Declaring Victory and Admitting Defeat

Dissertation

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Abstract

When do wartime events cause state leaders to change their political or military approach to a war, or try to end it? This study answers this question by focusing on leaders’ beliefs about how war advances their political aims and the changes those beliefs undergo, and the role of emotions in motivating or suppressing those changes. These key beliefs are conceptualized as Theories of Victory, and three key types of theory of victory—oriented toward demonstrating capability, wearying their opponent, or directly acquiring the aims—are identified. These types are used to explain how leaders interpret wartime events and, if they conclude their approach has failed, what further options (if any) will seem plausible. The motivation to learn associated with anxiety (produced by novel bad news) and the suppression of learning associated with anger and contentedness (produced by familiar bad news and good news) are used to explain when particular series of events lead to these key changes. Three cases are used to test the theory—the Winter War (Finland-USSR 1939-1940), the Pacific War (US-Japan 1941-1945) and the Battle of France (France-Germany 1940).
Dedication

For my Parents
Acknowledgements

It has been a long journey. My gratitude, therefore, goes out first and foremost to those who have helped me along the way.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

War is often thought of as if it were a boxing match—two sides trading blows until one manages a decisive military victory. While common, this kind of thinking is misleading. In 2001 the United States attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan with bombing and a brief on-the-ground campaign (assisted by local allies), in short order eliminating Taliban control over Afghan territory. But years later, Taliban forces continue to contest control of the county, Osama bin Laden remains at large, and state authority in Afghanistan remains tenuous. Despite a devastatingly successful military campaign, America has not yet obtained a favorable end to the conflict. This outcome would make no sense in boxing. Having been knocked to the ground time and again, the Afghan boxer would surely have been counted out by the ref— if the fight doctor, or the Afghan corner, had not already halted the fight. But there are no rules, no referees, and no fight doctor in war. The corner (politicians) may not care to stop the fight when their boxer (the military) is in trouble, and may even find ways to substitute in new fighters to replace tired ones. The analogy clearly fails; but if a sports analogy fails, how can we explain when wars will end?

Doing so is obviously important. Understanding when wars end means understanding how the political and military components of war fit together. This has both practical and scholarly significance. With this understanding, war planners can design less costly and more
efficient wars; politicians can better judge the consequences of their decisions about war; and peace-makers can more effectively intervene to halt or prevent wars. Within the field of international relations, war is among the most important behaviors—legions of studies of war initiation make this evident—but its dynamics and termination remain poorly explained.

There are some simple explanations for how states act in war, but they give at best partial answers. Perhaps the simplest is to insist that wars are decided on the battlefield. It is true that major military victories and catastrophes sometimes lead directly to war termination as one side or the other loses its ability to resist. But even the defeat or capture of a state’s main armies and the loss of its leadership is not necessarily enough to force an end to a war—as is being shown by the Taliban and as was shown by the French Provisional Government a century ago, after the disaster at Sedan. Even when military disaster succeeds in explaining why a loser accepted peace, however, it fails to explain the winner’s behavior. Having done so well, so far, why do they stop, as some chose to do? Why do these states not pursue total conquest?

In the absence of complete military collapse, the failure of battlefield explanations for why wars end when they do is even more glaring. If war is just a military phenomena, why do losers who still have some ability to resist their enemies (and thus impose costs on them) sometimes quit before they are wholly prostrated? Put this way, the political nature of war is self-evident—it is clear that someone is making tradeoffs between the costs of further effort, the prospective gains that further fighting might bring, and the benefits of an earlier peace. Tales of the fates of armies are not enough to explain courses wars take or why wars end when they do.

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1 Some examples of states that chose to stop short of conquest, though militarily and practically, higher aims were possible, include the US (1898, against Spain), Germany (1917, against Russia), the Allies (1918, against Germany), China (1962, against India), India (1965, 1970 against Pakistan); Israel (1967, 1970, against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan), and the US (1991, against Iraq).
Rather than following tank tracks, then, this dissertation tries to explain the behavior of states at war by focusing on the political process of war. It does so by focusing on leaders’ theories of victory—their beliefs about how and why the use of force can accomplish their objectives for the war—and the changes those theories undergo in response to military, domestic political, and diplomatic events. These theories of victory strongly shape the way leaders interpret battlefield events, their understanding of the political costs of further fighting, and the way they consider their alternatives. It also focuses on how leaders’ emotional responses to wartime events affect when, if ever, they decide to change their theories of victory.

The merit of this approach is then shown through a series of case studies drawn from World War II era conflicts—the Winter War, the Battle of France, and the Pacific War. Several important findings are made evident in the process. First, because the belligerents in a war may be pursuing different theories of victory, their understanding of the war and war events may be radically different, and their different responses to the same events may push bargaining positions further apart rather than cause convergence. Indeed, these different responses to war events play a great role in prolonging wars. Second, understanding the political decisions of state leaders at war and the evolution of states’ bargaining positions require recognizing the non-linear relationships between war events and war aims. These nonlinearities are created by changes in theories of victory and emotion-driven patterns of learning. While these nonlinearities sometimes prolong wars, they can also be responsible for bringing them to a sudden close. Third, learning from on-going series of events can be well explained using an emotion-mediated approach, which can better explain both resistance to new information and its
effective usage. Fourth, theories of victory provide more leverage than traditional concepts like strategy for explaining the political behavior of states.

The central difficulty in explaining when wars end comes from the varied and often indirect relationships between the use of force and the acquisition of war aims. It is true that sometimes the object of a war can be captured and held by an army, but the capture of territory does not of necessity mean the end of resistance. Unless the occupier mimics the Romans at Carthage, a determined loser can continue to resist that capture, from within the occupied zone and without. Only if that resistance is so minimal that the winner is insensate to it will the parties consider the conflict over. Force alone, then, only produces war aims when it is possible to effectively eliminate the opposition—an unusual circumstance. Given that some states’ war aims involve a preference for changing their enemy’s behavior over killing them, states will often prefer to avoid using force in this way. Instead, force can be used to convince states that they should concede to their enemy’s demands, make peace, and go home.

When force takes on this persuasive function, the relationship between force and the achievement of war aims is indirect. Rather than capturing disputed territory, force is used to change an enemy’s mind about how further fighting will affect their ability to obtain their aims, by teaching them about their opponent’s relative capability or resolve. Accordingly, when force is used to persuade, learning plays a central role in the process, moderating the relationship between the application of force and the production of war aims. Until a belligerent believes that they cannot further their cause through more fighting, even if the other side sees them as beaten, they will continue to fight so long as they can bear the costs. Similarly, belligerents who
are not objectively defeated on the battlefield may prefer to quit if they believe that further 
fighting will not help them politically.²

When war is used to persuade, then, the key questions are not “where is the front?” or
“is the mission over yet?” Rather, those who find their expectations of success failing face a
tense if familiar struggle. How long the war can be continued? What concessions are
unavoidable? What concessions remain unacceptable? But even the victors have hard tradeoffs
to make as winged Nike approaches. Mirror images of the loser’s struggles exist in the winner’s
capital: how much longer should the war be continued? What more can be wrung from the
loser, and what further demands are not worth further effort? Even those using force alone
face similar questions—will they be able to complete their military campaign? Having finished
the task they set, do they quit or reach for more? Explaining when the experience of war will
cause the winners and losers to accept their respective positions is thus a central part of
explaining when wars end.

A lot is known about how threats of force are used in deterrence and in coercive
diplomacy, the systemic and domestic political conditions favoring or suppressing the outbreak
of war, and the importance of accident, miscalculation, and cold calculus in sparking a war.
What happens after the first shots are fired is less clear in the literature, however. As with
boxing, there are plenty of ‘coaches,’ offering advice about how to fight wars. Yet while military
coaches like Clausewitz, Sun-Tzu, Liddle Hart, or Luttwak provide a lot of advice for winning
battles, they give precious little advice about how to win a war—let alone how to lose one with
a minimum of pain. There are studies that focus on the implications of different styles of

² Moreover, even if one combatant tries to use force alone to gain their aims, their opponent may see
force as having a persuasive role, thus bringing the question of learning back to the center of the process.
fighting, detailing differences between attrition and maneuver and punishment much like boxing experts discuss differences between in-fighters, out-fighters, and brawlers. These studies can tell us the probable length of a war—some kinds of strategies take longer to mount—and depending on the kinds of strategy chosen, can give a better sense of who will eventually win than a simple power measurement. But they cannot tell us how states will react to the particular situations war brings about, nor can they tell when states will choose to end a fight. Rational choice scholars, using bargaining models, have done considerably more by identifying some of the general political beliefs necessary to support continued fighting. However, the relationships between the real acts of war and changes in these beliefs is less clear, largely because their models do not take into account the degree to which the functions that force plays in war—themselves the result of the actors’ choices and exogenous beliefs—structure their perceptions of it and thus the ways that their beliefs change. They can identify the general set of beliefs that will cause want to end a war, but they cannot say what will make those beliefs change, or how exactly they will change.

These explanations fail to provide a coherent explanation of when wars will end because they address neither the importance of leaders’ beliefs in the process of war nor the changes they undergo in response to the actual events of a war. The relative importance of costs and military events vary depending on how leaders expect force to advance their aims. Therefore, the only way to identify their relationships to the end of a specific war is to look at how key state actors understand those relationships. Identifying these expectations is only the start, however—explaining when they will change is an equally important and problematic task. It is important because the existence of a war-ending agreement depends upon the belligerents being willing to accept the same set of terms at the same time—that one side is now ready to
accept the terms that their opponent offered a month or a year ago may not suffice to bring peace, after all. Sudden victories, third party interventions, and other events that can change both belligerents’ calculus may then intervene, perhaps changing the course of the war entirely before the ‘loser’s’ beliefs could catch up with the ‘winner’s’ beliefs. Because temporality matters in this way, explaining when beliefs will change is as important for explaining when wars will end as explaining what makes beliefs change. While these expectations generally change in response to experience, explaining when leaders in the cauldron of war will learn is a thorny problem. Often a rush of uncertain, ambiguous events, war is difficult for leaders to learn from because of the speed with which events develop and difficulty of teasing out the real meaning of events. But history shows that leaders do learn in these conditions, sometimes very effectively. Explaining when events will give rise to learning, and when they will not, requires a theory of learning oriented to a dynamic, changing, and often surprising environment.

The Starting Point: A Simple Architecture

The starting point is a simple model that identifies the key steps in the political process of war. The model I use relies heavily on ideas in Clausewitz (1973) Kecskmeti (1957), Blainey (1973), Mearsheimer (1983), Fearon (1995), Goemans (2000), and Smith and Stam (2004). Like them, I assume that the process starts with leaders on both sides having some reason for believing that they can use military action in a way that will make the outcome of political interaction with another state more favorable to their interests. On this basis, they identify their aims, and they select a strategy—a set of military operations that they believe will produce their aims, either through direct seizure or through persuading their opponent to concede them. This first step, the selection of aims and strategy, occurs conterminously with, or prior to, the decision to go to war.
This set of expectations is then put to the test through fighting. Fighting, as Goemans (2000) notes, is a process that reveals information to oneself, as well as to the enemy. Changes in technology, doctrine, and tactics, as well as peculiarities of leadership, force quality and morale, and geography, and of course fortune herself, mean that guesses about how combat will go are just that—guesses (Smith and Stam 2004). Battle itself is the only means by which reliable information about relative capabilities can be learned; even with substantial intelligence, parties can reasonably come to different power estimates in the absence of real combat. Leaders may also have beliefs about their opponents—such as an aversion to spending blood but not treasure in pursuit of their aims—that make battle the only credible, relevant test of resolve.

Once the shooting starts, then, battle produces a series of events—on the battlefield but also diplomatically and in the in domestic politics of both states—against which leaders tests their expectations of gaining their aims. If they understand events as confirming their beliefs, little change is likely. But if they find them to be contrary to their expectations, they may reach a point at which they no longer believe that their belligerent acts will produce their war aims. At this point, they face a set of decisions.

Now no longer believing in their prior expectations of victory, they might now decide to retain their strategy, but moderate their aims such that they believe that they will be able to acquire them. They might also keep their aims, but change their strategy. They might change both. Or, if they are unable to identify a plausible way to improve their position through further fighting of any sort, they may set out to terminate the war by making whatever concessions their opponent demands or by merely pulling back their troops. The war itself continues as both belligerents move through this process until both are satisfied that further fighting is not in their
interest, when it terminates. These decisions are fundamentally similar to those made at the beginning of the war, as leaders pick their initial aims and strategies. The difference, of course, is that they have now learned something of themselves and their opponents. That learning constrains their set of plausible options such that it is generally smaller after the failure of a strategy than it might have been at the outset.

Throughout this process, the key decisions are made by the leadership of a state. This may mean a single leader—like Stalin—who was able to make decisions without in the absence of anyone with the ability veto his policies. In other cases it may consist of a small group, since others may have formal veto powers or the ability to remove their chief from office. In these cases, the beliefs and responses of key individuals beyond the titular leaders need to be recognized as well, since they also influence policy.³

The Independent Variables

In itself, this simple model generates few predictions beyond generalities like the existence of state learning in war and its centrality to termination decisions. However, it provides a skeleton into which I insert novel independent variables and mechanisms, which then generate new hypotheses about old questions, provide hypotheses for uninvestigated questions, and clarify relationships. I do this using two independent variables, (1) theories of victory and (2) series of events, and an emotion-mediated model of learning.

Theories of Victory

A theory of victory is a set of beliefs that together make it reasonable for leaders (and others) to believe that their state can acquire its aims through war. Put together, these beliefs articulate a relationship between military acts, responses in both states (and beyond), and the

³ Tsebellis 2002.
gaining of war aims. These beliefs are derived from the actor’s mental models of how the fighting will go, their opponent’s response to that fighting, and their own state’s response to the fighting. While each particular theory of victory is idiosyncratic to the particular circumstances of a particular war, a typology of theories of victory can be constructed around the function that fighting is expected to play. The first kind of theory of victory of these is brute force. When a leader expects to use force to achieve their aim, they expect to either eliminate their opponent or degrade their ability to impose costs to a level that the leader believes will be tolerable over a long term.

There are also two ways that fighting can be used to convince an opponent to concede, by trying to change their estimates about either relative capability or about relative resolve. When they are trying to make their opponent recalculate the utility of fighting with a demonstration of their military power relative to their opponent, generally through some feat of arms, I say that they are pursuing an informative theory of victory. When they expect their enemy’s weariness of further war—incarnated in the political costs of war confronting the leadership—to cause concessions, I say that they are pursuing an attritive theory of victory.
Table 1: Theories of Victory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory of Victory</th>
<th>Function of Fighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brute Force</td>
<td>Eliminating opponent or degrading their ability to resist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informative</td>
<td>Demonstrate power or capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>Weary opponent of further fighting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both informative and attritive theories of victory can encompass a wide range of kinds of fighting, since many different kinds of capability can be demonstrated and several results of fighting can make further fighting politically costly for a leader. Depending on the war, the relevant demonstration may be of military skill, evinced by the taking and holding of an enemy strong point (for instance), or of an ability to punish, evinced by an unexpectedly effective civilian bombing raid, or any of a wide range of other demonstrations. Similarly, the wearying associated with an attritive theory of victory may be caused by deaths in combat, civilian deaths, limits on trade, or the anger associated with drafts and higher taxes.

*Series of Events*

War involves putting leaders’ beliefs about how they can win against the test of reality. The series of events that is actually obtained is that reality. Series of events are a more appropriate variable than individual events because war is a rush of many actions, often overlapping with each other, that together create leaders’ impressions of the current condition of the war. While single events may occasionally be very important, more often the general context of an event—created by the combination of leaders’ expectations and concurrent events—determines leaders’ responses to their emerging reality. In war, the events that have
part in this series are battlefield events, to be sure, but domestic political, diplomatic, and third party acts and events are also important, since they may affect states’ ability to win their war—or their opponents’ perception of their ability to win their war—as well.

**Emotion, a Crucial Mechanism**

One of the central problems in studying war is determining when leaders will respond to these series of events. Most studies to this point have focused on purely rationalist accounts that elide many of the challenges of learning in war or suggest that learning in war is psychologically very difficult, if not impossible. This study takes a third path, identifying anxiety as the key motivator of the processes that can produce learning and other emotions, like anger and contentment, as the main suppressors of learning. In doing so I rely on well-established findings that emotions are elicited prior to conscious cognition and actively shape the reasoning process.

Given these findings, emotional response is a most-likely mechanism with which to explain when state leaders will effectively use information about an event in considering their beliefs about how they can win their war, and when they will effectively ignore the outcomes of events. Anxiety—not instinctive fear but a more moderate emotion elicited by novel, threatening events—draws conscious attention to the eliciting events and mobilizes the mental and physical resources in an effort to respond to them. In contrast, anger, the product of familiar bad news, facilitates a reliance on existing scripts and schema, and suppresses further investigation of the stimulating event.

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4 Gartner 1997; Goemans 2000; Rosen 1993, 2005; Welch 2005
5 George Marcus and his collaborators are the principle advocates of this approach in political science (1999, 2000, 2002, 2003), but see also Blight (1990).
6 Happiness and joy are associated with similar response patterns.
What the Variables Explain

A focus on Theories of Victory as such can help explain why state leaders initially select the aims and strategies they choose to pursue. The typology can be used to explain what kinds of events will matter in a war and also the decisions made about whether or not to continue a war, and if so, how to do so, after an initial theory of victory has failed. In this sense, the kind of theory of victory—that is, the value of the independent variable—has a role at each stage of the model: selection, response, and reelection.

1. Initial Aims and strategy selection

To a great extent, the aims for which a war is fought define the war.\(^7\) Without a difference of opinion between the belligerents about the allocation of war aims, there is no cause for war; and when fighting ends the disagreement, tacitly or otherwise, it comes to a close. In terms of selection, the particular aims a state fights for are exogenous of any model of war. They originate in the wants and aspirations of a state’s society and leadership, or in response to the demands of another. Nevertheless, states are constrained by what they believe they can get or keep through fighting, and so their aims and demands are limited by what they believe is practically possible.\(^8\) What leaders believe they can do is based in good part based on their beliefs about what fighting between their state and their enemy will be like and how their state, and the enemy state, will respond to that fighting.

In a similar way, states’ strategies are chosen in good part because of how they fit into a broader understanding of how fighting will produce war aims. A strategy is “the way an

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\(^7\) Hence Clausewitz’s (1976) famous formulation, “war is politics by other means.”

\(^8\) Indeed, for this reason, states sometimes fight to ‘lose less’ rather than to ‘win’ as such.
organization operates a class of military forces to achieve specific aims against an adversary”. At any one time, most states will be limited in the range of forces, and thus strategies, that are available to them: some states are large, some are small; some are rich, some poor; some have many people, others few; some have coasts and navies, others are landlocked. The range of available strategies, when considered against the backdrop of their enemy’s range of strategies, produces leaders expectations of what battle will look like. Obviously, they will prefer a strategy that will have favorable military characteristics. But this is far from the end of the story. The suitability of a strategy depends on the wider purpose of fighting: a set of acts that effectively demonstrate military power may have little effect on an enemy focused on seeing that their opponent is wearied first, and a set of acts designed to slowly weary the opponent might be missed by an opponent focused on their ability to demonstrate power. In such a situation, battles may be fought and won, with little progress made toward achieving war aims, a program leaders would not intentionally commit their state to. For this reason, the strategy selected will depend to a great degree on how leaders believe their opponents will respond to the set of strategies available to them.

Beliefs about how the opponent will respond to fighting, then, strongly influence the selection of strategies, and, in turn, war aims. Only if leaders believe that their opponent is underestimating them, and will respond to a demonstration by changing their beliefs, will an demonstration-oriented strategy (and thus an informative theory of victory) seem plausible. If they do not believe that they can make this kind of a demonstration, or if they believe that their opponent is unable or unwilling to draw out the lessons of battlefield events, informative theories of victory will not be plausible but wearying strategies (and thus attritive theories of

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9 Gartner 1997, 18.
victory) may be, so long as they believe that they can use fighting to generate significant political costs in their enemy’s capital and that the enemy leader will respond to them. But if they believe that nothing that they can do—neither demonstrating power nor inducing political costs—will cause their opponent to concede, only a brute force theory of victory will seem plausible. Even then, the range of plausible options will be limited by their ability to eliminate their opponents or significantly reduce their ability to resist.

Leaders’ beliefs about how their own state will respond to the fighting also affect strategy and aims selection, though in a somewhat different way. If they believe that their population will not stand a war that requires many lives or dollars to win, several, and perhaps all of their options may be off the table because they are foreseeably too costly even if successful. These kinds of social costs, which may or may not be translated into political costs, occur most often when fighting is used to eliminate or weary an opponent, since these conflicts are wide-ranging contests of resolve. The political costs will be most grave when those outside the leadership do not understand how fighting will lead to victory.

In sum, thinking in terms of theories of victory helps clarify the relationships between aims and strategy selection, and points out the importance of leaders’ beliefs about how their opponent will respond to the resulting fighting for both selections. It also identifies the conditions under which costs will affect the process most. At the conceptual level, it is effective in clarifying these relationships because it directs attention to the beliefs about fighting and the responses to fighting that make war a prospectively reasonable course of action.

2. Explaining What Events Matter

Once a leader sets out to test their theory of victory, the typology of theories of victory helps explain which events are more likely to overturn it, which events will be seen as
confirming the theory of victory, and which will be seen as irrelevant. It has this predictive power because the basic logical structure of a theory of victory frames incoming information.\textsuperscript{10}

Moreover, the logics behind the theories of victory are such that they can frame events in very different ways, so that the same campaign may seem very different to individuals holding different theories of victory. What to one may seem successful campaign, confirming their expectations, might be seem to be failing fast by another.

Theories of victory influence learning by identifying which pieces of information are relevant to the political beliefs guiding the war and which are not. The brute force theory of victory focuses attention to the practical abilities of the state to seize or destroy its aim and the domestic costs associated with doing so. The informative theory focuses attention first on the state’s ability to win battles by defeating its opponents in combat, and secondly on the willingness of the opponent to concede in response to defeats. The attritive theory of victory focuses attention on the state’s ability to continue to bear the costs of fighting without military or political collapse, and secondarily on their opponent’s responsiveness at the bargaining table to the continued costs of fighting.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}Theories of victory do this by defining “the causal relationship between [leaders’] goals and the alternative political strategies by which to reach those goals.” (Goldstone and Keohane 1993: 12) Analysts cannot understand how events influence beliefs without taking these frames into account. As March and Levitt (1988) state, “interpretations of experience depend on the frames within which these experiences are comprehended” and “what is learned appears to be less influenced by history than by the frames applied to that history.” (324) For a more psychologically focused discussion of non-intentional framing effects, see Berinsky and Kinder (2006).

\textsuperscript{11}This exposition suggests that the relationship between how leaders expect to win their wars and how they respond to their wars has a paradoxical or contradictory quality: while they often set out to ‘teach’ their opponent through their acts, they themselves pay more attention to the results of their own efforts than the acts of their opponents. Yet this corroborates Sun Tzu’s maxim that “the highest form of warfare is to attack strategy itself” (2002, 14), inasmuch as the maxim takes advantage of the notion that the most efficient learning comes from one’s own failures.
Applying these frames to real events gives insight into which events are likely to be seen as positive, negative, novel, and familiar. These kinds of judgments are, in turn, important for understanding state responses to events, since leaders beliefs are not influenced by the objective qualities of events but by their perceptions of them.

3. Predicting When Learning Will Happen

Even when leaders recognize information as relevant, however, they may not use it effectively. If unaccompanied by an emotional push to investigate further and to reconsider their situation in light of new events, they may not connect the new information to their existing beliefs in a way that can lead to changes in those beliefs. Rather, they may rely on existing habits of mind and action to respond to the situation, but leave their more general beliefs about how they can obtain their war aims intact, unaltered.

Accordingly, changes in leaders’ beliefs about how they will win their war are most likely when a series of events is novel and threatening,(as framed by their theory of victory). In its absence—for instance, when negative but familiar events produce anger or frustration—leaders may respond tactically, by changing commanders or fiddling with the details of military operations, but not reject their theory of victory, or change aims and strategies. While much less likely, leaders may also grudgingly come to conclude that their theory of victory is false in the absence of events that produce anxiety. Such a change of beliefs is, however, likely to be much slower, and involve much smaller changes, than will be the case when learning is motivated by anxiety.

4. Changes in Aims

The theories of victory also help predict leaders’ choices after they conclude that their prior theory of victory was false. Even as the old theory of victory is discarded, the changes in
beliefs about battle and the belligerents’ responses it exert influences on which theories of victory (and thus the combinations of aims and strategies) seem plausible and which ones do not. This happens because the three theories of victory interact with the limits of information, the domestic incentives associated with mobilization, and the prospects of military collapse in different ways. Because efforts to inform will rarely be repeated after they have failed, informative theories of victory are unlikely to be tried more than once. Because they are cheap relative to the other kinds of theory of victory—since they are much less likely to require mobilization—the failure of informative theories of victory also presents leaders with a more difficult choice than the failures of the other kinds of theories of victory, a choice between mobilization and quitting. Unlike attritive theories of victory, however, militaries pursuing informative and brute force theories of victory are unlikely to reach the point of military collapse (when the main fighting force loses its coherence as a fighting force) and the grave choices leaders then face.

These interactions between these features of war fighting and the different kinds of theories of victory are particularly useful for making predictions about how states’ war aims will evolve in response to the emerging situations of war. This is particularly important, given the role that war aims play in defining the scope and character of a war, and in giving rise to the conditions necessary for termination. After the failure of an informative theory of victory, most states will either dramatically lower their aims in a bid to escape the war, or mobilize their society for war and pursue a more costly brute force or attritive theory of victory; leaders’ decisions will rest on the popularity of the war effort. In states that have already mobilized, the failure of an attritive or a brute force theory of victory, continuing does not require substantially new political costs or risks, so any moderation in war aims is likely to be smaller. The exception
to this rule occurs for states pursuing attritive theories of victory, which tend to risk the prospect of military collapse more than the others; in this case, as leaders perceive collapse to be impending, the scope of the concessions they are willing to make will increase. Should military collapse be reached, of course, most war aims, if not all, will be sacrificed.

**What this approach adds**

The most important theoretical contribution of this work is its argument that the function fighting is supposed to play in a war (as captured by the theory of victory) provides a structure that influences leaders’ responses to war and decisions about it. Despite its debts to the bargaining tradition, this is in sharp contrast with conventional bargaining models, which give little sense of how leaders will interpret and respond to the real events of real wars. Unlike their approaches, this work provides a guide to how and when the information about relative capability produced by battle, the concrete effects of military events themselves, and the costs of war will affect states’ bargaining positions. The framing effects produced by this structure mean that not only do enemies often start out with quite different beliefs about why they will win, they may also perceive events and their relative import quite differently. Indeed, because the theories of victory determine the way events are framed, belligerents may experience the same war very differently. These differences may actually inhibit the formation of war-ending agreements or even lead the belligerents to make peace based on different understandings of why peace is in their, and their opponents’, interest. Such an outcome would be in clear contrast to Slantchev’s ‘principle of convergence’.  

The approach to this structure, as encapsulated in the typology of theories of victory, has some passing resemblance to existing ideas about how fighting can yield victory in war.

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12 Slantchev 2003b.
However, there exist key differences between these theories of victory and these other literatures. The work of Schelling and his intellectual descendants\textsuperscript{13} on brute force and coercion has some clear points of similarity with this work, but the differences make clear the limitations of using Schelling’s concepts to study war.\textsuperscript{14} This is particularly true with regard to coercion.\textsuperscript{15} His conceptualization of coercion focuses only on the costs inflicted by the other party.\textsuperscript{16} Excluded from the rigorous conceptualization of coercion are the costs of doing the business of war—combat—which are not inflicted by an enemy but are the product of having decided to contest the enemy’s proposed settlement through arms. Including these costs within the rubric of coercion inverts the concept; it is like describing a brawler who quits a fight because his hand hurts from pounding on his feckless, semi-conscious opponent’s head as a victim of coercion. Nevertheless, these ‘costs of doing business’ are frequently important in leaders’ decisions about which aims and strategy to choose, and indeed whether and when to seek peace or not. History has long shown that the price of war, be it in the building of armies and navies or the expenditure of lives that occurs whenever the offer of combat is accepted, is almost always greater than the costs directly inflicted by the opponent.

Moreover, his conceptualization of brute force and coercion give little sense of how they shape perceptions of real events, and leaders’ responses to those perceptions. Wartime events can simultaneously have concrete military effects, re-shape beliefs about what might happen if the war continues, and affect the costliness of the conflict to the politicians running it.

\textsuperscript{13} Pape 1997; Stam 1996; and Cimbala 1998 among many others.
\textsuperscript{14} Notably, Schelling himself indicated that they were not designed for the study of war, but the interactions that may lead up to it (1966).
\textsuperscript{15} While my concept of brute force is similar to Schelling’s (1966), his conceptualization provides little suggestion of the beliefs that might cause someone to adopt brute force.
\textsuperscript{16} Schelling 1966. This is particularly true of the discussion of compellance, which more relevant to studying war than deterrence. See for instance Pape (1997) and Stam (1996).
But which matter most at any one point, and how are they conditioning leaders responses to them? While this is the central concern of my typology of theories of victory, it is absent both in Schelling’s work and later scholars’ use of it.

Similarly, there are passing resemblances between the theory of victory concept and strategy. However, strategy is just a plan for military operations, while the theory of victory also includes beliefs about how those military acts will have political effects—and thus lead to a politically satisfactory outcome. This allows for and understanding of how international and domestic political events, as well as military ones, shape beliefs about how successful a war is. The resemblance between the typology theories of victory and typologies of strategy is even fainter. In contrast with the typology of modes of fighting, classically understood as maneuver, attrition, and punishment (Stam 1996), the theories of victory typology is focused first on how fighting is intended to change the political interaction. The strategy typologies focus on the modes that the fighting itself takes. Since each mode of fighting can be used for more than one political purpose, any application of them to political questions has a provisional character. As a result, the theories of victory typology not only offers clearer predictions about the political process of war, it identifies important political commonalities between wars fought using different modes of fighting, and important political differences among wars fought using similar modes of fighting which are not otherwise evident.

Another key contribution of this work is its argument that emotion plays a great role in shaping when and how state leaders learn in war. While many rationalist scholars of war like

\footnote{Mearsheimer (1983) provides an alternative, attrition, limited aims, and Blitzkrieg, as does Pape (1997; see also Cimbala 1998), who argues for punishment, risk, denial, and decapitation; but the same problem I identify in the classical typology is also evident in these typologies. The classical typology is also limited by the absence of modes of fighting not seen in conventional, ground based warfare, including naval and guerilla fighting (Arquilla 1992).}
Goemans and Gartner recognize the difficulties of learning in war, this approach provides a mechanism for predicting when learning is more and less likely.\textsuperscript{18} In particular, their approaches, which rely heuristically on Bayes’ Rule, are limited by the fact that that rule is poorly suited to the conditions of war. Bayes Rule is designed for ‘closed universe’ situations\textsuperscript{19} in which the full set of observable outcomes, and the probabilistic relationships between those events and particular beliefs are known before the event occurs. In war, however, there are many unexpected events; indeed, many strategic thinkers’ ideas are anchored by ideas of surprise and paradox.\textsuperscript{20} While a Bayesian analysis can be constructed after-the-fact, if trying to explain responses to events, the performing of this analysis must itself be explained, since every event does not produce such effortful cognition.

At the same time, the focus on emotional responses to series of events seems to make more sense than common psychological approaches to war, which seem to argue that learning happens only in extremis (Welch 2005) or in response to strong ‘shocks’.\textsuperscript{21} In contrast, my use of emotions suggests that wide-ranging learning can happen in response to a much more moderate series of events, if they generate anxiety. Moreover, beyond specifying how emotion may lead to learning much more precisely than the shock theorists (shock is not, after all, a well specified concept at the psychological level), it casts doubt on the effectiveness of objectively defined shocks. Should an opponent expect a shock, it seems, it is not likely to produce learning, but at best generate frustration and indeed suppress political learning.

\textsuperscript{18} Goemans 2000; Gartner 1997; Slantchev 2004.
\textsuperscript{19} Binmore 1986.
\textsuperscript{21} Rosen 2005; Asada 1998. The interest in shock as a motivator of learning has been particularly apparent in the folk-psychology associated with policy planning, equally evident in War Secretary Stimson’s rationale for the atom bombings and the ‘shock and awe’ concept for initiating the Iraq war in 2003.
Another key contribution has to do with the nature of the relationships between events and bargaining positions. The product of both the structure provided by the theories of victory and the emotional responses to series of victory, this work suggests the relationship will often be nonlinear. As leaders ignore bad news, their bargaining positions can fall well behind the what the balance of capabilities or resolve would suggest. When they do revise their aims, should they adopt a different kind of theory of victory—thus changing the character of the war—the evolution of their bargaining position becomes non-linear because the effects it was predicated on suddenly change in their political implications, from—for instance—information to a source of political costs.

**Outline of the Study**

The study proceeds, first, with a more technical exposition of the theory and then a presentation of the research design. The research then consists of a set of case studies draw from three World War Two-era conflicts, Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland (1939-1940), the German conquest of France (1940), and the Pacific Theater war between the United States and Japan. There follows summary analysis, which brings together the results from all the cases, and the presentation of empirical conclusions, policy implications, and directions for further research.
Chapter 2: Theory

War has a structure to it and this structure gives meaning to wartime events, much as the structure of baseball make some hits meaningless foul balls and others home runs that determine who wins and loses. Unlike sport, this structure is created and enforced by the participants themselves. Being created by them, their war’s structure changes as the involved states’ leaders’ expectations and beliefs about it change. Answering the question “when do events in wars lead to change in strategies or aims, or in termination?” thus requires two things. First, it requires modeling war in a way that that captures, in as parsimonious a way as possible, the various expectations state leaders may have for a war. I do this using my theories of victory concepts. Second, it requires developing a model of learning and belief change that can be tied to war expectations, because connecting events to changes in beliefs requires understanding how and when events influence beliefs. I do this with my use of affective response states—that is, emotions.

First is a theory of what events matter in war. The three kinds of theory of victory shape perceptions of wartime events by relating them to the plan for achieving war aims. Thus, depending on the theory of victory being pursued, the same event could be coded as good, bad, or indifferent. In addition to the particular framing effects associated with each theory of victory, this pattern of effects reflects a further intuition about learning in war: that one’s own
failures to execute one’s own plans are politically more important than comparable blows from the enemy. It is failure and expectations of failure, rather than injury and expectations of injury, that leads to concessions and war-ending agreements.  

Second is a theory of learning. Being able to say whether leaders will see events as advancing or retarding their theories of victory (or neither) is not enough to explain when war events will lead to political decisions about war, because learning is not an automatic process. Emotion theory can be used to address this problem, because information has a double action. First, it acts as a stimuli for basic human emotions which affect whether or not people respond to events by reconsidering their beliefs, then secondly it serves as the pieces of data that are the subject of that reasoning. Of particular importance to the question of war, the different emotions that can be elicited by bad news mean that not all bad news gets equal treatment. Unfamiliar threats elicit anxiety, an emotion that promotes searching for new information, effective usage of that information to reshape beliefs about the situation, and perhaps even re-analysis of old information. But anger, produced by familiar goal obstructions, suppresses learning. Knowing how the characteristics of the events encountered affect emotional responses to the events thus help predict when failures matter—leading to significant changes in beliefs with consequences for the further prosecution of the war—and when failure leads to at best incremental changes in the execution of existing plans.  

Third is a theory of aims and strategy re-selection. The failure of a theory of victory triggers a search for a new one—and with it either a revision of aims, a change of strategy, or an effort to terminate the war. Before leaders will adopt a new theory, they must find it plausible—that is, given their understanding of both themselves and their opponents, they must believe that the proposed set of acts will lead to the acquisition of a particular, desirable set of
war aims. But they must also be willing to accept its political costs at home. As they run out of plausible alternatives that seem affordable to them, they become willing to make peace. When both sides, appraising their situations, are willing to accept an agreement, the war terminates.

A. A Structure and Architecture for War

War Games and War Aims

My approach to war begins with the assumption that state leaders use it instrumentally. War is a means to an end, the procurement through force of something that they, and perhaps their constituents, want. A conflict begins when one state’s leaders demand another state change the status quo, either by ceding territory, control over a policy, or by a change in policy. For the demanding state, then, their war aims are those things they hope to gain through war; for the demandee, the war aims are those things they hope to avoid losing to their opponent.22

In this context, if a state rejects any of the demands made against it by another, war can result if one state attempts to use force to keep its prizes and the other uses force to take them rather than backing down.23 Once war is in progress, state leaders may change their aims proportionally, in response to what the battlefield tells them they can achieve. According to Goemans24 and others from the bargaining tradition,25 we should expect rational states to lower their aims in response to bad news from the battlefield, and either maintain or increase their aims in response to good news. As two sides’ war aims converge, they are able to make an agreement to end their war. The agreement to end fighting may not entirely resolve the

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22 Of course, the ‘demandee’ may make counter-claims, etc. The depiction above is simplified for clarity’s sake; the addition makes no difference theoretically.
23 Fearon 1995.
25 Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner; Slantchev 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Powell 2002, 2004; Smith and Stam 2004
conflict; rather it reflects the most that each side believed it could get through continued fighting. Winning, in this sense, is not so much a matter of being the man who receives the sword as being the man who got what he wanted out of the war. Losing is not asking for an armistice as much as it is failing to achieve one’s aims.

In addition to being one of the principal dependent variables to be explained, changes in war aims—by an opponent—can be important wartime events affecting future political decision-making. This is because changes in war aims reflect changes in the opponents’ understanding of what they are fighting for and how they believe the war is going. An increase in aims may reflect, and will quite likely be interpreted to mean, that the decision-makers in a state believe that the war is going well, above and beyond their previous expectations. A decrease in war aims would likely give the opposite impression. Changes in war aims are important beyond the communication of beliefs about how a war is going, however, because the reasons that the leadership believes that they can attain the new set of aims may be different from the reasons they believed they could attain the earlier set of aims. That is, these changes may reflect changes in leaders’ theories of victory as well as beliefs about the outcome.

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26 Slantchev 2003b. Upward and downward shifts in war aims are not mirror images of one another, however, and so must be explained and predicted separately. While the negative falsification of war aims is relatively straightforward—since failure is relatively easy to spot—positive falsification is more difficult, so the patterns of learning are more difficult. Additionally, there may exist ceiling effects in war aims, either in the sense that there is nothing more that one belligerent desires to get from another, or that there is nothing else left to demand in practical terms. Once unconditional capitulation is demanded, it becomes hard to raise war aims further.

27 In rare situations, small, incremental and previously announced increases in war aims occur as part of a diplomatic strategy to increase pressure on their opponent. They increase pressure by suggesting that the concessions they will have to make will only increase as time passes, which may increase the risks of holding out further and thus change their calculations about further resistance. In this situation, the change in aims is not reflective of any change in the understanding of the situation on the part of the sender, and as such is not explicable in those terms; but by the same token, they reflect no change in the
In sum, war aims define much of the war game. Disagreement over their allocation provides the reason for fighting. Changes in aims can reveal beliefs about how well the war goes, but can also be a basis for pressuring one’s opponents. They influence the way the war is fought, including leaders understanding of the logic of their war and also intensity with which they are fought. When dear to a belligerent, they may force him to escalate a war beyond his earlier expectations if he is confronted with bad news. Ultimately, they provide the basis for ending fighting, either through their abject seizure, or through agreements that allocate them and end the conflict.

**Fighting**

Perhaps the defining characteristic of war is that it involves political bodies fighting one another in hopes of advancing their political goals. The power game, so often played in the shadows of prestige or supposition confronts a physical reality in the fighting of war. But what does this physical reality of power do, aside from kill people? The casual view is that the violence of war is used to destroy enemies, and for getting and taking war aims. Yet as Clausewitz noted, most wars do not involve a drive for absolute victory or defeat, and many war aims are not susceptible to direct seizure. Some bargaining theorists argue that fighting reveals information about the actual balance of power, allowing leaders to ‘screen’ the power or resolve of their opponents. Yet at the same time, the amount of information actually revealed in war is limited, particularly because the outcomes of battles are sometimes determined by fog, pattern of interaction between the states, either. In some cases changes can be important events from the perspective of the receiver, not for the nature of the change but for the substance of it.

luck, chance, and a penny nail off a king’s horse—none of which clearly reflect a fundamental balance of power. For other bargaining theorists, bearing the costs of fighting reveals something of the resolve of the belligerents, another face of power. Relative resolve, through time, can be determinative of the outcome. However, since many wars are in fact quite short, it seems unlikely that war is just a question of resolve—unless very little resolve is required to win a war.

This being so, I argue that fighting has no single, constant function across wars. Instead, the function of fighting is determined by the beliefs of the leaders who have chosen to fight, which I describe as theories of victory. In the brute force theory of victory, the function of the fighting is to gain direct control over something, or in some cases, to destroy something—like a nuclear plant or missile installations or an army. In the informative theory of victory, the function of fighting is to convince the opponent to make concessions by demonstrating, that they cannot win because the balance of power opposes them. In the attritive theory of victory, the function of fighting is to wear down one’s opponent, consuming his military, economic, and political resources until he prefers to concede.

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32 According to the correlates of war dataset, among wars fought between only two states during the twentieth century, the median war length is less than four months.
33 Powell (2004) argues that wars caused by uncertainty over costs (e.g., resolve) should be shorter than those originating in information. However, his approach relies on a screening function for war and a multiple-offers-per-battle framework. My approach differs from the overt screening approach in that I assume that leaders have a specific model of the enemy and that they believe that the costs must actually be generated before their opponent will make concessions. This may be because they see their opponent as stubborn, as being unaware of how many costs they can actually endure, or bluff. At an empirical level, war leaders do not seem to cycle through different terms as the multiple offers framework suggests.
34 Note that for the informative and attritive theories of victory, the function of fighting is closely related to the bargaining theory’s assignment of functions. In the informative ToV, leaders make concessions when they find that either they are unable to demonstrate a favorable balance to their opponent, or find that their opponent does not respond to the unfavorable balance of power they have demonstrated. This can be seen as a means by which the screening process associated with bargaining theorists who stress
War and Changes in Beliefs

Once fighting starts the expectations that took the state into war are confronted with the reality of the battlefield and the bargaining table. In each domain, expectations may be found right and wrong. The central theoretical bet of my study is that the falsification and confirmation of these expectations, and the formation of new expectations as old ones are given up, produce changes in aims and strategy, and likewise, eventually produce war termination. These processes of falsification and confirmation are, in essence, the process of learning. This highlights the difference between learning and policy change, evident in more recent work on learning but necessarily in older work. However, it is worth noting that only changes in political beliefs—as opposed to beliefs about military tactics or the skill of particular commanders—should lead to changes in aims or strategies. While these changes may lead to changes in some aspect of the conduct of the war, these tactical changes are not of interest to this project.

35 The idea that state leaders learn during war is not, however, universally accepted. Rosen (2005: 106-111) argues that fighting does not reveal meaningful information, and that—following Iklé (1971/1991: 16-37)—leaders do not seem to come to “more accurate understandings of enemy capabilities or [resolve]” (107). This divergence is necessarily an empirical problem, rather than a theoretical one. 36 Levy 1994. 37 Deutsch 1966; Steinbruner 1974. 38 However, beliefs about the general military situation are included. Of additional note, meaningful learning in war exists at a higher level than beliefs about who might best lead the military or the most appropriate military units to send, since these have little relation to outcomes. They are less general and encompassing than the kind of belief system changes, affecting grand strategic postures, studied by Bennett (1999). Bennett describes learning as a change in cognitive structures, and seems most interested in the most general belief systems, which affected over-all Soviet foreign policy, which might for instance support a general policy of balancing, buckpassing, badwagoning, etc. However, in his theoretical sections he also discusses other cognitive structures which are more specific to kinds of situations—like schemas and analogies. My theories of victory can be understood as archetypical schemas, but schemas closely tied to particular situations. So only at the broadest interpretation of...
B. Expectations and War: Theories of Victory

I take as a general principle that leaders who decide to fight have some idea of how fighting will help them advance their aims in their particular political, diplomatic, and military context. In some cases, this idea is quite precise and closely tied to the operational plans for the war; in others, it may be vague, ill-founded, or have little relationship to the information available to those leaders, let alone the events to come. But nevertheless, there is an idea, an explanation to at least themselves about why they have chosen to fight and pay the costs of fighting rather than cutting a deal that would save them from war.

While the reasons why they believe that they can succeed in war vary greatly and may include many considerations unique to their case and condition, I believe that their defining, ‘cognitive structure’ are we interested in similar kinds of learning. Although analogies may be used to in communicating or forming theories of victory, the theories of victory are more closely tied to the particulars of the situation, and I do not expect that there will always be an analogy associated with a theory of victory.


In addition to these basic theories of victory, three complex types are also possible. I expect that these three kinds of theory of victory will be rare, but they are logically possible. The first is a sequential theory of victory. In the sequential theory of victory, leaders expect to gain their aims by first applying one kind of theory of victory, then, once its purpose is served, apply another. Because a sequential theory of victory involves pursuing one theory, then another, states will behave according to the theory of victory they are using at that time. The second complex theory of victory is a linkage-based theory of victory. Here, two sets of aims are being pursued in different places by different means according to different theories of victory. Their only connection is that they are connected through intentional issue linkage (see for instance (Lacy and Niou 2004)). Analytically, states pursuing a composite theory of victory are essentially fighting two different wars, save for the fact that they have been politically combined into a single conflict. In this case, leaders expect to gain their aims in terms of the local theory of victory. Only if they believe that they can trade “extra” aims gained in one theater for aims in the other will this affect the bargaining between the belligerents. The third complex theory of victory is a composite theory of victory. A composite theory of victory exists when leaders use acts connected to different theories of victory within the same bargaining situation. While more than one theory of victory is being used, however, note that there remains a close connection between acts and aims. Unless replaced, the failure of a theory of victory means that those aims are lost. Depending on the nature of the aims and the specific theory of victory, it may be that there are emergent properties in the relationship between successes and failures in the war aims. Nevertheless, these properties will generally be recognized in advance, and so changes in aims will occur according to that already-recognized pattern of interaction.
essential characteristics can be captured by focusing on three principal beliefs. The first belief is a belief about the force they can exert and what they can do with that force; the second is a belief about how their opponent will respond. The third is a belief about how their own state will respond. With the informative theory of victory, leaders believe that they can create a set of acts that will demonstrate their power and thereby convince their opponent that they had underestimated their power and capability, and that the opponent will respond to this changed belief by making the concessions they desire before costs or defeats in the field cause them to concede. In the attritive theory of victory, leaders believe that their state’s essential force can persist to the point where their opponent will weary of fighting, in spite of their opponent’s acts, and that their opponent’s weariness will cause them to make concessions. Brute force theories of victory are based on leaders’ belief that their application of force will suffice to acquire their aims and that any resistance their opponent puts up—if they are yet able to marshal resistance—will be of little import. 41

Together, these principal beliefs define the logic of goal achievement. In this sense, the theories of victory are characterizing the relationship between three abstract models. The first model is a model of themselves, of what they can do and how they will respond to war. The second is a model of battle, of what will happen when their force meets the other in a particular place or places at particular times. The third is a model of their opponent, of what they can do and how they will respond to war and the events of war. Together, these models constitute a theory of their politico-military situation. A theory of the situation is a theory of victory when

41 This being the case, theories of victory rely on an INUS (Goertz 2006) logic of expectation. While both beliefs are necessary for an individual to believe that they can obtain their war aims, only together are the sufficient to do so.
three models come together such that, in expectation, a particular set of acts leads to the attainment of a particular set of war aims.\footnote{If once thinks of the model of the situation as a system of the three models, theories of victory are valid systems in the sense that the inputs yield the desired outputs.}

It may well be that leaders have multiple theories of victory available to them. In this situation, leaders make a choice, either explicitly or implicitly.\footnote{In contrast, the mental models of the actors involved in the formation of the theories of victory are not things which can be chosen, as choice is generally understood. They are, rather, beliefs about how the real world works and is working, and emerge from decision-makers’ interaction with the world. While there may be alternative models of the relevant actors, and while one version may be more attractive than another, they are not the subject of conscious decision. Conscious decision implies that actors recognize options to be selected from. These options may have better and worse consequences, respectively, but they are nevertheless things to be chosen among. In contrast, models of oneself and other actors are seen as elements of a single reality, and reality is generally perceived as a thing that exists outside of oneself. As something that exists, one can choose among guesses about its nature, but those choices are not instrumental choices. Choosing among guesses about reality is fundamentally tied to one’s experiences with it, and is thereby tightly constrained by one’s understanding of those experiences. Admittedly, one’s understanding of their experience of the world can be subject to unconscious instrumental motivation, but this does not fundamentally alter the process of thinking about reality.} This is because the same acts applied under a different logic may be expected to produce different aims. When they set their aims in relationship to their acts, they pick one theory of victory over others. The beliefs that form what I describe as a theory of victory, then, are the basis for a linkage between acts and aims. Because they have this linkage, they do not treat war as a random mash of violence or a wad of force, throwing whatever is laying underfoot at their enemy without a clear sense of what they will be able to get out of it or why their acts will allow them to get it.

Regardless of the existence of plausible alternatives, however, the theories of victory selected then define the political logic of violence for that war, until it is changed. This structure is useful because it connects the specific—the particular expectations of battlefield and bargaining table—with more general beliefs about the success of the war and the likelihood that
war aims can be achieved. In so doing, it provides a framework for analyzing the relationships between events in wars, state leaders’ beliefs, and state leaders’ decisions.

**Brute Force Theories of Victory**

A brute force theory of victory is characterized by the belief that one’s opponent will be unable to prevent or meaningfully respond to a military effort to directly acquire one’s war aims. This being the case, state leaders will believe that they can capture their aims without having to convince their enemy to accept their preferred end of the war. Having this expectation involves believing that one’s application of force will be enough to acquire the aim itself and also a belief that any future costs that the enemy might try to impose will be tolerable. This may be because the leaders believe that their opponent will have no ability to respond with costly action, either from the outset or because it is destroyed by the operation itself, or because they believe that whatever costs their opponent might be able to impose after the aim is seized will be negligible.

Because it is a vision of war that involves termination without an opponent’s admission of defeat, brute force has a military rather than political character. However, that non-political character limits it to tangible war aims. Thus, a brute force theory of victory is applicable to an effort to seize territory, natural resources, and people from another state. The German taking of Czechoslovakia in 1938, the Soviet seizures of the Baltic states in 1940, the Indonesian taking of East Timor in 1975, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are all examples of direct seizure. Brute force can also be used to destroy things that might be seen as a threat, as was the case in the Israeli’s 2006 move Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon or the American attempt to eliminate the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In each of these cases, victory was recognized when one side’s goal
was realized, either in the taking of property or in the destroying of people or things, rather than through a termination agreement between belligerents.

As these examples suggest, brute force theories of victory encompass a wide range of strategies, ranging from pin-point aerial assault to full-scale invasion. While in principle it can be the basis for a great war, more often brute force theories of victory are associated with short campaigns against relatively easy marks. After all, seizure and eradication are more likely to be seen as cheap and thus acceptable against the weak rather than the strong. Applied to great war, brute force is in the short term very expensive, since most states have ‘much ruin in them,’ but if leaders believe their enemies to be implacable there may be no other plausible route to a favorable outcome. Whenever brute force is successful it yields decisive political outcomes, as the winner dictates the outcome of the conflict to the loser, if there is a loser left to dictate to. This may be particularly desirable if the aim involves eliminating the capacity of an enemy to threaten one’s own security.

Informative Theories of Victory

An informative theory of victory is characterized by a belief that the enemy will respond to a demonstration of one’s military power by making the desired concessions. In this sense, its logic is more political than military and is based on bargaining over aims rather than simply capturing them. Its central premise is that the learning that results from a demonstration of power will change the preferences of the opponent such that they will make concessions. In this sense, the logic of an informative theory of victory is similar to the logic of a signaling model. The difference is that the sender of the signal is unable to completely control the outcome of the signal; chance and the determined acts of their enemy may oppose them and prevent them from executing the signaling act. Obviously, in order for the theory to be valid,
state leaders must also believe that they can make that demonstration, but that belief is not
certain knowledge in the same way that a state leader trying to mobilize part of their army as a
signal of resolve or willingness to use force knows that they can mobilize their forces. As a
result, leaders themselves learn from their efforts to demonstrate power through fighting in
ways that they do not learn in a typical signaling game.

The belief that this kind of learning about military capacity and efficiency will lead to the
achievement of political aims depends on an understanding of the nature of the confrontation
and the opponent’s politics. Specifically, the informational theory of victory is associated with a
belief that the cause of the fighting is a disagreement about relative military capability (see
Fearon 1995). This disagreement, moreover, is defined in terms of their existing military forces,
rather than the social resources that can eventually be devoted to them. The disabusing
demonstration can take many forms—defeating a force in pitched battle, or capturing a strong
point, or being able to make a punishing attack on the civilian structure of a country, to name
but a few.

Though not rendering their opponent hors de combat, informative theories of victory
work by clarifying the power relations between the two states.\textsuperscript{44} Because there is more
information about the power balance between the two states relative to the issue at hand, an
allocative agreement proportional to that power balance and thus acceptable to the belligerents
may come to exist. This is particularly the case if the state leaders are unwilling to escalate the
conflict by devoting more resources to the fight in an effort to make that balance more
favorable. Such an escalation would convert a dispute about power into a dispute about
resolve.

\textsuperscript{44} Fearon 1995; Goemans 2000; Smith and Stam 2004.
In order for this theory of victory to seem plausible, leaders have to believe that their opponents’ strategic calculus is wrong, and that, once they discover this, they will be unwilling or unable to bolster their forces enough to avoid making concessions. Disagreements about the utility of different kinds of forces, new technologies and doctrines, and the effects of geography, climate, and *élan* can produce differences in strategic calculus, even when both sides have close to full information about their opponent’s forces and equipment.\(^{45}\) While demographic or economic constraints may be responsible for leaders believing that their opponents will not continue after being informed about the real power balance, it is more likely they will believe that their opponents are constrained against doing so by their domestic political situation. This may be because they believe that their homologue cannot stand the political costs of mobilizing for that war at that time. They may believe that the opposing state lacks internal cohesion, and its leadership may not be willing to test their hold on their state in the crucible of a long hot war. Or, they may believe that there are friendly revolutionary elements who will rally to their side once victories reveal the weakness of their enemy’s forces—which will in turn may bring about a collapse of the state accompanied by the demanded concessions. Or leaders may simply believe that there is a fundamental lack of will to fight a long and difficult war.\(^{46}\) One might also believe that being seen losing in a war will be so costly to the state’s prestige that it will want to end the conflict through concessions rather than face further humiliation.\(^{47}\) In any event, leaders’ model of the opponent gives them reason to believe that ending the disagreement about power is an effective route to securing their war aims.

\(^{45}\) Smith and Stam 2004.  
\(^{46}\) This may be associated with the ‘paper tiger’ aspect of the enemy image (see, for example, Herrmann, Voss and Schooner 1997).  
\(^{47}\) Of course, this may not actually ‘save face’ in prestige terms.
Attritive Theories of Victory

Attritive theories of victory are characterized by an expectation that an opponent will weary of war first, and will concede to end the sacrifices of war. This is not a question of military efficiency. A state with the will to do so can make up the deficits associated with inferior efficiency until it reaches the barriers of population and resources. Rather, states pursuing attritive strategies view the war as a disagreement about which state is willing and able to put more effort (as discounted by relative efficiency) into acquiring their aims. It is, therefore, a disagreement about which state is more resolved. The fighting associated with this theory of victory, therefore, is a struggle to demonstrate greater resolve than one’s enemy. Thus, as with the informative theory of victory, but unlike the brute force theory of victory, it follows a coercive bargaining logic.

Attritive theories of victory are premised on beliefs that one’s opponent will be make the desired concessions as he wearies of fighting—rather than keep fighting to extinction—and that one’s own state will be able to continue fighting to that point without a collapse in the state’s essential fighting force. The first belief reflects a very simple model of an opponent in war: that they will prefer to cut their losses once it is no longer possible to meet the costs of pursuing thier war aims. The impossibility of further pursuit can be literal—despite the popularity of the aims, there are no more resources in society to put forth—or it can be political, in the sense that the leadership risks its position if it attempts to procure further resources for the war from its society. This simple model reflects the logic of “strategic surrender,” 48 in which actors who realize that they cannot attain their war aims seek to use whatever bargaining power

48 Kecskmeti 1957.
they have left to get whatever they have left, rather than squandering it on hopeless gambles or pursuing their goals to their own destruction.\footnote{It also reflects the idea, prominent in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) that state leaders are aware of the costs as they select the amount of effort they put into a war.}

The second belief, that one’s own state will be able to maintain its essential fighting force until that point in time, is rooted first in leaders’ model of battle and second in their model of themselves. The model of battle gives an expectation for how long the state’s essential fighting forces can retain their integrity and efficacy. The essential fighting forces, in the context of an attritive theory of victory, are those that prevent a drastic loss in bargaining power. If these forces collapse, the state become much more exposed to the forces of its enemy, and with that exposure, the state experiences a substantial loss in what it can preserve against the depredations of that enemy. This loss of bargaining power occurs because the collapse gives the enemy opportunities to dramatically increase the costs of war, by seizing property and people as bargaining chips, by being able to inflict greater harm on the civil aspects of the state, or by further interfering with its contacts with the outside world.

Though the prototypical example of an essential fighting force is a line of defense, like the trenches in France (1914-1918), the essential force need not be a defensive barrier. It can just as well be an army that seeks to attack or defend through battles of maneuver, always seeking to avoid destruction but always trying to remain enough a threat that one’s enemy must pay the costs of confrontation. This approach can be clearly seen in the Confederacy’s strategy during much of the US Civil War, or Frederick the Great’s strategy in the eighteenth century. Indeed, it was through studying Frederick’s maneuvers and use of logistics that Hans Delbruck, a
century later, developed the *Ermatungsstrategie* [strategy of exhaustion\(^{50}\)], which Falkenhayn adapted into the modern strategy of attrition\(^{51}\) in 1916 at Verdun.\(^{52}\) The focus on an essential fighting force, rather than a defensive frontier, seems particularly appropriate when applied to naval warfare\(^{53}\) and air warfare. In guerrilla warfare, the essential fighting force may not be even take the form of a massed army, but rather a functioning network—as seems to have been the case in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Notably, the elimination of an essential fighting force need not be the end of a conflict, if another force—using either the same or a different mode of fighting—can be put in its place. The raising and deployment of new armies and *francs tiers* by the French Provisional Government in 1870-71 is one example of this kind of essential force replacement. While physical limits may sometimes prevent this from being an option in come cases, in others, whether or not it is attempted is a matter of choice.\(^{54}\)

Leaders’ model of their own state and its domestic politics also gives rise to their beliefs about how long they can keep up the fight. Skillful military leadership is part of maintaining that essential fighting force, but so too is the political willingness and ability to maintain it against the degradation concomitant with fighting. Maintaining the force necessary to fight a battle of

\(^{50}\) Delbruck’s concept of exhaustion is conceptually closer to my attritive theory of victory than the apolitical mode-of-fighting approach to strategy used by modern scholars (for instance, Stam 1996) because of its political focus.

\(^{51}\) This is a good point to differentiate between the attritive theory of victory and a strategy of attrition. The attritive theory of victory is a framework for achieving goals by wearying the other state of fighting. Attrition, as a military strategy, is a mode of fighting in which the military target is the elimination of the enemy soldiers. While a strategy of attrition can be associated with an attritive theory of victory, so too can a strategy of maneuver (as the text makes clear) or punishment or blockade. In principle, a strategy of attrition might be associated with the informative or the brute force theories of victory.

\(^{52}\) Foley 2005.

\(^{53}\) Arquilla 1992.

\(^{54}\) Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s *Culture of Defeat* (2001/2003) examines the post-war consequences of two cases in which this was possible but not done (the CSA in 1865 and Germany in 1918) and one in which it was (France 1870), thus making the implicit argument that in at least some important cases, replacement is possible.
resolve of almost any size requires more than just the ‘on-the-shelf’ military and military budget. It requires the mobilization of additional social resources for military purposes. The kinds of demands associated with this mobilization will often be painful for society, and will very often provide the basis for opposition to the regime. Not only are there practical limits to what can be asked of a population, there are political limits to what they will give for particular war aims before they turn to alternative leaders. Leaders, wishing to preserve their jobs, must therefore be careful about how much they ask of their people, and must weigh the political costs of cutting losses and making concessions to their enemy against the political costs of making further demands on their society. Determinative of this will be leaders’ views of their population, its valuation of their war aims, and its willingness to pay for them. Some may view their people as wholly malleable and incapable of altering their situation, but others may view their population as actively learning from the war and intent on seeing the government do their will. Significantly, this means that those points in time when leaders must consider making additional demands on its populace are moments in which concessions are particularly likely, since they may find that they prefer concessions to further risking the wrath of their people. This is not the case with the brute force and informative theories of victory, as their execution generally does not require additional social resources.

State leaders may choose the attritive theory of victory because they believe it impossible to learn about the real balance of power from fighting, due to the incentives to mislead about private information that persist beyond the beginning of the war (see Fearon 1995 for the pre-war effects of incentives to mislead). They may also choose an attritive theory

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56 Foyle 1997.
of victory because they already know the relative efficiency of their enemy’s forces but doubt be
will be willing to deploy enough of them, through time, to gain his aims. In this sense, an
attritive theory of victory may be a state and its people’s last hope for gaining their war aims.
Nevertheless, as part of the model of the opponent, there need to be fairly clear reasons to
believe that it is possible to weary your opponent before you, yourself are too fatigued to
continue.

C. After the Fighting Starts: A Theory of What Makes Events Matter

If fighting performs different functions in war, then the meaning and importance of
wartime events vary according to its function. Because the theories of victory add additional
structure to the bargaining situation, the same battlefield and political events will vary in
political importance according to the theory of victory being pursued by the state leadership. In
essence, the theories of victory frame war-time events, determining not the nature of what
happens in the field but the interpretation and meaning of what happens in the field and at the
bargaining table.

Before entering into a detailed analysis of how the respective theories of victory frame
events, a few guiding principles need to be articulated. First, regardless of the aim or intent,
states are apt to learn more from their own efforts’ successes and failures than from the results
of their enemy’s efforts. Whereas state leaders know what they are trying to achieve with their
operations and what resources are dedicated to them, they can never be sure what their enemy
was trying to do—what may seem to have been the result of a minor operation could in fact
have been their enemy’s supreme effort (or vice versa). Thus events perpetrated by an opponent can never have the same informational status as one’s own efforts.  

Second is the important role of inferences about unintended signals. Many of the mechanisms by which the theories of victory operate are not directly observable, particularly to an opponent. But because they want to know if their expectations are being confirmed, leaders and other observers will try to use other indicators which they believe have a connection to the key movements that determine whether or not they will win. Thus, beliefs will often be shaped by inferences about events that only indirectly affect the actual processes of war and diplomacy.

*Events and Brute Force Theories of Victory*

When a state’s leadership is pursuing a brute force theory of victory, they expect to be able to control the course of the war. Finding that they cannot is the royal road to leaders determining that their brute force theory of victory does not reflect the reality they are confronting. Going in, leaders anticipate that the war will begin and end at their discretion. Indeed, if the war goes according to plan, while their opponents may shoot back from time to time, their opponents’ resistance will not interfere with their plans and timelines. Because

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57 A very different line of logic, using the principles of attribution theory in cognitive psychology, leads to the same conclusion. In attribution theory, one tends to explain one’s own acts in terms of circumstantial forces, but others’ acts in terms of dispositional factors. Since war is about forcing others to do our will, we can never learn as much about the real situation from their behavior as we can from our own.

58 Scott Page (2004) provides some analyses of the different characteristics of interpreted as opposed to intended signals.

59 My approach to indicators is both similar to and different from Gartner’s (1997) use of indicators in strategic assessment. In his dominant indicator approach, key or dominant indicators relevant to a strategy are identified, for instance tonnage sank or enemy soldiers killed, and quantitatively measured. Generally these indicators are indirect indicators of success or failure (or movement toward or away from those eventual destinations). Like him, I expect leaders will use indirect measures, unlike him I believe single events, as opposed to results that can be measured in terms of rates, will be more often used as indicators of success or failure.
leaders anticipate a decisive military outcome, they will be particularly alert to information from the battlefield. Outcomes of battles—in terms of whether or not particular military targets are achieved or not—will loom large, as will the degree to which the army sticks to its timetables. If they perceive targets being achieved and time-tables kept, they will retain their sense of control over the war. However, owing to expectations that they will be able to destroy or capture their aims with the force they have devoted to their war, failures to achieve targets or resist counter-attacks (i.e., defeats), and failures to keep to their timetable contradict the expectations on which their theory of victory was premised. Protests and other indications of discontent in either country, the magnitude of their opponent’s casualties, and third party offers of assistance will likely be irrelevant to them.

*Events and Informative Theories of Victory*

Leaders pursuing an informative theory of victory believe that convincing their opponent to make concessions is a matter of demonstration. So long as they believe that they can make their demonstration of military efficiency work, and believe that their enemy will respond to the demonstration with the desired concessions, they will be able to maintain their theory of victory and thus maintain the same level of war aims. This being the case, events that corroborate or confirm their theories of victory conform to those plans. Military forces meet their targets, on schedule, effecting the desired demonstration of power. Third parties behave as expected—most likely meaning that they do not take serious interest. After the demonstration of efficacy, the opponent makes the concession desired in short order.

Falsification of their theory of victory occurs either when they no longer believe that they can effect that necessary demonstration, or when they no longer believe their opponent will concede in response it. If leaders conclude that their military is unable to make a
demonstration with the required characteristics, because their military was unable to perform as expected, their theory is not longer tenable. This being the case, failures to achieve military targets are discrepant or contrary to the theory of victory. Similarly, falling behind timetables is a discrepant indicator because it suggests that their force is not as effective and efficient as they had believed. Some more concrete examples of discrepant events are failures to seize or hold a strong point, or failing to break up, or cause the retreat of, or at least halt, some group of the enemy’s forces. It may also take the form of failing to penetrate the enemy’s defenses in an effort to deliver a punishing strike against non-military targets.

Falsification of the other key belief, that the opponent will make concessions in response to a demonstration of military efficiency, is less straightforward because it comes through the absence of an action rather than through a concrete result. Each day after a demonstration that an opponent refuses to concede is a weak, discrepant indicator. It is discrepant because the opponent is failing to act as expected; but it is a weak indicator since there could be many reasons, not necessarily inconsistent with the theory of victory, that could explain the failure to concede. If the leaders believe that there are clear opportunities for concessions, for instance after some crucial domestic political event like an election or after the opposing leadership has had an opportunity to demonstrate to the folks at home that they at least tried, and these are missed, they are likely to be considered more seriously contrary indicators. Willingness to make some concessions, but not all, is likely to be an ambivalent indicator—in that it reveals that the other side believes it is doing poorly, but not poorly enough for them to concede across the board. Of course, some indicators are more straightforwardly contrary to the theory of victory, and thus will have greater impact: The initiation of a new series of operations by the opponent—regardless of their outcomes—is one, because it is an
indicator that they probably have not learned the lesson that they were expected to learn.

Taking steps to mobilize social resources is also a straightforwardly negative event after a demonstration of power has occurred, since it indicates that they intend to continue the fight by testing your resolve, perhaps having conceded relative efficiency.

Positive falsification—that is, determining that the theory of victory underestimated the aims that it is possible to obtain through fighting—is also possible. Unlike falsifications associated with underestimating of the opponent, this kind falsification does not necessarily lead to search for a new theory of victory with associated aims and strategies, because the leadership may be willing to satisifice and accept the achievement of the earlier aims, instead of reaching for more. Events that could contribute to this kind of falsification include achieving more than the desired target or with greater ease or speed than expected. Specific acts of the opponent—particularly demonstrations of their willingness to make concessions before the demonstration is made, or greater than anticipated, are also possible indicators of positive falsification of informative theory victories.

Informative theories of victory will render certain events relatively irrelevant. Any diplomatic chatter from the opponent prior to the demonstration, except perhaps conceding the full slate of demands, will be seen as such. Because pursuing an informative theory of victory will generally not require additional domestic resources, leaders will be unconcerned with domestic political opposition prior to the attempt to make the demonstration. The opponent’s casualty levels are apt to be seen as irrelevant, as well.

*Events and Attritive Theories of Victory*

The experience of war leads to the falsification of an attritive theory of victory when leaders perceive that they can no longer devote resources to fighting, or when they perceive
further fighting will not help them further their aims. This latter route for falsification is essentially the acceptance of an agreement proportional to the balance of power, factoring in both relative efficiency and demonstrated relative resolve. Falsification of an attritive theory of victory because the essential force can no longer be maintained is relatively straightforward: either the integrity of their essential fighting force has, or will soon, collapse, or the continued maintenance of the force requires making demands on society that the leader is unwilling to make (thus dooming it to eventual collapse, should the war be continued). Aside from over the objective absence of further men and resources to put into the fight, or the routing of the key military force, the principal indicators that this point has been reached originate within one’s own population. Anti-war and anti-regime demonstrations, particularly among sympathizers of the leadership, are an important sign of discontent.⁶⁰

As with the informative theory of victory, falsifying the belief about the other’s behavior is more complicated. An opponent can send two kinds of signal about their relative resolve: first, the fact of their showing up each day to fight, and second, the moves they make at the bargaining table.⁶¹ Both of these are meaningful indicators and signals, but alone, neither provides determinative, falsifying evidence. Similarly indicative but not individually definitive are events relating to a state’s ability to keep fighting which intentionally generated by decision-makers. This class of inferential events includes the levels of casualties experienced, measured

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⁶⁰A demonstration need not be a noisy protest or a riot in the street, however. Doubt or opposition noted in friendly newspapers and through more acceptable ‘society’ channels can be equally demonstrative.

⁶¹An increase in aims can suggest the belief that they are winning the battle of resolve, and concessions suggest they believe that are insufficiently resolved to gain their aims in a battle with you. This said, increases in aims are noisy and uncertain signals, since they can be used in an attempt to mislead—by falsely signaling that they believe they are more resolved than they are. Threatened future increases in aims can also be used in an effort to increase the pressure on state leaders to make concessions.
more in terms of units rendered useless than in terms of soldiers killed. It also involves battlefield events that seem to injure the integrity of the opposition’s essential forces. Similarly, the acts of third parties—foreign countries and the citizens of the opposing state—are indicators. Foreign offers of assistance made and requests for foreign assistance denied can have great influence on the ability of the state to continue the fight. Domestic political protests, if they visibly occur, are also indicative that the resolve of the opponent is limited. None of the inferential events are enough to draw a positive or negative conclusion about the theory of victory in themselves. However, the accumulated weight of inferential events, in combination with the direction of the intended signals, may ultimately cause leaders to draw conclusions about whether or not their expectations for how long their opponent will continue fighting are true or not. In so doing, they can either support the continued plausibility of attritive theories of victory, or subvert them to the point of falsification.

Positive falsification of the agential beliefs comes as the opponent makes concessions much earlier than were expected. The act itself is the only piece of evidence indicative of this. Again, the fact that they concede earlier than expected does not mean that leaders will prefer a new theory of victory which could lead to yet greater concessions, and the act of conceding early may not mean that the state is or will be willing to make greater concessions. They may have merely clarified to themselves the matter of relative resolve more quickly, and found it in their interest to seal the deal rather than waiting for the inevitable. Also, it may be politically difficult at the domestic level to continue a war involving significant social mobilization past the point when the states aims have been met, in the hopes of getting yet more booty. Given the

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62 I expect that the effect of a unit rendered useless is greater than that of a comparable number of casualties, as the costs of replacing a unit (if it is possible) fall on everyone, but the costs of soldiers’ deaths are born only by those close to them.
lack of clear signals that this might occur (as opposed to mere confirmation of the existing theory of victory), this kind of belief change is relatively unlikely; and should beliefs change, I expect that aims or strategies will rarely change.

The pursuit of an attritive theory of victory clearly privileges events that indicate whether or not the combatants’ essential fighting force can continue, and for how much longer they can continue. They render some kinds of events less important, however. Unless they threaten the integrity of the essential force, battlefield victories and defeats, tactical advances and retreats, and skirmishes on air and sea will seem relatively irrelevant. Attritive theories of victory mean that the ability of the state to keep fighting tomorrow is more important that who wins and loses on any particular day.

Relevant Hypotheses

This section describes how the different expectations that leaders pursue affect how they respond to the events of the war. Two key ideas about how theories of victory shape the response to events emerge. First, the different theories of victory focus leaders’ attention to different kinds of events and different aspects of those events, and thereby evaluate them differently. In its most basic form, this means that

**Hypothesis 1:** Individuals using different kinds of theories of victory will focus on different kinds of events and different attributes of events.

This can be further specified:

**Hypothesis 1.1:** Individuals using a brute force theory of victory will focus on events associated with their war-plan. They will tend to ignore diplomatic and domestic political events, save third parties’ threats to directly intervene.
Hypothesis 1.2: Individuals using an informative theory of victory will focus on events related to their ability to demonstrate military efficiency and efficacy and their opponents willingness to concede in response to it. They will tend to ignore domestic political events, most diplomatic events, and their opponent’s losses from fighting.

Hypothesis 1.3: Individuals using an attritive theory of victory will focus on events related to their opponent’s weariness from fighting and their own ability to continue fighting. They will tend to ignore wins and losses on the battlefield.

D. Reconsidering Theories of Victory

In the previous sections the theories of victory were described. They were said to determine the relevance (relevant, not), valence (positive, negative), and meaning of the events those state leaders encounter in war. In this way, the TOV’s determine whether information about those events corroborates or impeaches leaders’ expectations for winning the war. When the combatants’ theories of victory are brought together, they were said to define the strategic situation (the “game”) of the war. Leaders’ decisions about aims, strategies, and termination, it has been argued, depend on their perception of this game. Changes in the game—as they and their opponents’ theories of victory are corroborated or collapse—influence decisions about strategy, aims, and termination by changing the states’ and leaders’ perceived incentives.

The theories of victory cannot, however, provide expectations about when a series of events will actually lead to learning, and when they will not. Nor do they give a sense of the scope of learning that might occur—which could be a mere course correction, but could involve a much more radical change in beliefs about themselves, their opponent, or the interaction of
forces. While the TOV’s allow leaders—and scholars—to categorize events as supportive or discrediting, or irrelevant to their TOV, they give no indication of how much bad news is enough bad news to overturn a theory in the place it matters most—the mind of the state leader. Answering the basic research question ‘when do events in war lead to changes in aims or strategy, or to termination?’ however, requires answers to these questions.

The approach to learning that I advance here attempts to construct a relatively simple approach to learning that uses insights from psychology but is nevertheless meaningfully ‘rational.' Two key intuitions undergird my approach. First, that learning proceeds according to a hypothesis-testing algorithm, rather than the Bayesian algorithm. The second central intuition, derived from emotion theory, is that information has a double action in the learning process. The first action of information is to non-consciously stimulate emotional systems that affect the reasoning process, including the levels of attention allocated to new information and the degree to which the new information provokes further information search. The second action of information is as data which the mind attends to through reasoning processes.

*Emotions and Learning*

A focus on emotions helps address these questions because one of their key evolutionary functions has been to help people make sense of their surroundings. They help identify what is most important and particularly most threatening in those surroundings and then motivate responses to them. Some emotions affect ensuing cognitive processes by causing

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63 This “course correction” can be understood as engaging in ‘simple’ or ‘incremental’ learning (Deutsch 1966 and Bennett 1999, respectively)—and more major changes in their approach to the war evince what Deutsch called complex learning and Bennett discontinuous learning.
64 The approach presented, hypothesis-testing, can yield Nash Equilibrium in at least certain strategic games (see Young 2004 for a basic presentation of the approach and a formal analysis of its properties).
65 Young 2004.
people to rely on existing schema, and apply tried and true formulas to any problems they encounter. Others motivate them to try to figure out the situation anew and perhaps lead them to craft an entirely different response to it. Applied to war, emotion in general is a most likely explanation for when events will cause learning in war. On the one hand, emotions help leaders pick out what is most important, even amidst the rush of events that is war, even when those events are unanticipated. On the other, they help condition the response to those pieces of information through their effects on further cognition.66

Definitionally, emotions consist of a suite of affective/physiological, behavioral, and cognitive responses to particular kinds of situations.67 Of these responses, emotional feelings are perhaps the most familiar. But the others are no less important. These other responses can include stimulating information search and reasoning, facilitating the recall of pertinent memories, and preparing the body for particular kinds of action strategies (chiefly approach and avoidance) by affecting muscle readiness.68 With regard to learning, these other parts of the emotion syndrome seem to be more important than the felt response. Because human emotions seem to have developed as aides to responding to immediate environments, emotions are generally elicited by environments with particular structures or characteristics.69

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66 Notably, Huddy, Feldman and Cassese (2007) find that anger and anxiety have these effects in an experimental study involving the war in Iraq.
67 Russell 2003. All emotions are associated with particular targets, which differentiates them from moods, which have much looser relationships to particular, recognized events or stimuli. On this basis, some argue that anxiety is in fact a mood. But on all other dimensions (strong affective and physical aspects, short duration beyond exposure to a stimulus, etc.), anxiety is like an emotion rather than a mood. Additionally, at very least, particular elements within a situation give rise to anxiety, even if they are not well understood, so there is at least a sense in which anxiety is a response to particular stimuli in the environment.
69 Frijda 1986, 2007; Elster 1998; Roseman 2004; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lazarus 1991. This discussion is limited to those emotions that are associated with ongoing or in-process events, rather than those that are associated with responses to fully concluded ones.
concepts framing these structures are the existence of threat or reward, and the novelty or familiarity of the situation. Familiar reward brings happiness, familiar threat or punishment anger. Unexpected reward brings joy, and unexpected threat anxiety.70

George Marcus and his colleagues, through their work (1993; 2000; 2002; 2003) in public opinion, have helped spread awareness of emotion research that increasingly argues against a clean separation between cognition and emotion in perceiving and understanding the world.71 This work has been based on neuro-scientific studies that have articulated three systems related to emotion—a disposition system, which helps maintain current activity and reliance on habits of mind; a surveillance system, which helps recognize and respond to environmental changes, if necessary by interrupting ongoing activities; and a fear system, which helps respond to immediate physical threat.72 The disposition system is associated with a wide range of emotions, including both happiness and frustration. The surveillance system is principally associated with anxiety. The fear system can be broken down into rage and terror, with rage being an immediate threat that can be fought (thus giving rise to ‘fight’ responses) and terror being one that cannot (thus giving rise to ‘flight’ responses). Like Marcus, I do not expect that immediate physical threat will be encountered often in politics, and thus ignore this system.73 Even though many experience this kind of threat in war, state leaders generally have not been among them in a very long time.

70 Marcus 2003.
71 Grey 1990.
72 Gray 1994. I use Marcus’s labels for Gray’s systems, since they are probably conventional now within the discipline, particularly since (2003). Gray calls the ‘surveillance system’ the “Behavioral Inhibition System” and the ‘disposition system’ the “Behavioral Approach System.”
73 Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Marcus 2002.
Psychologists working in the appraisal tradition have long recognized many of the effects of emotion on cognition, and made great strides toward identifying the circumstances that elicit these emotional responses. One of the principal contributions of the neuro-scientific work, which started with work on rats, has been to improve our understanding of the pervasiveness of emotion’s influence not only on cognition but on non-conscious and pre-conscious cognition and on responding to that cognition. More directly relevant to this paper, neuro-scientific studies have made it possible to speak with greater precision about particular emotions and their differences from one another.

This is particularly true with regard to anxiety and anger or frustration, both traditionally labeled as negative emotions. To begin with, identifying anxiety as a distinct emotion was problematic within the appraisal framework, as the relevant materials tended to produce a muddle between anxious arousal (anxiety, as I use it) and anxious apprehension (worry). These two emotional states are produced by quite different situations and characterized by different responses. Working more directly on the brain has helped clarify these differences. It has also emphasized the importance of novelty in producing anxiety, rather than the mere existence of a threat or otherwise negative information.

The neuroscience work has also helped define anger (and related felt emotions like frustration and annoyance) more precisely. Prior to this work there had existed a consensus that anger required a perception of affront or insult, this consensus no longer exists. While

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74 Frijda 1986; Scherer 2001; Ellsworth and Smith 1985; Roseman 2004; Roseman and Smith 2001.
75 Grey 1986.
76 Damasio 1994; Bechara et al.1997.
77 Lazarus 1991; Frijda 1986.
79 Whalen 2006.
the perception of affront can certainly magnify the strength of the elicitation, it does not seem to be required; only the perception of an anticipatable obstacle or threat are necessary. The neuro-scientific work has also helped clarify that anger is a part of the disposition system, and is in many respects (general approach tendency (unlike anxiety), high levels of certainty, closure to further information, high coping potential) similar to happiness or contentedness.

Those emotions that are ‘positive’—that is, responses to rewarding or otherwise desired events are less fully studied than the negative affects associated with anger and anxiety. Nonetheless, a complete picture of how the emotions influence learning and bargaining in war necessarily involves consideration of how leaders respond to positive events. As most commonly presented, happiness (the response to familiar, positive stimuli) and joy (novel, positive stimuli) are both associated with the disposition system. There is, however, some speculative and anecdotal evidence that they do have a different effect with respect to reconsiderations of beliefs. The euphoria of victory, for instance, is often reported to cause people to see their own capabilities more favorably—sometimes to a fanciful degree, with little regard to the full picture of things. If joy does have this effect, it may be because it has a somewhat different affective pattern than happiness. Jaak Panksepp, in good part based on his work on laughter in rats, speculates that this might be the case: “When one feels anxious, the world looks bleaker. When one laughs, the world seems brighter. It seems that joy lowers the neural threshold for perceiving life events as being positive and hopeful, while raising the threshold for perceiving events as negative and hopeless.” However, the evidence for this is

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83 Marcus 2003.
84 Pankseep 2003, 189.
not fully developed, and the literature does not suggest that joy has the ability to inhibit the
operation of other cognitive and brain systems in the way that anxiety does—so it is clearly not
part of the surveillance system. Alternatively, it may be a secondary effect of the emotional
experience—the strongly positive physical sensations associated with joy may themselves
provoke introspection about its cause. This introspection would then take place in a
context in which emphasizes the positive aspects of events.

Accordingly, this suggests two major points about learning from positive events in war.
Under conditions of contentedness/happiness, a reconsideration of a theory of victory is not
likely. As a disposition system emotion, it tends to stimulate a reliance on existing modes of
thought. This sort of reaction also makes intuitive sense, since when plans are unrolling as
anticipated there is little reason to change. However, when events provoke a joyful reaction, a
reconsideration of beliefs is more likely—though not as certain as is the case with anxiety.
However, unlike the reconsideration associated with anxiety, which has strong affect-driven
cognitive biases promoting changes to better respond to threat, this reconsideration will often
lead to speculation about new courses of action that are more favorable than existing modes of
action.

85 I am indebted to George Marcus for suggesting this general approach (personal communication). Such
a situation would be entirely consistent with Just, Criger, and Belt’s (2007) discussion of hope, which they
describe as being elicited by `how we think about and interpret our external environment’ (234). Consistent with the approach I am arguing for, they suggest that hope is a response to
uncertain, uncontrollable situations where a preferable outcome is seen as possible.
86 In this sense its downstream effects would be similar to those of anxiety, as scholars have found that in
addition to provoking information search and usage, anxiety tends to focus attention on the threatening
or negative characteristics of events or situations. This interpretation is consistent with Just, Crigler, and
Belt’s (2007) findings in their study of hope in the context of candidate evaluation. They expect that hope
is likely to ‘encourage individuals to seek out further information, (235), much as with fear, and their
experimental findings show it causing people to use campaign communication materials more fully—just
as is the case with what they call fear (but which seems equivalent to my discussion of anxiety).
Hypotheses

This discussion yields as set of hypotheses about learning in war. They speak to four key dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the timing of belief reconsiderations. The second is the actual occurrence of changes in beliefs. I separate the two because they are analytically distinct; a reconsideration of beliefs necessarily precedes a change in beliefs, but one can reconsider beliefs without changing them. Separating the analysis provides insight into the learning process, since it separates the occasion of thinking about changing from the reasoning process involved in actually changing beliefs.

Hypothesis 2: Series of events’ likelihood of provoking a reconsideration of events is tied to the emotional response associated with their characteristics.

2.1: Series of events that are novel and perceived as contrary to a theory of victory are likely to cause a reconsideration of beliefs about how war aims will be gained because they stimulate anxiety.

2.2: Series of events that are familiar and perceived as contrary to a theory of victory are not likely to provoke a reconsideration of beliefs about how war aims will be gained because they stimulate anger.

2.3: Series of events that are perceived as confirmatory of a theory of victory are not likely to provoke a reconsideration of beliefs about how war aims will be gained, because they will provoke happiness/contentedness.

2.4: Series of events that are perceived as positive and novel may provoke a reconsideration of beliefs about how war aims will be gained because they can stimulate joy.

E. Theory Re-selection, Changes in War Aims, and the Admission of Defeat or Declaration of Victory

The last stage of this theory addresses what happens when leaders reconsider their theory of victory. Sometimes this reconsideration will end with a decision to maintain the
approach used thus far; at other times, new theories of victory will be selected. These
decisions—to stay the course or to change course but remain at war or to try to quit the war—
constitute decisions to either continue the war or, variously, admit defeat or declare victory. Of
course, depending on one’s perspective, the same act can be described as a declaration of
victory or an admission of defeat.

Perhaps the most important element of this complex decision—and the key factor in
determining when war termination will occur—is the level of war aims sought going forward.
Because these war aims are their proposal for a war-ending agreement, they indicate both what
the war is about now and what they will settle for, given their current beliefs about the war.
The more different they are from those of their opponent, the less likely their opponent is to
accept them; the more similar they are, the more likely an agreement is possible in the near
future. A decision to set their aims at the same level as their opponent demands is an effective
acceptance of their demand, and may even be phrased as such. If they see themselves coming
out ahead in this agreement, they are likely to consider it a victory; but crucially it is a ‘declared
victory’ because they could have, in principal, gone further. If they come out behind, they are
likely to see it as an admission of defeat—though one made while they still had some capability
to resist.

This reconsideration itself occurs under the influence of emotion: in the case of negative
falsification, most likely anxiety but possibly anger; in the case of positive falsification, either
happiness or joy. This emotion exerts some influences on the degree to which aims change.
Along with the emotional context in which the reconsideration occurs, these decisions are also
strongly influenced by the kind of theory of victory being pursued to that point. In addition to
the particular logics associated with the different theories of victory, they interact with domestic
political incentives related to the politics of mobilization, the characteristics of the military situation, and leaders’ perceptions of their opponent’s theory of victory.

As was made clear in earlier sections, there are multiple ways in which the theories of victory can be falsified. They can be found to have underestimated the opponent and overestimated their own capabilities, which I call negative falsification. They may also find that they have overestimated their opponent or underestimated themselves and the aims they can acquire through their strategy. I call this positive falsification. Negative falsification is more common, given tendencies to over-estimate one’s own power (for instance, Johnston 2004; Smith and Stam 2004). After a negative falsification, I expect leaders to search for a new theory of victory, or try to make concessions and thus end the war. After a positive falsification of their theory of victory, leaders may be moved by greed to seek greater aims. But they may be content with their current aims, and merely comforted by the knowledge that they have the capacity to take more if they want it.

Negative Falsification

After a theory of victory has been negatively falsified, leaders face a set of decisions about how to proceed. They can try another theory of victory, which may involve new aims or new strategies, or they may try to escape from the war itself. Continuing will likely require a

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87 It is possible that leaders may hold onto a theory of victory they no longer believe in, but expecting them to do so requires an irrationalist approach to decision-making, and thus it lays outside of my explanation. A state may remain committed to a theory of victory which the state leaders do not believe, of course, if those leaders are unable to persuade veto players that experience has shown it to be implausible. Thus while there may be circumstances that mitigate against their instantiating a change in aims or strategy, this only means that leaders are pursuing policies that they no longer believe in, rather than continuing to believe things they know to be false. In general, I do not expect this situation to occur, however. As such, while I would not argue that diversionary logics never underpin leaders’ decision-making, they do not provide the central base of my analysis.

