THE STUDENT DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT: ANTI-APARTHEID ACTIVISM ON U.S. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES

DISSERTATION

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by

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* * * * *

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Chapter I

AN INTRODUCTION TO STUDENT DIVESTMENT ACTIVISM

Divestment activism on U.S. college campuses is part and parcel of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, especially that wing of the movement that has galvanized the support of thousands of college and university students across the country. In this investigation of protest mobilization and effectiveness, what shall be referred to as the student anti-apartheid divestment movement is a "specific" manifestation of the more "general" U.S. anti-apartheid movement.

Herbert Blumer's explanation of the relationship between general and specific social movements provides a normative framework for the definitions that will follow. Blumer characterizes general social movements as "groping and uncoordinated efforts" which "have only a general direction, toward which they move in a slow, halting, erratic yet persistent fashion. As movements they are unorganized, with neither established leadership nor recognized membership, and little guidance and control" (1978:78). Examples of a general movement might be the civil rights movement, the peace movement, the labor movement and the women's movement.
Blumer goes on to explain that specific social movements emerge out of general social movements. "Indeed, a specific social movement is usually a crystallization of much of the motivation of dissatisfaction, hope and desire awakened by the general social movement and the focusing of this motivation on some specific objective" (1978:78). Therefore, one of the distinguishing features of a specific social movement is the fact that it has a "well-defined objective or goal which it seeks to reach." It is further characterized by an organization and structure, "a recognized and accepted leadership and a definite membership" with a "we-consciousness." However, Blumer makes it clear that specific social movements do not "come into existence with such a structure and organization already established." On the contrary, the organization and culture of such movements are developed over the course of the movement's career (1978:79).

The relationship between the U.S. anti-apartheid movement, as a general social movement, and the student anti-apartheid divestment, as specific social movement, seems to fit well into Blumer's normative framework. While the terms "groping and uncoordinated" may not be the most appropriate literal descriptions of the U.S. anti-apartheid movement's efforts, it must be observed that the movement is highly decentralized and segmented, characterized by extreme ideological diversity (Love 1985:45-51), with diffuse goals ranging from the abolition of racial oppression in South
Africa to the ultimate rejection of colonialist, imperialist, and capitalist societies.

By contrast, the student anti-apartheid divestment movement on U.S. college and university campuses does possess a well-defined, immediate objective, which is to force targeted institutions of higher education to divest totally, or sell all of their financial papers invested in U.S. companies and banks that maintain business operations in the Republic of South Africa or other non-equity financial ties with the South African government or white minority-owned businesses in that region. It must be admitted, however, that the student divestment movement does manifest some of the same decentralization and segmentation found in the general anti-apartheid movement, from which it was derived. But the student movement's goal orientation is more focused, with the ultimate objective of Southern African Black liberation appearing to be an extension of the more immediate goal of divestiture.

With this understanding of the relationship between the anti-apartheid movement and the student divestment movement, let us seek to establish the composition of the anti-apartheid movement and some operating definitions of the two campaigns. The Movements Defined

For purposes of reaching a coherent definition of the general anti-apartheid movement in the United States, we shall rely upon the important work of Janice Love (1985). In her
timely and insightful book, THE U.S. ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT: LOCAL ACTIVISM IN GLOBAL POLITICS, Love explains that the general "anti-apartheid movement is a multiracial, worldwide movement consisting of governmental and nongovernmental actors operating at international, national, and subnational levels in an attempt to end racial oppression in Southern Africa" (1985:1). The movement in the U.S., then, may be viewed as a national subset of the worldwide anti-apartheid movement. Primarily composed of nongovernmental organizations, including church and civic groups, labor unions, elected public officials, professional social movement organizations (SMOs), various professional associations, and college student groups, the movement in the U.S. has shared the general aims of the worldwide anti-apartheid campaign, but has emphasized a principle of non-cooperation with apartheid. Therefore, it has engaged mainly in those activities which "signify a rejection of institutional cooperation with apartheid and thus a rejection of the major thrusts of U.S. government and business policies toward Southern Africa" (1985:13). Perhaps reflecting the wide range of ideological diversity within the movement, "non-cooperation with apartheid" has meant everything from demanding complete U.S. corporate withdrawal from Southern Africa to encouraging U.S. corporations to remain in South Africa, but under conditions where they seek to improve the work and home environment of their black South African employees.
Observing that the movement has spanned three decades, involving a wide array of organizations, and has focused on racial oppression in all of Southern Africa (not limited to the Republic of South Africa), Love points out that the precise boundaries of the movement are difficult to discern. However, for the purposes of her study, she defines the "anti-apartheid movement as consisting of those organizations and persons who endeavor to support the struggles of black people from the region in their attempts to end white minority rule" (1985:2).

The U.S. anti-apartheid movement has consisted of four major thrusts of activities (The international movement has contained the same thrusts). According to Love (1985), these have included: efforts to enact sanctions against South Africa; initiatives to send direct aid, from nongovernmental sources, to Southern African resistance movements, to political prisoners and to their families; efforts to promote research and publication about apartheid; and corresponding attempts to educate the American public about apartheid and the history of U.S./South African relations.

Love's definition and discussion will serve as a backdrop against which we will construct a definition the student anti-apartheid movement on U.S. college and university campuses. The student anti-apartheid divestment is a direct derivative of the call for economic sanctions found in the more general U.S. anti-apartheid movement. What existed as a mere "thrust
of activity" in the general movement became a full-blown, specific movement on college campuses, with a discernible organizational structure, a movement culture, a relatively coherent ideology, specific tactics—with at least one (shanty-construction) being manufactured by the student movement, itself—and of course a well-defined, immediate goal.

In our study, student anti-apartheid divestment activism (hereafter referred to as "student divestment activism") is defined as organized, non-routinized activities, such as rallies, marches, sit-ins, building-occupations, shanty-construction, and the like, designed to force targeted colleges and universities to "divest," i.e., to sell their financial interests in U.S. corporations and banks that maintain economic ties with the Republic of South Africa or her white minority-owned businesses. Accordingly, college and university divestment is promoted by student activists in order to force U.S. banks and corporations to "disinvest," i.e., to completely withdraw from South Africa, severing all financial ties with the apartheid government and white minority-owned businesses in that country.¹

The student anti-apartheid divestment movement (hereafter referred to as "the student divestment movement") is similar to its general U.S. antecedent in make-up, scope, and ultimate objectives. Involving over one-hundred campuses in the U.S., the movement is multi-racial and nation-wide, composed of
tens-of-thousands of students who have been mobilized by relatively small, student-run, campus-based divestment pressure groups. We will call these divestment pressure groups "divestment locals."

While the student divestment movement has tried to maintain an interest in other activities, such as education about apartheid, divestment locals have devoted the overwhelming majority of their efforts to divestiture, as the major objective of their campaign. Indeed, as will become clearer later in this study, educational activities, such as films, have been used primarily to help convince other college students and university officials of the need for divestment.

As indicated above, colleges and universities have not been the sole targets of divestment activism. Divestment locals have sought to persuade U.S. banks and corporations to sever all economic ties with the South African government—a government that movement activists have labelled as "the racist regime." In a few instances, the investment practices of state and local governments have become the concern of campus activists. Even though the student divestment movement has rarely targeted the federal government, it has joined the general anti-apartheid movement in making total economic sanctions against South Africa one of its central objectives. Ultimately, of course, the goal of the anti-apartheid divestment movement on college campuses has been to pressure South Africa to abolish its apartheid system.
A distinguishing feature of the student movement is that it has ebbed and flowed, and thus has been characterized by three distinct waves of protest, each generated by cataclysmic events within South Africa. These waves may be distinguished from one another not only by the time period in which they occurred, but also by their dominant tactics and, to some extent, their major organizations. The first of these waves spanned the period from about 1965-1970 and was generated by the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre and the subsequent massive military build-up by the apartheid government in Pretoria, South Africa; the second, from approximately 1977-1981, generated by the killing of Steve Biko in 1976 and the Soweto Uprisings during 1976 and 1977; and the third, from about 1984 to 1987, motivated by black political protest in South Africa and the escalation of violence and repression by the apartheid government. The third wave has been the most effective, by far, in attaining divestment victories. A fuller discussion of these waves of protest will follow in the next chapter. But for now let us turn to a discussion of why the student divestment movement is important for our investigation.

Why Student Divestment Activism

In response to the erection of an anti-apartheid shanty on the campus of one small liberal arts college in Ohio, a group of anti-divestment students built a "Reagan shanty" on which they painted the message, "THE 60s ARE OVER." Today most of the individuals who would have counted themselves
among the student activists of the 1960s probably would not agree with the sentiment behind the above message. However, many of them do complain today that the political protests which characterized student life in the 1960s appear to be virtually non-existent in the 70s and 80s. Social scientists, such as Altbach (1981) and Levine and Wilson (1981), have observed that "American student activism of the 1960s' variety has virtually disappeared, although a minority of students remain involved politically, but in different kinds of activities (Altbach 1981:1)." But the flurry of divestment activism on American college campuses during the Spring and Fall of 1985 and again in the Spring and Fall of 1986 would seem to call into question the contention that the students of the 80s are not engaged in the 1960s' brand of student political activism.

Having concluded that confrontational student politics were a phenomenon of the past, college administrators were surprised when anti-apartheid divestment demonstrations erupted on campus after campus during the Spring of 1985. Although activist activities began slowly with disappointing student turn-out at planned protest rallies in early April, by the end of the month, divestment activists had staged blockades, rallies, sit-ins, and building occupations on more than sixty college campuses across the nation. Student protests resumed in the Fall, with the rallies occurring on more than fifty college campuses. During the well co-
ordinated anti-apartheid protest day in April of 1986, movement activists and news reporters counted demonstrations at more than one hundred campuses across the country. With more than 2,000 activists having been arrested to-date, and with tens-of-thousand more having participated in some form of divestment activism over the last several years, serious social scientists cannot afford to ignore this apparent resurgence of student political protest on American college campuses.

If indeed the 80s have seen a resurgence of student political activism, it is represented by the divestment movement among college students. For, neither Central American politics nor the nuclear freeze movement, nor any other single issue, in recent years, has been able to galvanize such passionate student support (and opposition).

Moreover, the student divestment movement is important for our investigation because it has amassed a series of tangible, and perhaps moral, victories. While the origins of student divestment activism may be traced back to the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 and the almost immediate call of the U.N. African-Asian block for a world-wide boycott against South Africa, the movement did not experience significant growth, nor public notice in the U.S., until the late 1970s, as sit-ins and rallies at Amherst, Princeton, Harvard, Columbia, Oberlin, and other campuses began to remind political observers of the turbulent 1960s. But large-scale
success had to await the mid-1980s when wide-spread student protest appears to have led to a series of impressive divestment victories. Among these were divestment decisions taken by 75 schools between April 1985 and February 1, 1987 to either totally or partially sell their South African-related stocks and bonds. Only 53 such decisions were made by colleges and universities in the period between 1977 and April 1985 (Africa Fund 1987).

Even though the pressure on U.S. companies to disinvest has come from a variety of sources, including institutional investors, elected public officials, professional SMOs, as well as anti-apartheid activism within South Africa, corporate disinvestiture must also be counted among the trophies of the student divestment campaign. As dramatic student demonstrations brought increased public attention to U.S. economic complicity in apartheid, top American businesses began departing South Africa in a virtual mass exodus (U.S. Centre Against Apartheid 1987:4; American Committee on Africa 1987:2; Vellela 1988:19-23). Some commentators concluded that their rapid departure represented a frantic effort to protect their own corporate image. Others surmised that astute businesses were merely making precautionary moves to weather the forecasted economic storm brewing on South Africa's political horizon and spurred on by volatile civil unrest in the racially torn country. Whatever the motivation, the departure of 96 U.S. companies from South Africa between
January 1986 and November 1987 was due, in part, to divestment activism in the United States (IRRC 1987).

Movement activists also counted among their victories state and local divestment decisions as well as U.S. Congressional sanctions against South Africa. In October 1986, Congress overwhelmingly voted for a package of limited sanctions. In September of that same year, when California passed divestment legislation affecting 9.5 billion dollars of South Africa-related stocks and bonds it joined 18 other states, 13 counties, 70 cities and the Virgin Islands in responding to public pressure to take an ethical stand against apartheid. California's decision brought the total amount of money affected by state and local divestment actions to more than 18.5 billion dollars (ACOA 1986).

It must be pointed out, however, that the victories were not without limitations. University decisions to divest were usually no more than pledges to sell all or a portion of their South Africa-related financial holdings by a certain future date, often within a two-year time frame but sometimes over a five-year period. Ninety-six companies have left South Africa, but almost half of these have retained contracts, licensing, distribution or other non-equity agreements with the new, mainly South African, owners of the businesses that American companies have sold. Moreover, as of November 1987, one-hundred and sixty-eight U.S. corporations continued to have direct investments or employees in South Africa (IRRC
1987). Still, the divestment movement on college campuses has made some impressive accomplishments, as the analysis in the subsequent chapters will show.

It is not simply the apparent resurgence in student activism, along with some apparent victories, that motivate the current study. It is also the observation of an apparent gap in previous social scientific research on student activism which impels our interest.

While it is clear that the literature on student activism exists in a voluminous bulk, it also quickly becomes apparent, even to the casual reader, that this literature is largely speculative, surprisingly reactionary, and uselessly journalistic. Therefore, as Altbach (1981:4) so aptly observes, "no widely accepted theoretical perspectives on student activism emerged from the massive outpouring of writings on students in the 1960s." Those studies that did employ social scientific theories tended to focus on either the ideologies, attitudes, motivations or socio-economic background of the activists (e.g., Flacks 1967; Feuer 1969; Keniston 1968; Wood 1974; Wood and Ng 1980). A smaller number examined the influence of institutional structure upon the occurrence of student activism (e.g., Astin 1970; Kerr 1964; Scottt and El-Assal 1969) and violent disruption (e.g., Bayer and Astin 1969). If one were to organize the literature under general categories, almost all would fall under the heading, "the sources and determinants of student activism." The
questions in which most researchers were interested related to why some students and not others participate in activist activities.

On the other hand, very little attention has been given to the organization and structure of student social movements. Moreover, few researchers have dealt with the consequences of individual student movements (e.g., Astin and Bayer 1971; Astin et. al. 1975), and have largely failed to ask, "what factors lead to the success or failure of these movements?" It is these latter questions in which the current investigation will be interested. Thus the following chapters will seek to analyze the emergence, decline and salient characteristics of the three waves of student divestment protest (Chapter II); describe the method of data collection, the sources and distribution of campus protests over time-period, region of the country and campus type (Chapter III); examine national movement structure and assess its impact upon movement mobilization (Chapter IV); analyze the impact of student divestment activism upon university decisions to divest and evaluate the political significance of those decisions (Chapter V); and assess the prospects and problems of the student divestment movement, and identify implications for future research (Chapter VI).
NOTES

1. Disinvestment usually refers to the action taken by a corporation to terminate all economic ties with South Africa. Initially, it referred to the mere liquidation of direct investments in South Africa. But as companies began to leave South Africa while still maintaining indirect, non-equity ties to businesses in the country, Disinvestment came to mean the termination of all investments in South Africa, including licensing and franchising agreements. Disinvestment must be distinguished from divestment. Divestment refers to action taken by institutions, such as churches and colleges, to sell stocks, bonds or other financial interests in corporations that conduct business operations in South Africa or have other financial ties with the South African government or white minority owned companies in South Africa.

2. The term "shanty" refers to a small hut, constructed of plywood, tin, and scrap pieces of lumber, built by student activists both as a visible, educational symbol of the oppressed economic conditions in which black South Africans are forced to live and as an instrument of protest against university administrations who refuse to divest. A complete discussion of shanties will follow in a later chapter.

3. Counter-movement activists themselves labelled the building, the "Reagan shanty."

4. "South Africa-related stocks and bonds" refer to those stocks and bonds that are invested in companies that are financially involved in South Africa.

5. The literature on student activism is truly voluminous. Keniston's (1973) annotated bibliography includes over 300 empirical articles and books on campus unrest since World War II. Altbach's (1968) bibliography lists 1.800 books and articles on student politics. Another bibliographic compilation features approximately 4.500 references on student activism in the United States, with an additional 4.500 items on other parts of the world (Altbach and Kelly, 1973).
Chapter II

EMERGENCE OF PROTEST WAVES

As was suggested in the previous chapter, the three waves of student divestment protest are grounded in the U.S. anti-apartheid movement's strategic push for economic sanctions against South Africa. This chapter seeks to analyze the emergence of these three distinct waves of student divestment activism. The emergence of each wave is ultimately traceable to specific precipitating factors in the Republic of South Africa. The protest waves, themselves, may be distinguished from one another, not only by their time period, but also by their organizational structure, major movement organizations, key resources, and distinctive tactics. Table 1 lists the salient features of the three waves.

Precipitating Events

Precipitating events are specific occurrences that serve to confirm generalized beliefs (Smelser 1963:16-17) or justify reform ideologies, which are themselves a form of generalized beliefs (Wood and Jackson 1982:43). For our purposes, generalized beliefs are those general ideologies (such as democracy) or those reform ideologies (such as the demand
for black South African equal voting rights) upon which the anti-apartheid movement is based.

Most, but not all, movements have a precipitating event which serves to justify or confirm ideological explanations for important social problems. These events may be minor, involving only one person, or major, involving large numbers. But they often come in the form of a crisis. Rosa Parks' refusal to relinquish her bus seat for a white person triggered the Montgomery bus boycott, a major campaign of the civil rights movement. Her arrest served to re-confirm ideologies concerning the prevalence of racism in America and served to help justify black demands for equal treatment.

Similarly, a sequence of cataclysmic political events in South Africa served to trigger student divestment protest on U.S. college and university campuses. The impact of these South African events upon U.S. students was mediated by a world-wide, mass communications network. Anthony Oberschall argues that a world-wide, almost instantaneous, mass communications system is sufficient to speed up the diffusion of protest activity (1973:298-99). He partly attributes the spread of student protest in the 1960s to just such a system. Moreover, he argues in the same context that precipitating events may take the place of prior organization in focusing attention on conditions of injustice and oppression (1973:297). However, these precipitating events must bear a
direct relationship to pre-existing grievances shared by those who presumably are moved to support others' causes through their own protest.

In this regard, then, news-worthy instances of violent repression in South Africa served as precipitating events for anti-apartheid protest by American masses who shared similar grievances. By the mid-1960s, student groups such as SDS and SNCC, concerned about racial oppression at home and Yankee imperialism abroad, were deeply involved in civil rights and other social justice causes. Although neither SDS nor SNCC would become major organizational forces in the student divestment movement, preoccupied as they were with domestic antiwar, poverty, and racial issues, it is easy to understand how student social activists, both inside and outside these two organizations, influenced by the human rights cultural drift of their era, might have translated their passion about domestic racial issues into a deep concern for the plight of similarly oppressed black South Africans. The arrival of the seventies and eighties, along with more liberalized civil rights laws, has not completely relieved racial problems in the U.S. Racism remains a concern of American students. Thus, the second and third waves of student activism were generated through the same social mechanism that mediated the precipitation of the first wave of activism. It should be pointed out, as well, that long before U.S. student activists became outraged over apartheid in the 1960s, they had begun
to draw connections between American corporate profits, military industrialism, and economic exploitation in the U.S. and in the Third World (Vogel 1978; Sale 1973). Under those conditions, then, where political crises in South Africa directly related to shared grievances in the U.S., cataclysmic political events in South Africa precipitated student protest on college campuses and at the front doors of American banks.

Yet, precipitating events mediated through mass communications networks are not sufficient to mobilize collective action (Smelser 1963:17). Leadership, co-optable networks, and other key resources are needed to organize and channel social protests (Oberschall 1973; Freeman 1983).

As it shall be shown below, each of the three waves of student divestment protest possessed its own organizational structure, key resources, major SMOs, and distinctive tactics. Lasting from 1965 to 1970, the first wave relied upon pre-existing student local chapters of national SMOs for leadership and organization, transitory volunteers for its key resources, and witness events along with occasional disruptive mass protest for its dominant tactics (See Table 1). Beginning in 1977 and declining in 1981, the second wave was characterized by a more complex organizational structure including the formation of regional coalitions and the leadership of national professional SMOs, the resources of national and regional conferences, church groups, and other large institutions such as colleges and universities. It was
also characterized by a moderation and diversification of

tactics wherein, in addition to students continuing to stage
mass protest, shareholder proxy resolutions were introduced
by institutional investors, such as churches and universities,
in corporate annual meetings. The articulated third wave of

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divestment activism, ranging from 1984 to 1987, experienced an expansion in organizational complexity characterized by a proliferation of divestment locals and the increased influence of national coordination by the American Committee on Africa. Additional professional SMOs, labor unions, church groups, legislative black caucuses, and other student organizations provided specialized and unspecialized resources. Shanty-construction, along with nationally coordinated and locally mobilized mass protests, constituted the distinctive tactics of the third wave. In all three waves, access to the mass media was a key resource.

**Emergence of the First Wave**

On March 19, 1965, six hundred student protestors staged a anti-apartheid demonstration in front of New York City's Chase Manhattan Bank (Hauck et al. 1963; NYT 1965). Thus began the first wave of student divestment activism.

Forty-nine persons were arrested when these student protestors held a sit-in protesting the renewal of bank loans to South Africa's apartheid government. This divestment demonstration was the occasion of the Students for a Democratic Society's (SDS) first act of civil disobedience (Hauck et al. 1983). The following day, a New York Times article reported that leaders of the protest represented at least five non-governmental organizations: SDS, National
Student Christian Federation (NSCF), Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Pan-African Student Organization of America. According to Hauck et. al. (1983), some students credited the apartheid issue with helping to develop a more activist climate on U.S. college campuses. Arthur Wasknow, one of the SDS members who was arrested at the Chase Manhattan demonstration, wrote in the February 1966 issue of LIBERATION, a New Left publication:

A number of students who took part in the Chase demonstration reported that on their campuses, some faculty and students responded to information about American business support of Apartheid with an even deeper sense of moral outrage than they ordinarily gave either racial inequality within the United States or the war in Vietnam (quoted in Hauck et. al. 1983:9).

Initially targeting banks and then expanding to focus on other U.S. institutions, including especially multi-national corporations and educational institutions, student protest against U.S. financial involvement in South Africa continued throughout the late 1960s. Available information reveals that student protest for divestment occurred on several campuses in 1968. In April of that year, 250 Princeton students demonstrated to protest the school's 100 million dollar investment in companies with business operations in South Africa. Students at Cornell also made demands that their university divest of its financial holdings in four banks that had made loans to the South African government. Protests
continued at Cornell into 1969. Chase Manhattan remained one of the major concerns of student activists as 300 University of Wisconsin students staged a sit-in during May of 1968 to protest the University's investments in the Bank. Divestment protests had occurred at Amherst College earlier that year. Black college students also demonstrated their opposition to America's financial ties to apartheid when students at the historically black Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia heckled New York's Governor Rockefeller, yelling, "get your money out of South Africa!" Governor Rockefeller's brother David was then president of Chase Manhattan. By the end of the decade, the divestment movement on college campuses was well underway.

This first wave of protest was triggered in large part by the Sharpeville Massacre, the passage of consequent repressive legislation in South Africa, and the country's precipitous military build-up following the 1963 U.N. arms embargo. At Sharpeville, on March 21, 1960, seventy unarmed black African demonstrators were killed, and another 180 were wounded, when South African police fired upon a peaceful protest against "pass laws." The Sharpeville Massacre caused widespread political unrest in South Africa and resulted in the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the organizations that had planned the non-violent anti-pass law campaign.

During the several years that followed, inside South Africa, the apartheid regime enacted a series of repressive
measures designed to secure apartheid and combat political protest. For example, the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 was the first in a series of measures designed to enforce a complete separation of the races, or provide for what the government refers to as "separate development." Moreover, in order to fight political unrest, the government passed a series of General Laws Amendment Acts giving the authorities power to commit persons to house arrest and detention without trial (Breitenbach 1974).

The other key precipitating factor that led to the emergence of divestment activism among college students was South Africa's response to the U.N. arms embargo. In 1963 and again in 1977, the U.N. Security Council, under pressure from the African-Asian block, was able to pass resolutions on a voluntary and a mandatory arms embargo, respectively, against South Africa. The U.S. and other Western nations announced their intent to comply with the U.N. resolutions, even though considerable evidence exists which suggests that South Africa was able to evade embargo restrictions (see: Gervasi 1978a, 1978b; Klare and Prokosch 1978).

