ATTITUDES TOWARD JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II

ESPECIALLY AS REVEALED IN POPULAR CULTURE

A Thesis

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by

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

As the sun sank low over the California desert the evening of March 22, 1942, its last glowing rays illuminated the Manzanar Assembly Center and revealed a scene never before witnessed in the history of the United States. Barbed wire and armed soldiers were keeping American citizens behind the Center's gates - citizens who had never been formally accused of any crime nor brought to any trial, but who were nonetheless incarcerated because of the color of their skin and the slant of their eyes. A long history of anti-Oriental prejudice had brought the Japanese to this lonely desert land, and the effects of this prejudice and their experience in the internment camps remain to this day.

The subject of the Japanese-Americans' experience in American internment camps has been explored at length. The historical background of longstanding prejudice against the Oriental in America, especially on the West Coast, has been well-documented. However, certain questions concerning the role of popular culture during the World War II period have not been as fully investigated. What were the attitudes toward the Japanese as expressed in popular culture? What did authors, film makers and song writers have to say about the Japanese in the years 1942-45? Was a distinction
made between the Japanese enemy and Japanese-Americans in the media? Did the American public absorb the attitudes toward the Japanese which was prevalent in the popular culture? Was popular culture a reflection of or a molder of general public opinion? These questions have an importance which is not limited merely to historical curiosity. If popular culture could influence Americans during the 1940's to tolerate the incarceration of 112,000 Japanese-Americans, what implications does that hold for all minority groups in the 1970's? Clarifying the role of popular culture in regard to Japanese-Americans during World War II may aid in finding solutions to the problems of prejudice and discrimination in contemporary America.

Popular culture is a difficult concept to deal with. Basically there are three problems in examining popular culture in the 1940's. First, there is the problem of how much influence popular culture really had on an individual. Is it possible to safely assume that people who read about the "dirty yellow Japs" transferred hostile feeling toward Japanese-Americans? Do we know whether an individual emerging from an anti-Japanese film and encountering a Japanese-American on the street associated him with the villains he had just spent two hours hating? Secondly, it is a temptation to observe reactions in the 1970's to popular culture and assume these same reactions prevailed in the 1940's. After all, one might say, "people are people." However, we cannot be sure that this is an
accurate procedure. Society is markedly different today than it was thirty years ago. The intense patriotism of the 1940's has drastically diminished, while a new skepticism concerning government leaders and propaganda has arisen to take its place. The third problem with examination of popular culture is the "popularity" of the item under discussion. Certainly hit movies such as "Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo" and "Guadalcanal Diary" qualify as possible opinion-molding popular culture. However what about the songs "We're Gonna Have to Slap the Dirty Little Jap" and "Remember Pearl Harbor" which vilified the "yellow scum of the sea?" These songs never reached to top ten or even the top fifty, yet substantial numbers of Americans were exposed to their racist lyrics. It is a difficult problem to decide whether or not these less popular items would have influenced American attitudes toward the Japanese-Americans.

In an effort to discover the attitudes of Americans toward the Japanese in the United States, I divided my research into two areas. I began by researching the attitudes toward the Japanese prior to World War II and then moved into a study of attitudes in popular culture during the war years. As I studied I became absolutely convinced that a true understanding of the latter was not possible without considerable knowledge of the former.

There was a wealth of material available on the Japanese prior to World War II. My problem was more where to begin than a lack of
material. George Nakama's thesis, "Japanese-Americans in the United States During World War II" written in 1955, gave me a general background and pointed me toward the authors who were considered to be the best sources prior to 1955. For the early history of the Japanese in America I leaned especially heavily on two works, Prejudice, War and the Constitution by Jacobus tenBroek, Barnhart and Matson and Prejudice; Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance by Carey McWilliams. TenBroek and company wrote their book in 1955 and the emphasis in the text is on the strong role of groups who had financial or political interest in repressing the Japanese. Carey McWilliams was a government official in the State Department and wrote his book during internment, in 1944. It was favorably received by the critics and was apparently widely read, at least in intellectual circles. McWilliams was very sympathetic toward the plight of the Japanese-Americans and laid the root of their problem in the 1940's to a long history of prejudice against the Oriental, especially on the West Coast.

Norman Thomas's pamphlet "Democracy and the Japanese-Americans" was written as a passionate plea to the American people in 1942 for the release of the Japanese from the internment camps. Besides being an interesting social document of the times, I found it very helpful in providing basic statistics and a brief background to the internment. Other books such as A Diplomatic History of the American People by T. Bailey, which gave a clear insight into the Russo-Japanese War of
1905 and its effect on the American people, and The Second-Generation Japanese Problem by Strong, which gave some psychological insight into the problems of the Japanese-Americans, were especially helpful.

In examining the history of the Japanese during the war years I again leaned very heavily on tenBroek and McWilliams. Allan Bosworth's American Concentration Camps, Bradford Smith's Americans From Japan, and Daniel's works on the internment camps were very instructive, also.

Having researched the history of the Japanese in America I then turned to an examination of popular culture in the 1940's. Popular culture is defined in this paper as magazines, film, books, comics and music. The emphasis will be placed on periodicals, films and books.

I first determined to identify the ten most widely read magazines and then to scan their contents for the period 1941-1945. Finding a list of the ten most popular periodicals proved more of a problem that I had anticipated. In the 1940's, Almanacs did not list them as they do today. Finally I was able to obtain a list by consulting N.W. Ayer and Son's Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals for 1942. This book lists each newspaper and periodical according to the state in which it is published. I was able to obtain a list by consulting the individual state lists and checking the circulation figures for each magazine published in each state.
In order, the most popular periodicals were: Reader's Digest; Saturday Evening Post; Life; Colliers; Liberty; American; Look; Cosmopolitan; Redbook; National Geographic and Time. Newsweek had a circulation of 450,259 and was the second most popular news magazine, following Time in circulation. Therefore, I have used Newsweek as a source also. True Confessions and True Story Magazine were also enormously popular, having a circulation of almost three million. However, university libraries do not keep back issues of these and Reader's Guide does not list them!

Armed with the above list I then scanned the Reader's Guide for articles having to do with Japanese-Americans or internment camps from 1941-1945. Later I broadened my search for articles about the enemy Japanese. I was very surprised at the scarcity of information when I checked out the articles listed in the Reader's Guide. I then moved to the indexes of Time and Newsweek for the war years. Again, although I discovered a little more I was surprised and disappointed by the lack of material available. Next I leafed through most of the Life Magazines for the war period. I found little other than what had been listed in Reader's Guide. The most useful additional information was contained in visual material -- i.e. the defense advertisements, especially those put out by Philco. These delineated clearly the stereotypical view of the Japanese.

Ohio State does not have copies of Look Magazine or Cosmopolitan going back to 1942. During a trip to the Popular Culture Library at Bowling Green University I did find some Look Magazines in their
archives, but they did not stress the Japanese any more than did other popular magazines. Attention in popular periodicals of the 1940's seems to have been focused almost exclusively on the Nazi's and the European theatre.

Moving from magazines to movies, I read the reviews of the most popular movies dealing with the war in the Pacific Theatre. Again these were not too numerous but I was able to discern attitudes from the content of the films themselves as well as the attitudes of the reviewers toward the Japanese. I looked briefly into war training films such as Frank Capra's "Why We Fight" series, and his "Know Your Ally; Know Your Enemy" series. Although most of the emphasis was on the European front, our men in the armed forces were exposed to several training films dealing with the Japanese.

Fiction in pulp magazine and book form I discovered at Bowling Green University in the Popular Culture Library there. Most of the fiction of the time dealt with Europeans rather than Orientals, but I was able to read the works of Sidney R. Bowen, popular author of the Dave Dawson and Red Randall series which were so popular with teenagers during the 1940's. In addition I was able to go through stacks of pulp magazines (mostly detective and armed service magazines) in their archives and again was surprised by the lack of material. Nazi's seemed to be a much more popular topic than Japanese.

Bowling Green was also able to supply me with recordings of two popular songs made during the 1940's which dealt with the
Japanese. While these songs never reached the hit parade they were very racist in tone and echoed the sentiments of many movies and novels of the time.

Finally I investigated comic books and magazine cartoons during the 1940's. This proved to be very difficult once again as comic books of this era seem to be in the hands of private collectors rather than university libraries! Local book stores dealing in comics also lack books that go back that far, although my husband discovered one in a Dayton book store for $4.00. Unfortunately he did not choose to contribute it to my research! Even the Popular Culture Library at Bowling Green lacked comics as far back as 1941, except for the one issue of Wings Comics which I have cited. I was able to locate some anthologies of best cartoons and comic strips in the Art Department of Ohio State University and gleaned a little information from them.

Having thus investigated magazines, books, films, music and comics I turned briefly to government publications and propaganda. I was able to see a War Relocation Agency film entitled "Challenge to Democracy." This film was distributed by the YMCA and shown to many groups as an explanation for the justification of the internment camps and a plea for tolerance once the Japanese were released into civilian life. I also found a little material put out by the War Production Board which was cited in John Morton Blum's new book, *V Was For Victory.*
A more thorough investigation of popular culture than this thesis entails might well delve more deeply into the role of government propaganda in American society. I did not go further than the research indicated other than writing the Pentagon and the National Archives for leads to references of government propaganda during the war years. Although I received no reply from either, I am sure that a thorough investigation of the annual reports of the Office of War Information, the War Department, and the War Relocation Authority would yield valuable data.

In sum, there was far less evidence of material on the Japanese-Americans during the war years than I had anticipated. Even evidence on the culture and habits of the Japanese enemy seemed limited. One gets the definite impression that after the internment there was a deliberate effort on the part of the national periodicals to ignore the existence of Japanese-Americans in the United States. This, coupled with an obsession with Hitler and the European front, gave rise to relatively little discussion of the Japanese. Even so, polls at the end of the war showed universal prejudice toward American-Japanese so that the publicity which was available evidently had a negative effect on the minds of the American people.
CHAPTER II

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CHINESE PRIOR TO 1870

The saga of Japanese-Americans in the continental United States began before the arrival of any Japanese to western shores, because the Japanese inherited the attitudes shown toward the Chinese who preceded them.

The anti-oriental story began in the 1850's with the Chinese arrival on the West Coast. The Chinese first appeared in great numbers during the California gold rushes. Competition for the gold from foreigners infuriated native Americans who were filled with zealous enthusiasm for "manifest destiny" which declared Americans and Americans alone had a "natural divine right to all the gold in California." This xenophobia, combined with greed for the gold, produced a West Coast tradition of antipathy and even violence toward anyone identifiably foreign or different. For the next hundred years racial prejudice and economic greed would wreck havoc within the oriental communities.

A stereotype of the Chinese soon developed, many features of which transferred automatically to the Japanese, as the average white American could not or would not distinguish between the two. First, the Chinese were seen as a threat to American labor, driving white workers from employment by stealth and treachery. Since they usually worked harder and for longer hours at substantially lower pay, they were considered somehow subhuman, incapable of assimilation
and therefore unworthy of citizenship. The Chinese were despised by the whites for their hard working habits, and ironically because of these habits they were seen as morally evil individuals, deliberately degrading white labor.

Part and parcel of the Chinese stereotype fashioned in the 1850's were the familiar images of opium dens, prostitution and slavery. In white America's eyes the aura of crime and dishonesty hung heavily about the Chinese communities.

The concept of the "yellow peril" also appeared as many Californians believed all Chinese were loyal only to the Chinese emperor and were working actively with him to conquer the United States through infiltration and subversion. Later a direct parallel was to develop in regard to the attitudes toward Japanese-Americans during World War II.

In sum, this picture of the inscrutable Oriental - sneaky, filled with cunning, and dishonest - was painted in vivid colors in the 1850's and would impress every succeeding generation, striking terror into the hearts of those who feared a culture and a people they could not readily understand.

After three decades of determined effort by businessmen who resented Chinese economic competition and politicians who profited from anti-Oriental sentiments, California was able to influence the United States Congress to pass legislation to exclude Chinese labor from American shores. The California State legislature proclaimed a legal holiday in 1882 to encourage attendance at rallies
urging passage of this national exclusion act. The popularity of such a move was apparent. The rally in San Francisco alone drew 30,000 enthusiasts. By the end of 1882 a coalition of West Coast politicians and sympathetic Southern legislators was able to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act. This act forbade the entry of any Chinese laborers for ten years, and later was extended indefinitely.

The Chinese Exclusion Act ironically led directly to the immigration of the Japanese. This was due to an acute shortage of cheap labor on the West Coast as many Chinese returned to their homeland and others moved inland. The Japanese were encouraged to immigrate to fill the void in the labor market as they were available and willing to work for lower wages than most Europeans. These new immigrants were to find themselves associated with the negative images assigned to the Chinese, so that the anti-Oriental prejudice merely shifted from the Chinese to the Japanese, intensifying as it did so.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II


3. Ibid., p. 18-19.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 17.


10. tenBroek, p. 18.


12. tenBroek, p. 23.
CHAPTER III
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE JAPANESE - 1870-1941

The migration of Japanese to the United States, following that of the Chinese, began as a trickle and rapidly grew to a rushing stream. In 1870 there were merely 55 people of Japanese ancestry in the United States and by 1880 the number had risen to only 148. However, by 1910 there were 72,157 Japanese in America. This tremendous growth in the Japanese population over a 40 year period was attributable to the desire on the West Coast for a renewed source of cheap labor.

The Japanese, like the Chinese before them, became targets of hatred and discrimination. They were easily identified as being foreign and "different." Indeed they were different, not only physically but culturally. Unfortunately, these cultural differences were perceived as racial characteristics and therefore most Americans felt that the Japanese could never change and assimilate into the American culture. This assumed inherent inability to assimilate made them a hated people, unworthy for citizenship in American eyes.

Cultural differences included differences in family life and social activities outside the family. There was an emphasis on the family and a respect for tradition which was quite different from the average West Coaster's emphasis on individuality and freedom from binding rules and regulations. The Japanese also had tight social organizations, partly through desire and partly through
necessity for survival in a hostile America. These social organizations came to be viewed with suspicion by white West Coasters whose social forms were quite loose and generally unorganized. Certainly the Japanese insistence on elaborate, formal etiquette and intricate ceremony was alien to the tough adventuring type who populated the West Coast during the latter half of the 19th century.

The stereotypes which described the Japanese to the American public grew from Chinese stereotypes - in fact, so many Californians mixed up the Chinese and Japanese that in 1901 the Japanese felt compelled to distribute leaflets requesting that they be differentiated from the Chinese. The sneaky, cunning, dishonest Chinese image clung to the Japanese. Then as the Japanese advanced beyond the position of the docile "coolie" in American society, they were differentiated from the Chinese because they were seen as even more dangerous and undesirable.

For instance, an editorial appearing in a San Francisco labor journal read:

"...the sniveling Jap who swarms along the street and cringingly offers his paltry services for a suit of clothes and a front seat in our public schools, is a far greater danger to the laboring portion of society than all the opium-soaked pigtailed who ever blotted the fair name of this beautiful city."