88 For this reason, the patterns of aims and strategy change after a falsification differ according to whether the change in beliefs is positive or negative.
new infusion of resources, and possibly mobilizing the country to a much greater extent. Such an effort to escape generally involves decreasing their war aims, since war termination requires the acquiescence of their enemy, and gaining that acquiesce requires termination terms acceptable to their enemy. The degree to which aims change depends on the circumstance of the reconsideration. Reconsiderations that occur under anxiety have different characteristics from those that occur under conditions of anger, and, accordingly, the choices made under the influences of the different emotions differ significantly. When reconsiderations are driven by anxiety, leaders’ choices depend in good part on the kind of theory of victory just falsified. This relationship between the falsified theory of victory and the strategic choices of leaders exists because of a set of functional, political, and military factors that relate in different ways to the different kinds of theories of victory. The range of changes in aims, moreover, is quite broad. When reconsiderations are made under the influence of anger, however, and changes in aims will likely be small unless they are militarily unable to continue.

**Logical Constraint**

The first consideration is the logical constraints on which theories of victory will seem plausible after an initial one has been falsified. This constraint is derived from the underlying beliefs that support the theories of victory. If a leader decides to enter a conflict because his model of battle suggests that he can (for instance) convincingly defeat his opponent’s forces, and then he learns from reality that his model of battle was incorrect, his model of battle changes, as well. This changed belief then affects the range of theories of victory that will then seem plausible.
Thus, the progression of changed beliefs affects the range of act-aim combinations that will seem like realistic options.89

Logical constraint affects changes in beliefs about both the military and the actors’ responses to war. If a state finds that its military capabilities are such that it cannot execute a demonstration of power, they will not believe that the same level of forces can be used to eliminate their opponent. Hence, the falsification of an informative theory of victory can make some kinds of brute force theories of victory seem invalid as well. Similar effects are associated with beliefs about their opponent. If they do not believe that their opponent will respond to costs, it will also seem implausible that information will affect their calculations, since anticipated cost has much to do with making leaders responsive to information from the war.

This means that there is a sequential element in the relationship between the theories of victory. In the absence of an exogenous shock like a major technological jump or an infusion of higher-quality allied troops, informative theories of victory only make sense at the beginning of a war. Hence there are limits to states’ abilities to use information. Once serious fighting has happened, and particularly if a leader believes that a theory of victory has failed, leaders are unlikely to believe that further demonstrations of capability will change their adversary’s relative power estimates enough to prefer conceding to the initial demands.90 Accordingly, only attritive theories of victory and brute force theories of victory not premised on a walk-over will seem plausible after an informative theory of victory has failed.

89 Note that this is all subjective constraint. As should be very clear by now, I cannot say exactly how all beliefs will change.
90 The adversary may, however, have learned enough from whatever fighting went on before to be willing to make some concessions. Though the purpose of the fighting may not have been to transmit information, the opponent may nevertheless have learned enough to prefer to give up something. But given that the styles of fighting that might be associated with brute force or attritive theories of victory are less likely to communicate information, it is less likely that the estimates would change so much that the full slate of demands would be conceded.
In contrast, attritive theories of victory remain plausible alternatives as long as leaders believe that their opponent is susceptible to the political costs that can be generated by fighting. Thus, leaders may start their war with an attritive theory of victory, or may switch to one from any of the other three theories of victory. Once fighting kills this belief, however, the only alternatives are between a brute force theory of victory and making the concessions necessary to quit the war.

Brute force theories of victory may rest on expectations of easy victory, but they may also anticipate a difficult death-struggle. Any fighting seen as failed, including that pursued under a brute force theory of victory, may eliminate the former as a plausible alternative. Beyond that, though, assuming that leaders believe they have enough resources to enact them, brute force theories of victory are always plausible alternatives after a theory of victory has been falsified because they are not predicated conquest or elimination rather than a belief that fighting can change the opponent’s preferences. Once one fails, diminished war aims are almost certainly necessary, even if the leader continues fighting with another brute force effort or an attritive theory of victory. Continuing with another brute force theory of victory involves diminished aims because the message of the failure was that the arms were insufficient to the task. Continuing with an attritive theory of victory implies diminished aims because it requires convincing the opponent to give up, and they are unlikely to give up things that they know could not be taken by conquest.

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91 This should not be taken to mean that all brute force theories of victory are always plausible; the model of battle—which may suggest that the fight will be very hard—is still an important part of the equation. Rather, if there are enough resources to implement them, a big if, some brute force TOVs like conquest and extermination are always logically possible.
**Domestic Political Incentives**

The second major consideration in my analysis of leaders’ decisions is the incentive structure emerging from domestic politics. The first part of this structure relates to social resource extraction. Recall that there are different resource requirements generally associated with the types of theory of victory. Because extracting resources from society for warlike purposes carries with it political costs, having different resource requirements implies that the different theories of victory will have different political costs and thus different domestic political incentives associated with them. Moreover, the more that a government demands resources from its people, the more difficult it will be to maintain their hold on power, *ceteris paribus*. Therefore, because they are less likely to require further extraction of resources from society, small-scale brute force and all informative theories of victory will be seen as cheap options. Pursuing an attritive or a large-scale brute force theory of victory, however, will generally be a burden upon one’s own society—one that society may reject by removing their leadership from office. Anticipating this risk, some state leaders may be deterred from going that route, preferring instead to make concessions, upon the perceived failure of their cheap brute force or informative theories. After a large-scale brute force theory of victory, or an attritive theory of victory fails, rejecting concessions and continuing the war with another theory of victory of either type will often require making further demands upon society; however, state leaders will be relatively like to continue despite this because once mobilized, further demands for resources involve smaller shocks to the civil populace. Each significant new demand upon society, though, remains a crucial decision point, as leaders must weigh whether they prefer to make the demand or make concessions to their opponent.
The second part of the domestic politics incentive structure is grounded in the responses of non-leaders to the war and its progress. Other state elites, some of whom could challenge the leader for his job, also learn and may even have the ability to shape the course of the war. To maintain his position, and perhaps his life, a state leader must retain their confidence. Similarly, there is also some wider set of constituents—perhaps the bulk of a state’s population, perhaps considerably less—whose support is necessary for their continued leadership.\(^2\) Obviously, many in these groups may lack access to first class information. This is particularly true of the latter group.

They nevertheless learn, however; they certainly learn about the costs of war, since these more common folk tend to bear the costs of war more directly. Their learning, in turn, affects the state leader’s incentives (and those of his lieutenants and possible competitors), as mediated by his beliefs about them (see for instance Foyle 1998). As the costs rise and if they see fewer and fewer prospects of victory, their support for continued fighting will likely fail (see also Smith 1997 and Downs and Rocke 1992).\(^3\) This decline in support may be bearable if the leader need not demand further resources for the war, as is generally the case in the brute force and informative theories of victory. Attritive strategies, however, generally require the mobilization of societal resources; if things do not go well, they may require making mobilizing demands on society more than once. These demands are particularly important because they are likely to increase the perceived cost of the war more than casualties alone, since while only

\(^2\) The relationship between corporate management, a board of directors, and shareholders is essentially homologous to this one.

\(^3\) Mueller 1973; Page and Shapiro 1992; Gelpi, Feaver, and Wilkening 2006. Official propaganda can mute bad news, but it cannot eliminate it; indeed, the muting of propaganda often gives rise to worse rumors, as official telegrams bearing news of the dead begin to appear in large numbers.
some families experience the loss of soldiers, most all experience taxes and rationing. As the leadership perceives (or anticipates) falling support and rising defeatism among their population, then, it will be more wary of making further demands on society. If the leader persists in pursuing failing, costly policies, his senior leadership may well grow weary of his folly and act against him (and if they fail to do so, others may do it for them, likely getting rid of the whole slate in the process). His ability to resist the dangers of any discontented is dependent on his retaining the confidence of others who will suppress any insurrection.

Quitting too early, however, may be equally dangerous. Concessions—be they things lost to an enemy or merely left on the table—can be dangerous if the population or other elites did not believe that the course of the war merited quitting yet. Conceding some specially valued aims may lead to a revolutionary rage dangerous to the leader, particularly if others do not yet see the situation as desperate enough to warrant their surrender.

Military Circumstances

In addition to these political and functional limits on secondary theory of victory selections, the practical effects of warfare also influence what is strategically possible, and therefore, the range of theories of victory that are possible. While many theories of victory are perceived to have failed long before the army or navy is broken, this kind of military collapse is a possible outcome of combat and can, should it occur as part of the series of events that falsify a theory of victory, strongly affect a state’s bargaining position vis-à-vis its opponent. More precisely, a military collapse occurs when a country’s military forces are no longer able to fight

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94 During WWI, even in the case of France, which lost almost 2 million soldiers, lost only 1 percent of its population. There are exceptions—like the odd case of Paraguay losing 90% of its male population during the War of the Triple Alliance, but these results are both rare and, when encountered, highly peculiar.
coherently. In such a situation, a state’s ability to continue either offensive or defensive activity is gravely limited.

These limitations arise because successful military action requires coordination between units. This is true not only because the units are more effective—and less dangerous to themselves—when they work together, but because different units bear different arms, have different levels of experience and skill, and fulfill different tasks, including vital unarmed logistical and combat support tasks. The classic strategic breakthrough is a useful if incomplete metaphor for military collapse, in the sense that its effectiveness lay in the opportunities it offers to weaken and disorganize combat units by attacking them from the flank and rear, and to directly attack weakly protected communications, logistics, and support channels, further weakening and disorganizing the combat units. It is an incomplete metaphor in the sense many strategic breakthroughs do not constitute military collapse, since states may have additional forces available to continue the fight with.95

When effective coordination becomes more difficult or impossible because command or communication breaks down, or as units with vital functions are degraded or eliminated, reinforcement alone is often insufficient to rehabilitate military effectiveness. In the short to middle term, replacement is more likely to be effective. Replacement, however, requires a great deal of resources, men, and materiel—and these will often not be available in time to save the situation before collapse turns into rout and rout turns into annihilation. Thus, while not all future military activity is foreclosed by a military collapse (for instance, guerilla strategies may remain possible), an incoherent force is unlikely to be able to effectively fight or resist even

95 The idea of ‘military collapse’ thus also has something to do with Clausewitz’s center-of-gravity concept. However, unlike some of his interpreters, I limit it to purely military factors.
Nevertheless, military collapse can sharply limit the range of theories of victory that remain available to states and state leaders. These limits, in turn, affect the range of war aims that states can continue to pursue through fighting. However, their effects on the level of war aims sought are different depending on the kind of theory of victory being pursued to that point. The most interesting effects are evident in states that have been pursuing attritive theories of victory. When pursuing an attritive theory of victory, states are able to maintain their war aims so long as they are able to keep fighting. Thus, in the absence of military collapse, war aims are likely to remain at similar levels or perhaps decline only slightly as successive attritive theories of victory are falsified. But a military collapse wipes out their ability to continue fighting at anything near the same level—thus greatly diminishing the costs their opponent must pay to continue fighting—and possibly even open their territory to occupation, plunder, and atrocity. Thus should a military collapse appear imminent to state leaders, they will become increasingly willing to make increasingly large concessions in the hope of avoiding that eventuality by ending the war first. The size of the concessions will increase exponentially as the perceived time to collapse increases because terms their opponent will likely demand more will grow as they also see collapse becoming imminent. Should collapse be reached, either as an unexpected turn of events or because a deal could not be struck in time, war aims are likely to fall dramatically because their ability to impose costs will have dissolved and the remaining alternatives are apt to be effective in brute force or attritive theories of victory associated with much lower war aims.

The effects of military collapse on war aims when states have been pursuing informative and brute force theories of victory are likely to be less significant. State leaders pursuing an informative theory of victory are much less likely to encounter military collapse, since the
indicators likely to cause alarm for them—failures to win battles, or to win them as easily as they expected—should be encountered long before military collapse. Nevertheless, should resistance to learning from events bring them to that point, or should the military collapse at the first battle, the effect should nevertheless be the same as falsification produced by any other series of events—lower aims; the only difference is that now mobilization is likely impossible. In the case of informative theories of victory, then, a falsification through military collapse merely means that the dramatic decline of aims is theoretically over-determined.

When military collapse occurs in the context of a brute force theory of victory, the effect on war aims is similarly uninteresting. Once again, the indicators problems in a brute force theory of victory are such that the theory should be falsified long before military collapse. Should a collapse occur, however, war aims will likely fall to the point that the residual forces can control—or whatever can be bargained for by using this as a chip. Overall, the collapse of aims should be smaller than would be the case if an informative or attritive theory of victory were being used, since in both cases the aims are greater than the relationship between the aims the state of the battlefield.

Anxiety Hypotheses

Because anxiety causes individuals to try to acquire and use new information in devising solutions to novel problems, leaders influenced by it are likely reconsider their approach to the war in the broadest possible sense, including changes in strategy, theory of victory, level of mobilization, and war aims. Four considerations undergird my analysis—the logical constraints on the uses of informative theories of victory, the incentives associated with domestic politics, the risks of military collapse, and perceptions of their opponent’s theory of victory.
Informative Theories of Victory

These factors tend to have reinforcing characteristics on state leaders’ decisions once they have concluded that an informative theory of victory has failed. The logical constraints on the use of information mean that they are unlikely to select another informative theory of victory, so their choice is between mobilizing and pursuing an attritive or brute force theory of victory, and making enough concessions to mollify their opponent. Their ability to mobilize is determined by the degree of public support for the conflict, for without it, leaders will risk office by mobilizing. If they believe that they lack public support for the war, then, they are unlikely to mobilize and are likely to make significant concessions, in a bid to get out of the war before it becomes more dangerous to them.

If they believe that they have enough support for the war, they will prefer to mobilize—in part because it promises a better outcome in the war, and in part failing to pursue a popular war may actually be politically dangerous for them. Doing so may mitigate any need for reducing their war aims. This is particularly true if they perceive their opponent to be themselves pursuing an informative theory of victory: merely by mobilizing they may be able to extract concessions from their opponent. There may be some need to reduce their aims if their opponent is pursuing a brute force theory of victory or an attritive theory of victory when they take up one of these kinds of theories of victory, merely because it requires more effort to acquire war aims with these approaches to conflicts. However, should they pursue a theory of victory that requires mobilization, may decline to decrease, or even increase, their war aims, in hopes of maintaining domestic support for the war.

Accordingly, it is likely that when an informative theory of victory is perceived to be falsified by state leaders, they with either decrease their aims to the point that they believe
their opponent will agree to end the conflict in a bid to escape the war, or mobilize, pursue a different kind of theory of victory and maintain or even increase their war aims.

**Attritive Theories of Victory**

For states whose leaders have been pursuing an attritive theory of victory and found it to be unworkable, their response will be driven by the emerging military reality and their ability to put further resources into the conflict. At this point, a switch to an informative theory of victory is not likely to be seen as plausible, since combat has already been tried and has gone more poorly than expected. The remaining options, then, are another attritive theory of victory, or a brute force theory of victory; a brute force theory of victory may be necessary if they believe that their opponent will not respond any further to the costs of war by making concession. Continuing with these theories of victory is possible, if state leaders believe that there are more resources to put into the conflict. In such a case, war aims are likely to decline only slightly, if at all. If further resources are not available, either for political reasons or because no additional resources exist, war aims are likely to lower in ways that depend upon the military situation.

Because states pursuing attritive theories of victory often risk the military collapse of their forces, the perceived time to that point will have an important, almost gravitational pull on state leaders’ war aims unless they are able to reinforce their military and push that moment further off. It is only as this point is perceived to approach that state leaders will make significant concessions—including concessions great enough to meet their opponent’s demands. Once they are nearing this point of collapse, only the perception that their opponent is closer to a collapse will put a brake on their concessions.
Given these factors, after an attritive theory of victory is falsified, it is unlikely that aims will decrease significantly, unless leaders perceive themselves near the point of a military collapse.

**Brute Force theories of victory**

Because it is unlikely that state leaders will select an informative theory of victory once fighting which failed to meet state leaders’ objectives has occurred, it is unlikely that leaders will switch from a brute force theory of victory to an informative theory of victory. Attritive theories of victory are only available if leaders believe that their opponent will be responsive to costs. Continuance with a brute force theory of victory is only possible if state leaders are able to devote more resources to it; if this is not possible, state leaders will likely to decide to try to get out with what they have. If they are strong enough to impose that (reduced) settlement without the assent of their opponent, the war ends there; if not, they may have to make further concessions and seek an agreement with their enemy. Large concessions, then, are only likely if they have not yet mobilized and confront a military collapse. Otherwise, smaller reductions in aims are likely.

The anxiety hypotheses are therefore:

**Hypothesis 3:** *The degree to which war aims decrease after a theory of victory is falsified under the influence of anxiety is dependent on the kind of theory of victory falsified.*

- **Hypothesis 3.1** After an informative TOV has been falsified, leaders will either decrease their aims substantially or mobilize their forces and either maintain their forces or make small concessions.
- **Hypothesis 3.2** After an attritive TOV has been falsified, aims will decrease substantially only if strategic collapse is perceived to be imminent or to have already occurred.
- **Hypothesis 3.3** After a brute force TOV has been falsified, aims will decrease slightly and will decrease substantially after strategic collapse has occurred.
Frustration Hypothesis

If anxiety causes leaders to re-examine their approach to a war in the broadest possible sense, leaders reconsidering an approach to their war under the influence of anger or frustration do so in the narrowest possible way. They arrive at this point only by default, as they run out of workable course corrections with which to respond to what they are apt to see as mistakes and bad luck, rather than because their beliefs about the nature of the conflict and their opponent have been seriously questioned. Accordingly, most of the time, any changes to their theory of victory are likely to be small, and the concessions they are willing to make are apt to be small and offered grudgingly. Because their focus will be on adjusting their aims to meet the limitations of their approach to the war, rather than considering a wide range of alternatives, the theory of victory will not have any particular influence on their decisions to change aims.

The only exception to this rule occurs when military collapse threatens or actually occurs. While military collapse is, in general, likely to be an anxiety eliciting event, in principle it could be associated with a reconsideration associated with anxiety. In this case, the leaders’ beliefs about what is possible are confronted with the fact that their forces are overtly unable to perform the tasks expected of them. Though they may never change their beliefs about what ‘should’ have been possible, they will be likely to try to escape the conflict nevertheless.

Hypothesis 4: States reconsidering their war aims under conditions of anger/frustration will make only small concessions, unless a military collapse is imminent or has already occurred. Then they will agree to most if not all of their opponent’s demands.
Positive Falsification

It is straightforward that when things go poorly, there will be a tendency to change one’s approach, either by changing aims, throwing more resources at the problem, or changing strategy. What is perhaps less evident is the problem of predicting how success will influence a state’s position. The traditional bargaining models, not unlike traditional neo-realism,\(^\text{96}\) tend to have a ‘status-quo bias’: that is, the maximum size of the prize which the states contest through war is fixed from the outset (Fearon 1995, for example); only state leaders acting under the influence of perverse incentives would increase their aims beyond those set at the outset.\(^\text{97}\) Thus their construction fails to anticipate any increases in war aims in response to success; and there is no lack of examples where aims do not increase in response to success—though this is sometimes because further increase is impossible, because the existing aim is conquest. Yet sometimes we do find state leaders increasing war aims during the war itself; this is most pronounced in cases that are identified as examples of over-reaching—starting a war with achievable aims but increasing them to the point that they are beyond one’s power—but these are hardly the only cases. When, then, and by how much are state leaders likely to increase their war aims?

The decisions state leaders make about their war aims are tantamount to decisions to declare victory or continue fighting. By not increasing their war aims, they make the formation of an agreement with their enemy an earlier, if not an immediate, possibility. When they do increase their war aims, however, they make the prolongation of the war more likely. The question they face, then, is when to bring about the termination of a war; do they up the ante

\(^{96}\) Schweller 1997.  
\(^{97}\) Goemans 2000.
and go for more, or do they decide that a bird in the hand is indeed better than two in the bush?

Should they continue the war, or declare that their purpose is achieved, their mission accomplished, in short, that victory has arrived?

**General Considerations**

There are two ways that aims can increase. One is to maintain the same kind of theory of victory—and quite likely the same strategy—but increase the demands associated with it. The second is to change the strategy or even the kind of theory of victory, and through that change increase the war aims, as well. A change in strategy (and an associated increase in war aims) is most likely the product of a technological or doctrinal development that makes a use of force, previously unimagined, possible. A change in the kind of theory of victory being pursued is most likely the product of a change in beliefs about what the opponent will respond to. For instance, if state leaders may start out believing that their opponent will not respond to information about capabilities, and therefore pursue a brute force or attritive theory of victory. Should their opponent then respond to that information from the fighting by making concessions, state leaders may change to an informative theory of victory, and correspondingly increase their war aims—either to the level offered by their opponent or even higher.  

Unlike the decisions to make concessions, decisions to increase war aims are made in the absence of coercive pressure from the enemy. Nevertheless, there are constraints on leaders’ ability to increase their war aims. The most obvious are ceiling effects: if states are pursuing conquest, or if the marginal cost of war aims beyond the status quo increases steeply, it may be difficult if not impossible to increase war aims. More importantly, these increases in

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98 The series of events necessary to falsify this theory of victory may not be straightforward—there will be resistance to learning if leaders believe their opponent may be cunning and this trying to trick them—so a credible communication will be necessary to produce joy and reconsideration.
war aims are only ‘free’ so long as they do not require further resources and effort; decisions to increase war aims that require further mobilization should be less likely because they may arouse the populace. Additionally, increases in war aims pose risks of extending the duration of the war, by pushing back the point at which a bargaining space may open. It may even be counter-productive, since it could provoke further support for fighting among the enemy’s populace, and thus allowing him to increase the effort devoted to the war. Raising aims does pose some domestic risks for state leaders, then, inasmuch as a longer war, or an enemy fighting harder, could lead to increased political costs for them.

**Contentedness Hypothesis**

Happiness or contentedness is the most likely outcome of a theory of victory being successfully executed: that which was anticipated comes to pass. Under these conditions, state leaders are relatively unlikely increase their aims, and when they do, they are likely to be cautious about doing so. Contentedness, after all, is unlikely to promote a reconsideration of states’ beliefs. Given that they are experiencing success, and the fact that contentedness suppresses learning, they are unlikely to consider different kinds of theories of victory. Any increase in aims, then, is likely to be small and have an opportunistic character, and motivated by a cautious unwillingness to ‘upset the apple cart.’ Moreover, the kinds of series of events that give rise to contentedness are unlikely to suggest levels of relative power or resolve very different from those that gave rise to the current theory of victory—given that they were anticipated. Accordingly, under the influence of contentedness, any increase in aims is likely to be relatively small.

**Hypothesis 5:** Under conditions of contentedness, increases in aims are likely to be small or non-existent.
Joy Hypothesis

Joy is the product of events that suggest that things are going much better than expected, by events that are not only positive, but positive in an unanticipated or novel way. Unlike happiness, joy seems to predispose people to reconsider their approach to how they are doing things. Unlike anxiety, it seems to predispose them to discount their limitations. Accordingly, under conditions of joy, I expect leaders to increase their war aims, and possibly change other aspects of their theories of victory. Under these conditions it is particularly likely that state leaders will increase their aims in ways that can lead to over-reaching. This tendency to over-reach is likely to be further exaggerated since the military and political events that are likely to stimulate joy are events that are themselves suggestive of a more favorable situation, ripe with greater opportunities than leaders had earlier imagined.

In general, the largest increases in aims are associated informative theories of victory, in good part because the leaders themselves view the acts as having informational effects beyond their direct military consequences. In this context, the novel positive events that are likely to produce joy are likely to be involve really striking victories beyond even the imagination of the state leader or his advisors. Thus, not only will they be open to reconsidering their approach to the war, they will be likely to believe that they are capable of informing their enemy that they have far underestimated them—indeed, more than they themselves had realized—and thus will be most likely to magnify their aims the most. A similar effect can be seen during the first phase of a war when states are pursuing brute force or attritive theories of victory and their opponents unexpectedly show a responsiveness to the information about relative capability created by fighting by, for instance, offering concessions. Then, state leaders
may be influenced by joy and reconsider their approach to the war by changing to an informative theory of victory and increase their war aims substantially.

**Hypothesis 6:** Under conditions of joy, increases in aims are likely, particularly if they make informative theory of victory possible.

**Responding to the Opponent’s Concessions**

The discussion to this point has focused on the decisions confronted through the negative falsification of beliefs. This is perhaps the most important means by which decision-points are reached. Another, relatively obvious in nature, occurs when the opponent makes the desired concessions at the point anticipated, thus confirming state leaders’ theories of victory. In this case, no further explanation of the decision is necessary. One situation meriting consideration, however, exists when opponents offer concessions before the point in the theory of victory when they are expected. Although such an event can contribute to the positive falsification of a theory of victory, this situation is not entirely synonymous with positive falsification. Beliefs about what can be achieved do not necessarily change just because the opponent has made some concessions—particularly if those concessions do not meet the full slate of demands against them. Nevertheless, the offer of concessions necessitates a decision about whether or not to accept them. Important differences in behavior exist between the theories of victory because of the different points in the process of fighting time at which concessions are expected.

In the brute force theory of victory, state leaders expect to obtain their desired state of affairs without the agreement of their opponent. Thus, they expect to end their military

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99 In this situation, for purposes of learning, concessions may act as confirming events. Again, the fact that a concession has been made early does not necessarily enough to falsify a theory of victory in itself, though in some circumstances it may.
operations when they have achieved their aims, and vice versa. What happens, then, when (unbidden) the opponent offers concessions, before those aims are fully realized? If they offer only limited concessions, the state leaders are unlikely to accept them—they still believe they can realize their full aims, at an acceptable cost; that their opponent has made some concessions is only likely to spur them on, suggesting that even their opponent knows that he is losing. The only case in which he might be tempted is if the difference between the concessions his opponent is willing to make, and the concessions he wants his opponent to make, is no more than the long-term costs of succeeding without an agreement. If the opponent offers to meet all demands, state leaders—now encouraged by their opponent’s apparent pessimism—may weigh potential additional gains (including the costs of continued fighting) that might be realized by merely completing their plans against taking their gains. The state leadership is likely to accept, since this yields an almost optimal situation: everything they initially sought, without any of the costs of ending without an agreement. Increase aims?

With regard to this question, the informative theory of victory is similar to the brute force theory of victory. State leaders expect to reap their aims once their demonstrative operation is complete. When their opponents offer concessions before this is achieved, unless they offer to meet the demands in full, state leaders are unlikely to accept. Doing so would seem to be accepting less than they need to, since they still expect to convince their opponent to meet all of their demands and their opponent has tacitly agreed that he is on the run. Only two situations suggest incentives to the contrary. First, if the difference between concessions offered and demanded is less than the costs of fighting to completion, they may accept these limited concessions. This is an unlikely situation given the generally cheap costs of informative theories of victory, but it may nevertheless occur when the stakes are relatively small. Second,
if the offer to concede is paired with a threat to adopt an attritive theory of victory, states
uninterested in pursuing a war of resolve may accept the limited concessions rather than pay
those costs. Last, should they offer to meet all demands, state leaders—now encouraged by
their opponent’s apparent pessimism—may weigh potential additional gains (including the costs
of continued fighting) that might be realized by merely completing their plans against taking
their gains. Here, I expect the better deal to obtain. That said, it is more likely that state leaders
will choose to take the money and run, since there is the risk that the opponent has learned all
he will and completing the demonstration may not change his offer.

Attritive theories of victory are different on this point. Unlike the other two theories of
victory, attritive theories of victory are expected to achieve full demands at a point determined
by politics, rather than by the process of military operations. Demands are expected to be
harvested not after the opponent militarily collapses, but rather when that point is approaching.
Should that point be reached, of course, substantial increases in state aims are possible. But
most state leaders will not enter a war under an attritive theory of victory expecting to continue
until the destruction of their opponent’s military forces. They expect concessions before the
(very costly) military process is complete. This being the case, should their opponent offer
concessions before that definitive point is reached, state leaders will be more apt to accept
them. If they are limited concessions, of course, the decision to accept will involve a bit more
calculation—that a concession is made suggests the other side believes it is losing, but is
obtaining all of the demands worth the costs of doing so? If they are full, it is very likely that
state leaders will accept the offer, rather than trying to raise them. The only exception might be
if they believe that their opponent is at the very verge of full collapse, and reaching that point
involves little cost. In this case, they might extort more, or even wait for the collapse of their opponent’s essential fighting force and thus his bargaining power.

Other Approaches to Learning and War

My approach, like most recent scholarship, argues that leaders’ learning during war is central to the process of war. This section mostly addresses the differences between my theory and these theories. Before doing so, however, it is useful to note that some scholars argue that leaders do not learn from wartime events.\textsuperscript{100} They argue that changes in leadership will often be necessary for peace agreements to be made. This is clearly seen to not be the case in the research presented.

Recent scholarship on learning in war or foreign policy has been related to one of two more general theoretical approaches. The best known are rationalist approaches derived from Bayes’ Theorem. All formal theoretic work and some applied work relies on this algorithm for changing beliefs in response to events based on their probabilistic relationship to a set of states of the world.\textsuperscript{101} In the context of war studies, Goemans (2000) and Gartner (1997) are good examples of this approach. Second are the cognitivist psychological theories, which have focused on the ways that existing beliefs, encapsulated in schema, analogies, or theories can

\begin{align*}
p(A \mid B) &= \frac{p(A_i) p(B \mid A_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n p(A_i) p(B \mid A_i)}.
\end{align*}

This calculates the degree to which beliefs about whether A accurately describes the state of the world should change, given that some event B has happened, by dividing the probability that A and B will both occur by the probability will occur regardless of whether or not A accurately describes the state of the world (Morrow 1994: 164).

\textsuperscript{100} Ikle 1971/19991.
\textsuperscript{101} Bayes’ Theorem, formally expressed is
make learning difficult and are sometimes reinforced by biased information processing. These biases originate in desires for self-esteem or the avoidance of pain. Khong (1992), Rosen (1991) and Welch (2005) are good examples of this approach, applied in the context of war and foreign policy. As described above, I articulate a third way—emotional states determine whether people do resist information (often in motivated ways) or respond to events in highly rational ways.

Despite the differences between these general paradigms, the applied predictions for when leaders will change their beliefs in war or crisis are remarkably similar. Goemans’ (2000) Strategic Learning Theory predicts leaders will give up on their strategy as its failures on the battlefield accumulate. Gartner’s (1997) Dominant Indicators approach predicts that strategies will be abandoned when the outcomes of the strategy (as measured by some dominant index) are bad and getting worse. Rosen (1991) predicts change when they become painful without improving the military situation. Welch (2005) predicts policy abandonment when it becomes apparent that further pursuit will only generate pain or catastrophic failure. Given that pain and failure generally go together, it quickly becomes clear that the difference in the applied theories, despite their different paradigmatic affiliations, is strikingly small: all seem to say that bad news, and particularly obviously catastrophic bad news, leads to changes in policy or strategy, eventually.

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102 Rosen 2005 falls, to a certain extent into this category, though he recognizes that not all bad news, even when really bad, will necessarily lead to learning. His approach is similar to Lebow (1981), arguing that panic and possibly depression can lead to an inability to act. I would argue that while the point is true, the mechanism is at best rarely encountered, and a number of the cases in which it is said to have happened may be exaggerations.

103 Indeed, Goemans’ and Gartner’s theories could be equally well derived from cognitivist ideas, and Welch’s and Rosen’s predictions derived from Bayes’ Theorem. In addition to this similarity, these approaches fail to address non-military reasons that leaders may change their aims and strategies, like changes in their beliefs about their opponents’ response to the conflict. The problem is even greater in
Other Approaches to War Termination

My approach to war termination focuses on leaders’ learning from the experience of war and then responding to those changed beliefs, either by changing their theory of victory or by making concessions enough to end the war through an agreement with their enemy. This approach is similar to a number of other approaches, most of which address the costs of fighting. However, some approaches to war termination argue that things other than learning are the most important causes for war termination.

The most obvious might be those who believe that war termination only occurs when the means of fighting no longer exist, that is, when one side’s army is decisively defeated or destroyed. I know of no current scholars who take this position in its purest form—the study of asymmetric war has made it very difficult to do so—but many accounts of war privilege military aspects over political ones. Arreguin-Toft’s account, for example, gives primacy to the relative ability of different kinds of military strategies to defeat one another, and only when this decisive outcome is likely to be absent does he address the potential domestic costs of not winning quickly enough as important for determining outcomes. Stam (1996) similarly focuses on the military aspects of war, addressing the interaction of conventional rather than asymmetric strategies, and addresses domestic politics as a residual factor in war decision-making relative to military factors. Given this tendency, most expect that political calculations should only be brought up in the absence of an early decisive victory—in clear contrast to my approach, in

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104 Mack 1975.
which relative importance of political factors is associated with the function of fighting leaders choose.

Implicit in many of these same accounts also seems to be an expectation that leaders cannot change their strategies, in function as well as form, as well as they might change war aims. They generally seem to believe that once the strategy they start with fails, they can decrease their aims, but shifts in the expected function or scope of fighting are not anticipated. Hence, in their empirics, they treat states as having pursued only one kind of strategy.\textsuperscript{106} Again, this is in clear contrast with my approach, which anticipates change and emphasizes that points at which leaders consider changes to the function or scope of the fighting are among the most important political decision-points in wars.

A diversionary approach to war termination is also in conflict with my hypotheses. Ellsberg (1971) argues that even when state leaders no longer believe in victory, they may continue a war over the long term in an effort to avoid being seen as responsible for a defeat. This logic can be extended to include any situation in which a leader knows that they cannot achieve the aims they claim that they are fighting for, but continue the fight for any domestic political purpose. Notably, this kind of a diversionary logic differs from that which Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) identify in Goemans; in Ellsberg’s approach, the leaders know that there is no means to achieve their aims, whereas in Goemans, they change to a policy with a greater probability of failure, if also greater probability of failure, rather than make concessions and risk political failure.\textsuperscript{107} Moreover, and most importantly, Ellsberg’s hypothesis—that leaders

\textsuperscript{106} Bennett and Stam 1996
\textsuperscript{107} Lamborn 1985; Lepgold and Sterling 2001
continue fights without what I would call a theory of victory—contradicts mine, while Goemans’
does not.

My account emphasizes that decisions to end wars come as leaders either realize the
accomplishment of their theory of victory or as their theory fails and they prefer peace and
perhaps concessions to continuing with another theory of victory. It built on the idea that the
different theories of victory—differentiated most importantly by the function of fighting—yield
different patterns of belief changes as they fail. There are no similar approaches to my
hypothesis that grows out of this. Certainly, this is not evident in the costly-process games
which are now most common in the bargaining approach, all of which assume that fighting
and effort in war has a linear quality and is functionally undifferentiable. The alternative,
therefore, is that while leaders may learn that particular kinds of operations may not work well,
and thus try others, these decisions do not have a clear relationship to the political decisions
about the war, or, for that matter, with the function of the strategies in the context of the war.
Since they recognize no difference in the function of fighting, they do not address the political
implications that confront states and leaders when their adversaries change the function of
fighting in their theory of victory, either.

A wide range of theories address the role of costs as an explanation for wartime political
decisions, and particularly for decisions to terminate. Indeed, even those that focus on military
aspects admit that costs have a role. My approach differs in two ways. First, it focuses not on
aggregate costs to the state, but on the degree to which these costs translate into political costs
for the leader. The potentially high costs of war on the infrastructure and body of a state and
society do not always translate into these kind of political costs, and sometimes quite small

\footnote{Slantchev 2003A,b, 2004; Powell 2004; Smith and Stam 2004; Filson and Werner 2003,2004, 2007.}
absolute costs in lives, dollars, and buildings can translate into very high political costs for leaders. Second, and related, my hypotheses admit the potential role of a demand for war. Ending a war too early, or with too little to show for it, may also lead to political costs for leaders, and they are likely to consider this as well in making decisions. The alternates risk underestimating the pressures to continue that leaders may face that emerge from peoples’ willingness to pay still greater aims in hopes of gaining their aims.

G. Methodology

This section describes the nature of the research I conduct. The plan consists of a series of qualitative and case-based methods of research applied to three wars—the Winter War (Finland-USSR, 1939-1940), the Pacific War, (US-Japan 1941-1945), and the battle of France (France-Germany 1940)—selected because they have qualities that make them useful for testing purposes. The empirics consist of a set of case studies that try to establish the correlation between the variables I identify and the outcomes, in an effort to determine how well my theory, and others, can predict when changes occur and when they do not. These case studies also involve process traces, in which I identify the key moments in each war—when changes occur and when they do not—and use documents, memoirs, and the secondary literature in an effort to check the mechanisms at work. Last, I pool the results from the three cases and analyze how well the key hypotheses faired across the cases.
Case Selection

Key criteria

I use three wars as the empirical fodder for this study. The principal criteria for my selection were the cleanness of my prospective tests. This is because I expect that my theory should work for any war, and if a theory is expected to work equally well for all cases, none can be considered crucial or critical tests. In the absence of arguments about cruciality, practical considerations relevant to effective testing become paramount. The first of these, of course, is that the set of cases should include the full range of independent and dependent variables.

The next criterion was that there be only two principal belligerents. Although other belligerents may be formally involved, and even have troops on the ground, the crucial decisions need to be clearly made in only one capital. Some wars are rendered complex by constellations of belligerents, involved parties, and allies. These complications, while not moderating the fundamental process of the learning and war, can introduce noise and potentially delay into the processes of learning and decision-making. This noise can be derived from the need for inter-allied agreement about aims and strategies, or a further lack of clarity about what is happening in the various theaters of the war. A clean test lacks this noise, hence the importance of having only two principal belligerents.

Third, again motivated by the need to minimize extraneous noise in the testing process, the cases need to be approximately contemporaneous. Failing this, differences in technology introduce noise into the testing process. Changes in communications technology mean that the speed with which messages are transmitted and the amount of information those messages contain has varied widely over the last two centuries. Changes in mechanical technology have similarly impacted the speed of war—armies that move on hoof and foot are far slower than
those moving on tire, tread, and air currents—meaning that the basic pace of war also varies greatly over those centuries. This noise is largely eliminated by selecting cases which are contemporaneous.

Fourth, because many authors believe that the character of a regime affect its political processes, variance on the kind of regimes involved is also important. While I do not expect this to be the case with this process, it is nevertheless possible. Following Goeman’s typology, I include regimes of three types—democratic, anocratic (semi-exclusive/semi-repressive), and dictatorial. I use his codings for the countries. In the event that regime-type does matter, it should be evident in both the correlational studies and the process tracings. Similarly, the wars are of different lengths. While, again, I do not believe that this should matter, it may, and its importance should be evident in the process tracings.

Last, as a matter of convenience, information should be relatively abundant. This suggests that cases should be historical in character. However, I recognize the tradeoff between availability of data and relevance, so while my selections are indeed historical, they occur well into the twentieth century.

The Particular Cases Selected

Both collectively and individually, my cases meet my criteria as closely as possible. They are contemporaneous, all being part of the Second World War, and involve similar levels of technology. Being that six decades have passed, information about them is relatively abundant, but because they involve mechanized militaries, modern tactics, the ability to transmit significant messages very quickly, through radio, telephone, and telegraph, and modern decision-making systems, they are arguably still relevant to modern conflicts. Collectively, they

provide variance on the theories of victory being pursued, length of war, and kind of regime (and, kind of regime that wins and loses). Thus they meet the collective requirements.

Individually, they are both appropriate to the test and interesting conflicts. In the Winter War (30 November 1939-13 March 1940), the Finns, though they eventually made concessions to the Soviets, successfully resisted Stalin’s apparent effort to seize their country like he seized the Baltic States in the preceding months. There were only two parties to this conflict—Finland, overtly democratic but coded by Goemans as anocratic, apparently for its semi-forcible exclusion of communists from politics, and the Soviet Union, an obvious dictatorship. The outcome of the war is particularly interesting given the disparity between the two sides’ fighting capabilities—not only did the Soviets throw far more men and material at the Finns than the small population of their country ever hope to throw back, but that material was as a rule much more advanced than Finland’s. The war is also interesting from a scholarly standpoint—Iklé, who presents a number of hypotheses contrary to mine, draws heavily upon the case in his study (1971/1991).

The Battle of France (May-June 1940) presents a short war between a democracy and a dictatorship, which ends with the French democracy’s acceptance of most German demands. Although it is the case that both France and Germany had allies during the conflict (most prominently the UK in the former case and Italy in the latter), both countries are the principal belligerents in this case. Although there were conversations and joint meetings with the British, most of the military activity in France was French, and the political decision-making was pursued with an eye toward French domestic politics and French interests more generally. The case is also very interesting in terms of the intersection between military acts and political decision-making. Bloch’s classic work *Strange Defeat* (1945) and much of the historiography since then
have focused on the unexpectedness of the outcome, and many discussions emphasize the psychological effects of the German attack on French decision-makers, soldiers, and everyday citizens (for example, May’s (2001) Strange Victory). This conventional wisdom makes the case unusually fertile for testing claims about the reasonableness of the decisions made and the effects of emotion on decision-makers.

The last case is the Pacific War (1941-1945), between the US and Japan, fought by a democracy and an anocracy, with the Japanese anocracy losing. Although it is true that there was substantial cooperation between the US, the British Empire, China, and Australia, the focus of military operations was the Pacific Theater and both the sides recognized that the struggle there between the US and Japan would determine the outcome of the war. Here, too the conventional wisdom makes the case unusually interesting. Common accounts of the war generally stress the American insistence on unconditional surrender and refusal to accept anything less than complete victory (and indeed, one of the early bargaining theorists of war, Kecksmeti, criticized this position for prolonging the war (1957)). They also stress the apparently suicidal determination of the Japanese government of the day to pursue the war well into the Home Islands, and suggest that the shock of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were responsible for the Japanese government’s surrender. These strands of conventional wisdom mean that it is an usually good case for examining the degree to which these leaders evinced bargaining behavior or not, or were acting irrationally. Being a prototype of the ‘shock into surrender’ school of strategy, the case is an important testing ground for examining the nature and role of emotion, and its relationships to reason, in changing beliefs.
Predicting Learning and Decision

The first stage of my analysis is an examination of how well my theory and its alternatives can predict when in time learning will happen. This is the most basic test of my theory—since it is, fundamentally, about explaining when these changes happen. For this test, each belligerent is considered a case. The independent variables are the theories of victory and the series of events (with their characteristics). Coding the theory of victory then makes it possible to code the individual events in terms of theoretically relevant characteristics. Thus coded, I use the general hypothetical statements and to make predictions of whether learning is likely to occur at a particular time, or not. I identify the points in time at which learning occurred, and then analyze the results to determine when my predictions were wrong, when they were correct, and the nature of the errors made (considering both type 1 and type 2 error).

My coding of theories of victory is by definition qualitative. To make the coding, I refer to descriptions of the plans and comments about the war made by leaders and their principal advisors, generals, and staff. In those cases when there is disagreement, I favor those statements made by those responsible for the principal political decisions. In those cases where there are no clear statements to this effect, I turn to the principles which guide the crafting of the strategy itself. Is the purpose to exhaust (attritive), to seize particular parts in the expectation that everything else will fall (informative), or is it to eliminate opposition in part or all of the enemy’s territory (brute force)?

Reconsiderations of policy are coded as occurring when the policy-maker or policy-making group with the ability to change war aims or strategies actively consider changes. Meetings of these groups or meetings of decision-makers with relevant advisors which include discussions of criticisms of the current strategy or aims, or consider changes to aims and
strategy, are the most observable indicators of reconsideration. Of course, individuals will in
many cases come to these meetings having already learned—but that purely mental process is
much harder to capture—so some error is predictable in using this measure, given that meetings
may take time to call and assemble. Given the importance of these decisions, an absence of
advisory meetings is a good indication that no one is reconsidering a policy.

Changes in beliefs are coded as occurring when the key decider or deciding group
concludes that their prior expectations about what aims they can secure, or their expectations
that their strategy will achieve their aims, were incorrect. These changes will generally, but not
necessarily, reflect themselves in changes in the aims or strategy, or both.\footnote{Of course, whether they do or not is a matter or contention within the literature. Those models with diversionary logics built into them do not, of course, expect that changes in belief directly translate into changes in aims or strategy; others, like mine, generally do.} What this means is
that decisions to change aims or strategy are positive indicators of learning, but that the
absence of such a change cannot be assumed to be an absence of learning.\footnote{Here we see a differentiation between the concept of learning and its indicators (Goertz 2006).}

Whenever a reconsideration meeting occurs, then, it is necessary to whatever record of it, or comments
about it, exist, to determine whether there were changes in beliefs but decisions not to change
aims or strategy in spite of that learning.

Changes in war aims are simply recognized: they occur when one state’s leadership
communicates to its opponent, via means direct or indirect, changes in their aims or demands.
Changes in strategy occur when state leaders issue orders to change the allocation of resources
to or within their fighting force, or when they change the targets or the nature of the targets
being pursued by those fighting forces. Changes in leadership or in the units pursuing particular
targets do not constitute changes in strategy (these are at best course corrections) unless they are accompanied by more fundamental changes in the conduct of the fighting.

**Process Tracing**

The purpose of process tracing is to examine the mechanisms by which outcomes were arrived at. Process tracing is particularly valuable in analyzing my theory. Between the fact that the theories of victory, as types, may miss subtle differences instantiations, and the fact that there exist individual differences in the levels of threat, novelty, etc., at which emotions are elicited, my theory of learning is necessarily probabilistic, rather than deterministic. In such a situation, process-tracing is useful for more than just verifying the mechanisms evident in successful prediction. It also provides the basis for determining if errors in prediction are explainable by mechanisms that are nevertheless consistent with the theoretical approach, or if they are in fact supportive of alternative explanations. Note that this combination of a focus on mechanisms and the usage of process tracing helps address the inferential problems of using qualitative methods for probabilistic theory (see for instance Mahoney 2003).

**Pooled Analysis**

Unlike the preceding methods, which are directed at analyzing single wars, and episodes within those wars, the last set of tests have an across-case design. Here, the analysis is focused on examining how well the theories succeed in predicting and explaining the responses to series of events across the cases. To do so, I pool the cases in terms of their independent variables, and examine their predictive power across the different wars. I then evaluate them, focusing on

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112 Bennett and George 2005; Munck 2004; Tarrow 2004; Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004.
113 See Elster’s discussion of mechanisms (1998, ch. 1) to get a sense of how failures in prediction might not necessarily be failures of explanation. See also Trachtenberg 2006 for a discussion of how theories can effectively explain but nevertheless be unable to predict.
ratios of success or failure, and using small comparative studies where relevant to explain and explore the nature of the differences found, (should they be found).

This step in the analysis is particularly important in generating external validity for my research at hand. External validity can be understood as the degree of confidence that the effects found in a single case will hold in others, not tested.\textsuperscript{114} Due to the intensity of the relevant research, two common means of generating external validity, creating a very large sample of cases (wars) or using a sample identical to the population (the approach in research using COW or MIDS data), are relatively impractical. Nevertheless, a degree of external validity can be generated by using a set of cases which have a number of possibly salient differences (in this case, most importantly regime-type and length of war), should similar effects be found.\textsuperscript{115}

These methods, then, set out the organization for remainder of the dissertation. The Winter War and the Invasion of France are both discussed in a chapter each; then the experiences of the US and Japan are investigated in separate chapters. Then pooled analysis is performed in a fourth empirical chapter, along with the presentation of conclusions.

\textsuperscript{114} Brewer 2000; Cook and Campbell 1979; King, Keohane and Verba 1994.
\textsuperscript{115} This argument is similar to those that focus on the potential power of single case studies that produce findings running against conventional wisdom, and has much to do with the “folk-bayesian” logic of case selection (Bennett and George 2005; Rueschmeyer 2003; McKeown 2004).
Chapter 3: The Winter War

Overview of the War

The Winter War was fought by Finland and the Soviet Union between 30 November 1939 and 13 March 1940. Although influenced by the wider Second World War, the war was in most respects a discrete incident. Neither Stalin nor the Finns wanted it linked to the conflict between the Germans and the Western Allies, and while the decisions and acts of third parties strongly influenced the course of events, the fighting was solely between the Finns and the Red Army. Decisions about it were made by Helsinki and Moscow alone.116

The conflict grew out of Soviet insecurity. The German threat was becoming increasingly obvious, and the creation of the Finnish state two decades earlier had complicated the defense of Leningrad and Murmansk. Stalin sought to ameliorate this insecurity through negotiations, but his demands—particularly a mutual assistance treaty, a military base on Hango Peninsula in the western Finland, and a large portion of the Karelian Isthmus—were more than the Finns were willing to grant, even with some compensation.117 After several months of

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117 The Finns were understandably concerned about the nature of these demands. On the Karelian Isthmus, accepting the Soviet demands would entail handing over key parts of their main defensive fortifications against the Soviets (later called the “Mannerheim Line”), rendering it almost useless. A Soviet military base on Hango peninsula, to both sides the critical Gulf of Finland demand, would have endangered Helsinki and all Southern Finland from the west, and with its proposed naval and air facilities, given the Soviets the ability to sever Finland’s access to Baltic sea. This was the demand that most troubled those opposed to concessions. The demands around Petsamo, in Northern Finland, would
fruitless talks, the negotiations were ended. Two weeks later, after a staged border incident, the Soviet Union invaded Finland at points reaching from the extreme south to the extreme north of their border.

This invasion went poorly. The offensive that had been forecast to last two weeks required several reorganizations, and even then was perceived as a failure. In late December, after mass casualties, failures to break Finnish defenses, and embarrassing encirclements of Red Army divisions by small Finnish forces, Stalin halted the attack and set about preparing a new offensive. Having kept the Russians at bay up to this point, a lack of native manpower and more effective Red Army tactics now forced the Finns to repeatedly pull back once the new Soviet offensives against the Karelian Isthmus began in February. By mid-March, the Finnish army had been forced to back to Viipuri and was perhaps within days of collapsing as an effective force. It was saved from this fate by a peace treaty accepted by the Finnish government on 12 March.

During early December, the Finnish government tried hard to restart negotiations. While they had not expected the dispute to come to blows, they were prepared to fight rather than give in—particularly once the Soviets created an ostensible Finnish puppet government, and declared that they would talk only with their puppets. This refusal to talk to the Helsinki government eroded at the very end of December and early January, with hints through the Estonians, Swedes, and Germans that they would be again willing to negotiate. The Finns, having tried hard to reinitiate negotiations earlier, were now only willing to talk once they had endanger Finnish control over valuable nickel deposits and its ice-free port on Artic Ocean. A mutual security pact, giving the Soviets rights to respond to aggression through Finland, was viewed with particular suspicion given their views on “indirect aggression.” Under this doctrine, even internal political developments that the Soviets found uncongenial might be grounds for invasion. As such, the Finns viewed the Soviet demands as demands for their sovereignty rather than mere border re-alignments.

118 On 2 December, they sought American mediation, then two days later, Swedish mediation, then they appealed to the League of Nations, and on 15 December, the Finnish foreign minister made a direct appeal to Moscow by radio.
heard these intimations of a willingness to come to terms. Using an unusual set of
backchannels, talks were restarted in mid-to-late January, but by early February it was clear that
no agreement was as yet mutually acceptable to the two sides, and they were broken off.
Interest in talks was shown again on 13 and 20 February, but in each case Soviet increases in
aims foreclosed Finnish willingness to accept the Soviet terms. On 28 February, the Soviets
issued an ultimatum which the Finns accepted and then—before it was transmitted—rejected
after the French and British promised massive aid. Between 1 March and 12 March, the Finnish
decision-makers ground their way through a maze of ominous news from the front, increasing
Soviet aims, and increasingly illusory promises of western aid. Eventually concluding that peace
was their best bet for survival, they settled with the Soviets, conceding the Hango Peninsula, all
of the Karelian Isthmus, including the city of Viipuri, territory north of Lake Ladoga, the
Fisherman’s (Rybacchi) Peninsula in the North, and the construction of a railway connecting the
Soviet border with the Swedish border. Although they avoided Soviet involvement in Finnish
domestic politics and retained their sovereignty—itself something of a humiliation for the
USSR—the outcome was in most respects much worse than it would have been had the Finns
ended the war even a month earlier.
Figure 1: Map 3.1: The Winter War

Courtesy Department of History, USMA
Section 1: What Mattered in the War?

The first issue of theoretical interest is the nature of leaders’ expectations and their influences on how they perceive wartime events. According to my theory, these expectations should frame the leaders’ interpretations of events, making some more important than others, depending on the theory of victory then pursued. The examination proceeds by first examining leaders’ expectations and coding them as theories of victory. Using these codings, I make predictions about the importance leaders accord the events they encounter, and then analyze Finnish and Russian leaders’ actual responses to events to determine if they accord with my theoretical expectations.

Over the course of the war, the Russians used two different kinds of theory of victory. They held an informative theory of victory during December, and then switched to an attritive theory of victory after their informative theory had failed. The Finns used only attritive theories of victory, but through the course of the war, they pursued three discernibly different ones.

At the empirical level, differences in regime type mean that codings are derived in a slightly different way. In the late 1930’s, Stalin clearly had supreme decision-making power over Soviet foreign and military affairs. His theory of victory, then, is the only important one. In the generally democratic cabinet system used in Finland, however, no single figure had the power to enact and make decisions. Tanner, the foreign minister and leader of the Social Democratic Party was seen as the ‘strong man’ of the Finnish cabinet—and changed it at the beginning of

the war to better reflect his view—was clearly the central figure in the development of policy. But, he could not enact his views on his own—he first needed to convince at least a strong majority of the cabinet, and the President, Kallio. The wartime commander-in-chief, Marshal Carl Mannerheim, was also seen as having an effective veto over policy. Given these vetoes, attention needs to be paid to both key individuals’ theories and the collective theory that reflects the consensus of the veto players.

Stalin’s Theories of Victory

Pre-War Expectations

Stalin had a clear idea of what war would look like, should it come. Soviet forces would quickly advance along a broad front, easily winning battles as they advanced through the Karelian Isthmus to Viipuri and then on to Helsinki in the south while cutting the country in half with a thrust to Oulu, near the Swedish border. In response to these victories, the Finns would give up. Khruschev describes the sense of the leadership group as “all we had to do was raise our voice a little bit, and the Finns would obey. If that didn’t work, we could fire one shot and the Finns would put up their hands and surrender.” He expected that they would give up because these ‘bosses’ feared their working classes, and those bosses would not risk a war that could turn into a revolution. Even if they did not themselves thrown in the towel, Stalin believed that before the armies reached their destinations, the Finnish workers would rise up

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120 Rintala 1969.
121 Stalin was clearly the principle Soviet decision-maker with regard to the war, and was deeply involved in its planning and direction (Baryshnikov 2000, 171-2; Seaton 1978, 66). He even preferred to act as his own intelligence analyst, actively discouraging others’ analysis as “dangerous guesswork” (Andrew and Elkner 2003). Many of the key mistakes were his, as well (Murphy 2005, 54).
122 Khrushchev 152.
and themselves throw off the oppressive government seated at Helsinki.\textsuperscript{123} The resulting workers’ government, already much more friendly to the Soviet interest, would then make the required concessions.

Though perhaps far-fetched, this depiction of a possible war was not pure Marxist fantasy. Just months before, the Russians had executed a similar military and political campaign in eastern Poland.\textsuperscript{124} Additionally, the Red Army was one of the largest and best armed militaries in the world—and Stalin was apt to ignore its greatest weakness, its leadership, since he himself was responsible for purging it of its most competent leaders. Finland’s army was known to be small, and relatively poorly armed given the parsimony of its leaders during the 1930’s. Marshal Mannerheim himself did not believe that his army would last long in a fight against the Red Army—a fact that Stalin had known since 5 October 1939, thanks to Beria’s intelligence services.\textsuperscript{125} Stalin had every reason to believe that his forces would quickly find dramatic victories in Finland.

Similarly, though they would be found false, Stalin’s expectations of the Finnish response to these battles was entirely plausible. Indeed, they were to a great extent shared by many in the Finnish establishment. The Finnish Civil War, a sharp and short affair, was only two decades past. As in Russia, “Whites” were ranged against “Reds,” but unlike in Russia, the Red Finns were beaten by a White force led by Mannerheim, himself a general just retired from three decades of service to the Tsar. The war and its aftermath created a deep bitterness

\textsuperscript{123} Roberts 1995, 114; Baryshnikov 2000, 169.
\textsuperscript{124} Stalin himself stated, after the war, that “we expected an easy win,” based on the experience in Poland, and only after “the army” realized that conditions were different did they set to winning a war that would not be the “easy stroll” that Poland was (Kulkov et al. 1999, 267). Kulik and others shared this view (Kulkov et al. 1999, 149-50, 156, 169, 179, 241).
\textsuperscript{125} Volgokonov 1991, 364.
among the Communists and many socialists, feelings aggravated by the banning of the Communist Party in 1929 and further persecution during the 1930’s. Although the Social Democrats’ entry into cabinet government for the first time in 1937 had softened some of these feelings, many Finns believed that their workers would refuse to fight,\footnote{Julissa et al. 1995/1999, 188.} and might even support the enemy through sabotage and guerilla warfare. Certainly such a narrative would seem plausible to Stalin, given his commitment to a Marxist-Leninist theory of history.\footnote{Roberts 1995, 114-115.} Incompetently gathered intelligence about popular and workers’ opinions, gathered by the Soviet Embassy and NKVD agents in Helsinki, reinforced this belief.\footnote{Andrew and Gordievsky 1990, 251.}

Events were such that there can be little doubt but that Stalin in fact held this theory of victory.\footnote{The plan Stalin described to a ‘lessons learned’ conference bears little relationship to this description of the plan, though it also would seem to bear little relationship to any of the other facts of the situation (Kulkov et al. 1999: 263-6).} The plan endorsed by Stalin, written by Meretskov, was the second plan considered. Stalin had earlier rejected the Shaposhnikov plan, devised by the General Staff. This plan anticipated that a campaign against Finland would require months of hard fighting and much of the Red Army.\footnote{Spahr 215; Shukman 1993, 224.} Disbelieving this, Stalin ordered Meretskov, head of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) to devise a plan that would rely on the forces of that military district and require
no more than 12-16 days.\textsuperscript{131} Meretskov’s plan was in line with these instructions, and was approved by Stalin after small modifications.\textsuperscript{132}

\textit{Coding the Russian Expectations as an Informative Theories of Victory}

Stalin’s expectations for how the Soviet Union would win a war with Finland are straightforwardly coded as an informative theory of victory. A series of battles—mostly on the Karelian Isthmus and in the North—would quickly convince the Finns of their much inferior power and their inability to resist in any meaningful sense.\textsuperscript{133} Being thus convinced, they would rush to the negotiating table, ready to accept the Soviets’ demands. Should they fail to, the Finnish people—led by their workers—would nevertheless be informed of the weakness of the Helsinki government, take power, and agree to the Russian terms. This clearly conforms to the informative type of theory of victory: fighting conveys information about relative power, and the

\textsuperscript{131} Baryshnikov 2000, 169; Murphy 2005, 51. Although the Shaposhnikov plan would prove to have been prescient, Stalin was not entirely crazy in rejecting it. It was derived from a more general plan that had been devised in 1937 and which was agnostic on the presence of foreign troops and assistance (Baryshnikov 2000: 168; Spahr 215). Since it was clear—particularly to Stalin—that the Red Army would not confront foreign troops in Finland, this provides a plausible reason for rejecting the plan.

\textsuperscript{132} The British Ambassador reports that Voroshilov stated at the outset of the war that it would last about four days. This, too, is reflective of a demonstrative or informative logic of goal achievement. (\textit{BDFA (III-A-1) (III-A-1) III:A:1} 161) Others like Mehklis and Kulik hewed closer to Stalin’s reported estimate of twelve days (Spring 1986: 215). Stalin’s April 1940 claim that he realized the war could well go into August or September is, in context, unbelievable (Kilkov et al. 1999, 264-6). This is particularly true since he states, within a couple of transcript pages, that “we” expected an easy win, \textit{[which]} prevented us from immediately recognizing our shortcomings (Kulkov 1999, 267). One Russian historian has judged the decision as one made in the presence of insufficient, and often contradictory, information. (Poznyahkov 2000, 109). Khrushchev states that no intelligence officers were consulted when the first strike was planned (Khrushchev 155). Both judgments may well be overgenerous: the intelligence was clearly there, it was just not well used. (Murphy 2005, 54-58)

\textsuperscript{133} JFC Fuller describes the Russian plan as to “bomb and to demonstrate,” a situation which would provide a test of Douhet’s theory that civilian bombing could win a war (Fuller 1948, 57-8). The description of the military side of the plan as a “demonstration” accords with my interpretation. While significant bombing, including against civilian targets, was conducted (Aptekar 1990, 144-5), it does not seem to have been mentioned by the leaders as a major part of their plan to bring the Finns around. Some of the most famous civil bombing, against Helsinki in the first days of the war, was the result of errors. The real targets were shipping and industrial infrastructure (Aptekar 1999, 140; \textit{BDFA (III-A-1)} 165). Owing to the political damage this was doing abroad, Meretskov banned the bombing of civilian population centers on 3 December 1939 (Van Dyke 68).
communication of that information leads to concessions. The Soviets also clearly evince a belief in their ability to effect these battles. Stalin’s rejection of the Shaposhnikov plan and his role in instructing Meretskov on the contours of his plan make clear that these beliefs in fact existing in the key decision-maker’s mind.

**New Expectations: Stalin’s Second Theory of Victory**

After the first plan was seen to have failed, in late December a new one was crafted. This new approach to the war that they found was based largely on Shaposhnikov’s General Staff plan, presented months earlier and rejected by Stalin. This plan called for a much larger Red Army force—fully half of its European assets, commanded by the more proven Timoshenko—to be focused exclusively on the Karelian Isthmus. Now the aim was to wear down the Finnish defenses on the line and around Viipuri, executing a breakthrough and then an encirclement. The purpose of these acts would be to wear down, encircle, and destroy this essential force.\(^1\) While Timoshenko’s plan (as detailed 3 February 1940 did not have plans for pursuit beyond Viipuri, he estimated that it would require between 7 to 12 day. Once that city, the second greatest in Finland, was taken, the road to Helsinki would be open, if the Finns had not yet submitted.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Van Dyke 136. In his discussion of the conflict at the ‘lessons learned’ conference, Chief of Staff Shaposhnikov described the Isthmus-focused strategy as follows: If the Germans ground the French up, and this is called the ‘Verdun mill,’ in this war we ground the Finnish army, and we can call it the ‘Karelian mill.’ ... [The attack across the frozen Bay of Viipuri to its western shore] finally ground down the Finnish resistance. The Finns tried to muster great forces there in order to mount a counterattack to check our advance across the Gulf of Vyborgi [sic]. However, the Finns could not withstand our pressure and began to clear Vyborg” (Kulkov et al. 171).

\(^2\) Van Dyke states that this indicates that the Red Army’s strategic goals were, exclusively, concessions on the Isthmus and the North Shore of Ladoga (Van Dyke 136). The diplomatic behavior of the Soviet Government suggests that this is not the case—Hanko remained a sticking point.
Simultaneously, the Soviets changed their diplomatic strategy. No longer would they refuse to talk to the Finns. Now, they sought an agreement that would end the war—one which must favor them and one which would ideally serve as a demonstration of their power, thus healing somewhat their losses in prestige. To this end, they would quietly solicit and even encourage talks—so long as they tended toward the agreement that they sought. For this agreement, the maximal terms of the Autumn talks would be the minimal terms in Winter talks—Hanko, land on the Karelian Isthmus, and the mutual assistance pact. Part of their diplomatic strategy, however, included making clear to the Finns that their settling terms would increase the longer the war went on—something Molotov and his emissaries described as the “logic of war.”

**Coded As: An Attritive theory of victory**

Coding Stalin’s second theory of victory as attritive is straightforward. He anticipated that as his better managed and much larger forces wore down the Finnish military—for which the Finns could not practically mobilize further resources—the Finns would prefer to make the concessions he sought rather than risk the collapse of their forces and the conquest of their state. He later described this risky choice as being between meeting his demands and having installed a “peoples’ government” that would “disembowel” them; he anticipated that they would prefer the former.\(^{136}\)

The theory of victory is different from the general type described above in one interesting way, however. There was an explicit statement that aims would increase as time passed, in what seems to be an effort to further incentivize earlier rather than later concessions. While the aims were, in practice, only increased as the Red Army advanced (in this way they

\(^{136}\) Kulkov 199, 266.
were always greater than the land already captured by the army), there was a quasi-automatic quality to the changes. For this reason, although mildly different from the prototypical theory of victory, I regard this as a single theory of victory.

The Finns’ Pre-War Expectations

The Finnish leaders anticipated that fighting would moderate Soviet demands to the point that they could accept them. While the most war-averse leaders, Mannerheim (Chief of the Defense Council, Commander-in-Chief during the war), Paasikivi (former PM, member of the war-time cabinet), and Tanner (leader of the Social Democratic Party, Finance minister prior to the war, Foreign Minister during) urged greater concessions in an effort to avoid war altogether, neither they nor any other senior Finnish leader supported accepting the Soviet demands as they were expressed when the talks broke off. They can be said to have preferred war to peace on those terms, believing alongside Errko (pre-war Foreign Minister), Kajander (pre-war Prime Minister), Kallio (President of Finland) and Niukanen (Defense Minister) that war would indeed lead to a moderation of the Soviet demands. They believed, in particular, that Stalin had not yet stated his true minimum demands, and that the Soviet Union would desire to avoid fighting a protracted war given the risks of intervention by either the Germans or the Allies and due to the reputation costs which the Russians would experience.

The consensus view was that most fighting would occur on the Karelian Isthmus, a thin strip of land between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. At the extremes of the Isthmus are Leningrad and Viipuri (now Vyborg). After the Isthmus, the road through southern Finland to
Helsinki was generally open. Historically, this was the location of most fighting between the West and Russia that occurred within Finnish boundaries. As such, the Finns constructed their main defensive positions on the Isthmus, and war plans stationed the bulk of the field army there. Aside from the Isthmus, there was a small concentration of forces just north of Lake Ladoga. Only scattered battalions and companies were stationed on the long border between that concentration and the Artic Ocean. But given that their main defense line was in the most likely theater of the war, many Finns maintained generous estimates of the power of their forces. Many also believed that the Red Army was a paper tiger—massive in size but weak in terms of actual military power.

It is clear that there were different estimates of how long the Finns could last among the leadership group. Mannerheim, Chief of the Defense Council and presumptive Commander-in-Chief in the event of war, expressed the most pessimistic view, suggesting only a few weeks, unless they received substantial international assistance. He believed that this assistance, from the Swedes, and perhaps also the western Powers, would be forthcoming. Niukanen, the Defense minister, believed that they could last six months without foreign assistance—which he also believed would be forthcoming. His opinion seems to have been partially informed by

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137 More precisely, the interior is open after Saima, somewhat to the west of Viipuri.
138 These positions, which would later be called the 'Mannerheim Line,' were constructed during the 1920’s and 1930’s. The last upgrades were produced by a popular effort in the summer of 1939, during which thousands of Finns donated their vacations and strength to building of tank traps, bunkers, and other fortifications (Ries 1988, 62-4).
139 Spring 1986, 216. It may be for this reason that Errko told Paasikivi to forget that Russia was a great power.
140 Baryshnikov 1990.
141 Niukanen consistently adopted more favorable estimates of Finnish fighting capability than did Mannerheim. That his home was on the Karelian Isthmus—in or near the areas tabled for cession—may have influenced these estimates somewhat. A range of other technical and political disagreements lead to the same conclusion.
more junior officers among the Finnish army, who found Mannerheim to be behind the times. The president and the rest of Cabinet fell between these extremes; Tanner, Paasikivi, and to a lesser extent Kallio fell closer to Mannerheim; Errko and Kajander (both of whom would be out of the Cabinet from 2 December) seem to have agreed more with Niukanen. Nevertheless, all believed that they could hold the Soviets back long enough for the dangers of the international situation to push the Soviets back to the table, if it got that far.

Finnish beliefs about their opponents in good part shaped their view of how far the Soviets could be pushed, including by war. The peace group (Mannerheim, Tanner, Paasikivi) argued for granting more generous concessions to the Soviets in good part because they believed that the Soviets were near their bottom line. Fighting could push them to that bottom line, but they would have to meet far greater success on the battlefield than they believed possible to get to the level of acceptability advanced by their opponents in the government. Errko, Kajander, and others, on the other hand, believed that Stalin was bluffing, and would only reach his bottom line through extended bargaining or through war. Moreover, they over emphasized the depth of the bite that they believed war would take out of the Soviets, and so expected that merely holding back Soviet advances for a time would drastically diminish the Soviet demands against them. This would facilitate agreement.

**Coding the Finnish Expectations as an Attritive Theory of Victory**

The Finnish expectations straightforwardly reflect an attritive theory of victory. They expected to test the resolve of the Soviets, and believed that it would be found wanting. As the

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142 Throughout the war, Mannerheim would have bad relations with a number of slightly less senior officers. This was particularly true of Gen. Osterman, the next-most-senior officer in the Finnish military establishment (Screen 2000).

143 Paasikivi would almost always embrace concession earlier and easier than anyone else, which encouraged charges of defeatism (Kuusisto, 1959, 40; Rintala 1969, 88-9, 109).
domestic and particularly the international costs increased, Stalin would be made willing to accept a less favorable settlement. Directly connected to this belief was their belief that their essential force—the army on the Isthmus, manning the “Mannerheim Line”—would be able to retain its integrity and positions such that they themselves would not experience a loss of bargaining power. Their expectations of foreign assistance increased their certainty that they could reach the point when Soviet resolve would crumble and Stalin’s demands would diminish.

New Expectations: The Finns’ Later Theories of Victory

The Attritive Theory of Victory from 20 February

By 20 February, the consensus among the Finnish cabinet was that they had to concede to the Soviets’ original demands—including, particularly, Hango. They were not prepared to make further concessions beyond that, however—certainly not the Sortavala region (north of Lake Ladoga) and Viipuri (a city at the extreme west of the Karelian Isthmus) regions. This revision in aims reflected their calculation of how much their continued ability to hold off the Russians would be worth to the Russians in the context of this dispute, particularly given the increasing interest of the Western allies in helping the Finnish cause.

This being the case, the Finns’ change in acceptable aims reflects a change in their theory of victory, as it is a change in their beliefs about how much their military activity could influence the outcome of the dispute. It is clearly a change from one attritive theory of victory

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144 Earlier in the month, Tanner and Mannerheim had been willing to concede Jussaro, an island near Hanko, but no more. In approaching the Swedish Foreign Minister to seek mediation on 20 February, Tanner indicated that Finland was now prepared to surrender Hanko, a position accepted by the Finnish cabinet. He was not, however, prepared to offer more than that, certainly not the Sortavala and Viipuri regions that the Soviets demanded upon inquiry being made by the Swedes. (Jacobson 234-5; Carlgren 1979, 41; Kollontai 1990, 197)
to another—the purpose of continued military action did not change, only their beliefs about what could be obtained through that action changed.

The Attritive Theory of Victory from 29 February

On 29 February, the Finnish cabinet accepted the Soviet terms in principle—including turning over Sortavala and Viipuri—but then, before transmitting their acceptance, rescinded it. French Premier Daladier, hearing that the Finns were near conceding, suddenly promised 50,000 men, to arrive by mid-April. Upon hearing this, the Finns decided not to concede: they believed that if the offer was realistic they would be able to hold on long enough that the Soviets would be forced to reduce their terms. Believing that they could use this offer to at least reduce the Soviet demands—either through its threat or by accepting it—the Finns decided that they were not yet at the point where they had to concede such great prizes. Two issues now determined whether they believed that they could use this opportunity: the validity of the offer, and their beliefs that they could last long enough to take advantage of the additional forces.

Although it reflects the same aims as its immediate predecessor, and relies on a similar logic of goal attainment—holding the Soviets back long enough that they would prefer to accept a less favorable settlement—this is properly coded as a different theory of victory. The reasons that they expect to hold off the opponent long enough to get lower concessions (or at least appear as if they can hold the Soviets off for that long) is through the addition of French and British troops, rather than through their own strength. Hence, a different theory of the situation, though still an attritive theory. As such, their theory would be falsified when they see

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145 Although the front was near breaking, the spring thaw was near. If they could last until the thaw arrived, many believed that they would gain as much as a two month respite, as the Isthmus would become a marshland unsuitably for the Soviet’s armored forces and they would be able to flood waters against Soviet positions.
146 This meant retaining the integrity of their essential force until the thaw began.
that those troops will not be coming, or not coming in time, rather than due to the collapse of their own forces.

**Investigation of framing effects**

Length prohibits an analysis of how all of the events in the war were viewed or understood. The events I analyze are instead selected to provide tests of the key hypotheses about the framing effects of the theories of victory. These analyses provide two kinds of leverage: first, they provide as individual tests of particular predictions. Second, collectively they provide tests of whether different events in the same frame, or similar events in different frames, are treated similarly or differently, and whether or not those differences accord with my predictions.

Two of the pairs of events are examined from the perspective of the Finns, and one pair is examined from the perspective of the Soviets. Since according to the above codings, the Finns pursued only attritive theories of victory, these tests probe how different kinds of events are understood in leaders’ political calculations. The first pairing examines perception of the initial Finnish retreats and the failure of the most significant offensive operation launched by the Finns, both ostensibly negative events. The second pairing examines Finnish response to two positive events—the first Finnish halting of the Red Army (near Suojarvi) and the famed “motti” encirclement operations. In the Soviet case I compare responses to two relatively similar events, pursued under different theories of victory. Here, the comparison is between the often troublesome offensives between 1 December and 20 December, and then between the often troublesome offensives between 13 February and 12 March.
Pair 1: Finish Responses to Negative Events

The Initial Finnish Retreats

Although the field army was already in place, the Finns suffered from tactical surprise on the morning of 30 November 1939, for despite numerous signs, no one expected the Soviets to start their invasion then.\(^{147}\) On the Karelian Isthmus, the Finnish plans called for an actively resisting withdrawal by the “covering forces” posted near the borders to the main defense line, followed by strong resistance there. Those units just north of Ladoga were to pursue a similar course. Given their surprise, the broad attack instead of a main attack across the Isthmus, and the numbers and armament of the Soviet forces, the first seven days of the war found the Finns retreating much more quickly than they expected all along the front.\(^{148}\) This was true on the Karelian Isthmus, where under orders from more subordinate officers, the covering troops very quickly retreated the main lines, with relatively little action to delay or harass Soviet forces.\(^{149}\) That this was their first encounter with armored forces further hurried them.\(^{150}\)

The first major Soviet attack on the line began at Taipale on 6 December. It was north of Lake Ladoga, where the Finnish forces were substantially weaker than those on the Isthmus. There, ground was quickly lost and Mannerheims orders for tactical counter-attacks and stronger resistance were not carried out by generals soon replaced.\(^{151}\) The Petsamo area was

\(^{147}\) The most obvious sign was the manufactured border incident, followed by the abrogation of the mutual assistance pact. Less obvious were the massing of forces, an increase in the number of unauthorized overflights, and large Soviet purchases of Finnish currency. As an indication of the degree of surprise they achieved, Mannerheim had offered his resignation as Chief of the Defense Council the previous day in a spat over the government’s declining level of alertness (it was quickly revoked). Had he known of the imminence of the Russian attack, it is unlikely that the would have resigned.

\(^{148}\) That their retreat was slower than the Soviets had anticipated was of little comfort to them.

\(^{149}\) Screen 141-3; Kirby 208-9.

\(^{150}\) Mannerheim 328.

\(^{151}\) Screen 143-4; Mannerheim 329-335; Chew 12, 17-18.
surrendered without a fight,\textsuperscript{152} few forces having been stationed there, and the drive through
the middle of the country toward Oulu encountered minimal resistance, making the most
significant progress it would make in the whole war during those first few days. Additionally,
Helsinki had been bombed and the Soviets had proclaimed a Communist government for
Finland, led by Kuusinen, a Finnish Comintern official.

This series of events was almost uniformly negative. In addition to the surprise of the
invasion itself, the Finns found themselves pulling back much more quickly than they had
expected that they would. This directly implicated their theory of victory—which relied on
wearying the Soviets so that they would trim their demands to a point acceptable to the Finns.
As such, the theories of victory model indicates that this series of events would be viewed as
important and dangerous. This is indeed the case. Mannerheim was particularly distressed by
the retreats near Taipale on the Isthmus and near Tolvajarvi (immediately north of Ladoga), as
well as the apparently massing Red Army forces further to the north. He responded by sending
as much of his precious reserve as he felt he could north to confront those theats, and changed
leadership in those sectors.\textsuperscript{153} More importantly, he concluded that Finnish intelligence had
greatly underestimated the forces the Soviets would throw at Finland and several favorable
assumptions about how the war would be fought (particularly in its location) were over-
optimistic (330). These days also drew strong emotion in him—anger at commanders he had
not really trusted,\textsuperscript{154} and anxiety at the pattern of attacks.\textsuperscript{155} Given these circumstances, by the
end of this first week, Mannerheim was reporting to the central government that he believed

\textsuperscript{152} Van Duke 52.
\textsuperscript{153} Mannerheim 334.
\textsuperscript{154} Chew 12, Edwards 124.
\textsuperscript{155} Mannerheim 330.
that the estimates of how long the army could hold back the Red Army were over-estimates, and that he doubted that they could last more than two months.\textsuperscript{156}

The framing effects of the theory of victory are evident in several ways. First, they are evident in what was seen as most important—the speed of the advances and the increased pressure on the small Finnish army produced by the breadth of the attack. Mannerheim and the political leadership were effectively unconcerned about Petsamo and were only concerned about bombing insofar as they took steps to protect the civilian population, as neither threatened the ability of the army to hold off the Red Army. The Communist ‘Terijoki’ government was only viewed as important insomuch as the Soviets used it as an excuse to refuse mediation and negotiation—giving rise to Tanner’s remark on 4 December that some defeats would have to be inflicted on the Red Army before Stalin would bargain.\textsuperscript{157} The framing effects are also evident in that they led Mannerheim to doubt even his own relatively thin\textsuperscript{158} theory of victory, though importantly it did not lead him to reject it. In this sense, particular pieces of information affect the degree to which key actors believe in their theory of victory, but not so much that they reject it. But other elements—that the Soviets could bomb Helsinki, for instance, were not counted as important.

\textit{Ohquist’s Failed Offensive}

By the end of the third week of fighting the Finns had largely halted Red Army advances against the Mannerheim Line and at the country’s waist. In the area north of Ladoga, the tide of

\textsuperscript{156} Nevaki 48. At this point, senior German military officers apparently shared this belief, anticipating that the Finns would be defeated by the end of December (\textit{DDF} 771).
\textsuperscript{157} Tanner 114.
\textsuperscript{158} ‘Thin’ relative to, for instance, Niukanen’s expectation that the Finns could last six months on their own.
battle was even turning against the Soviets, if at a great price to the Finns. Senior Finnish army officers concluded that the moment had come to counter-attack, to actively push the Soviets away from even the Mannerheim Line. Lt. Gen. Ohquist, corps commander at the center of the Isthmus developed an encirclement plan that would involve five divisions directed against a set of Seventh (Red) Army rifle units. He gained the support of Gen. Osterman, commander of the Isthmus army and (prior to the war) Chief of the General Staff. With some reservations, Mannerheim approved the plan. The attack went forward on 23 December, after two days of preparation. This attack, the largest Finnish counter-offensive of the war, collapsed within hours amid significant casualties. The problems were caused, generally, by poor planning, poor coordination, lack of ammunition, and a lack of intelligence.

The offensive occurred amidst rising Finnish confidence, given their successes at holding back attacks in the North and even making small gains just north of Lake Ladoga. Successes in their efforts to stop these attacks was considered very important by Mannerheim and other government leaders, and they allowed them to retain his pre-war estimates of how long the Finns could hold on. Yet even in this context of growing belief in their ability to hold on, the offensive was clearly seen for what it was by Mannerheim and those around him—a failure, something instantly regretted. Given that it was the largest-scale effort, to date, to try to actively beat—rather than merely hold back—Red Army forces in the most important theater of the war, its failure had no influence on the political calculations of the Finns. While

159 Chew 48-64.
160 Van Dyke 79; Mannerheim 344; Screen 145.
161 Chew 65.
162 Van Dyke 79; Chew 69; Mannerheim 344-5; Vuorennmaa 1985, 79.
163 Chew 69.
Mannerheim discusses it with regret and evinced some anger and depression at the time,\(^{164}\) it did not affect his political calculations about the Finns’ chances for attaining their aims. Nor, apparently, did any other Finnish participant.\(^{165}\)

This outcome is consistent with the framing effects anticipated by the theory of victory model. An attritive theory of victory focuses attention not to local wins or losses, but to those factors affecting how long the war can be continued. In this case a win—that is, pushing the Soviets back—would have suggested an ability to last longer than Mannerheim then believed, but a loss would not decrease Mannerheim’s (or any one else’s) estimates for how long the war would last. Had they been pursuing an informative or brute force theory of victory, however, the model suggests that the collapse of the most important test of their offensive capability would have influenced their bargaining position.

*Comparison*

Within the cases, it is clear that the framing effects are at work, giving different events different weight in relation to key figures’ beliefs about how long they could hold out. The comparison between the cases shows events that differ most significantly in terms of their relationship with the theory of victory receive different evaluations of political importance, even when both are considered failures by the evaluator. This is consistent with the key model hypotheses about the framing effects of the theories of victory.

\(^{164}\) Mannerheim 344-5; Chew 69.
\(^{165}\) Perhaps ironically, it significantly influenced the Soviets’ views and actions. They had not expected that the Finns could or would feel able to make an offensive act of this scope, and the mere effort was very disturbing. Additionally, it substantially disrupted Soviet plans for their third try at the line, ‘Plan Ladoga’ (Van Dyke 79).
Pair 2: Finnish Responses to Positive Events

Tolvajarvi, Suomussalmi, and the Karelian Isthmus

Meretskov’s plan had the merit of placing far more men along a much wider front than Mannerheim had expected. The stronger force attacking just north of Lake Ladoga was particularly dangerous to the Finns, since it had the potential to expose their logistics and communications lines into the Isthmus, and more generally their rear areas. Given their lack of preparation, Mannerheim had to improvise to defend these areas. Rather than merely augmenting the existing force on the north shore of the Lake, he sent a new group of battalions to the Tolvajarvi-Iломanti area, under Col. Tavela, to face the numerically superior 139th Red Army Division and supporting 8th Army units, which had rapidly advanced into the country.\textsuperscript{166}

Tavela’s group began active resistance on 9 December. They quickly halted the advances, and forces near Iломanti even eliminated a Russian battalion.\textsuperscript{167} Over the next five days, he and his battalions first halted the Soviet advances into Tolvajarvi and then by 12 December through violent fighting pushed two divisions out of the town and its environs.\textsuperscript{168} This was the first time a Red Army division retreated in the face of the Finns.\textsuperscript{169} Although not fully pursued due to the exhaustion of the relevant units and Mannerheim’s desire to conserve manpower,\textsuperscript{170} these the 139th division would find itself cut up and largely eliminated by the mid-January. In the week after Tolvajarvi was taken, Group Tavela managed to advance all the way to the Attijoki River, a distance of perhaps 15 miles.\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{166} Again, the advance was rapid from the Finnish perspective, but far behind the Russian schedules. \textsuperscript{167} Chew 36-39. \textsuperscript{168} Mannerheim 335-6; Chew 48; Vehvilainen 54. \textsuperscript{169} Van Dyke 81. \textsuperscript{170} Chew 54. \textsuperscript{171} By the end of the advance, approximately 650 Finns and 4000 Soviet soldiers were killed.
The situation further north, near Suomussalmi, was similar to that at Tolvajarvi, occurring about one week later. There, the 163<sup>rd</sup> rifle and 44<sup>th</sup> mechanized divisions had progressed almost 100 km into Finland, headed for the Swedish border in an effort to cut off foreign supplies. Here, seven battalions were cobbled together into a brigade under the leadership of Col. Siilasvuo. Beginning on 8 December, Siilasvuo’s forces began resisting their advance. By 12-13 December, his forces has succeeded in hemming in the 163<sup>rd</sup> division. The 44<sup>th</sup> division was then sent to aid them, but as it moved to Suomussalmi down the Raate road, it was tormented by flanking attacks and then halted by a roadblock on 23 December. It would later try to retreat, and meet an ignominious fate for trying.

At the same time as forces near the forces at Tolvajarvi-Iломanti and then Suomussalmi halted Red Army advances and then forced their retreat, on the Isthmus the Mannerheim line held firm against Soviet efforts to breach it, first near Taipale on 6 December, then near Summa and the ‘Viipuri gateway’ between 15 and 22 December. While the ability of the line to hold back the Russians was welcomed, these defenses were generally very close-run events with significant casualties—and even as the Russian casualties mounted, they kept coming. The events at Tolvajarvi and Suomussalmi were greeted as something more: the halting of the Russian divisions meant that the theory of victory was still tenable, and their retreats acted to reduce the already great pressure on the Finns’ limited manpower resources. They were thus seen as great victories by both leaders and the Finnish public.

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172 Van Dyke 86.
173 Mannerheim 342-3.
174 Nevali 68-69; Julissa et al. 1999, 84; Chew 48-57; Vehvilainen 54. Chew states that the Tolvajarvi battle was tremendously significant, effectively eliminating the threat to Ladoga-Karelia, but then goes on to state that “the psychological impact was even more significant. From a defeatist attitude verging on total despair, both nation and army responded to the first great offensive victory of the war with optimism and self-confidence. Other spectacular feats of Finnish arms followed...but group Tavela’s
those leaders whose beliefs about how long they could last were shaken by the first week’s withdrawals, Mannerheim in particular.

This response is consistent with the theory of victory model. The model predicts that positive news is most important—that is, it matters most—when it confirms the theory of victory. In this case, the holding and even pushing back of the Russians accomplished by often much smaller Finnish units eased the pressure on the Finnish war machine, and the high Russian casualties associated with their efforts suggested that the Finns could hold out for some time yet.

The Motti Battles

After the Red Army troops at Suomussalmi and elsewhere in the forested wilderness north of Lake Ladoga withdrew, Finnish army troops in many cases pursued them, harassing them and breaking units away from the main body. Often, these units were then encircled and—if they did not surrender—eliminated by force. These ‘breaking up and eliminating’ battles became known as the motti, from the Finnish word for cordwood. Through this process, the, 18th, 44th, 54th, 163rd, and 166th divisions suffered partial or (in most cases) total destruction between 23 December and mid-February.175

These eliminations—particularly those of the 163rd and 44th, near Suomussalmi and occurring in late December 1939, were dramatic and recognized as such.176 They were,
however, most significant for those less familiar with the theory of victory—so, members of the public and foreigners, like the New York Times, which on 9 January headlined that “Finns Smash a New Division.”\textsuperscript{177} Already by the end of December—before the motti battles were even near completion, Tanner was describing the Front as stabilized. Indeed, by the end of December, before the mottis fully formed—once he heard of Soviet interest in peace—he was ready to try negotiating again.\textsuperscript{178} Mannerheim was described as “calm and confident” by a visiting Swedish officer on 4 January—at which the point was stable, with no new attacks being made, but in the midst of the motti battles.\textsuperscript{179}

This pattern of response is entirely consistent with the framing effects posited by the theories of victory model. Eliminating the stalled out Soviet divisions did little to change the strategic situation—they no longer presented a military threat. The few thousand casualties involved could not plausibly be said to significantly wear down the Soviet government; indeed, they were unlikely to be noticed in Stalin’s Red Army. Thus while they fed fires of patriotism

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Chew 124-5. Writing on 10 January, so after the first two mottis were completed but as others were underway, the British military attaché (who had reason to understand the leadership’s theory of victory) places much greater emphasis on the stabilization of the front than on the mottis, which he references only parenthetically in terms of the capture of materiel and men (BDFA (III-A-1) (III-A-1) III:A:1:180).
\item Tanner 115-6. It is known that the Swedes tried to interest Tanner in mediation after Christmas, but Tanner was then uninterested. Thus the last appeal to talk was made 15 December. From that point they appear to have been uninterested, due to the positive turn of events. After he had heard of Stalin’s interest in negotiation, through the Estonians, however, Tanner was interested. At this point Tanner believed that the Soviets might be willing to make a reasonable deal—rather than expecting the Finns to give over their sovereignty. (Carlgren 29, 35; McSherry 46; Tanner 116). Given that the mottis had not yet matured, it seems likely that they played little role in affecting the leadership’s decision-making. Perhaps significantly, in his memoir of the war, Tanner’s only comment on the motti battles from the beginning of January on is to remark on the first time a Soviet unit preferred to surrender rather than be destroyed, seeing it as a positive harbinger of things to come.
\item Screen 2000, 144.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
and increased morale—they were, after all, an impressive feat of arms—they did not affect the beliefs of key members of the Finnish cabinet or the Finnish government’s bargaining positions.