In the wake of Sharpeville, the white-minority regime made a determination to protect itself against resurgent black liberation movements which had become convinced, after decades of non-violent protests, that armed struggle could not be avoided in the fight for African liberation. What began was an extraordinary military expansion with South African defense
expenditures increasing over 600 percent in the ten-year period after 1960. During the 1960s, military spending grew from $65 million to $405 million per year (Makgetla and Seidman 1978:200). Beginning in the sixties, but continuing into the seventies and eighties, the apartheid government's military expansion had quadrupled by the 1977-78 fiscal year. During the following year, the budget grew to $1.9 billion, and then to more than $2 billion by 1980 (Schmidt 1980:10).

Not only did military spending go up, but the government also initiated steps in the mid-sixties that began to secure its own military industry. For example, in May 1968, South Africa established its own corporation that both produces and exports a wide assortment of weaponry. Wanting to set up a structure that would meet the country's military needs, the government established the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) with a $144 million government grant (Varyrnen 1980:202). It also appears that the government wanted to take advantage of offers made by foreign investors. Thus, as a rationale for the legislation establishing ARMSCOR, the South African Minister of Defense said

...that a number of overseas firms had approached the government to suggest the joint establishment with South African concerns of armament factories in the Republic. The government welcomed these initiatives on the ground that technical 'know-how' would be available and South Africa's research costs correspondingly reduced. The new corporation would, it was claimed, facilitate links between local and overseas producers (Spence 1975).
Anti-apartheid activists--within South Africa, in other Western nations, and but especially in the U.S.--blamed the South African military expansion on foreign investments. Even though the events at Sharpeville resulted in a brief flight of foreign capital, as a consequence of government incentives (Myers 1980:46), new foreign investments began to flood the South African economy by the mid-sixties. Between 1965 and 1969, which were years of extraordinarily rapid growth, the average annual influx of new investments was more than $305 million (Litvak et.al. 1978:40). After Sharpeville, U.S. corporate investments in South Africa continued to rise as it had since World War II. Between 1943 and 1978, American investment in South Africa increased from $50 million to $2 billion--a 4,000 percent growth. By 1966, direct investments (i.e., corporate investments) had risen to $490 million.

Following Sharpeville, U.S. lending, or indirect investments, also began to rise. With the economy thrown into a state of emergency when short-term investors began to leave in response to the Massacre, U.S. banks quickly moved to bail out the financially plagued government. As Litvak et.al. pointed out:

...financiers in the U.S. put together loans adding up to $150 million. Foremost among these was a $40 million revolving loan offered by a consortium of ten American banks including Chase Manhattan and Citibank (1978:58).
It was these loans that prompted the 1965 SDS protest at Chase Manhattan, kicking off the first wave of student divestment activism. Banks, then, became the earliest targets of divestment activism, on campuses of higher education and in the general anti-apartheid movement. The strategy of the bank campaign was to convince individuals and organizations to withdraw deposits and stock investments to protest bank loans to South Africa. With the formation of its Committee of Conscience in 1966, ACOA took the organizational lead. Church groups were also among the most vigorous activists.

But movement activists in the U.S. anti-apartheid movement made it clear from the beginning that the campaign against bank loans was part of a broader strategy to force all U.S. firms to withdraw from South Africa. A. Philip Randolph, who along with Donald Harrington was then co-chairperson of ACOA, explained in a 1966 letter to potential campaign supporters, that "the campaign on the banks will be only a beginning. Essentially, what we wish to accomplish is to make clear to ourselves, to our fellow countrymen, and to our government, that Americans must disengage economically from the injustices of the apartheid regime in South Africa" (Quoted in Hauck 1983:128-9). In his biography of ACOA, George Hauser, one of its founders, also indicated that the campaign against bank loans was the beginning of a movement which rapidly expanded to include protest against investment in companies that maintained business operations in Southern

It might be point out, parenthetically, at this juncture that South Africa's response to the arms embargo also led to an apparent shift in the strategy of the general U.S. anti-apartheid movement. Prior to the 1963 voluntary arms embargo, movement strategies consisted of a relatively diffuse emphasis upon general sanctions, involving appeals for various types of boycotts (especially boycotts of South African gold) and appeals to the federal government to impose political and military sanctions. But after it appeared that the embargo would have little effect on South Africa's military and industrial growth, movement strategies shifted to focus more discretely upon divestment and disinvestment. The strategic shift toward divestment reflected activists' recognition that U.S. economic interests not only benefitted from their involvement with South Africa but also, through loans and investments, U.S. banks and businesses buttressed the apartheid regime. By the late 1970s, concerned scholars fully documented U.S. corporate complicity in apartheid, but most especially the role of U.S. private and public interests in abetting South Africa's evasion of both the 1963 and the 1977 arms embargoes and America's role in assisting the apartheid government's in the establishment of its own military-industrial complex (See, for example: Western Massachusetts ACAS 1978; Gerrasi 1978b; Varyrnen 1980). Research by such scholars provided movement activists with the documented
evidence necessary to launch a sustained attack on banks and multinational corporations.

The First Wave: Leadership, Organizations and Tactics

During the first wave of student divestment protest, no individuals emerged as major national student leaders to whom student activists across the country looked for guidance and inspiration. This is not surprising since student divestment activism was not tied into a centralized national structure.

Student organizations, however, did figure prominently in the first wave of the movement. The National Student Christian Federation (NSCF) made a sustained contribution throughout the late 60s (Sale 1973). But other groups, such as SDS, became too pre-occupied with antiwar and domestic civil rights issues to continue an organizational focus on apartheid following the 1965 demonstration at Chase Manhattan. As Sale (1973) indicates, even though SDS's involvement in the anti-apartheid campaign reflected their anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist sentiments, the demonstration at Chase Manhattan represented an isolated event, a one-time expression of moral outrage against apartheid. The student divestment movement was left to the leadership of NSCF, students at the Union Theological Seminary in New York, and students at Columbia University.

Organized divestment locals, that constituted the life-blood of the anti-apartheid movement during the third wave of
student divestment activism, had not yet begun to form on college campuses during the first wave. Rather, organized protest against apartheid was generated by pre-existing student groups such as the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), NSCF, and student chapters of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Essentially operating as transitory volunteers, these organizations took on anti-apartheid protest as one among their several special projects. The American Committee on Africa (ACOA), founded in 1953 by former civil rights activists, emerged as a major actor in the general anti-apartheid movement and would serve as an important organizational force for student activism throughout the divestment movement. But there is little evidence that it played more than a consultative role in generating student divestment activism during the first wave. On the other hand, it seems clear that student associational ties with community activists in CORE and ACOA, in addition to their involvement with student groups such as NSCF and SNCC, served to encourage their participation in the anti-apartheid movement. Thus, even though hundreds of students engaged in divestment activism throughout the late 1960s at Columbia, Cornell, the University of Wisconsin and at other campuses, student protest remained largely emergent, unsustained by on-going divestment locals, but nonetheless generated through associational ties in pre-existing religious and civil rights student organizations.
Tactics employed by student divestment activists also reflected the influence of civil rights organizations. Exemplary of the most spectacular tactics used in the first wave were the 1965 sit-in at Chase Manhattan and the 1968 occupation of the administration building at the University of Wisconsin. But for the most part, divestment demonstrators carried signs in peaceful marches and held public rallies.

The tactical models (Morris 1984), involving sit-ins, marches and rallies during the first wave (which would diversify to include the introduction of corporate shareholder proxies during the second wave, and expand to include blockades and shanty-construction during the third wave), were acquired through student association with direct action organizations such as CORE and SNCC. Indeed, Morris argues that the sit-in was a 1950s and 60s tactical innovation of the civil rights movement, perfected by black students at segregated lunch counters in the South. He points out how students at Northern white educational institutions were greatly impressed by the sit-in tactic and used it on their campuses in support of civil rights and also in support of other political causes (1984:188ff,222).

Sit-ins and building-occupations were used occasionally as disruptive tactics during the first wave of student divestment activism, but no conclusive evidence exists that would permit us to determine whether or not these tactics dominated the period. Less disruptive, witness events, such
as marches and rallies, were frequently used to call university attention to U.S. economic complicity in apartheid. It was these that seemed to dominate the first wave.

Whatever the dominant tactics of the period, they were not enough to convince large numbers of colleges and universities to decide to divest of corporate or bank stocks. The two immediate objectives of the student divestment movement during the first wave were to persuade targeted universities to sell their South Africa-related stocks and to convince U.S. banks to terminate all loans to the South African government. During the sixties, only a few universities actually sold South Africa-related stock. Columbia University, for example, completely divested its General Motors (GM) and Gulf Oil stock. Several other universities sold their stocks in banks participating in the 1960 $40 million loan agreement with the apartheid government of South Africa. But while a select few made decisions to divest, most institutions either steadfastly refused to surrender to student demands or responded to the protest by establishing selective divestment policies that would limit or prohibit university investments in companies with strong relationships to the South African government.

Decline of the First Wave

By the end of the decade, student divestment activism had fallen into a state of dormancy. All of the reasons for this
occurrence are not clear. However, several factors can be readily identified.

The first among these relates to the notorious instability of all student movements (e.g., see: Gusfield 1970:236). The rapidity with which the student population turns over and the frequency with which student interests change often creates abrupt shifts in movement direction and intensity. Not only are student groups typically affected by the natural rhythms of a school year's academic calendar, they are also peculiarly vulnerable to other external constraints such as university regulations, standard operating procedures, and legal obligations.

Particularly, with regard to this last observation, it seems apparent that student protest during the first wave was partially defused by university appeals to fiduciary responsibility. Such was the response of Cornell University's Board of Trustees to a 1968 faculty resolution supporting a divestment petition that had been signed by 1,200 students. The Board essentially said that it would keep the divestment requests under consideration, but that it would have to reject the petition on various grounds including most especially "the legal responsibilities of the Trustees as fiduciaries." (Quoted in Simon et.al. 1972:4).

But, perhaps, with greater effectiveness than appeals to fiduciary responsibility, institutional decisions to commission investment studies had the effect of reducing the
intensity of student divestment activism. Moreover, college presidents would often appoint student activist leaders to the school's investment committee, sometimes assigning it the responsibility of thoroughly reviewing current investment policies and practices. This combination of "delaying tactics" (as activists began to call them) and co-optation exacerbated the inevitable instability of the student movement, resulting in a decline of student protest. These university responses, in which study groups were commissioned and student activists were appointed to investment advisory committees, would plague the student movement throughout the second and into the third wave. The most immediate impact of these responses during the first wave was to quiet student protest. But movement adaptation to institutional responses would give student protest an added measure of resiliency during the third wave of divestment activism.

A second reason that student divestment activism fell into dormancy by 1970 related to the fact that it constituted an incipient movement. Killian (1964:26-29) argues that a social movement may exist as a simple collectivity, as opposed to an organized group, during the early phases of its life cycle. Movements gain a measure of stability over time, as they develop their own normative structures, values and tradition. During the 60s, "formal" divestment locals, bearing a name (such as "Students United Against Apartheid"), with recognized student leaders, and a statement of purpose,
had not yet arisen on college campuses. Such formally organized groups were not to emerge until the early 1970s (The South African Liberation Committee, founded in 1973 at Michigan State University, was one of the earliest such groups). The absence of formalized divestment locals increased the likelihood that there would be lulls in the movement.

Related to the above point is the fact that divestment activism was dependent upon student organizations whose stated purposes centered on other urgent issues, such as domestic civil rights, police brutality, and the Vietnam War. The mere urgency of such domestic issues might have been enough to prevent a tenacious pursuit of anti-apartheid issues.

Another factor also helped to produce dormancy in the student divestment movement, namely, student feelings that they had attained victory in the campaign against bank loans. Victories achieved with the leadership of religious organizations led students to that conviction. In 1966, church groups joined students and the ACOA in the bank campaign. Church organizations were to become the most vigorous and effective participants in the campaign and a major catalyst in the attainment of movement victories. When the United Methodist Church Board of Missions withdrew its $10 million investment portfolio from the First National City Bank in 1968, other church denominations made similar threats. After all was said and done, more than 200 hundred groups and
individuals withdrew an estimated $23 million from Chase Manhattan, First National City, and other Banks (Shepherd 1977:146; Vogel 1978:37). Several universities also sold their bank stock after students held protests on their campuses. Cornell and Princeton, for example, sold stock in two companies after students confronted recruiters on several college campuses. But university officials insisted that financial reasons, not student protest, accounted for the sale (Hauck 1983:129). Still, following a lengthy student-faculty study of university investments, President Goheen of Princeton announced that the university would cease buying stock in banks that continued to make loans directly to the South African government (Vogel 1978:37). Then in late 1969, the culminating event occurred, leading students and other anti-apartheid activists to claim victory. Publicly maintaining that South Africa was no longer in need of their assistance, the ten banks finally terminated their loans to the government. Privately, however, at least one bank official at Chase admitted that political pressures were partly responsible for the bank's decision (Vogel 1978:37). Even though the movement would receive evidence four years later that the smaller U.S. banks were still granting loans to South Africa, not having such evidence in 1969, student divestment activists could boast a measure of success.

Several studies have adequately demonstrated that movement success contributes to movement decline (e.g., see,
Zald and Ash 1966; and Miller 1983). That success leads to decline is especially true when a group organizes for the sole purpose of achieving only one goal, the accomplishment of which obviates the need for the movement's continued existence (Miller 1983:282). While the student divestment movement during the first wave did not center on just one goal, it did have both an ultimate goal--the abolition of apartheid—and several immediate, or instrumental, ones, the most energizing of which was the termination of bank loans to South Africa, especially the $40 million loan in which ten of the largest American banks participated. Under circumstances where student activists perceived a partial victory in the accomplishment of the movement's most immediate and energizing goals, student protest was thrown into a state of dormancy, until other precipitating events and the re-establishment of divestment goals would cause it to re-emerge in a second wave of campus protest.

The Emergence of the Second Wave

Student divestment activism, which had lain dormant for more than half a decade, re-emerged in the aftermath of the 1976-77 Soweto Uprisings and the 1977 killing of the prominent South African black leader, Steve Biko. On June 16, 1976, South African police opened fire on Soweto school children, cutting down 700 of them, as they marched in peaceful protest against compulsory Afrikaans. The incident sparked almost a
year of black revolt in which hundreds more were killed. Pretoria also responded with other repressive measures including the banning of many black consciousness leaders and sympathizers. Then in September, 1977, Steve Biko became the 45th known black activist to die while being held in detention by South African police. Anti-apartheid activists throughout the world and especially in the U.S. were predictably outraged. Just as the first wave had resulted from a series of South African political crises, so too was the second wave a consequence of cataclysmic events in that racially torn country.

The re-emergence of U.S. student divestment activism is also traceable to increased organizing at the national and regional levels. On December 10, 1977, after a divestment demonstration at Amherst College, representatives from thirteen colleges and six national organizations formed the Northeast Coalition for the Liberation of Africa (NECLSA). Composed of student, community, and national anti-apartheid organizations, the group then established a representative steering committee which in turn planned conferences (the first of which was held at Yale the weekend of March 31, 1978 with over 400 registered participants representing 48 colleges), organized national days of co-ordinated protest and began distributing a newsletter.

This effort to co-ordinate student anti-apartheid and divestment activities on a regional and national level was
merely one of several such successful attempts that were to follow. Regional conferences designed to co-ordinate student anti-apartheid activism were also held in the mid-west at Northwestern University and in the Southeast at Duke University during the Autumn of 1978. In the late 1970s, the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid began to hold hearings and the ACOA began holding strategy conferences, with both types of meetings being attended by representatives from campus divestment locals who gave progress reports, made contacts with other student activists and with professional SMO organizers, and helped plan, what one Student Anti-Apartheid Movement Newsletter referred to as the "spring offensive," or several weeks of co-ordinated anti-apartheid activity. Divestment locals also began to build linkages with other campus activist groups and community anti-apartheid organizations. The Upper Valley Committee at Dartmouth College, for example, was part of a larger coalition that submitted 25 demands to Trustees, focusing on institutional racism and sexism at Dartmouth as well as the school's connections to the nuclear industry. Moreover, with a staff member serving as "National Student Coordinator," ACOA was able to focus its impressive social movement organizational skills, through a major initiative, targeting the college campus market for maximum assistance in the generation and coordination of student divestment activism.

Thus, while the second wave was triggered by cataclysmic
events in South Africa, the diffusion of student protest activity resulted from expansions in the development of movement organization that created divestment locals and resulted in the growth of regional and national co-ordination. But while organizational development did lead to a diffusion of protest activity, resulting in the arrest of over 1000 student demonstrators at more than 100 colleges and universities, it also resulted in official efforts to co-opt the student divestment movement. Even though these efforts had limited effectiveness, they nonetheless led, in turn, to a slight softening of movement goals and strategies.

A major portion of the movement's organizational development resulted from the emergence of divestment locals. The presence of divestment locals, or organized groups with an identifiable leadership and membership, made the movement more susceptible to co-optation. By co-optation, we refer to "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability of existence" (Selznick 1953). As divestment locals confronted university structures and policies using pressure tactics such as sit-ins, building-occupations and blockades, university officials, sometimes quickly, other times sluggishly, but almost inevitably, moved to establish investment committees (or to reactivate existing ones), assigning them with the task of reviewing and revising investment policies and procedures in light of U.S. corporate
activity in South Africa and with the responsibility of advising trustees on investment issues. To these committees were usually appointed faculty, sometimes alumni, but almost always students, typically one or more leaders of the campus divestment local.

As members of these committees, student activists were, of course, subject to many of the same expectations and constraints that limited the actions of most university officials. They inevitably experienced a similar system of rewards and punishments, feelings of responsibility, and feelings of ownership of the process, in ways similar to the ownership feelings of faculty counterparts (For a discussion of participation and co-optation, see Gamson 1968:135-143). All of this is not to say that university officials were ultimately successful in controlling student protest through co-optation. Events beyond their control, such as additional news of South African repression, unexpected outcomes of other independent investment studies, along with the indomitaibility of student activist fervor, prevented such an occurrence. But it is to say that through the above process, student divestment activism was subjected to attempts on the part of authorities to co-opt the movement, partly as an indirect consequence of increased organization, and finally resulting in a moderation of goals and strategies.
Moderation of Goals and Strategy

During the first wave, total divestment and disinvestment were clearly the dominant goals of the student movement. Likewise, disruptive pressure tactics characterized movement strategy. But beginning in the second wave, the goals and strategies of a few divestment locals took on a decidedly moderate character. Moderation was represented by a tendency to embrace either "partial" or "selective" divestment as a goal and to urge corporate and university endorsement of the Sullivan Principles as a strategy.

While "total" divestment involves the selling of all South Africa-related financial holdings, "partial" divestment refers to the sale of only those South Africa-related holdings invested in U.S. companies and banks that fail to meet certain objective (and sometimes subjective) investment standards. For example, a university might establish an investment policy which requires it to divest of all South Africa-related stocks in companies that have failed to sign the Sullivan Principles. Acting on such a policy would result in "partial" divestment. "Selective" divestment, then usually refers to "partial" divestment exercised on a case-by-case basis. Thus rather than divesting from all South Africa-related companies that fail to meet certain policy standards, a university might decide to "selectively" divest from each of these individual companies only after a thorough examination of the unique circumstances of each company, or only after direct dialogue
with each company, or only after taking into account a (potentially infinite) range of variables that might help explain why the company has failed to meet a particular policy standard. The key to understanding selective divestment is to remember that it involves treating each corporation as an individual organization (Coon 1986:143).

Only a very small number of divestment locals have made a conscious decision to push for partial or selective divestment. Usually such calls have come from students representing broader constituencies. For instance, in a February 1985 letter written on stationary from the Associated Students of Stanford University, a student senator informed a student researcher at the University of Colorado that he favored selective divestment and that they had "overwhelmingly" passed a "student referendum" calling for "the establishment of criteria for selective divestment."

Still, a small number of student anti-apartheid pressure groups (divestment locals) have taken strong positions against divestment as a useful strategic objective. For example, during a 1981 National Student Anti-Apartheid Strategy Conference at Hunter College, activists representing Berea College's divestment local, Students United Against Apartheid, took such a position, indicating that "divestment has never been an organizing focus" for their group (Nessen 1981:7). The Berea activists argued that fundraising for liberation movements and consciousness raising courses on apartheid were
more effective than divestment.

The Berea student position was unambiguously in the minority at that conference and in the student divestment movement, nationwide. Nevertheless, while reaffirming that "the call for total divestment should always be the demand," the conference allowed that the achievement of "partial divestment...is often tactically helpful" in generating publicity and in leading "organizers to intensify rather than abandon the demand for total divestment" (Nessen 1981:9).

Let it be emphasized that the Berea-type and Stanford-type deviations from total divestment never really attained a foothold in the student divestment movement, nor even finally on their own campuses. But such deviations did reflect a small measure of moderation in movement goals that emerged during the second wave and found re-expression in the early part of the third wave of protest.

Strategies, which largely had consisted of disruptive pressure tactics during the first wave of campus protest, also began to moderate during the second wave. Through increased usage of established institutionalized methods, such as student referendum and proposals submitted to investment advisory committees, some student activists urged the adoption of the Sullivan Principles and pressed their universities to vote proxies in favor of South Africa-related resolutions that were up for consideration at annual corporate board meetings. As indicated above, student divestment activists were drawn
into such strategies through their involvement with university-appointed investment advisory committees.

Such strategies also reflected the degree to which student activists were forced to compromise in the face of stern university recalcitrance on the issue of divestment. Universities usually resisted divestment demands by appealing to the "progressive force" argument. Basically this argument holds that U.S. corporate involvement will accelerate South African economic growth, creating more jobs and higher income for black South Africans. Thus equipped with an improving economic situation, blacks would be better prepared to press for full equality. Having a new stake in the system, they would be more likely to use non-violent means of social change. Moreover, as the argument continues, under the progressive march of market forces, racial prejudice would soon dissipate since it is really a more anachronistic holdover from pre-industrial societies (for a concise critical analysis of this argument, see: Danaher 1984:41-58; Litvak et.al. 1978: 11-37; and Schmidt 1980).

Educational institutions who appealed to the progressive force argument were greatly aided in their opposition to divestment by the March 1977 introduction of a set of six fair employment criteria, call the Sullivan Principles. Table 2 lists six original principles, plus their most recent amplification. An highly acclaimed job training program organizer and the first black person elected to GM's Board of
Directors, the Rev. Leon Sullivan had formulated the Principles following lengthy consultation with U.S. corporate leaders. The Principles were designed as a code of conduct

Table 2. Statement of Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principle 1</td>
<td>Nonsegregation of the Races in All Eating, Comfort, Locker Room and Work Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle 2</td>
<td>Equal and Fair Employment Practices for All Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle 3</td>
<td>Equal Pay for All Employees Doing Equal or Comparable Work for the Same Period of Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle 4</td>
<td>Initiation and Development of Training Programs That Will Prepare Blacks, Coloured and Asians in Substantial Numbers for Supervisory, Administrative, Clerical and Technical Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle 5</td>
<td>Increasing the Number of Blacks, coloureds and Asians in Management and Supervisory Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle 6</td>
<td>Improving the Quality of Employees' Lives Outside the Work Environment in Such Areas as Housing, Transportation, Schooling, Recreation, and Health Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle 7*</td>
<td>Working to Eliminate Laws and Customs That Impede Social and Political Justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Formerly called "Fourth Amplification

Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1986, p. iii
for U.S. business operations in South Africa and were aimed at ending apartheid by asking U.S. companies to endorse and abide by them as fair employment practices for black South Africans. But the Principles were also an apparent compromise strategy, as indicated by the fact that Sullivan introduced them only after several years of failed attempts to convince his corporate colleagues of the merits of disinvestment. Therefore, in the wake of Soweto and in obvious response to increased pressure from divestment activists, South Africa-related American companies moved to endorse the Principles. The pace of endorsement was slow at first. But by the end of 1979, 135 of the approximate 350 South Africa-related U.S. firms had adopted the code (Schmidt 1980). Educational institutions were then in a position to use the Principles and corporate endorsement of them to reassure students that U.S. business activity in South Africa was indeed a progressive force for positive social change. The overwhelming majority of divestment locals were not persuaded by university appeals to the progressive force argument nor by corporate endorsements of the Sullivan Principles. But some found themselves frustrated by university responses of appeasement that rejected total divestment, but at the same time institutionalized student concerns about ethical investment and apartheid.
"Institutionalization," Social Control and the Decline of the Second Wave

As of October 1978, at least forty colleges and universities had adopted a South Africa-related social responsibility investment policy and/or established an investment advisory committee charged with the responsibility of making recommendations about the formulation of such a policy. Of these, fifteen urged companies in their investment portfolio to sign the Sullivan Principles. Some schools indicated that they would consider selective divestment based on Sullivan-related criteria or some other social responsibility criteria (Liff 1978). By the early 1980s, more than thirty-four colleges and universities had established policies requiring selective divestment or some form of "screened investment" (wherein companies would be screened according to established criteria prior to a decision to purchase their stock). Many schools included provisions in their policies which required them to vote in favor of or introduce proxy resolutions that asked corporations to disinvest or to discontinue sales to the South African government.