At a San Francisco labor rally seeking "protection against Asiatic hordes" Mayor James P. Phelan declared that "the Asiatic laborers will undermine our civilization." On the same occasion
Professor Edward A. Ross of Stanford said, "Should worst come to worst, it would be better for us if we were to turn our guns upon every vessel bringing Japanese to our shore rather than permit them to land."

In 1901 the United States Industrial Commission reported to Americans that the Japanese:

"...are more servile than the Chinese, but less obedient and far less desirable. They have most of the vices of the Chinese, with none of the virtues. They underbid the Chinese in everything and are as a class tricky, unreliable and dishonest."

Such observations diverged widely from reality. In actual fact the typical Japanese immigrant was a hard-working, thrifty young man under thirty who had come to America for purely economic reasons. Two thirds of the immigrants were farmers from the lower socio-economic levels of Japanese society, and thus they were used to strenuous physical labor over long hours. Twenty percent went directly into agriculture and the rest were generally migratory laborers for five to eight years before returning to the land. Educationally most of the immigrants had the equivalent of an eighth grade education which was above that of the average Chinese immigrant and even many American settlers.

As time went on the Japanese became more affluent, thus setting the stage for the resentment which springs from economic competition. They established families, usually sending to Japan for their brides. With wives and children working together with the men, the Japanese
were able to save enough to own their own land and open small businesses. White Americans, not understanding the family traditions, accused the Japanese of exploiting wife and child labor and deliberately undercutting the more "civilized" white workingman who would not stoop to the level of "enslaving" his own family for economic gain. This fear of economic competition on the farm and in the city led to increased anti-Japanese agitation.

The first specific anti-Japanese movements emanated from the 12 labor unions, especially in San Francisco. As early as 1888 the seaman's organization objected to the San Francisco Shipowners Association when the Association announced its intention to man 13 several ships with Japanese crews. Labor continued its fierce resistance to Japanese competition in California through the editorial pen of its own press and through political pressure on state and national officials.

The response of politicians to labor's particular hatred, and society's generalized hatred, of the Oriental was predictable. James Duval Phelan built his entire career on the anti-Japanese issue, rising at last to the United States Senate. He began by running for mayor of San Francisco in 1896 on a pro-labor, anti-Japanese platform. He was the chief speaker at the labor rally in 1900 whose primary aim was to stop Japanese competition in the labor market. The anti-Japanese sentiment reached to the statehouse where Governor Henry T. Gage urged the passage of memorials to the
United States Congress "for the protection of American Labor
against the Immigration of Oriental Laborers." For the next
forty-five years every session of the California legislature
introduced at least one piece of anti-Japanese legislation.

In July of 1900 the first national anti-Japanese legislation
was passed. The First Gentleman's Agreement was reached as a
result of American protest against Japanese Americans on the West
Coast. The Japanese government announced that no further passports
would be issued to contract laborers seeking to enter the United
States. As a result, in 1901 there was a 50% decline in immigration,
yet anti-Japanese sentiment on the West Coast did not abate.

The Russo-Japanese War made relations with the Japanese a
national issue. Russian anti-Japanese propaganda influenced all
classes of Americans, and fear of the "yellow peril" became wide-
spread. The Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs
predicted that if Japan won the Russo-Japanese War she would then
turn and "fight a bloody war with the U.S. over the Phillipines."
The Hearst newspapers also took up the cry of "yellow peril" and
led a crusade against Japan as the front line of the yellow menace
threatening California.

The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War was decided on American
soil, which brought the conflict close to the consciousness of most
Americans. Although the Japanese were victorious in the Russo-
Japanese conflict which ended in September of 1905, the cost of their
victory was dear. They were exhausted and near financial collapse. Together with the Russians they asked Washington to intervene and provide for a peace settlement. With great reluctance the United States agreed and set up a peace conference in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The ensuing Portsmouth Treaty resulted in Japan becoming a real power in the Pacific. Now Eastern Americans as well as those on the West Coast began to voice feelings of fear and distrust.

A year after the Portsmouth Treaty another incident of national importance brought the Japanese problem to the forefront of the American consciousness. In October of 1906 a scandal erupted in San Francisco which rocked the nation, bringing even President Teddy Roosevelt into the fray. The San Francisco school board declared that Japanese school children could no longer attend public schools with white children, but must attend segregated facilities. It is probably significant that this announcement came just prior to the November election when the incumbent Union Labor Party was struggling to keep in office despite well-publicized grant scandals. (Abe Ruef, political boss of the party, was later convicted of bribery. ) Considering there were only 93 Japanese students out of a student body of 6,000 in San Francisco, political motives seem more likely than genuine concern for the safety or mental health of the white students exposed to Japanese corruption.
This incident, though local in nature, had international repercussions. Japan reacted strongly to the perceived insult to members of the Japanese race. Strong official protests were made, noting the violation of treaty agreements dating back to 1854. Japanese newspapers had a field day, once again arousing anti-American sentiments in their own country as a result of white America's treatment of yellow skinned people in the United States. Mainichi Shimbun, one of the most reputable newspapers in Japan, wrote on October 22, 1906:

"Stand up Japanese nation! Our countrymen have been humiliated on the other side of the Pacific. Our poor boys and girls have been expelled from the public schools by the rascals of the United States, cruel and merciless like demons...why do we not insist on sending (war) ships?"

President Roosevelt took seriously the threat of war and was furious with the San Francisco School Board. He sent a message to Congress calling the action a "wicked absurdity". The San Francisco Chronicle reported: "Our feeling is not against Japan but against an unpatriotic president who unites with aliens to break down the civilization of his own countrymen." Roosevelt summoned Mayor Schmitz and San Francisco school officials to Washington to settle the problem. In the capitol the battle was waged in the back halls of Congress as well as the White House, with Southerners supporting the racial contentions of the delegation from California. A Mississippi congressman was quoted
as saying, "We want an homogenous and assimilable population of 32
white people in the Republic."

The Californians drove a hard bargain, but finally they agreed
to withdraw the segregation order in return for the President's
promise to negotiate with Japan for a restriction on Japanese
immigration. The President kept his word and his discussions with
the Japanese led to the Gentlemen's Agreements of 1907-8 which
guaranteed the denial of passports by Japan to all laborers except
"former residents" and "parents, wives, or children of residents."

San Francisco continued to be a hotbed of agitation, not only
discriminating in education but also in business. In 1907 the
San Francisco Board of Police Commissioners denied licenses to
Japanese businessmen wishing to conduct employment bureaus for their
people. Like the school controversy, this denial of basic American
freedoms had international repercussions. The Japanese protested
vigorously to Washington. Roosevelt was deeply disturbed by the
attitudes shown toward the Japanese on the West Coast and
other parts of the country and he continued to take the threat of
war very seriously. On July 10, 1907, Roosevelt wrote a note to
Lodge stating:

"I shall continue to do everything I can by
politeness and consideration to the Japanese
to offset the worse than criminal stupidity of
the San Francisco mob, the San Francisco press,
and such papers as the New York Herald. I do
not believe we shall have war, but it is no fault
of the yellow press if we do not have it."
The unfavorable stereotype of the Japanese which had begun in California was spreading nationwide through popular culture. In 1907, Colliers, a widely read national magazine, published a series of humorous sketches by Wallace Irwin entitled "Letters of a Japanese Schoolboy." Hashimura Togo, the schoolboy, was depicted in the stereotypical image — bucktoothed, bespectacled, tricky, arrogant and dishonest. Griffin Bancroft followed with a book entitled The Interlopers, a novel about the "yellow peril in California."

Despite the decline in immigration as a result of the new Gentlemen's Agreements, anti-Japanese agitation reached new heights in 1909. Labor continued to resist Japanese business in the urban areas. Many of the early immigrants who had not gone directly into farming took the savings they had managed to put away from their work on gang labor crews and opened small shops and boarding houses for Japanese immigrants. As they prospered they began to seek a white clientele outside of the Little Tokyos which had been created in the urban areas. This created competition with white businessmen and led to renewed boycotts and attacks against the Japanese. One such attack occurred against Japanese laundries. An attempt to drive Japanese out of business was launched in San Francisco, and billboards proclaimed the necessity for racial cohesion in business affairs. A typical billboard read:
"Foolish Woman!
Spending your Man's
Earnings on Japs.
Be Fair. Patronize
Your own. 37
We support you."

As a result of the pressure on Japanese businesses from the whites, and the drastic reduction in immigration after the 1907-8 Gentlemen's Agreements, customers for Japanese services were greatly reduced. Many urban Japanese left the cities and went into agriculture. This pleased labor but created antagonism among white farmers who feared competition from the efficient Japanese. Economic considerations would continue to inform white attitudes toward the Japanese through the 1940's.

Economics, prejudice and politics frequently go hand in hand. Election years usually saw an increase in anti-Japanese propaganda and the national election of 1912 was no exception. Woodrow Wilson campaigned in California and told Californians what they wanted to hear. "The whole question is one of assimilation of diverse races. We cannot make an homogeneous population of a people who do not blend with the Caucasian race." One hundred thousand copies of this speech were distributed by the Democrats all over California to spread the good word on Wilson's position. Wilson was to rue his facile encouragement of California prejudice when in January of 1913 the California legislature passed the Alien Land law. This Webb-Haney Bill stated that aliens not eligible for citizenship should not hold title to land in California. Fearing an outcry from Japan, Wilson sent the famed orator William Jennings Bryan to address the
California legislature in an attempt to prevent the bill's passage. Politics once again played an important part in the lives of Japanese-Americans living in California. According to Prejudice, War and the Constitution, Byran was most persuasive and had almost changed the minds of the legislators when Governor Hiram Johnson rose to his feet and gave such an impassioned speech the measure was passed overwhelmingly. It should be noted here that whereas Wilson was a Democrat, Hiram Johnson was a Progressive Republican who had open presidential ambitions. Johnson may have seen this victory as necessary to advance his political career. The Japanese in California had become pawns in a game for political power and it suited some of the players to enflame latent prejudice against the Japanese among the voters.

One of the greatest influences in American attitudes against the Japanese during this period was the Hearst newspaper chain. William Randolph Hearst had used anti-Chinese politics as one means of becoming a senator, and the junior Hearst built a career on being anti-Japanese. In fact, Time Magazine was later to lay much of the blame for the internment camps at the feet of the Hearst campaign against the Japanese.

In spite of the best attempts of Hearst, politicians, and an antagonistic public, the Japanese were not driven off the land nor out of California as a result of the Alien Land Act. The most
determined Japanese farmers merely put the land in the names of their minor children who were citizens by virtue of their birth in the United States. Those Japanese who did immigrate into the cities as a result of the Land Act served to renew labor antagonism as they provided fresh competition on the labor market.

World War I gave the Japanese community in the United States a brief respite. Anti-Japanese feeling abated somewhat as the Japanese were staunch and faithful allies. After the war, however, there was a large-scale revival of anti-Japanese sentiment with labor, agricultural and patriotic groups all combining forces to repress the Japanese. This renewed antagonism would eventually result in the Exclusion Act of 1924, an act which halted immigration of the Japanese to the United States.

1918-1924

Why would American attitudes toward the Japanese-Americans revert so quickly to Pre-World War I antagonism after a war to "save the world for democracy?"

The reasons are, no doubt, multiple, reflecting economic, political, and emotional fears. Carey McWilliams, respected author and state department official during the second World War, implies that Americans on the West Coast were frightened by the rapid growth of the Japanese population between 1900 and 1920. In 1900 the Japanese had been .07% of the population in California but by 1920 they were 2.1%. Californians were frightened by the future, not so
much by the existing situation. McWilliams also points out that politicians once again were exploiting the anti-Japanese issue. As an example, James D. Phelan who first rose to political prominence when he joined with labor against the Japanese in 1900 was still exploiting the anti-Japanese issue as a senator seeking re-election in 1920.

Jacobus tenBroek points out that the aggressive actions of Japan in Korea, China and Siberia after World War I strengthened arguments put forth by the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West that an invasion from Japan was likely. He also suggests that anti-Japanese agitation served the purpose of building membership in such organizations as the Grange and the Native Sons of the Golden West.

Professor Strong, psychologist at Sanford University, explains this prejudice in terms of the ego. Strong suggests that the "small man" felt that someone should be lower than he on the social scale, and he had chosen the Japanese. As the Japanese progressed, their race threatened the standards and privileges which the whites felt belonged only to them as the superior race. His theory goes on to say that the reason some groups were sympathetic toward the Japanese (i.e. social workers, school teachers, financiers, etc.) was because they were securely established and felt no feeling of threatened supremacy. Carey McWilliams more simply discusses the social disequilibrium involved when the upward movement of the Japanese resulted in class conflict.
Finally, economics certainly played a major role in anti-Japanese sentiment. Small farmers and shopkeepers were antagonistic when Japanese became land owners or entrepreneurs.

In response to the growing anti-Japanese feelings on the part of so many Californians, the California legislature strengthened the Alien Land Law of 1913 with an amendment passed in 1920. The Japanese had gotten around the 1913 bill by putting the land in the name of their minor children, so this new legislation was suggested in order to deprive the Japanese of the right to lease agricultural lands or to act as guardian for their own children to prevent them from buying land in the name of their offspring. This bill also forbade them to transfer property with the intent to evade the law. The Japanese could not even put up a good fight. The Alien Land Law Amendment passed overwhelmingly -- 668,483 to 222,086.

In 1923 a further restriction became law. No Japanese could engage in sharecropping. Therefore, unless a Japanese had purchased land prior to 1913 he could be nothing but a hired hand on the farms of California. Oregon and Washington and other western states rapidly passed similar laws.

Predictably there was widespread resentment in Japan and again they protested vigorously. Viscount Takahira Kato declared "We can never overlook this act" and students in Tokyo began to debate the question "Shall we declare war against the United States?"

In the face of this protest from Japan the Oriental Exclusion
League sent speakers throughout the East and Mid-West and covered the nation with leaflets in order to defend California's position. Once again attitudes spawned in California became national attitudes. Soon acts similar to the Alien Land Act Amendment of California were passed in Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Nebraska, Texas, Idaho and New Mexico in addition to Washington and Oregon.

Film and literature played its role in helping form public opinion. The American Legion realized the value of film, and as part of their effort to gain passage of the Alien Land Law of 1920 they released a picture entitled "Shadows of the West." Basically the film concerned a plot on the part of the Japanese to corner the vegetable market in California. The Japanese were portrayed as spies and cutthroats of the worst type. The movie climaxed with the kidnapping of two white girls followed by a dramatic rescue by the American Legion! One young lady interviewed in the 1920's probably had a typical reaction when she said of the influence of film on her attitudes:

"a few years ago the Japanese in the picture show always took a villainous part. I have never been personally acquainted with any member of the race, but I have formed a dis- like for them because of these little things."

Literature of the time also reflected anti-Japanese attitudes. Wallace Irwin continued to write hostile literature, publishing Seed of the Sun in 1921, widely read in its serial form in the Saturday Evening Post. In the same year Peter B. Kyne published
The *Pride of Palomar* which was serialized in *Cosmopolitan*. In his novel, Kyne described the Japanese as greedy, crude, selfish, calculating, quarrelsome, suspicious, crafty, irritable and unreliable. In addition they had no sense of sportsmanship, no affection for their wives and never showed any nobility or generosity of spirit. Cornelius Vanderbilt was so impressed by this novel that he sent copies to a list of important Americans seeking their comments. These comments were then published in a pamphlet entitled "The Verdict of Public Opinion on the Japanese-American Question."