Comparison

Placed aside one another, the offensively successful *motti* battles stretching from late December into February, and the defensive successes at Tolvajarvi, Soumussalmi, and on the Karelian Isthmus during the second and third weeks of December 1939 demonstrate the importance of the theories of victory in determining what events matter in political decision-making about war. Although the former created greater excitement in the country and the world, and indeed became much more famous, the latter had greater influence on the political beliefs of those running the country and the war. This greater influence was due to their relationship to the theory of victory. The defensive victories helped confirm to state leaders that their attritive theory of victory was, for the time being, plausible. The *motti* battles, while affirming of Finnish arms generally, did not speak to the Finns’ ability to continue holding out against the Red Army, and thus were irrelevant to the Finnish leaders’ political beliefs.180

Two Russian Cases: Different Theories of Victory, Similar Series of Events.

*The Initial Russian Campaign on the Isthmus*

As described above, the initial plan involved sending forces through the Karelian Isthmus, immediately north of Lake Ladoga, further north to the “waist” of the country, and to Petsamo. Only in the Petsamo region, where there were few Finnish troops indeed, did the Red Army units complete their missions on schedule. Elsewhere, the troops—which Meretskov had

180 This does not mean, however, that they were necessarily irrelevant to the Russian leaders.
assured Stalin could take the whole country in twelve days—fell behind schedule on the first day of the invasion. Few made it more than a few kilometers, as unexpected resistance, hostile weather, poor use of available intelligence, and logistical incompetence slowed the advance.\footnote{Kulkov et al. 1999, \textit{passim}; Van Dyke 1997: chapter 2.}

On the Isthmus, the use of mines was particularly bedeviling to the Red Army troops, who lacked mine detection equipment.\footnote{Here we see the irony that an advance much faster than the Finns expected was much slower than the Russians anticipated.} Further north, the strongly mechanized Red Army had trouble in the snow (of all things!) and with effective and—to the Russians, often scary—harassment by ski troops familiar with the forests. It was not until 6 December, the seventh day of the war, that troops on the Isthmus reached the main defense line. A major offensive was directed at the Taipale region of the line, on the extreme east of the Isthmus. Despite intense fighting, no breach was carved out of the line.

On 9 December, concerned after the Taipale offensive had failed to break the Mannerheim line, Stalin organized a Supreme Military Council (Stavka), composed of himself, senior military officials, and senior Party officials, to oversee and direct the war. Stavka directed that some reorganization and better coordination occur, then directed that another effort be made against the line, beginning 15 December, this time focusing on the Summa region and the nearby Leningrad-Viipuri railway.\footnote{Vuorenmaa 79; Van Dyke 61, 63, 71.} Despite intense fighting and very heavy casualties on the Russian side, they again failed to breach the line, and ground to a halt by 20 December. A last effort was planned to start 25 December, near Taipale, but this effort was in good part thrown...
off by the unexpected (and failed) Finnish counter-offensive of 23 December\textsuperscript{184} and was formally halted on 28 December, after it had stalled out.

Both military and political leaders were sensitive to the failures of their efforts. Within four days of the initiation of the conflict, Meretskov was already chastising his forces for the slowness of their advance, telling them that “We can no longer bicker with Finland, going four to five kilometers a day.”\textsuperscript{185} On 9 December, little more than one week into the offensive—by which point it was clear that a 12-day sweep was a promise Merestkov could not keep—Stalin’s organization of Stavka is a clear response to the slowness the operations. That it occurred so quickly—as the first offensives were merely slowing down—gives a sense of the sensivity of the high Soviet leaders to small and early failures. A political effect is also evident: the Russian newspapers stopped mentioning the ‘great victories’ of the Russian army by end of the first week of the war, and there were no mentions of the puppet government after the middle of the second week of the war.\textsuperscript{186} Although Molotov was still rejecting negotiation offers on the ground that Helsinki was not the Finnish government recognized by Moscow, the quick erasure of the Terijoki government ‘good news from the front’ from Soviet propaganda suggests that doubts about the outcome were already evident throughout the Soviet government and Party bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{187} On 23 December, the Leningrad Military District went so far as to publish a statement that the slowness of their offensive was the result of rugged territory and a foreign-constructed Mannerheim Line, the description of which was far more formidable than the one

\textsuperscript{184} Vuorenmaa 79.
\textsuperscript{185} Van Dyke 68.
\textsuperscript{186} DDF 85; BDFA (III-A-1) 161.
\textsuperscript{187} No mention of the conflict was to be found in the celebrations and celebratory publications associated with Stalin’s 60\textsuperscript{th} birthday, 20 December 1939.
that actually existed.\textsuperscript{188} By this point, Kremlin officials were deeply frustrated with the conflict.\textsuperscript{189} The Defense Commissar, Voroshilov, went so far as to blame Stalin’s purges for the failures of the army—to Stalin’s face—and upturned the suckled pig that was to have been their dinner.\textsuperscript{190}

Although these responses were to the events of the war generally, the Isthmus was by 15 December recognized by the Soviets as the most important area of the war. It is clear, too, that their responses were driven not only by failures to complete their tasks, but by the slowness of the army’s progression to its tasks. This fact is well illustrated by Meretskov’s instruction to ‘stop bickering’ and by the swift erasure of the Terijoki government and war news more generally. Both of these occurred before the full development of the plans, and indeed before the first major failures had occurred. It is equally well demonstrated by the LMD’s explicit explanation of the slowness of the attack, rather than its failures to break the line.

This pattern of response to events is entirely consistent with the pursuit of an informative theory of victory, which is how Stalin’s initial theory of victory was coded. Since the means of persuasion is through demonstration of power, the inability to keep to schedules and to accomplish operational missions with appropriate ease—which was of course not the case here—are framed as particularly important contrary events. While the political alertness to mission failures implied by the un-planned creation of Stavka is strongly suggestive that this framing is at work, the sensitivity to schedules demonstrated by the changes in propaganda provides quite strong evidence for this aspect of the theories of victory model. This finding is

\textsuperscript{188} Axell 1997, 57. The Russians themselves well recognized, and were deeply upset by, the irony of Russians being impeded by rugged terrain and harsh climate. See Kulkov et al. (1999), \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{189} DDF 855.

\textsuperscript{190} Khrushchev 153. Voroshilov had already demanded Meretskov’s court martial, on 20 December (Van Dyke 1997, 77). Stalin rejected the demand. Impressively, both survived Stalin.
put into further relief by the relative political insensitivity to military schedules shown in the second phase of the war.

The Last Weeks of the Soviet Campaign on the Isthmus

After several days of experimental and preparatory assaults, the Soviets began the offensive they had been planning since late December on 13 February. This attack involved several strong assaults on the Isthmus, with much more sophisticated combined arms coordination and far tighter planning, but there were still significant organizational challenges. On 15 February, after a very strong effort at Summa, they succeeded in creating a 4 km-wide breach in the Mannerheim Line. Elsewhere, however, despite hard fighting, no other unit completed its mission on that day or in the succeeding two days, and the Finns used this opportunity to execute an orderly retreat from vulnerable sections of the line to their intermediate defense line. In doing so they succeeded in stabilizing the front again by the end of 17 February. Despite local successes, they remained stable, as the Finns added precious troops to maintain the line. Due to a misreading of reports, Stavka did not recognize this restabilization and ordered the break-through divisions to prepare for the final assault on Viipuri. These ill-formed orders were partially followed, leading to further chaos and inhibiting further progress, an outcome that quickly shattered Stavka’s illusions. By 21 February, Timoshenko expressing a fear that the offensive was reverting to the stalemate that had existed since December; the next day he sent a message to his commanders, criticizing the sluggishness of:

191 The Finnish withdrawal was a recognized victory—as were the others, but observers continued to note that there was much left before they would win their concessions (DGPF 802).
192 Vuorenmaa 89.
193 By this point there were so many Soviet troops on the Isthmus that the road and rail systems simply could not accommodate more; traffic jams were a major source of delays in this period.
of the offensive and blaming it on poor troop control. As pressure increased, particularly in
the Viipuri region of the line, Mannerheim ordered a withdrawal to the ‘V-line’ just outside of
Viipuri on 27 February, which was successfully carried out; it would not be until late on the 28th
that the Soviets would regain contact with the Finnish forces.

Meeting again with local successes, the Red Army forces outside of Viipuri continued to
fall short of their missions. Though they now approached the city of Viipuri, continued
resistance and the flooding of some positions along the rail-line continued to slow the Soviet
forces. In an effort to increase pressure on the Finnish troops defending Viipuri, several
armored units were ordered to cross the frozen Viipuri Bay on 3 March, which they
accomplished by 6 March. On 5 March, as the Finns accepted Soviet terms in principle, Stavka
ordered the renewal of the assault; Timoshenko expected to take the city by 7 March. Over the
next seven days, despite progress towards that goal, the Red Army failed to take Viipuri, and it
ended the war in Finnish military possession.

The only other significant action during this period occurred north of Lake Ladoga,
where a motti battle against the 18th divisions was completed on 27 February. This nearly
eliminated the Soviet threat north of Ladoga, and freed up Finnish soldiers. More
importantly, the Finns expressed interest in negotiation—if not quite in the level of concessions
progressively demanded by the Soviets. Diplomatic demonstrations of interest were made on
13 February, 20 February, 28 February, and then continuously during the first two weeks of
March. As described above, Molotov increased the Soviet demands each time they came back.

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194 Van Dyke 165.
195 Vuorenmaa 89-90; Van Dyke 168.
196 Van Dyke 169-176; Vuorenmaa 90-92.
197 The Swedish volunteer corps took over these positions, their first placement into a combat position.
Since the Finns in general approached on the heels of a difficult military event, these increases were generally but not always coterminous with Red Army successes.

Neither Stalin nor the other political authorities appear to have been particularly troubled by the often slower than anticipated progress of their offensive. Timoshenko, the military commander, at several points expressed concern and frustration at the stalls and slowness of the offensive, even though it was gradually achieving its strategic goals—breaking through the Mannerheim Line and then besieging Viipuri. Stavka’s periodic orders to restart offensives, to ‘go in for the kill’ suggest that they acknowledged this slowness. However, crucially, there was no political effect of this military concern: all talk coming out of Moscow was of higher demands.\(^{198}\) All recollections\(^{199}\) suggest positive evaluations of the political prospects. Merely obtaining the military targets that maintained pressure on the Finnish Army was considered enough to forward Moscow’s political goals, even if those targets were taken behind schedule and with difficulty.

This is consistent with the framing effects associated with an attritive theory of victory in the theories of victory model. The speed, style, and local outcomes in a campaign are not important; what is very relevant is the degree to which the campaign wears down the essential military force and the political capability to maintain it. In this case, the slowness of the offensive did not concern Moscow. Instead, it was considered irrelevant.

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\(^{198}\) In addition to those officially communicated to the Finns, which increased incrementally, the Soviets played the diplomatic gossip game to suggest future increases. Although Molotov told the US Ambassador that the Soviet Union did not seek involvement in Finnish domestic politics on 8 March—something almost certainly communicated to the Finns, as they were Steinhardt’s guests a day latter (\textit{FRUS} 305-6), on 28 February, the titular State President, Kalinin, had given Steinhardt a ‘personal opinion’ that it was likely that Stalin would require some involvement by Kuusinen in the cabinet (\textit{FRUS} 293).

Comparison

While there are important similarities between the two campaigns, comparison between these cases is complicated by the fact that there are also important differences. Where the initial campaign, under Meretskov, failed to achieve most any of its military targets, Timoshenko’s later offensive did achieve its military targets, if in a less than inspiring way. Nevertheless, comparison of the two does reveal some of the differences between states pursuing attritive and informative theories of victory. From the first days of December, senior political leaders were very concerned by the failure of the Red Army to keep to its schedule—and their concern was evident, in the quick erasure of the Terijoki government from the news and in the formation of Stavka, even before the attacks on the main line were fully developed. They were attentive to and responsive to these details until they ended the offensives on 27-28 December. This attention seems to be the result of their expectations for how they would win—essentially, through a demonstration of their power. Because these acts specifically addressed their ability to make that demonstration, they were attentive to them.

In February-March, the Soviet political leadership seems to have been far less attentive to, and indeed responsive to, the continued slowness of their forces advances. That they were capturing their targets, if more slowly, and that their opponents repeatedly declared their interest in peace, is part of the explanation for this diminished attention and responsiveness. But just as important is the fact that they did not anticipate their forces to do so, and were able to maintain a belief in victory in spite of their forces’ inability to decisively defeat their opponent in grand style. This was because informational qualities of the victory and defeat in battle were

\[200\] Timoshenko himself was unsatisfied with the Red Army’s performance in the second half of the war, and believed that there were yet very substantial weaknesses to be corrected.
not important to how they expected to win: what was important was the frictional wearing away of their opponent’s ability to hold them back.

Thus, although the comparison is imperfect, examination of the two Soviet offensives suggests that the attritive and informative theories of victory frame information in different ways, highlighting aspects of events under one theory that are not highlighted under the other.

**Summing Up Framing Effects**

This section addresses two important questions. The first was whether or not the theories of victory exist in the way that they were expected. The evidence suggests several important things about the existence of the theories of victory. First, leaders seem to have had strong ideas about how they were going to win their war. Ideas and strategies were not thrown together on an as-available basis, rather, leaders had coherent expectations (some times wrong) about how their uses of force would influence their opponent’s decision-making process such that they obtained their aims. The war plans designed and selected followed from those ideas. Second, these expectations seem to follow the patterns expressed in the types of theory of victory. The codings were straightforward, and while there were certainly differences between them, the actual theories of victory followed the form described by the theories of victory types remarkably well. This provides strong evidence for both the existence of theories of victory as discrete sets of ideas, and for the typology of theories of victory described.

Next, the analyses suggest that the framing effects expected were found. Of course, the data is imperfect and limited—no war provides perfect theory tests, and what is found in one war may not be found elsewhere. Nevertheless, the individual findings converge with the model predictions, and the comparisons between cases support the central contention that different
events were in fact interpreted differently when leaders were pursuing different theories of victory. These differences, moreover, took the forms anticipated by the types of theories of victory associated with them.

Section 2: When Learning Happens

This section investigates when learning—defined as a change in a theory of victory—happens. The theory of victory codings above indicate that, over the course of the war, this happened four times over the course of the Winter War: once for the Soviets, and three times for the Finns. The model of learning advanced in this work makes three claims that will be probed in this section. First, it argues that emotion plays a key role in motivating whether or not information is acknowledged, properly analyzed, and effectively used. Second, it argues for a hypothesis testing approach to learning. The combination of these two claims produces the third key claim: that when learning is motivated by emotions like anxiety, less information is necessary to effect a change in theory of victory than when it is not motivated by that emotion.

Five brief cases are presented as a means of investigating these claims. The Russian failure to learn in early-to-mid December is presented first, followed by their very successful episode of learning in late December. Then, the coterminous experience of the Finns, as they found their expectations confirmed, is presented. The Finnish experience between 13 and 20 February, a case of moderately effective learning, follows. The fifth and last case examines the Finns learning over from between 27 February and 5 March, when they accepted the Russian terms in principle. These cases are both to test, as individual instances, the model’s predictions 201

201 The last, of course, occurred when they decided to forego further fighting and make the agreement ending the war.
about learning, and to provide a comparison between the processes extent when different values of the key dependent variable is obtained.

Case 1: The Soviet Union, December 15-20

During the second week of the war, Moscow concluded that their first offensive had failed.\(^{202}\) A new offensive following the same general outline but more focused on the Mannerheim Line was ordered for 15 December. On that day, the 50\(^{th}\) Rifle Corps attacked across the Taipalen-joki River, accompanied by artillery and aerial bombardment. Two days later, the 19\(^{th}\) Rifle Corps attacked near Summa. Neither made any progress, because, as one historian describes it, “both operations were ultimately compromised by organizational incompetence at every level.”\(^{203}\) They tried again on 18 December, but organizational chaos continued, and no progress was made. On 20 December, another attack against Summa was made without success, and the offensive was halted. Thus, on the Isthmus, things ended approximately where they started.\(^{204}\) North of Lake Ladoga, Red Army divisions were forced to halt and made short retreat by much smaller Finnish forces near Tolvajarvi and were halted near Suomussalmi (the 163\(^{rd}\) and then the 44\(^{th}\) Divisions).

Both of the unsuccessful offensives conducted by the Red Army during the first three weeks of the war were interpreted as bad news by Stalin.\(^{205}\) The events of 15 to 20 December

\(^{202}\) That it was seen as a meaningful failure is evident in the fact that Soviet media coverage of the war quickly dried up [DF, 85; BFA 161] and Stalin directed the formation of a Kremlin committee, Stavka, through which he would micromanage much of the war. Van Dyke 1997, 72-4.
\(^{203}\) Van Dyke 1997, 74.
\(^{204}\) Van Dyke, 1997, 74-77.
\(^{205}\) This was even evident to foreign observers. Andrei Zhdanov, seen as responsible for the USSR’s attention to the Finnish problem, was said to have been disgraced by Stalin. [DF, 885; BFA 161.] British
were worse, however, given that there were no successes and they suggested that the army had not fixed its problems. These failures were not novel. Not only were they their similar to the first week’s failures, they aligned with Stalin long-standing contempt for his military.\textsuperscript{206} Despite Stalin’s strong belief that the Red Army could simply roll over tiny Finland in two weeks, he was well aware of the weaknesses of the Soviet military. That the failures were essentially unforced errors, made against a weak force that quickly retreated to a rather weakly prepared position and then merely held it, meant that they fit readily into his pre-existing beliefs about the weaknesses of the Red Army.\textsuperscript{207}

Given that this series of events was both negative and familiar, my expectation is that they provoke frustration and cause leaders to maintain their beliefs. While there may be changes in doctrine or organization, the basic strategy and aims of the war will not be changed. Soviet responses to these events conform to these expectations, both in the pattern of learning and emotions expressed.

On 21 December, Stalin ordered that a third offensive, called \textit{Plan Ladoga}, be launched on 26 December. Meretskov and Stavka hoped that its greater detail and longer lead time would help overcome the failures of the previous attacks; it also had a greater emphasis on artillery and aerial bombing.\textsuperscript{208} For the most part, though, it was yet another run at the center

\textsuperscript{206} Van Dyke 1997; Murphy 2005; Gorodetsky 1999; Glantz 1998; Shukman 1993; Kulkov et al. 1999. This last work is the transcript of a post-war conference (June 1940) involving Stalin and many of his commanders. His contempt for most of them is self evident.

\textsuperscript{207} See for instance orders requiring a commander to improve the command of his division; requiring that troops be better supplied; requiring the air force to better support ground forces; requiring that ski training be improved; and criticizing poor operations in forested terrain and carelessness at night-time, Sokolov 2000, 200-202; 205; 207-8; 232-36.

\textsuperscript{208} Van Dyke 1997, 77-78.
of the Mannerheim line and yet another set of assaults north of Ladoga. At the strategic level, Stalin and his confederates had not changed their beliefs about how to win the war.

Instead, he responded with a combination of fury and familiar methods. For instance, on 19 December he informed the commander of the 9th Army (which included an encircled division) was informed that he would be held “personally responsible for the possible catastrophe” of that division. On 22 December, Voroshilov, angry at both Stalin for the purges that had weakened the army and his own commanders for failing him nevertheless wanted to solve the second problem with another application of the first: a court martial for Meretskov and a purge of his command. Though Stalin did not authorize executions, he was clearly and self-evidently furious at the military and intent on punishing officers. The decision-making here evinces, in several respects, the predictions of my learning model. Familiar bad news produced anger but no change in beliefs, no reappraisals of his theory of the war. Instead, a very frustrated Stalin focused on small improvements in organization and on using threats to punish in hopes of making his approach to the war work.

Case 2: The Soviet Union, 21-28 December

On 23 December, shortly after the order for Plan Ladoga was given, the Finns launched a major offensive of their own on the Karelian Isthmus, involving a fourth of their army. In addition to indicating that the Finns felt strong enough to make their own attacks, it unbalanced the plans for Plan Ladoga. Further north, near Tolvajarvi, units that had retreated now found themselves encircled. Near Suomussalmi, not only had Red Army divisions retreated, but the 163rd Division was being eliminated, and the encircled 44th was being cut to pieces by battalions.

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209 Order from Stavka to Commander 9th Army, Sokolov 2000, 202.
210 Van Dyke 1997, 77.
of ski troops. Despite the great effort of the attacks against Taipale on the Isthmus, Plan Ladoga very quickly revealed itself a failure was halted after two days, on 27 December. The failure was largely due to problems with command and morale in the attacking and supporting units. These events were both negative and novel. The Finns had made an attack, though failed, on the main Russian front. Elsewhere, they were destroying whole Red Army divisions with mere battalions. Given that Stalin and his comrades expected to win through a demonstration of their power, these events were clearly un-thought of. Certainly Khrushchev’s expectation that “we could fire one shot and the Finns would put up their hands and surrender” seems to indicate that these events were not only bad news, they had been unimaginable to the Soviet leaders. This being the case, hypothesis 1 (anxiety) provides the relevant prediction—a change in beliefs. This in fact happened.

In contrast with his earlier anger and punitiveness, Stalin’s pattern of response began to change. In a 24 December order, Stavka admonished the 7th Army commander for a variety of failings—the failure of the infantry to reconnoiter and guard its own positions; the tendency for whole artillery companies to go to the kitchens en masse, leaving their positions and weapons open to sabotage and spies; and the failure of the artillery to effectively support the infantry. However, this rebuke was not accompanied by threats, and the specific instructions were orders to consolidate all positions with wire and entrenchment. Similarly, Meretskov and his staff were reprimanded, but in a way that evinced a larger concern than merely his failings as a commander. Stalin told him that “The Red Army is the guarantee of the USSR’s national security. If we struggle for a long time against such a weak opponent, this will stimulate the

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212 Khruschev 1971.
213 Order from Stavka to Commander of the 7th Army, Sokolov 2000, 212-3.
anti-Soviet forces of the imperialists.” Plan Ladoga was still launched on 26 December—as did instructions to continue pursuing the fight in particular areas. However, within two days it was declared failed and major offensive actions were halted. Only bombardment and efforts to assist the encircled divisions continued.

In Stalin’s order of 28 December, he stressed that “the war with Finland is a serious war, distinctly different from our autumn campaign in Poland.” Strikingly, he rejected a key element of his earlier approach to the war by instructing his commanders to resist being carried away with rapid advance tactics; instead, they should only attack when fully prepared. He also urged wariness in pursuing the Finns, invoking their tactics in the 1808-09 war to suggest that the Finns may purposefully retreat, then surround and capture pursuing Red Army units. These statements strongly suggest that Stalin had rejected his earlier approach to the war.

Stalin’s associates also report having changed their beliefs. Molotov reports that he was now convinced of the real strength of the Finns, having earlier blamed the slowness of the advance on mined roads. Khrushchev reports that at the end of December there “we found ourselves in an even more difficult situation than before.” Thereafter, Stalin began an intensive search

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215 See orders to the commander of the 7th army air force and the 13th army, 27 December, Sokolov 2000, 219-222.
216 See for instance orders dated 1-7 January 1940, in Sokolov 2000, 248-258.
217 Van Dyke 1997, 103.
218 Van Dyke 1997, 103; Sokolov 2000, 222-24. He latter stressed the same idea, in a post war conference. Kulkov et al. 1999, 266)
219 Order from Stavka to commanders of the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, and 14th armies (signed Voroshilov, Stalin, and Shaposhnikov), Sokolov 2000, 222-4.
220 Watson 2005, 179.
221 Khrushchev 1971, 153.
for a new approach to the war—a which culminated by 7 January with the selection of a variant of Shaposhnikov’s earlier plan for the war.

This new plan called for vastly greater resources. Eventually, half of the Red Army’s European forces were involved. They would be led by Timoshenko, considered a better commander than Meretkov. Rather than executing a demonstration of power, the Soviets would use their demographic and industrial power to wear down the Finns. A new political strategy was also adopted: Stalin and Molotov sent hints that they were ready to talk through intermediaries they believed close to the Finns—the Estonians and the Germans.

In short, in response to the events of this period, Stalin rejected his approach to the war. The changing responses to events during the course of the week are particularly strong evidence that it was increasing anxiety that produced this change in beliefs. On 19 December, Stalin was evinced real anger at failure of the second offensive. But by 24 December, after the Finnish counterattack, Stalin was only rebuking commanders and giving those not in Plan Ladoga businesslike orders to entrench. By 28 December, he had halted Plan Ladoga, was warning his troops against rash advances devious Finnish tactics from 1808, and describing the war as ‘serious.’ This progression suggests an event-by-event increase in anxiety, culminating in a search for a new way forward. It is equally clear that he was not sure what that way forward would be: hence the odd reference to a long past-war with Finland, some suggestions that key

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222 This included investigations into morale, command performance, and tactics, which in turn produced further instructions to the commanders. See for instance the report from a regimental commander in the 9th Army to Shaposhnikov and Voroshilov, 31 December 1939, Sokolov 2000, 232-36; and the various orders from Stavka to Army Commanders dated 1-7 January, Sokolov 2000, 248-258.

223 Watson 2005, 179; GDFP, 629. The Estonians communicated the hint by New Years. McSherry 1970, 46; Tanner 1950, 116]. Diplomatic records suggest that the Germans did not communicate the hint to the Finns. Additionally, Kollontai, the Russian minister to Stockholm, told Swedish Foreign Minister Gunther that she now believed that the basis for a settlement could now exist. This occurred around 27 December. It is not clear whether or not she did this with authorization, however. [Carlgren 1979, 35.]
to winning was a longer front than the Finns could muster\(^{224}\) (*contra* the ultimate plan) and the series of inquiries and reports.

Other aspects of Kremlin responses were consistent with an anxiety-based response. There was no effort to derogate contrary information, as had occurred in earlier periods. Even the fact that Stalin had once ridiculed Shaposhnikov’s plan was not an impediment to adopting it. The reported feelings are, again convergent with anxiety being the mechanism for this changed behavior. While there were some instances of anger at particular individuals, like the general of the 44\(^{th}\) Division who ran out on his surrounded troops, Stalin seems to have ceased berating his leaders.\(^{225}\) The soberness of the leadership in this period and the concern at the wider effects of the situation on their security are also indicative of mild anxiety.

The character of the change in beliefs is also consistent with the kind of global learning anticipated under the influence of anxiety. Molotov’s conversion to recognizing the ‘unbelievable strength of the Mannerheim Line’\(^{226}\) is one example of this; Stalin’s comment that “we” had been misled by earlier experiences and had underestimated the “seriousness” of the war provides another.\(^{227}\) In each case, the change in beliefs suggests a change in both their model of battle and their model of their opponent, necessitating a very different kind of theory of victory. In general, then, hypothesis 1 (anxiety) effectively captures the dynamics of learning in this case.

\(^{224}\) Order of 28 December, Sokolov 2000, 222-4.
\(^{225}\) Some (Glantz 1998; Van Dyke 1997) describe these days as the beginning of a new attitude toward the military, one of valuing military professionals and professionalism, on Stalin’s part.
\(^{226}\) Watson 2005, 179.
\(^{227}\) Van Dyke 1997, 103.
Case 3: Finland, Mid-December to Mid-January

Starting with the forced retreat of the Soviets from Terijoki, the Finns encountered a series of events which they favorably interpreted. After Terijoki came the failure of the second offensive on the Isthmus, then the encirclement at Suomussalmi. Next came their offensive—which of course failed—then the short lived Plan Ladoga. Then, of course, came the halt to offensive operations and word from the Estonians that Stalin might be interested in talking. Early January brought the consummation of more motti battles, and reports of public sympathy and support from New York to Paris to Stockholm. In early and mid-January negotiations were covertly opened via the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm.

Already by the middle of the month there are reports of high Finnish officials being satisfied with these outcomes, demonstrating calmness and high morale, a feeling which persisted throughout the period. A month later, Mannerheim informed the cabinet that all was well and there were no grounds for panic. A British visitor on in the last week of January present both Tanner and Mannerheim as calm and confident. Writing to Ryti, Mannerheim stated that he had earlier overestimated the fighting capabilities of the Red Army. Around the same time, Ryti, the prime minister, stated that all the trumps were in Finnish hands. The public and more peripheral politicians were ‘buoyed up’ by the battlefield victories. Indeed, for those who had little sense of the leaders’ theories of victory and perhaps at best an inchoate

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228 BDFA (III-A-1) 141, 153.
230 Citrine 1940, 101-112. Indeed, Citrine presents Mannerheim as so calm that he seems semi-retired.
231 Vehvilainen 2003, 61.
sense of how they would win, the response was one of joy after a period of fear and despair. This sentiment only built as the further motti battles succeeded, and is evident in some of the cartoons of the period (see, particularly, Engle and Paananen 1973: 19, 41).

The combination of events had different effects on different groups of people in Finland. Mannerheim, Paasikivi, Tanner, and Ryti, all of whom displayed confidence and—perhaps a stretch, contentment—at the turn of events looked forward to making peace on terms generally similar to those they had offered in November. They anticipated a settlement that would involve some concessions on the Karelian Isthmus, some islands in the Gulf of Finland, perhaps one in the west. Others, who anticipated the eventual assistance of Swedish, German, or allied help, particularly including Niukannen, saw these events as confirming their theory of victory, one which foresaw an agreement with fewer, if any, concessions. Of course, having achieved such victories, the public was wholly unprepared for a settlement that would involve concessions.

During this period of time, all of the events which were framed by the dominant attritive theory of victory were seen as positively confirming expectations. According to emotion theory, this should produce happiness and contentment. The easy confidence recorded by visitors like Citrine and the assurances that no one need panic seem congruent with these feelings. And, certainly, the predictions about learning seem borne out by the experience: those who shared an attritive theory of victory seem did not experience changes in their beliefs about what would

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233 Kirby 2007, 211; Tanner 1957, 129; Vehvilainen 2003, 61. Further indication of the general positive spirit in the country was an agreement between the central unions and employer federations to enter into a corporatist arrangement for bargaining purposes (Jullisa 189-90).
234 One depicts a soldier asking ‘where are we going to bury all these Russians?’ another has a common Finnish soldier taunting a Red Army tank that has been hit by a Molotov cocktail.
235 DGFP 613.
236 Kirby 211.
be necessary to end the war. Paasikivi continued to expect the largest number of concessions—
though clearly he believed that they would accept a negotiated peace, something largely
confirmed by the Estonian hints during this period. Tanner and Mannerheim retained their
‘November concession’ beliefs. Niukanen continued to believe in minimal concessions, and
found this period similarly confirming. The public, for whom the experience of victory was
tremendously unexpected, after the air-raids and mass invasion of earlier weeks, experienced
these events as novel. This novelty, in turn, produced joy. This is evident in the high morale
consistently reported by diplomats and visitor. It product on learning can be thought of as
approaching that of a happy anxiety—rather seeing beliefs confirmed, the public began to
wonder if it might be possible to avoid the Soviet concessions altogether.

All told, these outcomes are consistent with the model predictions: confirmed
expectations led to happiness and a lack of interest in changing their terms or their strategies,
even as the strain of maintaining the army and maintaining even static defense increased. For
those members of the public with little sense of how they would win the war, the emotion and
the effect were slightly different—joy and hopes that peace could come without concessions—
but accord with the prediction for people without a clear theory of victory.

Case 4: Finland, 13-21 February

From the end of December, the Finnish leadership believed that the trend of the war
favored them. This began to change on 13 February, when Foreign Minister Tanner learned that

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237 Because Niukkanen’s memoirs have not been translated out of Finnish, I rely on Tanner’s descriptions
of him as they periodically occur in his quite detailed memoir of the war. In this case, the mentions during
late December and Early January are sparse, but there is a more substantial record of his participation in
meetings from late January.
the Swedes had foreclosed sending forces to assist them and that the Soviets had increased their demands.  

On the same day, just two days into its renewed offensive, the Red Army broke through a section of the Mannerheim Line. On 14 February, Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim described a ‘manpower crisis’ to senior military and government figures. The next day, Mannerheim ordered a withdrawal from the Mannerheim Line. By the 19th, the Finns had managed to stabilize the situation at their weaker Intermediate Defense Line, but the Red Army continued to bear down on Finnish defenses across the Isthmus.

Aside from the stabilization of the front at the IDL, all Finnish leaders saw these developments as bad news. The breaking of the main defense line was clearly threatening to the Finnish cause. No less threatening was the manpower crisis; the Finnish Army, limited by Finland’s small population, began to run out of soldiers just as the Soviets applied vast numbers of fresh troops. The Swedish refusal to reinforce them thus came as a particular blow to Finnish hopes.

For the cabinet members who took charge of the war effort—Foreign Minister Tanner, Prime Minister Ryti, and Paasikivi, most of these events were unexpected. The substantially increased Soviet war aims were entirely unexpected, given that the Finns had believed that the

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238 Nevaki 1976, 104. Moscow now demanded that the Finns concede the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga as well as parts of the Isthmus, Hanko, and a mutual assistance treaty. The mutual assistance treaty was seen as particularly ominous, since the Soviets had used the pre-text of mutual assistance treaties to invade the Baltic states just months before.

239 Mannerheim 1954, 358; Screen 2000, 158.

240 One historian describes this as the period in which the “unbounded illusions of the Finnish cabinet” were “dispelled forever.” [Nevaki 1976, 104] According to the British Ambassador to Sweden, relying on Swedish sources close to the Finnish government and army, the Finnish government had believed that the Soviets would be incapable of effective offensive action before the summer. [BDFA, 233.]

241 The status of this ‘troika’ as the key decision-makers was based on their power within the National Unity cabinet. It excluded two players who would normally be included as key decision-makers. However, President Kallio, who under the constitution was supposed to play a key role in war leadership, essentially abdicated that role. Defense Minister Niukkanen, the leader of a rightist party, tended to disagree with their direction of the war but never had enough political power to do much about it.
trend of the war favored them. After holding out against the Red Army throughout December, the strongest Finnish defense line was broken after only two days of sustained attack. The once bumbling Soviets were now orchestrating their attacks well and using innovative tactics. The description of a ‘manpower crisis’ Mannerheim gave to the cabinet after the breakthrough was novel; indeed, one might say that it was designed to be so. The Swedish rejection of military assistance may have been novel, though it is not clearly the case. Though long hinted at, all of these men refused to believe that the Swedes would rebuff them in their hour of need. Thus the firm and public rejections made by Prime Minister Hansson and King Gustaf V were a surprise.

For Defense Minister Niukanen and other likeminded individuals, the events during this week were undesirable but familiar. The only thing that surprised them was that some would talk of peace. Niukanen and some in the General Staff had grown unhappy with Mannerheim’s prosecution of the war, seeing him as out-of-touch and insufficiently aggressive. Given his belief that with a few more guns and bullets the war could be sustained for months, the retreat from the Mannerheim Line to the intermediate defense line after months of pressure was not novel for him, but rather the result of Mannerheim’s bad management. Niukanen was also unhappy with what he saw as the insufficiently aggressive political prosecution of the war by Tanner, Ryti, and Paasikivi. Along with Mannerheim, they refused to

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242 Jacobson 1960, 223; Nevaki 1976, 104. Tanner was clearly surprised and disappointed by the increased aims—feelings shared by the Swedish ministers, as well.
243 Mannerheim 1954, 353-7. In the earliest days of the war Mannerheim had been concerned that his forces were weak, however their successes in holding back the Soviets had increased his confidence in them.
245 Mannerheim’s views on the war were frequently challenged within the senior echelon of the army and in the war ministry. See Mannerheim 1954, 384; Tanner 1950, 169-70, 224; Screen 2000 (particularly with reference to Gen. Osterman); and Vuorenmaa 1985, 91.
246 Tanner, 1950, 156-7.
accept the aid offered them by the Western Europeans.\textsuperscript{247} This same weak diplomacy made the Swedish rejection unsurprising to Niukkanen, and he continued to urge Tanner to keep trying to secure both Swedish and Allied support.\textsuperscript{248} That the Intermediate Defense Line held was a positive but familiar development, given the earlier ability of the Finnish lines to hold back the Soviets.

Given these perceptions of the events, an emotion-oriented approach to learning predicts that the two groups will evince different patterns of learning. Niukkanen’s familiar bad news is likely to render him angry and frustrated, and resistant to new information (hypothesis 2). But for Tanner, Mannerheim, Ryti, and Paasikivi, the several novel elements in this progression of bad news is likely to produce a reappraisal of their approach to the war (hypothesis 1). These predictions are borne out by the evidence.

The Finnish cabinet’s position on 13 February was clear: they would not concede to Soviet demands for a base on Hanko, the whole Karelian Isthmus, and the shore of Lake Ladoga. Even Tanner, Ryti, and Paasikivi—who unlike the rest of the cabinet had then been willing to offer an off-shore base at Jussaro, an island near Hanko—felt that the new Soviet terms need not be borne.\textsuperscript{249} Their position had changed by 21 February. Then, a majority of the Diet foreign affairs committee endorsed Tanner, Paasikivi, and Ryti’s proposal to enter into peace talks even if it meant the loss of the Hanko Peninsula. It is clear that during this week, Ryti,

\textsuperscript{247} Tanner, 1950, 169-170. A month before, Mannerheim asked an Allied officer who brought up the matter of prospective western aid if he had ‘come only to prolong our agony?’ \textit{(BDFA, 153)} Recall that Daladier’s fall from power in March 1940 was precipitated by the Finnish treaty with Stalin, and the failure of France to actively aid the struggling Finns that it represented.

\textsuperscript{248} This reflects his belief that they could hold the lines for at least several months, the time that would be needed for Allied forces to organized and transport themselves to Finland, no easy task given the state of Europe.

\textsuperscript{249} Jacobson 1960, 224-236; Tanner 1950, 155-156; Vehvilainen 2002, 62.
Tanner, Mannerheim, and most of the rest of the cabinet discarded the beliefs had supported their bargaining position.  

These changes in beliefs are consistent with my predictions. Mannerheim, Paasikivi, Tanner, and Ryti all changed from a perception of the military situation that justified ceding Jussaro to one impelling them to cede Hanko itself. Several others in the cabinet moved further, catching up to Tanner and Paasikivi’s belief that the situation now justified conceding Hanko. Reports of emotional experience are congruent with anxiety as an explanation for their reappraisal of the situation: Tanner, Ryti, Mannerheim, and Paasikivi are variously described as disappointed, shocked, nervous, or concerned by the series of events, all of which can be seen as manifestations of anxiety.

The other group, however, retained its beliefs. Niukanen and several others still supported the cabinet’s bargaining position from the week before. Parliamentary ally Ikola staid that peace negotiations should not even be thought of; another ally inveighed against the ‘sacrifice’ of Hanko and even speaking of peace on such terms. They rejected this peace talk because they held to their belief that the fight could be carried on for some months, long enough to moderate the Soviet position. Consistent with the frustration hypothesis, Niukkanen is reported as very angry in discussions of the war situation; the expressions of his allies suggest the same. Importantly, Niukkanen’s lack of learning cannot be explained by a general

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250 Prime Minister Ryti now worried about the Finns’ lack of artillery, armor and anti-tank guns, deficiencies that would become grave should the Red Army breakthrough the remaining prepared defenses on the Isthmus. See Tanner 1950, 162.
251 Nevaki 1976, 104; Tanner 1950, 157; 161-162.
252 Tanner 1950, 169-70.
inflexibility. On 29 February-1 March, after the Red Army had smashed through the intermediate lines and began to approach Viipuri, Niukkanen became willing to cede Hanko.

**Case 5: Finland, 28 February-5 March**

The week from 28 February to 5 March was eventful for the Finnish decision-group. While enough of the group had, the week earlier, consented to the cession of Hango, the Soviets had simultaneously notified them that they were increasing their aims: now, in addition to Hango, and the mutual assistance treaty, they sought all of the Karelian Isthmus, including the city of Viipuri (the second largest in Finland) and territory north of Ladoga in the Sortavala region. Even Tanner and Paasikivi were not prepared to cede those lands on 22 February. Molotov repeated these demands in an ultimatum on 28 February, which he then repeated on 4 March, at the request of the Swedes, after it had expired. On 29 February, fearing that the Finns might make peace, French premier Daladier made an extravagant promise of aid—50,000 Allied soldiers, to arrive by mid-April. In the days that followed, it became clear that the promise could not be fulfilled—neither were the men available nor were the Scandinavians willing to grant passage. At most, 15,000 men could be sent, though how they would get there remained a question. Simultaneously the Soviet State President, Kalinin told the US Ambassador that he expected that Stalin would require some kind of interference in Finnish affairs as a cost of peace—most likely through the participation of Kuusinen (*FRUS* 293). Though unofficial, this rumor was clearly intended to increase the pressure on the Finns.

Militarily, a pause in the Russians’ advance ended. The intermediate defense line failed, and as the period began, the Finns retreated to the ‘V-line’ just outside of Viipuri. Mannerheim warned the cabinet that the military situation was increasingly serious and the army could not
hold out much longer—either in men or munitions. Then, it too, failed, and fighting moved to the outskirts of the city. The army opened a dam on the Saima canal to try to hold off their opponents—a measure which was temporarily successful. On 3 March, Red Army divisions started moving across the Bay of Viipuri—a grave threat, since it would have allowed them to flank the Finnish army, which lacked the men to defend the Bay’s eastern shore against such a force. By 5 March, Mannerheim warned the cabinet that the “situation at the front was obvious”—either they must have tremendous assistance, very soon, or they should make peace.

Beliefs changed very quickly during this period. On 27 February, Tanner remained firmly set against ceding Viipuri in talks with Kollontai, the Soviet envoy to Stockholm. But within two days—after gaining some Swedish promises for financial and military assistance after a peace was made—and with Mannerheim’s help, he convinced the cabinet to accept the Soviet ultimatum in principle. Niukkanen and Hanula opposed the decision, being willing to give Hango but still opposed to giving Viipuri, but they were unable to prevent the decision. Before it could be transmitted, however, the Allies made their presentation. Finally confronted with a promise for the kind of aid they had sought, they pulled back their acceptance before it was sent and decided to investigate the promise. Over the next several days, they compared how long they expected to be able to hold off the Soviets and how long it would be before

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254 Paasikivi 177-79; Tanner 190; Screen 150. Importantly, Mannerheim’s opinion was not shared by all of his senior generals. In a meeting with Ryti and other cabinet officials, it appears that Mannerheim had to exercise both persuasion and his personal prestige to gain consensus support for his view that the military situation could not be held much longer (Mannerheim 384).
255 Van Dyke 169.
256 Paasikivi 188. The only positive military news came from north of Ladoga, where there were great successes in the Tolvajarvi-Algajarvi area.
257 Kollontay 198.
258 Tanner 188-193; Jacobson 238.
259 Paasikivi 178.
enough men to make a difference. At first there were hopes that they could at least use this threat of a large-scale western intervention to pressure the Soviets to pull some demands off the table. This was true not only of Niukkanen and Hanula, who expected the Soviets to give back even territory that they had gained, but even of Mannerheim, Paasikivi, and Ryti.260

Progress came on both beliefs: it became clear that it would be hard indeed for the Allies to get their men to Finland, that fewer would arrive than had been promised, and that the Finns would probably not be able to hold out long enough. By the end of 3 March, Tanner, Paasikivi, and Ryti were convinced that the aid would be too small.261 By 5 March, after the repetition of the Soviet ultimatum, this same group was convinced that the military could not hold out even long enough for the insufficient troops to arrive. On this basis, they convince a cabinet majority to transmit an acceptance of the Soviet demands in principle. Niukkanen and Hanula continued to believe that the military could hold out longer than Tanner and Mannerheim, and continued to dissent, though they could not veto the act.262 Their insistence on this view is partially explained by the fact that several of generals and senior bureaucrats held this view.263 While several leaders (Kallio, Mannerheim) continued to hope that the

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260 Tanner 197; Paasikivi 180-9.
261 Tanner 207; Paasikivi 187.
262 On 6 March, Niukanen declared that he believe that it would require 100,000 soviet casualties before they could take Vipuri (Tanner 216).
263 Lt. Gen. Ohquist, a corps commander in the Isthmus Army, believed that defense could have continued for a few months had the withdrawal been carried out as soon as the v-line had broken, but Mannerheim had not done so, with an eye to the negotiations (and presumably a fear of losing more than Viipuri), instead forbidding withdrawal. (Vuorenmaa 91). An American diplomat reported that "Mannerheim and the general staff" were strongly opposed to even the mention of peace talks—which clearly misrepresented Mannerheim’s position but may not have been so far off the mark for the rest of the general staff. Colonel Paasonen, who served as advisor to the negotiating team, military envoy in Paris, and then influential aide-de-camp to President Kallio, was one of the principal proponents of Allied assistance, and was frequently far too persuasive for Finland’s good.. The professional head of the foreign ministry, Pakaslahti, felt similarly, and resigned at the conclusion of the peace (Tanner 224).
promise of Western aid could be used in one way or another to moderate Soviet demands, they remained in favor of opening negotiations and making peace, even if it meant losing Viipuri.\textsuperscript{264}

Unsurprisingly, this crowded week was characterized by strongly felt emotions. The meetings on 28-29 February are described as “anxious,” and Niukanen’s statements evince anger and frustration at the idea of quitting.\textsuperscript{265} The unexpected, last second Allied promise was surprising, and having rescinded the decision to concede, the group felt a strong sense of relief. Yet as the leaders further examined the offer in the cold light of day, Tanner, Mannerheim, Paasikivi, and Ryti became quite uncertain, changing their minds day by day and some times more than once in a day. Even Tanner, by accounts the most hell-bent for peace, describes himself as tormented by “noise,” unable to sleep, in the days after 1 March. Niukanen and Hanula evince happiness, in good part since they had been supporters of seeking foreign aid for some time, but then as Tanner and his fellow travelers turn again toward peace, again demonstrate anger and frustration.

The Red Army’s return to success in late February brought Tanner and his associates back into the realm of the unfamiliar: after the main ‘Mannerheim” line had lasted so well against it, the next lines failed in quick succession. The Army was left to make desperation moves, like opening the Saima Canal dam, sooner than many had expected. Molotov had, for the first time, made an ultimatum with a 24-hour deadline, and there were rumors of much less pleasant conditions if they did not concede by the deadline. The threat was thus much greater than it had been, and the speed with which lines fell back much greater. Together, these characteristics should create anxiety. This seems to have happened; indeed, the cabinet

\textsuperscript{264} Paasikivi 190; Tanner 223-4.
\textsuperscript{265} Tanner 188-9; Paasikivi 177-180.
meeting of 29 February is specifically described as being ‘anxious.’ It also tracks well with the changes in beliefs that occurred: Tanner, Paasikivi, Mannerheim, and Kallio at this point gave up hope of being able to hold back the Red Army long enough to save Viipuri with their own strength, and even Niukanen finally concluded that they could not save Hango.

Daladier’s false promise offered an opportunity to pull away from the pain of concession. Coming as it did, as if from nowhere, it should create joy or elation. This joy or elation, in turn, should excite hopes but also retard learning. That is exactly what happened, at first. All put aside their earlier doubts about Western help, leaping at this new idea. Yet at the same time, the joyful embrace of this solution meant that they had rejected a prior set of expectations or theory of victory without a clear sense of what their new theory of victory might be. When the sense of reward started to give way as it became clear that the aid would be smaller than promised, the leaders met a yet more punishing situation, as the army was further stretched and Finnish casualty rates continued to increase.

The key personalities emerged from this cauldron of emotion and fluctuating beliefs at different rates. Tanner and Niukanen emerged first: Tanner opposed accepting any aid, believing it would be too little too late; Niukanen believed it had the key to salvation. Then Paasikivi and Ryti and then Kallio, both accepting Tanner’s argument in general but hoping that the Allied help could be played as a card in the peace talks in such a way that Viipuri could be kept. Mannerheim would continued to flirt with the idea of foreign intervention until 9 March, at once recognizing that his forces could not hold out for more than days but still trying to avoid the loss of Viipuri. The different speeds at which the various leaders came to change their minds are reflective of three different factors. For Niukanen, the experience was essentially confirmatory—unexpected, but reflective of an existing theory of victory. For Tanner, Paasikivi,
Ryti, Kallio, and Mannerheim, the timing of their eventual rejection seems to be influenced by the degree to which they accepted the option as plausible and the degree to which they were surrounded by supporters of the western option. Tanner seems to have been most doubtful of the proposal from the start, and thus had few cognitive defenses associated with it. Perhaps motivated by a desire to avoid giving over something they greatly valued, Kallio and Mannerheim seem to have embrace the option more strongly, and thus were more resistant to disconfirmatory information. That Paasonen was at crucial moments around them, providing rationales and arguments against contrary events may also have slowed their learning, despite a continuing series of troubling events.

In all, the Finnish experience in late February-early March is supportive of the basic contentions of the model. The different influences of different emotions—anxiety, joy, frustration—are evident in the patterns of learning in response to diplomatic and military events. At the same time, the case reveals the importance of the interaction between the individual’s views, should they diverge, and the series of events in producing both emotion and learning patterns.

General Discussion

Taken together, the five cases constitute a strong argument for the influences of emotion on the timing and scope of the learning that occurs. For both the Soviets and the Finns, the conditions that, according to emotion theory, should have produced anxiety seem to have increased the speed and scope of the learning that occurred in response to events. In those cases where feelings were described, the descriptions are consonant with weak to intermediate anxiety. This strengthens the contention that the mechanism at work was in fact anxiety. Those
events that should have created anger and frustration seem to have slowed political learning for both Russians and Finns, even as steps were sometimes taken to address the military problems responsible for the anger and frustration. Consonant with this mechanism were, again, the reports of the relevant feelings being experienced. In the Finnish cases where events suggested happiness or joy, again, the predictions of the model are fairly well borne out: in the case of happiness, no political learning occurred. In the case of joy, evident among the Finnish public in the January case and in some Finnish leaders on 1 March, the response was somewhat more: more favorable sets of aims began to be considered, but rarely in a way that closely connected them to facts and information. Because they lacked this close connection to the things that, over days instead of moments make plans plausible to leaders (and others), these ideas were very susceptible to contrary information. However, given that only one case allows for the systematic examination of joy’s influences, my conclusions about its effects must remain of the most tentative kind.

The cases also corroborate the hypothesis model of learning. Even under the influence of anxiety—which served to speed the process of political learning, and perhaps expand its scope—no single battlefield event falsified a theory of victory. Rather, doubts were introduced and then sustained, or not. In this process, emotions either maintained and supported resistance to information contrary to the theory of victory, or magnified its import—but it seems to have influenced the more general process, rather than changing it utterly.
Section 3: Decisions After Changes in Theories of Victory

This section investigates the changes in effects of having a theory of victory falsified on future choices about aims, strategy, and termination. The intuition guiding the theories of victory model in this regard is that the falsification of a theory of victory affects decision-makers’ underlying models of the situation. Depending on the nature of the falsification, that may affect their model of battle, their model of their opponent, their model of themselves, two of these models, or even all three. These changes in the underlying models of the situation then logically constrain the plausibility of remaining options. Correlates of the theories of victory—like the tendency of attritive theories of victory to require mass mobilization with its attendant costs—may further constrain the theories of victory. In general, progress towards termination occurs when both sides’ models of the situation converge, though termination can occur without perfect convergence.

Five cases are presented in this section. They are offered chronologically. First are the Soviet decisions about how to proceed after concluded that their first theory was falsified. Next are the Finnish decisions of 21 February, 28 February, and 5-12 March. Last are the Soviet decisions of 5-12 March, which are presented not because a theory of victory was falsified, per say, but because they involved decisions to continue with the war or not, having been presented with apparent Finnish willingness to meet their terms.²⁶⁶ These cases provide insight into the decisions made as an informative theory of victory is falsified, as attritive theories of victory are falsified, and termination decisions made in the context of an attritive theory of victory. While

²⁶⁶ Although the Finns had made offers before, these offers were never came close to the Soviet demands of the moment.
the events of the war do not allow for a complete test of possible model situations, they provide—individually and as a group—tests of several important predictions. The cases begin with a discussion of how what beliefs changed with the falsification of the prior theory of victory. They then continue with a discussion of how the theory of victory chosen and the reasons give for that preference. Domestic political considerations are also examined for influence. An analysis of what occurred, in theoretical terms and an evaluation of theory performance is presented last.

Case 1: The Soviet Union, Late December-Early January

By 27 December, Stalin had given up on his hope of using a demonstration of power to gain his aims in Finland. He no longer believed that the Red Army was capable of making the kind of demonstration that would be necessary to persuade them. This is most evident in his turning back to the Shaposhnikov plan which he had earlier believed overestimated the military capability of Finland, and in his comments that the war with Finland was a “real” or “serious” or “hard” war. Also, whereas at the beginning of the war he believed that the Finns would back down after a couple of shots, he now considered them to be a deeply stubborn people. In this sense, both his model of battle and his model of his opponent had been changed by the falsification of this theory of victory.

It is clear that his model of the Soviet ability to continue fighting was also changing, but changing because of international factors rather than domestic ones. Although it is clear that there were strongly negative responses by Soviet citizens to the war, particularly in December-
January, there is no evidence that these public responses affected Soviet decision-making in a meaningful way. Clearly, the authorities were aware of discontent and generally passive resistance to their government’s bungled war, but there were no overt displays of resistance to the government.\(^{269}\) The same seems to be true among those players who could have, in principle, challenged Stalin. The army leadership, so recently purged of all signs of life and now tripping over itself in Finland, evinced no challenge or resistance.\(^{270}\) While Beria appears to have used the failures of the war as an opportunity to score points against Voroshilov and others in the military,\(^{271}\) he made no unfriendly moves against Stalin.

However, Stalin’s continued inability to force concessions out of the Finns was clearly dangerous to the Soviet Union, because it suggested weakness in the Red Army.\(^{272}\) Weakness in the Red Army put Soviet security at risk, given the aggression of Nazi Germany, so further displays of weakness could not be easily tolerated by the Soviet state. It is clear that Stalin was deeply concerned about this, from his comments to Meretskov during December and from Khrushchev’s description their response to apparent German mockery of Soviet weakness.\(^{273}\) Thus while the Soviet Union had the political resources to continue fighting, continued fighting brought other costs from other sources.

Some things did not change. First among them was the recognition that however hard the Finns might fight, there were a limited number of them. Leningrad itself had a larger population than Finland, after all. The demographic power of the Soviet Union could be brought to bear to crush them, eventually. Also unchanging was his belief that, if pushed hard enough,
the Finns would not make a suicidal stand. Rather, they would act sensibly and concede rather than face their own destruction. That they had protested their willingness to talk four times over the course of December certainly reinforced that belief.

Ultimately, Stalin choice to change his strategy and apparently his war aims. Rather than expecting a demonstration of power to force Finnish concessions, he would wear down their army to the point that their choice was between concession and subjugation. However, he would wait until the military was fully prepared for the fight, rather than suffering further failures of arms. In scrapping the Terijoki government, opened the way to constructive talks and he removed the apparent demand for Finnish sovereignty (and certainly a demand for the ability to interfere in Finnish politics).

In terms of the theories of victory model, Stalin had both the practical belief about what his military could do, and his belief about the nature of the other agent, falsified. This being the case, the logic of the model suggests that his alternatives were between termination and changing to an attritive theory of victory. The more precise prediction comes from an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with those options. In this circumstance, immediate termination, without achieving his aims, was undesirable: if taking a long time to win was dangerous, surely quitting without getting their demands would have been an even greater signal of weakness. It was also un-necessary, given the dearth of internal resistance to putting more forces into continuing the war. According to the model, then, Stalin should have preferred to choose an attritive theory of victory, but not changed aims. In the actual event, Stalin did indeed select an attritive theory of victory. However, according to most histories of the war, he

274 Kulkov et al. 1999: 266.
275 Glantz 1990, 39.
also decreased his war aims.

This puppet government is one of the thorniest issues in Winter War historiography.\(^{276}\)

To some, it reflects a Soviet desire to conquer Finland, and the refusal to speak to the Finns during December seems to them to confirm this perspective. To others, it was merely a propagandist’s expedient, a way of explaining an anti-imperialist country’s imperialist war.\(^{277}\)

Those supporting these claims focus on the absolute dearth of post-conquest plans and the speed with which it disappeared from the Soviet media. The theory of victory model suggests a third alternative. At first it had a clearly important propaganda aim—to try to bring Red Finns to the Red Army’s side. It also suggested that the Soviet Union anticipated influence in the country after the war, though not necessarily through direct control. Once it was clear that this was not going to happen, it disappeared from Soviet discourse. However, given that they were pursuing an informative theory of victory—and from their own perspective had yet to complete the

\(^{276}\) Baryshnikov 2000, 163.

\(^{277}\) There is a variety of conflicting evidence relevant to this issue. According to Marshal Konyev’s memoirs, Stalin told him that “We shall resettle the Finns...the population of Finland is smaller than that of Leningrad, they can be resettled” (Radzinsky 1996, 447). More ambiguously, on 21 January, Stalin told Dimitrov, a senior comintern official, as well as others in his party that “there should be nothing left but the bare bones of a state...We have no desire for Finland’s territory. But Finland should be a state that is friendly to the Soviet Union.” (Banac 2003, 124) On the other hand, there is a significant tradition in the literature suggests that he tucked the Terijoki/Kuusinen government on as a propaganda or rhetorical device, since good Marxists were not supposed to act in aggressive, imperialist ways. In this sense, it may have reflected a desire to appear ideologically consistent (Vihavainen 1987). According to Merestkov’s memoirs, Stalin described his interest as protecting Leningrad when instructing his general in the preparation of war plans in June of 1939 (Meretskov 1971, 104). Similarly, Khrushchev did not believe that he sought to conquer Finland (Khrushchev 1971, 156). Molotov, decades later, agrees that the security of Leningrad was the primary interest, then suggests that they were smart to not annex the country, as it would have become a festering wound (Chuev and Reis 1993, 9). (Of the three, Molotov’s comments are the most ambiguous—it is not clear whether the decision to not annex the country came before the war or only in the course of the war.) Stalin’s after-the-fact discussion of the war in April 1940 suggests he had little intent of taking the whole country (Kulkov et al. 1999, 263-66) (That said, several aspects of his discussion of the war ring false, see Chubaryon 1999, xvii). Most concretely in support of this perspective is the absence of documentary evidence of plans for a long-term occupation or the incorporation of Finland into the Soviet Union (Chubaryon 1999, xvi).
demonstration—the Soviets would have had little reason to be interested in talks with the Finns yet, as they would not have had their beliefs changed enough to make an offer acceptable to Moscow. Once they changed to an attritive theory of victory, they became interested in talks with the Finns. According to the model, however, because changing from an informative theory of victory to an attritive one should change the relationship between talking and fighting, it is not entirely clear that this kind of change implies a change in aims. Certainly, the change was perceived as a change in aims by the Finns and was important in their understanding of the war, but if the model is correct, that interpretation may have been a mistake. If that interpretation is a mistake, moreover, and the Soviet Union did not meaningfully change its aims, and the theories of victory model’s prediction is correct with regard to aims as well as strategy.

Case 2: Finland, 21 February

On 21 Finland, the key players in the Finnish cabinet agreed to the cession of Hango, in the expectation that this offer would suffice to end the war.\textsuperscript{278} This act reflected a change in their beliefs about how long they could continue to fight and what that would translate into. As such, it reflected the falsification of an attritive theory of victory. They were almost immediately confronted with Molotov’s response, however. Hango was no longer enough, they must also cede the entire Isthmus, including Viipuri, and the Sortava area north of Lake Ladoga. Helsinki was not prepared to surrender these territories yet.\textsuperscript{279} Moreover, the Soviets’ new offensive

\textsuperscript{278} Tanner 1957, 169-170.
\textsuperscript{279} Jacobson 1983, 234-5.
had apparently stalled out again.280 The Western Allies, also, looked increasingly willing to help.281 Based on their estimates of what they could continue to do, what the Red Army could do, and the external pressures upon the Soviet Union, they concluded that they could continue fighting, in the same way, and expect to preserve Viipuri and Sortavala.

Public opinion at the time was entirely uninformed about peace moves. It was, more over, still very optimistic about the outcome of the war.282 This optimism gave rise to some fear in many of the politicians that offering too much could be politically problematic. At various times in this period, Tanner, Niukanen, Kallio, and Paasikivi all advanced this concern283 in particular associated with the demand for Viipuri. Moreover, there was almost no opposition to even the very high levels of requisition associated with the war.284 Finland was a society totally and enthusiastically mobilized.285 Indeed, that was much of the problem that the leaders now faced. The public strongly supported the war, but there was nothing left to mobilize, and while there was enough to keep the Soviets at bay for a while longer, all agreed that they could not do so indefinitely. How long they could hold them back was in dispute, and the effects that would have on the Russian bargaining position were in dispute, but the ultimate failure of their essential fighting force was by now generally accepted among the leadership.

Having had an attritive theory of victory, the theories of victory model suggests that only termination or another attritive theory of victory will seem plausible. Owing to the absence of further men or materiel to insert into the war, the change could only be one of aims, rather

280 Van Dyke 164.
282 GDFP 802.
283 Kollontai 1990, 197; Paasikivi 1966, 175; Tanner 1957, 174-5
285 Jusilla et al. 1999, 188.
than strategy. This being the case, the model predicts that the choice between accepting the agreement and termination will be determined by the relative costs and benefits. The Finnish leaders valued their aims greatly, feared the negative response of a public that shared that valuation, and believed that saving Viipuri and Sortavala was both possible and would not be excessively costly. Given that these antecedents, it is unsurprising that they chose to continue with another attritive theory of victory rather than accepting Soviet terms. That they did corroborates the central tenets of the theories of victory model.

Case 3: Finland, 29 February

On 29 February, amidst an anxious meeting, the Finnish cabinet accepted in principle the Soviet demands for Viipuri (again, over the opposition of Niukanen and Hanula). To Tanner and most of the cabinet, it was now clear that the army was unable to bear the load much longer. Viipuri would not stand the onslaught long; with it lost, the Red Army would gain further entrée into the heart of the country. Sweden had made clear that it would not offer forces to assist them, and the Allied proposals all seemed to involve too few men, arriving too late. Finding no plausible route to victory available, they prepared to transmit their acceptance of the Russian terms. As they did so, the Allies came forth with a much more substantial, if vague plan. This new offer seemed to involve enough well-armed men—50,000—to hold off the Russians for a significant period of time. Moreover, it promised arrival by the middle of the

286 Paasikivi 1966, 177-8; Tanner 1957, 190; Jacobson 1983, 238.
next month, which then seemed to be a plausible period to hold off the Russians.  
This new offer seemed to suggest a way to hold onto the Isthmus by using foreign forces to strengthen Finnish defenses.

Meanwhile, public opinion had not changed from the week before in any meaningful way. It remained confident of success in the war, rather than expecting great concessions. Nevertheless, until they found a way that was plausible to them, the Cabinet would not continue the war. Once, however, a possible route was found, they grasped at it—even though they had been skeptical of western aid for some time.

This rather remarkable episode corroborates the model in several important ways. First, it shows decision-makers’ need for a plausible theory of victory. Before the promise of military assistance, the Cabinet saw no means by which they might achieve their aim of saving Viipuri and Sortavala, and responded by agreeing to concessions, even when they expected public opposition. Second, congruent with the failure of an attritive theory of victory, they saw their options as being between another, albeit poorly formed, attritive theory of victory—conducted with the injection of foreign assistance since their own well was running dry—and quitting. Third, given the value to the Finns of the territory to be lost, it is unsurprising that their evaluation of continuing with foreign aid versus making the concessions favored the former rather than war termination.

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288 According to a number of observers, once the spring thaw hit, the Isthmus would become wholly unsuitable for the heavy armored or mechanized equipment of the Red Army for about two months, being largely swampland in the spring (FRUS 298; Shoukman 1993, 128).
289 Ryti made clear that it was impossible to believe that the Finns could recover lost ground militarily at this point. (Paasikivi 1966, 177-8)
Case 4: Finland, 5-12 March

By 5 March the promise of foreign help had largely faded. It was now clear to a majority of the cabinet that foreign help would be smaller than the 50,000 men promised by Daladier and his emissaries.\(^{290}\) Given its weakness, it was not clear how it could be used as a bargaining chip to hold on to Viipuri or Sortavala, though some—Mannerheim and Kallio in particular—still maintained vague hopes.\(^{291}\) To these same people, events now also strongly suggested that if the Finns waited for the help to come, Helsinki itself might be on the front lines.

Given that they could no longer fit together a theory of victory, the Cabinet decided to communicate to the Soviets their agreement to concede in principle. They then dispatched Ryti, Paasikivi, and a team of negotiators to Moscow. These negotiators had hoped for a ‘grand gesture’ from Stalin, but instead were greeted on 8 March by Molotov with generally increased demands. While they dropped the demand for a mutual assistance pact—no trivial concession—they now also demanded reparations, a railway linking the Soviet Union with Sweden over which they would have near-free use, and territorial concessions on the Fisherman’s Peninsula near Petsamo (though not Petsamo itself).\(^{292}\) When Ryti evinced reluctance, Molotov threatened that he would next return to ‘talking’ to Kuusinen’s puppet government.\(^{293}\) Still Ryti dithered a few more days.

\(^{291}\) Nevertheless, Mannerheim had strong doubts about the seriousness and feasibility of the Allied offers (Ruotsila 2005, 96).
\(^{292}\) Jacobson 1983, 250.
\(^{293}\) Van Dyke 1997, 177.
But the situation on the Isthmus worsened. Mannerheim reported that the army could hold out for days, at best. By 9 March, Mannerheim was also fully disabused of the notion that external help could save their cause, and became fully resigned to accepting the terms. Tanner’s coalition in the cabinet grew more firm, and though President Kallio was reluctant, he approved the move, as did the Diet’s foreign affairs committee. There, only Urho Kekkonen, future president and a member with Niukkanen of the Agrarian Party, dissented. On 12 March, the agreement to conclude the agreement was approved. Niukkanen and Kekkonen, who continued to insist that foreign help could provide a way out, maintained an attritive theory of victory based in good part on an estimate though they may lose Viipuri—at great cost to the Russians—the Finnish army could continue as an effective fighting force for months thereafter. Given this case, they resigned from the Cabinet when the agreement became effective.

Here again, the close connection between the absence of a sense of a plausible theory of victory and concession strongly corroborates the central intuitions of the model. State leaders do not, it would seem, continue to fight wars when they lack a sense of how they will win them. That the Finnish army remained intact when this decision was made renders the conclusion stronger. They were not forced to concede by an absolute absence of remaining military force, rather, their hand war forced by the absence of a plausible way to use that force. The lack of consideration of other types of theory of victory also corroborates the logic of the relationships between the theories of victory—after an attritive theory fails, only an attritive theory, if any all, will seem plausible. Similarly, once the canard of foreign assistance dissolved,

294 Tanner 1957, 227; Van Dyke 177; Paasikivi 1966, 197.
295 Ruotsila 2005, 97.
296 Tanner 1957, 216; Lundin 60-61.
the leaders’ arguments and beliefs seem to have reverted to those that existed before—suggesting the continuing role of the underlying models despite changes in the theory of victory. The concern with public opinion also corroborates the model, as its role is shown as subsidiary to the existence of a cogent theory of victory.

Case 5: Soviet Union, 5-12 March

On the Soviet side, the decision-making process surrounding the end of the war is less clear, as less there do not exist any first hand accounts. Nevertheless, several important factors in the decision-making process are known. These allow some analysis of the factors that went into the Soviets’ decisions about what would constitute an acceptable end to the war in early March.

In many respects, the Soviet view of the military situation was similar to the Finns’ view. Both recognized that the Red Army was now able to obtain its military targets. However, much more than the even the Finns, the Soviets were aware that their operations, though far improved, still tended to achieve goals less efficiently than they expected. Timoshenko had expected to take Viipuri by 7 March, but even by 12 March his forces had been unable to do so.297 Just as some Finns saw in the coming thaw their salvation, the Soviets were aware that the coming thaw would cause them great problems, least of which would be the efforts and risks involved in keeping so much of their army, largely inoperative, in a small corner of Europe.298 The international risks of continuing were great, as well. The Soviets very much wanted to avoid war with the British, and as the war continued the Allies made increasingly

298 Shukman 1993, 128; FRUS 298.
obvious moves towards intervention. Continuing the war also offered the risk of further military embarrassments. While Timoshenko’s North West Front had presided over a much more effective and efficient offensive, it was not unproblematic and there remained the risk that stalemate, or worse, could return should the fighting move beyond the Isthmus.

Diplomatically, the Soviets made sure that the Finns recognized the limits of their demands as well as the likelihood that they would increase should peace not be made. Thus their final terms (delivered 8 March) excluded for the first time a demand for a mutual assurance treaty—the device they had used to interfere in the Baltic states’ affairs. They also sent word to the German and American ambassadors, assuring them that they had no intention of involving themselves. But Molotov also stated that if they did not concede soon, the Kuusinen government might become his negotiating partner once again—thus giving credence to rumors started by Kalinin’s comments to the American Ambassador a week earlier. The other changes in their demands, the Fishermen’s Peninsula and the railway to Sweden, were perhaps included at the last minute largely as a means of avoiding triggering Swedish fears for their own interest. Despite Finnish hopes for a ‘grand gesture,’ Stalin refused to budge on these demands and refused to accept a temporary armistice, insisting on fighting until a peace treaty was signed.

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299 Gorodetsky 1999, 16; Erickson 1984, 412; Roberts 1995, 116. It is not clear if this is because they feared the mighty British Army or, more likely, they did not wish to loose a possible ally in a war against Germany.
300 Meretskov 1971, 116.
301 Paasikivi 1966, 199.
302 GDFP 869; FRUS 305-6.
303 Though there is no concrete evidence that these envoys communicated the statements to the Finns, it seems likely.
304 FRUS 293; Paasikivi 1966, 189.
In many Soviet recollections of the war, Soviet leaders pride themselves for their generosity to the Finns. However, accepting this outcome—essentially the fulfillment of their theory of victory—was clearly a better option than continuing with the war in pursuit of conquest. It is clear that they recognized this. While they tried hard indeed to pressure the Finns into accepting this deal with threats of increased aims, they also tried hard to make sure that their demands were not so great that the Finns would walk into the waiting arms of the Allies. Though they increased their territorial demands, and structured their other demands in such a way that they could easily apply great pressure to Helsinki should they feel the need to do so, they abjured from insisting on rights to intervene in domestic politics, by one method or another. This was no insignificant concession for Stalin, since part of his plan involved making sure bordering states were either occupied or friendly. Though this agreement left him with more territory to fortify against an attack on Leningrad, it also left him with an essentially hostile state on his border—a decision that would haunt him before fifteen months passed.

This last case is considered because it allows a look at the decision-making that occurs when an acceptable or near acceptable offer to concede is made to a party pursuing an attritive theory of victory. Based on their acts, as well as participants’ and their parties’ observations at the time, Stalin found in this agreement a fulfillment of his existing theory of victory from January. This is evident in the absence of military plans beyond a conquest of the Isthmus to Viipuri. It is also evident in the demands he made. These additions, though painful to the Finns, were of relatively slight importance to the Soviet Union. His caution in making these demands, in such a way that the Finns would feel pressure but still accept them seems to

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307 Van Dyke 1997, 137.
indicate that he anticipated that the military and diplomatic pressure he placed on the Finns would suffice to win the concessions he really wanted, but also recognized that further pressure would be undesirably costly.

Stalin’s willingness to declare victory in this way, when more was militarily possible, is entirely consistent with a leader pursuing an attritive theory of victory. His aims fell far short of conquest, and the role of force was to weary the Finns until the lack of men brought on the fear of military collapse—and much worse political outcomes. He crafted his aims in keeping with his beliefs about how they would respond. Then, when the Finns found themselves in this position and responded as he expected, he accepted their concessions. While he could have tried to squeeze more out of the Finns, doing so would be costly for himself, and his interest in avoiding further costs and risks of costs made him content with the agreement. Both the structuring of demands in such a way that they aligned with the effort he was prepared to make in the war and the role of costs in dissuading him from further effort for further costs corroborate the vision of planning and deciding envisioned by the theories of victory model.

Section 4: Conclusions

In general, the results of the case study for the Winter War are supportive of the theories articulated. The ability to coherently code the theories of victory in terms of the ideal types, the framing effects found, the role of emotion in producing learning at some point but not others all conform fairly well with my theoretical expectations. More generally, the process leading up to the decision to terminate reflects key ideas in both the theories of victory model and more general bargaining applications to war. A bargaining space appeared when both parties’ beliefs about the war converged. Equally important is the very different route by which
the parties came to their conclusions. Though both experienced, essentially, the same events, they read and responded to them differently. Not the result of mere a fog from war, the belligerents’ differing interpretations as well as emotional and learning responses that were not just mirror images were produced by the different theories of victory that framed the sequence of events they experienced.

The examination of this case as a whole does more than just corroborate theory. It also points out the important role that non-belligerent third parties can have in shaping actors’ theories of victory. Stalin’s belief that he could bully his neighbor was in good part the result of the very peculiar relations of the great powers of the time, as those who would have at any other time run to the defense of Finland were engaged in war or feared being brought into it. The Finns’ belief in their ability to out-last the Soviets was to a great extent also an artifact of the international dimension, for without fear of making them. The theoretically motivated analysis also helps understand the events of the case in clearer, and sometimes novel, ways. The application of emotion and learning theory better explains why Stalin made the wide-ranging changes when he did. It also makes clear why different people changed their beliefs at different times, and particularly explains the divergences between Cabinet leaders like Tanner and Paasikivi and Mannerheim, on the one hand, and the public, on the other. In particular helps explain why the motti battles, despite their fame, were politically insignificant in the conflict between Helsinki and Moscow. It also helps explain why Finnish leaders were so taken by the Allies’ sudden promise and how it led to a delay in peacemaking which costs many Finnish lives and terms that made the Continuation war a near certainty.

308 Kulkov et al. 1999, 267.
Application of the theories of victory concept helped to clarify which battles were most important, and why—and helped point out which, like the Finns’ failed offensive, would have outsize importance. In terms of historical understanding of the war, the application of these concepts also provides a novel answer to the enduring puzzle of Terijoki, the puppet government Stalin first took up, only to drop later on. While it does not seek to prove the case, the ability of the concepts to create a third option beyond ‘it was a cover for conquest’ and ‘it was not seriously meant’—in essence, that it and the bargaining behavior associated with it were reflections of the different types of theory of victory pursued—suggests the power of the concepts as a source of novel hypotheses about real world empirical puzzles.
Chapter 4: The Battle of France

I. The Conflict

For those men who took France into the Second World War, entry was necessitated by existential threat.\(^{309}\) France could no longer be safe until Nazi Germany’s advances were halted. Not all of their colleagues agreed: Pétain seems to have doubted even then the French military’s abilities against the Germans, Georges Bonnet opposed war outright, Pierre Laval had illusions that a ‘Latin front’ composed of Italy and France could resolve Anglo-German tensions, and many confused communists opposed war with Moscow’s new ally. Nevertheless, for Daladier, the threat posed by Nazi Germany was clear, and the loss of France’s greatest Central European ally was too great a risk to ignore.\(^{310}\) Gen. Maurice Gamelin’s affirmation that the Army could do what would be necessary was sufficient, then, to bring about the declaration of war.\(^{311}\)

In those first days the fulcrum of the dispute was indeed the independence of Poland. It was for Poland that France and her ally Britain entered the war after the Germans refused to withdraw and negotiate about their relations with the Poles. The same was true for Hitler: in

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\(^{309}\) In March 1940, Daladier told visiting US Undersecretary of State Welles that the German government had been following very intelligently a policy of absolute domination of Europe and the Near East. *FRUS 1940(1)*, 63.

\(^{310}\) After the war, Daladier stated that he had wondered if he had made an error in entering the war, but, ‘given the gravity of events, France could have no other attitude. She would be without the US and the UK’s help.’ She could not avoid war. Testimony of Edourd Daladier, *ACI*, pp. 55, 60. Around this time, Gamelin told Col. Villedume that any peace would be no more than a truce. Villedume 1976, 42.

\(^{311}\) Shirer 1960, 609-10.
those first days of September, the partition of Poland was indeed the aim of his immediate plan.\footnote{Ciano’s accounts of conversations with Hitler and von Ribbentrop in August 1939 make clear that Hitler and other Nazi leaders did not believe that France was willing or ready to go to war. Ciano, 297-300.} While Mein Kampf and other statements prescribed the humbling of France’s power, the time for that task had not yet arrived. Indeed, the invasion of Poland represented something of a gamble: he bet that Britain and France would not act against him; if they had, his western flank was famously exposed.\footnote{Speer, quoted in Overy, 329-331.} Moreover, he seems to have believed that the Allies were intent on undoing his regime.\footnote{Shirer 1960, 658.} Thus when word was brought of the French and British declarations of war, shock, fears, even fatalism filled the senior offices of the Reich Chancery.\footnote{This is attested to by the translator who delivered the British documents to Hitler’s office on 3 September 1939. Upon handing them over, Hitler appeared ‘paralyzed,’ not moving, asking only ‘what now?’ Immediately after leaving Hitler’s office, Schmidt recalls Goring stating ‘if we lose this war, then heaven have mercy on us. Schmidt 158; Domarus 1746-50, 1758, 1775-6.} 

But neither of the British nor the French acted on this vulnerability, and within three weeks that shock, fear and fatalism dissipated.\footnote{Martens, 405.} With Poland well in hand, Hitler turned to France with confidence. Though it would not be fully apparent to many French leaders for some time to come, by October his next purpose was the elimination of France as a European military and political power.\footnote{Umbreit 1991, 232.} While a France would survive in some form or another, it would no longer have the ability to challenge, let alone threaten, German dominance of the continent.\footnote{Von Ribbentrop told Welles that Germany wanted a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for Central Europe, a characterization Welles took umbrage to. FRUS 1940(1), 38-9.} The annexation of French territory, though part of this plan (particularly in the case of Alsace-Lorraine), was not the focus of this plan but rather a supplement to it.

\footnotetext[312]{Ciano’s accounts of conversations with Hitler and von Ribbentrop in August 1939 make clear that Hitler and other Nazi leaders did not believe that France was willing or ready to go to war. Ciano, 297-300.}
\footnotetext[313]{Speer, quoted in Overy, 329-331.}
\footnotetext[314]{Shirer 1960, 658.}
\footnotetext[315]{This is attested to by the translator who delivered the British documents to Hitler’s office on 3 September 1939. Upon handing them over, Hitler appeared ‘paralyzed,’ not moving, asking only ‘what now?’ Immediately after leaving Hitler’s office, Schmidt recalls Goring stating ‘if we lose this war, then heaven have mercy on us. Schmidt 158; Domarus 1746-50, 1758, 1775-6.}
\footnotetext[316]{Martens, 405.}
\footnotetext[317]{Umbreit 1991, 232.}
\footnotetext[318]{Von Ribbentrop told Welles that Germany wanted a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for Central Europe, a characterization Welles took umbrage to. FRUS 1940(1), 38-9.}
Figure 2: Map 4.1: The Battle of France

Courtesy Department of History, USMA
II. The Belligerents and their Views of the War

A. France

France in the Autumn of 1939 was a riven country. The Third Republic’s multitude of parties, the controversies of the late Popular Front, and the gulf separating the elderly Army leadership from the politicians all divided those who would decided matters of war and peace in France even as it entered into war. These divisions were not only matters of prejudice, personality, and rivalry, however. They also reflected different beliefs about the nature of the challenge posed by Germany and the ability of France to withstand—socially, economically, and politically, as well as militarily—a war with the great power that Hitler’s Germany had become. When the events of May and June 1940 confronted these Frenchmen, their varied responses made the cabinet a game of musical chairs and, ultimately, produced the unlikely coalition—consisting not only of the conservative Petain, but the radical socialist Chautemps and the technocrats Baudouin and Bouthillier—that led France out of the war. One of the striking findings is the degree to which responses to the defeat influenced the composition of the war decision-making group itself, in addition to its members’ beliefs. In this way, responses to events redounded within the leadership in unpredictable ways.

The common Gaullist account of the conflict stresses that the defeatism that strangled the will of these men to fight, and so they quit. Bloch’s famous memoir condemns it in its wider social form. But while perhaps emotionally satisfying, references to a lack of will are

319 Kaspi 2001, 324; Villelume recorded in his diary that Daladier was more for war than the Chamber, and that Paul Reynaud was seeing himself as Daladier’s likely war-time successor as early as September 1939. Villelume, 1976, 41-2.
320 Bloch, 1944.
vague and theoretically unsatisfying. Rather than focusing on fighting spirit, then, my account focuses on the beliefs of these men and their evolution through time. In doing so, a clearer picture of the nature of defeatism, such as it is, emerges. Rather than question of will, it appears as beliefs about what is possible and what is impossible.

French theories of victory

*French Theories of Victory during the Drôle du Guerre*

With the invasion of Poland, the French government committed itself to war against Germany.321 However, few if any in the leadership believed France fully ready to fight; no one thought that immediately taking the offensive was wise.322 This agreement masked important differences, however. The principal war leaders at the time, Premier Daladier and Supreme Commander Gamelin agreed that the French should mobilize to ward off an immediate attack, while concentrating on longer-term preparations for a war.323 Success in the war would require up to four years, as the French and their British allies increased their military power, fought at first a defensive campaign and then took to the offensive in Germany itself. Others, however, did not believe that France could withstand four years of war. Other leaders within the military and particularly among the ranks of the government believed that a shorter war, one lasting not more than a year, could suffice to achieve France’s goals.

321 As a symptom of the divisions within France, the Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, opposed entering into the war, and, refusing to formally declare war, the National Assembly instead voted credits for it. 322 Paul Reynaud is one notable exception. Villetume 1976, 42. 323 Daladier states that Gamelin really meant that the army was prepared to defend French territory, and to uphold all her engagements. Daladier, *ACI*, 55. This generally accords with other accounts. Shirer 1960, p. 609.
In the socio-political context of late 1930's France, concerns about the state’s ability to survive a long war were widespread and not unreasonable. The parliamentary regime of the Third Republic had many domestic enemies, from the communists on the left to monarchists and fascists on the right. The military remained under-armed and riven by doctrinal disputes. The economy was not particularly strong. The scars of the Great War just two decades before remained imperfectly healed, and the war weariness and anti-war sentiments remained prominent in French politics. Georges Bonnet, the Foreign Minister at in early September 1939, even opposed entry into the war on these grounds, preferring to sever the alliance with Poland.

There were also differences over the nature of France’s goals in this war. For some, the war was to be a war of regime change, not only defeating Germany’s expansionist aggression but producing a change in German leadership such that it would no longer be a threat. This necessarily involved the re-imposition of the limitations put on Germany by the Versailles treaty which had been cast aside.\textsuperscript{324} Other war leaders, however, seemed willing to settle for less: assuring the security of France and containing German expansion.\textsuperscript{325} These goals did not necessarily correlate perfectly with their vision of the war. While long-war advocates Gamelin and Daladier’s war aims included regime change, the same was true of short war advocate Paul Reynaud. Given these differences, and the changes in leadership that occurred during the Phony War itself, the three most important theories of victory associated with the key players in

\textsuperscript{324} In October 1939, Daladier stated that “France would not lay down arms until guarantees for a real peace and general security were obtained.” Shirer 1960, 643. In early 1940, these appeared to be the French war aims to the British government leaders of the time. \textit{BDFA (III-F-12)), 24, 25, 38. To Welles in March 1940 he said that “whatever be said in public, he would not refuse to deal with the present regime, but always on the fundamental and ultimate basis, namely that France should thereby obtain actual, practical physical security, which would make it impossible for her to find herself at war with Germany again.” While this may seem a step away from regime change, during the same conversation (which, given the American role, had a somewhat otherworldly focus on the possibility of disarmament) Daladier made clear that he could never trust Hitler or his regime. \textit{FRUS 1940 (1), 63-4.}

\textsuperscript{325} See for instance Camille Chautemps discussion with Welles, recorded in \textit{FRUS 1940(1), 69.}
the Phony War will be sketched out, but they do not fully exhaust the range of theories of
victory extent in Paris in 1939 and 1940.

Daladier and Gamelin’s Attrtive Theory of Victory

Despite the carousel that was the French cabinet during the 1930’s, the two most
important war leaders during the fall of 1939 had actually managed to hold their positions for
some time. Edouard Daladier, the premier since 1938, had held the post of Minister for War
from 1932-1934 and the post of Minister for National Defense and War since 1936. Gamelin
had led the French Army since 1933. They shared a clear vision for the war, developed in
collaboration with their British allies. Unfortunately for both men, relatively few other war
leaders were as committed to this approach to the war.

France would mobilize but not take the offensive during the first period of the war,
instead relying on the Maginot Line and the Army’s ground forces to hold back any German
offensive.\footnote{Gamelin, vol. III, 82-3; Umbreit 1991, 268. The French leadership believed that trying to break
the ‘West Wall’ was not practical, so a defensive strategy at the start was almost dictated by conditions.
Umbreit 1991, 268; Villelume 1976, 16. Thus the expectation was that there would be two defensive
battles—one in the neighborhood of the Low Countries, and one on the Maginot Line. This belief was
based on a widely shared conviction that it would be impossible for a modern mechanized force to cross
the Ardennes. In addition to the difficulty of the terrain and its lack of good roads, it was believed that the
combination of the steepness of the Meuse Valley and the river itself combined to form a massive natural
tank trap. Junot 2007, 163; Lormier 2000, 32-3. There was little doubt in the power of the Maginot Line,
and there was a strong belief that the Dyle Plan would allow them to blunt any German advance in
Belgium, thus allowing them to the opportunity to defeat the Germans at leisure. German intentions or
plans, accordingly, did not matter to Gamelin, a belief that lended him a sense of invulnerability. Indeed,
The Polish experience in no way dampened the French belief that they could hold back the Germans.
Porch 1995, 164-8.} During this period they would increase French military strength, and contest their
enemies’ aggressiveness in the European periphery—perhaps in Scandinavia, perhaps with a
reopening of the WWI Salonika front in South-east Europe.\textsuperscript{327} These peripheral contests would serve both to maintain public support for the war within France and to maintain pressure on their opponents.\textsuperscript{328} They were not, however, the focal point of their effort. The focal point of their effort would come in the third and fourth years of the fight.\textsuperscript{329} Bringing to bear the full resources of the French and British empires, they would continue to wear away the German forces wherever they fought. But in those years they would move from a defense to an offensive posture in Western Europe itself, invade Germany, and see Germany surrender amid the collapse of the Nazi state.\textsuperscript{330} The resulting peace would constrain the new German state in ways that would guarantee French security for the long term, unlike the failures of Versailles.

It is clear that this long-war approach to the conflict was an attritive theory of victory. The purpose of the fighting was to wear away German willingness and ability to continue the fight, until domestic discontent produced a government willing to concede to France and her allies. They clearly believe that this was possible. They believed that France had the political and economic wherewithal, particularly as augmented by the British, to withstand a long fight, but Hitler’s German government did not. Looking back to the experience of the Great War, they believed that the French Army, now strengthened by its Maginot Line, could hold back any German offensive until France and her allies were prepared to launch their own, overwhelming, offensive.

\textit{Reynaud’s Informative Theory of Victory}

\textsuperscript{327} Umbreit 1991, 268; Daladier, \textit{ACI}, 61. Jackson describes the French strategy as “avoid any precipitate action and build up the war economy.” [2003, 80]. Gamelin actually believed that the action in Norway might serve to meaningfully retard any German plans for attacking France. Porch 1995, 166.