By adopting such policies and establishing such procedures, educational institutions were, in effect, seeking to institutionalize divestment activism and, thereby, to control it. Through the naming of investment advisory committees, schools were incorporating ethical investment
concerns into the daily operating procedures of the institution, while simultaneously insuring that the financial priorities of the institution would be taken into account during deliberations on whether or not to recommend divestment.

In addition to the establishment of investment committees, policies and procedures, universities' insistence upon using shareholder resolutions to address apartheid and disinvestment also reflected their attempt to institutionalize and control divestment activism. This becomes even more apparent when it is recalled that by the late 1970s direct political involvement of institutional shareholders (such as universities, churches, labor unions, etc.) in corporate boardroom decisions about social issues had become a routinized feature of the corporate environment (Vogel 1978). Even though this involvement usually challenged businesses to become more socially responsible, it typically came in the form of moderate proposals, often requesting full disclosure of business practices, suggesting modest reforms in employment practices, or urging endorsement of the Sullivan Principles. Rarely did South Africa-related proposals demand complete withdrawal from the country during the period of the second wave. In fact, during the 1978 proxy season, only a handful of educational institutions --- the University of Minnesota, Bryn Mawr, Haverford, Oberlin, Vassar and Wesleyan --- sponsored South-Africa related resolutions (Hauck et. al.
1983:67-74). Most of these proposals requested endorsement of the Sullivan Principles. A much smaller proportion asked companies, such as Eastman Kodak and Motorola, to terminate sales to the South African government and police. None demanded total disinvestment.

Universities' social control strategies during the second wave, were also exercised through a process of "minimal reform." Perry and Pugh argue that control authorities may attempt to contain a social movement by granting part of the movement's demands (1978:278). Minimal reform, then, "May satisfy the moderate followers so they will be unwilling to support the extreme demands of the most committed members."

Colleges and universities exercised minimal reform, in part, by adopting ethical investment policies, by commissioning special studies, and by establishing investment advisory committees. But a smaller number went one step further and actually decided to sell South Africa-related stock. Hampshire College became the first educational institution to divest all of its South Africa-related securities when it voted in 1977 to sell $2,000 worth of common stock. Ohio University and the University of Wisconsin followed suite in February 1978. The governing board of Miami University of Ohio adopted a total divestment resolution in April 1978 but decided to rescind it after several companies criticized the trustee's divestment decision and following a warning by a special committee that the board's decision to
divest might be in violation of state statutes on prudent investment of public funds. In May 1978, Antioch College's trustees authorized the school's investment managers to sell all financial holdings in firms with commercial operations in South Africa (Liff 1978:66-67).

But Hampshire, Ohio University, Antioch, and the University of Wisconsin were in the minority. The majority of divestments were, in fact, selective. Amherst College, the University of Massachusetts, Smith College and Tufts University all under pressure from student groups made selective divestment decisions during the late seventies. Most divestment decisions mandated the sale of or prohibited the purchasing of bank securities. During the late seventies, approximately twenty schools adopted banking policies that terminated the holding of debt securities and, in some cases, stocks in banks lending to the South African government or its agencies. Actions resulting from the adoption of new investment and banking policies included the sale of more than five million dollars in bank stocks by Yale, Columbia, Carleton, and Tufts, and the 1980 sale of $51 million of Citibank debt securities by Harvard (Hauck et. al. 1983:127-135).

These banking decisions represent "minimal reform" because they did not completely endorse the student activist view that loans to all South African borrowers should be stopped. But, especially since the decisions affected large
sums of money and were made by some of the leading universities in the country, moderate student activists could boast some measure of success.

More radical leaders of the movement responded with considerable frustration over the slow pace of change and over trustees' arguments against the merits of divestment. In a 1980 ACOA sponsored strategy meeting, radical student leaders of divestment locals reported on the difficulties of advancing "the level of student involvement and confrontation on campus." Some said that their divestment locals were in a "holding stage." Students from Amherst, for example, indicated that their movement was actually in a state of decline. Most leaders present complained that "...activists have grown frustrated over trustee refusal to divest..." (ACOA 1980).

By 1980, the second wave of disruptive activism had clearly begun to ebb. While disruptive activism sporadically occurred at a few schools in the Northeast, such as a student strike at Princeton on April 4, 1980, divestment protests dwindled in frequency and intensity. Several divestment locals continued to sponsor anti-apartheid activities, but these activities tended to be largely educational and non-disruptive. For example, divestment locals at Rutgers University, Harvard University, Berea College, Georgetown University, Cornell University, and many others continued their anti-apartheid work by conducting student polls,
sponsoring lectures by exiled South African activists, organizing fund-raisers, and showing films. In order to heighten student awareness about apartheid and to build support for full divestment, campus anti-apartheid activists sought to draw connections between domestic racism and racism abroad (apartheid) and to form coalitions with anti-draft, anti-nuclear, and anti-racist student groups (ACOA 1986). Although several divestment locals --- mainly those in the Northeast such as Princeton's Peoples Front for the Liberation of Southern Africa and Dartmouth's Upper Valley Committee--- continued to stage pickets and sit-ins into the early eighties, these demonstrations rarely attracted more than 50 student participants.

To summarize, protest strategies began to moderate during the second wave in response to efforts on the part of college administrators to control the movement. Through a process of minimal reform, university officials were able to sap the fiery enthusiasm of the movement's more moderate students, leaving radical leaders frustrated by university recalcitrance. But unlike the first wave, when divestment activists redirected their attention to domestic civil rights and anti-war issues following the achievement of limited victories, many divestment locals in the second wave continued to engage in educational and other non-disruptive anti-apartheid activities.
Emergence of the Third Wave

The beginnings of the third wave of student divestment activism followed the pattern of the first two. A series of South African events provided the catalyst.

They started when South Africa's Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, introduced various governmental reform proposals. The most important of Botha's proposed reforms aimed at including non-white participation in the central government, a reform which Botha had reason to believe an increasingly moderate white South Africa would support. Perhaps in an effort to fight off the right-wing challenge in his own white supremacist National Party and to under-cut, at the other extreme, the renewed militant insurgency of the ANC, in January 1983, Botha set into motion a proposed Constitutional revision which finally resulted in the November 1983 establishment of a racially segregated tri-cameral Parliament. To the existing white-only Parliament was added two separate chambers--one for the country's 3.5 million "Coloureds" (South Africa's term for people of mixed racial ancestry) and one for the nation's 850,000 Indians. South Africa's 24.2 million blacks (also referred to as Africans) remained disenfranchised under the reconstructed Constitution.

Most coloureds and Indians stated their strong opposition to this reform, because it continued to exclude 72% of South Africa's population. Natal Indian Congress, the organizational descendent of Ghandhi's 1893 movement, rejected
the reform on the same grounds. Indeed anti-apartheid organizations, in South Africa and in other parts of the world, argued that apartheid could never be effectively reformed; it must be abolished. Blacks in the country were predictably outraged at the Government's blatant attempts to perpetuate the disenfranchisement of black Africans.

Rallies of blacks, coloureds and Indians were held to protest the first 1984 elections that were to be conducted under the reconstructed Constitution. Black protest re-emerged in black townships near Johannesburg. Black school children boycotted classes. In May 1983 a car bomb, killing 16 people and allegedly planted by the banned ANC, exploded outside South Africa's military headquarters in Pretoria. The scene was repeated almost a year later in Durban when a car bomb killed five people.

As the ANC stepped up its campaign against apartheid, the Government retaliated with air raids on ANC installations in Mozambique during May of 1983. Banning all meetings critical of the Government in 21 cities where 33 people had been killed and 300 had been wounded over an eight day period in September 1984, South African police moved in to suppress political protest in black townships. Then in late October, about 7,000 South African military troops and police launched a before-dawn raid on the black township of Sebokeng and moved to crackdown on black riots and demonstrations in the neighboring townships of Sharpeville and Boipatong. By mid-November, at
least 160 lives had been lost in the protests and police had detained over 3,000 protestors, labor leaders, and others suspected of crimes against the state. The protests and violence continued unabated and then escalated in 1985.

In the U.S., the broadcast and print media dramatically brought the brutalities of apartheid into American homes, with graphic television depictions of South African police beating, gassing, and shooting black protestors, of black protestors stoning, kicking, and sometimes burning blacks suspected of spying for the Government. U.S. public attention began to focus again upon racism in South Africa and public officials began to raise questions about the role of the American government and multinational corporations in that apartheid nation. U.S. anti-apartheid activists in the general movement used this heightened public awareness of apartheid as an opportune occasion to step up their campaign for the liberalization of South Africa's labor union laws, for the release of the country's political prisoners and detainees, and for the establishment of U.S. economic sanctions against South Africa.

A new wave of U.S. anti-apartheid protest in the general movement was inaugurated by the arrest of U.S. Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy, U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner Mary Frances Berry, and Randall Robinson, director of the Afro-American lobbying organization, TransAfrica, as they staged a sit-in at the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. on
Thanksgiving Eve in 1984. The three initially staged the protest to call for the release of several South African labor leaders who had been detained by authorities in South Africa. But two days later Fauntroy, Berry, and Robinson announced a national non-violent confrontation campaign to oppose apartheid and to fight for sweeping U.S. sanctions against South Africa. This was the beginning of the Free South Africa Movement.

"What followed were daily protests lasting 53 consecutive weeks in Washington and at South African consulates in 26 cities across the U.S. In all, more than 4,000 people were arrested, including 23 members of the U.S. Congress, a number of mayors and a host of civil rights activists and celebrities" (Cheers 1987:110).

Several months after the Free South Africa Movement had gained considerable momentum, the third wave of student divestment activism burst forth with a fury on campuses throughout the country in April 1985. Actually, limited divestment activism re-emerged in early December of 1984. For example, thirty-eight student divestment activists were arrested at UC-Berkeley when they constructed a building blockade. Seventy-five protestors representing the Black Student Union, the African Students Association and the campus chapter of the NAACP, were thwarted in their December 6 attempt to stage a sit-in at Elkins Administration Building when the University of Maryland-College Park officials ordered
the building closed and instructed police to block all entrances. Around the same time period, about 200 divestment demonstrators held a march at the State University of New York.

But the real upsurge in confrontational divestment politics did not begin on college campuses until the Spring of 1985 when the "National Day of Protest" spearheaded by ACOA became the point around which divestment locals mobilized thousands of student activists. Student participation in other national days of protest would expand during the autumn of 1985 and the Spring of 1986.

**Distinctive Features**

The occurrence of sit-ins, blockades, and building occupations marked a return to the confrontational politics of the first and early part of the second wave of student divestment activism. The fact that these occurred on campuses beyond those schools which comprised the usual center of movement activity in the Northeast, indicated that university officials and corporate executives would be forced again to deal with a challenging movement of national proportion.

At the usual centers of student protest, such as UC-Berkeley, Cornell, and Columbia, confrontations between students and police resulted in thousands of arrests and many injuries requiring hospital treatment. For example, on one day in April 1985 at UC-Berkeley, 120 protestors were arrested.
and 29 were injured as 500 demonstrators tried to prevent police from razing twenty shanties which demonstrators had rebuilt after the shanties had been dismantled by police the previous day. But students at schools in the South and Midwest, such as the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of Texas at Austin, the University of Florida at Gainesville, and Macalister College in Minnesota, also rallied and built shanties. Thus, unlike the largely moderate and loosely coordinated anti-apartheid activity which occurred during the latter part of the second wave and predominated at northeastern schools during the lull period between 1979 and 1984, the third wave of divestment activism was a well coordinated, nation-wide phenomenon. The coordinated escalation of divestment activism was one of the most distinctive features of the third wave. This national network of coordinated protest, orchestrated by the ACOA with the support of other national and regional anti-apartheid groups, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

But for now, let us emphasize that even though cataclysmic South African events were the spark which ignited the flickering flame of protest that laid smoldering in the ashes of the second wave of activism, daily press reports of increased South African repression continued to fuel the fires and skillful national organizing fanned the conflagration, directing its course toward key universities and corporations. Ultimately, then, expansion of divestment activism may be
attributed to effective national organizing efforts via tried-
and-true basic communication channels, such as newsletters,
but also through relatively sophisticated modern technology,
such as computer networks.

The third wave was also characterized by a rapid
proliferation and revitalization of divestment locals. In
1985, student activists established divestment locals on at
least 100 campuses across the country. Examples among these
are: Student Community Coalition Against Apartheid and Racism
(SCCAAR) at Purdue University; Student Coalition Against
Apartheid and Racism (SCAAR) at the University of Florida;
Students United Against Apartheid (SUAA) at the Ohio State
University; Hawaii Committee For Africa (HCFA) at the
University of Hawaii; Yale University's Divestment Steering
Committee; Students Against Apartheid (SAA) at Arizona State
University; Atlanta University's Student Coalition Against
Apartheid and Racism (A-SCAR); South Africa Concerns Committee
(SACC) at Reed College in Oregon; and the South Africa
Awareness Group (SAAG) at Denison University in Ohio.

Tactical innovation was also a distinguishing feature of
the third wave. Tactics in the previous waves of activism
were borrowed from other movements. Sit-ins, for example,
were a product of innovative strategizing in the civil rights
movement (Morris 1984). Blockades seem to be a holdover from
SDS' antiwar campaign. But the construction of shanties, as
a symbol of oppression and as an instrument of confrontation,
originated in the third wave of divestment activism. Appearing first at Cornell in 1985, by the Fall of 1986 virtually every active divestment local had constructed a shanty. They became centers of heated controversy between divestment activists and other students, some of whom were members of right-wing campus groups.

Finally, one of the most critical characteristics of the third wave was the accomplishment of some impressive divestment victories, exceeding by far the successes of the first two waves. As was indicated in Chapter one, seventy-five colleges and universities decided to divest either all or part of their South Africa-related stock between 1985 and 1987. Ninety-six U.S. firms withdrew from South Africa between January 1986 and November 1987. In October 1986, the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly passed a package of limited sanctions against South Africa. Divestment actions by state and local governments amounted to more than 18.5 billion dollars by September 1986.

Decline of the Third Wave

The third wave fell victim to some of the same hazards of success as did the first and second waves of protest. In fact, students witnessed unprecedented levels of apparent accomplishment in attaining relatively large numbers of university divestment decisions. Whether or not these decisions were the direct result of student protests,
activists perceived the movement as being successful, such that by the Spring of 1988 disruptive blockades and sit-ins had vanished on all but a few university campuses. Ultimately, a complex web of factors involving university divestitures, corporate disinvestiture, and political deterioration in South Africa accounted for the decline of the third wave. This complex of factors will be explored in greater detail in the closing chapter.

As we further examine the intricacies of the 23 year old student movement, our aim will be to assess the complex of social factors--both internal and external to this campus crusade--that impacted on the movement's mobilization and effectiveness. Thus we turn in Chapter 3 to an analysis of the structural sources of student protest events and in Chapter 4 to an examination of the impact of movement structure on mobilization.
Notes

1. David Vogel (1978: 36-37) incorrectly dates the SDS protest at Chase Manhattan as occurring in 1966. But other reliable sources indicate that the sit-in took place in 1965.

Chapter III
Sources of Protest Events

With U.S. student divestment protest waves being precipitated by political crises in South Africa, it is important to discuss the structural sources of protest events, per se. Particularly since the student divestment movement escalated over the course of its three waves of activism, it would be well to identify the structural factors that have led to collective action.

The majority of previous investigations of student activism have tended to focus on the psychological and social-psychological factors that motivate individual students to participate in disruptive political demonstrations (e.g., Lipset and Altbach 1967; Flacks 1967; Keniston 1968; Feuer 1969; Block, et. al 1969; Kerpelman 1972). Very few empirical studies have been concerned about the structural sources of collective student protests (Scott and El-Assal 1969; Hodgkinson 1970; Bayer and Astin 1969; Astin 1970; Astin and Bayer 1971; Astin et. al. 1975; Lipset 1976). A virtual consensus exists among these latter studies that certain institutional traits increase the likelihood of student protests. In other words, some types of educational

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institutions are more conducive to student protest than others.

Using American Council on Education survey data, Bayer and Astin (1969:341-344) found that schools of high "selectivity" (as measured by the student body's mean standardized test scores) experienced student protest with greater frequency and severity than the least selective institutions. Theories vary as to why selectivity increases the occurrence of protest events. One explanation is that highly intellectual students who are attracted to prestigious schools tend to be more informed about political issues and may use protest to express their concern about these issues (Astin et.al. 1975). Alternatively, greater academic pressure at highly selective schools creates an inordinate degree of stress and frustration which students then channel into protest activity (Astin et.al. 1975). Others have suggested that research-oriented faculty play a key role either by spending more time doing research than creating a caring environment for students or by liberally approving of student protest activities (Bayer 1971; Lipset 1972; Astin et.al. 1975).

Scott and El-Assal's (1969) research represents one of the earliest and best documented analyses of the impact of institutional structure on student protests. Scott and El-Assal also view selectivity as a key determinative variable. At the same time, they emphasize the importance of
in institutional size. They operationalized, what Kerr (1964) had referred to as, the "multiversity," as a "composite index" based on nine factors having to do with "administrative complexity and social heterogeneity of the student body" (1964:704). Basically, multiversity structure refers to large educational institutions with a highly complex administrative system, having numerous departments granting bachelors, masters, doctorate, and professional degrees, with large enrollments composed of a heterogeneous student body. Scott and El-Assal argue that multiversity structures generate student protest because they attract highly politicized students who become alienated by the impersonality of the increasing bureaucratization and formalization that characterize large, high quality, heterogenous schools. With formalized channels of communication, multiversity structures close off students from personal contact with high level administrators, thus forcing persons with grievances "to engage in illegal or extralegal protest actions," such as "collective demonstrations and disorders" (1969:708). Even though institutional complexity helped to explain the occurrence of student demonstrations, Scott and El-Assal found that "complexity was highly dependent on school size..." and, therefore, concluded that "school size was...the most consistent predictor of student demonstrations" (1969:707).

Subsequent research has produced mixed evidence regarding the reasons that institutional size and complexity tend to
generate student activism. In his analysis of disruptive protest, Astin (1970) found that an institution's size is highly related to the probability that it will suffer major campus disorder. Consistent with Scott and El-Assal (1969), Astin theorizes that campus protest is either a "response to a feeling that the welfare of the individual student is slighted" or is a consequence of students feeling freer to protest when institutions "manifests little interest in their individual development" (1970:381). But Astin's (1970) additional analysis of race-related protest suggests that it is not sheer size compounded by the university's impersonal atmosphere that generates student demonstrations. Rather, it is that "the larger the institution, the more likely it will have a critical mass of students who can organize a protest" (1970:386).

Keniston and Lerner (1971) support the critical mass argument. They offer empirical evidence which suggests that institutional size, per se, is not nearly as important in promoting protest as having a critical mass of students who are more "protest-prone" (1971:52). Their data indicate that there are more student demonstrations per 10,000 students at small campuses than there are at larger ones. In their analysis of 1968-1969 American Council on Education data, they found that small colleges of less than 1,000 students had 2.63 protest events per 10,000 students, while educational institutions with 5,000 or more students had only .69
demonstrations per 10,000 students. Their explanation is that larger universities experience a greater frequency of protest and larger sized protest events because larger schools have more students and more student organizations. According to Keniston and Lerner, since larger schools have more of everything else, it is not surprising, then, that "they have more and bigger protests as well" (1971:52). Ultimately, Keniston and Lerner conclude that large universities have more and bigger protests because they attract a larger number of "protest-prone" students.

Data and Method

While the literature on protest-proneness is extensive and controversial,1 the current study is concerned with the structural sources of protest events rather than the psychological or social-psychological determinants of protest participation. Our data will not permit an examination of the question as to why certain individual students participate in radical activism while others do not. Rather than being based on surveys of college students, our data results from information gathered primarily from movement documents describing the type, time, place, and composition of divestment-related protest events that occurred on U.S. college and university campuses between the years 1977 and 1987. Thus questions which an exploratory analysis of this data might allow us to answer are: What was the distribution
of divestment campus activism nationwide? What kind of protest typified the divestment movement? What types of institutions seemed to generate student protest at a greater rate than other institutions? Responses to these questions should also permit us to comment upon previous findings concerning the influence of institutional characteristics upon the incidence of campus protest. Based on previous research (esp., Bayer and Astin 1969; Scott and El-Assal 1969; Astin 1970) the expectation is that institutional size and complexity compounded by critical mass (Keniston and Lerner 1971) will be positively associated with the occurrence of divestment-related student protest events.

The limitations of the current data renders impossible a direct analysis of institutional selectivity. Without the benefit of mean scores on standardized tests for each institution in our data set, the best we can do is to draw some inferences from information regarding institutional type and size. In this way, then, we will be able to speculate upon the possible influence of institutional selectivity upon the incidence of campus protest.

Protest Event Data

Protest event data were gathered from a variety of printed sources beginning in the Spring of 1985. The primary source of data the America Committee on Africa (ACOA), which not led in the coordination of student protests nationwide,
but also served as a clearinghouse for information about the occurrence of anti-apartheid protests. "South Africa: United States: University Action" files at the New York-based ACOA were examined in the Summer of 1988. These files contained descriptions of numerous student divestment protest events taken from campus newspapers, local community news accounts, nationally circulated newspapers (such as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*), the student Anti-Apartheid Newsletter published by ACOA, the Africa Fund's *Student and Youth Action News*, the *American Committee on Africa News*, proceedings of the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid hearings on student anti-apartheid activities, and records of direct reports of campus protest events from student activists themselves. Additionally, the *Chronicle of Higher Education* was perused each week for articles describing campus protest events. Limited items of information on anti-apartheid campus protest events were also recorded from 1984-1987 issues of the *New York Times Annual Index*. All of the above sources were examined to acquire information concerning the number, the size, date and mode of student divestment protest that occurred on college and university campuses between 1977 and 1987. These years coincide both with the last two waves of protest and with the years for which accurate divestment data could be acquired. All sources were cross-checked to avoid duplication.
The American Committee on Africa (ACOA) was chosen as a major source of data because it has played a central leadership role in coordinating movement activity throughout the three waves of student divestment protest (See: Chapter IV). With a full-time professional staff that included a National Student Coordinator and a Director of Research, ACOA maintained a close working relationship with student activists across the country and worked hard to maintain up-to-date information regarding student protest and other anti-apartheid-related campus initiatives. Moreover, since ACOA coordinated student protests by establishing special days and weeks during which divestment locals staged anti-apartheid demonstrations, the collection of student protest information was one way by which the organization could assess its own effectiveness. A significant portion of ACOA's information came directly from student sources via written correspondence, including clippings from local community and campus newspapers, and through the testimony of student leaders at national and regional anti-apartheid conferences, as well as during formal hearings at the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid. Additionally, ACOA's research staff clipped articles on divestment activism from major newspapers on a daily basis. Implied in all of this is the observation that the movement was very well organized (as shall be demonstrated in Chapter IV), with ACOA keeping careful records of student protest activity and institutional divestment decisions.
The Chronicle of Higher Education was another key source of data. It's "divestment watch" column gave weekly reports of divestment decisions by colleges and universities. It also included periodic reports of student anti-apartheid demonstrations, especially when they directly preceded a university decision to divest. But Chronicle articles which we had gathered independently, prior to a thorough examination of ACOA files, also had been collected by ACOA researchers and were contained in their files. In order to search for omissions, the New York Times Annual Index was used because previous studies have found it to be a comprehensive source of information on protest events (Jenkins and Eckert 1986). In the final analysis, however, ACOA's files proved to be the most complete source of information on anti-apartheid student protests. Based on a thorough search for reports of student protest using ACOA records as the major comprehensive informational source, we are confident, therefore, in assuming that the politically significant divestment-related student protest events have been included in our data set and that campuses for which we found no protest reported did not experience significant levels of divestment-related student protest. Thus, we scored protest event characteristics (e.g., size, mode) as zero for institutions for which no protest events were reported.

The fact that a large portion of the protest event data included in our analysis is derived, either directly or
indirectly, from newspaper sources causes some degree of concern about a possible lack of representativeness. One might expect massive spectacular events, such as large blockades resulting in numerous arrests, to attract more press attention than less spectacular events, such as teach-ins and open forums. But since teach-ins and symposia, which are now routine on college and university campuses, were not defined as protest events for this study (see a working definition of protest events below), we are not concerned about any possible press omission of these types of activities.