Thus national opposition to the Japanese built steadily during the years between 1918-1924. Popular novels, films, political propaganda (especially from Western and Southern politicians), hostility in the press (especially in the Hearst publications), fear of war, and the lobbying efforts of the American Legion, The National Grange, and other organizations opposed to the Japanese had done their work. In 1924 the Quota Immigration Act effectively shut the door to all further Japanese immigration.

With this Exclusion Act of 1924 the highest hopes of the anti-Japanese factions had been realized. After 1924 overt hostility toward the Japanese decreased. However, the negative stereotype of the Japanese was firmly set into the American consciousness. Periods of anxiety brought negative feelings boiling to the surface. Brief anti-Japanese outbursts recurred in 1931 as Japan aggressed
anew on her neighbors, and again during the Great Depression some Californians blamed the Japanese for their economic troubles. While anti-Japanese feelings were generally quiescent and beneath the surface of American society, nevertheless the hostility was still there. This is perhaps most graphically illustrated in Hollywood's decision in 1938 to abandon the Mr. Moto film series because "anti-Japanese feeling is running so high in America."

The bombing of Pearl Harbor released a storm of hostility so great that it only abated when 112,000 men, women and children of Japanese descent were behind barbed wire.

1940-1941

By 1940 the Japanese community in the United States was beginning to decline in numbers. Census figures showed that while there were 137,000 Japanese in 1930, there were only 127,000 in 1940. In addition to a low birth rate, more people were departing than arriving from Japan. After 1924, for every 100 arrivals there were 146 departures. Most of the people who left were aging men, going home to die.

Those remaining in the United States were sharply divided into two distinct age groups. The immigrants, called Issei, were an older group. Fully 50% were over 50 years of age, and 17% were over 60. Only 8% were under 35. The second generation, born on American soil and therefore citizens, was called Nisei. This was a
much younger group. Two thirds were under 20, with the average age being 19. Only 3% were over 35. This age grouping meant that while the Issei held the controlling influence in the Japanese-American community, the Nisei were fast coming of age and the reins of power were about to change hands.

Nearly 90% of the Japanese in the United States lived in three West Coast states. California still housed 80% of all Japanese in America with Los Angeles alone sheltering 28%.

This concentration of the Japanese created an image on the West Coast of far greater numbers of Japanese than there really were, and this contributed a great deal to the racial prejudice in the area.

Most Japanese were somehow connected with the land, either growing or selling a great deal of the produce which supplied the large urban markets on the West Coast. Japanese also had four million dollars invested in the floral business. The Japanese used only 3.9% of the farmland in California but because they farmed very intensively they were able to have a near monopoly of the fresh vegetable market in California, even though the amount of land they used was not vast. Again, however, their visibility on garden farms around the edges of cities and along highways leading into the cities created the image of large numbers of Japanese farmers.

Educationally the Nisei averaged two years beyond high school. In 1940 this was an attainment beyond the average American citizen, making the Japanese a particularly well educated group.
Although the eyes of America were focused almost exclusively on Europe and Europeans, some clues about the attitudes toward the Japanese during this period can be found in the popular culture. Hearst was continuing his life-long invective against the Japanese in 1940, with pieces like the editorial in the *Los Angeles Examiner* which appeared on February 21 to refute Washington's assurances of Japanese loyalty.

"Colonel Knox should come out to California and see the myriads of little Japs peacefully raising fruits and flowers and vegetables on California sunshine, and saying hopefully and wistfully: "Some day I come with Japanese army and take all this. Yes, sir, thank you." Then the Colonel should see the fleets of peaceful little Jap fishing boats plying up and down the California coast, catching fish and taking photos." 79

National publications took a kinder position, however. In its October 11th issue, *Life* ran a feature article on the Nisei in California. While noting that Californians were "casting an anxious eye upon the Japanese-Americans in their midst," *Life* went on to say:

"In one sense Americans have only themselves to blame for the clamorishness of the Nisei...excluded... all achieve economic independence of a sort, and it is this independence that most infuriates those white Americans who have failed to achieve it for themselves."

In this very sympathetic article, *Life* continued by showing in words and pictures that "Japanese babies are the world's cutest,"
and then describing how these babies had little chance as adults to achieve success in the white world which surrounded them.

"California universities acknowledge that Japanese-Americans are excellent students, excellent athletes, and excellent companions. But few of them are admitted to college fraternities or sororities and when they graduate, few find easy employment in the business or professional world... but their United States citizenship and patriotic loyalties mean little to race-conscious Americans. Their color imposes a barrier which few of them ever manage to transcend... housing is the worst problem of the Nisei as the color line is drawn."

Life was accurate in describing the urban Japanese as being restricted to their "Little Tokyo" settlements. These "Little Tokyos" were viewed with suspicion because of racial and cultural differences which were very sharply pronounced. In 1940 the leadership in Japanese-American communities belonged to the Issei. It was just about to turn over to the younger generation of Nisei, a generation which embraced American culture most enthusiastically and tended to reject the distinctly Japanese culture of their fathers. Had this transition occurred it might have alleviated much of the hostility toward the Japanese-Americans as other Americans perceived that Japanese could, after all, assimilate. However, the events of December 1941 shattered the American peace with Japan and ended with one swift blow any possibility of normal assimilation by residents with yellow skin and slanted eyes.
CHAPTER III

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3. Carey McWilliams, Prejudice; Japanese Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance, p. 79.

4. Ibid., p. 81-2.


7. Ibid., p. 34-5.

8. Ibid.

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13. Ibid., p. 33.

14. Ibid., p. 34.

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16. Ibid.


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20. McWilliams, p. 19.
21. tenBroek, p. 27.


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26. Bosworth, p. 34.


31. tenBroek, p. 41.


33. tenBroek, p. 41.

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50. tenBroek, p. 28.
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62. tenBroek, p. 57 and 65.
63. Ibid., p. 65.
64. Dorothy Swaine Thomas, The Salvage, p. 11.
68. Nakama, p. 10.

69. Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 4.

70. Carey McWilliams, Public Affairs Committee pamphlet, "What About Our Japanese-Americans?" p. 3.

71. Smith, p. 222.


73. Ibid., p. 87.

74. Ibid., p. 126-7.

75. Ibid., p. 87.


77. Smith, p. 252.


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80. Life, October 14, 1941, p. 75ff.
CHAPTER IV
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE JAPANESE AFTER PEARL HARBOR

On December 7 Pearl Harbor was bombed by the Japanese, catching the United States completely by surprise. In swift succession Japan successfully attacked Hong Kong, Manila, Thailand, Singapore, Midway, Wake Island and Guam. The British warships REPULSE and PRINCE OF WALES were sunk in the far Pacific, upsetting the balance of naval power there. It seemed as though Japan had invincible power sweeping through the Pacific. Americans were very apprehensive and they did not have access to very accurate information. Rumor had it that the entire Pacific fleet was destroyed and all reinforcements had been sunk, and this rumor was widely believed.

Other rumors stated that fifth column Japanese activity in Hawaii was responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor. These stories were widely repeated in the press and West Coast Americans read with believing eyes, educated by 50 years of lies about Japanese treachery. American officials did not dispute the stories which later proved to be totally false. Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, commenting on Pearl Harbor on December 16 said "it was the most effective fifth column work of the war with the possible exception of Norway," even though he knew this to be a false statement. In general the federal government showed a lack of interest in controlling public opinion by making true facts readily available. Roger Daniels suggests the reason for
encouraging the American public to believe in Japanese
treachery in Hawaii was a face saving attempt to protect our
own military incompetence.

Even though rumors and wild stories were widespread, there
was no immediate reaction against local Japanese. There were a
few instances of violence, such as the murder of a thirty year old
Nisei, recently honorably discharged from the Army medical corps
and stabbed to death on a Los Angeles sidewalk; the shooting of a
garage attendant in Los Angeles; and the shooting of a waiter in
Chicago. However, in general the atmosphere was relatively calm.

Dr. Eric Bellquist of the University of California points
out that it was not until after the "commentators and columnists,
'professional patriots,' witchhunters, alien-baiters, and varied
groups and persons with aims of their own" began inflating
public opinion that hysteria began to develop. Only after about
six weeks did the public temper begin to change from watchful
tolerance to hostility. The turning point in public opinion
appears to have been the arrival of the Tolan Committee in
California, a congressional investigation of the pulse of public
opinion on the coast. Members of the committee leaked unfounded
stories to the press concerning sabotage and treachery on the
part of the Japanese. These frightening stories made front page
headlines. Although the Roberts Report, commissioned by the
President to discover the causes of Pearl Harbor and released
January 25, and reports from responsible Hawaiian officials
declared absolutely and without doubt that there was no
evidence of Japanese sabotage, the truth never caught up with the sensational falsehoods.

With the widespread belief that Japanese-Americans were responsible for Pearl Harbor, the term "Jap" came into general use for American residents. Newsweek comments in its December 22nd issue that "newspapermen are now reveling in the use of the word "Jap," forbidden on most American newspapers until last week."

Ives Neeley points out in his article "The Press Was An Accessory" that the term "Japs" was used for both the enemy and the United States citizen. He writes "German-Americans were not Nazis; Italian-Americans were not Fascists; but a Jap is a Jap."

This inability to distinguish an enemy from a Japanese-American was illustrated in the city of Gardena which erased the names of all Nisei from its town honor roll of citizens in the service.

The hue and cry against the Japanese was reinforced in popular culture until evacuation was demanded. The Japanese stereotype was revived in such articles as Time's "How to Tell Your Chinese Friends From the Japanese." Japanese were said to look dogmatic and arrogant and to laugh loudly at the wrong moments."

John B. Hughes, well-known commentator for the Mutual Broadcasting Company, launched a month long campaign against the Japanese in the "News and Views by John B. Hughes." By the time it ended most of the influential newspapers were demanding evacuation of enemy aliens, especially Japanese on the West Coast. Early in February West Coast congressmen and senators joined the bandwagon demanding
evacuation. There is evidence of a large amount of money being spent to bring about this evacuation. Radio programs, public speakers, chain letters, post cards and telegrams poured in on public officials, often in identical language or even mimeographed form. Bradford Smith, author of *Americans From Japan*, is convinced that public opinion did not favor such drastic and un-American behavior even after being under pressure from the Hearst press and other influences. "It took a great deal of false publicity and over three months of time to produce the public sentiment for evacuation. There was nothing spontaneous about it."

Finally a poll taken by the University of Denver showed 3/4 of the residents of southern California and 1/2 in northern California favored segregation of Japanese aliens. A surprising 1/3 in southern California wanted the Nisei removed also.

The stage was now set for the full scale evacuation of the Japanese on the West Coast.

**Evacuation.**

"Evacuation" meant the removal of all those of Japanese heritage, citizens as well as aliens, from the West Coast military areas.

The mood for American acceptance of evacuation was set long before the actual event took place. American racism, bolstered by the external threat of Japanese militarism, created the pre-conditions necessary for the press and politicians to persuade most people that it was perfectly all right to force people to move and later be imprisoned without benefit of trial for an
indefinite period of time merely because their eyes slanted and their skin had a yellowish tint. Perhaps the fact that it was an election year, and anti-orientalism had always been a popular vote-getting issue, encouraged the politicians to support evacuation with especial vigor. All the blame cannot be laid at the feet of the press and politicians, however. Many groups used the tools of popular culture to contribute to the atmosphere in which evacuation and internment seemed so "right".

Radio and film played a significant part in the decision. Radio commentators such as John Hughes urged evacuation. He claimed the Japanese had contributed funds to Japan's war chest and that, in fact, the control of California's vegetable output was another facet of the Emperor's war plan. He supported unfounded rumors of espionage and stated that 90% of Nisei were loyal to Japan. By the end of January the West Coast press clamored for mass evacuation, and the book *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, implies strongly that the Hughes broadcasts were largely responsible.

Hollywood contributed Jungle Jim films (fighting the Japanese in Burma) and a Warner Brothers production called *Air Force* showed the Japanese committing acts of sabotage at Pearl Harbor. Significantly no government office, including the Office of War Information ever bothered to issue a denial of the premise of the film, even though they knew full well that no such sabotage occurred.
Bellquist has implied that certain groups supported evacuation for the financial advantage it would bring them. Other groups, like the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West, traditionally anti-Japanese, did what might be expected when they supported evacuation so enthusiastically. Among other things, the Native Sons sponsored a series of radio programs urging evacuation, while the American Legion protested to local citizens of Portland because they were helping keep up a Japanese-American cemetery. Eugene Rostow goes so far as to say that evacuation and internment "...was conceived and put through by the organized minority, whose business it has been for 45 years to increase and exploit racial tensions on the West Coast."

The official justification for evacuation and internment grew out of the stated conviction that the West Coast was in imminent danger of invasion and the Japanese constituted a dangerous fifth column who could aid and abet the enemy. A secondary consideration was the protection of the Japanese from mob violence as anti-Japanese hysteria grew on the West Coast.

The wheels began to turn in the direction of the camps immediately after Pearl Harbor. On December 6 and 9 the Department of Justice arrested all known "dangerous enemy aliens." On December 11, the Western Defence Command was established and the West Coast was defined as a theatre of war. Lt. General John L. DeWitt was named commander of the area.
A bespectacled, slight but wiry man, at sixty-two DeWitt was about to embark on the last command of his career. He is often portrayed as being a cautious, indecisive man who swayed to the opinion of the last eloquent person to whom he talked. There is no doubt that whatever reasons DeWitt had for ordering evacuation, at least one was racial prejudice. In a phone conversation with General Green, DeWitt objected to having blacks, Filipinos or Japanese in his command and protested their inclusion saying, "I'd rather have a white regiment." Testimony before the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee illustrates his difficulty in viewing Japanese as individuals capable of loyalty to the United States.

"The Japanese-Americans are a dangerous element, whether loyal or not. There is no way to determine their loyalty...it makes no difference whether he is an American. Theoretically he is still Japanese and you can't change him...you can't change him by giving him a piece of paper." Again he said, "The continued presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly-knit racial group, bound to the enemy by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion, constituted a menace which had to be dealt with." 39

and

"In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become Americanized, the racial strains are undiluted. It therefore follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies of Japanese extraction, are at large today." 36
Eugene V. Rostow states unequivocally that "the dominant factor in the development of this policy (evacuation) was not a military estimate of a military problem, but familiar West Coast attitudes of race prejudice." It seems obvious that DeWitt's own beliefs fit in very well with the general attitudes on the West Coast.