\textsuperscript{328} Cremieux-Brilhac 2001, 291.

\textsuperscript{329} Shirer 1960, 610. Villelume records Daladier explaining in September 1939 that the war will most likely last about five years. Villelume 1976, 41-2.

\textsuperscript{330} In retrospect, this plan was not entirely far-fetched, since it clearly anticipated the eventually Allied strategy. Alexander 2001, 47, 49.
Paul Reynaud, a former premier and during most of the *Drôle de Guerre*, finance minister, shared Daladier and Gamelin’s aims for the war. Indeed, he was happy to acknowledge being the ‘hardest’ man in the French government with respect to Germany.\footnote{FRUS 1940(1), 71.} However, he and some others, believed that a long war was undesirable but that a short war could be successful in obtaining the same war aims, including the overthrow of Hitler.\footnote{On 1 March, while still Finance Minister, Reynaud stated that the French economy, already, ‘was on a slippery slope.’ BDFA (III-F-12), 58.} His approach became particularly important after March 1940, when he became premier.

While he shared their war aims, Reynaud’s beliefs about the situation differed from Gamelin and Daladier in almost every other respect. Whereas they believed that France could withstand a long war, Reynaud was not so sure, and had as close advisors men like Paul Baudouin, Yves Bouthillier, and Col. Villelume, men who were convinced that France could not withstand a long fight economically, politically, or militarily.\footnote{For instance, Bouthillier told Villelume in early October that after a year, ‘it would be necessary to requisition foreign titles’ to pay for the war. Villelume 1976, 56. Notably, Herriot, President of the Chamber of Deputies, believed a long war would have these effects on France but nevertheless believed that fighting a long war was necessary. FRUS 1940 (1), 69.} These men, like Reynaud, were convinced that a war lasting more than a year would be a danger to France’s national health, giving revolutionaries, counter-revolutionaries, and mal-contents opportunities to disrupt the ruling order while destroying France’s best hopes for prosperity.\footnote{Villelume stresses that advocates of an offensive were against both Gamelin and Daladier as early as September. Villelume himself was against the offensive, but still opposed both men. Villelume 1976, 33, 36, 50.} But while he saw the apparent weakness of the Third Republic, he believed that the Third Reich was even more fragile. After a few military setbacks and the containment of his aggression, Hitler’s popularity with those who mattered would plummet. His regime would find himself changing policies at home and making concessions abroad, or it would be replaced by one that would.
Accordingly, his vision of battle did not involve a long, slow fight. Nor would it involve battles on the French frontiers, though he also believed that the Maginot Line would serve to keep the Germans out of France. Instead, the fights in the periphery were central to his view of the war. Fighting in Scandinavia, the Balkans, and elsewhere would indicate Allied superiority at arms and deny key products—like iron ore from Sweden and oil from the South-eastern Europe and the Caucasus from Germany and her allies. As Hitler’s words and military prowess were shown to be mere bombast and false hopes, his regime would come under the pressure that Reynaud expected to produce concessions.

Given this model of battle and the models of French and German behavior in response to fighting, Reynaud’s approach to the war clearly constitutes an informative theory of victory. The effect of battle was not to weary, nor to directly seize war aims, but to inform. Germans would respond to the information, and quickly, before France’s fundamental stability was tested by the rigors of war.

**After 15 May 1940**

Less than five days after the invasion began, France’s military position had crumbled. The German breakthrough at Sedan was successful; the bulk of the French army was trapped in the north and in Belgium; and the road to a poorly defended Paris was, famously, open. At this point the French were forced to try to construct a new vision of battle. That which was devised involved trying to stop the German advance at the Somme Valley. French forces from wherever they could be found would be gathered there with all the equipment that could be mustered,

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335 It is important to note that Reynaud, like many in the west, saw the Soviet Union as a tacit ally of Germany after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Hence the drive into the Caucasus was not bringing the USSR into a war against France; it merely recognized an existing situation.
and there the German offensive would be halted. The hope was that this line of defense could blunt the German advance, ending their Blitzkrieg. It would then set up a new line of defense.

For Paul Reynaud, now Minister of National Defense as well as Premier, the purpose of this line would be to create the base from with France, with British and eventually American help, would eventually turn back the Germans. In adopting this plan, Reynaud embraced an attritive theory of victory strikingly like that which had been propounded by earlier Daladier and Gamelin, with a changed field of battle. He did not indicate any war aims at this point, but given his commitment to a joint peace including the British, it is unclear that he would need to. He was certainly to more fully utilize the resources of France, to demand further sacrifices from the French people—as is clearly indicated by his promotion of George Mandel to be Interior Minister and his strong support for him. He was joined in believing this by Darlan, the head of the Navy, and later by De Gaulle.

Not everyone agreed to this. Many of those leaders who had been Reynaud’s allies in his fights with Gamelin and Daladier did not make the move to an attritive theory of victory, still believing that a long fight was not only unwinnable, given the smaller size of the forces now available to France and the occupation of its most important industrial regions, but fundamentally dangerous for French society. Thus Baudoiun and Bouthillier, formerly key cabinet allies, now turned on Reynaud. Weygand, who Reynaud brought in to replace Gamelin on 20 May, did the same: lacking a belief that France could triumph, he saw the battle in the Somme Valley as an opportunity to save the honor of the French Army before an

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336 In very late May, these men planned with Philippe Pétain, Weygand, and Camille Chautemps to bring him down after the next defeat. DeWailly 2000, 219.
armistice was requested, but little more. \(^{337}\) None of these men anticipated an unconditional surrender, however. The French fleet remained intact and much of France unoccupied. There were yet men under arms, and of course the resources of the French Empire. Over the long term, most all of France itself would remain under French governance—Marianne would not share Polonia’s fate. She would have to pay reparations, face near disarmament, lose colonies, and accept occupation until a British surrender. But a French state would continue.

*Le Marechal* Petain followed a similar course. Until this point ambassador to Franco’s Spain, he had refused to involve himself in the direction of the war, refusing to associate himself with Daladier, a man of the right who had broken ranks and supported the Popular Front. \(^{338}\) Even as he was recalled from Madrid on 16 May, he believed that France had lost the war and was convinced that Gamelin had mismanaged things. \(^{339}\) Furthermore, he saw no hope from abroad. Not only did he see the army as having been irretrievably broken by the fight, he did not believe that the British would ever help France, would even be able to help France, given its own situation. Unlike Reynaud, who attached great hope to his pleas to Franklin Roosevelt, Petain never viewed American help as a way out of France’s predicament. Like Weygand,

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\(^{337}\) Though he had clearly tried to find a way to win [Weygand 1952, 43-121; Umbreit 1991, 288; Beaufre 1968, 190-6], he seems to have been unable to do so in real time. Before the battle on the Somme even began, he was already making the claims (directing them towards Reynaud) that would become Vichy’s indictment of the Third Republic leaders: despite an army unprepared for war—because of its own decisions—the Government took the country into war when it should not have done so, thus ensuring France’s defeat. Ferro 1987, 38.

\(^{338}\) Ferro 1987, 10.

\(^{339}\) It is not clear that he ever believed victory was possible; in the fall of 1939, he told Gamelin that « J’espère qu’en tout cas vous ne commettez pas la folie de prendre l’offense contre l’armée allemande. » [I hope that in any case you will not commit the folly of taking the offense against the German Army.] Certainly when he retuned to France in May he no longer believed it was possible. Petain’s aide, Bonhomme, quoted him as saying on that day « La guerre peut être considérée comme perdue ». [The war can be considered lost.] He told Franco as he left the train station, « Ma patrie a été battue, on m’appelle pour faire la paix et signer l’armistice. » [My country has been beaten, I am called hope to make peace and sign the armistice.] Ferro 1987, 7, 14.
Baudouin, and the others, Petain claimed that he would continue to fight should Hitler demand
the Fleet. It does not seem likely that he would have kept this commitment were it tested,
however.

Unwilling to try an attritive theory of victory because they did not believe it politically,
economically, or social possible, these leaders chose to pursue an end to the war. Indeed,
Baudouin was playing a key role in bringing together two formidable opponents of continuing
the war—Weygand and Petain, who had long been estranged by a personal conflict—before the
Somme battle even began.\(^{340}\) The basis of their claims to maintain autonomy and their Navy
was the threat of pursuing an attritive theory of victory—of fighting on—and thus imposing
further costs on the Germans. But it was not a road they wanted to go down, or even viewed as
particularly plausible.

*June 1940*

By June, an ever-shrinking group of French leaders retained a clear theory of victory.
Paul Reynaud and his close associates continued to aim at the rolling back of German gains in
central Europe and, if possible, the elimination of Hitler’s regime. They had no illusions that this
would be easy. Until 8-9 June, these war aims were seen as being anchored by the French battle
lines on the Somme and Aisne. If these lines could be held, France with the help of her allies
could wage the kind of long war that Gamelin had envisioned, one in which the assistance of
France’s allies would be central to goal achievement. When these lines were broken and Paris
once again utterly exposed, a some sought for a new basis for these aims, but others did not.\(^{341}\)

\(^{340}\) Ferro; De Wailly 2000, 219.

\(^{341}\) On 12 June, Weygand stated that he war was ‘definitively lost.’ DWailly 2000, 250.
Various ideas were tried out, but none really stuck. First was the Breton Redoubt, a proposal to gather the remaining effective French forces into Brittany (implicitly accepting that the rest of France could not be held) and try to hold this piece of territory, being largely supplied by the sea, until her allies and the forces of France overseas could help her reverse the momentum of the war. Then came the proposal to wage guerilla warfare, with bases in those areas of the South and the Massif Central which had not yet been taken and whose geography would facilitate a long resistance. Last, the proposal that the government should remove itself to North Africa, in the expectation that the strength of overseas France, her British ally, and the eventual entry of the Americans would eventually allow them to turn the tide of the war, re-enter France, and eventually weary the Germans of the war.\(^{342}\)

The precise position of those who opposed further fighting is less clear. Petain would instruct Huntzinger, the senior French military delegate at the Armistice talks, that he should not accept any armistice that involved the surrender of the French fleet or any other sort of national indignity.\(^ {343}\) However, it is far from clear that he would have preferred the fleet to the armistice were he made to choose. His own mindset at this time was one of martyrdom; on 14 June, he would say that

“To deprive France of her natural defenders in a period of disarray is to deliver her to the enemy...I am therefore of the opinion that I will not abandon the soil of France and

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\(^{342}\) On 14 June, Reynaud told Bullitt that “the single hope of France and in his opinion England rested in the immediate declaration of war by the US.” *FRUS 1940 (1)*, 253.

\(^{343}\) According to a list dated 20 June, Petain would oppose an armistice were the terms to demand (1) The French Fleet for use against England, (2) the French Air Force for use against England, (3) the total occupation of France, (4) the Amputation of French territory, or (5) the undermining of French institutions. *DDF1940*, 74-5. Nevertheless, the Germans quickly ‘Germanized’ Alsace-Lorraine without strong protest from the Vichy government. Bergston 1962, 165. Additionally, Petain later claimed that the ability to keep some French troops for the maintenance of internal order was a red line. Petain, *ACI*, 179.
will accept the suffering which will be imposed on the fatherland and its children. The French renaissance will be the fruit of this suffering.”

His responses to even Weygand’s efforts to hold the Somme suggested an impatience with seeing men die for honor fully in keeping with his reputation as France’s ‘most humane’ military leader. The same is true of others, like Villedume, Bouthillier, and Baudouin, and even Weygand. In each was a determination that France should not become the next Poland, or even then next Rotterdam. This sentiment was widely—perhaps too widely—shared by the mayors of even small towns throughout France.

To these men, visions of guerilla warfare and a Breton Redoubt were dangerous day dreams, military infeasibilities which would only prolong France’s agony. Crossing the Mediterranean was ruled out because they saw no reason to place any faith in their erstwhile ally, while the US seemed entirely unwilling to act. Any government that left France, moreover, would quickly lose credibility with the French people. Regardless, Philippe Petain had already made clear that he would remain in France, come whatever may. Accordingly, it is not clear that these men had even an implicit theory of victory, a belief that there were some war demands that would be unacceptable deal-breakers should the Germans ask them. If they retained any war aims that they believed they could minimally insist upon based on their

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344 Jackson 2003, 105.
345 The description of Petain as France’s “most humane soldier” comes from Leon Blum. Ferro 1987, 9.
346 On 22 June, there was some consideration of allowing themselves to be captured rather than signing an armistice. This was rejected out of a fear of reprisals against the French people. DDF1940, 89. In 1947, before the Assembly’s Committee of Inquiry, Petain defended his decision by stating that without the armistice, “France would be a new Poland.” Petain, ACI1, 173.
347 Burrin 1996, 7. On 6 June 1940, Petain told Bullitt “The majority [of the cabinet] felt the sacrifices France is being called to make are too great to continue.” FRUS 1940 (1), 261.
348 DeWaillly 2000, 257. The statement was made in cabinet on 13 June.
349 Campbell, the British Ambassador to Paris, believed that they had no real bargaining power, and wondered how they could believed that they had any. BDFA (III-F-12) 127.
military position, it is not clear what they were. Nevertheless, the anticipated a settlement that would not leave them prone and defeated forever, but seem to have anticipated another 1871.  

Germany  

The Germany that entered the Second World War was far from certain of itself. Hitler gambled his way into the war, hoping against hope that France and Britain would again back down. When they declared war, he, Goering, and others expressed a deep pessimism. More broadly, the German public was itself uncertain about the war. William Shirer’s first hand description of the German popular mood is striking: wary and ill-at-ease. Nevertheless, the direction of Germany was not in the hands of the popular mood, but rather in the hands of Adolph Hitler. Moreover, his confidence and control over Army, in particular, only grew during this period. In analyzing German decision-making during the war then, the focus must necessarily be on this one man. While others’ responses and beliefs—particularly those of the Generals, since no politicians had an influential role in the prosecution of the war—will be from time to time compared his, these comparisons are designed to identify the degree to which his response was or was not typical, rather than because they form a essential element of

350 See for instance *DDF1940*, p. 46; De Gaulle 1998, 72-3. When he signed the armistice, Huntziger stated that “France has the right to expect in future negotiations that Germany show a spirit which will permit the two great neighboring countries to live and work in peace.” Shirer 1960, 745.  
351 Shirer 1960, 593-7. No popular expressions of happiness in the war were evident until the fall of Verdun, on 16 June 1940. Domarus 1997, 1749, 2022. That said, once the success was complete, Hitler’s public status grew to the point that the German resistance to him became weak indeed. Von Weizsacker 1951, 258.  
352 Describing a 1 October 1939 interview with Hitler, Ciano described his approach to the war: “should war have to continue, he does not intend to make the country weary by a long period of waiting and even less to give his enemies the advantage of time which they are feverishly seeking. Ciano 1948, 311.  
353 This was clearly the impression of senior leaders like Manstein, Speer, and Jodl. Manstein 1982, 68-125; Overy 2001, 244-8; 278.
a decision-group. Given that Hitler has often been described as psychologically abnormal, these comparisons are of particular importance for studying responses to war events.

**German Theories of Victory**

*From September 1939: Hitler’s Attritive Theory of Victory*

As German forces invaded Poland, Hitler hoped that the French and British would again cave in the face of German aggression. Particularly as his forces fought the Poles, his western flank was dangerously exposed. But he was nevertheless ready to fight if they declared their willingness. Strikingly, his approach to the war was a mirror image of the Gamelin and Daladiers’ theory of victory. As was the case two decades earlier, the principal battlefield would be the Franco-German borderlands and the Low Countries. There, both sides would fight a war of direct infantry, armor, and aerial engagement, probably for years, until one or the other gave out.³⁵⁴ Hitler was convinced that the French would fail before the Germans, because saw the French as unrecovered from the war-weariness generated by the Great War. Germany, he believed, could withstand a million more dead, but the Third Republic of the late 1930’s could not.³⁵⁵ With France fallen, Britain would soon follow. The exact date of the invasion was not

³⁵⁴ Umbreit 1991, 238-9; Manstein 1982, 95-100. Manstein was particularly critical of this plan because it was not militarily decisive—its objective was partial military victory. As such, he doubted that it would work.

³⁵⁵ Hitler believed that the French had allowed their military to decline, and very strongly believed that the German Army was now the stronger of the two, not only in aggregate but at the man-to-man level. Asked during the fall of 1939 how long the war would last, he stated that he did not know, that the current plan called for a four year effort, and that in the contest, “France will lose her national strength.” Von Weiszacker, permanent secretary of the Foreign Ministry, heard him insist that a campaign in the west “would cost me a million men, but it would cost the enemy that, too—and the enemy could not stand it.” He claimed to have no fears of a revolt within Germany during this fight. Domarus 1997, 1858, 1883, 1888, 1889; Von Weiszacker 1951, 218-9; Umbreit 1991, 233; Shirer 1960, 600, 719.
clearly set. Time and again between October and May, Hitler would order the invasion; warning orders would be issued; and his forces would prepare themselves for action, only to have Hitler cancel the invasion, sometimes with mere hours to go.356

Hitler’s aims with regard to France in 1940 were not entirely clear. In general, his aim was to eliminate France as a military and political power on the continent.357 Some things are certain: he wanted reparations, Alsace-Lorraine back, he wanted a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe (which would likely entail future limits on French military power), and he sought some parts of the French empire. Exactly how much control he sought over the remainder of metropolitan France is not clear. At one point during the May campaign it is said that he wanted to turn France’s boundaries back four centuries. While much of France was occupied in the aftermath of the campaign, this occupation was described to the French, at least, as a temporary expedient necessary for fighting the British. Importantly, Hitler had a very particular conception of the Allied war aims. He believed that their purpose was the destruction of Germany.358

Given that Hitler saw the purpose of fighting in France as wearing down the French willingness to continue fighting, it is clear that he was pursuing an attritive theory of victory. In the fall of 1939, it is clear that he did not believe that the Germany army which had demonstrated such command of air-land battle in Poland could do the same against the Western Allies, fighting in France. Thus he did not expect a quick end, or a cheap fight. Victory

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356 Among many others, Umbreit 1991, 238.
357 Bergstom 1962, 30.
358 To Welles, Hitler stated that “I can see no hope for the establishment of any lasting peace until the will of England and France to destroy Germany is itself destroyed. I fear that there is no way by which the will to destroy Germany can be itself destroyed, exception through a German victory.” FRUS 1940 (1), 49. Though it could be argued that this was mere self-justificatory rhetoric, there is a good extent to which it is true—the British and several French leaders were convinced that they could only have peace with the removal of Hitler.
did not depend on stunning military victories, or, indeed, on shoving the French army from the field. Instead, it would depend on the unwillingness of French society to continue fighting. Nevertheless, as Hitler told Ciano in October 1939, "I am mathematically certain of victory."  

**From March: Blitzkrieg, a Brute Force Theory of Victory**

Perhaps unusually, Hitler changed his theory of victory radically during the period between the declaration of war and the invasion of Western Europe. This change was not the product of falsification in the traditional sense—not disconfirming evidence was confronted—but rather because he was unhappy with the plan presented by his general staff, developed an alternative called the ‘sickle cut’, and was then presented with an alternative that reflected his intuition. This alternative was, of course, the famous Manstein Plan, a plan to engage in Blitzkrieg in France.

The purpose of a Blitzkrieg is use a powerful attack along a narrow part of the front to break through an enemy’s defenses and then use speed and mobility to make a series of moves in the rear to cut communications, divide and disorganize the opponent’s forces, and prevent them from reorganizing is a cohesive manner. This was true of the Plan Manstein as well. German tank forces would attack at the weakest point in the French line, made so because the French believed an armored attack there was impossible. From Sedan the armored Panzer columns would race to the sea in an effort to trap the main French forces in northern France.

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359 Though he indicated that he wanted no talk of peace before France’s military defeat [Umbreit 1991, 239], arguably this would be realized when the French asked for an armistice, rather than when there were no more Frenchmen fighting.
360 Ciano 1948, 313; repeated 18 March 1940, p. 361.
361 For instance, Umbreit 1991, 240-3; Shirer 718..
362 Manstein 1982, 94.
and Belgium. This would cut French and Allied supply and communication lines to their main army groups and make it hard, if not impossible, for the French to concentrate enough forces in France itself to effectively challenge the slower moving infantry units that followed the Panzer divisions. The Luftwaffe’s airpower would be used to support the Panzer’s advance, to attack cut-off land units, and to interdict forces as they tried to concentrate themselves prior to a battle.\textsuperscript{363}

Although it promised cheaper, faster, and more decisive results, the Manstein Plan was also far riskier. These risks derived from the importance of surprise, speed, and correctly identifying the French operational intentions. While the Army Headquarters plan was more conventional and expensive in lives, time and money it, it did not involve these sorts of risks. Where the Manstein Plan called for camouflaging the main thrust with an initial move into Belgium, the AHQ plan made that move the main thrust—exactly what the French expected them to do.\textsuperscript{364} With its Panzer version of the ‘race to the sea,’ the Manstein Plan risked that spearheads would be cut-off from the infantry divisions behind them, raising the prospect of both losing the Panzer divisions and blunting the infantry advance.\textsuperscript{365} This would not be risked in the more conventional AHQ plan. In both cases, the German hope was that the French would not notice in time; even if they did, they believed that the French would not be able to respond quickly enough to ameliorate their situation.\textsuperscript{366}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{363} Manstein 1982, 104-5. The goal, as Manstein states, was total victory on the European mainland (114-5).

\item\textsuperscript{364} The German Army’s leadership was very concerned about the risks inherent in the plan, particularly the risk that the fighting might quickly bog down. Umbreit 1991, 236-8.

\item\textsuperscript{365} Manstein 1982, 104.

\item\textsuperscript{366} As Halder notes, this was a product of the German Army’s study of French doctrine and practice, which strongly suggested an inability to respond effectively to rapidly changing situations. Gen. Beaufre, in his memoir of the war, reports being frustrated with this same characteristic of French thinking while serving on the General Staff before and during the 1940 invasion. De Gaulle had recognized the problem, as well.
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Hitler’s purpose for the battle of France was to destroy French military and political power and, in doing so, to facilitate a peace with the British. His ultimate political aims in France were never fully revealed in a peace treaty, and he specifically excluded discussion of ultimate peace terms with the Petain Government. There were rumors at the time, however—rumors which even reached the French—were that he wanted to turn back the clock on French territorial expansion by four centuries. It was readily apparent that he would take Alsace-Lorraine. The ‘zone of protection,’ an area of between 70 and 150 miles west and (in the north) south of the 1939 frontier and extending down the Channel Coast some distance seems to have been within his sights.

Hitler’s war aims, never clearly expressed, appear to have remained the same. Their achievement, however, was to be different. This Blitzkrieg would degrade and eventually eliminate the French Army. Their victory would be accomplished not through the eventual concession of the French, but unilaterally, through their own force of arms. In this sense, the German theory of victory was a brute force theory of victory.

Although not the focus of this discussion, it is worth pointing out that Hitler had different theories of victory for the French and British. As is well-known, he anticipated that the British would play a role as a ‘junior partner’ in ruling the world—out of Europe they would remain, but he believed that their retaining control of their empire could be useful, particularly given that he did not believe that Germany would be the beneficiary if the British Empire broke up. Accordingly, he hoped that the defeat of France would serve as a demonstration of German power that would bring the British to the negotiating table. Within the context of my theory, the focus on battlefield events is essentially similar in both informative and brute force theories of victory. The differences in attention pattern lay with the political and domestic responses to the situation. As noted in footnote X, these differences are apparent.

Between October 1940 and 1942, various offices were charged with drawing up war aims for France. Those reported above seem to have had the sanction of Hitler, though there were other plans. The Economic ministry, for example, suggested annexing the industrial areas of the North and East and turning the rest of the country into an agrarian vassal state. Other plans suggested cutting Brittany off from the rump France and making it a state of its own; there were even entirely unsuccessful attempts to stimulate Breton national feeling. Hitler himself seems to have alluded to a rump French state as a “tourist state,” a ‘sort of enlarged Switzerland,’ and a place that would only manufacture ‘certain fashionable goods.’
III. Responses to Wartime Events

The shortness of the conflict facilitates a complete analysis of the belligerents’ responses to the war. The analysis proceeds by first examining the French response to events, and then continues with the German response to those events. Because the belligerents’ perception and experience of the same war-time events differs so greatly, my analysis relies on slightly different delineations of the series of events. Accordingly, the French experience is constructed as having two phases: the first twenty days of the war, extending from the invasion to 1 June, when offensive action to eradicate German beachheads on the Somme and Aisne rivers began; and from 1 June until 17 June, when the decision to seek an armistice was made. The German experience follows a somewhat different periodization: the first five days of the war; 16 May-26 May; and 26 May-21 June. These periods were determined by the leaders’ approaches to the war: when they changed their approach to the war, a new series necessarily begins. The analysis of each series begins with a description of the events as experienced by the state, then an analysis of the framing effects of the theories of victory, and last an analysis of the leaders’ emotional responses and learning.

A. The French Response, 10-26 May

Events

In late April 1940 the German forces invaded Norway, Denmark, and then the Netherlands. In none of these places did the France’s forces, or those of her friends, do well: Franco-British operations in Norway failed; the Danes did not contest the invasion; and the Dutch, though they fought valiantly, soon lost control of their country. Then on 10 May, the
invasion that France had prepared for came. Early that Friday morning, German forces invaded Belgium, and the Belgians requested French aid. In response, the Dyle Plan was activated, and many of France’s best forces were thrown willy-nilly into Belgium.\textsuperscript{369}

They fought well against the 70 German divisions opposing them. However, five days later, the Manstein Plan was implemented.\textsuperscript{370} Ten Panzer divisions, followed by mechanized infantry and infantry, sped through the Ardennes Forest and crossed the Meuse at Sedan despite the best efforts of the French and British air forces to destroy their pontoon bridges.\textsuperscript{371} The French units guarding this section of the border, comprised of poorly equipped older reservists, confronted the full power of the German war machine. Confronted with the vastly superior firepower and the often terrifying tactics of the Wehrmacht and particularly the Luftwaffe, they were unable to halt or even slow the German advance.\textsuperscript{372}

With their failure, the way to Paris was suddenly open to this heavily armed and fast moving column. There was no meaningful concentration of ground troops between then and the French capital.\textsuperscript{373} To the amazement of the French leadership, however, this army did not head for Paris but for the small city of Abbeville, on the Channel coast. In doing so, they were cutting off the main French armies from the heart of France.\textsuperscript{374}

\textsuperscript{369} Due to Belgian neutrality, many of the plans—particularly the logistical plans—were in poor order (Bloch 1944).
\textsuperscript{370} Halder 1988, 144.
\textsuperscript{371} 105 French and 67 British planes were assigned to the fight, but most were shot down. Lormier 2000, 38.
\textsuperscript{372} These troops lacked anything comparable to the armament or armor of the Panzer units. Between the effective close-air support provided by the Stukas, their dive sirens, and the absence of allied air cover, these units were often pinned down and traumatized by the experience.
\textsuperscript{373} Junot 2007, 165. Daladier told the cabinet “xxxxxx” Villelume, . Reynaud informed shortly thereafter informed Churchill, who famously described his response to this news …...
\textsuperscript{374} Lormier 2000, 50.
Meanwhile, France’s allies seemed to fail her. Among all her military weaknesses, *l’Armée de l’Air* was greatest. With too few planes of too indifferent a quality, France was unable to contest control of the air and thus the *Luftwaffe* could provide the *Wehrmacht* with effective close air support, multiplying its combat effectiveness. But the British were unwilling to station too many fighters in France, fearing for her own defence. Flying from Britain, the *RAF’s* sorties were too few and of too short a duration to alter the situation. Leopold III, King of the Belgians, would provide an even worse surprise, however. Despite the fact that the Belgian Army formed much of the right flank of the French defense, Leopold, Rex Belgarum, surrendered without warning. Appeals for aid from America were met with sympathy but little else from FDR, who was constrained by a Congress and an electorate uninterested in entanglement in this European conflict.

**Framing**

During this period of time, leaders with different theories of victory had control over French policy. Paul Reynaud, of course, had an informative theory of victory, as did Paul Baudouin, Col. Villelume, Yves Bouthillier, and Camille Chautemps. Daladier and Gamelin, principally, had attritive theories of victory. Their initial responses to the war were relatively similar. The first few fleeting days of the war, when the German invasion of Belgium was managed by the French forces, were treated as good news. But then, then breakthrough at Sedan and the race for the channel began. Given the wholesale catastrophe that the breakthrough at Sedan represented, all found the events of the first weeks of the war relevant, negative, and unexpected.
During the first few days, the war progressed exactly as Gamelin had imagined it. The German Army attacked exactly where he expected it to, on the Belgian frontier. Despite heavy fighting, his forces in Belgium, though hastily placed, were relatively successful in slowing the German advance. This was treated as straightforwardly good news. When six days later, Panzer units had dashed through the Ardennes, crossed the Meuse, and then broke through all defenses in their way, Gamelin and Daladier perceived in these events a major setback. The defenses which were supposed to contain the German advances had failed. Material and human were heavy. Reserves had already been deployed to other areas. Gamelin had been tricked to great effect. Gamelin clearly recognized this as a failure. He, like the rest of the army, were surprised by the crossings. On 13 May, Gamelin called Eduard Daladier to tell him that “the defense of France is sunk, that the German armor is making for Paris and there is no reserve to protect the capital.” Clearly he was taken off guard. Daladier’s response was to first ask about reserves, then to call Reynaud and tell him that “All is lost.” He was deeply

375 Junot 2007, 162; Shirer 716; Simonnot 1990, 115..
376 Gamelin would ask in his memoirs how the 1\textsuperscript{st} DCR, among the best units in France, could perform so poorly. Lormier 2000, 46.
377 Lormier 2000, 22.
378 How did this happen? Forcæ describes the surprise as the product of a ‘psychological and intellectual blockade’ against considering an attack through the Ardennes. Porch addresses the problem of intelligence best. While May is incredulous that the signals were missed, (2000, 356-7), the problem was not so much a lack of intelligence on general German capabilities, Blitzkrieg doctrine, or even the possibility of crossing the Ardennes. However, French intelligence incorrectly guessed the German order of battle in Belgium, overestimating it such that they did not believe that there were sufficient forces for another strong attack. Moreover, Gamelin was “obsessed” with Belgium, insufficiently interested in determining German intentions, and ultimately, in this intellectual and perceptual context, this intelligence failed to shake his faith in his plans. Porch 1995, 137-146, 168-73.
379 At Vincennes, the site of Gamelin’s GHQ, the Meuse crossings “seemed incomprehensible, inexplicable.” May 2000, 413.
380 Junot 2007, 264
embarrassed by it; when he went to brief Reynaud about what had happened, he was said to have seemed like a schoolboy caught red-handed. 381

Despite Daladier’s melodramatic response, the response of others was stronger. Reynaud found this to be deeply negative news. For him, as with most of the other politicians, the threat to Paris was the worst part of the fiasco. That same day, he called Winston Churchill and informed him that “We have lost the battle. Paris is open. Send me all the airplanes and all the troops you can.” 382 The next day, the French cabinet discussed the possibility of evacuating the Government from Paris, though it did not take that step yet. 383 If Paris could be taken, and taken this easily, winning the war would not be possible. The fear of Paris’ imminent fall was relatively short lived, however; by 19 May the movement of the German forces toward the coast, away from Paris, diminished the perception of the threat. 384 More fundamentally, though, Reynaud found in this outcome evidence of a more basic problem. Gamelin, whom his staff nicknamed ‘the peasant’ and ‘the old woman,’ was not prosecuting the war as he should have been, was ignoring and underestimating the Germans. 385 He was among those, Reynaud believed, who did not appreciate the dangers inherent with already being at war with Nazi Germany. Believing, as Gamelin did, that France had years to prepare itself to fight, indeed believing that France could withstand years at war, were to Reynaud fundamentally flawed understandings of the situation. The defeat was not so much a failing of French forces as it was a failing of its leader: he, after all, was the one who had been tricked. Had a better, more

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381 Ferro 1987, 20; Simonnot 1990, 116. He was clearly humbled by this; when he met Reynaud in person to detail the events, he seemed deeply embarrassed.
382 Junot 2007, 164.
383 Simonnot 1990, 117.
384 FRUS 1940(1), 228.
aggressive leader been in the lead, France would not have been in this situation. Reynaud’s negative feelings about Gamelin were not new. Indeed, on 9 May, the day before the German attack, Reynaud had tried to fire Gamelin, and as part of his campaign to do so had announced his intention to resign to President Lebrun. With the announcement of the invasion of Belgium, his requests were withdrawn, and he warily pledged to work with Gamelin to fight the war.

This finding of similar reaction sits awkwardly with my model. The frames of those using attritive theories of victory led them to focus on those features that were most important to them: the fact that a significant breakthrough had occurred in the main defense lines, thus threatening the capital and severely impinging on their ability to continue fighting. The frames of those focusing on the relative power focused on the defeat of the French forces, and the danger to Paris, the most politically and economically important ground in the country. In this sense, both predictions are correct. However, that in this case both predictions lead to the same general perceptions of the situation runs against the grain of my intuition that different kinds of theories of victory frame events in different ways. In this case, the reason this finding is obtained is because, despite different kinds of theories of victory, the events of 13-16 May were simply great a setback that no French leader, regardless of his approach to the war, could have seen them as anything but important and negative.

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386 Reynaud’s difficulty in firing Gamelin originated in the fact that Daladier was a strong supporter of Gamelin, and trying to fire him was seen as an attack on Daladier. Daladier, of course, was still Minister of War and National Defense, and a key member of the Government. Firing Gamelin thus required a reformation of the cabinet. Junot 2007, 157-8.
During the first few days of the war, Gamelin experienced contentedness—the Germans were doing exactly as he expected, and his forces were meeting their challenge. While some fretted about the war now finally come to France itself, he was the picture of confidence, with a great smile on his face. However, given Gamelin’s theory of victory, it is clear that the events following 16 May were negative and unanticipated. One historian describes it as the ‘sudden discovery of an immediate threat.’ These experiences contradicted his model of the battle would be like, which reflected French military doctrine and was strongly shaped by the First World War. Given the existence of the Maginot Line and the impossibility (as he perceived it) of quickly traversing the Ardennes Forest, a German attack must come through Belgium. The war itself would be a war of position and frontal attacks; armor was best put to use as an embedded support to infantry units. That the Germans had used all-armor units so effectively in Poland during the preceding autumn was of little importance: they were fighting the weaker Polish Army, after all. When intelligence reports hinted that the war might not follow the course Gamelin had anticipated, including those that accurately predicted the German attacks through the Ardennes, he had rejected these ideas, actively derogating them.

Gamelin’s response to the events of these days is well-known. While all about him lost themselves, he maintained his famed imperturbability. Unlike others in the government and the army, he displayed no outward signs of shock, panic, or depression. Instead he remained an

387 Shirer 1960, 724.
388 Bouthillier 1950, 19. Beaufre recalls that “Gamelin was striding up and down the corridor in his fort with a pleased and martial air which I had never seen before.” Beaufre 1968, 180.
390 Junot 2007, 163.
391 Beaufre describes Gen. Georges weeping in his headquarters on 15 May—the first, but not the last time he would see weeping in the French senior command. Beaufre 1968, 187. May cites descriptions of similar scenes. (2000, 413)
even keel. When on 16 May Churchill asked him « Ou est la masse de manœuvre ? » Gamelin responded with a single word: « aucune » ['Where is the strategic reserve?'—‘None.’]. 392 Indeed, he was so calm that he seemed to be emotionally detached from the situation. 393 But this calm was really anxiety in moderate form. Certainly he was serious and attached great import to urgently finding a new way forward. 394 Within days, he had done so, preparing plans to erect a new front, this time in the valley of the Somme River, just south of Abbeville and the existing German passage to the Channel. These offensives would halt further advances in to France and cut off the fast-moving spearheads of the German advance before the slower infantry could catch up. 395 In support of this mission, he endorsed De Gaulle’s northward counter-offensive, though he lacked the forces to sustain it for the long-term. Arguably, Gamelin’s response was to learn, just as the emotion-oriented hypotheses predict in response to unexpected bad news. As anticipated, then, he experienced first contentedness and then anxiety.

392 Shrier 1960, 726.
393 Indeed, as much as Reynaud had mistrusted his generalship, it was his apparent lack of response to the catastrophe that led to his firing as supreme commander. Reynaud described his demeanor in a meeting on 16 May: « Il est comme s’il analysait la bataille d’Agincourt, pas un mot sur l’avenir, pas un mot d’espoir, il n’a plus de réserves. » [He is as if he would analyze the battle of Agincourt, not a word of promise, not a word of hope, he had no more reserves.] Ferro 1987, 21. Beaufre described his demeanor at lunch three days later, during a period of great danger for the armies in Belgium: “As soon as he was in the big salon he set forth his new directives in measured tones, beginning, curiously, ‘Without wishing to interfere in the conduct of the battle…’ Then, with Gamelin still calm and apparently indifferent, we sat down to lunch. This meal left me with a horrible memory. The cook, like all of us in despair at the defeat, had put all his frustrated patriotism into the preparation of a veritable wedding breakfast. With Georges pale and beaten and his senior officers practically dead with fatigue and worry, the lunch had more the atmosphere of funeral baked meats. But, sitting in the center, Gamelin, who knew even then that he had lost the confidence of the Government, felt it necessary to put on an act, to talk of this, that and the other and make jokes; it all sounded terribly false....I felt like weeping or hoping that the ceiling would fall on us...Gamelin ate heartily, drank his coffee and left, as imperturbable as ever.” Beaufre 1968, 187-8.
394 In this sense, his statement that the defense of France ‘is sunk’ is more a statement of fact which he then set out to change.
395 May (2001) has recently argued that had it been implemented in the timely fashion that Gamelin was planning, this plan would quite likely have succeeded.
For Reynaud, the first days of the war suggested that all might be alright. But the complexity of his perceptions of the war situation complicates the prediction of his response to the events of 15-16 May. As the discussion above suggests, Reynaud did not expect the war to go this way; the sudden breakthrough surprised almost everyone. But at the same time, he had been very unhappy with Gamelin’s approach to the war, and would not have been surprised by his failure to check the Germans.\(^{396}\) The evidence suggests that while he was incredulous at the dramatic nature of the failure, frustration predominated any anxiety he experienced.\(^{397}\) As much or more than the Germans’ military prowess, Reynaud saw Gamelin’s military leadership as the cause of the breakthrough. His reported response clearly suggested frustration. Within hours of learning about the breakthrough, he raged « Ah! Si le Marechal était là ! Il pouvait agir sur Gamelin, sa sagesse et son calme seraient d’un bien grand secours ! » [Ah! If only the Marshall (Petain) was here! He could act on Gamelin, his wisdom and his calm would be of great help!]\(^{398}\) In his speech on 21 to the Senate, he spoke of punishing those responsible for France’s defeats, also indicative of a frustration response.\(^{399}\)

He clearly did not revisit his belief that France, with its British ally, could beat the Germans.\(^{400}\) Instead of reconsidering his approach to the war, he removed Daladier from his cabinet (taking the foreign affairs portfolio for himself), fired Gamelin, and called General Weygand (Foch’s WWI chief of Staff) out of Syria, where he was leading French forces in the

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\(^{397}\) Significantly, ‘incredulity’ is a sign of surprise rather than an emotional state of its own.

\(^{398}\) Ferro 1987, 21. There is an obvious irony in this, however—Reynaud wants Petain’s wisdom and calm at the same time he raged against Gamelin’s imperturbability.

\(^{399}\) BDFA (III-F-12), 114.

\(^{400}\) While it is true that he told Bullitt on 18 May that “the war might end in an absolute defeat of France and England in less than 2 months,” [FRUS 1940(1), 128-9] these comments were ostensibly based on the speed of the current advance compared with the experience of the first World War and, more fundamentally, rooted in an effort to convince FDR to strenuously aid the Allies.
Levant, to take over the Supreme Command. Indeed, on 21 May 1940, he declared to Senate, with apparent sincerity, that

“In the unhappiness of the country we have pride that two of her children who have the right of living in their glory are coming to put, in their tragic hour, themselves in the service of their country: Petain and Weygand. Petain, the victor of Verdun, great chief who was also humane... Weygand, the man of Foch, it who has stopped the German rush when the front was collapsing in 1918 and who knew how to change all the destinies and drive us to victory. On the plan of driving the war, there exists between Petain, Weygand, and me a total community of ideas. We have confidence in the great chief who commands the top of the armies, we have confidence in the soldiers of France. ... For me, to those who come and say to me that only a miracle can save France, I say: I believe in a miracle because I believe in France!”

Despite the bad position Gamelin and Daladier had gotten France into, this team would fight the war with more aggression and to better effect. Given that he did not revisit his belief, but only made changes in the leadership to better pursue it and to eliminate what he saw as the source of his frustration, Reynaud’s response evinces a lack of learning. Though the complexity of his perceptions made this response harder to predict than some others, in retrospect his behavior is consistent with the theoretical intuitions.

The last group whose response bears particular examination is that of Reynaud’s defeatists, men like Villelume, Bouthillier, and Baudoiun. Each of these men had personal ties to Reynaud—each of them had advised him in one way or another—and each of them was promoted to their positions of influence by him. Their responses were important because they would play central behind-the-scenes roles during late May and early June, trying to

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401 Junot 2007, p. 168. [My translation from the French.] Notably, Reynaud also declared around this time that his new cabinet was committed to the “resolute conduct of the war.” Umbreit 1991, 288.
402 Given its collection of luminaries, it would also raise the morale of a France shaken by the sudden advances of the German army and the floods of refugees it unleashed.
influence Reynaud to end the war and acting to bring together Petain and Weygand, two men then united by a belief that the war was lost but separated by great personal distaste. 404

Col. Villelume is said to have had the strongest doubts about the war going into May 1940. He had been doubtful when Gamelin had assured Daladier and the Supreme War Council that the French Army was ready for war in late August 1939. As late as April, he had even supported ending the war, as it was clear to him that the Allies had no readily available way of retrieving the Polish or Czechoslovak situations and a long war seemed dangerous for a fragile France. He had serious doubts about the Dyle Plan and the deployments associated with it, apparently being particularly concerned at the weakness around Sedan—the place where the line would be punctured. 405 Even as Gamelin smiled, he worried. 406 Not even he, however, expected the breakthrough that was to come. Nevertheless, with the invasion of Belgium and France, the war was made new. No longer was it a question of Central Europe, it was a question of France itself. This, he was not prepared to concede.

On 15 May, then, Villelume had no clear theory of victory at all. He had not believed in Gamelin’s approach to the war, but had not subscribed to a new one; unlike Reynaud, who wanted a more forceful strategy, he doubted it was worth it, if it was possible. In this situation, the attack was bad news—much of the French army had been cut off, exposing the rest of the country to German attack. It was unexpected, as well: even though he had been concerned about Sedan, he was not a believer in the power of armored divisions as De Gaulle was, and so the speed and effect of the attack was a surprise. Like Reynaud, he was unhappy with Gamelin’s

404 When told Weygand had been selected for the Supreme Command, Petain responded « Weygand, je ne l'amie pas! » Ferro 1987, 25.
405 Even Lormier concedes that the troops around Sedan were at best mediocre. Lormier 2000, 31.
pursuit of the war, but unlike him, he did not have a clear belief that the Allies were strong enough to beat the Germans; quite the opposite was true. In this context, while there may be elements of frustration, anxiety and a search of a valid way forward should predominate. This is the case because though he may have been unhappy with Gamelin, for Villelume the surprising power and extent of the German attack, more than French mismanagement, was the cause of the problem.

His response is clearly consistent with this prediction. During the ten days that followed the attack, he was actively engaged in the search for a new military approach to the war. He actively sought out new information, and carefully considered it. Indeed, this process continued through 25 May, when he heard a briefing by Weygand on his battle plan to try to defend the Somme. In his journal, one can sense his mind racing as he tries to put things together, as well as the moments when he comes to the conclusion:

Mais que donnera une offensive engage dans des conditions si precariees? Il m'apparait que le moment est venu de tirer toutes les consequences de la situation. Les developpements qu'elle portait en germe des le 3 septembre 1939 et dont notre effroyable erreur du 1 mai a precipite l'évolution ont atteint meme signe. Il n'est cependant pas sur que l'adversaire le voie aussi nettement que nous. Tant que la bataille du 27 n'est pas lissue, nous pouvons traiter sur des virtualités. Lorsqu'elle aura ete perdue, il n'y aura plus sur la table verte que la realite toute nue, depouillee du halo a la faveur du que une ultime manoeuvre diplomatique semble pouvoir encore etre tente.

Mais bien que la necessite d'une telle solution m'apparaisse ave une clarte aveuglante, je ne me dissimule pas, toutefois, qu'en proposer l'adoption a Paul Reynaud est un acte d'une extreme gravite. Admettre la defaite avant qu'elle n'ait ete consommee, nier toute possibilite de redressement sans apporter une demonstration valable pour tous, renoncer definitivement apres quinze jour de lutte a l'immense capital materiel et moral herite de notre victoire de 1918...

Il est 17 heures. J'ai dans mon bureau plusieurs personnes venues aux informations. Leca entre a son tour et s'assied songeur. Je voudrais lui communiquer mes reflections, mais je ne peux naturellement le faire tout haut. Je prends donc une feuille de papier sur laquelle, avec un crayon rouge, le premier qui me tombe sous la main, je griffonne ce qui suit : « Il faut faire la paix tant que nous avons encore une armee. Quand nous n'en aurons plus, la paix qui nous sera impossee sera catastrophique. Mais l'Allemagne acceptera-t-elle encore ? »

407 My translation: “But why take the offensive in such precarious conditions? It appeared to me that the moment had come to draw all the consequences of the situation. The developments that grew from the
This passage from his journal strongly suggests that he had been actively considering alternatives and that drawing the conclusion that France needed to extricate herself from the war poste-haste was not a mere continuation of his pre-10 May beliefs. The 'blinding clarity' with which it came upon him as he silently rejected Weygand's plans, the sense that he was proposing something grave indeed, his need to urgently communicate it to Dominique Leca, and his vivid description of writing it 'for the first time' all suggest a new arrangement of the facts in his mind. This makes clear that he changed beliefs at this point. This careful consideration of information, the mental exertion involved in arranging and rearranging data, even the focus on the most threatening aspects of the information are all consistent with anxiety as the explanation for learning.

...germs of 2 September 1939 and which our appalling error of 10 May had precipitated had now completed their evolution—the stage when all the odds went in the same direction. It is not, however certain that the adversary sees the situation as clearly as we do. If the battle of the 27 May is not given, we can negotiate on the possibilities. Once it is already lost, there is no more on the table than naked reality, deposed of the halo which a final diplomatic maneuver can give it.

“But while the necessity of such a solution appears to me with a blinding clarity, I cannot fool myself that proposing such an act to Paul Reynaud is not an act of extreme gravity. To admit defeat before it has been consummated, before all possibilities are exhausted without making a real demonstration, to definitively renounce after 15 days of fighting the immense material capital and moral heritage of our victory of 1918...

“At 5:00 PM, I was in my office, which was then crowded. I wanted to tell Leca [Reynaud’s chief of staff] about my conclusions, but naturally could not say them aloud. On a slip of paper, with a red pencil, I wrote them down for the first time, scribbling: ‘A peace must be made such that we can still have an army. When we are not able to do so, the peace that would be imposed on us would be a catastrophe. But will Germany still accept this?’”

It is apparent that he had been looking for a better approach, rather than fighting, even that day, since he states earlier in his entry for that day that he believed that the Seine would have been a better place from which to make this stand than the Somme, given that by now that line was already broken in some places. Villelume 1976, 352-3.

408 Gates observes that during this period, France’s leaders were “a few puzzled and apprehensive people in something of a state of shock, mulling over possible solutions to a most unpromising situation.” Quoted in Jackson 2003, 132.
Paul Baudouin and Yves Bouthillier were among those, like Reynaud, who believed that France had not been fighting hard enough. Two of Reynaud’s principal advisors from the Ministry of Finance, both grew in importance during the period of the fighting. Bouthillier was a senior officer in the Finance Ministry and, from 5 June, Minister of Finance. Baudouin was from 30 March 1940 undersecretary of state to the President of the Council (Reynaud himself), secretary of the war cabinet, and secretary of Committee of War; in Pétain’s 20 June cabinet, Baudouin became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Like Reynaud, they were not opposed to the war, and believed that once it began, France would be able to achieve her aims—if she did not wait so long that she was weakened by the rigors of war itself. Like Reynaud, they were unhappy with the direction of the war provided by Gamelin and Daladier.  

Thus, much as was the case with Reynaud, they had a complex perception of the war, with some elements tending to an anxiety response but others to frustration. As was the case with Reynaud, then, it is more difficult to make a clear prediction for their response to the events seen in the first two weeks of the war, and particularly the German breakthrough and drive to Abbeville that followed. Unlike Reynaud, their response suggests anxiety rather than frustration. As the Germans raced past Paris and toward Abbeville, these two men reconsidered their approach to the war. They came to conclusions strikingly similar to those of Villelume, and during the same period of time. Both came to believe that the war was lost and that it would be better for France to try to extricate herself from the war as soon as possible.  

409 Baudouin wrote that “Gamelin lacks force….He is not a leader, he is an administrator.” My translation. Quoted Couteau-Begaric and Huan 1989, 209.  

410 The complexity of the three men’s perceptions means that it is hard, at the remove of retrospective work, to untangle the exact beliefs they carried in their minds. It would seem to be the case that as Reynaud saw things, the catastrophe that France was facing was more the result of bad leadership and but for Bouthillier and Baudouin, it was indicative of the relative power of the German forces. Such a view is consistent with their views during the drôle du guerre. While Reynaud was very hostile to defeatism and attacked Daladier’s timidity, they were more open to Villelume’s doubts.  

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Indeed, Bouthillier, Baudouin, Villelume, Camille Chautemps and Leca all seem to have drawn the same conclusion within days of each other—24 to 26 May. This timing is striking. Not only is it after Weygand has taken the reins, it is almost 10 days after the breakthrough. In none of their cases did they immediately give up on the war—unlike Petain, who was convinced the war was over upon hearing of Sedan. Rather, they actively searched for a new way forward, the old one having failed, as continuing negative information and ever more unexpected events—including the weakness of Weygand’s proposal—ratcheted up their anxiety. The nature of the affective response, and the results of that response, are straightforwardly reflective of the theory. Predicting anxiety as opposed to frustration, however, was not possible due to the complex nuances of their ambivalent set of beliefs.

B. After the first two weeks.

Events

In his last day as Supreme Commander, Gamelin put into motion orders to establish a battle-line in the Somme Valley, and for operations to try to cut off the armored spearheads of the German attacks from the slower moving infantry that was by now some distance behind them. Such an operation faced significant challenges: the bulk of the best forces were cut off in Belgium; the remaining French forces were in the state of organizational chaos that often accompanies retreat; and the Belgians had suddenly retreated, suddenly exposing the left flank of the Allied forces in Belgium and Northern France. When Weygand arrived, he handed him his operational plans, including the orders then in process. He closed the memorandum explaining what he had done with by stressing that if these operations were to be successful, “every hour

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412 Daladier, at least, believed that there was wisdom in the plan. Daladier, ACIJ, p. 78-9.
counts.” Weygand responded that he had the ‘secrets of Foch,’ so he would be able to take matters in hand.\(^{413}\) In practical terms, he ignored Gamelin’s plans and in fact froze the preparations spelled out in them for three days while he acquainted himself with the situation. He then reinstated them.

By then, however, it would be too late. With the three days reprieve, the slower moving mass of German infantry divisions were able catch up to the Panzer units. With less time, fewer French forces could be assembled, scarce heavier weapons were hard to bring into position and at some places, the French Army’s lines were already indented by German actions.\(^{414}\) They were also unable to convince the British to bring a more substantial part of their fighter force across the channel; while the British were willing to station an additional 10 squadrons in France, there remained a core of 25 squadrons which they considered essential for defending Britain. Because they refused to station them in France, they would play a much smaller role in defending the Allied ground forces. Nevertheless, a set of operations designed to firm up the defense, including several tactical offensives designed to eliminate bridgehead, began around 1 June.\(^{415}\) Despite hard fighting and some local successes, the French units were largely unable to secure these bridgeheads. On 5 June, the German forces launched an offensive of their own.

Now, the French forces were pushed back, forced to retreat. Some local routs occurred.

\(^{413}\) Gamelin apparently responded by suggesting that the ‘secrets of Joffre’ had not sufficed, and that the situation was fast moving and required clear thinking rather than only relying on the lessons of the past. Rivalries between several of the WWI maréchaux—Joffre, Foch, and Petain—had continued through the interwar years via their ‘disciples’ (Gamelin, Weygand, and, of course, Petain himself) and these rivalries impeded their ability to work together. [Simonnot 1990, 126.] Even though they would soon share perceptions of the war, at this point Weygand and Petain vehemently hated each other, and only the ministrations of fellow-travelling match-makers like Baudouin and Bouthillier brought them together by early June.

\(^{414}\) Ernest May has argued (2001) that these three days were crucial: had Gamelin’s orders been carried through, the French forces would have had a fighting chance of cutting off the spearheads, holding back the Germans, and buying enough time to build posture from which they could carry out a sustained fight.

\(^{415}\) Lormier 2000, 69-80; Umbreit 1991, 297; Vernet 2001, 204..
Concurrent with the preparations for the Somme effort and its (failed) execution, the British conducted the Dunkirk evacuation, an effort to recover as many of the remaining troops from the Dunkirk pocket as possible. Almost 200,000 British and 140,000 French troops were removed; the French troops were returned to France within 14 days, most too late to appreciably affect the outcome of the war. By 10 June, the progress of the German advance, now on a wide front, was such that the government evacuated Paris.\footnote{This same day, Weygand told Reynaud that the army was on the verge of disintegration. Umbreit 1991, 300.} There would be no repeat of charge of the taxis that saved Paris in 1914, nor would Paris again resist siege as it had in 1870-1. Declared an open city, Paris fell quietly on 14 June. As the Government slowly made its way through the flood of refugees, eventually making its way to Bordeaux, the Germans continued their offensive pressure: even in Bordeaux, the cabinet felt insecure. The army’s retreat began to turn into a rout, an French casualties began to soar.\footnote{Umbreit 1991, 302.} This phenomenon grew particularly after 15 June, when an address by Petain seemed to signal that the government had given up—before it actually had done so.

Indeed, the request for an armistice was not made until four days later, after the reorganization of the cabinet under Petain. This new cabinet involved relatively few changes: Reynaud, obviously, was out, and Mandel as well. De Gaulle, named under-secretary of war only two weeks earlier, fled before he received official notification that he was out. But most key figures remained: Camille Chautemps, before 10 May Reynaud’s Vice-President of the Council, returned to that office under Petain. Reynaud’s former advisors, Baudouin and Bouthillier, led Foreign Affairs and Finance, respectively. The principal military commanders, Weygand and Darlan of the Navy, remained in their places, as well. Concluded on 24 June, the

\footnote{Umbreit 1991, 302.}
armistice provided of a zone of occupation and a zone that would remain under the control of the French government, which was limited to a small military force it could use to preserve order. It was understood that the zone of occupation would exist only so long as the German war against Britain continued. This government also retained legal control over the French Empire, though given the scarcity of its military and financial resources, control over them would be tenuous. The remaining planes of the French air force were to be destroyed, and the Fleet effectively interned in ports controlled by the French government.

Framing

The theories of victory are less effective in framing the events of this period because, from the last days of May, none of the leaders had a theory of victory with a model of further fighting. Reynaud, though adhering to an attritive theory of victory in principle, had a distinctly fuzzy vision of battle. This is unsurprising, given that his Supreme Commander effectively told him to expect failure even before the Somme offensive began. Darlan, leader of the Navy, and Mandel, Minister of the Interior, were in similar positions. Even De Gaulle, two weeks before a colonel and now under-secretary of war, was searching for a workable path to victory rather than committed to one. Many in the government did not believe that victory—either in the war or on this battlefield—was possible by this point. This group included including Petain, Weygand, Bouthillier, Baudouin, Villelume, and Chautemps. Weygand, as Supreme Commander, insisted on it as a means of saving the Army’s honor—thus allowing it to surrender with dignity. Reynaud agreed that the plans should be implemented, though for the very

418 On 25 May, Weygand made clear in meetings with Reynaud, Petain, and other war leaders for the first time that he believed that there was little hope their last-ditch defense would do more than preserve French honor. Jackson 2003, 131. On 29 May, Weygand had stated in no uncertain terms that if the ‘Weygand Line’ failed, it would be ‘tantamount to final defeat.’ Umbreit 1991, 296.
different reason that he yet believed that France had a chance. Petain believed these plans, and particularly Weygand’s insistence on it, to be criminal, since they would produce the useless deaths of thousand of French soldiers. He did not, however, express this to his senior colleagues.

These beliefs, then, gave rise to an unusual phenomenon. Despite the high drama of the events of these weeks, the war leaders’ perceptions of them were largely unfocused and unsystematic. They became military and administrative problems and human tragedies, and were handled as such, but the events of the war no longer had a sustained relationship with leaders’ opinions about what steps to take next. The exceptions to this were Paul Reynaud and his new advisor, under-secretary of war Charles De Gaulle—who still believed that the war could be salvaged.

Though Dunkirk was a ‘miracle’ for Britain, and the site of hard and impressive fighting by the French Army rearguards, it was more of a sideshow for the French leaders. Though almost 140,000 Frenchmen were pulled off the beaches near Dunkerque, they lacked any heavy equipment. By this point, the French Army lacked the equipment to refit them. Little mention of it was made during the decision-making meetings of this period, except so far as it was related to Britain’s continuing refusal to provide air cover. In this sense, it was seen as irrelevant.

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419 Petain disapproved of the Somme offensive in principle, though he did not prevent their execution. Upon seeing plans that would range 50 divisions, lacking good collective organization and air cover, against 130 German divisions with effective air supremacy, he believed the act was criminal. Simonnot1990, 135. On 4 June he told US ambassador Bullitt that “against the German attack which would be made before the end of this week...the French had nothing to oppose but their courage.” FRUS 1940(1), 238.
The progressive failure of the Somme effort, which then turned into the broader German offensive, was both familiar and negative for all involved. No one expected it to end well—not Petain, who viewed the whole thing as an abomination, not Weygand, who saw its demonstration of the army’s will to fight (rather than to win) as sufficient to redeem its honor, and not Reynaud, who had been warned repeatedly by Weygand not to expect a very positive outcome. It was negative in different ways, however. It was most negative for Reynaud, who, despite Weygand’s warnings still hoped for some slowing of the German offensive. For Petain, it was negative in that it generated human costs for no reason. It had no relation to a theory of victory, since he lacked any. Perhaps strangely, it was least negative for Weygand, the supreme commander who ordered a fight most in the military establishment thought impossible to win. Given that his purpose was no longer associated with winning the war, but redeeming the honor of the army—as he understood it—it was a relative success. The sporadic local retreats and routs only began as the Germans began their offensive, when the troops were

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420 Vernet states that the failure occurred for ‘increasingly familiar’ reasons: lack of reserves, reinforcements, supply, and munitions. (2001, 205)
421 Evocative of both Weygand’s views of the situation and his relations with Reynaud is his statement to Reynaud on 5 June: If the battle on the Somme is lost, real courage is to treat with the enemy.” Vernet 2001, 207.
422 On 25 May he spoke to Baudouin about ‘sterile heroism,’ in the presence of Weygand and Reynaud. Ferro 1987, 35. Reynaud claimed to UK Ambassador Campbell on 4 June that Petain had already told him that “Well there is nothing left but to make peace. If you do not want to do it, you can hand over to me.” BDEF (III-F-12), 119.
423 Weygand and Petain had come to a general agreement on 29 May, though the intercession of Baudouin, that further fighting was largely useless. Ferro 1987, 39-40. Indeed, Ferro states that Weygand cad come to see the enterprise as a sort of « baroud d’honoré ». (35) Weygand was careful to praise the army’s actions in each case even as it went down to defeat; this was no exception. Lormier 2000, 81. Note’s written down by Weygand’s aide-de-camp on 12 June are similarly reflective of this attitude: “We are entirely defeated. No Reserves. The defense line is not possible. The army has been battered courageously. The honor is safe.” [My translation.] DDF1940, 41. See also Weygand 1952, 155.
exhausted from days of fighting and in many cases without food. Satisfied that the Army had shown its true character, he was now ready to move to the next stage—an armistice.

In a like way, the fall of Paris was anticlimactic. By 14 June, Paris had been under threat for almost a month—it was on 16 May, after all, that Daladier had first informed Reynaud and the cabinet that there was nothing standing between the Germans and the city. Moreover, by this point, even Reynaud’s vision of battle did not involve holding the city. Thus no one was surprised when on 10 June it was decided that the city could no longer be defended. Reynaud implicitly declared the city open, stating that France would fight the Germans around but not in the city. When challenged by Churchill, who argued that Paris could absorb thousands of German soldiers in a street-to-street, house-to-house fight, Weygand declared that the end would be the same, only the costs greater: both the city and France would fall, even if Paris were burned to ashes. Reynaud implicitly accepted this view. Petain was in fact among the first to leave, and had the best preparations for doing so. Unlike the others whose flight was poorly organized and done on a shoe-string amid the flood of refugees, he was driven in his Cadillac to a pre-arranged chateau. Striking as it may seem, the fall of Paris was effectively irrelevant to the French war leadership. Aside from pushing them to less convenient facilities, it did not influence their decision-making in the least.

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424 Lormier 2000, 106.
425 Significantly, Weygand would only accept an armistice if the Government, rather than the Army, were to ask for it. Both he and Petain insisted on the cabinet accepting responsibility for the act, rather than their beloved army.
426 Junot 2007, 176.
427 Simonnot 1990, 139.
Emotional Response and Learning

By and large the period after 26 May 1940 was a stressful but dismal time for France’s war leaders. Familiar bad news continued to flow in, be it from the receding front or London, where France’s British allies continued to be unable or unwilling to provide further support. Strikingly, by this point only one senior war decision-maker, President of the Council Paul Reynaud, persisted in believing the war effort was anything but doomed. Largely deserted by his former aides, he was increasingly assisted by Charles De Gaulle, who acted to try to find a way ahead by investigating options the Weygand and Petain dismissed out of hand, be it an guerilla warfare effort, a ‘Breton Redoubt,’ or Anglo-French union. From that point on, Paul Reynaud would be the only war leader to learn from wartime events. Perceiving Hitler as “Genghis Khan,” he was by the end of the period willing to concede effective control over l’hexagone but not give up the fight.428

Paul Reynaud

Given that only Reynaud had an operative theory of victory, I chart only his emotional responses and its affect on his changes in beliefs. Reynaud, then pursuing an attritive theory of victory, clearly found the relevant military events of this period—the Somme offensive that went nowhere, the retreats that followed, and the fall of Paris—to be negative. They were familiar because they were clearly predicted by Weygand, or had been expected for weeks (as was the case with the fall of Paris).429 Accordingly, they should produce frustration and, with it, an absence of learning.

428 An ‘internal note’ apparently by Paul Reynaud dated 15 June states that if France quits the war, “it will enter centuries of servitude.” DDF1940, 32-3.
429 Gen. Weygand to the President of the Council, 29 May 1940, DDF1940, 6-8.
Reynaud’s response is imperfectly captured by this prediction. On 6 June he concluded that metropolitan France would probably fall to the Germans. On that day, it became clear that there was no force in France or available to it that could halt the German onslaught. To this extent, he clearly experienced a change in beliefs. Unlike Villelume or Bouthillier before him, however, he did not respond to the falsification of his theory of victory by concluding that the war was lost. Instead, he had his staff, particularly Gen. De Gaulle, investigate several options for continuing the war. Even before the Somme fight, Weygand felt the need to argue forcefully to him that a repeat of Gambetta’s reorganization of an army would be impossible given the speed of modern war. Reynaud and De Gaulle were also willing to talk about fighting in Paris—a move Churchill pushed them on—but Weygand responded that ‘Tout cela n’a plus de sens. Réduire Paris en cendres ne changerait pas le résultat.’ Then there was the ‘Breton Redoubt,’ in which all remaining French forces would withdraw to Brittany. Once there, they would fortify their positions and rely on the British Navy to supply them by sea. This idea was quickly quashed by Petain the senior military leadership and others in the cabinet—particularly the Public Works Minister de Monzie—who deemed the proposal impossible to execute. There was also a proposal to immediately send the next two conscription classes to North Africa, where they would be trained and armed in preparation for a fight. Next came a proposal, floated for him by De Gaulle, to fight a guerilla campaign against the Germans. Petain brought

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430 DeWailly 2000, 222.
431 Gen. Weygand to the President of the Council, 29 May 1940, DDF1940, 6-8.
432 ‘There is no sense in that. Reducing Paris to ashes will not change the result.’ [My translation]. DeWailly 2000, 229.
434 Junot 198, 215. Even then, few saw this as a realistic plan—not Villelume, not the British military, not even Mandel.
435 Jackson 2003, 134. It was pointed out, however, that there were neither facilities nor arms nor means of providing either in North Africa.
his authority to bear on this question by declaring that it would be the ‘end of France.’ On 10 June, Reynaud decided that he had made an error in appointing Weygand and considered firing him in favor of a younger man due to his inability to re-establish the situation or at least stabilize the front. He later stated that on 15 June, he had decided to fire Weygand, but was forced out before he could do so. Almost alone among the French leadership, Reynaud was willing to consider Churchill’s proposed Anglo-French Union for more than a minute. Throughout this time he repeatedly returned to France’s pledge not to make peace without the British, describing it as treason. Finally, Reynaud was the most senior advocate for continuing the fight from North Africa. He maintained this position until he no longer had sufficient support in cabinet to continue. At that point he resigned in favor of Petain. During this period he was described as profoundly depressed and anxious, and fatigued. De Gaulle recalled that

He gave me the impression of a man who had reached the limit of hope. Only those who were eyewitnesses of it can measure what the ordeal of being in power meant during that terrible period. All through days without respite and nights without sleep, the Premier could feel the entire responsibility for the fate of France weighing upon him personally….The head of the government saw the system collapsing all around him, the people in flight, the Allies

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437 Chautemps considered that it would make France no more than a British dominion, but according to general Spears, Reynaud was “stupefied and enthusiastic...believed it was a miracle” when told of it, and could not imagine other members of the cabinet opposing the idea. Quoted in Junot 2007, 221-2. This response suggests joy. However, in this context joy would not produce the kind of re-thinking that would lead to a downward revision of aims. This single moment of joy, then, merely served to reinforce his resistance to changing war aims. This set of responses is striking similar to those of Niukkanen in the Winter War case after the Allies’ 1 March intervention.
438 “Internal Note,” DDF1940, 32-3.
439 On 15 June, in an 'internal note,' Reynaud wrote “Germany is victorious on the land. Our Fleet is intact. With the British fleet, we are master of the seas. The greatest colonial powers, having access to the principal sources of resources necessary for modern war. But on the other hand, the course of operations is to our detriment, with principle role of aviation. Most of the success of the Germans has owed to the success of their air force. But as things go forward, between the British and the Americans, our side will soon over-take them in aircraft production....In the meantime, it is necessary to conserve the French fleet and to transport to the African colonies everything we can of our land forces.” DDF1940, 34-5. [My translation] This indicates both his recognition that nothing more was possible in metropolitan France and his alternative theory of victory.
440 As recalled by Biddle. FRUS 1940(1), 253, 260.
withdrawing, and the most illustrious leaders failing. From the day when the government left the capital, unrolling along the roads amid the dislocation of services, disciplines, and consciences. In such conditions M. Paul Reynaud’s intelligence, his courage, and the authority of his office were, so to speak, running free. He no longer had any purchase on events. To seize the reins once more he would have had to wrench himself out of the whirlwind, cross over to Africa, and start everything afresh from there.

General Spears, the British military liaison to the French government, stated that on the evening of 13 June, Reynaud looked “ghastly, with a completely unnatural expression, still and white,” the next day, he was “forlorn...too tired and bewildered to be rational,” and the next day, “pale and washed out” and still nervously exhausted.\footnote{De Gaulle 1998, 78-9.}

Superficially, Reynaud’s behavior is suggestive of information search, consistent with the influence of anxiety. However, it was not really a search for new information. Indeed, none of the ideas he floated are indicative of an effort to find new information or ask new questions. Unlike the searches that occur under the influence of anxiety, Reynaud does not seem to have been equally open to many sources of information, nor to using them equally. Indeed, he resisted information that suggested that quitting the war was necessary and refused to effectively reconsider this belief. With apparent sincerity he stated during a radio broadcast on 10 June 1940:

\begin{quote}
The soul of France is not beaten. Our race cannot let itself be beaten by an invasion. She will always drive back of beat the invader! Must we despair? Certainly not. There must be waves of warplanes coming from over the Atlantic to crush the evil force that dominates Europe. Despite our reverses, the power of the democracies remains immense. We guard in our hearts this hope. Whatever may happen in the days that come, the French may have to suffer. But the day of resurrection is coming.\footnote{Quoted in Junot 2007, 199.}
\end{quote}

\footnotetext[441]{De Gaulle 1998, 78-9.}
\footnotetext[442]{Quoted in Jackson 2003, 142.}
\footnotetext[443]{Quoted in Junot 2007, 199.}
The man who had believed in a miracle on 21 May still believed in a day of resurrection on 10 June. His series of impossible proposals suggest a resistance to the conclusion that was self-evident to ever increasing numbers of Frenchmen: that France could no longer continue the war, and must seek an armistice.

The best explanation, then, is that Reynaud was in fact under the influence of frustration rather than anxiety. He could no longer see a path free to him, but he refused to reconsider his cardinal beliefs: that France could win. Frustration was clearly evident in both the way he talked about the situation and particularly his conclusion that hiring Weygand had been an error, soon raging about the man and his actions in discussions with other leaders.\footnote{For instance, Reynaud’s anger and irritation at Weygand were clearly in evidence in a meeting with the Presidents of the Chambers, Herriot and Jeanneney, on 15 June. Junot 2007, 208.} It was also evident in his interactions with those around him. He engaged in violent arguments with Weygand. He grew so angry with his pro-armistice mistress, Helene des Portes, that he threw two glasses of water at her during dinner on 15 June.\footnote{Jackson 2003, 137, 142. Of course, he also directed some of his frustration at those of his inner circle who had become partisans of armistice: Baudouin and Bouthillier. Junot 2007, 213.} This frustration did not make the utterly impossible—stopping the German advance by conventional means after 6 June 1940—possible. It did, however, cause him to resist the conclusion that the situation dictated a separate peace. Instead, he turned to De Gaulle, an associate of some years and a man who had not yet given up, unlike his military leadership, to try to find the path forward that they refused to present him.\footnote{Junot 2007, 193-4} Thus he worked through a set of possible alternatives that would allow him to maintain his war aims and his model of the situation.\footnote{DeWailley 2000, 229.} In terms of the prediction, then, it is
incorrect in predicting no learning at all, but the intuition behind it is correct in that frustration suppressed the scope and character of belief changes.

Petain

No discussion of the Battle of France, and the politics behind it, can be complete without addressing Philippe Petain. Petain fits poorly within the framework expressed by my approach because, while a maréchal and thus by right a member of the Council of War and war leader, Petain seems to have never believed in that the French could beat the Germans. This seems to have been true even before the breakthrough at Sedan. There is no contemporaneous explanation for this, though he and his propagandists later adopted Weygand’s explanation, a lack of men, arms, and preparation. He was, of course, not alone in having doubts about the Army’s preparedness or the wisdom of entering the war in September 1939, but unlike the case of Villelume, he does not seem to have searched for a way ahead after 10 May.

It seems clear that he saw himself as having a personal mission to save France from the war. This is evident in his comments on 16 May that he returned from Spain to make an

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448 When asked by the Assembly’s committee of inquiry when he first had the idea of an armistice, he responded [my translation; note that he was very aged and slightly senile at the time of his testimony]: “It would be with the knowledge of all that had passed in Poland. I had the occasion of having a conversation with a Polish officer who had made war in Poland. I asked him how it had come to pass and he described to me the whole affair….It was a brutal attack by the Germans who were near Poland that drove the Poles from one end of the country to the other. That’s what happened in our house in 1940. I had thought of these things as they then were as excessively grave. I made a remark at this moment—there and all the times which I spoke of any invasion, I recall this conversation that I had with a Polish officer on the railway. This officer had told me that Poland had been beaten, and completely put to death in this gale. I thought that if such a thing were done in France, we would be in the same condition as Poland.” Petain, ACII, 171-2. Note also that this response to the Polish fight differs substantially from those of Gamelin and most others in the French military establishment. (Porch 1995, 146-50, 166)

449 This was true almost immediately. In his 20 June radio address, he spoke of « Trop peu d’enfans, trop peu d’armes. Trop peu d’allies, voila le causes de notre défaite. Le people Français ne conteste pas ses échecs. Tous les peoples ont connu tour a tour des succès et de reverse. » [My translation : Too few children, too few weapons. Too few allies, these are the causes of our defeat. The French people do not contest these failures. All people go through both success and setbacks.] Junot 2007, 246.
armistice, and his martyr-like orientation to his task. Contrary to his statements then and at the time, it is far from clear that he had any set of minimum aims save from saving the French people from a fate like that experienced by the Poles.\(^{450}\) This determination led him to condemn as criminal or worse Weygand’s Somme Valley plan, De Gaulle’s proposal to take up guerilla warfare, and Churchill’s proposal that Paris be defended house by house, making it a sponge for absorbing German soldiers.\(^{451}\) This being the case, the only kind of learning that could have occurred would have been changes in beliefs that made him believe that there was a chance of retaining some war aim through the power of France rather than the generosity of Hitler. Within my framework, converting his quite strong ‘theory of defeat’ into a ‘theory of victory’ would likely require some experience of joy, with the relaxed perception of obstacles that tends to accompany it. Joy requires some unexpected, positive events. Neither Philippe Petain, nor France more generally, experienced any such events during this period. Accordingly, there was no basis for a change in Petain’s beliefs.

C. **GERMANY**

**Events**

Unlike the French experience in the Battle of France, the German campaign went off with nary a hitch. There were no meaningful setbacks; rather it was a story of success built upon success. This abundance of positive news does not mean that it is not an interesting case, however. There are several events that have been debated by both participants and historians, and my approach helps shed some further light on these events. There is also the question of

\(^{450}\) Burrin 1996, 9.

\(^{451}\) On 16 June, Petain described any continuation of the war as a ‘pointless slaughter.’ Junot 2007, 217-8.
the generosity of the German response. While the ritual of surrender, performed famously in the railway car in Compiegne, was designed to humiliate, the substance of the armistice has often been depicted as generous, though its relationship to the eventual terms of a treaty is unclear.

*The First Period of the War*

Unlike the French, the Germans did not fear the coming of the war with France. Having successfully completed their conquests in Poland, Norway, and then the Netherlands, they turned their attention to Belgium and France. (Luxembourg, like Denmark, chose not to resist.) These successes buoyed up the morale of the army and the confidence of public opinion, which had been uncertain about the enterprise during the prior year. They confronted an enemy who seemed to have little sense of the nature of their trick, whose military doctrine remained moored in the Great War, and whose political and military leadership was self-evidently fractured and uncertain about the war. Their enemy’s principal ally—the UK—remained unable and, to a certain extent, unwilling to give it powerful military support. The path of the invasion went through Belgium, a country whose recent bout with neutrality\(^45^2\) had deprived its certain ally, France, of the ability to effectively plan and prepare for an invasion. Like some among the French leadership, then, the Germans looked forward to the fight; unlike the French, they had a significant period of success behind them.

From the German perspective, the attack began according to plan with the delivery of an ultimatum to the Belgians. When rejected, they went forward with a large-scale offensive, involving seventy divisions. It started well—innovative paratrooper tactics brought the quick capture of the great modern Belgian fortress Eben Emael at Leige in less than a day. While the

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\(^45^2\) Leopold III proclaimed Belgian neutrality in 1937, having been allied with France and Britain since 1914.
offensive continued to advance, it soon slowed—but did not stop—as it met the French counter-
offensive.\textsuperscript{453} The bulk of the French forces thus engaged in Belgium and the extreme north of
France, Manstein’s plan was put into action. Panzer units crossed the Meuse near Sedan
despite intense opposition—more than 70 allied planes tried to sink the pontoon bridges they
used, but failed and were themselves destroyed.\textsuperscript{454} They forced themselves through the
Ardennes forest with a rapidity which, while promised by Manstein and Guderian, was
nevertheless unprecedented.

Having crossed the forest and bashed through the relatively weak French units blocking
their way, they made a dash for the Channel port of Abbeville. Throughout this dash, they
received effective close-air support of the \textit{Luftwaffe}. At the same time, they were quickly
outpacing the infantry units behind them.\textsuperscript{455} The Panzer units reached Abbeville on 20 May, and
two days later the mechanized infantry caught up with them. The Belgians then surrendered,
leaving a gap in the allied lines. The German army then began to consolidate their forces in
Flanders and Northern France. As it did so, generals like Halder and Manstein pleaded for
permission to engage more forcefully with the French and British units trapped in the Dunkirk
pocket. They were refused permission, and, to many generals’ displeasure, the 340,000 soldiers
were able to escape.

Nevertheless the 130 divisions of the German Army now in Flanders began to turn
southward. The French efforts to defend the Somme and Aisne produced locally hard fighting

\textsuperscript{453} Manstein writes that even the feint was more successful than anticipated (1982, 124).
\textsuperscript{454} Lormier 2000, 38.
\textsuperscript{455} Though the popular image of the \textit{Wehrmacht} is one of an intensely mechanized force, the bulk of the
infantry continued to move by foot and hoof in 1940. Even 13 months later, when Germany invaded the
USSR, the army had 3350 tanks and 650,000 horses. Jackson 2003, 218.
but were of little strategic import.⁴⁵⁶ On 5 June, the German offensive began in earnest. After four days the French forces there were largely exhausted; first the Aisne was crossed—opening the way to Paris—and then other breaches in the front developed.⁴⁵⁷ Those not captured began to retreat. In several cases, this retreat became a rout, with masses of soldiers mixing in with the refugees fleeing southward. The French defense began to lose strategic coherence. German forces began to easily stream southward across France, taking an open Paris on 14 July, and continuing southward. German forces began preparations for assaults in eastern France, against the fortresses of the Maginot Line. On 15 June, the Citadel of Verdun was captured.

Then, on 17 June, the French government relented to the German demand and requested an armistice. Though the French quibbled with a few points—one being the right to destroy their own air force (granted), the other their reluctance to turn over foreign émigrés (rejected)—but when pushed for an answer, they preferred to accept the armistice.

**Framing**

As noted above, the German forces were clearly pursuing a brute force theory of victory against the French. Their aim was to destroy French military power, largely through direct military means. This being the case, the importance of events should be defined by their ability to meet keep their schedule and to overcome any resistance. The degree to which this was the case is striking. The German leadership, including Adolf Hitler himself, paid careful attention to the progress of their forces and the health of their units.⁴⁵⁸

This was evident in the first weeks of the war, as Hitler paid careful attention to the progress of the German forces, first in the North—where they exceeded expectations—and then

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⁴⁵⁷ Umbreit 1991, 300.
⁴⁵⁸ Halder 1988, 141-2.
as they executed the breach in the French lines near Sedan. Similarly, German attention was focused on the progress of the French forces northward. Because the disembarkation at Dunkirk was explicitly allowed by Hitler, it was not an event that drew his particular attention—he certainly did not perceive it as a negative event. Similarly, the periodic reports of localized hard fighting, the few localized French offensive successes around Abbeville and in retaking the some bridgeheads along the Somme, and the hours French successes in holding the Somme made little impression on the German war leaders. This is in good part because these very mild setbacks generally occurred in times and places when the Germans did not have an active plan—or, along the Somme, were of such short duration that they were generally resolved before they were reported to higher headquarters. All of this is consistent with the hypotheses expressed.

There were only three significant exceptions to this pattern of attention. During the first five days of the fight, in addition to the progress of their own units, the Germans paid careful attention to French movements, trying to determine if they had detected the German plan. During the advance to Abbeville, Hitler was again attentive to the possibility that the French might launch a strike against the army’s southern flank. Then, as Paris fell, the state of the French government became a matter of interest. They began paying attention to it not because they expected overthrow, revolution, or a surge of domestic discontent. Instead, they feared that it might actually disintegrate before it could surrender. In addition to the practical difficulties in administering the new territory this could cause—and the possible annoyances

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460 All the more striking is the degree to which the German perception of the fight has become the standard, to the extent that a French author (Lormier 2000) felt moved to write a work defending the French performance during the Spring of 1940.
associated with continuing but disorganized resistance—this would have spoiled the ceremony Hitler had planned for the railway car at Compiegne.

Significantly, the attention paid to French action was not directed at indicators of likely political progress or military strength, but of intention and future action. The concerns were about what the French could do if things did not fall together properly, rather than anything they actually did do;\textsuperscript{461} and the fights were about the degree to which possible opportunities should have be pursued. Thus their attention was no so much political as practical, tailored to the question ‘would the French cooperate enough so the Germans would be able to execute their plans as easily as they had hoped?’ Though beyond the prediction of the hypotheses, these exceptions support the general intuitions behind the model.

This conclusion is strengthened by comparison of German responses to French and British acts during the war. The key difference in framing effects between informative and brute force theories of victory lay not in the way battlefield events are viewed but in the ways that political and domestic events are viewed. With brute force theories of victory, they are not important, whereas they are of great interest in informative theories of victory because they can serve as indicators of the degree to which their opponent is going to make concessions in response to the demonstration of power. While Hitler demonstrated little interest in even the many changes of government that occurred in France during the period, including the addition of Petain to the Government, the nearly simultaneous appointment of Churchill was seen as a negative event. Moreover, they were attentive to much smaller details in British policy—like their disengagements from the French, their failure to send over their RAF squadrons, their efforts to pull their army back. Hitler (and others) also exhibited a strong interest in the

\textsuperscript{461}Martens 2001, 408.
speeches of Churchill, parsing them for signs of willingness to negotiate, Reynaud’s appeals were seen as little more than death rattles. This differential pattern of behavior strongly supports the contention that brute force and informative theories of victory frame political acts in quite different ways.

**Emotional Response**

Hitler’s emotional responses to the battle of France are at once famous and disputed for their effects on the conduct of the war. The picture of him dancing a jig upon hearing the news of the French request for an armistice is famous. So too are his nerves. German generals at the time and after decried him as overly nervous and, once the gamble begun, overly cautious. Many of them believed his periodic orders to halt the Panzers, sometimes imperfectly obeyed, were the product of this cursed nervousness. Of course these military leaders, who saw themselves as being deprived of military glory, were hardly unbiased witnesses in this regard.

Nevertheless, Hitler’s emotional responses, as well as those of his generals, do seem to have influenced the pattern of learning during the Battle of France.

Given their theory of victory, the series of events which confronted the Germans during the six weeks of fighting were for the most part, all positive. Some elements were familiar, others less so. Unfamiliarity was the product of the plan succeeding far beyond expectations. Familiarity was the product of either conformity with the war plans or, later in the war, the increasingly familiar experience of exceeding expectations. As a result, most of the unfamiliar events—again, unfamiliar in terms of speed of goal achievement—occurred in the 10-14 days of the conflict. After the first few days went precisely according to plan, with the French Army responding as expected, the breakthrough occurred on 16 May. Although there was some local

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462 This was true as early as 2 June. Domarus 1997, 2013-4.

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hard fighting, the Meuse was crossed faster and more easily than expected.\textsuperscript{463} The spearhead then cut through all French and allied forces in their way and moved for the coast at breakneck speed. Their speed and the ease with which they crossed Flanders and Northern France were far beyond expectations.\textsuperscript{464} Indeed, their speed led to severe disagreements among the German commanders, many of whom were concerned that the ease of their progress had actually made them vulnerable to counterattack. Once the rest of the army caught up with them, they then turned south and east, and began their effort to cross the Somme and Aisne rivers. The four days this required were in line with their estimates. Thereafter, their progress followed evolving estimates as they pursued the French armies or, particularly as they moved south, moved through territory free of organized resistance. Taking Paris was a trivial task, given that it was made an open city. More significant, and given the memories of 1916 engraved in the memories of the German psyche, more unexpected, was the ease with which Verdun was taken.\textsuperscript{465}

Given these predictions, during the first few days of the conflict, the German leaders should have experienced contentment (and with it, suppressed learning). From the time of the breakthrough, they should be under the influence of joy. During the last weeks of the war, both joy and contentment may be evident but contentment should predominate, given that familiar

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\textsuperscript{463} Martens 2001, 408.\\
\textsuperscript{464} Martens 2001, 408. Jackson emphasizes that the Blitzkrieg doctrine, to a great degree, emerged haphazardly from the German experience in France in 1940. “Why else did the High Command [as well as Hitler] try to slow the panzers, finally doing so on 24 May? The victory in France came about partly because the General High Command lost control of the battle. The decisive moment was Guderian’s decision to immediately move west on 14 May, wrenching the rest of the army along with him.” (2003, 215)\\
\textsuperscript{465} Despite the series of victories encountered, it was only with the taking of Verdun that many Germans celebrated their success in the war. Many—in the army, in the political leadership, in the public at large—were moved to tears of joy by its capture.
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events were more frequent than unfamiliar ones. The latter two of these three predictions are confirmed in the data.

The First Period: 10-15 May

During the first five days of the war, from 10 May to 16 May, the German plans went according to plan. Luxembourg gave up without a fight, the Dutch were almost beaten, and the invasion of the Belgium was proceeding as expected: after the fall of Eben Emael and contact with the Allied lines, the German forces made relatively slow progress as the French reached their planned positions in Belgium. Even in this feint, however, there were success—the Dyle Line was crossed on 15 May. 466 Meanwhile, starting on 13 May, Panzer units began crossing the Ardennes Forest, reaching the Meuse on 15 May. All of these actions conformed to the German plans. My prediction is that they should not lead to learning, because they should provoke contentment and with it the suppression of the mechanisms behind belief change.

The outcome is more complicated. It is clearly the case that neither Hitler nor anyone in the Germany military or political leadership reconsidered Germany’s approach to the war during this period of time. While this is consistent with the prediction, the emotional response does not seem to be fully congruent with the prediction of contentment. Indeed, according to reports, during this period both Hitler and the army leadership were tense and, indeed, anxious. 467 They carefully watched the movements of the French military and the paid close attention to reports from the field. Given that things went in the direction they had hoped, the

466 Umbret 1991, 286.
467 On 14 May, Hitler’s statement that “The course of the offensive thus far shows that the enemy has failed to recognize in them the basic idea of our operation” strongly suggests his close attention to, and concern with, these matters. Domarus 1997, 2003. Halder 1988, 142-6.
question of actual learning and belief change is not reached, but behaviorally and in terms of reported feelings it is clear that the leaders were in fact under the influence of anxiety.

This is response is contrary to my predicted emotional response. Not only was the affective response incorrectly predicted, but the one obtained was entirely opposite\(^{468}\) from my prediction. Nevertheless, there was no apparent reconsideration of the effort. My post hoc explanation for this is rooted in these leaders’ awareness of the riskiness of their plan.\(^{469}\) If the French did not respond as expected, if they were able to see through the feint and camouflaging efforts and rapidly respond to the German Blitzkrieg plan, the German plan could quickly bog down or even lead to serious military defeats.\(^{470}\) This seems to have had an important influence on the emotional response of the German leadership. While the Germans clearly believed their plan would work, the perception of riskiness entailed an explicit awareness that the outcome was uncertain and that could go awry.\(^{471}\) This perception of uncertainty would suggest that their pursuit of their plan, through the critical point of uncertainty, would have an unfamiliar character and thus elicit anxiety. In this case, the critical point of uncertainty was the point at which the German forces tried to cross the Meuse and break through the French defenses around Sedan.

*The Second Period: 16 May-30 May*

During this second, the German Panzer advance sped through Flanders. Meanwhile, never having been effectively fortified, lacking sufficient air power, and thrown into disarray by

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\(^{468}\) They are opposite in the sense that contentment is a response to the familiar positive stimulus while anxiety is the response to the novel negative stimulus. Moreover, they involve different brain systems, the disposition in the case of contentment and the surveillance system in the case of anxiety.