Coverage by the national press is also likely to be more sensitive to events at large, prestigious universities that are located near news wire services than to events at small colleges located in rural areas (Danzger 1975). This would result in an over-reporting of protests at large universities. However, an overwhelming majority of our protest data are derived from ACQA sources that made extensive usage of campus newspapers and other campus sources for reports on student protests. This source of data would tend to counter-balance the under-coverage of small campuses by the national media. Moreover, Astin et. al. (1975:6) argue that campus newspapers are a better source than national media because the former comprehensively reports protest events "rather than just the more flamboyant and extreme incidents." We are therefore reasonably confident in the validity of our data sources.
With regard to the adequacy of newspapers, per se, as a source of data, Jenkins and Eckert, who used newspaper-derived collective action data to analyze elite patronage in the civil rights movement, argue that movement collective actions will be covered as the movement becomes politically significant, i.e., at the movement's peak as opposed to its inception or decline; and that professional SMOs will manipulate the media "since this is central to their mobilization" (1986:818). We suspect that similar conditions shaped media coverage of student divestment activism. Both national and local campus media tended to focus upon student protest as it became a significant part of college and university politics. The latter point in Jenkins and Eckert's argument is particularly relevant to our study of divestment activism. Specifically, it should be observed that well-organized divestment locals routinely informed the local press of planned demonstrations. The ACOA, the movement's most important professional SMO, regularly distributed news releases announcing its "national days of divestment protest," with descriptions of planned activities in specific regions and on particular campuses (see: Chapter IV). The publicity seeking efforts of the movement activists, then, helped to mitigate against coverage bias and increases our confidence in the news coverage of local and campus papers.

For purposes of this study, protest events are defined as incidences of non-routinized collective action (and
individual action, in the case of fasts and sit-ins) aimed at forcing targeted universities and colleges to divest of their South Africa-related financial holdings. Since conferences, symposia, films, and even teach-ins are considered to be routine in academic environments, they were not defined as protest events for this study. Multiple types (or modes) of protest occurring at the same institution, even if they occurred on the same day, were coded as separate events. This deviates from some previous research that used a 24-hour period to determine the incidence of one event. But we felt justified in designating such occurrences as separate events, since zealous student activists on a wide variety of campuses clearly staged multiple protests on the same day, especially during the peak of the movement's mobilization. For example, situations were reported in which activists sometimes held a rally during the morning, disbanded, and staged a vigil in the evening. Sometimes, subsets of rally participants would adjourn to stage a sit in the college president's office or to build a shanty on a nearby site. We, therefore, felt justified in treating such incidents as separate protest events.

Not all anti-apartheid-related protest events were finally selected for inclusion in the data set. An effort was made to record only those protest events that actually had occurred. Therefore, announcements of planned activities were excluded since there was no effective means by which to
determine whether plans to stage a particular protest were actually carried out. Furthermore, only those student protest events whose chief objective was divestment were counted. Therefore, we excluded anti-apartheid protests of a general nature whose purpose was to call attention to the evils of apartheid without, at the same time, calling for a targeted college or university to divest. Events which focused on disinvestment, per se, such as those aimed at particular banks and corporations were not counted. Finally, only proactive events were included. Thus, defensive events protesting ancillary issues, such as the punishment of student activists, were disallowed, even if the events were conducted by anti-apartheid activists. Since this data will also be used in a subsequent analysis to explore the influences of protest upon divestment decisions (see: Chapter V), strict criteria were used to enter protest events into the data set. These criteria were designed to insure that protest events were specifically and primarily targeted at a potential divestment decision. This may result in a slight under-estimation of the total number of protest events, but should not effect an assessment of the sources and distribution of protest.

In the final analysis, 817 protest events from 170 campuses in 37 states and the District of Columbia were included in the data set. Even though the years 1977-1987 are covered in our study, it should be pointed out that the data indicates that divestment activism is concentrated in the
third wave. In fact, less than 7 percent of the protest in our data set occurred in the years prior to 1984. There are two possible explanations: 1) The selectivity of press coverage itself might be responsible. That is, the media tend to under-report movement activity both during the incipient stages of the movement and during its decline, since it is during those periods of activity that the movement is more likely to be viewed as less politically significant (Jenkins and Eckert 1986); or 2) There actually was less protest during the movement's less articulated second wave. Indeed, as was suggested in Chapter II and as will be demonstrated in Chapter IV, the movement's increased organizational complexity during the third wave led to an escalation of student activism. Moreover, movement organizers at the local and national levels also used the media for mobilization. Thus, it is more likely that the latter of our two possible factors has a greater influence on the skewed time distribution of divestment protest in our data.

Protest events also ranged broadly in size and mode. Modes of protest included fasts, petitions, marches, rallies, class boycotts, sit-ins, building-occupations, blockades, and shanty-construction. Table 3 shows that rallies and shanty-construction predominated, while fasts, boycotts and petitions were infrequent. The size of individual protest events, as measured by number of participants, also varied greatly. Fasts, for example, never involved more than six individuals
per campus. But rallies and class boycotts, at institutions, such as the University of California-Berkeley, drew the support of thousands of students. At Berkeley, on April 24, 1985, fifteen thousand students participated in a divestment-related class boycott, with over two thousand joining in a rally on October 11, 1985.

**Table 3. Mode of Protest as a Percentage of Total Protest Events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Protest</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petitions</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotts</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fasts</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building-occupations</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ins</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockades</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marches</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanty-construction</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rallies</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Percentages do not equal 100 due to rounding.*

A measure was also included for disruptive protest. Disruptive protest was defined as the occurrence of any collective action involving an interruption of school functions, such as sit-ins, boycotts or strikes, building-occupations, and shanty-construction. Shanty-construction is included as a disruptive event because they were often built in areas that interfered with the routine maintenance of lawns or other school property. They also often involved blockades
in defiance of official mandates to dismantle the structures or to move them to less obtrusive locations.

A measure for disruptive protest is used for two reasons: 1) Astin (1970) found that 70 percent of private universities experienced some form of nonviolent or violent disruptive protest during the 1968-1969 academic year, and held that such protest was function of institutional type; 2) Impressions from college administrators and political observers during the eighties suggests that student divestment activism was less confrontational and activists were more constructive than student activists in the sixties.

Institutional Data

Institutions of higher education entered the data set by two means: 1) institutions that experienced divestment-related protest between the years 1977 and 1987; 2) institutions that made divestment decisions between 1977 and 1987. The latter group included many institutions that did not experience any reported divestment-related protest during the time period under consideration. These were derived from the February 1, 1987 up-dated version of the Africa Fund's "Divestment Action on South Africa by Colleges and Universities" and Coon's (1986:127-129) "Summary List of Divestment Actions." All of the colleges and universities contained in these two lists were included in the data set. The fact that these schools have made divestment decisions is irrelevant to the current
analysis. But they are included in the data set because many of these schools had no protest.

Schools were classified according to enrollment size, public or private university status, public or private four-year college, and four-year Protestant or Catholic sectarian control. For this purpose, several editions of the American Council on Education's *American Universities and Colleges* were used (e.g., American Council on Education 1987). The *Digest of Educational Statistics 1987* (U.S. Office of Education 1987:168-169) was used to approximate populations for the above categories.

Since the protest sample (i.e., the sample of schools that have entered our study by the means indicated above) is biased, it is important to make some observations about the degree to which the protest sample reflects the national sample. Based on data summarized in the *Digest of Educational Statistics 1987* (U.S. Office of Education 1987:168-169), the total national population of colleges and universities, excluding two-year schools, is 2,029. The total number of colleges and universities included in the protest sample is 170, or only 8.4 percent of the national sample. Public and private universities are grossly over-represented in the our protest sample. Nationally, they represent only 4.6 and 3.0 percent, respectively, of four-year colleges and universities. In the protest sample, they comprise 41.7 and 34.1 percent, respectively, of the institutions. On the other hand,
protestant institutions and Catholic universities are underrepresented in the protest sample. They constitute roughly 23.7 and 10.6 percent, respectively, of the colleges and universities nationally, but make up only 3 and 3.5 percent of the protest sample. Four-year private non-sectarian colleges are proportionately represented in our sample as compared to national data. There are only two four-year public colleges in the protest sample out of a national sample of 472. We, therefore, have decided not to report findings regarding four-year public colleges and to treat with some large measure of reservation findings concerning protestant institutions and Catholic universities. The protest sample does not contain any two-year institutions. Moreover, because of the extreme degree to which the protest sample is attenuated, we hesitate to generalize to the entire population of U.S. colleges and universities.

The size of institutions was measured by total enrollment. These were coded categorically. Protest event data and institutional-type data were dichotomously coded, and exploratory tabulations were run to assess the percentage of institutions by type and size that experienced some form of divestment-related protest between the years 1977 and 1987.

Findings

Partial support was found for theories that trace the occurrence of student protest to institutional size and
complexity (e.g., Bayer and Astin 1969; Scott and El-Assal). Table 4 illustrates the influence that institutional size and complexity has upon the incidence of protest. In general, it appears that the larger the institution, the more likely it will experience some form of student protest, but especially protest of a disruptive nature. Over seventy percent of schools whose enrollment exceeded 10,000 students had disruptive protest, while no schools under 1000, and only 4.2

Table 4. Incidence of Protest by Size and Type of Institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of School</th>
<th>Percentage having any protest</th>
<th>Percentage having disruptive protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N (n)</td>
<td>(n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public universities</td>
<td>94 (51) 54.2</td>
<td>(29) 30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private universities</td>
<td>62 (40) 64.5</td>
<td>(25) 40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-year Private Colleges</td>
<td>242 (13) 5.4</td>
<td>(6) 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant institutions</td>
<td>481 (3) 0.6</td>
<td>(2) 0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic universities</td>
<td>145 (3) 2.0</td>
<td>(1) 0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of School</th>
<th>N (n)</th>
<th>(n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500-999</td>
<td>348 (1) .3</td>
<td>(0) 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-2,499</td>
<td>489 (21) 4.3</td>
<td>(9) 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500-4,999</td>
<td>247 (14) 5.7</td>
<td>(6) 2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-9,999</td>
<td>201 (13) 6.4</td>
<td>(7) 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-19,999</td>
<td>155 (34) 22.0</td>
<td>(21) 13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-29,999</td>
<td>51 (16) 31.4</td>
<td>(10) 19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 and over</td>
<td>27 (13) 48.1</td>
<td>(10) 37.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=population of schools; (n)=protest schools.

of schools between 1000 and 5000 were hit by disruption. This finding lends support to the theory that large institutions are more conducive to student unrest because of their cold and
uncaring environment. This becomes even more apparent when one observes that universities, both public and private, experienced protest, especially disruptive protest, at much higher rates than did private colleges and other schools. Complex universities tend to bureaucratize channels of communication between students and higher echelon administrators, exacerbating student discontent.

Moreover, regarding divestment activism, in complex universities, where the wheels of the bureaucracy turn ever so slowly, university officials might not have been able to move with dispatch to pass moderate ethical investment legislation (such as, that which urges portfolio companies to sign the Sullivan principles). Feeling that the universities were being completely unresponsive to their demands, students increasingly engaged in disruptive protest. But even more than that, it is likely that large schools had more students who could organize a divestment-related protest. With large numbers of pre-existing progressive student organizations, divestment activists were able to gain access to organizing resources and skills because of their prior association with other student groups (see, Chapter IV for a discussion of movement allies).

The degree to which institutional size influences the incidence of protest is also reflected in correlation analysis of the variables. When exploratory zero-order correlations were used to determine if there was a relationship between an
institution's enrollment and the occurrence of protest, a moderately strong relationship, with an $r = .18$ ($p < .01$), was found. Even more than that, the size of protest events, themselves (as measured by the total number of participants), correlated moderately well with institutional size ($r = .14$ at less than the .01 level). This would seem to imply that larger institutions are more likely to have some occurrence of student protest than are smaller schools. This is corroborated by the fact that 48.1 percent of large schools, with enrollments that range 30,000 and over, had some protest, while only 4.3 percent of smaller ones, with enrollments between 1,000 and 2,499, experienced any protest (see: Table 4).

When one takes an overall viewpoint on these findings, it quickly becomes apparent that divestment protest was concentrated at large universities. Moreover, there appears to be many schools that simply had no protest at all, and these tended to be small, private, and religious institutions. On the other hand, private universities, which are highly represented in the sample, tend to be quite conducive to protest. Almost 65 percent of these schools had some form of student unrest, and 40.3 percent of these same schools were the cites of disruptive demonstrations during the period under investigation. They had both protest and disruption at a higher rate than public universities, which tend to be larger than private schools. This supports previous research (Astin
et. al. 1975:41-43) which found that private universities, during the 1970-71 academic year, "were the most susceptible to protests, including severe protests that often erupted in violence."

In spite of the influence which size appears to have upon the incidence of protest, private universities, which tend to be intermediate in size, were more likely to have protest than public universities, than tend to have large enrollments. One might ask, what are the factors that might account for the differential effects of private versus public university status?

One factor might account be the influence of "critical mass." Several scholars (Astin 1970; Keniston and Lerner 1971; Lipset 1972; Astin et. al. 1975) have observed that a critical mass of "protest-prone" students, not simply size, influences the incidence of protest. Highly intellectual and politically aware students are said to be attracted to prestigious institutions, which private universities tend to be. In our schema, "protest-prone" students are not so much those that are social-psychologically predisposed to radical activism, as it is those who are politically involved in anti-apartheid or related progressive activities and therefore have access to divestment organizing skills and resources. Campuses with a critical mass of these students would have an increased likelihood of protests. Since our data will not permit us to examine the academic background of students, one
way to test the critical mass hypothesis is by ascertaining the mean number of protest events per 10,000 students (Keniston and Lerner 1971). When computations were made, no significant difference was found in the mean number of protest events per 10,000 students at small schools, with under 1,000 students enrolled, as compared to larger ones, with over 5,000 students enrolled. Both had an average of approximately 3.1 events per 10,000 students. But when small schools, with enrollments less than 2,500, were compared with schools with over 30,000 students, the smaller institutions averaged 13.2 protests per 10,000 students, while the larger schools averaged only 2.4 protests per 10,000 students. These findings corroborate Keniston and Lerner (1971), who found that protests were almost 4 times more likely to occur at small schools that had a critical mass than at large schools that did not have a critical mass. Our data suggests that student protests are over 5 times more likely to occur at institutions with a critical mass than at others. Thus, one factor which might account for the failure of large public schools to experience protest more often than intermediate-sized private institutions might be the absence of a critical mass of students who could organize a protest or who were tied into the organizing efforts of anti-apartheid professional SMOs.

A second factor which might account for the inconsistency is the role of institutional selectivity. This is related to
the above point, but differs in that certain types of institutions might compound the likelihood that protest-prone students will protest either due to its having an inattentive research-oriented faculty or having a liberal faculty who shows sympathy for student protests (Astin et. al. 1975). As indicated earlier, the current data will not allow a direct examination of this hypothesis. Yet, one indirect indicator of the association between protests and institutional selectivity may be found in an examination of the regional distribution of student divestment activism. Table 5 summarizes this distribution. It is readily apparent that most divestment-related student activism was located in the Northeast. Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Cornell and Dartmouth accounted for the majority of protests that occurred in that region. On the west coast, where almost 18 percent of student divestment activism occurred, Stanford and UC-Berkeley were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of the United States</th>
<th>Percentage of Protest Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the predominant protest cites. These observations provide indirect support for the theories that associate highly
selective, prestigious universities with the incidence of student protests.

Private Universities and Divestment Activism

There might be one other factor that makes private universities more likely to have divestment protest, per se. To the extent that they have liberal, research-oriented faculties, these schools also have large endowments with fiscally conservative professionals who manage university investments. These universities are the ones that are most resistant to student appeals for divestment (as shall be shown later in Chapter V). Thus, as universities became more resistant to student appeals, students engaged in more protests, especially of a disruptive nature. Private universities, for example, experienced a higher rate of disruption and virtually as high a rate of all protests as did public universities (Table 4). Indeed, when an exploratory zero-order correlation, a positive association ($r=.23$ with $p=.01$) between protest events and endowment value (of the educational institution) was found. In this relationship, endowment value is not so much a means by which the movement targeted institutions for protest, as it is an indication of the degree to which heavily endowed private universities resisted divestment demands, thus making it more likely that student protests would be heavy and disruptive.
Summary and Conclusion

Support was found for theories that associate certain institutional characteristics, such as size and complexity. Large complex universities, public and private, seem to provide conducive environments for the occurrence of student protest. Yet, schools with a critical mass of "protest-prone" students appear to be more likely to experience protests, even though we were unable to directly assess protest-proneness. Indirect support was found for theories that associate protest with prestigious institutions. Our final observations, however, indicate that more research of a comparative nature needs to be conducted to evaluate the possible differential impact which the political-economy of different protest issues might have upon the incidence of protest.
Notes

1. Much of this literature focuses on the uniqueness of leftist student activists, with some arguing that leftist activists are peculiarly endowed with exceptional emotional stability (e.g., Trent and Craige 1967), or high commitment correlated with positive personality traits (Keniston 1968; Sampson 1967), or that there is little or no difference between the personalities of left activists and other activists (Kerpelman 1972) nor activists and nonactivists generally (Kerpelman 1972). Another body of literature which looks at the personality traits and social background of student protestors center on the issue of generational conflict. Some have located the source of protest-proneness in generational conflict (see especially, Feuer 1969), which either is the product of rapid social change (Mead 1970; Birnbaum 1969), or an Oedipus complex that extends to the entire older generation including educational institutions (Feuer 1969), or the result of youth feelings of parental domination. Others contradict this thesis and argue that student activists reflect the values and beliefs of their parents (Lipset and Altbach 1967; Lipset 1972; Keniston 1968; Birnbaum and Childers 1969).

2. I refer to these special days as "movement memorial" days in which activists commemorated anti-apartheid heroes by both holding memorial services and staging divestment protest events (see Chapter IV).

3. A full discussion of divestment data will be included in Chapter V. The Colleges and universities from these lists are included in the current analysis only because some of them are campuses on which no public divestment protest took place.
Chapter IV
Impact of Structure on Mobilization

On October 11, 1985 at six o'clock in the morning, several hundred students began a blockade of the Wesleyan University's administration building demanding total divestment of the school's South Africa-related financial holdings. Later that day, 250 students at the University of Illinois disrupted a trustee meeting resulting in the issuance of arrest warrants for five students. At the University of California-Berkeley, a massive March of 2000 people surrounded University Hall for several hours. The previous day, ten University of Minnesota students were maced and arrested during their occupation of the President's office. City Councils across the country declared October 11 Anti-Apartheid Day, while state-wide AFL-CIO affiliates held rallies in cities such as Honolulu and Cleveland in support of Black unionists in South Africa (Nessen 1985). Similar scenes were repeated involving thousands of people in over thirty major cities and on more than one hundred university campuses nationwide, making October 11 the largest ever coordinated day of divestment protests. Anti-Apartheid activism would
continue at unprecedented high levels of student and community involvement during the Spring of 1986.

What were the factors which accounted for the successful mobilization of thousands of movement participants in this articulated third wave of divestment activism? Why has anti-apartheid issues, instead of nuclear freeze or Central American politics, attracted such high levels of support? Most commentators have observed that the motivation to abolish apartheid approaches some of the moral clarity that stimulated widespread support for the 1960s' campaign for civil rights in the U.S. In a Newsweek interview, the Berkeley social scientist Todd Gitlin said that "it seems like a morally unambiguous issue. It touches on race issues, which are still a sore point to America" (Newsweek, April 1986). As the same Newsweek article suggested, "compared with the confusing nuances of Central American politics or the mind-numbing complexities of a nuclear freeze, apartheid is relatively easy for students to comprehend--and abhor."

Indeed, considerable evidence suggests that anti-apartheid support and participation among college students were generated, in part, by their abhorrence of racism and their identification with the civil rights movement of the past. Student divestment locals perceived themselves as sharing in the legacy and political perspective of the civil rights movement. If movement cadres espoused any coherent ideology, it was essentially an anti-racist one. While a few
divestment locals, such as the Chicago Committee for a Free Africa (CCFA), considered themselves to be an anti-imperialist organization, most campus-based organizations understood the fight against apartheid to be an attack upon overt institutionalized racism, and as such, a continuation of the civil rights struggles of the sixties. As a document from one divestment local said:

"In every part of the country, involving literally thousands of students, the movement against apartheid is showing itself to be a positive and forceful reminder of the movement of the sixties. The movement shows that students are still willing to take a stand for equality, freedom, and social justice..."

A University of North Carolina student, representing Action Against Apartheid, expressed the movement's anti-racist commitment in testimony during the U.N. Special Committee Against Apartheid hearings: "... only when apartheid is crushed and racist institutions and attitudes are overcome will true liberation come to oppressed peoples of Southern Africa, the United States and the world over" (U.N. Centre Against Apartheid 1987).

While it seems apparent that student support for divestment is attributable in part to a civil rights-inspired anti-racist commitment and to moral outrage concerning the evils of apartheid, it would be a serious diminution of the movement's organizational complexity to explain movement mobilization solely in these terms. The resource mobilization
perspective suggests that ideology, grievances, and generalized beliefs are not as important as long-term structural changes in group organization and resources in mobilization for political activism (e.g., Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978; Freeman 1979; McCarthy and Zald 1973). As Freeman (1983:33) points out, movements which exclusively rely upon ideological commitment are movements that fail. Implied in all of this is a definition of mobilization that will inform the remainder of our analysis. Mobilization refers to the process by which a movement uses its resources—tangible and intangible—for collective action (Jenkins 1983:532; Freeman 1979).

Mobilization of the divestment movement consisted of more than moral outrage over apartheid or a commitment to abolish racism. Moreover, the anti-racist ideological and moral appeals of the movement have remained relatively constant over its three waves. Yet, expansion in mobilization for collective activism has corresponded to distinct changes in movement organizational patterns and articulation. Just what has been the impact of movement structure upon the ability of the student anti-apartheid campaign to mobilize student protest and other resources in pursuit of its divestment objectives? Before addressing this question directly, let us briefly review two models of movement structure.
Two apparently competing models of effective organizational structure dominate social movement literature. One model emphasizes the importance of formal, hierarchical, centralized, and disciplined structures (Turner and Killian 1972; Wilson 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Gamson 1975). A major proponent of this model, Gamson (1975:89-109) argues that centralized authority structures facilitate mobilization through the effective management of internal disputes, thus reducing the likelihood of "factional splits." Similarly, bureaucratically arranged hierarchies contribute to "combat readiness" by providing "a cadre of workers with coordinated tasks."

A contrasting model is advanced by Gerlach and Hine (1970:34-56) who argue that decentralization, segmentation, and reticulation maximize mobilization. Decentralization promotes healthy competition, tactical innovation, and social adaptation by limiting authoritarian control over movement subgroups. Composed of segmented, relatively autonomous subgroups, or local cells, a decentralized structure permits the movement to diversify and proliferate, expanding to include diverse elements, groups, and individuals within the system. Reticulate, or networklike, the movement is held together by "intersecting sets of personal relationships and other inter-group linkages," such as ideological commitments, overlapping membership, coordinated activities, and traveling evangelists. Gerlach and Hine argue that such movements are
difficult to suppress or to coopt because of their built-in capacity for experimentation, creativity, and adaptation in maintaining their survival.

Although the above models are apparently contradictory, several theorists have suggested that both centralization and decentralization are typical of most social movements and that they may coexist in a complementary fashion. Jenkins (1983) argues, along with Zald and Ash (1966), that "different organizational structures are effective for different tasks."

For example, as Jenkins (1983:542) indicates, decentralized structures are effective in "mobilizing 'grass roots' participation and insuring group maintenance," while bureaucratic structures are most effective in contributing technical expertise and coordination. Moreover, Jenkins (1983:540) observes that debates over the Gamson versus Gerlach and Hine models tend to ignore

"...the distinction between social movements (or SMs) defined by broad goals and/or interests, and social movement organizations (or SMOs) defined by particular organizational structures. Since social movements are typically characterized by multiple SMOs, a multi-organizational model allowing the coexistence of diverse types is generally more appropriate in gauging the organization of a single social movement." (See also, Zald and McCarthy 1980).

The student divestment movement manifested just such a multi-organizational model, especially during the movement's articulated third wave of protest. Evolving over time, the movement developed to form a distinctive decentralized,
segmented, reticulate, multi-organizational configuration, composed of three non-hierarchical structural levels which may be distinguished from one another by their composition and relative function. We will refer to these levels as national, regional, and local. Each level consists of a different grouping of core movement organizations, periodically supported by a range of peripheral, progressive political and religious groups. Some of the organizations at the core and at the periphery of the movement are relatively centralized and formalized, containing discrete role definitions and clear lines of authority. This is obviously true of the professional SMOs, such as the ACOA. Other groups in the movement, such as regional coalitions and most—but surprisingly, not all—divestment locals are much less formalized with limited role differentiation and virtually no rules of membership. The main point is that multiple types of organizations coexisted in the movement. As will be demonstrated below, multiple types not only reflected diversity, but also resulted in tension between levels. Yet national coordination, along with regional and local networking, reflected movement integration resulting in a progressive build-up of student activism over the three waves, and an intensification of mobilization in the third wave.