The decision did not rest entirely with DeWitt, of course. Orders from Washington had to give him authority to do what he felt necessary to guarantee defense of the West Coast. Attention in Washington focused on the possibility of mass evacuation when Leland M. Ford, Congressman from Santa Monica, introduced the idea on the floor of the House on January 21, 1942. Some time later Senator Tom Stewart from Tennessee authored the Senate Bill to intern all Americans of Japanese descent. He said:

"The Japanese are among our worst enemies. They are cowardly and immoral. They are different from Americans in every conceivable way...and no Japanese...should have a right to claim American citizenship. A Jap is a Jap anywhere you find him, and his taking the oath of allegiance to this country would not help even if he should be permitted to do so. They do not believe in God and have no respect for an oath. They have been plotting for years against the Americas and their democracies."38

This view seemed to reflect the attitude of most southern and western congressmen as the national stage was set for evacuation orders.

Anti-Japanese lobbyists were hard at work in Washington also. For instance, the Shipper-Growers Association of Salinas, California
sent Mr. Austin E. Anson to the capitol. He was frank in admitting to the Saturday Evening Post:

"We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japanese for selfish reasons. We might as well be honest. We believe it's a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown man. They came into this valley to work and they stayed to take over...if all the Japanese were removed tomorrow we'd never miss them...and we don't want them back when the war ends, either." 39

On January 29, 1942, United States Attorney General Biddle issued the first of a series of orders establishing limited strategic areas on the Pacific Coast. All enemy aliens were to be removed from these areas by February 24, but United States citizens had permission to stay.

For many people this was not strong enough action on the part of the Federal Government. Walter Lippman was one of those who protested, and on February 12 he wrote a column entitled "The Fifth Column on the Coast." This column was to have tremendous impact on the future of the Nisei remaining in the strategic areas from which aliens had been removed. In part it read:

"It is a fact that the Japanese navy has been reconnoitering the Pacific Coast more or less continually and for a considerable period of time, testing and feeling out the American defenses. It is the fact that communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy agents on land. These are facts which we shall ignore or minimize at our peril.

I understand fully and appreciate thoroughly the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a policy of mass evacuation and mass internment of all those who are technically enemy aliens. But I submit that Washington is not defining the problem on the Pacific
Coast correctly and that it is failing to
deal with the practical issues promptly.
The Pacific Coast is officially a combat
zone; some part of it may at any moment
be a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional
rights include the right to reside and do
business on a battlefield."

This column received immediate attention in Washington. General

Marshall sent it to Secretary of War Stimson. One day after
the appearance of this widely read column, a congressional delegation
from the West Coast, led by Senator Hiram Johnson, sent President
Roosevelt a resolution urging "immediate evacuation of all persons
of Japanese lineage...aliens and citizens alike" from the entire
strategic area of California, Washington and Oregon. Justice
Department officials later declared that the Lippman column had
been one of the most important factors in pushing public opinion
onto the side of evacuation.

By mid-February the California delegation had the official
support of many southern congressmen. John Rankin of Mississippi
and Martin Dies of Texas, in addition to Tom Stewart of Tennessee,
were leaders in the drive for evacuation of all Japanese from the
coastal area. Rankin showed no hesitation in putting his feelings
on the record:

"Once a Jap, always a Jap. You cannot change him.
You cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear."

and

"This is a race war...the white man's civilization
has come into conflict with Japanese barbarism..."
One of them must be destroyed...I say it is of vital importance that we get rid of every Japanese...They violate every sacred promise, every canon of honor and decency...These Japs who had been (in Hawaii) for generations were making signs, if you please, guiding the Japanese planes to the objects of their iniquity in order that they might destroy our naval vessels, murder our soldiers and sailors, and blow to pieces the helpless women and children of Hawaii. Damn them! Let's get rid of them now!"

Martin Dies had headed a special Congressional Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, and this group became known as the Dies Committee. Part of its function after December 7 was to investigate the bombing of Pearl Harbor and later to investigate the internment camps. By early February, 1942, the committee began to release sensational stories of supposed Japanese espionage, and on February 7 Senator Dies claimed unequivocally that there was evidence that Japanese-Americans had aided the enemy in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Cloaked in the legitimacy of a Congressional Report, these stories were widely believed.

Back in California General DeWitt was under strong pressure from many sides to recommend evacuation of the Japanese from the coastal areas. Perhaps the more sober voices from Washington urging patience and deliberation were too far away to have much impact. Among others in California the Attorney General, Earl Warren encouraged DeWitt toward evacuation. He was joined by congressmen such as Leland Ford and A. J. Elliot. The mayors of Los Angeles and Portland, Bowron and Riley, were clamoring
for relocation. Mayor Bowron made repeated radio addresses urging interment. Even Tom Clark, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, sent from Washington, was actively supporting evacuation. News of resolutions for evacuation from many groups poured into Dewitt's office, i.e. the American Legion and other veterans' groups; county boards of supervisors; farm groups; labor unions; civilian defense councils; businessmen's associations and even mothers' clubs.

The West Coast newspapers were also doing their best to influence Dewitt to make a decision for relocation. From January 22-26 editorials were 19-1 in favor of relocation. One editorial in the Los Angeles Times on February 2 strongly stated the paper's view. "A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched. So a Japanese-American, born of Japanese parents, grows up being Japanese, not American." Hostile letters to the editor which demanded mass evacuation were given top priority, reaching a crescendo between February 1-5.

All over the nation columnists echoed the cry for evacuation. In addition to Walter Lippman, Henry McLemore and Westbrook Pegler wrote columns which were widely syndicated, recommending evacuation of all Japanese.

Henry McLemore, a Hearst columnist, was perhaps the most vitriolic, writing on January 29:

"I am for immediate removal of every Japanese on the West Coast to a point deep in the interior. I don't mean a nice part of the interior, either. Herd 'em up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside room in the badlands. Let 'em be pinched, hurt, hungry and dead up against it...Personally, I hate
the Japanese. And that goes for all of them." Pegler, then writing for Scripps-Howard, bluntly suggested that:

"The Japanese in California should be under guard to the last man and woman right now and to hell with "habeas corpus" until the danger is over."

DeWitt seemed to believe genuinely that Japanese sabotage on the West Coast was a real possibility. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts had been commissioned by the President to find the causes of the unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor. The Roberts Report had been released on January 25, and although it did not cite any evidence of sabotage, neither did it state unequivocally that there was none. DeWitt took the quiet on the West Coast as a sign that the Japanese were just waiting for a propitious moment to strike in concerted attack, citing the very lack of evidence as proof of future sabotage plans. Also DeWitt probably made a mental note of the fact that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had been charged with neglect of duty in Hawaii and determined that he would not be caught in the same position.

Neither DeWitt nor any agency from Washington took steps to allay the fear and rising hysteria on the West Coast. In spite of pleas from Donald Renshaw (a government agent charged with sampling public opinion and reporting back to Washington) to send "a respected cabinet officer...to calm growing fear of the Japanese" nothing was done and the pressure on DeWitt continued to mount as hysteria spread.
On February 14, DeWitt finally cast the die. He sent the Secretary of War a memo strongly urging evacuation of "Japanese and other subversive persons" from the West Coast area.

Pressure in Washington had been building toward permission for an evacuation order. Although U.S. Attorney General Biddle began by opposing mass evacuation, especially in the absence of martial law, he changed his mind in the face of pressure of practical politics. Members of the Pacific Coast congressional delegation threatened to lead an attack against the appropriations for the Department of Justice unless a "satisfactory solution" on the Japanese was reached. With the approval of the Department of Justice and the recommendation of the military, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order #9066 on February 19, 1942.

Executive Order #9066 authorized the Secretary of War, or any military commander designated by the Secretary, to establish military areas and exclude from them "any or all persons." This executive order gave legal permission to DeWitt to use a free hand in defending the West Coast as he saw fit, since the next day Secretary of War Stimson officially designated him military commander with power to carry out an evacuation. A prior order issued on January 29 by Attorney General Biddle had been limited to removing only enemy aliens from strategic areas. Now DeWitt could name any area a "military zone" and prohibit anyone from entering it.
On February 21 the Tolan Congressional Committee descended upon San Francisco to hold open hearings investigating the problems of evacuation of enemy aliens and others. Its task was to take the pulse of public opinion on the West Coast. The Tolan Committee discovered that it was widely assumed on the West Coast that the Japanese were racially unassimilable. Thus the institutions of the Japanese were highly suspect. The language schools held for the Nisei, in a vain effort to teach them the culture of their parents, were suspected of being instruments of Imperial propaganda. The many community clubs and associations were seen as front groups controlled by Tokyo. Buddhism and Shintoism were viewed as agencies of emperor worship. Even the innocent farmer was suspected of being part of a peaceful invasion of American soil. A great fuss was made about the Nisei who had been educated in Japan and who were therefore considered spies and fanatics for Japan. This latter group constituted only 8.8% of the Japanese population, yet many whites were terrified of them. Public opinion was beginning to respond to the forces which encouraged evacuation. Actually it was entirely too late to stop the wheels from turning even had the committee wanted to, as DeWitt had already been authorized to carry out his intention proclaimed on February 14. The Tolan Committee hearings turned out to be a reinforcement exercise for the decisions already made. However, the publicity coming out of the hearings made an impact on public opinion which further helped ready the public for the internment of the Japanese.
The opinions expressed in the hearings, so widely publicized, reinforced the old anti-Japanese stereotypes. California Governor Olson, although generally supportive of the Japanese, told the committee that all Japanese look alike, lending credence to the claim that you can't tell the loyal from the disloyal.

Earl Warren, then Attorney General and soon to be Governor, testified that he agreed with General DeWitt's assessment of probable Japanese sabotage when he said "the reason we haven't had disaster in California is because it has been timed for a different date...our day of reckoning is bound to come in that regard."

The hearings were held in many West Coast cities, and many groups came to testify at the hearings, including the American Legion, California Joint Immigration Committee, various grand juries, city councils, law enforcement agencies and the mayors of Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, and San Francisco. Almost all of these groups supported evacuation vigorously, such as the Board of Supervisors from eleven California counties who issued a joint declaration that during the attack on Pearl Harbor "the Japanese were aided and abetted by fifth columnists -- the Japanese." As news of this and other anti-Japanese testimony was played up in the press, the evacuation itself began.

The logistics of the evacuation turned out to be a nightmare. The evacuation was intended to be voluntarily carried out by the Japanese, and they were allowed to move anywhere they liked as long
as it was out of the restricted areas. Norman Thomas suggests that it was not illogical if other state officials took the view "that if American citizens could not be trusted in their own homes in California, they could scarcely be trusted as emigrants under compulsion in new homes in Idaho, Arizona and elsewhere."

Indeed receiver state officials were supremely logical. Representative Tolan wired the governors of the states adjoining California or felt to be possible receiver states, to feel them out as to their reaction to this plan. Almost unanimously they were negative about accepting Japanese refugees. Typical was the response of Homer M. Adkins of Arkansas, who wired:

"Our people are not familiar with the customs or peculiarities of the Japanese. We are always anxious to co-operate...but our people being more than 95% native born, are in no manner familiar with their customs and ways...I doubt the wisdom of placing any in Arkansas."

The Nevada Bar Association declared "We feel that if Japanese are dangerous in Berkeley, California, they are likewise dangerous to the state of Nevada." The State Tribune of Wyoming objected on the grounds of an employment problem. Governor Clark of Idaho made no bones about his racist views when he stated "Japs live like rats, breed like rats and act like rats. We don't want them buying or leasing land and becoming permanently located in our state." Clark seemed happily oblivious to the fact that the Japanese population in Idaho declined from 1291 in 1900 to 1191 in 1940, and, in fact, the birthrate of the Japanese was lower than the Caucasian birthrate.
As far away as Kansas, Governor Payne Ratner took precautions against immigration of Japanese to his state with his firm statement, "Japs are not wanted and not welcome in Kansas."

Only Governor Carr of Colorado went on record in response to Tolan's telegrams with a favorable reply. He was subsequently defeated in a political campaign and faded from view.

The Japanese who had been told to leave the coastal area were in a quandry. Many people had no money as the assets of all Japanese nationals had been frozen. Most adult Japanese, therefore, could not have access to their own money. (Eleanor Roosevelt did persuade the Treasury Secretary to relent a little and allow families to draw a maximum of $100/month if they had no other income.) Since their checks were no good and their cash very limited, grocers refused to sell them food, milk deliveries were stopped, and even life insurance companies cancelled policies that had been held a lifetime. Sudden widespread unemployment aggravated the situation as any Nisei who could read and write Japanese, who subscribed to a Japanese newspaper, or who belonged to certain Japanese groups were ousted from civil service jobs in California state, county and city offices. A number of cities forbade the Japanese to conduct business even if they could somehow weather the economic storm. Many areas also prohibited the Japanese commercial fishermen from putting to sea, evidently to cut down on the possibilities of communication with the enemy. California even revoked the licences
of the professionals, ruining the practices of lawyers and doctors. Since unemployment relief was refused the families of aliens, most Japanese were in dire economic straits by the time evacuation took place in March.

Further, even if they had money to travel many did not speak English and did not know where to go.

Many of those who attempted to migrate had terrible experiences which were rapidly related to those who remained behind. Armed posses would not allow migrants to cross the Nevada state line. The Arizona state highway patrol prevented the crossing over of Arizona's borders. Governor Payne Ratner of Kansas directed his highway patrol to turn back any Japanese trying to enter his state. "No Japs Wanted" signs sprouted beside the "Welcome" signs at the entrance of many inland towns. Filling stations refused to sell the Japanese gas; restaurants sported signs like "This restaurant poisons both rats and Japs" or refused to serve them altogether. Stores refused to sell merchandise to migrant Japanese and barbershops greeted them with posters like "Japs shaved: Not responsible for accidents." "Open Season on Japs" began to be spotted in automobile windshields. A number of Japanese were jailed overnight and then sent on their way to the next hostile community.

Chaos reigned and the voluntary evacuation program lasted only three weeks. On March 27, DeWitt instructed all the Japanese to stay where they were until further orders. These further orders were to be orders for internment.
**Interment**

Because the voluntary relocation plan had failed so miserably, internment seemed to be the logical next step. The Japanese had to have some place to go where they would be safe from hostile Americans and Americans would be safe from them.

On March 18, 1942 President Roosevelt created the War Relocation Authority and named Milton S. Eisenhower as its director. The WRA worked with General DeWitt in ironing out the details of the movement of the Japanese into the internment camps. A typical description of the internment process in one urban locale would be as follows:

The Japanese-Americans were given only five days notice. They were allowed to take a few personal items and what they could carry. No pets were allowed to accompany their masters. Goods could be stored with the government at the owner's risk, but the government offered no insurance on the property, so most people sold their goods for whatever they could get. Naturally they lost a great deal of money as it was a buyers' market.

Curiously their Caucasian neighbors proved to be very sympathetic and helpful on the day of departure. Christian agencies mobilized to give aid. They furnished transportation, and served coffee, donuts and sandwiches at the points of departure. Volunteers prepared box lunches, looked after Japanese children, and generally tried to ease the wrench for the bewildered evacuees. Thousands of people were herded into temporary quarters such as race tracks, fairgrounds and livestock exhibition halls. There they awaited the completion of the transfer to permanent internment camps.