\(^{469}\) Though Hitler was confident of success, he was well aware of the riskiness of the plan. Domarus 1997, 1944.

\(^{470}\) Umbreit 1991, 281.

\(^{471}\) The Ardennes advance was particularly seen as flirtation with catastrophe, since if there were problems with the advance it risked a 100 mile long traffic jam in an exposed position. Martens 2001, 408.
the breakthrough to their south, the French forces north of the Panzer strike force were pushed back faster than expected. Even on 14 May Halder had noted that the situation had begin to develop in a “positively classic manner.” By 17 May, Halder wrote in his diary that, given the French failure to effectively respond, “we can turn our minds to continuing in a south-westerly direction.” William Shirer writes that “[German] success exceeded the fondest hopes of Hitler; his generals were confounded by the lighting rapidity and the extent of their own victories.” Hitler himself said “it is a miracle, a decided miracle!” Likewise, Guderian would recall that “the success of our attack struck me as almost a miracle.” Clearly, these events were perceived as unexpected good news, and should elicit joy.

By and large this prediction is supported by the data. Very quickly there was a sense of euphoria; Hitler and others are described as ‘elated’ on 18 May. By the end of the period, Hitler’s focus had changed from proximate events in France to the next stage in the wider conflict—the British. Put differently, he began to ignore the remaining possible problems in his conquest for France and began trying to send signals to the British. The most prominent and controversial of these signals were his orders to allow the bulk of the British force to escape at Dunkirk, to the consternation of his military commanders. Additionally, Hitler started to begin speculating about the terms he would impose on France. This ‘moving on’ from the conflict while his forces were still north of the Somme is suggestive of the operation of joy, in that he

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472 Halder 1988, 145
473 Halder 1988, 147.
474 Shirer 1960, 281.
475 May 2000, 414.
476 On 20 May, he is described as being ‘beside himself with joy.’ Domarus 1997, 2005. During these days, any pessimism that Hitler had quickly dissipated. Martens 2001, 405. Von Weiszacker described himself as “amazed” and “completely surprised.” (1951, 235)
477 Jodl wrote in his diary “A special memorandum is in the files containing the emotion-choked words of the Fuhrer when receiving the telephone report from the CIC of the Army about the capture of Abbeville.” Shirer 1960, 727-8.
disregarded remaining obstacles to goal achievement and even began to wonder about all that
he could get out of the war. It marks a clear change from the way he had been thinking about
the war. Earlier, he had been very focused on the possible problems and pitfalls that even small
moves might make; now, he was willing to take risks with his war in France in his ultimately
misguided effort to signal his friendliness to the British. But because the generals saw him
taking military risks that they did not want, they were frustrated with him. Clearly, he was
reconsidering his approach to the war.

That said there were also moments—particularly when the Panzers were speeding so
quickly to Abbeville—when Hitler’s attention was drawn back to the conflict and he apparently
exhibited anxiety. So far had they outpaced the infantry that he was afraid they might be
vulnerable. Indeed, he said “I am keeping my eye on this—the miracle on the Marne of 1914
will not be repeated.” Unlike his generals, he became very concerned about their south flank,
eventually calling a temporary halt.

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479 On 17 May, Halder recorded in his diary that Hitler was surprised by his own success. In his diary he
recorded “An unpleasant day. The Fuehrer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he is afraid
to take any chance and so would rather pull the reins on us.” The next day’s entry reads “The Fuehrer
unaccountably keeps worrying about the Southern flank. He rages and screams that we are on the best
way to ruin the whole campaign and that we are leading up to a defeat.” Halder 1988, 149. On 18 May,
Jodl wrote that it was a ‘day of tension—Hitler orders forces continuing west to stop.
480 Halder, in a letter to Shirer in 1957, stated that “To the dictator the rapid movement of the army,
whose risks and prospects of success he did not understand because of his lack of military schooling,
became almost sinister. He was constantly oppressed by a feeling of anxiety that a reversal loomed.”
Shirer 1960, 733. Given the descriptions of his elation, he was not constantly oppressed by anxiety.
Moreover, Simonnot states that when he gave the order to halt the forces, he was in ‘good humor.’
(1990, 129)
481 Shirer 1960, 727.
the Generals, his moments of anxiety also irritated them, for he made them slow their advances to guard against threats that they believed were implausible. 483

While the experience of joy which dominated the German leadership’s affective response conforms to my predictions, two further points of discussion are appropriate with respect to this case. First, Hitler’s periodic experience of anxiety as well as joy—while others experienced mostly joy—requires explanation. The best explanation may be rooted in individual differences in trait anxiety, which meant that Hitler’s threshold for the experience of anxiety may have been lower than that of others. Too much novelty, even in the context of generally good news, can take on a threatening character. Hitler’s response to this period of unexpectedly good news suggests that his perceptions were at some points near his threshold for perceiving threat, while others were not near theirs. 484

Second, the stimulant to joy seems somewhat less novel than in other cases where joy seems to influence leaders’ learning and behavior. 485 That it was experienced as unfamiliar by many (not just Hitler), and indeed, so strongly, may have something to do with the perceived riskiness of the plan at its outset. The effect of ex ante perceptions of riskiness evident in this case seems to be similar to when leaders have models of their own forces with negative or limiting elements, to make failures somewhat more familiar and good somewhat performance more novel. This made the effect of joy more pronounced—to the point that joy verged toward

483 Halder 1988, 172.
484 This is a not insignificant point. My argument for broadly applying emotion theory to explain when state leaders learn rests on the assumption that most leaders are in the normal range for affective responses most of the time. Individuals’ thresholds for emotional response can differ. This seems to clearly be the case in Hitler’s responses. However, the fact that it literally ‘takes a Hitler’ for individual differences to matter—and even then, the effects of those differences are marginal—suggests the general applicability of the theory without significant attention to individual differences. After all, most leaders are not Hitler, an extreme case of a psychologically pathological leader.
485 That is, the speed of the German advance, while beyond the expectations of its planners, is not as great as the events that elicited joy in Yamamoto in the Pearl Harbor case, or anxiety in Stalin.
anxiety at some points—and had negative events occurred, would probably have made them more frustrating than anxiety inducing.

The Third Period: 31 May-21 June

After the Panzer units at Abbeville were joined by the follow-on units of the German Army, the advance of the German troops became more predictable. First they faced the determined fight of the French forces along the Somme, an offensive which succeeded but which required a few days before the breakthrough occurred—in line with German expectations. Thereafter, the advance was quick but it was an anticipated speed: after the breakthrough on the Somme front, the French had no nearby defensive line and, as the German military leadership expected, they retreat very quickly wherever this was possible in an effort to disengage so that they would have a chance to establish a front. Elsewhere, advances were fast but the speed was expected, since these territories were effectively devoid of French or Allied soldiers. The only event that happened with unexpected speed was the fall of Verdun—and here the speed produced joy because of the place of Verdun in German memory rather than military expectation.

Hitler had ordered his staff to begin preparing a draft of armistice agreement five days before one was actually requested and he himself completed editing it just before the request was made. Arguably, then, the French request for an armistice occurred exactly when it was expected.

Accordingly, with the exception of Verdun, these events were largely familiar, and should have suppressed further learning by generating contentment. This seems to have happened. Goebbels’ diary entry of 16 June records his mental state:

486 Halder, normally extremely restrained in his recording of war successes, that day wrote “An important day in military history. Verdun, scene of the heroic struggle in World War I, is in our hands.” (1988, 205)
The Fuhrer calls up: quite delighted and excited. He wants no talk of peace at the moment. First the French must go down on their knees. This will happen in 4-6 weeks time. Then we shall see what England intends to do. She will not be able to do much, in any case. First strike the sword out of her hand. Huge new military successes are around the corner. The Fuhrer describes them to me in detail. He has been studying the ceremony of the armistice and the Versailles peace very closely. It is to be our model. 487

Hitler was overtly happy—as the famous picture of Hitler when told of the French capitulation also demonstrates. This happiness, this sense of triumph, was also evident at the ceremony at Compiegne. William Shirer, present in his capacity as a war correspondent for CBS radio, describes him:

“I observed his face. It was grave, solemn, yet brimming with revenge. There was also in it, as in his springy step, a note of the triumphant conqueror, the defier of the world. There was something else...a sort of scornful, inner joy at being present at this great reversal of fate—a reversal he himself had wrought. [in response to reading the plaque commemorating the end of WWI] I look for the expression on H’s face. I am but 50 yards from him and see him through my glasses as though he were directly in front of me. I have seen that face many times at the great moments of his life. But today! It is afire with score, anger, hate, revenge, triumph. He steps off the monument and contrives to make even this gesture a masterpiece of contempt. He glances back at it, contemptuous, angry—angry, you almost feel, because he cannot wipe out the awful, provoking lettering with one sweep of his high Prussian boot. He glances slowly around the clearing, and now, as his eyes meet ours, you grasp the depth of his hatred. But there is triumph there too-revengeful, triumphant hate. Suddenly, as though his face were not quite giving complete expression to his feelings, he throws his whole body into harmony with his mood. 488

In his rejoicing and in his triumph, however, Hitler retained the approach to the war he acquired during the rush to Abbeville. In practice this meant that he retained his focus on the English responses to the war and resisted efforts to expand Germany’s takings in France beyond what he had settled upon during the preceding weeks.

488 Shirer 1960, 742. Another evidence of his contentment is the fact that Halder does not complain about him between the end of May and 20 June, except for when Halder and the other generals want to go beyond their original plans. Halder 1988, 184-209.
This is evident in his behavior with regard to the formulation of the armistice. Both the Army and Armed Forces high commands submitted drafts of the Armistice that involved substantially larger zones of occupation than had been proposed earlier. Despite the ease of gaining this territory, Hitler refused to budge on his earlier plans and in his personally edited the final draft such that the reduced the zones of occupation back to what he had proposed.\textsuperscript{489} Arguably, we see him resisting a reconsideration of his aims. This resistance to new information and exceptionally risk averse approach to settling this part of the war is also evident in other decisions about the French armistice. Accordingly, the French Fleet was not demanded. Self-disarmament, rather than surrender, of the remains of the French air force was conceded upon request. Had either of these been sought they would likely complicated the process of winding down the war with France, and perhaps made the English feel more threatened. Despite the capture of Paris and Verdun, Hitler’s acquisitiveness was kept in check during these weeks—something which had not been true just weeks before, and something which would not prove to be the case at several critical points in the coming years.\textsuperscript{490} This is strong evidence that these pieces of good news did not stimulate a reconsideration of any part of his approach to the war, be it aims or strategy.

Hitler was quite clearly happy during these days. This is evident in numerous accounts, including those of Halder, Jodl, and Goebbels.\textsuperscript{491} It is also evident in the pictures taken during these days, be it the photograph of Hitler when the notice of surrender reached him or the

\textsuperscript{489} Umbreit 1991, 313-4.
\textsuperscript{490} His caution and constraint ‘astounded’ Mussolini. Domarus 1997, 2012-3.
\textsuperscript{491} On 25 June, Goebbels describes him as ‘boisterous.’ (123) Pictures from around this date suggest he was relaxed, confident, and happy. Domarus 1997, 2036.
pictures of him touring Paris in the early hours of 17 June.\textsuperscript{492} This reported emotion is consistent with the prediction made.

The German experience of the war can be usefully divided into three coherent phases, 10-15 May, 16-30 May, and 31 May-21 June. In each of these phases, the series of events is such that I am able to make clear predictions about the emotional response of the German leadership. In one of the three cases—the last—the evidence clearly converges with my predictions. In another—16-30 May, the evidence is largely congruent with my expectations, though Hitler’s individual differences provide for some marginally divergent behavior. In one case, 10-15 May, the overall prediction—no learning—is correct, but the evidence for the emotional mechanism is contrary to expectations. As noted above, believe that this result was the product of suspense naturally associated with a plan that is perceived as risky.

IV. Changes in War Aims and Policy During the Battle of France

This section of the paper examines the changes in aims that occurred between 10 May and 22 June. The examination of these changes in aims is more difficult than was true in some of the other cases, however. There are two reasons for this. First, tracing changes in the French aims is complicated by the breadth of views in the Cabinet, and the fact that there was never a clear, collective agreement about what they were. Stating aims would have required a coalition, but this coalition was never fully manifested. Second, the German leadership never fully spelled out their war aims. Even the armistice failed to clarify their terms, because Hitler explicitly

\textsuperscript{492} Domarus 1997, 2012-2. However, at least one well remembered image of Hitler’s glee at the French surrender—during his walk to the Compiègne railway car—may not have happened. According to Lukacs, the film of him doing a jig on his way into the cart may have been the product of manipulation.
stated that the terms of the armistice did not prejudice the terms of the eventual treaty, with only one exception (the possession of the fleet).

This section proceeds by first testing the predictions about how theories of victory change with respect to the key individuals involved. Four cases are examined, three from the French experience and one from the German experience. The first French case examines the changes in aims that Baudouin, Villelume, and Bouthillier believed should be pursued. Their change in aims was the obviated by the abandonment of an informative theory of victory under the influence of anxiety, and largely occurred during the week after the breakthrough took place. The second case examines the change in aims experienced by Paul Reynaud during the same time: he also abandoned an informative theory of victory, but under the influence of frustration rather than anxiety. The last French case is again Reynaud, as he rejects his attritive theory of victory under the influence of frustration. The German case, temporally located during the two weeks after 16 May, involves the falsification of a brute force theory of victory under the influence of joy.

Several important actors are not included in these cases. In two possible important cases—Gamelin and Daladier—it is because they never articulated further theories of victory; indeed, in the case of Gamelin, he was fired before he was given the chance to do so. Another important possible case, that of Weygand, is not included because while he several days, he never found a theory of victory. Likewise, Petain never had a theory of victory, and so no possible case exists there, either.

The section closes with a discussion of how beliefs were translated into policy. This discussion includes two components: one focusing on the different perceptual coalitions that produced French policy, and then a more general discussion of the nature of the armistice.
A. **Changes In Aims**

*Case 1: France (16-26 May) Baudouin, Bouthillier, and Villelume*

From 10 May, Baudouin, Bouthillier, and probably Villelume pursued informative theories of victory. Each abandoned their theory of victory during the next two weeks, and give the discussion above, appear to have done so under the influence of anxiety. This being the case, the relevant hypothesis is that they will either dramatically decrease their war aims in an effort to flee from the war or come to favor a larger mobilization with minimal changes in war aims. Given that we know that they started the conflict with strong doubts about the ability of France to fight a long war, the former is more likely.

This is what actually occurred. Baudouin and Bouthillier, advocates of better and more aggressive prosecution of the war abandoned their beliefs that a short war that would convince the Germans to back down was possible by 25 May. Likewise, Villelume, the concerned defeatist who was willing to concede Poland but not France, likewise rejected any idea that there could be a short war. None of them believed that further mobilization was a serious option: it would take too long, and it was undesirable, even risky, from the perspective of French domestic politics. Given these conditions, they sought to get France out the war immediately. To do so they were willing to make significant concessions. The lengths to which they were willing to go are evident in Villelume’s statement that France needed to get out while it still had something of an army of some sort, to use as a bargaining chip.\(^{493}\) But this meant getting out of the war quickly—before the army was crushed, as they believed it would within a 

\(^{493}\) Villelume 1969, 352.
week once the fighting in the Somme and Aisne valleys began in earnest. To facilitate this, he and the others—Baudouin and Bouthillier, along with a cast of players with less central roles, including Chautemps, Leca, and the Helene, Madame des Portes—were now willing to make significant concessions to Germany. Indeed, they were so interested in exiting the war quickly that they were also willing to make territorial concessions in Europe and North Africa to Italy, should Mussolini prove willing to help them settle the war. Were they unable to exit the war quickly—with or without Mussolini’s help. Leastwise, they feared a “catastrophic” imposed settlement. This clearly suggests a rapid reduction in war aims, exactly what is predicted when an informative theory of victory is abandoned under the influence of anxiety. Indeed, from point, none of the members of this group convincingly articulated minimal war aims, if they even had them.

Case 2, Reynaud

Like Baudouin and Bouthillier, Reynaud pursued an informative theory of victory prior to the breakthrough on the Meuse. Like them, he had experienced concerns about France’s ability to pursue a long war without economic or political turmoil. Unlike Baudouin and Bouthillier, his rejection of his theory of victory was experienced under the influence of frustration—a frustration that seems to have emerged from his far greater tendency to blame Gamelin for breakthrough, rather than German cunning, might, or skill. Because frustration does not make what leaders had believed to be impossible suddenly possible, falsification is still possible. In

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494 Petain had long been close to the Italophile Laval, who was then actively promoting some sort of arrangement with Mussolini to resolve the war.
this case, any decrease in war aims should be small if it exists at all, and changes in the theory of victory should similarly be as small as possible.

Given the radically new circumstances of the war starting on 16 May, maintaining a belief in victory (as he did) required formulating a new theory of victory. The theory of victory crafted under frustration involved no decrease in war aims, though it necessarily came to involve a belief in a longer war. To fight this longer war, Reynaud became a partisan of the Weygand Line; indeed, he seems to have become more of a believer in this unlikely line that its namesake. He also scoured the landscape for more resources to put into the fight—pleading for more from the UK and the US, trying where possible to increase the level of mobilization within France itself. Given that the French Army and its reserves had been called out since September it may seem odd to suggest that the country war not fully mobilized. However, there remained recruiting classes that could yet be called up, economic sacrifices yet un-demanded, and a great many civilian supplies yet un-diverted to military purposes. France had certainly not mobilized to the extent it had in 1918, to the extent that Britain would reach within a year, nor even to the extent that America would mobilize its economy by late 1943. Thus, there clearly remained room to seek further sacrifice from the French people. Indeed, if one believes Marc Bloch, one of the problems of the drôle du guerre and then the six weeks of fighting was the failure to ask enough of the civilian population.

Reynaud’s new theory of victory, then, was an attritive theory of victory. This is a non-trivial change in kind of theory, to a kind of war he had been wary of before. Indeed, it is almost a more substantial change than I would expect a leader to change to under the influence of

495 It was certainly far from the level of national commitment experienced by the Japanese in 1945, or even the Finns in the Winter War.
496 Bloch, of course, is the author of the famous memoir and indictment Étrange Défaite.
frustration—indeed, a change from an informative theory of victory to an attritive theory of victory is more likely under the influence of anxiety. That said, two key things speak to the correctness of both the prediction and the mechanism. First, despite a change from an informative theory of victory to an attritive theory of victory, the ‘hardest man in the cabinet’ did not change his war aims. This is clearly consistent with the main prediction about changes in aims. Second, though he changed kinds of theory of victory, the change he made was in fact the minimal change: as the men who ran France were trying to feel out a way ahead, this was the only reasonable path offered them by their military experts.

Case 3, Reynaud (9-16 June)

After hard fighting led only to breaches in the Weygand line, first on the Aisne and then along the Somme, Paris was all but naked before the German advance. Lacking forces to defend Paris and most of the remaining country south of the Seine, Reynaud was again by circumstances to reconsider the path forward. Again he abandoned a theory of victory under the influence of frustration; this time, it was an attritive theory of victory. The prediction, then, should be minimal changes in aims. Minimal changes in the theory of victory should also be observed.

After maintaining control over Metropolitan France became apparently impossible, Reynaud’s remaining loyal staff members began investigating other options at his behest—first the Breton Redoubt, then guerilla warfare based in Southern France and the Central Massif while the Cabinet fled to North Africa. Sending the next two conscription classes to North Africa was also discussed. Each of these would be dependent on increased assistance from the UK and the US, assistance which Reynaud believed could be forthcoming. He utterly refused to lower
his war aims; even an evacuation of France would be no more than temporary. With each proposal, there was a clear effort (ultimately futile) to construct a new theory of victory that did not involve concessions. Reynaud never gave up, it seems. Rather, believing he lacked enough cabinet support—and opposed not only by the Generalissimo but le Marechal, a man who was not only an opponent but a political symbol with greater legitimacy on all sides than any of the cabinets formed in the preceding decade—he handed in his resignation.

Reynaud’s refusals to change aims throughout May and June are consistent with my predictions. Under the influence of frustration, minimal changes in aims are expected, as are minimal changes in theory of victory. So long as he could hang onto his position, he refused to countenance any decrease in war aims. The theories of victory he preferred were also attritive theories of victory. The Breton Redoubt, the most strongly advocated for and the most developed (De Gaulle, in his capacity as Under-secretary of War, even spent a valuable early June day in Brittany investigating the possibilities) involved the most similar vision of battle—the concentration of all remaining effective French units into a strong point. From this position they would await the turning of the tide and, with US and British help, eventually re-conquer France. Guerrilla warfare is an archetypical form of fighting associated with attritive theories of victory, since its success rests in wearying the enemy rather than destroying him. Sending conscripts to North Africa similarly fits into this model of a long war, the purpose of which would be to weary the German people beyond the point of further fighting.

Case 4, Hitler (16–26 May)

Investigating the German war aims for the battle of France is complicated by the fact that Hitler’s aims were never fully articulated. Hitler insisted that the terms of the armistice not
impinge on the terms of a future peace treaty, and made this insistence clear to the French with one exception: the French Fleet, he promised, would remain inviolate—if it remained disarmed and interned. Because they were held in reserve during these talks, the Germans never had to state what they would be, and they did not do so. This means that the armistice that ended the war was, despite its pages of terms, a fundamentally ambiguous document: the Germans and the French retained different views of the effects of the agreement. Given these ambiguities, my approach is to trace what the German leaders, and particularly Hitler, considered to be their war aims, rather than the (non-existent) communicated war aims. This case is, accordingly, different than the other two cases, since they involve more explicitly communicated war aims.

As the earlier section made clear, only during the middle phase of the war do the Germans appear to have reconsidered their war aims. This reconsideration involved a brute force theory of victory and proceeded under the influence of joy. Under these conditions an increase in war aims, if not inhibited by ceiling effects, is likely, as leaders’ review of the situation will tend to minimize obstacles and encourage speculation. Such a change may involve a new kind of theory of victory, but it may not. Hitler appears to have behaved in line with this expectation during this period of time.

498 Both the separation between armistice terms and peace terms and the unarticulated character of German war aims should trouble scholars using the bargaining framework to study war, given that it confuses if not severs the relationships between fighting and proposed settlement agreements. One way out of this might be to argue that this armistice was tantamount to unconditional surrender. This does not seem to have been the perception of the French signatories, however: leastwise, the discussion of the fleet would not have mattered.
499 This may be related to the fact that the Germans proposed to win the war through brute force. To the Germans, the French surrender seems to have been useful and gratifying, but not part of the fundamental political process of the war. The plan which Manstein felt would leave an incomplete victory would have yielded them precisely these territories.
At the outset of the war, Hitler’s principal stated aim was destroying the political and military power of France. Additionally, for the purpose of fighting the English he sought direct access to the Channel ports. His intentions of incorporating parts of metropolitan France into Germany were poorly articulated but the evidence suggests that he planned only limited annexations. Alsace-Lorraine, however, was to be taken immediately. Rather, it would remain something of a vassal state. During the second phase of the war, these seemed to grow somewhat, to include what would be termed the prohibited zone in the Armistice—a band of territory of between 70 and 150 miles wide south and west of the 1939 French border which he sought to take, as well as the creation of a separate Breton state in Brittany. He does not seem to have increased his aims beyond this point, neither during the last phase of the war as his troops raced southward across the open spaces and through the open cities of France nor after the armistice was signed. There was, of course, no need to change his vision of battle. Indeed, given the nature of the experience, it seems unlikely that either Hitler or his generals could have envisioned a better way of fighting than the one that fell into their laps, courtesy of Guderian and Manstein.

Thus, Hitler seems to have increased his war aims, if in perhaps limited ways. This is consistent with my prediction. Significantly for identifying the effect of joy, though the other periods of the war involved substantially good news, he did not reconsider his war aims during them. He even resisted suggestions that all of France be occupied—an act that would have certainly made further annexations more straightforward.

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500 Bergston 1962, 30; Weiszacker states that “in the long run, Hitler did not want to spare France.” Weiszacker, 236, 240.  
501 Bergston 1962, 63.  
B. From Beliefs to Policy

The French Coalitions

Throughout the period of the war there were not only terrific divisions over war policy, but more fundamental differences in the ways that French war leaders understood the nature of the conflict, the military, political, and moral capabilities of France, and the character of their German opponent. These differences in belief strongly influenced the evolution of these leaders’ perceptions of the war. Because the reactions of Gamelin, Reynaud, Villelume, Baudouin, Petain and others were so varied, policy cannot be derived by looking at any one individual’s reaction. Instead, policies rose and fell with coalitional shifts in the government. These coalitions were often motivated by different perceptions of the situation, and so they would collapse with the divergent evolution of these perceptions.

These shifting coalitions were dominated by a small group of actors—Reynaud, Daladier, Gamelin, Weygand, Petain, Darlan, Bouthillier and Baudouin. A supporting cast including Mandel, De Gaulle, Villelume, Lebrun, Chautemps, Marin, and others played periodically significant roles. The remainder of the cabinet and senior military and civilian staff shifted with the winds. Nevertheless, explaining the shifts in coalitions necessarily involves understanding the perceptions that underlay individuals’ allegiances and how the evolutions of those perceptions caused shifts in allegiance.

Because the following sections provide an explanation of why individuals pursued different courses, it is useful to identify the resulting coalitions and the policies they produced. At the outset of the war, the ruling coalition was clearly that of Daladier and Gamelin. However, their apparent failure to conduct the war with urgency and aggression led to their downfall. After
Finland made peace in mid-March, the Assembly withheld its confidence from Daladier. While many had anticipated that this would serve as a temporary rebuke, he chose to resign rather than reforming his government. Reynaud, who was more aligned with the majority of the Assembly in wanting quicker and more resolute action, moved from the Ministry of Finance to the Presidency of the Council. But Daladier remained a thorn and an obstacle by continuing as Minister of National Defense and War.

As the Norwegian campaign drew ignominiously to a close, Reynaud tried to use it as an opportunity to rid himself of Gamelin and likely Daladier as well. However, as his resignation came on 9 May, he withdrew it. He did, however, stock his cabinet with figures whom he hoped would inspire the nation better—Petain (now Vice-President of the Council) and Mandel (Minister of the Interior) most of all. For the next ten days he worked in uneasy alliance with Gamelin, until his frustration and fury brought him to replace him with Maxime Weygand. However, this cabinet and even those in his entourage—Villelume, Baudouin, and Bouthillier—did not provide stable support. Indeed, within two weeks, most of them were agitating for and to the war.

The policy that first seriously divided the government was the Somme plan. It was opposed by Petain, Villelume, and Baudouin in private but went ahead because Weygand and Reynaud supported it. Petain opposed it because he felt any waste of soldiers’ lives in a battle that could gain nothing was immoral, but Villelume and others opposed it because they believed that they while the army remained, they could negotiate ‘on the possibilities.’ Reynaud supported it because he believed it would help turn around the situation; Weygand seems to

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504 BDFA (III-F-12), 44, 66.
505 Villelume 1969, 352; Ferro 1987, 35.
have supported it as a means of salvaging the Army’s honor. Having completed the fight, Reynaud continued to search for a way ahead, but Gamelin, satisfied that he had vindicated the Army’s honor, began to apply pressure on the government to seek an armistice.

In its wake the terms of the debate changed. Now, Reynaud and advisors like De Gaulle sought to find new means of continuing the war despite France’s diminished state. But by 10 June, an increasingly strong coalition was opposing Reynaud. Petain, Chautemps, Weygand, Bouthillier, and Baudouin grew increasingly impatient with talk of a ‘Breton Redoubt’ or guerilla warfare, and even with talk of leaving France. Cabinet support for Reynaud quickly ebbed and flowed toward Petain. Even before Reynaud had formally resigned, he had lost control of the cabinet.506

The questions then focused on the nature of the armistice. Petain’s government approached it was several goals, and some expectation. The most important stated goal was to not hand over the Fleet. Petain, Darlan, and Weygand all agreed that this would be intolerable. Should the Germans have insisted, however, it is not clear what they would have done. Beyond this aim, they sought to maintain some semblance of state, looking forward to a post-occupation period. They also sought to avoid humiliations to the extent possible—they sought to be able disarm themselves and destroy their own warplanes rather than having to hand them over intact. These humiliations to be avoided did not extend to the Prisoners of War, however. Anticipating that Britain would soon cave, paving the way for a peace treaty, the

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506 Chautemps played an important role in this process. Through his participation, he brought both left and right (so far as they were represented in the cabinet) together in favor of armistice. He help expedite the move to requesting terms by arguing that merely asking after them did not commit France to accept them. Burrin 1996, 7; Junot 2007, 211-2, 222-3; Paul Reynaud, ACI1, 116; Jackson 2003, 137.
French government was content to allow the 1.5 million Frenchmen captured remain POWs until the conclusion of such a treaty.

A Few Important Words about the Armistice

The armistice signed by General Huntzinger in the famous saloon car in the Forest of Compiegne is often cast as the climactic resolution of the drama of the Battle of France. Yet despite its frequent portrayal, the meaning of that moment and the agreement signed there has an unresolved character in the literature about the war. Of particular importance, it renders ambiguous several theoretical and empirical points about the nature of the German theory of victory and war termination decisions. Accordingly, it demands particular attention and explanation.

Hitler’s direction to his staff to prepare an armistice agreement, made 16 June 1940, may suggest to some that he anticipated achieving his aims through agreement rather than brute force, and indeed ultimately did so through agreement rather than force. This misunderstands both the nature of the armistice and the nature of the decision to grant the armistice. The ‘Second Compiegne’ armistice of 1940, because it did not determine the outline of the eventual peace treaty, was fundamentally an administrative agreement rather than a political one. In exchange for the cessation of fighting—though not hostilities—the French

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508 Before the discussion of the armistice conditions, the German representatives formally refused to speak of conditions of peace. DDF1940, footnote 1, p. 96. In his statement prior conversations, Hitler declared that: “The conditions formulated by Germany look primarily to preventing the reprise of hostilities, second to offer Germany full security in her war against England... and to create in the third place the conditions necessary for the establishment of a new peace that will essentially repair the injustices done to Germany herself by force.” [My translation from the French] “Message du Chancelier Hitler a La Délegation Française...” DDF1940, 81-2.

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gave up most of their military capability.\textsuperscript{509} This froze the relative balance of power between the two sides. This was done to impede any effort by the French to improve their bargaining position prior to the signing of a peace treaty.\textsuperscript{510} In addition, the agreement temporarily determined the pattern of administration on French soil for the balance of the German war with England. This lowered the German costs of controlling French territory.

The armistice was useful for the Germans because it ‘locked in’ their advantages in France while they continued the war against the English in such a way that their ability to unilaterally impose the conditions of peace was unimpaired, if not strengthened. Accordingly, the armistice was a means of stabilizing what they had gained through brute force. Hitler’s refusal to disclose his peace terms—and the differences between the peace terms he considered and the armistice terms he simultaneously articulated—bear out this interpretation.

This was useful for France, in that it spared the French further pain\textsuperscript{511}—though arguably several Vichy leaders had illusions of what would be possible under its terms. Hence Petain and others spoke of ‘national regeneration’ in the wake of the defeat. Against the urgings of Reynaud, Petain and others believed that this defeat, like its predecessor in 1871, was a mere change in fortune, one that France would eventually be able to recover from.\textsuperscript{512}

\textsuperscript{509} Most of their war materiel was to be surrendered, stored, or destroyed. Umbreit 1991, 315.
\textsuperscript{510} The effect of this, in terms of the bargaining process, was the avoidance of a commitment problem. Had the French been able to use the time of occupation to grow stronger than they were on the day of the armistice, they would have been able to drive a better bargain for themselves vis-à-vis their conquerors at the bargaining table. By limiting French strength, they were able to maintain their freedom of action.
\textsuperscript{511} That is, it kept France from being, as Petain described the alternative, ‘another Poland.’ Petain, \textit{ACI}, 172. Ending the suffering of the French was clearly of great importance to him. Ferro 1987, 58-9. Additionally, this armistice made certain, through the existence of a 100,000 man French army, that the Communists could not take the country in an effort to stage another Commune. Vidal 2001, 358; Jackson 2003, 104.
\textsuperscript{512} In a diplomatic circular on 17 June, Baudouin stated that while the government had sought an armistice, it also ‘desired to search for a durable peace between the two countries.’ Moreover, the
There is also the question of the French fleet. Though it is impossible to say whether or not he would have remained faithful to his threat, Petain described continued possession of the fleet as a red line in his instructions to Huntzinger. For Darlan, it was a matter of honor: he insisted that he would lead the fleet in sailing west if the German demand was made. France would not sign the armistice if it meant surrendering the fleet to Germany. The Germans did not call the bluff: Hitler’s draft armistice did not demand the surrender of the French fleet. Instead, he demanded its neutralization. It was to be disarmed and effectively interned in Vichy’s own harbors. Allowing France to keep its fleet has been mistakenly interpreted as a significant concession by the Germans to the French. This mistake arises because the armistice is treated as an allocative agreement rather than one whose main purpose was freezing the military balance between the belligerents until an as-yet-unarticulated allocative agreement was put in place. In this context, a neutralized fleet did not meaningfully augment French power. So great was the power disparity, moreover, that the addition of those ships to the German listing would not have had a material affect in future bargaining with the French. The only sense in which this was a concession to France was as a trivial concession to French military sentiment, to the pride of Petain and Darlan. It was easy for Hitler to make.

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513 I do not believe he would have. After all, in his 17 June radio address “try to cease fighting”—words that had predictably spurred most of the routs that occurred, and cause many thousands of other French soldiers to allow themselves to be taken prisoner. Jackson 2003, 143. Once those words were said, they could not be taken back.

514 See particularly Slantchev 2003, but also historical discussions of the armistice as ‘generous,’ like Shirer (1960, 744-5).

515 In this sense, the actual outcome was not far from what Hitler told Mussolini would be the best outcome—the Fleet scuttling itself. Quoted in DeWailly 2000, 310.

516 It could be argued that by doing so, he was foregoing an advantage against the British—and indeed, was forced to by Petain. This argument ignores both Petain’s antipathy toward the British at this point
V. General Discussion and Conclusions

A. Discussion

Recovering Theories of Victory

The theories of victory of leaders on both sides were straightforwardly recoverable, though, significantly, some key figures in the struggle lacked a theory of victory. Coding the theories of victory for both the French and the Germans was straightforward. The only exception to this occurred on the French side after 5 June, when the situation developed such that assembling a theory of victory required a great deal of imagination. Even then, coding the theories of victory articulated by those who ‘still believed’ was straightforward. This is congruent with the intuitions of my approach.

One of the more striking findings in this case is the fluidity of the states’ dominant theories of victory, a fluidity which seemed greatest before the fighting actually started in earnest. Hitler and his generals began the ‘Phony War’ with an attritive theory of victory, but then changed to an informative theory of victory before invading France. On the French side, in September 1939 the political and military leadership were united by an attritive theory of victory. But the vicissitudes of French parliamentary and civil-military politics were such that by March 1940 a new Premier was more interested in an informative theory of victory, and after the first week of fighting, the Supreme Commander was replaced with one who lacked a clear

and Hitler’s earlier decision to forego a military advantage against the British by allowing the bulk of the British army to disembark at Dunkirk in hopes of indicating his desire to avoid a long war with them. Burrin 1996, 9-11. As an example of Petain’s feelings about the British during this period, note that he told US Ambassador Bullitt on 4 June that “England would permit the French to fight without help until the last available drop of French blood should have been shed...[and] the British after a very brief resistance or even without resistance would make a peace of compromise with Hitler, which might even involve...a British fascist leader.” FRUS 1940 (1), 239.

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theory of victory. The fractious character of French politics was also such that several major figures who came to yield great influence in war-time decision-making—Petain being but one of them—lacked a theory of victory. They believed that entering the war had been a mistake.

Framing Effects

For the purpose of testing the hypotheses about the framing effects of the theories of victory, three cases were crafted. The first case examined French responses during the first two weeks of the war. It contrasted the responses to two groups, pursuing different theories of victory: Gamelin and Daladier, who adhered to an attritive theory of victory, and Reynaud, Baudouin, et al., who pursued an informative theory of victory. As predicted, Gamelin (particularly) and Daladier (to a lesser extent) focused on the effects of the war in breaking the defense line. Reynaud the others seem to have focused more on what this said about the power and capability of the French Army, and their ability to retain the most important ground in France—Paris. Thus the finding is generally congruent with my predictions. However, the overall response to events was the same, so bad was the event. In the second case, Reynaud continued—now almost alone—to pursue an attritive theory of victory. He continued to focus on factors—the ability of the Weygand Line to hold, the prospects of help from abroad, the possibility of guerrilla warfare, a Breton Redoubt, and continuing in North Africa—that would allow France to continue fighting the long war he now anticipated. This is consistent with my prediction. The last case, that of Hitler and his Generals, is a case of leaders pursuing a brute force theory of victory. As was predicted, their focus was on their ability to execute their strategy rather than on its effects on the French polity. Interestingly, this contrasted with Hitler’s intense focus on how the war affected the British politicians of the period—a contrast that suggests strongly the framing effects of the different kinds of theories of victory.
These cases were particularly interesting for their nuances. In the first case, the evidence suggests that some events are so negative that regardless of the frame that an individual is using, they will see it in similar ways. This suggests, more generally, that there may be upper-bound limits on the framing effects. The second French case is interesting for the fact that there were many members of the decision-making group without an active theory of victory. Their responses to events, then—treating them as individual acts without a clear relationship to one another—shows the difference that having a theory of victory makes. In the absence of such a theory, wartime events are not perceived in consistent ways and lack a clear relationship to political approach to a war. In the German case, the imperfection of my predictions about German behavior—their unexpected focus on things that the French might do or be unable to do—does not so much contradict my hypotheses as add a further nuance to what leaders might be attentive to during a brute force theory of victory.

**Emotional Response**

The conflict provides seven cases for testing emotional response and its effect on the likelihood of learning. During the first two weeks of the war, the constellation of French leaders provides three cases: Gamelin, Reynaud, and the group consisting of Villelume, Baudouin, and Bouthilier. During the second phase of the war, Reynaud, the only major French leader with an operative theory of victory, is the only case of interest. There are then three German cases, each focused on Hitler, comprised of three series of events—the first six days, the period 16 May-31 May, and June 1940. The chart below summarizes the predictions and findings of these cases.
At first blush, the results may not seem all that impressive. In two cases it was not possible to make a single clear prediction. In another, the predicted emotional response was not evident. In two cases where frustration was observed, there still existed an effort to alter the theory of victory. Upon further consideration, however, things do not look so bad. The two cases where a prediction could not be made had that character because of the complexity of the individuals beliefs at that point. Once an affective response was observed, the behavior was largely as might be expected. In the cases where an effort to restructure a TOV was made despite the influence of frustration, the profess bore the hallmarks of frustration. Moreover, two key beliefs—that the war could be won and that no change in aims was necessary—were conserved. The reconsideration itself was triggered by sudden deficits in capability—the old plan was rendered overtly impossible. In the Hitler (2) case, the periodic appearance of anxiety is largely explicable in the terms of the theoretical perspective herein expressed, in that too
much success made Hitler began to take on an extremely unfamiliar character, and for a man with high trait anxiety, this is likely to elicit bouts of anxiety more generally. The unexpected appearance of anxiety in the first Hitler case is something else entirely: it suggests that the perception of risk—that something is risky—can provoke anxiety until what seems to be the crucial turning point is reached. Notably, this triggering of anxiety requires the overt recognition that a course of action involves serious risks. That an objective observer might detect risks and uncertainty in a course of action appears insufficient. In sum, though the results are far from straightforward, they generally corroborate the theory and, in their failings, add additional insight.

Changes in Aims

As noted above, there four cases with changes in war aims, which are summarized in the table below.

Table 3: Changes in Aims, Battle of France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>TOV Falsified/Affective Condition</th>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>Change in Aims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reynaud, May 1940</td>
<td>Informative/Frustration</td>
<td>Little or No Change, unless can not mobilize</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baudouin et al., May 1940</td>
<td>Informative/Anxiety</td>
<td>Big Decrease OR Mobilize</td>
<td>No apparent minimum aims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynaud, June 1940</td>
<td>Attritive/Frustration</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitler, May 1940</td>
<td>Brute Force/Joy</td>
<td>Some increase possible</td>
<td>Small increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The predictions were largely upheld. The only finding of particular interest is the first one, which involves the falsification of an informative theory of victory under conditions of frustration. This finding provides a small bit of evidence for the claim that the affective state
may actually predominate over the logic of the theory of victory, or at least bias the outcomes such that, of the two predicted possible outcomes, mobilization and attrition are the courses that will be followed.

A. Further Conclusions

The studies in this chapter are generally suggestive of the validity of the theoretical intuitions expressed in the earlier chapters. Beyond the explicit theory, four important points about the study of war and learning emerge from this chapter. The first is the role that disparate beliefs play in shaping and reshaping the coalitions necessary for pursuing policy in a democratic state. In the French case, people with different beliefs were often able to accept, if not always advocate for, the same policies. However, the force of events often broke up these coalitions by inducing different patterns of emotional response and belief change. To Reynaud, shocked and deeply frustrated by the German breakthrough on Sedan, Gamelin’s imperturbability was a response to crisis that further infuriated rather than calmed. Their ability to work together ended that day. But it was no less the case that as Reynaud experienced frustration, his former collaborators—Baudouin, Villelume, Bouthilier, even his mistress the Madame des Portes—experienced the anxiety that would lead them to conclude there was no way forward and thus break up their working relationship. Soon, they would be working with Petain, defeatist from the autumn at very least, rather than Reynaud, who still sought a more aggressive pursuit of the war.

The second is the utility of the brute force theory of victory for understanding the 1940 armistice, and thus at least some class of war terminations. Despite the fact that Hitler himself said that the armistice was a hostilities ending agreement rather than a war-ending agreement, it has often been looked at by social scientists in those terms. In trying to see every war
termination as the product of bargaining and agreement, theorists of war risk misunderstanding some of the political processes of war termination.

The third and fourth points that emerge from this chapter relate to the psychology of emotion and learning. The experience of Hitler and his generals suggest two important additional findings. First, while individual differences (most likely with respect to varying levels of trait anxiety) can cause the elicitation of anxiety at lower levels of uncertainty and threat, these individual differences seem to be relatively rare. In the second stage of the war, Hitler’s joy sometimes bled into anxiety. This was not true of his generals, who were often annoyed with the effects of that anxiety. This makes clear the existence of individual differences with respect to the elicitation of anxiety. However, if Hitler is the exception, the exception proves the more general rule. If it ‘takes Hitler,’ an overtly psychologically abnormal man, to have a moderately different affective response, this response should be relatively rare in the population. That is to say, the differences must be substantially abnormal, even pathological, before they seem to have an appreciate effect on situational affective response. This suggests a fairly broad generalizability for the effects described by my theory.

The last additional finding is perhaps the most interesting—the role of risk on emotional perception. During the first phase of the war, despite the positive unrolling of their vision of battle, Hitler and his generals remained anxious until the Meuse had been successfully crossed. Thereafter, relatively less than fully novel positive news led to a relatively strong joy response. These two findings suggest that risk may have two interesting effects on emotional response. In defining a situation as risky, individuals (and groups) are likely to identify a critical point in the development of their strategy for navigating a situation. Ex ante, they recognize that at that critical point, elements of the situation are uncertain, that there is risk present, and that
depending on its outcome—and outcome they cannot fully control—their strategy may collapse or continue on to likely success. Their model of the situation, then, involves a model of explicit uncertainty and threat until that point is reached. Until that point is successfully navigated, then, they will remain anxious and alert to the indicators in their environment. Thereafter, there may be an *ex post* effect of riskiness. Having recognized that things could have collapsed and ended badly for them, the recognition of a risk mastered may increasing the intensity of successes, mitigating that of failure. This could lead to the elicitation of joy in a situation that would otherwise have provoke contentment—with all the down stream effects of experiencing joy rather than contentment. This idea merits further study.
Japan’s experience in the Pacific War presents an interesting test for my theory. The Japanese had more theories of victory, and more dissention about the nature of their theory of victory, than is evident in any of the other war initiator cases. The largely naval character of the war is also significant. It forces a deeper analysis of the purpose of the battles and the nature of defense than traditional continental warfare does. The continuous decline in material power experienced by the Japanese is also important for the study, since it forces a further analysis of the relationship between the changes in material resources and the changes in theories of victory. While these particular elements of the case sometimes diverge from the specific predictions I make, they also provide strong evidence for the underlying logic of the theory.

The case is also important because it clarifies how different theories of victory provoke very different responses to the progress of a war. This is particularly true of the relationships between the Army, the Navy, and the Imperial Court. Though it has long been described as merely stubborn or at even fanatical, the Japanese Army’s responses to the progress of the war were in fact highly predictable given their beliefs about the war. The same is true of both the Navy and the Imperial Court, who were much more dovish at the beginning and the end of the war, though not always during it. Beyond its relationship to this study, my analysis of the case provides new insight into the Japanese decision-process and the degree to which different individuals and institutions changed their perspectives throughout the course of the war.
Figure 3: Map 5.1: The Pacific Conflict.  
Courtesy Department of History, USMA
The Dispute

The dispute between the US and Japan grew out of the changing power dynamics in East Asia during the 1930’s and the desire of each to play a strong hand in China.\(^{517}\) During the 1920’s, the US had been happy with the existing status quo in the Western Pacific and East Asia. Deep commercial involvement in China continued under the Open Door policy, and order was maintained primarily by British forces in South East Asia and Hong Kong and secondarily by US forces stationed at Hawaii and other possessions in the South West Pacific. Through the 1930’s, Japan was seen as a junior partner in this order. While the Japanese seizure of Manchuria was seen as undesirable, and caused some American leaders to view Japan as aggressive, it did not fundamentally change the existing Anglo-American order in Asia and the Pacific.

Much of the leadership in Japan, however, did not accept this regime, and believed that the status quo no longer reflected the underlying power relationships.\(^ {518}\) Their challenge became more pointed with the China Incident (1937), the ultimate aim of which was Japanese economic dominance over China—which would negatively affect American and British interests there. However, the Japanese were unable to bring the war with China to a satisfactory close, despite strong of political and military efforts. Tokyo came to believe that its persistence was largely the product of US, and to a lesser degree British, support for Nationalist China. The looming threats of a US petroleum embargo and the growth of the Pacific Fleet further created

\(^{517}\) Gordon 2006.

\(^{518}\) Komatsu 1999, 99-159; Gordon 2006.
pressure on them, and when it became a reality, they came to the conclusion that maintaining their challenge to the US-Anglo order in Asia would require a self-sustaining resource base.\textsuperscript{519}

Direct negotiations between US and Japan began once the embargo was announced. During these negotiations, the US position was made clear through what became known as the ‘Hull Principles.’ In short, these principles required that Japan give up all territories gained by what the US termed aggression before the US would end the embargo. This would have required not only that Japan leave China with the Open Door intact, but that she also give up Manchuria, which Japan had not only ruled through a Puppet regime since 1931 and where it had build a substantial industrial base.\textsuperscript{520} In essence, the US demanded that Japan accept to the American regime in Asia and the Pacific.\textsuperscript{521}

Believing in its power, the Japanese leadership believed that these demands were illegitimate and could not be enforced against Japan without great costs—costs they doubted the US was willing to pay. Doing nothing was not seen as a viable option by very many, because the effects of a US embargo would cause the Japanese military machine and industrial base to grind to a halt within two to three years. The choice confronting the Japanese, then, was stark: they could either accept US demands and shrink their ambitions and their possessions to a degree they believed inconsistent with their power, or they could build their power to the point

\textsuperscript{519} Tarling 2001, 49-50. Worth 1995. They explored other alternatives, including arrangements with South American countries, but those states largely followed the US lead and imposed embargoes on Japan; Worth 1995, 90.

\textsuperscript{520} Gordon 2006. At a meeting of the Liaison Conference after the Hull Note had been delivered, a foreign policy advisor stated that in “the present world, divided into those who are for the maintenance of the status quo and those who are for its destruction, and democracies and the totalitarian states, is in the midst of a war. Hulls reply is for the status quo and the democracies...I think the countries that are for the status quo are getting ready to put pressure on Japan. Quoted in Ike 1967, 94.

\textsuperscript{521} Certainly this was the Japanese belief; signals intelligence had in fact played an important role in their joining the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy by revealing what they believed to be American efforts to wage a diplomatic war against them. Kotami 2005.
that the US would accept their faits accompli and return to normal trade. Doing so required further resources, and particularly petroleum, since secure access to petroleum would eliminate their vulnerability to an American embargo. They perceived two directions they could go to obtain these resources: ‘North’—against the Soviet Union—and ‘South’, against the colonial powers in south-east Asia and Indonesia. After faring poorly against Soviet ground forces in the Nomohlan Incident (1939), Japanese opinion gradually came to favor the southern option.

‘Going South’ meant pursuing the resources found in the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), British Malaya, French Indochina, and Thailand. The prospect that the southern move would succeed only grew during 1940 and 1941, as the French and Dutch metropoles fell and Britain was strained by its contest with Germany. Securing these bases required taking the Philippines, as well, however, because otherwise the US could menace their control over their new resources with air, naval, and amphibious forces. Thus, the choice was one of accepting an increasingly US-centered hegemony in the Pacific and giving up both the gains of a decades fighting and their ambitions for the future, or fighting the Americans in the short term for the means to mount a long-term challenge to their hegemony in the Pacific.

American decision-makers clearly understood that this was the nature of the Japanese challenge. This is evident in their apparent willingness to fight to check the Japanese if they went after the Netherlands East Indies. The outbreak of the war, then, was not only a response

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522 Tojo, for instance, described this as “national suicide,” the reduction of Japan to a ‘third-rate power.’ Kawamura 73-75. Foreign Minister Matsuoka believed that “our Empire is confronted with a literally unprecedented danger.” Ike 1967, 83. Admiral Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, stated in the Imperial Conference of 6 September that “if there is no war, the fate of the nation is sealed. Even if there is war, the country may be ruined. Nevertheless, a nation which does not fight in this plight has lost its spirit and is already a doomed country.” Quoted in Tarling 2001, 76.

523 Ike 1967, 76.

524 Comments of Sugiyama in Liaison Conference of 2 July. Ike 1967, 89.

525 In this sense, the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere was intended as an anti-Western regime. Iriye 1987, 164.

526 Komatsu 1999, 145-68.
to efforts to take US territory, rather its fundamental cause was the Japanese drive to challenge US dominance over the Pacific. That there were attacks on US territories was incidental at best, and does not reflect the real prize over which the war was fought, though it permeates the rhetoric of the conflict.

Clearly, the war was a dispute between the US and Japan rather than an accident of Japan’s Chinese policy, miscommunication, or the product of domestic log-rolling. While they believed that it could bring an end to the Chinese conflict, their grand strategy was ultimately focused on a challenge to the US over the nature of the political-economic order in Asia and the Western Pacific.\(^{527}\) Given that the US would not accept the order the Japanese proposed, a deeply political dispute existed between the two countries. During the autumn of 1941, Japan’s leadership chose to resolve it with war.

The process by which they chose war reflected many of the weakness of the Japanese political system. Rather than a cohesive decision-making unit, Japanese decision-making depended on informal consensuses among many feuding actors—the Army, the Navy, the Emperor and his court, the cabinet, and the senior statesmen—ratified through ritual.\(^{528}\) As is predictable in a situation with vague institutions and so many veto players, decisions were difficult to reach and generally only arrived at after much negotiation and intrigue. The need for consensus also affected both the way views were expressed and the communication of them. Differences were often glossed over, and ‘decision’ memoranda often presented multiple contradictory views without expressing any real decision at all.\(^{529}\) Underlying all was the fear of

\(^{527}\) Indeed, they themselves recognized that the South-East Asia fight was relatively insignificant. Ford 2007.

\(^{528}\) Wilmott 1983, 35-6.

assassination by radicalized junior army officers—a phenomenon repeated several times during the 1930’s. Among these actors, the Army was clearly the most powerful, but in certain circumstances the collective political and symbolic effort of the other actors could delay or veto Army proposals.\textsuperscript{530}

The Initial Japanese Theory of Victory

How the Japanese Approached the War

It is often said that the Japanese went to war irrationally, having little idea how they would win their war with the US.\textsuperscript{531} Even some of the participants themselves confessed to this after the war. Iklè has even used these comments to argue that many leaders who take their country into war have little idea how they will win.\textsuperscript{532} Snyder made the apparent irrationality of the Japanese strategy and aims the central evidence for his arguments about the pernicious combination of domestic political log-rolling and blowback.\textsuperscript{533} There is some basis for these arguments in the record: it is clearly the case that there were doubts and dissention among the Japanese leadership over the desirability of a fight with the Americans and how the war should be fought, and whether and why there was hope for a successful outcome. Superficially, these facts may seem to run counter to my expectations for the existence of a theory of victory. However, the complexity of the views of the many Japanese leaders and decision-makers should not disguise the fact that there was nevertheless a common idea about the general direction of the war among those who decided for it and managed it.

\textsuperscript{531} Gordon 2006.
\textsuperscript{532} Ikle 1973.
\textsuperscript{533} Snyder 1991.
The outlines of the war plan predated the First World War.\textsuperscript{534} It would have two phases. During the first phase, the Japanese Navy and Army would seize the territories with the resources they found key to their effort—particularly Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies—and move into the Philippines, Singapore, Burma and other Western Pacific Islands necessary to protect their richest prizes from Western re-conquest.\textsuperscript{535} This phase was expected to last approximately five months. They anticipated that they would have relatively few problems with the native populations, as they expected to be seen as liberators from their colonial rulers.\textsuperscript{536} The cutting of the Burma Road would eliminate the last supply line reaching the Kuomintang from the outside world, thus bringing China to the negotiating table.\textsuperscript{537} Meanwhile, the US Pacific Fleet (given the US commitments to Europe) would either be deterred from entering the Western Pacific by the power of the Japanese fleet, or, should it do so, would be brought to a decisive battle and decisively defeated.\textsuperscript{538}

\textsuperscript{534} Agawa 1979, 195; Evans and Peattie 1997, 464. 
\textsuperscript{535} Tanaka, SJ\textit{O3}, 196; Hattori and Tomika, SJ\textit{O1}, 352; Tomika SJ\textit{O3}, 312. Col. Hattori, then head of the Operations Bureau of the Army IGHQ, notes that seizing these additional territories was essential if they were to delay and check an Allied counter-advance into their ‘Southern Region.’ It was estimated that it would take 50 days to take the Philippines, 100 days to take Malaya, and 150 days to take the Netherlands East Indies. The IJA had particularly tried to see a way to take what they really wanted without attacking the Philippines, but believed their prizes could only be safe if they pushed the Americans out. Hattori SJ\textit{O1}, 5 April 1949 and 13 July 1949. See also Hattori 1953, I.259. For the Navy, such an approach was unthinkable, in part for institutional reasons—it would eviscerate the Navy’s claims on resources, given that its \textit{raison d’etre} was fighting the Americans—and in part because they believed that it would be strategically foolish to leave the potential for an enemy build-up in the very midst of their prizes. Evans and Peattie 1997, 453. 
\textsuperscript{536} Hattori, SJ\textit{O1}, 13 July 1949. 
\textsuperscript{537} In previous interactions, the Chinese refused to negotiate with the Japanese on a basis that would satisfy Japanese aims. 
\textsuperscript{538} See Nagano’s assurances to the Emperor, Ike 1967, 233. The allies believed that this was the most likely Japanese war plan. Ford 2005. The Japanese anticipated that the Allies, and particularly the Americans, would respond by building up their power and then trying to cut Japan off from its southern gains using submarines and air power, and only then wage an offensive campaign. They anticipated that the Allies would be preoccupied with Germany for some time, thus delaying this offensive. Hattori, SJ\textit{O1}, 5 April 1949.
The decision to attack the US Navy at Pearl Harbor at the outset of the war was not seen as a fundamental element of the Japanese plan. First considered by Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto Isoroku in late 1940, the plan was inserted into the larger war plan during the fall of 1941 without serious discussion by the political leadership or even the Army. Yamamoto’s idea was that if the Navy had to fight the Americans their best chance was to attack the Americans at Hawaii at the outset. By attacking the main body of the Pacific Fleet, the Japanese Navy hoped to prevent it from interfering with their efforts to seize territory and resources in the South West Pacific. Rather than the core of the plan, then, the Pearl Harbor attacks were peripheral to most Japanese leaders’ concept of the war.

The Japanese leadership did not imagine these seizures of territory would be the end of the war, however. Rather, they expected that it would have to be ended by some

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540 It was not even war-gamed until late September 1941, after some argue that the decision for war had been made in principle (Agawa 1979, 213-4; Iriye 1987, 159). Even after the war game, it was opposed by many in the Navy General Staff, including its chief, Admiral Nagumo (Tomika SJ/O3, 346). It was not even presented to the Emperor until 5 November 1941 (Agawa 1979, 213-4; Drea 1998, 84).
541 Notably, it was never mentioned in the key Liaison Conferences between the military leadership, the Cabinet, and the Emperor at which decisions were made and finalized. Sagan 1987 ‘25-6’.
542 Evans and Peattie (1997, 476) describe Yamamoto’s reasoning as having two parts. It could break American morale, both in the public and in the US forces in the Pacific, and it would strengthen Japan’s chances in a protracted war by delaying the possible onset of offensive operations against Japan.
543 Evans and Peattie (1997, 481) indicate that this was also true of senior NGS leaders like Nagano. Though the Navy was less powerful than the army and far less confident about the war (despite the enthusiasm of Chief of Staff Naguno at the Imperial Conferences), its central role in fighting the war meant that it had an outsize role in planning strategy. It was only after Yamamoto developed the plan for the attacks on the Pacific Fleet that there was support for the war effort in the Navy. Given Yamamoto’s power as head of the Combined Fleet and intellectual prestige, there were no serious alternative pursued. As Sagan has noted, operational security concerns meant that it was never even discussed during the key cabinet meetings and Liaison Conferences during which the key decision for war was taken. Indeed, Navy General Staff Chief Nagano did not even mention it as part of his efforts to assuage the Emperor’s concerns (as voiced by Privy Council President Hara). Only within the Naval Staff was there an opportunity for debate and discussion of its likely effects, and there it ran into heavy opposition. Famously, it was only accepted after Yamamoto threatened to resign. Agawa 1979, 221-30.
544 Hattori and Tomioka, the Army and Navy Operations Bureau chiefs at General Headquarters, said after the war that “It was beyond doubt that the Pacific War would be an extended and total war. It was
agreement—one that would allow them to keep the spoils of their Southern adventure. This agreement would come about because the US would be either outright unwilling to pay the costs of fighting the Japanese in the Western Pacific for these possessions, or because the US would quickly tire of fighting for them.\footnote{Admiral Tomioka recalled that “we...anticipated the course of the war as follows: firstly, to attain an overwhelming supremacy over the enemy forces in its early stages and create an equilibrium versus the allies; then, to seek a favorable opportunity to enter into negotiations with our enemies for a compromise peace.” Quoted in Tarling 2001, 78. Hattori later described the Japanese approach to the war as being “designed to force the US to withdraw of her own accord by applying...indirect measures. Hattori 1953, I.256.} This tiring seemed likely given the difficulties of the war the Americans seemed more interest in—the war in Europe.\footnote{Nagano stated that ‘If this first stage in our operations is carried out successfully, our empire will have secured strategic areas in the South West Pacific, established an impregnable position, and laid the basis of a prolonged war, even if American military preparedness should proceed as scheduled. What happens thereafter will depended to a great extent on overall national power...and on developments in the world situation.... Thus the outcome of a prolonged war is closely related to the success or failure of the first stage in our operations. Ike 1967, 140. The planning board director believed that they would be able to begin receiving resources from the conquered areas within 6 months, and be making full use of them within 2 years. Ike 1967, 148.} This tiring would be possible because the Japanese anticipated that they would be able to extract enough from their new territories to entirely replace the embargoed resources within 12 to 24 months.\footnote{Hattori and Tomioka, SJ/O 1 352.} During this same timeframe they anticipated that they would be able to eliminate any French or Dutch resistance, decisively defeat the British fleet in the South West Pacific, and beat the British Army in South East Asia.

The basis of the argument that the Japanese had no idea how they would end their war comes from their discussions of what would follow the seizure of their territories. Unlike their plan for beating the British, their leadership knew that war with the US would have to be ended
by an agreement. They expected that this would come at the end of some kind of a
“protracted” war—but just how protracted was unclear. Some spoke in terms of a couple of
years, others of four to five years, and still others in terms of one to two decades.\textsuperscript{548} Also
unclear was how long Japan could last at war; the military leadership could only guarantee
about eighteen months.\textsuperscript{549} Even then they were unable to identify exactly what would bring the
US to quit. Some spoke in general terms about ‘seeing what would develop.’

Many—including the Emperor, Foreign Minister Togo and the Naval leadership
(excepting NGS Chief Nagano)—had serious doubts about the wisdom of going to war.\textsuperscript{550}
Nevertheless, most of the leadership agreed that fighting was preferable to accepting the
alternative offered by the US.\textsuperscript{551} Moreover, one can also read the Japanese leadership’s
apparently fatalistic comments in a more favorable light. At root, their belief in the feasibility of
their plan was based not on military power forcing an end to the war, but on the US concluding
that these islands were not worth the fight. Identifying how this would happen in a military plan
is obviously a different matter than explaining the seizure of an island or the destruction of a
fleet—hence there were vagaries in the texts of the key documents about what actions would

\textsuperscript{548} Iriye notes that talk suggesting longer periods was not meant to be taken literally. Iriye 1987, 151.
\textsuperscript{549} Kawamura 2007, 61
\textsuperscript{550} Yamamoto had serious doubts about the war; Hoyt 1990, 105-131. In his post-war monologue,
Hirohito stated that he opposed the war but was unable to impede it because as monarch he could not
effectively impede a consensus of his military and political leaders. He may have slowed the initiation of
the war by up to two months, but even though he believed that Japan was engaging in war out of
desperation, a dangerous situation, he believed that he could not stop it. Kawamura 55-57, 61, 78. Bix
(1992, 2000) has argued that he could have stopped the war if he wanted to, but Kawamura points out
that had he tried to do so, he would likely have risked assassination.
\textsuperscript{551} Nagano told the Emperor that “Japan can do nothing and collapse in a few years, or go and have a 70-
80% chance of an initial victory” that would yield a resource base necessary for fighting a war that would
produce a ‘good, long term peace.’” Iriye 1987, 161. And in the end, Hirohito seems to have accepted the
war plans, under the continuing reassurance of the military leaders. Bix 2000, 424, 431. Togo was an
exception to this kind of thinking. Ike 1967, 200. Ex-Prime Minister Konoe was one of the few who
believed that such a war was impossible to win. Bix 2000, 418.
lead the US to accept the Japanese seizures of these resources.\textsuperscript{552} Importantly, in the context of the time, it was not so fanciful to believe that the apparent hard-line the US took in the negotiations was something of a bluff. Much of the American public was deeply isolationistic—a tendency reflected in its lawmakers; both Lend-Lease and the 1941 extension of the draft squeaked through Congress on the thinnest possible margin.\textsuperscript{553} The Philippines were on a course to independence already; and though the US had begun preparations to beef up the Pacific Fleet, America’s military preparations were obviously oriented against Germany in Europe. Perhaps most importantly, during the preceding decades the US had adhered to a policy described some years before by Secretary of War Stimson as ‘nothing in the Pacific was worth a war.’\textsuperscript{554}

In this light, comments about a decades-long conflict are better understood as reflecting the struggle to fully enact the new order in the Pacific and Asia they sought, rather than this conflict over some islands. Of course, the US refused to separate the two issues in that way; but at least some key Japanese leaders believed it was possible. Altogether, it can fairly be said that the Japanese plans involved a gamble, and one that left much to chance; but it cannot be fairly said that they did not have an idea of how fighting would improve their position.

\textit{Coding the Initial Theory of Victory}

In sum the Japanese theory of victory from the Autumn of 1940 anticipated a war with two distinctive political and military phases. During the first phase the Japanese would seize their aims, and during the second, they would fight to secure American acquiescence. The first

\textsuperscript{552} Wood 2007.
\textsuperscript{553} Sagan 1987, 10, 25. During conversations about the prospect of war in July 1941, Mastuoka commented that the American people were being pulled toward war by the ‘demagogue’ Roosevelt. He held out hope, however, that “the American people might not follow him.” Ike 1967, 101.
\textsuperscript{554} Komatsu 1999, 145.
part of this composite theory of victory, then, can be coded as a brute force theory of victory, given that it anticipated that fighting would work to the achievement of the Japanese aims through the capture of the territories and the elimination of US and British access to them.555

The second part of the theory of victory is best coded as an attritive theory of victory. Although there is no specification of a set of military actions that would themselves extinguish American will to fight, there was a clear expectation that this was possible, and perhaps possible within a relatively short time. Discussions prior to the conflict, made clear, moreover, that that they did not anticipate direct attacks on the US mainland or any other means of eliminating US resistance.

Japan’s Theories of Victory After Pearl Harbor

The Navy and Hawaii

The successes of the first months of the war, and particularly the Pearl Harbor attacks, led to the articulation of a new theory of victory among the Navy. By the end of January 1942, Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet were arguing strongly for a Central Pacific offensive directed at the Hawaiian Islands.556 This attack, they believed, would draw out the American fleet and allow them to defeat it in its home waters. Yamamoto believed that by the time the IJN had laid siege to the islands—if not actually landed in Hawaii—the US would be willing to negotiate an end to the war.557 The politics of this theory of victory aligned with his military plan, since he perceived that the US would be willing to make concessions, given its isolationism and its focus

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555 Interestingly, I can find no expectations that they expected these seizures to have an informative effect on the American leadership, despite the ease with which they expected to (and in fact did) sweep through South East Asia and the South West Pacific during the first six months of the war.
557 Parshall and Tully 32; Stephan 1984, 92-93.
on Europe. For Japan, it seemed a cheaper and easier route than the Army was pursuing. He believed that Japan could more easily withstand a relatively quick naval war than the protracted war called for by the Army.\textsuperscript{558} Thus, despite an often cited initial pessimism about the war, Yamamoto quickly came to adopt a theory of victory involving tremendous risks.

In doing so, Yamamoto was clearly expressing an informative theory of victory, defined by a battle that would communicate to Americans the power of Japan’s forces relative to the US, and an expectation that the US would concede in the face of that demonstration. This approach was at odds with the composite brute force/attritive theory of victory being pursued by the Army. Indeed, the Army vetoed the plans for a Central Pacific offensive, as they did for the Australian invasion proposed by officers on the Naval General Staff.\textsuperscript{559}

In the wake of the Doolittle Raids, however, the Army leadership consented to the Midway Campaign as a way to prevent further attacks on the Home Islands.\textsuperscript{560} But Yamamoto saw this as his chance: he and others in the Navy had been arguing for an attack on Midway as his stepping stone to Hawaii. The operational design of the battle reflected this conception, as it was mostly oriented to drawing out the Americans and fighting their fleet—the small island itself was an afterthought in the plans. Midway, however, was a catastrophe for the Japanese Navy. Much like three of the IJN’s aircraft carriers, Yamamoto’s informative theory of victory did not survive the Battle of Midway.\textsuperscript{561} Thereafter, Yamamoto and others in the Naval leadership supported the Army theory of victory, though with much diminished confidence.

\textsuperscript{558} Parshall and Tully, 26-32. Wilmott puts it more strongly, suggesting that by now Yamamoto believed it to be the only way that Japan could win the war. Wilmott 1983, 33-42.
\textsuperscript{559} Hattori, instrumental in blocking the Australia plan, recalled believing it was “reckless.” SJOI 5 October 1947.
\textsuperscript{560} Parshall and Tully 2005, 43.
\textsuperscript{561} After the Midway the IJN was unable to launch a major independent offensive again because it lacked the resources—and particularly the experienced naval pilots necessary to do so. This inability produced a
The 1943 AZND: Moving from Brute Force to an Attritive Theory of Victory

Even as Japan was still conquering the territories specified by the first phase of the war, disputes between the Army and Navy about what to do next continued. The strong preference of the army was to build up its conquests to they could effectively resist the Allied counter attacks. The Navy, in contrast, preferred to continue to expand Japan’s territory. After all, the more distant the islands they could capture, the more difficult they made it for the Allies to maintain their supply and communication lines. By making it harder to maintain supply lines, they could make it more difficult for the US to strike back at critical Japanese territories. This dispute meant that further operations were decided on a case-by-case basis, and Japan took possession of more territory than the Army had anticipated.

Defeats at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal slowly brought about a new consensus. In September 1943, a new war direction policy was accepted, establishing an “Absolute Zone of National Defense.” The policy document described the policy as follows:

...we shall establish a strategic posture to cope with the American-British offensive, making mid-1944 our approximate target for full readiness. Whenever the occasion
presents, we shall capture and destroy the enemy’s offensive forces. To carry out the Empire’s war, the strategic area in the Pacific and Indian Oceans that must be secured is a perimeter that includes the Kurile Islands, Ogasawara, the inner South Pacific (the central and western parts), the western part of New Guinea, the Sundra strait, and Burma. 563

With the adoption of this policy, Japan shifted from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive. 564 Inside the zone, defenses and national power would be built up by transferring troops to them from China, Korea, and the Kwangtung army; in those possessions outside of the zone, efforts would be made to hold onto territory but these efforts would be not involve significant reinforcements. 565 All of the key resource-producing territories were included within the zone, as well as key strategic points like the Philippines and Truk. Among those territories excluded from the zone, the Rabaul base was perhaps the most important. IGHQ believed that this line could be held for at least a year, and assured the Emperor and others of this. Some hoped that after a year, they might be able to return to the strategic offensive. 566 Should the US mount an offensive against the AZND, Japan would respond with a decisive battle aimed at destroying the task force. A decisive battle was understood as one in which all available air, naval, and ground forces were applied according to a coordinated plan to a significant component of American military might with the intent of destroying it. The function of these decisive battles would be three-fold: to militarily cripple the US effort against them—making it

563 Quoted in Bix 2000, 470.
564 Matsutanki, of the IGHQ staff, states that the losses at Guadalcanal, Midway, the Solomons, and a fall in stockpiled supplies caused this change from the strategic offense to the strategic defense. The hope now was that Japan would be able to “crush the counter-offensive of the allied powers and force them to abandon their will to continue the war.” SJ02, 2 August 1947.
565 Bix 2000, 470. Takase, an IGHQ staff officer, describes the strategic imperatives: “The scope of the AZND had to be reduced in order to carry out a tenacious holding operation by reducing the time element and the length of supply lines and by regaining battle strength equality with the enemy....Originally, the AZND main line [of defense] was fixed by the fear that Rabaul could be isolated. To terminate resistance there meant the isolation of Truk, the Navy’s most important base in the AZND. So, [Truk] was on the forward reaches of the main line of the AZND.” SJ03, 46.
566 Drea 1998, 38.
more difficult if not impossible to take their captured territories; to buy time for their own resource extraction and industrial production efforts, as the US would have to reproduce the units and transport them to the Western Pacific if they wanted to continue fighting; and to increase the American human and material costs of the war.\textsuperscript{567}

This AZND is important because it gives the clearest sense of what the Japanese leadership believed that they could get from the war at that point. Because the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration specified US aims as unconditional surrender the Japanese never explicitly communicated their war aims, since they expected them to be rejected out of hand by the US. The AZND, therefore, is a close proxy of Japan’s war aims at this time. In short, then, Japan believed it could yet hold onto all of its most valuable conquests.\textsuperscript{568}

Not all Japanese leaders had an equal level of confidence in this theory of victory. Yamamoto, for instance, began to doubt that Japan could achieve her war aims after the defeat at Midway had so devastated the Navy. In April 1943, the Emperor indicated that he wanted to search for a ‘reasonable peace.’ However, as that quotation indicates, none of the major Japanese leaders were willing to countenance ending the war on the American terms expressed in the Cairo Declaration—unconditional surrender.\textsuperscript{569}

\textsuperscript{567} The Japanese leadership continued to believe that while public support for the war remained strong, should the Americans lose a decisive battle, US public opinion would sour. Hattori 1953, III.7

\textsuperscript{568} Ayake SJO1, 112.

\textsuperscript{569} Shigemetsu, SJO3 303. Togo, the dovish foreign minister, indicated that in December 1943 unconditional surrender was simply “out of the question.” Togo, SJO3, 243. In the spring of 1944, a top secret group within the Army Headquarters staff, the “Number 20 Group,” was charged with considering war termination scenarios, and their ‘worst case’ the could envision was that Japan would retain control over the Home Islands and the ‘National Polity.’ Tanaka SJO3, 212. This is clearly far short of unconditional surrender.
The AZND was clearly an attritive theory of victory—the one outlined in the initial strategic plan for the war.\(^\text{570}\) It was premised on the idea that Japan’s conquests could be made impregnable, and the US, already wearied of war by the European Theater, would wear itself by attacking this strong defense line. When it did, it would be possible to negotiate a settlement with them allowing it to keep the possessions it most valued, if not everything it had taken by force to that point. At this point in time the Japanese leadership continued to believe in the ability of Japan to withstand the fighting. At the same time, no apparent beliefs about the opponent had changed. While the US was clearly contesting the Japanese position, it was also clear that they were focusing much more effort on the war in Europe than they were in Asia. Though Japan had experienced significant losses, the ruling core of the government nevertheless believed that once they successfully conducted one or more decisive battles, American will to continue fighting in the Pacific would weaken.

\textit{A New Attritive Theory of Victory: The Sho Operations}

The further losses Japan experienced in 1943 and 1944 caused leaders to revise and shrink the AZND and to focus more narrowly on the fight in the Philippines.\(^\text{571}\) This plan, the Sho

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\(^{570}\) That it took until 1943 to determine that it was time to move from a brute force to an attritive theory of victory is largely the product of the nature of their composite theory of victory. While the Japanese leadership had specified what would be their key targets in the first phase of the war, they had not specified at what point they would cease to expand and pursue their attritive theory of victory against the US. This meant that they had to make decisions about when to stop advancing while they were successfully expanding their sphere of control—no easy thing.

\(^{571}\) While discussion about the importance of a decisive battle in the Philippines began at table-top exercises in December 1943, these plans did not come to full fruition until late in the spring, and did not become the center-piece of the Japanese theory of victory until after Saipan. Hattori 1953, III.85. The key Imperial Conference approving the Sho operations was held on 19 August 44. Hattori, SJO1, 1 October 49.
operation, was formally approved on 24 July 1944.\textsuperscript{572} Now, Japan expected to leave the war with some part of their ‘Southern Region’ conquests, Manchuria, the pre-war Japanese colonies, and the home islands. Most important to all, of course, was Japan itself, and particularly preserving its political and cultural forms, as defined by the \textit{kokutai} concept.\textsuperscript{573} They expected that they would be able to secure these particular aims because they continued to expect to fight at least one further decisive battle, now in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{574} This decisive battle, the focus of Plan \textit{Sho}, would involve all components of national military power—air, land, and sea—and would be used to destroy the invasion force directed sent to regain them. The key decisive battle in the Philippines would be fought at Luzon.\textsuperscript{575}

The shrinking of Japanese war aims was driven in part by the increasing economic and production pressures caused by the failure of the Japanese efforts to secure the resources they had expected to gain from their captured lands. It was also driven by the related increasing military pressure that Japan was experiencing as US forces continued to pursue their ‘island hopping’ campaign.\textsuperscript{576} Nevertheless, the Japanese had not yet been able to mount a decisive battle, and thus they retained their hopes that with enough preparation it would be successful.\textsuperscript{577} That success, in turn, would buy them time and increase the costs of fighting to

\textsuperscript{572} Bix 2000, 479.
\textsuperscript{573} Drea 1998, 193.
\textsuperscript{574} Prior to Saipan, the army believed that there were three possible courses the Allies’ 1944 counter-offensive might take: from the Central Pacific to Japan, Formosa, or the Philippines; from the North to Japan, and from New Guinea to the Philippines. After Saipan, they knew it would be from the Central Pacific to the Philippines. Hattori, \textit{SJO1}, 1 June 1948.
\textsuperscript{575} Hattori, \textit{SJO1}, 1 June 1948.
\textsuperscript{576} Particularly important were the losses at Saipan and in eastern New Guinea. Ohmae, \textit{SJO3}, 40.
\textsuperscript{577} Since 1943 the main US-Japan land battles had been the product of US action, rather than the result of Japanese aggressive action. This meant that they were not the product of careful strategizing, planning and coordination, and that the Japanese were unable to marshal their forces in such a way that they believed a decisive battle could be brought about. It also meant that many of the forces the US fought with—at Guadalcanal and Saipan, for instance—were garrison troops, rather than the best Japanese army
the US such that they would prefer to negotiate a war-ending agreement. In this sense it is clear that the Japanese were pursuing an attritive theory of victory with Plan Sho: they anticipated war termination through negotiation, and expected that it would be the costs of war and the likely further costs of fighting that would drive the US to make a deal with them.

While this describes the theory of victory of the Japanese military leadership, it is clear that there were increasing concerns in the Japanese establishment. The emperor himself began to doubt the Army’s promises after the fall of Saipan, and came to view the fighting in the Philippines as a crucial test case. After Saipan, Koiso, Tojo’s successor as prime minister, believed that things were hopeless, though after a while he began to place some hope that peace would be facilitated by a decisive battle.

Final Theories of Victory: Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and Ketzu-Go

After the failure of the decisive battles in the Philippines failed to develop, the Japanese leadership had to revise its expectations. Since the defense line anchored by the Philippines was now broken, they had to prepare for operations much closer to Japan. The response of the Army and Imperial General Headquarters was the Ketzu Operation plans, adopted 20 January 1945. These plans called for a combination of holding actions in places that they guessed the

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units. Additionally, given that the Japanese stopped supporting their troops after it became clear that they could not save them, much of this fighting involved undersupplied and underfed Japanese troops. Hattori 1953, III.100.

579 In September 1944, Privy Council President Hiranuma, a former Prime Minister, articulated a view most likely common among those who embraced this theory of victory: that diplomacy without defeating the Americans in a major battle was hopeless, and could only lead to unconditional surrender. Drea 1998, 194.

580 Hata 2007, 51.

581 Koiso, SJ02, 272. One familiar with his thinking at the time said he would be happy with ‘peace on even terms.’ Hayashi, SJ01, 399.

582 The failure of the Sho operations were clearly recognized by mid-December 1944. Hattori, SJ01, 5 October 1947.
Americans would attack soon—particularly at Iwo Jima and the Ryukyus, and Okinawa—and a
decisive battle. This theory of victory was effectively described by Hattori:

The 20 January Plan called for a bloody and protracted struggle in the Homeland, the
Nansei Shoto, Manchuria, and China...for exacting heavy casualties in the local fighting
everywhere, and thoroughly breaking his will to fight. Okinawa was included among the
vital areas where the blood was to flow. Preparations in the homeland...were assigned
a position of decisive importance in the 20 January Plan. It was thought that Japan was
to be attacked. Japanese forces were to inflict tremendous losses upon the advancing
enemy in an endeavor to break his will to fight....The object of the operational plan was
to wage and all-out decisive battle in the homeland after inflicting heavy casualties in a
long-drawn-out Okinawa campaign.

Only over a period of months would the Japanese become certain about where that battle
would be staged; at first, they considered Formosa, the Chinese Mainland and Japan as places
which the US might stage a major attack which they could turn into a decisive battle. As time
and action clarified US intentions, the Ketzu Operations became centered on staging a decisive
battle in the Home Islands. In the late spring, the focus was down to two locations, the island of
Kyushu and the Kanto Plain (a region including Tokyo) on Honshu. In June, planners concluded
that the invasion of Japan would occur after the first of October at Kyushu, and thereafter all
preparations were centered on making a powerful defense there. By August 1945,
approximately 14 divisions, or 600,000 men, were in Kyushu—about twice as many as the US
Army's first estimates of the opposition their invasion would face.

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583 There was significant interest among the Navy in making Okinawa a decisive battle, though the army
veted it. Tomioka, SJ03, 317, 320; Kagoshima SJ02, 3-4.
584 Hattori, SJ01. Another staff officer, Hoshina, expressed it in similar terms: “The object of each battle
was a war of attrition...[focused especially on] the decimation of troops. What was expected from the
above war of attrition [was] the breaking of the fighting will of the enemy through the loss of his men in
both the war of attrition and the decisive battle of the homeland.” Hoshina, SJ01, 492.
585 Fuwa SJ01, 161.
586 Fuchida SJ01, 128; Amano SJ01, 29-30. The Japanese believed that the Americans would attack
Kyushu first because they would need closer air bases in order to make a strong attack on the Kanto
region. Ohmae SJ03, 55.
Among the senior political, military, and court officials, only the Army leadership—anchored by War Minister Anami Korechika—was convinced that the Ketzu operations could bring the US to modify its terms in Japan’s favor. They believed that with that a successful decisive battle could yet be conducted on Japan’s own soil. This decisive battle would destroy the first wave, at very least, of the American invasion force. Recent historical research stresses that this expectation may not have been entirely fantastical: the Japanese concentrated a very large force in Kyushu, armed it better than had been reported, and were designing the operation with the lessons learned from Guadalcanal on in mind. As a result of their success in beating back the first wave of the invasion, they believed, the US would be willing to negotiate an end to the war, one which would probably allow Japan to retain political control over Japan itself and its oldest colonies, Formosa and Korea. The key Japanese Army leaders—Anami, Army Chief of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, and their subordinates, continued to affirm this theory of victory until the very end of the war.

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588 On 8 June 1945, Anami described himself as ‘confident’ of their success to his personal secretary. Hayashi SJ/01, 394.
589 Planners stressed the advantages that they would have there, including local knowledge, favorable geography, and the support of the people, though acknowledging that a lack of depth and air support would be problematic. Amano SJ/01, 35-7; Fuwa SJ/01, 181. Crucially, they viewed this one battle as their last real chance to avoid unconditional surrender. “Everything depended upon destroying the enemy in his invasion of Kyushu.” Hashimoto SJ/01, 290. Lt. General Miyazaki of the IGHQ stated that “the decisive battle for the homeland would be the final decisive battle calling upon all the resources of the nation. The decisive battle for the homeland had to be fought positively and absolutely in the vicinity of the coast where the enemy had landed.” Miyazaki, SJ/02, 540.
591 Kawabe, the IJA Vice-Chief of Staff, stated that “we never anticipated that the Homeland Decisive Battle would lead to victory...We saw the possibility of bringing the war to a favorable conclusion if we would inflict such unexpectedly heavy injuries on the invading army as to force him to realize the difficulty involved in an attack on the Japanese homeland.” Kawabe SJ/02, 74. Tanaka, of the war termination study group, believed that peace would best be sought after this defeat had caused the US to seek peace. Tanaka SJ/O3, 212.
592 Anami clearly adhered to this theory of victory. Though Umezu affirmed it in meetings, some of his associates and subordinates doubted that he really believed in it. Hata 2007, 74, 80. Ikeda SJ/01, 545, 548; Inaba SJ/01, 581; Kawabe SJ/02, 74, 94; Matsudaira SJ/02, 426. Hayashi recalled Umezu telling him on
But many outside of the Army did not fully believe in this theory of victory. The Emperor and those around him—particularly his most important aide, Kido—had grown to mistrust Army promises. Koiso, who succeeded Tojo as Prime Minister in July 1944 until April 1945, never had much confidence in victory. His successor, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, appeared to believe that it was necessary to find a peaceful settlement before Japan was invaded. Many in the Army even believed that he would be a ‘Badoglio,’ in reference to the Italian Marshal who succeeded Mussolini and surrendered Italy to the Allies. Yonai and most others in the Navy Department had similar, strongly held feelings. However, among the Cabinet, Court, and Military leadership, only Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori was willing to accept unconditional surrender before August. The others, while doubting the efficacy and wisdom of the Ketsu Operation, believed that a negotiated end could be made without unconditional surrender. By this time, the public was uncertain about Japan’s prospects of success.

13 August that the Potsdam Declaration terms were appropriate. Hayashi SJ01, 396. Drea describes Anami’s approach to the war at this point very effectively: Where even Umezu and Toyoda saw ruin, Anami saw opportunity.” Drea 1998, 209.

Bix (1992, 301) notes that in February 1945 he did not believe that efforts to end the war should be made before the battle of Okinawa. Hiranuma, one of his personal aides, believed he had lost hope in the prospects for the homeland battle by 22 June. Hiranuma, SJ01, 301. Nevertheless, Baxter (2004) argues that he was reluctant to embrace ending the war through surrender until August. Drea’s description of Hirohito has some merit to it: “Hirohito’s constant whining for a military victory demonstrates his comprehension that Japan had no bargaining chips to raise the ante for an unconditional surrender to the levels the Americans would find acceptable.” Drea 1998, 201.

Butow 1954; Saionji SJ03, 192, 194. Matsudaira suggested that the Emperor believed him interested in peace all along. Matsudaira SJ02, 425. Others were less sure. Ikeda SJ01, 543.

Inaba SJ01, 569; Hayashi SJ01, 400. However, Nagai suggests that some in the army secretly hoped that Suzuki would fulfill just that role. Nagai SJ02, 614.

Hata 2007, 55; Hoshina SJ01, 475; Sakonji SJ03, 193; Butow 1954. Admiral Toyoda Soemu, Chief of the Navy General Staff, was an overt supporter of the Army’s theory of victory. However, it is not clear whether or not his support was fully genuine. Toyoda stated after the war that, though he never expressed it, he was pessimistic about the Homeland Battle. Toyoda SJ03, 29 August 1949.

Bernstein notes that even in June 1945, an offer to leave the Imperial house in place probably would not have sufficed to end the war. Bernstein ‘12’.

Fuwa SJ01, 301. Bix (2000, 491) reports that by March 1945, production was declining and absenteeism was rising.
In late May and June the Japanese leadership decided to pair their theory of victory with a diplomatic outreach to the Soviet Union. Supported by both the dovish foreign ministry and Army leadership, they believed that the Soviet Union might be willing and able to broker a peace between them and the Western Allies. Unlike other possible mediators like the Swiss and the Swedes, the Soviet Union seemed powerful enough to help Japan secure more favorable terms than she could earn for herself on the battlefield. To secure these services, these same Japanese leaders were willing to give the Soviets most of their holdings in Manchuria and North China. Not everyone had equal hope in this option. Navy Minister Yonai, for example, believed that this was a foolish idea. It was, however, in keeping with a significant trend of opinion within Japanese strategic thought before and during the war. This approach, of course, came to naught: the Soviets delayed meetings with the special envoy for weeks at a time, and when Molotov finally met with him, it was to deliver the USSR’s declaration of war on Japan.

The final changes to Japanese leaders’ theories of victory came during the period of the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the war. At this point, there were six key leaders. Yonai had favored surrender with minimal terms for some time; Suzuki and the Emperor now believed that surrender was appropriate if it meant that the imperial house would be preserved—something the Americans appeared to be offering. In essence, they no longer had meaningful theories of victory. The remaining three—Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda—argued that

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599 Unusually, the Emperor was not notified of this development at first. Drea 1998, 202.
600 Koshiro 2004, 17-18. Koshiro goes onto describe the ploy in these terms: Japan’s surrender tactic was now to have the US and Soviet Union compete against each other in their planning for the future of East Asia.” Koshiro 2004, 32.
601 Oikawa SJ/03, 108. Bix suggests that it was only the Emperor and the senior army leadership that placed hope in this option. This is less clear. Bix 2000, 505.
602 Koshiro 2007.
unless the US met three conditions, including self-disarmament for Japanese forces, Japanese trials for possible war criminals, minimal occupation, and no fundamental changes in the Japanese political system, Ketzu-Go should go forward. They appear to have retained their theory of victory. The war ended on the terms favored by the ‘peace camp’ only as Anami and his compatriots were confronted with an explicit Imperial wish. Anami, in particular, was devoted to the cult of the Emperor, and though he struggled with the question of continuing the war, he found himself unable to act contrary to this wish. Accordingly, he acquiesced, and Japan communicated its acceptance of the Potsdam declaration to the US.