In our discussion of the impact of organizational structure upon movement mobilization, we will draw comparisons between the three waves wherever appropriate. But the central
context of analysis will be the third and most articulated wave of protest. For it was during this wave that the three levels of the movement became most clearly defined and mobilization reached its peak, approaching what Lofland (1982:222) refers to as "white-hot mobilization."

A Description of the Structural Levels

Organization at the National Level

At the national level of the decentralized, segmented, reticulate, multi-organizational structure stands a relatively centralized professional SMO, the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). Providing nation-wide technical expertise, coordination, and continuity across the three waves of protest, the ACOA performs with a supporting cast of several other professional SMOs who, themselves, devote a significant portion of their organizational resources to anti-apartheid projects. The most important among these are two religious groups, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR); and two political lobbies, the Washington Office on Africa (WOA) and TransAfrica. Labor unions, many institutionalized civil rights organizations (such as the NAACP, NUL, and CORE) and a small number of academic associations (most especially the Association of Concerned African Scholars) also played supportive roles. But while labor unions were active in divesting pension funds and civil rights organizations
contributed political support, these groups remain largely on the periphery of the student divestment movement playing supportive roles on the occasion of special projects and supplying assistance to a core of national organizations composed of ACOA with WOA, TransAfrica, ICCR, and AFSC working as its major allies.

Founded in 1953 by former civil rights activists, the ACOA preceded other professional SMOs and local student groups in the struggle against apartheid and in the fight for divestment. In its early years, it was one of only a small number of U.S. groups solely concerned with the liberation of African nations. Companion in this broader struggle were two other such organizations, the Council on African Affairs, a radical inter-racial group with Afro-American leadership (Lynch 1978); and the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa which was organized in the early 1960s (Lincoln 1970). Surviving a relatively short period of time, these groups focused broadly on African liberation. But as it has from its inception, ACOA is still thriving and spends the overwhelming majority of its attention and resources on the liberation of Southern Africa. Toward this end, it became one of the earliest supporters of the strategy to totally isolate South Africa economically and to sever all other cultural and political ties. With an Executive Director (currently Jennifer Davis, an exiled white South African economist) and a small, but well defined professional staff, including a
National Student Coordinator (currently Rob Jones, an alumnus of Columbia University and one of the former student organizers of that school's divestment local, the Coalition for a Free South Africa), the ACOA fits the description of a formal centralized organization.

Acting within the student divestment movement, ACOA has functioned as a "professional consulting agency" to divestment locals, supplying them with guest speakers, or "traveling evangelists," and expertise in organizing local divestment campaigns. The organization has sponsored national and regional conferences for anti-apartheid student leaders and coordinated national days and weeks of campus protest. Student activists remain in contact with different campuses and with the ACOA through the Student Anti-apartheid Newsletter published by the ACOA. Numerous pamphlets and fact sheets on topics such as "questions and answers about divestment" and "guidelines for divestment" are made readily available to student groups.

As a major force within the general U.S. anti-apartheid movement, the ACOA either has organized or has been instrumental in organizing a number of other committees and campaigns to support black African liberation groups, to call public attention to apartheid and to economically isolate the South African government (Houser 1976). For example, in the wake of the Soweto Uprisings, ACOA was instrumental in establishing the Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa
(COBLSA), a coalition of five national organizations—the ACOA, ICCR, AFSC, WOA, and Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC). In 1972, with the sponsorship of several religious denominations (Methodist, Presbyterian, United Church of Christ, and Episcopalian), the ACOA formed the WOA (Houser 1976:24). WOA lobbies the U.S. Congress on behalf of the anti-apartheid movement and provides ACOA with a necessary presence in Washington. Currently supported by nine protestant denominations, the United Auto Workers and the ACOA, the Washington Office on Africa also plays a leadership role in the Washington Interreligious Staff Council (WISC), provides educational and political action material to activist groups nation-wide, and publishes a quarterly newsletter analyzing overall trends in U.S. policy towards Southern Africa (World Council of Churches 1980:88). Especially through its feedback to ACOA, its distribution of information to movement activists, and its lobbying on Capitol Hill for full economic sanctions against South Africa, WOA serves as a major ally in the divestment movements on college campuses.

Playing a similar role is TransAfrica, an Afro-American political lobby, established in 1977. Initially conceived by the Congressional Black Caucus, the idea for a foreign policy lobby on Africa and the Caribbean was brought to fruition with two start-up grants, one each from the National Council of Churches and the Board of Global Ministries/United Methodist Church. In 1981 a research/publishing affiliate, called
TransAfrica Forum, was added to the agency. A significant feature of TransAfrica's anti-apartheid activities has been the mobilization of a nation-wide, non-violent anti-apartheid protest campaign, the Free South Africa Movement. Launched in November 1984 by Randall Robinson, TransAfrica's Executive Director, along with U.S. Congressman Walter Fauntroy and U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner Mary Frances Berry, the Free South Africa Movement staged daily protests lasting 53 consecutive weeks in Washington, D.C. and at South African consulates in 26 municipalities across the country. This campaign, in which members of the U.S. Congress and other dignitaries were arrested routinely for civil disobedience, seemed to inspire the thousands of student activists who renewed their movement on college campuses that same year. Along with ACOA and WOA, TransAfrica also provided expert information about anti-apartheid legislative proposals that were being debated in Congress. Two religious organizations have been close allies of the divestment movement at the national level. But as opposed to engaging in direct confrontation and demanding that American institutions divest from U.S. corporations, these religious organizations have preferred to use institutionalized channels, such as the submission of proxy resolutions in corporate board meetings, to ask companies to conduct their South African operations with social responsibility or to withdraw completely from that country.
One of these religious organizations is the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). It is a nationwide ecumenical alliance of Protestant denominations, agencies, dioceses and pension funds and more than 220 Roman Catholic orders who have coalesced to utilize church investments and other resources to challenge multinational corporations to become more socially responsible in their business practices and policies. While ICCR has sought to hold U.S. corporations accountable by sponsoring shareholder resolutions and negotiating with management, they have also divested stock and sponsored consumer boycotts, conducted public hearings and investigations and published special reports on corporate practices and policies. Its major publication arm is The Corporate Examiner, a newsletter which analyzes the social impact of corporate business practices and policies.

The other religious organization that has been a major ally to the student divestment movement is the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). Broadly concerned about human rights, AFSC seeks to build public awareness and action in the U.S. for the abolition of apartheid and for the self-determination of the peoples of Southern Africa. AFSC's Peace Education Division has helped supply much of the documentation that the movement has used to build a case for divestment. Along with the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and other research organizations including the publishing branches of religious groups mentioned above, AFSC published provocative
studies in the late 70s and early 80s linking American corporations and Western technology to the strengthening of Apartheid. For example, AFSC's *Automating Apartheid: U.S. Computer Exports to South Africa and the Arms Embargo* (1982) was instrumental in showing how U.S. technology was helping to outfit South Africa's military-industrial complex in spite of mandatory U.N. embargo restrictions. Among AFSC's most enduring contributions to the student divestment campaign has been the provision of carefully researched information useful to movement activists in refuting the progressive force argument (described in Chapter II).

Organization at the national level, then, consists of the above centrally organized religious and political agencies that played somewhat specialized, but overlapping, roles and that constituted a rather informal alliance of professional SMOs actively engaged in anti-apartheid activities, without these being their *raison d'être*. No formal declarations or organizational charters bound these SMOs together. While ACOA is clearly at the core of the alliance, there is no chain of command. These professional SMOs differ on the merits of total divestment (and disinvestment), but together constitute a decentralized unit that supplies nation-wide technical expertise, gathers and disseminates scholarly data, and sponsors movement campaigns such as COBLSA.

Leadership reflected this decentralization. When surveying the organizational landscape at the national level,
one is hard-pressed to locate a charismatic leader to whom movement cadres looked for direction, nor has it seemed likely that such a figure would appear on the horizon. While key students on various campuses have attracted followings of local activist cadres, the movement has not had a person of "vision to show the way, a prophet" at the national level (Lang and Lang 1978:104). As symbols of individual defiance, Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak, and other visionary Black South African leaders have contributed to movement inspiration and esprit de corps. In his job as national student coordinator for the ACOA during the second and third waves, Josh Nessen came as close as anyone to achieving the status of national leader. But he was known only to the representatives from divestment locals who attended student anti-apartheid national conferences or subscribed to ACOA publications. Even Randall Robinson who achieved some media acclaim as organizer and spokesperson for the Free South Africa Movement is not widely known to the rank-and-file student activist. To some extent then, the several national organizers and Black South Africans to whom we have referred, along with the hundreds of student leaders on the many college campuses across the country, formed the movement's polycephalous leadership.
Organization at the Local Level

The structure of the local level is segmented into divestment locals which may be found on well over one-hundred college and university campuses across the country. They have emerged out a process whereby the movement has sought to proliferate itself. Segmentation has not usually occurred over ideological differences, even though such differences between segments do exist. Rather it has resulted largely from the movement encouraging students to establish organizations on all college campuses. The rationale appears to involve a sense that cumulative divestment pressure on educational institutions would compound the disinvestment pressure on corporations ultimately resulting in insurmountable pressure upon South Africa to abolish apartheid. Thus through a form of segmentation, the movement proliferated itself in order to promote its short-term and long-term goals.

Divestment locals also emerged as a consequence of competition. That is, when dedicated and charismatic students on one campus witnessed thriving groups on other campuses, they challenged their peers to form similar organizations. Some groups were, in fact, organized by former student participants in divestment locals on other college campuses. For example, after attending summer school at one large public university where there was an extremely successful student
divestment campaign, a black South African student founded a
divestment local on her small private liberal arts campus when
she returned in the Fall.3 Other divestment locals were
formed by students who had participated previously in general
anti-apartheid movement organizations. Lisa Aubrey, for
example, helped to organize Students United Against Apartheid
(SUAA) at The Ohio State University as a consequence of her
having co-chaired the Greater Columbus Coalition Against
Apartheid.

In general, divestment locals are small campus-based
pressure groups composed of a cadre of ten to fifteen student
activists most of whom hold active membership in other campus-
based progressive student groups. Like most student groups,
divestment locals are unstable with a relatively high turnover
of active members occasioned by the rhythmic changes in
academic calendars. Yet a loyal core of four or five students
continue to remain active in divestment locals over lengthy
periods of time—sometimes for two or three years, depending
on the duration of the particular divestment campaign or the
student's graduation date.

By no means do divestment locals rival national
professional SMOs in their centralized organizational
structure. Yet, at the same time, these organizations are not
totally dissimilar. Participant observation in two divestment
locals, along with key informant interviews from four others,
revealed that these groups possessed a recurrent pattern of
organization. With elected co-chairpersons, each also had a range of other officers, including secretary, treasurer, an executive committee, and a series of committee chairpersons, who are in charge of different facets of the organization such as publicity, education, special events, and fund-raising. The South African Awareness Group (SAAG) at Denison University had a faculty adviser who attended most regularly scheduled meetings, and the group was eventually able to be recognized formally as a campus organization by the Denison Student Government Association. The Ohio State University's SUAA was unable to gain comparable institutional recognition. It did not have a formally designated faculty adviser, but interviews with SUAA leaders revealed that one or more faculty members secretly played that role.

While divestment locals tend to have no formal guidelines clearly establishing an internal chain of command, a highly dedicated core of student activists fills regularized roles and defined offices. What divestment locals lack in terms of centralization, they compensate for in terms of core activist commitment. Core activists are deeply committed often because of personal connections with South Africa. For example, three of the six core participants in Denison University's SAAG were themselves black South Africans. One member of Ohio State University's SUAA core group was a black South African whose family recently had immigrated to the U.S. Another was a black American graduate student who recently had visited
South Africa. Core activists are also committed to each other often because they have participated together in other movements and struggles. Ideological disputes and other differences may still arise among core activists, but they are far less likely to tear apart such a tightly knit group. Thus, even though divestment locals are ultimately susceptible to the same instability that is common to all emergent groups, they are moderately well-organized pressure groups, with a tightly knit activist core.

Love (1985: 206) corroborates this finding in her case study of Michigan's divestment campaign. In her examination of Michigan State University's divestment local, the Southern Africa Liberation Committee (SALC), she finds that one of its "best assets is the personal commitment and perseverance of a core group of members." Observing that SALC has been able to sustain itself through leadership transitions since 1974, Love points out that "four of the core members have strong personal connections with persons in Southern Africa or with South African exiles and have been working on anti-apartheid or anti-racist efforts other than divestment campaigns for many years. They see their contribution to anti-apartheid work as ongoing and as lifelong."

While SALC is unusual in its extreme longevity, most divestment locals manifest a similar capacity for stability through leadership transitions provided by core activist commitment. As Gerlach and Hine (1970:78) argue, "the
personal commitment characteristic of movement participants results in a communicable charisma, so that effective leadership is not irrevocably tied to certain individuals." Divestment locals seemed to embody this characteristic, in part, by selecting co-chairpersons, as opposed to one individual as the sole leader of the group. Personal commitment, especially among core activists, embodied in organizational structure, then, permitted relatively stable leadership transitions.

The main function of divestment locals in the movement is to apply direct pressure on particular colleges and universities to force them to divest their South Africa-related financial holdings. Toward this end, divestment locals launch direct action campaigns consisting of anti-apartheid protest rallies, marches, vigils, petition drives, campus-wide referenda, fasts, class boycotts, sit-ins, building occupations, blockades, and shanty-construction. As a means of persuading university officials of the merits of divestment and appealing to the broader student population, divestment locals also sponsor educational campaigns by setting up information booths, distributing pamphlets, showing films, holding open forums, conferences, teach-ins, and inviting guest speakers.

Divestment locals are assisted by a wide range of allied campus and community organizations. Other progressive student groups are the major allies. These include black student
associations, international (especially Third World) student groups, feminist student organizations, radical political collectivities, and various peace and anti-nuclear student groups. Most of these help sponsor demonstrations, and many, such as the Ohio State University's Black Law Students Association, supply material resources to divestment locals that were unable to receive support from student government associations.

Faculty groups and local labor unions also contribute tangible and intangible resources in terms of organizing expertise, scholarly analysis of divestment issues, and participating in confrontational anti-apartheid demonstrations. For example, in June 1985, fifteen-hundred University of California faculty supported their student divestment campaign by submitting an "Alternative Treasurer's Report" to the Board of Regents arguing that "the financial costs of [full] divestment would be negligible; that the Regent's proxy voting record has consistently supported the apartheid system in South Africa; and that the Sullivan Principles cannot be a constructive force for the abolition of the apartheid system." The Communications Workers of America Local 4501 helped the Ohio State University's SUAA coordinate rallies and finance folk singers and other material resources. They also participated in pickets and provided legal services to "designated arrestees."
In some cases, especially where divestment locals exist on public university campuses, legislative black caucuses and other legislators become allies of these student groups. The support shared is often mutual. SUAA at the Ohio State University (OSU), for instance, assisted divestment proponents in the Columbus City Council deliberations by providing legislators with background information on the divestment issue.⁴ On the other hand, state and city legislators used their influence to help persuade OSU officials to support SUAA's call for divestment. For example, State Senator Michael White challenged OSU officials to come to grips with the University's investments in South Africa-related companies and condemned them for George Nicholas' suspension from the track team after he protested the school's South Africa-related investments by refusing to participate in the school's 1985 opening track meet.⁵ Love's (1985) account of the passage of education bills in the Connecticut and Michigan state legislatures also reflects an alliance between campus-based divestment activists, community activists and state legislative officials.

Divestment locals also have been able to coopt the local news media as a major resource. Before staging demonstrations, particularly those involving direct confrontation with university officials, student leaders often call press conferences. Confrontational protests, involving
either minor injuries or arrests usually attract the attention of the local media, whether students have called them or not.

In sum, local level structure consists of surprisingly well organized, tightly knit, emergent student-run pressure groups, supported by a wide array of allied organizations. Faculty members, radical student groups, state and municipal legislators, labor union community organizers, and the local news media all play supportive roles.

Organization at the Regional Level

With the national level consisting of rather centralized professional SMOs and the local level composed of tightly knit pressure groups, regional organization is the least developed, the most loosely structured. Emergent coalitions of divestment locals predominated the regional level. Since geographical distances and the lack of pre-existing inter-campus student networks isolate divestment locals from one another, little opportunity exists for student activists to build effective coalitions. Still, where environmental conditions have been conducive, a few regional coalitions have emerged, with some of these persisting for several years, but with most becoming inactive as the immediate need for them dissipates.

Sustained and active coalitions have developed in regions of close proximity to national anti-apartheid SMOs. For example, in Washington, D.C. where TransAfrica and the WOA are
located, on separate occasions, two city-wide coalitions of divestment locals were established — Black Students for a Free South Africa in the early eighties and the D.C. Student Coalition Against Apartheid and Racism (DC-SCAR) in the mid-eighties. In the Northeast, the ACOA, located in New York City, assisted student and community groups in the organization of several regional coalitions. The most notable among these is the Northeast Coalition For the Liberation of Southern Africa (NECLSA), an alliance of divestment locals established in December 1977 at twelve major colleges and universities, including Amherst, Bowdoin, Brown, Cornell, Harvard, Princeton, Rutgers, Swathmore, University of Pennsylvania, Vassar, Williams, and Yale. In fact, ACOA views regional coordination as a major means by which to advance the anti-apartheid movement, and therefore, has urged student activists at national and regional conferences to form ongoing coalitions.

While statewide and regional community-based coalitions abound throughout the country, regional alliances of student groups are emergent, sporadic, and temporary. Most of these have arisen in the context of planning meetings for special events, such as speaking tours of exiled South African anti-apartheid leaders or ACOA coordinated national days of divestment protest. The general function of these regional coalitions has been to assist divestment locals in the mobilization of activists and to help maximize the impact of
protest on targeted institutions. In effect, then, regional coalitions have functioned as a bridge between national and local organizing, and as a mechanism by which to reinforce the potential impact of that organizing on targeted campuses. Regional coalitions such as the Northern New England Coalition for a Free Southern Africa, in which divestment locals have pooled resources with a range of anti-apartheid organizations, coalitions, and allied progressive groups, have also effectively functioned to sponsor important regional conferences.

To briefly summarize our description of movement structure: Movement structure is multi-organizational, decentralized, segmented, and reticulate, and consists of three distinct non-hierarchical levels of organization. National level organization is constituted by an informal alliance of formal, centralized professional SMOs led by the ACOA. The national level has functioned to provide technical expertise, scholarly research, coordination, and continuity across the three waves of student divestment protest. Consisting of emergent, temporary, and sparsely located, regional coalitions of divestment locals and allied groups, regional organization primarily functions as a bridge between the national and local levels, and is most effective in the coordination of regional conferences. Much more elaborately structured than the regional level, local level organization is composed of more than one-hundred, surprisingly well
organized, tightly knit divestment locals supported by a wide range of allied campus and community organizations. The local level functions mainly to target particular educational institutions for divestment pressure and to educate local activists and campus populations for participation in the anti-apartheid divestment movement.

Influence of Structure Upon Mobilization of Resources: Diversity, Tension and Integration

The decentralized, segmented, reticulate, multi-organizational structure of the student divestment movement reflects the movement's structural diversity and tension, but also provides for integration and permits adaptation through tactical innovation. Structural diversity, tactical, ideological and political differences, along with unresolved racial tensions at the local level are characteristic of the movement. These have contributed to the ebb and flow of protest activism across the three waves, and therefore have had both positive and negative consequences for the mobilization of tangible and intangible resources. Reticulation has given the movement a measure of continuity and national coordination resulting in a massive mobilization of participatory resources with increased national exposure during the third and most articulated wave of protest.
Diversity and Tension

The co-existence of multiple types of organizations in the movement evidenced structural diversity. In the context of a decentralized, segmented structure, tension then resulted. As shown above, organizational types included centralized and decentralized, formal and informal, national and local, professional and student, secular and religious groups. One source of tension was ideological and political differences over the role of multi-national corporations in South Africa. Moderate religious groups tended to be less critical of the progressive force argument than were the more radical ACOA and most divestment locals. Religious groups seemed to hold out the possibility that, under the right circumstances, progressive corporations could help alleviate, and perhaps eliminate, the suffering of black South Africans, and so sponsored and voted for numerous shareholder resolutions, threatening to divest if U.S. firms did not operate with more social responsibility in South Africa. The ACOA and most divestment locals argued that the mere presence of economically productive and technologically advanced U.S. firms in South Africa only served to further buttress the apartheid regime and could not abolish apartheid through economic growth, no matter how progressive their social policies are.
Another source of tension resulted from the dissimilarity between professional SMOs at the national level and divestment locals at local level. We have tried to suggest above that divestment locals were not totally dissimilar from formal organizations because core activist commitment compensates for a lack of centralization by insuring relative stability through smooth leadership transitions in divestment locals. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that there are no dissimilarities. Without formalized procedures for the review and evaluation of strategy and for the implementation of tactics, divestment locals were unable to sustain consistently high levels of activism from year to year, thus producing movement ebbing and flowing. In the absence of good record keeping, leaders could not continue, over long periods of time, productive relations with national SMOs or allied groups. Nor could they effectively build on past successes or learn from past failures. The ACOA repeatedly lamented the "difficulty of developing effective long-term campaigns" among an essentially transient student population. As Lisa Crooms and Joshua Nessen of the ACOA put it in a paper presented at an international student conference on Southern Africa, "in a decentralized anarchic movement in which participants often graduate just as their political consciousness develops, there are no blueprints for success" (Crooms and Nessen 1987:10; see also several ACOA documents including Nessen 1979a, 1979b, and 1980).
Racial tensions within the movement was one other area of conflict which related to segmentation and decentralization. The divestment campaign was largely a white student movement. Some divestment locals were able to involve Afro-American students. Harvard University's South Africa Solidarity Committee (SASC), for instance, built effective coalitions with black and Puerto Rican student organizations and consistently urged students to enroll in Afro-American Studies courses. The divestment campaign at the University of Texas-Austin was jointly run by the mostly-white Steve Biko Committee and the Black Student Alliance. A few divestment locals were organized and led by Afro-Americans or black South Africans, such as the ones at The College of Wooster, Denison University, and The Ohio State University. But most divestment locals evidenced considerable difficulty in including Afro-American students in leadership positions. In testimony during U.N. hearings on the student anti-apartheid movement, Lamoin Werlein-Jaen, representing the University of Wisconsin, said "the student movement has done little to include minorities in all phases of organizing." He cited as one major reason, "cultural and class differences," reasoning that "it is unlikely that political alliances will be forged when no other contacts exists" (UN Centre Against Apartheid 1986). During national and regional conferences Afro-American students often raised the question of racism within the movement and challenged white students to link
divestment activism to the political support of liberation struggles worldwide and connect divestment campaigns with the support of protest against institutional racism in the U.S. A few liberal white student leaders of divestment locals, on the other hand, sometimes cited the irony of Afro-American student's failure to join in the divestment movement ---- a movement which most white students considered to be a struggle against racism. "But more often than not," according to Crooms and Nessen (1987:7), "primarily white student coalitions turn an insensitively deaf ear to the concerns, suggestions, analyses, and leadership of the students of African descent in order to cultivate and court the support of the white liberal student population ---- all in the interest of building broad-based coalitions."

Gerlach and Hine (1970:63-78) argue that segmentation resulting from tensions and differences within a movement are more functional than dysfunctional. This is true of the divestment movement on college and university campuses. Rather than adversely impacting long-term mobilization, segmentation and decentralization, along with multi-organizational types, led to an expanded ability of the movement to gain access to additional necessary tangible and intangible resources over the three waves and particularly during the third wave of activism.
Diversity, Tension and the Mobilization of Resources

Like most social movements, the student divestment movement lacked tangible resources. But structural diversity made it possible for both moderate and radical anti-apartheid sympathizers to contribute valuable resources, producing significant growth in the movement during the third wave.

The political and ideological differences between religious moderates and secular radicals, referred to above, do not seem to have produced dysfunctional factional schisms in the movement. Rather, they have served to compound pressure on American firms. With moderate shareholder activists protesting inside corporate board-rooms and radical divestment activists demonstrating outside corporate headquarters and on college campuses, the movement presents a dual threat to the public image of multinational businesses. This dual threat is compounded into a triple pressure on companies to disinvest as the escalating political crisis in South Africa threatens the financial return on U.S. investments.