Naturally the financial loss was staggering. One analyst estimates the total property loss was $350 million. Another economist suggests a figure of $200 million. In California alone
the Japanese lost nearly $2 billion dollars in yearly income when they were deprived of their jobs and businesses. By November of 1942 112,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans were behind barbed wire. Forty thousand of these were aliens, averaging 55 years of age, and seventy thousand were American citizens by birth, averaging 20 years of age.

Most of the Japanese-Americans were willing to go along with the internment in order to prove their patriotism. Some expressed willingness merely to survive, to gain economic and physical safety. However, the acquiescence of the Japanese was greatly exaggerated by the press. *Life* published a photo essay about the internment which gave the impression of a Sunday picnic. For most Japanese-Americans internment was a real tragedy. Psychologically it called into question their individual value as human beings. Financially the Japanese-American community was pauperized. Allocated only $12-18 a month for their labor in the camp, individuals could not even keep up life insurance premiums, much less retain their homes or any possessions on credit outside the camps.

The college-age students had a particularly hard time. Those shut out of the colleges they had been attending in the prohibited zones found that a number of important colleges and universities outside the zones refused to admit them. The University of California would not even issue transcripts for awhile because in its view such an act would constitute giving aid to a prisoner of war. Two of the
centers were located in Arkansas, but proposals that evacuee students be permitted to pursue their education at state colleges and universities met with stiff opposition. Requests for extension courses, library books and guest faculty lectures from the University of Arizona were consistently denied. As President Alfred Atkinson put it, "We are at war and these people are our enemies." Governor Chase Clark of Idaho, in another allusion to rats, said, "The Japs live like rats...I don't want them coming into Idaho and I don't want them taking seats in our universities." Eastern and Mid-western universities were somewhat more lenient, although Princeton initially was not willing to take any Japanese-American students and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had a policy for the duration of the war not to accept students of Japanese ancestry. Generally speaking, private and religious institutions were more helpful than public colleges and universities.

Young men wishing to prove their loyalty by joining the armed forces were turned down. On June 17, 1942, the War Department made rejection official, except for use of the Japanese in Japanese language schools. In September there was a hearing for reversal, but General DeWitt and others opposed it so vigorously that the issue died. (Finally in January, 1943, the government reversed itself and an all-Nisei unit was formed. In 1944 drafting began again.)
In sum, frustration, poverty, and alienation from the rest of American society was the fate of thousands of Japanese aliens and citizens during the war years.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 70.


8. Ibid.


11. Ibid.


15. Time, December 22, 1941, p. 33.


17. Ibid.


19. Ibid., p. 266.

20. Ibid.

22. tenBroek, p. 74.

23. Ibid.


25. McWilliams, p. 115.

26. Ibid., p. 112.

27. Smith, p. 262.

28. McWilliams, p. 244.

29. tenBroek, p. 4.


31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., p. 5-6.

33. Bosworth, p. 61.


36. tenBroek, p. 263.


38. tenBroek, p. 87.


40. Bosworth, p. 254.


42. *Time-Life, This Fabulous Century, 1940-1950*, p. 203.
43. Roger Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*, p. 47.

44. Bosworth, p. 254.


46. tenBroek, p. 86.

47. Ibid., p. 87.


49. Smith, p. 262.


51. tenBroek, p. 83.


55. tenBroek, p. 85.

56. Bosworth, p. 60.

57. tenBroek, p. 86.


64. tenBroek, p. 93-4.
65. tenBroek, p. 279-82.
67. Ibid., p. 77.
68. Smith, p. 272
69. McWilliams, *Prejudice*, p. 117.
70. tenBroek, p. 83.
71. Bosworth, p. 98.
73. McWilliams, *Prejudice*, p. 130.
74. *Time-Life, This Fabulous Century, 1940-1950*, p. 204.
75. Ibid.
76. Smith, p. 271.
77. Ibid.
78. Smith, p. 232.
80. Ibid.
82. Smith, p. 161-3.
83. tenBroek, p. 94.
84. Smith, p. 263.
86. Ibid.
87. Smith, p. 262.
88. Bosworth, p. 98.
89. McWilliams, Prejudice, p. 130.
90. Ibid.
91. Bosworth, p. 98.
92. McWilliams, Prejudice, p. 130.
93. Ibid.
94. Bosworth, p. 98.
95. Bosworth, p. 255.
96. Ibid.
98. Smith, p. 280-1.
100. Ibid.
102. Time-Life, This Fabulous Century, 1940-1950, p. 201.
103. See Appendix for chart of camps and their populations, p.
104. tenBroek, p. 100.
106. Thomas, Norman, p. 9.
108. McWilliams, Prejudice, p. 189.
110. McWilliams, Prejudice, p. 163-4.
111. Ibid., p. 160.
113. Ibid.
CHAPTER V

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE JAPANESE IN POPULAR CULTURE

A national public opinion poll released on March 28, 1942 by the National Opinion Research Council showed 93% of the American people said, "We are doing the right thing in moving Japanese aliens away from the West Coast." 59% agreed that Japanese citizens should also be moved from the West Coast. 65% agreed that the evacuated Japanese should be kept under strict guard as prisoners of war. This poll showed a majority of the United States approved the internment policy even before it had been implemented. There was obviously a wide divergence between America's real feelings and the stated American policy so eloquently expressed by FDR in a speech on January 2, 1942.

"Remember the Nazi technique: 'Pit race against race; religion against religion; prejudice against prejudice. Divide and conquer. We must not let that happen here. We must remember what we are defending: liberty, decency, and justice.""

It would be instructive to look at American views through the mirror of its media -- the popular culture of magazines, films, books, records and newspapers.

1942

The newspapers are usually the first communication people have about the events which occur around them. Often newspapers tend to exaggerate or distort the news in the first flush of
receiving it. Later magazine writers can analyze and thoughtfully meditate on the material in a more leisurely manner.

Newspapers in California paid much more attention to the Japanese than did papers in other areas of the country. The West Coast was the one area in the United States with a significant Japanese population, and any military attack from Japan would be made first on the coast. Most of the newspaper writers in California were predisposed to suspect the Japanese, so immediately after Pearl Harbor evidence of espionage was found in every quarter. Many Japanese-Americans were picked up on suspicion and searched. Discoveries such as short-wave radio sets, bows and arrows, revolvers, auto maps and signal flares were seen as ominous evidence of sabotage and spying. When FBI agents made raids to uncover contraband their finds were given a great splash in the press. Normal items were seen as dangerous in the hands of the Japanese-Americans. Stories about widespread plans for terrorism grew out of the discovery of roadmaps, flashlights, and cameras found in automobiles. Soon most of the newspapers on the West Coast were referring to Japanese-Americans in derogatory terms.

Fear had swept the West Coast like an evil hurricane. Japan had taken over the Pacific Islands, Singapore had surrendered, Burma was attacked. The Phillipines were ready to surrender, the invasion of Australia seemed imminent and India was threatened with assault. Air raids, blackouts, and a Japanese sub's shelling of an oil field near Santa Barbara intensified the feelings of danger. Glen A.
Binford, financial editor of the *Los Angeles Times*, remembers those
days in 1942 when he was an ordinary reporter:

"In those days following Pearl Harbor everyone
was frightened. The Coast was so vulnerable.
There was a feeling of apprehension...I think
everyone was influenced by the same thing...
the apprehension, fear of attack..."

Presumably it was this fear which prompted the headline in the

*Los Angeles Times* on December 8.

CALIFORNIA IS A ZONE OF DANGER

(California needed) "...alert, keen-eyed civilians
of yeoman service in cooperating with the military
authorities against spies, saboteurs, and fifth
columnists. We have thousands of Japanese here...
some, perhaps many, are good Americans. What the
rest may be we do not know, nor can we take a chance
in the light of yesterday's demonstration that
treachery and double-dealing are major Japanese weapons."

Wild rumors were printed as news in many papers. The *Seattle
Post-Intelligencer* reported "a flaming arrow pointing toward
Seattle." This turned out to be forest workers burning bush.

Editorials urged evacuation such as the "Viper" editorial.

(See page ). The *Monterey Park Progress* used another kind of
animal example:

"If a cat crawls in the oven and has kittens,
they don't come out biscuits; they're still cats.
And it's that way with the Japs; being born in
this country doesn't make 'em Americans -- they
are still cats and polecats at that."

Whereas fear may have motivated the urban papers, Scott Newhall,
editor and publisher in California, claims the rural papers urged
evacuation out of greed since Japanese disappearance benefited the white farmers.

Many people supported evacuation because the military and government seemed to want it, and it was one's patriotic duty to support the army and government in wartime. Defense of the Japanese-Americans tended to be equated with a lack of patriotism. Ironically, the army and government were responding to the felt demands of the people as expressed in the media.

The Eastern press did not give the spectacular coverage of the Japanese-Americans of the Western papers since nearly 90% of the Japanese lived on the West Coast. Syndicated columnists, however, were printed throughout the nation. Henry Mclernon wrote, in addition to the material found on page:

"...they are a serious menace and you can't tell me an individual's rights have any business being placed above a nation's safety. If making a million innocent Japanese uncomfortable would prevent one scheming Japanese from costing the life of an American boy, then let a million innocents suffer...let us have no patience with the enemy or with anyone whose veins carry his blood."

Important officials were making statements about the dangers of Japanese attack on the West Coast and these predictions were widely published and read. For instance, Rep. Martin Dies, Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, predicted an enemy attack which would be "a tragedy that will make Pearl Harbor sink into insignificance." According to Ives Neely, the
main problem was not that the papers were printing predictions of
disaster -- that was as it should be -- but rather that they were
not giving equal coverage to the important people who held
opposing views, such as J. Edgar Hoover and the Attorney General.
The San Francisco Chronicle, one of the few opposing
newspapers, suggested editorially that the papers were responsible
for creating a mood among the people where none had previously
existed.

"The supposed hysteria over enemy aliens and
their dependents scarcely exists among the
people themselves...but the excitement is
visible almost entirely in political and
journalistic quarters...seeking to capitalize
on a supposed excitement of others which is
mostly a figment of their imagination."17

Soon the people of the United States would cooperate and become
very antagonistic and excited about the Japanese-Americans.

By 1942 film was a recognized art form and propaganda tool.
The War Department needed "educational" film to inspire the
American civilian-soldier to fight with the enthusiasm of
totalitarianism's dedicated troops. Thus in early 1942 General
George C. Marshall asked Frank Capra to prepare a series of
documentaries to be shown as training films to the army recruits.
These films would explain to the troops why they were involved in
a world war, and hopefully inspire them to fight the war with vigor.
Using captured enemy propaganda film as a base, supplemented with
Walt Disney's superb animated maps, Capra turned out seven 50-minute
films in record time. These films were a tremendous success and
were used not only by the army but by the navy, marines, and coast guard in addition to many of our allies. The series was considered to be so good that it won the New York Film Critics Award, and the first film of the series, "Prelude to War" was given an Oscar as the best documentary of 1942. Franklin D. Roosevelt was so enthusiastic that he insisted on the first film being shown in movie theatres all over the country. These films were frankly patriotic and portrayed the enemy leaders as madmen, embued with theories of the master race, determined to conquer the world. While most of the films dealt with Europe, Japan was discussed in "Prelude to War" and was featured in "The Battle of China." These films were strong defences of the American way and at least one presidential advisor, Lowell Mallett, thought that they were too filled with hatred for the enemy to be shown to the general public. Perhaps his view prevailed because after the general showing of the first film, the rest were restricted to training camps for the armed forces.

Capra also prepared a series of orientation films for American troops entitled "Know your ally; know your enemy," presumably with the same stress on the fanatical leadership of Japan, determined as the master race to rule the world.

Hollywood also released a spate of war films, these to be shown to the general public. While most of the films -- as indeed most of the attention of the nation -- were concerned with the war in
Europe, some were made about the war in the Pacific. In addition to "Air Force" (see p. 42), "Ravaged Earth" was shown in December, right after Pearl Harbor. The picture was built around Japanese atrocities during the 1937 attack on Shanghai, and was composed mostly of newsclips. It was used in U.S. army camps as well as in public theatres. Time Magazine describes it as "petrifying" and making the viewer "literally nauseous." How frightening such a film must have been to the Americans who saw it, fearing an attack on the West Coast or sending their sons and lovers into battles. To counter such fears war adventure films were made in which the Japanese never won unless they heavily outnumbered the gallant Americans. Although the Japanese brutally tortured and mutilated their captives, heroes like John Wayne would always come to the rescue. Consequently, claims John Blum, Woodward professor of history at Yale, the typical schoolboy dreamed of enlisting to fight alongside of Wayne "for the annihilation of the murderous little ape men."

Unlike the sensationalism of newspapers and film, most of the national magazines took a much more balanced view of the Japanese-Americans and later the enemy Japanese. While coverage was not extensive -- most of the nation apparently was much more interested in Hitler -- those articles which did appear prior to internment seem generally sympathetic toward our oriental citizens.
Time Magazine was typical of the attempt to play fair. Immediately following Pearl Harbor, Time put credence in the stories of espionage in Hawaii. Echoing the widely held belief of even government officials, Time called the Hawaiin Japanese "the most numerous and brazen fifth column in modern military history" operating to a "vast extent" in Hawaii. Gossip was reported of fishermen spying on our fleet; of the Japanese Tourist Bureau financially supporting spies; and of Japanese truck drivers who were in reality spies, delivering produce to ships and furnishing locations of those ships to the Japanese fliers who dropped their bombs on December 7. The summary sentence of the article published on January 5 was, "Fed on tolerance, watered by complacency, the Japanese fifth column had done its job fiendishly well and had not yet been stamped out."

A week later Time had come to define the problem not so much as generalized sabotage as distinguishing the loyal from the disloyal.

Finally, one month after the original article appeared assuming sabotage, Time published a retraction of sorts in its article headlined "Judgement Day."

"The report of the President's 5-man investigating commission told finally how the disaster occurred at Hawaii, and it placed the blame for dereliction of duty squarely upon Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieut. General Walter C. Short."20

In that same issue a picture of an all-Nisei machine gun unit was published with the caption: "Looks oriental but its members are all occidentals -- American-born Japanese."
The Japanese enemy soldier was treated with respect by *Time*, although the description was calculated to bring fear to the heart of the reader.

"Physically as tough as he was unhandsome... knowing he may die makes him ruthless, cruel, lascivious...spits in the white prisoner's food... has no compunction in whamming his rifle down on the captive's instep, to break his bones and prevent escape." 27

The old stereotype of the dope-ridden oriental was renewed when *Time* published an account of Narcotics Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger reporting to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. that for the past ten years Japan had encouraged smugglers to peddle dope in the United States in order to prepare them for Japanese domination. The national position and reputation of these gentlemen made their conversation newsworthy.

The decision for evacuation brought a varied response from the nation's magazines. *Newsweek* reported Attorney General Biddle's removal of all aliens from industrial areas on the West Coast under the heading "Safety First." After a strong implication that a Japanese fifth column was responsible for Pearl Harbor, *Newsweek* went on to say that, "in California...many constitute a potential threat." Earl Warren was quoted as saying that it was impossible to tell a dangerous from a loyal Japanese. The Governor of California went on record as being determined to prevent the re-opening of Japanese language schools because he felt they were being directed from Tokyo. One gets the impression from the article
that the writer rested assured that if the United States
government took steps to evacuate Japanese there must be a valid
reason for it.