**Framing**

Two sets of cases are presented to test the framing theories of victory. The first cases examine the ways that of Japanese leaders adhering to different theories of victory understand the same events. The relevant series of events is the set of events of late-May and early June in 1942. These events were selected because during this period—which includes the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway—key leaders had theories of victory of different kinds. While the Army was finishing the brute force phase of its composite theory of victory, the Navy—and particularly Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet—were pursuing an informative theory of victory. The second set of cases compares responses to three different American amphibious assaults, Guadalcanal, Saipan, and the Philippines. The first was made while Japanese leaders were still pursuing a brute force theory of victory; Saipan was a key part of the AZND, and thus a key element in the first Japanese attritive theory of victory. The Philippines attacks were

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603 As noted above, the true attitudes of Umezu and Toyoda are subject to debate. Anami’s support for Ketzu-Go seems to have been genuine.
expected and Japanese efforts to repel them had been designated a decisive battle, the 
keystone of the Sho operations, and thus was a major element in a different theory of victory.

**The Coral Sea and Midway**

Due to the Doolittle Raids, in April the Army allowed the Navy to attack Midway in 
hopes of eliminating the threat of further long-range bombing raids against the Japanese 
Homeland.\(^{604}\) This attack came to be part of three almost simultaneous naval offensives: in 
addition to Midway, a drive in the South against Fiji and Samoa, which would culminate in the 
Battle of the Coral Sea; and one directed at the Aleutian Islands to eliminate any threat of a 
northern approach to the Home Islands.\(^{605}\) Yamamoto supported the Southern action 
(sponsored by the NGS) and his own action against Midway; the Aleutians gambit was purely the 
creature the Naval General Staff.\(^{606}\) Within weeks of each other, the Coral Sea and Midway 
adventures ended in serious defeats for the IJN.\(^{607}\) Four carriers were lost or seriously damaged, 
as was the core of the IJN’s pilot force.\(^{608}\) The Aleutians were captured relatively easily, in the 
face of little opposition.\(^{609}\)

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\(^{604}\) It is clear that this was a negative, unexpected event, even to those in the Army. [Nagano was 
“stunned” by it (Parshall and Tully 2007, 43).] However, after study it was decided that this was not a 
serious threat to their theory of victory, and could probably be dealt with relatively easy through Naval 
action. Accordingly, though there was a reconsideration of their approach to the war among some in the 
Army, it did not culminate in a revision of beliefs but rather in the reaffirmation of the two-phase theory 
of victory. In this sense, while the effect of the Doolittle Raids was to cause a reexamination of political 
beliefs, slightness of their military effect and Japan’s apparent ability to eliminate the further threat so 
these kinds of raids meant that they had no lasting political effect.

\(^{605}\) Stephan 1983, 42.

\(^{606}\) As is well known, this division of forces meant that the Japanese would be under-strength at both Coral 
Sea and Midway (see for instance Kennedy 1983; Evans and Peattie 1997, 490).

\(^{607}\) Evans and Peattie (1997, 489) describe the Coral Sea fight as a ‘tactical draw’ but a ‘strategic reverse.’

\(^{608}\) Unlike the American system of pilot training—under which the best pilots were brought back to train 
new pilots—the Japanese kept their best pilots in fighting positions. Accordingly, as the war progressed, 
their cadre of pilots progressively weakened. The effect of this was even more pronounced since the
The Combined Fleet

During this time period, the Japanese Navy was pursuing an informative theory of victory. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the Navy’s successes elsewhere, Yamamoto concluded that a drive against Hawaii was possible. Victory there would convince the Americans to quit the war by revealing Japan’s power in the Pacific. This being the case, my framing theory predicts that the Japanese leaders adhering to this informative theory of victory should be particularly interested in the ability of the Navy to complete the tasks assigned to it, to conduct its operations successfully, and to win the key battles. Given this informative theory of victory, the Navy’s battles, and particularly its battles in the Central Pacific, took on great meaning to the JIN’s senior sailors. Rather than fights for specific pieces of ground or control of sea lanes, these battles should have been seen as determining Japan’s chances for winning the war.

Officials and Officers in Tokyo

By this point, the Army had largely completed its brute force theory of victory. It regarded further expansion with suspicion, and had only reluctantly assented to the operations directed toward Fiji-Samoan, Midway, and the Aleutians. Now engaged in mopping-up operations but not yet committed itself to specific operations oriented to the attritive phase of its theory of victory, it was in the midst of an operational pause in the Pacific. While in this operational pause, however, its key officers were clearly thinking in terms of the forthcoming relative of the Japanese fighter planes declined relative to their enemies: thus not only were their planes poorer than their adversaries, these weaker planes were piloted by decreasingly skilled pilots.

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Parshall and Tully 2007, 64.
Wilmott (1983, 33) suggests that in Yamamoto’s mind this was the only realistic path to victory.
attritive theory of victory, and rejected Yamamoto’s informative theory of victory. This seems to be the case for all of the political and court officials at Tokyo, including the Emperor. Even though the Naval General Staff was still interested in expanding the range of Japan’s conquests, it interest had moderated over the course of the spring, and the operations it particularly favored—Fiji/Samoa and the Aleutians—were clearly oriented to establishing the impregnability of the ‘Co-prosperity Sphere.’ Given my theoretical approach, it seems most correct to say that the leaders in Japan saw the events of late May and early June in terms of an attritive theory of victory. Thus their focus should have been on the qualitative of events that suggested their ability to hold what they had and the rates at which they lost key strategic elements.

Responses

The responses of the two groups, those around Yamamoto and those in Tokyo, increasingly diverged through this period. The outcome at Coral Sea seems to have been unimportant to both groups. A tactical draw involving one carrier lost and one carrier severely damaged on each side but a strategic defeat inasmuch as it checked the advance to Samoa, neither group seems to have paid much attention to it.613 For those adhering to an attritive theory of victory, this may have been because it delivered a significant loss to the Americans (one which early reports suggested was graver than it actually was—they believed the Yorktown was effectively lost), and did not touch the key areas of Japanese conquest. For those pursuing the informative theory of victory, it is somewhat more curious: after all, Japanese carriers—the heart of their force—experienced significant losses. However, because the American losses

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were exaggerated in initial reports, it may be that they did not recognize the degree to which they had failed. That senior members of the Combined Fleet staff urged Yamamoto to order the task force to continue corroborates this account.

Their responses to Midway were more different, however. For Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet, the abject failure to beat the American fleet was highly relevant. They would come to believe that their inability to win the preliminary battle in their theory of victory indicated that the Americans were far stronger, and possibly much luckier, than they had believed. Part of this was a direct effect of the tremendous losses to the aviation wing of the kaigun. But there were other lessons that they were quick to learn—especially in the areas of intelligence and capability. Because of the exaggerations of earlier battle reports, they encountered ships—particularly the Yorktown—that they believed had been sunk. The failings of their pilots and planes against the Americans were no less a matter of grave importance to the Combined Fleet. These lessons, deeply relevant to his informative theory of victory, would lead Yamamoto to give up on further offensive action as a means of winning the war.

The responses in Tokyo differed as well. These differences were the product of both a different availability of information and a different theory of victory. Outside of the Combined Fleet staff and the senior-most elements of the Naval General Staff, only the Emperor was provided with the nature of the losses. He is recorded as having been at first shaken and grieved by their scope, but then regained his composure. His response, however, was to act

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614 It was only when the Yorktown was encountered at Midway did the Japanese recognize that it had survived the battle. Parshall and Tully 2005, 66-7.
615 Bix 2000. According to Kido’s diary, when first told by officers of the Naval General Staff he appeared shocked and somewhat shaken; but by the time he described the situation to Kido a couple of days later, he betrayed no emotion. See also Parshall and Tully 2005, 385; and Drea 1998, 37.
so as to prevent news of the losses from reaching not only the public, but anyone else.\footnote{Bix 2000 describes in detail how, upon this request, the Navy went to great lengths to prevent survivors from telling what had happened. Those uninjured were quickly shipped out again, and the wounded were isolated in special wards within military hospitals. Some stayed in these wards for as long as a year, denied visits even from their families.}

Though disturbed by this defeat, however, he seems not to have treated the outcome as particularly important for his view of the war.\footnote{Although concerned about Guadalcanal from its first days, just as he had been about Bataan, it was only after the loss of Guadalcanal—more than seven months later—that he first began to express concerns about its direction. Thompson 2001, 221; Bix 2000, 447, 455.}

Few in the Army learned of the nature of this defeat.\footnote{Drea 1998, 187.} Indeed, key planners were unaware how many carriers had been put out of commission even at the outset of the Guadalcanal fight—more than two months later. Much of what the Army staff learned about the outcome of the battle, it learned from foreign broadcasts.\footnote{Ford (2007) stresses that with regard to intelligence, the Japanese tended to stress morale over judgment. This is an unfortunate example of this tendency.}

For those who learned that a significant defeat had occurred—like Hattori, of the IGHQ staff—it was certainly unexpected, but it was not considered terribly important for their beliefs about the outcome of the war. This central Pacific offensive had been at best peripheral to their approach to the war, after all; indeed, they had resisted it for months. Accordingly, for them Midway seemed a disappointing but largely irrelevant event. While they would have to devote more resources to protecting the home islands from air raids, and while damage was done to the sea-based air arm of the IJN, it remained a powerful fighting force. The great capital ships of the Japanese Navy, including the \textit{Yamato} and the \textit{Mushashi}, the biggest and most powerful battleships ever created, were largely intact.\footnote{Ito (1956, 71) emphasizes that aside from the aircraft carriers, Yamamoto’s surface forces were practically unscathed, and still almost double that of the US Pacific Fleet. Moreover, they still had two}
Navy for most Japanese leaders—even many in the NGS. Moreover, though fewer in number, they retained some air-craft carriers. Ground-based aircraft, with their pilots, remained available to defend most all of their conquests—and retained air superiority over them. There was little concern that the Americans would be able to make a serious attack on any of the major Japanese possessions.

In sum, then, two factors determined what lessons, if any, were learned from these events. The nature of the theory clearly played a key role: their informative theory of victory made the outcome of the battle at Midway important for Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet in a way that it was not for the others. The availability of information was also important. Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet may well have found relevant things to learn from the Coral Sea experience had its outcome not been so exaggerated. Similarly, had more information been available to the Army about the events of Midway, it is possible that they would have learned much more about what it would take to hold back an American offensive, give the American Navy’s success in sinking several key parts of the Japanese Navy.

**Guadalcanal**

In August of 1942 the US Navy and Marines attacked Guadalcanal, one of the Solomon Islands, in the Southwest Pacific. Their efforts were directed toward easing their lines of communication with Australia by taking the air field that was being constructed on the island. They went ashore relatively easy, and after some fighting took the Airfield. Even with the airfield, however, they controlled only a small part of the island. The Japanese slowly contested this invasion. Their first response was naval: a small fleet of destroyers and cruisers attacked fleet carriers, four light carriers, the *Taiho* scheduled to be in service within one year and the super-carrier *Shinano* on track to in service within two years.
some of the screening vessels near Savo Island at night, and sank or severely damaged them with minimal damage. Then, in late August, the Combined Fleet sent a carrier task force to challenge the US Navy forces supporting the invasion. Despite a sharp battle which sunk a carrier on each side, they were unable to eliminate the American presence there. Instead, both US and Japanese forces maintained their positions on the island, and the US controlled the areas around the island during the day while the IJN ruled the seas at night. This situation persisted for some months, as the two Navies traded tactical victories. Control of the night allowed the Japanese to slowly increase the number of soldiers on the island, though supplying them was difficult and at no point after the initial invasion did they have superior numbers on Guadalcanal. Despite another serious naval effort in late October, this situation persisted. In November, the IJN attempted to execute a major reinforcement and resupply landing. In a series of air-sea battles, the IJN did significant damage to US Navy assets—including the destruction of the *USS Hornet*—but it was unable to make the landing. Throughout the remainder of November and all December, efforts to resupply the island mostly failed despite significant losses to the IJN’s destroyer fleet. In late December, convinced that resupply was impossible, the IGHQ concluded that there was no alternative but to withdraw their literally starving forces from Guadalcanal. This was successfully executed in late January and early February.

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621 This situation developed because the US Marine pilots based at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal were effective against IJN ships during the day, but the IJN—far better at night fighting than its US counterpart—was almost invulnerable at night.

622 Those fought at night, at Savo Island and later at Santa Cruz Islands, were both injurious and humiliating to the US Navy. Frank 1990. Peattie and Evans (1997, 500) stress that these battles showed the IJN’s real tactical prowess.
At the outset of the attack, in the late summer of 1942, Japan’s theory of victory was in an awkward transition phase. The leaders of the Army were already thinking in terms of an attritive theory of victory. Their main focus was on consolidating and fortifying what they already held. While the Navy had given up their informative theory of victory, they were primarily thinking in terms of a decisive sea battle as the key component in the emerging attritive theory of victory. But the attritive theory of victory that shaped both the Army and Navy’s thinking—as well as that of other actors in Tokyo—had not yet crystallized into an operational plan. Indeed, they would not agree on one for almost a year. Moreover, Guadalcanal, in the Solomons, fell at the very fringes of the Japanese expansion. It was seen as useful—particularly for making communication lines between Australia and the US more difficult—but it had not been part of the core plan for the war. Rather, the region had been added to the list of conquests in the spring, and then accomplished with relative ease.

In this context of this vague theory of victory, ‘attritive-type’ thinking should shape the perceptions of the actors, but less sharply than it would if a clear plan existed. This well describes the initial response of most actors to the US offensive in Guadalcanal. Entirely unexpected, the US landings were at first thought to be a mere reconnaissance in force.

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623 Although on 7 March 1942 there had been a ‘General Outline on Future War Guidance Policy,” it did nothing to resolve the different approaches to the war present in different parts of the military. See for instance Hattori 1953, II.150.
624 The implicit point in this statement is equally true: there was no consensus about how Japan should be conducting the war during this period. This meant that in inter-service processes, all operations were judged on an individual basis, rather than with reference to a clear strategic or operational plan.
625 Yano, SJQ3, 534.
626 Both the Army and Navy sections of IGHQ agreed about this. Frank 1990, 141. When the Hirohito heard about the attack, he was concerned enough to return from Tokyo from his summer retreat. The army assured him this was not necessary. Hata 2007, 50.
perception of the fighting continued for several days. Only after more than a week was the leadership convinced that this was a serious effort. Yamamoto, in an effort to cut it off, sent the carrier group in late August as a way of halting any further operations—but did not see this as a prelude to a decisive battle. After it failed with damage to both sides, the Army and Navy persisted in supporting the defense of the island. Importantly, however, neither side believed it was appropriate to send large forces there until mid-September, after the smaller ground force units had failed to materially affect the situation. On 17 September, the Naval General Staff committed to massively reinforcing Guadalcanal, and the army agreed.

By early-October, the IJN was convinced that the American effort near Guadalcanal was their main counter-offensive. However, they also suffered a reverse on the ground: the Matanikau Line, which was central to their plans for a counter-offensive, was lost to the Americans on 10 October. Accordingly, they conducted a significant reinforcement of their forces there—sending an army division—and then prepared for a major naval clash. This occurred in late October. Once again, there was significant damage to both sides: both lost a

627 Nagano, Chief of Naval General Staff, told the Emperor on 13 August that the magnitude of the American effort in the Solomons remained unclear. The persistence of these beliefs may have been encouraged by intelligence from the Japanese embassy in Moscow, which indicated that a well-placed source had assured an embassy officer that the effort would necessarily be limited, given low morale within in the American forces and an inability to conduct sustained operations. Frank 1990, 143-4.
628 Frank 1990, 159. Ito (1956, 72) suggests that the Yamamoto and some others in the Navy were more alert to the dangers to the defensive perimeter that could be posed by the airfield, and so was somewhat faster to respond. By suggesting that Yamamoto was thinking in terms of defending a perimeter at this point, Ito—then on staff at Japan’s Naval War College—implicitly presents a pattern of framing convergent with an attritive theory of victory.
629 Frank 1990, 179 and 205. Unfortunately for them, their support was often half-hearted and stingy. Evans and Peattie 1997, 489.
630 Frank 1990, 252.
631 Frank 1990, 252-3. At this point, Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama assured the emperor that this act of reinforcing Guadalcanal would be the prologue to further military successes in the Solomon Islands. It is not clear that the Emperor fully believed him. Bix 2000, 456.
632 The Army was not yet convinced of this. Sugiyama was an exception, however, and agreed with the Navy. Frank 1990, 254-5.
633 Frank 1990, 290.
carrier, and both had a carrier damaged.\textsuperscript{634} But once again, the IJN was unable to dislodge the Americans, and its losses were arguably more severe than those of the Americans. After this defeat, however, the Army came to agree with the Navy that this could well have be the decisive battle they had awaited: it was clear now that the US was taking a massive interest in it.\textsuperscript{635} They embraced a plan that involved significant reinforcement to the forces on the island such that they would be able to wrest the airfield away from the Americans.\textsuperscript{636}

Thus in November there was once again an effort to land more army troops on Guadalcanal. A key component in this landing involved supplies, of which the garrison there was already in desperate need.\textsuperscript{637} In order to do this, the Navy would have to prevent the Americans from interfering.\textsuperscript{638} The outcome of the mid-November fight was paradoxical: while the IJN met with some success, they were unable to secure a complete landing.\textsuperscript{639} Fewer soldiers than planned, and only a fraction of the food, made it ashore. While they continued their night-time efforts to deliver food and supplies by destroyer and submarine, they were increasingly thwarted, and by mid-December the Navy was threatening to end the deliveries entirely.\textsuperscript{640} After a period of inter-service wrangling, and the imposition of limits on further shipping allocations by Tojo and the cabinet, the Army and Navy agreed that all the troops on

\textsuperscript{634} Frank 1990, 386.
\textsuperscript{635} Frank 1990, 404.
\textsuperscript{636} Kennedy 1983, 188.
\textsuperscript{637} Food supplies had been a problem even in September. Frank 1990, 260.
\textsuperscript{638} Significantly, this was the first time that Yamamoto accepted that the fleet action would have as its main purpose the supporting the landings on the island, rather than defeating the American fleet.
\textsuperscript{639} Frank 1990, 490-2.
\textsuperscript{640} Frank 1990, 521-7 and 534.
Guadalcanal that could be evacuated should be.\textsuperscript{641} This decision was presented to the Emperor on 31 December, and he ratified it without opposition.\textsuperscript{642}

This pattern of response suggests a shift in the importance accorded to the operation. At the outset, the landings were derogated as minor. Later, though, first the Navy and then the Army came to see Guadalcanal as a potential decisive battle. While the initial response is congruent with their hypothetical predictions, the shift in thinking is not. However, the shift can be explained in terms of the more general theory. The navy was looking for a decisive battle, which would be a response to a major offensive from the US. Only once they concluded that this was a major offensive did they treat it as important. It was the continued major investment by the Americans in taking and holding Guadalcanal—manifested in the dedication of sparse resources and continued reinforcements there—that convinced the leaders of this.

**The Marianas and Saipan**

The Marianas Battle at sea and the American seizure of Saipan were among the most significant moments of the war. These fights not only significantly affected the military capability of Japan—and particularly its navy—they upset the Absolute Zone of National Defense policies. While fighting was going on elsewhere—particularly in the Southwest Pacific area—the Japanese had managed to maintain impregnability of the AZND for nine months. The landings at Saipan and Tinian, however, came as complete surprises to the Japanese authorities, and Allied conquests were completed before any further reinforcement was possible.\textsuperscript{643} A naval

\textsuperscript{641} Frank 1990, 535-7. Tanaka SJO3, 168.

\textsuperscript{642} Frank 1990, 537-8. According to a member of the IGHQ, the ruling sentiment at this point was ‘Don’t do anything which will endanger the future or our country just to carry out the Guadalcanal island mission.’ Sanada SJO3 290. The emperor was slow to give up on the campaign, however, and felt compelled to go to the Grand Shrine at Ise before reconciling himself to the decision. Bix 2000, 461; Tarling 2001, 104; Drea, 1998, 189.

\textsuperscript{643} Goldberg 2007, 22-32, 89.
battle in the Marianas had been anticipated for some time, however, so the Japanese fleet believed it was prepared to stage a decisive battle there.\(^{644}\) Despite careful planning and a daring strategy, the battle was a disaster for Japan. Even more than the ships lost, however, the battle destroyed the IJN’s cadre of pilots. Already largely inexperienced, these fliers and the planes they flew were terribly outclassed by their American opponents, and hundreds were lost in what the Americans came to call the ‘Great Marianas Turkey shoot.’\(^{645}\)

Since September 1943, the Japanese had adhered to the ‘Absolute Zone of National Defense’ policy, which specified a defense line that they believed they could hold for at least a year.\(^{646}\) A key part of their plan to wage protracted war, the AZND was the core of an attritive theory of victory. Given this attritive theory of victory, the relevant prediction is that they will focus very attentively on events that risk compromising their defenses and their ability to continue fighting. Because the attacks at Saipan and in the Marianas did this, I predict that the Japanese military and political authorities would view them as both very negative and very important.

This was very much the case. These June, 1944 defeats were seen as tearing away an island chain that had been seen as a key part of the AZND defense lines. Similarly, the failure to win the decisive battle at sea was seen as deeply worrying because the other component of impregnability—the ability to beat back the Americans should they attempt a naval invasion of the zone—failed in this instance. It was also recognized as a disaster because it compromised

\(^{644}\) Shimada, in particular, led the Emperor to believe that this had rea potential to be a decisive battle. Drea 1998, 192.
\(^{645}\) Goldberg 2007, 91.
\(^{646}\) Saipan was considered a bastion of the AZND, and Admiral Koga declared that it would be held until death. Goldberg 2007, 91.
future efforts to hold back the American advances the Zone by eliminating many of the IJN’s pilots, who were essentially irreplaceable.

That many saw these events as threatening to their theory of victory was is clear. Within the IGHQ, the disaster was sensed immediately and the staff went very quickly to work on ways to try to figure out a new approach to the war. Among the politicians and court, the reaction is equally clear. In addition to some leaders who began to express doubt in the army and the prospects of the war for the first time, a concrete decision was reached to remove Tojo from his various offices, in July 1944. Koiso, a general who was then governor of Korea, was brought in as Prime Minister. Umezu replaced him as Army Chief of Staff, and Anami as War Minister. Shimada was replaced by Okikawa and Yonai, as Chief of Naval Staff and Navy Minister, respectively. When the Emperor asked Yonai—who was known to have his doubts about the war—and Koiso to form the government, it is said that he did so with the understanding that they would start looking for a way out of the war.

It is clear that the Army and Navy responded to these defeats in the way that they did because the threatened the fundamental basis of their theory of victory. It seems likely that this was true of the senior politicians who began to increase their pressure for Tojo’s removal. With regard to the Emperor, though his behavior is in line with my prediction, the explanation of his response to Guadalcanal may still hold here—he was merely responding to what seemed like a big defeat, because he was not committed to the theory of victory in a meaningful way. It is possible, then, that his congruent response is really a false positive.

647 Goldberg 2007, 205.
The Philippines and the Battle of Leyte Gulf

In the months after the fall of Saipan, it became clear that the Philippines would be the next target of the American offensive.\(^{649}\) The Japanese decided to try to turn the fight on and around Luzon into a decisive battle, one carefully planned and involving careful coordination and great effort by their air, naval, and army forces.\(^{650}\) Its purpose was to destroy the American assault force.\(^{651}\) The Navy would deploy much of what remained of the combined fleet, including the super-battleship *Musashi*, as part of the operation. Under the cover of ground based aircraft, including for the first time organized “special assault” (”*kamikaze*”) units, these ships would strike at the transports to cripple the landing force before it landed and to generate American casualties. To these ends, the Philippines were reinforced to the extent possible—though allied attacks on shipping meant that these reinforcements were less than planners had sought.\(^{652}\) Japanese hopes for this battle were heightened by the Battle of Formosa, when a small Japanese fleet and a large number of ground-based air units attacked an American fleet.\(^{653}\) The IJN believed that they had severely damaged or destroyed a number of major US ships including multiple air craft carriers. In fact, the Americans lost little more than a cruiser.

The events in the Philippines did not proceed according to the *Sho* Operations plan. This failure was a matter of both capability and poor strategic decision-making. The IJN devised a complicated plan, including the use of carriers as decoys, to get a strike force near the

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\(^{650}\) Hattori, *SJO1*, 21 July 1948. Evans and Peattie (1997, 494) note that the Japanese hope that a single battle could turn the whole war situation around in their favor persisted well into 1944.

\(^{651}\) Hattori, *SJO1*, 6 October 1949.

\(^{652}\) Amount of losses at this point.

\(^{653}\) The belief at IGHQ was that the Americans had forces had been dealt ‘devastating blows’ at Formosa. Hattori, *SJO1*, 6 October 1948. Drea (1998, 196) states that the highest number included in the briefings given to senior officials, including the Emperor, was 16 US aircraft carriers sunk or damaged—a highly unrealistic figure. In fact, an American cruiser was sunk.
effectively unprotected US transports. The plan succeeded at great cost—including the
_Mushashi_—but the admiral commanding the strike force experienced bouts of indecision and
twice shied away from his task without attacking. After he did so, the IJN was too weak to
mount any further fleet action against the invasion force.

Thereafter the Americans began to land on Leyte. Because of their belief that the
Americans had been severely damaged near Formosa, local commanders decided to move the
decisive battle to from Luzon to Leyte.\(^{654}\) This involved significantly reinforcing Leyte. Because
the US Navy was stronger than they realized, however, the reinforcement was a disaster, with
most of reinforcements’ heavy equipment being sunk to the bottom of the sea. Thus weakened,
there were insufficient reinforcements to mount the decisive battle. The Leyte forces were then
ordered to engage in holding actions to impose casualties on the Americans. By the time the
Americans were prepared to invade Luzon, however, a decisive battle there was rendered
impossible, there, too, due to the decimation of the remaining ground-based aircraft and the
capability lost in the Leyte reinforcement operation. Thus, the Japanese concluded that they
would not be able to mount a decisive battle in the Philippines. All forces remaining in the
Philippines where then ordered to continue their resistance in hopes of generating Americans
casualties. That force, under Gen. Yamashita, only stopped fighting when the cease fire was
proclaimed in August 1945.

For the Army, the _Sho_ operations in the Philippines were part of an attritive theory of
victory. The decisive battle was seen as having two purposes: it would keep the Americans out
of the Philippines—thus denying them a key strategic position—but it would also be a major

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\(^{654}\) This change was made in part because they believed that they could be successful there and in part
due to concern that if the Americans could gain ground anywhere in the Philippines, the Japanese would
be unable to achieve air superiority at any point within the archipelago.
blow to the Americans’ “fighting spirit.” The army leadership in particular hoped that this would suffice to make the Americans amenable to a negotiated settlement. Not everyone accepted this theory of victory. Navy Minister Yonai did not believe there was a meaningful chance of ending the war on favorable terms by this point; Hirohito was skeptical and viewed the proposed battle as something of a test for the Army’s promises. Still, among key decision-makers, Yonai and Hirohito are at best exceptions.

Given that the Japanese leadership was pursuing an attritive theory of victory focused on decisive battles, their focus should be directed toward those things that allowed the continuance of fighting. In general, the attritive theory of victory depends on wearying the opponent by continuing to fight and generate costs at some specified rate. This was not the focus of the Japanese leadership, however. Instead, they were focused on their ability to mount the decisive battle, rather than on their ability to continue fighting in the Philippines or the relative rate of loss. Many felt the battle for the Philippines was lost when it became clear that the Navy had been unable to culminate its action in Leyte Gulf; for others, when the army was unable to mount the decisive ground battle on Leyte. By the time the battle reached Luzon, the senior military leadership was already thinking about their next step. Not long thereafter, the Army gave up on supporting its forces there, though it asked them to continue fighting until the last man.656

This divergence from my predictions is best explained by the special characteristics of the planned fight. Due to the Air-Land-Sea nature of the island hopping campaign, the shape of the attritive theory of victory was more complicated than it was in the other cases. In this

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655 Drea 1998, 196.
656 Famously, some did so until the 1970’s.
situation, air, ground, and naval forces can skip over the shards of ground forces provided that they have secured an adequate base, effectively breaching the defense line despite the continued presence of fighting. ‘Holding the line’ then becomes a matter of preventing this kind of base from being secured by destroying the invading force or at least fighting them to a costly standstill. This was the aim of the Japanese’ decisive battle: they knew they had to destroy, halt, or at least slow the advance of the American and Allied forces so the fight could generate enough political costs on the American home front.\textsuperscript{657} This means that the focus of the Japanese at this point was somewhat narrower than might be the case in an archetypical attritive theory of victory. Rather than the existence of mere fighting, their focus was on their ability to conduct a battle that would increase significantly the Americans’ costs of fighting while effectively stopping their advance.\textsuperscript{658}

As such, the case does not offer clear support to the hypotheses. However, it does not necessarily contradict the key theoretical intuitions. Because the defense line would be effectively broken once the Americans were able to effectively secure any island major island in the archipelago, the Japanese’ main chance to hold back the Americans and to generate the largest number of costs for them was at the point of their main attack. Thus the decisive battle had to be early in the course of the invasion, before land could be lost and forces diffused. This is where the Japanese attention lay. Accordingly, the findings here are consistent with the Japanese leaders’ particular attritive theory of victory, and with the logic of a generic attritive

\textsuperscript{657} In principle, the fragments’ fighting could generate enough political costs to cause an opponent to make concessions. The Japanese did not believe that that this would be possible their case, however—and this seems to have been the correct judgment.

\textsuperscript{658} Note that this does not stretch the attritive theory of victory overmuch; had the island hopping-campaign continued, even with continued fragmented fighting, the Japanese would have been unable to themselves continue fighting.
theory of victory, but not consistent with the generic framing predictions associated with an attritive theory of victory. Accordingly, the results of this case are inconsistent with the hypotheses but not with the general thrust of the theory.

**Analysis**

Japanese responses to four sets of events have been presented in an effort to test the hypotheses generated by my theory. The chart below summarizes them.

**Table 4: Japan-Pacific War—Framing Effects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Theory of Victory</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Effective Prediction?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coral Sea-Midway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Fleet</td>
<td><em>Informative</em></td>
<td>Navy Defeated</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army/NGS</td>
<td><em>Attritive</em></td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army/Navy</td>
<td><em>Attritive</em> but not</td>
<td>Ignored at first, then</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showa Emperor</td>
<td>including Solomons</td>
<td>attempted to make</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Possibly Attritive</em></td>
<td>decisive battle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Loss of island</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marianas-Saipan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army/Navy/other</td>
<td><em>Attritive</em></td>
<td>Loss of key part of</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politicians</td>
<td></td>
<td>AZND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showa Emperor</td>
<td><em>Possibly Attritive</em></td>
<td>Loss of island</td>
<td>Yes, but may be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>false positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td><em>Attritive</em></td>
<td>Loss of Philippines,</td>
<td>No, but due to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>inability to stage</td>
<td>peculiarity of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>decisive battle</td>
<td>island campaigns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted above, the cases presented allow the testing of a wide variety of framing effects. The first allows a comparison between actors pursuing an informative theory of victory and others simultaneously thinking in terms of an attritive theory of victory. As such it allows not only a test of the case-specific predictions, but allows a demonstration that framing effects
are in fact active. The three island campaigns, Guadalcanal, Saipan, and the Philippines, show that fundamentally similar theories of victory—all involve attritive theory of victory for the dominant leadership group in Tokyo—can lead leaders to different events differently. Thus attritive theories of victory made the defeat at Guadalcanal largely meaningless, the defeat at Saipan very important, and the Philippines a failure almost before the fighting began.

Overall, the hypotheses predict leaders’ patterns of attention fairly well, particularly if viewed from the standpoint of their real-time informational framework. In this set of cases, the divergences from the predictions have three causes. The first evident cause is incomplete adherence to a theory of victory. This explains the divergences associated with the Emperor Hirohito in the Guadalcanal and Saipan cases. The second is incorrect or incomplete information; this explains divergences from my predictions associated with the navy regarding the Coral Sea outcomes, and the army with regard to the outcome of Midway. In some cases, the incorrect or incomplete information was the product of problematic information gathering systems, but in the case of Midway is was clearly the result of the intentional compartmentalization of information. Last, the particularities of a theory of victory that make it differ from the ideal, generic form of a kind of theory of victory also produced a divergence from my predictions. This was evident in the pattern of attention demonstrated by the Japanese leaders to the Philippines operations in 1944.

These results suggest both the utility of the using theories of victory to understand what battles will be understood as important and which ones will not be. They also suggest that while the framing effects are clear and strong, the three-fold typology of theories of victory is sometimes an imperfect predictor of how leaders will understand battles and what they will be attentive to when the nature of the battlespace is more complicated. These results also suggest
something obvious: the information that the decision-makers have, rather than the actual results of a battle, are what they respond to. This Clausewitzian fog becomes important when there are no immediate means of ascertaining the actual results of a battle on one’s enemy. This was a serious problem for all sides in the war at sea during the Second World War, because attackers were often unable to linger long enough to see if the ships they hit actually sank or not. Even if they did survive, they tended to be lost to the attacker in the vastness of the ocean as they moved to repair damage or prepare for the next assault.659

*Emotional and Learning Responses to Events*

In this section I use a series of cases to investigate when series of events give rise to reappraisals of the war situation by eliciting particular emotional responses. Five cases are presented to this end. The first case, the first months of the war, probes responses to good news. Thereafter, it probes responses to bad news. Because different actors often had different theories of victory at the same time, both the good news and the bad news strikes them with different levels of familiarity, eliciting different responses. Accordingly, I am able to contrast contentedness with joy responses, and frustration with anxiety responses. The cases presented involve some of the most important moments of the war: the responses to success at the outset of the war; responses to failures at Midway, Saipan, and the Philippines; and the

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659 Arguably, this ‘fog’ that veils the actual outcome of the battle is less of a problem for ground warfare, where it is easier to maintain contact with one’s enemy. Arguably, the radically improved tracking methods now used by the most powerful navies has made naval combat more like land combat in this respect. The fog has, for the most part, lifted.
responses to the atom bombings and the Soviet entry, which collectively led to the end of the war. Arguably, they give new insight into the nature and dynamics of the disputes among the Japanese leadership.

**Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath**

Starting in the very first hours of the war and continuing for some months, the Japanese offensives were successful.\(^{660}\) Not only did Japan achieve most of its aims, every operation was completed with fewer losses and in less time than anticipated. It was expected that it would take 50 days to take the Philippines, but the Japanese Army was in Manila by mid-January. Malaya, which was expected to take 100 days, was largely in the bag by mid-February. Singapore, which Yamamoto had believed might take six months to take, was captured on 15 February.\(^{661}\) The Netherlands East Indies were also captured well ahead of schedule.\(^{662}\) Other key actions were performed with similar effect. Though the carriers were absent and the oil tanks untouched, the sinking of four capital ships was twice what the Combined Fleet’s staff had predicted; it was done without damaging any ships (against expectations that multiple might be lost) and the loss of 29 planes—less than a fifth of those estimated to be lost. The “ABCD” Fleet was easily sunk, and the British battleships *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* were sunk by aerial assault alone.\(^{663}\) The attack on Ceylon in March, which led to the destruction of the British carrier *HMS Hermes* and two cruisers, was almost embarrassingly easy.\(^{664}\)

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\(^{660}\) Paul Kennedy (1983: 185) describes them as “amazingly successful.”
\(^{663}\) Agawa 1979, 268; Parshall and Tully 2005, 19.
These outcomes provoked different responses in Army and Navy quarters. For the Army, the most important parts of the campaign involved the seizure of ground—the Philippines, Burma, the NEI, and Singapore being foremost among them. They were strong believers in the ‘grab and hold’ theory of victory, and had never doubted their ability to seize these territories in short order. They relied on good intelligence and analysis, and meticulous planning, and achieved their aims easily, if not always perfectly—it would still take some months before Corregidor was taken, after all. But the fundamental experience for the Army during this period was of things going according to plan. The IJN’s spectacular achievements at Pearl Harbor were certainly seen as positive, but like garnishes at dinner, they were not particularly central to victory in the war. Given the Army’s theory of victory, then, these days of the war were positive but familiar. In the context of my emotion theory, this yields a prediction that key army leaders would experience contentment. With contentment should come an absence of strategic and political learning.

The perception of these events within the Navy was different. Many within the Navy had doubted Japan’s chances in 1941. Many believed that great risks were being taken. The Pearl Harbor operation itself was subject to great doubts within the Navy, and even Yamamoto recognized that it was a great risk. Aerial assaults against capital ships—the core of the Pearl Harbor plan—were largely untried. Much depended on being able to effectively surprise the enemy. In addition to these general doubts, the Navy’s focus was keeping the American fleet away from Japan’s on-going conquests on harming it where possible. Central to the Navy’s

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666 Indeed, Tojo, who was then serving as Prime Minister and Army Minister at the start of the war, only learned the particulars of the operation in the fall of 1945. Evans and Peattie 1997, 460.
theory of victory—and this was true of Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet faction as much as it was true of the Naval General Staff—was the fight against the US Fleet. For these men, this fight against the fleet was the essence of the theory of victory they agreed to in the late fall. In this context, the Navy’s spectacular successes were clearly positive. That they were achieved with such ease and with such new methods made them unfamiliar, as well.668 This should elicit joy and along with joy, speculation about what might be possible and a tendency to ignore obstacles.

The experience of those involved seems to bear this out. The Army general staff displayed happiness at the successes they encountered. Hattori recalls the response within IGHQ as “Truly, we felt that Divine favors were upon us, and we were deeply impressed by the splendid results. However, he also quotes the Army Operations Section’s Secret War Diary” entry for the day, which states in part that

At the close of the first day of war, it is indeed a gratifying to all us members of the war direction section, that w could confirm the successful and ideal opening of hostilities, as evidenced by the surprise attacks and the elevation of the fighting spirit of the people as a whole. However, the most difficult problem is to bring the war to a successful termination. This can be achieved only when the divine favors are with us.669

This response is strongly suggestive of happiness rather than joy—in good part because of the emphasis on the hard road yet ahead, something not evident in Yamamoto or his staff’s response. Similarly, Tojo felt the need to caution both politicians and the public against overconfidence.670 This act indicates both the level of joy felt among the population and the

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668 Kennedy 1983, 186.
669 Hattori 1953, I.371.
degree to which Tojo did not share in it—though he was certainly happy to see Japan’s successes.

But at the same time, the Army remained committed to its key concepts. Now that key areas were secured, those conquests must be reinforced in preparation for a defensive fight against the Americans. There was no need to change approach, indeed, doing so could be dangerous. Accordingly, the general staff worked very hard to prevent the dilution of its forces and the expansion of the region to be defended. As will be seen, the Navy acted quite differently, proposing sets of operations that would not only continue Japan’s expansion across the Pacific, but would involve changing the fundamental approach to the war agreed-to before. This lead to fights with the Navy throughout the winter and spring of 1942. General Tanaka, head of the Army Operations bureau of the IGHQ, described some moves that the Navy sought to make as “reckless,” poorly thought-out, and even delusional. Hattori, his chief of staff at the time, describes some of these major plans presented by the Navy as so fanciful as to be “absolutely impossible.”

It is often said that the successes of the first weeks of the war provoked ‘victory disease,’ an enthusiasm so strong that one author has described it as ‘almost a national catharsis.’ This enthusiasm was widely felt among the public and parliamentarians, but it was also felt among some decision-makers. The Emperor, for instance, who had before the war been so doubtful was said to be in a “splendid mood” on 8 December as he heard reports come

671 Wilmot 1983, 79.
672 Hattori, SJO1, 5 October 1947, 16 August 1949.
673 Costello 1981, 214; Stephan 1984, 126-7; Wilmot 1983, 34.
674 Kennedy 1983: 186; Togo, SJO3, 241; Tarling 2001, 78; Thompson 2001, 178. Though a few—former cabinet minister Shigeru and Lord Privy Seal Kido suggested that things had gone so well they should consider seeking peace, there was little interest in their proposals. Tarling 2001, 90.
It was also widely felt amongst the Navy leadership. Uchida, an officer of the Navy General Staff recorded that when the message ‘Tora, Tora, Tora’—the code for a successful attack on Pearl Harbor—came in, everyone gathered in the office became “wild with joy.”

In the days thereafter, Commander Sanagi, a leading member of the Air operations staff at Imperial General Headquarters, wrote in his diary “Oh, how powerful is the Imperial Navy.”

On the Nagato, the flagship of the Combined Fleet, those responsible for planning and winning acceptance of the plan accepted with elation, jubilation, and relief. According to the literature, there was one exception to this—Admiral Yamamoto himself. He remained unmoved, almost gloomy.

Indeed, several authors have described his response throughout this period as depressed or gloomy, and continuing to have severe doubts about what might be possible. On its face, this seems contrary to my expectation that he would experience joy. However, there is also evidence that in the days after the attack, Yamamoto began to experience something more like joy. Within two days, he was making bets on the fate of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, and when he heard both had been sunk by aerial assault, he was described as being ‘gleeful,’ his cheeks ‘flushed with excitement.’ Shortly thereafter, he wrote to a friend that “If we had known that air units along could achieve so much in the Hawaii operation, we wouldn’t have used just air units.” A letter written on 19 December to a former

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675 This continued. On 7 February he was described as being “intoxicated” by Japan’s victories. On 9 March 1942, Kido described hi as being “obviously delighted” by the progress of the war and smilingly telling him that “we are winning too quickly.” Bix 2000, 437, 446, 452.
676 Goldstein and Dillon 1993, 79.
677 Goldstein and Dillon 1993, 89.
679 See particularly Hoyt 1990, 140-148.
680 Stephan 91.
CIC of the Combined Fleet—who was also a former Carrier commander—is suggestive that he was rejoicing in the outcome even as he was aware that things were not yet settled:

As it turned out, I should say we were blessed by the War God, since a wide high pressure zone, the last one appearing in that district this year, prevailed in the district extending as long as 2,000 miles. It was the first such phenomenon since 1938, which enabled refueling at sea.... Such good luck, together with negligence on the part of the arrogant enemy, enabled us to launch a successful surprise attack. Especially of note is the fact that the actual hit rate of aerial torpedoing and bombing was upped 50% compared with that of training. I can't help by conclude that such and achievement was beyond the reach of human beings, and the loyal fliers must have been inspired by the soul of the emperor, who graciously worried about the outcome of this attempt. I am deeply impressed by this development....

[With regard to the attacks on the Repulse and Prince of Wales] Be that as it may, least expected was the fact that 51 medium land-bombers launched a successful attack on a fully-protected enemy fleet without any help from a surface force or fighters, and sustained a minor loss of only three bombers, and even those were shot down after releasing a torpedo. I think this fact should be taken into serious consideration in planning future war preparations.... I well realize that it will be long before we reach a successful conclusion of the war and there are numerous difficulties lying ahead of us. But, as mentioned, the burning spirit and the skill of those young officers and others are worthy of appreciation and respect. Therefore, I am now thinking that we may be able to reach His Majesty’s wish when we exert ourselves to fulfill our mission.  

Even as the messages about the Pearl Harbor attack itself came in, there were points when he grinned. Perhaps Yamamoto was less excited than those around him as the reports came in because he did not believe the reports about how many battleships were sunk. Later that day when his staff was preparing its initial report, he suggested that his staff officer might be exaggerating when he accepted the task force’s report of two battleships sunk; he felt that one was more likely. In the event, four were sunk—something that would become clear over the next few days. There were also no indications yet of whether or not the Japanese fleet was out of the woods. The American carriers were at sea, after all, and when the Combined Fleet had war-gamed the operation, the Japanese lost 2 carriers with 2 more heavily damaged, and

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681 Letter to from Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku to Admiral Sankichi Takahashi, reprinted in Goldstein and Dillon 1993, 120-121.
682 Agawa 1979, 259.
683 Agawa 1979, 260.
127 planes lost.⁶⁸⁴ In the event, no ships were lost with the exception of some midget subs, and only about 30 aircraft.⁶⁸⁵ Overall, then, it seems correct to say that Yamamoto was experiencing joy as well during this period, if perhaps in the name of decorum and proper military bearing he at times hid it.

Certainly his behavior with regard to his approach to the war suggests the experience of joy. The day after the Pearl Harbor, he instructed Ugaki, his chief of staff, to begin investigating another offensive toward Hawaii—something he had dismissed just months before as infeasible.⁶⁸⁶ Indeed, during those December months he is said to have ‘repeatedly’ brought this issue up.⁶⁸⁷ It was formally brought forward in early January, but when the Army issued a firm veto, he and his staff continued to develop the idea. By the end of January, Yamamoto seems to have become convinced that not only was the approach valid, but the conceptual core of a different approach to the war, one based on offensive action rather than defensive action that would see the Americans brought to the negotiating table within a year.⁶⁸⁸

The further development of the plan also bore the hallmarks of joy. The concept was only adopted by the Navy as a result of Yamamoto’s cachet and political power within the IJN, and he overcame serious and well-grounded objections through a threat to resign.⁶⁸⁹ Similarly, the table-top exercises were, in contrast to those leading up to the Pearl Harbor attacks, carried

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⁶⁸⁴ Stephan 1984, 82.
⁶⁸⁵ There was also some frustration with the failure of Nagumo to order a second strike at repair facilities and the oil pipelines. Ugaki and others suggested the fleet actually be turned around for such a strike, but Yamamoto preferred to accept his task force commander’s decision. Agawa 1979, 265; Hoyt 1990, 140-8.
⁶⁸⁶ Stephan 1984, 92.
⁶⁸⁷ Stephan 1984, 92.
⁶⁸⁸ To have a sense of how much Yamamoto’s beliefs had changed, prior to the war he thought Japan’s best chance would be to seek peace after the fall of Singapore—which he expected to take about six months, rather than the two it actually took. Tarling 2001, 102; Agawa 1979, 292.
⁶⁸⁹ This opposition came from the Army, from the members of the carrier divisions who would have to execute it, and from members of the Navy General Staff. Stephan 1984, 105; Parshall and Tully 2005, 19; Wilmott 1983, 68.
in a very lax and casual manner. Rolls of the dice deemed improbable were re-done by Ugaki, who acted as principle umpire. Key questions about contingencies were allowed to remain unanswered. When the Coral Sea battle eliminated two carriers, the Zuikaku and the Shokaku from the order of battle, no changes in the plan were made and intelligence about the resources the US could bring to the table was read in an optimistic manner, discounting the risks that fighting a battle with at parity could bring. When the Zuikaku was brought back to harbor largely denuded of its air squadron a week before the task force was to depart for Midway, no great efforts were felt necessary to staff it an prepare it for battle—unlike the herculean effort made to patch the Yorktown up in order to ready it for the Midway battle. Intelligence work was appallingly bad, including a radical underestimation of the US forces on Midway, the locations of the American carriers, and a firm belief that the US had no inkling of their approach.

In sum, unlike their preparation for the Pearl Harbor attacks, Yamamoto and his staff ignored objections, derided possible obstacles, and resisted contrary information of any sort. This is consistent with joy. Everyone not themselves acting under the influence of joy, and who remained skeptical or even concerned about what Yamamoto was doing, was cowed by Yamamoto’s determination to proceed.

Yamamoto and his Combined Fleet Staff were not alone in the Navy in feeling joy or experiencing its effects. A similar joy was evident at Imperial General Headquarters. This led to proposals to expand in other directions—particularly to invade the Aleutians to the North,

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690 Parshall and Tully, 63-7.
691 Ito 1956, 63.
692 Parshall and Tully describe Yamamoto as having thrown honesty out the window during the planning stage, and later states that “If [staff work and battle preparation] is symptomatic of victory disease, then it was a malady that sapped the imagination and diligence of the affected.” Parshall and Tully 2001, 64. Wilmott states that Yamamoto, “convinced of his own infallibility,” assembled a “plan was unreal. It was put into effect at the insistence of the Fleet Commander, despite the fact that the considerably body of opinion within the navy opposed it. Wilmott 1983, 111.
Australia to the South, and the Samoa-Fiji region. Indeed, the opposition to the Central Pacific plan from the Naval leadership in Tokyo was based in part on their preference to use the same resources elsewhere. Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano was particularly wedded to the south-ward advance to Fiji.

Over all, then, the events of the first period of the war were perceived in different ways by key Japanese Army and Navy leaders. These different perceptions had important effects on the further development of the war, because they produced different emotional responses to those events, and along with those different emotional responses, different patterns of learning. While the contented Army made every effort to move ahead with its theory of victory by consolidating its gains, principal Naval leaders entered into a period of speculative planning. The product of this speculative planning was a new, informative theory of victory fundamentally at odds with the Army’s approach to the war, which would culminate in a renewed attack on Hawaii. As they proceeded with this planning—against a background of continuing success—they ignored the objections of the army and operational details that would later doom their operations at Midway. These historical experiences are precisely what I expect given my theoretical approach.

These cases also show the utility of my approach in explaining one of the more curious puzzles in Japanese strategic decision-making during the war. Both at the outset of the war and the summer of 1942, the Navy was notorious among the Army for its doubts, caution, and apparent cowardice. But in the weeks after Pearl Harbor, Navy leaders like Yamamoto went

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693 A leading member of the Naval Section staff at IGHQ recalled that “with the outbreak of war, the initial operational successes on all sides brought forth an opinion that the initial victory should be followed up with more powerful operational activities. Tomioka, SJO3, 313.
695 Kennedy (1983: 187) argues that their basic battleplan was flawed.
from trying to undercut the Army’s optimism to proposing a plan that even the optimists of the General Staff thought fanciful, beyond the resources of the Japanese state, and likely to increase American determination rather than reduce it. Far from being pursued to score points in an inter-service rivalry or in a spirit of desperate risk taking, Yamamoto’s letter makes clear that he really believed his operation might actually be successful, and might cause the Americans to back away from the war. In accepting these beliefs, he explicitly rejected his own earlier doubts about using an attack on Hawaii to end the war, which as late as September he himself had thought impractical.

**Midway**

The defeat at Midway was fully recognized and understood by the Navy. It was not fully recognized by the Army—the details of the defeat, including the number of aircraft carriers lost, were simply not shared with them. The Army and others in the government only learned of it over a period of weeks and months, as facts and partial facts slowly leaked out. Accordingly, in this case I am focusing only on the experience of the Navy and the Emperor, who received the basic facts of the incident in its immediate aftermath.

Midway was an unmitigated disaster for the Japanese Navy. They failed to achieve the immediate objective of taking Midway Island. Their efforts to provoke a decisive battle were thwarted, as the Americans identified their plans and attacked the Japanese fleet before it was fully ready to execute its battle plan. In addition to four aircraft carriers lost or severely damaged, 696

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697 Parshall and Tully 2005, 386.
698 Kennedy (1983, 187) states that “in the battle of Midway, the Japanese made a terrifying number of mistakes.”

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damaged, the 100 experienced pilots and 322 planes lost permanently damaged Japanese naval aviation. This damage was great enough the while the Navy retained significant power, and several aircraft carriers, it was no longer had the capability to attack outside of the range of its ground-based aircraft. Thus, it no longer had the ability to strike at Hawaii or points east.

For those in the Navy who had supported the strike, and particularly for Yamamoto, who had insisted on the strike as prelude to a war-ending victory near Hawaii, Midway was bad news. It was also unfamiliar. Though he had gone into the war doubting Japan’s chances, his string of successes seems to have made him believe that an easy victory could be won near Midway. As the previous case shows, he accepted and participated in a sloppy planning process—particularly as compared with his preparations for the Pearl Harbor attack. So to lose in such a spectacular way was a novel as well as negative. This being the case, my prediction is that the outcome would be anxiety and a reappraisal of his approach to the war.

It is certainly the case that he reappraised his approach to the war. Not only did he give up on a further attack on Hawaii, he seems to have given up his expectation that the war could be won through informing the enemy of Japan’s capability. Instead, he began to adhere to the attritive-type thinking pervasive at the IGHQ and among the Tokyo decision-makers. However, he seems to have placed much less faith in it than others in the Navy General Staff.

699 Thompson 1995. In November 1942, Yamamoto said that “in the Navy they used to say that one Zero fighter could take on five to ten American aircraft, but that was at the beginning of the war. Since losing so many good pilots at midway we’ve had difficulty replacing them. Even now, they still say that one Zero fighter can take on two enemy planes, but the enemy’s replacement rate is three times ours....to be honest things are looking black for us now.” Agawa 1979, 321.

700 Agawa (1979, 321) states that “Yamamoto’s idea in the Midway operation seem to have been to score a victory that would give a second chance for an early peace settlement, and the shock of failure must have been correspondingly great.

701 According to Evans and Peattie (1997, 490) “After Midway, the Navy acceded to the Army’s request on once more turned its attention to meeting the allied counter-thrust in the New Guinea and Solomons area.” Part of this involved calling off the attack into the Samoa-Fiji region, then scheduled for July.
and among the Army leadership.\textsuperscript{702} His reported emotional response is somewhat hard to decipher, because while he exhibited an unusually strong response, retiring to his cabin for several days with complaints of severe abdominal pains, the diagnosis at the time was an attack of abdominal parasites (‘worms’).\textsuperscript{703}

Others who were fully aware of the plan had somewhat different reactions, because none of the other war leaders adopted this theory of victory. Nagano and the Naval General Staff, as well as Nagumo and his staff, had accepted this plan only at the risk of Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet Staff resigning en masse. It failure, while bad news, was not surprising—particularly since they had expressed prescient objections to the operation and its specific war plans. Thus my expectation is an experience of frustration, and a lack of learning or re-appraisal. Their frustration is self-evident: Kusaka, Nagumo’ chief of staff, said he “felt bitter,” and “I felt like swearing.”\textsuperscript{704} However, deprived of the ability to pursue their next goal the drive to Fiji, they cancelled it within the month.\textsuperscript{705} However, this was because of a lack of resources rather than because they had reappraised their beliefs about how to win the war. The emperor approved the operation, but it is unclear about how much he had adopted it as a serious path to victory. Therefore it is hard to make a prediction about the nature of his response, which has an enigmatic quality. He appeared to be ‘shaken’ by the news at first, a possible sign of anxiety, but then gave the curious order to prevent news of the defeat from getting to the soldiers,

\textsuperscript{702} Yamamoto’s journey, then, has a remarkable shape. Before the war, he had serious doubts about it. After successes at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere, though, he came to believe that there was a cheap and easy way to win the war—through a Central Pacific invasion. But after it failed, he was left more pessimistic than his colleagues of equal rank. All the while those colleagues, particularly in the Army, never changed their approach to the war, or their belief about how it should be done.
\textsuperscript{703} Agawa 1979, 321.
\textsuperscript{704} Morison, 1949 (vol. 4), 158.
\textsuperscript{705} Morison 1949 (vol. 4), 159.
sailors, or people, so as to avoid hurting their morale.\textsuperscript{706} However, if it led him to doubt the war, he did not make this apparent to anyone—indeed he would not until the strains and failures of the Guadalcanal operation, then some months in the future. The Army seems to have had relatively little reaction to the outcome. The operation section’s Secret War Diary from 8 June states that

\begin{quote}
The navy, which tasted its first setback since the outbreak of the war, must be feeling the anguish of defeat, and the army is deeply sympathetic with the navy. However, victory and defeat are incidental to a war, as the saying goes.\textsuperscript{707}
\end{quote}

These words do not suggest a strong response, certainly not anxiety. Because they were less well informed about it, it appeared negative—unsurprising, since they had opposed this sort of move for some time—but of undetermined import since they were unaware of the scale of the loss.

\textbf{Saipan and the ‘Marianas Turkey Shoot’}

In early June 1944, the US made a surprise landing at Saipan. After three weeks of often fierce fighting, the island was lost to US control.\textsuperscript{708} This defeat was coupled with the naval defeat in the Marianas, known within the US as the ‘Great Marianas Turkey Shoot’ for the great number of Japanese planes shot down with minimal US losses. As part of the AZND plan, the

\textsuperscript{707} Quoted in Hattori 1953, II.149. The next day’s entry suggests frustration—asking if the Navy had not acted rashly.
\textsuperscript{708} This was far longer than the US had expected; the US Navy anticipated seizing the island in only three days.
Army had been working to reinforce Saipan, to make it a bastion of their defense line. Over a six month period, they increased their fighting strength on the army from little over 1500 troops to over 40,000 soldiers. They were aware that the island would probably become a target of US attack, but did not believe that the US would be able to attack it until the late summer of 1944, most likely in August. Similarly, the IJN anticipated that an important battle would likely be fought in this region, and viewed it as an advantageous opportunity for a decisive battle. In addition to their carrier-based aircraft, there were enough Army ground-based aircraft stationed on nearby islands to nullify any advantage the US had in naval air power. Accordingly, Operation A-Go, a plan for a decisive naval battle in this region, was readied for implementation.

After some preparatory bombing attacks in late May, the American forces landed at Saipan on 7 June. Having failed to recognize the scale of the Japanese build-up, the fighting was slower and harder than expected. Nevertheless they were able to solidify their beachhead and begin to move inward from there. So effective was their attack that the Japanese leaders quickly came to believe that their only hope was a Navy victory followed by significant reinforcement. Shortly after the landing, the Navy decided to activate A-Go. Unbeknownst to the Navy, however, the local IJA ground-based air forces had been decimated in the May

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710 They would have increased these numbers even more had their effort not been partially compromised by American attacks on their shipping. Goldberg 2007, 22, 32.
711 Goldberg 2007, 23, 35.
712 Goldberg 2007, 24-5.
713 Goldberg 2007, 90-1.
714 Significantly, Naval Minister/Chief of NGS Adm. Shimada told Hirohito that this would be the decisive battle. Drea 1998, 192.
715 By 15 June, the Japanese commander on the island, Lt. General Saito, had wired High Command about the difficulties that his forces were having holding back American Advances.
716 This decision, to activate the A-go plan, was made 15 June. Goldberg 2007, 89.
bombing runs. While the overall naval plan was tactically sound, the Japanese lacked enough skilled pilots and enough machines to put it into effect against the Americans. They also fought with half of the strength they believed that they had, thanks to the army’s lying about their ability to contribute planes—lying which continued during the battle itself. The outcome was few ships lost but probably more than 400 planes lost with their pilots. Fewer than 30 American planes were lost. Given these numbers, it is unsurprising that they were unable to make a significant dent the American naval assets in the area. They were also unable to relieve defenders on Saipan, with the consequence that the ground forces there lost control of the island about three weeks after it was attacked, on 9 July.

The defeats at the Marianas and Saipan came as unexpected bad news. The Marianas Battle was surprising not for the outcome itself so much as the tremendous air and naval losses—losses that everyone knew could never be made up. Saipan came as a shock for most all

717 The Army never told the Navy it did not have the planes; even during the attacks—when it would have been tremendously useful for the Japanese admirals to know it—the Army claimed that it had the planes, even going so far as to say that they were in the air and inflicting heavy casualties on their American opponents.  
719 Goldberg 2007, 95.  
721 The loss at Saipan was followed by large numbers of both soldiers and civilians committing suicide.  While this made a significant impact on Americans—it was the first island they conquered with a meaningful Japanese civil population, after all—but it had little effect, if any, on the Japanese decision-makers, for whom this behavior was not out of the realm of the normal.  
722 Two days after the battle, Admiral Ugaki (then leading one of the battleship divisions that had taken part) wrote”  

Utterly awakened from the dream of victory,  
Found the Sky rainy and gloomy.  
Rainy clouds will not clear up,  
My heart is the same  
When the time for the battle’s up.  Ugaki 1991, 514.  

This poem seems to describe his response, for he goes on to write “The result of the decisive battle on which we staked so much was extremely miserable.  No only was our loss great, but we could not save Saipan from peril.” (416)
policy makers because the attack was entirely unpredicted and involved the rapid loss of one of a major component of the defense line associated with the Absolute Zone of National Defense.\textsuperscript{723} There were no positive events for the Japanese leadership, positive or otherwise, during this period. Given the negative and unexpected character of these events, the predicted affective response is anxiety and a resulting reconsideration of political beliefs about the war.\textsuperscript{724}

These appear to have happened. In the wake of these two battles, senior military authorities, political leaders, and military staff engaged in a collective reconsideration of their course in the war.\textsuperscript{725} With this significant breach in their defenses for the Absolute Zone of National Defense, they felt unsure of the way forward, of how they could best salvage their situation. Some, particularly in the Navy and the imperial court felt from this point on that winning the war on anything like the terms they sought was impossible. But even long-term supporters of the war like Col. Hattori and the general staff were uncertain about how to

\textsuperscript{723} Significantly, the American leadership seems to have been unaware at the time of the significance of Saipan to the Japanese, or the effect on the Japanese leadership at the time. Saipan was attacked because of its geographic position as part of the island-hopping campaign, not for its effect on the Japanese political leaders.

\textsuperscript{724} Hattori describes the events of this period as “unprecedented: and “undesirable,” that due to these events and air raids on Japan, “all Japanese people felt that the fierce battle was finally closing in on them.” He continues “Since Japan had summoned all her mental and physical strength for the anticipated decisive battle in the Marianas, from the time of the Imperial Conference in September of the previous year [which adopted the AZND policy], the effect of its failure was profound. The defeat in the battle of the Marianas naturally cast a dark shadow on the future direction of the war.” Hattori 1953, III.163-4.

\textsuperscript{725} Koiso himself stated after the war that “it was my belief that the fall of Saipan...meant defeat in the Great East Asia War. Such being the case, I did not think there was anyone—if he was at all informed of the situation—who felt that Japan could win the war.’ Koiso, SJQZ, 267-8. Additionally, Hata (2007, 51) states that the outcome there caused a group of senior statesmen—mostly ex-premiers—to begin more serious efforts to try to find a way to end the war. Unfortunately, Price Konoye, when he finally got the opportunity to represent the group, made such a bizarre argument—suggesting the possible Bolshevization of the Army—that the Emperor dismissed the concerns out of hand. Hattori states that The effects were clear, too. “signs of unrest in the Japanese people began to appear, though not openly....Vigorous activities against war and for peace began to be undertaken by Prince Konoye, senior statesmen close to the Throne, and members of the Imperial Household. Criticisms against the war began to be raised loudly by people other than war leaders.” Hattori 1953, III.164.
proceed, and in fact engaged in a period of reflection and strategic design.\textsuperscript{726} This clear period of reflection is clear evidence that they were learning from the battle.

The plan eventually did not involve significant concessions, though the means by which they were expected to be won changed somewhat.\textsuperscript{727} Rather than holding off the American attacks and then destroying a significant force, the Japanese combined both actions in their plans for the fight for the Philippines, which they now correctly guessed would be the next major target of American action. Defeating the American invasion force through a decisive battle involving air, naval, and ground forces would now be enough to preserve the key elements of the Absolute Zone—if not the Zone in its entirety—and particularly the resource rich areas the war was initiated for.\textsuperscript{728}

Another strong suggestion that the establishment had changed its approach to the war came in the form of a change of government. In the immediate aftermath of the twin defeats,

\textsuperscript{726} Hattori states that “the loss of the Marianas necessitated a basic revamping of the war direction plan...and it consisted a sevedre material, as well as spiritual blow to the IGHQ and the Government. Under such circumstances, the High Command was faced with the urgent problem of establishing a definite political and military policy by laying aside all pending matters, thereby rebuilding the deteriorating order and dimming hope. In order to cope with this critical situation, the IGHQ and Government launched an extensive study on various problems related to war direction.” The resulting documents stressed the importance of “abandoning wishful thinking” and ‘recognizing cold facts.” Hattori 1953, III.268-9.. Adm Ugaki, who was not among those in the IJN who had given up on the war, wrote around this time (29 July 1944) of the difficulty of seeing a way to victory. A week later, he wrote poignantly that “I think that a human can’t display his real strength, however hard he’s urged to do so vaguely, when he can see little way to win. So I’m in agony trying to discover the way to win by all means.” Ugaki 1991, 437 and 439.

\textsuperscript{727} Former premier and then-President of the Privy Council Hiranuma said on 24 September that “diplomacy only leads to unconditional surrender;” Japan needed a great victory before it could move to the peace table. Drea 1998, 194.

\textsuperscript{728} Koiso recalled, after the war, believing that the war could be continued “if there was at least one more engagement throwing our entire strength in it to win at least this one battle. [sic] Let’s make peace after such a victory, for then if we ride the wave of victory and sue for peace, the terms will certainly be lighter and more favorable. Koiso, SJ/O2, 272.
on 18 July General Tojo resigned under pressure. His administration was replaced by a cabinet which the Emperor and the senior statesmen (jushin) may have expected to seek peace. This cabinet led by General Koiso, the Governor-General of Korea, who became prime minister. Admiral Yonai, a friend of the late Admiral Yamamoto and known to favor efforts to make peace, was explicitly added to the cabinet by the Emperor to serve as the Navy minister.

To a certain extent, this change was dictated by the resources left by these battles. The defeat at the Marianas left the Japanese Navy desperately crippled. Only two carriers were left, and the pilot force available was under-strength, poorly trained, and inexperienced. However, there is evidence that these battles elicited the emotional response anticipated, and that this anxiety response played a central role in causing the Japanese leaders to re-think their theory of victory. The Emperor was reported to be very anxious when he was told about these results.

Similarly, Hattori, a senior member of the Army staff, describes himself as having been very surprised and shocked. Similarly, among the Naval Staff, the response was strongly suggestive of anxiety. Significantly, no reports of anger were reported. The kind of learning response generated is also congruent with the behavior associated with anxiety: a thorough, seriously undertaken review of their approach to the war, done both at the institutional level (particularly in the general staff) and at the personal level, among senior war leaders.

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729 Goldberg 2007, 205; Bix (1992, 534) notes that Hirohito opposed his resignation. However, this was probably the product of Hirohito’s intense loyalty to the Throne. Kawamura 2007, 72.
730 Still, even seven months later, Hirohito responded to Konoye by stating that peace negotiations would be difficult without at least one more battlefield victory. Hata 2007, 51.
731 The circumstances associated with his appointment were unusual: the Emperor summoned both Yonai and Konoye to his presence, and then asked them to form a cabinet. Only after they had left his presence was it explained by Lord Privy Seal Kido, in response to their questioning, that the Emperor and the senior statesmen expected Konoye to form the new government. Though not explicitly stated, it was known that they were expected to work for a peaceful termination of the war. Such a termination of the war should not be confused with a plan to surrender or accept the American terms.
732 In fact, he seems to have at first protested efforts to give up on Saipan. Hata 2007, 48.
The Philippines, 1944

The Americans landed on Leyte Island after a sustained bombardment and amid the battle of Leyte Gulf. Their landing was successful, and though they encountered stiff fighting on Leyte, the Japanese were unable to prevent them from seizing control over the island after a long fight. For the IJN, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest sea battle in modern history, approached the cusp of success before receding amid great losses. The battle then progressed to Luzon, where the Japanese Army had once planned to conduct a decisive land battle. However, having believed it might be possible to stage it on Leyte, they had weakened their forces on Luzon in an effort to strengthen their Leyte defenses. Now unable to fight the decisive battle, they ordered their remaining forces to continue fighting, but erased any further strategic purpose for the Philippines.

For the Army, the events in Leyte Gulf were clearly bad—not only did the Navy fail to achieve its strategic purpose in the decisive battle, but was so weakened as to be unable to play a further meaningful role in the war. However, for many in the Army General Staff, it was also a deeply familiar kind of failure: the Navy had again failed to make a serious dent in a landing US task force. That the dithering of senior officers was the apparent cause of the failure made it even more familiar, given the negative stereotypes the Army held of their sea-going brethren.

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733 Kennedy (1983, 190) describes the plan as ‘astonishingly new,’ and agrees that they only failed in their objective because of the indecision of the task force commander.
734 Koiso, who described the coming battle as a potential Tennozan, describes the conceptual progress of the battle: “A decisive battle must involve offense. As it was, they never took the offensive at Lingayen saying itsetad that it was a weakening operation. The Luzon campaign did not become a decisive battle, It was an instance of defense to the last...This was utterly contradictory to the policy of the Supreme War Council. Koiso, SJO2, 275.
735 The fact that there was a target whose bad acts were essentially responsible would serve to increase the level of anger.

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The events on Leyte, where the Army was unable to mount a decisive ground battle, were also negative. However, much of the problem there was due to a lack of effective support from the Navy and the Air Force; the problems reinforcing their garrison there were, after all, caused by the Navy’s inability to control the waterways in the archipelago. Similarly, they lacked sufficient air support. The abandonment of the effort after it became apparent a decisive battle would be impossible meant that while the Americans took the island, the defeat lost much of its sting: by then, the Japanese were not really trying. The fight on Luzon had many of the same characteristics. By the time they had landed in strength, it was clear that a decisive battle could not be mounted and so the eventual defeat of the Army forces there was anticipated, almost inevitable.

Given that key Army leaders seem to have perceived these events as both negative and familiar, my use of emotion theory predicts that they should have experienced anger and a resistance to learning. The existence of frustration is clear. Col. Hattori, a key member of the War ministry, records the sense of frustration among the key army leaders; his own words evince fury at the Adm. Kurita, the indecisive task force commander responsible for the failure to hit the American transports at Leyte Gulf.\(^{736}\)

The pattern of learning that was obtained is more complicated. In several key respects, the response of the Army leadership suggests a resistance to new information. After the failure of the battle to develop at Leyte, they tried to put the Luzon battle plan back together to wage

\(^{736}\) Writing about it several years later, the anger remains apparent. He stresses that the decision was made without orders, that it proceeded away from the battle, “throwing away a golden opportunity purchased at great sacrifice to friendly forces,” and that because of it the fleet “returned empty-handed from a mountain of treasures.” Hattori 1953, III. 398. The secret war diary of the period records the anger of the Army that the Navy never gave them full details on their plans for the Leyte Gulf battle. Hattori 1953, III.420.
one there. Even after the failure to generate a decisive battle at Luzon, they continued to believe that a decisive battle could be successfully mounted, and that the effect of that battle would be an American offer of acceptable terms. However, despite the resistance to learning associated with frustration—and the several respects in which they continued to resist possible lessons of the Philippine Sho Operations—the Army command nevertheless did give up on the Philippine effort while there was still active, even intense, fighting there.\(^{737}\)

The reason they changed their theory of victory at this point—rejecting one centered on a Philippines decisive battle—is that they had clear expectations about what was necessary to stage a decisive battle. In their development of the concept of a decisive battle, they articulated minimum requirements. Once their own capabilities in the Philippines no longer met those thresholds, they no longer believed that they could stage a decisive battle there. While they clearly resisted many of the possible lessons that could have been drawn from the Philippines experience, resistance to new information did not, at least in this case, make what they believed to be impossible suddenly seem possible.\(^{738}\) In doing so, the Army maintained the pattern which came to dishearten their Emperor: they experienced failures and changed the operational plan in substantial ways, but clung to the belief that fundamentally similar plans would have the desired effect on their enemy.

\(^{737}\) Lt. General Miyazaki, of the IGHQ Army Operations bureau, recalled that “by mid-December, it was impossible not to abandon the original plan....“In my journal I have a passage dated 9 January 1945 which states that “it is of vital importance that real battlefield conditions be effected in the homeland.” Miyazaki, SJO2, 504. By mid-December, Admiral Tomioka of the Naval section “considered Philippine Operations a lost cause...Okinawa alone was the decisive battle ground where we could reverse the war situation. Tomioka, SJO3, 317.

\(^{738}\) This case is important for the reason that it further illuminates the role of beliefs about fundamental quantities—in this case, numbers of troops necessary to win—and wider beliefs about what is possible through the responses of others or through further, uncertain developments. It also makes clear that learning in the context is possible, but it often has a grudging learning: the limits of possibility are respected, but the changes are as small as possible and tied to the possibility frontier, the conceptual border between what is possible and impossible in a given situation.
The response of the Navy\textsuperscript{739} to these events was closer to depression and fatalism than anything else. Few in the Navy had much hope for the war after the defeat at Leyte Gulf. They had gone into the fight with doubts, and even the ingenious plan to use the aircraft carriers as decoys was an indication of their determined desperation rather than an expectation that they could achieve a victory that would alter the course of the war. After Leyte Gulf, they saw no possible way to hold back the Americans because they saw that little remained of their navy.\textsuperscript{740} At the same time, the naval leadership saw no meaningful opportunity to change Japanese policy on the war, given their weak political position relative to the army. The result of the battle, then, was not anxiety, an emotion associated with emerging situations, but rather sadness and desperation, emotions associated with concluded situations, since it coincided with a realization that there was nothing left that they could do to influence the war.\textsuperscript{741} In this sense, their pattern of learning diverges from my expectations in the same way that they army’s pattern of learning diverged: as the existing resources dwindled beneath the minimal threshold for influencing the enemy, their theory of victory was undone. Unlike the army, however, they saw no alternatives, and thus they lacked a meaningful theory of victory thereafter.

The reaction of the Emperor was different still. The losses at Guadalcanal and Saipan had caused him to doubt the Army’s assurances that a great success was possible—as he had before the great successes at the outset of the war. Given these doubts, he had come to view the Philippines campaign as a critical test. If it failed, he had decided, he would no longer

\textsuperscript{739} While true of the general body of the Navy, there were of course exceptions—including Adm. Toyoda, who would become the Chief of Naval General Staff in May 1945. However, the belief was particularly strong in the Army and Navy air arms. Kagoshima, SJ02, 2. Before that, Chief of Naval General Staff Oikawa had declared himself to be confident of victory in the decisive battle at Okinawa. Drea 1998, 198.

\textsuperscript{740} Hattori 1953, III.420.

\textsuperscript{741} If the Navy had a more central political role and more control over remaining resources, it is possible that they would have experienced frustration and revised their beliefs in a minimal fashion. Their sense of powerlessness is clearly related to the emotions experienced.
believe in the Army’s assurances and would seek after peace more strenuously. ‘Seeking after peace,’ of course, is not the same thing as acceding to the American demand for unconditional surrender, but nevertheless it would reflect a rejection of the kind of theory of victory that the Army was propounding, and would continue to propound.

Having specially set apart the fight for the Philippines as a test of his doubts about the strength of the Army, Hirohito’s response to it differed significantly from both others’ responses to the battle and from his own responses to other war news. Instead of negative feedback about a belief that he adhered to, the news of the failures in the Philippines came as an unhappy confirmation of his doubts. As a result, he learned in the sense of rejecting the army’s existing theory of victory—and indeed a whole class of theories of victory like it, which involved setting up a decisive battle and using it to gain great aims—but this outcome was not the immediate result of a learning processes caused by the news from the Philippines. Instead, for Hirohito the news from the Philippines completed the learning process started for him by the defeat at Saipan.

The loss at Saipan had caused Hirohito to reconsider the approach to the war, and to seek further information. In the context of his position vis-à-vis the army, the Philippines Sho Operations fit into that need. Accordingly, he approached the Philippines uncertain of the army’s (and previously his own) theory of victory. Put differently, he had a belief that the theory of victory the army was trying to convince him of was wrong, but felt he needed further information. After the Navy lost in Leyte Gulf and the Army was unable to assemble a decisive battle in either Leyte or Luzon, this belief was confirmed. However, unlike the confirmation of a theory of action (like a theory of victory), the confirmation of a doubt is an ambiguous moment.

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Butow 1954.
That one understood one’s situation well enough to correctly predict a failure is positive; but that a failure occurred is clearly not. That there was some anticipation of the failure means that the failure was, by definition, not novel.

Accordingly, there may have been some contentedness at being right, but it was not overt—particularly since it meant he finally rejected the Army’s theories of victory. He was then left without a theory of victory. However, unlike the Navy—which was effectively out of the game, and knew it, by this point, the Emperor still had a sense that Japan was strong enough that it need not unconditionally surrender. He just lacked the capability, in personal and institutional terms, to devise a new theory of victory.743 Thereafter, he believed that Japan should pursue a negotiated peace, but he also rejected the idea that Japan was so that she must concede everything the Allies sought. He believed that the Army was taking his country down the wrong course, and contra the army sought to make Okinawa a decisive battle.744 Thereafter, for Hirohito, the Army’s failures would be familiar bad news.

**The End of War, Japan, 6-14 August 1945**

During the summer of 1945, as Japan endured the loss of Okinawa and continued bombing raids, the Japanese Army worked to prepare Japan for invasion. At the same time, the Japanese government had started to send out peace feelers. These efforts clearly indicate that

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743 Nevertheless, he seems to have continued to long for a ‘great victory’ into the spring of 1945. Drea 1998, 200-1.
744 For Hirohito, the Okinawa battle was a difficult experience. He believed it should be fought as a decisive battle, and repeatedly encouraged further efforts to defend it—efforts which the services tried to evade, though the Navy responded to his unhappiness by sending the *Yamato* on a suicide sortie. After Okinawa had been lost, Yamamoto became decidedly pessimistic about the war—more so than he had been. This change was not evident in anyone else, however, because they had not given Okinawa a prominent place in their theories of victory. Hasegawa 2005, 45.
while the Japanese leaders were interested in peace, they were not interested in unconditional surrender. The most important one was directed at the Soviet Union; many of the Army’s leaders retained a hope that the Soviets could be persuaded to help them secure a better deal than they could get from the Americans on their own.\textsuperscript{745}

On the morning of 6 August, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. However, the nature of what had happened in Hiroshima was not clear to Tokyo decision-makers until the night of 7 August. Certainly the implications of the weapon were not entirely clear: the effects of this new kind of weapon on the probable course of war were particularly hard to determine.\textsuperscript{746} The morning of 9 August brought news that the Soviets had declared war and were invading Japanese holdings in Manchuria. Later in the day came news of the Nagasaki atom bombing.

At the outset of these events, the Japanese leadership was divided into two groups, as had been the case since late June. One was the ‘Army faction’, which was represented in key decision by War Minister Anami, Army Chief of Staff Umezu, and Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda. The Army faction generally favored continuing the war. The other was the ‘peace’ faction. It included Premier Suzuki, Navy Minister Yonai, Foreign Minister Togo, Lord Privy Seal Kido, and the Showa Emperor.\textsuperscript{747} The members of this faction were united by an interest in making peace before an invasion could be made. However, they were divided by how this should be done and how it should be pursued.

\textsuperscript{746} Sheer civilian casualty figures certainly would not change the leaders’ minds, since Tokyo and other cities had already been devastated by firebombings which killed many more than the Hiroshima bomb killed. \textit{Ketsu-Go} itself anticipated large numbers of civilian casualties. Moreover, Toyoda and others doubted the existence of more than one or two bombs.
\textsuperscript{747} Bix 1996: 85-89, 99; Rees 1994: 114. Kido had begun preparing a plan to end the war in June 1945. Matsudaira, SJ\textsuperscript{O2} 418. After Okinawa, Yonai was “decisively” for a quick end to the war. Hata 2007, 55.
The Army faction adhered to an attritive theory of victory. Anami and his fellow-travelers believed that a strong defense could be made on Kyushu, based on the detailed Ketzu-Go plan. This defense would entail such strong casualties, and presage further casualties on the other home islands, that the Americans would negotiate a peace.\footnote{Butow 1954: 120; Frank 2007: 68-80.} The Army faction believed that while Japan’s over-seas conquests may be lost, Japanese sovereignty itself would not. Moreover, many senior army leaders believed that the entrance of the Soviet Union would have little influence this outcome.\footnote{Certainly they did not desire to see its entry, (Hasegawa 2005:197), and while some of the principal Ketzu-Go planners responded to it dramatically, they soon derogated its importance (Kort 2007: 311; Hasegawa 2005: 200). Moreover, Frank presents convincing evidence that they were not overmuch concerned by it (citing Umeza, Frank 2007: 88-9).} While the Soviets might annihilate the Japanese Armies on mainland Asia, those armies (the Kwangtung most of all) had already been hollowed out in anticipation of the fight on the home islands,\footnote{Hasegawa 2005: 207.} and the Soviet Navy lacked the ability to transfer significant forces to Japan proper.\footnote{Frank 1999, 88-9.}

The peace faction was of necessity more furtive was a ‘peace faction,’ kept quiet by fears of assassination or coup d’état.\footnote{Butow 1954, passim but particularly 72fn50; Hasegawa 2005, 215; Bernstein 1996, 51. Suzuki’s attitude at the formation of the cabinet remains uncertain. There were some indications that he favored Anami’s approach to the war, and others suggesting he favored a quick end, even at the cost of an uneven peace. Hata 2007, 52.} Accordingly, their beliefs were somewhat less clear. However, in general, they believed that peace needed to come sooner rather than later,\footnote{Bix 1996, 85-7, 99, 110; Butow 1954, 63-7, 112-5.} and that few concessions, if any, would be forthcoming from the United States.\footnote{As an indication of this, in late June 1945, Hirohito asked the ‘Big Six’ to revisit the question of a major land battle in the homeland. Hata 2007, 56.} While they never spelled out what they believed was possible—unsurprising, given the strong incentives against clearly stating their position—they nevertheless believed that a war-ending agreement would
retain at minimum the key elements of the imperial system, as defined by the concept of
*kokutai*, and the position of the emperor.\textsuperscript{755} While it may seem odd to describe it as a theory of
victory, these men shared the belief that the costs and risks of further fighting would make the
Americans to make these concessions in exchange for a quick end to the war. As such, they also
had an attritive theory of victory. It differed from the Army faction’s theory of victory, however,
in that they did not believe that any further military operations were necessary. All that needed
to be done was the communication of these beliefs. The Potsdam Proclamation, ambiguously
silent on the Emperor question, encouraged this faction, but not so much that they could see a
way to end the war yet.\textsuperscript{756}

The theories of victory adhered to by the two sides had other differences. The Army
leaders had a fuller understanding of what the Americans had available to them. This was
particularly relevant to the atomic bomb. Senior army leaders were well aware of American
research on atomic weapons and the possible nature of an atomic bomb.\textsuperscript{757} In contrast, those
outside of the army had little if any inkling that this kind of weapon was possible. Army leaders
also had a greater awareness of the military situation. In particularly, they were more aware of
the state of Ketsu-Go preparations in Kyushu, which were nearly ready. What they knew gave
them a fuller measure of confidence that their resistance would seriously impede the progress
of an American invasion, while the older and less detailed information available to the Emperor,

\textsuperscript{755} Bix 1996, 93, 105, 111; Bernstein 2007, 54. Drea (1998, 211) stresses that the Showa Emperor’s
version of *kokutai* was different from that of the Army—for him, it was tied to the expression of core
Japanese values and institutions, among them the imperial institution and the ‘three sacred treasures.’
For those in the army, *kokutai* also involved the preservation of existing political institutions, including
those that gave the military great political power.

\textsuperscript{756} Murray and Millett 2000, 522.

\textsuperscript{757} Grunden 2008.
Kido, and the other cabinet members caused the doubt Japan’s ability to resist the attack.\textsuperscript{758} The Army was also more aware of the limitations on any Soviet involvement in the war: though they had a vast and experienced army, they lacked the means to transport them from the Asian mainland to the Home Islands. Therefore, while they could go after Japan’s Asian possessions—from which they had already pulled their best forces, anyways—they would be unable to mount a major invasion of Japan itself.

Given these different theories of victory, the two groups should respond differently to these events. For those in the peace camp, the atom bombings were clearly unexpected: none of them had access to information from the Japanese atomic weapons study group, and were most likely completely unaware of the possibility of an atomic bomb, let alone the possibility that the US could use one against them. For some in the peace camp, this seems to have been less of a surprise.\textsuperscript{759} But for all, the events were bad news; they could hardly be otherwise. For those who were most eager for peace—including Hirohito—these events were bad because they threatened the closure of what they saw as a window of opportunity to retain at least the imperial system. The Soviet entry into the war had been feared for years.\textsuperscript{760} It was clearly a negative outcome for them, as well, suggesting a balance of forces shifting further away from

\textsuperscript{758} The well-developed state of the Ketsu-go Operation has only recently been fully comprehended by western historians. In contrast, the Emperor and his circle had been strongly influenced by two very pessimistic reports delivered in mid-June: Chief of Staff Umezu’s report on Japanese forces in Asia and by an inspector-general’s report on Japanese defense preparations, both made in June and based on investigations conducted in May and early June. Hata 2007, 46.

\textsuperscript{759} Suzuki seems to have had less faith in the Soviet option, as did Yonai by the end of the summer. However, in the early summer, Togo reports that they had at least some hopes that the Soviets would be helpful. Togo \textit{SJO3}, 244, 247-8, 284. Shigemetsu Mamoru, the foreign minister until the formation of the Suzuki cabinet, stated that after the Tehran Conference, he had no hopes that the Soviets would be of use to the Japanese in ending the Pacific War. \textit{SJO3}, 287. At the beginning of the Soviet gambit, the military hoped for aid from the Soviets, but the peace faction hoped at most for mediation. Tarling 2001, 119.

\textsuperscript{760} Bernstein 1995, 291.
them. For this group then, the atom bombings should be anxiety eliciting events. The Soviet entry into the war should be a frustration-inducing event.

For those in the Army faction, the nature of these events was more complex. Army leaders were aware of the possibility of an atomic bomb and knew that the Americans were working on one, but did not believe that they would complete its development before the end of the war. The Hiroshima bomb was not a complete surprise, then, but its use was not anticipated. More critically, it did not influence their theory of victory in a direct way—it did not weaken their ability to inflict casualties on the Americans whenever they landed on Kyushu. After all, Japan had already withstood devastating fire-bombings with larger losses of life and greater damage to war production. Though in retrospect it may seem counterintuitive, given these beliefs, for these leaders the atom bombings would be likely to generate low levels of anxiety, if any.

The Japanese Army had long feared the entry of the Soviet Union into the war; throughout much of it, a large fraction of their Army was stationed in Manchuria to deter any such action—even though this meant that their conquests in the Pacific were left less defended than they could have been. At the same time, some held hopes that they could be bribed to help the Japanese avoid unconditional surrender. While the principal leaders seem to have believed that the Soviets would be unable to influence the outcome of the war too directly,

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761 Grunden 2008, 19-21. Admiral Toyoda stated after the war that “the scientific conception of a bomb was nothing novel; but the news of its perfection and employment by the Americans was a shock to me. However, I personally had doubts as to whether the American forces would continue to drop atomic bombs at frequent intervals. I did not think that they would. A reason for this was the question of raw materials. I believed that the number of bombs would not be great. Toyoda SJO 3, 2 December 1949.

762 Umezu explicitly made this argument in the cabinet meeting of 9 August, after the Hiroshima bomb was fully understood and after word of Soviet entry. Ikeda SJO 2, 552.

763 Kennedy 1983, 183.

764 Togo, then foreign minister, reports that the Army Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff (Umezu and Kawabe) approached him in May 1945 asking about approaching the Russians. Togo, SJO 3, 244. Koshino 2004, 17.
some Army staff planners preferred very strongly to avoid their entry. Given these beliefs, it is clear that for everyone in the Army faction, the entry of the Soviets into the war was undesirable, though for some it was a more severe threat than it was for others.\textsuperscript{765} It is also clear that it was not an unexpected event. They had long feared it; that they had hoped that they could persuade the Stalin to help them out of the war in no way mitigated this. They never considered Moscow to be friendly to their cause, after all, and they approached prepared to pay a large fee for the service. Accordingly, this event should be most likely to elicit frustration and a lack of learning.

During the period in question, from the atom bombing until the decision to surrender, the main government leaders were meeting daily in cabinet and Supreme Council for War Decision-making (SCWD) sessions, some of which lasted for more than fourteen hours. During this period it is possible to trace both stability and changes in beliefs, as well as emotional responses. Accordingly, I follow that course.

Within hours of the first atom bombing, key government leaders were informed that something significant had happened at Hiroshima and began meeting. However, the nature of the situation was unclear; it would take more than 36 hours for the atomic character of the

\textsuperscript{765} Umezu stated during the 9 August cabinet meeting that he believed that despite the Soviet entry, Japan could still whether the blow. Ikeda, \textit{SJO2}, 553. Anami’s private secretary, believed that it came a bit earlier than the War Minister had anticipated it—which clearly suggests that it was an anticipated event. Hayashi \textit{SJO1}, 396. Lt. General Miyazaki, commanding officer for the IGHQ Operations Bureau, suggests that in early 1945, when the Ketsu operations plan was being drawn up, serious thought was given to building up defenses in the northern regions of Japan as a precaution against Soviet invasion. Miyazaki, \textit{SJO2}, 24 December 1949. Miyazaki also recalled that “I felt that the worst had happened with Russia entered the war. However, it was not entirely unexpected….I guess I did not feel that we should immediately sue for peace. I guess that Anami and Umezu were of the same opinion. Miyazaki, \textit{SJO2}, 19 December 1949. A senior intelligence officer at IGHQ, reported that in May of 1945, members of the war ministry were divided over whether Soviet entry would come in August 1945 or in early 1946. He adds that “I prayed that they would not enter the war against Japan before the spring of the following year, hoping it would never happen. I was fully aware that the Kwantung Army would be in its weakest condition. Tanemura \textit{SJO3}, 213.
bombing to be fully recognized. Even then, the implications of the weapon were not entirely clear; the effects of this new kind of weapon on the probable course of war were yet hard to determine.