The decentralized, segmented, multi-organizational structure also has provided the channels through which additional tangible and intangible resources have entered the movement progressively as the need for them has arisen. For example, as U.S. corporations became firmer in their assertion of the "progressive force argument" throughout the eighties,
even while the racial crisis worsened in South Africa, a steady influx of power resources (Jenkins 1983:55), in terms of South Africa- and divestment-related shareholder resolutions, increasingly poured into the movement. A source of leverage upon recalcitrant South Africa-related multi-nationals, these power resources were contributed by moderate institutional investors such as pension funds and religious organizations, some of which had not submitted a divestment resolution prior to 1987. Table 6 illustrates a steady progression in the number of South Africa-related and divestment-related shareholder resolutions submitted by institutional investors between 1982 and 1987.

**Table 6. South Africa-Related Shareholder Resolutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Presented</th>
<th>Total Withdrawn</th>
<th>Divestment-related Voted On</th>
<th>Total Voted On</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates unknown


Intangible resources, in terms of specialized and unspecialized labor and movement participants at the
grassroots level also flowed into the movement over the same period of time. Concerned scholars, veteran activists on university staffs, and the publishing arms of both radical and moderate profession SMOs lent their specialized organizational skills, technical information, and expert advice to fledgling student activists.

Rather than inhibiting the spread of the movement, decentralization permitted autonomous divestment locals to proliferate, along with a growth in power resources at the local level. These power resources existed in the form of direct action campaigns against targeted educational institutions led by students who pay tuition to attend these schools and supported by alumni/alumnae who financially contribute to these schools. As educational institutions took action to divest in response to direct action campaigns, power resources exercised at the local level thereby put pressure on multinationals to disinvest. As a measure of the expansion of power resources at the local level over the last two waves, it should be pointed out that less than 50 divestment-related confrontational demonstrations occurred on college and university campuses during the seventies, while more than 700 of these took place between the Fall of 1984 and the Spring of 1987.
Adaptive Functions. As the foregoing implies, decentralized and segmented structures are extremely adaptive (Gerlach and Hine 1970:63ff) in the face of adversity. Two examples of ways in which the student divestment movement adapted to adversity are presented by the movement's response to charges of racism in the ranks and its response to instances of failure. These adaptive responses helped to broaden and escalate the movement.

The decentralized, segmented structure prevented the racial tensions, referred to above, from destroying the movement, as might have occurred in a more formalized context. Gerlach and Hine (1970:73) suggests that one of the most adaptive functions of segmentation and decentralization is social innovation in the design of organizational patterns. In the presence of potentially destructive racial tensions, the segmented divestment movement generated new organizational designs. Pre-existing black student associations on some campuses began to include anti-apartheid issues as a major priority on their agenda. Some took on the role of divestment locals on their respective campuses. In New Jersey, for instance, pre-existing black student associations organized themselves into a statewide divestment coalition and built alliances with other divestment locals and regional coalitions. The divestment local at Princeton, the People's Front for the Liberation of Southern Africa (PFLSA), was
initiated and led by students of African descent. PFLSA became multi-racial and successfully organized campaigns to address divestment, campus racism and other domestic issues (Croome and Nessen 1987:5). Moreover, in response to complaints about racism in the movement, sensitive white student leaders worked hard to build coalitions with black student associations on their campuses. For example, "at Amherst College, the largely white South Africa Solidarity Committee was able to form a successful alliance with the Black Student Union based on a four-point program that included issues of institutionalized racism (e.g. African-American student and faculty recruitment and retention) as well as divestment" (Croome and Nessen 1987:5). Where racial coalitions were successful, as in the case of the University of Texas-Austin, the effect was to broaden the movement to include fund-raising for the victims of apartheid in South Africa and protest against institutional racism in the U.S.

The other salient means by which the student divestment movement demonstrated its adaptiveness was through tactical innovation. The one innovative tactic of this movement was shanty-construction. According to Joshua Nessen, former ACOA Student Coordinator, the idea seems to have emerged in the Spring of 1985, with "the blockade at Columbia University and.....the building protests at Cornell University where they [student activists] actually set up a sprawling shanty-town that was a base of escalation as well as a symbol of the
poverty of South African blacks." The tactic began to spread rapidly throughout the movement during the Fall of 1985. By the Fall of 1986, virtually every active divestment local had constructed or attempted to construct one or more shanties.

Shanty-construction was an adaptive response to movement adversity. From its inception, the movement had relied heavily upon graphic press reports about the daily atrocities of the apartheid regime as a means of capturing public attention. But Pretoria's crack-down on media coverage of black South African anti-apartheid protests in early April 1985, signaled a potential de-escalation of the student divestment movement in the U.S. Thus, as the government in Pretoria placed increased restrictions on television press coverage, shanties began to appear on university campuses. Shanties stood as present and visible symbols of the dire conditions of poverty and oppression under which black South Africans were forced to live.

The construction and the defense of shanties against movement opponents and university authorities also played an adaptive function through the "minimization of failures." Gerlach and Hine (1970:77) argue that polyccephalous movements minimize failures by not allowing the short-comings of one leader or group to seriously cripple an entire movement. The same is true with regard to multiple tactics. As movement reliance upon South African press coverage failed to produce
the desired escalation, the movement minimized this tactical failure by producing a new spectacular tactic.

Not only did shanty-construction serve as a symbol of South African oppression, but the successful defense of these small, plywood and tin buildings against conservative student vandals and official university demolition teams also served to escalate campus campaigns by sustaining commitment and camaraderie in the face of apparent defeat. Small groups of activists took turns sleeping overnight in shanties and built huge barricades to protect them against movement opponents. Essential to the persistence of a movement are a shared sense of belonging and a feeling of pride in group accomplishments (Lang and Lang 1978:101). Especially at universities that had not totally divested, the defense of shanties was just such a unifying force and as such became a rallying point for the escalation of the movement.

In spite of the mobilizing and adaptive functions of a decentralized, segmented structure, such movements are still only loosely unified. Reticulation is needed to provide integration throughout the long-term changes which are destined to occur in such movements.

Reticulation, Integration, and the Mobilization of Resources

National level movement organizers repeatedly complained about their inability to bring the decentralized movement under control. As one organizer put it: "There have been
numerous attempts to consolidate and institutionalize a youth and student Southern Africa solidarity movement, but these have been met with reluctance on the part of activists to relinquish their autonomy" (Crooms 1987:6). Consequently, some organizers felt that the movement consisted of "nothing more than pockets of activism scattered throughout the country without clear objectives or a uniform agenda" (Crooms and Nessen 1987:5). For instance, national organizers at ACOA wanted to de-emphasize the moralistic focus on divestment to integrate the movement into a highly politicized program of solidarity with liberation struggles in Southern Africa.

Gerlach and Hine (1970:64-65) point out that movement organizers are often dissatisfied with what they perceive as organizational disunity. In the student divestment movement, dissatisfaction among some national organizers reflected the basic tension inherent in the multi-organizational structure of the movement. Centralized and formalized professional SMOs were sometimes frustrated by the ebbing and flowing of movement activism caused by the relative instability of essentially decentralized and segmented local organizations. Similarly, Jenkins (1983:527) argues that "movement organizations that attempt to combine incongruent elements....confront strategic dilemmas." There is no question that the divestment movement's decentralized, segmented structure at the local level hampered the movement's ability to sustain consistently high levels of activism, thus
reflecting the basic incompatibility between decentralization and long-term national coordination of protest activity. At the same time, however, the multi-organizational structure enabled the movement to attain the dual strategic objectives of integration and national mobilization. Centralization at the national level provided integration by providing organizing expertise in the coordination of national days of protests, while decentralization, assisted by various unifying agents, helped to mobilize labor resources at the local level.

The movement possessed a significant degree of cohesion exercised through cross-cutting memberships and personal ties operating at various organizational levels, through integrating organizations, the networking of "traveling evangelists," and national and regional coordination of divestment activism. Pre-existing personal ties between members of different divestment locals helped to lessen the disorganizing effects of geographical distance that separated these groups. For example, visits and phone conversations between South African students on different campuses helped to forge informal linkages between various divestment locals. Similar ties between members of divestment locals and other campus and community organizations aided in closing dysfunctional gaps between divestment locals and potential allies. At Denison University, for instance, the leader of the Black Student Union was an active member of SAAG, the school's divestment local, and the leader of SAAG was an
active member of the Black Student Union, thus creating an interlocking bond of relationships that served to cement a close organizational alliance. Lisa Aubrey's personal association with members of the Black Graduate and Professional Student Caucus, the Black Law Student Association, the Young Democrats, the International Committee Against Racism (INCAR), Students for Peace and Disarmament, the All-African Peoples Revolutionary Party and her past leadership of the Greater Columbus Coalition Against apartheid and Black Students in Political Science, linked Ohio State University's SUAA into a broad range of allied groups which then provided material and labor resources.

Along with personal ties and cross-cutting memberships, networks of "traveling evangelists" also served to integrate the movement. The Catalyst Project was one such network in the late 70s that sponsored traveling activists and organizers to campuses to speak at anti-apartheid rallies and organizational meetings of newly formed divestment locals. ACOA staff members and exiled ANC and SWAPO activists were often featured speakers at movement rallies. When funding dried up for the Catalyst Project, student activists continued to host ANC and SWAPO leaders and ACOA anti-apartheid experts such as Joshua Nessen, Dumisani Kumalo, Jennifer Davis, Prexy Nesbit, and Gail Hovey who travelled from campus to campus with organizing resources and information about the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.
The "traveling evangelists" to which we have been referring were often featured speakers at rallies during "national days of protest" and "national weeks of action." First established by ACOA during the second wave, national weeks of spring activism became one of the most important mechanisms by which national organizers coordinated student protests and generated national momentum in the movement. The national weeks of action and days of protest were organized around what we will refer to as "movement memorial days." These movement memorial days were established to commemorate anti-apartheid martyrs and celebrate African liberation victories. For example, national weeks of action usually began on March 21—the anniversary of the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, and sometimes ended on April 6—the anniversary of the execution of ANC freedom fighter Solomon Mahlangu, and other times ended on April 4—the anniversary of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., who called for economic sanctions against South Africa as early as December 1962. April 4 was usually designated as National Divestment Protest Day in commemoration of Martin Luther King and other victims of racism. During fall initiatives, October 11 which coincides with International Day for Southern African Political Prisoners is designated as National Anti-Apartheid Protest Day. In the late sixties and early seventies, Afro-American students combined their anti-apartheid protest with rallies celebrating African Liberation Day. Sometimes
divestment activists would link their protests to the "memorial days" of other movements such as Central America solidarity groups' commemoration of the assassination of El Salvador's Archbishop Romero on March 24. On movement memorial days, movement organizers would ask schools to cancel classes or, failing this, request that students refuse to attend classes in order to participate in rallies, memorial services, vigils, and protest activities.

Coordinated days and weeks of protest scheduled on movement memorial days served to generate activism, increase movement momentum, and create group cohesion by emphasizing movement activities "beyond the local scene" (Gerlach and Hine 1970:58) and thereby heightening the collective impact of segmented collectivities. Emotional memorial services and silent vigils instilled an esprit de corps in the context of ritualistic unifying events (Lang and Lang 1978:101). Memorial services were often held on movement memorial days at regional conferences on college campuses which drew attendants from various divestment locals and progressive community organizations. Aroused by the inspirational speeches from "traveling evangelists," zealous students would sometimes spontaneously pour out of these rallies and memorial services into marches to blockade the school's administration building or to occupy the president's office. This seems to have been the case when 30 protestors at Stanford University staged a sit-in at the Bursar's office following a mass rally
on October 11, 1985. Nine people were arrested and one student was badly beaten by police. Most of the time, however, movement organizers had planned to stage confrontational actions immediately following these unifying events. For example, at Northwestern University, after students held a mock funeral procession for the victims of apartheid on October 11, 1985, they then joined the Coalition for Illinois Divestment from South Africa (CIDSA) and the Free South Africa Movement on October 12 for a March of 600 people to the South African Consulate.

National organizers helped to generate confrontational protest by providing organizing suggestions in the Student Anti-Apartheid Newsletter. Organizing suggestions included national targets such as U.S. policy that grants aid to UNITA in Angola, and recommended specific tactics such as protest in front of federal buildings. Activists were encouraged to focus on national and local targets.

The main point in all of this is that coordinated national days of protests scheduled on movement memorial days served both integrating and mobilizing functions. Emphasizing movement activities beyond the local level, they helped to secure group cohesion by instilling an esprit de corps across local cell boundaries, between national, regional and local levels and between core groups and movement allies. They generated protest through the mobilization of specialized and unspecialized labor resources and through the encouragement
of local organizers to focus on national and local targets. Ultimately multiple organizational types--nationally centralized and locally decentralized--gave the movement the advantage of meeting the multiple objectives of integration and mobilization.

Summary

The student divestment movement consists of three non-hierarchical levels of organization--national, regional, and local, with several professional SMOs led by the ACOA comprising the national level; with loosely organized, sporadic regional and statewide coalitions operating at the regional level; and with divestment locals or tightly knit student-run, campus-based pressure groups constituting local organization. The movement is supported by a wide array of allied progressive organizations at all levels of the movement.

The movement is therefore decentralized, segmented, multi-organizational, but reticulate. Consequently, the movement is characterized by structural diversity and tension within and between levels. Still, structural diversity has enabled the movement to mobilize tangible and intangible resources that have served to escalate activism over the three waves and especially during the third and most articulated wave of protest. Moreover, multi-organizational types within the movement have served to enhance movement cohesion and
heighten mobilization through a range of reticulate and unifying agents, including personal ties, cross-cutting memberships, traveling evangelists and national days of coordinated protest.
Notes

1. Taken from a flier entitled "The State of the Student Anti-Apartheid Movement," found in the files of Students United Against Apartheid at Ohio State University.

2. Many other religious groups were of course important actors in the general anti-apartheid movement. Among these were the United Church of Christ, the United Presbyterian Church, the United Methodist Church, the U.S. Protestant Episcopal Church, the World Council of Churches and the National Council of Churches. But they were not as engaged in with the student divestment movement as the AFSC and the ICCR. For a discussion of the role played by American religious groups in the anti-apartheid struggle, see: Paul Deets, "U.S. Religious Institutions and South Africa, in Alfred O. Hero, Jr., and John Barratt (eds.), The American People and South Africa: Publics, Elites, and Policymaking Processes (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1981), pp. 103-122.

3. The names of the student and the universities are intentionally withheld to protect the student against possible reprisal.

4. Interview with Lisa Aubrey, Ph.D. candidate at the Ohio State University and former Co-Chairperson of OSU's SUAA.


6. "Institutional investors" refers to institutions such as colleges, churches, pension funds, labor unions, etc. that hold shares of corporate stocks and bonds. The term is used to distinguish them from "individuals" who invest in stocks and bonds.

7. Major pension funds, such as TIAA-CREF, have historically supported the moderate position of encouraging expanded constructive involvement of U.S. companies in South Africa. Yet in 1987, they sponsored several divestment shareholder resolutions. They decided that "American corporations are severely restricted in what they can do to effect the dismantling of apartheid," since companies' political actions are thwarted by the South African government (IRRC 1986:15). But it is evident that TIAA-CREF and certain other large institutional investors, such as the huge New York State Common Retirement Fund (NYSCRF), were motivated by yet another more pressing concern--an economic one. In its supporting statement for its disinvestment resolution, TIAA-CREF writes that if a company remains in South Africa, it
exposes itself to "possible boycotts of its products and/or services; having its assets in South Africa jeopardized; and diminished confidence in its management." Consequently, TIAA-CREF has concluded that "the portfolio risks of portfolio corporations remaining in South Africa will increasingly outweigh the potential rewards" (quoted in IKRC 1986).

Chapter V

IMPACT OF CAMPUS PROTEST ON DECISION TO DIVEST

When student protest exploded on university campuses throughout the U.S. in the mid-1960s, researchers immediately began to treat it as an urgent topic of scientific investigation. Resulting was a virtual tidal wave of studies continuing through the late sixties and slowing down in the early seventies. Most of these were interested in the social-psychological, socio-political and socio-economic sources of leftist student activism (see, e.g., Flacks 1967; Feuer 1969; Keniston 1968; Wood 1974; Wood and Ng 1980). Many of these and others have tried to discover whether or not social psychological distinctions exist between activists and nonactivists (Trent and Craise 1967; Watts and Whittaker 1966; Heist 1965; Kerpleman 1972), while several (Lipset 1971; Block et. al. 1969; Kerpelman 1972) have argued that most leftists share similar psychological traits whether they are politically involved (activist) or politically uninvolved (nonactivist). Still other empirical investigations have looked at the influence of institutional structure upon the occurrence of student protest (e.g., Astin 1970; Kerr 1964;
Scott and El-Assal 1969) and violent disruption (e.g., Bayer and Astin 1969).

Yet, in the flood of scientific research that has focused on student activism, very little attention has been given to the issue of protest effectiveness. That is, the question, "To what extent has student protest accomplished its stated goals?" has been largely ignored by empirical investigators. Outstanding notable exceptions are found in a series of studies based on questionnaire data from two national surveys of colleges and universities participating in the American Council on Education's Cooperative Institutional Research Program (Bayer and Astin 1969; Astin 1970). Focusing on 1968-1969 campus unrest Bayer and Astin (1969) found that violent and non-violent disruptive protest significantly influenced institutional changes with regard to racial policies, resulting in the establishment of black studies programs, for example, but had almost no effect upon other institutional changes such as the modification of disciplinary practices or the elimination of war-related research. Controlling for student input and institutional characteristics, Astin (1970) and Astin et. al. (1975) corroborated these findings and also demonstrated that student protest was directly related to institutional changes increasing student power.

But Astin et. al. also found that "many institutions implemented changes without the pressure of protest" (1975:154). The possibility is that institutions
intentionally established changes in order to forestall the occurrence of protest (Astin et. al. 1975:154). Indeed, Astin et. al. argued that protest was less likely to occur when prior changes had been made on a related issue.

The general area of social movement research also contains surprisingly few studies of protest effectiveness (Gamson 1975; Snyder and Kelly 1976; Burstein 1981; Burstein and Freudenberg 1973). These investigations generally demonstrate that violently unruly protest is more likely to be effective than nondisruptive protest, especially when it is conducted by formalized organizations and executed in a context where "public sentiment neutralizes the normal deviance of the action, thus reducing the likelihood and effectiveness of counterattack" (Gamson 1975:88). However, Snyder and Kelly (1976) argue that violent strikes in Italy were successful, not because of violence but, because of the size of union membership. Still, Burstein (1981) insists that unruly urban protest was effective in generating increased welfare spending, but was counter-productive in the passage of civil rights legislation (cf. Jenkins 1983:545). For Burstein, disruptive protest was effective in setting the agenda for a debate of civil rights legislation by impacting public opinion, but was ineffective in positively influencing political decisions. Aside from limited attention given to issues of disruption, investigations into the general effectiveness of student protest are rare.
The main reason that social scientists have failed to address this question is that their attention has been focused on psychological issues related to why students participate in protests. Beyond that, the complexities of carrying out empirical research on student protest effectiveness are compounded by the presence of goal diffuseness in the student movements of the sixties and seventies. Even where student protest goals were clearly defined, in the sixties, they also were of a very general character, such as the goal represented by the sixties' quest for genuine morality or for social justice. Often they involved enormous political complexities, such as the push to get America out of Vietnam. The goal of the student divestment movement presents the luxury of being relatively discrete --- total divestment from all U.S. banks and firms that are linked economically to the Republic of South Africa. While it may be argued that the ultimate goal of the movement is the broad objective of helping to bring about true democracy in South Africa, there is no question that the most immediate objective of student protest was to force targeted educational institutions to divest all of their financial holdings from South Africa-related enterprises.

This question of protest effectiveness is important for our investigation, not only because it has been ignored in social movement research, but also because student divestment activism appears on the surface to have been quite successful. News reports of the enactment of U.S. sanctions against South
Africa and of numerous corporate withdrawals from that racially torn country have created the public impression that the campus unrest, along with populist community activism, have been effective tools against U.S. support for the minority-controlled South African government. Moreover, one hundred and fifty-nine divestment decisions by U.S. colleges and universities between 1977 and 1987 with 87 of these occurring between April 1985 and February 1, 1987 would seem to lead to the conclusion that student protest has succeeded. The central issue of this study, then, is whether or not student divestment protest occurring on college and university campuses between January, 1977 and February, 1987 has been effective in forcing targeted educational institutions to reach a decision to divest, either partially or totally, their South Africa-related stocks and bonds.

The "Risks" and "Costs" of Divestment

Most educational institutions that finally decided to divest, of course, were not eager to sell their South Africa-related financial securities. There are a number of reasons that colleges and universities have historically resisted student demands for divestment. One set of reasons have been philosophical, arguing that the adoption of any social responsibility investment policies risked damaging the basic "academic context" of university life wherein freedom of academic expression and the political neutrality of all
institutional decision-making are fundamental principles. Another set of reasons for institutional resistance to divestment demands have been pragmatic and functional, arguing that the university functions best to reinforce societal values, sponsor free inquiry, and supply skilled leaders. Therefore, for the university to involve itself in corporate responsibility questions would be an inefficient use of institutional resources and would detract from the degree to which the university could carry out its primary functions.¹

Ultimately, colleges and universities justified their resistance to divestment through appeals to the progressive force argument (discussed in Chapter II). Basically, this argument held that the expansion of U.S. business investments in South Africa would modernize that country's economy, thus improving the standard of living for all persons, including blacks.² Universities that appealed to this argument generally supported the position that U.S. firms should, therefore, be expected to conduct their operations with moral and social responsibility. But in order for other American institutions (including colleges and universities) to have any influence upon corporate business practices abroad, institutions had to retain their corporate securities, strategically using them to help shape corporate social policies and practices.

But far more prevalent than any of the above objections to divestment were institutional concerns about the potential
financial costs of divestment. The many studies projecting the impact of divestment upon portfolio performance, conducted between 1978 and 1984, some of which were commissioned by large universities, generally concluded that the impact would be negative.\textsuperscript{3} In IRRC's analysis of nine of the most frequently cited studies, it found that all of them had a different methodological limitation. For example, it found that a major shortcoming in Harvard University's 1978 study was its failure to "compare the rate of return and risk of the South Africa-free and the unconstrained portfolios" (Investor Responsibility Research Center, January 1985:5). On the other hand, IRRC found that several studies conducted by Trinity Investment Management Corporation compensated for the weaknesses in Harvard's study, but "would have been strengthened by a more detailed statistical analysis, particularly with regard to their means, standard deviations, and degree of correlation with movements in the S & P 500" (January 1985:17). Even though IRRC recognizes that "several aspects" of "the question of the impact that a decision to exclude South Africa-related stocks would have on portfolio performance" still "requires further attention, they argue that "enough work has been done to produce some valid conclusions" (January 1985:22).

The general conclusion is that the costs of divestment are rather significant for large investment funds but insignificant for small ones. Although most studies estimate
large funds to be those with equities of $50 million and above, IRRC sets a continuum of $50 million to approximately $150 million. In the normal buying and selling of stock, all equity investment portfolios are effected by transaction costs. These consists of commissions paid to the stockbroker, Securities and Exchange Commission fees and transfer taxes (in the case of a sale), and potential price pressure effects (or the incidental fall in sale price caused by the sale of a large amount of stock in a single company). If the sale is a quick one (taking place, say, in one trading day, as opposed to several days), liquidity costs may also become prohibitively large. Liquidity costs are those that result from price pressure effects when a portfolio's holdings in a single corporation are more than 20 percent of the average daily trading balance for that company's equities. Liquidity costs would not be a factor for small investment funds, but for large billion dollar funds, such costs might make it necessary for fund managers to stretch out the sale of a large holding to as many as 55 days. Such a lengthy trading period would very likely be unacceptable to fund managers (IRRC January 1985:26-27).

With regard to transaction costs, which tend to be relatively small (i.e., when there are no significant price pressure effects), one might argue that these are one-time costs which might be incurred in the transition from an unconstrained to a South Africa-free portfolio. But,
according to IRRC (January 1985:26), at least one study has demonstrated that large investment funds would incur significantly high on-going transaction costs that are peculiarly associated with South Africa-free portfolios. These would be higher for South Africa-free investment portfolios than for unconstrained portfolios because of the smaller market capitalization of the average South Africa-free company (IRRC January 1985:26). These higher on-going transaction costs are estimated to be as much as $67,500 for the round-trip transfer of a $2.5 million position (a typical sized position for large funds) in a South Africa-free portfolio.

All of the above indicates that divestment could be a rather expensive undertaking for universities with large investment funds. It should be pointed out that studies which compare the risk and return on South Africa-free portfolios with these variables in an unconstrained portfolio conclude that South Africa-free investments generally have a larger return, but are at the same time riskier investments than those found in an unconstrained portfolio. As IRRC (January 1985:2) observes, the weakness in such studies is that they have failed to comparatively examine the risk-to-return ratio in the two universes of stock. Thus, we are left unable to discern "whether the additional return is enough to compensate investors for the additional risks" (January 1985:2). The absence of adequate comparative studies of risks vs. return
in the two universes of stocks, therefore, might increase the weightiness of assessments of transaction costs and liquidity costs during university decision-making about the relative benefits and costs of divestment.

