of the time since the retreat from Warsaw.
entourage was thrown into the breach at Grodno in early May, 1831; at the time of its deployment it was under-strength due to combat losses it had suffered during the previous six months, and the devastating effect of the cholera epidemic. Constantine was disturbed that "its reputation was damaged due to no fault of its own."  

Constantine opposed the appointment of General Diebitsch from the beginning of the Polish campaign. The Grand Duke thought that there were other military men who were much more experienced and better qualified than Diebitsch. Constantine complained continually to Nicholas that the tactics of General Diebitsch lacked initiative and imagination; as a result, Russia had lost the initiative in the campaign. The Grand Duke wanted a Russian

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60Kornik, CXXXI, 214-215.

61This attitude of Constantine's toward Diebitsch may have stemmed in part from the contemptible attitude of Diebitsch toward the Polish army. He had not been inclined to use it in the projected western offensive of 1830 and in spite of Nicholas's orders for its mobilization for use in that offensive, he told Constantine to hold the Poles in reserve. Also, it was Diebitsch who had submitted a thorough report on the activities of Bestuzhev relative to the Decembeirt uprising and thereby played an important part in implicating the Poles in that affair as Bestuzhev was a member of the Russian Society which met with Krzyzanowski and the Polish Patriotic Society in 1823. Nikolai K. Shilder, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, ego zhizn i tsarstvovanie (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: A. S. Suworin', 1903), II, 799.

62Nicholas was also dissatisfied with the conduct of the Polish campaign by Diebitsch and he had sent Orlov to
victory, but he did not approve of a leader of the Russian effort such as Diebitsch who fought the Poles with such vengeance and caused such enormous destruction to the countryside.63

Constantine's Last Days

As the end of the Grand Duke Constantine's career approached, he became an abject figure. He was reduced to the status of a nonentity in the affairs of Poland and Russia. When transmitting comments to St. Petersburg, relative to the Polish campaign, he felt compelled to apologize. He had been admonished on so many occasions for interfering with the conduct of the war.

Nicholas did not recognize Constantine as a part of the Polish government or a member of the imperial staff.

observe the activities at Diebitsch's headquarters; at the same time he ordered Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich (1782-1856) to St. Petersburg presumably for a briefing prior to assuming command of the Russian offensive in Poland. Paskevich was a brilliant Russian commander. He fought against the Persians in the war of 1826-1827 and received the title of Count for his victory at Erivan (present-day Yerevan). He fought the Turks in 1828 and tooks Kars and Erzurum. In 1829 he was appointed Field Marshal. In June, 1831, following the death of Diebitsch, he assumed command of the Russian war effort in Poland and accepted the unconditional surrender of the Poles on September 7, 1831. After the war was ended Paskevich was named Prince of Warsaw and governor-general of Poland.

63 Constantine felt that a change in tactics would produce a quick Russian victory and perhaps cause his return to Warsaw.
that was charged with the suppression of the Polish insurrection. He wanted the Grand Duke Constantine to make a complete and final break with Poland and return to St. Petersburg. Constantine refused; he felt that his return to St. Petersburg would lead to the destruction of the Polish state and to his own death.\textsuperscript{64} In addition, he expressed his desire to resume his command at Warsaw when the insurrection was suppressed. The Tsar opposed the return of the Grand Duke to Warsaw. He did not plan to maintain the government of Poland as it had existed prior to the Polish uprising. He did not reveal this design clearly in his argument opposing Constantine's return to Warsaw. Ostensibly, he based his opposition to Constantine's return to Warsaw upon the circumstances of the Grand Duke's departure from the Polish capital. Nicholas felt that Constantine had deserted his post in Poland at a time when victory was in sight; by doing so, he had signified his concurrence with the idea that the position of the Polish kingdom within the Russian empire needed a revision.

\textsuperscript{64} Constantine seemed especially fearful of returning to the Russian capital after the death of General Diebitsch. It was rumored that Orlov or some other person had poisoned Diebitsch. Constantine asked Nicholas if he was really welcome to return to St. Petersburg and stated that he must know truthfully before he would proceed homeward. \textit{Sbornik}, pp. 230, 223, 226, 228.
The Grand Duke Constantine had not wilfully forfeited his command and position in Poland. He simply was not beguiled by the characteristic Russian appraisal that the war would be of a short duration. Constantine recognized that it was a national war and the Polish people would not submit without putting forth a determined and heroic struggle to gain their freedom.65

The Grand Duke Constantine's final correspondence with the Tsar of Russia appeared to be the testimony of a Polish patriot. He related to Nicholas, on June 25, 1831, that in spite of Russia's numerical superiority, the war was far from finished. Constantine knew that if the Russian invaders were to secure the victory, numerous changes would be required in their grand strategy:

They will be forced to employ other and more effective measures to fight an insurgent nation. If 10,000 Poles die today, 20,000 will replace them. . . . This is not a simple and ordinary war. The problems multiply greatly when one is involved in a war of national insurrection. . . . This will be a long, unfortunate and cruel war . . . and it will perhaps become necessary to investigate the principles of the revolution and from the findings discover the proper means of bringing it to an end.66

Nevertheless, the Grand Duke fervently hoped that his prophesy relative to the duration of the war was incorrect

65 Ibid., pp. 237, 279.
66 Ibid., pp. 240-241.
because of the devastating effects of the war upon the land. It is noteworthy to observe that he was extending to the Tsar, even in the last days of his existence, the alternative of discovering some common ground with the Polish patriots so that a compromise could be effected.