Time was an important element in analyzing events as reporters
saw the drama unfolding in ever greater detail. By February 16,
*Time* Magazine wrote:

"No citizen of a democracy could be happy about
some of the pathetic situations which these
orders created. For every potential fifth
columnist, hundreds of innocent aliens would
suffer."

On February 23 *Newsweek* was discouraging mob action against the
Japanese by "overpatriotic" citizens in an article entitled "Civil
Liberties."

In March of 1942 Don Eddy wrote an article in *American* Magazine,
a popular national magazine in the 1940's but now defunct. It was
an article which was generally very sympathetic to the plight of the
Japanese-Americans, yet duly recorded the stereotypes and myths so
rampant on the West Coast.

"...as long as they (West Coasters) can remember,
they have been schooled in the thought that the
Japs were a menace...authorities agree that they
constitute the most foreign-minded racial group
in our melting pot; a group that mostly doesn't
melt...the influence the Issei exert on their
descendants, because of the traditional Japanese
reverence for parents, is incomprehensible to
Western minds..."

It is interesting to note that by May he had taken a much stronger
stand against the Japanese-Americans. In another article which
appeared in *American*, called "Smoking Out Jap Spies," he wrote:
"Not one (anti-espionage agent) doubts that powerful spy rings are operating inside our borders, at least three, loosely coordinated, on our Pacific Coast. Irrefutable evidence has been unearthed..." In support of stronger action Eddy asks that democratic niceties be suspended: "Other warring nations treat spies as military offenders; judgement is swift and final. Fortunately for the spies and perhaps unwise for national safety, our democratic laws provide loopholes that even dangerous enemy agents can slip through. One of these is the fundamental that every individual is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty." 34

A tendency to justify federal action against the Japanese-Americans is again apparent in the March 2 issue of Newsweek. In an article entitled "Seaboard Safety," under a subtitle "FDR permits removal of anyone from military areas," Earl Warren is quoted as being sure of espionage:

"If we think sabotage has not been planned for us, we are living in a fool's paradise. The most convincing proof of a real plan is the fact that we have had no sabotage yet. That is the most ominous sign." 35

However, in the same article the reaction to the President's order by zealous patriots is reported in a slightly disgusted tone:

"The day the President's order was announced Shigemasa Yoshioka was shot to death in Stockton, California, several other Japanese wounded and some robbed by supposedly overzealous vigilantes." 36

A week later, reporting the "Japanese Roundup," Newsweek again refers to official justification, this time based on the Dies Report (later proved completely false.)
"Rep. Martin Dies of Texas made public a 285-page report on Japanese plans and plots based on 'a mass of evidence.' This report revealed the Japanese government used thousands of Japanese residents of the U.S. and its possessions to obtain detailed information about the American fleet, Hawaii, Panama Canal, and the Los Angeles water supply."37

_Life_ Magazine also used the Dies Report as justification in its feature article "U.S. Uproots Japanese Aliens" on March 9.

With commendable objectivity, _Life_ also pointed out the inequity of centering down on the Japanese-Americans while ignoring Germans and Italians.

"Though the heat was turned on aliens everywhere, in California it was hottest. For one thing, few communities wanted the evacuees. Secondly, officials found themselves torn between a violent popular outcry for tough treatment of Japs, and perverse apathy toward the even more numerous but equally dangerous Germans and Italians...From Washington on February 27 the Dies Committee furnished ammunition for internment with a 285-page report on Japanese espionage, making public maps, plans, charts, codes and hypothetical invasion (plans.)"38

Another article in the same issue of _Life_ describes the terror which descended on California after Santa Barbara was shelled by the Japanese, and the subsequent willingness to have all Japanese aliens removed promptly from the coastal area.

"All last week California's war nerves quivered tensely...Westerners watched a great involuntary migration of enemy aliens away from the posted areas, factories, away from the sea...the West appeared now to be approaching belated awareness that its murderous enemy was separated from it, not by 5,000 miles but only by a few feet of salt water."39

On April 6 _Life_ described the internment camp at Manzanar. The Headline read, "Coast Japs are Interned in Mountain Camp."
The camp is correctly identified as a concentration camp.

"Manzanar was a concentration camp designed...to detain at least 10,000 potential enemies of the U.S.," yet the area is described as a very pleasant place -- "scenic, a spot of scenic loveliness" with no mosquitoes and potentially fertile soil. The migration is described as "cheerful," the Japanese are "appreciative" of the good food. The camp is labeled "comfortable," and the Japanese are "willing" to stay in it "without bitterness or rancor -- wanting to show loyalty" to their country.

The Saturday Evening Post came out in early May with another justification of the evacuation in the article "The People Nobody Wants" by Frank J. Taylor, stating, "the evacuation order from the army was an unquestioned military necessity." There were "too many mysterious messages between unidentified ships at sea and secret radio stations on the shore had been intercepted to leave any doubt about the presence of Nipponese undercover agents on the Pacific Coast." Yet having said that, the rest of the article was very sympathetic to the plight of the aliens and to the Nisei in particular. Taylor recites the Japanese-American loyalty creed to which all Nisei publicly subscribed with the hope that the Japanese optimism in the American way would not be misplaced.

Loyalty Creed

"I am firm in my belief that American sportsmanship and attitude of fair play will judge citizenship and patriotism on the basis of action and achievement and not on the basis of physical characteristics -- although some individuals may discriminate against me I shall never become bitter or lose faith for I know that such persons are not representative of the majority of the American people."
After internment a strange silence fell over the national press, as though 112,000 United States Japanese no longer existed. Very few reports filtered out of the camps and most of the Japanese material concerned the enemy.

The American people were largely dependent upon the popular media for knowledge of the Japanese enemy. Most Americans formed their opinions based on the magazines, films, books and records to which they were exposed. Understanding this, national magazines undertook to educate the American public. For example, in August of 1942 stories of American prisoners of war began to filter back to the states. Newsweek wrote a feature article "Tales from Tokyo" in which the "water cure," strangling and choking were listed as perpetrations upon American men. In a dubious effort to comfort the public, readers were assured that "even so, Americans fared better than the British, twelve of whom committed suicide after their terrible tortures." In the same issue, Newsweek had a short article describing the use of American prisoners as stevedores on the docks of Osaka. The report was remarkable for its lack of racial overtones, and it duly noted that the "internment camp conditions aren't extremely bad."

In another issue in August, Newsweek ran an article "Japan Horns In On the Nazi Myth of Super Race To Rule World." This theme would be widely written about and commented upon. Life further explained the Super Race theory in an article written by Paul M. Anderson, entitled "Japan's 'Divine Mission' to Rule." Anderson had spent twenty years observing the Orient, had lived in Shanghai after
World War I and was currently head of the Red Cross. Anderson painted 95% of the Japanese as being sure that they were of divine origin from the sun goddess Amaterasu. Therefore, he stated, the Japanese felt they had superior qualification which translated into a racial obligation to rule the world. "Japanese apparently absorb with their mother's milk a belief in their destiny in world affairs," Anderson said.

The Life article on "The Japanese Language" taught Americans that English was culturally superior as Japanese "is ridiculously complicated," reflecting "hypocrisy" in class distinctions and "strange notions" of etiquette. Once again the "master race" theme was used as the author stated "the Japanese are taught to believe that they are the chosen leaders for all humanity, the master race."

Life ran several other stories in the fall of 1942 about the Japanese enemy. "Yankee Girl" related the adventures of Francis Long, interned at Santo Tomas University camp in Manila for five months. She portrays the Japanese as foolish, dirty, disorganized but not malevolent.

Interest in the fate of American prisoners continued to be high that fall. Another article about captured American flyers in Life implied that the Japanese were not entirely truthful about the treatment of the prisoners. It described with some pique what the "Japanese are doing to ridicule and humiliate U.S. heros."

The story of J.B. Powell was widely publicized and written up in three national magazines -- Life, the Nation, and then reprinted
in Reader's Digest. Mr. Powell had spent time in Japanese jails and had lost a foot as a result of poor medical care. It is interesting to compare the three versions. Life published a large photograph of Powell in his hospital bed with the caption: "Japanese jailers mistreatment and neglect." However, Life went on to quote from Powell, "The Japs didn't do this to me deliberately, you know. It was just their sheer, utter stupidity."

Reader's Digest reprinted the article which appeared in the Nation with significant deletions and one noticeable misprint. Whereas the Nation article said "about 30 people were crowded into a space 18' by 12'" Reader's Digest printed "about 40 people."
The deletions were of material that tended to alleviate the horror of the story. Examples of these deletions are as follows:

"No European was beaten, that I know of."
"The poor Chinese prisoners rioted because they were not allowed to receive food from friends outside. We foreigners were luckier."
(After having been moved to another prison) "conditions were a little better at Kiangwan. There was seaweed with the rice, the tea was more drinkable, and I got more food from the outside. When the weather was good we were taken out to the bath house and sat four or five of us together in big vats of hot water."
(The account of the Japanese taking him to his friend, the doctor, was entirely deleted.) "I was driven to Shanghai General Hospital where my friend, Dr. Gardiner took care of me and I was tended by French Franciscan nuns."

Further bias was illustrated in the introductory paragraph in which Reader's Digest explained to the reader that Powell lost his foot "as a result of the medieval callousness of the Japanese
jailers" refuting Powell's own statement that it was mere stupidity, not malice, which caused the loss of his foot. In the same issue, in another article, the reader was led to understand the "bestial savagery" of the Japanese could be fathomed by a look into the history of modern Japan, which was a product of "centuries of internecine warfare that made the island kingdom one vast blood-soaked battlefield." People were "ruthlessly butchered for human life was held at no value." Considering the millions of people who read Reader's Digest this negative view of the humanity of the Japanese must have made quite an impression on the minds of Americans.

Cartoons were another vehicle by which America revealed the stereotypes they held of the Japanese. Again, because the major focus in America was toward the European theatre, there were not a great many cartoons with Japanese figures. The New Yorker War Album of 1942 (a collection of the best cartoons) shows a cartoon of an evil Japanese warrior killing a Red Cross nurse and child. A more benign cartoon portrays one stout American matron commenting to another as they leave the opera house, "We won't have to feel sorry for Madame Butterfly any more."

Perhaps the cartoons with the widest exposure were the Philco cartoons. The Philco Corporation hired well-known cartoonists and each month published a poster to exhort workers in their factories to defeat the enemy through increased production. Copies
of these posters, which were hung in every Philco factory, were published in Life and other magazines, and free prints were available upon request. The Japanese were typically portrayed as buck-toothed, round faced, and often with mustache and glasses.

Most comic strips portrayed the Japanese as a subhuman species, consisting mostly of teeth and spectacles. The most popular strip, "Terry and the Pirates," had the Pacific theatre as its locale. The Japanese were pictured as "tough little fellers" who were dispatched with great joy.

There was evidently very little popular music which dealt specifically with the Japanese during the early war years. The Popular Culture Library in Bowling Green, Ohio, had only three selections, all coming from early 1942. Two were recorded by Frank Luther and were frankly racist in character. "Remember Pearl Harbor" speaks of the Japanese as "yellow scum of the sea" and "rats" and expresses relief that we aren't related to the "brown men." "We're Gonna Have to Slap the Dirty Little Jap" is an extremely clever ditty with a very catchy tune. It is easy to imagine people whistling and humming the melody while the lyrics run through their minds. Again the Japanese are portrayed as traitorous subhumans.

Books about the Japanese were more widespread than records. Early in 1942 a group of literary Americans banded together and formed the Council on Books in Wartime. Through radio dramatizations of books, short films which publicized books the Council deemed
essential wartime reading, and published lists of recommended books, the Council hoped to instruct and inspire Americans to greater wartime efforts. The Council was active during the entire war and under its auspices 108,500,000 paperback copies of 1,000 approved titles were distributed to the armed forces. Franklin D. Roosevelt lent his enthusiastic support to the program, writing "in our country's first year of war we have seen the growing power of books as weapons. Through books we have appraised the enemy and discovered our allies."

While the emphasis of the Council was on the European front, some notice was taken of Japan, especially in the dramatizations on the radio program "Words At War." Ten Escape From Tojo by Lt. Welbourne Kelley; Prisoner of the Japs by Gwen Dew; Short Cut to Tokyo by Coney Ford and I Served on Bataan by Lt. Juanita Redmond were read, in addition to Robert Sherrod's Tarawa. Robert Sherrod was particularly impressed with Japanese fanaticism which led hundreds to throw themselves into the sea to escape capture by the Americans. To his mind such behavior was incomprehensible.

While the books the Council recommended were supposed to be "good" literature, popular hack writers were also doing their part to immortalize the war in fiction. While most war books that came out in 1942 dealt with the Nazis, one series that was enormously popular often had episodes in the Pacific theatre. R. Sidney Bowen wrote a series of novels aimed at the teenage market, whose hero
was young Dave Dawson, an American pilot who joined the RAF. Dave is only seventeen, but very clever and extremely brave. These books are blatantly racist, giving vent to all the worst stereotypes about the Japanese. First there is stress on the unemotional aspects of the Japanese, frightening to Dave because he is so accustomed to American candor.

"three pairs of brownish-black eyes stared at him expressionlessly and unwaveringly...eyes showed even less expression than had Serrangi's hypnotic eyes."61

The association of Japanese with rats is played to the hilt.

"...(there is) a group of islands that are called Japan. It is full of a mess of little brown rats that even their buckteethed emperor Hirohito don't trust."62

In a chapter called "War Rats" Dave exclaims in Dave Dawson and the Pacific Fleet:

"I'm itching to take a whack or six at those dirty Japs. I think I hate them worse than the Nazis. Why were such vermin ever born?"63

The stereotypical physical characteristics of the Japanese were also played up.

"Just let that buckteethed, throat slitting son of Nippon try and stop us."

"He showed his big teeth in a broad smile so typical of the sly Japs."64

In Dave Dawson at Singapore the author gives a lesson on the superiority of the white race as he describes a scene at the bar of a dive in Singapore:

"Seated at the tables was a mixture of all races...Malay, Chinese, (etc.)...and a smattering that had once claimed kinship with the white races but had sunk so low they were no longer any part of a white man."65
These books, widely read by American teenagers, and shared by their parents, helped shape a very negative image of the Oriental.

1943-45

Bowen continued his literary success throughout the war, adding the Red Randall series to the Dave Dawson books. Red was another young and dashing American pilot who hated the "Jap Rats." Red Randall at Pearl Harbor was a whole book about the treachery of Japanese spies and murderers, perpetrating the myth of Japanese-American fifth column activity. It purported to be about "loyal Japanese who lived there (Hawaii) for years and had worked day and night for their Emperor."

The images of rats and snakes abounded in his text:

"...the most cunning, ruthless and dangerous rat in Hirohito's nest."
"In the rear cockpit was death in inhuman form. Kato Harada was his name...devil savages like Harada were all the same... they were like poisonous snakes, save that a poisonous snake was more trustworthy. They should all be killed and removed from the face of the earth. Just as you would uproot and destroy an ugly vine that was choking the life from a beautiful tree."67

In keeping with the snake image, the Japanese in Bowen's books frequently hiss.