Implied in all of this is the possibility that institutional factors, other than protest characteristics, might have impacted upon the divestment deliberations of campus officials. Specifically, the possible relationship between portfolio size and divestment decisions merits our examination. The analysis that we shall undertake will be strictly exploratory, seeking to discover just what the relationship is, if any, between divestment decisions and student protests. Some important questions to address are: Were there specific protest characteristics, such as size (Snyder and Kelly 1976), number of protest events, specific tactics, intensity, or disruptiveness (Gamson 1975; Bayer and Astin 1969; Astin and Bayer 1971; Astin et.al. 1975) that were associated with the decision to divest? Whether or not protest was related to divestment decisions, did it have any influence upon other institutional initiatives related to South Africa? Were some types of institutions more inclined to divest than others? Were divestment decisions associated with portfolio size?
Operationalization of Major Variables

To answer these questions, we operationalized three categories of variables: 1) divestment-related variables, including the divestment decision, the percentage of the endowment divested, and any other South Africa-related university initiatives, which we will refer to as "agenda effects;" 2) protest variables, including number of protest events, total number of protestors, intensity of protests, and disruptiveness of protests; 3) institutional variables, including type of institution, total value of endowment, and approximate value of equity portfolio. These variables are grouped under dependent and independent rubrics and are described briefly below.

Dependent Variables

The divestment decision is of course the primary dependent variable. Divestment decision is defined by whether or not an institution has established an ethical investment policy mandating either partial or total divestment of its South Africa-related portfolio (stock, bonds, debt or other securities), affecting either a known or unknown quantity of money during the time period under consideration. It will also be operationalized by the type of divestment decision, i.e., a negative or no decision, a partial-divestment decision, and a total-divestment decision each being assigned
a value in ascending order. This will be referred to as the
tendency to totally divest. The percentage of the endowment
divested will also be treated as a dependent variable.

Additionally, Burstein (1981) suggests that disruptive
protest might have no positive effects upon political
decisions, but do assist in setting the agenda for related
issues to be deliberated. Thus, the agenda effects of student
protest will be examined in two ways: 1) as to whether or not
an institution established any South Africa-related investment
policy; 2) the sum of South Africa-related initiatives or
programs made per educational institution.

Independent Variables

Independent variables will include both protest
characteristics and institutional characteristics. Protest
events will be measured as the sum of campus events, for all
years, during 1977 through 1987 including fasts, petitions,
referenda, marches, sit-ins, interruptions of school
functions, boycotts, strikes, building-occupations, blockades,
and shanty construction aimed at forcing a targeted
educational institution to divest its South Africa-related
securities. These events must be precisely or approximately
dated in relationship to specific institutional divestment
decisions, if such decisions had in fact occurred.

Several other protest characteristics will also be used
in the analysis. The total protestors will be defined as the
total number of persons participating in each protest event aggregated by school or divestment decision for all years. Protest intensity will be defined in this analysis as the number of events per campus (or per campus divestment decision where the school made more than one such decision) times the weight of the event. Protest events were assigned a value in ascending order according to whether they were individual protests, non-disruptive collective protests, disruptive collective protests. Disruptive protests includes sit-ins, interruptions of school functions, boycotts, strikes, building-occupations, blockades, and shanty-construction. Schools and divestment decisions were classified according to whether they had disruptive protests in addition to other types of protest since exploratory, zero-order correlation analysis and cross tabulations were to be used.

Treated as other independent variables are certain institutional characteristics. Type of institution is dichotomized by whether or not the educational institution is a public university, private university, four-year non-sectarian college, a four-year protestant institution of higher education, or a four-year Catholic institution of higher education. (No two-year institutions are included in the study.) Other institutional variables are financial ones: Value of endowment refers to the market value during the year of the divestment decision, based on endowment figures found in the National Association of College and University Business
Officers' (NACUBO) annual publication of comparative endowment performances (see: Dresner 1977-1987). Since precise equity portfolio values were not available for all institutions, an approximation of the value of equity portfolio will be used for each institution. Based on Dresner's (1987) comparative analysis of endowment performance, we will use 50 percent of an institution's total endowment as an estimate of its equity portfolio.

Method and Data

The major findings regarding the effectiveness of student protest during the late sixties indicate that "protest leads to change" (Astin et.al. 1975:154). On the other hand, a potentially negative impact upon divestment decisions is represented by transaction and liquidity costs, especially for institutions with large equity portfolios. It is not our intent to wright the relative influences of these variables upon the decision to divest. Nor is it to test interaction effects, conduct time series analysis, perform regression, or engage in a variety of other empirical techniques which might be appropriate to the data. A thorough examination of the degree to which the above variables and other impacted upon divestment decisions is beyond the purvey of this exploratory investigation. Rather, we will use exploratory zero-order correlations and cross-tabulations to determine what kind of relationship exists between divestment decisions and student
protests, as well as between divestment and other institutional variables including endowment value.

Based upon divestment impact studies that demonstrate the potential importance of liquidity and transaction costs in divestment deliberations, we hypothesize that student protests will be ineffective in persuading colleges and universities to totally divest. Total divestment can be especially costly for schools with large equity investment portfolio. We expect these institutions to be the least likely to totally divest. Thus, even though Astin et.al (1975) concluded that student protests resulted in significant institutional changes in racial policies and increases in student power during the late sixties and early seventies, we argue that divestment deliberations are more likely to be responsive to financial considerations than to student protests. Therefore, we expect to find a negative relationship between endowment values and divestment decisions. Furthermore, since the problem of U.S. institutional support for apartheid (which was the issue that student demands for total divestment sought to address) lends itself to other institutional responses short of total divestment, colleges and universities are likely to opt for these other responses, either for the purpose of protecting their public image or to forestall the occurrence of additional protest. Consequently, we also expect to find that, even though student protests were ineffective in persuading educational institutions to totally divest, they
were effective in setting the agenda wherein the issue of apartheid was addressed.

In order to test these hypotheses, protest data were collected primarily from a content analysis of movement documents and student anti-apartheid newsletters found in the "South Africa: United States: University Action" files at the New York-based American Committee on Africa. Additionally, the Chronicle of Higher Education and the 1984-1987 issue of the New York Times Annual Index were used. All of the above sources were content analyzed to code factual information concerning the number, size, date and mode of student divestment protests that occurred on college and university campuses between the years 1977 and 1987 inclusively. These years coincide both with the two most articulated waves of divestment activism and with the years for which accurate divestment data could be acquired. A complete discussion of protest data, the criteria for selection, and the limitations of the data is found in Chapter III. Suffice it to say, that 817 protest events from 170 campuses in 37 states and the District of Columbia were finally included in the data set. Even though the years of 1977-1987 are covered in our study, it should be pointed out that the data indicates that divestment activism is concentrated in the third wave. In fact, as we pointed out in Chapter III, less than 7 percent of the protest in our data set occurred in the years prior to 1984. Chapter IV shows that movement mobilization greatly
expanded after 1984. It is also likely that the movement drew increased press attention as it increased in political significance.

Protest events, themselves, also ranged broadly in size and mode. Modes of protest included fasts, petitions, marches, rallies, class boycotts, sit-ins, building-occupations, blockades, and shanty-construction. Rallies and shanty-construction predominated, while fasts, boycotts and petitions were infrequent. The size of individual protest events, as measured by number of participants, also varied greatly. Fasts, for example, never involved more than six individuals per campus. But rallies and class boycotts, at institutions, such as the University of California-Berkeley, drew the support of thousands of students. At Berkeley, on April 24, 1985, fifteen thousand students participated in a divestment-related class boycott, with over two thousand joining in a rally on October 11, 1985. As the movement escalated in its third wave, so too did its level of disruptiveness and participation. Disruptive shanty-construction, for example, does not appear on college campuses until 1985, and over 97 percent of all blockades occurred after 1984. Table 7 shows a steady build-up of participation as the movement intensified in disruptiveness.

Data on certain institutional characteristics were collected from several national directories of colleges and universities. To classify institutions according to
enrollment size, public or private university, public or private four-year college, and four-year Protestant or Catholic, several editions of the American Council on Education's American Universities and Colleges were used (e.g., American Council on Education 1987).

Table 7. Zero-order Correlations of Modes of Protests with Total Protestor Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Protest</th>
<th>(n=171)</th>
<th>Protest Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ins</td>
<td></td>
<td>.132*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fasts</td>
<td></td>
<td>.197**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marches</td>
<td></td>
<td>.435***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building-occupations</td>
<td></td>
<td>.508***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rallies</td>
<td></td>
<td>.614***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotts</td>
<td></td>
<td>.731***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockades</td>
<td></td>
<td>.802***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanty-construction</td>
<td></td>
<td>.909***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p = .005; ***p < .001

The National Association of College and University Business Officers' (NACUBO) annual publication includes a list of their subscribers along with endowment values for each (see: Dresner 1977-1987). The endowment sizes among NACUBO subscribers are fairly evenly distributed from large to small among educational institutions nationwide. NACUBO's list of institutions and their endowment values overlapped with more than half of the 128 colleges and universities on the Africa Fund's divestment list.
The February 1, 1987 up-dated version of the Africa Fund's "Divestment Action on South Africa by Colleges and Universities" was used as a primary source of data on educational institutions' divestment decisions. This list contained divestment amounts and years. In addition to the Africa Fund list, Coon's (1986) survey of the top 100 colleges ranked by endowment size provided useful insights into South Africa-related divestment decisions and investment policies. All institutions listed in Coon's (1986:127-129) "Summary List of Divestment Actions" were also contained in the Africa Fund's list. However, the Africa Fund's list proved to be more complete in terms of the total number of divestment decision included. Of all the possible sources investigated, the Africa Fund list proved to be the most complete. Since the Africa Fund is associated with the ACOA, it has access to information from campus activists as well as from some university officials. The research staff of ACOA daily scans appropriate news sources for information on divestment decisions. Coon's "date of policy" designation helped us to pin-point the month and year of divestment decisions for approximately half of the divestment actions listed by the Africa Fund, especially for those divestment decisions that took place in 1985. The importance of this information cannot be overstated since it enables us to draw conclusions about any possible causal link that might exist between various protest characteristics and decisions to divest.
There was considerable agreement between the two divestment lists regarding divestment amounts and unanimity regarding the year of divestment decision. In the few cases where slight discrepancies were found regarding the amount affected by a particular divestment decision, Coon's data was used since it was based on mail and telephone surveys.

For any given divestment decision, the total amount affected ranged from a low of $40,000 divested by Pace University in 1986 to a high of $3.1 billion divested in the University of California's divestment decision in 1986. Between 1977 and 1987, an overall total of $3,942,818,821 has been divested by 128 schools (The Africa Fund, February 1, 1987). As much as 3.7 billion dollars of that amount have resulted from divestment decisions that took place between April 1985 and February 1, 1987.

Information regarding non-divestment institutional responses was acquired from Coon's "Summary of South Africa-related Divestment Policies" (1986: 133-140). Additional information concerning divestment policies that were enacted after the publication of Coon's survey was gathered from Anne-Marea Griffin's (November 1986) Update to IRRC's The Response of Colleges and Universities to Calls for Divestment.

The means by which educational institutions were selected for entry into the data set has resulted in one segment of the national sample of colleges and universities being biased out of the analysis. Two categories of institutions were chosen:
1) institutions that made any divestment decision (whether negative, partial or total) between the years 1977 and 1987 inclusively, whether or not the school experienced any student protests during that time period; 2) institutions that experienced any divestment related student protests between the years 1977 and 1987 inclusively, whether or not they made any divestment decision. Therefore, biased out of the analysis were institutions that both had no student protests and made no divestment decision during the period under consideration. Consequently, any correlation analysis would probably result in a slight under-estimation of the impact of protest upon divestment.

Since the protest sample (i.e., the sample of schools that have entered our study by the means indicated above) is biased, it is important to make some observations about the degree to which the protest sample reflects a national sample of colleges and universities. Based on data summarized in the Digest of Educational Statistics 1987 (U.S. Office of Education 1987:168-169), the total national population of colleges and universities, excluding two-year schools, is 2,029. The total number of colleges and universities included in the protest sample is 170, or only 8.4 percent of the national sample. Public and private universities are grossly over-represented in the our protest sample. Nationally, they represent only 4.6 and 3.0 percent, respectively, of four-year colleges and universities. In the protest sample, they
comprise 41.7 and 34.1 percent, respectively, of the institutions. On the other hand, protestant institutions and Catholic universities are under-represented in the protest sample. They constitute roughly 23.7 and 10.6 percent, respectively, of the colleges and universities nationally, but make up only 3 and 3.5 percent of the protest sample. Four-year private non-sectarian colleges are proportionately represented in our sample as compared to national data. There are only two four-year public colleges in the protest sample out of a national sample of 472. We, therefore, have decided not to report findings regarding four-year public colleges and to treat with some large measure of reservation findings concerning protestant institutions and Catholic universities. The protest sample does not contain any two-year institutions. Moreover, because of the extreme degree to which the protest sample is attenuated, we hesitate to generalize to the entire population of U.S. colleges and universities.

The total number of divesting institutions finally selected for inclusion in the protest sample was 123. Five institutions, that were either professional schools, Canadian schools, or foundations contained on the Africa Fund's list, were excluded from the protest sample. Since protest events and divestment decisions can be dated for each campus, we will be able to draw some causal connections. A divestment decision on each campus will be analyzed as to the impact exercised on it by all prior protest events occurring on that
campus. However, in those situations where an institution has made more than one divestment decision, the decision will be treated in relationship only to that protest which occurred since the prior divestment decision.

Discussion and Analysis of Findings

With such a small number of four-year colleges and universities deciding to divest (123 out of 2,029), one might be led prematurely to the conclusion that student protest has had no positive effects upon educational institution divestment decisions. Since our sampling method has biased out the large group of schools that have neither divested nor had any protest, zero-order correlations and cross-tabulations between protest and divestment within the protest sample would produce misleading findings. Under these circumstances, to acquire an accurate as possible assessment of the impact of protest upon divestment, we evaluate the relationship between protest and divestment in the context of the national sample of colleges and universities. Table 8 summarizes the results. As these results indicate, the occurrence of any protest had only a weak impact upon the likelihood that colleges and universities would make any divestment decision, whether partial or total. Of the institutions having protest, just over half, or 60.2 percent divested. But with only 2.9 percent of schools choosing not to divest where there was no
protest, it becomes clear that protest does have some effect upon institutional divestment decisions.

Table 8. Divestment by Protest and Non-protest Four-year Colleges and Universities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage divesting</th>
<th>Percentage not divesting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(N=2,029)</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(n)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>having protest</td>
<td>(113)</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not having protest</td>
<td>(1916)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p< .0001; * excludes 2-year schools and Catholic colleges

These findings are almost identical to Astin et. al. (1975) who found severe protest to be effective especially in bringing about changes in racial policies during the late sixties at 63.3 percent of institutions with protest. At the same time, it should be emphasized that divestment protest appears to have been weakened by university opposition to the idea of divestment itself. University officials were highly skeptical about the potential impact which divestment would have on apartheid. Robert Rotberg, professor of political science at MIT, says that the economic logic of divestment is based on the doubtful assumption that if all U.S. universities divest, then corporations will pull out of South Africa and therefore South Africa will abolish apartheid (Newsweek On Campus, April 1986: 8). William Foltz, director of the Yale
Center for International and Area Studies, also argues that the economic impact of divestment is 'impossible to find' (Newsweek On Campus, April 1986: 9). Thus, by and large, university trustees have insisted that it is best to retain equity investments and try to use them as a leverage to pressure corporations to act with social responsibility in South Africa.

In addition to the weak effectiveness of the incidence of protests, the occurrence of disruptive protests also tended to increase the likelihood of divestment. Table 9 summarizes these results. With an even greater degree than non-disruptiveness, unruly protests seemed to have been the kind of pressure to which educational institutions responded. This is not surprising, since previous studies have found disruptiveness to have a major positive impact on university decisions to institute progressive policies. Bayer and Astin (1969:349) found disruptive protests, violent and non-violent,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational institutions</th>
<th>Percentage divesting</th>
<th>Percentage not divesting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>having disruptive protest</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>having no disruptive protest</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p< .0001; * excludes 2-year schools and Catholic colleges
to be rather influential in bringing about changes in racial policies at 55 percent of the educational institutions in their sample. It is anomalous, however, that resistance to disruptiveness in the divestment movement seems more severe than opposition to unruliness in the sixties. In response to non-violent disruptive divestment protests, school officials tended to call in outside authorities. Our data indicate that students were arrested on more than 55 percent of the campuses that experienced non-violent disruptive divestment protest. This compares to severe punishment (arrest, indictment, dismissal, or suspension) for non-violent disruptive behavior at only one-fifth of the institutions experiencing non-violent protest in Bayer and Astin's study (1969: 347). For example, during ACOA's "national week of anti-apartheid protest" in the Spring of 1986, divestment activists were arrested at 20 different schools, including the University of Texas-Austin, Yale University and the University of Wisconsin. At UC-Berkeley, on April 3, police equipped with riot gear confronted demonstrators, began tearing down shanties, and arrested hundreds of anti-apartheid protestors (ACOA Spring 1986b:3).

Moreover, our data demonstrate that disruptiveness was met with rather severe opposition by both university officials and "counter-divestment" student protestors. For example, in over 62 percent of the cases where divestment activists constructed shanties, either university authorities or
counter-protestors destroyed the shanties. The response of conservative Dartmouth students stands as a prime example of the intensity of student opposition to divestment. Twelve students associated with the college's controversial right-wing student newspaper, the Dartmouth Review, attacked five "shanties with sledgehammers on the night after the first federal holiday honoring the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King" (Chronicle of Higher Education, February 19, 1986). Divestment activists had been holding all night vigils in the shanties, both to protect them against counter-protestors and to symbolize living conditions for poor blacks in South Africa. There were no injuries in the attack, but the twelve students were arrested and reportedly convicted of 'malicious damage to property, unlawful and disorderly conduct, harassment, abuse, coercion and violence' (Chronicle of Higher Education, February 19, 1986). At Johns Hopkins, however, one of the three anti-apartheid protestors who were inside a shanty was injured when three other students fire-bombed the small, plywood structure (Chronicle of Higher Education, September 17, 1986:2). In Utah, U.S. District Judge Aldon Anderson barred University of Utah officials from dismantling two shanties and argued that the structures were protected by the First Amendment (Chronicle of Higher Education, September, 10, 1986:2).

It is surprising, therefore, in light of the stern opposition faced by divestment activists that the movement
managed to attain limited success. But does this mean that protest impacted colleges and universities in the way that divestment activists intended? It will be remembered that the demand of the student movement was "total divestment." Table 10 shows that institutions having any protest were more likely to divest partially than to divest totally, while disruptiveness appears to actually increase the chances of partial divestment. What seems a more probable interpretation, however, is that as universities' exercised more resistance to total divestment by adopting partial divestment policies, student activists became increasingly disruptive.

Table 10. Total, Partial, and Negative Divestment Decisions by the Occurrence of Any Protest and Disruptive Protest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage Divesting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totally Partially Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>having any protest</td>
<td>(113) 20.4 39.8 39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>having disruptive protest</td>
<td>(64) 18.8 51.6 29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not having any protest</td>
<td>(1916) 1.0 2.0 0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This shows a clear reluctance on the part of all institutions to totally divest, but a major tendency to enact partial divestment policies. What is interesting is that even those institutions that had no protest followed the same pattern.
Perhaps divestment decisions were being made to ward off divestment demonstrations, as much as it was to respond favorably to student demands. Indeed, with over 66 percent of schools divesting opting for partial divestment favorable responses to student demands for total divestment seemed to have been piecemeal at best, generally falling short of the complete divestiture that student activists wanted.

Table 11. Divestment by Institutional Type and Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of School</th>
<th>Percentage Divesting</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totally 21.2%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public universities</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private universities</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-year Private Colleges</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant schools</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic universities</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of School</th>
<th>Percentage Divesting</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500-999</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-2,499</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500-4,999</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-9,999</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-19,999</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-29,999</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 and over</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=population of schools

If protest tended to lead to partial decisions, were all types and sizes (as measured by total student enrollment) of institutions equally likely to divest? Table 11 demonstrates that there is significant disparity between the responses of institutions by both type and size. Since our divestment data
are fairly complete up through February 1, 1987, we are reasonably confident that different types and sizes of institutions divested at the rates indicated in the tables. Public and private universities, as well as large institutions, are much more likely to divest than other types of schools. In fact, private universities (69.3 percent) and institutions with enrollments 30,000 and over (51.8 percent) are more likely to divest than not. It should be observed as well that these are the institutions that experienced protests at higher rates than other schools (See, table 4, in Chapter III). This would seem to indicate that the more protest an institution experiences, the more likely it will decide in favor of divestment. Astin et. al. (1975:147-151) also found that institutions which were more conducive to protest, i.e. private universities, were also the that were most likely to enact changes increasing student power and establishing progressive racial policies.

Yet it seems clear from Table 10 that institutions of all types, even large public and private ones, show some tendency to change, but only with moderation, i.e., to divest partially rather than to divest totally. The only exception is represented by Catholic universities. But with such a small number (6) in the protest sample we do not feel justified in making any general statements concerning the possible inclination of Catholic schools to totally divest. However, we might observe that the role played in the anti-apartheid
movement by both Catholic and protestant churches would lead us to expect religious institutions to take a moderate stand on divestment. Many religious denominations, including Roman Catholics, have been heavily engaged in the anti-apartheid movement since the mid-70s (see, Chapters II & IV). But, their involvement has been largely moderate. Churches have divested funds from South Africa-related firms and banks, but these have usually been selective divestment actions, taken after companies have failed to positively respond to shareholder resolutions (see, Chapters II & IV). This helps to explain why no Protestant educational institutions in the protest sample made decisions to totally divest.

**Why Not Total Divestment**

As argued above, divestment-impact studies project that institutions with large equity portfolios, valued between $50 and $150 million, are likely to encounter major on-going transaction and liquidity costs after converting to a South Africa-free portfolio. Therefore, one way to measure the impact of potential liquidity and transaction costs upon decisions to divest is to analyze the relationship between portfolio size and divestment. Because institutions tend to keep the value of their equity investments confidential, endowment values were used in this analysis. These were taken from appropriate annual reports (ranging between the years 1977 and 1987) of NACUBO's endowment study (See especially,
Dresner, 1987). An institution's equity portfolio market value is not always proportional to the market value of its endowment. But we felt justified in using market value of endowment as a substitute for equity portfolio since the performance of equity investments in NACUBO's 1986 endowment study averaged about 50 percent of endowment (see, Dresner 1987).

When endowment values were used in a zero-order correlation analysis, a negative relationship was found between endowment value and divestment decisions. Table 12 indicates that prestigious private universities tend to have

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Type</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Universities</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>(p&lt;.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Universities</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>(p&lt;.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-year Private Colleges</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>(p&lt;.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divestment Decision</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>(p&lt;.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Pearson Correlations of Endowment Values with Divestment and Institutional Types

the largest endowments (cf. Dresner 1987).

Even though no significant relationships were found between endowment value and other types of educational institutions, the above data help us to better understand why
total divestment decisions do not tend to occur for any schools. The market value of a university's invested endowment appears to have a negative influence upon its decision to divest. Because of the moderate, negative relationship between endowment value and the tendency to totally divest, it seems apparent that institutions with large endowments are less likely to make total-divestment decisions, preferring instead to more in favor of partial divestment.

To further test this hypothesis, we used IRRC's $50 million and $150 million designations of large equity investments to categorized institutions. The results are shown in Table 13.

Table 13. Educational Institutions with High and Low Equity Investment Funds by Negative, Partial, and Total Divestment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage Deciding to Divest</th>
<th>(n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totally</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Using $50 million</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small equity funds</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large equity funds</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Using $150 million</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small equity funds</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(71)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large equity funds</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the divestment decisions of small and large equity investment institutions, while using a $50 million demarcation point, it is clearly apparent that institutions
with large equity portfolios are much less likely to totally divest than institutions with small ones. With only 14.6 percent of institutions with large funds deciding to divest fully, small equity fund institutions totally divested at twice the rate (see, Table 13). Moreover, large fund institutions were almost twice as likely as small ones to decide to divest nothing at all. When $150 million is used as a point of demarcation, the differences become even more striking. In this scenario, small fund institutions are almost five times as likely to divest totally than are institutions with large equity portfolios. Only 5.9 percent of the latter decided in favor of total divestment.