Two days later, the tragedy was ended. The Russian Grand Duke was dead, allegedly due to the ravages of cholera. Constantine died in the small western village of Vitebsk at 8:00 P.M., June 27, 1831, while witnessing the destruction of the Poland to which he had become attached very strongly. Still he was hated by the Polish people whose hearts he had failed to conquer and whose support he had never won.67

Throughout the war, the Polish soldiers displayed their usual qualities of heroism. Unfortunately, their commanders lacked initiative, discipline and unity and thus affected the morale of the soldiers in the field. Shortcomings of this nature had been their ruin in earlier wars. In spite of these impediments, the Polish army enjoyed a great deal of success at the outset of the war. Unfortunately, the only hopes for a Polish victory depended upon foreign intervention. England and France were not disposed to help the Poles. England was occupied with

67Grunwald, pp. 102-103.
an internal problem. France was struggling for Russian diplomatic recognition and in spite of popular support for the Polish patriots in the French assembly, no aid was extended. After several major disasters, General Jan Krukowiecki submitted an offer of unconditional surrender to the Russian Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich on September 7, 1831.

Following the end of the war, the innovations which the Grand Duke Constantine had feared were instituted in Poland. Nicholas I withdrew the Polish constitution, closed the Diet, dispensed with the separate army, ended the separate currency system, and integrated the territories of the "Congress Kingdom" of Poland into the Russian Empire.

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68 Morley, loc. cit., p. 416.

69 General Jan Krukowiecki (1770-1850) first served in the Austrian army; he later was in the service of the Duchy of Warsaw and the Polish kingdom. When the insurrection started in 1830, he was the governor-general of Warsaw and was charged with the defense of that city.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Grand Duke Constantine has been an unfairly maligned figure. It is the conviction of this writer that this crucial error stems from the period of Constantine's early career in Poland, when the creation of a reorganized and efficient Polish army was his single objective. He pursued this goal in a relentless fashion, and by doing so overlooked his other responsibilities to the Polish state and its constitution. A breach developed between Constantine's military aspirations and Poland's hopes for a constitutional government. Thus, an unfavorable opinion was formed of the Grand Duke which has persisted to this day.

Following the successful rebuilding of the Polish army, his marriage to the Polish Countess Grudzinska, and eleven years' residence at Warsaw, the Grand Duke Constantine began to experience a new appreciation of his moral obligations to the Polish state. Constantine revealed his changing sentiments in several ways. He renounced the Russian crown. He struggled with the Russian Tsar to protect and insure the constitutional guarantees of the Polish state during the Decembrist crisis and the
period immediately following.

In spite of his changing attitude toward the Polish people, Constantine was unable to make any significant advancement towards the realization of the objectives and goals of Alexander. The period of his development of an increasing sensitivity to his obligations to the Polish state coincided with the early years of the reign of Nicholas I. Nicholas was the representative of a different approach to Poland than that of his predecessor, Alexander I. The liberalism which characterized Alexander's reign was conspicuously absent during the era of Tsar Nicholas I. Alexander's liberality in spirit was replaced by the vengeful and reactionary nature of Nicholas I. Nicholas was determined to deprive the Poles of their liberties and to abrogate the constitution of the Polish kingdom.

Thus from the new historical stage of the Polish kingdom in 1825 until his death, Constantine was engaged in a struggle to maintain his position of authority in Poland and the existence of the Polish kingdom and her institutions. The Grand Duke experienced little success against his reactionary adversary.

The discontent in Poland was borne of violated confidence and trust, and aggravation of grievances arising from the neglect of the Polish constitution. It was
detonated by the revolutionary explosions of the West, and the decision of Nicholas I to pursue his chosen role of "Policeman of Europe," which was highlighted by his plan to use the Polish army as an instrument of repression. The result was the "Glorious Revolution of November 29," (1830) and the destruction of the Grand Duke Constantine's military command and its accompanying authority within the Polish state. In spite of Constantine's entreaty, it was apparent that the opportunity presented by the rebellion for the final destruction of Polish nationalism would not be forfeited by the most absolute of monarchs, Nicholas I.

Following the revolution of 1830-1831, Constantine never conceded defeat to the Polish insurgents. During his sorrowful retreat from Warsaw, he steadily maintained hope, of varying conviction, of an eventual return to the Polish capital. Significantly, throughout this destructive combat, Constantine was occupied with delivering an eloquent plea for Polish nationalism; he expressed his admiration for the spirit of the Poles and hoped fervently for a judicious settlement of the malignant circumstances which produced the Polish insurrection.

Thus, surrounded by a ravaged countryside and anticipating the destruction of a constitutional kingdom, the Grand Duke Constantine was afflicted and died of cholera on June 27, 1831. He had failed to win the loyalty or
trust of a nation and a people that he had grown to love and that he wished to rule in harmony with the original objectives and liberal principles of Alexander I. The tragedy had ended for the Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich.
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