Dave Dawson appears to have gained more respect for the Japanese by 1943, but in Dave Dawson on Guadalcanal the old stereotypes and racial slurs still abounded:
"They were Jap rats and true to their rotten race they had struck their blow under false colors." 

Dave Dawson With the Flying Tigers expressed very pro-Chinese attitudes while repeating the old anti-Japanese line. In this book the theme of the master race is used and a new animal is added to the epithets. This new designation of "monkey" was also reflected in the cartoons of the time.

"The Nazi smiled and turned toward the door. But there was a look of icy contempt in his eyes...when the door had closed behind the Nazi the little brown rat from the Far East curled his lips back in a snarl...We'll see who is the master race." 

"Monkey man of the Far East..."

Bowen epitomized in his books the double-think that allowed Americans to feel righteous fighting Hitler while ignoring their own internment camps. The last sentence in Red Randall at Pearl Harbor read:

"He would fly and fight to the death that the world might be made a far, far better place to live in for all nations, all peoples, and all races and creeds!"

Al Avery was another author of war fiction for teenage readers. While not as racist as Bowen, in his book A Yankee Flier in the South Pacific, Avery also compares the Japanese to monkeys and stresses the cruelty of the Japanese.

"Them monkees can't hit anything," and "The Jap guards had beaten Haggerty unmercifully." 

One passage describes a torture scene with inhuman and frightening politeness on the part of the Japanese.
Short stories in pulp magazines expressed the same anti-Japanese attitudes. "According to Plan," appearing in Short Stories, is replete with torture, senseless killings, and beheadings, accompanied by a sense of white racial superiority. "Lightning Over New Guinea," published in Army-Navy Flying Stories, being written by R. S. Bowen was full of vitriolic racism. "Stralia Born," by Albert Richard Wetjen, appeared in the Saturday Evening Post. The caption read, "The Japs paid dearly for torturing the helpless skipper of the Annabelle." In short, the plot concerned a boat captured by the Japanese. After several mindless torture scenes, including throwing the Chinese cook on a hot stove, the Japanese are blown up by the resourceful skipper.

Speed Adventure Stories Magazine of April 1945 featured a very provocative cover, suggesting rape of a white prisoner by her lascivious Japanese guard while a white man looks helplessly on. Oddly enough, there is no matching story!

More cartoons concerning the Japanese were published and comic books became the rage in the latter years of the war. Jules Pfieffer reports that "the unwritten success story of the war was the smash comeback of the oriental villain...a Jap...a yellow-belly Jap...a Jap-a-Nazi Rat...often sported fanged bicuspids and drooled a lot more than seemed necessary." A typical treatment was seen in Wing Comics, featuring Captain Wings. Japanese officers were featured with faces which looked more like rats than humans. The American hero identified the hiding place of the Japanese with the statement,
"I smell Japs." After a bloodbath "the butchers sweep" into a
curch and kill all the peacef ul monks. Finally, of course, 80
the Yankee G.I.'s emerged victorious.

While Washington did not officially consider the United
States a party to a racial war, the stereotypes seen in comic
were used by the War Production Board on occasion. For instance,
in 1945 the Board approved an advertisement that called for the 81
extermination of the Japanese rats. The Office of War Information,
created in June of 1942 to make sure the American people were 82
truthfully informed about the enemy, also put out propaganda
which abounded in stereotypes. After Germany was defeated, the
O.W.I. released a small book called Enemy Japan. It purported to
give American writers the knowledge of the Japanese, their war
aims and their ideology so that said writers could give Americans
the determination necessary to fight the Japanese to an unconditional
surrender. In this book the Japanese are accused of wishing to
enslave one-half the entire population of the world because they
consider themselves supermen, chosen for a divine mission.
Descriptions of the Japanese occupation of China include the use
of dope as a major weapon of control. Americans are warned not to
underestimate the Japanese enemy who is "ruthless and crafty," a
"fanatical fighter" or "fights without fear." Thus the official
government of the United States taught its citizens about the
Japanese.
Hollywood made quite a few films with a Japanese theme in 1943-4. The review in *Newsweek* of "Guadalcanal Diary" describes the army getting a "breathing spell from the little yellow terrors who sniped from the trees and bayoneted the wounded." "Behind the Rising Sun" was evidently too much for the *Newsweek* reviewer as he writes, "Perhaps the scenes of Jap outrages are gratuitously explicit for an audience long since convinced that the Nipponese can be incredibly nasty." In the review of "Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo" the reviewer alludes to rodents as he describes the "Jap-invested territory" in the film.

"The Purple Heart" came out just one month after a *Life* expose of Japanese prisoner-of-war camps, and therefore had the maximum impact. (see p. 92). The movie-goer now had documented proof that such things actually happened to prisoners of war. According to the review in *Life*, the picture was a "ringing indictment of Japanese atrocity." The story pivots on the trial of eight fliers captured after the Doolittle raid. It is a full length film "of the sickening treatment to American prisoners of war" and shows the "horrifying results" of such terrible torture that two of the men were driven insane.

Writers in the national news magazines continued to play an influential role in molding public opinion. In general they were a surprisingly positive influence in restraining anti-Japanese feeling.

In February, 1943, the *Saturday Evening Post* published an article entitled "How Strong is Japan -- a Look at the Every Day
Life of the Average Japanese." This article gave a very sympathetic view of the average Japanese family and its lifestyle.


"Results of Japanese fanaticism stagger the imagination. The very violence of the scene is incomprehensible to the Western mind... perhaps he (the Japanese) is human. Nothing on Attu indicates it." 93

*Life* reviewed a play, "The 47 Ronin," describing it as the most popular play in Japan. The reviewer claimed the play revealed "the bloodthirsty character of our enemy." Again the emphasis is on the inscrutability of Japanese behavior -- an emphasis that was particularly frightening to the average reader. Whereas the Nazis were represented as the worst in our common European heritage, the Japanese were somehow portrayed as basically "different" and "incomprehensible." I would suggest that this concept was especially frightening to Americans as what you cannot understand you can never fully control. In this article about "The 47 Ronin," *Life* writes:

"Japanese people are a puzzle to most Americans. Their behavior is so different from our own... their cold-blooded ruthlessness...shocked us... (they have) blind loyalty to their superiors... stubborn fanaticism in the face of death..." 94

While the enemy was described in such mysterious terms a very few stories of the adventures of Japanese-Americans began to appear. These stories were generally supportive of the attempts of the Japanese
to leave the internment camps and take up new lives in American society.

*Newsweek* wrote an account of Japanese-Americans migrating to New York. While sympathetically outlining the difficulties in finding employment, getting about (Mayor LaGuardia had warned the Japanese to stay off the streets and buses and trains!), and being socially accepted, *Newsweek* pointed out that many Japanese were heading for New York because the residents often couldn't tell them from the Chinese!

*Life* wrote sympathetically of Mr. Yamamoto, run out of a New Jersey town because of his ancestry. *Time* told of Schuichi Kusata, a mathematical physicist who ran into a town protest when he was hired at Smith College. In spite of declared opposition to the emperor of Japan on his part, residents threatened to tar and feather him if he remained because his presence was "unfair to those who have died." The author of the *Time* article was clearly on the side of the professor.

The Reader's Digest changed its tune and re-printed a very friendly article from the Baltimore Sunday Sun entitled "U.S. Soldiers With Japanese Faces."

On February 7, 1944, *Life* published an astonishing and horrifying story of atrocities in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps. The story ran for fourteen pages and contained the account of ten Americans, each with a more terrible story to tell than the last. Gruesome
pictures accompanied the story, showing Americans forced to bury their companions alive and terrible scenes of execution. The impact of the picture-story must have been enormous because it was the first time the State Department had allowed such accounts to be published.

Even so, seven months later the Nation was able to publish an optimistic article on the future of the Japanese-Americans, pointing out that out of 160,000 Japanese in Hawaii not a single case of sabotage had been discovered. They therefore concluded, "Our Honolulu case history tends to uphold the belief that the Japanese can, in time, be turned into decent, law-respecting citizens." This article in the Nation epitomized the manner in which the national magazines may have acted as a balance to the negative books and films about the Japanese.

In sum, during the war years the popular culture of comics, film and novel tended to reinforce negative images of the Japanese-Americans. The national magazines tended to give a more balanced view, yet often in reporting erroneous news about the Japanese-Americans or horrifying news about the enemy Japanese they, too, supported a negative image.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V


3. tenBroek, p. 81.


5. Ibid., p. 20.

6. tenBroek, p. 81.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 23.

11. Ibid., p. 21.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 23.

16. Ibid., p. 21.


18. Frank Capra, The Name Above the Title, p. 330 and 349.

19. Ibid., p. 335-6.

20. Ibid., p. 349.

22. John Morton Blum, *V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II*, p. 47.


24. Ibid.


29. *Newsweek*, February 9, 1942, p. 27.


32. See Appendix, p.


36. Ibid.


39. Ibid.


42. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 11.
48. Ibid.
49. Life, September 7, 1942, p. 82-91.
54. See Appendix, p.
55. See Appendix, p.
56. Carl Rose, Life, October 5, 1942, p. 3; Summers, Life, Sept. 7, 1942.
59. Ibid., p. 1.
60. Time, July 5, 1943, p. 28.
61. R. Sidney Bowen, Dave Dawson at Singapore, p. 204.
62. Ibid., p. 11.
63. R. Sidney Bowen, Dave Dawson With the Pacific Fleet, p. 213.
64. R. Sidney Bowen, Dave Dawson at Singapore, p. 232 and p. 214.
65. R. Sidney Bowen, Dave Dawson at Singapore, 89.
68. R. Sidney Bowen, Dave Dawson With the Flying Tigers, p. 42.
69. R. Sidney Bowen, Dave Dawson on Guadalcanal, p. 109.
70. See Appendix, p.
71. R. Sidney Bowen, Dave Dawson With the Flying Tigers, p. 39 and p. 42.
72. R. Sidney Bowen, Red Randall at Pearl Harbor.
73. Al Avery, A Yankee Flier in the South Pacific, p. 81 and 95.
74. Ibid., p. 106 and 112.
78. Speed Adventure Stories, April, 1945.
79. See Appendix, p.
80. Wing Comics, #69, December, 1945.
81. Blum, p. 46.
84. Ibid., p. 1.
85. Ibid., p. 2.
86. Ibid., p. 10.
87. Ibid., p. 15 and 17.


91. *Life*, March 13, 1944, p. 120.


95. *Newsweek*, March 8, 1943, p. 79.


100. Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

THE EFFECT OF POPULAR CULTURE ON THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS

Post Internment

1 After internment agitation against the Japanese increased rather than decreased, especially on the West Coast. Evacuation was seized upon as proof of disloyalty. Perhaps also white Americans had psychological needs to sustain their anti-Japanese feelings as justification for what Americans had done to them. Certainly America was aided and abetted in this justification by its popular culture.

2 Carey McWilliams suggests that the reactionary forces in California needed anti-Japanese propaganda much as Hitler needed anti-Semitism as a political weapon. Indifference to the Japanese was dangerous to the cause, he postulates, and therefore extremist groups renewed anti-Japanese efforts in 1943 even though evacuation was complete. McWilliams cites a Gallop poll of January 1943 which showed 30% in California poisonously anti-Japanese, 30% moderately anti-Japanese, and 40% indifferent or fair in their attitude. The anti's were well organized and had the ear of the press, especially the Hearst papers, which made them seem a larger majority than they were. Thus anti-Japanese images were reinforced in political circles.

3 One sign of the increased agitation was the Senate Committee resolution which suggested that the Supreme Court review its decision that children of Asiatics born in the U.S. were citizens with an
eye toward depriving the Nisei of their citizenship. A suit to this end was begun by the Secretary of the Native Sons of the Golden West and was argued by a former attorney general of California. However, the suit was dismissed by a federal judge.

Hostility against the Japanese-Americans increased even more when the federal government adopted the policy of relocation, taking loyal Japanese-Americans out of the internment and placing them in communities across the country. It all began in August of 1942 when a crisis developed in the sugar beet fields. Workers were needed in great numbers and immediately in order to save the crop. The WRA concluded an agreement with Governor Sprague of Oregon to provide Japanese labor from the camps and the idea worked so well that soon it spread to other states. By December there were 9,000 Japanese workers in Utah, Idaho, Wyoming and Montana. The seasonal leave program proved to be so successful that in October 1942 the announcement was made that henceforth relocation outside the centers would be a major goal of WRA policy. By the end of 1943 19,000 internees were released, 85% of whom were Nisei.

Many Californians re-opened their campaign of hatred against the Japanese-Americans in the face of the possibility that some might be able to return to their former homes. The elections of 1944 were much on people's minds and California politicians returned to the old trick of Jap-baiting.
Leo Carillo, screen actor, was appointed a member of a committee on race relations by Governor Earl Warren. Carrillo spoke throughout the state, saying such things as:

"When people in Washington say we must protect American-Japanese, they don't know what they are talking about. There is no such thing as an American-Japanese. If we ever permit the termites to stick their filthy fingers into the sacred soil of our state again, we don't deserve to live here ourselves."9

Individuals who urged fair play were denounced over the radio as "Jap-lovers" and "Kiss-a-Jap-a-Day" boys.

Senator Ward of Santa Barbara based his campaign on opposing the return of the Japanese, even after the war. His appointee, Mr. C. L. Freisker stated Mr. Ward's objectives:

"We should strike now, while sentiment over the country is right. The feelings of the East will grow more bitter before the war is over and if we begin NOW to try to shut out the Japanese after the war, we have a chance of accomplishing something...We don't want to see the time return when we have to compete with the Japanese again in this valley."10

Perhaps the key to much of the anti-Japanese sentiment lies in the last sentence of the previous statement. White Californians had gained an enormous amount when the Japanese left and many were probably very reluctant to have to give it back or even to compete with the Japanese on an even footing.

In this pre-election year Senator Chandler, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Affairs, went on a flying trip to
Inspect the WRA internment camps. He was a well-known conservative and anti-Japanese campaigner, and he set out to prove the WRA was coddling traitors. His hope was to take the control of the internment camps from the liberal WRA and transfer it to the army.

Chandler's trip was closely followed by Hearst's Washington correspondent, Ray Richards, who faithfully reported the inspection tour in great detail. His reports were duly published in Hearst papers all over the country, including Boston, Albany, New York, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, and San Antonio.

Chandler's hearings and the Hearst press campaign helped make the Middle West, Eastern and Southern communities more Japanese-conscious than they had been. As a result, Arkansas declared there could be "no public education for the Mongolian race" in her state, and there were mass meetings in Wisconsin to protest the employment of evacuees. Fifteen hundred farmers from Iowa, Missouri and Nebraska held a protest meeting in Hamburg, Iowa, to object to the location of evacuees in their area.