Table 14. Private Universities with Large Equity Investment Funds by Negative, Partial and Total Divestment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage Deciding to Divest</th>
<th>(n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totally</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using $50 million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Universities</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Institutions</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using $150 million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Universities</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Institutions</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should not be surprising, then, that private universities, such as Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and Yale, schools with billion-dollar endowments and some of the largest equity portfolios, were the least likely to totally divest.
Only 4.5 percent of private universities totally divested when the estimated value of their equity portfolios exceeded $50 million (The low number of cases of equity portfolios over $150 million renders a discussion of them inconsequential.). This compares to 26.3 percent for all other institutions (see, Table 14).

These findings help confirm the proposition that decisions for total divestment are adversely impacted by institutional concerns over the costs of divestment. Without the inhibitions created by potentially high liquidity and transaction costs associated with massive equity portfolios, other institutions could enact total divestment policies at a higher rate than private universities. Even though private universities, on the whole, tended to divest more frequently than other schools, they were more likely to partially divest or not at all, when compared to other schools with endowments over $50 million. We suspect that the primary reason for this is that the equity investments of private universities generally far exceed $50 million while the investment portfolios of other plus-$50 million schools are more concentrated near the $50 million border. To further test this theory, we compared public university total divestiture decisions with that of private universities when equity investments for both institutional types exceeded $50 million. Not surprisingly, 18.2 percent of public universities totally divested as compared to only 4.5 percent for private
universities. It should be recalled that Table 12 demonstrates that public universities tend to have smaller endowment values than private universities. This gives support to our theory that private universities with $50-million-plus investment portfolios totally divest at a lower rate because their equity investments far exceed the $50 million margin.

Other Factors

There are other factors which might help to account for the differential total divestment rates of public universities, private colleges, and private universities. The decisions of public universities were probably influenced by the involvement of local and state politicians (see, Chapter IV). For example, divestment activists at both Michigan State and Ohio State Universities developed alliances with liberal state and local politicians in order to gain passage of full divestment policies. The huge $3.2 million total divestment decision was not made at the University of California until the state's conservative Republican Governor George Deukmejian reversed years of opposition to full divestment. The Governor was running for re-election at the time (ACOA 1986c).

Overall, private colleges (1.7 percent) made total divestment decisions at a lower rate than private universities (21 percent). This probably relates to the smallness of their equity investments. Prior to 1987, the majority of South
Africa-related companies were large, blue chip firms that form the fundamental core of investments for small equity portfolios (see, IRRC 1985). Small private colleges might have had investments in only two or three of these companies, but to exclude them from their portfolios would have undercut the security of their investments.

The current data will not permit an examination of the above theories concerning other factors that might have impacted upon public university and private college divestment decisions. An evaluation of these theories, therefore, must await a future study.

The foregoing analysis would seem to indicate that financial considerations have a much greater impact upon university divestment decisions than does student protest. But does this mean that student protest was basically ineffectual? Previous research by Burstein (1971) suggests that, while protests (especially when it is disruptive) may not always positively impact political decisions, they often do have important agenda effects. They can influence the degree to which protest issues are deliberated. The question then becomes, even though student divestment activism had only a weak positive impact on divestment decisions, did it help set the agenda for colleges and universities to respond to apartheid by means other than divestment? For instance, institutions could have taken a variety of anti-apartheid actions, including adopting policies asking portfolio
companies to abide by the Sullivan Principles, or adopting other South Africa-related social responsibility policies restricting the purchase of South African goods, or restricting bank deals with South African-related financial institutions, or numerous other possible anti-apartheid actions. What impact, therefore, did student protests have upon the sum total of such college and university actions?

To address these questions, Pearson correlation analysis was conducted. Table 15 illustrates the results.

Student divestment protests were effective in forcing colleges and universities to confront the anti-apartheid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest Characteristics</th>
<th>Agenda Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Protests</td>
<td>.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of Protests</td>
<td>.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(210)</td>
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*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p=.01; ****p<.01
issue. Table 15 shows that almost all protest characteristics had a weak-to-moderate impact in setting institutions' anti-apartheid agenda. The more disruptive and intense protest events were, the greater the apparent impact upon university decisions to establish South Africa-related social responsibility policies, adopt the Sullivan Principles, and take several other anti-apartheid measures. For example, the moderately strong correlation (.16) between "blockades" and the "sum" total of institutional anti-apartheid actions would seem to indicate that disruptive modes of protest increased the total number of anti-apartheid responses made by colleges and universities.

When comparing the relative influence which protests seem to have had upon divestment decisions versus their agenda effects, the above data indicate that institutions were much more willing to try milder anti-apartheid measures than they were to divest. This is clearly apparent when one observes the relatively strong impact which most protest characteristics had upon the establishment of Sullivan investment guidelines. It is to an embrace of the Sullivan Principles that colleges and universities turned in response to student protests. This is corroborated by the fact that the implementation of the Sullivan Principles is strongly correlated with private universities (r=.15, p<.10), the institutions that had a relatively high rate of partial divestment.
In the final analysis only 6 percent of all educational institutions made positive divestment decisions. Of those, 66.3 percent were decisions in favor of partial divestment. Moreover, these decisions were only weakly effected by student divestment activism. When coupled with the above data, these observations lead one to wonder whether or not college and university decisions to divest, as well as their other anti-apartheid actions were merely symbolic gestures designed to appease unruly students.

The Symbolic Politics of Divestment

Murray Edelman (1970, 1971) advances the theory that each political act "evokes a quiescent or an aroused mass response" because political acts "symbolize a threat or reassurance" (1970:7). Because mass publics are so far removed from the day-to-day workings of political bodies, the objective consequences of political acts are not nearly as important as the emotional meanings that they symbolize. Edelman distinguishes between two types of symbols: referential and condensation. "Referential symbols are economical ways of referring to the objective elements in objects or situations." But "condensation symbols evoke the emotions associated with the situation. They condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act of patriotic pride..." (1970:6). According to Edelman, controversial and important political acts always serve as condensation symbols, either emotionally arousing or quieting
a mass public. All governments, especially non-democratic ones that are remote from full citizen participation, have a great need for reassuring symbols. It is no accident then, that all governments, especially "totalitarian states, involve their populations intensively and almost constantly in discussions of public affairs" (1970:9). This "dramatic symbolic life among abstractions" then becomes a "substitute gratification for the pleasure of remolding the concrete environment." Edelman suggests that this helps to produce quiescence by having a numbing effect upon the critical faculties.

Drawing upon Edelman's theories, Elder and Cobb (1983:16) argue that political systems, in their normal operation, tend to provide symbolic reassurance to the public through political communication systems. This reassurance has the effect of producing and sustaining acquiescence by "reinforcing perceptions that the normal order of things is being maintained." At the same time the real substantive transactions of the small, inner circle of political decision-makers go unattended by the general public. Consequently, if public anxieties are aroused by unpopular political decisions, they may be easily "assuaged by a dramatic symbolic gesture" (1983:16). Especially when these anxieties produce symbolic, as opposed to substantive demands, political decision-makers are able to easily satiate them (see also Edelman 1970, 1971).
According to Edelman (1971) decision-makers actively engage in the manipulation of symbols and rationalize their actions through them. Social protestors, in turn, respond to these symbolic stimuli, finding in them a source of reassurance. Yet on the other hand, mass responses are sometimes critical of political gestures. What determines which way the public will respond, according to Edelman, depends on whether or not the political situation consists of one in which values on a particular set of norms are bimodally distributed, i.e., "polarized into two clearly defined adversary foci," where those who hold the other value become the enemy. In this situation, apparent dramatic reversals on the part of the adversary are enthusiastically accepted.

Viewing educational institutions as political systems and university administrators as political decision-makers, the import of the above argument becomes obvious. Perhaps in order to protect their public image as progressive, socially responsible, educational institutions, university officials sought to quiet the student out-cry for divestment by enacting social responsibility invest policies, and inviting students to participate in otherwise "non-democratic" discussions of complex investment issues. Yet most of these policies seem to have been largely symbolic, requiring partial or selective divestment. Invitations of student participation placed students in situations where they were likely to be overwhelmed by abstract financial considerations, yet
ultimately gratified by the opportunity to participate directly in the financial governance of their educational institutions. Then, when formerly intransigent trustees and regents suddenly compromised and adopted divestment policies, even though most of them were selective and partial requiring the selling of stock over two-to-five year periods, the masses of student activists celebrated victory.

Protest did not stop at every school following selective and partial divestment. All of the reasons for the differential student responses are not clear. We speculate that it related both to the level of commitment and level of sophistication regarding the limitations of the progressive force argument. Radical student leaders were well aware of the short-comings of partial divestment decisions, but it is not likely that they could continue to mobilize mass protests among less aware activists who were impressed with apparent divestment victories. Another factor might relate to the degree to which campuses were consistently plugged into the on-going mobilizing efforts of the ACOA. This seems to be an important reason that accounts for the continuation of divestment activism at some colleges and universities, especially those in the Northeast, even during lull periods between the three waves of divestment protests.

Although we do not claim to have empirically measured the symbolic politics of divestment, the probability that college and university anti-apartheid actions were largely symbolic
gestures constitutes a major implication of our findings. We might speculate about the factors that might have been responsible for the role played by symbolic politics in educational institutions divestment decision-making. Partly responsible for such symbolic responses is the instant communications age in which all social institutions must compete for survival. The seeming omnipresence of the mass media creates an environment where public image counts a great deal. When one considers the fact that educational institutions today operate in a market where they must compete for a declining college-age population, the importance of public image is magnified. With daily press reports of the deteriorating racial and political conditions in South Africa and periodic national broadcasts about U.S. students protesting for divestment in solidarity with oppressed blacks in South Africa, few universities wanted to be perceived as being on the wrong side of the issue, even if they continued to have reservations about the potential effectiveness of divestment.

Colleges and universities were in the forefront of the institutional campaign to appease student activists. Colleges and universities are particularly vulnerable to public opinion because they are highly visible in their local communities, in their states, and in the nation. In addition, Catholic universities, because of their historic roots, tend to be perceived as the upholders of high moral values. But a
similar point may be made regarding prestigious private schools, especially Protestant affiliated ones. Because of their selective admission standards, they are viewed as academic leaders. Prestigious private institutions, were the most likely to opt for the symbolic gesture of divestment rather than to make a non-divestiture decision. Perhaps, even more so than other schools prestigious private institutions were concerned about their public image. But their resistance to total divestment, expressed the establishment of moderate anti-apartheid measures and the enactment of partial divestment guidelines, only served to prompt more protest on the part of highly politicized intellectual students.

Overall, educational institution divestment decisions constituted symbolic politics. Our analysis has shown student protest to have had only weak positive effects upon the decision to divest. Liquidity costs and transaction costs, mediated through large equity portfolios, have a strong negative effect upon the likelihood that an institution will make a decision to divest totally.

However, student activism does have a major impact upon the anti-apartheid agenda of educational institutions. The full import of student protests for divestment and other institutional anti-apartheid initiatives cannot be defined completely by the exploratory analysis contained herein. Several questions, beyond the scope of this analysis, still
need to be addressed. For example, might additional insights be gained from a time-series analysis? Might student protest which occurred years before a divestment decision have had an effect upon the decision? How does previous protest impact upon the success or failure of current protest? Further analysis which takes into account other factors, such as temporal proximity, might well yield different results.
Notes

1. It is not my intent to offer an evaluation nor a full discussion of university objections to divestment. For a detailed discussion and evaluation of several versions of the above objections, see Simon et.al. (1972:65-108).

2. For a discussion and response to the progressive force argument, see Danaher (1984), Litvak et.al (1978), and Schmidt.

3. The Investor Responsibility Research Center summarizes and critiques all of these studies. See its January 1985 publication, The Impact of South Africa-Related Divestment on Equity Portfolio Performance.

4. "South Africa-free" portfolios refer to those which are constrained by the limited universe of investments which may be purchased under a South Africa-related social responsibility investment policy. South Africa-free portfolios are, therefore, those which do not contain stocks or bonds from companies that are currently maintaining business operations in South Africa.

5. Interview with Lisa Crooms, ACOA Research Staff, June, 1988.
Chapter VI
Problems and Prospects

The emergence of divestment activism on U.S. college and university campuses was generated by tumultuous political crises in the far-away Republic of South Africa, a country still badly torn by racial strife and the only remaining modern polity with a legalized system of racial intolerance, exploitation, and domination. The daily outrages of governmentally sanctioned police and military brutality in South Africa periodically highlighted by a world-wide mass media, resulted in corresponding waves of student protests about U.S. complicity in apartheid.

Emerging out of a passionate opposition to overt racism, the ebbing and flowing divestment movement confronted the segments of the U.S. establishment that were most accessible to student influence, colleges and universities, demanding that they sever all economic ties with "the racist regime." Student protests were coordinated nationally by the professional SMO, the American Committee on Africa, whose organizing activities helped to mobilize divestment activism from the very beginning of the movement, and achieved major
importance during the movement's second and third waves. Mobilized through a decentralized, reticulate, and multi-organizational structure, student divestment activism escalated over the three waves into an articulated movement of national significance by the third wave.

In spite of its considerable organizational strengths, the movement had only weak positive influences on college and university divestment decisions. While divestment decisions were numerous, they were largely symbolic gestures of institutions seeking to protect their public image and quiet student demands. Student protests, then, were only minimally effective in promoting divestment, even though they clearly helped set the anti-apartheid agenda, wherein educational institutions deliberated their investment policies and established various anti-apartheid programs. If anything, in the face of stern institutional opposition to disruptive student protests, certain institutional characteristics were more effective in increasing the likelihood that colleges and universities would sell any of their South Africa-related stocks. Furthermore, financial considerations regarding potentially high liquidity and transaction costs impacted negatively upon institutional divestment decisions. Institutions that feared the high costs of divestment were the ones that were least likely to divest totally.

Implied in all of this are indications of several structural problems that served to weaken the overall impact
of the student divestment movement. Some of these problems are endemic to all social movements. Others find peculiar expression in the issue of divestment itself. The problems associated generally with the movement become most clearly visible as one analyzes the apparent decline of the third wave of activism. It is to this analysis that we now turn.

**Decline of the Third Wave**

By 1987 massive student divestment protests had all but faded from public view. Movement organizers boasted of huge successes. The $3.8 billion in university divestitures between April 1985 and February 1987 dwarfed the $240 million that had been divested in the eight years prior. And, even though no one associated with the student campaign would have been so immodest as to take direct credit for the U. S. comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, student leaders could take a measure of justifiable pride in knowing that sustained media attention to political unrest in South Africa and to student (and community) protests in the U.S. led to the eventual passage of the legislation over the veto of a very popular conservative President. Between January 1, 1986 and April 30, 1988, one hundred and fourteen U.S. companies withdrew from South Africa. It was in the wake of these apparent movement victories that the third wave declined.
"Success" and the Narrowness of Divestment

In earlier discussions (Chapter II), we have tried to show how movement success leads to movement decline (see also Zald and Ash 1966). Particularly when goals are unidimensional, movements run the danger of being short-lived. Turner and Killian (1957:336) argue that movements must have a hierarchy of goals in order to achieve sustained effectiveness. Such goals must range from those that are easily attainable to those that are almost unreachable. Movement participants should be led into a particular struggle being convinced that the accomplishment of successes are merely intermediate steps toward the achievement of the movement's ultimate goal. Otherwise, the attainment of the first victory will result in the movement's premature decline (Turner and Killian 1957:336).

The student divestment movement possessed an ultimate goal, the abolition of apartheid. Yet it appears that stern movement opposition led to the creation of an exalted status for a subordinate objective, divestment. Throughout its existence, the movement has remained under constant fire from skeptics who have questioned the practical benefits of divestment, asking whether it could produce any tangible benefits for black South Africans. Others berated divestment because it seemed to directly target U.S. companies rather than the South African government. Student activists were,
therefore, pushed into a defensive posture. Their passionate
defense of divestment as a viable tactic effectively exalted
it to the status of an ultimate goal, such that the main focus
of the majority of student anti-apartheid organizing centered
on this one narrow objective. For many rank-and-file
activists, then, recalcitrant university officials and profit-
hungry transnational corporations became the enemy against
whom all energies and protests were directed. A victory
against them, therefore, generally resulted in a decline in
mass participation and a corresponding loss in organizational
strength.

The elevation of divestment to the status of an ultimate
goal partly resulted from the vast geographical and
organizational distance between the student divestment
movement in the U.S. and the black liberation struggle in the
Republic of South Africa. Without being structurally linked
into the larger political liberation struggle in South Africa
itself, the U.S. student divestment campaign became a
reticulate organization of local groups who acted in moral
solidarity with the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa, but
whose day-to-day struggles were different from theirs, and
whose occasional victories, therefore, were also different.
"Traveling evangelists," some of whom were South African
exiles, served as the most tangible structural linkage to
South Africa's black liberation movement. But even these
representatives from the movement in South Africa were
themselves far removed from the day-to-day struggles in that country due to their status as exiles. Divestment, then, attained a greater importance than it would have if student activists had been able to maintain a close relationship with the black South African struggle.

National level movement organizers at the ACOA were mindful of the need of the U.S. student movement to see itself as part of the larger political movement in South Africa. Crooms and Nessen (1987) lamented the fact that divestment had become the only organizing focus for student anti-apartheid campaigns, to the neglect of material support for political prisoners and mass-based liberation organizations in South Africa. The too-narrow focus on divestment resulted in frustration when college and university officials refused to sell stock and premature celebration when divestment policies were adopted. Both of these eventualities led to a reduction in mass movement participation, making it impossible for national organizers to sustain high levels of coordinated student protests over long periods of time. The flood of divestment decisions which occurred between 1985 and 1987, then, sent the third wave into a precipitous decline.

The Influence of "Favorable" Events

Contributing to the movement's decline was the occurrence of "favorable" events, both in the U.S. and in South Africa, that were not direct consequences of student protests. In the
U.S., Congress passed a package of economic sanctions against South Africa in 1986. Earlier in the year, President Reagan had signed an executive order containing a list of mild sanctions. But in late September, he pocket-vetoed a list of punitive congressional measures against South Africa. On October 2, 1986 Congress over-rote the veto and established prohibitions on a variety of South African imports, prohibitions on U.S. oil exports, and prohibitions against any new investments in South Africa. Even though the legislation contained no provisions for disinvestment, it had the effect of relieving public criticism of U.S. economic complicity in apartheid.

In South Africa, worsening political and economic conditions prompted more than 96 U.S. companies to withdraw from South Africa between 1986 and 1987. By April 1988, 114 had left the country. The effect of withdrawals was to reduce the target of student protests. South Africa-related firms were both direct and indirect targets of the movement. Some divestment locals directly targeted certain U.S. firms by staging sit-ins and pickets at their front doors. However, most student groups indirectly targeted South Africa-related transnational businesses by trying to force educational institutions to divest from them. Part of the logic of divestment is that increasing numbers of institutional divestment decisions (by colleges and universities, churches, labor unions, etc.) would result in corporate withdrawals from
South Africa (disinvestiture). Corporate disinvestiture from South Africa, in turn, would exact sufficient pressure on the South African economy to persuade the apartheid regime to abandon its racial policies. It is not our intent to evaluate fully the logic of the movement's strategies. Rather, it is to suggest that, since divestment (i.e., the withdrawal of stock holdings from corporations) was the sole or key organizing focus of the movement, increased disinvestiture (i.e., the withdrawal of corporations from South Africa), an otherwise favorable occurrence, served to weaken the movement by lowering its intensity and lessening mass protest participation. Disinvestment served to diffuse student divestment activism. If one of the objectives of divestment was disinvestment, then increased disinvestment made divestment superfluous, which of course adversely impacted on mass protest participation.

Under circumstances where the movement might have been moving on a variety of fronts, including providing material aid to the ANC or political support for the liberation struggles of black South African labor unions, increased disinvestitures and the imposition of Congressional sanctions would have been very favorable events. But with divestment as the major (or sole) organizing focus, these otherwise favorable events contributed to a decline of the third wave.
The Role of Media Coverage

In addition to the narrow focus on divestment, the movement relied heavily upon media coverage for the generation of protests. Emergence of each of the three waves of student protest was precipitated by the occurrence of cataclysmic political events in South Africa mediated through a world-wide mass communications system (see Chapter II). Media coverage of campus protests helped to generate divestment protests on other campuses (See, Chapter IV). Local movement organizers called press conferences, used news releases and sought media coverage of protest events in order to help shape public opinion but also to draw other students into the movement. In an age of instantaneous transmittance of information, media coverage reduces the necessity for politically significant social movements to have a sophisticated system of internal communication.

Yet, there are built-in hazards to a heavy reliance upon media coverage. Repressive governments might place restrictions on press coverage. During the 1985 uprisings in South Africa, for instance, the apartheid regime banned television coverage of black protests and confrontations between police and demonstrators. To compensate for the reductions in visual media images of black suffering in South Africa, U.S. student demonstrators created their own visual symbols of South African oppression through the construction of shanties. The defense of shanties by anti-apartheid
student activists and the destruction of them by counter-protestors and campus authorities attracted considerable media attention leading to a proliferation of protests through shanty-construction nationwide. But as the sensation of shanty-construction, destruction, and defense wore off, media attention declined. The student divestment movement's experience with media coverage not only demonstrates that media coverage is susceptible to governmental suppression under some circumstances, but also that mass media's attention span is limited.

**Structural Problems in the Movement**

To summarize, the foregoing discussion of third wave decline is intended to suggest that two major structural problems plagued the movement throughout its career: a narrow organizing focus on divestment and a heavy reliance media coverage. Both served to weaken movement's strength by making it difficult, if not impossible, for it to maintain consistently high levels of collective action over long periods of time.

The narrowness of divestment as the dominant movement goal reflects a need for goal evaluation and restructuring. The setting of intermediate priorities and the establishment of proximate objectives prior to the beginning of protests would help to ensure that movement participants perceive the
accomplishment of successes as preparation for the attainment of ultimate victory (Turner and Killian 1957).

With movement local cells spread across the country, separated from one another, from national coordination and from South African liberation struggles by enormous geographical distances, the problem of media reliance might be one with which the movement will have to live and cope. In modern times, an instantaneous communication system seems a necessity. The movement made extensive and effective usage of newsletters. But in an age of high technology, such methods seem painfully slow. Yet the wide usage of technologically sophisticated techniques is probably beyond the financial capabilities of student-run social movement organizations.

Movement Prospects

The emergence of a fourth wave of activism does not appear imminent. Unfortunately, it seems that the re-mobilization of movement activism must await the occurrence of another South African calamity. But such occurrences are daily features of the South African landscape. Governmental restrictions upon media coverage, however, sharply decreases the likelihood that South African crises could be used to re-activate U.S. student anti-apartheid activities. Should such an opportunity present itself, movement organizers must be
prepared to mobilize participants around a variety of intermediate objectives.

But without students' passionate pursuit of an energizing proximate objective, such as divestment, it will be difficult to mobilize and sustain massive movement participation. Sustained high levels of student activism are also hindered by the natural rhythm of academic calendars and the continuous turnover in student generations. Yet the history of divestment locals demonstrates that a loyal core group of student activists remain committed and involved in anti-apartheid activities over significant periods of time. The movement might, therefore, benefit from increased centralization of student leadership and increased formalization of student anti-apartheid groups by tying them formally into a regional and national structure, perhaps as student branches of the ACOA. This would not solve the problem of maintaining high levels of mass student participation, but might ensure the continuation of viable anti-apartheid student organizations and activities, even in the absence of highly visible South African crises.

Research Implications

One major implication of our study of divestment decision-making is that fiscal considerations are much more important today in college and university decision-making processes than they were in the late sixties. Student
protests prompted colleges and universities to establish racial diversity programs, involving commitments to the long-term financing of black studies programs, minority affairs offices, and black student and faculty recruitment (Astin et al. 1975). Through these responses to protests, educational institutions considered themselves to be exercising their moral obligations in the important area of race relations. Colleges and universities have responded to divestment protests primarily by adopting ethical investment policies, by initiating student aid programs and a variety of other anti-apartheid measures, all of which fall far short of total divestment. Our empirical analysis has shown that financial considerations served as a major inhibiting factor. This suggests that financial considerations are much more important in the eighties than they were in the sixties, perhaps because the economic boom years of the sixties have given way to retrenchment in the eighties. On the other hand, it simply might suggest that colleges and universities felt that anti-apartheid measures short of full divestment were more effective or sufficient in carrying out their moral responsibilities toward black South Africans, but that programs short of the implementation of student demands in the sixties would not have been sufficient in addressing American racial issues. At any rate, further research should be conducted to compare the relative influence of financial considerations upon college and university decision-making
during the eighties with financial considerations during the sixties.

Additionally, our research suggests that the student movement was weakened both by movement opposition and by limited movement success (i.e., in the passage of partial and total divestment decisions). However, no thorough empirical tests were used to examine and verify this point. Further empirical study should be conducted to examine the impact of movement success upon the subsequent occurrence and intensity of protests.
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