By the end of 8 August, all members of the peace faction were prepared to accept immediate surrender provided that the emperor’s status was retained. They presented this view in cabinet and SCWD meetings the next day. The Army faction however, insisted that its approach to the war was still valid, and that surrender must be accompanied by three additional conditions—a minimal occupation, self-disarmament, and Japanese prosecution of war criminals. The next morning also brought notification that the USSR was entering the war as Japan’s enemy, thus also nullifying the leadership’s prior hopes that the USSR would act as a

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766 Butow 1954, 150-1; Asada 1998, 492. Planning minister Ikeda recalls that immediately after they received news of an unusual mass casualty event in Hiroshima, a special cabinet committee was formed, as was a technical committee. The technical committee at first concluded that it was probably not an atomic bomb, and only reversed itself about a day later. Ikeda, SJO1, 550. Gen. Kawabe, Army Vice-Chief of Staff, states that given his role overseeing the Japanese program, he immediately guessed it was an atomic bomb. Kawabe, SJO2, 99. Adm. Ugaki also knew at once the nature of the bomb, and wrote that “it deserves to be regarded as a real wonder, making the outcome of the war more gloomy.” Nevertheless, he would be one who would try to continue fighting. Ugaki 1991, 655.

767 Sheer civilian casualty figures certainly would not change the leaders’ minds, since Tokyo and other cities had already been devastated by firebombings which killed many more than the Hiroshima bomb killed. Ketsu-Go itself anticipated large numbers of civilian casualties. Moreover, Toyoda and others doubted the existence of more than one or two bombs.

768 Asado 1998: 489; Butow 1954: 160-1; Bix 1996: 111; Rees 1994: 164. On the morning of 9 August, Yonai told Hoshina, one of his key deputies, that “I have given up the war.” Hoshina SJO1, 478. But note that Hasegawa (2005, 2007) argues that there was less consensus at this point, and that Hirohito and Kido were only fully convinced that the single concession plan was the best way ahead, rather than the four concession plan on 9 August. Hasegawa’s accounts rely on a particular reading of certain silences (for instance, the relative quiet of Yonai and Suzuki, (2005: 205)) and suppositions about poorly detailed meetings (2005: 206-7).

769 Ikeda, SJO2, 553.

770 Anami was apparently opposed to any concession, at all, at first, but was brought to support Toyoda and Umezu’s position after they failed to support him (Hasegawa 2005: 203). This report is not evident in other accounts, but if true more strongly supports my contentions (as it is a complete absence of learning) than the account I report above.
mediator. At mid-day, news also reached the decision-makers in Tokyo that Nagasaki had been bombed. The meetings continued, still deadlocked: neither side moved from its position, neither side changed its mind in the slightest. Starting just before midnight, at the instigation of the Premier and the Lord Privy Seal, a meeting of the SCWD was held in the presence of the emperor. When it again deadlocked, Suzuki turned to the emperor and asked him to settle the question. Asking the emperor to decide a major question of policy himself was an act without precedent in modern Japan. As had been arranged, Hirohito spoke in favor of accepting the Potsdam Proclamation, provided that the Emperor’s position would be retained.

Later that day (10 August) a message to that effect was sent to the Allies. The response (received 11 August) seemed to indicate the acceptability of the reservation, though it did not overtly guarantee it; rather, it was left to the eventual will of the Japanese people. The next three days brought wrangling over whether this was enough or not; again, the peace faction deadlocked against the Army faction; again, the Emperor intervened and resolved the question in favor of accepting the terms and making peace.

The preservation of the imperial house accepted by Hirohito seems to have been substantially less than the kokutai he had earlier sought to preserve, which suggested a much more comprehensive maintenance of the associated dominant social and governmental norms and which seemed to be better reflected by terms sought by the Army faction after 8 August. Indeed, by 9 August, Hirohito seems to have been willing to abdicate if needed, so long as the

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771 Rees 1994: 117. Ikeda also states that the combination of the atom bombings and the Soviet entry motivated Suzuki to end the war. Ikeda, SJO1, 543.
772 Rees 1994, 164-5. It seems clear that the privately expressed views of the emperor were influential in the decision-making process when they were in fact expressed (Wetzler 1998). Formal and authoritative decision-making in the face of cabinet disagreement was very uncommon, being limited by the quasi-constitutional norms of the system and the emperor’s own beliefs about his role.
773 Rees 1994: 165
774 Bix 1996.
imperial house continued. The timing of this change in beliefs suggests that it was influenced by the first atom bombing, rather than the entry of the Soviet Union or the second bombing. Other members of the peace party seem to have changed their belief at the same time. This is evident in their determination to actively pursue peace immediately, rather than continue their quiet campaign.

The Army faction also seems to have changed their terms. Now they were willing to accept the Potsdam terms which called for the disarmament of their military (so long as they were to perform it) and the removal of the Army its position of predominant political power; before, they had only been willing to give up Japan’s conquests. This was evident in the meetings on 9 August—and evident before they heard about the second bomb. They did not change once they found out, however, and seem to have accepted surrender only because the Emperor, through his interventions on 10 and 14 August, insisted.

The responses of the two sides, though almost simultaneous and superficially similar, have important qualitative differences. The Army faction admitted willingness to make further concessions, but all involved doubted that the Americans would accept those concessions as the basis for ending the war. These apparent concessions, then, would constitute a ‘poison pill’ in any peace offer. Moreover, they continued to believe that resistance in the Home Islands would

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775 This is based on comments made to the Imperial Family that his own fate was of secondary importance (PWRS 1968, 22) and the fact that suggestions that he might abdicate if necessary had been made in this circle. Abdication seems a more likely interpretation of his willingness to sacrifice himself, given the context.
776 Togo, for instance, at this emphasized that the preservation of the imperial house was the most that could be asked (Bulow 1954: 163). But see also Hasegawa (2005, 2007) for an alternative depiction of the peace party.
777 Ida, S/O1, 514-5; Inaba, S/O1, 583. Kawabe stated that “Anami was a man of unswerving loyalty to the emperor. Therefore, he was the sort of person who would submit to an imperial decision without question.” Kawabe, S/O2, 95.
778 Hatano 2007.
lead to better terms, and so they were not so willing to concede as much as the peace faction.\textsuperscript{779} In contrast, the peace faction and the emperor no longer believed that anything else could positively influence the outcome of the war for Japan.\textsuperscript{780} Thus, the change in beliefs is more marginal than that of the peace party, who no longer believed in the feasibility or utility of resistance.

These values of the dependent variables are explainable in terms of the emotion-oriented model of learning. The key to the explanation lay in the differing representations of the situation and the differing emotions that were elicited when the events were perceived through these different lenses. Hirohito had been pessimistic about the course of the war since the Okinawa campaign, had had significant doubts about Ketsu-Go since late June, and had urged his cabinet to find a way to end the war soon.\textsuperscript{781} Comments in the immediate aftermath suggest that he may now have been concerned that the bombing had signaled a new phase of the war and that the moment to make a peace that would preserve the imperial system was passing.\textsuperscript{782} Thus, he seems to have believed that a basis for peace already existed, and now the bombing created a novel threat because it suggested that the window of acceptable peace was closing. In short, the atom bomb inserted novelty and threat into his perception of the situation, which should stimulate anxiety and with it increased information search, greater efficiency in the drawing of connections between events and over-arching beliefs, and changes

\textsuperscript{779} Hayashi, SJO1, 396.
\textsuperscript{780} In part this was because they doubted the soundness of the resistance plan. That said, they seem to have been unaware of how it was supposed to work—hence Hirohito’s criticism of its lack of defenses near Tokya, far from Kyushu. They may have been concerned that an eventual defeat might be accompanied by a popular leftist revolt might destroy those elements of Japanese society they particularly valued, including the imperial house (Wetzler 1998; Bix 1996).
\textsuperscript{781} Frank 2007, 87-88; Asado 1998, 488. Matsudaira, chief secretary to Kido, believed that Hirohito found the Potsdam Declaration acceptable when it was published. Matsudaira, SJO2, 420.
\textsuperscript{782} Hasegawa 2005, 185; Togo 1956, 315; Asada 1998, 488.
The entry of the Soviet Union and the second atomic bombing seem to have confirmed in him this new belief that peace needed to be made directly, so long as it preserved the imperial house. This seems to explain his new beliefs, the character of the changes necessary to reach those new beliefs, and his behavior thereafter.

Consonant with this view are his apparent feelings and personal behavior in the aftermath of the bombing. He is described as having been deeply surprised by the event, he asked unusual numbers of questions to his experts about the character and nature of the atomic bomb, and he inquired almost hourly after the situation in Hiroshima on 7 August. Each of these expressed feelings and behaviors is consistent with anxiety, as is his repeatedly expressed concern and, to those who favored continuance, pointed question about the chances of missing the window of agreement by trying to bargain too hard.

Those in the Army faction believed quite strongly in the prospective efficacy of the Ketsu-Go plan. Their calculations anticipated significant civilian losses, and the possibility of an atomic bombing was sufficiently familiar that though they resisted the information and sought to minimize its significance, they were able to guess the nature of the device from the early cryptic telegrams. Even after the Soviet Union entered—long expected but hoped against—and even though it violated one of the plan’s key assumptions, the Army faction continued to

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783 Suzuki’s testimony about how the atom bomb changed perceptions, particularly by potentially eliminating the need for an Allied invasion, among “many prominent people” further support this contention (as quoted in Frank 2007: 90).
784 Matsudaira recalls that the Soviet entry had little effect on Hirohito beyond strengthening his resolve to end the war. Matsudaira, SJO2, 427.
785 Asado 1998, 487.
786 Members of the War Ministry believed that the members of the Imperial Family were “too nervous” in response to the atomic bombs. Inaba, SJO1, 585.
787 Frank 2007.
derogate the significance of the news. Though their position did change in response to these events, it changed only slightly. The difference in response seems to be explained by the fact that the Army faction’s representations of the situation anticipated the bombing as well as the Soviet Union’s entry, though it hoped those eventualities would not come to fruition. Thus, while ‘jolted’ by the actual usage of the bomb, and while interested in learning more about it on the day after it was dropped, the Army faction, led by Anami, was able to accurately guess its nature, yet actively derogated its influence on the future course of the war in meetings and in analyses.

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789 Kort 2007, 311. While Bernstein (Bernstein 1995, 248 and 257) describes the Soviet declaration of war as a ‘profound psychological shock,’ he also notes that it did not move any of the hard-liners’ beliefs.

790 Kawabe’s response is worth quoting at length, because it reveals the feelings and emotions of a senior war leader at the very center of these events. It also very clearly indicates what was known and what was not, what was familiar and what was unexpected:

> When the atomic bomb was dropped, I felt ‘this is terrible.’ Immediately thereafter it was reported that Soviet Russia entered the war. This made me feel ‘This is really becoming a very difficult situation.’ Russia’s participation in the war had long since been expected, but this does not mean that we had been well prepared for it. It was with a nervous heart filled with fear that we expected Russia to enter the war. Although, it was a reaction of a man who was faced with the actual occurrence of the inevitable, mines was, to speak more exactly, a feeling that ‘what has been feared most has come into reality.’ I felt as though I had been given a thorough beating in rapid succession, and my thoughts were, ‘so not only has there been an atomic bombing, but this has come, too.’

I believe that I was more strongly impressed with the atomic bomb that other people. However, even then, nay, because I had a considerable amount of knowledge on the subject of atomic bombs. I had an idea that even the Americans could not produce so many of them. Moreover, since Tokyo was not directly affected by the bombing, the full force of the shock was not felt. On top of it, we had become accustomed to bombings due to the frequent raids by B-29’s.

The majority in the army did not realize at first that what had been dropped was an atomic bomb, and they were not generally aware of the terrible nature of the atomic bomb. It was only in a gradual manner that the horrible wreckage which had been made of Hiroshima became known, instead of in a manner of a shocking effect. In comparison, the Soviet entry into the war was a great shock when it actually came. It gave us all the more severe shock and alarm because we had been in constant fear of it. Since the atomic bomb and the Russian declaration of war were shocks in quick succession, I cannot give a definite answer as to which of the two factors was more decisive in ending hostilities. Kawabe, SJO2, 97.

791 On the morning of 14 August, War Minister Anami ate with Field Marshall Hara, who was to meet with the Emperor later that day, and implored him to ‘Please explain [the results of a report suggesting damage did not penetrate far into the ground] to the emperor without fail when you report to him, and make him understand that the atomic bomb is not such a dangerous weapon. Inaba, SJO1, 585.
The basic perception of the situation suggests the elicitation of frustration or anger for those holding these beliefs. The model predicts continued resistance to contrary information given these emotions. This is congruent with the behavioral outcome. The feelings expressed in the meetings over the succeeding days are similarly congruent—when displaying emotions, Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu all expressed anger—but not rage—and frustration with their opponents and with the course of action their opponents advocated. They resisted contrary information, including the directive character of the emperor’s intervention on 10 August.

**Analysis of Emotional Responses and Reappraisals**

The cases explored in this chapter allow for a set of effective tests of my learning hypotheses, both positive and negative. The comparison of the responses to the first months of the war allow for a clear test of the different emotional responses to positive events created by differing beliefs. The remaining cases all probe experiences of learning in response to negative events, and suggest both the efficiency of this approach and some of its limits. Following the progression of particular actors’ beliefs of also provides important insights into how emotional responses can cause individuals’ beliefs to undergo non-linear transformations.

Meaningful belief change was observed at several points during the war. Yamamoto, at the outset, thought he had found an easier path to victory. After Saipan, most government leaders rejected the AZND as a means of eventually gaining victory, and sought to craft a new path to victory, finding it in the Philippines. And at the end of the war, key elements in the court and cabinet changed their beliefs such that they chose to end the war. But learning was also

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792 During a meeting on 13 August, Umezu had argued passionately that the Ketsu-go plan could work. Hata 2007, 80. After meetings the next day, Anami “appeared extremely dissatisfied.” Ikeda, SJ01, 547.
793 Umezu may have changed his mind after 13 August, however, See for instance Hata 2007, 80 and Ikeda SJ01, 548.
resisted. The Japanese Army’s leadership, along with some sailors and civilians, resisted the new plans for further expansion and easy ways to victory proffered by their naval colleagues in 1942. They did not respond meaningfully to Midway, either. They also resisted as far as possible the lessons of the Philippines defeat, and even resisted changing their beliefs even in the face of the Russian entry and atomic bombings.

The ‘victory disease’ of those first days led some to believe that victory would be fast and easy—faster than they themselves had believed but days earlier. But this joy was not equally experienced: army men like Hattori, Tanaka, and Tojo were certainly gratified and happy at the outcomes of those early days, but they resisted the ‘disease’ and even cautioned others against overconfidence in those heady days. My emotion-oriented model helps explain these phenomena with greater clarity by recognizing the differences between joy and happiness, their antecedents and their consequences. ‘Victory disease’ can be better described as joy, and its effects are precisely congruent with those associated with joy—a mental diminishing of apparent obstacles and risks. The response of the army men, who expected success in their works, is reflective of contentedness. Their flinty resistance to flights of fancy in triumph is well predicted by this emotional state, as well: for them, good outcomes in those first days meant that the plan was going well, but they remained focused on all that was yet undone in the plan.

Frustration provides an explanation of the Naval General Staff’s failure to learn at Midway and the army leadership’s failure to learn in the last days of the war. It also explains an important part of the story—but not the whole story—of the Army’s response to the Philippines-area battles of late-1944. There, though they did change their theory of victory, that reconsideration was driven by their beliefs about what was possible. But the fact that it
retained the character of the foregoing theory of victory—with only the operations transported to a new venue—suggests that frustration played an important role in suppressing a reappraisal of the character of the theory of victory. It also seems to be at the heart of their failure to learn at the end of the war. Though hoped against blow fell after hoped against blow, none of these events was fundamentally unfamiliar.

Last, anxiety provides a clear set of explanations for several key turning points in the war. Yamamoto’s response to Midway, most everyone’s response to Saipan, and the response of the peace party after the first atomic bomb were all unexpected, negative events for the named individuals or groups of people. Their responses—both in terms of behavioral reports and apparent changes in belief—are strongly suggestive that the experience of anxiety created belief change.

These cases suggest three further important points about the learning and reappraisals that occurred in the conflict. They again highlight the role of beliefs in generating emotional responses. They speak powerfully against simplistic descriptions of simple ‘shock’ as a cause of learning. Last, their demonstration of belief change producing learning is powerful rebuttal to a revisionist claim that the Japanese were just waiting for the Soviets to enter the war before they gave in.

These cases show in clear relief the importance of existing beliefs in creating emotional responses. For Yamamoto, the first days were unfamiliar because he had counted on a harder fight and a lesser chance of victory; for the army, they were familiar because they had greater confidence in their own power relative to the Americans. The atom bombs were familiar to many in the military leadership because they had been involved in Japan’s atom bomb project—something that was not true of any of the leaders of the peace camp at the end of the war.
Similarly, Russian entry had been long expected, and given that they had no navy to transport their vast forces with, discounted. The curious case of the Showa Emperor puts the importance of beliefs in particularly stark relief. Throughout the war, his beliefs only periodically tracked with those of the more active war leaders. For this reason, his emotional responses and patterns of learning were often starkly different. For instance, because he had wanted Okinawa to be a decisive battle—but failed to make it happen—its fall seems to have generated anxiety in him, a feeling compounded by the pessimistic reports he received around that period. But because no one else saw Okinawa as a decisive battle, the loss of the island struck them as much less important; after all, the soldiers there had done what they were supposed to do—delay and weaken the Americans to the extent possible.

These findings arguably supersede claims that psychological shock brings learning and concession in war. This is true for three reasons. First, events with strong emotional force only sometimes cause learning—if they yield frustration, for instance, they are unlikely to produce these changes. This is clearly borne out by the fact that several leaders, like Army Vice-Chief of Staff Kawabe, who described themselves as ‘shocked’ by the Soviet declaration of war did not cease to believe that waiting for invasion and staging a homeland decisive battle was preferable to accepting the Potsdam terms. Second, whereas shock suggests panic, the anxiety that produced belief change does not suggest disorderly learning processes or frenzied

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794 Several scholars modern scholars have argued that the shock of the events of these days was a decisive element in the Japanese decision to surrender, though ‘shock’ is not precisely defined (Freedman and Dockrill 1994; Asada 1998). These arguments echo the explanations of wartime policy-makers on both sides of the war, including secretary of defense Stimson (quoted in Feis 1966: 47), Hirohito (Bix 1996: 107, 114), and premier Suzuki (quoted in Frank 2007: 90). Clarifying the lessons of this event has a wider importance, since trying to instill ‘shock’ has become a component of war plans. The ‘shock and awe’ aerial campaign that started the 2003 Iraq War is an unsuccessful example—unsuccessful for the fact that it did not cause the Iraqis to give up. Understanding why, and therefore when (if ever) such tactics can work is, correspondingly important.
responses. To the contrary, in each case where anxiety produced belief change, the war leaders who changed their minds reappraised the situation carefully, and pursued their new beliefs strategically. Certainly there were moments of surprise and disheartenment over this period of time, but there were also expressions of anger and calm. More than anything else, the deliberations would best be described as evincing soberness. Customary protocols and procedures were scrupulously followed, and the only divergences had been carefully scripted for possible use long before the atomic bombings. Last, not all of the senior leadership was so shaken by events that they favored surrender. Three of the six members of the Supreme Council for War Direction (SCWD) continued to oppose surrender, and it seems that it was only the semi-sacral authority of the Emperor that caused them to accept the decision. Recent research has made clear, moreover, that their opposition was not based on a fanaticism, but

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795 Asado (1998) at various points describes moods as ‘frenzied’ or panicked, but these adjectives are not used in a rigorous psychological sense. Additionally, the behaviors described do not seem congruent with true panic.

796 The divergences I refer to here involve Hirohito’s extra-constitutional inventions at Imperial Conferences on 10 and 14 August. These interventions, essentially short statements expressing his will, broke deadlocks in the Supreme Council for War Direction, first in favor of accepting the Potsdam Proclamation with the imperial house preservation condition, and then in favor of ending the war on the basis of the American offer. Lord Privy Seal Kido had first drawn up plans for this months earlier (PWRS 1968: 29, 77) and many others were involved assisting him and convincing him that the time had come to put the plan into action (Hatano 2007 102-4).

797 Bernstein 2007:12; Hatano 2007:108. According to some who were close to him personally and professionally on that day, Anami appears to have only been persuaded by the crying emperor. After leaving the meeting at which the Showa Emperor decided to accept the American terms, on 14 August, he was seen to be “choked with emotion.” Speaking shortly thereafter to officers who had gathered at his office, he stated that

"I could not refute the Emperor’s belief any longer. Especially when he asked me with tears in his eyes to forebear the pain however trying it may be..Moreover, His Majesty said that he was confident of the maintenance of the national policy. Now, if you try to rise in revolt, kill Anami before taking any such action.” Ida, SJOI, 515.

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rather a carefully worked out military plan which they believed would cause the Americans to mitigate their demands.⁷⁹⁸

Last, these findings cast doubt on scholars’ assertions that the war would have ended in August 1945 event without the atom bombings. Pape’s argument that the Army was prepared to surrender seems particularly hard to sustain given that key Army leaders—most prominently War Minister Anami—were very strong supporters of continuing to fight. Nothing changed his beliefs so much as he acceded to the expressed wish of the Showa Emperor. Similarly, Koshiro has recently argued that the Japanese leadership was waiting for the Soviet Union to declare war before surrendering. While they did not surrender prior to the entry of Stalin into the war, the behavior of the key decision-makers in the army, navy, cabinet, and court does not suggest that this was the case. While some lower-ranking strategic thinkers may have believed in the utility of such an approach, nothing in Suzuki, Yonai, or Togo’s behavior suggest that this was their plan—they had ‘given up the war’ before the entry of the Russians. Likewise, the Emperor, like those in the peace camp, made his zeal to end the war quietly apparent before the Russians were in Manchuria. Nor does it appear to have moved the generals Anami and Umezu and Admiral Toyoda; they at least on the surface, their desire to continue fighting seems to have remained constant. In the person of Anami, at least, there is little doubt he sought to continue the fight.

⁷⁹⁸It is true that several elements of the plan, particularly its reliance on suicide operations (aerial, sea, and ground), may strike many as somewhat irrational. To me, this is irrelevant to whether or not their opposition to making concessions is reasonable given their beliefs.
Changes in Theories of Victory, Changes in Aims

During the course of the Pacific War, there were six discernible moments when Japanese leaders changed their theory of victory. The first two involve only the Japanese Navy, and they came in the wake of Pearl Harbor and then after the catastrophe at Midway. The next involved the adoption of the Absolute Zone of National Defense Policy, in September 1943. After Saipan, most of the main war leaders changed their theories of victory, adopting the Sho plans for using the forecasted Philippine invasion to secure a more favorable settlement. Then, after the Sho plans failed, the last major theory of victory was put into place, focused on the Ketsu-go operations to be conducted in Japan itself. The key war leaders abandoned this theory of victory at different moments: the emperor and others in his circle did so after Okinawa fell, and others in the so-called Peace faction decisively gave up on them after the atom bombings. From the point they gave up their theories of victory, they attempted to extricate Japan from the war, expecting to keep only the Imperial system—something they believed possible without any further military operation. Arguably, the Army faction never gave up on the Ketsu-go operations or the theory of victory associated with them.

The Navy after Pearl Harbor

In the wake of Pearl Harbor as Yamamoto and his colleagues abandoned the brute force-attritive theory of victory. They did so under the influence of joy. This being the case, changes in the kind of theory of victory, including shifts to informative theories of victory, are possible. Similarly, increases in war aims become likely.
In this case, Yamamoto did embark on an informative theory of victory, and did so by changing beliefs in exactly the way anticipated: beliefs that some operational obstacles were insurmountable fell away, and reasonable concerns about the difficulties inherent in his new approach to the war were disregarded. His new approach to the war did not appear to involve increased war aims, however, because he never enunciated war aims this is hard to establish decisively. Even if he retained his war aims, however, he clearly believed that his approach to the war was much cheaper than those proposed by others in the Navy or by the Army’s leadership. In this sense, the hypotheses about the nature of a new theory of victory is shown to be effective. The hypothesis about the new war aims is not corroborated, but nor is it shown to be false: a belief that war aims can be gained with less expense and greater ease is not an increase in war aims but it certainly suggests a more expansive understanding of Japan’s economy of force. Certainly, with this belief he would be much less likely to make concessions that others would have been.

**The Navy after Midway**

As the Navy reconsidered its theory of victory in the days and weeks after Midway, even Yamamoto was compelled to abandon his informative theory of victory based on defeating the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific and then attacking or blockading the Hawaiian Islands. Having abandoned an informative theory of victory under the influence of anxiety, my approach expects that a significant decrease in war aims will occur, as the individuals in question try to either terminate their war or select an attritive or brute force theory of victory. Because the

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799 Most important was General Tanaka’s objection that even taking Hawaii would not bring the US to the bargaining table.
Navy was not in a position to set aims unilaterally, there are no clear indications of what naval officers believed would be an appropriate set of war aims in the wake of the Coral Sea and Midway battles. However, it seems clear that they adopted their role in the attritive phase of the Army’s theory of victory. It is equally clear that they had less confidence in this theory of victory than most army and political leaders had; many had expressed doubts about it before the war, and the tremendously important losses produced by these two battles only increased those doubts. There are some indications of something much like defeatism among naval officers at this point. (EX) Given these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the Navy’s leadership believed that much less could be salvaged from the war than the Army believed. It is at very least clear that they believed that the efficiency of their efforts would be much lower: if in the best case they could eventually secure the aims they had been seeking, it would be far more difficult and far more expensive.

The Absolute Zone of National Defense

From the start of the war until late September 1943, no formal strategy programs were adopted. Instead, after the first phase of the initial composite theory of victory was completed and the Navy lost at Midway, most war leaders settled into an attritive way of thinking about the war. It was not quite an attritive theory of victory because there was no specified set of operation associated with it. Instead, operations were dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and much effort went into trying to anticipate, respond to, and repel American advances. This was particularly evident at Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands. Only after Japan’s merchant shipping capacity came under pressure and the military assets of the Japanese Navy were clearly

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compromised was there serious consideration given to crystallizing this attritive mode of thinking into a widely-agreed-to set of plans and operations.

This crystallization set out a fairly specific theory of victory, and in its operational conception differed in important ways with the approaches to the war that had been dominant in 1942. No longer would Japan conduct operations in hopes of provoking a decisive battle. No longer would army installations in China and Manchuria command the bulk of the best units. Instead, the Japanese would wait within their defense zone, building it up and fortifying its bastions, waiting for the American onslaught. While the defense zone excluded some Japanese possessions, those that were included would be significantly reinforced, in necessary by drawing down military forces on the Asian continent. Any offensive action beyond it was held to be at least a year off, if that. During this time, they hoped to ensure the impregnability of their most valuable possessions, hoping that by doing so they could beat back any American invasion. By doing so, perhaps repeatedly, they would weary the Americans of war further war and thus win the settlement they sought.

This clearly attritive theory of victory did not, however, appear to involve a change in war aims. At the outset of the war, Japan’s principal demands included the islands and territories where they expected to draw the resources needed for autarchy from, as well as those islands necessary to protecting them. The AZND included all these areas. It excluded islands and other conquests that had never been central to the Japanese war plan but which had been seized in hopes of speeding the end of their conflict by denying their use to the enemy.

The formalizing of this theory of victory occurred in the context of increasingly frustrating events in areas beyond the initial range of conquest. The relevant set of hypotheses, then, are those associated with changes to a theory of victory that occur under the influence of
frustration. Given that an attritive approach to the war was being replaced, these hypotheses predict minimal changes in the war aims associated with the theory of victory. This seems to be the case: the war aims suggested by the boundaries of the AZND concede none of the rich prizes the Japanese had set their eyes upon at the outset of the war.

**After Saipan**

After the battles of Saipan and the Marianas, the Japanese government felt driven to re-examine its approach to the war. This change in approach was driven by anxiety. As part of this process there was a major shake-up in the government. Tojo was removed from his positions as Prime Minister, Army Minister, and Army Chief of Staff, and replaced by Koiso, Anami, and Umezu, respectively. Shimada, who had been Navy Minister and Chief of the Naval General Staff was replaced by Admirals Yonai and Oikawa, respectively. Despite the loss of Saipan, the devastation done to the Navy, and the failure of the AZND policy, however, Japan’s apparent war aims did not change.

All that changed was their belief about how they would get them. The old operational component of their attritive theory of victory having failed, they selected a new one based around the Sho operations. These operations consisted of their plans to meet the expected American offensive into the Philippines and turn it into a ground-sea-air decisive battle. The damage they would do in this battle, they believed, could bring the Americans to negotiate a settlement which would allow them to retain what they saw as their most important prizes—including Indonesia, Malaya, Manchuria, and the Philippines. In this sense, then, they clearly
replaced one attritive theory of victory with another, but apparently did not change their aims. This is congruent with my prediction.

While this approach originated within the Army staff, but many others, including the initially skeptical Koiso, came to embrace it. Though Hirohito, Kido, and Yonai never fully embraced it, they did nothing to halt it. In Yonai’s case, as Navy Minister, he participated in making its naval aspect a reality. They may well have been satisfied with lesser war aims, but there is no record of them indicating what they might have accepted to end the war. Certainly they did not involve capitulation—the stated policy of the Allies.

*After the Failure of the Sho Operations in the Philippines*

In the aftermath of the failure of the Sho operations, the Japanese reappraised their theory of victory. However, the changes in beliefs that resulted were different for the Navy, the Army, and the Emperor and those around him. After the battle of Leyte Gulf, the Imperial Japanese Navy was but a remnant of its former self. It now lacked meaningful air forces and was struggling to supply even what remained of the fleet with enough petroleum to remain seagoing. Lacking a meaningful contribution to what was a largely naval war, the much of the Navy, and particularly Naval Minister Yonai, believed that there was little point in continuing the war. It can fairly be said that they had no theory of victory at this point. Accordingly, they were willing to make significant concessions, perhaps even those sought by the Americans, in an effort to get out of the war as quickly as possible.

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800 That they did not change their aims in a meaningful sense despite shrinking the focus of operations significantly suggests that while anxiety caused them to reappraise their military approach to the war, at least at this point they were not updating their sense of their opponent’s likely response to war.

801 Hata 2007, 55.
The Army, however, persisted in believing that the American terms—still described as unconditional surrender—need not be acceded to. Moreover, they continued to believe that an attritive theory of victory, rooted in the staging of a decisive battle which would destroy an American task force, would bring the Americans to soften their terms and provide a way out of the war significantly better than unconditional surrender. However, given the more meager material capabilities available to Japan after the Philippines debacle, however, they necessarily had to make changes in their theory of victory. Given the Americans’ capture of air bases in the Philippines, the old line of defense no longer held. Given the Navy’s losses and the catastrophic losses of skilled pilots, the next decisive battle would have to be a largely ground-based affair with some sea and air support directed against key ships in the task force. In concrete terms, this meant strong holding operations at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, which the Japanese anticipated would be the next targets of the American campaign, and the Ketsu operations plans to defend Japan itself.

Hirohito found himself between these two extremes. He no longer accepted the Army’s approach to the war, but he also seemed to believe that continued fighting could produce a better outcome than surrender. After all, the American forces were still far from Japan, which had so far been only lightly touched by the war; even the great firebombing campaigns had not yet happened. However, he seems to have been without a clear theory of victory, even at this point; rather, as he would for months to come, he suggested to various leaders the need to seek after peace. Had he had clear control over policy, and the institutional support that would

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802 Hayashi, private secretary to the war minister, recalled that the basic idea was to seek peace after inflicting heavy blows on the American forces in the decisive battle of the homeland. Hayashi, SJO1, 295.
803 Hata 2007, 51.
accompany it, he may have adopted a clearer course than this evasion—and evasion shared by a
great many politicians, including Koiso.\textsuperscript{804}

These decisions to change war aims are reflective of my predictions. The Navy, having
exhausted its resources and thus believing that Japan could no longer be defended by sea, could
no longer assemble a theory of victory.\textsuperscript{805} Having pursued an attritive theory of victory and
believed that Japan was now without a realistic way of defending itself, Yonai and those like him
in the navy concluded that doing whatever was necessary to disentangle itself from the war was
the best course.\textsuperscript{806} This decision-making is consistent with the general prediction that once
defenses are perceived to have failed, those who have pursued an attritive theory of victory will
be willing to make substantial concessions to extricate themselves from a war.

The Army leaders believed that this plan would be sufficient to maintain the
independence of Japan itself, and its possessions in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria. The
concessions made here are not trivial: with the loss of the Philippines, even the Japanese
generals essentially gave up on holding onto the ‘Southern Resource Area.’ Nevertheless, the
changes in the nature of the Japanese theory of victory were as small as possible. They involved
only the changes in the ‘vision of battle’ dictated by the change in their material situation and
did not involve any changes in their model of either the American or Japanese responses to the
war. The changes in aims associated with this new theory of victory seem more significant than
anticipated by the hypothesis on aims change for an actor acting under the influence of anger.

\textsuperscript{804} Koiso’s downfall came because he tried to act upon this in a spectacularly ill-advised way, reaching out
to unscrupulous actors in China. Those who believed that the war could be resolved without surrender
through the intercession of the Soviets followed a similar course: refusing to believe that they could be
forced to surrender everything, and trying to find an easy expedient to avoid having to do so.
\textsuperscript{805} This belief was solidified by the battle at Okinawa, which involved the sacrifice of the Yamato.
\textsuperscript{806} This seemed s to have clearly been the case by early June. Hoshina, \textit{SJOI}, 471-478.
However, they seem consistent with the theoretical intuitions: the changes in the theory of victory and the war aims were as small as material conditions would permit, and there were no changes to the beliefs about the American response to fighting. This combination of changes provides considerable evidence for the theory: the only changes involved in the new theory of victory were those dictated by the Japanese’ own changes in capability, rather than in their expectations of American responses to the fighting. In this sense, the changes in beliefs were relatively minimal, and the changes in aims were as small as was possible. This is consistent with my hypothesis that under conditions of anger, any concessions will be as small as possible.

The Emperor’s behavior is harder to fit into the theory. Given that he did not construct a new theory of victory of his own, but also did articulate an alternative theory of victory, it is hard to identify with precision war aims he would have been willing to concede at that point. However, his behavior suggests that he would have been willing to make significant concessions, including claims in China and the territories in the South Pacific and South-east Asia that Japan had gained through the war. Such significant concessions are not predicted with the falsification of an attritive theory of victory—which he putatively held—unless it is replaced by no theory of victory at all (that is, with a ‘theory of defeat’). But he does not seem to have taken that position. Accordingly, though there is insufficient evidence to make a strong conclusion about the nature of the Emperor’s beliefs, his behavior suggests an inconsistency with the hypotheses.

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807 Recall, after all, that he told Konoye in February 1945 that Japan must still win a major battle before trying to make peace. Hara, 2007, 51.
The End of the War

After the loss on Okinawa and the delivery of two reports on the state of Japan’s forces in Okinawa, the Emperor seems to have given up on Ketsu-Go. Instead, his theory of victory involved trying to get the Americans to concede to Japan its imperial system—which was taken to mean much more than just the continuation of the Imperial House—in exchange for ending the war. If they were willing to do so, he seems to have been ready to end the war with Japan un-invaded. Yonai and others seem to have shared the same view. Togo took the most extreme position, believing that nothing else could be done and Japan would be best off trying to get out of the war.

During the last week of the war, the Emperor seems to have concluded that the window of opportunity to make peace short of invasion was closing. Even without invasion, Japan would run out of basic necessities within a year. With the new risks of atomic warfare and the further shift in the balance of power it represented, there seemed to these men that there would be no better opportunities to surrender in the future. Additionally, there were concerns about the Japanese people’s continued loyalty under the increasing duress of the war. Men like

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808 After Umezu had given his pessimistic report on the state of Japanese forces in China and Manchuria, Hirohito asked Umezu “Well, that means a battle for the Home Islands is impossible, right?” Umezu did not affirm the emperor, but it is not clear that the emperor’s mind was changed. Hata 2007, 45-6.
809 Bernstein (1995, 239-40) notes that in June 1945, an offer to concede the imperial system but nothing else probably would not have been accepted.
810 Ikeda, SJO1, 544. On 7 July 1945, as he dispatched Prince Konoye to Moscow, he instructed him to “try for anything at all short of unconditional surrender. The emperor himself suggested that Konoye should be willing to accept anything that he, Hirohito, could accept in good conscience. Of course, this instruction is ambiguous as to what those limits might be. Togo SJO3, 262.
811 Hirohito and those around him had come to doubt the ability of the army to successfully conduct the battle. On 9 August, he went so far as to ask Umezu why his opinions contradicted his aide de camps’ reports. Hata 2007, 59.
Privy Council President Hiranuma were concerned about whispers of discontent. Several cabinet ministers and even senior military officers reported feelings of disillusionment and defeatism throughout the country. Even early in the summer, productivity in relatively undamaged factories had begun to crash because of increased absenteeism. In short, key war leaders were less confident that they could rely on the continued support of the people. The entry of the Soviet Union and the atom bombings seem to have produced a reappraisal of the situation in Premier Suzuki which caused him to conclude that the moment to get out of the war had arrived. For Suzuki, this seems to have involved giving up hopes for a settlement not unlike the one the Army continued to favor.

Those in Army, however, continued to believe in the possibility that Ketsu-go could at least save Japan itself, and possibly some of its older possessions. With the dropping of the

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812 During the SCWD meetings that week, he raised concerns that the ‘people’s’ fighting spirit is lost,” that “uncertainty is increasing quickly,” and further stated that “the welfare of the people is the secret of politics. If there is any uneasiness, no matter how strong the army and navy may be, it is impossible to continue the war.” Ikeda, SJO1, 554-5. Others noticed this lack of confidence among the people. Kawabe latter recalled that

In April, people were uneasy about victory. In July, those who had lost confidence became more numerous and some predictions of defeat were heard. The factors conducive to anxiety and disaffection—severe air raids, acute livelihood problems, personal danger—were increasing and [the army’s apparent low level of readiness and the air force’s] inability to check air raids intensified those tendencies. However, the mass of the people were prepared to fight on without thinking of defeat or surrender. Kawabe, SJO2, 71.

These concerns over public response were not new. Hirohito had them raised in discussions prior to the war, and they had been raised after the losses in the Marianas, as well. Hattori 1953, I.234, III.296, and III.325.

813 Just two weeks earlier, he had publicly proclaimed an intention to ‘ignore’ the Potsdam Proclamation. Ikeda, the chief of the cabinet planning bureau (but not a close intimate of Suzuki) recalled that at the time of the Potsdam Declaration, Suzuki stated that while he had before entertained thoughts of peace, “acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration was impossible.” However, on 14 August, he recounts Suzuki as saying that “I should have considered peace efforts seriously at the time of cabinet formation. It is too late, but this too is fate.” Ikeda, SJO1, 543.

814 Opinion in the war (army) ministry itself was particularly opposed to conceding, particularly if it meant being disarmed by the allies or occupation. Ida, SJO1, 511.
atom bombs and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, they stated their willingness to end the war on four conditions: the preservation of the Imperial system, Japanese self-disarmament, Japanese trials for alleged war crimes, and a minimal occupation. These conditions were clearly unacceptable to the Allies, a fact well-recognized in Tokyo. Short of those concessions, they believed that Japan should wait for invasion and execute the Ketsu-go plans. After beating back the first wave of the invasion, they would get these terms, at very least.

Given that they continued to believe in the Ketsu-go operations and that the minimal requirements for settlement were unacceptable to the allies, it is hard to argue that this was a meaningful change in war aims.

For the emperor and others in the peace faction, their reappraisal of the situation in the first weeks of August 1945 seems to have caused them to conclude that Japan was at imminent risk of strategic collapse. Caught between domestic concerns, doubts about Ketsu-Go, the shift in the balance of power caused by Soviet entry, and the possible damage of more atomic bombs, the Emperor and the others in the peace faction came to prefer to end the war to everything else. The Emperor’s willingness to shush unstable allies like Hiranuma who were

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816 Takeshita, Anami’s brother-in-law and a member of the IGHQ staff, believed that Anami was accurately representing his feelings on the matter. Takeshita, SJ/03, 51. Toyoda was less sure. Toyoda, SJ/03, 2 December 1949.
817 Admiral Toyoda recalled Suzuki’s response to others’ insistence on concession, in one of the meetings on 14 August: “[Suzuki] became highly nervous and unable to withstand the discussion, he finally shouted to those for laying down concessions, that they were deliberately opposing his opinion in order to break up the peace overture.” Toyoda, SJ/03, 29 August 1949.
818 Recall that the Emperor did not appear to believe in the ‘decisive battle’ theory any longer, in good part because he did not believe that the Army could actually make the victory happen. See for instance Ida, SJ/01, 512.
concerned that the Byrnes reply did not go far enough to preserve the imperial system indicates his fear of further waiting, elicited by the risks of strategic collapse.

During early August, then, crucial difference between the peace faction and the army faction was that the peace faction’s reappraisal of the situation led them to believe that Japan now risked a strategic collapse that would eliminate her ability to even save the Emperor himself. The Army did not believe this to be imminent. Accordingly, though having pursued an attritive theory of victory, the peace faction favored even dramatic decreases in war aims to get out of the war. The Army did not. These outcomes are consistent with my predictions. Under the influence of frustration, the Army was resistant to learning and continued to believe that Japan had enough strength to drive a harder bargain. The peace faction, under the influence of anxiety, reappraised the situation and came to believe that strategic collapse was imminent and therefore were willing to offer whatever would the Allies demanded in order to end the war.

**Analysis**

My model performs fairly well at determining the magnitude in changes in aims that occurs when a theory of victory is abandoned in the cases studied. This is evident in Yamamoto after he rejects his informative theory of victory, in the absence of a meaningful change in war aims at the establishment of the AZND, in the failure to change aims after Saipan, and in the ‘Army’ faction’s resistance to ending the war in August 1945. However, this set of cases also shows the importance of secondary factors like ceiling effects and impending strategic collapse.

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819 In this sense, given their continued embrace of Ketsu-go and the absence of an event that would cause the army to revise its beliefs, Pape’s argument that the Japanese would have surrendered even without the atom bombings or the Soviet entry seems to be difficult to support.
These dynamics are evident when Yamamoto adopted an informative theory of victory after Pearl Harbor, in the change in aims after the Sho operations failed in the Philippines, and in the determination of the peace camp to pursue an immediate end to the war.

Only one case involves a change in theory of victory under the influence of joy. When Yamamoto adopted his informative theory of victory after Pearl Harbor, he selected a theory of victory that appeared to be quicker, easier and less costly for Japan. According to my predictions, he could have increased his aims. He did not do so because there was nothing else that Japan could easily add to its war aims. Hence, while he changed to an easier theory of victory, he did not change his war aims.

In three cases war aims were changed under the influence of anxiety. In the first, Yamamoto and others on the Combined Fleet staff reappraised the situation after Midway and came to support the attritive approach to the war adhered to by most army and civilian officials. In doing so, Yamamoto clearly adopted a theory of victory which was more costly and difficult, and which he was less confident in. Given that his earlier aims had been limited by ceiling effect, and also given that he never clearly expressed war aims (which in the context of his pessimist about the war leads me to believe he would have accepted lower aims than the army sought to end the war), the changes in the aims he would have sought were the leaders of Japan seems congruent with my prediction of a significant decline in war aims after the falsification of an informative theory of victory while under the influence of anxiety. The refusal to change aims when the Sho-operation attritive theory of victory was adopted after Saipan is also consistent with my predictions, given that it involved moving from one attritive theory of victory to another. Last, the peace camp’s sudden determination to end the war immediately after the atom bombing, even through significant decreases in war aims, is congruent with my prediction
that when strategic collapse is anticipated, those pursuing attritive theories of victory will try to flee from their wars.

In two of the three cases aims were changed under the influence of frustration—the AZND in 1943 and the Army leadership after the atom bomb was dropped—involved minimal changes in aims. This is consistent with my prediction. In the third case, after the failure of the Sho Operations in the Philippines, apparent war aims dropped significantly, despite an attritive theory of victory and frustration. Rather than keeping most all of her possessions, the Japanese became apparently willing to accept an end of the war that would have seen them concede substantial parts of their Pacific possessions, and perhaps in China as well. Here, the reason is that the part of their strategy that would have allowed them to retain their Pacific possessions had collapsed: they no longer occupied them, and no longer had the resources to do so in the future. The next-best possible theory of victory, in terms of the resources they believed necessary to pursue it, involved saving no more than Japan and its older possessions. They made this minimal move, as the intuitions behind the theory would predict. But because the minimal move involved significant concessions, they had to make significant concessions.

**General Discussion**

**Implications of the Case for the Theory**

**Theories of Victory**

The case suggests that the theory of victory concept is a useful way of identifying, linking together, and then probing the downstream effects of leaders’ beliefs about how they might win their war. With regard to the typology of theories of victory, the case suggests very
strongly its utility for illuminating the relationships and differences between approaches to a war, both through time and across individuals, the peculiarities. However, it also suggests some of its limits. Particular combinations of politics and kinds of battle can elude it—as was suggested by the difficulty in predicting what leaders found important after the Philippines Battles of 1944.

**Framing Effects**

The case shows the prevalence and importance of framing effects. At several critical junctures, war leaders were paying attention to clearly different facets of events. In some cases, events that in hindsight seem the most important or striking of the war were deemed irrelevant at the time by one or another group of war leaders because of their theory of victory. While the success at Pearl Harbor changed the Navy’s perception of itself, this same victory was seen as a mere matter of course by the Army. Similarly, while the Navy was deeply shaken by its experience at Midway, the Army was unimpressed—to the point that it did not make a great effort to determine what, exactly, happened there. Again, though, there were limits to the effectiveness of the typology for framing events. In addition to the Philippines case mentioned above, the evolution of responses to the Battle of Guadalcanal was imperfectly predicted. Though the initial responses were in line with my general expectations, the increased importance that it took on was not predicted. Here, the limits of my explanation were caused by the fact that the battle lasted for a long time and was gradually transformed in importance by the acts of both the US and Japanese militaries.
The Emotions and Learning

In addition to showing very clearly the influence of emotion as a cause of reappraisal and an explanation for failures to do so, this study demonstrates the other half of the ‘pessimism paradox’. Not only Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet, but many others (in the Naval Staff, the Imperial Court, and the Emperor himself) who had doubts about the war before it started quickly became believers after the first few weeks of success, showing the influence of joy. This led them to embrace, or at least support, plans that involved expanding the area of operations, sometimes quite dramatically. This contrasts with those who had been more confident: their response to success was to try to ‘stay the course,’ to prevent their colleagues from engaging in such impractical escapades as an invasion of Australia or an attempt to take Hawaii.

The study also shows some of the limits of emotions as an explanation for learning. When individuals reach a point where their stated beliefs suggest that continuing as they are is no longer possible, they are likely to engage in a re-thinking of their situation. Though this will generally proceed under the influence of frustration—which will tend to limit the changes made in response—it may nevertheless lead to significant changes in approach. Anger, unlike joy, does not seem to make individuals believe that what had seemed impossible is now possible. In this way, perceptions of the actual material capabilities of a state can independently trigger a reappraisal.

Changes in Aims

This set of cases provided strong support for several of the predictions about how and when aims will change. In particular, it showed the effect of beliefs that strategic collapse might
be imminent in causing a set of leaders—Hirohito, Suzuki, and Yonai in particular—to try to flee from their war despite having pursued an attritive theory of victory to that point. It also showed the influence of ceiling effects in situations where an increase in aims might otherwise have been considered. When Yamamoto selected an informative theory of victory under the influence of joy, it is entirely plausible that he might have increase aims, as the hypothesis considers. However, an increase in aims would have involved trying to take things far beyond Japan’s orbit which no Japanese leader had considered important to Japan’s rise to power. Accordingly, the existing aims were already such that it was hard to increase them beyond that point.

Other Theoretical Observations

The Fog of war, Emotion, and Learning

At several points during the conflict, leaders suffered from bad access to information. In many cases, particularly at sea and in the air, this was due to problems monitoring the effect of attacks. This had seriously negative effects as Japanese prepared for what they anticipated would be important battles. Overestimates of enemy losses at the naval battles at Coral Sea in 1942 and near Formosa in 1944 gravely harmed the Navy at Midway and the Army on Leyte.\(^{820}\) Intentional refusals to disseminate information about losses, even to leaders at the highest levels of the Army and Navy, injured the effort to hold Guadalcanal and rendered the battle plan

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\(^{820}\) Ford (2007) also stresses that Japan was bad at organizing and using intelligence, particularly across service boundaries.
for Marianas fatally flawed. But the effect of imperfect information did not only affect operational planning, as serious as that was. Because the errors and intentional imperfections in information tended to soften defeat and even suggest success, they made it less likely that anxiety would be elicited and reappraisals of the war would be provoked.

Framing, Emotion, and Inter-service Disagreement

The Japanese military establishment during the war was an extreme case of poor coordination between military services. Despite the existence of an Imperial General Headquarters, in practice the Army and the Navy lacked a powerful actor or agency with the ability to coordinate planning and strategy, logistics, and intelligence. Only the Showa Emperor had formal authority over both, and he lacked the institutional capability coordinate decision and resolve the bitter rivalries that existed between the services. However, the fact that there was such a disconnection between the two meant that the case provides powerful evidence that framing not only affects how events are pursued, but has important consequences for learning and later political decision-making.

The different frames provided by divergent theories of victory meant that leaders had divergent responses to the same events. Pearl Harbor provoked joy and Midway anxiety among the leadership of the Combined Fleet, causing them to embrace an informative theory of victory and then discard it within months. The Army leadership, in contrast, did not experience either emotion in response to these events, and in fact maintained its theory of victory during the

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821 Kennedy (1983, 181) stresses that Japan's defeat was as much a matter of bad strategic decision-making as it was of over-all power imbalances. Thus, these bad plans had a causal effect on the outcome of the war.

period. Because they remained constant, however, army leaders saw their naval colleagues as first tremendously over-confident and then, before, long, defeatist, cowardly, and untrustworthy—perceptions evident in Army-Navy relations until the very end of the war. But because they were pursuing different theories of victory, reappraising the war at different moments and responding to different events, the two services often clashed over operational decisions. In this sense, then, framing and emotional response served to exacerbate an already difficult relationship between the services.

**Implications for the Historiography of the Pacific War**

**Yamamoto’s reputation as an admiral and strategic thinker**

Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku is often portrayed as Japan’s greatest admiral of the war, and as a clear eyed strategic thinker who recognized early on the folly that attacking the US would be. While both may be true, this study strongly suggests that his strategic moves were strongly affected by some curious beliefs about American responses to his military moves and by his emotional responses to events. Both the Pearl Harbor attack and the Central Pacific drive that ended early at Midway were premised on a model of American response to fighting which involved it conceding after attacks on Hawaii, rather than seeking revenge. Once the war started, his response to Japan’s early successes was to become obsessed with a new round of attacks at Hawaii. During the planning for this offensive, he became effectively blind to holes in the plans and obstacles to successful achievement, and deaf to the objections of the Army and

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823 For instance, Anami frequently described Yonai as ‘weak-willed.’ Other times, he described the peace party as a group of conspirators betraying their country. Hayashi, *SJO1*, 397; Inaba, *SJO1*, 581.
Naval General Staff officials. While these were problems that almost anyone could encounter—after all, everyone is susceptible to emotional response—the apparent desire to celebrate a those Japanese who believed before the war that attacking America was silly and dangerous also seems to have caused a blindness to the serious flaws in Yamamoto’s approach to the war, and his role in making it the disaster it would become for Japan.

The Myth of Fanaticism

Another common discourse about the war impeached by this study is that of the fanaticism of the Japanese, and particularly their war leaders. The fanaticism of the Japanese soldier is a legend that began during the war and was founded on the refusal of Japanese soldiers to personally surrender. It was later strengthened by the ‘Special Assault’ (kamikaze) attacks which seemed foreign to western military discourse. This conviction was only solidified by the suicides of Japanese civilians at Saipan and Okinawa—though these suicides were often strongly encouraged by the Army for tactical advantage and the product of propagandistic efforts to scare the local residents of American barbarity. The statements by war leaders referring to ‘100 million shattered jewels’ should an invasion occur cemented this picture of the Japanese Army as peculiarly and pathologically fanatical in its approach to the war. However, this study suggests that throughout the war, and particularly as it moved towards conclusion, even those Japanese leaders who sought to continue the war sought to do so because they believed that

824 Arguably, however, this difference is one of degree rather than kind. Many American soldiers have, and continue to, perform effectively suicidal acts in hopes of saving their fellow soldiers or executing a mission. Like the kamikazes, they are generally recognized for it—with Medals of Honor. The differences lay in the degree of premeditation and ritual associated with it and the specific glorification of suicide as opposed to ‘giving one’s life for one’s friends’ or one’s country.
825 Hata 2007, 45.
they could improve the final settlement through further fighting. These references to mass suicide, to national ‘body smashing’ seem to have been more rhetorical rather than literal; after all, even as he made these comments, Anami expected that the war would end without total conquest.\(^{826}\) If Ketsu-go failed, the battle on the Kanto plain would be a last stand, one which would end quickly with Japan’s defeat. That Anami himself committed suicide should not be taken as evidence of a deeper fanaticism. While he did so immediately after the surrender decision was made, he did so because he believed his honor required it, rather than with enthusiasm.\(^{827}\) Indeed, throughout the summer he made comments suggesting that he did not desire to take his own life.

\textbf{The role of the atomic bombs in ending the war}

Henry Stimson, before the bomb was even dropped, expected that its awesome destructive power would create a psychological shock that would bring the Japanese to surrender.\(^{828}\) Scholars like Asado have believed this was the case. But others have suggested that the atomic bombs played little role in bringing about the surrender, instead focusing on the Soviet entry into the war.\(^{829}\) Pape goes so far as to argue that the war leaders were prepared to surrender in mid-August even in the absence of these major events. By looking at both the psychological

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\(^{826}\) Hayashi, who among other war ministry tasks acted as Anami’s personal speech writer, recalled that “My impression is that even Anami, who was said to be against a surrender more than anyone else, did not have the slightest intent of continuing the war at the risk of the destruction of the nation.” Hayashi, SJO1, 404.
\(^{827}\) Hayashi reports that he saw suicide as a means of apologizing for the army’s failures to win but also to keep the trust of the emperor. Hayashi, SJO1, 405. Notably, most government ministers did not take this course.
\(^{828}\) Due to signals intelligence, the US leadership was aware of Japanese concerns about Soviet entry. They hoped that the Soviet entry might have a similar shocking effect on the Japanese. Weinberg 1995. Scholars like Alperowitz (1985) and other retrospective opponents of the atom bombings argue that it was un-necessary, that Soviet entry would end the war.
\(^{829}\) This is particularly true of those who have been critical of the ethics of using the atomic bombs.
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underpinnings of emotional response, and its effects on how leaders think about their situation, this study is well-placed to address this question.

The answer, however, is not as simple as this debate has often been cast. Clearly, some leaders, like Anami or Kawabe, the Army Vice-Chief of Staff, were not shocked by the atom bombs or the Soviet entry. But others—particularly the emperor and the premier—do seem to have had an emotional response that provoked them to revisit the situation of their country. In this reappraisal, the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war were only part of the more complicated picture that also included domestic politics, the condition of their economy, and the ability of the army to resist an invasion. No single condition—neither the atom bombings nor the threat of the Red Army—was alone responsible for the outcome, but had any of these events failed to occur during that short window of time, it is not clear that the reappraisal would have occurred or, if it had occurred, that the outcome would have been the same. This argument extends to the debate over a ‘demonstration bomb’: in order for it to have been effective, it would have needed to be dropped in Japan itself under highly controlled circumstances, given that leaders who were aware of the bomb had had doubts that even if completed, the US would be able to move the bomb long distances or have more than one. While it (in connection with the Soviet entry) may have still provoked a reappraisal in men like the Emperor, it is not clear that the result of that reappraisal would have been concession.

These findings are important for thinking about future possible uses of nuclear weapons. If a belligerent is aware that their enemy possesses nuclear weapons, it will be rare that they do not anticipate their possible use in the conflict. This being the case, any actual usage would not be unfamiliar or unexpected. In the absence of this novelty, it is unlikely that anxiety would be provoked, and a war situation re-evaluated. Thus, except when war leaders were sure that the
nuclear weapons would not be used, this straightforwardly negative event will be unlikely to trigger a chain of events ending with the concession of the victim-state.\textsuperscript{830}

\textit{Did the demand for Unconditional Surrender Prolong the War?}

Since the Cairo Declaration’s demand for unconditional surrender was made in 1943, there has been dispute about whether or not it slowed the ending of the war.\textsuperscript{831} This is particularly true with regard to the war with Japan, which was ruled by soldiers, bureaucrats, and aristocrats, rather than an obviously pathological dictator.\textsuperscript{832} The general case is this: that by excluding any conclusion to the war but total unconditional surrender, they discouraged any peace moves by the Japanese. Given that the US eventually made a concession—the preservation of the Imperial House—the argument implies that had the concession been clearly stated earlier, fewer people would have died in the war.

Although the argument has a persuasive logic, it seems unlikely to be true in the case of the Pacific War. Making the offer to preserve the Imperial House as the basis for ending the war was acceptable to a bare majority of decision-makers even after Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Soviet entry into the war. Making the offer earlier would probably not have been enough to persuade the Japanese to end the war. Indeed, until that very moment, it seems like no set of offers the American leaders could make and survive in American domestic politics would have

\textsuperscript{830} This argument has particular relevance to small-arsenal nuclear weapons states. Given that they lack the ability to destroy large parts of their enemy’s country—thus limiting the effects of nuclear weapons on their enemy’s military and economic capabilities—they must rely on the political effects of nuclear weapons use to achieve their aims. If they are unable to provoke a reappraisal of the war in their opponent’s capital, they are that much less useful.

\textsuperscript{831} Togo, the peace-minded foreign minister reports that during much of the time that the Americans were “filling the airwaves with demands of unconditional surrender,” “there was no thought of it in this country. We were concerned with the steps to be taken to obtain suitable conditions.” Togo, SJ03, 254.

\textsuperscript{832} See particularly Kecksmeti 1957.
satisfied the Japanese prior to August 1945. When looked at from the perspective of the Japanese, what is striking is the degree to which the Japanese retained relatively high war aims, relative to American demands, until the very end of the war. Indeed, making clear concessions earlier would probably have been taken as mere evidence that the American will was cracking. This expected, positive event would have further encouraged the Japanese in their attritive theories of victory by confirming them and eliciting contentedness.

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833 Even then, the decision to abandon the unconditional surrender policy was not popular.
Chapter 7: The US in the Pacific War

This chapter focuses largely on the last eight months of the war. There is good reason for this—it was only in these last days of the war that a means for ending the war on favorable terms were seriously discussed. During this period, the experience of the war was dominated by the tremendous battle damage and casualties encountered in the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns. The US also experienced a chance of leadership. The new president, Harry Truman, at first accepted if not embraced the invasion of the Japan. A month later, he approved the dropping of the atom bomb. As he expected, this led to the end of the war. However, the process of decision was far more difficult and fraught than the simple, oft-told story suggests.

Common accounts of this period dwell largely on the atomic bomb, often asking why it was dropped when an invasion could also have done the job. The account that develops out of my theoretical investigation is somewhat different. Rather than viewing the decision as one made out of time, this account stresses first Truman’s difficulty selecting a means of ending the war, then the growing anxiety about invading Japan evident in Truman and Stimson after the costs at Iwo Jima and Okinawa; and finally their embrace of the atomic bomb as a resolution of that anxiety. In this account, the atom bomb functions almost as a \textit{deus ex machina}, a means of ending the war on terms acceptable to the public while avoiding costs that they had difficulty accepting.

\footnote{Feis 1965; Alperowitz 1985; but also Simson 1947.}
The Nature of the Conflict

It is clear that the Americans saw the conflict as one of interests and order. Just as the Japanese saw the war as a means of overturning the Anglo-American order in the Pacific, the US leadership was willing to risk war rather than see the Japanese rule the Pacific. In part, this was a matter of preserving US interests in China, and the Far East; in part, there was a perception of real threat—particularly once the Japanese joined with Nazi Germany. Several US leaders, among them Henry Stimson (from 1940 Secretary of War) and Harold Ickes, had long considered that war might well be necessary. FDR seems to have hoped it would not be. Indeed, he thought he designed the embargo in such a way that while the Japanese would be made uncomfortable and unable to rebuild oil stocks for use against the US, they might not feel forced into a corner. However, his own administration quietly sabotaged this plan by refusing to issue the requisite exportation licenses.

Meanwhile throughout the late 1930’s the US military establishment, and particularly the Navy had been working to improve its position in the Pacific. The US Pacific Fleet was growing in size, and MacArthur’s force was set to be reinforced in February 1942 with 20,000 additional troops. The Nationalists in China had been the recipient of $100 million dollar loans

836 Schmitz 2001, 139, 143. Eisenhower wrote an estimate of the situation during the second half of 1940 in which he stated that “there can be no assurance that in the near future [Japan] will not take action which will face the US with the alternative of armed opposition or complete modification of our Far Eastern policy.” Estimate of the World Situation [undated], US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 4.
837 Interestingly, the American public was much more supportive during this period of war with Japan than Nazi Germany. Even many isolationists made an exception for Japan, it seems.
for their fight against the Japanese. There was a plan for war with the Japanese, however, it was largely of date.

By late November 1941 there was a sense that the Japanese could strike—though there was also a hope that they would not. If they should strike, the most likely targets were seen as the Netherlands East Indies, or perhaps more remotely, the Philippines. The NEI were among the territories rich in natural resources that the Japanese sought, and given the German conquest of the Dutch metropole, it seemed unlikely that the Dutch could effectively defend them. Already the Japanese had launched a similar takeover of Indochina, which the otherwise overwhelmed Vichy French were powerless to prevent. The Philippines were seen as another prospective target. Though poorer in natural resources, they served as the American strategic keystone in the South-West Pacific region. Once taken, it would the difficult for the US to act in the region in a timely manner; should Singapore also come under attack, no western power would have an effective means of checking Japanese aggression in the region.

During the late Autumn of 1941, then, the American government was consciously taking risks in its relationship with Japan. It continued to resist Japanese aggression through strong economic coercion, it was in the process—far from completed—of increasing its military power in the Pacific, and it continued to engage in negotiations with the Japanese that went nowhere. It was unwilling to make concessions that the Japanese demanded, and it had made this clear to the Japanese. The only part of American policy that left room for peace was the thin hope that the Japanese would take no for an answer.  

It was not to be, of course. On 7 December 1941 the Japanese launched a set of attacks on American and Western territories throughout the Pacific. The most famous was the air raid

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838 Schmitz 2001, 143.
on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had decided that if they could not get concession from America through negotiation and even intimidation, they would take them through force. This was not a surprise to the American leadership, however, they were surprised by the scale, timing, and location of the attacks.\footnote{Schmitz 2001, 145. This also led to some failures in military response. The most famous is probably that of the Pearl Harbor garrison itself, caught entirely flatfooted, for which Gen. Smith and Adm. Kimmel, unfortunate enough to be in command at Pearl Harbor, were deemed culpable. Perhaps more contentiously, MacArthur’s refusal to get his planes up in the air during the 8 hours when he had a chance meant that the Army Air Corps planes in the Philippines were destroyed by Japanese air strikes while they sat on the ground in neat formation. Though the loss of the Philippines was probably unavoidable in the long-run, the loss of those airplanes hastened the process.}

This was not the kind of war with Japan that they had envisioned: the Japanese were fighting better than imagined, and over a far wider range than had been believed possible. Moreover, with the near simultaneous entry into war against Germany, serious decisions about how the war would be fought had to be made, and quickly. By late December, the fundamental building blocks of a theory of victory for dealing with the Pacific War in the large context of the world war was in place. This general approach would remain in force until the summer of 1945. However, because the theory of victory proposed a framework rather than a specific set of actions with anticipated specific effects, decisions about how to terminate the war were essentially put off until 1945.

More precisely, they were put off until the spring of 1945.\footnote{Skates 1994, 14.} At that point, of course, the US experienced a sudden transition of power from Franklin Roosevelt to Harry Truman. As is well known, Roosevelt had not involved Truman—or any of his vice presidents—in policymaking. Truman, therefore, assumed power at precisely the moment when decisions about how to finish the war needed to be made. In making these decisions, Truman was the principal decision-
maker. In these decisions, his principal aides were William Leahy, de facto Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral King, Chief of Naval
Operations; Gen. Henry Arnold, commander of the US Army Air Corps; Henry Stimson, Secretary
of War; the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew; and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.
Marshall and Stimson played particularly significant roles. Though none of them acted as a veto
player in practice, through their expertise and persuasion they were very influential throughout
this period.

American Theories of Victory

The Initial Theory of Victory

The American theory of victory for the war with Japan was largely the product of the
White House meetings between the Roosevelt Administration and the British delegation led by
Churchill during late December-early January 1941-2. In these meetings it was agreed that the
war against Germany must take precedence over the war against Japan. The practical effect
of this was a two-stage theory of victory. During the first period—a period of no less than two
years but possibly more—the bulk of Allied efforts were to be directed against subduing the

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841 During the war, executive power largely eclipsed Congressional authority. A clear example of this is the
funding of the Manhattan Project. Until 1944, it was funded solely at FDR’s discretion, without
informing any Congressional leaders or including it in the budget. Funds were simply removed from other
budget categories. Hodgson 1990, 291. Additionally, the US was largely unconstrained by allies’
842 At this point in time the Joint Chiefs of Staff were organized on a fairly informal basis, and adaption
copied from the British Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. There was no statutory basis for the
organization yet, and Leahy’s position was technically that of “Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Army and Navy.”
843 In fact, this agreement had been presaged by the ABC-1 staff agreement of March 1941. Adams 1985,
181.
Germans. Once they were defeated, the widely mobilized might of the American society and economy, its men and resources, were to be redirected to the Pacific to fight Japan.

This did not mean that the Pacific would be ceded to the Japanese for the duration of the European war, however. During the years when the focus was on Europe, American and Allied forces would conduct what amounted to a large holding operation. No serious effort would be made to roll-back the Japanese gains, but efforts to prevent the Japanese from further increasing their holdings would be made. Of greatest importance would be the maintenance of communication lines between North America and Australia (and, by way of Australia, South Asia and China). These communication lines were seen as crucial not only for holding those areas—and particularly Australia—but as a set of jumping-off points for the eventual westward movement. The closer to Japan they had to start, after all, the better. Meanwhile submarines would be directed against Japanese shipping, in an effort to cripple her industrial and war-making potential.

During the spring of 1942 there was a small change in the military aspect of this theory of victory. Japanese movements had put the communication lines which were the focus of the Allied Pacific Ocean Area defense at risk. Should these be lost, it would be more difficult to

844 Schmitz 2001, 156.
845 There was an exception to this, probably not communicated to the British. During early 1942 a serious contingency study on the implications of a Russian defeat was conducted. The study concluded that should the Germans prevail over Stalin’s government, it would be necessary to get the Japanese out of the way before turning the full, undivided might of the US against the Germans.
846 In a message to Stimson, Marshall, Arnold, Knox, King, and Hopkins, FDR wrote that “The whole of the pacific area calls, at the present time, fundamentally for a holding operation. This is the responsibility of the US...Defense of all essential points in the pacific Theater is the primary objective. This defense calls for offense in two areas—attacks upon the Japanese lines of communication and the bombing of Japan proper from east and west. The objective of the defense strengthened by offensive actions is to destroy or damage as many Japanese naval vessels, merchant ships, and airplanes as possible. Message from FDR, US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 14, “War Plans” Folder.
supply and defend Australia, a key South West Pacific position for the Allies.\textsuperscript{847} Moreover, it would mean that whenever the US should shift to the offensive in earnest, it might do so at a much greater disadvantage. Accordingly, some offensive elements, still largely directed towards the maintenance of communication lines and shipping lanes, would be started in the fall of 1942.\textsuperscript{848}

Once the Nazis had been attended to, largely American forces would begin an advance across the Pacific, eventually reaching Japan. As this would be conducted some years in the future, the plans were unsurprisingly vague about how this would be done, and to what effect. The “how” would be the source of much of the bureaucratic and inter-service fighting that would occur during the war. Admiral Nimitz (CINCPAC), Gen. MacAurthur (Commander, Southwest Pacific Area), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all had often quite different ideas about what this needed to entail—some arguing that the course to Tokyo went through Mainila, others Formosa, and others, the Central Pacific islands.\textsuperscript{849}

During this period of time, the nature of the effect of the fighting was not specified, either. Already the Japanese were seen as fanatical, a perception that would only become stronger in the minds of men like Halsey.\textsuperscript{850} It was not clear to many that the Japanese could

\textsuperscript{847} Obviously, Australian Prime Minister Curtin was also opposed to this prospect for more fundamental reasons. Were these calls for a stronger defense ignored, there were suggestions that the Australians would call home their forces from the North Africa theater, thus weakening the fight against Hitler.

\textsuperscript{848} See McCloy to Stimson, 20 December 1941, US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 14, ”War Plans Folder."

\textsuperscript{849} Frank 1999, 33-4.

\textsuperscript{850} Already in February 1945 he told Stimson that “too many of them are unregenerate” and “there is no hope of educating them to a decent life; their religion and traditions were such that it was hopeless to suppose that they would willingly conform to peaceful conditions in the Pacific, at least now within the next two or three generations. They would live under abiding hatred for this country, which to their mind had merely interfered in the accomplishment of their just destiny.” Report of Conversation between Stimson, Halsey, and Wilkinson, annex to20 February 1945 Committee of Three Minutes. US NARA RG 373
ever be made to quit. Accordingly, the plans anticipated, if only in the most general sense, the invasion of the Japanese Home Islands and, if necessary, the occupation of the country by force. Nevertheless, not everyone shared this interpretation, believing that it might be possible to bring the Japanese to quit short of full conquest.\textsuperscript{851}

\textit{American War Aims}

The US did not formally state its war aims until the 1943 Cairo Declaration, more than a year into the war. These terms were beguilingly simple: unconditional surrender.\textsuperscript{852} That said, there is evidence that the Cairo Declaration was not new policy. It is most likely the case that these aims had been agreed to in principle during the White House meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt. However, unconditional surrender is a military status more than it is a war aim. With unconditional surrender, a belligerent lays down their weapons and ceases to act as a sovereign power. This allows the victor to reshape things as they wish; but it is the product of that reordering rather than the condition that allows reordering that is the fundamental war aim. There was a good deal of ambiguity and disagreement over what the post-war status for Japan would be, just as there had been substantial debate of the Morgenthau Plan for Germany.\textsuperscript{853} In this case then, the fundamental war aims of the US were the elimination of

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107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 3. In a similar vein, in May 1945 Assistant Secretary of War (Air) wrote that “The point in our military progress at which the Japanese will accept their defeat and agree to our terms is unpredictable....Their protracted resistance is based upon the hope of achieving a conditional surrender. Presumably, only the conviction that their position is completely hopeless will persuade them to give up their holdings in Asia. Probably it will take Russian entry, coupled with a landing, or imminent threat of landing, on Japan proper for us to convince them of the hopelessness of their position.” Memo for the Secretary, US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 8.
\textsuperscript{851} Leahy was chief among the invasion skeptics. Adams 1985, 249.
\textsuperscript{852} Skates 1004, 38-41.
\textsuperscript{853} One indication of the uncertainty is Forrestal’s 12 June 1945 statement that the meaning of unconditional surrender was “one of the most serious questions facing the country.” The Deputy Chief of
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Japan as a threat to its peace, security, and political-economic relationships in Asia and the Pacific; the restitution of the territories it seized from 1931 onwards; and changes in the Japanese regime such that it would respect others’ rights and its own obligations.\textsuperscript{854}

\textit{Coding the Initial Theory of Victory}

Coding this composite, two-stage theory of victory is more difficult than coding the other theories of victory. During the first two or more years, no effort would be made to effectively win the war. Action would be instead limited to trying to prevent the war situation from getting worse. During the second phase, both the action and effect of this action was imperfectly stated. Instead, the vision of the fighting that would take place could be used to tow purposes: it could be used to raise the costs of fighting to the point that the Japanese would quit of their own accord (an attritive theory of victory), or it could be used to take and occupy the Japanese islands by force. The difficulty in coding the theory of victory, then, grows out of its vagueness and its long-term flexibility. While the different sets of actions would be needed to execute an optimal strategy, these actions were beyond anyone’s mental horizon. Given that specific actions were not planned, it could not be said the case that the effect of those actions could be specified.\textsuperscript{855} Indeed, until 1945, the exact character of the second stage was not specified. All that can be said about it, then, is that it was not an informative theory of victory. There was no sense among the American leaders that an exemplary beating of the Japanese military would suffice to win their concession.

\textsuperscript{854} Joint Staff Planners, Pacific Strategy Document forwarded to the JCS on “Pacific Strategy,” JCS 924/15, 25 April 1945. Cover-page states that the document was prepared of their own initiative.
\textsuperscript{855} Skates 1994, 14, 34-44.
Theories of Victory in 1945

This ambiguity in the theory of victory continued well into 1945. At the root of the arguments about which approach to take was an arguments about whether or not the Japanese would ever respond to anything but conquest. Those who believed that they would respond, and particularly those who believed that there were moderates within Japanese society and the government, tended to favor some sort of an attritive theory of victory. Those who saw mostly fanaticism among Japan’s leaders, or minimized the power of moderate or liberal Japanese, did not believe that such a theory of victory could work. For these men, only brute force and conquest would bring the war to an end.

President Roosevelt never settled on one side or the other; like a great many of his beliefs, he shielded them even from his advisors. President Truman, however, had no choice but to do so, for it was under his administration that the progress of American forces made these decisions unavoidable. Until this point, the basic military problem—getting close enough to Japan—was the same for those with an attritive or brute force theory. But now the short-term strategic goals that had gotten them to this point were no longer sufficient. If brute force was the preferred theory of victory, there was only one choice—invasion and conquest of the main Japanese islands. All recognized that this would be a costly endeavor. For those who favored attrtive theories of victory, however, invasion was only one choice among several. Unconditional surrender might also be achieved through a combination of blockade and bombing; even a warning of further dire consequences on the Japanese homeland might be enough to bring it about. There were even some who advocated dropping some of the

856 Forrestal 1951, 52; Stimson and McBundy 1947, 415.
857 Hodgson 1990, 304.
demands related to the territories Japan could keep (Korea) and its ability to govern itself, in hopes of bringing about an early end to the war.

During this period the dominant idea was, nevertheless, invasion. This was the general concept envisioned in the allied agreements made at Quebec City. Planning for invasion was the policy approved by the JCS in May 1945, and invasion was the only policy presented to President Truman at the critical 18 June meeting. The strongest advocate of invasion was Gen. George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff. In one of their rare points of agreement, Gen. Douglas MacArthur largely agreed with him. Opposing this viewpoint was Henry Stimson, Secretary of War and Adm. Leahy, the President’s Military Advisor and effectively the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Former President Herbert Hoover also played a surprisingly significant role in advocating for an end to the war short of a Japanese surrender.

Invasion as a Brute Force Theory of Victory

Invasion constituted a straightforward theory of victory, one which would lead to a decisive outcome—conquest—and the ability to reshape Japan and the region as the US saw fit. The US would begin with Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, then proceed to Operation Coronet, the invasion of the Kanto Plain and Tokyo. Once the armies in these regions had been beaten and the capital taken, further operations would be conducted as needed to complete the conquest of Japan. Japanese soldiers elsewhere would hopefully surrender after Tokyo had

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858 Though the Navy leadership acquiesced to preparing for an invasion, it was clear that they did not believe that the decision to invade was a done deal. Skates 1994, 44, 51; Maga 2002, 7-8; Adams 1985, 255.
859 Hoover had been perfectly shunned by the Roosevelt Administration, but shortly after taking office Truman invited him to the White House and asked him for advice. It is recorded that upon his re-entry into the Oval Office, he burst into tears. Ferrell 1994, 195. While his reports on reforming the government bureaucracy are well known, less well-known is the advice he confidentially provided to Truman about ending the war.
fallen, but war planners were particularly prepared for resistance in Northern Japan.\textsuperscript{861} Should the Japanese capitulate before conquest was complete, so much the better; but should they not, invasion remained an effective means of ending the war. In its favor, moreover, were its speed and its certainty. This approach was expected to be relatively fast: by April 1945, the Joint Chiefs had largely agreed on the date for starting the invasion—1 November 1945. Assuming that all went according to plan, they anticipated that the attack on Tokyo itself would occur in February 1946. In contrast, waiting for a blockade to work would have required at least a year, and possibly more.\textsuperscript{862} Moreover, with invasion, success would not be dependent on the willingness of the Japanese to concede. Many within the military establishment, in particular, had become convinced the by the words of Japanese leaders and the acts of ordinary Japanese soldiers that they would never surrender. Finally, with this approach there would be no question of a difficult negotiation; it would not be necessary.

All of the men in favor of the plan were aware of its likely costs. It was clear that it would involve at least tens of thousands of American casualties, and many thousands of dead US servicemen.\textsuperscript{863} They were also aware of the difficult American domestic politics of continuing the war. All of the American war leaders were concerned that the American public would grow weary of the war; indeed, it was taken as given that the war with Japan had to end within a year of the war with Germany in order to retain public support.\textsuperscript{864} Accordingly the war needed to be finished quickly. At the same time, there seemed to be strong public resistance to anything but

\textsuperscript{861} Frank 1999, 36, 117; Maga 2002, 121-2.
\textsuperscript{862} Truman 1955, 17.
\textsuperscript{863} At the crucial 15 June 1945 meeting, Marshall refused to state numbers but suggested that the successful invasion of Kyushu would involve casualty levels between those seen at Okinawa and Luzon. However, these estimates were almost certainly much lower than they actually would have been, since they relied on underestimates of the numbers of Japanese forces on Kyushu even then. Moreover, they did not provide any estimates of the costs of invading the Kanto Plain—the site of Tokyo.
\textsuperscript{864} Skates 1994, 37, 40; Maga 2002, 15-20; Frank 1999, 127.
termination through unconditional surrender. The anger of Pearl Harbor had only been
magnified by the experience of the war. Given the Scylla and Charbydis apparently erected by
public opinion, the only acceptable end to the war would be both quick and decisive. During
the Spring of 1945, for Marshall, invasion was the only path that met that criteria.

Doubts about Invasion and a Nascent Attritive Theory of Victory

Several war leaders were less sure about this approach, even as they felt it necessary to
approve it. Secretary of War Stimson, a man with personal experience of Japan, rejected the
notion that Japan lacked courageous and sensible leaders who would surrender rather than
commit national suicide. Moreover, he was concerned that once an invasion began it would
unify the Japanese people and strengthen their resolve to fight until the end. Implicit in this
approach was a belief that the Japanese were near recognizing that the end was near and that it
would be better to quit now than pay the costs. Pursuant to this, he sought a means of trying to
get the Japanese to quit before they were invaded.

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865 This was despite the fact that US war leaders were reluctant to publish too much information about
Japanese atrocities.
867 Skates 1994, 45; Maga 2002, 80-1; Forrestal 1951, 70.
868 I believe that Japan is susceptible to reason in such a crisis to a much greater extent than is indicated
by our current press and other current comment. Japan is not a nation composed wholly of mad fanatics
of an entirely different mentality from ours...I think the Japanese nation has the mental intelligence and
versatile capacity in such a crisis to recognize the folly of a fight to the finish and to accept the proffer of
what will amount to an unconditional surrender. I think she has within her population enough liberal
leaders (now submerged by terrorists) to be depended upon for her reconstruction as a responsible
member of the family of nations....Her liberals yielded only at the point of the pistol...Proposed Memo for
the President, appendix to Committee of Three minutes, 26 June 1945. US NARA RG 107 (Office of the
Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-
869 In a memo to the President, Stimson argued that “If we land on one of the main islands and begin a
foreceul occupation of Japan, we shall probably have cast the die of last resistance.” Memo For the
President, 2 July 1945. US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret
Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 15, Folder: “While
House Correspondence, 2 January 1944-21 September 1945.”
His preferred method ultimately came down to the issuing of a warning about the consequences of continuing and suggesting that the Showa Emperor would remain in place. Now that the US Navy and Air Corps were able to directly attack Japan, the costs of war were directly mounting and it would be clear to them that invasion was imminent. Even though sustained, intensive strategic bombing had only become possible in the early spring of 1945, severe damage had already been wrought on its major industrial cities. With the end of the war with Germany, there was also the threat—and the prospective shock—of Soviet entry into the war against Japan.\(^\text{870}\) He also believed that the very phrase “unconditional surrender” was an impediment to a Japanese surrender, and believed that US terms should be more sharply described. As part of this sharper definition, he urged that there be an explicit statement that the Emperor would not be pursued but instead permitted to continue his reign. This, he considered the “most serious single obstacle to Japanese unconditional surrender.”\(^\text{871}\) Between the costs then being imposed by air and sea, the costs already experienced, and the effective concession this statement offered, he anticipated that Japanese surrender would be forthcoming. In this sense, he offered a latent attritive theory of victory—one which, given its late development, effectively relied on costs already experienced and a threat of further, unavoidable costs.\(^\text{872}\) Admiral Leahy expressed interest in this approach. Grew was also favored this approach, though he insisted that the Emperor be the only concession. Marshall and others

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\(^{870}\) From April 1945, it was known that the Japanese were trying to get the Russians to intervene with the Allies on Japan’s behalf, using the offer of half of Manchuria as an inducement.

\(^{871}\) Annex 3: Proposed statement of UN Aims, of 22 June Committee of Three minutes. US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 3.

\(^{872}\) Schmitz 2001, 183.
in the War Department were concerned that this warning might actually undercut the threat of
invasion by suggesting that the US was lacking in the resolve necessary to fight through.  At the end of May, Herbert Hoover responded to a request from Truman to produce
proposal to for ending the war.  Starting from the premise that “no aim in the war with Japan
was worth 500,000-1 million casualties,” he argued that the US should dispense with the
demand for unconditional surrender.  Instead, he believed that the US should demand
disarmament, the loss of Manchuria, the cession of the island territories gained through force
during the war, and Allied trials of war criminals.  He would allow Japan to effectively govern
itself, however, would pledge not to disturb either the Emperor or the reign of the Imperial
House, and would allow Japan to continue to rule Formosa and Korea.  Though Hoover was not
certain that this would be accepted by the Japanese, he believed that there was a chance it
might.  Like Stimson’s warning proposal, it assumed an attritive character: costs already
experienced, and then being experienced, would be the basis for its acceptance by the
Japanese.

Always in the background was the possibility of gaining Japanese acquiescence
through a combination of blockade and bombing.  This, too, would have been an attritive theory
of victory.  Its chief proponents were, predictably, naval and air force leaders.  Hap Arnold, the
Chief of Staff of the Air Corps and Admiral King were the strongest supporters, though Leahy
also expressed interest in this approach.  However, this plan always remained somewhat in
the background because its timeline seemed too long.

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873 It seems likely that at least some of the Japanese leaders—particularly Anami and the other hard-
liners—would have interpreted it as such.
875 Wolk 1997, 173.
During July the Atom Bomb was tested and found to work—not a trivial thing, given its complexity and the convictions of some, like Adm. Leahy, that it would not. Throughout its development it had been recognized as a weapon of great power. But how would it relate to efforts to bring about the end of the war? This was a problem particularly since there were only three bombs available in the immediate term. Though there were a several ways that the bomb could have been used, one came to be dominant. It relied on the expected shocking character of the bomb, and the expectation that this shock would be great enough to cause the Japanese to recognize the full nature of their predicament and surrender. In this theory of victory, the use of the bomb (now combined with the promised Soviet entry into the war) would not end the war through the imposition of costs so much as through causing the Japanese to re-appraise their situation and the relative power of the United States. When they dropped the bomb, they should do it “without warning,” and in such a way as to “make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible.” In order to ensure this, certain targets—including the Hiroshima and Nagasaki—were actually saved from further incendiary bombing. Such an approach was most closely associated with Secretary of War Stimson. This was clearly an informative theory of victory. The purpose of the detonating the bomb was to get the Japanese to look around and see how poor their prospects were, given

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876 Adams 1985, 201.
877 There was real concern that a “new phase of bombing” was necessary to get Japan’s attention, as they had withstood months of bombing by that point, and thus had shown a certain imperviousness to the bombardment they were already experiencing, destructive as it was.. 29 June 1945, Committee of Three Minutes, US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 8.
879 Hodgson 1990, 325.
880 Schmitz 2001, 152-3.
proximity of American power, the bomb, and the Soviet entry. This is clearly anticipating that the Japanese would respond to the information about capability communicated by the bomb. Though this approach was developed largely by Stimson and the Interim Committee, Truman clearly came to agree with it and fully embraced it.\textsuperscript{881}

\textbf{Events}

\textit{The General Context}

By the beginning of 1945 American forces had reached striking distance of Japan. Though Yamashita’s troops on Luzon would continue to hold out through the official surrender, their presence did not impede American progress towards the Home Islands. In February the fight for the Ryukyus began in earnest, with the assault on Iwo Jima. Though successful in outcome, the costs of taking this small island were great.\textsuperscript{882} Indeed, it was one of the few fights where American casualties outnumbered Japanese casualties.\textsuperscript{883} In addition to the sheer costliness of the effort, Iwo Jima left American military leaders concerned about their further advances, for the Japanese soldiers’ refusal to surrender was shown to be quite genuine. The Iwo Jima campaign also confirmed the use of suicide planes, which the Japanese had only begun to use during the Leyte campaign late in 1944.

Another indication of American success in approaching Japan was the beginning of incendiary bombing. Though efforts at precision bombing had been tried—with few results—for

\textsuperscript{881} Truman 1973, 276; Miscable 2007, 228 (footnote). Truman’s statement delivered immediately after the Hiroshima bombing further suggests the informative character of the bombing: “if they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has ever been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already aware. Truman 1955, 422. 

\textsuperscript{882} Indeed, they were so great that an American public which had made it through the Normandy campaign was, according to the Office of War Information, “unsettled” by these casualties. Frank 1999, 126.

\textsuperscript{883} The percentage of fatalities was much higher for the Japanese than the Americans, however.
some months, the first massive strike of B-29’s bearing incendiary bombs designed to burn down Japanese cities only took place in mid-March 1945. Launched from Tinian in the Marianas, this raid against Tokyo destroyed 18 square miles, killed approximately 100,000 people, and “unhoused” more than 1,000,000 residents. This raid of 250 planes would soon be followed by others. By July, some raids included more than 500 B-29s. By August, more than 100 square miles of urban real estate would be incinerated.

Early April also brought the invasion of Okinawa. This campaign would last three months, well into June, before it was complete. Here again, the Japanese fiercely resisted American advances, innovating increasingly desperate tactics to do so. According to the final count, 6,319 Americans were killed and 32,943 were wounded on Okinawa itself. Thirty-five percent of the American striking force would be rendered a casualty by the end of the campaign; half of the tanks landed would be destroyed or otherwise put out of use by Japanese action. Kamikazes, conventional air strikes, and the last stand of the Japanese navy made the waters around Okinawa the most perilous of any of the Pacific campaigns, claiming more than 4,000 sailors and other ship-board personnel by June. The Joint Intelligence Committee’s weekly intelligence summaries stressed repeatedly during this time the ‘stiffness’ of the Japanese resistance, persistent desperation of their efforts, their general refusal to quit or surrender, and the degree to which they were able to slow American progress on the island.