In April of 1943, newspapers carried sensational headlines about the barbarous execution of American flyers captured and taken to Tokyo. Once again the temperature of American anti-Japanese sentiment rose, and there were renewed demands that no Japanese be re-released anywhere. General DeWitt lent his voice of authority when he said on April 13 that he was not worried about the German or Italian nationals, but "the Japs we will be worried about all
the time until they are wiped off the face of the map." When
the federal command began to contemplate replacing DeWitt and
his tongue with General Emmons, known for his liberal policy
toward the Japanese in Hawaii, racist groups in California hit
the panic button and redoubled their efforts to thwart the
Japanese threat of return.

In June of 1943 a significant case came before the Supreme
Court -- the case of Gordon Hirabayashi vs. the United States.
Hirabayashi was convicted of violating the curfew and refusing
to follow evacuation orders. The court held that the curfew
regulation was a valid exercise of war power, but refused to pass
judgement on the constitutionality of the evacuation order.
Had it done so, the internment camps might have been closed immedi-
ately.

By July formal organizations were forming to keep the Japanese
from returning to California once the war was over. The incor-
porators of the Pacific Coast Japanese Problem League included the
Native Sons of the Golden West; the American Legion; the President
of the Junior Chamber of Commerce of California; the former mayor
of Los Angeles and other ambitious politicians. The executive
director, Dr. John Carruthers, graduate of Princeton, Presbyterian
minister, five years assistant to the President of the University
of Southern California, testified at the statehouse:
"It is our Christian duty to keep the Japanese out of this Western world of Christian civilization..." Before testifying he bowed his head "in the privacy of that precious American heritage, the Christian home in a Christian city in a Christian land of freedom..." The results of his prayer led him to urge "the deportation, if possible, by every means possible, of all the Japanese from the American continent." 17

Other groups were formed throughout the state with the same purpose. The California Citizens Council typically had as its slogan "Remember a Jap is a Jap" and they distributed bumper stickers carrying the good word with a picture of a rat with a Japanese face. The Home Front Commandos, Inc., a Sacramento organization, published a pamphlet urging all patriotic Californians to "Slap the Jap Rat" because "No Jap is fit to associate with human beings." This is because they are "treacherous, faithless, untrustworthy, irresponsible, inhuman, depraved, ungodly, soulless, and disloyal. Obviously this group was not afraid of overkill."

Those few evacuees returning to inland California found "Japs not Wanted" signs in store windows and incidents of violence awaited them.

In his message to Congress in September, FDR tried to improve the American attitude with a strong presidential statement.

"We shall restore to the loyal evacuees the right to return to the evacuated area as soon as the military situation will make such restoration feasible. Americans of Japanese ancestry... have shown that they can and want to accept our institutions and work loyally with the rest of us,
making their own valuable contribution to the national wealth and well-being. In vindication of the very ideals for which we are fighting this war, it is important to us to maintain a high standard of fair, considerate and equal treatment for the people of this minority, as of all other minorities." 

In order to help assimilate Japanese into American culture and to relieve the shortage of men in the armed forces, the War Department announced that as of January 20, 1944, all Japanese-Americans would hereafter be drafted for military service. An all-Nisei unit was sent to Italy and soon became the most decorated unit in the American armed forces. Favorable publicity on this was pushed by the War Department which was trying to ease the process of relocation.

As part of the attempt to encourage acceptance of relocated Japanese-Americans in all parts of the country the WRA put out a film in cooperation with the Office of War Information to try to counter American resistance to returning Japanese. "Challenge to Democracy" was distributed by the YMCA as part of the "Victory to Peace Preparedness Series," and a pamphlet accompanying the film warmly supported relocation and urged public acceptance of it.

Basically "A Challenge to Democracy" tried to show the Japanese as typical Americans, loyally fighting the war on the home front and abroad. Scenes of baseball and Boy Scouts underlined the Japanese "Americanism," while the public was assured that the Japanese were paying for their own equipment as the federal government does not pay for recreation! Stress was laid on the good moral
character of the Japanese, with illustrations of church services, extremely low crime rate "as it always has been in the Japanese community," and high productivity in the camps as a result of hard work. To allay the fears of the businessman, Americans were reassured that none of the produce of the camps went on the open market to threaten free enterprise.

There were further assurances that only totally loyal Japanese would be released from the camps on relocation projects. Advantages to relocation were put in blunt economic terms, such as the saving of money on the internment camps and using the desperately needed labor of the Japanese in the war effort. Examples of happy Japanese adjusting well to work in the Mid-west or East were shown in profusion.

The film ends on a patriotic note, showing Japanese in the army and heaping praises upon the all-Nisei unit. Viewed in 1976 it is somewhat ironic that the film ends with the ringing declaration that the Nisei knew what they were fighting for -- "democracy, freedom, and equal opportunity regardless of race, creed or ancestry."

As the war drew to a close the federal government was eager to shut down the internment camps. The Supreme Court had in effect upheld the constitutionality of the camps in the case of Hirabayashi vs. the U.S. in 1943 and Korematsu vs. the U.S. in 1944. However, on December 18, 1944, the court made a ruling in the case of Miss Mitsuye Endo that opened the doors of the camps. In 1942 Miss Endo had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that her detention in camp was unlawful. The court ruled she should be given her liberty.
All nine justices agreed that the WRA had no right to detain a loyal American citizen. Shortly thereafter, on January 2, 1945, the West Coast exclusion orders against the Japanese were revoked.

Finally in June of 1946 the last of the internment camps was closed and the WRA officially ended. 112,000 Japanese-Americans were ready to begin a new chapter, hopefully in freedom and equality of opportunity.

Fortunately the National Opinion Research Center has left us some data on the attitudes of the American public toward the Japanese after the war, as compared with attitudes during the war. By examination of this data it is possible to partially re-create the atmosphere in which the Japanese had to operate after World War II.

In April of 1945 only 53% of the American public believed most of the Japanese Americans would not try to harm the United States if they had the opportunity. In 1946, with the war over, most held the same opinion. The most highly educated and most wealthy Americans were the most trusting of the Japanese. People in the south and west were least trusting.

On the question of whether the Japanese were spies or saboteurs, 2/3 of the people in the United States believe the Japanese spied and 1/3 believed they destroyed war material. Only 13% said the Japs did not spy and 32% said no war materials were destroyed, despite the FBI and OWI clean bill of health on both counts. Again, the most likely to believe Japanese guilty
of sabotage were southerners and people in the least privileged educational, economic and occupational groups. However, the majority of groups all over the country concurred in the belief that the Japanese had spied.

Further polls taken by the National Opinion Research Center show most of these negative opinions to be the result of unreasoning prejudice rather than experience with any Japanese-Americans.

In terms of employment, polls showed the majority felt that the Japanese should take second place in their quest for jobs. Persons with a college education were the only group where the majority would give the Japanese equal employment opportunities.

These, then, were some of the public attitudes prevailing when the Japanese tried to begin their new lives in freedom.

1960-1970's

Considering the great handicaps under which the Japanese had to operate when they left the internment camps - for most the complete loss of former homes and jobs, for some psychological problems concerning their self-worth after experience in the camps, and a very negative attitude toward Japanese-Americans on the part of many Americans - the Japanese have made remarkable progress.

Roger Daniels claims that the Japanese are a model minority and have achieved middle class status by embracing middle class values (especially of law and order) and institutions. He points
to the successes of Senator Inouye of Hawaii, the first Oriental to give a keynote address at a national political convention, and to S. I. Hayakawa, darling of West Coast conservatives, as proof that Japanese have made it in the United States.

Nevertheless there are still signs of discrimination, especially on the West Coast. Income is one way to measure the success of a group, and measurements indicate the Japanese are still suffering from the effects of prejudice. For instance, in 1960 in California the Japanese had a significantly higher degree of education than the general population. Among Japanese males, 11% more have college degrees than white males, yet for every $51 received by white Californians, Japanese got only $43. A white man's chance of making $10,000 was 57% greater than the Japanese. These figures point clearly to discrimination since there is usually a high correlation between income and education.

Although there has been definite improvement in the job market insofar as Japanese finding employment appropriate to their education, the problem lies in not moving upward in their chosen field. There is a very real reluctance on the part of whites to put Japanese in supervisory or executive positions, where they might have an opportunity to hire or fire whites.

Harry Kitano remarks in his book that even by 1969 the Japanese were not fully integrated into American society. He, too, points out that there are very few Japanese executives or administrators
or people in publicly visible important positions. While housing
discrimination has improved, and in fact is better in California
for Japanese than for blacks or Mexican-Americans, it is still a
"constant source of irritation, unhappiness and deprivation."

Kitano advises Japanese to move east of the Mississippi where
possibilities for promotions and higher salaries and equal housing
are greater.

While much anti-Japanese sentiment can still be found around
the United States, a new wave of sympathy for the Japanese-Americans
has swept across the country in recent months as television programs
(Farewell to Manzanar), films (Midway) and books (Years of Infamy)
have suddenly burst upon the scene concerning the war years and the
unfair treatment of the Japanese-Americans. Hopefully this trend
will continue.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 262-3.
9. Ibid., p. 263.
10. Ibid., p. 233.
13. Ibid., p. 252.
17. Ibid., p. 239.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 240.


26. Maisie and Richard Conrat, Executive Order #9066.


29. Ibid., p. 5.


31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., p. 17.

33. Ibid., p. 18-19.

34. Daniels, Concentration Camps U.S.A., p. 171.

35. Ibid., p. 172.

36. Ibid.


38. Ibid., p. 48.

39. Ibid., p. 50.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

It is clear that attitudes toward the Japanese during World War II were actually determined long before Pearl Harbor. The octopus of prejudice and hatred, spawned in the Pacific waters of the West Coast, had reached its ugly tentacles across the nation until even the waters of the Atlantic were polluted. The reasons for this prejudice and hatred seem to be rooted in racial and economic causes. Strong points out that throughout world history people have always been prejudiced against those with different physical characteristics than themselves. He suggests that it is almost impossible to see individual characteristics in a face which has one major difference from oneself, saying "with members of another race the primary racial difference is so pronounced that it overshadows all others, so that the Caucasian first coming into contact with Japanese feels that all Japanese look alike."

This makes it very difficult to perceive that the individual who caused you harm yesterday is not the same person who stands before you today.

When economic competition is a factor, the person who is feeling threatened economically often looks for the most obvious and easily recognizable scapegoat. On the West Coast this recognizable person was the Japanese-American. Because he was not only physically different, but also culturally different, the Japanese
became an easy target for harbingers of racial hatred. During the war years, on the West Coast at least, this racial prejudice combined with greed on the part of many whites to gain what the Japanese possessed. Thus racial prejudice, economic interests and outright greed combined to create an enthusiasm for internment which many politicians were pleased to exploit.

Both before and during the 1940's popular culture reinforced the negative attitudes seen on the West Coast, and because of the national aspect of American popular culture, films and books and magazines helped disseminate these attitudes across the country. During the war years the impression was given through popular culture that whereas Naziism and Fascism were the results of the actions of bad men, Japanese Imperialism was the result of the actions of a bad race. This made the distinction between Japanese-Americans and the Japanese enemy very blurred and contributed greatly to negative attitudes toward our own citizens of Japanese heritage.

That the American public absorbed the attitudes toward the Japanese that were prevalent in popular culture can be proven by polls both during and after the war. These attitudes have endured, I submit, even until today.

Thus, in conclusion, it seems apparent that the Japanese-Americans were interned because of a deep-seated prejudice toward the Oriental which was encouraged because of the economic and political interests
of the non-Orientals. Popular culture both reflected and spread the message that the Japanese were untrustworthy and to be feared, and the American people responded to this message with enthusiastic acceptance of the internment of 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry.

Now in 1976 we seem to have come full circle. Television, film and books are urging white America to look at the internment with guilty eyes, to realize that individuals were involved and hurt because of this action, and to atone. It has become stylish in popular culture to sympathize with the Japanese-American and recognize him as a loyal citizen. A future study on the success of popular culture in changing the stereotype of the Japanese in American society would be most interesting!
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII

This map shows the area from which Japanese Americans were relocated. The shaded areas represent the original "Military Area No. 1," which was originally divided into "prohibited" and "restricted" zones. Eventually, the zones and areas became meaningless, as all Japanese, citizens and aliens, in the four states were incarcerated.
IT ISN'T IN THE BOOK"... or "A Chapter the Author Forgot!"
"I can't help but feel that if Hitler and ... had made that trip with us through those plants, they would ... cut their throats ..."

—Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production, after his recent tour of America's War Plants.
"Well, there's one good thing about it. We won't have to feel so sorry for Madame Butterfly any more."
"Was I embarrassed! I thought he was Uncle Harry and I went over to say hello."
Pacific coast spies flashed ship movements by radio to Jap submarines off the coast.

Cover for Don Eddy's Story
TELEGRAPH: "EVEN A RATTLESHANE GIVES WARNING." EVEN THOUGH HIS JAP WAS A SNAKE, JUPITER GAVE HIM MOUTHFUL OF SIE TEETH.
OH OKAY, THIS IS A REASONABLE PLACE, ... NOW IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO HAVE FACED RELOADED GUN ... THAN TO STAY ARMS ON AN AMERICAN TRANSPORT OR ITS WAY TO THIS PLACE....

IT'S STRICTLY CONTRARY TO IF I KNEW MY NAME, I LL BE GETTING BACK TO NOW AND THE RELOADED GUN, ... BATAVIA WOULD BE SOMETHING REJECT THE LIES OR THE JAP CATCH ME, ... AND I ALWAYS THOUGHT BATAVIA WAS A NICE-SCOUNDREL NAME...

MEANWHILE:  QUITE AN OUTFIT, ... I HAD TO HANG MY CLOTHES ON THE CLOTHESLINE TO BE INCOMING ... BUT IT WOULD BE EASIER IF I KNEW WHAT HAPPENED TO BATAVIA, ... I THINK I'D BETTER CHOW NOW.

MORNING, CAPTAIN... DON'T CALL ME CAPTAIN, OR I'LL CALL YOU COLONEL...

WH....

HAH HAHA! THEY NEVER IN SECONDS THE NIGHT TO ON A KICK-OFF ORDER--BUT IF THEY HIT THE FIRST BUT THEY'RE NOT GOING TO!

DON'T MOVE!

YIPPEE! WAY TO!

THE INMATES HAVE SPOT THE GENERAL AREA ON THE FOOT GUN... WHEN HE SHOOTS AT HIM, THEY'LL SHOOT HIM... THERE HE GOES...

HEY, CATS SNIPER... UP HERE... MUST BE TIED IN... GIVE ME THE MARQUEE BOSS...

COME UP!

RECOGNIZE THE DOTE OUT? DON'T KNOW THESE DEAD MEN CAME ON THE LANDING STAGE, YOU CAN SEE IN THE MARCHAN... THAT WAY...

GETTING TO THE OLD RIDE IS PROMPTLY UNCOMFORTABLE. I, SORRY ABOUT THE INTERRUPTION, BUSTER... YOU HAVE THE THERMAL... SNAKE THEM... AND YOURS?

I'M NOT THE ONE...
"DEATH WAS PART OF OUR LIFE"

THE MAZATEN - SECTIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY IN MEXICO AND
INVITATION TO LEARN TO KILL

A JAP——-

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