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885 Frank 1999, 171. For the Navy and Marine Corps, fully 17% of the fatalities experienced in the war were experienced in the Okinawa campaign.
886 Skates 1994, 76.
887 See RG 218 Records of the U S Joint Chiefs of Staff ~ Central Decimal File 1942-1945 CCS 000.76, Box 14, Joint Intelligence Council, Weekly Intelligence Summary.
More generally, the spring of 1945 was a time of extremely high casualties for America. During March, more American servicemen—more than 20,000—died than during any other month of the war. May 1945 saw more than 8,000 Americans die, despite the fact that the European war ended during the first week of the month. More generally, 64% of the American casualties occurred between June 1944 and May 1945. Public support for the war against Japan, moreover, was not straightforward. One the one hand, in May 1945, a survey reported that 90% of Americans favored continuing the war until Japan’s unconditional surrender, regardless of the costs. But on the other, at Harry Truman’s first press conference on 17 April 1945, he was asked if the racetracks would reopen and when civilian production would resume. An overwhelming public and Congressional manifestation of sentiment compelled that the war department demobilize more than one million men, almost immediately after the end of the war with Germany.

Key Events from the Accession of Truman

It was in this context that Truman came to office on 12 April. Iwo Jima had been conquered and Americans had been fighting on Okinawa for two weeks. The incendiary

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889 Truman 1955, 49.
890 In a June 1945 survey, 72% of respondents expected at least partial demobilization in the immediate future. Congress was deluged with mail asking that the boys be brought home. Vinson, the head of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, spoke of the overwhelming demand for consumer goods and that “we had never seen people in their present state of mind.” The Navy Department narrowly avoided a similar demobilization but its ability to persist in doing so beyond August is uncertain, and, in retrospect, unknowable. Frank 1999, 124. This massive demobilization was a tremendous disruption in the Army’s order of battle. Overnight, it turned hardened veteran units green; in others, where there were already large proportions of inexperienced replacements, it eliminated all of the experienced NCO’s and junior officers. This pattern of disruption occurred because demobilization was conducted at the individual level, using the ‘points system,’ and was applied to the Pacific Theater as well as the veterans of the war against Germany. All soldiers who, through battle experience, accumulated 85 points were to be discharged. George Marshall complained that his ‘first team’ was being taken away from him right as it came time to prepare for the invasion of Japan. Skates 1994, 62-7; Frank 1999, 124-6.
bombing campaign had been in operation for more than a month. However, he nevertheless inherited a set of assumptions that had not yet been turned into policy. One was the sense that there would probably need to be an invasion of Japan. Another was that the atom bomb, should it work, should be used in some way. Its likelihood of working, however, was uncertain, as was the timing of its completion and the best way to utilize it.

The Army strongly favored invasion. General George Marshall was its strongest advocate, believing it necessary to end the war quickly and decisively. The Navy was willing to support planning for invasion with the acknowledgement that it might be called off at a later date. On 18 June 1945, Truman received the full briefing on the matter. At that meeting, all service chiefs and military secretaries argued for ordering preparations for invasion, though Adm. Leahy was unsatisfied with the plans that then existed. A key element of Truman’s decision to sanction the invasion strategy was the anticipated level of casualties. He was assured during the meeting that casualties would be lower than the estimates being bandied about by others—including suggestions by men like Herbert Hoover that the conquest of Japan might involve more than 500,000 US casualties. Indeed, Marshall argued that they would be below 40,000. Marshall’s underlying argument for this low number seems to have been exceptionally weak—perhaps the greatest challenge to his reputation for probity in his career as a major policy-maker. It was based on the 25 April estimate of MacArthur’s G-2 [chief intelligence staff officer], Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, which anticipated that the US landing force of 766,000 would confront no more than 350,000 Japanese defenders and 2500 planes.

891 Pogue 1987, 24.
892 The “500,000-1,000,000” figure was commonly discussed during the period, sometimes by people with access to information and estimates, sometimes by people attracted to big round numbers. Although we do not know the precise source or sources, former-President Hoover appears to have been an example of the former. Frank 1999.
During July this estimate would be thoroughly revised. Using ULTRA signals intelligence, by 9 July it was already estimated that there were already 350,000 Japanese army troops on Kyushu, among them some of the best troops in the Japanese Army. ULTRA indicated a “tremendous influx” of reinforcements, proceeding at a “feverish” pace, “without an end in sight.”\(^{893}\) During this time no fewer than nine new divisions were found to be on the island; nine of the thirteen divisions were placed in positions near the US landing sites.\(^{894}\) By the first week of August, when he offered an official “amendment” to his 25 April estimate, Charles Willoughby reported that these reinforcements could “grow to the point to where we attack at a ratio of one to one, which is not the recipe for victory.”\(^{895}\) In fact, by August 1945, the Japanese had surpassed that ratio. Though US intelligence had correctly counted Japanese divisions, these divisions were unusually strong. Rather than the approximately 600,000 counted by US intelligence, 900,000 were present.\(^{896}\) Estimates of planes involved—now all recognized to be likely Kamikaze flights—increased to 7500. Many of these planes were ‘trainers,’ but their lower-tech construction actually made them less, rather than more, susceptible to the US Navy’s anti-aircraft methods.\(^{897}\)

During this time there were also continuing but deeply uncertain indicators that some Japanese, at least, were interested in peace. There were two main sources of these apparent peace feelers. The first came from Russia. As early as late April, there were indications that the

\(^{893}\) Frank 1999, 201, 211; Drea 1994, 208, 214.

\(^{894}\) Once the Japanese had concluded that Kyushu was next—an operation performed largely using logic—identifying likely American landing sites was a relatively straightforward matter of terrain analysis. Given the nature of Kyushu’s topography, there were few sites that would have been suitable for mass landings.

\(^{895}\) Frank 1999, 211, Drea 1994, 216. Generally a 3:1 ratio was thought necessary to ensure success without extremely high casualties. Frank 1999, 135.

\(^{896}\) Frank 1999, 203. This figure was, of course, not learned until after the war was over.

\(^{897}\) Wood-and-fabric construction was harder to detect with radar and did not trigger the new proximity fuses in the anti-aircraft shells (which had been of great use at improving shipboard defenses against air attack). Frank 1999, 211.
Japanese were trying to trade land in Manchuria for Soviet assistance in ending the war. At first merely rumors, they became plainly evident in July 1945. At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet representatives reported them to the US. More fundamentally, during this time messages between Togo, the Japanese Foreign Minister and Sato, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow revealed the nature of the offer. They suggested that both Togo and the Emperor were very interested in ending the war—but Sato’s response poured cold water not only on the plan but doubted whether Togo could really claim to speak for the government in this matter.\textsuperscript{898}

Though revealing an interest in peace by some parties, to the Americans, these messages reiterated the power of the military in Japanese politics and the weakness of the ‘peace party.’

The second set of peace feelers that gained high level attention were those directed by Japanese diplomats, sailors, and businessmen in Switzerland to Allen Dulles, then OSS chief of station in that country. Though eliciting interest,\textsuperscript{899} the apparent lack of official support behind them meant that they were not considered authoritative. However, they were continued for almost two months.\textsuperscript{900}

Meanwhile production work continued on S-1, the atomic bomb project. It was tested on 18 July, and found to significantly exceed many of the program leaders’ estimates for its destructive force.\textsuperscript{901} The successful test was an important event in several respects. First, it worked. Prior to the test, even the program’s overseers acknowledged it functionality was only a probability; indeed, Adm. Leahy repeatedly poured scorn on the idea that it might, and

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{898} Frank 1999, 222-6.

\textsuperscript{899} Truman’s copy has his handwritten directions to follow up on them.

\textsuperscript{900} Maga 1994, 50-2.

\textsuperscript{901} The official estimate going into the test was that it would generate an explosive force equaling of 20,000 tons of TNT; in fact it would generate the equivalent of 45,000 tons of TNT.
\end{footnotes}
Stimson made jokes about having avoided jail when it did work. 902 Second, the scale of its success meant that it would be effective in fulfilling the purpose anticipated for it—for shocking the Japanese into surrender. On 6 August Hiroshima was successfully bombed. Three days later, Nagasaki was bombed. However, the next bomb would not be ready until 21 August at earliest; and a fourth bomb would not be ready for weeks.

**Framing**

By January 1945, although not yet fully crystallized in policy, the dominant theory of victory for defeating Japan was invasion. US forces would first take Kyushu, then to move up to the Kanto (Tokyo) Plain on Honshu, and then, perhaps, subdue remaining resistance in the north. 903 This brute force theory of victory was expected to involve significant costs, however, at this point there was not a clear sense of how costly it might be. By the end of June it had become the presumptive strategy, and on 18 June President Harry Truman gave his initial, if perhaps not final, approval for preparing for invasion. Even before June, though, a general brute force theory of victory provided the framework through which most leaders understood events. Given that this brute force theory of victory involved a large-scale mobilization of forces, US leaders’ focus should fall mostly on two aspects of the fighting: events that address their ability to complete the task they set and the costs of doing so. This seems to have been the case. Additionally, the hypotheses predict that the domestic politics of the other government with respect to possible concessions will garner less attention. This also seems to be the case.

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902 Hodgson 1990, 333.
903 Maga 2002, 121-3.
The overwhelming point of attention for this series of events during the Spring of 1945 was the success of their American campaigns. In no case, be it in the Philippines (Leyte and Luzon), Iwo Jima, or Okinawa, was an American campaign anything but successful. The same was true of the earlier island-hopping campaigns, dating all the way back to Guadalcanal. All objectives were achieved in each case, the resisting Japanese were eliminated, and US forces were able to quickly convert the seized territories to their use. This is evident in the confidence of Gens. MacArthur and Marshall in the ability of the US forces to successfully invade Kyushu and defeat the Japanese armies. No one disagreed with this, though it was not foremost in everyone’s mind.\footnote{\textsuperscript{904}}

Their attention to information about their ability to achieve their military task is also strongly evident in the stir that ULTRA signals intelligence on the July build-up on Kyushu provoked. During the last week of July and the first week of August 1945, both the JCS’s Joint Intelligence Committee and Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, MacArthur’s G-2, noted with alarm that the Japanese already had almost 600,000 troops in Southern Kyushu in 13 divisions. Nine of these divisions were placed near the planned landing zones, emphasized the JIC with evident alarm. In his cover-letter to the report, Willoughby noted that not only was the build-up continuing at a “feverish pace,” but that the attacker : defender ratio was in perilously close to 1:1.\footnote{\textsuperscript{905}} Once reached, it would be hard guarantee a successful invasion. Marshall clearly reacted to it by calling for alternatives. Strikingly, these same reports indicting the possibility of a

\footnote{\textsuperscript{904} Indeed, in September 1945, in a letter to the President praising Gen. George Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson emphasized how well he had conducted the war, declaring that “with this army we have won a most difficult dual war with practically no serious setbacks and astonishingly ‘according to plan’.” It is clear that he believed that this was the case well before the end of the war. US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 15. Folder: “White House Correspondence, 2 Jan. 1944-21 Sept. 1945. See also Stimson and McBundy 1947, 662-3.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{905} Skates 1994, 134-6.}
successful invasion do not seem to have troubled Truman or Stimson, though both men were privy to them. Neither makes mention of either the reports nor, more generally, the information contained in them in their memoirs, their discussions of why dropping the bomb was the correct decision, or in any later discussion. Arguably, this is because they had by then become committed that the atomic bomb was the best chance of ending the war. By late July, they were no longer thinking of invasion as the most likely means by which the war would be ended.

At the same time, the costliness of the recent Pacific campaigns was also a center of attention and worry. The casualties produced by the stubborn Japanese resistance on Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns were intensely worrying to Truman, Stimson, Marshall, King, and Nimitz. The ground casualties experienced on Iwo Jima and Okinawa were clearly above expectations. No less were the sea casualties at Okinawa—something which made a strong impression on both King and Nimitz. Indeed, Truman’s main concern with the invasion campaign from the very start was the casualties it would generate rather than its efficacy. Perhaps spurred by Hoover’s citation of 500,000-1 million US casualties, this was the reason he called the 18 June meeting to discuss the invasion plan.

Similarly, Marshall’s presentation of the invasion to Truman showed an acute sensitivity to the prospective casualties of the invasion. At this 18 June meeting he argued that Kyushu invasion casualties over the first thirty days—the expected timeframe for taking the targeted part of the island—casualties would most likely fall between the levels experienced over the first

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906 It could be argued that Truman got the 500,000-1 million casualties from Marshall during a late July discussion, however, this is by no means clear. Indeed, there is no documentary evidence that Marshall ever told Truman that casualties would be so high, and several historians have suggested it never happened. Moreover, Hoover had mentioned this number to Truman much earlier. Skates 1994, 77-8.
907 Frank 1999, 148.
thirty days on Okinawa and Luzon. This meant a range between 31,000 and 40,000. Thought there were no widely accepted formulae for generating casualties in use at this point, this estimate was the absolute lowest that anyone would give. At that same meeting, Adm. Leahy, using another method, suggested that casualties would be closer to 250,000, using the casualty rate experienced on Okinawa rather than the aggregate numbers, though Marshall and King both moved quickly to discount this method of estimation. Even more significant were the casualty figures not presented. Nimitz’s first estimates were above 49,000. MacArthur, when asked by Marshall for estimates, suggested 124,000, though when Marshall responded in a way that suggested the number was too high, he backed away from quoting an estimate. In Marshall’s advocacy for invasion, he apparently felt pressures to limit the number of casualties he presented. Even if he was willing to accept relatively high casualties, he was clearly concerned about Truman’s tolerance for casualties, as this new President seemed to have doubts about the public response to the costs of fighting.

At the same time as they displayed this strong attentiveness to their ability to successfully fight and to the potential costs of doing so, those who most strongly supported invasion—and by extension a brute force theory of victory—tended denigrate the possibility that the Japanese were likely to concede. When in responding to Hoover’s proposal, the War Department position paper which Marshall explicitly agreed with (via his cover letter) was very dismissive of the argument that changes were occurring in the Japanese government which would make it more likely to make enough concessions to end the war. Though there may be a few individuals arguing for efforts to end the war, it said, a military that was determined to fight

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908 Frank 1999, 140.
909 Skates 1994, 80; Frank 1999, 136-9; Drea 1994, 209.
910 Frank 1999, 198.
to the end remained in power. Indeed, the perception of the ascension of Suzuki to the Premiership tracks closely with adherence to theories of victory. Those who were intent on pursuing a brute force theory of victory tended to see his coming to power as uninformative and uninteresting; George Marshall and Douglas MacArthur seem to fall into this category.\textsuperscript{911} However, those who doubted it tended to see it as important and even hopeful. This was certainly true of men like Grew, Hoover, and Stimson—all of whom had in fact met the man. Men like King, Arnold, and Nimitz also focused on these effects, though their analyses tended to emphasize economic aspects of the situation more than political ones. MacArthur’s response to political moves in Japan was similar. Both his and Marshall’s convictions were only strengthened by the stubbornness of the resistance on Okinawa and Iwo Jima, by the increasing use of suicide methods, and by the moves mobilize the Japanese population. In late June, both of these men agreed that invasion alone would bring the desired, decisive outcome.

In contrast, the men who opposed the invasion, or saw it as a contingency rather than best path to victory, were much more attentive to signs that the Japanese might be wearying.\textsuperscript{912} Truman provides an excellent example of this: he was intent on following up on the peace feelers made to Allen Dulles in Switzerland—indeed, these dialogues continued for more than two months. Similarly, in early July, Forrestall saw the early July approach to the Soviets as “the

\textsuperscript{911} In response to the Hoover memo, Marshall wrote that the “intelligence people believe that the Japanese leaders, such as Suzuki do not differ materially in their national ambitions, their idea of Japanese destiny, and their ruthlessness from the so-called militarists. They have differed only in the means they thought best to attain the ultimate ends, which are the same as the militarists….As to the middle class, the best information we have is that this is a small group of questionable influence and not very articulate.” Stimson marked this section and wrote the word NO next to it. US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 8.

\textsuperscript{912} Of course, most information went in the other direction. Frank 1999, 288.
first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war.”913 Already in May, Grew was relating to his colleagues work from a recent Finnish ambassador that the “Japanese had lost their enthusiasm for the war,” and that there is a widespread understanding now in Japan that they face inevitable defeat.914

The one area where the theory of victory does not provide a clear frame is the development of the atomic bomb. During 1945 it became increasingly apparent that the bomb would be useable against Japan, and this caused those ‘in the know’ to concentrate on the new question of how best to use it.915 Marshall and Stimson, in particular, focused their attention on this question. Stimson was fairly certain that it should be used for its shock value, as a means of shocking the Japanese leadership into recognizing their situation and thus surrendering. For him, the success of project S-1 (the atom bomb project) was of tremendous importance and rendered an invasion potentially un-necessary. Even well before the successful test, he had inquired of Marshall if it would be possible to hold off the invasion until the bombs could be tried.916 During the late spring and early summer, Marshall also speculated on ways in which the atom bomb might be used in a demonstrative fashion to inform and shock the Japanese.917 But he also speculated on its use in conjunction with the invasion, at one point proposing that the 7-9 bombs that would be ready by 1 November be used tactically, near the main landing sites of

913 Maga 2002, 50-2; Forrestal 1951, 74.
914 1 and 15 May Committee of Three minutes. US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 3.
915 Several significant figures were unaware of the existence of the bomb until very late—Truman, of course, only learned of the bombs existence on 12 April upon his assumption of the presidency, but both MacArthur and Nimitz were only told of it on 4 August (two days before it was actually used). Drea 1994, 219.
916 Pogue 1987, 9; Schmitz 2001, 80.
the Kyushu invasion. In mid-July, Brig. Gen. Lincoln, the head of the Joint Staff Planners, said that there were “two psychological days” left in the war for the Japanese. Despite knowing of the preparations for the bomb, neither of them were the bomb—instead, he listed the “day the Russians enter the war” and “the day after we get what the Japanese recognize as a secure beachhead.” Moreover, as McCloy later told Forrestal, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were quite cool to his mention of the bomb as a possible alternative to invasion during the 18 June meeting. The failure of the continuing fire-bombing raids in Japan, as had been the case of strategic bombing in Germany, to bring about a surrender was also mentioned in this connection. While these indications suggest some differences in perception of the atom bomb, they are not obviously connected to any prediction associated with the theory of victory. In part, this is because there are no predictions affecting the development of new technologies on one’s own side.

Discussion

In general, the framing predictions are successful in identifying leaders’ patterns of attention to wartime events. Those committed to a brute force theory of victory were attentive to the ability of US forces to achieve their military missions, as well as to the costs of those missions. Interestingly, some of the information to which they were most attentive to consisted of intelligence reports. These reports, in late July and early August seemed to suggest that invasion would be quite difficult, and were the subject of intense interest at the highest levels of the military establishment. They tended to pay less attention to the effects of the bombing and

919 Brower 1991, 333. The correspondent was Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer, then commanding the China area and formerly a leading member of the OPD, which developed the key war plans.
920 Neither Forrestal nor Stimson were present at the meeting; McCloy was the only civilian defense leader there (aside from President Truman). Forrestal 1951, 70.
blockade on Japan, and more generally downplayed any signals which indicated that the
Japanese might be interested in peace. In contrast, those who were not committed to this brute
force theory of victory were not disturbed by the Willoughby and JIC reports expressing concern
over the feasibility of invasion and were much more strongly focused on hints from Japan than
they might be ready to surrender. These findings are generally consistent with my hypotheses.

Truman’s concern with casualties is consistent with the intuitions of my model, though
it fits more awkwardly with the predictions. Given that Truman had not committed to a theory
of victory, even in June, I have no way of identifying the framing effects that would be active.
However, my approach stresses the role of political costs to leaders considering mass-mobilizing
theories of victory.\footnote{Though the US was clearly mobilized already—in fact partial
demobilization was then beginning—keeping the nation at a high level of mobilization for the
purpose of fighting Japan was effectively a new decision to mobilize, and Truman would pay
the period-by-period costs associated with it.} Truman was in this kind of situation, and he was,
predictably, concerned with the scale of the costs involved the different paths by which the Pacific War
could be ended. The difficulty accounting for perceptions of the atom bomb prior to its usage is
an artifact of the theory: there are no predictions for how new technology that lacks a unique relationship
to the current prosecution of the war should be viewed.

**Emotional Response and Learning**

In addressing the emotional response and patterns of learning evident in this case, two
groups emerge as having substantially different kinds of responses to the events and evincing
different patterns of learning. The first includes those who strongly believed in invasion and,
thus, a brute force theory of victory. The second includes those who were had not yet
committed to a theory of victory by early summer 1945. Gen. George Marshall was the most
important member of the first group. Truman, Stimson, Leahy and King were the most
important members of the latter group. These two groups displayed substantially different emotional responses to events and patterns of reconsideration.

The Response of Marshall and others committed to Invasion

As made clear above, for this first group, the success of the campaigns on Iwo Jima and Okinawa was the most important element of the events. Given their success in taking these islands with relative speed, these events were largely confirmatory of their theory of victory. This should tend to elicit contentment and, with it, the suppression of the tendency to reconsider their approach to the war. Arguably, they were more aware of the difficulties of ending the war as quickly and decisively as the official policy demanded. Though they recognized that the casualties were high, they were not entirely out of their experience for the war, either in the Philippines or elsewhere. Any element of anxiety associated with this should, thereby, be slight if it existed at all, and its effects largely overwhelmed by their relative contentment with the course of the war. For George Marshall in particular, the successful development of the atom bomb was clearly positive, but it was also expected, and moreover, he does not seemed to have viewed it as a ‘game-changing’ development in the war. Thus, it should elicit relatively little joy and, again, little reconsideration of his plans for the invasion. Last, the intelligence about the size and speed of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu was not anticipated by Marshall, and was clearly very negative, given that it began to encourage doubts about the success that the invasion might meet. It should be likely to encourage anxiety and a reconsideration of his approach to the war.

Throughout the spring and early summer, it is clear that Marshall did not reconsider his belief that invading first Kyushu then the Kanto Plain was the best, indeed, perhaps the only,

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922 Pogue 1987, 24.
means by which the war could be ended with the speed and decisiveness required. Indeed, his behavior suggests that he felt it necessary to undercut discussions of alternatives like an indirect approach, via Formosa or the Asian mainland and the possibility of bombing and blockade (he argued that the experience of Germany demonstrated that this would fail to bring them to the point of unconditional surrender, a demand he opposed backing away from). Though he evinced concern with the casualties that might be expected, his emphasis was on preparing the American people to support them during the pursuit of the option he thought would be least costly. This tendency of thought is evident in both his summoning to a JCS meeting the Director of War Information (effectively the US propaganda chief) and his strong efforts to present the low estimates to Truman during the 18 June meeting. Indeed, he even tended to think of the use of any special weapons—in particular poison gas and later the atom bombs—as devices for cutting casualties that might be expected in an invasion rather than independent means for ending the war. During the period of Okinawa and into July, then, he demonstrated no flagging of his commitment to invasion, and indeed a resistance to considering alternatives and a tendency to fit new developments into his existing belief structure rather than reconsidering it. This is consistent with the influence of contentment, and with my predictions.

His late-July-early August behavior seems consistent with the prediction that anxiety trigger a reconsideration of his beliefs. Throughout the month there were indications that the Japanese were much stronger on Kyushu than had been estimated. At first these suggested merely higher levels of casualties, but they eventually reached the point where they made it

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924 Skates 1994, 76.
925 Pogue 1987, 17. Indeed, according to McCoy’s recollection, he was ‘annoyed’ at the mention of the bomb as a possible alternative route to war termination during the 18 June meeting. Forrestal 1951, 70.
impossible to absolutely guarantee the success of an invasion.\textsuperscript{926} Several historians suggest that Marshall and his aides were “shocked” by these estimates, though they are not able to cite direct reports of his response.\textsuperscript{927} It is evident, nonetheless, that Marshall was reconsidering the invasion plan. In a late July discussion with Truman, he seems to have quoted him much higher casualty estimates—prospectively as many as 250,000.\textsuperscript{928} On the very day of the Hiroshima bombing, the Joint Staff Planners—almost certainly with his approval—stated that alternatives to a Kyushu invasion needed to be offered and studied.\textsuperscript{929} Most concretely, he himself wrote to MacArthur that same day and asked him for alternatives to the Kyushu invasion—possibly a direct invasion of the Kanto plain, or at some location north of Tokyo on Honshu.\textsuperscript{930} This is clear evidence of his reconsidering of the invasion plan, and is consistent in timing and character with my predictions.

While the patterns of reconsideration and interaction with information correlate well with the predictions made, there is little or no evidence of the mechanism—of affective response. Simply put, there are no direct reports of George Marshall’s emotional or affective responses during this period. Consistent with the socialized pattern of military bearing during the period he apparently

\textsuperscript{926} Frank 1999, 211.
\textsuperscript{927} Ferrell described him as “appalled,” (1994, 213, 216); Drea describes him as “apprehensive,” (1994, 203, 222); Frank says that the intelligence created “powerful shock waves in Washington.” (1999, 211, 213).
\textsuperscript{928} Skates 1994, 78; Maga 2002, 124; Truman 1955, 417.
\textsuperscript{929} Frank 1999, 223-4.
\textsuperscript{930} “In order to assist in disussions likely to arise here on the meaning of reported dispositions in Jpaan proper and possible alternate objectives to OLYMPIC, such as Tokyo, Sendai, Ominato, I would appreciate your personal estimate of the Kapanese intentions and capabilities as related to your curent directive and available resources.” Message from Marshall to MacArthur, 7 August 1945. Frank 1999, 274. MacArthur then denied that these changes might be necessary. The surrender within a week mooted any further discussions.
maintained a business-like demeanor in all of the social and political settings he was in during the period. Moreover, the diarists and memoirists involved in the administration by then realized that they were writing for history as much as for personal recollection, and therefore tended to omit personal details from their accounts.

The Response of those Uncommitted to Invasion

For those who were uncommitted to invasion—even as they were willing to move forward with plans for invasion—the difficulties and costs of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa successes should be more significant than was the case for Marshall and MacArthur. These men presumed that the US would be successful regardless of their method for ending the war, and for them costs mattered much more. Thus as the direction of planning tended toward invasion, the high casualties became increasingly unexpected and increasingly negative element of the current policy. Accordingly, they should be begin to experience anxiety, and as a result of that anxiety, begin to search for more information and consider alternatives to the policy presented to them. In the context of this search, the atom bomb appeared as a possible solution, though, from the early summer, a highly uncertain one. The successful test—indeed, in terms of power the beyond expectations test—at Almagordo on 26 July was therefore should cause joy, and with it the quick reconsideration of the approach to the war. The successful bombing at Hiroshima should reinforce this. Because of influence of joy around the atom bomb, and thus the optimistic turning away from the prospect of invasion, for these men, the intelligence about the Kyushu build-up should be unlikely to elicit anxiety.

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932 Schmitz 2001, 188.
During the late spring and early summer, those war leaders not already committed to invasion clearly evinced patterns of information search and reconsideration of that approach. They were actively trying to find a way to avoid invasion. This had two major manifestations. One was the interest in the atomic bomb as a means to quickly end the war. Pogue states that “increasingly worried about the shrinkage of the ground force replacements, [Stimson asked Marshall] in May if it would be possible to hold off from ‘involvement in heavy casualties in the pacific’ until [the atom bomb] could be tested. The other was the proposal to issue a ‘clarification’ of the unconditional surrender demands, specifying most importantly that the current occupant of the throne would remain in place and the dynastic institutions would not be interfered with. Most of those who opposed him—James Byrnes and John McCloy in particular—opposed him not for trying to find an alternative to invasion but because the opposed this specific concession. Stimson began advocating this position in late May and pursued it all the way through the issuance of the Potsdam Proclamation, which reflected only a partial achievement of his advice. Grew, the Acting Secretary of State tried very hard in May to convince Truman to explicitly make this concession, however he was beaten back by the advice from Marshall, King, and even Stimson that making it during the Okinawa fight would give the

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933 By 25 May, the slowness of the fighting on Okinawa had caused Nimitz to privately indicate that he might no longer support the invasion plan—a plan he had explicitly agreed to one month earlier. Frank 1999, 147. The day after preparations for invasion were approved, the Committee of Three (the secretaries of State, War, and Navy) agreed to make “every effort” to find a way to end the war without invasion. Stimson and McBundy 1947, 619; Schmitz 2001, 183.

934 Pogue 1987, 9.

935 For Byrnes, his opposition was mostly rooted in fears of the effect on American politics of leaving Hirohito on the throne—at the time, this was a far from popular option. For McCloy (as had been the case with Roosevelt), leaving the Imperial system in place impeded their program of reshaping Japanese society such that it would no longer be a threat. Maga 2002, 13.
Japanese evidence that American was wearying of the war—an impression they desperately wanted to avoid.936

This pattern of behavior is most evident in Harry Truman himself. Truman is described as being “very much perturbed” by the casualties on Okinawa.937 In mid-May he stated that “the thought now uppermost in my mind was how soon we could wind up the war in the Pacific.”938 He described the situation in June 1945 as:

Okinawa and Iwo Jima had been defended fiercely by the enemy and our loss olives had been very heavy. But we now had bases from which direct attacks could be launched on Japan. We also knew that the closer we came to the home islands the more determined and fanatical would be the resistance. There were still more than four million men in the Japanese armed forces to defend the main Japanese islands, Korea, Manchuria, and North China. The Chiefs of Staff were grim in their estimates of the cost in casualties we would have to pay to invade the Japanese mainland. As our forces in the Pacific were pushing ahead, paying a heavy toll in lives...

In requesting the 18 June meeting, Truman stated its rationale as determining “how far we could afford to go in the Japan campaign.”940 These comments strongly suggest both his continuing anxiety about ending the war quickly, and the key source of his anxiety—the high casualty rates.

When he received the reports from the OSS about Dulles’ contacts in Switzerland, his marginalia on the report suggests interest, as does his written query “should we pursue this?”941 When he received Hoover’s memorandum advocating a negotiated settlement and the concession of Korea and Formosa to a disarmed Japan, was interested enough that he sent it

936 Stimson and McBundy 1947, 628.
937 Frank 1999, 133.
938 Truman 1955, 235.
939 Truman, 1955, 314.
940 Brower 1991, 324.
941 Memorandum for the President from William Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services, 12 May 1945. Harry S. Truman Library, Rose Conway Files, Box 009, OSS, Donovan Chronological File, June-August 1945.
with personal requests for feedback to, among others, Grew, Stimson, Marshall, Fred Vinson, and former Secretary of State Hull. Though he chose not to provide a detailed response, Hull described the proposal as not less than “appeasement.” Truman’s interest in a proposal that other leading war leaders would see as appeasement is striking evidence of information search.

This pattern of consideration and reconsideration is also evident in his responses to the invasion plan. Having called the 18 June meeting with the JCS to discuss his concerns about the invasion policy, he asked skeptical questions about casualties and about the possibility of it degenerating into a ‘race war.’ He also said that he “hope there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other.” His acceptance of the policy was itself tentative: he approved invasion planning and preparations but indicated that he expected to revisit the issue. That his approval of the policy did not indicate an end to information search and consideration is evident in a later description of his general decision-making approach: giving an immediate decision, but then mentally revisiting it until he was certain of its correctness. These indications of continuing information search and reconsideration are consistent with my predictions. As was the case with Marshall, the record provides few direct indications of emotional or affective state, so direct evidence of the mechanism is somewhat thin. One of the few, a possible indication of anxiety, is Truman’s comment in his diary the day

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942 Additionally, the proposal was the topic of conversation at the Committee of Three meeting on 12 June. 12 June Committee of Three minutes. US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 3.
944 Frank 1999, 143.
945 Maga 2002, 88. The admirals involved seem to take the same position. Wolk 1997, 173.
946 Ferrell 1994, 182.
before the June 18 meeting with the JCS that this was the “most important decision I have ever had to make.”

This anxiety seems to have ended when Truman received the full report of the atomic bomb test, on 21 July. The explosion was larger and more powerful than expected. No longer a hope, it was now clear that the US possessed a powerful weapon which might indeed be able to shock the Japanese into surrendering with minimal further American casualties. Truman appears to have joyfully accepted this as his theory of victory. From this point he seems to have been less interested in concessions to the Japanese—the overt statement Stimson advocated was no longer important to him, and indeed he was much more susceptible to Byrnes’s suggestions that unconditional surrender not be backed away from too overtly, either in the Potsdam Proclamation or in the reply to the Japanese offer to surrender. Truman seems to have been, similarly, unmoved thereafter by the reports of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu. Moreover, the few clear reports of emotional response all relate to Truman and the atomic bomb. Harry Stimson wrote in his diary that when he told Truman of the successful test, he was “highly delighted and filled new optimism by the success of the atom bomb test.” Similarly, he was “quite pleased” when he was told that the time-table for nuclear weapons usage had been moved up. Churchill recorded that he was a much more confident bargainer.

In his diary, he wrote of now having an ‘ace in the hole’—no small thing for a man who loved poker as much as Truman. When the Hiroshima bomb was successfully dropped, he was so

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947 Perhaps the other was his statement that he felt “painfully ignorant” as he confronted these problems. Maga 1994, 73.
948 Stimson seems to have preceded him in this: during his visit to Oak Ridge National Laboratory on 12 April, he wrote in his diary that he had “spent a long afternoon going over the most wonderful and unique operation that probably has ever existed.” Hodgson 1990, 314.
950 Schmitz 2001, 186, 188. See also Hodgson 1990, 334.
excited that he all but ran around the *Augusta* (the cruiser he was returning to the US on from Europe) telling everyone he met the news.\(^{951}\) Both in his emotional response and in his pattern of reconsideration, Truman’s experience is suggestive of joy and its effects.\(^{952}\)

**Discussion**

Overall, then, these cases strongly corroborate the emotion-based theory of learning. For those committed to the invasion and a brute force theory of victory, the successes of the campaigns of 1945 seem to have created contentment and a resistance to reconsidering their theory of victory. However, intelligence reports which increasingly suggested that the plan might not even succeed clearly produced a reconsideration of this theory of victory. In contrast, for those uncommitted to invasion, the costs of Iwo Jima and Okinawa caused anxiety, information search, and further consideration of the plan. It also primed them for a joyful acceptance of the atom bomb informative theory of victory when it proved more than a theoretical possibility. While the behavioral evidence of resistance, information search, and reconsideration are fairly strong in these cases, direct evidence of the mechanism is somewhat

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\(^{951}\) The historian Miscable writes that “According to [Truman’s] own account, Truman was ‘deeply moved.’ He passed along the news to Byrnes and then with gushing enthusiasm proclaimed to the sailors gather with him that ‘this is the greatest thing in history. It is time for us to get home.’ A further message arrived that confirmed the initial assessments. With palpable excitement, Truman informed his mess-hall compatriots of the powerful new bomb, which he described as 20,000 times as powerful as a ton of TNT. Then he raced to the ship’s wardroom to share the news with the *Augusta*’s officers. An observant journalist remembers him almost running as he moved about the ship “spreading the news...he could not keep back his expectation that the pacific war might now be brought to a speedy end. Here lay his primary and deepest hope regarding the impact of the atom bomb.” (2007, 222)

\(^{952}\) Nevertheless, it is clear that his joy in solving this difficult problem, not in killing. On 11 August, he said that “the only language they seem to understand in the one we have been using to bombard them. When you deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable.” Miscable 2007, 243. The day after the Nagasaki bombing, he told the cabinet that “the thought of wiping out another 100,000 kids was too horrible. He didn’t like the idea of killing, as he said, all those kids.” Gilbert, 1989, 717. Recalling his actions that day, he later wrote that “I could not keep back my expectation that the Pacific War might now be brought to a speedy end. Truman 1955, 422.
more sparse: only in the last case, involving Truman’s joyful response to the atom bomb’s feasibility, is there clear evidence that the anticipated emotion was actually manifest.

**Changes in Aims**

When Truman came to the Presidency there was no specified theory of victory, nor even an agreed-up strategy, for beating Japan. There was, however, a statement about war aims—unconditional surrender—though even these apparently total aims said little about the nature of the post-war situation. In this situation, though already well into the fight against Japan, the leaders of the Truman administration were in the position of selecting a theory of victory from the very start. Some—again, Marshall most of all—had a clear sense of the theory of victory the preferred and were, to a great extent, already operating under. Others were not sure about the costs of that invasion. The preferences of leaders during the late spring and early summer comprise the first cases for my analysis. The last case is Truman upon the acceptance of the atom bomb. Though Marshall rejected his theory of victory by reflecting his model of battle in early August, he did not move to the point of selecting a new theory of victory because the atom bomb ended the war too quickly. Accordingly, this possible case cannot be considered.

*Selecting a Theory of Victory: May-June 1945*

During this period, the question of war aims and the strategy for bringing the war against Japan to a close were the first priority of the war leaders. Leaders debated whether or not they should step back from the demand of unconditional surrender set by Roosevelt and codified in the Cairo Declaration, while simultaneously debating the military path forward.\(^{953}\)

For Harry Truman, the decision problem was whether or not he could find a political and military strategy that would allow him to maintain his aims but also minimized the risk that the

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\(^{953}\) Skates 1994, 38-41.
public might turn against it. This active consideration occurred under the influence of anxiety cause by his professed ignorance of the situation and the very high casualties experienced in the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns.\textsuperscript{954} Truman was confronted with four possible options. The first, and most widely supported, was invasion, a brute force theory of victory. However, invasion risked extremely high casualties.\textsuperscript{955} The second was to rely on blockade and bombing to bring the Japanese to surrender. While this would possibly be cheaper in lives,\textsuperscript{956} it was expected that it could require up to 18 months—so, possibly success might not come until the end of 1946 or even into 1947, an unacceptable timeline.\textsuperscript{957} The third was making concessions, and was in essence a latent attritive theory of victory—an expectation that enough Japanese had suffered enough costs that Japan would be willing to negotiate a peace agreement should the Emperor be preserved.\textsuperscript{958} But it would have involved backing away from unconditional surrender—an unpopular move at the time—and the Japanese might interpret concessions as evidence that their plan to weary the Americans of war was working. The last was using the atom bomb to shock the Japanese government into surrender. While cheap and decisive, this approach relied on the bomb working—something that was far from certain at this point in time. Truman chose invasion, but only tentatively, and only after he was assured by Marshall and other military chiefs that the casualties would not be as high as some were then arguing.

\textsuperscript{954} These casualties were so high that they caused several instances of public criticism over the direction of the war. Skates 1994, 76.
\textsuperscript{955} Truman had difficulty accepting these casualties both at the political and personal level. Maga 2002, 71.
\textsuperscript{956} Not everyone agreed with this—Marshall emphasized that even after surrender mopping-up operations to occupy the country would probably still be necessary; these operations would take place in a hostile country.
\textsuperscript{957} Wolk 1997, 175.
\textsuperscript{958} Maga 1994, 74.
Moreover this was done only after approving in principle a statement clarifying unconditional surrender in such a way that it suggested that the emperor could remain in power.

I am only able to make a tentative prediction in this case, given that no theory of victory was actually falsified. One cannot falsify a theory that does not exist, after all. However, given that the situation occurred under (1) the influence of anxiety, (2) the general sense that a brute force theory of victory would be necessary and (3) conditions of mobilization, the relevant prediction is that any change in aims would be small, assuming that continued mobilization is possible. Truman’s June decision is broadly consistent with these expectations. A general brute force approach became a concrete brute force theory of victory. In approving this program, Truman sought to avoid a significant decline in war aims, but at the same time required assurances of the speed with which termination would come and smaller-than-rumored casualty levels. Indeed, the actual change in effective war aims was minimal: the clarification allowing for the continuance of the imperial institution would be made later.

The Atomic Bomb: July 1945

With the news that the test of the atomic bomb had succeeded beyond expectations, Truman reconsidered his active theory of victory under the influence of joy. When a brute force theory of victory is reconsidered under the influence of joy, increases in war aims become possible. In this case, Truman abandoned the brute force theory of victory in favor of an informative theory of victory. Due to the presence of ceiling effects, significant increases in war aims were not possible. However, a small increase—in the form of greater reticence about conceding the emperor up front—was possible. This seemed to have been obtained.

The Potsdam Proclamation, finished after the atom bomb was tested, is evidence that this in fact occurred. Rather than a clear statement that the Emperor would be permitted to
retain the throne, it instead offered the vague condition that “The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.” Despite the efforts of Grew and Stimson, Truman preferred James Byrnes’ counsel to keep it vague.959 Were Truman concerned about the difficulty and cost of invading, it seems unlikely that he would have followed Byrnes’ advice. This is even more striking given that intelligence suggesting the increased difficulty of invasion was now reaching the senior-most war leaders. Moreover, this unwillingness to overtly lower war aims continued into the days of the surrender themselves. In their first overture, the Japanese explicitly required the continued reign of the Showa Emperor. In the council held in response to this overture, Stimson strongly advocated granting it, and Byrnes just as strongly argued against it. Forrestal offered a third way—a vague assurance that Hirohito and all Japanese government would continue to function under the authority of the Supreme Commander—and Truman chose it. Once again, rather than grant the concession that Stimson and Grew had advocated for months,960 one which he seemed to agree with earlier in the summer, he now chose the somewhat riskier approach, one which in practice demanded more of the Japanese.

The picture that emerges is that, though there was little room to increase war aims, Truman seems to have become much cooler to openly stating a concession he had earlier

959 Schmitz 2001, 189.
960 On 2 July, Truman had agreed that Stimson’s arguments in favor of a final warning—which necessarily included signaling that the Emperor would remain on the Chrysanthemum Throne—were “very powerful.” Schmitz 2001, 180, 189. In a 30 May 1945 memo to Marshall, Stimson noted that “as you know, the President is himself already thinking about [a revised statement of the overall objective].” US NARA RG 107 (Office of the Secretary of War) Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File) July 1940-Sept. 1945. Box 8.
agreed with in principle. While not quite an increase in war aims, it is something very much like it. This is consistent with my prediction.

Discussion

These two cases are generally supportive of the theoretical predictions. Obviously, the second is more supportive because the required antecedents—including the falsification of a theory of victory—were in fact obtained, allowing for direct relationship with the relevant hypothesis. The finding is supportive, as well, in as much as Truman's new reluctance to confirm that the US would allow the Hirohito to remain emperor meant that the US terms did not change as much as had been likely. Certainly, they did not fall—even though it may have seemed as if they did to the public, which was not privy to plans to clarify theory unconditional surrender demand. The former case well reflects the intuitions of my model, and evinces the pattern that would have been upheld had one brute force theory of victory actually been falsified—small decreases in war aims, minimized by a plan to continue mobilization at a level that would be politically acceptable. In general, then, these cases are supportive of my predictions.

Further Discussion and Conclusions

On the Case Itself

Unlike the other cases, this case challenged my operative assumption that states have theories of victory at the outset of a war. In this case, there was a general two-stage framework for the war, implied in the Europe-first policy. However, that broad policy was filled in with short-term goals rather than a clear statement of how the US would achieve its aims in the war with Japan. It was not until late 1944 that discussion began, and not until after Truman came into office in April 1945 that the senior-most war decision makers were fully involved. Even
then, the principal war decision-maker—the President—was only partially committed to the brute force theory of victory that he approved. All the while he had his eye on the alternate promised by the atom bomb—should it actually work.

That a government and its leaders would wait so long to determine their theory of victory was, in this case, a product of the idiosyncrasies of the situation. It was a unique situation because, first, there was an effectively separate war to be won first. Second, it was possible to fight for three years without seriously endangering any more key territories. Third, it was possible because any theory of victory for obtaining an ‘unconditional surrender’ involved getting close to Japan. Accordingly, the pursuing the island-hopping program on the basis of short-term strategic goals was sustainable. Had any of these circumstances been different, it is unlikely that the US would have gone without a clear theory of victory in the war against Japan for so long.

The case is also unique in the sense that some leaders, and a great many scholars, have suggested it was conducted with an eye towards a non-belligerent. It is certainly the case that the relationship with the Soviet Union was a common question for all involved. However, my study strongly suggests that US decisions about how to proceed in the war against Japan were largely determined by a desire to beat Japan as quickly and with the smallest cost possible. Indeed, my findings rely on this. Contrary to revisionists who argue that American leaders, particularly Truman and Stimson, decided to bomb Hiroshima did so because they saw an opportunity to use the bomb in hopes of influencing the Soviets, my findings suggest that they were mostly concerned with the defeat of Japan. Certainly Truman’s response to the atom bombing on the Augusta is suggestive of his primary interest in Japan rather than the Soviet Union at that point in time.
This case study helps clarify the relationships between fighting and diplomacy in war. At two crucial moments, this relationship determined action, but in sharply different ways. During the Okinawa campaign, Grew’s proposal to immediately clarify the unconditional surrender demand was blocked because of the relationships between the theories of victory that the two states were pursuing. Obtaining maximal concessions from the Japanese required that they not believe that the US was wearying of the war. Given that they were pursuing an attritive theory of victory, and the US leadership knew this, they were aware that in that context, anything suggestive of a concession would be seen by the Japanese as reason to keep fighting until the US gave them what remained of their demands. Later on, diplomacy won out over fighting. After the second atom bomb was dropped, Truman, believing that the requisite demonstration had been made, ordered that future atom bombing, and most other forms of offensive activity against Japan be halted while they made up their mind about fighting.\footnote{Forrestal 1951, 83.}

The case also suggests the importance of intelligence in a way that had not been anticipated. Whereas the orientation of my theory was rooted in the response to real, concrete events, this case demonstrated the importance of intelligence in falsifying theories of victory. However, further research into the treatment of intelligence is needed. Given that it has different properties than concrete events—intelligence estimates are guesses based on indirect evidence rather than direct observations, after all—it may be treated differently than conventional events. The case also suggests the importance of technological innovation in making new kinds of theories of victory possible. This, too, requires further research.
A natural counterfactual question whenever a difficult political or strategic problem is resolved via a *deus ex machina* is “what would have happened without the interruption?” In this case, the interruption in the pattern of interaction was caused by the development of the atom bomb. Failing it, my study of the case suggests that the US would not have invaded Kyushu. In the absence of a Kyushu invasion, it seems likely that Truman would have offered some concessions—starting with a straightforward offer to allow the Showa Emperor to continue to reign. An invasion further north may have occurred had the Japanese not accepted the offered concession, but this invasion would probably not have happened until December or even into 1946 given that it would have required a new planning and decision process. All the while, incendiary bombing would have continued. Given Japanese beliefs and leaders, it seems likely that a negotiated peace may well have been obtained late in 1945 or perhaps into 1946, around the time of a prospective northern invasion. This last phase of the war would almost certainly have been politically messy for both the Americans and the Japanese. Failing the shock of the atom bombs, convincing hardliners and perhaps even the emperor that the set of terms that an American leader could then offer were sufficient would have been difficult. Coups attempts would almost certainly have been likely, and may well have succeeded. At the same time, offering concessions would have brought difficulties for Truman at home and abroad. These concessions would most likely be unpopular domestically, stirring up opposition, even within the president’s own party. The allied coalition would also have been brought under strain. While the British would almost certainly have acquiesced, the Australians would have resisted strongly. Similarly, as the Soviets advanced through Manchuria and into China, the
Chinese Nationalists would likely have responded negatively to the emerging situation. All in all, the situation would have been much messier, difficult, and costly for all involved.962

962 Casualties would almost certainly have been higher, as well. In addition to continued incendiary bombing and the casualties to Americans and Japanese associated with an invasion somewhere in Japan, fighting in China/Manchuria, Malaysia, and the Philippines would have involved significantly more casualties. Moreover, in 1945 the Japanese were killing through various means approximately 100,000 non-combatants a month. These losses would have continued to mount, as well.
Chapter 8: Summary Analysis and Conclusions

In the preceding chapters, the focus has been on identifying how leaders thought about their conflicts and describing how they learned about them. Though their perceptions and the evolution of their perceptions was compared with my predictions, this was largely conducted on an individual basis. This chapter builds on those analyses by using their cumulative results to evaluate the strength of the hypotheses and the theory from which they are derived. It finishes by discussing how these findings differ from others in the literature and how they help explain current conflicts, as well as those in the past.

Existence of Theories of Victory

The first analytical question does not have any hypotheses attached to it. A fundamental assumption of my theoretical approach is that leaders actually have these theories of victory. This assumption is generally well supported by the case study research presented. Even in a highly unequal fight—between Finland and the Soviet Union—the weaker side nevertheless had a theory of victory at the outset of the war. Even as initial theories of victory were broken, they were replaced in all cases where an individual continued to believe that there was something that they could hold back from the prospective victory. In some cases, these were latent theories of victory—that is, they felt that no further action was necessary because
the other side realized the costs of continuing their effort to get more—but only in cases where there leaders had given up on all war aims was there no theory of victory. In no case did a leader who lacked a theory of victory take their country into war; indeed, the only leaders without a theory of victory were certain French leaders’ whose lack of a theory of victory developed after 16 May 1940.

**Framing Effects**

In general, the cases presented show the importance of framing effects in determining how war-time events are perceived and understood. Several of the cases show put this in stark relief: different frames meant that the failed Finnish offensive was seen as unimportant, while the slowness of the contemporaneous Red Army retreats were seen as serious indeed. It also suggests why the Japanese Navy saw their defeat at Midway as a catastrophe while the Japanese Army saw it as merely unfortunate. Nevertheless, some cases suggested the limits of these kinds of framing effects. Some developments are simply so bad that, regardless of the frame applied, the event will be seen as bad news. This was particularly evident in the case of the French collapse experienced between 13-16 May. Gamelin and Reynaud had different types of theory of victory, but, nevertheless, their global appraisal of the event was the same. The development of the atomic bomb suggests another kind of limitation: when events do not have a clear linkage to any theory of victory, people with different theories of victory may view them similarly as they grapple to find their meaning.

Beyond the general intuition about the importance of framing effects, the cumulative results are favorable hypothesis 1 and the associated sub-hypotheses. To restate,
Hypothesis 1: Individuals using different kinds of theories of victory will focus on different kinds of events and different attributes of events.

Hypothesis 1.1: Individuals using a brute force theory of victory will focus on events associated with their war-plan. They will tend to ignore diplomatic and domestic political events, save third parties’ threats to directly intervene.

Hypothesis 1.2: Individuals using an informative theory of victory will focus on events related to their ability to demonstrate military efficiency and efficacy and their opponents willingness to concede in response to it. They will tend to ignore domestic political events, most diplomatic events, and their opponent’s losses from fighting.

Hypothesis 1.3: Individuals using an attritive theory of victory will focus on events related to their opponent’s weariness from fighting and their own ability to continue fighting. They will tend to ignore wins and losses on the battlefield.

The cumulative summary of the cases can be found in table 1. A cursory review of column 3 suggests the validity of the general hypothesis (1): the pieces of information stressed by leaders within the same type of theories of victory are similar, while between theory of victory types they differ. This is true despite the presence of different countries in each of the sections. Neither similarities nor differences can be explained by the strategic culture or any other aspect of the country involved. Thus, this hypothesis is supported.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory of Victory Type</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Ignore</th>
<th>Prediction Effective?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attritive</strong></td>
<td>Finland, Dec. 1939</td>
<td>Ability to hold/force back Russians</td>
<td>Failure of own offensive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSR, 15 Feb-13 Mar. 1940</td>
<td>Ability to wear down Russians</td>
<td>Slowness of advance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France (Gamelin) 10-20 May</td>
<td>Ability to hold back Germans</td>
<td>German politics</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan (Army/Naval General Staff)-Coral Sea/Midway</td>
<td>Ability to maintain territories</td>
<td>Failures to further expand</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan (Army/Navy)—Guadalcanal</td>
<td>Ignored US moves at first, then considered battle essential</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan (Hirohito)—Guadalcanal</td>
<td>Loss of Island</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan (Army/Navy/Cabinet)—Marianas/Saipan 1943</td>
<td>Loss of key part of AZND</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan (Hirohito)—Marianas/Saipan 1943</td>
<td>Loss of island</td>
<td>Yes but maybe false positive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan (Army/Navy/Cabinet)—Philippines 1944</td>
<td>Loss of the Philippines, inability to stage decisive battle</td>
<td>No, due to nature of island-hopping campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informative</strong></td>
<td>USSR, 30 Nov.-28 Dec. 1939</td>
<td>Ability of Red Army to meet its objectives</td>
<td>refused to treat with Finns</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan (Yamamoto/Combined Fleet)—Coral Sea/Midway</td>
<td>Ability of IJN to demonstrate Japanese power through victory at sea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France (Reynaud) 10-18 May</td>
<td>Ability to defeat the Germans</td>
<td>Ignored German domestic politics</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brute Force</strong></td>
<td>US (Marshall/Army), 1945</td>
<td>Ability to win battles, magnitude of US casualties</td>
<td>denigrated importance of Japanese pol. changes</td>
<td>Yes (casualty attention because required mobilization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany, May-June 1940</td>
<td>Focus on Wehrmacht’s ability to perform tasks, keep schedule</td>
<td>paid no attention to changes in Fr cabinet</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The sub-hypotheses have an arguably more difficult task. Rather than merely arguing for different attention patterns, they make predictions about exactly what should matter and what should not matter. Of the 14 cases, 10 of them are deemed to have effectively predicted which aspects of events were important, and which were less important or even irrelevant. All of the problematic cases are drawn from the Japanese experience in the Pacific War. Both one of the negative cases and the positive case which may reflect a false positive are the product of one man, Hirohito, who may not have had a firm grasp on the nature of the Japanese strategy at the time. The other two are reflections of a more significant problem, the idiosyncrasies of the air-sea warfare, which change the nature of what makes a defense line work.

Beyond those four cases, each sup-hypothesis (1.1-1.3) seems to be validated by the results. Attritive theories of victory place most emphasis on the ability to maintain a strong defense while wearying the opponent. Informative theories of victory place most emphasis on the ability of the military to meet its objectives until after the demonstration is completed—though domestic political events prior to the adoption of the theory of victory may be influential in their adoption. Brute force theories of victory cause leaders to focus on the achievement of military goals, and minimize the importance of their enemy’s political maneuverings.

That this pattern of findings suggest considerable generalizability, given that they are found in states as culturally and politically different as Japan, the USSR, Finland, and the US. The wide spectrum of individuals whose perceptions were correctly predicted—from George Marshall and Marshal Stalin to Paul Reynaud and Adm. Yamamoto—also suggests considerable generaliability to other wars in different time periods. However, the findings also suggest that
technology and type of fighting may in some cases intrude. Effective application may thus require a careful study of the meaning and means of defense and demonstration, to ensure that the predictions made appropriate to the military context.

**Emotion and Reconsideration**

For this section the general argument has been that emotions strongly affect when state leaders reconsider their approach to a war. The results strongly corroborate this hypothesis, both in the timing and the nature of the reconsideration that occurs. Moreover, the results are very consistent with the more general findings in psychology about the operation of emotion. The full hypotheses follow:

**Hypothesis 2: Series of events’ likelihood of provoking a reconsideration of events is tied to the emotional response associated with their characteristics.**

2.1: Series of events that are novel and perceived as contrary to a theory of victory are likely to cause a reconsideration of beliefs about how war aims will be gained because they stimulate anxiety.

2.2: Series of events that are familiar and perceived as contrary to a theory of victory are not likely to provoke a reconsideration of beliefs about how war aims will be gained because they stimulate anger.

2.3: Series of events that are perceived as confirmatory of a theory of victory are not likely to provoke a reconsideration of beliefs about how war aims will be gained, because they will provoke happiness/contentedness.

2.4: Series of events that are perceived as positive and novel may provoke a reconsideration of beliefs about how war aims will be gained because they can stimulate joy.

A summary of the cases is available in Chart 2. In reviewing the cases, it is important to recall the methodology: predictions of reconsideration are made from characteristics of the war-time
events. Reported emotion addresses the mechanism, but is so tricky to recover that I treat it as corroborating rather than direct evidence.

Table 6: Affective Response and Reconsideration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Affective Response</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Reconsider?</th>
<th>Observed Emotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anxiety</strong>&lt;br&gt;Reconsider Theory of Victory</td>
<td>USSR 21-28 Dec. 1939</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Suggestions of anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland 13-21 Feb 1940 (Tanner et al)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland 28 Feb-5 Mar 1940</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US May-June 1945 (Truman, Stimson)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Some suggestions of anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US July-Aug 1945 (Marshall)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Few observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan-Midway (Yamamoto)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan-Saipan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan Aug 6-15 1945 (‘Peace Faction’)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France 10-18 May 1940 (Gamelin)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Imperturbability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frustration</strong>&lt;br&gt;Suppresses reconsideration</td>
<td>USSR, 15-20 December 1939</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Strong anger, raging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland, 13-21 Feb 1940 (Niukkanen)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Anger, frustration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan-Midway (Army, NGS)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Frustration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan-Philippines (Army, cabinet)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Frustration, anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan 6-15 Aug 1945 (Army)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France 1-15 June (Reynaud)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Anger, Frustration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joy</strong>&lt;br&gt;Reconsideration,</td>
<td>Japan, December-January 1941-2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Elation, joy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speculation</td>
<td>(Yamamoto, CF)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Elation, excitement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US July-Aug 1945</td>
<td>Truman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contentment</td>
<td>Finland, Late Dec-13 Feb</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Contentment, happiness, pride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppresses</td>
<td>Japan, December-January 1941-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Happiness, pride, “victory disease”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconsideration</td>
<td>(Army)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US May-June 1945</td>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Few observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 10-16 May</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to Predict</td>
<td>France May 1940 (Reynaud)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Frustration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety OR Frustration</td>
<td>France May 1940 (Villelume)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Anxiety</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In surveying the cumulative findings, two things are instantly clear. The first is that unexpected, negative events, and the experience of anxiety they elicit, have a strong association with reconsidering theories of victory. In each of the cases studied where the antecedents of anxiety were found in a series of events, the war leaders in question reconsidered their approach to their war. In the strong majority of these cases, there were also reports of anxiety or anxiety-like behavior. Moreover, in the case where the complexity of the individual’s beliefs was such that it was hard to predict the resulting emotional state, experienced anxiety was tied to a reconsideration of beliefs. Joy and its antecedents have the same association. Contentment has the opposite association. All of these hypotheses are, accordingly, corroborated by the research.

The second instantly clear finding is that the relationship between frustration and rethinking is more complicated. In some cases, it seemed to have strikingly strong suppressive
effects on reconsideration. This was perhaps most dramatically illustrated in the Soviet experience of the first three weeks of the Winter War. As three cases make clear, however, reconsideration is also possible under conditions of frustration. That said, the findings from the cases suggest there was a unique antecedent. In all three cases, reconsideration occurred only when a leader concluded that some action necessary to pursue their theory of victory had been rendered impossible. Frustration did not make the impossible possible. This meant that there were times when they were searching for new options in the context of frustration. However, the kind of reconsideration that occurs seems to be different—there is a tendency to small changes, to ‘minimal’ learning rather than the more global learning evident when a reconsideration proceeds under the influence of anxiety. Significantly, no leader under the influence of frustration favored ending a war at the terms then on offer; none of them recognized their setbacks as ‘defeat.’

Three further interesting findings emerge from the studies. One is the role of unforced errors—or the perception of unforced errors—in giving rise to frustration. At a theoretical level, this should not be entirely surprising, since the emotion literature is clear that while a blameworthy actor is not necessary to elicit anger, it does intensify anger. That said, the presence or absence of unforced errors is not determinative in the elicitation of anxiety and frustration. The other is the pessimist’s paradox. Those leaders who started the war with some recognition of their own states weakness were more likely to experience frustration in response to bad news than those who were more optimistic. This meant that they were more likely to advocate continuing the war. At the same time, in response to good news, they were more likely to experience joy—with the implication that they might favor more ambitious goals and risky strategies—than those who were more optimistic at the outset. In the same
circumstances, the more optimistic are more likely to experience contentment, along with the more conservative attitude to risk and ambitious goals that seem to accompany it. The last is the role of risk in emotional response. Most leaders pursuing most theories of victory—things that are fundamentally uncertain—do not seem to acknowledge this uncertainty. However, in at least one case, war leaders explicitly recognized the riskiness of their actions. In this case, (Germany as it launched the *Blitzkrieg*), leaders experienced anxiety and its usual effects, most prominently information search, until what they saw as the critical point of uncertainty was reached. Thereafter, having passed this test, they seemed more likely to experience joy than contentment. While this finding is at best suggestive of the effects of recognized risk on emotional response, it merits further research.

Last, the findings also suggest considerable generalizability. Whenever addressing a psychological mechanism, it is necessary to consider possible individual differences that might mediate a general response. Despite looking at the responses of people from a broad range of cultural and personal backgrounds—the only characteristic they seem to share is a position of leadership in national security affairs—the findings are largely consistent. In only one case—Adolf Hitler himself—did there seem to be a lower tolerance for anxiety such that very good news made him anxious while it caused others to rejoice.

**Changes in War Aims**

It is through changes in war aims that victory is declared and defeat fully recognized. The theory chapter expresses a clear argument: that emotions and the kind of theory of victory just abandoned matter a great deal in determining if and when that happens. More specifically, the kind of theory of victory falsified matters most when the rejection of its predecessor occurs
under the influence of anxiety. This is important, of course, since this is the most likely circumstance in which reconsideration is likely to occur. The general results are largely favorable. The hypotheses derived from this argument are below.

**Hypothesis 3:** The degree to which war aims decrease after a theory of victory is falsified under the influence of anxiety is dependent on the kind of theory of victory falsified.

**Hypothesis 3.1** After an informative TOV has been falsified, leaders will either decrease their aims substantially or mobilize their forces and either maintain their forces or make small concessions.

**Hypothesis 3.2** After an attritive TOV has been falsified, aims will decrease substantially only if strategic collapse is perceived to be imminent or to have already occurred.

**Hypothesis 3.3** After a brute force TOV has been falsified, aims will decrease slightly and will decrease substantially after strategic collapse has occurred.

**Hypothesis 4:** States reconsidering their war aims under conditions of anger/frustration will make only small concessions, unless a military collapse is imminent or has already occurred. Then they will agree to most if not all of their opponent’s demands.

**Hypothesis 5:** Under conditions of contentedness, increases in aims are likely to be small or non-existent.

**Hypothesis 6:** Under conditions of joy, increases in aims are likely, particularly if they make informative theory of victory possible.

Coding the magnitude of a change in war aims is not as straightforward as it might seem. In some cases, it has an obvious character: when war aims remain the same, for instance, or when war leaders become willing to make enough concessions to satisfy their opponent.

Beyond those cases, however, there is no clear means for delineating what is a significant concession and what is not. Instead, a sense of the bargaining context must be the means for coding large and small concessions. The most important part of this calculation is the status quo: what are they already willing to concede, and what is there opponent demanding? Part of it is the product of military reality: if, for instance, an island is captured and for the foreseeable future the resources to contest it will not exist, war leaders may judge regaining it to be
practically impossible. Conceding the island can, in this sense, be unavoidable. But if the conflict involves other contested war aims, their concession of that island may not be so a large concession; indeed, conceding that island alone may have a minimal character. This is particularly true in cases like the Japanese experience in 1944, when concessions were not announced but had a purely *de facto* existence through policies like the Absolute Zone of National Defense. When this species of minimal concession is made, it necessarily implies continuing the war. The findings are summarized in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affective State</th>
<th>Abandoned TOV</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>New TOV</th>
<th>Observed Change in Aims</th>
<th>Prediction Correct?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>Japan-Fall 1944 (Saipan)</td>
<td>Small/no decrease</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland-21 February 1940</td>
<td>Small/no decrease</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>Concede Hanko, some islands, land on the KI: incremental change</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland-28 February 1940</td>
<td>Small/no decrease</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>Concede some more islands, land on the KI: Incremental change</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland-5 March 1940</td>
<td>Possibly significant (weak defense)</td>
<td>End War</td>
<td>Concede remaining land of the KI, some land north of Lake Ladoga, RR to Sweden: relatively large</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (Emperor et al.)-6-15 Aug. 1945</td>
<td>Possibly significant (weak defense)</td>
<td>End War</td>
<td>Concede control over Japan but continued reign of the emperor: large</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informative</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan (Navy) June 1942</td>
<td>Large decrease or mobilize</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>No change but a more difficult method of</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>Emotion</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR-28 Jan 1939</td>
<td>Large decrease or mobilize more</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>Concede Finnish sovereignty, seek return to near prewar demands: large</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (Baudouin et al.) May 1940</td>
<td>Large decrease or mobilize more</td>
<td>End War</td>
<td>Uncertain what would not be conceded: very large concessions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustration</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Sept 1943 (AZND)</td>
<td>Small/no decrease</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>Some peripheral islands not included AZND: minimal</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Jan 1945 (after Leyte)</td>
<td>Small/no decrease</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>Continued to demand retention of Japanese sovereignty: minimal</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (Army)-6-15 Aug 1945</td>
<td>Small/no decrease</td>
<td>Attritive (opposed ending war)</td>
<td>Demand minimal occupation, no interference in political system: minimal</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (Reynaud) June 1940</td>
<td>Small/no decrease</td>
<td>Attritive (opposed ending war)</td>
<td>Concedes temporary de facto control of France</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informative</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (Reynaud) May 1940</td>
<td>Small/no decrease</td>
<td>Attritive</td>
<td>No Change—seeks further mobilization, allied support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>Brute Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 1940 (Late May)</td>
<td>Increase aims</td>
<td>Brute Force</td>
<td>Small increase: the protected territories</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Jan-Mar 1942 (Navy)</td>
<td>Increase aims</td>
<td>Informative</td>
<td>No increase, but an easier method of achievement</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brute Force?</td>
<td>Increase aims</td>
<td>Informative</td>
<td>Possible increase, easier method of achievement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering first the effect of emotions, it is clear that when the theories of victory selected under the influence of anxiety, large concessions were offered—or, failing that, efforts to significantly increase the level of resources devoted to the problem were made. When
concessions were made, they were made in an honest effort to resolve the war—even if they were not always as large as their opponent sought. When concessions were not made, it was because there was a radical change in the theory of victory, and thus continuing the war meant continuing a different kind of war than they had thus far experienced. Similarly, when under the influence of joy, leaders tended to increase their war aims or, when ceiling effects prevented them from increasing their war aims, they changed their approach to the war in such a way that winning their war aims seemed easier. Again, the nature of the war and their pursuit of it was changed. Under the influence of frustration, however, when concessions were made they were “minimal” concessions, recognitions of a difficulty reality that nevertheless provided for the continuation of the war. Indeed, the war that was continued was generally the same kind of war. The exception to this rule is Paul Reynaud in May 1940, after the breach at Sedan, from which point it became impossible (in his mind) to demonstrate French power in such a way as to win the war. Nevertheless, he continued fighting for the same things.

Turning to the effects of the abandoned theories of victory, which have different effects on aims changes when reconsiderations are influenced by anxiety, the result are largely supportive of hypothesis 3. There is the caveat, however, that there were no cases in these wars when anxiety brought a brute force theory of victory to an end, so 3.3 is not directly tested. However, it is clear that there were differences. Only when the Finnish leaders believe that their defense line was failing, or when Hirohito no longer believed that the Army could defend Japan, were leaders pursuing an attritive theory of victory willing to make very large concessions in an effort to end their war very quickly. In contrast, both Stalin and Baudouin (et al.) were willing to make very large concessions in an effort to get out of their wars after their informative theory of victory failed. Similarly, many in the Japanese Navy gave up after the
failure of the Midway gambit; those who remained recommitted themselves to the same aims but the much more difficult theory of victory being pursued by the Army. In considering the discussions of the cases themselves, the reasons that these changes were made are congruent with my expectations—the costs of war and leaders’ willingness or lack thereof to try their publics willingness to bear it.

Because they involve changes in policy, changes in war aims necessarily involve an element of politicking. Only in rare cases—like that of Stalin—is one man’s opinion law. Many of the cases presented above involve individual preferences over war aims. Nevertheless, even the decision of a cabinet is the product of individual learning. As decision-group members’ beliefs evolve in response to war-time events, coalitions form, break apart, and coalesce around a new set of policies. Indeed, one of the clear conclusions of this study is that the beliefs that individual war leaders start with reverberate through a conflict, affecting their perception of events, the emotions they experience, and the new policies they support.
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Appendix A: Emotion Theory

My use of emotions and emotion theory follows the general path set, within political science, by George Marcus’s Theory of Affective Intelligence (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Marcus 2002; Marcus 2003), which is a further development of ideas particularly evident in the work of Jeffrey Gray, a neuroscientist (1987, 1990, 1994; see also Carver, Sutton, and Scheier 2000). That said, I have tried to construct my use of emotion theory around effects generally accepted by emotion theorists of many different stripes. This being the case, this appendix is designed to further explicate two things. First, the nature of the effects my theories rely on. Second, I explicate some of the commitments to and against some theories of emotion that my use of these effects implies. I state at the outset that, like the many others who have reached beyond the traditional boundaries of the borrowing discipline that is political science, I come to emotion theory as a student, rather than an expert; and that my employment of emotion theory is by nature as a user of emotion theories, for particular ends, rather than as a theorist of emotions.

Following Marcus’s focus on emotion in the context of public opinion formation, I am most interested in the ways in which emotion lead either to information search and usage or to a lack of interest, even a resistance, to further information. In this sense, I am interested in the possible motivating effects of emotion and affect relative to cognition. Marcus’s account of
emotions, following as it does the work of a neuroscientist, is a biologically rooted account with a strong emphasis on the brain systems that seem to influence cognition as part of a wider emotional response. This is correct in a very important way, because the core of almost any modern theory of emotion is affect, which we can think of as the basic physiological component of the emotional response (Damasio 1994; Elster 1998; Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004; Barrett 2006; Frijda 2007). The physiological aspect of emotions has long been recognized—indeed, changes in overall arousal, muscle tension and facial expression have long been seen as part of emotional response. But relative to our questions, there are two great contributions of the neuroscientific studies of emotion over the past two decades or so, and which Marcus’s work relies upon. The first is the idea and the evidence that brain systems that affect the way people address new information and integrate it with existing memories and beliefs are part of that physiological component of emotional response. The second is the evidence that this physiological component—or at least its most basic components (Barrett 2006)—can be and generally are elicited without conscious awareness or conscious cognition, and sometimes without any cognition at all.

Gray’s approach to emotions is focused on three brain systems that help the individual interact with their environment and promote survival at the most basic, physical level. The first is the Behavioral Approach System, renamed by Marcus and his colleagues the disposition system, which responds to signals of reward or non-punishment, and which seems to stimulate the use of habituated responses to incoming stimuli (Gray 1987, 1990, 1994; Marcus et al. 2000; Marcus 2002, 2003). The second is the Behavioral Inhibition System, renamed the

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963 These stimuli might also be thought of as being “goal congruent.”
surveillance system, which scans the environment for novel, threatening, and punishing data. It is thus activated, then, when goal incongruent data is noticed. When activated, it (among other effects) interrupts conscious thought and other ongoing cognition, causing the individual to focus on these pieces of data, and motivating search for and use of further information in an effort to get a better grasp on the situation (Gray 1987, 1990, 1994; Marcus et al. 2000; Marcus 2002, 2003). Such affective responses are beyond the control of human actors, and cannot be suppressed by conscious intention (LeDoux 1996). Gray’s third system, which I follow Marcus in largely ignoring, is the fear (flight/flight) system, which responds to direct threats to physical integrity—which is generally not encountered in politics, including war leaders (though it is obviously encountered by those lower in the military hierarchy) (Gray 1990, 1994; Marcus et al. 2000). Gray’s division into these systems is perhaps the most prominent division of its kind (CCS 2001), but similar divisions exist, often with only slightly different nomenclatures (Gray 1990, 1994). The felt human emotion anxiety seems to be associated with the Behavioral Inhibition System (disposition system),\(^{964}\) and Gray connects feelings of hope, relief, and joy to the Behavioral Approach System (surveillance system). Based on this, some have associated negative emotions (those associated with punishment) with the Behavioral Inhibition System, and positive emotions with the Behavioral Approach System.\(^{965}\)

\(^{964}\) Note that there is a range of anxiety—extreme state anxiety, particularly as associated with those high in trait anxiety (phobics and other pathologically anxious people) can lead to over-openness and near paralysis, and even give rise to fear responses. This part of the anxiety range is, like the fear system itself, not of interest to me since I do not believe it will be encountered on a systematic basis in war-time leaders. Indeed, even the most famous case of something like this, Stalin’s apparent collapse in response to the German invasion in 1940 (though it may also have been despair or depression, which are responses to different situations) is challenged by some who were close enough to have first-hand knowledge (Sudoplatov et al. 1994).

\(^{965}\) It should be noted that “approach” is an action tendency associated with many emotions (Lazarus 1991; Panksepp 1998; Elster 1998, 1999); Gray is in essence arguing that the affective response associated
Marcus’s principal development of Gray’s framework relates to the placement of responses to familiar punishment, which he terms loathing (Marcus 2002) or aversion (2003: particularly pp. 201-205) and sometimes describes as a variant of anger (2003). Marcus argues that this loathing or anger also promotes a reliance on mental habits and habituated behavior, and so belongs with the disposition system (or one similar to it—see Marcus 2002), rather than in the surveillance system (2002)—which is where the plain text of Gray’s work would suggest it belongs (Gray 1990, 1994). I believe that this development is correct, but I must emphasize that Gray’s work and the work of others using Gray’s work which I have seen provide no direct support for the contention.966

I believe that this development is correct for two reasons. First, Marcus’s (2003) logic is persuasive. If the purpose of the brain systems is to aid organisms in making their way through the world, it is reasonable to believe that when there exist mental habits or routines for dealing with punishers—as we would expect in the case of familiar punishments—those brain systems would tend toward their deployment and the suppression of further information search about the situation. Second, evidence from studies of emotion associated with other schools of with this system evolved out of mechanisms that prepare the body to physically approach good or desired things. This will be an important point latter in this appendix.

966 I also note that Marcus’s terminology further complicates the issue. In at least one presentation, he described the emotion as aversion (Marcus 2002b), but emotion theorists tend to use aversion as a synonym for any potentially punishing circumstance—not to describe a particular emotional or affective response. In describing it, at least initially, as loathing, he seems to be connecting it with disgust, rather than anger. But disgust, though it is very much a response to a familiar punisher, is very clearly described in the literature as relating only to food-type items which are literally indigestible, contaminated, or poisonous (Rozen et al. 2000 (Handbook of Emotions); Lazarus 1991; Frijda 1986, 2007); Tetlock has also used it in the context of acts that would metaphorically contaminate a person (Tetlock 2002, Tetlock et al. 2000), but in doing so he is in fact outside of the mainstream of emotion theory.
emotion theory suggest that this pattern of effects is valid, though their work is not uncontested. 967

Appraisal theory is perhaps the most significant approach to the emotions within the wider psychological tradition of emotion theory. Some neuro-scientific and appraisal approaches to emotion have much in common (Rolls 2005; Barrett 2006); others, like the Damasio’s somatic-marker hypothesis (Damasio 1994), do not. 968 Appraisal theory is based on the theoretical claim that cognition, be it conscious or not, or something very much like cognition, is responsible for eliciting particular types of emotional response (Cacioppo 1999; Frijda 1986, 2007; Lazarus 1991; Roseman and Smith 2001). 969 In a nutshell, a representation of the situation confronted by an individual is scanned for particular features, and those features give rise to the affective and emotional responses to the situation. 970 Much of the work associated with appraisal theory has been to define the situations connected to particular

967 An alternate base of argument could be that if one has a habituated means of dealing with a punisher, it is no longer a punisher—unpleasant, perhaps, but not a punisher. This seems a bit sophistic, however.
968 The basic insight behind the somatic-marker hypothesis is that emotions are stimulated in wholly unconscious ways, and influence cognition through the brain’s conscious perception of the physiological components of emotion. Given that many emotions are dependent on nuanced readings of situations (for instance, the differences between guilt and shame), it seems unlikely to me that the affect system alone is responsible for the elicitation of emotion (see also Cacioppo and Berentson 1999, Cacioppo, Berentson, and Gardner 1999). Indeed, the only sense I can expect this to be the case would be if consciousness is purely an effect, a shadow of more fundamental processes, though this view is not dominant within the literature. Other approaches similar to this—for instance the “mood as information” approach to emotion—fall into the same category.
969 Originally, appraisal theorists were perceived as requiring actual cognition. This gave rise to the Zajonc-Lazarus debate during the 1980’s over the role of automaticity. Current appraisal theorists seem no longer committed to this exclusive position (Roseman and Smith 2001; Scherer 2001; Frijda 2007), however, questions about this have led some from outside of psychology to apparently reject the theory out of hand (Elster 1998).
970 Barrett’s (2006) model is in many respects similar to appraisal theory but is careful to point out that there may be separate patterns of perception and appraisal responsible for emotional states. Her model might be summarized as follows: primitive non-conscious and possibly non-cognitive mechanisms elicit a core affective response (which is generally positive or generally negative), which is then part of a cognitive process which combines perception, categorization, and cognition about both that affective response and the situation the organism finds itself in to produce a more specific emotional response. This second step, cognitive in character, is generally not conscious and has an automatic character.
emotions, and to identify with greater precision the nature of the emotional response to them. These scholars’ investigations of anger lend some support to the effects Marcus claims for anger. Most appraisal theorists argue that anger is associated with high coping potential and control, beliefs suggesting that the stimulus for the anger is something that the actor can effectively respond to (Lazarus 1991; Scherer 2001; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). Others have found that it is related to beliefs about a certainty of the situation and a willingness to take risks (Lerner and Keltner 2001). These characteristics, and others, suggest that it has an appraisal pattern in many respects similar to happiness, despite its negative valence. Similarly, most accord it as giving rise to an approach action tendency (Elster 1998; Lazarus 1991; Frijda 1986)—and notably, others working in other tradition agree with this (see for instance Panksepp 1998; Harmon-Jones and Allen 1998; Harmon-Jones and Sigelman 2001). All of this directly associates it with the disposition (“behavioral approach”) system.

However, according to most appraisal theorists, the elicitation of anger and its main variants also requires a perception that some blameworthy actor is responsible for the experienced punisher (Lazarus 1991; Lerner and Keltner 2000; van Dijk and Zeelenberg 2002; Scherer 2001; Roseman 2004; Clore and Centerbar 2004). This view is not uncontested (Kuppens et al. 2003; Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004), but the breadth of support for the narrower view impels me to explain why, for these specific purposes, I am not including it. My explanation requires a wider discussion, about more general questions of how emotions arise

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971 Additionally, at least some appraisal theorists whose work is still in currency (Smith and Ellsworth 1985, cited as authoritative, for instance, in Lerner and Keltner 2001), disgust, anger, contempt, and frustration are all described in terms that would suggest that they are closely related to something much like the anger or “aversion” described by Marcus (2003).
and are differentiated, and so my defense emerges through a more general statement of the commitments to particular emotion theories that I make and avoid.\textsuperscript{972}

The experience of emotion seems to originate in a basic affective response to a situation, sometimes called “core affect” (Russell 2003). This affective response is physiological in character, and reflects a relatively primitive judgment about whether the situation is rewarding or punishing (Rolls 2005) (or, in other terms, positive or negative; for instance, Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004, Barrett 2006; or, alternatively, goal congruent or incongruent, for instance Frijda 1986, Lazarus 1991). Certain stimuli associated with threat seem to be able to activate this affective response without any kind of cognition\textsuperscript{973} (Ohman and Mineka 2001); however, this phenomena seems limited the visual, aural, or tactile perception of natural kinds of threat (for instance, things with the shape of a snake or loud, sudden noises). Abstract and man-made threats seem to require cognition of some sort, though it may well be non-conscious and occur faster than conscious thought (Batty, Cave, and Pauli 2005).\textsuperscript{974} Because it occurs with this speed and automaticity (Bargh and Chartrand 1999), even if is the result of cognition, and because this affective response is physiological in character, it may well be the case that the body is providing information to the mind about the situation faster than the brain would otherwise be able to access.\textsuperscript{975}

\textsuperscript{972} Thus, as will be seen, my argument about why I do not feel impelled to limit anger to situations with blame is made \textit{a fortiori} through my more general argument about how emotions are elicited.

\textsuperscript{973} I am using cognition here to refer to processing of information as it relates to a particular context.

\textsuperscript{974} Complicating this are experiments that show amygdala responses to facial expressions being affected by a linguistic context given subjects in advance (for a discussion of this and related issues, see Phelps (2006)). It remains an area of emerging research.

\textsuperscript{975} This is how I interpret the data supporting the “somatic marker” hypothesis (Damasio 1994) and other “mood as information” effects (for an example in political science, see Rahn 2000); while I agree that they exist, my reading of the literature suggests that cognition has a role in producing most emotions, rather
This basic affective response seems trigger cognitive judgments about the situation, which further shape the response, and which again occur non-consciously, automatically, and at great speed. When perception of the situation itself requires reference to goals, representations of the situation, etc., it seems likely that the process will occur as a single, fully automatic and nonconscious (again, see Bargh and Chartrand 1999), step. Nevertheless, it is a process—one which I argue starts with a recognition of the principal stimuli that give rise to the sensation of punishment or reward (or the expectation thereof), and then attempts to relate that stimulus to the situation through reference to mind’s representations of the situation. As this process of comparing the situation to the minds’ existing range of explanations for the situation proceeds (which involves activating the full set of schema, memories, and situational expectations associated with the range of stimuli then being encountered), brain systems determine whether the situation is explicable and resolvable in terms of these existing mental patterns and habits, or not.

976 This differentiation into two steps is not generally part of the literature, though it is evident in Barrett (2006), who argues that there is evidence that initial positive and negative affective responses are not as differentiated as is sometimes claimed. My sense of the process is this: when the process is started through a cognitive appraisal of a situation, the initial affective response and the further judgments about the situation may be essentially one process, but when affect is elicited in wholly non-cognitive ways, the activation of these cognitive components, which further develop the nature of the situation, are a discernibly different step, likely one using a different set of brain systems. Notably, the issue is probably academic for my purposes: either way, the process is extremely fast and likely non-conscious.

977 The idea that appraisal is a process rather than a single instantaneous event is evident in Scherer’s Sequential Check Theory of appraisal (see for instance Scherer 2001), but Scherer’s description of the process may be overly rigid.

978 An important consideration in this context, it seems to me, is the appraisal of whether or not the situation is concluded or involves room for further action. Many emotions—for instance sadness, shame, and disappointment—seem to be exclusively associated with responses to situations that are closed, and are really directed toward motivating future actions, be they proximate to the situation or not. These emotions, while important for other things, do not seem relevant for my questions.
If these brain systems determine that the process is resolvable in terms of these habituated patterns of thought and action routines, the brain’s behavioral approach (disposition) system is activated (Gray 1994: 246). This activation then produces the range of feelings and effects associated with positive emotions like happiness, joy, elation, hope, and enthusiasm and, critically for this work, the negative emotion anger (and its variants). Critical to eliciting both of these kinds of emotions is the sense that one is encountering familiar situations—in the case of joy and happiness, familiar situations which will bring reward, and in the case of anger, familiar punishers. While the feelings are a crucial part of how we experience emotions, the other effects of these emotions are more important for this research. Among these effects are the activation into conscious thought—if needed—of the relevant mental habits so that resources associated with conscious cognition can be brought to bear on the providing the resources for bringing about the routines expected to resolve the problem. Alongside that activation of existing habits of mind, stereotypes, and schemas, the BAS seems to suppress interest in further information (Marcus 2003). Social psychologists investigating the effects of anger have recognized equivalent effects, like tendencies to overlook mitigating details before attributing blame, tendencies to perceive ambiguous behavior as hostile, tendencies to draw mistaken conclusions about causes, to rely on simple heuristics and stereotypes rather than more effortful cues, make pessimistic risk assessments, (Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1998; Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock 1998; Lerner and Keltner 2001). All of these are consistent with a closure to further information about the situation, which is in line with the predictions made by Marcus, on the basis of Gray’s work.979

979 Because the differences between these negative emotional states are most crucial to my questions, I am not addressing in detail the emotions of joy, happiness, enthusiasm, etc. Suffice to say that there is
If, on the other hand, the brain systems are unable to match the characteristics of the situation to mental habits, the Behavioral Inhibition (surveillance) System is activated (Gray 1994). 980 This activation produces the feelings of anxiety, 981 interrupts other cognitive processes (alerting the mind to the problem), facilitates greater attention to the situation, information gathering and usage, and perhaps even a discarding of old theories of the situation. In sum, then, low to moderate anxiety is a signal that the situation is not well, and helps individuals come to better understand their situation by motivating better learning. 982 Although there is some—largely older—literature that disagrees with this largely positive assessment of anxiety, there is also substantial evidence for these positive effects. This is evident in Craig and Smith’s appraisal work, which suggests that “fear,” though high in uncertainty, is less associated with high attention and interest than “frustration” and has about the same attentive level as anger (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). 983

Much other neuroscientific evidence corroborates this account of state anxiety. For instance, Whalen (2006) finds that presentation with fearful faces stimulates the amgdala to increase vigilance, whereas presentation with angry faces does not, despite the fact that both

general agreement about definition and the effects of the positive or goal-congruent emotions. 980 Although working in a different theoretical tradition, Frijda largely agrees (Frijda 2007: 103, 108).
981 The nomenclature here can sometimes be confusing. Extreme anxiety can feel like fear, and vice versa. For this reason, in the literature, fear is sometimes used to describe the affective and emotional response I am associating with anxiety, and phobics are often described as being “anxious.” For clarity’s sake, I define fear as the affective response associated with fright or flight, and anxiety as the affective/emotional state associated with unfamiliarity and possible threat. Note that my interest applies solely to state anxiety, rather than trait anxiety.
982 Anxiety may provide a negative bias on events, however, by emphasizing a search for threat or problems (Frijda 2007: 98)
983 Methodologically, their study consisted mainly of a questionnaire about remembered emotional experiences, the responses of which were then subjected to dimensional analysis. Several authors have noted that while there is value to these approaches, there are also problems associated with these kinds of analyses, rooted in the interpretation of the felt state by the subject. In this case, some subjects may have recalled experiences of fear (flight/fight) and others experiences of anxiety, for instance.
presentations can be taken as indications of threat. Whalen concludes that the root of the
difference is that the presentation of angry faces provides much more information about the
situation, since an angry face is a clear and familiar sign of threat, but that the presentation with
a fearful face is an ambiguous and uncertain indication of threat. The ambiguity of the situation
thus gives rise to a need to investigate further; attached to increased vigilance is the sensation
of state anxiety. Similarly, Shackman et al. (2006) find that state anxiety produced by an
unrelated threatening event robs ongoing working memory to devote resources to the stimuli
producing the anxiety. They note that this fits into the wider argument that moderate anxiety
can improve information search, usage, and more generally, decision-making.

Appraisal theorists only partially agree with this assessment of anxiety. Many find that
anxiety is the result of appraisals of threats and uncertainty (or a combination thereof) (Frijda
1986; Lazarus 1991). They tend to associate it with the effects predicted by the neuroscientists.
Others describe it in terms of uncertainty about impending, personally relevant goals with a low
or medium ability to affect that outcome, and perhaps only and intermediate level of urgency
(Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Raghunathan and Pham 1999; Scherer 2001). In terms of effects,
some find it associated with low-risk, low reward preferences, and others have associated it
with poor performance in cognitive tasks. This is generally, in line with the Janis and Mann
tradition (1977), brought to political science by Lebow (1981).984

These discrepancies in the reported appraisal patterns of anxiety and the effects
anticipated by it may be explicable in terms of ambiguity about what is actually meant by
anxiety. The anxiety I am most interested in, and that which is well supported in the
neuroscience literature (and, to a lesser extent, in the appraisal literature) can be described as

“anxious arousal,” as opposed to “anxious apprehension” or worry. Shackman et al. (2006: 54) offer these differences as an explanation for the different effects of anxiety observed across several studies. Anxious apprehension, or worry, is generally characterized by a higher cognitive load as individuals run through the many possible situations or outcomes the face, harming processing and usage, whereas this is not the case with anxious arousal. Significantly, the appraisal theorist who most overtly conflates worry with anxiety (Scherer 2001) identifies it as being less novel and less immediately threatening as other appraisal theorists and the other neuroscientists. Of particular importance for analyzing these discrepant studies, Schackman et al. (2006) note that many of the materials designed to induce anxiety are biased toward the production of anxious apprehension more than anxious arousal.

Ultimately, then, the effects which I rely on in my model of learning in war, though based on Marcus’s Theory of Affective Intelligence, seem widely supported by multiple literatures, using a wide variety of methodologies and theoretical approaches.